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Full text of "Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first[-second] session .."

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE INTERNAL SECUKITY ACT AND OTHER 

INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OP THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGKESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



PART 6 



JANUARY 24, 25, 26, AND 30, 1952 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




Orcein Eacir 
DEC^' 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
22848 WASHINGTON : 1952 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 

HARLEY M. KILGORB, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

J. G. Sourwine, Counsel 



Internal Security Subcommittee 

PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER. Indiana 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 



Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

Robert Morris, Special Counsel 
Benjamin Maxdel, Director of Research 

II 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — Pag» 

Vincent, John Carter 1683-1996 

For appendix I see part 7, page 2286. 

in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS 



Resolution 



Whereas testimony of John Carter Vincent was received in executive sessions 
of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on 
each of 3 days, January 24, 25, and 26, 1952 ; after which Mr. Vincent testified 
in public session on 4 days, January 30, 31, and February 1 and 2, 1952 ; and 

Whereas repetition in public session of all of the testimony given in executive 
session was deemed undesirable, from the standpoint of efficiency and economy ; 
and, therefore, substantial areas of the testimony given in executive session 
were not again traversed in the public sessions which followed ; and 

Whereas before the decision was made not to repeat all of the executive 
testimony at the public sessions, the question of making the executive testimony 
public was discussed with the witness and his counsel ; and 

Whereas the witness, John Carter Vincent, and his counsel after having 
opportunity to read the record of the aforesaid 3 days of executive sessions, 
stated on the record, during one of the subsequent public sessions, that they 
had no objection to the public disclosure of the testimony taken in executive 
session ; and 

Whereas the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary 
deems the release of such executive testimony to be in the public interest : 
Therefore be it 

Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, That the testimony of John Carter Vincent taken at the executive 
sessions of the subcommittee on January 24, 25, and 26, 1952, be released from 
the injunction of executive secrecy, and be printed and made public together 
with the public hearings held on January 30 and 31 and February 1 and 2, 
1952. 

Pat McCarran. 
James O. Eastland. 
Herbert R. O'Conor. 
Willis Smith. 
Homer Ferguson. 
W. E. Jenner. 
Arthur V. Watkins. 



THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 
of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws or the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

EXECUTIVE session CONFIDENTIAL 

The subcommittee met, at 10 : 30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman of the com- 
mittee), presiding. 

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, and Ferguson. 

1683 



1684 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Present also: Senators Magnuson and Hendrickson; J. G. Sour- 
wine, counsel; Kobert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin 
Mandel, research director. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent is the witness, Senator. 

The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand ? 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give be- 
fore the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY 
WAITER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL 

The Chairman. Will you please proceed, Mr. Sourwine ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, newspaper stories which preceded your 
return to this country indicated, quoting friends of yours, that your 
primary desire when you got back here was a full hearing which would 
give you an opportunity to clear your name in the public eye. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you appear here today because you want to be 
here and you want to testify and cooperate with the committee? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. I have confirmed that in letters to the com- 
mittee, I think. 

Mr. Sourwine. The committee will shortly give you an opportunity 
to make such statement as you want to volunteer. I would like to ask 
at the outset, so that the record may show : when you were subpenaed 
to this hearing, were you requested to bring certain documents ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have those documents with you? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You referred the letter of request to the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have here a letter from the State Department of 
which a copy has been sent to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have a copy, yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, it is respectfully suggested that 
for the purpose of saving time today the traverse of this State De- 
partment letter be saved and we will put the letter into the record 
of the public hearing and then go into detail as to the documents. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine. The gist of the letter is that the State Department 
has already furnished documents such as press releases and has de- 
clined to provide the others on the ground that to do so would inhibit 
free and frank expressions by Foreign Service officers. 

Mr. Vincent. May I say that I do have copies of those documents 
which the State Department sent. They had an extra copy made 
for me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have, sir, any of the documents which the 
State Department did not include? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1685 

Mr. Sourwine. They mention several which they say their files do 
not contain. Do you have any of those? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What is it that the State Department says, you 
mentioned there once, as to letters that they are not sending on here ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I will read an excerpt from the State Department's 
letter, sir : 

With respect to the remainder of the requests it is noted that they call for a 
large number of internal documents of the Department of State. In many cases 
these are reports from the field. It is the view of the Department that pre- 
serving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter of 
principle of the highest importance. It is equally important to protect the 
integrity of the internal memoranda in which views are exchanged in the forma- 
tion of policy. The release of* these documents would undoubtedly inhibit the 
free and frank expression of views by the officers of the Department. For 
these reasons, the request for these internal papers presents such serious ques- 
tions of policy and principle that it has been felt necessary to refer the matter 
to the White House for reply. 

Your request for the loyalty file on Mr. Vincent has also been referred to the 
White House as required by the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the White House refuse ? 

Mr. Sourwine. We have no word from the White House. This 
letter is dated January 22 and was delivered this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether the State 
Department also has ever considered the fact that, if these are held 
forever secret, you lose something, in that a man can falsely report 
and he is never called to task for it. It appears to me that that is a 
big thing in this question of reports. 

The Chairman. I think right off the bat it puts this witness in 
a light that perhaps he should not be in, because it can be assumed 
that there is something there which may not be there at all, that they 
do not want to disclose with reference to this witness. 

To my way of thinking that is a very unfortunate situation. What 
is more, their excuse for not giving us that seems to me the most 
flimsy in the world. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understand, the witness has not claimed 
that these ought to be secret? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not. 

Mr. Sourwine. I might say, on the contrary, it is the State De- 
partment's statement, in the letter, that Mr. Vincent has requested 
the Department to cooperate in making the documents available. 

Senator Ferguson. So he wants these delivered ? 

Mr. Sourwine. The situation was that the committee wrote separate 
letters to Mr. Vincent and to the State Department asking for the 
documents in each of these 32 categories. Mr. Vincent referred his 
letter to the State Department. 

The Chairman. That is a matter we will have to deal with at a 
later time. I think the State Department has forgotten the principal 
point of this matter, that national defense, the internal security of 
this country, means more than anything internal in the State De- 
partment. If this country is to be protected and secured internally 
everything in every Department should be made available if necessary 
so that security may be obtained. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you feel now, Mr. Vincent, because of the 
writing of this letter that you cannot disclose to this committee the 



1686 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

contents of reports and so forth that you may have made to the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as my memory would enable me to recall 
actions of mine, but I do not think I could disclose the contents of 
reports, sir, as an employee of the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. It leaves you in the position that you really 
cannot testify on these matters ? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar as it is necessary to have those documents; 
no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I know, but the contents of the documents ? 

Mr. Vincent. I see what you mean. 

Mr. Sourwine. There are four documents mentioned here which 
the Department says do not appear in its' records, thereby implying 
that they are personal to Mr. Vincent. I would like to ask about those 
four. One is referred to as a statement criticizing the statement of 
six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding So- 
viet intentions in the Far East. Do you recall such a statement, Mr. 
Vincent ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. I went over that and we looked over 
the statement of the six members but we found nothing. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never made a statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never made a statement to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. The text of a speech made at a conference of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations at Hot Springs, Va. ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of making a speech there. I 
took part in panel discussions but nothing in the way of a formal 
speech. 

Mr. Sourwine. There is nothing in your files such as a copy of a 
speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. A statement of November 4, 1946, concerning Gen- 
eral MacArthur. Did you make a statement on or about that date ? 

Mr. Vincent. What date ? 

Mr. Sourwine. November 4, 1946. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of making such a statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. The text of an address delivered by you at Cornell 
University, January 21, 1947? 

Mr. Vincent. That was made from notes, Mr. Sourwine, and I may 
say that it followed very closely a speech that I had made at Wellesly 
College which has been published in a little book by Rutgers Press, 
but the other speech made at Cornell was made from notes which I 
do not have but which may be in Tangiers. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that speech reported ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; it was not reported to the press. It was a 
closed — not a closed — but not a meeting for the public. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I am jumping toward a conclusion 
for the purpose of saving time. Are you in your own opinion an 
expert on the Far East and far eastern affairs? 

Mr. Vincent. I should say, I am. 

Mr. Sourwine. You spent a substantial part 

Mr. Vincent. As regards different areas, my primary activity has 
been as you know China. 

Mr. Sourwine. You spent a good deal of your life in China and in 
dealing with Far Eastern affairs? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1687 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. For the purposes of this hearing is the committee 
satisfied with that brief qualification of Mr. Vincent ? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Mr. Vincent, I think it might be appropriate at this 
time to let you make any voluntary statement that you came here to 
make. 

Mr. Vincent. Thank you, sir. I would like to read this statement, 
Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How long is it, Mr. Vincent ? 

Mr. Vincent. It will take me exactly 5 minutes, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. I thought if it were long we could get copies. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I have no extra copies of it except 
for this one. May I proceed ? 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee : 

I have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. 
First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave 
allegations made against me before this committee : and secondly, to 
give the committee whatever assistance I may in the conduct of its 
investigation. 

On August 23, 1951, before this subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked a 
witness, Louis Budenz, the following question : 

Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Budenz replied : 

From official reports I have received, he was. 

Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or 
describe the "official reports" to which he referred. 
Later Mr. Morris again inquired : 

Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret 
shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the 
Communist Party? 

"Yes, sir," replied Mr. Budenz. 

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with 
the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it." When ques- 
tioned as to his source, he answered : 

That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. 
Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel. 

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to 
recall that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings committee that 
he knew of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either 
directly or indirectly. 

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before the subcom- 
mittee. 

Mr. Morris asked : 

Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the 
Communist Party before this committee? 

Mr. Budenz replied: 

Yes, sir, from official communications. 



1688 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Later, during this same hearing, Mr. Morris said that — 

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a naval intelligence officer, the fact that John 
Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on 
that fact. 

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this subcom- 
mittee or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of 
the Communist Party is bearing false witness ; he is, to put it bluntly, 
lying. I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In 
my own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has en- 
deavored before this subcommittee to support his allegations by 
strained suggestions and devious insinuation. 

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am not a Com- 
munist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. I 
have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the con- 
trary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my foreign 
service career in the interest of our own Government and people. I 
am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy 
and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the mem- 
bers of the committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it is 
for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic in- 
stitutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or any- 
one else. 

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a "mistake." Any at- 
tempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to 
lose confidence in their officials, or in each other, is in itself subversive 
to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, 
the official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly 
harmful. 

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The 
internal security of the United States, now probably more than ever 
before in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our American 
way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. But we 
cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, on November 9, defend demo- 
cracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish to 
state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely accused, 
but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and security of 
his country, that irresponsible testimony such as Mr. Budenz is 
wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state but has no place 
in our American democracy. 

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are 
equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared 
before your committee and made statements concerning me which are 
factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning 
the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most in- 
accurate ; in fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges that 
I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship of the 
committee dealing with the problem, or by Governmental agencies 
in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cook's testimony about 
my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the Na- 
tionalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you that 
I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and discuss 
any other issues which this committee may wish to consider. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1689 

But, gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking an opportunity to come 
before you has been accomplished. At the subcommittee hearings of 
October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying : 

Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say "I 
am not a Communist." That draws the issue. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I now solemnly re- 
peat : I am not and never have been a member of the Communist Party. 
I so draw the issue. 

The Chairman. Let me say to you, Mr. Vincent, that it is not alone 
membership in the Communist Party that constitutes a threat to the 
internal security of this country ; it is sympathy with the Communist 
movement that raises one of the gravest threats that we have. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I think I said in here that I had no 
sympathy with the aims of the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, that raises a question, if I might 
ask. ( Membership in the Communist Party is pretty difficult to de- 
termine, is it not ? You have had experience with Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would not say that I had enough exper- 
ience with the Communist Party to know whether membership is dif- 
ficult or not to determine. 

Senator Ferguson. To prove ? 

Mr. Vincent. To prove whether one is or is not. I suppose one 
could prove very easily that one was a member of the Communist 
Party. 

Senator Ferguson. You think it is easy for a person to prove 

Mr. Vincent. One could prove it I suppose by producing a Com- 
munist Party card. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you not realize that many members do 
not carry a card, never have a card ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not true ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is true as far as I know. 

Senator Ferguson. You are now saying in this testimony that you 
are not a card-carrying member and you have never been a member 
in any form, directly or indirectly, is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct, sir, and that I have had no sym- 
pathy with the aims of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, as an expert on the Far East do you 
recognize that communism is one of the maior problems in the Far 
East? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly do, Mr. Sourwine, and have recognized 
it for some time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever seen or read the Communist Mani- 
festo, by Marx and Engels ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have seen it but have not read it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever seen or read State and Eevolution, 
by Lenin ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever seen or read Left-Wing Commu- 
nism : An Infantile Disorder, by Lenin ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not. 



1690 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know about it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't ever heard of that last one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see or read Foundations of Leninism, 
by Stalin? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall having heard of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see or read Problems of Leninism, 
by Stalin ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see or read History of the Commu- 
nist Party of the Soviet Union, authorized by the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see or read Program of the Commu- 
nist International and Its Constitution, third American edition? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Any edition ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see or read The Revolutionary Move- 
ment in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, a resolution of the Sixth 
World Congress of the Comintern ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, I haven't. My reading of Communist docu- 
ments has not been broad. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you be able to characterize those docu- 
ments as a group at all ? Do you know what they represent ? 

Mr. Vincent. I should say from the titles, and I can only speak 
from the titles, that they represented the Communist point of view 
on various and sundry subjects, as you mentioned. 

Mr. Sourwine. That would be all you know about them ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be all I know about them and I would 
gather that from the titles. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I have here a list of names of a 
number of individuals. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I want to simplify the questioning. The first 
question we want to ask is, Did you or do you know the individual 
named ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Second, Did you know, under any other name, an 
individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Third, if so, what were your associations with the 
individual ? Fourth, did you know at any time that the individual 
was connected with the Communist movement? If so, in what way, 
to your knowledge, was the individual connected with the Communist 
movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You understand that is the information we want 
about each one of these persons ? 

Mr. Vincent. And you will ask the questions? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1691 

Mr. Sourwine. If agreeable with you I will simply read the names 
and it is intended to cover the first two questions : Did you or do you 
know the individual named ? Did you know, under any other name, 
an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person 
referred to? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you say "No" when I read the name you are 
answering "No" to both the questions ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you say "Yes" we will go into it. A "No" an- 
swer is a denial that you ever knew the individual or that you ever 
knew an individual whom you now believe to be the person referred 
to. 

Solomon Adler ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What .were your associations with Mr. Adler? 

Mr. Vincent. I have a piece here on Solomon Adler because I 
anticipated that, if you let me. I don't like to be inaccurate as to 
dates because there are many people. 

The Chairman. What are you reading from ? 

Mr. Vincent. These are notes, Mr. Chairman, that I made in 
anticipation because I haven't too good a memory for dates and 
people that I have known in the dim, distant past. 

The Chairman. Are those notes made by yourself ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Were they all made by you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. I had assistance in getting the facts to- 
gether. 

The Chairman. You had assistance in getting the facts together? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, from Mr. Surrey. 

The Chairman. Who gave you that assistance ? 

Mr. Vincent. People in the State Department who would look up 
and find out as to when and where I had met somebody if I did not 
recall the circumstances. You see, many of these concern places and 
people whose service has not exactly coincided with mine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you now here testifying as to Mr. Adler and 
the others on the basis of your own recollection, as refreshed ? 

Mr. Vincent. As refreshed. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are not simply telling the committee this is 
what somebody in the State Department says is the facts? 

Mr. Vincent: No (reading) : I first met Mr. Adler in Chungking 
and that was in 1942, early 1942. It may have been late 1941. He 
came out as an assistant to Dr. Manuel Fox, who died some months 
later, in the matter of administering our interest in the Chinese cur- 
rency stabilization loan, I think, of about half a billion dollars. 

The Chairman. Under what department or authority did he come 
out? 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : He came out under the authority of the 
Treasury Department, Mr. Chairman. I at that time was counselor of 
our Embassy in Chungking. In the course of the natural business be- 
tween the Embassy and these people with the Treasury Department 
I did see Mr. Adler from time to time during that year and a half. 

I was transferred back to Washington and did not see Mr. Adler 



1692 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

again until sometime in 1945. I think he made a trip home. I saw 
him once or twice then on business connected with China. 

Mr. Sourwine. In 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1945 or 1946, 1 wouldn't be sure (reading) : He at 
that time had become Treasury attache. I then went to Bern as Min- 
ister. I did not see Mr. Adler again and have not seen him since that 
time. At Bern I remember receiving a letter from him in which, and I 
do not recall the exact contents, he asked me to give some estimate of his 
work at Chungking when he was associated there with me. 

I did and replied that he had been, as far as I knew, a conscientious 
and hard-working Government employee and that I had no reason 
whatsoever to question his loyalty. I assumed from the character of 
his request that at that time, although I cannot testify to this, he was 
being examined by the Treasury Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. And that was when ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was in either late 1948 or early 1949. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Mr. Adler is now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. I have heard from someone that he is 
teaching school somewhere, but I do not know. 

Mr. Sourwine. In the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I do not know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall who introduced you to Mr. Adler? 

Mr. Vincent. I should say that Dr. Manuel Fox introduced him be- 
cause he came after Fox. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever heard of him before that? 

Mr. Vincent. I had not. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have told the committee your full associations 
with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time that Mr. Adler was con- 
nected with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have reason to believe that he was? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you now know or have any reason to believe that 
he is or ever was in the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

The Chairman. Mr. Adler in Bern asked you to make some kind of 
a statement as to his loyalty ; is that true ? 

Mr. Vincent. As to his work at Chungking. 

The Chairman. And at that time did he give you a reason for his 
request or why he was seeking such a statement from you ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did, sir. He indicated that the Treasury Depart- 
ment wanted a statement from me on his work because he was — here I 
must testify completely from memory — that investigation was being 
made into his work while he was in Chungking. 
Senator Ferguson. Loyalty ? Work ? 

Mr. Vincent. His work. I would not say the letter said "loyalty" ; 
but I do not deny it might have. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, you were familiar with the loyalty 
program ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not at that time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I heard of it but had no familiarity. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1693 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that different departments were 
making inquiry about the loyalty of their members ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. This indicated to you then that this was a loy- 
alty investigation? 

Mr. Vincent. It indicated to me that there might have been a loy- 
alty investigation into Mr. Adler, but my testimony on him was solely 
as to his work and my estimate of his work in Chungking. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not put in the reply that you believed 
him to be loyal ? Did you not cover the question of loyalty ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would have to have a copy of the letter 
which I don't have to be able to answer that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think they would have been able to 
judge his work on other questions? They would have been able to 
determine what he had accomplished and so forth as far as being a 
representative of the Treasury ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I will say this : That I would have, and may 
have been perfectly free to say that I had no reason while Mr. Adler 
was working in Chungking to question his loyalty. 

The Chairman. Right there, Senator, may I interrupt you ? I am 
called away and I believe we might suspend for a few minutes. 

Senator Ferguson. Let the record show that the committee will 
recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to recon- 
vene at 3 p. m. of the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Senator Smith. We will come to order. 
Mr. Sourwine? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY 
WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, we were discussing various names. I 
assume that the witness does remember the questions but it has been 
some time ; this is an unusually long recess. The mention of the name 
is intended to ask these two questions : Did you or do you know the 
individual named and did you know under any other name an indi- 
vidual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to ? 

I believe we had completed the discussion of Mr. Solomon Adler? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Robert W. Barnett ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. What were your associations with Mr. Barnett? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my recollection (reading) : Mr. Bar- 
nett came to China, Chungking, in 1942 with the OSS I believe on a 
very short mission. It's the first time I ever saw Bob Barnett. Then 
later, back in the Department of State after the war was over he came 
into the State Department to do some kind of economic work. He was 
never to my knowledge — I was in the Far Eastern Division and my 
associations with him were not close, primarily because our jobs were 
of a different character. He was an economist and still is in the 
State Department. 



1694 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I saw him here some days ago in the State Department, but as I say 
he was a man that I met casually from time to time and may have been 
on committees where I served, but I didn't know him very well ever. 

Mr. Sourwine. He is not a social acquaintance of yours? 

Mr. Vincent. Never. I don't know his wife, I don't think. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time that Mr. Barnett was 
connected with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did I ask you that question with regard to Mr. 
Adler? 

Mr. Vincent. You did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you at any time know that Mr. Adler was 
connected with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Joseph Barnes. 

Mr. Morris. When did you first hear Mr. Adler's name connected 
with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never have heard his name connected with the 
Communist Party, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. You are not acquainted with the testimony taken by 
this committee? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I am not. 

Senator Smith. Where is Mr. Barnett ? Is he here now ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. Was not his father a missionary to China? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he was. Most of those boys were sons of 
missionaries to China. 

Senator Smith. I used to know his father years ago. 

Mr. Vincent. It is surprising how many of them are sons of mis- 
sionaries and some day somebody can write a book on the influence of 
the sons of missionaries in the Far East. 

Senator Smith. This is a man who used to go to student conven- 
tions down in South Carolina during the summer \ 

Mr. Sourwine. Joseph Barnes ? 

Mr. Vincent. Joseph Barnes. Let me see. I have never had much 
association with Mr. Barnes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I know him. I just want to see the dates. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who is Mr. Barnes? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Barnes, when I knew him, was a newspaperman. 
Yes; here I have a note jotted down (reading) : I met Mr. Barnes 
first in 1942 when he came to China with Wendell Willkie. Subse- 
quently on my return to Washington I probably saw Mr. Barnes once 
or twice. I met him socially in New York, I think, on one occasion. 
I have forgotten what the occasion was. 

I have never met Mrs. Barnes, and we were not close associates. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was the last time you saw him, do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent. The last time I saw him, my guess would be, was in 
1946, but it might turn out to be 1947. It was at some time when I 
was in New York making a speech and there was a dinner afterward 
and he was present after the dinner. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever been in his home ? 

Mr. Vincent. Never. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is he married ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1695 

Mr. Vincent. I am told lie was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. Adler is married ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Adler is married, or was married the last time 
I met him, because he told me he had a new wife. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever met his wife ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; but I think I met her when he came back here. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was the last time he visited Washington ? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection would be that he was here some 
time before I departed for China and after the war closed, which 
would be in 1946, more likely than not, if that is when he married. 
I don't know when he married, but at the time I learned he was married 
was the last time. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was the occasion when he told you he had a 
new wife? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I think I either had lunch with him or saw 
him at the Cosmos Club, because I have a recollection of seeing his 
wife and was introduced to her as the new wife. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember who else was present on that 
occasion? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say offhand that it was just the three of us, 
although my wife may have been present. It was one of these down- 
town lunches. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give the party or did he? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I did. I think I did because I don't think 
he is a member of the Cosmos Club. I may have told him to meet 
me at the Cosmos Club. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is Mr. Barnett married ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he is, but I don't know his wife, at least I 
don't recall his wife, although I may have met her. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, when you said you met Mr. Barnes at a 
dinner in New York, under what auspices was that? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. I think he came in after dinner 
some time. 

Mr. Morris. You said you were the speaker ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, no, it was at a time when I was in New York 
making a speech and stayed on in New York. I was never given 
a dinner. 

Mr. Morris. Where was the speech given? 

Mr. Vincent. It may have been my speech before the National 
Trade Council or it may have been the speech I made before the for- 
eign affairs group. 

Mr. Sourwine. The Foreign Policy Association? 

Mr. Vincent. I made one. I was up there three or four times 
during the year. If I could recall I would tell you which one. I 
didn't usually go ; up to New York except to go up there to make a 
speech. I couldn't afford going up there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have any correspondence with Mr. 
Barnes ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time that Mr. Barnes was 
connected with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

22S48— 52— pt. 6 2 



1696 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Dr. Norman Bethune, B-e-t-h- 
u-n-e. 

Mr. Vincent. I can't, Mr. Sourwine, recall knowing Mr. Bethune, 
yet the name rings a mild bell somewhere. If you could possibly aid 
my memory in what connection I may have known him I might be 
able to contribute something. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry, I could not, naturally, make a sug- 
gestion in that regard. 

Mr. Vincent. Then my testimony is that I don't recall Mr. Bethune 
and yet there were so many people in and out of Chungking and in 
and out of my office that Bethune was somebody that I might have 
known. 

Mr. Mandel. Could I refresh your memory? 

Mr. Vincent. You could. 

Mr. Mandel. He was the head of a hospital in China. He is en- 
gaged in medical relief in China. 

Mr. Vincent. Chong Chow ? There was a hospital that I was in 
myself in 1937. In Peking? There was the Peking Medical Society 
Hospital, a Rockefeller hospital, but I don't recall any association 
with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is T. A. Bisson, B-i-s-s-o-n. 

Mr. Vincent. I have a note here on Bisson, I think, if I may refer 
to it as to when I met him. The note here, well, could I say I have 
a recollection of meeting Bisson on several occasions? The one that 
is the most prominent in my memory, the others have faded away, 
is the IPR conference in Hot Springs in 1945. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was Mr. Bisson ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Bisson at that time was connected with the IPR 
in some capacity and wrote for the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. What has been your association with Mr. Bisson? 

Mr. Vincent. Very slight indeed, as I have put here. As I say 
(reading) : I may have met him on half a dozen occasions. These peo- 
ple came into the office on one matter or another. I don't know a Mrs. 
Bisson, I don't know where he lives. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you say you don't know Mrs. Bisson or a 
Mrs. Bisson? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know a Mrs. Bisson. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is he married? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you corresponded with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. At any time? 

Mr. Vincent. There may have been an exchange of letters during 
1944 or 1945 during that period when I was connected with the IPR, 
but as I say I don't recall any correspondence or the nature of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you have not corresponded with him at any 
other time ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. He may have written me a letter while I was in 
China and I didn't know him. He may have written while I was 
consul in Dairen. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you know him? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't say that I did. But people would write 
you letters wanting to know what is going on in Mukden or Dairen. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1697 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where you met Mr. Bisson, first met 
him? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't. 

Mr. Souravine. I take it you don't recall how you met him?_ 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Bisson didn't make much of an impression on 
me, but I do know he was at the Hot Springs conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that the last time you saw him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to testify that was the last time, that 
was the last time according to my recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not make any appointment with him for 
a meeting at any subsequent time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. I never sought him out. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you met he sought you out ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my testimony based on my recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or a chance meeting? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Earl Browder? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never met to my knowledge Earl Browder. 

Mr. Sourwine. I forgot to ask the standard question, sir, with re- 
gard to Mr. Bisson. Did you know at any time that Mr. Bisson was 
connected with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Evans F. Carlson, C-a-r-1-s-o-n. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever meeting Evans Carlson at all. I 
have heard of him and understand he wrote a book, which I never read, 
but I never met him to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. We come now to the first of what will, before we 
are through, be many Chinese names. I do not speak the language, 
and I must apologize for what will undoubtedly be improper pro- 
nunciation in many cases. 

Mr. Vincent. May I apologize, too, that there are going to be many 
of these names that will be Chus or Yus or Yings and Yangs who just 
not through a lack of desire to be helpful but that I won't be able to 
place unless you can place them for me. 

Mr. Sourwine. The first name I have here is with my inadequate 
pronunciation, I will spell it — C-h-e-n H-a-n-s-e-n-g. 

Mr. Vincent. Chen Han-seng. I don't recall meeting Chen Han- 
seng. I knew him by repute in China, a professor there, but I don't 
recall my meeting with him. I want to continue that testimony. You 
meet many Chinese and I want to be quite frank with you that Chen 
Han-seng may have been in a meeting at Chungking or when I was 
in Kunming or he may have come here to the State Department with 
other Chinese but I don't recall meeting him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he was a professor ? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought he was down in Kunming. 

Mr. Sourwine. About what time was that? 

Mr. Vincent. It would be the time when I was in China, which 
would be the last time, 1941 to 1943. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about the present connec- 
tions of Chen Han-seng? 
Mr. Vincent. I do not. 



1698 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time that he was connected 
with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name I have here is Ch'ao Ting Chi, 
C-h-'-a-o T-i-n-g C-h-i. Or perhaps the Chi should come first ? 

Mr. Vincent. Chi. I have met Chi (reading) : I met him in Chung- 
king when he was acting as assistant to Dr. H. H. Kung, K-u-n-g, when 
he was assistant to Dr. Kung and also was connected with the Stabiliza- 
tion Board. I saw him from time to time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you met him before that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall who introduced you to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. My thought would be that the logical person would 
have been either Dr. Kung or Manuel Fox, who was head of the 
Stabilization Board. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether it was the logical per- 
son who did introduce you ? 

Mr. ^incent. I do not remember whether it was the logical person. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know, in other words, who did introduce 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I met him frequently on social occasions in the 
house of General Chiang Kai-shek because he was also a man who was 
there at any social functions. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you meet him socially elsewhere? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. Probably in Chinese homes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you yourself have any personal social inter- 
course with him? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he in your home or you in his ? 

Mr. Vincent. He may have been in Dr. Gauss' home. We invited 
Chinese over to have lunch once a week and he may have been one of 
them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any correspondence with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any correspondence with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall when or approximately when is the 
last time you saw him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that I haven't seen him since I left 
China, but if he came to the States and was around at large func- 
tions such as they have in New York, Dr. Chi may have been there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is he a doctor ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I think we called him Dr. Chi because he is a 
professor. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is he a Ph. D ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. I fell into the "Doctor" because he 
was a professor. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall when you last heard about him from 
anyone else? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you heard anything from him in the last 2 or 
3 years? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I haven't. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1699 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know and do now know that at any time 
Dr. Chi was connected with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. Judging by the closeness he had with 
Chiang Kai-shek and H. H. Kung I would certainly have thought he 
was the opposite. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would be surprised to know that he was con- 
nected with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. The association that I had with him was in Chung- 
king where he was almost a habitue of Chiang Kai-shek and Kung's 
home. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you read any of the hearings of this sub- 
committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have read those that were particularly pertaining 
to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did you find out which were the ones particu- 
larly pertaining to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. By going through and picking up my name; that 
on August 3 Mr. Bunclez testified about me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who would tell you that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Who would tell me? The books are up in the State 
Department, the three books that are now 

Mr. Sourwine. I thought that in going through the books you had 
checked the subject index and read the pages where your name ap- 
peared ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did in the first and in the second. 

Senator Ferguson. Has the State Department anyone working on 
these records? 

Mr. Vincent. What records? 

Senator Ferguson. Our hearing. 

Mr. Vincent. The books are all down there in the legal adviser's 
office and I have access to these books. 

Senator Ferguson. But is there any particular person working on 
it down there that helps you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Several people who helped me, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Who is assigned to the task for instance? 

Mr. Vincent. There is no particular person assigned to the task. 
It is a matter where if we are trying to recollect a situation or some- 
thing. 

Senator Ferguson. I meant for instance you say that in the legal 
department. Is there anyone there that reads them daily and di- 
gests them and gets in touch 

Mr. Vincent. With me ? 

Senator Ferguson. Or with somebody ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or with whoever is mentioned ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know of anybody like that? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. The gentleman with you is your counsel ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Private personal counsel ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Not from the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 



1700 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, do you want the committee to under- 
stand that you have, with respect to the first two volumes, read those 
portions and only those portions which were listed in the index as 
pertaining to you and that with respect to the third volume you have 
read some portions pertaining to you and that you have not read the 
fourth or subsequent volumes yet ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I would want the committee to know 
that I read, I believe, the volume of August 23. Is that not the date? 
I ran through, I believe, the index afterward of that one. How thor- 
oughly I ran through the index of the next two volumes as they 
came out printed, I wouldn't know. 

I read pretty thoroughly the volume of Admiral Cooke and the 
volume in which Mr. Budenz made his second appearance. There 
are many of the volumes that I have not gone through. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how many volumes there are as of 
now that have been released ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid I don't, Mr. Sourwine. I would guess 
about 12, but that may be wrong. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you reading them in manuscript form? 

Mr. Vincent. If you mean by manuscript form 

Mr. Sourwine. Typescript. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are not reading the printed record? It's 
typescript, in the form of duplication. 

Mr. Vincent. Typescript, but I had already read the August 23 
one, but when the typed one came out I probably referred to the 
typed one because the typed one has some of the exhibits in it, I believe. 

Mr. Sourwine. I should point out that if you are reading them in 
the — that is, the 8-by-ll or 8-hy-liy 2 size sheet, there is no index in 
those, so I have been talking about something that is nonexistent. 
When I was talking about the index I was talking about the printed 
volumes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I am aware that the printed volumes have an 
index where my name occurs. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you have not had occasion, or for some other 
reason, you have not read those through ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not read those through. I have no doubt the 
first volume, which I think carries the Budenz testimony, I again 
went through it to the extent of trying to see what exhibits were 
put in. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say you read the original through? You are 
not saying that you read all of the originals through or all of the 
original through? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I do not recall seeing any mention in any of 
the volumes I read of Dr. Chi. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is what I meant. There is mention of him 
in those hearings. 

Mr. Vincent. If I saw it, it didn't ring a bell. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name I have here is spelled Chou En-lai, 
C-h-o-u E-n-1-a-i. 

Mr. Vincent. It is pronounced Chou En-lai, the present Premier 
of Communist China. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1701 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Do you or did you know him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did know him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us to what extent and what was the 
nature of your association ? 

Mr. Vincent. If I may check here because I would like to refer to 
these notes on him. Yes, here I have jotted down these things as 
exactly as I can (reading) : As consul of the American Embassy I met 
Chou En-lai in Chungking several times. He was the representative 
in Chungking of the Chinese Communists, who had their seat of gov- 
ernment at Yenan. He had an official position recognized by Chiang 
Kai-shek, and it may have been a reception at Chiang's where I first 
met Chou. 

I recall also meeting him at a luncheon in the home of an American 
manager of the British-American Tobacco Co. Also I met him when 
he made a courtesy call on Ambassador Gauss soon after Gauss' arrival 
and my own in the summer of 1941. 

The last time I saw him was before my departure for the United 
States in May 1913. He called at the Embassy as I was leaving to 
meet George Atcheson, who was taking my place as charge at the 
time. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. I see you are using your notes for that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Other things reminded me of that. I got the date 
for that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you attempted in those notes to set down, 
and have you attempted here in telling us about it to tell us about, 
all of the instances and occasions when you met Chou En-lai? 

Mr. Vincent. I have named so far all of the instances that I can 
recall of meeting Chou En-lai. I have another note here that (read- 
ing) my few conversations with Chou concerned conditions in the 
areas of North China occupied by the Communists. That would have 
been a logical topic of conversation, in particular, the conduct of 
military operations against the Japanese. 

The information obtained by me and by other officers of the embassy 
was of considerable value to us in evaluating conditions in an area 
to which we had no access whatsoever at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Would he go out into the field himself? 

Mr. Vincent. Chou? 

Senator Ferguson. Would he? 

Mr. Vincent. He could have gone to Yenan from time to time. 
Whether he did pass backward and forward I don't know, I would 
think he did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall whether you ever had any private 
conferences with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never had a private conference with him in the 
sense of the two of us getting together. He was at the luncheon I 
speak of. He came and told me goodby when I was leaving. He met 
Atcheson. I recall it was made the subject of a memorandum, what 
he was describing as conditions, and I believe it must have certainly 
been submitted to the Department after my departure because I would 
have been home. 

Senator Ferguson. That would have been one of the papers sent 
by you, an appraisal of the Communists after you conferred with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been a paper sent by me. To the extent 



1702 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

it would have been a factual report, it would have been what he had 
to say. I was more of a reporter than I was an appraiser. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have a conference with him at which 
you were the highest-ranking State Department official present? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, Mr. Sourwine, I wouldn't call them conferences, 
but I was probably the highest-ranking State Department official 
when the British- American Tobacco man gave his luncheon, which 
was the first time I recall meeting him. 

Mr. Sourwine. I was not referring to that kind of conference. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that the conference when he came over 
and called to say good-by, that Atcheson was senior to me. We were 
both the same grade, but he had assumed charge of the Embassy. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was not Dean Acheson but another ? 

Mr. Vincent. George Atcheson, now dead. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever participate in a conference with Chou 
at his headquarters or at his office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never was in his office that I can recall at all. I 
never made a call on him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever participate in a conference with him at 
his home ? 

Mr. Vincent. I may have been in his home one time when he was 
there, but I don't recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever participate in a conference with him 
away from American official premises and not in connection with some 
social gathering? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, Mr. Sourwine. I can give an all- 
embracing answer, I never had a secretive conference with Chou. 
That wasn't your question, but I can assure you I didn't have that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever correspond with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. Never. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you answered fully in your opinion the ques- 
tion of whether you know that at any time he was connected with the 
Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I know he was connected with the Communist move- 
ment. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you have known that since you first met him? 

Mr. Vincent. When I met him he was a known Communist repre- 
sentative. 

Senator Ferguson. What was his official title, if you have it? 

Mr. Vincent. That I don't recall, Senator, but it was something 
of the order of Representative of the District Government of Northern 
Shensi, and the Chinese were careful not to use the word Communist 
too much. 

You see, the theory was maintained always, even the theory, that 
there was an official connection between Chungking and Yenan during 
those years. 

Senator Ferguson. Even the Communists let that be believed ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. As a matter of fact, the Communist Army was 
described under the same general designation as other armies in 
China, I have forgotten, something like the Eighth Route Armies or 
Sixth Route Army. The Chinese Armies were given the designation 
"Route Army." 

Senator Ferguson. The Communists wouldn't say "Communist 
Army," they would refer to it as the Eighth Route? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1703 

Mr. Vincent. They would refer to it as the Eighth Route Army 
or the Shensi Border Army or some title of that kind. No, officially 
it was not called the Communist Army. 

Senator Ferguson. Was their government called the Chinese Gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, it was called, I think — you are speaking now of 
what, the Chinese? 

Senator Ferguson. Chou's Government. 

Mr. Vincent. I think the Chinese would have referred to it as 
Shensi. Shensi is the province where the Yenan Government was 
located. We called it the Chinese Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not deceived from the fact that it was 
the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not, I can recall. 

Senator Ferguson. So he was known to be a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. They were not, as 1 say, I recall quite distinctly 
myself that they were not agrarian democrats. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you refer to them as agrarian farmers ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. We will go on to the next name here, sir. 

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Sourwine, may I ask one question % 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Mandel. Would you describe the nature of the luncheon with 
the British- American Tobacco official ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can describe it only that there were probably half 
a dozen people there and the only person I can remember is the host 
himself and the fact that Chou was there, which made quite an im- 
pression on me. The host was Dick Smith, Richard Smith, manager 
for the British-American Tobacco Co. 

Mr. Mandel. Is it not rather- curious that you should be invited 
together with Chou En-iai ? What was the purpose of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. Smith spoke Chinese. I didn't speak 
Chinese well. Chou speaks some English, and he was up there on 
business, just that kind of luncheon. I would like to be able to tell 
you that it had some special significance, but it didn't have any special 
significance to my mind. 

I had, as I say, met Chou at a reception of Chiang Kai-shek before 
this luncheon, and he had made a courtesy call on Mr. Gauss. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that luncheon at the home of the host ? 

Mr. Vincent. At the home of Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that all, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name I have here would be, I imagine, 
Chu Teh, C-h-u T-e-h. 

Mr. Vincent. It's Chu Teh. I know he was head of the Chinese 
Communist Army. He never came to Chungking to my knowledge, 
and I was never in Yenan. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is O. Edmund Clubb. I have these 
alphabetically, which accounts for the intermixture. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I put it down so I could be sure and tell you 
where Clubb's service and mine were together. 

Mr. Sourwine. I might say that we deliberately put these alpha- 
betically so there would be no possible parallelism. 



1704 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Mine are not in alphabetical order (reading) : I find 
that I first met Edmund Clubb when he was assigned for language 
study in Peking in 1929. I was a student of Chinese there from 1928 
to 1930, and our duties overlapped for about 9 months. 

Our paths have crossed from time to time during the next 10 years, 
but we did not have service together again until 1941. In 1941 I 
stopped in Shanghai briefly on the way to Chungking as a consul 
and was later assigned to Chungking. I wanted to make a note that 
he was in Shanghai for those few months I was there. 

I was a consul and Mr. Clubb came to Chungking after the people 
were let out of Shanghai by the Japanese, and he was assigned by 
the secretary to the Embassy in Chungking in 1942. I recall that his 
job at that time, which he was briefly there, was looking after our 
relations with the OWI activities. 

Subsequently he was assigned to Tihwa in Sinkiang. Mr. Clubb 
served briefly with me in the Department during the period of 1943- 
44 before he was assigned to Vladivostok. I believe he was home 
on leave once before I left for Switzerland in 1947 and I no doubt saw 
him when he was about the Department. 

That is a record of any associations I have had. I may add there 
that I have had associations with these younger officers from time 
to time. My association with Clubb probably has been less than with 
any others through no design of my own, but we just haven't been 
together in places and socially we never have been close. 

Mr. Sourwine. I take it that with regard to what you have just 
testified to, it was more from notes than from memory. You are 
stating facts that you would not be expected to remember, is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. For instance, if I did not have these notes, if I had 
not looked up Clubb's history, I would have forgotten that Clubb was 
there when I went to Shanghai. 

Mr. Sourwine. What you testified to is merely what the records of 
the State Department show ? 

Mr. Vincent. And what his duties were. His duties in Chung- 
king were with OWI. 

Senator Ferguson. Where would you find this kind of informa- 
tion in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I found this in the record of Edmund Clubb's bio- 
graphic career. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is the Official Eegister of the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Senator Ferguson. As to when he was at a certain place ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But that would not tell you that you met him 
at this spot and at this luncheon ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall the last time you talked with Mr. 
Clubb? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, Mr. Sourwine, but I would imagine it was 
when he was home on leave in between his coming from China and 
going to Vladivostok. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where is he now ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know he is here in the city. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you seen him since you got back ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1705 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't seen him since I got back. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember corresponding with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I do not remember corresponding with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk over the subject of communism 
withClubb? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't believe I ever did talk over the subject of 
communism with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you feel that you have a real knowledge of 
communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have a real knowledge of communism in the sense 
that I have seen it operate in China. As I indicated this morning, I 
am not a student of communism. 

Senator Ferguson. I notice you haven't read even the manifesto? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. How can a man be a Foreign Service officer these 
days and not know about communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, that is a very difficult question, but I have 
to answer the question that I am not. 

Senator Ferguson. I am wondering how a man could be a Foreign 
Service officer and not understand communism. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I just have to reply that it's part of my edu- 
cation that has been limited. While I was in the State Department I 
was busy and haven't had an interest. 

Senator Ferguson. But I am talking as part of your work. How 
can a man really do the job as a Foreign Service officer in the State 
Department and not know communism, not know what it is ? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean not be a student of it ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right, know what its aims are and what 
it is doing and everything. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say, Senator, that, without having read 
these books that were listed this morning, that just by watching it in 
China I had a pretty clear idea of what its aims were. 

Senator Ferguson. What books have you read on communism or 
Marxism ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't recall of any that I have read. I 
probably have read one, but I can't recall one. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it is possible that some of your 
acts, some of your statements, may be in line with this philosophy and 
you not know it? 

Mr. Vincent. Some of my acts ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. If you have not been a student of it, could 
it be that you may be paralleling it in some lines and not know it? 

Mr. Vincent. That is certainly a possibility. As I say, I have to 
testify that I have not made myself a student of communism, and I 
have not read to any extent at all Communist books. 

Senator Ferguson. So your knowledge of communism is based on 
how the Communists acted in China? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. To follow Senator Ferguson's thoughts, have you 
read the two publications of the House Un-American Activities Com- 
mittee on communism ? 



1706 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I have not. 

Mr. Soukwine. Have you read the American Bar Association brief 
on communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Did you know they had a brief on communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. The next name I have here is Frank V. Coe, C-o-e. 

Mr. Vincent. Frank V. Coe, I recall, was in the Foreign Economic 
Administration. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. I beg your pardon; I forgot to ask you the ques- 
tion whether you knew at any time that Mr. Clubb was connected with 
the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Now go ahead with Mr. Coe. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Coe, I recall, was an officer of some sort in the 
Foreign Economic Administration during the — well, how long he was 
there I don't know, but I was there from October until January — that 
is, October 1943 into January of 1944 when he was over in the Eco- 
nomic Cooperation Administration under Mr. Crowley. There is 
where I first met him, and as far as I can recall it's the last I met him 
until he, I believe, was a delegate at the IBP conference. 

I could tell quickly whether or not he was. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Which IPR conference? 

Mr. Vincent. Hot Springs. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Is that the only one you ever attended ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the only one I ever attended. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you yield for a moment ? 

Mr. Sourwine. If the Senator would pardon me for just a moment? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that the end of your association with Coe ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the end of my association with Coe. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. All right, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You were asked a question by me about the 
Communists, and you indicated that you had knowledge of what they 
were, what they stood for and did in China, and then you were asked 
the question about Mr. Clubb, I think it was, as to whether or not you 
knew he was a Communist or sympathetic to the Communists, and 
your answer was "No." 

Would you state for the record what were the principles of the 
Communists in China at the time you knew them and if they changed ? 
Tell us what the change was. 

Mr. Vincent. The principles of the Communists as I first knew 
them in China, and that would have to be dated 1941, the announced 
ones were the unification of China and resistance to Japan. I am 
speaking now of what were their announced objectives. 

At that time when I was there 

Senator Ferguson. You mean unification because China was 
separated ? 

Mr. Vincent. Separated because Manchuria was in the hands of 
the Japanese. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean unification under Chinese Communist 
domination, do you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was coming to that. They were not announcing 
they wanted unification under Communist domination. It became 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1707 

apparent, as you went along and became more conscious of what they 
were doing in China, that their objective was not simply the creation, 
as they professed, of a unified democratic China, but it was a China 
which insofar as they could bring it about would be controlled by them. 

In other words, it was a matter of wanting power. It was not so 
clear at that time how they meant to get the power. 

Mr. Sottrwine. That was true; and their desire and objective was 
clear even as early as 1940 to you, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1940 I would have not reached that conclusion 
so quickly, because in 1940 the unity between the Generalissimo and 
the Communists had not broken down. You may recall, Mr. Sour- 
wine, from 1937 to 1940 there was a fairly close military cooperation 
between the two, and it looked like the objective was as stated for 
the two to work together for defeating the Japanese. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you want the committee to understand that you, 
despite all your prior years in China and your familiarity with what 
was going on out there, did not until 1940 know the true nature and 
objectives of the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. The true nature of the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Sourwine. The true nature of the objectives of the Chinese 
Communists. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't want the committee to get that impres- 
sion. I realize that a Communist Party was out to seize power. I 
saw it in 1930 — not 1930 — in 1926 when the wrangle came up between 
the two, and they tried there at Hankow and Canton to seize power. 

Chiang Kai-shek eventually triumphed in 1927 over the Commu- 
nists, and you had the other thing. There was clear evidence of what 
they wanted. I was speaking, when I said the other, the obvious thing 
when you were out in 1941 there was a certain unity in trying to 
defeat the enemy. 

Mr. Sourwine. That unity, that rapprochement, was a partial vic- 
tory and a step toward total victory ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was my interpretation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that not recognized by you and other well- 
informed persons? 

Mr. Vincent. That the Communists, if the opportunity presented, 
would seize power. 

Mr. Sourwine. That that was their objective? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. There was one other thing along that same line. 
They had two known things in mind, and that was, you say, in uniting 
of China, which would be getting back from Japan Manchuria, and 
the defeat of the Japanese ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was really one; defeat of the Japanese 
would have accomplished both of them ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How was that made known ? "Was that a pub- 
lished fact, or was that said in their open speeches ? 

Mr. Vincent. On the contrary, their open speeches, as I can recall 
them, it was always based upon the desire for national unity in order 
to defeat the Japanese at that time. The Communists themselves, in- 
sofar as I can recall, never made an open declaration of a desire to 
achieve full power in China. 



1708 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Not full power, but to have the land, not indi- 
cating who was to control it ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first come to the conclusion that 
the Communists of China were part and parcel of the Communists of 
Kussia ? 

Mr. Vincent. I should say that I never came to a definite conclu- 
sion, and I will frankly admit that there were many of us who hoped 
they never would for a long time. But it became, I believe, clearer 
toward the end of 1942 and 1943. 

Senator Ferguson. What was Mao's position in the Chinese Army ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mao was always the head of the government. 

Senator Ferguson. Head of the Communist Government? 

Mr. Vincent. Up in Yenan where they had their seat ; Mao Tse- 
tung. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you not known that he had been a Kussian 
Communist, had been to Moscow? 

Mr. Vincent. He had been to Moscow, but Chiang Kai-shek had 
been to Moscow. I am not saying that Mao Tse-tung was not a Com- 
munist. I knew he was a Communist from the way he acted and 
talked. He never made any bones about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they talk about Russia? 

Mr. Vincent. In those days ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, but I never had any conversation 
with Mao. 

Senator Ferguson. You have never seen Mao ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never seen Mao. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you any doubt back at the earliest time that 
there were Communists trying to dominate in China; that they were 
the regular Communists with headquarters in Moscow. 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would not be able to answer that question 
fairly in saying that — did I ever have any doubt that they were Com- 
munists and had their headquarters in Moscow. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not say that you had? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't say that I had knowledge that they were 
regular Communists with headquarters in Moscow. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly take it for granted. I don't know 
it as a positive fact. I think they take their direction from Moscow. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you come to that conclusion that they 
were Communists and that they had their headquarters in Russia and 
were part of the regular Communist Party? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I came to that definite conclusion some- 
time during the period of General Marshall's mission to China in 1946 ; 
that I was also convinced that it was a Communist movement which 
wanted to achieve power in China, but it was only after the war that 
it became clear to my mind. 

Senator Ferguson. At the time of the Marshall mission, what 
brought you to the conclusion that they were then under Russia ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because it seemed to me that the difficulties which 
General Marshall was having with his mission out there clearly indi- 
cated that the Communists were getting support from just not them- 
selves ; that they were, if you want to put it, being guided by Moscow. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1709 

Mr. Sourwine. What did the Communists do to make General Mar- 
shall's mission difficult? 

Mr. Vincent. By holding out for terms. You may recall — I may 
have to be a little lengthy there, and I am speaking purely from mem- 
ory. You will recall that General Marshall went out in early 1946. 
There was at that time called by the Chinese, you remember, a consti- 
tutional convention or a people's political council, I thing it was, as a 
preliminary thing to which the Communists were to send delegates. 

When General Marshall arrived, I think that thing was about to be 
convoked or had been ; and he had a certain degree of success, you may 
recall, in the first 3 months in bringing about a truce which was, I 
know as a matter of fact, one of the main objectives of General Mar- 
shall to try to stop civil war. 

I mention civil war because in my mind, correctly or incorrectly, the 
worst that could happen in China in those days was the all-out civil 
war. As the negotiations went on after the spring, it became more 
and more apparent from General Marshall's telegrams back — we sent 
very few to him because he was in charge; it was his own show — 
that the Communists were making it more and more difficult in trying 
to get not a majority position in this so-called constitutional govern- 
ment but a position of greater influence than they were warranted in 
having, plus the fact that there was a certain amount of anti-Marshall 
propaganda that came out from time to time from the Communists 
that seemed to be inspired from elsewhere, it appeared to me. 

I make that statement from memory because I do recall at one time 
Marshall complaining. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did the propaganda come from? 

Mr. Vincent. From the Communists in China. One or another 
would make a statement or speech throwing, or casting, some doubt 
on the sincerity of General Marshall in trying to undertake his 
mission to bring about peace. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think that was inspired by Russia? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What made you think that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because it seemed to have the flavor of propaganda 
that was coming out of a place not Chinese. That is hard to ex- 
plain, but at the initial stages, in the initial stages, the Communists 
had seemed from Marshall's report to be quite agreeable to calling off 
war and of sitting down and talking things over with the Generalis- 
simo, which is just what the Generalissimo wanted. 

But in the spring it seemed to me that situation changed. Now I 
have purely a surmise, Senator. You recall I think it was in March 
that Mr. Byrnes — Secretary Byrnes, Jimmy Byrnes — was at a foreign 
ministers' conference in London; and at that conference, I think it 
was, it was the first time that the Secretary of State of the United 
States and the Foreign Minister of Russia — mind you, the war was 
only over 4 months, 6 months — really got to calling each other names. 

It was a very uncongenial conference. I have, as I say, in trying to 
piece these matters together, thought that at that moment the chances 
of success of Marshall's mission were certainly lessened tremendously 
because of the animosity that was developing between us and the 
Russians. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, then you felt that Russia was in complete 
charge at that time of China's policy — that is, the Communists? 



1710 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. That is I think difficult : saying Eussia was in com- 
plete charge. I think at that time Russian influence on what Chinese 
Communists did or did not do increased. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your position in China when Mar- 
shall came out ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was back here in the States, Mr. Senator, I was back 
in the Department of State. 

Senator Ferguson. You were back in the Department of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the memorandum as to 
what his mission was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was, sir. You mean the one that had been called the 
directive ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Were you familiar with that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was familiar with that. 

Senator Ferguson. Who drafted it? 

Mr. Vincent. It was drafted, I believe, in the War Department. 
If you wish I have dates and I can read a 2-page memo I have to be 
sure that I know what the sequence was. 

Senator Ferguson. What about that mission? When did it first 
come to your attention ? 

Mr. Vincent. When did what come to my attention? 

Senator Ferguson. The Marshall mission. 

Mr. Vincent. The Marshall mission came to my attention for the 
first time when as you recall at the end of November General Hurley 
resigned, and the next day the President appointed or requested Mar- 
shall to go to China. 

Senator Ferguson. All right; now when did Hurley resign? 

Mr. Vincent. As far as I can recall Hurley resigned on Novem- 
ber 26. 

Senator Ferguson. November 26? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have that here. I don't want to tell you the twenty- 
sixth when it really was the twenty-seventh. Yes, on November 27 the 
President asked General Marshall to undertake a mission for him. 
General Hurley had submitted his resignation as Ambassador the day 
before. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. On the twenty-sixth he resigned, 
and on the twenty-seventh the President asked General Marshall 
to go? 

Mr. Vincent. Undertake a mission, not as an Ambassador. 

Senator Ferguson. No. When did you first hear about the di- 
rective ? 

Mr. Vincent. I first heard about the directive in the sense that it 
came over from the War Department. I was asked on the 28th of 
November to draw together quickly something on the basis of which 
Byrnes could talk to General Marshall about what was his general 
idea of his mission. 

Senator Ferguson. You were asked to draw up a memorandum for 
Byrnes so that Byrnes could have a conversation with Marshall as 
to his mission on the twenty-eighth ? 

Mr. Vincent. As to what were the Department's general ideas on 
the thing. It was not a directive. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1711 

Senator Ferguson. It was getting in line for a directive ? 

Mr. Vincent. Marshall had to have something as a background. 

Senator Ferguson. So the next day after hjs naming Marshall — 
was that a public naming on the twenty-seventh ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was public? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. George Marshall was then testifying before a 
joint committee here in the Senate? 

Mr. Vincent. On Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. He was then under cross-examination. 

Mr. Vincent. I remember that. 

Senator Ferguson. He was named and indicated that he had to 
leave immediately for China ; is that not true ? 

Mr. Vincent. He left on the fifteenth of December, I think; that 
is true. Up until the day almost that he left I am told he was with 
the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you draw a memorandum as to 
what a directive should contain ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not as to what the directive should contain because 
I want to be exact. I have it here. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, if you want to. 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to as a matter of history. The follow- 
ing is my recollection of the development of the directive to General 
Marshall. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you will pardon the interruption, did your 
counsel assist you in that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, this is from my own memory in getting dates. 
You will find at times I couldn't even get a date. 

In the autumn of 1945 we in the Department were becoming in- 
creasingly concerned over developments in China. It looked as 
though China were heading rapidly toward a general civil war. There 
was much press and public criticism over the stationing of our marines 
in North China. Disarmament and repatriation of Japanese soldiers 
in China was moving slowly. 

We had flown three or four of Chiang Kai-shek's divisions from 
South and Central China to North China, mostly to the Peking- 
Tientsin area. The objective of this move was to place Chiang's 
troops in the position to take the surrender of Japanese troops. But 
there was strong indication that the Nationalist Army was finding it 
difficult if not impossible to gain control of rural areas held by 
Communists. 

Our marines had to be used directly in effecting surrender of Jap- 
anese troops. 

I have that as a background [reading] : 

In late October or early November I was asked to prepare a memo- 
randum regarding the situation and what we could do about it. This 
I did, setting forth four alternative procedures which may be briefly 
described as follows : 

(a) All-out support for the government of Chiang Kai-shek; 

(b) Normal diplomatic relations with the National Government 
while refraining from taking any part in internal affairs ; 

22848—52 — pt. 6 3 



1712 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(c) Assistance to the Chinese Government in bringing about a 
settlement with non-Kuomintang groups including the Communists 
in order to avoid general civil war (at this time discussions were 
under way among the various Chinese political groups with that idea 
in mind, but they were making little headway) ; 

(d) An international conference of interested powers to seek a 
solution. 

Senator Ferguson. Those are the four ? 

Mr. Vincent. Those are the four. That was a memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. That was a memorandum that you had pre- 
pared ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is a memorandum that I had prepared. 

Senator Ferguson. That was while Hurley was still in China? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you make a recommendation on any of 
those ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I have never seen that memorandum. I did it 
over a week end and haven't seen it since that day. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long it was before the 28th? 

Mr. Vincent. That would have been done the latter part of October 
or the early part of November, probably the latter part of October, 
so probably it would be a month before Hurley resigned. 

Senator Ferguson. Now on the 20th did you prepare a new mem- 
orandum? 

Mr. Vincent. This memorandum was submitted to the Secretary of 
State, to the White House, and to the War Department. Procedure 
(c) was chosen as furnishing the most practical approach to the exist- 
ing problem. 

Senator Ferguson. Was (c) the one? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; (c) was the one chosen to assist the Chinese 
Government and avoid civil war. In other words, to bring about a 
settlement with the non-Kuomintang groups, including the Com- 
munists, in order to avoid civil war. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, in your memorandum in the last part 
of October did you recommend a taking of the Communists into the 
Chiang Kai-shek government? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; these were four alternative procedures that I 
set forth as clearly as I could, and I was never consulted at any time 
as to the selection of (c) . 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn that they had chosen 
(c) ? Your (c) is so indefinite I would not know how a man would 
take that and say that it was a consolidation of the two governments. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I am trying- to do this from memory because I 
haven't seen that document since I wrote it 5 years ago, but that was 
the general tenor of it, assistance to the Chinese Government in bring- 
ing about a settlement with non-Kuomintang groups, including the 
Communists, in order to avoid civil war. 

It was not a new idea. It was an idea that General Hurley had 
pursued during his Ambassadorship of trying to bring about some 
kind of settlement during the war for military cooperation. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 28th what did you do ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had better read here. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1713 

General Hurley had submitted his resignation as Ambassador the 
day before. On November 28 I was asked to prepare something to 
indicate to General Marshall our line of thinking in the Department. 
That was the first time that I realized 

Senator Ferguson. When did you prepare that ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was when it was indicated to me that that was 
going to be prepared along the lines of my point (c). This I did in 
the form of a rough outline of possible courses of action. This mem- 
orandum was, I believe, handed to General Marshall on November 28 
or 29 by Mr. Byrnes. 

Senator Ferguson. So you did not take long to draw that up? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; it was a rough memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you recommend ? 

Mr. Vincent. In my memorandum I suggested assistance to Chiang 
in recovering Manchuria and steps to assist the Chinese in bringing 
about a military truce and a settlement of political difficulties through 
a general political conference. 

I also stated that political peace in China was impossible as long as 
there existed autonomous armies such as the Communists had, and 
suggested that all armies be united and organized under the National 
Government. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you recommend the taking of the Commu- 
nists into the Government? 

Mr. Vincent. The Communists were included in my statement here, 
,4 a settlement of political diiliculties through a general political con- 
ference." 

Now whether that would have resulted in the Communists coming 
into the Government or not I wouldn't know, but it was in my mind, 
I can assure you that. 

Senator Ferguson. It was? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you recommend in this memorandum the 
taking of the Communists into the Nationalists ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that I recommended specifically, but 
when I said taking other political parties in I had the Communists 
in mind. 

Senator Ferguson. You had the Communists in mind. Did you 
not indicate that the Communists if they went in wanted such power 
that they would in effect take it over ? 

Mr. Vincent. That brings up a question of tactics which I would 
be glad to explain. We were, as I say, terribly concerned over the 
results of an outbreak of general civil war in China. I was particu- 
larly. I had been in China and had seen the effects of civil war on 
the country. 

Senator Ferguson. But coming back, I understood you to tell me 
before that you knew that if you took the Communists in that they 
wanted a greater power than they were entitled to, indicated to you 
that Russia was in command? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is what I was coming to, Senator, was in 
my conception that you had a better chance of taking the Commu- 
nists in in more ways than one by bringing them into a government 



1714 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

on a minority basis, not against the wishes of Chiang Kai-shek's 
government, but they themselves were at that time negotiating. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, you told me in the meeting in 
London it was clear to you then that they wanted a domination. 
Prior to that, were you not also of the opinion that if you ever took 
the Communists in they would dominate the Government? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have been willing to say that the Commu- 
nists would try to dominate the Government, but I still believed that 
you could have taken them in, not forced them on Chiang, but Chiang 
could have taken them in in more ways than one on a minority 
basis. 

There were at the time Communists in the Italian and French 
Governments who were eliminated. But I was trying to avoid what 
I thought honestly was the worst possible disaster that could come 
to Chiang, which was the outbreak of general civil war. 

Senator Ferguson. Could that be any worse as far as America was 
concerned than to have the Communists take over the government and 
not have a civil war? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, my concept was that the Communists would 
come into the Government on a minority basis and that we could, 
through support of the Chiang Kai-shek government, and I think 
you will find this philosophy stated in my memorandum, that with 
help from us we could eventually strengthen the Chinese Government 
enough to eliminate the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. To kick them out? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I stated that in so many words. 

Senator Ferguson. In this memorandum of the 28th did you 
state that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, but I did in the subsequent memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. How long after that? 

Mr. Vincent. I should say some time in the spring or summer of 
1946. 

Senator Ferguson. When did this memorandum come over, back 
from the Army? 

Mr. Vincent. The memorandum came back from the Army — this 
memorandum, as far as I can recall, was handed by Mr. Byrnes to 
General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. On the 28th or 29th? 

Mr. Vincent. On the 28th or 29th. Subsequent to that, some 
time in the following week, a memorandum came back from the War 
Department which General Marshall either drafted or had drafted. 
This statement then came back. Mine had been entitled "Rough 
Outline." 

This one came back as Statement of Policy Toward China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Beyond the change in titles what difference was 
there ? 

Mr. Vincent. There was a vast difference. It was a memoran- 
dum, as I have said here, and some of the phraseology and thought 
in my memorandum was there, but it was in composition and charac- 
ter a much bigger paper. Mine ran to two pages, I think, and this one 
ran to probably six, and mine was not a directive. 

I didn't realize that Marshall was going to want a directive. This 
was jotting down the ideas that I thought were important. 

Senator Ferguson. Then Marshall drafted his own directive? 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1715 

Mr. Vincent. Marshall drafted or had drafted. I would doubt 
that General Marshall, as busy as he was with the committee, had 
drafted it. 

Senator Ferguson. Somebody in his Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Somebody at the War Department, if he did not 
himself, drafted this long statement. 

Senator Ferguson. You feel that if it had been drafted in the 
State Department that you would have been part of it? 

Mr. Vincent. If it had been drafted in the State Department, 
as Director of the Far Eastern Office I would certainly have had 
something to do with it. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you called in conference at all? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I want to finish this (reading) : That memo- 
randum came back to the State Department sometime during the first 
week of 

Senator Ferguson. December? 

Mr. Vincent. December [reading] : There were some changes and 
I can't recall them, but they were not changes of any great merit. This 
was already Marshall's idea. Some additions were made for clari- 
fication and then it was sent back again to the War Department 
during the first week of December. 

Then the next thing, and the last thing I had anything to do with 
it, was on December 9, as I think both General Marshall and Mr. 
Acheson testified. There was a meeting in Byrnes' office to go over 
the final draft of this statement of policy toward China, which has 
been called the Marshall directive, and it was agreed upon by Mr. 
Byrnes and Mr. Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any changes made at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. At that meeting I don't recall, any other drafting. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you present? 

Mr. Vincent. I was present, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Hull, 
and General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it appears that here when there was a 
grave diplomatic move to be made that the Army dictated that move. 
It was their directive ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say that the Army dictated that move, 
but I am sure that General Marshall, who then considered himself 
as a civilian, had ag reat deal to do, not with the drafting, but with 
the general ideas. 

Senator Ferguson. What did he know about the situation in China ? 
Here was a memorandum drafted in the War Department, you assumed 
in your answer, and said it was Marshall that directed it. What did 
he know about the conditions in China? 

Mr. Vincent. He probably had kept up with them as well as any 
intelligent man would, but he had in the War Department, I am 
quite sure, officers who had just come back from service in China. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who they were ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you feel that you had a grasp of the situa- 
tion in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Both politically and militarily? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar as I could trust the information that was 
coming to me. I hadn't been in China for some time. 



1716 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. For how long? 

Mr. Vincent. I hadn't been there since 1943. 

Senator Ferguson. You left there in 1943 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I left there in 1943, and this was in 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. Who in the State Department knew more about 
conditions in China at that time, at the time of the drafting of this 
document, than you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is a difficult question, Senator, to say. Let me 
think of the people who might have known more of conditions than 
I. We all read the same papers and had the same information. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you the top man ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was the Director of the Far Eastern Office. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So it would be natural that they would 
come to you as the man who had the most knowledge and the best 
insight into the whole problem; is that not right? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now did you sanction and agree that the 
Marshall directive as drafted by the War Department was the way 
to solve this problem ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were consulted? 

Mr. Vincent. I was consulted, the memorandum, as I say, came 
back, and we saw the full draft. There were some minor changes made 
in it, but I want to say that I was fully in support of the objectives of 
what General Marshall was going to try to do. 

Senator Ferguson. You say you were ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was. 

Senator Ferguson. You say the objectives, did you believe in the 
method that was laid down to do it, of taking them in ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What made you believe that if you ever took 
them in you could get them out ? 

Mr. Vincent. What made me believe that was the fact that they 
were going to come in on a minority basis ; that was clear all the time. 
The Chiang Kai-shek government was to be strengthened, not pub- 
licly, through assistance, and that there would be positions where, as I 
have stated before, and I have this on record some place or another, 
that the idea was to take them in in more ways than one. 

Let me make this clear about Marshall's mission. One of the main 
things was the stopping of the civil war. As I say, I don't know that 
I was right or wrong in that, but I dreaded the idea of China being em- 
broiled in the civil war immediately after the war. 

Senator Ferguson. But did you argue the point that you always had 
to keep Chiang Kai-shek's government in the forefront with aid and 
support? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In such a way that this other would always be a 
minority ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, so much to the point that I said it to a mem- 
ber of the Chinese Embassy here in this city. 

Senator Ferguson. No, no, but did you say it to Marshall ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1717 

Senator Ferguson. So lie understood how you felt about it, that if 
they did not dominate the situation they would lose this thing, is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. That the Chinese had to dominate. 

Senator Ferguson. That is, the Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Vincent. And in the last analysis that is what — I am working 
from memory here now — what in the last analysis broke it down was 
the excessive demands of the- Communists as to representation in a new 
government. 

Senator Ferguson. Well now, you did not know anything about the 
strategy in the military situation over there ? 

Mr. Vincent. In what military situation, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. In China? 

Mr. Vincent. I mean in the military situation, the war was over. 

Senator Ferguson. Between the Nationalists and the Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. We knew that, as I have testified here, that in north 
China Chiang was having a terrible time taking over those areas from 
the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Then did you not know that if you stopped that, 
that you might give the Communists a great edge over Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. If you stopped this war ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Marshall tell you that? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he know anything about the conditions 
there ? 

Mr. Vincent. He found out very quickly, and an indication of that 
is that General Marshall immediately set about organizing these truce 
teams to stop the fighting ; that was his own idea. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out about giving aid. What 
did you know about that ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was not taken into consideration that you were 
actually aiding the Communists by preventing a civil war. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever consulted after the final draft of 
the Marshall document? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Acheson present at the final draft ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had already taken off for Moscow with Mr. Byrnes. 
The final draft, when it was adopted in the White House and handed 
to General Marshall, if that is what you mean, that was on the 14th. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Dean Acheson in the Department with 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he consent to this draft ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Byrnes consent to it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, on the 9th, and a day later he was over to 
the White House, took it over to the President and the President ap- 
proved it. It was approved by General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any argument at all to the effect that 
once you put the Communists into this Government there was a 
probability that it would be the government of the future ? 



1718 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, no argument that I heard of because it was 
based probably mostly on the hope that this plan would succeed in 
subordinating the Communists in the Government rather than mak- 
ing a trial of arms and civil war. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but you do not solve problems by hopes, do 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. I know you don't, but I will say that was the estimate 
you had to operate on. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew the military upper hand was in the 
Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. The upper hand insofar as Chiang holding central 
and south China? 

Senator Ferguson. The upper hand was held by the Communists in 
north China? 

Mr. Vincent. We had assistance. We helped Chiang in taking 
over Tientsin and Peking by flying his divisions over there. 

Senator Ferguson. After Marshall left here with the directive you 
did not know whether or not the State Department was consulted? 

Mr. Vincent. Consulted in what manner ? 

Senator Ferguson. As they were going along? 

Mr. Vincent. On the general operation of his mission ? No. Gen- 
eral Marshall, under the directive, had, I should say, a free hand. 

Senator Ferguson. And exercised it ? 

Mr. Vincfnt. And exercised it. 

Senator Ferguson. How long did you stay in Russia? Did you 
go over with Byrnes ? 

Mr. Vincent. I went over with Byrnes in December for that short 
conference at Christmas time with the Russians and came back. 

Senator Ferguson. That was a very short time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Half a month. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Marshall consult the State Department at 
all? 

Mr. Vincent. After he went to China? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. That I do not recall. My general impression is that 
we did not have telegrams from him asking for advice. He kept us 
very well informed in telegrams of about once every 10 days or 2 
weeks. 

Senator Ferguson. But not asking for advice, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. When did he come back? 

Mr. Vincent. He came home in March, and there were conferences 
that he had with Byrnes, but they were not in the sense of conferences 
having to do with what he could do. 

Senator Ferguson. Telling you what he had done? When did he 
make the statement to the effect, "Plague on both your houses" ? 

Mr. Vincent. He made that, I should say, in the first week of 
January 1947, after he came home. 

Senator Ferguson. After he finally came home ? 

Mr. Vincent. After he finally came home. Whether he had as- 
sumed the secretary of stateship by that time or not I don't recall, 
but it was all in that week. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you leave this China desk or the Far 
East desk? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1719 

Mr. Vincent. I left the Far East desk July of 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. So you were in all the time? 

Mr. Vincent. All the time the mission was out there and after 
Marshall came back. 

Senator Ferguson. And there was no advice sought from your desk 
on the situation ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Sourwine ? 

Mr. Vincent. When I make a positive statement like that there 
may have been questions as to this, that, or the other. 

Senator Ferguson. But you do not recall any of them ? 

Mr. Vincent. On the over-all policy. 

Mr. Sourwine. May I ask a series of questions ? 

Senator Ferguson. You go right ahead. 

Mr. Sourwine. Since this subject has been opened up I would like 
to ask a series of questions. Going back, sir, you said you had pre- 
pared a memorandum on the situation ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was prior to the directive, it was not a direc- 
tive, it was what you got together hurriedly, as you say ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to distinguish between that one I made 
at the end of October and the one I made at the end of November. 

Mr. Sourwine. The rough draft for the use of Mr. Byrnes? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was sent over to the State Department and 
subsequently a draft came back which was a much longer draft, in 
pages about a 2 to 6 ratio ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say so. 

Mr. Sourwine. I want you to tell the committee what, if anything, 
there was in the Marshall draft — that is, the one that came from the 
War Department — that was at variance with any of the concepts or 
suggestions that were in your rough memorandum. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think there were any. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was merely an expansion then ? 

Mr. Vincent. The Marshall draft came back incorporating this 
idea of trying to seek a truce ; that was one of the ideas. It had more 
ideas than mine. 

Mr. Sourwine. But there was no variance ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say there were some changes by way of clarifica- 
tion before it went back to the War Department the second time? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you participate in making any of those changes ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You knew then that there were changes, but they 
were not of any consequence ? 

Mr. Vincent. They were not of any consequence. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then the final draft came back? 

Mr. Vincent. The War Department got it, and they brought it 
over to this meeting of December 9. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had they again made further changes ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think they did. 



1720 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Were they of any consequence ? 

Mr. Vincent. None. 

Mr. Sourwine. You sat in on the conference approving the final 
draft? 

Mr. Vincent. Approving the final draft insofar as Byrnes and 
General Marshall were concerned. The President finally approved it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had three cracks at it? First, you prepared 
the rough draft memorandum ; and, after that had been expanded but 
without in any way changing your concepts or suggestions, you had a 
chance to make further suggestions and did make or approve some; 
and then you were present and concurred in the final approval ? 

Mr. Vincent. My concurrence was not necessary in the final ap- 
proval when General Marshall and Mr. Byrnes were there. 

Senator Ferguson. Not to interfere with your line of thought, I 
just wanted to know when George Marshall left the War Department. 

Mr. Vincent. Let me see. That is a question that I will just have 
to guess on here. My recollection is that he left almost immediately 
after the war was over with Japan. At least he hadn't been out more 
than 2 or 3 months when he was asked to come back. 

Senator Ferguson. But he was not in the Government at the time 
the President asked him to come back? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that the War 
Department, of all departments, was drafting a diplomatic document 
and implementing and saying how it should be implemented? You 
did not have any implementation in it at all. How do you account for 
the War Department, of all departments, drafting a diplomatic docu- 
ment and handling its implementation? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, there were many people over in the War 
Department who had a great familiarity with the situation. There 
was still in China — our own forces which had not been deactivated. I 
want to be fair to the Army. There were many people over in the Pen- 
tagon Building who had a very up-to-date and clear idea of the situa- 
tion in China, which even still was military in the sense of the surren- 
der of the Japanese troops. 

I don't know how many there were, but it was something over a 
million. 

Senator Ferguson. But there was that great diplomatic problem of 
the negotiation between the Communists and the non-Communists. 
You had had an Ambassador, you had had a Department of State 
staff there, and you were head of the Far Eastern Division? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Here was the Army drawing the .directive and 
the implementation of a directive, taken out of your hands really ; is 
that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I hate to testify that it was taken out of my 
hands, because they did send it back and give us a crack at it. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was not taken very far out of your hands when 
you had initiated the policy, and had one chance to correct it, and saw 
it at the finish ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. Not just I, but Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Acheson. 

Mr. Sourwine. I was speaking specifically of you because it was 
from you virtually alone that the initial rough draft came ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1721 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. As I testified, I had no argument with the docu- 
ment as it came over. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with any of these Army people ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. While it was being drafted ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you did not confer with them? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; except on the 9th when General Marshall came 
over. 

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead. 

Mr. Sourwine. You made a very interesting statement, sir, in the 
course of your discourse with Senator Ferguson and in response to his 
questions you said, speaking, I presume, of yourself and others, "We 
all read the same papers, we all had the same information." 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. What papers and what information are you talking 
about ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am speaking of information coming in from re- 
ports. I think we will have to go back and remember what Senator 
Ferguson's question was. Who did I consider the best-informed per- 
son on the Far East? When I say "we all," I have in mind my own 
Deputy Director, who is Mr. Penfield. 

Anything of importance was read by Mr. Acheson ; and the Chief of 
the China Division, who was Mr. Drumright at that time, would read 
them. These were not immature people, I mean. Everybody in the 
State Department had access to them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would that include reports from Mr. John Stewart 
Service ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would include whatever reports came in. John 
Stewart Service during this time was not in China; he had already 
been sent to Tokyo. 

Mr. Sourwine. I was not thinking of a particular period. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It would include such reports as were coining back. 
In other words, would it be correct to say that the thinking not only 
of yourself, ex officio, so to speak, but of the others around you in 
the State Department was conditioned by the reports that came in that 
you all saw ? 

You all depended primarily on the reports you saw from the field ; 
therefore, you and the others around you could be expected to have sub- 
stantially the same views about the matters which you were consid- 
ering ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; and we also saw reports from General Wede- 
meyer. His reports were made available to us, too. I will say that in 
an operation of that kind we didn't depend entirely on reports from 
the field for making up our minds on things. It was a case of bringing 
our experience to bear and using the reports to reach a decision. 

Mr. Sourwine. If the reports or memoranda were in the Depart- 
ment, would they also circulate the same way so that they would all see 
them ? \ 

Mr. Vincent. They wouVl in the Far Eastern Office. Any person 
with sufficient rank to merit having it. For instance, General Mar- 
shall's reports back were seen only by General, Carter, who was in the 



1722 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

State Department as his assistant; myself; Dean Acheson; and the 
Secretary. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, to turn to another point, you have three times 
used the phrase, "take the Communists in in more ways than one." I 
got the feeling that you perhaps had used that phrase yourself at an 
earlier time either in arguments or something you had written. 

Mr, Vincent. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall where you used it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I used it, and I have to — before I left China in 1942. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is a phrase you have used often ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I know it was a concept I had that the best way 
to take the Communists in — and it is based on the knowledge of fight- 
ing and civil war — was to take them in. 

Mr. Sourwine. We were discussing your use of the phrase "take the 
Communists in in more ways than one." 

Mr.. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You intended, did you, by the use of that phrase on 
various occasions, as you have here, to suggest that there was some 
advantage to the Nationalist Government, some disadvantage to the 
Communist Government, in bringing the Communist Government into 
a coalition government ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, through the avoidance of civil war and the 
other component part of this, which was the dissolution of a Com- 
munist army and integration into a national army. 

Mr. Sourwine. I want to examine that a little bit. You spoke of 
your first point there, the avoidance of a civil war? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is actually merely a matter of inducement; 
that is a club because a civil war would not have been a direct dis- 
advantage to the Chinese Communists, would it ? 

Mr. Vincent. A civil war ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. A civil war, I believe, would have been a direct 
advantage to the Communists ; it would have stirred up more trouble 
in China. I couldn't foresee any conclusive 

Mr. Sourwine. It was an alternative, was it not, civil war or bring 
them into the Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was an alternative to bring them into the Govern- 
ment and dissolve this army; they were supposed to dovetail. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you think the Communists would give up their 
power in the north to any government that they did not control or 
expect to control ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did assume that they would if given a part in gov- 
ernment. They had said they would and joined in conferences to 
that effect. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you believe them ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I hoped they would. Yes; I will say that I 
believed that General Marshall going out there could bring about 
this kind of a solution. I don't believe I could have, but I thought 
General Marshall could. 

Mr. Sourwine. In view of what you have testified to today with 
regard to your knowledge, going back a long way, as to the nature of 
the Chinese Communists and their objectives, you never did believe, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1723 

did you, that the Communists would give up their power in the north 
to a government that they did not control or expect to control ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. And give up that advantage that you said they 
had? 

Mr. Vincent. The advantage militarily ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. It was an advantage of creating or continuing to 
create disorder in the country. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You thought really that you would be putting 
something over on the Chinese Communists by bringing them into a 
coalition government ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. At the time you felt that they had the upper 
hand in north China ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the rural districts, Senator, and they had had 
this kind of advantage even over the Japanese. We watched this, and 
it was tremendously difficult to deal with the guerrilla operation that 
they carried on. 

Senator Ferguson. And they would give that up ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And become a minority in a government and 
give that up ? 

Mr. Sourwine. In justice to yourself, sir, is it possible that you 
would like to amend that, that you thought that would be so if the 
Nationalist Government retained the upper hand in the coalition? 

Mr. Vincent. That was implicit in all of the negotiations that they 
had had with the Communists and the minor parties. It was on that 
point, as I say, that I believed the negotiations finally broke down. 

Mr. Sourwine. If the Nationalist Government was not to have the 
upper hand, then bringing the Communists into a coalition govern- 
ment would not be putting anything over on the Communists, would 
it? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you state that again, please? 

Mr. Sourwine. If the Nationalist Government was not to have the 
upper hand in the coalition, bringing the Communists into the coali- 
tion government would certainly not be putting anything over on the 
Communists, would it? 

Mr. Vincent. It would not. 

Mr. Sourwine. It would not be taking them in in any sense except 
by bringing them into the Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; and the point was always that the National 
Government was the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek, which 
was to be organized under a constitutional form and in which there 
would be some minor — I think the highest figure ever used was that 
the Communists would have 7 or 8, and I am just calling on memory 
now, out of a possible 21 in a provisional government. 

Mr. Sourwine. But, regardless of the form of the government or 
mere matters of form, it was absolutely essential that the Nationalist 
Government retain control of the coalition ; otherwise the Communists 
by getting the coalition won a great victory ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is true, sir, and General Marshall never thought 
in any other terms. 



1724 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you, sir, point out what there is in the 
Marshall directive or in any official statement of the State Department 
at or about that time which says or implies that it is important or 
essential that Chiang retain control of the coalition government ? 

