INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
USC^^f^^^OMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAKY
w ''' UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 7
JANUARY 31, FEBRUARY 1 AND 2, 1952
I'rinted for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
""^^^-^^^^ij^^
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1952
PUBLIC
^.•C Ant) fy^l'
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
J. G. SouRWiNB, Counsel
Internal Security Subcommittee
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
Robert Morris, Special Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
U
CONTENTS
Testimony of— P&tt
Blenman, Commander William 2180
Stufflebeam, Robert E 2121
Vincent, John Carter 1997-2286
Appendix I :
Correspondence from the President to the Vice President of September
22, 1951, and attachments thereto regarding former Vice President
Henry A. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944 2286
Letter to Hon. John E. Peurifoy from John Carter Vincent, dated
March 7, 1950 2294
State Department press release of January 6, 1947 22{©
State Department press release of October 5, 1945 2296
Appendix II (printed as pt. 7A) 2305-2474
ni
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1953
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met at 9 : 45 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator
William E. Jenner presiding.
Present: Senators McCarran (chairman), Ferguson, Jenner, and
Watkins.
Also Present : Senators Hayden, Knowland, and Welker ; J. G. Sour-
wine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and
Benjamin Mandel, director of research.
You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY, WASHINGTON, D. C, AND
HOWARD REA, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, at the conclusion of the hearing yester-
day we were up to the period of about December 1942.
Mr. Vincent. You mean in reading over my — yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. To the extent that we were taking things chrono-
logically we had about reached that point.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You may remember that during the afternoon ses-
sion yesterday afternoon there was some questioning about your ap-
proval of a talk which was made by Mr. Service before the IPR or
before a group of IPR people.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I remember that.
Mr. Sourwine. Am I correct that it was your testimony that you
remembered nothing about having authorized such a talk?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I had no recollection of that, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, this is the State Department em-
ployee loyalty investigation hearings before a subcommittee of the
Ccrtnmittee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate of the
Eighty-first Congress, second session, part 2, appendix. On page
2234 appears the text of a document which was apparently entitled
'"Personal Statement of John S. Service — Part 2." I read this
paragraph, Mr. Vincent, and ask if it refreshes your memory in that
regard.
Shortly after my arrival —
1997
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and lie is referring then to his return to the Department in April of
1945.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sour WINE (reading) :
I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis with ttie research
staff of the IPR in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed
to me by Edward C. Carter. I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy and
then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting. This meeting with the
IPR took place on April 25. I believe that there were 10 or 12 people present.
Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bisson, Laurence Rosinger,
and a New Zealander named Belshaw. I did not give a prepared talk, and most
of the time was spent in answering questions and in general discussion.
Did you know anything about that at the time?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Were you Chief of the Division at the time ?
Mr. Vincent. I was Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ; yes,
sir. What was the date of that ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. That was 1945, sir.
Mr. Vincent. I mean the month.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That would have been in April.
Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten the exact date, but I left for San
Francisco about the middle of April.
(Senator Ferguson took the chair.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there an earlier occasion on which you per-
sonally had approved Mr. Service's appearance before an IPR group ?
Mr. Vincent. I have said, sir, that I just don't recall any instance
pf that kind.
(Senator McCarran took the chair.)
Mr. SouRWiNE. Reading from the same hearings, Mr. Chairman,
from the transcript of proceedings before the State Department
Loyalty Board, page 2051 of the hearings. This is Mr. Service
talking :
The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come
over and give an informal off-tbe-record talk to some of their i>eople in the
Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me
that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all
right with me.
Question : In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the
IPR?
"Answer. That is right.
"Question. And authorized by the Department?
"Answer. That is correct, and it was quite a customary thing. We had a
great many officers who did exactly the same when they came back from the
field and had news, information of interest. I believe that Mr. Oliver Edmund
Clubb had one of those meetings after he returned from Sinkiang. I know that
Mr. Raymond P. Ludden was asked for and authorized to give a talk when he
also returned from China in June, 1945. and I am sure that there are many
other instances of Foreign Service officers being authorized by the Department
to meet the research staff of the IPR in these off-the-record background sessions."
What would be your comments on that Mr. Vincent ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, Mr. Service apparently refreshed his memory.
I don't recall these people going regularly over to the IPR. What Mr.
Service says there is no doubt correct, that the people did talk to the
IPR.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any doubt now, having heard this,
that you did receive a request from the IPR with regard to Mr.
Service and passed it on to him and told him it was all right to go ?
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Mr. Vincent. No; I have no doubt that Service was testifying
correctly.
The Chairman, What is that answer, please ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I originally said I had no recollection
of this incident, but the question there is whether or not now, having
heard this, I still have no recollection of that specific incident, but I
am not doubting the fact that it occurred.
The Chairman. My understanding is that the question primarily
was whether you had engaged in the discussion, is that right?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is right.
The Chairman. Now you have no doubt that you did ?
Mr. Vincent. According to that testimony now, I have no doubt
that that incident occurred because Service remembers it better than
I have.
The Chairman. I just wanted to get your testimony.
Mr. Sourwine. On December 15, 1945, sir, you were
Mr. Vincent. Excuse me. Would you repeat that ?
Mr. Sourwine. On December 15, 1942, you were named counselor
to the Department of State ?
Mr. Vincent. There is no such title.
Mr. Sourwine. Counselor of Embassy, perhaps ?
Mr. Vincent. Counselor of Embassy in Chungking in 1942.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that what it was ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; if that was the date.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you back in the United States in 1943 ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you not know Jack Stachel ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he is ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. How do you know that ?
Mr. Vincent. From reading the hearings of this committee. I
don't know his precise work even now from memory.
Mr. Sourwine. All you know about him is what you have read in
the hearings of this committee ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether you ever ate lunch in
the Tally-Ho Restaurant in Washington ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't remember eating there, but I could have eaten
there. I don't remember any instance of eating there.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember having lunch there one day in
April of 1943 with Mr. John Stewart Service and one or two other
persons ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that instance. I have heard it re-
ferred to, but I still don't recall it. I may say there that I ate lunch
every day with various and sundry people and I don't recall that
luncheon that has been referred to here.
Mr. Sourwine. You did have lunch on at least one occasion in
there with Mr. Service, did you say ?
Mr. Vincent. I mean I might have had lunch. I do not recall
eating in the Tally-Ho with Mr. Service. I might have eaten else-
where with him.
Mr. Sourwine. You have no memory of any time when you did?
Mr. Vincent. Not that particular one.
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Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you say whether on the occasion referred to
in April of 1943 or on any other occasion about that time you dis-
cussed with Mr. Service and one or two others ways and means of
getting rid of Ambassador Hurley as Ambassador to China?
Mr. Vincent. I do not have any recollection of discussing getting
rid of Ambassador Hurley at that time. As a matter of fact, I think,
sir, that you will have to correct the date there because you said 1943.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Hurley was not made Ambassador until
the fall of 1944.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That would be a good reason for stating that you
did not discuss it on this date, wouldn't it?
Mr. Vincent. It certainly would.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you now so state ?
Mr. Vincent. I now so state.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember on the occasion of such a lunch-
eon or a luncheon about that time discussing Mr. Hurley in any way ?
Mr. Vincent. Are you still using that date of April 1943 ?
Mr. Sourwine. Still referring to April 1943.
Mr. Vincent. April 1943?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vincent. No, I have no recollection of that.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you did or did not?
Mr. Vincent. I certainly did not. I didn't even know Ambassador
Hurley and he wasn't Ambassador.
Mr. Sourwine. Now we are talking simply about Mr. Hurley,
whether he was discussed. Did you on the occasion of such a luncheon
state that the up-and-coming political group in China was the Com-
munist Party ?
Mr. Vincent, I have no recollection of making any such statement
and don't think I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you ever could have made such a
statement ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think so.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in June of 1943 or about that time while
you were counselor to the American Embassy in China — ^were you
counselor of the American Embassy in China in June of 1943 ?
Mr. Vincent. No, I had already left Chungking.
Mr. Sourwine. When did you leave Chungking?
Mr. Vincent. I left Chungking the latter part of May 1943, or the
middle of May. I don't recall the exact date.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in the spring of 1943, while you were
counselor to the American Embassy in China, cable to the Depart-
ment of State with respect to an interview which you had had with
Chou En-lai?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in that cable quote Chou as having said :
Japan anrl Russia will not clash for the time being, but in the future will
Inevitably fight. Therefore, we welcome American forces to help our guerrillas
in north China to prepare for joint opposition against Japan in the future. Now
they, the guerrillas, have been dispatched to occupied territory for intense ac-
tivity. It is hoped that the American leaders will adopt positive action and send
an observer to North China.
Mr. Vincent, I couldn't testify that that is the exact language of
the telegram.
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Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that the substance ?
Mr. Vincent. A telegram was sent, and I would have to refresh
my memory on the telegram, sir, to be able to say whether that was
what was actually said.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that the substance?
Mr. Vincent. That was certainly what Chou would have said, 1
think, that he would have wanted somebody to be dispatched to North
China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You said you remembered that you had sent such
a telegram.
Mr. Vincent. I remember such a telegram. I don't remember the
substance of the telegram.
Mr. SouR^VINE. You do not remember even the substance of the
telegi-am? Do you remember whether in that cable you stated "The
Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist lean-
ings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method
should be to disparage the Communists as much as possible and be
sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will
be approved."
Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no recollection of saying that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you did say that?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think I did say that.
Senator Ferguson. Would that have been a fact ?
Mr. Vincent. He would have to read that again. You mean the
fellow who sent that should be pro-Nationalist in order
Senator Ferguson. No ; to get the Nationalists to do it, to consent
to it. Read it.
Mr. Sour^vine (reading) :
The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist leanings.
Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to dis-
parage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist
Government. Then the request will be approved.
Mr. Vincent. Now your question is could that
Senator Ferguson. No. Was that a fact?
Mr. Vincent. It is a fact that certainly the Nationalist Govern-
ment was very much anti-Communist and would have disliked any
pro-Communist who was sent up there.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, and if you had wanted to do it and have
it approved you would have had to make it appear that he was pro-
Nationalist.
Mr. Vincent. I don't think you would have had to do that kind of
subterfuge. What you would have had done is send a man up there
who was just a factual reporter on the situation.
Senator Ferguson. Then that was not a fact ?
Mr. Vincent. This statement here would be a fact, if it existed,
that you would not send a pro-Communist to North China.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever send anyone up ?
Mr. Vincent. I didn't, but they were sent there in 1944, after I
left China.
Senator Ferguson. Was that person pro-Nationalist?
Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten who was sent up there. There was
an Army group sent up there in 1944, and then various and sundry
other people from the State Department were sent up there in 1944,
I mean people with Stilwell's headquarters.
2002 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you now testify that you
did not make such a report ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I do not recall the substance of my telegram.
I recall that a telegram was sent on the basis of Chou En-lai coming
in and calling on me before I left Chungking in 1943.
Senator Ferguson. That is why I was trying to find out if that
was the fact and that could have been in the telegram. You see, this
committee is handicapped that they can't get records, and they have
to reply upon testimony.
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would have to refresh my memory by
seeing the telegram before I could testify that that was in that tele-
gram.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That telegram is one of the papers which the State
Department has declined to give us and which the President has de-
clined to permit the committee to have, is it not ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether the committee asked for it
or not
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know that it falls in that category of
papers ?
Mr. Vincent. It would, I think, fall in that category.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think that you would be able to see it and
refresh your memory from it and come back and testify to the com-
mittee with regard to it?
Mr. Vincent. I think I could ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you can see it in the State Department, can
you not?
Mr. Vincent. I can ask to see it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you try to do that, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell us anything else about that conference
with Chou En-lai ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I don't haA^e any other recollection except he
called before I left to talk with me and to see Acheson, to meet Acheson
for the first time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you become Assistant Chief of the Division
of Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943?
Mr. Vincent. It was about that time ; yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You were detailed to the office of the Foreign Eco-
nomic Administration as special assistant to the Administrator Octo-
ber 25, 1943?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct, according to this thing.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You stayed there until February 25, 1944; is that
right?
Mr. Vincent. About that time ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. While you were in the FEA office on detail, who
was the Administrator?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Crowley.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you work in his office ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; he maintained an office up on Fourteenth Street,
and I worked down in the temporary T or U Building on Constitu-
tion Avenue.
Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Currie with FEA at that time?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Currie was Deputy Director.
Mr. Sourwine. Where did he maintain offices ?
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Mr. Vincent. He maintained his office in temporary U or T, down
on Constitution Avenue.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was your work then closely associated with his ?
Mr. Vincent. Wliat work I did ; yes. It was not closely associated
with his because I just did odd jobs down there for the time. I never
took any active part in running FEA.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was your office close to Mr. Currie's office ?
Mr. Vincent. Across and down the hall.
Mr. Sourwine. The same floor ?
Mr. Vincent. The same floor, I think.
Mr. SouRwiNE. At that time, sir, was Mr. John Stewart Service in
China?
ISIr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this. He was assigned to
China. Whether he had come home on leave I don't know. I think
he was.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden
was?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether Ludden was still in China or
not. I would assume he was. If you will let me refer to this I will
find out, but I would say he was still in Kumning or Chungking.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Davies, John Paton Davies, Jr., was also in
Chungking at that time ; wasn't he ?
Mr. Vincent. He was either in Chungking or New Delhi. He
spent a great deal of time in New Delhi, India.
Mr. SouRAviNE. And Mr. John K. Emmerson was second secretary
at Chungking in 1942 ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this, but he arrived after
I left Chungking and must have been there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And Mr. Lattimore was Deputy Director of Pacific
Operations, OWI?
Mr. Vincent. In 1943 ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall when Mr. Lattimore took on the job.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was he in Washington at that time ?
Mr. Vincent. If he was Deputy Director of OWI, he would have
been in Washington.
Mr. SouRwiNE. "^Vliile you were with the FEA, sir, can you tell the
committee just what functions or duties you did perform? Wliat did
you do over there ?
Mr. Vincent. That would be very difficult to say because I never
had any definite functions. I can tell you what one of the principal
things was, because I went up for Mr. Crowley to the UNRRA con-
ference, simply as an observer at the UNRRA conference. That took,
I should say, the better part of a month of this time. Otherwise, it was
a matter of the area directors and what not in FEA coming in from
time to time and asking me specific questions as to factual conditions.
I was used more or less as a person to be consulted with on conditions
in China for the brief period I was there.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you say you were there as an expert, or were
you there as an adviser and consultant ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I was there to be consulted by the FEA people
as they might wish to on conditions in China, from which I had just
returned.
Mr. Sourwine. And you were consulted?.
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Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Who was your immediate superior while you were
withFEA?
Mr. Vincent. My immediate superior would have been Currie in
the position I held.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Who were your principal associates over at FEA?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to think who was over there. You
see, I was there such a short time. There was a man named Riley,
I recall his name, who worked with Crowley. I saw him from time to
time at conference meetings. There was Oscar Cox, who was I think
legal counsel for the FEA; I just don't recall the others who were
over there to any great extent. I was trying to think of the area
director, but I can't place him now.
Mr. SoURWiNE. You have already explained to the committee,
have you not, how your detail to FEA was brought about by Mr.
Currie ?
Mr. Vincent. I said Mr. Currie asked me to come over and the
State Department detailed me.
Mr. SouRWiNE. So far as you know it was initiated by Mr. Currie?
Mr. Vincent. So far as I know.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You have already testified in executive session
about your acquaintanceship with Mr. Lawrence Eosinger. You did
know him, did you not?
Mr. Vincent. The only distinct recollection I have of meeting him,
as I think I said, was at the IPR conference in 1945. He was there, as
I recall it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know him well at all ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know him socially ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr, SouRWiNE. Did you ever have business dealings with him ?
Mr. Vincent. I never recall having any business dealings with him.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was he in your office in connection with your offi-
cial duties?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall a call from him.
Mr. Sourwine. Outside of the one meeting you have mentioned did
you ever attend any meetings with him ?
Mr. Vincent. He may have been present at this meeting the nature
of which I do not recall very clearly, of the American delegation to
the conference which met some time in the late autumn of 1944 before
the conference.
Mr. Sourwine. Here in Washington?
Mr. Vincent. I think it met here in Washington.
Mr. Sourwine. That was the whole delegation ?
Mr. Vincent. That was the delegation ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever attend any meetings of the IPR or
functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which Mr.
Rosinger was present?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified, sir, that T did attend a meeting or
that I don't have any recollection, but I probably did attend a meet-
ing in 1938 if Mr. Rosinger was there — I have no recollection of his
being there.
Mr. Sourwine. Then aside from tlie two meetin^is you have men-
tioned,- one in 1945, the conference, and one in 1938, and the further
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possibility that lie might have been at a meetiiipr of the delegates to the
1945 conference, is it your testimony that otherwise you never attended
a meeting with Mr. Rosinger ?
]Mr, Vincent. I have no recollection of attending meetings with
Mr. Rosinger.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you read his book, War Time Politics in China ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection distinctly of reading that book.
I have seen the testimony that it was sent to me, and I apparently re-
tained the manuscript and was asked by Mr. Bisson to send it back.
That is in the testimony before this committee. I don't have any
recollection of whether I read the book in manuscript or not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have the book in manuscript form?
Mr. Vincent. I would assume that I did. 1 would not have recalled
it had I not noticed that — I mean I would not have known it or re-
membered it had I not noticed this letter from Bisson to me asking me
to send it back. Therefore, I must have had it.
Mr. Sourwine. You have no independent recollection of it now ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I don't, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how that manuscript came to you?
Mr. Vincent. No. Whether it was mailed to me, handed to me, I
just don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it sent to you for criticism by the Institute of
Pacific Relations or some official of that organization?
Mr. Vincent. I would assume that the fact that he sent it to me in
manuscript was for me to look it over and see if it had factual mist;ikes
in it or something else. I don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you well acquainted with New York City ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not say I am.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you been there a number of times ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I have been there a number of times.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether the Seville Hotel is locjjted
in New York City?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Twenty-ninth and Madison
would be in New York City ?
Mr. Vincent. No. I mean I would know
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you have ever been to the
Seville Hotel?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that I don't ever recall having been at
the Seville Hotel. It makes no impression on my memory at all.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you have ever stayed over-
night there ?
Mr. Vincent. At the Seville?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I would say almost positively I never have stayed
overnight at the Seville.
]Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet anyone there?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet Agnes Smedley there?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRAviNE. Did you ever meet Louis Gibarti there ?
Mr. Vincent. No. I don't know who Louis Gibarti is, but I didnt
meet him there.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that name before?
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Mr. Vincent. No ; I haven't heard the name of Louis Gibarti.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did anyone every tell you to go to the Seville
Hotel?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever arrange to meet anyone there?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I never arranged to meet anyone there.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. You became Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs
January 15, 1944?
Mr. Vincent. I was appointed to it. I see there is a conflict there.
This would say that I left FEA in February. I became Chief of the
Division about that time. It says I was with FEA until February,
but it says I was appointed Chief of the China Division in February.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE, Is that impossible?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr, Sourwine. You could have had the title and rank and still
be on detail, could you not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Raymond Dennett, the
Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, the question of Amer-
ican policy in the Far East?
Mr, Vincent. I have no recollection now of discussing it with
him, but I would say it would be logical that Dennett as secretary
would come down and discuss matters in China with me.
Mr. Sourwine, Why would you discuss American policy in the
Far East with Mr. Dennett?
Mr. Vincent. I didn't say, sir, that I discussed American policy.
I might have discussed matters concerning China, factually or other-
wise, with Dennett.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean to deny that you did discuss American
policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett ?
Mr, Vincent. I don't have any distinct recollection of discussing
policy with Mr. Dennett.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have discussed policy
with Mr. Dennett ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not have discussed policy which was policy
that should not be discussed with someone on the outside, but policy
which was adopted I would have and it would have been carried out.
Mr. Sourwine. Specifically did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett
the so-called least common denominator of American policy in the
Far East, that is, what could safely be said to be the minimum that the
United States would demand'?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing the least — or in
those terms.
Mr. Sourwine. Would that be the kind of policy that had been
made and could properly be discussed with an outsider ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, you would have to be more precise, I think,
as to what would be called a least common denominator of American
foreign policy with regard to China,
Mr. Sourwine. You would have an opinion about that phrase;
wouldn't you ?
Mr. Vincent. Just at this moment the meaning of the least com-
mon denominator doesn't even arouse in me any recollection of such
an idea as a least common denominator.
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Mr. SouRWiNE. The question of what could safely be said to be
the minimum that the United States would demand in its Far East
policy — would that be a matter that could properly be discussed
outside the Department ?
Mr. Vincent, It could be discussed speculatively with Mr. Dennett.
To demand of whom? I am just trying to clarify that question.
JNIr. SouRwiNE. I am trying to keep the questions reasonably short.
Demand in general, or of particular nations, or in regard to particular
situations. Does that clarification change your answer in any way?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett specifically
the alternative policies Avhich branched out from the so-called common
denominator, which were being seriously considered by the State
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it. but as I say Mr. Den-
nett was a man whom I knew, not too well, but a man whom I knew
and thought was a very intelligent man, and I may easily have dis-
cussed them with him in the matter of trying to get his views and
benefit by them if he had any views on that.
JNIr. Sourwine. That would not be a matter of fixed policy or mat-
ters of policy that had been established; would it?
INIr. Vincent. No ; because I think from what you are saying here,
this was looking into the future.
Mr. Sourwine. These were matters which were being seriously con-
sidered by the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. Foreign policy with regard to the future in China
was being considered seriously by the State Department, I should say,
at all times.
Mr. Sourwine. You think it would have been entirely proper for
you to have discussed with Mr. Dennett alternative policies which were
being seriously considered by the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. If they were not matters of secrecy.
Mr, Sourwine. Did you ever tell Mr. Dennett or imply to him that
American policy in the Far East might grow out of Navy demands
rather than being founded upon a general plan or set of principles into
which Navy demands would be integrated and by which Navy demands
would be limited ?
Mv. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say whether I discussed that
thing with him or not. That seems to be a very involved matter. I
imagine that you are referring to a memorandum or something that
Mr. Dennett himself may have prepared as a result of a conversation
with me. People came in and out quite frequently. I suppose they
went out and said they had had a conversation with me ; but I have no
recollection of discussing a particular problem of that kind with Mr.
Dennett.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know of such a problem ?
Mr, Vincent. I don't even recall having in mind such a problem of
the Navy and discussing the matter of policy with relation to the Navy
in the Far East.
Senator Ferguson, Had you ever heard that there was a problem of
Navy there ?
Mr. Vincent. There was a problem of the Navy in the postwar
period, of what the position of the Navy was, but it was not one with
which I was familiar.
2008 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson, How could you, as the head of this Division, pass
on these questions if you weren't familiar with all the ramifications ?
Mr, Vincent. Senator
Senator Ferguson. How could you help to make policy if you didn't
know?
Mr, Vincent, I had a general idea of what was the policy and what
we wanted out of the war, but as far as
Senator Ferguson. You mean you were making policy on just gen-
eral ideas?
Mr, Vincent. I wasn't making policy.
Senator Ferguson. Were you helping to make policy ?
Mr, Vincent. I was helping to make policy.
Senator Ferguson, How could you do it on general ideas ? Didn't
you lead this committee to believe that you didn't have all the facts?
Mr, Vincent, It was the whole accumulated experience in the Far
East on which I was depending, but I am not setting myself up here
as an expert on naval relations in the Far East,
Senator Ferguson. But if the Navy relations had something to do
with the question you would have to consider that in order to advise
on the policy ?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson, Can you give this committee any idea as to what
the facts were about this Navy entering into this decision ?
Mr, Vincent. I cannot from the reading of this question that we
have here, and can't recall from recollection discussing with Mr.
Dennett.
Senator Ferguson. Or with anyone ? I am not talking about Den-
nett now. I am talking about the facts.
Mr. Vincent. He would have to read that question again.
Senator Ferguson. Kead it again.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Could I ask a different question, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, early in 1944 were the views and needs
and pressures of the Navy an important factor with regard to United
States policy in the Far East ?
Mr, Vincent, They certainly would have been; yes, sir. You are
speaking now of the postwar period ? You are speaking of the needs
of the Navy in China at that particular time or with relation to the
Far East?
Mr. Sourwine. I will leave that to your definition. I believe my
question is clear.
Mr. Vincent. It certainly would have been of entirely different
character while we were prosecuting the war, that is, for the next year,
if this was in 1944 ; but in the postwar period certainly the position
of the Navy in the Far East had to be given consideration.
Mr. Sourwine. Did that help at all, Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that
you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the
Pacific basin?
Mr. Vincent, Mr. Sourwine, you are again asking me to remember
what I said to an individual that long ago, and I just do not recall the
conversation with Mr, Dennett.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2009
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you miglit have so stated or inti-
mated ?
Mr. Vincent. That China could not be considered a stabilizing
power ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. That you had no confidence in China becoming the
stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't think that I said that.
Mr. SouKwiNE. Did you hold that view at that time?
Mr. Vincent. I held the view at that time, now that I recall it,
wliich may have been misinterpreted here, which was that I did not
think too much confidence could be placed or too much weight could
be placed on China becoming the stabilizing influence in the Far East,
that we would have to look to other means of having stabilization
there because China was coming out of the war rather weakened.
Mr. SoTTRWiNE. In other words, you held the view substantially
which you say you think you did not give to Mr. Dennett?
Mr. Vincent. That it would be a mistake to count too much on
China being a stabilizing influence in the Far East at the end of the
war ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether I expressed it to Mr. Dennett
or not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you want us to understand that you think you
did not express it to him ?
Mr. Vincent. I could easily have expressed it to him.
The Chairman. What is that answer, please ?
Mr. Vincent. I say I could have expressed that opinion to him.
Mr. SouEWiNE. What is the difference between that opinion and the
statement that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing
power in the Pacific basin ?
INIr. Vincent. Because the statement taken like that out of context
would mean that I had no confidence in China. This was, in the broad
picture of China, that it would be a mistake in our policy to place too
much confidence in China being the stabilizing influence, and I am
accenting "the" because I just remember having held the view that
China was coming out weakened from the war and that we could not
count too much on China. Let's go back to history a little bit. There
was entirely, it seemed to me, too much weight being placed on China
for China's own good, that China was being ushered in as one of the
great powers and that China was going to come out of the war in a
weakened condition and we would have to do a great deal ourselves
toward building up China.
Senator Watkins. May I ask a question at that point. That didn't
happen to be the view of Mr. Koosevelt, did it? He felt that China
was to be one of the great powers and seemed to emphasize China's
importance and her ability to carry on.
Mr. Sourwine. That was Mr. Roosevelt's policy, to build China up
as a great power.
Senator Watkins. As I recall something hns been said recently by
Mr. Churchill or someone to the effect that they felt Mr. Roosevelt
had placed too much faith in the ability of China.
Mr. Vincent. I didn't read Mr. Churchill's statement, but probably
to come out of the war as the stabilizing influence in the Far East.
22848—52— pt. 7 2
2010 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. If China wasn't to be, what was to be the sta-
bilizing influence in the Far East ?
Mr. Vincent. We would liave to be the stabilizing influence in the
Far East in combination with China.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you think we carried that policy
out? .
Mr. Vincent. Of trying to be the stabilizing force ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I think we did.
Senator Ferguson. With what we did with Nationalist China?
Mr. Vincent. We tried to support the Nationalist Government of
China.
Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the Marshall mission ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that that was support of the Na-
tionalist Government of China?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. The whole intent of that mission certainly
was to support the Nationalist Government of China by bringing
about a cessation of civil war and bringing into the Government all
of the dissident elements, including the Communists, but under the
Nationalist Government of China and under Chiang Kai-shek.
Senator Ferguson. Knowing what you do about communism, do
you think you could stabilize any government by taking the Commies
into it?
Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified before it was a matter of
alternatives, and I thought and the President thought and the Secre-
tary of State thought that the best alternative was to try to bring about
a cessation of civil war through the matter of some kind of political
settlement under a constitutional government arranged by the Chinese
which would have representation in it of the various non-Kuomintang
policies.
Senator Ferguson. Then it is your contention now, you, knowing
what communism is, that you can stabilize a government by putting
the Commies in it?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, it wasn't stabilizing a government. It was
stabilizing a situation, sir. Let me answer, please, sir. It was sta-
bilizing a situation where your alternatives were civil war or trying
to bring about some kind of political agreement. The Chinese them-
selves, the National Government, was trying to do just that.
Senator Ferguson. Will you cite a case in history where Commu-
nists have been taken into a government and that that has stabilized
conditions and tliat they didn't take it over or they had to kick them
out ; one of the two ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified here, sir, that it was in the back
part
Senator Ferguson. No, no. My question is, you state a situation
in past history where they were.
Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that in the French Govern-
ment
Senator Ferguson. I am not asking about what you have already
testified.
Mr. Vincent. I say now, then, that an analogous situation is that
the Communists came into the Government of France at the end of
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the war, that the Communists came into Government of Italy, and
were eventually kicked out.
Senator Ferguson. All right. You had in mind, then, that either
you would have to kick them out or you can't stabilize the situation
or they would take it over.
Mr. Vincent. That would have depended entirely on how the
Communists conducted themselves in the government.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of a case where they did conduct
themselves such that you could stabilize the situation and not kick
them out or they not take it over ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Then why did you think that it could be done in
China?
Mr. Vincent. Because it was an alternative to civil war in China
and
Senator Ferguson. That wasn't my question. Why did you think
it could be done in China, that you could stabilize it, and not kick
them out or they not take it over?
Mr. Vincent. Because you could stabilize the situation by the
avoidance of civil war, by taking them in on a minority basis with
the Kuomintang and the major parties maintaining control of the
government. That would have been stabilization of a situation inso-
far as the avoidance of civil war was concerned.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think the Chinese Communists would
€ver have given up their position in the civil war on any philosophy
such as you now say : that you would take them in and they would
he in such a weakened condition that you could kick them out?
Mr. Vincent. I not only thought that, sir
Senator Ferguson. And lose their position in their civil war.
Mr. Vincent. I not only thought that, sir, but General Marshall
thought it. It has turned out not to have been the case.
Senator Ferguson. It turned out not to be true.
Mr. Vincent. It turned out the Chinese Communists were not
prepared to come into the government on a minority basis.
Senator Ferguson. And on a basis that you could take over their
position in the civil war and then kick them out.
Mr. Vincent. But I will say this: that the Chinese Communists
themselves had joined in these conferences with just that idea in mind,
because, as I have repeated before, the conferences were going on
among the various parties, including the Communists, before General
Marshall ever reached China.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, don't you know that when the
Chinese were negotiating, as you now say they were, they were nego-
tiating to better their position in the civil war and to kick the Nation-
alists out, and not for the purpose that you and General Marshall
were trying to have it done ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no exact information as to what were the ideas
at that time of the Communists. I would say, from what I know now,
that the Communists never intended to come in and let themselves
be subordinated, because their very actions show they would not be
subordinated to tlie Kuomintang.
The Chairman. Past history had proven at that time that that
would be the verv result that would follow.
2012 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Jenner. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right, Senator.
Senator Jenner. Taking that position and that attitude and that
policy toward China, when General Marshall returned and made his
report and that program had failed, then what was the next policy or
position of the Far Eastern Division and our Government toward
China or Marshall's report back that his mission had failed?
Mr. Vincent. T]ie next position of the Government toward China
was to help the government of Chiang Kai-shek.
Senator Jenner. All right, then, I want to ask you if it is not a
fact that, although Congress had appropriated the money for military
aid to Chiang Kai-shek, for the next 15 months after Marshall made
his report, although the money was appropriated, this Government
didn't do a single thing for Chiang Kai-shek ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, you are speaking of a period when I was not
in America. I have no first-hand knowledge of that appropriation. I
left in 1947. But I do know that arms were turned over to China,
airplanes.
Senator Jenner. Following the Marshall mission ?
Mr. Vincent. In 1947, a considerable amount of arms.
Senator Jenner. When did Marshall return from China ?
Mr. Vincent. Marshall returned from China in January 1947.
Senator Jenner. And for the next 15 months we went ahead arming
Chiang Kai-shek and giving him aid and support? You state that as
a fact?
Mr. Vincent. I can state as a fact that specific instances occur to me
during the time I was still here, during half of 1947.
Senator Jenner. All right. That is all.
Senator Ferguson. I think you testified — didn't you, Mr. Vincent,
in the executive sessions — that the War Department, for General
Marshall, made up the directive under which he went to China ?
Mr. Vincent. That directive was prepared over in the War De-
partment.
Senator Jenner. In the War Department? General Marshall
brought it to you made up ?
Mr. Vincent. I have described it. Do you want me to describe the
various steps in that again ?
Senator Ferguson. Have you already in the open hearing described
it?
Mr. Vincent. No ; we haven't discussed it in the open hearings.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We have quite a series of questions on that a little
later, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jenner. I would like to return, Mr. Chairman, to one ques-
tion. I would like to know what was done following Marshall's re-
turn from China and reporting that his mission had been a failure;
that Chianc: Kai-shek refused to take the Communists into his gov-
ernment. Wliat did we then do to aid Chiang Kai-shek ?
Mr. Vincent. I am working on memory here. One, there was a
large amount of ammunition at Tsingtao in China.
Senator Jenner. What kind of ammunition ?
Mr. Vincent. Rifle ammunition, which was there and was surveyed
and turned over to the Nationalist Government troops in the Province
of Shantung.
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Senator Jenner. Did they have rifles to shoot that ammunition
with?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, I think I testified yesterday, Senator, tliat
people with much better knowledge of the situation in China have
testified or stated that Chiang Kai-shek did not lack the military
equipment in the year 1947 to carry on his campaign ; that, as a matter
of fact, during that year he was more successful than he had been at
any time before or after in consolidating his position.
Senator Jenner. Who in the State Department could give us better
information about what we did to aid China ?
Mr. Vincent. In the period 19
Senator Jenner. Following the Marshall report back that it was a
failure and that we would wash our hands of Chiang Kai-shek and
that it was impossible.
Mr. Vincent. I would say the Secretary of State could do that.
Senator Jenner. The Secretary of State. You know we had the
same situation paralleled in Korea. We said we gave them aid, and
I believe it came out in the evidence in some of the hearings that we
did give them aid. We sent them some baling wire, I just wonder if
that was the same policy followed in China, It is the fact that follow-
ing that 15 months' lull there, during that period, the Chinese Com-
munists organized in Manchuria and marched down and took over
the Government, Isn't that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Jenner. That is the result ?
Mr. Vincent. During 1948.
Senator Jenner, That is right.
Senator Watkins. Let me ask a question with respect to this am-
munition. Were you referring to what I think one of the witnesses
testified to, an incident in which the ammunition v, as placed out in a
dump somewhere and indirectly or by some other means Chiang and
his group were told it was there and they went and helped themselves
to it,
Mr. Vincent. That is one of the instances which I was speaking of.
Senator Watkins. We had a witness as I recall.
Mr. Morris. That was Admiral Cooke's testimony, sir.
Senator Watkins. Admiral Cooke said that is what happened. I
think he also testified or someone testified on that point before this
committee that they were short of ammunition in this period of time;
that they didn't have more than about 2 rounds to fight with.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that testimony. Senator.
Senator Watkins. Have you gone over the testimony before this
committee ?
Mr. Vincent. Some of it. I haven't gone over all of it.
Senator Watkins. I may be mistaken on that, but that is my
memory.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. ]\Ir. Vincent, did you ever state or intimate to Mr.
Dennett that the United States, with the tacit approval of Great
Britain, and with the active support of Australia and New Zealand,
would be the stabilizing power upon the Eastern Asian Continent?
Mr. Vincent. I will have to testify again that I cannot recall a
conversation with Mr. Dennett on that specific subject, but I would
2014 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
say that that would seem to me to have been a logical position to take ;.
that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia could
stabilize conditions in the Far East.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that
the United States needed to be prepared for what its prospective course
of action in or with respect to Eastern Asia would cost ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall stating that to Mr. Dennett.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that
the United States needed work on the development of a formula for
the problems of the independent areas in Southeast Asia ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall stating that to him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Might you have stated that to him ?
Mr. Vincent. I might have stated that to him. We were very much
preoccupied at that time with the postwar status of such areas as
French Indochina, Indonesia.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you think the IPR might be an organization
which would be a good one td assist in the formulation of that
formula ?
Mr. Vincent. I was not thinking in terms of the IPR, If I wa&
speaking to Mr. Dennett, I was speaking to a man who I considered
to be intelligent and was discussing the matters with him. The idea
of the IPR, with which my relations were not close except that one
year, did not enter my mind as an instrument for bringing about
that policy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Don't you remember talking with Mr. Dennett at
a time when he was about to take a job with the American Council of
the IPR and he said he needed to know what the outlook was, what
the future of American policy was going to be, to decide what he
was going to do ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of that.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell the committee whether you ever stated
or intimated to Mr. Dennett that you did not think Russia was a large
factor in the eastern Asia picture?
Mr. Vincent. I do not remember that.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you have been likely to have made such a
statement ?
Mr. Vincent. It would sound most unlikely that I would say that
Russia was not going to be a large factor. It w^ould have to be con-
sidered in connection with the situation that might be described. I
never in my life thought that Russia was not going to be a factor in
the Far East.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in January of 1944 hold the view that
Russia was not a large factor in the eastern Asia picture?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall holding such a view or stating
it to him.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that
in your opinion Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe
anci would probably not interfere to upset the status quo in China?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall making such a statement to Mr.
Dennett.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you could have made such a state-
ment?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't believe I could.
Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact ?
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Mr. Vincent. No ; it was not a fact.
Mr. SocKwiNE. You did not hold that view yourself?
(No response.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask Mr. Mandel, who
has been sworn for the purpose of all of these hearings, if he can
identify that as a photostat of a document taken from the IPR files.
Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of a document from the IPR
files.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Will you identify it by the heading ?
Mr. Mandel. The heading is "Confidential," marked "R. Dennett^
January 18, 1944, memorandum of conversation with John Carter
Vincent."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, this memorandum of a conversa-
tion, as Mr. Vincent surmised, is the basis for the line of questions
that have just been completed. I don't think it is necessaiy to take
the time of the committee to read all of it. I would like to read from
the last page five short paragraphs which are marked "Conclusions"
and then ask that the entire document be placed in the record at this
point.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine. Conclusions:
(1) Vincent certainly implied tliat American policy in the Far East may grow-
out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of prin-
ciples into which Navy demands will be integrated or limited.
(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the
Pacific basin, and questions its stabilizing influences upon the eastern Asiatic
Continent.
(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great
Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing
power.
(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action
will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for
the problems of the dei>endent areas in the southeast Asia country.
(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture:
Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would un-
doubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably
not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart.
The Chairman. You want this instrument inserted in the record
in toto ?
Mr. Sourwine. If the chairman please.
The Chairman. Very well.
(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 380" is as follows :)
Confidential R. Dennett. January 18, 1944..
Exhibit No. 380
Memorandum of Conveksation With John Cartee Vincent
I explained to Mr. Vincent that I was considering a job with the American'
Council of the IPR, and that I thought it highly desirable to get some inkling:
of American policy in the Far East with a view to determining (1) the least
common denominator of that policy — what, that is, everyone was agreed to as
the minimum that the United States would demand, and (2) the alternative
policies which branched out from the common denominator which were being
seriou.sly considered. My purpose, I explained, was to see what the minimum
was which the American people would be called upon to support, so that I couldi
2016 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
get a line on what educational work the American Council should be concerned
with in the next few years, and to see, on possible future policy, what alternative
proposals were being seriously considered so that IPR research could be geared
as close to reality as possible. Mr. Vincent indicated the following:
(1) Consideration of American policy in the Far East is definitely "second
drawer" and is the concern at the present time of relatively few people in the
American Government. He personally, and he thought others in the Govern-
ment, would welcome the publication of material which pointed out just what the
situation was. Ed Snow has an article on southeast Asia which he cannot
get published now because of the fear that it will give aid and comfort to the
•enemy. What Snow says in effect is that Japanese propaganda on increased na-
tionalism is catching on in Burma and other areas. Vincent thinks that, through
a slight feeling of guilt, Americans have been building up China in the past
few years and are still a little ashamed of the small amount of aid going to
that country. There is a vast difference, he feels, between having a feeling of
this sort and allowing this feeling to keep (handwritten insert maybe us, not
clear) from telling the American people what they ought to know.
(2) There seems to be a general agreement, undertaken at the instigation
of the British, that dependent areas in southeast Asia will remain undisturbed
after liberation, and that their future will be worked out at a later date. Vin-
cent thinks that unless the United States gets on the ball and makes some defi-
nite suggestiorua for the record pretty soon, it may be too late as no one will
have notice of what American policy might be.
(3) Vincent thinks that the first determinative on American policy will be
the demands of the American Navy for what it considers it needs on the Pacific
area in the way of bases for defensive purposes. He believes that they will
"want considerably more than they had before and that, in view of what hap-
pened in 1941, they will get a receptive hearing on the Hill. The result of their
demands will be to bring out several consequential questions :
(a) Granted that the Navy gets what it wants, the first problem facing the
United States will be to utilize those bases for other than purely negative in-
fluence of defense of the United States. Vincent believes that the demands of
the Navy, when met will actually make the United States the "stabilizing power"
in the Far East. We will be there, and we will have the power.
(ft) So far as China is concerned, the problem of the United States far
from being that of building up China to become the stabilizing power, will be to
keep China from disintegrating. China cannot become industriaized in the
modern sense unless the United States will literally give her the heavy capital
machinery; it would, he believes, be possible to increase Chinese purchasing
power through agrarian reform and improved communications to a point where
China could support a light industrial economy which would assist in keeping
her from disintegration. Whether the things that need to be done will be done
by the conservative Kuomintang is doubtful. In essence, therefore, this means
the development in China of a "welfare economy" rather than an "industrial
economy."
(4) Vincent believed that the British would have no serious objection to the
implication behind the probable United States Navy demands, that the primary
interest of Britain would continue to be Western Europe, and that she was not
prepared to equip and to maintain an adequate force in the Pacific to he tbe "sta-
bilizing power," and that they would certainly prefer the United States in that
position than China. This would, of course, mean that Australia and New
Zealand would gravitate toward the United States in political interest.
(5) I raised the question as to where British and American interests might,
in the outline he had presented, come to disagreement. I pointed out that the
line between a stabilizing power and a dominating power was thin, and that if
the United States failed to make some provision for dependent areas, or at-
tempted by the possession of adequate power plus assistance from Australia and
New Zealand to put the stopper on the development of nationalistic feeling in
any of the far-eastern areas, the position of the United States as a stabilizing
power changed to that of a dominating power. This, I suggested, Britain might
not be opposed to. On the other hand, if the United States did take a lead in
developing a formula providing expression for nationalistic feelings in southeast
Asia, I wondered whether the United States and Great Britain might not fall
out over India, which would, in this situation, certainly attempt to line up as a
far-eastern nation in order to come under whatever formula the United States
developed for other parts of southeast Asia.
Vincent stated that this was precisely the point at which he thought intelligent
work was needed. It is very apparent that Britian is as unwilling to talk about
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India as Russia is to talk about Poland — in fact the reason William Phillips is
still in this country because the British convinced him of the validity of their
position. Vincent felt that the Indian question might very well be the point
of major disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.
(6) I raised the question whether, at this point in the line of reasoning so
far pursued, it did not become apparent that some mechanism was needed in
the form of a regional council at the very least, through which the pressures
developed by nationalistic feelings could be siphoned oft' into discussion and
open examination, and what the prevailing attitude, if any, was toward the
British regional ideas.
At this point Vincent became vague. He indicated that few people other than
Hornbeck and Blakeslee had done much thinking on the subject, and that
Blakeslee was all in favor of some sort of international political machinery.
The implication was that Hornbeck and he had their doubts. He did say that
Hull was very sympathetic about the problem of dependent areas and thought
that something should be done, but left the impression that very little had in
fact been done. He thought that the British were, in all probability, throuuh in
Hong Kong, and that, although they had little enthusiasm for Hong Kong as a
base, they might definitely want it developed to a free port. He thought that
the question of face could be handled by letting British troops retake Hong
Kong, although he admitted quite a situation would arise if, by any chance, the
Chinese recaptured the area.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Vincent certainly implied that American policy in the Far East may grow
out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of prin-
ciples into which Navy demands will be integrated and limited.
(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the
Pacific Basin, and questions its stabilizing influence upon the eastern Atlantic
continent.
(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great
Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing
power.
(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action
will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for
the problems of the dependent areas in the southeast Asia country.
(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture : Rus-
sia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would undoubtedly
be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere
too greatly to upset the applecart.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you or do you know Maxwell S. Stewart ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of ever meeting Maxwell S.
Stewart.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you ever read any of his writings?
Mr, Vincent. I do not recall reading any of his writings.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever read in manuscript form anything
that Mr. Stewart wrote?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of reading in manuscript form.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say that a manuscript written by Mr. Stew-
art was not transmitted to you by Miriam S. Farley, of the Institute
of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of the incident.
The Chairman. Going back to this exhibit, Mr. Sourwine, should
it not be further identified as to its date ? It is dated January 18, 1944,
headed "Memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent."
Mr. Sourwine. The Chairman is correct.
You recall this incident was referred to yesterday by Mr. Morris.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; at which time I said I couldn't recall the inci-
dent.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you want your testimony to imply that you find
the incident incredible, or that you are willing to accept the possibility
that this manuscript may have been transmitted to you, that you may
2018 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
have read it and that you may have expressed an opinion with regard
to it?
Mr. Vincent. I would like my testimony to be that I have no recol-
lection of the incident as it occurred.
The Chairman. You are speaking now of what? You used the
term "manuscript."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, there is in the record of the hearings
as exhibit No. 176 (page 629, part 2,) a memorandum to W. L. H. from
M. S. F., presumably to Mr. Holland from Miriam Farley, which
reads :
As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max
Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.
The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent
among others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that
he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things
should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive
rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to
leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful
suggestions on point of detail.
Then there is more to it, all of which is in our record. It was men-
tioned at yesterday's hearing. Mr. Morris asked some questions about
it, and I was endeavoring to find out, thinking it over overnight, if
there had been any recollection come to Mr. Vincent about it at all.
The Chairman. Do I understand the witness to testify that he does
not recall at all having the manuscript or going over it ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; that is my testimony, sir.
Senator Watkins. Would you go so far as to deny that you had
such a manuscript?
Mr. Vincent. I just said I do not consider it incredible that I might
have.
Mr. Morris. Was it a habit on the part of IPR people to send manu-
scripts to you for criticism and approval ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not call it a habit. I do not recall other
manuscripts.
The Chairman. What do you mean, you would not call it a habit ?
Mr. Vincent. One would have to define habit.
The Chairman. Was it customary?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have to say I do not recall other manu-
scripts being sent to me. Apparently the Rosinger manuscript was
sent to me.
The Chairman. Do you recall that?
Mr. Vincent. Now that this thing has been read, I don't recall the
incident, but as I say, there was a letter written to me asking me to
return it, and I have no reason to deny it.
Senator Ferguson. You were in a position to make policy as far
as the Far East was concerned ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have said many times I was in a position
to suggest courses of action or policy to my superiors.
Senator Ferguson. And you knew that the IPE, was interested in
the Far East?
Mr. Vincent. It was interested in the Far East.
Senator Ferguson. What their people were writing for consumption
here in America would be of interest to you as a foreign officer.
Mr. Vincent. It would be. I never followed the IPR too closely.
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Senator Ferguson. You thought it was of interest because you be-
came a trustee in the organization ; is that not true?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The fact that there is evidence in the files that
they sent you these before they were published would indicate to you
that they had been sent to you ?
Mr. Vincent. It would indicate that they had been sent to me. I
so testified.
Senator Ferguson. And you believe that they were valuable, their
works, in forming public opinion ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't use the word "valuable," no; but I think
they were of use in forming the public opinion.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that was of greater
value in forming public opinion than these documents and books and
papers being written by the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. What I would say offhand is that the IPR did not
have too wide a circulation. Therefore, I would say that what was
reported in the national press would probably have had a greater in-
fluence on public opinion with regard to the Far East than the IPE,
publications.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that some of these publications,
and the speeches made from them, were getting into the public press?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot say whether they were getting in the public
press or not. It would certainly be logical to say they were.
Senator Ferguson. Were not you watching the public press also for
public opinion?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; but Senator, I could not now say whether I can
recall whether the IPR was covered in the public press to any great
extent. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Does it not sound reasonable that if a publica-
tion came to your desk that could have some effect upon public opin-
ion in manuscript form for your criticism that you would have read
it or had somebody read it to report to you so that you could judge
whether or not it was accurate and you felt that that should be used
as a molder of public opinion ? Does that not sound reasonable ?
Mr. Vincent. That sounds reasonable to me.
Senator Ferguson. Now, can you explain where the other facts and
testimony show that you were submitted these papers that you did
not so act ? Is it one of neglect ? Is that what you are telling us ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't understand your question, Senator. One of
neglect if I had not read them ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; and did not have somebody read them to
report to you. Would it not show now neglect on your part?
Mr. Vincent. Not to have read them ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, or have somebody read them.
Mr. Vincent. I would not call it neglect. It would depend on
whether you had time to read them or not. I have already testified
that I possibly read these publications. It is not incredible. But I
have no recollection of reading them.
Senator Ferguson. Then you do not swear now that you did not
read them ?
Mr. Vincent. What ?
Senator Ferguson. You do not swear now that you did not read
them?
2020 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I would not swear now that I did not read them.
Senator Fekguson. All right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever have any connection with
the China Aid Council ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you or do you know Mrs. E. C. Carter, former
president of the China Aid Council ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I have no recollection of meet-
ing Mrs. Carter, but that I probably did meet her at the IPR confer-
ence if she was there.
Mr. SouR^viNE. Was the Mrs. E. C. Carter, who was at one time
president of the China Aid Council, the same Mrs. E. C. Carter who
was the wife of E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify on that, sir.
Mr. Soitrwtne. Did you ever ask Mrs. E. C. Carter to send your
regards to Madam Sun Yat-sen ?
Mr. Vincent. You have made that question before and I have said
I have no recollection of asking her to send it to her.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, I show you a publication headed
"China Aid Council Newsletter," June 1944, and I ask you to look
at the marked paragraph in the second column.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you see there a reference to yourself ?
Mr. Vincent. I do.
Mr. SouRWTNE. Would you read that paragraph, sir?
Mr. Vincent (reading) :
John Carter Vincent, in charge of Chinese affairs for our State Department,,
asked Mrs. Carter to send his regards to Mme. Sun since he knew her well in
Chungking, and both liked and respected her.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Does that refresh your recollection in any way?
Mr. Vincent. It does not refresh my recollection, but I don't find
it incredible that I would have sent my regards to Mme. Sun.
The Chairman. Wliat is the last part of your answer?
Mr. Vincent. That I might have sent such a letter of Mme. Sun.
Mr. Sourwine. How would you have communicated to Mrs. Carter
your request that she give your regards to Mme. Sun ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I have no recollection of how I might
have communicated that to her. I have already testified that the
incident on my own memory, relying on it, I had no recollection of
the incident. Therefore, I have no recollection of how I might have
told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun.
Mr. Sourwine. I understood you, sir, in your answer to that ques-
tion the first time to indicate that the only occasion on which you
could have met Mrs. Carter was this IPE. conference you attended.
Mr. Vincent. I said that was the only occasion I had a recollection
of meeting Mrs. Carter.
Mr. Sourwine. You did have a recollection of meeting her there?
Mr. Vincent. It was the only one I had any recollection of meeting
her, at the IPR conference.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recollect that you did meet her at the IPR
conference ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no memory of it.
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Mr. SouRWiNE. Then it is not the only occasion you remember
meeting her, because you don't remember meeting her at all, is that
right?
Mr. Vincent. That is right. I wouldn't know Mrs. Carter if I
saw her today.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you send your greetings to Mme. Sun Yat-
sen through someone you never met or saw before ?
Mr. VixGEXT. I say this is an incident I have completely forgotten
about. "Wlien I say that I have no reason to doubt that at some time
I may have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun,
that does not alter my testimony that I don't know Mrs. Carter, or
would not know her if I saw her today.
Mr. SouRw^ixE. The fact you have no recollection of her or would
not know her if you saw her is not, in my mind, any reason to doubt
the accuracy of this statement that you did ask her to give your
regards to Mme. Sun.
Mr. VixcEXT. I have said it is possible. I don't recall the incident
at all. .
Mr. SotjRWIne. The question was not whether it is possible. Is not
the mere fact that you do not remember and would not know her if
3'ou saw her enough in your own mind to make you doubt somewhat
the accuracy of this paragraph ? Why do you say you have no doubt
about this paragi'aph ?
Mr. Vix'CEXT. I just don't recall the incident at all. As I say, it is
not incredible — put it on a matter of doubt — that I sometimes talked
with Mrs. Carter, that at some time I met her, which I don't recall,
and she may have said she was going to see Madame Sun, and I may
have said, "Go ahead, and give her my regards." I say I have no
recollection. I am simply speaking with regard to the possible rather
than something I myself recall.
Mr. SouRwixE. You have not even entertained the thought that this
might be something made out of the whole cloth relating to a com-
pletely nonexistent message ?
Mr. VixcEXT. I have not considered it from that angle.
Mr. SouRwiXE. You think that this was in good faith ?
Mr. Vix'^CEXT. I say again this is possible.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire?
The Chairmax. Yes.
Senator Fergusox. Mr. Vincent, do you have the same difficulty m
your work in the State Department, advising with other officers, of
remembering things that have happened as you have here on the
witness stand ?
Mr. Vix'CEXT. If it is a matter of going back •
Senator Fergusox. Are you as uncertain in your work there about
what has happened as you are here?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, this all happened 7 or 8 years ago.
Senator Ferguson. Can you answer that question ?
The Chairman. You better answer that question.
Senator Ferguson. It is necessary for a foreign officer and a diplo-
mat, such as you are, to remember things for 7 years, is it not ? You
have to keep them all in mind ?
Mr. Vincent. These incidents here, as I say, I do not recall.
2022 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. But are you in as much doubt in conferring
with State officials on things that have happened as you are before
this committee ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, it is a matter of recalling what I would think
now as details.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking, Are you usually in as much doubt ?
The Chairman. I think that is a simple question and easily under-
stood. Why do 3'ou not answer it ?
Senator !• erguson. Are you in as much doubt in advising on facts
with the State olHcials as you are here in this committee?
Mr. Vincent. If they were matters which I considered of as little
importance as some of these things brought forward here, I would
be in the same degree of doubt. In other words, whether or not I
remembered would be a case whether I can remember them.
Senator Ferguson. As to whether or not documents passed through
your hands for criticism in manuscript form is not a minor matter,
is it?
Mr. Vincent. It is a matter — I do not know whether you call it
minor at all. It is a matter which made no impression on me at the
time.
Senator Ferguson. That is the only answer you can give to my ques-
tion as to whether or not you are as uncertain and lack as much knowl-
edge in your advice to State officials as you do at this committee?
Mr. Vincent. That is the answer.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, following up what Senator Fergu-
son has said, if we could return for just a moment to the Maxwell
Stewart pamphlet, do I correctly understand your testimony with
regard to that, that while you do not remember anything about the
incident, you think it is possible that the manuscript was submitted
to you, that you did read it and you did comment on it as indicated
by the Miriam Farley memorandum ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I used your words. I think it was not in-
credible that I might have.
Mr. Sourwine. I do not know whether this has been called to your
attention before. I think perhaps it may have been. I am reading,
Mr. Chairman, from Wartime China by Maxwell Stewart, the pam-
phlet referred to in the memorandum which we are discussing. These
paragraphs appear:
As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel
elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other
countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots, populace move-
ments that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective
opposition pai'ty in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many
progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl
Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Commu-
nists as agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices. In the past
the Chinese Communists dealt very harshly and ruthlessly with landlords and
others who they considered oppressors of the people and expropriated landlord
estates in order to divide them up among the poor peasants. Today in the inter-
ests of the united front, the Communists have largely abandoned these extreme
methods. Their present program is reformist rather than revolutionary. They
no longer expropriate the property of landlords except that of traitors. In
fact, they welcome the cooperation of landlords or anyone else who will help
fight Japan. But they have lowered rents, taxes, and exorbitant interest rates,
and encouraged education, cooperatives, and other measures of popular improve-
ment. In addition they have developed a rough and ready system of local
democracy in the villages under their control. Elected councils have been set
up in village, town, and district, and the local executive oflficials are also chosen
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2023
by popular vote. Tax assessment committees made up of local farmers have been
set up to assure fair administration of taxation. These measures reflecting
the most deep-seated desires of the Communist peasant have given him the
feeling of having a stake in the war and have thus succeeded in arousing the
peasants for support of the war effort.
Having heard that read, I ask you, sir, does it appeal to you as a.
factual statement?
Mr. Vincent. It seems to me to be a statement by Mr. Stewart of
his opinion of what was the condition in Communist China.
The Chairman. That is scarcely an answer. That does not answer
at all. The question is. Does it appeal to you as a factual statement-
Mr. Vincent. It is certainly a statement of the conditions in that
area insofar as Mr. Stewart knew them; and I didn't know, and I
could not judge.
The Ch.\irman. I do not see why you want to evade the question.
"Wliy do you not answer it ? The question is, is that a factual state-
ment.
Mr. Vincent. I would not be in a position to testify because I had
never been in the area. I didn't know what the conditions were there.
Mr. SouKAViNE. Would you, sir, consider it credible that you would
have read that as part of the pamphlet and then reported that it was
good and should be published ?
Mr. Vincent. As this man's statement of his opinion of what was
liappening in that area, that it could be published.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Would 3'Ou, Mr. Vincent, have read that and then
reported that you thought it was good and should be published ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall saying whether it was good and should
be published.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you find it credible that you could have read that
as part of this j^amphlet, and then reported that you thought it was
good and should be published ?
Mr. Vincent. I thought it was good and it should be published in
bringing information about Communist China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is all.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire?
The Chairman. All right. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. What did your counsel say to you ?
■ Mr. Vincent. I didn't hear him.
Mr. Surrey. I don't believe that is the statement as to what he re-
members, since he testified he did not remember the incident.
Senator Ferguson. Hearing this statement, you want to say now
that as a foreign officer in the State Department, and a former trustee
of the IPR, that you would allow to go to the public a statement like
that when you did not know whether it was a fact or not ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, it was not a case of my allowing it to go to
the public.
Senator Ferguson. If you were to criticize it in manuscript form be-
fore it was printed, were they not asking you in effect, "Do you ap-
prove this to be printed and circulated to the public?" Is that not
what your criticism was asked for ?
Mr. Vincent. No; not my criticism. They might have completely
rejected any criticism.
Senator Ferguson. Surely, but you would have been on record as
saying you did not agree with it because you either did not know
what the facts were, or did not believe what he was saying. You
2024 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
do not think they were submitting it to you just for the English, do
you ?
Mr. Vincent. They were submitting it to me as they say there as
to wliether it would be good for this to be published. So they say in
this memo.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that is exactly it, whether or not it should
be handed out to the American public to help crystallize public opin-
ion, and here you were, a State official, and now you say that you would
pass it because it was his word, and anything he would say you would
pass, is that correct? Is that what you want to leave with this
committee ?
Mr. Vincent. It was not a case of my passing the thing. It was
not my document. It was submitted to me to go over. It could be
published whether I approved it or not.
Senator Ferguson. But if you did not say anything to the con-
trary, the IPR would take for granted that you were approving it, is
that not correct ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not think so.
Senator Ferguson. You would not think so ?
Mr. Vincent. That I was approving it. My approval was not
necessary to publish IPR documents.
Senator Ferguson. Then why did you not mail it back and say to
IPR, "I am not going to criticize your document. Print anything
you want to, but I am not going to criticize it. I am not going to
say whether it is good, bad, or indifferent''? Wliy did you not tell
them that?
Mr. Vincent. As I have just said, the whole matter is one I have
no recollection of what attitude I took on it. I said it is not incredible
that the incident occurred.
Mr. Sourwine. You have stated that you are willing to accept the
fact that it occurred?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. The memo indicates that you have expressed your
opinion in confidence. You were advising the IPR but you did not
want the fact that you were expressing an opinion to go out. That
is the implication of the memo. Does that change your testimony ?
Mr. Vincent. This memo was not written by me. I cannot myself
vouch for what my exact attitude was at the time.
Mr. Sourwine. That is right. But you still find nothing incredible
in the memorandum?
Mr. Vincent. Except the matter of saying, "I have expressed in
confidence" or the language of the thing, the existence.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you deny that you expressed an opinion in con-
fidence ?
Mr. Vincent. No, I do not deny that I told them that.
Senator Ferguson. With your present knowledge, Mr. Vincent,
having heard this read, do you say now that it accurately sets forth
the facts?
Mr. Vincent. I say now, sir, that I did not know the facts as they
existed.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now.
Mr. Vincent. Wliether now this was an accurate statement of what
was happening ?
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Senator Ferguson. Yes, witli your knowledge now is that or is that
not an accurate statement of the facts?
Mr, Vincent, Knowing what I do know about Communist China,
I would not say that was a completely accurate statement of the condi-
tions in Communist China at that time.
Senator Ferguson, Would you say now with your present knowl-
edge that that was a pro-Communist writing?
Mr. Vincent, I would say that it was a writing which had a slant
in favor of giving the Communists, I do not think it w^as pro-Com-
munist, I don't even know that Stewart expected it to be. Stewart
was writing what he considered to be an account of conditions in
Communist China,
Senator Ferguson, Why are you defending Stewart in this answer?
Mr, Vincent, I don't even know Stewart,
Senator Ferguson. Knowing it is an inaccurate statement, which
you have said, why do you doubt that Stewart was trying to put propa-
ganda out in favor of the Communists ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not call — I have no idea of what Stewart's
motives were at that time. If he wrote a memorandum, I must assume
that he was trying to write what he thought was a factual memo of
conditions in Communist China.
Senator Ferguson. Suppose he was a Communist, would you still
give that answer ?
Mr. Vincent. If he were a Communist, I would say certainly
he was trying to slant it toward a better understanding of what was
going on or a sympathetic understanding of what was going on in
Communist China,
Senator Ferguson. From that statement, have you any doubt that
he was pro-Communist in the statement?
Mr, Vincent, At that time? At the time he made the statement?
Senator Ferguson, No, from what you know now,
Mr. Vincent, I would say now on the basis of that statement that
he probably was pro-Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that it is a fair statement to the
American people ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't know whether it was a fair statement
because I have to go back again and say I was not familiar with condi-
tions
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now. Your knowledge of
the facts now.
Mr. Vincent. From my knowledge of the facts now, I would say
that was a statbment which was slanted or sympathetic toward Com-
munists.
The Chairman. You were asked the question, do you regard that
as a fair statement to go to the American people.
Senator Ferguson. Is it?
Mr. Vincent. Is it now, or was it then ?
Senator Ferguson. Knowing what you do now, was it a fair state-
ment to go to the American people ?
Mr. Vincent, I would say as a statement of Maxwell Stewart, a
man who was supposed to learn something about it, that it was not a
case of it being a fair statement to go to the American public or not.
It was a case of Maxwell Stewart putting out in IPR a statement.
And its fairness does not seem to enter into it.
22848— 52— pt. 7 3
2026 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. My question is, you as a State official, and a
United States Government official, knowing what the facts are now,
knowing what he said, was it or was it not a fair statement to the
American people ?
Mr. Vincent, It was a statement to the American people which
could have misled them as to what conditions were in Communist
China.
The Chairman. Therefore, not a fair statement to go to the Amer-
ican people ?
Mr. Vincent. I iBnd trouble in saying what is fair when one man
wants to report.
The Chairman. If it is misleading, it is not fair ?
Mr. Vincent. The American public, it w^ould seem to me, would
have a right to receive anybody's opinion through these kinds of things.
The Chairman. You have stated in answer to Senator Ferguson
that it was not a fair statement to go to the American people. Then
it w\as misleading the American people, was it not ?
Mr. Vincent. I have so testified that the statement itself, slanted as
it was, would have misled the American people at the time as to con-
ditions in Communist China.
Mr. Sourwine. By your previous answer
Mr. Vincent. From what I know now.
Mr. Sourwine. By your previous answer, one question ago, do you
mean to say that you feel the American people have the inalienable
right to be misled as far as the Communist writers want to mislead
them ?
Mr. Vincent. I certainly did not. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, was this statement Communist
propaganda ?
Mr. Vincent. In my opinion at that time, I did not so consider it.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now.
Mr. Vincent. Now I would say, as I look back on it and know
about communism, it would have misled people as to conditions in
Communist China. It was painting too rosy a picture of conditions
there.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, would you say it was Communist
propaganda ?
Mr. Vincent. I would n®t say it was Communist propaganda:, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Why not '^
Mr. Sourwine. Was it pro-Communist propaganda ?
Mr. Vincent. I said that the thing was slanted towards the Com-
munists and giving an unduly rosy view of what was happening in
Communist China as I look back on it now.
Mr. Sourwine. In that regard, it was pro-Communist, was it not?
Mr. Vincent. I find it difficult to define what you mean by pro-
Communist.
Mr. Sourwine. That phrase is used in the State Department com-
monly. How does the State Department use it ?
]Mr. Vincent. Then it was in that sense. If it gave a rosy view it
would be considered to be slanted toM^ard the Communists and pro-
Communist.
Mr. Sourwine. It was propaganda ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2027
Mr. Vincent. I would not call it propaganda in the sense that Mr.
Stewart, as far as I know, was trying to report on the situation as he
saw it.
Mr. SouRAViNE. We have defined propaganda once.
Mr. Vincent. Information.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is right, which is put out, which is propa-
gated, with a view to creating an impact on the people to whom it is
sent. In that sense this certainly was propaganda.
Mr. Vincent. In that sense it was.
Mr. SouiiwiNE. Then it was pro-Communist propaganda, was it
not?
Mr. Vincent. Well, it was pro-Communist propaganda.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, do you find as much trouble among
State officials as you are having here this morning on the question of
pro-Communist propaganda ? Do they all have as much trouble as
you have here this morning?
Mr. Vincent. In looking back upon other situations at times, and
trying to described what was or was not a pro-Communist situation in
1943 or 1944, 1 couldn't answer that question, sir, whether they would
or would not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have trouble at that time in determin-
ing what was or ^as not pro-Communist or anti-Communist propa-
ganda ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall an instance of having trouble.
Senator Ferguson. You do not feel there was any trouble in de-
termining that back in those days?
Mr. Vincent. People may have had difficulties in determining what
was Communist and what was pro-Communist or anti-Communist. I
don't know that during the war, when they were fighting, that a great
deal of emphasis was placed on that particular phase of the thing.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, when you say you had no trouble in
distinguishing pro-Communist and non-pro-Communist matter, is that
because you had no trouble making the distinction, that is, you were
always readily able to make the distinction, or is it because you were
not bothered very often trying to make the distinction?
Mr. Vincent. I think trying to get it down to a fine point of what
was or was not pro-Communist was not something that occupied one's
thoughts too much at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It did not occupy very much of your attention ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And that means that if it did not occupy your
attention, it did not really occupy anyone's attention in the Depart-
ment ?
Mr. Vincent. No, that is not so.
Senator Ferguson. Whose job was it to pay attention as to whether
or not the people were being misled by Communist propaganda, if
it was not yours ?
Mr. Vincent. I didn't say that I was not occupied. I said we were
not too much occupied.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by that?
Mr. Vincent. That you didn't examine every document that passed
over your desk to see whether it was pro-Communist or anti-Com-
munist.
2028 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Then it would have been a very easy thing for
Communists either in or out of the State Department to act with
immunity and mislead the American people ?
Mr. Vincent. I can't agree with that, sir, because people were cer-
tainly conscious of the threat of communism. I was myself.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, do you not think that the head of a
desk in the State Department, the director of a division, should be
thoroughly conversant with the Communist objectives in the area
under his jurisdiction, so that he would recognize almost instantly
Communist propaganda, or their line, if it cropped up in anything
that came to him ?
Mr. Vincent. I should think he should be alert to such a situation.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you feel that you were, while you were the Di-
rector of the Far Eastern Division, informed and so alerted with re-
gard to Communist propaganda and the Communist line in the Far
East?
Mr. Vincent. I endeavored to keep myself so.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think, as an alert man, that this state-
ment that has been read by Mr. Sourwine would go through your
hands with approval?
Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that it went through — it did
not go through my hands with approval insofar as T recall, but I am
perfectly willing to say that the thing went through.
Senator Ferguson. With your approval.
Mr. Vincent. Again, I don't use the word "approval."
Mr. Morris. The memorandum states that you said it was good and
worth publishing.
Mr. Vincent. I am not testifying that the report of what I said
there is a factual statement of what I said.
Mr. Sourwine. But you do not contest it?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. And you do not find it incredible ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might turn to another line of
questions.
The Chairman. Try to turn to something that the witness. knows
something about.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, was Owen Lattimore an adviser to
Chiang Kai-shek at the time he accompanied Mr. Wallace to China ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. He had ceased to be adviser to Chiang Kai-shek
some time before that, had he not?
Mr. Vincent. I think he ceased to be adviser to Chiang in the fall
of 1942.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you in China during the period when he was
adviser to Chiang?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. During that period when Mr. Lattimore was ad-
viser to Chiang, did he make reports directly to the White House ?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot say with any assurance which way he made
his reports.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever consider the possibility that he was
making reports directly to the White House ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2029
Mr. Vincent. I assumed that he was, since he was sent out by the
President.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you eyer discuss this possibility with Am-
bassador Gauss ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall discussing it with Ambassador Gauss.
Mr. SouKwiNE. As a matter of fact, is it not true that possibility
was a source of irritation to Ambassador Gauss?
Mr. Vincent. I recall that the Ambassador did not like the idea of
having two people reporting out of China.
Mr. SouRAViNE. How do you know he didn't like the idea if you
never discussed it with him ?
Mr. Vincent. I didn't say I didn't discuss it with Mr. Gauss.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I thought you said you had no memoi-y of dis-
cussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was report-
ing directly to the White House.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not say that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember ever discussing with Mr. Gauss
the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was reporting directly to the Wliite
House ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of any particular incident, but
I do have a recollection that was his attitude at the time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He was irritated at that possibility?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did it irritate you ?
Mr. Vincent. It did me, too.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did it irritate you ?
Mr. Vincent. Because as Foreign Service officer in the field, it was
somewhat difficult for us to have a separate reporting office out of
China on conditions there, and not know what was going on in that
reporting field.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore had
not reported directly to the White House?
Mr. Vincent. I would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore, under
directions he had to report to the White House, showed us what he was
reporting so we could know as well.
Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not show you any reports that he filed with
the White House?
Mr. Vincent. None that I ever recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, Mr. Vincent, do anything to condition Mr.
Wallace for his mission to China ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified that we met not frequently
but on several occasions before we started out. I have no distinct
recollection of memory that I may have prepared him for the mission,
but I may have ; of factual conditions in China as I saw them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not indicate, in executive session, that you
did supply him with material in advance of the trip ?
Mr. Vincent. That is just what I was testifying again now. I
testified further that I had no distinct recollection of the exact char-
acter of the material.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you also testify in executive session that you
had consulted with Owen Lattimore to make preliminary arrange-
ments for the Wallace trip ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall my exact testimony in executive session,
but I think it is quite logical that I would have.
2030 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, did you not say that you had
discussed the trip with him before the appointment was announced?
Mr. Vincent. I think I told you, sir, it was quite logical I did, but
I can't recall any particular discussions with him. But as I say, it cer-
tainly would have been logical for Lattimore and myself, who were
going out with him, to have had discussions.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you influenced Mr. Wallace at all on
his trip ?
Mr. Vincent. I should hardly see how it would have been impos-
sible for me not to influence Mr. Wallace on the trip, since I had
been in China for 20 years, with factual information.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You can "hardly see how it would have been im-
possible" for you "not to influence"? Straighten that out.
Mr. Vincent. I say it certainly would have been logical for me to
have had some influence on Mr. Wallace.
Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, you know you did influence
him?
Mr. Vincent. What I am trying to say is that I don't recall specific
influences I had on him. I am trying to give the question or the
answer a geneial character, rather than saying in what particular
way I may or may not have influenced him.
Mr. Sourwine. I am perfectly willing to be general, but perhaps
you can be a little more specific. Do you really mean that you cannot
recall any instances in which you influenced him or might have in-
fluenced him ? You do not mean that, do you ?
Mr. Vincent. I was trying to recall specific instances.
Mr. Sourwine. Furnishing him material in advance of the trip is
influencing him, is it not ?
Mr. Vincent. That would be giving information.
Mr. Sourwine. Giving advice throughout the trip would be influenc-
ing him, would it not?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Talking with him one evening after having a con-
versation with Chiang and suggesting you take a certain line the next
day is influencing him, is it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You did that, did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. On more than one occasion, did you not?
Mr. Vincent. I was trying to consider specific instances.
Mr. Sourwine. That is a specific instance, is it not ?
Mr. Vincent. I did talk to him and certainly he must have been
to some degree influenced by me.
Mr. Sourwine. You know he was, do you not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRW^NE. He changed his line at least on one occasion because
you suggested it, did he not ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Breaking in on conversations with Chiang to steer
him in particular directions was influencing the mission was it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You did that, did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2031
Mr. SouRwiNE. Then there is not any question in your mind that
yon did influence Mr. Wallace in the course and direction of his mis-
sion, is there ?
Mr. Vincent. There certainly is no question.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you present at all of the talks between Mr.
Wallace and General Chiang t
Mr. Vincent. I was present at all except the first and the last.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there anywhere at any time, in any written
memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace, any refer-
ence to a request by General Chiang for the assignment of General
Wedemeyer as the representative of President Roosevelt?
Mr. Vincent. I recall no memorandum. It was all oral discussion
as far as I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Wallace ever tell you orally that General
Chiang had made a request for the assignment of General Wedemeyer
or had indicated that he would like to have General Wedemeyer as-
signed as the President's representative to him ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall his ever telling me that the General-
issimo wanted General Wedemeyer.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know where the first idea of having Gen-
eral Wedemeyer recommended originated?
Mr. Vincent. My recollection would be that it originated with Mr.
Alsop. I didn't know Wedemeyer, and I think Mr. Wallace stated
that he had never known General Wedemeyer.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You and I have been over this, and I realize I am
cutting corners on it. I simply wanted to traverse that here for the
public record in case Senators who were not present at the executive
session might want to ask questions.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you also testify that it was Mr. Alsop who
had stopped the proposed recommendation of General Chennault for
that job?
Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of my testimony.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And that he had done so by saying that General
Chennault did not want the job ?
Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you read Mr. Alsop's testimony before this
committee ?
Mr. Vincent. I have not read it carefully; no, sir. I glanced
through it.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you discussed that matter at all in recent years
with Mr. Alsop ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. You do not, then, know whether what you have ]ust
testified was in any way at odds with what Mr. Alsop said?
Mr. Vincent. No. I do not recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify in executive session that Mr. Lauch-
lin Currie played a part in your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Vincent. I testified that it was possible that Lauchlin Currie
was the first one to mention to me that Mr. Wallace was going to
China. If I could have the testimony I could
Mr. Sourwine. I just asked.
Mr. Vincent. That is true.
2032 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. You testified to a fact there. You testified to the
same fact here. There cannot be any conflict in your testimony.
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. So far as you know, who initiated the request for
your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. So far as I know, Mr. Wallace initiated it,
Mr. SoTJRw^iNE. How do you know that Mr. Wallace initiated it ?
Mr. Vincent. Because I testified that we had a conversation one
time about conditions in China. He called me and we had this conver-
sation regarding going to China.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that before Mr. Currie had mentioned to you
the possibility of your going with Mr. Wallace on this mission ?
Mr. Vincent. 1 don't recall the sequence as to whether Mr. Currie
mentioned it first or Mr. Wallace.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first
one to mention it to you ?
Mr. Vincent. That Mr. Wallace was going to China?
Mr. SouEwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwt:ne. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one
to mention to you that you would go along with Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the testimony in executive session, but
as I have said, it is possible that Mr. Currie was the first to mention
the matter of going.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes?
Mr. Vincent. I am trying to distinguish between a knowledge that
there was going to be a Wallace mission
Mr. SouRwiNE. Oh, yes?
Mr. Vincent. And who first initiated the request that I go along.
In any formal way Mr. Wallace initiated it insofar as the Secretary
of State was concerned.
Mr. SouR-\viNE. When Mr. Wallace talked to you about it, he came
to your office, did he not?
Mr. Vincent. He came over to the State Department.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. That meeting was arranged?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He did not come without an appointment?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. At the time the appointment was arranged you knew
what he was going to talk about ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Who arranged that appointment?
Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that I have testified that Mr. Wal-
lace called, and I said I would come over to his office, but he came
over to the State Department. But Mr. Currie may have arranged
the interview.
Mr. Sourwine. You did not know at the time that Mr. Wallace
called you on the phone that the thing he wanted to discuss with you
was going on the mission ?
Mr. Vincent. I was sure of his going on the mission.
Mr. Sourwine. No ; your going.
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that I was, but as I say, it is logical.
I am just trying to be factual in the testimony here. Whether Mr.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2033
Wallace told me he was coming over to talk to me about going on the
mission with him or whether he was coming to talk about going on
the mission.
Mr. SouRwiNE. As of now, as of this morning, are you able to re-
member who first discussed with you the matter of you going on that
mission with Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. From my memory this morning I would have to re-
peat again that Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss with me the
mission, but I do not recall whether Mr. Currie was the first one to
discuss that I would go on the mission.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did Mr. Hull send you with Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hull sent me with Mr. Wallace as far as I know
because I had had 20 years' experience in China, I had just come back
from China, with 2 years' experience there.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliy did he want to send anybody with Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Vincent. Putting it this way, that Mr. Wallace was the one
wanting someone to be sent with him. I don't know that Mr. Hull
wanted somebody to be sent with Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember your testimony on this point in
executive session ?
Mr. Vincent. I remember my testimony, but you put the question
differently here. Why did Mr. Hull want somebody to go. I am
saying after Mr. Wallace had asked for somebody to go, and I had
been designated by Mr. Hull to go, I referred to a brief conversation
which Mr. Hull had with me. I am using the word "want," why
did Mr.
Mr. Sourwine. Did not that conversation indicate to you why Mr.
Hull wanted you to go ?
Mr. Vincent. I think you are using what Mr. Hull wanted me to
be alert to, it already having been decided I was going.
Mr. Sourwine. All right. Tell us about the conversation if you
will.
Mr. Vincent. It was a very brief conversation in which Mr. Hull
told nie to be careful not to let Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, make
promises to the Chinese that we would be unable to fulfill.
Mr. Sourwine. Did that not mean to you that Mr. Hull was afraid
that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese
authorities ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I testified in executive session that there was
a feeling, which I had no knowledge of, that Mr. Wallace in his
trip to South America the year before had given the impression there
that we were going to be of greater help to the South American coun-
tries than was possible.
Mr. Sourwine. Tlie answer to my question is what, then, yes or
not?
Mr. Vincent. What is your question, sir ?
Mr. Sourwine. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that Mr.
Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to
the Chinese authorities?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Senator Ferguson (presiding). Did Mr. Wallace make any
promises ?
Mr. Vincent. None that I recall.
2034 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Did you on any occasion have to warn him not
to make promises?
Mr. Vincent. I never had to warn him that I can recall not to make
elaborate promises.
Senator Ferguson. What do you call an elaborate promise ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say promises beyond our own possibility of
performance ; the matter of support to China
Senator Ferguson. What did he promise them that you thought was
within our capabilities of carrying out?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace made no specific promises insofar as
I can recall to General Chiang other than a continuation, and if pos-
sible, an augmentation of support for the Chiang Kai-shek govern-
ment.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Hull
said elaborate promises ?
Mr. Vincent. No. You used that word. He just said don't make
promises to the Chinese that we were unable to fulfill.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you know what we would or
would not be able to fulfill ? Did Mr. Hull tell you what we could or
could not fulfill.
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hull was not specific in telling me that.
Senator Ferguson. How could you be of any aid on that ?
Mr. Vincent. I would recognize with my knowledge of China that
if Mr. Wallace were to go out there and make promises of support
which could not be carried over the hump in the air, or further sup-
port of a military nature which was impossible —
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the military situation
so that you could advise as to what we could or could not carry over
the hump ?
Mr. Vincent. I was familiar enough to know what I would con-
sider to be an unreasonable request and if I did, I would also be in
touch with the military people in China who could give me any
advice that they might wish to.
Senator Ferguson. Then you never had to use this so-called
warning ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall did I ever have to stop Mr. Wallace
from doing something which I thought was going beyond our ability
to fulfill.
Senator Ferguson. Did he make any promises at all ?
Mr. Vincent. The only promises I recall he made was that we were
going to try to go back and get support for General Chiang's govern-
ment continued over the hump insofar as it was practical to send
lend-lease.
Senator Ferguson. That is the only promise that he made ?
Mr. Vincent. That is the only promise as I recall he made.
Senator Ferguson. Did he promise to get him a representative —
Wedemeyer ?
Mr. Vincent. No, he did not promise him so far as I know unless it
took place in a conversation at which I was not present. It was only
the fact that the Generalissimo had given Mr. Wallace the distinct
impression that he could not get along with Stilwell. What promises
he may have made in trying to alter that situation to Chiang Kai-shek,
I don't know.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2035
Senator Ferguson. You did not quite fill your mission for Mr. Hull,
did you, when you allowed Mr. Wallace to meet with Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek on the last occasion without you being present?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the
United States then, and Chiang Kai-shek was President of China, and
they got in a car and rode to the airport, and I rode in another car. I
could hardly have insisted on riding with the Vice President when
he did not invite me.
Senator Ferguson. But Mr. Hull had told you that you were going
for a specific purpose, and that was to watch Mr. Wallace so that he
would not make promises to Chiang Kai-shek, is that not true ?
Mr. Vincent. Not watch him so he would not.
Senator Ferguson. What would you do ?
Mr. Vincent. I could not stay by Mr. Wallace's side all the time
because as I say, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States.
I do not think Mr. Hull ever intended that I stick to his side in that
way.
Senator Ferguson. But at least you did not hear the last con-
versation.
Mr. Vincent. I did not hear the last conversation, but Mr. Wallace
to my recollection reported it to me going down in the plane.
Senator Ferguson. Did you report to Mr. Hull that you had not
been at the last conversation ?
Mr. Vincent. In my memorandum on the thing it shows very
clearly I was not at the first or last conference.
Senator Ferguson. You reported that to Mr. Hull ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to resort to the book, but I am quite sure
it shows clearly in my memorandum that in the last conversation
General Chiang and Mme. Chiang and Mr. Wallace occupied a car
going to the airport, and I was not in the car.
Senator Ferguson. Would you not expect that if any promises
were made, they may have been made on the last conversation just
before he would leave?
Mr. Vincent. I do not say whether they would be made then or at
some other time.
Senator Ferguson. All right, counsel.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever make, other than your
original notes and the memoranda which are printed in the white
paper, any other memoranda or narrative of the Wallace trip ?
Mr. Vincent. None that I recall, sir. I think I have testified that
they were the first notes, which were then transcribed either in writ-
ing first and then on the typewriter.
Mr. Sourwine. You kept a copy of what you filed with the Depart-
ment in that regard, did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. I kept a copy ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall keeping a copy. I turned it over to
the State Department when I got back here.
Mr. Sourwine. You had access to it subsequently ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you not subsequently from those notes prepare
in more narrative style a summary somewhat shorter of what took
place on the Wallace mission, just a summary record ?
2036 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I told you in executive session that a
summary in shortened form was prepared in the State Department.
I did not prepare it.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you know who did prepare it ?
Mr. Vincent. I can't recalL It was probably Mr. Stanton who
prepared it. I could refresh my memory by going up there to see
whose initials were on it. Mine was a 20-page running thing. As
usual, it was narrowed down to much shorter pages.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who did prepare it if it was not Mr.
Stanton ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I could name half a dozen people
there. It was the kind of a thing that Mr. Stanton might have done,
it is the kind of thing — who else was in the Division, this was in 1944 —
there was a Miss Ruth Bacon there who did that kind of thing quite
frequently, of going through things, she had legal training, she would
reduce things. I would have to see who the personnel was to guess who
put the initials on. I do know it was reduced and summarized for the
Secretary.
Mr. Sourwine. It was prepared from your notes ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether a copy of that summary was
ever given to Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a matter of fact whether the sum-
mary was given to Mr. Wallace or not.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it would be given to Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Vincent. I think it would be logical that it would be given.
Mr. Sourwine, Do you remember having seen that summary ?
Mr. Vincent. I remember seeing the summary. I did not prepare
it myself. It was prepared in the normal procedures of summarizing
things.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you recognize that summary if you saw it
again ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. I want to ask you, if this, that I show you is in any
way to you reminiscent of that summary.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. It is not ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, what I have just shown you, does it appear to
be a summary of the Vice President's trip ?
Mr. Vincent. No; this is not a summary of the trip insofar as I
can see which has anything to do with the memo I wrote, which is a
summary of the conversations.
Mr. Sourwine. This that I have showed you refers to the Vice Presi-
dent in the third person, just as your notes did ; does it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. I always referred to him as Mr. Wallace or
the Vice President.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. This is Henry Wallace's letter of July 10 to the
President.
Mr. Sourwine. How do you know ?
Mr. Vincent. Because I have seen it — I have it right here myself —
since it was published. I have never seen it before.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2037
Mr. SonRWiNE. I want to know how you know it was Henry Wal-
lace's letter?
Mr. Vincent. I know only by the fact it was published.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it published as Henry Wallace's letter ?
Mr. Vincent. I haA^e to see what it is.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What you have is a letter. What I have shown you
is headed "Summary report of Vice President Wallace's visit in
China," is it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It is dated the 10th of July 1944,
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. It was transmitted apparently to the President with
a note by Mr. Wallace: "Dear Mr. President: I am handing you
herewith a report on my trip to the Far East. Sincerely yours, H. A.
Wallace."
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. But it does not say it is Henry Wallace's own re-
port, does it? He says "a report."
Mr. Vincent. Yes; he does.
Mr. Sourwine. And it is in the third person ?
Mr. Vincent. This ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. The report refers to Mr. Wallace in the third
person ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. As you said you referred to him in the notes?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation
of that report?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. I did not even know of its existence
until this thing was published here, until the last 3 or 4 months. If
there is any confusion in your mind about the relationship of that and
tlie summarization of the memoranda of conversation between Chiang
Kai-shek and the Vice President, this has no relation to that.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you sure?
Mr. Vincent. I am sure.
Mr. Sourwine. How can you be sure?
Mr. Vincent. I can be sure because I have seen the summary of
the memorandum that I wrote on the conversations and I have just
testified it was prepared by some officer in the Far Eastern Office, and
was a two or three page summarization of 20 pages, and it followed
much the same lines as my own, that on such and such a day they
talked and this was taken up.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you account for the fact, if it was a fact, that
Mr. Wallace in reporting to the President on his trip, would refer to
himself in the third person?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot.
Mr. Sourwine. He did not do that in the Kunming cables, did he?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Here was the Vice President of the United States
reporting to the President of the United States; do you think it is
quite the logical thing to do that in a report which he himself had
written he would refer to himself in the third person ?
Mr. Vincent. I can't testify on the basis of what the logic of Mr,
Wallace was in using the third person.
2038 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouEwiNE. On the other hand, if a report had been prepared
by someone else as a summary of yonr notes, such a report would have
had to refer to Mr. Wallace in the third person, would it not?
Mr. Vincent. It would have.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Do you from those facts draw any conclusion as to
whether the report transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President was
written by himself or prepared by some other person ?
Mr. Vincent. I think the report prepared by Mr. Wallace was
written by him. As I say, I cannot testify
Mr. SouRwiNE. Of course, a report prepared by him was written
by him. What I want to know is whether you have any conclusion,
on the basis of the meager facts now at our joint disposal, as to
whether this report, a copy of which you have just seen, a copy of
which you have before you, was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. My belief is that it was in fact prepared by Mr.
Wallace.
Mr. SouRwiNE, On what do you base that belief ?
Mr. Vincent. Because Mr. Wallace transmitted it to the President
on July 10, so he himself said.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He did not say it was "my report."
Mr. Vincent. He said, "Here is a report."
Mr. SouRWiNE. "Here is a report."
Mr. Vincent. I have no exact knowledge that Mr, Wallace him-
self prepared the report. My assumption is that Mr. Wallace did
prepare the report.
Mr. Sour wine. The heading on that report does not say, "Report
by Henry Wallace," does it?
Mr. Vincent. Counsel is just showing me a paragraph out of Mr,
Wallace's letter to the President in which Mr. Wallace himself says
here
Mr, SouRwiNE, What letter to the President ? Is this what I have
been referring to as the report ?
Mr, Vincent. No; this is the letter to President Truman of Sep-
tember 19, 1951, which Mr. Wallace says, "I wrote the July report
myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the Presi-
dent."
Mr. SouRwiNE. On that basis you are testifying this was Mr. Wal-
lace's report?
Mr. Vincent. I can reach no other assumption. I have no reason
why Mr. Wallace should wish to deny or lead to any subterfuge on
that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And it does not seem queer to you that the report
was not headed "Report by Henry Wallace," but "Report of the Trip
of Henry A. Wallace," and it did not refer to the Vice President in
the first person, but in the third person.
Mr, Vincent, It is not a matter of my thinking it is queer or not.
Mr. A\'allacc has testified he wrote it. Why he may have used the third
person with respect to himself instead of the first person, I don't
know,
Mr, SouRwiNE, You cannot account for that?
Mr, Vincent, I can't account for it,
Mr. SouRWiNE, Do you not think it is queer ?
Mr, Vincent. I don't know whether it is queer or not.
Mr. Sourwine, You would not write a rejDort like that?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2039
Mr. Vincent. I might under certain circumstances write a report
like that and not use the first person.
INIr. SouRwiNE. All right, sir. I would like to talk for just a little
while about the conversations with General Chiang, using your notes
as the basis.
Mr. Vincent. Can I go back just to clear up this matter of the
possible relationship of this to the summary ?
Mr. Sourwine. Surely.
Mr. Vincent. I hope it is clear to you that the summary of those
conversations has no relation to this.
Mr. Sourwine. You have so stated, sir, very clearly.
Mr. Vincent. I just wanted you to be sure of that.
Mr. Sourwine. I presume you made that statement from your own
|7ersonal knowledge.
Mr. Vincent. From my own personal knowledge, and I have tried
to narrow down who it was in the Department that summarized my
memoranda of the conversation.
Mr. Sourwine. But you remember that summary well enough that
you can say definitely it is not the basis for this report ?
Mr, Vincent. It has no relation to this.
]SIr. Sourwine. Your memory in that regard is clear?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. All right, sir.
Now I am reading the wliite paper, and if you would like to have
it before you
Mr. Vincent. I have it, sir.
Mr. Surrey. Do you have another copy, Mr. Sourwine ?
Mr. Sourwine. The chairman has it now.
You will note on page 550, at the top of the page, you wrote :
Mr. Wallace expressed the opinion that there should not be left pending any
question which might result in conflict between China and the U. S. S. R. Pres-
ident Chiang suggested that President Roosevelt act as an arbiter or middleman
between China and the U. S. S. R.
Note. — President Chiang's suggestion was apparently prompted by Mr. Wall-
ace's earlier statement that President Roosevelt was willing to act as an arbiter
between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Mr. Wallace made no comment
at the time.
By that you mean, unquestionably, that Mr. Wallace made no com-
ment at the time of President Chiang's suggestion; but your own note
suggests that Wallace previously made the statement that President
Roosevelt was prepared to act as arbiter between the Communists and
Kuomintang?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. May I ask if the record makes it clear that the
white paper shows on page 549 that what you are reading was pre-
pared by John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese
Affairs, on note 11 at the bottom of the page.
Mr. Sourwine. These are his notes.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. These are the notes I made.
Senator Ferguson. So they are not Stanton's notes; they are your
your notes.
Mr. Vincent. No. This is the full text of the memorandum rather
than the abbreviated form.
Senator Ferguson. But these were made by you and not Stanton ?
2040 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. No, sir — yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE, They were made by-
Mr. Vincent. They were made by me.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Then the notes continue :
However, after discussing tlie matter with Mr. Vincent that evening, Mr.
Wallace made it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast
that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China
and the U. S. S. R.
That was one occasion when you pulled the Vice President back
from what might have been a commitment?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, because the Vice President himself had in-
formed me of his conversation with the President in which he jotted
down notes.
Mr. SouRWiNE, Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Which was that he could tell Chiang Kai-shek that
he would be glad to be helpful in anyway to bring about a settlement
of the difficulties between the Kuomintang and the Communists.
That was his statement to me.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. You wanted Mr. Wallace to make it perfectly clear
to Chiang that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as ar-
biter between China and the U. S. S. K ?
Mr. Vincent. I wanted him to make it clear because he himself
told me that was just exactly what the President wanted him to do,
was to be an arbiter if it was needed or asked for between the Kuomin-
tang and the Communists, and not between Russia and China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you mean to say that the President had told Mr.
Wallace and that you knew about it that he, President Roosevelt, was
willing — ready, willing and able, shall we say — to act as an arbiter be-
tween the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?
Mr. Vincent. That is what Mr. Wallace told me that the Presi-
dent told him. Whether he used the word "arbiter" or not
Mr. SouRwiNE. Intermediary?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, or help settle their difficulties.
Mr. Sourwine. When you told Mr. Wallace about this situation and
persuaded him to make it clear to President Chiang the next morning
before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as
arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R., did you also make it clear
to him that the President was willing to act as arbiter between the
Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?
Mr. Vincent. I reminded Mr. Wallace that that was what he had
told me and Chiang apparently misunderstood it to mean arbiter
between Russia and China.
Mr. Sourwine. But when Mr. Wallace made his position clear to
President Chiang, the generalissimo, the next day before breakfast,
did he express that distinction to him, or did he simply make it clear
that Roosevelt was not available as an arbiter between China and
Russia ?
Mr. Vincent. I was not present at that conversation.
Mr. Sourwine. You reported in your notes
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace reported the conversation to me.
Mr. Sourwine. I see.
Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether Mr. Wallace made this clear
to him. From his own statement to me of this conversation before
breakfast
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2041
Mr. SouRWiNE. Go ahead.
Mr. Vincent. He told me tliat he had made it clear to Chiang that
the President had not intended to suggest that he be a mediator be-
tween China and Russia.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Your notes do not indicate anything beyond the
unavailability of President Roosevelt as a mediator between Russia
and China.
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Your notes do not indicate any availability as a
mediator between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.
Mr. Vincent. The notes here state "President Chiang's suggestion
was apparentl}' prompted by Mr. Wallace's earlier statement that the
President was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists
and the Kuomintang."
Mr. Sourwine. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. So Mr, Wallace must have made an earlier statement.
Mr. Sourwine. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. To the Generalissimo.
Mr. Sourwine. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. Which, as far as I can figure here, was misinterpreted
by the generalissimo because it says here, "Mr. Wallace made no
comment at the time."
Mr. Sourwine. What I am trying to get at is whether when he went
to Chiang the next morning before breakfast to correct this false
impression, against which you had warned him the night before,
whether he did it in such terms as to negative his original statement
with regard to President Roosevelt's availability as an arbiter between
the Connnunists and the Kuomintang, or w^hether he made it clear
that he was simply fearful that Chiang had broadened his statement
to carry a meaning that he had not intended.
Mr. Vincent. I cannot add anything to what is said here, but it
would appear here that all he did was to straighten out the miscon-
ception that the President was willing to be a — what do you call it — a
mediator between U. S. S. R. and China.
Mr. SouR^^^NE. All right. Bearing on the question of your influence
on Mr. Wallace, which we discussed before, this is another incident
where you did have a considerable influence, is it not ?
INIr. Vincent. Yes. It is a case where Mr. Wallace had himself
been misunderstood and I pointed out to him that the generalissimo
had misunderstood him.
Mr. Sourwine. It is evidence of the fact that Mr. Wallace was re-
ceiving and listening to your advice.
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, we find this statement farther down on the
same page, referring to a conversation which Mr. Wallace had had in
Tashkent with Ambassador Harriman.
Mr. Wallace suggested that Dr. Soong discuss the matter with Mr. Vincent who
had probably a better idea of the contents of the memorandum since he had had
a number of conversations with Ambassador Harriman.
(Note. — That evening Dr. Soong asked Mr. Vincent about the matter, requesting
to see any notes that Mr. Vincent might have made. Mr. Vincent said that he
had only his memory to rely upon.)
Was that correct?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
22^48— 52— pt. 7 4
2042 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. You had no notes?
Mr. Vincent. I had not made notes of the conversation.
Mr. SouRwiNE (reading) :
And informed Dr. Soong of those portions of the memorandum which he thought
it appropriate and judicious to give him.
Wliat portions of the memorandum did you withhold from Chiang?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the portions I withheld from him. I
only recall what I had told him. There may have been things in Mr.
Harriman's memorandum which were highly injudicious to show him.
1 had no memorandum. We are speaking now of Mr. Harriman's
memo which he showed me in Tashkent.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you write this in your notes because you knew
there had been portions of the memorandum which you thought it
inappropriate or injudicious to give to Chiang and which you had
therefore withheld, or did you merely use this language to protect
yourself against any eventuality?
Mr. Vincent. I would say from reading this that I had knowledge
of some comments that were in Mr. Harriman's memo which would
not have been wise to give him.
Mr. SouRWiNE. At any rate, that is the impression intended to be
conveyed ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I take it at the time you were talking with Dr.
Soong, the Harriman memo was clear in your mind?
Mr. Vincent. Fairly clear, yes. I noted this
Mr. SouRWiNE. How long before had it been that you had seen that
memo?
Mr. Vincent. Possibly a week or 10 days.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was quite recent at that time ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Sourwine, I do not see any other member
of the committee here, and I want to be on the floor, so I will have
to recess at this time. Senator McCarran and I have a meeting with
other Senators at 2. I would have to put this at 2 : 30, so we will recess
until 2 : 30.
Mr. Morris. May I ask Mr. Vincent one question ?
Mr. Vincent, you testified that you did not know Agnes Smedley ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you look at that picture, and see if you ever met
that woman ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no recollection of meeting Agnes Smedley.
Mr. Morris. There is another picture here. According to the back
she is identified as the first one on the lower left. That is the same
woman ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. May the record show that these photographs and
pictures which have been shown to Mr. Vincent are pictures of Agnes
Smedley, if that is the fact ?
Senator Ferguson. I think there is testimony on that.
Mr. Sourwine. The pictures have not been identified.
Mr. Morris. The picture has the caption "Agnes Smedley" and there
is a designation "Agnes."
Mr. Sourwine. How can that be identified for our record ? Will you
read what is on the back of it?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2043
Mr. Vincent. "Front row, left to right, Agnes Smedley" and some-
body else. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. That will be marked an exhibit, and so will
the pamphlet.
(The pictures referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 381 and 381A"
and were filed for the record.)
Mr. SouRWiNE. Just for the sake of the record, I want to ask Mr.
Vincent if he will put his initials somewhere on the back of the picture
as the picture shown here. That is for his protection.
Senator Ferguson. And the same under her name.
Mr, SouRwiNE. Just on the back of that photograph, to identify
that as the one that is shown you, and which you have not recognized.
Mr, Surrey. Put "Shown to me this date.''
Mr. SouRwiNE. Whatever you wish. Otherwise, we could put in
any picture.
Senator Ferguson. We will recess until 2 : 30.
(Thereupon at 11:55 a. m,, a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m.,
the same day.)
AFTER recess
Senator Ferguson (presiding). The committee will come to order.
Mr, SouRWiNE, Mr, Vincent, at the noon recess, we were discussing
the notes you made of the Wallace mission,
Mr, Vincent, Yes, sir,
Mr, SouRwiNE, I had read an excerpt from page 550 of the white
l)aper with regard to a conversation you had w^ith Mr. Soong, Dr,
Soong, about the discussions of Mr, Wallace with Mr. Harriman, at
Tashkent?
Mr, Vincent, Yes.
Mr, SouRWiNE, Reading further from your notes : "Specifically,"
meaning Mr, Vincent —
he told Dr. Soong that Mr. Stalin had agreed to President Roosevelt's point
that support of President Chiang was advisable during the prosecution of the
war, that Mr. Stalin had expressed a keen interest in there being reached a
settlement between the Kuouiintang and the Chinese Communists, basing hie
interest on the practical matter of more effective fighting against Japan rather
than upon any ideological considei'ations ; that Mr. Stalin had criticized the
suspicious attitude of the Chinese regarding the Sakhalin agreement with
Japan, and that Mr. Stalin felt the United States should assume a position
of leadership in the Far East.
Is that your own best summary of what you told Dr, Soong at that
time ?
Mr, Vincent. That is my best summary of that, sir.
Mr, SouRwiNE, Do you have a present re ollection of the Harri-
man conference with Stalin as it was recounted to you ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were not present at that, were you ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. And I haven't seen the memorandum of
that conversation with Stalin since that time.
Mr. Sourwine, Can you tell the committee, sir, whether, in say-
ing in your notes that Stalin based his interest in a settlement between
the Kuomintang and tlie Chinese Communists on the practical mat-
ter of more effective fighting rather than upon any ideological con-
siderations, you are .stating something which Mr, Stalin himself had
. told Ambassador Harriman, or stating merely Ambassador Harri-
2044 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
man's nnderstaiiding of Stalin's attitude, or stating merely your own
interpretation of it ?
Mr, Vincent. So far as I was capable of remembering the memo-
randum, I was reporting what Mr. Harriman had told me had taken
place in his conversation w^ith Stalin.
Mr. SouRW^iNE. In other words, it is your impression, your under-
standing, that Stalin liimself had made the distinction, had said, "I am
interested in this from the standpoint of fighting tlie Japanese" rather
than from the standpoint of any ideological consideration ?
Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of what Mr. Harriman told
me.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Going over to page 553 of the white paper, the
paragraph that begins near the bottom of the page, we find this sen-
tence : "Mr. Vincent inquired as to the progress of conversations be-
tween the Communist representative in Chungking" — how do you pro-
nounce that name ?
Mr. Vincent. Lin Tso-han.
Mr. SouRWiNE. "And the Kuomintang representatives of which
Dr. Chiang Tse-che was chief."
You were, in other words, saying in effect, "Let's talk about the ques-
tion of how the negotiations are getting along beteween the National-
ists and the Communists" ?
Mr. Vincent. We liad an interest in how they were getting along.
Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador, had indicated that they were talking.
Senator Ferguson. They were what?
Mr. Vincent. That they were discussing this matter among them-
selves. I hadn't been back for a year, but this Lin Tso-han — I don't
know who lie was, but apparently I was told that he was a Commu-
nist delegate at tliat time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Just before that, a different matter had been under
discussion; is that correct?
Mr. Vincent. I will have to read this to see, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is a change of subject.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was then one of the occasions where you brought
about a change of subject in the conversations; is that correct?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I woiddn't say it was a very abrupt change in
subject.
Mr. SouRwiNE. No ; I did not characterize it as abrupt. You were
opening up a new subject; you were changing the focus at that point.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Was that because you did not want Mr. Wallace
to discuss the other point?
Mr. Vincent. No. I mean, I have no recollection of that being
in my mind, to change the subject. The conversation may have lapsed,
Mr. Sourw^ne. It was probably because this was a matter of par-
ticular interest to you and you wanted it brought up; right?
Mr. Vincent, That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Had you any instructions as to what to dis-
cuss in China when Mr. Wallace was there?
Mr. Vincent. You mean, did we receive any instructions from
Senator Ferguson. From the State Department ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2045
Mr. Vincent. No; the State Department gave me no specific in-
structions as to what line of instructions, line of conversations ; no.
Senator Ferguson. They had given you warning, Mr. Hull had,
not to permit Mr. Wallace to make promises; is that correct?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. But you had no instructions as to what to
take up ?
Mr. Vincent. Myself; no.
Senator Ferguson. With the respective parties?
Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Gauss himself was the Ambassador
there, and any instructions about what was to be taken up would
have come from him.
Senator Ferguson. But he did not give you any instructions?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Gauss did not give me any instructions. I talked
with him, when I got there.
Senator Ferguson. What did you figure the Wallace mission was ?
What were you trying to accomplish ?
Mr. Vincent. As far as I was told at the time, it was the return
of the visit that Madame Chiang had made to the United States the
year before. I never did know exactly what.
Senator Ferguson. Was that the only purpose; just a return
courtesy call?
Mr. Vincent. Well, then it was, too, just that occasion for Mr.
Wallace to have conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.
Senator Ferguson. But what was he to accomplish ? He was not to
promise anything. What was he to accomplish ?
Mr. Vincent. You ask me something there, Mr. Chairman, that
I don't know, what he was supposed to accomplish. He had himself
a little note that he referred to from time to time, as to his con-
versations with Roosevelt before he left.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, whatever instructions he had
came from the President ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And whatever instructions you had were that
of a warning from the Secretary of State ?
Mr. Vincent. That is all I know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know wiiether the Secretary of State
had any mission for Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection that Mr. Wallace ever saw the
Secretary of State before he went out. He may have; but I say I
don't know what he did.
Senator Ferguson. How did you know that, if INIr. Wallace, was
making a promise, he did not have a direct authority from the Presi-
dent to make it ?
Mr. Vincent. Because from time to time Mr. AVallace would refer
to these rough notes he had taken in his conversations with the Presi-
dent, and the main idea of this was to go out and talk to Chiang Kai-
shek about the situation in China and bring it back and report to him,
insofar as I knew.
Senator Ferguson. What were some of the things that Mr. Wallace
had on these notes that he was to accomplish in China ?
2046 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. There is only one of them that I recall right now, and
that was to try to bring about some kind of cessation or better rela-
tions between the Chinese groups for more effective fighting in
China.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, were you at that time to get a
combination of the Nationalists and Communists?
Mr. Vincent. For more effective military operations.
Senator Ferguson. For more effective military operations?
Mr. Vincent. That was the emphasis at that time, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I see.
Mr. Sourwine. Will the Senator pardon me ?
Do you mean that Mr. Wallace had been given instructions, to your
knowledge, by the President, which were, in effect, a forerunner of
instructions given General Marshall?
Mr. Vincent. My meaning there is that Mr. Wallace, himself, told
me that the President had indicated to Chiang that he was prepared
to act as adviser or mediator to get them together, which showed
that the President even at that time had an interest in trying to settle
the internal dispute in China.
Mr. Sourwine. Very good.
Senator Ferguson. You may proceed.
Mr. Souravine. Mr. Vincent, still on that same page, and going back
just a little bit above the passage that I read in my last question, you
were recounting the remarks of Chiang, were you not — "it was his
statement * * *" to quote your words as a matter of fact — "the
Communists follow the orders of the Third International." It that
right?
Mr. Vincent. I don't see that here. Yes, I do.
This is Chiang speaking ?
Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you. It is not you speaking is it ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I will have to read this to see.
Mr. Sourwine. xind it would not be Mr. Wallace, would it?
Mr. Vincent. That is General Chiang speaking there.
Mr. Sourwine (continuing) :
The Chinese Government cannot oi)enly criticize the Communists for their
connection with the Third International because it is afraid of offending the
V. S. S. R. * * *.
That was Chiang himself, was it not ?
JSIr. Vincent. That is a report as well as I understood Chiang's
statement.
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
Mr. Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United
States —
That is Wallace speaking, your report of what he said?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine (continuing) :
and said that he could not understand the attitude of the Chinese Communists
as described by President Chiang. President Chiang said that this difference
in the attitude of the American and the Chinese Communists might be explained
by the fact that there was no possibility of the American Communists seizing
power ; whereas, the Chinese Communists definitely desired to do so in China.
Now, going back to your reference to Mr. Wallace, can you give us
any further details about Mr. Wallace's reference to the patriotic
attitude of the Communists in the United States ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2047
Mr. Vincent. No more than there is right there, sir. I was trying
to be just an accurate reporter of the conversations that were taking
place.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Just how did Mr. Walhxce refer to it? Did he say,
"In our country the Communists are patriotic," or do you remember
just what kind of words he used?
Mr. Vincent. Other than what I have here, at this time, I do not
recall. This was put down at the time.
Mr. Sour"svine. This is a generalization of what he said ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, he probably had more words to say, but I put
down here all I could recall at that time.
Mr. Sourwine. All you could recall at that time, and all you can
recall now, is that he referred to the American Communists as pa-
triotic ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Souewine. You do not know what he meant by that ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know what he meant by that. That is his
statement.
Mr. Sourwine. He then said — and you are referring to Wallace —
that "* * * the United States was far removed from the U. S. S. R."
Is that Wallace or Chiang?
Mr. Vincent. That is Chiang, I think.
Mr. Sourwine. That is Chiang — "but that the U. S. S. R. would not
feel safe if the Communists were not in power in China. He then
laughingly remarked * * *." That is still Chiang, is it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
* * * He tben laughingly remarked tbat the Chinese Communists were
more communistic than the Russian Communists.
Do you know why Generalissimo Chiang should laugh about that?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. He did laugh ?
Mr. Vincent. He did.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it your understanding that he was referring
to the Chinese Communists being more communistic than the Russian
Communists in the sense that they lived a more communal life, or that
they were more indoctrinated with the principles of Marxist-Leninist-
Stalinist communism ?
Just how did he refer to it?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't tell you. I don't know what was in the
Generalissimo's mind at that time.
Mr. Sourwine. How did you understand it ?
Mr. Vincent. I understood him to mean that they were more dan-
gerous.
Mr, Sourwine. More dangerous ?
Mr. Vincent. More communistic. It wasn't a case to my mind, but
I was trying to remember here, that he wasn't referring to the fact
that their doctrines were more of a Russian doctrine, but from his
point of view they were a greater menace.
Mr. Sourwine. He was saying that the Chinese Communists were
more dangerous, more dangerous to him than the Russian Com-
munists ?
2048 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And lie was laughing about it?
Mr. Vincent. He did.
Mr. SoTJEwiNE. Now, turning over to page 554, in the second para-
graph, we find this sentence — and may I ask, sir, throughout these
if, on any case in reading these, you feel that they are being taken out
of context, will you please so say and indicate the whole context which
should be read? These are necessarily notes which jumped around
among a lot of subjects.
I am trying to read all of a note that had to do with a particular
subject that was pertinent to the question.
If, in your opinion, I fail, please call attention to it.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think I have taken anything improperly
out of context, so far?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that you did. I would have to read
the whole thing, but it doesn't seem so to me.
Mr. SouRWiNE. This sentence is on page 554 :
President Roosevelt should bear in mind that the Communists could not openly
use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use the U. S. A,
opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.
That is a statement by Chiang, as you report it; is that correct?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRwaNE. Do you know^ whether Mr. Wallace reported that
to the President at any time ?
Mr. Vincent. Whether Vice President
Mr. SouRAViNE. Whether Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, reported
that to the President at any time ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he did or not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not do so in his Kunming cable, did he?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not do so in this report which was trans-
mitted under the January 10 date, did he?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to reread that to see. Do you want
me to read that ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. No. Do you know whether he did ?
I will rephrase the question. The report will speak for itself.
Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he did.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. All right. Do you think that was a fair statement?
Mr. Vincent. I think it w^as a statement of Chiang, and I think it
was a fair statement from his point of view that that is what he thought
actually at the time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Without regard to what he thought, was it a fact
at the time that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R.
for support but that they could and did use the U. S. A. opinion to
force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that the Communists were using
U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think they were making any effort in that
regard ?
Mr. Vincent. They probably were,, which I don't recall. They
probably were. At least, Chiang Kai-shek felt they were.
Mr. SouRWiNE. JS'o, I am asking you what you thought.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2049
Did you know of any efforts that the Communists were making in
that regard ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you realize at that time that the Communists
would like to have the force of the United States public opinion
back of accession by the Kuomintang to Chinese Communist demands?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, I think there were people reporting that. The
press were reporting it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. No, I say, did you realize that that is what the Chi-
nese Communists wanted?
Mr. Vincent. At that time?
Mr. Souewine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Well, I am trying to think whether I had any obvious
reason for realizing it at that time, that this is a flat statement of
Chiang Kai-shek, and I am trying to think of what other evidence
there might be, I mean, that would have come to my attention.
And as I say, I can't think of any specific thing that the Communists
were doing at that time to try to influence American opinion in their
favor.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not know, and you do not now recall, any-
thing that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence
American public opinion?
Mr. Vincent. No; I'm afraid I don't.
Senator Ferguson. Did you keep close track of what the Com-
munists were doing in America ?
Mr. Vincent. Of what the American Communists were doing in
America ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. To sway public opinion?
Mr. Vincent. In this country?
Senator Ferguson, Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You anticipated, from what was said here, that
they apparently were doing something?
Mr. Vincent. That the Communists were doing something, that
the Chinese Communists were doing something ?
Senator Ferguson. No, that the Communists in this country were
doing something to sway opinion here that would sway opinion over
in China.
Mr. Vincent. In this statement?
Senator Ferguson. You do not find anything in there to that effect ?
Mr. Vincent. No. I thought we were talking about Chinese Com-
munists in here, and I think that is what Chiang Kai-shek was talk-
ing about.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Chinese Communists. Were there
any?
Mr. Vincent. I was trying to recall specific instances.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know any Chinese Communists in this
country ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not at that time, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, going down to the bottom of page 554
of the White Paper, we find this paragraph
Senator Ferguson. Just one moment.
2050 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Do you think the IPE, might have been acting to sway public
opinion, as a pro-Communist organization ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not think so, sir.
Senator Feeguson. You found no evidence in any of these writings
that have been shown to you or that you have read ?
Mr. Vincent. At that time ? No.
Senator Ferguson. At that time or up to that time.
Mr. Vincent. Up to that time ?
Senator Fekguson. Nothing in any of these documents ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall anything up to that time of evidence
that the IPR was trying to sway.
Senator Ferguson. Had you known of any pro-Communist activi-
ties in America up until that time ?
Mr. Vincent. In 1944? No, I don't.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, up to the time this trip was made. You
did not know that the Communists had been active along any line?
Mr. Vincent. I w^as not following Communist propaganda or lines
at that time, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So that you had no knowledge about any of their
activities in America?
Mr. Vincent. I had no knowledge of their activities in this country
at that time, in 1944.
Senator Ferguson. Was that generally true in the State Depart-
ment ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say it was generally true in the State
Department.
Senator Ferguson. Was it true in your Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know that it was generally true in my
Department.
Senator Ferguson. Who was assigned in your Department to keep
track of what was going on among the Communists ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say no one was particularly assigned in the
Far Eastern Office to keep track.
Senator Ferguson. That is, as far as you know, there was not any
one looking into that question at all ?
Mr. Vincent. In the Far Eastern Office, no, no one that I know of.
Senator Ferguson. No one that you knew. And do you not think
you would know^ if there was someone ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say I would know if there was someone in
the Far Eastern Office specifically assigned to that task. There were
people in the State Department who did have such jobs to do, I be-
lieve. They were security.
Senator Ferguson. Did they report to your Department?
Mr. Vincent. They didn't report to me. I don't know whether
they reported to the higher-ups.
Senator Ferguson. At least, in your Department, they did not
report ?
Mr. Vincent. To me.
Senator Ferguson. You said that there were people to look out for
the security because of Communists ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. You know, then, they were a menace. Is that
not true ?
Mr. Vincent. That the Communist ideal was a menace ; yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2051
Senator Fergusox. You knew that?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But no one was assigned to look into the prob-
lem as to what they may be doing to change opinion here in America
as far as China was concerned ?
Mr. Vincent. Nobody in the Far Eastern Office that I taiew of, sir.
Senator Ferguson. No one in the Far Eastern Office. And that
covered China?
Mr. Vincent. That covered China.
Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness.
Mr. Sourwine. The paragraph at the bottom of page 554, is :
Mr. Wallace was asked whether it was not possible to reach an understanding
on a lower level with a view to maximum use of forces in the north. Mr. Vincent
asked what President Chiang thought would be the adverse effects of sending
the United States Army Intelligence group to Communist areas now without
awaiting settlement.
Now, that was another occasion, was it not, on which you shifted
the focus of the conversation ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. On the next page, which is your account of the dis-
cussions of the morning of June 23 :
Mr. Wallace reported conversations with General INIarshall and with Secretary
Stimson before leaving America in regard to China's situation in an endeavor
to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists,
but are interested in the prosecution of the war. He and Mr. Vincent had de-
cided upon this line of approach the night before in order to avoid further
lengthy discussion of the Communists, per se.
That is, is it not, another instance in which you had guided the
course of the conversation through a conference with Mr. Wallace
alone, and not with Chiang ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, where I had given Mr. Wallace the best of my
advice which I thought would save time.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. and he had taken it ?
Mr. Vincent. But let me say here that these conversations are not
fully reported because I didn't take a note on everything, and the con-
versation would go on for 3 hours. This is my quick note on what was
said.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. But you have, I am sure, endeavored to bring
out all of the salient, all of the important points of the conversation!
Mr. Vincent. I had endeavored to ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And you were a trained observer in that regard ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. So it is reasonable to assume that you have covered
all of the important points, all of the salient points of the
conversation ?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't promise that I have covered every salient
point, because, as I say, this whole thing can be read and these conver-
sations covered 3 hours. I was trying to clarify, because there would
be very lengthy discussions, which then had to be translated, on the
Communists, per se.
Mr. Sourwine. But you did not deliberately leave anything out ?
Mr. Vincent. I didn't deliberately leave anything out.
Mr. Sourwine. This was a case where, the night before; that is,
June 22, there had been a rather involved conversation about the Com-
munists, per se; is that correct?
2052 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. That would be correct.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And you wanted to avoid the continuance of that
discussion the next day, so you discussed with Mr. Wallace what kind
of an opening- approach could be made to avoid it ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And Mr. Wallace took that line in opening the con-
versation the next day ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, what he was trying to do, according to your
statement here, is to persuade President Chiang that we, that is, the
United States ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That we, the United States.
Mr. Sourwine. That we are not interested in Chinese Communists,,
but are interested in the prosecution of the war. You mean only in
the prosecution of the war ; right ?
Mr. Vincent. Interested in the Communists from the standpoint of
the prosecution of the war.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Only from that standpoint?
Mr. Vincent. Only from that standpoint.
Mr. Sourwine. Just so that the record can be completely clear, by
saying that Mr. Wallace reported his conversations with General
Marshall and Secretary Stimson in an endeavor to persuade President
Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, and so
forth, you do not mean any implication that he was just trying to per-
suade Chiang of something, do you?
Mr. Vincent. No; he reported it as a fact, and it was simply to
get the conversations down to what he thought was some kind of
progression along, to disabuse his mind of the fact that we were
interested in comminiism and Communists in China, as such.
Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, you were not interested, Mr. Wal-
lace was not interested, and the Government of this country was
not interested in the Chinese Communists, per se, but only in the
progress of the war against Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. That was what he had come out there to discuss,
getting on with the war.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, from what was said on page 554,
of what President Chiang had said about the Communists, particu-
larly what they were doing in this country, did that not indicate to
you that we should have an interest in it if we wanted a real prosecu-
tion of the war ?
Mr. Vincent. No; because at that time, Mr. Chairman, what we
were trying our best to do was to get some kind of joint military
activity.
The Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese, and the Kuo-
mintang were jBghting the Japanese, and it was the hope of Mr. Wal-
lace, of me, of the Army authorities, and the President to get those
groups fighting in some kind of joint effort.
Senator Ferguson. But did he not indicate the fact that the Com-
munists were acting as they were acting, that that was interfering
with the prosecution of the war, and that they were trying to use
America, or American Chinese, to influence the opinion in the Far
East?
Mr. Vincent. Influence opinion in the Far East, that is what his
testimony, his statement, was here.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2053
Senator Ferguson. All right; after you heard that, and returned
to this country, did you pay any attention to Communist activities
in this country as far as they related to the Far East?
Mr. Vincent. To whatever came to my attention, I did ; but I don't
recall any specific instance of the Communist activity in this country,
Chinese Communist activity.
Senator Ferguson. You had great difficulty in determining whether
or not propaganda or literature or statements were pro-Communist;
have you not?
Mr. Vincent. No, I haven't ; I don't think.
Senator Ferguson. You have not? You would say this testimony
did not indicate that you had difficulty in determining when a thing
was pro-Communist?
"V\nien I read a Communist statement yesterday, you did not recog-
nize it as pro-Communist?
Mr, Vincent. I think I testified that I could not readily have a
definition of what I would call procommunism.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know if the statement that I read to
you yesterday did not indicate to you that it was pro-Communist?
Would you tell me what procommunism was back at that time?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I haven't got a ready definition of what one
would call procommunism in 1944.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, you know what the State Department
means when it uses the phrase "pro-Communist"?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you not heard that phrase used in the State
Department ?
• JNIr. Vincent. The State Department uses it in many contexts, I
would say.
Mr. SouR^vINE. It does not always mean the same thing when used
as a phrase ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not think so.
Mr. Sourwine. It may mean one thing at one time and another
thing at another time?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know what it would mean at any time.
Mr. Sourwine. It does not mean that?
Mr. Vincent. There is one time when procommunism might mean
sympathy, or, at another time, people working for communism or
Communists.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, have you not had any warning
in the State Department about what is or is not pro-Communist, so
that you may guard against Communist activity in the State De-
partment?
JNIr. Vincent. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, any warning that one
had about what is procommunism.
Senator Ferguson. You do not think you have had any warning?
Mr. Vincent. I do not think so.
Senator Ferguson. You knew it was a menace, because you had a
Security Department; is that right?
Mr. Vincent. That is right ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. And you know of no instructions or warning
as to what communism really was or its menace?
2054 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I know of no warnings that were given an officer in
the State Department to alert him to what was a warning against
communism or procommunism.
Senator Ferguson. Then Communists might have been working
right in the very Department.
Mr, Vincent. But that was a matter of the Security Division, to
try to find out whether Communists were working in the State De-
partment.
Senator Ferguson. I see; so it was not up to the Department it-
self, it was up to some distant security officer
Mr. Vincent. No; that was an integral part of the Department,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. How many security officers worked in your
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't remember, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were there any ?
Mr. Vincent. In my Division ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that any worked in my Division, because
it was a separate Division.
Senator Ferguson. How would they be able to tell whether or not
you had pro-Communists or even Communists in your Department, if
none of them worked in there ?
Mr. Vincent. I would assume that they made investigations of the
people as they were employed.
Senator Ferguson. And do you think that you can tell by an inves-
tigation when you employ a person as to whether or not he is a
Communist?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't know whether you can or not. That
was the intent of it.
Senator Ferguson. Would you think that by asking a man if he
was a Communist you would ascertain the fact as to whether or not
he was a Communist ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think you would, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You do not think you would ?
Mr, Vincent. I do not think you would; but there were security
investigations even back in those days, I imagine.
Senator Ferguson. Are you only imagining that there were security
investigations back in those days?
Mr. Vincent. I am saying that because I have not any direct famil-
iarity with how the Security Division operated.
Mr. SouRWTNE. Mr. Vincent, just to clear up one little point before
we go back to your notes, is it your desire to leave the impression with
the committee that the State Department considers that procommu-
nism or the phrase "procommunism" is a relative phrase, that it covers
a rather broad field of conduct, some of which is relatively harmless
and some of which is serious?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think I would want to leave that impression,
but I just simply can't make what would be a definition of pro-
Communist.
Mr. SouRwiNE. When the State Department uses the appellation
"pro-Communist," the State Department is always referring to a seri-
ous problem; is it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2055
Mr. SouRWiNE. The State Department does not use the phrase "'pro-
Communist" to mean merely some one who has a slight ideological
aberration from the normal ; does it ?
Mr. Vincent. If they were using the phrase carelessly, I don't know.
I mean that the common use
Mr. SouRwiNE. Does the Department of State use the phrase "pro-
Communist" carelessly ?
Mr. Vincent. What I was about to say, I don't recall frequent use of
the phrase "pro-Communist" by the Department of State.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The question of frequency has not been asked, sir.
The question is when the Department of State uses that phrase, if it
does use that phrase, how is it meant ?
Mr. Vincent. It is meant to describe a person who is sympathetic
with communism.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And that is all ?
Mr. Vincent. That is what I would say would be a simple definition
of "pro-Communist."
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is a definition. Now, can we talk about pro-
communism in the frame of that definition from now on ?
Mr. Vincent. I should think we could ; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. All right, fine.
Now, reading from page 555 of the white paper :
Mr. Vincent again stressed the point that whereas he appreciated that Presi-
dent Chiang was faced with a very real problem in handling negotiations for a
settlement with the Communists, the American Army was also faced with a
very real problem with regard to obtaining intelligence from North China.
That was, was it not, another occasion when you brought up in these
conversations the matter of sending a mission to North China?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct. I was doing it after conversations
with the American military there in Chungking, with the full knowl-
edge and agreement of Mr. Wallace.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now we find this sentence :
He-
referring to you —
pointed out that the American Army had no interest whatever in the Commu-
nists, but that it had for very urgent reasons an interest in carrying on the war
against Japan from China.
Now, when you stated that the American Army had no interest
whatever in Communists, did you mean to imply that the American
Army had no interest either for or against the successes of the Com-
munists in China?
Mr. Vincent. What that meant, by that, is that the American
Army, to disabuse Chiang's mind of anything, they had no interest in
the support of the Chinese Communists, per se. They wanted to get
intelligence out of North China.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you realize at the time, did you feel at the time,
that the American Army had any interest adverse to the success of the
Chinese Communists in China ?
Mr. Vincent. The American Army's, at that time, interest was pri-
marily, sir, the prosecution of the war against the Japanese, and 1
cannot vouch for what the Army's attitude was toward the Chinese
Communists other than as the Chinese Communists were useful to the
Army in prosecuting the war against the Japanese.
2056 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. Then your answer must be, must it not, that you did
not know at the time of any adverse interest which the Army had to
the Chinese Communists?
Mr. Vincent. That the American Army at that time was not in the
position to take an adverse attitude because tlie Chinese Communists
themselves were fighting the Japanese.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Then what you were saying, is it not correct, is that
the American Army had no interest either for or against the Chinese
Communists at that time?
Mr. Vincent. In taking a position against the Chinese Communists,
no.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, going down into the next paragraph, sir, you
were recounting what President Chiang had said, were you not, when
you said this :
Much pressure has been brought to bear by the United States Government to
have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists, but the
United States Government has exerted no pressure upon the Communists.
Mr. Vincent. That is a statement, as I can see — is that Chiang say-
ing that?
Mr. Sourwine. I am asking if it was not. I believe it was.
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. The sentence itself does not attribute it. but in con-
text it seems clear you were reciting what Chiang had said.
He said that the American Government should issue a statement
that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Govern-
ment. He said that the United States Army attitude supported the
Communists and requested Mr. Wallace, upon his return to America,
to make it clear that the Communists should come to terms with the
Chinese Government. That is all what Chiang said to Mr. Wallace
and you, is it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, was Chiang stating matters factu-
ally as they then existed, when he said that?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that Chiang was overstating the matter
when he says that the American Army here — where is that state-
ment ? — that the United States Army attitude supported the Commu-
nists. I have no knowledge that that was a factual statement.
Mr. Sourwine, Was it a factual statement that much pressure had
been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the
Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that that is also an overstatement.
Mr. Gauss had frequently spoken to Chiang, and so had some of the
military commanders, about the vital necessity of their getting to-
gether in a military way for the prosecution of the war against Japan.
Mr. Sourwine. But you do not think that constituted much pres-
sure ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not think it would constitute much pressure. I
mean, it wasn't pressure in the sense of intervening. It was just from
time to time the Chinese themselves were trying to get together.
The pressure was brought to bear as much by Chinese leaders to
bring about some settlement and that therefore we were not introduc-
ing any subject that the Chinese were not familiar, of not themselves
anxious to accomplish.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2057
Mr. SouRwiNE. The question, sir, is not who else brought pressure,
but whether the United States brought much pressure.
Mr. Vincent. The United States had certainly expressed its inter-
est in many cases. I think "pressure" would be an overstatement —
had expressed its interest in some kind of a settlement.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did you not tell us just a few
minutes ago that Mr. Wallace's mission to China was to do that very
thing ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. "Wallace's mission to China was to tell Chiang
Kai-shek that the President was prepared, himself, if there was any
opportunity for it — he would be glad to assist in getting them to-
gether; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Would you not figure that that was some pres-
sure, to send the Vice President out to see the President of China, to
tell him to get together with the Communists, and if he could not do it
alone, the President of the United States would mediate or help to get
them together ?
Mr. Vincent. I would certainly say that was expressing an interest
in it.
Senator Ferguson. Was it not more than an interest? Was it not
indicating that that is what the President wanted done ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not think that it is what you would call exerting
pressure.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, did not the President of the United
States at that time, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, hold a position in
world affairs and in world esteem such that if he conveyed a message
directly to the sovereign of another nation through the second execu-
tive officer of this Nation, it could not fail to have a profound effect?
Mr. Vincent. It could not fail to have a profound effect.
Mr. Sourwine, Then was that not exerting substantial pressure,
when he so conveyed his wishes and expressed his desires ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it true, sir, that the United States Government
had exerted no pressure upon the Communists to reach a settlement
with the Nationalist Government?
Mr. Vincent. The United States Government had no contact with
the Communists, and I know of no pressure that was brought to bear
on them.
Mr. Sourwine. It was a true statement, then, was it not?
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.
Do you change your testimony? You say that the United States
Government had no contact, when they sent the Vice President out
there ?
JSIr. Souravine. This is with the Communists.
Mr. Vincent. With the Communists in China.
Senator Ferguson. But with the President of China.
Mr. Vincent. With the Communists. The question here — would
you restate your question ?
Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you want to let it stand that we
did not exert, as a nation, any pressure on the Chinese Government —
that is, the Nationalists?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I have just testified that we did exert pressure
on them.
Senator Ferguson. Did we in any way see the Communists ?
22S4S— 52— pt. 7 5
2058 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. We did not see the Communists at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Wallace see any Communists up there?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that Mr. Wallace saw any Communists
on his visit to Chungking.
Senator Ferguson. Will you think over and see whether or not he
did while he was in China on this mission ?
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did he see Madame Sun Yat-sen while he was there ?
Mr. Vincent. He saw Madame Sun Yat-sen.
Mr. Morris. She is a Communist.
Mr. Vincent. She was not a Communist that he knew of at that
time. I didn't know of her at that time as a Communist.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn she was a Communist?
Mr. Vincent. When she first went to Peking, and when I heard that
she was a Communist, I had no direct knowledge that she was a
Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Wallace go to any place where the
Communists were in domination?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At that time, he did not go ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Feruson. Then as far as you know, he saw only Nationalist
officials?
Mr. Vincent. He saw only Nationalist and provincial officials, and
American officials.
May I read from your own hearings here? This is Mr. Wallace^s
testimony.
Senator Ferguson. I wanted your knowledge.
Mr. Vincent. But I was saying, in fact :
He-
meaning the President —
asked me not to see the Comnnmists at all, since a visit by the Vice President of
the United States might be misunderstood as indicating that our country favored
the Communist cause.
That is Mr. Wallace's testimony here.
Senator Ferguson. Had you any such instructions ?
Mr. Vincent. I had no such instructions.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know, Mr. Vincent, up until the time
you left the Far Eastern desk, or had any connection with it, that there
were Communist fronts in this country ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I would have known there were Communist
fronts in this country. I don't know now what specifically they might
have been.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know any of them?
Mr. Vincent. I can't recall them now. This would be in 1946-47.
Senator Ferguson. When did you leave the Far Eastern desk?
Mr. Vincent. I left in 1947.
Senator Ferguson. What part of 1947?
Mr. Vincent. The middle of 1947.
Senator Ferguson. Up to that time, do you know of any ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't name any now.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of the Committee for a Demo-
cratic Far Eastern Policy ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2059
Mr. Vincent. Now that you mentioned it, I have heard of it ; yes,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether or not that was a Com-
munist front?
Mr. Vincent. I have heard since it was; I don't know whether I
knew then it was or not.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know at that time?
Mr. Vincent. I can't specify now that I did know at that time it
was a Communist front.
Senator Ferguson. You know now that the former Attorney Gen-
eral had found it to be a Communist front?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and I don't know at what time he found it to
be a Communist front.
Senator Ferguson. Can you name any ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I can't,
Mr. Morris. How about the China Aid Council ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether the Chinese Aid Council was
a Communist front at that time or not.
Senator Ferguson. And you are unable to name any Communist
fronts ?
Mr. Vincent. From the memory of that time, I probably knew of
them, but from my memory now, I can't recall what you would call a
Communist-front organization.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what a Communist-front organ-
ization is?
Mr. Vincent. It is an organization which does not take on real
Communist character, but it is a front for the Communists, just what
it says.
Senator Ferguson. You have read some articles and books and
pamphlets by the IPK?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Would 3'OU say that they were or were not a
Communist front?
Mr. Vincent. I would not say they were Communist front, from
what knowledge I had of them at the time.
Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you that. I said, from what has
been read here.
Mr. Vincent. No, I would not say they were a Communist-front
organization.
Senator Ferguson. You would not say that?
Mr. Vincent. I would not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You may j^roceed.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We have established, then, have we not, Mr. Vin-
cent, that in that one particular, that double-barreled statement,
Chiang was correct when he said that pressure had been brought to
bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Govern-
ment reach a settlement with the Communists, but that the United
States Government had not exerted pressure upon the Communists?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, at the bottom of that paragraph, you will note
the sentence :
Mr. Vincent again pointed out that solution of President Chiang's important
problems of relations with the (Communists and the U. S. S. R. need not precede
the dispatch of military observers to North China.
2060 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouEWiNE. That was another occasion, was it not, on which you
turned the conversation ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right. And I will tell you why, because I
myself had been in contact with the Army, and it was a matter which
appealed to me because of their advice as one of the utmost importance.
I had just been in Chungju, where we had B-29's flying out. There I
was told of the urgent need for getting people into North China, to
get Intelligence there for them, and it seemed to me to be the most
urgent problem there was at the time, to try to get some kind of mili-
tary group into this North China area.
It was a vacuum in all of our Intelligence work.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And at that time, that is, at the conclusion or very
near the conclusion of the morning session of June 23, you finally won
your point and President Chiang said that the military observers
would be permitted to go. Is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, over on to page 556, in the third paragraph
from the bottom, we find this statement :
Mr. Vincent suggested that the best defense against communism in China was
agrarian reform.
That is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the
conversation ; is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Where is that statement ?
Mr. Sourwine. It is just this far down the page, here.
Mr. Vincent. I would like to see it.
Mr. Sourwine. It is, I believe, the third sentence in the paragraph,
but I began with it because it appears to be a new thought at that time,
and I am trying to find out if that is right.
Mr. Vincent. That is a statement that, as I say, I would have made.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes; it is another occasion on which you changed
the focus of the conversation.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I think in that case Mr. "Wallace said that unity
should express itself in the welfare of the people if communism was
to be avoided.
Now, this was when we were having a conversation and the welfare
of the people was mentioned. It was largely an agrarian population,
and I simply added to that that the best defense against communism
would be agrarian reform, meaning the welfare of the people.
Mr. Sourwine. That was the first mention of agrarian reform at
that point in the conversation ?
Mr. Vincent. Agrarian reform is not a change in the subject. It
is discussing the same subject but introducing a new idea.
Mr. Sourwine. It is, shall we say, a particularization of the general
subject of the welfare of the people?
Mr. Vincent. Just exactly.
Mr. Sourwine. And to that extent, can we agree that what you did
was, if not to change the conversation, to narrow it down to the
agrarian reform at that point?
Mr. Vincent. To narrow it down or to add to it that, for the welfare
of the people, being 80 percent agriculture, agrarian reform would
certainly contribute to the welfare of the people.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2061
Mr. SouKWiNE. The welfare of the people is a broader term, is it
not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Soura\t:ne. So when yon spoke of agrarian reform, you were
narrowing the subject, if the previous subject had been the welfare
of the people ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I was interpreting it down, sir.
I was interpreting what the welfare of the people was.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you mean that welfare of the people was wholly
agrarian reform?
Mr. Vincent. No, I did not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Then there must have been some area of welfare of
the people outside of agrarian reform ?
Mr. Vincent. There would be, yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Then the term "agrarian reform" is narrower than
the term "welfare of the people"; is it not?
Mr. Vincent. In this context, yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Then you were narrowing it down, were you not?
Mr. Vincent. If you wish it that way, it was narrowing it down,
but not much, when you have 80 percent of your population that are
agricultural.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I do not know why we quibble about this, sir.
Mr. Vincent. Because, in my own mind, that was not. It was just
simply an explanatory statement of whether it would be welfare
rather than narrowing it down.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, if we will look at the very last sentence, be-
ginning on page 556 :
Mr. Vincent made a brief recapitulation of the morning's conversation, and
asked President Cliiang wlietlier Ills understanding was correct that the observer
group might proceed to North China as soon as it was organized.
That was another occasion on which you swung the conversation
back to the matter of sending observers into Communist-held North
China. Is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. And your purpose, I take it, was to be sure that the
consent which Chiang had granted at the end of the morning session
was nailed down, so to speak?
Mr. Vincent. This was a summary of the morning conversation,
and I inquired again whether I had correctly understood.
Mr. Sourwine. That one point, you wanted to be sure there was
no misunderstanding about it?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. On page 558, in the third paragraph from the top
of the page, we find this :
A conference with regard to Pacific affairs was desirable, and the United States
would be the logical place for such a conference.
Now, that was Chiang speaking ; is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. I haven't found that place yet, sir.
Mr. SouR\viNE. Page 558, the third paragraph from the top.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, that is Chiang.
Mr. Sourwine. Then you say :
Madame Chiang interpolated to suggest that it be called the "North Pacific
Conference." Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two re-
2062 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
lated but separate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet
representatives in regard to their problems, and a conference of nations border-
ing on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said —
that is, you said, is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouBWiNE [reading] :
He said that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior
to any North Pacific conference.
Now, that was another occasion in which you directed the trend of
the conversation ; is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct. And I directed it at that time in
keeping with what was my earlier understanding we have spoken of
here, that the President's indication was to keep out of — not keep out
of, but to not be a mediator between the Chinese and the Russians,
wliich I would have interpreted a North Pacific conference to have
been at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, in effect, what you were telling Chiang, was
it not, was this : that he would have to settle his differences with the
Chinese Communists before he could expect any American help with
regard to a North Pacific conference such as Madame Chiang and he
M-ere urging?
Mr. Vincent. I was expressing the opinion that a conversation be-
tween the Chinese and Soviet — I am speaking of the U. S. S. R. now,
not the Chinese Communists — that a Sino-Soviet negotiation would
be preferable in advance of any North Pacific conference.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I realize that that is what it says here, sir. But
I had understood you, in your last answer, to say that you were fol-
lowing what you understood to be the President's desire to separate
the question of conversations betw^een the Chinese and Russia from
the question of conversations between the Kuomintang and the
Chinese Communists.
Did I misunderstand you ?
Mr. Vincent. That was true.
Mr, SouRwiNE. Did I misunderstand?
Mr, Vincent. No. But here we are speaking of Chiang intro-
ducing the subject of conferences with the U. S. S. R,, and here we
are speaking of possible conferences between the U. S. S. R. and
China.
Senator Ferguson. Taking your last view, did you not know that
the Communists of China were under the control and domination of
theU. S. S. R.?
Mr. Vincent. At that time I did not know that they were under
the control and domination of the U. S, S. R.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first come to that conclusion ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I testified already it was about 1945 that
I began to recognize the fact that the Chinese Communists were being
directed from Moscow. As a matter of fact, in those days. Ambassador
Hurley and the others had generally accepted the idea that the Rus-
sians were not interfering on the side of the Chinese Communists in
China.
Mr. Sourwine. You did not believe Chiang when he told you and
Mr. Wallace, when he told you that the Chinese Communists took
their orders from the Third International?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2063
Mr. Vincent. We had no evidence that that was the case.
Mr. SouEWiNE. You did not consider Chiang's statement as
■evidence ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat had you to the contrary, that you did not
believe Chiang?
Mr. Vincent. Because there had been visitors to Moscow, and Mos-
•cow had itself said several times that they were not interfering in
China, and we saw no evidence of it at that time. They weren't get-
ting material aid.
Senator Ferguson. But you had Chiang's statement ?
Mr. Vincent. That they were supported ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. "V\^iose statement did you have that it
was not a fact?
Mr. Vincent. We had the statements of people who were observers
that did not see any evidence of it.
Senator Ferguson. Wlio ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I mean observers in China, that we saw no
evidence that the Russians were in any way giving any aid to the
Communists.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. John Stewart Service had so reported, had he
cot?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether he reported it or not.
Mr. Sourwine. And Mr. Ludden, did he so report ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any report from Ludden.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Emmerson so report ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall those reports.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that a view held by Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it a view of Edgar Snow ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the view of Edgar Snow.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it a view held by Israel Epstein ?
Mr. Vincent. I haven't read Epstein's book, so I don't know.
I know 6 months later it was a view held by Ambassador Hurley
when he came back from Moscow, when he reported they were not
supporting the Communists. And we saw no visual evidence of it
there. When you mention these people, did they report it, I do not
recall it.
But it was a generally accepted view of Gauss and all others, and
all of us there. Therefore, it could have been of the names that you
have mentioned.
Senator Ferguson. Then you felt Chiang was wrong?
Mr. Vincent. That any direct aid was given to the Chinese Com-
munists ? We saw no evidence of it.
Senator Ferguson. We were not talking about aid, we were talking
about under the influence. Are you talking about aid ?
Mr. Vincent. I was talking about aid or influence.
Senator Ferguson. Let us talk about influence?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know what influence the Russians were exert-
ing in Yenan at that time.
Mr. Sourwine. If any ?
Mr. Vincent. If any. I just don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Chiang said they were, is that not right ?
2064 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I would have to read his statement here to see whether
he said they were influencing him or not. Do you recall what page
that was on ?
My recollection was that Chiang said that the Communists were not
being aided by Russia.
Senator Ferguson. Not openly.
Mr. Vincent. Well, as I say, I can't find that quotation I was
just trying to remember.
Senator Ferguson. Here it is, on page 554 :
Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese
Commuuists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need
for settlement.
So Chiang did claim they were connected, did he not? He said
they were linked.
ISIr. Vincent. The quotation I had in mind, or the reference I had
in mind, Mr. Chairman, was :
President Roosevelt —
this is Chiang speaking —
should bear in mind that the Communists do not openly use the U. S. S. R. for
support, but that they could and did use U. S. A.
Senator Ferguson. That is right, openly. But down at the next
part, where Mr. Wallace pointed out that if, as President Chiang
stated, the Chinese Communists were linked witih the U. S. S. R., then
there was even greater need for settlement.
That indicated clearly that they were so linked, did it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I mean, Mr. Wallace is certainly giving an "if"
clause.
Senator Ferguson. If they were as Chiang contended : Chiang was
contending that they were linked.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any evidence that they were
not?
Mr. Vincent. That they were not linked ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You had at least Chiang's word that they
were. Did you have any that they were not ?
Mr. Vincent. We were taking it purely from the standpoint of
what was brought to them, and I don't recall any evidence that we
had that they were getting support from
Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about support. I am talk-
ing about being linked with them.
Mr. Vincent. No ; we had no evidence that I know of, other than
Chiang's statement, that tliey were linked with them at the time.
Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you did not take that state-
ment?
Mr. Vincent. That statement, that is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I just want to be sure that the record speaks truly
with regard to this matter of a North Pacific conference,
Mr. Vincent. Yes. What page is that?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Page 558. Your note says :
Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two related but sepa-
rate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2065
regard to their problems, and a conference of nations bordering on the North
Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said —
that is, you said —
that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any
North Pacific conference.
Now, in view of that whole conversation right at that point, what
Chiang had said, what Mrs. Chiang had said, what you said, I ask you
were you not, in effect, telling Generalissimo Chiang that his nation
could not expect any United States aid in bringing about a North
Pacific conference until it had first settled its matters with Soviet
Russia ?
Mr. Vincent. I was indicating that it was preferable, from my
mind, that they settle their own differences before they would call to-
gether a general North Pacific conference; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How does that differ from the way I phrased it?
Mr. Vincent. Well, you will have to rephrase.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you not getting across to him the idea that
he had better settle his affairs with Soviet Russia before he could ex-
pect any aid from this country in setting up a North Pacific con-
ference ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not want to say it that way. I much prefer
to say it my own way. It is that I was expressing an opinion that
it would be advisable for them to settle their own differences before
you got into any general North Pacific conference.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you making it clear to him that that was only
your own, individual opinion and you were not intending to reflect
the opinion of the American Government?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that General Chiang himself would
have taken it in this conversation as an expression of my opinion in
any discussion carried on there.
Mr. Sourwine. And not reflecting the opinion of your Government?
]Mr. Vincent. Not as reflecting it as the opinion of my Government.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean in such conversation, on a very high dip-
lomatic level, you would ever be presumed to have expressed an
opinion not in complete accordance with that of your Government?
Mr. Vincent. He would expect it to be in accord, but he didn't
at that time, I don't believe, because he simply introduced the subject
that very morning and I couldn't have had any consultation with the
Government and, therefore, be expected to express a Government
opinion.
Mr. Sourwine. You were not expressing a Government opinon in
a strict diplomatic sense. But he did know, as you have said, that
he had a right to expect what you said to be in accord with your Gov-
ernment's opinion, did he not?
Mr. Vincent. He would have a right to expect, although he had no
reason to expect, I had consulted the Government, and was therefore
speaking a Government opinion.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace was there. If there had been a Gov-
ernment opinion to be transmitted, protocol would have required
transmission through Wallace, would it not?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
2066 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, SouEwiNE. But you were the Chief of the Far Eastern Di-
vision
Mr. Vincent. Chief of the China Division.
Mr. SoiJRwiNE. Did General Chiang know that?
Mr. Vincent, He did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. He would expect that you would be familiar with
your Nation's policies, would he not, particularly in that field ?
Mr. Vincent. He would.
Mr. SouRwiNE. So that when you expressed an opinion, he, having
a right to expect that you would not have expressed an opinion which
was at odds with your Nation's policies, and knowing that you knew
what your Nation's policies were, would be expected to think that
you were expressing an opinion which was, in essence, the policy of
your country, would he not ?
Mr. Vincent. There, again, you have to go back to the nature of
these conversations. He suddenly introduces a subject here, and
there was no attempt on my part to give him the feeling I was speak-
ing Government policy.
They had introduced, as a speculative idea, "Why not have a North
Pacific conference?" I expressed an opinion, and he certainly knew
that I had no chance to express Government opinion at that time.
Mr, SouEwiNE, Let us ask this question : Were you telling him that
in your opinion he had better settle his differences with Soviet Russia
before he looked for any help from the United States ?
Mr, Vincent, I was giving it as my opinion that it would be pre-
ferable for them to settle their own differences before we emerged in
international conferences as suggested by him,
Mr. SouRwiNE, Very well.
Senator Ferguson, Are you through?
Mr, SouRwiNE, Yes,
Senator Ferguson. You were an expert on China ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. To be an expert on China, do you think you
should have known what was going on by the Communists in China?
Mr, Vincent, I tried my best to keep myself informed on what
was going on.
Senator Ferguson, Did you know that there was a volume in exist-
ence, AVorkers of All Countries, Unite, volume 7, Congress of the
Communist International ?
Mr, Vincent, I don't recall the volume. When was it published?
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there was such a book in
1939?
Mr. Vincent, I don't recall the book.
Senator Ferguson, Did you know of the 23d to the 32d sittings,
Continuation of Discussion on Comrade Dimitrov's Report? That is
the manuscript cited to you yesterday and you couldn't recognize his
pro-Communist leanings. Now I show you on page 293 of that, what
the Communists in Russia themselves said about the Chinese Com-
munists and ask you to read it into the record,
Mr. Vincent. You mean right here?
The ideological, political, and organizational growth of the Communist Party
in China is explained by the fact that it is being led by the Leninist Com-
munist International, by the fact that it can utilize the experience of all sec-
tions of the Communist International and, primarily, the valuable experience
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2067
of the leading section of the Communist International — the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union.
Senator Ferguson. With that in mind you say you were correct
in not giving any weight to Chiang's statement to Wallace and to
you, as I read to you ?
Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese
Communists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need
for settlement — •
and that you as an expert on China should have known that you
should take Chiang's word ?
Mr. Vincent. If I read this
Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it the duty of someone in the State
Department to know that, and to advise you as Chief of the section ?
That is what I am trying to get at.
Mr. Vincent. I know that and I had no knowledge of this at that
time.
Senator Ferguson. Did you try to find out what the Communists of
China were ?
Mr. Vincent. When I was in China, certainly I did.
Senator Ferguson. Did you find out ? That book was in existence
then.
Mr. Vincent. We were viewing the problem of the Communists
in China at that time, not this time, at that time, from the stand-
point of fact that both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang
were fighting the Japanese, and that was the context in which we
viewed it.
Senator Ferguson. We have gotten off the subject. Let us go
back. They were talking about the Communists of China being
agrarian reformers, isn't that true?
Mr. Vincent. Who is "they"?
Senator Ferguson. The people. Is that not correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Had you heard it ?
Mr. Vincent. I had heard it ; yes. I don't know whether you are
speaking of Government people.
Senator Ferguson. Here you have the writings of the Communist
International telling you who the Chinese Commuists are, Chiang
telling you who they were, and you and Mr. Wallace came to the
conclusion there was nothing in what Chiang told you, isn't that true ?
Mr. Vincent. That at that time that the Chinese Communists
were not being directed from Moscow ?
Senator Ferguson. That was in 1944?
Mr. Vincent. That was in 1944.
Senator Fi.rguson. Prior to that time there was a statement in the
book by the Communist themselves, is that not correct?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember, Mr. Vincent, testifying with
regard to the question of any proposal that the Communists in China
receive arms from America?
Mr. Vincent. You mean testifying in executive session?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes, or here.
Mr. Vincent. In executive session. I don't recall down here. In
executive session I remember testifying that toward the end of 1944
2068 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
or early in 1945 the idea became generally bruited that we were going
to try to make landings in north China, and my testimony upstairs in
executive session was to that effect. I had a talk with General Wede-
meyer in March of 1945 suggesting to him the possibility of getting
arms to the Chinese Communists. That was the nature of the con-
versation. Mr. Grew himself had earlier in that year suggested that
any troops that could be used to fight the Japanese should be used.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, that the pro-
posal for arming the Communist Chinese was made formally and
officially to Chiang within 2 weeks of the Wallace conversations with
liim.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall it was made formally and officially to
him.
Mr. SouKwiNE. Can you say it was not ?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot say that it was not.
Mr. SoTiRwiNE. Do you think it might have been ?
JVJr. Vincent. Within 2 weeks of the Marshall mission ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. No, within 2 weeks of the Wallace mission.
Mr. Vincent. I mean of the Wallace mission. I do not recall that
it was formally made that there should be arms within 2 weeks of the
Wallace mission.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall the date of Mr. Wallace's Kunming
cable?
Mr. SouRwiNE. The date of his Kunming cable was about June 26,
I should say, is that right, or 28 ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was drafted on the 2Gth and dispatched about
the 28th, is that right?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that within less than 10 days after
that message that the President of the United States sent a message
to Chiang Kai-shek proposing the arming of the Chinese Communists?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the message.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that there had been one sent?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the fact of a message telling them to
arm the Chinese Communists.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did you ever write any memo-
randum that might have been used by the President, as to communism
in China ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Were you ever asked or did you have super-
vision of any document or memorandum of advice to anyone on com-
munism in China ?
Mr. Vincent. Reports were made from the field
Senator Ferguson. No, no ; I am talking about you.
Mr. Vincent. I know I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see a report on it ?
Mr. Vincent. On communism as such in China ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall a report on communism in China.
Reports were made by officers who were out in the field from time to
time. To what extent they got to the President
Senator Ferguson. But you never saw them ?
Mr. Vincent. I saw them, the dispatches coming in from the field
reporting on conditions in China including conditions
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2069
Senator Ferguson. As to wliat commimism was ?
Mr. Vincent. As to what their idea of communism was, yes. Are
yon — I am talking about conditions in Communist China as far
Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about conditions. I am talk-
ing about the party activity and whether or not it was under
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall.
Senator Ferguson. You don't recall anything like that?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall.
Senator Ferguson. How could you then help to make the policy of
the United States toward the Communists in China if you didn't hav©
any support ?
Mr. Vincent. You made up your mind that the Communists were
in China because of the reports you got of conditions in the Chinese
Comunist area.
Senator Ferguson. Why didn't you look at what the Communists
themselves said ?
Mr. Vincent. I was not studying that at that time. You mean the
earlier documents ?
Senator Ferguson. How could you advise without studying it ?
Mr. Vincent. Because we were faced with the situation there.
Again I say, the Communists of China were fighting the Japanese.
AVe were not studying what their ideological content was at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Dichi't Chiang tell you there was a difference
between the Communists in China, which wanted to take over the Gov-
ernment, and those in America? Now we find very little difference
when we uncover what was going on in America, that they had the
same intent there in China as they had here, to actually take over, but
they had a much better chance in China. Isn't that what Chiang
told you ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. You discounted that entirely ?
Mr. Vincent. No one discounted it ; no, sir. What we were trying
to get there was an agreement to fight against the Japanese. It
wasn't a case of discounting or not discounting it.
Senator Ferguson. How could you get that when the Chinese Com-
munists wanted to become the government and were therefore fighting
against Chiang?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; but the Chinese Communists at that time were
protesting that they did not want to take over the Government, not
that that made it necessarily true, but the all-important fact was to
utilize these Communist armies to fight the Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. Today would you believe a Communist?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you back in those days?
Mr. Vincent. I believed that the Chinese Communists were really
fighting the Japanese and that is what we wanted them to do.
Senator Ferguson. So you believed the Chinese Communists at
that time
Mr. Vincent. Wanted to fight the Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. No, no. Did you believe Chinese Communists
back in those days ?
Mr. Vincent. Wlien the Chinese Communists told me they were
fighting the Japanese and we had visual evidence of it; yes.
2070 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. But the fact that they didn't want to take over
the National Government of China or the Government of China —
did you believe them ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know that any of them protested they were
not going to take over the Government.
Senator Ferguson. I thought you included that in one of your
answers.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall including it. That the Chinese Com-
munists had told me they did not want to take over the Government?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall that.
Mr. SouRA^aNE, Just so the record may be clear, sir, did you have
any visual evidence that the Chinese Communists were fighting the
Japanese?
Mr. Vincent. Did I ? No ; I never visited the areas. But people
who did visit the areas reported they were fighting the Japanese.
Mr. Sourwine. You had evidence of that kind in reports of wit-
nesses? You used the phrase "visual," and I just wanted to clear that
up.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, who were some of these people who re-
ported that the Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese?
Mr. Vincent. I remember one American coming down from the
National City Bank, passing through, and he had seen conditions
there. I don't recall what others.
Mr. Morris. Who was he ? Will you tell us who he was ?_
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall his name. I don't recall his name.
Mr. Morris. Can you give us the name of anybody who visually saw
the Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese ?
Mr. Vincent. I think this was a man from the National City Bank.
Excuse me. I haven't finished my answer.
Mr. Morris. If you know of anybody who visually experienced the
Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese, will you give us the names
of those people?
Mr. Vincent. I can't recall the names of those people, but there were
people coming in and out, so far as I recall, who did make reports, and
there were newspaper reports to that effect, also of battles here, there,
and yonder.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did you have any connection what-
ever or any cooperation between the military intelligence of the War
Department and the State Department? Was there close cooperation
during the war?
Mr. ViNCEN^T. Between military intelligence in the War Department
and the State Department?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I should say there would be. I don't recall.
Senator Ferguson. Then I want to show you a page from the
Chinese Communist Movement, dated July 5, 1945. That is before
the war ended. "Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
Washington, D. C." This is "d." I ask you to read what the military
intelligence said about the Communists in China. I will ask you then
what you know about it.
Mr. Vincent (reading) :
The Chinese Communist movement is part of an international Communist move-
ment. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2071
follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environ-
ment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy, which
in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Com-
munists have supported loyally and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and
have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.
Senator Ferguson. Can you explain why you as an expert and the
head of this Division didn't know what the military intelligence
thought about the Communists of China ?
Mr. Vincent. What is the date of this?
Senator Ferguson. July 5, 1945, but it says from the beginning it
was that. Here is the front page,
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether this was available to me or not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you ever seen it before?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeing it before.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account for at least that much co-
operation between the State Department, which was making policy in
relation to the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Communist
government in China, that you wouldn't get that ?
Mr. Vincent. I say I don't recall seeing it. I am not saying I did
never see this ; but
Senator Ferguson, Was it, Mr. Vincent, that the State Department
at that time was not even slightly interested in communism?
Mr. Vincent. Certainly it is not the case. The State Department
was interested in communism.
Senator Ferguson. All right, then, why did you not know about
what the Communists themselves had written, what our own G-2
in the War Department had written?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that you have to change
your idea of what we were trying to do if we can pin this down to the
specific situation we are talking about in China at that time, of trying
to bring about some kind of military activity of a greater nature
against the Japanese. That is what I am speaking of, a consciousness
of what the international position of the Communists was
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman
Senator Ferguson. You told me you discounted what Chiang said,
that you and Mr. Wallace didn't believe what he said. Now I am
showing 3^ou these two documents and ask you as an expert on China
why you didn't have that evidence along with Chiang's statement
and now why you would discount his statement. You would not do
it today ; would you ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not do it today.
JSIr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, now that his intelligence report
has been brought up and since it has been declassified, may I respect-
fully suggest that it be ordered printed as an appendix to the hearings
of this subcommittee.
Senator Ferguson. It is too large
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is not elsewhere available. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Under the circumstances, if it is not available
in any other form, I will receive it and have it in the appendix of
this report, because I think this is the kind of thing that may convince
the American peoj^le of what was going on.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is an important historical document.
Mr. Morris. There will be other references to it, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ferguson. I will receive it in evidence now.
2072 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The document referred to is printed as appendix II of this part.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, you remember in discussing tlie matter
of Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable, great stress was laid upon the recom-
mendation that General Stilwell be replaced?
Mr. Vincent. The necessity of replacing General Stilwell. Yes;
that was in our minds something that was necessary.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know anything as to what effect that may
have had upon the President or upon American policy?
Mr. Vincent. The effect of the recommendation?
]\Ir. SouRWiNE. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. I should think it was taken seriously by the President
and the interested departments of government.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What evidenced that ?
Mr. Vincent. The evidence of it was, so far as I can figure, that
Stilwell was eventually relieved.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. What do you mean by eventually ?
Mr. Vincent. Within a matter of 2 or ?> months.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If the President had very shortly after receiving
the Kunming cable taken a step directly contrary to that recommenda-
tion, would that indicate to you that he was not very much impressed
by the Wallace cable and the Wallace recommendation ?
Mr. Vincent. It would. It would have to.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. If he had taken such a step, that is, directly op-
posite to the Wallace recommendation, and then had a matter of 2
months or so after that changed his mind, would it indicate to vou
that it was something other than Mr. Wallace's recommendation that
caused General Wedemeyer to be sent out ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say it was taking Mr. Wallace's recommen-
dation plus whatever other thing happened.
Mr. SouRWiNE, Do you know whether the President did in fact
very soon after receiving the Kunming cable take a step contrary
to the recommendation therein made with regard to Stilw^ell?
Mr. Vincent. I do. I recall — and I think it was a War Depart-
ment-White House matter — that Stilwell was authorized to go over
to Chiang and see him and recommend a unified command of all
troops in China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Wliat did that mean ?
Mr. Vincent. That meant, so far as I can recollect, that Stilwell
was to assume command of all forces in China.
Mr. Sourwtne. Didn't that necessary imply the arming of the
Chinese Communists ?
Mr. Vincent. If Stilwell was going to take over all command?
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Certainly.
Mr. Vincent. It would imply the arming of them under his com-
mand and utilizing them as a unified army.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That was, then, a proposal for arming the Chinese
Communists, wasn't it?
Mr. Vincent. If it had been carried out in the way that I under-
stood Stilwell wanted to carry it out, it w^ould.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It was a proposal for arming the Chinese Commu-
nists, whether it was carried out or not, wasn't it ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2073
Mr. Vincent. It was a proposal that Stihvell would take command
of all the troops, and I assume it would have followed from that that
the Chinese Communists would have been utilized.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It was necessarily implicit, wasn't it ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know when that proposal was made ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall wlien it was made.
J\Ir. SouRAViNE. Because of the question of how long after the
Kunming cable it was made, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to refer
to page 1970 of State Department employee loyalty investigation
hearings, previously referred to here, part 2, appendix, where, from
the personal statement of John Stewart Service, appears this para-
graph [reading] :
On July 7 the headquarters received a telegram from President Roosevelt to
be delivered personally to Chiang Kai-shek. This was the first of a series of
messages recommending that, in view of the desperate military situation in
China, Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies. I have no knowledge
of the background or origin of this recommendation. Stilwell himself was in
Burma, and the chief of staff seemed to be surprised. The message was con-
sidered to be of such importance that the chief of staff determined that tliere
should be no Chinese interpreter and that we should not follow the normal pro-
cedure of allowing the message to go through an intermediary. I was therefore
ordered to accompany the cliief of staff and to translate the telegram, phrase
by phrase, to the Generalissimo himself. This was in effect a proposal that
the Chinese Communists be armed, since it was taken for granted that if Gen-
eral Stilwell was to command all Chinese armies, this would include tlie Com-
munists and that they would therefore be eligible to receive a share of American
equipment. This was, so far as I know, the first such recommendation. On
July 15—
Senator Ferguson. Wliat is the date of this statement ?
Mr. Sourwine. The date of that was July 7, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What year?
Mr. Sourwine. 1944. Wliich is 9 days after the Kunming cable
was transmitted.
Senator Ferguson. Was that while you were in China ?
Mr. Vincent. It was while I was on my way back. I think I
arrived back on the 10th of July.
Mr. Sourwine (continuing reading) :
On July 15 there was a second telegram from the President which I again was
required to intepret for the Chief of Staff. I have been sure since then that my
presence on these unpleasant occasions helped to contribute to Chinese animosity
toward me and to their conviction that I was again the instigator of a very
unwelcome demand.
It is understandable how General Chiang should have considered that
an luiwelcome demand, is it not ?
Mr. Vincent. We had evidence later that it was an unwelcome
demand.
Senator Ferguson. Wlio was the Chief of Staff they were mention-
ing in there ?
Mr. Vincent. General Marshall.
Mr. Sourwine. No ; it is the Chief of Staff of General Stilwell.
Mr. Vincent. The Chinese Chief of Staff to Stilwell ?
Mr. Sourwine. It would have been the American Chief of Staff.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall who the American Chief of Staff to
Stilwell was at that time.
22S48 — 52 — pt. 7 €
2074 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Who do you think they were talking about m
that cablegram there?
Mr. Vincent. When they say Chief of Staff ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. If the Chief of Staff at that time was still Ho Ying
Chin, it was Ho Ying Chin ; but there was another man named Chen
Cheng who was Chief of Staff at one time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He is not named in Mr. Service's statement.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, to revert to a subject that we pre-
viously discussed, you remember the question of whether you asked
for or received any security information on Max Granich.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall that.
Senator Ferguson. Then let me ask you this question : Did you at
the time of the question of the treatment of Mr. Granich and his pub-
lication— do you recall that occasion ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you at that time ask for or receive any
security report on Mr. Granich ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall asking for any. I seem to recall
somewhere that a security report was included in that large file. That
was my testimony, I think, last time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If you did testify that you neither asked for nor
received a separate security report, was that testimony in error ?
Mr. Vincent. That if I asked for it ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Or received a separate security report.
Mr. Vincent. I said that so far as I can recall there was probably
in that batch of papers, that I went over hurriedly, a security report
on him. I do not recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am referring to such a security report as you
would have had to sign for. You know what the procedure is in
regard to that.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any security report that I had to sign
for.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Haven't you ever sent for a security report that you
had to sign for when you received it ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall that.
Mr. Sourwine. You never have ?
Mr. Vincent. Back in those days; no.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you on or about June 20, 1944, attend a confer-
ence at which John Stewart Service was present?
Mr. Vincent. What time?
Mr. Sourwine. About June 20, 1944. That would have been while
you were in China with Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Vincent. John Service would have been present at a confer-
ence that I would have had with General Ferris about this very mis-
sion into the north China area. But there was also the fact that
Service himself attended one of the meetings in Chiang Kai-shek's
house with General Ferris.
Mr. Sourwine. Other than those two occasions, did you on or about
June 20, and while you were in China with Mr. Wallace, attend a con-
ference at which John Stewart Service was present?
Mr. Vincent. Those are the only two that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember a conference at which John Stew-
art Service and General Stilwell were both present ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2075
Mr. Vincent. I do not. I do not recall, and I don't think lie was
in China during the period of our visit.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember a conference at which John Stew-
art Service and Owen Lattimore were both present?
Mr. Vincent. I do not, unless Owen Lattimore was present at this
conference with General Ferris about sending a mission into north
China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say there was not a conference which you
attended at which John Stewart Service, Owen Lattimore, and Gen-
eral Stilwell were all present?
Mr. Vincent. I can say that the best I can recall I had a conference
with General Ferris, but my recollection as to General Stilwell is that
he never came north during this visit of ours, so that would eliminate
him, and, insofar as whether Lattimore was present, I do not recall.
Mr. SouRWiNE. If John Stewart Service or anyone else has reported
such a conference, would you accept the report as true?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that his memory was in error because
my distinct recollection is that General Stilwell never set foot in
■China while the Wallace Mission was in China.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters
at Yunnan while he was in China in 1944 ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Was a visit by the Vice President to Yunnan dis-
cussed at all while he was over there ?
Mr. Vincent. A visit to Yenan ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yunnan is what I am talking about.
Mr. Vincent. Which is the same as Kunming. I want to get the
Chinese straight. One of them is Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n, which is
another name frequently used for Kunming. Yenan, Y-e-n-a-n, was
the capital of the Province of Shensi, of the Communists.
Senator Ferguson. You had better repeat your question and spell
the word.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters
at Yenan, Y-e-n-a-n, while he was in China in 1944?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at
Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n?
Mr. Vincent. There is no Communist headquarters at Yunnan
that I know of, and if there were I am quite sure Mr. Wallace didn't
visit it.
Mr. Sourwine. Was the question of a visit to Yenan discussed with
Ambassador Gauss ?
Mr. Vincent. It may have been, but I don't know that it was.
Mr. Sourwine. Was he opposed to such a visit ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say Mr. Gauss would have been opposed to
a visit to Yenan. By the Vice President, you are speaking of ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. We have already had the Vice President's testimony
himself that he had been told by the President not to visit the Com-
munist territory, and he did not visit it.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who coded the Kunming cable for
transmission ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I do not. It was sent out in Army code, so I
assume that it was coded by some Army personnel.
2076 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. How do you know that it was sent in Army code ?
Mr. Vincent. Because it was handed over to the Army and sent
down to New Delhi for transmission from there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. To whom was it handed for transmission?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you hand it over to somebody for transmission ?
Mr. Vincent. My recollection would be that Mr. Alsop handed it
over to whoever would transmit it.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what became of the original copy ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Owen Lattimore accompany you and Mr. Wal-
lace to Kunming?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he stay with you while you were there?
Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that Mr. Wallace and I stayed
at Chennault's headquarters and that Mr. Lattimore stayed some-
where else, I don't know where.
Mr. Sourwine. Would General Chennault have been either de-
sirable or acceptable as the President's personal representative to
Chiang so far as you know?
Mr. Vincent. He would have been acceptable to General Chiang,
as I have already testified. I don't know whether he would have
been acceptable — Did you say to the President?
Mr. Sourwine. No. Would he have been either desirable or ac-
ceptable from the standpoint of the War Department, do you know ?
Mr. Vincent, I do not know, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you hear a view expressed with regard to that?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. Didn't Mr. Alsop express the view that General
Chennault would not have been acceptable?
Mr. Vincent. To the War Department ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. If he did I don't recall it. It was the general under-
standing that General Chennault would stay where he was and do
the flying there.
Mr. Sourwine. When you and Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking,
you stated that you did visit Madame Sun Yat-sen?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Atcheson, the counsellor of the Embassy,
go with you?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether Atcheson went with us or
not, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Was Sun Fo at that conference?
Mr. Vincent. Sun Fo was, as I recall it.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace was there?
Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified to that. And I thought Sun
Fo was present, and there was possibly another Chinese, but I don't
know.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Madame Sun request Mr. Wallace and America
to help the Chinese Communists?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to refresh my memory on that, but
Madame Sun I know was in favor of bringing about some kind of
united front to fight the Japanese. Whether that would be construed
as aiding the Communists I don't recall.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2077
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she indicate that she regarded the Chinese
Communists as the oppressed ?
Mr. Vincent. 1 (io not recall such phraseology, but Madame Sun
Yat-sen had such ideas with regard to oppressed peoples. She was a
very humanitarian woman and would have felt keenly about people she
felt were oppressed, but whether she specifically mentioned the Com-
munists as being oppressed I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she express any views with regard to broaden-
ing the political power of the Communists in China and permitting
them to participate in the government?
Mr. Vincent. I would think she did. I am testifying here from
memory and also from my knowledge of Madame Sun Yat-sen, that
she would have made such a suggestion.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What views did she express in that regard?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the exact views, but she was in favor
of broadening the base of the government, like many people elsewhere,
and I would have assumed that, that would include bringing in the
Communists.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Was the question of replacing Stilwell discussed at
all at that conference ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall; but I say I am trusting to my
memory.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think it might have been ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't believe Madame Sun Yat-sen would have
raised the issue of replacing •
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you raise it or Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I don't think that the question would have
been raised, of replacing Stilwell, at this meeting with Madame Sun
Yat-sen.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say that Stilwell was not discussed?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot say from my memory that Stilwell was not
discussed, but I think it would seem to me illogical that we would
have discussed with Madame Sun Yat-sen the replacement of General
Stilwell.
Mr. Morris. A^liy would it have been illogical ?
Mr. Vincent. Because Madame Sun at that time was a private citi-
zen so far as we were concerned, and the whole problem of replacing
General Stilwell would have been to my mind a very delicate one.
Senator Ferguson. You were discussing the question of war and
the relation of the Communists.
Mr. Vincent. This involved the future of an American military
officer there.
Mr. Sourwine. Why did you go to see Madame Sun ?
Mr. Vincent. I testified before that the President — and the Vice
President himself was so anxious to meet her and wanted to make a
courtesy call.
Mr. Sourwine. Why ?
Mr. Vincent. Because she was the wife of the President of China,
Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
Mr. Sourwine. She was a very important person, was she not ?
Mr. Vincent. She was an important person, but not politically at
that time.
Mr. Sourwine. She was not politically important ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't believe she would have been considered po-
litically important at that time in China. She was an influence among
2078 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
liberal groups, but politically insofar as the Government was con-
cerned, she didn't have any position and I would not have considered
that she was of great influence in the councils of the Government in
China then.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Wasn't she an outstanding spokesman, if not the
outstanding spokesman, for the Chinese Communists at that time?
Mr. Vincent. I would not have considered her such ; that she was
an outstanding spokesman for the improvement of conditions in China^
but to say that she was an outstanding spokesman for the Communists
as such I do not recall that she was.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Wasn't it generally recognized in the diplomatic
service at that time, pai'ticularly among those in China, in the Foreign
Service, that Madame Sun was a Communist ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think we recognized her as a Communist then.
She had been associated with the Communists as early as 1926.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And had never ceased that association, had she?
Mr. Vincent. Whether she was a member of the Communist Party,
I have testified before that we generally looked upon her as a person
who was sympathetic toward the Communists.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And had been since 1926 ; that is the date you men-
tioned ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, that is the date, but when the northern march
came, in 1925 or '26.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And had never ceased to be associated with them
and sympathetic to them?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE, That was well known ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. She was an outstanding figure in China ?
Mr. Vincent. She was a very — I don't know whether you call it
outstanding. Yes; an outstanding figure. The wife of the former
President was an outstanding figure.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any woman in China who was more out-
standing at that time than Madame Sun Yat-sen, with the exception
of Madame Chiang ?
Mr. Vincent. And the possible exception of Madame H. H. Kung,
her other sister. I would say that Madame Sun Yat-sen, depending
on what group you are speaking of, would be looked upon as an out-
standing woman, either before or after Madame Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. Sourwine. She was certainly the outstanding pro-Communist
woman in China, was she not?
Mr. Vincent. She would have been so considered if you called her
pro-Communist.
Mr. Sourwine. You did call her pro-Communist ?
Senator Ferguson. You called her that.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did she say anything at the meeting of you and Mr.
Wallace to indicate she was anti-Communist ?
Mr. Vincent. She did not, as I recall it, but as I say I am trying to
recall the conversation from memory.
Senator Ferguson. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 10
o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 4 : 15 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m.,
Friday, February 1, 1952.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS
FEIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1953
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To In\^stigate the Administration of
THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
OF the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., Senatoi
Homer Ferguson presiding.
Present: Senator Ferguson.
Also present: Senator Knowland, Senator Kem; J. G. Sourwine.
committee counsel; Eobert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Ben-
jamin Mandel, director of research.
Senator Ferguson. The Committee will be in order.
You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, did you in the summer of 1944 know
that you had been recommended by Mr. Lauchlin Currie as one of
the Government delegates to the IPK, conference to be held the follow-
ing winter ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not know that Mr. Lauchlin Currie recom-
mended me as a delegate to the IPR conference in 1945.
Mr. Sourwine. That would be the 1945 conference?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever talk to you about it at all, going as a
Government delegate to that conference?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall talking to him about going to the con-
ference; no.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. Dennett, the secretary of the
IPR, was worried about whether Mr. Grew would let you attend
that conference?
Mr. Vincent. No. I recall speaking to Mr. Grew about attending
the conference, but I didn't know that Mr. Dennett was worried that
I couldn't attend.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. Grew had expressed the
view to Mr. Dennett that, since the conference would be discussing'
postwar plans, he. Grew, didn't see how anyone in the Department
could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would nat-
urally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself,
upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements?
2079
2080 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I didn't know that Mr. Grew told that. Is that
what Mr. Dennett told?
Mr. SouRwiNE. The question w^as whether you knew of that.
Mr. Vincent. I didn't know of that incident.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss with anyone in the IPR the
problem raised by Mr. Grew's attitude in that regard ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't think so. I sat in on a panel at the dis-
cussions there, at the IPR, and what turn those panel discussions took
I could not possibly recall today.
Mr. SouRAviNE. Did you know that Mr. Dennett had written to Mr.
William C. Johnstone of the IPR, stating that "either Grew has got to
be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come?"
Mr. Vincent. No; I did not know that.
Senator Ferguson. Come where?
Mr. Vincent. To the IPR conferences, yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether anything was done about
changing Mr. Grew?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Grew, when he spoke to you about the mat-
ter, express any objection to your attending the conference?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that he did, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. What did he say when he spoke to j^ou about it ?
Mr. Vincent. That I don't recall, Mr. Sourwine, what Mr. Grew
would have said. He made no objection to my going, because it was
mentioned to him. It was cleared with him.
Mr. Sourwine. You volunteered that you did remember talking to
Mr. Grew about it?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. What do you remember about that conversation?
Mr. Vincent. The only thing I remember is that I mentioned it to
Mr. Grew, and Mr. Grew took no exception to my going.
Mr. Sourwine. We mentioned yesterday the question of the report
transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President after he returned to this
country from his mission to China.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace ever ask you for any suggestions
with regard to that report?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. You never discussed it with him ?
Mr. Vincent. I never discussed that written report of his after he
got back here with him.
Mr. Sourwine. You never discussed with him at any time the ques-
tion of whether he was going to make a report to the President?
Mr. Vincent. Only that I testified in executive session that he told
me he was going over to see the President when he got back.
Mr. Sourwine. You never saw a rough draft of that report or notes
for that report?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. Nor ever suggested any language for possible in-
clusion ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall doing that.
Mr. Sourwine. So far as you know, did Owen Lattimore see the re-
port or suggest language for inclusion or submit language ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that question, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ' 2081
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, wasn't it unusual for a man to go
out on a foreign-policy matter like Mr. Wallace's trip and then make
a report to the President, and no copy of that go to the State Depart-
ment ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have called that unusual ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That would be unusual.
Mr. Vincent. It would seem to me to be unusual, and I was sur-
prised that he had ever done it when the question arose as to whether
he had made one.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other occasions where peo-
ple would be sent out, particularly not on a secret mission, because you
went along, a State Department official who made reports to the Presi-
dent, and no copies or any reports went to the Secretary of State ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall any.
Senator Ferguson. Could it have been that the President heard
about the fact or something had happened about Mr. Grew's warning
to you to not allow Mr. Wallace to make promises, that the report was
not made back to Mr. Grew to ascertain whether promises were made?
Mr. Vincent. You are talking about Mr. Hull. I don't think that
that would be a connection, but I would just have to give that as an
opinion, because I don't think anybody knew. I never told Mr. Wal-
lace, for instance, that Mr. Hull had told me to see to that.
Senator Ferguson. You did not tell Mr. Wallace that ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I didn't tell Mr. Wallace that Mr. Hull had made
this one remark to me about his not — ■ —
Senator Ferguson. Was this an unusual proceeding, to send a man
out like that from the President? He had sent Mr. Lattimore at one
time on the same kind of mission ; had he not?
Mr. Vincent. No. It was a different kind of mission. Chiang Kai-
shek himself had asked for somebody, and Lattimore went out. The
Vice President Avent out at the President's suggestion for a brief trip
to consult with Chiang Kai-shek and to return, as I understood it, the
courtesy call of Madame Chiang the year before.
Mr. Morris. Who recommended Mr. Lattimoro, for that trip, the
1941 trip, to the Generalissimo?
Mr. Vincent. The President recommended him so far as I know.
Mr. Morris. Who was the one who arranged for the appointment ;
do you know ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know who arranged for his appointment to
go out to be with Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. Morris. Was it your testimony, Mr. Vincent, that you did not
know who made the arrangements for Mr. Lattimore to go out?
Mr. Vincent. I did not know who made the arrangements for him
to go out other than that the President sent him out at Chiang's re-
quest.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Mr. Currie made the
recommendation ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Mr. Currie had been sent out
by the President at one time ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Currie was sent out by the President at one time
while I was there.
Senator Ferguson. While you were there. Did a report go back to
the State Department from Mr. Currie on that trip ?
2082 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't know, Mr. Chairman, whether one did or
not.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever heard of one ?
Mr. Vincent. I myself never saw a report that Currie made of his
trip to China in 1942.
Senator Ferguson. How were you able to coordinate these matters
in the field, in the State Department, and in the "White House, if you
did not know what these reports were showing or what these people
found, or at least a report on that report telling you what they had
found.
Mr. Vincent. You are asking me something that I don't really feel
competent to say, what the relationsliip was with the White House.
The Vice President had gone out under instructions of the President.
I have testified that it seems to me to be curious that we did not see his
report. But why it was not sent over, I don't know. I don't know
about Mr. Currie's report. I never saw a report of Mr. Currie's when
he went out in 1942.
Senator Ferguson. You were head of the China desk ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That was a very important position ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think now, looking back, that the whole
China situation was handled properly by the State Department, given
the attention it should have, and the care ?
Mr. Vincent. I think it was given as much attention as we were
capable of giving it, sir; yes. I certainly gave it my full time and
attention. I had nothing else to do but that.
Senator Ferguson. But your information on communism as shown
by yesterday's testimony was limited ?
Mr. Vincent. Was limited to the reports we got in from the field, I
said yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. Wlien you were in the field, did you ever make a
report on communism, when you were in the field in China ?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have those reports ?
Mr. Vincent. There is one in the State Department that I recall
now, made sometime in the year 1942.
Senator Ferguson. Would you give us a little better description so
that we may ask for it ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't give you the date, sir ; but I know it was
written in 1942, and I can tell you more or less what was said in it.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us ?
Mr. Vincent. It was a rather long report, but I can remember some
of the thoughts that were in it.
Senator Ferguson. Tell us what was in it if you can.
Mr. Vincent. That was a report which I wrote in which I dis-
tinctly recall saying that the Chinese Communist leaders were defi-
nitely Communists and not agrarian democrats. The general argu-
mentation of the dispatch was to the effect that the Kuomintang or the
National Government could cut the ground out from under the Com-
munists if they would take some reform measures in the matter of
land and in general handling of the popular difficulties of the Chi-
nese people. I would have to reread it
Senator Ferguson. Is that the substance?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2083
Mr. Vincent, That was the general argumentation it was pointing
out, as I said before and testified upstairs.
Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We referred yesterday to your conversation with
Madame Sun?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And the question was asked, then as to wliether
General Stilwell had been discussed ; and, as I recall it, you said you
did not remember whether that had been discussed.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I said I did not remember that it was discussed.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any
other representative of the American Government get an expression
of view from any Chinese Communist source on Stilwell's removal ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not get any from any Communist source. I
would doubt very seriously if Mr. Wallace got any expression of view
on the removal of Stilwell.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know of any other report from a Commu-
nist source that was received by an American representative on the
question ?
Mr. Vincent. Expressing a view on the removal of Stilwell?
Mr. SouR^vINE. On Stilwell's removal.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall any.
Mr. SbuRwiNE. Did you send in separate reports to the State De-
partment or to the President while you were in China w^ith Mr. Wal-
lace, that is, any reports other than the notes that you transmitted?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember Sergei Goglidze ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I remember Sergei Goglidze as the man who
made the toast during the trip in Siberia at some time or other.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you now remember that toast ?
Mr. Vincent. I can look here and find it.
Mr. SouR"\viNE. Do you remember that it was made ?
Mr. Vincent. I remember that the toast was made now. I would
not have remembered it, as I testified in executive session, had not
Mr. Wallace made a record of it in his book. There were hundreds of
toasts made during that time, and it did not impress me.
Mr. Sourwine. How many toasts were there at this particular
dinner?
Mr. Vincent. I would say there were probably as many toasts as
there were guests, but I could not say with any exactitude.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that a dozen, fifteen ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't even recall the occasion of the
toast or the luncheon or the dinner, whichever it was. Usually in this
group there were six or seven of us and probably an equal number of
Russians, which would make as you say 12 people.
Mr. Sourwine. What did they drink the toast in ?
Mr. Vincent. They drank the toast usually in vodka.
Mr. Sourwine. Was this ])articular toast to you and Mr. Lrattimore
the first toast that was drunk?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say, Mr. Sourwine, whether it was the
first, the middle one
Mr. Sourwine. Or the fifth or the tenth ?
Mr. Vincent. I see your point, but I cannot say whether it was the
last one or the first one.
2084 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson, Do you see where it is leading ?
Mr. Vincent. I see where it is leading.
Senator Ferguson. We understood you then, the larger the dinner
party, the more toasts, is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. May I make the statement here that Mr. Wal-
lace did not drink vodka.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He is the fellow who reported the Goglidze toast in
detail in his book.
Senator Ferguson. He seems to be the only one who remembered it^
Mr. Vincent. It made no impression on me, but I won't say it was
because it was the tenth toast.
Mr. Sourwine. On the way back from China, sir, did you and Mr.
Wallace fly?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Lattimore with you in the plane ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. What did you do on the way back ? Did you work ?
Did you have work to do?
Mr. Vincent. We worked as much as we could. We were doing
fairly high flying and we were fairly sick one day flying back. We had
to fly at 22,000 feet with no particular apparatus for it. But most of
the time was taken up in assisting Mr. Wallace in writing a speech
which he was to give in Seattle the first week of July. I have forgotten
the date. We got back here by the 10th so he must have given the
speech on the 8th or the 9th in Seattle.
Mr. Sourwine. In other words, as soon as he got back he was to give
this speech and you worked on that on the way back ?
Mr. Vincent. We worked on that on the way back.
Mr, Sourwine. Was Mr. Alsop with you ?
Mr, Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson, Did you read the Wallace book, Mr. Vincent,,
where the toast was quoted ?
Mr. Vincent, I never read through it, sir. He sent me a copy and
I regret to say I never did take the time to read that book.
Senator Ferguson, Would you not think that would be valuable in
your position in the State Department? Here he had gone out and
made this trip and came back.
Mr. Vincent, As I say, I glanced through it but I never read it
with any care. It was not concerned with my area. It was concerned
with Siberia.
Mr. Sourwine. So the record may be clear about the toast we are
talking about, we are all referring to the toast where Goglidze said
"To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on
China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future." Is
that right?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is the toast.
Mr. Vincent. That is the toast as Mr. Wallace has reported it.
Senator Ferguson. Did you approve the book ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I did not approve the book. You mean did I
approve of its contents or did I approve of it in advance of its
publication?
Senator Ferguson. No; its contents.
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to testify, because I have just said
that I only glanced through it.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2085
Senator Ferguson. You do not know enough about it to approve or
•disapprove ?
Mr. ViN(^,ENT. I don't know enough about what Mr. Wallace had
in the book.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat did you think this toast meant when you
heard it?
Mr. Vincent. I simply thought it was the kind of a toast that a
man would make as you usually make toasts, overstating the case but
recognizing at least a fact which was that I at least — I don't know
whether Lattimore did — had a certain amount of responsibility with
regard to the future of China, since I was at that time Chief of the
•China Division.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I beg your pardon, sir, but I think your answer may
give an impression that you don't intend. The chairman's question
was, What did you think when you heard the toast? and you have
testified here, as I understood it, that you don't remember hearing it.
Mr. Vincent. That is quite correct. What I mean is what do 1
think of the toast now. At the time the toast was given, as I say, I
have no recollection of the toast being given.
Senator Ferguson. I see.
Mr. Vincent. As I say, those toasts were given at that dinner party,
and I have no memory of it and would not have remembered it had
not Mr. Wallace made a report of it in his book.
Senator Ferguson. Did you at that time believe that you did share
a great responsibility for the future of China ?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't put it a great responsibility, but as Chief
of the China Division I had some responsibility for the future of
China insofar as American relations with China would have any
effect on the future of China.
Senator Ferguson. Were these people Communists who were giving
this dinner?
Mr. Vincent. Goglidze was a Communist. And I also assumed
that any other Russian present, and there were usually a half dozen,
were Communists.
Senator Ferguson. You felt that he was pro-Communist?
Mr. Vincent. I felt that he was a Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; and therefore would be pro- Communist.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is right, isn't it ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. We have found one man now who is really pro-
Communist.
Mr. Vincent. Well, he was a Communist, and I would naturally
assume that he was pro-Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You may take the witness.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore assisted at all
with the preparation of Mr. Wallace's Seattle speech, the one that
was prepared in the airplane on the way back ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of his helping, but
I would say it was quite logical that Lattimore would have helped
with it because a portion of the speech was given over to conditions
as Mr. Wallace found them in Siberia. Mr. Wallace himself had
made, as I have noted, as we went along, copious notes on his Siberian
trip, and to what extent he relied upon Lattimore I don't recall.
2086 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were any of the conversations with Chiang men-
tioned in the Seattle speech ?
]\lr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't recalL I wonld have to have the
speech here, but I am quite sure they weren't. May I say that the
speech, if you haven't seen it, I don't know whether I have it here or
not, was taken up hirgely with an estimate of the postwar commer-
cial relations between the west coast of the United States and the
Pacific area.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember whether the preparation of that
speech took up your available work time while you were on the plane
on the way back ?
Mr. Vincent. Pretty much so.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You didn't have time to do any other work on the
way back ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall doing any other work.
Mr. SouRwiNE. After you got back from Chungking, sir, were you
consulted about the question of establishing a Washington informa-
tion center on the tJ. S. S. E. ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not to my recollection.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Mr. Currie talk to you about that matter?
Mr. Vincent. I have no present knowledge of his ever talking tO'
me about it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know that the Council of American Soviet
Friendship had requested the establishment of such an information
center ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not, as far as I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you go to see Mr. Currie soon after you got
back from Chungking?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the occurrence, but I would prob-
ably have seen Mr. Currie soon after I got back. I know one time
was at one of the early meetings attended, was one of the meetings
that he held in his office at the time he was still holding his meetings
of far-eastern people.
Mr. Sourwine. What was discussed?
Mr. Vincent. In those meetings ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. General far eastern things. I don't think records
were made of them or anything. I attended only one meeting, and it
seemed to be, as I have testified in executive session, meetings of ex-
perts from various departments in regard to far eastern problems.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you state definitely that you did or did not
meet with Mr. Currie soon after you got back from Chungking?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot state definitely. If you would like for me
to say, I would have considered it logical that I did see him soon after
I got back. He was the White House assistant who was at that time
under presidential direction, I suppose, to inquire into far eastern
matters.
Mr. Sourwine. He naturally would have been interested in the
results of your trip, would he not?
Mr. Vincent. He certainly would have been. You mean after we
got l)ack from the Wallace trip ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; he would have been interested.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2087
Mr. SouRWiNE. He had talked with you about it before you went ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It was logical that he would talk with you about it
after you got back ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know Mortimer Graves ? I believe you have
testified on that point.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I have met him.
INIr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember reading in the hearings of this
committee, exhibit No. 177, page 631, part 2, introduced on August 25,
1951, being a note from Mr. Graves to ECC, presumably E. C, Carter,
reading :
I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendsliip to call together
a few people in Washington for a discussion of a Washington information center
on the U. S. S. R. I can't spend any time on the matter myself, but am quite
willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with
Russian war relief plans or anytliing of that sort? If so, I won't participate.
Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to
see John Carter Vincent just back from Chungking.
Mr. Vincent. Is that in 1943 or 1944 ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am unable, sir, to place the date of this, and that
is why I was asking you.
Mr. Vincent. I thought you had said whether it was after I came
back from the Wallace mission or whether it was when I came back
from China for the first time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I was simply asking you about the Wallace mission.
Mr. Vincent. There is no date on it. What is your question, sir,
or is that a question ?
Mr. Sour WINE. Whether you had an appointment with Mr. Currie
or an arrangement to see him after you did get back.
Mr. Vincent. As I have just testified, I have no recollection of see-
ing him. You have read this. It w^ould be logical for me to see him.
I was trying to correct that in this sense, that in 1944, although Currie
had still retained his White House position, at that time he was
already operating as Deputy Director of the FEA.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would it have been logical for Mr. Currie to have
consulted you about the question of a Washing-ton information center
for U. S. S. R., if that matter had been brought to him ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not consider it logical, and I have no recol-
lection of being consulted on that matter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You think it probably was coincidental that in Mr.
Graves' note that matter was mentioned in the same note with the
sentence about Mr. Currie waiting to see you ?
Mr. Vincent. That is the way I had interpreted this letter. I saw
it in my hurried reading of the transcript.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how well Mr. Currie knew Mr. Graves ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I couldn't testify on that. I don't know to
what extent the relationship was, or the closeness of the relationship
between those two.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever, Mr. Vincent, take part in the draft-
ing or preparation of a message to Chiang Kai-shek for the signa-
ture of President Roosevelt ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. That is the message that we referred to in
executive session, I think.
2088 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SoTD^wiNE. Are you referring to the message which appears on
page 560 of the white paper, the message under date of July 14, 1944 ?
Mr. Vincent. I am referring to the message which we discussed in
the executive session, which I think is that message.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. Would you see if that is the message you refer
to?
Mr. Vincent (after examining white paper). Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Would you tell us, sir, what part you took in the
drafting or preparation or submission of that message ?
Mr. Vincent. I was the drafting officer of that message. I would
not want the inference drawn from that that I had the sole responsi-
bility for its contents.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it substantially changed after it left your
hands ?
Mr. Vincent. No, it was not substantially changed as far as I can
recall, but I am speaking now of in the matter of what kind of infor-
mation was wanted in the message. I have no recollection of consulta-
tion with anybody, but I imagine that Mr. Wallace himself had in
some way indicated to me what kind of message he w^anted to go out,
but I cou' ^n't testify on that.
Mr. Sourwine. That message refers to two other documents, does
it not?
Mr. Vtvtcent. Yes.
Mr. . ltrwine. Do you have any recollection of those two other
rY^iv. -^nts?
Mr. Vincent. I do not. As I have testified before, sir, I see they
are mentioned here but I have no recollection of the contents of those
two documents.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about the general tenor of
those two other documents ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation
or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944,
quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine ?
Mr. Vincent. I have looked that up. You asked me that once before
in the executive session. As I testified then, I have no recollection of
that. I have looked it up now and have found that it was a message
drafted in the special assistant's office in the State Department, Mr.
McDermott, and that it passed through the China Division and was
initialed by Mr. Chase, who was working for me, and by me.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation
of it?
Mr. Vincent. I had nothing that I recall to do with its preparation.
It was prepared in the office of the special assistant.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know it was going to be prepared before it
was presented to you for initialing ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of having any knowledge of it
before it was sent up to me.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliere was that message to be transmitted when you
approved it ?
Mr. Vincent. It would be transmitted to Mr. Gauss, the American
Ambassador in Chungking.
Mr. Sourwine. Anywhere else ?
Mr. Vincent. That is the only direction of it that I know of.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2089
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you in any sense order the distribution of that
document ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Or direct where it should go ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not direct it or have anything to do with draft-
ing it.
Mr. Sourwine. Is this a copy of the document in question, sir?
Mr. Vincent (witness examining document). I have a copy here.
Mr. Sourwine. I would much rather talk about your copy, if you
have a copy here.
Mr. Vincent. I have it here, if you would like to have it.
Mr. Sourwine. May I see it, please ?
Mr. Vincent. That, I may explain, Mr. Sourwine, is a photostat of
a press conference held by Mr. McDermott, the press man in the State
Department.
Mr. Sourwine. "What you have here, then, is not a copy. What you
have here is a photostat of an actual transcript of a press conference
at which Mr. McDermott read it, is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Working from that may I ask the witnt^s, is that
paper of mine a copy of the document ?
Mr. Vincent. There are differences. The one I have here is longer
than the report that you have here in this document.
Mr. Sourwine. May we have the copy that you have thett A.nd
will you tell us. Is that a photostat of the original State Departii.,p
records ?
Mr. Vincent. This is a photostat of a press conference held by
Mr. McDermott.
Mr. Sourwine. A photostat of a transcript?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. That transcript is in the official records of the State
Department ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. Let me say this : This telegram as it is quoted
here is quoted from the original telegram insofar as I am able to
testify, but I haven't got the other telegram in. front of me.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you present?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I was not present.
Mr. Sourwine. May we have that?
Mr. Vincent. This was in 1950. I was in Switzerland when that
happened.
Mr. Sour^vine. This is Mr. McDermott's press release of Friday,
June 2, 1950?
Mr. Surrey. It begins on page 4 in connection with this item.
Mr. Sourwine. It is addressed. Embassy, Chungking, from Hull,
July 25, 1944.
July issue of Amerasia possibility of using Japanese Communist, 8us2imu
Okano, in role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping Japanese people to establish Oov-
ertiment that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy. Magazine,
however, voices uncertainty as to whether the American State Department "will
support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor
the so-called 'liberal elements' in .Japan's present ruling class."
Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout eastern China should
be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guerrilla
forces that are now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in north, but
22848^52— pt. 7 7
2090 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
also in central and southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material,
technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why United
States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen
their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to current political situation
in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow the policy adopted
toward guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were
eventually superseded by military necessity.
Magazine denounces "incredible and preposterous statement" of General Lo
Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and condemns the
Information Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan
on forces that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been stead-
fastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Gov-
erament. It is asserted that vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000
Japanese, with not more than 116 tanljs, at time when approximately 250,000
Central Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks
that form iron ring blockading the Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to
have information proving that northern guerrilla forces have carried on their
resistance to Japanese and have jpersistently continued their work of educating
people to participate in that resistance, despite constant "mopping up" campaigns
by Japanese and hostility on part of Chinese Government. Article points out
that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have
enlisted enthusiastic support of local population. Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps,
according to Amerasia, has won the support of local population sufficiently to
enable them to withstand both Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and repeated
efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they
defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kowloon Railway, article re-
ports, that although Japanese have controlled both terminals for over 2 years,
they have not been able to run a single through train.
Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations
can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recognition
of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison of-
ficers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance for success
of our future offensive against Japanese.
Signed by Hull, HMB, SA/M.
Senator Ferguson. That is the same, as I checked it.
Mr, SouEWiNE. Yes.
You said it was longer. What did you have in mind that was in
this that was not in the other?
There is a word or two variation, but not in length.
Would the only difference be that a few articles such as "the" and
"a" have been left out in the cable text that was read?
Senator Ferguson. 1 think that is it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This does not purport to be a cable text, does it?
Mr. Vincent. It doesn't seem to me to be, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you familiar with the preparation of messages
for sending by cable in the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I am not familiar with that.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you ever prepare messages for sending by cable?
Mr. Vincent. I prepare messages for sending by cable, but so far
as distribution ; no. I just prepare the message on a cable form, yes.
Mr. Sourwine. When you prepare a message for sending by cable,
do you abbreviate it ? Do you use "cablese" or do you write the mes-
sage out and leave it to someone else on the cable desk to abbreviate it?
Mr. Vincent. I write it out in ordinary English except for the pos-
sibility of the elimination of some ai'ticles.
Mr. Sourwine. Isn't that the message as it was written out in ordi-
nary English and perhaps what Mr. McDermott read at the press
conference was the "cablese"?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't testify on that, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2091
Mr, SouRwiNE. Can you tell us what those distribution symbols at
the bottom of that message mean, or what any of them mean ?
Mr. Vincent, No. I could simply hazard the guess that these are
distribution symbols which the office of Mr. McDermott used to put
on them.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You don't know what they meant? Or what any
of them mean ?
Mr. Vincent. I think that last, "State FC/L,'] is foreign liaison,
but I couldn't be sure whether that is the designation or not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this message may be put
in the record at this point immediately 'following the text of Mr. Mc-
Dermott's press conference which was read into the record.
Senator Ferguson. It may be received, and it will show the
variation.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 387," and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 387
Secret (July 28, 1944.)
(Message sent:) Chungking, China, July 25 (1005), Hull (Secretary)
FAR EAST
The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibilitj/ of using the Japanese
Communist, Susiimu Okano, in the role of a ''Tito for Japan'' in helping the
Japanese people to establish a Oovernnient who will discard the aggressive aims
of the present ruling oligarch}/. — The magazine, however, voices uncertainty as
to whether the U. S. State Department "will support the program advocated by
Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called liberal elements'
in Japan's present ruling class."
The same issue proposed that the opposition to Japan throughout Eastern
China should he strengthened by the Allies' establishing close working relations
with the guerrilla forces now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in
the North, but also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities
with material, technical, and financial aid. The article insists there is no reason
the U. S. and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen
their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to the current political situa-
tion in Chungking. Amerasia advocates the Allies follow the policy adopted to-
ward the guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were
eventually superseded by military necessity.
The magazine denounces the "incredible and preposterous statement" of Gen-
eral Lo Tse-Kai that the Eighth Route Army has never fought the Japanese and
condemns the Information Minister's attempt to put the blame for Japan's vic-
tories in Honan on forces that, for a long time, have been prevented from fight-
ing and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other
essentials by the Central Government. It is asserted the vital Honan campaign
was won by only 40,000 Japanese, with not more than 116 tanks, at the time
when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only
a short distance away in barracks that form an iron ring blockading the Eighth
Eoute Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving the northern guer-
rilla forces have carried on their resistance to the Japanese and have persistently
continued their work of educating the people to participate in that resistance,
despite the constant "mopping up" campaigns by the Japanese and the hostility
on the part of the Chinese Government. The article points out that though
poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted the
enthusiastic support of the local population. The Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps,
according to Amerasia, has won the support of the local population sufficiently
to enable them to withstand both the Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and'
the repeated efforts on the part of the Central Government to uproot them. Sc
effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride the Canton-Kow-
loon railway, the article reports, that although the Japanese have controllecJ
2092 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
both terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single
through train.
Amerasia contends the time has passed when internal political considerations
can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recogni-
tion of the potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of
liaison officers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance
tor tlie success of the U. S. future offensive against the Japanese.
GOMINCH F-0
GOMINCH F-20
Op-13
Op-16
Op-16-1
OP-16-F •
OP-20-G
OP-16-A-3-1
State FC/L
Exhibit No. 377-A
Januaey 2, 1952.
Mb. John Caeter Vincent,
State Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Vincent : Due to unforeseen circumstances, your appearance before
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will have to be postponed from
January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.
We had previously notified you that you would be asked to bring certain
documents to enable the Committee to have full access to the facts. We are
enclosing herewith a list of the documents which you are requested to bring
with you.
We are notifying the State Department of our request in the interest of
assuring full cooperationjin the fulfillment of this request.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
(The 32 categories requested are the same as those appearing on pages 1915
and 1916.)
Exhibit No. 377-B
Department of State,
Washington, January IJf, 1952.
My Dear Senator McCarran : I have received your letter of January 2, 1952,
postponing the date of my meeting with your Subcommittee on Internal Security
from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.
On September 7, 1951, I wrote you from my post at Tangier, Morocco, denying
the allegation made by Budenz before your Subcommittee that I was a member
of the Communist Party. I also requested an opportunity to appear before
your Subcommittee in the event that you had any doubts as to my loyalty. I
received no reply to my letter.
On November 9, 1951, after my return to Washington on home leave, I wrote
you again. I then advised you that I had had an opportunity to read not only
Budenz' testimony of August 23, 1951, before your Subcommittee, but also his
subsequent reiteration of the same allegations on October 5, 1951, and that I
desired an opportunity to meet with your Subcommittee before Christmas, be-
cause of my scheduled return to Tangier at the beginning of the year, for the
purpose of denying publicly under oath the false testimony of Budenz.
On December 3, 1951, in reply to j'our letter of November 30, I stated that I
could postpone my departure for my post in order to meet with your Sub-
committee on January 11.
In response to my request, the Department of State has again authorized
a delay in my departure in order to meet with your Subcommittee on January
24 or 25. I hope there will be no further postponements. I consider it highly
important in the public interest as well as my own that I meet with your Sub-
committee, but it is also in the public interest that I resume my duties in
Morocco as soon as practicable.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2093
With regard to your request that I bring with me State Department docu-
ments designated under 32 separate categories, I have to inform you that this is
a matter for consideration by the Department of State. My own desire is, as it
has been from the beginning, to assure you and other members of the Sub-
committee that I am and always have been a loyal American official and
citizen and to make available to you any further information that I may have to
assist your Subcommittee in its inquiries regarding the internal security of the
United States.
Sincerely,
[s] John Carter Vincent.
John Caktee Vincent.
Mr, SouRwiNE. I should like to ask that instructions be given to the
staff to ask the State Department to send down here someone who is
familiar with their distribution symbols and can testify to what is
meant by the distribution symbols at the bottom of this. May we ask
that that person be down here at the beginning, if not before the con-
clusion this morning, at the beginning of the afternoon session?
Senator Ferguson. If they can come down right away. See whether
they can come immediately because it may help the witness on the
matter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. May we then pass over this until we have that testi-
mony ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I would like to ask some questions, but I
will reserve them until that goes in.
I notice it is marked "secret." How do you have a secret press
release ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, the first time I ever saw this thing it
would have been marked "secret." I have no explanation of that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The press release was in 1950, was it not?
Mr. Vincent. The press conference was in 1950.
Mr. SouRwiNE. So Mr. McDermott, having read it to the press in
1950, removed the secrecy injunction and it need not be regarded?
Senator Ferguson. At the time you understood it was a secret
document ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I am quite surprised to see that document marked
"secret." It may have been marked "restricted" when it went out.
Usually telegrams from State going to Chungking at that time used
naval radio, and they had to be sent oiit in some kind of code. I was
surprised to see that thing marked "secret."
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you on or about August 18, 1944, write a letter
dated that date, August 18, 1944, to Mr. Kaymond Dennett accepting
an invitation to become a member of the board of trustees of the
American Council of the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. 1 have no recollection of the date, but I would say I
must have written a letter accepting this invitation at some time.
Therefore, I have no reason to question that the date is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. Haven't you stated or implied here that your nam-
ing as a trustee was without your consent, that you had nothing to do
with it, that they just named you and you learned about it?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. You mean that I had no idea that
they were going to name me?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I think I have already testified that I had spoken to
Mr. Grew about the matter of becoming a trustee. If I did not, in
2094 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
executive session, it was my intention to. As I say, 1 testified that I
had no recollection of a letter, but a letter may have been written and
I don't deny that Mr. Dennett may have informed me that I was being
elected or may have asked me wether I could be elected.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether instructions or orders were
ever sent to Ambassador Hurley to stop trying to save the Chinese
Nationalists ?
Mr. Vincent, No, sir ; I have no recollection of a telegram telling
him to stop trying to save the Chinese Nationalists.
Mr. SouRwiNE. "Instructions and orders" is a little more broad
than "a telegram."
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection at all of Mr. Hurley being
instructed or ordered.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever send or assist in sending such orders
or instructions to Mr. Hurley ?
Mr. Vincent, Not as far as I recall, sir.
Mr. SouR^viNE. Was it, in 1944 and 1945, a Communist objective or
aim to achieve removal of the Japanese Emperor so as to give the Com-
munist type of "democratic elements" an opportunity to move into
the government of Japan ?
]VIi', Vincent. Was it the Chinese Communist aim ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. In 1944, yes.
Mr, Vincent, I couldn't testify as having any knowledge on that
subject, sir, I have no knowledge now and don't recall ever having
any that that was an objective of the Chinese Communists.
Mr. Sour WINE. Was it, at about that time, a policy objective or
aim of the Communists to secure removal from participation in Jap-
anese affairs of the existing business and political leaders, and the
breaking up of large business organizations and existing financial
control so as to bring about social and economic disorders and permit
the communistic democratic elements to take over?
Mr. Vincent. You asked me to testify and I have no personal
knowledge of that aim.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You don't know what the Communist aims and ob-
jectives were?
Mr. Vincent. With regard to Japan at that time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you favor, or seek to further, either of the two
objectives about which I have just inquired, that is, either the removal
of the Emperor or the removal from participation in Japanese affairs
of existing business and political leaders and the breaking up of large
business organizations and existing financial control ?
Mr, Vincent, In my position after I came into the State Depart-
ment as chairman of SWNCC, both matters were discussed. We
will take the first one first, which is the removal of the Japanese Em-
peror, There was a great deal of discussion as to his standing
Senator Ferguson, Will you speak a little louder.
Mr. Vincent, As to his standing trial as a war criminal. My rec-
ollection, without notes in front of me, is that my position was stated
fairly clearly in a radio forum address in early October 1945, in which
I said that the Japanese Emperor or the institution of the Emperor, if
the Japanese decided to retain the Emperor must be radically modi-
fied. That is my attitude on the Emperor question,
Mr, Sourwine, What did you mean by radically modified?
Mr, Vincent, I meant that the institution of the Emperor which
theretofore or up to that time had been what we call an absolute mon-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2095
archy would have to be modified into a constitutional monarchy if
the Japanese retained the Emperor with responsibility to the elected
representatives of the Japanese people.
Mr. SouRwiNE. With regard to the matter of securing removal from
participation in Japanese affairs of existing business and political
leaders and the breaking up of large organizations, did you favor,
or seek to further, that?
Mr. Vincent. At the time I took over my chairmanship of SWNCC
that was already adopted policy. I had no argument with the policy.
I thought the breaking up of the large combines would further the
economic development of Japan along democratic lines, along lines
that would encourage the healthier economic development and away
from what I would call the feudalistic capitalistic system of Japan.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Isn't it clear, then, sir, to you, that although you
do not remember having any knowledge as to whether either of these
things were Communist aims or objectives, since you did favor them
you must have felt at the time that they were not Communist objec-
tives ? Would that be correct ?
To put it another way, sir, you would not have favored these two
things knowing that they were Communist objectives, would you?
Mr. Vincent. I W'Ould not have favored them because they were
Communist objectives. I cannot be responsible for any coincidence
of papers' worked out in the State Department in which I had a part
and what the Communists at that time wished to accomplish.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know anything about the withdrawal of
the Marines from China?
Mr. Vincent. The withdrawal of the Marines from China was a
matter under discussion almost continuously during early 1946; yes,
sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did the State Department have anything to do with
that?
Mr. Vincent. The State Department from time to time under
pressure from public opinion here was interested in withdrawal of
the Marines as soon as it could be accomplished without endangering
our position in North China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have anything to do with that ?
Mr. Vincent. I presumably took a position as subordinate officer
in the State Department on the withdrawal I knew that I favored it,
but the actual withdrawal, which was not completely accomplished
.until after I left for Switzerland, I would not recall a specific instance
of my favoring the withdrawal except under the circumstances in
which as I say when they were no longer needed. That was reiterated
and reiterated in press conferences I remember held by the Secretary
and the Under Secretary in response to press questions, when are the
Marines going to be withdrawn. The answer always was, when they
can be spared. Chiang Kai-shek himself had welcomed their being
in there, but he himself had also stated in public, as I recall, that
they would be withdrawn as soon as they had accomplished whatever
mission they were there for, one of which was to assist in the Japanese
surrender.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, have you ever visited 155 East Forty-
seventh Street in New York City, apartment 7-D, or any apartment
in that building?
2096 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. Wliat would be the biiildiiifr? I have no recollection.
Mr. SouRwiNE. 155 East Forty-seventh Street.
Mr. Vincent. My knowledge of New York is not very clear, but I
was just saying that I have visited people in New York — 155 East
Mr. SouEwiNE. Forty-seventh Street.
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of visiting anyone there. If
you would try to refresh my memory
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever meet anyone there ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have a meal at Anthony's Steak House
at 627 Lexington Avenue ?
Mr. Vincent. At Anthony's Steak House ? I don't recall it, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. In 1944 and 1945 who in the State Department had
authority with regard to the issuance of visas, do you recall?
Mr. Vincent. I could look it up here, sir. I don't recall who the
head of the Visa Department was.
Mr. Sourwine. It was only a preliminary question. The second
question is, did you ever have anything to do with instructing em-
bassies to issue visas ?
Mr. Vincent Not that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever indirectly or directly instruct, that is,
yourself or through your subordinates, the issuance ef visas to any
alien Communist writers ?
Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that I do not recall ever giving any
instructions or causing to be issued visas to anybody, including Com-
munists.
Mr. Sourwine. You were a member of the Board of Trustees of
the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the year
1945?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. You were not a member of that board during any
other year?
Mr. Vincent. Not unless the trusteeship ran over to some period
into 1946. I don't know when they changed their trustees.
Mr. Sourwine. You did not contribute to the American Council
during 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I have any recollection of, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. During any other year?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I have any recollection of.
Mr. Sourwine. I am asking leading questions because we are cover-
ing territory that has been covered in executive session.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you given to understand that even though you
were a member of the board of trustees, you were not expected to
contribute ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any definite statement being made to
me that I would not be expected to contribute. I know I did not
contribute.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that you were the only member of
the Board of Trustees of the American Council of IPR in that year
who was listed as a complimentary member?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't know why it was that you were a com-
plimentary member ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2097
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
tjenator Ferguson. Why do you think they wanted you on the
board ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I testified in executive session, sir, that it
was the kind of organizatioij that would like to have in it somebody
from the State Department.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Why ?
Mr. Vincent. I was the Chief of the China Division.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Why did they want somebody from the State De-
partment on the board ?
Mr. Vincent. Because they had had people from the State De-
partment before. Dr. Hornbeck had been in it. They wanted some-
body from the State Department. I don't know whether there was
anybody else in that particular year from the State Department.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that to lead the public, which was reading
their books, pamphlets, and so forth, to believe that it had the backing
of the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify to that, whether that was their
intention.
Mr. Sourwine. What do you think they had in mind? Were you
told?
Mr. Vincent. I was never told what they had in mind.
Mr. Sourwine. When you went on didn't you inquire anything
about it? "Here, I am a trustee, and what am I to do?"
Mr. Vincent. No, I did not inquire what I was supposed to do.
My understanding was that many people were trustees who never
took any active part in the IPR trusteeship meetings. I don't even
know whether they have trusteeship meetings. I presume they do
have.
Mr. Sourwine. Where did you get that understanding?
Mr. Vincent. From looking at the number of people who were on
it, who couldn't possibly, it seems to me, be called together for trustee
meetings.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever attended a trustee meeting?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever talked to anybody about a trustee
meeting ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever asked anybody who attended trustee
meetings ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever asked anybody whether you would
be expected to attend trustee meetings ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. How many people did you know, approximately,
having their names on the board of trustees ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall how many people there were.
Mr. Sourwine. Were there as many as 50 ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to see the letter.
Mr. Sourwine. Were there as many as 500 ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; there wouldn't be 500.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliat difficulty would there have been about calling
together any lesser number than 500 ?
2098 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I would say because the names they had, like for
instance in 1949 General Marshall, I would assume that General Mar-
shall didn't go to trusteeship meetings.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You never inquired ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't know to this day whether he did or not ;
do you?
Mr. Vincent. No, I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. Your testimony is then, you want it to stand, that
simply from the number of names on the board of trustees you assumed
that it would not be an obligation of a trustee to attend meetings ?
Mr. Vincent. From the character of the names on there I would
have assumed that not all the trustees went to the meetings, but I don't
know. I would have to change the testimony, then, that I don't know
who attended the meetings other than the fact that I didn't attend
meetings.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean there were names on that list of board
of trustees who were obviously stooges or phoneys to you ?
Mr. Vincent. No, they were prominent people who I would have
thought didn't come all the way, or to a trusteeship meeting.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you see anything unusual about prominent
people being members of the board of trustees of the IPR?
Mr. Vincent. No, I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did it occur to you that prominent persons probably
wouldn't attend the meetings of that board ?
Mr. Vincent. I am simply trying to explain now that there was
no occurring to me at that time whether people did or did not attend.
You were asking me.
Mr. Sourwine. You just stated that from a perusal of the list of
the board of trustees you arrived at the conclusion that the trustees
were not expected to attend meetings.
Mr. Vincent. I only perused, so far as I can recall, the list of the
board of trustees only after I came back to the United States this
time, seeing a list of the board of trustees in the hearings exliibited
here.
Mr. Sourwine. This was not at the time that you had accepted
trusteeship ?
Mr. Vincent. That I perused it and came to the conclusion.
Mr. Sourwine. At that time you had no knowledge whatsoever as
to what the duties of a trustee were ?
Mr. Vincent. I had no knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. You never inquired of anybody ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. You wrote a letter accepting trusteeship, member-
ship on the board of trustees, with no knowledge as to what the duties
were and without inquiring of anybody what the duties would be?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. What do you think, Mr. Vincent, this name of
yours, being in the State Department, at the China desk, conveyed to
the public as a trustee of the IPR ?
IMr. Vincent. You have asked me that, sir, and I don't know what
the public would derive from that.
Senator Ferguson. What did you think it would convey to the
public when you accepted ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2099
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I did not think, in accepting, of any
effect my name as a trustee would have on the public.
Senator Ferguson. You never thought of that ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not think of that. I did not take myself in a
vein that the public would be impressed by my being on the board of
trustees.
Mr. SouR'WTNE. You thought of yourself in terms of a State Depart-
ment official when you thought of yourself as going on the board of
trustees of IPR, didn't you ?
Mr. Vincent. I was a State Department official.
Mr. Sourwine. You thought of yourself in that connotation and
not just as John Carter Vincent, private citizen ; didn't you?
Mr. Vincent. That I wouldn't want to testify, whether I thought
at all that that was the reason I was being put on there.
Mr. Sourwine. Haven't you stated that you knew they wanted
State Department people on ?
Mr. Vincent. I knew they had State Department people on there
before. Dr. Hornbeck had been on.
INIr. Sourwine. Didn't you state they wanted you because you were
a State Department person ?
Mr. Vincent. Because I was in the China Division ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Of the State Department.
Mr. Vincent. Because I knew China.
Senator Ferguson. You knew China and they wanted to convey,
apparently, the idea that they had a trustee on this board who knew
China and who was an expert and was directly connected with the
United States Government. That is apparent; isn't it?
Mr. Vincent. It would certainly be logical, but you asked me
whether I thought in those terms in accepting it. I am not trying to
quibble.
Senator Ferguson. No; and I am not trying to quibble with you,
but the only way I can get an answer is as to what you did think. If
you didn't think, I am not going to get an answer. Did you think at
that time what this would mean to the public ?
Mr. Vincent. I have told you, Mr. Chairman, I did not think of
what it would mean to the public.
Mr. Sourwine. Did the IPR have a democratic method of electing
its trustees ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know what method the IPR had for electing
its trustees, Mr. Sourwine.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see any of the literature of the IPR
as to how your name was listed ? Isn't it true they put under your
name that you were with the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I have never seen any of that literaturee, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, didn't you write to them to give
instructions as to how your name was to be listed in the roll of those
who attended the convention in 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. How my name was to be listed ?
Mr. Sourwine. Exactly. Didn't you write to the IPR telling them
that you were listed as (then giving your title) but that it was not
necessary to use the whole title, including "Office of Far Eastern
Affairs"?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall writing and telling them how to list
me. I wouldn't have thought I had to write, but if I did it is certainly
2100 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
something which has slipped my memory. They knew I was Chief of
the China Division.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes, of course they did, and they did list you that
way, didn't they ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, they did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you through, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever see the ballot for the election on which
you were elected a member of the board of trustees ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know that your name was one of six names
on that ballot under the subheading "Washington," with the instruc-
tion at the top, "vote for six" ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not know that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What duties, if any, did you perform as a member
of the board of trustees of IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. As far as I can recall I performed no duties at all as
a member of the board of trustees of IPR.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You have indicated that perhaps you were sought
as a member of that board because of your expertness in your field.
While you were a trustee did the IPR ever call upon you, as a trustee,
for expert advice or opinion ?
Mr. Vincent. As I have already testified, I saw members of the IPR
from time to time. Mr. Dennett, as I have already testified, came to
see me. Wliether they came to see me in my capacity as a trustee of the
IPR, whether they came to see me simply to discuss, as many people
did, conditions in the Far East.
Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, IPR people came to see you
before and after you were a trustee, didn't they ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any increase in the number of them that
came to see you while you were trustee ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of any increase or decrease
of the numbers.
Mr. Sourwine. Any increase after you became or decrease after
you ceased to be ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear of any charges of the IPR being
controlled by a Communist or pro-Communist group ?
Mr, Vincent. No, I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever read a report on the IPR prepared by a
State Department investigator ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see such a report ?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know such a report had been made?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge ; no, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. To the present date do you know that such a report
was made ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge even to the current date that
such a report was made.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know the State Department had been
called upon for such a report and had refused to produce it?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not know that.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2101
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you read the hearings of this committee with
regard to the IPK?
Mr. Vincent. Not all of them, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you at any time take any action for the purpose
of bringing about a change or changes in the Department of State
personnel assignments for the handling of far eastern matters?
Mr. Vincent. The matter of changes in persomiel in far-eastern
matters was handled by the administrative section in personnel. I
can't recall any instances of making their suggestions as to where peo-
ple would go. I do recall that — I am thinking now of the ones that
made an impression on me — remember recommending that Mr. Stan-
ton be made Ambassador to Siam or Minister to Siam at the time, that
was in 1945. But insofar as interfering or directing the assignment.
of people, I may have made recommendations from time to time as to
assignments. I cannot recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. While you were Director of the Far Eastern Divi-
sion, were people hired in that Division without your knowledge, con-
sent, or approval ?
Mr. Vincent. While I was Director?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I would say that I won't be consulted as Director of
the Far Eastern Office in regard to people being hired unless it was
a matter of hiring a new secretary or a higher officer.
Mr. Sourwine. Anyone who was going to deal with policy would
have to have your approval, wouldn't he?
Mr. Vincent. Practically, yes; theoretically he wouldn't have to
have my approval.
Mr. Sourwine. The Secretary could always go over your head?
Mr. Vincent. Go over my head and just send somebody in the office.
Mr. Sourwine. But as a matter of form that wasn't done? You
had the confidence of your superiors?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You were therefore consulted about personnel
changes in your department, were you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Of a major nature, of an important nature.
Mr. Sourwine. Which involved policy?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever initiate any such changes ?
Mr. Vincent. We are speaking of the Far Eastern Office, are we,
when I was Director, that period ?
Mr. Sourwine. They are certainly people dealing with the handling
of far eastern matters.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, but I mean, I am speaking of a period now, be-
cause when I was Director of the Far Eastern Office I had much more
to do with the organization of that office that I did when I 'was Chief
of the China Division, and there was a Director and an Assistant
Director. I am speaking when I was Director.
Mr. Sourwine. I think that is obvious. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. I recall recommending the man who took the China
Division at that time, who was Mr. Bill Turner. I am trying to
think of the organization of the office. He was a Foreign Service
officer whom I suggested to take that job.
^ Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, you made many recommenda-
tions, didn't you, during the course of your tenure ?
2102 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I thought you wanted me to recall them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. No. I am just trying to establish the fact that you
were the active head of that Office, that you were not a figurehead,
that you did initiate recommendations, and pass on the recommenda-
tions of others.
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever give any information to any person
or i^ersons outside the Department of State regarding changes sought
or effected in the State Department's assignment of personnel for the
handling of far eastern matters.
Mr. Vincent. Will you read that again ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. Did you ever give any information to any
person or persons outside the State Department regarding changes
sought or effected in the State Department's personnel assignments
dealing with far eastern matters ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of such conversations outside.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did any of your associates do so with your knowl-
edge?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of their doing it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall stating at a dinner in 1945 that "for
3 years I worked at nothing but to get the Communists and the
Nationalist Government together in China."
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you might have said that?
Mr. Vincent. I think I might have said that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would it have been a true statement at that time?
Mr. Vincent. It would have been a true statement at that time;
to get the Nationalists and the Communists to settle their differences.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever engage in a private correspondence
with personnel of the Embassy staff in Chungking?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. I am not much of a personal
correspondent. At some time I exchanged a personal letter with some-
body, George Atcheson or somebody else, but I have no recollection of
personal correspondence.
Mr. SoURwiNE. Did you ever carry on such personal correspondence
by way of the diplomatic pouch ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Would there have been anything wrong with that
if you had ?
Mr. Vincent. In getting things to Chungking it was about the
only way we had of getting them there.
Mr. Sourwine. Is there anything wrong in carrying personal stuff
or sending personal stuff in a diplomatic pouch?
Mr. Vincent. There is now, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there then ?
Mr. Vincent. To Chungking there was not because Chungking
was an exception because it was so difficult to get in there. I don't
know when the regulations were put in, but I know now you are ex-
pected not to use the pouch for purely personal matters, unless you
put stamps on the letters ; or, in some places, exception is made for it.
1 don't know what the regulations are.
Mr. Sourwine. If you had something when you were in China that
you wanted to bring back with you, couldn't you have put it in a
pouch and brought it back even though it was personal to you ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2103
Mr. Vincent. In Chungking during the war years you could.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Couldn't you do that from another station ?
JNIr. Vincent. Putting personal things in a Government pouch now
is discouraged.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Suppose you had a friend and he said, "I want to get
this back to tlie States, and I am afraid if I carry it I will have trouble
with the authorities or will lose it, I will be questioned about it, you
take it back for me," would you not be authorized to do that ?
Mr. Vincent. You are speaking of when ? During the war years
in China ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. In the war years in China people who were trusted,
people who were Government people, did use the pouch for that pur-
pose.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. But currently you are not supposed to put things in
the pouch.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean except in the China situation you
couldn't do it ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know what prevailed in other areas. I am
speaking only of the one that I had any knowledge of, that communi-
cations with Chungking were very difficult in those war years.
Mr. SouEwiNE. You have been at other stations, at other posts, was
it permitted from other posts?
Mr. Vincent. In Bern, where I most recently served, using the
pouch for transmission of personal letters was discouraged.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever use the pouch for bringing any-
thing back to this country for a friend ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, but I may have from Chungking.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have anything to do with bring-
ing the manuscript of Berlin Diary back to this country?
Mr. Vincent. I brought it through Spain ; yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. How did you carry it?
Mr. Vincent. I put it in my trunk.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who owned Berlin Diary at that
time ?
Mr. Vincent. William Shirer was the author of the notes that I
brought in my trunk through Spain in 1940.
Mr. Sourwine. It was a matter of accommodation ?
Mr. Vincent. It was a matter of accommodation, because at that
time Shirer was afraid that if it came out in private hands, that the
Spaniards would see it.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it correct to say you favored political settlement
of the dispute between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist
Government in China?
Mr. Vincent. It is correct to say so, and I may add that Chiang
Kai-shek on numerous occasions said he favored political settlement,
Mr. Sourwine. What did you mean by that phrase, "political set-
tlement"?
Mr. Vincent. I meant that they would settle their differences in
political conferences, as they were trying to, in order to avoid, as I
say, a disastrous civil war.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Chiang Kai-shek mean the same thing when
he used the same phrase ?
2104 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent, Chiang Kai-shek would mean the same thino;^ of
bringing them into the Nationalist Government in some manner which
would avoid conflict between them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. When you attended that conference of the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations in 1945, did you do so as a member of the
board of trustees or as a member of the American delegation to the
conference ?
Mr. Vincent. My recollection, sir, is that I attended as just one
member of the delegation. .
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were invited to attend the conference some-
time before you were elected a trustee, were you not?
Mr. Vincent. You have spoken to me of a letter here from Den-
nett in regard to my becoming a trustee and I don't recall whether
I was asked to be a trustee before I was asked to go to the meeting.
I would say that I was asked, my best recollection on attendance at
the conference, being asked to be a trustee was somewhere near about
the same time, but which came first or second, I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you not invited to a conference in the late
summer of 1944 or earlier?
Mr. Vincent. I would have placed the time later but I have not
clear memory as to what the time was.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You were given several months' notice, in any
event ?
Mr, Vincent. I would say so.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Mr. Philip C. Jessup had recom-
mended you for inclusion in that American delegation to the IPR
conference ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You have stated you made no speech at the con-
ference ?
Mr, Vincent, I made no speech that I recall at the conference.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you make a lengthy statement, 10 minutes or
longer, at any discussion at the conference ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall making any lengthy discussion. I may
have talked 5 minutes, and my recollection, as I testified in executive
session, is that I took very little part in the panel discussions,
Mr, SouRWiNE, After you got to Hot Springs, were you included
in any preliminary meetings of any groups other than the conference
groups in the official meetings and sessions of the conference?
Mr. Vincent. You are asking me to recall that ?
I don't. I do not recall any political meeting. I should imagine
the American group met. I don't know of any other meetings.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The American delegation group had met before you
left to go to Hot Springs, had they not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SoiJR\viNE. You testified in regard to that ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I am talking of a meeting with not all but some
members of the American group after you got to Plot Springs.
Mr. Vincent. I think that tlie American delegation met, whether I
attended all the meetings, every morning before the panel discussions
took place, but whether every member of the American delegation was
present at those morning meetings — I was not regularly present, but
my memory as best as I can bring it to bear on this matter that I have
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2105
forgotten a great deal about, is that the American delegation did hold
meetings preliminary to the day's discussions.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know Julian Friedman ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Soura\t:ne. What do you know about him ?
Mr. Vincent. I know that in 1944 Julian Friedman was assigned to
the Far Eastern Office, that he worked in the China Division for a
matter of about a year, and that subsequently he went to China as a
labor attache.
My recollection is that before he came into the Far Eastern Office,
that he had worked in some other office or division in the State Depart-
ment concerned with labor matters.
Mr. Souewine. What was his position in the Far Eastern Office ?
Mr. Vincent. He was simply one of the junior members of the staff.
He had no specific duties except that he was trying to learn something
about China preparatory to going out to China as a labor attache.
That is my recollection.
Mr. Souewine. Did he not have a title of some kind ? Was he just
a clerk ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; he was one of those types of people — I am trying
to think now what we called them in those days. He was not a Foreign
Service officer and he was not Foreign Service reserve, because that
title was created later.
Foreign Service auxiliary, I think, is what they called it at that
time, but I don't know whether he was Foreign Service auxiliary
or not.
Mr. Souewine. I read you a description of Mr. Friedman, and ask
you if it is correct :
Julian Friedman was born June 2, 1920, in New York City. Immediately upon
graduation from tlie Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he was hired by
the State Department in 1943 as a junior divisional assistant in international
economic affairs.
Mv. Vincent. That was the job that he had before he came to the
Far Eastern Office.
Mr. Souewine. You do not know what the job was when he came
to the Far Eastern Office ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether he had that title of junior
divisional assistant, because it was a departmental title.
Mr. Souewine. What did that title meaij?
Mr. Vincent. I would say it meant just what it says, a junior
divisional assistant, somebody who assisted as a junior in a division.
As I say, I don't know what division he was in, but I think he was
in that division of labor.
Mr. Souewine. Was it about equivalent to third assistant super-
visor of auxiliary functions?
Mr. Vincent. It would depend on the man, but it was just about
that.
Mr. Souewine. He certainly took no demotion w^hen he came into
the Far Eastern Office, did he ?
Mr. Vincent. Wliether his title was changed or not, I don't know,
but I don't think he would have taken a demotion in salary.
Mr. Souewine. Did you have anything to do with bringing him into
the Far Eastern Office?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
2284S— 52— pt. 7 8
2106 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you approve ?
Mr, Vincent. I neither approved nor disapproved. I don't think
I was consulted. The first time I saw him, he was assigned to the
office.
Mr. SoiTRWiNE. You were Chief of the China Division ?
Mr. Vincent. Chief of the China Division. Assignments were
made then to the Far Eastern Office, and people were assigned then to
the Division.
Mr. SouEwiNE. You mean- he was just foisted upon you without
consultation with you at all ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of being consulted on the em-
ployment of Julian Friedman.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean in the State Department the superiors
will say to the head of a division, "Move your desk over in the corner,
we are going to put another desk in the opposite corner, we have a
man that is coming in here who is going to work with you" ?
Mr. Vincent. No. You mean his employment and transfer to the
Far Eastern Office. I had nothing to do with that. After he came
into the Office, he was no doubt assigned to the China Division. I was
probably consulted by Mr. Ballantine or Mr. Grew as to whether that
was an assignment for him. I have no recollection of interfering
with the assignment one way or the other.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you at least consulted, then, when they moved
him into your office ?
Mr. Vincent. I must have been consulted.
Mr. Sourwine. I mean physically, the room that you occupied.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I would have been consulted. But you asked
me whether I remember being consulted. I don't remember being
consulted but it would be logical to be consulted.
Mr. Sourwine. You did approve bringing him in ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it your testimony you did not initiate that in any
way at all ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. But the suggestion for moving him into your office,
for desk space roughly corresponding to your own, was not your
suggestion ?
Mr. Vincent. No. It came, I suppose, as a matter of discussion
between Ballantine and myself or someone else as to whether I needed
new personnel in the China Division.
Mr. Sourwine. A person coming into that Office would have seen
two desks, one on his right and one on his left, in the corners opposite
the door?
Mr. Vincent. Wliether that was the Office — I know what you are
speaking of now, when Friedman first joined the Division, but the
Office when he occupied space with me was one of those large State
rooms.
Mr. Sourwine. A person coming in the door would have seen two
desks, one on his right and one on his' left?
Mr. Vincent. People coming in the room would have seen a desk
of a secretary immediately on the left. She did not have an outside
room. They would have seen in the left-hand corner, as I recollect it,
another desk. In the right-hand corner, on the far side, they would
I
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2107
have seen my desk and, as I recollect it, there was another desk against
the wall immediately to the right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that being occupied ?
Mr. Vincent. That other desk was not occupied except as people
came into the Division as visitors. General Hurley occupied it, inci-
dentally, for a month.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you and Mr. Friedman share a secretary?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether he used the same secretary as
I did or not, but if she wasn't busy, I would assume he did.
Mr. Morris. Who occupied that desk ?
Mr. Vincent. People would come in. I remember that General
Hurley, when he visited the United States in ]\Iarch, General Hurley
and I sat there in the room. I gave him my desk and I sat in the
corner desk for about a month, but there would have been other
people. We had very little room and there would have been other
people to use that desk who were visiting from the field.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any security check that was
ever made on Friedman ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't know of a security check on him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Friedman what ma-
terial or information might be shown to Andrew Eoth ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you describe Mr. Friedman's full duties ?
Mr. Vincent. I have tried to do that in executive session, sir. I
wound up with the fact that he did just whatever job was assigned
to him from time to time, to read dispatches when they were of par-
ticular interest on social or labor matters.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did anybody ever assign work to him, other than
you, when he was occupying office space with you ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify exactly on that. I don't know
whether the director or the deputy director would have assigned some.
They could have assigned it to him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mainly ; and, insofar as you know, any assignment
he got came from you ?
Mr. Vincent. Assignments he would have gotten were mainly from
me.
Mr. Sourwine. What kind of assignments did you give him?
Mr. Vincent. As I say, he just did what other people gave him,
just worked in the office and did jobs of reading dispatches when
they were of one concern or another.
Mr. Sourwine. When he would read a dispatch, he would do it
because you assigned him to do it?
Mr. Vincent. Either I or my deputy, the Assistant Chief.
Mr. Sourwine. Generally, you gave him most of the assignments?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to testify exactly on that.
Mr. Sourwine. You just did testify on that. Did you not say that
generally you gave him most of his assignments ?
Mr. Vincent. I said generally I would give him most of the assign-
ments, or my deputy.
Mr. Sourwine. You did, on occasion, assign him to read dispatches;
is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. When you asked him to read a dispatch, why did
you want him to read it ?
2108 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. In order for himself to become informed on it and,
as the system was in those days, to put briefings on the dispatches so
you would not have to read the whole dispatch.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He was briefing dispatches for you ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRw^NE. Did he ever prepare any memoranda for you on
dispatches ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any memoranda, but he probably did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The briefings did not constitute memoranda?
Mr. Vincent. If you call a brief on the thing a memorandum. But
sometimes, depending on the length, it would be a memorandum on
one subject or another, but I don't remember any.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever rough draft anything for you ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether he did or not. He had the
work there and he could have.
Senator Ferguson. Was he there in July 1946 ?
Mr. Vincent. In July 1946?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I would have to look up his record here, if you have
that book ; but I think he had already gone to Shanghai.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever dictate to your secretary for your sig-
nature ?
Mr. Vincent. He probably did.
Mr. Sourwine. If he had so dictated, would his initials ever appear
anywhere on the letter or paper ?
Mr. Vincent. That would have been normal procedure ; if he had
dictated a letter for my signature, it would have his initials in the
lower left-hand corner.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he not do that with some frequency ?
Mr. Vincent. Whether frequently or not, I assume he did.
Mr. Sourwine. You had a man there who was in your Division
whom you considered was competent to do the work. You gave him
a lot of routine correspondence to handle for you ?
Mr. Vincent. Probably.
Senator Ferguson. Why do you say "probably" ?
Mr. Vincent. As I say, he was there ; I don't recall any specific in-
stance. I don't recall any general instance, but he certainly was there
earning whatever he was making and doing work. I would have
assigned him to answer this letter or that letter. The answer is "Yes."
Senator Ferguson. You did do so ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You did not confine his assignments to reading dis-
patches and preparing briefings for you?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. You gave him other work ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And that other work included the preparation of
certain correspondence ?
Mr. Vincent. I can only say that it is logical to say that he would
have prepared correspondence.
Mr. Sourwine. What other kind of work did you give him?
Mr. Vincent. I can't think of the specific types of work.
Senator Ferguson. Was he kept busy ?
Mr. Vincent. He seemed to be busy to me.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2109
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you have him run errands for you, personal
errands ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recalh
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did he ever do any research for you ?
Mr. Vincent. That would have been possible, that I had asked him
to look into something, read something, to let me know what was
in it.
Mr. SouinviNE. That was one of his functions, was it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sour WINE. I believe you stated that you never investigated his
loyalty record.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I never have.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You never asked for his loyalty file ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. His security file?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know where he is now ?
Mr. Vincent. I think in executive session you, yourself, said he was
in San Francisco, so I know it from your report that he was in San
Francisco.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Independently of anything I might have said, do
you have any knowledge as to where he is ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir; because I testified in executive session I
didn't know where he was.
Mr. SouRWiNE. For the record, on the question of what I said, I
told you that information had come to the committee that he was at
the University of California. That does not necessarily place him at
San Francisco, but he might be only a "bay" away.
Mr. Vincent. I am sorry.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Why was he dropped or terminated at the State
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge as to why he was dropped or
whether he himself resigned.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You never discussed that matter with anyone?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall discussing it. I was in Bern and I
don't know the date when he was dropped or resigned.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did anyone every tell you that Friedman was sus-
pected of being the source of leaks ?
Mr. Vincent. No. I have seen that in the testimony here but at
the time he was working with me nobody told me, as far as I know,
that he was suspected of leaking.
Mr. SouRwiNE. No one ever made those charges to you or told you
about such charges or such suspicions ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall anybody coming to me and ac
cusing him of leaking.
Senator Ferguson. You were never questioned about leaks ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you not think you would recall an im-
portant matter like being questioned about leaks ?
Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief.
Senator Ferguson. Think a moment. Were you ever, while you
were in the State Department, questioned about leaks from the State
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Questioned about leaks from the State Department?
2110 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. To my knowledge and belief, I don't recall being-
questioned about leaks from the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. Were you ever asked any questions about the
loyalty of any employees in the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. I have been questioned about the
loyalty of people after I got out to Bern because we would get letters
from the Security Division there about people who had served or
who had lived in Switzerland.
Senator Ferguson. That is what we are trying to get at.
Mr. Vincent. That is a system that was initiated. I am describing
now a system which the State Department has which you call checks
on people who apply for jobs.
Senator Ferguson. When did that start?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say definitely when it started.
Senator Ferguson. About when ?
Mr. Vincent. It had started when I went to the field, when I went
out to Bern in 1947.
Senator Ferguson. Up until 1947, had you ever been- questioned
about leaks in the Department?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever been questioned about the loyalty
of any person in the State Department ?
Mr. V incent. In the State Department ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, prior to going into the field in the middle
of 1947.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall being questioned about leaks or
loyalty of people in the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. Since you went to Bern, have you been ques-
tioned about leaks in the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall. Our office used to get letters, but I
don't recall being questioned about leaks in the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. You had charge of the Far East desk at one
time?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it not true that in the Amerasia case the
papers were taken from the State Department or had been in the
State Department and got to Amerasia and were published ?
Mr. Vincent. That is true.
Senator Ferguson. And found in their office ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Were you ever questioned by anyone about those
papers or how they may have gotten out of that office ?
Mr. Vincent. I am trying to think whether I was or not.
The reason I am hesitating here is because I am trying to figure —
it is a perfectly logical question — as to what the logical answer would
be.
Senator Ferguson. I suggest that you think about it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you say, Mr. Vincent, you were trying to think
what a perfectly logical answer would be?
Mr. Vincent. I said it is a logical question.
Senator Ferguson. I have already given the question. Do not
worry about the question being logical.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2111
Mr. Vincent. I was trying to think whether at the existing time
Senator Ferguson. Can you not remember a thing like that, as
important as it would be, about leaks or about papers being taken
from the State Department, that you were questioned about it?
Mr. Vincent. That is just what I am trying to do, Senator, to see
whether I can recall anybody asking me about the leaks in connection
with the Service case, and I am trying to think of anybody I might
have known in the Security Division that might have come up and
questioned me about it. I think somebody did come up from the Secu-
rity Division or somebody was sent up by the Security Division that
did ask where papers were kept and asked about them at that time,
what the files were.
Senator Ferguson. Tell us what you know about that investigation.
Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of the thing except that
it was on the matter of where files were kept.
Senator Ferguson. Where files were kept. Anything else?
Mr. Vincent. Where files were kept in connection with the avail-
ability of papers to one person or another.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the explanation now as to the question-
ing?
Mr. Vincent. That is the explanation, as far as I can remember.
Senator Ferguson. As to the investigation that was made?
Mr. Vincent. As to the investigation, the only one I recall.
Senator Ferguson. How long did it take to complete the investiga-
tion, as far as you were concerned?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't know whether it was 10 minutes,
20 minutes, 30 minutes.
Senator Ferguson. Have you no recollection at all?
Mr, Vincent. No ; I can't recall back in 1945 how long a conversa-
tion I might have had.
Senator Ferguson. You saw in the newspapers the question in the
Amerasia case?
Mr, Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did that not refresh your memory ? Was it not
about that time you were questioned?
Mr. Vincent. I thought you meant the length of time. It was at
the time of the Amerasia case, and I didn't even recall this in execu-
tive session, but I now think somebody came up.
Senator Ferguson. You now only "think" there was some one. Do
you know?
Mr. Vincent. I recall somebody came up. I am trying to think
who it was that came up, whether he came from the Security Di-
vision, whether he was sent up from the Security Division to ask how
we kept papers, and that is all I recall of that particular instance.
I thought you asked me of the length of the conversation.
Senator Ferguson. All they did was to come in and ask how you
kept the papers?
Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of what the thing was about.
Senator Ferguson. That is your best recollection ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is all you can give this committee?
2112 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent, Well, I mean the whole investigation was in con-
nection with the disappearance of papers from the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about your share in it.
]VIr. Vincent. That is my recollection of my share in it.
Senator Ferguson. That is all you were questioned about ?
Mr. Vincent. That is all I recall being questioned about.
Senator Ferguson. Was that not an important matter to the State
Department, papers being removed ?
Mr. Vincent. It certainly was.
Senator Ferguson. Did some of them come out of your files ?
Mr, Vincent. I have since learned that some of them came out of
my files; yes.
Senator Ferguson. And the only examination that was made is
what you have told us about here this morning ?
Mr, Vincent. That somebody was sent up by the Security Division.
I imagine I can add to that ; they asked me whether
Senator Ferguson. I wish you would do more than imagine.
Mr, Vincent, I say it was in connection with the Amerasia case
and in connection with the disappearance of these papers that the
man came up.
Senator Ferguson, First, when I asked the question, you had abso-
lutely forgotten about that.
Mr, Vincent. I had forgotten whether anybody had come up or not.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, the Amerasia case was so un-
important that you had forgotten anybody had asked you about
papers or leaks or anything else ?
Mr. Vincent. The Amerasia case took place in 1945, I was trying
to do my best to remember if in any way I was questioned about the
Amerasia case, and I have told you all I know,
Mr. Morris, Do you think it is possible you may have been a mem-
ber of the Communist Party in 1945 and now have forgotten it ?
Mr, Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You think you would remember that ?
Mr. Vincent. I am sure I would remember that.
Senator Ferguson. As far as you were concerned, did you make an
investigation about the papers that were taken from your files?
Whom did you question ?
Mr, Vincent. I did not know at that time who, or what papers
had been taken from the files. Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. You mean they never told you what papers they
were talking about when they investigated?
Mr. Vincent. The FBI was keeping the papers, and I do not
know what the exact papers were that were taken from the files.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to an FBI officer?
Mr, Vincent, There may have been an FBI ofhcer sent up by
Security.
Senator Ferguson, Just may have been ? Do you not know if an
FBI officer came in he would show you his picture and credentials?
Mr, Vincent, No; because I don't recall being interviewed by an
FBI officer except possibly on this one occasion.
Senator Ferguson. Let us get it a little more definite than "pos-
sibly." Did you make an investigation about the papers or the leaks
in your office?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not make an independent investigation.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2113
Senator Ferguson". Were you asked to make an investigation ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall being asked to make an investigation.
Senator Ferguson. And the only thing that you can recall now is
someone coming to you and asking where you kept the files; is that
right ?
Mr. Vincent. And who had access to the files.
Senator Ferguson. And who had access to them. Is that all ?
Mr. Vincent. That is all I can recall.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you as to wliether or not you gave
these papers to someone outside?
Mr. Vincent. They might have, but I don't recall their asking me.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think they might have ?
Mr. Vincent. I think they might have, and my answer would have
been "No."
Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you as to whether or not you gave
the papers to Roth or Jaffe ?
Mr. Vincent. You are asking me whether they did or didn't. I
don't recall whether they did or didn't ask me whether I gave the
papers.
Senator Ferguson. They may have missed asking you that, the man
in charge ?
Mr. Vincent. That may have been one of his questions, and my an-
swer would have been "No."
Senator Ferguson. It may have been. Did you know Roth ?
Mr. Vincent. I had seen Roth come in and out of the Department ;
yes.
Senator Ferguson. Had he ever been in your office?
Mr. Vincent. He had been in the office one time or another calling
on Friedman.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you any questions about Fried-
man?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you any questions about Roth and
Friedman ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether they did or not.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you whether Roth had ever been
in your office ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't recall this conversation, whether
they asked me specifically about Roth or not.
Senator Ferguson. That is the best you can do for this committee
about this investigation of the leaks and the removal of papers from
your files ?
Mr. Vincent. From my memory, that is the best I can do.
_ Senator Ferguson. You do not think this committee has been en-
lightened about this problem ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have liked to enlighten the committee more,
but I do not recall exactly.
Senator Ferguson. Did they ask whether John Service came in and
out of your office ?
Mr. Vincent. They probably did.
Senator Ferguson. Just probably?
Mr. Vincent. When I say that, I am not recalling the conversation,
but it certainly would have been logical to ask for the disappearance
2114 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of the papers whether Service could come in or out of my office, and
my answer would have been "Yes."
Senator Ferguson. Do you have as much trouble giving the De-
partment heads and so forth, in your office, information as you do this
committee of happenings in the past ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, that question was asked me yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. And I ask it again.
Mr. Vincent. I answered it yesterday the same as I will answer
today. If the Department asked me questions about something that
happened 7 years ago, I would have equal difficulty.
Senator Ferguson. This was an important matter, the removal of
papers from your office.
Mr. Vincent. It certainly was.
Senator Ferguson. It cast a reflection on you personally: did it
not?
Mr. Vincent. It certainly could have.
Senator Ferguson. Is that all, just "could have"? Did you not
take this matter seriously when this man came?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Who was it?
Mr. Vincent. I said he was somebody sent up by the Security
Division of the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. Did you question Friedman about the papers?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall interviewing Friedman about the
papers.
Senator Ferguson. Did it not strike you that, if Friedman was in
the office and Roth came in to see Friedman and the papers were re-
moved, you ought to ask Friedman about it?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That never struck you ?
Mr. Vincent. No. As I say, I wasn't, myself, conducting the in-
vestigation. As I say, I didn't interview or question Friedman
about it.
Senator Ferguson. Even though you were not conducting the ex-
amination, Mr. Vincent, I would have thought, and now think, that
you would have been more interested in it than you have displayed to
this committee. I must tell you frankly that I do not think you have
been frank on this investigation that I have been asking you about.
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have tried to be frank.
Senator Ferguson. I do not believe you have been. I refer to the
record, and the record will speak for itself.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, when was the so-called Amerasia case ?
When were the papers discovered in the office of Amerasia ? Do you
know?
Mr. Vincent. I would say the latter part of March or early April
1945.
Mr. Sour WINE. Toward the end of 1945, was there any fear in the
Institute of Pacific Relations that there might be further investiga-
tions growing out of the Amerasia case ?
Mr. Vincent. Would you repeat that question ?
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any fear in the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions that there might be further investigations growing out of the
Amerasia case?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall them, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2115
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you ever consulted by anyone connected with
the Instiute of Pacific Relations about the possibility of surveillance
or other activity which might drag the Institute of Pacific Relations
into some kind of turmoil in connection with subversive charges?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge was I consulted about it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Specifically, did Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore or Mr.
Lattimore ever see you about such a matter?
Mr. Vincent. If they did, I am afraid I would have to make my
usual statement, I don't recall their seeing me.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to state if
what I hand him is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific
Relations.
Mr. Mandel. It is.
Mr. Sourwine. It is a carbon copy of a letter, is it not ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. And attached to it is an original of a letter ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. To whom is the carbon copy letter addressed?
Mr. Mandel. Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council, Institute
of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Sourwine. Signed by whom ?
JNIr. Mandel. Signed, Mrs. Marguerite Ann Stewart, Acting Ad-
ministrative Secretary.
Mr. Sourwine, How is the other letter addressed ?
Mr. Mandel. "Dear Peggy" and refers to Mrs. Marguerite Stewart,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Sourwine. How is it signed ?
Mr. Mandel. Betty Ussachevsky.
Mr. Sourwine. May I have those ?
This letter, which is dated December 12, 1945, addressed to "Dear
Eleanor," reads as follows:
I am going to read the whole letter, but we will get down to the
meat in the coconut toward the end.
I have discussed the matter of your pinch hitter in Washington with ECO
and he tells me that Phil Lilienthal is out of the picture. With Hilda gone,
Pacco is too understaffed to spare him.
Do you know who Phil Lilienthal was ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified I have no recollection who Phil
Lilienthal was.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who the "Hilda" was that he re-
ferred to ?
Mr. Vincent. Not by that name.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who it might have been ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. By that name or any other name ?
Mr. Vincent. Not unless you give the last name.
Mr. Morris. Did you know Hilda i\.ustern?
Mr. Vincent. No; I testified I didn't know Hilda Austern. I said
I thought she was secretary to Carter. I may be wrong on that.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who Pacco is, that is referred to?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Reading the next paragraph of the letter :
As you surmised, he is not particularly interested in either Gretchen Green
or Eleanor Perkins. I thought your suggestion about an old IPRite advisory
2116 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
committee meeting at a regular weekly luncheon a masterful one, and think
it should be started at once by you so that it will be in full swing for the new-
comer. With regard to your accompanying suggestion of Ellen Atkinson, ECO
asked how pink she is. I think this query was motivated by Betty's worries
with regard to possible future trouble and, in that event, Carter does not favor
Ellen's being associated with the IPR. He is, however, open to argument on
this matter if you feel strongly that she has no pink reputation.
In the meantime, I have consulted the staff and Larry suggests Lillian CoviUe
and Audrey Menefee, both of whom, I understand, have recently been let out
of FCC.
Do you know Menefee ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I think, if the Audrey Menefee was connected
as a script writer with NBC.
Mr. SouEwiNE. That was Selden Menefee.
Mr. Vincent. That I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether Audrey Menefee is related to
Selden Menefee ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. SouRWiNE (reading) :
Miss Coville, in particular, sounds rather good and has already told Larry
she would like a job in the IPR. Enclosed is a bit of dope about these two
prepared by Shirley and Larry. Will you be good enough to try to get in touch
with them and interview them?
I just received a note to Eugene Staley from Betty. Please tell her that he
is the executive secretary of our San Francisco office and, in future, mail to
him should be directed there. I shall forward this letter.
Now we come to what I characterize as the meat in the coconut :
We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter,
and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with
John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know
on these things.
Now, does that aid your recollection at all ?
Mr. Vincent. It does not.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know why Marguerite Ann Stewart, the
acting administrative secretaiy of IPR, referred to you in a letter
to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council of IPR as a trusted
friend who might be in the know ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. One of the "knows" was whether this party
was pink or not.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what "these things" referred to?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
Do let me know what you think of Coville and Menefee as soon as you have
had a chance to sound them out.
As ever,
(Mrs.) Marguerite Ann Stewart,
Acting Administrative Secretary.
Did you know Marguerite Ann Stewart ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether she is any relation to
Maxwell Stewart?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. This second letter addressed to "Dear Peggy" and
dated December 5, is on the Stationery of the American Council of
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2117
IPR. I will read tlie first paragraph. It appears to be of little
relevance :
Dear Peggy : I was very horrified to discover that I had not sent one of
the school orders to you with the batch that I sent after we had moved here.
I am enclosing it in this letter. It is dated October 25. I discovered it in a file
box which I have just got around to sorting out. I hope that you can feel
assured that we won't have any more delays like this and I am very sorry. I
would fill this out myself except that Eleanor's pamphlet is listed and I think
it better that you handle that request ; also, so far we have established no
machinery to take care of school discounts. The latter is something I'll take
up with Tillie soon. Also, today it is quite difiicult to get at our publications
because of some workmen who are tearing apart a floor. I won't go on about
this difficulty ; it makes me absolutely profane.
This is the paragraph which is referred to in the previous letter
when they said :
We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter,
and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with
John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know
on these things.
Now, I would like you to listen to this, if you will, and I am going
to ask you when I am through whether you had any conversations
or discussions about the subject matter of this letter with Mrs. Latti-
more, Owen Lattimore, or anyone else connected with IPR.
Something that has been on my mind these last few days and which I haven't
yet mentioned to Eleanor since she has been in Ruxton, is a bit of news that
j'ou should have. I was told that there would again be all the business that
preceded the arrest of the six. The warning was that this time-tailing, mid-
night raids, et cetera, tapping of wires might get started in an effort to establish
a "Communist ring" and that the IPR would definitely be on the list, and that
people who had been questioned during the case would be on the list as possible
suspects in this ring. I must say that this warning has only made me angry
and it hasn't in any way, or won't stop normal business here. The office of
course, is quite accessible for searching, but I am at a loss as to what can
be construed that is in our possession as being evidence of communism. At
the same time, it is good to know that this process is going on because it shows
that the "open" fight over on the Hill is employing under-cover methods that
are malicious in intent. If this report is true, I am not sure whether or not
the under-cover activities are being instigated by a small group of Republicans,
by the Un-American Committee whom Hurley has stirred up, or by the FBI itself.
However, it is dirty and it is quite possible to believe that every attempt to
distort and twist facts will occur, and because of that we should be prepared
to be on the offensive. That this whole mess of name-calling, the obscuring of
issues, and all the red herrings that have cluttered up the perspective in the
past is emerging again has made me feel sick; however, Peggy, I hope that
people like you can insist that we take a belligerent stand if we are dragged
in. Of course, I am not sure whether this information is true, but I can well
believe it.
Cordially,
[S] Betty.
Betty Ussachevskt.
Now, did you ever discuss the subject matter of that letter as such
or as a subject with Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Mr. Owen Lattimore,
or anyone else in the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, discussing the subject matter of
that letter.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, can you not be more definite?
Can you not be more definite after hearing that letter read ?
2118 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge, I can be that definite,
to the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not discuss the subject
matter of that letter with anyone.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard of the subject of that
letter ?
Mr. Vincent. Of the subject of that letter?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No; I had not heard that the IPR was going to be
under investigation.
Senator Ferguson. Had you heard of any of the other things ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I had not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore
any question having to do with surveillance of IPR members, search-
ing of the IPR offices, or possible attempts to check the IPR for
communism ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no current knowledge of having such a con-
versation.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have had such a conversa-
tion ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't deny that the Lattimores may have mentioned
to me at some time they were afraid of the IPR. I have to testify
1 have no knowledge at this time.
Senator Ferguson. I want that answer to my question read back.
(The answer referred to was read by the reporter.)
Senator Ferguson. What do you say now ?
Mr. Vincent. What I said then was, in answer to Mr. Sourwine's
question, I do not deny it is possible they did discuss it with me.
Senator Ferguson. Discuss what with you ?
Mr. Vincent. The fact that the IPR might have been under in-
vestigation.
Senator Ferguson. This letter is dated December 5, 1945.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that the first mention of red herring, Mr.
Vincent ?
Senator Ferguson. In connection with communism.
Mr. Vincent. I can't testify as to whether it was the first men-
tion.
Senator Ferguson. You know the words "red herring" in relation
to investigations of communism became rather prominent later?
Mr. Vincent. I heard that, yes, sir, when I was in Switzerland.
Mr. Sourwine. You were in Switzerland in 1947 ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. This was in 1945.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Here we have a girl wlio is worried about a possible
investigation that might involve the IPR, using the phrase "red her-
ring" in a letter to Mrs. Stewart. Mrs. Stewart forwards that letter
to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore and suggests that Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore
get in touch with you about the matter.
Can you say definitely you never saw this letter of Betty Ussa-
chevsky's ?
Mr. Vincent. I can say to the best of my knowledge and belief I
never saw that letter.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say definitely you never were told about it ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2119
Mr. Vincent. I can say definitely I have no recollection of ever
being told about it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is a dijfferent thing.
]\Ir. Vincent. I am trying to say to the best of my knowledge and
belief I did not see that letter nor was I told about it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you not think you would remember that
letter if you saw it before ? ,
Mr. Vincent. I think I would, yes, and therefore I am testifying
to the best of my knowledge and belief I didn't see that letter.
]\Ir. Sourwine. May these two letters be inserted in the record at
this point ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, they will be received.
(The letters referred to are Exhibit No. 382-A and No. 382-B, and
are read in full.)
Senator Ferguson. You did have a conversation with one or both
of the Lattimores ?
Mr. Vincent. From time to time ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. About the IPK, and its connection with com-
munism ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, my testimony was that I said it would have
been possible to have had a conversation but I do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. That does not help this committee at all, that it
could be possible that you had such a conversation. I am asking you,
did you ever have a conversation ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, I did not, but I am also testifying in response to your question
that they might have mentioned it to me at some time. I am speaking
now from my memory of 5 years ago.
Senator Ferguson. Which do you think is the more probable, that
they did or did not? You have given both ways in the record, as I
recall it. Which is right ?
Did they ever talk to you about the IPR and communism ?
Mr. Vincent. I am testifying that I have no recollection of their
talking to me about communism in the IPR, but I am saying I am not
denying that such a thing is possible for them to have discussed it
with me, but based on my memory, on my memory, I do not recall such
a conversation.
Senator Ferguson. You are not a lawyer, are you?
Mr. Vincent. I am not a lawyer.
Senator Ferguson. You understand that you are under oath ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And have been under oath ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator L erguson. And are you giving now your best answer?
Mr. Vincent. I am giving you the best answers.
Senator Ferguson. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth ?
Mr. Vincent. I am telling you I have no recollection about the
conversation in regard to that.
Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you what the conversation
was. I am asking you whether you ever had a conversation with
both or either of the Lattimores about the IPR and communism.
Mr. Vincent. I am telling you that I have no recollection of that
conversation.
2120 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. That does not say that you did not have the
conversation. It merely says now you have no recollection.
Mr. Vincent. That is perfectly correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is a mental reaction at the present time
that you have no — —
Mr. Vincent. My memory does not inform me that I had a con-
versation.
Senator Ferguson. So if we could prove you did, it would only be
a matter that you did not remember it at this particular moment ?
Mr. Vincent. That is perfectly correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I would like to clean up one thing about Mr. Fried-
man. I have read you part of a description of Mr. Friedman. I
would like to read the rest of it and ask you if it is accurate, so far
as you know.
At the time of the Amerasia investigation, he —
that is Friedman —
held the rating of Division Assistant in the office of John Carter Vincent, Chief
of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the
United States Department of State?
Is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. What are you reading from, sir? I have already
testified that he might have had the title of "Division Assistant." I
did not recall his exact title.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, you were a pretty close friend of
the Lattimores?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think now, after hearing these letters
read to you, that they should have come to you and discussed this
matter with you ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, we can go back to that again. I have said
already that it is quite possible that the Lattimores had discussed it
with me, but I cannot recall the occasion of any such discussion.
It could have happened later, but I went to Moscow with Mr. Byrnes
4 or 5 days after that letter was written, but the conversation could
have taken place after I returned.
Mr. SouR^\aNE. Did you have Julian Friedman with you in San
Francisco at the United Nations Conference?
Mr. Vincent. Julian Friedman was out in San Francisco at the
United Nations Conference working on the Secretariat of the Con-
ference.
I was assigned to the office that was set up under Mr. Ballantine to
keep contact with the far eastern delegation.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not have any contact with Mr. Friedman at
San Francisco?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, I saw Mr. Friedman at San Francisco. You
asked me whether he was assigned to me at San Francisco.
Mr. Sourwine. I asked you whether you had him with you in San
Francisco.
Mr. Vincent. My answer is that he was in San Francisco at the
same time I was.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the assignment to
San Francisco ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2121
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall having anything to do with it. He,
himself, independently tried to get the job.
There was a notice around to try to get people on the Secretariat,
and he got that job for himself.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that assignment away from your office ?
Mr. Vincent. That assignment was away from my office.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you not asked to approve that ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have had to be asked to approve it.
Mr. Sourwine. So you know you did approve it ?
Mr. Vincent. Either I approved it or the Deputy Chief of the
Division approved it. I don't know who approved it. He asked for
permission to go to San Francisco, and he would have had to ask
permission from me. AVho actually signed the order for him to go to
San Francisco, I don't know. It wouldn't have been me, to sign his
orders.
Senator Ferguson. We will recess here until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12: 05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., this
same day.)
afternoon session
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. Mv. Chairman, this morning it was ordered that a
request be made of the State Department to send someone down here
who was familiar with their distribution of documents and their dis-
tribution coding. I believe such a man is here. I would ask that he
be sworn and that we hold JVIr. Vincent on the stand while I ask a few
questions of this gentleman from the State Department.
The Chairman. All right. Do you solemnly swear the testimony
you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Stuftlebeam. I do.
TESTIMONY OF EOBEET E. STUFELEBEAM, CHIEF, DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Sourwine. What is your name, sir?
Mr. Stufflebeam. Kobert Stufflebeam.
Mr. Sourwine. And your position with the Department of State ?
Mr. Stufflebeam. Chief of the Division of Communications and
Records.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Stufflebeam, I hand you a document which this
morning was placed in the record of this committee. Will you read
the heading?
Mr. Stufflebeam. The underscored portion ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. Just enough to identify what the document is.
Mr. Stufflebeam. This document is headed "Far East," and the first
sentence reads :
The July issue of the Amerasia suggests possibility of using the Japanese
Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping the
Japanese people to establish government —
Is that sufficient ?
122848— 52— pt. 7—9
2122 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouEwiNE. That is a two-page paper, is that correct ?
Mr. Sttjfflebeam. That is a two-page paper.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And in the lower left-hand corner of the second
page appear some symbols ?
Mr. Stufflebeam. There are a number of symbols there, which
appear to be Navy organizational units.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you say those are distribution symbols, those
are symbols indicating the distribution of this paper?
Mr. Stufflebeam. If the Navy uses a system similar to the system
used by the State Department, those would probably be distribution
symbols.
Mr. Sourwine. Those are not State Department distribution
symbols ?
Mr. Stufflebeam. No. Navy.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you sufficiently familiar with the Navy Depart-
ment distribution symbols to tell us what those symbols mean ?
Mr. Stufflebeam. I am not f amilar enough to know what organiza-
tional units these would stand for.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, it appears that we have gone to the
wrong place for our information. Perhaps we owe Mr. Stufflebeam an
apology. I would suggest that he be excused and that we make a re-
quest of the Navy Department that they send us a man to try to
identify these symbols.
The Chairman. There are none of those symbols that you can
identify, is that right ?
Mr. Stufflebeam. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it instructed, Mr. Chairman, that the staff request
the Navy Department to send someone up here ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. May we hold this matter in abeyance until the Navy
Department man gets here ?
The Chairman. The matter will stand in abeyance.
Mr. Sourwine. Thank you, sir.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, do you remember testifying in execu-
tive session about the question of whether you ever gave or arranged
a luncheon for members of the IPR at the Blair Lee House ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; I do.
Mr. SouuwiNE. Would you briefly summarize your testimony in
that regard ?
Mr. Vincent. May I refer to the testimony? I think I testified
then that 1 had no distinct recollection of it, that luncheons and din-
ners were given there, and that I did not know of any luncheon or
dinner particularly that I had given.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify that you might have arranged such
luncheon ?
Mr, Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. And that if you had, while you would have been
host, the State Department would have paid for the luncheon?
Mr. Vincent. If I said I was host, I might have been host.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2123
Mr. SouRwiNE. You said you might have been ?
Mr. Vincent. I have since investigated to find out what this func-
tion is, which is the only one that I recall having any part in.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what I wanted to find out, if you had
checked up.
Mr. Vincent. May I say that I found out that it occurred on Jan-
uary 23, 1945, after the termination of the IPR conference in Hot
Springs.
Mr. Sour WINE. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vincent. That is was a reception arranged primarily for tha.
foreign delegates who had attended that conference.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. That is, delegates from foreign nations?
Mr, Vincent. Delegates from foreign nations.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Who had attended the IPR conference ?
Mr. Vincent. Who had attended the IPR conference.
Mr. Sour WINE. I said it was a reception. You mean it was a.
luncheon ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; a reception.
Mr. SouRwiNE. At the Blair Lee House ?
Mr. Vincent. The one I have in mind now. I don't recall a lunch-
eon. It was a reception at which Mr. Grew — because at that time Mr.
Grew was Under Secretary but was familiar with the area and famil-
iar with some of the people, that Mr. Grew would act as host to this
group of I would say distinguished foreigners. I have copied down
here the names of some of them. If you would like me to
Mr. SouR\^^NE. We would like those in a moment, sir, but I would
like to ask you first what did you have to do with arranging this
luncheon.
Mr. Vincent. As far as the record shows
Mr. SouRwiNE. I beg your pardon. This reception.
Mr. Vincent. This reception. Insofar as the record will show, I
asked that invitations be sent down to Hot Springs, and I think it was
there that I gave these people their invitations to attend this reception.
I may have made a preliminary survey to see whether they would be
in W^ashington at that date rather than just asking them without any
anticipation that they would be there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. So while Mr. Grew was the host, you were the, shall
we say, major-domo of the affair?
Mr, Vincent. I was the fellow who arranged for the foreigners.
There were Americans present, too, which Mr. Ballentine, in the State
Department who was Director of the Far Eastern Office, kindly ar-
ranged there to get the foreigners together.
Mr. Sourwine. How many people were there altogether, do you
know?
Mr. Vincent. About 60, sir,
JNIr. Sourwine. Is there anywhere in existence a guest list for that
reception ?
Mr. Vincent. There is, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have it?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether we have it here or not. It is
in existence.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you furnish it to the committee?
Mr. Vincent. I can furnish it to the committee, yes sir.
Mr. Sourwine. You have copied off certain names ?
2124
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I have copied off quickly certain of the names. Not
all 60 of them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am going on and ask you to give us those names in
a moment, but would you agree now that you will furnish the com-
mittee with the complete guest list?
Mr. Vincent. I agree to that.
Mr. Sourwine. May it be ordered, Mr. Chairman, that that list
when furnished be inserted in the record at this point?
The Chairman. Such will be the order.
(The document referred to is Exhibit No. 383 and is as follows:)
Exhibit No. 383
List of Guests Invited to a Reception To Be Given by the Honorable Joseph C.
Gbew, Undee Secretary of State, in Honor of Delegates to the Institute of
Pacific Relations, on January 23, 1945, at Blair-Lee House at 6 O'Clock
IPR delegates and officials :
Bailey, K. H. (Australia)
Bolton, Hon. Frances P. (United
States)
Belshaw, Horace (New Zealand)
Bundle, Ralph (United States)
darter, Edward C. (United States)
Chiang, Mon-lin (China)
Dennett, Raymond (United States)
Eggleston, Sir Frederic (Aus-
tralia)
Farmer, "Victor (United Kingdom)
Gyaw, the Honorable Sir Htoon
Aung (United Kingdom)
Hart, Admiral T. C. (United
States)
Johnstone, Wililam C. (United
States)
Kunzru, H. N. (India)
McDougall, Sir Raibeart (United
Kingdom)
Horizon, Colonel Victor (France)
Naggiar, Paul Emile (France)
Pramoj, M. R. Seni (Thailand)
Rao, B. Shiva (India)
Reid, E. (Canada)
Shao, Yu-lin (China)
Turner, Bruce (New Zealand)
Visman, Franx H. (Netherlands)
Watt, Alan S. (Australia)
Yang, Yun-chu (China)
Yeh, George (China)
Zafra, Urbano A. (Philippines)
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Dunn
Mr. McLeish
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Clayton
Mr. Hackworth
Mr. Pasvolsky
Mr. Edwin Wilson
Mr. Mathews
Mr. Blakeslee
Mr. Ballantine
Mr. Dooman
Mr. Stanton
Mr. Lockhart
Mr. Dickover
Mr. Vincent
Mr. Meyer
Mr. Steintorf
Mr. Williams
Mr. Moffat
Mr. Dickey
Mr. Taft
Mr. Julius Holmes
Mr. Haley
Mr. Peck
Mr. Fearey
Mr. Friedman
Mr. Sol Bloom
Mr. Eaton
Senator Connally
Senator Hiram Johnson
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Will you tell us the names you have copied off ?
Mr. Vincent. I have copied off some of the more prominent ones.
Mr. SouRwiNE. When did you see that list?
Mr. Vincent. I saw that list a matter of 3 days ago, sometime
this week after the question was raised.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You got it from the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. I got it from the State Department.
Mr. Sourwine. Very good.
Mr. Vincent. As I say, there were about 60 guests. The for-
eigners included, I shall say, Chiang Mon-lin, who was the prin-
cipal Chinese delegate
Mr. Sourwine. Will you spell these names for the reporter ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2125
Mr. ViNCE]srr. Chiang Mon-lin — C-h-i-a-n-g M-o-n-l-i-'ji.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Who is he?
Mr. Vincent. He was the principal Chinese delegate, if I recollect.
He was on the Chinese delegation.
Sir Andrew McFayden — M-c-F-a-y-d-e-n — I think that is the way
it is spelled.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Before you talk about Mr. McFayden, was the
Chinese gentleman you mentioned Nationalist Chinese or did he have
some other connection?
Mr. Vincent. He was Nationalist Cliinese.
Mr. SouE^^^[NE. Is he still ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know what position he occupies now. He
was with the Nationalists and was an adviser. He is primarily an
educationalist, who had been president of a university before the Jap-
anese invasion.
Mr. SouRwiNE. To save questions, as you mention each one of these
names will you give a little thumbnail sketch about him and what
his connection is so far as you know it ?
Mr. Vincent. Sir Andrew McFayden was the British or United
Kingdom delegate. I had never met him before and don't know what
his position was other than as a leading delegate for the British.
Mr. SouRwiNE. To the IPR conference.
Mr. Vincent. To the IPR. There was a Mr. Naggiar. He was
French, and I don't know what his position was at that time, but he
later became the French delegate to the Far Eastern Commission.
There was Sir Frederic Eggleston, who was at that time Austral-
ian Minister in Washington. He attended the conference.
There was a Mr. Zafra of the Philippine delegation. I know no
more about him.
There was a Mr. George Yeh, of China. He came over from England
and was at that time in the Chinese Embassy at Hongkong.
There was a Mr. Belsliaw, of New Zealand, whom I camiot identify
any further than that I recall the man.
There was a Mr, Bailey, of Australia. He was a member of the
staff of the Australian legation, if I remember correctly.
There was a Mr. Eeed, of Canada.
There was a Mr. Shao Yu-Lin, of China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you spell that?
Mr. Vincent. Shao Yu-Lin ; S-h-a-o Y-u-L-i-n. He was with the
Chinese Government at that time and if he still occupies the same po-
sition he had when I was in China, he was with an information service
with the government.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think he still occupies the same position
that he had when you were in China ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know what position he occupies now, sir.
I haven't heard of him for years. He was a friend of mine in Chung-
king, and my testimony was if when he came over here in 1945, he still
occupied the position when I had known him in Chungking, it would
have been in connection with some kind of information service in the
government.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is just another way of testifying that at the
time you knew him in Chungking he was in some kind of information
service, right?
2126 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. Yes. I thought you asked me whether he was now
in it ; in the Chinese Government.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I did.
Mr. Vincent. I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. But you didn't mean to suggest that you think he is?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. All right.
Mr. Vincent. There was a Mr. Turner, of New Zealand; a Mr.
Farmer, of the United Kingdom. There was a Mister or Sir, Sir I
have it, Sir Gyaw, of Burma. There was Colonel Morizon, of France.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do any of those people have Communist connec-
tions ?
Mr. Vincent. None that I know, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know anything more about Mr. Belshaw
than you have told us ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Belshaw ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not know any more than I have told you
about him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You do not know, then, whether he had any Com-
munist connections ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that the complete list as you copied it?
Mr. Vincent. That is the complete list. There were probably twice
that many.
Mr. SouR^VINE. How many names are there on that list?
Mr. Vincent. There are 15, but there is a Mr. Pramog of Siam, who
I see I skipped.
Mr. Sour WINE. On what basis did you select the 16 names that you
have there?
Mr. Vincent. I have selected the 16 names primarily on the basis
that they would be available to come to a reception in Washington.
Many of them were going back to their homes.
Mr. Sourwine. No. You are answering that question in the con-
notation of why did you select them to be invited.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I am glad to have that information. But what I
meant was when you copied these 16 names down from the list of 60
on what basis did you copy these 16 ? Were they the only 16 foreigners
or were they the only 16 people whose invitations you were responsible
for or in what other category did they fall that you chose to copy
down these names?
Mr. Vincent. I copied these names down, my recollection, as being
a representative of the people who were there.
Mr. SouRW^NE. This is a representative list of the people who were
there?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr, Sourwine. These approximately 25 percent is a cross-section of
those who were there, is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Were there any Americans there?
Mr Vincent. I was coming to that, sir.
Mr. Sourwine, Yes.
Mr. Vincent. There was also present Mr. Carter, Edward Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2127
Mr. SouRwiNE. Edward C. Carter?
Mr. Vincent. Of IPR, Edward C. Carter. Mr. Dennett of the
IPR.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Raymond?
Mr. Vincent. Raymond. There was present Admiral Hart, re-
tired at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was he connected with IPR?
Mr. Vincent. He was a member of the American delegation. That
was the reason for his inclusion here.
Senator Ferguson. Is that Tommy Hart, what is his first name ?
Mr. Vincent. The one who was in the Far East. I would not be
able to know what his first name was.
Senator Ferguson. Was he a Senator at one time ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, he was a Senator at one time.
Senator Ferguson. Tom Hart, then.
Mr. Vincent. There was Mr. Johnstone, William Johnstone,
George Washington University.
Mr. Sourwine. He was with IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. There was Mrs. Frances Bolton of the United
States Congress.
Mr. Sourwine. A Representative from Ohio ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, at that time, and a member of the American
delegation to the IPR conference. There was Sol Bloom, Mr. Eaton,
both of the United States Congi^ess, House of Representatives.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that Dr. Eaton ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. And there was Senator Connally.
I could not say with complete assurance that every one of these came
because the check list I have did not show. I mention that simply
because I do not have down Senator Johnson, Hiram Johnson, be-
cause there was a clear indication that he could not come.
From the Department we had besides Mr. Grew, who was host, and
myself, there was Mr. Dunn and here I have given just a few of the
names.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that James C. Dunn ?
Mr. Vincent. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary. There was Mr.
Will Clayton, Under Secretary. There was Ballantine, of course.
Mr. Dooman. Mr. Matthews, who at that time was Director of the
European Office. Mr. Julius Holmes. There was Mr. Acheson.
Mr. Sourwine. Dean Acheson?
Mr. Vincent. Assistant Secretary at that time; yes. There was
Charles Taft.
Mr. Sourwine. Charles P. Taft?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. And Mr. Hackworth.
That is all I have here. This is far from complete.
Mr. Sourwine. George Hackworth?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; the American list, I mean the list from the State
Department — I cannot be too sure how many of them came to it —
was made up in the State Department and I don't know how many
came. Looking back on it, I didn't even put the name down here. I
think that the Secretary was included on the list but I would doubt
that the Secretary got over to that reception.
Mr. Sourwine, That was a very strong top-level representation
from the State Department, wasn't it ?
2128 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and for that reason I question whether every one
of them came. My recollection is that Mr. Will Clayton came. I am
sure Mr. Grew came. They were all invited.
Mr. SouRwiNE. An effort was made to get them there ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouEwiNE. You say the State Department paid for this recep-
tion?
Mr. Vincent. The State Department. It was a State Department
reception. I remember looking up, which I had not known before,
how must it cost, and the reception for 59 or 60 people cost only $53,
which was a fairly good bargain.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You didn't serve any food; did you?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, we served food.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the decision as
to who would be invited to this reception other than the suggestions
that you have already said you made with regard to the foreign
delegates ?
Mr. Vincent. To the ones who were down — No, I don't recall mak-
ing any selection from the State Department people.
Mr. Sourwine. I mean did you designate or name or suggest any of
those foreign delegates who were there ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You made out that list ?
Mr. Vincent. I was the one who would have handed them their
invitations. My recollection is that the list was made up down in the
IPR there.
Mr. Sourwine. That is the list of people to be invited ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did that include the IPR people, the Americans
also?
Mr. Vincent. It included those that I have mentioned here.
Mr. SouR^viNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. The IPR people that I have mentioned.
Mr. Sourwine. And possibly some others.
Mr. Vincent. Possibly some others.
Mr. Sourwine. If there were any IPR people invited they were on
the list that was made up down at the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. But the IPR didn't make up a list of the State De-
partment people they wanted or did they ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; not that I recall. The IPR did not make up the
State Department list. In these papers I have seen the statement
made that Mr, Ballentine said he would take care of the foreign list.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that at your request?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. It would have been the normal
thing, I think, to do.
Mr. Sourwine. Who initiated the request for the State Department
people?
Mr. Vincent. There is no record up there that I initiated it, but
Mr. Ballantine would have understood the idea was to have these
foreigners entertained by State Department people.
Mr. Sourwine. Whose idea was that originally?
Mr. Vincent. I can't remember. It could have been mine, but
as I say, whether I initiated or thought up the idea or whether it was
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS - 2129
somebody in the IPR who thought it would be an excellent idea
or whether it was even Ballantine who thought it would be a good
idea, but I think
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember receiving a letter, Mr. Vincent,
in December of 1944 about the matter of this affair?
Mr. Vincent. I do not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify that as a photostat of
a letter from the IPR files ?
Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of a letter from the IPR files.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I show you this, Mr. Vincent, and ask you
The Chairman. Please identify it as to date.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I was going to ask Mr. Vincent to read it, sir.
The Chairman. I just wanted to identify it for the record.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This is a letter dated December 19, 1944, and signed
Raymond Dennett, secretary, addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Would you read it, sir, and then tell us if that refreshes your recol-
lection in any way ?
Mr. Vincent. Read it just to myself?
Mr. SouRwiNE. If you wish, or aloud, sir.
Mr. Vincent. Yes. (Examining document.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. To what extent does that refresh your recollection ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that it refreshes my recollection to the
extent that now that I see this letter it tells me how the matter was
first initiated.
Mr. Sour^vine. Tell us how the matter was first initiated.
Mr. Vincent. This matter was first initiated presumably by my
speaking to or writing to Mr. Dennett about the matter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that all that you can remember now ?
Mr. Vincent. That is all I can remember now.
Mr. Sourwine. All right, Mr. Chairman, would you prefer that this
letter be read into the record now or would you rather have it inserted ?
The Chairman. I think you might read it into the record now.
Mr. Sourwine. It is fairly short, sir.
Dear Mr. Vincent: I was very pleased indeed with your suggestion that
you might be able to arrange either for Mr. Grew or yourself to have seven or
eight of the top members of the conference to a luncheon at Blair-Lee House
in the week following the conclusion of our meeting. If it is acceptable to you,
I would suggest that you try for a reservation at the Blair-Lee House January
23 or 24, as Mr. Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee wishes to have
a luncheon on the Hill on Monday, January 22.
If you could confirm which date you would like to have the luncheon, we
can keep it open, making up our list after we look the situation over in Hot
Springs. The reason I ask that you confirm some date is that I suspect that
Tom Connally may want to have a similar meeting with the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate, and I just don't want to get mixed up on our dates.
With cordial best wishes and sincerest thanks, I am,
Sincerely yours,
Raymond Dennett, Secretary.
He was secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations; was he not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you testify that your original suggestion was
to have 7 or 8 of the top members of the conference to a luncheon?
Mr. Vincent. I can testify after reading that letter, but I would
not have distinguished between that and the reception, and my testi-
2130 . INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
mony would be that somewhere along the line we decided to have
many more than just a luncheon and decide to have a reception.
Mr, SouRwiNE. That is perfectly clear. You originally suggested
7 or 8 of the top delegates and between then and the time you held it,
it grew into a luncheon for 60 people ?
Mr. Vincent. Reception.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Reception, and a number of IPR people and a num-
ber of top State Department people ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether the suggestions for the growth
came from you or from the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether they came from one or the
other. I would imagine that in this case they came from me, think-
ing it would be a better idea to get that many people together to try
to meet some of the State Department people rather than to try to
be selective and get only a few.
Mr. Sourwine. You said the IPR made out a list, did you not?
Mr. Vincent. No, my testimony was that down at Hot Springs,
whether I conferred with IPR people or not, was that I would have
remembered that I made out the list of these people.
Mr. Sourwine. I understood you to say that the IPR made out a
list of the people who were to be invited to this reception, that they
put on that list the names of the foreign delegates and that they put
on that list the names of any IPR people who wer,e there, but that the
names of the State Department people were added separately at the
Department.
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I think if you will check back here
it was a slip of the tongue.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember testifying to that effect?
Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that I testified that I chose the
ones in Hot Springs and that Mr. Ballantine picked the foreign guests,
I mean the American guests.
Mr. Sourwine. You do not remember testifying substantially as
I just recited to you ?
Mr. Vincent. No, and I think if you will check back I said that I
picked out the ones down at the IPR conference, the members down
there, and Mr. Ballantine chose the ones
Mr. Sourwine. The record, of course, will speak for itself, but I
wanted to know what your memory at this time was.
Mr. Vincent. My memory is that I, with probably some assistance
from the IPR, went around and found out which ones of the delegates
would be available for such a reception or luncheon, I don't know
when the change from one to the other, to be given in Washington on or
about the 23d.
Mr. Sourwine. Who picked the IPR people to attend? Did you
select those people ?
Mr. Vincent. That was my recollection, and that is what I thought
I testified, that I picked them in consultation with, I suppose, these
people themselves and with IPR people.
Mr. Sourwine. Did the IPR give you a list of any kind?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall them giving me a list.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you testify that they didn't give you a list?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot testify they did not give me a list.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2131
Mr. SoTJRWiNE, But you definitely do not remember that there was
any list of people from the IPR in connection with this reception?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall ; as I say, I do not recall who picked
the list. I thought I had picked the list of people by asking them
and
Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not now recall having had any list from
theIPE?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall having had it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not now recall having testified here con-
cerning any list from the IPR ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That a list was received by me from the IPR.? I
do not recall testifying that I received a list.
Mr. Sourwine. I ask you, Do you recall testifying here concerning
any IPR list of people to be invited to this reception ?
Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that I do not recall receiving a list-
The best of my recollection is that in consultation down there, pre-
sumably with other people, a list was made out more or less under my
supervision.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall testifying here
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire. Were you a trustee of the IPR
at this time ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And listed on the letterhead of the IPR?
Mr. Vincent. T suppose I was, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was this part of your duties as trustee, do you
think?
Mr. Vincent. No. The whole inception of this thing from my point
of view was to get some of these distinguished foreigners together with
some of our State Department people who were handling far-eastern
problems or European problems and to have them meet. The main
idea was to give them a reception, to give them some entertainment
here in Washington after the conclusion of the conference there.
]Mr. Sourwine. When you originally suggested that, sir, and at
that time you were suggesting a luncheon
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you include in your suggestion among those
to be invited Mr. Bloom and Mr. Connally and other Members of
Congress ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; my suggestions had only to do, as I recall it, with
the foreigners, but again, if Mr. Dennett discussed it I would have
said promptly it would have been a good idea to have members of
the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.
Mr. Sourwine. If he had suggested it you would readily have
acceded; would you not?
Mr. Vincent. I certainly would.
Mr. Sourwine. In fact, did he suggest it or did you subsequently
suggest that those men should be included ?
Mr. Vincent. So far as the papers in the State Department are
concerned, I would have thought that Mr. Ballantine, who was in
charge of getting invitations to the American guests, may have sug-
gested it himself.
Mr. Sourwine. Don't you think that this letter that you have just
read and which I subsequently read aloud, indicates that in acknowl-
edging your suggestion Mr. Dennett was already bringing in names
2132 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of that nature? He mentioned Mr. Bloom and mentioned Mr.
Connally ?
Mr. Vincent. That he was trying to get them, but you are asking
me whether I might have suggested to him originally to get them
and he tried to get them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You stated, did you not, that you did not originally
suggest them.
Mr. Vincent. I said I had no recollection of originally recommend-
ing Members of the House.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Then I asked you whether subsequently you first
broached it or he did, and I understood you to start saying that you
thought Mr. Ballantine first brought that subject up.
Mr. Vincent. I said that I thought Mr. Ballantine, in accordance
with the memorandum I have seen in the State Department, was left
with the matter of choosing and getting invitations to the foreigners —
I mean to the Americans.
Mr. SouRwiNE. To what?
Mr. Vincent. To the American members.
]Mr. Sourwine. Are you now testifying that it was Mr. Ballantine's
decision and Mr. Ballantine's initiative with regard to all of the
Americans who were invited to this reception?
Mr. Vincent. Certainly the Americans that came from the State
Department. I say, I don't see what the point here is, but if Mr.
Dennett himself first suggested that we have Mr. Bloom and Senator
Connally and the others, he would have had then to take it up with
Mr. Ballantine because Mr. Ballantine was in charge of getting out
the invitations.
Mr, Sourwine. The point here is very clear, sir. I will try to make
it apparent.
Mr. Vincent. I wish you would.
Mr. Sourwine. Here was a reception which was held by the State
Department, as a State Department function, which brought together
high officials of the IPR, high officials of the State Department, and
foreign delegates to the IPR convention and certain important and
influential Members of Congress?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. This affair was brought about, you have testified,
through your initiation originally.
Mr. Vincent. That is right ?
Mr. Sourwine. The question arises whether the concept of the whole
affair as it finally was held was yours or whether your initial con-
cept was seized upon and, through suggestion or otherwise, expanded
by the IPR. In other words, to what extent the IPR influenced what
was ultimately decided with regard to this reception. That is what
I am trying to get at. If you will address yourself to that we will
be very grateful.
Mr. Vincent. I have to address myself to it in the same way that
I have, that from a reading of Mr. Dennett's letter it would appear
that he was going to contact the Congressmen. From a reading of
the memo that I have up in the State Department, that Mr. Ballantine
was in charge of getting the Americans from the State Department,
and that insofar as my recollection goes, the foreign guests at Hot
Springs were chosen by me or in consultation with IPR people.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2133
Mr. SouRWiNE. That still leaves one category of guests at this re-
ception, does it not, that you have not mentioned ? To wit, the Ameri-
can IPR members.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Who suggested their names? Who made up the
list of American IPR people who were to be brought to this reception ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection. It might have been
me. It might have been someone else. It might have been somebody
down there. It would certainly have been very obvious to me to have
Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have quickly jumped at the suggestion
of Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have wanted to have Admiral!
Hart.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would Mrs. Bolton have come under the IPR group-
or under the congressional group ?
Mr. Vincent. Mrs. Bolton would have come under the American
delegation group. She was down there in Hot Springs. She would
have been one in Hot Springs that I would have contacted to find out
whether she could come, and the invitation would have been delivered
to her in Hot Springs.
Mr. Sourwine, How about American IPR people who were neither
State Department nor congressional? Who decided which of those;
people were going to come ?
Mr. Vincent. Who were neither IPR
Mr. Sourwine. IPR people who were neither State Department
nor congressional.
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who made the final deci-
sion. As I say
Mr. Sourwine. If it wasn't you
Mr. Vincent. Mrs. Bolton. It would have been to me obvious to
have Mrs. Bolton.
Mr. Sourwine. Mrs. Bolton doesn't fall within that category, does
she ? Mrs. Bolton was congressional, wasn't she ?
Mr. Vincent. She was congressional but was a member of the
American delegation and was at Hot Springs.
Mr. Sourwine. You have stressed that fact several times. I am
attempting to talk about IPR people who were neither congressional
nor Stnte Department. There were such, were there not ?
Mr. Vincent. There were.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. Wlio decided which people, in that categoryy
were to come ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who decided. I would
say it would have been quite easy for me to decide. The names here
seem to me to be obvious people who would come.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a list that included all the IPR people
who were there ?
Mr. Vincent. All of the IPR people so far as I know,
Mr. Sourwine. There will be no names on this list you are going to
furnish us
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't promise I might not have missed a name.
The list will be furnished you.
Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you consult with the IPR about what IPR
people were going to be invited ?
Mr. Vincent. I would naturally have consulted with them. I said
I consulted with the people down there as to who were to be invited,
2134 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
but I say here are the people that I have on here. I have on here also
Senator Connally in that group. He was not a member of the
Mr. SouRwiNE. Of course. It was their suggestion, that is the IPR's
suggestion, as to what IPK people should be invited, wasn't it?
The Chairman. Wliose suggestion ?
Mr. Vincent. As I say, I can't recall. It would be perfectly logical
for the IPE. to have suggested people who would be coming to this
reception. As far as I can see here there are four of them who were
suggested.
Mr. SouRwiNE. All right, sir. You will furnish the full list ?
Mr. Vincent. Five of them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You will furnish the full list ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I will furnish the full list.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall whether you ever discussed with Mr.
Dennett plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't recall discussing that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett the matter
of IPR. activity in connection with the United Nations Conference in
San Francisco?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of it, but again I will say I
quite easily might have discussed with him that question.
Mr. SoTTRwiNE. Did you ever suggest to Mr. Dennett that it might
be very desirable for the IPR to put on a series of small dinners dur-
ing the course of the Conference, the San Francisco Conference, for
the Far Eastern people at that conference ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of it, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever express an opinion to Mr. Dennett
with regard to the necessity or desirability of the IPR providing
a staff of specialists to be available for consultation during the United
Nations Conference?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, if I had a conversation of that kind
with Mr. Dennett I don't recall it.
Mr. Sourwine. AVould you have had a conversation like that with
him?
JNIr. Vincent. I could have had a conversation with him like that.
I knew Mr. Dennett.
Mr. Sourwine. At a time when the State Department was marshal-
ling all of its own specialists to go to San Francisco, wasn't it?
Mr. Vincent. It was, but not all of them. Many people went out
to the San Francisco Conference.
Mr. Sourwine. Certainly the Department sent its best qualified peo-
ple out, didn't it ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. The best available qualified people.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might at that time have expressed
to Mr. Dennett the desirability of necessity of IPR providing a staff
of specialists for consultation?
Mr. Vincent. Consultation at the United Nations ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. As I say, I do not recall suggesting it to him. You
mean for the United Nations?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. You mean to be on the staff of the United Nations?
Mr. Sourwine. No. To be available for consultation during the
Conference, an unofficial expert staff, so to speak.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2135
Mr. Vincent. As I say, I have no recollection of an instance of that
kind, but it would seem — ■ —
Mr. SouRwiNE, Would it have been unusual ?
Mr. Vincent. It would not have been unusual to discuss with Mr.
Dennett having people out there because there were many foreign
delegates coming.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Could it be possible that you ever talked with Mr.
Dennett about that matter in the presence of Alger Hiss?
Mr. Vincent. Alger Hiss was Secretary-General of the Confer-
ence.
Mr. SoTjRwiNE. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. You say could it be possible? I don't recall it, but
it could be possible. He was in San Francisco if this conversation
which I don't recall took place in San Francisco.
Mr. SotJRwiNE. Did you and Mr. Hiss ever confer jointly here in
Washington with Mr. Dennett about the matter of IPR activity at
San Francisco?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall, sir, any conversation.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you mean to say by that that you did not ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I said I do not recall such a conference.
Mr, SouRwiNE. If you conferred with Mr. Dennett about the United
Nations Conference, did you at that time know that Mr. Dennett had
also conferred in that connection with Mr. Alger Hiss ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not know that, so far as I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Hiss was, as you stated, in charge of arrange-
ments for the UN Conference at San Francisco, wasn't he?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hiss was Secretary General of the Conference,
but I don't know whether he was in charge of arrangements in advance
of the Conference.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not know whether he was ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a matter of fact whether he was.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know to what extent Mr. Hiss' connection,
if any, with the UN Conference at San Francisco was known early in
March of 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. I have testified here that Mr. Hiss was
at that time in charge of some kind of activities which had been con-
nected with Dumbarton Oaks. He had left Dr. Hornbeck's office.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it public knowledge at that time that Mr. Hiss
was in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Fran-
cisco? That is, in March of 1945 was it know that Mr. Hiss was in
charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Francisco?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether it was public knowledge or not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it known to you ?
Mr. Vincent. As I say I don't recall myself whether he was actu-
ally in charge of arrangements or not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you discuss with Mr. Dennett probable length
of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall discussing the probable length of the
conference with him. As I say, I could have.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In early March of 1945 was it the policy of the
State Department to encourage or to discourage the plans of private
organizations to be present at the United Nations Conference in San
Francisco ?
2136 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. -I can't testify to that from exact knowledge, but I
would say again that it was probably to encourage private organiza-
tions to come out to San FranCisco.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think it was State Department policy at
that time to encourage private organizations to be present in San
Francisco ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no exact knowledge of it, but you are asking
me whether I would have thought it would be and I say yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If you did talk with Mr. Dennett as the questions
I have asked you would appear to indicate, and as you have not nega-
tived, if you did so talk with Mr. Dennett, would you say that that
was not contrary to any general rule or policy of the Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have. As I say, I don't recall the conversa-
tion.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember whether you indicated to Mr.
Dennett in March of 1945, early March, or about that time, that the
State Department would welcome a move on the part of the Institution
of Pacific Relations with regard to defining and making arrangements
for the Institute's activity in San Francisco in connection with the
UN Conference?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall the conversation, but
again I say that it is a perfectly reasonable conversation to have had
if the IPR were coming out to San Francisco.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever assist or were you ever asked to assist
in the securing of air priorities for Mr. Dennett or any other official or
representative of the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have assisted them in get-
ting air priorities to go to San Francisco ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know how I would have been able to get them
air priorities, but if I did it would be the first time in my recollection
I ever got air priorities for anybody.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have been asked to assist
them ?
Mr. Vincent, I might have.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Mandel, can you identify this as having been
taken from the files of the IPR ?
Mr. Mandel. This document dated March 5, 1945, addressed to
Admiral John W. Greenslade, from Raymond Dennett, is a photostat
of a document in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, this letter is two pages, but I think
we should take the time to read it. May I have the permission of the
Chair?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
My Dear Admibal : Saturday I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State Depart-
ment, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Hiss
attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the arrange-
ments for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information is per-
tinent to our plans.
I ask you again at that point, suspending the reading for a moment —
the date of this letter is March 5 — do you know whether on March 5,
1945, it was general knowledge that Alger Hiss was going to be in
charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2137
Mr. Vincent. I still cannot say that I knew it was general knowl-
edge.
Senator Ferguson. Could I interrupt there. On March 5, 1945, did
you know the contents of the Yalta agreement ?
Mr. Vincent. In 1945 ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On March 5.
Mr. Vincent. On March 5 I still did not know the contents. I have
testified to that.
Senator Ferguson. I wanted to get the date. ,
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they had been published
at that time ?
Mr. Vincent. The Yalta agreement ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I am quite certain it had not been published by
March 5.
Senator Ferguson. Do you say now that the Yalta agreement or
agreements were favorable to the U. S. S. R. ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Senator, I testified in executive session that I
did not think they were favorable. I described them as nearly as I
could as setting the wheels back, that they were retrogressive, that they
had the possibilities of setting up a preferential position in Manchuria
for the Russians, and I spoke of them as agreements which would be
inimical to our own foreign
Senator Ferguson. You were very critical of them ?
Mr. Vincent. That was in July.
Senator Ferguson. Wlien you learned about them you say now that
you are very critical of their contents ?
Mr. Vincent. I told you that I was shocked.
Senator Ferguson. You were shocked. Here is a letter indicating
that they knew that Hiss had been at that meeting and they wanted in
effect to make sure that they were going to San Francis'co or that he
would go there.
Mr. Vincent. That who was making sure. Senator?
Senator Ferguson. The writer of this letter.
Mr. Vincent. But the contents of the China portion of the Yalta
agreement were not public knowledge then.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it was known by the writer of this
letter?
Mr. Vincent. I do not think so. The writer of this letter is Mr.
Dennett. I do not think so at all.
Senator Ferguson. Would it indicate that it might be known by the
writer of that letter that where Mr. Hiss had been there had been
very favorable consideration to the Russians, to the Soviets ? In fact,
it was so favorable that you said it was even shocking to you.
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. All right. You make take the witness, Mr.
Sourwine.
The Chairman. I think that letter should be inserted in the record,
and then you may read it. It will be inserted in the record at this
point.
22848— 52— pt. 7 10
2138 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 384," and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 384
[Copy — For your information]
Makch 5, 1945.
Admiral John W. Greenslade,
1201 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.
My Dear Admiral : Saturday, I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State De-
partment, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco,
Hiss attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the
arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information
is pertinent to our plans :
1. The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from
the IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (a) library
facilities, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (6)
office space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many
people they might accommodate, (c) an offer of any equipment, particularly
foreign-language typewriters that might be available, (d) the offer of any
specific housing accommodations, either individual or group, which might be
arranged through the Bay Region Committee.
2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section,
who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget
could permit it, to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Con-
ference for the Far-Eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not
specify the nature of these meetings, it was quite obvious that he felt that the
IPR could be a very useful means of getting together some of the technical
people and, possibly, some of the delegates to discuss informally some of the
matters appearing on the agenda.
3. Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR
to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the
Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped
with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to
library and other material.
4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of
Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference, he thought it would
be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of each delegation received
an appropriate number of copies early in the course of the Conference.
.5. The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a mini-
mum of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat
iji advance. There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations
from the various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably
near future. It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delega-
tions will not be known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference.
6. Hiss also stated that the Department is not officially encouraging private
organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to
discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite appa-
rent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since
it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind.
I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch send
me immediately the following :
1. A description of the library facilities — not over 200 words in length.
2. A statement of whether any office space would be available. I would assume
that one room at least could be loaned to the Conference, and possibly two, and
that a total of six people could be given desks. The description should mention
the size of the room and number of accommodations available.
3. It might be desirable to consider whether we should not state in the letter
that a committee to assist in housing had been set up which could probably
make arrangements to take care of some specified number of people in private
houses, say 2.5 to 40, or whatever number seems most appropriate. We could
then state that the committee will not go into action until we receive word that
their services are desired.
4. It might be helpful to explore the possibilities of reserving rooms at some of
the private clubs at 10-day to 2-week intervals, starting a week after the Con-
ference opened, for possible dinners for groups of 15 or 25 people. These reserva-
tions might be made in advance to protect us in case it does seem desirable to
have dinners of the kind suggested.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2139
If you will have the information forwarded to me at once, I will see that the
formal letter goes to the State Department. There is no assurance, of course,
that they will accept any of our offers, but they obviously would welcome the move
on our part.
Admiral Home was not in his office, so I shall have to wait until next week
to find out about air priority. It seems to me that the best procedure would be
for me to come out for a week or 10 days later this month and help work out
preliminary plans. I could then return to New York, keep in touch here, and
return later to San Francisco during the Conference, making arrangements, if it
seems desirable, for members of the international staff to come periodically to
assist as well.
I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter from the American Asso-
ciation for the United Nations, which indicates their plans for Conference partici-
pation. No doubt Mr. Rowell will be able to keep you in touch with developing
plans which they may have.
With vei'y cordial best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
Raymond Dennett, Secretary.
Enclosures.
( Enclosure sent with original only. )
The Chairman. You may continue to read, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. Subparagraph 1 :
The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from the
IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (a) library facili-
ties, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (b) office
space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many people
the.v might accommodate, (c) an offer of any equipment, particularly foreign-
language typewriters that might be available, {d) the offer of any specific housing
accommodations, either individual or group, which might be arranged through
the Bay Region Committee.
2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section,
who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget
could permit it
The Chairman. I suggest you listen to this, Mr. Vincent.
Mr. Sourwine (continuing) :
to put on a series of small dinners during tlie course of the Conference for the
far-eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not specify the nature
of these meetings, it was quite obvious that lie felt the IPR could be a very
useful means of getting together some of the technical people and, possibly, some
of the delegates to discuss informally some of the matters appearing on the
agenda.
Suspending the reading for a moment, does that paragraph in any
way refresh your recollection, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Vincent. It does.
Mr. Sourwine. To what extent ?
Mr. Vincent. To the extent that I have testified before, that it
was quite possible that I could have talked to Mr. Dennett and now
I find that I did talk to Mr. Dennett.
Mr. Sourwine. You now have an independent recollection that
you did talk with Mr. Dennett about this matter ; is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I still don't have any independent recollection
of a meeting with Mr. Dennett in 1945.
The Chairman. That is not the question. Read the question. Re-
peat the question.
Mr. Sourwine. I am simply trying to determine, Mr. Chairman,
whether Mr. Vincent's memory has in fact been refreshed or whether
he simply having read this letter is willing to accept what Mr. Dennett
wrote to Admiral Greenslade as a fact.
Mr. Vincent. The latter is the case.
2140 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. You are willing to accept what Mr. Dennett wrote
Admiral Greenslade as a fact ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Subparagraph 3 :
Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR
to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the
Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped
with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to
library and other material.
4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of
Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference —
He refers there to the conference of the IPR, does he not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I suppose he does.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Security in the Pacific was the title of the report of
the Hot Springs conference ?
Mr. Vincent. Of the Hot Springs conference.
Mr. Sourwine (continuing) :
he thought it would be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of
each delegation received an appropriate number of copies early in the course
of the conference.
Conference there means the San Francisco Conference, does it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. So what that states is that Alger Hiss recommended
that each delegation to the San Francisco Conference receive an ap-
propriate nuniber of copies of the report of the IPR Hot Springs
conference?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Subparagraph 5 :
The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a minimum
of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat in
advance —
You don't know whom he meant by that, do you ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't.
Mr. Sourwine (continuing the reading) :
There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations from the
various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably near future.
It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delegations will not be
known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference.
Did you furnish to Mr. Dennett any of the information contained in
that paragraph that I just read, the one that I designated as No. 5 ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not, so far as I know.
Mr. Sourwine. Subparagraph 6 :
Hiss also stated that the Department is not oflScially encouraging private
organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to
discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite appar-
ent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since
it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind.
Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett, sir?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall expressing that view to him, but I
might easily have made that expression to him.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that fall within your statement that you are
willing to accept as fact what Mr. Dennett wrote to Admiral Green-
slade?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; it would fall within fact. I have no reason to-
deny it. I only say that I don't recall making it.
1
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2141
Mr. SouBwiNE (continuing) :
I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch
send me immediately the following :
And thereafter, Mr. Chairman, follows some instructions with regard
to material to be sent to Mr. Dennett. There is no further mention of
this witness or of Mr. Hiss. The matter has been placed in the record
and I suggest it need not be read.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, a question to the witness if I
may.
The Chairman. Yes, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. This makes it quite clear that you were con-
sulted about IPR going to San Francisco.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conference with Mr. Hiss
about these problems?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall having any conference with Mr. Hiss —
jointly with him. Mr, Hiss was in the Department and I might have
had a conference with Mr. Hiss on these problems.
Senator Ferguson. Would not this letter as a whole indicate that
you and Hiss had conferred about it and had advised together?
Mr. Vincent. Not from my recollection of the letter, sir. I would
have thought here that Mr. Dennett came to see me and came to see
Mr. Hiss, because there is reference in different paragraphs to what
Mr. Hiss stated to him and what I said.
Senator Ferguson. But apparently no conflict.
Mr. Vincent. No conflict so far as I can see. I would have to read
it again if there is a conflict in advice, but I don't see any. I don't
recall any.
Senator Ferguson. How many delegates had the IPR at San
Francisco?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't state with any exactitude.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no idea how many they sent out there.
Senator Ferguson. You were there ?
Mr. Vincent. I was there. At the time this conversation took place
I wasn't even expecting to go. It was probably the end of March or
early April that I was designated to go out for the half time of the
conference. I attended the first half of the conference and Mr. Stan-
ton attended the second half as the assistant to Mr. Ballantine.
Senator Ferguson. You may proceed.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Before I move to another subject I would like to
revert to two matters. One, you remember I asked you about Mr.
Belshaw.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know that the State Department Bio-^
graphical Division would have had information on Mr. Belshaw in
case you had wanted it?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know that the State Department had a Bio-
graphical Section at that time, but it might have, yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't know that the State Department main-
maintained a Biographical Division?
2142 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent, I know that it does now, but I am trying to place
the time.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. When did you first learn that the State Department
maintained a Biographical Division ?
Mr. Vincent. I say I don't know when it may have started one,
I know now that it had one when I went to the field, but I can't recall
from memory
Mr. SouRwiNE. It has been since 1945 that you learned that the
State Department had a Biographical Division, is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. I can't testify exactly when the State Department
maintained a Biographical Section.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know when you were Director of the Far
Elastern Division that the State Department had a Biographical
Division ?
Mr, Vincent, Not as a positive fact,
Mr, SouRWiNE, You called it a Biographical Section, Did you
know there was a Biographical Section ?
Mr, Vincent. You are asking me to say whether I knew there was
a Biographical Section ?
Mr, SouRwiNE. That is right,
Mr. Vincent. I say I can't recall that there was. At the time I may
have known it, but at the present moment I can't recall whether at that
time I knew there was in existence a Biographical Section.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You cannot say whether while you were Director
of the Far Eastern Division you knew whether the State Department
had a Biographical Division or a Biographical Section ?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot at this moment say
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know it ?
Mr. Vincent. That at the time I was Chief of the Division I may
have known it, but at the present moment I am trying tell you that
I don't know from memory that the State Department had a Bio-
graphical Section.
Mr, Sourwine, How did it come into your knowledge that they
do have a Biographical Section ?
Mr, Vincent. You mean to my positive knowledge ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I am saying now that when I was in the Far Eastern
Office I would have known if there was one and may have known it, but
I don't recall now whether I did know it.
Mr. Sourwine. How do you know now ?
Mr. Vincent, I know now because when I went to the field in 1947
we were asked to send in biographical data on people abroad,
Mr, Sourwine. Before that time you don't know whether you knew
it or not ?
Mr. Vincent. Before that time, as I say, I don't know now that I
did know then, you see.
Mr. Sourwine. As Director of the Far Eflstern Division, the Office
of Far Eastern Affairs or as Chief of the China Division, didn't you
use the Biographical Division or Biographical Section of the State
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I am trying to tell you that I don't
recall now whether I did or did riot use it or whether one existed, but
I would be perfectly willing to say if one existed I would have used
it and I am quite willing to say it would be perfectly logical for them
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2143
to have one but on tlie basis of my memory now I haven't a distinct
recollection of a Biographical Section.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is it a fair inference that you did not seek infor-
mation from the State Department's Biographical Section or Divi-
sion with regard to any of these foreign delegates who were invited
to the Blair-Lee House reception?
Mr. Vincent. That is a fair assumption.
]Mr. SouRAViNE. That is the fact, is it not ?
Mv. Vincent. That is the fact.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you present at any conference or conferences
between Ambassador Patrick JIurley and General Wedemeyer in
1945?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified in executive session that General
Wedemeyer and Mr. Hurley, Ambassador Hurley, came home in 1945,
in March. I had a conference with General Wedemeyer which I have
already described which had to do with the equipping of Chinese
guerrilla Communist troops in north China and on the coast in an-
ticipation of a landing of American troops in that area. General
Wedemeyer and I had quite a discussion on that subject. Earlier that
year, as I recall it, Mr. Grew had indicated that wherever we could
use Chinese troops that might save American lives, they should be
used. It was on that basis that I talked to him about it and men-
tioned tthat to him. I made it clear, however, in talking with General
Wedemeyer that it was purely a military decision to be made in the
event it was made. General Wedemeyer himself indicated that he
had no clear knowledge of the problem of using them but that he
M'ould look into it when he got out to China, when he returned. Inso-
far as a conference jointly with Ambassador Hurley and General
Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley occupied as I testified this morning,
my desk in my office, and it is quite possible that there were meetings
between General Wedemeyer, who was home, Mr. Hurley, who was in
my office, and myself.
Mr. SouRwiNE. March or April of 1945.
Mr. Vincent. In March or April of 1945. Mr. Hurley went back
to China through Russia in April, I think it was.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that a "Yes" answer to my question or a "No"
answer or an answer "It is possible, but I don't remember" ?
Mr. Vincent. It is possible. I would say more than that. I do
not remember the meeting. I remember the meeting with Wede-
meyer. I do not remember a conference, but I am saying it is more
than possible, it is probable that General Wedemeyer came into the
office where Mr. Hurley was. He was Ambassador, and General
Wedemeyer was in command of the troops.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you prepare a memo with respect to such a
conference ?
Mr. Vincent. I prepared a memo with regard to the Wedemeyer
conference. I do not recall preparing a memo with regard to a con-
ference with Mr. Hurley and General Wedemeyer.
Mr. Sourwine. If you prepared such a memorandum would it be
in the State Department files ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you have a copy ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have a copy ? No, sir.
2144 INSTITUTE DF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have a copy ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not have a copy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Of any such memorandum ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SotJRWiNE. Would you be able to furnish the committee with
a copy of any such memorandum if it exists ?
Mr. Vincent. I am afraid that comes under the provisions of the
letter from the President to the Secretary of State which we read and
put into the record here — what day ? Wednesday, or yesterday.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean the release of a
Mr. Vincent. State Department document.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You think the release of such a document as your
report on a conference between yourself and Hurley and Wedemeyer
here in Washington would hamper the free flow of information from
the Foreign Service field.
Mr. Vincent. I would be glad to ask the State Department whether
they would make an exception.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I ask you what you think.
Mr. Vincent. I don't think so. You refer now to a memorandum
of a conversation with Mr. Hurley and with General Wedemeyer and
myself ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right.
Mr. Vincent. I was referring to a memorandum of a conversa-
tion between General Wedemeyer and myself.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am trying to find out if you have participated in
and subsequently prepared a memorandum with regard to a con-
ference or conferences between General Hurley and General Wede-
meyer in 1945.
Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that I have no recollection of pre-
paring such a memorandum. I was referring to the earlier memo-
randum of the conversation with General Wedemeyer.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss such a memorandum with
Andrew Koth?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I have no knowledge of having discussed
that memorandum with Andrew Roth ?
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you ever furnish him with a copy of such
memorandum ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give any of the IPR authors access to
any State Department information ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge of having ever given any of
them and I am quite sure I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give Andrew Roth access to any
State Department information?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give Mark Gayn access to any State
Department information ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss State Department matters
with Mark Gayn ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr, Sourwine. With Andi'ew Roth?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2145
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever give Owen Lattimore access to any
State Department information?
Mr. Vincent. None that I can ever recall.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters
with Owen Lattimore ?
Mr. Vincent. When Owen Lattimore was Director of the OWI
or Deputy Director we would have discussed State Department mat-
ters.
Mr. SouRwiNE. But at no other time ?
Mr. Vincent. Presumably when I would meet him from time to
time, yes, we would discuss matters of China.
The Chairman. I can't hear you.
Mr. Vincent. We would have discussed China whenever we met
socially because he was very much interested in the area, but I would
not have revealed to him confidential information in the State De-
partment.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Your testimony is that you never did reveal to liim
any confidential information ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; not so far as I know.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters
withT. A.Bisson?
Mr. Vincent. No ; not so far as I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever give him access to any State Depart-
ment information ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How about Lawrence Kosinger?
Mr. Vincent. The same answer there, to the best of my knowledge
and belief, I haven't given him any.
Mr. SouRWiNE. How about Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore?
Mr. Vincent. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have
never given her State Department information.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to another sub-
ject now, the matter of the Japanese surrender policy. Mr. Vincent,
did you or do you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy
to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?
Senator F:erguson. Mr. Chairaian, I wonder whether I might
inquire.
Did any of these people who have been mentioned here as to whether
or not you gave them confidential information of the State Depart-
ment, not using each name but you remembering the names, did any
of them ever ask for any confidential information ?
Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of
these mentioned here have asked me for confidential information of
the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. How long had you had Mr. Lattimore under
consideration for an adviser in the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that we had him under consideration
only in the early spring of 10 — or the late winter of 1945.
Senator Ferguson. 1945. ^^
Mr. Vincent. 1945. He had quit OWI some time before that and
had gone back to his work at Johns Hopkins.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time it was in 1945?
Mr. Vincent. I can only testify as to my memory, that it was in
early 1945, January or February or March.
2146 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Oh, early 1945.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is what I meant, early sprmg, or the late
winter of 1944-45.
Senator Ferguson. After you came home from the Far East with
Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Was he. employed by the Government when he
went out with Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; he was Deputy Director of the Office of War
Information.
Senator Ferguson. Wlien did he leave that department ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't recall.
Senator Ferguson. Was he employed in the spring of 1945?
Mr. Vincent. No; he was at the Johns Hopkins University. He
had gone back to teaching.
Senator Ferguson. So at the time you recommended his coming
back, he was employed by the Government ?
Mr. Vincent. He was not. He was back at his teaching job at
Johns Hopkins.
Senator Ferguson. While he was at Johns Hopkins and before you
recommended him, did you discuss any of the Chinese problems with
him in order to ascertain if he was the kind of a man that you would
want ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I just testified, Senator, that I would have
discussed Chinese problems with him because he was an old friend,
and a friend who understood China from my point of view.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, would it not have been necessary to
discuss what was secret?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; it would not have been necessary to discuss
what was secret if we were discussing the matter of his coming into
the State Department on a consultant basis and in a technical capacity.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss communism in China with him
before you recommended that he be on the advisory staff?
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing that as a specific
subject, but it could have been a subject of discussion.
Senator Ferguson, Did you ever discuss with anyone the question
of communism in the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You are sure about that ?
Mr. Vincent. I am sure about that. I have no recollection of dis-
cussing communism in the IPR.
Senator Ferguson. Then, of course, you dispute what is in these
letters that were exliibited here this morning?
Mr. Vincent. The letter that was exhibited this morning — my
testimony this morning was that I have no knowledge of those sub-
jects discussed in that letter.
Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that the part here indicating
Carter — which would be you, would it not ?
Mr. Vincent. I should think it would be Edward Carter, Edward
C. Carter. People don't usually call me Carter.
Senator Ferguson. They don't? You are named down below as
John Carter Vincent.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. But as I say here — let me see the context.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2147
Senator Ferguson. You were considered at that time as a trusted
friend about this question of communism in the Department, "trusted
friends who mig^ht be in the know on these things," meaning com-
munism in the IPR. Is that not true?
Mr. Vincent. I will have to read the whole letter. The language
that these people use here, I am not responsible for at all, sir. It isn't
in this letter. It isn't in this letter here w^hat we are talking about.
[Witness referring to another letter].
Senator Ferguson. The letter we are talking about is an answer to
another letter that did have it in it.
Mr. Vincent. No, I would not say that statement there implies by
its use, as they say, of "trusted friends" that I had a knowledge of
what was in this paragraph here.
Senator Ferguson. What do you think Margaret Ann Stewart was
writing to Eleanor Lattimore about, that "John Carter Vincent, and
any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things" ?
Mr. Vincent. I have told you, Senator, I cannot be responsible for
the language of these people.
Mr. Sourwine. For the sake of the record, Mr. Senator, may the
record show, if it is correct, that when Mr. Vincent said "this para-
graph here," he is talking about the last paragraph of Betty Ussachev-
sky's letter.
Senator Ferguson. Next to the last paragraph of the December
12 letter.
Mr. Vincent. You are talking about this letter, and I think Mr.
Sourwine is talking about the long paragraph in this letter.
Mr. SouRWiNE. When he said, "this paragraph here," I think he
referred to the long paragraph in the Betty Ussachevsky letter.
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. The record shows that.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not also true that in the letter of December
12, in the next to the last paragraph, that that is what they were
talking about, this long paragraph in the letter of December 5 ? Is it
not clear that that is true ? "We are somewhat worried about the pos-
sibilities outlined in Betty's letter." That is what was outlined in
Bettys' letter, the long paragraph?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. About communism in the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Then she goes on and says, "I hope that you
will have a discussion." That is to Eleanor Lattimore. She was a
good, close friend of yours. "* * * have a discussion about this
with Bill"
Who is Bill ? Do you know ?
Mr. Vincent. He would be the head of the American delegation,
the American office here in Washington — Johnstone, as I called him.
Senator Ferguson. Bill Johnstone. "And also with John Carter
Vincent, and any other," indicating that you two were trusted friends,
but "any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these
things."
Did you ever discuss with Eleanor Lattimore and/or Owen Latti-
more, communism in the IPR ?
2148 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I testified this morning, Senator, and I testify again
this evening, that I have no recollection of any such discussion. Soon
after this letter was written, I left the country, and I do not recall
any consultation or conversations I had with regard to the matter
of communism in the IPR,
Senator Ferguson. But at least by reputation, this letter would
indicate, and as far as knowledge of Eleanor Lattimore would be
concerned, that you were a trusted friend, and she could discuss com-
munism in the IPR with you ?
Mr. Vincent. That is the apparent intent of this, that I might be
in the know about — whether it was communism in the IPR she has
in mind, this covers quite a large field of subjects, this letter in the
second paragraph.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; that paragraph covers quite a bit, but it
is principally concerning communism in the IPR, and the FBI inves-
tigation of it, and the stealing of papers from your Department which
you indicated this morning.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. It refers to the papers that were taken out of
your office, does it not ?
Mr. Vincent. I will have to read it to see.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Wliat does it mean by the arrest of the six ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. The arrest of the six were the Amerasia group.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; for taking papers ; and part of them were
taken out of your office ; is that not correct ?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct. Taken out of the files.
Senator Ferguson. Here is a good friend of yours describing you
in this language, that you are a trusted friend and that you might
be consulted in regard to the taking of these papers and communism ;
is that not true ? You do not think Eleanor Lattimore ever discussed
it with you ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not think so, sir; and I cannot, as I have said
before, be responsible for what a Mrs. Margaret Ann Stewart would
put in that letter.
Senator Ferguson. Would you not expect a good friend of yours to
at least tell you that, "Here, your papers have come out of your
office"?
Mr. Vincent. I would. You are reverting back to the Amerasia
case?
Senator Ferguson. The Amerasia case. That is what we are talk-
ing about in these letters.
Mr. Vincent. I knew, as I testified this morning, that there was
an investigation to see how those papers came out.
Senator Ferguson. All right, when was the investigation ?
Mr. Vincent. Of Service and the other group ?
Senator Ferguson. No; you. They investigated you, that is, they
asked you questions. Wlien was that ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to fix the time of the Amerasia case.
I think it was in April, and sometime during that period in April.
Senator Ferguson. Of what year ?
Mr. Vincent. Of 1945.
Senator Ferguson. April 1945 ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2149
Mr. Vincent. As I said this morning, it might have been the latter
part of March. It could not have been much later than that, because
I left for San Francisco, oh, I should say the 10th or 12th, for the
United Nations conference.
Senator Ferguson, That is all at the present time.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, do you or did you know anything about
a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the
event Japan surrendered ?
Mr. Vincent., Yes, sir. I have testified on it.
Mr. Sourwine. That is right. Did you know that such a draft was
submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the State
Department on or about May 24, 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. I testified, I think, that I did not at that time have
any first-hand knowledge of the handling of that paper.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know now that there was such a paper
submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the Depart-
ment on or about May 24, 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Sourwine, Did you discuss such a paper or such a proposed
policy with anyone at any time, outside the Department, between
May 24, 1945, and July 29, 1945 ?
Mr, Vincent, To the best of my knowledge and belief, no, sir. I
would doubt that I had any knowledge of the paper, because I was
not connected with the group that was drafting such a paper.
Mr. Sourwine. What ultimately happened to that paper, do you
know?
Mr. Vincent. That paper was ultimately adopted on the — let me
see. I have it here. It was adopted by the SWNCC committee on
August 31, earlier on August 29, but it had to be reopened. May I
read this thing ? No, I don't need to read this.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that a statement which you prepared ?
Mr. Vincent. This is a statement which I read to you in the execu-
tive hearing.
Mr. Sourwine. It is in the record, sir.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. I am just trying to place in here the date
it was finally adopted. It was August 31, as I have just testified, it
was adopted by the SWNCC committee.
Mr. Sourwine. It was considerably changed between May of 1945
and the date of adoption, was it not ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify to that, because I have just testified
that I had nothing to do with its formulation until I became — and
there were no considerably changes in it after I became
Mr. Sourwine. It was not changed after August — what is the date
there— 31, 1945?
Mr. Vincent. August 31, except for some minor changes which,
if you wish me to, I can reread them, but it would take a long time.
Mr. Sourwine. You have testified with regard to that.
Mr. Vincent. I have testified there were only minor changes of
phraseology after August 31.
Mr. Sourwine. Prior to August 31, you had nothing to do with
the far-eastern subcommittee of SWNCC?
Mr. Vincent. That was the first meeting, I attended my first
meeting of the subcommittee of SWNCC on September 1.
2150 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is right. You took over the next day from
Mr, Dooman ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you say what view General Marshall took
with regard to this proposed policy as early as May or June of 1945?
Mr. Vincent. What attitude he took ? No ; I could not state that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know what view Owen Lattimore took
about it at any time prior to its adoption by SWNCC? .
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss the matter with Mr. Lattimore
prior to August 31, 1945?
Mr. Vincent. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief did I
discuss it with him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Wlien did you first learn that Mr. Lattimore went
to see the President about that proposed policy ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever learning that Mr. Lattimore went
to see the President about that policy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Didn't you say in executive session you had learned
it from our hearings for the first time ?
Mr. Vincent. If I did, I will stand by that, but I don't recall that.
Mr, SouRwiNE. You don't remember ever having learned it or
knowing it ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you discuss the matter of that proposed policy
with anyone in the IPR or representing the IPR prior to the time it
was adopted by SWNCC ?
Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not,
sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you thereafter ?
Mr. Vincent. Did I thereafter? No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mrs, Betty Ussachevsky, the Betty who wrote
this letter we talked about earlier, of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, ever arrange an appointment with you for Mr. Raymond
Dennett?
Mr. Vincent. I have no exact recollection of that, but I wouldn't
know whether it would be Mrs, Ussachevsky or someone else who
would arrange an appointment. I don't know what her position was
at that time. If she was the secretary, I would say she might have
arranged one,
Mr, SouRwiNE. You saw Mr. Dennett on a number of occasions, did
you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. How many times, altogether, have you had inter-
views or conferences with Mr. Dennett?
Mr, Vincent, I have no exact knowledge of the number of times,
Mr. Sourwine, I have had interviews with him.
Mr, SouRwiNE, Ten; a dozen?
Mr, Vincent, I would say less than that.
Mr, Sourwine, Less than 10 ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever visit him in his office?
Mr. Vincent. Not that T recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliere else have you met him, outside your office?
Mr. Vincent. I have met him at—I think he was down at the IPR
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2151
conference in Jannary 1945, and I have testified also that he may
have been present at a meeting of the American delegation prior to
going to the IPR conference in 1945.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you or did yon know Mr. Theodore White ?
Mr, Vincent. I did, as a newspaperman in Chungking,
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is he your friend ?
Mr. Vincent, He is an acquaintance. I would not call him a
friend.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know where he is now ?
Mr, Vincent, I do not know where White is now.
Mr, SouRwiNE. Do you know what he he is doing now? I don't
mean now in the sense of this instant, but generally this period.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't. I would assume he is in the news-
paper business.
Mr. SotiRwiNE. Is he or was he connected with the Institute of Pa-
cific Relations?
Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that subject, whether he was
with the Institute of Pacific Relations. During my time, I don't re-
call ever running across White.
Mr. SotJRWiNE. Did you ever discuss with him or with anyone else
the question of Mr. White's discharge by Mr. Henry Luce?
Mr. Vincent. No, not that I recall,
Mr. SouRwiNE. You never discussed with anyone the matter of Mr,
White's discharge ? Is that your testimony ?
Mr. Vincent. As I say, I am trying to remember, but I can't recall
any conversation I had with regard to Mr. Wliite being discharged.
I don't know at what time he was discharged.
Mr. Sotjrwine. Didn't you ever discuss that matter with your su-
periors in the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I will have to say again, I didn't dis-
cuss the discharge of White if he was discharged or when he was dis-
charged. It didn't make any impression on my memory.
Mr, Sourwine, He never discussed the matter with you ?
Mr, Vincent, He may have come into the office and discussed it
with me, but I am telling you frankly, I don't recall any conversation
with Mr, White about a discussion with him over his being discharged,
IMr. Sourwine. Do you remember the charge that Mr. Luce was
seeking a passport to go out to the Far East, and that you attempted
to influence the denial of that passport ?
Mr. Vincent. Do I recall the charge ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Didn't anybody ever discuss that with you before?
Mr. Vincent. Nobody told me I ever tried to interfere with a pass-
port for Mr. Luce.
Mr. Sourw^ine. Didn't the Secretary of State ever discuss with you
or through an intermediary bring up with you, take up with you, have
taken up with you, the problem presented by an allegation that you
were somehow mixed up in the denial or refusal of a passport to
Mr. Luce ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir, not to the best of my knowledge and belief.
It seems to me it is to my mind such an absurd story. There may
have been an allegation of that kind, but I don't recall it.
2152 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. If the Secretary of State ever quoted you in con-
nection with that matter, he was misquoting you, then, is that right?
Mr. Vincent, In connection with denial of Luce's passport. There
may have been an instance of some kind. I don't want to say here
under oath that the Secretary of State woukl be misquoting me, but
I am telling you that I have no recollection of an instance of my hav-
ing anything to do with the denial of a passport to Mr. Luce.
Mr. SouinviNE. You apparently consider any such charge as ab-
surd, is that right?
Mr. Vincent. That would be my position.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If the Secretary of State had taken up with you
the matter of an absurd charge, you certainly would remember it,
wouldn't you ?
Mr. Vincent. I would certainly think I would remember it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Then can't you testify here as to whether it ever
was or ever was not taken up with you ?
Mr. Vincent. I can testify to the best of my knowledge and belief
it never was taken up with me.
Mr. SouRwiNE. But you can't testify positively that it was not?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot testify that it was not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you ever called upon for an explanation of
that matter by any official of the Department?
Mr. Vincent, To the best of my knowledge, I never was called
upon.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Or for a statement in connection with it?
Mr. Vincent. For a statement in connection with it ? No, sir, not
that I recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You became Director of the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs September 19, 1945, is that right?
Mr. Vincent. September 19.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That was 19 days after you had succeeded Mr,
Dooman as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We talked a little while ago about a paper circulat-
ing in May, whether there was a paper circulating in May of 1945
with regard to post-surrender policy for Japan. I am asking you
now about a paper entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender
Policy for Japan," which was an official State Department document.
Do you know anything about that paper ?
Mr. Vincent. My testimony on the other paper is exactly the same
paper. So I must have given incorrect testimony before, because I
had in mind that very paper, the Initial Post-Surrender Policy, as
to when it was adopted by SWNCC. That is the paper I had in mind
in the previous testimony.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember testifying in executive session
that that paper which was adopted August 31 had been in the course
of preparation for 7 or 8 months ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall testifying. My recollection would be
that I testified that I didn't know how long it had been in prepara-
tion, because I was not connected with the drafting of that paper.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that paper communicated to General Mac-
Arthur ?
Mr. Vincent. That paper, I think, was communicated to General
MacArthur in the first week of September. I have the date here
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2153
somewhere. It was distributed to him, but I don't think I have the
exact date. My belief would be it was circulated to him sometime
between the first of September and the time that the President issued
it with General MacArthur's approval on the
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say it was not communicated to him until
after it had become a firm United States policy?
Mr. Vincent. That would be my impression, that it was not cir-
culated to him until after it had become a policy of the SWNCC Com-
mittee, but it had to be approved by the President and it was cir-
culated to General MacArthur before it was released by the Presi-
dent and his consent or his approval to its issuance was made.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is. General MacArthur's approval was
secured ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That testimony would be, would it not, that the
paper was not communicated, nor its contents communicated, to Gen-
eral MacArthur prior to the 31st of August 1945 ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. I would have no knowledge as to whether initial
drafts or others were communicated to him. I can say that after I
took over SWNCC, there was quite frequently drafts or suggestions
requested of General MacArthur in regard to the drafting of a paper.
The War Department member usually was the one who took the initia-
tive in referring matters as we went along in drafting. I would
assume that situation prevailed prior to my being Chairman as well
as afterward.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you say whether it was communicated to Gen-
eral MacArthur on the 29th of August ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. No, I have no information here from which I could
testify as to when it was, whether it was communicated to him before
the 29th.
Mr. SouRWiNE. After the paper was communicated to General Mac-
Arthur, was it changed in any way ?
]\Ir. Vincent. After it was communicated to him ? I have just testi-
fied there were some minor changes, which I can read to you here.
Mr. SouRwiNE. But only minor changes?
Mr. Vincent, Only minor changes.
Mr. SouRwiNE, Do you remember reading Mr. Dooman's testi-
mony before this committee ?
Mr. Vincent. I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember his testimony with regard to
this paper ?
Mr. Vincent. I do.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember that he testified that this paper
was adopted by SWNCC on the 29th of August, and was on that date
telegraphed out to General MacArthur as a firm United States policy
for Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. Now that you read it, I do.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe that testimony to be true and ac-
curate ?
Mr. Vincent. For the first time it was telegraphed to him ?
Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry, I don't want to expand Mr. Dooman's
testimony.
jNIr. Vincent. I do not have here the exact date when it was tele-
graphed out to him.
22S48— 52— pt. 7 11
2154 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. You are referring to SWNCC ?
The Chaieman. Do you believe that to be true and accurate ? That
is the question.
Mr, Vincent. As to the exact date, I don't know whether it is
accurate or not.
Mr. SouRw^NE. You testified it was communicated to General Mac-
Arthur after the 31st, and you have testified it was adopted by
SWNCC on the 31st of August. Now, we have before us Mr. Doo-
man's testimony before this subcommittee that the paper was adopted
by SWNCC on the 29th of August and was telegraphed out to Gen-
eral MacArthur on the 29th of August as a firm United States policy
for Japan. I am asking you w^iether you believe that testimony by
Mr. Dooman to be true and correct ?
Mr. Vincent. It is not correct insofar as the paper was not finally
adopted by the top-level, over-all SWNCC Committee until August
31, 1945.