Mr. Vincent. There is a paragraph in the Marshall directive 
which, I recall, says just exactly that, that we continue to recognize 
and support the National Government of China, which is the Govern- 
ment of Chiang Kai-shek. 

Senator Ferguson. Get us that, please. 

Mr. Vincent. We don't have the Marshall directive here. Is there 
a copy of the famous book, the White Paper, here ? I am sure it is in 
there, and I can produce it tomorrow if necessary. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you say "the famous book, the White 
Paper"? 

Mr. Vincent. Because it has been referred to, and I had a part in 
it, and it has become rather famous, in my opinion. 

Mr. Sourwine. I refer to that particular language. Do you believe 
that that particular language clearly expresses the view that in any co- 
alition government Chiang would have to control and the Commu- 
nists would have to have a minority interest ? 

Mr. Vincent. I believe it does, and added to 

Mr. Sourwine. Actually, if there was a coalition government and 
it was called the Nationalist Government of China, even though the 
Communists took over that government and maintained control of 
that government, it would still come within the phrase which you 
have cited? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't believe so, but we are both — at least I would 
have said it was the Nationalist Government of China under Chiang 
Kai-shek. I will go on to say from my memory of General Marshall's 
telegram back that it was very clear that at no time did he ever con- 
ceive of the Communists getting a majority control of the Government. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you talked about the Nationalist Government 
of China you meant the Chiang Kai-shek government? 

Mr. Vincent. The Kuomintang government, whether Chiang Kai- 
shek 

Mr. Sourwine. Kuomintang government would have been what- 
ever Government was controlled by the Kuomintang regardless of who 
composed the Kuomintang and whether or not Chiang still had a part 
in it? 

Mr. Vincent. It would. 

Mr. Souravine. So that all that that part of the directive said was 
that the United States Government should continue to support the 
National Chinese Government without regard to whether Chiang was 
in it or not? 

Mr. Vincent. Support the National Government. It was Chiang 
Kai-shek's party. The Kuomintang was Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was at that time. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your conception that the directive was making 
it clear that we were to maintain it as Chiang's Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. To maintain it as a Kuomintang government under 
Chiang. 



l & to v 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1725 

Senator Ferguson. We were to maintain it as a Kuomintang gov- 
ernment under Chiang. In other words, we were to continue to main- 
tain Chiang as over that particular government ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, we were supporting Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. We were supporting Chiang. 

Mr. Sourwine. And we were continuing 



"to 



Mr. Vincent. If Chiang Kai-shek had resigned as head of the 
Kuomintang and somebody else had taken over that position as head 
of the Kuomintang, Dr. Kung or T. V. Soong, it wouldn't have meant 
that we wouldn't support that government. 

Mr. Sourwine. No. Suppose that Chou En-lai had taken over 
instead of Mr. Soong, would it have meant that we would not support 
that? 

Mr. Vincent. We certainly would not have to do that because 
Chou En-lai couldn't have taken over a Government of the Kuomin- 
tang, could he? 

Mr. Sourwine. Assume that the Government was taken over by 
some Communist as the result of bringing into the Kuomintang of 
a majority of Communists or pro-Communist elements. If it were 
still in the form of the Kuomintang government and still called the 
Nationalist Government of China, would not the United States have 
felt itself committed to cooperate and to support that government 
under the Marshall directive? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think so, it would change its entire character. 

Mr. Sourwine. It certainly would have. Are you saying that it 
was your conception, that it was the conception of the State Depart- 
ment, that it was the conception of General Marshall, that it was 
intended to continue to support in power Chiang Kai-shek as the 
head of the Chinese National Government? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is what we were committed to do ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what we were committed to do. 

Mr. Sourwine. We were going to assist in the attaining of that 
objective by bringing the Communists into the coalition government? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And we were going to take the whole Army? 

Mr. Vincent. We were going to amalgamate the Army and call 
it the National Chinese Army. 

Mr. Sourwine, And you thought it was a feasible program? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought it was a feasible program. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, that perhaps is a good note on 
which to recess. 

Senator Ferguson. I think so. We will resume tomorrow morning 
at nine o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 
9 a. m., Friday, January 25, 1952.} 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC BELATIONS 



FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

of the International Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

EXECUTIVE session — CONFIDENTIAL 

The subcommittee met at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess,, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding. 

Present : Senator Ferguson. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel, and Benjamin 
Mandel, director of research. 

Senator Ferguson. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Vincent, you have been previously sworn. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY 
WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe I asked you about Frank V. Coe. 

Mr. Vincent. You had. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Lauchlin Currie. 

Mr. Vincent. May I consult my book here? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : I first met Dr. Currie in 1936 or 1937 when 
he was an officer with the Federal Reserve Board. I saw him occasion- 
ally during the next 2 years prior to my departure for Geneva in 1939. 
Upon my return from Switzerland late in 1940 en route to China I 
saw Dr. Currie several times. He was then an administrative assistant 
to President Roosevelt. He was interested in China officially and he 
was a White House representative. We had several discussions on 
the matter of financial aid to the Chinese Government. The currency 
stabilization loan at that time either had just been passed or was being 
passed. 

In 1942 President Roosevelt sent Dr. Currie to China to see Chiang 
Kai-shek and consult the Chinese Government officials on matters of 
common interest regarding the war. I saw him several times there. 
I gathered his conversations were largely on financial and economic 
matters. I did not participate in the conversations with Chiang 
Kai-shek. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you attend any conferences with Currie 
and any Chinese? 

22848 — 52 — pt. 6 4 1727 



1728 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No (reading) : When I returned to Washington in 
1943 I was loaned by the State Department for several months to the 
newly-established Foreign Economic Administration. 
Mr. Sourwine. You got back when, December 1943 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, June, and had a vacation, a couple of months in 
the far eastern office and went over there for a matter of 4 months, 
(reading) : Dr. Currie was Deputy Administrator of the FEA. I saw 
him directly during this period. After I returned to State in February 
of 1944, 1 had little occasion for contact with Dr. Currie. 

In 1945 he left the Government and went into business in New York. 
The last time I saw him was in New York in 1949 when I had lunch 
with him and Mrs. Currie at the Metropolitan Club. I was home 
for a brief period of consultation in Washington at that time. I have 
not seen him since this meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall how you met or who introduced you ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was up in New Hampshire where he had a little 
farm. I was with Mr. Grew. He had a farm and had loaned his 
farm to my wife and children. They had one at Hancock. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have covered fully your associations with him? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I can recall them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he had any connection with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think he did. I never connected him in my 
own mind with the Institute. He wasn't at the one meeting I went 
to at Hot Springs that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever consult with him and with persons 
known to you to be members of the Institute ? 

Mr. Vincent. With him at the same time as other members? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall any such consultation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall ever being asked by the IPR, or some- 
one representing it, to talk with Mr. Currie ? 

Mr. Vincent. About any specific subject? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall any. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you at any time know or have reason to believe 
that Mr. Currie was connected in any way with the Communist move- 
ment ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name here is John P. Davies. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) . I first met Davies when he was a language 
student in Peking. I was consul in Dairen. That was in 1932 or 
1933. Our paths no doubt crossed from time to time during the next 
10 years, but we did not serve together. 

In 1942 Mr. Davies was assigned to China while I was counselor 
of the Embassy. His job was, he said, a sort of political adviser to 
General Stilwell. He was not directly connected with the Embassy. 
I saw him from time to time during this period. 

Also after I returned to Washington, Mr. Davies would come 
in to see me when he was on home leave or on assignment by General 
Stilwell to Washington I would see him. In December 1945, I again 
saw Mr. Davies in Moscow when he was Secretary of the Embassy 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1729 

there. We were having the Moscow conference of the foreign secre- 
taries. I saw him last in Washington in 194:9 briefly when I came 
home on consultation. I have not seen him since. 

Mr. Soukwine. Did you know at any time if Mr. Davies had any 
connection with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, I did not . 

Mr. Soukwine. Eugene Dennis ? 

Mr. Vincent. Eugene Dennis, I do not know him, and I have not 
followed matters well enough to know who he is ; but I know who he 
is now. He was Secretary of the Communist Party, but I don't know 
him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Laurence Duggan? 

Mr. Vincent (reading). Laurence Duggan was in the State De- 
partment at the same time I was in 1936 to 1939. I don't recall any 
contact with him. I was junior to him. He was concerned with 
Latin- American affairs and I was assistant desk officer in the far east- 
ern office. I can recall no association with him, other than I might 
have met him at some meetings that did take place in the Department 
or something where I would see him casually in the hall. He was not 
a person with whom I had any reason to have official contact, and I 
had no social contact with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time that Mr. Duggan was 
connected in any way with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. John K. Emmerson. 

Mr. Vincent (reading). He is a junior officer in the State Depart- 
ment who had specialized, I believe, in Japanese affairs rather than 
Chinese. I cannot recall when I first met Emmerson. He served in 
the far eastern office sometime during the period 1914 to 1945, maybe 
somewhat earlier than that. 

He was in China, I think, just at the end of my term of duty. I 
can recall no specific meeting with him. I have seen him since I 
came back this time. He is now an officer there in the State Depart- 
ment. 

I have seen him once or twice casually, but I had not anticipated his 
name, so I have not got the State Department register to see about him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any reason to believe he was con- 
nected with the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wilma Fairbank. 

Mr. Vincent (reading). She is the wife of John K. Fairbank. I 
first met her — I may say I met her because he was in China, but I think 
I first met her at the IPR conference where she Was either on the 
secretariat or a delegate. From that time on we saw her from time to 
time. My wife was a good friend of hers while they were stationed 
here. We visited them once before he went off to Switzerland in 1946 
or 1947, I should say, and the last time I saw them was when I was 
passing through Cambridge. I had come back from visiting my son at 
Exeter. We visited the Fairbanks in Cambridge then. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe 
that she was in any way connected with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Miriam S. Farley. 



1730 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I have no clear recollection of having met Miriam* 
Farley, but I probably did see her at the IPR conference. I wouldn't 
know her now if I saw her. 

Mr. Soukwine. What position did she hold with IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think she was a member of the secretariat. I no> 
doubt met her in that capacity. 

As I say, if I saw her I don't believe I would know her. She may- 
have written at some time or called. It is purely a name to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time or have reason to be- 
lieve that she was connected in any way with the Communist 
movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Frederick V. Field ? 

Mr. Vincent (reading). Frederick V. Field I met casually and' 
briefly at a large cocktail party at the IPR, conference. That is the- 
only time I have a distinct recollection of having met him. I do recall) 
there was a preparatory meeting of the American delegation that went 
to the IPR conference. He may have been there. If he was, it made- 
no impression on my mind. 

I never had any vis-a-vis conversations with him or any contact 
with him other than through that conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you asked to assist in any way when Mr. 
Field was trying to get a commission in the Army ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know he tried to get a com- 
mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time or have reason to believe- 
that Mr. Field was connected in any way with the Communist 
movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. At the time I knew him I had no reason to believe- 
he was connected with the Communist Party. 

Mr. Sourwine. Julian R. Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent (reading). Friedman was a young fellow assigned to> 
the Far Eastern Division and assigned to my office in the China Divi- 
sion in 1944. I had nothing to do with his assignment either to the 
divsion or to my division. He worked there in the division for a matter 
of, I should say, a year. He was then particularly interested in the 
field of labor and had, I think, come to that division from the Labor 
Division, as it was called, in the State Department, primarily be- 
cause he had indicated an interest in the Far East and China, and 
had hoped to get an assignment as a labor attache as soon as the war 
was over, attache to China. 

He got the assignment in the fall, I think, of 1945, at the end of 
the war. I don't recall having seen him since then. The last recol- 
lection I have of him was his sending me a notice he had gotten 
married when I was in Switzerland. His duties in the China Divi- 
sion were those of a junior officer who was a leg man. He went to- 
the IPR conference as a member of the secretariat and he was also 
out in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference. 

Senator Ferguson. How would a man like that get to the United 
Nations Conference and the IPR conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Take the second one. I don't know how he got 
there. I know there was a notice that went around that they needed 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1731 

young people on the secretariat at San Francisco. He, being an 
energetic young man, probably went down and applied for a job on 
the secretariat. I did not recommend him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they not look into these people to see 
whether or not they had Communist leanings? Did they not in the 
State Department have any idea that there might be disloyalty? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't say as to that. I had no suspicions of Fried- 
man. 

Senator Ferguson. Or anybody else ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was a very active young man probably with free 
ideas. I disagreed with him, but I did not suspect him of having 
Communist leanings. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it ever enter your mind while in the serv- 
ice during these days we are talking about that the Russians might 
be trying to penetrate our Foreign Service and our diplomatic service? 

Mr. Vincent. No evidence of it ever came to my attention. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not conscious of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not look into that question at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. It never entered your mind, in fact ? 

Mr. Vincent. Do you say "it never entered my mind"? I can 
vouch that it never entered my mind. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall of any instance you may have 
thought well, now, this person or that person may be working for 
the Kremlin, for the Communist Party? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. It never entered your mind ? 

Mr. Vincent. But there were several divisions in the State De- 
partment that were supposed to look into that. 

Senator Ferguson. But in the Far East situation nothing ever en- 
tered your mind that there could be an influence of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Vincent. Within the Foreign Service ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Even as far as Friedman was concerned? 

Mr. Vincent. I never suspected Friedman at any time or any of 
my associates there in the Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you at the United Nations? 

Mr. Vincent. I was part time. 

Senator Ferguson. What did Friedman do out there? 

Mr. Vincent. He was working down on the secretariat and keep- 
ing contact with the various labor organizations represented out there. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that not have been a good place to put 
a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. To have contact with the labor unions there? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. It probably would. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it not have been a good place to put a 
Communist in relation to the work of our delegation? 

Mr. Vincent. I should say it would have been a very good thing 
for the Communists to try to plant people there. 



1732 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. You never thought about it at that time, never 
thought about questioning any of these people ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or to look into the records or anything of that 
kind? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I may say again we had security divisions 
that were supposed to look into these people. 

Senator Ferguson. When were you first questioned on security? 

Mr. Vincent. Myself you mean? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know I was ever questioned as to security; 
never in my mind. 

Senator Ferguson. I just wondered whether they questioned 
everybody. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you sure that you have not understated Mr. 
Friedman's importance in any way ? Was he in any sense more than 
a f etcher and carrier? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know that is all he was. I can't recall 
the particular assignments he had. He sat in a far corner of the room. 
I had a big office there. He looked over the papers that came in with 
regard to labor conditions. I can recall of no major assignment 
Friedman had. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he work directly under you? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, in the China Division. 

Mr. Sourwine. You supervised his work? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there any official in the echelon between you 
and him, or did you supervise his work directly ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had an Assistant Chief of the China Division who 
probably exercised supervision over him as well as I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he actually exercise supervision over him? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't say to what extent. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was the Assistant Chief? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Paul Meyer. I would have to consult the reg- 
ister, but the period in there is somewhat vague. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Friedman was never given any real responsi- 
bility? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. He never substituted for you or acted as your deputy 
in any matter? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Meyer act as your deputy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, occasionally. I think what you have in mind 
is some area committee that Mr. Dooman has mentioned where he 
went in. He was not my deputy or representative. He was simply 
there. I went sometimes myself to this area committee. Mr. Dooman 
has testified on that, but not in the capacity as my deputy. He had 
started going to those meetings when he was still in the Labor Divi- 
sion and continued to go. I attended them very seldom. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are referring to the meetings of the Far Eastern 
Committee of SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. No, he never, went to the SWNCC committees. There 
was a rather vague committee called the Area Committee that various 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1733 

divisions would sit in on and discuss problems in a general way. He 
attended those from time to time so I am now told or gather from the 
testimony. I would not recall that. 

Mr. Sourwine. But he never did attend the meetings of the Far 
Eastern Committee of SWNCC ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Nor ever had any authority to represent you there ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the SWNCC meetings ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no record of his ever going to the SWNCC 
meetings. I think he had left the Department for China before I ever 
became connected with SWNCC. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did he leave ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall the date. I would have to have the 
register, but my recollection is the early autumn as soon as the war 
was over. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know or have any reason to believe that 
Mr. Friedman was connected in any way with the Communist move- 
ment? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know or have any reason so to believe? 

Mr. Vincent. I have seen nothing that would indicate it. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Mark J. Gayn. 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know him and I have never met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know who he is ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was with Amerasia. The name clicks in that way 
that he was connected with Amerasia, but I never met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether that name sticks in your 
memory because associates or persons might have mentioned him to 
you, or did you read it in the newspapers? 

Mr. Vincent. I read it in the newspapers. I am trying to remem- 
ber ; that is where he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mark Ginsbourg. 

Mr. Vincent. No, I have no recollection of a Mark Ginsbourg. 

Mr. Sourwine. Louis Gibarti? 

Mr. Vincent. No recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Harold Glasser? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes [reading] : He was with the Treasury Depart- 
ment. I met him, I should say, once or twice on Treasury business 
that had to do with State. He was at the UNNRA conference, if I 
recall correctly, at Atlantic City. That was in 1944. I had very lit- 
tle contact with Glasser. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall where you first met him ? 

Mr. Vincent. My estimate would be it was at the conference at 
Atlantic City, but it may have been earlier. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your association with him was very slender after 
that? 

Mr. Vincent. Very. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not on a friendly social basis? 

Mr. Vincent. I never saw him socially that I can recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe 
he was connected in any way with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 



1734 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. I think I stated this before but I will ask again that 
question. I mean no implication that these people were, or are, 
Communists. 

Mr. Vincent. I was hoping my answer was also that I did not then, 
but in most of these cases and in all of them I had no idea then or 
now. 

Mr. Sourwine. I think the question is quite broad enough to cover 
that. It is so intended. I asked it specifically, notwithstanding, in 
the one case of Mr. Friedman, the discussion which had gone on which 
might have left an implication that you have some such feeling. 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to say that being out of the country since 
1947 almost continually, things may have happened here that I should 
have been aware of that I am not. Four years' absence means I have 
not followed it. Somebody may have admitted he was one and I 
wouldn't know it. 

Mr. Sourwine. The committee will not hold you responsible for 
knowing who is and who is not a Communist in every instance. We 
are trying to find out what you do know. 

Grace Maul Granich? ' 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know Grace Maul Granich. I know that 
she is the wife of Max Granich who was out in Shanghai. I never 
knew her. 

Mr. Sourwine. Max Granich? 

Mr. Vincent. I never knew Max Granich except by name. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know him to be a Communist, by 
name? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And in any way connected with the Communist 
Party ? 

Mr. Vincent. We have reports. The Chinese gave reports that 
they thought he was connected with the Communist Party. Mr. Gauss, 
the consul general at that time in Shanghai, asked the Chinese to pro- 
duce evidence. The Chinese were unable to produce it, but that did 
not destroy the suspicion that they were connected with the Com- 
munist Party. They were certainly left wing. 

Senator Ferguson. Were any of these other people you may have 
mentioned you did not know to be Communist left-wingers? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I have gone through so far. 

Senator Ferguson. Even Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. Friedman I would have called a New Dealer of an 
extreme sort. 

Senator Ferguson. But not a left-winger? 

Mr. Vincent. You have to define that. I have described him as a 
young New Dealer. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not unusual to find those people ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. In the Foreign Service ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the Foreign Service. You have the whole politi- 
cal pattern from one extreme to the other in the Foreign Service. 

Mr. Sourwine. Michael Greenberg? 

Mr. Vincent. Michael Greenberg, I think, was at one time an 
assistant to Lauchlin Currie when Lauchlin Currie was a Special 
Assistant to the President in the White House. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1735 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Lauchlin Currie to be a New 
Dealer? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly have associated Lauchlin Currie 
with the New Deal. 

Senator Ferguson. And Michael Greenberg? 

Mr. Vincent. I know nothing- about his political views, but I would 
have thought if he was working for Currie he would have been. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say either one of those were left- 
wingers ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not from my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any association with Greenberg? 

Mr. Vincent. None other than the fact that he was an assistant to 
Currie at a time when Currie was handling far-eastern affairs. They 
had a little office. From time to time I would see him. I don't recall 
having any discussions with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say from what you knew about him 
or even reports from the Chinese Government that he was in any 
way connected with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I never saw any reports from the Chinese Gov- 
ernment on Michael Greenberg. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you on any of these other people, other than 
the ones you have mentioned, Granich, Max Granich ? 

Mr. Vincent. I mentioned him, but I would not say I saw any 
report on him. 

Senator Ferguson. Or any others ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did on Granich ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he not operating some kind of a paper? 

Mr. Vincent. He was operating something called the Voice of 
China, which was highly propagandist^ in character, as a magazine, 
in Shanghai. 

Senator Ferguson. What language ? 

Mr. Vincent. In English. I had no first-hand knowledge of that 
in the sense he was operating in Shanghai and I was in Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Joseph Gregg ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of ever meeting anyone by 
that name. The name doesn't ring any bell. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know anybody by that name who 
might have been known by some other name ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Alger Hiss ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I might like to refer to these papers [reading] : 

My first recollection of meeting Alger Hiss was in 1940 when he 
had become assistant or special assistant to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, 
who at that time was political adviser for the Far East. I may have 
met him in the halls or elsewhere before that because he was working 
for Mr. Sayre, but I have no recollection of that. I am giving my 
first meeting where I recollect. 

I was home en route to China and he was assistant to Mr. Horn- 
back. I went to China and did not see him again until I came back 
in 1943. I had occasional meetings with him. All business with Horn- 
beck had to pass through Mr. Hiss. When Dr. Hornbeck left the 



1736 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

far eastern office some time in the spring of 1944, Mr. Hiss became, 
as far as I can recall, interested in the work preparatory to the Dum- 
barton Oaks Conference which was the prelude to the United Nations 
Conference. I saw him, frankly, not at all then. 

Senator Ferguson. How much did you see him then ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not at all. I don't recall seeing him; I may have 
seen him in the halls, but I had no business with him. Once he left 
I had no business with him. 

Senator Ferguson. When you were in the Far East you had quite 
a bit of dealing with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was in Washington and I was in the Far East. 
Therefore, he presumably saw the reports I wrote in, but I never saw 
him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he ever talk with you about a report ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know on any occasion he wrote you 
directly about a report you had made, not agreeing with it? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever having any correspondence with 
Alger Hiss about any reports I made or he made. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have any correspondence or cable- 
grams or any communication with Hornbeck about these ? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean when I was in China and Hornbeck was 
here? I would not have been able to tell about telegrams coming 
out from Hornbeck, because they would have been signed by the 
Secretary, and I have no recollection of personal correspondence 
between myself and Hornbeck about myself or about official matters. 

The Senator had asked me whether I had any correspondence 
while in the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. About his reports, Mr. Sourwine. He has testi- 
fied the fact that Hiss was assistant to Hornbeck and therefore matters 
would be through Hiss to Hornbeck, the reports. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I had not finished with this paper. I said that 
[reading] he left far eastern affairs and went with some group that 
was preparing for Dumbarton Oaks and later I saw him only as he was 
Secretary General of the Conference in San Francisco and was very 
busy. I had no contact other than to know he was there. 

After that he came back to the Department and was made, in the 
autumn of 1945, I believe, the chief or the director of the newly 
created United Nations office. In that capacity he attended staff meet- 
ings which I also attended where we were discussing matters where 
we would cut across them on United Nations affairs, far eastern affairs, 
European affairs. I saw him in that capacity for just a year before 
he resigned and went with the Carnegie Institute. I have not seen 
him since. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet with Mr. Hiss outside the State 
Department, or otherwise than on official duties ! 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of it. I believe that no doubt 
we attended dinner parties where he was present. I may have gone 
to a cocktail party at his house, but I had no intimate, outside-of -office 
associations with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at any time Mr. Hiss was connected 
with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or have any reason to believe it ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1737 

Mr. Vincent. I had no reason to suspect him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Since you have stipulated your answers bring it 
down to the present time, do you have any reason now to believe 
that Mr. Hiss was ever connected in any way with the Communist 
party ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you believe he was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't say I believe he was, but I have reason to 
suspect that he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a belief in that regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether Mr. Hiss was a Communist or was con- 
nected with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say he was at one time in his life. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name here I will ask you to pronounce. 
It is Ho Chi Minh. 

Mr. Mandel. May I refresh your memory? He is the leader of 
the forces in Indochina. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. No, I never had any contact with 
him. I certainly knew him by reputation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any reason to know or believe that 
he is in any way connected with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say most definitely I think he is connected 
with the Communist Party. 

Mr. Sourwine. Philip Jaffe? 

Mr. Vincent. I never knew Mr. Jaffe, never met him knowingly. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever had any communication with him? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I can recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever send him any messages or receive any 
irom him ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I don't think there was correspondence between 
Ihim and me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you talk with him over the telephone? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before you answer further, who was Mr. Jaffe ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Jaffe was, as I recall it, connected with the 
Amerasia magazine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that before having read it in the 
papers, or otherwise? 

Mr. Vincent. From the papers. I don't think I knew Jaffe was 
on Amerasia until the case broke. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the Amerasia magazine? 

Mr. Vincent. Very slightly. I remember seeing it from time to 
time. I read it from time to time. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you a subscriber of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the State Department get you a copy ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would come into- the State Department, or people 
would bring it. I can't say whether the State Department subscribed 
to it or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get any idea it was a left-wing 
magazine? 



1738 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I had no thought at the time I was reading it. I don't 
recall reading it. I remember the first issue. I thought it was a rather 
good magazine. Dr. Hornbeck contributed an article to it, but I didn't 
follow the magazine. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever contribute to it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever asked to contribute? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. I can do Owen Lattimore [reading] : I first met Lat- 
timore probably in 1930 when he was in Peking. At that time I be- 
lieve he was connected with some scholarship that he had ; whether it 
was the Crane Foundation or something else. Our paths from then 
on might have crossed. I have no recollection. I was not an inti- 
mate friend of his. 

My recollection of meeting him was when he came to China in 1941 
in the late autumn or early spring as the President had sent him out 
to be a special — I don't know his title, but he was supposed to be an ad- 
viser to Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. I did not see him very often 
at that time primarily because he was connected with Chiang Kai-shek 
and I believe Lattimore himself thought that too close an association 
with the Embassy would probably not be conducive to his good rela- 
tions with the Generalissimo. He would think he was reporting back- 
wards and forwards. 

I did not know his work. I would see him in Chungking from time 
to time. He left Chungking before I did. 

When I came back here, I found that Lattimore had become, I think, 
Deputy Director of OWI for the Pacific, for matters in connection 
with the Pacific area under Elmer Davis. We no doubt had contact, 
although it was not close, because he was busy. I was busy, and the 
liaison between the State Department and its various divisions and 
OWI was carried on by an office especially designated for that purpose. 
I recall Mr. Merrill Meyers was our liaison with OWI. He would keep 
them currently informed and point out what they were doing in the 
way of their programs. 

My next association with Lattimore was on the trip to China with 
Mr. Wallace. He, as you know, was a member of that group. I saw 
him, of course, there, when we were in a plane for 50 days, with great 
frequency. I would say in passing that in Siberia and Central Asia 
Lattimore interested himself primarily in visiting museums, educa- 
tional institutions, whereas I stayed more closely with Wallace in 
visiting agricultural places, industrial things, and attending social 
affairs in the evening that were usually given for us. 

We returned from that trip, and I think soon thereafter Lattimore 
resigned. I don't know at what time he went back to his work at 
Johns Hopkins. I can't recall. I wasn't keeping in close enough 
touch to remember when he quit OWI. It is in his own record. 

I saw him from time to time. We knew his wife, Mrs. Lattimore- 
I remember visiting them once in Towson, Md., and Baltimore. 

The question has arisen, and we might as well deal with it now, 
of the matter of a proposal that he become a consultant in the State 
Department. I would just as soon make that statement now. In 
the early spring of 1945 Mr. Lattimore had a form made out, and 
I don't know what the form of employment was, for consultant in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1739 

the State Department on a per diem basis. I thought it was a good 
idea. We needed somebody who as a tactical expert would give us 
information or prepare background data on those borders and areas 
of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. 

He had written a book called the Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 
I think is the name of it, and was in my estimation the foremost expert 
on that area in the States. We had at that time Dr. Kennedy, the 
late Dr. Kennedy, of Yale, who was furnishing in the far eastern 
office similar information and background work done for Indonesia, 
and I think also other Southeast Asian areas. 

So I recommended, if you want to call it "recommended," Mr. 
Lattimore be taken on in this job. The recommendation was approved 
by my chief, who was then Mr. Ballentine. Mr. Grew, however, 
told me he did not think it was a good idea to hire a man who was 
engaged in publicity to the degree that Lattimore was at that time. 
He was contributing to magazines and other things. There the matter 
was dropped. I did not know 

Senator Ferguson. Was that the only reason he assigned? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the only reason he assigned to me. 

Senator Ferguson. I would think that was the kind of man you 
wanted. • 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Grew put it on the basis of "who was engaged m 
publicity." I think Lattimore was writing articles for maybe the 
Baltimore Sun or something else, contributing once or twice a week. 
He was certainly a contributor to magazines. 

Subsequently I have learned through seeing Mr. Dooman's testi- 
mony that he took it up with Mr. Grew and had it stopped. But Mr. 
Grew did not tell me that then. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any reason to believe he should 
not have come with the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; as a matter of fact, I thought as a man to 
work on a tactical subject he was ideally suited, and those areas were 
little known to us. 

Senator Ferguson. What would he have received in compensation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what the per diem was. I know it 
probably ran — I just don't know what it was. I knew Dr. Kennedy 
was getting a per diem. 

Senator Ferguson. How much ; $50 ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not as high as $50. The financial side of it 
would not have been an inducement for anybody to come down. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it Mr. Lattimore's idea, or someone else's, 
that he apply for this position with the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. It was the result of discussions between Mr. Latti- 
more and myself. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it your suggestion ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I would not recall, whether I suggested it or 
he did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ask him if he would accept one of these jobs 
that had no financial inducement? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say the financial inducement was not a con- 
sideration. We discussed the matter of needing a better source of in- 
formation on these areas which were certainly going to come up in 
any subsequent negotiations of a peace treaty. I may add this : That 
at the time we discussed that, neither I nor he, or anybody else, any- 



1740 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

body else on my level in the State Department, knew that the Yalta 
agreement was going on and you might say certain disposition was 
being made there, particularly with regard to Outer Mongolia. That 
did not become known to me until June 1945. 

Mr. Soukwine. Do you recall where this conference with Mr. Lat- 
timore took place at which you asked him if he would accept a job 
with the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. I don't recall whether I asked him or 
whether he indicated it was a job he thought should be done. 

Mr. Sourwine. I understand you to testify 

Mr. Vincent. It came out in a conversation with him. I am per- 
fectly willing to say I may have asked him to accept the job and he 
may have accepted the job and I said "Yes, it is a good idea." Who 
produced the idea I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was this in your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall, or whether it was on the week end in 
Towson. We went up Saturday night and came back Sunday. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that week end before or after this occasion? 
Can you definitely place it? 

Mr. Vincent. I can. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it only the one week end? 

Mr. Vicent. With Lattimore, that is the only week end I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not in the habit of interchanging visits 
with him or you and your wife with him and his wife ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. He could not have spent a week end with us be- 
cause we did not have any place to put him up. He was down in 
Washington and would probably call up and say, "I am here. Won't 
you have lunch with me?" My relations with Lattimore were of that 
sort. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are or were quite friendly over a long period 
of time ? 

Mr. Vincent. He would certainly let me know. Over the period 
I would say of 1941 on down 

Mr. Sourwine. You first knew him as early as 1930 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would not say you have been unfriendly since 
then ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have been friendly since then ? 

Mr. Vincent. There was a whole gap of 10 years when I saw him. 
When we were associated it was after he had an official position in 
Washington. 

Mr. Sourwine. We don't have to see a man every day to be good 
friends, do we ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore is your good friend ? 

Mr. Vicent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. So you undoubtedly saw him on enough occasions 
outside the office so that you would not be able to pinpoint any par- 
ticular one or necessarily remember the sequence of all of them? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know Mr. Lattimore was connected in any 
way with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1741 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know him to be a left-winger? 

Mr. Vincent. Again I would say I felt Lattimore was a person of 
New Deal complexion. He was a man with liberal ideas rather than 
a left-winger. 

Senator Ferguson. That brings up the definition of liberal. What 
is a liberal in your opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator 

Senator Ferguson. ISow, you said he was a man with liberal ideas. 

Mr. Vincent. I confess I don't have any definition ready for a 
liberal. 

Senator Ferguson. I claim to be a liberal and my views are entirely 
opposite to that of Lattimore. I want to know what your definition 
of a liberal is. 

Mr. Vincent. I suppose the best way to put it would be if a person 
is looking for means and ways of improving and changing conditions 
as they exist where he finds them unsatisfactory that he is liberal in 
his views, because he is not tied to any preconceived ideas as to exactly 
how our democratic things work. That would be the best definition 
I can give. Maybe I am getting confused with a humanitarian. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say a man who works to relieve 
people from activities of Government was a liberal ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't quite understand what you mean by the activ- 
ities of Government. 

Senator Ferguson. The Government dictating the policies and do- 
ing things for everybody. 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly say a person could be a liberal and 
still resent that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think a liberal would be the man who 
would want the Government to do things ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not Owen Lattimore that kind of a man? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. He was a person who believed in 
the Government. You have got to define what you mean by the 
Government doing things. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let us not talk about Mr. Lattimore in the past 
tense. 1 think he is still very much alive and you have not ceased to 
know him or associate with him. 

Mr. Vincent. 1 have not seen him since 1947. I would rather not 
try to discuss Mr. Lattimore as a liberal. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he not the kind of man that wanted the 
Government to do everything? 

Mr. Vincent. You are getting me into an area now 

Senator Ferguson. You said he was a liberal. You class New Deal- 
ers as liberals. You said he was a New Dealer and a liberal. You 
used the term, not me. 

I want to know what it is now. Here is a man that you describe as 
a liberal. What was he? 

Mr. Vincent. I described it here as a man who was not tied to a 
preconceived idea of how things should be done but was looking for 
ways to improve Government. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you call communism liberalism? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you call Marxism liberalism? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 



1742 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Do you call socialism liberalism ? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you call New Dealers liberals ? 
Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the difference between New Dealers and 
socialism ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think the New Dealer ever — I should not get 
into this because I am not a political philosopher. The New Dealer, 
to my mind, never, as I saw it, wanted to bring about Government 
ownership. There may have been cases where the New Deal did 
in a broad sense. I know there was TVA. Government ownership 
of the means of production I do not think was ever the program of 
the New Deal. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you a New Dealer? 

Mr. Vincent. I would describe myself as being in favor of some 
of the New Deal's policies. 

Senator Ferguson. What about the policies you were in favor of ? 
What were they ? . 

Mr. Vincent. Such things as banking and insurance. I was not 
mixed up in the New Deal at all. I was opposed, for instance, to 
the Supreme Court, if you want to call that New Deal. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean packing the Supreme Court? 
Mr. Vincent. That was one thing. I would not know. You would 
have to name what measures. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not the idea of packing the Supreme Court 
to give the Government power over people ? 
Mr. Vincent. I didn't like the means at all. 
Senator Ferguson. Was not that the idea ? 
Mr. Vincent. I don't know the objective at the time. 
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that was a liberal movement to 
pack the Supreme Court? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, and I was opposed to it. 
Senator Ferguson. Can you give us any more information as to 
what Lattimore was ? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was a New Dealer and a liberal ? 
Mr. Vincent. I don't know that Lattimore himself would call him- 
self a New Dealer. I find myself in a disagreeable position because 
our conversation was about China and not about internal politics. 
Mr. Sourwine. Would you describe him as a humanitarian? 
Mr. Vincent. I would think so. There again I don't want to be 
put in the position of having to describe a humanitarian. 

Mr. Mandel. Would you estimate precisely and briefly the authority 
of Owen Lattimore in the field of far-eastern affairs according to 
your own personal opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. As an authority ? 
Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I think he has been a very serious student of Far 
Eastern affairs. I have not any exact recollection now just what the 
thesis is in his book, the last book he wrote on the Far East. I found 
myself in agreement with some of his ideas in that book and in dis- 
agreement with others. That would not mean I didn't think he was 
an authoritative writer on the Far East, but some of his ideas I have 
found to be not in agreement with mine. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1743 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you intending to hedge on Lattimore? Did 
not you call him earlier the outstanding authority on the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. On these inner areas. I thought we were covering 
a much broader subject. I did. I would get around to that. 

That was his principal field of claiming to be an expert. As to the 
Far East, he certainly has already lived there all his life, and I have 
looked at him as a man having a certain knowledge about the Far 
East. 

Mr. Mandel. You read all his books ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I have glanced through and read the Inner 
Asian Frontiers and that other book I am trying to recall. I do not 
recall reading anything else. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you read Solution in Asia ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what I am talking about. I know certain 
parts of that I was not too much impressed with. There were others 
I thought were sound. I would have to have the book to know what 
I was talking about. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to ask some question about Latti- 
more. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have an additional line of questioning about 
him. 

Senator Ferguson. I will come back to that, then. 

Mr. Sourwine. I will ask one question out of order. 

Do you know what a Communist means when he refers to someone 
as a liberal? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name here is Duncan Chapin Lee. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall meeting him. He may have been a per- 
son who came into my office or may have been in the Far East at one 
time. I don't recall him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Michael Lee? 

Mr. Vincent. If that is the man I think it is [reading] down in 
FEA at one time when I was there for a short time, I saw him in and 
out of FEA during that period in 1943 through January of 1944 when 
I was there. I don't recall seeing him since. 

Mr. Sourwine. How well did you know him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know him well at all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he is ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. I heard at one time he went to the De- 
partment of Commerce after I left Washington, or even before, maybe. 

Mr. Sourwine. How about Li Shao Chi ? 

Mr. Vincent. Li Shao Chi — I don't recall meeting anybody by that 
name. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does the name mean anything to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. There are many Li's whose last names I would 
not have known. 

Mr. Mandel,. Could I come back to Michael Lee for a moment? 
Michael Lee was in charge of far-eastern shipments in the Depart- 
ment of Commerce. Wouldn't it be logical to believe he was in touch 
with the State Department on matters pertaining to the Far East and 
in touch with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think while I was there — he may have been in 
touch with the State Department, but while I was there I was not in 

22848—52— pt. G 5 



1744 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

touch with him. I don't think he was in charge of that operation 
while I was in Washington. I left in early 1947 or the middle of 
1947. I can't quite place Michael Lee as of the time he went into 
Commerce. 

Mr. Sourwine. Raymond Ludden? 

Mr. Vincent. He is a young Foreign Service officer. I think I have 
him just for dates here in my book [reading] : He was a junior officer 
whom I may have met from time to time, but my first association with 
him which I recall was when he was assigned to China in 1943 some- 
what before my departure for America. 

I met him casually since then. He was assigned to China at Kun- 
ming. I recall in 1950 I had met him in Brussels when he was there 
with Mr. Bob Murphy as Ambassador and had dinner at Mr. Murphy's 
with him. He is back in America now and I saw him once in the 
State Department since he has been back. He is not one of the junior 
officers I have known as well as some of the others like Davies. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember reading any of his reports? 

Mr. Vincent. He made reports from time to time from Kunming 
which I no doubt read. They don't stick in my memory, though. 

Mr. Sourwine. I will ask this question and go back on it : Did you 
know or did you ever have any reason to believe that Mr. Ludden was 
connected in any way with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know or did you ever have any reason to 
believe that Michael Lee was connected in any way with the Commun- 
ist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did I ask you that question about Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. I believe you did. I am sure you did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Selden Menefee? 

Mr. Vincent. That name recalls something if you will give me a 
minute. I have not thought of the name in years. Can I put it in the 
form of a question ? Was he connected with radio broadcasting ? I 
am trying to place him as a young man. 

Mr. Sourwine. He is. 

Mr. Vincent. He was a young man who used to come in and assist 
during a period when we were using these broadcasts on various and 
sundry subjects in the State Department. If I am not mistaken, he 
was working with Fischer of NBC, and arranged the broadcast which 
General Hildring and someone else and I gave on Korea and on Japan. 

I think there was a series of about four. To what extent Menefee 
each time was engaged in this — I would say that he came in and tried 
to piece these things together because they were prearranged debates 
on Far Eastern policy. He would get my ideas, Hildring's ideas, and 
patch them together, and he was an arranger of radio programs. 

Mr. Sourwine. He wrote the scripts ? 

Mr. Vincent. He wrote some of them. I wrote most of mine, but 
he would fit it in. If you mean he arranged the scripts, he may have 
written some of them. 

Mr. Sourwine. In a sense of writing the script, the man who writes 
it is the man who puts down the words in the order in which they 
were said. Did you write the script or prepare a memorandum of the 
ideas you wished to express ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1745 

Mr. Vincent. Menefee would come in and interview me, get that, 
and take out of it what I said and rearrange it to make it in the form 
of a conversation among the three of us. 

Mr. Sourwine. Inserting questions by others or responses by them 
to questions by you? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that script then submitted to you for approval 
before you went on the air with it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it submitted also for the approval of the other- 
participants ? 

Mr. Vincent. I assume it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. As far as you know was the procedure the same in 
the case of the others that Mr. Menefee would interview them and 
then write the script ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know, yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not suggest what the others on the pro- 
gram should say ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know, but I don't recall in these meetings 
we ever met together to arrange a program. 

Mr. Sourwine. You met for the first time at the radio station? 

Mr. Vincent. In the case of Hildring we were meeting in the 
State Department, but insofar as the program was concerned 

Mr. Sourwine. You would see the whole script in advance for 
approval ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever make any suggestions in any of those 
scripts for changes in what any of the others said ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you make suggestions for changes with regard 
to your own, or did Mr. Menefee do a good job Of putting on paper 
what 3^011 had told him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I no doubt made changes in the way he had put it 
down as to what I said. 

Mr. Sourwine. So the scripts when they went on the air were 
made up of your language and not his? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar as I recall they were. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe 
Mr. Menefee was connected in any way with the Communist move- 
ment ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. William Mandel. 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't — the first name? 

Mr. Mandel. He is an expert on the Soviet Far East, a writer, 
a lecturer. 

Mr. Vincent. He wrote a book which I think had to do with the 
Soviet, with Siberia, the Soviet eastern Siberia area. I never met 
him, and I don't know whether I read the book or not. I can't recalL 
That is the man. Thank you. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mao Tse-tung? 

Mr. Vincent. General Hurley used to call him "Mouse Tung." 
No; I never met him. 

Mr. Mandel. Have you read any of his works ? 



1746 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know or have reason to believe that he is 
connected in any way with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Souewine. What is that connection ? 

Mr. Vincent. He is now president of the Communist regime, if 
that is the title they use. He may be chairman of the board or 
chairman of the party as well. 

Mr. Sourwine. In China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he an active Communist at the time you were 
in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know him as such then ? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew him as such. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet him ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Kate Mitchell? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I never met Kate Mitchell to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did 'you know who she was? 

Mr. Vincent. She also I think was connected with the Amerasia 
matter, wasn't she ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that only from reading about it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mc Sourwine. V. E. Motylev ? But, before you go to that name, 
do you know or did you have any reason to believe Kate Mitchell was 
connected in any way with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. V.E. Motylev? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I have no recollection of meeting anybody by 
that name. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he is ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Constantine Oumansky? 

Mr. Vincent. He was a Soviet, either charge or ambassador, for a 
period. I never met him other than I think I attended the Soviet big 
to-do and this annual celebration where I shook his hand one time. 
Otherwise I had no contact with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had no conferences with him on any other 
occasions ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or participated in conferences that he was partic- 
ipating in ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. J. Peters? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

You don't want me to recall when I might have met him ? The name 
means nothing. If I met him, it made no impression. 

Mr. Sourwine. When I name one of these names — it will do no 
harm to refresh your recollection — I am asking two questions : Did you 
or do you know the individual named ? Did you know by any other 
name an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person 
referred to ? 



I 



i 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1747 

Mr. Vincent. No. I didn't know him. 

I may say we skipped that other one frequently : Did I know any- 
body by any other name ? That is understood, is it not ? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is understood in each case. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I don't know anybody that I might havn 
known under some other name at other times other than somebody who 
might have gotten married. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mildred Price? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I ever met Mildred Price. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who she is? 

Mr. Vincent. May I look here? I went through some of those 
names. 

Mr. Mandel. May I refresh Mr. Vincent's memory ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I wish you would. 

Mr. Manuel. She was executive secretary of the China Aid Council. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I ever met her. If she had turned up 
at the IPR conference, I don't know. She may have been at a func- 
tion, but I never had any contact that made any impression on my 
memory of her. 

Mr. Sourwine. LudwigRajchman? 

Mr. Vincent. Ludwig Rajchman was a man out in China and asso- 
ciated with Mr. T. V. Soong. I think I met him here in Washington 
once or twice at social functions* I don't recall ever having any con- 
ferences with him on any business. He was a name well Known to 
me in China because he was in Nanking but never when I was sta- 
tioned there. He came out with the League of Nations in the first- 
instance, or maybe not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know or have any reason to believe that 
he was ever connected in any way with the Communist movement! 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Vladimir Rogoff? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall having a luncheon at the Cosmos Club in 
January 1944 with Rogoff and some other people. At the present 
time my recollection is that Bill Johnstone, of George Washington 
University, was there. Rogoff had some connection with Tass Newa 
Agency, I believe, and had been recently in China. I don't recall 
who arranged the luncheon. I did not. It could not have been 
Rogoff, because it was at the Cosmos Club. It was probably John- 
stone. I never met him before or since. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you a member of the Cosmos Club ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

The conversation was of a general character, and it did not make 
such impression on me as to recall now what it was about. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that a long luncheon? 

Mr. Vincent. It lasted longer than a luncheon would normally 
last. We had that little room, I think, in the Cosmos Club where 
you don't sit completely apart but have a little room there, and we 
probably stayed on, instead of 1 hour, 2 hours. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall who else was there ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall other than Bill Johnstone was there. 
I remember talking with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Lattimore there? 



1748 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. If he was, I don't recall it. Maybe the testimony 
of these hearings has indicated who it was, but I don't recall who 
else was there. 

Mr. Sourwtne. I thought perhaps from your consultation of your 
notes, which you told us were prepared by people who had access to 
the hearings, that the notes covered what had been said in the hear- 
ings about that particular conference. 

Mr. Vincent. I have made no record here of who else was there. 
I remember Johnstone. I do recall other people were there, but I 
don't recall the names. 

Mr. Sourwine. These notes are intended to cover instances which 
have been made mention of in our hearings? That is, concerning 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. That is the reason some of them I 
have and some I have not. 

Mr. Sourwine. We will come back to that last conference later, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Vladimir Romm? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall. Could I ask my other question 
as to how I may have met him? I just don't recall him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let me go back to Rogoff. Did you know or have 
reason to believe that he was connected in any way with the Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly have thought he was connected 
with the Communist Party, since he was a Tass correspondent. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean a Tass correspondent has to be a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't say he has to, but I would say I assume he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he has to be ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't. 

Mr. Sourwine. Andrew Roth? 

Mr. Mandel. You skipped Romm. 

Mr. Vincent. I said I didn't know him. Mr. Mandel had some- 
thing to offer there ? 

Mr. Mandel. He was the Tass correspondent sometime prior to 
Rogoff and was purged subsequently in Russia. He was Tass cor- 
respondent in Washington for a number of years. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever meeting him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Andrew Roth? 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : Andrew Roth was a young man who was 
in the Navy who first came to my attention when the Amerasia case 
broke. I don't think I knew of him before that time. I don't think I 
ever met Roth more than two or three times in my life, never had any 
business dealings with him, but know the name, and met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you met him before the Amerasia case broke? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall meeting him before that. He may 
have come into the office on one thing or another. He was particularly 
interested in Japan. He may have been in, but it made no impression 
on me. He was a man who would go around. I never had any what 
you would say business dealings with him that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know or have any reason to believe Mr. 
Roth was connected in any way with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Mandel. Have you read his book; Dilemma in Japan ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1749 

Mr. Vincent. No; I have not. His very recent book? 

Mr. Mandel. No. 

Mr. Sodkwine. Laurence Salisbury? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes [reading] : Laurence Salisbury is or was a For- 
eign Service officer whom I met from time to time as our paths crossed 
as Foreign Service officers. The first time I recall serving with Salis- 
bury was in Nanking, China. No; he was not there. He was in 
Peking but came to Nanking frequently. We had a double Embassy 
office there. He was in Peking, and I was in Nanking. He would 
come down to Nanking. 

I had met him before, but that was casually. When I came back 
to the Department in 1943, Salisbury was in the Far Eastern Office. 
1 suppose he was handling Japanese affairs because that was his 
specialty. He had studied Japanese. 

I will go back and say he was with the Lytton Commission that came 
to Manchuria in 1936. I met him there. I never saw the Lytton 
Commission, but I saw him. I think that would be the first time I 
met him. 

In 1944 Salisbury became, in the reorganization, Chief of the South- 
east Asian Office of the State Department. He resigned some months 
after that. My recollection would be either in the summer or autumn 
of 1944 Salisbury retired ; and now he is living, so far as I know, in 
retirement in Connecticut. I have not seen him for many years. I 
have not seen him since I went to Switzerland, and I don't recall seeing 
him since he retired. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever correspond with him? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. There might have been corre- 
spondence. 

Mr. Sour wine. Did you ever know or have reason to believe he 
was in any way connected with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. John Stewart Service? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I have something on him [reading] : Service 
was a junior secretary. I was going to precede it with the fact that, 
Service being in the Foreign Service, I no doubt run across him in the 
State Department, but I am limiting myself to periods when we served 
together. He may have been in Shanghai for that brief 2 months 
T spent there, but I don't recall. I do know he came to Chungking 
and worked when I was there as consul under Mr. Gauss. He was 
•one of the secretaries, the second or third. 

For a while during this period he lived with Mr. Gauss and me 
for a short time. He was an active and intelligent young officer. 
I do not recall the exact date of his assignment. In 1943 Service 
went to General Stilwell's headquarters on loan as a sort of political 
adviser in the same way that Davies was lent. I don't know whether 
you are familiar with that arrangement, but there were about five 
•or six of these young officers who were attached to Stilwell's head- 
quarters to assist him in any way they could. I probably should 
not emphasize the word "political," although that was what they 
were called. 

My next contact with him was in 1944 when he came home on a 
short vacation, and that was purely seeing him in the Department. 
In 1945 he was in Washington again. He was assigned at that time 
to the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service doing 



1750 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

some kind of administrative work. It was this time that the Amer- 
asia case broke. I never discussed the case with Service, nor did I 
have anything to do with the Amerasia case. I did, along with some 
other friends, make a small contribution to assist him in the business 
of obtaining legal counsel at that time. I believe he repaid me. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell us how that was brought about. Did he 
solicit you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I have forgotten who did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did somebody ? 

Mr. Vincent. Somebody must have started the idea of trying to 
get him some money. I remember Mr. Gauss was one of them that 
contributed. I was one, and I wouldn't know who else. 

Senator Ferguson. How much did you contribute ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten, but it was not more than $50, and 
it may have been $40 or something like that. I think Service repaid 
it. 

Mr. Mandel. Was it an interdepartment project, or did Mortimer 
Graves 

Mr. Vincent. He was another contributor. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he solicit you ? 

Mr. Vincent. He may have. He may have been the person who 
conceived the idea of getting money for Service, although I wasn't 
one who would have to be prodded or solicited on the thing if I 
thought he needed any money. 

Senator Ferguson. What was he being accused of? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time I think the accusation was espionage- 
Senator Ferguson. You mean as a Foreign Service officer you would 
not need to know any of the facts but that a fellow employee in the 
Department was accused of espionage and that you would contribute 
to his defense ? 

Mr. Vincent. I contributed toward helping him get a lawyer for 
his defense. That is exactly the case. He was not guilty. 

Senator Ferguson. Wait a minute. Did you know anything about 
the facts ? 

Mr. Vincent. Only what I read in the papers. I had no consul- 
tation with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Why would you in your position contribute to 
a man when you didn't know whether he was guilty or not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because of a matter of friendship. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you contribute to a man who was guilty 
if the facts showed he was guilty ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you contribute any to the Hiss defense ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you asked to ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To any other defense? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You said you made a contribution of $50, I 
think. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I said $40 or $50. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it paid back? 

Mr. Vincent. I could not recall, but I think Service paid it back. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1751 

Senator Ferguson. What was the occasion for Service paying it 
back? 

Mr. Vincent. He did not have any money at the time. He later got 
money to pay it back. I am testifying that I think he paid it back. 

Senator Ferguson. This is the only time in your life, is it, that you 
ever contributed to a fund for a man's defense ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't know any more about it than you are 
telling us now? 

Mr. Vincent. Any more about what ? 

Senator Ferguson. The contribution. 

Mr. Vincent. All I know is what I am telling you. 

Senator Ferguson. You certainly are not clear on what you did, 
when you got it back, what the facts are. You do not know who 
solicited you ? You mean to tell us this is the only occasion and your 
memory is no better on this than you are giving us ? 

Mr. Vincent. My memory is no better than I am giving you here. 

Senator Ferguson. Think a minute about this fund. "Who solicited 
you? 



Mr. Vincent. Mr. Mandel- 

Senator Ferguson. He is not trying to- 



Mr. Vincent. I know he is not. I don't recall who solicited me. 
If he said Mortimer Graves solicited me, he may have. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to Graves about it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What did Graves say about it? 

Mr. Vincent. Graves had been in touch with Service and said he 
needed money. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he ask you for a certain amount? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ask him what the facts were? 

Mr. Vincent. Of the case? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not care whether he was guilty or not? 
You were going to contribute? 

Mr. Vincent. I was going to contribute to a man who was in 
trouble who had been a friend of mine, who lived with me in Chung- 
king just as the Ambassador did the same thing. If he had been 
proved guilty, but he had no money to even hire counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. It is not a question of that. I wanted to know 
whether or not you asked anything about the facts before you con- 
tributed. You were a United States official, were you not? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. He was then being accused of betraying the very 
Government that was hiring you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you made no inquiry as to his guilt or 
innocence ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you contributed? 

Mr. Vincent. Before I contributed to his defense, to hiring a lawyer 
for his defense. 



1752 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. You knew who the lawyer was? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the occasion for you being repaid? 

Mr. Vincent. I have said I don't recall whether I was. 

Senator Ferguson. Why? 

Mr. Vincent. If I was, I don't recall whether he did or not. I 
think he did. Probably he simply repaid the money when he was 
able. He was home on leave and had no money. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't even recall whether you were repaid 
this money, you say? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether I was paid it. My impression 
was he did repay it. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall the facts of the repayment? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you really think that is possible, that a man 
who once in his life makes a contribution cannot recall whether or not 
it was repaid to him? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my testimony, sir, that I do not recall whether 
Service repaid it. My impression is he did. 

Senator Ferguson. He did. 

Mr. Vincent. He did. 

Senator Ferguson. Where, here? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Your memory is blotted out as to where he may 
have repaid it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; if he repaid it. I never asked him to repay it. 

Senator Ferguson. When you made the donation or gave the money, 
was it understood it would be repaid ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You cannot give us any more light? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not contributed with the idea it woulcj be 
repaid. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all you know about it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know or have any reason to believe that 
Mr. Service was connected in any way with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Just a minute. If he took papers and gave them 
to the Communist movement, and that is what you were paying the 
money for, to get him a lawyer, to defend him on that, do you want 
your answer to stand to that last question ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. As to whether or not you knew or had any 
knowledge ? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you read the question again, please ? 
(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. The fact that the United States Government 
was accusing him, did that not raise any suspicion in your mind at all I 
It is your Government and mine. 

Mr. Vincent. Just a minute. At that time it was not even estab- 
lished, as I recall, that Amerasia itself was connected with the Com- 
munist movement. 

Senator Ferguson. No, but the fact that he was being accused of 
espionage, it had to be connected with some other government. You 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1753 

are a Foreign Service officer, an employee of the United States. Here 
was the United States Government accusing a newspaper or a maga- 
zine of espionage, and Mr. Service, another Foreign Service officer, 
was accused in the same conspiracy. You knew that the espionage 
was with Russia did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew there could be espionage. I knew of none. 

Senator Ferguson. But if it was true it would be with Russia ? That 
was the claim? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not make any inquiry about what 
Service was charged with? 

Mr. Vincent. Except I saw it in the newspapers. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it not tell you? 

Mr. Vincent. It told the case. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that bring anything to your mind at all 
that Service may have had some connection with the Soviet? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Service in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I have just testified to that. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew him well ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

(Off the record discussion followed.) 

Mr. Mandel. Did you know he lived with Solomon Adler? 

Mr. Vincent. In China? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. If he lived with him, it was after I left Chungking. 
I think he was living with Mr. Gauss and myself up to the time we 

left. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, as a Government employee, if a 
man did get papers from the State Department that would get into 
the hands, or that he knew might get into the hands, of the Soviet 
Government, you would then say that if you had that knowledge that 
he was in some way connected with the Communists, but in this case 
you made no inquiry from the State Department itself whether or 
not Mr. Service could have taken those papers out ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You now know that the Loyalty Board has 
found that he did take the papers? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Senator Ferguson. And he did give them to Amerasia? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that lead you to believe on this question 
that he had any connection with the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. This recent thing? 

Senator Ferguson. This question is not only past, it is present. 

Mr. Vincent. If it is present, then certainly this last finding of 
the committee would indicate that he had this connection. 

Mr. Sourwine. With the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. Not with the Communist movement. I still do not 
think he thought he was having a connection with the Communist 
movement. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you say that when the facts are that 
he gave it, the information, to aid the Communists? 



1754 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I don't believe, sir, that Service knew when he gave 
those papers he was giving them aid, but I have not read his testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you made inquiry ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not read the hearings of the Review Board 
that came out. I am here simply stating that I do not believe that 
Service at the time he did that felt that he was aiding the Communist 
Party, 

Senator Ferguson. The way you have acted in this case, with your 
donation and everything, you would say that it would be very difficult 
for the State Department itself to get the facts so that it would ever 
be convincing that a man had any connection with the Communist 
Party ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. You would have to restate that. 

Senator Ferguson. I will strike that out. 

You won't now believe and you have not gone into the facts to as- 
certain whether or not a fellow officer had any connection with the 
Communist Party; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. You are speaking of Service? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You cannot believe that Service 

Mr. Vincent. I find it extremely difficult to believe that Service 
purposely did this in order to aid the Communist Party. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to ask this question : You would be 
one of the people that the Government might want to get evidence 
from as to whether or not Service was connected with the Commu- 
nists and took these papers out and gave them to Jaffe or Amerasia ; 
is that not true ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you learned anything about the facts 
or were consulted, you made a donation to his defense ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator 

Senator Ferguson. How would you ever be a witness in that kind 
of a case ? 

Mr. Vincent. When you have a friend such as he was who was in 
trouble, I don't know that you would prejudice the case or your own 
attitude toward it by contributing something for him to hire legal 
defense when he did not have the money to do so. 

Senator Ferguson. I believe firmly in the idea that a man is pre- 
sumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but you were a fellow employee in the very Department where 
these papers were taken from. They were far-eastern papers and they 
were given to an agent of the Communists and that was the charge 
by your Government for which you were working. I cannot under- 
stand why you would not make some inquiry about that before you 
would take such a definite stand as to make a donation. I really 
cannot. 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I am sorry I can't 

Senator Ferguson. You made no inquiry. If you had made an 
inquiry and convinced yourself that he was right, then I can see why 
you would have donated all the money. You would have gone and 
testified for him. 

But you were connected with the very Department that these papers 
came from. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1755 

Mr. Vincent. I can only say this : That you have got to put this on 
the basis that he was my friend and innocent until he was proved 
guilty. 

Senator Ferguson. But the facts now prove that the Loyalty Board 
found that he did take the papers out. 

Mr. Vincent. The grand jury acquitted him at the time on the 
charge that was made against him insofar as 

Senator Ferguson. Before you gave the money they had not 
acquitted him. 

Mr. Vincent. No, but they did afterward. 

Senator Ferguson. But you made no inquiry. 

Mr. Vincent. There was an agency in the State Department han- 
dling the whole matter. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you inquire from them ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did anybody inquire from you about the facts? 

Mr. Vincent. No, not that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Did anybody ask whether or not you knew any 
papers were taken out ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. In fact, he was under you, was he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How was he connected with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was in the administrative section under the 
Director General of Foreign Service. He had been assigned to that 
division. 

Senator Ferguson. He had far eastern duties? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think so. He was purely in an administrative 
job in Selden Chapin's office. 

Senator Ferguson. How would he get his hands on the papers from 
the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. Most of the papers he had were his 
own memoranda and notes that he kept with them. 

Senator Ferguson. From the Far East ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that the custom when you make a report to 
keep a copy ? 

Mr. Vincent. It never has been my custom. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Sourwine. A new name, Agnes Smedley ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall ever meeting Agnes Smedley. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who she was ? 

Mr. Vincent. Wasn't she a missionary ? In China ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any reason to know or believe that she 
was ever connected in any way with the Communist Party? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Richard Sorge? 

Mr. Vincent. No. Mr. Mandel, does that — the name does not mean 
anything to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any reason to know or believe that Mr. 
Sorge was ever connected with the Communist Party or with Com- 
munist activities? 



1756 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No. I don't know him, and I therefore don't know 
who he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. He is not one of the people you have read about in 
the papers ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Gunther Stein ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was in Chungking at one time or another during 
the period I was there — as a newspaper man, as I recall it. I didn't 
see much of him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know him ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall where you first met him ? 

Mr. Vincent. In Chungking, at what they called the press hostel 
there, where the newspaper people stay. I think he was again at 
the IPR conference, although I have no recollection of meeting him 
there. I just reviewed who was there and noticed he was there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know him socially at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever correspond with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know or have any reason to believe he was 
connected in any way with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Mandel. May I ask one question? Have you read his books 
and articles? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. William T. Stone ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was in the State Department under William, now 
Senator, Benton at the time I was stationed in the State Department. 
I think that was his position there. I saw him from time to time 
on official business. I don't know that I ever saw him socially out. 
He was an acquaintance, you might call it, a friend in the State De- 
partment, a fellow officer. 

But my associations with him were not such as to make any meeting 
with him stand out. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know or have any reason to believe he was 
in any way connected with the Communist movement ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Anna Louise Strong? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I know who she was, but I don't have any recol- 
lection of ever meeting her. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was she? 

Mr. Vincent. She was a woman we all suspected of being a Com- 
munist out in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was that? 

Mr. Vincent. It was while I was in Washington. I could not 
recall any date of when people are suspected of being a Communist. 
She may have declared herself to be a Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you say, "we all suspected her of being a 
Communist out in China," you mean those in the State Department 
here suspected that she was in China as a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know her in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1757 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know her here at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. She may have been at one time or another at a 
social function or a cocktail party. She was around. She was an 
American citizen, but I have no recollection of ever meeting her. 

Mr. Sourwine. On what basis was she suspected of being a 
Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say. I have no exact knowledge as to on 
what basis she was. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say, "we all thought she was" ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact knowledge as to why. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was "we all" the whole State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. The people in the Far Eastern office who thought 
that Anna Louise Strong was generally considered to be, if not a 
Communist, very much in sympathy with them. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't know on what basis ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I suppose it was her associates out in China. 
I don't know right to this day whether she ever went up to Yenan 
or ever had any contacts. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know her associates and who they were 
in China? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I have no clear recollection of Anna Louise 
Strong's activities. I can tell you that it was the general impression 
she was either a Communist or a sympathizer. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you have no facts, it must have been the case 
someone told you that she was suspected of being a Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. I would not remember anybody telling me. It was 
just a general impression that one got of Anna Louise Strong. If 
you asked me the question, Do I recall anybody telling me she was 
a Communist 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know with whom she associated? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to find out how you got your general 
impression. It was the process of osmosis in the Far Eastern 
division ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall. There were no doubt instances of 
somebody saying that she has an association with this or that person, 
but I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think it was a matter of inferences which 
you drew from specific information that at one time you had? 

Mr. Vincent. That at one time may have come to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Laurence Todd? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I don't recall knowing Laurence Todd. 

Mr. Sourwine. Here is another Chinese name, Tung Pi-wu? 

Mr. Vincent. Oh, yes. He was the Chinese Communist that Chi- 
ang Kai-shek sent to San Francisco for the United Nations Confer- 
ence, and I recall meeting him out there along with the other Chinese 
delegates. I don't recall having any close association with him and 
wouldn't know him if I saw him now, but he was a member of the 
Chinese delegation to the U. N. I think I met him with others of 
the general delegation because my job was to keep in contact with 
the delegates from China and from other countries. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you met him before that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Julian Wadleigh? 



1758 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall him or ever having met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he is? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Paul Walsh? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I don't recall him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Harry Dexter White? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes [reading] : He was, as you know, in the Treas- 
ury Department. My first distinct recollection of meeting him was 
when I came back from Geneva in 1945, and again it was the discus- 
sion of the Chinese stabilization loan. I may have met him before 
then, but I had no business with him. I may have met him at a 
luncheon but was not socially acquainted. I don't think I ever met 
his wife, never was in his home. 

But we did have discussions then. After I came back from China, 
there was from time to time matters concerning China of a financial 
character which we went over. I remember one conference in Secre- 
tary Morgenthau's office which was concerned with assistance to China 
of one form or another. Outside of that I think the last time I ever saw 
him — maybe I saw him later — was at the Bretton Woods Conference 
when I went there just for one day to discuss a matter of paying for 
an airfield with the Chinese. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know or have reason to believe that he 
was in any way connected with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now I have a much shorter list of names. Some of 
them are names we have mentioned. The question is, What position 
did you take in reference to the loyalty status of this individual in the 
State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. What position did I take? 

Mr. Sourwine. If you took any position at any time with reference 
to the loyalty of the person named, please say so. If you did take 
a position, please explain fully what the circumstances were. 

Alger Hiss ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Cora DuBois? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. John K. Emmerson ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Robert W. Barnett? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Julian R. Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. John P. Da vies ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wilma Fairbank ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Laurence Salisbury ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. John Stewart Service ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Raymond Ludden ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. William T. Stone? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1759 

Senator Ferguson. By your answers do you mean you never at any 
time were asked regarding the loyalty of any of those persons ques- 
tioned in that connection ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I was never questioned. 

Senator Ferguson. You never expressed an opinion in that regard? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You said you were never questioned. 

Were you ever questioned ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was never questioned as to the status of their loy- 
alty. 

Mr. Sourwine. With regard to their loyalty? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You were never questioned in the Service 
loyalty hearings? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. You would recall that ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I certainly would. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not serve with Service and Da vies in 
China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Nobody ever asked you a question about them? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you were never approached by the FBI 
with regard to the loyalty of any of these persons ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Really, I cannot understand this. 

Mr. Sourwine. They must have gone around Mr. Vincent, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. Here you were, a fellow working out in the Far 
East with these people. It is notorious now that they have had charges, 
before the Department as well as before the Loyalty Board. You 
have never been consulted about it? 

Mr. Vincent. Throughout this whole period of these loyalty hear- 
ings I have been in Switzerland, and no one ever approached me with 
regard to any one of them. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not have a case before the Lovalty 
Board ? 

Mr. Vincent. My case before the Loyalty Board ? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have a case before the Loyalty Board? 

Mr. Vincent. Mine is finished now. 

Senator Ferguson. You did have one? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. No one asked you any questions about these 
other people? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Or about any person in the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. In connection with their loyalty? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall anybody approaching me, in Swit- 
zerland, since I have come back, or before, regarding the loyalty status 
of anyone. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew at the time of Service's arrest there 
was a Loyalty Board? 

2284S— 52— pt. f> (1 



1760 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Was there one in 1945 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Was there not? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Not in the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. No; not that I recall. I think the Loyalty Board 
system came into existence after 1945. 

Mr. Mandel. There was a Security Board in the Department, was 
there not? 

Mr. Vincent. There was a Security Office or Division there. 

Mr. Sourwine. This question and your answer to it included even 
the Security Office or officer of the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have concluded that list of names. Do you have 
any names in your memoranda that we have not asked you about ? 

Mr. Vincent. I will check on it. I went through some of these. 

Mr. Sourwine. I want to give you an opportunity to get them in, 
and this is a good time for it. 

Mr. Vincent. Let me ask you, because I notice that T. A. Bisson 
was mentioned in connection with me. Did you ask me about Bisson ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe so. 

Mr. Vincent. I know, because you asked something about it yes- 
terday. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Bisson was on this list of names ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether you ever asked me whether I 
had any acquaintance with Mr. Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Sourwine. No. 

Mr. Vincent. I have him here [reading] : My acquaintance with 
him has been slight and brief. My first recollection of meeting him 
was in 1943 when I returned from Chungking. He came into the 
•office and wanted to talk about China. That was when I attended the 
Hot Springs conference of the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Please go through your notes now. Are there anj 
others ? 

Mr. Vincent. You asked me about Wilma Fairbank. Did you ask 
about her husband? 

Mr. Sourwine. John? No. 

Mr. Vincent (reading). I met Dr. Fairbank when he was in China 
in 1942. I believe he was with OSS and later with OWL We saw 
each other in Chungking socially and on official business. 

Later in Washington I believe he was with OWL I saw him from 
time to time. 

As I testified, my wife was a good friend of his wife. We visited 
Dr. Fairbank at Harvard when he passed through Cambridge last 
year. I made that testimony also. 

Senator Ferguson. You never knew he had any connection with 
the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Or you had no reason to believe that he did ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know him to be a left-winger ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. A New Dealer ? 

Mr. Vincent. I suppose he was sympathic with the New Deal. I 
don't know. I never discussed it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1761 

I have made notes here if you want them on where and when I have 
met Dr. Jessup. You have not asked me about him. 

Mr. Sourwine. I wish you would go through your notes and pick 
up any names you have not been asked about. 

Mr. Vincent (reading). My first recollection of meeting Dr. Jes- 
sup was at the Hot Springs conference of the IPR in 1945, or perhaps 
at a preliminary conference of the American delegation to that con- 
ference in the autumn of 1944. It is quite possible I met Dr. Jessup 
from time to time after that, either in Washington or New York, but 
I do not recall the occasions. 

I last saw Dr. Jessup in Paris in May 1951, when he was attending 
the conference there on the agenda of the foreign ministers. 

Senator Ferguson. Just one question on Fairbank. Did you ever 
know him to be pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know Owen Lattimore to be 
pro-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How many of these people outside of Mao 
Tse-tung and the ones you said you knew to be Communists did you 
know to be pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not have called any of them pro-Com- 
munist. 

Senator Ferguson. Even Julian Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think he was pro-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. None of them were pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Did you mention Dr. Johnstone? We have mentioned him from 
time to time here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Whom do you mean ? 

Mr. Vincent. William Johnstone of George Washington. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mentioned him. 

Mr. Vincent. I have just a brief note on him [reading] : I knew 
him as dean of George Washington University and as head of the 
Washington office of the IPR for a while. 

Mr. Sourwine. Of what is he a doctor ? 

Mr. Vincent. He is just a Ph. D., I suppose. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is is a young man ? 

Mr. Vincent. Forty-five, I should say. 

Senator Ferguson. It has become the habit that you call almost 
everyone doctor in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I don't think so. He is not in the State 
Department. He was dean of George Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean IPR and people connected with that. 
You have named some of the others doctor. 

Mr. Vincent. Dr. Chi. He has his doctor's degree from one of 
the Peking universities. At least he was called doctor there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Johnstone, dean did you say ? 

Mr. Vincent. At George Washington University, sir. Whether 
he is there now, I do not know, because I haven't seen him for years. 
He was at the IPR conference at Hot Springs. 

Mr. Sourwine. And he was also at this luncheon at the Cosmos 
Club? 



1762 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. He was also at the luncheon at the Cosmos Club- 
Senator Ferguson. In fact, you think he was the man that invited 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I haven't seen him since those days. I have 
here another Chinese whose name has been mentioned in connection 
also with Chou En Lai, Lin Piao. 

I might say, since we are mentioning that, do you want me to say 
also that I had never reason to believe that Dr. Johnstone was con- 
nected with the Communist Party or a pro-Communist? 

Mr. Sourwine. If that is the fact, I wish you would. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, suppose I put it this way : If they are Commu- 
nists I will say I knew them to be Communists, and the ones I have 
here, I do know to be Communists [reading] : 

He was in Chungking during the winter, Gen. Lin Piao, incidentally, 
he was in Chungking during the winter of 1942-43 while I was there. 
He was there at the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss measures 
of military cooperation in fighting the Japanese. 

I have no clear recollection of meeting him, but it was quite possible 
I did. Perhaps at a reception at Chiang Kai-shek's, or perhaps at 
some other function. 

I do not recall any conversations with him. 

I do recall a report made by one of our young officers on the conver- 
sation with Lin Piao, the primary object of which was to get informa- 
tion regarding the military situation in Communist areas. I didn't 
speak Chinese well enough to talk with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know a man by the name of Asiaticus? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think so. Could I look at it ? 

No ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you pronounce that ? 

Mr. Mandel. Asiaticus. 

Mr. Vincent. It isn't anybody's name. 

Mr. Mandel. Also known as Hans Moeller or Heinz Moeller. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know Heinz Moeller ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know Han Seng ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; that is a name that has something in my mind, 
but I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. That name was on the list, and Mr. Vincent was 
asked about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Chi? 

Mr. Vincent. He is the man I was asked about ; he was Dr. Chi, if 
he is a doctor. 

Senator Ferguson. What would you say about a person who would ' 
write this language : 

I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the Chinese section of 
the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely 
essential radical aspect, but can be depended upon to do it with the right touch. 

What would that convey to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That, I think, is a part of that letter that was read 
into the record, wasnt' it ? The whole letter ? 

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What does that convey to you ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1763 

Mr. Vincent. Taken out of context, it would certainly convey to 
me, and I don't recall the whole letter 

Senator Ferguson. There is the paragraph. That is not taking it 
out of context. 

Mr. Vincent. But my recollection is, Senator, that there was some 
other paragraph in it that indicated that the intent of it was entirely 
different. But if you asked me, I think that that would indicate that 
the people, taking that out of context, that the people writing it had 
some — I don't know what you call it — ideas in mind, which were 
somewhat "subterfugeous." 

Senator Ferguson. What? 

Mr. Vincent. I mean that they were trying to get across something. 

Would you read that again ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the Chinese 
section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out 
the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with 
the right touch. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I would say that I have no opinion on that, 
without seeing the whole letter, Senator, because I don't know quite 
what he means by the radical aspects of it, or the right touch. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you think a person was pro-Communist 
that would write that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. A person that would bring out the radical, 
would do it with the right touch ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I wouldn't necessarily call him pro-Communist. 
I already testified that I didn't have knowledge that Chi was a 
Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew that some of these persons he was 
talking about were Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes? 

Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that I don't know Chi was 
a Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Or that Han-seng was a Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I didn't know Chen Han-seng, and I think I 
testified that I knew of him only as a professor. 

Is that the whole letter ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I have the whole letter. That is all, go 
ahead. 

Mr. Vincent. The name occurred somewhere of James S. Allen, 
and I simply say I haven't any knowledge of ever having met him- 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he was ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your notes do not indicate it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. To the best of my knowledge I have never met 
James Allen and don't have any recollection of who he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. 

Mr. Vincent. I have the name here of Hilda Austern and I say she, 
I have learned, was Mr. Carter's secretary. I may have met her in Hot 
Springs conference. I have no recollection of her or any meeting. 



1764 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I have testified on Edmund Clubb, haven't we? 

We have testified on Ludden. 

Did you ask me about a man named Little? 

Mr. Sourwine. No, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. I have him here for some reason, and have said I 
haven't any recollection of having met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. I did not ask you. 

Mr. Vincent. And Ford. I don't recall why I have it here. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is Little's name ? 

Mr. Vincent. Ballard. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you do not know anything about him except 
that you have a note on him that you don't know him, and never did? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know him, and never did. 

You asked me about Earl Browder, didn't you ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir. What was the name after Mr. Little ? 

Mr. Vincent. Anne Ford. 

Mr. Sourwine. A woman ? 

Mr. Vincent. A woman, I suppose. 

Mr. Sourwine. A-n-n? 

Mr. Vincent. A-n-n-e. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was she ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Except that you have a note that you know nothing 
about her ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Somewhere the name cropped up. 

Mr. Surrey. I think the name was in the committee hearings. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are those notes in your handwriting? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you do not know in what connection the name 
Anne Ford came to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I have no idea. But I believe it was a name 
that came up in these hearings. 

You have asked me about Robert Barnett. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Evans Carlson* 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I think you asked me about a fellow named Abraham 
Chapman. 

Mr. Sourwine. No, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. You didn't? 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was he? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know him, and I don't know why he was 
mentioned. 

Mr. Surrey. That was another name that came up in the hearing. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is all. That concludes your recounting of 
the names in your list that we did not ask you about? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know, sir, whether Mr. Owen Lattimore was 
ever called in to advise the Secretary of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he ever came in to advise the 
Secretary of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1765 

Mr. Sourwine. Might he have come in to advise the Secretary with- 
out your knowledge ? 

Mr. Vincent. He could have easily come in to the Secretary with- 
out my knowledge. Are you speaking of the current Secretary, or at 
any time? 

Mr. Sourwine. Ex officio, or any time. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he ever advise you ? 

Mr. Vincent. When you say advise me, he came into my office when 
he was OWI Director of Pacific Affairs. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he advise with you? 

Mr. Vincent. He advised with me on the program of the OWI in 
China. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he advised the Secretary 
of State on the same thing? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever ask him to advise you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever ask his advice about anything? 

Mr. Vincent. Probably on far eastern matters, on China matters ; 
yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You considered him as an expert? 

Mr. Vincent. On these areas. 

Mr. Sourwine. If he had been available to you, you would have 
asked him; wouldn't you? 

Mr. Vincent. I would. 

Mr. Sourwine. You probably would have taken it? 

Mr. Vincent. That would depend on the character of the advice. 

Mr. Sourwine. Expert advice? 

Mr. Vincent. Expert advice on these Inner Asian frontiers, yes ; I 
would have taken the advice. 

Mr. Sourwine. His advice would have weighed most heavily in 
your mind on any far eastern matters, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly have paid attention to it. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, when the occasion presented 
itself, as often as you had opportunity, you did discuss with him 
matters about which you could use or needed such expert advice? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, have you completed a full discussion of any 
efforts that you ever made to assist in securing an appointment for 
Mr. Lattimore to a job in the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe you stated that Mr. Ballantine approved 
that appointment ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection. I haven't seen it, but it 
would normally go through with him, and I am sure it did go through 
him. He was the director of the Far Eastern Office at the time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did that involve any recommendation by you for 
appointment of Mr. Lattimore in any capacity or to perform any 
work or duties in or with the China subdivision of the Far Eastern 
section ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the general idea, that he would come in for 
a day or so a week and prepare background material, as Dr. Kennedy 
was doing, on these Inner Asia areas. 



1766 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. That is where he was to work as a consultant? 

Mr. Vincent. When he came from Baltimore; yes, sir. In the 
Far Eastern office. But he probably would have worked in the China 
division, where the Inner Asian frontiers were in my division at the 
time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Lattimore the fact 
that his application had been rejected after the rejection had taken 
place ? 

Mr. Vincent. I probably did. He probably wanted to know why 
and I told him why. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is, you told him what had been told you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I told him he couldn't have it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any present recollection of that con- 
versation or conference? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I have my mind refreshed, because I don't 
think I knew at the time; but I am talking about the president of 
Johns Hopkins. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to distinguish in your testimony be- 
tween what might have happened and what you remember happened. 

I wish, if it meets the Chairman's pleasure, that the witness would 
endeavor not to say "this might have happened" or "that might have 
happened," unless he remembers that it did happen, or he has some 
reason to believe that it did happen. That is, please do not use that 
phrase as pure speculation, as a hypothesis without any basis. 

Mr. Vincent. All right ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That should make the record clear. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that Lattimore received an appoint- 
ment and served as adviser to Mr. Pauley in connection with his so- 
called repatriation mission to Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Mr. Sottrwtne. Was that at a time when you were head of the Far 
Eastern Division? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What, if anything, did you have to do with Mr. 
Lattim ore's appointment as adviser to Pauley? 

Mr. Vincent. Nothing. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you recommend it? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you approve it ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was not for my approval. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know about it at the time? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew about it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who did recommend him? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sottrwine. Do you know how it came about? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or whether Lattimore asked for it, or initiated it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did vou ever discuss it with Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did vou talk with Lattimore about it after he left 
the university for the Pauley mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. I probably did. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1767 

Mr. Sourwine. And did you discuss with Lattimore the Pauley 
report after he got back ? 

Mr. Vincent. I probably did. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no independent recollection of it in 
either case? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; after Lattimore got back, I do recall that Latti- 
more came in and I was obviously anxious to find out what the con- 
ditions were out there, and we had a discussion about that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not discuss the Pauley report as such ? 

Mr. Vincent. No doubt, but I don't recall discussing the Pauley 
report. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore had a hand in writing that report; 
did he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did. 

Mr. Sourwine. And when talking about it, did you not discuss his 
handiwork, as one expert to another, discuss his craftsmanship in that 
report ? 

Mr. Vincent. I probably did. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no recollection? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of the discussion itself. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no recollection of the discussion having 
taken place ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, but as I say no doubt one took place. I am trying 
to make a distinction between what you asked me now, if I have a 
recollection of, you might say, a discussion at a particular time. But 
I would say that it no doubt took place. 

Mr. Sourwine. So that the record will not carry implications that 
are not testified, do you even know whether Mr. Lattimore had any- 
thing to do with the Pauley report ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that he certainly must have 
had something to do with it. He went with Mr. Pauley ; he was with 
him. 

Mr. Sourwine. He could have been with him without having any- 
thing to do with the report ; could he not ? That could have been one 
of those things that could have been. 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say to what extent he participated in 
drafting the report, but I say I assume that he did. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to find out whether you discussed it, 
or whether it was another thing that might have happened. 

Mr. Vincent. It might have happened. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not recall discussing it with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that we discussed drafting the report. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was a good friend of yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. If he did participate, he had a hand in the drafting ; 
but you have no memory of discussing that job ? 

Mr. Vincent. No memory. 

Mr. Sourwine. Even saying "That was a fine job"? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't recall saying it was a fine job. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you read the report ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't — I don't recall reading it; but I certainly 
must have read the Pauley report in the office. 



1768 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. I am not so clear on the answer that you gave 
that the Secretary of State would not hire Lattimore in the Depart- 
ment. 

Why did he say he would not hire him ? 

Mr. Vincent. It wasn't the Secretary at that time, Senator. It was 
Mr. Grew who was Under Secretary. Mr. Grew told me that he could 
not approve the job for him because he was engaged in publicity to 
the extent that he thought it would be unwise to have a man in the 
State Department who was doing that publicity. He was writing for 
a couple of newspapers or so, and he was contributing articles. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, to be afraid that he would leak 
things out in these articles? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, he wasn't going to give up his articles, and that 
therefore it was a situation that 

Senator Ferguson. That could be the reason ; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That could be the reason. I don't know that he 
would have. 

Senator Ferguson. But that was Grew's attitude in saying "Now, 
this man is writing for these articles, and so forth, and we cannot have 
him here because he will get information that he may use in the 
articles" ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore ever delivered 
a lecture to personnel of the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any occasion of his delivering a lecture 
to the personnel. 

Mr. Sourwine. Suppose we say the word "lecture" is broad enough 
to include talks, briefings, informative addresses. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; as I say, it is quite possible he did, but I 
don't recall the occasion of Mr. Lattimore delivering an address. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could you recall the occasion of his having delivered 
more than one ? Or how many ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have anything to do with arranging or ap- 
proving any such lecture or lectures? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall approving a lecture. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever instruct any of your subordinates to 
attend such a lecture? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Koswell Hartsen Whitson ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he was ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Whitson is a man who is alleged to have made 
a written report to the State Department stating that General Mac- 
Arthur could not be trusted for either ability or knowledge of affairs 
in the Far East. Did you ever see or hear of such a report ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. If there had been such a report officially trans- 
mitted through channels to the State Department, you would have 
seen it, if it had come in during the period you were head of the Far 
Eastern division ; would you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not necessarily, 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1769 

Do you mean General MacArthur was writing to him ? 

Mr. Sourwine. This was supposed to be a report by Mr. Whitson. 

Mr. Vincent. You don't know the period of that? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am attempting to ascertain whether you can give 
us the date. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know the name, and I have no recollection of 
such a report. 

Mr. Sourwine. It would be a fairly sure thing, then, that you 
never recommended Mr. Whitson for employment? 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly would be, if I don't know him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or for promotion? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who is Kim Koo-sek? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, he is a Korean. That I can tell from the name. 
But I don't know him, Kim Koo-sek. He had something to do with 
the general political situation, either in Korea or when there were a 
bunch of Koreans up in Yenan. 

But I can't place Kim Koo-sek at this moment. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet him? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him for employment? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him for a promotion? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him to replace Syngman 
Khee on any mission or trip? 

Mr. Vincent. No, not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know, or have you any reason to believe, 
that Kim Koo-sek is or was a Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No; was he? 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you not know, or did you not know, that he 
was a Moscow-trained Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I would have to go back over the whole record. 
I may at one time have known him, but you are asking me now what 
I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am making an effort not to be argumentative in 
any of these questions. We simply want to ask them and get your 
answer. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. When did leave the Far Eastern Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the middle of 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of an order going out, or 
instructions, to General Hodge to advise the Koreans that they had to 
take Communists into their Government? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know anything about that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't remember any order telling that. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever consulted about that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yon see, it happened in China. You said the 
instructions that went out for Marshall were that he was to take them 
in and consolidate, and so forth. Did you know the same thing that 
happened in there ? 



1770 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Let me go back. No instructions went out to Marshall 
to take the Communists into the Government. It was his own 
directive. 

Senator Ferguson. It was his directive, you said, to take them in ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether a directive to General 
Hodge, or any other public official in Korea, to take them in in Korea 
was made ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was the International Assets Commission? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean the International Assets Commission in 
Switzerland ? It is not called that there, I don't think. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is it called ? 

Mr. Vincent. It has no name, as I recollect. But I have a paper 
on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there an organization which comes to your mind 
when I say "What is the International Assets Commission ? 

Mr. Vincent. There is. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is that organization ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is not an organization; but it is a committee in 
Bern made up of the representatives of the four legations there. I 
have it right here, and I can give you a statement on that [reading] : 

After the Japanese surrender the Japanese Government, pursuant to 
SCAP directive, instructed its missions in neutral countries to turn 
over all Japanese state property to the custody of the neutral govern- 
ments for eventual transfer to representatives of the Allied Powers. 

In February of 1946 the Swiss Government transferred the Japanese 
Legation and Archives in Bern and all Japanese state funds in Switz- 
erland to the custody of the United States, British, and Chinese 
Legations in Bern. 

Sometime later, when Switzerland accorded! recognition to the 
U. S. S. R., and the IT. S. S. R. established a legation in Bern, the Rus- 
sians were admitted into this group on their insistence. This is all 
something that happened before I went to Switzerland. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were the French a part of that group ? 

Mr. Vincent. The French were not. 

Mr. Sourwine. But the Chinese were ? 

Mr. Vincent. They were. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that the Nationalist Chinese ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was [reading] : 

By agreement, the British assumed the duties of day-to-day admin- 
istration of the assets. I might define them a little more clearly. It 
was not just the Japanese Legation, but there was a certain amount 
of money in the bank that the Japanese had there. 

Whenever any relatively important operation was to be carried out, 
such as major repairs to the Japanese Legation, it was accomplished 
after agreement by all four legations on the steps to be taken. This 
was sort of a rent contract. The Chinese were paying for the Legation. 

The various legations were represented in these affairs by first or 
second secretaries. I never attended one. The meetings of these rep- 
resentatives were informal and, in general, when action was taken, it 
was taken by unnnimous agreement. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1771 

There were never any formal rules laid down for these proceedings. 
It was no doubt tacitly assumed by all representatives that each lega- 
tion had the power of veto. 

This matter, however, was never put to test until the arrival in Bern 
of the diplomatic mission of the Chinese Peoples Eepublic. 

Following the departure of the Japanese diplomats from Bern, their 
premises were rented by the Chinese Nationalist Government for its 
Legation. 

The Chinese Nationalist mission left Bern in February of 1950, 
shortly after the recognition by the Swiss Government of the Chinese 
Communists. The Chinese Communists, however, did not send a mis- 
sion to Bern until December of 1950. 

At this time, the former Japanese Legation premises were vacant, 
although efforts had been made to rent them after the departure of the 
Chinese Nationalists. 

Our Legation learned informally from the Swiss Foreign Office 
through the British Legation, as administrator of the property, that 
the Chinese Communists were interested in renting the property. The 
British were not enthusiastic about the prospect of renting the prop- 
erty to them, but the British were being pressed by the Swiss Foreign 
Office, which was under a duty to use its best efforts to find space for 
the Chinese mission. 

The British had recognized Communist China a year or so before. 

Our Legation reported the matter to the Department of State before 
the question was raised in a meeting of the interested powers in Bern. 
We stated that normally we would maintain a united front with the 
British on these things, but that there might be objections in this case. 
We requested the Department's instructions. 

We were informed that the Department definitely opposed the rent- 
ing of the former Japanese Legation to Chinese Communists. 

About a month later, our Legation received a letter from the British 
Legation enclosing a note from the Swiss Foreign Office requesting 
an agreement to rent the Japanese Legation to the Chinese Commu- 
nists. The British were told that we were opposed to this. 

At the same time, the Chief of the Foreign Office — that is what we 
would call the Secretary of State — interceded in an interview with 
me. He called me to his office. I told him that we were opposed to 
renting the building to the Chinese Communists. 

In view, however, of the fact that the Chief of the Swiss Foreign 
Office had made a personal approach on this matter, I told him that 
I would send his request to the Department of State. This was done, 
and the Department replied that they were opposed to renting the 
Legation to the Communists and would interpose a veto if necessary. 

Another question arose after this. The British Foreign Office auth- 
orized the British Legation to treat the Chinese Communist represen- 
tatives as entitled to have a voice in the administration of the Japanese 
state property in Switzerland. One was the Legation, it was state 
property, and there was also money in the bank which we didn't do 
much about. It was just there. 

I reported this to the Department, and adding that unless instructed 
to the contrary, I intended to inform the British that the United 
State could not approve of such action. That ended the matter, 



1772 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

and since that time the administration of Japanese assets in Switzer- 
land have been carried on with the participation of only the United 
States, British, and Soviet Legations. 

The former Japanese Legation, the last time I heard of it, had no 
tenant. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not at any time a member of the organ- 
ization ? 

Mr. Vincent. As Minister I was head of the Legation and the secre- 
tary who attended these meetings was sent by me. I never attended a 
meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then there never were any Chinese assets turned 
over or former Japanese assets turned over to the Chinese Communist 
Government as a result of any action taken by that organization? 

Mr. Vincent. No; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Nor any such turning over in which you concurred ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

And before I left Bern, the Chinese Communist group has found 
some other place to live, as I gather. I may add in that connection, 
to show my relation, I was the only person who gave a farewell 
reception for the Chinese Nationalist Minister, Dr. Wu. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was in what year ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was 1950. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not mean in regard to Mr. Wu. 

Mr. Vincent. I mean in regard to all this thing coming up here. 
It was late 1950 and 1951. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am jumping around here a bit, necessarily. I 
have some matters that I have no date on. I cannot put them in 
chronologically. 

What, if anything, do you know about a plan or plans, or concerted 
movements, to remove various officers from positions in the Depart- 
ment of State connected with far-eastern affairs ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, now, that brings up two questions. I mean, two 
people. I have seen Mr. Dooman's testimony, and I would be glad to 
explain that. I am thinking now of Mr. Dooman's testimony that I 
was at least a part in the removal of Mr. Dooman, Mr. Ballantine, 
and Mr. Grew. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. I was in Potsdam with 
Mr. Dooman during July, at the Potsdam Conference. He and I 
were rather close together. Such a scheme as removing anybody was 
never mentioned to me and between us. He and I traveled back to- 
gether to London to attend a short UNRRA conference as far-east- 
ern people. We both came home, sometime in the middle of August. 

I saw him one day coming into the Department with a suitcase, and 
I remember saying to him, "I thought you were going in the other di- 
rection." 

With that, he passed on by. I asked for, and got permission, to 
take leave in New Hampshire. I went up there to a. place, up around 
Hancock and some other little place, and only 3 days after I had 
been there — and I say this as indicating how ignorant I was of how de- 
velopments were — and having spent money to get up there, I had a 
telephone call from Mr. Ballantine to come back; that I was wanted in 
Washington. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1773- 

He did not explain what it was. When I came back he told me, and 
later Acheson told me, that they wanted me to be Director of the Far 
Eastern Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when that was ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was in the latter part of August. It wasn't 
early September, because I was back here by the end of August. 

I had, as I say, only 2 days' leave up there. I was ignorant as any- 
body could have been of what the plans were for my future. I was at 
that time Chief of the China Division. 

Mr. Sourwine. You got back here? 

Mr. Vincent. And in August, when I got back from Potsdam, I 
took off, I should say, within a few days because I had already gotten 
permission to be away for a short vacation with my wife in New 
Hampshire. I didn't see Acheson except a short time. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were called back from that vacation and 
stepped into Mr. Dooman's shoes, so to speak ? 

Mr. Vincent. I took over Mr. Dooman's job at the end of August, 
as Chairman of the FESWNCC, and on the 19th or 20th of Septem- 
ber, I took over Mr. Ballantine's job, and he was made special as- 
sistant to the Secretary. 

Mr. Dooman resigned. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has there ever been any controversy anywhere about 
those dates? 

Mr. Vincent. About those particular dates? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, when you took over from Mr. Dooman, either 
at SWNCC or head of the Far Eastern Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not as far as I am concerned. But I know that the 
record shows that I attended the first SWNCC meeting, subcommittee 
of the SWNCC on, I think September 1. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in that position as head of the Far East- 
ern Committee of SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. In that position, I was ex officio head of the 
FESWNCC Committee. 

Mr. Sourwine. I would like to repeat that question about contro- 
versy, because it could be that you misunderstood it. 

To your knowledge, has any controversy arisen about those dates, 
wIicti you took over from Mr. Dooman, either as head of the FESW- 
NCC Committee, or as head of the Far Eastern Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not call it a controversy. I know what you 
are referring to because at one time, in a situation which I think 
that you know about, I had thought that my position and duties as 
head of SWNCC were coincidental of my becoming head of the Far 
Eastern Office. I later checked the record and found that I became 
head of SWNCC earlier than I became head of the Far Eastern 
Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify before the Loyalty Board, as you 
have testified here, with regard to those dates ? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified before the Loyalty Board that I did not 
recall becoming head of SWNCC until I became director. 

I subsequently checked on the record and corrected that testimony, 
which is now that I chairmaned the meeting on the first. 



1774 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. The correct date now on all records is as you have 
given it here ? 

Mr. Vincent. There was never any formal appointment. But I 
found that I did attend as chairman a meeting on the first of 
September. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know of any plan or plans or move- 
ment with regard to the removal of Mr. Dooman or getting rid of 
Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. Vincent. No, and I had nothing to do with it. 

I would like to put this on the record, that I considered myself 
a friend of Eugene Dooman. We were very close at Potsdam. I 
suppose we spent more time together than any other two people, 
because we didn't have much to do. We were not called on to attend 
the conference or anything else. 

I never realized that Mr. Dooman had resentment against me. I 
may be naive. 

Senator Ferguson. There is a question I would like to ask. 

You brought up this morning in your testimony about your loyalty 
board. What were the charges against you at the loyalty hearing? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I am not at liberty, I am told, to reveal 
the charges against me. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean you are forbidden by the Secretary 
of State ; is that it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think that the revelation of the thing is in 
order at all. I have to say that. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you say you are forbidden. 

Mr. Vincent. You see, there has not been any decision in the case 
yet. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but you know what you are charged with. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, but I am not at liberty to reveal anything about 
the Loyalty Board hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking about the hearings. 

You did reveal here something about the testimony. 

Mr. Vincent. The charge is a part of the hearings. I did that 
simply to correct a misapprehension. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand that you are not allowed 
to disclose what you are charged with? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. Who told you that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know who told me that, but I don't think 
it is in order to disclose them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you consulted counsel about that, Mr. Vincent ? 

Mr. Surrey. I consulted the Loyalty Board, and we were advised 
that we were not to reveal, not in connection with this hearing, not to 
reveal anything connected with the Board hearings except on their 
approval, and they included "or anything on the record of the Board 
hearings." 

Mr. Sourwine. The Chairman has asked a specific question. The 
witness has stated in several different terms what appears to be his 
intention not to answer. I think it is understood, or should be clear, 
that that is, in fact, a refusal to answer the question, a respectful and 
polite refusal, but a refusal to answer the question. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1775 

I am trying to find out on what basis that refusal is made, and I am 
asking the witness, if you do not mind, whether the witness has con- 
sulted counsel in connection with his refusal. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I have. 

Mr. Sourwine. On what basis do you base that refusal ? 

Mr. Vincent. I base it on the fact that any proceedings of the 
Loyalty Board or the charges are not a basis for this discussion. 

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, your refusal is a challenge to the 
right of this committee to ask the question ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are using legal language. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are an extremely intelligent man, sir, and I 
am sure I am not using language beyond your comprehension when 
I say you are basing it as a challenge to the authority of this com- 
mittee, rather than claiming the privilege. You know what I mean 
by challenge to the authority of this committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I know that I am not at liberty to reveal hear- 
ings before the Loyalty Review Board, of which the charges are a 
part. 

Mr. Sourwine. You feel that this committee does not have the right 
to compel you to answer the question ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know about the jurisdiction of the committee 
to compel me to answer the question, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are refusing to answer, and you do not mean 
to be contemptuous of the committee, I am sure. 

Mr. Vincent. Certainly I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. If the committee has the power to require you to 
answer that question, and you refuse, you are being contemptuous of 
the committee. You would realize that, would you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. You have turned that around there where I can't 
answer. 

All I know is that I have to go back to my original statement that, 
from my understanding of the statement, I am not at liberty to 
reveal the hearings before the Board, which would include, to my 
mind, the charges themselves. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you intending to claim your privilege under the 
fifth amendment, your privilege against self-incrimination? 

I am not trying to trap you, sir. If you intend to claim that priv- 
ilege, you have to so state. Otherwise, it is not a claim of that priv- 
ilege. I am not urging you to claim that privilege. Your counsel is 
there, and I suggest you consult with him and then advise the com- 
mittee on what basis you are refusing to answer the question. Take 
as long as you want. 

Senator Ferguson. "What is your answer? 

Mr. Vincent, (after conferring with counsel). My answer is I 
don't want to claim immunity under the fifth amendment and that as 
far ns I know the documents which brought the charges against me 
would come under a category the same as the State Department docu- 
ments, and that I will ask permission to reveal to the committee, if 
thev want, the charges that were brought against me. 

I have no desire, particularly, to hide them myself. 



22848— 5a— pt. 6- 



1776 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you receive a specification of charges in 
writing ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were they marked as classified when you received 
them? 

Mr. Vincent. That I don't recall, sir. I don't recall whether it was 
confidential, but I imagine it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you do not recall that it was classified, how can 
you claim that it was classified? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it was classified, then. 

Mr. Sourwine. How was it classified ? 

Mr. Vincent. Confidential. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your contention that this committee, in execu- 
tive session, has no right to question you about matters which are 
classified as confidential? 

Mr. Vincent. I should not say that ; no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you contending that 3^ou are refusing to answer 
this question because the matter was classified or confidential? 

Mr. Vincent. I am refusing because of my original statement, that 
I didn't think I was at liberty to reveal them. I have no objection 
myself to revealing them to this committee, and we have gone over 
them here quite extensively, what the charges were. 

I think they extend in large measure from the same things we have 
gone over here. 

If I just consulted my own self, and I have not a clear knowledge 
of this Loyalty Board business, I would not have the slightest objec- 
tion to telling you what the general charges were. 

But I would like to clarify it with the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have arrived at a situation, by the asking of the 
question, and the witness' reluctance to answer it, which challenges the 
jurisdiction of the committee. I feel it is my duty to make a full 
record on it here for whatever consideration the committee might 
want to give to it later. 

I want to give the witness every opportunity to consult with counsel 
and place his refusal, if he persists, on whatever basis he wishes. 

As it stands now, I would say it appears that the basis of the refusal 
is simply that the witness does not want to answer. If there is another 
basis, if you have received orders or instructions not to answer such 
questions, or questions of this particular class, I wish you would tell 
the committee so. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I can find out from the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not the question. 

Have you been instructed not to answer that question ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is my impression, as I go back again, that any- 
thing connected with my Loyalty Board hearing are not for 

Senator Ferguson. Who told you that? 

Mr. Vincent. The legal adviser in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Who is that? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Fisher. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Fisher told you that you were not to answer 
any question relating to anything that concerned the Loyalty Board 
hearings ? 

Mr. Vincent. That the Loyalty Board hearings were not to be 
released. 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1777 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you discuss with Mr. Fisher your appear- 
ance before this committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I discussed it with him from time to time during 
the last month, I suppose. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ask his advice, or did he give it unasked? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall the definite advice. Are you speaking 
of the specific question? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am speaking about advice in connection with your 
appearance before this committee. Did you ask his advice, or did h*3 
volunteer ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I don't recall. But I recall the letter which 
the State Department wrote that the loyalty trial, of which I consid- 
ered the charges to be a part, is one that only the President can release. 

Mr. Sourwine. "What letter do you refer to ? 

Mr. Vincent. I refer to the letter which the committee received 
from the State Department just the day before yesterday, or whenever 
it was, the letter from the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. The State Department has refused the committee 
certain files, but we are not asking you for any files. We are asking 
you for a matter that is within your knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Not what is in the file — what is in your knowl- 
edge. 

Mr. Vincent. But I simply am at a loss to know whether the charges 
are a part of the loyalty file. If they are a part of the loyalty file 

Senator Ferguson. We are not asking for the files. 

Mr. Sourwine. You will have another opportunity to testify before 
us, sir, and I will simply ask this : At the present time, for the record, 
do you want your respectful refusal to answer that question to stand ? 

Mr. Vincent. I want at least an opportunity to review the thing. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are not going to answer the question now, are 
you? I am trying to give you every possible opportunity. 

Mr. Surrey. May I consult with him a minute? 

Mr. Sourwine. Of course. 

Mr. Vincent (after conferring with counsel). I would not want 
to put a respectful refusal, but to have an opportunity to find out 
whether the Presidential order with regard to releasing loyalty files 
includes those charges. 

Senator Ferguson. Includes 3 T our knowledge? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; includes my knowledge of the thing. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are not the custodian of any loyalty files, are 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You see, we cannot tell now, but you may have 
avoided many answers here on the grounds that there is something 
in the loyalty proceedings about it. 

Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir. I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. But I say you could under this arrangement. 

Mr. Sourwine. This particular question, however, at this time, 
the witness respectfully refuses to answer. I do not mean to put words 
in your mouth, but is that the way you want the record to stand ? 

Mr. Vincent. May I consult counsel, because I don't know whether 
that is considered to be contempt of the committee. 



1778 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sottrwine. I will put it another way: The question has been 
asked; will you now answer it? Will you say "Yes" or "No"? Will 
you answer the question ? 

Mr. Vincent. My counsel has now told me, and which clarifies 
matters considerably, that, if you wish, I will be glad to tell you the 
three or four questions. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was the question. The question itself is much 
less material than the refusal to answer. 

Mr. Vincent. It was divided into three questions, three statements: 

One, that I was pro-Communist, according to reports that had been 
received, I assume, through the FBI investigation. 

The second one was that I was a member of the Communist Party. 

There was no indication in these letters as to what that springs from, 
but I assume it comes from testimony of Mr. Budenz. 

The third one was association with people about whom the Depart- 
ment had derogatory information. I can't recall the names, but I 
am sure that every one of them has been gone over here. 

There was Lattimore, Currie — I would have to get the list there. 
But, as I say, there were five or six names. Those are the three charges 
that I had to answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anybody else besides Lattimore 
and Currie? 

Mr. Vincent. I could look at the letter. I think every one of them 
would come to me. 

Senator Ferguson. They have been covered here, anyway? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Adler — I am guessing now. Let me look at this. There were Adler, 
Currie, Field. Strong — Anna Louise Strong 

Senator Ferguson. I do not think you put Lattimore in that last 
answer. 

Mr. Vincent. Lattimore was one of them; Adler was one of them; 
Field was one of them; Rogoff may have been one of them; I don't 
know, but I don't think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have testified, sir, with regard to many of those 
persons. 

Mr. Vincent. I can assure you that if I got the letter that I have 
testified to with regard every one of them, because it is a limited 
number of eight. With the number we have gone over here, I am 
quite sure we covered those eight. 

Mr. Sourwine. I was phrasing the question a little bit differently. 
You have testified with regard to a number of those persons that you 
do not know or have any reason to believe that they were in any way 
connected with the Communist activities or the Communist movement. 

Now, you want that question to stand as of the present time, in view 
of the fact that some of these names are names which have been 
included as Communist or pro-Communists in charges against you? 

Mr. Vincent. They were not called Communists or pro-Commu- 
nists, but about whom the Department — I recall the phrase — "had 
derogatory information." 

I gave the same testimony with regard to them that I have given 
here. 

Mr. Sourwtne. I just wanted to be sure that you did not want to 
imake any change in your testimony in that regard. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1779 

Senator Ferguson. And you know of no derogatory information 
as far as these men are concerned ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I know of none now. But what information the 
Department had 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you what they had, but to your 
knowledge. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Well, Senator, let me correct that in connection with Anna Louise 
Strong. She was one covered. I said that I never knew her. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have made clear testimony in that regard. 

Mr. Vincent. But the Senator asked me if I myself had any knowl- 
edge of derogatory information. 

Mr. Sourwine. I think he meant with respect to those that you 
have so testified to today. 

Senator Ferguson. You say you did not know her ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you say, when you did associate with Field, 
you did not know anything derogatory about him ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And the same way with any of them ? You did 
not know of anything derogatory when you were associated with 
them ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you complete your answer to the question 
whether you knew of any plan or concerted movement for the removal 
or displacement of Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew of no plan or concerted plan. I thought I 
had finished that. 

Mr. Sourwine. I was not sure. It was some time ago. Therefore, 
obviously, you could not have taken any part in such a plan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I took no part in such a plan.  

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know of any such plan or movement with 
regard to Mr. Ballantine ? 

Mr. Vincent. None. 

Mr. Sourwine. With regard to Mr. Grew ? 

Mr. Vincent. None. 

Mr. Sourwine. With regard to Mr. Hornbeck ? 

Mr. Vincent. With regard to Mr. Hornbeck, there was no plan 
or concerted plan to remove Dr. Hornbeck. I will give you that 
story, if you wish to have it, about the misunderstanding on Dr. 
Hornbeck. 

Dr. Hornbeck himself has thought — I don't think he does now — 
that there was a concerted plan to get rid of him. 

In 1943, when the Department was undergoing a reorganization — 
1944, please — there was a general feeling that Dr. Hornbeck, who had 
been in the Department as chief of things for 15 years, had, you 
might say, been under a considerable strain. That was my feeling, 
anyway. 

But I was assigned to FEA and knew nothing about it except that 
I saw him when I came back after having been closely associated with 
him for about 4 years, from 1936 to 1939, very closely associated with 
him, because he and I were both very much in favor of giving things to 
China during that period of our time of helping Chiang Kai-shek out 
against the others. 



1780 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Dr. Hombeck was to become Director of the newly formed far- 
eastern office — at that time he was political adviser — he was to become 
Director of the newly formed far-eastern office. He did become Di- 
rector of that. 

There were two officers in the State Department who did not want 
to serve under Dr. Hornbeck. They indicated that to the Secretary 
of State or to the chief of personnel, I don't know which. 

I did not participate in that. I did write a letter to the chief 
of personnel telling the chief of personnel that I did not want to take 
a job which would have been Chief of the China Division which a 
friend of mine had, for reasons that I had to respect — had known 
him for so many years — did not want to take it. In other words, I 
did not want to replace him. 

No attention was paid to my letter and I did become Chief of the 
China Division in January or February. Dr. Hornbeck did become 
Director of the Far Eastern Office and remained there until May 
when he was made a Special Assistant to the Secretary and sent out 
as Ambassador to The Hague. 

Mr. Souewine. Who were the two employees who declined to serve 
under Dr. Hornbeck? 

Mr. Vincent. One of them is Mr. Salisbury, whom we have now 
already mentioned. The other was Mr. Stanton, who is now Ambassa- 
dor to Siam. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were there any others? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I know of. 

Mr. Souewine. Do you know what was the basis for the friction in 
connection with these two gentlemen ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no certain knowledge of it, because I don't 
know what they put into their memorandum to them. 

But my recollection is that it was based on the fact that Dr. Horn- 
beck was under a strain ; that Dr. Hornbeck, as Director of the Office, 
was an excellent man for political thinking, but as an administrator, I 
think that these two fellows did not want to work under him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it was more personal than a matter of 
policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am quite sure that it was more personal than a 
matter of policy, and I might add that all three of us worked under 
Dr. Hornbeck. 

Salisbury subsequently retired. Stanton continued on as a special 
assistant in the Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Personal frictions can arise in any office, even in the 
State Department. 

Mr. Vincent. They arise far too often in the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. That Department is not exempt from office politics, 
I take it? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid it was not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Sir, has it been reported to you at any time that your 
name has been mentioned in connection with the disappearance of 
three CIA agents in Bulgaria? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever been questioned about that matter? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever had any connection with the editorial 
board of Amerasia magazine? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1781 

Mr. Vincent. No, none whatsoever. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have any connection with the magazine 
itself? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you play any part at all in the Amerasia case, 
so-called ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not at all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you defend any of the individuals involved? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, you did contribute to the defense of Mr. Serv- 
ice, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, when you say "defend," I didn't appear in any 
defense of any one of them. I contributed $50 to a friend who didn't 
have any money in order for him to hire counsel. 

Mr. Sourwine. Words can have many connotations. I do not mean 
to fence with you. But we will have fewer semantic difficulties if you 
will accept my words in the broadest sense. If it seems to you they 
should be narrowed, go ahead and narrow them down. 

I meant, by defense, did you speak in his behalf; did you take up 
the cudgel for him ? Anything that might be constituted as defensive ? 

Mr. Vincent. I might say that I kept myself completely apart 
from the trial of him, other than contributing $50 to assist him in 
hiring counsel. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know now the story of the Amerasia case ? 
Do you know what the facts were in that case? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall them from memory ; no. I would have 
to see. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever write for publication under a pen name 
or a pseudonym ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. While you were in China, did you know Edgar 
Snow ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who is he ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was a writer. Do you want me to comment ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know him only as a writer? 

Mr. Vincent. I only knew him as a writer. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not know him as a person ? 

Mr. Vincent. I met him first in Mukden, during the Japanese 
trouble of 1931. He came up to cover that and I met him. 

As far as I know, I didn't meet him again until he came to Chung- 
king — well. I would say in Mukden I have forgotten what press agency 
he was with. When he came to Chungking, in 1942 or 1943, he was 
then, I think, associated with the Saturday Evening Post. 

He was in Europe at one time, getting a story, and came in to see 
me at Bern. I saw him again at a large cocktail party in New York 
last autumn. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever correspond with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say he was a friend of j^ours ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. A personal friend ? 

Mr. Vincent. Personal friend, but not a close one, very personal 
friend. We have never had any business dealings. 



1782 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sour wine. Did you ever read any of his books ? 

Mr. Vincent. I read The Red Star Over China. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you think of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. At the time ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I thought it was a fairly good presentation of the 
case. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you still think so? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't reread it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you think it was biased in any way? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say he took a sympathetic point of view 
toward the regime there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Toward the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge, or any basis for belief r 
that he was connected in any way with the Communist movement? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you think he was a pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not his book indicate that? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say. I think it was biased from a factual 
point of view, from presenting the Communist point of the case. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was not pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. He was writing about the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. But he was biased on the facts, you said. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the facts. No, I said it presented them 
in, what shall you say, a favorable light. 

Mr. Sourwine. And not completely an objective report, perhaps ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would want to read it again and see if it was an 
objective report. It gave the Chinese Communist side of the case. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you mean to imply that it was unduly favorable 
or unjustifiably favorable to the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Souravine. Was it your impression that it was not unduly favor- 
able to the Communists or unjustifiably favorable to them? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to read the book again, but you asked 
for my impression. I again state that it was stating the case of the 
Chinese Communists. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did it purport to be a statement of the case of the 
Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. It purported to be, as I understood it, a case of what 
was the situation with regard to the Chinese Communists. 

Mr. Sourwine. It reported to be a factual and objective statement, 
did it not? 

Mr. Vincent. It did. 

Mr. Sourwine. It did not purport to be a brief for the Chinese 
Communists, or a statement of their side of the case? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. But was it, in fact, a statement of their side of 
the case ? 

Mr. Vincent. To my recollection it was a statement of their side of 
the case, because it was the first book given about it, because he had 
been to Yenan, and I suppose he was giving factual statements of the 
situation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1783 

Mr. Sourwine. Without regard to his mind, but considering it as 
a book, with regard to what you know and knew about the Far East, 
was it factual or was it pro- Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have thought it was factual at the time, but 
1 had no way to check the facts. 

Mr. Sourwine. I see. 

Mr. Mandel. I just wanted to know whether Mr. Vincent knew 
Mrs. Snow. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I may have met her sometime, but I wouldn't 
have known her at all. She may have been to cocktail parties. I don't 
know Mrs. Snow in the sense that I would know her if I saw her. 
There is a new Mrs. Snow that I met in New York. 

Mr. Sourwine. He has two wives ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I met his new wife in New York at this cocktail 
party. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does the name Nym Wales mean anything ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the name she went under. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was his first or second wife ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the old one. I don't know the name of his 
new wife. 

Mr. Sourwine. You knew she used that name ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you read any of the works of the Chinese 
•Communist leaders, their writings ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you read any of the published works of Israel 
Epstein ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I never read that. I don't recall the book. It 
was a book he wrote, and I did not read it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you read any of the published works of Owen 
Eattimore, other than the two mentioned here ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any of them. I recall reading his 
column from time to time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall whether you read the published works 
of any other IPR writers ? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall from the testimony given here that I am 
supposed to have reviewed or read a book of Rosinger's. 

I have no recollection of reading that book, but it is quite possible 
I had, that these books came into the office and if that is the book that 
I have in mind, which I reviewed, I have no recollection of the book, 
but some review that he had. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was the IPR in the habit of sending you books to 
review or read ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think they came from the IPR. They came 
from the individuals. I am quite sure David Rowe sent me his on 
China and the Powers. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you read that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether I read the manuscript or the 
other. John Fairbank — I have a copy of his book. That came out 
after I left the States. I read it, though. 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe you testified that you do not know Agnes 
-Smedley ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Never met her ? 



1784 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Did you ever read any of her books ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Did you, or do you, know Harry B. Price? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have a note here on Harry B. Price. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. We have been through that list and you gave us the 
names of everybody you had a note on that we had not asked you about, 
did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. I have a note on one of the Prices. There are two 
Prices. Yes, I have one here on Harry B. Price, which is in the back 
tiling, which simply says that [reading] Mr. Price was, I recall, with 
the China Defense Supplies during the war. I have no doubt met him 
from time to time, but I do not recall the specific occasions of our 
meetings. That is all I have on Mr. Price. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You do not know whether he ever worked for the 
State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall his ever working for the State De- 
partment. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You do not know where he did work? 

Mr. Vincent. I said here that he did work for China Defense Sup- 
plies, but I have forgotten since that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you if you knew Mildred Price ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think you did, and I said I didn't know. Is Mildred 
Price his wife? 

Mr. Sourwine. I was going to ask you. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Do you know Mrs. Price, his wife? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't recall ever having met her. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Well, you would not know anything of her associa- 
tions, if you do not know her ; would you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. y 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Was Mrs. Price, Elizabeth Rugh ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do yon know Elizabeth Rugh ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether she was ever employed by the 
State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know if she is employed there now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have any hand in getting her em- 
ployed there ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Our information, Mr. Chairman, is that Elizabeth 
Rugh is currently employed by the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess until 1 : 30. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
1 : 30 p. m., same day ) . 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1785 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY 
'WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, before we resume the questioning of 
the witness I have here a letter addressed by the witness to the Chair- 
man in response to the request that he bring with him certain docu- 
ments. In that connection a letter from the State Department has 
been discussed at these hearings. 

I would respectfully suggest that an order be entered that this letter 
may be placed in the record at the same point where the State letter 
which was discussed is inserted, if counsel has no objection. 

Mr. Surrey. No objection. 

The Chairman. It is over the signature of the witness ? 

Mr. Sourwine. It is over the signature of the witness. 

The Chairman. That may be done. 

(The document referred to appears hereafter, at p. 2092.) 

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Sourwine, does that include our request? 

Mr. Sourwine. No, it does not. Would the Chairman deem it de- 
sirable that our letter of request be placed at the same point in the 
record ? 

The Chairman. I think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. The State Department letter is also to be placed in 
the record at that point. 

The Chairman. I think it would be well to do so. 

(The document referred to appears hereafter, at p. 2092.) 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, have you ever read the book Inter- 
Asian Frontiers of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who wrote that book? 

Mr. Vincent. Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you ever asked to review that book for the 
publication Pacific Affairs? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever review any book for Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what the publication Pacific Affairs 
was ? 

Mr. Vincent. Pacific Affairs I think was a publication of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations; was it not? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is your memory ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was the editor of that publication ? 

Mr. Vincent. The only time that I knew exactly who was the editor 
was Salisbury, I think it was, who was the editor at one time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Owen Lattimore ever the editor of that 
publication ? 

Mr. Vincent. I believe at a very early date he must have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you have known it at the time if he had 
been ? 



1786 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I believe I would have. I would not have known his 
exact position. That is the reason I am trying to refresh my memory, 
but it seems to me that some time in the thirties he was the editor of 
Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think he was editor of Pacific Affairs at the 
time he wrote Inter- Asian Frontiers of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't say with exactness because I have forgotten 
when. 

Mr. Sourwine. That would have been in 1940. 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I don't know when he wrote Inter-Asian 
Frontiers of China. 

Mr. Sourwine. It would have been in 1940. I believe it was 1940. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know when he began or when he ceased being 
editor of Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that book in your opinion a good objective 
analysis of the subject with which it dealt? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought it was, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You so regarded it at the time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. And still so regard it? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall now the exact nature of the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now 1 believe that you may have covered some of 
these questions in previous testimony. I ask that you forgive any 
repetition, but I want to set them in here all together. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first meet Mr. Laughlin Currie? 

Mr. Vincent. I first met Laughlin Currie as I have testified either 
in 1936 or 1937. I have forgotten the year. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he in Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. That is not where I met him, but he was in Chung- 
king in 1942 when I was counselor of the Embassy there. 

Mr. Sourwine. You knew him there? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you were given leave to handle work in the 
Office of the Director of Foreign Economic Administration, or as- 
signed to that Administration — which was the case? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I was assigned or detailed. I was still paid by 
the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. At that time did Mr. Currie have anything to do 
with that assignment or detail? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he asked me whether I would come over; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was at that time in what position with the FEA ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was just organizing it or helping organize it under 
Crowlejr, and he was one of the deputies or the deputy of FEA. 

Mr. Sourwine. FEA had just been created? 

Mr. Vincent. FEA had just been created in that autumn. BEW 
had gone out of business. 

Mr. Sourwine. How well did you know Mr. Currie at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew him, I should say, well, not very well, but 
well. 

Mr. Sourwine. Socially as well as professionally? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; my wife was a friend of his wife. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you, prior to that time, ever consulted Mr. 
Currie with regard to matters of policy? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1787 

Mr. Vincent. On the Far East ? 

Mr. Sourwine. On anything. 

Mr. Vincent. I had, I suppose, on the Far East, but he was in 
Chungking and he, no doubt, from time to time would ask me about 
the situation in Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did your consultations with him on matters of 
policy limit themselves to far-eastern matters? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; except for FEA where 1 was in there for a short 
period. 

Mr. Sourwine. At that time he was in a sense your superior? 

Mr. Vincent. He was my superior. 

Mr. Sourwine. Subsequent to that detail and after you had re- 
turned to the Department, did you continue to consult Mr. Currie 
with regard to matters of policy from time to time? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you intending to testify that after you re- 
turned to the Department from FEA you did not thereafter consult 
with Mr. Currie concerning any matters of policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall that he ever contacted you there- 
after — that is, after you got back from FEA, with regard to matters 
of policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. He might have, but I don't recall the instances. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now I believe you already testified with regard to 
3^our knowledge or acquaintanceship with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have testified who they were ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you restate that for the record at this point? 

Mr. Vincent. Chou En-lai at that time was the representative of the 
so-called Communist government. 

Mr. Sourwine. At what time ? 

Mr. Vincent. At the time that I had any association with him in 
Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. About 1942? 

Mr. Vincent. About 1942 over to the middle of 1943. He was the 
representative, officially recognized, in Chungking of what we called 
the Yenan Government or the Communist government. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now Lin Piao ? 

Mr. Vincent. Lin Piao was a general, as I recollect, who had come 
down to Chungking also at the end of 1942 at the request of Chiang 
Kai-shek to discuss matters of interest in trying to get the two armies 
together to fight the Japanese. I don't know the nature of the 
discussions. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you testified about whether you ever met 
them ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did 3^011 ever meet them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did meet both of them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell the committee where and when ? 

Mr. Vincent. May I refer to this just exactly the same as I did 
before [reading] : 

As counselor of the Embassy at Chungking I met Chou En-lai sev- 
eral times. He was the representative in Chungking of the Chines 



1788 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Communists at Yenan. He had an official position recognized by 
Chiang Kai-shek and it may have been at Chiang's where I first met 
Chou En-lai. I also recall meeting him at a luncheon in the home of 
an American manager of the British-American Tobacco Co. 

Also I met him when he made a courtesy call on Ambassador Gauss. 
The last time I saw him was just before my departure for the United 
States in May 1943. He called at the Embassy to meet George 
Atcheson, who was taking my place. 

My few conversations with Chou concerned conditions in North 
China, areas occupied by the Communists, and in particular the con- 
duct of military operations against the Japanese. The information 
obtained by me and by other officers of the Embassy was of con- 
siderable value to us. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have any conferences with Mr. Chou 
En-lai? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified that I never had any con- 
ferences with Chou En-lai other than these conversations I have just 
mentioned here. I did recall I think in the testimony this morning, 
or was it yesterday afternoon, that there may have been a luncheon 
party that I attended given by the Chinese, whether it was at a house 
I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever consult with or meet with Chou En- 
lai and Lin Piao together ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; although let me say it would have been quite 
natural for them to be together. I don't recall the occasion of ever 
meeting Lin Piao. I might have met him at Chiang's or elsewhere. 
Whereas, I have a distinct recollection of the places where I met 
Chou I have no recollection of occasions when I met Lin Piao. 

Mr. Sourwine. The occasions when you met Chou were either social 
or as you have testified to ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you and Mr. John Stewart Service ever have 
a conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. I will amend that, Service may 
have been present at this luncheon I mentioned at the British- Ameri- 
can Tobacco Co.'s place. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was that luncheon? 

Mr. Vincent. I was unable to recall it yesterday, and I can't re- 
call it today, but I would say at the end of 1942 or early 1943. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been later, as late as July of 1942? 

Mr. Vincent. It could have been. 

The Chairman. Where was that? 

Mr. Vincent. Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been as late at August 1942? 

Mr. Vincent. I say it could have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been as late as September 1942? 

Mr. Vincent. It could have been as late as November or Decem- 
ber of 1942 because I was still there. Are you speaking now of the 
luncheon ? 

Mr. Sourwine. The luncheon. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that it was before then, but I say I have 
no recollection — that it was before the autumn of 1942. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been on November 20, 1942? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1789 

Mr. Vincent. One of these occasions might have been in November, 
but I would not say this luncheon. 

Mr. Sourwine. One of what occasions? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it was in the autumn. 

The Chairman. What occasion ? You say "one of those occasions." 

Mr. Vincent. I have named those occasions when he called on Mr. 
Gauss. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am inquiring now about an occasion, if there was 
one, when you and Mr. John Stewart Service had a conference wifch 
Chou En-la i and Lin Piao. 

Mr. Vincent. A conference with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao? I said 
I do not recall. 

Mr. SonmviNE. I think you said such conference Could only have 
occurred if you had met them all together at a luncheon ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say it might have occurred at the luncheon. Lin 
Piao was not at the British-American Tobacco Co. luncheon. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then you could not have had a conference with 
Chou En-lai and Lin Piao at that luncheon? 

Mr. Vincent. No. Lin Piao did not arrive in Chungking until the 
autumn of 1942. If I had a conference with him, it was not in con- 
nection with the British- American Tobacco Co. luncheon. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you and John Stewart Service have a conference 
or conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao on or about November 
20, 1942? 

Mr. Vincent. It could possibly be so. I have no recollection of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where would you have had such a conference? 

Mr. Vincent. That may have been the reference I have had here to 
having a luncheon at Chou En-lai's. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you stated that Lin Piao was not at the lun- 
cheon, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have stated that Lin Piao was not at the luncheon 
given by the British-American Tobacco Co. 

Mr. Sourwine. What luncheon did you mean? 

Mr. Vincent. The luncheon given by the Chinese, which may have 
been Chou En-lai. It was an invitation to a Chinese lunch. 

Mr. Sourwine. You and Mr. Service? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that Service was there, but he could 
have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. What I am endeavoring to find out is whether there 
was a meeting of that nature at which yourself and Mr. Service and 
Chou- En-lai and Lin Piao were present at which time they, meaning 
Chou and Lin, made certain suggestions to you with regard to Ameri- 
can policy. Was there such a conference? 

Mr. Vincent. And I am trying to be helpful, and I cannot recall 
the conference; but, as I say, a conference of that kind could be not a 
conference but a meeting, which, as I say, I do not recollect the 
meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then if there was such a conference or conversation, 
you would be unable at this time to testify concerning any suggestions 
that may have been made; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly w r ould not be able to testify as to sug- 
gestions. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any memory of any suggestions made 
to you and Mr. Service by Chou and/or Lin about American policy ? 



1790 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No. I have testified already that from my recollec- 
tion our conversations were on the matter of conditions in Yenan and 
fighting of Japanese and the whole military situation in north China 
as they knew it. 

Mr. Sourwine. If such suggestions had been made at such a con- 
ference, would you have felt that you should transmit a memorandum 
concerning them to the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I would. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say 

The Chairman. Even though these conversations may have been at 
a social gathering such as a luncheon? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir; where we thought there was sufficient 
amount of importance to a conversation at a social gathering, Ave made 
a memorandum. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you feel that you would have transmitted them 
if there had been such conversations, such recommendations? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say "Yes," that we probably would. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you feel that so strongly that you would be 
willing to say that if you made no such report to the State Depart- 
ment there was no such conversation and there was no such suggestion ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not be willing to say. In other words, 
if the conversations were not of such importance that I considered 
them so that I would not have burdened the Department with the 
report. But, if I considered them of sufficient importance to have 
the Department have the information, then I would have reported, or 
it would have been reported, as you stated here; Service may have 
done it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have called to your attention the 
report made by Mr. Service under date of January 23, 1943 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. In that report it is stated, and I read from page 
792 of our hearings, part 3 : 

The Communists themselves, Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, in a conversation with 
John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942, considered 
that foreign influence, obviously American, with the Kuomintang, is the only 
force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of 
successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how 
tactfully made, but they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign 
opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more farsighted ele- 
ments of the leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the generalissimo. 

Then it continues. Does that refresh your recollection at all!, 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid it doesn't. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember having heard such views expressed 
by Chou or Lin? 

Mr. Vincent. No. But I say I have simply forgotten the occasion. 
I am not denying the occasion, because Service was an exact reporter. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not remember it. You say he was an exact 
reporter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought he was an exact reporter at that time. 

The Chairman. Let me get that answer. You thought what ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was saying that in connection with this instance 
I think he was an exact reporter there of a conversation of that kind. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next paragraph of the report reads as follows : 

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be 
the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government and in our propa- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1791 

ganda to China of the political nature of the world conflict, democracy against 
fascism. This would include constant reiteration of American hope of seeing 
the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuo- 
mintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. Another 
suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a 
participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to 
the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given 
by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists 
hope this might include a specification that the Communist army receive a 
proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. Another way of making 
our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send Amer- 
ican representatives to \isit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed 
by the Communists themselves, but there is no doubt that they would welcome 
such action. 

Your memory remains im refreshed? 

Mr. Vincent. My memory remains unrefreshed, but that was a 
question that was discussed continually in Chungking at the time and 
subsequently by Mr. Hurley and all of us as trying to get a more 
effective cooperation. Chiang Kai-shek himself had Lin down to do 
that in fighting the Japs. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is this an accurate statement of what the Com- 
munist objectives and desires were? 

Mr. Vincent. If you would read it again? I don't want to be 
caught up on anything, but I think it probably was the Communist 
desire to get American assistance, if that was one of the points. 

Mr. Sourwine. I will read it rapidly, if I may. Please listen with 
the idea that I want you to tell us whether this, which is in Mr. 
Service's report, is a fair and accurate statement of the Communist 
desires, Communist objectives at the time : 

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be 
the emphasiz'ng in our dealings with the Chinese Government and in our prop- 
aganda to China of the political nature of the world conflict, democracy against 
fascism. This would include constant reiteration of American hope of seeing 
the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuo- 
mintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. Another 
suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a par- 
ticipant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the 
end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the 
Central Government to the Eightei nth Group Army. The Communists hope this 
night include a specification that th;^ Communist army receive a proportionate 
share of American supplies sent to China. Another way of making our interest 
in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American represent- 
atives to visit the Communist aiea. I have not heard this proposed by the Com- 
munists themselves, but there is no doubt that they would welcome such action. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that that was a fairly accurate statement 
of what the Communist Government at that time wanted. 

Mr. Sottrwtne. Those were, as Mr. Service has reported, the rec- 
ommendations of Chou and Lin with regard to American policy. 
Now, to what extent w r ere those suggestions followed ; do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, let me see. Taking the Inst one, there was an 
American military mission sent to Yenan in 1944. 

Mr. Sourwine. You favored that, and, as a matter of fact, urged 
it at the time, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. The President favored it; Mr. Wallace favored 
it; and the military. As a matter of fact, it was initiated by the 
military in Chungking, our own American military, of trying to get 
some intelligence group up into that area. The objective w T as to get 

22848— 52— pt. 6— S 



1792 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

intelligence for our own Air Force, which were flying bombing 
missions. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let ns not lose sight of the fact that I am trying 
to find out, with regard to the speciiic recommendations of the Com- 
munists, which ones we followed. 

Mr. Vincent. There never was, to my knowledge, any arms or 
ammunition supplied to the Communists by us that I know of. There 
may have been some supplied in a manner through OSS or something, 
but I don't recall it. Isn't that one of the points, too ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Let us take it seriatim. In our dealings with the 
Chinese Government was it emphasized, and in our propaganda to 
China was it emphasized, that this was, this Chinese situation, part 
of a world conflict of a political nature ? 

Mr. Vincent. Was it emphasized ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Did I emphasize it, or was that realized ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Did that become a part of American policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did those in power in the State Department, in posi- 
tions of influence in the State Department both here and in China, 
emphasize, in dealings with the Chinese Government and in propa- 
ganda to China, the political nature of the conflict ? 

Mr. Vincent. They did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there repeated reiteration of "American hope 
of seeing the development of genuine democracy" in China? 

Mr. Vincent. There was. 

Mr. Sourwine. That statement is necessarily in derogation of any 
claims to democracy of the then-existing Government, is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. That was not in derogation. It was that the Chinese 
should have a constitutional government, which they themselves spoke 
of more often than we did. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you say that you hope a country will someday have 
all of this development of genuine democracy, you are saying it is 
something that an existing government does not have? 

Mr. Vincent. The existing Government made no pretension to hav- 
ing a democracy ; it was a one-party tutelage under the Kuomintang. 

Mr. Sourwine. The conclusion seems so clear. 

Mr. Vincent. I was thinking of representative democracy, and they 
certainly did not have that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there ever a specification that the Communist 
armies receive an apportioned share of American supplies sent to 
China? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that ever recommended? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot testify to that. I don't know whether Gen- 
eral Stilwell did or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have anything to do with such a recom- 
mendation? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever assent to such a recommendation ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not Mr. Wallace make such a recommendation in 
his Kunming cable? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1793 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. I do not think so. That a proportion- 
ate amount of supplies be sent to the Communists ? No ; he did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you read Mr. Wallace's testimony before this 
committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, you might be asked this question again, sir, 
and I suggest you read this testimony between now and the time you 
come back in publie session. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not want to belabor that point, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. That testimony of Mr. Wallace's can be made avail- 
able to the witness. 

Mr. Vincent. Your question was whether Mr. Wallace in his Kun- 
ming cable recommended, and I do not recall that it did. I haven't 
read his testimony before this committee completely. I have looked 
at it, but looked at it where it concerned me personally. 

Mr. Sourwine. I have stated earlier, Mr. Chairman, it is not the 
endeavor here, the objective here, to become argumentative. We 
are trying to traverse the area. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Sourwine. For the record and the chairman's information at 
this point, the witness has already testified that he has access to the 
hearings of this committee — that they are available at some place 
in the State Department. Incidentally, they are available down there 
in manuscript form, are they not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

The Chairman. And Mr. Wallace's testimony is available? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace's testimony is available. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first come into contact with Mr. Henry 
Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. I have that here; and, if you like, for precision I 
would like to read it. 

Mr. Sourwine. We would be glad, of course, Mr. Chairman, to 
supply any copies of printed record that the witness may wish. 

Mr. Surrey. We appreciate that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, the witness desires to add a paren- 
thetical clause to his testimony of a moment ago. 

Mr. Vincent. I am referring to this because it is primarily a state- 
ment of my early association with General Wedemeyer. 

The Chairman. Was that raised? 

Mr. Sourwine. As I understand it, the point the witness wants to 
make, and correct me if I am incorrect, he wants no inference by his 
answer with regard to Mr. Wallace's recommendations in the Kunming 
cable, he wants no inference that the question of aid to the Chinese 
Communists did not come up later. I think he wants to expand on 
that. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : In the late autumn or probably winter of 
1933, in December, it was generally understood in the State Depart- 
ment — I was in the State Department then — that there was possibly 
going to be an American landing on the north coast of China. That 
area was largely occupied by Chinese Communist guerrillas. 

It became apparent to us, and by "us" I include Mr. Grew, who 
himself at the time was anxious that any forces that could aid us in 



1794 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

fighting the Japanese should be utilized, and this would. Also, we 
assumed it would save American lives if we would utilize the Com- 
munists. 

I went to call on General Wedemeyer in March of 1945. 

The Chairman. Where? 

Mr. Vincent. Here in Washington, sir [reading] : He was home on 
leave. It was my first meeting with General Wedemeyer. I brought 
the problem to his attention, making it clear to him that it was after all 
a military problem to be decided by military officers, but that in the 
State Department we had felt that if we could get some arms to these 
people it would be of assistance. 

General Wedemeyer and I discussed the matter, and he said that 
he would go back and look into it. He said, and I agreed with him, 
that he did not believe in just arming the Communists, nor did I. 
Nothing was done about it, and I subsequently learned that it was 
about that time that any idea of landing on the Chinese coast had 
been abandoned for the general landing that was going to be made 
in October in the southern island of Japan. 

I just wanted to add that to it, that that is my recollection of it 
when getting arms to the Communists did arise and not during the 
Wallace mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is your answer to the question as to whether 
the question of the extension of a portion of our aid, military and 
otherwise, to the Chinese Communists was raised? 

Mr. Vincent. What is my answer? 

Mr. Sourwine. To the question as to whether that question was 
raised ? * 

Mr. Vincent. It was not raised to my knowledge during the Wal- 
lace mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it raised at all? We had a statement that 
there had been a recommendation with regard to policy by the Com- 
munist leaders and that that was one of the things that the Commu- 
nist leaders urged that we do. Now I am asking whether by anyone 
in the Department, in a position of authority or responsibility, that 
was subsequently urged — that is, the extension of aid to the Chinese 
Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not outside the context of what I have mentioned 
here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Not outside of your discussion with General Wede- 
meyer ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was not otherwise recommended by you, or, to 
your knowledge, by anyone in the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first come into contact with Mr. 
Henry Wallace ? 

The Chairman. Just a moment there. There is perhaps some- 
thing that I have not connected up in my mind. My recollection is 
that the witness testified that he was in the State Department at 
that time and that it was discussed in the State Department. If I 
misquote him I want to be corrected. And that following the dis- 
cussion between himself and some other member of the State Depart- 
ment 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1795 

Mr. Vincent. No, I mentioned Mr. Grew. Mr. Grew was Under 
Secretary and it didn't result from the discussion, it was his attitude. 

The Chairman. A discussion as to arming the Reds. You called 
on General Wedemeyer, is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Then there was a discussion in the State Depart- 
ment on the question of arming the Reds? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Vincent. For the specific purpose that I have mentioned, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. As I understand it, it is your testimony that that 
was the only time when there was such a discussion? 

Mr. Vincent. As far as I can recall, of getting arms to the Com- 
munists. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first come into contact with Mr. 
Henry Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. I first came into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace in 
1944 just prior to the mission. I went out with him in May 1944. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not know him in 1943? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1943 I had not met Mr. Wallace ; no. May I, just 
to keep my memory fresher, describe what I have here [reading] : 

In the spring of 1944, probably April, I met Mr. Wallace at his 
request. I had never met him previously. I was then Chief of the 
China Division in the State Department. I had spent 2 years, 
1942-43, in Chungking and was on good terms with the Chinese offi- 
cials there. No one in the Department at that time had had similar 
experience. 

Mr. Wallace told me of his plan to visit China at the President's 
suggestion. He wanted information regarding China. He also 
talked with Mr. Ballantine, Deputy Director of the Foreign Office, and 
I believe Mr. Grew, the Director. Subsequently, Mr. Wallace asked 
Secretary Hull to allow me to accompany him on the mission. Mr. 
Hull agreed and instructed me to make the trip. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let me get that straight. Mr. Wallace talked with 
vou about his trip before there was any request that you accompany 
him? 

Mr. Vincent. As far as I can recall it was first going over condi- 
tions in China. The President had just asked him to go, according 
to his statements to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he and you talk about the possibility that you 
might go with him? 

Mr. Vincent. We possibly did ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who broached that possibility first, you or he ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did. I was just about to say that I had no desire 
to go to China again. I had been away from my family %y 2 years and 
I may admit that I didn't like flying for 51 days, so I had no desire 
to make that trip. But I considered it my duty to make it on the 
basis of what I have just said, that it was a logical selection for me 
to go if someone was going, that it be a man who had been in China 
the previous 2 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. When were you assigned to work in the office of 
FEA? 

LMr. Vincent. In either September or October. 
Mr. Sourwine. Of 1943? 



1796 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was the Director of FEA at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace had left when the BEW had ceased 
to exist? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I recollect the BEW had ceased. I think 
he left before the BEW ceased to exist. 

Mr. Sourwine. The Board of Economic Warfare became the Office 
of Economic Warfare as part of the Office of Emergency Management 
and. Mr. Wallace went out at that time, July 15. That is the record 
I have. Does that accord with your recollection ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had just gotten back. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was subsequent, September 25, 1943, that what 
was then the Office of Economic Warfare of the Office of Emergency 
Management became the FEA ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who initiated the request for your 
assignment to FEA ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Currie, I testified this morning. 

Mr. Sourwine. He initiated it himself ? 

The Chairman. Mr. who ? 

Mr. Vincent. Currie, Laughlin Currie. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall a series of meetings organized or ar- 
ranged by Laughlin Currie in 1943? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us about those ? 

Mr. Vincent. Why, I never did quite know what the purport was, 
but apparently, before he went with FEA, as a Presidential assistant 
he had been given general, some general, job in connection with Far 
Eastern affairs. He had made a trip to China and interested himself 
very much in China. 

When I got back from China in 1943, the summer, I found that 
these meetings went on from time to time. I don't know to what 
extent, what their regular frequency was. I recall attending one or 
two in Currie's office. There would be an OWI person present, prob- 
ably a military man, people interested in China who were there to 
sit and discuss problems in Currie's office which he had in the State 
Department at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it a case of Mr. Currie calling together people 
who were in various departments of Government who were function- 
ally concerned with China ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was my understanding of the meeting. As I 
say, it went out of business more or less when he went over to FEA, 
and he went over to FEA the next month after I got back. 

Mr. Sourwine. How often did such meetings occur? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say because I don't think I 
attended more than two or three, and whether it was a weekly or 
monthly or semimonthly thing I don't know. 

The Chairman. Who were the attendants at these meetings ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, as I say, it was people interested in 
China from various departments of Government. My recollection is 
vague on that because I didn't attend many meetings, but I would say 
that there would be an OWI man and an officer from the War Depart- 
ment particularly interested in China. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1797 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember who was present at any of the 
meetings you attended? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did your deputy attend any of those meetings? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't have a deputy at that time because I was just 
back and was assistant, or had the title of assistant, in the Far Eastern 
Office and didn't have a deputy. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Friedman in the office at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not think so. He was not; he did not come 
in until 1944 as far as my office was concerned. He may have been in 
the Labor Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything more about the purport of 
those meetings than you have testified to ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever prepare any memorandum or instruc- 
tions in connection with any of those meetings ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you became Assistant Chief of the Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. That will come from the record. 

Mr. Sourwine. That date is taken from the State Department reg- 
ister. I am in a chronological portion of the inquiry. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you stated that you did know Mr. Lawrence 
K. Rosinger? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe you stated that you read his book, War- 
time Politics in China ; is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the title. I recall a book which he wrote 
which covered the period from, I would say, 1923 up to the beginning 
of the war, if that is Wartime Politics in China, which was supposed 
to cover that period. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that the only book of Mr. Rosinger's you ever 
re;i < 1 ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the only book of Mr. Rosinger's that I have 
read. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did you come to read that one? 

Mr. Vincent. It was either furnished me or, as somebody has tes- 
tified, I was furnished a manuscript. I wouldn't want to say I didn't. 
I know I have read the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. At the risk of repetition will you testify how well 
you knew Mr. Rosinger? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know Mr. Rosinger well. Mr. Rosinger 
was a casual acquaintance whom I had met at one time or another; 
I didn't even know what he did at that time. 

The Chairman. What was his official position at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall, Senator, that he even had an official 
position. If he did it escaped my attention. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at that time that he was connected 
with the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. I would assume I did know that he was connected 
with the IPR and was writing, contributing articles, I think, to the 
IPR publication. I don't recall reading them. 



1798 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Souewine. Is that something that we could eliminate assump- 
tion on, and find out whether you remember that you did know, or 
you do not remember whether you knew? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, because my recollection is that Mr. Rosinger 
was at the Hot Springs conference in 1915 as a member of the Ameri- 
can delegation. 

Mr. Sourwine. We are now talking about November 1943. 

Mr. Vincent. We are? 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you at that time know that he was connected 
with thp Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact knowledge that I did know at that 
time he was connected with the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. The IPR had no evil connotation for you at that 
time, did it? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to be perfectly clear with you as to 
whether Mr. Rosinger was connected with the IPR in November 1913. 
I couldn't give you exact testimony. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever attend meetings or conferences at 
which Mr. Rosinger was present? 

Mr. Vincent. I attended a conference, as I have just testified, in 
Hot Springs in 1945. 

Mr. Sourwine. Other than the conference at Hot Springs? 

Mr. Vincent. He was probably at a preparatory conference for the 
American delegation before he went down to the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember that he was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, but again I assume he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever attend any other conference or meet- 
ing at which he was present? 

Mr. Vincent. I may have, but I do not recall them. 

Mr. Sourwine. You recall no such other meeting or conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would that mean it is your testimony that you 
never attended any meetings of the Institute of Pacific Relations or 
any functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which 
Mr. Rosinger was present except the Hot Springs conference and 
possiblv a meeting of a delegation in advance of that conference? 

Mr. Vincent. It would not because I think there has been testimony 
here that I attended a conference of the IPR in 1938. 

Mr. Sourwine. At which Mr. Rosinger was present ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he was present, but I have no 
recollection that he was present. My testimony is that I would not 
recall if he was there. I thought you were limiting it to these two cases 
of the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, but at which Mr. Rosinger was present. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you attend any other meetings or functions of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say. I may have attended this one in 1938, it 
would have been natural for me to do so. 

The Chairman. Then let us close that incident. Let us see if we 
can get at it. Thp only time that you remember meeting with Mr. Ros- 
inger was at the Hot Springs meeting and another meeting at some 
other place? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1799 

The Chairman. Two meetings? 

Mr. Vincent. That is, the only ones I recall. I have testified, I 
think, before that Mr. Rosinger was a person who may have come to 
my office, and I may have met socially elsewhere, but I am testifying 
to where I know I met him. 

The Chairman. You knew, however, that he was writing for 
the I PR? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did you first meet Mr. Rosinger? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I cannot recall how I first met Mr. 
Rosinger. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could he have been introduced to you by the Secre- 
tary of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would consider it most unlikely that Mr. Hull intro- 
duced me to Mr. Rosinger. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could he have been introduced to you by Mr. E. C. 
Carter? 

Mr. Vincent. He could, although I never met Mr. Carter until 1943. 

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, you really have no recollection at 
all about your first meeting with Mr. Rosinger ; you might have known 
him always? 

Mr. Vincent. I might. I would like to just say that during this 
period there were so many people that came into my office, people in- 
terested in the Far East, people who came to the Far East when I was 
in Chungking, that I don't want the inference that I would be able 
to tell you every time I met Mr. Rosinger. Mr. Rosinger, and I don't 
want to be immodest, probably has a better recollection of when I met 
him than I have of when I met him, and that would apply to a great 
many of these other people. 

If I could recall the occasions that I met Mr. Rosinger or any of 
these other people I would be glad to do so because it is in no sense 
trying to avoid indicating when or when I did not meet them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now you have stated, have you, that you read his 
book, Wartime Politics in China? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Try very hard to recall whether you read it in book 
form or in manuscript form. 

Mr. Vincent. I have said that I cannot recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether you did have the manuscript 
at one time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I did have the manuscript at one time and 
1 don't recall whether I read it or not in manuscript, but it would have 
been perfectly natural for me to have it in manuscript, I think, and 
look it over. I had just come back from China. I think the book 
was published in 1943, was it not? 

Mr. Sourwine. Why would it have been natural for you to have 
the book in manuscript? 

Mr. Vincent. Because as a person just back from China frequently 
people would come to me with articles and books on China. Here was 
a man writing me to see whether there was factual data that was in- 
correct. I had been in China for the previous 15 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in the habit of going over manuscripts 
for peonle that you did not know? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not in the habit of it ; no. sir. 



1800 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have many people bring you book manu- 
scripts to go over and correct? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I did, but there were occasional ones. I 
testified this morning that I think David Rowe sent me one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have anybody bring you a book manu- 
script for correction outside of the IPR or the channels of IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I think Mr. David Rowe sent me his China 
Among the Powers. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean that he had no connection with the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I knew of at that time. Did he ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you for your testimony. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I cannot testify to the ultimate fact of what you 
knew, only you can do that. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that it has been stated that Mr. 
Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent to you 
for criticism by an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I have seen that testimony. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that the truth ? 

Mr. Vincent. That — I have no distinct recollection of it, but it 
may have been the case. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you doubt that? 

Mr. Vincent. I have read the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you doubt that? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't doubt it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Why do you suggest that it may have been brought 
to you by Mr. Rosinger himself ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't suggest. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry, I misunderstood. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall Mr. Rosinger bringing it in himself. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said people were frequently bringing such 
things in to you, and I thought you meant the authors were bringing 
them in. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Rosinger himself did not bring it in to you? 

Mr. Vincent. I say, I don't recall whether Mr. Rosinger brought 
it himself or whether it was sent through the mails or whether some- 
body else brought it. 

The Chairman. Just a moment there. You left the impression 
with the chairman that Mr. Rosinger brought it in because you said 
many people came to your office ; that you had been in the Orient for 
15 years and that many people came to your office and discussed mat- 
ters with you and left manuscript with you or otherwise. 

I took it from that that you regarded Rosinger as one of many who 
left his manuscript with you. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. When I say "many" I say people 
would come in to discuss conditions in the Far East. As I say, the 
only manuscript, the only other manuscript, that I can recall is China 
Among the Powers. How I came into physical possession of the 
manuscript — I have already testified that I have no clear memory of 
how I got the manuscript. 

The -whole case is something I would like to be clear on, but the only 
thing I can say is that I have a knowledge of the book, knew the book, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1801 

and whether I read it in manuscript or not and how I got it is a mat- 
ter I would like to be clear on, but I can't. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that the record of this committee 
includes a letter to you from Mr. T. A. Bisson of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations asking you to return the manuscript? 

The Chairman. Asking what? 

Mr. Sourwine. Asking the witness to return this manuscript of Mr. 
Rosingers book, Wartime Politics in China. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I had read that, and I had no recollection of that 
incident at all when I read it in the thing. That is the reason I 
would say that I assumed that the thing had come to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think that you did return the manuscript at 
Mr. Bisson's request? 

Mr. Vincent. Did I? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; did you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I did. I would have no reason for keeping it. 

Mr. Surrey. You mean Mr. Bisson's request? 

Mr. Sourwine. I intended to say, and I hope that the record will 
read, that I asked if you think you did return the manuscript of 
Mr. Rosinger's book at Mr. Bisson's request. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you were with the Board of Economic War- 
fare on detail — let me ask this foundation question first. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you ever assigned or detailed to work with 
the Board of Economic Warfare ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have anything to do with the meet- 
ings of the so-called Interdepartmental Regional Committee? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. May I amend that previous 
statement? When you say "any connection with the Board of Eco- 
nomic Warfare," I was while we were waiting to get somebody to 
China, I acted on the BEW in addition to my duties as counselor be- 
fore we procured somebody for BEW. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what the Interdepartmental Regional 
Committee was? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall, no sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You wouldn't be able to tell us what if anything 
that committee or such a committee had to do with the Board of Eco- 
nomic Warfare, or vice versa ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Mandel. Could I have one question? 

Mr. Sourwine. By all means break in any time you want. 

Mr. Mandel. Mr. Rosinger was a delegate to the conference, an 
IPR conference, at New Delhi, India, in 1949 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Mandel. Did that conference or his attendance at the confer- 
ence have any direct or indirect approval of the State Department 
or support from the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Mandel, I couldn't say, give any answer to that, 
because I was in Bern, Switzerland, and completely out of the 
picture at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have testified I believe that you knew Vladimir 
Rogoff? 



1802 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; on one occasion. 

Mr. Sourwine. At the risk of repetition, where did you meet him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I met him at the Cosmos Club in January 1944, I 
think I have testified, at a luncheon. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that on January 20 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know the exact date, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify that was a luncheon to which you 
were invited by Mr. Bill Johnstone? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I think Bill Johnstone was the 
host at the luncheon. 

Mr. Soukwine. Was Mr. William L. Holland at that luncheon? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Mr. Holland ? 

Mr. Vincent. I know Mr. Holland. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Owen Lattimore at that luncheon ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think this morning I said I did not recall. I have 
seen the manuscript as } 7 ou call it, but made no note of who was 
there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was C. F. Bemer at that luncheon ? 

Mr. Vincent. He might easily have been, he was interested in the 
Far East. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Mr. Remer? 

Mr. Vincent. I have met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who is he ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was at one time with the OSS. I don't recall 
when I first met Remer. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was his position there in January of 1944? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that that was the period, but here I can't 
be exact, when he had come over to the State Department and had 
some position in the economic work as a man studying capital invest- 
ment or investment of one sort or another. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. William Lockwood at this luncheon ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall Lockwood, sir, but I, as I say 

Mr. Sourwine. What can you tell us about the luncheon ? What was 
its purpose ? What was discussed ? 

Mr. Vincent. The purpose of the luncheon insofar as I knew was 
to find out from Rogoff what he knew about China. That was my 
recollection of it, that RogofF had come back from China as a Tass 
correspondent, and these people wanted to find out from him what he, 
a Tass agent, had to say about China. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were seeking information that would be useful 
to you? 

Mr. Vincent. I was seeking information that would have been 
useful to me ; that would have been something that I would have gone 
to in the normal course of my duties to find out what was going 
on in China from his angle. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do yon know whether you were invited to that 
luncheon by a telephone call? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I can't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been a telephone call from someone 
in the IPR office speaking on behalf of Mr. Johnstone? 

Mr. Vincent. It could easily have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember anything more than you have told 
us about what took place at the luncheon ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1803 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Souk wine. Do you remember anything about anything that 
Mr. liogoff said? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. Unfortunately, I do not recall any details. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you make any memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. To my knowledge I did not make any memorandum? 

Mr. Sourwine. Do }'ou know Mrs. E. C. Carter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think I have ever met Mrs. Carter. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who she is ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would amend that to say that if she was at the 
IPR conference in 1945 and I may have met her at some social gather- 
ing. No ; I don't know. You mean, who she is other than the wife of 
Mr. E.G. Carter? 

Mr. Sourwine. The wife. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about her connection, if 
any, with the China Aid Council ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have any connection with the China 
Aid Council? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not recall having personally known Mrs. 
E.C.Carter? 

Mr. Vincent. In any relationship; if she was at the IPR confer- 
ence I would probably have met her at a social gathering there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever correspond? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever ask her to send your regards to 
Madam Sun Yat-sen? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you. know Madam Sun Yat-sen ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you have asked mutual friends to tender 
regards ? 

Mr. Vincent. I believe so. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you did not regard Mrs. Carter as such a mutual 
friend ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not regard Mrs. Carter as a mutual friend. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say that you never made such a request 
to her — that is, to convey your regards to Madame Sun Yat-sen ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can say that I have no recollection of asking Mrs. 
Carter to convey my regards. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had done so you would probably have re- 
membered ; would you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I would, if somebody came in 
casually and said, "I am going to China and seeing Madame Sun Yat- 
sen." I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not constantly sending your regards to 
Madame Sun Yet-sen? 

Mr. Vincent. No, Mr. Sourwine, but I don't know what the period 
was. 

Mr. Sourwine. In 1944, about June ? 



1804 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, something that happened 7 years ago, 
whether I sent my regards to Madame Sun Yat-sen or not through 
Mrs. Carter I don't want to say because I don't remember. 

Mr. Mandel. Would you regard Madam Sun Yat-sen as pro- 
Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would regard her as pro-Communist. I haven't 
seen her since 1943. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether she is a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. She was in Peking and I would as- 
sume she is with the party. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You have no more information than that answer 
implies? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you do anything to prepare or condition Mr. 
Wallace for his mission to China ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I have already testified, he and I met on two or 
three occasions prior to our departure in May, and I no doubt brought 
him up to date on conditions in China. There were not memoranda 
made of that, and I don't recall the exact nature. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not supply him with certain material in 
advance of the trip? 

Mr. Vincent. I suppose I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether you did ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember whether I did or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet with him prior to that trip ? 

The Chairman. That is rather perplexing, Mr. Vincent. This is 
a very important occasion that you were going on for you to say that 
you don't remember whether or not you supplied material to Mr. 
Wallace. 

Mr. Vtncent. But, Mr. Chairman, I thought I had just testified 
that I probably did, but I don't remember the nature of what I may 
have supplied him. 

The Chairman. That is not the way I caught it. 

Mr. Vincent. Whether I did it orally or in writing. 

Mr. Souravine. You testified that you did meet with him and did 
have oral discussions ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, and they may have resulted in preparing him 
with written material on China. 

Mr. Sourwine. The purpose of the discussions was to help prepare 
him or condition him for the trip, but whether there was any writing 
you do not know? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember. 

Mr. Sourwine. On the occasions when you met with Mr. Wallace to 
discuss his forthcoming trip to China, did any of those meetings take 
place outside the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. In his office. In the building here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did any of those meetings take place anywhere 
else? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where did the first meeting take place; here in his 
office? 

Mr. Vincent. Not the first meeting. I recall it was in the office in 
the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he come up there? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1805 

Mr. Vincent. He came up there and I said, "I am coming up to 
see you," and he said, "No, I am coming up to the State Department." 
He didn't come to my office, he came to the little office occupied by 
Currie. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you went over and met him there? 

Mr. Vincent. I went over and met him there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Currie have anything to do with arrang- 
ing that first conference? 

Mr. Vincent. I would assume that he did. Wallace has testified 
that Mr. Currie had a great deal to do with arranging the mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you from the basis of your recollection. 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that Mr. Wallace called me for a 
meeting and that Mr. Wallace then said he would come to the Depart- 
ment and meet me there. What part Currie had I don't know : that 
was the first time I recalled meeting the Vice President of the United 
States. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that the first mention that was made to you of 
such a meeting, when he called you about it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't think so, but I don't recall any other 
mention. I don't know when that meeting took place. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you think there was mention before Mr. 
Wallace called you of the possibility of your meeting with him? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know who that was mentioned by? 

Mr. Vincent. I think probably that Currie himself told me that 
the President had proposed to Wallace to go to China and that Wal- 
lace wanted to meet me and talk about China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, sir, consult with Owen Lattimore to make 
any preliminary arrangements for the Wallace trip? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of a consultation be- 
tween Lattimore and myself on making the arrangements, but I would 
certainly expect that they would have taken place with him and pos- 
sibly with John Hazard, who also made the trip. 

The Chairman. Who? 

Mr. Vincent. John Hazard, who was another member of the party, 
sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you discuss the forthcoming trip with Mr. 
Lattimore at any time before his appointment was announced? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I have no distinct recollection of discussing 
it, but as I say it would stand to reason that I did. It was not an- 
nounced until just before we left, so there would have been consider- 
able discussion. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that you did discuss it with Mr. 
Lattimore for some time before you left on the trip ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am quite sure. 

The Chairman. Where was that discussion ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Was it in Baltimore? 

Mr. Vincent. He may have been at one of the meetings that I 
went down to in Mr. Wallace's office. 

The Chairman. He was not connected with the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. He was connected with the Office of War Informa- 
tion at that time, he was Deputy Director. 



1806 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you discuss it — that is, the forthcoming trip, 
with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall having any discussion with him be- 
fore I discussed it with Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say you did not discuss it with Mr. Latti- 
more before you discussed it with Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. I would consider it most unlikely that I would dis- 
cuss it with Mr. Lattimore before I discussed it with AVallace. 

Mr. Sourwine. Why? 

Mr. Vincent. Because my recollection of my first meeting with 
Mr. Wallace was for the very purpose of discussing his trip to China 
and whether I would go. 

Mr. Sourwine. But that was not the first you had heard about this 
mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had heard about it before that from Currie. 

Mr. Sourwine. Lattimore was your good friend and Mr. Wallace 
yon had never seen before? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Why is it unlikely that you would have discussed 
it with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. Because I didn't think at that time there was any 
certainty that I was going. 

Mr. Sourwine. As long as we have gotten into the matter of prob- 
abilities, why do you consider it improbable that you would have 
discussed it with IVTr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. Because my recollection of the meeting with Wallace 
is that that was the first time there was any definite idea that I was 
going. 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't say that 

Mr. Vincent. I will amend that to say that it is probable that I 
did meet with Lattimore before. 

Mr. Sourwine. It's not what I want, it's what you want to testify 
to? 

Mr. Vincent. All right. 

Mr. Sourwtne. If T express incredulity it is only for the purposes 
of straightening out the record. 

M'\ \ i ntf.nt. I anpreciate that. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Were you present at all the talks between Mr. 
W ol1 a^p nnd Oen. Ch i a n<r Kai-shek? 

Mr. Vincent. All except the first one and the last one going over 
in the car to the airport. I think that is considered as one of the 
conversations. 

Mr. Sourwtne. How did you learn about what took place at the 
two talks at which vou were not present? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace told me after the first one and Mr. 
Wallace told me as soon as we got into the airplane of the second 
one that T hadn't taken part in. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he give you written memoranda of those talks? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that he gave me no written mem- 
oranda of the first one; of the second one he had scribbled some notes 
which he gave me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he supplement those notes with an oral recount- 
ing of what had taken place? 

Mr. Vincent. I think so. 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1807 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you make written memoranda with regard to 
the talks at which you were present ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; at Mr. Wallace's request. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes; I do not mean to suggest for a moment that 
there is anything improper about that. 

Mr. Vincent. They are all in the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was some written memorandum with regard to each 
of the talks, except for the first one, then, in your possession before 
you started back for America ? 

Mr. Vincent. They were in my possession at Kunming where I 
transcribed them into the notes as you now know them in the White 
Book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wait a minute; that was done at Kunming? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your notes of the conversations ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; let me say that what I had was — I am not a 
stenographer. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes? 

Mr. Vincent. What I had was rough notes taken at the conferences. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes? 

Mr. Vincent. Immediately we got to Kunming I sat down and 
using my memory and these notes and names, expanded them into 
what were the reports of each meeting, with Mr. Wallace present at 
Kunming to aid me. 

Mr. Sourwine. "What became of those reports, or what ultimately 
became reports? Did you actually send those from Kunming? 

Mr. Vincent. We brought those home with us. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not change them or expand them after you 
left Kunming? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. As prepared at Kunming is the way they were 
submitted ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you do with your original memoranda, the 
rough memoranda ? Were they discarded ? 

Mr. Vincent. They were discarded. They were written in a little 
book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you say they were destroyed ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you consciously destroy them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I might have destroyed it because I don't possess it 
now. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you not have consciously and deliberately 
destroyed it, Mr. Vincent ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you? 

Mr. Vincent. I would. 

The Chairman. What he means by that last answer is that he con- 
sciously destroyed the original notes that he made at the respective 
conferences ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. T have no recollection of the physi- 
cal process of destroying them, but I don't have them. 

22848— 52— pt. 6 9 



1808 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. You said you did destroy them ? It is a very posi- 
tive statement. 