Mr. SouRWiNE. When was it adopted by the Far Eastern Subcom-
mittee of SWNCC?
Mr. Vincent. The paper was sent up by the SWNCC Committee,
to the top SWNCC Committee by the other committee, sometime prior
to the 31st.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that on the 29th ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that was on the 29th.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether the paper was communicated
to General MacArthur on the 29th as a firm United States policy for
Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a fact the day it was communicated
to General MacArthur.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether it was communicated to him
at all on the 29th?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know. I have no positive knowledge of the
day it was communicated.
Mr. Sour WINE. If it was communicated on the 29th, would it be
communicated again after the 31st?
Mr. Vincent. My own recollection is that it was communicated to
him as a policy paper that had been adopted by SWNCC, but as I
say, I do not know the date it was communicated.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean you could have been in error in testify-
ing that it was communicated after the 31st ; that it might have been
communicated on the 29th?
Mr. Vincent. It might have been before ; yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It is a single communication that we are talking
about, regardless of wliether it was the 29th, 31st, or some other date ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, with regard to the changes made in that docu-
ment, do you remember what Mr. Dooman said about that?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall completely what he had to say.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember he said, quoting from page 7l7 of
our hearings :
These were among the changes that had been made in the paper after it
had been adopted on the 29th of August (reading) :
"Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and
of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall
be the policy of the Supreme Commander —
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2155
"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the
economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort
solely toward peaceful ends."
And then Mr. Dooman commented :
Please do not ask me to explain what that means.
Was that matter which was inserted in the document subsequent
to the time of its communication to General MacArthur ?
Mr. Vincent. That matter was in the paper when it was communi-
cated to General MacArthur.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That matter was in the paper, was it, at the time
it was approved by SWNCC?
Mr. Vincent. That matter was in it by the time it was approved
by SWNCC.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In other words, in that regard you contradict Mr.
Dooman's testimony, is that right?
Mr. Vincent. I do, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Dooman said this :
(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and bank-
ing combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan's trade
and industry.
He was apparently citing that as one of the changes made in the
paper after its adoption. Do you contradict his testimony in that
regard ?
Mr. Vincent. I do, sir, and you will recall at the executive session
I stated that that language occurred in the paper as early as mid-
August.
Mr. Sourwine. I do.
Did you make any changes or dictate or approve any changes or
suggest any changes in that paper after you became head of the Far
Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC?
Mr. Vincent. Those are the minor changes which I have here of
which I have been able to find a few. Would you like me to say what
changes were made ? I don't recall that I dictated them, but after T
became Chairman of SWNCC there were some minor drafting changes
made.
]\Ir. Sourwine. Are you accepting responsibility for whatever
changes were in fact made after you became head of the Far Eastern
Subcommittee of SWNCC?
Mr. Vincent. No, I am not accepting responsibility for any changes
that were made. The top SWNCC Committee has to be responsible
for any changes made. Some of those changes were made at top
SWNCC level. Some of them were made at the SWNCC level. Some
of them were made at the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if
I recall. But I have the complete thing, if you would like me to read
this, of how those minor changes came about.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you testified as to that before?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified to that.
Mr. Sourwine. Fi-om this document here ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I think we can avoid repetition on that point here.
T tliink the record is clear on it.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine. You have been asked before if you know or have
knowledge of Yoshio Shiga and Kyuchi Tokuda ?
2156 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I did not know them.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Do you now know that they were Communist lead-
ers, Japanese Communists?
Mr. Vincent. I have not refreshed my memory on it at all. You
have told me they were.
Mr. SouEwiNE. But you have no independent knowledge as to
whether they were, or whether they were in jail in early October of
1945?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Or as to how they got out of jail ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Souewine. You were asked in executive session whether you
had heard the report that John K. Emmerson of the State Depart-
ment, possibly accompanied by another person, went in a staff car to the
prison on the day Shiga and Tokuda were released, and brought them
back to their homes in Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. No. Did I testify that I knew of that incident?
Mr. SouRWiNE. I am asking you.
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you know of it ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I had no knowledge of that, so far as I know.
Mr. SoTJEWiNE. You have never heard that report?
Mr. Vincent. I have never heard that report until you gave it to me
here.
Mr. Sourwine. If that action was taken, would it have had any
effect on the Japanese people?
Mr. Vincent. You are asking me a speculative question there, and
I don't know that I can answer what effect it would have had for them
to have been taken from prison at what time.
Mr. Sourwine. If two Communist leaders who at the conclusion of
the war were released from prison should be met at the prison gates
by an official staff car with an official of the United States State De-
partment, and in that staff car conveyed to their homes, would that
have any effect on the Japanese people if that fact became generally
Icnown throughout Japan?
Mr. Vincent. This was a period — wasn't it ? — when we were releas-
ing Japanese political prisoners.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I could testify whether it would or
would not have an effect.
Mr. Sourwine. You are an expert on the Far East ; are you not ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified I am an expert on China.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what "face" means?
Mr. Vincent. I know what the general oriental concept of "face"
means.
Mv. Sourwine. Is that oriental concept held in Japan as well as in
China?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't give you eact testimony on that, but I
would say that the Japanese also have some idea of "face."
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it would have given "face" to the Com-
munists to have two of their leaders picked up in a staff car by a State
Department official and taken to their homes as soon as they were
released from prison?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that it would.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2157
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. That would, then, have had an impact on Japan if
that fact had been known ; would it not ?
Mr. Vincent. If the fact had been known that they were picked up
like that, yes ; I would say that it would.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It would have given prestige to Shiga and Tokuda —
would it not ?— both in their own party and among the Japanese people
generally ?
Mr. Vincent. It is possible that it would have. It would depend
on what Japanese were doing it, or what was the purpose of picking
them up in the car.
Mr. Sourwine. I cannot speak of the purpose and neither can you;
but, knowing what you must know about "face" in the Orient, if the
very unusual procedure of taking two released prisoners to their homes,
convoyed by officials of the State Department in a staff car, had fol-
lowed, it certainly would have given them face ; would it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And to say "give them face" is the same as saying
it would have enhanced their prestige and the respect in which they
were held by their people ; would it ?
Mr. Vincent. It would have.
Mr. Sourwine. I do not know why we quibble about these things.
Do you recall a broadcast dealing with policy with respect to Japan,
in which General Hilldring and Captain Dennison participated, along
with yourself?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you participate in the broadcast ?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you participate in the preparation of it?
Mr. Vincent. Of my own script.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you approve of the entire script of that broad-
cast in advance of the broadcast ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think I did. The others approved theirs, and
I approved mine.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have an opportunity in advance of the
broadcast to see the whole script ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I had an opportunity to see the whole script
when it was finally prepared.
Mr. Sourwine. For what purpose was it shown to you ?
Mr. Vincent. To familiarize myself, to see how the thing was made
up by Selden Menef ee.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he was a Communist ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he was a Communist.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he was a pro-Communist?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he was a pro-Communist.
Mr. Sourwine. If it was shown at the time prior to the broadcast,
if you wanted changes made, could you have had them made ?
Mr. Vincent. In my own script.
Mr. Sourwine. You could not have had them made in
Mr. Vincent. In General Hilldring's, or whoever was the third
person.
Mr. Sourwine. Captain Dennison.
Mr. Vincent. Captain Dennison.
Mr. Sourwine. You are stating that General Hilldring and Captain
Dennison were solely responsible for what they said ?
2158 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I am so stating, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was this approved by the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. These broadcasts were approved by the State Depart-
ment.
Mr. SouRwiNE. So, their broadcasts were approved, as well as
yours ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Who, for the State Department, approved this
script ?
Mr. Vincent. The people in the Press Office. They went over them
to see if they were all right, but not as to policy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. They were not approved as to policy?
Mr. Vincent. They were on a higher level.
Senator Ferguson. Who did approve it as to policy ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say which man.
Senator Ferguson. Whose job was it to approve as to policy? Who
approved yours, as to policy ?
Mr. Vincent. Mine was submitted to whoever was above me at
that time.
Senator Ferguson. Who was it that approved your script as to
policy?
Mr. Vincent. On October 6th, who could have approved it?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
INIr. Vincent. It would be normally submitted to Assistant Secre-
tary Benton. It could have been submitted to him because he was
our public-relations man at that time. It could have been submitted
to Mr. Acheson.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that a public-relations man
would pass on the policy ?
Mr. Vincent. He would pass on the advisability of taking this
thing and looking into it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that does not answer my question.
Mr. Vincent. Whether Acheson approved this or not, I don't know.
It was the policy not to go out and do things without some approval
by the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. Wliose job was it to approve your script, and
who did approve it ?
Mr. Vincent. In this particular case I don't recall who approved
it. General Hilldring could have approved my script. I could not
have approved his.
Senator Ferguson. You were answering his questions.
Mr. Vincent. General Hilldring at that time was already an Assis-
tant Secretary of State, and he could, in his position, approve my
script.
Mr. SouRwiNE. As background, is it not true, sir, that you testified
in executive session that you had had a session with Mr. Selden Mene-
fee at which you had, simply talking to him, expressed your ideas,
that he had made notes of that, that he had gone away and written a
script and brought that back to you for approval ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the way it was approved?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; but I am speaking now of the whole idea of
making this kind of thing had to be approved above me.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2159
Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you tliat question — who conceived
the idea of making the statement. I was talking about the policy
that was set forth in that broadcast.
Mr. Vincent. Who approved the policy set forth in that broad-
cast ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. The policy set forth, as far as I am concerned in
this broadcast, had already Jbeen approved, because you will find it was
taken primarily from approved policy at the time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Who cleared this script for policy ?
Mr. Vincent. For policy ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I have just stated that I don't know who would have
cleared this script for policy. In this particular case it might have
been left up to me to clear it. I was Director of the Far East Office,
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what the Senator is trying to determine,
whether you yourself, as the Director of the Far Eastern Office, could
have taken responsibility for clearing the script for policy or that it
had to go to a higher echelon for policy clearance.
Mr. Vincent. That could have been decided on the basis of whether
I thought it had to have policy clearance.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether this was submitted above me
to Mr. Acheson to look over, or not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you feel that you were making no departure
from policy and making no new policy ?
Mr. Vincent. If I felt I was making new policy, I would have
submitted it above, but I am testifying I don't know whether it was
submitted above, to someone else. General Hilldring could have
cleared the whole memorandum.
Mr. Sourwine. If you did submit it above, does that indicate you
felt you were making new policy ?
Mr. Vincent. Not necessarily. It would mean I was sending it to
somebody to read to see what they felt about it.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether it was submitted any higher,
or whether you yourself submitted it for policy?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether it was submitted higher, or not.
Mr. Sourwine. In that broadcast, sir, did you advocate changing the
institution of Emperor ?
IMr. Vincent. I think I can almost quote it.
Mr. Sourwine. I do not want a lengthy answer if you can avoid
it, sir. We are going to get down to this detailed broadcast.
Did you advocate changing the institution of Emperor?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I did.
Senator Ferguson. Was that the policy of the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Did you in that broadcast serve notice that the Japa-
nese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist
Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the
Communists or other "liberals" would be permitted, so far as the
United States is concerned?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to read the whole thing to find out
whether that is in it.
2160 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, SouRWiNE. Is it conceivable to you now that you did so state?
Did you, in that broadcast, serve notice that the Japanese Govern-
ment would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that
even .the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or
other "liberals" would be permitted?
Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not? That is a definite and unequivocal
statement; you did not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, before we discuss this thing in detail, I would
like to ask Mr. Mandel if there is in existence any public records with
regard to Mr. Selden Menef ee ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
In the Second Report on Un-American Activities in "Washington
State, 1948, Report of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee
on Un-American Activities, under the heading "Appendix — A Com-
parison of the Communist Party Line and the Activities and Affilia-
tions of Certain Professors at the University of Washington and Offi-
cials of the Repertory Playhouse," we find a record of Selden Menefee
on the following pages, which I offer for the record :
Pages 341, 344
Senator Ferguson. Before you read those, who was Menefee ?
Mr. Vincent. Menefee was a young man I met at this time who
came in and prepared the transcript for NBC.
Senator Ferguson. He was working for NBC ?
Mr. Vincent. He was working for NBC, not for me.
Senator Ferguson. Not for the Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Not for the State Department.
Mr. Mandel. 344, 345, 346, 347, 359, and 360.
I offer that for the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 385" and filed
for the record.)
Exhibit No. 385
[Source : Second report Un-American Activities in Washin^on State, 1948. Report of the
Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities)
[P. 341]
*******
SiGNirrcANT Activities and Affiliations, August 1935 to September 1939
February 7, 1936 — Northwest Veteran — American Civil Liberties Union official
speaks at auditorium.
Dr. Harry F. Ward, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, secretary
of the Methodist Federation for Social Service and chairman of the American
League Against War and Fascism, failed to speak on one of his advertised sub-
jects, that of the undesirability of requiring school teachers to take an oath of
allegiance to the National and State constitutions * * *. Included in the list
of sponsors for the lecture were four members of the University of Washington
faculty ; namely, Farquharson, Tyler, Selden Menefee, and Hugh DeLacy.
[Pp. 344 and 345]
[May 8, 1937— Sunday News— volume 3, No. 38, Seattle, Wash.]
Teachers Form State Federation
Affiliation with the Washington Commonwealth Federation was one of the
first acts of the newly formed Washington State Federation of Teachers, com-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2161
posed of teachers' unions from Seattle, Snohomish County, Tacoma, and Bremer-
ton, when they convened in Seattle last Saturday to form their organization.
The new federation supersedes the smaller informal Washington Joint Council
of Teachers, a committee formed a year ago to coordinate the program of teachers'
unions in the public schools, the university, and the workers' education projects.
After adopting a constitution the group voted in Hugh DeLacy, councilman-
elect and discharged university instructor, as president and Hallie Donaldson,
of the West Seattle High School, as vice president * * *.
Resolutions adopted asked release of Tom Mooney ; King Eamsey Connor ;
selection of State Superintendent of Public Instruction Stanley Atwood as
speaker at the American Federation of Teachers' national convention ; civil-
service laws for teachers ; and equalization program for State schools ; repeal
of the Washington, D. C, loyalty oath bill ; continuation of WPA projects at
union wages ; a referendum on war.
The American Federation of Teachers is affiliated with the American Federa-
tion of Labor. Delegates to the Seattle AFL Central Labor Council for the
teachers union were Selden Menefee, of the University of Washington, and
Victor Hicks, of the WPA educational project.
Comment : Affiliation of Local 401, U. of W. Teachers' Union with the American
Federation of Teachers ; the Washington Commonwealth Federation and resolu-
tions passed as indicated above, show the beginning of the pattern to be followed
by them as their program adjusts to the changing pattern of the Communist
Party line. The Washington State Un-American Activities Committee, as well
as other agencies, have voluminous files on the radical activities of Selden Mene-
fee, Victor Hicks, and Hugh DeLacy. The Sunday News was the official organ
of the Washington Commonwealth Federation and its editorial board, according
to its masthead on the above date, included among its members Prof. R. G.
Tyler, Prof. Harold Eby, and ex-Prof. Hugh DeLacy, all of the University of
Washington.
[Pp. 346 and 347]
[April 28, 1938, Daily Worker, statement by Ajnerican Progressives on the
Moscow trials]
(This statement also appeared in the May 3, 1938, issue of New Masses.)
Appendix IX, section 1-6, page 1617. The statement was obviously a docu-
ment concocted in defense of the line of the Communist Party and undoubtedly
originated in the headquarters of the Communist Party. The following excerpts
from the statement seem significant : "We the undersigned, are fully aware
of the confusion that exists with regard to the Moscow trials and the real
facts about the situation of the Soviet Union * * * ipj^g measures taken
by the Soviet Union to preserve and extend its gains and its strength therefore
fin^ their echoes here, where we are staking the future of the American people
on the preservation of progressive democracy and the unification of our efforts
to prevent the Fascist from strangling the rights of the people. American
liberals must not permit their outlook on these questions to be confused, nor
allow their recognition of the place of the Soviet Union in the international fight
of democracy against fascism to be destroyed. We call upon them to support
the efforts of the Soviet Union to free itself from insidious internal dangers, and
to rally support for the international fight against fascism, the principal menace
to peace and democracy."
Comment : Among Seattle persons whose names were signed to this statement
were the following: Dr. Garland Ethel, Selden Menefee, Albert Ottenheimer,
Burton James, and Florence B. James.
[Pp. 359 and 360]
[August 31, 1941, Seattle Times]
An article in this issue reveals that Dr. Ralph H. Gundlach of the University of
Washington was a visitor in Washington, D. C., the past week end. He attended
2162 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
sessions of the American Federation of Teachers Convention at Detroit before
going to Washington D. C. He will go from Wasington to Chicago to read a
paper on peace movements before the annual sessions of the American Psychology-
Society. While in Wasington, D. C, Dr. Gundlach has been a guest at the home
of Professor and Mrs. Selden Menefee. former University of Washington
faculty members.
Comment: The files of the Washington State Un-American Activities are
replete with information relative to activities and affiliations of Selden Menefee.
^^ » * * * * *
Mr. SouRwiNE. I offer and ask that it be inserted in the record, a
photostatic copy of a document, and I ask Mr. Vincent if this is a
photostatic copy of the State Department's publication of the text
of this radio program.
Mr. Vincent. I would have to compare it with this. [Examining
document.]
The Chairman. It will be admitted.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 386" and filed
for the record and is as follows :)
(Note. — Department of State press release No. 732, text of broad-
cast appears in appendix.)
[Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945]
Our Occupation Policy foe Japan
participants
John Carter Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of
State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordin-
ating Committee
Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department
Capt. R. L. Dennison, United States Navy, Representative of the Navy De-
partment on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating
Committee
Sterling Fisheb, Director, NBC, University of the Air
[Released to the press October 6]
Announcer. Here are headlines from Washington :
General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken
Up ; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines ; Prom-
ises Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military
Fanatics.
John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto;
Says That the Institution of the Emporer Will Have To Be Radically Modi-
fied, and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free
Assembly and Free Discussion.
Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil
Aviation ; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and
Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan.
Announcer. This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our
Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs
by Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast
to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service
men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities
of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important dis-
cussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions
on how to obtain them.
This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast
on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan". Participating are Mr. John Carter Vin-
cent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department;
Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department ;
and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U.S.N., Navy Department representative on the Far
Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2163
will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the
Air. Mr. Fisher —
FiSHEE. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and
general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That de-
bate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans con-
scious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million
Japanese.
Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much
of the confusion surrounding this debate.^ But it also raised many questions — •
questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have
asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned — the State, War,
and Navy Departments — to interpret further our Japan policy.
General Hilklring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at
least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down
our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by tell us just how
that policy is determined.
HiLLDRiNG. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will
try to explain how it is made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee —
SWING, we call it — formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions
of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the
approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of
StafC to General INIacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces
in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we
think he is doing it very well.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chair-
man does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.
Vincent. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far
Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters.
We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with
whicli General Hilklring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and
I sit in an advisory capacity.
HiLLDRiNG. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the
Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James
Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, an^ the Under Secretary
of the Navy, Artemus Gates.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, I'd like to know whether there is a — shall we say —
strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.
Vincent. No ; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There
is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and
the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving
our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.
Fisher. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian
advisers.
Vincent. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists
have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has
welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with
specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to
send more and more such people out.
Fisher. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee. Captain
Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation.
Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and
voice in, the policy for Japan.
Dennison. We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000
vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played
in the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country
separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always
present a naval problem.
Fisher. What part is the Navy playing now in that control?
Dennison. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this
duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General
MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil-
affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the
former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islanda
Fisher. Does that include Okinawa?
1 Bulletin of Sept. 23, 1945, p. 423.
2164 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Dennison. Yes.
Fisher. That's not generally known, is it?
Dennison. No ; I believe not. I'd like to add — besides these immediate duties
the United States Navy vpill have to exercise potential control over Japan long
after our troops are vpithdrawn.
Fisher. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcommittee
which drafts our occupational policy, can you give us a statement of our over-all
objectives?
Vincent. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces
and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize Japan —
to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will
not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.
Fisher. And how long do you think that will take?
Vincent. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the
.Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this : The occupation will continue
until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue
until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its
form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American
democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic
tendencies.
Fisher. General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?
HiLLDRiNG. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clair-
voyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish
our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we
have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.
Fisher. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and
the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy?
Hilldring. That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves
matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department.
I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.
Fisher. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?
Vincent. Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States
proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of
regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries
interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced
recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies
for the control of Japan.^ In addition to the four principal powers in the Far
East, a number of other powers are to be invited to tiave membership on the
Commission.
Fisher. Coming back to our first objective — General Hilldring, what about the
demobilization of the Japanese Army ? How f ai* has it gone ?
Hilldring. Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is
virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning dis-
armed soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport sys-
tems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.
Fisher. And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of
Asia?
Hilldring. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on
shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority.
Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated ; the return of
Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.
FiSHEB. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the
Japanese forces scattered through Asia?
Dennison. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close
to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for
the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.
Fisher. And what is being done with the Japanese Navy?
Dennison. The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's
nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed.
Fisher. Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military system —
the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecut-
ing liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be
done about that?
Vincent. That vicious system will be abolished, INIr. Fisher. Not only the top
chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its
* See p. 545.
■INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2165
hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America
will have to be substituted for it.
Dennison. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and
not an army in the guise of police.
HiLLDRiNG. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthu'r has already
abolished the Kempai and political police.
Fisher. It seems to me that a key position in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent,
is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government,
from the Emperor on down.
Vincent. Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in
the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would
hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the
people of Japan must be removed.
Fisher. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?
Vincent. The institution of the Emperor — if the Japanese do not choose to
get rid of it — will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher.
Dennison : The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will
not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent
to General MacArthur establish that point.
FiSHEB : Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point.
Captain Dennison?
Dennison : I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur
said:
"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the
state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You
will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our
relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional
surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question
on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.
"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to
the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does
not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders
issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, in-
cluding the use of force." ^ That's the directive under which General MacArthur
is operating.
Fisher. That's clear enough. * * * Now, General Hilldring, you have to
do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main
difference between them?
HiLLDKiNG. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Re-
duced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again
breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of
control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Govern-
ment, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, and
our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.
Fisher. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of
the national Government in Japan?
Hilldring. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the
national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Gov-
ernment available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole com-
plicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million peo-
ple. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By clean-
ing up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving
time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the
Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.
Fisher. But some people argue. General, that by utilizing the Japanese Gov-
ernment we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't
this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry
persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?
Hilldring. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japa-
nese gi-oups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy
requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed.
The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. Re-
movals are being made daily by General MacArthur.
Dennison. Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan,
not to support it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had
to feel out the situation.
» Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480.
2166 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Fisher. Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went
to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?
Dennison. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General
MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has corre-
spondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those polices.
Fisher. He certainly has. Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians,
Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me.
Vincent. Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today
that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict
exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it
will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found
by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out.
Fisher. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war
criminals?
Vincent. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we
can say this : All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being
war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection.
HiLLDRiNG. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they
are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is
applying in Germany are being used in Japan.
Dennison. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they
are punished — not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.
Fisher. All right. Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let
me ask you this : Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu — the big indus-
trialists— who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war,
among the guilty?
Dennison. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall
that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.
Fisher. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists
who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?
HiLLDKiNG, Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos — militarists — will be
removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and
education as well. As a matter of national policy, we ai'e going to destroy
Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up.
There's no other way to accomplish it.
Fisher. What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?
Vincent. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those
members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General
Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines
have over the economy of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and
Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.
Fisher. And the financial combines as well?
Vincent. Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already
taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of
their loot.
Fisher. Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu".
Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?
Dennison. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr.
Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and
arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of
occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought
about this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be
arrested and tried as a war criminal.
Fisher. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany
has been to send Americans over to rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Faiben-
industrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in
Japan. What about that?
Hilldring. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are not rebuilding the big
trusts in Germany, we have not rebuilt them, and we are not going to rebuild
them in the future. The same policy will ])revail in Japan. Moi-eover, not only
will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans
or the Japanese to do so.
Fisher. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?
Hilldring. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2167
modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel,
as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equip-
ment.
Vincent. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese econ-
omy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under
our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural
resources to the ends of peaceful living.
FisHEB. Mr. Vincent, won't this creat a lot of unemployment? Is anything
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers,
for example?
Vincent. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their
economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and
the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work
to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by
the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all
the encouragement we can.
Fisher. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out
of heavy war industry?
Vincent. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed
to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy
will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more
and more for their domestic market.
Fisher. They'll have to have ^otne foreign trade of course to keep going.
Vincent. Of course, but not the unhealtbful sort they had before the war.
A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military
preparations, and not to support her internal economy ; after all, scrap-iron
and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's
foreign trade far below the prewar level and still have a standard of living
comparable to what they had before the war.
Fisher. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over
there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our
policy be on food?
Hilldring. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he
does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this
winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in
other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy
populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest
that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation.
The Japanese will have to gi'ow their own food or provide it from imports.
Fisher. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going
to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?
Dennison. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy — that's the
price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships
shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's
imports, in order to keep her from rearming — and the best way to do that may
be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.
Fisher. Then, Captain Dennison, wh,at about Japan's civil aviation? A lot
of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some
Japanese transport planes to resume operations.
Dennison. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of Gen-
eral MacArthur's directive in this field, no civil aviation will be permitted in
Japan.
Vincent. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a
specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.
Fisher. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of
the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialista
will be?
Vincent. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agri-
culture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider dis-
tribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade.
But those nre things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—
and will, we expect.
Fisher. And the labor unions? What about them?
Vincent. We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher,
because that's an essential part of democracy.
Fisher. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals
are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?
2168 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Vincent. General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons
imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.
Fisher. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces
in Japan, Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?
Dennison. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among
the Japanese. We'll give them eveiT opportunity to draw up and to adopt a
constructive reform program.
Vincent. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured
the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation author-
ities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political
parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all
barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.
Fisher. I take all this to mean that the democratic and antimilitarist groups
will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group
tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?
Vincent. It would be suppressed. One of General INIacArthur's policy guides
calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan." It
also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies
of the government are to be permitted and favored."
Fisher. And if the democi-atic parties should find it necessary to use force
to attain their objectives?
Vincent. In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where
necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve
liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force.
Dennison. We are not interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as
such. I think we should make that doubly clear.
Fisher. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been
the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand
that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting
together in one party — a Socialist party. Wliat stand will we take on that.
General Hilldring?
Hir.LDRiNG. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every
encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in
Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military
fanatics.
Fisher. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for
the democratic forces.
Hilldring. We're prepared to support the development of democratic govern-
ment even though some temporary disorder may result — so long as our troops
and our over-all objectives are not endangered.
Fisher. I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will
be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion qf
nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"?
Vincent. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not
to be interfered with. Shintoism. however, as a state-directed religion is to be
done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there
will be no place for Shintoism in the schools.
Fisher. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.
Vincent. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemina-
tion of .Japanese militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology in any form will
be completely suppressed.
FisiiER. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That
will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.
Vincent. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their
schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic leanings
are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.
Dennison. That's where the real change must stem from — the school system.
The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes
for the older generation as weU.
Fisher. And that may take a very long time. Captain Dennison.
Dennison. How long depends on bow fast we are able to put our directives
into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through
all channels — school texts, press, radio, and so on.
Fisher. What's the basis for your optimism. Captain?
Dennison. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many
Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in
Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, 1
think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2169
they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the greal
majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They
proved their loyalty there during the war.
Fisher. What accounts for that loyalty?
Dennison. Simply that they like the American way of life better. At seven,
it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they lilie, but as they get older
they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I
believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a
taste of them — of real civil liberties— they'll never want to go back to their old
ways.
HiLLDRiNo. I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite
possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining
the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack —
they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoc-
trinated with one basic idea : obedience. Tliat makes it easier to deal with them.
Vincent. Or it may make it more difficult. General. It depends on how you
look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if
there's to be a real, working democracy in Japan.
HiLLDKiNG. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight.
And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese
under the occupation?
ViNCEi^T. The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent
indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about
the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to coop-
erate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military
domination they've imdergone, only time and encouragement will bring about
the emergence of sound, democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle
the East," or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and
political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully
fostered.
Fisher. Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you. General Hilldring
and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupa-
tion policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic
policy — one that's aimed at giving no encouragement to the imperialists and
every possible encouragement to the prodemocratic forces which are now begin-
ning to i-eappear in Japan.
Announcer. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the
Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring,
Director of Civil Affairs. War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy
representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Co-
ordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Seldeu Menefee.
This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy,"
presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain
printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like
to receive copies of the broadcasts, send $1 to cover the costs of printing and
mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to
the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also
invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special
State Department program on our Latin-American policy, with reference to
Argentina and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de
Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who
has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the
Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for
this important program * * * Kennedy Ludlam si)eaking from Washington,
D. C.
Exhibit No. 386A
Statement on the Establishment of a Far Eastern Commission To Formulate
Policies for the Carrying Out of the Japanese Surrender Terms ^
[Released to the press October 1]
Mr. James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State of the United States, announced
that he has received from Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign
' Issued by the Secretary of State In London on September 29, 1945.
22848— 52— pt. 7 12
2170 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Affairs of Great Britain, the consent of the British Government to the proposal
made by the United States Government on August 22 for the establishment of
a Far Eastern Commission to formulate policies for the carrying out of the
Japanese surrender terms.
The Commission will also be asked to consider whether a Control Council
should be established and if so the powers which should be vested in it.
The Soviet Union and China had already given their consent to the establish-
ment of the Commission. France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and the Netherlands will be invited to become members of the Com-
mission. The first meeting of the Commission will be convened in Washington
in the near future.
In agreeing to the establishment of the Commission Mr. Bevin stated it was
his understanding that the Commission could determine whether it should meet
in Washington or Tokyo. Secretary Byrnes confirmed Mr. Bevin's understanding
and said that the United States representative would be instructed to vote that
the Commission hold meetings in Tokyo.
Mr. Bevin also requested that India be invited to become a member of the
•Commission. Mr. Byrnes said the United States would agree to the request and
that he would submit the request to the Governments of the Soviet Union and
China for their approval.
Mr, SouRWiNE. Do you recognize the format there?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. What publication is it?
Mr. Vincent. State Department Bulletin.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It is from the State Department Bulletin?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, Mr. Manclel, will you state whether that is a
photostat of certain pages from the State Department Bulletin?
Mr. Mandel. That was ordered from the Library of Congress by me,
to be photostated.
Mr. Sourwine. It is a photostat of certain pages of the State Depart-
ment Bulletin?
Mr. Mandel. It is.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in this speech say, Mr. Vincent, "The
institution of the Emperor, if the Japanese do not choose to get rid
of it, will have to be radically modified." ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Captain Dennison then quoted part of the directive
sent to General MacArthur ; is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Captain Dennison said :
The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacAi'thur and will not be
permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliat is the next paragraph ?
Mr. Vincent. I can quote a part of it to you.
Mr. Sour'wt^ne. Will you read the two paragraphs that Captain
Dennison read with regard to the directive to General MacArthur?
Mr. Vincent (reading) :
"The authority of The Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state
is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will
exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our
relations with Japan do not rest on a conti'actual basis, but on an unconditional
surrender.
"Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the
part of the Japanese as to its scope.
"Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the
extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not
prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders
issued by you by the employment of such measvires as you deem necessary, includ-
ing the use of force."
That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2171
Mr. SouRWiNE. That directive was in line with your own views; is
that correct?
Mr, Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, did you, in that radio broadcast, state :
We have every intention or proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu
who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hildriug has just said, we
Intend to break the hold these large family combines have over the economy
of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, to name the most
prominent.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I stated that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not state further along
This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which
for years has been seared to the requirements of total war. Under our close
supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources
to the ends of peaceful living?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. And Mr. Fisher asked :
Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done ,
to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for
example?
And you replied :
Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic
problems. They should ]:ut emphasis on farming and fishing and the produc-
tion of consumer goods. They also have p'( nty of reconstruction work to do in
every city.
Mr. Vincent. Will you continue?
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help
themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement
we can.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; that is my statement.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Fisher then said :
What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy
war industry?
and you replied:
They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain.
The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be
to turn that economy in on itself, so that the Japanese will produce more and
more for their domestic market.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
IsIt. Sourwine. Was that a delineation of a realistic policy ?
Mr. Vincent. It was a delineation of a realistic policy that we con-
sidered at that time.
Mr. Sourwine. You had considered fehat policy at that time to be
realistic?
Mr. Vincent. I considered that policy to be realistic ; yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. On the basis of all that you as an expert knew about
the Orient?
Mr. Vincent. On the basis of all that I knew about the Orient, I
thought that was a realistic policy at that time.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you consider it now to be realistic ?
Mr. Vincent. I think now that Japan has to get back its heavy in-
■dustries, but at that time we had just finished a war against Japan,
2172 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
where its heavy industries had been used against us for 4 years of war,
and the objective and idea in mind in that statement was to reduce
Japan's war-making potential in the future, and at the same time to
try to provide the Japanese who had lived off those industries, other
means of living, which, as I say, were light industries and other forms
of economic activity.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did your background and experience and knowl-
edge with regard to Japan and the Orient generally lead you to be-
lieve that the Japanese nation could exist, turned in on itself, as you
here referred to it ?
Mr. Vincent. I am not an economist, but that was my general be-
lief, and it was the belief, I think also, of the people who clrafted the
postsurrender policy for Japan.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Certainly, in any event, that was the belief that you
were conveying in this radio speech ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, did you further along state :
All democratic parties will be encouraged. Tbey will be assured the rights
of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to
place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The
Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom
of religion, of thought, and of the press?
Mr. Vincent. Are you asking whether that was a statement by me?
Mr. Sot7Ra^t;ne. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr, SouRWiNE. Now, did you include in your category of "all demo-
cratic parties" the Communist Party?
Mr. Vincent. Just what I have stated here, that it would place no
obstruction in the way of organization of political parties, ancl that is,
if not a quote, a paraphrase on the postwar suiTender policy.
Senator Ferguson. That would include the Communist Party ?
Mr. Vincent. That would include the Communist Party. That
would not exclude them.
Mr. Sourwine. You say "all democratic parties" using "democratic"
as a generic phrase, all parties included within what you spoke of as
democratic, including the Communist Party, will be encouraged, will
be assured the rights of free assembly, and free public discussion, and
the occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of
their organization; is that right?
Mr. Vincent. I have used the phrase here, "the organization of
political parties."
Mr. Sourwine. That is right. Did you consider the Commimisi-.
Party a political party ?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. Sourwine. It was then included, was it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Now did you, after Mr. Fisher said :
Then, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with
them, using gangster methods?
state :
It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for
the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says that
changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Government
are to be permitted and favored.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2173
Is that what yon said ?
Mr. Vincent. That is what I said.
Mr. SouR^VINE. Did that not convey the implicit information that if
the Government attempted by force to pnt down the Communists, that
Government's effort would be suppressed ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not draw that inference from it, sir, no. Let
me read it again. [I^eadinfr document.]
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes; please do.
Mr. Vincent. I would say here that the inference here is not the
Government, but if a political group using gangster methods, were
trying to interfere with the ideas expressed in the previous statement,
which is that the Japanese would be free to organize political parties,
that those gangster methods would be suppressed by General Mac-
Arthur.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Wliat do you thing that Mr. Fisher meant by "gang-
ster methods"? Did he not mean force?
Mr. Vincent. I would say he meant force.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You understood him to mean force, did you not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Does the nationalistic groups that he spoke of, in-
clude the National Government of China ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The Chinese Nationalist Government?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I don't mean to say here that in Japan we
are talking about a nationalistic group from China that was going to
try to interfere, using gangster methods, in Japan ; no, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were talking about the nationalistic group in
Japan?
Mr. Vincent. Talking about the old military group in Japan.
Mr. Sourwine. You were talking about any nationalistic group?
Mr. Vincent. That was trying to use gangster methods.
Mr. Sourwine. Meaning by that, force ?
Mr. Vincent. You are talking about Mr. Fisher here. I am trying
to figure out what Mr. Fisher meant.
Mr. Sourwine. You understood him to mean the use of force when
you answered this question ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; gangster methods.
Mr. Sourwine. By "gangster methods" you meant force?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. What you were saying was that no nationalistic
group would be permitted to use force against a democratic party;
is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That is what you could read into that ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. The democratic parties, you have already testified,
included the Communist Party; is that right?
Mr. Vincent. I have said that the organization of political parties
would have included and not excluded the Communists.
Mr. Sourwine. You said your use of the phrase "democratic parties"
included the Communist Party ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. What you are saying is that no nationalistic group
would be permitted to use force against the Communist Party ; is that
right?
2174 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. Mr, Sourwine, Mr. Fisher has used the words "gang-
ster methods." You are trying to draw this around to the idea that
gangster methods mean force.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You said that gangster methods meant force.
Mr. Vincent. And the Government of Japan would not be allowed
to suppress the Communist Party. That is not what this means at
all, but gangster methods and nationalistic groups, using gangster
methods at that time, would not have been what was expected to
happen in Japan, and General MacArthur, according to his own
directive — because I quote him here^also says :
Changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Govern-
ment are to be permitted and favored.
Senator Ferguson. You have answered now that the Communist
Party back when you made that broadcast was a democratic party?
Mr. Vincent. In the general sense of a political party.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, democratic political party.
Mr. Vincent (reading) :
The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in tlie way of the
organization of political parties.
Senator Ferguson. I am taking your answer that it was a democratic
political party. Do you today hold the same belief ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not say here that I am calling the Communist
Party a democratic party. It says :
All democratic parties will be encouraged.
But later on it says :
The occupation authorities are to plac eno obstruction in the way of the
organization of political parties.
Senator Ferguson. Then you now want to have the record stand
that the Communist Party was not a democratic party?
Mr. Vincent. That the Communist Party was not considered, in
my mind, to be a democratic party insofar as I can recall, but the
use here would imply that.
Senator Ferguson. You would include them ?
Mr. Vincent. You include them in the organization of political
parties :
The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the
organization of political parties.
Senator Ferguson. Then if it had been a Fascist Party, an Emper-
or's party, they would have been welcome, because you did not use
the word, you said, "democratic," so everything that could be called a
political party was included there, is that not right ?
Mr. Vincent (reading) :
All democratic parties will be encouraged.
Senator Ferguson. Now we are going back to the word "democratic."
That is in there, is it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, the Communists are included in the
democratic parties ?
Mr. Vincent. In the context of this thing it would be assumed that
the democratic parties at that time were considered to be
Senator Ferguson. We will start over again.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2175
Are you of the same opinion now, that they are a democratic party ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then you have changed your mind ?
Mr. Vincent. I have changed my mind ; yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. These were words of art, were they not ?
Mr. Vincent. This was giving a broadcast.
Mr. SouRwiNE, Yes, but in the context of this broadcast you meant
to inchide the Communist Party among the democratic parties about
which you were speaking ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That would be correct, sir, in the matter of broad-
casting.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now when Mr. Fisher said :
And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain
their objectives —
Did you reply to him :
In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary
to protect our own occupation forces.
Did you say that ?
Mr. Vincent. I did say that.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Now have you not stated there in two succeeding
statements, with only one intervening question, that on the one hand,
if a democratic political party, a democratic party — and in that con-
notation, that included the Communist Party — should be sought to be
put down by a nationalistic group, the nationalistic group would be
suppressed by the Supreme Commander ; and then in the next breath
you state that if a democratic party — and that included the Com-
munist Party — sought to achieve its ends by force, our people would
not interfere or intervene except where necessary to protect our own
occupation forces ? Is that not true ?
Mr. Vincent. That is what the language here said.
Mr. Sourwine. That is what you said ?
Mr. Vincent. But I think you are drawing some very wrong impli-
cations from the language here.
Mr. Sourwine. What other implications do you draw ?
Mr. Vincent. I certainly do not draw the implication that if the
Communist Party became a menace in Japan, that General Mac-
Arthur would be prohibited from taking action against them, because,
in the broadcast here I had mentioned the fact in a loose context the
democratic parties will be encouraged.
Mr. Sourwine. I asked you earlier if it was not true that in that
broadcast you had served notice that the Japanese Government would
not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the
use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other liberals
would be permitted.
I ask you again, is it not true you did ?
Mr. Vincent. I say that is a wrong inference from the language
of this thing here, Mr. Sourwine, and you know that that is a wrong
inference from this thing here.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I do not know that is wrong, or I
would not be urging it here.
Mr. Vincent. I can tell you flatly, then, that irrespective of the
language here, it was not the intention of this language to in any way
2176 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
permit the Communist Party to take over control of Japan or to
operate in a manner which would be inimical to the occupation of
Japan.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Or to assist in that objective ?
Mr. Vincent. That was not in my mind, and I don't think it was
in anybody's mind in drafting this.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You can see, can you not, how the language can be
so construed?
Mr. Vincent. I can see how the language can be so construed.
Senator Ferguson. This was cleared as to policy ?
Mr. Vincent. This was cleared — I have testified before that the
language of this was not particularly cleared as to policy. I think you
will find in the post-surrender paper that it also contains language
like that.
Senator Ferguson. If the language does not clear it, what was
cleared ? What would you clear in a broadcast if you did not clear the
language ?
Mr. Vincent. I would clear whatever there was in over-all policy.
Senator Ferguson. Does this state an over-all policy ?
Mr. Vincent. This states an over-all policy in the popular language
of making a broadcast ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it the policy of our Government at that
time, that you made the broadcast, to get rid of the Emperor ?
Mr. Vincent, The policy of the Government to get rid of the
Emperor ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it to allow the Communists to rise in Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then why did you not exclude the Communists
from this "democratic political parties" ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, we were thinking, in those times, of the old .
totalitarian party in Japan, which had been running the Government.
We were not thinking in terms here of making fine distinctions.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Were you not saying in this speech that any liberal
party in Japan would even be permitted to use force to gain its ends
against the then existing Government ?
Mr. Vincent. Any liberal party?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I will have to read this again.
That is what I was saying here. He puts the words here in his
mouth.
Mr. Sourwine. There are words you put in your own mouth, are
they not ?
Mr. Vincent. My reply to him.
Mr. Sourwine. You said :
This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese
may even use force.
Mr. Vincent, Yes,
Mr. Sourwine. Now, that included "to achieve ascendancy of the
Communist Party," did it not ?
Mr. Vincent. I say that the inference you are drawing from that,
that there was any intention in my language or in the post-surrender
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2177
document — of which I think I have a copy here — in which you find
similar language, and to draw the inference from that which can be
drawn, is entirely correct.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, if you, sir, as a State Department
official, had desired on a public broadcast to serve notice on the Jap-
anese people that the Communists would be permitted to use force
to gain their ends, and that the United States Government would not
defend the monarchy, would you have dared to use any more explicit
terms than were used in that broadcast ?
Mr. Vincent, I had no such intention of making any
Mr. SouEwiNE. Answer the question.
Mr. Vincent. That if I had wanted
Mr. Sourwine. If you had desired to serve notice in that speech,
would you have dared to be any more explicit about it than you were
in that broadcast ?
Mr. Vincent. You are asking a hypothetical question.
Senator Ferguson. You are an expert on the Far East. Answer it
as an expert. It is a hypothetical one.
Mr. Vincent. It is a hypothetical question. I don't know what I
would have tried to do. How can I say what I would have tried to
do it I were trying to get the Communists to take over China, which I
was not doing ?
Mr. Sourwine. Could you at this time, October of 1945, have said
in a radio broadcast that it was the policy of the Communist Party
against the use of force by any nationalistic group in Japan, but
that the Communist Party would be permitted to use force in the
achievement of its ends? Would you have been able to say that?
Could you have dared to say that in a radio broadcast at that time^
in exactly those terms ?
Mv. Vincent. I would never have even thought of saying it.
Mr. Sourwine. It would not have been permitted, would it?
Mr. Vincent. I would never have thought to say that.
Mr. Sourwine. It would have been completely contrary to the
policy of the United States ?
Mr. Vincent. It would have been contrary to the policy of the
United States.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliat we have is a speech in which you used lan-
guage which you now say could be construed in a manner which waSy
at that time, completely contrary to the policy of the United States?
Mr. Vincent. I say that you are drawing an inference from state-
ments here which were perfectly understandable at the time.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how those statements were under-
stood by the Japanese people ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not. I will say that I never had any objec-
tions to the speech from the Japanese, General MacArthur, or any-
one else.
Senator Ferguson. Do you infer now that Mr. Selden Menefee
inserted this in or do you take full responsibility for this language?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Selden Menefee wrote the language, but I will
take full responsibility, because I have already testified I went over
this broadcast.
Senator Ferguson. Now, have you seen this record on Mr. Selden
Menefee ?
Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir.
2178 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that may make a difference as to
what he intended in this speech ?
Mr. Vincent. From what you have read there it could make a dif-
ference, but I doubt it.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that Amerasia back on July 28,
1944, was advocating allowing the Communist Party to cause an up-
rising and take over Japan?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I remember, from that document there.
Senator Ferguson. Who drew this document ?
Mr. Vincent. Who drew that document ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. In the State Department?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. It was drawn up in the special assistant's office, for
relations with the press.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, since the chairman has referred to this, our
specialist from the Navy Department is here. Would the chairman like
to put him on ?
Senator Ferguson. I do. But first, did you approve it ? I do not
know the exhibit number, but I want to receive it as an exhibit. Did
you approve it?
Mr. Vincent. It passed over my desk and I initialed it.
Senator Ferguson. It passed over your desk and you initialed it.
I ask you whether or not you approved it ?
Mr. Vincent. My initialing of it would approve sending it to the
field in response to requests that had come from the field for informa-
tion as to what publications were saying.
I did not initiate the action.
Senator Ferguson. Do you mean to say now that you only approved
that it might be sent out ?
Mr. Vincent. We were sending out other articles. We were send-
ing out newspaper clippings to Mr. Gauss, over the radio, because of
a request from him to get reaction in this country.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know who Susumu Okano was?
Mr. Vincent. Susumu Okano?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. When I testified, I did not. I think Mr. Sourwine
told me.
Senator Ferguson. When you testified — ^that means before the ex-
ecutive session?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is within a week or 2 weeks ?
Mr. Vincent. A week ago.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know this man ?
Mr. Vincent. I didn't know the man.
Senator Ferguson. But you did approve language in this release, as
of July 28, 1944?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Is that true?
Mr. Vincent. That is true.
Senator Ferguson. And this language clearly indicates he was a
Communist, does it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; it does.
Senator Ferguson. Is there any question about it ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2179
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you account for the fact in any way that you
as an expert on the Far East did not know, certainly, one of the lead-
inf? Communists, if not the leading Communist, of Japan, by name?
Mr. Vincent. My testimony to you was that I did not know him
and I could not recall his name.
Mr. SocTRWiNE. I say : Do you account in any way for the fact
that you did not ?
Mr. Vincent. I account for it by the fact that 7 years afterward
I could not recall the name of a Japanese. •
Mr. SouKwiNE. Mr. Cliairman, might the record show at this point,
so there will be no false impression, that while this Amerasia document
speaks of using the Japanese Communist Okano in the role of Tito
for Japan, Tito at that time was in a much different position than
what he is in at the present time ?
Is that not true, Mr. Vincent, that at that time, in July of 1944,
Tito was a Communist leader, there had been no break with Commu-
nist Kussia in Yugoslavia at that time ?
Mr. Vincent. In 1944, Tito was, as I recall it, a guerrilla leader
in Yugoslavia, but I can't give exact information on it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He was a Communist guerrilla leader ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R. ?
Mr. Vincent. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R. and,
it is my recollection, by the United Kingdom.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes?
Senator Ferguson. Now the second line in this describes Okano as
a Japanese Communist, does it not?
Mr. Vincent. The second line in what, sir? I am trying to follow
you.
Senator Ferguson. In your release.
Mr. Vincent. The second line from where ?
Senator Ferguson. The second line from the top.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, "using the Japanese Communist, Susumu
Okano."
Senator Ferguson. Yes. He was a Japanese Communist; is that
not correct?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know then that Amerasia was a Com-
munist front?
Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What did you think they meant by this state-
ment, if it was not a Communist front?
Mr. Vincent. This was simply, as the policy was, even in Yugo-
slavia, of using people anywhere we could, to fight the Japanese.
Senator Ferguson. But this was to do more than fight the Japa-
nese; it was to establish a Communist Government in Japan, was it
not? You would not expect the Communists to establish any other
kind of government than a Communist Government, would you ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you were advocating that they estab-
lish a Communist Government in Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I was not advocating anything.
This was sent out.
2180 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. You knew tliat Amerasia was-
Mr. Vincent. That Amerasia, in writing this article, had expressed^
that opinion.
Senator Ferguson. Would that be pro-Communist?
Mr. Vincent. It certainly would be pro-Communist.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, we have now our expert from the
Navy Department, on distribution coding. May we have him as a
witness ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Will you raise your right hand ?
You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before this
subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United
States you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth?
Commander Blenman. I do.
TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM BLENMAN, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND PLANS DIVISION, OFFICE OF
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY DEPART-
MENT
Mr. Sourwine. Commander, will you state your name for the
record?
Commander Blenman. Commander William Blenman.
Mr. Sourwine. What position do you hold in the Department ?
Commander Blenman. I am the Assistant Director of the Admin-
istration and Plans Division in the Office of Chief of Naval
Operations.
Mr. Sourwine. I hand you a document consisting of two pages.
Will you read the first couple of lines so we may identify it ?
Commander Blenman (reading) :
The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibility of using the Japanese
Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of * * *.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you look at the lower left-hand corner of the
bottom of the second page? Do you find there symbols indicating
distribution ?
Commander Blenman. I do.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us what those symbols mean?
Commander Blenman. The first one, Comminch F-0 means "com-
mander in chief, and the Chief of Naval Operations."
Mr. Sourwine. Now, first of all, does the presence of these symbols
indicate to you that this document was sent to a number of places or
a number of categories of places and persons ?
Commander Blenman. It indicates to me that it received distribu-
tion within the Navy Department.
Mr. Sourwine. Within the Navy Department?
Commander Blenman. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Then these are people or officers within the Navy to
whom it went?
Commander Blenman. That is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you please proceed?
Commander Blenman. First one, "Comminch F-O" is the com-
mander in chief and the Chief of Naval Operations.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2181
Senator Ferguson. Wlio is the commander in chief?
Commander Blenman. This means the commander in chief of the
^avy, sir, who was at that time Fleet Admiral E. J. King.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral King, on July 28, 19i4, was the com-
mander in chief ?
Commande*r Blenman. Yes, sir.
The next symbol "Comminch F-20" is the assistant for Combat In-
telligence.
In July, 1944 — I do not have the organization sheets of that particu-
lar month — so the incumbent at that time I do not know at present.
"Op-13"' refers to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.
"Op-13" is the Director of the Central Division.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who that was ?
Commander Blenman. Reading from the sheet which is dated Au-
gust 22, 1944, that w^as Capt. O. S. Colclough.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What is the next one ?
Commander Blenman. "Op-16" is the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence.
"Op-16-1" is the Deputy Director for Naval Intelligence.
"Op-16-F" is the Head of Intelligence Branch in the Naval Intelli-
gence Division.
"Op-20-G" is the Communications Division, the Assistant Director
for Communications and Intelligence.
The last I am unable to identify positively, but by the first "Op-16"
it indicates that it belonged to the Naval Intelligence Division. I be-
lieve it was probably a mailing file section.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Considering that paper as a whole, would you say
that it is a copy of a State Department document which was circulated
within the Navy Department, for the information of high-echelon of-
ficers and intelligence?
Commander Blenman. Judging from the distribution list, I would
say "Yes."
Mr. SouRwiNE. The document appears on its face to be originally
a State Department document ; is that right ?
Commander Blenman. I would be unable to positively identify it
as such.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What is the marking in the upper left-hand corner ?
Commander Blenman. "Message sent, Chungking, China, July 25
(1005)."
Mr. Sourwine. Is there a name there ?
Commander Blenman. It says "Hull (Secretary)."
Mr. Sourwine. He was Secretary of State ?
Commander Blenman. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Assuming this document was an official Navy De-
partment document, the presence of that name would indicate it was
originally a message sent by Mr. Hull to Chungking, would it not?
Commander Blenman. It would.
Senator Ferguson. Over on the second page, does it not have under
"OP-16-A-3-1" "State FC/L"?
Commander Blenman. That must be, I believe, some State Depart-
ment distribution. It is not within the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. It would indicate that it was distributed in
.State, also?
Commander Blenman. Yes, sir.
2182 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Now, does it indicate in any place that that is
a Navy document ?
Commander Blenman. It has no indication of such.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Vincent, you concede that this was
a State Department document ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. I don't think there is anything very mysterious
there. Our communications with Chungking during the war, and
the channels being confined, this was made over Navy radio. We have
had Navy radio personnel in the Embassy at Chungking. This long-
distribution symbol put on — it was put on as it went out over Navy
radio.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean if something went out over Navy radio,
they had a closed circuit of distribution there to the Navy Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; as the telegram goes from the Navy to the State
Department, the State Department would not have put a distribution
list for the Navy.
Mr. Sourwine. Would that be the practice in the Navy Depart-
ment, if they sent a State Department message to Chungking, to cir-
culate a copy of it ?
Commancler Blenman. I Can't testify that was the procedure done
in those days.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know that to be done during your
time ?
Commander Blenman. I have no experience in that regard.
Mr. Sourwine. I do not want to put you on the spot, sir, I have no
more questions.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, the date on this is July 28, 1944. The message
purports to have been sent on July 25, 1944, to Chungking.
Do you know if that date is correct, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know that the date is absolutely correct.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have reason to believe it is not correct ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no reason to believe it is not correct.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you accept the fact that this document was cir-
culated in the Navy Department about the 28th of July?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I do.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, do you know if this document quotes from the
August 1944 issue of Amerasia ? It states : "The July issue."
Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge if it was quoting from the Au-
gust issue. It says it was quoting from the July issue ; as far as I know
anything about it. It is right here, if you want me to read this.
Mr. Sourwine. What is this?
Mr. Vincent. This is a press release that I spoke of this morning.
Mr. Sourwine. That has been ordered in the record, and this docu-
ment has been ordered in the record, so they will both be in the rec-
ord for whatever they may speak. But, I would like to ask : Did you
not know that, in fact, the text quoted was not in the July issue of
Amerasia but in the August issue of Amerasia ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. It was in the July issue ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I did not draft this. I have no recol-
lection other than passing over my desk. I don't know whether it
was in July. It says "July issue."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2183
A telegram drafted in Mr, McDermott's office would be the July
issue ; that would be my assumption.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Do you recall ever urging that China w'ould be used
as a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union
in the Far East?
Mr. Vincent. I recall making a speech some time or other using a
phrase similar to that. I don't recall urging it. You will have to
take that whole speech.
Senator Ferguson. It looks as if we can finish this in 2 hours, but
we are not going to try it tonight.
So we will start at 9 : 30 tomorrow morning and continue for 2 hours
and see whether we can finish.
Mr. Vincent. I have great confidence in Mr. Sourwine, but he has
made those 2-hour promises
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I have made no promises as to 2 hours
or when we could conclude.
Mr. Vincent. That is a fact.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Why did you say that I had made a promise of 2
hours ?
Mr. Vincent. I correct the statement. You have not made a prom-
ise. You have said at times you would hope to get through in 2 hours.
Mr. Sourwine. And I have expressed that hope with the utmost
sincerity, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I might suggest that if you will get a good
night's rest and then answer these questions a little more directly, we
might save some time.
Mr. Vincent. Thank you.
Mr. Sourwine. I am informed that the actual order for admission
into the record of this press conference transcript which Mr. Vin-
cent has furnished, and this particular document referring to Amer-
asia, has not been made.
Would you care to make that order ?
Senator Ferguson. 1 am entering the order now and will also re-
ceive what Mr. Mandel read from the Second Eeport, Un-American
Activities in Washington State, in the record.
(The document referring to Amerasia and the press conference
transcript referred to were marked ''Exhibits Nos. 387 (content of
which appears on p. 2091 ; distribution numbers identified, beginning
on p. 2180) and 388." No. 388 is as follows :)
Exhibit No. 388
[Not for the press. For departmental use only]
Department of State Press and Radio News Conference, Friday, June 2, 1950
12 : 20 PM, EDST
Mr. McDekmott. We have a release on the employment of high-ranking sci-
entists in top-level policy posts in the Department and in key foreign posts,
which is being handed out to you. I think you will find it interesting (See press
release No. 579). It is a nice story when you get it down to small print, and
it may he that you would rather work from that and I think you will find some-
thing in it.
There is a story from London this morning to the effect that at the recent meet-
ing in London the Western Big Three nations liad agreed to let the Western
German Government establish an armed federal police force, and I have had a
lot of requests on that this morning. The comment on that is, the question of
2184 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
strengthening police forces in Germany was raised during the meeting of the
three Ministers in London. They did not feel, however, that they had sufficient
data and information to reach a decision. The matter was therefore referred
to the High Commission for study and discussion with the Germans. No de-
cision was reached at London as to the nature or size of additional policy units
for Germany.
Q. Mac, is that all?
A. That it all.
Q. What do they mean by saying that they didn't have sufficient data and in-
formation? As I recall, out of that three-power meeting there came a very
detailed statement on the situation of Eastern Germany.
A. There was a lot of information came out about Eastern Germany, but
these three Foreign Ministers felt that they didn't have enough information or
data to reach a decision, so they referred it to the High Commission.
Q. There has been no decision as yet?
Q. These stories from London are pretty mutual on that.
A. Yes. -
Q. Mac, who brought up the question. Schuman or who?
A. I dont' know who brought it up over there.
Q. Can we find out?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn't there any rule concerning armed police forces in Western Germany
now ? They have some sort of arms for the policy force.
A. I suppose so.
Q. They must have federal police forces.
A. I don't know just how the police do that.
Q. Who had the story, Mac?
A. It just came oft the ticker and I think there was something before on the
ticker about it.
Q. Can we get something about this eventually?
A. I would rather not express any opinion until McCloy has a chance to work
it out with the others.
Q. Do they have authority to make any plan or do they have to make recom-
mendations?
A. They will make recommendations which will be discussed with the Gov-
ernment.
Q. It was referred to them for study and discussion.
Q. Was there any decision reached as to the principle involved — whether
there should be
A. (Interposing). The whole thing was just turned over to the High Com-
mission for study and report.
Q. It is under study by them and it looks as though there was agreement in
principle.
A. It is under study by the High Commissioners until they make some report
to us.
Q. Did the Commissioners receive any guidance at all?
A. Of course, they had the benefit of all the discussions between the Min-
isters.
Q. That wouldn't affect a policy against rearming Western Germany.
A. That is not the question. This question is about rearming Western Ger-
many. That matter has not been discussed at all. What was covered here was
the matter of arming some police.
Q. Is this a new thing? The question has been reported before, but what
I can't get is — I can't get an answer to what our attitude is — if we are against
the thing?
A. No; I won't even go that far. The whole thing is under discussion.
Q. The report from London was about federal police.
A. I will read the report from London if the UP will give me permission :
"(German Police) London — The Western Big Three Nations have agreed to
let the West German Government establish an armed federal police force of
about 5,000 men, informed sources said. These sources said the police would be
equipped with light arms, including automatic weapons, and be about one-tenth
the size of the militarized 'people's police' in the Soviet zone of Germany. In-
formed sources said the new force was designed to bolster the prestige of the
West German Government and give it an instrument to help preserve domestic
order. They said it was not designed as a reply to establishment of the Soviet
zone 'peoples police.' Informants said the three allied High Commissioners in
West Germany had been informed of the decision and instructed to begin dis-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2185
cussions with the Federal German Government on establishment of the force.
Negotiations will begin this month in Bonn, where the exact composition of the
police will be worked out." (6/2-GM95SA).
Q. Mac, you say then that there has been no decision up to the present time?
A. There has been no decision reached as to the size of the federal force.
Q. The idea of that is that there has been a decision to establish a police force?
A. There has not been any decision to establish or increase it — or how many.
Q. Are there federal police in Germany now?
A. No ; there are no federal police.
Q. What was your answer to the query as to whether the Western German
police now having arms?
A. I don't know what they carry.
Q. They must carry something.
A. They are not federal police, they are local police. They might have pistols.
Now I am going into a little discourse about practii es in the State Department
which most of us, of course, know but which some people outside do not. There
are hundreds of telegrams in the Department every day. The Secretary of State
does not sign all the telegrams but his name appears on every telegram. There
are various officers in the Department authorized to sign the Secretary's name
and put their own initials under it. That seems to be what happened in con-
nection with a document being discussed in the papers the last two days. There
are stores about a message in Chungking, concerning an ai'ticle that appeared in
Amerasia which interested me a lot. I found that the telegram referred to was
written in my own office, that it was signed in my own office, and initialed in my
own office, and went out as a matter of routine, following a procedure of long
standing of keeping our missions abroad informed on what was appearing in the
public print in the United States concerning their areas.
I ran through .•^ome of my tlimsiv s auu iound rhai many for a certain period
went to Chungking. These were not secret telegrams at all. The information
in these papers has appeared in the newspapers in the United States.
Q. Did any of your telegrams express any information in the Amerasia case?
A. None whatever. .Just let me continue. There had gone up to Yenan a
couple of American newspaper correspondents. They were following their pro-
fessions of observing what was going on. Their stories were reports of their
observations to the American people.
Q. Yenan was the headcpiarters of the Chinese Communists.
A. I don't know what headquarters this was, but it was in that area. There
were many stories written by these correspondents which appeared in the press.
Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was well aware of the shift of the corre-
spondents to that part of China. On July 10, he wired the Department
Q. (Interposing.) What year?
A. 1944 (continuing) that the press correspondents had reportedly returned
from their visit to Yenan and were en route to Chungking. The Embassy had
not as yet received from the United States any copies of the press despatches
or articles written by them, and accordingly did not know whether it had been
possible for them to make comprehen.sive factual reports. That telegram was
referred to my office for action, which consisted of clipping newspapers, leading
articles, leading magazines, and writing a digest compressed into a despatch
that could be sent by cable, sending the cable to Chungking, and wrapping up
the despatches and articles and sending them by air nnil. If you want me to,
I will read a despatch — one of them : (Washington, July 19, 1944, Amembassy,
Ckungking) "As indicated in following digest, press correspondents who trav-
eled to Yenan were evidently allowed consideralile latitude in their despatches
and articles relating to their trip. (Embassy's telegram — July 10.)
"The corre.spondents in despatches to New York Times. New York Herald-
Tril)une, and Christian Science Monitor, praised Communists' industrial and
agricultural achievements, and applauded fighting sp'rit and military achieve-
ments of Communist troops. New York Times' correspondent on .Tuly 1 re-
ported finding in Yenan 'hatred of Japanese and determination to defend their
achievements against all interference.' Same correspondent stressed finding
realization of nearness of counteroffensive against Japan, in wh'ch Coramuni.st
armies and guerrillas want to participate to fullr«st. He reported seeing how
formerly barren country has been transformed into area of intensive cultiva-
tion, stock breeding, and handicraft industry. Harrison Forman in Herald-
Tribune on June 2.*^ described Yenan as 'magnificient symbol of tenacity and
determination of i:>eop]e of this border region of China.' He descrilied how this
border area, forced by circumstances to become wholly self-reliant since it was
cut off from outside world three years ago, 'encourages any and every industry,
22848 — 52 — pt. 7 1?.
2186 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
small or large, even subsidizing some which admittedly would be unprofitable
if products they yield could I.e imported, Gueuiher Stein in Christian Science
Monitor on June '27 declared that any Allied jcommander 'would be proud ta
command those tou.uh, well-fed, hardened troops whose exercises show both,
high skill and spirit.'
"Harrison Forman in June 23 Herald-Tribune described refreshing, informal
atmosphere of place, declaring : 'No one bothers about ceremony, styles ot cloth-
ing or time. Everytliing is open and above board, with absolutely no control
or restrictions on movements, discussions, interviews, visits or photographs,
while every one, from highest governuient official lo lowliest peasant worker,
sincerely asks lor criticism and advice for betterment of himself and of work-
ing conditions.'
'Hari-ison Forman reported in July 1 Herald-Tribune that Mao Tse-tung
stated Communists' attiiude on Kuomintang-Communist relations as follows :
'To support Generalissimo Cliianu Kai-shek, to persist in Kuomintang cooper-
ation as well as cooperation with whole people of China, to struggle for over-
throw of Japanese imperialism and to build an independent and democratic
China.' Guenther Stein quoted Wang Cheng in June 27 Monitor as asserting
that everyone hopes for achievement of full understanding with Kuomintang,
'for we have never ceased to recognize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as leader.'
Communist spt.kesman, Cliou En-lai, according to Harrison Forman in July 9
Herald-Tribune, declared that 'there is still considerable distance between
national government's proposal and our suggestions.' Forman in same story
says Yenun hopes that Chungking will send representatives to Yenan for closer
examination of situation an i to enter into more comprehensive discussion.
"Correspondents reported from Sian that that city had had three months'
notice of their visit, and was 'on its toes.' Guenther Stein in June 1 Monitor
related that beggars and dogs had been cleared out, and 'the usually clean city
was cleaner than ever.' New York Times correspondent in June 3 despatch
. said Sian .'looks and feels like a political and mililary fortress.' Ha reported
that 'one's actions are not one's private business. Everything is traced, checked
and counterchecked.' He said he telt like 'a piece on a chess board, with his
movements circumscribed by fixed rules.'
"General Hu Chung-nan's chief of staff, General Lo Tse-Kai, flatly told re-
porters, according to June 3 despatch to New York Times, that Eighth Route
Army had never fought Japanese since war began, that they had done nothing
except impede attack of Central Government troops, that all guerillas in Shansi,
Hopeh, Shantung belonged to Kuomintang, and that if Chungking talks achieved
any settlement, "we don't hope that they will help us fight the Japanese because
this is too much to expect. We only hope they will not interfere with us.'
"New York Times correspondent reported on June 2 that General Hu himself
declined to answer a question about possible Government-Comuumist under-
standing, after representative of Clningking Ministry of Inl'ormation, who was
accompanying party, broke in to say that this question had already been an-
swered by General Lo.
"Harrison Forman in June 4 despatch to Herald-Tribune described Kenanpo
and unoccupied Shansi provincial areas still under Marshal Yen Hsi-shan's
control as even more Communist than Communist districts adjacent, with which
relations are strained, and there is little or no contact.
"Copies of the available despatches and articles are being air mailed to you.
"Hull
"(HMB)
"(SA/M)" (Homer M. Byington)
Q. Mac, wa.s the correspondent for Amerasia in this group?
A. I don't know.
Q. Wiiat about this Amerasia telegram?
A. Then on July 25
Q. (Interposing.) All these things that you have read to us have been by
correspondents?
A. That is right.
Q. Did this include Amerasia? Did these reports include everything else that
was written by all of them — or was Amerasia reporting?
A. I don't know whether Amerasia was there or not. All I have is the tele-
grams picked out of the file.
Following that then, the same people who drafted the telegram I have just
read to you, and this was not a secret telegram. It was not in the public print,
it was sent restricted and coded.
Q. Wii!!t diite was tliatV
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2187
A. July 25. It was about the Japanese
Q. (Interposing.) Just a second, Mae. Did you say that has been printed?
A. It was printed in part. They .have taken quotes out here and there.
Q. How long is it, Mi^e?
A. I will just read the whole thing to you, it is 21/3 pages :
(Amembasst, Chungking from Hull ; July 25, 1944)
"July issue of Amerasia suggests possibility of using Japanese Communist
Susumu Okano in role of a 'Tito for Japan' in helping Japanese people to estab-
lish government that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy.
Magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to wliether the American State De-
partment 'will support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will
prefer to favor the so-called liberal elements in Japan's present ruling class.'
'•Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout Eastern China
should be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guer-
rilla forces that are now operating behind Japanese lines not only in North, but
also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities with mate-
rial, technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why
United States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to
strengthen their war effort in Asia simply out of deference to current political
situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow policy adopted
toward guerrilla "groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were
eventually superseded by military necessity.
"Magazine denounces 'incredible and preposterous statement' of General Lo
Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and ccmdenms Infor-
mation Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces
that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly
refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Govern-
ment. It is acserted that vital Honan campaign was won l)y only 40,000 Japa-
nese with not more than llfi tanks, at time when approximately 2.j0,000 Central
Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks that form
iron ring blockading Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information
proving that northern giierilla forces have carried on their resistance to Japanese
and have persistently continued their work of educating people to participate in
that resistance, despite constant 'mopping up' campaigns by Japanese and hos-
tility on part of Chinese government. Article points out that though poorly
equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted enthusiastic
sui^port of local population.
"Kwangtung Guerilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won support of local
population sufficiently to enable them to withstand l)oth Japanese 'mopping up'
campaigns and repeated efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them.
So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kow-
loon railway, article reports, that although Japanese have controlled both
terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single through
train.
'•Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations
can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists that immediate recog-
nition of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of
liaison officers, technical aid, and munitions, has become of primary importance
for success of our future offensive against Japanese.
"Hull
"(HMB)
" ( SA/M ) "
Q. Some of the press dispatches commented that this telegram was an instruc-
tion to the Embassy concerning action which might be taken against the Japa-
nese.
A. The telegram was in no sense an instruction. It merely relayed to the
Ambassador information which had appeared in the magazine Amerasia. I
don't think there is any doubt that Ambassador Gauss knew the magazine
Amerasia and this was merely a digest of an article in it. The telegram was
drafted I)y a young lady in my office of Current Information and in no way
could it be considered an instruction from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Gauss
in Chungking.
Q. This was endorsed by the State Department?
A. It was in no sense an endorsement but a transmission of information which
had appeared in that magazine.
Q. This is in no case a Department dispatch?
2188 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
A. No, not at all in the sense you have in mind. It was just a report of what
had appeared in the public press. I have gone into this in detail so you might
see what the operation was — the Press OfRce keeping the Ambassador informed
of what appeared in the American press. .
Q. I noticed that correspondents in China were quoted in these press dispatches.
Was Haldore Hanson one of them?
A. I don't know.
Q. I was looking for his name. They refer to an AP correspondent but didn't
quote him by name.
Q. AP correspondent?
Q. Can you say why you should deny this so emphatically?
A. Now, look ! I am not saying' whether this teleuram I have just read you
exists in any file outside the State Department because I do not know. I do not
know whether a copy of tliis telegram was in the Amerasia file or whether or
not it was seized there. What I have is the ofBcial State Department file and
I am giving you the information from that file.
Q. Would it be possible for Amerasia to obtain the file?
A. I don't see how.
Q. I was wondering what the operation was.
A. I do not make public press digests sent to the Embassy for their infor-
mation.
Q. That was signed by Acheson, wasn't it?
A. No. It was signed by Hull.
Stories in the newspapers have said that this telegram was a secret one from
Hull to Chungking. That is just not true, and I put emphasis on that. Off the
record.
Q. What category would it appear in here, or would it be sent out with dis-
tinguishable instructions, or what?
A. It was marked restricted and not to be shown to anybody except in para-
phrase. That was because the material was not secret, it having appeared in
public print, but it was transmitted in code to save money. We did not want
lo prejudice the code : hence, the stamp that it was restricted.
Q. It was signed "Hull" though, wasn't it, Mac?
A.. It was signed "Hull," just exactly at tliis one. They are all the same.
Mr. White. Every telegram that has gone out of the State Department has
been signed by the Secretary of State, so far as I know, from the inception of
the Department.
Mr. McDER>roTT. It has to be signed by the Secretary or the Acting Secretary
in his place, or otherwise it doesn't go out.
Q. That doesn't mean that he sees everything with his signature?
A. He never sees them — he wouldn't have time. iMr. Hull never saw all the
telegrams. The yellow telegrams are incoming, the green one are outgoing.
Mr. White. The question was asked as to who brought up the question of the
German police at London and whether the Ministers gave the High Commissioners
any guidance.
Prior to the London meeting a letter had been received by the three Goveim-
ments from Chancellor Adenauer requesting 25,000 central police. This letter
had not been answered nor had it been discussed prior to the London meeting. At
that meeting Ciiancellor Adenauer's letter was brought up by the British. Mac
has told you the position that the Ministers took — namely, that they did not
feel that they had sufficient information to make any decision on it whatsoever.
Accordingly, the High Commissioners were asked to study the problem and to
come up with recommendations. In other words, in answer to the second part
of the question, the High Commissioners did not, NOT, receive any guidance from
the Foreign Ministers.
Q. Link, have the High Commissioners been told to make any recommenda-
tions by any particular time?
A. So far as I know, no. The question was dumped in their lap and they were
told to work it out.
Q. Thank you, sir.
SA/M : AW
M. J. McDermott.
Senator Ferguson. We will now recess until tomorrow morning at
9 : 30'.
(Whereupon, at 4: 15 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
9 • 30 a. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1952
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
or the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. O.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 : 30 a. m., Senator
Homer Ferguson, presiding.
Present : Senator Ferguson.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel : Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of sresearch.
Senator Ferguson. The committee will come to order.
You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. SouRwiNE, Mr. Vincent, some of the newspapers report to have
discovered what they appear to have thought was a contradiction in
our testimony toward the end of yesterday's session. I don't believe
it was, but I want to be sure that the record speaks true and that we
have an opportunity to discuss it on that point. There also has been
an indication that perhaps you were — on yesterday — bulldozed or
browbeaten or overcome to the point where you said something you
really didn't mean to say, and if that is the fact I want to give you an
opportunity to correct it this morning. If I seem to you perhaps to
oversimplify this, bear with me for a moment.
When you were making this talk that we discussed — —
Senator Ferguson. I think he ought to be given an opportunity now.
Do you want to change or alter or make any explanation of any of
your testimony as of yesterday ?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would like to see, if I can, the transcript,
but it isn't here, is it, of my testimony yesterday ?
Mr. Sourwine. It has not been delivered yet. It should be here this
morning by about 10 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. Then you may proceed. You may see the tran-
script.
Mr. Sourwine. When we were talking about this radio speech on
the occupation policy for Japan I had asked you about your use of
the phrase "democratic parties," and again about your use of the
1^189
2190 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
phrase "liberal parties," and whether that included the Communist
Party of Japan. It is true, is it not, that at that time there were more
than one political party in Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRAViNE. You were in this speech endeavoring to divide the
political parties of Japan roughly into two groups, the monarchistic-
nationalistic on the one hand, and the democratic-liberal on the other ;
is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Don't agree with me if it is not 'right.
Mr. Vincent, That was my general intention, yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You simply were using a label for each of those two
groups ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You might have called them group A and group B,
and written a long thesis about what you meant by group A ; but you
were making a radio speech and you chose a label for group A and
a label for group B, is that right?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The label that you chose for one group was demo-
cratic parties or liberal parties.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The label you chose for the other group was mon-
archistic parties or nationalistic parties, is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. Is that the label I chose [referring to paper] ? I was
just wondering whether I used that or whether I used reactionary
parties.
Mr. SoiJRA\aNE. All right, reactionary parties; for the other group?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, I used the word "nationalistic" here, I see.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Right. In which of those two groups did you in-
tend that the Communist Party of Japan should fall ? In which of
those two groups did you consider it to be, for the purpose of the
discussion that you were here undertaking?
Mr. Vincent. The Communist Party ?
Mr, SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. If you are asking me in the context of this, I didn't
consider that it fell in either.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what we are trying to find out, because sub-
sequently you were asked if you thought that the Communist Party
was democratic, and of course you very properly said you did not, but
you were not then talking about the same thing as you were in this
speech, were you ?
Mr. Vincent. Would you repeat that? I am just trying to get it
straight.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE, Yes, indeed. You were asked if you thought that
the Communist Party of Japan was a democratic party, and you said
you did not,
Mr, Vincent, I correctly testified I did not,
Mr, Sourwine. In that sense you were not talking about the same
thing as you were when in the speech you attempted to classify the
parties of Japan into one of two groups, were you ?
Mr, Vincent, No, sir.
Mr. Sottrwine. So in that sense you were not contradicting your-
self at all, were you ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2191
Mr. Vincent. I would not say I was, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. No. When yon say that the Communist Party
-does not fall in either of these two t^roiips would you explain that a
little?
Mr. Vincent. I would explain that in this way: That in making
this speech I did not have in mind the Communist Party as falling in
either group. In other words, I was thinking of democratic parties
as parties as we think of them, as democratic-liberal parties in this
country, and in making this speech there was no intention in my mind
to include Communist parties among democratic parties.
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment, ]\Ir. Vincent. You knew there
were Communists in Japan.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. You knew that they wanted to bring back to
Japan a Communist Japanese according to the press release that you
had prepared and sent out.
Mr, Vincent. I didn't prepare it, sir, but you are speaking of the
Amerasia press release.
Senator Ferguson. You approved it, did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. I had passed it ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. You knew Amerasia was advocating that ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. You knew there was a Communist Party in
Japan ?
]\rr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. You knew it was active?
]\Ir. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Then you excluded it entirely ?
Mr. Vincent. In speaking of democratic parties I did not have it
in mind. In speaking of political parties
Senator Ferguson. Then why did you not exclude it by words?
You told us yesterday, as I recall your testimony, that it was included
in that.
Mr. Vincent. Included among the politica]«parties. That was my
testimony yesterday, sir, that I did not have in mind — I haven't the
testimony here now — that I did not have specifically in mind, but I
did not exclude the Communist Party specifically as you have said,
but I do not think that it can be interpreted here that because I did
not exclude the Communist Party from a mention of democratic
parties that it necessarily follows that I included it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it possible that the man who wrote
that speech had something in mind different than what you had in
mind?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify to that, sir, what he had in mind.
It is possible, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it is fair to the people of the
United States to have a State Department official, a high official have
his broadcast written by a person connected with the radio station
and then for him to repeat it on the radio ?
]\Ir. Vincent. ]\Ir. Chairman, I think that is done quite frequently.
As long as it is gone over.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking, do you think that is the proper
thiuff to do?
2192 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I don't think it is improper. I think it is done
regidarly.
Senator Ferguson. You heard this read about the man who pre-
pared your speech.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it was a good thing to do it?
Mr. Vincent. At that time I had no suspicion
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now. I am not talking
about then.
Mr. Vincent, I think now it would be, to have a man like that pre-
pare a script.
Senator Ferguson. You think it would be now ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, on the basis of the information I now have
about Menefee.
Senator Ferguson. You say you would do it now ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson. So a man has to be careful who he has work on
his speeches, isn't that true ?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, you don't want us to believe, do you,
that in making this speech you were unaware of or unconscious of
the existence of the Japanese Communist Party?
Mr. Vincent. No, I do not wish you to.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were attempting to draw a line, and it is always
a very difficult thing to draw a line, but you were attempting to draw
a line which would divide the political parties of Japan into two
groups, is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You say that you didn't mean to include the Com-
munist Party of Japan in either of those two groups ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Yoif certainly would not include the Communist
Party of Japan in the monarchistic or nationalistic group, would
you?
Mr. Vincent. I would not.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that the Communists in Japan, as
elsewhere, always refer to themselves as democratic, the "real demo-
crats," as the "true liberals," that the words "democratic" and "liberal"
are always applied by the Communists to themselves?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, I am ; that they quite frequently do that.
Mr. Sourwine. You realize that when they are used that way by
the Communists they are understood as including the Communist
Party ?
]Mr. Vincent. That when the Communist Party uses it, that they
frequently refer to themselves as a democratic party.
Mr. Sourwine. That is right. Did you ever have any thought at
all that your use of the words might be interpreted in Japan as in-
cluding the Communist Party in this group that you call democratic
or liberal ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, it could have been interpreted as that, con-
sidering what you just said.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2193
Mr. SouRWiNE. Without considering any argument that I may have
made, on the basis of your own knowledge of Japan, of the Far East,
do you think that the general use of the phrase "democratic parties"
or "liberal parties" of Japan would be interpreted by the Japanese
hearer or reader as including the Communist Party of Japan ?
]\Ir. Vincent. Yes ; it could have been interpreted as including it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, the subcommittee hearings mentioned
the following published paragraph, that is, the hearings of this sub-
committee on a previous date. I read :
With the assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Engene
Dooman, who was chairman of SWNCC, the powerful interdepartmental com-
mittee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph
Grew out, the forces in the State DepaHment which were relatively anti-
imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain direc-
tives which had been held up in committee theretofore so that the set of direc-
tives for treatment of Japan which the White House recently released were
even better than the original directives which had been flown over to MacArthur
and apparently ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts.
If I tell you that that paragraph was published about October of 1945,
could you comment on it.
Mr. Vincent. I would comment on that paragraph as being a mis-
statement of fact. I testified yesterday with regard to the develop-
ment of the postsurrender policy and I can testify again today if you
would like me to. I testified also in executive hearing that that is not
correct.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Do you know, sir, who could have revealed the
information contained in that paragraph, that is, as to who was out and
what directives were being held up and what was being forwarded ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I cannot.
Mr. SonRWiNE. Do you know what was referred to in that para-
graph by the mention of "the forces in the State Department which
were relatively anti-imperialist"?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you a part of the so-called anti-imperialist
forces in the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. I know of no such designation, and I don't
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall who replaced Mr. Dunn as Assistant
Secretary of State ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think, sir, that anybody actually replaced INIr,
Dunn.
Mr. Sourwine. Wlio replaced Mr. Grew ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Acheson.
Mr. Sourwine. Who replaced Mr. Dooman?
Mr. Vincent. On the SWNCC committee, I did.
Mr. Sourwine. At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday I had
just started to ask you about another address which you made. I
refer now to the address which you made at the Foreign Policy As-
sociation forum in New York City on October 20, 1945. I believe the
subject of the forum was BetAveen War and Peace, and your address
was called The Post War Period in the Far East. Do you recall
that?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in that address urge that China be used as
a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union
in the Far East ?
2194 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I would like to ^jet the exact phrase (referring to-
paper). Would you like to know exactly what I said or do you have
it there?
Mr. SouRWiNE. I have a copy of the speech and intend to put it
in the record, but I don't want to let that summary stand if you think
it is an unfair summary.
Mr. Vincent. What I said here is "China is in a position to form
a buffer or a bridge in our relation to the Soviet Union in the Far
East."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Head a little more to get it in context.
Mr. Vincent (reading) :
We will all agree, I believe, that, the bridge concept is preeminently prefer-
able and that that it shoiild be our policy to make it a fact. I would go further
and say that only through the cooperation of China, the U. S. S. R. and our-
selves can the objectives of our policy in the Far East be achieved.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in that speech say anything that might be
construed in China as semiofficial notice to the Chinese Nationalist
government that the United States would never cooperate with that
government in any move against the Communists?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to look at the speech, I do not recall
saying any such thing.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in the speech say :
In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agree-
ments which we hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries^
It will l»e our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability
in the Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed
against the other.
Mr. Vincent (reading). "Antagonistic toward the other."
Mr. Sourwine. You said, "Antagonistic toward the other" ?
Mr. Vincent. That is what this press release from the State De-
partment has.
Mr. Sourwine. May I see that, sir ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator I^erguson. What position would that place you in? We
couldn't be anti-Communist, could we?
Mr. Vincent. I w as not speaking of anticommunism. I was speak-
ing of the relations of states, Mr. Chairman, and I did not there have
in mind any ideology. I had in mind that we did not wish to cooper-
ate with China in a policy which would bring about friction or antag-
onism with the Soviet Union.
Senator Ferguson. But don't you understand that the Russian State
and communism are one thing?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, in this speech
Senator Ferguson. No, no. My question has nothing to do with the
speech now. I just asked you the plain question whether or not the
Russian State, the U. S. S. R. State, and communism are not one and
the same thing.
Mr. Vincent. It operates differently, but yes, it is one and the same
thing in its effect.
Senator Ferguson. In effect.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. How would we fit our policy of not allowing
communism to expand, if that was our policy in the State Department^
and you use this language?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2195
Mr. Vincent. That is what I am getting at here. We ourselves
recognized the U. S. S. R., but we do not cooperate with communism.
In this case I was speaking of the relations of states, which means
Cliina, Russia, and ourselves, in an attempt to avoid friction in the
Far East. This was immediately at the close of the war, and anything
that could have avoided friction and difficulty.
Senator Ferguson. All right, that meant that we would have to play
along with the Communists in China.
Mr. Vincent. That was also a part of our policy at the time, of
trying to get the National Government and the other parties to settle
their political differences under the National Government of China,
that was part of our jDolicy.
Senator Ferguson. When did you make this speech?
Mr. Vincent. I made this speech on the 18th of October. I think
it is
Mr. Sourwine. I believe it was the 20th, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The 20th of October. What year?
Mr. Vincent. 1945.
Senator Ferguson. 19-15. After the war was over.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That meant that our policy after the war. when
the fighting was over, was to play along \^'ith the Communists in
Chinal
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't put it that way, sir. The policy was very
clear. It has been put in General Marshall's directive, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How would you put it?
Mr. Vincent. I would put it just as I have said before, that there
was a serious threat in China, I will have to repeat this, of an out-
break of civil war which would have disturbed relations throughout
the Far East, and which has disturbed them. At that time it was my
idea and it was the idea of the other people in the Government of the
United States, including the President and General Marshall, that
the best way to avoid that kind of difficulty was to bring about some
kind of political settlement in China.
Senator Ferguson. All right. I asked you this before, whether or
not there were any places in history that you were able to consolidate
Communists with anti-Communists in a government and not have the
Communists take over.
Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have testified before that in France and
in Italy at the conclusion of the war Communists came into both gov-
ernments, and that they were eventually eliminated. I have testified
also that there was never any intention to allow the Communists to
take over control of the Chinese Government, and the very fact that
the negotiations broke down was on the basis that the Communists
were trying themselves to get a greater degree of power in the Govern-
ment than we or the National Government of China, which was really
conducting the negotiations, were prepared to grant.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Just so that the record may speak very truly, will
you look at this, which is — let me identify it first. Mr. Mandel, is that
a photostat and of what publication?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Department of State Bulle-
tin dated October 21, 1951.
Mr. Sourwine. Certain pages thereof?
Mr. Mandel. Certain pages thereof.
2196 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. Will you look at that paragraph where we differed
on the language ? Will you look at it as it appears in the Department
of State Bulletin, which is what I was quoting from, that paragraph
that begins "In August." Will you read it as it appears there?
Mr. Vincent (reading) :
In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agreements
which vre hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries. It will
be our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability in the
Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed against
the other.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I didn't know whether you had made any point of
the difference of the words "directed against" or "antagonistic
toward."
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. I was just correcting your statement.
Mr. Sourwine. You see I was reading from the Department of State
Bulletin and you were reading from the mimeographed release, is that
correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Were they not both furnished by the Department
of State. Do you know which was the way you spoke when you made
the speech ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say I made it the way it is here. It is much
more like I made it the way it is here.
Mr. SouRWiNE. By "here" you mean in the press release ?
Mr. Vincent. In the press release.
Mr. Sourwine. Using the word antagonized ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of the State Department's
instrument, the photostat ?
Mr. Vincent. It hasn't a date there.
Senator Ferguson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. It is marked on there in red pencil, I believe, sir.
Mr. Vincent. You have "23i/^" in red pencil. This seems to have
no date on it. Down at the bottom.
Mr. Sourwine. It is hard to read. October 21, 1951. Is that the
correct date of that instrument ?
Senator Ferguson. How could it be 1951 ?
Mr. Vincent, I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. What is the date of it, Mr. Mandel ?
Senator Ferguson. Unless they reprinted it, this was back in 1945.
Mr. Sourwine. October 21, 1945, would be very close to being cor-
rect. It is certainly subsequent to the press release.
Senator Ferguson. About the same time.
Mr. Vincent. This was released to the press on the 18th of October
but to be held until October 20, when the speech was given. I can't ac-
count for the discrepancy there. There may be other discrepancies.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you consider it important ?
Mr. Vincent. I consider it of no great importance. I prefer the
word antagonistic to that, and that is the one I used.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you familiar, Mr. Vincent, with the statement
by President Truman on United States policy toward China under
date of December 15, 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2197
ISIr. SouRwiNE. Have you referred to that here as being the same
thing as the Marshall directive ?
Mr. Vincent. It is generally called the Marshall directive.
Mr. SoTJEWiNE. The Marshall directive consisted really of several
se])arate documents, did it not?
]\Ir. Vincent. Yes. It consisted of a memorandum to the War
Department which was included with
]Mr. Sourwine. From the Secretary of State ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And a letter to General Marshall ?
INIr. Vincent. And a letter to General Marshall from the President.
Mr. Sourwine. And a statement by the President, a copy of which
was included in the letter ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mv. Sourw^ine. And a copy of a press release, I think, also.
Mr. Vincent. The press release became, or the press release was,
the directive.
Mr. Sourwine. Substantially the same. But Mr. Marshall, Gen-
eral INIarshall, was given all three of the documents with his letter
of transmittal ; was he not ?
Ml". Vincent. Yes.
Mv. Sourwine. Have you stated what part you had in the drafting
of that directive ?
Mr. Vincent. I have, in executive session.
. Mr. Sourwine. Does your testimony boil down in substance to this,
that you initially prepared a rough draft, that that rough draft was
taken over to the military, the War Department, that a new draft was
prepared expanding your draft from two pages to about six pages,
that that came back to the State Department and you had an oppor-
tunity to go over it for changes, and that some few changes w^ere made
in the State Department, that it then went up and when it came back
for final approval you had a chance to see it again in its final form be-
fore it went to the White House.
Mr. Vincent. Yes. May I amend that in one respect just for
clarity ?
]\Ir. Sourwine. Please do.
Mr. Vincent. The paper that I drafted originally was drafted with
a different idea in mind than what finally came out in the form of a
press release or directive. I had drafted a short paper to have for
Mr. Byrnes something as to a statement of what I considered to be
the problems that faced us and how we might solve them in China, as
a basis for his discussion. I am trying to get why the other was ex-
panded because I didn't have in mind writing a directive for Marsliall.
Senator Ferguson. Yours did not purport to be a directive?
Mr. Vincent. Mine did not purport to be a directive.
Senator Ferguson. Alternatives?
Mr. Vincent. Now you are speaking of a paper which I composed
about a month earlier.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Which I would like to mention. That was not the
one that I wrote as of November 28. I am speaking of the alternative
one which set forth four alternatives for the Secretary witli regard
to what course we might follow in the Far East.
2198 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. So there were two papers.
Mr. Vincent. Yes; there were two papers. The other one has no
connection with the eventual directive other than the fact that one of
these four alternatives was substantially chosen as a starting point
for what developed into the policy under Marshall.
Senator Ferguson. When you drew the second paper did you choose
the alternative that was put in the directive ?
Mr. Vincent. That had already been chosen.
Senator Ferguson. Who chose it?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall except that I know it was submitted
to the President. Whether the President chose it, whether General
Marshall chose it, whether the Secretary of State chose it, or whether
they chose it in consultation. I did not choose it ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then when it came back to you again, it came
back from the War Department as a drafted directive?
Mr. Vincent. It came hack as a drafted directive, called United
States policy toward China, as I recall it. I am trying to make that
distinction, because that isn't what I called my small paper, which was
just an outline.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did write a memorandum ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Which was the basis for the approximately 6-page
directive which came back from the War Department ? Is that cor-
rect ?
Mr. Vincent. I am trying to get the word "basis." I want to be
more exact. There has been so much discussion of this whole thing.
Mr. Sour WINE. You have stated, have you not, that you did write
a two-page memorandum as to what should be in it?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And that the six-page
Mr. Vincent. No; not what should be in it, but what should form
the basis for a discussion between Mr. Byrnes and General Marshall.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have that two-page memorandum ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't, sir. It is among the papers in the State
Department. I am sorry.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In any event, you did write a two-page memoran-
dum ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; and I have described what its contents were
here before the committee.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And the directive which came back from the W^ar
Department
Mr. Vincent. I testified — and I would like to have it the same way —
I testified that it did incorporate some of the phraseology and some
of the ideas in my November 28 thing, but it was an expansion and
it contained many other matters which were not taken up in mine.
Mr. SouRWiNE. But you have stated that it contained nothing which
was contrary to or at odds with what had been your original memo-
randum ?
Mr. Vincent. That is what I said.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. Did you also draft the memorandum which
was signed by the Secretary of State, which was one of the three
documents that went along with the letter of transmittal to General
3Iarshall?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to refresh my memory on that one.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2199
I don't think I am going to be able to testify from knowledge
whether I drafted, whether it was drafted in cooperation or after
discussion with Army officers or not. If I knew factually whether
I drafted it, I would tell you I drafted it, but then I would add also
that it was a result of discussion which took place between State and
War and General Marshall. I would make the same statement that
if somebody else drafted it, I had also had a part in its preparation.
Senator Ferguson. You never had any doubt that General Mar-
shall understood and had a part in the drafting of his directive?
Mr. Vincent. I never had any doubt but what General Marshall
knew what was in the directive.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; and had a part in drafting it.
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, we sat for a matter of 3 hours on a
Sunday morning in December discussing it with General Alarshall.
We read it over. There were minor phraseology changes made in it,
and so on.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean. He was part and parcel
of the making of this directive ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Is there another question pending?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr, V^iNCENT. He wants to know whether I drafted it, and I am
afraid I cannot testify as to whether I drafted this memorandum by
Secretary Byrnes for the War Department. I think a reading of it
would make it clear that it is in a sense a military — it first sets forth
what the Secretary of State had said. Then it goes on to enumerate
certain things which were supposed to be a guide, I think, to General
Wedemeyer, which came out of the discussion.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean wdiere it says :
In response to Genei'al Wedeijieyer's recent messages the State Department
requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I recollect clearly that that also came into the
discussion on this Sunday morning on December 9.
■ ]Mr. SouRwiNE. That was strictly a State Department document,
was it not?
Mr. Vincent. This memo, yes; except that it was discussed with
General Marshall in that morning meeting there, because General
Marshall also had quite an interest in what kind of directive or what
kind of advice was going out to General Wedemeyer.
Mr. SouRwixE. This directive, though, did not go to the War De-
partment for redrafting and then come back to State; did it?
Mr. Vincent. That I cannot testify, whether the War Department
had seen it or not. It was an attempt to get instructions out to
Wedemeyer, and I would say just from knowledge of how things de-
veloped there, that the War Department did have, not, we will say,
a matter of drafting, but that they had seen it before and it was a
matter of agreement as to what kind of memorandum they were going
to get as a basis for Wedemeyer to operate.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you please from the white paper here iden-
tify by page which of these documents, or which two if more than one,
you were referring to when you spoke of the expanded directive that
came back from the State Department after your two-page memo had
gone over ? Is it that first one ?
2200 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. No ; it is the one that is marked "62. Statement by
President Truman on United States Policy Toward China."
Mr. SouKWiNE. That is the one that you wrote an original two-page
memo that went to the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. That w^ent to the War Department.
Mr. Sourwine. Went to the War Department, came back to the
State Department for changes?
Mr. Vincent. Went back to the War Department and came back
to State.
Mr. Sourwine. Came back for a high-level conference at which it
was approved in the State Department and then finally went to the
President, Mr. Byrnes taking it over?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Byrnes taking it over.
Mr. Sourwine. I think General Marshall went with him.
Mr. Vincent. The two of them I think went over on whatever day
it was.
Mr. Sourwine. Then you did write a two-page memorandum ? •
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Which dealt with the subject matter of this state-
ment by President Truman, which contains some of the ideas that
w^ere found in this.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And with which the President's statement was not
at odds or in controversy.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; as a matter of fact, as I said here in executive
session, from recollection there was the matter of assisting the Chinese
to take back Manchuria, the matter of the urgency of bringing about
some kind of truce to stop the civil war, there was the matter of assist-
ing the Chinese insofar as it was feasible to bring about a political
settlement after they ceased fighting.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know wdiat became of the original of your
two-page memorandmn ?
jNIr. Vincent. Of the original ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I have seen testimony that Mr. Byrnes handed it to
General Marshall and General Marshall took it.
Mr. Sourwine. This is a photostat of a document, sir. I ask you if
you recognize that document.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. What is that document ?
Mr. Vincent. This document is the memorandum by Secretary
Byrnes to the War Department.
Mr. Sourwine. That is not the memorandum as so transmitted, is
it ? That is an earlier draft of the memorandum, isn't it ?
Mr. Vincent. This one ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes; that is, that is not the particular draft which
was transmitted to the War Department, is it?
Mr. Vincent. I w^ould have to compare this word for word.
Mr. SouRWTNE. I don't mean that. I mean as a draft, this is a
draft which preceded the formal document that was actually trans-
mitted to the War Department, isn't it?
Mr. Vincent. From my , examination of this, this looks like it is
the document which w^as transmitted.
]\Ir. SouRwaNE. It looks like the document actually transmitted ?
INSflTUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2201
•
Mr. Vincent. Because it is initialed by Mr. J. F, B. ; whether there
was a subsequent redrafting I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do your initials appear on that?
Mr. Vincent. They do, as the drafting officer.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you say you did draft that?
Mr. Vincent. I would say I did draft it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This is, then, the original of the document for the
War Department which appears on page 606 of the white paper?
Mr. Vincent. Insofar as I can testify. This looks exactly like
it is it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Then you did draft two documents ?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. A two-page memorandum which formed
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I won't use the words "formed the basis". A two-
page memorandum which was in some way, the ideas of which were,
incorporated into the President's statement?
JNIr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And this two-page memorandum for the War De-
partment which the Secretary of State signed?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this memorandum may
be laid in the record at this point.
Senator Ferguson. It will become part of the record and received
in evidence.
(The document referred to, marked "Exhibit No, 389," is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 389
[Declassified December 9, 1945]
MEilORANDUM FOR THE WaR DEPARTMENT
The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification
of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.
At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on
December 7, the Secretary of State said :
"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to
promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their
combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range
goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of
a strong, united, and democratic China.
"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government
of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of
their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we
have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a develop-
ing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the
representatives of those large ahd well-organized groups who are now without
any voice in the government of China.
"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience
and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solution depends primarily
upon the good will of the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our
influence is . a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that
influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage con-
cessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the
otlier factions."
The President has aslied General Marshall to go to China as his special repre-
sentative tor the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable
manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set
forth above. Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the
2284S— 52 — pt. 7 14
2202 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
•
Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major
political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently,
effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.
In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department
requests the War Deiiartment to arrange for directions to him stipulating that :
(1) He may put into effect the arran.;ements to assist the Chinese National
Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the
logistical support of such troops ;
(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for
the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater ;
(3) Pending the outcome of General Marsliall's discussions with Chinese
leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of
representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities,
further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China
ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Man-
churia, will be held in abeyance :
(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may
be immediately perfected, but not conmiunicated to the Chinese Government.
Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either
(a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out
consistently with his negotiations, or (&) that the negotiations between the
Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the cir-
cumstances are such as to make the movement necessaiy to effectuate the
surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in
the maintenance of international peace.
[s] J. F. B.
[s] JCV.
FE : Vincent : ALM,
December 10, 1945.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I also ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to offer for
the record a letter under date of October 3 addressed to Senator Mc-
Carran and signed by Mr. Humelsine of the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. It will be received.
(The letter referred to was admitted as exhibit No. 390, and read
in full as follows:)
Mr. SouRWiNE. I would like permission to read this letter.
My Dear Senator McCarran : Further reference is made to your letter of
September 19, 1951, requesting "A draft of General Marshall's directive which
he took with him when he went to China in 1945" referred to by General Wede-
meyer in his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Sep-
tember 15, 1950 ; and also the names of individuals who prepared this directive.
According to your letter of September 19, General Wedemeyer testified that he
saw the initials "J. C. V." on the requested directive.
I am enclosing a photostat of the Department's file copy of the memorandum
to which, I believe. General Wedemeyer referred.
Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I Avant to state that this photostat
which has just been offered for the record is the photostat which was
submitted with this letter from the State Department.
This memorandum was one of the enclosures of the President's letter of De-
cember 15, 1945, to General Marshall. As you are aware, the President's letter
of December 15, and its enclosures constituted General Marshall's written direc-
tive for a China mission.
A search of the Department's files reveal that none of the other documents
of the Presidential directive which General Marshall took with him to China
in 1945 bears the initials "J. C. V." or the name of Foreign Service Officer John
Carter Vincent.
As to the authorship of the enclosed memorandum, it would be impossible for
the Department to provide a list of all those who contributed to or edited the
memorandum. At the time the memorandum was drafted, I\Ir. John Carter
Vincent was the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and hence tiie
responsible subordinate ofiicer for the drafting of the memorandum. It should
be pointed out, however, that in important memorandum of this kind it is
generally the case that many officers participate in the drafting, even though the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2203
record copies (such as the enclosed) only show the name of the responsible sub-
ordinate oflEicer. Since this particular memoiandum was addressed to the War
Department and since it was signed by Secretary Byrnes and approved by the
President, it is entirely possible that in addition to Mr. Vincent and other State
Department officers, military officers as well as Secretary Byrnes and even the
President may have had a hand in the drafting.
In this connection, Mr. Acheson's detailed account of the drafting of General
Marshall's directive is contained on pages 1848 and 1849 of part 3, hearings be-
fore the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session.
Sincerely yours,
Carlisle H. Humelsine.
So presumably the two-page memorandum which was handed to Gen-
eral Marshall was never returned to the State Department file I Would
you assume that from this letter ?
Mr. Vincent. I would assimie that from this letter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That memorandum did bear your initials or your
name, did it not?
Mr. VINCENT. It did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. But it was not in the State Department files in
October, so presumably it never came back to the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. The original never came back to the State Depart-
ment, but let me testify here that in my search after I came back from
leave this time I found a carbon copy of this November 28 document
to which I refer, which was in the Far Eastern Office files and had
never gone into the regular State Department files.
Mr. SoURWiNE. How would you identify that so that we might re-
quest it ?
Mr. Vincent. I could identify it by date and I could describe it.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Would you do that ?
Mr. Vincent. I will put it this way : You don't have to identify it,
because I would like to have it now to complete this record of all the
difficulty there has been about the draft.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I am sure we all would because there has been a lot
of confusion.
Mr, Vincent. It would be well to have it in. I would like to have
it. If you would write the State Department there will be no diffi-
culty in identifying it as the document concerning which Mr. Vincent
testified here.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Do you think there will be any difficulty in get-
ting it?
Mr. Vincent. I can't promise that, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. You at least are anxious that we should have it?
Mr. Vincent. I would like to have it now. That I think would
clarify one other thing in General Weclemeyer's testimony, wdiat docu-
ment did General Wedemeyer see with my initials on it, and I am
inclined to think that wdiat he saw was my November 28 memo when
he testified that he saw something over my initials.
Mr. Sourwine. Rather than the one
Mr. Vincent. Rather than this, because although he may have
seen this here, from the contents too great significance — and I am not
trying to avoid responsibility — too great emphasis is being placed on
the fact that my initials are on it,
Mr. Sourwine. On the question of the significance of this, to what
extent did you shape the requests of the War Department with regard
2204 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to the stipulations that they wanted made, the directive that they
wanted given to General Wedemeyer?
Mr. Vincent. I would say that I had my part in them, and I remem-
ber the discussion on the 9th of December, but I do not recall exactly
which idea in there is mine and which is General Marshall's or
Mr. SouRWiNE. Just on the chance that you might recognize one
of these paragraphs of one of the ideas advanced, it says :
In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department
requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating^
that:
(1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National
Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the
logistical support of such troops.
Did you have anything to do with putting that into this message?
Mr. Vincent. As I have testified, that was one of the recommenda-
tions in my memorandum of November 28. Therefore, whether I put
that in there or not, it was an idea that I had.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was your memorandum of November 28 a fore-
runner of this message of Secretary Byrnes as well as a forerunner
of the President's statement of policy?
Mr. Vincent. It was a forerunner in time, but I don't think that
it was the memorandum that was consulted in connection with this.
As I say, you asked if we were discussing the matter of should or
should not we send troops to Manchuria, and I was already on record
in my memorandum of November 28 as favoring that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would it be a fair assumption, then, that since you
had placed that in your memorandum of the 28th of November, and
since it is in here in a memorandum which you drafted, you can claim
some substantial share of the credit for putting it in here?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, I could claim some substantial share. I would
like to have here what were General Wedemeyer's requests. You see,
that refers to General Wedemeyer's telegram. General Wedemeyer
probably could also claim a considerable share to everything that is in
there, because I believe that that was something that General Wede-
meyer wanted, too.
Mr. SouRwiNE. These points were in compliance with his request,
in other words ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr, Sourwine. Point 2 :
He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the
evacuation of Japanese troops from the China Theater.
The same answer, it got in there the same way ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know how. That would be something I could
have put in on anyone could have put in, because it was a matter of
generally agreed policy.
ISIr. Sourwine. Point 3 :
Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders
in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representa-
tives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further
transportation of Chinese troops to North China, except as North China ports
may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will
be held in abeyance.
Mr. Vincent. The same answer to that one, that it was a matter
resulting from general discussion and I was in agreement with that
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2205
idea. Whether I proposed it, whether General Marshall proposed it
■or somebody else, I don't know.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That also was in response to a recommendation
of General Wedemeyer ? .
Mr. Vincent. I should say it was, but I say what we lack here is
General Wedemeyer's telegram to see whether that was what he
wanted to do.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Point 4 :
Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into North China may be
immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such
arranaements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a)
that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out con-
sistently with his nesotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese
groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are
such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and
to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of inter-
national peace.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, that resulted again from the discussion on
December 9.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any
Mr. Vincent. From the general discussion on the 9th. I would
say just purely hazarding a'guess, that the latter one is no doubt, or
seems to me to be, General Marshall's contribution primarily, because
he was undertaking this mission and he wanted to know what were tho
circumstances under which he was going to undertake it.
Mr. SouRw^NE. Was it the purpose or intent of the group that
engaged in that general discussion to stymie General Wedemeyer in
China?
]Mr, Vincent. No, sir.
JNIr. SouRAviNE. Was it in anway the purpose or intent to give him
unrealistic directives, directives which he could not successfully carry
out or which, if carried out, would render ineffectual if not actually
ineffective his efforts in China?
Mr. Vincent. I don't think that crossed anybody's mind. There
was no intent of that kind.
Mr. Sourw^ine. Do you feel that this directive in any way ran at
cross purposes to what General Wedemeyer had reported ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not, but I say in the absence of having General
Wedemeyer's telegram, which we should have here, we can't reach
any conclusion.
Mr Sourwine. It was discussed at top level in the State Depart-
ment in connection with General Wedemeyer's recommendations?
Mr. Vincent. With General Wedemeyer's recommendations, and
in connection with General Marshall's forthcoming mission.
Mv. Sourwine. Hadn't General Wedemeyer, in point of fact, said
that it was absolutely impossible for Chiang to make any success in
Manchuria, that lie should concentrate his efforts in North China ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that, Mr. Sourwine. I don't know
whether he had or not.
JNIr. Sourwine. If he had said that, what would be the effect of this
directive which said he could proceed to take Chinese troops into
Manchuria, but he couldn't take any into North China?
Mr. Vincent. If he had said it this would be just the reverse effect
of what he wanted.
2206 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRA^aNE. Will you look at page 131 of the white paper, please,
and follow as I read :
General Wedemkyeb's Reports
On November 14, 1945, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General,
China Theater, reported to Washington that the National Government was com-
pletely unprepared for occupation of Manchuria in the face of Communist op-
position. He also reported his recommendation to the Generalissimo that the
Cliinese should adopt the immediate objective of consolidating the areas south
of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze and of securing the overland line of
communications in that area prior to entry into Manchuria.
Again on November 20, 1945, he reported as follows :
"I have recommended to the Gfneralissimo that he should concentrate his
efforts upon establishinq: control in North China and upon the prompt execu-
tion of political and official reforms designed to remove the practice of corrup-
tion by officials and to eliminate prohibitive taxes."
General Wedemeyer also recommended the utilization of foreign executives
and technicians, at least during the transition period. He then added :
"Chinese Communists guerrillas and saboteurs can and probably will, if
present activities are reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of
National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly
and extended campaign. * * * Logistical support for National governmental
forces and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been
fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts plus
the lack of appropriate forces and transport have caused me to advise the
Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North
China and the consolidation of his military and political position there prior to
any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed
with this concept."
Among General Wedemeyer's conclusions at that time were the following :
"1. The Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China
provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians
and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent,
civilian officials.
"2. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China for months or
perhaps even years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Com-
munists is achieved and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested
in parnyrapb 1.
"3. He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory
agreeuients are reached with iiussia and the Chinese Communists.
'"4. Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of
Chinese Communist and possibly their own plans in North China and Man-
churia. These activities are violations of the recent Sino-Russian Treaty and
related agreements.
"5. It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached be-
tween Chinese Communists and the National Government."
How do you now, having read it, understand that report by General
Wedemeyer? Do you thnik it counsels moving Chinese troops into
Manchuria ?
Mr. Vincent. On the contrary, this counsels not sending them into
Manchuria.
Mr. SoumviNE. And what did the directive from the War Depart-
ment by the State Department say on that point?
Mr. Vincent. It said it authorized moving troops into Manchuria.
It told him also to proceed with his plans for North China, but not
to operate under them until General Marshall had gotten out there and
figured out the chances of his success.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Where did that overruling of General Wedemeyer
originate ; do you know ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know. It was a military matter, I should
think, and it was one of Pentagon Building or General Marshall
himself.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2207
Mr. SouRWiNE. Coiildirt it have originated with Chiang Kai-shek
himself ?
Mr. Vincent. It could have. Chiang Kai-shek was anxious to move
troops into Manchuria.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think he is the one that overruled Wede-
mej^er in that regard '(
Mr. Vincent. I can/t testify factually on that, whether the Gen-
eralissimo
]\Ir. SouRwiNE. You say that this directive here, which is made by
the Secretary of State to the War Department, originated in the
Pentagon or at a high military level ?
Mr. Vincent. I would think that those military provisions there
were the result of discussion between the War Department and the
State Department. You are speaking now of these four points there?
IVIr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
]Mr. Vincent. And with General Marshall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Wherever they originated, is there any question
in your mind now that this directive was contrary to what General
Wedemeyer had himself recommended ?
Mr. Vincent. It certainly was contrary to what he recommended
here. Whether there was a subsequent recommendation from him
I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Are you going to pass to another subject ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir.
(The material following was ordered printed in the record at this
point, by the chairman on April 8, 1952.)
Outline of Suggested Course of Action in China
(Drafted by John Carter Vincent on November 28, 1945)
lA (1) The United States is prepared to assist the Chinese National Govern-
ment in the transportation of troops to Mancliurian ports to enable China to
reestablish its administrative control over Manchuria as an integral part of
China. The United States and the United Kingdom, by the Cairo Declaration,
are committed to the return of Manchuria to China. The U. S. S. R., in adher-
ing to the Potsdam Declaration, is also committed to the return of Manchuria
to China ; and by the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August
194."> the U. S. S. R. pledges itself to respect Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.
All of these Governments recognize the National Government of China as the
only legal government in China. Resumption of Chinese sovereignty in Man-
churia can therefore be properly effected only through reestablishment by the
recognized National Government of China of administrative control in Man-
churia.
2A (2) The United States is prepared to assist the National Government of
China in effecting the rapid demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops
in north China. United States marines are in north China for that purpose and
stand ready to act more directly and effectively in accomplishing that purpose.
Quite apart from the United States conunitment to assist the Chinese National
Government in the demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops, the United
States feels that it has a responsibility of its own, deriving from its adherence
to the principles and policies which brought it into war against Japan, to effect
the removal of Japanese troops from China.
3A (3) The United States recognizes and supports the National Government
of China on an international level, but it cannot support that Government by
military in'ervention in an internecine struggle.
4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable condition to the accomplishment of (2)
above and a highly advantageous condition to the achievement of the ultimate
objective of (1) above would be the declaration of a truce between the armies
of the Nationalist Government and the armies of the Chinese Communists and
other dissident Chinese armed forces. The United States is prepared to arranger
2208 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
if so requested by the National Government of China, for a truce between the
opposing forses.
5A (5) The truce mentioned in (4) above could have long-term advantage
for China only if accompanied by the immediate convocation of a national
conference to seek and find a peaceful solution of China's present political strife.
The United States is committed to assist the Chinese National Government, in
every appropriate way, in the achievement of unity, stability, and democracy in
China by methods of peaceful political negotiation. The United States is pre-
pared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to reaffirm tliat they
also are committed to such .a policy. The United States is cognizant of the
fact that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government"
and believes tnat it would be conducive to peace, unity, and democratic reform in
China if the bases of that Government were broadened to include other political
elements in the country. Furthermore, the United States is convinced that the
existence of autonomous armies such as the army of the Communist Party, is
inconsistent with and makes impossible political unity in China. It is for
these reasons that the United States strongly advocates that the Chinese Na-
tional Government call as soon as possible a conference of representatives of the
major political elements in the country for the purpose of agreeing upon ar-
rangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation
in the Chinese National Government. To be consistent, the National Govern-
ment should at the same time annoiance the termination of one-party "political
tutelage." I^pon the institution of a broadly representation government, the
Chinese Communist forces should be integrated effectively into the Chinese
National Government army.
6A (6) The United States is prepared to encourage and support the Chinese
National Government in its endeavors to bring about peace and unity by the
creation of a government representative of the various political elements in the
country. It is also prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom
to give similar encouragement and support to the Chinese National Government.
7A If the Chinese Goverument is able to bring about peace and unity along
the line.s described, the United States is prepared to assist the Chinese Gov-
ernment in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, to initiate con-
structive measures for improvement and progress in the agrarian and industrial
economy of the country, and to establish a military organization capable of
discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the mainte-
nance of peace and order. Specifically, the United States is prepared to give
favorable consideration to the establishment of an American military advisory
group in China ; to the dispatch of such other advisers in the economic and
financial fields as the Chinese Government may need and which this Govern-
ment can supply ; and to Chinese requests for credits and loans, under reason-
:able conditions, for projects which contribute toward the development of a
healthy economy in China and the development of healthy trade relations be-
tween China and the United States.
FE : J.C.Vincent : hst.
11-28^5.
Statement by President Tkuman on United States Policy Toward China,
December 1.5, 1945
(Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945)
IB The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity
of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of
the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations
Organization.
2B It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united, and demo-
cratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations
•Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by
foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent
internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now
and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the
principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the
peoples of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would
indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace
■of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States
and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to
adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2209
3B The Government of the United States believes it essential :
(1) That a cassation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the
National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese
armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective
Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces.
4B (2) That a national conference of representatives of major political
elements be arranged to de\elop an early solution to the present internal strife—
a solution which will bring about the unification of China.
5B The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the pres-
ent National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government
in China. It is the proper instrnuient to achieve tJie objective of a unified China.
6B The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in
1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam
Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August
1945, are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Man-
churia to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National GoV-
ei'nment of the Republic of China.
7B In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National
Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance
with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence
remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the
disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United
States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government
of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese
troops in the liberated areas. The United States marines are in North China for
that purpose.
8B The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National
Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and siiecif-
ically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is con-
vinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the
effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to
United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal
strife.
9B The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to
restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria.
The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated,
unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her
place as a unified, democratic, and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the
maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in
China.
lOB The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of
China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity, and democratic
reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened
to include other political elements in the coiintry. Hence, the United States
strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major
political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give
those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Gov-
ernment. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party
"political tutelage" established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the
nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.
IIB The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army
is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China.
With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies
should be eliminated as such and all armed, forces in China integrated effectively
into the Chinese National Army.
12B In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the
United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the
achievement of political unity in China must be marked out liy the Chinese them-
selves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would
be inappropriate. The United States Government feels, however, that China has
a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict
within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace, a
responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese
political and military groups.
13B As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above,,
the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every
reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial
2210
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
economy, anri establish a military organization capable of rliscliargingr China's
national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and
order. In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable
consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable con-
ditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy
economy throughout China and healthy trade relaticms between China and the
United States.
Outline of Suggested Course of
Action in China
lA (1) The United States is pre-
pared to assist the Chinese National
Government in the transportation of
troops to Manchurian ports to enable
China to reestablish its administrative
control over Manchuria as an integral
part of China. The United States and
the United Kingdom, by the Cairo Dec-
laration, are committed to the return
of Manchuria to China. The U. S. S. R.,
in adhering to the Potsdam Declara-
tion, is also committed to the return of
Manchuria to China ; and by the terms
of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agrep-
ments of August 1945 the U. S. S. R.
pledges itself to respect Chinese sov-
ereignty over Manchuria. All of these
Governments recognize the National
Government of China as the only legal
government in China. Resumption of
Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria can
therefore be properly effected only
through reestablishment by the recog-
nized National Government of China of
administrative control in Manchuria.
2A (2) The United States is pre-
pared to assist the National Govern-
ment of China in effecting the i-apid
demobilization and repatriation of Jap-
anese troops in north China. United
States Marines are in north China for
that purpose and stand ready to act
more directly and effectively in accom-
plishing that purpose. Quite apart from
the United States commitment to as-
sist the Chinese National Government
in the demobilization and repatriation
of Japanese troops, the United States
feels that it has a responsibility of its
own, deriving from its adherence to
the principles and policies which
{Statement by Prestdknt Trttman
ON United States Policy Toward
China, December 15, 1945
(Department of State Bulletin, De-
cember 16, 1945, p. 945)
IB The Government of the United
States holds that peace and prosperity
of the world in this new and unexplored
era ahead depend upon the ability of
the sovereign nations to combine for
collective security in the United Nations
organization.
6B The United States and the
United Kingdom by the Cairo Declara-
tion in 1943 and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics by adhering to the
Potsdam Declaration of last July and
by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agree-
ments of August 1945, are all com-
mitted to the liberation of China, in-
cluding the return of Manchuria to Chi-
nese control. These agreements were
made with the National Government of
the Republic of China.
5B The United States and the other
United Nations have recognized the
present National Government of the
Republic of China as the only legal gov-
ernment in China. It is the proper in-
strument to achieve the objective of a
\inified China.
TB In continuation of the constant
and close collaboration with the Na-
tional Government of tbe Repultlic of
China in the prosecution of this war, in
consonance with the Potsdam Declara-
tion, and to remove possil)ility of Jap-
anese influence remaining in China,
the United States has assumed a defi-
nite obligation in the disarmament and
evacuation of the Japanese troops. Ac-
cordingly tne United States has been
assisting and will continue to assist the
National Government of the Republic of
China in effecting the disarmament and
evacuation of Japanese troops in the
liberated areas. The United States
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
2211
Outline of Suggested Cottrse of
Action in China — Continued
brought it into war against Japan, to
effect the removal of Japanese troops
from China.
3 A (3) The United States recog-
nizes and supports the National Gov-
ernment of China on an international
level, but it cannot support that Gov-
ernment by military intervention in an
internecine struggle.
4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable
■condition to the accomplishment of (2)
above and a highly advantageous con-
dition to the achievement of the ulti-
mate ob.iective of (1) above would be
the declaration of a truce between the
armies of the National Government and
the armies of the Chinese Commu-
nists and other dissident Chinese armed
forces. The United States is prepared
to arrange, if so requested by the Na-
tional Government of China, for a truce
between the opposing forces.
5A (5) The truce mentioned in (4)
above could have long-term advantage
for China only if accompanied by the
immediate convocation of a national
conference to seek and find a peaceful
solution of China's present political
strife. The United States is commit-
ted to assist the Chinese National Gov-
ernment, in every appropriate way, in
the achievement of unify, stability, and
democracy in China by methods of
peaceful political negotiation. The
United States is prepared to request the
U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to
reafhrm that they also are committed
to such a policy. The United States is
cognizant of the fact that the present
National Government of China is a
"one-party government" and believes
that it would be conducive to peace,
unity, and democratic reform in China
Statement by President Trttman
ON United States Policy Toward
China, December 15, 1945 — Con.
Marines are in North China for that
purpose.
9B The United States has already
been compelled to pay a great price to
restore the peace which was first
broken by .Japanese aggression in Man-
churia. The maintenance of peace in
the Pacific may be .ienpard'zed, if not
frustrated, unless Japanese influehce in
C^ina is wholly I'emoved and unless
China takes her place as a unified,
democratic and peaceful nation. This
is the ]>urpose of the maintenance for
the time being of United States mili-
tary and naval forces in China.
SB The United States recognizes
and will continue to recognize the Na-
tional Government of China and co-
operate with it in international affairs
and specifically in eliminating Japanese
inflience from China. The United
States is convinced that a prompt ar-
rangement for a cessation of hostilities
is essential to the effective achievement
of this end. United States support will
not extend to United States military
intervention to influence tne course of
any Chinese internal strife.
3B The Government of the United
States lielieves it essential:
(1) That a cessation of hostilities be
arranged lietween the armies of the
National Government and the Chinese
Communists and other dissident Chinese
armed forces for tne purpose of com-
pleting the return of all China to ef-
fective Chinese control, including the
immediate evacuation of the Japanese
forces.
2P, It is the firm belief of this Gov-
ernment that a strong, united and demo-
cratic China is of the utmost importance
to the success of this United Nations
organization and for world peace. A
China disorganized and divided either
by foreign aggression, such as that un-
dertaken by the Japanese, or by violent
internal strife, is an undermining in-
fluence to world stability and peace,
now and in the future. The United
States Government has long subscribed
to the principle that the management of
internal affairs is the responsibility of
the peoples of the sovereign nations.
Events of this century, however, would
indicate that a breach of peace any-
where in the world threatens the peace
of the entire world. It is thus in the
most vital interest of the United States
and all the United Nations that the
2212
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Outline of Suggested Course of
Action in China — Continued
if the bases of that Government were
broadened to include other political ele-
ments in the country. E\irthermore,
the United States is convinced that the
existence of automonous armies such
as the army of the Communist Party, is
inconsistent with and malies impossible
political unity in China. It is for these
reasons that the United States strongly
advocates that the Chinese National
Government call as soon as possible a
conference of representatives of the
major political elements in the country
for the purpose of agreeing upon ar-
rangements which would give those ele-
ments a fair and effective representa-
tion in the Chinese National Govern-
ment. . To be consistent, the National
Government should at the same time
announce the termination of one-party
"political tutelage." Upon the institu-
tion of a broadly representation gov-
ernment, the Chinese Communist forces
should be integrated effectively into the
Chinese National Government army.
6A (G) The United States is pre-
pared to encourage and support the
Chinese National Government in its en-
deavors to bring about peace and unity
by the creation of a government rep-
resentative of the various political ele-
ments in the country. It is also pre-
pared to request the U. S. S. R. and the
United Kingdom to give similar encour-
agement and support to the Chinese
National Government.
7A If the Chinese Government is
able to bring about peace and unity
along the lines described, the United
States is prepared to assist the Chinese
Statement by President Truman
ON United States Policy Toward
. China, December 15, 1945 — Con.
people of China overlook no opportunity
to adjust their internal differences
promptly by means of peaceful nego-
tiation.
lOB The United States is cognizant
that tlie present National Government
of China is a "one-party government"
and believes that peace, unity and demo-
cratic reform in China will be furthered
if the basis of this Government is broad-
ened to include other political elements
in the country. Hence, the United
States strongly advocates that the na-
tional conference of representatives of
major political elements in the country
agree upon arrangements which would
give those elements a fair and effective
representation in the Chinese National
Government. It is recognized that this
would require modification of the one-
party "political tutelage," established
as an interim arrangement in the prog-
ress of the nation toward democracy by
the father of the Chinese Republic, Doc-
tor Sun Yat-sen.
IIB The existence of autonomous
armies such as that of the Communist
army is inconsistent with, and actually
makes impossible, political unity in
China. With the institution of a
broadly representative government au-
tonomous armies should be eliminated
as such and all armed forces in China
integrated effectively into the Chinese
National Army.
4B (2) That a national conference
of representatives of major political ele-
ments be arranged to develop an early
solution to the present internal strife — ■
a solution which will bring about the
unification of Cliina.
12B In line with its often expressed
views regarding self-determination, the
United States Government considers
that the detailed steps necessary to the
achievement of political unity in China
must be worked out by tlie Chinese
themselves and that intervention by any
foreign government in these matters
would be inappropriate. The United
States Government feels, however, that
China has a clear responsibility to the
other United Nations to eliminate
armed conflict within its territory as
constituting a threat to world stability
and peace — a responsibility which is
shared by the National Government and
all Chinese political and military
groups.
13B As China moves toward peace
and unity along the lines described
above, the United States would be pre-
pared to assist the National Govern-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2213
Statement by Presiedent Truman
OuTi.iME OF Suggested Course of on United States Policy Toward
Action in China — Continued China, December 15, 1945 — Con.
Government in every reasonable way to nient in every reasonable way to re-
rehabilitate the country, to initiate con- habilitate the country, improve the
structive measures for improvement agrarian and industrial economy, and
and progress in the agrarian and in- establish a military organization ca-
dustrial economy of the country, and to pable of discharging China's national
establish a military organization ca- and international responsibilities for
pable of discharging China's national the maintenance of peace and order. In
and international responsibilities for furtherance of such assistance, it would
the maintenance of peace and order, be prepared to give favorable consid-
Specifically, the United States is pre- eration to Chinese requests for credits
pared to give favorable consideration and loans under reasonable conditions
to the establishment of an American for projects which would contribute
military advisory group in China ; to toward the development of a healthy
the dispatch of such other advisers in economy throughout China and healthy
the economic and financial fields as the trade relations between China and the
Chinese Government may need and United States.-
which this Government can supply ; and
to Chinese requests for credits and
loans, under reasonable conditions, for
projects which contribute toward the
development of a healthy economy in
China and the development of healthy
trade relations between China and the
United States.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to inquire about this: Yesterday
I asked you some questions in relation to an investigation of the Amer-
asia case, that is, the taking of the paper from your office.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Can you recall when that investigation was
made by the security office ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I testified yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that I
could not recall the exact date of it, it was a matter of days after the
Amerasia case broke, because I had left — this is my recollection now — •
that I had left for San Francisco by the middle of April. I don't
think it took place after I returned.
Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us whether it was before or after
you made the donation to the defense fund for Mr. Service ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I could not. No ; I couldn't place the date.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that you would make a donation
to a defense fund of Mr. Service, one of the people involved in the
removal of the papers from your office if the security office was making
an investigation of your office ?
Mr. Vincent. I testified that I among others made such a donation.
Senator Ferguson. How much did you donate?
Mr. Vincent. I testified that I gave $40 or $50, among others, to
assist him in hiring a lawyer.
Senator Ferguson. That is his defense fund. I did not misname
that ; did I ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, it was to defend him, to get a lawyer to de-
fend him ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that you would give that money
after your office was being investigated ?
Mr. Vincent. I have said I do not know when I gave it; yes. I
would have given it
Senator Ferguson. Even after
2214 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. Because he was an old friend, because he had not yet
been indicted. He was a man who was being accused.
Senator Ferguson. You say he wasn't indicted ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; he was not. He was brought before — I am.
working on recollection — he was brought before the grand jury.
iSenator Ferguson. He was arrested.
Mr. Vincent. He had been arrested ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. How long after he was arrested
Mr. Vincent. That 1 couldn't say. I must have given it before I
went to San Francisco. I would have to get the date of when he was
arrested, but some time within a matter of a week or 10 days.
Senator Ferguson. Within a week or 10 days after he was arrested.
Mr. Vincent. That would be my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Would you think your oflfice was investigated
during that period^
Mr. Vincent. During that period, yes. I don't place the date.
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't it have been very embarrassing to
you to be a witness in the case and at the same time be a donor to the
defense of one of the defendants, you being a State official 'i
Mr. Vincent. No, sir; it would not have been embarrassing.
Senator Ferguson. It wouldn't have been i
Mr. Vincent. A contribution to assist a man who had no funds to
hire a lawyer would not have been embarrassing to me.
Senator Ferguson. Did they say who the lawyer was to be ?
Mr. Vincent. No; 1 don't recall who the lawyer was. Did who
say
Senator Ferguson. The man who collected the fund.
Mr. Vincent. No. I don't recall who the lawyer was, and I
don't
Senator Ferguson. You couldn't give us the name before of the
man who collected the funds.
Mr. Vincent. 1 told you 1 did not recall it, but Mr. Mandel recalled
it to me. That it was a man named Mortimer Graves.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember now that it was Mortimer
Graves '(
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the incident of Mortimer Graves col-
lecting it, but I am quite prepared to say that Mortimer Graves did
coUocl it. As 1 told you betore, 1 didn t recall who physically col-
lected the money.
Senator Ferguson. Overnight have you thought anything about the
matter of the investigation in your office? Could you give us more
help as to that investigation ?
JNlr. Vincent. Senator, I am afraid I cannot.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, how well did you know Solomon Adler?
Mr. Vincent. Solomon Adler I met hrst in 11)41 or early 1942, when
he came to China to be an assistant to Manuel Fox, who was handling
the Stabilization Fund in China.
Mr. Morris. Did you get to know Solomon Adler well ?
Mr. Vincent. 1 knew Solomon Adler well, as one would knowing
an official who was working with me in Chungking, where we were
rather a small community.
Mr. Morris. When did you learn that Solomon Adler was a member
of the Comnmnist Party, Mr. Vincent?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2215
Mr. Vincent. I never learned that Solomon Acller was a member of
the Communist Party.
Mr. Morris. You. did not know of the testimony Miss Bentley gave
before the Federal grand jury in 1947 to that ett'ect ^
Mr. Vincent. 1 do not recall any testimony of Miss Bentley, but if
she had given any it would not be indicative to me that he was a
Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any information ever given to you
while you were an officer in the State Department, from the Govern-
ment, that certain people ^^•el•e or were not Communists or were not
such that you should avoid them as Communists or Communist sym-
pathizers 'i
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. Not that I recall.
henator Ferguson. You had no idea, then, that there may have
been subversive agents around?
Mr. Vincent. Nobody ever informed me. The State Department
had its own Security Division, that was supposed to look into sub-
versive agents in the State Department.
Senator I'erguson. liut a Security Division that does nothing
would not help you, would it ? I mean, as far as you were concerned,
it did not give you the names of any people that were Communists or
had Communist leanings?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall
Senator Ferguson. You do not recall ever getting a name like Mr.
Adler?
Mr. Vincent. I am sure they never gave me Mr. Alder's name.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, Mr. Alder's name was mentioned in a
public session of the House Un-American Activities Committee as a
member of an espionage ring.
Mr. Vincent. When?
Mr. Morris. In 1948.
Mr. Vincent. You. are asking me whether I knew Solomon Adler as
a Communist ? I did not know Solomon Adler as a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever hear that testimony ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. Morris. Did you hear Whittaker Chambers' testimony before
this committee that Solomon Adler was a Communist ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Go ahead.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, in executive session, do you remem-
ber being asked the question as to whether it w^as in any sense the
tenor of the Marshall directive to invite the Kepublic of China to agree
to the Communists' terms for a coalition government, or face the pros-
pect of getting no more aid from the United States?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall it in those terms ; no, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, let me ask now : Was it implicit in this Mar-
shall directive that the Chinese Nationalist Government should have
pressure brought to bear on it to come to terms with the Communists,
and was there the clear implication in the directive that until there
had been a settlement with the Communists there would be no more
aid from the United States ?
Mr. Vincent. Those were the general ideas under which General
Marshall went out and started operating. When I say "no more aid,"
2216 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
there was during that period, and I say this just to make the record
clear, some aid given in south China. I remember money was given
to build the railroad. But there was to be no military aid. It was to
be withheld while General Marshall was carrying on. This is quite
correct.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I was not talking about anything that happened
afterward, but only about what was in the letter.
Senator Ferguson. Just one moment on that. Do I understand that
the idea of the directive was that General Marshall was to go out there,
and there was to be no aid to the Nationalists until he had made or
carried out the directive of having a consolidation ?
Mr. Vincent. The whole matter was entirely in General Marshall's
hands, sir. And during the period that he was trying to assist the
Chinese in getting together, military aid was not to be given.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I say.
Mr. Vincent. Unless he himself suggested it ; other than the mili-
tary aid of getting and assisting General Chiang Kai-shek to get
troops into Manchuria.
Senator Ferguson. Outside of putting troops into Manchuria, the
Nationalists were to get no aid.
Mr. Vincent. Of a military character.
Senator Ferguson. Of a military character, while this was going on.
Mr. Vincent. It was to be withheld until General Marshall himself
changed. He was authorized to operate under that kind of basis.
Senator Ferguson. That would be quite a pressure, would it not,
on a Nationalist Government ?
Mr. Vincent. It would.
Senator Ferguson. To be told, "You either make this settlement, or
else you do not get any military aid?" That is what it amounted to,
is it not?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And the putting of troops into Manchuria was sim-
ply putting the Nationalist forces in a position which, according to
General Wedemeyer, was completely untenable, without a satisfac-
tory settlement with the Chinese Communists; isn't that right?
Mr. Vincent. That is what is in this telegram, as I recall it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. So that the record may show the portions of the
directive which counsel had in mind in asking that question, I ask
leave to read two paragraphs from President Roosevelt's letter of
transmittal, which, together with the other documents, constituted
the directive.
Senator Ferguson. Very well.
Mr. Sour WINE (reading) :
Specifically I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government
to call a conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring
about the unification of China and concurrently to effect a cessation of hostili-
ties, particularly in north China.
He was telling them to stop fighting, wasn't he?
Mr. Vincent. Yes
Mr. SouRwiNE. And a little later on :
In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders, you
are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly you may
state in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance, in
the economic field, and military assistance — I have in mind the proposed United
States military advisory group that I have approved in principle — that a China
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2217
disunited and torn by civil strife could not lie considered realistically as a place
for American assistance along the lines enumerated.
I say those are the particular paragraphs counsel had in mind.
There are perhaps other passages which would carry out the same
general intent. Is tliat correct i
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think now, from your vantage point of the
years, that it was correct to urge a coalition between the Nationalists
and the Communists?
Mr. Vincent. In the light of the situation as it obtained at that
time, I still think it was the most feasible part of the policy.
I have testified many times that it was not the perfect solution, but
it seemed in our minds, considering the situation in the best light
we could, that it was better than civil war.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Civil war was actually under way, wasn't it?
Mr. Vincent. It hadn't broken out all over the place yet.
Mr. SouPvWTNE. And the Communists weren't all over the place.
They didn't get all over the place until after the truce was brought
about in 1948. At this time the Communists were in north China.
Mr. Vincent. And scattered around Manchuria.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And that is where the hostilities were going on?
Mr .Vincent, Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And those were the hostilities that Chiang was told
in this message to cease?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know, sir, that it was an official Soviet
policy as early as 1938 to demand coalition in China?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no distinct knowledge of that being Soviet
policy.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that the Soviet Ambassador at that
time had demanded such coalition as the price of Soviet aid?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. And that the Nationalist Government had refused?
Mr. Vincent, Well, in 1938, the Chinese Communists and the Na-
tionalists were cooperating to a rather eifective degree in fighting the
Japanese. I don't know whether you are speaking of coalition, now,
in the form of bringing about a constitutional government, but so far
as the military operations were concerned, in 1937 and 1938, and on
into 1940, there was quite effective cooperation between the two mili-
tary groups.
Mr, Sourwine. You have stated, I believe, that you did not see, read,
or know about, the G-2 report on the Communist Party which was
delivered to the State Department on July 25, 1945?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall seeing it. That was the one the
chairman showed me?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. That was made a part of the appendix of this
record at an earlier session.
Senator Ferguson, Do you know what Mr, Byrnes' part was in
this particular directive? Had you any personal knowledge about it?
Or on what Wedemeyer was to do, or Wedemeyer's report, or anything
else?
Mr, Vincent, I know that he sat in and took part in the discussions
on December 9, which finalized the documents, and he chairmanned
that meeting. It was in his office. Other than that, I had no dis-
cussions with him.
22848— 52— pt. 7 15
2218 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Was that his language, or his thought, to your
knowledge ?
Mr. Vincent. To my knowledge, I could not testify that Mr. Byrnes
himself has language in here.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, I would like to read, if the chairman
will permit, one paragraph from page 88 of that G-2 report, which is
already in the appendix to our record, because I want to ask you if
this accords with what you knew to be the fact at that time.
Reports from Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that the Central Government
military leaders h..ped that if the Communists were admitted to the Govern-
ment, Soviet Russia would come directly to China's aid. The correctness of this
attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in 1938 after the first rift in the
united front. At that time, the Soviet Ambassador presented Chiang Kai-shek
with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party in China should
be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. In other words, that the
Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a promise which
Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That does accord with your understanding of the
situation at that time ?
Mr. Vincent. The situation at that time, yes. I think it does ; al-
though I have no distinct recollection of the situation at that time.
Mr. Sourwine. Was this directive to General Marshall, or any part
of it, or any draft in connection with it, submitted at any time to
Mr. Dean Acheson ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Dean Acheson was present at the December 9
conference with General Marshall.
Mr. Sourwine. How about before that time ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether he saw it. I would say it
was certainly quite likely that he did see it.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it submitted at any time to Mr. Ben Cohen ?
Mr. Vincent. That I could not say. He was not at the meeting
on the 9th, and I never heard of his name being mentioned in connec-
tion with the directive.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything, sir, of a Russian demand
in 1945 that they participate in the occupation of Japan by sending
an undetermined number of troops to Hokkaido ?
Mr. Vincent. Hokkaido ?
Mr. Sourwine. Hokkaido.
Mr. Vincent. Well, at that time, I was not in charge of Japan
affairs, but I do recall the whole matter of discussion as to the basis
on which troops would be contributed to the general allied occupation
of Japan.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to revert for once, and I
apologize to the witness for breaking the thread : I have a document
that got out of place and should have been placed in the record when
we were discussing the question of moving troops into Manchuria and
north China, I hold in my hand a publication, American Policy
Toward China, by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, statement before
a joint Senate committee, June 4, 1951, Department of State Publica-
tion 4255, Far Eastern Series 43, released June 1951, and from page
24 thereof, I read :
The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer ; the possi-
bility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent ; and the possibility of really
getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly
diminished.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2219
I ask, Mr. Chairman, although this is a transcript from a i^revious
congressional hearing, to avoid reading at length here and so that there
may be no question of taking out of context, that we insert in the record
at this time, all of page 24, which will show the date and the context in
w^hich that paragraph appears.
Senator Ferguson. It may be inserted.
(The material referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 391" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 391
By the end of 1946 we had removed 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand
under 3 million, from China to Japan — one of the great mass movements of
people.
After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese
Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes
broke out again between the two parties ; and both the Government authorities,
the Chinese Government authorities, and the American Government authorities,
were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.
If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems
which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.
If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the Government
forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese
either disappeared or was gravely diminished.
The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer ; the possi-
bility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent ; and the possibility of really
getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly
diminished. So, the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese
Government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese
Government.
(Source: Department of State, Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43,
Released June 1951, p. 24.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, reverting to the question of Hokkaido, sir,
did you know whether advice was sought in the Department of
State by Secretary Byrnes with regard to that demand, that is, the
Russian demand of 1945 that they participate in the occupation of
Japan by sending troops into Hokkaido ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of it being sought.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were .you ever asked for advice on that point ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall being asked for advice. That was
a period, I think, prior to my association with Japanese affairs.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether that Russian demand was
accepted?
Mr. Vincent. It was not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You became a Foreign Service officer, class I, in
December 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, now% I would have to look that up. I assume
you have looked up the record.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I am simply trying to peg the chronology. That
record was taken from the Department of State register.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. How well did you know Frederick V. Field ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified before that I met him at the IPR
conference in Hot Springs. I never knew him even well. I had no
close association with him at all. I may have met him at a meeting
preparatory to going down to Hot Springs.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did he ever visit your home ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever visit his home ?
2220 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he ever visit you elsewhere ?
Mr, Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SiiuRwiNE. Did you ever meet him by appointment?
Mr. Vincent. Never by appointment, sir, that I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever meet with him on Forty-eidith Street
in New York City ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I never met with him.
Mr. SouRwiNE, Did you ever give him any information of a con-
fidential or security nature?
Mr, Vincent. I did not, sir,
Mr. SouRwiNE, Did you ever give him any information with the
l^nowledge or expectation or reason to believe that it would be passed
on directly or indirectly to the Soviet Government or to an agent of the
Soviet Government or to the Communist Party ?
Mr, Vincent, I did not, sir, I have testified that I never had any
conversations with him other than just casual.
Mr. ScuRwiNE. Have you ever discussed Japanese policy with him ?
Mr. Vincent. I have never discussed Japanese policy with him ; no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever meet him at the United Nations Con-
ference at San Francisco?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him for appointment, for
promotion, or for a commission in the Armed Forces of the United
States ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that he had made applica-
tion for such a commission ?
Mr, Vincent, I did not, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever read any of his writings?
Mr. Vincent, I don't recall ever reading anything that Field wrote,
sir,
Mr, Sourwine. You have testified in executive session, have you not,
with regard to your failure to recall a man by the name of Joseph
Gregg?
Mr. Vincent. I have,
Mr. Sourwine. Were you asked whether you knew a man by the
name of Joseph Greenstein ?
]\[r. Vincent, You mean in executive session?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall your asking me.
Mr. Sourwine. I wasn't sure whether I had asked. I will tell you
that Joseph Gregg and Joseph Greenstein are the same person. But
did you know a man under the name of Joseph Greenstein?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not,
Mr, Sourwine. Did you ever hear of a plan to assassinate Gen-
eralissimo Chiang Kai-shek?
Mr. Vincent. No, unless they are speaking of the arrest of Chiang
Kai-shek in Sian in 1936. But I didn't hear of any plan to assassinate
him there.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see a memorandum or memoranda
concerning such a plan in 1945 or 1946?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeine; such a memorandum.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2221
Mr. SouKwiNE. To your knowledge did such memorandum or
memoranda ever circulate from the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I have said I didn't recall it, so I can't say that I
have any knowledge of it circulating.
Mr. SoURWiNE. I think, Mr. Chairman, I should state this for the
record, in fairness to Mr. Field. At occasions through this hearing,
questions are asked which may to the witness seem preposterous. I
do not mean by asking questions to make assertions. It was my un-
derstanding from the witness himself that he desired here an oppor-
tunity to testify with regard to any and every charge that had been
made against him, and I want to say that so far as the staff of this
committee is able to do so, we are throwing at him everything that we
have found that Jias been thrown, and giving him an opportunity to
answer with regard to it.
Mr. Surrey, Did you mean making it clear to Mr. Field?
]\Ir. Vincent. I was going to correct that. You intended to say
"Mr. Vincent."
Mr. SouRwiNE. I intended to say "Mr. Vincent."
Senator Ferguson. You understand that ?
Mr. Vincent. I Understand that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you familiar with the report made by Mr.
Paule}^ after his visit to Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I have seen it. I am not familiar
with it, now. It was an economic report.
Mr. Sourwine. Generally speaking, what did that report propose ?
Mr. Vincent. Generally speaking it dealt with the matter of Japa-
nese assets, as I recall it, in Manchuria.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Didn't it propose reduction of Japan to an agri-
cultural community, essentially, with only light industry ?
Mr, Vincent. I think you are using the same phraseology that was
in my speech, there. I don't recall that phraseology in Pauley's re-
port, I couldn't testify whether that is in his report or not, or whether
it recommended that, sir, because I have no distinct recollection of his
recommendations.
Mr. Sourwine. I don't attempt to quote either from Mr. Pauley's
report or from your speech, and I don't want to foist that upon you.
I intended merely to ask if that was a summarization of what the
Pauley report recommended.
Mr. Vincent. And I have testified that I am not familiar enough
with it now, after 5 or 6 years, to say whether that was in it or not.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall now whether you had any reaction
to that report at the time ?
Mr. Vincent, No ; I do not recall.
Mr, Sourwine, Do you recall now whether that report was in line
witli the views which you had expressed in your radio broadcast
in October of 1945 ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say that I do recall that it was in line
with that.
Mr. Sourwine, Did you have anything to do with the preparation of
the Pauley report?
Mr. Vincent. Not anything that I can recall sir, no.
Mr. Sourwine. Did any of your associates have anything to do with
that preparation ?
Mr. Vincent. You mean my associates in the State Department?
2222 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Or elsewhere.
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Owen Lattimore have anything to do with
the preparation of that report?
Mr. Vincent. Well, are you describino; Mr. Owen Lattimore as an
associate now? He was on the Pauley Commission, and I have testi-
fied in executive session that I had no knowledge as to what he had
to do with the report, but I would assume since he accompanied him
that he had some part in helping draft it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss that report with Mr. Latti-
more at anytime ?
Mr. Vincent. I have told you I never had any discussion with
Lattimore on the report.
Air. SouRwiNE. Were you in any way responsible for Mr. T. A. Bis-
son's appointment to the Pauley staff?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir, not that I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have anything to do with the appoint-
ment of anyone else to Mr. Pauley's staff?
Mr. Vincent. No, not that I can recall. I had nothing to do with
the Pauley administration that I can think of.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know a man named DuBos, D-u-b-o-s?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know such a man.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know a man named DuBois, Du-B-o-i-s?
Mr. Vincent. To the best of my recollection, I don't know a man
named DuBois.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember testifying with regard to Far
East Commission 230?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that a paper submitted by the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee to the Far Eastern Commission?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; it was.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that mean it was formally approved by the
State- War-Navy Coordinating Committee?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified, I think, that I have no recollection
as to formal approval. Sometimes they wenfover to FEC, to the Far
Eastern Commission, without formal approval, I don't recall whether
it had what you would call formal approval. But normally it would
have been sent over by General Hilldring to the FEC.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who prepared that document?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified, I think, that a working group in the
FE., SWNCC, prepared it on the basis of Edwards' report back from
Japan.
Mr. Sourwine. Did it come before the Far Eastern Subcommittee?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that it did, but I would assume that it
did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you approve it?
Mr. Vincent. I had a deputy on the Far East Commission then, and
he approved it or I approved it.
Mr. Sourwine. Who was the deputy ?
Mr. Vincent. Penfield was the man, James K. Penfield.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you identified him here?
Mr. Vincent. I think I did in executive session, yes, sir, as the
Deputy Director of the Far East Office.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how this paper reached Japan ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2223
Mr. Vincent. No, I do not know how it reached Japan, but I am
trying now to recall the statements in executive session, where I made
the assumption that it reached Japan through the War Department.
Senator Ferguson. Was it supposed to reach Japan?
Mr. Vincent. My understanding at the time was that the War
Department kept General MacArthur pretty well informed step by
step as to the type of thinking, the type of papers and the thinking
on them.
Senator Ferguson. Then it was to reach Japan ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it in any sense an official State Department
paper ?
Mr. Vincent. You mean when it reached him? No, I would not
call it official,
Mr. Sourwine. Was it ever made an official State Department
paper?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether it would be called a State
Department paper or not.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that designation, "FEC 230," indicate it had
such status ?
Mr. Vincent. No, because FEC was not under the State Depart-
ment. And, you see, all of this is a period after I left the Department,
this whole matter of the FEC 230 ; and from knowledge of the way
things went then, the designation of FEC 230 would not have made
it a State Department document.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anyone who sent this paper or a copy
■of it to Japan, or to anyone in Japan?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know. I have testified that is probably went
through.
Mr. Sourwine. Went through? Were you finished?
Mr. Vincent. Went through the War Department channels, and
the War Department kept in pretty close touch, so I understood at
the time, with General MacArthur.
Mr, Sourwine. Was this the same document as the document known
as State Department Document FEC 230 ?
Mr. Vincent. I have never seen that designation of it, but if it was
called State Department Document FEC 230, that would have been
its designation.
Mr. Sourwine. Would such a document have required your endorse-
ment as Chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ?
Mr, Vincent, I think I have testified it would not have required
it. It would have required the endorsement of the SWNCC commit-
tee, of which General Hilldring was the Chairman, the top committee.
Mr. Sourwine, Did this contain clauses directing General Mac-
Arthur to effect wide distribution of income and of the means of
ownership and trade?
Mr, Vincent, I would have to refer to the document, sir, before I
could say that it did.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember?
Mr, Vincent. I don't recall that,
Mr. Sourwine. Was this document subsequently printed by James
Lee Kauffman, a New York lawyer ?
2224 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I think I have seen testimony to that effect, but I have
no knowledge myself, that it was.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is this, sir, a photostat of the document that we
have been talking about ?
Senator Ferguson. Counsel, were you familiar before with FEC
230?
Mr. Surrey. I never read it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Does that look like the document ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, I have no reason to believe this was not a photo-
stat of it. I was not familiar with it.
Mr. Sourwine. I offer this document, with a letter of transmittal,,
showing how it came into the possession of the subcommittee, and I
ask that they be put into the record at this point.
Senator Ferguson. They may be received.
(The material referred to is marked Exhibit No. 392 and is as
follows:)
Telephone Rector 2-6541
Cable Address : "KIVORLEE"^
James Lee Kautfman
counsellor at law
55 Liberty Street
New York 5, January 29, 1952.
Mr. Robert Morris,
Room 424-C, Senate Office Building. Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morris : At the request of Mr. Eugene H. Dooman I am enclosing^
a copy of FEC-230. When it has served its purpose I would appreciate your
returning it to this office.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Maria McDermott,
Secretary to Mr. Kauffman.
McD : MO
Ene.
FEC-230 Confidential
FEC-230
12 May 194T
FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY ON EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS
OF ECONOMIC POWER IN JAPAN
Note by the Secretary General
1. The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive
concentrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States
Representative, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern
Commission and is referred to Committee No. 2 : Economic and Financial
Affairs.
2. Enclosure "A" is the statement of transmittal of tl^e United States Govern-
ment. Enclosure "B" is the text of the proposed policy.
3. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document
which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to
unauthorized persons or to the press.
Nelson T. Johnson, Secretary General.
enclosure "a"
Statement of Transmittal
The United States Government desires to present herewith to the Far Eastern
Commission a report of its mission on Japanese combines, and concurrently to
recommend for adoption by the Commission certain policies with respect to the
concentration of economic power in Japanese industry, finance, and trade.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2225
It is tlie belief of tliis Government that the existence of the Zaibatsu, and the
monopolistic controls exercised by these giant combines over Japanese economic
life, have been a major factor in fostering and supporting Japanese aggression.
The dissolution of excessive private concentrations of economic power is essen-
tial to the democratization of Japanese economic and political life. It therefore
constitutes, in the United States view, one of the major objectives of the
occupation.
This basic occupation policy with respect to the Zaibatsu is stated in Basic
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (FEC-014), and is reaffirmed in Basic Initial
Post-Surrender Directive to SOAP for the Occupation and Control of Japan
(FECM)15). Substantial steps to implement this policy have already been under-
taken by the appropriate Japanese authorities, at the direction of or with the
approval of SCAP, in the organization and operations of a Japanese Holding
Company Liquidating Commission, in pi'oviding for an economic purge, and in
initiating other measures with respect to combines, control associations, and
cartel arrangements.
To aid in formulation of comprehensive policies, standards, and procedures
a mission headed by Corwin D. Edwards was dispatched to Japan In January
1946. Its report is submitted herewith.
On the basis of tliat report, the United States Government has prepared the
follovi^ing statement of broad policy with respect to the Zaibatsu question, which
It desires to submit for approval by the Far Eastern Commission. In many
respects, this statement incorporates measures which already have been or are
being Implemented by the appropriate Japanese authorities at the direction of or
with the approval of SCAP, in accordance with the directives referred to above.
ENCLOSURE "b"
Policy on Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power in Japan
1. Objective. — The over-all objective of occupation policy in dealing with
excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan should be to destroy such
concentrations as may now exist, and to prevent the future creation of new
concentrations. Especial care should be taken to avoid the futile gesture of
destroying one Zaibatsu class only to create another ; a drastic chanse in the,
nature as well as the identity of the groups controlling Japanese industry and
finance should therefore be effected. Realization of this change will require
achievement of the following specific objectives :
a. Dissolution of all excessive concentrations of economic power, unless
technological considerations require their continuation (paragraphs 2, 3,
4, below).
6. Elimination of the excessive economic power of persons formerly ex-
ercising control over these concentrations, and of certain individuals close
to such persons (paragraphs 5, 6, below).
c. Support for varied and diffused types of private ownership of elements
of these dissolved concentrations, as well as support for government owner-
ship of such of these concentrations as cannot be dissolved and of such ele-
ments of the dissolved concentrations as do not lend themselves to competitive
oi>eration (paragraphs 7, 8, below).
d. Elimination of financial support for excessive concentrations — through
the divesture of Zaibatsu holdings in banks and insurance companies, through
an increase in the number of sources of credit, through the termination
of alliances between financial and nonfinancial institutions, and through elim-
ination of governn^ent favoritism toward certain financial institutions (par-
agraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, below).
c. Destruction of legal support for excessive concentrations — through the
termination of control legislation, through the creation of an antitrust law,
through changes in the patent law, through amendments to corporate law,
and throucrh alterations in current tax law and practices (paragraphs 13,
14, 15, 18, 17, below).
/. Strengthening of the instruments necessary to effect the above policies —
through financial and technical aid to preferred types of purchasers, through
the creation of public support for anti-Zaibatsu actions of the Japanese
Government, and through measures to assure the independence of govern-
ment personnel from Zaibatsu influences (paragraphs 18, 19. 20, below).
It is considered that the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration will not
have been fulfilled until the objectives listed above have been met through the
application of measures specified in succeeding paragraphs. It is also considered,
2226 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
however, that the means to be employed in compelling the Japanese Government
to effectuate these measures, and the timing of such means, are matters for
executive decision by SCAP. In general, the Japanese Government should be
required to take such administrative, legislative and judicial measures as w^elL
be consistent vi'ith its structure and constitutional powers and will accomplish
the policy set out herein.
2. Definition of an excessive concentration. — For purposes of the policies set
forth in this paper, an excessive concentration of economic power should be de-
fined as any private enteri)rise conducted for profit, or combination of such en-
terprises, which, by reason of its relative size in any line or the cumulative
power of its position in many lines, restricts competition or impairs the oppor-
tunity for others to engage in business independently, in any important segment
of business.
In applying this standard, it should be presumed, subject to refutation, that
any private enterprise or combination operated for profit is an excessive con-
centration of economic power if its asset value is vei'y large ; or if its working
force (i. e., the working force required to operate its facilities at capacity as
evidenced by its peak past employment figure) is very large; or if, though
somewhat smaller in assets or working force, it is engaged in business in various
unrelated fields, or if it controls substantial financial institutions and /or sub-
stantial industrial or commercial ones ; or if it controls a substantial number of
other corporate enterprises ; or if it produces, sells or distributes a large propor-
tion of the total supply of the products of a major industi-y-
Absolute size, as well as position within a given industry, is to be considered
grounds for defining a specified concentration as excessive. It is desii-ed to
eliminate not only monopolies but al.so aggregations of capital under the control
of a given enterprise which are so large as to constitute a material potential
threat to competitive enterprise.
All larger Japanese enterprises should immediately be surveyed by SCAP in
the light of the above standards. Uncertainty as to whether any specified enter-
prise is covered, by these standards should be resolved in favor of coverage since
it is intended that ownership of the bulk of Japanese large-scale industry should
be affected by the policies set forth in this paper. It is understood that SCAP's
Schedule of Restricted Concerns, as amended from time to time in accordance
♦ with the procedures provided for that purpose, comprehends tlie Japanese en-
terprises considered to be excessive concentrations within the meaning of this
paper. /
3. Dissolution vs. nondis solution of excessive concentrations. — Excessive con-
centrations of economic power should immediately be dissolved into as many
nonrelated units as possible, no one of which would be covered by any of the
defiinitions of an excessive concentration presented in paragraph 2. Such dis-
solution snould not be effected, however, where the technological need for large
scale operation is such that dissolution would clearly cause a drastic reduction
in operating efficiency. It should be presumed, subject to refutation, that such
a drastic reduction would not result from the dissolution of holding companies ;
or from the severance of ties of ownership, directorship, and officership between
operating companies; or from the severance from operating companies of por-
tions of such companies, where these portions ai"e in unrelated industries, or
where they have had a separate corporate existence within the last five years, or
where they are so separated from one another physically and technologically that
they do not in fact have a common operating management. Treatment of con-
centrations which are to be dissolved is specified in paragraph 4; treatment of
concentrations which are not to be dissolved is specified in subparagraph 8 a.
The provisions of paragraph 5 should apply equally to persons and holdings in
concentrations which are. and are not, to be dissolved.
4. Policy with respect to excessive concentrations which are to he dissolved. —
The following measures should be undertaken with respect to excessive concen-
trations of economic power which are to l)e dissolved :
a. All concerns in these excessive concentrations which are merely hold-
ing companies should be dissolved and divested of their security and property
holdings.
ft. The units, other than those described under a above, into which these
excessive concentrations are broken down should, in the case of nonfinancial
enterprises (insurance companies being considered financial enterprises),
be divested of any securities which they may hold in other concerns, in-
cluding concerns not a part of any excessive concentration of economic-
power.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2227
c. All officers (auditors are to be consiflered officers) and directors of
these operating units, and of operating units in tlie financial field as well,
should surrender all offices and directorships except those in the company
in which they are principally engaged, and should be forbidden to acquire
any offices and directorships outside of whatever company they may be
Ijrincipally engaged in at any time in the future, except as provided in
paragraph 16. This policy does not apply to persons specified in paragraph
5. who will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that paragraph.
d. Certain contractual and service arrangements between the units into
which these excessive concentrations have been dissolved should be termi-
nated, including arrangements for performance of central oflice services,
interchange of personnel, executive agency, and preferential or exclusive
trading rights. Resumption of similar arrangements should be prohibited
for a time sufficient to ensure bona fide severance of the arrangement.
e. The operating units into which these excessive concentrations are dis-
solved should grant licenses on nondiscriminatory terms to all applicants
under patents which they now hold and under licenses which give them
rights to sublicense ; should surrender any exclusive or preferential riglits
which they now enjoy under patent licenses granted them by others; and
during the period of transition, should make available to all comers on non-
discriminatory terms any technology and patent rights which they make
available to other concerns which have been a part of the same combine.
Where the units in question hold license under Japanese patents owned by
foreigners under terms incompatible with the sense of this paragraph, these
terms should be renegotiated. Where the licensor will not agree to rene-
gotiation, the Japanese unit should cease utilizing the license, so that the
Japanese government can cancel the patent or open up the patent to licens-
ing on nondiscriminatory terms pursuant to Chapter II, Article 41 of the
Patent Law.
/. Mergers of any portions of divested or dissolved concerns should be
prohibited, except when permission is granted after an affirmative showing
of public interest.
5. Treatment of personnel in excessive concentrations. — All individuals who
have exercised controlling power in or over any excessive concentration of eco-
nomic powder, whether as creditors, stockholders, managers, or in any other
capacity, should be :
a. Divested of all corporate security holdings, liquid assets, and business
properties.
&. Ejected from all positions of business or governmental responsibility.
c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings or from acquir-
ing positions of business or governmental responsibility at any time during
the next 10 years.
All other persons likely to act on behalf of the individuals described above should
be subjected to the measures specified below. In determining who such persons
may be, such factors as ties by blood, marriage, adoption or past personal rela-
ship should be taken into account. (The phrase "past personal relationship"
is used in the previous sentence chiefly in reference to persons who have been
placed in positions of substantial responsibility in holding companies or their
subsidiaries by the Zaibatsu families, but it should also be taken to refer to
persons otherwise associated wuth the Zaibatsu whom SCAP may consider to
be acting as "fronts" for the latter.) Such persons should be:
a. Divested of liquid assets and business propeities, where they possess
such assets or properties in amounts of any significance ; and divested of all
corporate security holdings in any excessive concentration of economic
power and corporate security holdings representing an interest of more
than 1 percent in any other major private enterpi'ise.
6. Ejected from all positions in business or government which might be
used to favor Zaibatsu interests.
c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings, or from acquir-
ing positions in business or government which might be used to favor
Zaibatsu interests at any time during the next 10 years.
Where any doubt exists as to whether a given person should be covered by the
above policies, that doubt should be resolved by SCAP in favor of coverage,
since it is desired to divest a sufficient number of holdings to effect a thorough-
going transformation of the ownership and control of large-scale Japanese
industry.
6. Compensation of divested holdings. — Individuals covered by the definitions
in paragraph 5 above shall be indemnified, provided that such indemnification
2228 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
shall be made in such manner and degree as will prohibit their buying back a
place of power in the Japanese economy. In order to bring this about, it is
essential that certain measures be taken in the dissolution of excessive concen-
trations and in the sale of the assets of these persons. The measures set out
below have been designed with a view to preventing the payment of excessive
indemnification to the persons covered in paragraph 5 without affecting to the
same degree and manner the compensation of others who have invested in enter-
prises considered to be excessive concentrations. The determination of what
is an excessive indemnification shall be made on the basis of the objectives of
these measures. Accordingly :
a. Policies which facilitate the conveyance of divested holdings to new
owners should not be modified by an effort to obtain any specified degree of
compensation for the former owners of these holdings. The overriding ob-
jective should be to dispose of all the holdings in question as rapidly as
possible to desirable purchasers ; the objective should be achieved even if it
requires that holdings be disposed of at a fraction of their real value. In
negotiated sales of divested holdings to desirable types of purchasers, the
purchasers's ability to pay, rather than the real value of the holding, should
affect the fixing of prices and terms of payment.
h. A tax of not less than 90 percent should be levied on any amount by
which the gross sales price exceeds the August 1945 market price (in the case
of securities having a market) , or the book value as of the same date (in the
case of other securities or property). To prevent this tax from resulting
in injury to non-Zaibatsu individuals, the following priority should govern
the disposition of funds secured through the sale of divested assets :
First priority: All taxes due, other than the 90-percent tax referred to
above, and all liabilities should be paid in full.
Second priority : All non-Zaibatsu equity holders, where such exist should
be paid up to the amount of the AiTgust 1945 market price of their holdings
(or the August 1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market)
Third priority : The 90-percent tax described above should be paid in full.
Fourth priority : All the Zaibatsu equity holdings should be paid up to the
amount of the August 1945 market price of their holdings (or the August
1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market), and remain-
ing funds should be distributed among all equity holders in proportion to
the amount of their holdings.
To prevent observance of the priorities cited above from resulting in total
expropriation of Zaibatsu shareholders, proceeds of the 90-percent tax
should be partially refunded to Zaibatsu shareholders where necessary to
provide such shareholders with a total compensation not exceeding 15 per-
cent of the August 1945 market value (or book value where no market ex-
isted) of their divested holdings.
In lieu of the 90-percent tax specified above, a steeply progressive tax
may be specifically imposed (in addition to capital levy) on funds which
are assigned to the individuals described in paragraph 5 as a result of the
sale of assets divested from such individuals.
c. A 75-percent tax be levied on any gain realized through resale of
divested holdings within 2 years and a 50-percent tax should be levied on
any gain realized through resale within 4 years.
d. Sums credited to persons defined in paragraph 5 above as compensation
should be invested in government bonds, whose total par value will not
exceed the sum thus credited and which will pay a rate of interest no
higher than the lowest rate being paid by comparable government bonds.
Such bonds should not be saleable, transferable, or usable as collateral,
but should be acceptable for taxes, when all other sources of liquid assets
have been dissipated, for 10 years from the completion of the sale of such
holdings. During this period, cash payments, even of interest, should be
limited to sums required for accustomed living expenses, in order that there
may be no surplus for investment.
e. After the process of dissolution and liquidation has been well advanced,
and before the end of the 10-year freeze period, the program should be
reviewed to determine whether the sums credited to persons defined in
paragraph 5 above will be so large as to make probable a revival of Zaibatsu
power. If it is determined that the probability of such a revival still exists,
added measures appropriate to the circumstances existing at the time should
be applied to remove the probability.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2229
f. Before the freeze is terminated, succession by the owner's heirs should
be required, coupled with payment of steeply graduated inheritance taxes.
7. Liquidation of Divested Holdings. — Liquidation of divested securities and
properties should be effected rapidly in a period of about 2 years from the
organization of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission. The plan of
liquidation should allow for :
o. Pro rata distribution of security holdings to individual stockholders
of the holding concern other than those specified in paragraph 4 (and in
some cases to financial institutions which own the holding concern's stock ) .
b. Exchange and cancellation of securities between companies which hold
each other's stock.
c. Negotiated sale of securities and properties.
d. If necessary to complete the liquidation within about 2 years, invitation
of bids upon securities from eligible purchasers, and acceptance of the
highest bids however low such bids may be.
Liquidation should be effected by the Holding Company Liquidation Com-
mission, a wholly public agency of the Japanese Government operating under
close supervision of SCAP. Especial care should be taken not to allow repre-
sentatives of large-scale business, large-scale trade, or large-scale finance, or
of political groups, sympathetic to such business, trade, or finance, to have any
place on this Commission. All nominations to the Commission should be approved
by SCAP, its personnel should be removable by SCAP, and it should be required
that all sales effected by the Commission be revocable by SCAP. Public
announcement should be made of the terms and conditions of all sales.