Mr. Sour wine. Could you have just thrown them in the wastebasket 
somewhere ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I could have thrown them in the waste- 
basket. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you hand them to somebody and say, "Take care 
of these"? Could you have left them in the bureau drawer? Could 
you have left them in a trunk ? Could you have left them in the pocket 
of an old coat? In a duffle bag? Or on the airplane? Are any of 
those things possibilities ? 

Mr. Vincent. All of those things are possibilities because as I say 
I don't have a distinct recollection of taking those notes and in any 
manner destroying them. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not want to embarrass you, Mr. Vincent, but 
how long had you been in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had been in the State Department for 20 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. Those were notes of a very highly restricted confer- 
ence ; were they not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Those notes were classified material ? 

Mr. Vincent. They were. They weren't at that moment but should 
have been classified. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you not have felt that it was your absolute 
obligation to either guard those most carefully or personally destroy 
them? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had let them out of your possession, would 
you not have classified them very highly ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have, but I am not a classifier. I don't know 
whether I would have put "confidential" on them, but I would have 
indicated. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would have classified those notes as only con- 
fidential ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am only using the word in its general sense. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would not have classified them as secret? 

Mr. Vincent. I use the word simply to indicate. Whether I would 
have classified them confidential or secret 

Mr. Sourwine. There is a lot of difference between secret and con- 
fidential, is there not? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have considered them secret. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or perhaps even top secret? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or perhaps even "eyes only" ? No, it would not be 
a message, so it would not be that. All right, sir, you have no memory 
of precisely what you did with them ? 

Mr. Vincent. Precisely? 

The Chairman. To straighten this thing out, he said he destroyed 
them. 

Mr. Sourwine. I understand that the witness says he has no memory 
as to what he did with them. 

The Chairman. Then he says he has no memory of what he did with 
them. He says positively that he destroyed them. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1809 

Mr. Sourwine. I thought he said any number of things was possible. 

The Chairman. After that he said any number of things was pos- 
sible. 

Mr. Vincent. The Senator is right, but as I say, under further 
questioning I have no memory of any physical disposition that I made 
of those things. 

Mr. Sourwine. In any event at Chungking they became the basis 
for the reports on the talks ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your memoranda on the talks which are now part 
of the White Paper? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there anywhere at any time in any written 
memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace any reference 
to a request by Chiang Kai-shek for the assignment of General Wede- 
meyer as the representative of President Roosevelt? 

Mr. Vincent. My only recollection in connection with that is that 
after we reached Kunming the name of General Wedemeyer was sug- 
gested as a good man to take the place of general over-all command of 
the troops of American forces in China and the statement was made 
that when General Wedemeyer made a trip to China at some time earl- 
ier the Generalissimo had been well impressed by him. 

Mr. Sourwine. That statement was made when ? 

Mr. Vincent. That doesn't answer your question. I am telling you 
all I know about the relationship of Wedemeyer. 

Mr. Sourwine. That statement was made when ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was made when we were in Kunming in June, 
1944 after we had left Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. And it was made by whom ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was made to me by either Alsop or Wallace. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know which ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. My recollection is that T. V. Soong, who was 
also at one time on the plane with us, may have made the statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. As far as you know was that the first mention of 
that? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I do not recall it ever coming up in the con- 
versation at Chungking, the name Wedemeyer. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then it was not included in any of the oral or writ- 
ten reports that Mr. Wallace gave you about his conferences with the 
Generalissimo? . 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Owen Lattimore have anything to do with the 
transmission to you of any report or memorandum concerning any 
conversation of General Chiang with Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that he had anything to do with it. 
He was present at several of the meetings with Chiang. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with him what took place at 
any of those meetings? 

Mr. Vincent. I say, he was at three or four of them, and I may have 
discussed them with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not think you ever discussed with him 

Mr. Vincent. A meeting at which he was not present. 

Mr. Sourwine. A meeting where he was present or was not present? 



1810 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I did have discussion on the plane but not after the 
meeting that we left Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, after the meeting had taken 
place, did you not on some occasions discuss the meeting with Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. But I have no distinct recollection of any of those 
occasions where I would have discussed with him. It was a natural 
thing to have discussed it with him, he was a member of the party. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever give you a memorandum of his recol- 
lection of what took place? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think he did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Whatever discussions you had with him were prior 
to the time you prepared your memoranda, which was at another 
place? 

Mr. Vincent. Which was at Kunming. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I recall no assistance that he gave me because 
these were supposed to be fnctual memoranda insofar as I could re- 
construct them from my notes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, sir, while you were with Mr. Wallace on this 
mission did you feel it was your duty to make available to the Vice 
President your 20 years or so of experience in China? 

Mr. Vincent. I did so. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Did vou make that experience available to him to 
the best of your ability ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my ability I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you take advantage of every opportunity to 
make that experience available to him? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Did you ever give him any unasked advice? 

Mr. Vincent. That is difficult to say, but I imagine I did give him 
unasked advice. 

The Chairman. To whom are you referring now? 

Mr. S'URwtne. The Vice President when he was on his mission to 
China. You were there as a matter of fact for the purpose of proffer- 
ing advice when it was needed? You were his adviser, were you not? 

Mr. Vtncent. That was my purpose. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your usefulness would have been severely restricted 
if you had only spoken when you were spoken to? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwtne. You did not feel that you were in that position ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Souravine. You did speak out whenever you felt that you had 
information to give him that would be of value? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Or advice that would be to his interest or to the 
interest of the mission? 

Mr. Vincent. Aid his mission. 

The Chairman. At all of the meetings that the Vice President 
was present in Asia was Mr. Lattimore present also? 

Mr. Vtncent. Mr. Lattimore was present at — there were probably 
five meetings, and Mr. Lattimore was present at two or three of them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember the places where he was present? 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1811 

Mr. Vincent. The meetings, all of them, except the first one and the 
last one, which I did not attend, took place in Chiang Kai-shek's 
home out in the hills. 

The Chairman. Lattimore was there ? 

Mr. Vincent. Lattimore was there. 

The Chairman. Who else was in your party besides Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. John Hazard. 

The Chairman. Was he there? 

Mr. Vincent. He was not there because he was a Kussian expert. 

The Chairman. He was what? 

Mr. Vincent. He was the Russian expert who went along with 
Wallace. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was an expert, he was not himself a Russian? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he attend any of the talks with Chiang ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refresh myself from the talks to see. 
He may have come into one of them. He was not consciously present, 
he certainly took no part in them that I know of. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who initiated with Mr. Currie the 
request for your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. Who initiated with Mr. Currie ? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. The request? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. It might have been Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. It might have been Mr. Wallace in discussion with 
Currie ; that would have been my impression. 

Mr. Sourwine. It might have been somebody else ? 

Mr. Vincent. It might have been somebody else, but I would say 
that Currie, who knew Wallace — either way. 

Mr. Sourwine. If it was between them, for all you know Mr. Currie 
may have initiated? 

Mr. Vincent. He may have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or the President ? Or somebody else ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. At least you did not? When you first learned of 
it, it came from Mr. Currie ; and who initiated it, you do not know, it 
might have been himself ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It might have been spontaneous ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know why Mr. Hull sent you with Mr. 
Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. My only knowledge as to why Mr. Hull sent me 
with Mr. Wallace was to make available to Mr. Wallace the experience 
that I had had recently in Kunming and over a period of 20 years in 
China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear any other reason given as to why 
Mr. Hull sent you to Mr. Wallace, with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I think, and here I am having to call very 
largely on my memory, there was a small conversation between Mr. 



1812 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Hull and myself just before I went out at which Mr. Hull very briefly 
said, "Vincent, you are going." He said that he hoped Mr. Wallace 
would not make any promises to the Chinese that we couldn't live 
up to. 

Mr. Wallace had just come back from a trip the year previous to 
South America. There had been some feeling that Wallace had been 
expansive in his promises of aid there and Mr. Hull was himself a 
little concerned about whether Mr. Wallace was going to overdo it. 

The Chairman. That wish was expressed by Mr. Hull to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That idea was expressed by him to me, as I recall it. 
As I say, there I am drawing on a memory that isn't too good on a 
situation long ago. I do remember seeing Mr. Hull, and that is my 
recollection. There may have been something else said. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, you were afraid that Mr. 
Wallace might make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities? 

Mr. Vincent. I was aware of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you were specifically charged by the Secretary 
with doing what you could to avoid that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Hull tell you he had picked you to ac- 
company Mr. Wallace in order to hold him down ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any such language as that, but 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it your understanding that you were to serve 
as a restraining influence over him in the event he endeavored to make 
unjudicious or injudicious commitments to the Chinese Government? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be what I would gather from this con- 
versation I vaguely remember. I may say, in adding there, that I did 
not find it necessary to hold him down. He didn't become expansive in 
China so far as I know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he make any commitments to Chiang ? 

Mr. Vincent. None other than saying, as I think was reported in 
one of these conversations, that we would do our best to aid and sup- 
port them in their conduct. But so far as a specific promise to Chiang, 
which we had to live up to, I don't recall any. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it only to Chiang that Mr. Hull was afraid Mr. 
Wallace might make injudicious or elaborate promises ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; so far as I know he had in mind the National 
Government of China under Chiang and not any other group. 

Mr. Sourwine. He had no thought of any promises or commitments 
that might be made elsewhere ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would General Chennault have been either desir- 
able or acceptable as the President's personal representative to Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that General Chennault would have been 
most acceptable to the Generalissimo as his adviser. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would he have been either desirable or acceptable 
to the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony would be that he would be desirable 
and acceptable. I had a great admiration for him myself. I don't 
know to what extent the State Department knew him as a man that 
might have been acceptable or desirable or fit for that job, but to my 
own estimate he was. 

Mr. Soifrwine. Would he have been desirable or acceptable to the 
War Department in that job? 






INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1813 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you express any view in that connection, 
that is, with regard to his desirability or acceptability on behalf of 
anyone to Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. When we were in Kunming, after we left Chung- 
king, I recall suggesting that General Chennault might be the man 
he wanted for the job of being adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. It was 
hardly the matter of adviser. It was taking over the general control 
of the American Armed Forces in China and maintaining close con- 
tact with the Generalissimo, so that we had a coordinated military 
-effort. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. It was far more than adviser, wasn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. It was more than adviser, and at that time I think 
the title of Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo was being used. 

I do know, as a matter of fact, that Wedemeyer did, when he took 
over the job, have the title of Chief of Staff. He was also Com- 
mander, but he had the title of Chief of Staff. I am getting into 
military things now. 

Mr. Sourwine. But that was not proposed by either you or Mr. 
Wallace at that time, was it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, not at that time, no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Senator O'Conor, we are discussing at the moment 
the Wallace mission to China. 

"Would General Chennault have been either desirable or accepta- 
ble as the President's personal emissary to Chiang" was the subject, 
and the witness has testified that in his opinion he would have been 
acceptable and desirable to Chiang, that he would have been accep- 
table to the State Department. He does not know whether he would 
have been acceptable to the War Department. 

Did you testify, sir, that it was your suggestion to Mr. Wallace at 
Kunming that perhaps General Chennault was the man to be recom- 
mended for the job of the President's personal emissary to Chiang 
Kai-shek? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I recommended Chennault as 
the man to take over the control of the forces in China, which carried 
with it also this idea of being the adviser to Chiang. 

Mr. Sourwine. In that connection, did you recommend the re- 
placement of Stilwell by Chennault ? 

Mr. Vincent. In that connection, the recommendation was one 
which was not entirely one, in its inception, of getting Stilwell out 
of the command. It was possibly leaving Stilwell in the over-all 
command militarily in the whole China-Burma theater area. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you recommend the removal of Stilwell? 

Mr. Vincent. Let me please continue here. It was thought possible 
at that time to make the recommendation that Chennault would take 
over the China thing and be on his own as the political adviser to 
Chiang Kai-shek, commanding troops there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it that you were trying to accomplish the re- 
moval of General Stilwell ? 

Mr. Vincent. WTiat we were trying to do was accomplish the re- 
moval of General Stilwell from the position he occupied in China as 
adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Sourwine. By "we," you mean you and Mr. Wallace ? 



1814 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. That was the general idea here, and I think it is 
stated here in the cable. 

Mr. Sourwine. But I am asking for your memory of the purpose. 

Mr. Vincent. The purpose was to replace Stilwell in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. And your recommendation was that Chennault was 
the man for that? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did Mr. Wallace say about that recommenda- 
tion? 

Mr. Vincent. Of Chennault ? I do not know what he said, but it 
became clear in the conversations that General Chennault himself did 
not feel that he wished to take the job. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, how did that become clear ? Did Mr. Alsop 
make that clear ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether it was Alsop, sir, or, since we 
were living in General Chennault's house, whether he made it clear 
to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't discuss this Kunming cable with Chen- 
nault, did you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Nor did Mr. Wallace, so far as you know? 

Mr. Vincent. Not so far as I know. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you did discuss it with Mr. Alsop? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And Mr. Alsop was on General Chennault's staff? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You certainly didn't know that General Chennault 
was unwilling to take that assignment, or you shouldn't have made the 
suggestion; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That's right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then the word that General Chennault was un- 
willing to take that assignment must have come either from Mr. Wal- 
lace or Mr. Alsop. Is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. It probably came from Mr. Alsop. 

Mr. Sourwine. It must have come from either Mr. Wallace or Mr. 
Alsop? There were only the three of you there, and it wasn't you, 
so it was either Mr. Wallace or Mr. Alsop ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. So, on that basis, what is your memory as to who 
made the statement? 

Mr. Vincent. My present memory would be that Alsop made the 
statement. 

Mr. Mandel. Could I ask a couple of questions there ? 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. 

Mr. Mandel. Did Mr. Wallace or any of his group of advisers con- 
sult with any of the Chinese Communist leaders in reference to the 
matter of the replacement of Stilwell ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; not that I recall. I don't think that Mr. 
Wallace or any of his advisers saw the Chinese Communists during 
this mission out there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that all you had? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who first suggested General Wedemeyer ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1815 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified before that I can't recall 
whether it was T. V. Soong or whether it was Alsop. 

Mr. Sourwine. No ; I mean at the conference with Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. Vincent. At the conference with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. At which, of course, T. V. Soong was not present. I 
would say it was probably Alsop, although it may have been as a result 
•of a conversation that Mr. Wallace had had coming down on the 
plane with T. V. Soong. It could easily be Mr. Wallace recalling. 

Mr. Sourwine. The objective was to secure the removal of S til well; 
you recommended Chennault as the man to replace him; and either 
Alsop or Wallace suggested Wedemeyer ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. There may have been something previously 
placed in the mind by somebody. 

Mr. Sourwine. You wouldn't know who placed the suggestion in 
Mr. Alsop's mind? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was your comment when General Wedemey- 
er's name was suggested? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't recall my exact comment. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was the nature of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. The nature of my comment, if it was any comment at 
all, was that we needed a man, and I knew General Wedemeyer by 
reputation, and he would make a good man. But I had no way of 
knowing it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you think he was a better man for the job than 
'Chennault ? 

Mr. Vincent. I made no comparison in my mind as to his being a 
better or a worse man than Chennault. 

Mr. Sourwine. Having recommended Chennault, did you thereafter 
assent entirely in the suggestion of Wedemeyer ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. While you were in China with Mr. Wallace, did you 
have a conference with General Stilwell ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any knowledge of a conference be- 
tween General Stilwell and Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I take it, then, that your answer would be "No" to 
the question, Did you and Mr. Lattimore have a conference with Gen- 
eral Stilwell? 

Mr. Vincent. The answer is "No." General Stilwell, insofar as I 
can recall, remained in north Burma or India and did not come to 
Trimming, and none of us went in the opposite direction, as I can recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are stating this definitely now ? This is a mat- 
ter of memory and not a matter of what might have happened ? You 
are stating that you did not have a conference with General Stilwell 
and that you and Owen Lattimore did not have a conference with 
General Stilwell in June of 1944? 

Mr. Vincent. We did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. If Mr. Service or anyone else reported the results 
of such a conference, how would you characterize the report ? 



1816 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. If Mr. Service or anyone else said that I had a con- 
ference with General Stilwell during this trip, I would have to char- 
acterize it as a complete misstatement of fact. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, were you in China with Mr. Wallace on or 
about J une 20, 1944? 

Mr. Vincent. I was, sir. 

Mr. Sour wine. When you and Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking, 
did the two of you go to visit Mme. Sun Yat-sen ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sour wine. Was she a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not identify her as a Communist at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I gather that she is. 

Mr. SirnnviNE. Do you now identify her as having been a Commu- 
nist at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified earlier that she was probably pro- 
Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. How do you square that with your recent testi- 
mony that neither Mr. Wallace nor either of his advisers consulted 
with Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it would square on the basis that I had no 
knowledge that she was a Communist, but we thought she had Com- 
munist leanings at that time. She certainly was sympathetic. And 
he called on her, Mr. Wallace called on her, as the widow of Sun 
Yat-sen. 

Mi 1 . Sourwine. You say she certainly was sympathetic. You mean 
at that time she was sympathetic to the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. That was my understanding. 

Mr. Sourwine. You knew that at the time, didn't you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator O'Conor. May I interrupt there to ask, Upon what would 
3^ou base your statement of belief that she was favorable? From 
any expressions on her part ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I would see her from time to time. She was 
living with either Chiang Kai-shek or with the Kungs — I forget — 
one or the other. And it was a matter that we had social gatherings 
together, and Mme. Sun Yat-sen always took the more extreme view 
with regard to assisting the Communists in getting on with the war 
against the Japanese and things like that. We did not have many 
political conversations. I am giving an impression based upon the 
fact that as you will recall Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also in 1928 or 1927 
disassociated herself, when Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Commu- 
nists. 

Mr. Sourwine. We are talking about 1944. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. But, as I say, I am giving you the reasons 
that I have the impression that she was sympathetic toward the Com- 
munists, and it goes back as far as 1926. 

Mr. Sourwine. Just expand a little bit on the point you are trying 
to make when you talk about Mme. Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. Why 
did you drag her in at this point? What is the point you are trying 
to make? 

Mr. Vincent. No; Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Did I say "Mme. Chiang 
Kai-shek"? Will you correct that? 

I know she wasn't pro-Communist in 1927. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1817 

Mr. Sourwine. I didn't know anything except what you said. I 
had to go by that. 

Mr. Vincent. But you can have a slip in names. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; but you can recognize it was rather startling 
testimony at the moment. 

Mr. Vincent. I am referring to Mme. Sun Yat-sen. 

Senator O'Conor. You will have the opportunity to clear that up 
if there was any slip of the tongue. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was well known to you in 1944 that Mme. Sun 
Yat-sen was definitely pro-Communist, and that was known to you 
and, I presume, to Mr. Wallace when you went to visit her ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you went to visit her on or about the morning 
of June 21, 1944. Is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. It would be that date. We were there between the 
21st and 24th. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who went with you ? Do you remember ? 

Mr. Vincent. There was one other Chinese present, and I do not 
recall his name. It may have been her own brother, Sun Fo. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there a Caucasian present? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I can recall. I think it was Mr. Wallace 
and myself. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Atcheson, from the Embassy, accompany 
you on the visit to Mme. Sun Yat-Sen ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think he did- sir ; but he may have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Isn't it a fact that he went with you to Mme. Sun's 
residence and was asked to retire during the actual conference? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of such an incident at all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, what can you tell us about the meeting, or the 
conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can say that it was a conversation of a very general 
character, and I don't recall any of it. It was more or less, as I have 
stated, a courtesy call on the part of Wallace to call on the widow of 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen as far as I had any knowledge of its objective. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no memory that Mr. Atcheson was present 
at the conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no memory of that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say he was not present ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I would not say he was not present. As I say, 
the only people I recall being there were Wallace, myself, Mme. Sun 
Yat-sen, and one Chinese, maybe Sun Fo. 

Mr. Sourwine. For how long did you talk together? 

Mr. Vincent. I would estimate it was anywhere from 20 minutes 
to a half an hour. 

Mr. Sourwine. No longer than half an hour ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was my recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mme. Sun request Mr. Wallace and America to 
help the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that she did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say that she didn't ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say that she did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. If there was in existence a report of that conference 
that said that she did, would you challenge it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not. 



1818 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever report on that conference to anyone? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall a report on that conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you report to the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall reporting to the State Department. 
But I may have after we got back. I did not report from Chungking 
on it. It may have been that Atcheson, who was present, reported 
on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, you don't know whether he was present or not, 
do you ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I don't know whether he was present, but 
one could easily have gone back and told Atcheson what the con- 
ference was about, and he might have reported on it. 

Senator O'Conor. Specifically, Mr. Vincent, what was taken up 
with her directly? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't recall what was taken up, as I say. 
It was a mission to go over there to call on the widow of Sun Yat-sen, 
and as far as the conversation was concerned, to my recollection, it 
was a general conversation. If there exists, as you say, reports here 
that she asked Wallace to help the Chinese Communists, I have just 
said that I would not deny that she did. But I don't recall it. 

Senator O'Conor. Have you any recollection, though, of any specific 
matter which was taken up or about which you and Mr. Wallace went 
to see her ? 

Mr. Vincent. Unfortunately, I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did she indicate that she regarded the Chinese 
Communists as the oppressed ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall that she did, but, as I 
say, I have indicated already that I can't recall the specific character 
of the conversation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, even so, I hope I don't insult you by asking 
specific questions, because the question itself might refresh your 
memory. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I am glad you are. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was well known as her view at the time, was 
it not, that the Chinese Communists were the oppressed ? 

Mr. Vincent. She never, to my knowledge, told me that she thought 
the Chinese Communists were the oppressed. Madame Chiang's 
principal line 

Mr. Sourwine. Madame Sun, you mean? 

Mr. Vincent. Madame Sun's. Most of the time, was for bringing 
about a greater degree of unity, political and military, among the 
Chinese, among which, of course, she included the Communists. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did she express, on the occasion of the meeting of 
yourself and Mr. Wallace with her, any views in regard to broadening 
the political power of the Communists in China and permitting them 
to participate in the government ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that she certainly would have. I don't, 
as I say, recall the nature of it, but it would have been a very logical 
thing to do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall the nature of the meeting? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall anything about the dwelling in which 
it took place? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1819 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you recall anything about the room in which 
it took place? Was it a room with small windows? 

Mr. Vincent. It probably did have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was she seated or standing during the conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would think that she was seated, and that it was 
in Sun Fo's home. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was she behind a desk, or in a chair, or on a divan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether she was on a chair or on a 
divan. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am just trying to recall it for you. 

Mr. Vincent. I know, but the position of Madame Sun Yat-Sen 
at this meeting I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you don't recall your own position, what you 
sat on ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly remember it if I stood the whole 
time, but I must have sat. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you have to do with the preparation of 
Mr. Wallace's report to the President on his China mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. We are speaking now of the telegram from Kun- 
ming? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am talking about his report, if there is a distinc- 
tion. Was that telegram from Kunming a report ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to make a distinction between what was 
a telegram from Chungking on or about 

Mr. Sourwine. From Kunming, you mean? 

Mr. Vincent. I mean from Kunming. On or about June the 26th, 
and a report which Mr. Wallace made to the President after he 
returned here from his mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he make two reports, then, one in the form 
of a cable from Kunming and one in the form of a written report 
after he came back? 

Mr. Vincent. He has so stated, that he made one after he came 
back. I don't know of my own knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. I want to know on the basis of your own knowledge. 

Mr. Vincent. I had no knowledge at the time that he made a 
report on the mission to the President in writing or orally, although 
he said he was going to see the President. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the submission 
of any report or memoranda by Mr. Wallace to the President other 
than the Kunming cable? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace ever ask you for suggestions with 
regard to any such report, oral or written ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with him the subject of such 
a report? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who typed his report to the President ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see a rough draft of such a report, or 
of memoranda prepared for such a report ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever submit any suggested language, orally 
or in writing, for possible inclusion in such a report ? 



1820 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. So far as you know, did Owen Lattimore ever sub- 
mit any suggested language for possible inclusion? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that subject. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, you were, as you have testified, present 
with Mr. Wallace, as an adviser, as his chief adviser. You were the 
man who knew China. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wouldn't it have been in your contemplation the 
most important thing about his whole mission, to make a report to 
the President? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have certainly thought it was, and he told 
me he was going over to see the President and talk to him, but I was 
not present at the conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. How do you account for the fact that throughout 
the whole mission you never discussed with him or touched on in your 
conversations with him the possibility of a report to the President? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, he told me he was going over to see the 
President. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was after you got back. I am saying, all the 
way along, all the way on the trip, the airplane trip, and across the 
country, and until you got back, you never touched upon the question, 
with him, of a report to the President? 

Mr. Vincent. We touched upon the matter of his going in to see 
the President and talk to him. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was that? Was it before you got back to 
Washington ? 

Mr. Vincent. On the plane from time to time he would tell me he 
was going in to see the President. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you never talked about what he would say ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Nor did he, or whether he would file a written report 
or an oral report ? 

Mr. Vincent. He never told me he was going to file a written report. 

Mr. Sourwine. But when you talked about it, you never talked 
about whether he was going to file a written report or an oral report? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator O'Conor. Did you find yourself in entire accord with Mr. 
Wallace in his verbal expressions concerning what he had found out? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean his verbal expressions after he came back 
here, or during the trip? 

Senator O'Conor. No, en route, during the trip back. 

Mr. Vincent. One doesn't always find oneself in entire accord 
with anyone, and I would say there probably were differences of 
opinion. I don't recall them. 

Spun tor O'Conor. Were there any marked differences? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall any marked differences, Senator. 

Mr. Sourwine. I would have thought the question of a report to 
the Chief Executive would have been uppermost both in your mind 
and in Mr. Wallace's. How do you account for the fact that it 
wasn't? 

Mr. Vincent. I can account for it as far as I can. I myself told 
you, and I have said before, I didn't ever know he made a written 
report to the President until here within the last few months. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1821 

Mr. Sourwine. No; that doesn't account for anything. Excuse 
me. I interrupted you. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I was about to say Ave had sent in a telegram, 
which was two or three paces long, from Kunming, to bring to the 
President's attention the situtaion as it was seen by Mr. Wallace in 
China. There was also the transcript of the notes which I had made 
in the conversations with Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Sourwine. Those had already been transmitted to the State 
Department ; hadn't they ? 

Mr. Vincent. The notes were brought home by me and typed 
after they got back to the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. I thought you said they were prepared at Kun- 
ming. 

Mr. Vincent. They were prepared at Kunming, but brought home 
by me. 

Mr. Sourwine. They weren't typed at Kunming? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether they were in longhand or whether they 
were typed at Kunming, I don't recall, but my recollection would 
be that they were in long hand. 

Mr. Sourwine. I thought you testified that they were unchanged 
from the time you prepared them at Kunming until you submitted 
them. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I mean unchanged in form, because they were 
retyped here in the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. But unchanged in context? 

Mr. Vincent. Unchanged in context. I simply came in, just to 
keep the record completely straight, and then there was a digest 
made of them, which reduced them down from 20 pages to 3, in the 
State Department, for Mr. Hull's attention, and I have no certain 
knowledge whether they ever went over and were read by the Presi- 
dent. 

Mr. Sourwine. We are back to the question of how you account 
for the fact that you and Mr. Wallace didn't even discuss this sub- 
ject of a possible report to the President. Have you said all you 
want to on that subject? 

Mr. Vincent. I have. I was just saying it is possible that he con- 
sidered — he always told me he was going in to see the President ; and 
that was his affair. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he say, "that is my affair" ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, he didn't say "that is my affair." He simply 
didn't take me into his confidence about going to the President at any 
time, once we arrived back in this city. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you never broached the subject ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had known that he had no thought of making 
a report to the President, would it have concerned you at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; it would have concerned me. But he had told 
me he was going to see the President and talk over the mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. And it didn't concern you whether he would make 
an oral or a written report? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had no interest in ascertaining which he was 
going to do ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 



1822 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator O'Conor. Did you subsequently inquire? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with anyone the question of 
whether he would make a written or an oral report to the President, or 
any such report that was to be made ? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall no conversation. And I want to reemphasize- 
that from a certain point of view the telegram from Kunming, which 
was our last stop, might have been considered as my last participation 
in the thing. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you so consider it? 

Mr. Vincent. I did so consider it, once we got back to Washington. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, on the plane, on the way back, did Mr. Wallace- 
do any typing ? 

Mr. Vincent. He presumably did. He kept a typewriter with him,. 
or we had a stenographer, an Army officer, a young fellow in the 
Army. 

Mr. Sourwine. On the plane ? 

Mr. Vincent. On the plane. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace dictate to him on the way back ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And he had a typewriter? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, whether Mr. Wallace had a typewriter, I don't 
recall. I don't know whether Mr. Wallace can type. 

Mr. Sourwine. I mean the young Army officer. Well, you never 
saw Mr. Wallace typing, then, or you would know whether he could 
type. But you never saw him typing on the plane? 

Mr. Vincent. I never saw him typing ; no. 

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of a plane was this ? 

Mr. Vincent. A T>C-A, four motor. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it all compartmented up, or one large com- 
partment? 

Mr. Vincent. There was a compartment forward, with a bed here,, 
and a bed there, and aft it was all one compartment. 

Mr. Sourwine. So if Mr. Wallace had been typing on the plane,, 
you would have seen him ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. The conclusion, then, is inescapable that he didn't 
do any typing on the plane. 

Mr. Vincent. He certainly made notes, but he didn't do any typing. 
I would say here that quite apart from the question of any report 
to the President, Mr. Wallace was getting ready at that time for a 
speech which he was scheduled to make immediately on his return at 
Seattle. And I was -busy with that, contributing whatever little 
share I had in it, and Wallace was busy writing his report — I mean,, 
writing this speech which he subsequently gave in Seattle about the 
10th of July. 

Mr. Sourwine. On the way back, then, you were working on the 
Seattle speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Together? 

Mr. Vincent. All of us were working on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. The young Army officer, the stenographer, too? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1823 

Mr. Sourwine. You wouldn't have had much time to work on a 
report on the plane, then, would you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any 
other representative of the American Government get an expression 
of views from any Chinese Communist source on General Stilwell's 
removal I 

Mr. Vincent. None to me. When you name other people 

Mr. Sourwine. To your knowledge, did you or Mr. Wallace or 
Mr. Service or any other representative of the American Government 
get an expression of views from any Chinese Government source on 
the removal of General Stilwell ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can state that I got none. I can state that as a 
positive fact. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you a little more than that. I am 
asking you whether to your knowledge anyone else did. 

Mr. Vincent. To my knowledge, no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you send in separate reports to the State De- 
partment or to the President while you were in China with Mr. 
Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You sent no reports to the Department from China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. And when you got back, did you submit any reports 
other than your memoranda of the conversations ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the only report I submitted that I can recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you submit any oral reports to your superiors 
in the Department after you got back? 

Mr. Vincent. I undoubtedly talked the mission over with Mr. Grew 
and with Mr. Ballantine. Both were my immediate chiefs. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you express 

Mr. Vincent. Just a moment. I went in with Mr. Wallace when 
he called on Mr. Stettinius, who was Under Secretary then, and just 
as a junior person present listened to that conversation. I don't re- 
call what it was, but it was mostly just how the trip came out. 

We also went with him when he called on Secretary Hull, just to 
report that he was back and on the mission. That was a very brief 
conversation, which developed nothing beyond what we had already 
reported. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you at any time express any dissatisfaction 
with or disapproval of any of the views Mr. Wallace had expressed ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know Sergei Goglidze — G-o-g-l-i-d-z-e? 

Mr. Vincent. The Russian? The man of the toast ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. If I have mispronounced it, correct me. 

Mr. Vincent. The man that gave the toast ; yes sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Identify him, will you ? Who was he ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was the Russian official who was sent to join the 
Wallace party when we arrived in eastern Siberia. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he sent to join the party, or was he there 
when you got there? 

22848— 52— pt. 6 10 



1824 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Whether he met us when we first came down on Rus- 
sian soil ; I don't recall. There was a Russian Army officer who met 
us when Ave came down, but whether Goglidze met us a day or so later, 
I don't recall. But he was with us most of the time we were in eastern 
Siberia. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he a commander in that area ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; he was a political man in what they called the 
Department of Maritime Provinces. 

Mr. Souravine. Did he hold army rank? 

Mr. Vincent. If he did, I knew nothing of it. 

Mr. Souravine. Was he a Georgian ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was a Georgian, so he told me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he a friend of Stalin ? 

Mr. Vincent. So he himself stated. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did you first meet him? 

Mr. Vincent. I met him when he came aboard the train or met him 
at their various hostels we stayed at along the way. But I would pre- 
sumably have met him the first night, because everybody sat down in 
these hostels together. 

Mr. Sourwine. We keep getting presumably mixed with recollec- 
tion. I know it is very difficult. But do you recall when you first met ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall who introduced you? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that he introduced himself, because we 
had nobody on the plane to introduce him to us, because none of us on 
the same plane had ever met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore didn't introduce him to you? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I remember ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You mentioned a toast. Will you tell us about that? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. And I don't remember the occasion, but, as I 
say v 1 seem to think that it was when we were about to leave Siberia. 

Mr. Souravine. It was at a dinner, wasn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. It was at a dinner. And it was, I think, about the 
time Ave were leaving. I Avould not have recalled that toast, if I may 
say, had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it. It made no impres- 
sion on me at the time, either mental or otherwise, and 1 made no 
note of it. 

Mr. Sourayine. Do you speak Russian? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Souravine. Were all of the toasts at this dinner translated? 

Mr. Vincent. Goglidze, I think, could speak a little English, and 
it may have been that in this case he tried to speak a little English. 

Mr. Sourwine. This toast was in English? 

Mr. Vincent. That I don't recall. But he could speak a little Eng- 
lish, and I couldn't speak a word of Russian, and I know from time 
to time he and Mr. Wallace were talking. 

Mr. Sourwine. He praised you rather highly in the toast, didn't he? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether you would call it praise or not. 
There were those overstatements. I saw no significance in it, even 
though Mr. Wallace's book writer did. 

Mr. Souravine. Do you think it is possible that you might be more 
familiar with such things than Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. What things, sir? 

Mr. Souravine. Such encomiums. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1825 

Mr. Vincent. I would say it is the nature of toast-makers to always 
overstate the case; but in this particular instance my recollection is 
that he said I had great responsibility with respect to China. Now, 
the factual thing is that I was the chief of the China Division in the 
State Department. Therefore I did have some responsibility with 
regard to China. So it reduces itself down to analysis of what he 
meant by "great," and I can't put it 

Mr. Sottrwine. What he said was, "For China's future," wasn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't got the toast here. 

Mr. Sourwine. "To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, 
American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for 
China's future."? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think he was talking about your duties and 
responsibilities in the American State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he was ; yes. I don't want to deny — but all 
of the implications that this toast had any ulterior significance or any- 
thing else were completely wrong. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember it as ever having been given ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't even remember the toast and would not have 
remembered had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you remember it after you read his record of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I still don't remember. I don't remember the occa- 
sion. I know that toasts were made, but this particular toast — I rely 
completely on Mr. Wallace's book for knowing that a toast was made. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever take part in the drafting or prepara- 
tion of a message to Chiang Kai-shek for the signature of President 
Roosevelt ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the fall of 1944, there was a telegram that went 
out to Chiang Kai-shek. Now, this is a matter of S'ate Department 
archives, and I do recall the occasion, that I took part in the drafting 
of a telegram. Now, whether that is still classified material, I don't 
know, but I judge there is no harm in my saying here — I don't recall 
the exact contents of the telegram, but there was a telegram. Since 
you remind me of it, about the President participating in signing it, 
there was a message that went out in the fall to Gauss, which, my 
recollection is — that is the reason I remember it, because it was one of 
the few telegrams that went out. It was signed by Hull, incidentally. 
It said the President and I were authorizing Gauss, in response to a 
telegram he had sent, to go over and speak very frankly to the Gener- 
alissimo about the urgent need of trying to bring about a greater 
amount of unity in the military command in China. Now, without 
consulting that telegram, which has now been drafted 7 years ago, I 
am trying to give you as best I can recall that that was the general 
nature of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. I understand. 

Mr. Vincent. There was also an idea that Mr. Gauss, the Ambas- 
sador at that time, who had very much on his mind, was trying to 
bring about some kind of military council, which would have the 
same objective as I have just mentioned, which would have in mind 
having a more effective prosecution of the war. 

Mr. Sourwine. What part did you take in drafting that telegram ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I could not say, what part. I was one of the 
drafters. 



1826 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you prepare a draft? 

Mr. Vincent. I prepared a draft. 

Mr. Sourwine. How close was your draft to the final draft ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I wouldn't have any recollection of, how close 
the final draft was to my draft. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see the final draft before it went out ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. I myself, as I recall it, took it down to Mr. 
Hull. 

Mr. Sourwine. The final draft came to you for at least review be- 
fore it went out, and you took it to Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And he sent it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hull took it over to the President, as I recall, 
and the President approved it, and Mr. Hull took it back and sent it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't see it after it came back from the White 
House ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Mandel. Could I add a question on the Wallace mission for a 
moment ? 

Senator O'Conor. Go ahead, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. Would you definitely say that at the session with 
Mme. Sun Yat-sen and Sun Fo, no mention was made of the Stilwell 
matter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say definitely there was no mention made of 
the Stilwell matter, insofar as I can recall, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. What attitude or responsibility would you take for 
the book of Wallace, Soviet Asia Mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. None, Mr. Mandel. I was only sent a copy of it after 
Mr. Wallace finished it. I didn't know who wrote it. I didn't know 
until I saw this testimony that someone else wrote it for him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you read it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never read it. I have glanced through the pic- 
tures. I am ashamed to admit I never read through the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who initiated the contents of the draft which you 
prepared of this telegram that you prepared? Were they your own 
thoughts? 

Mr. Vincent. We haven't got the telegram here. We are speaking 
of a document I haven't seen. But I was in full accord; that is, the 
initiation of the telegram was in response to a telegram from Ambas- 
sador Gauss, who was pointing out that there was an urgent need for 
a greater degree of unity of command. 

Mr. Sourwine. What I mean is, can you recall whether having 
Ambassador Gauss' telegram it occurred to you it was desirable to 
respond to it, and perhaps in a certain way, or whether the request 
came down to you from a higher echelon to prepare a draft of response 
to this message from Gauss ? 

Mr. Vincent. Now, I am just reconstructing purely from logic, 
knowing how things were handled in the Far Eastern Office at that 
time. 

Mr. Sourwine. First, do you remember? 

Mr. Vincent. Do I remember that I drafted the first draft? 

Mr. Sourwine. No ; do you remember which of the two theories of 
initiation was correct? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1827 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that the theory of an initiation in the 
Far Eastern Office is the one that is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is, in your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, it wasn't my office then. In 1944, it was Grew's 
and Mr. Ballantine's. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean a higher echelon than you at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Proceed. 

Mr. Vincent. I was about to say that if the thing worked as it 
logically would in those things, it resulted from a conference between 
Ballantine, Stanton, and myself. I think Stanton was in the Depart- 
ment at that time, but a telegram of that kind would have been of 
general discussion. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would have called a conference on Gauss' mes- 
sage, and a reply would come out of that conference? 

Mr. Vincent. And somebody would have assumed the duty of 
drafting the telegram, and it quite probably would have been me. 
I don't think it would have been Ballantine, because he did not do 
much drafting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell the committee what part, if any, you 
had in the drafting or preparation or submission of the message under 
date of July 14, 1944, the text of which appears on page 560 of the 
State Department white paper ? 

Mr. Vincent. Have we got the white book ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Have we the white paper here? I will defer that 
question until we get it here. I am sorry I asked it without the vol- 
ume. I thought we had one here. 

Did you have anything to do with the preparation or transmission 
of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, quoting or 
paraphrasing Amerasia magazine ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of any such telegram. I could 
not say; as being in the Far Eastern Office at that time. If such a 
telegram existed, I did not have a part in drafting it, but you ring no 
bell in my memory there. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no memory of preparing it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no memory of approving it or of having 
seen it ? 

Mr. Vincent. None at all. But I cannot say that such a telegram 
did not go out. 

Mr. Sourwine. I wish you would try to search your memory on 
that point. We will ask you about it again later. It is possible that 
if you think about it something might come back to you about it. 

Mr. Surrey. What is the date, again ? 

Mr. Sourwine. July 25, 1944. 

Mr. Surrey. On Amerasia ? 

Mr. Sourwine. A message paraphrasing or quoting from Amerasia. 
If there is anything you can do to refresh your memory on that, we 
would like to have you do it. 

Senator O'Conor. Before going off that point, and returning again 
to the consideration of the part played by the several individuals, 
and specifically on the return journey on the plane, either in con- 
nection with the preparation of the Seattle speech or the prospective 



1828 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

report or anything of that kind, what part did Professor Lattimore 
take in it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am speaking now without exact memory of the 
thing. Professor Lattimore probably gave him information about 
central Asia, where he had taken notes. We had visited Tashkent 
and other places in central Asia. He probably gave him the benefit 
of the notes he had taken in Siberia. I had taken none there. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you say "he," you mean Professor Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. That he gave to Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I have no exact memory or knowledge of it, 
but that would be my recollection of how the thing came together. 
It is a speech which I haven't read in a long time, but it had a great 
deal of emphasis on the commercial relations between the Pacific 
area, China, Siberia, and others, and our own west coast. It was a 
speech given in Seattle, and it was given with that general idea in 
mind, of envisaging the great opening up of trade relations across the 
Pacific. It was a political speech, I should say, though it didn't take 
up politics. 

Senator O'Conor. Are we to understand that much of the factual 
information or the detailed information upon which the speech was 
based was furnished by Professor Lattimore from the notes that he 
had made? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say, Senator, that the Vice President, him- 
self, so far as Siberia was concerned, supplied most of his own infor- 
mation, because he had also taken very copious notes on agricultural 
development, on the whole industrial development of Siberia. He was 
very industrious in taking those notes. I had taken none. There- 
fore, I am assuming he did most of his own work but was assisted 
in that part of it by Lattimore and Hazard, who were people who 
did take notes on the trip. 

Mr. Sourwine. Apart from the Vice President's notes, are you clear 
that there had been a substantial quantity of notes taken by Profes- 
sor Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified earlier that Professor Latti- 
more didn't go with us on many of these missions. He went to educa- 
tional places, museums, when we would take off elsewhere. I would 
say the major portion 

Mr. Sourwine. In those instances, though, when he went alone, I 
have no doubt that on the return his information that he had gathered 
on his exclusive mission, so to speak, was accepted; because that is 
what he went for. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I interrupted you in what you started to say. 

Mr. Vincent. I started to say that I omitted Mr. Hazard, too, be- 
cause Mr. Hazard spoke in Russian, too, and he was at Mr. Wallace's 
side on the Siberian trip, and it was a matter of all of us getting to- 
gether and trying to throw together a speech. My contribution was 
what I could recall of trade relations with China. It was not one 
taking up policy, had nothing to do with these other matters we have 
just gone into, but the possible trade relations between the west coast 
and Asia. 

Mr. Sourwine. I have been asked to inquire : What was the date of 
that message to Ambassador Gauss, the "President and I" message? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1829 

Mr. Vincent. I thought you gave the date. 

Mr. Sourwine. Hull's message to Gauss said, "The President and I." 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection. But I thought you gave 
the date. 

Mr. Sourwine. No; I didn't give the date. And do you know just 
what the date was ? You said the fall of 1944. 

Mr. Vincent. That is as near as I can identify it. And Mr. Gnuss 
himself retired around the 1st of November, so it couldn't have been 
later than that. And I was out of the Department on leave during 
most of that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't think it was in the summer ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think it was in the summer. I would identify 
it as best I could as in September, but I am not sure, and I don't know 
where I could check to find out. 

Mr. Sourwine. What do you know about a struggle over policy 
within the State Department on the question of whether there should 
be a hard peace or a soft peace with Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. That Wings up presumably testimony by Mr. 
Dooman. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, my question was only: What do you know? 
The question doesn't necessarily bring up any testimony by anybody. 

Mr. Vincent. Then I would say that in my position at that time, 
as chief of the China office, I had no direct knowledge of a struggle 
going on in the State Department over a hard peace or a soft peace 
with Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. You played no part in any difference of opinion over 
that matter of policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not over that matter. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you an advocate of a hard peace, so-called, 
with Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. I would probably have been called an advocate of a 
firm peace with Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. I am sorry. I didn't mean to be at all 
harsh a moment ago. 

Mr. Vincent. My advocacy was not one that would be heard in any 
committee meetings or anything else. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am sure the committee would be glad to have you 
volunteer any comments you want to make with regard to Mr. Dooman's 
testimony. I didn't mean to foreclose you on that. 

Mr. Vincent. This morning I think I testified with regard to my 
relations with Mr. Dooman that I had nothing to do with getting him 
out of the Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. I only jumped a little bit when you said that that 
brings up the Dooman testimony. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. Well, I have traced that to Dooman in my own 
mind and in recollection of his testimony, but I have no exact recollec- 
tion of what Dooman said about a hard peace or a soft peace. I do 
remember it was discussed. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall what he said a "hard peace" means? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think that your advocacy of a firm peace 
was in line with what he called a hard peace? Or did you mean to- 
make a distinction between hard peace and firm peace ? 



1830 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I probably meant to make a distinction between a 
hard peace, which some people wanted for Japan — I have even heard 
the statement used, and I don't recall where it was, at the end of the 
war, and as a matter of fact, feeling was running very high, that the 
thing to do was to "let Japan stew in its own juice," after the war 
was over. That seemed to me a very short-sighted view. 

Mr. Sourwine. What were the principal points in the firm peace 
that you would like to have seen, that you wanted? 

Mr. Vincent. Disarmament of Japan; breaking up of the large 
cartels, called the Zaibatzu, would be another one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, now, this Zaibatzu, is that a word that is 
translated "large cartels," or is it more broad and more inclusive? 

Mr. Vincent. It is more inclusive. It is a matter of the interrela- 
tion, however, of the large families, such as the Mitsubishi, the Mitsui, 
and so on. I am not, I may say, an expert on all of the internal matters 
in Japan, because I have never lived there in my life. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you spoke of the breaking up of that class, 
did you mean to include only the breaking up of the large families, 
such as the Mitsubishi, or did you mean the manufacturing and mer- 
cantile class, the business class generally ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not mean to include those. I meant the large 
families, which it seemed to us had almost a virtual monopoly of a 
certain type of Japanese economic activity ; to what extent they were 
also the controlling element in manufacturing in Japan, I really don't 
know, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in favor of the breaking up, removing 
from power or authority, of all those having anything to do with 
controlling large business interests, banks, and industrial concerns 
in Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you oppose it? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not in a position to oppose it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You took no position on that point? 

Mr. Vincent. Because those were all matters that took place before 
I came into it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said you favored breaking up the Zaibatzu. In 
favoring that, you said that you did not favor breaking up all these 
groups 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, when you vocally espoused the breaking up of 
the Zaibatzu, did you make the distinction that you didn't include all 
these groups in it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; to use a word Mr. Dooman used, I certainly was 
not in favor of an atomization of Japanese industry. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you favor the deposing of the Emperor? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. Let me continue, there. I expressed 
it that, as one who had considerable feeling about the war with Japan, 
I would have hoped, as I say, that the Japanese might have established 
a republican form of government. But in a speech I made and in other 
things, I was not in favor of deposing the Emperor against the wishes 
of the Japanese and trying him as a war criminal. 

Mr. Sourwine. I might say for the record that I now have the White 
Paper, and I ask you if this message, beginning on page 563, is the one 
that we talked about as Secretary Hull's cable to Gauss. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1831 

Mr. Vincent. As far as I can remember, this is the telegram we have 
spoken of. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Now, will you turn back to page 560 ? That is the 
one I asked you about at the time when I didn't have this volume before 
us. I will ask the question again. 

What part, if any, did you have in the drafting or preparation or 
submission of that message under date of July 14, 1944, which appears 
to have been signed by President Roosevelt? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you give me a chance to read this? 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Of course. 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, as I say, I 
either drafted this or had a part in drafting it. It is one of those 
kinds of messages, where a request would come from the White House 
or from Wallace, which I do not recall, and I was told to draft the 
message. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Do you remember any more about it than that? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any more about it than that. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Do you remember anything about the documents 
that that message itself refers to ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't. 

Do you mean where it says, "The Vice President handed me your 
telegram of July 8" ? 

Mr. Sotjrwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that. "And in reply to a letter to you 
of June 27. * * *" 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Those are the two documents then. You must have 
had those. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any letters that Mr. Wallace wrote 
the Generalissimo, which is apparently what this was. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You must have had those documents, in order to 
prepare a draft of this. Correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. But as I have told you, I do not recall those two mes- 
sages. I am not giving that testimony because they have not been 
found, but 

Mr. Sotjrwine. It should be obvious that you must have had them 
in order to prepare the draft, is that right ? That draft couldn't have 
been prepared without it. 

Mr. Vincent. No, unless Mr. Wallace simply told me that he had 
received a letter and had replied to Chiang Kai-shek. But that seems 
wholly improbable. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. The draftsman would almost have to see the letter. 
You don't know what happened to them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. All right, sir. May I have that volume? 

Were you ever a member of the board of trustees of the American 
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. May I here refresh my memory, if this is 
going to be about the IPR? 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Of course. Were you a member of that board in 
1945? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar as being a member of the board and being 
on a letterhead. I do not recall ever attending any board meetings. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Do you know what other years you were a member 
of that board ? 



1832 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I was never a member of that board except during 
the year 1945. It may have gone over into 1946, before I was ap- 
parently not reselected, but I had nothing to do with my selection on 
it or nothing to do with my selection off it. 

Senator O'Conor. Were you consulted before your name was added ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was consulted. A letter or telegram, as I recall, 
came, and I asked Mr. Grew if it would be all right to be on that 
board. 

Senator O'Conor. From whom did the letter come ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall. It may have come from the secre- 
tary or from E. C. Carter or a man named Dennett. Dennett, at that 
time, I think, was secretary. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you contribute to the American Council of 
the IPR during 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you contribute during any other year ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you given to understand that even though 
you were a member of the board of trustees you were not expected to 
contribute ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I was told that I was not expected 
to contribute. I did not contribute, and I have no recollection of any- 
body asking me to contribute. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that you were the only member of 
the board of trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pa- 
cific Relations in 1945 who was listed as a complimentary member. 

Mr. Vincent. I knew it after reading the testimony here, but I 
was not aware then. I was aware that I had not contributed any- 
thing to it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know why it was that you were listed as a 
complimentary member ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir. I know why I didn't contribute ; 
as I didn't have any funds to contribute. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you a nominee on the 1945 IPR ballot for 
board of trustees ? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean to carry over into 1946? I was on in 
1945, in the best of my recollection. But you mean a nominee of 1945 
to become one for 1946? 

Mr. Sourwine. No, the ballot that elected the trustees for 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. I presumably was. I don't know how they elect 
their trustees, so you are giving me new information. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't recall having seen the ballot? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't know, then, whether it is true that your 
name was one of six on that ballot under the subheading "Washington" 
with the instruction "vote for 6"? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. What duties did you perform as a member of the 
board of trustees? 

Mr. Vincent. None whatsoever, as I recall. Outside of it it was a 
duty I performed in the American delegation ; but I was never called 
upon to perform any duties as a trustee. 

Mr. Sourwine. What other official positions did you ever hold as a 
member of the Institute of Pacific Relations? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1833 

Mr. Vincent. None that I recall, except on the American delegation 
to IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. If that is official. Did you ever hear that the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations was controlled by a Communist group or 
groups ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not during that period. 

Senator O'Conor. Did you see evidences of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you still affiliated with the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you attend a conference of the IPR in 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you invited to attend that conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a member of the American delegation? 

Mr. Vincent. As a member of the American delegation, and was 
sent by the State Department, under State Department instructions. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you went as an official representative of 
the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; but I asked whether I could go, and, as I say, I 
was not under instruction to go as an official. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say you were sent by the State Department. 
Do you mean the State Department paid your expenses? 

Mr. Vincent. They didn't pay my expenses. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your expenses were not paid by IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how it was that you were invited to 
attend that conference as a member of the American delegation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no memory of the background. I was Chief 
of the China Division in the State Department at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. Philip C. Jessup had recom- 
mended you for an inclusion in the American delegation to this 
conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember his mentioning it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. No one else told you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any recollection of making a speech 
in the conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I took part in the panel discussions in a 
rather desultory way, but I made no speeches. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have testified here with regard to your ac- 
quaintanceship with Julian Friedman. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Friedman the ques- 
tion of what material might be given or shown to Andrew Roth? 

Mr. Vincent. I clo not have any recollection of any such discussion. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you testified that Mr. Friedman occupied a 
desk in your office. Was that a large office, physically speaking? 

Mr. Vincent. That was an office about two-thirds the size of this, in 
old State. He sat down in one corner. I sat down in the other 
corner. The situation changed as soon as we got new quarters. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were those opposite corners ? 



1834 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Opposite corners. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or corners along the same wall ? 

Mr. Vincent. Along the same line. But that was for a short 
period, and when I came back from the IPR, which had nothing to 
do with the IPR, new quarters had been given us in the north side of 
the building, where I had a private office of my own. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he sit in an outer office there ? 

Mr. Vincent. There he sat in another office. I don't know where 
he sat then. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it an office connecting with yours? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where you were both in the same office, was there 
a door between you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean the door of entry to the room was not 
between you ? 

Mr. Vincent. The door of entry to the room ? You came into the 
room at the side, and I moved forward to my desk, which was up in 
the corner by the window. He went back across to the rear end of 
the room, to his desk. 

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, the door was in the wall opposite 
the wall along which your two desks were situated? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. So that a person coming in the door could look 
in one direction toward your desk and in the other toward his. They 
were corners opposite the door? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. But as I say, I am not making a factual thing 
about it. We have gone into the details of that office so much. As I 
say, a month later we did get a new set-up, where we had to put in 
partitions, and so forth. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you only occupied office space with Mr. 
Friedman for 1 month? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I have forgotten how long it was, during the 
fall of '44. But in the spring of '45, we moved out of this big room. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is this 1 month period? One month from 
what? 

Mr. Vincent. From the return from the IPR conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. I see. 

Mr. Vincent. It was over about the middle of June. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Friedman occupied office space with you for 
some time before that? 

Mr. Vincent. In the autumn of '44 ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before that, who else occupied space with you? 

Mr. Vincent. No one. Because we didn't have that office. When 
we moved into that office, that was another move. I moved three 
times, I think. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you moved into that office, he moved with 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Now, did you have anything to do with the ap- 
pointment of Mr. Friedman? 

Mr. Vtncent. I had nothing to do with it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or his assignment or detail in your office? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1835 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you describe for this committee his full 
duties while he was occupying office space with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think this morning I went into that. He was a 
sort of an odd- job man, but he took a particular interest in whatever 
matters came into the Division on labor problems. He was trying 
his best to equip himself to go to China as a labor attache, which 
he eventually did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was material coming to your desk routed across 
his? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was material leaving your desk routed across 
his desk ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. Unless it was a matter that particularly 
concerned him. But there was no automatic routing to him. 

Mr. Sourwine. It didn't go to him unless you so marked it? Is 
that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that that would be correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did anything ever come to your desk from his? 

Mr. Vincent. Let me say here that routing of stuff that came into 
the China Division was not done by me. It was done by an adminis- 
trative officer, or the assistant chief ; I don't recall which. 

Mr. Sourwine. The routing of material that left your desk was 
done by you, was it ? 

Mr. Vincent. The routing from my desk was sent off by me; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Material leaving your desk never went to his un- 
less you so directed ? 

Mr. Vincent. Unless I so directed, insofar as I can recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you normally so direct? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not normally so dirsct. 

Mr. Sourwine. So that he was not generally familiar with what 
came on and went off your desk ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say he was generally familiar. 

He certainly was not familiar with memoranda and things that I 
might write to my superiors, because he had no part in that. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was not a party to the routine of your office, 
and of your job ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was not in any sense your understudy or your 
deputy or your assistant ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was not my deputy or my assistant. He was just 
a man who had been assigned to my Division, and physically occu- 
pied that space, because he were so crowded. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever investigate his loyalty revord ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever call for his file, his security file? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I said, I think, this morning or yesterday, last I 
heard of him he was in London. He sent me a notice that he was 
going to get married, and that is the last I ever heard of him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you hear from him since he got back to the 
United States? 

Mr. Vincent. Since he got back here ? No ; I haven't heard from 
him. 



1836 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't hear that he was out in the University 
of California? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. I should rephrase that. Do you know he is out in 
the University of California ? 

Mr. Vincent. The first I heard he was back in the United States 
was when I heard he was going to appear before this committee. The 
last I had heard from him, he was at the London School of Economics 
in London. 

Mr. Sourwine. Why was he dropped from the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I had already left Washington. I do not know why 
he was dropped. 

The Chairman. We will pause there. The committee will recess 
until tomorrow at 10. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 15 p. m., Friday, January 25, 1952, the hearing 
was recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 26, 1952.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



SATTJBDAY, JANUARY 26, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washirigton, D. c 7 . 

EXECUTIVE SESSION 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding. 

Present : Senator Ferguson. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. The committee will come to order. Mr. Vincent, 
you have been previously sworn. You may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER 
STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I am informed that I failed to ask a 
pertinent question yesterday. I cannot understand how it happened. 
I am told that in the discussion of the trip with Mr. Wallace, when 
Mr. Hazard was mentioned, I did not ask you to characterize Mr. 
Hazard as pro-Communist or anti-Communist, as the case might be, 
or neutral, if that was the fact. Would you express an opinion on 
that? 

Mr. Vincent. I would express an opinion, yes, that I have no 
knowledge at all that he was pro-Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what his views were with regard 
to communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see any evidences during the trip that he 
was pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, you know I spoke to you the other 
day about your knowledge of communism. Do you think that at that 
time you were competent to tell whether a person was pro-Communist 
or not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that I would be able to tell if he gave 
very clear evidence of it. But I would not call myself an expert on 
being able to detect whether a person was pro-Communist or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Having in mind what I call the "cagey" letter, 
and you know the letter 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

1837 



1838 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. The way that Mr. Lattimore indicated that cer- 
tain things were to be done, in other words, you were to do things but 
you were to make it appear that that just was not your purpose, and 
that was not what you were doing, do you not think at times it is a 
little difficult to tell when a person is advocating the Communist line? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly agree with that, sir, that it would 
be difficult for me to detect. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am getting at. Some of these 
people that we are going over here, if you had close contact with them, 
I wonder whether you were able to judge whether or not they were 
pro-Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. I have said, sir, that I would not call myself a person 
competent to judge, except on the most obvious evidence, whether a 
person was pro-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Back in those days, did you appreciate the fraud 
and deceit with which communism worked? 

Mr. Vincent. Not in the degree I do now. I was anti-Communist 
in the sense I did not like Communists, but I certainly was not aware, 
as I am today, of the manner in which they worked. I certainly was 
not. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with their technique of pene- 
tration? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I just wondered about your knowledge, what it 
was with respect to communism in those days. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, what was SWNCC ? The initials are 
S-W-N-C-C; right? 

Mr. Vincent. SWNCC was the State, War, Navy Coordinating 
Committee. 

Mr. Sourwine. "What was the purpose of that committee? 

Mr. Vincent. The purpose of the committee was to examine various 
and sundry problems that came up that cut across the lines of State, 
War, and Navy at that time, to formulate papers to go for general 
approval by the three Secretaries. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it a high level policy committee? 

Mr. Vincent. I would call it so ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was your connection with SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. My connection with SWNCC began at the end of 
August 1945, when I assumed the chairmanship for the first time, 
on September 1, of the FE, what we called Far East subcommittee 
of SWNCC. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had not been represented at all, or a member, 
or an attendant, at the committee meetings before that time? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no recollection of having attended a meet- 
ing before that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Subsequent to that time, were you ever represented 
on SWNCC by anyone else? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of being represented, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Julian Friedman ever represent you on 
SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sttrrey. Do vou mean SWNCC or the subcommittee of 
SWNCC? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1839 

Senator Ferguson. What does the witness mean, that is more 
important. 

Mr. Vincent. I think Mr. Sourwine is always speaking, with ref- 
erence to me, as being a member or represented on the Far East Sub- 
committee. But I was never a member of the top level SWNCC. 
That was composed of the Assistant Secretaries of State, War and 
Navy. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never attended a meeting of that? 

Mr. Vincent. I attended meetings of that from time to time, when 
invited, after I became the chairman of the Far East Subcommitee. 

Mr. Sourwine. But not before that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not before that time to my recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Either on SWNCC itself or on the Far East Sub- 
committee, were you ever represented by anyone else? 

Mr. Vincent. Sir ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Either on SWNCC itself or the Far East Subcom- 
mittee, were you ever represented by anyone else ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. By whom were you represented ? 

Mr. Vincent. Very shortly after I became chairman, my duties 
elsewhere became so pressing that at one time or another Penfield, who 
was my deputy, represented me ; also Mr. Hugh Borton. 

Mr. Sourwine. How do you spell Penfield, one "n" or two ? 

Mr. Vincent. P-e-n-f-i-e-1-d. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember his first name? 

Mr. Vincent. James K. Penfield. I think that at other times Mr. 
Hugh Borton, the Chief of the Japan Division, would represent me. 
There may have been others, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would Mr. Friedman have been one of those others 
at any time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, that Mr. Friedman has ever been 
a representative of me on the F. E. SWNCC, or attended the SWNCC 
meetings. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give him authority to do so, or to repre- 
sent himself, at either one of those organizations' meetings, as repre- 
senting you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever report to you concerning what went 
on at meetings of the Far East Area Subcommittee of SWNCC ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think there that you are confusing two things un- 
intentionally. It is that there was an area committee which was not, 
to my knowledge, a committee of SWNCC. It was an area committee 
which had been formed on a different basis in the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was that a committee of ? 

Mr. Vincent. What? 

Mr. Sourwine. What was it a committee of ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was a committee of representatives, also, who 
gathered, I think, from other departments. But it was mostly State 
people who came from different divisions to discuss area problems that 
cut across divisional and office lines. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it also a high level policy committee? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

22848— 52— pt. 6 11 



1840 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. What? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my recollection; it wasn't. I didn't attend 
it more than once or twice. That doesn't keep it from being high 
level. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was the difference? 
Mr. Vincent. Of the two ? 
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I must say that my memory on just exactly what 
the area committee did other than just discuss interdivisional prob- 
lems, I don't know what its origin was. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say it was an interdepartmental committee? 
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether any other departmental — I 
mean, outside of the departments. It may have been intra. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you sure that it had nothing to do with the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection was that it was not related to it. 
Mr. Sourwine. What became of the recommendations, if any, of the 
area committee? 

Mr. Vincent. I suppose that they were sent to the chiefs of what- 
ever divisions or offices were interested in the particular problem dis- 
cussed. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see any such recommendations? 
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the recommendations of the area com- 
mittee. I am speaking of the area committee now. 

Mr. Sourwine. You brought this subject up when I was discussing 
Julian Friedman and asked about him. Am I to understand that 
you want the committee to understand that Mr. Friedman represented 
you on the area committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say that he represented me on the area 
committee. I think my former testimony was that my recollection 
had been that he attended at the area committee meetings while he- 
was still with the Division of Labor or the Labor Division of the 
State Department, and that he continued to attend them after he was 
assigned to the Far Eastern Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say that he did not attend in your stead,, 
or as your deputy? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my statement, sir. I don't ever recall 
instructing him to attend them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Friedman ever report to you concerning 
what went on at meetings of the area committee? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that he probably did, but I have no 
recollection of his reports on those meetings. 
Mr. Sourwine. Orally, or in writing? 
Mr. Vincent. Orally, as far as I can recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give to another person or persons 
information that Mr. Friedman had given you about what took place 
in those meetings? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I did not reveal information that took place- 
in those meetings. I make that as a general statement because I just, 
testified that I do not recall the information. 

Mr. Sourwine. There was not anything in that question about re- 
vealing it outside, sir. 
Mr. Vincent. No. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1841 

Mr. Sourwine. The question simply was did you ever give to any 
other person or persons information which Mr. Friedman had given 
you about what took place in meetings of that committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought the implication was the other. But I would 
certainly, if I thought it was important enough, discussed it with Mr. 
Grew or Mr. Ballantine, who were my chiefs. 

Mr. Sourwine. Again you are in the realm of speculation. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no specific memory as to what happened in 
regards to the discussions of this area committee. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know whether you discussed it with any 
other person, or, if so, with whom ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I may add there that my recollection is that Mr. 
Stanton, who was also a person of my same rank, attended those area 
meetings far more often than I did, as a man to speak for China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give information about the Far East 
Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee 
to The Nation, or representatives of that publication ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give to The Nation, or representatives 
of that publication, information about the so-called area committee? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is the phrase Far East Area Subcommittee of 
SWNCC a misnomer? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection would be that the name of the com- 
mittee was the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy 
Coordinating Committee. 

Senator Ferguson. The way that Mr. Sourwine put it would not 
mislead anyone? It would be the same thing? 

Mr. Sourwine. Sir, if I may interpose before the witness answers, 
it might mislead someone if there was a Far East area subcommittee 
somewhere else, and I understand there was. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think it was called the subcommittee. It was 
the Far East Area Committee. But there I am speaking only from 
memory. What the exact title was I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. But the Far East Area Committee had nothing to do 
with SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know. 

Mr. Sourwine. The Far East Area Subcommittee was the one which 
you became the active head of on the 1st of September? 

Mr. Vincent. I became the ex officio head of it. 

Senator Ferguson. It is clear now. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give information about either of the 
two committees we are discussins\ the Far East Subcommittee of 
SWNCC or the Far East Area Committee, to the New Kepublic? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To PM? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 
Mr. Sourwine. To Amerasia ? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear reports that information from 
SWNCC or the Far East Subcommittee thereof was leaking out? 
Mr. Vincent. I didn't hear it at the time. I have since seen from 
testimony here in the hearing room, that it did leak out. 
Mr. Sourwine. You did not hear about it at the time ? 



1842 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I have no recollection of hearing about it 
at the time. But my testimony is that I do now know that Mr. Dooman 
has testified that it did leak out. 

Mr. Sourwine. But knowing nothing about it at the time, you did 
nothing about it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I may express my disappointment that Mr. 
Dooman didn't come to me at that time, according to his testimony, 
and say something to me about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Is the first that you ever heard of that in the 
testimony ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I can recall, sir, I never heard of any ac- 
cusation that it was leaking. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think you would recall an impor- 
tant matter like that? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I would ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you could say that was the first, is that 
right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give or arrange a luncheon for mem- 
bers of the IPR at the Blair Lee House? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall arranging any luncheon. I don't 
recall it ; no. I don't recall ever giving a luncheon at the Blair Lee 
House, but I may have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember discussing such a luncheon with 
Mr. Kaymond Dennett, secretary of IPR, in January 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. About January 1945, which would have been before 
or after the IPR conference at Hot Springs. The Hot Springs con- 
ference took place — I am trying to remember whether 

Mr. Sourwine. I give you that date to refresh your memory. The 
question is whether you ever discussed such a luncheon with Mr. 
Dennett. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing it, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember receiving a letter from him 
under date of December 19, 1944, with regard to that matter? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not remember receiving it, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was such a luncheon actually held ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to recall the two or three occasions that 
I was in the Blair Lee House. I am coming to this because I do 
believe a luncheon was held in the Blair Lee House. Whether I gave 
the luncheon or not, and who was present, I am trying to recall — 
whether it was specifically a luncheon for IPR people or whether it 
was a luncheon at which there were IPR people. There was a luncheon 
or dinner about the same time, along at that time, for the Vice Presi- 
dent of the Philippines. ' I can recall that one. 

I can't testify with any clarity whether I believed that a luncheon 
was held there and whether it was specifically to entertain IPR people 
or not. I can't say. 

Mr. Sourwine. You recall no further details? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall no details, except that there was a luncheon 
at the Blair Lee House in which I participated. Whether I gave it or 
not, whether I got the permission of the State Department to use the 
Blair Lee House, I don't recall. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1843 

Anything given in the Blair Lee House was always an arrange- 
ment by the State Department, and it was given under the State 
Department auspices and was paid for by the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. So that if there was such a luncheon or dinner, the 
most that could be said on your participation would be that you ar- 
ranged it? You would not have given it, really, because the State 
Department would have been giving it ? 

Mr. Vincent. The State Department. But somebody had to be 
host ; but I don't recall being host. I may have arranged it, but I don't 
think I was host. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, sir, in 1945 express the view that Chiang 
Kai-shek must be gotten rid of? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you concur in that view ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you ever informed that you were being in- 
vestigated or had been investigated by the State Department Security 
Division or security officers with respect to your connection with the 
Amerasia case ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I was never informed that I was being investi- 
gated by them in connection with the Amerasia case. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether, in fact, you were so inves- 
tigated ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, as a matter of fact, whether I ever 
was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you ever told that you were suspected of 
responsibility for leaks in the State Department in connection with 
the Amerasia case ? 

Mr. Vincent. No one ever told me that I was suspected of being 
responsible for them ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. That includes down to the present time; does it? 

Mr. Vincent. I seem to have read somewhere that my name had 
been mentioned in connection with the possible leaks of the Amerasia 
case, but nobody told me at the time and nobody told me directly 
since. 

Mr. Sourwine. By "read it," do you mean in the newspaper? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether I read it in the newspapers or in hearings of 
the committee, or one place or the other, I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. But it would be one of those two places? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see Andrew Roth in your suite of 
offices at the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he was in there ; yes, sir. I don't know when, 
but some time. 

Mr. Sourwin. How often? 

Mr. Vincent. Not often. As a matter of fact, I don't even recall 
the instances when I saw him. But I know that I have seen Andrew 
Roth in the State Department and in the Far Eastern Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. More than once? 

Mr. Vincent. Probably more than once. 

Mr. Sourwine. More than twice? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't think so. I mean, I would say several 
times, but my testimony would be 



1844 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. What was his position when he was in the 
office? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he was a young naval officer at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. What duties would bring him into that office? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall what brought him in. I think he was 
a friend of Friedman's. 

Senator Ferguson. If he was a young naval officer, had he any 
duties in the Navy that would bring him in there for information? 

Mr. Vincent. He had no duties in connection with my Far East- 
ern Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Friedman introduce him to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. In your office? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, in my direct office or in some office of his where 
I ran into him. 

Senator Ferguson. Where was this office? 

Mr. Vincent. In the old State Building, sir. 

Seantor Ferguson. Did Roth ever visit you in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Miss Rose Yardumian, of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, ever arrange an appointment with you for Mr. Ray- 
mond Dennett, of the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of her arranging it, 
but I had meetings with Mr. Ray Dennett, of IPR, and I believe that 
Miss Yardumian was the person who arranged those, because she was 
in charge of some office of the secretaries here in Washington, over on 
Madison Place. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether she arranged an appoint- 
ment for Mr. Dennett with you within the week immediately following 
February 5, 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of that. That might 
have been the time, but, as I say, you pin it down to that point and I 
don't recall whether I saw Mr. Dennett through arrangements with 
her at that time or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Miss Yardumian other than as a voice 
over the telephone ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; because I think she was down at the IPR con- 
ference in Hot Springs. I think I have seen her. I don't think I 
would recognize her. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you meet her at any other time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think there was a meeting up in the American head- 
quarters of the IPR when she was secretary there, and I probably met 
her there. 

Mr. Sourwine. That would have been after the Hot Springs con- 
ference ? 

Mr. Vincent. It may have been before or it may have been after. 
I believe there was a preparatory meeting of the American delegation, 
of which she probably acted as secretary. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you meet her after the Hot Springs conference? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall meeting her after the Hot Springs con- 
ference. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not meet her socially ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1845 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall meeting her socially. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever an officer of the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was a trustee during the year 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were then a State employee? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get consent to be a trustee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I took the matter up with Mr. Grew, yes, sir, who was 
then my chief, and he said it was agreeable with him. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the IPR as far as you knew? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; or at any time. 

Mr. Vincent. It was a research organization in which there was a 
tremendous number of academic people, and was not connected with 
the Far East, as far as I knew. I had no great familiarity with it. 

Senator Ferguson. You were trustee? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I never attended a trustees' meeting, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You never attended a trustees' meeting? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. What were they trying to do ; just get names? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my assumption. General Marshall 
was a trustee at one time. Henry Grady was a trustee. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate, as being a trustee, that you 
had something to do with the policy. 

Mr. Vincent. It would indicate it, but I didn't ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you know how many trustees they had 
on the basis of your connection, that like you were just figureheads, 
letterheads of it ? Letterheads would be better than figureheads. 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't think I can say how many they had 
on that basis. I would have to see a list of them. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you think George Marshall was one? 

Mr. Vincent. I would think George Marshall never took any part 
at all in the policy of the IPR.  

Senator Ferguson. You thought it was a research agency; is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Doing research in the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. Doing research in the Pacific area and handling pub- 
lications. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think it had an influence? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought it had an influence in the matter of in- 
vestigating into the problems of the Far East; yes. Its publications 
came out and people read them. 

Senator Ferguson. You think it is well now for a man to serve as 
a trustee as a letterhead ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not ; no sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You would say now, if you were asked, you 
would not go on ? 

Mr. Vincent. If I were asked, I would say ? would not go on as a 
trustee of the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. Because it might leave a wrong impression that 
the State Department was interested in the particular policies that 
they were carrying out ; is that not right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 



1846 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. What was Gen. George Marshall when he 
was a trustee ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was a trustee in 1949, 1 notice. That would have 
been while he was Secretary of State. 

Senator Ferguson. He would have been Secretary of State? 
Mr. Vincent. When did George Marshall become Secretary? No; 
he was not. He had ceased to be Secretary of State at the beginning 
of 1949. He retired. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, he is an ex-Secretary of State? 
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; he had retired. He was head of the Red Cross. 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. But when you were trustee, you were then 
on the desk for the Far East ? 
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it would give prestige to a publication to 
read that one of the trustees for that publication was a member of 
the State Department desk of the Far East, would it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; just as it gave prestige — I mean, Dr. Hornbeck, 
who had been my predecessor, had been a trustee. Henry Luce was 
a trustee at the same time I was. Henry Grady was a trustee. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think, looking back as an officer in the 
State Department, that communism would want to penetrate the IPR ? 
Mr. Vincent. I would assume that, with the objectives of commu- 
nism, they would try to penetrate most anything they could, and that 
the IPR. would be one of the organizations they might try to penetrate. 
Senator Ferguson. Do you know a more fertile field for penetration 
than the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I wouldn't want to put the comparison on 

that there might be more fertile fields. It would be a fertile field. 

Senator Ferguson. What would be a more fertile field? Would 

there be any publications of the State Department that would be more 

fertile than the IPR's? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't get that question. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any publications of the State De- 
partment that would be more fertile than the IPR publications ? 
Mr. Vincent. I don't know of any State Department publications. 
Senator Ferguson. Do they not have publications? They are 
spending thousands of dollars every year on publications. 

Mr. Vincent. You mean the bulletin from the State Department! 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I should say that if Communists could infiltrate 
and influence the publications of the State Department, that would be 
more effective. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that would be more effective than the IPR 
books ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you think that the IPR would probably 
come next? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I would say if the Communists could infiltrate 
the Luce publications, it would be more influential than infiltrating 
the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean by that Life and Time? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And Fortune ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1847 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. They are far more widely read. I find it 
difficult to make these comparisons. 

Mr. Sourwine. Life, Time, and Fortune never have been regarded 
as the expression of the views and opinions and knowledge of experts 
on the Far East, have they ? 

Mr. Vincent. We are limiting ourselves to the Far East? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vifcent. If we limit ourselves to the Far East, the answer to 
the question would be "Yes." I know of nothing that limited itself 
to the Far East. 

Mr. Sourwine. Life and Time and Fortune have never been con- 
sidered technical publications in any field, have they ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. And many of the publications of the IPR were so 
considered, were they not, by you and others in the State Department, 
as authoritative, expert publications in the field ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you would not say that you and George 
Marshall would go on those as letterhead trustees, on Life and Time 
and Fortune? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And they were not considered as expert opin- 
ions ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But this IPR was considered so, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it have an influence in the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge. Obviously, people read the 
articles that were in there, and if there were facts or opinions in 
there 

Mr. Sourwine. If the chairman will permit, that is a question which 
calls for such a broad conclusion ; if I might ask one or two questions 
sort of underlying that, it would be better. 

You have just stated that you read Red Star Over Asia by Mr. 
Snow. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And at the time you believed it to be a factual and 
objective treatment of the subject? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you read Mr. Lattimore's books, or some of 
them ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you considered them highly expert ? 

Senator Ferguson. I do not think you answered that last question. 
I think you mumbled the answer. 

Mr. Vincent. We were making a distinction between inner- Asian 
frontiers of China, which I did think was an expert piece of factual 
work. 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe you testified, did you not, that you would 
give great weight to any views that Mr. Lattimore expressed about 
the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 



]848 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not willing to say that he was the out- 
standing expert outside of that one area, but you said in the entire Far 
East you would give great weight to his views ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. In fact, you thought so much of him that you 
wanted to hire him, but in the context of an expert of these inner- 
Asian frontiers. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, these publications of the IPR were then, were 
they not, considered as the opinions of experts on the field ? 

Mr. Vincent. And they were, as I say. 

Mr. Sourwine. And they were rather widely read by people who 
were in positions of authority dealing with those matters ? Now on 
the other hand, you have not read, although you considered com- 
munism one of the important problems in the east, you had not read 
any of the basic Communist documents, so that your ideas about 
communism and its influence and its objectives, so far as you got them 
from books, were gathered at least in part from IPR publications ? Is 
that not correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they widely read in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I couldn't say whether they were widely 
read. It was generally read, I suppose, in the far-eastern office when 
there was an article that was of particular interest to us. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, they covered just the Far East, did they 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of a more influential publication 
than the IPR is on the Far East ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it aimed to influence public opinion as well 
as State Department opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that any magazine published, of that 
kind, was aimed to influence the readers, and the readers were the 
public. 

Senator Ferguson. And the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. And the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think they would have wasted all 
their efforts just on the public, Joe Doaks, reading it? They, in fact, 
distributed them free to you people, did they not, in the State 
Department? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether a copy came to us free or whether it was 
subscribed to 

Senator Ferguson. Well, either one. But do you not think that 
all of these publications on the Far East came to the State De- 
partment ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am quite sure they did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; and they would be distributed among the 
members of the Far East Division. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. This was not just to influence the opinion of 
Joe Doaks in Detroit? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1849 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I would not say that they particularly slanted 
themselves toward the State Department. But they certainly would 
have figured that the State Department would have read their pub- 
lications. 

Senator Ferguson. And be influenced by them. That was part of 
the policy, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, the policy of any publication is to influence 
its readers. I can't say for IPR whether it aimed particularly and 
especially at influencing the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that one of the things that made 
you feel that Owen Lattimore was an expert on certain parts of the 
Far East was what he said in publications of the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In fact, you got more knowledge from those 
publications than any other way about Mr. Owen Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. During the period that Owen Lattimore was editor 
of the Pacific Relations, I don't recall having a great deal of contact 
with the magazine itself. I was speaking of the period when I was 
back here, and at that time when I knew him — well, I had hardly 
known him intimately before, but when I knew him here on an offi- 
cial basis as head of OWI he was at that time not editor. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean of Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. Vincent. Pacific Affairs. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not get your knowledge about his 
expertness in the Far East from the OWI work, did you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I got it partially from that, in conversations 
with him, when we were discussing far-eastern policy as the OWI 
was supposed to carry it out. 

Senator Ferguson. And the reading of these books, is that not 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever come to the conclusion that Fred- 
erick Vanderbilt Field knew anything about the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I never had any conversation with Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field about the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read any publication in the IPR 
written by Field? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of ever having read an article 
by Field in the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know the IPR was using aliases to 
write articles ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never knew that. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you believe that the people writing those 
articles were the real people that signed them ? 

Mr. Vincent. If I read an article signed by somebody, I assumed 
so, unless it was an obvious pseudonym. I was not, I may say, a reg- 
ular reader of Pacific Affairs at the time. I am just saying not as a 
factual statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but these books came out. Is that not 
true? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 



1850 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. What would you say now about a publication 
like the IPR writing either articles or books under fictitious names? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't like it in the IPR or in any magazine, to 
have fictitious names. 

Senator Ferguson. Clearly fictitious. If they were marked Mr. X, 
or something like that. 

Mr. Vincent. I wasn't thinking of Mr. X. You mean clearly fic- 
titious to mislead the reader? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; I mean clearly fictitious not to mislead the 
reader. Say Mr. X writes this. You would think thatthey should 
not use another name indicating another writer was writing it. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say they certainly should not. 

Senator Ferguson. Or a fictitious name. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were any of these names out of the "cagey" 
letter? For instance, the "Asiaticus." Was that a fictitious name? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that it was fictitious. 

Senator Ferguson. Were the other two fictitious? 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten the other names. 

Senator Ferguson. One was Chi. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; they were not fictitious names. 

Senator Ferguson. What is Chi now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. I have had no contact with Dr. Chi 
since I was in Chungking. I haven't seen him in this country. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what he is now, what his posi- 
tion is? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Has he any position with the Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you at Yalta ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever write a memorandum about the Yalta 
Conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; not before the Yalta Conference. Are you 
making your question clear ? Did I write a memorandum about the 
Yalta Conference? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. That is the question. I asked that 
after you had testified that you were not at Yalta. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us about that memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. May I read these notes ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I would rather have you answer the question. 

Mr. Vincent. You say did I ever write a memorandum. I am now 
going to describe the memorandum I wrote. I made no contribution 
to Yalta. I did not know the conference was going on until after it 
was over, and I knew nothing about the contents of the agreement on 
China until after several months, I should say, in June 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. Let me see, you were then on the Far East desk ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was Chief of the China Division, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, of the Far East Office. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And was there anybody higher except the Secre- 
tary of State ? Who was your next one ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1851 

Mr. Vincent. The Deputy Director for the Far East Office, and 
after him the Director. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was that ? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time in 1944 it would have been Ballantme 
as Director of the Far Eastern Office, and Stanton was Deputy 
Director. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was Deputy Director ? 

Mr. Vincent. Stanton. 

Senator Ferguson. He was over you? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; he was over me. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were never consulted or knew that 
they were going to deal with the China situation at Yalta? 

Mr. Vincent. Never, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for not being consulted? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I would say the secrecy with which the whole 
Yalta Conference was conducted. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Ballantine considered a Far Eastern 
expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had he served as much as you had in the Far 
East? 

Mr. Vincent. More, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He had served more ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was an older man. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Stanton an expert in the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether either one of those were 
consulted ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know that they were consulted. But I don't 
believe they were, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn about the Yalta agree- 
ments ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, in June or just before the Potsdam con- 
ference. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you get knowledge of it? 

Mr. Vincent. Just before we went to Potsdam, I have forgotten 
now who told me, we were told before we went to Potsdam about 
the Yalta Agreement. I was on the delegation to Potsdam, with Mr. 
Byrnes. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know who told you about the Yalta 
agreements ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I can't recall. It may have been someone in 
the delegation. It may have been, as I say, Mr. Bohlen, Charles 
Bohlen. It may have been someone else. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you then learn about what we had done, 
as far as Yalta was concerned, about China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. And it was my first knowledge of it, and 
it came to me as a great shock. 

Senator Ferguson. It was a shock ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you feel that Yalta was a mistake? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, sir. 



1852 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. I considered that the word "shock" indicated 
a mistake rather than you were delighted. It was a shock rather than 
being delighted ? 

Mr. Vincent. Without being there, I don't know what all of the 
considerations were that caused them to have Yalta. But just seeing 
the bare agreement was a shock to me. 

Senator Ferguson. And therefore you thought it was a grave mis- 
take? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I didn't pretend to know what my superiors 
had in their minds in reaching that conclusion, whether it was a good 
bargain or a bad bargain. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; but to you it was a shock and a mistake ; is 
that right? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

May I go on ? I am getting to this memorandum, if that is all right, 
Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Go ahead. I am hopeful we can get along and get 
through by noon. 

Mr. Vincent. This is just this page. 

Mr. Sourwine. Very good, sir. 

Mr. Vincent (reading). Some factual papers were prepared in the 
Far East Area Committee for use at Potsdam. They were not, to my 
knowledge, used. As far as I know, any discussions of far eastern 
policy at Potsdam were purely incidental to the main consideration of 
matters concerning Europe. 

While at Potsdam, we received the State Department report on the 
conversation which Dr. T. V. Soong had had just prior to Potsdam 
with Stalin and Molotov, in regard to the Sino-Soviet treaty. 

I addressed several memoranda to Mr. Dunn, now American Ambas- 
sador in Italy, and at that time Assistant Secretary of State, who was 
assisting Mr. Byrnes at Potsdam and the President. I expressed my 
concern over the character of the discussions that had taken place at 
Moscow. The Yalta Agreement, insofar as it concerned China, had 
shocked me. I considered it retrogressive and a threat to our interests 
and security in the Far East. 

I felt that it was inconsistent with China's sovereignty. However, 
it was an agreement between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin and, 
therefore, from my point of view, a part of policy. 

But I was alarmed to find that the Russians were going even beyond 
the agreement in their demands. I suggested that Soong be asked to 
come to Moscow where he could have our support in talking with 
Stalin. The suggestion was not acted upon, I suppose for the reason 
that it was not on the agenda of the Potsdam Conference, and they 
were busy with other matters. 

That is the statement. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that you thought the Yalta 
Agreement should be changed, and you might do something about it 
at Potsdam ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I considered that the Russians were overreach- 
ing themselves, even considering that the Yalta Agreement, in my 
mind, was no contribution to peace and security in the Far East, but 
even so within the framework of the Yalta Agreement, from the re- 
ports that we got. The Russian demands and requests of Soong, to 
my mind, went beyond even Yalta. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1853 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you present at any conference or conferences 
between Gen. Patrick Hurley and General Wedemeyer in 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had a conference with General Wedemeyer in 1945, 
and in which General Hurley was not present. I do not recall any con- 
ference between Hurley and Wedemeyer and myself, but it is prob- 
ably simply a faulty memory because it could have easily happened 
during that time. 

They were both home, back from China, in March and April 1945, 
and it would have been most natural if the three of us had met. I 
don't recall the occasion. The one I recall, sir, is the conversation 
with General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you prepare a memorandum with respect to a 
conference with General Hurley and General Wedemeyer, or with 
General Wedemeyer? 

Mr. Vincent. I prepared a memorandum with respect to a confer- 
ence I had in the Pentagon Building with General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that the only memorandum of a conference with 
General Wedemeyer that you prepared? 

Mr. Vincent. It is the only one that I recall, sir. Are you inter- 
ested in the conference I had with Wedemeyer? I think I covered it 
yesterday. Yes, I think we discussed Wedemeyer yesterday, and it 
has to do — yes, as I testified — it has to do with the matter of the 
landings on the China coast which never took place. 

Mr. Sourwine, Is any more comprehensive memorandum of that 
conference in existence than the one you prepared ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you furnish this committee with a copy of the 
memorandum you prepared? 

Mr. Vincent. It is a part of the State Department documents, and 
I would have to refer your request to the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss that conference or your mem- 
orandum on it with Mr. Andrew Roth ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you furnish him with a copy of your memo- 
randum ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who got copies of your memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that the copies, if there were copies, were 
given to no one. They were kept in the State Department. I may 
have shown one to Hurley, and no doubt did. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was not circulated ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not out of the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who in the office would have received copies of it? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Grew. 

Mr. Sourwine. Anyone else ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Stanton would have received it. Would he 
receive a copy or not ? He would have received it, 

Mr. Sourwine. Anyone else? 

Mr. Vincent. If the Secretary was there at the time he would have 
probably seen it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Anyone else ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 



1854 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give any IPR authors access to State 
Department information ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Specifically did you ever give such access to Andrew 
Roth? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To Mark Gayn ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To Owen Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To T. A. Bisson? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you know anything about a draft of a 
proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan 
surrendered ? 

Mr. Vincent. A policy that would have been drafted where, in the 
State Department ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I would rather read the question back, because I 
cannot testify to where such a thing was drafted, if it existed. I 
want to find out whether it was drafted, if we can, from you. Do 
you know, or did you know, anything about a draft of a proposed 
policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan 
surrendered ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I did. It is the SWNCC papers that were 
drafted and called the Post Surrender Policy for Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you speaking now of a draft that was submitted 
to and considered by the Policy Committee of the State Department 
on or about May 24, 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I am not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about a draft of a proposed 
policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan sur- 
rendered, having been submitted to, and considered by, the Policy 
Committee of the State Department on or about May 24, 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I may add that 
at that time I had no direct or, as I can recall, indirect relation to 
policy regarding Japan. I was Chief of the China Office and didn't 
have any responsibility nor any connection with Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. If there was such a draft, you might not have known 
about it? 

Mr. Vincent. I might not have known about it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss the question of such a draft, 
or of any proposed policy with regard to the possible Japanese sur- 
render, with anyone, at any time, between May 24, 1945, and July 
29, 1945, approximately a 2 months' period in there? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall discussing it with anybody. 

Mr. Sourwine. And during that time you did not know of any 
paper or memorandum on the subject of a proposed policy in the 
event of the surrender of Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I found out about it — I think we may refer there 
to the Potsdam declaration. I only heard about it after I went to- 
Potsdam, with regard to the terms of surrender which was issued 
from Potsdam. Prior to going to Potsdam, I had no knowledge of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what view General Marshall took with 
regard to any proposed policy to be followed by the United States in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1855 

the event Japan surrendered, at about this time, that is, late May, 
early June and July of 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. He was Chief of Staff then. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what view Owen Lattimore took ? 

Mr. Vincent. On the surrender of Japan, I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss that matter with Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first learn that Mr. Lattimore went 
to see the President about this proposed policy? 

Mr. Vincent. I never knew, to my recollection I never knew, that 
he went to see the President about the proposed plan. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not read that in our hearings? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with anyone in the IPR the 
question of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in 
the event Japan surrendered? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing it with anyone 

in the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you present at the Potsdam Conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What agreements with respect to China were made 
at that Conference? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were any secret agreements entered into by or on 
behalf of the United States at Potsdam ? 

Mr. Vincent. With respect to China ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Were any secret agreements entered into by or on 
behalf of the United States at Potsdam ? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I know of, but I would not have been in 
a position to know then because I was there purely 

Mr. Sourwine. Were any secret agreements entered into concerning 
China? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
of a letter by Mr. John M. Patterson, Acting Division Chief of the 
Department of Public Liaison of the Department of State, addressed 
to the American-China Policy Association, in which it was stated that 
no secret agreements concerning China were concluded at the Potsdam 
Conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, I have no recollection of that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Letters prepared by the Public Liaison Division 
would not necessarily be checked with you even though they dealt with 
the subject under your jurisdiction? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, tney would not. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I find out whether your answer includes 
in the term "agreements" an understanding between governments ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, it does, sir. You mean the previous question 
there? 

Senator Ferguson. It would include the word "understandings" ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you know Mr. Theodore White ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

22S48— 52— pt. 6 12 



1856 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify him, please? 

Mr. Vincent. As a newspaperman, who visited China from time to 
time, while I was out there as counsel of our Embassy. My recol- 
lection is that Theodore White at that time was writing for the Luce 
publications. 

Mr. Sourwine. What time was this? 

Mr. Vincent. This would be from 1941 until the spring of 1943. He 
was there after the war broke out, as I recall it, which would be 1942. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know him personally ? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew him personally. 

Mr. Sourwine. A friend of yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. A friend of mine, not a close friend, but a friend 
of mine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is he or was he connected with the Institute of 
Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the connection of White with the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with him or with anyone else 
the question of Mr. Wliite's discharge by Mr. Henry Luce ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't think I discussed it with anyone. 

Mr. Sourwine. He never talked with you about it? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever write to you about it?- 

Mr. Vincent. I have no record of his writing to me about it at all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you remember that he ever did ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember that he ever did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say that he did not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Drawing on my memory, I can say that I don't recall 
that he did, but I can't say that he didn't. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he send any message to you about it through 
someone else? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any message. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you never discussed his discharge with any- 
one else? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever urge or recommend that T. V. Soong 
and Foreign Minister Wang Shi-shueh, or either of them, go to 
Moscow ? 

Mr. Vincent. There is a record in the State Department that in the 
spring of 1945- the matter was discussed with Hurley, who was then 
in China, that Soong had planned to go to Moscow to discuss matters 
with Stalin, a matter of an agreement. I just try to draw on my mem- 
ory, but I have no clear recollection of the incident, nor do I know 
whether he ever went, nor do I recall any part I had in it other than 
the telegrams coming in, and a telegram would presumably have gone 
back to Mr. Hurley who reported Soong's intention, as I recall it, to 
go. 

I don't recall that Soong did go to Moscow until after he found out 
about the Yalta agreement, which he was told of, it seems to me, 
sometime in May 1945. 

Is that responsive to your question, sir ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Partially, sir. Now, how about the question of 
whether you ever urged or recommended that Soong and Wang Shi- 
shueh 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1857 

Mr. Vincent. Well, there was a man named Wang Shi-shueh who 
was, I think, either Acting or Foreign Minister at that time, and he 
did go to Moscow at the time the Sino-Soviet treaty was discussed. 

Mr. Sourwine. How would you spell that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would spell it W-a-n-g S-h-i-s-h-u-e-h. 

Mr. Sourwine. Could it be H-s-u-e-h ? 

Mr. Vincent. It could be, because the Chinese words vary. But I 
think that is the man we have in mind, because I think at that moment 
he was Foreign Minister of China or Acting Foreign Minister. 

Mr. Sourwine. He is described as Foreign Minister, so that is the 
man. May we call them Soong and Wang ? 

Mr. Vincent. And I have no clear recollection of having urged that 
Soong and Wang go to Moscow. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or recommending them? 

Mr. Vincent. Or recommending them. My only recollection, as 
I say, is a report from Chungking to the Department that Soong had 
discussed the matter with Ambassador Hurley, and Hurley reported 
on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did they in fact go to Moscow ? 

Mr. Vincent. They did, in fact, go to Moscow in early July to dis- 
cuss the Sino-Soviet treaty. Whether they went prior to this 

Mr. Sourwine. After they got to Moscow, were additional demands 
made upon them by the Russians? 

Mr. Vincent. I have just testified with regard to my attitude toward 
the Yalta agreements, and it was my impression that the Russians 
went beyond my interpretation at least of the Yalta agreement in 
making their demands. Both the length of the leases and the joint 
agreement on the railways, of what they demanded of half of the port 
facilities at Dairen, I recall, and the extent of the naval report agree- 
ment all seemed to be excessive. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your answer is, then, that the Russians did make 
additional demands upon Soong and Wang? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be a matter of interpretation. 

Senator Ferguson. That was your interpretation ? 

Mr. Vincent. My interpretation ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the Chinese Government appeal to Ambassador 
Hurley to mediate ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall if they did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never learned that they had made that request? 

Mr. Vincent. That they had Hurley to mediate between the Rus- 
sians and the Chinese ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear that they asked Ambassador 
Hurley for any assistance at all in connection with their conference? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't recall their asking. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear of any instructions sent by the 
Department to Mr. Hurley in that connection ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, now, there are two matters here, Mr. Sourwine : 
One is when Soong and Wang Shi-shueh went over to Moscow as a 
result of having been informed of the Yalta agreement, and one of the 
conditions in the Yalta agreement was that the Russians and the 
Chinese would negotiate a treaty. My recollection is that prior to 
that, and even prior to Soong having any knowledge, insofar as I 



1858 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

knew, of the Yalta agreement, there was also a plan in Chungking- 
reported to us in the Department by Ambassador Hurley that they 
had intentions of going. 

If they had any knowledge of the Yalta agreement at that time,. 
I didn't know that they had it, and I had no knowledge of the Yalta 
agreement. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. What I was attempting to reach 

Mr. Vincent. So, my first testimony was with regard to a reported 
intention of T. V. Soong to go to Moscow at a time when, as I say, 
I didn't know about the Yalta agreement, and I don't believe he did. 
T don't think he went to Moscow, but I can't recall. He went to* 
Moscow later when he found out about the Yalta agreement. 

Mr. Sourwine. What I was attempting to reach with my question 
was this : Whether you knew or were aware of any instructions f rom 
the Department to Mr. Hurley in connection with his assistance to the 
Chinese delegation in their negotiations with Moscow, or in connec- 
tion with his response to a request that he mediate or assist at that time. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I recall, and I recall it not too distinctly, a tele- 
gram from Hurley giving what was a proposed agenda that Soong 
had proposed to take up with Stalin if he went to Moscow at this 
time, prior to the knowledge of the Yalta agreement. 

I recollect, too, that there was a telegram that went back telling 
Hurley that we appreciated getting that telegram and the informa- 
tion on it. I don't recall the rest of the telegram. It might have 
had in the telegram a suggestion by Hurley that he mediate or go 
along with Soong. I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. It might have had that in it? 

Mr. Vincent. It might have had something in it, and the telegram, 
that went back which may have been sent by me or anybody else, may 
have suggested. I would have to refresh my memory from the State 
Department, which I would be glad to do. It may have told him 
that we didn't want him to be in the position of mediator between 
Russian and Chinese Governments. 

Senator Ferguson. I am wondering whether your telegram did not 
say that, to tell him to stay out of it. 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to see the telegram before I testify here. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean it may have said either, for all you know, 
it could have approved his mediation or it could have prohibited it? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection, without referring to it now, would 
be that it did not approve any mediation. 

Mr. Sourwine. You started out by saying that it might include 
approval. 

Senator Ferguson. You said it might. Now which did it? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I haven't got the telegram here, and I haven't 
see it for some time. 

Senator Ferguson. But is that not a very important matter, and 
would you not remember a thing like that ? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollecetion is, and I don't know whether I 
drafted it or not, that Ambassador Hurley was told that we didn't 
wish him to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you use the words "it might have been" ; do 
you mean it- is theoretically possible, or do you mean there is some 
likelihood ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1859 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I mean this : From the best that I can recall, the 
attitude in the State Department at that time was not to mediate 
between the Russians and the Chinese in coming to an agreement. 
Therefore, it could have been put in a telegram quite easily. I have 
asked that I would like to refresh my memory with the telegram. 

Mr. Sourwtne. A moment ago, when you used the phrase "it might 
have been", as referring to words of approval of such mediation, were 
you discussing that as a possibility or as a probability, or as a likeli- 
hood, or were you discussing it merely as something which theoret- 
ically could have happened, all other considerations aside? 

Mr. Vincent. I was discussing it as something that would have 
been a logical position to take in the State Department at that time, 
that it was not desirable to mediate between the Russians and the 
'Chinese. 

Mr. Sourwine. You remember saying that this message in response 
to Hurley's telegram might have approved his mediation, might have 
told him to go on with it? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall making that testimony, Mr. Sour- 
wine. If I did, it is incorrect, because I said it approved the idea of 
•discussing the matter with Soong, and expressed appreciation, if I can 
recall it at all, of getting these five points. But so far as I can recall, 
it did not approve the idea of mediating. 

Mr. Sourwine. All that concerned me was the semantics problem. 
We have a record here which is full of your saying "this might have 
been" or "that might have been." I wanted to find out clearly whether, 
when you used that phrase, you meant something which in your opin- 
ion was likely, something which in your opinion was logical under 
the circumstances. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that what you have meant here when you used 
that phrase ? 

Mr. Vincent. That it was logical ? 

Mr. Sourwine. When you say "it might have happened," did you 
mean that to you it seemed logical under the circumstances? 

Mr. Vincent. That Hurley would have been advised not to mediate. 

Mr. Sourwine. At any time when you used that phrase, you used 
it to mean something that to you was logical ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwtne. And something that you did not know did not 
occur ? 

Mr. Vincent. Right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see the text of a cable to Ambassador 
Hurley in August of 1945, signed by Grew, conveying the idea or in- 
struction that Hurley was not to advise, mediate, or otherwise assist 
in Chinese-Russian negotiations ? 

Mr. Vincent. In August 1945 ? I do not recall any such telegram. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall such a cable at any time prior to 
August 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I just recalled this cable that we are speaking 
of here, the exchange of cables which took place in the spring. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that signed by Grew? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't know whether it was signed Grew or not 
without seeing the telegram, Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Byrnes was Secre- 



1860 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

tary of State at that time, and if Byrnes was there it would have been 
signed by Byrnes. If Mr. Grew was acting, it would have been signed 
by Grew. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
or approval of that cable ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I have said that I don't recall the 
telegram, and therefore I can't say whether I had anything to do with 
the preparation of it. I just don't recall those circumstances. I do 
the earlier one, but I don't recall this one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether it was composed by Under 
Secretary Grew? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would be unable to testify further with regard 
to it unless we can get the document ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you have an opportunity or means for re- 
freshing your memory by access to the document, other than through 
this committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I could ask the State Department if they would let 
me see the telegram, if you will give me the date of it. 

Mr. Sourwine. All I can ask you about is a cable on or before Aug- 
ust of 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. That could easily have been the telegram we have 
been discussing, if it is on or before August. It could be the one of 
the spring we have just discussed. 

Mr. Sourwine. If there was one in the spring and there was none 
later, that is what this committee would like to establish. If there was 
a telegram in the spring and a reiteration of the policy later in re- 
sponse to a specific request from Hurley, that is what the committee 
would like to establish. 

Have you any thought of what the fact might be in that regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. My thought would be that when you are speaking of 
this telegram, we are speaking of the same telegram, just on a knowl- 
edge that by the 8th or the 10th of August the Sino-Soviet agreement 
or treaty had already been signed, or maybe the 15th of August. But 
the first half of August the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed, and there 
would be no need for mediation then. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your best recollection is that there was only one 
such cablegram ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. And that was in the spring of 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you advised about sending that cable ? 

Mr. Vincent. The one I have testified to originally? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I knew about that exchange. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you advise against mediation or Hurley 
having anything to do with it? 

Mr. Vincent. I presumably would have advised against mediation. 
I have no distinct recollection of whether I advised or not, but I knew 
it was the policy in the State Department at that time not to interfere 
in these negotiations. 

Senator Ferguson. Why ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1861 

Mr. Vincent. We thought it was better for the Russians and the 
Chinese to work out their own arrangement. I had no knowledge at 
•that time- 



Senator Ferguson. You said you were violently opposed to what 
happened to China. Notwithstanding that, you were against any 
change ? 

Mr. Vincent. At the moment of this telegram, Senator, I had no 
knowledge of the Yalta agreement. I didn't have any knowledge of 
the Yalta agreement until June or early July, just before Potsdam. 
There were presumably other officers in the State Department who 
did know about the Yalta agreement. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the message in May had nothing to do 
with the Yalta agreement ? 

Mr. Vincent. If it was in May — it would be earlier than that, I 
think, because I think Soong himself was already advised. This 
was early in spring, or May. 

But to answer your question, it is that the message at that time had 
nothing to do with the Yalta agreement. It was a plan of Soong's, 
as I recall it, to go to Moscow to discuss with them, at a time when I 
was ignorant, and I believe Soong was ignorant, of the existence of 
the Yalta agreement. 

Mr. Sour wine. With regard to mediation : would such a question 
of policy, established at that time, with regard to mediation, neces- 
sarily have controlled at a conference subsequent and after it had 
been made necessary by the Yalta agreement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think it would, sir. You mean after the 
Yalta agreement ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. We had ourselves so completely, you might say, laid 
down a line for China to follow that it would have, to my mind, al- 
tered the situation completely. 

Mr. Sourwine. But it did, in fact, control, and that policy was 
adhered to and persisted in, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Susumu Okano ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess, and convene again at 1 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 15 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 1 p. m. of the same day.) 

AFTER RECESS 

Senator Ferguson. The hearing will come to order. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, the last question asked before the recess 
was whether you knew Susumu Okano, and you replied "No." 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he is or was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Susumu Okano is a Japanese Communist leader. 

Did you, Mr. Vincent, know that Susumu Okano had been flown 
from China to Japan after the conclusion of hostilities in the Japa- 
nese war? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall having knowledge of that; no, sir. 



1862 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you have to do with the preparation or 
approval of a paper entitled "The United States Initial Post Sur- 
render Policy for Japan" ? 

Mr. Vincent. May I refer to these notes ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Surely. 

Mr. Vincent. Thank you, sir [reading] : 

Mr. Dooman, before this committee in September, discussed the 

Eolicy entitled "The United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan." 
te said that this paper was adopted by the State-War-Navy Coordi- 
nating Committee on August 29, 1945, but that the paper had been 
reported reopened prior to its release on the 22d of September by the 
White House. 

Actually, the records show that the paper was reviewed by the Far 
East Subcommittee of SWNCC, of which Mr. Dooman was chairman, 
not by SWNCC itself, on August 29, and the paper was not finally 
adopted by the top-level over-all SWNCC committee until August 
31, 1945. 

Both Mr. Dooman and I attended this meeting on August 31, 
although it was Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, who 
officially represented the State Department. 

Mr. Dooman has placed particular significance on the fact that he 
had retired as chairman of the Far Fast Committee and had been 
replaced as chairman by me prior to September 6, when the paper 
was approved by the President. 

His principal charge was that I had primary responsibility for this 
paper and that certain important changes were made in it following 
its approval during the last days of his tenure as chairman of the 
Far East Committee. 

In connection with these statements, Mr. Dooman had read into 
the record several paragraphs taken from this document which he 
said subsequently were used as the basis of work undertaken to destroy 
and eliminate the capitalist class in Japan. 

When asked by Senator Eastland whether this was the work of 
John Carter Vincent, Mr. Dooman replied that I was chairman of the 
Far East Subcommittee at the time, and the implication clearly was 
that I had instigated the changes in this important document that 
would pave the way for communism in Japan. 

First, I wish to inform the committee that the paragraphs which 
Mr. Dooman read into the record as changes were not written by me. 

Secondly, I am prepared to testify here on the basis of an examina- 
tion of the record that the language which Mr. Dooman implied had 
iDeen changed following his resignation as chairman of the subcommit- 
tee was not changed, but, in fact, appeared in the document when it 
was before the subcommittee under his chairmanship on August 29, 
and again when it was approved at a meeting of SWNCC which he 
attended on August 31. 

Finally, I would like to show that the paragraph read by Mr. Doo- 
man, far from being intended to destroy capitalism in Japan, was an 
expression of general policy to foster the peaceful and democratic de- 
velopment of Japan's postwar economy. 

Here is the language from the document entitled, "United States 
Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan," which Mr. Dooman read 
into the record as changes made in the paper after its adoption in the 
last days of August 1945. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1863 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have that document ? 
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Surrey. We have the document that was released on Septem- 
ber 22. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the 
ownership of the means of production and trade * * * To this end it shall 
be the policy of the Supreme Commander : 

"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for place of importance in the 
economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic efforts 
solely toward peaceful ends ; and 

"(b) To favor the program for the dissolution of the large industrial and bank- 
ing combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade 
and industry." 

I should like to refer to a photostatic copy of the press release of 
United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan, dated September 22, 
1945. Beginning at the bottom of page 4, under the heading of "Pro- 
motion of democratic forces," the first sentence reads : 

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organi- 
zations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. 

Immediately following this sentence appears the first sentence 
quoted by Mr. Dooman: 

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and 
of the ownership of the means of production and trade. 

Following this sentence there appears another important sentence 
which Mr. Dooman did not uee fit to use in this quotation. I shall 
quote it here because I believe that the entire substance of the para- 
graph which he has quoted relates very closely to this sentence. 
The sentence reads : 

Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be 
favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the 
Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic 
activities in support of military ends. 

The remainder of the language quoted by Mr. Dooman then 
follows. 

I do not place special significance on the fact that Mr. Dooman 
did not quote in full from the document, but I think it is important 
that the committee have the full text. What is of utmost importance 
for this committee to know is that this very language which Mr. 
Dooman alleged was changed, in fact appeared in this document as 
early as mid- August 1945, and remained unchanged when released 
by the White House September 22, 1945. 

I have reviewed the changes made in the document. The changes 
made in the document subsquent to its approval on August 29 by 
the subcommittee, chairmaned by Mr. Dooman, were : 

1. In the first paragraph headed "Purpose of this document" 
minor changes were made by the subcommittee after I became chair- 
man, but these changes were made at the request of the SWNCC 
committee at the meeting at which Mr. Dooman and I were both 
present, that is the meeting on August 31. 

For example, the original document contained the clause, "Fol- 
lowing Presidential approval", and the revision made by the com- 
mittee, of which I was chairman, read: "It has been approved by 
the President." 



1864 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

In the first document it is not specifically stated that distribution 
should include General MacArthur in Japan. The revision made 
by the subcommittee, of which I was chairman, made clear that the 
document had been distributed to the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers and to appropriate United States departments and 
agencies for their guidance. 

I think that the committee will agree that these modifications 
in no way changed the basic meaning of the document. 

The second modification concerns military training in the Japanese 
school system. The record shows that the change was offered by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff at a meeting attended by Mr. Dooman. The 
change itself merely makes clear that the paragraph refers to career 
military and naval officers and not to all Japanese who had served in 
such capacity. 

The record also shows that Mr. Dooman attended the meeting at 
which this change was made. 

The next modification concerns the section dealing with "Encourage- 
ment of desire for individual liberties and democratic processes." 

In the first paragraph an additional sentence was added, which 
reads as follows: 

At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic 
and militaristic organizations and movements will not be pernrtted to hide be- 
hind the cloak of religion. 

In the second paragraph the words "other United Nations'- was 
-changed to read "other democracies." 

Mr. Dooman attended the meeting at which these minor changes 
were made. 

The final modification had to do with exports from Japan and 
according to the minutes of the meeting was intended to strengthen 
the hands of the occupying authority in the control of exports. The 
suggestion for this modification had been originally made at a meet- 
ing of the subcommittee, but was not acted upon at that time because 
it was deemed appropriated for this to be taken up at the top SWNCC 
level. 

This change, which was in line with current policy at the time, can 
hardly be interpreted as seeking to destroy capitalism in Japan. 

Without wishing to burden this committee with further analysis 
of these documents, I would like to point out that the only changes 
made following its adoption on August 31 at a meeting of SWNCC, 
attended by Mr. Dooman and me, were very minor modifications in 
the first paragraph and the modifications in the paragraph on 
reparations. 

I submit again for the consideration of this committee that these 
changes were important, but they were not changes which carry the 
implication read into them by Mr. Dooman. 

The records prove beyond any question that the language which Mr. 
Dooman asserted was an example of changes made actually appeared 
in the document prepared by the subcommittee when he was chair- 
man and were approved by the higher level SWNCC at a meeting 
which he attended. 

Insofar as the document itself is concerned, I should like to em- 
phasize that it was a broad, general document, which in no way spelled 
out specific measures. General MacArthur himself urged its pub- 
lication. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1865 

In line with a policy of promoting a strong middle class in Japan, 
'our Government then proposed that it be the policy of the Supreme 
Commander in Japan to suppress the activities of those who in the 
words of the document "do not direct future Japanese economic ef- 
forts solely toward peaceful ends." 

I do not believe that anyone familiar with the prewar economic 
structure of Japan would quarrel with that statement. I think that the 
results of the program carried out by General MacArthur under this 
policy statement bear out the wisdom of our initial approach to the 
problem. 

The second policy given General MacArthur in this section was one 
of breaking up the large family combines and cartels which for so 
long had dominated Japanese life. It was these groups primarily 
who had succeeded in making Japan a war-making aggressor in the 
thirties. 

Without the support of these combines the Japanese militarists 
would not have been able to conquer half of Asia and bring about 
Pearl Harbor. 

The program developed under this second policy was largely im- 
plemented by the Japanese themselves, with the approval of General 
MacArthur. To a degree it paralleled our own antitrust program in 
this country; in some cases I understand it went further. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, it went a good deal further, 
did it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Than our own antitrust program ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say in its application to Japan it did go 
further. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you want the committee to understand that you 
think there is a paralled between the program in Japan toward the 
elimination of the Zaibatsu and our own antitrust program in the 
United States? 

Mr. Vincent. Not exactly parallel. 

Mr. Sourwine. How much is it paralled ? 

Mr. Vincent. Parallel to the extent of where there was interlocking 
directorates on banks, shipping companies. 

Mr. Sourwine. Parallel to the extent only, is it not true, that they 
both dealt with the industrial class, really ? 

Mr. Vincent. With industrial combines, I would say. 

Mr. Sourwine. They both dealt with industrial combines, but they 
did not have the same objective, did they? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. And they were not carried out in the same way? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with our own antitrust laws? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I am not familiar with our antitrust laws, par- 
ticularly. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you state that they were in effect 
parallel to our own antitrust program ? 

Mr. Vincent. I state just as a layman who understood that the 
antitrust laws are to prevent large combines from controlling large 
areas of the banking and industrial life of our country, and my own 
understanding that that is what the Zaibatsu and Mitsui combines in 
Japan did. 



1866 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that they put into effect an order 
that no rice paddies could be owned by one individual of greater 
than 2!/2 acres? 

Mr. Vincent. Of that land program, I know. I am not familiar 
with the details of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that kind of thing is in com- 
pliance with this program ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not think it was in compliance with this. 
It was not in connection with this program. I have a paper on that 
here, if you would let me present it, on land reform. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the education of Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. The educational system ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know, as a matter of fact, that we 
placed in the schools the Communists of Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never heard that, sir. 

Mr. Ferguson. You have never heard that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you heard now that the real Communist 
menace in Japan is in two places, the labor unions and the educational 
system of Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I had not heard that. I do not deny it, but 
I have been out of the country for a long time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who had charge of the taking 
over of the schools arid changing of the teachers and so forth? 

Mr. Vincent. Under General MacArthur? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that a State Department function? 

Mr. Vincent. No; it was not. It was a function under General 
MacArthur. 

Senator Ferguson. Military function ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was a function in the educational program of 
SCAP,wasitnot? 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking you. 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Who is the author of this document ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of this document here ? 

Mr. Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir. It was virtually in its form there 
before I ever became a part of SWNCC. It was drawn up in large 
measure at the time when Mr. Dooman was chairman of the SWNCC. 

Senator Ferguson. Who drew it up? The State Department, the 
Army, or who ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was drawn up by F. E. SWNCC, which means 
that State, War, and Navy, in the SWNCC committee collaborated 
in drawing it up. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you consider this a military document? 

Mr. Vincent. I consider it a SWNCC document. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not a Government policy program, and not 
military ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is a Government policy program, coming out of the 
SWNCC committee, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1867 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think military men would be competent 
to draft such a political document ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think we had quite a few military men. 

Senator Ferguson. Many of these men even take pride in the fact 
that they have never voted in an election. Do you say that men who 
are not allowed to take any part in our civilian government are com- 
petent to lay out a program for the future of the Nation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall any of their names, Senator, but I do 
know quite a few competent military men. 

Senator Ferguson. Are they not all barred from taking any part 
in political activities, and so forth? 

Mr. Vincent. But they were assigned to this committee by the 
Assistant Secretary of Navy who was the top SWNCC man. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. 

Mr. Vincent. Aren't they barred from taking any part in political 
activities ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; by their own regulation. 

Mr. Vincent. Barred, I would not say. I don't know that a mili- 
tary man can't vote. They can vote, I know, but he certainly could 
not run for political office and would not be expected to take part 
in political activities in this country. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not that a State Department function to 
lay out the future of Japan's political life? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the very purpose for which the SWNCC 
thing was created, to get State, War, and Navy joint action on matters 
of this kind. 

I was not there when SWNCC was created, but that was my im- 
pression of the objective of the creating of the SWNCC committee, 
was for State, Navy, and War to cooperate. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this document intact when you first came 
in contact with it? 

Mr. Vincent. It was intact when I first came in contact with the 
exception of a few minor changes which I just said were put in it to 
make it clearer. 

Senator Ferguson. Who in the State Department was in higher 
position than you who had control of this document ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Dooman was higher than I was and was chair- 
man of the SWNCC committee at the time this document was drawn 
up. 

Senator Ferguson. So it was either your responsibility or Dooman's 
to approve this ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, it would have had to have been approved by 
the top SWNCC, I have to refer to that, which was made up of the 
Assistant Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of War, and 
the Assistant Secretary of Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. They did not make any changes in it, though? 

Mr. Vincent. They made no changes insofar as I know, but I was 
not in SWNCC in the month in August, and I believe July, when 
this was being discussed. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in when it was issued? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you feel you were responsible for this docu- 
ment? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I would have approved that document. 



1868 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. There is nothing in this that you disapprove 

of? 

Mr. Vincent. There is nothing in that that I disapprove of. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Sourwine. May this be offered for the record ? 

(The document identified by Mr. Vincent, entitled "United States- 
Initial Post- Surrender Policy for Japan," was marked "Exhibit No. 
376A" and is as follows:) 

[Immediate release, September 22, 1945] 

The following is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender 
prepared jointly by the Department of State, the War Department, and the Navy Depart- 
ment and approved by the President on Sept. 6. The document in substance was sent to 
General MacArthur by radio on Aug. 29 and, after approval by the President, by messen-^ 
ger on Sept. 6. The text follows : 

No. 273 

UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN 

Purpose of This Document 

This document is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after 
surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate U. S. departments and 
agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the 
occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not 
included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately. 

Part I — Ultimate Objectives 

The ultimated objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which 
policies in the initial period must conform, are : 

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States 
or to the peace and security of the world. 

(&) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible 
government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the 
objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government 
should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government 
but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any 
form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people. 

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means : 

(a) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, 
Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in 
accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United 
States is or may be a party. 

(b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of 
the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from 
her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit 
of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed. 

(c) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual 
liberties and resoect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of 
religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form 
democratic and representative organizations. 

(d) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for them- 
selves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the popula- 
tion to be met. 

Part II — Allied Authority 

1. MILITARY OCCUPATION 

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry 
into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate 
objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation 
in behalf of the principal allied powers acting in the interests of the United 
Nations at war with Japan. For that reason, participation of the forces of 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1869' 

other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be 
welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a 
Supreme Commander designated by the United States. 

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of 
appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupa- 
tion and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in 
the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United 
States will govern. 

2. RELATIONSHIP TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject 
to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate 
the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of 
the occupation and the control of Japan. 

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the 
United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces 
and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Jap- 
anese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the ex- 
tent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese 
Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal pow- 
ers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, 
will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require 
changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Em- 
peror or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements 
of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, 
moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or 
any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes 
looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to 
use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in 
the form of Government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the 
direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted, 
and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the 
use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed there- 
to, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the 
security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation. 

3. PUBLICITY AS TO POLICIES 

The Japanese people, and the world at large, shall be kept fully informed of 
the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of progress made in their ful- 
filment. 

Part III — Political 

1. DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION 

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occu- 
pation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort 
shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by the mili- 
tary and naval leaders, and those who collaborated with them, in bringing about 
the existing and future distress of the people. 

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any 
civil aviation. Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and dis- 
banded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff, and 
all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval materiel, 
military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, 
naval, and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as 
required by the Supreme Commander. 

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General 
Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders 
of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents 
of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future 
disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant 
nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other 
position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or 
militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institu- 
tions will be dissolved and prohibited. 



1870 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, including para- 
military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former 
career military and naval officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, 
and all other exponents of militarism and ultranationalism shall be excluded 
from supervisory and teaching positions. 

2. WAR CRIMINALS 

Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations 
agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited 
cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, 
tried, and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Na- 
tions for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as 
witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody 
of such other nation. 

S. ENCOURAGEMENT OF DESIRE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 

Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At 
the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic 
and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide 
behind the cloak of religion. 

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become 
familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the 
United States and the other democracies. Association of personnel of the oc- 
cupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled, only to the 
extent necessary, to further the policies and objectives of the occupation. 

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, 
shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the 
occupying forces. 

Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discriminations on ground of 
race, nationality, creed, or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which con- 
flict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, 
suspended, or amended as required ; and agencies charged specifically with their 
enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly con- 
fined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The 
judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to 
conform to the policies set forth in Articles 1 and 3 of this Part III and there- 
after shall be progressively influenced, to protect individual liberties and civil 
rights. 

Part IV — Economic 

i. economic demilitarization 

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed 
and not be permitted to revive. 

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, 
among others ; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of 
all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force 
or establishment ; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the 
production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms 
of aircraft ; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected 
elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military 
preparation ; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches 
of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the pro- 
nibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of 
war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's 
heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese 
merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of 
demilitarization. 

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan 
which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion 
to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. 
Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should 
not be destroyed, except in emergency situations. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1871 

2. PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES 

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organiza- 
tions in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. 
Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the 
ownership of the means of production and trade. 

Those forms of economic activity, organization, and leadership shall be favored 
that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese 
people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support 
of military ends. 

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander : 

(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the 
economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort 
solely towards peaceful ends ; and 

(6) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and bank- 
ing combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade 
and industry. 

3. RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic de- 
struction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffer- 
ing. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the 
Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired 
only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves 
diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be 
necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the 
nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find 
useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. 
The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the 
accomplishment of these tasks in due time. 

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of 
the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing 
starvation, widespread disease, and acute physical distress. 

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to main- 
tain, develop, and enforce programs that serve the following purposes: 

(a) To avoid acute economic distress. 

(6) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies. 

(c) To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the 
Allied Governments. 

(d) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable 
peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied. 

In this connection, the Japanese authorities on their own responsibility shall 
be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, in- 
cluding essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and 
distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the 
Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of 
the occupation. 

4. REPARATIONS AND RESTITUTION 

Reparations 

Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made : 

(a) Through the transfer — as may be determined by the appropriate Allied 
authorities — of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained 
by Japan. 

(6) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and 
facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying 
of the occupying forces. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on 
reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who 
agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports 
in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere 
with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization. 

Restitution 

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable looted property. 

22S48— 52— pt. 6 — —13 



1872 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

5. FISCAL, MONETARY, AND BANKING POLICIES 

The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and di- 
rection of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies subject to the ap- 
proval and review of the Supreme Commander. 

6. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS 

Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with 
the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will 
be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods 
that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved 
imports. 

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign 
exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise 
of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval 
and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make sure that they 
are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular 
that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for 
essential needs. 

7. JAPANESE PROPERTY LOCATED ABROAD 

Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located In 
territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets 
owned in whole or part by the Imperial Household and Government, shall be 
revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the 
decision of the Allied authorities. 

8. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR FOREIGN ENTERPRISE WITHIN JAPAN 

The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business or- 
ganization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity or terms to the enterprise 
of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch 
of economic activity. 

9. IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY 

Imperial Household property shall not be exempted from any action necessary 
to carry out the objectives of the occupation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before we go further with that statement of yours, 
let me ask this question : 

Mr. Vincent. I am through with it — it is just 10 more lines. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right, get your 10 lines in and then I will go 
back to the point I want to make. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

I would like to make it clear that this broad directive had my concurrence in 
September 1945. It had the approval of Secretary Stimson. It had the approval 
of Secretary Forrestal, and the approval of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes. 
It had the approval of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, and 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

It had the approval of the President. 

Although I have not had the opportunity to follow events in Japan closely 
since 1945 when I went to Bern, I am sure there has been general approval 
in this country of the occupation under General MacArthur. 

To imply that this general policy statement under which General MacArthur 
carried out the occupation, was a document that was calculated to promote the 
destruction of the Japanese capitalist class seems to me childish. I think that 
the facts completely refute Mr. Dooman's references. 

At this point, I would like to emphasize particularly that my testimony today 
on the Japanese directive is offered here for the purpose of setting the facts 
straight and correcting the statements made by Mr. Dooman. Accordingly, I 
have pointed out that I was not the author of the changes under discussion, 
but I do not wish to disassociate myself from the document. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that statement your own ? 
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1873 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that statement wholly prepared by you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Now, because you raised the subject, I had assistance in getting the 
information together, because I was not familiar with that whole 
document after 5 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. But the language is yours, the content is yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. In large part. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is not prepared from somebody's outline and 
suggestions? It is the argument that you yourself want to make? 

Mr. Vincent. It is the argument I am making. 

Mr. Sourwine. Because you raised the question of parallelism be- 
tween the activity in the elimination of the Zaibatsu, and our own 
antitrust program, I would like to ask you this : Do you know of any 
elements of confiscation in the antitrust program in the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of confiscation of property? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there any element of confiscation in what was 
regarded the Zaibatsu in Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall no element of confiscation except as the testi- 
mony of Dooman, of the capital levy or of everything over a thousand, 
but the combines were broken up. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think that the capital levy of everything 
over a thousand was confiscatory? 

I am not asking whether it was justified as a confiscatory measure, 
but was it confiscatory ? 

Mr. Vincent. Everything over a thousand? 

Mr. Sourwine. It was confiscatory? 

Mr. Vincent. In a sense ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. So you had one element, that of confiscation, which 
was present over there which was not present in our own antitrust 
program ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know of anything arbitrary in our antitrust 
program in the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there anything arbitrary in this program in 
Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. It was arbitrary, as a military program would be. 

Mr. Sourwine. So that is another difference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there any element of proscription in our anti- 
trust program in the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you define "proscription" ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Prohibiting people from engaging in any particular 
activities. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. There was such an element in the program in 
Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. The people who might endanger the 

Mr. Sourwine. There was a class of people, a substantial number 
of persons who were proscribed? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 



1874 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there anything in the nature of attainder in our 
antitrust program in the United States? 

Mr. Vincent. What is attainder ? I don't think there is ; no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Attainder would be the placing of burdens upon 
those who come after the original wrongdoer. 

Mr. Surrey, would you like to try a better explanation ? 

Mr. Surrey. That is good enough. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am not trying to give a technical, but an untechni- 
cal definition. What is your answer? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there attainder, in that sense, in the program 
in Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. There was not? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of. 

State that again, will you please, because you were talking to Mr. 
Surrey and I didn't get what you said. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let me start over again without the use of that 
technical phrase. 

In our antitrust program in the United States, do you know of any- 
thing which prohibits a man from engaging in lawful business be- 
cause he may have been convicted in a prior antitrust action, or once 
had an antitrust case against him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am not familiar with our antitrust laws, but I 
wouldn't think there would be. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there anything of that nature in the Japanese 
program ? 

Mr. Vincent. There was. 

Mr. Sourwine. So that would be another difference, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, on the basis of those differences, sir, would 
you like in any way to revise your suggestion of parallelism between 
this program against the Zaibutsu and the antitrust program in the 
United States? 

Mr. Vincent. I would, to this extent, to point out that I used the 
term in a general character without any specific knowledge of the 
antitrust program in this country. I had just the general objective 
of a layman's idea of breaking up large trusts which were inimical. 

Mr. Sourwine. Merely for the purpose of argument ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that your own conception to use that argument 
as parallel ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I would have thought that combines here and 
the Zaibutsu both might have a strangling effect on business. 

Mr. Sourwine. As you testified before, the Zaibutsu is a broader 
term than merely combines? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It includes the capitalist class, the industrialist 
class ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, but it generally referred to the large combines, 
the Mitsubishi and others. 

Mr. Sourwine. They have constantly been brought up in connec- 
tion with it, and it certainly had an impact upon them, but it was not 
exclusively an impact on them, was it? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1875 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. It has a much broader impact? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what has happened to the Japanese 
capitalist class? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't followed it, sir. I haven't followed spe- 
cifically what has come out of this, because I left the country in 1947 
and only came back a few months ago. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether any of those who were of 
the Japanese capitalist class before the war are still so engaged in 
industry in Japan today? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir, whether they are still engaged 
in industry. 

Mr. Sourwine. There could not be very many of them, under the 
program which was undertaken, could there ? 

Mr. Vincent. My impression was that many of them had returned 
to industry. 

Mr. Sourwine. The whole purpose of the program was to eliminate 
them from influence and power, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. It was to break up the large combines. 

Mr. Sourwine. You took all property away from a man over 100,- 
000, did you not? That was true, was it not? That was the con- 
fiscation feature we have just been talking about? 

Senator Ferguson. $100,000. 

Mr. Vincent. 100,000 yen. 

Senator Ferguson. How many dollars was that ? 

Mr. Vincent. The official rate was 15 to 1. Probably the rate at 
the time was anywhere from 50 to 70 to 1. 

I am not saying the effect was the same, but to be precise my recol- 
lection of this, then, was that the 100,000 yen was left intact and there 
was a graduated scale up to a million or more, at 25 percent of the first 
10,000, or 10 percent of the first 10,000, but it was a graduated scale. 

Mr. Sourwine. The whole operating effect and intent of that pro- 
gram was to eliminate anybody as a large industrialist, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. It would seem to be, yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Because he could not continue to be one after you 
took his property away ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Furthermore, the man who had been the head of a 
business was proscribed, he was kept from continuing that business, 
or from returning in that field, was he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would have been an after effect of it, that I 
could not testify on, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You made mention toward the end of your state- 
ment about the Japanese capitalist class. Would you go back and 
read it again, that sentence where you mentioned the Japanese cap- 
italist class ? 

Mr. Vincent. Toward the end, sir ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, in what you described as the last 10 lines. 

Mr. Vincent. This is the only reference I see : 

To imply that this general policy statement under which General MacArthur 
carried out the occupation was a document that was calculated to promote the 
destruction of the Japanese capitalist class is not correct. 



1876 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you please tell us what it was calculated to 
do, if it was not calculated to promote the destruction of the capitalist 
class ? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean by confiscating? 

I cannot testify to that, the program which has been spoken of here 
as taking everything over 100 million or taxing it was put into effect 
as strenuously as we have been led to believe here. 

Senator Ferguson. Is this 100,000,000, or is it 100,000? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection, it is 100,000 ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. In the first place, what do you mean by "calcu- 
lated"? Do you mean "designed for" or "adopted to the purpose of"? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not believe it was designed for the destruction. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean "calculated" in the sense of "designed 
for"? 

Mr. Vincent. Not "designed for." That was not the intention. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean it was not intended? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not mean to say that it was not adopted for 
that purpose? Is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you admit that this whole program was well 
adapted to the destruction of the Japanese capitalist class? 

Mr. Vincent. It could have been used to destroy the capitalist class 
if the program of taking everything over 100 million yen applied to 
property, capital, and everything else. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let us leave the "if s" out. 

Mr. Vincent. My understanding of this program, which I say I did 
not have anything to do with formulating, was to stop currency infla- 
tion, and my impression, if I must give the impression I have, was that 
this was directed primarily against currency inflation. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are familiar with this program, are you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are familiar with this document ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have reviewed it recently ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, are you contending that that program as it 
was laid down and recommended was not well adapted to the elimina- 
tion of the Japanese capitalist class, or are you willing to admit that 
that program was in fact well adapted to the elimination of the Japa- 
nese capitalist class ? 

Mr. Vincent. It could have been adapted to the elimination of the 
capitalist class. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean it could have been used for the elimina- 
tion of them? 

Mr. Vincent. I hate to use "if," but my understanding is that it 
was a plan for currency, to stop currency inflation, and the 100 million 
was money that people had, rather than property. 

Mr. Sourwine. This program could have been used to eliminate 
the Japanese capitalist class, will you admit that? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you have said, then, and that coincides with 
what you did say, that when you used the word "calculated," you meant 
intended or designed for, and what you are contending, then, is that 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1877 

this program was not intended or designed for that purpose of elimi- 
nating the Japanese capitalist class ? 

Mr. Vincent. What I have said here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. You are saying that this program was not 
intended or designed for eliminating the capitalist class in Japan. 

Mr. Vincent. That was not my idea. 

Mr. Surrey. By "this program," you mean this document ? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right, the program espoused in this docu- 
ment. 

Mr. Vincent. The program espoused? This document is not 
specific. The program grew out of a later mission that went out in 
the fall of 1945 or the early spring. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Now, do you think that the people who formulated this program, this 
document, were aware that that program was well adapted for the 
purpose of eliminating the Japanese capitalist class ? 

Mr. Vincent. The people who made this document ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not think they thought they were going to 
eliminate the Japanese capitalist class in drawing up this document 
here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think they knew that it could be used for the 
elimination of the Japanese capitalist class ? In other words, that it 
was well adapted for that purpose ? 

Mr. Vincent. I could not testify what was in their minds, whether 
they knew, or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. They were at least informed as much about this 
matter as you were, were they not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have said you know it could have been used for 
that purpose. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, but it was not used. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you not suppose they knew it could have been 
used for this purpose ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify as to whether they knew it would 
be used for the purpose. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think it is possible that this program was put on 
paper this way; that this document was prepared and promulgated, 
without a realization on the part of those who had a part in this that 
this could be used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, you are asking me that and I would 
say that I do not believe any man who participated in the prepara- 
tion of this document intended that it was to be used to eliminate 
the Japanese capitalist class. 

Mr. Sourwine. At the time you approved that, did you know it 
could have been used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist 
class ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. That has been an afterthought? 

Mr. Vincent. Yps. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there at any time in connection with that 
document any representation going along with it, in the way of memo- 
randum or otherwise, cautioning that this program was one which 



1878 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

could be used to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class, or disavowing 
an intent that it should be so used ? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I recall, but I was not there in the prepara- 
tion of the document, except its final adoption. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has it been used for the elimination of the Japan- 
ese capitalist class ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean that opinion in the sense that there 
is always a capitalist class in any country, and, therefore, we still 
have one in Japan, or are you referring specifically to those who 
composed the capitalist class in Japan prior to the end of the war? 

Mr. Vincent. I am referring to that class which this document 
refers to here. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a class? 

Mr. Vincent. Of those whose economic activities were inimical 
to peace. I think there is a statement in there. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is a different category, if you please. 

Senator Ferguson. You might say that all capitalists were inimical 
to peace. 

Mr. Sourwine. Communists hold that all capitalists are inimical 
to peace, do they not ? 

Mr. Vincent. What? 

Mr. Sourwine. Do not Communists hold that all capitalist classes 
are inimical to peace? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. So without getting into the semantics of where a 
capitalist class stands, what is your answer to the question? 

Mr. Vincent. Without getting into the semantics of where the 
capitalist class stands, what is my answer to your question? 

I would like to have the question again. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean that opinion in the sense that there 
is always a capitalist class in any country, and, therefore, we still 
have one in Japan, or are you referring specifically to those who com- 
posed the capitalist class in Japan prior to the end of the war ? 

Mr. Vincent. My answer would be that I had reference to the 
people who composed the capitalist class before the end of the war. 

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, you are saying that the group of 
people who composed the capitalist class before the war have not been 
destroyed as the capitalist class of Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, and I do not know what you 
mean by "destroyed." The combines, they are probably destroyed, 
but as a class, I do not know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do the same people who controlled the industry 
and capital of Japan, before the war, control it still ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir. They certainly do not control 
it in the same extent, but whether they are in business, or not, I could 
not say so. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, you do not care? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not want to say I don't care. If you mean 
somebody who was in Mitsubishi before the war is still back in busi- 
ness in Japan, and I would care or not 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1879 

Mr. Sourwine. Perhaps I should not have asked the question that 
way. 

Is it your testimony, sir, that you have no knowledge as to the ex- 
tent to which the capitalist class of Japan, as it existed before the 
end of the war, has been eliminated as such ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my answer. 

Mr. Sourwine. May we pass that point, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who was Yoshio Shiga ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who was Kyuichi Tokuda? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the name. I don't know who he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would it refresh your memory if I said that they 
were Japanese Communists, Japanese Communist leaders? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the names of them as Japanese Commu- 
nist leaders. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever read a report about Shiga and Tokuda 
being released from jail and returned to their homes at the conclusion 
of the war ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or of that having been done by United States per- 
sonnel in a United States car ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall a report made by Gen. John S. Hodge, 
then commanding general in Korea, relating to the situation in Korea, 
the report being made to SCAP in Tokyo late in 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall the report to SCAP in late 1945, 
that General Hodge made. 

Mr. Sourwine. To the best of your knowledge, you have not seen 
such a report ? j 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge, I have not seen such 
a report. 

Mr. Sourwine. If there had been such a report, and it had borne 
the endorsement by John S. Service, would you have been likely to 
remember that fact ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would, I suppose. I couldn't tell you without seeing 
the report. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember having seen a report bearing 
the endorsement by Mr. Service ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall a request from General Hodge, 
directly or indirectly, that Syngman Rhee be flown out from 
Washington ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall the incident. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear of any State Department ob- 
jection to a request, by General Hodge or anyone else, that Syngman 
Rhee be flown out from Washington ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know the circumstances under which Mr. 
Rhee, in the fall or later of 1945, was flown out to Korea ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall it, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever make a recommendation for someone 
to go to Korea instead of Mr. Rhee? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 



1880 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever make a recommendation that Kim 
Koo-sek be sent to Korea ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall Kim Koo-sek or the recommendation 
I made. 

Mr. Sotirwine. Now perhaps we had better clear this point up 
because a question has been presented here. Is the statement by 
President Truman on United States policy toward China, under date 
of December 15, 1945, the same statement that has been referred to 
throughout these sessions with you as the Marshall directive? 

Mr. Vincent. I have referred to that, yes, sir; as the Marshall 
directive. It is carelessly referred to as that, but it is the one that 
is generally spoken of as the directive, as it was generally understood 
at that time. It was the same statement made public on December 
15, to which I testified yesterday or before, in the preparation thereof. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say it was made public on the 15th ? 

Mr. Vincent. The President made it public. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was dated December 15, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and I think it was made public the same day, 
sir. I was in Moscow at the time, but I think it was made public the 
same day. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether that directive, or any draft 
of that directive, was at any time submitted to Mr. Ben Cohen ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To Mr. Dean Acheson? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; it was submitted to Mr. Dean Acheson. We 
went over it at that conference on December 9. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before that, do you know whether it was submitted 
to Mr. Acheson ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no positive knowledge that it was, but I would 
assume that it passed through his hands. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know whether Mr. Cohen ever saw it? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. 

Mr. Sourwine. How well did you know Joseph Gregg? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I knew Joseph Gregg, sir. The 
name doesn't make any response at all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. Joseph Gregg was ever 
in your home? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall Mr. Joseph Gregg. I don't recall his 
ever being in my home. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see a security file or investigation file 
on Mr. Gregg? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give him any information of a con- 
fidential or a security nature? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give him any information with the 
knowledge or expectation or with reason to believe it would be passed 
on, directly or indirectly, to the Soviet Government, or an agent 
thereof ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or to the Communist Party of the United States,, 
or any foreign nation? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1881 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about an effort or movement 
to force Patrick J. Hurley out of the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I know of no such movement. I would want to 
review the matter, as a matter of dates, but I know of no movement. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know the name of Guesev, G-u-e-s-e-v, 
or Gussev, G-u-s-s-e-v? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know a man connected with the Rus- 
sian Embassy whose name was similar to Gussev, or who used the 
name of Gussev or some similar name, as an alias ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was the Far East Commission ? 

Mr. Vincent. The Far East Commission was a Commission of 
11 nations first formed in the fall of 1945. But as the Far East Advis- 
ory Commission at the Moscow conference in December 1945, there 
was an agreement reached there with the British and the Russians, 
and endorsed by the Chinese and the other nations, for the establish- 
ment of a Far East Commission. It was established in the spring or 
earlier, 1945. under the chairmanship of Gen. Frank McCoy, and 
functioned in a manner that was to more or less supervise or go into 
the matter of the control — not control, because the word "control" was 
never used — of relationships between the various governments and 
SCAP. 

Mr. Sourwine. I have a few questions here, a series of questions. 

I suspect it is possible you may have a prepared statement on the 
subject. 

After you have answered these questions, if there is any further 
statement that you would like to make, I shall be glad to have you make 
it on the record. 

Mr. Vincent. I have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember a paper known as Far East 
Commission 230, FEC-230? 

Mr. Vincent. I do, sir, and I have a paper on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that paper submitted to the Far East Com- 
mission for consideration? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it ever adopted by the Far East Commission? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who submitted that paper? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the paper that grew out of the trip of Mr. 
Edwards to Japan in the fall of 1945, and was acted upon in the 
SWNCC Committee some time after his return. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who prepared that paper ? 

Mr. Vincent. Members of the SWNCC Committee, so far as I know. 
I would like to refer to the statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. I shall be glad to have you refer to it, but just at the 
moment 

Mr. Surrey. For the purpose of answering the question. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; I understand. 

Mr. Vincent. I have here the mission went out in 1945. I testified 
it went out in autumn. It went out in 1946. 

Mr. Sourwine. We are referring now to the State Department 
document known as FEC-230 ? 



1882 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. That is the one I am referring to here, and I have here 
the statement [reading] : "The recommendations of this mission be- 
came the basis of a paper prepared by the working group of the Far 
East Subcommittee of SWNCC." 

Mr. Sourwine. But it was not prepared by the Far East Commis- 
sion, then ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did it ever get the name "Far East Commission 
230"? 

Mr. Vincent. It was submitted over there as such a document and 
numbered as such, but never adopted by the Far East Commission. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was submitted to the Far East Commission for 
consideration, then, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. A moment ago I asked you whether it was, and you 
said "No". 

Mr. Vincent. I said the Edwards report. 

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you if this paper, FEC-230, was submitted 
to the Far East Commission for consideration, and I understood 
you to say "No." 

Mr. Vincent. I am sorry ; but it is a fact that I did know it was 
never approved by the Far East Commission. 

Mr. Sourwine. I had two separate questions. It was submitted? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. But it was never adopted by them? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who submitted it ? 

Mr. Vincent. The SWNCC Committee, I imagine it submitted it, 
after the working committee had prepared it. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was prepared by the working committee of 
SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was prepared by that working committee. Do 
you mean the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. A working committee of the Far East Committee; 
yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would that be under your control ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was chairman of the FE Committee, and it would 
be under my general control, but this particular working committee 
was under my control in an ex officio way. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you approve the document before submission 
to the Far East Commission? 

Mr. Vincent. I may have. 

Mr. Sourwine. How could it have been submitted to the Far East 
Commission without your approval ? 

Mr. Vincent. It had to be submitted through SWNCC and top 
SWNCC would have been the one that submitted it. 

Mr. Sourwine. They did not go around you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. The FE Subcommittee of SWNCC would have 
taken it up with SWNCC. 

Mr. Sourwine. You headed that subcommittee? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would have had to approve it before it got to 
SWNCC? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1883 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. On that basis, did you approve it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did approve it. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was submitted by SWNCC to the Far East Com- 
mission ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. By SWNCC to the Far East Commission. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does that mean it was approved by SWNCC ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten what the exact formula was, whether 
it was submitted to FE, whether it was submitted to FEC by SWNCC 
purely for consideration, or whether it went over with an approval 
of SWNCC. I can't testify as to whether it was sent over to them 
for their consideration, but without any advance approval by SWNCC 
or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you testify in any event it was ordered trans- 
mitted to FEC by SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, who were the members of the working group 
who prepared that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who any of them were ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall a one of them ; no sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how many of them there were? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How many were there on the Far East Committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I could find out. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do yon know how many men there were on the Far 
East Committee who might have worked on it? 

Mr. Vincent. There would have been economists, and I can't tell 
what the number would have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you can find out, try to do so before we come in 
on public session. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Souryvinh. Do you know how that paper reached Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. The paper reached Japan by being sent out infor- 
mally to SCAP. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do vou know who sent it out? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was usually sent out by the War Department — the 
War Department, usually — but the communications between SCAP 
and Washington were almost always through the War Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. So far as you know, it was sent by the War Depart- 
ment, and not by the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know, it was sent out by the War Depart- 
ment. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say it was not sent out by the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say it was not, because my memory is not 
exact enough to know, but there was no implication there that the 
State Department did not know it was being sent out. I am just speak- 
ing of a channel of communication. 

Senator Ferguson. You are speaking of the means of communi- 
cation ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the channel of communication. 



1884 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. It was not an official publication by the State De- 
partment ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Although it had been transmitted officially from 
the SWNCC committee to FEC? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It had not been ordered by FEC to be disseminated 
or transmitted to SCAP, had it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anyone who sent this paper, or a copy 
of it, to Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know anyone who sent it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anyone in Japan to whom a copy of 
this was transmitted? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, other than to SCAP. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anyone who gave this paper, or a copy 
of it, to anyone to be taken or transmitted to Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would a document of that nature have required your 
endorsement as Chief of the Office of Far East Affairs if it was to be 
issued or circulated as a State Department document? 

Mr. Vincent. No; it would not have required my endorsement. 
An economic paper of that kind might have had my endorsement. It 
might not have required my endorsement. It could have been the 
endorsement of the Assistant Secretary of State, the endorsement of 
Will Clayton. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would it have required your approval ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would not have required my approval. It would 
have been normal to have my approval. 

Mr. Sourwine. If such a paper were to be distributed through State 
Department channels would it have been normal to have cleared that 
circulation or distribution with you? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been normal, except where it might 
have been an economic paper — that had to be through Mr. Will Clay- 
ton ; it might equally have not been sent through me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether this paper was circulated or 
distributed by or within the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say. 

Mr. Sourwine. If it was so circulated, what would be your opinion 
as to whether you knew of and approved of that circulation at the 
time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of circulation in the State Department? 

Mr. Sourwine. In or by the State Department. 

Mr. Vincent. What do you mean by "circulation" ? 
Mr. Sourwine. I use "circulation" in the technical sense of copies 
prepared, a notation at the bottom, usually at the lower left-hand 
corner, as to whom it is circulated to. 

Mr. Vincent. I would not have thought, and I am speaking here 
purely from memory, that the paper was in a form to be circulated 
through the State Department. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1885 

Mr. Sourwine. Such circulation might have a half-dozen names, or 
20. It might have distribution symbols. You are familiar with all 
the possibilities there? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have marked papers for distribution? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. There is quite a wide range. You can put a couple 
of initials, or a half-dozen initials, which mean it will go to several 
hundred places. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, it normally would have been 
your function to mark for distribution such a paper, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Not a paper coming out like that, on economics. It 
probably would have gone to a division there which was handling 
Japan and Korean affairs at the time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you did mark this paper for 
distribution ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say whether I did or did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. This is the same paper, is it, that was subsequently 
printed by Mr. James Lee Kuffman, a New York lawyer? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge of that. I have read in the 
hearings that the testimony has been to the effect that he did print it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of this document, FEC-230, the 
document about which we are talking? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did that document instruct General MacArthur to 
"effect wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means 
of production and trade" ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to see the document, Mr. Sourwine, 
to be able to testify exactly to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, do you have anything that you want to con- 
tribute voluntarily in addition to the answers that you have given to 
the questions asked? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. It has been said, Mr. Vincent, that you have been 
falsely charged with being one of those who was deluded by the belief 
that the Chinese Communists were just agrarian reformers. Do you 
want to comment on that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to comment on that, sir. 

Since I returned to America here, I have gone through some papers 
and find that it is on record that I have stated that the Chinese Com- 
munists were real Communists, and they were not agrarian demo- 
crats, and I have made that statement many times ; but I have one fac- 
tual statement to that effect but I never was deluded into thinking that 
they were agrarian reformers. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever believe that the Chinese Communists 
were just agrarian reformers? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall at any time that I thought the leaders 
of the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers. 

The fact that they used agrarian reform as one of their methods 
of ponnlarizinsf themselves is a distinct matter from whether they 
were Communists, and I would have called them Communists, utilizing 
agrarian reform as a tool. 



1886 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. You have never yourself believed, have you, nor 
attempted to spread the doctrine, that the Communists were just 
agrarian reformers? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I have not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did I interrupt you? Did you want to read a 
statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, sir, in a speech before the Foreign Policy 
Association Forum in New York City, on October 20, state that? — 

at the throat of Chinese difficulties is the need for certain economic reforms, 
particularly in the agrarian field, and in the field of taxation. 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to see that speech. That is a Foreign 
Policy Association speech and I would have to see whether that is an 
exact quotation, but I may say that I felt very much that the National- 
ist Government of China could have strengthened its position tremen- 
dously by taking some reforms in the agrarian field. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember making this statement in that 
same speech ? — 

Much is written about the industrialization of China, but without reforms, 
one of the primary objectives which would be to increase the individual incomes 
of the Chinese farmers, and without an expanded transportation and a sound 
currency, industrial development would be meaningless to the Chinese people. 

Mr. Vincent. I do recall — I assume you have the exact words. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is substantially the view you had ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is substantially the view. I would like to 
expand on that in two sentences. 

Mr. Sourwine. You shall have that privilege. 

Mr. Vincent. My idea at the time was that you had to have a public 
in China to absorb the product of industry. There was a strong 
feeling at the time that when the war was over — these were discus- 
sions concerning postwar economic developments — that the Chinese 
should go about increasing the purchasing power of the mass of people 
which were the farmers, as a corollary, to go with industrial develop- 
ment, rather than have industrial development come ahead of that and 
simply have the products coming out of Chinese factories that were 
exported, rather than to be bought by the Chinese people. That was 
my philosophy behind that. 

Mr. Sourwine. The philosophy, in other words, of creating the 
market first before you produce the goods ? 

Mr. Vincent. Create it simultaneously, anyway. 3 am not an 
economist, but that seemed to be sound common sense in China at the 
time. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have a slightly different theory in this country, 
do we not? 

Mr. Vincent. That production creates the market? 

Mr. Sourwine. Is not our industrial advancement built rather 
largely on the principle of make all you can as good as you can, and 
then go out and sell it? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, we have not been faced with the same situa- 
tion as there is in China, with a buying public that did not have 2 
pennies to rub together. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was a diversion, I admit, and we got a little 
bit away from the scene of this conference. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1887 

Did you on or about February 23, 1946, write a letter under that 
date to Mr. Edward C. Carter, executive vice chairman of the Ameri- 
can Council of the IPR, advising him you did not feel you could ac- 
cept nomination for a second term as a member of the board of trustees 
of the American Council 2 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I did not accept it, but I do not recall 
writing him the letter I wouldn't accept it. If you would ask me to 
rely on my memory as such, I would have said that I simply did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. I will tell you now that we have such a letter from 
the files of the IPR. I do not have it now, but at the public hearing 
we will produce it, and you will have an opportunity to look at it, and 
I will ask you the question again with the letter in your hands. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your reason for not wanting to con- 
tinue ? Did you state it in your letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I do not recall the letter, Senator, so I don't 
know what my reason was at the time. I have an idea that a part 
of it was that I just didn't have time to bother with anything con- 
nected with the IPR because I was awfully busy. 

Mr. Ferguson. Was it because of any communistic tendency on 
the part of IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; it was not based on any suspicion I had then. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was the newspaperman who telephoned you on 
September 2, 1946, on behalf of the New York Herald Tribune, to 
ask you what you thought of the statement that had just been issued 
by General MacArthur personally known to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was that newspaperman? 

Mr. Vincent. It was a man named Metcalf. I had not met him 
often, but I knew who he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did this newspaperman subsequently apologize to 
you and acknowledge to you that the story he had written was untrue ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Arthur C. Bunce? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall him. Could I ask where I would have 
known him ? If you will give me a minute, I will try to think. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Bunce was an economic adviser. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; to Korea. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not know him but you now know who he 
was? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and I met him once or twice in my office before 
he went out to take up his duties in Korea. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember an article or dispatch transmitted 
from Mr. Bunce criticizing both the military government and the 
United States policy in Korea? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether a copy of such an article 
or dispatch was requested by Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who Mr. Lilienthal was ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

22848-— 52— pt. 6 14 



1888 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he connected with the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, but I am not saying he was 
not. I don't know of his connection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was a copy of such a report from Mr. Bunce re- 
quested by anyone else connected with IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you furnish a copy of that report pursuant to 
any such request ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in the habit of furnishing information 
to Lilienthal? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or anyone else in the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have already testified that Mr. Penfield, who 
was your deputy for a period 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether he had any connection 
with the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. I know of no connection that Penfield ever had with 
the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember a statement issued by General 
MacArthur on or before September 11, 1946, in the nature of a warn- 
ing with respect to the danger of communism in Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall the statement. That couldn't be 
the same statement that you have just referred to here, of Metcalf 
printing an incorrect article? 

Mr. Sourwine. It could be; the times are very close together. I 
would not be surprised if that was the article. 

Mr. Vincent. I am assuming you recall the circumstances, or should 
I recall them, of the Metcalf article ? 

He called me on the telephone and asked had I read a statement by 
General MacArthur. 

My recollection was that it was about Labor Day that I was working, 
around Labor Day, the early part of September. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. . 

Mr. Vincent. I told him I had not read it and then he went on to 
talk about Japan policy, not about the statement, and asked me 
whether there had been any change in our policy toward the Far East, 
toward Japan, and I told him I knew of no changes that had been 
made. That may be the statement of General MacArthur's. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who recommended your appointment 
as head of the Far Eastern Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. Director of Far Eastern Division. 

Mr. Sourwine. I beg your pardon. 

Mr. Vincent. I was not correcting you — I was just thinking. 

The first person to mention my appointment to me of Director was 
Mr. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State. I was appointed by 
Mr. Byrnes and I had already known Mr. Byrnes 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that Mr. Acheson recommended your 
appointment to that post? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not positive knowledge that he recommended 
my appointment to that post. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1889 

Mr. Sourwine. At the time he mentioned it to you, was it already a 
fait accompli? 

Mr. Vincent. That brings up the testimony I gave yesterday of 
being out of the city off on vacation, when I was called back suddenly, 
and it was a fait accompli, because I was called back from this and told 
I was going to be — I was not then Director, and I was not immediately 
made Director of the Far East Office; I was not made Director until 
the 19th of December — but Mr. Acheson told me that was the reason he 
was calling me back, to get myself ready to be Director. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was before Mr. Byrnes had actually made the 
appointment? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, was not your appointment as 
head of the Far Eastern Division one of Mr. Acheson's first acts after 
he became Under Secretary ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have a hard time testifying to that, but it 
was very early after he became Under Secretary of State, but whether 
it was one of his first acts, I wouldn't say. 

Senator Jenner. What year was that? 

Mr. Vincent. That was in 1945. I became Director in September 
1945. Have you got 1946? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry. Your testimony is unquestionably cor- 
rect on that point. I did not mean to challenge it, but I was trying to 
think of when Mr. Acheson was appointed. His appointment had 
been less than a month before that time, had it not? He was ap- 
pointed toward the end of August ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was appointed, I should say, around the middle 
of August. 

Mr. Sourwine. Around the middle of August and you were called 
back from your vacation before the end of August ? 

Mr. Vincent. The circumstances were, you may recall, that Ache- 
son had tendered his resignation as Assistant Secretary of State, and 
when Mr. Byrnes got back from Potsdam, he called him back and told 
him he was going to be Under Secretary of State, or asked him to be 
Under Secretary of State. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, moving up to the fall of 1946, did you at that 
time draft or assist in drafting a statement designed to be issued in 
case General Marshall should admit failure of his efforts to end the 
civil war in China? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't quite get the connotation of failure, but I 
am fully aware of the circumstances we are talking about, that in 
the late autumn of 1946 it became more and more apparent to all of 
us that General Marshall's mission was not going to succeed. So 
where the instructions came from, whether it came from Mr. Byrnes, 
whether it came from the White House or where, or whether General 
Marshall asked us to prepare something of the sort, there was a docu- 
ment which eventually became public on December 18, which was a 
general review, economic, military, and otherwise, of our relations 
with China during and since the war, and of developments there. 

Senator Jenner. May I ask a question right there? 

Having missed his previous testimony with reference to Marshall's 
mission to China, has that been gone into ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Very thoroughly. 

Senator Jenner. All right. 



1890 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. I will summarize it for the Senator. 

The gist of the witness' testimony in that regard, as he himself 
assented to a summary of it here, was that he had three cracks at it. 
He prepared an original rough draft. After certain changes had been 
made in that rough draft over at the War Department, it came back 
for his perusal, the second time ; and then, before ultimate final ap- 
proval he saw it again. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Jenner. Did Marshall see it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

May I straighten out one thing? I prepared, not a rough draft of 
the directive but a rough draft of what were the problems, and of 
the manner in which I thought they should be attacked in China. 

It was handed to General Marshall. It was not in the form he 
wanted it, and then a statement of China policy was drafted under 
General Marshall's direction. 

Senator Ferguson. In the War Department? 

Mr. Vincent. In the War Department. And this other draft, al- 
though it had some of the phraseology and the thought of my much 
shorter rough draft, is in itself a completely different document in 
intent, as well as in language. 

Mr. Sour wine. You said your document was about two pages, and 
the one that came back is about six ? 

Mr. Vincent. We have it there. 

Senator Ferguson. By the way, do you have your document ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is in the files of the State Department. I shall 
be glad to try to procure it for you. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am surprised at the addition now to your state- 
ment : "It was much different in intent." 

Mr. Vincent. I said "content." 

Mr. Sourwine. Since I understood your statement to be initially 
that what did come back from the War Department contained a num- 
ber of the phrases or phraseology and ideas that were in yours, and 
contained nothing at odds with or in derogation of what was originally 
proposed. 

Mr. Vincent. What I meant by "intent" I had not intended when 
I wrote a rough draft to draft something called a directive. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is understood. 

Mr. Vincent. I was writing something for Mr. Byrnes to talk with 
Mr. Marshall about. I did not conceive it in the terms of a directive, 
and if we could produce it you could easily see it had no relationship 
to being a directive. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not recognize the child when he came 
back? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I was able to recognize some phraseology. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know, sir, who did take part in originating 
the idea of that draft? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. As I say, I have just testified that 
there was a general feeling, and I know that the White House shared 
that feeling that we must be prepared to issue something for General 
Marshall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anyone who took part in drafting 
that ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1891 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that the boys in the Far Eastern Office, 
under me, that they consulted — you can look at the content, they must 
have consulted the War Department people and the economic people, 
and it was a composite document of some five or six pages which was 
preparatory. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you take any part in the preparation of that? 

Mr. Vincent. I no doubt did. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not remember ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not remember what I may have contributed. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it in a sense your responsibility, since it was 
being done under you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I had the principal responsibility to see 
that it was done. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you then instrumental in presenting that draft 
to Secretary Byrnes? 

Mr. Vincent. I no doubt was. I don't remember the physical 
process of presenting it to Mr. Byrnes. 

Mr. Sourwine. The routine procedure would have been for you to 
transmit it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. It would have gone down under my initials. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did that draft statement recommend withdrawal of 
all aid to the Nationalist Government of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I haven't reread it for some time. I am 
testifying from memory. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did it contain any recommendation of that nature? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall it did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that draft statement approved ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was approved and issued as a press release on 
December 18. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose that draft ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of. I know that it was sent out 
to General Marshall and he approved it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there a draft in October which was disap- 
proved, or which the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that the Joint Chiefs of Staff op- 
posed it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember making more than one address 
at Cornell University ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. The only address you made there was on or about 
January 21, 1947? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to check the date. I have never been 
to Cornell but once, and the address we spoke of yesterday. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether, in the course of that 
address, you stated that it would be advantageous for our defense 
to throw our weight on the side of the status quo in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall making any such statement as that, 
throw our weight on the side of the status quo 

Mr. Sourwine. In China. 

Mr. Vincent. In January 

Mr. Sourwine. 1947. 

Mr. Vincent. In January 1947? No; I don't recall making such 
a statement. You would have to define the status quo. The status 



1892 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

quo was that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government was 
in control of the country politically. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall in that address saying, or that you 
said, anything about throwing our weight or influence on the side of 
the status quo ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would it have been possible that in that address 
you said that it would not be advantageous to our defense to throw 
our weight or influence on the side of the status quo in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I made that statement either. I don't 
recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you be surprised to learn that you had made 
that statement? 

Mr. Vincent. I would be surprised to learn that I made the state- 
ment that we should not throw our weight behind the status quo 
because the status quo was that Chiang Kai-shek was in control of the 
Government. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you made a statement at that time that it would 
not be advantageous for us to throw our weight or influence on the 
side of the status quo, that was a statement against Chiang Kai-shek, 
was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember participating in the briefing of 
General Wedemeyer and his staff before they left for the Far East 
in July 1947? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; there was a meeting of a few of us which Gen- 
eral Wedemeyer himself had requested. It was not in the sense of 
any exhaustive briefing. 

Mr. Sourwine. How long did it take? 

Mr. Vincent. Not more than 20 minutes or a half hour. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where was it held ? 

Mr. Vincent. In my office in the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. You not only participated, then, but you were one 
of the chief participants in that? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not call myself the chief participator, except 
it was called to my office. I was packing my suitcase to go to Swit- 
zerland. I don't recall. A naval officer was there who was going 
to accompany General Wedemeyer. Mr. Sprouse, chosen by the State 
Department was there. Some Army officer was there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did they merely drop into your office to get any 
suggestions you might have? 

Mr. Vincent. No. General Wedemeyer himself suggested that they 
meet in my office, just to go over the general — there was a discussion 
among them more than any briefing by anybody like myself, as to 
what they were supposed to do. 

Mr. Sourwine. It would have been the customary thing, with any- 
body undertaking a mission, to get an expression of views, from the 
head of the Far Eastern Division ; would it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. But General Wedemeyer had his discussions 
before that with General Marshall, and his relation with General 
Marshall was one that he hardly required briefing from me at any 
high level. I remember at the meeting that General Wedemeyer 
asked me: "Is there any intention here that I shall have any respon- 
sibility to try to carry on the objective of the Marshall mission?" 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1893 

I said, "None whatsoever," that that is, so far as I am concerned, 
a "dead duck." 

He was going out on a fact-finding mission and not any mission to 
get together with the Nationalists and Communists. 

Mr. Sourwine. The directive, as such, was it a "dead duck" in 
1947? 

Mr. Vincent. The directive to General Marshall ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. General Marshall having come back and given up 
the mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. As we pointed out, that was a public statement by 
the President of the United States. 

Mr. Vincent. The directive to General Marshall ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. It was not withdrawn or renounced ? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar as General Marshall's attempts to imple- 
ment that statement of policy, he was back here and he had made his 
statement of January 7. 