8. Sale of divested lioUlings. — In the sale of divested secui'ity and property
holdings, the overriding objective should be to transfer ownership and control
of these holdings to groups and individuals in such a way as to secure, in addi-
tion to the requisite managerial skill, protection against the future creation of
excessive concentrations of economic power, through a wider distribution of in-
come and of ownership of the means of production and trade. In order to
achieve this objective, the following criteria are set forth as a guide to the
selection of purchasers and should be given priority, in this connection, over
the purchaser's present ability to pay :
a. Divested holdings in excessive concentrations of economic power
which are not to be dissolved for technological reasons, and in other enter-
prises such as public utilities which do not lend themselves to competitive
operation, may be subjected to purchase by the national and local govern-
ments of Japan, provided, such purchases are accomplished and approved
through democratic processes. Where such concentrations or enterprises
are not purchased by these governments, their rates and profits should be
subjected to open and effective regulation by impartial public commissions.
When the National Government or a local government purchases divested
equity holdings in a given concern, it should also give consideration to the
concomitant purchase of non-Zaibatsu equity holdings in that concern.
Every effort should be made, however, to dissolve all excessive concentra-
tions of economic power, rather than to assign them to government owner-
ship or regulation, until and unless the democratization of the Japanese
Government has proceeded sufficiently to render it a truly trustworthy in-
strument for economic control.
&. In connection with nongovernmental purchases, sales to wealthy
and economically powerful persons and corporations should be held to a
minimum, in order not to lay the groundwork for the creation of a new
Zaibatsu class. A decided purchase preference, and the technical and finan-
cial aid necessary to take advantage of that preference, should be furnished
to such persons as small or medium entrepreneurs and investors, and to
such groups as agricultural or consumer cooperatives and trade unions ;
whose ownership of these holdings would contribute to the democratization
of the Japanese economy. Every encouragement should be given such per-
sons and groups to purchase divested holdings, even if they only wish
to buy a small proportion of the holdings offered for sale in a given enter-
prise. In the case of negotiated sales, prices should be fixed with special
reference to such purchasers' ability to pay, as should the time period al-
lowed for payment of these prices.
c. No single person, or enterprise, or group of allied persons or enter-
prises, should be allowed to purchase a number of divested holdings so large
as to render probable the future creation of a concentration of economic
2230 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
power approaching in size or character those concentrations defined as
excessive under paragraph 2.
d. The purchase of divested holdings in ex-Zaibatsu concerns by the em-
ployees of such concerns should be encouraged only if a vigorous effort is
made to disperse ownership widely through the working force in question,
rather than to concentrate it in a few top executives. To render such
dispersion possible, provision should be made for financing these purchases
at low prices over a long period of time, possibly through wage deductions.
Especial care should be taken to prevent the use of groups of employees in
ex-Zaibatsu concerns as purchasing screens for persons disqualified from
making these purchases themselves.
e. All sales should be screened to exclude cloakes for Zaibatsu and for
other groups who fall under way of any purge directives or purge para-
graphs of the Basic Directive.
The criteria specified above should be adhered to regardless of the wishes of
non-Zaibatsu stockholders in the enterprises concerned.
9. Liquidation of Zaibatsu Financial Enterprises.— Divested holdings in Zai-
"batsu financial and insurance enterprises should be liquidated and disposed of
in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 for the
liquidation of nonfinancial enterprises. Policyholders in Zaibatsu insurance
companies should be aided in buying stock of these concerns which is now owned
by the Zaibatsu, where the condition of these concerns is sufficiently strong so
that the policyholders desire to make such purchases. Purchase should be
facilitated, under these circumstances, by liberal loans on policies, or payment
should be permitted in the form of a reduction in the face value of policies.
Zaibatsu insurance companies which are insolvent should be mutualized by
cutting back the face amount of outstanding policies, where sufficient assets
still exist to render this procedure practicable. In the reconstitution of insolvent
financial enterprises, stock held by Zaibatsu holding companies and Zaibatsu in-
dividuals should be subordinated to that of other stockholders.
10. Sources of a-edit. — As a fundamental measure to encourage competitive
operation of the Japanese economy, the number of independent sources of credit
should be increased substantially, although not to the point where the individual
banks would be so small as to be unable to secure the diversification of loans
necessary to banking safety. The strengthening of local savings banks, and
of rural and urban credit cooperatives, as well as of independent local banks,
should be encouraged. To this end, the following policies, among others should
be adopted :
a. Former owners of independent financial institutions which have been
merged with Zaibatsu concerns should be encouraged to reestablish their
old enterprises by forced divestitures. In this connection, a procedure should
be set up whereby former owners of merged banks, trust companies, or
insurance companies should have the opportunity, for a limited period of
time, to compel the institutions into which their organizations were merged
to divest themselves of assets and liabilities to the extent necessary to re-
constitute the absorbed institutions in adequate size.
h. Banks over a size to be specifi 'd by SCAP should be required to split
themselves into two or more independent units within a stated period, as
should other banks deemed by SCAP to enjoy a monopolistic position in
the field which they serve. The permissible size should be set at a level
sufficiently low to force a significant number of such actions and thus greatly
Increase the number of independent sources of credit, but sufficiently high
to guard against the dangers of financial insecurity associated with exces-
sively small banks.
11. Financial alliances. — Alliances between any financial and nonfinancial
enterprises, and alliances among any financial enterprises, should be broken.
To this end :
a. Banks and trust companies should be prevented from investing more
than 10 percent of their capital and reserves in the securities, loans, bills,
advances, and overdrafts of any one company.
h. Such concerns should not be permitted to hold, either as Jn owner of
record or as the holder of a beneficial interest, in their proper, savings, or
trust accounts, the stock of any other company in an amount which exceeds
5 percent of the outstanding shares of that company, nor to vote any such
stock which they may hold. Nor should they be permitted to own any
stock in a competitor. Exemption should be made to the percentage rule for
stock acquired in connection with bona fide underwritings and to the per-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2231
centajie and voting rules for stock acquired in default of loans, but any
such exemptions should not run loniier than one year.
c. Officers and directors of any bank or trust company, and persons hold-
ing 5 percent or more of the stock thereof, should be ineligible to hold any
office or directorship or similarly large percentage of stock in any other
company. Exception sliould be made for part-time non-policy-making em-
ployees, such as attorneys and certifying accountants, but such exceptions
should be defined as narrowly as possible.
d. No bank or trust company should be allowed to redeposit more than
10 percent of its deposits in any one institution other than the Bank of
Japan.
12. Eliminotion of financial discrimination. — To eliminate discrimination in
favor of Zaibatsu banks :
a. A system of deposit insurance should be instituted, to diminish the
belief among depositors that accounts in Zaibatsu banks are safer than
elsewhere. A limit (e. g., of the order of magnitude of ten billion yen)
should be set to the total amount of deposits which will be insured for a
single bank. A limit should also be set to the amount of deposits which will
be insured for a single account.
&. The Postal Savings System should ultimately be required to deposit
its funds in ordinary banks, allocating at least 90 percent of what it re-
ceives in any regional grouping of prefectures among the banks having head
offices in that region in proportion <-o the assets of such banks. A bank
ineligible for deposit insurance should also be ineligible to receive the rede-
posits of the postal savings system.
c. Legislation should be introduced to improve the standard of com-
mercial banking and to prevent banks from xmdertaking bu:^iness considered
unwise for commercial banks. (Performance of investment banking func-
tions by commercial banks should not be proliibited, however, until suit-
able alternative agents for these functions become available.) Such legis-
lation should also assign to the P>ank of Japan, or to some other suitable
public agency, powers of direction and inspection over other banks,
whose activities would be required to conform to statutory provisions
regarding capital, reserves, investment policy, and other matters. The
discretion which the laws now entrust to the Minister of Finance, in this
connection, should be greatly reduced, and his functions clearly defined by
law and made subject to check and review by the Diet. His powers to
legislate by ordinance and regulation should be strictly curtailed and limited
to. genuine emergencies. Bank examinations should take place at least
every 2 years.
d. The functions and powers of special banks should be defined and
limited by law, and these banks should not be allowed to engage in ordinary
banking. The need for the existence of the special banks should be reviewed,
in order to determine whether certain of these banks might not revert
to the status of ordinary banks.
e. All vestiges of private ownership of the Bank of Japan should be
eliminated. The Board of Directors should be made representative of
finance, trade, industry, agriculture, and of large, medium, and smaller size
business.
/. Competition among banks for customers should be restored through
such measures as the aboiit'on of the designated bank system and of the
financial control associations.
(7. Employees performing responsible functions in the Ministry of Fi-
nance and government banks should be forbidden to hold the securities of
any financial institution, and should be ineligible for employment by private
financial institutions for 2 years after they leave government employment.
13. (Jovernment support of industrial monopolies. — Laws and practices
through whicli the Japanese Government has favored the growth of private
monopolies should be terminated; although that Government should not be
deprived of its power to regulate the Japanese economy in the public interest.
To this end :
a. Laws and ordinances establishing existing control associations or
special companies should be generally repealed and the associations or special
companies abolished. The future assumption, by nongovernmental agencies,
of powers formerly exercised under these laws, should be prohibited. The
future assumption, by governmental agencies, of such of these powers as
have no major use other than to support monopolistic bodies and practices
2232 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
should also be prohibited. Necessary governmental functions formerly-
performed by control associations or special companies should be trans-
ferred to appropriate governmental agencies, which agencies should be-
created where they do not now exist. In cases where SCAP is satisfied that
current conditions pi'event the government from effectively performing these-
functions, and is further satisfied tliat effective performance of these func-
tions is necessary for public purposes, he may allow temporary delegation.
of these functions by the government to the old control associations or
special companies or to similar new quasi private bodies, provided that final,
decisions are made by the government and the rights of appeal to the govern-
ment against abuse of powers are provided. All quasi private bodies ex-
ercising such delegated functions should be liquidated as soon as their
functions can be transferred to appropriate government agencies, or at such
sooner time as SCAP may find the exercise of their functions to be no longer
necessary, (For example, where these functions relate to allocation, or
price and trade control for reconversion purposes, their performance could
be terminated upon the expiration of the reconversion period.)
&. All legislation which forbids, or requires governmental approval of,,
the entry of any new business into an industry, or the expansion of any
business, should be terminated, except insofar as :
(1) The right to effect such a restriction is implicit in the antitrust
legislation suggested below.
(2) The right to effect such a restriction is necessary in order to
comply with SCAP directives dealing with industrial disarmament
and other subjects.
(3) Nondiscriminatory restrictions for generally accepted public
purposes, such as protecting the public against fraud, and protecting
the public health, are concerned.
(4) Fields of business activity reserved to the national or local
governments are concerned. In this connection, prewar laws which
set up clear-cut government monopolies should be left undisturbed ; but, .
to prevent the use of this type of law to evade other portions of the
anti-Zaibatsu program, the creation of new government monopolies
during the period of the occupation should be permitted only in cases-
where they are in the public interest or where their creation is in
accordance with the policy for sale of divested holdings to the national
and local governments described in paragraph 7a above. The petro-
leum and alcohol monopolies, which were instituted for war purposes,
should be terminated as soon as possible.
c. All laws and practices under which the government has favored
specific private or quasi private enterprises, to the deteriment of poten-
tially or actually competitive enterprises, should be systematically re-
viewed, and sucii of these laws and practices as do not have a de-
monstrable public purpose should be terminated. Insofar as any subsidies
are allowed to continue, or are granted in the future they should be con-
trolled by the legislative branch of the government, and provision should
be made that hereafter their amount, purpose, and effect be disclosed in
public reports.
Principles such as those set forth in the preceding subparagraphs should be
made effective, not only by changes in substantive law, but also by provisions
giving aggrieved persons the right to attack in the courts any discriminatory
subsidy, preference, or other practice.
14. Antitrust law. — A Japanese antitrust law should be enacted, prohibiting,
among other things :
a. Concerted business activity which burdens trade, including, but not by
way of limitation to, such activities as fixing of prices, restriction of sales or
output, and allocation of markets, commodities, or customers.
&. Individual or concerted activity which has the purpose or effect of
coercing business enterprises to conform to business policies, or participation
in programs carried on by the coercing concern or group which are designed
to drive selected enterprises out of any line of business, through means which
include but are not limited to intimidation of a rival's customers or sale to
a rival at discriminatory prices.
c. The creation of excessive concentrations of economic powtrs, as such
concentrations are defined in paragraph 2; (where considerations of struc-
tural or technological unity require the creation of large concentrations,.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2233
government ownership or strict regulation of these concentrations should be
provided for).
d. Types of industrial growth and of intercorporate connection which are
particularly likely to lead to monopoly or to excessive size, including mergers
(i. e., acquisition of any substantial portion of the capital assets) of going
concerns of other than negligible size which are in competition with one
another, or mergers of noncompeting concerns wliicli might lead to the cre-
ation of large scale enterprises capable of developing into an excessive
concentration of economic power, where such mergers are not explicitly
found to be required in the public interest.
e. Types of intercorporate relations (e. g., those described in paragraph
4 d) which restrain competition.
This antitrust law should be enforced by a specialized agency operating at a
high governmental level and exercising broad investigatory and remedial powers.
Consideration should be given to including in this agency representatives of the
groups most likely to be aggrieved by excessive corporate growth ; in any event,,
special care should be taken not to allow representatives of large scale business,.
or of political groups sympathetic to large-scale business, to be named to this
agency.
Exemption from the provisions of this law should be provided for the joint
activities of cooperatives, where such activities are not coercive or monopolistic,.
and where they are conducted according to the democratic principles char-
acteristic of genuine cooperatives. Similar exemption should be provided for
labor activities other than those involving the restriction of commercial com-
petition, and for natural monopolies and public utilities insofar as they are
owned or closely regulated by the government.
15. Patent law. — The provisions and the manner of enforcing Japanese patent
law should be revised to ensure that patents in Japan cannot be used to support
the establishment or perpetuation of concentrations of economic power.
16. Corporate Law. — The following changes in Japanese corporate law should
be effected :
a. Disclosure of relevant facts in selling corporate securities should be
required, and the fraudulent practices in connection with such sales should
be prohibited.
6. Before any call to a meeting of the stockholders of a corporation, the
management of the corporation shall make full disclosure of all the facts
necessary for the stockholders to appraise intelligently the proposals to be
placed before the meeting.
c. Misleading practices in corporate accounting should be forbidden, and
minimum standards of disclosure in such accounting should he required.
d. Interlocking officerships should be prohibited, and officers of one con-
cern should be prohibited from serving as directors of another. Interlocking
directorates should be prohibited in the case of competing concerns and in
the case of concerns which rent, sell, or buy goods or services to or from
each other in significant amoimts. In the case of other concerns, interlock-
ing directorates should be allowed to the point where no more than one-
fourth of the members of any Board of Directors are at the same \time
directors of other corporations. No one person should, however, be allowed
to serve on the Board of Directors of more than three corporations. Nothing
in this paragraph should be taken as in any way modifying the provisions
of paragraph 11 c. Officers and directors should be prevented from having
holdings of shares in competing or supplying concerns, and should be pre-
vented from having holdings of shares in any other enterprises representing
more than 5 percent of their liquid assets or more than 5 percent of such
other enterprises' outstanding shares. Officers, directors, and persons hav-
ing a beneficial interest in or control of any equity issue of a corporation in
excess of 1 percent of the total issue should be required to report their
holdings and transactions in all issues of the corporations, and such reports
should be publicized. Profits of corporate insiders derived from short-term
transactions in the corporation's securities should be subject to recapture
by the corporation.
e. An ultra vires action by a corporation should be grounds for remedial
action by a stockholder or punitive action by a public agency. Moreover,
a corporation should be specifically prohibited from entering partnerships,
either directly or indirectly, or in other respects avoiding the limitations on
intercorporate relationships.
22848— 52— pt. T 16
2234 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
/. It should be required that all shares having par value should be fully
paid, and that equal voting rights attach to all shares of the same issue. The
use of no par-value shares should be permitted ; such shares to be offered
for sale at any time at a value to be decided by the company's board of
directors. All corporations should be required to adopt the principle of
preemptive rights in offering nevp shares.
g. Every effort should be made to assure the independence of Japanese
auditors, who should be prevented from having direct or indirect aflSliations
with management and from having conflicting interests in other concerns.
/(. With stated exemptions for banks, investment trusts, insurance com-
panies, and possibly other types of financial institutions, the Japanese com-
pany law should be amended to forbid one corporation from holding the
stock of another. The use of 100 percent owned subsidiaries should be per-
mitted, however (subject to the restrictions on mergers outlined under
paragraph 14 d).
i. Stockholders should not be undiily hampered in bringing suits against
management for money damages or for equitable remedies.
17. Tax and inheritance laws. — In connection with current and impending re-
visions of Japanese tax law, every effort should be made to favor the wide dis-
tribution of income and ownership envisaged in this paper, through the following
means :
a. Income and inheritance taxes should be very much more steeply grad-
uated than they are at present.
&. Property inherited by the head of a house should be subject to the tax
rates applicable to other heirs.
c. Diffusion of inherited wealth should be assured by by provision for rea-
sonably equal distribution among heirs, insofar as estates aggregating con-
siderable wealth are concerned.
d. Members of a house should be prevented from deriving significant tax
advantages from the insolvent status of other members of the house.
e. The present discretionary power of the Minister of Finance in tax
matters should he greatly reduced. Tax rates should be fixed by the Diet.
18. Policy concerning preferred purchasers. — Measures specified below should
be taken in order to strengthen and democratize preferred categories of pur-
chasers of divested holdings :
a. In order to qualify Japanese cooperatives for purchase preference in
connection with divested holdings, such cooperatives should be freed from
governmental influence and should be relieved of public functions. They
shfmld be subject to government supervision, only insofar as srch super-
vision is necessary to prevent fraud and to ensure compliance with the pro-
visions of this paragraph. Membership in these cooperatives should be
voluntary, and requirements for membership therein should be nondiscrim-
inatory. (In this connection, the minimum contribution or entrance fee
should be reduced to the point where it will form no obstacle to the mem-
bership of low income persons.) All participating members should have
equal votes and officers should be selected by majority vote. The proceeds
should be divided equally among members or in proportion to the relative
volume of business, without allowance, beyond a low fixed dividend, for
contribution of capital. In addition to being converted into genuinely dem-
ocratic instruments through these and other changes, cooperatives should
be freed from all legal restrictions which prevent them from engaging in
various kinds of activities. Specifically, consumers' cooperative societies
should be recognized and afforded the same tyr/e of privilege as other coop-
erative societies. The minimum number of members qualifying for reg-
istration under the Cooperative Societies Law should be raised from the
present figure of seven to levels which will vary for different types of so-
cieties but which should be sufficiently high in each case to prevent domina-
tion by minorities. Genuine cooperative societies should receive such pub-
lic financial technical aid as may be necessary to their expansion.
6. Where the possibility exists that trade unions might purchase Zaibatsu
holdings, all possible technical and financial assistance should be furnished
the trade unions concerned, provided that these unions are genuine labor
organizations, and are not acting as cloaks for former owners. As a means
of providing for trade union ownership of divested holdings, consideration
should be given to assigning ownership of divested holdings to cooperative
societies organized especially for this purpose, with a membership parallel
to that of trade unions.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2235
c. Small entrepreneurs desiring to purchase divested holdings should
be given all possible public assistance so tliat they may compete on more
advantageous terms with large scale business. The Japanese Ministry of
Commerce should establish a bureau specifically devoted to aiding such
small business. This bureau should give special support to the performance
of joint activities of an unrestrictive character by such mutual-aid organiza-
tions of small entrepreneurs as manufactures' guilds and export guilds.
Precautions should be taken, however, against domination of these guilds by
the government or by the larger fii'ms; nor should they be permitted to
engage in such of their former activities as were in restraint of trade.
19. ■ Public support. — "Vigorous efforts should be made by SCAP to create
Japanese public understanding of, and support for, the anti-Zaibatsu program
through such means as :
a. Provision for access to recent literature in English about the problems
of industrial organization.
h. Publication of SCAP's factual findings about the Zaibatsu.
c. Encouragement of the organization of a Japanese commission of inquiry,
representative of a wide range of interests and opinicms, to investigate the
facts about the Zaibatsu and make public its recommendations.
d. Attention to the problems of industrial organization, and the dangers
of monopoly and excessive concentration of economic power in the revision
of the Japanese educational system.
e. Provision for contact between the Japanese antitrust agency and similar
bodies in other countries.
A special attempt should he made to furnish relevant data to and to secure the
support of, those groups whose economic interests are most actutely promoted
by the dissolution of the Zaibatsu ; consumers, small and medium-size business-
men, trade unions, and cooperatives.
20. Japanese Government.- — xVn attempt should be made to deprive the Japa-
nese Government of its former pro-Zaibatsu character, and to prevent renewed
alliances between the bureaucracy and business interests :
a. SCAP should make every effort to see that new public agencies estab-
lished in order to carry out the anti-Zaibatsu program envisaged in this
paper are staffed with individuals not previously associated with or sym-
pathetic to large scale business or its political spokesmen. Economist and
other intellectuals or technical experts hitherto debarred from government
work because of their anti-imperialist or anti-Zaibatsu views would be de-
sirable recruits.
h. In view, however, of the limited availability of such persons, and of
the uncertain political complexion of the present Japanese bureaucracy,
SCAP should reduce the discretionary policy-making authority of that
bureaucracy insofar as the more important issues related to this program
are concerned. In economic matters at least, the Japanese bureaucracy
should not be left in a position to usui'p the functions of the legislative
branch of the government.
c. Existing government officials performing responsible functions relating
to the control or regulation of private industrial, commercial, or financial
enterprises should be discharged where, because of their past employment
in Zaibatsu concerns or other previous private or public actions, they are
believed sympathetic to Zaibatsu interests.
d. Government officials performing responsible functions relating to the
control or regulation of private commercial, industrial, or financial enter-^
prises should be prohibited from holding the securities of any one such pri-
vate enterprise in an amount which would represent more than 5 percent
of the official's total wealth, or more than 1 percent of the enterpriser's
capital value. Reports of all security holdings by such government officials
should be made public. Such officials should also be prohibited within a
period of 2 years after their leaving of government employ, from accepting
private positions which involve their representing, directly or indirectly,
private enterprises before the government bureaus with which they were
formerly associated, or from holding positions in any private enterprise
which is the object of legal action as a result of its alleged violation of any
of the measures specified in this paper.
e. Special procedures should be set up to make public the names of govern-
ment officials holding responsible positions relating to the control or regu-
lation of private, commercial, industrial, or financial enterprises, so that
anti-Zaibatsu groups and persons may scrutinize their past records and pro-
test publicly against appointments which they consider unsuitable.
2236 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
/. The principle of private redress for injury suffered as a result of gov-
ernmental action should be recognized in Japanese law.
21. United Nations and neutral interests. — In the application of measures
specified in this paper, SCAP should protect the interests of nationals of mem-
bers of the United Nations in Japan, insofar as this can be accomplished with-
out limiting the effectiveness of these measures. In general, his objective should
be to provide adequate, prompt and effective indemnification for property taken
from such interests to the extent feasible. He should also keep full records of
any change in the status of such interests which may result from the application
of these measures.
22. Nonprofit corporations. — An exception should be made to the provisions of
this paper affecting interlocking officerships and dii-ectorates insofar as these
provisions concern nonprofit corporations which are devoted to public, charitable
and cultural purposes and which do not hold securities of other corporations.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that, as far as you know, this is the
first time this has been made public ?
Mr. Vincent. So far as I know. I have never seen it outside of the
State Department, and it has been years since I ever saw it. I am not
familiar with it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a
rally
Mr. Vincent. Excuse me. The testimony here when asked if I had
knowledge of MacArthur receiving FEC 230 in any form
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did I ask you that ?
Mr. Vincent. I thought you did; the channels through which it
went.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I mentioned MacArthur ? I would be glad to have
your testimony on that point.
Mr. Vincent. My purpose is here to show a letter which he wrote
to Senator McMahon on the 1st of February 1948, in which he states
that he had received FEC 230. This is a photostat of a letter from
Douglas MacArthur to Senator McMahon.
Mr. Sourwine. It is a photostat of a printed copy of that letter, isn't
it ? Where was that copy printed ?
Mr. Surrey. It is printed in the Political Reorientation of Japan,
September 1945 to September 1948, Report of Government Section,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, at page 783 of the docu-
ment appendix F.
Mr. Sourwine. Thank you.
Do you adopt that testimony?
Mr. Vincent. I adopt the testimony.
Mr. Sourwine. I have no objection to counsel stating the fact, but
counsel hasn't been sworn. Where did you get this photostat ?
Mr. Vincent. In the State Department.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you order it made, or did someone make it and
bring it to you ?
Mr. Vincent. The regular photostat work there; yes. I ordered
having it made, from the regular people who make photostats.
Senator Ferguson. Have you had aid in the State Department in
preparing your case here ?
Mr. Vincent. I have had aid in collecting documents.
Senator Ferguson. You have had a private counsel as well as
counsel in the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you see him between sessions ?
Mr. Vincent. I go back and see the people in the State Depart-
ment ; not regularly.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2237
Senator Ferguson. Have they a copy of the transcript?
INIr. Vincent. That comes out from day to day? Yes, the State
Department has gotten a copy of it.
Senator Ferguson. And do you discuss with them the transcript?
Mr. Vincent. I haven't even seen this transcript, myself.
Senator Ferguson. That wasn't my question.
Mr. Vincent. I have not discussed the transcript with them.
Senator Ferguson. When is the last you have been in the State
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten. I didn't go yesterday. The day
before yesterday, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see the State Department's counsel?
Mr. Vincent. I saw people in the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. The counsel ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I wouldn't say the counsel. People in the
Legal Advisers' Oflice.
Mr. SouR^VINE. I would like to ask that this document that Mr.
Vincent has just handed over and identified be placed in the record
at this point. I have not seen it, but in justice to the witness, it should
go in the record.
Senator Ferguson. I will receive it in the record right now.
(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 393" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 393
Lettee Feom General MacArthur to Senator Brien MoMahon February 1, 1948
Reproduced in "Political Orientation of Japan" [report of Government section,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, September 1945-September 1948]
Appendix F: 43
LETTER TO SENATOR BRIEN M'MAHON DEFENDING ECONOMY POLICY
Tokyo, Japan,
1 February 1948.
Dear Senator McMahon : I have your letter of January 22nd and the pages
from the Congressional Record subsequently received under separate cover, for
vphich I thank you.
The discussion of Senator Knowland covers a policy paper of the United
States formulated by the State, War, and Navy Departments and referred to the
Far Eastern Commission for consideration by the other ten governments repre-
sented on that body and to the supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for
guidance. As the sources of origin, authorship and authority are all in Washing-
ton and my responsibility limited to the executive implementation of basic
decisions formulated there, I am hardly in a position ten thousand miles away
to participate in the debate.
For your information, however, I did publicly state my views with respect to
the underlying purpose of the policy paper known as FEC 230 on New Year's Day
last and subsequently on January 6th, 1948 at San Francisco the Secretary of
the Army in an address before the Commwealth Club, with marked clarity sum-
med up the situation as it presently exists. It is somewhat difficult to under-
stand why these published views did not figure in the discussion of the subject
matter upon the floor of the Senate, and against the possibility that the texts of
such statements did not come to your attention I am inclosing herewith copies
thereof which I should be only too glad to have inserted in the Record as you
have suggested.
In any evaluation of the economic potential here in Japan it must be under-
stood that the tearing down of the traditional pyramid of economic power which
has given only a few Japanese families direct or indirect control over all com-
merce and industry, all raw materials, all transportation, internal and external,
and all coal and other pow*^r resources, is the first essential step to the estab-
2238 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
lishment here of an econoruic system based upon free private competitive enter-
prise which Japan has never before known. Even more it is indispensable to
the growtli of democratic irovernment and life, as the abnorujal economic system
heretofore in existence can only thrive if the people are held in poverty and
slavery.
The Japanese people, you may be sure, fully understand the nature of the
forces which have so ruthlessly exploited them in the past. They understand
that this economic concentration not only furnished the sinews for mounting
the violence of war but that its leaders, in partnersip with the military, shaped
the national will in the direction of war and conquest. And they understand no
less fully that the material wealth comprising this vast concentration at war's
start increased as war progressed, at the forfeiture of millions of Japanese lives,
as resources of Japan theretofore only indirectly controlled came under direct
control and ownership. Those things are so well understood by the Japanese
people that apart from our desire to reshape Japanese life toward a capitalistic
economy, if this concentration of economic power is not torn down and I'edis-
tributed peacefully and in due order under the Occupation, there is no slightest
doubt that its cleansing will eventually occur through a blood bath of revolu-
tionary violence. For the Japanese people have tasted freedom under the
American concept and they will not willingly retui*n to the shackles of an au-
thoritarian government and economy or resubmit otherwise to their discredited
masters.
With expressions of cordiality.
Faithfully yours,
Douglas MacArthur.
Mr. Rea, That letter makes reference to-
Mr. SouEwiNE. Are you going to testify ?
Mr. Rea. No, sir. I was just calling attention to the fact that that
letter makes reference to a longer letter expanding on the views of
the shorter one, of which you already have a copy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it your opinion that that also should be in the
record at this point ?
Mr. Rea. I was going to suggest that.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Have you identified yourself for the reporter ?
Mr. Rea. My name is Howard Rea.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And you are associated with Mr. Surrey ?
Mr. Rea. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I would like to adopt that as my testimony.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What you are offering is this entire three-page
photostat? It comes from the same source; is that right, Mr. Rea?
Mr. Rea. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. May we proceed, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, proceed.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a meet-
ing of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on Janu-
ary 24, 1946?
Mr. Vincent. No; I do not recollect that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Don't you remember being asked to speak on behalf
of the Department or to designate a speaker to discuss State Depart-
ment policy toward Japan at that rally ?
Mr. Vincent. No, Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it. I didn't speak
before it, and I have no recollection of being asked to send somebody
to speak before it.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you recall a Mr. Hugh Borton ?
Mr. Vincent. I do.
Mr. Sourwine. Identify him.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2239
Mr. Vincent. He was an officer in the Far Eastern Office while
I was Director.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know that Mr. Borton did speak at the
rally of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on Janu-
ary 24, 1946?
Mr. Vincent. I have just testified that I have no recollection of
his speaking before it. It is not a matter that is in my memory.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say whether you suggested to Mr. Borton
that he make this speech?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think it is possible that you did.
Mr. Vincent. I think it is possible I did. It certainly is quite pos-
sible that I had a discussion with him, because he was in my office.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say whether you referred to Mr. Borton a
request which had come to your desk for a speaker to represent the
Department at that rally?
Mr. Vincent. I can't say that I have any recollection of it, but I
am perfectly sure that if oue came, I probably would have referred it
to one or the other of the people in my office handling Japanese
American affairs.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you at that time know that the Japanese- Amer-
ican Committee for Democracy was a Communist-front organization?
Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember that the Department was at the
time sending a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall tlint.
Mr. SouRWiNE. AVasn't there an investigation of Mr. Borton as a
result of his having made that speech ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. When was that speech made?
In 1946?
Mr. SouRWiNE. January 24, 1946.
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know that Andrew Roth was going to be
on the program of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy
on January 24, 1946?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir.
]\Ir. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether the State Department cleared
the speech which Mr. Borton gave on that occasion ?
Mr. Vincent. I simply don't recall the speech or the incident, so
I don't know whether it was cleared or not, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Then you did not clear the speech before he gave
it, did you?
Mr. Vincent. I do not recall clearing the speech before he gave it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you see it?
Mr. Vincent. I simply don't know, Mr. Sourwine. I just don't
recall that whole incident.
Senator Ferguson. You cannot recall ever having heard of it?
Mr. Vincent. I can't recall, sir, having anything to do with that.
As I sav, Borton was in my office, and if you can refresh my memory,
I would be perfectly happy to.
2240 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter written
by Mr. Hugh Borton to Mr. Victor Lasky of the New York World
Telegram, under date of September 14, on the letterhead of Columbia
University in the city of New York, dated September 14, 1950.
In answer to your inquiry of September 13, I am glad to have this opportunity
of explaining the circumstances of my appearance at a rally of the Japanese-
American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946. An invitation had
been received in the Department some weeks earlier for a speaker at the meeting
to speak on our policy toward Japan. My immediate superior in the Department,
Mr. John Carter Vincent, was unable to go and referred the matter to me, sug-
gesting that I make the speech. None of us in the Department were aware at
that time that the committee was described as a Communist-front organization.
It was with considerable embarrassment that upon arrival in New York upon
the evening of the 24th I found that the Department was being accused of send-
ing a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization. So far as I can
remember, we were not aware in the Depai'tment that Mr. Roth was to be on
the program. The speech which I gave on Japanese policy was cleared by the
Department prior to my giving it in New York.
After my return to Washington, the Department was naturally upset over the
matter, but it was too late to rectify the situation. As a result of the newspaper
articles on the matter, it was read into the Congressional Record. The Depart-
ment felt, therefore, that a further investigation of me was necessary. I was
reinvestigated by the Department's security officers. I was not aware of this
until after the investigation was over, as the Department did not take any action
in reference to my position, becau.se of the incident.
Hoping that this answers your questions and if not, you will communicate
with me further, I am,
Sincerely yours,
Hugh Borton.
Does that refresh your recollection in any way ?
Mr. Vincent. I am afraid it doesn't. That incident is completely
out of my mind. It does to the extent that such an incident must
have arisen. But Borton's letter
Senator Ferguson. January 24, 1946, you were there?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I was Director of the Far Eastern Office.
Senator Ferguson. That brings np the same question I asked you
this morning, about your Security Branch, whether or not there were
any questions raised about Communist fronts or espionage or es-
pionage agents, around the Department.
Mr. Vincent. Well, as I say, I had no knowledge that this was a
Communist-front organization or that there was an investigation go-
ing on of Mr. Borton.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This was at the very least a teapot tempest at the
time, wasn't it?
Mr. Vincent. As I say, I should have remembered it.
Senator Ferguson. Do yoit know whether anyone else in the State
Department contributed to Mr. Service's defense fund ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall anybody else. I have mentioned
Mr. Gauss, but he was outside the State Department at that time,
Ambassador Gauss.
As to the others, I don't recall who may have contributed.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that there was a solicitation in
the Department ?
Mr. Vincent. In the Department?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I recall there was something in the Foreign Service
Journal about sending money to Jack Service.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, even the Foreign Service Journal
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2241
Mr. Vincent. Somebody wrote a letter in it.
Senator Ferguson. Suggesting contributions from people in the
State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Foreign Service officers.
Senator Ferguson. And at that time there was an investigation of
Mr. Service in relation to removing papers?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And Mr. Service now has been removed from
his service in the Department; and I think, while the document will
speak for itself, it shows that it was on account of giving unauthorized
papers out in the Amerasia case.
Mr. Vincent. I have told you that I have not read it, have not read
the statement.
Senator Ferguson. I see. You do not know why he was removed,
then ?
Mr. Vincent. I think he was removed for just the reasons you do.
Senator Ferquson. For giving these papers ; is that not right ?
Mr. Vincent. The ruling of the Loyalty Eeview Board that there
was a reasonable doubt. And they based that as I understand it, on the
Amerasia case.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that there was also a solicita-
tion of funds in the State Department when Mr. Hiss was accused?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson. And that certain donations were made by people
in the State Department and other branches of the executive branch
of tthe Government ?
Mr. Vincent. I was never solicited. I was in Switzerland. But I
did not know there was any solicitation.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know that?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson. Was your security branch very active, to your
knowledge ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say it was active. I had no knowledge of
its activities. It operated as a distinct branch in the State Depart-
ment and carried on its activities without my knowledge, which I
think would be the appropriate way for them to do it.
Senator Ferguson. Had it ever struck your mind while you were
in the Department that there may be Communist agents at least try-
ing to get things out of the Department ?
Mr. Vincent. When you ask whether it ever struck my mind,
yes. It is a reasonable question to ask. But I don't recall, myself,
being conscious of the fact that there were or that there was a need
for it. That was the Security Division's job.
Senator Ferguson. That was the Security Division's job. Well,
they didn't have a man in your office ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson. And it now turns out that Mr. Koth, who was
connected with the Amerasia case, was coming into your Department
to see Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Vincent. That's right.
Senator Ferguson. But it never struck you that you would give it
any care, about agents being around trying to get information?
Mr. Vincent. I had no reason at that time to suspect Koth.
2242 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. To even think about the matter. That is what
I am getting at.
Mr, Vincent. No, sir ; I did not think in terms of that.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other cases where they
raised money in the State Department or put it in the Foreign Service
Journal, to contribute to some one that was accused of a very serious
matter like the removing of papers or information from the State
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. No, Senator, I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anything in the Journal about the
Alger Hiss case?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Your testimony is that you recall nothing about any
investigation of Mr. Borton in connection with attending this rally?
Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that, sir. Until it was brought to my
attention. I do now say that the instance is one that I was certainly
•conscious of at that time. You asked me now whether I could recall it,
I did not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You can recall now that there was some measure of
iuror in the Department about this matter ?
Mr. Vincent. I can, yes.
Mr. SouRAViNE. On the question of the newspaper report of it, Mr.
Chairman, I have an article which appeared in the New York World-
Telegram of the 23d of January 1946, headed "State Department send-
ing speaker to pink rally."
I ask that that be inserted in the record at this point.
Senator Ferguson. It may be inserted.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 394," and is as
follows :)
[New York World-Telegram, January 23, 1946, p. 1]
State Department Sending Speaker to Pink Rally
(By Frederick Woltman, World-Telegram Staff Writer)
Possibly its right hand isn't aware of what its left hand is doing. Or maybe
the State Department just thrives on punishment.
At any rate, the State Department is sending an official representative, Dr.
Hugh Borton, to address a "Rally for a Democratic Japan" in Manhattan Center
tomori'ow night, where its policies are sure to be lambasted.
A cospeaker with him on the platform will be Andrew Roth, former lieutenant
in Navy intelligence now awaiting trial in Washington on a Federal indictment
•charging him with conspiracy to take confidential Government military records.
Mr. Roth was relieved of active duty last year following an FBI investigation
instigated by the State Department itself.
The rally is being staged by the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy,
"which lately has been active in promoting the Japanese Communist movement,
demanding the immediate recall of all American troops in China and assailing
what it terms our undemocratic foreign policies in Asia.
The committee, which was started 3 years ago by loyal Japanese-Americans,
has become heavily larded with Communist influence. Its advisers include such
well-known Communists or fellow-travelers as Lewis Merrill, president of the CIO
United Office and Professional Workers, Michael Obermeir, Katherine Terrill,
Abner Green, and Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.
Its announcements list Dr. Borton, former teacher of .Japanese at Columbia
University, as representing the United States State Department.
In addition to live speakers, including Dr. Borton and Mr. Roth, there will be an
added feature, a dramatized narration by Canada Lee, the actor. Mr. Lee's latest
appearance was January 15, when he was given star billing in a Madison Square
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2243
•Garden Lenin memorial meeting run by the New York State Committee of the
Communist party.
The main spealier will be Representative John M. Coffee, Democrat, of Wash-
ington, who, with one or two exceptions, has managed to get his name on a
greater number of Communist fronts than any Member of Congress.
Last summer he joined three other Representatives with the avowed aim of
putting pressure on the State Department for a more pro-Soviet stand. This time,
according to the JACD's announcement, Representative Coffee will take up the
problems of the Indonesians, the Annamese, the people of India, Japan and China.
REGULAR TICKET OUTLET
To distribute tickets for the rally, the committee has chosen the regular book-
shops which the Communists always use as outlets for their literature and ticket
agencies for their affairs. These are the Worker's Bookshop at the party's head-
quarters, 50 East Thirteenth Sti'eet, the Jefferson Book Store of the party's
Jefferson School, the Forty-fourth Street Book Fair and the Guild Book Center.
In its bimonthly News Letter, the JACD is strongly anti-Chiang Kai-shek and
favors the Communist regime in China. Last November it protested to President
Truman against the State Department's role in China as "in ugly contradiction
between our stated policies and our actions."
Mr. SouRwiNE. I hold in my hand a copy of the pro2;ram for this
rall}^, or what purports to be a copy of the program for this rally.
I will ask Mr. Mandel : Is that a photostat of the program for the
rally in question?
Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of the announcement of the rally.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I stand corrected. A photostat of the announce-
ment for the rally. The second page says : "Program" and indicates
that Dr. Hugh Borton, of the State Department was No. 3 on the
program and the first speaker, that Andrew Roth, author of Dilemma
in Japan, was No. 5 on the program and the second speaker; the space
between them, No. 4 on the program being a soprano who was to give
two selections. On the next page, endorsers include Israel Epstein,
Michael Obermeir, and Max Yergan, among others. There is also
a statement bearing beneath it the facsimile signature of Harold L.
Ickes, saying :
There are those in Japan who are struggling to achieve a democratic type
of government in place of the military tyranny which plunged the nation into
war and led it down the path to defeat. It is deeply encouraging to me that
many Japanese-Americans are anxious to further this movement to foster the
growth of freedom in Japan. This "Rally for Democratic Japan" can be im-
portant in bringing about a better understanding between our countries, and in
encouraging Japan on her new road. I send you my greetings and my hope
that you will carry forward the ideal for which our soldiers fought and died,
a world in which all people will live in freedom and without fear.
I don't offer that for the record, but on the basis of all of this
there is no question in your mind, Mr. Vincent, that there was such
a rally?
ISIr. Vincent. Now that you refresh my memory.
Mr. Sourwine. Or that Mr. Borton spoke ?
Mr. Vincent. That Mr. Borton spoke.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any question in your mind that he was
subsequently investigated by the State Department, whether it was
a thorough investigation or just a gesture that there was an investi-
gation?
Mr. Vincent. I don't have any knowledge of that. You would
have to ask the Security Division.
Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Borton in your Division ?
Mr. Vincent. He was in the far-eastern office ; yes.
2244 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. If there had been an investigation of him at the
time, would you have known about it?
Mr. Vincent. No; I do not think I would have. Not necessarily.
The Security Division procedures were not known to me. They car-
ried out their investigations.
Senator Ferguson. Did you advise anyone in the Department at
that time that you had suggested to Mr. Borton that he make the
speech ?
Mr. Vincent. As I say, I can't recall the instance. I don't recall
whether I told anybody I advised him to make the speech.
Senator Ferguson. If there has been an investigation of this mat-
ter— and you assume here this morning that Mr. Borton was right,
that you had received the invitation, and you could not go, and you
had in effect obtained him as the speaker.
Mr. Vincent. That's right.
Senator Ferguson. Should not that investigation have included
what you knew about it, that you had the invitation ? Wliy did you
not know that this was a pink organization? And why did you ask
one of the men under you to go and make this speech? Would not
any kind of an investigation have included that?
Mr. Vincent. Senator, you will have to get security people here to
testify.
Senator Ferguson. I am not asking about security. I am asking
your opinion as a Foreign Service officer. Should not any investiga-
tion have included that much at least?
Mr. Vincent. An inquiry ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; as to what you knew about it.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; it should have.
Senator Ferguson. Because you were the man who had the invita-
tion. You were the man who handed it over to Borton.
Now, could there have been an investigation without at least doing
that much ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I can't testify on that, to say whether it should
or shouldn't. The Security Division operated on its own.
Senator Ferguson. What you are saying about the Security Divi-
sion leaves this committee, as far as I am concerned, in the position
that it certainly must conclude that Division was not functioning,
when it would not make an investigation of this matter and at least
ask you some very critical and personal questions. I cannot under-
stand it. Can you understand it ?
Mr. Vincent. I have not testified that they did not ask me. I have
no recollection of their asking me any questions.
Senator Ferguson. I cannot understand a man's memory on an
important matter like that failing him. I do not understand your
telling me that you cannot remember if they did. You would not say
they did not. You would not say they did. Now, if you were ques-
tioned about sending a speaker to a pink organization, do you not
think that you would remember it ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I do not remember it. To ask
me whether I think I would remember it or not is another question.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, in justice to the witness, I think
perhaps it should be pointed out that the only evidence we have that
there was an investigation is a statement by Mr. Borton in a letter
which is not under oath.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2245
Senator Ferguson. I am certainly trying to be fair to the witness.
Borton wrote to the paper and said there was an investigation. And
I think it is even worse for the State Department if there was not an
investigation at all. I was giving them the benefit of the doubt, that
they did conduct some kind of an examination.
If it turns out that they did not, I think it is even worse for the
State Department and the Security Branch of it.
Do you not also ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, there was an investigation, according to Mr.
Borton.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think there was, now ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no reason to doubt that there was one.
Mr. SouR"vviNE. Did you, in February 1946, attend a luncheon
given by the American Council of the IPR in honor of Mr. Owen Lat-
timore ?
Senator Ferguson. Of course, I tliink the record ought to be clear
that any investigation that the State Department has made on the
question of loyalty or communism is not available to this coimnittee.
We are helpless along that line.
Mr. Vincent. It is not available to me, either, Senator.
You asked about a luncheon ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes. Did you, in February of 1946, attend a lunch-
eon given by the American Council of IPE, in honor of Owen Lat-
timore?
Mr. Vincent, I am afraid I have to testify again that I don't recall
the luncheon. But I went to many luncheons, and I could easily have
gone to this one.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not recall such a luncheon on February 21,
1946?
]\Ir. Vincent, Mr. Sourwine, no. There were many luncheons I
don't recall, and I don't recall the occasion of this one.
]Mr. SouRwiNE. How many luncheons honoring Owen Lattimore
have you ever attended ?
Mr, Vincent, I am not talking about honoring Owen Lattimore,
I am just thinking of the luncheons one attends, and I don't recall
this.
jMr. SouRwiNE. He is your good friend, is he not? He is your long-
time friend ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. If you had attended a luncheon in his honor, do you
not think you would have remembered it ?
Mr. Vincent. Not necessarily. I don't see why I should remember
now, in 1952, a luncheon in honor of Lattimore. Whether I did or
didn't is a matter
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you ever have attended any
luncheons in honor of Owen Lattimore ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any luncheons in honor of Owen Lat-
timore, but I could easily have attended a luncheon in honor of Owen
Lattimore, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. I don't mean to be unduly repetitious, I am try-
ing to help your memory on this. Do you remember a luncheon of
that nature at which Mr. William L. Holland of the Institute of
Pacific Relations acted as chairman ?
Mr. Vincent. Of the luncheon ?
2246 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SoURWiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you remember such a Imiclieoii in the pan-
American room of the Mayflower Hotel ?
Mr. Vincent. Now you have broadened my memory ; yes. Because-
I was just in the Mayflower yesterday, and I, myself, was trying to
recall the last occasion I was thei'e, in the pan- American room.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember ever having been in the pan-
American room of the Mayflower Hotel at a luncheon honoring Owen
Lattimore ?
Mr. Vincent. When you say "honoring Owen Lattimore," I don't
recall that it was honoring Owen Lattimore, but it may have been.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember having been there in 1946 at a
luncheon given by the IPR Council ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't remember the date, but I do know that on
some occasion I was there in that Pan American room. I would be
perfectly willing to tell you, "Yes, I have been there." But I am
trying to tell you I don't recall the circumstances of the luncheon, Mr.
Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have an appointment book? Do you keep-
an appointment book?
Mr. Vincent. No; I do not keep an appointment book. When I
am working in the office, I have a pad on my desk.
Senator Ferguson, You do not keep a diary ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever kept one?
Mr. Vincent. Not for many years. I kept one when I first went
to China ; in 1924.
Mr. Sourwine. Since you do not yourself remember attending thi&
luncheon, it would be useless to ask you about any of the other offi-
cials of the Department who might have joined you at that time in
paying tribute to Owen Lattimore, is that right?
Mr. Vincent. That's right.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you, on or about February 23, write a letter
under that date, to Mr. Edward Carter, executive vice chairman of the
American Council of the IPR, advising him that you did not feel
you could accept nomination for a second term as a member of the
board of trustees of the American Council of IPR.?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I had no recollection of the
particular method by which I ceased to be a member of the IPR.
Mr. Sourwine. I show you a photostat of a letter, and I ask you
if it refreshes your recollection.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that a letter which you wrote to Mr. E. C.
Carter?
Mr. Vincent. It is.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, you have just read that letter. Did you in
that letter state that it was your belief that it would not be to the best
interests of the American Council to have on its board of trustees two
official members from the same office in the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. I did. '
Mr. Sourwine. Who was the other official member from the same
office in the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. Abbott Moffat, who was mentioned there.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2247
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, of which I
have a photostat, be phxced in tlie record at this point.
Senator Ferguson, It will be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 395" and is as
follows) :
Exhibit No. 395
Address Official Communications to the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
Department of State,
Washington, February 23, 1946,
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Executive Vice Cfiainnan, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
Inc., 1 East S^th Street, Neiv York 22, N. Y.
■ Dear Mr. Carter : I understand that my office has gotten in touch with your
IPR ottice here in regard to my nomination for the Board of Directors of the
American Council, but I shall confirm what I asked them to tell your office here,
I appreciate A^ery much the nomination for a second term but feel that, in as
much as Abbot Moffat has also been nominated and has been advised by me to
accept the nomination, I should decline the nomination. I do this because of
my belief that it would not be to the best interests of the American Council to
have on its Board of Directors two ofiicial members from the same office in the
State Department. I shall of course continue to follow with interest the worlc
of the Council.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ John Carter Vincent
John Carter Vincent.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, in that letter, state that you would, of
course, continue to follow with great interest the work of the Amer-
ican Council of the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. I think I did, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you, in fact, continue to follow that work with
great interest ?
Mr. Vincent. I would not say I followed it with great interest ; no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you on or about April 1, 1946, asked to lend
your name and support to a membership appeal by the Institute of
Pacific Relations?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall such an appeal.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in fact lend your name and support in the
spring of 1946 to a membership appeal by the American Council of
the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Vincent. Since I say I don't recall I was asking, I don't recall
lending my name to it ; no.
Mr. Sourwine. Or the Washington advisory committee of IPR?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall.
Mr. SouTiw^iNE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel
what is that a photostat of ?
Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of a document headed "Meeting
of Washington IPR advisory committee at the Lattimores' home,
March 25, 1946," from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Sourwine. Is this the second page of that photostat, of the
same document?
Mr. JVIandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I ask that these, as identified, may
go in the record at this point.
Senator Ferguson. They will be received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 396" and is as
follows : )
2248 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 396
Meeting of Washington IPR Advisory Committee at the Lattimores' home,
JMaich 25, 1946
Present: Mr. and Mrs. Robert Barnett, Edward C. Carter, Mrs. Lilian Coville,
Mrs. Shirley Jenkins, Mr. and Mrs. William Johnstone, Mr. and Mrs. >AIortiraer
S. Graves, Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Abbott Low Moffat, Catherine Porter, Mrs.
Elizabeth Ussachevsky, Mr. Pollard.
Main points discussed during the evening were :
1. A definite campaign should be developed to point up and increase the quality
of the Washington program in order to —
(a) Bring in new members to increase the Washington total to approximately
500.
It was felt that many Government workers in the Far East field would .ioin in
response to a form letter or a personal request. The letter should indicate
specifically what IPR has to offer this special group: inter alia, periodic publica-
tions and a list of books which are subject to members' discount.
Chairman of international relations committees of clubs and organizations,
and members of local college and university faculties, could also be circularized.
We should consider a form of membership for people who could pay between
$10 and $100 annually.
(6) Strive for income and a budget of from $15,000 (Johnstone) to $25,000
(Carter).
2. 1 n order to get the funds needed for a f uU-scale program in Washington, it
was suggested that —
(a) Several first-class programs be built around headliners and headline
topics, such as :
Harold Ickes (or Abe Fortas), plus a Navy official (or Senator Hart) and Sir
Carl Berendsen, to discuss Pacific Island bases. Invite, along with regular
members, a selected group of prospective Supporting Members. (A possible al-
ternative to an Ickes meeting would be to have a half dozen former Navy offi-
cers discuss the question, men who have seen service in the Pacific and are full
of ideas. Miss Cora Du Bois at ORI or Miss Clare Holt could suggest people
for this program.) John Usene and Lowell Hattery were mentioned, along
with James Roosevelt.
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, perhaps on some phase of the colonial question.
(E. C. Carter to invite by cable after Eleanor Lattimore consults John Carter
Vincent.)
Clarence-Gauss on China ; Benjamin Gerig on trusteeships ; Clarence Ropes on
the Soviet Far East.
Other speakers under («), or under (&) following, might include: on .Tapan —
Gen. Ken R. D,\ke, John Emmerson, or John Embree (May) ; on China — Michael
Lindsey or Edwin A. Locke; on Mongolia — Mr. Cammon (ask through George
Harris) ; on Thailand — Kenneth Landon or Howard Palmer (May).
(b) Invitation luncheons (pay as you come) be arranged on other occasions
if A-1 speakers and topics can be provided. Invited groups would include lead-
ing editors, writers, and radio and news commentators. Purpose : Attract new
members from this group and strengthen IPR's "good press."
(c) New iitei'ature to be prepared, usable in Washington and other IPR
centers, to help pave the way for showing membership prospects how IPR can
serve them as it served the Government and regular members during and before
the war.
3. That the whole financial and membership campaign be integrated by and
be made the responsibility of Mr. Pollard, with the immediate help of a List
Committee (Mrs. Bolton, Mr. and Mrs. Graves, Mrs. Lattimore, Mr. Moffat, Mrs.
Moorhead. Mrs. Ussachevsky) and a Program Committee (Mr. Barnett, Mr. W. D.
Carter, Mr. Johnstone, and Mrs. Lattimore).
4. That top sponsorship be provided by inviting Mr. Sumner Welles to be
chairman of the Washington membership appeal ; and that other leading foreign-
affairs personnel, in and out of the Government, be asked to lend their names
and support also.
A few such might include :
Frances P. Bolton Eugene Mf^yer
Mnrquis Childs Raymond Swing
Helen Gahagan Douglas Elbert D. Thomas
Herbert ETiston John Carter Vincent
Walter Lippmann Henry A. Wallace
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2249
Mr. SouRwiNE. Because of the desire to conclude today, instead of
laboring this point, I simply leave it as a part of the record. (Hand-
ing document to witness.)
(After pause, witness and counsel reading document.)
It seems that we gain nothing this way. We might as well read it.
Senator Ferguson. It is pretty long. Let them read it. I think
we can save time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Perhaps counsel can read it.
Now, do you remember whether you knew, or do you now know,
Mr. Arthur C. Bunce, B-u-n-c-e ?
Mr. Vincent. I testified, I think, when you asked me — you helped
my memory — that he was the economic man sent to Korea about the
1st of January, some time in 1946. I don't recall the time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember an article or dispatch transmitted
from Mr. Bunce in his capacity as economic adviser criticizing both
the military government and United States policy in Korea ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall it, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was a copy of that dispatch requested by Mr.
Philip Lilienthal?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Requested by anyone connected with IPR?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was a copy furnished pursuant to such a request?
Mr. Vincent. I cannot testify, since I don't know about the incident.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you in the habit of furnishing information
to Mr. Lilienthal?
Mr. Vincent. I was not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. To others in the IPR?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, you have already discussed Mr. Penfield, have
you not?
Mr. Vincent. James K. Penfield ; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask Mr. Mandel what this is
a photostat of.
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations of a letter dated September 3, 1946, to Mr. Philip E.
Lilientlial from Arthur C. Bunce.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, as identified,
may go into the record at this point.
Senator Ferguson. It will be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 397
Department of State,
Office of Economic Advisee,
September 3, 1946.
Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. T.
Dear Mr. Lilienthal : Your two letters of June 13 and June 22 were waiting
for me when I returned from a brief trip back to Washington. If I had visited
New Yorli, I was planned to call on you ; however, I did not have much time
because I was recruiting civilians for Military Government in Korea and also
for my staff.
When my staff arrives, I may find time to write an article for you dealing more
narrowly with economic matters. At present, I am too rushed trying to catch
up with affairs occurring in my absence. The reason that my article was not
22848— 52— pt. 7 17
2250 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
acceptable for publication was that it criticized both Military Governments and
United States policy as well as U. S. S. R. policies and programs. This was not
felt to be desirable under the hope that the Joint Commission might reconvene.
The article was sent to the Department as a despatch, however, and Mr. Vincent
or Mr. Penfield might send you a copy for your own information if you asked them.
In reply to your letter of August 20, I believe I can help you considerably.
There is a large amount of unclassified material available in the War Department
and in the State Department. This material covers the monthly reports from
Military Government, all press releases, translations of Korea press comments
and reports on public opinion trends. I am sure these could be made available
to anyone making a study of Korea.
A complete set of all unclassified materials has been sent to the Hoover Library
of War Revolution and I'eace at Stanford University, and you should contact
Dr. H. H. Fisher regarding the use of this material. The first lot was shipped
August 8 and additional shipments will follow every three months.
From your letter I was not sure whether you wanted materials available in
the United States or in England. I have spoken to Mr. Carmode, the British
Liaison OflScer, and he tells me that he has not been forwarding materials in bulk
to London. It would, therefore, appear essential for the study to be made in the
United States unless the Royal Institute asked Mr. Carmode through the Foreign
Office to supply them with a complete set of documents.
Mr. Sunages of the Public Information Division in the War Department is
coming to Korea to see what further materials can be sent back to Washington
in order that they may do a better job of informing the public about Korean
affairs. I will show him your letter and ask him to do what he can to make
materials available to you.
In addition, I am asking that the Institute be placed on the mailing list for
current materials and that any available back issues be forwarded to you.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Arthur C. Bunce
Arthur C. Bunce, Economic Adviser.
Mr. SouKwiNE. You have had a number of questions about Solomon
Adler. I don't think you have been asked this question in just
this way.
Do you now or did you ever know that he was a member of the
Silvermaster spy group ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You took over from Mr. Dooman as head of the Far
East Committee of SWNCC on the 1st of September, 1945; is that
right?
Mr. Vincent. That is the first time I acted as chairman of FE-
SWNCC;yes, sir.
Mr, Sour WINE. Who recommended your appointment to that post ?
Mr. Vincent. The Secretary of State or Mr. Acheson ; I don't recall
which.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You have testified you were called back from a
vacation to take that job.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And that Mr. Acheson was the first one to speak
to you about it ?
Mr. Vincent. About the change.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I am hurrying along here, and if I seem to give in-
adequate treatment to any of these, please stop me and expand as you
think desirable.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, in the fall of 1946, prepare or supervise
the preparation of a draft statement designed to be issued in case
General Marshall should admit failure of his efforts to stop the civil
war in China?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. It was drafted in my office.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2251
Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate he was going to fail ?
Mr. Vincent. In the fall of 1946, I did anticipate it, and others
did, too.
Senator Ferguson. How long after he had been out there did you
anticipate that he was going to fail ?
Mr. Vincent. Some time during the summer or early autumn of
1946, I was afraid it was going to be a matter of failure, although I
wouldn't want to say now that he was conscious he couldn't pull it out.
But it looked like that then.
Senator Ferguson. And he had been there how long then?
Mr. Vincent. He had been there 9 months then.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you present, or were you instrumental in pre-
senting, a draft of such a statement to Secretary Byrnes?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified that it would have been logical for
me to present that draft.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did that draft recommend withdrawal of all aid
to the Nationalist Government?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to refresh my memory. The draft is
right here.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I wish you would, and I wish you would identify
the draft, if it is to be found in the white paper, as the one you
prepared.
Mr. Vincent. It was prepared, as I say, in the Far Eastern Office,
but in consultation, as my testimony was before, with Army people,
with economic people.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We are talking now about a draft you prepared in
the fall of 1946, if there was such a draft. Where is it to be found in
the Wliite Paper?
Mr. Vincent. Well, we are talking about the paper here. I have
told you before that the thing was a matter of consultation with eco-
nomic people and covers a wide range of subjects. It is a general
review.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, the draft that is in here is not a draft which
is identifiable as something which you prepared, is it?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't recall how many stages.
Senator Ferguson. Can you identify that document in the white
paper as the one that you prepared ?
Mr. Vincent. I can identify it that this was the draft that was pre-
pared. Wlien you speak of "draft," these things go through many
drafts.
Mr. Sour WINE. Let's identify what you have in the white paper
first, and then I think we can clear it up with a few questions. What
page ? Are you talking about document 63 on page 609 ? No ; I am
in error. Which one are you talking about ?
Mr. Vincent. I am talking about the document of December 18,
1946.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Wliere does it appear ?
Mr. Vincent. It appears on page 689.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Document No. 114 in the white paper, a statement
by President Truman on United States policy toward China?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat is its date?
Mr. SouRWiNE. December 18, 1946.
Is that the one you are referring to ?
2252 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. That is the one I am referring to.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, to what extent is that the outgrowth of frui-
tion of any memorandum which you prepared in the fall of 1946, or
any draft which you prepared in the fall of 1946 ?
Mr. Vincent. I have testified several times that the draft was a
composite thing that was prepared. I don't know just what would be
the fruition of drafts that were prepared and finally approved.
Senator Ferguson. Does it refresh your memory ?
Mr. Vincent. Does this? Yes. But you are speaking here of the
draft that I prepared. What I am trying to get at is that this draft,
by its very nature
Mr. SouRWiNE. You did prepare a draft in the fall of 1946, didn't
you?
Mr. Vincent. Of this ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. No, no.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that I personally prepared a draft.
It was a composite
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you personally, in the fall of 1946, as early as
October or earlier, prepare or supervise the preparation of a draft
statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit
failure of his effort to end the civil war in China ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall preparing the draft myself, but, yes,
there was a draft prepared, in anticipation of this very thing that
came out.
Mr. Sourwine. That is what I was trying to get at. There was a
draft prepared that early ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And it was in your office ?
, Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And you helped on it?
Mr. Vincent. I have no doubt I helped on it.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, did that draft subsequently become the docu-
ment you have identified, document 114 from the white paper?
Mr. Vincent. It became, in substance, the document here in the
white paper, so far as I can recall. You are speaking of a draft
now that was prepared in anticipation of this, and this was the thing
that was prepared at the time we realized Marshall was coming home.
Mr. Sourwine. We realize that the draft prepared in your division
in October may have been thrown in the wastebasket, and this sub-
stituted. Did that happen?
Mr. Vincent. No ; not that I know of.
Mr. Sourwine. Was the draft prepared in your office in fact dis-
approved, rejected?
Senator Ferguson. Or approved?
Mr. Vincent. It may have gone through other drafts, and other
drafts.
Mr. Sourwine. Was the initial draft rejected? Or was it sent
back for correction ? Or did it go along up ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the exact process of what happened
to the drafts, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Look at that document. Is that the substance
of your draft ? So that we can move along.
Mr. Vincent. It is the result of the thinking that was done in the
Department, in the War Department, and in the Economic Division,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2253
as to what should be done. This is the result of the thinking. Wliat
form some of the earlier drafts took, I don't recall.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That was the point I was getting at. This original
draft, the first one submitted, back in October, prepared in your office
under your direction ; was that a draft which included a recommen-
dation for withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know, without seeing the document, whether
it recommended that or not, sir.
Mr. SouEwiNE. You can't say whether that was recommended?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. &0URWINE. And you can't say whether that initial draft state-
ment was in fact approved ?
Mr. Vincent. No,
Mr. SouR^VINE. Can you say whether that original draft statement
was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The whole drafting business was a matter of give and take.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have anything to do with the draft of
President Truman's letter to Chiang in August of 1946? That is on
page 652 in the White Paper, Document No. 86.
Mr. Vincent. I would certainly think that I participated in the
drafting of that letter.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you approve it ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. What was referred to in the fifth paraairaph of
that letter as the assassinations of distinguished Chinese Liberals at
Kunming recently ?
Mr. Vincent. It referred to an incident in Kunming at that time
where certain Chinese Liberals and intellectuals had been removed
and killed.
Mr. SouRwiNE. "\'\'Tio were the intellectuals and liberals who were
killed, assassinated?
Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to the files in the State De-
partment.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were any of them Communists?
Mr. Vincent. That I do not know, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know at the time whether any of them
were Communists?
Mr. Vincent. I did not know at the time whether any of them
were Communists, not that I recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This was a pretty tough letter, wasn't it ?
Mr. Vincent, Well, I don't know whether you would describe it
as tough or not. It was drafted with the idea in mind of great dis-
appointment over the failure or the apparent failure of General Mar-
shall to achieve his objectives.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Look at the sixth paragraph, where it says :
There is a increasing awareness, however, that the hopes of the people of
China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reaction-
aries who are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation by
failure to understand the liberal trend of the times.
What persons or groups were referred to there ?
Mr. Vincent, What particular militarists were referred to I don't
know. It would probably be such people as among the other groups ;
what we called the Chen Li-f u clique.
It would have been, we will say, Gen. Hoy Lee Chin,
2254 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I am just speaking from memory now of what groups we had in
mind there. They probably had figured in General Marshall's reports
back of his mission and would be the groups that he himself had
indicated to us in his telegrams he thought were interfering.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It refers to a small group of political reactionaries.
Do you know who they were ?
Mr. Vincent. I just referred to some of them as, we will say, the
Chen Li-fu gi'oup. I can't identify any others at the moment; but
it would have been groups. Because, mind you, this is all based on
General Marshall's own attitude and own thought of what was hap-
pening to his mission.
Mr. SouEwiNE. You think there would have been any possibility
that the Chinese Government construed this language as an intima-
tion that the President of the United States regarded Chiang and
his immediate surrounders as a small group of political reactionaries
obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation ?
Mr. Vincent. It could be so construed without the inclusion of
Chiang.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Was it so intended ?
Mr. Vincent. It was so intended to indicate that there were small
groups.
Senator Ferguson. Was it intended to indicate to him that Ms
government was being criticized by this sentence ?
Mr. Vincent. It was. And, as I say, based upon the disappoint-
ment of the failure of not accomplishing the objective.
Senator Ferguson. Was there a similar letter written to the head
of the Communists criticizing them for not cooperating ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not think so, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Look at the last paragraph :
It cannot be expected that American opinion will continue in its generous
attitude toward your nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that
genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal
problems. Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the
position of the United States to the people of America.
How do you interpret that statement, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Vincent. I interpret that stateitient to mean it is critical of the
failure for them to get along, that Chiang Kai-shek, at that time,
according to General Marshall's report, was himself, or his Govern-
ment, responsible for the breakdown of the truce negotiations.
The truce negotiations had broken down, and it was the general
feeling of Marshall and the rest of us that the responsibility for the
reopening of the civil war at that time was with the National Govern-
ment, more than it was with the
Mr. SouRwiNE. The President is saying there, is he not, "I hold
you and your Government respo^ sible for the failure to effect an
agreement with the Communists and if the agreement is not effected
pretty quick, I am going to tell the American people that that is the
fact."
Mr. Vincent. That was that the American people would have to
know the facts, and which finally was drawn up in the September 18
memorandum.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you know Arthur Behrstock ?
Mr. Vincent. Arthur who ?
Mr. Sourwine. Behrstock, B-e-h-r-s-t-o-c-k.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2255
Mr. Vincent. No, sir, not that I recall.
Mr. SouRWiNE. A former chief of the Planning Section, -Civil In-
formation and Education, Tokyo.
Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of knowing him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He never worked with you at any time?
Mr. Vincent. Not at any time that I know of.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember making an address at Cornell
University on or about January 21, 1947 ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is the approximate time I made it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you, in the course of that address, state that it
would be advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or influT
ence on the side of the status quo in China ?
Mr. Vincent. I made that speech from notes, and I think I have
testified that I do not recall what I said in that speech.
Mr. Sourwine. I have here a clipping of an Associated Press dis-
patch date-lined Ithaca, N. Y., January 22, and reading:
John C. Vincent, head of the State Department Far Eastern Division, declared
tonight that the United States should avoid relying on a preservation of the
status quo in China and other areas.
In an address at Cornell University, Mr. Vincent said, "We should use strength
for our security on short-term expedience. There will be times" he said, "When in
the short view it will seem advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or
influence on the side of the status quo. Such a course," he added, "might prove
short-sighted because it would fail to encourage progressive elements,"
Do you think that is a fair report of your speech at Cornell, sir,
so far as it goes?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I would say that is a fair report of the speech.
Mr. Sourwine. You think you were accurately quoted, to the
extent that you were quoted ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I think I was accurately quoted.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you, in that speech, advising against throwing
the weight of the United States and its influence on the side of the
status quo in China ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not have China particularly in mind there.
That was a generalized statement, and status quo, from my point of
view, was economic as well as political.
It had to do with the areas of southwest Asia, where the colonial
areas are, there. It was just a general philosophical approach to the*
problem that a continuation of the status quo, in the sense of not having
progress, which is very clear there, was not good for the defense of
the United States.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you include China in your thinking in that
connection?
Mr. Vincent. The idea was directed primarily on the idea of South-
east Asia. But the status quo in China would have possibly had the
same connotations there.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it clear in your own mind that you did not
intend to advocate that we should not throw our weight or influence
on the side of the status quo in China ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, it depends on what you speak of as the status
quo.
Mr. Sourwine. The status quo was Chiang, was it not?
Mr. Vincent. We recognized the Government of Chiang Kai-shek,
but we were at that time still working, or Marshall had gone there
2256 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
with the very idea of assisting the Chinese in working out a coalition
government, after adopting a constitution.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I do not mean to argue with you. I am simply
trying to find out whether you included China in your advice there,
with regard to our not supporting the status quo, or whether it was
clear in your own mind that you did not include China ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not include the National Government of China
as something that was to be overthrown, if that is your implication.
But certainly our own policy at that time was to assist the Chinese
in bringing about a more progressive situation, both in the economic
as well as in the political field, to adopt a constitution.
Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Excuse me, sir.
Mr. Vincent. Go ahead, I am through.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember making a speech before a luncheon
session of the thirty -third annual foreign trade commission on Novem-
ber 12, 1946?
Mr. Vincent. National Foreign Trade Council ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. The Annual Foreign Trade Convention, I believe.
Mr. Vincent. Well, I know the speech you have in mind. It is
the one on November 12 ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I remember making a speech.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember in that speech stating :
What is unsound for private capital is \insound for government capital. It
is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is wide-
spread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is wasting
its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war
exists, where tendencies toward government monopolization exclude American
business, or where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling,
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I am just reading it here.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes. That was at a luncheon meeting at which
Ambassador Wellington Koo was present, is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Wellington Koo, as I recall it, also spoke^
Mr. SouRwiNE. He followed you, is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. Whether he came first or I came first, I think he was
the main speaker.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you happen to have there the text of that
address ?
Mr. Vincent. I do.
Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Would you offer it for the record?
Mr. Vincent. I would.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you want that copy back ?
Mr. Vincent. Not particularly. I can get plenty more of them.
Mr. SotJRWiNE. May this go into the record ?
Senator Ferguson. It will be received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397A," and
is as follows:)
American Business With the Fae East
(Address by Mr. John Carter Vincent. Director of Far Eastern Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, before the Thirty-third Convention of the National Foreign
Trade Council, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, Tuesday, November 12,
1946, at 2 : 00 p. m.. E. S. T.)
American business with the Far East began 162 years ago. The Empress of
China, out of New York, put into Canton on August 30, 1784, after making a
tortuous six-month voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The vessel's cargo,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2257
made up of furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, was exchanged at Canton for tea, silk,
and chinaware. The total investment in the venture was $120,000. The pro-
moters cleared $30,000. This was good business ; it was private enterprise ; and
it was mutually beneficial. I hasten to say here that I do not actually know
how much the Chinese made out of the furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, but having
had some knowledge of Chinese businessmen, I still think I am safe in saying
that the benefit was mutual.
In the course of the 19th century American business with the Far East ex-
panded. Gradually our trade extended to other portions of the Far East : Japan,
Korea, the Philippines, Siam, and adjoining areas of Southeast Asia. Through-
out this period American trade with the Far East was based on sound business
considerations. We asked for no concessions or special rights ; nor were our
business dealings based upon exploitation associated with political privilege or
pressure.
During the 19th century the basic factor in our close ties with the Far East
was trade. Our early treaties with China and Japan were framed largely with
American business in mind. After the Spanish-American War and our assump-
tion of territorial responsibilities in the Pacific, notably in the Philippines, politi-
cal and strategic factors gained weight, but on into the 20th century commercial
and cultural considerations were still to the fore in shaping our policies toward
the Far East. Our enunciation of the Open Door and our insistence on non-
discriminatory and most-favored-nation treatment were motivated largely by a
desire to promote American business and expand international trade relations.
In his radio address last month Secretary Byrnes gave voice to traditional
American trade policy in the following words :
"The United States has never claimed the right to dictate to other countries
how they should manage their own trade and commerce. We have simply urged
in the interest of all peoples that no country should make trade discriminations
in its relations with other countries."
By 1936 our foreign trade or business with the Far East was valued at close to
one billion dollars. In the 20-year period from 1915-35 the Far East's share of
our total exports increased from 5 percent to 16 percent. In 1936 our total direct
investments in tlie Far East amounted to roughly $335,000,000.
In making this brief sketch, I have in mind a recent tendency toward taking an
unbalanced viewpoint of our role in the Far East. Political and military con-
siderations, as important as they are, seem to me to occupy a disproportionate
share of present public attention. It is accepted that an all-important objective
of our policies is to provide for the security of the United States and the mainte-
nance of international peace, but I think we also have another objective of
equal importance ; that is, to bring about in the relations between ourselves
and other states mutually beneficial commercial and cultural exchanges which
will promote international welfare and understanding.
These are interrelated objectives. I feel strongly that we cannot be success-
ful in achieving the kind of security we want, or in maintaining the kind of
peace we want, unless we take an active and leading part in international com-
mercial and cultural life. I will go further and say that a strong element in
our security, and in the maintenance of peace, will be the development of com-
mercial and cultural ties with other peoples.
At the same time, it is my conviction that a strong national defense is essential
to the pursuit of our broader objective of developing commercial and cultural
relations. We must be equal to the task of encouraging and supporting democ-
racy and progress. There may be times and occasions when, in the short view,
it will seem advantageous to our security to throw our weight or influence on the
side of the status quo ; on the side of those forces calculated to bring about
immediate or early stability. But history, I believe, will show that strength lies
on the side of progress.
In Chicago last April the President said :
"In the Far East, as elsewhere, we shall encourage the growth and the spread
of democracy and civil liberties. * * * The roots of democracy, however, will
not draw much nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic
distress. It is a part of our strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabili-
tation and development of the Far Eastern countries."
Today we are faced with the problem of a return of American business to the
Far East under conditions which are, to state it mildly, uninviting. Japan is
a defeated country whose economy must perforce remain under Allied control
for some time to come. Korea is a liberated country split in half at parallel 38
between us and the Russians. In China internal strife seriously retards steps
2258 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
toward economic recovery. In the independent Philippine Republic we are faced
with a new situation, to which we must adjust ourselves. In Indochina and
Indonesia a return to normal trade conditions awaits a solution of problems
presented by the self-governing aspirations of the peoples in those countries. In
Siam — well, Siamese in Washington tell me that they will be glad to do business
with any or all of you who will show an interest in their country.
But the over-all picture is not encouraging and it is not my intention to dress
it up in attractive colors. In the brief time allotted me I want to say something
of what we are doing in the various areas of the Far East to brighten the outlook.
General MacArthur has demilitarized Japan, but it is impossible to proceed
with plans for postwar Japanese economy until some decision is i-eached with
regard to the amount and types of industry that Japan vpill be allowed to retain
and the amount that is subject to removal as reparations. We have reason to
hope that a decision on the problem of reparations will be reached before the
end of this year. Our main purpose shall be to achieve a healthy balance in
Far Eastern economy for the benefit of commerce in the Far East and at the
same time to insure the effective industrial disarmament of Japan.
As you know, Japanese overseas trade is controlled on a government-to-
government basis. An Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan was recently estab-
lished by the Far Eastern Commission at the request of the United States. Its
purpose is to advise on the disposition of Japanese exports and on sources of
Imports.
Among the present obstacles to a change-over to private trading are in inflated
and unstable currency and the inadequacy of transport and communications
facilities. Although it is not possible to say how soon these obstacles can be
overcome, I might hazard the guess that a resumption of private trade with
Japan will be possible some time during the latter half of next year, possibly
sooner.
In Korea, we are now estopped from putting into operation an over-all economic
plan by the inability of the Russians and ourselves to reach agreement on a
unified administration for the coimtry. We want a united Korea and we want
to assist the Koreans toward self-government and independence. But while we
continue our efforts to bring about a resumption of discussions in the Joint
Soviet-American Commission, we cannot mark time. Therefore, we are taking
measures to improve economic conditions in southern Korea and to bring Koreans
more and more directly into the administration of their country. In doing so,
however, we do not lose sight of the fact that a united self-governing Korea
is the goal we are determined to achieve.
From what I have said it will be apparent to you why private trading in
Korea is not now feasible. But the development of a healthy trade relationship
between Korea and Allied nations is our aim, and consideration is now being
given to measures which may soon make possible limited trade relations between
Korea and private business concerns. We hope that Ajnerican business wiU
take an active interest in Korea.
Foremost among the problems facing the Philippines is reconstruction. Con-
gress has approved two measures: the Philippine Rehabilitation Act and the
Philippine Trade Act of 1946.
The Rehabilitation Act authorizes a grant of $620,000,000 for the payment
of war claims of private property holders, for various rehabilitation and train-
ing projects, and for purchase of surplus property. In addition. Congress has
authorized a loan of $75,000,000 to the Philippine Government to enable it to
meet a serious budgetary situation.
The Rehabilitation Act authorizes a grant of $620,000,000 for the payment of
war claims of private property holders, for various rehabilitation and training
projects, and for purchase of surplus property. In addition, Congress has au-
thorized a loan of $75,000,000 to the Philippine Government to enable it to meet
a serious budgetary situation.
The Philippine Trade Act provides that the Philippines shall continue to
enjoy free trade with this country for a period of 8 years, after which a grad-
uated tariff will apply until full duties are levied at the end of 20 years.
We expect to cooperate with the new Republic in meeting the manifold prob-
lems facing it as an independent state. It may be anticipated that, with a
return to more normal conditions, the Philippines will again represent a sub-
stantial and expanding market for American products.
From the standpoint of business, the areas of Southeast Asia have been of
interest to the United States primarily as a source of supply for such products
as rubber, tin, and petroleum. Because of our large purchases of these items
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2259
our prewar trade was in a chronic state of imbalance, our sales in most years
being only about one-tenth of our purchases.
You may recall a recent press statement by the Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs, Mr. Will Clayton, to the effect that the United States
should give greater support to foreign investments of its nationals in strategic
minerals that are in short supply. This statement has a special application to
the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Far East generally, as sources of supply
of a number of strategic and critical materials. Investment along the lines
proposed by Mr. Clayton should have the effect of increasing the importation of
American materials into the areas concerned.
Last but far from least we have China.
We have signed with China a comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation. Most-favored-nation treatment is provided for individuals and
corporations.
The Treaty is somewhat broader in scope than existing United States commer-
cial treaties in a number of respects. For instance. Article 19 provides for fair
and equitable treatment as regards the application of exchange controls and
Article 20 embodies certain commitments with regard to monopolies. It is de-
signed to meet the needs of present-day commercial relations with China.
China is expected to collaborate in the establishment of the proposed Interna-
tional Trade Organization and is one of the "nuclear" countries which have
agreed to negotiate for the reduction of trade barriers. China will also be urged
to enter into other multilateral economic conventions having as their objectives
a promotion of international trade and the solution of international commercial
problems through consultation and collaboration. Constant effort is being made
to discourage other countries, including China, from adopting temporary measures
in the fields of tariffs, trade barriers, and other domestic legislation of a type
which might jeopardize the successful attainment of this long-range economic
collaboration.
Restoration of stability and direction in Chinese economy is retarded by the
unhappy politico-military situation. The press, I feel, has made abundantly
clear to you the ups and downs of General Marshall's mission. The National
Assembly is scheduled to meet in Nanking today for the purpose of considering
a constitution and reaching certain political decisions in regard to government
organization. General Marshall hopes, and so do we, that wise counsels — the
wisdom of China — will prevent the disaster of continued civil discord. Chinese
economy and the Chinese people are already suffering acutely from the ravages
of 8 years of Japanese aggression and occupation. They cannot stand much
more adversity.
Premier Soong has been reported recently as stating that upwards of 80 per-
cent of China's expenditures are diverted to military purposes. Because of the
wide gap between revenues and expenditures China has had to resort to large
note issues with the inevitable result of accelerating inflation and a progressive
rise in prices. The foreign exchange that might normally be expected to accrue
from exports has been negligible in the relation to outgo for imports. Conse-
quently China's current balance of payments position has continued to
deteriorate.
The exchange and foreign trade regulations adopted by China, UNRRA's relief
and rehabilitation program, and surplus sales and enemy property disposals are
only temporary palliatives. The Chinese must resolve the present political im-
passe before any substantial improvement can be expected in China's economic
situation.
In this connection I think it worth while to mention what I feel has been in
some quarters a misinterpretation of General Marshall's mission as being solely
political in its objective. Chinese econcny is in a vicious circle. General Mar-
shall is fully aware of this state of afifaij ■ and it has been his purpose to encour-
age the Chinese to break the vicious ci cle by reaching a political settlement
that would result in a cessation of civil strife and make possible a revival of
economic activity. Sooner or later this must be done, and be done by the Chinese.
Military measures will not accomplish an enduring settlement. That is why
General Marshall has advocated with such persistency settlement by the demo-
cratic method of negotiation and agreement.
In making this brief sketch of current conditions in the Far East I cannot be
accused of optimism. But I do think the potentialities of an expanding Ameri-
can business with the Far East exist and can be developed if we go about it in
the right way. This brings me to a thought which I would like to express and
2260 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
emphasize. When I use the term "American business" I have in mind all Ameri-
can business irrespective of whether it has a private, semiofficial, or official
character. I do not believe that we can have one standard for private business
and another standard for official business.
A recent editorial in the New York Times states that our Government should
base a loan policy upon the important principle "that loans are not gifts, and that
any country applying for a loan must furnish, like any prospective private bor-
rower, convincing proof that by virtue of its political, economic, and trade poli-
cies it is a good credit risk."
Generally speaking, what is unsound for private capital is unsound for Gov-
ernment capital ; that is, for the taxpayers' money. I believe it is unsound to
invest private or public capital in countries where there is wide-spread corrup-
tion in business and official circles, where a government is wasting its substance
on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists, whei-e ten-
dencies toward government monopolization exclude American business, or where
undemocratic concepts of government are controlling.
In expressing the foregoing views, I do not of course ignore the advantages of
cooperation between government finance and private trade or the fact that there
are fields for the investment of government capital into which it is not feasible
or attractive for private capital to venture. I have in mind large-range and
long-term projects, which are basic in character and are fundamentally sound
from the standpoint of the economy of the country.
Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden stated some weeks ago in Chicago
that "the purpose of lending should be to create a net increment to the economy
of a borrowing country. Therefoi'e, he went on to say, "loans should not be
made if they enable another government to acquire or dis^ilace existing efficient
free enterprises, whether they be American in ownership or not."
In stressing the economic and trade features of our position in the Far East,
I do not wish to give the impression that I am overlooking other factors. In this
complicated world in which we are living we must give full consideration to the
interrelation of the political, cultural, economic, and security factors in our for-
eign policy. For our policy to be effective there must be harmony among all these
factors — the teamwork we find in a good basketball team or a fine string quartet.
The President, in establishing the Committee for Financing Foreign Trade,
said: "* * * j am anxious that there shall be fullest cooperation between
governmental agencies and private industry and finance. Our common aim is
return of our foreign commerce and investments to private channels as soon as
possible."
I look upon this statement as a recognition of and a challenge to American
business. I am in Washington to do my part in carrying out the cooperation of
which the President speaks. Please call on me if I can be of help to you in meet-
ing the challenge.
Mr, SouRWiNE. In discussing that speech, sir, do you recall that
the newspapers regarded that speech, and particularly the portion
which I read, as being directed at China ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; some of the newspapers so interpreted it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it so intended ?
Mr. Vincent. It was intended to be a generalized statement which
would include China as well.
Mr. SouEwiNE. You were simply stating, in general, certain truths
about policies ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. I was stating in general my attitude toward a general
situation, which was the conditions under which you wouldn't in-
vest capital.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I want to take just a few minutes to analyze that
statement that I read. You said what is unsound for private capital
is unsound for government capital; is that right? You may use
this [handing document].
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, do you not think that other factors should
enter into government expenditure or investment than the factors
which enter into private expenditure or investment ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2261
Mr. Vincent. I think there was a following statenient right after
the one you have quoted. Would you repeat your question ?
Mr. SoTjRWiNE. You said what is unsound for private capital is un-
sound for government capital ; did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, I ask you, do you not think that other factors
should enter into government expenditure or investment than the
factors which enter into private expenditure and investment?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I do. But for a political reason. I am speak-
ing 'here before a bunch of businessmen on the matter of investment
of capital. This is a business meeting I was speaking at, and to my
mind, if you will take it as a general statement, it was sound, that the
government capital should not go into unsound investment.
Mr. Sourwine. You were talking about government capital as
against private capital ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And you said what is unsound for private capital
is unsound for government capital ?
Mr. Vincent. I still think that is true, unless there are political ob-
jectives to be attained, and then I would not call it investment, I
would call it political assistance, such as the loans to Greece and
Turkey.
Mr. Sourwine. You recognize that there might be political con-
siderations that would make a difference ?
Mr. Vincent. I certainly do.
Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, dollars are frequently used as
instruments of policy or economic warfare by this country ?
Mr. Vincent. They certainly are.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think we have made investments or loans
to countries where, at the time, it was unsound policy to make invest-
ments ?
Mr. Vincent. I think we have.
Mr. Sourwine. Has it been the policy of .the State Department to
recommend against such loans or policies in all cases, as a matter of
principle ?
Mr. Vincent. Would you repeat the question?
Mr. Sourwine. Has it been the State Department practice or policy
to recommend against such loans or advances in all cases, as a matter
of principle?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall; no, sir. The State Department,
where there is a political objective to be attained — that is what the
State Department would do — such as making advances to Greece or
Turkey.
Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, would you not say now, that it
is often entirely sound for Government capital to be invested in a place
where the investment of private capital would be unsound?
Mr. Vincent. Not from a businessman's point of view, and here
Mr. Sourwine. Were you speaking up there as a businessman or as
an official of the State Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I was speaking to businessmen and trying to lay down
what I thought were certain general ideas that would guide the in-
vestment of capital on the part of the taxpayer without any political
connotations.
2262 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. You think you made that clear in the speech ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, you said it is unsound to invest the private or
public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in
business and official circles, is that correct ?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You think that was true?
Mr. Vincent. I certainly think it was true.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you want to qualify that statement now in any
way ? Do you still think it is true ?
Mr. Vincent. That it is unsound to invest
Mr. Sourwine. It is unsound to invest private or public capital
in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and
-official circles.
Mr. Vincent. I think, as a general statement, it is quite true.
Mr. Sourwine. Has the United States ever invested public capital
in loans or grants, or in any other form of assistance, in any such
country ?
Mr. Vincent. I can't recall where you would make that description
of the country.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say that, in your opinion, in all of the
countries to which the United States has provided military or economic
assistance, loans, grants, or otherwise, they were countries where there
was no corruption in business or government circles ?
Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At that time, what countries were you refer-
ring to?
Mr. Vincent. I was making a generalized statement about the
whole Far East, which would have included China, northeast Asia,
Japan.
Senator Ferguson. And any other countries ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, the Philippines are in the Far East.
Mr. Sourwine. You said it is unsound to invest private or public
capital in countries where a government is wasting its substance on
excessive armament; is that right?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. What country were you referring to in that?
Mr. Vincent. I am referring to just a general — I am making a gen-
eralized statement, and that would have applied, as you will see earlier
in this dispatch, where the Chinese were using at least 80 percent of
their entire budget in military expenditures.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you hold to that statement as true, that it is
unsound to make public or private investments in countries where a
government is wasting its substance on excessive armament?
Mr. Vincent. If you will define the word, and remember I am
speaking to businessmen as a matter of investment, and I am trying
to make clear that this was a matter of investment of capital rather
than the use of capital for political objectives ■
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you made it clear in the speech?
Mr. Vincent. Speaking to businessmen, I think they would have
accepted it, that I was speaking of investment.
Ml". Sourwine. What percentage of the total national income may a
government spend for armament for the purpose of resisting, or pre-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2263
paring to resist, Communist aggression without reaching the point of
wasting its substance on excessive armament ?
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. What percentage of its total national income does
this Government spend on armament, present and past wars, do you
know ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no figure that comes to my mind.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any idea ?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to guess what it was.
Mr. Sourwine. Is there any absolute standard with regard to what
is wasting substance on excessive armament, or does it make a dif-
ference what the armament is for ?
Mr. Vincent. It would make a considerable difference as to what
the armament was for.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you consider that factor, of what the armament
was for, in connection with this speech ?
Mr. Vincent. No. Again, I was speaking of a generalized situa-
tion; I was generalizing here. The whole objective of this was, as
I say, a speech before an American businessman, laying down certain
general principles, and I did not have in mind political objectives or
a political situation.
Senator Ferguson. What was it, just a speech to please these busi-
nessmen ?
Mr, Vincent. This speech ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I would like for you to read the whole speech.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking you, was that the purpose ?
Mr. Vincent. It was to respond to a group of American business-
men called the National Foreign Trade Council.
Senator Ferguson. Did you say it to please them ?
Mr. Vincent. Most speeches are made with the idea of pleasing,
but it was supposed to give some general ideas that I had.
Mr. Sourwine. You were speaking on policy as a State Department
official, were you not ?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't call this policy.
Mr. Sourwine. You stated that it is unsound to invest private or
public capital where the threat or fact of civil war exists; is that
right?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. SouR'sviNE. Do you think that is' a true statement ?
Mr. Vincent. I think it is a true statement, when you consider
that you are speaking of investment of capital, private or public.
I am not now speaking of whether you might want to use political
loans or other kind of loans that the Government would give.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, this Government does not have a policy of
making investments for profit in foreign nations, does it?
Mr. Vincent. Not for profit, but the Export-Import Bank, for in-
stance, makes advances to countries, which you would call investment.
Mr. Sourwine. For what purpose ?
Mr. Vincent. For the specific purpose of promoting trade or de-
velopment projects.
Mr. Sourwine. Was the Export-Import Bank in existence in 1946 ?
Mr. Vincent. It was.
2264 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. And were you referring, then, to the Export-Import
Bank when you made this statement?
Mr. Vincent. Not specifically ; no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there any other agency of the United States
Government that invested public funds in a comparable manner ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, you could not have been talk-
ing of the investment of public funds for profit in the same sense
that private funds would be invested when you used the term "invest-
ment of public funds," could you ?
Mr. Vincent. Other than, we will say, like the Export-Import Bank
would make funds available.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The investment of public funds necessarily connotes
a public purpose; does it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The two are inseparable ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is true.
Mr. SouRwiNE. So you stated that the investment of public funds is
unsound where the threat or fact of civil war exists ?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you recall any nations to which the United
States Government has extended economic or militaiy aid at a time
when the threat or fact of civil war existed in that nation ?
Mr. Vincent. Greece, for instance.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yugoslavia?
Mr. Vincent. But that was an appropriation in Congress, it was
not an investment.
Mr. Sourwine. Did the State Department recommend against that
appropriation?
Mr. Vincent. The State Department recommended for it.
Mr. Sourwine. You think it was not an investment?
Mr. Vincent. It was an investment from the standpoint of invest-
ment in policy. But it was not an investment from the standpoint of
businessmen's idea of investments.
Mr. Sourwine. But you have stated that in connection with public
funds there could not be investments from the businessmen's stand-
point ?
Mr. Vincent. No, I said that the Export-Import Bank could make
investments, not for profit.
Mr. Sourwine. But for a public purpose?
Mr. Vincent. For a public purpose, but governed by sound business
principles.
Mr. Sourwine. How about Yugoslavia?
Mr. Vincent. That is true. We recently made an investment in
Yugoslavia, as I recall it.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that unsound?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. How about Korea ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that unsound ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. You said it was unsound to invest public or private
capital where tendencies toward government monopolization excludes
American business. Is that right?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2265
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know of any country today where tenden-
cies toward Government monopolization exclude American business ?
Mr. Vincent. You have just mentioned Yugoslavia, I don't know
whether they exclude American business, but I can't imagine American
business can get into Yugoslavia.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any such tendency in Iran ?
Mr. Vincent, I am not familiar with conditions in Iran.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have we aided Iran?
Mr. Vincent. We have.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any such tendency in Egypt ?
Mr. Vincent. Of Government monopolization ?,
Mr. SouRwiNE. Where tendencies toward Government monopoliza-
tion exclude American business.
Mr. Vincent. I am not familiar with conditions in Egypt.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is there any such tendency in Great Britain ?
Mr. Vincent. Not toward Government monopolization, I shouldn't
say. Well, Government monopoly, yes, of the industries.
Mr. Sourwine. We have aided Egypt, have we not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. We have aided Great Britain ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You said it was unsound to invest public capital
where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling. Is that
still true ?
Mr. Vincent. You have just mentioned that we have invested
money in Yugoslavia, so it is not still true. I don't think you can
apply this paragraph
Mr. Sourwine, But it might be true, we still are making unsound
investments?
I am asking whether you think it is still true, or whether you
changed your mind about it ?
Mr. Vincent. Again I say that I am not speaking of political loans
in this particular paragraph, and the whole tenor of things now is
along the lines, more than it was then, of making loans.
We have had the Marshall plan — not loans but voting money. That
was not in my mind in making this speech.
Senator Ferguson, Could it be possible that you were just speaking
of China ?
Mr. Vincent, I was speaking generally about the Far East. But
the application to China is very obvious from the thing.
Senator Ferguson. And it is not true that you, in this State Depart-
ment memorandum, it was your idea since the Marshall mission had
failed in China, that there was going to be no more aid ?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And could that be the reason for making this
speech, right about that time ? Was it not that reason ?
Mr. Vincent. It was in line with that policy ; yes.
, Mr. Sourwine. You knew at the time, or right after the speech
had been made that it was widely interpreted in the press as directed
at China, did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you do anything at that time to correct that
misconception, if you thought it was a misconception ?
22848— 52— pt. 7 18
2266 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. No, I did not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You have testified at length about Israel Epstein,
have you not, and your lack of knowledge of him ?
Mr. Vincent. I haven't testified at length. I don't know Israel
Epstein, haven't read his book.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you know that he wrote a book called The Un-
finished Eevolution in China ?
Mr. Vincent. I had heard that he did, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you read the book ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you ever have the manuscript of it ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever have a copy of it ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever seeing a copy of it.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Do you know whether a copy of that book was sent
to you by someone in the IPR ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall their sending it to me, no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you do anything at all to assist in the prepara-
tion of that book; ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't have any recollection of doing any assisting
in that, not to my knowledge and belief.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you call that book to General Marshall's atten-
tion or direct it to his attention ?
Mr. Vincent. I did not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I might say now that I am asking questions based
on exhibit No. 116, page 464, par. 2, before this committee, put in the
record on August 15.
Do you know whether General Marshall ever saw or read that book ?
Mr. Vincent. I do not know that he ever saw it or read it, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see Owen Lattimore's review of the
book?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeing his review.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Did you ever recall seeing a review of the book by
Frederick Vanderbilt Field in The New Masses ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any other writing by Mr. Epstein ?
Mr. Vincent. No, I do not, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see or read an IPR publication Notes
on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein ?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, I don't remember reading it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that that study had a supplement
called "Labor in Nationalist China," by Julian R. Friedman ?
Mr. Vincent. No, I don't recall it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did not Mr. Friedman call that to your attention ?
Mr. Vincent. He may have, but I don't recall it.
Mr. Sourwine. You have testified here fully with regard to your
participation in the briefing of General Wedemeyer and his staff
before they left for the Far East in July of 1947.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You were named Envoy Extraordinary and Minis-
ter Plenipotentiary to Switzerland in July of 1947?
Mr. Vincent. That is when I took the oath of office ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who initiated your appointment as
Minister to Switzerland?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2267
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Acheson.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You became a part of the United States delegation
to the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information at
•Geneva in 1948?
Mr. Vincent. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Sourwt;ne. Did you ever know that an investigation had been
made by a State Department investigator, an investigation of the
IPR?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir.
Mr. Souhwine. I have asked you about that before, have I not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRWTENE. Would you be surprised to learn that there had been
such an investigation?
Mr. Vincent. Investigations are carried on at all times.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. In view of the fact that you had never seen it, if
there had been one and it was not sent to you, would not that surprise
you a little?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, it would, if I had any connection with it at
the time. But I don't know when the investigation you are speaking
of took place.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I have here copies of, first, a letter
addressed by the chairman of this committee to the Secretary of
State under date of January 12, 1952, as follows. To save time, let
me summarize this and then ask that both of these letters go into
the record. I also have the reply of Mr. Humelsine under date of
January 21.
Senator Ferguson. It will be received after you have summar-
ized it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The chairman asked for a report submitted to the
State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare of
the State Department, an investigation of IPR, and the State Depart-
ment reply indicates the existence of such an investigation, but says
that, "The report in question contains investigative material of a
confidential nature within the scope of the President's loyalty pro-
gram, and hence is controlled by the President's directive of March
13, 1948."
(Letters referred to were marked "Exhibits 398 and 399" and are as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 398
January 12, 1952.
The Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Secretary : I am informed that in 1948 a report on the Institute
of Pacific Relations was' submitted to the State Department as a result of the
investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Department connected
Avith its New York City office.
In view of the fact that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee now has
the Institute of Pacific Relations under study, the State Department findings
€!hould be of considerable importance. We therefore make a formal request for
a copy of this report.
Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated.
Sincerely,
Pat McCaeran, Chairman.
2268 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 399
January 21, 1952:.
The Honorable Pat McCarkan,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.
My Dear Senator McCarran : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
January 12, 1952, to the Secretary in which you requested "a report on the
Institute of Pacific Relations" which "was submitted to the State Department as
a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Depart-
ment connected with its New York City office."
The report in question contains investigative material of a confidential nature
within the scope of the President's loyalty program and hence is controlled by
the President's directive of March 13, 1948, a copy of which is attached.
In accordance with this directive, the Department must respectfully decline
your request for a copy of the report and has referred your letter to the Office of
the President.
Sincerely yours,
Oaeusle H. Humelsine.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not know about that at all, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not know about it. I was in Switzerland,
and I have no recollection of it having been brought to my attention.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were not in Switzerland in January of 1952,
at the time that this request was made ?
Mr. Vincent. No; I was speaking — you said in 1948, and I told
you I was in Switzerland in 1948.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Then I intended to ask if you knew about this re-
quest and the State Department refusal.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know why the State Department concludes
that this report contains investigative material of a confidential
nature ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. This was an investigation of the IPR, by its terms ;
would not that necessarily imply that that investigation of IPR con-
cerned Government personnel ?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to read any implication to the letter
at all. I think it speaks for itself.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you familiar with the President's directive
that they referred to there ?
Mr. Vincent. The President's directive about loyalty files?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I haven't read it recently, but I know what it is.
Mr. Sourwine. It concerns loyalty files of Government employees
and officials, does it not ?
Mr. Vincent. By its name I would think it does; but, as I say, I
can't testify to that.
Mr. Sourwine. This is in the record ; is it not ?
Mr. Morris. Yes ; that is in the record.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the State Department was
making an investigation?
Mr. Vincent. Of the IPR?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know a Mr. Clare ?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, I don't know a Mr. Clare.
Senator Ferguson. Why do you think the State Department would
investigate the IPR? Have you any reasons for knowing?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2269
Mr, Vincent. I haven't any reason for knowing why they investi-
gated the IPR.
Senator Ferguson. You were a former trustee, were you not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did they consult you about making an inves-
tigation of the IPR?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that would lead you
to believe that if the State Department did make an investigation it
should be kept secret because it would disclose questions of loyalty
as to State Department employees ?
Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that subject, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, you have discussed the notes that you
prepared for the State Department on the Wallace mission.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you in those notes, or in any memorandum to
the Department, refer to the fact that Mr. Wallace had sent a cable
to the President from Kunming?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I don't recall that that is in the notes at
all, because the notes were prepared purely on the basis of the con-
versation with Chiang.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you in any other memorandum to the Depart-
ment refer to the Kunming cable ?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge. You mean from China ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. At any time.
Mr. Vincent. Well, I would have referred to it after I got back to
the Department, in some memorandum or other, probably, using it as
a reference or background.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, then, you did write at least one memorandum
about the Wallace trip other than the notes which are printed in the
white paper?
Mr. Vincent. That is not the way you put the question, sir. I
wrote the memorandum of the conversations.
What I said was that I had no recollection of any other memo-
randum on the Kunming cable. But it is quite possible that the con-
tents of the Kunming cable were referred to, or something in them
in subsequent memoranda of other telegrams referring to that.
Mr. Sourwine. You did not mention them in your notes that are
printed in the white paper, did you ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. That is, you did not mention the Kunming cable
in those notes ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to find out if you did subsequently write
a memorandum to inform the Department of the fact that the Vice
President had sent a cable to the President from Kunming.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall doing that.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any particular reason for wanting to
keep the Department in the dark about that?
_ Mr. Vincent. The Kunming cable had gone to the Department,
sir, from Kunming. I am trying to get at what
Mr. Sourwine. Did it go to the Department or to the President?
_Mr. Vincent. Well, it was addressed to the President, but it cer-
tainly would have been distributed to the Department.
2270 rNTSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. It would have been distributed to the Department t
Mr. Vincent. That would be my assumption.
Mr. SouRAViNE. So that you did not find it necessary to make any
separate reference to it at all ?
Mr. Vincent. I assumed that it would go to the Department.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. Well, is your testimony that, aside from the notes
which are in the white paper, you made no other memorandum at all
about the trip with Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We have discussed here already, sir, I believe, a
number of basic Communist documents, and you were asked if you had
read any of them. Do you remember that ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I will not go over them individually. The list in-
cludes the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels; State and
Revolution, by Lenin ; Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder,
by Lenin ; Foundation of Leninism, by Stalin ; Problems of Commu-
nism, by Stalin ; History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(Bolshevik), authored by the Central Committee of the CPSU; the
Program of the Communist Internationale and Its Constitution.
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and
Semi-Colonies, a Resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the
Comitern. You said you had seen none of them ; is that right ?
Mr. Vincent. I testified that I had no recollection of reading any
of them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And you had not seen the G-2 report on commu-
nism?
Mr. Vincent. It is the one that the chairman showed me? I had
no recollection of seeing it.
Mr. SotJRwiNE. Did you ever see the American Bar Association
brief on Communism-Marxism-Leninism?
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeing it, sir.
Mr. Sotjrwine. This is a copy of it.
Have you ever recalled seeing it in that format or any other format?
Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge have I even seen it in this form.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was printed previous to that time as part of th&
proceedings of the American Bar Association, I believe, which would
be a different format.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever read any of the writings of Mao
Tse-tung?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't recall reading it.
Mr. Sourwine. I asked those questions, Mr. Chairman, because they
go to the question of Mr. Vincent's knowledge of Communist docu-
ments and, in that sense at least, to the question of his knowledge of
Communist principles, aims, and objectives.
It was not intended either as an implication that this committee
felt he should have read those documents, or demands to know why
he did not study communism, but simply to ascertain the fact of
what information he had, as background ?
When were you transferred to Tangiers, Mr. Vincent ?
Mr. Vincent. The transfer came through, I think, in February,,
but I didn't go until June.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2271
Mr. SouRWiNE. Has anyone in the State Department ever ex-
pressed an opinion to you as to why you were transferred to Tangiers?
Mr. Vincent. No one expressed an opinion to me other than the —
they expressed the opinion to me that Mr. Patterson was going to be
assigned to Bern, and that I would have to leave.
Senator Ferguson. You were named, were you not, as Minister to
Switzerland ?
Mr. Vincent. At that time, I was Minister to Switzerland.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, but your appointment was sent up to the
Senate.
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, in 1947.
Senator Ferguson. In 1947, as Minister to Switzerland?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And it was never approved ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, it was approved, in 1947. I went to Switzer-
land as Minister, and was there for 31/2 years.
Senator Ferguson. You were named to some other post? Or were
to be named to some other post ?
Mr. Vincent. You are speaking of the statement that I was
going to be named to Costa Rica as Ambassador ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Had you heard that ?
Mr. Vincent. I had heard that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Had you been consulted about it?
• Mr. Vincent. I had been informed. I hadn't been consulted. I
had been informed.
Senator Ferguson. Were you named?
Mr. Vincent. No ; I was not named.
Senator Ferguson. Your name was never sent to the Senate on
that one ?
Mr. Vincent. My name was never sent to the Senate.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Has anyone in the State Department ever ex-
pressed an opinion to you as to why you were sent to Tangiers in-
stead of to some other post ?
Senator Ferguson. Or to Costa Rica ?
Mr. Vincent. Let me see. I don't recall that they have.
Senator Ferguson. There was no explanation, then?
Mr. Vincent. Well, there was a great deal of press statement.
Senator Ferguson. No, I am talking about the State Department
or the Government. Did they ever tell you why you were not going
to be sent to Costa Rica ?
Mr. Vincent. They simply told me they were not going to send my
name up for confirmation in the Senate, and I would go to Tangiers.
Senator Ferguson. Did they say why ?
Mr. Vincent. They did not say why, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Who is "they" ?
Mr. Vincent. The Chief of Personnel.
Senator Ferguson. Who would that be ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; not the Chief of Personnel. It would be Humel-
sine.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any correspondence on that ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Senator Ferguson. Were there any cablegrams on it?
2272 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. No. There was a telephone conversation with Hum-
elsine.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the telephone conversation?
Mr. Vincent. Hiimelsine simply telephoned me that I was going to
be sent to Tangiers, asked me if I was prepared to go to Tangiers, and
I said I was. He said that the Costa Rica appointment was off.
Senator Ferguson. That is all he told you ?
Mr. Vincent. That is all he told me.
Senator Ferguson. You did not ask him why it was off? The
ambassadorship was a much more important position than going to
Tangiers, was it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, it was a more important job from the matter
of title. But the Morrocan job is just as important.
Senator Ferguson. There is a difference even in the salary, is there
not?
Mr. Vincent. There was no difference in salary.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Having achieved the rank of Minister, you retain
that, do you not ?
Mr. Vincent. In Tangiers.
Mr. SouRwiNE, But you are a career foreign officer. Foreign Service
officer, are you not ?
Mr. Vincent. I am.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And having obtained the rank of Minister, you
retain it as Minister ?
Mr. Vincent. I remain a career Minister.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what I mean.
Senator Ferguson. What is your pay ?
Mr. Vincent. At the present, $15,000.
Senator Ferguson. What would have been the pay as Ambassador?
Mr. Vincent. $15,000.
Senator Ferguson. Did you receive from Secretary Acheson a let-
ter with regard to your appointment to Tangiers ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Or anyone else in the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. I received my orders to go to Tangiers, formal orders.
I never received a letter from anybody.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you get any communication from Mr. Acheson
with regard to that matter, either before or after the fact ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you return to the United States from Tangiers
on October 16, 1951 ?
Mr. Vincent. 15, I think. But we will not quibble over that.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you interviewed by reporters on that occa-
sion ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes ; the reporters came to the boat.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you asked to comment on reports that you
were returning to testify before this subcommittee ?
Mr. Vincent. I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you then state that you were not in any de-
fensive position ?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you then state to reporters that you would be
willing to testify if you were asked to do so, but that you had not
been invited and that you would not volunteei ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2273
Mr. Vinson. That I don't recall, whether I said all that to them or
not. The general idea was that I had already written to — let me
finish this — I had already written, as you know, to Senator McCarran
expressing my willingness to testify.
Wliether I, at that time, said to these people that I was not going to
ask to testify or not, I don't know.
Senator Feeguson. You had already offered to testify ?
Mr. Vincent. I had already offered ; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I hold here a newspaper story, an AP dispatch,
and the particular clipping is from the Washington Star, and it is
dated New York, October 16, AP. The headline is: "John Carter
Vincent Back in United States — 'not on defensive'."
John Carter Vincent, United States Minister to Tangiers, Morocco, charged
with pro-Communist leanings by Senator McCarthy, returned yesterday on the
liner Constitution and said he was "not in any defensive position." After con-
ferring with a State Department official, he was asked about reports he was
returning to testify at congressional hearings into internal security. "I am
coming back strickly for a vacation after 4 years aboard," Mr. Vincent replied.
Pressed further for comments on accusations that he was a Communist sympa-
thizer, Mr. Vincent said, "I am not in any defensive position. I certainly
would be willing to testify any time they wanted me to. I have not been asked
yet, and I am not volunteering."
Do you think that is an accurate report, sir ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, it is an accurate report of what I had in mind at
that time.
Senator Ferguson. That was not a fact ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; that was a fact.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not write to the Senator before that ?
Mr. Vincent. I wrote to the Senator on September 7, expressing a
willingness to appear before the committee. I had not at that time
requested a hearing before the committee.
Senator Ferguson. You say the willingness was different than a
request. Did you ever request ?
Mr. Vincent. I made the request to the committee on November 9.
Mr. Sourwine. You did send a letter to Senator McCarran under
date of November 9, did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. I ask that that letter, Mr. Chairman, be inserted in
record.
Senator Ferguson. It will be inserted.
(The letter referred was marked "Exhibit No. 400" and is as
follows:) •
Exhibit No. 400
Department of State,
Washington, November 9, 1951.
The Honorable Pat McCarran,
United States Senate.
My Dear Senator McCarran : You may recall that I wrote to you on Septem-
ber 7, 1951, from my post in Tangier in regard to Louis F. Budenz' testimony
before your subcommittee on August 23, 1951. Budenz swore that from "official
reports" he had received I was a member of the Communist Party. I assured you
that I was not and never had been a Communist, that I had never worked in the
interests of other than our own Government and people, and that, if you had
any doubts on that score, I desired to appear before your committee. I have
received no reply to my letter.
On October 5, 1951, Budenz, still under oath, repeated his allegations before
the subcommittee.
2274 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I am now home on vacation and have had an opportunity to read the Budenz
testimony. I am shoclied at the devious manner in which he attempted to support
his false testimony.
Convinced that establishment of the facts is essential in a democracy, I request
and shall welcome an opportunity to meet with your subcommittee to testify
publicly under oath.
I must return to my post and official duties after Christmas and therefore
would appreciate your arranging a public hearing before members of the sul>-
committee some time this month or early in December.
Believe me, this is not simply a matter of self-defense. The issue far tran-
scends personal considerations. We cannot defend democracy with perfidy or
defeat communism with lies.
Sincerely yours,
[s] John Carter "Vincent
John Caeteb Vincent.
Mr. SouEwiNE. That letter has been released by the State Depart-
ment, has it not ?
Mr. Vincent. It has.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Senator McCarran reply under date of
November 16, 1951 ?
Mr. Vincent. He did. I assume you have the date.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is that the text of his reply ?
Mr. Vincent. I have it here. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I ask that this be inserted in the record at this
point.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 401" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 401
November 16, 1951.
Mr. John Carter Vincent,
Oifice of the Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Vincent : Your letter of November 9 has been forwarded to me
here in the hospital.
I would be happy to hear your testimony, but due to the fact that Congress
is not in session it may be difficult to do it at the time you desire. I have, how-
ever, advised my staff of your request, and please be assured that if it is at
all possible your request will be carried out.
Sincerely,
Mr. SouRWiNE. I ask you if that letter was mailed to Senator Mc-
Carran, the letter of the ninth, your letter of the ninth ?
Mr. Vincent. I testified before, and it is still my recollection, that
it was brought down here to the office of Senator McCarran by hand.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right. Did you at that* time know that
Senator McCarran was ill in a hospital in Reno, Nev. ?
Mr. Vincent. I did, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have any help in drafting that letter ?
Mr. Vincent. In drafting this letter of the ninth ?
Mr. Sour WINE. Of November 9.
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I had some help in drafting the letter.
Mr. Sourwtne. Who helped you in drafting?
Mr. Vincent. I made most of the draft myself, but the letter was
drafted in the Legal Division of the State Department, there.
Mr. Sour wine. Who originally suggested drafting that letter?
Mr. Vincent. I did, myself.
Mr. SouRwiNE. With whom did you discuss the letter before it
was sent, other than the Legal Division of the State Department?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2275
Mr. Vincent. With my own wife.
Mr. SouRwiNE. With anyone else ?
Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you disclose to the Legal Division of the State
Department that you knew Senator McCarran was in a hospital in
Reno?
Mr. Vincent. I didn't have to, sir. They knew it themselves.
Mr. Sourwine. If they knew it and you knew it, why did you send
the letter down here instead of sending it out to Reno?
Mr. Vincent. As I testified before, I thought that this was the
best place to get it, quickly, to his office, where he had a staff here
and they would see that it was transmitted to him.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the release of
this letter by the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. I did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You say you did ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. The State Department released it with my
knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you suggest the release of it, or did the
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. I suggested the release of it.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Do you know when that release was decided upon?
Mr. Vincent. No; I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. It must have been decided on at least as early as
the 17th, must it not ?
Mr. Vincent. Wlien was it released ?
Mr. Sourwine. The release was given to the press on the 17th for
release on the 19th, was it not?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, it was. That would be a Saturday, I think it
was. It was decided then
Mr. Sourwine. That is right, to get the break in the Monday morn-
ing papers. Is that right?
Mr. Vincent. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. You had had it delivered here on the 9th, is that
right? The date that it was written?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You had delivered it to Senator McCarran's office
here on the 9th, a letter, knowing that he was in a hospital in Reno,
and on the 17th you were consenting to a release of a protest to the
Senator's failure to answer your letter. Is that right?
Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't call it a protest. It was my request to
■appear before the committee.
Mr. Sourwine. You think that the State Department release was
not a protest against the failure to answer the letter? That is, the
State Department release under the date of the 19th, which was handed
to the press on the I7th? Was that not a protest against Senator
McCarran's failure to answer your letter of the 9th?
Mr. Vincent. I would not have qualified it as a protest.
Mr, Sourwine. Did you see the State Department release ? (Pause.)
Did you see that State Department release?
Mr. Vincent. I saw the State Department release; yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Did not that release state, in effect, that your letter
was being released because of the Senator's failure to answer it ?
2276 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten. I didn't draft it.
Mr. SotJRwiNE. You saw it, did you not ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You assented to whatever was in it?'
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I assented.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It was played up in the newspapers as a protest of
the Senator's faikire to answer your demand to be heard, was it not?
Mr. Vincent. It was, sir.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you not intend that it should be so played up f
Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not intend for it to be so played up. But
it was played up that way.
What I wanted primarily to do was to put on notice the fact that
I wanted to appear before the committee. Many people had asked'
me, "Wliy don't you appear before the committee; why don't you
appear before the committee ?" and I wanted it known that I had made
a request. I don't like for it to be interpreted that it was a protest
over the failure to release that.
Mr. Sourwine. And you do not think it was so intended by either
you or the State Department?
Mr. Vincent. It was not intended as a protest against his failure
to answer. It was intended by me to put on notice, through the papers,
that I had made a request to appear before the committee.
Now, it could be interpreted that way, as you have, too, but I am
speaking quite frankly here that my idea was to respond to what
was a general desire that I let it be known that I wanted to come
before the committee.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you expect Senator McCarran to have an answer
in your hands within a week after you delivered the letter here to his
office, when he was in a hospital in Reno ?
Mr. Vincent. I have told you before that I thought probably the
staff here in his office could give an answer by telephoning him, and
giving an answer.
Mr. Sourwine. That the staff would answer that letter ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I suppose you thought that the staff would sign
his name to it, too ?
Mr. Vincent. No, that the staff would notify me that I could
appear and set a time. But I thought that 10 days was a sufficient
time.
Mr. Sourwine. When did you first learn of Mr. Budenz' testimony
before this subcommittee on August 23 ?
Mr. Vincent. I learned of it through the press in Tangiers, I
should say, along the first week in September.
Mr. Sourwine. And when did you learn of his testimony on August
5?
Mr. Vincent. Pardon me. What was the first ?
Mr. Sourwine. He testified here twice, August 5 and August 23.
Did you learn about his testimony on both occasions at the same
time, or did you learn about it at two different times as it occurred,
shortly after it occurred ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't know of the two, I don't know but
two times that Budenz appeared before the committee, to my recollec-
tion, August 23 and again October 5.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2277
But you, 1 think, identified them both as August, August 5 and
August 23.
Mr. SouKwiNE. All right, if I am in error, when did you first learn
about his testimony on October 5 ?
Mr. Vincent. Let me see. Wlien I got back to the States, in
November; November 15, 1 was told.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You did not learn about it until you got back to the
United States ?
Mr. Vincent. No, I had no knowledge, as I recall it, because I had
taken the boat on the 8th or 9th, and I did not know of the October 5,
so far as I know. '
Senator Feeguson. Had any testimony been sent to you ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir. In Tangiers ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You had never received any testimony?
Mr. Vincent. No, I had never seen any of the records of this com-
mittee.
Mr. Morris. Or reports of the testimony ?
Mr. Vincent. I think the first time was reports in the press.
Senator Ferguson. Just press reports ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes. I had nothing from the State Department,
unless there was something in the State Department bulletin at one
time. But my recollection is that I saw it in the press.
Senator Ferguson. When was his arrival ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. His arrival here was October 15.
Senator Ferguson. Now, from October 15 to November 9, you did
not make any request ?
Mr. Vincent. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear that Senator McCarran,
the chairman of this committee, went to the hospital ?
Mr. Vincent. Well, if you would identify the date, I would say
I heard of it, reading in the papers, the day it was announced. I have
forgotten the date that he went to the hospital.
Senator Ferguson. How long before you wrote the letter of the 9th
did he go to the hospital ?
Mr. Vincent. I would say it had been very few days before.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think now that the fact that he went
to the hospital had anything to do with your writing of that letter?
Mr. Vincent. Nothing whatsoever, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Nothing whatsoever?
Mr. Vincent. Nothing whatsoever.
Senator Ferguson. That was not considered ?
Mr. Vincent. That was not considered. It was already decided
to send the letter before we knew that he had gone to the hospital.
I had.
Senator Ferguson. You had. Had the Department ?
Mr. Vincent. The State Department did not make the decision.
I made the decision.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not talk to them about it until after you
knew he had gone to the hospital, did you ?
Mr. Vincent. If you would identify when he went to the hospital —
I have forgotten.
2278 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. From your own memory.
Mr. Vincent. That I did not talk with them until after he had
gone to the hospital ? Yes, I talked with them before he went to the
hospital.
Mr. SouRWiNE. About the matter of the release of this letter ?
Mr. Vincent. Also about the release of the letter, and the drafting
of the letter. I can assure you that the release of the letter and the
drafting of the letter did not have anything to do with Senator
McCarran going to the hospital.
Mr. Morris. Did it have anything to do with the fact that the Senate
was out of session, even though at the original timfe when the Senate
was in session you said you were not requesting a hearing ?
Mr. Vincent. It had nothing to do with the fact that the Senate wels
out of session.
Senaor Ferguson. Whom did you discuss it with in the State De-
partment ?
Mr. Vincent. People in the Legal Division, but discussed it not
as to the decision.
Senator Ferguson. Who ? I want the name.
Mr. Vincent. Mr. McJennett.
Senator Ferguson. Anybody else?
Mr. Vincent. A young man named Mr. Ousley. They are the only
two that I remember,
Mr. SouRWiNE, Are they in the Legal Division of the State
Department ?
Mr. Vincent. They are attached to it; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. They are not in the Public Relations Division ?
Mr. Vincent. They are attached to it. I don't know what their
actual relationship comes from, but that is where I met Mr. McJennett
and that is where I know him.
Mr. Sourwine. In the Legal Division ?
Mr. Vincent. That is where I had seen him, the first I met him.
Senator Ferguson. That is not an unusual thing, to put Public
Relations people under the title of lawyers in the Legal Division,,
is it?
Mr. Vincent. It is not unusual ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether it is unusual or usual, sir. I
only know that I met Mr. McJennett in Mr. Fish's office.
Senator Ferguson. You thought he was in the Legal Division ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes; I thought he was in the Legal Department.
I, myself, have since heard that he draws his salary from some place
else.
Senator Ferguson. They usually do not put them under Public
Relations, and it is easier to get them through the appropriation if
they are in the Legal Division.
Mr. Vincent. I also notified Mr Humelsine in the State Depart-
ment I had intentions of doing this, and I also notified Mr. Webb.
Senator Ferguson. What did Humelsine and Webb say?
Mr. Vincent. I asked them if they had any objection to me, as a
Foreign Service officer, taking this action. I wanted to clear with
them first, and they said "No objection."
Senator Ferguson. Did you show them the letter?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2279
Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether they actually saw the letter,
I have no recollection of showing it to Mr. Webb. I don't know
whether it went to Humelsine.
Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them that the chairman of the
committee was ill in the hospital ?
Mr. Vincent. Sir, I think they knew it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you talk about it?
Mr. Vincent. No ; we didn't talk about it.
Senator Ferguson. You were just assuming, then, that they knew it?
Mr. Vincent. I would have assumed that they read it in the papers,
sir.
And I would like to make my testimony again as clear as I can,
that the Senator being in the hospital had nothing to do with my
decision to request an appearance before the committee.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Carl Humelsine know about this release before
it went out ? Did he see it before it was released ?
Mr. Vincent. I don't know that Carl Humelsine saw it before it
was released. I don't know whether he knew it was going to be re-
leased.
Senator Ferguson. I will receive those two letters for the record.
(The letters referred to appear on pp. 2273 and 2274. J
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think a man can be an American Communist
without being a traitor to the Government of the United States ?
Mr. Vincent. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think a person who is an employee of the
United States Government can be a Communist without being a
traitor?
Mr. Vincent. He cannot be.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think a person who is an official of the United
States Government can be a Communist without being a traitor ?
Mr. Vincent. No ; he cannot be.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it then your belief and contention that to become
or remain a Communist while an employee or an official of the Govern-
ment of the United States is a traitorous act ?
Mr. Vincent. I would certainly say it was.
Mr. Sourwine. And by "traitorous act," you mean treason?
Mr. Vincent. Well, now, I am not a legal person so I don't know
what the charges would be on treason. But in a general sense.
Mr. Sourwine. To you it means a traitorous act ?
Mr. Vincent. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I think that this letter from Mr.
Vincent to Senator McCarran should also be put into record ; and it
should be read, I believe.
Senator Ferguson. It is November 19, 1951?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes [reading] :
Exhibit No. 401A
My Dear Senator McCarran : I have been informed that you interpreted my
action in making public the letter I addressed to y'ou on November 9 as being in
some way critical of the subcommittee. I regret that you had that impression.
As you know, Budenz has publicly and falsely called me a Communist in testi-
mony before your committee. In my position as an official of the American Gov-
ernment his charge is tantamount to saying that I am a traitor. This, you will
agree, is a very serious matter, not simply for me, for my country and my
friends. Under such circumstances, I believe you will understand my motive
2280 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
in making known tliat I am ready and anxious to appear publicly before your
committee to refute under oath the Budenz allegations.
I trust you are recuperating from your illness and will soon be in good healtu.
Sincerely yours,
John Carter Vincent.
Mr. Vincent, before we close, and I have no more prepared questions
for you, I will say to you that I would like to give you an opportunity
to correct any false impressions that you think may have been created,
if you recall any,
Mr. Vincent. Over the length of the whole
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes ; and I don't mean that I am trying to put you
on the spot to remember all of the testimony. It is just if there is
anything that rankles in your mind, I want to give you an opportunity.
Mr. Vincent. No ; I can't be too sure here that I have used the same
phraseology in answering in the executive hearing and down here.
Senator Ferguson. I think that that ought to be put in the record.
You have no objection, have you, that the transcript of your executive
session become part of the public record?
Mr, Vincent. I have no objection, sir, but I am pointing out at this
time that I can not say that in executive hearings of last week, which
lasted 3 days, that I have answered exactly the same way.
Senator Ferguson. I think we ought to make that part of the record.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It has been recommended by the staff and assented
to by Mr, Vincent and his counsel. But the committee has to meet
and act on it.
I believe it will take a majority of the committee to do that.
Senator Ferguson. I will recommend to the committee that it be
received.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, you realize, do you not, that your testi-
mony has, in some respects, contradicted the testimony of other wit-
nesses, just as it has, in some respects, corroborated it?
Mr. Vincent. That is true.
Mr. Sourwine. That you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr.
Wallace; that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Alsop;
that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Budenz ; that you
have, in some respects, affirmed what Mr. Budenz says.
Mr. Vincent. I don't recall affirming anything that Mr. Budenz
says.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you realize that you have established, by your
testimony here, that you did have a very substantial influence over Mr.
Wallace and over the conduct of his mission ?
Mr. Vincent. True, that is true.
Mr. Sourwine. And which was one of the points that Mr. Budenz
made, and something that Mr. Wallace appeared to seek to negative.
Mr. Vincent. Did he ? I have forgotten that he did.
Mr. Sourwine. I simply mention those things.
Mr, Vincent. Yes ; I know. You are not trying to say that the in-
fluence I had over Mr, Wallace was of the nature of Mr. Budenz'
statement.
Mr. Sourwine. I am simply calling to your attention possible fields
in which you might feel that further clarification was needed so that
if you think you want that opportunity you can do it now.
Mr, Vincent, No ; I can't think of any particular.
Senator Ferguson, Mr. Carter
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Vincent.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2281
Senator Ferguson. Have you had a full hearing?
Mr. Vincent. I have had a full hearing, sir.
I think I have had a very full hearing.
Senator Ferguson. Do you believe that it was a fair hearing?
Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; in all intents and purposes a fair hearing.
Senator Ferguson. And there is nothing that you know now that
you would want to add ?
I will give you this opportunity.
Mr. Vincent. Well, I have nothing to add, sir, except that my coun-
sel here failed to get these documents into the record. When we were
speaking of that FEC and Japanese policy.
Senator Ferguson. I will receive them.
(The information referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 402" and is
as follows :)
Comment of Fak Eastern Commission Policy Decision*
13 July 1947.
The policy decision just adopted by the Far Eastern Commission dealing with
the postsurrender treatment of the Japanese problem is one of the great state
papers of modern history. It establishes definitely the type, the extent, and the
scope of Japan's future, and the position the Japanese nation shall occupy in
relation to the world at large. It not only ratifies the course which thus far has
been taken, but signifies a complete unity of future purpose among the eleven
nations and peoples concerned. It at once sweeps aside fears currently felt that
the great nations of the world are unable to reconcile divergent views on such
vital issues in the international sphere and demonstrates with decisive clarity
that from an atmosphere of conflicting interests and opposing predilections may
emerge common agreement founded upon exi^erience and shaped to a realistic
appreciation of world conditions and the basic requirements of a progressive
civilization. For in this agreement have been firmly resisted two insidious con-
cepts, poles apart but equally sinister — the one which would seek harsh and
unjust treatment of our fallen foe, and the other which would seek partially
to preserve and perpetuate institutions and leadership which bear responsibility
of war guilt. Tlie first would have produced a mendicant country dependent
upon charity to live, while the second would have encouraged the regrowth of
antidemocratic forces with the consequent revival of international distrust and
suspicion. It confirms by the considered action of the representatives of the
Allied Nations a sound moderate course based upon a concept embodying firm-
ness but justice, disarmament but rehabilitation, lower standards but the oppor-
tunity for life — a concept shunning both the extreme right and the extreme left
and providing for the great middle way of the ordinary man.
The basic and easily the most essential requirement of the policy — disarma-
ment and demilitarization — has already been fully accomplished. Even were
there no external controls, Japan could not rearm for modern war within a
century. This primary objective has led all aims in the occupation of Japan.
Japanese military forces have been disarmed, demobilized, and absorbed in
l^eaceful pursuits, and Japan's remaining war potential has either been destroyed
or completely neutralized. The political and economic phases of the disarma-
ment program have been effected through the dissolution of the alliance long
existing between government and industry, the breaking up of monopolistic com-
bines and practices which have suppressed private enterprise, and the raising of
the individual to a position of dignity and hope, with provision made for a new
leader.ship untainted by war responsibility and both mentally and spiritually
equipped to further democratic growth. The transition stage of destroying those
evil influences which misguided Japan's past has been virtually completed and
the course has been set upon which Japan is now embarked toward a peaceful
and constructive future. We thus see here the transformation of a state which
once proclaimed its mastery of war into one which from material impoverishment
and spiritual dedication now seeks its destiny as a servant of peace.
*The policy decision, adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947. as FEC
014/9 and transmitted to SCAP through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS
Directive Serial No. 82, is a restatement of the United States Initial Postsurrender Policy
for Japan of August 29, 1945 (Appendix A : 11).
22848— 52— pt. 7 19
2282 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This action representing the agreement of the Allied Nations engaged in the
I'acitic war not only confirms the postsurrender policies previonsly evolved and
largely implemented, but it establishes at the same time a norm for the restora-
tion of peace. Resting squarely upon those same principles and ideals written at
Potsdam, reaffirmed on the Missouri, and subsequently translated into action
in the occupation of Japan, this accord provides the entire framework for a
treaty of peace — a treaty which, if it is to be faithfully honored, should consti-
tute within itself a charter of human liberty to which the Japanese citizen will
look for guidance and protection, rather than shun with the revulsion of shame^
a treaty which, without yielding firmness in its essential mandates, should avoid
punitive, arbitrary, and unrealistic provisions, and by its terms set the pattern
for future peace throughout the world. It should in full reality mark the
restoration of a peace based upon justice, goodwill, and human advancement.
Such a treaty may now be approached with the assurance of complete vmderstand-
ing in principle and full unity of purpose evolving its detail.
Viewing this international accord in the light of the great strides made by the
Japanese themselves toward the achievement of those very objectives which it
prescribes, without confusion, without disorder, and with steady progress toward
economic recovery despite the destruction of war and defeat, it becomes unmis-
takably clear that here in Japan we shall win the peace.
Appendix F : 39
New Year's Message to thei Japanese People
1 January 1948.
To THE People of Japan :
The design of a remodeled and reconstructed Japan is nearing completion.
The pattern has been etched, the path has been laid. The development now lies
largely in your own hands. Success or failure will depend upon your ability to
practice the simple yet transcendental principles which modern civilization
demands.
No occupation, however benevolent and beneficial, can substitute for the
spiritual uplift which alone can lead to an invincible determination to build a
future based upon the immutable concepts of human freedom — a social status
under wdiich full consciousness of individual responsibility must ever remain the
keystone to the arch of success and progress.
Individual hardship is inevitable. Your economy, due to the disastrous war
decisions of your past leaders, is now impoverislied. This can only be relieved
by employment to the maximum of the energies of your people, by wisdom and
determination on the part of your leaders, and by the restoration of peace with
its removal of existing limitations upon international trade. So long as your
needs continue to be greater than your productive capacity, controls upon your
internal economy will be essential lest the weaker segments of your population
perish. Such controls must, liowever, only be temporary and subject to ultimate
removal in favor of free enterprise.
Economically, Allied policy has required the breaking up of that system which
in the past has permitted tlie major part of the commerce and industry and
natural resources of our country to be owned and controlled by a minority of
feudal families and exploited for their exclusive benefit. The world has probably
never seen a counterpart to so abnormal an economic system. It permitted ex-
ploitation of the many for the sole benefit of the few. The integration of these
few with government was complete and their influence upon governmental
policies inordinate, and set the course which ultimately led to war and destruc-
tion. It was indeed so complete a monopoly as to be in effect a form of socialism
in private hands. Only through its dissolution could the way be cleared for the
emergence of an economy conducive to the well-being of all the people — an econ-
omy embodying the principle of private capitalism, based upon free competitive
enterprise^ — an economy which long experience has demonstrated alone provides
the maximum incentive to the development of those fundamental requirements
to human progress — individual initiative and individual energy.
Politically, progress toward reform has been equally encouraging. Your new
constitution is now in full effect, and there is increasing evidence c/C a growing
understanding of the great human ideals which it is designed to serve. Imple-
menting laws have reoriented the entire fabric of your way of life to give
emphasis to the increased responsibility, dignity and opportunity which the in-
dividual now holds and enjoys. Government has ceased to be totalitarian and
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2283
has become representative, with its functions decentralized to permit and en-
coi;rage a maximum of individual thought and initiative and judgment in the
management of community affairs. Control of every political segment has been
shifted to permit the selection of a new leadership of your free choice capable
of advancing democratic growth.
Socially, many of the shackels which traditionally have restricted individual
thought and action have been severed and action has been taken to render the
exercise of police power a matter for individual and community, rather than
national, responsibility. The judicial system has been freed from executive and
legislative controls, and laws have been enacted to temper inordinate bureau-
cratic power by requiring all public officials to justify the trust of public re-
sponsibility and answer for their acts directly to the people.
Every Japanese citizen can now for the first time do what he wants, and go
where he wants, and say what he wants, within the liberal laws of his land.
This means that you can select your own work, and when you have completed
it you can choose your own method of relaxation and enjoyment, and on your
day of rest you can worship as you please, and always you can criticize and
express your views on the actions of your Government. This is liberty. Yet
inherent in it are its obligations to act with decorum and self-restraint, and
become acutely conscious of the responsibilities which a free society imposes
upon its every segment.
The future therefore lies in your hands. If you remain true to the great
spiritual revolution which you have undergone, your nation will emerge and go
on — if you accept only its benefits without its obligations, it will wither and go
under. The line of demarcation is a simple one, understandable to all men —
the line between those things which are right and those things which are
wrong. The way is long and hard and beset with difficulties and dangers, but it
is my hope and belief and prayer this New Year's Day that you will not falter.
Douglas MacArthur.
Appendix F : 42
Reply to Criticism of Economic Policy
1 February 1948.
(The following was sent as a letter to Mr. J. H. Gipson, The Caxton Printers,
Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, under date of 24 January, 1948, in reply to Mr. Gipson's
letter of 27 December 1947, relative to a December release from the Committee
for Constitutional Government in New York stating that the Occupation is
fostering socialization of Japanese industries, etc. Permission was later re-
quested on 31 January 1948, by Mr. Gipson for release to the press and approval
was radioed on 1 February 1948.)
Thank you so much for sending me the extract of comments on Japan from
the December release of the Committee for Constitutional Government in New
York, with your letter of December 27 which has just reached me.
I have never heard of this Committee and know nothing about its purpose or
composition, but its estimate of the situation here is amazing in its complete
inaccuracy. The existing Government of Japan is fully representative of the
popular will, elected under throughly democratic processes in accordance with
the provisions of a constitution patterned in essential respects after our own.
The only "private enterprise" which has heretofore existed in Japan was neither
free nor competitive — two fundamental qualifications of American economic
philosophy which it is my firm purpose to see entrenched in the Japanese system
before the occupation withdraws.
Japan has long had a system of ''private enterprise" — but one which per-
mitted ten family groups comprising only fifty-six Japanese families to con-
trol, directly or indirectly, every phase of commerce and industry ; all media
of transportation, both internal and external ; all domestic raw materials ; and
all coal and other power resources. The "private enterprise" was thus limited
to a few of feudal lineage, who exploited into virtual slavery the remainder
of the Japanese people, permitted higher standards of life to others only through
sufferance, and in search of further plunder abroad furnished the tools for the
military to embark upon its ill-fated venture into world conquest. The record
is thus one of economic oppression and exploitation at home, aggression and
spoliation abroad. As early as 1930, these Japanese industrial combines veered
in the direction of armaments production and geared the country for war.
This portrays the private enterprise to which the Committee refers.
2284 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
As you will see, the very start toward free enterprise is dependent upon
tearing down so abnormal a structure. For so long as it remains undisturbed,
it is a standing bid for State ownership, and a fruitful target for Ck)mmunist
propaganda and coUectivist purposes. The Japanese people, with the exception
of those who covet the opportunity to exploit this situation for ideological pur-
poses, and those who have been entrenched within its orbit of political and
economic power, are overwhelmingly in favor of destroying such a system, and
unless its destruction is effected peacefully and in due order under the occupa-
tion, there is little doubt but that if necessai'y the way would be found even
through the violence of revolutionary means once the occupation is withdrawn.
In all of these measures in the reformation of Japan, it must be clearly
understood that we are here dealing with fundamental realities. It does not
suffice merely to issue an edict that there shall be no socialism, or that there
shall be no advance of communism or other ideologies opposed to the one in
which we ourselves firmly believe. For the strength of such an edict vs'ould
find its measure in the power of Allied bayonets alone. The need has called
for positive action which, while we yet have time, will superimpose here upon
a decadent and discredited past a system of government and economics which,
because their very processes generate a more healthy and virile society, will
even after our controls are lifted stand as an invincible buttress against the
inroads of any conflicting philosophies of life.
In the accomplishment of this purpose, two difficult barriers have stood out
to bar any progress. The one has dealt with the feudalistic system of land
ownership under which practically all agricultural land has been owned by a
relatively few persons of feudal heritage, with all agrarian workers exploited
under conditions of practical serfdom. This archaic system of land ownership
is being torn down in order that through sale in small lots those who long have
worked the soil may have the opportunity substantially to profit from their
toil. Thereby there will emerge in Japan, from a field theretofore fertile to the
spread of communism, a new class of small capitalistic landowners which itself
will stand firm against efforts to destroy the system of capitalistic economy of
which it will then form an integral part. Needless to say, the communists and
the land barons alone oppose this reform.
The other barrier is the one which I have heretofore described, popularly
known as the Zailiatsu, and in neither case, even despite war enrichment at the
sacrifice of American blood, has there been any confiscation of property, as the
principle of just compensation throughout has governed, with untrammelled re-
course left to judicial appeal in the Japanese courts. The effect of its dissolu-
tion will be to transform a small number of monopolistic combines into numerous
competing units and to bring about widespread ownership of the instruments of
production and trade, thereby erecting a solid bulwark against the spread of
ideologies and systems destructive of both free enterprise and political freedom
under democratic capitalism. Otherwise, if business in Japan were allowed to
continue with its concentration of economic power, it would lead to concentra-
tion of power in government, and from there the transition to socialism of one
form or another would be natural, easy of accomplishment, and inevitable.
The statement of the Committee that "prominent leaders including many out-
standing friends of freedom have been ousted from the control of industry and
their places have been taken by incompetent visionaries" finds no basis in fact.
Apart from action taken with respect to the Zaibatsu, wherein the family mem-
bers and their appointees are removed from positions of influence in the identical
enterprises they have heretofore controlled, there have been in all less than
two hundred and fifty persons removed vinder Allied policy from positions in
the economy under the purge program. The removal of these persons was due
to their close identity with the causes which led to war. In the implementation
of this phase of the occupation program, I have in the exercise of the normal
discretion accorded a field commander, pursued far less drastic measures
than were called for by my policy directives from the Allied Powers, shifting
the emphasis from punitive action to action merely designed to provide for a
more healthy leadership and one unattainted by war responsibility. Even in
those cases of persons removed from positions of power, involving the most
aggravated circumstances, I have, against strong Allied opposition, permitted
no property confiscation, no deprivation of liberty, no forfeiture of political
rights, and where restriction upon future economic activity is involved embrac-
ing but a relatively few persons, I have insured that policy-makers rather than
technicians were affected, and have left undisturbed a broad field of economic
activity in which even they might continue to engage without the slightest
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2285
restriction. If within this small group of persons affected, there are any out-
standing "friends of freedom," they are unknown to this headquarters, and all
have had the opportunity, through exhaustively fair hearings before screening
committees of the Japanese Government and on appeal, to prove any such con-
tentions. The statement that the places of those few removed have been taken
by incompetent visionaries is absurd. Such places have in all cases been filled
by junior executives of long service in the enterprises concerned, who have
moved up into opportunities which otherwise would not have been available to
them.
The Committee's statement that "the government has been flooded with a
horde of bureaucrats," not unlike the situation in other capitals, is probably true.
Even so, ou the national level of government there are less than 350,000 ijersons
so employed, which is not disproportionate to Japan's population of seventy-eight
million, should standards elsewhere be accepted as a general guide. It is not
the quantity, however, which has given me most concern, but the quality and
the inordinate power which the bureaucracy traditionally has arrogated to itself
in Japan. To cope with this evil, we are now in the process of assisting the
Japanese Government toward a civil service reform. The pattern already has
been set tlirough wise and farsighted legislation, the implementation of which
will be completed within the present year. The basic purpose and effect of this
reform is to require that all public officials justify the trust of public responsi-
bility and answer for their acts directly to the people.
The general statement that the money is unsound, that foreign trade is re-
stricted by a maze of regulations, and that production is paralyzed is wholly
misrepresentative in its failure to recognize the following fundamental ami
controlling facts, i. e., (1) that Japan is a totally defeated nation, still tech-
nically at war with tlie Allied Powers and luider the controls of military occu-
pation ; (2) that a primary objective of war and cause of defeat was the destruc-
tion of Japan's industrial capacity to wage war and ability to transport its
sinews on the high seas; (3) that Japan has always been dependent for the bulk
of the raw materials essential to sustain the industrial capacity upon jjrocure-
ment from abroad, now denied by the economic blockade inherent in the present
situation; (4) that Japan's shipping afloat has been destroyed, and Manchuria,
Formosa and Korea, former sources of direct procurement of essential raw
materials, have been taken away ; and (5) that Japanese money, not unlike that
even of all of the victor nations, is suffering the severe strain of war-caused
economic dislocations.
Finally, the statement that "the net result has been so to paralyze production
as to leave the Japanese people on the verge of starvation, and that the Americans
are now called upon to furnish hundreds of millions of dollars to relieve the
hunger for which our representatives are primarily responsible" is completely
lacking in realism and false as an indictment. The wonder is that despite the
lack of needed raw materials, widespread destruction of plant facilities, and
seizures under Allied policy for reparation payments, the industrial output
has risen from complete paralysis at war's end to over 40 percent of prewar
levels. It must be understood that the Japanese people before the war suffered
a deficiency in indigenous food resources which compelled the importation from
abroad of approximately 20 percent of food requirements. Add to this natural
deficiency the fact that over six million Japanese citizens have been repatriated
to the home islands, with none permitted to leave during the occupation, while
Manchuria, Korea and Formosa have been removed as sources of food supply,
and you can understand the actualities which exist. During the occupation
we have contributed food partially to cover this deficiency, but such contribu-
tion has not even approximated the importations required during the prewar
era when industry was at full capacity and there was a smaller population to
feed. Such action has not been entirely altruistic as under Japan's present
status the Japanese people are in all practical aspects our prisoners of war,
and as such entitled to our protection under the international conventions which
we ourselves historically have never failed to respect. Even so, the Japanese
people have made diligent effort themselves to solve this deficiency problem,
and once a healthier economic structure has been erected, there will be seen,
through the release of long-suppressed energies of a people enslaved, the building
of that higher productivity which alone comes from a people who are free.
The foregoing will give you the facts as they exist for comparison with those
stated by the Committee, which you have been good enough to quote. The pre-
scription for Japan's economic ills is as crystal clear as it is simple — a structurall
redesign to make possible the emergence of an economic system based not solely
2286 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
upon the formula of "private enterprise" to which the Committee alludes, but
to free private competitive enterprise v^'hich Japan has never before knovi'n,
and which alone will maximize the energies of the people. Even more, the con-
clusion of a treaty of peace which would permit the reopening of the channels
of trade and commerce to make available essential raw materials to feed the
production lines, woi'ld markets to absorb the finished products, and food to
sustain working energy.
Douglas MacArthub.
Senator Ferguson. You have a notebook. I wonder whether or not
we could not receive that notebook. You have been reading from it
as part of this record.
Mr. Vincent. That notebook, sir, contains scratched out places and
everything else. I would rather keep it to myself, because I have
taken practically everything there is out of it. I would prefer to keep
it to myself, as my own notes.
Senator Ferguson. You have been reading from it.
Mr. Vincent. That is right, sir-.
Senator Ferguson. You feel that you do not want the notebook
made part of the record ?
Mr. Vincent. I have made all of it that I want to as part of the
record, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you let the committee have the notebook for
study, Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Vincent. If I do not need it, I have no objection. But I would
rather not have it in the record.
Mr. Sourwine. The Chairman, I think, was asking for it not to be
made as part of the record, but asking for it just as the committee asks
for certain other papers to be examined.
Senator Ferguson. Counsel can look at the notebook and may decide
on more questioning, if he does.
We will now recess. Is there any particular time to reconvene ?
Mr. Morris. I think Tuesday at 10 o'clock is the date, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ferguson. We wdll now recess until Tuesday morning at
10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12: 40 p. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952, the hear-
ing was recessed to reconvene Tuesday, February 5, 1952, at 10 a. m.)
Appendix I
HOLD FOR RELEASE
Confidential: The following correspondence from the President to the Vice
President and attachments thereto are for automatic release at 7 : 00 p. m.,
E. D. T., Sunday, September 23, 1951. No portion, synopsis, or intimation may
be published or broadcast before that time.
please guard against premature publication or announcement
Joseph Short,
Secretary to the President.
September 22, 1951.
The Honorable the Vice President of the United States,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Vice President : I am sending you a copy of a letter, together with
certain documents, which I recently received from INIr. Henry A. Wallace.
These papers deal with the facts of Mr. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944,
and the part played by his advisers on that trip. These papers deal with certain
matters which may be of interest to the Senate and its committees. I am there-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2287
fore making Mr. Wallace's letter available to you for use in such ways as you
deem appropriate.
Very sincerely yours,
Haeey S. Truman.
Farvue, South Salem, New York, September 19, 1951.
Honorable Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President : During the last three weeks there has been considerable
newspaper and radio controversy as to what part John Carter Vincent and Owen
Lattimore played in my trip to the Far East in 1944. This controversy arose
from certain testimony before the Senate Committee on Internal Security during
August. Therefore I have decided to make available to you for what disposition
you care to make of it the complete tile of my reports to President Roosevelt on
my Far Eastern trip in 1944. Parts of these reports were at one time looked
on as secret but with the situation as it is today there is no reason why these
reports should not be made available to the public. I shall, of course, take no
steps to publish this letter myself but I wish you to feel completely free to
handle it in any way which you deem will best minister to the welfare of the
United States.
The following comments as well as the documents themselves should clear
up any confusion as to what I was trying to do in China. The part of various
individuals in my trip will also be made more clear. In March of 1944 I
wrote Secretary Hull asking him to designate someone to accompany me on the
projected trip and the State Department named John Carter Vincent, then
Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. The OWI sent Owen Lattimore to
handle publicity matters in China. I passed through Soviet Asia on my way to
China but China, where the situation was critical, formed the sole subject of
my recommendations to President Roosevelt. These recommendations were
contained in two related documents :
First, a message drafted in Kunming, China, on June 26, 1944, but which, be-
cause of difficulties of communication from Kunming, was cabled to the President
from New Delhi on June 28, 1944. This was divided into two parts, the first
part being a quick resume of the political situation in China and of my talks
in the days immediately preceding with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ; and
the second part, a resume of the military situation, its implications and require-
ments.
Second, a formal report to President Roosevelt covering whole trip, including
also certain longer term proposals about American policy in China which I
presented in person at the White House on July 10, 1944.
These were the only documents originated by me and contained all recom-
mendations of mine resulting from the trip. IMr. Vincent, of course, transmitted
to the State Department the detailed, reportorial account of my conversations
with the Generalissimo which have already been published in the State Depart-
ment White Paper.
There has been testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee that
Messrs. Vincent and Lattimore were members of the Communist Party at that
time and were relied on by the party leadership to "guide" me along the party
line. Hence it is important to specify the parts that these two men took in
the recommendations that I presented to President Roosevelt. As to Mr. Latti-
more, he had no part whatever. He did not contribute to and to the best of my
knowledge knew nothing about either the cable from New Delhi or the formal
report to the President delivered in Washington. He offered me no political
advice any time sufficiently significant to be recalled now, and when we were
together, he talked chiefly about scholarly subjects of a common interest such as
the history of Chinese agriculture and the relationship of the nomadic tribes
with the spttled peasantry.
Mr. Vincent as the designated representative of the State Department was
naturally consulted by me when we were travelling together. Aside from serving
as reporter at the meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, his most important part was
his assistance in the preparation of the two-part cable sent from New Delhi,
In Kuoming, the knowledge I had already gained in Chungking of the urgency
of the Chinese situation, and of the grave dangers of the Japanese offensive then
going on in East China was heavily underlined by General C. L. Chennault's
presentation to me of the current military picture. In the light of this presenta-
tion and in response to Chinag Kai-shek's request made of me on June 24 I
2288 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
decided to cable President Roosevelt on June 26. Mr. Vincent joined in the
advance discussions of the projected cable, was present while it was drafted, and
concurred in the result. The finished cable was, of course, mine but I was dis-
turbed by the fact that I was making far-reaching recommendations without
having had an opportunity to consult the Theater Commander, General Joseph
Stilwell. My recommendations were so drastic that Vincent would certainly have
urged that I get in touch with General Stilwell if he (Vincent) had had objections.
Instead Vincent concurred in the cables of June 28.
On the other hand, as both Mr. Vincent and Secretary of State Dean Acheson
have stated, Mr. Vincent took no part in the preparation of my formal report to
President Roosevelt on July 10 and to the best of my knowledge was not aware
of its contents. I wrote the July 10 report myself and went alone to the White
House to present it to the President. In doing the work of writing I made use
of various memoranda which had accumulated during the journey, some no doubt
from Vincent. However, the strongest influence on me in preparing this final
report of July 10 was my recollection of the analyses offered me by our then
Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, who later occupied one of the Republican
places on the Export-Import Bank Board.
With regard to the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28, it should be
said that the military recommendations contained therein were the most impor-
tant contribution I made while in China. These recommendations were that
China be separated from the command of General Stillwell, that General Wede-
meyer should be considered in the choice of a new military commander in China,
and that the new commander should be given the additional assignment of
"Personal representative" of the President of Chungking. The name and record
of General Wedemeyer are enough to indicate that the purport of these recom-
mendations was the opposite of pro-Communist.
Some months later the change of military command I proposed to the President
was carried out at the most urgent plea of Chiang Kai-shek. History suggests
that if my recommendations had been followed when made, the Generalissimo
would have avoided the disasters resulting from the Japanese offensive in East
China later that summer. And if Chiang's government had thus been spared
the terrible enfeeblement resulting from the disasters, the chances are good the
Generalissimo would have been ruling China tcday.
The political section of Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 should be
read with the atmosphere of that time in mind. Much emphasis had been placed
from the very beginning of the war on the primary importance of "beating the
Japs," and by the spring of 1944 even the most conservative American publications
were urging that the Chinese communists could contribute substantially to this
end. Roosevelt talked to me before I left, not about political coalition in China,
but about "getting the two groups together to fight the war." Chiang Kai-shek
for internal political reasons had, on his own initiative so I was informed, opened
talks between the Nationalists and the Communists but, so he told me, with no
prospect for success. When I cabled the President that "the attitude of Chiang-
Kai-shek towards the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little
prospect for satisfactory long term settlement" I was referring not to "political
coalition" but to this "military problem" of "getting the two groups together to
fight the war." On the other hand, when I said that the disintegration
of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be
filled in ways which you will understand," I was, of course, warning against the
possibility of a Communist political triumph in China.
The July 10 report does not .recommend any political coalition between the
government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinest communists. It was written,
however, against a Chinese political background which is still quite unknown to
most Americans. In brief, one of the worst of several ills from which the
Chungking government was suffering at the time, was the absolute control of all
positions of political, military, and economic power by an extreme pro-Asian
anti-American group within the Kuomintang. This was much emphasized by
Ambassador Gauss who plainly stated that this group in Chungking was doing the
Chinese communists' work for them. The more Western-minded, more efficient
and more pro-American Chinese Nationalist leaders had been so completely
driven from power that Dr. T. V. Soong's appearance as interpreter at my talks
with the Generalissimo was authoritatively reported to be his first emergence
from a sort of informal house arrest, while the most highly praised of the
Chinese Generals, General Chen Cheng, now Prime Minister in Formosa, had
been dismissed from all command some months before. These factors are hinted
at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10 in which it is noted as "significant" that
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2289
"T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (witli tlie Generalissimo) except
as interpreter," while General Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Generals
Chang Fa-lvwei and Pai Chung-hsi as the sort of men who might rally the
Chinese armies to greater efforts.
In this concluding section of this final report to President Roosevelt on July
10, a coalition is in fact suggested but not with the Communists. Instead Presi-
dent Roosevelt is urged to use American political influence to "support" the
"progressive banlving and commercial leaders," the "large group of western
trained men," and the "considerable group of generals and other ofhcers who are
neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry." In short I
urged President Roosevelt to help the Genelarissimo's government to help itself,
by bringing bacli to power the better men in the Chinese Nationalist ranks.
These better and more enlightened Nationalists, being more able to stand on their
own feet, were somewhere more independent of the Generalissimo than the ex-
treme pro-Asia groups. Hence it was necessary to point out to President Roose-
vlt that if the desired changes were made in the Chinese Nationalist govern-
ment, the Generalissimo's future would depend on his "political sensitivity,"
and his ability to make himself the real leader of the reconstituted administra-
tion. Internal reform at Chungking was, in short my proposed means of avoid-
ing the "revolution" and insuring the "evolution" that are referred to earlier
in this report of July 10. It is worth noting that the Generalissimo must have
been thinking along parallel lines, since the extremists began to lose their control
and Dr. Soong and General Chen Chang were brought back to power by the
Generalissimo himself during the same month that I rendered my report to
President Roosevelt.
Su;h were the recommendations, such was the direction of the influence of
my trip to the Far East in the spring of 1944. During the years immediately
following the end of the war my thinking about Chinese problems underwent a
sharp change. My views during this later period are known as are now my
views in 1944. Recent events have led me to the conclusion that my judgment in
1944 was the sound judgment. I append herewith a copy of the two-part Kun-
ming-Ntw Delhi cable of June 28 in the War Department paraphrase given to
me when I returned to Washington and of the final report to President Roose-
velt of July 10 as presented by me to him.
Wishing you health and strength in shouldering the tremendous burdens ahead,
Mrs. Wallace joins me in asking you to convey to Mrs, Truman and Margaret our
best regards,
Sincerely yours,
Henry A. Wallace.
JtJLY 10, 1944.
The Prestdent,
The White House.
Dear Mr. President : I am handing yoia herewith a report on my trip to the
Far East.
Sincerely yours,
H. A. Wallace.
July 10, 1944.
Summary Report of Vice President Wallace's Visit in China
Our first stop in China was at Tihua (Urumchi), capital of Sinkiang province.
The Governor, General Sheug Shih-tsai, is a typical warlord. The Government
is personal and carried out by thorough police surveillance. Ninety percent
(90%) of the population is non-Chinese, mostly Uighur (Turki). Tension be-
tween Chinese and non-Chinese is growing with little or no evidence of ability to
deal effectively with the problem. General Sheng, two years ago pro-Soviet, is
now anti-Soviet, making life extremely difficult for the Soviet Consul General
and Soviet citizens in Sinkiang.
There seems little reason to doubt that the difliculties in the early spring on the
Sinklang-Outer Mongolia border were caused by Chinese attempts to resettle
Kazak nomads who fied into Outer Mongolia, were followed by Chinese troops
who were driven back by Mongols. The Soviet Minister in Outer Mongolia
stated that Mongolian planes bombed points in Sinkiang in retaliation for
•Chinese bombings in Outer Mongolia. He did not appear concerned regarding
the situation now.
22848— 52— pt. 7 20
2290 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Soviet oflScials placed primary responsibility on General Sheng for their diflS-
culties in Sinkiang but gur Consul at Tihua and our Embassy officials felt that
Sheng was acting as a front for Chungking, willing or unwittingly. Sinkiang is-
an area which will bear close watching.
Due to bad weather at Chungking, we stopped for 2 hours at the large 20th
Bomber Command (B-29) airfield near Chengtu. The first bombing of Japan
had taken place only a few days before. We found morale good but complaint
was freely made of inability to obtain intelligence regarding weather and.
Japanese positions in north China and leak of intelligence to the Japanese.
Summary of conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is contained in a
separate memorandum. Principal topics discussed were : (1) Adverse military
situation which Chiang attributed to low morale due to economic difficulties and
to failure to start an all-out Burma offensive in the spring as promised at Cairo ;
(2) Relations with the Soviet Union and need for their betterment in order to
avoid possibility of conflict (Chiang, obviously motivated by necessity rather
than conviction, admitted the desirability of understanding with USSR, and re-
quested our good offices in arranging for conference) ; (3) Chinese Government-
Communist relations, in regard to which Chiang showed himself so prejudiced;
against the Communists that there seems little prospect of satisfactory or en-
during settlement as a result of the negotiations now under way in Chungking ;
(4) Dispatch of the Unit^^d States Army Intelligence Group to north China,,
including Communist areas, to which Chiang was initially opposed but on last
day agreed reluctantly but with apparent sincerity; (5) Need for reform in
China, particularly agrarian reform, to which Chiang agreed without much
indication of personal interest.
It was significant that T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions except as
an interpreter. However, in subsequent conversations during visits outside of
Chungking he was quite outspoken, saying that it was essential that something
"dramatic" be done to save the situation in China, that is was "five minutes to
midnight" for the Chungking government. Without being specific he spoke of
need for greatly increased United States Army air activity in China and for re-
formation of Chungking government. He said that Chiang was bewildered and
that there were already signs of disintegration of his authority. (Soong is
greatly embittered by the treatment received from Chiang during the past half
year.)
Conversations with Ambassador Gauss and other Americans indicated dis-
couragement regarding the situation and need for positive American leadership
in China.
Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent called on Dr. Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen.
Dr. Sun had little to contribute. He was obviously on guard. Madame Sun was
outspoken. She described undemocratic conditions to which she ascribed lack
of popular support for government ; said that Dr. Sun Fo should be spokesman
for liberals who could unite under his leadership; and advised Mr. Wallace tO'
speak frankly to President Chiang who was not informed of conditions in China.
Madame Sun's depth and sincerity of feeling is more impressive than her
political acumen but she is significant as an inspiration to Chinese liberals.
Dr. Sun Fo does not impress one as having strength of character required for
leadei'ship but the fact that lie is the son of Sun Yat-sen makes him a potential
front for liberals.
Mr. Vincent talked with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, former Foreign Minister and for
many years Ambassador in London, and to K. P. Chen, leading banker. They
see little hope in Chiang's leadership. Dr. Quo spoke in support of Sun Fo under
whom he thought a libei'al coalition was possible. Quo is an intelligent liut not
a strong character. K. P. Chen said that economic situation had resolved itself"
into a race against time ; that new hope and help before the end of the year might
be effective in holding things together.
Conversations with other Chinese officials in Chungking developed little of
new interest. The Minister of Agriculture (Shen Hung-lieh, who incidentally
knows little about agriculture) showed himself an outspoken anti-communist.
General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, also an anti-com-
munist, is influential as a political rather than a military general. Dr. Chen
Li-fu, Minister of Education, a leading reactionary party politician, also had
little to say. Ironically, he took Mr. Wallace to visit the Chinese Industrial Co-
operatives which be is endeavoring to bring under his control to, prevent tlieii'
becoming a liberalizing social influence.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2291
Convei-sations with provincial government oflBcials were also without much
significance. As an indication of political trends, there were unconfirmed re^
ports that the provincial officials in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provmces
were planning a coalition to meet the situation in the event of disintegration of
central government control. In Szechuan province the Governor, Chang Chun,
is a strong and loyal friend of President Chiang. The loyalty of military fac-
tions, however, is uncertain. In Kansu province the Governor, Ku Cheng-lun,
is a mild appearing reactionary who, during his days as Police Commissioner in
Nanking, earned the title of "bloody Ku."
Developments subsequent to conversations with General Chennault and Vin-
cent in Kunming and Kweilin have confirmed their pessimism with regard to
the military situation in east China. There was almost uniform agreement
among our "military officers that unification of the Ajnerican military effort irr
China, and better coordination of our effort with that of the Chinese, was abso-
lutely essential. It was also the general belief that, the Japanese having during
recent months made China an active theatre of war, it was highly advisable tO'
take more aggressive air action against such Japanese bases as Hankow, Canton,
Nanking and Shanghai. However, the factor of loss of Chinese life at those
places was recognized as an important consideration. It was the consensus
that Chinese troops, when well fed. well equipped, and well led, can be effectively
used. A number of Chinese generals were mentioned as potentially goad lead-
ers. Among them were Generals Chen Cheng, Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-
hsi.
In Outer-Mongolia there is considerable evidence of healthy progress, military
preparedness, and nationalistic spirit. Soviet influence is without doubt strong
but political and administrative control appear to be in the hands of the capable
Mongols. Any thought of resumption of effective Chinese sovereignty would
be unrealistic. On the contrary, it is well to anticipate considerable agitation
in Inner-Mongolia for union with Outer-Mongolia after the war.
Specific conclusions and recommendations regarding the situation in China
were incorporated in telegrams dispatched from New Delhi on June 28 (copies
attached).
We should bear constantly in mind that the Chinese, a nonfighting people,
have resisted the Japanese for seven years. Economic hardship and unin-
spiring leadership have induced something akin to physical and spiritual
anemia. There is widespread popular dislike for the Kuomintang government
But there is also strong popular dislike for the Japanese and confidence in
victory.
Chiang, a man with an oriental military mind, sees his authority threatened
by economic deterioration, which he does not understand, and by social unrest
symbolized in Communism, which he thoroughly distrusts ; and neither of which
he can control by military commands. He hoped that aid from foreign allies
would pull him out of the hole into which an unenlightened administration (sup-
ported by landlords, warlords and bankers) has sunk him and China.
Chiang is thorough "eastern" in thought and outlook. He is surrounded
by a group of party stalwarts who are similar in character. He has also, re-
luctantly, placed confidence in westernized Chinese advisers (his wife and T. V.
Soong are outstanding examples) with regard to foreign relations. Now he
feels that foreign allies have failed him and seeks in that and the "communist
menace" a scapegoat for his government's failure. His hatred of Chinese com-
munists and distrust of the USSR cause him to shy away from liberals. The
failure of foreign aid has caused him to turn away from his uncongenial "west-
ern" advisers and draw closer to the group of "eastern" advisers for whom he
has a natural affinity and for whom he has been for years more a focal point
and activating agent of policy than an actual leader.
At this time, there seems to be no alternative to support of Chiang. There is
no Chinese leader or group now apparent of sufficient strength to take over the
government. We can, however, while supporting Chiang, influence him in every
possible way to adopt policies with the guidance of progressive Chinese which
will inspire popular support and instill new vitality into China's war effort. At
the same time, our attitude should be flexible enough to permit utilization of
any other leader or group that might come forward offering greater promise.
Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has
the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of
postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now
seems more likely the latter.
2292 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Possible Policy Line Relative to Liberal Elements in China
Our policy at the present time should no the limited to support of Chiang.
It is essential to remember that we have in fact not simply been supporting
Chiang, but a coalition, headed by Chiang and supported by the landlords, the
M^arlord group most closely associated with the landlords, and the Kung group
of bankers.
We can, as an alternative, support those elements which are capable of form-
ing a new coalition, better able to carry the war to a conclusion and better
qualified for the postwar needs of China. Such a coalition could include
progressive banking and commercial leaders, of the K. P. Chen type, with a
competent understanding both of their own country and of the contemporary
Western world ; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not lim-
ited to perpetuation of the old, landlord-dominated rural society of China ; and the
considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient
to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry.
The emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting
•both American military aid and economic aid, and by the formulation and state-
ment of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and in regions
adjacent to China.
The- future of Chiang would then be determined by Chiang himself. If he
retains the political sensitivity and the ability to call the turn which originally
brought him to power, he will swing over to the new coalition and head it. If
not, the new coalition will in the natural course of events px'oduce its own leader.
Paraphrase of Vice President Wallace's Message to the President, Drafted in
Kunming June 26 and Dispatched From New Delhi About June 28
Message No. 1
The discussions between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and
those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking but the attitude
of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can
see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement. Chiang has assured me
that only "political" measures will be used to reach a settlement.
Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement in relations with Russia and for
our assistance in bringing about a meeting of representatives of China and
Russia. I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with
Russia.
The economic, political, and military situations in China are extremely dis-
couraging. The morale of the Chinese is low and demoralization is a possibility
with resulting disintegration of central authority. With regard to the economic
situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of
coping with it. However, a general collapse does not seem imminent. Insta-
bility and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of con-
fidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the
Kuomintang. With regard to the militai-y situation, I can only say that it might
be worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Potentialities and plans are in
existence for stiffening China's defense south of the city of Hengyang but there is
a serious threat that east China may be severed from contact with west China.
Morale in remaining free China would of course be aflf jcted by such a development.
Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 on the subject of a U. S. Army
observer group proceeding to north China to obtain military intelligence, Chiang
had informed me of his agreement to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could
be organized. After receipt of your telegram I again discussed the matter in
detail with Chiang. General Ferris, Chief of Staff in charge of General Stilwell's
Headquarters at Chungking, was present and we obtained what should prove to
be the full cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early dispatch and effective
operation of the group.
Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation ; bewild-
ered regarding the economic sitwation, and, while expressing confidence in his
army, distressed regarding military developments. Current military reverses are
attributed by him to low morale caused by economic difficulties. He is convinced
that a general offensive in Burma early this year would have bolstered the Chinese
will to resistance and have prevented military revei-ses. He has assured me that
the Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their ability but he displays
discouragement rather than optimism.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2293
Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better coordinated United States^
Government repi'esentation in China. In its military and related political aspects
our elt'ort in China requires more positive direction and closer cooperation with
the Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of operations against the
Japanese.
Message No. 2
There is a strong probability that east China will be severed from west China
in the near future. It is the general opinion that such a development can only be
prevented by unforeseeable chance. There are various estimates with regard to
the rapidity with which the Japanese may be able to carry out their intentions.
Although the time factor may be longer than most people seem to expect, I feel
that we should be prepared to see all of east China in Japanese hands within three
or four weeks.
The loss of east China will nullify our military effort in this area. It will also
prove a violent political and economic shock to the Chungking regime.
China may be rendered almost valueless as an Allied military base unless deter-
mined steps are taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular and military
morale, both seriously impaired already, must somehow be strengthened. A new
offensive effort must somehow be organized, primarily guerilla in character
probably.
It is necessary also to consider political forces. Disintegration of the Chung-
king regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways
which you will understand.
The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available infor-
mation to show you how serious is the situation. However, the situation is far
from hopeless and may actually be turned to both military and political advantage
if the right steps are taken promptly. The Generalissimo is alarmed, anxious for
guidance, and, I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if wisely approached.
Insecurity has undermined vested interests in the Government. It should be
possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the semblance of a united front
necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to
organize a new offensive effort.
As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal
representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton de Wiart ofv
cupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion
a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation.
An American General officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and
military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears
that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain
close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does
not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political
considerations. I do not think any oflScer in China is qualified to undertake the
assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should
not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to
a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the
latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions ;
(2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordina-
tion between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he com-
mand American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no
substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal di-
rectly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated
from General Stilwell's present command.
Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation
here to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should
be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can
assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.
While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of
General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his
visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.
I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number
of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular,
I regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views. Never-
theless, I am convinced of the need for the decisive action summarized in the
final paragraph of my previous message.
2294 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Amebican Legation,
Bern, Switzerland, March 7, 1950.
Hon. John E. Peueifoy,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
T>EAB Jack : I am sorry about all of the trouble that is being raised for you
as a result of charges made against the Department. You and the Secretary
have my full conlidence and support, if needed.
A friend has sent me a copy of the Congressional Record of February 20.
I gather that I have been "identified" in the press as Senator McCarthy's case
No. 2. I am, in fact, one of our "foreign ministers" although the job is hardly
what I would call "high brass." Also, I did misplace a piece of clothing one
time in 1946. But I must profess myself amazed that the incident became a
matter of record, if in fact it has as Senator McCarthy's story would seem to
imply. It was not my piece of clothing. It was a raincoat which some visitor
left behind in the Far Eastern Office, of which I was Director at the time, and
which hung there for weeks. One rainy day, having no coat with me, I put this
raincoat on to go to lunch. Returning, I stopped at a Department washroom
and forgot to take the raincoat when I left. Some days later, I recalled the
oversight and called the Building Guard Office, where I learned that the coat
Lad been found and turned over to the Department's Security or Control Office.
I have forgotten with whom I spoke in that office, but he informed me that there
was a piece of paper in the inside breast pocket containing writing in what
looked like Russian. I explained the history of the coat and asked whether the
writing gave a clue to ownership. He did not know, but subsequent examination
showed the writing, as I recall it, to be a practice or exercise in Russian word
endings or suffixes, presumably the work of someone studying Russian. The
coat was returned to the Far Eastern Ofl5ce. When we moved from Old State
to New State in 1947, I appropriated the coat and still have it. That is the
history of the "clothing." I shall be glad to return the raincoat to the real
owner, should his memory as to where he left it be revived by Senator McCarthy's
story.
As to the main portion of the Senator's statement, I must profess complete
ignorance. I have ne^ er acted directly or indirectly to provide espionage agents
of Russia, or any other country, with information in the State Department or
from any other governmental source. Therefore, the Senator's story, if it is
intended to apply to me, is simply not true. Furthermore, I do not believe there
were people in the Far Eastern Office capable of such action. No case of the
kind ever came or was brought to my attention.
So much for that. I do not know whether the Department has a "case history"
on me, but I would like to take this opportunity to let you have briefly a few
facts concerning me which may be unknown to you, and to state that there are
no other facts pertinent to the situation which is troubling Senator McCarth.v.
As to family, just in case the question should arise: My mother died when I
was a child. My father died in 1938. He was a real-estate agent and an active
member of the Baptist Church. My stepmother is 76; lives in Macon. Geor.eia ;
and is as active in the Baptist Church as her age (76) will permit. My brother
is a banker in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Sister is married to Rear Admiral
Allan E. Smith, USN, who recently rescued the USS Elissovri. I have various
and sundry cousins with whom I have virtually lost contact, but I have never
heard anything derogatory regarding them. I have two nephews who served in
the Armed Forces during the late war.
My wife has two brothers, John and Fred Slagle. They are in the insurance
business, one at Chicago and the other at Kansas City. Both, as I understand it,
are respected and sturdy Repulilicans. My wife's parents have been dead for
many years. So much for family.
As for myself: I have never joined any political organization, "front" or other-
wise. For one year, I think it was 194.5, I was made an honorary or noncon-
tributing member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Service abroad has made
it Impracticable to join a political party. I am a Jeffersonian democrat, a
Lincolnian republican, and an admirer since youth of Woodrow Wilson. I am
a member of the Cosmos Club, Washington, the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity,
and the Baptist Church.
I have never knowingly associated with American Communists or Communist
sympathizers. I say "American," because my official duties have from time to
time caused me to be in contact with foreign Communists. Chou En-Lai. for
instance (the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Regime), I met in the
house of Chang Kai-shek. He was head of a Liaison Mission to the Chungking
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2295
•Government during the war. Here and in Washington, before my assignment
here, and at other posts abroad, I have met foreign Communists at official or
social functions. Our relationships have been perfunctory, except where oflScial
business had to be transacted.
In 1944, I accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a mission to Cliina.
I went under instructions from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The pur-
pose in sending me was to make available to the Vice President my experience in
China, extending back over 20 years.
As you know, my association with Far Eastern affairs has been a subject of
intermittent press criticism. This was especially true while I was Director of
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs' (September 1945-August 1947). During that
time I served under Mr. James Byrnes and General Marshall, as Secretaries of
State. My job was to implement the Government's policies, not to make them.
It is immaterial that I found myself in accord with those policies. Had I not,
I would have still attempted to carry them out or asked to be removed from a
position where it was incumbent upon me to do so.
Any American, in public or private life, has a right to criticize our policies
toward China and in the Far East and elsewhere. He does not have the right
to impugn, simply on the basis of disagreeing with the policies themselves, the
motives or character of those who are charged with the duty of implementing
them. I have taken the oath of allegiance and loyalty to my country many
times during my twenty-five years of service. The last time was in 1947, as
U. S. Minister to Switzerland, after the Senate had confirmed my appointment.
One is free to question my ability ; but they cannot, in truth, question my
loyalty. My record of public service is clear and so is my conscience.
I regret very much the circumstances that have caused me to feel it necessary
to make this protest of innocence and loyalty but it is my belief that you and,
■if you approve, the public, have a right to expect a statement from me.
With best regard and best wishes.
Sincerely,
John Carter Vincent, American Minister.
Department of State,
January 6, 19Jp.
For the press. No. 8.
Following is the substance of a note delivered by the American Embassy at
Moscow on January 3, 1947, to the Soviet Foreign Oifice. A similar note has also
■been delivered by the American Embassy at Nanking to the Chinese Foreign
•Office.
"The American Government considers it desirable that the current unsatis-
factory situation with regard to the status and control of the port of Dairen be
promptly considered by the Cliinese and Soviet Governments with a view to
the implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Soviet-Chinese agree-
ment of August 14, 1945, in regard to Dairen. This Government perceives no
reason why there should be further delay in reopening the port, under Chin^^se
•administration, to international commerce as contemplated in the aforementioned
•agreement.
"The Government of the United States, while fully appreciating that this is a
matter for direct negotiation between the Chinese and Soviet Governments, feels
that it has a responsibility to American interests in general to I'aise the question
with the two directly interested Governments. It hopes that the abnormal con-
ditions now prevailing at Dairen may be terminated at an early date and that
normal conditions may be established which will permit American citizens to
visit and reside at Dairen in pursuit of their legitimate activities.
"In the foregong connection this Government also wishes to express the hope
that agreement can be reached soon for the resumption of traffic on the Chinese
Changchun Railway.
"It is believed that prompt implementation of the agreements with regard to
Dairen and the railway would constitute a major contribution to the reestablish-
ment of normal conditions in the Far East and the revival of generally beneficial
commercial activity. This Government therefore would be glad to have the
assurance of the Chinese and Soviet Governments that all necessary steps to this
end will be taken in the near future."
2296 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Enclosure to Letter, January 22, 1952, to Senator McCarran Regarding JoHif
Carter Vincent
Department of State,
October 5, 1945.
For the press. No. 732
Confidential release for publication at 7 p. m., e. s. t., Saturday, October 6, 1945.
Not to be previously published, quoted from, or used in any way
Following is the text of an NBC network broadcast from the State, War, and
Navy Departments, the 34th in a series entitled Our Foreign Policy.
Subject: "Our Occupation Policy for Japan."
Participants :
1. Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs for the War
Department.
2. Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the OflSce of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, and Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee-
of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.
3. Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. Navy, representative of the Navy Depart-
ment, on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy
Coordinating Committee.
4. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air.
Announcer. Here are headlines fi-om Washington :
General Hilldring says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese big business, will be broken
up; states we will not permit Japan to rebuild her big combines; promises pro-
tection of Japanese democratic groups against attacks by military fanatics.
John Carter Vincent of State Department forecasts end of National Shinto;
says that the institution of the Emperor will have to be radically modified, and
that democratic parties in Japan will be assured rights of free assembly and
free discussion.
Captain Dennison of Navy Department says Japan will not be allowed civil
aviation ; predicts that Japanese will eventually accept democracy, and em-
phasizes naval responsibility for future control of Japan.
Announcer. This is the 34th in a series of programs entitled Our Foreign
Policy, featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Govern-
ment officials and members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people
of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women
overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces
Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available.
Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.
This time ,we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on
"Our Occupation Policy for Japan." Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent,
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department ; Major
General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department,
and Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the
Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.
They will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University
of the Air. Mr. Fisher. « * *
Fisher. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio and gen-
eral public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has
served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the
dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.
Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much
of the confusion surrounding this debate. But it also raised many questions —
questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have
asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned — the State, War,
and Navy Departments — to interpret further our Japan policy. Here in the
studio are three men who help to formulate or to execute this policy from day
to day. General Hilldring is an executive in his capacity as Director of the
War Department. Tonight the general is sustituting for the Honorable John J.
McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, who was originally scheduled to speak
but who is not now in Washington. Mr. Vincent is chairman of the Far Eastern
subcommittee which formulates our Japan policy for the approval of the State,
War and Navy Coordinating Committee, and Captain Dennison is a Navy member
of this same Subcommittee. All three of our guests are "up to their ears," so
to speak, in the spadework of formulating our occupation policy for Japan.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2297
General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least,
that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy
for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that policy is
determined.
Hilldring. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will
try to explain how it is made. The State, War and Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee— "SWING," we call it — formulates policy for the President's approval,
on questions of basic importance. On the military aspect, the views of the Joint
Chiefs of StafC are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry
the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation
forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out.
And we think he is doing it very well.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern Subcommittee of which you are chair-
man does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.
Vincent. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far
Eastern policy, and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters.
We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with
which General Hilldring is associated and which Captain Dennison and I sit
with in an advisory capacity.
Hilldring. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the
Secretaries of the three Departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James
Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secre-
tary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, a lot of people would like to know whether there is a —
shall we say — strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State
Department.
Vincent. No ; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There
is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and
the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our
support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.
Fisher. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian
advisers.
Vincent. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists
have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has
wfelcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with
specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to
send more and more such people out.
FiSHEE. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, Captain
Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation.
Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and
voice in, our policy for Japan.
Dennison. We have a vital interest in it. The large part that the Navy was
called upon to play in the defeat of Japan is a measure of that interest. Japan
is an island country separated from us by a broad expanse of ocean. Its con-
tinued control will always present a naval problem.
Fisher. What part is the Navy playing now in that control?
Dennison. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty
they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General Mac-
Arthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in Civil Affairs
administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former
Japanese Mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.
Fishek. Including Okinawa?
Dennison. Yes.
Fisher. That's not generally known, is it?
Dennison. No, I believe not. I'd like to add that besides these immediate
duties, our Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan, where neces-
sary, long after our troops are withdrawn.
Fisher. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee which drafts our occupation policy, to give us in a word a statement of our
over-all objectives.
Vincent. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces
and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize J.^pan — to
encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not
again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.
Fisher. And how long do you think that will take, Mr. Vincent?
Vincent. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the
Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue
2298 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue
until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its
form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American
democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic
tendencies.
Fisher. General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?
HiLLDRiNG. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of
clairvoyance I don't possess. I .iust don't know how long it will take to accom-
plish our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required,
until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.
Fisher. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and
the Soviet Union, participate in formulating occupation policy and in carrying
out the actual occupation?
Hilldring. That is not a question which the soldiers should decide. It involves
matters of hi?h policy on which the Army must look to the State Department.
I be'ieve Mr. Vincent should answer that question.
Fisher. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?
Vincent. Immediately following the Japanese surrender the United States
proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Commission as a means of regularizing
and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested
in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced from
London that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies
for the control of Japan. In addition to the four principal powers in the Far
East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the
Commission.
Fisher. Coming back to our first objective — General Hilldring, what about
the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?
Hilldring. Disarmament of the Japanese foi'ces in the four main islands is
virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning dis-
armed troops to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems
and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.
Fisher. And the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?
Hilldring. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on
shipping are urgent and the return of our own troops is the highest proirity. Re-
lief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated ; the return of Jaip-
anese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.
Fisher. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the
Japanese forces scattered through Asia?
Dennison. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close
to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for
the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.
Fisher. And what is to be done with the Japanese Navy**
Dennison. Such remnants as are left might well be destroyed.
Fisher. Now, there are some other less obvious parts of the military system —
the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecut-
ing liberal, antimilitarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be
done about that?
Vincent. That vicious system will be abolished. Not only the top chiefs, but
the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its hold on the
Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have
to be substituted for it.
Dennison. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force,
and not an army in the guise of police.
Hilldring. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already
abolished the Kempai and political police.
Fisher. It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent,
is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese govern-
ment from the Emperor on down.
Vincent. One of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the
constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the constitution which would hamper
the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible only to the
people of Japan must be removed.
Fisher. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?
Vincent. The institution of the Emperor — if the Japanese do not choose to
get rid of it — will have to be radically modified.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2299
Dennison. The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and
will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives
sent to General MacArthur establish that point.
FisiiER. Can you give us the sense of the directive that covers that point,
Captain Dennison?
Den>'ison. I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur
said, "1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule
the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission.
Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an uncondi-
tional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any
question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.
"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to
the extent that sucli an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does
not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the
orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem neces-
sary, including the use of force." That's the directive under which General
MacArthur is operating.
FisHEK. That's clear enough. Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with
our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference
between them?
Hir.LDiaNO. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Re-
duced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again
breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of
control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national govern-
ment, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government and
our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.
FisifEK. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of
the national government in Japan?
HiLi.DUiNC,. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the
national government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese gov-
ernment available to our use. we would have to operate directly the whole com-
plicated machine required for the administration of a counti-y of seventy mil-
lion people. These people differ from us in language, customs and attitudes. By
cleaning up and using the Japanese government machinery as a toui, we are
saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we
are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing
the specifications.
Fisher. But some peo[ile argue. General, that by utilizing the Japanese gov-
ernment, we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't
this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry
persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?
Hilldring. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Ja-
panese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy
I'equires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be re-
moved. The desires of the Japanese government in this respect are immaterial.
Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.
Dennison. Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not
to support it. It's lai'gely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to
feel out the situation.
FiSHEK. Would you say. Captain Dennison. that when our forces first went
to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?
Dennison. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General
MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has corres-
pondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.
Fisher. He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians.
Ml' Vincent. Some of them look pretty guilty to me.
Vincent. The old gang is on its way out. The Higashi-Kuni Cabinet resigned
this week, of course. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be
like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the
last onf^. If any Japanese offi'ial is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to
hold office, of course, he will go out.
Fisher. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet be tried as war
criminals?
2300 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Vincent. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we
can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being
war criminals will be arrested and tried. Even Cabinet status would be no
protection.
HiLLDRiNG. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they
are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jaclison is
applying in Germany are being used in Japan.
Dennison. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they
are punished — not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.
Fisher. All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion,
let me ask you this : Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu — the big indus-
trialists— who have cooperated with the militarists, and profited by the war,
among the guilty ?
Dennison. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall
that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.
Fisher. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrial-
ists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?
Hilldring. Under our policy, all fascists and jingos — militarists — will be
removed, not only from public oflBce but from positions of trust in industry and
education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's
war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. There's
no other way to accomplish it.
Fisher. What do you say about the Zaibatsu, Mr. Vincent?
Vincent. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those
members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General
Hilldring has said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines
have over the economy of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo,
and Tasuda, to name the most prominent.
Fisher. And the financial combines as well?
Vincent. Yes. General Mac-Arthur, as you've probably heard, has already
taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them
of their loot.
Fisher. Well, there's no feeling of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu"
here. * * * Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?
Dennison. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr.
Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and
arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occu-
pation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about
this war, the Zaibatsu or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war
criminal.
Fisher. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany
has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farben-
industrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in
Japan. What about that?
Hilldring. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are not rebuilding the big
trusts in Germany, we have not rebuilt them, and we are not going to rebuild
them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only
will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans
or Japanese to do so.
Fisher. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?
Hilldring. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions or implements of war, as well as
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a
modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel,
as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment and automotive
equipment.
Vincent. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese econ-
omy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under
our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural
resources to the ends of peaceful living.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers,
for example?
Vincent. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving
their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing,
and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2301
work to do in every city. And we have no intention of interfering with any
attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll
give them all the encouragement we can.
Fisher. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of
heavy war industry?
Vincent. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries that Japan is allowed
to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy
will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more
and more for their domestic market.
Fisher. They'll have to have some foreign trade, of course, to keep going.
Vincent. Of course, but not the unhealthful sort they had before the war,
A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military
preparations, and not to support her internal economy ; after all, scrap iron and
oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign
trade well below the prewar level and still have a standard of living comparable
to what they had before the war.
Fisher. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over
there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our
policy be on food?
Hilldring. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does
not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this
winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other
occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy popu-
lations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that
might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The
Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.
Fisher. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going
to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?
Dennison. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy — that's
the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships
shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's
imports, in order to keep her from rearming — and the best way to do that may
be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.
Fisher. Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of
people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some
Japanese transports planes to resume operations.
Dennison. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General
MacArthur's directive in this field, no civil aviation will be permitted in Japan.
Vincent. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific
emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.
Fisher. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of
the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big indus-
trialists will be?
Vincent. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agri-
culture on a more democratic economic base. Our policy favors a wider distribu-
tion of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But
those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself — and
will, I have no doubt.
Fisher. And the labor unions? What about them?
Vincent. We'll encourage the development of trade unionism, Mr. Fisher,
because that's an essential part of democracy.
Fisher. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals
are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?
Vincent. General INIacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons
imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.
Fisher. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces
in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?
Dennison. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among
the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a
constructive reform program.
Vincent. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured
the rights of free assembly and public discussion. The occupation authorities
are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties.
The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to
freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.
Fisher. I take all this to mean that all democratic and antimilitarist groups
will all be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group
tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?
2302 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Vincent. It would be wiped out. One of General MacArthur's directives calls
for '"the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says
that "changes in the direction of modifjing authoritarian tendencies of the
government are to be permitted and favored."
Fisher. And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to
attain their objectives?
Vincent. In that event, the U. S. Supreme Commander is to intervene only
where necessary to pi'otect our own occupation forces. This implies that to
achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese may even use force.
Dennison. We are not interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as such.
I think we should make that doubly clear.
Fisher. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been
the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand
that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting
together in one party — a Socialist Party. What stand will we take on that,
General Hilldring?
HiLLDRiNG. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every
encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in
Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attacks by military
fanatics.
Fisher. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way
for the democratic forces.
Hilldring. We're prepared to support tlie development of democratic govern-
ment even though some temporary disorder may result — so long as our troops
and our over-all objectives are not endangered.
F^isHER. Mr. Vincent, will we do anything about reforming Japan's election
laws?
Vincent. The Japanese themselves have already advocated some reforms in
the election laws, to reduce the age of male voters from 25 to 20, and to permit
women of 2.5 years and over to vote. We'll give every encouragement to such
reforms ; but they can be brought about by the Japanese people themselves, if
they have a government that does more than pay lip service to democracy.
Fisher. 1 have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will
be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that is called National
Shinto?
Vincent. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not
to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, insofar as it is directed by the
Japanese Government, and is a measure enforced from above by the government,
is to be done away with. People would not be taxed to support National Shinto
and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools. Shintoism as a state
religion — National Shinto, that is — will go.
Fisher. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.
Vincent. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemina-
tion of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will
be completely suppressed. And the Japanese Government will be required to
cease financial and other support of Shinto establishments.
Fisher. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That
will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.
Vincent. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their
schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalist leanings
are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.
Dennison. That's where the real change must stem from — the school system.
The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes
for the older generation as well.
Fisher. And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.
Dennison. How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives
into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through
all channels — school texts, press, radio, and so on.
Fisher. What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?
Dennison. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many
Japanese outside of Japan. The Japanese-Americans in Hawaii used to send
their children to Japan at the age of about seven, I think, to spend a year with
their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the
life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii
comnletely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during
the war.
Fisher. What accounts for that loyalty?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2303
Dennison. Simply that they liJce life in America better. At that age, it's the
Ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they lilie. Well, I believe that the
people in Japan will like our ways, too. I thinli once they have a taste of them —
of real civil liberties — they'll never want to go back to their old ways.
HiLLDRiNG. Im inclined to agree. Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possi-
ble we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the
people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack — they've
been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated
with one basic idea : obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.
Vincent. Or it may make it more dlfiicult, General. It depends on how you
look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if
they're to have a real, working democracy.
HiLLDRiNG. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight.
And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.
Fisher. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese
under the occupation?
Vincent. Well, recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned
to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good
•evidence of a willingness to cooperate witli the occupying forces. But, because
of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and
encouragement will bring about tlie emergence of sound democratic leadership.
We shouldn't try to "hustle the East," or liustle General MacArthur, too much.
Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process,
wisely initiated and carefully fostered.
Fisher. Well thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you. General Hilldring
and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupa-
tion policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic
policy — one which is aimed at giving no encouragement to the impei'ialistic, and
every possible encouragement to tlie prodemocratic forces whicli are now begin-
ning to reappear in Japan.
Announcer. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of
the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the
Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department ; Major General John H.
Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department ; and Captain R. L. Denni-
son, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War
and Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by
Selden Menet'ee. * * * This was the 34th of a series of broadcasts on
Our Foreign Policy, presented as a public service by the NBC University of the
_Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at ten cents each in
coin. If you would like to receive copies of the br-oadcasts, send $1.00 to
cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large
orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City,
New York 20, New York. (Let me repeat that address for those of you who wish
to write it down : Send your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio
City, New York 20, New York. Ten cents in coin for one broadcast, $1.00 for
a series of thirteen reprints.)
NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to
present a special State Department program on our Latin-American policy,
with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the Inter-American Con-
ference at Rio de Janiero. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State
Spruille Eraden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O.
Briggs, Director of the Office of American Repub'ic Affairs. Listen in next week
at the same time for this important program. Kennedy Ludlam speaking, from
\Washington, D. C. ♦ * *
INDEX TO PART VII
Note.- — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organ-
ization in this index.
A
Page
Acheson, Dean 2002, 2124, 2127, 2158, 2188, 2218, 2250, 2272, 2288
Adenauer, Chancellor 2188
Adler, Solomon 2214, 2215, 2250
AFL (American Federation of Labor) 2161
Allied High Commission 2184,2188
Allied Powers 2089, 2090, 2091, 2164, 2167,
2170, 2184, 2186, 2187, 2236, 2237, 2281, 2282, 2284, 2285, 2298, 2299
Alsop, Joseph 2031, 2070, 2084, 2280
Amerasia 2088, 2089, 2090, 2092, 2110, 2111, 2114, 2120, 2121,
2148, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2182, 2183, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2191, 2213, 2241
American Association for the United Nations 2139
American B-29's 2060
American Bar Association 2270
American Civil Liberties Union 2160
American Council (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2006,
2014, 2015, 2016, 2093, 2096, 2115, 2116, 2133, 2245, 2246, 2247.
American Delegation (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2104,2127,2133
American Embassy (Moscow) 2295
American Federation of Labor (AFL) 2161
American Federation of Teachers National Convention 2161, 2162
American Government 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2026, 2052, 2057, 2058,
2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176,
2177, 2183, 2187? 2193, 2207, 220S, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2215,
2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295
American Legation (Bern) 2294
American Navy 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180, 2181,
2182, 2193, 2203, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296
American Progressives 161
American Psychology Society . 2162
Annual Foreign Trade Convention (Waldorf-Astoria Hotel) 2256
AP (Associated Press) 2188, 2255, 2273
Armed Forces Radio Service 2162, 2296
Army Intelligence Group (United States) 2051,2060,2070,2071,2290
Armed Forces (United States) 2001
2007, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070-2072,
2075, 2076, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193,
2197-2199, 2200-2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2250, 2252,
2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301.
Associated Press (AP) 2188, 2255, 2273
Atcheson, George 2076, 2102
Atkinson, Ellen 2116
Atwood, Stanley 2161
Austern, Hilda . 2115
Australian Government 2013-2016, 2170
Australian Legation (Washington) 2125
B
Bacon, Miss Ruth 2036
Bailey, K. H 2124, 2125
Ballantine, Joseph W 2106, 2120, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2141
Bank of Japan 2231
I
22848— 52— pt. 7 21
II INDEX
Page
Baptist Church 2294
Bai-nett, Robert W 2248
Barnett, Mrs. Robert W 2248
Bay Region Committee (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2138, 2139
B.'lirstocls, Artlmr 2254
Belshaw, Horace 2124, 2126, 2141
Bentley, Elizabeth 2215
Benton, Mr. William 2158
Berendsen, Sir Carl 1 2248
Berlin Diary 2103
Between War and Peace 2193
Bevin, Ernest 2169, 2170
Bisson, T. A 1998, 2005, 2222
Blair Lee House 2122, 2124, 2129, 2143
Blakeslee, George H 2017, 2124
Blenman, Commander William 2180-2182
Bloody Ku (Ku Cheng-lun) 2291
Bloom, Sol 2124, 2127, 2129, 2131, 2132
Bolshevik 2270
Bolton, Mrs. Frances 2124, 2127, 2133, 2248
Bomber Command (20th, Airfield) 2290
Borton, Huiih 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245
Braden, Spruille 2260, 2303
Briggs, Ellis O 2169, 2303
British Foreign Office 2250
British Government 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2090, 2091, 2125,
2104, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2265, 2297
British Troops (Hong Kong) 2017
Budenz, Louis Francis 2092, 2274, 2276, 2279, 2280
Bunce, Arthur C 2249, 2250
Bunche, Ralph 2124
Bvington, Homer M 2186
Byrnes, James F 2120, 2124, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2197, 2198,
2199, 2200, 2201, 2203, 2204, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2251, 2257, 2295, 2298
Cairo Declaration 2207, 2209, 2210
California University ^ 2109
Cammon, Mr. Schuyler 2248
Canadian Government 2170
Canton-Kowloon Railway 2090, 2091
Carmode. Mr 2250
Carter, Edward C— 1998,2020,2087,2115,2116,2124,2126,2127,2146,2246,2248
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 2020,2021
Carter W. D 2248
Caxton Printers 2283
Central Chinese Government 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187, 2201, 2218
Central Committee (CPSU) 2270
Central Labor Council, AFL (Seattle Teachers Union) 2161
Chambers, Whittaker 2215
Changchun Railway 2295
Chang, Cliun 2291
Cliang, Fa-kwei 2289, 2291
Chase, Mr 2088
Chen, Cheng 2288, 2291
Chen, K. P 2290, 2292
Chen, Li-fu 2253, 2254, 2290
Chennault, Gen. C. L 2031, 2076, 2287, 2291, 2293
Chiang Kai-shek 2010, 2013, 2028, 2030, 2031,
2034, 2035, 2037, 2039, 2040-2043, 2045-2049, 2051, 2052, 2055-2061,
2083, 2064-2069, 2071-2074, 2081, 2086, 2087, 2095, 2103, 2104, 2186,
2201, 2206, 2207, 2216, 2217-2218, 2220, 2243, 2254, 2255, 2287-2294
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame 2045, 2061, 2062, 2065, 2078, 2081, 2291
Chiang, Mon-lin 2124, 2125
Childs, Marquis 2248
INDEX in
Page
•^^China Aid Council ^_ 2020, 2059
China Mission (Henry Wallace Summary Report) 2037, 2038, 2080, 2081
Chinese Clianwlnm Railway 2295
Chinese Communist Guerrilla Troops 2090, 2143, 2186, 2206, 2209, 2211
•Chinese Embassy (Hong Kong) 2125
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 2290
Chinese National Assembly 2259
Chinese National Military Council 2J18
Chinese Nationalist Army 2012,
2073, 2090, 2143, 2202, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212
Chinese Nationalist Goverment 2001,
2010-2013, 2044, 2046, 2056-2059, 2070, 2071, 2077, 2078, 2082, 2090,
2091, 2094, 2102, 2103-2120, 2170, 2173, 2186, 2187, 2194. 2116, 2202,
2204-2213, 2215-2217, 2219, 2250, 2253-2256, 2288, 2289, 2293, 2295
Chinese Republic 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215
Chinese Stabilization Fimd 2214
Chou En-lai 2000, 2001, 2002, 2186, 2294
Christian Science Monitor 2185,2186
Chungking Embassy 1999,
2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188
Churchill, Winston 2009, 2293
CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) 2242
Civil Affairs (United States War Department) 2162,2169,2296,2303
•Civil Information and Education (Tokyo) 2255
Clare, Mr 2267
Clayton, Will 2124, 2127, 2128, 2259, 2268
Clubb, Oliver Edmund 11,98
Coffee, John M 2243
Cohen, Ben - 2218
Colclough, Capt. O. S 2181
Columbia University 2-40
Combat Intelligence (Navy Department) 2181
Committee for Constitutional Government in New York 2283
Committee for a Democratic Far p]astern Policy 2058
Committee on Foreign Affairs (United States House of Representatives 2129,
2131
Committee for Financing Foreign Trade 2260
Committee on Foreign Relations (United States Senate) 1997,
2129, 2131, 2201, 2203
Commonwealth Club (San Francisco) 2237
Communications Division (Navy Department) 2181
Communism-Marxism-Leninism 2270
Communist International 2066, 20r)7
Communist International (Workers of All Countries, United) 2066
Communist Manifesto 2270
Communist Party 20"0,
2001, 2010, 2013, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2026-2028, 2039-2041, 2044-2055,
2057-2059, 2061-2064, 2066-2073, 2075-2078, 2082, 2083, 2085, 2')89,
2091-2095, 2100-2103, 2112. 2121, 21:6. 2146, 2156, 2157, 2160, 2161,
2172-2180, 2185-2187. 2190-2195. 2206-2209. 2211, 2212, 2214-2220,
2243, 2253, 2254, 2270, 2273, 2279, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295
Communist Party (China) 2000,
2001, 20010-2013, 2022-2026, 2039-2047, 20 !9, 2051-20:8, 2061-2073,
2075-2078, 2082. 2083, 2094, 2102, 2103, 2146, 2177, 2185, 21S6, 2195,
2206, 2212, 2216-2219, 2243, 2254, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294.
Communist Party (Fi-ance) 2010
Communist Party (Italy) 1011
Communist Party (Japan) 2089,
2091, 2121, 2160, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179,
2180, 2185, 2187, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193.
Communist Party (New York State Committee) 2243
Communist I'arty (Russia) 2047, 2066, 2067, 20^5, 2179, 2270
Communist Party (United States) 2046,
2047, 2049, 2053, 2054, 2112, 2160, 2161, 2214, 2215, 2243, 2279,
2294.
IV INDEX
Page
Comparison of the Communist Party line and tlie activities and affiliations
of certain professors at the University of Washington 2160,
2161, 2162, 2]vS3
Congress (United States) 2127, 2131, 2132, 2162, 2243, 2296
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 2242
Congressional Record 2237, 2294
Connally, Tom 2124, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134
Connor, King Ramsey 2161
Cmistitution. (SS) steamship 2273
Continuation of discussion on Comrade Dimitrov's report 2066
Cooke, Admiral Charles Maynard 2013
Cooperative Societies Law (Japan) 2234
Cornell University 2255
Cosmos Club 2294
Council of American-Soviet Friendship 2086, 2087
Coville, Lillian 2116, 2248
Cox, Oscar 20O4
Currie, Lauchlin 2002,
2003, 2004, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2079, 2081, 2082, 2086, 2087
Crowley, George T 2004
Currie Report 2082
D
Daily Worker 2161
Davies, John Paton, Jr 2003
DeLacy, Hush 2160, 2161
Democratic Party — 2294
Dennett, Raymond , 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2079, 2080, 2093, 2094, 2100, 2124,
2127, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2150.
Dennison, Capt. R. L 2157,
2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2296-2303.
Detroit American Federation of Teachers Convention 2162
Dickey, Mr 2124
Dickover, Mr 2124
Diet (Japan) 2231, 2234
Dilemma in Japan j* 2243
Dimitrov Report (continuation of discussion) 2066
Dooman, Eugene C 2124, 2127, 2153, 2155, 2193, 2250
Douglas, Helen Gahagan 2248
DuBois, Mr. (Josiah) 2222
DuBois, Miss Cora 2248
Dumljarton Oaks 2135
Dunn, James C 2124,2127,2163,2193,2297
Dyke, Gen. Ken R 2248
E
Eastern Germany 2184
Eaton, Mr 2124
Eby, Harold 2161
Edwards, Corwin D 2222, 2225
Edwards Report 2222, 2225
Eggleston, Sir Frederic 2124, 2125
Eighth Route Army 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187
Elliston, Herbert 2248
Embree, John 2248
Emmerson, John K 2003,2063,2156,2248
Emperor of Japan__ 2094, 2095, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2170, 2174, 2176, 2296, 2298, 2299
Empress of China (SS) (steamship) 2256
Ensels 2270
Epstein. Israel 2063, 2243, 2266
Ethel, Garland 2161
European Affairs Office (State Department) 2127
Export-Import Bank 2263,2264, 2288
INDEX V
F
Page
Fail-bank, Johu K 2018
Far East 2121
Far East Subcommittee of State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee
( FESWNCC) 2152, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297
Far Eastern Commission (FEC) 2125
2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298
Far Eastern Commission Policy (Economic Power in Japan) 2224
Farley, Miriam S 2017,2018,2022
Farmer, Victor 2124, 2125
Farquharson . 2160-
Fascist Party 2160, 2166, 2174
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 2112,2117,2148,2242
FEA (Foreign Economic Administration) 2002,2003,2004,2006,2087
P'earey, Mr 2124
FEC (Far East Commission) 2125
2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2112,2117,2148,2242
Federal German Government 2185^
Ferris, General 2074, 2075, 2292
FESWNCC (Far East Subcommittee of State, War, Navy Coordinating
Committee) 2152, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297
Field, Fredericli V 2219, 2220, 2221
Fish, Mr 2278
Fisher, Sterling. 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2171, 2175, 2296, 2303
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2105
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) 2002,2003,2004,2006,2087
Foreign Policy Association 2193
Foreign Relations Committee (United States Senate) 1997
Foreign Service (United States) 2029,2101,2105,2144,2241,2244,2272
Foreign Service Journal 2240,2242
Foreign Trade (Committee for Financing) 2260
Forman, Harrison 2185, 2186
Fortas, Abe 2248
Forty-fourth Street Book Fair 2243
Foundations of Leninism 2270
Fox, Manuel 2214
French Government 2010, 2170
Friedman, Julian R 2105, 2106, 2107, 2109, 2113, 2114, 2120, 2124, 2241, 2266
G
Gates, Artemus 2163, 2297
Gauss, Clarence E 2029,
2045, 2063, 2075, 2088, 2178, 2185, 2187, 2188, 2248, 2288, 2290
Gayn, Mark 2144
Geneva Conference (United Nations) 2267
George Washington University 2127
Gerig. Benjamin 2248
German Federal Government 2185
German Government (Western) 2184
German police 2184, 2185, 2188
German trusts 2166, 2300
Germany (Eastern) 2184
Germany (Soviet zone) 2184
Gibarti, Louis 2005, 2006
Gipson, J. H 2283
Goglidze, Sergei 2083, 2084, 2085
Government of Australia 2013-2016, 2170
Government of Canada 2170
Government of France 2010, 2170
Government of Great Britain 2013-2017
2090, 2091, 2125, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207, 2208-2212, 2265, 2297
Government of Italy 2011
Government of Japan 2000, 2043, 2044, 2052, 2068, 2069, 2071, 2076, 2089,
2091, 2094, 2145, 2153 2154, 2157, 2160, 2162, 2104. 2165, 2167, 2168,
2170, 2172-2176, 2208, 2226, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2283, 2285, 2299, 2301
VI INDEX
Pagfr-
Government of the Netherlands 2170
Government of New Zealand 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2170
Government of the Philippines 2170, 2258
Government of the United States 2012, 2014, 2015-2017,
2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093,
2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193, 2207, 2208-2213, 2215,
2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295-
Government pouch 2103
Granich, Max 2074-
Graves, Mortimer 2087, 2214, 2248
Graves. Mrs. Mortimer 2248
Great Wall of China 2206;
Green, Abner 2242
Green, Gretchen 2115-
Greenslade, Admiral John W 2136,2138,2139,2140
Greenstein, Joseph 2220^
Gregg, Joseph 2220'
Grew, Joseph C 2068,
2079, 2080, 2081, 2106, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2129, 2143, 2193
Guerrilla troops (Chinese Communists) 2090,2143,2186,2206,2209,2211
Guild Book Center 2248-
Gundlach, Ralph H 2161, 2162
Gyaw, Sir Htoon Aung 2124,2125.
H
Hackwith, George 2124. 2127
Haley, Mr 2124
Harriman, Ambassador W. Averell 2041-2044
Harris, George 2248
Hart, Admiral T. C. (Senator) 2124,2127,2248
Hattery, Lowell 2248
Herald Tribune (New York) 2185, 2186--
Hicks, Victor 2161
Higashi-Kuni Cabinet (Japan) 2166.2299^
Hilldring, Gen. John H 2157-2159, 2162-2169, 2171, 2222, 2223. 2296-2303-
Hiss, Alger 2135, 2136-2138, 2140, 2141-2142, 2241
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 2270'
Ho Ying-Chin 2074, 2290
Holding Company Liquidating Commission (Japan) 2225,2229'
Holland, W. L 2018, 2245
Holmes, J-ulius 2124, 2127
Holt, Miss Clare 2248-
Houan campaign 2090, 2091
Hoover Library (Stanford University) 2250
Hornbeck, Stanley K 2017, 2097, 2099, 2135^
Home, Admiral F. J 2139
Hot Springs Conference (IPR) 2104,.
2123, 2130, 2132, 2133, 2140, 2151, 2219
House of Representatives (United States) 2127,2132
House Un-American Activities Committee 2117, 2160, 2215-
-Hoy Lee Chin, General 2253
Ho, Ying-Ohin 2074, 2290'
Hu, Chung-nan 2186-
Hull, Cordell 2033-2035
2045, 2079, 2081, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2181, 2187, 2188, 22S7, 2295
Humelsine, Carlisle H 2202, 2203, 2267, 2268, 2271, 2272, 2278
Hurley, Ambassador 2000, 2063, 2094, 2107, 2117, 2143, 2144
Ickes, Harold L 2243,2248
Institute of Pacific Relations 1997
1998, 2004-2006, 2014-2020, 2023-2025, 2050. 2059, 2080, 2093. 2096,
2097-2101. 2104, 2114-2119, 2122-2124, 2127-2134. 2136, 2139, 2140.
2141. 2144, 2146-2148, 2150, 2151, 2219, 2245-2250, 2266-2269, 2294
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 2006,
2014, 2015, 2016, 2093, 2096, 2115. 2116, 2133, 2245, 2246, 2247.
INDEX vn
Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (American delegation) 2104,2127,2133,2147
Institute of Pacific Relations (Bay region committee) 2138,2139
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs conference) 2104,
2123, 2130, 2132, 2133, 2140, 2151, 2219
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York research staff) 1998
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine delegation) 2125
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington branch) 1998,2248
Intelligence Group (United States Army) 2051,2060,2070,2071,2290
Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan 2258
Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janiero) 2303
Italian Government 2011
Jaffe, Philip J 2113
James, Burton 2161
James, Florence B 2161
Japanese-American Committee for Democracy (JACD) 2238,
2239, 2240, 2242, 2243
Japanese-Americans ( Hawaii ) 2168, 2332
Japanese Army 2090, 2091, 2092, 2164, 2204, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2298
Japanese Cabinet (Higashi-Kuni) 2166,2299
Japanese Cooperative Societies Law 2234
Japanese Diet 2231, 2234
Japanese Emperor__ 2094, 2095, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2170, 2174, 2176, 2296, 2298, 2299
Japanese Government 2000,
2043, 2044, 2052, 2068, 2069, 2071, 2076, 2089, 2091, 2094, 2145, 2153,
2154, 2157, 2160, 2162, 2164, 2165, 2167, 2168, 2170, 2172, 2173, 2174,
2175, 2176, 2208, 2226, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2283, 2285, 229Q, 2301.
Japanese Holding Company Liquidating Commission 2225, 2229
Japanese Ministry of Finance 2231
Japanese Navy 2164, 2298
Japanese Postal Savings System 2231
Japanese school system 2168
Japanese secret police — 2164, 2298
Japanese surrender policy 2145,
2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
Jefferson Book Store 2243
Jefferson School 2243
Jenkins, Mrs. Shirley 2248
Jessup, Philip C 2104
Johns Hopkins University 2145, 2146
Johnson, Hiram 2124, 2127
Johnson, Nelson T 2224
Johnstone, William C 2080, 2124, 2127, 2147, 2248
Johnstone, Mrs. William C 2248
Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States) 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297
Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities
(Second Report of 1948 on Un-American Activities in the State of
Washington) 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Joint Soviet-American Commission 2258
K
Kauffman, James Lee 2223, 2224
Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark 2248
King, Fleet Admiral E. J 2181
Knowland, William F 2237
Koo, Ambassador Wellington 2256
Korean Military Government 2249, 2250
Ku, Cheng-lun (Bloody Ku)— 2291
Kung Group 2292
Kung, Madam H. H 2078, 2292
Kunzru, H. N 2124
Kuomintang Government 2010, 2011, 2016, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2043, 2044, 2048,
2049, 2052, 2062, 2067, 2082, 2186, 2218, 2288, 2292
Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps 2090, 2187, 2206
VIII INDEX
L
Page
Labor in Nationalist Cliina 2266
Landon, Kenneth P 2248
Larry 2116
Lasky, Victor 2240
Lattimore, Owen 2003,
2028, 2029, 2030, 2063, 2075, 2076, 2080, 2081, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2115,
2117, 2118; 2119, 2120, 2145, 2147, 2150, 2222, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248,
2266, 2287.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) __ 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2145, 2147,
2148, 2247, 2248
League Against War and Fascism 2160
Lee, Mr. Canada 2242
Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder 2270
Lenin 2047, 2066, 2242, 2243, 2270
Lenin Memorial Meeting (Madison Square Garden) 2242,2243
Leninist Communist International 2066
Library of Congress 2170
Lilienthal, Philip E ^_2115, 2249
Lin, Tso-ban 2044
Lindsey, Michael 2248
Lippmann, Walter . 2248
Lo, Tse-Kai 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187
Local 401, U. of W. Teachers Union - 2161
Locke, Edwin A 2248
Lockhart, Mr 2124
Luce, Henry 2151, 2152
Ludden, Raymond P 1998, 200.3, 2063
Ludlam, Kennedy 2169, 2303
M
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 21.52, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2158,
2163, 2165. 2166, 2167, 2168. 2169, 2170, 2172, 2174, 2175, 2177, 2193,
2223, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2283, 2286, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2301, 2302, 2303
MacLeish, Archibald 2124
Madison Square Garden (Lenin Memorial Meeting) 2242.2243
Manhattan Center 2242
Mao Tse-tung 2186, 2270
Marines (United States) 2095
Marshall Directiye 2195, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2202, 2203, 2215
Marshall, Gen. George C 2011,
2012, 2013. 2046, 2051, 2052, 2068. 2073, 2098, 21.50. 2195, 2197. 2198,
2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2215, 2216, 2218,
2250, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2259, 2265. 2266, 2295.
Marshall ]\Iission 2012, 2068, 2205, 2254, 2259, 2265
Marshall Plan 2265
Marshall Report 2013, 2254
Marx, Karl 2022, 2047, 2270
Mathews, Mr 2124, 2127
Mayflower Hotel (Pan American Room) 2246
ISIcCarthy. Senator Joseph M 2294, 2298
McCloy, John .7 2163, 2184, 2296. 2297
ISIcDermott, Mr. M. J 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2183, 2184, 2186, 2187, 2188
McDermott, Maria 2224
McDougall, Sir Raibeart 2124
McFayden, Sir Andrew 2125
Mc.Tennett, Mr 2278
McMahon. Senator Brien 2236, 2237
Menefee, Audrey 2116, 2162
Menefee, Selden 2116, 2158, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2169, 2177, 2303
Merrill, Lewis 2242
MethoMst Federation for Social Service 2160
Meyer, Mr 2124
Meyer, Eugene . 2248
Military Goyernment (Korea) . 2249,22.50
Military Intelligence (War Department) 2051,2060,2070,2071,2290
INDEX IX
Page
Ministry of Finance (Japan) 2231
Missouri (USS) 2294
Mitsubishi (Japanese big business firms) 2166,2171,2300
Mitsui (Japanese big business firms) 2166,2171,2300
Mofeat, Abbot Low 2124, 2246, 2247, 2248
Mooney, Tom 2161
Moorhead, Mrs 2248
Morizon, Col. Victor 2124, 2126
N
Naggiar, Paul Emile 2124, 2125
National Assembly (China) 2259
National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) 2116,2160,2162,2163,2169,2296,2303
National City Bank 2070
National Foreign Trade Council 2256, 2263
National Military Council (China) 2218
National Shinto (Japan) 2162,2168,2302
Nationalist Chinese Army 2012,
2073, 2090, 2143, 2202, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212
Nationalist Chinese Government 2001, 2010-
2013, 2044, 2046, 2056-2059, 2070, 2071, 2077, 2078, 2082, 2090, 2091,
2094, 2102-2104, 2125, 2126, 2170, 2173, 2186, 2187, 2194, 2196, 2202,
2204, 2205-2217, 2219, 2250, 2253, 2254-2256, 2288, 2289, 2293, 2295
Naval Intelligence Division (Navy Department) 2181
Naval Operations (Office of Chief) 2180,2181
Navy (United States ) 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178,
2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 2202, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296
Navy radio personnel 2182
Nazi Party 2169, 2303
NBC (National Broadcasting Co) 2116,2160,2162,2163,2169,2296,2303
Netherlands Government 2170
New Masses 2161, 2266
News Letter (China Aid Council) 2020
News Letter (JACD) 2243
New York Committee for Constitutional Government 2283
New York Herald Tribune 2185, 2186
New York State Committee (Communist Party) 2243
New York Times 2185, 2186, 2260
New York World Telegram 2240, 2242
New Zealand Government 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2170
North Pacific Conference 2061, 2062, 2064, 2065, 2066
Northwest Veteran 2160
Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China 2266
()
Obermeir, Michael 2242, 2243
Office of War Information (OWI) 2003, 2145, 2146, 2287
Okano, Susumu 2089, 2091, 2121, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2187
Ottenheimer, Albert 2161
Our foreign policy 2162, 2169, 2296
Our occupation policy for Japan 2162, 2296
OWI (Office of War Information) 2003, 2145, 2146, 2287
Pacific Island bases 2248
Pai, Chuns-hsi 2289, 2291
Palmer, Howard 2248
Pan American Room (Mayflower Hotel) 2246
Pasvolsky 2124
Patent law license 2227
Patterson, Mr 2271
Pauley, Edwin M 2221, 2222
Pauley Commission 2222
Pauley Report 2221
Peck, Mr 2124
X INDEX
Page
Penfield, James K 2222, 2249, 2250
Pentagon Building 2206
Perkins, Eleanor 2115
Peurifov, John E 2294
Philippine Government 2170, 2258
Philippine Rehabilitation Act 2258
Philippine Trade Act of 1946 2258
Phillips, William 2017
Political Reorientation of Japan (Report) 2236,2237
Pollard, Mr 2248
Porter, Catherine 2248
Postsurrender policy for Japan 2145,
2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163,2169, 2225, 2281
Postal Savings System (Japan) 2231
Postwar Period in the Far East 2193
Potsdam Declaration 2207, 2209, 2210, 2225, 2282
Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr 2242
Pramoj, M. R. Seni 2124, 2126
Presidential Directive 2202, 2267, 2268
President's Loyalty Program 2267, 2268
Press and Radio News Conference (State Department) 2183
Problems of Communism 2270
Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution 2270
Quo, Tai-chi 2290
R
Radio City 2169, 2303
Radio New Conference ( State Department) 2183
Radio personnel (Navy) 2182
Radio service (United States Armed Forces) 2162
Rally for Democratic Japan 2242, 2243
Rao, B. Shiva 2124
Ranch, Mrs 2138, 2141
Rea, Howard 1997, 2079, 2122, 2189
Reid, E 2124, 2125
Repertorv Plavhouse (University of Washington, Un-American Activities
of Certain Professors) 2160,2161,2162,2183
Republic of China 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215
Republican Party 2117, 2288, 2294
Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies, Resolution of
the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern) 2270
Riley 2004
Roosevelt, President Franklin D 2002,
2009, 2010, 2029, 2031, 2037, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2045, 2046. 2048, 2052,
2057, 2058, 2062, 2064, 2068, 2072, 2073, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2080, 2081,
2083, 2087, 2144, 2216, 2269, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2292.
Roosevelt, James 2284
Ropes, Clarence 2248
Rosinger, Laurence 1998, 2004, 2005, 2018. 2145
Roth. Andrew 2107, 2113, 2114, 2144, 2239, 2241, 2242, 2243
Roval Institute 2250
Russia 2000, 2014, 2015. 2017, 2039-
2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062-2067, 2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161,
2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 219.3-2196, 2206-2212, 2217, 2218, 2220,
2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297
Russian • Troops 2218, 2219
Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) 2ia3, 2297
S
Sakhalin Agreement 2043
SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) 2225,
2226, 2227, 2229, 2230, 2232, 2235, 2236, 2281
Schuman 2184
Seattle AFL Central Labor Council (Teachers Union) 2161
Secret Police (Japan) 2164,2298
INDEX XI
Page
Secretariat (United Nations Conference, San Francisco) 2120,
2121, 2135, 2136, 2138
Security in the Pacific 2138
Service, Joliu S 1997, 1998, 1999,
2003, 2063, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2083, 2113, 2114, 2213, 2214, 2240, 2241
Seville Hotel 2005, 2006
Shao, Yu-lin 2124, 2125
Shen Hung-lieti 2290
Sheng, Shih-tsai 2289,2290
Shiga, Yoshio 2155, 2156, 2157
Shinto, National (Japan) 2162,2168,2302
Shirer, William 2103
Shirley 2116
Short, Joseph 2286
Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity 2294
Silvermaster Spy Group 2250
Sino-Soviet Negotiations 2062, 2065, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210
Slagel, Fred 2294
Slagel, John 2294
Smedley, Agnes 2005, 2042,2043
Smith, Rear Adm. Allan E 2294
Snow, Edgar 2016, 2063
Socialist Party (Japanese) 2168,2302
Soong, T. V 2041, 2042, 2043, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291
Soviet-Chinese Agreement 2295
Soviet Union 2000,
2014, 2015, 2017, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062-2067, 2071,
2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 2193-
2196, 2206-2212, 2217, 2218, 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287,
2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297.
Soviet Zone (Germany) 2184
Spanish-American War 2257
Stabilization Fund (China) 2214
Stachel, Jack 1999
Staley, Eugene 2116
Stalin, Joseph 2022, 2043, 2044, 2047, 2270
Stanford University (Hoover Library) 2250
Stanton, E. F 1998, 2036, 2039, 2101, 2124, 2141
State and Revolution 2270
State Department . 1997—1999
2001, 2002, 2006-2008, 2012, 2013, 2020-2023, 2026-2028, 2032, 2035-
2037, 2039, 2044, 2045, 2050-2054, 2058, 2066, 2007, 2070, 2071, 2073,
2079, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2088-2095, 2097-2102, 2105, 2100, 2109-
2112, 2114, 2120-2124, 2127-2133, 2136, 2138-2149, 2151, 2152, 2156,
2157-2160, 21G2, 2169, 2170, 2177, 2178, 2181, 2183, 2185, 2187, 2188,
2191, 2193-2197, 2199, 2200, 2202, 2203-2208, 2210, 2215, 2217-2219,
2221-2224, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2240-2247, 2249-2253, 2255, 2256, 2261,
2264, 2267-2272, 2273-2275, 2277, 2278, 2287, 2294-2298, 2303.
State Department (Biographical Division) 2141, 2142, 2143
State Department (Building Guard Office) 2294
State Department (Bulletin) 2170, 2195, 2196, 2208, 2210, 2277
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) 1998, 2006, 2008, 2020, 2039,
2066, 2082, 2088, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2105, 2106, 2120, 2142
State Department (Division of Communications and Records) 2121
State Department (Division of Far Eastern Affairs) 1998,
2002, 2012, 2028, 2037, 2050, 2051, 2058, 2066, 2071, 2099, 2101, 2105,
2106, 2110, 2120, 2123, 2142, 2152, 2159, 2162, 2169, 2202, 2203, 2219,
2222, 2239, 2240, 2243, 2251, 2255, 2256, 2294-2298, 2303.
State Department (Employee Loyalty Investigations) 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241
State Department (FEC 230) 2222, 2223, 2224, 2236, 2237
State Department (Legal Advisers Office) 2237, 2274, 2275, 2278
State Department (Loyalty Board) 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241
State Department (Office of American Republic Affairs) 2169, 2303
State Department (Office of Economic Adviser) 2249
State Department (Office of European Affairs) 2127
State Department (Press Office) 2158, 2188
XII INDEX
Pa"
State Department (Press and Radio News Conference) 2183
State Department (Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43) 2218, 2219
State Department (Public Relations Division) 2278
State Department (Radio News Conference) 2183
State Department (Register) 2219
State Department (Security Division) 2054,
2110, 2111, 2112, 2215, 2240, 2241, 2243, 2244, 2245
State Department (White Paper) 2039.
2049, 2055, 2088. 2201, 2206, 2251, 2253, 2269, 2287
State, War, Navv Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 2094,
2095, 2149. 2150, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169. 2193,
2222. 2223. 2250, 2296, 2297.
Steak House (Anthony's) 2096
Stein. Guenther 2186
Steintorf, Mr , 2124
Stewart, Mrs. Marguerite Ann 2115, 2116, 2118. 2147. 2148
Stewart. Maxwell S 2017, 2018, 2022, 2023. 2025. 20.57
Stilwell, General Joseph 2001,
2034, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2077, 2083, 2288, 2292. 2293
Stimson. Secretary Henry L 20.51, 2052
Stufflebeam, Robert E 2121-2122
Sumitomo (Japanese big business) 2166, 2171
Sunagos, Mr 22.50
Sunday News 21(>1
Sun Fo 2076. 2290
Sun. Yat-.sen. Dr 2077. 2209, 2212
Sun. Yat-sen. Madam 2020, 2021, 2058, 2076, 2077, 2078. 2290
Surrender Policy for Japan 2145,
2152, 2153, 21.54, 2162, 2163. 21^9. 2225. 2281
Surrey. Walter Sterling 1997,2079.2122.2189
Swing, Raymond Gram 2022, 2248
SWNCC (State. War. Navy Coordinatins Committee) 2094,
2095, 2149. 2150. 2152. 2153, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2193.
2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297.
Taft. Mr. Charles P 2124, 2127
Tally-Ho Restaurant (Washington) 1999
Terrill, Katherine 2242
Third International 2046, 2062
Thomas, Elbert D 2248
Tillie 2117
Times (New York 2185. 2186. 2260
Tito for .Japan 2089, 2091, 2121, 2179, 2187
Tokuda, Kyuchi ^ 2155, 2156. 2157
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (China) 2259
Truman, President 203S,
21.53. 2195. 2196, 2197. 2198, 2200. 2201. 2202. 2203. 2204, 2208, 2210,
?'?11. 2212. 224.3. 2251 2253 22.54. 2257. 2260 2268. 2286. 2287, 2289
Truman, Mrs. Harry___I . ' '_ __1 ^ 2289
Truman. Miss Margaret 2289
Trusts (German) 2166, 2300
Turner, Bill 2101, 2117
Turner, Bruce 2124, 2125
Twentieth Bomber Command 2290
Tyler, R. G 2160, 2161
U
Un-American Activities Committee (House) 2117, 2160, 2215
Un-American Activities in Washington State 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Unfinished Revolution in China 2266
United Nations 2120. 2121. 21,34. 2135. 21.36. 2138,
2139. 2140. 2141. 2149, 2208, 2209. 2210, 2211, 2212, 2220, 2236. 2''67
United Nations Conference (Fi-eedom of Information, Geneva) 2267
INDEX XIII
Page
United Nations Conference ( San Francisco) 2120,
2121, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2149, 2220
United Nations (Secretariat) 2120, 2121, 2135, 2136, 1:138
United Uftice and Professional Workers (CIO) 2242
United Press (UP) 2184
United States Air Force (USAF) 2290
United States Armed Forces 2^01,
200 r, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070-2072,
2075, 2076, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163. 2167, 217S, 21^0, 21ftl, 21»2, 2193,
2197-2199, 2200-2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2250, 2252,
2289, 2290, 22ti2, 2294, 2-96, 2301.
United States Congress 2127, 2131, 2132, 2162, 2243, 2296
United States Embassy (Cliungking) 1999,
2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188
United States Embassy (Moscow) 2295
United States Foreign Service 2029, 2101, 2105, 2144, 2241, 2244, 2272
United States Government .. 2U12,
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2069,
2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193,
2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2215, 2219, 2224, 2225, 2241,
2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295.
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2129, 2131
United States House of Representatives 2127, 2132
United States Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan 2145,
2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297
United States Library of Congress 2170
United States Marines 2095, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211
United States Navy 2007,
2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193,
2203, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296.
United States Policy in Korea 2249
United States Policy toward China 2196,
2198, 2200, 2208, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2218, 2251
United States Senate 1997, 2127, 2218, 2268, 2271, 2286
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1997,
2129, 2131, 2201, 2203
United States War D?partment 2012,
2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2075, 2076, 2143, 2162,
2163, 2167, 2193, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2206,
2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294,
2296, 2301.
University of Caliiornia 2109
University of Stanford (Leland Stanford) 2250
University of the Air (NBC) 2162, 2163, 2169, 2296, 2303
University of Washington ( Un-American activities of certain professors ) __ 2160,
2161, 2162, 2183
UNRRA (United Nations Rehabilitation Relief) 2003, 2259
U. of W. Teachers Union (University of Washington) 2161
UP (United Press) 2184
tjSAF (United States Air Force) 2290
Usene, Julm 2248
Ussachevsky, Betty 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2147, 2150, 2248
U. S. S. R 2000,
2014, 2015, 2017, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2046, 2047, 20.59, 2062-2067,
2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184,
2193-2196, 2206-2212, 2217. 2218. 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258,
2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297.
V
Vincent, John Carter 1997-2121, 2122-2180, 2182-2303
Visman, Franx H 2124
XIV INDEX
W
Page
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel (Annual Foreign Trade Convention) 2256
Wallace, Henry A 2029-2048,
2051. 2052, 2055-2058, 2060, 2064, 2065, 2067. 2068, 2071, 2072,
2074-2078, 2080, 2081. 2083, 2084-2088, 2146, 2248, 2269, 2270,
2280, 2286-2290, 2292, 2295.
Wallace, Henry (Summary Report of China Mission) 2037, 2038. 2080, 2081
Wallace, Henry A. (Truman letter) 2038
Wallace, Mrs. Henry A 2289
Wallace Mission 2029,
2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 20.34, 2035, 2036-2043, 2045-2058, 2075,
2080-2087, 2269, 2270, 2286, 2295.
Wallace Mission (Goglidze Toast) 2083, 2084
Wallace Seattle speech 2084, 2085-
Wang, Cheng 2186
War Department (Civil Affairs) 2162, 2169, 2296, 2303-
War Department (United States) 2012,.
2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2075, 2070, 2143,
2162, 2163, 2167, 2193, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203,
2204, 2206, 2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2250, 2252, 2289,
2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301.
Wartime China 2022'
Wartime Politics in China 2005
Ward, Harry F 2160
Washington Commonwealth Federation 2160, 2161
Washington Star 2273
Washington State Federation of Teachers 2160
Washington State Un-American Activities Committee (Second Report of
1948) 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Washington University (Un-American Activities of Certain Profes-
sors) 2160-2162, 2183
Watt, Alan S 2124
Webb, Mr 2278, 2279-
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C 20.31, 2068, 2072,
2143, 2144, 2199, 2202-2204, 2206, 2207, 2216, 2217, 2266, 2288, 2293
Wedemeyer Report 2217
West Seattle High School 2161
Western Big Three 2183,2184
Western German Government 2183
White House 2028,
2029, 2038, 2072, 2082, 2086, 2087, 2163, 2193, 2287, 22S9, 2293, 2296
White Paper (State Department) 2039,
2049, 2055, 2088, 2201, 2206, 2251, 2253, 2269, 2287
White, Theodore 2151
Wi]liam.s, Mr 2124
Wilson, Edwin 2124
Wilson, Woodrow 2294
Woltman, Fredericli 2242
Workers of All Countries, Unite (Communist International) 2066
Worker's Bookshop 2243
Woiks Progress Administration (WPA) 2161
World Telegram (New York) 2240,2242
Y
Yalta Agreement 2137
Yalta Conference 2136, 2137, 2138
Yang, Yun-chu 2124
Yasuda (Japanese big business) 2300
Yeh. George 2124, 2125
Yersan, Max 2243
Yoshio, Shiga 2155, 2156, 2157
Z
Zafra, Urbano A 2124,2125
Zaibatsu (big business in Japanese language) 2162,2166,
2171. 2225. 2227. 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2235, 2284, 2296, 2300
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INYESTICiATE THE ADMINISTEATION
OF THE INTEENAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHEE
INTEENAL SECUEITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 7A
Appendix II
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Brsfem Bnsiness Brr-'i
DEC 24 1952
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22848 WASHINGTON : 1952
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAKY
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Wasliington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
J. G. SODRWINE, Counsel
Intebnal Seoueity Subcommittee
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
Robert Morris, Special Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
n
APPENDIX II
(Appendix I is contained in pt. 7 beginning on p. 2286)
CONTENTS
Vol. I
Page
Report submitted by Brig. Gen. P. E. Peabody, Chiief, Military Intelli-
gence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C 2305
Statement of report and conclusions - 2310
1. Characterization of the Chinese Communists :
A. Most effectively organized group in China 2314
B. How Red the Red?
(1) "Chinese Communists" a misnomer for "Agrarian Demo-
crats," according to some 2314
(2) Those who Delieve that the Chinese Communists are not
Communists are doomed to disillusionment 2315
(3) Chinese Communist tenets: Democracy a means to achieve
socialism 2315
2. Outline history of the Chinese Communist movement :
A. Period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, 1923-27 :
(1) Formation of Chinese Communist Party 2318
(2) The Soviet Russian-Chinese "Entente Cordiale" 2318
(3) Chinese Communists accepted into the Kuomintang 2319
(4) The Kuomintang-Communist split 2320
B. Period of Kuomintang-Communist civil war, 1927-36 :
(1) Comintern orders policy of attack on cities by Chinese Reds_ 2321
(2) The Chinese Soviet peasant movement 2322
(3) Growth of the Red Army and of Soviet base areas 2324
(4) Beginning of Kuomintang "extermination" campaign 2324
(5) Defeat of Soviet movement in Central China 2325
(6) The long march 2326
C. Period of the United Front and after, 1937-45 :
(1) Chinese Communist Party and Comintern sponsors of the
united-front movement 2327
(2) The Sian incident — Formation of the united front 2330
(3) United-front action, 1937-40 :
(a) Communists expand in North and Central China 2332
(b) Democracy as practiced by the Chinese Communists 2334
(c) The high point of the Kuomintang-Communist united
front : The Hankow period, 1938 2340
(d) The war against Japan becomes subordinate to the
"war within the war" :
1. Basic principles of Kuomintang and Com-
munist wartime policies toward each
other 2344
2. The Kuomintang enforces a military block-
ade of the Communist area in the Shen-
Kan-Ning border region, 1939 2345
3. The struggle between Chungking Govern-
ment and Chinese Communist forces for
possession of guerrilla bases in East
China, 1937-40 2346
4. The New Fourth Army "incident" of
January 1941 2350
5. A virtual truce with the "puppet" armies
while the Chungking-Communist forces
continue the "war within the war," 1942-45 2354
in
IV CONTENTS :
2. Outline history of the Chinese Communist movement — Continued
C. Period of the United Front and after, 1937-45— Continued l*«g«
(4) The Chinese Communists' war against Japan 2363
(5) International implications of the Kuomintang-Communist
struggle :
(a) Attitudes of the Kuomintang toward foreign powers- 2373
(&) Attitude of the Chinese Communist toward foreign
powers 2375
(c) Soviet Russia's attitude toward China 2382
(d) The American stake in the Kuomintang-Communist
struggle 2387
3. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party and governments in
Communist-controlled areas :
A. Chinese Communist Party 2398
B. Base areas 2400
C. Government in the border regions 2401
D. People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance 2402
4. Directory of the Chinese Communist Party and Border Region Gov-
ernment :
A. The Chinese Communist Party 2403
B. Border region governments 2405
5. Education in Communist-controlled base areas 2405
Appendix :
Party Statutes of the Chinese Communist Tarty (1928) trans-
lated from Chinese 2406
Vol. II
6. Economic situation in Chinese Communist areas :
A. Economic characteristics, area and population :
(1) General 2412
(2) Economic characteristics 2412
(3) Area and population ^ 2412
B. Economic policy, program and achievements :
(1) Economic theory 2413
(2) Present economic policies 2414
(3) The program for increased production and self-sufBciency- 2415
(4) Achievements of the production program : Living standards. 2416
C. Ascriculture and trade :
(1) Agriculture 2417
(2) Trade 2418
D. Industry and arms production :
(1 ) Industry 2418
(2) Arsenals 2418
E. Transportation and communications :
(1 ) General 2419
(2) Roads and trails 2419
(3) Equipment and methods 2419
(4) Interference with Japanese transportation : 2420
(5) Radio 2420
(6) Telegraph 2420
(7) Air transport 2420
(8) Post office 2420
P. Currency and finance :
(1) Currency 2420
(2) Prices and inflation 2421
(8) Banliing and finance 2421
(4) Interest and loans 2422
(5) Taxation 2422
(6) Government income 2422
G. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region :
(1) Agriculture — general 2423
(a) Agricultural education 2423
(&) Land reclamation 2423
(c) Food production 2423
(d) Cotton 2423
(e) Salt 2424
(/) Livestock 2424
(g) Opium 2424
CONTENTS V
Economic situation in Chinese Communist areas — Continued
G. Tlie Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region — Continued I'a'^e
(2) Industry — general 2424
(a) Cooperatives 2424
(&) Textiles 2425
(c) Iron and steel 2425
(d) Coal 2425
(e) Printing and paper 2425
(/) Petroleum 2425
(g) Miscellaneous industries 2425
(h) Arsenals 2425
(3) Trade 2426
(4) Finance:
(a) Currency 2426
(b) Inflation and prices 2426
(c) Interest and loans 2427
(d) Taxation 2427
(e) Government revenue 2427
H. The Shansi-Suiyuan border region :
(1) General 2427
(2) Arsenals 2428
I. Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh-Hopeh border region :
(1) General economic features 2428
(2) Government economic program 2428
(3) Industry and arsenals 2429
(4) Currency and taxation 2429
J. The Chansi-Hopeh-Honan border region :
( 1 ) General ._ 2429
(2) Agriculture 2429
(3) Industry and arsenals : 2430
K. The Hopeh-Shantuug-Honan border region 2430
L. The Shantung base area 2430
M. The New Fourth Army area in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang 2431
N. The Hupeh-Honan-Anhvpei base of the New Fourth Army 2431
O. Bases in Kwangtung Province 2432
P. Conclusion 2432
The Chinese Communist Army :
A. Strength and distribution of the Chinese Communist forces :
(1) General 2435
(2) Over-all strengths 2433
(3) 18th Group Army strength and distribution 2433
(4) New 4th Army strength and distribution 2433
(5) East River military region 2434
(6) Hainan Island military region 2434
B. Organization of the Chinese Communist Army :
( 1 ) General 2435
(2) The High Command 2435
(3) Territorial organization 2435
(4) Organization of the Army 2436
(a) Field forces 2436
1. General 2436
2. Divisions 2436
3. Brigades 2436
4. Regiments 2436
a. Type A regiments 2436
b. Type B regiments 2436
c. Type C regiments 2436
5. Battalions 2436
6. Companies 2437
(b) The local forces, or guerrilla army 2437
(c) The People's Militia 2437
1. The Youth Vanguards 2437
2. The model detacliments 2437
3. Self-defense detachments 2437
4. Womens' detachments 2437
VI CONTENTS
7. The Chinese Communist Army— Continued
B. Organization of the Chinese Communist Army — Continued Page
(5) Air force 2437
(6) Navy 2437
(7) Organization of the service ^ — 2437
(a) Signal communications 2437
(&) Medical service 2438
C. Training of the Chinese Communist forces :
(1) General 2438
(2) Training in weapons
(a) The rifle 2438
(b) Machine guns 2438
(c) Hand grenades 2439
(d) Bayonet training 2439
(3) Unit training:
(a) Squads, sections, and companies 2439
(ft) Regiments and brigades 2439
D. Tactics of the Chinese Communist military forces :
(1) General 2439
(2) The offensive :
(a) Large-scale operations 2439
(ft) Attacks against fortified areas 2439
(c) Attacks against enemy troop concentrations 2439
(d) Small-scale operations 2439
(e) Demolitions 2440
(/) Use of propaganda 2440
(3) The defensive 2440
(4) Summary of Communist tactics 2440
(5) The People's Militia :
(a) General 2440
(&) Tactical doctrine 2440
(c) Training methods 2441
id) Tactical employments 2441
(e) Tunnel warfare 2441
(/) Mine warfare 2441
(g) Harassing warfare 2441
(6) Communist army intelligence measures 2441
E. Military weapons of the Chinese Communists :
(1) General 2441
(2) Weapons:
(n) Rifles and bayonets 2441
(&) Light machine-guns 2441
(c) Grenade dischargers and hand grenades 2441
(d) Land mines 2442
(e) Mortars and antitank guns 2442
(/) Ammunition 2442
(g) Individual equipment 2442
F. Uniform and insignia of Chinese Communist forces :
(1) Uniform 2442
(2) Insignia 2442
7. The Chinese
G. Administration and logistics of Chinese Communist forces :
(1) General 2442
(2) Procurement of supplies:
(a) General 2442
(6) Food 2442
(c) Clothing 2443
(d) Arms and ammunition 2443
(e) Other supplies 2443
(3) Distribution and transportation of supplies 2443
(4) Maintenance requirements 2443
CONTENTS VII
7. The Chinese — Continued
H. Medical organization and equipment of the Chinese
Communist forces : Page
(1) General 2443
(2) Line of evacuation of the sick and wounded :
(a) Company first-aid men 2444
(&) Battalion medical station 2444
(c) Regimental medical station 2444
(d) Brigade field hospital 2444
(e) Divisional fixed hospital 2444
(3) Base medical service:
(o) Hospitals 2445
(b) Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital 2445
(4) Conclusions 2446
I. Conclusions , 2446
8. Charts:
No. 1. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party and border
region governments facing 2448
No. 2. Strength distribution of Chinese Communist Army 2448
No. 3. Organization of class A Regiment 2449
No. 4. Organization of class C Regiment 2450
9. Who's Who in Communist China 2451
Appendix II
( Secret classflcation changed to Unclassified — authority Director of Intelligence,
23 August 1949)
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 5 JULY 1945
(Military Intfxligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C. )
1. The Problem
The problem of the Chinese Communists is not merely one of how the Com-
munists should be dealt with ; even more difficult has been the problem of deter-
mining the facts. "Authorities" on both sides have disputed the most elementary
statements of fact.
It was considered by the Military Intelligence Service that this state of affairs
constituted an impediment to the effective prosecution of military operations in
China and in the Pacific. A major project was therefore initiated at the end of
1944, under which the most competent analysts — both civilian and military —
were assigned to the examination of all material available, and to the compilation
of a report on the Chinese Communist movement. The preparation of the report
involved the examination of over 2,500 reports, pamiihlets, and books.
2. Fundamental Conclusions
Careful study of these materials has led to a number of basic conclusions.
Appropriate qualification and detailed authentication for these conclusions is
contained in the full report. The most important conclusions may be summarized
as follows : (1) The "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy,
(2) The Chinese Communist Movement is part of the international Communist
movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow. (3) There is reason to believe
that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea
and probably North China. (4) A strong and stable China cannot exist without
the natural resources of Manchuria and North China. (5) In order to prevent the
separation of Manchuria and North China from China, it is essential that, if
Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided (like Europe) into
American-British and Russian zones of military operations.
3. Precis of Conclusions
a. high morale
The Chinese Communists are the best led and most vigorous of present-day
organizations in China. Their morale is high. Tlieir policies are sharply defined,
and carried out with a devotion which is fanatical.
B. policy of establishing communism through "democracy"
The Chinese Communists emphasize two stages in their revolutionary pro-
gram : first, the change of the Chinese semi-feudal society into a "bourgeois"
(or capitalist) democracy; second, the establishment of communism. The first
is their present goal according to their own claims. They insist, however, that
the "bourgeois democracy" must have "the support and leadership of the prole-
tariat under Communist guidance." This objective they have achieved in their
areas of control ; theirs is a one-party controlled "democracy".
c. "soviet democracy"
While the Chinese Communists call their present political system "democ-
racy", the "democracy" which they sponsor is in fact "Soviet democracy" on
the pattern of the U. S. S. R. rather than democracy in the Anglo-American
sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist
2305
2306 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Party than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship" of the Chungking Govern-
ment controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indi-
cated by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance
between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions
to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-
controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to main-
tain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while minority
parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated in
Communist-controlled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily
suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance
is true, it is also true that the Commimists will be still more intolerant if they
ever obtain supreme power in China.
Nevertheless, since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially
the laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunities than the Kuomin-
tang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the
areas held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of con-
trol. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China.
D. PART OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the international Communist
movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda pol-
icies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese
environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy
which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their hi-story the Chinese
Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia
and have accepted the whole content of "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism."
E. DESIRE FOR U. S. SUPPORT AGAINST JAPAN AND THE KUOMINTANG
This does not prevent the Chinese Communists from maintaining a friendly
attitude toward the United States. Their attitude toward us and all capitalist
democracies is conditioned, however, by the extent to which they can obtain
benefits from us in the furtherance of their own revolutionary aims ; the sub-
jugation of China under Communist rule and the development of a Communist-
controlled "capitalist democracy" in China as a preliminary to the introduction
of communism. They would use American support to further their struggle
against both Japan and the Chungking Government.
F. DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE
The Chinese Communist movement today is not represented merely by a
political party ; it is represented by what is a state in all but name, possessing
territory, (the combined area of which is about the size of France or one-fifth
of China Proper), a population of probably more than 70.000,000 people, armies,
law, and money of its own. The Chinese Communist state is economically
primitive, but (at a primitive level) fairly self-sufiicient.
G. RIVALRY WITH THE KUOMINTANG
(1) Failure of the "Entente Cordiale"
During the period of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang Entente Cordiale, 1923-
1927, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese
Communists promised to support the revolutionary, national, democratic pro-
gram of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to
the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, urged on by Soviet Rus-
sia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme
control over China. In 1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the
Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia.
(2) Development of the "united front" movement.
The ensuing civil war, 1927-1937, between the armies of the two Chinese parties
was accompanied by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By
1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter
was saved by the Kuomintang's acceptance of the idea of a "united front" with
the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had
been developed in Moscow. It applied to Communists in all countries and in-
volved cooperation between Communists and non-Communist groups and parties
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2307
in the capitalist demooracies.as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against
the threat of fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Commu-
nists in capitalist democracies.
Under the terms of the united front understanding in China, the Chinese Com-
munists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against the
Government, to abolish their separate government and administration, and to
integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.
(3) The "icar icithin the war"
The Chinese Communists did not fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreal?
of the Sino-.Tapanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain
defense zones. The Communists, however, refused to stay within their assigned
zones. While the Kuomintang armies in obedience to the Chinese High Com-
mand, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted
on being granted entry into any Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter.
Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into
tlieir defense sectors and to share with them their exceedingly limited resources
they were called "traitors" by the Communists. When the National Government
refused to grant' the Communists permission to establish in Kuomintang areas
their own separate civil administrations, called "united front governments,"
which flouted the national authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from
the Communist capital. Yenan. the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being
"anti-democratic" and the Kuomintang troops of being "experts in dissension."
Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kiiomintang troops. The latter
fought in self-defense against both the Communists and the Japanese for the
protection of their bases.
Internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation.
After the Ignited States entered the war against Japan both the Communists
and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-a-vis each
other than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount im-
portance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against
Japan, and the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the party that won
out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.
H. ROLE IN WORLD WAR II
In spite of this internecine strife, or quasi- war, the Chinese Communists have
contributed to the United Nations war against Japan. By organizing extensive
guerrilla territories within areas enclosed by the Japanese Army they have
prevented the full Japanese exploitation of North China's resources in food-
stuffs, raw materials, and manpower. They have also rescued many American
pilots who have been forced down in Communist-controlled areas.
Contrary to the widely advertised report of their sympathizers, the Chinese
Communists have, however, fought the Japanese far less than have the National
Government troops. The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and his followers
have yielded ground politically and militarily to the Communists in order to avoid
an open break : as a Nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek has been primarily interested
in the war against Japan.
I. ^MILITARY CAPACITY SMALL
The Chinese Communists now claim to have an army of 910,000 troops in addi-
tion to local militia forces numbering about 2,000,000 men. However, in October
1944 the strength of the Chinese Communists regular forces was reliably reported
as 475,000. The degree to which the increase since October of last year repre-
sents an actual increase in fighting capacity depends upon the number of rifles
available. Rifles were available for only about 2.j0,000 men in October 1944.
J. THE ALTERNATIVE SETTLEMENTS OF THE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST PROBLEM
(1) General
As far as can l3e seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement
of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and
the Chinese Communists; a "settlement" which would be disastrous for the
Chinese people, even though it might ultimately decide the question of which
party shall rule; (2) institution of a National assembly to inaugurate a demo-
cratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representa-
tion; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be
2308 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" of all
parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed inde-
pendently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties
would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations.
Many observers believe that neither of the latter two alternatives is feasible.
Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists aspire to supreme control
over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is un-
avoidable.
(2) Oeneralissimo sponsors the National Assembly
Chiang Kai-shek has proposed the National Assembly, which is to convene
on 12 November 1945, as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of
the Kuomintang-Communist problem and for the re-establishment of unity
in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved so long as there
are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that
the Comnumi.sts fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the
National Government. He makes compliance with this demand a prerequisite
for any political settlement with the Communists.
(3) Chinese Commuists sponsor idea of coalition government
The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the
National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution
of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might
be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang
and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly
tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense
areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demar-
cation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be
established.
In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the
Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would
only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would
obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving
the Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration
through legal or illegal means. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of
a coalition government.
(4) Unity or permanent division of China, the issues at stake
Here the matter rests (3 July 1945). For the time being it is a question of the
National Assembly versus the coalition government. The former provides a
chance for unifying China by the agreement of the Chinese armed parties to sub-
mit to arbitration and law instead of force. The latter would continue into the
postwar period the system of territorial division of China between the Kuom-
intang and the Chinese Communists and the maintenance of separate party
armies. Real unity cannot be achieved on this basis. Each party insists on Its
own plan.
K. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
(i) Common policy of V. S. and U. S. S. R.
It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party settlement in China depends
largely upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow
a common policy toward China. Were the Soviet Union to decide to give active
support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while
the United States supports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Amer-
icans would be meeting head on.
(2) Uncertainty concerning Soviet aims in China
Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press
is strongly denouncing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly
sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. There
are indications that Soviet Russia envisages the establishment of Soviet domina-
tion (along somewhat the same lines as in Outer Mongolia and in Eastern Europe) ,
in the areas of North China adjacent to Soviet Russia ; that is in Sinkiang, Inner
Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also the northern provinces of China Proper.
A typical statement in this regard is one by a Soviet Russian diplomat in China
who emphasized that Soviet Russia is determined that all her border states
should be "free from unhealthy combination or linkage with other great powers."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2309
The Chinese Communists' plan for a coalition government would conceivably
further this aim in that North China and Manchuria might "legally" become the
exclusive spheres of influence of the Chinese Communists and hence come under
a regime that would be wholly obedient to Soviet Russia. At the same time the
coalition government, which would represent all groups in China, would lend
China an outward appearance of unity.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union will try to improve
relations with Chungking on the basis of the re-establishment of a "united front"
between the Kuomintanj; and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet
Russia's experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the
Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists has always favored the Communists
against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent,
whether i-eactionary or liberal. By contrast, the Communist cause in China has
suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil
war. It is possible that this is the explanation for Soviet's Russia's apparent
willingness to welcome the visit of Dr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive
'Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government. He arrived
in Moscow and was received by Stalin on 30 June. An agreement between Moscow
and Chungking would have the advantage, for Soviet Russia, of reducing the
danger of immediate disagreement between the U. S. S. R. and the United States.
(3) The U. S. and the situation in China
(a) The post-icar peace in the Far East depends on re-establishment of
Chinese independence and unity. — The type of peace we shall gain by our victory
over Japan depends on our success in aiding the Chinese to regain complete in-
dependence and to establish unity. For China is the center of the Far East;
political, economic, and military relation.ships in the Far East have always re-
volved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by
acquiring vast regions from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power
has depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Simi-
larly, Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in
Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests
in China Proper in the 1930's.
The independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, in-
cluding Manchuria, have been key points of U. S. policy and interests in the Far
East. During the past eighty-flve years Russia, and during the past fifty years
Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers in Asia, have been the
chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of
the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance
between these two powers. The sea powers. Great Britain and the United States,
have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern
in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China has been demon-
strated several times. The rivalry between Russia and Japan has centered on
Manchuria and Korea.
(h) With the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will emerge as the sole military
land power in Asia.— Necessary as is the defeat of Japan to the re-establishment
of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole
structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was
developed in the decades before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and
with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she
started at the dawn of her modern era ; a group of relatively worthless islands,
populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock
will be turned back some eighty years, to the time when the rivalry between
Russia and the Western democracies in China began. With the total defeat of
Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account
in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time in the past.
(c) Prevention of a repetition of the "Polish situation" in Maiichuria and
Korea is essential to post-war stability in the Far East. — The problem of post-
war peace In the Far East revolves, in so far as the United States is concerned,
around two major questions: (1) How can the military-political vacuum in the
Far East be filled following the defeat of Japan? (2) How can the United States
promote internal unity in China?
The answer to both questions is vitally affected by the action of Soviet Russia,
and by the arrangements in regard to the Far East that we can make with
Soviet Russia. If it be assumed that Soviet Russia will join in the war against
Japan, the solution of these questions will be greatly affected by the extent to
which we can prevent the division of China along the same lines as Europe into
2310
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
an American-Britisli and a Soviet zone of military operations. For tlie elements
of uncertainty as to Soviet Russia's intentions in Cliina and in regard to the
Cliinese Communists are very similar to those in regard to Eastern Europe
during 1943 and 1944. Many of the fears and speculations current at that time,
to the effect that Soviet Russia intended to develop Eastern Europe as an exclusive
Soviet sphere of influence, have proved to be right. There is justification for
similar fears in regard to North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Just as Soviet
Russia's plans in Eastern Europe have been favored by the absence of American
and British forces in these areas, so also would Soviet Russia, if she does plan
to create a Soviet sphere of influence in North China, Manchuria and Korea,
find herself in a most favorable position if these areas were assigned to her
exclusively or even predominantly as a zone of military operations against
Japan.
On the other hand, if American forces cooperate on equal terms with Soviet
Russian, Chinese, and British forces in the reconquest and occupation of North
China, Manchuria, and Korea, a peace settlement in complete accord with the
terms of the Cairo declaration of 1 December 1948 can much more readily be
achieved. For it is clear that if the war were to end with us in control of
Japan, and with Chungking-Chinese, American, and British forces in control
of Central and South China, while Soviet Russian and Chinese Communist
forces held the controlling power in Manchuria and Korea, a peace settlement
in regard to these areas might entail a considerable compromise of the terms
of the Cairo declaration. In that case, the plan of the Chinese Communists for
a "coalition government" might well be the only feasible way of settling the
situation in China; North China and probably also Manchuria and Korea
would come under the control of native Communists dependent upon Soviet
Russian support, and in these areas tliere would be established the now typical
"united front" or "democratic" coalition administrations in which the Com-
munists hold the dominant power. Deprived of the vast raw material resources
of North China and Manchuria the present National Government of China
would find itself unable to compete with the Communists in the North and to
establish a strong and stable state. For this reason it is necessary, for the
maintenance of peace in the Far East and for the long range interests of the
United States, that the Cairo Declaration be implemented without modification.
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 :
P. E. Peabody,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief, Military Intelligence Service.
Distribution :
USAF POA
(10)
SWPA
(10)
USAF China
( 5)
USAF India-Burma
( 3)
ASF
( 1)
AGF
( 1)
AAF
( 6)
OSW
( 1)
OPD
( 3)
AWC
( 1)
ANSCOL
( 1)
C&GSS
( 1)
USMA
( 1)
Navy
(25)
White House
(15)
State Dept
( 3)
OSS
( 1)
MID
( 1)
MIS
(21)
Auth : Col. Alfred McCormack.
No. of copies : 110.
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, July 1^5
(Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.)
STATEMENT OF REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Political
a. The Chinese Communists are Communists. They are the most effectively
organized group in China.
b. The "democracy" which the Chinese Communists sponsor represents "Soviet
democracy" on the pattern of the Soviet Union rather than democracy in the
Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the
Chinese Communist Party (OCP) than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship"
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2311
of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National
Party). This is indicated by the fact that there have always been several
groups in opposition to the Government in Kuomintang-controlled China, and
in spite of severe Government restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech
these opposition groups have always managed to make their voices heard.
Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various
factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist
opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China.
Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to maintain such a balance,
he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while small parties friendly to the
CCP are permitted to exist in Communist-controlled China, real opposition groups
are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuo-
mintang intolerance is true, it will be more true of the Communists if they ever
attain supreme power in China.
c. The Kuomintang is a nationalist party. The CCP on the other hand is inter-
national ; it is part of the international Communist movement which has been
sponsored by the Soviet Union since 1919 when the Communist International
was established. Although the Communist International has been dissolved,
the CCP still follows the Soviet Russian "party line."
d. During the period of the Soviet-Kussian-Kuomintang Entente Cordiale in the
1920's, the Kuomintang and the CCP cooperated with each other. The Com-
munists promised to support the revolutionary program of the Kuomintang.
They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders
that the Chinese Communists, edged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn
the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. The
Kuomintang, therefore, in 1927 turned against the Chinese Communists and
Soviet Russia. The ensuing civil war between the armies of the two parties bore
all the marks of bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars.
e. In 19.36 the Kuomintang had almcst defeated the Chinese Red Army. What
save dit was the acceptance by the Kuomintang of the idea of a united front with
the Communists in defense of China against .Japan. The united front idea,
which applied to Communists in all countries, had been developed in Moscow as
a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of fascist aggres-
sion and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies.
Under the terms of the united front agreement in China, the Chinese Commu-
nists pledged themselves in 1937 to cease subversive activities against the Gov-
ernment, to abolish the Chinese Soviet Republic, to support the National Gov-
ernment, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Cen-
tral Army.
f. This pledge was never kept. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. As a
sign of its trust and goodwill the Government even established a new army com-
posed of Communists, the New Fourth Army, to operate between Nanking and
Slianghai. The leaders of the Kuomintang spoke highly of the Communist forces
(luring the first year of the war. There was considerable cooperation between the
armies of the two parties in fighting .Japan. The Communist armies, however,
refused to stay within their assigned defense areas. While the Kuomintang
armies, in obedience to orders from the Supreme Command, kept within their
assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry
into any Kuomintang defense zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the
Kuomintang troops refu.sed to admit the Communist troops into their defense
sectors and to share with them the exceedingly limited resources of their base
areas they were called "traitors" by the Communists. Whenever they refused to
permit the Communists to set up, in Kuomintang areas, their own separate civil
administration which flouted the authority of Chungking and accepted orders
only from Yenan, the capital of the Chinese Communists, the Communists called
the Kuomintang troops "anti-democratic" and "experts in dissension." These
tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang tx'oops. The latter fought
against both the Communists and the Japanese for the defense of their bases.
g. This internecine strife led to a general deterioration of tlie Chinese war
situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the
Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status
vis-a-vis each oher than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of
paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed vic-
tory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would, in their opinion, obvi-
ously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for
power.
2312 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
h. The expansion of Communist areas demonstrates the remarkable military
and political skill of the Chinese Communists. But it has created an explosive
situation between the Kuomintang and the CCP. The Kuomintang leaders feel
that the Communists have cheated them in that they have used the united front
as a means of fighting the Kuomintang rather than the Japanese. The Commu-
nists feel that they have been justified in their policy since the Kuomintang has,
in their opinion, never intended to grant them legal rights and has been waiting
for the end of the war against Japan to renew the civil war against the Commu-
nists.
i. As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement
of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and
the CCP ; a "settlement" which will be disastrous for the Chinese people, even
though it may ultimately settle the question of which party shall rule ; (2) insti-
tution of a National Assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form
of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China
into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be united in a loose "federa-
tion" represented by a "coalition government" of all parties. The decisions of
this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Com-
munists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their
separate armies and administrations. (See p. 2394.)
Many observers believe that neither of these latter two alternatives is feasible
of execution. Both the Kuomintang and the CCP aspire to supreme control over
China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.
The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, has proposed the National Assembly,
which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible peaceful solution
of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and the reestablishment of unity in
China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved as long as there are
several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the
Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National
Government. He makes compliance to this demand conditional to any political
settlement between the Kuomintang and the CCP.
The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the
National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solu-
tion of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government
might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of
Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has
vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of
defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any
demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government
were to be established. While at present the Communists do not permit Kuomin-
tang armies and anti-Communist Kuomintang members in their areas of control,
they insist that the Kuomintang, in fulfillment of its promise to institute democ-
racy, should permit Communists to operate freely in Kuomintang-controlled areas
and should allow Communist armies to operate in Kuomintang defense zones.
I'ollowing this practice, the coalition government, if established, would only
serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas of control
would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties. But
there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Communists would
accord legal status to present Kuomintang areas. Chiang Kai-shek has refused
to accept the idea of a coalition government.
j. Here the matter rests (4 June 1945). For the time being it is a question of
the National Assembly versus the "coalition government." Both parties are
insisting on their own plans. It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party
settlement depends greatly upon the extent to which the United States and
Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. For were the Soviet
Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of
supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking Govern-
ment, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on. Present relations
between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denounc-
ing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of
the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. It seems possible, however,
that tlie Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis
of the reestablishment of a "united front" between the Kuomintang and the
Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia's exiierience in China that
cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2313
favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shad-
ing the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the
Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the
Communists in an all-out civil war.
2. Economic
The Chinese Communists control a large area and considerable population
behind the Japanese lines in north and central China. Economically their activi-
ties have been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of
communication and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops
and manpower out of Japanese hands. By so doing the Communists have pre-
vented the Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of north and cen-
tral China. The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, consti-
tute the poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The
Communists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the
peasantry, to increase agricultural production, and to develop handicraft indus-
tries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of the
resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufBcient in terms of their rela-
tively simple requirements.
Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak
and undeveloped. Railroads are non-existent, roads and motor transport are
practically non-existeiat, communication facilities — radio, telegraph, telephone —
are hopelessly inadequate, and modern Industry simply does not exist. Facilities
for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable
adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and
geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla
warfare, and the relations between the peasanti-y and the Communist forces
are good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip
or maintain modern fighting foix-es capable of meeting the Japanese in open
combat, and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing
Communist forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they
could maintain if they were better equipped and supplied.
3. Military
In October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communist Regular Forces wa3
reliably reported as 475,000. The Communists claim in a press report of
17 May 194.5 that their regular f(;rces have been increased to 910,000. This in-
crease has probably been achieved by incorporating part of the militia, which
numbers more than 2,000,000 men. into the re'^Ulur forces. The degree to which
this increase of strength represents an actual increase in fighting potential de-
pends, however, upon the number of rifles available: the militiamen have an
undetermined number of old rifles. Rifles were available for only slightly more
than half of the regular forces in October 1944.
The Communist Army is a volunteer force of comparatively young men in
excellent physical condition, adequately clothed and fed. The troops are fairly
well trained for their type of guerrilla warfare, and have considerable ex-
perience in it. Observers report a high level of general intelligence and morale
is very high. Lack of equipment constitutes the most serious problem of the
Communists.
Up to the present time, the scale of effort of the Communists has been extensive
and of serious concern to the Japanese, but does not represent the maximum of
which the Communists are capable. Operations have generally been purposely
restricted in order to conserve_arms and to avoid provoking the Japanese to
strengthen the barriers protecting their lines of communications, which would
further restrict Communist movement. Part of the Communist forces have also
been engaged in fighting the Chungking forces rather than the Japanese.
Improvement in the Communist strategic position, either by receipt of supplies
or by an operation which would destroy the strategic initiative of the Japanese
in China, would doubtless result in an all-out effort on the part of the Com-
munists. Their forces are not capable of decisive independent operations to drive
out the Japanese, but are capable of rendering strong support to an Allied
operation against the Japanese in China.
2284S— 52— pt. 7A-
2314 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1919-1945, VOLUME I
1. Characterization of the Chinese Communists
A. MOST effectively ORGANIZED GROUP IN CHINA
A question of first importance in connection witti tlie Chinese Communists is :
how effective are tliey in comparison witli the Nationalists of the Chungking
Government, as an instrument for developing China into a strong, progressive
nation? The answer to this question has almost uniformly been in favor of the
Chinese Communists.
An American observer stated recently after his first meetings with the Chinese
Communist leaders in Yenan, the Chinese Communist Capital, that "they are
displaying a degree of initiative and planning ability which I have never before
encountered in China." This observer has had long experience in China. An-
other American who visited Yenan at the end of 1944, summed up his impressions
of the Chinese Communists by stating that he found himself "continually trying
to find out just how Chinese these people are," and in another report commented,
"Their manners, habits of thought, and direct handling of problems seem more
American than oriental." He noted the open, direct, and friendly relations
between the officials and the people. He saw no signs of desperate poverty. He
emphasized that there is no defeatism, but rather confidence. "There is no
war weariness . . . There is a surprising political consciousness . . . There is
no tension in the local situation . . . There is no feeling of restraint or sup-
pression . . . The leaders make excellent personal impressions. The military
men look and act like capable military men." All of this contrasts sharply with
conditions in Chungking-controlled China. The foregoing observer concluded : "I
think now that further study and observation will confirm that what is seen at
Yenan is a weil integrated movement, with a political and economic program,
which it is successfully carrying out under competent leaders. And that while
the Kuomintang ^ has lost its early revolutionary character and with that loss
disintegrated, the Communist Party, because of the struggle it has had to con-
tinue, has kept its revolutionary character, but has grown to a healthy and
moderate maturity. One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is
strong and successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so
closely to the people that it will not easily be killed."
Practically all impartial observers emphasize that the Chinese Communists
comprise the most efficient, politically well-organized, disciplined, and construc-
tive group in China today. This opinion is well supported by facts. It is
largely because of their political and military skill, superior organization, and
progressive attitude, which has won for them a popular support no other party
or group in China can equal, that they have been expanding their influence
throughout the past seven years. This expansion has now reached the point
where many of the best informed observers believe that no anti-Communist group
in China can longer hope to eliminate them. Some of the keenest observers go
so far as to predict the ultimate ascendancy of the Chinese Communists in China
"if the present reactionary groups in Chungking are allowed to continue in
power." The present trend is definitely in favor of the Communists. The growth
of Communist power has been perhaps the most outstanding factor in the devel-
opment in China during the past two years. It has led several of our observers
to question whether we are not "backing the wrong horse" in China.
B. HOW RED the RED?
(1) "Chinese Communists" a misnomer for "Agrarian Democrats," according
to some
If the Chinese Communists should develop into the leading political power in
China, how ^yould this affect American and British interests in the Far East;
could we continue to deal with China as an independent nation, or would a Com-
munist China find its political and economic interests to be linked, predominantly,
with those of Soviet Russia?
There is no clear answer. The majority of Allied observers agree, however,
that there seems to be little to fear on this account, because "the Chinese Com-
munists are not Communists," they have given up their socialist revolutionary
tenets and have become mere "reformers" who can in no way be compared with
^ The Kuomintang (National People's Party) is the Chungking Government Party.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2315
the bolsheviks of the Soviet Union. Thus the British Ambassador to China
said in 1938 that the Chinese Communists are really Keir Hardeians," and he
added that it was regrettal)le that their name unnecessarily frightened conserva-
tives. More recently Brooks Atkinson, N. Y. Times' correspondent in China,
expressing a widely-held opinion, has emphasized that although the Chinese
Commimists "began as followers of the Russian system, they abandoned their
sovietization program about eight years ago when they concluded that China
was not ready for socialism and would not be for at least a half century . . .
Their system now might be described as agrarian or peasant democracy, or as a
farm labor party . . ." An American official report from Chungking, also reflect-
ing a widely-held opinion, states that "it is unfortunate that the present day
Communist Party [in China] bears that name. As a misnomer it conjures up
all the hatred of the capitalistic nations — a bogey of yesterday — the 'Red
Menace' that almost lost us Russia as an ally in this war. The [Chinese] Com-
munists adhere more closely to the basic . . . fundamentals of Sun Yat-sen's
"Three Principles — Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood — than does
the Kuomintang." Finally, Molotov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs,
subscribed to this opinion when he stated during the summer of 1944 that
Chinese Communism was not Soviet Communism, and that when the Chinese
Communists achieved a greater degree of economic prosperity they would no
longer be Communists.
(2) Those who Relieve that the Chinese Communists are not Communists are
doomed to disillusionment
If mere statements constitute proof, we have here ample proof that the
Chinese Communists are not Communists but Democrats. There are, however,
some who object strongly to this viewpoint. Edgar Snow, for instance, one of
America's foremost sympathizers with the Chinese Communists who is con-
sidered by many an authority on them, wrote in 1941 that some Chinese publi-
cists, foreign diplomats, missionaries, and other pro-China people "did their
best [during the first years of the Sino- Japanese war] to convince the world
that the Chinese Communists were 'not real Communists' . . . Some think that
because the Chinese Reds are now fighting for democracy and national inde-
pendence they cannot be bolsheviks but are 'only a peasant reform party.' How
all these people reconcile such interpretations with the Chinese C. P.'s loyal ad-
herence to the Comintern I do not know. But if I understand Mao Tse-tung
[the leader of the Chinese Communist Party] correctly he would not be bothered
about these aspersions cast upon his Marxism. He would chuckle and say that if
it would solve the contradiction in the sentiments of liberals who want to be
known as pro-China but anti-Stalin they might call him anything they liked —
as long as they did something to . . . [help] China and the [Communist]
Eight Route Army to win victories. My personal feeling in the matter is that
liberals who build up hopes that the Communists of China are 'different' and
'only reformers' who have abandoned revolutionary methods to achieve their
program, are doomed to ultimate disillusionment. These men are nationalists
because they are in a nationalist united-front phase of revolution, and they are
perhaps strong enough in their own right not to fear becoming submerged as
puppets of Anybody. But their religion remains international socialism and if
conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they believe necessary in
order 'to stay on the locomotive of history.' "
A Dutch refugee, who soon after Pearl Harbor escaped from Peiping through
Communist areas in North China, stated that he gained a decided impression
"that the Chinese Communist leaders, such as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te
[C-iu-C of the Chinese Communist army], and in general the teachers, doctors,
commissars, etc., are devoted Communists as we [Westerners] understand it,
"but that this does not mean that they are convinced that their communistic
ideas can be applied to China at present.
(3) Chinese Communist tenets: democracy a means to achieve socialism
A study of the writings of the Chinese Communist leaders themselves fully
supports the above analysis. They themselves do not agree with the contention
of some of our observers that they are not "real" Communists. In his booklet
New Democracy, published in January 1941, Mao Tse-tung has given a frank
- The Keir Hardeians were nineteenth century constitutionalist labor reformers In Great
Britain.
2316 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and accurate outline of the tenets and policies of the Chinese Communist Party.
A reading of this booklet is as essential to an understanding of the Chinese
Communists as is reading China's Destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek, to an understand-
ing of the Kuomintang Nationalists. The following condensation of the New
Democracy provides a basis for comparing, and judging the accuracy of, the
various and conflicting characterizations of the Chinese Communist offered by
foreign observers.
China's revolution is part of the world revolution. But the ■ Chinese
revolution must pass through two stages : first, the change of our colonial,
semi-colonial and semi-feudal society into an independent democratic
society ; second, the establishment of a socialist society. The first is our
present goal, a new borgeois-democratic revolution. But do not confuse
this with the burgeois-democratic revolution in capitalist countries. Al-
though the objective of the first stage of our revolution is the destruction
of feudalism and imperialism and the development of capitalism, it is
certainly not the establishment of a capitalist society dictated by the
bourgeoisie. On the contrary, our objective is to establish a New Democracy
based on an alliance of several revolutionary classes, but led wholly or
partially by the proletariat. After the accomplishment of this first stage,
the revolution will be developed into the second stage — the establishment
of a socialist society in China.
The outline of and basis for the New E'emocracy is found in the Mani-
festo of the First Kuomintang Congress in 1924, long forgotten by the present
Kuomintang. This Manifesto embodies Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles
of the People. It provides for democratic, representative government from
lower grades to the higher, and for free universal suffrage. The same Mani-
festo lays out our economic platform. Big banks, industries and mono-
polistic enterprises are to be owned by the Republic, non-monopolistic private
enterprises are to be free. Large landholdings are to be distributed to land-
tilling peasants to hold as their own private, not communal, property.
Now there are some "obstinate elements of the bourgeoisie" [the reac-
tionary Knomintang elements] who come forward and say : "Well, since
you [Chinese] Communists have put aside the social system of socialism for
a later stage, and since you have declared 'The Three Principles of the
People are a necessity today, and our party is willing to struggle for their
thorough realization,' why then don't you pack up your Communism for a
while?" This only shows the lack of common sense on the part of some
bourgeois elements, for they should know from the history of the Chinese
revolution that without the guidance of Communism, even the democratic
revolution in China cannot be a success, not to mention the final stage of the
revolution, socialism. Once Communism is "packed up" China will face
ruin. The world now depends on Communism for its salvation, and so does
China.
We Chinese Communists must not neglect establishing a united front
with the Chinese bourgeoisie, which still maintains to a certain degree the
revolutionary characteristic of opposing imperialism as well as the bureau-
cratic warlord government of its own country [the Kuomintang dictator-
ship]. But it must be remembered that the bourgeoisie, especially the big
bourgeoisie, even in the process of revolution, is never willing to break with
the imperialists completely, nor to overthrow imperialism and feudalism
thoroughly. For instance, from 1927 to 1936 tlie bourgeois elements sur-
render to the imperialists ; " and allied themselves with the feudal forces
and opposed the revolutionary people. Again, during the present anti-Jap-
anese war, a part of the lug bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Ching-wei,
surrendered to the enemy, illustrating a new betrayal of that class. "In view
of this, is it not a dream to expect that China can establish a [democratic]
bourgeois society ruled by her own bourgeoisie?" The bourgeois revolution
needs the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist
guidance. It was with regard to this kind of united front between the
Communists and the bourgeoisie that Sun Yat-sen said : "Communism is the
good friend of the Three Principles of the People."
* A reference to the chancre in China's policy after Chiang Kai-shek hroke away from the
anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet Russian Knoniintans:-rommnnist government at Hankow during
1926. The new Kuomintang Government established by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking
adopted a friendly policv toward Groat Britain and the United States and other imperialist
and capitalist nations. It hroke off relations with Soviet Russia.
•• A reference to the landlord and merchant classes in China.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2317
The "obstinate elements'' are practicing their principle of "one party"
[the Kuomintang doctrine] and denying the united front today, so they
utter such fatal absurdities as renunciation of Communism. "To tell you
fi-ankly, it is useless to urge us [Chinese Communists] to 'pack up.' It is
much better to urge us to make a contest. If there is somebody who beats
us in the race, we shall admit that it is our fate. If not, you had better 'pack
up' your anti-democratic, 'one-principle' style as early as possible . . .
Whoever prepares to oppose the Communists has to prepare to be crushed."
Our [Communist] kind of democratic revolution is a great blow to
imperialism and is therefore opposed by the imperialists. On the other
liand, it is permitted by socialism and is assisted by the Socialist State and
the international socialist proletariat. It is the result of the Russian October
Revolution which, as Stalin said in 1918, ". . . promotes the liberation
work of the Western and Eastern oppressed peoples, and attracts them into
the common, victorious anti-imperialist course . . ."
Mao Tse-tung concludes: "We [Chinese] cannot separate ourselves from
the assistance of the Soviet Union or from the victory of the anti-capitalist
struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Great Britain, the United States,
France and Germany . . . [The aid of] the Soviet Union [is] an indis-
pensable condition for the final victory of China's war of resistance . . ."
And, again, ". . . If we forsake the policy of allying with the Soviet Union
and cooperate with imperialism instead, then the word 'revolution' may be
cancelled, and the Three Principles of the People will become a reactionary
doctrine."
China's revolutionary policy must therefore be (1) alliance with the
Soviet Union; (2) cooperation betw'een the boui-geoisie and the Chinese
Communists; (3) protection and assistance to the peasants and workers.
That this policy has not been changed even though the Comintern was dis-
solved in May 1943, was confirmed by Mao Tse-tung in the summer of 1944 when
he told a British correspondent, then visiting Yenan, tliat "the Chinese Commu-
nist Party has not changed its fundamental ixilicy which is "New Democracy
. . ." General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Chinese Communist Army, made a special
point of emphasizing after the dissolution of the Communist International that
the "Chinese Communists are Marx-Leninists . . . The Chinese Communists
will certainly continue to apply and develop Marxism-Leninism dialectically in
accordance with our own conditions."
This does not, of course, prevent the Chinese Communists from taking a very
strong pro-American attitude at present, and offering us full cooperation both in
the war against Japan and in the postwar period. This is fully in line with
Mao Tse-tung's statement in NEW DEMOCRACY that the Chinese Communist
"revolution, due to the variations in the condition of the enemy [meaning the
capitalist nations and the Chinese "big bourgeoisie"] and in the conditions of
this alliance [between the Chinese Communists and the bourgeoisie] may be
divided into a certain number of stages during its process, but no change will
occur in its fundamental character, which will be the same until the arrival of
the socialist revolution."
Strategic considerations may make it desirable for America to establish
military cooperation with the Chinese Communists. Because of their political
control over large areas of eastern China, it may also become desirable for us
to establish some kind of official diplomatic relations with them. But it is
obvious from the foregoing that it is completely unrealistic to deal with the
Chinese Communists on the assumption that they are not Communists. If we
speculate that it will take "at least half a century" before the Communists have
achieved the objective of their present democratic boui'geois revolution, we may
just as well speculate that it will take only five or ten years. We may even
speculate that this democratic trend in Communist China may in time become so
strong that the Communists can no longer control it and use it as a means of
introducing communism in China. The Communists themselves realize this,
and have stated that the only "danger" is that the country may "go democratic."
However, all that we know is that at present the democratic movement in
Communist China is fully controlled by the Communists in fulfilment of the
policy expressed in Mao Tse-tung's NEW DEMOCRACY. We have no reason
to suppose that their policy has changed. In the woi'ds of Wang Chia-hsiang, at
present Director of the Political Department of the Eighteenth Group Army :
The Chinese Communists "will never abandon their ideals and the theories of
2318 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Marxism and Leninism . . . The whole program of the Chinese Communist Party
consists of two parts : (1) the maximum program, for the overthrow of capitalism
and the establishment of socialism, and for racial emancipation through the
elimination of classes; (2) the minimum immediate program of the national
democratic revolution . . ."
2. Outline History of the Chinese Communist Movement
A. PERIOD OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST COOPERATION, 1923-27
(i) Formation of Chinese Communist Party
The Chinese Communist movement found its origin in the Student Movement of
1919, which reflected Chinese indignation against the decision of the "Big Four"
of the Versailles Conference to concede to Japan all the rights which Germany
held in Shantung Province before the outbreak of the first World -War. It led
to a new awakening of national consciousness, particularly among the Chinese
literati, and focussed the attention of the students on the need of organized
resistance against imperialist aggression, and of instituting reforms in the Chinese
political and social system to start China on the road to modern progress. While
most of the students entering political work enrolled with the Kuomintang, the
Nationalist party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, many became imbued with Marxian
doctrines and established small Socialist societies, which formed the nucleus
of proletarian political organization in China. Many Chinese went to Moscow
and Irkutsk to investigate the Soviet system of government. Many became
Communists an^l entered Russian universities.
Then, in 1920, Soviet Russia determined to organize the Communist Movement
in Asia. This decision was accepted at the Baku Congress of Nations of the
Orient (Sept. 1920), presided over by Zinoviev, President of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Third or Communist International (Comintern). In the same year
Lenin sent his secretary, Marin, to China as the first delegate of the Comintern
in China. Marin secretly organized the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter
written CCP) as a branch of the Communist International. In May 1921 the
foundation meeting of the CCP was held in Shanghai. It was attended by 12
Chinese delegates, among them Mao Tse-tung, the present leader of the Com-
munist Party in China. The first Central Party Committee established in
Shanghai included Ch'en Tu-hsiu, scion of an Anhwei mandarin family and one
of the foremost literary figures in China of his time. He was elected General
Secretary of the Party. Another member of the Central Committee was Ch'en
Kung-po, the present leader of the Nanking puppet government. CCP branches
were also organized during 1921 and 1922 in several foreign countries. Among
the founders were : in France, Chou En-lai, one of the most important Communist
leaders today ; in Germany, Chu Te, present C-in-C of the Chinese Communist
armies ; in Japan, Chou Fu-hai, at present one of the chief collaborators with
Japan in the Nanking puppet government. The CCP was organized as a secret
society. It started its activities by conducting an intensive campaign among
students in Peking and laborers in Shanghai and Hong Kong.
(2) TJie Soviet Rtissian-Chinese "Entente Cordiale."
The first of the Communist Party's problems was the question of Its relations to
the bourgeois Nationalist Kuomintang. Cooperation with the Nationalists was
considered essential, since the Comintern program was based on Lenin's thesis
that, in the imperialist epoch, the national liberation movements in the colonial
and semi-colonial countries could be led to merge with the main stream of the
international proletarian revolutionary movement. After Sun Yet-sen had re-
jected the idea of a two-party Kuomintang-Communist alliance, Chinese Com-
munists began at the end of 1922 to enter the Kuomintang while secretly main-
taining their membership in the Communist Party. It was not until May 1926
that they appeared on the Kuomintang registration lists as Communists, after
Chiang Kai-shek in an, effort to counteract subversive activities of the Com-
munists, had prevailed upon the Kuomintang to accept a ruling that the CCP
should cease to be a secret organization and that a list of Communist members
should be filed with the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.
In 1922 the Soviet Government sent Adolf Joffe to China with the delicate
mission of establishing oflQcial diplomatic relations with the internationally
recognized Chinese Government in Peking while at the same time arranging for
Soviet support of the revolutionary movement of the Kuomintang, which aimed
at overthrowing the Peking Government. He did not meet with immediate
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2319
success in I'eking, but during a meeting with Sun Yat-sen in Slianghai (Jan.
1!)23) he was able to arrange an Entente Cordiale between Soviet Russia and the
Kuomintang. In tallying witli Chinese, Jofte made a point of "admitting" tliat
what was in operation in Russia was not Communism. When a Chinese asked
him whether Communism could be realized in Russia in ten years" time, Joffe
said "No." "In twenty years?" "No." "In a hundred years?" "Perhaps,"
said Joffe. Joffe's method of assuaging Chinese fears of the "Red Menace" bears
a strong resemblance to present Chinese Communist methods in regard to Amer-
ica. General Ch'en I, Acting Commander of the (Communist) New Fourth Army,
said to an American official observer in Yenan (Sept. 1944) : ". . . it will be
many years before (Communism) can possibly be adopted in China. It may take
a 10() years or more for China to achieve a state of democracy such as exists today
in the United States . . ."
Joffe returned to Russia and was succeeded by Leo Karakhan, the foremost
Soviet expert in Oriental diplomacy, who in 1924 obtained official recognition
of the Soviet Union from the Peking Government. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen,
having failed after repeated efforts to obtain any promise of aid from either
Britain or America, wrote to Karakhan in Peking requesting him to send a
representative with whom Sun might discuss mutual relations. Karakhan sent
Michael Borodin, who arrived in October 1923 in Canton, where Sun had estab-
lished a Kuomintang government. Soviet Russia now maintained two types
of relations with China. The Soviet Government dealt with the Government in
Peking on the basis of normal diplomatic relations. The Communist Inter-
national dealt with the Kuomintang. Borodin's task was to reorganize and
pump now life into the Kuomintang.
(5) Chinese Communists accepted into the Kuomintang
The first Kuomintang Party Congress in January 1924 endorsed the admis-
sion of Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang on condition that they accept
Kuomintang principles. Great numbers of Communists now joined the Kuomin-
tang while still secretly maintaining their Communist Party membership with
Soviet Russian money and backing they organized and directed the Hong Kong
strike against the British. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers left
Hong Kong. The trade and shipping of the colony were practically brought to
a standstill. The workers from Hong Kong were quartered in Canton where
they served as a powerful weapon in the hands of the Communists against the
Chinese merchants and the Kuomintang "reactionaries." The Communists like-
wise organized a nation-wide anti-British boycott and anti-foreign demonstra-
tions and strikes in Shanghai and Canton. These led to clashes with British and
French police and military forces — the "May 30 incident" (1925) in Shanghai,
and the "June 23 incident" (1925) in Canton. The rapidly growing influence
of the Communists alarmed many Chinese, however, and in August 1924 the
first violent outbreaks occurred between pro- and anti-communist groups in
Canton. Nevertheless, since Soviet Russia was the only power willing to support
the Kuomintang, the Nationalists became increasingly dependent upon her aid.
Because of this the Kuomintang had to accept Borodin's advice, even though
many objected to the Russian-Chinese Communist influence. Borodin rose to
the position of a quasi-dictator.
He saw that the first task was to reorganize the Kuomintang and forthwith
reconstructed it along the lines of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia. Boro-
din was able to have .voung and hardy men, most of them Chinese Communists or
men sympathetic toward the Comnmnists. appointed to pivotal positions in the
Kuomintang machine and in the new Nationalist army under Chiang Kai-shek.
This army was being trained by Russian advisers, headed by General "Galen"
(Vassily Bluecher) at the Whampoa Military Academy. Auxiliary societies
were also organized to strengthen the Kuomintang, such as the "Federation of
Farmers, Workers, Soldiers, and Students to Promote the Revolutionary Move-
ment," "The Youth Movement," etc. In all of these the Chinese Communists
obtained the leadership. Borodin also brought from Russia experts for each
type of organization who trained the Chinese to assume new leadership in the
Kuomintang.
In the years that followed, up to the spring of 1927, the revolutionary move-
ment swept like wildfire over south and central China. It was focussed on two
immediate objectives : first, the undermining of the influence of the Imperialist
powers in China, foremost among them Great Britain; second the defeat of the
independent warlords and the forces of the Peking Government. Bef(u-e the
advancing Nationalist armies, Kuomintang propaganda agents infiltrated into
2320 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the areas of the opposing forces. They concentrated their attention on organizing
the impoverished peasants and laborers, and while the peasants were encouraged
to loot and burn the estates of their landlords, strikes and boycotts were organized
in the large industrial cities where foreign economic interests were concentrated.
The Chinese Communists played the dominant role in organizing this popular
unrest. It greatly contributed to the success of the Nationalist armies, since it
disrupted the administration and the economic life in strategic areas of the
opposing forces. Before the end of 1926 the revolutionary armies had reached
the Yangtze River. The Kuomintang government was transferred to Hankow in
November 1926.
(4) The Kuomintang-Communist split
The tensions within the Kuomintang between pro and anti-Communist groups
had approached the breaking point. In the course of 1926 most of the National-
ists realized that the Communists were gaining the leadership over the revolu-
tion. The strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and violent acts of the mass or-
ganizations, which in 1924-25 had been directed primarily against British
nationals and interests, in the course of 1926 became increasingly focussed on
Chinese social classes with vested interests as well. This in turn led to a
i-ealization among the Chinese Nationalists that the Chinese revolution under
Soviet Russian-Chinese Communist influence was rapidly turning into a social
class war, or a Communist revolution, instead of a nationalist-democratic
revolution as originally envisaged by Sun Yat-sen. The rapid increase of Com-
munist influence was shown by the growth of the memloership of the CCP
from less than 1,000 in 1926 to 60,000 in April 1927.
Chiang Kai-shek ^ and the Kviomintang had never favored a course like this,
and in 1926 Chiang began to take an open stand against the Communists. By
the end of the year he had completely disassociated himself from the leftist
Kuomintang government in Hankow. His headquarters at Nan-ch'ang (Kiang-
si) assumed the status of a rival government, challenging the authority of the
Hankow regime. While the Kuomintang leftists and the Communists rallied
under Borodin, the conservatives rallied under Chiang Kai-shek. When
Chiang's forces occupied Greater Shanghai in March 1927, Chiang received
from Chinese banking groups assurances of financial support which relieved him
from any need of further reliance on Soviet Russia. After this it was only a
matter of months before the power of the Hankow government was broken.
Many of the political and military leaders of the Hankow regime shifted their
loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek.
While Chiang Kai-shek initiated the policy of suppression of the Chinese
Communists by force (beginning with the labor massacre in Shanghai, April
1927), neither he nor the conservative Kuomintang groups were chiefly re-
sponsible for the disintegration of Communist influence in the Hankow govern-
ment. This was cau.sed primarily by a split between leftist Kuomintang leaders
and Communists, in the course of the flrst half of 1927. After Great Britain had
signed, in February 1927, an agreement with the Hankow government for the
restitution of the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang, sevei-al leftist
Kuomintang leaders wanted to adopt a friendly policy toward Great Britain.
Borodin opposed this. Opposition was also developing among leftist leaders
against the Communist-sponsored policy of land confiscation, which was assuming
increasingly violent forms. In May 1927 these confiscations led to anti-Commu-
nist riots among troops of the Hankow government at Changsha, and after this
the movement against the Communists spread throughout China. Borodin lost
his hold over the Hankow government and was treated with increasing distrust.
The anti-Communists movement also spread to North China, where the so-
called Christian General, Feng Yii-hsiang, had been won over and converted to
Communism. The Peking Government took drastic action against Soviet Russia.
On 6 April 1927, armed with a warrant countersigned by the Dean of the Diplo-
matic Body, Chinese police and troops entered the Legation Quarter and raided
the Soviet Embassy. Many documents were confiscated proving that Soviet
diplomatic officials were actively supporting the Chinese Communists. On the
same day, the Peking Government broke off diplomatic relations with Soviet
Russia.
B Chiana: Kai-shek together with the leftist leader Wang Chins;-wei had assnmpd leader-
ship of the Kuomintans: following Sun Yat-sen's death in March 192.5. At the hpi;inning
of the Northern Expedition from Canton in the spring of 1926, Chiang was appointed C-in-C
of the Nationalist forces.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2321
The final break with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Conmiuuists came in July
1927 after an Indian representative of the Third International, M. N. Roy, had
revealed a Soviet plot which practically amounted to ousting the Kuamintang
from power. Roy confided to Wang Ching-wei, the Kuomintang leader in Han-
kow that he and Borodin had received orders from Stalin to instruct the COP
to push the policy of land confiscation. Stalin had also advised the reorganiza-
tion of the Kuomintang Central Executive Comittee with a view to increasing
tlie proportion of pro-Communist hibor and peasant leaders. The CCP was ad-
vised to build up a regular army of its own of 20,000 men, in addition to forming
a force of peasants and workers detachments, 50,000 strong, to be used against
the loyal Kuomintang forces. Following this, the Kuomintang Central Execu-
tive Committee at Hankow formally adopted a resolution on 15 July for the
expulsion of the Communists.'* At this meeting Borodin's resignation was also
accepted. With the growing anti-Communist movement, the Communist Party
in Soviet Russia had begun a strong propaganda attack on the Kuomintang and
the Hankow government ; in view of this the leftist leaders in Hankow found
the entente between the Kuomintang and Moscow impracticable.
At the end of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek had formed, at Nanking, a new Kuomintang
government which started military operations against the leftist government at
Hankow. Hankow fell to the Nanking forces in November 1927. In December
Chiang ordered all Soviet Consulates in central and south China to be closed.
By the end of the year thousands of Communists and their sympathizers among
farmers and laborers had been killed throughout China. Most of the Com-
munists had been routed from the large cities. Their labor and iieasant unions
had been dissolved. While many Communists fled to Russia, those remaining
in China either went into hiding in the foreign concessions in the treaty ports or
fled into rural districts to rally the support of the peasants. The period of
Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was closed.
B. PERIOD OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CIVIL WAR, 1927-1936
(7) Comintern orders policy of attack on cities by Chinese Reds
When the great anti-Communist reaction set in during 1927, the Communists
at first planned to occupy some of the larger cities and use them as bases from
which to counter the armed opposition of the Kuomintang. They had become
greatly impressed by their past successes and especially by the power they had
wielded through the unions of peasants and workers. There were about 10,000,-
000 members in the peasant unions and nearly 3,000,000 workers in trade unions
in 1927, and they counted upon these as effective instruments to maintain the
power of the CCP. Some Communist leaders, among them Ch'en Tu-hsiu, did
not consider the peasants' and workers' unions sufliciently strong to fight the
well-armed forces of the Kuomintang without the support of an army, and there-
fore advised a policy of caution. But the majority of Communist leaders, fol-
lowing orders from Moscow, decided on a policy of "direct action," that is, in
the words of the Comintern, "to unfold mass political strikes and demonstra-
tions, to expand the partisan warfare . . . and to turn the militarist war into
class civil war" for the establishment of the rule of the "Workers', Peasants', and
soldiers' Delegate Councils," or Soviets.
In August 1927 Ch'en Tu-hsiu was ousted from the leadership of the CCP for
his objection to this insurrectionist policy. In 1929 he was expelled from the
Party and subsequently joined the small Trotskyist Left Opposition that devel-
oped in China during the early 1930's. He was succeeded as head of the CCP by
Li Li-san who was assisted, among others, by Chou Eu-lai in the Political Bureau
of the Party. The Comintern appointed Lominadze to succeed Borodin, and
after him Heinz Neumann, to guide the Chinese Communists in organizing the
insurrectionary movement for taking possession of city bases.
Until the end of 1930 the main attention of the Communists was focused on
gaining control of such cities as Canton, Shnnghai, Hankow, and other industrial
and trading centers. While the Communists were comparatively successful in
rural areas, where they established several bases and built up relatively strong
peasant armies, they wasted the strength of these armies in costly attacks upon
the cities. The majority of the Communists, though anxious to make use of the
peasants in attacks upon the cities, actually despised the peasants, for they
feared that the Communist movement might "degenerate" into a peasant move-
" In Ansnst 1927. the left-win? Knomintans ?ovPrnnipnf in Hankow declared the TCP an
illegal organization.
2322 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ment. They considered this as contrary to the aims of the international Com-
munist movement which was to establish "proletarian hegemony," not "peasant
hegemony." The peasant armies were scornfully referred to as "lumpen
proletariat."
Futile attempts were made in 1927 to occupy Nan-ch'ang, Swatow, and Canton.
Communist soldier and labor forces actually held Canton for three days in De-
cember 1927 before they were driven out by the combined armies of the Na-
tionalists (Generals Li Chi-slien, Chang Fa-k'uei, and Hsiieh Ytieh). Some 600
people were reported killed during the days of the "Canton Commune," as the
short-lived Communist regime was called. But after the Communists had been
driven out, the Nationalists massacred thousands of the city's population (accord-
ing to one account 5,700 men and women) in an effort to eradicate all Com-
munists and Leftists. This was the pattern followed in all the cities and rural
areas under Nationalist control. The Communist-sponsored labor and peasant
movement was literally killed in blood purges of hundreds of thousands of work-
ers and peasants. Few were killed in the actual fighting between Communist and
Kuomintang forces, in comparison with those killed in Kuomintang massacres.
The result was that the Communist labor movement of the 1920"s collapsed
within a few months. No one dared to belong to a Communist labor or peasant
union. In spite of this the Communists continued their efforts to keep the labor
movement alive. When the Kuomintang began to organize labor unions of its
own, the Communists started a program of forming seci'et "red" unions in
opposition to the "yellow" unions of the Kuomintang. But in their efforts to
incite the workers to strikes and armed uprisings they alienated the sympathy
of the workers, because of the terrible retribution from the Kuomintang au-
thorities which every one of these uprisings caused. At the end of 1928 the
Communists had to admit that "the trade union organizations have shrunk to
almost nothing. The Party organizations in the cities are scattered and
smashed. In the whole country there is not one healthy nucleus of industrial
workers." In the summer of 1930 a Communist source claimed that there were
some 64,000 members in the "red" trade union federation, but the totals for
the principal cities amounted only to some 5,700. The rest were scattered
throughout the country-side. These figures showed the staggering defeat of
the peasant and worker union movement, which had been 13,000,000 strong in
1927. In the same year, 1930, Chou En-lai stated that the CCP numbered
120,000, among them only 2,000 factory workers.
The policy of "direct action" had proved a complete failure. Li Li-san was
made the scape-goat. He was ousted from his position as head of the CCP by
the Comintern Headquarters in Moscow and was replaced in January 1981 by
Ch'en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), a special protege of the Comintern.
(2) The Chinese Soviet peasant 'movement
Attention was shifted to the hitherto despised peasants, who from this time
came to play the dominant role in the Chinese Communist movement. With this
shift in policy, which gained Moscow's approval, the emphasis in the Chinese
Communist movement was also directed toward the strengthening of the Red
Army, rather than the development of peasant and labor unions, and the em-
ployment of this army in protecting Communist rural areas rather than in
attacking the Kuomintang strongholds in the cities.
The (Tlhinese Communist army had a humble beginning. When the anti-
Communist terror began in 1927, scattered peasant and worker detachments in
the Kuomintang labor coi'ps fled to the hills and assumed the role of partisan
bands. They joined with local bandits and with a few companies and i-egiments
of Kuomintang soldiers who had mutinied and taken refuge in the mountains.
From the fusion of these elements there emerged in 1927 and '28 a number of
Red armies. The first and most important of these, the "First Peasants' and
Workers' Army," was formed by Mao Tse-tung, who had fled from Hankow where
he had served as the head of the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang. In
1927, with a motley force of peasants, bandits, workers, and soldiers he led the
so-called Autumn Crop Uprising in Hunan, aimed at occupying Changsha and
other larger Hunan cities. When it failed he led what was left of his band to the
mountain stronghold of Ching-kan Shan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. At this
time his force numbered only about 1,000. Here the first Soviet in China was set
up in November 1927 (in Tsalin), and the first Soviet Government was elected.
In this Soviet the Communists promoted a more democratic program, with a
moderate policy based on slow but regular development, and with emphasis on
agrarian reform.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2323
It was Mao Tse-tung who dictated this policy of moderation. He was aware
that the Communists were not strong enough to launch attacks upon the cities
and that their campaign for land confiscations, strikes, and widespread upheavals
would only serve to intensify the Kuomintang terror and weaken the Communist
forces in China. Born of a peasant family, he realized that China's strength
was in her rural population, not in the insignificant industrial proletariat in the
cities. He believed that only a movement for rural rehabilitation, combined
with gradual elimination of the excessive abuses in the system of land ownership,
could win for the Communists a wide-spread following among the Chinese people.
Because of this he disagreed with the Comintern policy of centering attention
on the conquest of the cities. He also opposed the policy of looting and burning
the property of landlords, and urged a moderate policy in regard to land confisca-
tion. He made an arbitrary distinction between big landlords and rich peasants.
While he favored confiscation of the land of the big landlords, he counselled leni-
ency toward the rich peasants. Until the Communists were strong enough to take
charge of the political and economic administration of the country themselves
they were still, in Mao Tse-tung's opinion, dependent upon the landlords and
merchants, for they alone knew the intricate system of rural administration, and
they controlled the tax collection, the money market and the trade. No matter
how evil was the rule of the landlords, they were the only group with sufficient
education to keep the administration and economy of the country running. To
kill the landlords or to cause them to flee was tantamount to introducing anarchy,
for whereas the ignorant peasants could loot and burn and confiscate the land of
the landlords, they could not survey the land and re-divide it equitably, nor could
they set up and run rural administration and economy by themselves.
The answer to these problems was the establishment of Soviets. But these
Chinese Soviets could not entirely follow the pattern of the Russian Soviets,
which provides a platform for discussion and the right of voting for workers
and peasants only, for the establishment and maintenance of a Soviet govern-
ment of the proletariat. In China the basis of the Soviet had to be broadened
to include the landlords and other moneyed classes. In this respect the Chinese
Soviets became more democratic than the Russian. The landlords were even
admitted into the Party.
This policy of moderation was by no means adopted b.v all Chinese Soviet
districts. Landlords, together with their families and their large retinue of
tax collectors, police agents, court runners, servants, and friends were killed
in most Soviet areas. In many cases the Communists perpetrated mass execu-
tions on a scale comparable to the Kuomintang massacres. But in the Kiangsi-
Fukien area (the largest Communist base area) where Mao Tse-tung led the
Soviet movement, his policy of moderation was practiced. It bore fruit in that
in time many landlords came to cooperate with the Communists. Communist
sources stated in 1931 that two-thirds of the Soviet Government in China was
in the hands of rich peasants and that rich peasants were also in all the Party
posts. Since they often favored their own interests at the expense of the poor
peasants, Communist leaders complained frequently about their influence. Even
Mao Tse-tung complained in 1934 that "Many landlords and rich peasants put
on a revolutionary coloration. They are very active and rely on their historical
advantages — 'they can speak well and write well' — and consequently in the first
period they steal the fruits of the agrarian revolution . . ." Party leaders
freciuently disciplined the landlords by seizing their land and imposing fines
on them. On the whole, however, the system of democratic cooperation be-
tween landlords and peasants in the Soviet central district (Kiangsi) worked
well. It should be emphasized that landlord participation in the Party and in
the Soviet governments — both central and local governments — was permitted
only as a temporary expedient during the "first period," or the "bourgeois-
democratic period" of the revolution, until such time as the masses should be
sufficiently educated to take over control by the establishment of a proletarian
dictatorship.
Because he counselled moderation and a "go slow" policy, Mao Tse-tung earned
the disfavor of Moscow. Soon after the failure of the Autumn Crop Uprising he
was repudiated by the Central Committee of the CCP and dismissed from the
Politburo, and also from the Party Front Committee. It was not until Mao's
peasant movement had proved to be the only successful Communist movement
that he was again accepted into the grace of the Party and rose to its highest
leadership. It is not known when he succeeded Ch'en Shao-yii as Party leader.
However, in September 19.33 Ch'en himself referred to Mao Tse-tung as "Presi-
2324 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
dent of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Com-
missars."
The Chinese Soviet movement and the Chinese Red Army began under purelv
Chinese leadership. They did not, in fact, obtain Moscow's approval till after the
Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July 1928. Following
this the Sixth Congress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in July and August
1928, gave its approval of the agrarian movement. But the Party, obeying Mos-
cow's dictates, persisted for two more years in its policy of using the peasant
movement and peasant armies for the conquest of city bases.
(3) Groivth of the Red Army and of Soviet base areas
In May 1928 Chu Te joined Mao Tse-tung at Ching-kan Shan vsith the remnant,
less than 2,000 strong, of the forces which had participated in the attack on
Swatow.' Mao and Chu combined their forces into the famous Fourth Red
Army, of which Chu became commander and Mao political commissar. Another
army, the 11th Red Army, was formed out of the remnant of the forces which
took part in the Canton uprising. Uprisings in southern Kiangsi, around Chi-an,
in the spring of 1928 led' to the formation of still another army, the Third Red
Army. More troops arrived at Ching-kan Shan in the winter of 1928, following
uprisings and mutinies in General Ho Chien's Kuomintang army in Hunan,
and out of these emerged the famous Fifth Red Army under P'erig Te-huai, a
former Kuomintang officer. In the winter of 1927 other Communist armies were
formed in eastern Hupeh under Ho Lung and in eastern Hupeh and southern
Honan under Hsii Hai-tung. At the same time Soviet bases were established
along the northeastern edge of Kiangsi, on the border of Fukien.
The armies at Ching-kan Shan broke through the cordon of Kuomintang troops
at the beginning of 1929 and spread over southern Kiangsi and western Fukien.
In the course of 1929 and '30 Communist power was consolidated in these areas
as well as in large sectors of northern Kiangsi and Hunan. The anny was
constantly enlarged, drawing its recruits partly from the peasantry, partly from
troops who left the Kuomintang army. By the beginning of 1930 Soviet power
had been sufficiently consolidated in Kiangsi to permit the establishment of the
Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government. The Red armies in Kiangsi, Hunan and
Fukien were united into the First Front Army with Chu Te as C-in-C and Mao
Tse-tung as Political Commissar.
With this growth of power, however, the Comintern and Li Li-san pressed for
an early attack i;pon Changsha and Hankow to win the first large city bases.
All available forces were concentrated upon Changsha, and the Fifth Red Army
under P'eng Te-huai actually succeeded in occupying the city on 28 July 1930.
But the Communists were soon driven back with heavy casualties. In this battle
of Changsha, the foreign powers offered active support to the Kuomintang forces.
American, British, Japanese, and Italian gunboats, having evacuated foreigners,
steamed up the Hsiang River and bombarded the occupied city.
(4) Beginning of Kuomintang ''extermination" campaign
The attack on Changsha marked the last attempt during the 1930's on the part
of the Chinese Communists to invade any of the large cities. It also marked the
end of the "Li Li-san line," as Mao Tse-tung scornfully called it, the Chinese
policy laid down by the Comintern of "direct attack" upon Kuomintang forces.
In the years that followed the tactics of guerilla warfare as developed by
Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung became standard for the Red Army. It was based on
four principles :
( 1 ) When the enemy advances, we retreat.
(2) When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them.
(3 ) When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.
(4) When the enemy retreats, we pursue.
The warnings of Mao Tse-tung against the policy of "direct attack" were now
amply justified. The attack on Changsha fully aroused the Kuomintang to the
danger of the growing Communist power. Chiang Kai-shek began to pour
reinforcements into Hunan and Kiangsi, and in December 1930 he began the
"First Bandit Extermination Campaign" against the Red Army in Kiangsi.
According to Mao Tse-tung the Kuomintang forces totalled over 100.000 troops,
but were defeated in little more than a month by 40,000 Communist troops. In
''Chu Te's foroe comprised the remnnnts of the Knoniintnng: 20th Division under Ho Lung,
and of the 4th Army (under Chians Fa-k'uei), and Yeh Ting's Division of the 11th Army
which had revolted on SO .Tuly 1927 and occupied Nan-ch'ang for a few davs. Driven oiit
of Nan-ch'ang, this force marched south and attaclved Swatow where it was defeated
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2325
May 1931 the Kuomintang launched its Second Extermination Campaign with
forces exceeding 200,000 troops '' under General Ho Ying-ch'in. It, too, was
quickly defeated. In June 1981 Chiang himself took command of the Third
Campaign with an army of 300,000 men." He was assisted by Generals Ho
Ying-ch'in, Chu Shao-liang, and Ch'en Ming-shu. By September this campaign
had been successfully countered by the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek withdrew
his ti'oops.
The Red Army now entered a period of comparative peace. It had gained
strength through the capture of vast quantities of modern equipment from the
Kuomintang armies. The Red armies established their capital deep in the hills
of south Kiangsi in the village of Jui-chin and there, on 7 November 1931, they
proclaimed the creation of the "Chinese Soviet Republic." The First All-China
Soviet Congress was called in Decemlier 1931, and the Central Soviet Govern-
ment was established with Mao Tse-tung as chairman. Chu Te was elected
C-in-C of the Red Army. "The Soviet Government in China," read the Consti-
tution adopted by the First Congress, "declares its readiness to form a revo-
lutionary united front with the world proletariat and all oppressed nations,
and proclaims the Soviet Union, the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its
loyal ally."
In the same month in which the First All-China Soviet Congress was held, over
20,000 troops of the 28th Route Army of the Kuomintang revolted in Kiangsi
and joined the Reds ; they were reorganized into the Fifth Army Corps. The
Red Army, now having a strength of five Army Corps, began small offensives of
its own. It expanded into southern Fukien and northern Kwangtung. In this
same year, 1931, Red forces became active in Shensi Province, where two years
later a new Soviet base was established. This, the smallest of all Soviet bases,
was destined to become the refuge of all Communist forces in China.
The pattern of the Communists" control in Kiangsi and neighboring provinces
resembled their control in present Japanese-occupied areas. While Kuomintang
troops held the roads and the main cities, defended by thousands of pillboxes,
barbed wire and trenches, the Communists held surrounding rural areas. While
the size of these areas was constantly changing with the fortunes of war, the
Communists laid claim in 1932-33 to 70 of Kiangsi's 81 hsien (counties). The
most important Red Army area, the "Central Soviet District," comprised 17
hsien astride the Kiangsi-Fukien border, with a total population of 3,000,000.
The other Soviet districts, in the Hupeh-Hunan, Hunan-Kiangsi, NE Kiangsi,
Honan-Huijeh-Anhwei, and Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi border areas, were all smaller,
less stable, and more frequently compelled to dissolve under the pressure of re-
peated attacks.
The Red Armies, themselves varied no less in size and strength, both in their
more or less regular formations and in the auxiliary corps of peasant Red Guards.
In 1932 it was estimated that the grand total of all Red armies operating in all
districts was 151,000, of whom only 97,500 had rifles. In 1934, at the beginning
of the Nationalist Fifth Extermination Campaign, the Red Army in the Kiangsi-
Fukien areas numbered 180,000 with perhaps 200,000 partison and Red Guards.'
But altogether the Reds had only about 100,000 rifles. Ho Lung's forces in the
Hupeh-Hunan area numbered about 10,000, The other scattered forces were even
smaller. (79)
That these insignificant peasant forces could hold out for seven years in central
China, against Kuomintang forces two to seven times their number and vastly
superior in armaments, is strong testimony to the capable leadership of the
Communist commanders and the loyalty they enjoyed from the people. It also
goes to prove the remarkable endurance and fine soldierly quality of the Chinese
peasant soldier when and if he is lead by capable officers, which has been com-
mented upon by many American military observers.
(5) Defeat of Soviet movement in Central China
The continued growth of Communist power, however, prompted the National-
ists to renew their efforts to win back Kiangsi. In April 1933 they began the
Fourth Extermination Campaign against the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek
appointed his best field commander, General Ch'en Ch'eng, to direct the campaign.
On the recommendation of the late Gen. Von Seeckt (former C-of-S of the German
army and for a time chief military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek) Ch'en Ch'eng
* According to Mao Tse-tung.
' One Communist source claimed 350,000 "Red Army regulars" in 1933, and about 600,000
partisans. (154) These figures, however, seem too high.
2326 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
began the use of the blockhduse and fortification system against the Communists.
But this campaign failed like all the previous ones. Ch'en Ch'eng is said to have
stated that fighting the Reds was a "life-time job" and a "life sentence."
Finally, in October 1933, the Fifth and last Extermination Campaign was
launched. Communist sources claimed that Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 900,000
troops, of whom perhaps 400,000 actively took part in the campaign in Kiangsi-
Fukien and Honan-Anhwei-Hupeh. This time Chiang Kai-shek built hundreds of
miles of military roads and thousands of small fortifications, with interconnect-
ing fields of machine-gun or artillery fire. His defensive-offensive strategy di-
minished the Reds' superiority in maneuvering, and emphasized the disadvan-
tages of their smaller numbers and lack ot.resources. The Reds were unable to
resist the slow advance of the Kuomintang forces which in effect ringed them
in within a wall which gradually moved closer around their central base.
Nevertheless the Fifth Campaign proved inconclusive. The Kuomintang
won back Kiangsi, but it failed to exterminate the Red Army. In January 1934
the Second All-China Soviet Congress convened at Juichin, and it was decided to
transfer the Red Army to a new base. Preparations were made soon afterward
for the "Long March." It began on 16 October 1934, just a year after Chiang
Kai-shek launched his Fifth Campaign. The main forces of the Red Army, about
90,000 men, concentrated in southern Kiangsi, broke through the Kuomintang
lines of fortifications in Hunan and Kwangtung, put the enemy to flight, and
tlien started its long march westward.
The price in life paid for the reconquest of Kiangsi reached a staggering fig-
ure. The Red Army, according to Chou En-lai, suffered 60,000 casualties during
the Fifth Extermination Campaign. There is no figure available for the Na-
tionalist losses. But the military casualties were nothing compared with civilian
casualties. The Kuomintang is reported to have admitted that about 1,000,000
people, mostly peasants, were killed or starved to death during the Fifth Cam-
paign. Tang Yii-jen, Secretary of the Kuomintang Central Political Council,
stated in May 1934 that 9,000,000 people had been killed in Kiangsi during the
period of Kuomintang-Communist civil war. The Chinese Postal Administration
estimated the population of Kiangsi as 27,560,000 in 1926, the Kuomintang
Government estimated it as 20,320,000 in 1936— a decrease of 7,240,000.
(6) The Long March
After the break-through into Kwangtung and Hunan, the Red Army, accom-
panied by thousands of peasants, marched through Kwangtung and Hunan. It
was under constant attack. By the time it reached Kweichow it had lost one-
third of its troops. Prevented by Kuomintang forces from marching north for
a crossing of the Yangtze River, the Red Army turned southward and in May
1935 entered Yunnan, where Chiang Kai-shek and Governor Lung Yiin were pre-
paring to ambush them. They passed within 10 miles of Kunming in their march
toward a crossing of the Yangtze River. After a famous forced march of 85 miles
in 24 hours to avoid and deceive the Nationalist forces, they suddenly descended
on the Chou P'ing Fort at the Yangtze River, disarmed the unsuspecting Nation-
alist garrison, and secured a crossing of the river.
Tiience they marched through the Lolo (aborigines) forest and mountain
country in western Szechwan and Sikang. Befriending the Lolos and obtaining
their aid as guides, they made a rapid march toward the Ta-tu River where
they defeated the forces of the Szechwan warlord, Gen. Liu Wen-hui, at An-jen-
ch'ang in present Sikang. While part of the army forced a crossing of the river at
this point, the main body marched 130 miles west along the Ta-tu gorges and
forced a crossing of the river over an old iron bridge. The crossing of the Ta-tu
bridge has gone down as one of the most famous exploits of the Chinese Red
Army, for it was done under constant attack by Kuomintang airplanes trying
to bomb the bridge. The bridge also had to be conquered from wall emplaced
opposing forces. Many a Chinese rebel army had met its end attempting to
cross the turgid Ta-tu River in face of enemy opposition. Here the last of the
T'ai-p'ing rebels, an army of 100,000 had been surrounded and destroyed in the
I860's. The Red Army was the first to have lived through a crossing of the Ta-tu
while under fire.
From the Ta-tu River the Red forces continued their hurried march over the
high mountains of western Szechwan. At Sung-p'an in northwestern Szechwan
they finally paused for a rest (July 1935). The original force of 90,000 now num-
bered 45,000. Here the Reds reached a Soviet base which had been established
in 1933 by partisan forces under Haii Hsiang-ch'ien of the Honan-Hupeh-Anhui
Soviet district. Defeated by Kuomanting forces, they had marched across Honan
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2327
and Shensi to Szechwan. When the Kiangsi Reds arrived in Sung-p'an, Hsii
Ilsiang-ch'ien commanded a force of 50,000, so that the combined Red force in
western Szechwan in July 1935 was nearly 100,000.
In August 1935 the main force from Kiangsi, the First Front Army, continued
its march northward. Chu Te and Hsii Hsiang-ch'ien, remained behind with
Hsii's Fourth Front Army in Szechwan for another year, to be joined by Ho Lung's
Second Front Army before undertaking a march northward to Shensi. "With the
First Front Army went Commanders Lin Piao, P'eng Te-huai, Chou En-lai, Mao
Tse-tung. and a majority of the members of the Central Committee of the Party.
Under incredible difficulties, the Red forces marched through the grassland of
southeastern Tsinghai, thence fighting their way through Kansu against the
combined forces of the Kuomintang, the Moslems, and the "Tungpei" (north-
eastern) warlords in Shensi.
On 20 October 1935, one year after the start of the Long March, the Reds entered
the Soviet base in northern Shensi, just below the Great Wall, and made contact
with the Red armies of Shensi, 5,000 strong, under Liu Tzu-tan. The Red forces
had marched 6,000 miles from their base in Kiangsi-Fukien. At their entry into
Shensi they numbered less than 20,000. A year later, when Chu Te and Hsii
Hsiang-ch'ien brought the forces from Szechwan to north Shensi, the combined
Red Army totalled 90,000. At the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
war in 1937, it numbered 100,000.
The Red Army had given a brilliant account of itself. It is doubtful, however,
that it could have continued to maintain itself if the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-
shek, had pursued his policy of military annihilation of the Red forces. The only
Soviet base which remained in 1936, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border area, was
one of the poorest, most arid regions in China. At the end of 1936 the Generalis-
simo was preparing a new "blockhouse-fortress" campaign around the Soviet
base in Shensi along the lines of the Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi. Had he decided
to open this campaign, the Communist forces would almost certainly have been
either "exterminated" or forced to begin a new "long march," probably across
Mongolia to Soviet Russia.
What saved them was the growth of the United Front movement against Japan,
and the acceptance by the Generalissimo at the beginning of 1937 of an all-party
alliance in China for united resistance against Japan.
C. PERIOD OF THE UNITED FRONT AND AFTE3J, 19.ST-1945
(1) Chinese Communist Party and Comintern sponsors of the united front
movement
The first suggestion of the united front idea in China came from the Chinese
Communists following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In April 1932 the
Chinese Communists "declared war" on Japan. This was probably an effort to
exploit the anti-Japanese sentiment in the Kuomintang armies, as a means of
diverting their interest in continuing the aiiti-Connnunist campaigns. On 10
January 1933 the Chinese Red Army offered a united front to any armed force
that would join it in battle against Japan. This offer was in line with the
directive of the 12th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International, Septeihber 1932. In regard to the Communist Party of China it
directed, among other things, that it should "mobilize the masses under the
slogan of the national revolutionary struggle against the Japanese and other
imperialists and for the independence and integrity of China," and should work
for the establishment of "an elected people's government."
These first suggestions for a united front in China did not, however, cpn-
template the inclusion of the Kuomintang. The program of the CCP as laid
down after the Japanese invasion of INIanchuria committed the Party to con-
tinue its fight for the "overthrow of the Kuomintang as the government of na-
tional betrayal" and at the same time to promote a movement for a "national
revolutionary war of the armed nation against [Japan]." The Chinese Com-
munists made it plain that they expected to emerge as the ultimate victors
not only over the Kuomintang but also over Japan, for the Party declared in
1932 that "only the Soviet Government and the Red Army of China can . . .
lead the national revolutionary war against the Japanese and other imperialisms
and achieve full national liberation." In his report to the Seventh World
Congi'ess of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July-August 1935. Ch'en Shao-yti
made it plain that up to that time the Chinese Communists still did not con-
template any united front with the Kuomintang.
The Soviet Union was, however, adopting a different policy toward the Kuo-
mintang, and in the end the Chinese Communists changed theirs to conform to
2328 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
that of Soviet Russia. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 vpas a threat
to Soviet Russia as much as to China proper, in addition tlie Soviet Union felt
the threat of the rising tide of anti-Communist sentiment throughout the Western
World. Therefore it became the object of Soviet diplomacy to ward off any pos-
sible attack on the Soviet Union. In the midst of her first Five- Year Plan, and
seething with internal political unrest as a result of the Trotsky opposition and
Kulak resistance to the collectivization campaign, Soviet Russia was in no
position to take a strong stand against the aggressive nations on her frontiers
in Europe and Asia. The Special Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Union was,
in 1932, only three years old, and it had, so far, little industrial basis. The first
Five-Year Plan, 1928-1933, aimed only to establish an industrial base in western
Siberia. The industrial development of eastern Siberia was projected for the
second Five-Year Plan. Soviet Russia needed time.
These factors induced Soviet Russia to give up, in 1928, her policy of inciting
world-wide unrest. She became increasingly a sponsor of international peace.
The Communist International accordingly lent its support by serving as an instru-
ment to neutralize the growing anti-Soviet movement in capitalist countries, and
to focus the attention of all groups in the democracies on the growing danger
of fascism instead of communism. The Sixth World Congress of the Commu-
nist International (1928) gave the first hint of their methods of attaining these
objectives, the development by the Communist proletariat of a "temporary co-
operation with the bourgeoisie." This was the first indication of the Soviet-
sponsored world-wide united front movement.
In regard to the Far East, this policy at first found its expression in the dis-
continuance of active Soviet participation in the internal political struggle in
China, and likewise in a considerable decrease in direct support of the CCP by the
Comintern. When, for instance, Mr. and Mrs. Noulens were arrested in Shanghai
in 1932 and convicted in Nanking as chief Far Eastern agents of the Comintern,
the complete evidence which the Chinese police produced showed that total out-
payments for the whole Orient (not just China) had at most not exceeded the
equivalent of about U. S. $15,000 per month. This was a pittance compared with
the amounts expended during the time of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance.
After 1928 the Comintern acted mainly as the directing agent, not the supporting
agent, of the Communist Party of China. Following the Japanese occupation of
Manchuria, Soviet Russia began to temporize with Japan while at the same time
adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the ii'Cuomintang Government in China.
The crisis in Manchuria also made the Kuomintang somewhat more favorably
disposed toward Soviet Russia. Diplomatic relations between China and Soviet
Russia were re-established in December 1932.
It would seem that both Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists believed
in 1932 that Soviet China would soon emerge as the victor over Kuomintang China.
The Comintern was at this time playing up the Chinese Communist movement as
gaining tremendous victories, and although most of this was pure propaganda,
the Chinese Red Army had proved its ability to defeat Kuomintang armies, and
the new Soviet base in Kiangsi and Fukien was entering a period of considerable
expansion.
However, by 1935 the world situation was developing unfavorably for the
Soviet Union and Communism in general. Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese
aggression were in the ascendancy. The power of the German Communist Party
had been smashed by the rise of Hitler. The Chinese Red Army had been forced
out of its base areas in central China. The tide against Communism and the
Soviet Union was rising in all capitalist countries, with the fascist countries
taking the lead in fomenting this anti-Communist movement. The fascist coun-
tries, therefore, became the chief threat to the Soviet Union and the Communist
World Movement. Drastic measures were considered necessary by Communists
all over the world to save the situation.
When the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International met in
Moscow in July-August 1935, the united front idea was carefully developed.
Among the many speeches and resolutions, the following extracts suffice to
indicate the methods and aims of the united front. The "Communist Interna-
tional puts itself at the head of the campaign for the defense of peace and the
Soviet Union." "If, thanks to the struggle for peace of the Soviet Union and
the toilers of all capitalist countries, war can be delayed . . . this also will
better enable the proletariat to strengthen its position in the capitalist countries,
tcstrengthen the power of the Soviet Union . . ." While the united front move-
ment aimed chiefly at establishing unity between all working class organizations.
a prominent speaker at the Congress emphasized that ". . . under certain condi-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2329
tions we [Communists] can and must bend our efforts to the task of drawing
these parties and organizations [i. e. non-Communist organizations, rich peas-
ants, big businessmen, petty shopkeepers, etc.] ... to tlie side of the anti-
facist people's front, despite their bourgeois leadership." Since fascism was the
immediate threat, the point was to create a united front between the Soviet
Union and the capitalist democracies to oppose fascism and thereby weaken the
anti-Communist, anti-Soviet Union movement in the world. However, what-
ever the "temporary cooperation" with the bourgeoisie which the Communists
might arrange, it "must never lead to renouncing the class struggle, i. e., it cannot
and must not ever be a reformist cooperation. It is the more necessary to stress
this because the bourgeoisie . . . even if it is compelled at a given moment to
take up arms in defense of national independence ... is always ready to go
over to the camp of the adversary in face of the danger of the war being con-
verted into a people's war and of a mighty upsurge of the masses." This point
was, as we have seen (pp. 2315-2316), endorsed and developed by Mao Tse-tung
in his outline of the policy of the CCP in his booklet NEW DEMOCRACY.
While the Communists were urged to unite temporarily with the democratic
elements and even with "big business" in the capitalist countries, it was em-
phasized that this did not mean that the Communists would become bourgeois-
democrats. "We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the demo-
cracy of the toilers. . . But in the capitalist countries we defend and shall
continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy, because the interests of
the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate." This became a cardinal point
in the united front movement of the Chinese Communists. While they offered
their support even to the reactionary Kuomintang, they became the foremost
advocates of democracy in China— but with the purpose of turning the demo-
cratic revolution into a socialist revolution.
In regard to China, the Congress adopted a resolution stating that the CCP and
the Chinese Red Army "nmst exert every effort to extend the front of the struggle
for national liberation and to draw into it all the national forces that are ready
to repulse the robber campaign of the Japanese and other imperialists." Ch'en
Shao-yii explained in his report to the Congress that this was to be achieved by
the organization of "an All-China United People's Government of National
Defense and an All-China United Anti-Japanese National Defense Army."
The Congress elected Ch'en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-
tao, and Mao Tse-tung members of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International, with Po Ku and Kang Sin as alternate members. China and Soviet
Russia had an equal (and the largest) number of representatives on the execu-
tive Committee, which shows the great importance attached to the Communist
movement in China. Ch'en Shao-yii was elected a member of the Presidium of
the Executive Committee along with Stalin and 17 other members.
The united front principles of the Seventh World Congress of the Cominterm
were soon put into practice by the Chinese Communists. During the time of
the Long March (1935) they had tried in vain to build up a united front vvith the
dissident Nationalist groups more or less opposed to Chiang Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang dictatorship. Foremost among these groups were the Kuomintang
liberals (Dr. Sun Fo, Mme. Sun Yat-sen and others), the Kuominchiin (National
People's Army) under Gen. Feng Yii-hsiang, the Kwangsi Military Clique under
Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and the Northeastern Army (Man-
churian) under Marshal Chang Hsiieh-liang. The failure of the united front
movement in 1935 was not because of lack of response. The popular sentiment
in China was strongly in favor of discontinuing the Government's anti-Communist
campaign and concentrating the nation's united power against Japan. But none
of the dissident Nationalist groups dared in 1935 to subscrilie openly to the
Communist idea of a united front. In so far as any one could see at that time
the Chinese Communists were on the losing side. The Kuomintang was winning.
Following the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International the
Chinese Communists changed their tactics. In January 1936 Mao Tse-tung
publicly offered "the hand of friendship" to Chiang Kai-shek if he would take
up arms against Japan. To those who expressed doubts concerning the avowed
democratic spirit and sincerity of the Communists in offering a united front,
Mao Tse-tung replied in August 1936 that the "Workers' and Peasants' Govern-
ment had been renamed the People's Soviet Government" and that "the former
laws about workers' control and leadership in the various enterprises have been
repealed. The workers have been advised not to put up demands which may
be in excess of what can be granted ... In the non-Soviet districts it is our
intention not to accentuate the anti-capitalist struggle, though we are in favor
22848— 52— pt. 7A 3
2330 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of improving the standard of living of the workers . . ." On 26 August 1936, the
Chinese Communist Party wrote the Kuomintang that "We are prepared to form
a strong revolutionary united front with you as was the case during . . . the
great Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 . . . [That] is the only proper way to
save our country to-day . . ,"
(2) The Sian incident. Formation of the United Front
Chiang Kai-shek was still not willing to accept the united front idea, but
many of his field commanders were. The army opposing the Communists in
the Northwest was composed of two groups. One group consisted of regular
Nanking, or Central Army troops ; this was the Fii'st Army under General Hu
Tsung-nan, an inveterate foe of the Communists. The other group comprised
former independent provincial armies, the Northeastern ("Tungpei" — Manchu-
rian) Army under Marshal Chang Hsiieh-liang, C-in-C of the "Bandit Suppression
Commission," and the Northwestern Army ("Hsipei"— mainly Shensi provin-
cials) under General Yang Hu-cheng. This latter group, comprising about
170,000 troops, strongly opposed continuing the anti-Communist campaign. A
virtual truce with the Communists existed in their sectors, and they offered no
support to the First Army in its campaign against the Communists. Partly
as a result of this, the First Army suffered a severe defeat during November
1936.
A strong wave of nationalist feeling was sweeping through China at this
time. The Japanese were continuing their invasion of Suiyuan Province of
Inner Mongolia, which they had started in the spring of 1936, and they were
expanding their influence in eastern Hopeh (including Peiping and Tientsin)
and in Tsingtao. The anti-Japanese agitation among the Chinese people and
Army rose to a new high pitch. The danger from the Japanese seemed much
greater than that from the Communists, confined as they were to the semi-
waste lands of north Shensi and adjacent areas in Kansu and Ningsia. In
November, Chang Hsueh-liang appealed to the Generalissimo to permit him to
shift the Northeastern Army to the Suiyuan front to take up the defense against
the Japanese.
The Generalissimo, however, insisted upon continuing the anti-Communist
campaign. He had been preparing for several months for the Sixth Extermina-
tion campaign, planning to use the same blockhouse-fortress tactics as in the Fifth
Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934. After Hu Tsung-nan's defeat in November 1936
Chiang Kai-shek became convinced that the only requirement for final success
against the Communists was imity among the army groups opposing them. It
was for this purpose that Chiang together with his whole personal staff arrived
at army headquarters in Sian on 7 December 1936. He talked to the Tungpei
and Hsipei commanders and tried to persuade them to "destroy the Reds." "I
told them," said Chiang in his own diary, "that the bandit-suppression campaign
had been prosecuted to such a stage that it would require only the last five min-
utes to achieve the final success."
Finding no response to this viewpoint, Chiang then decided to summon a Gen-
eral Staff Congress on 10 December. At this Congress final plans were formally
adopted to push ahead with the Sixth Campaign. It was announced that a general
mobilization order for the Tungpei, Hsipei, and Nanking troops in Kansu and
Shensi was to be published on the 12th. It was also openly stated that if Marshal
Chang Hsiieh-liang refused to comply with these orders his troops would be dis-
armed by Nanking forces, and he himself would be dismissed from his command.
On the 11th, Chang Hsiieh-liang conferred with the commanders of the Tungpei
and Hsipei armies. They agreed to take matters into their own hands. Early
in th'i morning of 12 December Sian was occupied by their troops. Chiang's
personal staff (including many of the highest Government officials), the Gover-
nors of Shensi and Kansu, and a number of members of Chiang's secret police
(the "Blueshirts") were arrested. A detachment of Tungpei and Hsipei troops
went to the Lintung hot springs, 10 miles from Sian, where the Generalissimo
stayed. He was captured and brought back to Sian where he became the in-
voluntary guest of Marshal Chang and Gen. Yang Hu-cheng.
On the same day the rebel headquarters at Sian issued a circular telegram to
the Chinese Government and people demanding among other things reorganiza-
tion of the Government to admit all parties, an end of civil war and immediate
adoption of a policy of armed resistance against Japan, the guarantee to the
people of liberty of assembly and pardon of political prisoners. The Communists
announced their support of this program. On the 14th the rebels announced from
Sian that all orders for war against the Red Army were cancelled and that an
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2331
anti-Japanese Army had been formed comprising Tungpei, Hsipei and Eed Army
troops. „ , . J
It is unnecessary to go into details on tlie events of the following days in
Sian. Suffice it to state that Chiang Kai-shek for the first time in 10 years met
with Communist delegates, among them Chou En-lai. Chou greeted him as
C-in-C. Several conferences were held between 17 and 25 December between
Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsiieh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng and the Communist dele--
gates. Meanwhile negotiations were carried on between Sian and Nanking
for an agreement on the Government's policy toward the rebels, the Communists,
and Japan, and for the release of the Generalissimo. Among others, T. V. Soong,
brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, arrived in Sian on 20 December. As a mem-
ber of the liberal "American" group in the Kuomintang, which sympathized with
the united front movement, he was favored by the rebels. On the 22nd Mme.
Chiang Kai-shek also arrived in Sian. So also did Gen. Tai Li, the head of the
"Blue Shirts." No details of the discussions have ever been officially released,.
but it seems certain that tlie rebels and the Communists received assurances
from Chiang Kai-shek that the civil war would be stopped, and that Chiang
would give his support to the united front movement. This being the case,.
the Communists and Chang Hsiieh-liang offered him their support. The Tungpeii
army officers were unwilling, however, to release Chiang. They demanded his
death. The Communists dissuaded them. W. H. Donald, Chiang's Australian
advisor, who was the first to arrive in Sian from Nanking to arrange for the
Generalissimo's release, and who took a prominent part in the negotiations, has
stated that Chou En-lai "was actually the one man who enabled Chiang to depart
unharmed from the 1936 Sian kidnapping."
On 25 December Chiang Kai-shek flew back to Nanking accompanied by Chang
Hsiieh-liang. Chang Hsiieh-liang went with the Generalissimo to the capital
to "await punishment." It was a typical Chinese gesture aimed at giving
the Generalissimo "face" after his humiliating experience in Sian. Chang has
been held a prisoner ever since.
The sequel to this was the conclusion of the united front agreement, or rather
"understanding" (no signed agreement seems to have been made). In March
1937 the Kuomintang, while announcing that it would continue its policy to "up-
root the Communists," laid down its formal terms for accepting the Communists'
submission : ( 1 ) Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the
Government's Central Army under direct control of the Military Affairs Com-
mission (National Military Council) ; (2) Dissolution of the Soviet Kepublic ;
(3) Cessation of all Communist propaganda; (4) Suspension of the class
struggle. No written agreement seems to have been made for the recognition
or legalization of the Communist party." The Chinese Communists formally
acceded to these terms on 15 March 1937.
The Chinese Communists did not, however, accede without Soviet Russian ap-
proval. In the Moscow magazine Bolshevik of 15 April 1937, Ch'en Shao-yii,
member of the Presidium of the Comintern, presented an article giving Moscow's
answer to Kuomintang's demands. Ch'en stated that Moscow would be willing
to see the Chinese Red Army turned into a National Revolutionary Army, re-
taining its corps of officers and political workers, and to have it incorporated
into a "Chinese United National Revolutionary Army, which would be sub-
ordinate to a single command." Moscow would be willing to see the Soviet
power in China turned into a "general democratic power acting in concert with
the United All-China Central Government," and to regard such a development
as a real change in the character of the Chinese Soviets. Ch'en indicated that
Moscow was ready to accept the demand for cessation of "red propaganda"
provided the phrase would be taken to mean what it says and would not be
applied to all sorts of views which have little or nothing to do with real Com-
munism. In regard to the fourth point (suspension of the class struggle),
Ch'en pointed out that the class struggle produced the Communist movement
and not vice versa, and that "at the present time" the Communists were doing
nothing to disunite Chinese society. An official American source commented that
^0 The documents concerning the united front negotiations between the Koumintang and
the Communists have never been published. It seems, however, that the Communists be-
lieved for a time that the Kuomint;nia had extended legal recognition of the CCP. Mac
Tse-tung said at the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP, 12 Oct.