Mr. Sourwine. But the policy had not been recanted ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not telling General Wedemeyer that the 
policy, as such, was a "dead duck" ; you were simply telling him that, 
in your opinion, he had no duties with respect to affirmatively seeking 
to implement that policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Exactly. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, at the time of that briefing or conversa- 
tion with General Wedemeyer and others, emphasize the necessity 
for introducing a liberal element into the Chinese Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you mean by "liberal element" ? 

Mr. Vincent. I meant exactly the same thing that General Mar- 
shall had meant when he finally left China, which was that it would 
be a very good idea to have a liberal business, broad-minded group 
in there. As you know, at that time there was considerable criticism 
of some of the old-line Kuomintang officials, who were retarding 
progress. 

General Marshall and I thought K. P. Chiang and John Chiang 
and some of the more broader-minded Chinese should come into the 
Government. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did 3 7 ou consider the Chinese Communists as among 
the "liberals" who should be introduced ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that when a Communist says "liberal" 
he means Communist or pro-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know it now ? I am not stating it. 1 am 
asking you if you know that is true. 

Mr. Vincent. As a matter of exact knowledge, I do not know when 
a Communist says a person is "liberal" it means that he is a 
Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or a pro-Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who initiated your appointment as 
Minister to Switzerland? 



1894 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. The first discussion I had about it was with Mr. 
Acheson — I had to leave the Department at the end of 4 years — 
some time in the late spring. 

Mr. Sourwine. I mean the selection of Switzerland. Do you know 
whose thought that was, Mr. Acheson's or yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was Mr. Acheson's. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Acheson's? 

Mr. Vincent. I can recall that exactly. He said, "Where would 
you like to go?" 

I said, "I would like to go anywhere, from New Zealand to Norway, 
provided I can take my family with me," because I had been absent 
from them 2y 2 years during the war. I meant to eliminate the Far 
East, from which families were barred. 

He said: "How would you like to go to Switzerland?" I said I 
would be delighted. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who initiated the statement on China policy made 
by President Truman on December 15, 1949 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, that is the same thing that is mistak- 
enly referred to as the directive. 

It was a published statement, but General Marshall considered 
that a directive. 

Mr. Sourwine. I have been asked to ask you this question : 

Sir, do you own a home in Sarasota, Fla. ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you buying a home there ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you plan to live there ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Maybe the Florida Chamber of Commerce has an 
interest in you. 

Mr. Vincent. I find that is the most curious question that has been 
asked here. I am not indicating here that I would not like to have a 
home there. 

Mr. Sourwine. When were you transferred to Tangiers? 

Mr. Vincent. I was transferred to Tangiers — I went to Tangiers 
in June 1951, just this past year. The actual transfer order came — 
there was 3 months' difference between the time I got my order to go. 
I had to stay in Switzerland to finish the matter of the German assets. 
The transfer to Tangiers came to me sometime in February, and I 
went to Tangiers in early June. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know why you were transferred ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was transferred because I had already been in 
Switzerland 3% or 4 years. Mr. Patterson had been assigned to 
Switzerland as Minister. Therefore, it was necessary to find a place 
for me to go, and Tangiers was chosen. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has anyone in the State Department ever expressed 
an opinion to you as to why Tangiers was chosen as the next position? 

Mr. Vincent. They have not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before you were transferred to Tangiers, had you 
any expectation of being transferred to some other post? 

Mr. Vincent. There was talk of going to Costa Rica, as Ambassa- 
dor. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had expected to leave Switzerland, in any 
«vent ; is that right ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1895 



I 



Mr. Vincent. I had already indicated I would like to leave when 
my children were leaving, at the end of 4 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever receive from Secretary Acheson any 
communication with regard to your appointment to Tangiers ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I have never had any communication with Mr. 
Acheson regarding my appointment to Tangiers, unless the travel 
order may have been signed by him, which I doubt. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you ever informed that you had been sus- 
pected of or charged with revealing to Russia, to the Communists, the 
identities of American agents in Eastern Europe ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I never have been. I never have and I never 
have been informed. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever propose or recommend the inclusion of 
Chinese Communists, or their representatives, in the Economic Com- 
mission in Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; Chinese Communists or Japanese Commu- 
nists? 

Mr. Sourwine. Chinese Communists or their representatives, in the 
Economic Commission. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or Japanese Communists or their representatives? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know any of those, either. I was trying to 
think — What was the Economic Commission for Japan ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Mr. John Mc Jennett ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; he works in the legal adviser's office in the 
State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is he a personal friend of yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. I just met him since I came back from Tangiers this 
time for the first time, but I would call him a personal friend. 

Mr. Sourwine. What part, if any, did he play in the release of 
your letter of November 9th, to Senator McCarran ? 

Mr. Vincent. I understand he telephoned the release was going to 
be made. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you understand that from what I told you or 
did you have any prior understanding ? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew that he was going to let Senator McCarran's 
office know that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ask him to do so ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I asked him to do so, or we agreed it was to be 
done. I was perfectly agreeable for it to be done. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you specify whom he was to call ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or that he was to get the message to Senator Mc- 
Carran, or something of that sort? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; that the message was to be gotten to Senator 
McCarran's office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at the time that Senator McCarran 
was ill and in the hospital in Nevada ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. McJennett had called on 
a Saturday afternoon, to the Judiciary Committee here, and had 
spoken with Mr. Mandel, rather than calling Senator McCarran's 
office? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know who Mr. McJennett called. 



1896 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

i 

Mr. Sourwine. Your request to him was simply what ? 

Mr. Vincent. To let Senator McCarran's office know that this was 
to be issued on the following Monday. November 9th was the date of 
the letter, and this took place some 10 days later, which would make 
it the 20th. 

Mr. Sourwine. I think it was the 17th. 

Mr. Vincent. Saturday was the 17th. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your letter to Senator McCarran was addressed to 
him where? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall the envelope. I know it was delivered 
to the Senator's office. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was addressed to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was delivered to him here by hand ; and, therefore, 
it must have been addressed here. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. And you knew at the time that he 
was in Nevada? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. There were two copies delivered, one for him 
and one for whoever was in charge of the office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Knowing that the letter was delivered here on the 
9th — if that was the case; certainly not earlier than the 9th, because 
it was dated the 9th — yet as early as the 16th you were already press- 
ing for a reply, although you knew he had gone to the hospital in 
Nevada ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were making a point of it and suggested that 
the Department make it a point on his failure to reply by the 16th ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not suggesting that the Department make a 
point of his not replying. I myself, maybe naively, would have 
thought that his office itself would have made a reply on his behalf. 
That is my own feeling : That the letter would be sent out to him, but 
the staff here would be in a position to make a reply. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry that things are not run up here as perhaps 
they are in the State Department, but up here there is nobody who 
can answer for a Senator on a matter where the Senator has to 
make a decision, at least until he has made the decision. 

Mr. Vincent. I am simply giving you my belief that I would have 
thought it could have been answered. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see the State Department release on that 
letter before it was issued ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not see the actual release, I do not believe. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you discuss it with Mr. McJennett? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not prepare that release ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ask that it be prepared ? 

Mr. Vincent. I asked that it be prepared. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you now have any feeling that Senator McCar- 
ran was dilatory or discourteous? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not have any feeling that he was dilatory in 
replying to that letter. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of this 
witness. We hope to be able to have him back here in public session 
on Wednesday of next week, if that might be the order, subject to a 
possible contingency that we cannot now foresee. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1897 

Mr. Vincent. Did you say 10 or 10 : 30 on Wednesday ? 
Mr. Sourwine. That would be subject to the Chair. I would think 
we should start at 10 o'clock and try to get through if we can. 

Senator Jenner (presiding). If there is no objection, that will 

be the order. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, there is also this matter which has 
been discussed with the witness, and counsel. 

This examination has taken much longer than any of us anticipated. 
We have been at it 3 days and the record is quite large. 

Among other things there was a long list of names about which Mr. 
Vincent was asked, and each one of which required substantial 
comment. 

The thought has been advanced that a great deal of time could be 
saved all around if, prior to going into the public session on Wednes- 
day, it might be the order of the committee that the executive record 
be opened. 

That would permit us to refer to specific portions of it, to place 
matter in the record. It would give the witness an opportunity, which 
he desires, to make the most public possible denial of these charges that 
have been made against him and, at the same time, it would give us 
some hope of getting through in a day or so. 

It is my understanding that the witness and counsel have no objec- 
tion to that, if they can be allowed to see the record ; and while they 
recognize they have no right to control the committee in that regard, 
they would like to have an opportunity, if there is any portion of the 
executive record they would not like to make public, to make expres- 
sion to the committee before it is ordered to be made public. 

Senator Jenner. That is a reasonable request, and we will make 
that an order. 

Mr. Sourwine. We will have this record back here on Monday. 

I regret that there was a resolution of the committee, with regard 
to these records, and I cannot send it out. 

Mr. Surrey. Is it all right for someone to be here in my behalf? 

Mr. Sourwine. Anyone by authority of your firm may have access 
to it here. 

Mr. Vincent. Do you know whether a meeting is scheduled in here 
Monday morning % 

Mr. Sourwine. The full committee is meeting here Monday, but 
we will give you a desk in one of these other rooms and do what we can 
to make you comfortable. 

If this committee may stand in recess, with the assent of the wit- 
ness, he may return at the public session at 10 o'clock on next Wednes- 
day morning. 

Senator Jenner. That is agreeable. 

(Whereupon, the executive session was concluded at 2 : 40 p. m.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of 

the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security 

Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m. pursuant to recess, Senator Pat 
McCarran, chairman, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Ferguson, and 
Jenner. 

Also present: Senators George, Hay den, Hendrickson, Millikin, 
and McCarthy. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research 
for the subcommittee. 

The Chairman. Do you want the witness sworn ? 

Mr. Sourwins. The witness has been sworn, sir, in executive ses- 
sion. If the record may show that, I don't think another swearing 
would be essential. 

The Chairman. I believe the witness had better be sworn again. 
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the 
subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States 
Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS 
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I believe the record should show 
that the unanimous consent of the Senate was granted yesterday to 
the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate meeting while the 
Senate is in session this afternoon, that is, Wednesday, today, and 
during the remainder of this week. As the chairman knows, that 
consent was granted at the chairman's request. 

Mr. Vincent, you are here today at your own request for the purpose 
primarily of denying any and all charges that may have been brought 
against you in connection with communism, is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. It will be the purpose of the committee to give you 
the fullest possible opportunity to make your denial in this regard as 
complete and comprehensive and explicit as you may wish. 

Mr. Vincent. Thank you, sir. 

1899 



1900 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. To that end a series of questions will now be put 
to you which are not intended as either argumentative or repetitive. 
They merely cover different facets of the issue. Do you understand 
that? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any objection to that procedure? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. At the conclusion of this opening series of ques- 
tions, if you have anything you want to add in the way of a prepared 
statement, or an impromptu statement, you will be given an oppor- 
tunity to read it into the record or make it. 

Mr. Vincent. At the conclusion? 

Mr. Sourwine. I have a few questions; not the conclusion of the 
hearing, but of this series of questions. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member ot 
the Communist Party of the United States or a member of the Com- 
munist Party of any other country ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever been under Communist discipline? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever knowingly assisted the Communist 
Party of any country or any person or persons known to you to be 
Communist or pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever been asked to do so ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never have been asked to do so. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever received any orders or instructions 
or suggestions, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro- 
Communist source ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever made any suggestions to a Commu- 
nist or pro-Communist source? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever conferred with Communists or per- 
sons known to you to be pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever been asked, or invited, or urged, to 
join the Communist Party of any country? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you been in contact with any members of the 
Communist Party of the United States or of any other country ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have in my official duties from time to time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Other than 

Mr. Vincent. Officials of other countries, not members of the Amer- 
ican Communist Party. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your answer is that you have not been in contact 
with any members of the Communist Party of the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever received any advice, or directives, 
on policy, from any Communist or pro-Communist source? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1901 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever received any money, reward, emolu- 
ment, decoration, or praise from any Communist government or its 
representative, at any time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever visited any Communist country ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I visited Siberia. 

Mr. Sourwine. On more than one occasion ? 

Mr. Vincent. Siberia once, and I was on the conference with Mr. 
Byrnes in Moscow in 1945, December. 

Mr. Sourwine. Other than those two occasions ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to recall whether recently in Europe. 
No ; I never visited any of the Communist countries in Europe. 

Mr. Sourwine. On August 30, 1948, Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., for- 
mer Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House Com- 
mittee on Un-American Activities that there was a group in the State 
Department opposed to the idea that the Kussians w r ere not going to 
be sympathetic or cooperative and that they indicated a very aggres- 
sive policy, and that this group, Mr. Acheson's group, as he described 
it, with Mr. Hiss as his principal assistant in the matter, won out 
in the State Department. Would you consider yourself a part of the 
group there referred to? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever attended any discussions, group 
meetings, or social gatherings with Communists or pro-Communists, 
either in the United States or in any other country ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever consciously conformed your actions 
or your expression of opinion with any Communist policy or Com- 
munist directive? 

Mr. Vincent. Not consciously, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever express publicly or privately sym- 
pathy for Communist aims and ideology ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of ever doing so, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does that cover the question of expression of sym- 
pathy for Communist aims or ideology in China or in Asia, generally ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your answer is no in that regard also ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the 
assignment or transfer to China, or to Japan, of any person whom 
you knew or had reason to believe was Communist or pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the 
transfer to the Far East of Mr. John S. Service? 

Mr. Vincent. I had nothing to do with Mr. John S. Service's 
transfers in any way, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the 
return to the Far East of Mr. John S. Service? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the 
assignment of Miriam Farley to the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 



1902 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the 
assignment of T. A. Bisson to the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you ever a part of any Communist organiza- 
tion, apparatus, or network? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you ever under Communist discipline ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever agree to accept Communist discipline? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you have a statement that you want to make, 
sir, now is a good time to do it. 

Mr. Vincent. Thank you. 

Senator Eastland. I would like to ask just one question. 

The Chairman. All right, Senator. 

Senator Eastland. He asked you if you had approved the transfer 
of Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mr. John S. Service, and other people to the Far 
East. Your answer was that you had nothing to do with that. Do 
you know who did? 

Mr. Vincent. In the case of Mr. T. A. Bisson, I don't know of his 
ever having been transferred to the Far East in any official capacity, so 
my answer would be that I wouldn't know that anybody had trans- 
ferred him to the Far East. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you stressing the word "transfer" ? 

Mr. Vincent. Or the assignment. 

Mr. Sourwine. I intended the question to include assignment also. 
May I ask that question again with regard to Mr. Bisson: Did you 
ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment of Mr. Bisson to 
the Far East? 

Mr. Vtncent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever advise, recommend or approve the 
assignment of Miriam Farley to the Far East ? 

Mr. Vincent. The answer again is no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever advise, recommend or approve the 
assignment of Mr. John S. Service to the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. Now, Senator 

The Chairman. What is the answer to that ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the last one? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Senator Eastland. Now, do you know who did? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would say it was the Personnel Division 
of the Department of State in the case of Service's assignments. 

Senator Eastland. What individual down there was behind this 
assignment to the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. Let's go back. Are we speaking of the recent period 
of history? 

Senator Eastland. We are speaking of the period he spoke of in 
those questions. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sou" wine, I think, covers the whole period. 

Senator Eastland. That is what I want you to cover. 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot recall, Senator, who were the heads of the 
Personnel Division in the State Department at the time that Mr. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1903 

Service was assigned at one time or another, but his most recent 
assignment to the Far East was when he went out to General Mac- 
Arthur, which I recall, and that was just an assignment by the Person- 
nel Division, and at that time I would say that a man named Pen 
Davis was Chief of Personnel. 

Senator Eastland. Are you saying that Mr. Davis was responsible 
for Mr. Service's assignment ? Is that what you are saying ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am saying so far as I know the Chief of Personnel 
technically was the responsible man for the assignment of personnel 
to the field. 

The Chairman. Is that the way it is carried out in the State Depart- 
ment, that the Chief of Personnel makes the assignments to the major 
places? 

Mr. Vincent. The Chief of Personnel, acting under the Adminis- 
trative Assistant Secretary. 

The Chairman. Who was the Administrative Assistant Secretary 
during this time? 

Mr. Vincent. That would have been in 1945. I should think it 
would have been Mr. Donald Russell, the Assistant Secretary to Mr. 
James Byrnes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that Mr. Service was being assigned 
to the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean in this particular assignment ? 

Mr. Morris. 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I knew that he was being assigned to General 
MacArthur's headquarters. 

Mr. Morris. Did you participate in any discussions concerning 
that transfer ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall any, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Had you known at that time that Mr. Service had 
gotten into difficulties in the Amerasia case ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had known that ; yes. 

The Chairman. Senator? 

Senator Eastland. That is all. 

Mr. Sourwine. It had been the purpose to go into some of these 
matters more fully at a later time, I might say, Senator. 

Senator Eastland. That is all right. I will wait. 

The Chairman. I understand the witness has a statement, and 
you say this is the proper time for him to make it ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe so, sir, since I understand it has to do 
with subject matter of the series of questions just asked and answered. 

The Chapman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine. You may proceed. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I 
have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. 
First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave 
allegations made against me before this committee, and secondly, 
to give the committee whatever other assistance I may in the con- 
duct of its investigation. 

On August 23, 1951, before this subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked 
a witness, Louis Budenz, the following question : 

Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party? 

22848— 52--pt. 61 15 



1904 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Budenz replied : 

From official reports I have received, he was. 

Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or 
or describe the "official reports" to which he referred. 
Later Mr. Morris again inquired : 

Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party 
secret shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party? 

"Yes, sir," replied Mr. Budenz. 

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with 
the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it." When ques- 
tioned as to his source, he answered : 

That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. 
Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel. 

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to recall 
that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings committee that he knew 
of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either directly 
or indirectly. 

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before this com- 
mittee. Mr. Morris asked : 

Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the 
Communist Party before this committee? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; from official communications. 

Later, during the same hearing, Mr. Morris said that : 

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a Naval Intelligence officer, the fact that John 
Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on 
that fact. 

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this subcommittee 
or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of the Com- 
munist Party is bearing false witness ; he is, to put it bluntly, lying. 
I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In my 
own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has endeavored 
before this subcommittee to support his allegations by strained sug- 
gestion and devious insinuation. 

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am not a 
Communist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. 
I have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the 
contrary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my For- 
eign Service career in the interest of our own Government and people. 
I am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy 
and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the mem- 
bers of the committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it 
is for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic 
institutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or 
anyone else. 

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a mistake. Any at- 
tempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to 
lose confidence in their officials or in each other is in itself subversive 
to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, the 
official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly harmful. 

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The 
internal security of the United States, now probably more than at any 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1905 

other time in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our Amer- 
ican way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. 
But we cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, on November 9, defend 
democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish 
to state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely 
accused, but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and 
security of his country, that irresponsible testimony, such as Mr. 
Budenz is wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state 
but has no place in our American democracy. 

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are 
equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared 
before your committee and made statements concerning me which 
are factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning 
the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most in- 
accurate. In fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges 
that I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship' 
of the committee dealing with the problem or by governmental agen- 
cies in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cooke's testimony 
about my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the 
Nationalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you 
that I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and 
discuss any other issues which this committee may wish to consider. 

But, gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking this opportunity to 
come before you has been accomplished. At the subcommittee hear- 
ings of October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying: 

Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say 
"I am not a Communist." That draws the issue. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I now solemnly repeat : 
I am not and never have been a Communist. I so draw the issue. 

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Sourwine, here is a letter which I wrote to 
the Honorable John Peurifoy, at that time Under Secretary of State, 
and which was submitted to the committee by the State Department 
which I would like an opportunity to read. It will take an additional 
3 minutes. Mr. Chairman, may I? 

The Chairman. Very well. What date is that? 

Mr. Vincent. This is March 7, 1950. It is addressed to John 
Peurifoy. 

The Chairman. Is it pertinent to this issue? 

Mr. Vincent. It is pertinent to this issue, sir. 

You will note that the date is about the time of the hearings in 
the Tydings committee and I wrote him when I was Minister at 
Bern. 

Mr. Sourwine. This document, Mr. Chairman, is one of several 
documents which the State Department furnished in response to the 
committee's request for a much longer list. We will go into that a 
little later. It might be well at this time to point out that this is the 
only one of the documents furnished by the State Department which 
had not theretofore been made public. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

Dear Jack : I am sorry about all of the trouble that is being raised for you 
as a result of charges made against the Department. You and the Secretary 
have my full confidence and support, if needed. 

A friend has sent me a copy of the Congressional Record of February 20 I 
gather that I have been "identified" in the press as Senator McCarthy's case 



1906 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

No. 2. I am, in fact, one of our "foreign ministers" although the job is hardly 
what I would call "high brass." Also, I did misplace a piece of clothing one 
time in 1946. But I must profess myself amazed that the incident became a 
matter of record, if in fact it has as Senator McCarthy's story would seem to 
imply. It was not my piece of clothing. It was a raincoat which some visitor 
left behind in the Far Eastern Office, of which I was Director at the time, and 
which hung there for weeks. One rainy day, having no coat with me, I put this 
raincoat on to go to lunch. Returning, I stopped at the Department washroom 
and forgot to take the raincoat when I left. Some days later, I recalled the 
oversight and called the building guard office, where I learned that the coat had 
been found and turned over to the Department's Security or Control Office. I 
have forgotten with whom I spoke in that office, but he informed me that there 
was a piece of paper in the inside breast pocket containing writing in what 
looked like Russian. I explained the history of the coat and asked whether the 
writing gave a clue to ownership. He did not know, but subsequent examina- 
tion showed the writing, as I recall it, to be a practice or exercise in Russian 
word endings or suffixes, presumably the work of someone studying Russian. 
The coat was returned to the Far Eastern Office. When we moved from Old 
State to New State in 1947, I appropriated the coat and still have it. That is 
the history of the "clothing." I shall be glad to return the raincoat to the 
real owner, should his memory as to where he left it be revived by Senator 
McCarthy's story. 

The Chaikman. What did you say you did with the coat? Will 
you kindly go back just a little way when you moved from the old 
State Department to the new ? 

Mr. Vincent. When we moved from Old State over to New State 
in 1947 I appropriated the coat and still have it, no one having called 
for it in a matter of a year. 

May I continue? 

The Chairman. Yes, surely. 

Mr. Vincent (continuing) : 

As to the main portion of the Senator's statement I must profess complete 
ignorance. I have never acted directly or indirectly to provide espionage agents 
of Russia, or any other country, with information in the State Department 
or from any other governmental source. Therefore, the Senator's story, if it 
is intended to apply to me, is simply not true. Furthermore, I do not believe 
there were people in the Far Eastern Office capable of such action. No case 
of the kind ever came or was brought to my attention. 

So much for that. I do not know whether the Department has a "case his- 
tory" on me, but I would like to take this opportunity to let you have briefly a 
few facts concerning me which may be unknown to you, and to state that there 
are no other facts pertinent to the situation which is troubling Senator 
McCarthy. 

As to family, just in case the question should arise: My mother died when I 
was a child. My father died in 1938. He was a real-estate agent and an active 
member of the Baptist Church. My stepmother is 76 ; lives in Macon, Ga. ; and is 
as active in the Baptist Church as her age (76) will permit. My brother is a 
banker in Spartanburg, S. C. My sister is married to Rear Adm. Allan E. Smith, 
United States Navy, who recently rescued the U. S. S. Missouri. I have various 
and sundry cousins with whom I have virtually lost contact, but I have never 
heard anything derogatory regarding them. I have two nephews who served 
in the Armed Forces during the late war. 

My wife has two brothers, John and Fred Slagle. They are in the insurance 
business, one at Chicago and the other at Kansas City. Both, as I understand it, 
are respected and sturdy Republicans. My wife's parents have been dead for 
many years. So much for family. 

As for myself : I have never joined any political organization, "front" or other- 
wise. For 1 year, I think it was 1945, I was made an honorary or noncontributing 
member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Service abroad has made it imprac- 
ticable to join a political party. I am a Jeffersonian Democrat, a Lincolnian 
Republican, and an admirer since youth of Woodrow Wilson. I am a member 
of the Cosmos Club, Washington, the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity, and the 
Baptist Church. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1907 

I have never knowingly associated with American Communists or Communist 
sympathizers. I say "American," because my official duties have from time to 
time caused me to be in contact with foreign Communists. Chou En-lai, for in- 
stance (the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime.) I met in the 
house of Chiang Kai-shek. He was head of a liaison mission to the Chungking 
Government during the war. Here and in Washington, before my assignment 
here, and at other posts abroad, I have met foreign Communists at official or 
social functions. Our relationships have been perfunctory, except where official 
business had to be transacted. 

In 1944, I accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a mission to China. 
I went under instructions from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The purpose 
in sending me was to make available to the Vice President my experience in 
China, extending back over 20 years. 

As you know, my association with Far Eastern affiairs has been a subject of in- 
termittent press criticism. This was especially true while I was Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs (September 1945 to August 1947). During that 
time I served under Mr. James Byrnes and General Marshall, as Secretaries of 
State. My job was to implement the Government's policies, 31 i to make them. 
It is immaterial that I found myself in accord with those policies. Had I not, I 
would have still attempted to carry them out or asked to be removed from a 
position where it was incumbent upon me to do so. 

Any American, in public or private life, has a right to criticize our policies 
toward China and in the Far East and elsewhere. He does not have the right 
to impugn, simply on the basis of disagreeing with the policies themselves, the 
motives or character of those who are charged with the duty of implementing 
them. I have taken the oath of allegiance and loyalty to my country many 
times during my 25 years of service. The last time was in 1947, as United States 
Minister to Switzerland, after the Senate had confirmed my appointment. One is 
free to question my ability ; but they cannot, in truth, question my loyalty. My 
record of public service is clear and so is my conscience. 

I regret very much the circumstances that have caused me to feel it necessary 
to make this protest of innocence and loyalty but it is my belief that you and, 
if you approve, the public, have a right to expect a statement from me. 

With best regards and best wishes. 
Sincerely. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, when was that letter written ? 

Mr. Vincent. That letter was written on March 7, 1950. 

Mr. Sourwine. How was it transmitted ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was transmitted in the normal mail. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it requested by one of your superiors * 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it indicated to you that you should write such 
a letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was your own desire to write such a letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Voluntarily submitted by me. 

Mr. Souravine. Does that seem to you to indicate that you had 
heard certain charges had been made against you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had read some of the testimony that was being made 
in Congress in the press, press reports. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was solely on the basis of the testimony in Con- 
gress and statements in the press that you wrote this letter? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

The Chairman. This letter was written before or after the Budenz 
testimony i 

Mr. Vincent. This letter was written before the Budenz testimony. 

Mr. Sourwine. This letter was written in 1950, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Vincent. March 7, 1950. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Budenz, I might say that there may be occasions 
when counsel or members of the committee 



1908 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Did you say "Mr. Budenz"? 

Mr. Sourwine. I beg your pardon, sir. If I did it was a slip of 
the tongue. 

Mr. Vincent, there may be occasions when counsel or members of the 
committee may not feel that they agree wholly with your answer to 
some question, but we will not always on that occasion challenge you 
then and there with regard to it. I don't want the next few questions 
to be taken as an indication of policy as to how the hearing will be con- 
ducted, but some matters have been brought up that perhaps should be 
gone into right now. 

You mentioned the fact in that letter to Mr. Peurifoy that you were 
a noncontributing member to the IPK. That makes it obvious that 
as early as 1950 you knew that you were a noncontributing member, 
does it not? „,.. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall discussing that question in executive 
session here earlier? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the exact discussion. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall having been asked if you knew that 
you were a noncontributing member ? _ 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell us now when you first came to know 
that you were a noncontributing member ? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew that I was a noncontributing member because 
I never contributed so far as I could recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that you were the only noncontribut- 
ing member of the board of trustees ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

The Chairman. You were a member of the board of trustees of the 
IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1945. 

The Chairman. You knew that? 

Mr. Vincent. I was notified of that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mentioned the matter of a coat. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you been asked any questions about that coat 
in this committee in executive session ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are volunteering that here? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your intent to testify with regard to the coat 
in question that you had left it somewhere? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. And where did you leave it? 

Mr. Vincent. As I said in this letter, I left it in a washroom in the 
State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. How long after that did you remember that you had 
left it in the washroom ? 

Mr. Vincent. It must have been a matter of a week, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. "Who did you call? 

Mr. ^Vincent. I called the police guard that was in charge in the 
State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you say to them? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1909 

Mr. Vincent. I said, "Have you found a raincoat," and tried to 
describe it. 

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of a description did you give them with 
regard to the coat? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't have a very clear idea because I had just 
taken the coat out that one time, but it was one of these ordinary 
brown-colored raincoats. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is all you were able to tell them? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it the custom of the guards in the guardroom 
at the State Department when a person is attempting to identify lost 
or stolen property over the telephone to help them out by telling 
them what is in the pockets ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; and he did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did you know about the Russian papers in 
the pockets? 

Mr. Vincent. You may recall, as I say, that the police guard said 
he had turned it over to the security officer in the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the security officer volunteer to you what was 
in the pockets ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did. 

Mr. Sourwine. You made no statement to him? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You made no statement to the guard that you 
called first with regard to what was in the pockets of the coat ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. I did not know that there was anything 
in the pockets. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were asked several questions here, Mr. Vin- 
cent, and I bring this up not for the purpose of quibbling with you 
but for the purpose of impressing upon you the desire of the com- 
mittee — and I am sure it will be your own desire — to testify quite 
factually and give no wrong impressions with regard to anything. 
You were asked a number of fairly broad questions at the outset of 
the hearing. You were asked, for instance, if you had ever received 
any orders or instructions or suggestions directly or indirectly from 
any Communist or pro-Communist source. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have received suggestions from many people, 
have you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't doubt that I have. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have received suggestions through the read- 
ing of many books and other writings, have you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you in a position to state categorically that 
none of the people from whom you received suggestions and none 
of the writings that you read in that connection were either Com- 
munist or pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, in the absence of being able to recall exactly 
what I have read, but it would be a very broad statement to say that 
I have never received any suggestions from anything I have read, 
and I have read not consciously, if I have ever read what you call 
pro- Communist literature. 



1910 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. The question was whether you are in a position to 
state categorically that no person who has ever given you a sugges- 
tion was Communist or pro-Communist. 
Mr. Vincent. I cannot state categorically. 

Mr. Sourwine. I think that is obvious. Your answer to this ques- 
tion was a little bit too broad, then, was it not? The committee is 
not trying to trap you, Mr. Vincent. If a question is asked that it 
too broad, narrow it down. We will go into it and straighten out 
all the semantic difficulties and be sure that we understand your testi- 
mony and that you understand the questions. 

As a matter of fact, you have through the years received sugges- 
tions from members of the IPR, have you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Through their writings and through conversations 
with them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Right. Are you in a position to state categorically 
that none of those members of the IPR were Communist or pro- 
Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I could not state categorically that they are not 
pro-Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is your opinion as to whether the IPR was 
Communist or pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not consider the IPR Communist or pro-Com- 
munist at the time I had any association with it. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is your present opinion, if it has changed 
in any way? 

Mr. Vincent. From the testimony I have heard and seen here, I 
would say that it certainly had a pro-Communist slant at times. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then you know now that the IPR had a pro-Com- 
munist slant at times, and you know now that at' times you received 
suggestions from IPR personnel and IPR writings ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall direct suggestions from them, but I 
have testified that in reading their writings and in conversations 
with them there is no doubt that there were suggestions. 

Mr. Sourwine. I don't mean to labor 

Mr. Vincent. I don't quite get what you mean by suggestions, 
whether you mean by suggestions that they came to me suggesting 
or whether I read or in conversation with them myself drew infer- 
ences from what they were saying. 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe you stated that both had occurred. 

Mr. Vincent. I think we understand each other, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were asked the question have you ever been 
in contact with any members of the Communist Party of the United 
States. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. The most that a man could say to that would be, 
not knowingly, isn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You stated categorically that you had not been. 

Mr. Vincent. Didn't I add to the best of my knowledge and belief ? 

Mr. Sourwine. You were asked if you had ever received advice on 
policy from any Communist or pro-Communist source. You have 
received advice on policy from people connected with the IPR, have 
you not ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1911 

Mr. Vincent. Now you are bringing the word "advice" in rather 
than suggestions ; that I could not say that I have received advice from 
members of the IPR or from the IPR itself ? 

Mr. Souewine. Persons connected with the IPR, was the question. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't doubt that from time to time in conversing 
with those people that they have attempted to give advice on matters 
of policy. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. You were asked if you had ever received any 
praise from any Communist government or its representative at any 
time. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Souewine. You said "No." 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Souewine. Do you remember Sergei Goglidze ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Mr. Souewine. We will go into that more fully later, but Mr. 
Goglidze did praise you, did he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say in connection with that toast he might 
have considered that praise. 

Mr. Souewine. There is an incident in the record of a statement by 
Mr. Sergei Goglidze which highly praised Mr. Lattimore and Mr. 
Vincent. 

Mr. Goglidze was at that time a representative of the Communist 
government, was he not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you answered that question categorically, 
then, your answer was a little too broad, at least, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not thinking in terms of that toast as praise. 

Mr. Souewine. I won't reiterate on all of these questions, but you 
were asked whether you had attended any social gatherings with 
Comnnmists or pro-Communists in the United States or any other 
country and you said "No." You did attend at least one, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Then I didn't understand the question, because I 
have attended social gatherings. I have attended receptions at the 

Mr. Souewine. Any time you don't understand the question please 
ask to have it repeated because your answers are going to be binding 
upon you, sir, and if the question is too broad we want you to narrow 
it down. If you don't understand it make sure you do. If you don't 
understand the meaning of a word, let's be sure that the understand- 
ing is there. For instance, in the executive sessions we had the 
understanding — and I would like to have it here — that if you use the 
phrase "it might have been," you mean it in the sense of something 
which you feel was logical under all the facts known to you and which 
you did not know did not happen, is that clear ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is clear ; yes. 

Mr. Souewine. You will not use the phrase "it might have been" 
merely in the sense of a hypothesis, the truth of which you have no 
knowledge or belief with regard to ? 

Mr. Vincent. I will try not to, if it confuses you. 

Mr. Souewine. Very well. If it strikes counsel that you are so 
using it we will certainly bring it up and straighten it out. 



1912 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for these digressions, but it is going 
to be a long hearing and I think perhaps that foundation will be 
helpful. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Sourwine. At the executive sessions — as the chairman knows., 
there were 3 days of executive sessions — a number of questions were 
asked which were necessarily tedious. Mr. Vincent and counsel have 
stated, and I ask them to reaffirm it here — that they have no objection 
to having those hearings or any part of them made public if the 
committee so rules. The committee of course has the right to remove 
the executive injunction from those at its option but I thought the 
record should show that Mr. Vincent and counsel have voiced no 
objection after having read the testimony. 

You were asked, sir, were you not, at the executive sessions with 
regard to what position you took in reference to the loyalty status 
of certain named individuals in the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I was. 

Mr. Sourwine. I would like to go through that list again. The 
question with respect to each name is this : What position, if any, did 
you take in reference to the loyalty status of this particular individual 
in the State Department ? 

That is a fairly inclusive question. Take your time in answering. 

Alger Hiss. 

Mr. Vincent. I recall taking no position on the loyalty status of 
Hiss. 

Mr. Sourwine. Cora DuBois. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of taking any. 

Mr. Sourwine. John K. Emmerson. 

Senator Eastland. Give him time to answer the question. 

Mr. Vincent. John K. Emmerson. I have no recollection of taking 
any position on the loyalty status of Emmerson. 

Mr. Sourwine. Robert W. Barnett. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I have not ; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Julian R. Friedman. 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge have I taken a position. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you ever hear of any charges against Mr. 
Friedman, any suspicion about him, any suggestions that he ought to 
be investigated or checked? 

Mr. Vincent. I may have, but I took no position on Friedman. No 
inquiry was ever made of me as to the loyalty status of Friedman that 
I recollect. 

The Chairman. Let him finish his answer. 

Mr. Vincent. That I recollect. I don't recall ever being questioned 
regarding the loyalty or taking a position on the loyalty of Friedman. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't anyone ever come to you with allegations 
against Mr. Friedman, with the statement or urging that they should 
be investigated? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall anything coming to me, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. John P. Davies. 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wilma Fairbank. 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. John Stewart Service? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1913 

The Chairman. Get this all clear. You are going back to your 
original question that he had taken no position and expressed nothing 
with reference to each one of these. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is correct. 

That brings up, before I go through with the rest of these names, 
your answer to Senator Eastland's question with regard to Mr. Service. 
As a matter of fact, do you know who made the telephone call to Mr. 
Service in California to tell him to go back to China, that he was going 
to work with General Wedemeyer ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you make that telephone call ? 

Mr. Vincent. It could be logical that I did, but you are asking me 
if I recall, and I don't recall telephoning him to go on back to China. 

Mr. Sourwine. I understand that you stated categorically in re- 
sponse to several questions along that line that you had nothing what- 
soever to do with Mr. Service's assignment or reassignment or 
instructions to return to China. 

Mr. Vincent. That was my testimony, sir, and based on my memory 
I have no recollection of having anything to do with Service's return- 
ing to China. He was already assigned to China in 1944. It was a 
mere matter of his returning, was it not ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember the occasion on which Mr. Service, 
then in California, was instructed to return to China and told that 
he was going to be attached to General Wedemeyer ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that, sir. I knew he was going to 
be attached, but I don't recall this particular occasion. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that he had been back to the United 
States and did return to China and was thereafter attached to General 
Wedemeyer ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. He had been attached previously to General 
Stilwell. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any circumstances at all about his 
return to China and his attachment to General Wedemeyer? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid I do not, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. Service himself had made 
a statement with regard to that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever read the hearings of the State Depart- 
ment employee loyalty investigation before a subcommittee of the 
Senate on Foreign Relations of the Eighty-first Congress? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not read it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I have here a copy of those hear- 
ings. They contain a paragraph which I shall ask the permission of 
the Chair to read. It is on page 1998 of the printed hearings, part 2, 
appendix. 

The Chairman. Very well, if it is pertinent to the matter we are 
discussing. 

Mr. Sourwine. This is a transcript of an oral statement made by 
Mr. Service before the Department of State Loyalty Board. 

The Chairman. That is a statement made under oath ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir. Referring to the telephone call we have 
just been discussing, which told Mr. Service that he was to go back to 



1914 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

China, the chairman said, "Who in the State Department made that 
telephone call ?" Answer, "Mr. John Carter Vincent." 

Do you have anything you want to add at this time to the statement 
you have made in that regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't have anything to add, sir. I simply do not 
recall telephoning Service. I recall that Service went back, but the 
fact that I made the telephone call has completely slipped my 
memory. 

Mr. Sourwine. He is and was a friend of yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. I don't even recall that there was an 
issue as to whether he was to go back. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next name is Laurence Salisbury. 

The Chairman. I think, Mr. Sourwine, you had better connect up 
there again. 

Mr. Sourwine. The question asked with regard to this name, as in 
the case of each of the other names, is, What position did you take 
in reference to the loyalty status of this individual in the State De- 
partment, Laurence Salisbury ? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall taking no position with reference to his 
loyalty. 

Mr. Sourwine. Raymond Ludden. 

Mr. Vincent. I took no position that I recall in connection with 
the loyalty status of Ludden. 

Mr. Sourwine. William T. Stone. 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. There is a point, sir, that perhaps should be cleared 
up. Newspaper accounts have differed with respect to your comment 
on the testimony of Louis Budenz. Many newspapers and all of the 
national wire services have referred to the fact that you called Mr. 
Budenz' testimony false. Certain other publications, including the 
New York Compass and the Daily Worker, have specifically used the 
word "perjury." You have made a statement here today which dealt 
with the matter. Would you tell the committee whether you wish to 
be understood as declaring Mr. Budenz' testimony to be in error be- 
cause of faulty memory or improper recollection or hallucinations or 
the drawing of unjustifiable conclusions or any similar noncriminal 
reason or whether you wish to charge Mr. Budenz specifically with 
willful perjury? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not wish to charge Mr. Budenz with willful 
perjury. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you were subpenaed to attend this hearing 
were you requested to bring with you certain documents ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you bring them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give the committee an explanation for not 
bringing them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was that explanation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I said I requested the State Department permission 
to bring them and the State Department said they could not release 
the papers. 

The Chairman. What is the record on that with reference to the 
State Department, Mr. Counsel ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1915 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, the letter of the chairman to the 
State Department requesting 32 categories of documents is already- 
referred to in the record, together with the State Department's reply. 

The Chairman. In the record in executive session? 

Mr. Sourwine. In the record in executive session. It will be the 
recommendation of the staff that that record be opened up as a public 
record and be made a part of the printed record of the examination 
of Mr. Vincent. With that in mind we are not immediately prepared 
to put that letter in the record again. The State Department took 
the position that most of the documents could not be turned over and 
they were therefore refused on the grounds that to turn them over 
would hamper the free flow and interchange of information at various 
levels in the State Department. 

There is here, Mr. Chairman, a list of the 32 documents which were 
requested of the State Department, and if desired it can go in the 
record at this time. 

The Chairman. I think it should go in the record at this time. 
I think the answer of the State Department should follow. 

Mr. Sourwine. Very good, sir. Will you order that it be laid in at' 
the proper place in the record ? The question I was asking Mr. Vin-~ 
cent was his own answer with regard to these documents because the 
request was made separately to him and to the State Department. 

The Chairman. He seemed to be inclined — at least he had no objec- 
tion to bringing the instruments requested, but the State Department 
refused to permit him to bring them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that substantially your statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is substantially correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. You felt you had no authority to bring any of those 
documents without the State Department's authorization? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. I had no possession of them. 

(The documents referred were marked "Exhibits No. 376 and No. 
377," and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 376 

January 2, 1952. 
Hon. Dean Acheson, 
Secretary of State 

State Department, Washington, D. C. 
My Dear Mr. Secretary : Due to unf orseen circumstances, the appearance of 
John Carter Vincent before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will have 
to be postponed from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25. 

In the interests of full justice to Mr. Vincent and in order to safeguard against 
any possible misinterpretation of his position or that of the Department of 
State, we are asking him to bring with him the enclosed documents. It would 
undoubtedly expedite matters if the State Department made all the necessary 
arrangements for obtaining these documents from its files for use at this bear- 
ing. 

It would further expedite the situation if the Senate Internal Security Sub- 
committee were given access to the loyalty file of Mr. Vincent. 
Sincerely, 

Pat McCarran, Chairman. 

John Carter Vincent — Documents Requested 

1. Correspondence with United States Embassy staff in Chungking from July 1 

to December 30, 1945. 

2. Copy of statement issued criticizing statement of six members of the House 

Military Affairs Committee regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East — 



1916 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

House Members' statement published September 10, 1946 — Vincent state- 
ment subsequent. 

3. Drafts of all statements prepared by Vincent for General Marshall. 

4. Draft of statement for Secretary Byrnes in the fall of 1946 recommending 

withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government of China. 

5. Copy of speech delivered before the Far East luncheon of the National 

Foreign Trade Council on November 11, 1946, stating that it is unsound 
to invest capital in countries with corrupt regimes. 

6. Drafts of all memos prepared for Henry A. Wallace, or correspondence with 

him. 

7. Copies of all recommendations made to Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. 

8. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Julian R. Friedman, 

Harry B. Price, Philip Jaffe. 

9. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Alger Hiss, Hugh 

DeLacy, Frederick V. Field. 

10. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with John P. Davies, 

Raymond Ludden, John S. Service, T. A. Bisson, Edward C. Carter, Miriam 
Farley, John K. Fairbank. 

11. AH memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Patrick J. Hurley. 

12. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Owen Lattimore, 

Lauchlin Currie, Solomon Adler. 

13. Draft presented to Secretary of State in the fall of 1946 used as a basis for 

the President's statement of December 18, 1946. 

14. Letter of Vincent to John E. Peurifoy dated March 7, 1950, from American 

Legation at Bern. 

15. Copy of speech made at IPR (Institute of Pacific Relations) conference at 

Hot Springs, Va., in 1945. 

16. Memorandum prepared for Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the 

late autumn of 1945, later submitted to the Secretary of State and the 
White House. 

17. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Gen. Albert C. 

Wedemeyer and Gen. Joseph Stilwell. 

18. Drafts of all memos on Japanese Peace Treaty and surrender conditions. 

19. Recommendations on the supply of arms to the Chinese Nationalists and the 

Chinese Communists; also all estimates and recommendations regarding 
the Chinese Communists. 

20. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with John N. Hazard, 

Joseph Barnes, Vladimir Rogoff. 

21. Full statement published in the New York Herald Tribune September 4, 1946, 

attacking MacArthur for violation of State DeparLment directives re 
"building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union." 

22. Statement authorized by Vincent in the latter part of 1946 re American naval 

vessel being summarily ordered out of Dairen by Soviet commander in 
violation of Yalta Pact and Sino-Soviet Pact of 1945. 

23. Copy of address at Cornell University January 21, 1947, indirectly attack- 

ing Chinese Nationalist Government. 

24. All documents in connection with Vincent's change from Minister to Switzer- 

land to the position of diplomatic agent and consul general at Tangier. 

25. A full record of votes by Vincent before the International Assets Commission 

which voted on the question of turning over the assets of the Chinese Na- 
tionalist Government to the Chinese Communists. 

26. Copies of all cables sent by Vincent to the State Department in June 1943. 

27. Broadcast speech contained in State Department Bulletin October 7, 1945, 

page 538. 

28. Vincent recommendations regarding the setting up of the Korean government. 
2i>. Memorandum prepared by Vincent about March or April 1945, regarding 

conferences with Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer held in Washington. 

30. Vincent report of conversation with Ohou-En-lai and Lin Piao on November 

20, 1942, and any other conversations with Communist leaders in China. 
(See p. 3, Subject: Kuomintang-Communist situation— probably Service 
document.) 

31. All memoranda furnished by Mr. Vincent to Mr. Wallace in connection with 

the latter's mission to China in 1944 and in connection with subsequent 
reports on the mission. 

32. All memoranda furnished by Mr. Vincent to President Truman relative to the 

la Iter's statement on China policy made December 15, 1949. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1917 

Exhibit No. 377 

January 22, 1952. 
The Honorable Pat McCarran, 

United States Senate. 

My Deab Senator McCarran : This is in reply to your letter of January 
2, 1952, requesting that the Department of State transmit to the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee 32 categories of documents from its files relating to 
Mr. John Carter Vincent and to the policy of the Department of State with 
respect to the Far East. 

Mr. Vincent has referred to us your letter to him dated January 2, 1952, in 
which you also requested the same 32 categories of documents, and has re- 
quested the Department to cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in making 
the documents available. 

The Department is happy to cooperate to the fullest extent that its regulations 
and policies permit. 

There is transmitted herewith a copy of the speech delivered by Mr. Vincent 
before the National Foreign Trade Council on November 12, 1946, summary notes 
of conversations between Vice President Wallace and President Chiang Kai-shek 
prepared by Mr. Vincent, a copy of a letter from Mr. Vincent to Mr. John E. 
Peurifoy, dated March 7, 1950, a press release issued by the Department of 
State January 6, 1947, on the status and control of the port of Dairen, and a 
press release of October 5, 1945, on a radio forum concerning our occupation 
policy for Japan. There is also enclosed a paraphrase of the telegrams sent 
by Vice President Wallace to President Roosevelt as a result of Vice President 
Wallace's mission to the Far East, a mission on which he was accompanied 
by Mr. Vincent. These telegrams deal with both General Stilwell and General 
Wedemeyer. 

The records of the Department do not disclose any statement criticizing the 
statement of six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding 
Soviet intentions in the Far East, the text of any speech made at the conference 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Hot Springs, Va. in January 1945, any 
statement of November 4, 1946, concerning General MacArthur, or the text of 
an address delivered by Mr. Vincent at Cornell on January 21, 1947. 

With respect to the remainder of the requests, it is noted that they call for 
a large number of internal documents of the Department of State. In many 
cases these are reports from the field. It is the view of the Department that 
preserving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter 
of principle of the highest importance. It is equally important to protect the 
integrity of internal memoranda in which views are exchanged in the forma- 
tion of policy. The release of these documents would undoubtedly inhibit the 
free and frank expression of views by the officers of the Department. For 
these reasons, the request for .these internal papers presents such serious ques- 
tions of policy and principle that it has been felt necessary to refer the matter 
to the White House for reply. 

Your request for the loyalty file on Mr. Vincent has also been referred to the 
White House as required by the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948. 
Sincerely yours, 

Carlisle H. Htjmelsine, 

Deputy Under Secretary 
(For the Secretary of State). 

Enclosures : As stated above. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, you were qualified as an expert on 
the Far East by more than 20 years of training and experience, is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Vincen. That is correct, with the modification that my train- 
ing and experience have been primarily in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. You testified, I believe, that you considered your- 
self an expert on the Far East, particularly with regard to China? 

Mr. Vincent. Particularly with regard to China, because I have 
not had actual physical service outside of China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is the committee satisfied with this qualification 
of Mr. Vincent or does it desire further questions asked ? We will go 
more into his experience as the examination progresses. 



1918 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Did you or do you know Mortimer Graves ? 

Mr. Vincent. I met him here in Washington. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify Mortimer Graves ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I first met Mortimer Graves when I came 
back from China in 1943. I don't believe I met him before. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who is or was Mortimer Graves ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mortimer Graves was a member of something called 
the Learned Societies. I don't recall the exact title he had here. He 
was working at the time I met him in connection with some kind of 
study of languages for the Government, I believe. I am testifying 
here completely from memory because Mr. Mortimer Graves was not 
a close friend of mine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you continued the acquaintanceship since 
1943? 

Mr. Vincent. I saw him probably from time to time between 1943 
and 1945. I don't recall seeing him subsequent to 1945 or 1946. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you carry on a correspondence with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of a correspondence with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you or do you know Edwin M. Martin? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify him ? 

Mr. Vincent. He is an economist in the State Department whom I 
met first, I would say, when I came back from China, either in 1943 
or 1944, some time during the period of my service in the State De- 
partment. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he ever Chief, Division of Japanese and 
Korean Economic Affairs for the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my recollection that was his title. He 
was in it, whether he was chief or not I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was that? 

Mr. Vincent. That would have been — I am now testifying purely 
from memory — in 1945, 1 should think. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you at that time Chief of the Far Eastern 
Division, Director? 

Mr. Vincent. I became Director of the Far Eastern Office in Sep- 
tember 1945. Prior to that I had been Chief of the China Division. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic 
Affairs under the Far Eastern Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is a separate division? 

Mr. Vincent. Under Mr. Will Clayton. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Martin, then, at the time you were Director 
of the Far Eastern Division, was on a level with you in the State 
Department echelon? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't give exact testimony to that because he 
didn't have the title of Director, so I doubt whether he would be 
technically considered on the same echelon. He would have been 
considered the same echelon when I was Chief of the China Division, 
but he would not have been 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he then your subordinate ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he in any sense your protege ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not say so. Mr. Edwin Martin was never 
a protege of mine. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1919 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he work under you ? 

Mr. Vincent. He worked with me from time to time, but he did not 
work under me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever seek your advice or counsel with regard 
to his work? 

Mr. Vincent. I should think he would have. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. He did very frequently ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would be logical for him. I don't recall. We 
will use your word logical. It certainly would have been logical for 
him in the economics office, and there were always committee meetings 
and consultations. 

The Chairman. Does your memory serve you that he did or that 
he did not? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have thought that he would have sought my 
advice. 

The Chairman. You say it is logical. What is your memory ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I have no distinct recollection of his seeking 
my advice, sir, but it would have been logical for him to do so. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, he conferred with you with 
considerable frequency, didn't he? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; but I was saying I was not able to recall specific 
instances. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you do know that he did confer with you 
frequently ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, did you know that Mr. Martin was a speaker 
much sought after by the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never knew that he made speeches for the Insti- 
tute or at their request ? 

Mr. Vincent. Edwin Martin? I have no recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was Mr. Martin's position with regard to 
General MacArthur and his activities ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall his attitude on General MacArthur 
and his activities. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know him to or hear him express him- 
self with regard to General MacArthur's staff? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't have any recollection of Martin 
discussing General MacArthur's staff. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say it was not common knowledge in the 
State Department what attitude and opinion Mr. Martin held with 
regard to General MacArthur's staff ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say it was common opinion because it cer- 
tainly wasn't common to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say it was not common knowledge in 
the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Martin ever express himself to you or in 
your hearing with regard to officials in Korea who are opposed or 
were opposed then to the left-wing element ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of his making such a statement, 
sir. 

22S48 — 52 — pt. 6 — —16 



1920 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever express himself with regard to the 
Korean Commission ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall his expressing himself to me. To what 
Korean Commission would that be, sir? I am trying to get that pre- 
cisely. I have no recollection of his making any comments to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Having raised the question, let's get it precise. How 
many Korean Commissions were there ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to get myself what is the Korean Com- 
mission at this time. I have been out of this country for 6 years. I 
was trying to remember what was the Korean Commission. If you 
have data 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't place the Korean Commission? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't at this moment place the Korean Commission. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is possible that counsel has used a misnomer. Do 
you know whether he ever characterized the Korean Commission or 
any agency that he referred to as the Korean Commission as right- 
win g reactionaries ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall his making such a statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. There has been some discussion with regard to Mr. 
John Stewart Service. To be sure your testimony is complete on that 
point, will you identify him and tell the committee when and where 
you met him ? 

Mr. Vincent. May I refer to these notes I have here just so it is 
in accord with the facts and the dates? 

Mr. Sourwine. Are those the same notes you had at the executive 
session ? 

Mr. Vincent. The same notes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you augmented them in any regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no names in there now that you didn't have 
in the original notes ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. So you have, then, already commented to the com- 
mittee in the executive session on each of the names that you have in 
that notebook, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir; as far as I recall. I haven't added any 
names to it. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is understood, Mr. Chairman — it was understood 
in the executive session and I will ask Mr. Vincent to agree to this —  
that when he uses this notebook it is for the purpose of refreshing his 
recollection. He is not reading the notebook and saying this is what 
the notebook says. He is saying this is my testimony, having been 
refreshed from notes which I have myself made. 

The Chairman. These notes are of his own making ? 

Mr. Sourwine. They are of your own making ? That is your testi- 
mony, is it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir; and in looking up to find out what times 
or places Service may have served. 

The Chairman. How did it come about that you prepared these 
notes preliminary to the executive session ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because I went through some of the hearings of the 
committee and people who may have been mentioned in connection 
with me, I anticipated that there probably would be a request for 
testimony, and my purpose was solely to have as nearly exact inf orma- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1921 

tion as I could get as to what my associations were with these various 
people. 

The Chairman. In making the notes did you confer with others or 
did you confer with records ? 

Mr. Vincent. I conferred with records. 

Mr. Sottrwine. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vincent brought out in the 
executive session that the State Department has in its library a com- 
plete file of the hearings of this committee in the manuscript form, 
that is, a file purchased from the reporter. He didn't have to wait 
until the printed record came out. The State Department purchased 
that. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Vincent. Do you want me to give this data ? 

The Chairman. Now, let's have the question, please. 

Mr. Sourwine. The question is to identify Mr. John Stewart Serv- 
ice and tell the committee when and where you first met him. 

Mr. Vincent (reading). Service was a junior secretary at our Em- 
bassy in Chungking when I was counselor under Ambassador Gauss 
from May 1941 to May 1943. For a while during this period he lived 
in the house with Ambassador Gauss and me. He was an active and 
intelligent young officer. I do not recall the exact nature of his as- 
signments. In 1943, Service was lent to General Stilwell's headquar- 
ters as a sort of political adviser. Several other junior officers were 
similarly assigned. 

My next contact with Service was in 1944 when he came home on a 
short vacation. In 1945 he was in Washington again. He was as- 
signed to the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service 
doing some kind of administrative work. It was at this time that the 
Amerasia case broke. I never discussed the case with Service, nor 
did I have anything to do with the Amerasia case, but I did, along 
with other friends, make a small contribution to help him hire legal 
counsel. I believe he repaid me. 

After the grand jury dismissed the case against Service, he was 
assigned to General MacArthur's headquarters, and I do not believe 
I saw him again before my departure for Switzerland in 1947. When 
I came home in 1949 for 10 days' consultation, Service was in Wash- 
ington and we and other friends had lunch together. 

Since my return to Washington I have seen Service once in the halls 
of the State Department. We chatted briefly. I have not seen him 
since. 

I do not mean to imply by the foregoing that I have avoided Service. 
It was simply a matter of no time for social meeting and we both had 
other business. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you intend that statement, Mr. Vincent, to be 
a full and complete disclosure to the committee of your association 
with Mr. Service? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. I could add to it that without doubt I may 
have seen Service at other places prior to 1942, but — he may have been 
in Shanghai at the time I was there. Or our paths may have crossed 
elsewhere. 

Mr. Sourwine. How well do you know him ? 

Mr. Vincent. Quite well. 

Mr. Sourwine. You still know him quite well ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 



1922 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him for employment? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of recommending him. He 
was already employed when I met him. You mean as to assignment ? 
He was employed when I met him first. He was already employed 
with the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your answer is that you never recommended him 
for employment ? 

Mr. Vincent. Employment. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him for assignment to any 
particular post ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall ever recommending him for assign- 
ment. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him for promotion % 

Mr. Vincent. Let me see. No, I have no recollection of recom- 
mending him for promotion. 

The Chairman. Who effected or brought about his being lent to 
General Stilwell? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I would say General Stilwell did 
himself. I think General Stilwell made a request of the State Depart- 
ment to assign to him certain officers in 1942. 

The Chairman. Did Stilwell select or name the officers that he 
wanted ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say whether General Stilwell actually se- 
lected them or not, 

The Chairman. He was at that time housed with you and someone 
else? 

Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Gauss. Ambassador Gauss and I dur- 
ing my period in Chungking lived together, and some time during that 
period a short time Service was also there. 

The Chairman. It was during that period that he was lent to Gen- 
eral Stilwell % 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. He was lent to General Stilwell, and I 
think in that period he then moved out and another young secretary 
moved in with Ambassador Gauss and myself. 

The Chairman. His being lent to General Stilwell must have come 
from some State Department authority ? 

Mr. Vincent. The State Department would have had to approve 
his being loaned to him. He still continued to be on the State De- 
partment payroll and continued to have the title, I think, of third 
or second secretary with the Embassy. But his work was with Gen- 
eral Stilwell. 

The Chairman. You had nothing to do with his going with Gen- 
eral Stilwell? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. General Stilwell I think chose 
his own people. Service was already in China and was known to Stil- 
well. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever arrange for Mr. Service to make a talk 
forthelPR? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall that he made a talk 
before the IPR, and I don't recall any recollection of my arranging 
for him making a talk. 

The Chairman. That wasn't the question. What is that question 



again 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1923 

Mr. Vincent. The question is did I ever arrange for him to talk, 
and I said that I had no recollection of making arrangements for his 
talking or of his talking before the 1PR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Following Mr. Service's return to Washington in 
1944 did someone in the IPR ask you whether it would be possible to 
have Mr. Service come over and give an informal off-the-record talk 
to some of the IPR people in their Washington office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of such an instance, but again 
I will say that it would be logical for somebody to ask me whether a 
returning officer could come over and make a talk. I say I have no 
memory of the incident. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you arrange talks for the IPR so frequently 
that they didn't make any mental impression on you, Mr. Vincent ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. I don't recall ever making arrangements 
for talks with the IPR, even this one that you mention here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. Service has himself 
stated that the circumstances were substantially as indicated in my 
question, that is that someone in the IPR asked if it would be possible 
for him to come over and make a talk and cleared it with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of that incident. It would be 
logical for them to call me. 

Senator Eastland. I would like to get the information connected 
with his joining IPR. Who sponsored him? Would you ask him 
those questions ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir ; I have a series of questions on it. I will be 
glad to ask them now if the Senator wishes. 

Senator Eastland. No. Go ahead, that is all right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who would have arranged for Mr. Service to make 
a talk before the IPR, if it was to be arranged from a State Depart- 
ment source ? Who had the authority ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say who would have the authority. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had it, didn't you ? 

Mr. Vincent. If I had the authority — I would not have thought it 
would take authority for him to make an off-the-record talk. 

The Chairman. Do you not know whether you had that authority 
or not? 

Mr. Vincent. To allow him ? He was not under my control. 

Mr. Sourwine. A moment ago you said it would have been logical 
for him to come to you. Why would it have been logical for him to 
come to you? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been logical because I was Chief of 
the China Division at that time. 

The Chairman. You were his superior, too. 

Mr. Vincent. You have there to go into the whole matter of the 
arrangements in the State Department. I was a senior officer, but not 
in any sense his superior in the sense that I gave him instructions 
what to do or not to do, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Eastland. Why? 

Mr. Vincent. Because he was working at that time under General 
Stilwell, loaned by the State Department to General Stilwell, and was 
home, as I gather it, on leave. 

The Chairman. That isn't the time referred to in the question. 

Mr. Vincent. What is the time ? 

The Chairman. Back to the question. 



1924 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Following Mr. Service's return to Washington in 
1944. 

Mr. Vincent. At that time he was assigned to General Stilwell. 

Mr. Sourwine. If there was a man in a lower echelon from the 
State Department who desired a clearance at a higher level with 
regard to making a speech outside the Department and he did come to 
you, would you have had authority to express an opinion as to whether 
he could or could not properly make that speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is a difficult question. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you have hesitated to express an opinion in 
such a case ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would probably have told — as I said, I am testify- 
ing — I probably would have told him I saw no objection to his going 
over and making a talk before them. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you would have told him that as a matter 
of course, without investigating the circumstances, or going into where 
he was going to make the speech or who the people were % 

Mr. Vincent. No. If he told me where he was going or if he just 
told me the IPR, I would have had no objection at the time to his 
going before the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give Mr. Service any papers to be 
taken or delivered to anyone else ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of ever giving Service papers 
to be delivered elsewhere. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give Mr. Service any papers to be 
given to Mr. Jaffe ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did any of your associates or subordinates do so? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think they did, but I have no exact knowl- 
edge on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you instruct anyone directly or indirectly to 
give Mr. Service any papers to take to Mr. Jaffe? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Where did he get those papers ? Did they come 
from your department? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time, at the time of the Amerasia case, he 
was working down in the administrative office. How he ever got those 
papers- 



Senator Eastland. Was he in your department? 

Mr. Vincent. No, he was not in my Division. He was working in 
the Administrative Division of the State Department in 1945. He 
was not in the Far Eastern Office at that time. 

Senator Eastland. Those papers were under your charge, were 
they not? 

Mr. Vincent. They were not. They were under my charge in the 
sense that I was Chief of the China Division. 

Senator Eastland. That is what I mean. They were under your 
charge. Did he have access to them ? 

Mr. Vtncent. He probably did. As a China service man and officer 
in the State Department. 

Mr. Morris. They were reports on conditions in China, weren't 
they, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the nature of these. I haven't read 
the Service testimony and I don't recall the nature of the documents. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1925 

But it is correct to say that they were in the charge of the Far Eastern 
Office, and I was the Chief of the China Division. 

Senator Eastland. They were under you. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. Did you say he had access to those papers I 

Mr. Vincent. He could have come up and seen papers because he 
was a member 

The Chairman. Let's get your statement there. The question of 
the Senator is did he have access? You can answer that "yes or "no." 

Senator Eastland. Of course, he can answer it "yes" or "no." 

Mr. Vincent. I have answered that he would have had access to 
the papers up in the Far Eastern Office. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Eastland. Who sponsored you for membership in the IPR, 
Mr. Vincent. 

Mr. Vincent. I have learned lately that it was Dr. Philip Jessup. 
I did not know it at the time or didn't recall that I was sponsored by 
anyone. But I have seen somewhere 

Senator Eastland. Didn't you attempt to find out who sponsored 
you for membership when they asked you to join ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. 

Senator Eastland. How long were you a member before you were 
put on the board of trustees ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wasn't a member before I was put on the board of 
trustees. 

Senator Eastland. When you became a member you were put on 
the board of trustees ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. How were you notified of membership ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of a letter being served, but I 
imagine I was notified that I had been made a trustee. 

Senator Eastland. By whom ? Who notified you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall, Senator. 

Senator Eastland. Mr. Jessup ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have seen somewhere that Mr. Jessup was the one 
who recommended me. 

Senator Eastland. Did Mr. Lattimore have anything to do with it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Senator Eastland. You were a friend of Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was a friend of Mr. Lattimore. 

Senator Eastland. You are a friend of his now ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. In fact, when you were in the Far Eastern Divi- 
sion of the State Department you were friendly with Mr. Lattimore, 
were you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. How long were you a member of IPE % 

Mr. Vincent. Just that 1 year — 1945. 

Senator Eastland. Why did you quit? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I was just not rechosen as a trustee or a member. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, didn't you decline to serve for a 
second term ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection on that, but my point is that I 
didn't become a member again and I presume I did decline. 



1926 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sottrwine. That is a little different from not being chosen 
again, isn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember why you declined ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. You have said that you could re- 
fresh my memory on that, I think, in executive hearing. 

Senator Eastland. Did Mr. Lattimore discuss with you our China 
policies ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did from time to time, Senator, when he was 
Deputy Director of the OWI, the Office of War Information. Dur- 
ing what period that was I don't know. 

Senator Eastland. Did he advise with you about our policies in 
China and Asia at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. He almost had to, if I may add. He al- 
most had to as Deputy of OWI. There were conferences all the time 
because they had to keep in touch with us in the State Department 
on what was the general line. 

Senator Eastland. That is what I asked you. What you are say- 
ing is that he was attempting to find out what your policies were. 
Did he advise you what those policies should be? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall his advising me as to what our poli- 
cies should be. He advised with us as to what policies were, and then 
through the mechanism of the OWI they were trying to work out their 
matter of bringing information to the Far East during that period of 
1944, 1 think it was, that he was Deputy Director of OWI. 

The Chairman. The policy was made in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; not in OWI. 

The Chairman. Not in OWI, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, weren't you considered by the IPR as a 
"trusted" member of the IPR, and I use that word in quotes? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge that they considered me a 
trusted member of the IPR. I never had had any association with 
the IPR to any extent prior to my choice or election as a trustee. I 
had known the IPR members, but I had not followed the affairs of the 
IPR with any closeness. 

The Chairman. As the picture stands now, as I view it — and I wish 
you would correct me if I am wrong — that you became a member, and 
when you became a member you became a trustee ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Immediately on your being selected ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was never a member other than the period when I 
was a trustee. 

The Chairman. All right. Then you failed to be a member and 
was no longer on the board of trustees, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. And I may add there that the board 
of trustees, if it met, I never met with it during the time I was 
a* trustee. I didn't participate in whatever deliberations there were 
expected of trustees. I don't know what deliberations were expected 
of trustees. 

Senator Eastland. Do you know Freddie Field ? 

Mr. Vincent. I met him once or twice. 

Senator Eastland. Where ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1927 

Mr. Vincent. I met him for the first time, I think, at an IPE 
conference at Hot Springs in January 1945, at a social gathering. 
I may have met him at a meeting here in Washington of the American 
delegation. I was on the American delegation to the IPE con- 
ference in Hot Springs in 1945. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, do you recall having seen a report on 
the subject of The Need of an American Policy Toward the Problems 
Created by the Eise of the Chinese Communist Party, a report indi- 
cating that the Communists are about one-fifth of the population and 
that they were going to have a definite influence on the future of 
China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Will you state your question again, sir ? Do I recall 
seeing such a document ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall seeing such a document. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that that was one of the so-called 
Amerasia papers ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know to this day that that is one of the 
Amerasia papers ; no sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall having seen a document, a report on 
the subject The Growth of the New Fourth Army, an Example of the 
Popular Democratic Appeal of the Chinese Communists, indicat- 
ing that the popular support of the Chinese Communists shows their 
policies and methods are democratic ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall such a document. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall having seen a document entitled The 
Views of Mao Tse-tung, America and China, dated in March of 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. My answer again is I db not recall the document. 
My testimony is that I do not recall the document. If I saw the 
document, it was one of many that passed across my desk as Chief 
of the China Division, but I have no present recollection of those docu- 
ments. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that all three of those documents I 
mentioned were among the so-called Amerasia papers ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any information or knowledge as to 
how any of those documents could have gotten into the possession of 
Amerasia ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, except that the testimony is that Service 
was the man who brought them there, so the testimony is. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, did you ever give confidential and specific 
advice to the Institute of Pacific Eelations in connection with the 
advisability of their publishing a controversial report on the Chinese 
situation written by Maxwell Stewart? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Morris, I have no recollection of giving such 
advice on the report. I don't even recall the report. I do not recall 
ever having any confidential conversations with regard to such re- 
port. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

Mr. Souravine. Mr. Service, did you ever hear 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Vincent, please. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, did you ever hear the view expressed 
that the Chinese Communists had a non-Eussian orientation ? 



1928 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I have heard that view expressed, yes, because in 
China frequently we would use the term "Chinese Chinese Com- 
munists" and "Russian Chinese Communists." I don't recall any 
particular Chinese called by one or the other of those names, but 
there was an impression that some of the Communists in Yenan were 
more Russian in their viewpoint than some of the others. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., ever espouse the 
view that the Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall his expressing such a view, but I do 
recall that Davies was one of them also who referred to what you 
would call Chinese Communists and Russian Chinese Communists. 
I wouldn't be surprised if he wasn't the one that created that idea. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever express or approve the view that the 
Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall expressing such a view, sir. 

Senator Eastland. What were your views ? 

Mr. Vincent. My views were that some of the Chinese Commu- 
nists were not as closely allied to the Russians as some of the others. 

Senator Eastland. What about the leadership ? 

Mr. Vincent. The leadership of Mao Tse-tung we considered to 
be out-and-out Communist, and some of the people under him. I re- 
call, I think it was Chu Teh, the head of the army, was not considered 
to be as much of a pro-Russian Communist, but there was never any 
question but what they were Communists. 

Senator Eastland. They were not agricultural reformers? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear or see the view expressed that 
the Chinese Communists were pursuing a policy of self-limitation so 
far as the postwar period was concerned ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of self -limitation ? No ; I don't recall such a report. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. John Paton Davies ever 
expressed that view? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a matter of fact whether he ever 
expressed that view. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see a memorandum in which he ex- 
pressed that view ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall seeing the memorandum. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what is meant by that phrase, that 
the Chinese Communists were pursuing a policy of self-limitation? 

Mr. Vincent. I must confess I don't know what he meant unless he 
meant that in the postwar period they were not going to try to take 
over the power. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is what it was used to mean, isn't it, that the 
program of the Reds after the war was to make sure for communism 
the areas they had already taken over, but that they did not contem- 
plate further expansion? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wasn't that a view held by Mr. Davies, among 
others ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know that that was a view held by Mr. 
Davies. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that that was a view held by anybody? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall anyone expressing that view to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Ambassador Gauss agree with that view? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1929 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't know whether Ambassador Gauss agreed 
with that view or not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you agree with it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you attach a memorandum to a report by Mr. 
Service expressing that viewpoint, stating therein or indicating in it 
agreement with Mr. Service's views in that regard? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall such an incident. 

Mr. Sourwine. Speaking of Mr. Service, you stated here a moment 
ago that Mr. Service was and is your good friend, and yet you stated 
you had never discussed with him the matter of the Amerasia case. 
How do you account for the fact that in the case of a good friend of 
yours, who had serious accusations made against him, you never so 
much as slapped him on the back and said, "I am for you, old boy" or 
"I don't believe it," or give any other expression about him? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any 

Senator Eastland. He put up money for him, did he not? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't. As a matter of fact, during that pe- 
riod — we are speaking of the period when he was under charge, before 
he went before the grand jury 

Mr. Sourwine. You said "never." You said you never discussed 
with him the question of the Amerasia case. 

Mr. Vincent. I will have to correct that to say that after the grand 
jury released him, then I am quite sure that he or I discussed the 
case. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you never discussed it with him during the 
time that he was under suspicion, so to speak? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall discussing it with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that because you were cautious? 

Mr. Vincent. It was because I thought that he should keep away 
and not discuss it with anyone, just go and get a lawyer. As I say, he 
may have popped into the State Department one time or another but 
I have no recollection of discussing the case with him while it was 
pending. 

Mr. Sourwine. It wasn't because he kept away. It was because 
you thought he should stay away? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't know that I thought he should stay 
away, but I thought he should consult counsel and handle the case 
that way rather than consult people in the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you as a matter of fact avoid him? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not avoid him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever send word to him or notification that 
you didn't want to see him or it would be better if he didn't see you? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall telling him not to come to see me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have ? 

Mr. Vincent. I just simply say I don't recall it, but I don't think 
that the issue arose of telling him not to come. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did hold the view that he shouldn't be seen 
around the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I did hold that view while the case was pending. 
Whether he came around the State Department I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, did you ever try to get Owen Lattimore 
appointed to a job in the State Department? 



1930 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I testified on that, sir, and I would be glad to do so 
again. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Please. 

Mr. Vincent. In the early spring of 1945 the question arose of get- 
ting someone in the State Department — as I have testified before, 
whether it was Mr. Lattimore who first suggested it or myself — to 
come in on a consultancy basis and furnish background technical in- 
formation on the border areas of China, meaning by that Mongolia, 
Sinkiang, and possibly Manchuria. Mr. Lattimore had written a 
book called Inner Asian Frontiers of China. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Is that the book [indicating] ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Let the record show that counsel is showing the 
witness a book. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is the book. 

I considered Mr. Lattimore an expert on this. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Had you read this book? 

Mr. Vincent. I had read the book, not carefully, but I had gone 
through the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. You read it carefully enough to satisfy yourself 
that he was an expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and I had also discussed the area with Mr. Lat- 
timore when we traveled through a large portion of it during the trip 
with Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. Sourwine. How carefully do you have to read a book to sat- 
isfy yourself that the writer is an expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you don't have to read it very carefully to 
reach that conclusion ? 

Mr. Vincent. In connection with Mr. Lattimore, having already 
talked to him in China and seen him in action and seen what he did 
know about Sinkiang and what he did know about Outer Mongolia. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You are the one who brought up the book. If you 
mean you knew he was an expert before you read the book, that is 
one thing. If you concluded he was an expert from reading the book, 
that is another thing. I am trying to find out what the fact is. 

Mr. Vincent. The fact is, I concluded he was an expert from the 
reading of the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before that you didn't know he was an expert? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't know he was an expert on that. I knew he 
traveled in those areas. I knew he had been in Mongolia. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you say you didn't read the book very 
carefully. 

Mr. Vincent. I read the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said, "I didn't read it very carefully." 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Nevertheless, from your reading of the book you 
concluded he was an expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, on page 101 of this book there is a 
paragraph which I ask 

The Chairman. What book are you referring to ? 

Mr. Sourwine. This is the book I showed the witness and identified 
by him as Inner Asian Frontiers of China, by Owen Lattimore. 



INSTITUTE OF PACTFIC RELATIONS 1931 

Senator Eastland. Let him finish his answer about Lattimore's 
job in the State Department. Had you finished that? 

Mr. Vincent. I hadn't finished that. 

Mr. Sourwine. I beg the Senator's pardon. 

Mr. Vincent. At that time in the State Department we also had 
in the Far Eastern Office the late Dr. Kennedy of Yale, who was per- 
forming similar services with regard to Indonesia and some of the 
southeast Asian areas. The way the system operated these people 
would come down 1 or 2 days a week on a per diem basis and prepare 
background material that might be needed. 

Senator Eastland. And advise you about what our policy should 
be there ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not conceived as a policy job particularly, 
Senator, although that certainly would come out. 

The Chairman. It was partly a policy job, wasn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. There was prepared a form in the State De- 
partment which was to authorize the per diem employment of Mr. 
Lattimore. 

Senator Eastland. What were you going to pay him ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't know ; what the prevailing 

Senator Eastland. You have read Mr. Lattimore's books, have 
you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. You knew him, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. You knew Lattimore intimately, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. You knew Lattimore had always followed the 
Communist line, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Haven't you studied Mr. Lattimore's books? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say I have studied Mr. Lattimore's books. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would not say you have studied them ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, and I don't know that I would say that he 
has followed the Communist line. I have no feeling that Mr. Latti- 
more has followed a Communist line. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you read enough of Mr. Lattimore's books to 
satisfy yourself with regard to a conclusion as to whether he is merely 
liberal or pro-Communist? 

Senator Eastland. Or worse. 

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified that I have read through this 
book and I have seen Solution in Asia, and I have not drawn the 
conclusion that Mr. Lattimore was Communist or pro-Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have drawn no conclusion at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you state you had studied Mr. Lattimore's 
books and from your study you had concluded he was merely a liberal? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what I stated here to the committee. 

Mr. Sourwine. Here in this committee? 

Mr. Vincent. Didn't I state that here? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you. Don't you remember where you 
stated it? 

Mr. Vincent. I stated here in this committee what my recollection 
is. I haven't the testimony before me. 



1932 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you just state you had not studied Mr. 
Lattimore's books, that you would not say you had studied his books ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am using the word "studied." I haven't studied 
them. I have read this book. 

Senator Eastland. You knew Mr. Lattimore's views. You knew 
his views on problems in Asia, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. More or less ; yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. You discussed them with him? 

The Chairman. Wait a minute. I don't know whether he answered 
that question or not. You discussed them with him. You have a 
habit of grunting at it, and I take it the reporter is getting your 
answers. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I have discussed it. 

Senator Eastland. You have been intimately associated with him? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Can you tell us, knowing his view, knowing his 
writings, that he was not attempting to promote the Communist line 
in Asia? 

Mr. Vincent. That — I was never conscious that Mr. Lattimore in 
his discussions with me was trying to promote the Communist line in 
Russia. 

Senator Eastland. In Asia? 

Mr. Vincent. In Asia. 

Senator Eastland. You didn't get that idea from his books? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not get that idea from his books. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, earlier today you acknowledged that the 
Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist in its orientation. 

Mr. Vincent. I said that at the time I was with it I was not con- 
scious of that, but from these committee hearings and others there are 
certainly people in it now who at that time I had no suspicion were 
pro-Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, was not Mr. Lattimore one of the leaders 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time. 

Mr. Vincent. At what time? 

Mr. Morris. At the time you now realize it was pro-Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Morris. He was not one of the leaders? 

Mr Vincent. I don't know that he was one of the leaders now but 
at the time I knew the IPR and at the time I knew Lattimore, I never 
thought the IPR was pro-Communist or that Lattimore was. 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; but you have admitted, Mr. Vincent, that you have 
changed your mind about the pro-Communist slant of IPR, have you 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. Exactly right. 

Mr. Morris. You have now decided from the additional evidence 
that has been brought to your attention that the IPR was at some 
time in the past pro-Communist in its orientation? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Inasmuch as Owen Lattimore was the leader of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations at the time that you had dealings with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations do you also consider that he too was 
pro-Communist in his orientation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think Mr. Lattimore is pro-Communist in 
his orientation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1933 

Mr. Morris. So you make a distinction between Mr. Lattimore and 
the other leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that your 
position ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was thinking more in terms of some of the people 
who were associated. 

The Chairman. The question is, Do you make a distinction between 
Mr. Lattimore and other people in IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. You see, Mr. Vincent, Mr. Dennett, who was the Secre- 
tary of IPR during the war years, has testified that the two leaders 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, No. 1 and No. 2 leaders of the 
IPR, were Philip Jessup and Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I think in reverse order, Owen Lattimore and Philip 
Jessup. I am wondering to what extent you consider, now that you 
recognize the IPR was pro-Communist, that the same label was at- 
tached to the two leaders of the IPR. 

(No response.) 

Senator Eastland. Who were the pro-Communists in the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I am trying to recall now. It is just a mat- 
ter of referring to the testimony before this committee. I have no 
distinct recollection of how I came about the conclusion that there 
were pro-Communists in it. 

Senator Eastland. You reach the conclusion now, you say, that it 
was pro-Communist. Who were those pro-Communists who fixed 
their policy? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid I would have to refer to the membership, 
and I am not trying to be evasive. 

Senator Eastland. Of course you would have to refer to the mem- 
bership. Who were they? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I have no distinct recollection of the member- 
ship now. 

Senator Eastland. Was Mr. Jessup pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Jessup is not pro-Communist. 

Senator Eastland. You said Mr. Lattimore was not pro-Commu- 
nist. Was Mr. Carter pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not believe he was. 

Mr. Morris. They were the three outstanding leaders of the IPR, 
were they not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, Field was certainly a leader. 

Mr. Morris. He was also one of the leaders of the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Did Field fix the IPR policy? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether Field fixed the IPR policy or 
not. 

Senator Eastland. You don't think he did, do you? Now do you 
think Jessup fixed the policy of the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think Field had any influence on Jessup. 

Senator Eastland. Would he control Lattimore's policies in IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't think he would, sir. 

Senator Eastland. How could he fix the policies of IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; you asked me, I thought, whether I could recol- 
lect any of them in the IPR who were pro-Communist, and I would say 
that Mr. Field was pro-Communist. 



1934 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Eastland. I want you to tell us frankly, and you can do 
it, who the pro-Communists were who fixed those polices. You say 
that you are now convinced it is a pro-Communist organization. Who 
were those pro-Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have tried to think of names, and I have 
thought of Field, and I can't think of any others. 