1938: ". . . The next day [25 Sept. 19.37] the Kuomintang. the Central Government, and'
the highest leader of the National Revolutionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, made public the
conversation in which the legal existence of the Communist Party of China was recognized
and a united front for national salvation was formed."
2332 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Ch'en's article showed that the policy of the CCP not only enjoyed the support
of Moscow "but was probably laid down in the Kremlin." Mao Tse-tung stated
in 1928 that "the Communist International is in complete agreement with the
new political line of the Communist Party of China. For the victory of the
Chinese people, the Communist International has called upon all the Communist
Parties of all nations to support and give aid to China's Anti-Japanese War."
Although no formal agreement seems to have been signed between the Com-
munists and the Kuomintang," the Red Army base was designated by the
Chinese Government in September 1937 as a garrison area comprising 23 hsien
(counties) and designated as the Shen-Ken-Ning Border Region."
By order of the Central Government, the Red Army was reorganized as the
Eighth Route Army with Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai as Commander and Vice
Commander, and Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng as division commanders.
Chu Te was appointed Deputy Commander of the Second War Zone (including
Shansi) under the Kuomintang General Wei Li-huang, in August 1937. The
Central Government also decided that the Eighth Route Army should be organized
into three divisions (known as the 115th (Lin Piao), 120th (Ho Lung), and 129th
(Liu Po-ch'eng) divisions), and that it should be permitted to levy troops until
its strength reached 45,000 men. The Government began paying a regular
subsidy to the Eighth Route Army on the basis of this number of troops (CN
$600,o6o per month, the standard pay allowance for three divisions, plus a
meager allowance of ammunition)."
Actually, however, the Eighth Route Army seems to have numbered around
100,000 men at the time. (The name of the army was later changed to
Eighteenth Group Army, a name which the Communists have seldom used.)
On 22 September 1937 the Communists issued a proclamation from Yenan for-
mally dissolving the Soviet Republic, and affirming their adherence to Sun Yat-
sen's Three Principles of the People and their unity with the Kuomintang. The
next day Chiang Kai-shek gave them his approval. By that time the Japanese
armies had already spread far into north China and intense fighting raged in
Shanghai. In this way the united front was established. It should be added,
however, that already before the Kuomintang-Communist united front had been
established in September 1937, other dissident Chinese groups had joined the
Government for united resistance against Japan. Thus the united front in-
cluded all resistance groups in China.
(3) United Front action, 1937-19-iO
(a) Communists expand in North and Central China. — Following the occupa-
tion of Peiping on 28 July 1937, the advance of the Japanese armies through
North China was exceedingly rapid. By the end of the year all the main cities
and their connecting railways in Hopeh, Shansi, and the provinces of Suiyuan
and Chahar in Inner Mongolia had been taken by the Japanese. Tsinan, provin-
cial capital of Shantung, was occupied on 27 December 1937, Tsingtao on 10
January 1938.
The collapse of the Chinese provincial and Central Government armies north
and east of the Yellow River was nearly complete by the end of 1937. While
the Japanese set up a Chinese puppet administration, and through this and their
army authorities maintained a measure of order in their occupied zones in north
China, the rural areas around these zones fell prey to ravaging hoards of Japa-
nese soldiers engaged in grain confiscations and "mopping up" operations against
Communists and remnants of Chinese provincial forces, roving units of disor-
ganized Chinese soldiers who had turned bandits, and bandit groups formed
out of peasants who had collected arms on various battle fields.
It was into this "no-man's land" that tlie (Communist) Eighth Rouse Army
moved and began to restore order and unit.v. It fought the Japanese in cooper-
ation with the forces of General Yen Hsi-shan (Governor of Shansi) and other
non-Communist Chinese forces. For the most part, however, the Eighth Route
Army fought on its own, even though it offered supporting action to other Chinese
forces. Tlie regular provincial and Central Army forces preferred to fight the
^^ Not having extended legal recognition of the CCP, the Kuomintang does not sign agree-
ments with the CCP. It issues orders or demands which the Communists either accept or
refuse.
^ Between 1937 and '.S9. Central Government troops invaded and reoccupied five of these
hsien. By November 1940. the Communists had full control over 16 hsien and partial con-
trol over 3 hsioi — total 19 — of which three hsien were In Kansu, one on the Shensi-Suiyuan
border, the rest in North Shensi.
■'^ This was the amount paid during the first three years of the war, until all payments
were discontinued in 1940.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2333
Japanese from fixed positions and prepared front-line defenses. This invari-
ably led to their defeat and cost them tremendous casualties, because they had
neither air support nor the modern mechanized equipment and artillery neces-
sary to counter the Japanese superiority in tire power. The Communists refused
to tieht on these terms, and concentrated on the guerrilla tactics and mobile
warfare which had gained them outstanding success in the past against the
superior Kuomintang forces. In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army gained
a victory over two Japanese divisions in the famous battle of P'ing-hsin Kuan
(Pass) in eastprn Shansi, which has been described by German military journals
as "a classic of mobile warfare." This victory delayed the Japanese in their
advance toward T'ai-yiian, capital of Shansi Province. It netted the Communists
considerable quantities of arms.
It was, however, not so much occasional victories over the Japanese that
contributed to the supply of arms to the Communist forces, as the defeats suf-
fered by the regular Central Army and provincial forces which opposed the
Japanese in the initial stage of the war. Tens of thousands of rifles were left
by fallen and fleeing Chinese soldiers on the battle fields in Shansi, Hopeh,
Chahar, and Suiyuan. The Chinese Communists collected vast quantities of
these abandoned arms and munitions, and used them to replenish thpir own sup-
plies and to arm guerrilla units and local self-defense corps which they organized
among the peasants. Before the end of 1937 the Communist forces had infiltrated
into and restored a measure of order in scattered guerrilla areas in northern and
eastern Shansi, southern Suiyuan, southern Chahar, and Central and Southern
Hopeh. By early spring of 1938 Eighth Route Army columns had entered Shan-
tung east of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. This was outside the operational
limits assigned to them by tlie National Government (North Shansi, part of
Hopeh). At the same time five groups of Communist organizers were operating
in the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhui area near Japanese-occupied zones. Next to the
Japanese, the Communists held the domiuafit military power in Shansi and
Hopeh.
The Eighth Route Army was, however, not the only factor in the restoration of
order in North China outside Japanese-controlled areas, and the organization of
guerrilla warfare and of base areas from which to carry on the struggle against
Japan. When the provincial and Central Army forces fled, most of the higher
government ofiicials and the wealthy families also fled. With the advance of the
Communist forces, many more wealthy families of merchants and landlords fled,
fearing that they would be killed by the Communists. Most of these latter
sought safety in Japanese-occupied cities. Left to themselves, the people im-
provised some organization. The villagers organized self-defense units against
bandits, and in many places the leading men of the hsien (or county) called a
meeting to elect a new hsien magistrate to replace the oflicial who had fled. The
National Salvation Association, formed by Mme. Sun Yat-sen and other pa-
triotic leaders in 1932 as a non-partisan organization for the establishment of a
united or "popular front" against Japan," and other similar patriotic organiza-
tions, also played a considerable role in the re-establishment of order in rural
areas outside Japanese-occupied zones. The Communist political agents got in
touch with these patriotic societies to re-establish the hsien administration. The
Communist Party and those patriotic societies became the nucleus for the Mobil-
ization Committees (Tung Yuan Hui) which became the highest local government
during the period of the war.
After the fall of T'ai-yiian in November 1937, some of the Shansi provincial
leaders retreated with Governor Yen Hsi-shan to southern Shansi, while others
fled to the Wu-t'ai Mountains in Northeastern Shansi, where the Eighth Route
Army had established a base. One of these. Sung Shao-wen, the chairman of the
Civil and Military Training Committee and of the Propaganda Section of the
Shansi Provincial Government, conferred with General Nieh Jung-chen, the Com-
munist commander of the region ; together they developed the idea of forming a
regional emergency government. They obtained Y'en Hsi-shan's approval. This
led to tlie famous Fu-p'ing Conference in the Wu-t'ai Mountain region of Western
Hopeh, 9-15 January 1934. It was a united front conference attended by 148
delegates from 39 hsien, representing 28 organizations. Of the 28, the Commu-
nists appear to have had predominant influence in 19 organizations. These
included 7 mass organizations (composed of peasants, workers and students),
" This organization was banned in KuomJntang-controlIed China.
2334 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
10 military organizations and mobilization committees, the Communist Party (1
vote), and "Local Communists" (1 vote). About 90 of the 148 delegates repre-
sented Communist-sponsored organizations. The Conference included delegates
from Governor Yen Hsi-shan and from General Cheng Chien, Commander of the
First War Zone (including Hopeh) and concurrently Deputy C-of-S of the
Chinese Army. Although some delegates to this Conference were Kuomintang
members, the Kuomintang Party as such was, significantly, not represented.
The Fu-p'ing Conference emphasized the opportunities for guerrilla warfare.
Members of both the Kuomintang and the CCP spoke of the coopej'ation of their
parties for the establishment of a free, independent, and democratic China. The
Conference passed resolutions for the setting up of a "border government" com-
prising parts of Shansi, Hopeh, and Chahar provinces, with the status of a
provincial government under the Central Government, and for the establishment
of a united and armed people's self-defense army. It elected a Central Executive
Committee of nine members for the new government with Sung Shao-wen, a non-
partisan, as Chairman. Of the otlier eight members four were non-partisans, one
a member of both the Kuomintang and the CCP, one a member of the Kuomin-
tang exclusively, and two (including General Nieh Jung-chen) members of the
CCP exclusively. A telegram approving the new government was received from
Chiang Kai-shek on 30 January 1938 ; on 1 February Dr. H. H. Kung, newly ap-
pointed President of the Executive Yuan, wired the Government's confirmation.
Thus the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government (Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien Ch'ii)
was established with its capital at Fu-p'ing. It was the first of several similar
Communist- sponsored border governments to be established in North and Central
China. Its titular leader was a non-partisan ", but its real leader was the Com-
munist General Nieh Jung-chen. In fact, an American newspaper correspondent
who visited the Border Government area early in 1938 reported as his impression
that the new organization was headed by General Nieh.
(&) Democracy as practiced blj the Chinese Communists. — The system of
democratic united front government introduced into the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border
Region became the model for all Communist-led areas in China. The government
was organized on a non-partisan basis ; political parties could be represented,
but the party line of each participating party was not stressed. No member
of the government administration needed to reveal his party afiiliation provided
he was willing to cooperate in the anti-Japanese program. The system of govern-
ment emphasized the principles of democracy, self-government, and united front
action against Japan by all parties and population groups. The people were
rallied under the slogan : "He who has strength gives strength, he who has money
gives money, he who has knowledge gives skill in the united front against Japan."
The basic unit of the political organization was the village Mobilization Com-
mittee (variously called Village Committee For Armed Resistance Against Japan,
Self Defense Government, People's Resistance Committee, People's Committee).
The "village" is composed of approximately 3,000 people and includes between
1,500-2,000 voters. This "village" is the "administrative village" which consists
of approximately 10 normal villages. Tiie village Mobilization Committee had
its counterpart in each higher administrative unit, the chii (town), the hsien,
the sub-military region within each border region, and in the Border Region
Government itself, where it was subordinate only to the Border Government
Council. Members were elected and included gentry and peasants. In the village
Committees only local people could serve. The Mobilization Committee held the
supreme executive power. It had power within its area of control to requisition
man power, skilled workers, money, food, clothing, and weapons. It fed and
housed all loyal troops in its area of control. It maintained guards at every
village and crossroad. The local militia was under its command. It issued pass-
ports to authorized travellers, and identification cards to local people. As the
administration in the Communist-controlled areas became better organized many
of the functions of the Mobilization Committees were taken over by the Village
Delegates' Assembly.
Parallel to the Mobilization Committees, the Communists promoted the estab-
lishment of People's Congresses (or Citizens' General Assembly). Villagers elect
their own Congress from among local people, several villages elect the members
of the chil Congress, the people of the several cJiil comprising a hsien elect the
members of the hsien Congress, and so on up to the Borden Region Congress.
The Army also elects a few members to each of these Congresses. All elections
^= Snns: Shao-wen Is still chairman of the Chin Ch'a Chi Border Government. Some re-
ports list him as a Kuomintang member. By his own statement In 1938 he is a non-partisan.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2335
are by secret ballot. It took several years, however, to develop the election
system, and it was not until January 1943 that the first Congress of the Chin-
Ch'a-Chi Border Rejiion, properly elected by all sub-districts, was held.
These People's Congresses provide a sounding board for public opinion. The
Border Region Congress elects the members of the Border Government Council.
It ratifies constitutions for various mass organizations. But in so far as is
known the several Border Region Congresses have only a limited measure of
legislative power, although they claim to exercise the highest legislative power
within the Border Regions. Nominally the two main Border Region govern-
ments ( Shensi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia, the only ones that
have obtained official recognition from the National Government) are under the
Government in Chungking and are independent of the CCP. Actually they are
under the Communist Party, which holds the supreme power in all Communist-
sponsored Border Regions. The Communist Party Headquarters (the Central
Executive Committee and the Politbureau under the Central Executive Com-
mittee) at Yemen is the highest policy making organ. It is the highest au-
thority over the Communist Army. It also plans the social, political, and
economic life of the Borden Regions. These plans are not, however, handed
down as orders to the Border Region Congresses ; instead they are submitted
through a Communist or pro-Communist member of the Border Region Con-
gress concerned for a vote.
The civil government is linked with the Communist Party and Army by the
Political Commissars, who rank with the Military Commanders of each Commu-
nist army unit. They represent the Communist Party. Beside their duties in
the regular army units, they are responsible for the organization of the people's
militia and for the supervision of the political training of the Army and the
people in the areas behind the enemy lines. Thanks to this dual influence each
Political Commissar occupies the Key position in controlling the military and civil
administration of the area to which he is assigned. Thus he is able to insure that
the decisions of the democratic border governments do not deviate from the
policies laid down by the Communist Party. The strong influence of the Army
Political Commissars over the civil government is shown by an example from the
(Communist) New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu Province. A report of condi-
tions there in 1944 states that if two villages have some dispute which they are
unable to decide between themselves, and which cannot be satisfactorily decided
by the regional government, the matter will finally reach the Political Commissar
of the New Fourth Army who will then make the final decision. This decision
will be returned to the People's Congress and it in turn will vote upon the issue.
The report states that the functions of the Political Commissar in such matters
might be compared with that of a Supreme Court.
From the very beginning of the Communists' expansion into North China, they
took a particularly active interest in the development of mass organizations.
When the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government was formed, they had al-
ready established the Farmers' National Salvation Association, Women's National
Salvation Association, Workers' National Salvation Association, Young Men's
National Salvation Association, the Little Vanguards, and the People's Self-
Defense Corps, embracing all men between the ages of IS and 48. Later Commu-
nist-sponsored trade unions were developed which by now (March 194.5) comprise
about 600,000 members in all of China. The purpose of these organizations was
to educate the farmers to defend themselves and to share their wealth with the
Eighth Route Army. Already by early spring of 1938, after only four months
of activities, it was estimated that about 1,000,000 people out of a total of 7.000,-
000 people in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region had been enrolled in the
mass organizations, and that half a million men had been armed and were
serving in the local militia forces.
The Communists were no less active in developing the educational system. They
organized courses to teach the illiterate musses 1,000 characters which would
enable them to read simple books and newspapers, and re-established schools for
children, universities and military academies. All textbooks were edited by the
CCP. A vast propaganda program was set in motion, utilizing mass meetings,
propaganda posters, theatrical plays (probably the most effective method of in-
doctrinating the illiterate masses), and the dissemination of newspapers, maga-
zines, and books. The central theme of this propaganda was anti-Japanism,
but it also emphasized the meaning of the united front, democracy, and the
struggle against imperialism and fascism. Eighth Route Army officers gave
courses in guerrilla warfare in the towns and villages. Teachers and political
propagandists were active throughout the Border Regions. "K'ai Hui" ("as-
2336 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
semble for a meeting") became one of the most commonly heard phrases in
Communist China. Every moment of spare time was used for political indoc-
trination, school work, and military training. The people came to see the need
of these meetings, although at first some accepted them only as a wartime ne-
cessity. Questioned in 1938 by an American correspondent, the members of one
Mobilization Committee said that the general opinion was that it was a good
thing to give power to the people, but that in peace time they did not want to
spend so much of their time at meetings.
What in the final analysis won the people for the Communists and the Eighth
Route Army was, however, not so much their political program as their economic
program. The abolition of the Communist program of land confiscation, as a
condition for the conclusion of the united front with the Kuomintang, did not pre-
vent the Red leaders from making some very shrewd bids for mass support. The
land of all landlords who had fled to Peiping, Tientsin, T'ai-yuan, and the other
large cities in Japanese-occupied China (and most of the big landlords had
fled) was guaranteed to be the owner's property, but was "temporarily"' used
by the new Border Government. This land was distributed among the poor
and among refugees from villages which the Japanese had burned. The Border
Government collected the rents and promised to repay the landlord in full
whenever he returned. These rents became a large source of revenue for the
new government. The property of traitors who accepted office under the Japa-
nese was confiscated by the Border Government and distributed among the poor.
All rents were arbitrarily lowered 25 percent in some areas, more or less in
others. A three-year moratorium on all debts was declared in 1938, and interest
during the three-year period was fixed at only one percent annually. The maxi-
mum interest rate for new loans was set at 10 percent per year, which was a
great reduction of the prevailing usury rates. The land of all farmers who had
no animals was plowed by Eighth Route Army cavalry horses, and the farmers
were assisted by Eighth Route Army troops. Any refugees within the Border
Region areas who did not have enough food to last until tlie harvest wei-e fed
by the Mobilization Committee. The system of requisition used by the Mobiliza-
tion Committee in collecting food and cloth for the army was so organized that
the burden did not fall upon the poor. In some areas each member of a family
was allowed three mou of land (about half an acre) unassessed. In other words,
in a family of five, 15 mou (a large holding in China) bore no assessment. All
people owning more than that minimum shared public expenses proportionately
to their holdings. Since more than half of the population had less than the
minimum amount of land, the burden of taxation fell on the well-to-do. The
Communists called this "Ho Li Fu Tan" (reasonable bearing of responsibility).
Without in any way violating the agreement of Kuomintang to abandon their
radical land program, the Communists succeeded in winning the support of a
large proportion of the poorest farmers, whose land holdings became dependent
upon the maintenance of the Communist-sponsored government.
A new taxation system was introduced in 1942 based on a progressive income
and property tax, with rates varying from 7 percent of income for the lowest
tax paying group to 65 percent for the highest income group. In 1943 the exemp-
tion limit was lowered and the rate on high incomes reduced. The taxes were
('and still are) payable largely in grain. It should be added that although these
rates favor the poor they are not discriminatory against the rich. One wealthy
landlord stated in 1943 that his taxes were lower than during the old regime.
As sponsors of such an economic program in a country where the overwhelming
majority of the people were debt ridden, and impoverished by exhorbitant taxes
and rents, the Chinese Communists could not fail to gain a tremendous popular
following. The Eighth Route Army in North China came soon to be considered
the benefactor and saviour of the people not only against the Japanese, but also
against the rule of landlords and the former warlords who had held supreme
sway over North China. As one official American observer in Communist-con-
trolled North China recently said, the peasant appears not only willing but even
enthusiastic about pay-taxes "because he is doing it for the Army, which is pro-
tecting hira and his possessions, and for the first time in centuries he feels that
he is getting something in return for his money or goods." It is not the ideology
of Communism as such that impresses tlie people. It is the practical results of
Communist leadership. A Communist leader said recently : "Communism to the
people means freedom — freedom to have meetings, to discuss things with the
landlord and government ofiicials, freedom to elect their own representatives.
This is a way of life they have never known, and they like it for it has done
things for them. This is all that they can understand. This is all Communism
really means to them." (142) (143)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2337
The members of the mass organizations and local militia are certain to vote in
favor of almost any plan the Communists sponsor. These plans have in general
proved of benefit to the people.
The fact of the existence of a state of war helped the Communists to put their
economic program into practice. Because of the war the entire economic effort
could readily be focussed on support of the Eighth Route Army and other military
forces in the Border Regions, for the defense of the people against the Japanese.
Had the Japanese followed a policy of conciliation with the Chinese, and of
economic reconstruction in ravaged areas, it is doubtful that the Communists
could have succeeded so well as they did. There is no question that some of the
Japanese military leaders genuinely desired to conciliate the people,
But their influence was not (and has never been) strong enough to enforce
conciliatory'behaviour in the Japanese Army. When Japanese troops entered a
village, one of their first demands was for women. There was usually looting,
and even when thei-e was no resistance men of military age were frequently
killed. As one private observer who visited the Shansi Chahar-Hopeh Border
Region in 1938 stated : "If the Japanese had offered peace and security it would
have been hard to rouse the peasants to patriotic self sacrifice, but refugees
going to their relatives and friends have spread throughout the country the
association of the Japanese with murder, rape, and looting, and the peasant is
prepared to defend his home if not his country." The Japanese reply to guerrilla
war was a policy of frightfulness. It drove the people into the arms of the
Communists, because they undertook to organize the rural areas for defense
after the regular Chinese armies had been defeated and had fled. Tlie people
subscribed fully to the Communists' answer to those who doubted their ability
to fight the superior Japanese forces: "If we don't fight, what happens? The
Japanese kill us anyway. If we fisht, let's see what happens." By sustaining
the anti-Japanese War the Communists won the jjeople's sympathy, and gained
immeasurably in political and military power through popular support.
The rapid rise of Communist power in North China induced an American
official in China to remark at the beginning of 1938 : "Thus the net result of
Japan's 'holy war' to insure the peace of the orient by stamping out communism
in China has apparently been to place the Chinese Reds in a position many times
more favorable than they could ever have hoped to attain under the Chinese
Government as it existed before the outbreak of hostilities."
The importance which the Communists attach to their economic program as a
political weapon is shown by the fact that they consider it to be basic. The
democratic self-government program plays a secondary, supporting role. It
brings all classes together, and forces the landlord-merchant class into active
participation in and hence support of the economic program. For if the land-
lords try to obstruct the economic program the people will vote against them
and the landlords may lose whatever power and influence they possess. As one
obsen-er recently put it : "The landlord-capitalist group was driven to active
participation to preserve its own interests."
This economic program explains, in large part, \yhy the Communists can
operate their democratic government system with a minimum of direct participa-
tion in government organs by Communist Party members, and why, during the
first two years of the united front movement, they could leave considerable areas
in North China under the control of cooperating Kuomintang generals and war-
lords without any danger of impairment of their own power.
An example (which may in part explain why Kuomintang generals now fear
to engage in united front action with the Communists) is the experience of
General Wan Fu-lin, then Commander of the 53rd Army, in the central Hopeh
area of the Shinsa-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. He attended the Fu-p'ing
Conference with the remnants of his troops in January 1938. General Wan was
and old warlord from Manchuria, but a patriotic man who refused to comproi^ise
with the Japanese and put up a stubborn (and costly) resistance along the
Peiping-Hankow Railway in Hopeh Province. Returning to Central Hopeh from
the Fu-p'ing Conference, he was accompanied by a "political director" from the
Eighth Route Army. Together they organized the area and recruited a new
army. The work was as much political as military. In the suppression of
banditry, at that time rampant in Central Hopeh, fighting was sometimes neces-
sary. Some bandit groups were won over and incorporated into the army and
the rest were forced to move east and north in advance of the new government
forces. At the end of April 1938 only small areas in Central Hopeh still con-
tained bandits. Simultaneous with this military occupation of Central Hopeh
by Wan Fu-lin's forces, political organizers were sent to each village, and they
2338 INSTITUTE or pacific relations
arranged for the election of Mobilization Committees, the formation of units of
the People's Self-Defense Corps, and other mass organizations. These mass
organizations gave such support to the Communist sponsored economic reforms
that within about a year the Communists obtained the dominant position in
Central Hopeh. And since the new 53rd Army was recruited from the local
people and obtained its political indoctrination from the Communist political
director, it became as loyal to the Communists as the people as a whole. Exactly
what happened to General Wan in the course of 1938 is not known. In April
1939, however, he was reported to have been "relieved" from his command. By
that time the Eighth Route Army was in full control of General Wan's former
areas in Central Hopeh. In 1942 Wan was appointed a member of the National
Military Council at Chungking. The remnants of the original (Manchurian)
troops of the 53rd Army who refused to accept Communist control'were driven
out of North China by the Eighth Route Army. They reformed themselves as
the 5.3rd Army in areas outside Communist control. In 1941 this army was in.
Hopeh. In 1944 and 1945 it fought on the Salween front. This anti-Japanese
Manchurian army who had welcomed cooperation from the Communists was
driven out from Manchuria by the Japanese in the early 1930's, and driven out
from north China by the Japanese and the Communists in separate campaigns
in the late 1930's. It marched clear across China toward Burma to continue its
fight against Japan. There can be little wonder that experiences like this have
made many leaders in the Chungking army distrustful of any united front
arrangements with the Chinese Communists.
Units of Central Government foi'ces have, on several occasions, cooperated with
Communist forces in fighting the Japanese. But as a general rule, they have
maintained their identity only when fighting in Central Government areas. But
when they have tried to fight the Japanese in Communist-sponsored border region
areas they have either lost their identity through absorption into Communist
forces, or been expelled from the Communist areas. (134).
In the border regions it is only the Communist Party which has a large-scale
party organization. At present this organization includes over 1,200,000 party
members, of whom the Communists claim that more than half are peasants. (152)
The Kuomintang is permitted to function in the border regions, and in the
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government there are still a number of Kuomintang
representatives. As late as 1943 there was even a Kuomintang office which ranked
as a provincial office, but it had very limited resources. Its only publication was
a fortnightly paper which had a small circulation. The Kuomintang contested
elections to the Border Region Congress in 1940 (the Congress was not convened
until 1943) but it did not put forward any party candidates in the village elections.
The Kuomintang lacks a well integrated organization in Communist areas, and
since most of the initiative and most of the popular following lies with the
Communist Party, it is doubtful that the Kuomintang could expand even if it
adopted a liberal policy in Communist areas and tried, in this way, to compete
with the Commxinists. Actually most Kuomintang members in the border region
governments are liberals. _
The policy of the Communists is to have one-third Communists, one-third upper-
class individuals (landlords and merchants), and one-third Kuomintang and non-
party progressives elected to government posts. In 1944, of the 47 members of the
Yenan Municipal Council, seventeen were Communist party members, five Kuomin-
tang members, twenty-one non-partisans or members of other parties and groups
(or mass organizations) , two protestants, and one Catholic.
This system supports the claim of the Communists that they are maintain-
ing a democratic, united front government. But no real opposition toward
the Communists could, it appears, develop from any other party or class or
group, since the electoral vote is controlled by the masses and the masses are
controlled by the Communists. Anyone is free to stand as a candidate, but in
practice nearly all the candidates are proposed by the mass movement associa-
tions and the choice offered the electors is usually limited. For instance, in
one hsien which elected six representatives to the Border Region Congress,
there were only eight candidates.
The Communists' control of (or loyalty from) the masses, combined with
universal suffrage, is the chief cause of Communist power and political and
military control. It is also the cause of their great expansion of influence, for
the masses welcome the Communists as their benefactors and will support
them against their fonuer rulers. But this type of democracy has by its very
nature created an atmosphere which rules out opposition and makes it nearly
impossible for any other party to exist except as a minority party. A capable
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2339
English observer, who is a strong sympathizer with the Chinese Communists
and has lived in Communist areas since the end of 1941, recently commented
upon the expansion of the influence of the Communists and their growing power
in relation to the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. He stated that
"If the Kuomintang doesn't reform it seems to me that there is a very big
probability of China coming under exclusive Communist control which would
be a pity in many ways as I feel that the real weakness of the democratic sys-
tem here [in Communist-controlled China] is that there is not enough real
discussion which comes from having no real opposition party."
In the final analysis, the democratic system in the Communist-controlled Bor-
der Regions is predominantly a "democracy of the toilers" (see p. 2327) spon-
sored and led by the Communist Party. Members of the middle classes are per-
mitted to vote and are not, in so far as is known, discriminated against or
persecuted. But they have lost their pre-war positions of leadership, and
must now follow the masses, who are under Communist guidance. In January
1941 Mao Tse-tung said that the "bourgeois revolution" should be supported and
led by the proletariat under Communist guidance. This objective has been ful-
filled.
Non-Communist parties are permitted to exist if they conform to the policies
of the CCP as carried out through the Communist-controlled Border Govern-
ments. Thus the Kuomintang is permitted to function in the Border Regions.
But it cannot establish itself as a party competing with the CCP. Furthermore,
the Kuomintang members who participate in the Border Region governments
are those in sympathy with the policy laid down by the CCP. Individuals who
openly voice their opposition to the CCP and work against the Communists are
outlawed. Even Communists must adhere to the prescribed "party line;" Trot-
skyites get short shrift. When Mao Tse-tung outlined the democratic policy of
the CCP in 1938 he declared : "In the new situation of the war the traitors, spies,
Trotskyites, and Japanophiles . . . must be suppressed according to law with-
out leniency."
This insistence upon conformity has not been abandoned in the "democratic"
program, nor do the Chinese Communists appear to consider it inconsistent with
their claim that they permit freedom of thought and expression. A 20-point
"Practical Political Program" which was ratified by the first formal People's
Congress of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region in January 1943 included as point
6 : "Guarantee freedom of speech, association, belief, press, residence ; guarantee
freedom from illegal arrest." But point 17 states: "Suppress followers of Wang
Ch'ing-wei, Trotskyites, and other treacherous cliques. Confiscate and use their
property." Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the former leader of the CCP, is a Trotskyite. He
was released by Chang Kai-shek from a Kuomintang prison in 1937, but he re-
mained until his death in 1942 in controlled China, in Szechwan. In Communist
China his followers are outlaws.
The system of democratic united front government as introduced by the
Communists emphasizes the political role of the mass organizations and trade
unions, rather than of political parties. The mass organizations, in which the
Communist Party has predominant influence, sponsor plans for political and eco-
nomic reform which are then put to a vote in the various People's Congresses and
government councils. There again the mass organizations and Communist
sympathizers hold the controlling vote. Thanks to this system the Communist
Party maintains absolute leadership. The close connection between the people
and the Communist Army, and the important role of the Political Commissars
of the Army as a link between the military and civil administration, provide
additional safeguards for insuring the leadership of the CCP.
The Communists are able to maintain their position of control primarily
because of the capable leadership and strong discipline existing within the CCP.
In outlining the war-time functions of the CCP in 1938 Mao Tse-tung said:
". . . we [Communists] must have iron discipline in the Party, the Eighth
Route Army and the New Fourth Route Army. Discipline guarantees that
we will adhere to our Party policies. Without discipline the Party cannot lead
the- army and the masses toward victory. ... It is necessary to place the
[Party] organization before the individual, the majority over the minority,
upper Party functionaries over the lower, and the Central Committee over the
entire Party. This is the Party's centralized democracy."
There is no question that the Chinese Communists have produced the best
organized movement modern China has seen, and have knit the people together
in support of the Communist Party and Army as no other government in modem
China has been able to do. At the same time it is clear that the term "democracy,"
2340 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
when used to describe the Communist regime, has a meaning different from the
ordinary American understanding of the term. While the Chinese Communist
system is not altogether a "dictatorship of the proletariat" it is far more akin
to Soviet democracy, as outlined in the constitution of the Soviet Union, than
to the democracy practiced in the United States and Britain.
(c) The high point of the Kuominy tang-Communist united front ; the Hankow
Period, 1938. — It was inevitable that the Chinese Communists, with their concept
of a united front movement as involving economic reform, improvements of class
relations, development of local self-government, formation of mass organizations
of peasants, workers, and students, and democratic cooperation between these
and all political resistance parties, should soon clash with the Kuomintang.
There were many points in the Communist-sponsored program that agreed with
the officially accepted policy of the Kuomintang as laid down in Sun Yet sen's
San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the people — Nationalism, Democracy, Peo-
ple's Livelihood) . In a sense the Communists also became more representative of
the Kuomintang's officially accepted policy than the Kuomintang itself. For
whereas the Communists acted, in many respects, in conformity with the Three
Principles of the People, the Kuomintang not only did not put them into practice,
but was opposed to any party or group which tried to do so. It had started as the
leading revolutionary party of China. It led the great Kuomintang-Conmmnist
"united front" revolution of the 1920's. But beginning 1927, in the course of its
struggle to prevent the Communists from gaining the leadership of the revolution,
it ceased to be a revolutionary party. It became the leader of all the feudal,
reactionary forces in China which it had originally set out to destroy. It perse-
cuted and alienated from itself not only the Communists, but also the liberal-
democratic groups within the Kuomintang and in Nationalist parties outside the
Kuomintang. These groups were genuinely interested in putting the Three
Principles of the People into practice, not, like the Communists, as a preliminary
to the introduction of communism in China, but as a means of introducing democ-
racy as an end in itself.
The characterization of the Kuomintang given by an American official in China
in 1935 is worth quoting, not only because it holds true to this day, but also be-
cause it explains much of the inter-party friction which has characterized the
united front from its beginning in 1937, and become increasingly acute with the
passage of time. "Chiang Kai-shek," he wrote, "is no revolvitionary and therein
lies the reason for the decline of the Kuomintang as a revolutionary party. If
Chiang was a revolutionary at any time he lost that character the instant he
came to power or before. He undoubtedly longs for a great, free, and prosperous
China. But China must arrive at this state under his personal control.
"What was the reaction upon the Kuomintang of this state of affairs? It was
just what might have been expected. As soon as events demonstrated that the
revolution was dead as far as the leader was concerned, the revolutionary spirit
among the rank and file gave up the ghost. The real revolutionaries withdrew
from party activity or went South to set up the rival Canton government of 1931,"
and left control of the party to the 'practical politicans' and job seekers. The
schism of 1931 left not a real revolutionary leader in the Central Kuomintang
councils. All that remained at Nanking were personal henchmen of the dictator
. . . Some of the old time revolutionists came back to the party after the
rape of Manchuria in 1931, driven solely by their patriotic desire to unite in op-
position to Japan. How they were beti'ayed at Nanking is a matter of history.
"To suppress whatever of the old revolutionary idea was left within the ])arty
the secret society known as the 'Blue Shirts' was organized within the party
itself. This clique is supposed to be animated by but one purpose, complete and
unquestioning support of Chiang Kai-shek as dictator. It conducts its operations
after the fashion well exemplified by the fascist parties of the West, or better still
by the old American Ku Klux Klan. Murder and threat of murder are used to
bring into line such party members or officials as cherish ideas inimical to the
dictator.
"The Kuomintang at present strongly resembles the political machines in the
United States, such as Tammany Hall or the Republican clubs of PennsylvaJiia.
'"This refers to the Canton dissension movement which started in April 1931. Dr. Sun
Fo and many other liberals left Chinnj? Kai-shek. Dr. Sun, Eugene Ch'en, Chou Lu, Wang
Chinsr-wei (leader of the left-wins: Kuomintang), T'ancr Shao-yi, and other lihernls estah-
lished a new Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Canton, compotiug with
that of the Kuomintang right-wing under Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. Peace I)etween the
two groups was re-established after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, following a prom-
ise by the Nanking Government that "elected representatives of the people" were to be
included in the central political organs. The Nanking leaders never kept this promise.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2341
Nominally devoted to the salvation of China through the principles of Sun Yat-sen
it really concerns itself with nothing but the perpetuation in office of and division
of political perquisites among its members."
To the Kuomintang the united front movement meant cooperation betweea
all Chinese against Japan, on the basis of the integration of all military forces-
formerly independent of the Kuomintang into the Central Army, and the sub-
ordination of all political parties to the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang-con-
trolled Central Government. Since the Government did not extend legal recogni-
tion to parties other than the Kuomintang, it did not deal with dissident parties
as such. It could not ignore their de facto existence, but just as it worked
for the elimination of all independent armies by integrating them with the
Central Army, so it worked for the elimination of independent political parties
through their integration with the Kuomintang. But it was not interested in
democratic reforms or, for that matter, reforms of any kind. In the words of an
American observer in China, commenting upon the united front negotiations in
1937 : '"The Kuomintang will fight for its position of authority and its accompany-
ing perquisites of office, trimming where it has to, compromising when it mustf
but determined to hold the reins to the exclusion of all other factions."
The system of the united front government as it developed in Hankow during
1938, following the evacuation of Shanghai and Nanking, was also one of com-
promise, which affected the power of Chiang Kai-shek and his inner circle very
little. On 1 January 1938 the Central Government in Hankow was reorganized
on a basis that left all key positions with the right-wing Kuomintang members.
The American Assistant Military Attache in China cabled that the reorganization
was welcomed as a definite triumph for tlie conservatives and that it put at rest
the rumors that the new government was to include radicals. However, on 4
January Chiang Kai-shek announced his approval of a reorganization of the
National Military Council on the basis of equal participation by Communists, the
"Southwest Military Group" (Kwangsi-Kwangtung), and the Kuomintang "with
all equally responsible" for continued resistance. The promise, or hope, that
this approval conveyed was never carried out. The formerly dissident parties
were never given "equal" responsibility with the Kuomintang. But for the
moment Chiang's announcement helped to offset public reaction against the reor-
ganization of the government on a conservative basis, An American observer in
Hankow stated that it also satisfied the Communists, to whom "formal recogni-
tion was not vitally important since they had actually gained control of large
areas of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopeh. On 5 January the
Government announced that it had appointed K'ung Ho-ch'ung, a former Com-
munist General who surrendered to the Kuomintang forces in 1934, as commander
of all mobile units operating in North China. He had left for North China in
December 1937."
In the following months several moves were taken that seemed to promise a
liberalization of the Kuomintang regime. A number of former dissident leaders
were given positions in the Kuomintang, the Government, and the Central Army.
Several Communist leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, Chou En-lai, Lin
Tsu-han, and P'eng Te-huai were "reinstated" in the Kuomintang. Chou En-lai
was appointed Deputy Director of the Political Training Department of the
National Military Council, and the famous Communist guerrilla fighter, General
Yeh Chien-ying, present C-of-S of the Eighth Route Army, was appointed adviser
to the guerrilla school which Chiang Kai-shek established in Hankow.
In February 1938 the Supreme National Defense Council was established. It
was to function as a supreme political and governmental organ for the duration
of the war, providing a unified civilian military control. It was not, de jure, a
part of the government, since it was established as the war-time replacement of
the Kuomintang Central Political Council, the Party organ charged with exercise
of the Party's sovereign powers in government. Since the composition of the
Supreme National Defense Council was a war-time secret, no full list of its
membership has been published. It is known, however, that right-wing Kuomin-
tang members held the key positions. Several Communists, among them Mao
Tse-tung, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai, were reported to be members of the Council,
although not of its Standing Committee. Already at the end of 1937 the Com-
munists had been permitted by the Government to establish their own news-
paper, the Hsin Hua Jih I'ao (New China Daily), in Hankow. It was later
moved to Chungking and is still published there.
" Apparently he never succeeded In taking command, at least not over the Communist
forces. In 1943 he was reported to be a divisional commander In the 6th War Zone
(Hupeh).
2342 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Between 29 March and 1 April 1938 an Extraordinary National Congress of
Kuomintang delegates was convened. The Communist leader Chou En-lai was
among the 17 members of its presidium. This Congress resolved that the system
of Kuomintang leadership should "be firmly established and the Party Con-
stitution be amended accordingly." It elected Chiang Kai-shek "Tung Ts'ai," or
"Supreme Executive," of the Party. The Congress decided to postpone in-
definitely the convening of a National Assembly (or National People's Con-
gress) for the adoption of constitutional government. As a consolation to the
Communists and democratic groups, who saw in this decision an attempt by the
Kuomintang to maintain its dictatorial rule indefinitely, the Congress decided to
convene immediately a People's Political Council, a rather powerless organization
which was to function as an advisory organ to the Government. It held its
first session in July 1938. While the Communist Party was not openly recognized
or given official status, the Congress decided that "hereafter the people shall have
absolute freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assemblage, and free-
dom in the formation of associations, provided such activities do not interfere
with the war against Japan." The Communist Party organ, Hsin Hua Jih Pao,
expressed great satisfaction with the results of the Congress. As an intersting
sidelight on the general attitude of British and Americans toward the Chinese
Communists in 1938 as compared with today, it may be mentioned that one
American observer in Hankow, in commenting on the results of the Congress,
stated that open recognition of the Communist Party "may possibly have been
avoided for fear of possible alienation of support of China's cause by England and
the United States." He could hardly have thought at that time that the Ameri-
can Government would one day send an American Military Observer Section
to the Communist capital at Yenan.
The united front spirit was strong in Hankow during these days, and the
feeling of unity between the Chinese led them to feel more optimistic con-
cerning the future than actual circumstances warranted. The Central Army
moved from one defeat to another. The Japanese Army was moving ever
deeper toward the heart of China. But the momentary relaxation of the
Kuomingtang dictatorship, with all its pre-war repressions of popular sentiment,
and the genuinely cooperative war effort between all resistance groups in China
imbued the people with the feeling that the war was worth its sacrifices.
Chiang Kai-shek was hailed as the national leader who had risen above party
politics and he emerged as the symbol of the people's aspiration for unity and
victory. In the course of 1938 Mao Tse-tung developed a three-point strategy
for the war which soon found acceptance among all Chinese resistance leaders
and, in fact, became the theoretical basis for Chiang Kai-shek's war plans.
Briefly, the theory of this plan, the "three-stage war," as Mao Tse-tung called it,
was (1) Japanese offensive, Chinese "retreat in space but advance in time;"
(2) Stalemate: The Japanese offensive attains its climax at the foothills of
Western China, after which it reaches a standstill. China continues to mobil-
ize while concentrating upon guerrilla warfare to hold the Japanese and diminish
Japan's war energy ; (3) Japan's internal and international complications reach a
breaking point. China attains her maximum mobilization, followed by large-scale
counteroffensive and victory. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek predicted
a long war.
Even though this plan emphasized the responsibility of the Chinese to build
up their own war potential, it counted upon foreign aid especially from Soviet
Russia. In his outline of the "three-stage war" Mao Tse-tung said : "On the
one hand we have the increasing movement of aid to China in foreign coun-
tries, the great power of the Soviet Union and her important aid to China, etc.,
and on the other, the menace of another European war, the tendency towards
rapprochement between Britain and Japan, and the sale of munitions and war
materials to Japan, etc."
It was not only the Communists who at this time looked primarily to Soviet
Russia as their liope of victory against Japan. Their viewpoint was shared by
most Chinese, including Kuomintang leaders.^* The Soviet Union had entered into
^* It was, however, not without fear that some Kuomintang leaders accepted the idea of
Soviet Russian support. There was a powerful group in the Government, representing
Wang Ching-wei, General Ho Ying-ch'in, and General Cliang Ch'un, which advocated tliat
China talje steps to come to an understanding with Germany and Italy. They recommended
this course of action during the last session of the People's Political Council, which met
from 5 to 12 July ]938. This brought about an acrimonious dispute with the Communist
delegates. One of them, Ch'en Shao-yii, hotly replied that Germany and Italy were allies
of Japan and that any rapprochement with them would lead to capitulation to the Japanese.
The Soviet Union, Ch'en declared, is the natural ally of China. One of tlie Nationalist dele-
gates thereupon demanded of Ch'en Shao-yii : "Are you a Chinese or a Russian?" A scuffle
was avoided only by the intercession of more temperate elements and the appeal of the
Chairman, Dr. Chang Po-ling, to remember the united front. (184)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2343
a treaty of non-aggression with China on 21 August 1937, within a few weeks of
the outbreak of the Sino- Japanese war. (This treaty is still in force.) Article I,
which condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,
was viewed by some as the Soviet justification for her policy of assisting China
while remaining neutral. Although both the Chinese and Soviet governments
denied that a secret agreement for Soviet military aid accompanied the treaty,
such aid was given in a variety of forms. The Soviet Ambassador to China
stated his Government's attitude at a celebration of the 21st anniversary of the
Bolshevik revolution, 7 November 1938, as follows : "Under the leadership of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the great Chinese nation is now being united and
has presented a united front to oppose the aggressor, and your struggle has won
the whole-hearted sympathies of the whole Soviet people." The emphasis on
the united front is worth noting.
It is true that America, Britain, Soviet Russia and other countries contributed
considerable amounts to Chinese war relief. And an American Volunteer Avia-
tion Corps, organized by Lt. General (then Major, Retired) Clair Lee Chennault
(at that time Aviation Advisor to the Generalissimo), was actually fighting the
Japanese in China. But Soviet Russian aid vastly surpassed that of any other
country. Soviet planes were delivered to China in considerable quantities, and
Soviet aviators served in the Chinese Army in a "private" capacity as volunteers.
On 26 January 1938 the first recorded Chinese-employed all-Soviet Russian air
raid was made on Japanese installations in Nanking. During these first years
of the war Soviet Russian loans to China, in the form of barter agreements, were
also considerably greater than tliose of any other country. Up to the time of
Pearl Harbor, Soviet Russia is reported to have concluded barter agreements
totalling the equivalent of US $300,000,000, compared with US $170,000,000 from
the United States, and £18,000,000 from Great Britain. When the German
military advisers headed by General von Falkenhausen were withdrawn from
China in 1938 they were replaced by Soviet Russian military advisers. Not since
the days of the Kuomintang-Communist revolution in the 1920's had there been
so many Soviet advisers in China.
Although the Chinese were anxious to cultivate friendly relations with Britain
and America and made several appeals to these two nations and to the League of
Nations for greater support, the response from these quarters was small com-
pared with that from the Soviet Union. The concensus of opinion in Government
circles in Hankow was, according to some reports, that China's only hope lay in
seeking closer collaboration with Soviet Russia. It was the compelling need of
foreign aid, and the fact that Soviet Russia alone of all foreign powers was
willing to extend aid in substantial quantities, that influenced the Kuomintang
to take a conciliatory attitude tov^ard the Chinese Communists. Reports from
Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that "the Central Government military leaders
hoped that if the Communists were admitted to the government, Soviet Russia
might come definitely to China's aid." The correctness of this interpretation of
the Soviet attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in October 1938, after
the first rift in the united front. At that time the Soviet Ambassador presented
Chiang Kai-shek with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party
in China should be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. Another
was that the Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a
promise which Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill. This
showed that the policy of Soviet Russia toward the Kuomintang was basically
the same in 1038 as in 1923-1927; Soviet Russian support of the Kuomintang
was conditional upon Kuomintang cooperation with the CCP.
Soviet-Japanese relations were exceedingly tense in 1937 and 1938, partly as a
result of Japanese objections against Soviet aid to China. The Changliufeng
incident on the Manchurian-Siberian border in July 1938, involving heavy fight-
ing between Japanese and Soviet forces, raised high hopes in Hankow that Rus-
sia had decided to go to war with Japan. Although these hopes were dashed
by the news of the armistice on 11 August, the Chinese felt that Soviet Russia
had too high a stake in China to permit Japan a free hand in the Far East.
Great as the spirit of the united front had been during the first part of
1938, it began to wane during the last months of the year. Already at the end of
July the situation began to deteriorate. The Chinese Communists, availing
themselves of the March 1938 resolution of the Kuomintang Congress granting-
freedom of speech and of formation of associations, etc., began to establish mass
organizations in Hankow on the same pattern as in their guerrilla areas in
North China. Within a few weeks after this Congress there appeared in Han-
kow the Communist-sponsored "Wuhan Youth National Salvation Corps", "The
2344 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
National Emancipation Vanguards," and the "Ant Society." Tlie Kuomintang
authorities looked with apprehension on the growth of these mass organizations,
well remembering the effective use the Communists had made of similar organi-
zations in the 1920's, and knowing their current use of mass organizations in
North China as a means of winning popular support. These organizations were
also considered a threat to the development of the newly established San Mm
Chu I Youth Corps, a mass organization sponsored by Chiang Kai-shek to bolster
popular support of the Kuomintang.
At the end of July the "Blue Shirts" were reported to be working against the
Communists, and this led to a Communist protest in the Hsin Eita Jih Pao. At
the end of August the Hankow-Wuchang Defense General Headquarters ordered
the dissolution of the three Communist mass organizations mentioned above.
The Communists announced that the step was a breach of good faith on the
part of the Government and demanded, without result, the restoration of freedom
of action to the three organizations.
This first open rift, combined with a return of restrictions on the non-Kuomin-
tang press and increasing suppression of the right of assemblage of non-
Kuomintang groups, was generally interpreted as a sign of the inability of the
controlling reactionary elements in the Kuomintang to get along, not only with
the Communists but also with the Kwangtung-Kwangsi liberal factions, the few
Kuomintang liberals, and the large number of non-political military leaders who
had united with the Government. With the transfer of the seat of Government
to Chungking and the fall of Hankow in October 1938, the Kuomintang seemed
to return more and more to its pre-war tactics of dictatorial rule. In October
following the Soviet Russian Ambassador's demands, mentioned above, Chiang
Kai-shek suppressed several more Communist organizations. As a result Soviet
Russia withdrew some of her aid to China. Rlao Tse-tung issued a warning
from Yenan : "For the Kuomintang the most important link in the chain of
progress is the democratization of its organizational form, making the party
itself the people's alliance for resistance against the enemy and for national
reconstruction. Judging from the present tendency of the war, if the Kuomin-
tang does not open its doors and admit all the other patriotic parties and
individuals . . . the tremendous task of resistance . . . will be too great a
burden on the shoulders of the party.
The year closed with a bitter attack on Mao Tse-tung in the Central News, a
Government organ, liy a Kuomintang leader, Chang Chun-mai. He attacked
Mao and the Communists for failure to turn over control of the Communist area
in Shensi Province to the Central Government and for not allowing Chiang
Kai-shek to command directly the Communist armies in the field, and to direct
their training.
(D) THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN BECOMES SUBORDINATED TO THE "WAR WITHIN THE WAK"
1. Basic principles of Kuomintang and Communist wartime policies toward
each other.
It is impossible within the limits of this study to enumerate all the incidents in
the Kuomintang-Communist inter-party struggle that ensued in the years after
1938. The pattern of the struggle was set within the first 18 months of the war.
It has not changed to this day. But the struggle has become more and more
intense.
The Communists operated along two lines: (1) Expansion of their areas of
military control, in which they established their own special form of democratic
united front government, patterned after the "Soviet democracy of the toilers :"
(2) Exertion of the utmost possible pressure upon the Kuomintang and the people
in Kuomintang-controlled areas for the introduction of democracy more in the
Anglo American than in the iSoviet sense of the word. This paradoxical policy of
the Communists toward the two separate areas of Communist and Kuomintang
China was fully in line with the united front policy as laid down by the Congress
of the Communist International in IMoscow, 1935, which advocated a two-fold
democratic program : "We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the
democracy of the toilers [in our areas of control] , . . But in the capitalist coun-
tries we defend and shall continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy,
because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate."
The basic principles of the policy of the Communists toward the Kuomintang
were announced on 28 March 193S in the Hsin Hua -Jih Pan, Communist Party
organ, as follows : "The permitting of existence to only one political party and
refusing legal status to other parties is not justifiable, while the abolition of all
parties and merging them into one [the Kuomintang] is impossible. Therefore,
we propose the organization of a people's revolutionary alliance under the follow-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2345
ing three principles : (1) A joint policy to be adopted by all parties, to be followed
by individual parties; (2) Representatives of various parties to organize a
united administration to formulate an anti-Japanese program and adjust party
affairs; (3) All parties participating in tlie alliance to retain their political and
organizational independence." To this should be addetl a fourth, and cardinal,
point, namely that the Kuomintang and the CCP would maintain their separate
armies.'^ There has been no change to this day of this policy of the Communists.
The Kuomintang's answer to this policy followed two main lines of action :
(1) Restriction of Communist areas of military-political control; (2) Suppres-
sion of Communist activities in Kuomintang-controlled areas.
The one common policy of the two parties was that the war against Japan
must be continued. This was the main factor in preventing the resumption of
the Kuomintang-Communist civil war on the scale of pre-war days, and the reason
why both parties tried to preserve, outwardly at least, the semblance of unity.
The Kuomintang Government allowed a few Communist party members to reside
in Chungking and some of the other larger cities in Free China, and the Com-
munist newspaper in Chungking was permitted to continue publication, although
under Kuomintang censorship. The Communists were also granted a small rep-
resentation in the People' Political Council. The Communists accepted these
"favors" for what they were worth. They gave them a chance to make their
voice heard in the capital, to press their demands for democratic reforms and to
maintain public interest in the united front idea. In the People's Political
Council where Chou En-lai was one of the Communist members the Communists
could, in an official capacity, present their criticism of the Kuomintang and the
Government.
2. The Kuomintang enforces a military dlockade of the Communist area in
the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, 1939
The Kuomintang-Communist inter-party relations in the capital, never friendly
although moderately polite, were, however, only a faint reflection of the two-party
relations in the provinces. For it was inevitable that the opiX)sing policies of the
two parties would lead to clashes between their armed forces. As the number of
clashes increased from year to year, the military situation in China became more
and more "a war within a war."
In the summer of 1939 the Chungking Government began to enforce a strict
military blockade of the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. It had two
objectives : first, the prevention of Communist military infiltration and elimina-
tion of Communist propaganda in Free China west and south of the Shen-Kan-
Ning Border Region ; second, the closing of any possible overland route between
the Chinese Communist base areas in North China on the one hand, and Sinkiang
and Soviet Russia on the other. The Japanese Army blocked all routes leading
north through Inner Mongolia as far as to Pao-t'ou, the western terminal of the
Ping-Sui Railway. From Pao-t'ou westwards the Chungking Government gen-
erals Fu Tso-i and Kao Kuei-tze maintained a blockade of the northern border of
the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. The northwestern border facing Ningsia and
Kansu provinces was blockaded by Moslem troops of the three Ma Generals ^**
who in 1937, before the conclusion of the united front, had inflicted on the Chinese
Red Army one of its worst defeats. The Moslems in Kansu and Shensi provinces
were reinforced by the First Group Army of General Hu Tsung-nan, allegedly
the best equipped of all the Central Army forces. It had retreated to Shensi after
its defeat and withdrawal from Shanghai at the end of 1937.
Soviet Russian aid to China was still continuing at this time. Lanchow,
capital of Kansu Province, had become a great transportation center for Soviet
supplies brought overland to the Chungking Government via Sinkiang. Since
Sinkiang was under Soviet influence, the Kuomintang authorities feared an at-
tempt on the part of the Chinese Communists to extend their influence toward
Sinkiang with the view of establishing an over-land route to Soviet Russia.
These were some of the factors that induced the Chungking Government to im-
pose a blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Frequent border clashes
■^ Alao Tse-tungr said in October 193S : "As a result of special historical conditions the
Kuomintanff and Communist Party have their own armies. This is not a defect but a good
noint. Their own armed forces enable them to effect a division of labor in the war of re-
sistance so that each does its best to fulfill its own responsibility. They constantly help and
enconrape each other.
2° Ma Hniiff-k'uei. Governor of Ninssia.
Ma Pii-fana', Governor of Tsinghai.
Ma Pi-ch'ing, Commander of Moslem troops In Kansu. He has since been forced out of
Kansu by Chiang Kai-shek.
22848— 52— pt. 7A 4
2346 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
occurred. The Communists lost some districts. In time a net work of piU
boxes was built by the Kuomintang forces along the southern and western ap-
proaches to the Communist base in Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. This block-
ade is still maintained although it has been slightly relaxed in the past few
months."
While the foregoing were important reasons for concentrating large forces of
Government troops in the Northwest, not all the troops were there to oppose
the Communists. A large part of Hu Tsuug-nan's First Group Army was con-
centrated in the area south of the Yellow River bend to guard the vital Tung
Kuan (Pass) against a Japanese offensive toward Siam.
3. The struggle between Clumgking Government and Chinese Communist
forces for possession of guerrilla bases in east China, 1937-1940 '
In the guerrilla areas of Eastern China frequent fighting between Kuomintang
and Communist forces took place. Who was the actual attacker is in many
cases impossible to determine, for both parties accused each other of breaking
the peace, and no neutral observers, if present at the scenes of fighting, have
submitted any reports of their impressions, in so far as is known. Two ex-
amples suffice to show the Communist method of presenting their case. In a
press interview with Chinese reporters on 11 September 19.39 Mao Tse-tung said :
"In North China, Chang Yinwu and Chin Chi-yuug are experts in dissension —
the former in Hopeh and the latter in Shantung. They have become very
rampant and their activities are scarcely different from those of traitors. They
have spent very little time in engaging the enemy, but have devoted much time in
fighting the Eighth Route Army. I obtained strong proofs in this regard, such
as Chang's orders to his troops to attack the Eighth Route Army, et cetera,
which we have submitted to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek."
Another typical statement by the Communists reads as follows : "Early in the
summer [1940], disputes in North China [between Kuomintang and Communist
forces] were fortunately solved through the demarcation of areas of operations
[in Shansi and Hopeh] and the door to negotiations between the Kuomintang
and Communist parties was thus reopened. Efforts were made in the following
months to settle various issues, and the Eighteenth Group Army was doing its
utmost to prepare the 100-regiment battle against the enemy. Unexpectedly,
Shih Yu-san's troops, having obtained by deceit the support of the Central
[Chungking] authorities, again crossed tlie [Yellow] River and entered Hopeh,
and launched attacks in conjunction with the enemy and puppets. Disputes
arose as fighting broke out."
This Communist story about Shih Yii-san is probably true. He was shot in
1940 by the Chungking commander. General Wei Li-huang, for working with the
Japanese. Another Communist account of how his areas in Southern Hopeh
were taken over by the Communists is given by a private foreign observer who
has lived in Communist-controlled areas of North China for several years. Ac-
cording to his information, also derived from Communist sources, the army of
Shih Yii-san in South Hopeh and Shantung was much better equipped than the
Eighth Route Army forces but its leader was "distrustful of democratic mass
organization." As a result he was not able to withstand a large-scale Japanese
attack and the areas he occupied have now come under Eighth Route Army
control.
This version accords with the explanation usually given by the Communists of
how they have expanded their areas of control. Piecing together the two Com-
munist stories about Shih Yii-san as quoted above and similar stories, each of
which fits its particular case, it appears that (according to the Communists) the
Japanese are in the habit of frequently attacking and defeating Kuomintang
generals who have been fighting together with them against the Communists,
whereupon the Communist armies move in, take over control of the rural areas
and start organizing the people for guerrilla warfare.
Exactly why the Japanese should be interested in fighting Kuomingtang gen-
erals who are cooperating with them in fighting the Communists is not explained
by the Communists !
The Communist versions of Kuomintang attacks upon their forces are, how-
ever, usually devoid of obvious propaganda distortion. On the other hand,
Kuomintang accusations against the Communists are often so full of obvious
misstatements that it frequently becomes impossible to distinguish between the
^ In January 1945 It was reported that 200,000 Kuomintang troops were still blockading
the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Since November 1944 about 20,000 troops had been
moved south, presumably to Kwelchow Province.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2347
grain of truth and the mass of falsehood. This has, naturally, led to a tendency
among many observers to trust statements by the Chinese Communists concerning
Kuomiutang activities, while almost entirely disregarding those of the Kuomin-
tang concerning the Communists. Mao Tse-tuug's statement about the two
"experts in dissension" may be true. However, since we have definite proof
that General Ch'eng Ch'ien, C-in-C of the North China war area in 1937 and 1938,
and General Wan Fu-lin and his troops of the 53rd Army actively cooperated with
the Communists in Hopeh, but that they later disappeared from Hopeh, the
Kuomintang version of what happened to one of the "experts in dissension,"
Chang Yiu-wu, deserves a hearing.
Chang had a good reputation before the war (and he probably still has) as
an honest, simple, and upright person. The son of a Shansi peasant, he was
known for his simple manners and lack of pretense. As Mayor of Peiping during
the late 1920's and early 1930's he established an outstanding record for honest
and progressive administration. Here is the Kuomintang version of what hap-
pened to him :
"Skipping over the [Kuomintang-Communist] clashes [in Hopeh] in 1938 . . .
we find that large-scale systematic operations began in June 1939 and lasted
till the end of March 1940. General Chang Yin-wu was C-in-C of the Hopeh
People's Armies [Chungking guerrillas] and at the same time Commissioner of
the Interior of the province. His troops occupied a circular area east of Cheng-
ting on the Peiping-Hankow Railway ... It was a flat country ; nevertheless
the People's Armies had fought seven successful guerrilla encounters with the
Japanese in this area. The Communists could and should have been useful allies.
"On the night of June 21, 1939, the headquarters of the People's Armies was
suddenly surrounded by two Communist regiments under Ho Lung. The battle
lasted two days and two nights until Chang's ammunition was exhausted and his
troops were completely disarmed. Then the battle spread over 120 kilometers
and over 40,000 Communist troops were employed, under Ho Lung, Liu Po-cheng,
and Li) Cheng-chao. Chang's troops escaped toward west of the Peiping-Hankow
Railway, but the 129th Division of Liu Po-cheng, the 120th Division of Ho Lung,
and the Youth Guards of Lii Cheng-chao followed in hot pursuit until they com-
pleted the annihilation or disbandment of the People's Army. The Communists
pushed further ..."
It may be true that Chang Yin-wu was the initial attacker. But in the final in-
stance Ho Lung seems just as responsible for the fighting as Chang Yin-wu since
he drove Chang out of his war zone. And if we accept Mao Tse-tung's statement
that Chang Yin-wu was an "expert in dissension" and that he fought the Eighth
Route Army, it must also be agreed that Ho Lung was a more successful "expert
in dissension" and fought the Kuomintang forces.
The Communists' version of the inter-party war, namely, that they have been
Innocent victims of Kuomintang attacks and have been forced to fight the
Kuomintang forces in self-defense, has been accepted quite generally among
foreign Allied observers. There can be no doubt that in many cases Kuomintang
troops have attacked the Communists, forcing them to make counter-attacks in
self-defense. In granting this it would seem, however, that simple logic would
prove conclusively that the Communists have been the chief attackers against
the Kuomintang forces throughout the past eight years. From its tiny original
base in North Shansi the Eighth Route Army has spread out into vast areas of
the coastal provinces of North China within and beyond the Great Wall, and the
New Fourth Army has spread its influence over great areas of Central China.
The Communist armies could not possibly be where they are today without having
been on the offensive. And it is not without significance that the expansion of
Communist control has been at the expense of Kuomintang areas far more than
of Japanese-occupied areas.
The contention of the Communists, that they have throughout the war been
forced to fight the Kuomintang forces in self-defense, implies that in order to
defend their original wartime base area in North Shansi from Kuomintang
attacks they had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of the greater part of
Shansi and Hopeh. In order to defend their "united front" bases in the Shansi-
Chahar-Hopeh Border Region from Kuomintang attacks, they had to drive the
Kuomintang forces out of the greater parts of Shantung and Northern Honan
and establish several new "united front" bases in these areas. And in order to
defend their original base of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhwei and
Southern Kiangsu from Kuomintang forces, the New Fourth Army had to drive
the Kuomintang forces out of all of Kiangsu, great parts of Anhwei, Chekiang,
Hupeh, and Southern Honan. If we accept the justice of this type of self-defense,
2348 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
we must also concede that the Japanese were justified in conquering great parts
of China, and in order to defend their home land and China were forced to con-
quer the Philippine Islands and Southeast Asia. For the Japanese, just as the
Chinese Communists in regard to themselves, claim that they have been "forced"
to undertake these conquests in "self-defense."
The Kuomintang and the National Government permitted the Chinese Com-
munists considerable freedom of action at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese
war. The Government assigned to the Communists certain war areas in which
they were to cooperate with the regular Central Army troops in the defense
against the Japanese. Thus North Shensi adjacent to the Communist base in the
Shen-Kan-Ming Border Region was assigned to the Eighth Route Army. When
the Eighth Route Army penetrated into Hopeh and began to organize a united
front resistance after the collapse of organized resistance by the Central Army
forces, the Government also sanctioned this move.
The Communists, however, continued to expand their areas of control, and it
soon became evident to the Chungking authorities that they considered it within
their right to expand into any war area of eastern China without previous
permission of their C-in-C, Chiang Kai-shek, or even consultation with the
National Military Council or with the Government-appointed war zone com-
manders. This was, of cour.se, an open violation by the Communists of their
united front agreement with the Kuomintang, for in March 1937 the Communists
had formally accepted the Government's terms for a united front, among them
the abolition of the Red Army "and its incorporation into the Government's
Central Army under direct control of the National Military Council."
While the regular Central Army forces were distributed in the various front
sectors according to the plan of the High Command in Chungking, the Communist
forces moved anywhere they liked according to plans laid down in Yenau. And
wherever they went they set up their own guerrilla bases and their own type of
democratic united front governments which were linked up with Yenan instead
of with Chungking. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that fighting
with Government forces would develop. These latter had, after all, full right
to be where they were, for they were there by order of the Government. The
incursion of Communist power into their base areas and the establishment of a
Communist-led administration which flouted the authority of the Chungking-
appointed officials reduced the size of the areas of the Chungking forces on which
they were dependent for their sources of supply. The Chungking forces became
enraged over this invasion of their defense sectors. They had fought against
the Japanese for the defense of their guerrilla bases. They fought against the
Communists for the same reason, in self-defense.
Soon after the formation of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region in
January 1938 (which did not include all areas within these provinces). Eighth
Route Army forces under Ho Lung moved into Southeastern Shansi to the
T'ai-heng Shan (Mt. ) area. This lay outside their defense area assigned to
them by the Government. Fighting broke out with the Government's forces in
which the latter suffered several defeats. Intermittent fighting continued for
several years.
During the latter part of 1938, Communist forces under Hsii Hsiang-ch'ien
invaded Northeastern Shantung and began establishing guerrilla bases on the
Shantung promontory south of Chefoo and Lung-k'ou and in the areas around
Tsinan, the .Japanese-occupied capital of the province. This area also lay outside
the defense zone assigned to the Communist forces by the Central Government.
Fighting broke out with Government forces under Admiral Shen Hung-lieh and
General Yii Hsiieh-chung who tried to defend their bases. This fighting con-
tinued with intermittent pauses until 1943, when the greater part of the Govern-
ment's forces were withdrawn from Shantung.
After most of the Government's troops had been forced out of Hopeh Province
(March 1940), the 115th Division (under Lin Piao) of the Eighth Route Army,
supported by several independent detachments, crossed to the south bank of
the Yellow River into Western Shantung. This, again, was an invasion of areas
which the Government had never assigned to the Communists. Fighting with
Government forces broke out. The latter were forced to retreat. Western
Shantung became another Communist base.
Following this the Eighth Route Army forces invaded Eastern Honan and
Northern Anhwei Provinces (early summer 1940) where they established contact
with the forces of the New Fourth Army which had extended their influence
northward from the Yangtze River. In August 1940 the Eighth Route Army
forces in Northwestern Shantung combined with those under Hsii Hsiang-ch'ien
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2349
in Northeastern Shantung, and under Hsii's command they launched an invasion
of the southern part of the province, fighting the Chungliing forces for possession
of bases. In October 1940 these Eighth Route Ai-my forces invaded Northern
Kiangsu. In full coordination the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies gradu-
ally extended their areas of control in Shansi, Shantung, Hopeh, Chahar,
Suiyuan, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, Chekiang and Hupeh. The Lunghai Rail-
way became the dividing line between the areas of operations of the two armies.
The nucleus of another Communist armed force had been organized by the New
Fourth Army in Kwangtung Province of South China during 1939. The leader of
this force, the 3rd Detachment, was Tseng Sheng, a graduate of Chungshan Uni-
versity in Canton. After a short time his force was accepted into the Kwangtung
Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps under the Chungking commander Hsiang Han-
p'ing. The 8rd Detachment adopted the name of Hui-yang Pao-an Anti-Japanese
Guerrilla Corps, indicating its area of operations in the Hong Kong region from
the coast across the Hong Kong-Canton Railway to Hui-yang (Waiyeung). But
in expanding its guerrilla areas it got into trouble with the Chungking forces and
in March 1940 General Hsiang declared Tseng Sheng's guerrilla corps an "un-
authorized party." Other Communist forces had meanwhile begun to establisli
guerrilla bases on Hainan Island.
This rapid expansion of Communist influence was new evidence of the capable
leadership of the Communist army commanders, political commissars, propaganda
workers, and mass mobilization organizers. But when stating this it must also
be admitted that the Communist tactics were not conducive to the maintenance
of the united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP. To the Communists
any Chungking general who refused to welcome their armies into his defense zone
and who fought against them for the defense of his base areas was a "traitor"
and an "expert in dissension." On the other hand, the Chungking army leaders
accused the Communists of unpardonable breaches of military discipline, and of
supporting the Japanese by fighting the Government forces.
The Chungking Government repeatedly asked the Communists at least to agree
to a clear demarcation of defense zones, as a means of avoiding the hopeless con-
fusion created by tlie intrusion of Comumnist armies into the defense zones of
Chungking Government forces, and averting the resultant inter-party fighting.
The Government finally offered the Communists all of North China north of the
Yellow River (that is, the pre-193S bed of the Yellow River) except Southern
Shansi, as their defense zone, provided they would withdraw the New Fourth
Army to North China.
In September 1940 Chou En-lai also stated to an American observer in Chung-
king that although no formal agreement had been signed a settlement had been
reached with the Government "to the satisfaction of both sides" involving a
clear demarcation of defense areas, the size of the Eighth Route Army, and
the exact number of hsien to be included in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region.
According to Chou the Government had agreed to hand over the area north
of the Yellow River to the military control of the Eighth Route Army. The
Communists had accepted this. But at the very time Chou En-lai made this
statement Eighth Route Army forces were successfully fighting Government
forces for the possession of their guerrilla bases in Southern Shantung.*^
In December 1940 Generals Ho Ying-eh'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, C-of-S and
Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army respectively, sent a telegram to General Chu
Te, C-in-C of the Eighteenth Group Army [Eighth Route Army], and General Yeh
T'ing, C-in-O of the New Fourth Army, in answer to their complaints about
" Information obtained in Chungking at this time was often extremely misleadinsr. Chou
En-lai let it be known that the Commimists were satisfied with the Government's hehavior.
The Government also seemed satisfied, because the Communists had "more or less" ajrreed
to the transfer of the New Fourth Army from Central to North China. Chon En-lai indi-
cated that the Communists had agreed to this, for ho said (Sept. 1040) that the remaining
problem to be solved was the transfer of the New Fourth Army to North China. The Gov-
ernment indicated its satisfaction over this settlement by appointing Chou En-lai to the post
of Vice Director of the War Areas Kuomintang Affairs Board, an organization which main-
tains control of Chinese political affairs in occupied provinces of China. In view of this
American observers commented that "present-day relations" between the Kuomintang and
the Chinese Communist party are highly satisfnctory and that an ojien brenk is scarcely
conceivable between the two groups so long as the Communists continue to afford General
Chiang Kai-shek full support in his policy of resistance." And yet, at this very time
fighting went on between Kuomintang and Communist troops in Shantung and Kiangsu,
with the Communists expanding their influence in Shantung and Kiangsu instead of with-
drawing to the North. Three months later in .January 1941, Kuomintang and Communist
troops were involved in the biggest clash of the war-period, (see page 109)
2350 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"attacks" of Kuomintang troops upon the Communists and their request that the
Government order a cessation of the "attacks." The two Chungking generals
said among other things :
"Ever since the days when the present war broke out, the Eighteenth
Group Army was included in the Order of Battle of the Second War Zone
while the New Fourth Army was included in the Order of Battle of the
Third War Zone immediately after the said Army was organized. They
have each been given their respective operational areas, and definite opera-
tional objectives were assigned them as well. In fact you have failed to
carry out the stipulations outlined in the order ... On the contrary,
your troops marched into Hopeh and Chahar without orders from the Govera'
ment. Then a part of your troops were dispatched to Shantung and finally
the New Fourth Army was secretly transferred from areas south of the
Yangtze River to the north. As a next step, the troops which you sent to
Shantung to create disturbances there were dispatched farther south and
they, in coordination with other units of your forces, made a joint attack on
Government troops stationed in North Kiangsu.
"What we want to know is whose orders were you acting upon when you
moved your troops away from your respective designated war areas and
who ordered you to attack your friendly units . . . Whenever your
troops went, they treated their comrade units as enemies and attacked
them as such . . . Who ordered you to conduct this internecine
war? . . . Your troops have succeeded in their plans of occupying
territories and disorganizing Government troops to swell your own ranks
and you, too, have succeeded in establishing an independent system of ad-
ministration in the territory under your occupation. These were the actual
causes of the so-called 'frictions, controversies, and complications' [of which
you complain to the Government] . . . All these incidents [in 1940 of
which you complain] occurred either in North Kiangsu or in South Shantung,
which had nothing to do whatsoever with the operational areas assigned to
the Eighteenth Group Army and the New -Fourth Army. If you could really
obey orders of the Government . . . such frictions and controversies
could never have occurred, a fact which is as plain as a book ... By
pursuing this policy of attacking your own countrymen in an effort to swell
your own ranks you have virtually forgotten . . . that what is disadvan-
tageous to us is advantageous to the enemy."
These statements were true. Had matters been reversed, with the CCP in-
stead of the Kuomintang the dominant party in China in control of the Central
Government, there can he little doubt that the Communists would have objected
to having a Kuomintang army moving around through all the Communist anti-
Japanese base areas demanding that the Communists make room for them and
accept a Kuomintang-led united front administration.
4. The NeiD Fourth Army "Incident" of January 19Jfl
By the summer of 1939 it was apparent to everyone that the revolutionary
struggle between the Kuomintang and the CCP had in no way ended with the
united front; the contest between the two parties for the supreme control of
China was continuing in the midst of the war against Japan. The Government
was, however, at a disadvantage in countering the Communist threat, for it
could take only limited action. It could not afford an all-out offensive against
the Communists. Such a move would have meant the collapse of resistance
against Japan and the loss of the w^ar. And it would have deprived the Govern-
ment of whatever popular following it had and would have incurred the con-
demnation of the whole world. But while both the Kuomintang and the Com-
munists were determined to continue the war against Japan, it became obvious
that each party was fighting to win the war in its own behalf.
In September 1939 General Chang Ch'iin, then Secretary-General of the Su-
preme National Defense Council, stated publicly that the united front no longer
existed. This did not mean that the Government had broken off relations with
the Communists. It continued to deal with them and even made some conces-
sions to them. At times there was also active cooperation between Central
Army and Communist forces against the Japanese. But the relations between
the Government and the Conununists assumed more and more the form of a
temporary alliance. The united front was recognized for what it was, a truce.
In October 1939 when an American observer asked General Chu Shih-ming, at
that time Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how he thought the differences between the Central
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2351
Government and the Communists could be settled, General Chu said that he
felt that when the war with Japan was over the Government would be able to
"wipe out" the Communists.
In an interview with the American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, in Sep-
tember 1939, Mao Tse-tung indicated that the Communists did not recognize
the existence of the united front more than the Kuomiutaug and that they were
intent upon building up their own state organization that would challenge the
authority of the Kuomintang. He said: "We [Chinese Communists] claim
. . . leadership over the peasants and workers, and it is of two kinds, political
and organizational. In the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and in the guerrilla
districts under the Eighth Route Army we possess not only political leader-
ship, but organizational hegemony." This was an open admission that the
Communists had broken their pledge of 1937 not to maintain their own inde-
pendent political organization but to recognize the authority of the National
Government. In answer to Mr. Snow's question as to whether a united front
really existed, and Snow's comment that General Chang Ch'iin had stated that
no united front existed, Mao Tse-tung replied by referring to Hitler and Ah Q,
a character in one of the stories by the famous Chinese Communist novelist
Lu Hsiin : "There is a certain group of people who attempt to ignore facts, like
Ah Q and like Adolf Hitler. You know. Hitler said some time ago that the
Soviet Union was only a name, and maintained that there was really no such
country in the world. But after a while Hitler became more educated, and
made some progress. On August 23, 1939, Hitler discovered not only the nom-
inal existence of the USSR, but the reality of it." ^' The implication of this
remark was, of course, that as the power of the Chinese Communists expanded
and more and more areas in China came under their control, the Kuomintang
would in time be forced to seek a compromise with them.
The Communists defended their actions in establishing independent base areas
on the ground that the Kuomintang and the Government would not treat them as
equals and would not accord them freedom of action within the limits of demo-
cratic rights. Tliey pointed out that the Government refused to extend legal
recognition to the CCP. It refused the Communists representation in the Gov-
ernment and in the National Military Council, in view of which they maintained
that it was impossible for them to obtain assurance of a fair treatment. The
Government, furthermore, refused to mobilize the people for prolonged resistance
against Japan through what was, according to the Communists, the only means
possible : "the development of partisan warfare, progress in the process of na-
tional democratization, [and] the growth and development of the people's
movement."
No matter how justified the Communists may have been in these contentions
it was inevitable that they would antagonize the Government, which had no in-
terest in any "process of national democratization" and which saw in the ex-
pansion of the Communists' influence only an attempt on their part to use the
united front and the war against Japan as a means of increasing and consoli-
dating their power.
The bitter anti-Communist sentiment in Government circles found its most
violent expression in the New Fourth Army "incident" in January 1941. The
Headquarters of the New Fourth Army at Mao-lin in Southern Anhwei Province
was attaclced on 6 January by the Chungking forces of the 9th Army under Gen-
eral Ku Chu-tung, Commander of the Third War Zone, and General Shang-Kuan
Yiin-hsiang, Commander of all Government forces in South Anhwei Province.
For eight days a battle raged between the Government forces, numbering nearly
80,000 troops according to a pro-Communist source, and the New Fourth Army
Headquarters force, which included 4,000 troops, about 2,000 wounded soldiers
and officers, and more than 3,000 political workers, cadets, medical service people
and their families. More than 2,000 New Fourth Army fighters were killed and
between 3,000 and 4,000 wounded. More than 2,000, including many political
workers, were taken prisoner. Commander Yeh T'ing was wounded and taken
prisoner (he is still being held) and the Deputy Commander, Hsiang Ying, was
killed. The Government forces suffered more than 20,000 casualties according to
the Hong Kong "Far Eastern Bulletin." It also reported that several thousand
of the local residents were killed.
The New Fourth Army was created in October 1937 by order of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek. It was formed out of remnants of the former Red Army
^ This refers to the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact.
2352 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
which had been left behind in Kiangsi and Fukien after the Communists started
the Long March in the fall of 1934. As late as the summer of 1937 these forces
were still defending themselves against Kuomintang forces in the lower Yangtze
valley. As a sign of his support of the united front, Chiang Kai-shek ordered
these Communist guerrilla units to be formed into an army. He appointed
General Yeh T'ing, a pro-Communist officer, as Commander of the New Fourth,
with Hsiang Ying, an experienced Communist military leader, as Vice-Com-
mander. The army was organized in February 1938 and went into action in
April. Its strength at that time was reported as 12,000 officers and men.
Its first field of operation lay south of the Yangtze River in Kiangsi and
Fukien. It was later ordered by the Government to operate in the Shanghai-
Nanking area. A small force of the New Fourth was sent by General Yeh
T'ing to the Tientsin-Pukow Railway front north of Nanking, without authoriza-
tion from the Government. The Army became especially active in the areas
between Shanghai and Wu-hu (southwest of Nanking).
It made an outstanding record. On 26 June 1938 General Chiang Kai-shek is
reported to have addressed a telegram to Commander Yeh T'ing, stating:
". . . you have enjoined upon your subordinates the determination to advance
but not to retreat. This precisely manifests your loyalty to the state. This is
really worthy of praise and comfort." In December 1939 General Ku Chu-tung,
under whom the New Fourth Army operated, sent a telegram of commendation
to Yeh T'ing. The New Fourth was also highly commended in 1939 by General
Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army, Like the Eighth Route
Army, the New Fourth received suppoi't in money and ammunition from the
Central Government. The relations between the New Fourth and the Kuomici-
tang armies in the lower Yangtze were comparatively good.
The New Fourth, however, adopted the same tactics in Central China as the
Eighth Route Army used in the North. It began to introduce the familiar and
successful system of united front democracy, of the same pattern the Communists
were following in the Sliansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and elsewhere in
North China. And the people willingly rallied to the side of the New Fourth
Army, partly because of its struggle against the Japanese invaders, partly be- '
cause of the economic-political program it enforced in areas under its control.
In no area of China had the people been more heavily burdened by the abuses
of landlords, usurers, and tax and rent collectors than in the thickly populated
provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang. And in no areas of China had the Kuomin-
tang been more powerful than in these two provinces. To the common man the
Kuomintang was partly responsible for the misery of his existence, for the
representatives of the Kuomintang, the Government and Central Army in most
villages and towns were the close associates, friends, and protectors of the
landlords. Many of them were landlords themselves. In its struggle against
the abuses of the native landlord class and the Kuomintang, as well as against
the Japanese, the New Fourth Army brought liberation to thousands.
As new areas were brought under its control, the New Fourth Army recruited
more soldiers and began to arm the people. By 1939 its strength grew to 35,000.
By May 1940 it had grown to over 100,000 troops. In addition some 500,000
guerrillas and local militia were operating luuler its command on both sides
of the lower Yangtze. By January 1941 the regular army numl^ered 125,000
troops, according to one report. The New Fourth was beginning to assume
the same kind of independence in its areas of control as the Eighth Route Army
enjoyed in North China. In September 1940 the New Fourth Army was operat-
ing in various districts of Anhwei, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Hupeh. Thus it
had not only expanded far beyond its operational base in the Third War Zone,
assigned to it by the Government, but had invaded the Fifth War Zone in Anhwei
and Hupeh where it began to compete with the Government's forces for opera-
tional bases.
This led to friction and clashes with Government troops who refused to evacu-
ate their base areas to make room for the New Fourth. The Communist propa-
ganda presented this as a case of Kuomintang "attacks" upon Communist troops
and Kuomintang collaboration with the Japanese. The Government's viewpoint
has been stated in the preceding section of this study; the behavior of the New
Fourth Army was in violation of every agreement the Communists had made
with the Government.
At the beginning of 1940 most of the New Fourth Army troops were south of
the Yangtze River. In line with the informal agreement of 1940, referred to above
for the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army to North China, units of the New
Fourth began to cross to the north bank of the Yangtze River during the latter
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2353
part of 1940. By the end of 1940 they were reported to have transferred about
three-fourfhs of their troops to the north side of the Yangtze and were proceeding
north. The Government authorities, however, considered that the Communists
were too slow in moving. On 9 December 1940 the National Military Council
issued orders specifically directing the New Fourth Army to abandon its positions
in the lower Yangtze region and remove northward to join the Eighth Route
Army in Hoi>eh.
In acknowledging the receipt of this order General Yeh T'ing was reported to
have requested CN$r)00,000 for a mobilization fund and 2,000,000 rounds of am-
munition from the Government. Communist sources stated in December 1940
that the Government had made "certain grants" in money and ammunition after
receipt of this request. At the same time the Eighth Route Army leaders re-
minded the Government that its allotments for their troops were several months
in arrears and that they required increased supplies of equipment for military
action against the Japanese forces. This latter request was ignored by the
Government. By the end of December, the local Commanders of the Government
forces in Anhwei and Kiangsu had become convinced that the New Fourth and
Eighth Route Army leaders were not sincere in their promises to move north.
Not only was Yeh T'ing remaining with his headquarters staff south of the
Yangtze, but both New Fourth and Eighth Route Army forces were pressing
their campaigns in North Kiangsu and South Shantung against Government
troops for the possession of bases. On 6 January 1941 Government forces
launched the attack, mentioned above, on General Yeh T'ing's headquarters. On
12 January 1941 the Government decreed that the New Fourth Army should be
disbanded.
This attack was on such a large scale that it attracted nation-wide attention. It
brought an avalanche of protests against the Government from the Communists
and all liberal groups in Kuomintang-controlled China, who accused the Govern-
ment of intending to start a civil war and of cooperating with the Japanese
against the Communists. The foreign press reflected the same sentiment. When
the People's Political Council was convened in Chungking on 1 March 1941, the
seven Communist delegates failed to attend. But Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu,
two of the Communist representatives of the Council, submitted by letter to
the Secretariat of the Council 24 demands of the Communist Party, divided into
two parts, "rehabilitation measures," and "measures for a provisional settlement."
The most important among the former included : demands for abolition of the
one-party dictatorship and the introduction of democracy; realization of Sun
Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People ; formation of a combined committee of
various political parties, each party and clique to have one delegate, of which the
Kuomintang and Communist delegates were to be chairman and vice chairman
respectively ; appointment of a Communist to the Presidium of the People's Politi-
cal Council ; freedom of speech ; release of all political prisoners ; and discon-
tinuance of Government censorship of the press.
• The group of "measures for a provisional settlement" included demands for
discontinuance of military attacks by Government troops against the Commu-
nists, withdrawal of the Government's "Communist Suppx-ession Army" from
Central China," withdrawal of the Government's order to disband the New
Fourth Army, punishment of the ringleaders of the New Fourth Army incident,
Government sanction of the formation of a new Communist army corps in addi-
tion to the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army ("the CCP should
control a total of 6 armies"), lifting of the military blockade of the Shen-Kan-
Ning Border Region, and official recognition of the "anti-Japanese democratic
political powers behind the enemy's lines." INIao Tse-tung and Chu Te had
issued a joint statement in February 1941 stating that unless the New Fourth
Army were reconstituted and its leader freed, and unless it were molested no
further, the united front could no longer continue.
In a speech before the People's Political Council on 6 March 1941, the
Generalissimo refuted these demands. He defended the attack on the New
Fourth Army and stated that acceptance of the Communists' demands meant, in
effect, that the Government would commit itself not to "suppress disobedient
and rebellious troops and that the Government authorities should be punished
for so doing." He emphasized that the Communists' demands also implied that
"the Government should establish special areas outside the sphere of its author-
ity and restrict its power to check illegal activities."
^ There was no army specifically designated "Communist Suppression Army" in Central
China.
2354 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In regard to the activities of tlie Communist armies Chiang Kai-shek said that
"the consistent policy of the Government has been to nationalize our armies.
That is, under the supreme command of the National Government there is but
one system of individual parties or private persons . . . There can be but one
source of command. Should a second presume to assert itself, it would be in-
distinguishable from the 'military council' of Wang Ching-wei's puppet re-
gime . . . All that is required is a complete change in the attitude and actions
of the Communist Party in no longer regarding the Eighteenth Group Army as
its peculiar possession or as an instrument for the obstruction of other sections
of the national forces to the detriment of resistance."
In regard to the Communists' demands for democracy Chiang said that "the
political principle of the Government is to democratize the national political
system. All citizens . . . should . . . possess all due freedom of action, but
sovereignty is indivisible. If a second source of political authority were to be
allowed to exist outside the Government — such, for example, as might be called
'. . . a democratic authority behind the enemy lines,' mentioned in these [Com-
munist] demands — it would not differ from the traitorous administration in
Nanking and INIanchuria. Although as a result of the nation's historical devel-
opment there is now but one party exercising administrative power, while
others of varying size and permanency are 'in opposition,' yet all parties exist
in a spirit of equality . . ."
Here the matter rested. Chiang Kai-shek spoke from the point of view of a
traditionalist who insists on his legal rights. The Communists insisted on their
revolutionary right to question the moral value of the Government's legal
rights. Throughout the following years in many negotiations between Kuomin-
tang and Communist representatives for a settlement of their two-party prob-
lem, these demands and countei'-dc^mands as quoted above were repeated with
monotonous sameness.
But while the two parties' representatives kept up their futile negotiations in
Chungking, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army (under its Acting
Commander, General Ch'en I who replaced Yeh T"ing) kept expanding their in-
fluence into Government areas, establishing new guerrilla bases wherever they
went. The Chungking Government's armies were gradually being forced out of
all the coastal provinces of East China north of the Yangtze River.
5. A virtual truce with the "puppet" armies while the ChungMng-Communist
forces continue the "war within the rear," 19/f2-1945
In the years that followed the New Fourth Army incident the Kuomintang-con-
trolled Government in Chungking centered its attention increasingly on the prob-
lem of conserving its military strength in order to strengthen its internal position,
primarily against the Communists. To this end it became less and less willing to
commit its best armies to tight the Japanese. This became especially noticeable
after the entry of the United States into the war.
While the Government never ceased to resist the Communists in the war areas
of east China, the burden of fighting them there tended to shift more and more
to the Japanese and the Chinese puppet armies. Many Chungking Government
troops (although few regular Central Army or Kuomintang troops) joined the
puppet army to fight the Communists with Japanese support. Before the start
of the Japanese offensive in China in 1044, a virtual truce between Chungking
and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops had existed for several .vears along some
front sectors. The ma.iority of the Chungking armies in Shantung and Kiangsu
withdrew in 194.3 into areas of Free China in Honan and Anhwei, leaving only a
few guerrilla units behind. As a result practically all of the coastal provinces
of North China came under either Communist or Japanese control. Several times
since 1943 Chungking troops have fought Communist forces attempting to expand
their areas in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Southern Kiangsu,
Chekiang, and Kwangtung.
Meanwhile the Government has centered most of its attention on strengthening
the blockade of Communist areas in the Northwest and on consolidating its power
in West China. The Kuomintang had never been stx'ong in this part of China.
It felt its iiosition endangered by a number of military leaders who, though loyal
to the Government in supporting the war against Japan, felt no loyalty to the
Kuomintang. The Kuomintang resumed its pre-war policy of intolerance toward
all opposition groups. The reactionary elements gained supreme control, and the
Government became increasingly oppressive and dictatorial. The result was that
it lost most of the popular support it had enjoyed at the beginning of the war.
Its intolerance has driven several of the minority groups in Chungking-controlled
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2355
China to consider the formation of a political coalition against Chungking.
They seek American support for this coalition not so much as a means of over-
throwing the Chungking Government as of forcing the Government to abandon
its system of one-party dictatorship. Some of the minority groups within the
coalition now contemplate forming a new united front with the Communists
against both Chungking and Japan.
The Chinese Communists on their part have greatly expanded their areas of
control since the New Fourth Army incident in 1941, partly at the expense of the
Japanese but chiefly at the expense of Chungking-controlled areas. From control
of about 35,000 square miles with a population of about 1,500,000 people at the
beginning of 1937, the Communists have expanded their control to about 225,000
square miles with a population of about 85,000,000 people.'' About 23,000,000
people have been added to their control in the past year alone, mostly through
conquest of Chungking-controlled areas.
The Communists have also competed with the Chungking Government in win-
ning the favor of the Chinese puppet forces, and have probably been as successful
in this respect as Chungking. Just as in the case of several of the Chungking-
Japanese front sectors before 1944, a virtual truce between the Communists and
the Japanese has existed during the past two years on several of the Communist-
Japanese front sectors.
The two chief factors contributing to the growth of Communist power and
prestige in the past two years have been the growing anti-Kuomintang movement
in Chungking-controlled China since 1943, and the Japanese offensive against
the Chungking forces in 1944. Communist forces fought Chungking forces dur-
ing the Japanese offensive last year. The latest information available indicates
that they are at present fighting Chungking in several areas of East China.
The Chinese war effort against Japan became obscured by the intense inter-
party rivalry going on in the Qiidst of war. The history of this inter-party strug-
gle, against the background of the war against Japan, presents both the Kuomin-
tang and the Chinese Communists in a most unfavorable light.
The Chungking Government's policy of conserving its military strength led it
to keep many of its best armies away from the front in East China, and although
some of its better armies were stationed in front areas, many of the front line
troops represented military units which were undesirable to the Kuomintang;
some were the troops of warlords, like P'ang Ping-hsiin and Wu Hua-wen, others
of Nationalist leaders who had formerly fought against Chiang Kai-shek, like
Li Tsung-jen of the Kwangsi Military Clique, Yii Hsiieh-chung of the former
Manchurian (Tungpei) army, and Hsiieh Yiieh of the Kwangtung Military
Clique.
After the United States entered the war and American military aid was ex-
tended to China, Chungking's unwillingness to commit its best armies to fight
the Japanese became even more apparent. American observers came to believe
that many leading Chinese Government officials felt that China had done her
part in fighting Japan and that it was henceforth up to the United States and
Britain to defeat Japan. American officials in China repeatedly complained in
their reports about the Chinese Government's lack of interest even in supporting
the American war effort in China, and emphasized that Chinese troops "that could
be used for the protection of our air bases are stationed elsewhere to blockade
Chinese Communist areas." In September 1943 General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Sec-
retary-General of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, agreed
with an American observer in Chungking that it was "unfortunate" that so
many Government troops were immobilized because of the Chinese Communists.
He said that "about 20 divisions of good soldiers" were "prevented from fight-
ing Japan." (222)
The prevailing attitude among many Chinese is well illustrated by the fol-
lowing examples. American officers have observed hov/ Chinese troops stationed
at American air bases have frequently refused to shoot at Japanese raiding
planes. Asked by an American officer for the reason for this behavior a Chinese
officer at Lao-ho-k'ou air base in Hupeh answered (November 1944) : "Well you
see, if we shot down a Jap plane, the Japs would be angry and would take revenge
and return and bomb the city and do a lot of damage." Another Chinese officer
expressed the opinion that "it is not necessary for the Chinese to take up an
offensive against the Japs because soon the United States Forces will surround
25 The Communists claim at present that they control 520,000 sq. miles with a population
of about 100,000,000. These figures are considered too high, especially the figure for areas
controlled.
2356 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Japan and then the Japs will have to retreat without fighting, and so it is better
to leave them (Japs) alone, and get along as best we can as we are."
This remark not only shows the reliance which many Chinese have come to
place upon the United States to relieve China of the presence of the Japanese, but
also indicates the method by which the Japanese will withdraw from China ac-
cording to the speculation of some Chinese. In August 1944 the National Herald,
an English-language newspaper in Chungking (reputedly sponsored by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), expressed an opinion on this subject which is quite
generally held among Chinese : "As we have already had occasion to point out
in these columns before, the Japanese militarists will in all probability give up
the struggle when Japan Proper has been invaded and they have been crushingly
defeated by the Allies in their homeland. However, if the Japanese should keep
on fighting on the Asiatic mainland even after their homeland has been occupied,
the Allies of course must carry out a land campaign in China . . . Some Ameri-
cans are right in saying that 'most infantry work can be done by the Chinese . . .'
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the use of the newest weapons of war cannot
be learned in a few days or weeks. By the time when it will be possible to bring
these weapons to China in large quantities it will be too slow a process to teach
the millions of Chinese troops how to use them . . . The best way, we believe, is
for the United States to send a large expeditionary force — say, 1,000,000 men — to
China as soon as landings in this country can be effected and immediately start
to drive the Japanese into the sea."
This question of the withdrawal of the Japanese has occupied the thoughts of
many Chinese leaders both in Chungking and in Yenan for many years, espe-
cially since the American Forces in the Pacific started their offensive against
the Japanese. The ports on the China coast, the cities along the Yangtze River,
the railroads, the mines, and the great agricultural plains in the coastal prov-
inces of Central and North China comprise the heart of China. Their reposses-
sion means, to the Chungking Government, the consummation of victory over
Japan. These areas, now held by the Japanese, are also essential to the Kuo-
mintang as a base for carrying on the post-war struggle against the Communists.
The Chinese Communists, at present confined to scattered rural areas, also
look forward to establishing their control over as many of these Japanese-
occupied areas, cities, and transportation lines as possible. Control over these
would not only give them the fruits of the victory over Japan, but also place
them in an almost indomitable position vis-a-vis the Kuomintang.
Since many Chinese expect that the Japanese will withdraw without fighting
from great parts of the areas they now hold in China, the question of whether •
these areas will go to Chungking or Yenan depends largely on which of the two
armies, Chungking's or Yenan's, will be the first to move in and take over control.
This vital question has led to an intense competition between the Kuomin-
tang and the Communists in preparing for the re-occupation of Japanese-con-
trolled areas. Their attention has been centered on the Chinese puppet troops
whom the Japanese have employed in increasing numbers, especially since the
beginning of 1942. They are used mainly as garrison forces, together with
Japanese troops, to maintain order in Japanese areas and guard them against
attacks from either Chungking or Chinese Communist forces. It is assumed by
both Kuomintang and Communist leaders that these puppet forces will remain,
after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, in the areas now oc-
cupied by the Japanese. The Party that wins the favor of these troops may,
therefore, be able to unite with the puppet forces and effect a peaceful occupa-
tion of the Japanese-controlled areas.
The puppet army is composed partly of Chinese recruited and trained by the
Japanese, partly (and probably mainly) of deserters from the Chungking Gov-
ernment army, and partly of Communist troops. During the interminable
struggle during the first four years of the war between Chungking and Com-
munist forces in the guerrilla areas of East China it was inevitable that some of
the Chungking Government commanders came to feel that they had here a
common cause with Japan, for both they and the Japanese were fighting the
Communists. This applies especially to the former warlords in North China who
had first been swept away by the Japanese during their defense of the large cities
and transportation lines and thereafter, in their efforts to maintain control over
rural areas, had been faced by pressure and attacks from both the Communists
and the Japanese. These warlords have little feeling of loyalty to anyone. Their
main concern is the preservation of their own power. The Chungking Govern-
ment had little use for them and left them without adequate support to fight
either the Japanese or the Communists.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2357
The Japanese, on the other hand, were anxious to develop a puppet army to
support their anti-Communist campaigns and to maintain order within their
occupied areas. They offered these warlords better pay and more prestige than
did the Chungking Government. Denied adequate support from Chungking and
unable to cope with the Communists and the Japanese at one and the same
time, many of them joined the puppet forces to serve under the Japanese. This
placed them in a far more advantageous position against the Communists whom
they considered their chief enemy.
In the course of 1942 and 1943 a great number of these warlords .ioin(3d the
Japanese. Among them were the aforementioned General P'ang Ping-hsiin, the
Chungking appointed commander of the Hopeh-Chahar War Zone, and General
Wu Hua-wen, who according to Japanese reports joined them with some 50,000
troops. In 1943 he was appointed commander of the puppet anti-Communist
forces in Shantung.
The Chinese Communists maintain that the Chungking Government encouraged
the desertion of troops to the Japanese in an effort to support the Japanese
anti-Communist campaign. The composition of this anti-Communist puppet
army, made up largely of troops who were disgruntled with the treatment ac-
corded them by the Chungking Government, does not support this contention.
But there are strong evidences that in the course of the mass desertions in 1942
and 1943 the Kuomintang leaders gradually developed a scheme for making use
of the puppet troops, -both as a means of fighting the Communists during the
war and for gaining control of Japanese-occupied areas after the withdrawal of
the Japanese from China. An American observer in China, in a report on the
"willingness" of Chungking military leaders to become puppets, concludes that
the "creation of an anti-Communist army in North China, eventually to be used
by the Kuomintang, is probably more of a fortuitous development, as far as the
Kuomintang is concerned, than a deep-laid Kuomintang plot with Japanese con-
nivance."
It was apparent to the Kuomintang leaders that the warlords who had joined
the Japanese, and their poorly disciplined troops, would hardly be able to defend
themselves indefinitely against the Communists after the withdrawal of the
Japanese from China. They might, therefore, be willing to reaffirm their loyalty
to the Kuomintang Government as soon as the Japanese withdraw from China.
I\Ieanwhile these puppet forces, operating from Japanese bases and in conjunc-
tion with Japanese troops, are in a better position than the Chungking troops to
fight the Communists. The North China warlords, who had been of little use to
Chungking as long as they served in the Chungking army, became invaluable to
Chungking after they joined the puppets.
In December 1943 General Hsi-En-sui, the Vice C-of-S of the First War Zone
(including parts of Honan and Shansi), told an American observer that the
Chungking Government would use puppet troops to oppose the Communists in
North China. He said that General Chang-lan-fang, a former Chungking com-
mander, commanded the best equipped, trained, and disciplined of the puppet
forces, numbering about 50,000 troops. These were stationed in East Honan.
He stated that General Chang was in close touch with Chungking Government
armies and that he was very helpful in supplying Chungking armies with needed
supplies and information. General Hsi also mentioned other puppet forces in
North China with whom the Chungking Government maintained close relations.
At the same time it was reported that on many sectors along the front between
Chungking and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops there existed a "virtual truce."
The Chungking Government also adopted, officially, a lenient attitude toward
the puppets who were considered pro-Chungking, anti-Communist, and in a sense
also anti-Japanese. In February 1943 a Chungking army spokesman declared
during a press conference that the Nanking puppet army of 300,000 men "is
threatening to boomerang against the Japanese," because "Free Chinese have
filtered into it." In November 1943 Dr. K. C. Wu, Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs, declared during a foreign press conference that Chinese participating
in the activities of the puppet regime in China wei'e not regarded by the Chinese
Government as war criminals.
This attitude toward the puppets led to a form of indirect collaboration
between the Chungking Government and Japan against the Communists. The
war areas of North China became more and more divided between the Japanese
or their puppets and the Chinese Communists, with the Chungking Government
forces either joining the puppets to fight the Comrminists or withdrawing into
Free China areas within the provinces of Honan and Anhwei. Here they tried
to stop the penetration of the Communists westward and southward into Chung-
king Government territories.
2358 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In March 1943 it was reported by Chinese sources in Chungking close to the
Government that the Government had lost contact vv^ith the Kiangsu provincial
government and that it was "feared" that the provincial leaders had gone over
to the Japanese. In September 1943 General Han Te-Ch'in, the Governor of
Kiangsu who was at that time a refugee at Kweiyang, stated during a press
interview that "Central Government authority in Kiangsu is non-existent due to
the withdrawal of Chungking troops from North Kiangsu to Anhwei in the
summer of 1945" and that "Chungking has no intention of taking action against
the Communists in Kiangsu at this time. Communist forces appear to be in
complete control of all points not under Japanese occupation in that part of
Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River and in the entire province of Shantung."
Chinese sources at Sian stated that while in Kiangsu, General Han Te-ch'in had
been taken prisoner by units of the New Fourth Army following a clash late in
1941.^" He had subsequently been released and arrived at Sian in September
1943. Communist sources in Chungking confirmed this, adding that General
Han Te-ch'in had been released after he had signed an agreement to withdraw
his troops from Eastern Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River.
Han Te-ch'in's statement that Chungking no longer controlled any part of
Shantung was confirmed in October 1943, when the American observers in Chung-
king reported that under orders of the Generalissimo the Chungking armies in
Shantung were in process of withdrawal and that no regular troops were left north
of the Yellow River, except for the small area in Southeastern Shansi where
General Yen Hsi-shan maintains his base. The report emphasized that the im-
portant provinces of the north had thus been almost completely stripped of Chung-
king troops except for a few remaining guerrilla troops. The report sided that
the military authorities in the Sian region "apparently" occupied themselves
chiefly with more close relations with the puppet forces which, when they feel it
is safe, will adhere to Chungking.
According to Communist sources, while in 1941 there were nearly 1,0^0,000
Chungking troops in the war areas of East China, by the summer of 1944
their number had been reduced to between 20,000 and 30,000. This presumably
refers to the war areas in which the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies operate
north of the Yangtze River. The Communists also maintained that time that
67 Chungking generals had gone over to the Japanese, and that no less than 62
percent of the puppet troops were former Chungking Government troops." The
Communists have also made a great propaganda Issue of the desertion of Chung-
king officers and troops to the Japanese, accusing the Chungking Government itself
of collaboration with the Japanese.
There is unquestionably a measure of truth in this, in that Chungyng and Japan
have indirectly cooperated against the Communists. But apparently this coop-
eration has always been through the puppets, or rather through those groups
among the puppets who are anti-Communist. As far as the Chungking Government
is concerned there is no indication that its cooperation with the puppets has
signified any willingness to come to terms with the Japanese, except on condition
that the Japanese withdraw from China. On many occasions, especially since the
entry of the United States into the war, the Japanese have attempted, usually
through the puppets, to negotiate peace with the Chungking Government. These
attempts have always ended in failure.
Failure of the attempts at peace negotiations induced the Japanese in 1944 to
launch their greatest offensive in China since 1938. It was, according to their
own statements in July 1944, directed against the Anglo-American "encroach-
ment" in China, not against the "Chungking related armies," which would be
treated as friends if they would "cast off the Anglo-American yoke." The defense
put up by the Chungking armies, especially by the units of the regular Kuomin-
tang or Central Army, was according to all reports poorly planned and executed.
There was considerable disunity among the Chinese commanders. But on several
fronts, particularly in Hunan, the Chinese put up a stubborn defense which won
the admiration of American Army observers. There is no available evidence
that the Chungking Government ever considered surrendering to the Japanese
during the critical days of 1944. It is important to remember this when faced
with the Communist accusations against Chungking (often repeated by some
official American observers in China) , of "traitorous relations" with the Japanese.
2« Another source states that General Han Te-ch'in was captured by the New Fourth
Army during an attack in Norljiern Kiangsu on Chunsltinjr forces in .Tune 194.3.
2^ Current (April 1945) estimate of the number of puppet troops in China proper la
910,000. of which 374,000 are in the "regular" puppet army and 536,000 in the provincial
and local Peace Preservation Corps.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2359
Nevertheless, the policy toward the puppets combined with that of concen-
trating hundreds of thousands of troops in rear areas, as a reserve against the
Communists and other opposition groups in Free China, had disastrous results
on the morale of the Chungking armies and people. For hundreds of miles along
the front peaceful conditions prevailed for years until the outbreak of the Japa-
nese offensive in 1944, and a flourishing smuggling trade developed which was
controlled by the military authorities on both sides of the front. An American
observer in Hunan reported in 1943 that "As far as the Chinese are concerned,
the [Chungking] military appear to be only too pleased to continue the truce
indefinitely, as they control the trade with occupied territory aud are growing
comfortably rich."
The Chungking armies, in the anti-Communist blockade zone in the Northwest
and elsewhere, became an intolerable burden both to the Government and the
people. Many of the troops lost their fighting spirit through long inactivity.
And the Government lost much of the popular support it had had because of its
heavy exactions from the people to maintain these idle troops. An American ob-
server in Shansi-Province reported in March 1944 that the relations between the
population and the Chinese military and civil authorities in the San-yuan area
in the anti-Communist blockade zone in Shensi were extremely unsatisfactory
due to the imposition of onerous grain and fuel taxes, miscellaneous exactions,
and the ever-increasing corruption and graft on the part of officials. He con-
cluded that "A continuation of the present practices of the officials is likely to
result in the peasants' welcoming the Communists who went to great efforts to
conciliate the populace when they were in this area in 1936 and 1937. The situa-
tion in San-yuan is typical of conditions in many other areas of Shensi, Honan,
Anhwei, and other provinces."
When the Japanese launched their great offensive in 1944 the Chinese peasants
in some areas turned on their own army. This was the case in Honan Province
particularly, where the peasants began to disarm individual Chinese soldiers
one by one, and finally began to unite into roving bands looking for smaller bands
of soldiers. An American observer in North China stated in November 1944 that
mal-administration by officers and lack of discipline of troops, which Chinese
freely admit contributed to the loss by the Central Government of much of
Honan to the Japanese, also create conditions favorable to the growth of Com-
munist influence in that province. According to several reports, Communist guer-
rillas are slowly filtering. in from north of the Yellow River, subduing robber
bands and organizing the peasantry.
As compared with the charges made against the Kuomintang, there are few
accusations on record that the Communists have had "traitorous relations" with
the Japanese or their Chinese puppets. Nevertheless, when the vast amount of
propaganda is eliminated from reports of conditions in Communist-Japanese
front sectors, the policy and behavior of the Chinese Communists toward the
Japanese appear very similar to those of the Kuomintang— no more, but no less
"traitorous." Communist troops have joined the puppet army, although probably
in smaller numbers than Chungking troops. While the Chungking Government
appeals for the friendship of the commanders of the puppet forces, the Com-
munists make their appeals to the soldiers. Some puppet troops have deserted
the Japanese to join the Communists. Others show a decided friendliness toward
the Communists. This applies especially to the puppet Peace Preservation Corps,
as distinct from the "regular" puppet army in which the Chungking Government
has its strongest following. The soldiers in the Peace Preservation Corps are re-
cruited chiefly from the local population and share the general sympathy of the
people for the Communists. They are usually poorly armed and serve as a
police force. In areas where friendly relations exist between the Communists
and the puppets there is a virtual truce, just as in the case of some of the Chung-
king-Chinese puppet front sectors.
A private foreign observer in Communist areas on North China reported in
1943 that puppet troops "will seldom oppose the passage of fairly strong Chinese
[Communist] forces," and that "it is fairly certain that as soon as the .Japanese
seemed likely to be defeated almost all the puppet forces would change sides"
[joining the Communists]. This referred to Hopeh and Shansi Provinces especi-
ally. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943, who had lived in Paoting,
Japanese-occupied capital of Hopeh Province, stated that the puppet troops in the
Peace Preservation Corps "seem to have an understanding of sort, or non-aggres-
sion pact, with the Eighth Route Army." Agents of Feng Yfi-hsiang (the "Chris-
tian General") in the areas of Kiangsu Province north of the Yangtze River
reported in 1943 that puppet troops and troops of the New Fourth Army in North
2360 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Kiangsu do not fight each other due to the fact that many of the men of the puppet
forces belong to the New Fourth Army. These men were "ordered" by the New
Fourth Army to join the puppets. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943,
who had lived in Japanese-occupied areas in Kiangsu Province, reported that
though the New Fourth Army forces in the areas between Shanghai and Nanking
were effective in keeping the whole area "upset" and unpeaceful and were "a
thorn in the side of the Japanese," they sought no trouble with the puppet forces
of the Nanking regime
The foregoing are a few examples among many of the friendly relations,
amounting to a virtual truce, that exists in some areas between Communist
and puppet forces. This development of friendly relations began simultaneously
with the similar development between Chungking Government and puppet
forces, that is in the course of 1942, after the entry of the United States into
the war.
In the course of 1943 insistent rumors began to circulate in Chungking-con-
trolled China to the effect that there was a definite understanding of some
sort between Nanking and Yenan. An American observer in Shansi reported
in January 1944 that a "highly placed provincial oflicial who is reputed to be
very well informed in regard to Communist affairs" had stated that the local
authorities had "conclusive proof" to the effect that an agent of Wang Ching-
wei's^* puppet regime, said to be residing in T'ai-yiian, Shansi Province, went
regularly to Yenan to maintain contact with the Communist authorities. The
same informant also asserted that the Communists had an agent representing
them in Nanking. During March 1944, another American observer who had
spent some time in Lanchow, reported that "there are, in this area, current
rumors that the Communists have made an alliance, or have come to a working
agreement, with Wang Ching-wei or elements associated with his regime."
Chinese sources in Chungking stated that "news was current" that the Com-
munists had come to terms with the "enemy and their puppets" not to attack
one another in North China, and that in Central China the Japanese were said
to have agreed to let the New Fourth Army remain where it was "for the time
being," in return for a promise that the New Fourth Army would not hinder
the movement of the Japanese Army, and would not assist the Chungking
Government.
The American observer in Lanchow did not wholly discredit these rumors.
He said that Wang Ching-wei and his associates were using, as a bargaining
point to secure "forgiveness from Chungking, the threat of throwing in their
lot with the Communists. He explained that his sources in Lanchow alleged
that Wang was motivated both by fear of the treatment he might receive at the
close of the war from a victorious Kuomintang Govei'nment, and by the leftist
tendencies of which he had given evidence at various stages of his career."
The Communists, of course, denied the truth of these rumors, just as the
Chungking Government has denied similar rumors in regard to its relations with
the puppets. And there is no evidence that the Communists, any more than the
Kuomintang, have ever considered coming to terms with the .Japanese, except
on condition that the Japanese withdraw from China. But this does not pre-
clude the possibility that they have played politics with the puppets for whatever
advantages they could gain thereby. In May 1943 an American agency in
Chungking, commenting on these rumors of cooperation between Yenan and
Nanking, stated that "It would be surprising, therefore [in view of the antici-
pated efforts of the Kuomintang to seek the liquidation of the Communist Party
and its army], if the Communist Party failed to utilize opportunities to under-
mine the Kuomintang, but it does not necessarily follow that the Chinese Com-
munists would cooperate with the puppet elements in order to overthrow the
Central Government."
There were elements in the Kuomintang-Communist situation in 1943 which
favored the Japanese and mitigated the danger of large-scale Communist attacks
against them. For in 1943 inter-party relations reached the gi-eatest crisis
=8 The late head of the Nanking puppet Rovernment.
20 In this connection it is of sisnificance that it is not those reactionary leaders of the
Kuomintang, who are most strongly opposed to tlie Communists and who have been most
commonly referred to as "appeasers," that have .ioined the Japanese to serve under them
as puppets. On the contrary, it is so-called leftist leaders like Wang Ching-wei, and
ex-Communists like Cli'en Kung-po and Chou Fu-hai, who have become the outstanding
puppets. The Kuomintantr officials who joined Wang Ching-wei in Nanking were for the
most part his personal followers. Aside from them the majority of the puppet officials
came from non-Kuomintang parties and groups.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2361
since the New Fourth Army incident of 1941. In the spring of 1943 the Chung-
king Government began to increase its troop concentrations on the frontiers of
the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and the Communists in turn withdrew some
of their troops from guerrilla areas in North China to the Shen-Kan-Ning area.
Throughout the year there was the serious threat of an all-out Kuomintang
offensive against the Communists. In 1942 and 1943, while a virtual truce
existed on several of the Communist-Japanese front sectors, the Communists
had concentrated their attention on expanding their areas of control into Chung-
king Government areas. Clashes occurred in Shansi-Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu,
Anhwei, Hupeh, and Chekiang, and the Communists scored several successes.
The Kuomintang leaders became infuriated against the Communists for their
"aggressive tactics against the Chungking forces," and their "intensified . . .
activities, endangering the security of the State and sabotaging our [the Govern-
ment's] war efforts."
It is against this background that the following Tokyo radio announcement
made in March 1944, one month before the opening of the Japanese offensive
against Chungking Government and American forces in China, assumes a par-
ticular significance. "The Sino-Reds recently adopted a '10-20-70 forward policy
under which they use 10 percent of their power to deal with Japan, 20 percent
for the protection of their bases, and the remaining 70 percent for the expansion
of their influence. In order to counter . . . the new strategy mapped out by the
Chinese Reds, the Chungking regime is putting into practice the dual policy of
political and military pressure, carrying on political negotiations with the
Communists, and simultaneously carrying out an encirclement offensive."
The events of 1944 up to the present, April 1945, do not contradict this state-
ment. A report by the Kuomintang Headquarters in Chungking in August 1944,
evaluated C-3 by an American observer in Chungking, stated that "Puppet-Com-
munist cooperation since last January is becoming clear." In substantiation of
this, the report stated that "The puppets have demilitarized fortifications in
Hopeh, the construction of which was primarily an anti-Communist measure."
The demilitarization of some fortifications in Hopeh Province has been confirmed
by the Chinese Communists, although they do not, of course, state that this is
the result of any "understanding" or "cooiieration" with the puppets. Since the
Japanese consider their areas in North China as vital to their empire defense,
they would hardly abandon some of their defenses in North China unless they
felt reasonably assured that this move would not endanger their position vis-a-vis
the Communists.
There is no indication that the Chinese Communist forces made any effort to
support the Chungking Government and American forces in China during the
Japanese offensive in 1944. But there is evidence showing that the same kind of
"non-aggression pact," which American missionaries reported to exist between
Communist and puppet troops in 1942 and 1943, continued in some front sectors
in 1944. Throughout 1944 the Communists also continued their campaigns
against Chungking Government forces.
An American Army oflScer who spent three months, from August to November
1944, with the New Fourth Army in Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces reported that
the railroads in Japanese-controlled areas in Kiangsu "are not diked or walled in
order to prevent attack upon them [by New Fourth Army troops]. There appears
to be a tacit arrangement between the New Fourth Army and the Japanese by
which, and in return for the Communists not attacking the trains and railroads,
the Japanese will not construct walls and dikes along the [Tientsin-Pukow]
railroad [in Kiangsu] as they have done elsewhere, and which would make
crossing by the Communists next to impossible." New Fourth Army leaders told
the American ofl5cer that they would not attack the Japanese railroad until "such
an attack would have a strategic or tactical bearing as a part of a specific military
operation." They claimed that a premature attack on this railroad would achieve
little of military value, and "at the same time such would make their own opera-
tions and movements considerably more hazardous and difficult."
The American Army officer mentioned above reported on the tense situation at
the Chungking Government-Communist front in Anhwei, northwest of Nanking.
Several small clashes had occurred there during 1944. In January 1945 an
American Army officer observer in China reported that Kuomintang troops had
"attacked" the Communists in Anhwei. He did not explain whether the "attack"
was necessitated as a means of self-defense. That this was the case, if the
Kuomintang forces actually launched an attack, is indicated by other reports. In
January 1945 Chungking Government sources, reporting on the fighting in Anhwei,
stated that between 2,000 to 3,000 troops of the New Fourth Army had crossed to
32848— 52— pt. 7A 5
2362 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the south bank of the Yangtze River with the aim of joining up with Communist
elements in Cheliiang to prepare to "greet" an American landing. Another re-
port by an American Army observer in Anhwei (February 1945) stated tliat
fighting between Chungking and Communist troops was taking place in Northern
Chekiang and that 8,000 Communist troops had crossed to the south bank of the
Yangtze River during the past few months. An American representative of the
air ground aid service in Anhwei stated that progress was being made by the Com-
munists, that they were winning over more recruits, were getting increased sup-
port from the people, and that the New Fourth Army troops could not be halted by
the troops of the Chungking Government. He said that southern Chekiang and
the Northern Fukien coast were reported to be the objectives of the Communists.
The available information seems to show clearly that, in general, it is the
Communists rather than the Kuomintang who have been on the offensive.
As the Japanese campaign progressed with the Chungking forces routed in var-
ious sectons of China, clashes between Chungking and Communist forces were
reported by Kuomintang, Chinese Communist, American, and Japanese sources
to have taken place in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Chekiang, and
Kwangtung, with the Communists extending their areas of control into Chungking
Government areas. According to Japanese sources the Communists have success-
fully penetrated into Western Kwangtung. A Tokyo broadcast of 19 February
1945 states that "the Chungking troops [in the area southwest of Canton] are
being gradually and steadily pressed by 5,000 Yenan troops and the armed
populace is aligning with the, Yenan regime."
In October 1944 Mao-Tse-tung told an American observer in Yenan that the
Communists would "recover any territory lost by the Kuomintang," and that
Communist forces had already moved into East Honan from both North and
South. He intimated that the Communists would also go into Southeast China
if Kuomintang control there "disintegrated." But he insisted, said the American
observer, that "the Communists will not compete with the Kuomintang for terri-
tory which it still holds, and while they recognize the Japanese crushing of the
Kuomintang may mean eventual advantage, the Communists realize that this
will be outweighed by immediate disadvantages to the Allied war against Japan."
The foregoing outline of the Kuomintang-Communist fighting shows how little
truth there was in this statement by Mao Tse-tung. In Honan the Communists
have undoubtedly occupied some areas evacuated by the Chungking forces after
their crushing defeat in 1944, but even here they have clashed with Chungking
troops trying to maintain their remaining areas of control. In Anhwei, Chekiang.
Hupeh, and Kwangtung the inter-party fighting during 1944 and thus far in 1945
did not take place in areas where the control of the Chungking Government had
"disintegrated" in the sense Mao Tse-ung implied, for had this been the case
there would obviously have been no fighting.
The foregoing examples have not been quoted in order to belittle the value of
the contribution of the Chinese Communists to the war against Japan, nor to
create the impression that the virtual truce which has existed on several Com-
munist-Japanese front sectors indicates that the Communists have shown any
willingness to surrender or to stop fighting the Japanese. As the succeeding
section of this study will show, there was considerable fighting between Commu-
nist and Japanese forces all through 1944. although it was not in any respect
comparable to the great battles between Chungking Government and Japanese
forces. (Section 2. (4) )
Nevertheless, all evidence leads to the conclusion that while the Communists
have been on the defensive against the Japanese, they have been on the offensive
against the Chungking Government. Their refusal to accept any demarcation of
Chungking Government and Communist defense areas, and their policy of moving
into Chungking Government defense areas whenever they feel that they are
strong enough to drive out the Chungking forces, is largely responsible for divert-
ing the Chungking Government's attention from the war against Japan and for
the confusion created by the constant inter-party fighting.
Careful and dispassionate examination of the record shows that statements to
the ccmtrary notwithstanding, the behavior of the Kuomintang toward the Com-
munists has been more moderate than that of the Communists toward the Kuo-
mintang. Several times during the war the Kuomintang has considered invading
Communist defense areas in the same way that the Communists have actually
invaded several Kuomintang defense areas. Some observers have maintained
that the Kuomintang could have defeated the Communists. In October 194.3,
during a serious inter-party crisis, the American Military Attach^ in China
reported : "In point of fact, the Communists could be crushed by force of arms.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2363
They have not had any equipment from the Central Government for four years.
They have not had any pay for three." Nevertheless, no general Kuommtang
offensive against the Communist areas has been launched ; each crisis has been
resolved through the moderating influence of the Generalissimo and others affil-
iated with Chungking, who have maintained that a civil war must be avoided
at least until the end of the war against Japan. That the Kuomintang has proved
more sensitive than the Communists to this latter consideration does not neces-
sarily prove greater virtue on the part of the Kuomintang, nor less on the part
of the Communists. Certainly a powerful factor in the situation has been the
attitude of the United States, which has been the chief source of vital supplies
to China Both the United States Government and the press have made it very
clear to the Kuomintang that a military liquidation of the Communists, during
the war with Japan, would be frowned upon by American opinion. It does not
appear, on the other hand, that the Communists have had to fear similar dis-
approval of their activities in extending their areas at the expense of the
Kuomintang.
The record indicates that neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang have
expended their main efforts against the Japanese, except as both have been com-
pelled to defend themselves. Both have done everything they could to prepare
to maintain their own positions after the war. The evidence substantiates the
statement made by Congressman Mansfield in his report to the Congress in
January this year, after his return from his Mission to China: "On the basis
of information which I have been able to gather, it appears to me that both the
Communists and the Kuomintang are more interested ^ in preserving their
respective parties at the present time, and have been for the past two years, than
they are in carrying on the war against Japan. Each party is more interested
in its own status because both feel that America will guarantee victory."
(4) The Chinese Communists' toar against Japan
In August 1943 General Hata, at that time C-in-C of the Japanese Expedi-
tionary Forces in China, said during a press interview in Nanliing that in North
China,"^ "the Communist bandits . . . are the chief disturbing factors endanger-
ing peace and order. They are not only handicapping the administrative pro-
gress but also undermining the work of reconstruction of a New China.
Furthermore, under the pretext of offering resistence, the Communists are
actually bent upon expanding their influence for selfish purposes. In the paci-
fication of North China, suppression of the Communists is a matteer which should
not be overlooked." In October 1943 a Tokyo broadcast to the home audience
reported on fighting in Western Hopeh Province and the T'ai-heng Mountains
of Southeastern Shansi Province. After repeating the usual claims of "destruc-
tion"' of Communist bases, the Japanese announcer added the following unusual
admission : "The work of detecting the fleeing enemy forces is not an easy matter
even with the aid of the air units who report to us the positions of the enemy . . .
Therefore, our forces are able to seek out only a small number at a time, and
then pursue them. The hardships that our imperial forces are facing today may
be well imagined."
To those who have followed the .Tapanese war communiques since the begin-
ning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the frequent mention of battles with
"bandits," "mopping up operations," and "pacification campaigns" in North
China is strong testimony to the resistance offered by the Chinese Communists.
This is confirmed by neutral observers, primarily by American and British mis-
sionaries, repatriated in 1943, who have lived in Japanese-occupied cities and
towns and have had ample opportunities to witness the struggle between the
Communist guerrilla forces ^" and the Japanese Imperial Army.
This does not mean that the resistance of the Communists has been strong in
terms of military power, but rather in terms of political-economic subversive
activities against the Japanese. The following statements are typical of the eye-
witness accounts of the repatriated missionaries, which give a picture of the
pattern of Communist guerrilla warfare. In regard to the border area between
Shantung and Hopeh Provinces one Catholic priest stated : the Eighth Route Army
forces "move from place to place constantly to elude Japanese watchfulness.
Their influence is enough to cause constant worry to the Japanese, although
their effectiveness remains small because they lack the necessary heavy arms . . .
'"The Communists make a clear distinction between their regular army (EiRhtli Route
and New Fourth armies), the fruerrillas. and local militia. For convenience sake they are
all referred to in this section as "guerrilla forces" since the methods of fighting of each
group follow the pattern of guerrilla warfare.
2364 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Their hatred of the Japanese is real, and in equal combat they put up a good
show. They specialize and excel in guerrilla fighting." Another Catholic priest
from Shantung stated in regard to the Eighth Route Army forces in that
province : "As soldiers they are not much, because their equipment is inferior to
the Japanese. In one skirmish that I witnessed in November 1942, though the
Communists outnumbered the Chinese puppet troops 4-1, the Communists fled
without firing a shot. But their nuisance value is considerable, since the Japa-
nese must constantly maintain garrisons in the region."
A Protestant missionary from Shantung reported : Formerly "I just thought
of them [the Communists] only as a menace but their eifectiveness [in Shan-
tung] is now [1943] an established fact. They are fighting the Japanese and
spreading their doctrine. I do not know about their numbers but they must be
numerous because when the Japanese start one of their expeditions to 'mop up
bandits,' they have to collect from 400 to 500 soldiers before they start out. The
country people suffer most from these excursions because when the Japanese
appear in force, the Communists simply melt away to reappear when the danger
is past. Consequently the Japanese take it out on the village people. The
'Eighth Route' Army (Communists) are well disciplined and, where they have
control, the common people enjoy a measure of security and of freedom from
exhorbitant taxes . . . Where the Japanese are in control the taxes are lowest
but personal security and freedom are much less. Their [the Communists']
propaganda is strong and is definitely Communistic when not forced by circum-
stances to be anti-Japanese."
A Protestant missionary from Anhwei stated : "The Chinese 'New Fourth
Army' is active very near Su-hsien [in North Anhwei on the Tientsin-Pukow
Railroad]. They carry on guerrilla activities and prey upon the Chinese people
a great deal, taxation, etc. Every so often there are battles fought, but nothing
is very effective. Near to the area strictly occupied by the Japanese (along
Railroad, main motor roads, and principal cities) so many of the activities are
just ordinary banditry and the well controlled groups are farther away." In
regard to New Fourth Army activities in the Hankow area in Hupeh Province
one Missionary from Han-yang, opposite Hankow, reported : "They [the Com-
munists] are reported to have fought with the Japanese and even the regular 128th
Chungking division in order to [obtain] local supremacy. [Their] spying system
is very good. Sabotage — attacking Japanese shipping on the [Yangtze] River.
This is not very helpful, for a shot will be fired and then they will run and the
Japanese will take the particular village." A missionary physician from Ningpo
reported: "A small group (1,000 perhaps) New Fourth Army Communists
appeared in April [1943] in a sector of no-man's-land which lies between Shao
hsing and Ningpo [in Chekiang Province] . . . They carried out the typical
program of robbing the well-to-do and befriending the poor. They were to all
reports not short of weapons or funds."
These statements which are confirmed by many other sources show that the
policy of the Communists toward the Japanese is chiefly centered on winning the
confidence of the people, "befriending the poor," and in this way extend their
political-economic control in areas adjacent to Japanese-occupied zones.
Through this policy, which was probably the only one possible in view of their
poor arms and consequent inability to attack the Japanese and defeat them by
military force, they have prevented the Japanese from deriving adequate econ-
omic benefits from their military conquests. Since both, the Japanese-occupied
zones and adjacent areas were originally under control of the National Govern-
ment (Chungking), this policy of the Chinese Communists has inevitably in-
volved alienation of the loyalty of the people from Chungking, as the initial step
in establishing their anti-Japanese base areas. It led, as we have seen, to fighting
between Chungking Government and Communist forces as well as between these
forces and the Japanese. But whether the fighting represented the internal
inter-party war in China or the Chinese war against Japan, the net result as far
as the Japanese were concerned was that they never succeeded in consolidating
their power.
It should be emphasized that the Communists were by no means the only ones
who organized and maintained resistance in guerrilla areas. The Japanese have
frequently, as late as 1944, mentioned Chungking guerrilla forces as fighting
against them in Shantung, Shansi, and Hopeh, the three most important guer-
rilla areas of the Chinese Communists. And foreign missionaries repatriated
in 1943, who reported on conditions in these three provinces during 1941, 1942,
and part of 1948, were often unable to specify whether guerrilla operations in
the areas in which they had lived were led by Chungking or Communist forces.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2365
However, during the inter-party war that went on in guerrilla areas the Chung-
king forces in North China gradually lost out against the Communists. As from
the end of 1943 the Communist forces were in unquestioned control of the Chinese
resistance movement in North and Southeast Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, and
Kiangsu, although a few Chungking guerrilla forces w^re (and still are) operat-
ing in these provinces. In several other areas both Chungking and Communist
troops are leading the resistance movement against the Japanese, each group
within its own areas of political-military control.
The Communists' resistance has been strongest in North China since they
possess their largest bases here. It has been comparatively weaker in the Central
China areas controlled by the New Fourth Army, partly because the New Fourth,
is weaker than the Eighth Route Army, partly because it has had far more
trouble than the Eighth Route Army in North China in establishing and consoli-
dating its base areas. The Chungking armies are stronger in Central than in
North China, and therefore have been able to put up a more determined resistance
against the New Fourth Army's attempts to secure bases than could the provincial
forces in North China against the Eighth Route Army.
During the first three years of the war the Japanese employed, against the
Communists in North China, tactics somewhat similar to those which Chiang
Kai-shek had used against them in Kiangsi during his first four "Extermination
Campaigns," 1931-1933. They launched out from their bases along the railways
in several directions, trying to occupy as many places as possible in the guerrilla
base areas. From these they made strong local encirclements against the scat-
tered Communist forces.
But the latter avoided pitched battles with the Japanese. They developed an
excellent intelligence system through the local militia forces and the Village
Mobilization Committees. They also developed a telephone system for rapid
transmission of information about the movement of Japanese troops. The wires
were stolen from Japanese lines. The telephones were taken during raids on
small Japanese positions or bought in the large port cities and smuggled out to
the guerrillas. Eight months after the outbreak of war the Communists claimed
that they possessed a telephone system with 2660 miles of wires and over 600
offices in Hopeh, in addition to 10 radio stations. The rural areas became honey-
combed with Communist spies and observation posts. Simple looking farmers
working in the fields or bringing food to the Japanese-occupied towns watched
the concentrations and movements of the Japanese forces and transmitted their
information to the guerrilla headquarters from hidden telephone posts in the
fields and in the villages.
Communist intelligence agents also infiltrated into the cities, many of them
obtaining employment by the Japanese as puppet officials, soldiers, police agents,
servants, and laborers. The Communist secret service organization was de-
veloped by Hsieh K'ang-chih (Chao Jung, Kang Sang), who is variously men-
tioned as chief of the Central Political Protection Bureau of the CCP, head of
the Central Social Affairs Department of the CCP and concurrently director
of the Intelligence Department. Available reports confirm that the Communist
secret service organization is at present one of the best organized and efficient
in China with secret centers in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, and in
many of the cities and towns in rural areas of East China. Part of its work
consists of gathering intelligence, and part of organizing subversive activities
against the Japanese.
Through their well developed underground system, the Communists were
able to avoid encounters with superior Japanese forces. They attacked their
supply columns, severed their communication lines, and raided small isolated
Japanese outposts. They attacked only when assured that they commanded
superior strength. Like a blind colossus the Japanese army struck out in all
directions fumbling for its opponent but seldom finding him. After the Chinese
Government and provincial forces in North China were defeated in large-scale
battles against fortified points and along front-lines, the war deteriorated, for
the Japanese strategists and tacticians, into an undignified game of "hide and
seek."
The realization that the Communists were turning the war into a people's
war induced the Japanese to turn their armed might against the people. They
adopted a policy of trying to make guerrilla areas uninhabitable. They burnt
houses, carried off or destroyed the crops. Men, women, and children were
killed in droves. Thousands were drafted as laborers and sent to Manchuria.
By the end of 1939 the Japanese held most of the hsien cities in North China
2366 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and motor roads connecting them. But they still could not prevent the move-
ment of the Chinese forces. The Communists had even managed to infiltrate
into areas north of Peiping, whence they moved into the wild mountain region
of Southern .Tehol. There they began to establish their first base area in
"Manchukuo."
Lt. General Tada was C-in-O of the Japanese North China Expeditionary
Forces at this time. In 1940 he developed the so-called "cage policy," or "fortress
tactics." Deep and wide ditches or moats were dug and high walls built along
the sides of the railways and highways in Central and Southern Hopeh in order
to protect them from attacks and, more important, to blockade and to break up
the Communist base areas. At the same time hundreds of miles of new roads
with protecting ditches were built with the object of cutting up the guerrilla
bases into small pieces which would then be destroyed one by one. The number
of blockhouses along the railways and roads, manned by Japanese soldiers, was
greatly increased.
This policy was an adaptation of Chiane Kai-shek's successful "fortress-block-
house policy" used against the Communists in Kiangsi in 1934; Chiang had
renewed this policy in the summer of 19.39, although this time as a means of
defense against and segregation of the Commtinists, in the military blockade of
the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. The Eighth Route Army clearly saw the
danger of Tada's new tactics. On 20 August 1940 it launched the so-called
"lOO-regiment offensive" in Hopeh and Shansi which lasted for three months.
According to the Communists considerable damage was done to Japanese trans-
portation and communication lines and to several coal mines near the railroads,
Including the important Ching-hsing coal mine on the Cheng-Tai Railroad in
Shansi. The Communists claimed that over 20,000 Japanese were killed, over
5,000 puppet troops were killed and wounded, 281 Japanese oflBcers and soldiers
were captured, and some 18,000 puppet soldiers were captured. 2,993 Japanese
forts and blockhouses were destroyed. Large quantities of arms and ammuni-
tion were captured.
This was probably the largest Communist campaign of the war. It was suc-
cessful in that the Japanese had to go on the defensive temporarily. They were
also forced to strengthen the defense of their transportation lines and to con-
centrate more troops in North China. But the offensive had been costly to the
Communists both in ammunition and in casualties. They were unable to keep it
up without supplies.
General Tada supplemented the "fortress tactics" with what the Communists
called the "butcher knife tactics," which involved concentration of an over-
whelming force in a sudden attack upon strongholds or important centers in
Communist base areas. These attacks developed into virtual scorched earth
campaigns when tens of thousands of the civilian population were killed and
thousands of villages leveled to the ground. Foreign neutral travellers in the
guerrilla areas in 1942 reported that it was rare to see a village in Hopeh and
Shansi which had not been at least partially destroyed. Some areas in North-
west Shansi had been completely depopulated. In the districts west of Peiping
it was estimated that two-thirds of all the houses had been destroyed.
With their base areas on the plain of Central Hopeh chipped into small seg-
ments by the Japanese fortified roads, rapid escape from areas threatened by
superior .Japanese raiding columns became increasingly difficult for the Commu-
nist forces. They suffered several defeats. Tada was replaced by General
Okamura in the summer of 1941. He strengthened the "fortress tactics" by
digcing more ditches, walls, and blockhouses, and by extendinsr the network of
fortified roads in Hopeh, Shansi, and Shantung. At the end of 1942 the Eighth
Route Ai'my estimated that the Japanese had built 9,600 miles of walls and
ditches throughout North China, 29.846 blockhouses, and 9,243 forts or strong-
holds. In the fall of 1941 General Okamura directed an army of more than
100,000 men, according to Communist statements, in an attack upon the Shansi-
Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. In May 1942 he launched other offensives against
the Communist guerrilla bases in the T'ai-heng Mountain region of Southeastern
Shansi. During the latter part of 1942 similar campaigns were undertaken
against Communist base areas in Southern Shantung. The Communists re-
ferred to these campaigns as General Okamura's "triple" or "three-all policy,"
that is kill all, burn all, and loot all. These campaigns achieved a measure of
success. The Communists lost ground during 1941 and 1942 in both Hopeh and
Shansi. But the Japanese campaigns were by no means conclusive. They
aggravated the people's hatred of them and drove them into the arms of the
Communists, who combined th^ir efforts in fighting the Japanese with attempts
to help the peasants in rehabilitating their devastated land.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2367
The Communists had also been able to compensate for their losses of areas
to the Japanese in Hopeh and Shansi by expansion into areas controlled by the
Chunskins Government. During the summer of 1941 they also began to expand
into rural districts of Eastern Hopeh. There they laid the foundation for their
political organization of the areas east of Peiping and Tientsin, preparatory to
using this important area for guerrilla attacks against the Tientsin-Mukden
Railway and for further penetration of Communist forces into "Manchukuo."
The Communists' answer to the Japanese "fortress policy" and their annihila-
tion campaigns was the employment of land mines, which became one of their
chief weapons. Every trail in the mountains was mined. Before the villasers
fled into thq fields or to the hills at the approach of Japanese raiding columns
they mined the approaches to their village and placed "booby traps" in their
homes, streets, wells, and courtyards. This caused a large number of casualties
among the Japanese. In Central Hopeh they developed a new technique of un-
derground fighting. The villagers built underground shelters where they could
hide from the Japanese. Later these underground shelters were joined up by
tunnels inside the village, and finally tunnels were built to connect several
villages. These tunnels made it possible for the villagers and the guerrillas to
escape from Japanese encirclements, and they enabled the guerrilla forces to
cross underneath the fortified roads and railways and to attack the Japanese
in villages which they believed to be deserted. The approaches to the tunnels
were protected by land mines and "booby traps" which made the Japanese very
unwilling to go near them. These tunnels played an important part in the
Communist defense system during the campaigns in 1940 and 1941. Their
usefulness became limited when the Japanese, according to Communist reports,
started using poison gas. The anti-gas curtains which the villagers hung up at
the entrances of the tunnels were not always effective.
Nevertheless, the Communists claim that their new technique placed the Japa-
nese more and more on the defensive in the course of 1943. The Communists
maintain that it became increasingly difficult for the Japanese to hold their
widely-scattered hsien cities and to maintain the vast system of fortified roads.
According to estimates published by the Eighth Route Army 10% Japanese divi-
sions were tied down in opposing the Communists in North China during 1942,
in addition to 3 Japanese divisions engaged by the New Fourth Army in Central
China. These made up 44 percent of the total of Japanese troops in China.
This explanation does not, however, seem wholly satisfactory. It fits part of
the picture, but not all. It is questionable if the Communists actually "tied
down" 13% (and later more) Japanese divisions in China. Several observers
have contended with a great deal of justification that the Japanese used China,
and North China in particular (since they controlled larger areas in North
China than elsewhere in China), as a proving ground for their troops. The
numerous "annihilation campaigns" against both the Communists and Chungking
Government forces were probably designed as much for the purpose of providing
training for the Japanese troops as for defeating the Chinese. China, after all,
was only a stepping stone for further Japanese conquests. The army that fought
and conquered in China was designed for even greater conquests in other coun-
tries. The limited resistance offered by the Chinese provided an atmosphere of
real war. The Japanese suffered casualties, but probably not so many as to
render the annihilation campaigns truly costly to them. Because the Communist
troops usually retreated before the Japanese few actual battles were fought
during these campaigns. It was not the Communist armies that suffered so much
as the people who were left a prey to Japanese vengeance. The Chungking armies
when faced with these Japanese annihilation campaigns usually tried to defend
their cities and areas. And as a result the Chungking armies also suffered far
greater casualties than the Communist armies.
Many of the Japanese troops that have fought the Americans in the Pacific have
had years of training in China. And as experienced Japanese troops have been
shifted from China to the Pacific fronts, they have been replaced in great part
with new Japanese recruits for training in China. Many foreign military ob-
serves came to view these Japanese annihilation campaigns in China as train-
ing campaigns without any other significance except possibly to loot and bring
in grain for the Japanese Army. They were usually marked by a Japanese ad-
vance into the Chinese bases, destruction of these bases and the crops in rural
areas, followed by a retreat to the original Japanese starting point. The pat-
tern had been repeated so many times that some military observers failed for a
long time to recognize the Japanese offensive against Chungking Government
forces in 1944 as anything else than one of the "usual" training campaigns.
2368 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
There were several indications that the Japanese defensive policy against
the Communists which began in 1943 was induced by many other factors of
greater importance than the one mentioned by the Communists, namely, the
effectiveness of their new technique for fighting the Japanese. With the estab-
lishment of American air bases in China, Japanese military operations became
increasingly centered on Chungking Government rather than Communist areas
of control. Beginning with the Japanese spring offensive in 1942, following
Lt. General (then Col.) J. H. Doolittle's raid on Tokyo, which had as one of its
objects the destruction of Chinese- American air bases in Chekiang, the Japanese
resumed, for the first time since 1939, offensive operations against Chungking
with intent of conquering additional areas. In Communist areas the Japanese
"training campaigns" continued through 1943 and 1944, although on a consider-
ably smaller scale than before. But their campaigns in Chungking Government
controlled areas assumed an increasingly serious nature far beyond the scope of
mere "training" of troops.
Probably the most important factor in forcing the Japanese to reconsider
their policy of large-scale annihilation campaigns into Communist areas was that
the wholesale destruction of property and the mass slaughter of the people made it
impossible for them to exploit the country adequately. They derived no more
economic benefit than did the Communists from areas which had been laid waste.
The Communists concentrated their efforts on fighting the Japanese in the
guerrilla areas, the "no-man's land," between the Communist, Chung-king Gov-
erment, and Japanese bases in which all three groups compete for control. It
was therefore the guerrilla areas that suffered the greatest destruction. And
since these were nearest the Japanese zones they were also the areas in which
the Japanese were most interested, the pacification of which would have yielded
them the greatest economic benefits.
There is no space here to go into the details of the economic problems that
the destruction in the guerrilla areas caused to the Japanese. It reduced food
production in North China considerably. The effect of this had not been felt so
much by the Japanese and the people in their occupied areas so long as Australian
and Canadian wheat could be imported. But from the end of 1942 when imported
food supplies had been exhausted, the question of food control and production
became one of the main problems of the Japanese and their puppet officials in
China. The devastation in guerrilla areas also created a serious labor shortage
for the Japanese in China and Manchuria. The question of filling the quota
of labor for Manchuria, which before the war always came from North China,
became increasingly difficult. During 1943 the labor emigration to Manchuri«
seems to have created such a manpower shortage in North China that it led
to an actual clash between the puppet authorities in North China, trying to
decrease the emigration, and the Japanese authorities trying to fill their Man-
churian labor quota.
The North China Political Council announced during March 1943 that "in view
of the increase in the number of laborers going to Manchuria, it would restrict
the outflow ... in order to insure . . . the agricultural production in North
China." According to a Japanese statement, the emigration in 1942 from China
to Manchuria was 1,086,000. This was 3 million below the number desired by the
Japanese. In spite of strenuous efforts by Japanese labor recruitment agencies
in North China and by the Japanese army the emigration during 1943 was con-
siderably less than 1,000,000, probably less than 800,000. Even so many of the
emigrants in 1942 and 1943 had been forcibly recruited from Central China.
Central China had never before contributed to the Manchurian labor needs.
The emigration to Manchuria increased the acuteness of the labor shortage in
Japanese-controlled areas of North China, where the demand for manpower be-
came far above normal. There develoi)ed a shortage of farm labor because of the
conscription of Chinese peasants for the puppet armies and for the construc-
tion of roads, defense walls, moats, fortifications, and other military works.
Because of this there was also an industrial manpower shortage. In the end
it became necessary to send laborers from Central China to North China and
Inner Mongolia to fill the labor demands in those regions. And in order to
relieve the food shortage in Japanese-occupied areas in North China food was
imported from Central China.
Both the food and manpower shortages derived in great part from the com-
parative smallness of the Japanese-occupied areas. It is estimated that at
the end of 1943 the total area of "Occupied" China proper, that is the areas be-
hind the most advanced Japanese positions, was roughly 345,000 square miles.
Out of this the Japanese controlled about 82,000 square miles. The guerrilla
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2369
areas ("no-man's-land") comprised about 67,000 square miles. The Com-
munists controlled, roughly, 155,000 square miles (of which 110,000 square miles
were in North China proper) comprising mostly thinly populated mountain
regions. The balance, 41,000 square miles, represented Chungking-controlled
areas. The Japanese-occupied and the guerrilla areas are the most fertile
areas in China.
At the end of 1943 the total population of Occupied China was about 183,000,-
000 people. Of these about 70,000,000 lived in Japanese-occupied areas, and
some 43,000,000 in guerrilla areas. About 54,000,000 lived in the Communist-
controlled base areas, of which about 28,000,000 lived in North China. About
16,000,000 lived in Chungking-controlled areas.
These figures explain many of the difficulties vnth which the Japanese were
(and still are) confronted in China. In 1943, with control over a population
of only about 70,000,000 people in China proper, the Japanese had available as
actual manpower only some 26,000,000 people. The difficulties the Japanese
have had in supplying "Manchukuo" with one million immigrant laborers per
year becomes apparent when it is realized that they have had to be recruited,
chiefly, from Japanese-controlled areas. For example, the total population of
Hopeh and Shantvmg, the two provinces from which most of the immigrants
to "Manchukuo" have usually come, is about 70 million, of which, however,
no more than about 27 million people have lived within Japanese-controlled
areas. This represents a manpower capacity of barely 10 million employable
people available to the Japanese in these two provinces.
The population and size of the different areas mentioned above varied con-
stantly, of course, with the shifting fortunes of war. At all times the Japanese
were able to supplement the resources of food, raw materials, and manpower In
their occupied areas by drawing partially upon the food resources and man-
power in the guerrilla areas, or no-man's-land.^ But since the Japanese, Com-
munist, and Chungking Government forces were all competing with each other
for control over no-man's-land, the Japanese could never derive adequate bene-
fits from these areas.
The outbreak of war with the United States made Japan more dependent
than before upon the resources of China, especially after 1942 when American
sinkings of Japanese ships began to reduce Japan's ability to exploit the South-
east Asia countries. In trying to find a solution for their problems in China
the Japanese recognized that their annihilation campaigns had failed to crush
the resistance of the Communists and the Chungking Government. Since the
military campaigns had failed in their objectives, the Japanese decided to try
diplomacy. The first announcement of the "New China Policy," or as it has
also been called Japan's "appeasement policy" toward China, was made in
November 1942 by Mamoru Shigemitsu, at that time Japanese Ambassador to
the Chinese puppet government in Nanking. The chief objective of this policy
was to establish better cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese in
Japanese-occupied areas of China so as to maintain and possibly increase the
production of food and industrial raw materials.
At the beginning of 1943 the Nanking puppet government was reorganized.
Three new Ministries were created, those of Social Affairs, Food Supply, and
Construction. In addition several economic control agencies for food, labor,
commerce, and industry had been established during 1942. Many more were
created during 1943. This emphasis on economic and social control showed
not only where the Japanese and the puppets faced their greatest difficulties,
but also, of course, in what fields of activity they intended to exert special
efforts at rehabilitation. On 1 January 1943 the Nanking government inaugu-
rated the "New Citizen Movement" (Hsin Kuo Min) which was to be co-
ordinated with the "Rural Pacification Movement" which had been inaugurated
in May 1942. The task of these two movements was to increase agricultural
production, to exercise thought control, to promote the cooperative movement
among the peasants and to organize student and youth organizations.
The government reorganization in Nanking at the end of 1942 and beginning
of 1943 also involved a change of the military affairs structure in which the
puppet military leaders obtained a considerably greater influence. At the end
of January 1943 the Nanking government promulgated a decree by which the
provincial puppet governors and district magistrates were designated to hold
concurrent positions as commanders of the provincial and local Peace Preserva-
" The Japanese also obtained considerable amounts of food and raw materials from the
smuggling traffic with Free China.
2370 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tion Corps respectively. In the central government in Nanking the civilian
puppet leaders continued to hold the dominant power, but in the provincial gov-
ernments, the puppet miiltary leaders obtained the dominant role. This change
vpas of considerable significance. Since most of the puppet provincial governors
were military men, the combining of both political and military authority in their
hands added greatly to their prestige and power. It showed that the Japanese
were placing increasing confidence in the puppet military leaders rather than,
as before, in the civilian puppet leaders. The responsibility for garrisoning
occupied areas was more and more shifted over from Japanese to puppet troops.
This was one of the outstanding military aspects of the New China policy which
the Japanese adopted at the end of 1942. The second aspect was the shift in the
use of Japanese and puppet troops. Instead of trying to hold as many fortified
roads and towns as possible they concentrated on consolidating control in a few
key agricultural areas. These areas were called "Model Peace Zones," and
"Special Administrative Areas."
The first Model Peace Zone had been established in the summer of 1941 in
the Soochow (Wu-hsien) area between Shanghai and Nanking. During the
latter part of 1942 and 1943 Model Peace Zones were established along the
entire railway line between Nanking and Shanghai, around Hangchow in
Chekiang Province, in the Wuhan (Wuchang-Hankow) area in Hupeh, in the
Canton area in Kwangtung, in Northeastern Hunan, in the rich Huai Hai agri-
cultural area in Northeastern Kiangsu, and around Kaifeng, capital of Houan
Province. The Japanese stated in August 1944 that the combined area of these
Model Peace Zones was slightly more than 24,600 square miles, with a popula-
tion of 13,818,000 people. In North China, Special Administrative areas were
established during 1943 south of Peiping and west of Tientsin, and, in 1944, in
East Hopeh.
Within the Model Peace Zones the Japanese concentrated their military effort
on clearing out the Communists and keeping them out. As areas were "pacified"
in this manner, the administration and policing of them was turned over to the
puppet military forces. As more Model Peace Zones were established the prin-
ciple of the old strategy of breaking up Communist areas through the occupa-
tion of as many cities and towns as possible and the construction of fortified
roads between these was gradually relaxed. In the course of 1943 and 1944 the
Japanese voluntarily withdrew from hundreds of villages and abandoned many
of their blockhouses and fortresses, which were taken over by the Communists.
In some areas the Chinese Communists tried to prevent the Japanese from
consolidating their power and developing the agricultural production within
the Model Peace Zones. Their principal method was to prevent the Japanese
from maintaining their census system, which plays an important role in the en-
forcement of peace and order. In Japanese controlled areas each Chinese is
required to carry a Certificate of Residence and each household must keep hang-
ing beside the door a small wooden board listing the persons who dwell therein.
Persons without a Certificate of Residence are subject to execution as spies or
bandits. Any household that fails to give the Japanese police an adequate
explanation for an increase or decrease in the houseliold faces drastic punish-
ment. On some occasions the Communists on arriving at a village confiscate and
destroy all Residence Certificates and household census boards. Villages so
treated by the Communists tend to be forced into opposition to the Japanese.
The young men are then recruited by the Communist army. Food supplies are
taken by the Communists to prevent them falling into the hands of the Japanese.
The Communists thereafter afford these villages such protection as tliey are
able to give.
There are, however, indications that the Communists have abstained from
violence in many of the Model Peace Zones. One report from Kwangtung Pro-
vince, in February 1944, emphasized that the Communists did not constitute much
danger to the Japanese "since the policy of the Reds is undoubtedly to con-
centrate on strengthening their own position and avoid direct action . . . with
Japanese." Another report from 1943 concerning Central China emphasizes that
the Communist gueri-illas were welcomed by the country people in so far as
was "consistent with safety whei'ever they go. And in view of the fact that
Japanese reprisals are usually collective, the guerrillas keep this in mind in their
activities and keep as far away as possible from villages" in Japanese-controlled
areas.
This statement and similar ones suggest strongly that the Communists had
learned, from their experiences in the late 1920's, the danger of needlessly
causing bloodshed. Their policy at that time of encouraging and organizing
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2371
strikes among the workers in the large cities under Kuomlntang control had
caused massacres of thousands of these workers by Kuomintang troops and
police. The result was not only that the Communist labor movement in the
cities was crushed, but that the city workers came to fear the Communists.
The Japanese policy toward the villagers in areas under their control w^as
similar to that of the Kuomlntang in the 1920's and early '30's toward the
workers. The Communists, therefore, avoided inciting the Japanese needlessly
into reprisals against the population in their areas of control.
A factor which undoubtedly favored the Japanese, after 1943, in consolidating
their power in the Model Peace Zones and Special Administrative Areas was
the increased attention which the Communists devoted, particularly in the
New Fourth Army areas, to fighting Chungking Government troops. As we
have seen, it was also during this time that the Commxmists began to compete
with the Chungking Government in winning the friendship of the puppet troops.
A virtual truce existed between the Communists and the puppet forces in some
of the front sectors, particularly in Kiangsu and Anhwei. This undoubtedly
favored the Japanese, and in September 1943 they turned over most of their
defense sectors in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang to the puppet forces.
The new strategy of the Japanese was partially successful. The size of their
areas of control within the Communist defense zones in Central and North
China decreased, but conditions within these areas, especially within the Model
Peace Zones, in Central China, became more ordei'ly than before. The added
attention given to agrarian improvements within these Model Peace Zones also
led to an increase of production. A German source stated that, in 1942, 24
million piculs (1.320,000 short tons) of rice and 600,000 piculs (33,000 short
tons) of cotton were harvested in the Model Peace Zones, which meant an in-
crease of no less than 30 percent over the previous year. The German source
stated that "the increase of production strengthens the Model [Peace] Zones
in their self-sufficiency with regard to food, and also facilitates the food supply
for the larger cities, especially Nanking and Shanghai." In 1943 the harvest
was especially good in China, and the food production in Japanese areas of
China were estimated to be about 30 percent greater than in 1942. Since the
Japanese no longer pursued their annihilation campaigns as vigorously as be-
fore, there seems also to have been a greater degree of order in the guerrilla
areas between Communist and Japanese base regions, especially in Central
China. And it is probable that this enabled the Japanese to derive somewhat
greater profit from the agricultural production in the guerrilla areas.
On the other hand, these improvements were offset by several other factors
beyond the control of the Japanese. The most important factor was the de-
creasing confidence in a Japanese victory of the Chinese population in Japanese-
occupied areas. This made the people highly distrustful of the value of the
currency of the puppet regimes which was backed chiefly by Japanese bayonets.
And this in turn led people to prefer exchanging their currency holdings into
commodities. Hoarding of food and other commodities became even more
prevalent in Japanese occupied areas than in Chungking Government areas.
From 1943 on the currency inflation in Japanese occupied areas began to rival
that in Chungking areas. Hoarding and inflation became important factors
in preventing a normal development of trade, and made it increasingly difficult
for the Japanese to finance their vast military and civilian undertakings in
China. The inflation reached an acute stage during 1944 ; since that time it
has been considerably worse than in Chungking areas.
Another important factor offsetting the advantages derived from increased
agricultural production in the Model Peace Zones was the deterioration of the
rolling stock on Japanese railways, which greatly hampered the movement of
goods. Contributing factors were guerrilla activities against the railways, par-
ticularly in North China, and American bombings of Japanese railway bridges.
American air attacks against Japanese shipping on the Yangtze and along the
China coast further diminished the flow of Japanese inter-provincial traffic in
China. As a result serious food shortages developed in the large cities in the
occupied areas which are tlie centers of .Japanese military and political control.
The withdrawal of Japanese forces from several fortified points led to a con-
siderable increase of Communist areas in 1943 and especially in 1944. The
Yenan radio announced in November 1944 that the Eighth Route Army had in
1944 "liberated" in Shantung eight county towns {hsien capitals), and an area
of 11,100 square miles with a population of .5,000,000 people. Another an-
nouncement by the Yenen radio stated that nearly half of the population and
territory of Shantung was still in Japanese hands, and that the Japanese were
2372 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
holding the important communication lines and economic centers of the province.
During 1944 the Eightli Route Army also began to use its growing strength in
Shantung to attack the Japanese at several points. Its most notable victory was
the occupation in November 1944 of Chii-hsien, an important city in Southeastern
Shantung on the road from Tsingtao to Stichow. Throughout the past two years
there has been considerable fighting in Shantung between Communist and Chinese
puppet forces. On tlie basis of Japanese and Communist reports there has been
more fighting in Shantung than in any other Communist-Japanese front sector.
Another area where the Eighth Route Army has been particularly active
against the Japanese is in Shansi Province. The Yenan radio announced in
December 1944 that between January and October the Eighth Route Army had
talien 3,060 square miles of territory with a population of 259,600. The Eighth
Route Army was also active in Shansi during 1944 in fighting Chungking Gov-
ernment forces of General Yen Hsi-shan.
Except for Northeastern Hopeh and the coastal region between Hopeh and
Shantung, no large-scale fighting took place between Japanese and Eighth Route
Army forces in this province during 1943 and 1944. Communists sources state
that in February 1944 Eighth Route Army forces occupied a "strong point" near
Hsi-feng K'ou, one of the two important passes between Hopeh and Jehol. In
the course of 1948 and 1944 the Eighth Route Army also became active in the
area northeast of Peiping and along the Hopeh section of the Japanese-held
Tientsin-Mukden Railroad. Eighth Route Army forces also extended their
operations in Chahar and Jehol during 1944 and penetrated into Liaoning
Province in Manchuria. Here, however, they met such strong resistance from
the Japanese and Manchurian puppet troops that the Communists stated in
December 1944 that "further expansion in Manchuria is not feasible at the
present time." It was reported in March 1945 that the "most important fighting"
between Japanese and Communist troops in China was in East Hopeh, South
Jehol and South Liaoning, where the Japanese had started a large-scale mopping-
up campaign in order to clear out the Communist positions. An American
observer in Yenan also reported that the Cliinese Communists "seem to expect
a strong Japanese effort to consolidate themselves in North China." The fight-
ing in Eastern Hopeh, Chahar, and Liaoning "is apparently intended to establish
a cordon sanitaire betweeen China and Manchuria and is being conducted with
unusual determination and ferocity. The Communists claim that the whole
areas are being either depopulated or made into fortified areas in which the whole
population is concentrated into garrisoned villages — as was done in parts of
Manchuria [during the 1930's]. Large-scale Communist movement southward
shows not only a growing determination [by the Communists] to control China
proper, but may also be an effort to get out from under an expected Japanese
attempt to crush Communist strength in North China."
In Central China there was sporadic fighting during 1943 and 1944 between
New Fourth Army forces and the Japanese, but most of the fighting was between
Chungking Government and New Fourth Army forces, and most of the expan-
sion of New Fourth Army influence was into base areas of the Chungking Gov-
ernment forces in Central China.
The combined effects of Communist gains against both the Japanese and
Chungking Government foi-ces in the past two years have been to instill in the
Communists a self-assurance and confidence about their future position in China
greater than at any previous time. The great defeats suffered by the Chungking
Government forces during the Japanese campaign in 1944 have opened up for the
Communists an opportunity to attempt to drive out all Chungking forces from
Eastern China. This is part of the reason why there has been more fighting
during the recent months between Communist and Chungking forces than be-
tween Communist and Japanese forces. An American observer in Yenan stated
in February 1945 that Communist leaders point out "on numerous occasions"
that Communist planning envisages the organization of Communist guerrilla
units in all areas of Eastern China "evacuated by Kuomintang forces." He also
stated that "Among the Communists there is no doubt as to their ability to repeat
in other parts of China their North China feats of popular organization. In
March 1945 General Ch'en I, Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army, stated
to an American observer in Yenan that the New Fourth Army had reached a
strength of 300,000 regulars, and can easily be expanded to 400,000. Other
Communist leaders said : "Give us a year and we will have all of East China
from the borders of Manchuria to Hainan [Island]. When that has been accom-
plished, the Communist forces will be at least as strong as those of the Central
Government, and it will be the Kuomintang which will be blockaded."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2373
The growing strength of the Chinese Communists is also reflected in their
propaganda and in their official attitude toward the Chungking Government.
They have begun to claim the role of representing the Chinese people as a whole
rather than the Communist Party. At the end of April 1945, Mao Tse-tung, in
his report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP at Yenan, referred to the Govern-
ment in Chungking as "the illegal so-called National Government without popular
support." The following passage in his report clearly expresses the conscious-
ness among the Chinese Communists of their emergence into a position of power
rivalling and possibly surpassing that of the Kuomintang: "Chinese [Communist]
liberated areas have become a democratic pattern for China, and the center of
gravity for cooperation with our Allies to drive out the Japanese aggressors and
to liberate the Chinese people. The troops in the liberated areas have expanded
to 910,000 '' and the people's volunteers to over 2,200,000. These troops have
become the main force in the war of resistance. And as soon as they receive
modern equipment they will become still more invincible and able finally to
defeat the Japanese aggressors." It was also pointed out during this Congress,
the first Communist Party Congress held since 1928, that "the power of the
Chinese Communist Party, the unity and solidarity within the Party and the
Party's prestige among the people of China, are higher than at any period in
the past."
At the beginning of May 1945 the Japanese admitted the growing power of the
Chinese Communists in the following broadcast report from Tokyo quoting an
article in MainicM SMm'bnn: "During the past two years . . . the Yenan regime
has stubbornly pushed a political offensive in Japanese occupied North China.
But in reality no military offensive of a major scale has been undertaken. How-
ever, [Yeuan's] . . . clever maneuver to win over the Chinese masses to its cause
(is) by no means slighted. Along with the expansion of its political sphere of
influence the Yenan regime strove hard to cultivate its fighting strength through
an aggressive military enlargement program, as well as a production increase
movement . . . Yenan's anti-Japanese general counter-offensive does not go be-
yond the scheme to strike the Japanese in the back in conjunction with the
heralded American landing on the China coast."
(5) International implications of the Euomintang-Conimunist struggle
(a) Attitudes of the Kuomintang toivard foreign powers. — There are strik-
ing differences in the attitudes of the Kuomintang and the CCP toward foreign
nations. The Kuomintang is a Nationalist party. The Communist Party is
international. The Kuomintang argues that Communism is a foreign doctrine
incompatible with Chinese tradition and temperament. The Communists charge
that the Kuomintang represents and is supported by the capitalist class which
exists at the expense of the masses, and therefore adheres to foreign capitalist
nations and betrays the interests of China.
In regard to the Kuomintang, there are pro and anti American leaders in the
Party, pro and anti British leaders, and pro and anti Soviet Russian leaders. But
all of them are nationalists who, in their relations with foreign countries, place
the interests of China first of all. They intensely resent foreign domination. Be-
cause Great Britain formerly represented imperialist domination in China they
accepted Soviet Russian aid, in the 1920's to drive the British out of China.
When Soviet Russia used her position in China to win a dominant position for
herself, they turned against her and reestablished friendly relations with Great
Britain. The CCP as developed by Soviet Russia had many of the features
of a puppet organization, serving the interests of Sovet Russia. The Kuomin-
tang turned against the Chinese Communists as well as against Soviet Russia.
When Japan began to invade China, the Kuomintang was willing to accept the
aid of Soviet Russia, America, and Great Britain.
The Kuomintang, of course, hailed America's entry into the war as China's
salvation. It has welcomed American aid and has accepted American advisers
to help the Government in Chungking to plan and organize Chinese resistance
against Japan, just as it once accepted Soviet Russian advisers to organize
Chinese resistance against Great Britain. But there can be little doubt that if
the leaders of the Kuomintang were ever to feel that America was trying to
dominate China, they would turn against us and would accept aid from any
foreign power, even from Soviet Russia, to combat our influence.
China under the Kuomintang is willing to cooperate with any and all foreign
powers that are willing to treat China as an equal, and willing to respect
her sovereign rights.
'^ In July 1944 the Communists claimed that their regular troops numbered 47,000.
2374 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This is why most of the Kuomintang leaders resent and fear Soviet Russia,
for in their opinion Soviet Russia has not respected Chinese sovereign rights.
She has established Soviet domination over Outer Mongolia. She exerted a
dominant intiuence in Sinkiang, and even though she withdrew her military
forces and economic interests from Sinkiang in 1943, she did not prevent Outer
Mongolia from supporting the anti-Chinese Kazak rebellion in Sinkiang, which
began in 1943 and still continues. An American observer in Lanchow, capital
of Kansu Province in the Northwest, reported that in 1942 Chinese "con-
tinually spoke of Outer Mongolia as being just as much a part of China as
IVlanchuria, and its recovei-y just as important . . . This determination to
reestablish control over Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was, they had no hesitation
in saying, the dominant reason for the great emphasis on the development of
the Northwest, particularly the Kansu Corridor which is regarded because of
its position as being of vital strategic importance."
The leaders of the Kuomintang have opposed any attempt to fetter China
to the British imperialist world system. They have opposed China's inclusion
in the Japanese imperialist system. Today they fear that it is Soviet Russia's
intention to drag China into the Communist world system under Soviet Russian
domination. And because the Chinese Communists have always been followers
and supporters of Soviet Russia, most of the Kuomintang leaders think of the
Chinese Communists as an instrument of Soviet Russian expansion into China.
The American Consul in Lanchow stated that Chinese with whom he had
travelled through Kansu in 1942 commonly spoke of Great Britain as China's
old enemy, Japan as her present enemy, and Soviet Russia as her future enemy.
The C-of-S of the Eighth War Zone, including Kansu, Ningsia, and Sinkiang,
said in 1943 that the Chinese in the Northwest are "faced on one side by Russia,
and on the other side by the [Chinese] Communists." In August 1943, just
before General Hsiung Shih-hui was appointed chief of the National Planning
Board (mainly concerned with post-war plans), he told an American official
that China's first problem after the war is over is "military security particu-
larly in the north."
Many of the most influential Kuomintang leaders have been apprehensive
about what might happen to China if Soviet Russia were to enter into the war
against Japan. American observers in China reported in August 1943, during a
crisis between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, that "reactionary
Kuomintang circles" deeply distrusted Soviet intentions and good faith, argu-
ing that the Chinese Communist problem should be resolved immediately by
the use of force. Otherwise, they feared, if Soviet Russia entered the war against
Japan, the Chinese Communists would take over North China while the Russians
were sweeping through Korea and Manchuria. The tense situation in 1943
between the Kuomintang and the Communists, arising from the heavy concen-
tration of Kuomintang troops in areas facing the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning
Border Region in Shensi, Kansu, and Ningsia, was explained by an American
agency in China as follows : "Kuomintang provincial officials in the Northwest
are strongly suspicious of Soviet Russia and fear the occupation by the Chinese
Communists of parts of Kansu and Ningsia. The Chungking Government has
concentrated its forces in the Northwest not in preparation for an attack against
the Chinese Communists, but rather because of fear that Soviet Russia and the
Chinese Communists possibly intend to establish land communications between
their areas of control."
This fear of Soviet Russia increased during 1944 and 1945 with the suc-
cessful Russian offensive into Germany and with Soviet Russia's denunciation
of the Neutrality Pact with Japan on 5 April 1945. An official American source
in Chungking reported on 15 April that "Although Chinese expressed approval
of Soviet denunciation of the Japanese pact, thei'e was also a question of when
and how Russia will enter the war. Informed Chinese hope that the United
States will be able to deal with Japan alone and are afraid that Russia will com-
plicate Kuomintang-Chinese Communist relations and the future status of Man-
churia and North China."
Most Kuomintang leaders, foremost among them the Generalissimo, maintain
their suspicious attitude toward Soviet Russia and lean heavily on American sup-
port of the Chungking Government to counteract the growing power of the Chinese
Communists and possible future Soviet domination of China. But some Kuomin-
tang leaders, among them Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan and
one of the leading spokesmen for the Chinese liberals, began in the course of
1944 to press for closer cooperation between the Chungking Government and
Soviet Russia, They argued that it was futile to ignore the fact that after the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2375
defeat of Japan. Soviet Russia will emerge as the greatest land-power of Asia,
and that it would be essential to the security of China that the Chungking Govern-
ment establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia. These Kuomintang leaders
also realize that the initial step toward winning Soviet Russia's good-will is the
establishment of friendly relations between the Kuomintang and tlie Chinese
Communists.
In April 1945 it was reported from Chungking that the "Sun Fo school of
thought" is gaining in Chungking. "Chungking believes that unity with the
[Chinese] Communists cannot be achieved unless Stalin gives the necessary
orders to the Communists. If there is danger of U. S. agreeing to some deal
with Russia on Manchuria in order to bring lier into war against Japan, China
would do better by bargaining direct with Stalin. Chang Kai-shek so far has
refused to budge from his position."
(&) Attitude of the -Chinese Comninnists toward foreign powers. — Throughout
their history the Chinese Communists have consistently followed the Soviet Rus-
sian party line. In the course of the present war they have upheld evex\v action
of the Soviet Union, even though at times it has appeared difficult to reconcile
these actions with the interests of China. But when the United States and Great
Britain have taken somewhat similar action, the Chinese Communists have never
failed to make their displeasure known. Thus they denounced the "capitalist
nations" in 1938 for shipping "great quantities of munitions and war materials"
to Japan. But they saw nothing wrong in Soviet Russia concluding a Neutrality
Pact with Japan in 1941.
When the Soviet Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was concluded in Au-
gust 1939, Mao Tse-tung said that it "strengthens the confidence of the whole of
mankind in the possibility of winning freedom." He said that the pact
"... has upset the plot of Chamberlain, Deladier and others who were
engaged in transactions for the international reactionary bourgeoisie and
who wished to provoke war between the U. S. S. R. and Germany. The Pact
w^as a hard blow to Japan [since it exix)sed the "false character" of the
Anti-Comintern bloc], helped China strengtlien the position of the supporters
of the war of emancipation and dealt a blow to Chinese capitulators . . .
"As I have already said, Chamberlain and his policy will meet with the
fate described in the proverb, 'He that mischief hatches, michief catches.'
... In order to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, both belliger-
ent sides [Germany and Great Britain who in the opinion of Mao Tse-tung
would soon start a war against eacli other] will cynically declare that they
are waging a just war, while others are waging an unjust war. But only a
non-predatory war, a liberation war is a just war.
"In the capitalist world, in addition to the above-mentioned two big groups,
there is still a third group, namely, the states of America, headed by the
United States. This group, guided by its own interests, has as yet not
entered into the conflict. It can still, together with the U. S. S. R., call for
the preservation of peace.
"American imperialists intend afterwards to appear on the scene and win
for themselves a dominant position in the capitalist world . . .
"In the sphere of Japanese foreign policy a struggle is taking place between
two groups. The fascist military clique continues to strive to seize the
whole of China and the South Seas and to squeeze Britain, America, and
France out of the East. The liberal bourgeoisie on the other hand insist
that concessions be made to the British, Americans, and French in order
[that] the Japanese may be able to concentrate their attention on the plun-
dering of China. At present time, the danger of an Anglo-Japanese agree-
ment has increased. The British reactionary bourgeoisie evidently want
to partition China, jointly with Japan, to give Japan political and economic
assistance on the condition that Japan becomes Britain's watchdog in the
East to protect its interests, to suppress the Chinese movement of national
emancipation, to launch an attack on the U. S. S. R., and to restrict Amer-
ica's influence. Hence Japan's chief aim as regards the enslavement of
China will not change . . . Britain's policy in the East is directed towards
organizing a Far Eastern Munich . . .
"As regards the U. S. S. R. we [Chinese] should strengthen our friendship
with it, in order to establish a front of unity of both great nations, to secure
still greater support . . . Relations with the United States should, generally
speaking, he the same. The most reliable friends rendering us support in
the Capitalist countries are the broad masses of the people . . ."
2376 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chungking Government at this time saw little hope that America and
Great Britain would come to the aid of China, and therefore hailed the Soviet-
German pact as a distinct blow to Japan, and conversely an aid to China. The
Kuomintang press agencies agreed with the Chinese Communists that the agree-
ment automatically broke up the anti-Comintern pact and expressed the opinion
that the Russo-German pact would allow Soviet Russia to center her attention
on Japan and devote her resources more fully to the aid of China.
This proved to be a mistaken idea. Soviet Russia did not devote her resources
"more fully to the aid of China." With the break up, in the course of 1939 and
1940, of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists,
Soviet Russia began greatly to reduce her shipments of supplies to the Chungking
Government. On 13 April 1941 Soviet Russia concluded a Neutrality Pact with
Japan.
Wang Ch'ung-hui, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, bitterly attacked
the Soviet Union. The American M/A in China reported that Government circles
in Chungking viewed the signing of the Soviet-Japanese pact with alarm. "The
worst feature, as far as the Chinese are concerned, is the possibility that the
Japanese will be able to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from Man-
churia for use in settling the China incident . . . The possible effect of the pact
on continuance of Russian aid to China has also caused some concern." Well
informed Chinese quarters in Chungking were also apprehensive that what they
called Russia's "appeasement policy" toward Japan might induce Great Britain
and the United States to follow Russia's example.
The brighter side of the picture, as far as the Chinese in Chungking were con-
cerned, was the possibility that the pact might tempt Japan, "now that the back
door in Manchuria is at least partially freed from fear of attack from Russia,"
to move into American, British, French, and Dutch areas in Southeast Asia
"without attempting a settlement of the China incident." The American M/A
reported that "recent developments have led China to believe that a move south
will bring on a war between the United States and Japan which, as far as China
is concerned, is a consummation devoutly to be wished." By signing the Neu-
trality Pact with Japan, the Kuomintang leaders believed that Soviet Russia
had acted against China, the United States and Great Britain.
The CCP, however, thoroughly subscribed to Soviet Russia's move. In a
statement issued in Chungking on 23 April, the Chinese Communists announced :
"[The Soviet-Japanese neuti'ality pact] is a great victory of the USSR's
foreign policy. The significance of this agreement lies above all in the
fact that it strengthens peace on the eastern frontiers of the USSR and
g«arantees the security of the development of socialist construction. This
kind of peace and development of the USSR is in keeping with the interests
of the working people and oppressed nations of the whole world . . .
"The Soviet-Japanese pact has not restrained the aid which the USSR
renders to independent and just resistance. If only the Chinese govex'n-
ment will not use the help of the USSR against compatriots in the country,
as for instance was the case in January of this year when the New Fourth
Army was destroyed in the southern part of Anhwei Province ... we are
deeply convinced that the USSR . . . will continue to help China . . .
"The hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests above all on
the USSR and by this treaty the USSR has not disappointed and never will
disappoint China.
"As regards the statement of the USSR and Japan about mutual non-
aggression on Manchuria and Mongolia, this measure was necessary since
so-called Manchukuo already for some time past had been used by Japan
as an instrument for attacks on the USSR and for creating disorders on the
frontier of the USSR and Outer Mongolia . . .
"Following the USSR's statement that it will not attack Manchuria, these
people [referring to Kuomintang "speculators"] began to maintain that the
USSR has acted incorrectly. Such people are to say the least, craven
tricksters ..."
What these "craven tricksters" in the Kuomintang had objected against above
everything else was Soviet Russia's pledge in a separate "Frontier Declaration"
attached to the Neutrality Pact to "respect the territorial integrity and in-
violability of Manchukuo."
After Germany's attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941 Chinese nationalist
groups viewed the new war development with some optimism from China's
standpoint as it tended to confirm their long-held belief that eventually all
major powers would be drawn into the conflict, to the benefit of China. Many
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2377
expressed the opinion that Japan would have to "honor" her alliance with the
Axis by attacking Siberia and Outer Mongolia.
The Chinese Communists adopted more or less the same attitude toward the
new world situation as Communists all over the world. Their concern was for
Soviet Russia's welfare, even to the point of making it clear that the Chinese
Communists wished that the United States and Great Britain would employ
"every means" to help "the countries lighting Germany," even if this meant
leaving China to fight on as best she could. Mao Tse-tung's statement on 10
October 1941, the thirtieth anniversary of the Chinese Revolution, is typical
of the attitude of the Communists :
"The war which will decide the fate of the human race is today being
fought ferociously on the plains of Russia between the Red Army and the
fascist hordes of Hitler. All those people who want freedom, and first and
foremost the great Chinese people, are wholeheartedly behind the Soviet
Union, behind the Soviet-British-American anti-fascist united front."
In November 1941 Mao Tse-tung stated :
"In our opinion Britain and the United States must employ every means
to help the countries fighting Germany. It is absolutly clear that the aspira-
tions of the majority of Americans and Britains coincide with our own.
The British and American people must display more energy in overcoming
diflSculties and must strengthen the world anti-fascist front."
When those statements are compared with Mao Tse-tung's statement in 1939
after the conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression pact it becomes clear
that in the opinion of the Chinese Communists whoever sides with Soviet Russia
sides with the cause of freedom.
After the entry of the United States into the war against Japan the Chinese
Communists could naturally not continue to say that the "hope of the Chinese
people for aid from abroad rests above all on the USSR." On 23 December 1941
the Central Committee of the CCP published a statement in the Hsin Hua Jih Pao
in Chungking as follows :
"The war in the Pacific, started for the purpose of aggression, is an unjust,
predatory war on the part of Japan. On the other hand from the point of
view of resistance to Japan, the United States of America and Great Britain
are waging a just war in defense of independence, freedom and democracy.
This new act of Japanese reaction is similar to the Japanese aggression pur-
sued in China for ten years, and fully coincides with the aggression of the
German and Italian fascists in Europe and against the Soviet Union.
"The world is now divided into two fronts — the Fascist Front, waging war
against aggression, and the Anti-Fascist Front, engaged in a liberation war
[sic]. China, Britain, the U. S. A. and other anti-Japanese countries must
conclude a military alliance to bring about full military cooperation. At the
same time a united front of all anti-Japanese countries and peoples in the
Pacific must be formed to continue the war against Japan to final victory.
"The Anti-Japanese National Front [in China] must be strengthened.
The people must be afforded an opportunity to participate in the anti-Japa-
nese struggle, as well as in the national reconstruction."
In the years that followed the Chinese Communists, like the Communists in all
countries, came to stress more and more the "national" character of their revolu-
tionary movements. When the Communist International was dissolved in May
1948, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the revolutionary organizational form of the
Communist International had become unsuited to the necessities of the revolu-
tionary struggle. "What is needed for the present is to strengthen the Com-
munist Parties in the various countries . . . The disbandment of the Com-
intern does not weaken the Communist Parties of the various countries but, on
the other hand, strengthens them, making them more national jind more suited
to the necessities of the war against Fascism." Mao Tse-tung stated that since
the Seventh Congress in 1935 the Communist International "has not once inter-
vened in internal questions of the Chinese Party." The Central Committee of
the CCP stated, however, that the Communist International had aided China up
until it was dissolved. "What the Chinese people can never forget is that it
helped the relization of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation with all its
possibilities in 1924 when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was alive. Thence forward it helped
the victory of the Northern Expedition. Moreover, when the Chinese Revolution
was in most difficult situation between 1927 and 1937, it again aided the Chinese
revolutionary people [the Chinese Communists]. Further on, during the six
years of anti-Japanese war since 1937, it has called upon all its sections and work-
ing people in all countries to help the Chinese to oppose the aggression war of
Japanese imDerialism."
22848— 52— pt. 7A 6
2378 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In the period following the dissolution of the Comintern, the Chinese Commu-
nists have tried to convince American observers of their friendly feelings toward
America and the importance they attach to America's role both in the war against
Japan and in the post-war rehabilitation work in China. This became the case
especially after the establishment of an American Military Observer Section in
Yenan in July 1944, which was approved by the National Government in Chung-
king. In December 1944 General Yeh Chien-ying said to an American observer
visiting Yenan that "in the past, especially during the period of civil war after
1927, the Communists' attitude toward the United States had not been particularly
favorable. However, this attitude had improved to a great extent since the out-
break of the Pacific War. General impressions of the United States were now
very good."
In January 1945 Mao Tse-tung said: "We [Chinese Communists] hope for
Allied aid but we cannot stake everything on this. We rely on our own efforts
and the creative power of the [Communist] Army and the people."
During Interviews on 1.3 March and 1 April 194.o with one of the American
observers attached to the American Military Observer Section in Yenan, Mao
Tse-tung gave a detailed outline of the policy and attitude of the Chinese Com-
munists toward the United States and the implications of American support of
the Chungking Government. He stressed five things in particular: (1) China
needs American aid both during and after the war; (2) the Chinese Communists
will extend cooperation to the United States regardless of American action; (3)
The Kuomintang cannot develop China into a stabilizing power in the Far East ;
(4) The Kuomintang is unable to maintain friendly relations with "Soviet Rus-
sia and other neighbors;" (5) the CCP represents the interests of the Chinese
people wherefore it would be to the best interest of the United States to support
the Chinese Communists ; only under Communist leadership can democracy be
established in China. The following extracts give the main points of Mao Tse-
tung's statements:
"Between the people of China and the people of the United States there
are strong ties of sympathy, understanding and mutual interests . . .
China's greatest post-war need is economic development . . . America is not
only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China :
she is also the only country fully able to participate. For all these reasons
there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunder-
standing between the Chinese people and America."
"[Chinese] Communist policy toward the United States is. and will re-
main, to seek friendly American support of democracy in China and co-
operation in fighting Japan. But regardless of American action, whether
or not they [the Communists] receive a single gun or bullet, the Communists
will continue to offer and practice cooperation in any manner possible to
them . . . The Communists will continue to seek American friendship and
understanding because it will be needed by China in the post-war period of
reconstruction."
"Whether or not America extends cooperation to the Communists is, of
course, a matter for only America to decide. But the Communists see only
advantages for the United States — in winning the war as rapidly as possible,
in helping the cause of unity and democracy in China, in promoting healthy
economic solution of the agrarian problem, and in winning the undying
friendship of the overwhelming majority of China's people, the peasants and
liberals."
"The peasants are China . . . The problems of the Chinese farmer are,
therefore, basic to China's future . . . There must be land reform. And
democracy . . ."
"The Kuctfiiintang has no contact with the agrarian masses of the popula-
tion . . . Afraid of real democracy, the Kuomintang is forced to be Fas-
cistic . . . Unwilling to solve the agrarian pi*oblem it turns toward the
principle of rigidly planned, State directed and controlled industrial de-
velopment."
"Unable, therefore, to create a solid basis for power at home or for co-
operative and amicable relations with Russia and other neighbors, it con-
centrates on 'national defense industry' and engages in the dangerous game
of power politics. The expectation of future conflicts, internal and external,
is implicit in these policies . . . Under these policies, . . . the Kuomintang
cannot solve China's basic internal problems, cannot lead the country to full
democracy, and cannot be a stabilizing power in the Far East."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2379
"The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is the party of the
Chinese peasant . . . The Communist Party will be the means of bringing
democracy and sound industrialization to China . . ."
"It is to be expected that Chiang [Kai-shek] will do everything possible to
avoid compromise in which he and the groups supporting him will have to
yield power and give up their dictatorship. But the road he is taking now
leads straight to civil war and the Kuomintang's eventual suicide . . ."
"When attacked we [Communists] will fight back. We are not afraid of
the outcome because the people are with us."
"We [Communists] are not worried about Chiang's American arms, be-
cause a conscript peasant army will not use them effectively against their
brother conscripts fighting for their homes and economic and political democ-
racy. What we are worried about is the cost to China in suffering and loss
of life . . . China needs peace. But she needs democracy more, because it
is fundamental to peace. And first she must drive out the Japanese. We
think America, too, should be concerned, because her own interests are
involved."
"America does not realize her influence in China and her ability to shape
events there. Chiang Kai-shek is dependent on American help. If he had
not had American support, he would have either collapsed before now or
been forced to change his policies in order to unify the country and gain
popular support."
"There is no such thing as America not intervening in China !"
"You are here, as China's greatest ally. The fact of your presence is
tremendous. America's intentions have been good. We recognized that when
Ambassador Hurley came to Yenan [in November 1944] and endorsed our
basic . . . points [for a settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist prob-
lem] . . . [But] we don't understand why America's policy seemed to waver
after its good start. Surely Chiang's motives and devious maneuvers are
clear. His [recent] suggestions of 'war cabinets' and 'inter-Party confer-
ences' did not solve any basic issues because they had absolutely no power :
they were far short of anything like a coalition government [which the
Communists demand]. His proposals of 'reorganizing the Communist armies'
and 'placing them under American command' were provocative attempts
to create misunderstanding between us (the Communists) and Americans.
We are glad to accept American command, as the British have in Europe.
But it must be of all Chinese armies."
Mao Tse-tung's statement that the Chinese Communists will cooperate with
America whether we support them or not may have been more diplomatic than
realistic. A former American observer in China with close contacts with Chinese
Communist leaders stated in November 1944 that the United States "is the
greatest hope and the greatest fear of the Chinese Communists," because they
recognize that if they receive American aid, even if only on equal basis with
Chiang Kai-shek, they can quickly establish control over most if not all of China.
This observer concluded that "if we continue to reject them [the Communists]
and support an unreconstructed Chiang [Kai-shek] they see us becoming their
enemy. But they would prefer to be friends."
The conclusion from this observation is that the Chinese Communists, if given
aid by the United States, will use this aid to oust the Kuomintang from power
and unify China under their control.
The result of such a development as far as America is concerned depends much
on the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Soviet Russia. A commonly
held opinion on this subject was expressed by an American repatriated in 1943
from Occupied China : "Should the Communists get the upper hand in China as
they nearly succeeded in doing in 1927 and are quite liable to do after this war
again, seeing how widespread their armies are already in China, there will be a
united front that will challenge the world, under orders from Moscow, as soon
as the Red Armies have sufficiently recovered from their losses in the present
war."
The strong attachment of the Chinese Communists to Soviet Russia is indicated
in many ways besides their approval of Soviet Russia's policy no matter which
way it swings. An American observer who visited Yenan at the end of 1944
states that there is "no doubt" that a strong sentimental attachment holds for
"Mother Russia," the home of the ideology of the Chinese Communists. "At a
recent showing of newsreels in Yenan, loud applause greeted Stalin's appearance ;
tliere was none for Roosevelt, Churchill, or Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin's speeches
receive prominent space in the newspapers." The pictures of Stalin, Lenin, and
2380 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Marx are seen on the walls of most public buildings. Occasionally the picture of
Sun Yat-sen is placed beside these Communist "saints." At times when American
visitors have been received by the Communists, the pictures of Roosevelt and
Churchill have been temporarily added to those of Stalin, Lenin, and Marx.
The Soviet Russian training and background of the Chinese Communists is
shown in such small details as the romanization used on their paper money.
They employ the Soviet Russian romanization instead of the British-American
romanization commonly used in China for Chinese characters ; thus "bank" is
written as 'Hnxanff" instead of "yin-hang."
A former American observer in China, who is convinced of the "nationalist"
spirit of the Chinese Communists, stated in November 1944 : "With all of their
strong nationalist spirit, the Chinese Communists do not seem to fear Moscow's
political dominance over them as a result of possible Russian entry into the
Pacific war and invasion of Manchuria and North China. They maintain that
the USSR has no expansionist intentions toward China. To the contrary, they
expect Outer Mongolia to be absorbed with a Chinese federation. They do not
see this or any other issue causing conflict between Russia and Chinese Com-
munist foreign policy." This same observer wrote that "Possible future Soviet
assistance to the [Chinese] Communists is a subject on which Yenan leaders are
uncommunicative. It seems obvious, however, that they would welcome such
aid for what it would mean in exterminating the Japanese and giving impetus to
Communist expansion in Central and South China."
The Chinese Communists have made great efforts to convince American ob-
servers that they have no relations with Soviet Russia. Mao Tse-tung said to the
foreign correspondents visiting Yenan in July 1944 that "There has been no
connection between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party
of the USSR, either in the past or now. There was a relationship with the Com-
munist International, but this is no longer true. There has been no connection
with the Communist Party of any other country." This rather naive statement
probably did not convince anyone.
In an analysis of this subject an American observer in Yenan contradicts
Mao Tse-tung's statement just cited. "Although it will be denied, channels do
exist and there is almost certainly some contact between the Chinese Communists
and Moscow. This is probably through Chinese Communists in Moscow and
radio at Yenan . . . What contact does exist is between the two Parties, not
Governments." This observer states that at present the Chinese Communists
in Moscow include the former Chinese representatives to the Comintern, who
have been in Russia since the beginning of the war. Among them are Li Li-san,
at one time leader of the CCP, and a certain General Chao. "These men cer-
tainly are in contact with Russian Communist leaders. Another possible channel
of contact is, of course, through the Communist representatives and the Soviet
Embassy in Chungking. This contact, however, seems to be limited to avoid
arousing Central Government suspicions." There is probably radio communica-
tion between Yenan and Moscow, and the Communist newspaper in Yenan re-
ceives its TASS news directly by monitoring Russian broadcasts. "Important
Soviet editorials are often reprinted . . . These are enough to give at least the
Party 'line.' The same can work in the reverse direction — from Yenan to Mos-
cow." He states that there is no evidence, however, that the Chinese Commu-
nists receive any supplies from Soviet Russia.
In regard to Soviet Russia Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer
in Yenan that Soviet participation either in the Far Eastern war or in China's
post-war reconstruction depends entirely on the "circumstances of the Soviet
Union." He pointed out that Russians have suffered greatly in the war and
will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding. He said that the
Chinese Communists do not expect Russian help. "Furthermore, the Kuomin-
tang because of its anti-Communist phobia is anti-Russian. Therefore, Kuo-
mintang-Soviet cooperation is impossible. And for us to seek it would only
make the situation in China worse. China is dis-unified enough already ! In
any case, Soviet help is not likely even if the Kuomintang wanted it." He
emphasized, however, that Soviet Russia will not oppose American interests in
China if Americans are "constructive and democratic."
Mao Tse-tung did not explain what he meant by this. But it seems ap-
parent from his remark that the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia are in
agreement as to what should be a "constructive and democratic" American
policy in China. It may be safely assumed that he meant that the United
States should support the Chinese Communists.
This assumption is supported by Mao Tse-tung's indirect answer to the fol-
lowing statement by Maj. General Patrick J. Hurley, American Ambassador to
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2381
China. During a press conference in Washington on 2 April 1945 Ambassador
Hurley said tliat the Chinese Communists had requested the United States
to furnish them with arms. He explained that furnishing arms to an armed
political party would be equivalent to recognizing it as a belligerent. And the
United States, he noted, recognizes the Chungking national regime as the gov-
ernment of China. He emphasized that the U. S. policy in China was unity and
that there would be no unity so long as there were "armed political parties and
warlords strong enough to resist the Central Government."
In the subsequent weeks Mao Tse-tung warned the United States and
Great Britain not to let their diplomacy go against the "will of the Chinese
people." He added that "if any foreign government helps China's reactionary
group [a reference to the Kuomintang] to oppose the democratic cause ... a
gross mistake will have been committeed." At the same time he stated that
the Chinese Communists believe that the Pacific question cannot be settled
without the participation of Soviet Russia.
When Soviet Russia denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5
April 1945, the Chinese Communists used the occasion to praise the Soviet
policy in the Far East and to denounce the Kuomintang for having expressed
its disapproval of the Neutrality Pact in 1941. The Emancipation Daily
iChieh Fang Jih Pao), Communist Party organ in Yenan, wrote in an editorial
on 8 April : "If the Kuomintang authorities are sincere about correcting their
mistakes, they must not continue their four-year hatred of the Soviet Union."
The editorial pointed out how the Soviet Union had adroitly used the neutrality
pact with Japan to mass her forces to knock out Nazi Germany first, and re-
called the "vicious ravings of China's reactionary group against the Soviet-
Japanese neutrality pact in the past . . . even ... to the extent of talking about
the so-called 'Tokyo-Moscow-Yenan axis.' "
At the end of April Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the Seventh Congress of
the CCP in Yenan, gave an important outline of the foreign policy of the Chi-
nese Communists. The Yenan radio reported his speech as follows :
Mao Tse-tung said, " 'Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, we
[Chinese Communists] are of the opinion that the Kuomintang Government
must stop its attitude of enmity toward the Soviet Union and swiftly improve
Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations.' On behalf of the Chinese people Mao
Tse-tung expressed thanks for the help which has always been rendered to
China by the Soviet Government and people in China's war of liberation and
expressed welcome of Marshal Stalin's speech last November rebuking the
Japanese aggressors and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese
neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.
" 'We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is
not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.
" 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, America and Great Britain,
especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors
and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to
China, deserve our thanks. We request the Governments of the United
Nations, especially the Governments of the United States and Great Britain,
to pay attention seriously to the voice of the widest masses of the Chinese
people and not let their diplomatic policy go against the will of the Chinese
people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people.
" 'If any foreign Government helps China's reactionary group to oppose
the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been
committed.'
"Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China by many
foreign governments and the establishment of new treaties with China on
the footing of equality, Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people welcome
such (measures of treating) the Chinese people on a footing of equality.
'But,' he pointed out, 'China definitely cannot rely simply on equality being
given by the good will of foreign governments and peoples. A real and actual
footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese people
to build up politically, economically and culturally a new democratic coun-
try, which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous and strong.
China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to
the policy of the Kuomintang Government at present in force.'
"Mao "Tse-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard
to the countries in the Far East :
2382 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
" 'After the . . . unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors all
democratic [groups] of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a
democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic
regime of the Japanese people, thorough extermination of the Japanese
Fascism and militarism would not be possible to guarantee peace in the
Pacific. The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to
Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should help the Korean people to
attain liberation.
" 'America has already granted independence to the Philippines. We also
hope that Great Britain [will] grant independence to India, because an inde-
pendent, democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people, but is
also needed for world peace.' Regarding Burma, Malaya, the Dutch Indies,
and Annam, Mao Tse-tung said : 'We hope that Great Britain, the United
States, and France [will grant], after helping the local peoples to defeat the
Japanese aggressor, the right to establish independent, democratic regimes
to the local people in accordance with the stand of the Crimea Conference
regarding liberated areas in Europe.
" 'With regard to Thailand she should be dealt with according to the
measures of dealing with a fascist turncoat.' "
In regard to Japan, the Chinese Communists are reported to seek a democracy
"like that which they plan in China." In effect this means that they envisage a
democracy in Japan more akin to "Soviet democracy" than democracy in the
Anglo-American sense. An American obsei"ver in Yenan has reported that the
Chinese Communists hold it necessary to give Japan reasonable opportunities
for economic recovery and stability. This will include freedom of participation
in the economic development of China. This observer states that it is apparent
that the views of the Chinese Communists are closely similar to the program of
the Japanese Communist Party as set forth by Okano *Susumu, leader of the
Japanese Communist Party. Okano has been staying in Yenan since 1943. Mao
Tse-tung has expressed the opinion that military occupation of Japan would be
necessary with the aim of forming a democratic government in Japan.
In May 1944 the Chinese Communists established in Yenan the "Japanese
People's Emancipation League." It advocates a united front of all Japanese
parties with the "fundamental objective" of inducing the Japanese people to
cease hostilities and overthrow the militarists.
The League maintains a school in Yenan, the 'Japanese Workers' and Farmers'
School." The League recruits its members chiefly from Japanese P/Ws. Out of
several thousand Japanese P/Ws taken by the Chinese Communists during the
past years, the Emancipation League has only between 400-500 members at
present.
(c) Soviet Russia's attitude totcard China.- — In order to understand Soviet
Russia's attitude toward China it is essential to bear in mind that the united
front world movement was developed by Moscow. Its purpose, as we have
seen, was to safeguard the Soviet Union against fascist aggression and strengthen
the Communist parties in the capitalist, "bourgeois" democracies, as an instru-
ment of Soviet policy.
In no country has the united front movement succeeded better than in China.
It served its purpose during the first years of the Sino-Japanese war. It then
centered the attention of all Chinese political parties and military groups on
the problem of fighting Japan, at a time when Soviet Russia felt itself threatened
by a war with Japan which it was anxious to avoid. It saved the Chinese Com-
munist Army from extinction and gave the CCP a more powerful position in
China than it had ever enjoyed. Had Chiang Kai-shek pursued his intention
of starting a new "Extermination Campaign" in 1936 against the Communists in
Shensi on the pattern of the Fifth Extermination Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934,
it is likely that the Chinese Red Army would have been defeated. What saved it
was Chiang's approval (stimulated, of course, by the Sian Kidnapping) of the
united front idea.
Soviet Russia's policy in China during the first years of the war was basically
the same as during the period in the 1920's of the Soviet-Kuomintang Entente
Cordiale. Soviet support to China in terms of military supplies went exclusively
to the Chungking Government as long as the Kuomintang supported the Chinese
Communists. When the united front broke up. Soviet support of Chungking was
gradually withdrawn. By that time, however, the Chinese Communists had
gained a powerful position in China. As a result of the break up of the united
front, Chinese resistance against Japan began to diminish. By that time, how-
ever, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact eliminated the immediate danger of a
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2383
Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union. America's entry into the Pacific War
gave Soviet Kussia an additional assurance that her Siberian frontiers were
safe. On 12 December 1941 Pravda, in an editorial entitled "War in the Pa-
cific," wrote that Japan's initial successes had decided nothing. The war un-
doubtedly will be "long and protracted," it believed, but "the Japanese aggressoi
has plunged into a very hazardous adventure which bodes him nothing but
defeat. ... In comparison with the United States, Japan is poor as regards
resources of raw materials." Pravda pointed out that Japan faced the "united
front" of the United States, Great Britain, and China.
While Soviet Russia ceased sending military supplies to China she continued
her diplomatic relations with the Chungking Government. And her military ad-
visers remained in China, although they were treated with increasing suspicion
by the Chungking officials. During the first six years of the Sino-Japanese war
Soviet Russia abstained from any action that would have substantiated Chinese
suspicion that she was supporting or intended to support the Chinese Com-
munists. Such action would not only have intensified the hatred of the Kuomin-
tang for the Chinese Communists, which could have led to a large-scale civil war
and the collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. It might conceivably
have involved Soviet Russia in a war against Japan. Soviet officials main-
tained, outwardly, the attitude that they were not interested in the Chinese
Communists and that they hoped for unity between all Chinese resistance parties.
Until 1943 the Soviet press hardly mentioned the Chinese Communists.
Soviet Russia's exi^erience in China has been that cooperation or a united
front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always favored the Communists
against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent,
whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the Communist cause in
China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists. In
view of this it is only natural that Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists
have always supported unity in China, "democratic" unity.
That Soviet Russia was interested in the fate of the Chinese Communists was,
however, explained by American observers in Chungking in a comment on the
serious situation during 1943 between the Kuomintang and the CCP. "In the
background of the situation is inevitably present a deep-seated Chinese L Kuo-
mintang] fear and suspicion of Soviet Russia and its intentions with regard both
to the Chinese Communists and the Northeastern Provinces [Manchuria] . . .
That the Russians are not altogether disinterested in the Chinese Communist
Party is evident from the call made in July [1943] at [several American observ-
ers by] representatives of the Soviet Embassy at Chungking who expressed So-
viet concern over the possibility of civil war . . . This fear gives added reason
for the Kuomintang to wish to dispose of the Communist question before the con-
clusion of the war in order that a post-war Kuomintang-Chinese Communist
struggle for control in North China may not occur. Even should Soviet Russia re-
main outside the war against Japan, there would exist the possibility of Russian
assistance, outright or under cover, to the Chinese Communists." The Coun-
selor of the Soviet Embassy in Chungking stated to foreign observers in the
Chinese Capital on 14 July 1943 that Chungking Government troops had fired
on positions or outposts of the Chinese Communists in as many as ten different
places "within the last few days." American observers commented that the
Soviet Counselor's approach is "interesting" because so far as could be recalled,
the Soviet Embassy had never before shown concern so unequivocally over what
happened to the Chinese Communists. (367)
In August 1943 it was reported from Moscow that the Soviet press, for the
first time since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, was emphasizing the
role of the Chinese Communists in the Chinese war against Japan and was openly
supporting their cause. At the same time the Soviet press was becoming mo'-e
critical of Japan and was criticizing the Kuomintang for harboring pro-Japa-
nese groups. The Soviet press alleged that these groups sought the destruction
of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. While Chiang Kai-shek was not
attacked, some of his supporters were called "traitors." This press campaign
was started by the publication on 6 August 1943 in the semi-official Soviet Journal
War And The Working Class of an article by Vladimir Rogoff, for many years
a Soviet correspondent in China. He charged that the "Capitulators and de-
featists holding high posts in the Kuomintang . . . weaken China . . . [and]
had sent large forces to the area in which the [Chinese Communist] armies were
operating ... to disarm them and wipe out the Communist Party. If these
adventures are crowned with any success, anti-democratic and anti-popular
elements will gain the upper hand in Chungking." He warned against civil
2384 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
war in China. It was not the content of the criticism in the Soviet press that was
noteworthy. Similar criticism and charges against the Kuomintang had been
made for years by American and British writers. It was the fact that Soviet
Russia had departed from its previous press policy, which was to avoid mention
of the Chinese Communists and not to make unfavorable remarks about the
Kuomintang, that was significant.
It was also not without significance that in 1943 Soviet Russia withdrew her
support of the Chinese regime in Sinklang. The evacuation of Soviet military
forces and advisers from Sinklang began in May. During the rest of the year
all Soviet citizens, except the consular staff, were withdrawn from Sinklang. All
Soviet technical equipment, the oil pumps and refinery equipment at the Tushan
oil fields, tungsten mine equipment at Bole, and the aircraft assembly plant at
T'ou-tung-ho were also withdrawn. Trade Ibetween Sinklang and Soviet Russia
came to a standstill.
Russia was fully within her rights, of course, in taking this action. It might
even be argued that it was favorable to China, since the Chungliing Government
was anxious to gain control over Sinklang. But the stoppage of trade and the
total withdrawal of Soviet forces as well as technical advisers and material
interests was significant, because its inevitable result was a rapid deterioration
of the economic situation in Sinkiang which would reflect unfavorably upon the
Chinese rulers. A Chungking Government official stated that while the action
of Soviet Russia "means considerable political success for the Central Govern-
ment, it will result in almost insolvable economic problems." And the Chungking
Government's Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Sinkiang who resides
at Tihwa, Capital of Sinkiang, stated that the Chinese had attempted to persuade
the Soviet Union to maintain their advisers in Sinkiang. In November 1943 he
said that the Chinese wished to resume trade between Sinkiang and Soviet
Russia but that the Soviet Consul General in Tihwa had stated that there is no
possibility of such trade.
A statement by the Soviet Embassy representative in Lanchow, capital of
Kansu Province, indicates that the Soviet Russians were aware that their with-
drawal from Sinkiang would weaken the position of the Chungking Government
in China's Northwest. He said in August 1943 that "Chinese policies [in
Sinkiang], unless radically changed, will alienate rather than win the people.
In any event. Sinkiang cannot avoid having closer economic ties with Russia
than with China." He emphasized that the Tibetans, Mongols, and Moslems in
the Northwest could not be won to China unless the Chinese would abandon their
attitude toward "subject peoples," give up their present policy of "Sinification,"
and give up their efforts to govern minority groups by direct control or through
support of the "feudalistic leaders" of these minority groups. He expressed the
opinion that the Mohammedan question was more important than the Chinese
realized and that the Chinese would be opposed by the Mohammedans until
Mohammedan interests were recognized and given a more important share in
local government matters.
This was, of course, a very correct evaluation of the Chinese. The intolerant
attitv;de of the Chungking Government toward the non-Chinese groups in Sin-
kiang (which compose about 95 percent of the population) soon led to uprisings
against the Chinese. At the end of 1943 the Kazak nomads, the second largest
population group in the province, revolted in Northern Sinkiang. They received
military support from Outer Mongolia. When the Chinese authorities in Tihwa
protested in October 1943 to the Soviet Consul General, he denied that any
disturbances had occurred. In March 1944 serious clashes developed in the
Altai Mountains on the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. The
Chinese stated that Soviet planes bombed their provincial troops in the Altai
region. Although the Chinese Military Attach^ in Washington said that the
Soviet Government had denied this. Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative
Yuan of the National Government in Chungking (who advocates rapproache-
ment with Russia), stated that the Soviet Ambassador to China had admitted
that Soviet planes were involved in these bombings.
On 2 April 1944 the Soviet Tass news agency announced that Chinese troops
had violated the border of Outer Mongolia and that Chinese planes had bombed
towns and villages in Outer Mongolia and strafed Kazaks fleeing from Sinkiang.
This announcement referred to events during the latter part of 1943. Accord-
ing to Dr. Sun Fo, the Soviet Ambassador to China had informed the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Soviet Russia, because of its mutual assistance
pact with Outer Mongolia, would have to aid Outer Mongolia if called upon,
"owing to the fact that the Sinkiang-Mongolian frontier had been crossed by
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2385
Chinese planes and Kazaks had been machine gunned." An American observer
in NW China reported in July 1944 that he had seen a Soviet map of 1940 on
which the Mongolian-Sinkiang border was shown well west of the border line
on maps printed in Moscow in 1927, slicing off some 83,000 sq. miles of terri-
tory from Sinkiang to the benefit of the "Mongolian People's Republic." It
seems possible, therefore, that the Outer Mongolians considered the Chinese
to have violated their border while the Chinese considered themselves in legit-
imate Chinese territory.
In November 1944 Kazaks, "White Russians," and Tartars revolted in Ining in
Western Sinkiang. They organized a government at Ining by setting up a Local
Maintenance Committee with An Te Hai, a Turki (the Turki, Moslems, are the
largest population group in Sinkiang) as Chairman, with the reported aim of
establishing an East Asia Turki Republic. The new government was reported
to possess its own flag, a red banner with white star and crescent and, according
to one report, a hammer and sickle as well. Latest reports (10 May 1945) from
official sources at Tihwa stated that the Chinese have uncovered a widespread
conspiracy in Tihwa itself for seizing the city and establishing a Turki Govern-
ment. Americans have been informed that the conspirators are well supplied with
machine guns, rifles, and hand grenades. Tihwa was reported to have been
placed under martial law by the Chinese authorities. At the same time reports
said that disturbances are spreading throughout the province. A portion of the
Mongol garrison at Karashar, 120 miles southwest of Tihwa, who number about
1,500, are threatening the city from a northwestern direction. Men in plain clothes
from Ining have marched south and are threatening Kashgar. "Serious trouble
might develop at Kashgar. In the Ining Valley the rebels are forcing con-
scription."
In the light of these events it seems that Soviet Russia will in the long run
benefit from her withdrawal from Sinkiang in 1943. Previous to that time she
was committed to the support of Chinese rule in Sinkiang and in 1933, 1934, 1936,
and 1937 she rendered military aid to the Chinese in suppressing rebellions by
various Moslem groups in the province. During this time the Chinese Governor of
Sinkiang, General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, had maintained a friendly policy toward
Soviet Russia and had kept himself aloof from the Chungking Government.
In 1942 he accepted a rapprochement with the Chungking Government and he
and the Chungking authorities began an anti-Soviet policy in the province. The
rebellions which followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Sinkiang has
undermined Chinese rule in the province. There is at present a strong possibility
that the Moslems in Sinkiang may renounce Chinese rule and establish one or
several autonomous regimes of their own. All observers agree that if this were
to happen these regimes would reestablish friendly relations between Sinkiang
and Soviet Russia. By withdrawing her support of the Chinese in Sinkiang,
Soviet Russia has not only indicated indirectly to the Moslems in the province
her disapproval of the Chinese regime, but has also indicated that she is placing
herself in a position to adopt a new policy in regard to Sinkiang.
In April 1944 the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa emphasized to an American that
it was the policy of the Soviet Union to prevent the formation aroimd Soviet
Russia of a "cordon sanitaire" of border states. Soviet Russia was determined,
he said, "that the foreign policies of border states should be friendly to the
Soviet Union and free from unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great
powers." He said that where border peoples in the past had been oppressed
against their will by the large powers, as Outer Mongolia had been by the
Chinese, the Soviet Union was prepared to enter into mutual assistance pacts,
such as that existing with Outer Mongolia since 1936, to prevent a recurrence of
oppressive acts. The remark is significant since it may be considered as giving
a commonly held Soviet interpretation of Foreign Commissar Molotov's statement
to Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, in August
1944. Molotov said that the Russians had many grievances against Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek and that they were interested primarily in having a good neigh-
bor to the south.
If we accept the statements of Molotov and the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa as
indicative of Soviet policy, it would mean that Sinkiang, and probably Inner
Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also Communist-controlled North China would
go the way of Outer Mongolia which has been protected bv the Soviet Union for
twenty years from "unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers.*'
This trend of events is, of course, conditional upon whether or not the Chung-
king Government will readjust its relations with Soviet Russia on a basis of
friendship and will accept a new united front arrangement with the Chinese
Communists.
2386 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The appearance in 1943 of Soviet official and public' concern for the Chinese
Communists, the beginning of a press campaign highly critical of Chungking, and
the Soviet vpithdrawal from Sinkiang were all indications of the beginning of
a more active Soviet interest in the Far East. A member of the French Special
Mission to Moscow stated in May 1944 that in his opinion Soviet Russia is not
going to tolerate for a very long time the continuance of a "reactionary regime"
in China. He felt convinced, "definitely," that when the proper time arrives the
Soviet Union will take active measures against Chiang Kai-shek and his group
of supporters. He said that the Soviet Union will tend to intervene in Asia i-ather
than in Europe in the post-war period.
His comment is similar to that of Mr. XX, a former member of the Communist
International and a friend of Stalin, now ostracised as a "Trotskyite." He
aflSrmed that the development of communism in China has always been upper-
most in the mind of Stalin, because a Communist China, aligned with Soviet
Russia, would create an indomitable Communist world power. Stalin has al-
ways been more interested in the Chinese Communist Party than in the German
Communist Pai'ty. This created considerable jealousy among the German Com-
munists who, before Hitler smashed their Party, always considered themselves
as the most important Communist Party outside of Soviet Russia. This informer
stated that Stalin had been criticized by members in the Comintern for his policy
in China after the failure of the policy of cooperation between the Kuomintang
and the Chinese Communists in 1927. In developing the new united front policy
during the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935, Stalin paid especial
attention to the application of this policy in China and repeatedly emphasized the
coming role of China in the Communist world movement.
The Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang was followed in 1944 by a general with-
drawal of all Soviet military advisers from the Chungking Government. The
Soviet Military Attache in Chungking stated to American observers in .Tune 1944
that the Soviet disapproved of Chungking's policy of making relations with the
U. S. S. R. worse, "and yet not cooperating with the British or Americans either."
American observers, commenting on the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers,
said that "the activities of Soviet military advisers in China have been so limited
for such a long time that no particular significance is attached to the statement
of the Russian Military attach^ that these advisers are being removed from
China as 'needed for the European fighting ;' it might be an indication of Russian
displeasure with the growing propaganda by Chinese ofiicials along anti-Soviet
lines, which has been particularly in evidence in various ways since the 12 April
Sinkiang incident." (This "incident" was the fighting on the border between
Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.)
Another indication of growing Soviet displeasure with the Chungking Gov-
ernment was the Soviet press criticism, which during the past year has become
progressively more outspoken in its condemnation of Chungking and its approval
of Yenan. In July 1944 War and the Working Class sharply rapped the help-
lessness of the Chungking Army in its war against Japan and pointed out that
the Chungking Army, numbering ten times the army of Tito in Yugoslavia, was
waging a losing battle whereas the latter army had shown successes against
Germany. The magazine charged that Chungking should score better results
and stated that the Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were feel-
ing the brunt of the Japanese attacks. This was, of course, a misrepresentation
of the facts, because the Japanese army did not launch any large-scale attacks
against the Communist armies in 1944. Instead, it concentrated its attacks
against the Chungking forces.
On 18 February 1945 the Soviet government newspaper Izvestia was reported
to have given "unqualified endorsement" to the stand of the Chinese Communists
for "liquidation of the Kuomintang dictatorship and formation of a coalition
government and a united supreme command of the armed forces." Izrcstia said
approvingly that "other democratic parties as well as the Communist Party also
suggested the liquidation of concentration camps and fascist organizations,
strengthening of friendship with the USSR and increasing ties with Britain, the
United States and the other Allies." The newspaper said, "The present situa-
tion imposes especially responsible tasks upon China which the National Govern-
ment and the supreme army command, regardless of their reorganization, have
been unable to fulfill . . . China's allies, especially the United States, warmly
support the effort of Chinese democracy to achieve national unity."
At the beginning of March 1945 the Soviet trade union organ Tnid published
an article in which it urged the organizing committee of the World Trade Union
Conference in London to issue invitations to trade union representatives from
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS . 2387
Poland, Iran, and tbe "Special border areas of China" [Chinese Communist
areas], to join the embryonic world trade union federation." American sources
in Moscow commented that "The larger political phases of the keen interest of
Moscow in international trade union movement are illuminated by the wish of the
Russians to advance world standing of Communist China."
On 14 March 1945, the Soviet writer Viktor Avarin gave a lecture in Moscow
entitled "The Struggle of the Chinese People for Their National Independence,"
in which he condemned the "reactionary elements" among the ruling circles
in Chungking, discussed the weakness of the Chungking army and lauded the
Chinese Communist armies. The speaker gave sympathetic treatment of the
role of the United States in China. He stated that the recall of General Stilwell
was instigated by "reactionary" Chinese elements. But he pointed out that
it would be an error to assume that the Stilwell recall signified a departure
from the American policy of attempting to promote Chinese national unity.
Ambassador Hurley's visit to Yenan and his "mediation" in the Chungking-
Communist negotiations were referred to as evidence of continuing American
interest in Chinese unity. In response to a question regarding the Soviet
attitude toward China, Avarin remarked that the Soviet Government's policy
was based on the Leninist-Stalinist principles of the equality of all peoples.
He added that the Soviet people were warmly sympathetic to the Chinese
people and their struggle for national liberation and desired to help them in
their aspirations.
An American source in Moscow commented that it was significant that
Avarin's criticism was directed at the "reactionary"' elements in the Chinese
Government and the Kuomintang and not against the Government or the Kuo-
mintang as a whole. "This may indicate that if the Soviet Union has decided
on an anti-Chungking and anti-Kuomintang policy, it is not prepared at this
juncture to reveal it ; or that the Kremlin reckons that the situation in China
is still sufllciently fluid to warrant hope for the emergence in China of a 're-
formed' regime (presumably including the Communists) congenial to the Soviet
Union ... If this interpretation is correct, the Kremlin certainly will have
no desire, so long as it believes the situation in China remains fluid, to condemn
wholesale either the Kuomintang or the present Chinese Government."
Only a month after this lecture, however, in the middle of April, War and the
Worliing Class published an article by Viktor Avarin entitled "Whither Goes
China," which was one of the most severe Soviet press attacks on the Kuomintang
in many years. He emphasized that "Representatives of the broad masses of the
[Chinese] people and the democratic press still suffer persecution. In districts
where power is in the hands of the Kuomintang, anti-Japanese democratic
fighters are jailed. Only one party is legal — the Kuomintang. Only the Kuo-
mintang press can write what it wants and at present, when all humanity curses
the German fascist butchers we come across such lines in tlie Chungking paper
as 'we admire the German people and German soldiers for their valor on the
battlefield.' " ^' Mr. Avarin contended that the Chungking Government was
cooperating with the Japanese and that it had constructed and "presented" to the
Japanese the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway by not defending it. He also men-
tioned that inflationary prices in Chungking-controlled China had risen from an
index number of 48-5 to 87,3 since last December. He then asked: "Is this not
the beginning of a counter-offensive of large bankers and reactionaries against
the people and their demands for the democratization of China? The democratic
public received with great anxiety the news that the negotiations between the
Chinese Communist Party and Chungking had produced no results."
(d) The American stake in the Kuomintang-Communist strugcile. — The prob-
lems of U. S. diplomacy in China are serious. Success or failure in solving
these problems will affect the future situation not only in China but in the entire
Far East; it is no exaggeration to state that it will decide the type of peace
we shall gain by our victory over Japan. For China is the center of the Far East ;
political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always re-
volved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by
acquiring the vast region beyond the Ussuri River (the present Russian Far
Eastern Provinces), including the port of Vladivostok, from China. Russia's
growth as a Far Eastern power has depended greatly upon its success in ex-
tending its influence in China. Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her
territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace
after her vast conquests in China proper in the 1930's.
'' There is no confirmation available that the Chungking press has published a statement
to this effect.
2388 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Far Eastern policy of the United States has always revolved around the
ideas of equality of competitive commercial opportunity in China, and of respect
for the independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. The
need of this policy was stated as early as 1853 by the then American Minister
to China, Humphrey Marshall. He affirmed that the weakness, or dissolution,
of China was a matter of national concern to the United States and that the
"true policy" of the American Government must be to strengthen and sustain
the Chinese Government against "either internal disorder or foreign aggres-
sion. The highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining
China."
Marshall arrived at this conclusion by observing a situation in China, in the
1850's which was in many respects similar to the present one. At the outbreak
of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (comparable in its destructiveness to the Kuomintang
Communist civil war of our time) he saw clearly that the success of the T'ai-p'ing
rebels would have meant the separation of China into parts. The break-up of
the empire could have resulted in the dismemberment of China by foreign powers.
He therefore advocated American support of the Chinese Government as a means
of promoting national unity in China and preventing, or at least limiting, en-
croachments on Chinese territory by the powers. At the turn of the century
this policy was given fuller expression in the "open door" agreements which
were sponsored by America. At present the prospect of a renewal of the
Kuomintang-Communist civil war, on the scale of the years before 1937,
threatens China again with separation into parts and possible dismemberment
by foreign powers.
The importance to the United States of supporting China's independence has
been demonstrated on several occasions. During the past eighty-five years Russia,
and during the past fifty years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land
powers of Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because
of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been
centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers.
Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the
two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan
for control in China was shown at the beginning of the present century when the
United States a.ssailed St. Petersburg with unavailing protests on the score of
Russian violation of the "open door" in Manchuria. To strengthen her hand, the
United States negotiated a commercial treaty with China in 1903, guaranteeing
observance of the "open door" principle in all Chinese-American trade, and
opening to such trade the Manchurian cities of Mukden and Antung. America's
concern about Russian domination over Manchuria was shown again by the
watchful attitude of this country during the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905. In
1905 President Theodore Roosevelt told one of his friends that "As soon as
this war broke out, I notified Germany and France "... that in the event of a
combination against Japan ... I should promptly side with Japan and proceed
to whatever length was necessary on her behalf." After the Sino-Japanese war,
in 1908, America proposed the internationalization of the Manchurian railroads
as a means of preventing Russia and Japan from establishing a monopoly over
their respective zones of influence in Manchuria.
The Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 aimed at restraining the
foreign powers concerned, and Japan especially, in their policies of territorial
aggrandizement in China and preventing any power from gaining control over
China. The United States and Great Britain took the initiative in 1922 in induc-
ing Japan to restore full sovereignty over the province of Shantung to China.
During the time of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang Entente Corciiale in the
1920"s and the "anti-imperialist" movement at that time, Russia was successfully
carrying through a policy of "freeing" China from "unhealthy domination by or
linkage with other great powers" than Russia. A^fter Chiang Kai-shek turned
against Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, America strongly supported
his nationalist movement for building up a strong, united and independent China.
In 1928 the United States took the initiative in strengthening the prestige of the
new National Government under Chiang by concluding a treaty with China recog-
nizing the latter's complete autonomy in regard to the levying and collection of
tariffs. This was the first important step in abolishing the system of unequal
treaties by which the foreign powers had infringed China's sovereign rights.
Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to re-establish Chinese control over Manchuria,
where Soviet Russia entertained ambitions similar to those of Czarist Russia
^ There was at this time a Franco-Russian alliance, with Germany a silent partner.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2389
brought him into conflict with Soviet Russia. In the summer of 1929 China and
Soviet Russia fought pitched battles and came close to a formal declaration of
war over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The American Secretary of State,
Henry L. Stimson, tried in vain to settle the dispute through the instrumentality
of the Kellogg Pact. After Soviet troops had invaded Manchuria, the Chinese
Government was forced to accept peace terms from Russia which reimposed upon
China essentially the same terms as those contained in the unequal treaties set-
ting up Russia's privileges in Manchuria which China had attacked.
Soon after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 Secretary Stimson elo-
quently reaffirmed America's Far Eastern policy as follows :
"For several centuries Eastern Asia has owed its character mainly to the
peaceful traditions of this great agricultural nation [China]. If the char-
acter of China should be revolutionized and through exploitation [by Japan]
become militaristic and aggressive, not only Asia but the rest of the world
must tremble. The United States has made a good start in the development
of China's friendship. It would have been the most short-sighted folly to
turn our backs upon her at the time of her most dire need."
As necessary as the defeat of Japan is to the re-establishment of peace in the
Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the
international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the years
before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries
smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her
modern era ; a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen,
primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some
eighty years, to the time when Russia and the Western democracies stood facing
each other in the Far East and when the period of power politics over China
began between these powers. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again
emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be
vastly stronger than at any time during the past eighty years.
To meet this situation the United States has affirmed its policy, aid to China.
A recent statement prepared by the State Department reads as follows:
"The principal and immediate objectives of the U. S. Government are to
keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China's full military
and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war. To accom-
plish these objectives the.U. S. Government has undertaken the following
measures: (a) direct military assistance to China and the Chinese armed
forces; (b) promotion of effective Sino-American military cooi>eration ; and
(c) encouragement to the Chinese to contribute their maximum effort in
the war.
"The American Government's long range policy with respect to China is
based on the belief that tlie need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor
in the Far East Is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that
area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives : 1.
Political : A strong, stable and united China with a government representa-
tive of the wishes of the Chinese people ; 2. Economic : The development of an
integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade
between China and other countries ; and 3. Cultural : Cultural and scientific
cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress."
Our present policy was indicated already in 1844, after China had si^ffered
her first major defeat by a Western power. Great Britain. After the first
American Commissioner to China, Caleb Gushing, had signed our first treaty
with China he offered to the Chinese delegate, Kiying, some models of gims
and some books on military and naval tactics, and fortifications, delicately ex-
pressing the opinion that such information might be of value to China in the
future. Kiying's behaviour was almost prophetic. He politely declined the gifts,
stating: "If at a future day there be occasion to use them, then we ought to
request your Honorable Nation to assist us with the strength of its arm."
Solutions for the present problems of U. S. diplomacy in China have been
offered by many observers. In April 1944 after confirmation had been received
of the Kazak rebellion in Sinkiang, an American observer into Chungking com-
mented on American policy in regard to China as it may affect Soviet Russia
and the Chinese Communists as follows :
"This incident [in Sinkiang] and the possibility of its repetition in other
forms if the Chinese leaders continue in their present [anti-Soviet] course
bring into prominence the question of Sino-Soviet relations and the position
of the United States in relation to that problem. The United States in its
dealings with China should; (1) avoid becoming involved in Sino-Soviet
2390 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
relations; (2) limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of tlie war
against Japan; (3) show a sympathetic interest in liberal groups in China
and try to fit the Chinese Communists into tlie war against Japan; and (4)
use our tremendous influence with the Kuomintang to promote internal unity
on a foundation of progressive reform.
"To give, either in fact or in appearance, support to the present reaction-
ary government in China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid
solely for the prosecution of the war against Japan would encourage the
Kuomintang in its present anti-Soviet policy. The result would be that
the Chinese Communists, who probably hold the liey to control of North
China and possibly Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, would feel that their
only hope for survival lay with Russia, and the Soviet Union would be con-
vinced that American aims are opposed to hers and that she must protect
herself by any means available, i. e. the extension of her direct power and
influence."
Another American observer has stated the problem of U. S. policy in China
in its relation to Soviet Russia as follows : He emphasizes that many people
think that the situation in China is potentially one of revolution. The "opposi-
tion against the Chungking Government," that is, the Chinese Communists, want
Russian-type reorganization of the country.
"If the Central Government starts organizing the peasants, there is
always tlie possibility that the Communists might gain control of such an
organization. Americans and Russians have tremendous influence in this
situation. The Russians could quite easily sway the situation by sending
in supplies — troops would not be necessary. The Russians could also lend
diplomatic support for a Communist Manchuria. If, when a revolution
starts, the Russians assist the Chinese Communists and the United States
assists the Central Government, the Russians and Americans will be meet-
ing head on. This possibility worries many people.
"Care must be exercised in sending help to the Chinese Government be-
cause ... if we send in material with 'no strings attached,' we may just be
building them up so a civil war can be more easily started."
That problems of China and of Soviet influence in China, either direct or
through the Chinese Communists, affect not only China but also Southeast Asia,
is indicated by the following observations by an American oflicial observer :
"American cooperation with patriotic, subvei'Sive revolutionary groups of
Southeastern Asia would . . . frustrate Chinese and Russian efforts
through these groups to dominate tlieir countries after the war . . . [These]
groups prefer American help to help from other countries, such as China,
Russia, or Great Britain whose motives the'y suspect ... On the whole,
China and Russia successfully influence the groups tlfey touch. This in-
fluence is due less to genuine sympathy of these people for China and Russia
than to their desperation that causes them to grasp at any aid extended to
them. As long as the Chinese and Russian monopoly in these areas is not
broken up, China and Russia will determine domestic and international
political issues in these areas after the war, and Chinese and Russian dom-
ination of eastern and southeastern Asia will complicate economic adjust-
ments in these areas and threaten legitimate American interests." ^^
Among Western Allied observers in the Far East not only Americans, of course,
are aware of the danger of Soviet domination in China. The British are keenly
aware of it. In October 1943 a high British diplomat in London stated to a
Chinese official in the pi-esence of an American diplomat that Soviet Russia, "the
most powerful or at lef>st the most potentially powerful country in the world, is
tlje great enigma, a part of which is whether Russia will collaborate with the
rest of the world." "The latter aspect," lie emphasized, "is one which Chinese
should study and watch."
The problems evolving out of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle and its
implications for Soviet Russian and American policies merge into the general
^^ Amoiiff the most active subversive srroiips in Southeast Asia are the Communists. They
caused the Preneli considerable trouble in tho yonrs before the Japanese sent military forces
to Indo China in 1040. The Chinese Communists are comparatively strong in Malaya.
After the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1041 they pledged their allegiance to Great Britain.
(So also did the Communist Party of India.) The British released the Chinese Communist
prisoners in Malaya and allowed'them 10 seats out of fio in the Chinese Mobilization Com-
mittee in Singapore. This gives an indication of their strength.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2391
question of how the Chinese shall be able to establish a government acceptable
to both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, a government which can
deal on a basis of friendship with both America and Soviet Russia. The other
question is how America shall apply its influence in China in the interest of
Chinese unity.
It is obvious that the Chungking Government, as now constituted, endangers
Soviet-Chinese friendship. Its strong suspicion that the Soviet Union intends
to dominate China through the Chinese Communists may or may not be justified.
Personal opinions on this subject are divided, although the past records of Soviet
Russian-Chinese relations give little support to the contention of those who
maintain that Soviet Russia has no intention to dominate China. There is,
however, no question that if the Chungking Government fails to effect a com-
promise with the Chinese Communists whereby the National Government of
China becomes representative of the Chinese Communist Party as well as other
parties, Soviet Russia may in time denounce the Chungking Government and
support a Communist-sponsored government in China. This would be in line
with present Soviet policy in Poland and other eastern European countries.
There is also a fairly general agreement among observers that failure to effect
a Kuomintang-Communist compromise might lead to a large-scale civil war in
China after Japan's defeat, possibly before. America's interest in such a com-
promise is obvious.
In view of this, unity between the Chinese political parties is the key to a
solution of China's problems. At the instance of Genei-alissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
Kuomintang and Communist delegates met in May 1944 in an effort to find a
solution of their inter-party problems. On 11 May they agreed tentatively to a
set of 20 proposals which included a stipulation that the Communist annies should
obey the orders of the National Military Council and that the Government should
agree to a reorganization of the Communist forces into three armies consisting
of 12 divisions, as proposed originally by the Communist general Lin Piao during
his negotiations in Chungking in November 1943. It was also tentatively agreed
that the Kuomintang should recognize the legal status of the Communist Party
and should lift the military blockade of Communist areas.
On 5 June 1944 the Government issued a reply in which it approved of the
organization of the Communist armies into "four armies consisting of ten divi-
sions." In other respects the Government expressed its willingness to accept the
proposals mentioned above provided the Communists also agreed to them. On the
preceding day, however (4 June), Lin Tsu-han, the Communist delegate in
Chungking submitted a new set of 12 proposals by the Chinese Communists which
w^ent far beyond the proposals agreed upon in May. Among other things, the
Communists now requested the Government "to organize the Chinese Communist
Party troops into 16 armies consisting of 47 divisions with 10,000 troops per
division. As a compromise, the Government is requested to grant designations
to at least five armies of 16 divisions." The Communists also requested that
"during the period of war . . . the status quo be maintained in areas garrisoned by
the Communist troops," and they asked the Government to recognize the legal
status not only of the CCP but of all Communist Border Regions and base areas
in China. The Government was, furthermore, requested to "give full material
aid to the [Communist armies]," and to give the Communist armies 'a share due
them" of the weapons, munitions, and medicines furnished China by the Allied
countries. The Government was advised to "realize democracy." At the Plenary
Session of the People's Political Council, which was held in Chungking in Septem-
ber 1944, Lin Tsu-han added a new request of the Communists, the establishment
of a Kuomintang-Communist "coalition government."
These demands were refused by- the Government. In regard to the Communist
demands for democracy and "guarantee of freedom" the Government pointed out
that these were "empty phrases . . . because the 'Democracy' in which the Kuomin-
tang believes and the 'Democracy' in which the Communists believed in the past
or believe at the present are not necessarily the same."
The negotiations became deadlocked. To the Chungking Government leaders
it became obvious that if the Government agreed to the new demands of the
Communists to accord legal status to all Communist areas it would in effect give
its consent to a permanent division of China into two independent parts.
In a speech before the People's Political Council session in September 1944
Chiang Kai-shek said: "If only the Chinese Communists obeyed military and
political orders, the Government would make the greatest concessions to their
demands ... No nation can hope to attain an appropriate position in the
family of nations if its internal administration is not unified . . . The Central
2392 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Government has repeatedly made it clear that what it insists upon is a unified
military command and political unity. While it means to accord equal treat-
ment to the Eighteenth Group Anny, it demands equal observance of law and
discipline."
A new attempt to break the deadlock which followed the Kuomintang-Com-
munist negotiations in June 1944 was made in November of the same year.
The American Government had by this time shown its concern for bringing
about unity in China. The Soviet Russian press criticism of the Kuomintang
was growing increasingly antagonistic. The situation in Sinkiang was going
from had to worse as a result of the Kazak rebellion. In the summer of 1944
Vice President Henry A. Wallace visited Siberia, Sinkiang, and China proper.
The National Herald in Chungking, which is believed to express the opinions
of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in commenting on Wallace's visit said
that the Chinese hoped he would be able to help in bridging the gap separating
China and Soviet Russia.
On 3 July an American observer in Chungking, in a conversation with Dr.
Sun Fo (one of the leaders of the liberal faction within the Kuomintang),
advanced a suggestion that it might be helpful if the Generalissimo, Chiang
Kai-shek would call together 11 independent parties and groups, including the
Communists and the Kuomintang, into a High Command or Military Council
and] make an appeal to them to accept, along with the Generalissimo, joint
responsibility for effective military operations, "to save what remains of China."
This became the basis for the ensuing negotiations for an inter-party settle-
ment. With the Japanese advance in Hunan and Kwangtung toward Kwangsi,
the military situation was becoming almost desperate. Kweilin was threatened,
and many felt that both Kunming and Chungking were threatened.
In August President Roosevelt appointed Donald M. Nelson, chief of the War
Production Board, and Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, to undertake a mission to
China to di.scuss military and economic problems with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek. On 21 October 1944 General Joseph Stilwell was removed from his China-
Burma-India command and was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.
On 31 October Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned his post in China and
was succeeded at the end of November by General Hurley.
On 7 November General Hurley, accompanied by the Communist delegate
Lin Tsu-han, flew to Yenan for a two day conference with Chinese Communist
leaders. He had been granted permission by the Generalissimo to present an
offer to legalize all parties and allow the Communists to participate in the Su-
preme National Defense Council and in the Government. Mao Tse-tung accepted
the offer "in principle" as comprising a portion of the desires of the Communists.
He and Hurley drew up and signed a document which not only included Chiang's
offer but also embodied the Communists' desires, among which were a coalition
government and a bill of rights. On 10 November General Hurley flew back to
Chungking accompanied by Chou En-lai. Ambassador Hurley took part in the
ensuing negotiations between Chou En4ai and representatives of the Chungking
Government.
Tentative agreements were reached providing for legalization of the CCP,
giving the Communists representation in the Government and on the Supreme
National Defense Council, and a fair method of distribution of military supplies
to the Communist armies. But negotiations broke down on the question of com-
mand of the Chinese Communist armies. The Communists were willing to ac-
cept an American commander to coordinate their army with the Central Govern-
ment army. But they refused serving under an American commander who would
act luider Chiang Kai-shek, the C-in-C of the China war theater. General Chu
Te stated to an American observer in Yenan that the only really practical solu-
tion is "an American C-in-C of all forces in China, strongly supported by the
American government. This commander would have to be able and willing to
use the whiphand over the Kuomintang through control of American sup-
plies . . . Even under these circumstances it would be necessary not to mix the
Kuomintang and Communnst forces. Each should have its own task and sphere
of operations." This remark indicates that, as long as the Kuomintang main-
tains its power, the Communists do not seek any unification of China, but a
division of China into two independent parts. They aspire to American sup-
port of this plan.
The Communists' proposal for a coalition government was rejected by the
Generalissimo. On 7 December 1944 Chou En-lai flew back to Yenan.
On 16 December Mao Tse-tung, in a speech before the People's Congress of the
Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, reaffirmed the Communists' demand for a coali-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2393
tion government. He said that there was little prospect of accomplishing the
desired unity in China by negotiation.
On 1 January 194.5 Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year's speech announced his
Intention of calling a People's National Congress (or Assembly) in 1945. The
Congress would "adopt a Constitution, which would enable the Kuomintang to
transfer the power of the government to the people." On the same day, Mao
Tse-tung reatlirmed the Communists' demand for a coalition government. On
24 January Chou En-lai returned to Chungking. "My present trip to Chung-
king," he stated, "is to propose to the National Government, the Kuomintang,
and the Chinese Democratic League ''"' that ... a conference of all parties and
groups should be held. This will be a preparatory conference to the National
Affairs Conference so as formally to discuss the organization and steps leading
to the realization of a National Affairs Conference and a coalition government.
We [Communists] consider that apart from this there is no other way to . . .
overcome the present crisis ... It is hoped that the Government will quickly
accept these proposals."
The American Government again reaffirmed its desire for an inter-party set-
tlement. During a press conference on 23 January Acting Secretary of State
Joseph C. Grew reminded both the Chungking Government and the Chinese
Communists that the United States stands ready to use its "friendly good offices"
in bringing them together. During a press interview in Chungking on 14 Febru-
ary Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Information, and one of the delegates
in the negotiations with Chou En-lai, announced that the Government had made
the following concessions to the Communists: (1) A "readiness" to recognize
the CCP as a lawful political party. (2) Inclusion of a high Communist official
in the National Military Council; (3) Inclusion of Communist representatives
and representatives of other political parties in the Executive Yuan with a view
to forming a "sort of wartime cabinet"; (4) Establishment of a committee of
three to consider reorganization of the Communist Army and the qu3stion of
that Army's supplies, "with possibly an American Army officer presiding."
Dr. Wang said, however, that the Communists had considered these proposals
unacceptable, and had brought forth a proposal to convene a conference of all
political parties. "It is," he said, "in compliance with the general idea of this
request [by the Communists] that the Government has . . . consented to convening
a conference of the Kuomintang, the CCP, and other parties as well as some non-
partisan independent leadeds to consider interim measures of military and po-
litical unfication pending a convocation of a National Congress." He expressed
thanks to Ambassador Hurley for his "disinterested but friendly efforts" during
the past negotiations with Chou En-lai in "keeping the two sides together and
in helping create a better atmosphere for the negotiations."
Chou En-lai left for Yenan on 15 February with new Government proposals.
But he told newsmen that he doubted that the Communist Party would accept the
new proposals "any more readily than those rejected." These proposals included
one for the establishment of a "Committee of Political Affairs" comprising mem-
bers from all parties. It would consider problems of reform transition from
Kuomintang rule to constitutional all-party rule, and a unified political program
for the unification of all armed forces. Chou En-lai stated during a press con-
ference in Chungking that the Government's "concessions" to the Communists,
as announced by Wang Shih-chieh, were unacceptable because "there were condi-
tions attached." These conditions, he said, were (1) The Communist troops
should be placed under the National Military Council, which the Communists
regarded as tantamount to handing them over to the Kuomintang; (2) The Kuo-
mintang "obstinately insisted" that one-party dictatorship would not be ter-
minated. "Concretely speaking," he said, "the Government's conditions mean
that there would be no legal status for the Chinese Communist Party unless
Communist troops were given over to the Kuon\intang Government. The pro-
Itosed so-called War Cabinet under the Party-ruled Executive Yuan would have
no power for final decisions of policy. One-party rule would not be abolished.
The proposed Committee of three [including one American] to reorganize Com-
munist troops could only mean giving them to the Kuomintang. On the basis of
achievements, the Kuomintang troops, and not the Communist force, require re-
organization." Chou En-lai, like Wang Shih-chieh, expressed thanks to Ambas-
sador Hurley for his help in the negotiations.
Here the matter rests. No further negotiations have been held since Chou
En-lai's departure from Chungking in February. The issue now is between the
^^ The league comprises several smaller political parties and non-Kuomintang military
groups.
22848 — 52— pt. 7 A 7
2394 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Commnnist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang-spon-
sored plan for a National Assembly. Ambassador Hurley recently stated that
"the objectives of both plans appear to be generally the same ; the chief differ-
ences between public statements of both parties concern procedure." The Com-
munists insist that the coalition government should not derive its authority from
the Kuomintang. Therefore they maintain that the National Government in
Chungliing should "discard, immediately, the one-party dictatorship," recognize
the legal status of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, and recognize the legal
status of the Communist Border Regions and base areas. The coalition govern-
ment would then derive its authority from the "preparatory conference," of all
parties as suggested by Chou En-lai in January this year.
The Kuomintang rejects this plan. On 1 March Chiang Kai-shek announced
in an address before the Preparatory Commission for Inauguration of Constitu-
tional Government that he would propose to the Kuomintang Congress, due in
May, the convocation of a National Assembly on 12 November this year. "The
position of the Government," he said, "is that it is ready to admit other parties,
including the Communists as well as non-partisan leaders, to participate in the
government, without, however, relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power
of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convocation of the National
Assembly ... If the Government . . . surrenders its power of ultimate decision
to a combination of political parties the result would be unending friction and
tears, leading to a collapse of the central authorities. Bear in mind that in such
a contingency, unlike in other countries [where parliaments or congresses exist]
there exists in our country at present no responsible body representing the people
for a government to appeal to. I repeat, whether by accident or design the Kuo-
mintang has had the responsibility of leading the country during the turbulent
last decade and more. It will return the supreme power to the people through
the instrumentality of the National Assembly, and in the meanwhile it will be
ready to admit other parties to a share in the government, but it definitely can-
not abdicate to a loose combination of parties [a reference to the Communist-
sponsored plan for a "preparatory conference]. Such a surrender would not
mean returning power to the people. We must emerge from the war with a
United Army. The Communists should not keep a separate army . . ."
The last sentence gives a clue to the main and important difference between
the Communist plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang plan for a
National Assembl.v, for the Communists insist on maintaining their army inde-
I)endent of the Central Army. It now becomes apparent that what the Com-
munists mean by a coalition government is not the establishment of a national
government with sovereign rights over all of China, but rather some sort of loose
federation between independent parts of China divided between the Kuomintang,
the Communists, and other parties and groups, including Mongolians, Tibetans,
and the Moslems of Northwest China. The parties would decide on policies of
common interest in the councils of the coalition government, these policies to be
executed separately by the CCP, the Kuomintang and other independent parties
within their respective areas of control.
This type of a federation might be feasible if China were to be divided between
the Kuomintang and the CCP with a clearly defined border demarcation between
the two parts. This study has, however, shown that whereas the Chungking
Government has throughout the war tried to persuade the Communists to accept
a demarcation of defense areas between Kuomintang and Comnmnist troops,
the Communists have persistently rejected these suggestions. An American
Embassy observer in Yenan stated in October 1944 that a statement by Chou-En-
lai indicates that the Communists "are now not merely seeking recognition of
their present forces and Communist-controlled governments, but of all future ones
which may be set up."
A federative coalition government established under such conditions would
obviously not lead to unity. There is no indication that the Communists would
not continue to insist, as they have throughout the war, tliat the Kuomintang
forces evacuate any area into which Communist forces penetrate. If they refuse,
they are accused by the Communists of being "uncooperative," "traitors," "ex-
perts in dissension." Under such conditions the plan for a coalition government
could never lead to the establishment of a strong central government in China.
It would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas
of control would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other
part'es. But there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Com-
munists would accord a legal status to present Kuomintang areas.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2395
Little if anything could be gained under these circumstances by extending
American aid to the Chinese Communists. The Kuomintang would no doubt
resent American aid to the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless the "reactionary"
Kuomintang has never stipulated to the United States that if we were to extendi
aid to both the Kuomintang and the CCP our military commander in China
"must," to reverse the statement of General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Communist
army, be "willing to use the whlphand over the Chinese Communists." But it is
clear that were we to aid the "democratic" Chinese Communists they would ex-
pect us to use our "whiphand" against the Kuomintang. This being the case, it is
obvious that if the United States started arming both the Kuomintang and Com-
munist armies, we would run the risk of encouraging civil war in China rather
than restraining it. This would be a repetition of the tactics employed by
several foregn nations, who desired to keep China weak, during the first two
decades of the Chinese Revolution. They sold and gave arms to all Chinese
warlords, knowing that this would lead to civil war.
It is in this light that General Wedemeyer's recent press statement of the
American Army's policy in China must be understood. It was given on the day
of Chou En-lai's departure from Chungking, 15 February. "My policy," he said,
"is this, that we will not give any assistance to any individual, to any activity,
to any organization within the Chinese theater [except to the Central Govern-
ment] . . . Obvously we get requests from time to time for assistance from
various sources but I am ordered to support the Central Government and I am
going to do that to the best of my ability." This policy was confirmed by Ambas-
sador Hurley during a press interview in Washington on 2 April.
There is, obviously, no other recourse for the moment. But an all-out support
of the Chungking Government with "no strings attached" will not solve the prob-
lem. We are facing a situation, it must be candidly admitted, where we are
backing a government in China which, though it may be militarily stronger than
any other independent Chinese regime, has lost much of its popular following.
It is still the same widely hated political "machine" which the aforementioned
American observer described in 1935, and the same men who were in power then
are in power today. The difference is that the Chinese Communists of today
constitute a greater challenge to the Kuomintang's rule than it has ever faced
since the days in 1928 when it established itself as the National Government
of China.
Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer in Yenan, when com-
menting on the probability of the Kuomintang leaders planning a civil war against
the Communists : "Chiang [Kai-shek] could not whip us during the civil war
when we were a hundred times weaker. What chance has he now?" He was
undoubtedly right. In recent references to armed clashes between Kuomintang
and Communist troops, it has been repeatedly stated that the Kuomintang troops
are losing because "the populace join the Communists."
It is not only the populace which shows a tendency to join the Communists.
Within the past year, several of the military and political leaders in Chungking
China who, thoi'gh not members of the Government except in a purely nominal
way, are afliliated with it in the war against Japan, have shown a tendency to
cooperate with the Communists rather than the Kuomintang. The corruption of
the Gcvernment administration and its almost total disregard for any construc-
tive reforms, together with the unwillingness of Kuomintang leaders in the Gov-
ernment to share power with any but well-trusted party members, have alienated
practically all the political parties and groups who offered their support to the
Government in 1937 at the outbreak of the war. There are also many progressive
and liberal leaders within the Kuomintang who strongly object to the policy of
the present ruling clique.
In April 1944 Dr. Sun Fo, who is the chief spokesman for the discontented
groups within the Kuomintang, said during a speech at the Central Training In-
stitute of the Kuomintang : "There must be a fundamental readjustment of meth-
ods within the Kuomintang itself ... If we had realized the principle of
democracy during the past twenty years, the democratic spirit of the party would
now be an inspiration to the rest of the country. Unfortunately we have failed
to do so . . . The Kuomintang has no right to monopoly of political activity.
We have now developed from a system of party dictatorship to one of personal
dictatorship [a reference to Chiang Kai-shek] and while claiming to be a demo-
cratic country we have no democracy even inside the Party . . . Suggestions
have been made that I make complaints against the Government and the
Party directly and privately. I have done this many times without effect.
People accuse me of being a talkative idealist, but if I do not say these things
2396 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
no one else will and I say them for China's sake. Unless I say these things
now and unless China goes democratic now it will be too late."
All observers agree that the greatest cause of the exceedingly poor showing
made by the Chungking forces last year during their defense against the Japanese
was the hostility of the people toward their own army and the hopeless disunity
between the regular Kuomintang or Central Army and the Provincial armies.
Marshal Li Chi-shen of the Kwangsi Military Group, one of the outstanding liberal
leaders in China, and a strong advocate of a democratic government said in
July 1944: "[The] drift toward dictatorship and departvire from democratic
principles has brought about the inevitable result ; the seizure of power by a small
clique, and taxation, which is levied on the people as a whole, is used arbitrarily
to maintain the clique in power to the detriment of the people, thus weakening
the power of national resistance . . . Because of misappropriation of govern-
ment funds, the treatment of the soldiers is disgraceful to the extent that they
have now neither the strength nor the will to fight . . . The masses of the
people are now ready and willing to assist the enemy. There is a slogan quite
popular among the people of Honan : 'We should prefer to be slaughtered by the
Japanese than to endure the tyranny of [the Kuomintang] General T'ang En-po.'
A similar situation exists in the Ninth War Zone [including Honan and parts
of neighboring provinces] . . ."
Among various discontented groups in West China in the provinces controlled
by the Chungking Government, there is today a strong tendency to form a new
united front. But unlike the movement of 1937, this new united front is develop-
ing against the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. It includes several
leading scholars, the powerful Szechwan warlords and several other military
groups, seven small political parties united in the Democratic League, and a
number of non-partisan leaders. The movement has considerable popular sup-
port from small shopkeepers, small manufacturers and "petite bourgeoisie," who
are angry about inflation, corruption and increasing monopoly of business by the
Kuomintang. It is also supported by some enlightened landlords.
None of these groups are pro-Communist. They would be far more willing
to unite with the Kuomintang than with the Communists, were the Kuomintang
to liberalize its rule and share power with other groups. They have made persist-
ent bids for American friendship and support, but in deference to the Chinese
Communists, they have received neither publicity in the American press nor oflS-
cial American recognition in any form. They are not powerful enough to change
the political situation through their own efforts. But they can, as they have
shown on several occasions, combine with the Communists by supporting their de-
mands for "democracy" and thereby strengthen their position against the Govern-
ment. The Democratic League is as doubtful as the Communists about the sin-
cerity of Chiang Kai-shek's announcement that the Kuomintang will relinquish
one-party dictatorship. Just as the Communists, it has boycotted the National
Assembly to be convened in November this year and has subscribed to the Com-
munist plan for a coalition government.
The Chinese Communists on their part are offering strong support to the
Democratic I-,eague. One leader of the League asserted in August 1944 that
the new united front movement against the Chungking Government had been
"assured" of the support of the Soviet Russian Government.
It must be emphasized that if the Chinese Communists gain control of this
movement, it is not because the followers of this movement desire to combine
with the Communists but rather because they find it impossible to obtain any
cooperation from the Kuomintang. Under Communist direction the movement
can be turned into a powerful weapon against the Government. This move-
ment includes one of the most genuinely pro-American elements in China as
well as many of the best educated, most intelligent men and women in China.
The literary editor of the Ta Kung Pao, the "Manchester Guardian of China,"
wrote in July 1944 to an American observer in Chungking: "Sino-American
friendship is based upon the genuine love of Americans on the part of our peo-
ple, not on the thanksgiving attitude of the present Government. The people
with no exception hate their government, and recognize it as no stabilizing force
but a serious trouble maker here. If you (Americans) go on to strengtben
it with your support you will find gradually our people taking you as hypocrites,
visionless traders. . . Even if the war is won in spite of all the above you
(America) will be regarded the world wide as Lords Simon and Hoare during
the Spanish war. And the world's hope for a leadership towards a new peace
will easily turn away somewhere else."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2397
There are still good prospects that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can reverse"
the trend, bringing these dissident groups bacli into the Government's fold.
One of the chief complaints of military leaders who belong to these groups is
that they have been denied a share of American military supplies, even though
their troops are fighting in the Government's army. In March of this year
it was reported that General Ho Ying-ch'in, C-of-C of the Chinese Army, was
sincerely endeavoring to weld the troops of General Lung Yiin, the Governor of
Yunnan, and one of the leaders of the opposition movement in Free China, with
Central Government forces stationed in Yunnan. It was also reported that he
has been advocating measures which would make available to General Lung
a substantial portion of the U. S. arms and equipment.
This is, of course, a correct procedure. If American supplies are distributed
to various non-Kuomintang groups by the Chungking Government rather than
directly by the American Government representatives in China, the dissident
groups will undoubtedly rally behind the Government. There has of late been
no report of Lung Yiin sponsoring the movement against the Government. If the
Government effects an equitable distribution of these supplies to other dissident
military groups, it is likely that unity will be established between these groups
and the Chungking Government, and that these will give up their support of the
Communist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and will decide to join the
National Assembly. Similarly, if the Chungking Government, rather than the
United States on its own initiative, were to distribute to the Chinese Communists
a part of the American supplies sent to China, it is conceivable that they would
be more favorably disposed to accept Chiang Kai-shek's plan for a National As-
sembly and constitutional government as the basis for establishing unity in China.
The Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang, whicli was held from 5 to 21
May 1945, resolved that a law should be enacted giving legal status to political
parties and groups other than the Kuomintang. This is apparently a concession
to one of the chief conditions stated by the Chinese Communists and the Demo-
cratic League as prerequisite to their participation in the National Assembly.
Another important resolution was the abolition within three months of all exist-
ing Kuomintang headquarters in the Army. This is a move toward the develop-
ment of the Chinese Army into a true national army rather than a party army
of the Kuomintang.
The Kuomintang Congress confirmed Chiang Kai-shek's promise to convene a
National Assembly on 12 November to enforce constitutional government. The
coming five months will, therefore, be decisive, for unity in China depends greatly
on the final decision of the Communists as to whether they shall join in the
National Assembly. And this decision will be largely determined by their willing-
ness to join their armed forces with those of the Central Government. At the be-
ginning of May Ambassador Hurley conferred with the Generalissimo on this
question of unifying the Chinese armed forces opposed to the Japanese. The
Generalissimo said that "some progress" was being made with the Communists
although things were "not moving as fast as he would like." He promised,
however, that the situation would be solved satisfactorily.
Nevertheless, the prospects for a settlement of this all-important question are
not promising. The tendency during the past months has not been toward unity,
but away from it. The Communists have freely admitted to an official American
observer in Yenan the truth of Kuomintang charges that they keep increasing
the scope of the concessions which they demand for a two-party settlement.
This supports a conclusion by Congressman Walter H. Judd, who has spent many
years in China, and who re-visited China during the latter part of 1945 :
"They [the Chinese Communists] do not want unity. What they want is
all the advantages of appearing to want unity so they can get arms and
sympathy and support from abroad, while at the same time having all the
advantages of complete independence."
Congressman Judd continues :
"If they [the Chinese Communists] can stall along thus until the war in
Europe ends, then they can hope for powerful support from Russia. They
can try an 'October Revolution' in the hope of getting control of all of
China. If that fails, they can at least rebel and try to split off North China,
including Manchuria — of course, in the name of freedom — and then the new
'independent democracy' can invite Russia in to protect it as she is pro-
tecting Eastern Europe. The new 'North China' can even voluntarilv in-
2398 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
sist, if it desires, on being taken in as one of the United Socialist Soviet
Hepublics."
This observation should be viewed in the light of a statement by Mao Tse-tung
during the recently concluded Seventh Congress of the CCP in Yenan. While
in 1941 he approved of Soviet Russia's Neutrality Pact with Japan as in the
interests of China and "the oppressed nations of the whole world," he now ex-
pressed thanks to Stalin for Soviet Russia's denunciation of the same pact. As
long as Soviet Russia was fighting Germany, he never urged Soviet help of
China, although he stressed that China's hope was with Soviet Russia. How-
ever, with a Soviet victory in Europe assured, Mao Tse-tung declared: "We
[Chinese Communists] believe that without the participation of the Soviet
Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific
question." In the next sentence he expressed thanks to the United States and
Great Britain, especially the former for their efforts "in the common cause of
fighting the Japanese aggressors." But he warned them not to let "their
diplomacy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose
the friendship of the Chinese people." "If any foreign Government," he added,
"helps China's reactionary group to oppo.se the democratic cause of the Chinese
people, a gross mistake will have been committed."
The "democratic cause" here referred to is, of course, the Chinese Communists'
version of "Soviet democracy" which they have introduced in their areas of con-
trol. This "democracy" is, as we have seen in this study, as rigidly controlled by
the CCP as is the so-called "dictatorial" system of the Chungking Government
controlled by the Kuomintang. The American Military Attache to China, in a
study of the Kuomintang-Communist problem, stated in October 1943 : "Political
intolerance is nothing new in Chinese history. If the [Chinese] Communists'
charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it will be sternly truer of the Com-
munists if they ever attain power."
Soviet Russia's attitude toward China will undoubtedly play an important part
in the decision of the Chinese Communists as to whether or not to joiib the
National Assembly, proposed by Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. T. V. Soong, Acting Presi-
dent of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Foreign AiTairs, is
expected to visit Moscow on his way home from the San Francisco conference.
The diplomatic correspondent of the Kuomintang party organ, the Chungking
Central Daily News, who is now in San Francisco, has stated that T. V. Soong
was invited by Molotov to go to Moscow, "presumably" to discuss a mutual aid
agreement between China and Soviet Russia. This has not been confirmed.
However, any agreement or understanding between the Chungking Government
and Soviet Russia would undoubtedly strengthen the cause of unity in China, and
lessen the danger of Soviet Russia and the United States becoming involved in the
inter-party struggle in China between the Kuomintang and the CCP.
3. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party and Governments in
COMMUNIST-CONTHOLLED AEEAS
A. CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
In May 1945 the Yenan radio announced that the CCP comprised 1,200,000
members. In comparison, the Kuomintang has 2,000,000 members. In August 1943
Chou En-lai stated that the CCP had about 800,000 members. A member of the
Communist Party Headquarters in Chungking stated in July 1944 that no new
members had been admitted into the Party in China since 1939. If these various
statements are true, then the great increase of Party members has taken place in
the past ten months, concurrent with the Communist expansion of areas of control
in Central and South China.
The procedure for admission into the CCP is reported by a Communist Party
member to be as follows. In a school or factory or particular locality in which
there is a "cell" {hsiao tsu, literally "a small organization"), a person who is
sympathetic to the ideas and ideals of Communism will begin to associate with
and become known to others of the same general trend of thought. When such
a person has come to have a firm acquaintance with several members of a cell,
and they are sure of his sincerity, he will be informed of the cell's existence and,
if he wishes to join, he will be supplied with an application blank on which he
will enter his name, his status in society, the condition of himself and his family,
etc. His application is then presented to a meeting of the cell, and a resolution is
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2399
proposed and passed (or rejected) to the effect that he is to be admitted to
}iiembership in the Party.
A worker elected in this way will thenceforward be a full member, but a stu-
dent or peasant will be required to go through a probationary period of several
months or more before being admitted. In the case of a member of the "capitalist
class" or of the Kuomintang, the cell itself will not be authorized to grant
membership ; after the applicant's name has been voted on favorably, it will have
to be submitted to the next highest organ of the Party for approval.
The Communist informant stated that the Party is organized on an "industrial
basis," vertically rather than horizontally, that is, "steel workers in one plant
who are members of the Party have no necessary connection with steel workers
in another plant who are also Communists ;" every Communist, worker in that
one plant, whatever his task, is a member of the cell or cells in that plant. A
cell usually consists of about 20 people. If it becomes too large it is split to
form two or more cells, so that in a large factory with a considerable Communist
membership there may be several cells. Each cell represents a cross-section of
the work of the factory ; there is not one cell for one kind of work and another
for another kind of work. Each cell has a "Secretary," a "Director of Propa-
ganda," and a "Director of Organization." These officers, who form the Cell
Committee, are not elected, but appointed by the next highest Committee in the
Party, usually the Hsien (County) Committee. All cells are self -supporting,
being financed by contributions from the members. Every member must pay into
the Party treasury a percentage of his earnings. If the earnings are low the
percentage is low, being somewhere between four and seven percent ; if the earn-
ings are high, the percentage is sometimes as high as 40 percent.
Liaison between the cells is accomplished through officers appointed by the
Hsien (county) or City Committee of the Party, according to the district or
city in which the cell is located. The Hsien Committee is in turn appointed by
the Provincial Committees, which are appointed by the Central Committee in
Yenan.
The Communist Informant emphasized that this control from above was es-
sential under pi-esent conditions in China because of the danger that the Party
would be inter-penetrated by Kuomintang and other counter-espionage agents.
The greatest secrecy is maintained ; the whole organization in Chungking-
controlled China is "underground," although its objectives there are no different
from those of the Chinese Communists as a whole. According to the informant
these objectives are the establishment of "democracy, with free elections and
freedom of speech, etc., throughout China, coupled with agrarian and other re-
forms." "To this end," he said, "they [the Communists] cooperate at the higher
levels with members of the Democratic League and other liberal and leftist
groups in China, but members of the latter are never directly or indirectly as-
sociated with one of the cells, and on the lower or 'operation' levels there is
practically no contact."
Election of a new Central Committee was one of the items on the agenda of
the Seventh National Congress held in Yenan during the latter part of April
1945. The preceding Central Committee was elected by the Sixth National Con-
gress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in 1938. The total membership of
the Central Committee is about twenty. The Communist informant stated, how-
ever, that their names and the number of them are both secret. He said, how-
ever, that among the members were Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu,
Lin Tsu-han, and Chu Te. The list of members of the Central Committee which
appears in Section 4 of this study has been compiled from non-Communist
sources.
Because of this secrecy the average member of the Party knows little or noth-
ing about the organization as a whole. The greater part of the membership of
the Party is in the Communist-controlled areas. When the Chinese Communist
Army reaches a new hsien, it contacts the local cell, which it expands, or if
there is no cell in existence it organizes one. The cell may be permitted to hold
its own election, but usually the Cell Committee is appointed, as is the case
in Chungking-controlled China.
The Communist informant stated that no knowledge of the theories of Karl
Marx is required of an applicant for membership in the Party. It is only
necessary that he sympathize with what he understands to be the general aims
of the party, and that he be willing to obey the Party leadership. He is not
even required to be literate, the informant said, describing the Party's attitude
2400 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
as being that the neophyte can be schooled after he enters." The heads of the
Propaganda "Department" of the Cell, Hsien and Provincial Committees are
responsible for the education of the members. In some places classes are held,
and higher education is available in Yenan. The local cells only conduct classes
in two subjects, "political work" and "common sense." The American Embassy
officer who obtained this information stated that he understood that the first of
these subjects was largely an elementary education in how to keep out of the
hands of the jjolice, while the second course evidently covers the teaching of a
basic number of Chinese characters, together with the rudiments of geography,
history, etc.
For the Party Statutes (1928) of the CCP, see Appendix I, page 267, Vol. I.
B. BASE AREAS
Communist-controlled areas behind Japanese lines are generally referred to
by the Communists as anti-Japanese bases. They have been set up by the 8thi
Route and New 4th Armies. These anti-Japanese bases are officially called
"Military Regions" {Chiin Ch'u) in Communist military communiques. Ad-
ministratviely, they are called either "Border Region {Pien Ch'u) Governments"
where full-fledged Governments are established, with elected village, hsien
(county) and Border Region Congresses, or "Administrative Committees"
{Hsing-chang Wei yuan hui) , where representative governments have not yet
been established. In nearly all instances the military and administrative regions
are identical in extent, although there are three military regions which have no
border region governments or administrative committees. The Communist, for
brevitys sake, use the literary one-character names of the provinces ; for ex-
ample, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsi Border Region is called the Sheu-Kan-Ning
Pien Ch'u, and the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region is called the Chin-Ch'a-
Chi Pien Ch'u. All the main base areas are divided into sub-regions, and are
called either military sub-regions (or sub-districts), or just districts (when
used administratively).
At the end of 1944 there were sixteen anti-Japanese bases, of which only
five had full-fledged Border Region Governments, eight had Administrative
Committees, and three were Military Regions where no anti-Japanese govern-
ment organizations had yet been set up. They are as follows (see map) :
(i) Border Region Governments
Under 18th Group Army :
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia : Shen-Kan-Ning Pien Ch'ii.
Shansi-Suiyuan : Chin-Sui Pien Ch'ii.
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan : Chin-Chi-Yii Pien Ch'ii.
Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar: Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien Ch'ii.
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan : Chi-Lu Yii Pien Ch'ii.
(2) Administrative Committees
Under 18th Group Army :
Shantung ; Shantung Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
Under New 4th Army :
North Kiangsu : Su-pei Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
Central Kiangsu : Su-chung Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
South Kiangsu : Su-nan Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
North Huai : Huai-pei Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
South Huai : Huai-nan Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
Central Anhwei : Wan-chung Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei : Yii-Wan Hsing-cheng Wei-yiian-hui.
^ There is some evidence that the Chinese Communists do not encourage educated people
to join the Party. Even Chinese liberals and non-party intellectuals who offer their services
to the Communists have found it difficult to cooperate with them. For example, the
daughter-in-law of Tai Chi-t'ao, President of the Examination Yuan of the National Gov-
ernment in Chungking, a well educated woman, fled from Japanese-occupied Peiping to
Yenan en route to Chungking. She was treated with the greatest suspicion by the Com-
munists. It took her a year and a half to obtain a release from the Communists to proceed
to Chungking, which led her to remark that it is easier to get out of Japanese-occupied
areas than out of Communist areas. Meanwhile, she offered her services to the Communists
•while staying in Yenan, but found them extremel.v uncooperative. Mr. Michael Lindsey,
a British sub.iect who has been working for the Chinese Communists during the past three
years, recently told an American Army officer visiting Yenan that "for some unknown
reason" the Communists find it extremely difficult to obtain cooperation from. Chinese "tech-
nical people". Because of this one of tlii^ir greatest shortcomings is lack of capable techni-
cians, teachers, and administrators. "They [the 'technical' Chinese] all run away at the
first opportune moment," he said. But he added as possible explanation for this that it
is difficult for any educated person who does not follow the "Party line" to work for the
Communists.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2401
(5) Base Areas with no anti-Japanese governments
Under 18th Group Army:
Hainan Island : Hainan or Ch'iving-yai Base.
East River : Tung Chiang Base.
Under New 4th Army :
East Chekiang : Che-tung Basa
As originally planned, the Border Region governments were to be under the
National Government in Chungking. Of the thirteen Border Region Governments
and Administrative Committees which existed at the end of 1944, only two
were officially recognized by the National Government — the Shensi-Kansu-Ning-
sia and Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Governments.^' The eleven other
anti-Japanese governments have, therefore, no legal status. Whether legalized
or not, however, the real leadership of these anti-Japanese bases is centered
in the Communist Party Headquarters at Yenan.
Within, or alongside, a Communist-controlled area there may be found "island"
areas where a Kuomintang Government is still in existence. Such areas, how-
ever, are much smaller than Communist base areas, and are found only in Central
China and the coastal Provinces.
Along the outer edges of the Communist-controlled base areas, near the
Japanese lines, the Communists mention the existence of so-called "revolutionary
double side" and "reactionary double side" (local) governments. The "revolu-
tionary double side" governments are made up of landlords, merchants and
wealthy people in the Japanese-occupied area, who are appointed by the Japanese,
but are not enemies of the Communist forces. The "reactionary double side"
governments, on the other hand, are made up of wealthy individuals who have
played both the Japanese and Communist sides alternately for individual gain,
but are at present with the Japanese because their fortunes are dependent on
Japanese control.
C. GOVERNMENT IN THE BORDER REGIONS
The administration in the base areas is carried on by Borden Region, Hsien,
(county) Chu (township) and village government organs. Chart No. 1 (see last
page, Vol. 1.) shows the general structure of the Border Region Government.
Paralleling this structure is the organization of the "People's Committee for
anti-Japanese Armed Resistance", which aids the ISth Group Army in the de-
fense of the Border Region and is the link between the Border Region Govern-
ment and the 18th Group Army.
(i) Border Region, Hsien and Village Oovernments
The highest organ of government in the base area is the Border Region Council
(see Chart No. 1, last page. Vol. I.) When the Border Region Council is not in
session, government is carried on by the Border Region Government Committee
whose members are chosen by the Council. A standing committee is also chosen
by the Council to supervise the Government in its carrying out of resolutions
passed by the Council. There are also the Hsien Council and the Village Citi-
zens' General Assembly whose functions within the hsien and village respectively
are the counterpart of those of the Border Region Council.
(2) Supervisor's and Chii Offices
The Supervisor's Office represents the Border Re.gion Government in super-
vising the affairs of several hsien. The Chii (township) Office is the counterpart
of the Supervisor's Office in supervising the affairs of several villages. These
two offices are purely supervisory and not administrative organs, and are gener-
ally called the "nominal offices," while the organs of the Border Region, hsien
and village governments are the "real offices." Personnel for the Supervisor's
and Chii Offices are chosen by the Border Region and hsien governments respec-
tively, except in areas behind enemy lines where communications are poor and
where the personnel of the Chii Office are selected by the Chii People's Delegates
Assembly rather than by the hsien government.
(3) Village Government organs
The Village Citizens' General Assembly (which includes all village inhabitants
of voting age) chooses delegates to form the Village Delegates Assembly, as well
" The Chungking Government recognized the Shansl-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Gov-
ernment in 1938. This recognition may have been rescinded later when an attempt was
made by the Kuomintang to set up a conflicting government under Lu Chung-Lin in Hopeh.
At any rate, its present status of legality vis-a-vis the Central Government is obscure.
2402 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
as the Mayor and the Assistant Mayor who are respectively Chairman and Vice-
Chairman of both the General Assembly and the Delegates Assembly. Each
delegate chosen by the Citizens General Assembly represents several persons ;
and if the people whom he represents are not satisfied with the way he performs
his duties, they jnay change him at any time without waiting for the next election
date. The heads of the various village committees are chosen by the Delegates
Assembly from among their ranks. The Mayor and his Assistant and the heads
of the village committees together form the Village Government Committee which
directs the Village Office's work.
A Village Government as described above may actually govern a combina-
tion of several small villages or settlements, or a single large village. If several
small villages comprise an administrative village, each small village elects a
"chief delegate" to act as intermediary with the Village Officer, taking care of
the interests of the particular village. If the Village Government represents only
a single village, no "chief delegate" is selected.
(4) Congresses
The Congresses of the various levels of government (Border Region People's
Congress of the Border Region Government ; Administrative Congress of the
Supervisor's Office; and the Hsien People's Congress) are convened by the heads
of the various government organs to stimulate democracy and realize collective
leadership, according to Communist statements.
(5) Elections
Elections are held every year for village delegates, every two years for the
Hsien Affairs Conference, and every three years for the Border Region Council.
It appears that in the more sparsely populated regions, in the village (or group
of villages) one representative is elected for every 60 persons, in the hsien one for
every 600 to 800 persons, and in the Border Region Congress one representative
for every 8,000 persons. In the more densely populated region of the Chin-Ch'a-
Chi Border Region, however, one representative for 30,000 people was elected to
the Border Region Congress of Jan. 1, 1943.
As early as 1940 '„he Communist Party decided to limit the number of Com-
munist members in any elective Government body to one-third, leaving one-third
for upper class members (landlords and merchants) and one-third for Kuomin-
tang members and non-party people.
This self-imposed restriction has not, however, prevented the Communist Party
from taking the leading role. As has been shown in the historical section of
this study, in the Communist areas the Kuomintang members have no party
machine to back them, and the upper-class non-party group is made up of
representatives of the unorganized landlord-merchant class. The liberal in-
tellectual members of the Government are strong supporters of the Communists,
and so are the peasants and representatives of mass organizations.
The Communist Party makes a point of sponsoring most progressive plans.
An individual landlord, for instance, may suggest a regulation to bring about
a certain improvement in administration or in pi-oduction or distribution. If it
is considered worthwhile, the Communist Party endorses such a regulation, pub-
licizing it as a Communist-sponsored measure. It is soon forgotten that the
landlord originally introduced the measure, and the Communist Party receives
the credit for having sponsored the regulation. For all of these reasons, there
is no strong opposition party to the Communist Party, which remains undisput-
ably the dominant political factor.
D. PEOiPLE's COMMITTEES FOR ANTI-JAPANESE AEMED RESISTANCE
The organization of the Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance is
strictly a militia ("People's Militia") organization and works closely with the
18th Group Army. The Committees have no civil administrative functions,
although they originally formed the core of the Mobilization or Administrative
Committees which were the rudimentary governments later replaced by elected
governments. The organization of these People's Committees for Anti-Japanese
Armed Resistance parallels the administrative set-up of the Border Region
Government. Members of the Village Committee are elected by the citizens of the
village. The Village Committees elect the Chii Committee. The several Chit
Committees within a hsien elect the Hsien Committee and so on. Although the
Committees have a large measure of independence, they are subject to both
government and military control.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
2403
The Committees are headed by the Village, Chu or Hsien Command Head-
quarters. In the village the Mayor is the head of the Command Headquarters,
while the head of the village guerrilla detachment is the executive officer, and
the Chairman of the Committee is next in authority. If a Communist army
unit is stationed in the area, an army representative is also included in the
Village Command Headquarters. The head of the Chii government is also head
of the Chii Command Headquarters, and the Hsien Magistrate is head of the
Hsien Command Headquarters ; the organization of these headquarters is similar
to that of the Village Command Headquarters.
The functions of the various groups within these committees are more fully
discussed in the military section of this report under "The People's Militia."
4. Directory of the Chinese Communist Party and Border Region Governments
a. chinese communist party
Since the names and number of members of various Communist Party organs
are secret, no personnel list has been obtainable from Communist sources. The
list below is supplied by various non-Communist sources and should be evaluated
asC-3.
(1) The Central Committee
Chairman : MAO Tse-tung
CHANG Hao
CHANG Wen-t'ien
CH'EN Ch'ang-hao
CH'EN Keng
CH'EN Shao-yu
CHI Ming-hui
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CHOU En-lai
CHOU Hsing
GHU Te
FENG Wen-pin
FU Chung
HO K'o-ch'iian
HO Lung
HSU Hai-tung
KAN Ssu-ch'i
ELAO Tzu-li
(2) The Political Bureau.
LIN Piao
LIN Tsu-han
LIU Shao-ch'i
LIU Shao-wen
LO Mai
LU Ting-i
MAO Tse-tung
P'ENG Te-huai
TENG Fa
TENG Ying-ch'ao (Miss)
TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)
TS'AI Shu-fan
TUNG Pi-wu
WU Li-p'ing
WU Yii-chang
YANG Ching-yii
YANG Shang-k'un
Chairman : MAO Tse-tung
CHANG Wen-t'ien
CH'EN Shao-yii
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CHOU En-lai
HSIEN K'ang-chih
K'ANG Sheng
KAO Kang
LIN Tsu-han
LIU Shao-ch'i
LO Mai
MAO Tse-tung
TENG Fa
TSENG Shan
TUNG Pi-wu
WANG Chia-se
WU Y'ii-chang
YANG Ching-yii
YANG Shang-k'un
2404
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(5) The Secretariat
Committee Members;
Chairman : MAO Tse-tung
Chief of Organization:
Chief of United Front :
Chief of Publicity:
Chief of Intelligence:
Chief of Social Affairs :
Chief of Military Affairs :
Chief of Industrial Workers:
Chief of Agricultural Workers :
Chief of Women :
Chief of Young People:
Chief of Minorities :
Chief of Overseas Members :
Director, National Labor Union Headquarters :
Director, Southeast Political Branch Bureau :
Director, North China Political Branch Bureau :
Director, Southern Political Branch Bureau:
Director, Northwest Political Branch Bureau :
Director, Statistics Research Bur :
Director, Central Research Inst :
Director, Medical Service for the Masses :
Director, Chieh-fang Jih-pao ("Emancipation
Daily") :
Director, Chieh-fang Press ("Emancipation
Press") :
Director, Hsin-hua News Service :
Principal, Party School in Yenan :
(4T Central Revolutiottary Military Counoil
Chairman :
Vice-Chairmen :
(5) 18th Group Army
Commander :
Deputy Commander :
Chief of Staff:
Chairman General, Political Dept :
Secretary General :
Director, Yenan Office :
Secretary, Yenan Office :
(6) New 4th Army
Commander (Acting) :
Vice Commander :
Chief of Staff:
Political Commissar:
(7) United Defense Headquarters at
Kansu-Ningsia Border Regions
Commander :
Vice Commander :
Chief of StafT:
Political Commissars :
CHANG Wen-t'ien
CH'EN Shao-yu
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CHOU En-lai
LIU Shao-ch'i
MAO Tse-tung
WANG Chia-se
CH'EN Yiin
SSU Ko-ching (Acting)
HO K'o-ch'iian (Acting)
HSIEH K'ang-chih
HSIEH K'ang-chih
CHOU En-lai
CH'IN Pang-hsien
K'ANG Sheng
TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)
FENG Wen-pin
TSENG Shan
LIAO Ch'eng-chih (in 1940)
LIU Shao-ch'i
LIU Shao-ch'i
NIEH Jung-chen
CHOU En-lai
KAO Rang
MAO Tse-tung
FAN Wen-Ian (Acting)
FU Lien-chiang
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CH'IN Pang-hsien
MAO Tse-tung
MAO Tse-tung
CHOU En-lai
CHUTe
CHU Te
P'ENG Te-huai
YEH Chien-ying
WANG Chia-hsiang
YANG Shang-k'un
WANG Shih-ying
HUANG Hua
(8) Party Office in Chungking
Resident Representative :
Secretary :
Publisher, Hsin-hua Jih-paos:
CH'EN I
CHANG Yun-i
LAI Ch'uan-ch'iu
YAO Shu-shih (Acting)
Yenan of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-
HO Lung
HSIAO Ching-Kuang
CHANG Ching-wu
HSIAO Ching-kuang
HSU Hsiang-ch'ien
KUAN Hsiang-ying
TUNG Pi-wu
LI Pong
P'AN Tzu-nien
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2405
B. BORDEE REX5ION GOVERNMENTS
(i) Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region government
Membership lists have been included here for only the three most important
Border Region governments. Personnel information on other governments of
Border Regions and Base Areas is too incomplete to be of value in this directory.
Chairman: LIN Tsu-han
Vice Chairman : LI Ting-ming
Chairman's Committee :
AI Ssu-ch'i KAO Su-hsien
CHANG Ch'in-ch'iu LEI Ching-t'ien
CH'EN K'ang-pai LIU Ching-jen
CHOU Yang MA Ming-fang
HSIAO Ching-kuang PAI Chen-pang
JAO Chang-hu T'AN Cheng
K'ANG Sheng T'ENG Tai-yiian
KAO Ch'ung-shan TS'AO I-ou
KAO Kaug TS'AO Lan-ju
KAO Lang-t'ing YEH Chi-chuang
Secretary General : LO Mai
Commissioner of Civil Affairs : LIU Ching-fan
Commissioner of Construction : HO Tzu-lo.
Commissioner of Education : LIU Shih
Commissioner of Finance : NAN Han-chen
President, Supreme Court : KAO Tzu-li
President, High Court : LEI Ching-t'ien
Director of Trade : YEH Chi-chuang
Chairman, Cultural Association : MAO Tse-tung
Director, Cultural Association : WU Y^ii-chang
President, Yenan University : CHOU Yang
President, Bethune Medical College : CHANG I-chen
Director, Bethune Hospital : LU Chih-chiin
Commander, Peace Preservation Corps : KAO Kang
Mayor of Yenan : KAO Lang-t'ing
Chairman, 2nd People's Political Council : KAO Kang
Vice Chairman, 2nd PPC : HSIEH Chiieh-tsai
(2) Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region government
Chairman : SUNG Shao-veen
Vice Chairman : HU Jen-k'uei
Political Committee :
CHANG Su NIEH Jung-chen
HU Jen-k'uei SUN Chih-yuan
LIU Tien-chi SUNG Shao-wen
President, Associated University : CH'ENG Fang-wn
Chairman, People's Political Council : CH'ENG Fang-vpu
(3) Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region government
Chairman : YANG Hsiu-feng
Vice Chairman : JUNG Wu-sheng
5. Education in Communist-Controlled Base Areas
Education in the Communist base areas is designed to further the war of re-
sistance and train the people to improve agricultural and industrial produc-
tion. There are two kinds of schools, those directly under the Communist Party
for the training of Party officials and Communist Army personnel, and those
under the educational departments of the various Border Region Governments.
Despite this distinction, however, there is Communist influence in the schools not
directly under the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung's "new Democracy," for
instance, and Communist newspapers are used extensively in the University of
Yenan (which is under the Educational Department of the Shen-Kan-Ning Bor-
der Region Government), and primary school textbooks in the Shen-Kan-Ning
Border Region, examined by the group of visiting correspondents in the summer
•of 1944, were found to contain Communist propaganda.
2406 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(1) Communist Party Schools
The Communist Party School at Yenan is under Mao Tse-tung's direction. All
Party leaders and functionaries from all over China are required to attend the
school periodically for purposes of indoctrination. There is also the Anti-Japa-
nese Military and Political University in southeast Shensi, vpith a branch at
Suiteh, Shensi, to train officers for the Communist Armies.
(2) University of Yenan
This University is under the Educational Bureau of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border
Reg:ion Government. It was established in 1941 by the amalgamation of the
North Shensi Public School, the Chinese Women's College, and the Tze-tung
Youth Cadre School. The Institute of Public Administration was incorporated
early in 1944. The University of Yenan now comprises the f ollowng :
(a) College of Administration, with departments of public administration,
public finance, economics and jurisprudence ;
<b) Lu Hsiin Art College, with departments of fine arts, drama, music, and
literature ;
<c) College of Natural Science, with departments of medicine, chemical en-
gineering, mechanical engineering, and agriculture.
In July 1944 there were 1,302 students enrolled in the University of Yenan,
according to Liu Shih, the Commissioner of Education of the Shen-Kan-Ning
Border Region Government. They are said to spend 80% of their time in classes
and study, and 20% in agricultural and industrial production. Great stress
is laid upon "practical" education. According to Liu Shih, "National educa-
tion cannot be isolated from life, and college and secondary education cannot
be isolated from society. It will not do to depend upon textbooks alone." The
Yenen newspaper CHIEH FANG JIH PAO (Emancipation Daily), organ of the
OCP, and other documentary materials are used in addition to textbooks.
(3) Primary and secondary schools
Owing to the deficiency of equipment and materials, the schools in the Shen-
Kan-Ning Border Region are not considered adequate by normal standards.
Mimeographed textbooks and hand-drawn maps are used, as well as the Com-
munist-controlled newspaper MASS JOURNAL (which is published by the so-
called Cultural Association of the Border Area). Primary schools are under
the village and hsien governments, and secondary schools are under the Border
Region Governments. There are also classes for adults who wish to learn to
read and write, and in the Army, factories, and arsenals, illiterates are urged
to learn a few characters each week.
Primary school courses in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are five years
long, according to Commissioner of Education Liu Shih, and classes are held
mainly in the winter so as not to interfere with production. Students are re-
quired to learn 500 characters the first year and an additional 500 the second
year ; these enable the student to read the Mass Journal.
During the winter, schools are in session all day with alternate periods of
study, song, recreation, and spinning and weaving. Enrollment in the winter
classes in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region is said to be over 40,000, and gov-
ernment officials expect to wipe out illiteracy within five years. Mass educa-
tion is also carried on by means of blackboard newspapers, dramas and so-
called "Transplantation Songs," which are songs and dramatizations telling the
population how to improve production and keep up the anti- Japanese resistance.
APPENDIX
Party Statutes of the Chinese Communist Party [1928]
CHAPTER 1. terms
[Article] 1. Definitions. — The Chinese Communist Party is a part of the Communist
International. It shall be called : Chinese Communist Party, Branch Headquarters * of
the Communist International.
* Before a prospective Party member has been approved as a Party member, [one char-
acter possibly missing] the appropriate Party Headquarters may entrust said prospective
Party member with a certain type of Party worlt in order to observe his ability and his
attitude toward the Party.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2407
CHAPTBK 2. PABTT MEMBERS
[Article] 2. Qualifications for entering the Party. — i Whoever accepts the Party regu-
lations and Party Statutes of the Communist International and of the Party, joins one of
the Party's organizations and does active work, therein obeys the decisions of the Commu-
nist International and the Party, and regularly pays his Party dues, may be a member
of the I'arty.
[Article] 3. Procedure for entering the Party. When a new Party member enters the
Party he shall be passed by a Branch Headquarters of the Party. His entry must also
be approved by a District Committee of a Municipal or Hsien (county) Committee or of an
organization equivalent to a Hsien Committee.
Conditions for entering the Party are as follows :
A. Factory workers must be introduced by one Party member and passed by a Produc-
tion Branch Headquarters.
B. Peasants, workers in handicraft industries, intellectuals, and low-ranking employees
of various agencies must be introduced by one Party member.
C. High-ranking employees of various agencies must be introduced by two Party
members.
D. Those who leave other political parties (such as the Kuomintang) to join the Party
must be introduced by three Party members with a membership of one year or more in the
Party. If [such person] was formerly an ordinary member of the other political party,
he shall be approved by a Provincial Committee ; if he was formerly an officer of the other
Dolitical party, he must be approved by Central [Headauartersl.
[Article] 3. When members of the Young Communist League enter the Party, they shall
be introduced by the Young Comm.unist Committee. They must also undergo whichever of
the above procedures may be appropriate, be passed by a Plenary Meeting of the Party
members of a Branch Headquarters or be approved by a higher-ranking Party Headquarters,
Under certain special circumstances Party committees of all ranks have the power
directly to recruit and pass on new Party members.
[Article] 4. Changes in Organization. — When portions of other political organizations
or whole political groups, including entire party organizations, enter or come over to the
Comnunist Party, [their entry into the Party] must be decided on by Central [Head-
quarttrs].
[Article] 5. Transfers oj Party members. — When a Party member transfers from one
[Party] organization into the sphere of activity of (that is into the district of) another
[Party] organization, he must enter the organization in the place to which he moves and
become a member of that organization. All procedures by which Party members transfer
from one organization to another or from China to another country must be in accordance
with the regulations promulgated by Central [Headquarters].
[Article] 6. The question of expulsion. — Expulsion of a Party member must be passed by
a Plenary meeting of the Party members of his Branch Headquarters and must be approved
by a higher-ranking Party committee before becoming effective. Also, [during the period]
before an expulsion decision has been approved by the higher agency, all activities in the
Party of the expelled member must cease immediately. Anyone not submitting to an
expulsion decision may appeal to the supreme organ of the Party. In cases where a
Party member engages in anti-Party activities. Party committees "of all ranks have the
power to expel [the offender] directly. But the lower-ranking Party Headquarters organ-
ization which the expelled person had joined must be notifled of such an expulsion decision.
CHAPTER 3. PARTY ORGANIZATION
[Article] 7. Principles of organisation.- — Like other Branch Headquarters of the Com-
munist International, the principle of organization of the Chinese Communist Party Is
the concentrated democracy system. The fundamental principles of the concentrated
democracy system are as follows :
(1) Low-ranking and high-ranking Party Headquarters are elected by Plenary meetings
of Party members, by congresses, and by national congresses.
(2) Party Headquarters of each rank must make periodic reports to the body of Party
members which elects it.
(3) Lower-ranking party Headquarters must unfailingly recognize the decisions of
higher-ranking Party Headquarters, must strictly observe Party discipline, and must
execute speedily and exactly the decisions of the Communist international Executive
Committee and the directing agencies of the Party. [One character possibly missing]
Organizations having control over a certain district are superior in rank to the organiza-
tions in the various parts of that district. Party members can carry on debate concerning
any question within the Party only before the passing of a decision on that question by
the appropriate agency. Any decision passed by the Congress of the Communist Interna-
tional, by the Congress of the Party, or by a directing agency within the Party must be
executed unconditionally. Even if a certain group of Party members or cei'tain local
organizations do not agree with such a decision, it must still be executed unconditionally.
[Article] 8. The appointment of directing agencies. — When made necessary for reasons
of secrecy, lower-ranking agencies of the Party may be appointed by higher-ranking
agencies and may, with the approval of the higher-ranking agency, appoint new members
to its Party Headquarters Committee.
[Article] 9. Regional districts of the Party. — The Party is divided into units on
the regional principle. An organization controlling a region is a higher-ranking agency
than the organizations of the various parts of that region. All Party members, without
regard for race or nationality, must enter the organization of a local JParty Headquarters
of the Chinese Communist Party and liecome members of the Chinese Communist Party.
[Article] 10. Executive atithority of agencies of various ranks. — Party organizations
have the right of free decision with respect to local problems, within the limits of the
decisions of the Communist International and of the Party.
(Notes). 1 The introducer must be responsible for the person introduced. If his letter
of introduction should l# found incorrect, he must be subjected to disciplinary action,
which may include expulsion from the Party.
2408 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
[Article] 11. The supreme organ of Party Headquarters of each rank. — The supreme
organ of Party Headquarters of each rank shall be the Plenary Meetings of Party mem-
bers, the Congresses, or the National Congress.
[Article] 12. The various ranks of committee. — The Plenary Meetings of Party mem-
bers, the Congresses, or the National Congress shall elect Executive Committees of
the Party Headquarters of corresponding rank. This Executive Committee is the
directing agency in the interval between Plenary Meetings and directs all ordinary
activities of the organizations appropriate to it.
[Article] 13. Question of approval. — All newly established Party organizations (Branch
Headquarters, Hsien Committees, and so forth) must be approved by the higher-ranking
agency to which they are attached.
[Article] 14. The system, of organization of the Party is as follows :
(1) In each factory, workshop, commercial shop, street, village, small town, military
unit and so forth : firstly, Plenary Meeting of Party members of Branch Headquarters';
and secondly, Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee.
(2) In urban or rural districts: firstly, Plenary Meeting of Municipal District Party
members or Municipal District Congress ; and secondly. District Committee.
(3) Within a Hsien or municipality : firstly, Hsien or Municipal Congress ; and secondly,
Hsten or Municipal Committee.
(4) Special districts (include several Hsien, part of a province) : firstly, Special District
Congress ; and secondly, Special District Committee. Special district organizations may
be set up when necessary by a decision of a Provincial Committee.
(5) Province: firstly. Provincial Congress; and secondly. Provincial Committee.
(6) The nation: firstly. National Congress; and secondly. Central Committee.
(7) For the sake of convenience in directing the activities of each Party Headquarters,
the Central Committee may, in accordance with the needs of the situation, establish
Central Administrative Bureaus or Central Special Commissioners with jurisdiction over
several provinces. The Central Administrative Bureaus and Central Special Commissioners
shall be appointed by the Central Committee and shall be responsible to the Central
Committee only.
[Aiticle] 15. Agencies of Party Headquarters. — In order to carry out various special
Party functions, various departments or committees, such as an Organization Department,
a Propaganda and Agitation Department, Labor Movement and Women's Movement Com-
mittees, and so on, may be set up under the Party Committees of each rank. Each such
department or committee shall be attached to the Party Headquarters Committee, shall
carry on its activities under its direction, and shall put into effect its own decisions upon
their being passed by the Party Committee. The organization of the various departments
under the Party Committee shall be determined by Central [Headquarters].
(Supplementary note) : For the purpose of using national languages among the labor
and peasant elements of other nationalities and thus facilitating work, a Minority Na-
tionalities Activities Department shall be set up under local Party Committees. This
Minority Nationalities Activities Department must carry on its activities under the
leadership and supervision of local party Headquarters.
CHAPTER 4. BRANCH HEADQUARTERS
[Article] 16. Basic organisation. — The basic organization of the Party is the Branch
Headquarters (the factory, the mine, the workshop, the commercial shop, the street, the
village, the military unit, and so forth). All Party members [carrying on] activities
in a place must without exception join a Branch Headquarters. Any place where there
are three or more Party members may set up a new ijarty Branch Headquarters organi-
zation, but it must be approved by a District Committee of a Hsien Committee or of an
organization equivalent to a Hsirn Committee.
[Article] 17. Special organizations of Branch Headquarters. — In any business enterprise
where there are one or two Party members [carrying on] activities, these Party members
may be amalgamated with the Production Branch Headquarters nearest to said business,
enterprise, or they may organize a Branch Headquarters jointly with Party members in a
neighboring business enterprise.
Party members not in any business enterprise, such as persons engaged in a handicraft
industry, independent workmen, domestic servants, intellectuals, and so forth, [may]
organize a Street Branch Headquarters in accordance with their place of residence.
If in a Village Branch Headquarters there should be workmen in village economic
enterprises, such as small mines or a certain kind of agricultural pursuit, they may organize
a Production Branch Headquarters on the basis of what they produce.
[Article] 18. Functions of Branch Headquarters. — Branch Headquarters is an organiza-
tion created for the purposes of linking the Party with labor and agriculture. The functions
of a Branch Headquarters are: (1) To carry out the Party's slogans and decisions among
the non-Party laboring and agricultural masses and cause labor and agriculture to stand on
the side of the Party by means of planned Communist agitation and propaganda ; (2) To.
participate actively with the strength of the Party organization in all the political and
economic struggles of labor and agriculture ; to argue their demands from the standpoint
of the revolutionary class struggle ; to organize revolutionary movements among the masses ;
to struggle for the leadership of all revolutionary movements among wo' kers and peasants ;
to strive to draw workers and peasants into narticipation in the general revolutionary
struggle of the Chinese and international proletariat; (3) To recruit and train new
Party riiembers ; to dissseminate Part.v literature; and to carry on cultural and jjolitical
education activities among Party members and among non-Party workers and peasants.
[Article] 19. Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee. — Branch Headquarters
shall elect three or five persons, according to the number of Party members, to constitute
an Administrntive Committee to conduct ordinarv Party affairs. This Administrative
Committee shall conduct the activities of Branch Headquarters and shall assign the work
of Partv members in Branch Headquartci's. such as propaganda, disseiuinn tion of printed
material, carrying on Psirtv gronp activities in Inbor unions and pcas.mt organizations,
women's activities, establishing liaison with Yoting Communist Brancli Headquarters, and
so foith. Tlie Brancli Headquarters Administrative Committee skall elect one person to be
Branch Headquarters Secretary to execute Che decisions of the Plenary Meeting of Party
members or of Branch Headquarters meeting and the directives of higher Party Head--
quarters.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2409
CHAPTER 5. ORGANIZATION OF URBAN AND EnRAT, DISTRICTS
[Article] 20. The District Congress. — Within the urban or rural sub-district the highest
ranking Party organ is tlie Plenary Meeting of Party members or the Congress of Delegates
from every Branch Headquarters of the urban or rural district in question. The Urban or
rural district Plenary Meeting of Party mendiers or Congress of Delegates receives and
passes on the reports" of the District Committee, and it elects the District Committee and
the delegates to the Hsien or Municipal Committee or to the Special District and Provincial
Congresses.
[Article] 21. The District Committee. — The urban or rural District Comnvittee directs
all Party affairs within the jurisdiction of the district during the interval between
Plenary Meetings of Party members or between Congresses. Ordinary meetings of the
urban "or rural District Committee must be convened regularly, within the lin>its imposed
by conditions of secrecy, at least once every half-month. During the interval between
meetings of the Municipal District Committee activities shall be directed by the Stand-
ing Committee of the Municipal District Com<mittee. The Standing Committee shall be
chosen from among the members of the District Committee itself.
CHAPTER 6. HSIEN OR MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION
[Article] 22. The Hsien Congress. — The highest' Party organ within the Hsien is the
Hsien Congress. The Hsien Congress shall convene once every three days. .A temporary
Hsien Congress shall be called by the Hsien Conrmittee on the demand of over half the
organizations in the Hsien or on the decision of the Provincial Committee (or Special
District Committee). The Hsien Congress shall receive the reports of the Hsien Com-
mittee and the Hsien Investigation Committee. It also shall elect delegates to the
Special District Congress or Provincial Congress.
[Article] 23. The Hsien Committee. — The Hsien Committee is elected by the Hsien
Congress, and is the highest Party organ in the Hsien in the interval between Hsien
Congresses. In addition to representatives of the Hsien capital, representatives from the
Party Headquarters of the rural districts or from each important village in the Hsien
moist also participate in the Hsien Committee.
The time [for holding] Plenary Sessions of the Hsien Committee may be determined
by the Hsien Committee itself, but it must hold meetings at least once each month.
The Hsien Committee shall elect one person as Secretary of the Hsien Committee to
administer daily business. The Secretary of the Hsien Conrmittee must be approved
by higher Party Headquartei"S.
[Article] 24. Age7icies of the Hsien Committee. — The Hsien Committee must execute
the decisions of the Hsien Congress, the Provincial Committee, and the Central Com-
mittee : and it must, so far as possible, set up various departments or committees (such
as, Organization, Propaganda, Agitation, Women's Movements, Peasants' Movements,
and so forth) to conduct each type of activity. The heads of the various departments
and committees must as a rule be members of the Hsien Committee and must conduct
their activities under the direction of the Hsien Committee. If a Hsien Party paper
is published, the Hsien Committee shall name its editors. The Hsien Conrmittee admin-
isters Party affairs within the .iurisdiction of the Hsien and in the interval between Hsien
Congresses is responsible to higher Party Headquarters. It must also make regular
reports concerning its own activities to said higher Headquarters.
[Article] 25. In cities where a Hsien Committee is located a Municipal Committee
shall not be set up. Activities [in such cities] shall be under the direct guidance of the
Hsien Committee. City organizations may be divided into city districts. The city
District Committee shall be the organization in charge of the activities of a city district.
[Article] 26. The organization of the Municipal Committee shall be [the "same as]
the Hsien Committee, and, in addition to the rural and Municipal Districts under it, it
may control the suburban rural districts or the Branch Headquarters directly attached
to its suburbs. A Municipal Committee will not be set up in cities where there is a
Provincial Committee or a Special District Committee. Activities [in such cities] shall
be under the direct charge of the Provincial or Speiial District Committee.
[Article] 27. In places where a Special District organization has already been established,
the Special District shall conduct its activities in accordance with tlie regulations for
all Hsien. Where there is no Provincial Committee, the Special District shall establish
direct relations with Central [Headquarters] and shall carry on its activities in accordance
with the regulations for all provincial organizations.
CHAPTER 7. PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION
[Article] 28. The Provincial Congress is the supreme organ within the jurisdiction
of a province. Ordinary sessions of the Provincial Congress shall be convened once
each half-year. Temporary Provincial Congresses shall be called by the Provincial
Committee on the demand of over half of the organizations of the province or in ac-
cordance with a motion of Central [Headquarters]. The Provincial Congress shall listea
to the reports of the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Investigation Committee,
shall debate questions of Part.v affairs and social activities in the province, and shall
elect the Provincial Committee, the Provincial Investigation Committee, and delegates
to the National Congress.
[Article] 29. The Provincial Committee shall be elected by the Provincial Congress.
In the interval between Provincial Congresses it shall be the supreme Party organ withiE
the jurisdiction of the province. Representatives of the Central (provincial capital)
organization of the province and representatives from Party Headquarters in other im-
portant places in the province must all participate in the Provincial Committee.
The Provincial Committee sliall determine the time for its own meetings : hut it shall
hold at least one meeting eveiy month and a half. In the interval between meetings
of the Provincial Committee, the Provincial Committee may, for the sake of convenience
in its work, elect a Standing Committee from among the members of the Provincial
Committee and it may elect a Secretary for the purpose of administering daily business.
[Article] 30. The Provincial Committee shall execute the decisions of the Provincial
Congress and the Central Committee. The Provincial Committee shall organize the
various Party agencies within the jurisdiction of the province ; shall name the editors
22848— 52— pt. 7A 8
2410 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of the party papers in the province ; shall manage party resources and expenditures
within the jurisdiction of tlie province ; and shall control the Accounting Office of
Party Headquarters. The Provincial Committee shall have charge of Party group
activities in non-Party organizations within the province. The Provincial Committee
shall make regular reports on its activities to Central [Headquarters] and shall regu-
larly apprise lower-ranking Party Head-juarters of its activities. For doing research
into each important problem, the Provincial Committee shall set up various departments
or committees, such as, an Organization Department, a Propaganda and Agitation
Department, a Labor Movement Committee, and so forth. As a general rule, the head
of each department shall be appointed from among the regular or reserve members of
the Provincial Committee and shall carry on its activities under the direct guidance
of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Committee.
[Article] 31. The Provincial Committee shall conduct activities in the city where it
is located by means of Municipal District Committees. For this reason, if a Hsien Com-
mittee be established where a Provincial Committee is located, such Hsien Committee
may carry on activities only in the rural districts of the Hsien.
CHAPTER 8. THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PARTY
[Article] 32. As a rule, the National Convention of the Party shall meet twice a year.
The composition of the National Convention and its rate of representation (i. e., how
many persons shall elect one delegate) shall be determined by the Central Committee.
[Article] 33. Resolutions of the Party National Convention shall take effect only after
authorization by the Central Committee.
[Article] 34. If the time for holding a Party National Convention should fall just
prior to a World Congress of the Communist International, [the National Convention]
may, with the consent of the Communist International Executive Committee, elect
delegates to such Communist International World Congress.
CHAPTER 9. THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE P.ARTY
[Article] 35. The National Congress of the Party is the Supreme organ of the Party.
As a general rule, it shall meet once a year, being convened by the Central Committee
upon obtaining the consent of the Communist International. ^ Temporary meetings of the
National Congress of the Party shall be called by the Central Committee on the inde-
pendent decision of the Central Committee or on the motion of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International or on the demand of delegates to the last previous Congress
representing organizations [comprising] a majority of the membership of the Party. But
the calling of temporary meetings of the National Congress of the Party must be approved
by the Executive Committee of the Communist International. [Information] concerning
the convening of the Party National Congress, matters to come up for discussion in the
Congress, its daily agenda, and so forth must be made known to the membership of the
Party one month before it meets at the latest. The Party National Congress may pass
resolutions only when the delegates present are able to represent a majority of the
membership of the Party.
The rate of representation in the National Congress of the Party shall be determined
by the Executive Committee of the Communist International or by the Central Committee
or by the Party Convention held prior to the Party National Congress.
[Article] 36. The National Congress of the Party shall
(1) receive and examine the reports of the Central Committee and the Central
Investigation Committee,
(2) decide questions concerning Party regulations,
(3) make decisions on all such matters as political questions and questions of
policy or organization,
(4) elect the Central Committee, the Central Investigation Committee, and so forth.
[Article] 37. Delegates to the National Congress of the Party should be elected by
the Party Provincial Congresses, but when made necessary by secret activities, delegates
may be appointed by a Provincial Committee on obtaining the consent of the Executive
Committee of the Communist International. A temporary National Convention of the
Party may be substituted for a Party National Congress on obtaining the consent of
the Executive Committee of the Communist International.
CHAPTER 10. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
[Article] 38. The number of members of the Central Committee shall be determined
by the National Congress.
[Article] 39. The Central Committee is the supreme organ of the Party in the interval
between National Congresses of the Party. It represents [the Party] when relations are
opened with other political parties,'' establishes the various kinds of Party agencies, directs
all political and organizational activities of the Party, names the editors of the central
official organs of the Party, which are under its guidance supervision, sends Central Com-
missioners to Party organizations in any province and establishes Central Administrative
Bureaus as conditions may require, administers publishing offices and other enterprises
of importance to the Party as a whole, administers Party finances and resources, manages
the Central Accounting Office, and so forth.
The Central Committee shall periodically convene Plenary Sessions of its members — at
least once every three months.
[Article] 40. The Central Committee shall elect a Political Bureau from among its own
membership to direct the political activities of the Party in the interval between Plenary
Sessions of the Central Committee, and it shall elect a Standing Committee to conduct
ordinary business.
[Article] 41. In accordance with the various types of activity, the Central Committee
shall set up various departments and committees, such as : an Organization Department,
a Propaganda and Agitation Department, a Labor Committee, a Woman's Movements
Committee, and so forth. The duty of the various departments or committees is to conduct
' The 6th National Congress was held in Moscow in 1928. The 7th National Congress
was held in 'Senan in April 1945.
■* Origin of italics uncertain.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2411
Tarious activities within their particular sphere of work in accordance with the directives
of Central [Headquarters]. The Central Committee shall appoint the heads of the various
departments and committees. These heads should so far as possible be chosen from among
the members of the Central Committee.
[Article] 42. On the basis of political and economic conditions, the Central Committee
shall determine the scope of the activities of each Party Headquarters organization in
each place, and it shall delineate the various territorial units in accordance with the
administrative districts throughout the country.
CHAPTER 11. THE CENTRAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE
[Article] 43. The Party National, Provincial, Hsien, and Municipal Congresses shall
elect Central, Provincial, Hsien, and Municipal Investigating Committees for the purpose
of inspecting the finances and accounting of Party Headquarters of various ranks and
the activities of the various agencies.
CHAPTER 12. PARTT DISCIPLINE
[Article] 44. Strictly to observe party discipline is the highest obligation of all Party
members and of Party Headquarters of all ranks.
The decisions of the Communist Tuternational, of the Chinese Communist Party National
Congress, of the Central Committee and of the other high-ranking agencies must all be
speedily and exactly executed. However, all controversial questions within the Party
may be debated freely before a decision is made.
[Article] 45. [Those who] do not execute a decision of higher Party Headquarters and
[those who] are guilty of other faults recognized within the Party as errors must be giren
disciplinary punishment by the appropriate Party Headquarters. The methods by which a
Party Headquarters administers punishment against an organization are : rebuke, naming
a temporary committee, and dissolution of the organization and re-enrollment of its Party
members. Against individual party members they are : various kinds of formal rebuke,
warning, public rebuke, cessation of important Party activities, and dismissal from the
Part.v or subjection to observation for an appropriate period.
Questions relating to breaches of discipline shall be investigated by Plenary Meetings
of Party members or Party Headquarters of the various ranks. Committees of the various
ranks may set up special committees to conduct a preliminary investigation of questions
relating to a breach of Party discipline. The decisions of such committees shall take effect
after being approved by Party Headquarters of that rank. Questions of dismissal from the
Party shall be settled ia accordance with the procedure established in Article 6 of these
Statutes.
CHAPTER 13. PARTY FINANCE
[Article] 46. Expenditures of a Party Headquarters shall be paid from Party dues,
special contributions, subventions from Party printing establishments and from higher
Part.v Headquarters, and other such sources.
[Article] 47. The amount of Party entry fees and Party dues shall be determined by
the Central Committee. Unemployed and extremely indigent Party members may be
exempted from payment of dues.
One who for three months successively fails without adequate cause to pay his dues shall
[make] a statement of his voluntary separation from the Party and shall announce it to
the meeting of Party members.
CHAPTER 14. PARTY GROUPS
[Article] 4S. Whenever there are three or more Party members at the congresses or
conventions of. or in the agencies of, a non-Party organization (such as a labor union,
peasant association, social group cultural organization, and so forth) they shall form a
Party Group the duty of which shall be to strengthen the influence of the Party within
such non-Party organization, to carry out the Party's policies, and to supervise the
activities of Party members in such non-Party organization. A Party Group may elect
an Administrative Committee and a Secretary to conduct ordinary business.
A Party Group shall have the right of independence in settling internal questions and
In its ordinary business. Wlien disagreements arise between the committee of a Part.v
Headquarters and a Party Group, the Party Committee should re-examine the question
with the help of a representative of the Party Group and make a decision. The Party
Group must execute such a decision at once. If the Party Group should dissent from it
and make an appeal, the question shall he settled by the nearest higher-ranking Party
Headquarters, but it must still carry out the decision of the Party Committee during the
period of the appeal.
[Article] 49. When a Party Committee debates a question which concerns a Party
Group, it must have a representative of that Party Group in attendance at the appropriate
meetings of the Party Headquarters Committee, and [such representaive] shall have the
right to speak.
[Article] 50. When a Part.v Group elects an Administrative Committee, such Adminis-
trative Committee must be approved by the Party Headquarters to which [the Party
•Group] is attached. The Administrative Committee of a Party Group must be responsible
to a Party Headquarters of that rank for the work of the Party Group. A Party Head-
quarters may send one of its ov.n committee members as a representative to join the
organization of the I'arty Group Administrative Committee ; it shall also have the power
to recall any committee member, but it shall at the same time inform the Party Group of
the reasons for the recall.
[Article] 51. In any organization in which a Party Group is active, name lists of per-
sonnel for each position shall be proposed by the Party Group on obtaining the consent
of local Party Headquarters. Questions relating to the transfer of Party members from
one Party Group to another shall be settled in the same way.
[Article] 52. Every question requiring decision in an organization where there Is a
Party Group ought first to be debated in a meeting of the Party Group or in the Party
-rrroup Administrative Committee.
2412 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
At meetings of an organization [where there is a Party Group], Party members who
have joined that Party Group must uniformly support and vote for the decisions of the
Party Group on all questions. All Party members who break this rule must be given dis-
ciplinary punishment by Party Headquarters in accordance with the Statutes of the Party.
CHAPTER 15. RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST YOUTH CORPS [YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE]
[Article] 53. Representatives having the right to speak and vote must be exchanged
between directing agencies of all ranks (from Branch Headquarters to Central [Head-
quarters]) of the Party and of the Youth Corps. Likewise, the Youth Corps may elect
and send [a number of] representatives proportionate to the number of members in the
Corps to all Congresses of the Party.
VOLUME II
6. Economic Situation in Chinese Communist Areas
A. ECONOMIC characteristics, AREA AND POPULATION
(i) General
The Communist-controlled areas of North China embrace the northeastern
parts of Shensi and Kansu in Free China and parts of the provinces of Shausi,
Hopeh, Shantung, Honan, Suiyuan and Chahar behind the Japanese lines. In
Central China the Communist areas are all behind the Japanese lines and include
substantial portions of the provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh and small
areas in Chekiaug and Hunan. In South China the Communists control small.
areas in and around the Canton delta and on Hainan- island. In the occupied
region the Japanese control the railways and main highways, the important
navigable rivers, the large cities, the chief district cities, and the adjoining coun-
tryside. The Japanese-controlled territories separate the Communist areas one
from the other and make free and easy communication between them impossible.
A unified economic life within the Communist region is therefore impossible.
(2) Economic characteristics
In North China the central core of each Communist base is located in a rough,
mountainous or out-of-the-way region. The periphery generally extends out into
the plains and more fertile agricultural areas. Between the consolidated Com-
munist area and the Japanese-controlled area there is a region not effectively
controlled by either. Millet and wheat are staple food crops. In Central and
South China the Communist bases are located in more fertile territory, but are
generally outside the main lines of communications and in regions cut by»many
waterways and divided by swamps and lakes. Ilice and wheat are the staple
food crops. In general the areas occupied by the Communists were the most
backward and least fertile and productive regions prior to the war. Although
important mineral-producing areas are within the Communist Border Regions,,
the important mines are controlled and operated by the Japanese. Agriculture
and decaying handicraft industries were characteristic of these areas before the
war. Although the Communists have made extensive efforts to reclaim land,
revitalize agriculture and revive handicraft industries, the productive capacity
of the areas is still low, and there are no modern large-scale industries. Small
scale farming and handicraft industries provide the economic foundation of
the areas.
(3) Area and population
No even approximately accurate figures on the area and population controlled
by the Coinmunistis are possible, because a census has not been taken and because
the dividing line between Japanese and Communist controlled areas is constantly
changing. Communist broadcasts have claimed as much as 520,000 square miles
of "liberated" territory behind the Japanese lines, but other Communist sources
lay claim to little more than 150,000 square miles. Similarly some recent Com-
munist sources claim that they control as many as 100,000,000 people, but i-eports
of 1943 claimed only about 52,000,000.
As careful an estimate as possible of the area and population conti'olled by
the Communists was made in MIS in the spring of 1944. This estimate was as
follows :
Area, square
miles
Population
North China .
155,000
48, 500
8,300
35, 718, 000
Central China ---
23, 700, 000
South China _ .-_ -
3, 000, 000
Total - ---
212, 000
62, 418, 000
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
2413
After making due allowance for recent Communist advances it seems probable
that the area largely under their control is somewhere between 200,000 and
225,000 square miles and that the population largely under their control i»
between 70,000,000 and 85,000,000. Further details as compiled from' various
sources are given in the accompanying table.
Area and population of the Communist regions
Claims of 1943-44
Claims of 1944-45
Region
Area, square
miles
Population
Area, square
miles
Population'
North China (Eighth Route Army Area):
(?)
9,000
30, 000
1 33, 000
26, 000
2, 000, 000
1, 750, 000
8, 600, 000
13, 470, 000
10, 700, 000
35,000
1, 580, 000'
Shansi-Suivuan
3, 000,. 000'
1 18, 000, 000'
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan . . . _
14, 000
f 4, 200, 000'
1 10,800,000
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan
1 14,000,000'
Total for North China
98, 000+
36, 520, 000
51, 580,. ODD
Central China (New 4th Army Area):
Northern Kiangsu
3.700,000
7, 608, 075'
1,908,843
3, 021, 318
2, 083, 600
1,660,000
Eastern Chekiang
(?)
9, 200, 000
Total in Central China
(?)
15, 480, 000
2 30, 481, 836
South China:
East River Base . .
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
7,000
1,000,000
(?)
Grand Total
52,000,000+
83,061,836+
' The figures for the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shantung areas seem too large.
'Sic.
B. ECONOMIC POLICY, PROGRAM AND ACHIEVEMENTS
(i) Economic theory
Although the Communist leaders are admittedly Marxists and look forward to
the time when a Communist society will prevail in China, they have for the
present abandoned their earlier policies of land confiscation and immediate col-
lectivism in favor of a more moderate policy designed to gain the supi>ort of the
mass of the people and more suited to the situation in China. In general the
theory being followed for the present is that it is impossible for China to move
immediately from an agrarian society to a Communist collectivistic society. The
Communists argue that China must go through a stage of democratic industrialism
based fundamentally upon private property before the time is ripe for true Com-
munism. During this transitory period they expect to avoid the major evils that
have appeared in Western capitalistic society.
The ideas of the Communist leaders are set forth in the following reported
statements of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Mao states that :
"Our old program of land confiscation — modified, inasmuch as the land-
lord got a share — was not bad at the time. The basic demand of the masses
was concentrated on their desire for land. Sun Yat-sen advocated it. But
it is not suitable to war time because the landlords wish to be anti-Japanese,
but a policy of confiscation may drive them into the other camp. The
peasants see the simple truth that rent reduction makes it possible for the
landlords to remain, and helps to isolate the Japanese. After a few ex-
periences of land confiscation in some areas early in the war, the peasants
saw that this policy ultimately harmed them. A policy of rent concessions
by the landlord and guarantee of payment of rent by the tenant results ia
successful and genuine cooperation. This policy is not merely opportunistic :
it is the only possible one. Three forms of industrialization will coexist.
2414 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
These are mentioned in the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress.
(State, large scale private, and handicraft) Use of cooperatives depends on
locality. Here in the Northwest there v^^ill be need for handicrafts. In the
large cities conditions will be different. We can work according to Sun Yat-
sen. Nation-wide enterprises capable of influence on the national economy,
such as railways,- should be State-owned. The rest will be private. In rural
and distant areas, we will need cooperatives."
Chou En-lai looks forward to an ultimate socialist collectivism but believes
that will not come for a considerable length of time.
"China's development will not proceed along the same lines as Soviet
Russia's. There will be stages. For example, on the basis of individual
production we have adopted the mutual help or labor-exchange method,
rather than an immediate and drastic establishing of collectivism."" Sec-
ond, from the principle of private ownership we hope to move to the na-
tionalization of big enterprises — communication systems, banks, war indus-
tries. Third, we shall progress from the reduction of rents and interest to
the stage of land owned by the tillers, and eventually to state ownership or
nationalization of the land. Fourth, on the basis of equal suffrage for all
social classes, we shall enable the majority — the laboring classes — to obtain
the privilege of suffrage. The intention is to make rule by a minority less
likely. . . . Fifth, under conditions of equality we shall strive for inter-
national peace and cooperation. These five points summarize what we call
our New Democracy. They are also incorporated in the program of the
revolutionary San Min Chu I as interpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the
Manifesto of the First Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924."
(2) Present economic policies
Present policies include among others the following main points :
(a) The abandonment of land confiscation. As a result of the formation of
the united front, the program of confiscation of the land of the landlords wa&
abandoned in September 1937. Confiscations prior to that time have remained
in force, but according to the Communist none have been made since then.
(b) The reduction and guarantee of rents. Although land confiscation has
been abandoned, landlords have had to accept smaller rents, but in return a
policy of guaranteeing the payment of these rents has been adopted. This
policy has had the three-fold purpose of gaining the support of the landlords,
protecting the peasants, and, by reducing the rents on land, forcing the land-
lords to invest their surplus capital in industry.
(c) The encouragement of cooperatives as a means of developing industry.
Increasing capital, promoting self-sufficiency and raising the living standard.
(d) The encouragement of private capital in order to obtain suflBcient funds
to make possible the economic development of the Communist areas. The in-
vestment of private capital in industry and business has been encouraged.
Profits are limited, and hoarding and profiteering are regulated, but loans are
made to all types of private enterprise, especially cooperative. Recent ob-
servers indicate that small business enterprises are encouraged and that pri-
vate trade flourishes in the market towns. In 1944 there were 2,579 private
shops in the Yenan area, and the number is said to be increasing every year.
(e) A program of increased production aimed at self-sufficiency, the raising
of the standard of living and the equalization of wealth. This program is pop-
ularized in the One-One Program of Mao Tse-tung, so named because of its
eleven points. The pertinent economic elements of the program are as fol-
lows:
Each family is to keep one year's food supply in storage.
Each village is to have a spinning and weaving machine and a blacksmitli
shop.
Each village (hsiang) is to have a large storehouse.
Each town is to have a general merchandise store.
Each family is to have a pig and a cow.
Each family is to plant 100 trees.
Each village is to have a well and a water supply station.
^ It should be noted that collectivism T^as not introduced immediately In the Soviet
Union. It was not before 1928 when Stalin felt that Soviet power had been sufficiently
consolidated to permit such a drastic economic reform that collectivism was introduced in
Soviet Russia. There are many similarities between the economic program, of the Chinese
Communists and the "New Economic Policy" of Soviet Russia as introduced in 1921.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2415
(f ) After the war they look forward to free trade and hope to have foreign
help In the development of industry.
The following economic principles, outlined In the People's Political Council
in Yenan in 1941, set forth certain of the basic essentials of the present policy:
The Communists will urge the strict enforcement of the principle of clean
and honest government and severe punishment of any functionary guilty
of graft or embezzlement. They will oppose jobbery. If a Communist
violates the laws, the Party is of the opinion that he should be subjected to
a severe penalty. At the same time, we believe that the salary system
should be based on the principle of economy and fi-ugality. The necessary
material needs of all functionaries and their dependents should be satisfied,
and an adequate cultural and recreative life must be guaranteed them.
Communist representatives will urge measures intended to develop agri-
cultural production and to mobilize the masses for their spring sowing and
autumn harvesting, and help poor peasants to overcome difficulties in
securing plowing animals, farm implements, fertilizers and seeds. They will
propose that a further 600,000 mou [six 7nou equal one English acre] of
untitled land be cultivated in the present year in order to increase the supply
of food crops by 400,000 piculs [one picul equals 133 pounds]. Migration
of people to the Border Region wil Ibe encouraged.
The Communists declare their belief that in the districts where land
has been distributed, the right of private ownership of land should be
guaranteed to all peasants who have acquired land. In other districts where
land has not been distributed (such as Suiteh, Fuhsien and Chinyang),
the right of ownership of land should be guaranteed to creditors. The Party
declares that the rates of rent and interest must be reduced. Tenants
should pay a certain amount of rent to the landlords, and debtors should
pay a certain amount of interest to creditors. The Government should regu-
late the relationship between landlords and tenants and between creditors
and debtors.
The Communist representatives will propose measures designed to develop
industrial production and trade, encourage private enterprise, and protect
private property. They believe the Border Region should welcome invest-
ments from outside and al)road, foster free trade, and oppose monopoly
and manipulations. At the same time it should develop the cooperatives
and promote the development of handlicraft industry.
The People's Political Council should regulate the relationship between
employers and employees, put into practice a ten-hour working day, raise
labor productivity, foster labor discipline, and adequately improve the liveli-
hood of the workers.
The People's Political Council should devise a rational system of taxation,
with the exception of the poorest section of the people, who should be ex-
empted from taxation, a progi'essive tax system- — in which the rate of taxa-
tion varies in accordance with the amount of property or income of the tax-
payer— should be enforced, so that the costs of the anti-Japanese War are
equitably borne, and by the great majority of the population. At the same
time the oi'ganization of financial institutions should be improved, financial
relations regulated, national currency protected. Notes issued by the Border
Region Bank should be consolidated so as to facilitate the development of a
healthy economy and finance.
The People's Political Council should provide vagrants with opportunity
to work on the farm, secure jobs, and receive education. It should seek to
correct the bad habits of functionaries and others in discriminating against
vagrants. It should pursue a policy of winning over, uniting and educating
Hweimin [organizations with superstitions and semifeudal practices and
purposes].
(5) The program for increased production and self-sufficiency
Because of the relative poverty of the Communist areas and the difficulty of
getting supplies from the outside, a drive to increase production and make the
areas self-sufficient was begun in the late thirties. After the imposition of the
blockade against the Communist areas by the Chungking Government in 1940
this program was intensified. The main methods used to increase production
were as follows :
(a) Every person was to be a producer. Women were encouraged to work and
to form spinning and weaving cooperatives. Townspeople, officials, students
2416 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and soldiers were ordered to cultivate gardens, to work part time in industry
and in general to become self-sufficient. In pursuit of tliis policy, most of the
army units began the reclamation of land, the cultivation of gardens, and the
production of clothing and other items needed by themselves. As a result many
of the army' units are now practically self-sufficient. Army, government and
party members are said to be producing about 64 percent of their food and cloth-
ing in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.
(b) "Labor Heroes" were introduced as a means of encouraging people to in-
crease their productive efforts. Persons who had made signal contributions were
singled out for honors, and their achievements were propagandized. Idlers were
encouraged to go to work and every possible device used to get them to work.
In 1935 there were supposed to have been 70,000 idlers in the Yenan area, which
number was reportedly reduced to 3,967 by the beginning of 1944.
(c) Labor unions and agricultural labor brigades were also organized to in-
crease the efficiency of labor. The organization of labor unions was begun in
1937, in the Yenan area. The Border Regional General Labor Union was formed
in 1940. It includes industrial workers, office workers and agricultural laborers.
It is considered a mass organization and aims to mobilize the population in the
war. Its functions are to adjust relations between employers and workers, to
carry out the government production program and to improve the general cultural
condition of the workers. In general it aims to support the labor policy of the
government which includes the following points :
The improvement of livelihood, increased production and strengthening the
cause of workers.
A 10-hour day for the present period with an 8-hour day as the ideal.
Respect on the part of labor for contracts and the maintenance of labor
discipline.
Strengthen the organization and improve workers' education.
Increase the number of laborers.
Peasant societies have been organized to improve the condition of agricultural
workers and to bargain with employers. Wages in general are paid in kind, and
in many industrial establishments, meals, clothing and other items are provided.
(d) Immigrants were encouraged from other areas, particularly from the
famine-stricken regions of Honan. Some 70,000 have reportedly been absorbed
recently in the Yenan areas alone.
(e) An extensive program of land reclamation and agricultural improvement
was put into effect. ( This will be discussed in more detail below ) .
(f ) The organization of cooperatives was actively promoted. They are of four
types : industrial or producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, transporta-
tion cooiDeratives, and credit cooi>eratives, of which the first two are the most
important. They have been organized extensively throughout all the Border
Regions and have added materially to the productive power of the area. Indus-
trial cooperatives were started in 1939 with the aid of organizers of the movement
from the Chungking area. However, support from Chungking was soon cut off,
and the movement had to go on with little support or aid from the outside. No
over-all statistics on the number of coopei'atives in the Communist areas are
available, but in the Yenan area they are said to have increased from 142 in 1937
to 624 in February 1944.
(4) Achievements of the production program: living standards
In general the program of increased production seems to have been successful.
Recent travelers in the various Communist regions almost universally agree that
economic conditions have greatly improved over what they were in 1941. At
present all of the areas are relatively self-sufficient. Food production has been
increased and is fairly equitably distributed. Beggars have practically disap-
peared, and there are few signs of desperate poverty. Handicrafts have been
revised to such a state that the most pressing needs of the civilian population
and fighting forces are being met. Clothing is simple but generally adequate.
The Yenan area, one of the poorest of the Communist areas and the one which has
been most severely affected by the Chungking blockade, is now said to be produc-
ing at least two-thirds of its cotton cloth requirement and to be self-sufficient in
most consumer goods such as matches, soap, paper, etc. Wheat is of increasing
Importance in the diet, although millet is still the staple food.
Most observers seem to agree that the general living standard is equal to and
in many cases superior to that in Kuomintang China. Troops in genei*al are
better fed and certainly in better physical condition than in Kuomintang China,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
2417
One observer indicates the change in the standard of living of troops in the Yenan
area as shown in the following table. December 1939 equals 100.
1939 100
1940 88
1941 84. 2
1942 96. 3
1943 125.5
Although living conditions may have improved, judged by Western standards
they are still pitifully low, as can be seen from the accompanying table which
gives the monthly ration allowance per person established by the government in
the S.hensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Area.
[Pounds]
Basic mini-
mum ration
Factory
workers
Soldiers
Millet . -
48
2. 7-5. 3
40
1. 3-2. 2
1.3
60
160
4
36+
60
Meat
4.6
Vegetables.
43
Vei;etable oils ... . ...
Salt.
Coal
I Includes 20 pounds of wheat.
In addition clothing, shoes, bedclothes, soap, paper, lodgings, medical care and
some other items are provided.
C. AGKICULTURE AND TBADE
(1) Agriculture
As has been pointed out, agriculture forms the basis of economic life in the Com-
munist area. In North China the important food crops are millet, wheat, sweet
potatoes, kaoliang, soybeans, broad beans, corn, Irish potatoes and oats, while the
most important commercial crops are cotton, soybeans and vegetable oil seeds.
Considerable wool is also produced, and pigs, sheep and poultry are the important
food-producing animals. Oxen, donkeys, mules and horses are the chief draft
animals. In Central China rice becomes an important food crop, replacing millet
and kaoliang to a considerable extent, and in South China rice is the all-important
food crop. The water buffalo is the most important draft animal in Central and
South China.
Since much of the area controlled by the Communists is relatively unproductive,
since agricultural methods are very backward, and since the area depended upon
the importation of many agricultural tools and implements, the Communists have
often had serious difficulties in meeting their food requirements. Consequently
they have endeavored to increase agricultural production by the following means :
(a) Land reclamation which includes the clearing and cultivation of land
which have been allowed to go to waste, the reclamation of other areas through
irrigation and the construction of irrigation canals or drainage ditches. The
army has taken a prominent part in this reclamation program. Although no
over-all figures on land reclamation are available it seems certain that consider-
able areas have been restored to cultivation and that areas damaged by Japanese
raiding expeditions have been restored.
(b) Agricultural education and the introduction of new methods and new crops.
Each of the Border Regions maintains an agricultural experiment station which
studies improved varieties of seeds and carries on education among the peasantry
directed toward the improvement of agricultural methods.
(c) The increase and improvement of agricultural implements.
(d) The encouragement of livestock breeding.
(e) The improvement of the condition of the tenant farmer through reduction
of rents, loans and exemptions from taxation.
(f) The formation of labor exchange groups among the farmers so as to
increase village productivity and to use more economically the limited supply
of agricultural implements.
(g) Keeping agricultural production out of the hands of the enemy by en-
couraging handicraft industries and discouraging the production of crops which
have no food value or could not be marketed within the Communist area.
2418 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
As a result of these measures agricultural production has increased, and at
the present the Communist areas are generally self-suflficient so far as food
production is concerned.
Agriculture is discussed more extensively under the various Communist areas.
(2) Trade
The Communists carry on a limited amount of trade with Chungking China
and with Occupied China. The trade with Chungking is mainly from the
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area, while the trade with the Japanese occupied regions
is carried on from the areas behind the Japanese lines. Since the Communist
areas were deficient in cloth and most types of manufactured articles, they
have attempted to acquire these through trade either with the rest of Free
China or with the occupied areas. They adopted a policy in the regions behind
the Japanese lines of restricting the export of food, cotton and other raw
materials which would be useful to the Japanese, but did permit sufficient trade
so that they could obtain cloth and finished products such as munitions, radio
parts, medicines, kerosene, etc. During the early years of Japanese occupation
it was relatively easy to acquire goods from the Japanese controlled areas, but
as time has gone on the availability of manufactured products has decreased
and the Japanese have imposed a more rigid blockade, with the result that the
flow of essential commodities has decreased. Between 1937 and 1940 relatively
free exchange of goods between the Yenan area and the rest of Free China
took place, but since that time the Central Government has imposed a partial
blockade against the Communist areas. As a result, exports from the Yenan area
have been confined largely to salt and petroleum products which were needed
by the rest of Free China in return for cloth, dyestuffs, etc. There was very
little movement of goods from one Communist area to another because of the
difficulties of transportation.
D. INDtJSTEY AND ARMS PKODTJCTION
(1) Industry
Before the war there was no modern industry in any of the Communist-con-
trolled areas, and because most of the people depended upon imported cloth and
manufactured items the home handicraft industries had deteriorated or gone out
of existence entirely. Under Communist leadership a great effort has been made
to develop handicraft industries in order to make the areas self-sufficient both as
to military supplies and essential civilian needs. Numerous obstacles have been
encountered, including: (1) lack of equipment, (2) difficulties in obtaining raw
materials, (3) lack of skilled artisans, and (4) shortage of power, practically no
electrical power being available. Nevertheless considerable progress has been
made through the development of cooperatives and the establishment of govern-
ment factories or government subsidized industries. At present numerous handi-
craft industries exist throughout the Communist region. They produce cotton,
woolen and linen cloth, blankets, stockings, towels, cigarettes, matches, soap,
paper, dyes, chinaware, chemicals, machine tools, etc. Although the Communist
areas are still not entirely self-sufficient in the production of light consumer
goods, their position has greatly improved. They are, however, still woefully
weak so far as the production of machinery, chemicals, electrical equipment and
all heavy industry goods are concerned. Most steel is obtained from rails torn
up from the Japanese-controlled railways.
(2) Arsenals
Although there are a number of small arsenals scattered throughout the Com-
munist areas, they are incapable of effectively meeting the needs of the Com-
munist troops, who still must depend to a considerable extent for arms and
munitions upon materials captured from the enemy. No rifles, bullets or other
military supplies have been received from the Central Government since 1940-41,
when the sending of such supplies was stopped. The largest and best equipped
arsenals are in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area and the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh
area. Generally speaking the arsenals behind the Japanese lines are of a mobile
type so that they can be dismantled and moved about readily in case of raids.
No complete list of arsenals is available, although there appear to be three in the
Shenai-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region one or two small ones in the Shansi-Suiy-
uan Border Region, two in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region, two in the
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region and a number in each of the other base
areas. American fliers forced down in the New 4th Route Army region in
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2419
•
Xiangsu province reported that each division had three small arsenals attached
to it.
The arsenals specialize in the repair of small arms and the loading of car-
tridges, the manufacture of mortars and mortar ammunitions, hand grenades and
land mines, and the production of powder. A few of the arsenals are able to
make rifles and light machine guns and repair light field guns. Among the diffi-
culties which interfere with arms and munitions production are: (1) lack of
steel, copper, brass and other necessary raw materials; (2) poor explosives
(generally speaking the powder available is a locally made black powder of poor
quality, although in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region a good quality
powder is manufactured) ; (3) lack of proper equipment and machinery ; and (4)
lack of adequately trained technical personnel. Numerous observers agree that
the armament production facilities of the area are so limited that no large scale
offensive would be possible.
Industry and arms production are discussed in more detail under the various
Communist areas.
E. TEANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(i) General
Transportation and communication facilities throughout the Communist areas
are very poor. There are no railroads and, except in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region which is outside the Japanese occupied area, there are no motor
roads. In fact, behind the Japanese lines the Communists have deliberately
destroyed roads and trails leading into their base areas as a means of defense
against the Japanese. Within the base areas trails provide the chief connect-
ing arteries.
(2) Roads and trails
In the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region there are said to be about 800
miles of road which could be used by trucks or motor cars. These include the
main highway from Fu-hsien north through Yenan to Mi-chih. From Fu-hsien
this road runs southward through Kuomintang-controlled territory to Sian and
affords the only motor connection between the Communist area and Free China.
Other motor roads include one running northwestward from Yenan via Ching-
pien to the salt-producing area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. Another runs from
Ting-pien southeast to Ch'ing-yang. A fourth road reportely runs from Ch'ing-
chien on the Yenan-Mi-chih road to Ching-pien on the Yenan to Ting-pien road.
These roads supplemented by trails constitute the main transportation routes
in this area. During 1942 about 45,000 laborers are said to have been mobilized
to work on road construction.
The main route leading from Yenan to the base areas behind the Japanese
lines runs northward from Yenan to Mi-chih. From there a trail runs north-
eastward to Chia-hsien on the Yellow River and thence for some distance north
along the west bank of the river to a ferry crossing which connects with trails
leading to the headquarters of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. From there
various routes lead to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and the Shansi-
Hopeh-Honan Border Region. Communication between the base areas behind
the Japanese lines is difiicult because the Japanese-controlled railroads can be
crossed only by armed forces or by means of tunnels.