Senator Eastland. Here is an organization in which you say that 
Dr. Jessup would fix the policy, that Mr. Carter would fix the policy, 
and that Lattimore would fix its policy. Then you say Field, the only 
pro-Communist, couldn't fix their policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't said that Field could not fix their policies. 
I have no exact knowledge as to how the policies of the IPR were 
fixed. 

Senator Eastland. You said Field couldn't fix Jessup's policy. 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say that Field would fix Jessup's policy, 
but to what extent he would fix IPR policies I don't know because I 
don't know how the IPE, adopted policies. 

Senator Eastland. It is bound to be Jessup's policies when he is 
one of the leaders in it. ' 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, if you say on the over-all basis that the 
Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist, then you are say- 
ing either the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations are pro- 
Communists or they are influenced by Communists ; are you not, Mr. 
Vincent ? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you repeat that question ? 

Mr. Morris. I am submitting to you, Mr. Vincent — if the chairman 
thinks it is appropriate, I think Mr. Vincent should have an oppor- 
tunity of clearing up any possible ambiguity that may reside in the 
record. If, Mr. Vincent, you say that the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions as a whole was pro-Communist at that time 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think my testimony was, and if it is that 
the Institute of Pacific Relations as a whole was pro-Communist 

Mr. Morris. Exactly what was your testimony, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony I thought was — but the chairman has 
reminded me that it was not — that there were pro- Communist ele- 
ments in the IPR. 

Senator Eastland. That was not what you said. 

The Chairman. That wasn't your testimony at all. Your testi- 
mony was, in direct answer to Mr. Sourwine, that the Institute of 
Pacific Relations was pro-Communist, that you had come to that 
conclusion. 

Mr. Vincent. Well 

The Chairman. The leaders of IPR have been referred to here. 
Where was the policy fixed, if not in the leadership ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, my testimony is that there were pro-Com- 
munist elements in the IPR. 

The Chairman. Do you want to change your testimony now from 
what you gave this morning? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly change it and say that it was my 
intent then to indicate that because of testimony I had read before 
this committee I have become conscious that there were pro-Com- 
munist elements in the IPR. 

The Chairman. Is it because of the mention of these names that 
you wish to change it ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1935 

Mr. Vincent. Tt is not, sir. 

The Chairman. Why do you want to change it from what you gave 
this morning? 

Mr. Vincent. Because it would be a more exact statement of what 
my feeling is about the IPR. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Sourwine. The major question we started out with was whether 
you ever tried to get Owen Lattimore appointed to a job in the State 
Department. 

Mr. Vincent. We haven't finished that yet. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes or no, did you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. 

Mr. Vincent. Did you want me to finish with that ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Go ahead. 

Mr. Vincent. I think when we broke off that testimony I was 
speaking of a form that had to be submitted for Lattimore to be- 
come employed. I have no exact recollection, but it is quite possible 
that I myself was one who signed the slip to go down for the employ- 
ment. It was approved by the then Director of the Far Eastern 
Office, Mr. Ballentine. It went to Mr. Grew. Some time later Mr. 
Grew called me down and told me that he did not think Lattimore 
should be brought into the State Department because he was engaging 
in publicity at the time; I think he was writing for a newspaper. 
There the matter closed as far as I was concerned. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had Mr. Lattimore applied to you for a job? 

Mr. Vincent. As I have testified, I don't know whether Mr. Latti- 
more applied or whether Mr. Lattimore suggested it and I went ahead 
and had the form filled out. 

Mr. Sourwine. In any event, it originated with Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say so. 

Mr. Sourwine. You weren't drafting him into State Department 
service. 

Mr. Vincent. I was not drafting him into the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were carrying out his wish to come in, whether 
it was in his formal application or his suggestion to you and then you 
filling out the form ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did what you could to make it easy up to the 
point of getting it up to your superior ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I thought that it was something that was 
needed in the Far Eastern Office at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have stated, have you not, that you thought 
then and think now that he was and is one of the outstanding experts 
in the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. At the time when this recommendation for Mr. 
Owen Lattimore's employment was under consideration you stated 
Mr. Ballentine was head of the Far Eastern Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. Office, but that is all right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss the matter of Mr. Lattimore's 
appointment with Mr. Ballentine? 

22848— 52— pt 6 17 



1936 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of any discussion with him. 
The form would have had to go through him as Director of the Far 
Eastern Office, and in that way I may have mentioned it. 

Mr. Sourwine. But he didn't discuss it with you at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall discussing with Mr. Ballentine, Mr. 
Lattimore, but I am saying it would have been logical for there to 
have been a discussion. 

Mr. Sourwine. It must have gone up to him with your favorable 
recommendation, didn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that Mr. Lattimore subsequently re- 
ceived an appointment and served as adviser to Mr. Pauley in con- 
nection with his mission to Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that at a time when you were head of the Far 
Eastern Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to place the dates. I was either still 
Chief of the China Division or I had become Director of the Far 
Eastern Office. The probability is that I was head of the Far Eastern 
Office because I think the Pauley mission went out to Japan and 
Korea and Manchuria in the latter part of 1945, and I became Director 
of the Far Eastern Office in September 1945. 

Mr. Sourwine. What, if anything, did you have to do with Mr. 
Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley ? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall no connection that I had with his appoint- 
ment to Mr. Pauley. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you recommend him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I recommended him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you approve it ? 

Mr. Vincent. The mission was drawn up, I think, under the White 
House auspices, and I don't believe I had anything to do with his 
appointment or the appointment of anybody on the Pauley Mission. 

Senator Eastland. Do you know who did? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you discuss that matter with Lauchlin Cur- 
rie? 

Mr. Vincent. T may have but I have no recollection of discussing 

it with Lauchlin Currie. At that time he was in FEA. 

The Chairman. Where was Lauchlin Currie at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten exactly when Lauchlin Currie quit 
the Government and went to New York in business, but it must have 
been some time right after the conclusion of the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I ask a question : During Lauchlin Cur- 
rie's work at the White House did you consult him on matters ? 

Mr. Vincent. I probably did, Senator. I have no recollection. We 
held these meetings 

Senator Ferguson. That is pretty indefinite, "probably. 

Mr. Vincent. Let's put it this way : I was back here, I came back 
here in June 1943, and by September Currie had gone over as Deputy 
Director of the Foreign Economic Administration, FEA, under Crow- 
ley. So my period- 



Senator Ferguson. Then when did he go back to the White House? 
Mr. Vincent. I don't think he ever went back to the White House. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1937 

I think when FEA was dissolved he went out into business. Went 
to New York. I think he went directly from FEA to New York. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you consult with him while you were in 
Washington ? 

Mr. Vincent. From time to time ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. On what matters ? 

Mr. Vincent. On far eastern matters, China. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he an expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you consult with him if he was 
not an expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because some time during the period 1940 or 1941 
he had apparently been designated by the President as a Presidential 
man to handle far eastern affairs. He had come to China in 1942 at 
the request of the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that the only reason why you consulted 
him, because you thought he was close to the President? 

Mr. Vincent. No. He himself had a position which was well- 
known in the State Department as a man in the White House who was 
handling far eastern matters, particularly China matters, from the 
White House. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us anything you consulted him on ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall any specific instance of consulting him 
on matters. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you discuss with Mr. Lattimore the matter of 
his appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall discussing it with him. As I say, I 
might easily have, but I do not recall discussing the matter. The 
Pauley Mission, as I said, from whatT can recall, was something that 
was organized and put forward without any consultation as far as I 
can recall, with me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know about Mr. Lattimore's appointment 
as adviser to Mr. Pauley at the time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I knew he was going out with Mr. Pauley. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, was the Pauley Mission undei 
the State Department payroll ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know who paid the Pauley Mission. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Sourwine, would it be appropriate to ask a question 
at that time ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Any time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, I think in fairness to the record and in 
fairness to you, in connection with the question I asked you a while 
ago with reference to whether or not you had been consulted by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to the advisability of pub- 
lishing a controversial manuscript or pamphlet by Maxwell Stewart, 
you stated that it was your recollection that you could not recall being 
consulted by people in the Institute about the advisability of publish- 
ing that. That is your testimony, is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my testimony. I have no recollection of any 
instance of being consulted on a publication. I don't know that I have 
ever met Maxwell Stewart. 



1938 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read at this time 
for us exhibit No. 176, which does appear in the record. As you know, 
Mr. Vincent, there is a conflict between that and your testimony at 
this time. 

Mr. Mandel. I read exhibit No. 176, which is a letter taken from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 4, 1944, 
marked "W. L. H." presumably William L. Holland 

Mr. Sourwine. Which appears at what point in our record ? 

Mr. Mandel. It appears on page 629 of part 2. From M. S. F., pre- 
sumably Miriam S. Farley, "copy to H. M.," presumably Harriet 
Moore. 

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max 
Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China. 

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among 
others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that he 
thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things 
should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive 
rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to 
leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful 
suggestions on point of detail. I am now editing the Ms. in the light of sug- 
gestions from Fairbank, Vincent, and others. I have also to consider the author, 
who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless, I am making some 
changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not, likely, enough to 
satisfy him completely. My position is that I am willing, in fact, anxious, to 
go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, provided this does not 
destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing 
it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national 
policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that 
ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it. 

Personally I doubt that the China Council will leave the IPR because of this 
or anything else in similar vein. They have more to lose than the IPR by such 
action, though naturally they will use threats for what they are worth. I am 
inclined to agree with Max that they respect us more if we don't knuckle under 
to them. 

The American Council is, of course, prepared to take full responsibility for this 
pamphlet, and will quite understand if the Secretariat wishes to disown it. 
Nevertheless, we should welcome yours views. Perhaps I have assumed too 
much from the meagerness of your comments on the original Ms. ; if so, please 
let me know. I shall be glad to show you the revised Ms. if you care to see it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, do you know now that Maxwell Stewart 
is or was a Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever suspect that he was a Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't even recall ever meeting him, sir, and I have 
heard nothing about Maxwell Stewart, whether he is a Communist or 
not. 

Mr. Morris. I mean m view of the letter that has just been read, 
Mr. Vincent, can you recall reading that particular pamphlet? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony, without having had my memory re- 
freshed, is that I would not have recalled that particular instance 
of reading that particular pamphlet. 

The Chairman. Do you now recall ? 

Mr. Vincent. I actually now do not recall the instance, but I see 
they have used my name, but I do not recall the instance even now. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you willing to accept that letter as expressing 
a fact, to wit, that you did read the manuscript and did express the 
opinion which is there attributed to you? 

Mr. Vincent. I am not willing to testify on the basis of that 
letter. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1939 

Mr. Sourwine. I said do you accept it as a fact. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not accept it as a fact. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you challenge it as a fact? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't challenge it either, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't contend that you did not read the manu- 
script ? 

Mr. Vincent. Even the reading of the thing here does not re- 
fresh my memory as to an instance of that kind. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you contend that you did not express an opinion 
with regard to the manuscript as outlined in that letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not contend that I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. You might have? 

Mr. Vincent. I might have. 

Senator Eastland. Do you know Agnes Smedley ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never met her. 

Senator Eastland. Have you ever talked with her ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any IPR writings or publica- 
tions that were submitted to you prior to publication ? 

Mr. Vincent. IPR publications? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall any. 

Senator Ferguson. None whatever? 

Mr. Vincent. None whatever that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that the testimony from the wit- 
ness yesterday, Larry Rosinger, indicates that they did submit docu- 
ments, papers, and writing to members of the State Department for 
criticism prior to publication ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't read his testimony and didn't hear his 
testimony yesterday. That is what Rosinger said yesterday? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall on any occasion seeing an IPR 
document, while you were trustee of the IPR, prior to its publication? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall any. 

Senator Ferguson. None whatever? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Does this refresh your memory at all? 

Mr. Vincent. This doesn't refresh my memory at all. There has 
been testimony that Mr. Rosinger submitted a manuscript to me, but 
that was not an IPR document, I believe. That was a book. 

Senator Ferguson. It was published by IPR, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know who published it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that document ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the document. I presumably some- 
time saw the Rosinger book, but I do not recall the instance. It is in 
the record apparently that it was sent to me and he had to ask for it 
back. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any recollection at all of this docu- 
ment that they are now talking about, this manuscript? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. That Max Stewart manuscript ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. You haven't the slightest recollection of it? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't the slightest recollection of what these peo- 



1940 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

pie are talking about that manuscript, of its being changed here and 
being modified. 

Mr. Souravine. Do you know whether Mr. Owen Lattimore ever 
delivered a lecture to personnel of the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he delivered more than one 
such lecture ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall any time that Mr. Lattimore delivered 
lectures to the State Department. It is logical that he may have, but 
I do not recall Mr. Lattimore making lectures to the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge as to how many times 
he delivered lectures to personnel of the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have anything to do with arranging 
or approving any such lectures ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of arranging or approving 
lectures for Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had arranged it or approved it you would 
remember it, wouldn't you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not. 

The Chairman. What is that answer ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I would not necessarily remember that I had. 
We are dealing with a period back 7 years ago. I say that I would 
not now want to say that I would naturally remember arranging for 
a lecture for Mr. Lattimore to speak before Foreign Service people 
or in the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever instruct any of your subordinates to 
attend a lecture by Mr. Owen Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of instructing my subordinates 
to attend a lecture by Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean to deny that you ever did instruct 
them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I mean to say just what I said, that I have no recollec- 
tion of ever instructing my subordinates to attend a lecture. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had instructed them to attend a lecture by 
Owen Lattimore, would you remember it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say this again as I said to the other question, 
that in the first place I would not have instructed them to attend a 
lecture but I 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you testify that you did not ? 

Mr. Vincent. But I could have suggested that somebody attend a 
lecture by Mr. Lattimore but I have no recollection of having done so. 

Mr. Sourwine. A suggestion by you as head of the Division to a 
subordinate would have been tantamount to a command, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would State Department personnel have felt com- 
pletely free to disregard such a suggestion ? 

Mr. Vincent. They certainly would. In other words, I wouldn't 
have instructed and I would not have said — I might have suggested 
that they attend, but I don't even recall either instructing or suggest- 
ing that they go to 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean to deny that you did instruct or sug- 
gest that they attend such a lecture ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1941 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I mean to say that I have no recollection of 
having instructed anyone or suggested that they attend a lecture. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it a common thing for you to instruct or sug- 
gest your subordinates to attend a function of that nature ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not. 

Mr. Sourwine. If it was an uncommon thing, don't you think if 
you had done it you would remember it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't think I would remember an instance of 
that kind of telling somebody I thought it was a good idea, if it 
occurred. 

Mr. Sourwine. Which of Mr. Lattimore's books have you read? 

Mr. Vincent. I said that I had read the Inner Asian Frontiers and 
that I had read solution in Asia, at one time or another. 

Mr. Sourwine. And that is all ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is all I can recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You certainly did not make a study of Mr. Latti- 
more's books at any time, then, did you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I would not say that I had made 
a study of his books ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would not be able to say that you could form a 
conclusion on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books, is that- 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. I said that I formed a conclusion on the basis of the 
knowledge of this book here ; that he was, in addition to what else I 
knew, a man who knew the subject of the inner Asian frontiers of 
China. 

Mr. Sourwine. The question was whether you feel it would be right 
and proper for you to state that on the basis of a study of Mr. Latti- 
more's books you had formed any conclusion at all with regard to his 
writings. 

Mr. Vincent. Formed any conclusion of any kind ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you made a study of Mr. Lattimore's books? 

Mr. Vincent. I said I have not made a study of Lattimore's books. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you have not made a study of Mr. Lattimore's 
books, would it be proper for you to state that on the basis of a study 
of Mr. Lattimore's books you had reached thus and thus a conclusion? 

Mr. Vincent. It could not be made. If I haven't made a study of 
them I couldn't reach a conclusion on the basis of a study. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you have made such a statement you were wrong ; 
is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. If I have made such a statement ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you say now, if you have said that on the basis 
of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books you reached certain conclusions 
about his writings, that was a statement which was not true? Will 
you say that now? 

Mr. Vincent. It was certainly a statement which was not factually 
correct as far as I can figure. It may have been an opinion. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is the difference between not being factually 
correct and not being true? 

Mr. Vincent. There is no difference. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire ? Did you ever have anyone in 
the State Department make a survey of Mr. Lattimore's writings prior 
to the time that you recommended him as a consultant ? 



1942 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. So without an examination of his writings and 
without causing an examination to be made for your advice, you still 
recommended him as an adviser to the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that a customary thing? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't say it was customary. I will say here 
that my knowledge of Mr. Lattimore is derived from having seen 
him from time to time when he was director of OWI and when he 
went on the Wallace mission, as much as on his books. 

Senator Ferguson. But without examining what he had written 
you recommended him ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I read two of his books. 

The Chairman. He testified he read them. Let us straighten it out 
with the Chair a little bit. I understood that you had read the book 
that is referred to here, by Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

The Chairman. Before you recommend him for a place in the 
State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that enter into your recommendation? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You believed because of that book that he 
should be recommended ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because of that book and because of the knowl- 
edge I had of Mr. Lattimore that he would be an excellent technical 
expert to come into the State Department to assist us on these areas. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you testify, sir, that before you read this 
book you didn't consider him an expert, that it was on the basis of this 
book that you concluded he was an expert? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't believe I testified to that, and if I 
did I was incorrect because I knew already that Lattimore had trav- 
eled extensively through 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean before you read this book you had your 
mind all made up that Lattimore was an expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are using the word "expert" there. I knew 
Lattimore was well informed with regard to those areas. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any opinion as to whether he was 
an expert? 

Mr. Vincent. You would have to define an expert. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have been talking about that word "expert" 
for quite a while now. What definition did you intend it to have 
when you were using it? 

Mr. Vincent. I considered him an expert. If a man wrote a book 
like that on those areas, I considered him an expert on those areas. 
Prior to that time I also had an opinion on him because I knew 
he was making travels through those areas. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you now wish to testify that before you read 
this book you knew him to be an expert? 

Mr. Vincent. On those areas? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say I — there again you are getting into 
the matter of definition of an expert. I knew he was a man familiar 
with those areas. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1943 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Let's define "expert" and then we will use it with 
your definition. - What do you mean expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that an expert is — a man who could 
write as exhaustive a book as that became an expert on those areas, 
but prior to that I had no knowledge he was an expert. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Is the exhaustiveness of the book the mark of an 
expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. What precisely do you mean, since you have raised 
the point of definition ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because he was a man who had had extensive travels 
in those areas and so far as I knew was a man who knew more about 
those areas than anyone at the time. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Is an expert a man who, as you say, knows the sub- 
ject thoroughly, is preeminent in the field, and writes well and factual- 
ly about it? Will you accept that definition? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no objection to that definition. 
. Mr. Sotjrwine. Using that definition of expert, did you consider Mr. 
Lattimore to be an expert? 

Mr. Vincent. I considered Mr. Lattimore to be an expert on those 
areas ; yes. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Did you consider him to be an expert on those areas 
before you read this book, meaning the book Inner Asian Frontiers of 
China? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not have thought him an expert. He was a 
man well informed on the areas. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. But you didn't consider him an expert until you 
read this book ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, the thought of considering him an expert or 
not an expert would never have come to my mind until you make this 
statement here, but a man who writes a book of this kind I would con- 
sider an expert. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You brought up the question of the book and said 
that after reading that book you were sure he was an expert ; didn't 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. I said he was an expert. 

Senator Ferguson. If he wasn't an expert, why did you want him 
as a consultant? 

Mr. Vincent. I am not saying he was not an expert. The point I 
am getting at here is there is a differentiation trying to be made be- 
tween before and after he made the book as to whether he is an expert. 
I don't know quite 

Mr. Sotjrwine. I want to know whether the book is what made up 
your mind that he was an expert. 

Mr. Vincent. It was. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. It is now your testimony that it was your reading 
of this book that convinced you that Mr. Lattimore was an expert. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; on those areas. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You were not convinced before reading this book? 

Mr. Vincent. The matter of not being convinced whether he was 
an expert had not arisen. I knew he was a man well informed on the 
area. I knew he traveled in the area. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. That is all you knew about him before you read the 
book. 



1944 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may I read a brief paragraph from 
page 101 from this book that I want to ask the witness about : 

Actually a return to the past was inhibited by the new forces that had pene- 
trated both Mongolia and China. Instead, Outer Mongolia was first made a vic- 
tim of Tsarist Russian imperialism and then set free by the nonexploitative 
policy of the Soviet Union toward th? Mongol Peoples Republic, the granting of 
loans without interest, economic aid, technical help, and the creation of an army 
trained and equipped by the Soviet Union but not officered by the Soviet Union 
or under its orders. 

Do you consider that an informed and factual statement, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is page 101. 

The Chairman. The answer is, "I do not" ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let's go over to page 202. That is twice as many. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you leave that, on the basis of that 
statement did you want the man who wrote that as a consultant in 
the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, at the time I wanted him as a consultant 
in the State Department I had read this book several years before, I 
had no recollection of that particular paragraph. 

Senator Ferguson. Now what would you say after its being read 
to you? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say after having that read to me, that he 
could not serve well as a consultant if he took that attitude toward 
Outer Mongolia being now free. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is a strongly pro-Communist statement, that 
paragraph I read, isn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would not recommend him today after 
hearing that statement in the book ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not. 

Mr. Sourwine. It may be redundant but I would like to read one 
more paragraph. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I just didn't want to leave that para- 
graph without following it up. 

Mr. Sourwine. From page 202 : 

Again, since these changes are visibly progressive, since they have been ex- 
pedited by active Soviet policy, since the Soviet Union has not taken advantage 
of its power to fasten an "imperial" control on the Province — 

referring to the Province of Sinkiang. 
Mr. Vincent. Yes. 
Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

And since the Soviet Union has not taken advantage of its power to fasten 
"imperial" control on the Province, and since Soviet trade remains important in 
keeping up the progress that has been begun, the total result has not been to 
fasten Soviet control on the Province but to set up in the Province itself a drift 
toward the Soviet Union. This, which I have elsewhere described as the phenom- 
enon of "negative accretion" results in a wide expansion of the influence of the 
Soviet Union beyond its own borders, not by a process of acquisition and control 
but by the action of the peoples who come within reach of Soviet policy. Find- 
ing that they are not subordinated either economically or politically to the 
Soviet Union but are helped to help themselves these peoples continue of their 
own accord to seek a closer association. 

Is that a fair and factual and objective statement, Mr. Vincent? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1945 

Mr. Vincent. I would not call that a fair and factual statement on 
the situation there, but I was not familiar with the situation in Sin- 
kiang at that time. I did know that the Russians had moved in. 
That is the reason I gave the positive answer on the other one, that 
the Russians had moved into Outer Mongolia. In Sinkiang they had 
not come in to the same extent. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, the Senate is in session. The Chair 
would like to be on the floor. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you let me have one question before you 
adjourn. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you believe that that fairly represents the 
attitude of the Soviet Union toward Mongolia or the Province there? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Hearing that read, would you now recommend 
the author of that paragraph as a consultant ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, we will resume this afternoon. I don't 
know that the present chairman can preside this afternoon. Senator. 
Ferguson, how are you fixed for this afternoon ? 

Senator Ferguson. If the time was about 2 o'clock. 

Mr. Sourwine. I would like very much to go all afternoon and 
possibly have an evening session. It is going much slower than 
anticipated, and we have a short time schedule. 

Senator Ferguson. I could make it about 2 o'clock. 

The Chairman. Very well. If you will do that I will appreciate it. 

Senator Ferguson. With the right to close to go over on any vote. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon the committee was recessed until 2 p. m. the 
same day.) 

AFTER RECESS 

Senator Ferguson (presiding). The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Sourwine, I have several questions I would like to ask. 

You are familiar with the last two quotations read from this book 
that you had read ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not familiar with those quotations  

Senator Ferguson. I mean you are now familiar with them ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you or would you not say that the writer 
of those quotations was pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. Taken in the way they were read, Mr. Senator, I 
wouldn't; no. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not describe them as pro-Communist. I 
would like to refresh my memory on the whole book to see how. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the quotations. 

Mr. Vincent. Take, for instance, the one on the Province of Sin- 
kiang. So far as I know, it may have been quite a factual statement 
of the situation there at the time, because I was not familiar with 
conditions in Outer Mongolia or Sinkiang at the time. 

Senator Ferhuson. What was your reason for answering the 
questions, then that I gave to you as to whether or not you would 



1946 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

have recommended him for the position as being consultant, that 
you would not after hearing these read? 

Mr. Vincent. After hearing the first one read, I thought there 
was an attitude there regarding the area — not an attitude but a de- 
scription there that I would have thought now would not be one 
which would not have accurately recognized the real dangers in 
there of a Communist control of Outer Mongolia. 

Senator Ferguson. Then would it not be pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not describe it particularly as pro-Com- 
munist. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not at this morning's session admit that 
that was a definitely pro-Communist statement, that paragraph, sir? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recollect saying that in so many words ; no, 
sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you did admit it this morning, did you mean to, 
or was it a slip of the tongue ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that this morning showed a misconcep- 
tion of the dangers of communism in that area. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you not remember, sir, what you testified to this 
morning? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't remember the exact words that I testified to 
this morning. If they would read them back 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that either one of these state- 
ments was anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say they were anti-Communist ; no. 

Senator Ferguson. They do not represent the facts? That is, in 
your opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I did not know what the factual situation 
was in Sinkiang, therefore, whether this does represent the facts at 
that time I do not know. The conditions — I am talking about the 
conditions. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you tell us, then, that if you had 
known of these two statements you would not have recommended him 
as a consultant? 

Mr. Vincent. I spoke of that as regards to the first statement. I 
thought it showed a misconception. The first one was on Outer Mon- 
golia. I would have to have it read back to me. 

There were certain statements there which I thought showed a mis- 
conception of the real situation in Outer Mongolia at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you wish it read or simply pointed out to the 
witness ? 

Senator Ferguson. Just let the witness see it. 

Mr. Sourwine. This is the paragraph, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. I think you must have read more than this, did you 
not, Mr. Sourwine? That is, more than that paragraph that you 
have marked here ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I read that paragraph this morning from page 101. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. Is that the only one you read ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Since there is a question about what I read, you had 
better let me read it again, sir, or perhaps if you would read that 
marked paragraph, the one that you expressed doubt if I read any 
more, the record will show what you are talking about and what I was 
reading this morning. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1947 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

Actually, a return to the past was inhibited by the new forces that had pene- 
trated both Mongolia and China. Instead, Outer Mongolia was first a victim 
of Czarist Russian imperialism and then set free by the nonexploitive policy of 
the Soviet Union toward the Mongol People's Republic. The granting of loans 
without interest and economic aid, technical help and the creation of an army 
trained and equipped by the Soviet Union, but not officered by the Soviet Union, 
or under its order. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is the paragraph where you expressed doubt? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the paragraph as I read it aloud here that 
Outer Mongolia was first a victim of the — "Outer Mongolia was first 
a victim of Czarist Russian imperialism and then set free," that is 
the phrase in there that would have given me the idea that there was 
not a complete understanding of the policy there or the policy of the 
Soviet Union. But I would not necessarily — and I do not say that 
a person could be in error making a statement that because of that 
it was pro-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar at that time with the policies 
of communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. As familiar, probably, as just the ordinary man in 
the street was. But I was not a student of the policies of communism ; 
no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you were representing the 
United States on the desk of the far eastern or the China desk and 
you want to tell us now, this committee, that you were no more 
familiar with the principles of communism than the average man on 
the street. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Are you speaking of the time this book was written 
or 1945 ? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; in 1945 when you recommended him to be 
an adviser to the State Department. 

Mr. Vincent. I thought you were speaking about the time I read 
this book. In 1945 I had just been in China and I had a fairly clear 
idea of what the policies were of communism in that area. I have 
testified heretofore that I was not familiar. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you read the book ? 

Mr. Vincent. I read the book sometime early in the 1940's. I don't 
know when. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you, I think, stated that the 
reason for recommending him as an expert was your reading of the 
book? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. That was one of the reasons I gave, 
as reading the book, otherwise it was my general knowledge of the 
Dian. 

Senator Ferguson. You had it clearly in mind at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not have the book clearly in mind at that time. 
It was just my impression of the book which I had read 4 or 5 years 
before, but I say I would not have recalled at the time I recommended 
Mr. Lattimore for the job these particular paragraphs in that book, 
and I didn't reread the book. 



1948 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Knowing what you know about communism 
as of today, would you or would you not say that that or was not a 
pro-Communist statement? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say it was a statement which showed a lack 
of knowledge of what the Communists were up to. 

Senator Ferguson. A lack of knowledge of what the Communists 
were up to ? 

Mr. Vincent. That seems to me to be the principal thing you can 
keep out of that, a lack of understanding at that time of what was 
the real intent and the real danger of communism. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that Mr. Lattimore at that time, 
at the time he wrote the book, did not know what the Communists 
were up to ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I cannot testify as to what Mr. Lattimore 
thought. 

Senator Ferguson. You thought he was an expert ? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought he was an expert. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you think an expert would know as of 
the time he wrote that book what the Communists were up to ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that he was an expert on those areas, 
but I don't know that I would call him 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about what the Communists were 
up to in that area. 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say that Mr. Lattimore was an expert 
on communism. I just don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not say he was an expert on com- 
munism, is that your answer? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say because I just don't know. I say I 
couldn't say whether he was an expert on communism or not, because 
I just don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know at the time you read that book 
what was going on in this territory that this statement was written 
about ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Where were you working at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I was working at that time in Geneva, Switzerland, 
as consul there. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you a far-eastern expert then ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You were ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How long had you been in the Far East, dealing 
with the Far East ? 

Mr. Vincent. Prior to 1940 ? I had been in the Far East and deal- 
ing with the Far East for the previous 12 or 15 years. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to 1940 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Prior to 1940. 

Senator Ferguson. And as such an expert, did you try to find out 
what the Communists really were doing and had in mind in relation 
to this territory that is written about ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had no knowledge of what was going on in Mon- 
golia. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1949 

Senator Ferguson. Did you try to find out, as an expert? That 
is part of the Far East, is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. You are assigned to various and sundry tasks, and 
my task never carried me into a place where I would be expected to 
find out, if I could find out, what was going on in Mongolia. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think today you know what communism 
really is in the world ? 

Mr. Vincent. I believe I do, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you acquire your knowledge of know- 
ing what communism was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I became fully conscious of it when the war was 
going on and at the conclusion of the war. I would say before this 
time I wasn't aware of the real menace of communism. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not conscious of the real menace until 
after the war was over? 

Mr. Vincent. I was conscious that the Communist ideology was a 
menace, but I am talking about the machine as we have now seen 
the expansive power and aggressiveness of the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness. 

Mr. Sourwine. Thank you. The Chair may desire to have placed 
in the record at this time a reply from Mr. Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy 
Under Secretary of State, to a request transmitted to the State Depart- 
ment for certain documents in connection with or relating to Mr. 
Vincent. 

Mr. Humelsine sends with his letter a photostat of a letter to the 
Secretary of State from the President. The Chair might wish those 
read. 

Senator Ferguson. You may read them into the record. 

Mr. Sourwine. This is in response to Senator McCarran's letter 
to Mr. Acheson, which is already referred to in the record, requesting 
these 32 categories of information. 

It will be recalled that the State Department, over Mr. Humelsine's 
signature, had earlier sent a few of them and said that the request 
was being referred to the White House. I believe this would be a good 
place in the record to insert the chairman's request and that earlier 
reply. 

Senator Ferguson. They will be inserted. The documents supplied 
by the Department will be printed in the appendix. 

(The documents referred to appear in the appendix, beginning at 
p. 2286.) 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Humelsine now says in his letter of January 
30, 1952 : 

My Dear Senator McCarran : I am enclosing for your information a photo- 
static copy of a letter to the Secretary from the President in regard to your letter 
of January 2. in which you requested certain departmental files relating to Mr. 
John Carter Vincent. 

If I may be of any further assistance to you in this matter, please do not 
hesitate to call on me. 

The photostat letter is dated January 24, and reads : 

Dear Mr. Secretary : I have given very careful consideration to Mr. Humel- 
sine's memorandum of January 22, relating to Senator McCarran's request for 
the loyalty file of John Carter Vincent, and for certain other papers and reports 
from the internal files of the State Department. It is understood that the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee desires these documents for the protection of 
Mr. Vincent against misinterpretations of his position, and that Mr. Vincent for 



1950 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the same reason has urged compliance with this request. While it is earnestly 
desired to accommodate Mr. Vincent and the subcommittee to the maximum 
extent possible, the paramount consideration in ruling upon this matter must be 
the protection of the interests of the United States. 

The surrender to a legislative investigating committee of this type of report 
and other documents from the confidential files of the State Department would 
create a serious danger of intimidation and demoralization of Foreign Service 
personnel. It is of overriding importance to our national security, internal as 
well as external, that officers of the Foreign Service are free to present their 
reports and express their views as to problems of international relations, without 
fear or favor, completely and honestly, as they see them at the time, and not in 
anticipation of the possible reaction of some future investigating committee 
which might hold opposing views. Accordingly, it is considered that it would be 
clearly contrary to the public interest to furnish these documents. 

The release of individual loyalty files to congressional committees has con- 
sistently been denied under terms of my directive of March 13, 1948, as contrary 
to the public interest in that it would involve the disclosure of confidential infor- 
mation and sources of information and would tend to undermine the integrity 
of the loyalty program. The request for Mr. Vincent's loyalty file should be 
denied. 

Very sincerely yours, 

Harry S. Truman. 

Is it desired for insertion ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; it will be inserted. The reporter will com- 
pare this actual letter and enclosure with your reading of them, to be 
sure they appear accurately in the record. 

I want to ask you another question. 

You have heard the President's letter read. Do you think that that 
keeps you from testifying in relation to the matters that were asked 
for? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not? 

Mr. Vincent. Except where there may be confidential documents 
that I couldn't reveal the subject matter of. 

Senator Ferguson. Are there any of them that you cannot reveal 
the contents of ? 

Mr. Vincent. I should say there would be quite a few of them, sir. 
I should say there would be quite a few of them that were confidential, 
that were still classified documents, as you call them. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that recently the State Depart- 
ment released an opinion of the Appeal Board, of the Loyalty Appeal 
Board? 

Mr. Vincent. In the case of Service, I think that was it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I have seen that in the paper. I didn't see the opinion, 
but I know they released it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that that places you now in 
the position as indicating that if yours is not released, the matters that 
are asked for, there where it was felt that they were favorable to the 
State Department they were released and now they do not release 
yours. 

Mr. Vincent. Would you state that question again ? 

Senator Ferguson. I say do you not think it puts you in an unfavor- 
able light for the President to deny those documents to this Commit- 
tee when, in the Service case, the State Department itself released the 
opinion of the Loyalty Board ? 

Mr. Vincent. After the loyalty case had been closed ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you see that report ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1951 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. That opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that they did not release, however, 
the men's names who signed it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I did not know what they did not release. I am 
not familiar with the document. As I told you, I know it was released, 
but I did not read the document that was released in the case of 
Service. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no reasons to keep or suppress the 
evidence asked for, have you? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no reason to suppress it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it would embarrass you or any 
other foreign officer in the future if that was released to this com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Vincent. It might conceivably embarrass somebody. 

Senator Eastland. How could it? 

Mr. Vincent. Because there might be other names, there might be 
situations which are still current in the documents, Senator, that 
might be embarrassing to the Government. The President here has 
given his reasons. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the President saw the 
documents before he wrote the letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't, know whether he saw them or not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that the State 
Department has possibly foreseen a question as to whether the Presi- 
dent did, in fact, send them this letter, because they sent us not just 
a copy of it but a photostatic copy of the President's letter to the 
Department. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not questioning the President's signature 
at all. I do not mean that ; but it is as to whether or not the President 
saw the documents, not the letter. You may have misunderstood. 

Mr. Sourwine. I beg your pardon. 

Mr. Vincent. No, my answer was "No." 

Senator Ferguson. Are there any other questions? 

Mr. Sourwine. May I proceed? 

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed. 

Mr. Sourwine. We were discussing Mr. Lattimore. Have you 
read his book Solution in Asia ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I think I read a copy of it when it first came 
out. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know about when that was? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that it came out in the spring of 1945 ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is correct. 

Mr. Chairman, it is copyrighted 1944, 1945, and it is marked "Pub- 
lished February 1945, reprinted February 1945." 

Did that book in any way change your opinion of Mr. Lattimore 
as an expert? 

• Mr. Vincent. I have testified that Mr. Lattimore was an expert, 
in my opinion, on the inner Asian frontiers. I would not want to 
say that this book here changed my ideas by reading the book, because 
I have no clear recollection of the book. 

22848 — 52 — pt. 6 18 



1952 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine, So, at that time you got just the general impres- 
sion ? You did read it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you read it carefully ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not read it carefully. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you read it as carefully as you read Inner Asian 
Frontiers of China? 

Mr. Vincent. About the same way as that. 

Mr. Sourwine. And I want to know, did that reading in any way 
affect that opinion, the opinion you then held of Mr. Lattimore as an 
expert in certain fields ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall it affecting my opinion. 

Mr. Sourwine. I take it, then, that you did not recognize any of 
the passages in this book which you chanced to read as pro-Com- 
munist ? They did not so affect you ? 

Mr. Vincent. They did not so affect me at that time, sir, or I have 
no recollection of their affecting me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember reading this passage, from the 
bottom of page 16 of this volume and running over to the top of 
page 17 : 

In the whole record of our protests to Japan, Britain and America never once 
contested Japan's right to make demands on China. We only protested that 
privileges acquired by Japan should not exclude us. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it read, does it have any 
connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 
Mr. Vincent. It does not. 
Mr. Sourwine. May I read from page 23, this sentence : 

For well over a hundred years we have taken for granted the ascendancy of 
capitalist thought as the civilized mode of thought. 

Do you remember reading that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't remember reading that. 

Mr. Sourwine. And the following paragraph : 

Capitalist ascendancy of this kind is no longer unchallenged. Marxist thought 
is now as fluently and as cogently expressed in such Asiatic languages as Buryat- 
Mongol, Kazakh, Uzbek, and Tajik as it is in Russian or Ukranian, because 
Marxist thought has rooted itself as firmly in the minds of these people as it has 
in the minds of the Russians and Ukranians. In most territories adjoining the 
Soviet frontier, Marxist thought cannot be dismissed as merely "subversive 
propaganda." It is no longer subversive but competitive. 

Do you remember reading that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember reading that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
notation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say, as you have read it there — I would have 
to read it more carefully — as you have read it there, it would seem 
to me that it was a fair analysis of what he observed in the area. It 
is an observation. 

Mr. Sourwine. It impressed you as a fair, factual analysis? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I didn't say that. I said it impressed me as to 
what' he observed in the area. In other words, he had just been to 
Asia, I think. 

Mr. Sourwine. It impressed you as an expression of opinion? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1953 

Mr. Vincent. It impressed me as an expression of his opinion, and 
the best of his judgment, as to what was the situation there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Even with that in mind, does it, in your mind, have 
any connotation of whether it is pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from page 24 : 

The prestige of Soviet industrial production has increased with every victory 
won by weapons made in Soviet factories, and this prestige extends to the system 
of production as well as to the things produced. Along the inland frontiers of 
Asia we may expect to see Soviet engineers increasingly consulted where formerly 
the only engineers consulted were European or American. If we are politically 
intelligent we may expect the Soviet engineers to be consulted on the organiza- 
tion and management of production, as well as the design of machines and the 
lay-out of factories. We may count on seeing, over wide areas, the partial ac- 
ceptance of Marxist ideas and the adoption of one or another part of the Soviet 
system. 

Do you remember having read that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
notation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from the bottom of page 67, and over to 
the top of page 68 : 

Into this complicated situation there intruded the influence of the Russian 
revolution, the effects of which were felt all over Asia. We in America have never 
yet properly grasped the character of that influence. Wherever we see Russian 
influence we still tend to look for Russian agitators, upsetting the minds of people 
who would not make trouble if they were not stirred up by troublemakers. We 
cannot understand either the Asia of yesterday or the Asia of today and to- 
morrow if we resort to such absurd simplifications. 

Do you remember having read that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
notation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. It appears to me as just an opinion of Mr. Latti- 
more's on the situation as he observed it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does it have any connotation as either pro-Com- 
munist or anti-Communist to you? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. On page 69 : 

One of the most powerful, brutal, and insensitive of the master people, the 
Russians had overthrown its own masters, had summoned all other peoples to 
do the same, and was now held at bay by the remaining master peoples. In this 
observation of big, simple ideas, the people of Asia saw, or hoped that they saw, 
a community of interest between themselves and the Russians. 

Do you remember reading that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it read, sir, does it have, 
in your mind, any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti- 
Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not have a pro-Communist connotation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Anti? 

Mr. Vixcent. No, sir. 

Mr. Souravine. Reading on page 73 : 

China, struggling to throw off the economic control of the great capitalist 
countries, had a natural community of interests with Russia politically and 
economically blockaded by the same countries. 



1954 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Do you remember having read that? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it read, does it have in 
your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from page 74 : 

With the advantage of hindsight, we can see that the Russian policy was 
reasonable and realistic, since the powers which were trying to hamstring the 
Chinese revolution were also the powers which were trying to wreck the Russian 
revolution. 

Do you remember having read that ? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, sir, does it have in your 
mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti- Communist? 
Mr. Vincent. I would not call it pro-Communist or anti. 
Mr. Sourwine. Reading from page 99 : 

During this period, the Communists pressed and propagandized for a nego- 
tiated end to the civil war and a full stand against Japan at the earliest possible 
moment rather than the last possible moment. By so doing they invested them- 
selves with a new political character. They ceased to be merely a policy which 
opposed the policy of the Government, and became a party with a policy 
alternative to that of the Government. Furthermore, although they remained 
a one doctrine party and could not yet broaden out into a coalition, they became 
potentially the focus of a new coalition because a number of movements out- 
side of Communist territory and not in the least Communist in character began 
to urge the national government to accede to the policy advocated by the 
Communists. 

Do you remember having read that? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have, in your 
mind, either a pro-Communist or anti-Communist connotation? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say it is a factual statement? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that, as well as I can recall it, it seemed 
to describe the situation that was present at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it has any bias in it? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think that is a biased statement, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, do you realize that this statement 
says, in essence, that the Nationalist Government of China was op- 
posed to fighting a war against Japan, to making a stand against 
Japan. 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't recall you reading that. 

Mr. Sourwine. You realize that this statement says that it was 
the Communist government and not the Nationalist Government that 
was making a stand and wanted to make a stand against Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. It does ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you if you realized it? 

Mr. Vincent. From my recollection of the situation in China at 
that time, I was not in China, that could be a conclusion that one 
could reach, that Mr. Lattimore could reach. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you realize that this paragraph was stating 
that conclusion, was advancing that theory, that thesis? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I did, that the Communists themselves were 
urging greater resistance to Japan. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1955 

Mr. Sourwine. Let me read that paragraph again. 

Senator Eastland. Was that true, did yon observe it in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not in China at the time, sir. But I think 
the reports back from China generally gave that impression, the fac- 
tual reports back, that the Communists were through their organi- 
zations urging resistance to Japan. Chiang Kai-shek at that time 
made a visit, if I recall, in 1936, and was arrested, held in house ar- 
rest, for a short time, and because at that time some of his armies in 
the south and the Communists were urging greater resistance to 
Japan. 

Mr. Souewine. How did you place this in 1936, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. I placed it in 1936 because I have a clear recollection 
of General Chiang Kai-shek ? s arrest at Ceylon. I don't place this 
in 1936. I was just simply saying, referring to an incident at that 
time. 

Mr. Morris. Was not Senator Eastland's question addressed to the 
period of this presentation? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't get when this period was, but I gathered 
that this is describing the situation in China around 1936 or 1937. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You recognize it as a description of the situation 
in China in 1936? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what I would have thought that was. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are thinking about the situation in China in 
1936 being in such close terms as this that you recognize that area 
of time by what was said here? 

Mr. Vincent. That was my general impression. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Reading from page 110 : 

The coalition trend of the Communists has put them in a strong position to 
make a bid for wider allegiances when on the heels of the Japanese their columns 
marched parallel with those of the National Government into recovered territory. 

Do you remember having read that ? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
notation in your mind of being pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 
Mr. Vincent. It does not, sir. 
Mr. Sourwine. Reading from page 121 : 

The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they 
■control * * *. 

Mr. Chairman, my reference is wrong. I am beginning on page 120 
and carrying over to page 121 : 

* * * The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory 
they control not because they subdued the people by armed force but because 
the people support them. Basic economic conditions as to food and clothing are 
better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuoinintang-controlled China. 
The incident of conscription and taxation is more equally distributed in Com- 
munist-controlled territory than in Kuomintang-controlled territory. Many pro- 
gressive, educated, middle-class Chinese have somehow got through the blockade 
into Communist territory, but not many have fled from that territory. The 
political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it is 
under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representa- 
tive committees are elected and that the Communists limit themselves to one- 
third of the representation ; whereas, in Kuomintang territory it is increasingly 
difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang and accepting 
its discipline. 



Do you remember reading that passage ? 



1956 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
notation in your mind of being pro-Communist or anti- Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say it is a factual statement? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar as I can recall, it was a statement that de- 
scribed the situation there. I was never in that area. Other people, I 
don't recall who, newspaper people, were there who came back with 
similar stories. 

Mr. Sourwine. So far as you know, you believed it when you read 
it, and you are willing to believe it now ? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time, it was fairly as accurate a statement as 
one could get out, with the knowledge you had of the place. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from the bottom of page 121 and over to the 
top of page 122 : 

Representatives of the minor parties which have no armed forces and no 
rights are inclined to believe that it is only because the Communists have armed 
forces that people in the Communist area have political rights and liberties. 
They assume that if the Communists lose control of their armed forces the 
people would lose their political freedom. They therefore support as openly as it 
is possible for them to do so demands for freedom to organize political bodies 
and the right to elect members of political bodies with real functions and 
authority, and do not demand that the Communists should first submit to mili- 
tary control. Pending the development of a larger body of knowledge about the 
Communist area, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn. The Communists 
have done well enough in the territory they control to stand comparison with 
the Kuomintang. There is a case for negotiating a political compromise with 
the Communists before pressing the question of military control. 

Do you recall having read that passage ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Having heard it read, sir, does it have in your mind 
any connotation as being either pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does it impress you as a factual statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. It impresses me as a report on conditions in China at 
that time, one man's report, and his opinion which could have been 
held by him and other people. 

Mr. Sourwine. The passage I have just read, and immediately pre- 
ceding, do they strike you as being unrealistic ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think now that you use that word "unrealistic" — I 
think you would have to read them again, sir, for me to say whether 
I would describe them as unrealistic, because of the many statements 
there. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are an expert on China ? 

Mr. Vincent. But I don't recall from the reading of those two pas- 
sages, and applying the one idea "unrealistic." 

Mr. Sourwine. I will read the one before last, and you listen : 

The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they 
control, not because they subdued the people by armed force, but because the 
people will support them. Basic economic conditions as to food and clothing are 
better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuomintang-controlled China. 
The incidence of conscription and taxation is more equally distributed in Com- 
munist-controlled territory than in Kuomintang-controlled territory. Many pro- 
gressive, educated, middle-class Chinese have somehow gotten through the 
blockade into Communist territory, but not many have fled from that territory. 
The political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it 
is under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representa- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1957 

tive committees are elected and that the Communists limit themselves to one- 
third of the representation; whereas, in Kuomintang-controlled territory it is 
increasingly difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang 
and accepting its discipline. 

Do you find anything that strikes you as unrealistic in that passage ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I would say that that passage there, without 
being able to check the facts because I was never in the area, seems in 
some measure to be unrealistic. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did any of these statements influ- 
ence you in determining your foreign policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They did not ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I have said I don't recall that. Most of this 
was information that he has written here, and was already more or 
less available, in different form, to us in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that what influenced you to act? You say 
it was already available in the State Department, that which was 
read. 

Did that influence you in acting, that information ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have influenced me, but one way or the 
other I didn't accept it. I don't accept it all. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you accept any of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, as reports from China on a situation there in 
North China. But you w r ould have to say in what way, I am afraid, 
that it influenced me to act. I can't now say how my actions might 
have been influenced. 

Senator Ferguson. I will read a statement : 

Dniring the 15 years of its existence, the Communist Party of China has grown 
up into a powerful revolutionary party, steeled in the fire of its Chinese revolu- 
tion in one of the best sections of the Comintern, and has succeeded in estab- 
lishing Soviet districts in the armed forces of the revolution, the Red Army, which 
is displaying miracles of heroism, and which the seven campaigns of the enemy 
have not succeeded in breaking. 

Would you say that statement was or was not pro-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't say that statement was pro-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. You would say ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not say. Do you know who wrote 
that statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know who wrote that statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say it was anti-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say it was anti-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know Georgi Dimitrov ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of him ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You have never heard of him ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, there are so many Russian officials. I mean, 
Dimitrov may have been a Russian official, but I don't recall him now. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from the bottom of page 

Senator Ferguson. Just a minute. Did you know that he was head 
of the Communist Internationale? 



1958 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't, no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from the botton of page 129, and continu- 
ing to the top of the next page : 

As industrialization passed from experiment and many local mistakes and 
failures to general and increasing success and prosperity, Russia began to ac- 
quire a reputation for stability, reinforced later by ber firm handling of Japan, 
and especially her decisive repulse of Japanese incursions against her frontiers. 

Do you remember reading that passage ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, sir, does it have in 
your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Com- 
munist? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. On page 134 : 

In Asia, the Soviet Union has a major power of attraction, backed by a history 
of development and a body of precedents. 

Do you recall reading that? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
notation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 
Mr. Sourwine. On page 135 : 

There then began the process of reintegration into a federative Soviet Union. 
This was not done all at once or by degree. From 1918 to 1924 there was a 
complicated grouping and regrouping. The Russian Soviet Federal Socialist 
Republic was, from the beginning, the major unit. Other Republics split off from 
it, but made agreements of various kinds with it and with each other. After a 
number of preliminary steps, not all of them simultaneous, the main Russian 
Republic combined with about six other Republics to form the Soviet Union, 
whose first constitution was approved in 1924. 

Do you remember having read that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
nection in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is primarily historical, is it? That is, in your 
opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not having any familiarity with the history of the 
time, that is what it sounds like to me, as an account of what actually 
happened. But I couldn't check into whether it is an account. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you do not have sufficient familiarity of 
the history of Russia at that period to know whether this is a factual 
account ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are willing to accept it as a factual account be- 
cause he wrote it? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I am not willing to accept it because I have 
not 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore is an expert, in your opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; but Mr. Lattimore could be easily wrong on his 
facts. I have no reason to accept that as being facts. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think he is the kind of an expert that could 
be wrong in his facts in a book that he has written? 

Mr. Vincent. I think any expert could be wrong. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1959 

Mr. Sourwine. But you think Lattimore is the type that could be 
wrong in what he has written in this book ? 

Mr. Vincent. He could be wrong, but I have no reason to challenge 
it. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand you have read this book that is 
now being quoted to you prior to your recommendation that he be 
hired in the State Department as a consultant to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator Ferguson, I have no recollection as to what 
time I read this book. I think we said it was published in February. 
I have already testified that I do not know what exact time was the 
recommending of Mr. Lattimore, so I couldn't testify as to whether 
I had read this book before or after that. 

Senator Jenner. Mr. Chairman, is the witness trying to say to 
this committee that he does not know what is pro-Communist and 
what is anti-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, no, I am not trying to say that. I am being 
asked here to identify these as anti- or pro-Communist, and most 
of them seem to be the opinions of a man with regard to a situation 
at that time in China. 

Senator Jenner. I know, but Senator Ferguson just read you a 
passage from the Secretary General of the Communist International, 
and you did not recognize it as pro-Communistic. 

Mr. Vincent. No, I thought that was a statement of the describing 
of a situation. 

Senator Jenner. Mr. Vincent, you are the head of the Far Eeastern 
Division of our Government, in the State Department. How long 
has that been ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was from 1945 to 1947. 

Senator Jenner. 1947? 

Mr. Vincent. Late 1945 until the middle of 1947. 

Senator Jenner. Then would you think this would be a fair state- 
ment of the appraisal of the Far Eastern Division : That they did 
not know what was pro-Communist down there and what was anti- 
Communist during that period of time ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I would not ; no. 

Senator Jenner. Would you think this would be a fair statement of 
the Far Eastern Division of our State Department: That up until 
the Korean war, and that includes the time you were head of the Far 
Eastern Division 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I was already in Switzerland. 

Senator Jenner. But 1945-47, from that time on up into the Korean 
war, would you say that the pro-Communist influence in the State 
Department of our Government was predominant ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not, sir. 

Senator Jenner. Are you acquainted with John Foster Dulles? 

Mr. Vincent. I am. 

Senator Jenner. Are you well acquainted ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never met John Foster Dulles. 

Senator Jenner. If John Foster Dulles made that statement, would 
it have any effect upon your thinking? 

Mr. Vincent. It would not, sir, because when I was in the State 
Department I did not myself detect any procommunism in the State 
Department. 



1960 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Jenner. Do you know what is procommunism ? In these 
readings you say you do not think they are procommunistic and yet 
history has proven that they are procommunistic. 

Mr. Vincent. They are, to my mind, Mr. Lattimore's opinion of a 
situation as he thought. I wouldn't want to describe this as pro- 
Communist or anti-Communist. Almost every one of those is one 
man's opinion of a situation that existed at that time. 

Senator Jenner. Mr. Chairman, my point is, if the witness does not 
know what is procommunistic and anticommunistic — — 

Mr. Sourwine. If it might be suggested to the Senator, the record 
will speak for itself on such a question. All the committee can attempt 
to do is to find out what the witness' opinions are. 

Senator Eastland (presiding). Mr. Vincent, how long were you at 
the head of the far-eastern desk in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. From September 1945 until July 1947. 

Senator Eastland. What was the American policy toward China 
at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, that would take a long time, but the American 
policy toward China at that time was primarily expressed in the mis- 
sion of General Marshall to China, which that directive describes. 

Senator Eastland. You can just explain it now in a few words. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. One of the principal preoccupations at that 
time, or let us say when I walked into the office, the war was over — 
that was September oi 1945 — was the imminent danger of civil war 
breaking out again in China. Another preoccupation at that time 

Senator Eastland. Was there not a question of who would win 
that war, if civil war did break out in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. There certainly was a question. 

Senator Eastland. Who did you want to win that war ? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly wanted Chiang Kai-shek to win the war 
if it broke out, and for the Communists to be defeated. 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead. 

Mr. Vincent. But there was a serious doubt in many people's minds, 
not my own, but people in the State Department and in the Pentagon 
Building, that the outbreak of civil war, after the Chinese had already 
been undergoing 8 years of war, would make conditions in China even 
worse than they were at the end of the war, and would be conducive, 
even, to the future spread of turmoil from which the Communists 
themselves could take advantage. It was far from clear to anyone at 
the time that the National Government of China was going to be able 
to completely militarily defeat the Chinese Communists. 

Senator Eastland. Why? 

Mr. Vincent. On the basis of the historical analogy, the Japanese 
had been trying to defeat the Chinese Communists for the previous 
7 years. 

Senator Eastland. Did you know that Russia was arming and 
equipping Chinese Communists at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. The only knowledge we had at that time of the Chi- 
nese Communists getting anything from the Russians was what they 
were able to pick up from Japanese arms in Manchuria. 

Senator Eastland. That was considerable. 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say whether it was considerable or not, sir. 

Senator Eastland. You knew in reality that hundreds of thousands 
of Japanese soldiers had surrendered to the Russians, and that their 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1961 

equipment was being turned over to the Chinese Communists. Is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Eastland. So the cure for that situation was to take those 
Communists into the government and form a united front between 
Chiang and the Communists, was that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I think, Senator, that is an oversimplification of it. 
The idea then was, and the Chinese themselves, the National Govern- 
ment was holding conferences trying to bring about a peaceful solu- 
tion of their difficulties. 

Senator Eastland. I know, but those conferences, what you were 
doing was telling Chiang to take Communists into his government. 
Is that true or is it false ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think that General Marshall ever told the 
Chinese Government to take the Communists into the government. 
They were already discussing the matter of some kind of peaceful 
solution of a political difficulty. There had been a political conference 
at which the Communists were already present and discussing things 
when General Marshall went to China. 

Senator Eastland. You say our Government did not pressure 
Chiang to take Communists into the Government of China? 

Mr. Vincent. I am not saying — the word "pressure" I think is an 
incorrect one. I don't know to what extent General Marshall used 
his influence, but that was one of the things in his directive, which was 
to go out and assist the Chinese. 

Senator Eastland. You agreed with that policy, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. That Communists should have been taken into 
the Government of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I made the statement several times that it seemed 
that that was a less violent way than to go ahead and carry on civil 
war. But I made the statement many times that the idea was to take 
them in in more ways than one, as Mr. Sourwine will recall, on a 
minority basis. 

Senator Eastland. And it has always wound up one way : That is a 
Communist stepping-stone to take a country over. That was an 
identical system that Communists used all over Europe. Is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have already testified here, and I was at 
that time not an authority on Europe, but in that particular time 
the French had Communists in the government, the Italians had 
Communists, and were able to eliminate them. 

Senator Eastland. I understand, but that was a common front in 
the satellite states. It wound up that they became nothing but 
satellite states of Moscow. Why is it that you had adopted that Com- 
munist tactic and was pressuring it on Chiang Kai-shek? 

Mr. Vincent. As I said before, it was the understanding not of 
myself but of a policy adopted by the entire administration that, tak- 
ing the Chinese Communists into the government on a minority basis, 
for the time being, was a better solution and gave a better chance of 
putting them in a subordinate position than carrying on civil war. 

Senator Eastland. In other words, it would permit them to take 
over China without a big war. Is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, that was not in anybody's mind, that it was 
going to permit them to take over China. 



1962 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Eastland. You have testified that you knew, and that the 
State Department knew, that the Chinese Communists were being 
equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese equipment. 

It appears to me that this would call for equipment from this coun- 
try. Did we attempt to equip the Nationalist forces of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. We did, during that period. In the fall of 1945 we 
had already equipped, I think it was, 39 divisions of Chinese troops. 
We flew Chinese troops from south China to north China to help take 
over the areas there. 

Senator Eastland^ But were we giving them the arms and equip- 
ment, now, to win the war and to match what Russia was giving the 
Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. We had given and were giving during that period, 
turning over arms to the Chinese. 

Mr. Morris. Not after the decision was made that there should be 
a coalition government. 

Mr. Vincent. After General Marshall went out, I do not know the 
degree to which arms were still turned over to the Chinese. But at 
that time the Chinese had received arms from us, with the possible 
exception of those troops that we transported to Manchuria. They 
were also armed by us. 

Senator Eastland. Did we furnish them equipment to meet the 
aggression caused by Russian equipment given to the Chinese Com- 
munists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, we had virtually equipped the Chi- 
nese Army during the war, and were still equipping them when the 
war ended in 1945. 

Senator Eastland. When did we stop equipping them? 

Mr. Vincent. When General Marshall went out for a short period. 

Senator Eastland. When was that? 

Mr. Vincent. That was in January 1946. 

Senator Eastland. And that caused the fall of China, did it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Chiang Kai-shek was never short of arms during that 
period. He was well equipped. We carried his troops to Manchuria 
and north China, and they were also equipped. I think people much 
better than I on it have said that Chiang Kai-shek's troops were 
always sufficiently equipped. 

Senator Eastland. We stopped giving them war equipment in 1946. 
When did we resume? 

Mr. Vincent. We resumed in 1947 at a time when, I would say, 
the military position of Chiang Kai-shek was stronger than it had 
ever been before, when he was in north Manchuria and elsewhere in 
north China. 

Senator Eastland. What did he get, what was the equipment he 
got? 

Mr. Vincent. Specifically I can't recall. I remember that arms 
were turned over to him from certain ammunition dumps in China. 
I know that air equipment was given to him, transport planes, during 
1947. 

Senator Eastland. You do not know whether it was an appreciable 
amount, enough to offer serious opposition, do you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it was an amount sufficient to offer opposition 
which is what he had done and was doing at that time. I left the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1963 

Department in July of 1947 and don't know how the thing developed 
after that. 

Senator Jenner. During that crucial period, was there not a 15- 
month period there when we withheld aid from Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. During the period 1946, military aid as such — it was 
the policy of the Government not to give military aid. General 
Marshall was out there trying to carry out a mission to assist the 
Chinese in settling their differences without civil war. 

Senator Jenner. What were the Chinese Communists doing dur- 
ing that 15-month period? Were they demobilizing? 

Mr. Vincent. The Chinese Communists during the latter part of 
that period, Senator Jenner, were actually being defeated by the 
Chiang Kai-shek forces. As I have just said, the Chinese Govern- 
ment forces expanded their area of control considerably during the 
period 1946 through to 1947 in the summer. They controlled a larger 
area of China at that time than they had at any time previously. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from page 144: 

Soviet policy in outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It 
certainly establishes a standard with which other nations must compete, if they 
wish to practice a policy of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, 
like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe deserve careful and respectful 
study. 

Do you remember having read that ? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any conno- 
tation in your mind as being either pro-Communist or anti-Com- 
munist? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think the reference to the careful and re- 
spectful study which Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe deserve 
is a realtistic one ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know about the word "respectful," but I 
would certainly say that one should very carefully study the relations 
between any country and the Soviet Union. 

Senator Eastland. Well, now, do any of these passages, do you 
think they connote that they are pro-Communist, any of the passages 
he has read ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Taking them altogether, do they raise any 
question in your mind ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it is an attempt on the part, and these are read 
out of context, an attempt on the part of Lattimore, as it seems to me, 
to analyze the situation from which he might arrive at a completely 

Senator Eastland. Of course, Lattimore is your close friend, and 
you do not want to say that you think he is a Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Eastland. You were his protege, were you not? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I was not a protege. 

Senator Eastland. Did he recommend you for appointment to the 
Ear Eastern desk? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; never. 

Senator Eastland. Who did ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I just simply came up to it as a matter of pro- 
Tnotion in the State Department. I mean, I was head of the China 



1964 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

division. Then I was appointed Director of the Far Eastern Office 
in 1945. So far as I know, Mr. Acheson was the first one to tell me 
that I was going to be Director of the Far Eastern Office. Mr. James 
Byrnes appointed me the Director of the Far Eastern Office, and I 
knew Mr. Byrnes. So I couldn't say that Mr. Acheson recommended 
to Mr. Byrnes, or Mr. Byrnes himself 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not say it was one of Mr. Acheson's first 
acts after he became Under Secretary ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. I testified that I was called back from leave. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading from page 187 : 

As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are 
likely to overturn the throne unless we prevent them. As a matter of political 
principle, I think we should make the worst possible mistake in trying to use for 
our own purposes either the present Emperor or a successor nominated by us. 

Do you remember having read that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any 
connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does it strike you as realistic and factual ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is an expression of an opinion, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now I have one more I would like to read, Mr. 
Chairman, from page 139 : 

The fact that the Soviet Union always stands for democracy is not to be 
overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things. 
Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claim- 
ants to the status of democracy. If China or Russia or some other alien 
people does not measure up to the standards of the particular American modi- 
fication of Anglo-Saxon democracy, we say that it is not democratic. We are 
going to find ourselves boxing with shadows instead of maneuvering in politics 
if we stick to this habit. The fact is that for most of the people in the world today 
what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves 
people to act, to try to line up with one party or country and not with an- 
other is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic 
in practice. 

Do you remember having read that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now that you have heard it, does it have any con- 
notation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that that was a misconception of com- 
munism. 

Senator Eastland. Answer his question. He asked you whether 
it was pro or anti. 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would say that that, to my mind, is a pure 
misconception of communism, to describe it as democracy. 

May I continue, sir? But to say that it therefore constitutes a 
pro-Communist statement in the mind of Mr. Lattimore, or that 
other, it is just simply a misconception of what is communism. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think a man who wrote that and meant it is 
an expert on communism in the Far East or anywhere else? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it could have been written by Mr. 
Lattimore with the knowledge that it was not' the exact truth? 

Mr. Vincent. That I cannot testify. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1965 

Senator Eastland. Do you think the man who wrote that and knew 
it, should be an American adviser on far eastern affairs in the State 
Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't get your question. 

Senator Eastland. I said, do you think that a man who wrote that 
and meant it should be an adviser to our State Department on China 

policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Taking these things out of context, they would seem 
to leave the impression that he should not. 

Senator Eastland. Then why did you want to employ him ? 
Mr. Vincent. I wanted to employ him, as I testified before, Mr. 
Chairman, because he was an expert on these fringe areas in China. 
He was the only person that I knew, or who was known in the State 
Department, who was familiar with conditions in Outer Mongolia in 
Sinkiang and these other things. 

We took it for granted that he was a technical expert and he was 
coming in to do a technical job. 

Senator Eastland. I think you also said it would be broader than 
that. 

Mr. Vincent. He was coming in on a per diem basis. 

Senator Eastland. And adviser, too. He was going to advise you 
on policy. 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, that was the purpose of his coining in. 

Senator Eastland. Policy adviser? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I would give you the answer, then, that Mr. 
Kennedy who was preparing papers and doing things with regard to 
Indonesia, and what not, never, to my knowledge, never assumed to 
advise policy. He gave factual reports on what he knew of conditions 
in those areas, and that was what was anticipated that Mr. Lattimore 
could do with regard to these other areas. 

Senator Eastland. Of course, the facts that he alleges to give are 
colored, or tainted, from the Communist point of view, the policy that 
emerges must be a pro-Communist policy, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. If, as you say, they are tainted. But I have not, my- 
self, felt that his facts were tainted. He was trying, in his opinion, to 
give a factual picture of the situation there. 

Senator Eastland. Proceed. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever take Mr. Lattimore to see the Presi- 
dent on the question of declaring the Japanese Emperor to be a war 
criminal ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that he ever went to see the Presi- 
dent about that question ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not have any recollection of Mr. Lattimore going 
to see the President. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Lattimore the fact 
that he had gone or what took place ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing with him a visit 
to the President. He was a good friend — I don't know whether the 
testimony is pertinent, but I knew that he was a friend of the Presi- 
dent, the President himself > 

Mr. Sourwine. Which President are you talking about? 

Mr. Vincent. I am talking about President Roosevelt now. 



1966 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. The President himself had what? 

Mr. Vincent. The President himself, according to Mr. Wallace, had 
himself suggested that Mr. Lattimore come on the mission with us to 
China in 1944. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about any testimony in which 
Mr. Currie had suggested it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not know of any testimony there may be. 
I know only Mr. Wallace's statement that the President had several 
times suggested that Mr. Lattimore come on the trip with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I give you this, which is the biographic 
register of the Department of State, with the thought that it may be 
useful to you. 

As we go through here I will ask you questions about where you 
were, and what your assignments were. I understand that volume 
gives dates, but not dates of arrival. From that, or what memoranda 
you have, it might help you to refresh your recollection. 

Mr. Vincent. You are asking about me now ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. When I ask you about a biographical fact, I 
give you that to assist you, if you need it. But I would like to have 
you give us the facts as you know them rather than say "this is what 
I read somewhere." 

How old are you, sir ? 

Mr. Vincent. Fifty-one. 

Mr. Sourwine. And where were you born ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was born in Seneca, Kans. 

Mr. Sourwine. And your early education ? 

Mr. Vincent. My early education was in Macon, Ga. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where did you go to secondary school ? 

Mr. Vincent. Macon, Ga. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you go to college ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What degrees ? 

Mr. Vincent. A. B. 

Mr. Sourwine. From where? 

Mr. Vincent. From Mercer University, Macon, Ga. 

Mr. Sourwine. When? 

Mr. Vincent. From 1919 to 1923. I graduated in 1923. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you hold any jobs after graduation before you 
were appointed to Changsha ? 

Mr. Vincent. I worked with my father for a year in the real-estate 
business. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you were appointed a clerk in the American 
Consulate in Changsha on April 4, 1924? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you went out to the Orient soon after ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you married at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge that he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first meet him? 

Mr. Vincent. I met him some time in 1929 or 1930 in Peking. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not meet him any earlier ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I know of. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1967 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that he was in business with Arnold 
& Co., Ltd., at Tientsin and Peking from 1922 to 1926 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know at the time. I have later heard that 
he was in business. 

Mr. Sourwine. You know now ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I knew he was in business with someone and 
I assumed it was Arnold & Co. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have occasion, between 1922 and 1926, to 
visit Tientsin or Peking ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never visited Tientsin until 1928. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were appointed foreign-service officer, unclas- 
sified, vice consul of career, and vice consul at Changsha on May 
12,1925? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be the date. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know he was a draftsman in China in 1925 
and 1926 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't referred to his record, so I wouldn't know. 
I didn't know him. I knew he was the son of a missionary or the son 
of a YMCA man, and therefore he might be in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not know him in China at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't know him at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your paths may have crossed, but nothing that 
you remember? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were appointed vice consul at Swatow tem- 
porarily on May 28, 1927 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; I was appointed, but never went to Swatow. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never spent any time there ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; by that time they canceled the vice consul. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were appointed to Foreign Service School 
October 10, 1927? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you return to this country for that purpose ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; 1 came not for that purpose; no. I came home 
on leave, and after coming home, I was given an appointment to 
the school. 

Mr. Sourwine. By that time had you met Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I had not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you meet him while you were here in the 
United States? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were appointed vice consul at Hankow on 
February 4, 1928 ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. And language officer at Peking on October 1, 1928? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Foreign Service officer, class 8, and appointed consul 
December 19, 1929? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was John Paton Davies, Jr., in China at that time? 

22848—52 — pt. G 19 



1968 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know he was at Yenching University f 
Peking, 1929 and 1930? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know it, sir, and I did not know him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Lattimore in China at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was in China at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was doing research in Manchuria under the 
Social Science Research Council, was he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not know the exact organization, but I under- 
stood he was doing research work. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you met him that early? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I met him some time in 1929. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not remember where ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or the circumstances ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or who introduced you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I may add that I have very little recollec- 
tion of my early meetings with Mr. Lattimore. It was social until 
1940. 

Mr. Sourwine. While you were in China, did you know Edgar 
Snow? 

Mr. Vincent. I first met Edgar Snow when he visited Manchuria, 
during the time the Japanese were taking over Manchuria. I forgot 
what newspaper he was with, but I saw him there with other news- 
paper people. 

Mr. Sourwine. What year would that be ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be either late 1931 or 1932. 

Mr. Sourwine. How well did you know him ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not well. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you form a friendship then ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know John K. Fairbank in 1930 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I had not met him at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you meet him ? 

Mr. Vincent. My first recollection of meeting Fairbank is when 
he was assigned to Chungking, in 1942, 1 think it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were appointed consul at Tsinan August 7, 
1930? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I presume he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know him in China at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I already said I met him in Peking, but I never 
saw him in Tsinan. I asumed he continued on in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were appointed consul at Mukden Januarv 28, 
1931? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. And foreign Service officer, class 7, July 1, 1931? 

Mr. Vincent. You are losing the place here, but assume that is 
factually correct here ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Consul at Nanking June 23, 1932 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Raymond Paul Ludden in China at that time?: 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1969 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. I hadn't met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first meet Mr. Ludden ? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection of our first meeting, or our paths may 
have crossed, was somewhere when he was a junior officer when he 
came to China in 1942, 1 believe, and was assigned as secretary of the 
embassy and as consul in Kunming. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., in China at that 
time ; that is, 1932 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to turn over here to see whether Davies 
at that time had begun his language work in Peiping. I don't think 
he had, sir ; therefore, I don't know where he was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was in 1932? 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. I can't gave any exact statement on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he not in Peiping under the Harvard Yenching 
Institute ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or had he come under the Guggenheim Memorial 
Foundation at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are asking information about him that I really 
don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. You stated that you had not met Mr. Ludden in 
China at that time, in 1932 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Had not met Mr. who ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Ludden, Raymond Paul Ludden. 

Mr. Vincent. No, I had not ; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you at Yenan in 1932 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was in Yenan from the fall of — was I in Yenan in 
1932? No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you leave? You were appointed consul 
at Tsinan August 7, 1930. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. And I left there in April 1931. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where did you go, do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent. I went to Mukden. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. Ludden was appointed vice 
consul at Tsinan in December 1932 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't have any distinct recollection of it, but if it is 
in the biographical — do you want me to refer to see ? 

Mr. Sourwine. No, I just want to know if you knew it. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. These dates, I might say, for the benefit of the chair- 
man, are dates which I myself have copied out of the State Department 
Regi ster. I do not vouch for their absolute accuracy, and I am simply 
using them to find out from the witness what the connection was, if 
any, with these people. 

You were named consul at Dairen September 13, 1932 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How long were you at Dairen ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was in Dairen for 2,y 2 years, approximately. 

Mr. Sourwine. 1932 to 1934, approximately? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I did not leave. You see, that is where you get 
these dates. I did not leave November 30, 1934, which would indicate 
when I left for Nanking. I left in either January or February 1935. 



1970 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you after that, at any time, stationed at 
Dairen ? 

Mr. Vincent. After? 

Mr. Sourwine. After 1935, after you left to go to Nanking? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were consul at Dairen,- were you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was consul at Dairen. 

Mr. Sourwine. While you were consul at Dairen, were you married? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. When had you married in the interim ? 

Mr. Vincent. I married in Tsinan just before I left for Mukden. 

Mr. Sourwine. While at Dairen was your wife living with you at 
that post? 

Mr. Vincent. She was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who else was a part of your household? 

Mr. Vincent. My children and the Chinese servants. My child, I 
should say, and the Chinese living in the house, and a Chinese servant 
out behind. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did your wife have a companion living with you? 

Mr. Vincent. No, no companion lived in the house with us. 

Mr. Sourwine. In 1933, was John Stewart Service in China? Do 
you know? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this book to see. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you met him at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall having met him at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Raymond Paul Ludden? 

Mr. Vincent. I had not met him at that time, as far as I know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know this Mr. Service had been appointed 
clerk in the American Consul in Yunnanf u in 1933 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this to know, but I have no 
knowledge of Mr. Service's appointments. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had no connection with the consulate at Yun- 
nanf u ? 

Mr. Vincent. Did you say Yunnanf u or Tsinan ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Y-u-n-n-a-n-f-u. 

Mr. Vincent. That is the other name for the city we have been 
calling Kunming around here. That name was changed to Kunming 
some time during the last 5 or 6 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then, in 1933, Service was at Kunming, and Davies 
was at Kunming, later going to Peiping. Did you know that at the 
time? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't know it at the time. I know at some time in 
there Davies was appointed a language student at Peiping. 

Mr. Sourwine. In August of 1933. Is that about when you first 
met him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that is when I first met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Owen Lattimore was in China 
at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know Lattimore was in China at that time. 
I may have seen him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any contact with him ! 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall contact with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that he was doing work with the 
Guggenheim Foundation? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1971 

Mr. Vincent. I have no familiarity with that. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was in Peiping ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I said, sometime in there he started becoming a 
writer for the Pacific Affairs. I don't know the date. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named secretary of the diplomatic service 
and consul at Nanking, November 7, 1934? 

Mr. Vincent. I was named such. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. That I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was vice consul at Yunnanfu or, as you say, 
Kunming? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Raymond Paul Ludden was at 
that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know where he was at that time, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Owen Lattimore was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that not the year that he did field work in 
Mongolia ? 

Mr. Vincent. It may have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named second secretary at Nanking on 
November 30, 1934? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Second secretary to the Department, September 11, 
1935? 

Mr. Vincent. I am just trying to be exact here. To the Depart- 
ment on September 11, 1935, is what I have here. But not as a second 
secretary. 

Mr. Sourwine. Foreign Service officer, class 6, October 1, 1935? 

Mr. Vincent. October 1, 1935 ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were stationed at Nanking at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I was stationed 

Mr. Sourwine. You had come to Nanking? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to figure when I left Nanking, but I don't 
know exactly when I left Nanking. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had been named second secretary at Nanking 
November 30, 1934? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, these dates here — I mean, I was named second 
secretary whether that date is correct or not. I might say, from my 
own, that I left Nanking on transfer back to Washington. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were detailed for special study at the George- 
town University February 12, 1937 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where John Stewart 'Service was 
then? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall where he was, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Ludden was then ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Davies? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not know that Mr. Service was at Peiping 
and Mr. Ludden and Davies at Mukden ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. I didn't recall it. 



1972 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Mr. John Kenneth Emmerson 
was at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I would say he must have been in Japan, 
if he joined the service. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you met him yet? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How long were you at Georgetown ? 

Mr. Vincent. During two sessions, I think ; that is, 2 years. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you study there ? 

Mr. Vincent. I studied Latin-American history under Mr. Cul- 
bertson at one time, and I studied a course called geopolitics under 
a Hungarian professor whose name I have forgotten. There may have 
been another course, but I don't recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever study the Russian language ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you speak Russian ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who Max Granich is ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do know who he is ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who is he? 

Mr. Vincent. He is an American that went out to Shanghai in 
1935, I think, with his wife, and published a magazine called the 
Voice of China there for a period. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that he was Mike Gold's brother? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who Mike Gold is ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid I don't, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel has been sworn pre- 
viously for the duration of these hearings for the purpose of giving 
expert testimony. 

Is it proper if I direct a question to him without reswearing him ? 

Senator Jenner (presiding). You may proceed. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell the committee, of your own knowledge, 
who Mike Gold is? 

Mr. Mandel. Mike Gold has been for a number of years a regular 
Communist writer for the official organ of the Communist Party, the 
Daily Worker, and his name appears there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Max Granich ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never met him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know Mike Gold ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know Max Granich's wife? 

Mr. Vincent. Never knew Max Granich's wife. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is she the former Grace Maul ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify as to whether she was or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. What do you know of Mr. Granich's connection with 
the Voice of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I know that in 1935 he was editor and, I suppose, 
owner of the Voice of China. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was managing editor ; was he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't define it as managing editor — whether he 
was owner, editor. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1973 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know he had been managing editor of China 
Today? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not know that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that publication, China Today? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall it, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that it was the official organ of the 
American Friends of the Chinese People ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that the American Friends of tha 
Chinese People is a Communist-front organization? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge of the fact that Grace 
Maul was a contributor of articles to the Party Organizer issued by the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge that that was the case. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that brought to your attention at any time? 

Mr. Vincent. It may have been in some of the documents which 
I read over before I went down on the Granich case, before the un- 
American Activities Committee, but I don't recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you at any time check, or cause to be checked, 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the records of either Max 
Granich or his wife? 

Mr. Vincent. I myself ? No ; I didn't. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see an FBI report or other security 
report on either one of those persons ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall seeing one, but there may have been 
one in a large file I read in the State Department. 

You realize, when I am giving this testimony, that I was in Wash- 
ington when the Granichs were in Shanghai. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. Did you ever ask for an FBI report or other 
security file on either Max Granich or his wife, Grace Maul Granich ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall asking for that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you think you asked for one ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall asking for one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you tell the committee, please, about your 
activities, if any, as a State Department official, in connection with 
the message to the American consular general in Shanghai which has 
been referred to occasionally, at least, as a reprimand, for harassing 
the activities of Granich ? 

Give us the correct version of that, please. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I can give you the story of that. 

Sometime in 1935 Granich arrived in Shanghai, but I don't know at 
what time. I don't recall from memory what time he was there, he and 
his wife. 

They applied for registration at the consular general for a pub- 
lishing company which was to publish cultural matters and things in 
regard to China. I do not recall the name of what they called the 
publishing company. I recall the name of the Voice of China, which 
was the magazine. 

Mr. Gauss, after seeing one or two publications, realized that it 
was engaging in what he called radical propaganda, directed against 
stirring the Chinese up against the Japanese. I am testifying here 
from memory, from what I can remember from these documents I 



1974 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

have seen. Otherwise, I would not have had this memory of that 
particular instance. 

Mr. Gauss canceled the registration of this firm which was publish- 
ing the Voice of China. Registration, I may say here, is an act which 
is done in China where a company will come in and register simply 
to have its name in the consulate in case of difficulties. It is not 
obligatory to register, nor is a lack of registration a particular handi- 
cap to the company, although some of them think it is, like the 
Standard Oil Co. would register. 

He canceled that because he did not think that the magazine was 
carrying the kind of material which Granich had originally indicated 
to him it was going to carry. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that why he said he canceled it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Why Mr. Gauss said he canceled it? Because he 
thought it was not doing what Mr. Granich had originally held out 
that he was there to do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that the only reason he gave? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the only reason I know he gave at the time. 

The Chinese then complained to Mr. Gauss, the Chinese police, 
that Mr. Granich was — I have forgotten now, whether they said pro- 
Communist, Communist, or a member of the Comintern. 

Mr. Gauss wrote back, and I am recollecting these things from this 
file, and asked the police for any information that they may have to 
support this evidence that he was a member of the Comintern. 

The Chinese police did not furnish him with this information. The 
next thing that happened in this case was that Granich came in and 
told Mr. Gauss, or somebody in Mr. Gauss's office, that some of his 
magazines' had been seized out of a book store. 

Mr. Gauss told him that he should take whatever recourse that he 
should in getting these magazines back. 

The next time I have any recollection now of the case really coming 
up was when we were notified by Mr. Gauss that Granich had had — 
I forget now how many copies, probably 1,000 or 2,000 copies of his 
magazine seized by the Chinese from the Chinese post office. 

Mr. Gauss informed us in the Department — this was in 1930, by 
then, I believe — Mr. Gauss then informed us that he had not taken any 
action in this case to get the man to recover his goods. 

At this time, the case was referred down to what we call the Legal 
Division to get an opinion on whether Granich's property under the 
extraterritorial treaty should be given protection. 

The Legal Division of the State Department ruled that, irrespec- 
tive of the character of the magazine, since Granich was an American 
and since this was American property, at least a gesture should be 
made to assist him in recovering the magazines. 

That was put in the form of a dispatch. Mr. Gauss was told that, 
whereas Granich deserved no diplomatic protection, the State Depart- 
ment was in sympathy with his general attitude toward Granich, but 
from a purely legal point of view Mr. Granich had a right to what 
we would call his treaty rights under the extraterritorial treaty, to 
expect the consulate to make some effort to recover the magazines. 

Mr. Gauss, I think, has already testified that he did not consider 
that a reprimand. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say he was told that the State Department was 
in sympathy with his viewpoint ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1975 

Mr. Vincent. That the State Department was in sympathy with his 
general attitude on Granich, but on this legal point, for fear of estab- 
lishing a precedent, for fear of, in those days, admitting to the Chinese 
that they had a right to seize American property, no matter whether 
it was property which we had no sympathy with ourselves, it was 
property. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see the police memorandum ; that is, 
the memorandum prepared by the Shanghai police dated January 12, 
1937, covering the activities of Granich A 

Mr. Vincent. I presumably did when I read that file. I have no 
distinct recollection of the police memorandum. But I think the 
Chinese police themselves recited the matter as to his Communist 
affiliations. That is my recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not Mr. Gauss accuse him of any Communist 
affiliations ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall Mr. Gauss accusing him of Communist 
affiliations. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not Mr. Gauss forward the Shanghai police file? 
Mr. Vincent. I believe he did. 
Mr. Sourwine. For what purpose? 

Mr. Vincent. For informing the Department as to the man, I sup- 
pose. 

Mr. Sourwine. He wanted you to read it and know what was in it? 
And it contained allegations with regard to communism? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 
. Mr. Sourwine. Did you say Mr. Gauss did not make any allega- 
tions ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Gauss, the only thing I recollect in this big file 
was his statement that whereas he realized that the man was carrying 
on activities of a radical character, which would have stirred up the 
Chinese people, that he was being critical of the Nanking Government, 
the Chinese Government, that he had had no positive evidence that he 
was a Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you prepare or approve the instructions sent 
by pouch under date of July 12, and signed by Sumner Welles, re- 
garding the disposition of that Eastern Publishing Co. matter, that 
being the name of Granich's firm ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I was the final drafter on that thing. 
Mr. Sourwine. Did you prepare the telegram of May 13 to the 
United States consular general at Shanghai, that is, to Gauss, asking 
an explanatory statement as to why the consular general declined to 
intercede on behalf of Granich? 

Mr. Vincent. There I cannot, from memory, say that I did. I know 
that I was in the final drafting, not final, but I was the one that put 
together the ideas in the dispatch. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you prepare a memorandum of June 12, 1936, 
stating that the Voice of China, upon examination, did not show that 
it was carrying out Communist propaganda ? 
Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that based on a study which you yourself had 
made of the magazine ? 

Mr. Vincent. Somebody in the office, it may have been myself, had 
looked at the magazine, and Mr. Gauss himself had also reported that 
the magazine did not carry Communist propaganda. 



1976 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not reporting Mr. Gauss' conclusion, 
were you, in this memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I cannot say at the time, or whether I was re- 
porting his conclusions, because I recall that memorandum was a 
summary of the case up to the time, and whether I was reporting infor- 
mation which I myself arrived at or whether I was reporting that as 
simply what Mr. Gauss had done. I think you will find that the date 
of that, as I just arrived back from Washington, I was just given the 
job of reviewing the Granich case when it came up. • 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not in that memorandum state it as your 
opinion that an examination of the magazine Voice of China did not 
show it was carrying out Communist propaganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did state that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. As your opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not as my opinion. This was a summary, if I recall 
that memorandum correctly. It started out and gave a complete re- 
view of the case of the Voice. Whether I was summarizing there an 
opinion of Mr. Gauss, or whether I was stating an opinion of my own, 
or examination of the magazine, I cannot state. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know what you were purporting to state 
in the memorandum? 

Mr. Vincent. I know in the memorandum I was purporting to 
review for superior officers the present status of the case, based upon 
what I had there. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were trying to give them facts, were you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to give them the facts at the time. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is what you would try to give your superior 
officers, the facts? 

Mr. Vincent. A factual summary of the Granich case in order for 
them to reach a decision ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. All the facts that they would need to reach an 
intelligent decision ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were then giving them the fact that the Voice 
of China did not appear to be carrying propaganda; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I was giving them that either as a fact taken from 
Mr. Gauss' report or from reading it there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether you ever examined a copy of 
the Voice of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of having examined a copy. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had examined it, do you think you would 
have been competent to state whether it was carrying out Communist 
propaganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would depend entirely on the magazine at the 
time. I can't say whether I would have been competent to judge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Upon what basis or in what frame of reference 
would you decide that anything was or was not Communist 
propaganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. In this particular case,, I would decide it was or was 
not, because Mr. Gauss himself had reported that an examination of 
the magazine showed it was not Communist. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1977 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean that Mr. Gauss' expression of opinion 
in that regard would have been conclusive with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. Without an examination of the document? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. That explains, then, how you could reach such a 
conclusion in this case. 

Generally, do you feel that you yourself are competent, from ex- 
amination, to determine whether something is Communist or non- 
Communist, pro-Communist or anti-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly, as I testified before — I am not an 
expert on communism. I would have to probably have the thing to 
see what magazine you had, to see whether I could determine whether 
it was Communist or anti-Communist. I am no expert. 

Mr. Sourwine. What frame of reference do you have to determine 
whether anything is Communist or non-Communist, pro-Communist 
or anti-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I will have to answer there, sir, that I have no 
frame of reference, particularly, on which I would decide it. I mean, 
if this magazine had carried on at that time propaganda in favor of 
the Chinese Communists, then I would have thought it was pro- 
Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. How would you recognize propaganda in favor of 
the Chinese Communists? Did you know what the propaganda line 
was? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then how would you recognize propaganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am simply stating that if the magazine had come 
out speaking favorably of the Chinese Communists in China, then I 
would have certainly known it was pro-Communist. But I am not 
testifying that I would have been able to adopt a subtle line of 
approach. 

Mr. Morris. On that last point, may I ask a question, Mr. Sourwine ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Surely. 

Mr. Morris. I think the last thing you said, Mr. Vincent, was that 
you set up the standard that if something spoke favorably of the 
Chinese Communists therefore it was pro-Communist in its orientation. 

Mr. Vincent, is that a fair appraisal of your testimony ? 

Mr. Vincent. I said if the Voice of China had come out with 
propaganda for the Chinese Communists, then I would call it a 
Communist magazine. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had recognized something in that magazine 
as Communist propaganda you would have said it was pro-Commu- 
nist? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you might not have recognized it because you 
didn't know what the Communist line was? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, I would like to read just one paragraph 
from a volume here, Wartime China, by Maxwell Stewart : 

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel 
elsewhere. ' You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other 
countries, and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots populace move- 
ments that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective 
opposition in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progres- 



1978 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

i 

sive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or 
Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as 
agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices. 

Would you call that pro-Communist propaganda according to your 
definition ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would call it a misconception of Communists in 
China. 

Mr. Morris. Would that conform to the definition you just gave of 
the standard of recognizing pro-Communist writing ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that that is Mr. — what's his name ? 

Mr. Morris. Maxwell Stewart. 

Mr. Vincent. Maxwell Stewart's interpretation of what the Com- 
munists were up to in China. 

Mr. Morris. You would not, employing your standard, call that 
procommunism ? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar a? it is just his analysis of it, it is an incor- 
rect analysis, whether or not you want to call it incorrect or his opinion, 
as to the Chinese Communists in China. 

Mr. Morris. You recognize that is the pamphlet, Mr. Vincent, about 
which we had evidence this morning which you said you were not 
able to deny ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Which reads : 

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent* 
among others. Vincent said (in confidence), and with a certain emphasis that 
he thought it good and well worth publishing. 

You recognize that that is the same publication ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not until you tell me now, because I testified 
this morning that I had no recollection of this particular incident 
and when you read this I do not recall that as the memorandum which 
these people say I read. 

Mr. Morris. Yet this morning you did not deny it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not deny that I had read this. 

Mr. Sourwine. With whom, sir, did you discuss this matter of the 
Voice of China, Max Granich's publication? 

Mr. Vincent. I discussed it with the legal adviser, one person in 
the legal adviser's office, Mr. Francis Xavier Ward, who was a good 
friend of mine there and who was in charge of far eastern matters in 
the legal adviser's office. It was discussed also with my chiefs at the 
time and went out under their initials. The chiefs at the time if I may 
recall from memory, were Mr. — let me see. This was in 1936. Max- 
well Hamilton would have been Deputy Director and Dr. Stanley 
Hornbeck would have been Director. If my recollection is correct 
both of them initialed that before it was sent out under the signature, 
I think, from my recollection of the document, under the signature of 
Sumner Welles. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss that matter with anyone out- 
side of the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall discussing it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall discussing it with Mr. Latti- 
more. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1979 

Mr. Sourwine. Was the decision with regard to the memorandum 
which you prepared on the nature of the magazine wholly your own 
decision ? 

Mr. Vincent. On the nature of the magazine ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, that it was non-Communist, that it did not 
appear to be putting out Communist propaganda. 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified already, I think, sir, that my con- 
clusion as to the nature of the magazine was derived from Mr. Gauss' 
own statement on the magazine, which was that it was carrying out 
radical propaganda 

Mr. Sourwine. Perhaps it is a quibble, but what I am trying to get 
at is this: Let me see if I can get more apt language: Whether the 
decision to characterize it as non-Communist, on whatever basis 
you chose to make that decision, was your own decision, or were you 
instructed in that regard? 

Mr. Vincent. I have already testified, sir, that this memorandum 
I wrote here was a summation or summary af the case for my superior 
officers and was based upon the report of Mr. Gauss. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not instructed, then ? 

Mr. Vincent. Nobody instructed me to include a statement in my 
memorandum, although if I had left it out I would have felt that I 
was lacking in my duty because that was a part of the record which 
I was summarizing. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were, about June 1, 1937, made Foreign Serv- 
ice officer, class 5 ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I assume so, sir. May I refer to this again ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Surely. 

Mr. Vincent. Where are we down to? 

Mr. Sourwine. 1937. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. In 1938 where were you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was still in the Department of State. 

Mr. Sourwine. You remained there through 1938, is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you attend a discussion conference of the Amer- 
ican Council, Institute of Pacific Kelations, in Washington, on or 
about December 9 and 10, 1938 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified in executive session on that, 
sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. That I have no recollection of that meeting, but that 
it is quite possible I did attend. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't know how you attended that conference 
or what was the subject of the conference or what part, if any, you 
took in it? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid that I don't recall that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not know the names of anyone else in the 
Department who attended the conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not. I know that — I think Dr. Hornbeck 
might have attended it. Dr. Hornbeck was a trustee of the organiza- 
tion about that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. I don't mean to be unduly repetitious, but you re- 
member you were asked to try to scrape your memory on this one. Do 
you remember whether Mr. Alger Hiss was in attendance? 

22848' — 52 — pt. 6 20 



1980 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether Mr. James Penfield 
attended ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether Owen Lattimore was 
there? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether Mr. and/or Mrs. Steve 
Raushenbush was there? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall. I simply don't recall the occa- 
sion. I think I have testified that as far as being attending there, I 
would have considered it part of my job to keep up 

Mr. Sourwine. You know the record shows you did attend ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You simply have no memory of having attended 2 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named consul at Geneva February l r 
1939? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Messrs. Service, Ludden, 
Davies, and Emmerson were at that time? Was Mr. Service at Shang- 
hai? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I do not recall. If you want me to 
refer to this, or if you have already done that I will take your word. 

Mr. Sourwine. My notes here indicated that Mr. Service was at 
Shanghai, Mr. Ludden was at Peping, Mr. Davies was at Hankow, 
and Mr. Emmerson was at Osaki, first at Taiheku temporarily and 
then at Osaki, Japan. 

Mr. Vincent. If you have referred to this I don't think I should 
take the committee's time 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have connections with any of those gentle- 
men at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you notify any of them when you were leaving 
for Geneva 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. And give them your new address ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think that it would have been in the Gazette, 
but I may have. I certainly would not have notified Emmerson be- 
cause I don't know him. I don't think I knew Ludden, so I wouldn't 
have notified him. I don't think at that time I knew Service so I 
hardly would have notified him. I had met Davies, according to my 
recollection, at that time, but it is highly improbable I would have 
taken the trouble to notify him I was going to Geneva. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named Foreign Service officer class 4 
November 16, 1939, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't find that one. I will take your word for it. 
I don't see why we should take the time for it. I was named class 4 at 
some time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Class 4. Do you remember going 

Mr. Vincent. Class 4 ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember going to Geneva in the spring of 
1940? 

Mr. Vincent. I do, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1981 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you get back ? 

Mr. Vincent. Get back where? 

Mr. Sourwine. From Geneva. 

Mr. Vincent. I think I got back from Geneva in the latter part 
of November 1940, yes, 1940. 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't go over for just a short trip and then 
come right back and go over again ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What time did you leave to go over there, do you 
know ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I took a sailing in May. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had left the country by the 1st of June? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I was already in Switzerland by the 1st of June. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you got back did you get in touch with Mr. 
Owen Lattimore immediately after you got back ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of getting in touch with Mr. 
Lattimore when I got back. I may testify there that our relations 
were not one where I would have felt it incumbent upon me to get 
in touch with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. How soon after you got back was the first time 
that you saw Mr. Lattimore? 

I will rephrase the question. It is not very well stated. How soon 
after you got back did you see Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection, I would say, of seeing him 
at all. I came here to Washington for I think a week or 10 days' 
consultation. I went from here to Chicago and spent Christmas with 
my wife and family. I went from there out to the west coast to spend 
time with my brother-in-law, Admiral Smith, and sailed for Shang- 
hai in January some time, or maybe early February. 

Mr. Sourwine. While you were in Washington did you speak to 
Mr. Lattimore by telephone? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't have any recollection of speaking to Mr. 
Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no recollection of speaking with him in 
person during that period ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. While you were away did you write to him? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of corresponding with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. After you got back did you write to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall writing to Mr. Lattimore ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you receive any letters from him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in the habit of keeping in touch with 
Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. Not at that time ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know why Mr. Lattimore should feel that 
you would get in touch with him as soon as you got back? 

Mr. Vincent. Not unless at that time he was being considered by 
the President, which eventually came through, for appointment as 
adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and that may be the reason that he may 
have seen me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Mandel, can you identify that as having come 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations? 



1982 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel. This is a document from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph 
from this letter and ask that the whole letter be made a part of the 
record at this point. 

Senator Jenner. It may go in. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 378" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 378 
Cable : Pacaf, Baltimore Telephone : UNiversity 0100, Ext. 43 

PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

Published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations 

Amsterdam — London — Manila — New York — Paris — Shanghai — Sydney — Toronto — 

Wellington — Moscow 

Please address reply to : 300 Gihnan Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 
Maryland 

June 7, 1940. 
Mr. E. C. Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, 

New York City. 

Dear Carter: I have now looked up the book on "The Geology of China" 
by J. S. Lee. It turns out to be a textbook, and as such is hardly suitable for 
review in Pacific Affairs, crowded as we are. Nor do I think you really need 
it for the International Secretariat library, unless for the rather artificial point 
of having such a book by a Chinese author. You already have Cressey's "Geo- 
graphic P^oundations," which will give you all the references that you could get 
from the book by Lee. 

I have not yet been able to read Buell's "Isolated America," and hardly think 
that I am the one to do the suggested review. There are a number of other 
books, on subjects that I know more about, which I ought to review first, and 
Pacific Affairs ought not to be overloaded with my reviews. On the other hand, 
I should think that you yourself are just the man who ought to review this book. 
You have the particular link with the Far East, and you have a broader outlook 
than most of us who have specialized on the Far East, through constantly being 
in touch with international organizations. 

I am sorry that Gauss would not take on the review of "Inner Asian Frontiers 
of China." I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva, 
or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he 
would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book. 

The trouble is that the best of the "specialists" available in America — Witt- 
fogel, Wang Yu-Chaun, Feng Chia-sheng, Bishop, Creel — have all been so heavily 
quoted and directly acknowledged that they can hardly review the book in a 
publication which is edited by the author of the book. That is why Gauss would 
have been good, if he had not been so confoundedly modest. He is a man of 
great general knowledge, and an acute comparative knowledge of theory. 

Do you know what I think would be an excellent idea, if you could persuade 
him to do it? Get Field to write the review. It's a little bit in the family, of 
course, but Field has the qualifications. He is not himself a specialist on ancient 
history, of course, but why should he be? There are other things in the book. 
And Field is interested in, and knows a lot about, theories of historical origins, 
the interaction of society and environment, and so on. 

I'll also scratch the part of my head where the bald spot is rapidly spreading, 
and let you know if I can excavate by this method any further bright ideas, 
if Field should prove to be obstinate. 
Yours very sincerely, 

[s] Owen Lattimore 
Owen Lattimore. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1983 

Mr. Sourwine. This is a letter on the lettehead of Pacific Affairs. 
It is dated at 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 
Md., June 7, 1940, and is addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, Institute of 
Pacific Kelations. The third paragraph reads as follows : 

I am sorry that Gauss would not take on the review of Inner Asian Frontiers 
of China. I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva 
or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he 
would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book. 

Would you say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Lattimore's apparent expecta- 
tion that you would get in touch with him as soon as you got back from 
Geneva was completely unfounded? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say so. It was. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were friends, were you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. We were friends, but as I say at that time not, or we 
never have been close friends. At that time I would not have looked 
up Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think this might indicate that he was keep- 
ing tabs on where you were and was going to look you up as soon as 
you got back ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly draw that inference from the letter. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he in fact look you up when you got back ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I said, I do not recall seeing Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what Mr. Lattimore meant when he 
said here, "as a member of the State Department, he," referring to you, 
sir, "would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political 
parts of the book," referring by "book" to "Inner Asian Frontiers of 
China"? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. I don't know what was in his mind 
that I would have to pussyfoot in commenting or what his idea was 
for me to review his book. I never reviewed the book. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that his book? 

Mr. Vincent. Inner Asian Frontiers of China ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never did review the book. Were you ever 
asked to review it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever being asked to review it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in a position at that time, that is, in 1940, 
where you could have written a completely frank review about a book 
no matter what your views on it were for publication ? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean for publication ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I would have to refer to the State Department, 
and I myself would naturally have not wanted to appear in public 
press in reviewing a book about the Far East. 

Mr. Sourwine. Anything you had written in the way of a review 
of a book would have had to accord with State Department policy or at 
least not be violently at odds therewith ; is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, but I would say according to personal policy and 
other things I wouldn't have gone into the business of publicly review- 
ing books. 



1984 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever read the book Inner Asian Frontiers 
of China? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named consul at Shanghai August 10, 
1940? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. You ought to correct your records there. 
I left very much later. 

Mr. Sourwine. I want to find out approximately when you got to 
Shanghai. 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't leave Geneva, for instance, until November, 
although this shows I was appointed consul in Shanghai. I came 
home and, as I said, did not leave the United States for Shanghai 
until the latter part of January or early February, and more likely 
February. Then I would have arrived in Shanghai late in February 
or early March. 

Mr. Sourwine. Of 1941? 

Mr. Vincent. Of 1941. 

Mr. Sourwine. You remained at Shanghai until you were appointed 
first secretary at Nanking in June ; is that right, temporarily ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. That is purely a technicality there. Nanking 
was occupied by the Japanese. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never changed your duty station? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I stayed in Shanghai but the appointment to 
Nanking, may I explain there just for your record, the appointment 
to Nanking was a technicality because theoretically the Chinese Gov- 
ernment was still supposed to be at Nanking, but when you were ap- 
pointed to Nanking you went to Chungking where the government 
was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you leave Shanghai and go to Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. I left Shanghai and went to Chungking, my recollec- 
tion is, in May, but this doesn't show it here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to turn to this. Whether John Service 
was in Shanghai during those few months I was there I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wasn't he third secretary at Nanking prior to about 
April, and named vice consul at Shanghai in April ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this, sir. My first distinct 
recollection of Service is when he was in Chungking at the same time 
I was counselor there with Mr. Gauss. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember having met him earlier at 
Shanghai ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall exactly but I think he was in Shanghai 
at that time and I would have met him if he was there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden 
was at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can look it up for you, sir, but I don't recall. Do 
you want me to look it up ? 

Mr. Sourwine. The note I have here is that he was vice consul at 
Canton. Would you have had contact with him if he was there ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I have never visited Canton in my life. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know from memory where Mr. John Paton 
Davies was at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1985 

Mr. SouirwiNE. If lie was still at Hankow, as seems to be indicated, 
would you have had contact with him there? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named first secretary at technically Nan- 
king but actually Chungking June 3, 1941 ? 

Mr. Vincent. That must be the date; yes. Then I would like to 
correct that testimony. I wasn't named until June. I probably 
didn't leave Shanghai until June. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that about the time you first met Lauchlin 
Currie ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I didn't meet Lauchlin Currie there. He came 
up later to Chungking. I didn't meet him in Shanghai. I have testi- 
fied that I first met Mr. Currie up in New Hampshire when he had 
a little farm there and we had been loaned a little house at Hancock by 
Mr. Grew. That was 193G or 1937. I have testified to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him in Chungking in 1941 or 1942 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't see him in 1941, as I recollect, but did see 
him in 1942. I think the 1941 visit was made prior to my arrival in 
Chungking but I couldn't testify exactly to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. How well did you know him in Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew him fairly well in Chunking. He was there. 
I had met him before. I saw him from time to time. I think I have 
testified before that I was not taken with him on conferences because 
he stayed with the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you were given leave to handle work in the 
office of the Director of the Foreign Economic Administration did Mr. 
Currie have anything to do with that assignment? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. He asked me to come over there for a while. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was then in what position ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was Deputy Director of the FEA, Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration. 

Mr. Sourwine. You covered here the question, either in the execu- 
tive session or here today, the question of your social intercourse with 
Mr. Currie and of consulting him on matters of policy and so forth? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You stated, I believe, that you had visited him on 
a number of occasions, both at his office and at his home; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I saw him from time to time, not frequently but 
from time to time socially when we were in the FEA. I saw him from 
time to time during the short period I was there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember if you went to see Mr. Currie soon 
after your return from Chungking ?  

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say from memory whether I saw him soon 
after I came back from Chungking or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you receive an invitation from him to come see 
him shortly after you got back from Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. I have used the phrase before: it would have been 
logical that I would have seen him but I have no recollection of meet- 
ing him at that time. As I testified before he was a White House 
man who was handling China affairs. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where was Mr. Lattimore at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. This would be now in 1943, 1 gather. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in 
1941-42, wasn't he? 



1986 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. He left China sometime in 1942. It may have 
been early 1943. 

Mr. Sourwine. And became Deputy Director of OWI in early 1942 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't the exact information on that. He became 
the Deputy Director sometime. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was then in charge of Pacific operations for 
OWI? 

Mr. Vincent. "Whether it was late 1942 or early 1943 I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any contact with him while he was 
in that job? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that contact 

Mr. Vincent. Not frequently, but I would see him from time to 
time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have a telephone contact with him from 
time to time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of it, but it would be logical 
that I would have. 

Mr. Sourwine. And correspondence passed between you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Correspondence of an official nature. I don't recall 
any personal. 

Mr. Sourwine. Solely official ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. There may have been correspondence. 
I don't recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that in November 1941 Mr. Lattimore 
had sent a message to Lauchlin Currie at the White House indicating 
a violent adverse reaction by Chiang Kai-shek to the proposed modus 
vivendi for Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you read that again, because I want to be 
sure of this one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let me start over again. Do you know what I 
refer to when I speak of a proposed modus vivendi for Japan, circa 
1941? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I think I do, but I know it from 

Mr. Sourewine. You know what I am referring to ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I do ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that in November 1941 Mr. Latti- 
more had sent a message to Lauchlin Currie at the White House indi- 
cating a violent adverse reaction by Chiang Kai-shek to that proposed 
modus vivendi for Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know he had sent one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know Mr. Lattimore had urged that the 
President be told about Chiang's adverse reaction ? 

(Senator Ferguson took the chair.) 

Mr. Vincent. If we are speaking of that situation I don't know 
that it had to be urged. The answer to that is that I do not recall. 
But Mr. Gauss and I informed the White House, the State Depart- 
ment, of the very strong adverse reaction to the modus vivendi on 
the part of either Chiang Kai-shek or the foreign secretary at that 
time, Quotai Chi. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at the time that Mr. Lattimore had 
sent or intended to send such a message? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you discuss it with him at any time ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1987 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing it with Mr. 
Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. Since you say that you and Ambassador Gauss 
had sent such a message, will you tell us what was the proposed modus 
vivendi and why it was opposed by Chiang ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact memory on that modus vivendi, and 
I would have to go back into documents to see, but I can tell you why 
Chiang Kai-shek, I can tell you enough to know why Chiang Kai-shak 
had a violent reaction to it, because this proposed modus vivendi, which 
I don't know whether it ever was a proposal, had something to do with 
advising the Chinese and the Japanese to give up their war status ; it 
had something to do with our calling off the oil embargo on Japan, 
provided Japan would agree not to move any farther south in French 
Indochina and eventually get out of French Indochina. 

As I say, without being able to refer to that specific modus vivendi, 
I know that his reaction was violent and that Mr. Gauss reported it. 
I say Mr. Gauss and I because I was present when the Generalissimo 
or the Foreign Secretary — I forget which — had this. It was brought 
to their attention not by Mr. Gauss and myself, mind you. It was 
brought to their attention by their own Ambassador here in Wash- 
ington, and one or the other of them called Mr. Gauss and me in to 
give their violent reaction to this proposed modus vivendi. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did inform the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. We did inform the Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. What if anything do you know about the origin of 
that proposed modus vivendi ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid that I don't know anything about the 
origin of the proposed modus vivendi. It came out, I believe, of 
talks that Mr. Hull was having with Nomura at the time, but from 
here I am speaking from memory. I was in Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named Foreign Service officer, class 3, 
February 1, 1942. 

Mr. Vincent. I assume that you are correct because you copied it 
from out of here. Class 3, February 1, 1942 ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And consul of Embassy, actually at Chungking, 
March 17, 1942. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. John Stewart Service was third secretary at Chung- 
king from about July 1942. Did you know him there ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did know him there, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Raymond Paul Ludden was second secretary at 
Chungking from about July 31, 1942, and later division consul at 
Kunming October 1942. Did you know him there? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. John Patton Davies was consular officer at Kun- 
ming, for duty as second secretary, temporarily, at Kunming, begin- 
ning at the end of April 1942. Did you know him there? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you met John K. Emmerson ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not.believe I had yet met Emmerson, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named Counselor of Embassy at Chung- 
king July 1, 1942? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought we read that first. That is changing the 
order to Chungking, yes. 



1988 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify for the committee Chou En-lai 
and Lin Pao ? 

Mr. Vincent. Chou En-laid is the present member and Foreign Sec- 
retary of the Kuomintang regime in China. He was the representative 
of the Communist group in Yenan stationed at Chungking. It was a 
position of, I suppose, liaison character. I never knew how it was 
described, but he was there in a capacity recognized by the Chinese 
Government. As I have testified before, I met him at Chiang Kai- 
shek's. I am describing their character. Lin Pao to the best of my 
recollection was a general who came to Chungking in the fall, I believe, 
of 1942 to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek the possibilities of settling 
their differences and having a better coordinated military campaign 
against the Japanese. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet those gentlemen? 

Mr. Vincent. As I have testified in executive session, yes, I have 
met En-lai when he paid a courtesy call on Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador. 
As I say, I met him at a reception at Chiang Kai-shek's. I had a lunch 
with him and the head of the British-American Tobacco Co. at Nan- 
king. I testified also that I met him somewhere at some time at a 
Chinese residence. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you keep your voice up a little. 

Mr. Vincent. Excuse me, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Specifically, did you testify concerning whether 
you ever met them together and had a conference with them together? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not specifically testify to that because I had no 
recollection of meeting the two of them together. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify as to whether you and Mr. John 
Stewart Service together had a conversation with Chou En-lai and 
Lin Pao in November 1942 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not testify that I recalled such a meeting. I 
notice now that Mr. Service has himself, in a memorandum which he 
wrote, said that he and I did meet them, under what circumstances 
I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. 'You were asked to check up on that, were you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I saw it on the page that you mentioned. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you refreshed your memory in that regard? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid after even reading the memorandum 
here, I don't recall the circumstances of that meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no memory of that meeting ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of that meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. The paragraph you are talking about appears on 
page 792, part 3, exhibit No. 249 of the hearings of this committee. 
Mr. John Stewart Service in that report stated : 

The Communists themselves (Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in a conversation with 
John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider 
that foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only 
force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of 
successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how 
tactfully made. But they believe that the reflection of a better informed foreign 
opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted 
elements of leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo. 

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem — 

and so on. 

Are you sure you have no memory of any such meeting at all ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1989 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't have. As I say, that meeting, which I 
gather here he reported on 2 months later, I just don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you two had had a meeting like that it would have 
been in line with your official duty, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been. 

Mr. Sourwine. And there would have been an obligation to report 
upon it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have searched through the files of the State Depart- 
ment and can't find that I ever reported on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would there have been an obligation on you to re- 
port on it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, there wouldn't have been an obligation to report 
on it if I did not consider it of sufficient importance to report on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. If it took place as Mr. Service had described it, it 
would have been of sufficient importance to report on, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have seemed to me to be, but I cannot find 
any report I made on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. In that event would it have been your duty to report 
or would the joint duty of yourself and Mr. Service have been dis- 
charged by his report ? 

Mr. Vincent. The joint duty would have been discharged by Mr. 
Service's reporting on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Whether you knew about it or not ? 

Mr. Vincent. He would have had to report on it, and at that 
time — here you have to get into the matter of assignments again. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Whether or not he was at that time, and I think he 
had become, adviser to Stilwell or not, I do not know. 

Mr. Sourwine. If he was adviser to Stilwell and was making his 
report to Stilwell that wouldn't have discharged your duty of report- 
ing, would it ? 

Mr. Vincent. He would have made a copy of the report to Stilwell, 
presumably, available to the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would he have made a copy available to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you knew that he was reporting it to Stilwell and 
a copy to the State Department you would have had no obligation 
to report, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have had no obligation to report, but as I 
say, whether he reported through the Embassy or whether he reported 
through Stilwell, I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have read this account. Do you have any 
opinion as to whether it happened as Mr. Service reported it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not have, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Doesn't the mere fact that Mr. Service reported it 
at least lead you to the prima facie supposition that it happened? 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly does. You asked me whether I had a 
memory. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do have an opinion whether it happened? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I have an opinion, but I don't recall the instance. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it happened as Mr. Service reported ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am inclined to think it did happen as Mr. Service 
reported it. 



1990 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no reason to doubt Mr. Service's accuracy 
or veracity ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I would say one thing on the question of my 
recollection of it, that Mr. Lin Pao or Gen. Lin Pao spoke only Chinese 
and Mr. Service spoke Chinese well, whether the conversation which I 
say is one that I cannot recall whether it was in Chinese which I did 
not myself understand well. I just give that as a circumstance in 
this meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading further from this report: 

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be 
the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government, and in our 
propaganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict ; democracy 
against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American 
hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply 
to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. 

Was that suggestion carried out in American policy? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was American policy such as to be in accordance 
with the expression contained in that suggestion, whether wittingly 
or otherwise? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say it was, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, wasn't there a great deal of 
stressing by the State Department of the "political nature of the 
world conflict," and a good deal of reiteration, almost constant reitera- 
tion, of the American hope of "seeing the development of genuine 
democracy in China"? 

Mr. Vincent. Of genuine democracy in China, yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then there was, as a matter of American policy, 
precisely what the Communists here suggested as one of their ap- 
proaches, was there not? 

Mr. Vincent. Let me read again [referring to document]. Well, 
yes. When you say that you get on to the matter of democracy in 
China- 

Mr. Sourwine. I don't want to get on to the question of democracy 
in China, please. I only want to get on to the question of what the 
State Department was stressing in its propaganda. 

Mr. Vincent. Let's take first the word "propaganda." The State 
Department, I don't think, had any propaganda at that time, but if 
you are speaking of what was the policy which Mr. Gauss and I 
were supposed to carry out, it was to try to get the Communists and 
Kuomintang to settle their differences so they would both fight the 
others. 

Mr. Sourwine. I don't believe there will be any difference here if we 
will get our words together so they mean the same thing. I mean no 
evil inference when I use the word "propaganda." I mean propa- 
ganda as an expression of opinion which it is desired that others shall 
hear and react to. In that regard the State Department engages in 
propaganda every day, isn't that true ? On the basis of that kind of 
definition. 

Mr. Vincent. On that definition. 

Mr. Sourwine. On the basis of that kind of definition of propa- 
ganda what Mr. Service says Chou En-lai and Lin Pao were suggest- 
ing here was actually a particular type of propaganda, was it not? 
They were suggesting that the State Department reiterate the Amer- 
ican hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1991 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Whether they meant by democracy what we mean, 
or whether they meant by democracy what the State Department 
would mean, or what Soviet Kussia would mean, is not the question. 
They were asking for a specific phrase to become a part of State De- 
partment propaganda, were they not? 

Mr. Vincent. According to this, they were. 

Mr. Sourwine. That phrase did become a part of the State Depart- 
ment propaganda, did it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I again object to the word "propaganda." 

Mr. Sourwine. We have defined "propaganda" in a manner ac- 
ceptable to both of us, and I use it in that sense. 

Mr. Vincent. It was the policy of the Embassy to try to bring about 
as much as we could an improvement in the Chinese Government. 
Whether we were stressing at that time democracy I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. The State Department at Washington did reiterate 
on numerous occasions the American hope of seeing the development 
of genuine democracy in China ; didn't they ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You wrote memoranda with that phrase or substan- 
tially that phrase in it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. For signature by the Secretary of State? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Those memoranda were so signed? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Others in the State Department used the same 
phrase ? 

Mr. Vincent. Genuine democracy in China ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. An expression, a reiteration of the American hope 
of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to pin this down to a particular period 
of 1942, and I do not know that it was being reiterated at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was being done all the way through ; it was still 
being done in 1945 and 1946 ; wasn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Very strongly in 1945 and 1946? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. By which time you had a strong hand in the matter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Isn't it conceivable to you that that phrase may have 
had in China the impact which the Communists, Lin Pao and Chou 
En-lai, desired, whatever it may have meant to the people who heard 
it used back home ? 

Mr. Vincent. The impact that Chou En-lai and Lin Pao desired ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I will simplify that question: 

Mr. Vincent. I wish you would. 

Mr. Sourwine. Obviously if Lin and Chou desired that this particu- 
lar phrase be reiterated by the State Department, they had a reason 
for that ; didn't they ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. That reason must have been the impact that they 
felt it would have in China ; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 



1992 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Sourwine. They felt that the use of that phrase by the State 
Department would have an impact in China which would be helpful 
to them ; isn't that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. To broaden the Government 

Mr. Sourwine. Can't you conceive that when the phrase was used 
by the State Department it did have an impact in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. It never had much impact in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is your opinion? When the State Depart- 
ment used that phrase and reiterated it they were not at any time care- 
ful to include a parenthetical statement, "We do not mean by this 
phrase what Lin Pao and Chou En-lai might like to think we mean," 
did they ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Soukwine. They simply used the phrase and let it go out over 
the wires. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of an impact do you think that had in 
China? 

Mr. Vincent. I have just said it had very little impact at this par- 
ticular period because the Chinese Government did not bring it about. 

Senator Ferguson. It was a criticism of the then government. 

Mr. Vincent. It was what we considered a constructive criticism of 
the then existing Kuomintang government, which was a one-party 
government. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say it had no impact at what time? You mean 
in 1942? 

Mr. Vincent. 1942 up to the time I left it had produced no results 
that I knew of. 

Mr. Sourwine. It had no impact in 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. It had an impact in 1945, bringing about the Mar- 
shall mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. It had an impact in 1946? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1946 it didn't have any results. 

Mr. Sourwine. It had had its result by that time, had it not? 

Mr. Vincent. It didn't even have a result by that time because even 
then it didn't result in anything other than a falling out among the 
various parties, but it did eventually bring about a constitutional 
regime. 

Mr. Sourwine. Its impact had certainly been felt by 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next paragraph [reading] : 

Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist 
Army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might 
intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support 
be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Com- 
munists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies re- 
ceive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. 

Let's take the first sentence of that : 

some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist Army as a participant in the 
war against fascism. 

Did you ever advocate that? 

Mr. Vincent. I never did advocate participation of the Chinese 
Communist Army in the war with Japan other than that what they 
were doing, except as all of us wished that the Kuomintang and the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1993 

Communists could bring about some kind of coordinated military 
effort. In that context, yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, sir, ever advocate some sort of recognition 
of the Chinese Communist army as participant in the war against 
Fascists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Some kind, we certainly did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Of course you did. 

Mr. Vincent. We advocated that Chinese Communist army be 
brought into some kind of coordinated position with the Kuomintang. 

Mr. Sourwine. Of course, and that was the State Department posi- 
tion, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Let's take the second sentence : 

The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade 
be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eigh- 
teenth Group Army. 

Did the United States ever intervene to that end ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that we ever intervened to that end. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the United States ever ask that the Kuomintang 
blockade be discontinued? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the United States ever ask that support be 
given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall its ever taking that up with Chiang 
Kai-shek. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any expressions by the State De- 
partment, official or semiofficial, in favor of that? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall now ; yes, they were in favor, as I have 
said before. 

Mr. Sourwine. Certainly. 

Mr. Vincent. They were in favor of these people settling their 
differences and fighting on a united front against the Japanese. 

Mr. Sourwine. They did express themselves in favor of that. Cer- 
tainly they did. 

Mr. Vincent. I am confining that now to their intervening with 
Chiang Kai-shek to get him to do it. I don't recall any official inter- 
vention on the part of Mr. Gauss to get them to do it. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. Sourwine. The next sentence : 

The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist 
armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. 

Did you ever recommend anything along that line? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have already testified, sir, that I don't recall 
ever recommending that they get a proportionate share. May I clar- 
ify that. To what extent Chiang Kai-shek would have given them 
their proportionate share had they settled their differences and had 
they fought under one command, I don't know, but I never recom- 
mended that they get an independent 

Mr. Sourwine. You concurred in Mr. Wallace's recommendation 
in that regard, didn't you ? 

Mr. Vincent. We discussed that in executive session. 

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you to read Mr. Wallace's testimony, you 
remember. 



1994 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't find anything in Mr. Wallace's testimony 
about his saying that they were getting a proportionate share. Is it in 
the testimony there? I glanced through it hurriedly but I don't 
recall it. You recall at the meeting here you said it was in his tele- 
gram from Kuomintang and I couldn't find it. 

Mr. Sottrwine. Is it still your statement, having read that, and 
having read Mr. Wallace's testimony, that in your opinion there was 
nothing in there which involved giving a proportionate share of 
American supplies sent to China to the Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. After we talked about that in the testimony, I say 
that I glanced through it hurriedly and I left here and I did not see 
anything in there where he said that. 

Mr. Sourwine. The record speaks for itself; so I don't mean to 
argue with you about the record. I didn't want you to make a record 
of a statement in conflict or in apparent conflict with the record with- 
out having the chance to look at it. That is why I asked you the 
other day to look at the record. 

Mr. Vincent. I glanced through it — I won't say I read the whole 
thing — and did not find any such statement. 

Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang 
would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. 

Was that ever proposed or urged by anybody I 

Mr. Vincent. That was proposed and urged by the Vice President 
at the request of the President when Mr. Wallace made his mission 
during 1944. That was the first I heard of it. The American Army 
authorities were the ones who were anxious that they get some kind of 
observer group up there. 

Mr. Sourwine. You can't say for sure that that was the first you 
ever heard of it, can you, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't say for sure, but I have no recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have admitted that probably you heard it first 
from Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in 1942 as reported by Mr. Service. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, but I don't think that Mr. Service — is he now 
still saying that this is what ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I don't know what Mr. Service is saying now, but 
this is his report of January 23, 1943, to what occurred in 1942, and 
you have stated you think it probably did occur that way. 

Mr. Vincent. You have said that Mr. Chou En-lai and Lin Pao 
suggested that, but the next sentence says, "I have not heard this 
sponsored by the Communists themselves." I am not here now trying 
to dispute the testimony, but it seems to me that Mr. Service is imply- 
ing that this is something he was suggesting. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think that is entirely his suggestion? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say so from a reading of the context of this. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it a suggestion in which you concurred ? 

Mr. Vincent. I later concurred in it, but as I say I had no recollec- 
tion of this memorandum here, but the sending of a military mission 
to Yenan to find out what conditions were was in people's minds from 
time to time and I am not myself denying here that the suggestion 
may not have been made. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was strongly urged upon Chiang during Mr. 
Wallace's visit, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is quite right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1995 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, you yourself brought it up at 
least three times and shifted the conversation to that subject. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. And were extremely anxious that he should make a 
decision to permit that mission to go, holding all other matters in 
abeyance. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I was no more anxious for it than the American 
Army was at the time, which wanted to get intelligence out of Yenan, 
the Communist area. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right, sir. 

I am through with that phase. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 9 : 30. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 30 p. m. the committee was recessed until 9 : 30 
a. m., Thursday, January 31, 1952.) 



22S48— 52— pt. 6 21 



INDEX 



[Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the 
mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.] 

A Pag» 

Acheson, Dean 1702, 1715, 1717, 

1720-1722, 1773, 1880, 18S8, 1SS9, 1S94, 1895, 1901, 1915, 191G, 1903 

Adler, Solomon 1091-1695, 1753, 177S, 1016 

Allen, James S. (Sol Auerbach) 1703 

Allied Powers 1770, 1S04, 186S, 1SG9, 1871 

Alsop, Joseph 1S09, 1S14, 1S15 

Amerasia 1733, 1737, 174G, 174S, 1750, 

1752-1754, 1780, 1781, 1827, 1841, 1843, 1903, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1929 

American Bar Association 1706 

American-China Policy Association 1855 

American Council (IPR) 1S31, 1832 

American Delegation (IPR) 1730, 1761, 1798, 1832, 1S33, 1844 1927 

American Forces (China) 1S09, 1S13 

American Friends of the Chinese People 1973 

American Government 16S8, 1720, 1724, 1728, 1741, 1742, 1751, 

1752, 1754, 1823, 1S55, 1805, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1951, 1959, 1963, 1992 

American Red Cross 1846 

Area Committee (SWNCC) 1732, 1733 

Armed Forces (United States) 1710, 

1712, 1714, 1715, 1719, 1721, 1730, 1748, 1791, 1792, 1809, 1812, 1813, 

1S67, 1868, 1872, 1S83, 1890, 1891, 1906, 1995. 

Arnold & Co., Ltd 1967 

Asiaticus (Hans Moeller) (Heinz Moeller) 1702,1763,1850 

Atchesou, George 1701, 1702, 1788, 1817, 1818 

Atlantic City UNRRA Conference 1733 

Austern, Hilda (Bretholtz) 1763 

B 

Ballantine, Joseph W 1739, 

1765, 1772, 1773, 1779, 1795, 1823, 1S27, 1841, 1851, 1853, 1935, 1936 

Ballard (Little) 1764 

Baptist Church 1906 

Barnes, Joseph 1694, 1695, 1916 

Barnett, Robert W 1693, 1694, 1695, 1758, 1764, 1912 

Benton, Senator William 1756 

Berle, Adolf A., Jr 1901 

Bethune, Norman 1098 

Bishop 1982 

Bisson, T. A 1696, 1697, 1760, 1801, 1902, 1916 

Bisson, Mrs. T. A L__ 1096 

Blair Lee House 1842, 1843 

Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) 1786, 1796, 1801 

Bohlen, Charles 1851 

Borton, Hugh 1839 

Bretton Woods Conference 1758 

British-American Tobacco Co 1701, 1702, 1703, 1788, 1789, 1988 

British Foreign Office 1771 

British Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1771, 1772 

Browder, Earl 1687, 1697, 1764 

Budenz, Louis 1687, 1688, 1689, 1699, 1700, 1778, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1914 
Buell, Raymond Leslie 1982 

I 



II INDEX 

Page 

Bulgarian Government 1780 

Bulletin (State Department) 1916 

Bunce, Arthur C 1887, 1888 

Byrnes, Secretary James 1709, 1710, 1713-1715, 1717-1720, 

1851, 1852, 1859, 1860, 1872, 1888-1891, 1901, 1903, 1907, 1916, 1963 

C 

Cairo Declaration 1868 

California University 1836 

Carlson, Evans F 1697, 1764 

Carnegie Institute 1736 

Carter, Edward C 1760, 1763, 1799, 1803, 1832, 1887, 1916, 1934, 1982 

Carter, Mrs. Edward C 1803, 1804, 1934, 1983 

Carter, General 1721 

Central Committee (Communist Party) 1690, 1973 

Central Government (China) 1791, 1993 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 1780 

Chamber of Commerce of Florida 1894 

Changsha Consulate 1966, 1967 

Chao-ting, Chi. (See Chi, Chao-ting.) 

Chapin, Selden , 1755 

Chapman, Abraham 1764 

Charter (United Nations) 1868 

Chen, Han-seng 1697, 1762, 1763 

Chennault, Gen. C. L 1812,1813,1814,1815 

Chi, Dr. Chao-ting 1698-1700, 1761-1763, 1850 

Chi, Li Shao 1743 

Chiang, John 1893 

Chiang, K. P 1893 

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo 1698, 

1699, 1701, 1703, 1707-1709, 1711-1714, 1716-1718, 1724, 1725, 1727, 
1738, 1757, 1762, 1779, 1787, 1788, 1791, 1806, 1809, 1811, 1812, 1816, 
1821, 1825, 1831, 1892, 1907, 1917, 1955, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1986-1988, 
1993, 1994. 

Chiang Kai-shek, Madam 1816, 1818, 1963, 19S5 

Chia-sheng, Feng. (-See Feng, Chia-sheng.) 

China Aid Council 1747, 1803 

China Among the Powers 1783, 1800 

China-Burma Theater 1813 

China Defense Supplies 1784 

China Today 1973 

Chinese Armies 1702 

1703, 1708, 1711, 1725, 1791, 1792, 1928, 1962, 1991, 1992, 1993 

Chinese Central Government 1791, 1993 

Chinese Civil War 1709, 1713, 1717, 1722, 1960 

Chinese Communist Army 1702, 1703, 1741, 1792, 1928, 1992, 1993 

Chinese Communist Government 170S 

1722, 1771, 1787, 1791, 1793, 1907, 1911, 1955 

Chinese Communist Premier 1700' 

Chinese Currency Stabilization Loan 1691 

Chinese Embassy (Washington) 1716 

Chinese Legation (Bern Switzerland) 1770,1771 

Chinese Nationalist Army 1711, 1725, 1962 

Chinese Nationalist Government 168S 

1711, 1714, 1717, 1722-1725, 1727, 1735, 1770-1772, 1790-1792, 1812, 
1823, 1858-1861, 1881, 1886, 1891-1893, 1905, 1916, 1954, 1955, 1960, 
1961, 1975, 1984, 19S8, 1990-1992. 

Chinese Nationalist Mission (Bern, Switzerland) 1771 

Chinese Peoples Republic 1771 

Chinese Red Army 1957 

Chinese Revolution 1954 

Chinese-Russian Negotiations 1859, 1861 

Chinese Stabilization Loan 1758 

Chou, En-Lai 1700-1703, 

1725, 1762, 1787-1791, 1907, 1916, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 

Chungking Embassy 1691, 1701, 1702, 

1704, 1729, 173S, 1786, 1787, 1817, 1856, 1915, 1921, 1922, 19S5, 79S7 
Chungking Government 1907 



index in 

Page 

Churchill, Winston 1852 

■Chu, Teh 1703, 1928 

CIA: (See Central Intelligence Agency.) 

Civil War (China) 1709, 1713, 1717, 1722, 1960 

Clayton, Will 1884, 1918 

Clubb, O. Edmund 1703, 1704, 1705, 1700, 1704 

Coe, Frank V 1706, 1727 

Cohen, Ben ISSO 

Comintern (Communist Party) 1690,1957,1974 

Comintern (Sixth World Congress) 1G90 

Commerce Department 1743, 1744 

Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate) 1913 

Committee on Military Affairs (House) 1686, 1915, 1916,1917 

Communist Chinese Army 1702, 1703, 1791,1792, 1928, 1992, 1993 

Communist Government (China) 1708,1722, 

1771, 1787, 1791, 1893, 1907, 1911, 1955 

Communist International 1690, 1957, 1959 

Communist Left-wingers 1 734 

Communist Manifesto 1689 

Communist Party 16S7-1G90, 

1692-1697, 1714, 1717-1725, 1728-1740, 1743-1748, 1752-1763, 1769- 
1772, 177S, 17S2, 1783, 1788-1795, 1840, 1814-1818, 1823, 1833, 1837, 
1S3S, 1846-1850, 1861-1866, 1878-1S80, 1S85, 18S6, 1893, 1895, 1900- 
1911, 1916, 1927-1934, 1938, 1944-1949, 1952-1962, 1964, 1965, 1972- 
1979, 19S8, 1990-1994. 

Communist Party (Central Committee) 1690,1973 

Communist Party (China) 1700-1729, 

1746, 1757, 1771, 1772, 1782-1783, 1788-1795, 1804, 1814-1818, 1823, 
1850, 1885, 18S6, 1893, 1895, 1907, 1911, 1916, 1927, 1928, 1948, 1954- 
1962, 1977, 1979, 1988, 1991-1994. 

Communist Party (Comintern) 1690,1974 

Communist Party (France) 1714,1961 

Communist Party (Italy) 1714, 1961 

Communist Party (Japan) 1861,1866, 1879, 1S95 

Communist Party (Korea) 1769,1770 

Communist Party (Russia) 1708, 1748, 1895 

Communist Party (Russian Chinese) 1928 

Communist Party (United States) 1687-1689, 

1694, 1706, 1730-1737, 1740, 1744, 1745, 1755-1762, 1778, 1837, 1846, 
1880, 1900, 1903-1907, 1910, 1911, 1938, 1973. 

Compass (New York) 1914 

Conference of Foreign Ministers (Paris, 1951) 1761 

Congress (United States) 1905, 1907 

Congressional Record 1905 

Consulate (Darien) 1696 

Cooke, Admiral Charles Maynard 1688, 1700, 1905 

Cornell University 1686, 1891, 1916, 1917 

Cosmos Club 1695, 1747, 1761, 1762, 1802, 1906 

Crane Foundation 1738 

Creel 1982 

Cressey, George B 1982 

Crowley, Mr 1706, 1796, 1936 

Culbertson, Mr 1972 

Currie, Lauchlin 1727. 1728 

1734. 1735, 1786, 1787, 1796, 1805, 1806, 1811, 1916, 1936, 1985, 1986 
Currie, Mrs. Lauchlin 1728, 1778 

D 

Daily Worker 1914, 1972 

Darien Embassv 1696, 1969, 1970 

Davies, John P 1728,1729,1744 

1758, 1759, 1912, 1916, 1928, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1980, 1984, 1987 

Davis, Elmer 1738 

Davis, Ben 1903 

DeLacy, Hugh 1916 

Democratic Party 1906 

Dennett, Raymond 1S32, 1844 



IV INDEX 

Page 

Dennis, Eugene (see also Paul Walsh) 1729 

Department of Maritime Provinces (Russia) 1824 

Dilemma in Japan 1748 

Dimitrov, Georgi 1!)57 

Dooman, Eugene 1688, 1732, 1739, 1772- 

1774, 1779, 1829, 1830, 1842, 1863, 1864, 1868, 1S67, 1872, 1873, 1905 

Drumright, Mr. Everett Francis 1721 

DuBois, Cora 1758, 1912 

Duggan, Laurence 1729 

Dulles, John Foster 1959 

Dumbarton Oaks Conference 1736 

Dunn, James C 1852, 1802 

E 

Eastern Publishing Co 1975 

Eastland, James O 1862 

Economic Commission for Japan 1895 

Economic Cooperation Administrator 1700 

Edwards, Mr 1881, 1882 

Edwards' Report 18821 

Eighteenth Group Army 1791, 1992, 1993 

Eighth Route Army 1702, 1703 

Emmeison, John K 1729, 1758, 1912, 1972, 1980, 1987 

Emperor of Japan 1830, 1864, 1869, 1965 

Employee Loyalty Investigations (State Department) 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913 

Engels 1689 

En-lai, Chou (See Chou, En-Lai.) 

Epstein, Israel 1783 

Exeter 1729 

F 

Fairbank, John K 1729, 1760, 1761, 1783, 1916, 1938, 1968, 1978 

Fairbank, Wilma 1729, 1758, 1760, 1912 

Far East Advisory Commission 1881 

Far East Commission. (See State Department, FEC 230.) 

Far East State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (FESWNCC) 1732, 

1733, 1773, 1838, 1839, 1841, 1S52, 1862, I860, 1882, 1883 

Farley, Miriam S 1729, 1730, 1901, 1902, 1916, 1938 

Fascist Party 1993 

FBI. (See Federal Bureau of Investigation.) 
FEA. (See Foreign Economic Administration.) 
FEC-230. (See State Department, FEC-230.) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1759,1778,1973 

Federal Reserve Board 1727 

Feng, Chia-sheng 1982 

FESWNCC. (-See Far East State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.) 

Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 1730, 

1778, 1779, 1849, 1916, 1926, 1933, 1934, 19S2 

Fisher, Mr. Adrian 1776, 1777 

Florida Chamber of Commerce 1894 

Ford, Anne 1764 

Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) 1706, 

1728, 1743, 1779, 1786, 1787, 1795, 1796, 1936, 1937, 1985 

Foreign Ministers Conference (Paris, 1951) 1761 

Foreign Office (Britain) 1771 

Foreign Office (Switzerland) 1771 

Foreign Policy Association 1695, 1886 

Foreign Policy Association Forum 1886 

Foreign Service. (See United States Foreign Service.) 

Forrestal, James 1872 

Fortune 1846,1847 

Fo, Sun (Sun, Fo) 

Foundations of Leninism 1690 

Fourth Army 1927 

Fox, Manuel 1691, 1692, 1698 

French Government 1714 



INDEX V 

G 

Pa^e 

Friedman, Julian R 1730, 

1731, 1732, 1734, 1758, 1761, 1797, 1833, 1834, 1838, 1839, 1841, 1844, 

1912, 1916. 
Gauss, Clarence E 1698, 

1701, 1703, 1734, 1749, 1750, 1788, 1789, 1825, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1S29, 

1830, 1921, 1922, 1928, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1982, 19S3, 

1986, 1987, 19S8, 1990, 1993. 

Gayn, Mark J 1733 

Gazette 1980 

General Staff (Japanese) 1869 

Geology of China 1982 

Georgetown University 1971, 1972 

George Washington University 1747, 1761 

Gibarti, Louis 1733 

Gilnian Hall (Johns Hopkins University) 1982,1983 

Ginsbourg, Mark. (See Mark J. Gayn.) 

Glasser, Harold 1733 

Goglidze, Sergei 1823, 1824, 1911 

Gold, Mike 1972 

Government of Bulgaria 1780 

Government of Japan 1770, 1869, 1S72 

Government of Korea 1769, 1770, 1916 

Government of Siam 1780 

Government of Switzerland 1770, 1771 

Government of the United States 1688, 1720, 1724, 1728, 1741, 1742, 1751, 

1752, 1754, 1823, 1855, 1865, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1951, 1959, 1963, 1992 

Grady, Henry 1845, 1846 

Granieh, Grace Maul 1734 

Granich, Max 1734, 1735, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978 

Granieh, Mrs. Max (Grace Maul) 1972,1973 

Graves, Mortimer 1750, 1751, 1918 

Greenberg, Michael 1734, 1735 

Gregg, Joseph 1735, 18S0 

Grew, Joseph C 1728, 1739, 1768, 1772, 1779, 

1793, 1795, 1823, 1827, 1832, 1841, 1845, 1853, 1859, 1860, 1935, 1985 

Growth of the New Fourth Army (a report) 1927 

Guggenheim Memorial Foundation 1969 

Gung. (See Rung.) 

Gussev 18S1 

H 
Hague 1780 

Hamilton, Maxwell 1978 

Han-seng, Chen. (See Chen, Han-seng.) 

Harvard University 1760 

Harvard Yenching Institute 1969 

Hazard, John 1805, 1811, 1828, 1S37, 1910 

Headquarters (Japanese Imperial General) 1869 

Herald Tribune (New York) 1S87, 1916 

Hildring, Gen. John H 1744, 1745 

Hiss, Alger 1735, 1736, 1737, 1750, 1758, 1901, 1912, 1916, 1979 

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1690 

Ho Chi Minh 1737 

Hodge, Gen. John S 1769,1770,1879 

Hodge Report 1S79 

Holland, William L 1802, 1938 

Hornbeck, Dr. -Stanley 1735, 1736, 1738, 1779, 1780, 1846, 1978, 1979 

Hot Springs Conference (IPR) 1686, 

1696, 1097, 1706, 1728, 1760, 1763, 1798, 1842, 1844, 1916, 1917 

House Military Affairs Committee 1686, 1915, 1917 

House of Representatives (United States) 1915,1916 

House Un-American Activities Committee 1705, 1901 

Hull, Cordell 1715, 

1795, 1799, 1811, 1812, 1821, 1823, 1825, 1826, 1829, 1S30, 1907, 1987 

Humelsine, Carlisle H : 1917, 1949 

Hurley, Gen. Patrick 1710, 1712, 1713, 1745,1791, 1853, 1856, 1858, 1860, 1916 



VI INDEX 

I 

Page 

Imperial General Headquarters (Japan) 1869 

Imperial Household (Japan) 1S72 

Inner Asian Frontiers of China 1739, 

1785, 1786, 1930, 1941, 1943, 1951, 1952, 1982, 1983, 1984 
Institute of Pacific Relations 1686, 

1696, 1706, 1728-1730, 1756, 1760-1763, 1783, 1785, 1797-1803, 1831- 
1834, 1842-1850, 1854-1856, 1887, 1906-1927, 1932-1939, 1979-1983 

Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) — — 1831, 

1832, 1887, 1888, 1938, 1979 

Institute of Pacific Relations (American Delegation) 1730, 

1761, 1798, 1832, 1833, 1844, 1927 

Institute of Pacific Relations (American Headquarters) 1844 

Institute of Pacific Relations (China Council) 1938 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference) 1686,1696, 

1697, 1706, 1728, 1760, 1761, 1763, 1798, 1842, 1844, 1916, 1017, 1927 

Institute of Pacific Relations (New Delhi, India Conference) 1801 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Secretariat) 1938 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 1761,1923 

Intelligence Group (United States Air Force) 1791,1792 

Interdepartmental Regional Committee 1801 

International Assets Commission 1770, 1916 

International Secretariat 1982 

International (Communist) 1690, 1957, 1959 

Isolated America 1982 

Italian Government 1714 

J 

Jaffe, Philip 1737, 1754, 1916, 1924 

Japan (United States Post Surrender Policy) 1862,1863,1868,1905 

Japanese Archives (Bern, Switzerland) 1770 

Japanese Emperor 1830, 1869, 1964, 1965 

Japanese General Staff 1869 

Japanese Government 1770, 1869, 1872 

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters 1869 

Japanese Imperial Household 1872 

Japanese Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1772 

Japanese Oil Embargo 1987 

Japanese Peace Treaty 1916 

Japanese State Funds (Switzerland) 1770, 1772 

Japanese State Property (Switzerland) 1771, 1772 

Jessup, Philip C 1761, 1833, 1925, 1933, 1934 

Johns Hopkins University 1738, 1766, 1982, 1983 

Johnstone, Dr. William (Bill) 1747, 1748, 1761, 1762, 1802 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States) 1864, 1872, 1891 

K 

Kennedy, Dr 1739, 1765, 1931, 1965 

Koo-sek, Kim 1769, 1880 

Korean Commission 1920 

Korean Government 1769, 1770, 1916 

Korean War 1959 

Kremlin 1731 

Kuffman, James Lee 1885 

Kung, Dr. H. H 1698, 1699, 1725 

Kung Group 1816 

Kunming Embassy 1969, 1970, 1987 

Kuomintang Blockade 1992, 1993 

Kuomintang Government 1712, 1724, 1725, 

1790, 1791, 1792, 1916, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994 
Kyuichi, Tokuda. (See Tokuda, Kyuichi.) 



index vn 

L 

..Page 

Lattimore, Owen 1737, 

1738, 1740-1744, 1747, 1764-1768, 1778, 1783, 1785, 1802, 1805, 1806, 
1809-1811, 1815, 1820, 1824, 1825, 1828, 1838, 1847, 1849, 1855, 1911, 
1916, 1925, 1926, 1929-1933, 1935-1937, 1940-1943, 1947, 1948, 1951- 
1954, 1958-1960, 1963-1971, 1978, 1980-1983, 1985-1987. 

Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) 1738, 1740, 1785 

League of Nations 1747 

Lee, Duncan Chapin 1743 

Lee, J. S 1982 

Lee, Michael ^ 1743, 1744 

Left-Wing Communism : An Infantile Disorder , 1689 

Legation of Britain (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1771 

Legation of China (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1771 

Legation of Japan (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1771 

Legation of Russia (Bern, Switzerland) 1770 

Legation of United States (Bern, Switzerland) 1692, 1770, 1771, 1772, 1916 

Lenin, Vladimir I 1689, 1690 

Life 1846, 1847 

Lilienthal, Philip E • '_ 1887 

Lin, Piao 1762, 

1787, 1788, 1789, 1790, 1791, 1916, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 

Li, Shao Chi 1743 

Little (See Ballard). 

Lockwood, William 1802 

London School of Economics . 1836 

Loyalty Board 1753, 

1755, 1759, 1760, 1773, 1774, 1775, 1776, 1777, 1913, 1950 

Loyaltv Board Hearings 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913 

Luce, Henry 1846, 1856 

Luce Publications 1846, 1856 

Ludden, Raymond 1744, 

1758, 1764, 1914, 1916, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1980, 1984 
Lytton Commission 1749 

M 

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 1686, 1768, 1769, 1864, 

1866, 1868, 1869, 1871, 1872, 1875, 1885, 1888, 1903, 1916, 1919, 1921 

Mandel, William 1745 

Mao Tse-tung 1708, 1745, 1761, 1927, 1928 

Marshall Directive 1716, 1718, 1719. 1724, 1725, 1880 

Marshall, Gen. George C 1708-1711, 1713-1725, 1769, 1S45- 

1847, 1854, 1880, 1889, 1890, 1892, 1894, 1907, 1916, 1960-1962, 1992 

Marshall Mission 1708, 1709, 1710, 1716, 1719, 1S89, 1960, 1992 

Martin. Edwin M 1918, 1919 

Marx, Karl 1689, 1741, 1952 

Maul, Grace (Mrs. Max Granich) 1972,1973 

McCarthy, Senator 1905, 1906 

McCoy, Gen. Frank 1881 

McJennett, John 1895, 1896 

Menefee, Selden 1744, 1745 

Mercer University 1966 

Metcalf 1887, 18S8 

Metropolitan Club 1728 

Meyer, Paul 1732 

Meyers, Merrill 1738 

Military Affairs Committee (House) 1686,1915 

Minh, Ho Chi. ( See Ho, Chi Minh. ) 

Missouri (U. S. S.) 1906 

Mitchell. Kate 1746 

Mitsubishi 1830,1878 

Mitsui 1830,1865 

Moeller, Hans (Asiaticus) (Heinz Moeller) 1762,1763,1850 

Molotov 1852 

Mongol Peoples Republic 1944,1947 



vni INDEX 

.Page 

Moore, Harriet 1938 

Morsenthau, Secretary 1758 

Morris, Robert 1687, 1688 

Moscow Conference 1881 

Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries 1729 

Motylev, V. E 1746 

Murphy, Bob 1744 

N 

Nanking Embassy.. 1749, 1968, 1971, 1985 

Nanking Government , 1975 

Nation 1841, 1867 

National Board (Politburo) 1687 

National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) 1744 

National Foreign Trade Council 1916, 1917 

National Trade Council 1795 

NBC (National Broadcasting Co.) 1744 

Nationalist Chinese Army 1711, 1725 

Nationalist Chinese Government 1088, 

• 1711-1714, 1717, 1722-1725, 1727, 1735, 1770-1772, 1790-1792, 1812, 

1823, 1858-1861, 1881, 1886, 1891-1893, 1905, 1916, 1954, 1955, I960, 

1916, 1975, 19S4, 1988, 1990-1992. 

Nationalist Chinese Mission (Bern, Switzerland) 1771 

Naval Intelligence 1688 

Navy (United States) 1748, 1809, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1906 

Need of an American Policy Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of 

the Chinese Communist Party (a Report) 1927 

New Deal 1735, 1741, 1742, 1760 

New Dealer 1734, 1735, 1741, 1742, 1760 

New Delhi, India, Conference (IPR) 1801 

New Republic 1841 

New State Department Building 1906 

New York Compass 1914 

New York Herald Tribune 1887, 1916 

Nomura 1987 

Northern Shensi District Government (China) 1702 

O 

Office of Economic Warfare (OEW) 1796 

Office of Emergency Management (OEM) 1796 

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 1693, 1760, 1792, 1S02 

Office of War Information (OWI) 1704, 

1738, 1760, 1765, 1796, 1805, 1849, 1926, 1942, 1986 

Oil Embargo on Japan 1987 

Okano, Susumu 1861 

Old State Department Building 1906 

OSS. (See Office of Strategic Services.) 

Oumansky, Constantine 1746 

OWI. (See Office of War Information.) 

Outer Mongolia 1740 

P 

Pacific Affairs 1785, 1786, 1849, 1971, 1982, 1983 

Party Organizer 1973 

Patterson, John M 1855, 1894 

Pauley, Ambassador Edwin 1766, 1767, 1936, 1937 

Pauley Mission 1766, 1930, 1937 

Pauley Report 1767 

Peace Treaty (Japan) 1916 

Pearl Harbor 1711, 1865 

Peking Medical Society Hospital 1696 

Penfield, Mr. James K 1721, 1839, 1888, 1980 

Pentagon Building 1720, 1853, 1960 

Peters, J__ 1746 

Peurifoy, John 1905, 1908, 1916, 1917 



INDEX IX 

Page 
Piao, Gen. Lin. (See Lin Piao.) 
Pivru, Tung. (See Tung, Pi-wu.) 

PxM 1841 

Politburo. (See National Board.) 

Post Surrender Policy for Japan 1854, 1862, 1863, 1S68, 1005 

Potsdam Conference 1772, 1773, 1774, 1851, 1852, 1854, 1855, 1861, 18S0, 1916 

Premier (Communist China) 1700 

President and I (message) 1828,1829 

Presidential Directive 1685, 1777, 1917 

Price, Harry B 1784, 1916 

Price, Mildred (Coy) 1747,1784 

Problems of Leninism 1690 

Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution (third 

American edition) 1690 

R 

Rajchman, Ludwig 1747 

Raushenbush, Steve 1980 

Raushenbush, Mrs. Steve 1980 

Red Army (China) 1957 

Red Cross 1846 

Red Star Over China 1782, 1S47 

Register of State Department 1704 

Remer, C. F 1802 

Republican Party 1906 

Review Board i 1754 

Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies (a resolution 

of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern) 1690 

Rhee, Syngman 1879 

Rockefeller Foundation 1696 

Rognff, Vladimir • 1747, 1748, 1778, 1801, 1802, 1916 

Romm, Vladimir 1748 

Roosevelt, President 1727, 1734, 

1738. 1791, 1795, 1809, 1811, 1813, 1819, 1820. 1821, 1822, 1823, 1825, 
1826, 1831, 1852, 1855, 1917, 1937, 1965, 1966, 1981, 19S6, 1994. 

Rosinger, Lawrence K 1783, 1797, 

179S, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1939 

Roth, Andrew 1748, 1S33, 1S43, 1S44, 1S53 

Rowe, David .. 1783, 1800 

Rugh, Elizabeth 1784 

Russell, Donald 1903 

Russia 1686, 1690, 

1709, 1710, 1713, 1718, 1731, 1745, 1746, 1748, 1753, 1770, 1811, 1823, 
1824, 1852, 1857-1859. 1861, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1901, 1906, 1908, 1915, 
1916, 1917, 1927, 1944, 1945, 1947, 1952-1954, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, 
1964, 1972. 1991. 

Russian-Chinese Negotiations 1859, 1S61 

Russian Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1770,1772 

Russian Revolution 1953, 1954 

Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic 1958 

Rutgers Press 1686 

S 

Salisbury, Laurence 1749, 1758, 1780, 1785, 1914 

Saturday Evening Post 1781 

Sayre, Francis B 1735 

SCAP 1770, 1879, 1881, 18S4 

SCAP Directive 1770 

Secretariat 1730, 1731, 1938, 1982 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1913 

Service, John Stewart 1721, 

1749-51, 1753, 1754, 1758, 1759, 1781, 1788-1791, 1815, 1816, 1823, 
1879, 1901-1903, 1912, 1913, 1916, 1920-1924, 1927, 1929, 1950, 1967, 
1970, 1971, 1980, 1984, 1987, 1988-1990, 1994. 

Shanghai Embassy 1973, 1975, 1984 

Shanghai Police ; 1975 



X INDEX 

Page 

Shensi Border Army 1703 

Shiga, Yoshio 1879 

Shi-shueh, Wang. (See Wang, Shi-shueh.) 

Siani Government 1780 

Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity 1906 

Sino Soviet Treat 1852, 1857, 1860, 1916 

Sixth Route Army 1702 

Sixth World Congress (Comintern) 1690 

Slagel, Fred 1806 

Slagel, John 1906 

Smedley, Agnes 1755, 1783, 1939 

Smith, Rear Adm. Allan E 1906, 1981 

Smith, Richard 1703 

Smith, Senator 1905 

Smith, Willis 1689 

Snow, Edgar 1781, 1783, 1847, 1968 

Snow, Mrs. Edgar (Nym Wales) 1783 

Social Science Research Council — 196S 

Solution in Asia 1743, 1931 

Soong, T. V 1725, 1747, 1809, 1815, 1852, 1856, 1857, 185S, 1859, 1861 

Sorge, Richard 1755 

Soviet Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1772 

Soviet Union 1686, 1690, 1790, 1710, 1713, 

1718, 1731, 1745, 1746, 1748, 1753, 1770, 1811, 1823, 1824, 1852, 1857- 
1859, 1861, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1901, 1906, 1908, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1927, 
1944, 1945, 1947, 1952-1954, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1972, 1991 

Sprouse, Mr 1892 

Stabilization Board. (See United States Stabilization Board.) 

Stachel, Jack 1687, 1904 

Stalin, Joseph 1690, 1824, 1852, 1856, 1858 

Standard Oil Co 1974 

Stanton, Mr 1780, 1S27, 1841,1851,1853 

State and Revolution 1689 

State Department 1684-1705, 

1710-1733, 1736-1744, 1749-1761, 1766-1780, 17S4-1787, 1790-1805, 
1808, 1812, 1813, 1818, 1821-1S27, 1829-1855, 1859-1862, 1866-1884, 
1890-1896, 1901-1931. 1935-1951, 1957-1983, 1987-1993. 

State Department (Administrative Division) 1924 

State Department (Bulletin) : 1916 

State Department (China Desk) 1947 

State Department (China Division) 1730, 

1732, 1733, 1765, 1773, 1780, 1795, 1825, 1833, 1836, 1S50, 1854, 1918, 
1923, 1924, 1925, 1927, 1936. 

State Department (Department of Public Liaison) 1855 

State Department (Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs) — 1918 

State Department (Far East Desk) 1718,1719,1846,1850 

State Department (Far Eastern Division) 1693, 

1720, 1730, 1757, 1765, 1766, 1768, 1769, 1773, 1797, 1848, 1888, 1889, 
1892, 1918. 1925, 1935, 1936, 1959. 

State Department (Far Eastern Office) 1715, 

1716, 1718, 1721, 1749, 1757, 1765, 1766, 1773, 1780, 1797, 1826, 1827, 
1840, 1843, 1844, 1850, 1851, 1889, 1891, 1906, 1907, 1925, 1931, 1935, 
1936, 1963. 
State Department (FEC-230, Far East Commission) __ 1881, 1S82, 1883, 1884, 1885 

State Department (Foreign Office) 1795,1918 

State Department (Japan Division) 1839 

State Department (Labor Division) 1730,1732,1797,1840 

State Department (Legal Department) 1699,1974 

State Department (Loyalty Appeal Board) 1950 

State Department (Loyalty Board) - 1753, 

1755, 1759, 1760, 1773, 1774, 1775, 1776, 1950 

State Department (Loyalty Board Hearings) 1774,1776,1777,1913 

State Department (Office of Director General of Foreign Service) 1749, 

1755, 1884 

State Department (Old and New Buildings) 1906 

State Department (Personnel Division) 1902,1903 



INDEX XI 

Page 

State Department (Policy Committee) 1854 

State Department (Post Surrender Policy for Japan) 1854 

State Department (Public Liaison Division) 1855 

State Department (Register) 1704, 1797, 1969 

State Department (Security Board) 1760 

State Department (Security Office) 1760, 1843, 1906 

State Department (Southeast Asian Office) 1749 

State Department (White Paper) 1724, 1827 

Statement of Policy Toward China 1714 

State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 1732, 

1733, 1773, 1838-1841, 1854, 1862-1864, 1S66, 1867, 1872, 1881-1883 

Stein, Gunther 1756 

Stettinius 1823 

Stewart, Maxwell 1927, 1937, 1939, 1977, 1978 

Stilwell, General Joseph W 1728, 1749, 1792, 

1813, 1814, 1815, 1816, 1823, 1826, 1916, 1917, 1921, 1922, 1924, 1989 

Stimson, Secretary 1872 

Stone, William T 1756, 1758, 1914 

Strong, Anna Louise 1756, 1757, 1778, 1779 

Sun Fo 1817, 1819, 1826 

Sun Yat-sen 1816, 1817, 1818 

Sun Yat-sen, Madam 1803, 1804, 1816, 1817, 1818, 1819, 1926 

Supreme Court (United States) 1742 

Surrey, Walter Sterling 1684, 1693, 1727, 1785, 1837, 1899 

Susumu Okano. (See Okano, Susumo.) 

Swing, Raymond Gram 1978 

Swiss Foreign Office 1771 

Swiss Government 1770, 1771 

SWNCC. (See State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.) (SWINK) 

T 

Tangiers 1686 

Tass News Agency 1747, 1748, 1802 

Teh, Chu. (See Chu Teh.) 

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 1742 

Time 1846, 1S47 

Todd, Laurence 1757 

Tokuda, Kyuichi 1879 

Treasury Department (see United States Treasury) 1691 

Tsarist Russia 1944, 1947 

Tse-tung, Mao. ( See Mao Tse-tung. ) 

Tsinan Embassy 1969 

Truman, President 1685, 1710, 1717, 

1720, 1777, 1855, 1862, 1863, 1868, 1872, 1894, 1917, 1949, 1950, 1951 

Tung, Pi-wu 1757 

TVA. (See Tennessee Valley Authority.) 

Tydings Committee 1687, 1904 

U 

Un-American Activities Committee (House) 1705, 1901, 1973 

United Nations 1731, 1757, 1864, 1868, 1870 

United Nations (Charter) 1S68 

United Nations (Chinese Delegation, San Francisco Conference) 1757 

United Nations Conference 1730, 1736, 1757 

United Nations (Secretary General, San Francisco) 1736 

United States Air Force (Intelligence Group) 1792, 1809 

United States Armed Forces 1710, 1712, 1714, 1715, 1719, 1721, 1730, 1748 1791, 

1792, 1809, 1812, 1813, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1883, 1890, 1891, 1906, 1995 

United States Congress 1905, 1907 

United States Consulate (Changsha) 1966, 1967 

United States Department of Commerce 1743, 1744 

United States Embassy (Chungking) 1691,1701,1702, 

1704, 1729, 1738, 1786, 1787, 1817, 1856, 1915, 1921, 1922, 1985, li>87 
United States Consulate (Dairen) 1696,1969,1970 



XII INDEX 

Page 
United States Consulate (Kunming) (same as Yunnanfu)__ 1969, 1970, 1971, 1897 

United States Embassy (Nanking) 1749, 1968, 1971, 1985 

United States Embassy (Shanghai) 1973, 1975, 1984 

United States Consulate (Tsinan) 1969 

United States Foreign Service 1684, 1688, 1705, 1731, 1734, 1744, 1749, 1750, 

1753, 1755, 1904, 1921, 1940, 1950, 1967, 1968, 1971, 1979, 1980, 1987 

United States Foreign Service School 1967 

United States Government 1688, 1720, 1724, 1728, 1741, 1742, 1751, 

1752, 1754, 1823, 1855, 1865, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1951, 1959, 1963, 1992 

United States House of Representatives — 1915, 1916 

United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan 1854, 1862, 1863, 1S68 

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 1864, 1872, 1891 

United States Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1692, 1770, 1771, 1772, 1916 

United States Naval Intelligence 1688 

United States Navy 1748, 1809, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1906 

United States Senate 1684, 1711, 1913, 1915, 1917 

United States Stabilization Board 1698 

United States Supreme Court 1742 

United States Treasury 1691, 1692, 1693, 1733, 1758 

University of California 1836 

University of Yenching 1968 

UNRRA 1733, 1772 

UNRRA Conference (Atlantic City) 1733 

UNRRA Conference (London) 1772 

U. S. S. Missouri 1906 

U. S. S. R 16S6, 1690, 1709, 1710, 1713, 

1718, 1731, 1745, 1746, 1748, 1753, 1770, 1811, 1823, 1824, 1852, 1857- 
1859, 1861, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1901, 1906, 1908, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1927, 
1944, 1945, 1947, 1952^1954, 1957, 1958, I960, 1963, 1964, 1972, 1991 
i 

V 

Vincent, John Carter 1684-1995 

Voice of China 1735, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978 

W 

Wadleigh, Julian 1757 

Wales, Nym. (See Mrs. Edgar Snow.) 

Wallace, Henry A 1738, 1741 

1743, 1792, 1794, 1795, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, 

1813-1826, 1828, 1831, 1837, 1907, 1916, 1917, 1942, 1966, 1993, 1994 
Wallace Mission 1738, 

1794, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1810, 1813, 1814, 1819, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824, 

1S25, 1826, 1828, 1907, 1917-^2, 1966, 1994. 

Wallace Mission (Goglidze Toast) 1824,1825 

Wallace Reports 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823 

Walsh, Paul (see also Eugene Dennis) 1758 

Wang, Shi-shueh 1856, 1857 

Wang, Yu-chuan 1982 

Ward, Francis Xavier 1978 

War Department (United States) 1710,1712,1714, 

1715, 1716, 1719, 1720, 1796, 1812, 1813, 1S68, 1872, 1883, 1890, 1891 

Wartime China 1977 

Wartime Politics in China 1797,1799,1800,1801 

Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert 1721, 

1793, 1794, 1809, 1813, 1814, 1815, 1853, 1892, 1913, 1916, 1917 

Welles, Sumner 1978 

Wellesly College 1686 

White Book 1807 

White, Harry Dexter 1758- 

White House 1685, 

1712, 1717, 1727, 1734, 1826, 1831, 1862, 18S9, 1890, 1916, 1917, 1936, 

1937, 1949, 1985, 1986. 
White Paper. (See State Department.) 
White, Theodore 1855, 1856- 



index xni 

Page 

Whitson, Roswell Hartsen 1768 

Willkie, Wendell 1694 

Wilson, Woodrow 1906 

Wittfogel, Karl August 1982 

Wu, Mr 1772 



Yale University 1739, 1931 

Yalta Agreement 1740, 1851, 1S52, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1861, 1916 

Yalta Conference 1850, 1851, 1852, 1916 

Yardumian, Miss Rose 1844 

Yat-sen, Sun. (See Sun, Yat-sen.) 
Yat-sen, Madam Sun. (See Sun, Yat-sen.) 

Yenan Government (Chinese Communist Government) 1703,1787 

Yenching University 1968 

YMCA 1967 

Yoshio Shiga. (See Shiga, Yoshio.) 

Yu-chuan, Wang. (See Wang, Yu-chuan.) 

Yunnanfu Embassy. (See United States Consulate, Kunming.) 

Z 
Zaibatsu 1830, 1865, 1873, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1877, 1878 

o 



4NHHto 



1 



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