(3) Equipment and methods
The few hundred miles of motorable highway are of little use to motor trans-
port because of the almost complete absence of trucks or automobiles. One
source states that there are only about 20-odd dilapidated trucks in the Yenan
area. In general, mules, donkeys and human carriers are the main means of
transportation, while horses are used to transport persons. Travel is slow and
difficult, throughout the Communist areas, and one member of the U. S. Army
Observer Section at Yenan indicates that during an extended field trip which
he took by horseback they were rarely able to cover more than 25 miles a day.
In the area behind the Japanese lines travel is even slower because of the long
delays caused in crossing the Japanese controlled railways and highways, and
in many cases it takes week or even months to travel a distance which would
normally take only a few hours or days. In Hopeh extensive tunnel systems
lead under the railways.
The government has encouraged the formation of transportation cooperatives
and salt transport groups to facilitate the movement of goods in the Yenan
;area. These organized groups are said to be much more efficient in transporta-
2420 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
•
tion than private transport efforts. Salt is perhaps the most important item-
transported. In 1942 over 1,550 animals were reportedly employed in the trans-
portation of salt, of which 246 belonged to cooperatives and the balance was-
privately owned. By 1943, 3,706 animals were employed by cooperatives and-
21,337 by private owners.
(4) Interference with Japanese transportation
North of the Lung-Hai railway the Communists have attacked the Japanese-
controlled railroads and roads so often that the Japanese have been forced to
defend them with blockhouses and ditches and defense works running along the-
communication lines. Despite these elaborate precautions the Communists are
still able to wreck trains, attack convoys and cause considerable damage to-
Japanese transportation. South of the Lung-Hai railway in the new 4th Army
area, the Communists have been less active in attacking communication lines.
Consequently they are not protected by dykes and walls, and it is much easier
for the Communists to move back and forth across them. They claim to be in ai
position to destroy large sections of the transportation routes in this area when-
ever it seems especially profitable to do so. Apart from this type of interference
with communications, the Communists hold certain areas whicli deny to the
Japanese the ready use of several potentially important highways. Among
these are the through highway in eastern Shantung from Chiao-hsien via Lin-i
to T'ung-shan (Suchow), the through highway from Tung-hai (Haichow) to
Nan-t'ung in Eastern Kiangsu, the highway from Huhi-yin to Pukow via T'ien-
ch'ang in Western Kiangsu, the main highway from Ch'ing-yiian (Paoting) to
Tientsin and various other routes of lesser importance.
(5) Radio
Radio communications, although they exist between most of the Communist
base areas, are very slow and inadequfite. Several days are usually required to
transmit or receive messages from the coastal areas to Yenan. Except in Yenan
all of the sets are powered by hand generators and the messages have to be
relayed fi'om one area to another in order to cover any extensive distance. In
exceptional circumstances Yenan can communicate with the Shantung peninsula
in seven or eight hours, but this is the exception rather than the rule. The chief
difficulty is lack of adequate equipment. Most of the existing equipment is old'
or has been patched up from materials captured from the Japanese. Efforts are-
being made through the U. S. Army Observer Section at Yenan to provide short-
wave radio sets so that weather data and information about American fliers
forced down behind the Japanese lines can be more rapidly communicated to
Tenan.
The Yenan radio broadcasting station XNCR exists only for the purpose of
broadcasting to outside areas. There are no private receiving sets in Yenan,
and the broadcasts are devised primarily for foreign consumption or consump-
tion of people outside the Communist areas.
(6) Telegraph
There are some telegraph lines in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and'
there are limited telegraphic connections between the area and the Shansi-
Suiyuan Border Region. So far as is known telegraphic communications are not
used in other areas. A study of the whole communications situation in tjie
Communist area is being carried on by officials attached to U. S. Army Observer
Section at Yenan.
(7) Air transport
Air transport between Yenan and Free China is possible and the U. S. Army
Observer Section there has bi-weekly connection with the outside by transport
plane.
(S) Post Office
The Communists have their own postal system which is managed by the^
General Communications Administration. They have their own post offices,
stamps and system of postal deliveries. The Nationalist Government insists that
the Communist postal authorities interfere with the functioning of the regular
postal system of China.
F. CUEBENCY AND FINANCE
(1) Currency
Each of the Communist areas issues its own currency which circulates freely
throughout the issuing region. This currency is backed in some cases by reserves
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
2421
of gold, silver and Chinese national currency but in general it seems to have no
great backing other than popular confidence in it. It is issued by the various
Border Region banks, and in general the circulation of Chinese National Currency
or of Japanese puppet currency is prohibited. However, in the areas behind the
Japanese lines puppet currency is stolen or otherwise acquired to use in
commercial transactions with the areas controlled by the Japanese. An original
function of the Border Region currency was to serve as a shield between Chinese
National Currency and the puppet currency and so prevent the former from
falling into Japanese hands.
The Border Region currency has a fair degree of stability within the issuing
region. Since there is little trade between the various Border Regions, it is
impossible to determine any accurate standard of value as between the various
currencies. In general, however, it seems that currency of the Yenan area is
less valuable than that of some of the other areas. As a matter of fact, in all
of the Border Regions money is of relatively minor importance, because wages
and salaries are paid in millet or other commodities and taxes are collected in
kind. Millet is in reality the standard of value in the northern areas and rice
is probably the standard in the New 4th Army areas. According to National
Government sources approximately $350,000,000 worth of this Communist cur-
rency had been issued by the end of 1943. All such currency is illegal in the
eyes of the Chungking Government.
Such exchange rates between the Border Region currencies as are available
are given in the accompanying table.
Some exchange ra
\es of Communnist currencies
Date
SilTer $
CN*
SKN$
ss$
SCH$
Shan$
New
4th $
FRB$
CRB$
igsr
1.21
1.50
February 1941
1941
lH-2
5
1
1943
2.20
10
1,500
1,000
July 1943
Late 1943
1
1
150
30
May 1944
Spring 1944
i
1
1
Spring 1944
4
1
Spring 1944
8
10
8.50
'8
"4-6
6
July 1944
1
1
1
1
Fall 1944
1944
1944 -
Tall 1944
1
February 1945
1
4
NOTl.—
Silver $
CN$
SKN$
8S$
SCH$
Shan $
New 4th $
FRB $
CRB$
> Official.
« Unofficial.
Chinese silyer dollars.
Chinese National Curreijcy.
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia.
Shansi-Suiyuan.
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh.
In 1941 Shansi-Hopeh-Honan, but in 1945 Shantung.
New Fourth Army Area currency in Kiangsu.
Japanese Puppet Federal Reserve Bank currency (North China; .
Japanese Puppet Central Reserve Bank currency (Nanking Gov't).
(S) Prices and inflation
Prices have gone up considerably in all of the Communist areas and there is
unquestionably currency inflation everywhere. Inflation seems to be the worst
in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region but most observers agree that infla-
tion is not as serious as in the Chungking area because salaries and wages are
paid in kind to a very large extent and hence currency inflation matters very little.
(5) Banking and finance
A number of banks function in the various Communist areas. According to a
Kuomintang source the following banks have been set up in the various Border
Regions:
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Frontier Bank
Kwang Hwa Shang Tien (shop) in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region
2422 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Frontier Bank
Northwest Agricultural Bank in Shansi
Shang Tang Bank in Southeast Shansi
South Hopeh Bank
Honan-Anliwei-Kiangsu Frontier Bank
Pel Hai Bank in Northeast Shantung
T'ai Shan Bank in Shantung
North Kiangsu Bank
Huai Nan Bank
National Salvation Cooperative Society in Shansi
Agricultural Cooperative Society in South Shantung
Besides issuing currency these banks make loans to the Border Region govern-
ments, to cooperatives, and to private enterprises. They also have floated the
following loans or bond issues, according to Chungking sources :
(a) The $12,000,000 Ten Year "Reconstruction Loan" issued by the Shensi-
Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.
(b) The $500,000 Fifteen Year "Relief Loan" by the office of the Administra-
tive Commissioner for South Hopeh.
(c) The $4,000,000 Fifteen Year "National Salvation Loan" by the Hopeh-
Shansi-Chahar Border Region Government.
(d) The $6,000,000 Ten Year "National Reconstruction Loan" by the Hopeh-
Shansi-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government.
(e) Tlie $3,000,000 "Trade Loan" by the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region
Government.
(f) The lottery savings bonds issued by the Frontier Bank, each issue of
which is $1,000,000. (1) (24) (25) (46)
(4) Interest and loans
Generally speaking, the Commimists have abolished usury and greatly re-
duced the interest rates throughout their territory. The various governments
make loans in the form of grain, agricultural implements and machinery, equip-
ment, etc., to farmers or industrial enterprises at very low rates of interest as
a means of encouraging production. The Communists claim to have reduced in-
terest rates in 899 hsien under their influence.
(5) Taxation
Taxation seems to have been reduced, particularly upon the poorer classes,
throughout the Communist areas. Most observers agree that there are only a
few types of taxes and that the maximum rate is generally not over 37 1/^ per-
cent upon the total income. Taxes at this rate are levied only upon the richer
peasants who hire others to do their work. The rate progressively lowers until
the poorest people pay no taxes at all. Since 1937 a general effort has been made
to introduce a progressive tax system based upon ability to pay and to be levied
upon income or property. However, no uniform system seems to have been
adopted throughout the whole region. Taxes are generally paid in kind. There
are also rather light taxes upon business, a courvee or work tax, levies for the
support of troops and various other devices aimed at collecting revenue and
equalizing income.
The Communists claim that in the New 4th Army area in Kiangsu and Anhwei
taxes have been reduced by about $200,000,000. In the Tai-hang mountain area
of Southern Shansi taxes in 1944 are said to be only about half of those levied
in 1941, and in most other liberated areas they also claim that taxes have been
reduced. In contradiction to the above claims and to the general opinion of
observers in the Communists areas, the Chungking Government contends that
the Communists have introduced a multitude of new taxes and lists some 27
different types of levies to back up its contention. These include among others :
anti-Japanese contributions, levies on rich families, inheritance taxes, stamp,
tobacco, opium and wine taxes, enemy goods entrance tax and marriage regis-
tration tax.
(6) Government income
The income of the Border Region governments in general seems to be derived
from the following sources: (1) taxation, (2) income from government enter-
prises and the production of the armed forces, and (3) note issue.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
2423
Q. THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINQSIA BOKDEE REGION
(i) Agriculture — General
This is one of the poorest of all the Communist areas, although it served as the
original base for the whole movement. The region consists of loess-clad hills and
barren mountains with valley regions where agriculture can be pursued. Rainfall
is very scanty and most of it comes in July and August with some in June. Crop
failure caused by lack of rainfall occurs every few years. The hillsides are rather
barren or covered with short grass because of lack of rainfall. The most impor-
tant food crop is millet followed by wheat and kaoliang. Irish and sweet potatoes
are also important food crops and corn, soybeans, barley, flax and rye are pro-
duced. Vegetables include carrots, onions, tomatoes, cabbage and string beans,
while melons, apricots and peaches are also produced. Among the commercial
crops opium, cotton and tobacco should be noted.
(a) Agricultural education. — In an effort to improve agriculture the govern-
ment has sent instructors among the peasants to introduce crop rotation, diversi-
fied planting and better methods of fertilization. Seeds have been supplied to the
peasants by the government and loans have been made to enable them to acquire
necessary equipment. Classes on agriculture and animal husbandry have been
set up in rural villages and spinning and weaving have been taught to women in
the villages. As a result of these efforts the cultivation of rice has been intro-
duced into this area and the production of wheat considerably increased. More
beans, corn soybeans and cotton have also been produced. (1)
(ft) Land reclamation. — According to Communist figures, some 3,300,000 mou
(one mon probably equals % of an acre) of land were reclaimed between 1939 and
1943. The area reclaimed amounted to about 699,000 mou in 1940, 381,000 in 1942,
976,000 in 1943, and the olijeetive in 1944 was 1,000,000 mou. In 1943, of the
976,000 mou reclaimed, 207,000 were reclaimed by the Sth Route Army. (9 p. 1)
(c) Food production. — According to Communist figures, total cultivated land
and food production (principally millet) in recent years was as follows:
Date
Food produc-
tion
Cultivated
land
1940
Piculs 1
Mou
11,742,000
1942
i, GSO, 000
1,840,000
1943- _
13, 387, 000
• The picul probably equals 133 pounds but it may be the shih picul of 110 pounds.
In 1943 food production was roughly divided as follows :
Percent
millet 24. 5
wheat 21. 5
yellow millet 1. 4
beans 11. 2
buckwheat 7. 1
kaoliang 6. 4
Percent
flax 5. 1
corn 3. 7
potatoes 3. 2
cotton 1. 4
vegetables, misc 2. 2
The food requirements of the area are given by one Communist source as 1,620,000
piculs and by another as between 1,.500,000 and 1,600,000 piculs of millet plus
230,000 piculs of other food. Production in 1943, therefore, exceeded require-
ments.
(d) Cotton. — The production of cotton has been particularly encouraged,
apparently with good results, as can be judged from the accompanying table.
Area
cultivated
Production
of cotton
ProdurtioQ
of cottonseed
1940
(Mom)
15,117
94, 000
150,288
1300,000
{Piculs)
{Piculs)
1942
14, 000
17, 300
28,000
1943 - .
1944
» Planaed.
2424
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The planned production for 1944 would have reached requirements, but frost
damaged the crop and consequently complete self-sufficiency was not attained.
The main cotton producing districts are around Yen-ch'ang, Yen-ch'uan and
Ku-lin. The first two of three districts had about 80 per cent of the total cotton
acreage in 1942. In order to encourage the production of cotton, the fields
have been exempted from taxation and also loans at low rates of interests have
been given to cotton producers.
(e) Salt. — Important salt fields are located in the northwestern part of the
area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. These fields are worked especially during the
season when people are not engaged in agriculture. Salt provides the largest
percentage of exports from the area, and, according to one source, about $40,000,-
000 worth of revenue was obtained from salt in 1942. Salt transport coopera-
tives have been organized to work the fields and transport the salt. Com-
munist figures Indicate that 310,000 piculs were produced in 1942 and that in
1943 between 800,000 and 900,000 piculs were produced. During this latter year
some 3,706 animals belonging to transport cooperatives were involved in trans-
porting the salt and over 21,000 belonging to private individuals.
(/) Livestock. — The Border Region Government has also encouraged the
production of cattle, donkeys, mules and sheep. According to Commmunist
figures, the following increases in livestock took place between 1940 and 1943 :
Year
Cattle
Donkeys
Sheep
1940 - . - -
193, 283
220, 781
125, 054
167, 671
1, 725, 037
1943
20, 332, 371
Sheep products in 1943 are given as follows : white wool 6,710 poculs ; black wool
3,337 piculs; large sheepskins 71,512, and small sheepskins 45,756.
iff) Opium. — During the last few years it appears that opium has been pro-
duced in the area, primarily for export to the Chungking area as a means of
obtaining necessary currency for the purchase of cloth and other items. The
Chungking Government claims that throughout the Communist areas, 158,000
mou were planted to opium in 1942. The controversy over opium has been one
factor of discord between Chungking and the Communists.
(2) Industry — General
The government at Yenan has established a number of industrial plants ; it
has also encouraged the development of industrial cooperatives and has pro-
moted private handicraft production. Military units, government officials, stu-
dents and other people are also encouraged to produce items needed for their
own use. Early in 1944, according to a Communist pamphlet, there were 108
government establishments in the Yenan area as follows :
weaving 23 implements 13
coal enterprises 18 blankets and cloth 15
grain grinding mills 12 printing presses 5
chemical plants 13 miscellaneous 9
In 1939 there were 800 workers in industrial establishments, and by early 1944
there were some 12,000 workers in 70 of the government and private factories.
(a) Cooperatives. — Cooperatives have developed rapidly, reportedly increasing,
according to one Communist source, from 142 in 1937 with a membership of
57,807 and a capital of $.^15,225 (Border currency) to 6.34 in February 1944
with a membership of 182,878 and a capital of $733,998,403. These cooperatives
in 1944 were classified as follows : consumer 281, producer 114, transportation
223, credit 6. Another Communist source gives more detailed but very dif-
ferent figures on the cooperatives as follows (values are presumably in Border
currency) :
Year
Number
Members
Shares of
Capital
Business
Income
Production
Transporta-
tion Chead
of cattle)
1937
142
107
115
132
155
207
260
57, 847
66, 707
82, 885
123, ?79
140.218
143, 721
150,000
$55, 229
75, 629
125,848
332, S43
1,362,384
9, 346, 876
170, 000, 000
$261, 689
391,282
552, 249
1,156,435
6, 493, 399
34,932,109
600, 000, 000
1938
1939 -
$600, 000
4,131,500
14,189,000
23, 252, 600
494, 000, 000
1940
1941
206
1942
265
1943
3,706
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2425
(ft) Textiles. — No satisfactory over-all figures on the textile industry are
available. In 1941 1,085 persons were reportedly employed by government and
army units and operated 3S8 looms and 32 carpet macnines, and 30 spinning and
weaving cooperatives employed 385 persons, operating 176 looms and 12 carpet
machines. In addition 34,500 weaving workers and 75,000 spinning workers
operated 12,000 locally-made looms while 68,000 hand looms were operated in
various households. Total production in this year was reported as 100,000 pi of
cloth (1 pi equals 32.33 meters or about 100 feet). This production was said to
equal 40 per cent of the requirement. At about the same time Mao Toe-tung
indicated that the total demand for cloth in the Yenan area was 360,000 pi and
that cloth production amounted to one-third of demand. Since that time consid-
erable efforts have been made to increase the production of raw cotton, and some
reports state that the area is now approximately self-sufficient in cloth. Woolen
and linen cloth production has also been encouraged. Production in government
weaving factories, which amounted to only 3,000 pi in 1940, increased to 15,840 by
1943.
(c) Iron and steel. — Shensi iron, generally speaking, is of a poor quality and
all mining and refining is done by very primitive methods. The first iron foundry
was established in May 1943, and it is operated by people who know very little
about iron production. It lias two small and three somewhat larger furnaces
and employs about 200 workers. Several thousand workers are employed in
digging iron ore from mines about 10 miles distant. Some steel is produced by
a very primitive puddling process. Iron and steel production is inadequate, and
the area has to depend very largely upon captured rails for the steel used in its
arsenals. Iron is reportedly produced near Yenan, Kan-ch'uan and other jjlaces
in Shensi. Mao says that the iron requirements of the area are 47,000 piculs
a year.
(d) Coal. — In 1942 the 15 coal mines in operation are said to have produced
3,400,000 11)S. during the mouth of September. This, however, barely met the
requirements of Yenan. Good anthracite is produced in some areas, but lack
of mechanical facilities and adequate transportation seriously limit production
and distribution of coal. It has to be carried by mule and donkey to points
where it is used.
(e) Printing and paper. — A local type of grass is used in the production of a
rough but rather good quality paper. Several primitive paper factories are
operated in the Yenan area, and although production has increased it still does
not meet adequately the needs of the area. One of the larger factories which
was visited in the spring of 1944 by representatives of the press made ten reams
a day. Its motive power was provided by a waterfall and horses.
(/) Petroleum. — Several oil wells are 'operated in the vicinity of Yen-ch'ang.
The equipment is old and very unsatisfactory and the operating personnel are
unacquainted with the technical aspects of oil production. Wells Nos. 1 and 2
are practically dry. Only Well No. 3 is at present functioning, and drilling on
Nos. 4 and 5 has just been started. Daily output is said to be from 70 to 80
bbls. The plant produces gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil, lubricating oils and
candles. Most of the gasoline produced is kept to operate the few trucks in the
Yenan area. Kerosene and other byproducts are largely exported to the Chung-
king area.
{(J) Miscellaneous industries. — Other important industries include matches,
soap, chemicals and pharmaceutical supplies. There is a fairly efficient estab-
lishment for the production of the latter materials in connection with the hospi-
tal at Yenan. It produces sodium chloride, sodium sulphate, magnesium car-
bonate, sulphur, medical carmon and bandages, etc.
(h) Arsenals. — Two arsenals are reported in the vicinity of Yenan. One is
located about 12 miles northwest of Yenan at a place variously called Wen-chia-
kou or Wu-ch'i-chen. The location of the other is unknown. This was visited
by Colonel Barrett and various others who have described it in detail. Its power
is provided by two truck motors, and it contains a heterogeneous assortment of
lathes, presses, punches and machines. The steel and smokeless powder used
in it is produced in other nearby plants. Forgings are hammered out by hand
on anvils and a great degree of skill is shown by the blacksmiths. Most of the
steel is obtained from rails torn up from the Japanese railways. Its principal
product is grenade dischargers (knee mortars). It formerly produced about 100
of these per month, but because of shortage of steel it now only produces about
50. It also reloads rifle ammunition and produces bullets and primers but is
largely dependent upon captured cartridge castings. It is now preparing to manu-
facture cartridges and hopes ultimately to be able to produce about 1,000 rounds
22848— 52— pt. 7A 9
2426 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
per month. It also repairs rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, knee mortars
and mountain artillery.
Another arsenal is located in Northern Shensi at the village of Pan-nu-kou,
which is somewhat south of Chia-hsien and about 13 miles west of the Yellow
River. It serves the Shansi-Suiyuan area primarily. This is said to be the
largest and best equipped arsenal in the Communist area. It is located in a very
out of the way place and is equipped with machinery which formerly belonged
to the arsenal at Taiyuan. It has a large steam generator. It is said to pro-
duce from 250 to 300 knee mortar projectiles and 10 knee mortars a week. It
also reloads- rifle cartridges and manufactures a few light machine guns. The
reloading of cartridges is irregular because this depended largely upon the
number of casings retrieved from liattle. It also makes land mines and repairs
weapons. Four hundred men are employed, and it operates two 10-hour shifts
daily. One hundred of the men had been former employees in the Taiyuan
arsenal.
(3) Trade
Because of the deficiencies of this area in manufactured products, particularly
cloth and munitions, it desires to obtain these products from the Chungking area.
From the formation of the united front agreement in 1937 until 1940 some prod-
ucts did reach the Yenan area and helped to meet its difficulties. However, in
1940 Chungking limited trade to such items as would benefit Chungking and
prohibited entirely the movement of arms or munitions into the Communist
region. About the only products which Chungking wanted from the Yenan
area were salt and petroleum products. Consequently, the balance of trade
turned strongly against Yenan, with the result that in 1943 it had an unfavor-
able balance of trade amounting to CN 150.000,000. In an effort to redress this
unfavorable balance and obtain sufficient currency to acquire the imports desired,
the cultivation of opium was carried on and some if it is smuggled into Chungking
territory. The Yenan government has also imposed restrictions upon all imports
except cloth, iron and similar items of vital necessity, and has pi'ohil)ited the
importation of luxuries and nonessentials and the export of foodstuffs. The
export of salt and other items is under strict government control.
(4) Finance
(a) Currency. — The currency of this area is issued by the Shensi-Kansu-
Ning.sia Frontier Bank at Yenan. The existing currency dates from 18 February
1941, according to Communist sources. It is illegal in the eyes of Chungking, but
it is the only currency allowed to circulate in the area. According to Chung-
king these Border Region notes were issued much earlier than 1941, and Edgar
Snow indicates that when he visited the Yenan area in 1936 Communist notes
were in circulation. The exchange rate was then CN$1 equaled Yenan $1.21.
It may be that after the formation of the united front the issuance of the Border
Region currency was temporarily suspended and that the Yenan government
resumed issue in 1941 after the imposition of the bloc-kade by Chungking. The
Border Region currency is backed b.v gold, silver and Chinese national currency,
and it seems probable that the silver was brought by the Communists to Shensi
at the time of their long march from Kiangsi. One source indicates that much
of the currency is in small denominations, which, because of the inflation, makes
its use as an ordinary medium of exchange troublesome. Another source indi-
cates that currency is now printed in $200 denominations.
(6) Inflation and prices. — Observers disagree as to the degree of inflation in
the Yenan area, l)ut all agree that it is considerable. Prices of cloth, metals and
such objects which are relatively scarce are possilily higher than in Kuomintang
China, but in general prices are probably less inflated than in the rest of Free
China. Regardless of the degree of inflation, most people do not suffer from it
seriously because of the relative unimportance of money in the whole economy.
The situation is summarized by one observer as follows ;
"Prices in Yenan are as high as elsewhere in Free China but the inflation
has little effect on the economic well-being of the population. Those groups
which suffer most severely in Nationalist China — government employees,
soldiers, teachers, students — are paid in kind in Yenan and are under no
hardship. Housing, clothing, food and a variety of other necessities are
provided. Cash salary or wages have little significance except for the pur-
chase of luxuries, and of these there are practically none. Farmers, .shop-
keepers, artisans and small industrialists sell their product or labor at
inflated prices and accordinglv are able to purcha.se tlieir requirements."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2427
(c) Interest and loans. — As soon as the Commuuists came into Shensi they
undertook the abolition of usury and the reduction of the interest rate. As of
1936 Edgar Snow noted that the maximum rate permitted was 10 per cent and
that most government loans were made at a rate of about 5 per cent. More re-
cently the government has followed a policy of making extensive loans in the
form of money, seed, agricultural implements, machinery, etc., to poor farmers,
small merchants and private individuals who will enter productive enterprise.
The government has also guaranteed payment of the l^^wer rates of interest
allowed, which has tended to satisfy money-lenders.
((?) Taxation. — Soon after the Communists came into Shensi they abolished
the existing tax structure, canceled most taxes on the small land owners and
tenant farmers and levied rather heavy taxes upon the wealthy landlords and
usurers. In 1937 Mao Tse-tung proposed the introduction of a progressive tax
system which would be based upon ability to pay, and some such scheme has
gradually been introduced. The present tax system seems to embrace the fol-
lowing main features :
A tax levied on land and agricultural gains. This in general is a certain
percentage of the produce of the land levied in kind plus taxes on income from
rents, animal hire, etc. The maximum is 37^; per cent on the largest incomes
and progressively decreases until the poorer people pay little or no taxes at all.
The families of soldiers, immigrants of less than three years' standing, and
people with too low an income to maintain a decent standard of living are ex-
empted from taxation. Those exempted are said to amount to less than 20 per
cent of the population.
A commercial tax. This is said to have started in 1940 and is collected twice
a year by the tax office of the local government and the local chamber of com-
merce. In 1943 it is said to have amounted to 13 per cent of the net profits of
commercial activities.
A public service or labor tax. This consists of labor service to the government
and includes the transportation of foodstuffs and salt or aid to troops such as
carrying wounded soldiers, building roads, underground houses, etc.
Various forms of assistance to the army such as loans of seed, tools, food,
clothing, animals, etc.
Most obsei-vers agree that taxation for the mass of the people is considerably
less than in pre-Communist days.
(e) Governtnent revenue. — In 1936 govei'nment expenditure was said to
amount to about $320,000 per month (presumably Border Region currency).
At that time 40 to 50 per cent of government revenue was obtained through
confiscations, another 15 to 20 per cent through voluntary contributions and the
remainder through taxation, trade, government industries and bond issue.
In 1943 according to Communist sources total government expenditure was
$6,000,000 Border Region currency plus taxes collected in kind, which perhaps
amounted to 170,000 piculs of millet. Of this income 64 per cent came from
government enterprises and army production. The remainder came from taxation
and note issue. The deficit was said to be 18 per cent, which was met by borrow-
ing from the Border Region bank, i. e., by the is.sue of notes. The main factor
in the unbalanced budget was the drain of currency to pay for imports from the
rest of Free China. In 1944 70 per cent of the government revenue was said to
be derived from government and army production, and the deficit was said to
be considerably less than in 1943. Income from the land tax is given as follows :
1938— 10,000 piculs of millet
1939— 50.000 piculs of millet
1940—180,000 piculs of millet
1944—160,000 piculs of millet plus 180,000 piculs of fodder.
H. THE SHANSI-SUIYUAN BORDER REGION
(i) General
In general the physical characteristics of this area are similar to the Shensi-
Kausu-Ningsia Border Region. It is probably the poorest of all the Com-
munist areas and has made the least progress. Achievements here cannot be
compared with those in any of the other Border Regions. It is a rather desolate
region with a very impoverished peasantry who have not responded as rapidly
to Communist leadership as has been the case elsewhere. Most of the people
speak a dialect which is not very widely known and this has complicated matters.
However, some developments have taken place, and even as early as 1943 some
125,000 people had been organized into the Farmers' Mass Organization and 55,-
000 workers into the Workers' Mass Organization. It is very important as a
2428 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
connecting link between the Yenan region and the more prosperous Border Re-
gions to the east.
(2) Arsenals
A small arsenal is reported to be located near Hsing-hsien and another in the
mountains south of Taiyuan and north of Fen-yang. Both of those are appar-
ently small plants which specialize in the repair of small arms and the manu-
facture of land mines and grenades. One of them is said to manufacture black
powder and the one north of Fen-yang reportedly makes a thousand land mines
and two thousand grenades a month.
I. SHANSI-CHAHAK-HOPEH BORDER REGION
{1) General economic features
The central core of this area is made up of the mountainous regions forming the
border between Sh;;nsi, Chahar and Hopeh, but the base area also extends into
the fertile North China plain. It is one of the most progressive and richest of the
Communist areas. The economy of the mountainous regions is similar to that
of the Yenan area, but the plains include very fertile agricultui'al lands. The
rainfall is greater than in the loess highlands and crop failures are less fre-
quent. Wheat and millet are the most important food crops. Wheat is generally
planted in October and harvested in the late spring and early summer. Impor-
tant spring and summer crops are millet, kaoliang, corn, soybeans, sweet potatoes,
peanuts and sesame. Cotton, hemp and tobacco are important commercial crops,
•and some wool is also produced. Vegetables include cabbage, beans, carrots and
Irish potatoes, while the important fruits are pears, persimmons and melons.
The alluvial plains support a large population, and it is in these regions that the
intense struggle between the Communists and Japanese for control goes on. The
people have suffered severely from Japanese raiding expeditions which destroy
property, deplete the food supply, reduce the domestic animals and commandeer
workers. As a consequence the area has suffered from a shortage of cattle,
seeds and manpower.
(2) Government economic program
The government, which inckides a large number of non-Communists, has fol-
lowed a very progressive policy along the following lines :
(a) Land reclamation has been pushed forward. In this regard there has
been a close cooperation between the civilian population and the army, which
aids in carrying out repair of damage done by the Japanese to drainage canals
and irrigation ditches. A considerable amount of land has been reclaimed.
(b) To compensate for the shortage of manpower and to facilitate the general
agricultural program, cultivation teams have been formed, consisting of several
workers who jointly use the same implements and draft animals and who move
from place to place plowing and doing agricultural work.
(c) Mass organizations have been promoted, and by 1943 about 858,000 per-
sons were organized into farmers' groups and some 235,000 in workers' groups.
(d) Loans of seed and animals have been made to fai'mers, and food has been
supplied to famine and devastated areas. The government maintains some food
storehouses, but in general government tax grain is left stored in the local vil-
lages and is issued to troops or other persons when needed against vouchers
which the taxpayer can present to the government as tax receipts.
(e) Household industries have been encouraged to supplement normal farm
production and improve the self-sufficiency of the area.
(f) A policy of preventing cotton and other important industrial production
from reaching the Japanese has also been enforced. Some opium is produced in
the area, but its use is restricted to trade with the Japanese in exchange for
necessary commodities.
(g) Finally, a very active program of agricultural research and education
aimed toward the improvement of grain seeds and agricultural production has
been carried on. This program is well summarized by an observer who was in
the area in 1948.
"A lot of agricultural research work is being done in developing new kinds
of seed, methods of pest control, the introduction of new kinds of animals and
so on. There are a number of experimental farms which have done some
valuable work. Twenty-three irrigation schemes have been carried on with
58 miles of canal increasing the irrigated area by over 15,000 acres. Agri-
cultural credit is given by branches of the government bank and there are
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2429
also credit cooperatives. Some worlc lias been done on afforestation but
the people have not yet been educated to the dancers of soil erosion, which
is actually one of the most serious problems in North China, and progress
has been very slight. A lot of trees have been planted by the rivers where
people can see that the timber will be useful in the future but they do not
see the point of planting on the hills.
"At the end of 1941 an organization for controlling grain prices was
started. The farmers usually sell their grain soon after the harvest so that
there has been a ver.v big fluctuation in grain prices which rise very high
before the harvest and fall very low after. The grain control board has a
capital of $5,000,000, half from the government and half from private capi-
tal. The private capital was largely subscribed in the form of grain. The
board, therefore, started with a considerable influence on prices. It has
been of considerable assistance to the farmers and small merchants by being
ready to buy in local markets when the price fell too low. Communications
in the areas are so bad that slight excess of supply might cause a very big
fall in the local market price and the farmer or small merchant might spend
■ a long time transporting his grain by mule between markets several days'
journey apart before he could obtain a reasonable price."
(5) Industry and arsenals
The industries in this region are in general similar to those found in the Shensi-
Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, and the same methods of production are used.
One of the most notable industrial establishments of this region is an excellent
chemical plant near Fou-p'ing (Fuping) which enables the area to produce the
best explosives in the Communist region. It is operated by competent chemists
from Peiping. Observers from the area say that the plant is to be divided into
four sections which are to be located at different places throughout the base area.
The area also has a small blast furnace which makes iron for military use. Two
arsenals are also reported, one of which is located near Fou-p'ing. This arsenal
is described as being rather similar in character to the one at Wen-chia-kou near
Yenan. Vegetable oils are also cracked to produce fuel for lamps. There is a
research bureau which encourages new industrial developments.
(4) Currency and taxation
The currency in this area seems to have been especially well managed and
apparently its value is holding up better than that in most other areas of North
China. It is issued by the Northwest Fariners' Bank and originally had a back-
ing of 60 percent national currency notes. As national currency depreciated
most of this reserve was spent in buying gold and silver, which now backs the
existing currency. Some reports claim that the currency has a higher value
than that of Chinese currency at present.
A progressive tax system has been introduced into certain parts of this area,
very similar in nature to that described under the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region. The main features are taxes on land and income. Reportedly the
rates range from about 7 per cent of the income of the lowest taxpaying group
to 65 per cent for the highest income group. There is also a tax on imports
and exports. This is levied primarily to regulate trade rather than as a means
of revenue. Taxes in general are pa.vable in kind and are* collected and stored
locally. The policy of reducing rents and interest rates and of public loans
at low interest rates is also maintained in this area.
J. THE SHANSI-HOPEH-HONAN BORDER REGION
(i) General
Much of this area is mountainous and unproductive and its population is
relatively small. In general the economy resembles in most respects that of the
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. Tobacco is one of the most important
commercial crops produced. There are important minerals in the mountains,
but these have never been greatly developed, and the few that have been are
under Japanese control. Despite its comparative poverty, the region is relatively
self-sufficient.
{2) Agriculture
During 1942 and 1943 the fertile agricultural regions of this area suffered
from a severe famine brought on by drought and later by a plague of locusts.
The government aided in meeting the famine and rehabilitating the area through
a policy of rent and tax reductions and the granting of loans and the supplying
2430 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of seed grains to the devastated area. Good crops in the fall of 1943 and 1944
improved the condition of the area considerably. A vei'y active program of
improving types of grains and reclamation is carried on. Tlie agricultural ex-
periment station has introduced a new type of corn which has greatly increased
the yield. It also maintains an agricultural school which attracts students from
throughout the area. During 1944 the government of the area claims that 50,000
acres of wasteland were reclaimed and that agricultural production was greatly
increased. In 1943 in this area and the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region
some 2,670,000 peasants were organized in mass farmers' organizations and
23,625 workers into workers' organizations.
(3) Industry and arsenals
This region is particularly notable for its production of cigarettes from locally
produced tobacco. The cigarettes are traded to the Japanese-controlled areas In
return for sugar and cotton cloth. It also makes paper, farm tools, cotton cloth,
etc. Fliers forced down in this region report that there are two small arsenals
which can make mortars and mortar shells, reload cartridges, repair rifles and
produce land mines and grenades. Powder in the area is said to be poor.
K. THE HOPEH-SHANTUNG-HONAN BORDER REGION
This area lies entirely in the alluvial plains of North China and it resembles in
every respect the plains area of the Shansi-Cliahar-Hopeh Boi-der Region. It is
a comparatively rich agricultural region, but sviffered very severely during 1942
and 1943 from a prolonged drought followed by a plague of locusts. During the
drought nearly a million and a half acres reportedly lay uncultivated, and crops
of millet, kaoliang, wheat, corn and cotton were not over 50 per cent of normal.
Many people died or left the area. However, during the fall and winter of 1943-
44 there was adequate rain ; the government supplied grain seeds, and the result-
ing winter crop was fairly good. The area was plundered again during the spring
and summer of 1944 by the Japanese. Despite these difficulties over 2,500,000
acres were reportedly sown to wheat during the winter of 1944.
L. THE SHANTUNG BASE AKEuV
The Communist-controlled region in Shantung is broken up into a number of
separate areas, although there has been a tendency for consolidation during the
past year. Tlie most important base is in the mountainous areas of central
Shantung south of the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway, with other centers in the moun-
tainous parts of the Shantung Peninsula and in the relatively swampy areas
around the estuary of the old Yellow River. In general, however, the economy
resembles tliat of the plains and mountainous areas of the Shansi-Chahnr-Hopeh
Border Region. Some silk is produced in the mountainous areas of Shantung.
A picture of conditions in the area is given by the Austrian, Dr. Rosenthal,
who is serving with the medical deiiartment of the Shantung Liberated Area.
"In Shantung, private property is untouched and landlords have reduced
rents by 25%. Formerly landlords got 60-70% of the produce, but now they
are getting 37% 2^. Through seven years of armed resistance, peasants in
the 8th Route and the New 4th Army bases are living in greater prosperity
compared with the past. It is very obvious that the peasants are willing
and actively prepared to fight for their own democratic government and
against Japanese mopping-up drives. Landlords are also happy. Income
from 37%% of the harvest is handsome, while there are troops fighting
against Japanese pillage. Thus the majority of landlords are also backing
up and supporting the democracy government.
"There is dire lack of armament, but the food ration of the army is good
and the fighting morale is high. There is excellent unity between the army
and the democratic government. . . .
"Peasants plow their land with buffaloes, cows, oxen, donkeys and mules.
Staple food is millet, kaoliang and sweet potatoes which have low nutritious
value. The output of wheat and rice is comparatvely [small], but in many
places there are extremely sweet pears, peaches, apples, grapes, water-
melons, chestnuts and walnuts. . . . Tobacco is planted and excellent
cigarettes are manufactured."
Little information is available on currency or tax policy in this area. Reduc-
tion of rents and interest rates are put into effect in newly liberated regions.
Relief grains and loans at low interest are also distributed by the government.
Prices are reported to be less inflated than in occupied China or in Chungking
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2431
controlled areas, and one broadcast claims that the Communist currency in the
area is at a premium over the puppet Federal Reserve Bank notes.
M. THE NEW FOURTH ARMY AREA IN KIANGSU, ANHWEI, AND CHEKIANG
This includes seven base areas in east central China. In Northern Kiangsu
and Anhwei a good deal of wheat is grown, and in some respects the economy
is similar to that of the North Cliina plain, but as one proceeds south precipita-
tion increases and rice increases in importance as a basic food crop. Because
of the extensive rainfall the area is cut by numerous canals and streams, and the
existence of these waterways has facilitated the development of the guerrilla
bases. In general, two crops a year are produced in these areas. The winter
crop consists of wheat, beans, barley, rape seed and similar commodities. Kice
is the most important summer crop and is probably the main element in the diet
of the people. It is planted in the spring and liarvested in October and Novem-
ber. Silk and cotton are also produced. It is perhaps the richest of all the
Communist areas, and observers who have been in the region generally agree
that it is well administered and tliat there is close cooperation between the
troops and the local population. If crops are short the ration allowance of
troops is reduced. The property of landlords seems not to have been disturbed,
and troops are careful to pay for supplies. The general economic well-being of
the area is testified to by the fact that no rationing is imposed upon the civilian
population. Along the coast peasants are encouraged to produce salt and fisher-
men are also encouraged.
Local Communist currency, Chinese National Ciirrency and puppet currency
are said to be used in these areas. The latter is used primarily in trade with the
Japanese, of which there seems to be considerable. A policy of rent and interest
reductions has been carried out, althovigh the Communists have moved rather
carefully in this regard because of a desire to avoid alienation of the powerful
landed interests. Taxation is levied on a progressive basis with the poorer 20
per cent of the farmers exempted from taxation. The highest rates, which gen-
erally do not exceed 35 per cent of income, are levied on rich landlords. Revenue
is said to be derived from taxes on agricultural production and on industrial and
commercial activities. The tax money is reportedly divided so that seven-tenths
is used for military affairs and three-tenths for civil affairs.
N. THE HUPEH-HONAN-ANHWEI BASE OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY
This is in general the ai'ea around Hankow, and in recent times seems to have
been extended to include parts of Hunan and Kiangsi. Its general economic
characteristics are similar to the New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu and
Anhwei. A recent broadcast from Yenan summarizes the achievements in the
area during 1944.
"The total area of the Honan-Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi-Anhwei border region
is now approximately 33,000 square miles, of which 5,500 square miles were
added in 1944. The total population is 9,200,000, of which 1,500,000 were
liberated last year.
"There are five prefectures controlling 44 counties. The first provisional
Border Region People's Congress attended by 177 delegates was held in June
of last year. There are now 16 counties with a County' People's Council.
"Vast irrigation projects and productive measures passed by these County
People's Councils have led to bumper crops never seen in the past 15 years.
Fifteen million dollars in local currency wex'e spent by the government last
year for famine relief work, while 293,120 tan, 67,844 dollars, 78,785 labor
days and 168,664 cattle days were used to aid the dependents of the army
men.
"The government has launched a large scale production movement which
is also joined by government organs, public bodies and the army. At present
the army and institutions are already self-sufficient in vegetables, firewood
and coal for three months. They have altogether reclaimed 3,928 acres of
wasteland and planted 1,158 acres of vegetables. There are now six coopera-
tives with a capital of 5,000,000 one with a capital above 5,000,000 and one
with a capital of 50,000,000 in local currency.
"Economic reconstruction has been mainly devoted to building and repair-
ing of irrigation works : 1,392,963 work days spent on building of dykes,
dams and irrigation canals have reclaimed 88,392 acres of land in 12 counties.
In another 13 counties, 1,731,273 work days wei"e spent on irrigation works
which can irrigate 141,250 acres of land."
2432 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
^ 0. BASES IN EWANGTUNG PROVINCE
There are two Communist base areas in-Kwangtung province one being located
in'ttie Canton delta region and the other nn Hainan Island. Little is known about
economic developments under the Communists in either of these base areas. The
East River base in the Canton delta is located in a rich rice-producing area. Rice
farming and vegetable production supplemented by local handicrafts undoubtedly
provide the basis of economic life in the area. The area of consolidated Com-
munist control in Hainan Island seems to be in the rice-producing lowlands of
northeastern Hainan, and rice production undoubtedly forms the basis of eco-
nomic life.
p. CONCLUSION
The Communists control a large area and considerable population behind the
Japanese lines in North and Central China. Economically their activities have
been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of communica-
tion and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops and man-
power out of Japanese hands. By so doing the Communists have prevented the
Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of North and Central China.
The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, constitute the
poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The Com-
munists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the
peasantry, to increase agricultural production, and to develop handicraft indus-
tries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of
the resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufficient in terms of their
relatively simple requirements.
Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak
and undeveloped. Railroads are nonexistent, roads and motor transport are
practically nonexistent, communication facilities — radio, telegraph, telephone —
are hopelessly inadequate, and modern industry simply does not exist. Facilities
for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable
adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and
geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla
warfare, and the relations between the peasantry and the Communist forces are
good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip or
maintain modern fighting forces capable of meeting the Japanese in open combat,
and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing Communist
forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they could maintain if
they were better equipped and supplied.
7. Chinese Communist Army
A. STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMXTNIST FORCES
(i) General
The forces of the Chinese Communists may be classified into three general
categories : the Field Forces, the Local Forces (Guerrilla Army) and the People's
Militia. The Field Forces are often moved about from one area to another as
the military situation demands, and they generally wear uniform. The Local
Forces, or Guerrilla Army, usually confine their operations to particular areas,
and wear plain clothes. Other than this, there is little difference under the
present organization of the Communist forces between the Field Forces and the
Local Forces. These two forces make up the so-called regular troops of the
Communist Army. Equipment and training of the former is usually slightly
better than that of the latter, but both receive their orders through regular
channels of command and both are supplied by regular supply organs. It is
believed that both of these forces comprise the two large units of the Chinese
Communists, the 18th Group Army, and the New 4th Army. The People's Militia
is composed of men and women throughout Communist-controlled areas, selected
on the basis of courage, physical condition, endurance, and initiative. Unlike
the two groups of regular forces above, they engage regularly in production, and
perform their military duties as the occasion demands.
Fuller discussion of these three groups is contained in section 6 of this
report.
The average age of general officers is approximately 40 years ; of field officers,
approximately 37 years ; and of company officers, approximately .30 years. In
general education the average of both field and company officers is about that of a
middle school graduate. (The Chinese middle school corresponds to the Western
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2433
High School.) Almost all officers come from the ranks, but of these about 70
percent have received training in the Communist "Anti-Japanese Military Acad-
emy" in Sulteh, Shensi.
The average age of enlisted men is approximately 28 years. Taking into con-
sideration their general education before entering the Army and the education
they I'eceived in the Army, their average level of education is approximately that
of a student in lower middle school. (The Chinese lower middle school cor-
responds to the Western Junior High School.) Their average length of service
is about eight years.
(2) Overall Strengths
In October 1944 it was reliably reported that the total strength of the regular
Communist forces was 475,000. Of these, 318,000 are reported as under the
18th Group Army Command, 149,000 under the New 4th Army, and 8,000 in South
China. Recent reports indicate that these forces may have been increased to as
many as 910,000 troops. There is a marked difference between the actual
strength of Communist forces and that authorized by the Central Government.
Offlcially, only three Communist divisions and a so-called "Garrison Force" are
recognized with a total authorized strength of about 50,000 officers and men.
Expansion has been effected by increasing the number of regiments in each di-
vision, and by creating new regiments in the various military regions. The New
4th Army was officially disbanded in 1941 and is now unrecognized by the Central
Govexnment ; nevertheless, its strength is steadily increasing.
(5) IStJi Group Army Strength and Distribution
General Chu Te has official status under the National Military Council of
the Central Government as Commanding General of the 18th Group Army. The
Deputy Commanding General is P'eng Te-huai. General Yeh Chien-ying is Chief
of Staff. The ISth Group Army operates in general north of the Lung Hai rail-
road and East of Sian, Shenai. The six military Regions under the 18th Group
Army follow :
(a) Shcnsi-Kansu-Ninghsia Military Region. — This region contains a rela-
tively large concentration of troops, reported as 50,000 in the Field Forces.
These are all first-line troops held in this home base area to guard against possible
Kuomintang or Japanese attack.
(&) Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. — In this region there are 26,000 in the
Field Forces, 5,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 31,000 regulars. There
are 50,000 Militiamen in the area. The area is relatively small, and has a sparse
population. The 120th Division of the 18th Group Army is in this Region,
commanded by General Ho Lung.
(c) Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region. — This region contains 35,000 in the
Field Forces, 29,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 64,000 regular troops.
There are 630,000 in the Militia. The forces of this area are large, but are
probably relatively weak in the extensive plain regions (Central and East Hopeh)
and in the mountainous and sparsely populated North (along the North of the
Great Wall). This is a well-known area because it was the first established
behind Japanese lines and has been more often visited by foreigners.
id) Shantting Military Region. — This region contains 42,()00 in the Field
Forces, 28,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 70,000 regulars. 500,000
Militiamen are reported in the Region. The 115th Division is stationed in the
Region, with General Ch'en Kuang as its commander. The Communist Forces
have expanded rapidly in Shantung in the past few years, and are well organized
in the whole area.
(e) Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region. — In this region there are 50,000
in the Field Forces, 25.000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 75,000 regu-
lars. 320,000 Militiamen are reported. This area includes South Shensi and
the T'ai-hang Mountains, where the Communists have apparently become well
entrenched. The 129th Division is stationed in this Region, Commanded by
Liu Po Ch'eng.
(/) Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military Region. — This area contains 17,000 in
the Field Forces, 11,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 28,000 regulars.
There are 80,000 Militiamen in the Region.
(4) New J/th Army Strength and Distribution
The New 4th Army is also under General Chu Te's command. General Yeh
T'ing is still carried on the roll by the Communists as Commanding General
of the New 4th Army, but since his arrest by the Chungking Government dur-
2434 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ing the New Fourth Aimy Incident in 1941, command is exercised by General
Ch'en I, whose title is "Acting Army Commander." The Army operates South
of the Lung-Hai Railroad, with headquarters in the Hung-tze Lake area. No
break-down for Local Forces in the New 4th Army is available but the total has
been reported at 31,000. In regions where no figure is given for the Militia,
information is not available. The eight Military Regions under New 4th Army
Command follow :
(a) Central Kiangsu Military Region. — This region contains 19,000 in the
Field Forces and 130,000 in the Militia. It is the area of the 1st Division, and
is bounded on the South by the Yangtze River from Ch'ung-Ming Island
(North of Shanghai) West to the Grand Canal, on the West by the Grand Canal
to Huai-an, and on the North by the She-yang River.
Cb) South Huai Military Regiov. — This region contains the 2nd Division of
the New 4th Army, with 21,000 in the Field Forces. (See North Huai Military
Region below for boundaries.)
{(') North Kiangsu Militaru Region. — The 3rd Division is stationed in this
Region, with 23,000 in the Field Forces. 85,000 Militiamen are reported. The
Region is bounded on the North by a line running generally west from Lieny-
iinkang (Lao-yao) to the Grand Canal, on the West by the Grand Canal as far
south as Huai-an, and on the South by the She-yang River east to the coast.
(d) North JIvai Military Region. — The two Huai Military Regions (North and
South) cover an area bounded generally by a line running from Siichow, N.
Kiangsu, east to the Grand Canal, then south along the Grand Canal to the
Yangtze, along it to Nanking, from Nanking southwest to Ho-fei, northwest
generally along the Huai-Nan Railroad to near T'ien-chia-an, thence northeast
to Pengpu (Pang-fou) and north along the Tsinpu Railroad back to Siichow. The
Huai River is the dividing line between the two regions, with Hung-tze Lake
generally in the center. The 4th Division is stationed in the area, with 18,000
troops in the Field Forces reported.
(e) Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Military Region. — This Region contains the 5th
Division with 22,000 in the Field Forces. Although this division is almost com-
pletely surrounded by the Japanese forces, the Ta-pieh Mountains (on the junc-
tion of Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei borders) on the East and the Ta-hung (Tung-pei)
Mountains (about 120 miles NW of Hankow) on the west provide terrain
favorable for the Communist troops. Parts of these mountain areas are old (pre
1934) Red districts and the people therein are experienced in guerrilla warfare.
The Region extends north of Hankow on both sides of the Ping-Han Railway to
the vicinity of Hsin-yang, Honan, and south of Hankow along the Canton-Han-
kow Railway to Yochow, (Y"iieh-yang) in Huan. On the east the Region extends
to the vicinity of Huang-mei in eastern Hupeh, and on the west to Shasi and
Ichang.
(/) South KiangsK' Militari! Region. — The 6th Division is stationed in this
Region with 6,000 in the Field Forces. 25,000 INIilitiamen are reported. The
Region is bounded on the north and west by the Yangtze River and on the south
by a line running generally from Wu-hu east to the coast. In the center of the
Region is T'ai Lake (between Nanking and Shanghai). The Region contains
some of the largest cities in China.
(g) Central Anhwei Military Region. — The 7th Division, with 5.000 in the
Field Forces, occupies this area, which is along both banks of the Yangtze from
Nanking westward to Su-sung. In the northern and widest part of the Region,
part of the 2nd Division is operating in the area between the Tsin-Pu and Hwai-
Nan Railroads. 25,000 Militiamen are reported in the area.
(7() East Chekiang Military Region. — The forces operating in this area, about
4,000 in the Field Forces, are known as the "East Chekiang Column." They
were originally the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division, 18th Group Army, which
were sent to Chekiang in the fall of 1942. 10.000 Militiamen are i-eported. The
Region extends generally on both sides of the Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad to
Ningpo, and south as far as Feng-hua.
(5) East River Military Region
In this area there are 3,000 in the Field Forces. Very little is known of the
troops in this area and on Hainan Island. Communist Headquarters in Yenan
appears to maintain very slight contact with them.
(6) Hainan Island Military Region
This Region contains 5,000 in the Field Forces.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2435
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES
(1) General
The organization of the Chinese Communist Army is closely linked with the
political organization of the Communist Party and the political organization
of the territory controlled by the Chinese Communists. (See p. 2335.) The
organization and administration of the People's Militia is based on the civil
organization of the Military Regions, Military Districts, and Military Sub-
districts. Every unit headquarters of company size and larger has a political
section which is headed by a commissar. The commissar usually has received
military training and in the higher units often serves as deputy commander.
(2) The High Command
Supreme command of the Chinese Communist Army is vested in the Communist
Military Council (Military Affairs Commission). This body consists of a Chair-
man, who in this case is the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (Mao
Tse-tung) ; a vice-Chairman, who is the Commander in Chief of the Communist
Army (Gen. Chu Teh) ; a second vice-Chairman; a Chief of Staff; the Chiefs
of departments of the General Staff; the Inspector General; and two deputies
of the Inspector General.
(3) Territorial Organization
(a) General. — The territory controlled by the Chinese Communist Army
consists of a large area in North China under the jurisdiction of the 18th Group
Army, a somewhat smaller area in Central China under the New Fourth Army,
and two very small areas in South China and Hainan.
(b) Area controlled, l>ij the 18th Group Army. — The area controlled by the 18th
Group Army is divided into six regions, as follows :
1. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Military Region
This region west of the Yellow River is the Main Communist Base, in which
Yenan is located.
2. The Sliansi-Suiyuan Military Region
This region is divided into the Ta-ch'ing Mountain Military District (in
Suiyuan) and the Chin-hsi-pei (northwest Shansi) Military District.
2. The Shansi-Hopeh-Chaiar Military Region
This region is sub-divided into four Military Districts, and 13 Military Sub-
districts. The Four Military Districts are the following : Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning,
(area east of Peiping and Tientsin) Ping-Pei (area north of Peiping). Central
Hopei (area SW of Tientsin), and North Ytieh, (area W and SW of Peiping.
4- The Hopeh-Shantiing-Honan Military Region
This region is sub-divided into two Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-
Districts. The two Military Districts are the following : South Hopie, and Hopei-
Shantung-Honan.
5. The Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region
This region is sub-divided into tw^o Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-
Districts. The two Military Districts are the following : in the east, T'ai-heng
and in the west, T'ai-yueh (Sw Shansi, excluding Gen. Yen Hsi-shan's area in
SE Shansi).
6. The Shantung Military Region
This Region is sub-divided into four Military Districts and 17 Military Sub-
districts. The four Military Districts are the following: Po Hai (gulf) in the
northwest, Chiao-tung in the Northeast, (Shantung Promontory), Central Shan-
tung, and Pin Hai in the southeast (coastal region S of Tsingtao).
(c) Area Controlled by the Kew Fourth Army. — The area which is controlled
by the New Fourth Army is divided into eight Military Regions. Further sub-
division of this area into Military Districts and Military Sub-districts is not
known. The eight ^Military Regions are the following:
1. North Kiangsu Military Region.
2. Central Kiangsu IMilitary Region.
3. South Kiangsu Military Region.
Jf. North Huai River Military Region.
5. South Huai River Military Region.
6. Central Anhwei Military Region.
2436 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
7. East Chekiang Military Region.
8. Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei INIilitary Region.
(d) South China. — In South China there are two small Military Reprions under
command of the 18th Group Army. They are : East River Military Region (Can-
ton Area), Ch'iung-yai Military Region (interior of Hainan Island).
(4) Organization of the Army
(a) Field Forces. —
1. General
The Field Forces and Local Forces of the regular Army are organized into the
two main units of the Communist Forces, the 18th Group Army, and the New
4th Army. The former has 3 oversized divisions in its formal organization, plus
jurisdiction over the other minor units. The latter has 7 divisions and the
"East Chekiang Column" under its command.
2. Divisions
The three divisions of the 18th Group Army as originally authorized by the
Central Government consisted of three brigades of two regiments each. The
strength was about 14,000 officers and men per division. The exact extent to
which these divisions have expanded in numbers of regiments and troops is not
known. A recent report states that the divisions of both the 18th Group Army
and New Fourth Army are now each organized into three brigades of three
regiments. The strength of tlie New Fourth Army divisions appear to vary
greatly and is believed to approximate the strength listed for the field forces in
each of the military regions in which the divisions operate.
3. Brigades
A recent report states that there are three regiments to a brigade. The highly
decentralized nature of operations would appear to make the brigade an impor-
tant link in the chain of Command. It probably exercises a relatively high
degree of independence in both command and administrative functions.
4. Regiments
The tactical units of the Chinese Communist Army are organized into three
types of regiments : type A, type B, and type C.
a. Type A regiments
The 59 type A regiments are organized as follows : a headquarters company,
three rifle battalions, and a political section. The headquarters company com-
prises an administrative section, a signal platoon, an artillery or mortar platoon,
a supply platoon, a medical platoon, and a service company. The regiment has a
strength of 1763 officers and men and the following equipment: 693 rifles, 124
carbines, 82 pistols, 81 light machine guns, 6 heavy machine guns, 482 mm mortars,
27 light mortars and 33 horses.
6. Type B regiments
There are 105 type B regiments. Type B regiments are similar to type A regi-
ments, but they have only two rifle battalions, and they have no artillery or
mortar platoon in the headquarters company. The strength of the type B. regi-
ment is 1,163 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment consists of 468 rifles, 24
carbines, 76 pistols, 36 light machineguns, 6 heavy machine-guns, 18 light mortars,
and 13 horses.
c. Type C regiments
There are 133 type C rifle regiments. These regiments are designed to operate
in flat terrain where unobserved movement of large bodies of men is difficult.
Type C regiments comprise the following: a headquarters company, a political
section, and from four to five rifle companies. The headquarters company con-
sist of an administrative section, and supply, signal, medical, and service platoons.
The strength of a type C regiment is 866 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment
consists of 425 rifles, 20 carbines, 62 pistols, 15 light machine-guns, 2 heavy
machine guns, 5 light mortars, and 9 horses.
2. Battalions
The rifle battalion consists of a headquarters, a political section, a headquarters
and service company, a machine-gun platoon, and three rifle companies.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2437
6. Companies
The rifle company consists of a headquarters, a political section, a service pla-
toon, and three rifle platoons. Each rifle platoon has three 13- to 16-man squads.
The strength of a rifle company varies from 118 to 136 ofiicers and enlisted men.
The equipment allotted to a company consists of 83 rifles, 3 light machine-guns,
3 light mortars, 380 hand grenades, 81 picks, and 81 shovels.
(ft) The Local Forces, or Guerrilla Army. — The personnel of the guerrillas
is drawn from the local inhabitants. These men receive the same military and
political training as do the members of the field force. They do not regularly
engage in productive vpork. The guerrilla forces are controlled by the commander
of a Region. The commanders of separate guerrilla detachments besides being
responsible to the Regiou commander are also accountable to the local People's
Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. It is believed that the organ-
ization of the Local Forces is patterned after that of the Field Force, but that
they are not as well equipped.
(c) The People's Militia. — Every able bodied Chinese Communist of either
sex between the ages of 16 and 45, who is not a member of the regular army
field forces or local forces (guerrilla) is a member of the People's Militia.
(Most of the members of the People's Militia are, however, non-Communist volun-
teers). At each level of administration (region, district, sub-district, county,
township, and village) there is a People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed
Resistance. This body, including an Anti-Japanese Service Section, Demolitions
Section, Training Section, and Operations Section, is subordinate to the Commu-
nist military commander and the Political Commissar of the Communist Army
in the region, district, etc. The People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed'.
Resistance trains and directs the operations of the following four groups whicbj
comprise the People's Militia :
1. The Youth Vanguards
The Youth Vanguards is a group comprising inhabitants between 16 and 23
years old. Their training consists of military drill, use of weapons and first aid,
as well as political indoctrination and intelligence work.
2. The Model Detachments
Male graduates of the Youth "Vanguards are organized into Model Detachments.
This group supplies replacements to both the regular army field forces and local
forces. The "local guerrilla groups," formed within the Model Detachments from
those who desire particularly active service, should not be confused with the
local forces above, which are composed of full-time guerrillas. Members of the
People's Militia engage in production in addition to their military duties.
3. Self Defence Detachments
This group consists of able bodied men who are not members of any of the other
groups. They are organized into small groups whose function is to protect the
homes and fields in event of raids by small Japanese parties, and sabotage in the
event of Japanese occupation.
4. Women's Detachments
Able bodied women who do not belong to the Youth Vanguards are members
of this group. Their organization and functions are similar to those of the
Self Defense Detachments.
(5) Air Force
The Communists do not have any aircraft.
(6) 'Navy
There is no navy as such. The Communists operate a number of armed junks
off some sections of the coasts of Kiangsu and Shantung Provinces which they
sometimes refer to as their "Navy."
(7) Organization of the Services
(a) Signal Communications. — Signal communications in Communist China are
limited by shortage of equipment and trained personnel. However, both radio
and wire communications are used by the Army. The radio communications
network within the army is as follows :
The 18th Group Army Headquarters in Yenan communicates with the various
Military Region headquarters at least once a day.
The Region Headquarters communicate with each other and with the Military
Districts under them.
2438 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Military District headquatei's communicate with local regimental head-
quarters, intelligence stations, and other units equipped with radio.
( 6 ) Medical Service. — See Section 7, h, page 2445.
Note. — ^For chart of territorial organization, see chart No. 1, opposite page 2448.
C. TRAINING OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES
(i) General
The training policies of the Chinese Communist army have been influenced
by many factors. Training has been carried out under unusual conditions, since
the Communists must be on the constant alert against possible attack by the
Japanese as well as by the Kuomintang. The time devoted to training is limited,
due to the fact that the troops in many areas must produce part or all of their
own food and clothing in order to exist. Training equipment is of the most primi-
tive type. Training in the combined arms is practically non-existent. Many of
the units have been forced to combine the problem of subsistence with the prob-
lem of training. One brigade was sent to an area for the purpose of making it
self sufficient. The troops would plant crops in the springtime and tend the
fields until harvest. During the period there was practically no training. After
harvest time an intensive program would be carried out until the following spring
when the cycle would be repeated.
The training objectives of the Chinese Communists have been set forth by
General Lin Piao, President of the Anti-Japanese Military Academy in Sui-te,
Sliensi. He points out that it is necessary for the troops to conduct training
and operations simultaneously, and since the troops are scattered it becomes
quite difiicult to engage in the unit training of regiments or brigades. Due to the
bigh rate of attrition in officer personnel and to the raipid expansion of the mili-
tary forces, enlisted personnel have been advanced to the officer grade after a
comparatively short period of service in the ranks.
The training policy is to give infantry instruction to all personnel regardless
of branch of service. Little instructional effort is devoted to subjects like close
order drill or company administration. The emphasis is on field training, with
the tactics of close combat and guerrilla warfare being stressed. The shortage
of ammunition necessitates reliance on the hand grenade and bayonet. Stealth,
night fighting and ambush are accepted doctrine.
Training periods vary from two and one-half months in the forward areas to
about four and one-half months in the rear areas. Troop training is the responsi-
bility of all officers. Higher commanders indicate the general policy and the
details are left to the commanders of the smaller units. Officers are instructed
first, and then are expected to pass on their knowledge to the men, who use the
coach and pupil method of instruction. Routine tasks of the day are utilized for
training whenever practicable. For instance, troops on a routine march would
be trained in the tactics of the advance guard, approach march and meeting en-
gagement.
The competitive spirit is fostered by the publication of standings in the progress
made during any training period. Formal or informal contests are held and
prizes are awarded.
The Communist Forces have emphasized decentralization in training. This
does not make for efficiency in methods, but it seems to have been unavoidable
by reason of the conditions under which the Communist forces have been forced
to operate.
(2) Training in Weapons
{a) The Rifle. — The extreme shortages of ammunition have curtailed formal
target practice as we know it. In many instances the trainee is allowed but
three rounds of rifle ammunition for training purposes. Field manuals on
rifle marksmanship are in use by Chinese Communist forces and the conventional
subject matter is included in them. The only report available of an observed
target practice indicates that no attempt was made to coach the pupil, and
that training methods were most primitive.
(b) Machine Guns.- — In an observed target practice, the machine gun was
emplaced and aimed, and the pupil had but to step up and pull the trigger.
He then would make whatever adjustment he considered necessary.
In their official training manual on the use of machine guns the Communists
emphasize vigorous training under field conditions. They teach the doctrine
of fire and movement, emphasizing the value of the machine gun as a close
support weapon. The weapon is utilized in night training exercises. A knowledge
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 24.39
and use of the terrain in the proper selection of positions is considered essential.
Stress is placed on the proper methods of cover and concealment.
(c) Hand Orenadcs. — The liand grenade has been considered the most im-
portant weapon at the disposal of the Connuunist forces, and appears to have
been effectively employed. Termed "Artillery for the Soldier'' the hand grenade
has proved a decisive factor in many instances. As a result, training in the
use of this weapon lias received much emphasis. In an observed training exer-
cise, the troops performed in a most creditable manner.
(fZ) Bayonet Training. — Training methods in the use of the bayonet follow
the conventional pattern. The use of the weapon in hand to hand fighting is
stressed, since the al)sence of artillery malces victory difficult for the Communists
except that which is gained by close combat.
{3) Unit Training
(a) Squads, Sections, and Companies. — Extended order drill, for units up to
the size of the company, receive careful attention in the theoretical and prac-
tical training of the Communist Military Forces. Methods of movement under
fire, of deployment, close support and reliance on stealth and ambush are taught.
The preponderance of unit training is given under this category by reason of the
fact that it is difficult to assemble larger units exclusively for training purposes.
(6) Regiments and Brigades. — It is in the training of the larger units that
the Chinese Communist forces have been most deficient. A U. S. military ob-
server reported on an exercise consisting of an approach march and a meeting
engagement conducted by a brigade of two regiments. Among the deficiencies
noticed were these: There was not sufficient time given for a reconnaissance,
for the designation of assembly points, for the issuance and receipt of orders
or of making estimates of the situation. No use was made of concealment or
of cover. IVIachine guns were employed without any definite fire plan in mind.
Trench mortars were fired from the crest of hills without taking advantage of
the cover afforded by the reverse slope of the hill. Communications were almost
non-existent. Communist Military leaders admit their deficiencies and acknowl-
edge the need for further training for officers of the grade of regimental com-
mander and above. Training in the combined arms and in Staff procedure are
among the more important items which must be studied before the military
potential of these forces is realized to the fullest extent.
D. TACTICS OF THE CHINESE FORCES
(1) General
The tactics of the Chinese Communist Army have been influenced by their low
economic potential, and their operations have been aimed chiefly against Japa-
nese military and economic consolidation and exploitation of the occupied areas.
(2) The Often sive
(a) Large Seale Operations. — Despite existing deficiencies in weapons and
materiel the Communist forces have occasionally engaged in operation of a fairly
large scale. Well organized attacks have been made against puppet troops in
Shantung province recently. These attacks against the Chinese puppets appear
to have been intensified in the past few months, with the probable objectives of
capturing their arms and causing defection in their ranks.
(6) Attacks against Fortified Areas. — The Chinese Communists have engaged
in offensive operations such as raids, attacks on forts, strong points, and forays
into large cities.
(c) Attacks against Enemy Troop Concentrations. — The Communists attempt
to strive at the critical time when the Japanese are preparing for mopping up
operations. This causes the enemy to detach portions of his striving force and
tniis weaken the proposed offensive. The favorite tactics are to strike the Jap-
anese on the flanks and rear and then disappear l^efore the enemy can effect a
concentration of forces. The Comnumists have managed to capture an increas-
ing number of prisoners in this manner.
id) Small Scale Operations. — It is in the small scale operations that the
Chinese Communist Army has dealt the most damage to the Japanese. These
operations constitute the larger portion of engaged military activity. The strug-
gle for supplies has been a motivating factor in many cases. Captured enemy
materiel and supplies are needed to remedy the deficiencies confronting the
Communists. In these engagements the fighting unit is seldom larger than a
company, and the operations are generally of short duration. The attacks are
leveled at small Japanese detachments on independent missions, isolated Garri-
2440 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
SODS and villages. The tactics used are those of conventional guerrilla vparfare.
Strategems, night attacks and ambush are employed in order to overcome the
inferiority of numbers and weapons.
( e) Demolitions. — Demolitions on a small scale are included in the program of
employed strategy. Bridges, roads, military installations and railroads are de-
stroyed with regularity. However, the homemade black powder used in these
operations often prevents the accomplishment of results commensurate with the
effort and danger involved.
(/) Use of Propaganda. — The Communists claim that the increasing number
of prisoners captured in the past year is due as much to the effectiveness of their
propaganda measures as to their increased military strength. While the peasants
in the People's Militia frequently mistreat or kill Japanese prisoners, the regular
army forces use the prisoners for propaganda purposes to cause defection in
enemy ranks. They are given money, new clothes and good food. They are
usually allowed to return if they so desire. Those who do return dispel the belief
of their associates that they would be maltreated if captured ; hence, according
to the Communists, they surrender more easily when hard-pressed. Those who
remain receive political indoctrination and usually espionage training, after
which they are either returned to Japanese troops for espionage work or used
to shout propaganda to the Japanese troops in blockhouses or other enemy
concentrations.
(S) The Defensive
In defending against Japanese attacks, the Communists avoid frontal clashes
wherever possible. Avenues of approach are mined and booby-trapped, and the
Japanese flanks, rear, and line of communications are harassed and attacked in
an attempt to prevent the Japanese advance from penetrating too deeply into
the base areas. Where they fail to halt a deep Japanese incursion, the food
supplies and the small quantities of manufacturing machinery are either removed
from the area or hidden to prevent their capture or destruction by the Japanese.
Attacks are then made against the extended enemy line of communications to
force a Japanese withdrawal, after which the bases are reestablished.
(4) Summary of Communist Tactics
Shortage of ammunition has had noticeable effect on the tactics of the Chinese
Communists. By necessity they are forced to fight small engagements of short
duration. They are precluded the use of long-range fire. In fact, some units
have adopted the following rule of thumb for purposes of conservation : Rifle fire
is not to be used beyond 200 yards, although more expert riflemen are allowed to
fire up to 400 yards. Light machine guns may be fired 300 to 400 yards and heavy
machine guns 400 to 500 yards.
Extensive use of land mines has been made recently, and hand grenades are
used as much as possible.
The necessary emphasis on small scale operations has had its effect on Staff
Procedure as employed in larger Chinese Communist units. Communist forces
have had little experience in logistics. Nevertheless, certain characteristics
have been developed in their operations. They have attained a high degree of
efiiciency in independent actions. Their leaders have courage, initiative and self-
reliance. Their troops are highly mobile. They know the terrain intimately and
use it to the best advantage. They have also learned to improvise with their
limited resources.
(5) The People's Militia
(a) General. — While not actually a part of the Chinese Communist Regular
Forces, the People's Militia has an important part in the continuing operations
against the Japanese. The function of the Militia is to maintain peace and
order in the rear areas. They are primarily concerned with the task of produc-
tion, but they are capable of spontaneous guerrilla warfare. The People's
Militia is a natural outgrowth of the desire of the more aggressive elements of
the iK)pulation to participate in active defensive operations.
(&) Tactical Doctrine. — An excellent knowledge of the surrounding terrain
coupled with an efficient intelligence system combine to make the Militia a for-
midable bulwark of defense. Their tactical doctrine can be be summarized by
the following Militia Dictum :
"Appear where the enemy does not expect you ; attack where he is not prepared.
When the enemy attacks, avoid him ; when he encamps, harass him ; when he re-
treats, pursue him."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2441
(c) Training Methods. — Training is considered secondary to production and
as a result it is given during the free time of the Militiamen, generally two hours
during the evening. Training methods are extremely simple, but the course is
varied. The following subjects are covered ; fundamentals of drill, rifle marks-
manship, grenade throwing, ambushing, tunnel warfare, surprise attack, harass-
ing lines of communication and methods of reconnaissance.
(d) Tactical Employment. — The People's Militia is used for the most part in
active support of the regular forces. It renders valuable service in the protection
of supply lines in the evacuation of the wounded.
(e) Tunnel Warfare. — With customary ingenuity, village inhabitants of areas
under the control of the Chinese Communist Military Forces have built under-
ground defense works. Many villages have elaborate caves and tunnels. They
are built as a means of escape from Japanese raiding parties. They have an
additional function in the safeguarding of supplies and materiel. The tunnels
have numerous narrow twists and turns both in the horizontal and vertical planes,
making defense a fairly easy matter. Gas proof chambers, secret passages, and
air vents are a part of the detailed construction plan.
(/) Mine Warfare. — The People's Militia has used mine warfare effectively.
In many areas the Japanese are reluctant to leave their blockhouses and garri-
sons, since roads and paths are mined nightly. Mine casings are received from
local, pi'imitive ordnance factories. The village inhabitants fill them with home-
made black powder, attaching a simple detonating apparatus.
{g) Harassing Warfare. — The Militia is deployed to tear down and destroy
blockade walls, and to till ditches and moats surrounding Japanese garrisoned
villages. They have been instructed to waylay individuals and small groups of
Japanese. They have planted spies and intelligence agents Ln Japanese occupied
villages, and in many Japanese units.
(6) Communist Army Intelligence Measures
The Chinese Communist Armies have developed a unique intelligence system
which has apparently been highly successful for their immediate purposes.
The People's Militia, in addition to other duties, maintains a constant vigilance
in order to detect spies and traitors. It performs a valuable counterintelligence
function by constantly checking the passes of individuals found within their par-
ticular locality. In general, the Communist armies could not carry on operations
in their present area without the help of the People's Militia.
The Communists have planted spies in towns and villages under Japanese con-
trol. Information of impending Japanese attacks has usually been received in
sufiicient time to allow the proper employment of defensive measures. Many
Communist agents are working in Japanese organizations. The lack of portable
radio equipment, however, often prevents agents operating in the cities from
getting timely information back to Chinese Communist Army Headquarters.
E. MILITARY WEAPONS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
(1) General
The Chinese Communist forces are poorly armed. Their manufacturing facili-
ties are extremely limited, and they are forced to depend almost entirely on
captured weapons and equipment. The Communists have a few old and badly
worn artillery pieces but no artillery ammunition. Trucks and other mechanized
equipment are destroyed when captured because the lack of fuel and the lack of
trained personnel precludes their use. No protective equipment is available
against chemical attack, and signal and medical supplies are insufiicient. The
troops, all of whom are trained primarily in guerrilla tactics, depend completely
on small arms and individual close-combat weapons.
(a) Rifles and "bayonets. — Approximately 80% of their rifles have been
captured from the Japanese and Chinese puppet forces. Most of these are prob-
ably the Model 38 (1905) 6.5 mm. The remainder have been obtained from the
National Government forces and are for the most part 7.92 mm Mausers M 88
and M 98. Bayonets are mostly Japanese Model 30 (1897). A few that are
manufactured by the Communists are of inferior quality.
(h) Liaht machine guns. — Most of the light machine guns are probably Jap-
anese Model 11 (1922) 6.5 mm, although a few are Chinese 7.92 mm. Z.B. 26
"Praga" type and Belgian 6.5 mm Brownings. Heavy machine guns are Japa-
nese Model 3 (1914) 6.5 mm and Model 92 (1932) 7.7 mm.
(c) Grenade discharges and hayiA grenades. — Great faith is placed in grenade
discharges and hand grenades for close combat. Al)ont 50 percent of the grenade
discharges are Japanese M 10 (1921) 50 mm and Model 89 (1929) 50 mm. The
22S48— 52— pt. 7A 10
2442 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
rest are made, mostly by hand, by the Communists in their own small arsenals.
Hand grenades are used in relatively larjie quantities. These are made by
the Communist arsenals and appear to be effective. They are the '"potato masher"
type consisting of a cast iron head filled with black powder and wooden handle
and pull-type friction igniter with a time delay of 4 to 6 seconds.
{(1) Lund mines. — In recent operations extensive use has been made of crude
land mines. These mines consist of spherical cast iron bodies 5.9 inches in
diameter containing a high explosive filling. They are detonated by means of
pull-type igniter.
(e) Mortars and antitank guns. — The Communists have a few old Japanese
mortars, possibly the Model 11 (1922) 70 mm, as well as some Chinese 82 mm
mortars of the Stokes-Brandt type. In 1938 they received 6 anti-tank guns and
120 light machine guns from the Chinese National Government, but since then
have had to capture eqiiipment from the Chinese Nationals or use weapons that
have been discarded by the Nationals for salvage.
(/) Ammnnition. — Ammunition supply is the most serious disadvantage to
the Communists. All types of ammunition are exceedingly scarce, and the many
different small arms calibers complicate the problem. Much rifle and machine
gun ammunition has been reloaded in Communist arsenals but is of inferior
quality. Ammunition is so scarce that practically none can be allotted for either
rifle or MG training.
{{/) Individual Equipment. — Theoretically, the equipment of an infantry
soldier consists of a rifle and bayonet, 50 rounds of amnmnition, 4 hand grenades,
and an entrenching tool. Actually, there is an average of one rifle per two
infantrymen and a proportionate amount of other individual equipment.
F. UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES
{!) Uniform
In winter the Communist soldier wears the horizon blue quilted uniform, made
of cotton. This uniform is light in weight but affords great protection from the
cold, and is not too bulky for efficiency. The items making up the uniform are a
vest, a long coat (double breasted, high collar model), knee-length breaches and
a short jacket. Some or all of these items may be worn by one soldier. Blue
denim wrap puttees and the usual Chinese cloth shoe with closely stitched sole
of cloth complete the outfit.
A lighter weight uniform is worn in warm weather. A typical blouse has the
following characteristics : high neckline, buttons up to the neckline, turned down
collar on which insignia could be attached, and a buttoned-flap patch pocket.
(2) Insignia
Equality is the basis of the relationship in the Chinese Communist Army.
There is no diff'erence in the uniforms of "Leaders"' and "Fighters" and Leaders
wear no rank insignia. Their contact with the Fighters is supposed to be so
intimate that their position of authority is known to all. The cap device is usually
a red cloth star, although the Chinese national emblem has been oflicially
designated for use.
G. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES
{1) General
Before 1940 the Chinese Central Government furnished the Chinese Communist
Forces with some explosives, rifles, ammunition, and grain. This flow of supplies
was curtailed in 1940, and halted in 1941. The Communists, therefore, in recent
years have had to provide supplies and maintenance exclusively through their
own efforts. They have fared best with food and clothing, while the quantity
of arms, ammunition, medical supplies and other important manufactured and
imported supplies has been meager.
( 2 ) Procurement of supplies
(a) General. — The territorial organization forms the basis of the productive,
maintenance, and repair activities of Communist China. Farmers retain suf-
ficient produce for their needs, moving the balance to numerous widely dis-
tributed collection points.
(b) Food. — Wheat, millet, rice, other graiijs, vegetables, and small quantities
of meat are raised wherever possible. Some of the troops aid in planting and
collecting the harvests while others provide protection for these activities.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2443
(c) Clothing. — Some clothing and viniforms are manufactured in a number of
small factories.
(d) Arms mid ammvnition. — The Communists obtain most of their weapons
and ammunition by capturing them from the Japanese, Chinese Puppet, and to a
lesser degree from the Central Government forces. A few arsenals are known
to exist but these manufacture only small quantities of rifles, small arms am-
munition, hand grenades, and land mines. Because most operations are manual,
precision is low, and models antiquated. These arsenals as well as other in-
stallations provide limited repair facilities.
(e) Other Supplies. — Some material such as medical supplies and storage
batteries are purchased in either open or "black" markets of Japanese held
cities, notably Shanghai.
(3) Distribution and transportation of supplies
The dispersed supply collecting points (see '23) become distributing agencies
from which troops in the area may draw when necessary. In the event of
Japanese incursions, these stockpiles may be moved or hidden and thus saved
from destruction or capture. Troops in movement may requisition supplies di-
rectly from farmers, offering "ration cards" which are redeemable by the Com-
munist-sponsored government.
Communist forces are particularly deficient in transport. In some rear areas
there is a small amount of transport by pack animals and two-wheeled carts
(usually drawn by three mules) but in active areas all that troops take with them
on the march is carried on their backs or slung on poles over their shoulders.
Field officers are often provided with horses or mules. Motor transport is prac-
tically non-existent.
(4) Maintenance requirements
A Yenan press dispatch states- that the standard'allowance of the army is now
four pounds of meat, one and three quarters pounds of oil and lard, forty-seven
pounds of vegetables and sixty pounds of grain per man per month. This aver-
ages about three and one half pounds per man per day. Observers report that
the average soldier appears healthy and well fed.
H, MEDICAL ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES
(1) General
In evaluating the medical accomplishments and problems of the Chinese Com-
munist forces the following four points and their effect upon medical care in the
area have been considered :
(a) The Chinese Communist Army is primarily a guerrilla army, and its tactics
and organization are based on extreme mobility. The eft'ectiveness of the Com-
nuinist forces has been due in great part to their ability to strike and run, to in-
filtrate through enemy lines and harass their rear, to sabotage enemy personnel,
supplies and lines of communications. Such extreme mobility directly effects
medical organization.
(b) Areas under Communist control correspond rather closely with a topog-
raphy of rugged hill and mountain sections, while enemy-held territory consists
of plains lands and lines of communication running in the valleys between guer-
rilla areas. This factor is at the same time advantageous and disadvantageous
medically speaking. The terrain precludes evacuation of the wounded by any
method save hand-borne stretchers or, in the case of the less severely wounded,
by horse. At the same time the numerous more or less inaccessible hide-aways
in the hills afford excellent sites for dispersal of hospital units.
(c) The Communist Army has on the whole succeeded exceedingly well in their
determined effort to win over the peasant class. This cordial relationship be-
tween the soldiers and the local peasantry plays an important part in the army's
evacuation and care of its sick and wounded.
(d) Since 1939, except for a few more or less luxury items, the Central Govern-
ment has thrown a rigid blockade around the Border Regions of the Conmiunist
area. This blockade has excluded medical supplies and literature from the
Communists and has resulted in improvisations, the manufacture of a few mod-
ern drugs from locally procureable products, and the utilization of Chinese drugs
of questionable efficacy. Only rarely are some urgently needed items smuggled
through the blockade.
2444 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(2) Line of Evacuation of the Sick and Wounded
(a) Company First Aid Man. — The smallest unit having attached medical
personnel is the company, and save for exceptional circumstances this is an
enlisted man who has had no more than a basic first aid course or some nursing
instruction. The exception occurs in the case where a company is going on a
long and arduous journey as a single unit at which time a medical oflficer (sur-
geon) may lie attached. The medical corps first aid man is equipped with a
small cloth bag containing bandages, gauze, iodine and a pair of dressing forceps.
Due to the shortage in medical supplies he carries no drugs such as morphine
or sulfonamides. After an engagement the medical corps man gives first aid
and supervises the evacuation of the wounded to the Battalion Medical Station
or a nearby sheltered spot, utilizing the soldiers of his company as stretcher
bearers. At this point the responsibility of the company ceases. In the event
that a company is out on an isolated mission cut off from rear lines of com-
munications the disposal of the wounded is accomplished by one of two methods :
firstly, if the wounded are few in number and the company anticipates further
engagements, their uniforms are changed to civilian clothes and they are placed
in the homes of the local populace who nurse them back to health and then aid
them in filtering back to their units ; secondly, if the percentage of wounded is
rather high and further engagements are not anticipated, the medical corps
man remains behind with the wounded who are dispersed through the local homes,
supervises their nursing and after convalescence leads them back to Communist
army units. These men though wounded retain their arms, and in their return
trip may fight guerrilla warfare for months before rejoining their army. The
medical attention given the wounded under such conditions is of necessity
limited and those whose lives are dependent on major surgery are lost. Food,
bed rest and bandaging constitute the sum total of medical care. At times even
bandages are not available. •
(6) Battalion Medical Station. — ^This medical station lying about a mile behind
the lines, staffed by one doctor and two nurses, constitutes the first point in the
chain of evacuation where the wounded soldier comes under the supervision of a
surgeon. No major surgery is attempted here and the main duties of the surgeon
are those of redressing, giving priority of evacuation and supervising the
stretcher bearers. Those lightly wounded and able to ride horses or walk are
moved on to the rear in this fashion. The mode of medical care in case the
battalion is cut off from further evacuation corresponds to that of the company.
(c) Regimental Medical Station. — The next in line of evacuation is the Regi-
mental Medical Station staffed by two surgeons and four nurses whose duties are
to: 1) prepare dressings and bandages for forward stations; 2) debride minor
wound and ligature hemorrhaging vessels; 3) temporarily splint fractures;
4) register the wounded. (This is the first point along the line where the
wounded are registered). There are no beds in this medical unit, but those
lightly wounded may remain here for a few days before returning to join their
combat forces. Those requiring further medical attention are evacuated down
the line by stretcher or horse to the next unit which is usually set up in some of
the buildings of a village about five miles behind the lines.
(d) Briffade Field Hospital. — This hospital, staffed by five surgeons and a
dozen or so nurses, is the first point along the line of evacuation where major
surgery, such as amputations, debridement of major wounds and removal of
foreign bodies, is performed. No abdominal surgery is undertaken. Here, too,
are found the first hospital beds which are put up in buildings temporarily ap-
propriated for this purpose. The time lapse from injury to hospitalization in the
Brigade Field Hospital runs from three to eight hours.
(e) Divisional Fixed Hospital. — Up to this point all medical units have been
mobile, but in this hospital the first stationary organization is found. Each sub-
military district normally contains two such hospitals, which are set up in vil-
lages and have an average bed capacity of one hundred and fifty. Actually the
emergency expansion of such a unit is limited only by the size of the village.
Usually the operating and the dressing rooms are the only permanent fixtures of
the installation, the patients being distributed through the village homes as the
occasion demands. The basic staff consists of five ofllcers distributed as follows :
three surgeons, one assistant to the surgeons and one pharmacist. The size of
the nursing staff depends on the number of patients and the number of nurses
available. In such fixed hospitals all types of surgery are performed, the extent
limited only by the amount of medical supplies on hand. In the event of a Jap-
anese push even the "fixed" hospital is sometimes forced to move, and the pa-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2445
tieuts are dispersed into isolated mountain regions where tliey are cared for in
caves. The surgeons and nurses accompany the patients and the local peasants
volunteer their services as stretcher bearers to aid in the mass evacuation.
(3) Base Medical Service
Each military Region of which there are fourteen reported in Communist
China, has as the head of its medical organization a Base Medical Service under
whose jurisdiction come larger fixed hospitals (three to four), medical schools
(only one of which gives training at all comparable to accepted medical institu-
tions of the west), medical factories and nursing schools. The several Base
Medical Services are theoretically under the control of the 8th Route Army
Medical Department; however, the various medical organizations are very de-
centralized and to a great extent on their own initiative. This decentralization
is readily exj^lained on the basis of two factors : firstly, the Base Medical
Services are to a great extent isolated from one another with poor lines of
communication : secondly, the 8th Route Array Medical Department, because
of the stringent Kuomintang blockade, has practically nothing in the way of
medical supplies to distribute to the various Base Medical Services. As a result,'
the two organizations are not interdependent. The larger fixed hospitals care
for both the local civilian population and the more chronic military patients who,
because of the necessity for prolonged hospitalization, have been evacuated to
the rear from Divisional Fixed Hospitals. In certain cases where these larger
hospitals are in fairly close areas, one will cater to the civilians and the other to
the military.
(a) Hospitals. — On November 23, 1939, Dr. Norman Bethune, who had been
sent to China under the auspices of The American Canadian League for
Peace and Democracy some two years before, died of a septicemia resulting from
a wound sustained while operating on the wounded in Wutai. Yenan held a vast
memorial meeting attended by all representatives of the Communist Party, Army,
Government and people, and passed a resolution to enlarge the 8th Route Army
Military Hospital and to change its name to the "Bethune Memorial International
Peace Hospital." This hospital has been moved several times and has split off
into further subdivisions. At present there is the head hospital and three sec-
tions, all in tlie vicinity of Yenan. The different sections are located in different
areas to facilitate management, supply (growing of food, etc.) and the reception
of different kinds of patients. They are all able to solve their own technical
problems, but whenever medical difficulties ai'e encountered the head hospital
usually convenes consultations of all section chiefs. General consultations are
held on all rare and difficult diseases with members of each section attending.
Medical reports on the activities of each section are received monthly, and an
interchange of professional experiences is a regular item in this relationship. All
problems of medicines, medical equipment and other hospital supplies are decided
on in meetings organized by the head hospital. Education work, for example, is
handled by the head hospital and all three sections, some providing actual
teachers for lectures in the medical school and others taking in the graduates for
their internships.
( b ) Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital. — In the Spring of 1943 the
hospital moved to its present location at Liu Wan Chia Kou, about four miles
northeast of the old walled city of Yenan. The hospital, nestled in a small valley
oft" the Yen River, is a community in itself with all the staff living on the prem-
ises. Every family has a small vegetable garden (including the patients who are
able to work). The Communist Party has put on a great agricultural drive dur-
ing the past few years in an effort to make the country self-sufficient. The pro-
fessors and their families take great pride in showing off their gardens to visitors.
The wards and homes of the faculty of the hospital are caves dug out of the soft
loose soil .of the hill sides.
The hospital has six services with separate wards for each ; surgical, medical,
infectious diseases, obstetrical-gynecological, pediatrics and the out-patient serv-
ices. Each individual ward room contains around six beds, except for the pedia-
trics ward where, due to the shortage of nursing personnel, the preponderance
of breast feeding and the local customs, beds are furnished the mothers of the
patients so they may sleep beside the cribs. The pliarmacy and the laboratory
are also housed in caves, but the operating rooms are in a stone building built
on a level area below the wards. Each service has one chief doctor and two
assistants (out-patient department is staffed by members of the other services
2446 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
rotating daily) ; there are two pharmacists, one laboratory technician and one
assistant, one superintendent of nurses, and 38 nurses.
Though civilians are accepted, the head hospital is primarily a military insti-
tution and caters to soldiers and their families. There are approximately two
hundred beds of which fifty are for surgical cases.
Each hospital has a political commissar whose duties seem to be those of a
sort of morale builder, catechizer and political instructor. In many ways he
would compare with a chaplain attached to our military hospitals. The staff
members are from varying walks of life and educated in various parts of the
world, some in China, others in America, Germany, France, or Switzerland.
The common surgical diseases encountered are : wounds, burns, fractures, acute
appendicitis, inguinal herniae, and minor rectal conditions such as hemorrhoids,
rectal fissures and fistulae in ano.
The operating rooms are two in number. In the same building are preparation
rooms, dressing rooms where gauze is prepared for sterilization and a small room
with the instrument cabinets.
Local and spinal anaesthesia are used almost exclusively, primai'ily because
other types are not available. It is possible to smuggle novocaine and local
anaesthetics from Japanese controlled sections of China.
In the medical service the following diseases are prevalent : tuberculosis, in-
fluenza, gastro-intestinal diseases, maleria, relapsing fever, and some cases of
kalaazar. In pediatrics one encounters whooping cough, pneumonia, and gastro-
intestinal diseases. Typhoid, typhus and bacillary dysentery are the more com-
mon diseases encountered in the infectious disease wards. One can readily ap-
preciate the difficulty of treating the above diseases when such items as the
sulfonamides, neostibosan, arsenicals for intra-venous use and typhoid and typhus
vaccines are not available.
Daily ward rounds are held throughout the hospital with weekly staff con-
ferences. Charts are kept in orthodox fashion with history sheets, nursing charts,
temperature charts, drug order sheets and laboratory sheets, all of which are
printed locally on paper made in this region.
The running fund and expenses of the hospital, except for a small part com-
ing from the China Defense League and the China Aid Council, comes from the
Border Region Government. Another small part is supplied from the self-produc-
tion work accomplished by the hospital.
(4) Conclusion
The medical personnel seem very much alive to the needs of the Army and
civilians in Communist China. Considering the difficulties encountered, U. S.
observers have been favorably impressed l)y the accomplishments of the medical
profession. The medical staffs of the local hospitals, medical school and military
establishments of forward echelons are all very cognizant of their limitations in
personnel and materiel. Major improvement in the medical service can only be
effected by the importation of medical supplies, at present prevented by the
Central Government embargo. The peasants as well as the army would likely
benefit from any medical improvement in this section. This would in turn be
a factor in improving the fighting qualities of the soldier, for the civilian be-
sides being his family is also his rear echelon, growing the food and making
the supplies essential to the army.
I. CONCLUSIONS
The consensus of opinion of U. S. observers is that the Chinese Commu-
nist Regular Army is a young, well fed, well clothed, battle-hardened volun-
teer force in evcellent physical condition, with a high level of general intelli-
gence, and very high morale. Training of these troops may be rated as fair for
their present capabilities even though it is woefully inadequate judged by Ameri-
can standards. Military intelligence, for their purposes, is good. The most
serious lack of the Communist forces is in equipment.
The outstanding weaknesses of the Communist forces include lack of sufficient
small arms ammunition, lack of artillery, lack of engineers and other technical
personnel, lack of signal equipment in general and especially of radio communi-
cation below regiment level, complicated and irregular organization, and heavy
casualties among officers with consequent weakness in junior leadership.
The most pressing needs of the Chinese Communist forces are for rifle and
machine gun ammunition and for an easily portable weapon capable of knocking
out Japanese forts, which sometimes have brick walls. The bazooka might prove
useful for this latter purpose, and could" also be used against the numerous
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2447
Japanese blockhouses of less formidable construction than the forts. The same
weapon might be employed against Japanese rail traffic, since the Communists
are often able to operate very close to important Japanese-held railroads. Rifle
and machine gun ammunition required is caliber 7.92, about half Chinese and half
Japanese. An urgent need is for more modern signal equipment, so designed
as to be light and easily portable. Photographic equipment of the Communists
is very meager. Medical supplies and hospital equipment of all kinds are urgent-
ly needed. A few supplies, such as chemical balance scales and various machine
tools, would materially increase the productive capacity of Communist manufac-
turing plants. Many factories waste time making inferior tools which soon
wear out because they are made from railway rails. The bayonets manufactured
by the Communists are of soft steel and the quality is poor. This is a serious
handicap because the shortage of anununition compels Communist troops to rely
heavily on bayonet charges and fighting in close quarters. The Communists have
no anti-gas equipment. General Yeh Chien-ying C-of-S of the 18th Group Army,
states that the Japanese have taken advantage of this fact to inflict over 14,000
casualties, including a number of brigade and division commanders. There is
need for a definite program of tactical training and for trairring in combined arms.
Training in weapons is deficient, partly due to lack of sufficient ammunition and
partly due to faulty methods employed.
These shortcomings of the Communists are, however, offset in part by certain
organizational advantages. The small units of the Communist forces, carrying
the lightest possible equipment, have high mobility and are well adapted to
guerrilla warfare. Tliese units are equipped and trained to operate independ-
ently. They exist off the country, apparently having full support of the popu-
lace in the areas. This facilitates quick dispersal and mobility. The organiza-
tion of the forces enables coordination of the operations of these individual
units, within the limits of existing communication facilities, through a central-
ized command. This command takes in not only the regular forces of the area,
Init also the local detachments and other units within the People's Militia, and
the whole population enlisted in the People's Self-Defense Corps. The Commu-
nists claim that the political work throughout the Army guarantees high morale,
excellent discipline, and the whole-hearted support and cooijeration of the
people.
The capabilities of the Chinese Communist Army may be viewed in the light
of the following two factors. Firstly, the Communists are capable of continuing
indefinitely the present program of harassment against the Japanese while
slowly increasing their strength and supplies. Secondly, they are not capable
of independent, decisive operations to dislodge the Japanese from north or east
China unless the Japanese situation has deteriorated seriously or is on the
verge of collapse.
This deterioration of the Japanese situation depends largely upon the success
of the Chungking Government army in an advance against the Japanese and on
a landing of Allied forces on the China coast. At present the Japanese forces
are so disposed in China that a major operation against them would entail the
movement of substantial troops and supplies to the threatened, areas. Allied
domination of the seas would confine the movement to the lines of communica-
tion available to them within China. The reinforcements which tlie Japanese
could obtain to bolster their defense against the Allies would be drawn largely
from units engaged in garrison duties along the railways. The Communists
are so disposed over all of North China and a large part of Central China that
they are capable of (a) widespread attacks against Japanese garrisons and
concentrations to hamper their mobilization for movement and (b) attacks upon
and destruction of sections of the railroads to interfere with the movements
of Japanese troops and supplies. This interference will slow down Japanese
movements considerably, though they will probably not stop all movements.
In tactical situations the Communists are capable of providing a local Allied
force with the following forms of resistance :
To serve as advance, rear, and flank guards ;
To pursue a defeated or withdrawing enemy ;
To strike at or turn an enemy flank ;
To plant mine flelds and engage in demolitions ;
To engage in ambush, surprise attacks, and night operations :
To infiltrate enemy lines, attack rear installations, and harass lines of
communications ;
To provide intelligence to Allied forces on local Japanese strengths, con-
centrations and movements.
2448
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2451
Who's Who in Communist China
~Sotc : Asterisks indicates names for which no Chinese characters are available.
AI Ssu-ch'i — Leading Chinese Marxian-Leninist philosopher. Member of the
Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Govern-
ment when reported in 1943. One time member of the Party Central Research
Institute.
*AN Wen-hsiang — Identified in 1944 as President of the Sui-te (in Shensi)
People's Political Council.
ANDKEOFF — One of the Russian Communi.st advisers with Borodin in China
until 1927. Reported in 1944 in Chungking on the staff of the Russian
Military Attache. Speaks Chinese fluently, said to be "very clever."
ASANUMA — Head of the Japanese Emancipation League formed in W^est Suiyiian
Province by a group of Japanese captives.
BERG, Michael— See BORODIN, Michael
BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovitch (Ga-lin, Galen)— Marshal. Chief Ru.s-
sian Military Adviser to CHIANG Kai-shek and Instructor in Whampoa
Military Academy 1924-27. Born 1889. Metal worker. Served in Czavist
Army in World War I until seriously wounded, 1915. Formally joined the
Bolshevik Party, 191C. Rose to fame as a military leader in the Russian
Civil War. Drove the White Russians out of Crimea, 1920, out of Outer
Mongolia. 1921. Appeared in China in 1924 under the name of Ga-lin or
Galen. Reorganized and trained Chinese troops. Devised plan of attack
for the Northern Punitive Expedition, 1926. Departed from China early
1927. C-in-C of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, 1929-38. Served on the
military court which tried TUKACHEVSKI and other Soviet officers in
1937. Reported in October 1944 to be in an NKVD political concentration
camp in good liealth but blind from work in the mines.
BO Gu-^ee CH'IN Pang-hsien
BORODIN, Jacob— see BORODIN, Michael
BORODIN, Michael (BORODIN, Jacob; GRUSENBERG, Michael; BERG,
Michael )^ — Chief Russian Communist Adviser to Chinese Nationalist Party
(Kuomintang), 1923-27. Exile from Czari.st Russia, studied in the U. S.
where he was known as Michapl Grusenberg or Berg, 1910- 17. Returned
to Russia to take part in the 1917 Revolution. Communist propagandist
in Spain, Mexico, the U. S., and Great Britain. Illegally in England, he
was arrested and deported to Russia in 1922. He arrived in Canton, China,
September 1923 as an agent of the Communist International. Became
adviser to SUN Yat-sen. Played an important part in the reorganization
of the Kuomintang in 1924 and of the Nationalist Government in CANTON,
1925, which was moved to Hankow in 1926. He became, by invitation,
High Advi.ser to the Foreign Ministry of the Nationalist Government and
was instrumental in revolutionizing Chinese diplomatic methods. In 1927
the Chinese opposed his idea of a Chinese alliance with Japan and a bellig-
erent attitude toward the Briti.sh. With the rise of strife between the
Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang and Kuomintang aversion to the
Communist International, his position became impossible. He offered his
resignation which was accepted in July 1927. However he departed for
Soviet Russia in 1927 with full honors and expressions of appreciation from
the Nationalist Government in Hankow. Later he became Editor of the
Moscow Daily News.
♦CHANG Ai-ping — Apparently succeeded P'ENG Hsueh-feng as Commander,
4th Division, New 4th Army in September 1944.
CHANG Ch'in-ch'iu — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
CHANG Ching-wu— Chief of Staff of United Defense Headquarters at Yenan
under HO Lung.
CHANG Go-tao— see CHANG Kuo-tao.
♦CHANG Han-fu — Editor of the Communist newspaper, Hain-hua Jihpao in
Chungking. Attended the San Francisco Conference, 1945, as secretary to
the Chinese Communist delegate TUNG Pi-wu. He speaks English.
CHANG Hao (LIN Yvi-ying) — Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party. Around 1917 member of the Social Welfare Society
of Hupeh, a great many of whose members became Communists.
CHANG I-chen — Identified in 1943 as President of the Bethune Medical College
founded in 1940 in honor of the late Dr. Norman Bethune. Former asso-
ciate of Dr. Bethune.
2452 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
CHANG Kuo-tao (CHANG T'e-li ; CHANG Go-tao)— Expelled from the CCP
March 1938.
Once uiuch respected in Chinese Communist circles as a hero of the
"Long March", and as a real field general. Well read and able to converse
on many subjects besides the strictly military. Jovial, approachable, stocky,
muscular. Member of the upper classes. Was a radical student in Peking.
A returned student from Moscow. I'articipated in the "Literary Revolution"
1917. Helped found the CCP in Shanghai, 1921. In February 1934 at
.Tui-chin, Kiangsi he was appointed "Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the
Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee with HSIANG Ying as the
other Vice Chairman and MAO Tse-tung as Chairman. Member of the
Executive Committee of the Communist International elected by the 7th
World Congress July-August 1935 in Moscow. As Chairman of the Hupeh-
Anhwei-Honan Soviet he helped 4th Front Army Commander HSU Hsiang-
ch'ien lead the army into north Szechwan where they joined the Red forces
from Kiangsi in the "Long March". Later he became Chairman of the
Soviet at Yenan with precedence over MAO Tse-tung himself. He was ex-
pelled from the CCP in 1938 apparently because he urged a genuine United
Front on the basis of a sincere acceptance of the 8an-min Chu-i. Became a
member of the Third People's Political Council in Chungking.
CHANG Lo-fu— see CHANG Wen-fien
CHANG Su — Identified in 1943 as member of the Political Committee of the
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.
CH'ANG Te-i — Identified in 1942 as the Communist magistrate of Yen-ch'ush
Hsien, Shensi.
CHANG T'e-li— see CHANG Kuo-tao
CHANG Ting-ch'eng — Commanding General of the 7th Division, New 4th Army,
Central Anhwei Military Region in 1943, but his acitivities have not been
reported since then. TAN Hsi-ling was Acting Commander of the 7th Divi-
sion in 1944. CHANG established one of the early Soviets in western Fukien
Province, 1928. Appointed Commander of the 7th Division February 1941.
'CHANG Wen-ping — Apparently still under arrest as of May 1944. The release
of CHANG and other Chinese Communists allegedly arrested in connection
with the "New 4th Incident" was requested by LIN Tsu-han in a signed
proposal, 1944.
CHANG Wen-t'ien (CHANG Lo-f u ) —Member of the Central Committee, the
Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party in
1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he held the following posts : Member of
the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat, and Minister of Propaganda
of the CCP ; Member, Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive
Committee and Chairman of the People's Council. In 1940 at Yenan he was
Member of the Central Committee of the CCP, Member of the Political Bu-
reau, and Secretary-General of the Secretariat of the CCP, also President of
the Marx-Lenin Institute.
CHANG Yiin-i — Deputy Commander of the New 4th Army since at least 1943.
Graduate of Paoting Military Academy. Once a leader in the 7th Red Army.
Chief of Staff of New 4th Army in 1940. Appointed Commander of the 2nd
Division of the New 4th Army, February 1941.
CHAO Jung— see HSIEH K'ang-chih
CHAO Yung— see HSIEH K'ang-chih
CH'EN Ch'ang-hao — Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of
the CCP.
CH'EN Chen-hsia — Identified in 1944 as Director of the Yen-ch'ang Petroleum
Refinery, Shensi Province, operated by the Chinese Communists.
CH'EN Chia-k'ang — Acted as representative for CHU Te at some of the functions
for the press party to Yenan summer 1944.
CH'EN Chung-fu— see CH'EN Tu-hsiu
CH'EN I (CH'EN Yi)— Acting Commander of the New 4th Army and Political
Commissar of Shantung Military District.
Graduate of Whampoa Military Academy 1926. Joined the Communists in
Nan-ch'ang after the split with the Kuomintang. In 1931 when Communist
control of Kiangsi was almost absolute, he was appointed Military Governof
and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Provincial Government of Kiangsi.
When the "Long March" started in 1934, CH'EN remained behind in com-
mand of guerrilla forces on the Kwangtung-Fukien Kiangsi border. Com-
manded the 1st Guerrilla Division of the New 4th Army in o]ierations be-
tween Shanghai and Nanking, 1938. Escaped with his division after the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2453
"New Fourth Army Incident" 1941, and assumed acting command of the
New 4th Army upon capture of Commander YEH T'ing.
CH'EN K'ang-pai — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shansi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
CH'EN Keng — General in southeast Shansi in 1944. Listed as member of the
Central Committee of the CCP in 1943.
He allegedly once saved CHIANG Kai-shek's life by carrying him from a
field of defeat in one of his early wars, 1925. He was promoted to a brigadier
general in the nationalist army, but was subsequently jailed under suspicion
of being a Communist. He escaped and as Commander of the 1st Division of
the 1st Red Army Corps he participated in the "Long March." He was de-
scribed as one of the important officers of the First Front Anny which held
a reunion in Kansu with leaders of the 2nd and 4th Front Armies in October
1936. He commanded a brigade of the 129th Division, 18th Group Army in
the "100 Regiment Offensive" against the J'apanese operating in southeast
Shansi, 1941.
CH'EN Kuang — Vice Commander, Shantung Base, 18th Group Army. Reported
Deputy for LIN Piao in both 1938 and 1943.
CHEN Pai-ta— see CH'EN Po-ta.
CH'EN Po-ta (CHEN Pai-ta)— Identified in 1943 as secretary to MAO Tse-tung.
He is reportedly a well-known Communist theoretician. Author of several
books on socialism and of numerous Communist pamphlets in English as well
as Cliinese. Member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1940. He is
reported to have sent CHIANG Kai-shek a criticism of the latter's book
"China's Destiny". While in Chungking in 1942 he served as editor of the
Shang-hiio 8hii-chu (Life Book Company) and as editor of the Communist
newspaper Hsin-htia Jih-pao. He was closely associated with CHOU En-lai
during this Chungking period. He is reported to be a native of Hunan
province and long-time member of the CCP.
CH'EN Shao-yii (WANG Ming)— Identified in 1943 as member of the Central
Committee, Member of the Political Bureaii, and of the Secretariat of the
CCP. Is reported very ill in Yenan, probably with ulcers. He is now in his
late thirties. Has a pleasing, disarming manner. He is exceptionally articu-
late, but is essentially a theoretician. His very short stature is the butt of
many Kuomintang jokes. Born the son of a prosperous Anhwei family, he
went in 1925 to Moscow at his own expense to attend the Chungshan Uni-
versity. There he specialized in subjects pertaining to revolutionary methods
and problems of the unpropertied class. Wrote many pamphlets. He alleg-
edly became the sworn confederate of CH'IN Pang-hsien whom he met at
the University. During the 1930's he became the leading Chinese in the
Moscow apparatus of the Communist International. In 1934 he was ap-
pointed to the following posts at Jui-chin, Kiangsi. Member, Secretarial
Bureau ; member, Political Bureau ; Chairman of the Chinese Communist
delegation to Moscow. At the 7th World Congress held July-August 1935 he
was elected to the following positions in the Communist International : Mem-
ber of the Executive Committee ; Member of the Presidium ; Alternate Mem-
ber of the Secretariat. In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committeev
member. Political Bureau, and member, the Secretariat of the CCP, also
President of the China Women's College, and member of the People's Political
Council at Chungking. Although Kuomintang sources have long reported
him as being at odds with MAO Tse-tung, there is no evidence of any serious
rift. According to a reliable American source, his alleged ouster by MAO
from the post of Director of the United Front Department in March 1940 was
probably a resignation due to real ill health.
CH'EN Tai — Identified in 1944 as Deputy Commander of the 115th Division
of the ISth Group Army at the Shantung Base in absence of Gen. LIN
Piao.
CH'EN Tu-hsiu (CH'ENG Chung-fu)— Deceased. One of the founders and the
first leader of the CCP. Noted scholar and literary figure. He was born
in Anhwei 1879. He received advanced education in France and Japan.
Returning to China he liecame professor and later Dean of Literature of
the Peking National University. He was in the forefront of the "Literary
Revolution" in China which signified an attempt to bring the written lan-
guage into closer correspondence with the colloquial language. In 1919 he
established contact with the Communist International. Together with Li
Ta-chao and Lenin's secretary Marin he organized the foundation meeting
of the CCP in Shanghai, May 1921. As a result of the Soviet Russian Kuo-
2454 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
mintang Entente Cordiale he was admitted into the Kuomintang in 1924'
and was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-
mintang in 1925. Concurrently a member of the CCP he was elected by the
Chinese Communists as one of their delegates to the Communist Interna-
tional at Moscow in 1925.
CH'EN Tu-hsiu led the CCP until the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, 1 August
1927. Shortly thereafter he incurred the disfavor of the Comintern because-
of his opposition to the Moscow-inspired policy of class war. He was de-
posed as Secretary General of the Central Conuuittee of the CCP and was
dismissed from the Communist Party. Later he affiliated himself with the
Chinese Trotskyite sympathizers. In 1932 he was arrested in Shanghai by^
the Kuomintang, tried and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, ine was
released, however, a few years later. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japa-
nese war he went with the Nationalist armies to west China and lived in
Szechwan. He died in May 1942.
CH'EN Yi— see CH'EN I
CH'EN Yiin — Identihed in March 1944 as director of the Department of Organi-
zation of the CCP. In 1934 at .lui-cliin, Kiangsi he was chosen member of
the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee.
CH'ENG Fang-wu — Identified in 1944 as Chairman of the Shansl-Chahar-Hopeh
Border Region People's Political Council, and President of the Associated
University of the Shansi-Chabar-Hopeh Border Region. He is a noted Com-
munist writer.
Born in 1894 in Hunan Province. He was a friend of the writer KUO Mo-ja
during the latter s student days in Japan, and together with KUO he joined
the Creative Society {CJVuatuj-tnao t^he) and collaborated with him in cer-
tain literary efforts. He was formerly professor at Canton University. In
1940 lie was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP and
also President of the North Shensi Public School. In 1943 he was listed in
the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government as a member of the
Chairman's Committee and as Education Commissioner.
CHI Ming-hui — Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the-
CCP.
CHIANG Ping-chih— see TING Ling.
CHIHO Sheng-ping — Identified in 1944 as magistrate of Yen-ch'ang, Shensi,.
where the petroleum wells are located. Born a peasant.
CH'IN Pang-hsien (CH'IN Po-ku, Po-ku, Bogu)— He is editor of the Yenan.
Chieh-fang Jih-pao (Emancipation Daily) ; Director, Chieh-fang Press; Di-
rector, Hsin-hua News Service. He is tall, broad-shouldered, pale and hand-
some to tlie point of incurring such Kuomintang epithets as "pretty-faced
Bolshevik." He speaks Russian and some English. He was educated in
Russia where he met CH'EN Shao-yii, who allegedly became his sworn con-
federate. He returned to China in 1930 and was appointed member of the
Central Committee of the CCP and concurrently Chief of the Kiangsu Bu-
reau of Organization. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was appointed mem-
ber of the Secretarial Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP. He
was elected an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Com-
munist International by the 7th World Congress July-August 1935. He was
reported to have played a big part with CHOU En-lai and YEH Chien-ying
in the negotiations with CHIANG Kai-shek during the Sian Incident, De-
cember 1936. In 1938 he was Chief of the HankoW Office of the 18th Group-
Army. In 1939 he was Director of the Northwest Office of the CCP and
Resident Member of the Central Government's 1st People's Political Council.
In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CCP and member
of both the Chairman's Committee and the Secretariat of tlie Political
Bureau of the CCP. These posts he still held in 1943, when he was also
Chief of the Industrial Workers' Department of the Secretariat.
Although he may still hold all or some of these posts, his chief activity is
now in propaganda. He has built the circulation of the Ctiieh-fung Jih-pao to
a total of 7,8.55 and is constantly increasing the output of the Chieh-fang
Press. As Director of the Hsin^hug News Service, he is entrusted not only
with the job of keeping Chinese Conuiuuiist leaders informed of world hap-
penings, but must disseminate such news to the public.
CH'IN I*ang-hsien, Mrs. — see LIU Ch'tin-hsien.
CH'IN Po-ku— see CH'IN Pang-hsien.
CHOU En-lai — Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Central Revolutionary
Military Council, and concurrently Chief of Military Affairs, and Director
of the Southern (China) Political Branch Bureau of the CCP. He is also
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2455
member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the CCP.
He has lately visited Chungking twice to negotiate with the Central Gov-
ernment, 13 November to 7 December 1944, and 2.j January to 15 February
1945. He is at present considered second only to MAO Tse-tung. Since he
has great influence in shaping the policy of the CCP toward the foreign
powers as well as the Kuomintang and other Chinese parties, he is often
referred to as the "foreign minister" of the Chinese Communists. He has
been a leading political figure in the political section of the CCP and has also
been considered one of the most able and forceful military men in China.
Intelligent, he has a modest but composed manner, a friendly smile and a
good sense of humor. CHOU is a practical rather than theoretical Com-
munist. He is the one leading Chinese Communist said to enjoy the respect
and confidence of CHIANG Kai-shek. He has been reported largely respon-
sible for saving CHIANG'S life during the Sian Incident, December 1936.
He was born in 1898 in Kiangsu Province of an old mandarin family. At
the age of 13 he moved to Manchuria. He graduated from the Nankai Middle
School in Tientsin 1917 and became a student leader, much interested in
revolutionary movements. He attended universities in Japan for a year
and a half after which he returned to Nankai University where he edited
a student newspaper. He was arrested and imprisoned in 1919 for leading
a student demonstration, and met his future wife, TENG Ying-ch'ao, in jail.
When released he joined a radical society called "Awaken", to which she
also belonged. In October 1920 he went to France for two years. There he
helped found the French Branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Subse-
quently he went to Germany for a year and is also reported to have traveled
in England. He joined the Kuomintang at Canton in 1924 as Secretary of
the Provincial Committee. During 1925-26 he was Chief of the Political
Department of the Whampoa Military Academy under CHIANG Kai-shek.
He participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition 1926. In command of
three divisions under General Ho Ying-ch'in at the time of CHIANG Kai-
shek's first anti-Communist coup in Canton, March 1926 CHOU was arrested
in Swatow, but CHIANG released him and retained him as "advisor"
because of his great influence with the Wharupoa cadets. He was appointed
head of party work in the Kuomintang armies. Meanwhile he also studied
military tactics and strategy under General Galen and other Soviet teachers
at Whampoa.
In 1927 he went to Shanghai and led three workers' uprisings, the object
being to help CHIANG Kai-shek seize Shanghai. A few months later when
the Kuomintang turned against the Communists, PAI Ch'ung-hsi ordered
CHOU'S arrest and execution, but a division commander freed him. He
fled to Hankow and worked on the Military Committee of the leftist Kuo-
mintang Government in Hankow. He joined the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, Au-
gust 1927, and became Secretary of the CCP 'Front Committee. He w-ent
wnth the 1st Red Army to Swatow, led a division in the Kwangtung East
River fighting and was defeated. Thereafter he became an undercover
worker in Shanghai. He was a delegate to Moscow to the 6th Congress of
the Comintern, 1928, and was appointed a member of the Communist Inter-
national. In 1930 he was Chinese Red Army delegate to Moscow. In the
Kiangsi Soviet, 1931, he became Secretary of the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee of the CCP. Six months later he became Political Com-
missar under CHU Te. In January 1934 he was appointed a member of the
Secretariat of the CCP and concurrently Chairman of the Political Bureau
of the Central Committee of the CCP and Minister of Military Affairs of the
Chinese Soviet Government at Jui-chin, Kiangsi. Then in February 1934
he received the following posts from the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Execu-
tive Committee : member of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central
Executive Committee ; Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs
Commission, with CHU Te as Chairman.
He participated in the "Long March" starting in October 1934. He was
elected member of the I]xecutive Committee of the Communist International
by the 7th World Congress, July-August 1935.
With the advent of the United China Front in 1937 he became the repre-
sentative of the Chinese Communists to the Central Government and was
readmitted into the Kuomintang in 1938. In 1940 be was reported member
of the Supreme National Defense Council in Chungking. He held the post
of Vice Minister of Political Training of the National Military Council
2456 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
1938-40. In 1940 he was I'elieved of this post and appointed Vice Director of
the War Areas (Kuomintang) Affairs Board, a position which actually-
meant little. His chief task remained that of liaison officer between the
Kuomintang and the CCP. In 1941 he was also head of eight Communist
representatives to the Peoples Political Council in Chungking. In 1942 he
was asked whether he were ambassador or hostage in Chungking and his
answer implied the latter. In the same year he was appointed Chief of
Staff of the Communist Central Revolutionary Military Council, but did not
return to Yenan until the summer of 1943. After the reshuffle in the CCP
in March 1944 he received his present posts.
CHOU is known to speak adequate English and to have studied it in re-
cent years. He said that he had forgotten French and German.
CHOU En-lai, Mrs.— see TENG Ying-ch'ao
CHOU Ho-sheng (CHOU Ho-sin) — Author. Elected member of the Control
Commission of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress
July-August 1935.
CHOU Ho-sin— see CHOU Ho-sheng.
CHOU Hsing — Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the
CCP
CHOU "Shih-ti— see CHOU Tzu-t'i.
CHOU Tzu-t'i (CHOU Shih-ti ??)— Identified in 1940 as Chief of Staff of the
120th Division, 18th Group Army. Reported in 1944 as Chief of Staff and Vice
Political Commissar' of the Shansi-Suiyuan Base of the 18th Group Army.
CHOU Yang — As of 1944 President of Yenan University. Member of the Chair-
man's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.
In 1943 he was Secretary General of the Border Government.
CH'U Ch'iu-pai— see CH'U Ch'iu-po.
CH'U Ch'iu-po (CH'U Ch'iu-pai. TSUI Chiu-pai) DECEASED. One of the
founders of the Moscow Branch of the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he
held the following posts : Member, Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central
Executive Committee ; People's Commissar for Education. Apparently killed
sometime prior to 1937.
CHU Min-liang^Acted as representative for CHU Te at some of the functions
for the press party to Yenan, summer 1944.
CHU Te (CHU Teh) — C-in-C of the Chinese Communist Army, Commander
of the 18th Group Army and Deputy Commander of the 2nd War Zone since
August 1937. Vice Chairman of the Central Revolution Military Council and
member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
He is the best trained military leader among the Chinese Communists. Te-
nacious when convinced, scrupulously honest, exceedingly selfless in thought
and action. He possesses the personal magnetism of inspiring leadership,
he is considerate to subordinates, devoted to his men. He lives and dresses
like the rank and file, is a wide reader, and sports lover. He is characterized
as taciturn, kindly, mild, slow temperament, courteous but not polished. He
is stockily built, and has rough features, of peasant type. In January 1944
he was reported as serving more in a General Staff capacity, with P'ENG
Te-huai directing operations in the field.
Born 1886 in Szechwan Province. One story safs he comes of a poor
tenant farmer family, went to local schools, then to the Yunnan Military
School 1909-1911. Other sources describe him as a son of the landed gentry,
who entered the Yunnan Military Academy through his family's prestige.
He joined the T'ung Meng Hui in 1909 and later the Kuomintang. In
the 1911 Revolution he was a company commander in TS'AI Ao's Yunnan
army. He was Brigade Commander in the Yunnan Army during 1913-16,
and later aide to the Governor of Yunnan. It is said that at this time he
became sunk in vice, opium; he had a harem, and other amenities of a war-
lord's existence. In 1921 when his patron was ousted as Governor, CHU
went with him. He began to read books on- Communism and the Russian
Revolution and came into contact with Chinese Communists in Shanghai and
Canton. He became affiliated with the Communist party, gave up his vices,
and divided his property among his wives. He was allegedly sent to Ger-
many in 1922 to study military science at the expense of the Communist
International. He was one of the founders of the CCP in Germany. He
was twice arrested by the German Police for revolutionary activity and
finally driven out of the country. He traveled through Europe and the
USSR.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2457
On his return to China in 192G he became Chairman of the Political Depart-
ment of the Kuomintang 20th Army in Szechwan province. Later he waS
appointed Principal of the Military Training School in Nan-ch'ang and con-
currently chief of the Nan-ch'ang police. He helped organize the Nan-ch'ang
Uprising of 1 August 1927. Driven out of Nan-ch'ang, he retreated to Kwang-
tung, reequipped his men, and organized the South Hunan Uprising. In
May 192S he combined forces vpith MAO Tse-tung, thereby becoming Com-
mander of the 4th Red Army. They began a campaign through southern
Kiangsi in January 1929 and reorganized the 3rd, 4th and 12th Red Armies
into the First Red Army Corps with CHU as Commander. In 1930 he became
Commander in Chief of the First Front Army which included the First and
Third Army Corps. MAO Tse-tung was always Political Commissar.
At the 1st All-Soviet Congress at Jui-chin, Kiangsi in 1931, CHU was
elected C-in-C of the Chinese "Red Army" which repeatedly defeated the
Central Government troops sent against the Red Army in Kiangsi. In Janu-
ary 1934 he was appointed member of the Political Bureau of the CCP. In
February 1934 he was appointed member of the Presidium of the Chinese
Soviet Central Executive Committee ; People's Commissar for Military
Affairs; and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee.
In October 1934 he was forced to start the "Long March" and arrived in
the Northwest at the end of 1936.
In August 1937 CHIANG Kai-shek appointed him Commander of the
Eighth Route Army (the new name given to the Red Army after the con-
clusion of the Kuomintang-Communist united front) and Vice Commander
of the 2nd War Zone. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central
Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP, also member of the Supreme
National Defense Council in Chungking.
CHU Te, Mrs.-— see K'ANG K'o-ch'ing.
CHU Teh— see CHU Te.
CHUNG Ch'i-hsien— Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the
1st Division of the New 4th Army, Central Kiangsu Base.
FAN Chin — Known to be the author of at least one Chinese Communist pam-
phlet, no date.
FAN Tzu-chia — Last known information dated October 1940. He was a brigade
commander, 129th Division, 18th Group Army. Wounded in south Shansi.
FAN Wen-Ian — Acting Director of the Central Research Institute of the CCP
as of 15 March 1944.
FANG Chih-min — Last known information dated 1939 when he was reported
under arrest by the Chungking Government. He was chosen Member of the
Presidium of the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee at
Jui-chin, Kiangsi 1934. Later he became member of the Central Committee
of the CCP.
FANG Pu-chou — Last known information dated 1939 when he was identified as
Commander of the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Border Region Guerrilla 5th Col-
umn, New 4th Army.
FENG Wen-pin— Reported in 1940 and 1943 as Chief of "Young People" and
member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
FU Ch iu-tou — Identified June 1944 as a garrison commander of the New 4th
Army.
FU Chung — Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the Chi-
nese Communist Party.
FU Lien-chiang — Ph. D. Reported to be a Christian. He is a graduate of Fukien
Christian University. Joined the Chinese Communist forces from the start.
In 1944 he was in charge of the medical service for the masses.
FUNG Pak-yu — Reported in March 1943 as leader of about 1,000 armed Com-
munists on Hainan Island.
GALEN— see BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovltch.
GA-LIN— see BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovltch.
GOGOV — Russian Communist Doctor connected with Bethune Memorial HospitaL
He has contributed his medical services to the Chinese Communist forces
for several years.
GRUSENBERG, Michael— see BORODIN, Michael.
HAN Ying— see HSIANG Ying.
HO Ch'ang-chiang (HO Ch'ang -kung?) — Identified in 1942 as a commander in
the 3rd Column, 18th Group Army. He is possibly the HO Ch'ang-kung
reported in 1940 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
HO Ch'ang-kung — see HO Ch'ang-chiang,
22848— 52^I)t. TA 11
2458 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HO Ch'ang-li — Identified in 1942 as an "important Communist."
HO K'o-ch'uan (KAI Feng)— Acting Director of Publicity of the CCP. In 1940
was member of the Central Committee of the CCP, and listed again as such
in 1943.
HO Lien-ch'eng — Identified in January 1944 as Vice Commissioner of Education
of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.
HO Lung — General. Commander, United Defense Headquarters (Lden-fang
Ssu-ling-pu) at Yenan of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Regions. Concurrently commander of the two large units which compose
the UDH : the 120th Division of the 18th Group Army and the Yenan Gar-
rison Army (lAu-sliou Ping-Vuan). Listed as member in 1943 of the Central
Committee of the CCP.
He is known as "China's Chappiev". About 50 years old. Allegedly still
illiterate at time of the "Long March", he has since been improving his
education. An able leader with a sharp wit, shrewd judgment, and a swash-
buckling manner which appeals to his men. He is said to possess a fiery
temper. Handsome. Allegedly the most admired of all 18th Group Army
generals, and most feared by Kuomintang commanders. He is reported to be
closely connected with Chinese secret societies.
HO Lung is a native of Hunan. He was a cowherd. At 20 he became
leader of a kind of Robin Hood gang. He commanded the 2nd Division of the
Chien-lmo Army in Szechwan in 1925, and subsequently joined the Nationalist
Revolutionary Foi'ces. There he commanded the 3rd Division under T'ANG
Cheng-chih. When the Party split in 1927 HO remained with the leftist
Kuomintang group. In August 1927 he and YEH T'ing organized the
Nan-ch'ang Uprising. Defeated, they fled to Kwangtung where they joined
CHU Te and tried to occupy Swatow. After the failure of their venture HO
escaped to Hong Kong and thence via Shanghai back to Hunan. There he
joined the CCP and, beginning in 1928, built up the 2nd Front Red Army
and established a Soviet in the Hupeh-Hunan border area. He participated
in the "Long March". In 1940 he was identified as a member of the Central
Committee of the CCP.
HO Tzu-lo — Construction Commissioner of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region Government.
HO Wei — Reported in 1940 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
Identified in 1939 as any army commander in the Chinese Communist forces.
HO Wei-te — Vice Commissioner of Construction of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region Government when last reported in January 1944.
HONG Ying— see HSIANG Ying.
HSIA Hsi — Identified in 1939 as Commander of the Chinese Communist 3rd Army.
HSIANG Ying (HAN Ying, HONG Ying, HSIANG Te-lung, SHANG Ying) —
DECEASED. One report states he was killed in the "New 4th Incident"
January 1911. He was an experienced military leader who reportedly pro-
vided most of the military leadership of the New 4th Army under YEH
T'ing. He was very active in Kiangsu in 1927. In January 1934 at Jui-
chin, Kiangsi, he was appointed to the following posts by the 5th Plenary
Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CCP : member Secretarial Bu-
reau of the CCP ; member. Political Bureau of the Central Committee of
the CCP; Head of the Labor Department of the Chinese Soviet govern-
ment. In February 1934 he was appointed to the following posts by the
Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee ; Vice Chairman of the
Presidium, with CHANG Kuo-tao as the other Vice Chairman and MAO Tse-
tung as Chairman ; and People's Commissar for Inspection of Labor and
Agriculture. This last post he still held in 1939, but meanwhile had been
appointed Vice Commander of the New 4th Army under YEH T'ing. In 1940
he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
HSIANG Te-lung— see HSIANG Ying
HSIAO Ching-hsien — see HSIAO Ching-kuang
HSIAO Ching-kuang (HSIAO Ching-hsien) — Member of the Government Com-
mittee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region since at least 1943, con-
currently Vice Commander and Political Commissar of the United Defense
Headquarters (Lien-fang Ssu-Ung pu) at Yenan under HO Lung. He studied
at CHIANG Kai-shek's Whampoo Military Academy at Canton, 1924-27. He
was one of the first Chinese cadets to be trained at the Moscow Military
Academy where he spent the next four years He participated as a leader
in the "Long March." In 1936 his task was to break through the hostile
Moslems to the Russian controlled areas in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2459
He was defeated by Kansu warlords in October 1936. In .January 1937 he
held the posts of Chairman of the Military Department of the Kansu Soviet
and Commander of the 29th Red Army. In 1940 he was identified as member
of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1943 he was reported as Shensi-
Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Garrison Commander.
He is possibly the HSIAO Ching-hsien {kiiang and hsien are two charac-
ters frequently mistaken for each other) referred to as a member of the
CH'EN Shao-yil clique among Chinese Communists.
HSIAO Chiin — Identified in 1944 as a literary figure in Yenan.
HSIAO Hua — Identified in 1942 as a commander of Chinese Communist forces in
south Hopeh.
HSIAO Keh— see HSIAO K'o.
HSIAO K'o (HSIAO Keh, HSIAO K'o-ch'eng)— Vice Commander under NIEH
■Tung-chen of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Military Region, 18th Group Army,
He is about 43 yeai'S old, of small stature. He was formerly an independent
warlord, famed as a guerrilla leader. He received military training in
CHIANG Kai-shek's army. In 1928 he helped lead a peasant revolt, then
raised his own independent Partisan Army in centi-al China to fight against
the Central Government. He joined forces with HO Lung in 1934. Both
joined the main Conmnmist forces iu the "Long March." He was Vice
Conunander of HO Lung's 120th Division in 1939, and patrolled d'stricts
west of Peking in 1941.
HSIAO K'o-ch'eng— see HSIAO K'o.
HSIAO Wang-tung— Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department, 4th
Division, New 4th Army. He was Political Commissar of the same divi-
sion in 1943 but was apparently succeeded by *TEXG Chih-hui in 1944.
HSIEH Chiieh-tsai — Vice Chairman of the 2nd Peoples Political Council of the
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in Yenan ; Chief of the
1st Department of the Chinese Communist IMilitary Council. Sexagenarian.
He was interviewed by Chinese members of the Chungking Press Party to
Yenan in the summer of 1944.
HSIEH Fu-chih (HSIEH Kung-chih)— Identified in 1940 as a member of the
Political Department of a brigade of Chinese Communist forces in North
China.
HSIEH Ilao-ju — Identified in 1939 as a divisional commander of Chinese Com-
munist forces.
HSIEH K'ang-chih (CHAO Jung, KANG Sang, CHAO Yung)— Chief of the
Social AfTairs Department and of the Intelligence Department of the CCP.
He is a native of Shantung Province, about 41 years old. He attended the
University of Shanghai. He is reported to be a follower of CH'EN Sbao-yH
and to have become a member of the CCP upon the latter's recommendation.
He once held the post of Secretary of Organization of the CCP in Kiangsu.
In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee and Chairman
of the Party Paper Editorial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
He was reported in 1943 as Chief of the Central Protection Bureau, in charge
of all Communist secret service work. He was also listed in 1943 in the
concurrent posts of Chief of Organization in the Central Secretariat and
member of the Political Bureau of the CCP.
HSIEH Kung-chih— see HSIEH Fu-chih
HSING Jen-fu — Identified in 1942 as a commander of Chinese Communist forces
in south Hopeh.
HSIUNG P'o-ch'en — Identified in 1940 as a Chinese Communist army oflScers.
HSU Cho-jan — Identified in 1939 as a Chinese Communist military leader.
♦HSU Fan-t'ing — C-in-C of the Shansi "new Army," and Vice Commander of the
Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. The Shansi "New Army" is composed of
troops formerly under YEN Hsi-shan. Under the influence of HSU", who
served under YEN Hsi-shan, these troops mutinied and went over to the
Communists in 1940 after YEN allegedly attempted to disband them. The
"New Army" now shares garrison areas with the ISth Group Army and oper-
ates under the General StafT of the 18th Group Array. It is referred to as
the "Dare to Die Detachments" under its original commander HStJ.
HStJ was formerly member of the Tunri Menrr Hui. In 1935 he attempted
harakiri before SUN Yat-sen's mausoleum to show his loyalty to the San Min
Chu I and protest against the non-resistance policy against .Japan. After
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he became a high staff officer to YEN
Hsi-shan, then Commander of YEN's "New Army" in the 2nd War Zone,
2460 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
West Shansi. This army consisted largely of liberal volunteers with sus-
ceptibility to the influence of Communists with whom they were in close
proximity in Shansi. HSU wrote an article, "Words Unspoken for Three
Years," in the Chich-fang Jih-pao, Communist Party organ in Yenan, on 16
August 1944, protesting against YEN Hsi-shan's alleged slander of the Com-
munists.
HSU Hai-tung — Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported
in 1943. Born 1900 in Hupeh province, youngest son of a potter. He went
to school while learning his father's trade. In 1922 he joined the 4th Kuo-
mintang Army under CHANG Fa-k'uei. When the Chinese Communists
were driven under ground in 1927, HSU returned to Hupeh and organized a
"workers' and peasants' army". This group later grew into the 4th Front
Army of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, with HSU Hsiang-ch'ien as army
commander and CHAJS^G Kuo-tao as chairman of the Soviet. HSU later be-
came commander of the 15th Red Army Corps. In 1937 he was assigned
to help NIEN Jung-chen in anti-Japanese action in Shantung. In 1939 he
was reported to be in command of a unit of the 18th Group Army in S'hensi.
In 1940 he was reported as Vice Commander of the Chiang-pei Headquarters
of the New 4th Army.
HSU Hsiang-ch'ien — Vice Commander and a Political Commissar of 120th Divi-
sion of ISth Group Army under Ho Lung, also Political Commissar of the
United Defense Headquarters. He has been a leading Communist figure for
a long time. He was a member of the first class graduated from CHIANG
Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy and served as an officer in the Kuo-
mintang forces. He participated in the Nan-Ch'ang Uprising in 1927 and
subsequently in the Swatow and Canton uprisings. In 1932 he commanded
the 4th Red Army Corps on the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei borders. This unit,
later known as the 4th Front Army of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, ad-
vanced into north Szechwan under HSU and the Chinese Chairman of the
Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, CHANG Kuo-tao, and merged in Szechwan
with Kiangsi Communists in the "Long March". In 1940 HSU was re-
ported in command of a unit in Shantung and Kiangsu. He was also
member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1943 he was appointed
Chief of Staff of the United Defense Headquarters {Lden-fang Ssu-ling-pu)
at Yenan of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu Ningsia Border Regions under
HO Lung.
*HSU Hung — Member of the Political Committee of the Independent Communist
Division of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi.
•HSU Te-lieh— Known as "Elder HSU," or Lao HSU, the educator. Born 1876
in Hunan of a poor peasant family. He received six years of classical school-
ing and becnme a school teacher. When 29 years of age he entered the
Changsha College and upon graduation became an instructor of mathematics.
MAO Tse-tung was one of his poorer mathematics pupils. He is said to have
been one of SUN Yat-sen's collaborators. During the Revolution in 1911 he
was active in the Honan provincial Kuomintang and afterwards became a
member of the provincial council. After World War I he accompanied the
Hunanese delegation of "workers-Students" to France and studied for three
years in the Paris University. He returned to Hunan in 1923, established
two modern normal schools in Changsha, and prospered for four years.
He did not join the CCP until 1927, but had sympathized with the Commu-
nists before that and had preached Marxism to his pupils. "I wanted to be
a Communist" he allegedly stated "but nobody asked me to join. I was
already fifty and I concluded that the Communists considered me too old."
He joined when a Communist sought him out, and the Party subsequently
sent him to Moscow to study for two years. On his return he ran the block-
ade to Kiangsi, where he became Assistant Commissioner, then Commis-
sioner of Education upon the death of CHU Ch'iu-pai. He survived the
"Long March" and became Commissioner of Education in the northwest.
HSt) Yen-kang — Identified in 1930 as commander of a group army of the Chinese
Communist forces.
HU Fu— see LIU Shao-ch'i.
HU Jen-k-\iei — Identified in 1944 as Deputy Director of the Administrative Com-
mittee of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government. In 1943 he
was listed as Vice Chairman and member of the Political Committee of the
Provisional Executive Committee of the same Border Region Government.
He was formerly a Magistrate of Yn-hsien, Shansi.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2461
HUANG Chen-t'ang — Identified in 1939 as Commander of the Chinese Com-
munist 5th Regiment under CHU Te.
HUANG Hsin-liieh — Identified in 1935 as an important Chinese Communist
leader.
HUANG Hua— Identified in 1944 as Secretary in the 18th Group Army Office,
Yenan.
HUANG K'o-ch-eng — Identified in 1944 as Commanding General and Political
Commissar of 3rd Division of New 4th Army, North Kiangsu Base.
HUANG Ya-kuang — Identified in 1944 as Manager of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region Bank.
HUANG Yung-sheng — In 1943 he was reported Commander of the Chinese Com-
munist 3rd Divisional War Zone. He was under command of NIEN Jung-
chen in 1940.
JAO Cheng-hu — ^Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
JEN Chih-pin — Identified in 1943 as Political Commissar of the 5th Division,
New 4th Army.
JEN Pi-shih (ZENG Pi-shu — When last reported in May 1943 he was to attend
a meeting of the Chinese Communists to discuss the disbandment of the
Communist International. He was Political Commissar of the 8th Route
Army in 1938. In 1940 he was member of the Central Committee and Po-
litical Bureau of the CCP. He speaks perfect Russian.
JOFFE, Adolph Abramowicz — Deceased. Special Soviet Envoy to China and
Japan 1922-24. Outstanding diplomat. Friend of Trotsky and other op-
positionists. He was born in Crimea 1883 of wealthy parents. He joined
the Socialists in 1900. An exile from Russia, he studied medicine and law
in Berlin, Zurich and Vienna, 1903-08. Together with Trotsky he foun/Ied
Pravda in Vienna. On one of frequent secret trips back to Russia he was
arrested and exiled to Siberia, 1912. After release, 1917, he became a leader
in the Soviet councils. He negotiated with the Central Powers at Brest-
Litovsk, and was Ambassador to Germany, 1918. He was ousted from
Germany in the same year when it was discovered that he was helping to
prepare a revolution in Germany. Thereafter he became Commissar of
Foreign Affairs and of Social Insurance of the Soviet Government, then
Commissar of Soviet Inspection in the Ukraine. He formulated the Russo-
Polish-Ukrainian treaty, and attended the Genoa conference in April 1922.
Arriving in Shanghai, December 1922, his talks with SUN Yat-sen led to the
SUN-JOFFE Manifesto issued in January 1923 inaugurating the Kuomin-
tang-Soviet Entente Cordiale. He left the Far East in 1923 and went to
England where he negotiated with the MacDONALD Government in Febru-
ary 1924. He won Britain's recognition of the Soviet Union. He committed
suicide, November 1927, out of agony caused by a disease he had contracted
in the Far East.
JUNG Wu-sheng — Identified in November 1944 as Vice Chairman of the Shansi-
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government.
*KAI Feng — see HO K'o-ch'uan.
KAN Ssu-ch'i — Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the
CCP.
K'ANG K'o-ch'ing (Mrs. CHU Te) — In her twenties. Buxom. Apparently fond
of the Yenan Saturday night dances. Not reported as holding any oflicial
post.
KANG Sang— see HSIEH K'ang-chih.
K'ANG Sheng (KANG Sin?) — Chief of Agricultural Workers and members of the
Political Bureau of the CCP when last reported in 1943. Member of the
Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Govern-
ment. He is probably the KANG Sin who was elected an alternate member
of the Executive Committee and an alternate member of the Presidium of the
Communist International in 1935 by the 7th World Congress.
KANG Sin— see K'ANG Sheng
KAO Ch'ung-shan (KAO Tsung-shan) ---Member of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region Government in September 1944.
KAO Kaug— General. Director, Northwest Bureau, and member of the Political
Bureau of the CCP. Chairman, 2nd People's Political Council, Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region; concurrently Commander of the Peace Preserva-
tion Corps. He is about 40 years old, of a peasant family in Shensi, The
22848—52 — pt. 7A 12
2462 msTiTUTE of pacific relations
alleged inspiration of his revolutionary activity was the death of his father
at the hands of authorities for tax defaults. He is locally influential, which
is why he is kept in nominal authority, but he has probably run his course
in the revolution due to lack of education. He was illiterate in 1935, but
has since learned to write. He has had no training abroad. He is inclined
to exaggeration. He has an assistant with better education. KAO began
his career by stirring up mutinies among soldiery while a young recruit
during famines of 1928-29. Subsequently he organized peasant uprisings.
He finally established soviet self-government in considerable areas of north
Shensi. He organized the Workers' and Farmers' Anti-Japanese Army
(Kung-nung K'ang-jih Chun) and had the region already operating as an
anti-Japanese base when MAO Tse-tung and CHU Te arrived in Shensi from
the south. He is reported to have been Chief of the Supreme Court of the
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in 1940. In 1943 he was
identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
KAO Lang-t'ing — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
KAO Su-hsien — Member of the Chairmen's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
KAO Tsung-shan — see KAO Ch'ung-shan.
KAO Tzu-li — Identified in 1943 as Vice Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region Government and Concurrently President of the Supreme
Court of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1940
and 1943 he was also identified as member of the Central Committee of the
CCP.
KARAKHAN, Leo Mikhailovich — Soviet emissary, then Ambassador, to the
Peking Government 1923-26. Armenian, born 1889. He joined the Bol-
' sheviks in 1904. In 1918 he was Secretary to the Russian Brest-Litovsk
Peace Delegation. In 1921 he was Acting People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, and became Ambassador to Poland in November 1921. Between 1922
and 1924 he was Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Affairs
Commissariat. He went to China in September 1923 to negotiate with the
Peking Government, and concluded agreements in May 1924 for the estab-
lishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and USSR and for
the provisional management by the Soviet Union of the Chinese Eastern
Railway. He was appointed Ambassador to China in 1925, and as such
became the first Ambassador to China appointed by any foreign power. He
was Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs 1928-34. In 1933 he was reiwrted
to have been replaced in the conduct of Far Eastern matters and to have
fallen into complete disfavor. Nevertheless, he was Ambassador to Turkey
1934-37. No information on him after 1937.
*KUAN Hsiang-ying^Political Commissar of United Defense Headquarters at
Yenan under HO Lung.
KUAN Wen-wei — Identified in 1940 and 1942 as a commander in the New 4th
Army.
KUO Shu-chung — Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the
2nd Division of the New 4th Army.
LAI Ch'uan-ch'iu— Chief of Staff of the New 4th Army. In 1940 he was Chief of
Staff of the Chiang-pei Headquarters of the New 4th Army.
LAN P'ing (Mrs. MAO Tse-tung) — She married MAO Tse-tung in the spring of
1939. Comely, fairly young, and said to be very intelligent. She was for-
merly a well-known movie actress in Shanghai. Member of the Chinese
Communist Party since 1933. She left her movie career in 1937 to attend the
LU Hsun Fine Arts College in Yenan where MAO's interest in drama appar-
ently drew them together.
LEI Ching-t'ien — Identified in 1944 as President of the High Court and Member
of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region
Government.
LI Chieh-yung — Identified in 1943 as a member of the Executive Committee of the
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.
LI Fu-ch'un — Vice Director of the Department of Organization of the CCP at
least since March 1944. In 1940 was member of the Central Committee and
Director of Organization of the Party.
LI Hsien-nien — Commanding General. Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base, and momber
of the Political Committee of the 5th Diviison of the New 4th Army. He was
appointed to the latter post by the Communist Military Council in February
1941. In 19.39 he was reported as Commander of the Honan-Hupeh Flying
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2463
Column of the New 4th Army. His troops were said to have fought Central
Government troops in central Hupeh in 1941, and in Anhwei and Hupeh in
1943.
LI Kuang — Identified as a Communist writer in 1935.
*LI Pong — Identified in July 1944 as Secretary in the Office of the Chinese Com-
munist Resident Representative in Chungking.
LI Ting-ming — Vice Chairman, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Govern-
ment. He is allegedly not a member of the CCP or of any other party. In
1941 be originated the principle of the "Picked Army, Simplified Government"
{Ching-ping Chien-cheng) which has since become one of the ten most
important policies of the Chinese Communists. He is about 64 years, a native
of Mi-chih, Shensi, and comes from the prosperous gentry class. A typical
scholar of the old school, he has been noted as a chu-jen (2nd Degree Grad-
uate) in north Shensi. He was onetime private secretary in the former
Imperial Office of the Governor of the Yii-lin District, Shensi. Upon forma-
tion ofthe Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in 1937 he was
elected member of the People's Political Council.
LIAO Ch'eng-chih (S. C. LIAO)— As of May 1944 he was still under arrest by
Chungking Government authorities and he probably is still under arrest
He is the son of the late Kuomintang leader LIAO Chung-k'si. After study-
ing in Germany he i-eturned to China in 1932 and was arrested the following
year on charges of Communistic activities. He was subsequently released
by CHIANG Kai-shek. At the time of Pearl Harbor he was in Hong Kong
as representative of the New Fourth Army. He escaped, but allegedly was
arrested by Kuomintang authorities in 1943. LIAO was reported to have
left his chief assistant LOO Sun as head of an underground Chinese Com-
munist organization in Hongkong. In 1940 he was identified as a member
of the Central Committee and Director of Overseas Members of the CCP.
LIAO, S. C— see LIAO Ch'eng-chih.
LIN Chu-han — see LIN Tsu-han.
LIN Ohlin — Identified in 1940 as Commander of the Chiang-nan Anti-Japanese
Volunteer Army of the New 4th Army.
LIN Mai-k'o— see LINDSAY, Michael.
LIN Pai-hsu — see LIN Tsu-han.
LIN Pei-chuh — see LIN Tsu-han.
LIN Pei-yii — see LIN Tsu-han.
LIN Piao — General. Commander, 11.5th Division, 18th Group Army, with CH'EN
Tai as Deputy Commander. President, Anti-Japanese Military Academy
{R'ang-jili Chi'm-cheng Ta-hsiich) since at least 1940. Listed in 1943 as
member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He is at
present in charge of recruitment and training of 18th Group Army troops.
LIN Piao is rather diminutive, but wiry and in excellent health. He has
proved an able military leader, and is famous for his tactics, strategy and
remarkable memory. His articles on military subjects have won recogni-
tion not only in Chinese Communist circles but also in Kuomintang China,
Japan, and the U. S. S. R. He knows no language but Chinese. He has,
perhaps, visited Moscow briefly, but most reports state he has never been
abroad. LIN Piao, the son of a factory owner who was ruined by taxation,
was born in 1908 near Hankow, Hiipeh. He joined Socialist Youth and Kuo-
mintang in 1924, and the CCP in 1925. He graduated from CHIANG Kai-
shek's Whampoa Military Academy in 1925 with a brilliant record. Subse-
quently he commanded a unit in the Kuomintang Fourth Army or "Iron-
sides" of CHANG Fa-k'uei. In 1927 he joined HO Lung and YEH T'ing in
the Nan-ch'ang Uprising. He was made Field Commander of the Chinese
Red Army in 1929, and Commander of the First Red Army Corps in 1932.
This unit immediately began to defeat or outmaneuver every government
force sent against it. After participating in the "Long March", LIN was
placed in charge of training cadets at the "Communist Anti-Japanese Mili-
tary Academy". In 1937 he was given command of the 115th Division with
which he defeated the Japanese ITAGAKI Division at P'ing-hsing-kuan
(Pinghsing Pass), Shansi, in September of that year. He was indentified
in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1942 he was
invited to Chi;ngking for discussions, but returned to Yenan in 1943 after six
months of fruitless negotiations.
LIN Po-ch'tl— see LIN Tsu-han.
LIN T.su-han— (LIN Chu-han, LIN Po-ch'u, LIN Pai-hsu, LIN Pei-chuh, LIN
Pei-yii) — Chairman, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government
2464 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Member, Third People's Political Council, Chungking. Member, Central
Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. About sixty years old. Hand-
some, white haired, scholarly looking. Alert, energetic, enthusiastic. He
is cliaracterized as an inspiring organizer and leader with ability to draw
the best out o-f junior officers, a man who knows how to pull teams together.
He is widely venerated for his learning even in non-Communist China. For
a long time LIN was a co-worker of the late SUN Yat-sen, allegedly having
done underground work with him prior to the 1911 Revolution. He is re-
ported to have been driven to the study of Marxism by the failure of the
1911 Revolution. In 1925 when SUN Yat-sen died, LIN was appointed Chief
of the Department of Peasantry (Nung-miu Pu) of the Kwangtung Gov-
ernment. In 1926 he participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition as
Kuomintang representative in CH'ENG, Ch'ien's 6th Army. In the same
year he was appointed Member of the Central Executive Committee of the
Kuomintang, and in 1926 he was appointed Secretary General of the Revolu-
tionary Military Affairs Committee at Hankow. He went to Russia after
the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927 and founded a Chinese Workers'
School at Khabarov.sk. Returning to China in 1931, he became in the fol-
lowing year Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Chinese Soviet Gov-
ernment in Kiangsi. He participated in the "Long March" to Yenan. Since
its formation in 1937, LIN Tsu-han has been chairman of the Shensi-Kangu-
Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1940 he was reported as being a
member of Chungking's Supreme National Defense Council and member of
the People's Political Council. In 1943 he was identified a5 a member of
the Central Committee of the CCP, also member of the Political Bureau of
the Central Committee. He represented his party in the Kuomintang-Com-
munist discussions of May-Octol)er 1944, and also acted as a party spokes-
man before the session of the People's Political Council at Chungking in
September 1944.
LIN Yii-ying— see CHANG Hao.
LINDSAY, Michael (LIN Mai-k'o) — Radio advisor and technical assistant to
the Chinese Communists in Yenan. An Englishman, son of the Master of
Balliol, about 40 years old. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War he was
professor of economics at Yenching University, Peking, where he also car-
ried on extensive experimentations in radio. After Pearl Harbor he escaped
from Peking with his Chinese wife to the headquarters of the Shansi-
Chahar-Hopei Base of the Chinese Communists. He trained radio techni-
cians for the Communists, rebuilt their wireless sets, and worked on improve-
ment of telephone communication for the Border Government. In March
1944, he spent three weeks in Northwest Shansi rebuilding their apparatus
and teaching their technicians and eventually arrived in Yenan on 17 May
1944. He now translates material for broadcasts in English and advises on
choice of material, taken largely from Chinese Communist newspapers. He
is described as fair and honest in opinion but politically naive and naturally
influenced by long association with the Chinese Communists. He wears a
rough military uniform and is full of enthusiasms for the Border Govern-
ments and guerilla warfare.
LIU Ching-fan — Identified in 1944 as Civil Affairs Commissioner of Shensi-
Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.
LIU Ching-jen — Member of the Chairmans Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
LIU Ch'iin-hsien (Mrs. CH'IN Pang-hsien) — In her late thirties. Formerly a
mill worker in Shanghai. Returned student from Moscow Chung-shan
University. She was reported in 1937 as Dii'ector of the Women's Depart-
ment of the Chinese Communist Trade Unions.
LIU I — Identified in 1039 as a Chinese Communist army commander.
LIU Pai-cheng — see LIU Po-ch'eng.
LIU Po-ch'eng (LIU Pai-cheng)— Commander of 129th Division of the 18th
Group Army since August 1937. Acting Commander of the Shansi-Hopei-
Honan Military Region. Serious-minded, rated as one of the best tacticians
and students of military history in the Chinese army. He formerly be-
longed to the old Szechwan military clique and has been through hundreds
of bloody encounters. His right eye was shot out during the civil war.
According to a Kuomintang source he belongs to the "CHU Te clique".
He is about 46 years old. In 1927 he directed and led an uprising against
CHIANG Kai-shek which failed. Subsequently he studied at the Moscow
Military College. Upon his return to China he was appointed a staff officer
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOiNS 2465
of the Headquarters of the (Communist) Central Revohitionary Army. In
the vangnard of the First Red Army Corps during the "Long March," he
obtained a safe passage for the Communists through the territory of the
Lolo tribes in Sikang and Szechwan. He won the friendship of these tribes
because lie understood tlieir tribal feuds and knew a few words of their
language. He even succeeded in enlisting hundreds of Lolos in the Red
Army. LIU Po-ch'eng was identified in 1940 as a member of- the Central
Committee of the CCP. As Commander of the 129th Division he occupied
towards the end of 1943 the T'si-bang Shan area following evacuation by
Central Government forces. In April of 1944 he was reported operating in
northern Honan.
LIU Shaoch'i (HU F\i) — In 1943 he was identified as member of the Central
Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the CCP, also
Director of National Labor Union Headquarters and Director of the South-
east Political Branch Bureau. He probably still holds these, or at least
some of these posts. He is reported to be! on 2: to the "MAO Tse-tung
clique" within the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin. Kiangsi, he w-t^ memb'^r of
the Secretarial Bureau and of the Political Bureau of the Central Com-
mittee of the CCP, and also member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese
Soviet Central Executive Committee.
LIU Shao-wen — Member of the Central Committee of the COP when last
reported in 1943.
LIU Shih — Identified in 1944 as Commissioner of Education of the Shensi-
Kansu-Ningsia Border Government.
LIU Tien-chi — Identified in 1943 as a Kuomintang member who was also a
member of the Political Committee of the S'^ansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border
Region Government.
LIU Tse-ju — Identified in July 1944 as head of the CCP in Honan, a student in
the Party School and a writer.
LIU Tzu-tan — Identified in 1939 as Commander of the 26th Chinese Communist
Army.
LIU Yen — Last known information dated 1943 when he was reported Political
Commissar for the 1st Division of the New 4th Army, a post now held by
SU Yii. He was appointed a member of the Political Committee of the 1st
Division of the New 4th Army in the Central Kiangsu Military Region.
LO Jui-ch'ing — Director of the Political Department, Field Headquarters of the
18th Group Army. Vice Chairman of the Anti-Japanese University in Yenan
in 1938. Identified in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the
CCP.
LO Jung-heng — Political Commissar and Acting Commander of the 115th Divi-
sion of the 18th Group Army in the Shantung Military Region. He has held
the position of Political Commissar of the 115th Division under LIN Piao
at least since 1939.
LO Mai — Secretary General of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Gov-
ernment as of March 1944. In February 1934 he was chosen member of the
Presidium of the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee at the
meeting in Jui-chin, Kiangsi. In 1943 he was reported as member of the
Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP.
LO Ping-hui — Commanding General of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army
in the South Huai Military Region. Member of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party in 1940. Appointed Vice Commander of the
2nd Division of the New 4th Armv February 1941.
LOMINADZE— DECEASED. Replaced BORODIN as chief Comintern adviser
to the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Chief instigator of the Commu-
nist coup in Canton, December 1927. It failed and he returned to Russia
where he became a youth leader. Referred to among friends as the "darling
of Stalin." After 1933 he began to disagree with Stalin's policy and fell into
disfavor. Committed suicide, 1935.
*L00 Sun — Reported in 1942 as head of a Chinese Communist organization in
Houp' Kong with the undergroiind address of 181 Sai Yeung Choy Street,
3rd Flcor, Samshuipo. He was chief assistant to LIAO Ch"eng-chih former
New 4th Army Representative in Hong Kong.
LOU Ning-hsien — Identiflr-d in 1943 as a member of the Executive Committee of
the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.
LU Cheng-ts'ao — General in the United Garrison Army commanding in the
Shansi-Suiyuan IMilitary Region. He serves under HO Lung, C-in-C of the
United Garrison Army of the 18th Group Army. He is said to have been a
2466 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
leader of a Red cell in WAN Fu-lin's 53rd Army and a former guerrilla
fighter in Jehol. He was the commander of the Central Hopeh Military
Region from 1938 probably until it was reported abolished in September
1943 and incorporated in the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region under
the direct command of NIEH Jung-chen. As of 1938 he was a member of the
Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government.
Early in 1943 he was reported in command of Communist forces in western
Hopeh.
LU Chih-chun — Director of the Bethune International Peace Hospital in Yenan.
LU Ting-i— Member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1943.
LUNG Ling — ^Identified in 1939 as a divisional commander in the Chinese Com-
munist forces.
MA Hai-te — American doctor on the Staff of the Bethune International Peace
Hospital and medical advisor to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Base Medical
Service. He is responsible for student health and epidemic prevention. He
is a Catholic from North Carolina. Received his medical education in
Switzerland. He has been with the Chinese Communist Medical Service
since 1936, but apparently Is not a Communist himself. He is a man in his
thirties or early forties, not tall, muscular, and bent slightly forward. He
has an energetic, handsome tanned face, deep set kindly blue eyes under
fierce black shaggy brows. He speaks English like an American, French like
a Frenchman, Chine.se like a native, and some Near Eastern languages. He
said he was a Syrian American.
Ma Hsi-wu — Special Administrative Commissioner in East Shensi, concurrently
Chief of Branch Court. Originator of the "MA Hsi-wu court method." The
procedure is to go among the populace in search of evidence and then com-
bine trial and settlement in court.
Ma Ming-fang — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
*Ma Pun-chi — Identified in 1943 as Commander of a Mohammedan column of
the 18th Group Army.
MAHLIN (MARTIN, MARLIN)— Comintern representative, LENIN's secretary,
sent to China in 1921. He met Chinese Communists in Shanghai and
organized the CCP together with CH'EN Ti-hsiu and others. He also visited
Marshal WU P'ei-fu and SUN Yat-sen and recommended, on his return to
Moscow, that the Comintern enter relations with both.
MAO Tse-tung (MAO Tze-tung. MAO Tzu-tung). Chairman of the Central
Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Chinese Com-
munist Party ; Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Council ;
Principal of the Chinese Communist Party School in Yenan, Director of
the Statistics Research Bureau. MAO is an able political, military, and intel-
lectual leader. He has the confidence of the Chinese Communists. He is
well read on cuiTent affairs at home and abroad. An expert dialectician,
he is skilled in rationalizing the policies of the Communist International
and is keenly critical within limits of his Marxian orthodoxy. He is a
prolific contributor to the Yenan press, and is the Author of "New Democ-
racy" ("Principles of New Democracy" published in 1940), an outline of
the basic aims and policies of the CCP. He has impressed interviewers with
his sincerity. Born in Hunan Province in 1893, he is a son of poor peasants.
His father, however, became fairly prosperous, and was a))le to pay his son's
tuition at various schools. MAO read and studied considerably on his own,
becoming acquainted with Western literature as well as Chinese. He en-
listed in the RevoUitionary Army of 1911, but resigned when SUN Yat-sen
came to terms with YUAN Shih-k'ai. He became a student leader. He
graduated from the Hunan Provincial First Normal School, and obtained a
job as assistant librarian at the Peking National University, where he also
attended classes.
Always a rebel and a liberal, his political ideas did not become consoli-
dated until 1920 when he read Marx and books on the Russian Revolution.
He began organizing workers politically for the first time in the winter of
1920. In May 1921 he went to Shanghai to attend tlie foundation meeting
of the Chinese Communist Party. In October he became a member of the
first provincial branch of the Party in Hunan and Secretary of this group
in May 1922. By this time he had organized more than twenty trade imions.
In 1923 he went to Shanghai to work in the Central Committee of the Party.
He attended the third CCP Congress in Canton when it was decided to
cooperate with the Kuomintang. He was then elected Member of the Central
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2467
Committee of the COP and concurrently Member of the Executive Committee
of the Kuomintang in Shanghai.
In 1925 he began organizing the peasants, thereby arousing the wrath of
the landlords who demanded his arrest. He fled to Canton. For a while
he was editor of the Kuomintang paper "Political Weekly" and headed the
Kuomintang propaganda department. In 1926 he went to Hankow and
directed the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang. From there he was
sent to Hunan as inspector of the peasant movement. The following year
he was elected the first President of the All-China Peasants' Union. After
the Kuomintang-Comnumist split in 1927 he took part in the decision to de-
pose CH'EN Tu-hsiu as Secretary of the Chinese Communist Central Com-
mittee, 7 August 1927. He was then sent by the Communist Party to Chan-
gsha, Hunan, where he organized the First Division of the First Peasants'
and Workers' Army and the Autumn Crop Uprising. The Uprising was not
approved by the Central Connuittee so MAO was dismissed from the Political
Bureau and the Party Front Committee. However, he held his army to-
gether, based at Ching-kan Shan (Mt.)
In May 1928 he combined forces with CHU Te and created the 4th Red
Army with CHU as Commander and himself as Political Commissar. They
began a campaign through southern Kiangsi in January 1929. MAO and
CHU assumed the same positions in the First Red Army Corps when it was
organized in 1929 to include the 3rd, 4th, and 12th Red Armies. In 1930
when CHU became C-in-C of the First Front Army combining the First and
Third Army Corps, MAO was again Political Commissar. He also became
Chairman of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee.
In 1930 MAO's wife, YANG T'ai-hui, and his younger sister were executed
by the Kuomintang authorities. He later married HO Tzu-chien, school
teacher and Marxist. His present wife is LAN P'ing, former Shanghai movie
actress.
In 1931 he was elected Chairman of the Central Soviet Government in
Kiangsi. He was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the
Communist International by the 7th World Congress, July-August 1935. In
1938 after the Kuomintang-Communist United Front against the Japanese
had been formed he was readmitted into the Kuomintang. In 1940 he was
reported member of the Supreme National Defense Council and of the 1st
People's Political Council in Chungking.
MAO was described in the summer of 19'^4 as slightly stouter, a chain-
smoker inhaling every time, a man with a hearty laugh when amused. Other
observers describe him as rather effeminate, somewhat slow-witted, with a
tired kindly smile, and fine sense of humor. He seldom appears in public in
Yenan and is said to be always well-guarded for fear of assault by Kuomin-
tang secret service agents from Sian.
MAO Tze-tung— MAO Tse-tung
MAO Tzu-tung— MAO Tse-tung
MARLIN— see MAHLIN
"MENG Fu-tang — Identified in Cctober 1944 as Chairman of the South Hopeh
Administrative Office of the CCP. He is noted educator in Hopeh Province.
MIYAMOTO. Tetsuji — Formerly a labor foreman who was taken prisoner. Chief
of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh branch of Japanese Anti-War League in China.
After the. formation of the Anti-War League's North China Association he
became secretary of its Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh branch.
Note: Japanese Anti-War League was organized by Wataru KAJI, re-
siding in Chunking, who is not a Communist; but location of its branch
referred to above makes it possible that Japanese People's Emancipation
League, organized by Susuri OKANO in Yenan, is meant.
MUELLER, Hans — Anti-Nazi German doctor with the Chinese Communist Medi-
cal Service in Yenan in 1944.
NAN Han-chen — Finance Commissioner of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region Government.
NEUMANN, Heinz — DECEASED. German. Comintern representative with
LOMINADZE to the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. One of the chief
instigators of the Communist coup in Canton, December 1927. Following
its failure, he returned to Europe where he became a leader of the German
Communist Party. After the rise of Hitler, NEUMANN opposed the policy
of the Comintern to infiltrate into the NAZI Party. He fled to Switzerland,
1935, and thence to Russia. He was murdered during the purge in 1936.
2468 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
NIEH Jung-Chen (NIEH Yung-chen) — Commanding General and concurrently a
Political Commissar of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region under the
18th Group Army ; Member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-
Hopeh Border Region Government. Psychologically he is westernized to a
certain degree, and is described as more like a college president than a mili-
tary man. Energetic looking. Approximately 37 years old. Speaks good
French. He worked in the Sehneider-Creusot Arms factory, Renault Motor
Works and the Thomson Electric Company in France. He was educated in
the Belgion Labour College and received political training in Moscow. About
November 1937, as Political Commissar of the Communist First Army Corps
he was sent to Wu-t'ai in Shansi to develop partisan organizations and pre-
vent Japanese occupation of the area. In January 1938 he was Vice-Com-
mander and Political Commissar of the 115th Division of the 18th Group
Army in command of Fou-p'ing are in Hopeli. He was the founder and
builder of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar War Base and has been a member of
the Executive Committee of its Border Government, INIilitary Commander,
and Political Commissar in this region since 1938. In 1940 he commanded
the 18th Group Army forces in the northeast of Shansi Province, and was
also member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In September 1943 the
Central Hopeh Military region was reported abolished and incorporated
under NIEH's direct command in the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region.
NIEH Yung-chen — see NIEH Jung-chen.
NOULENS — Comintern agent arrested in Shanghai 1932, and convicted in Nan-
king. He was reported to be at that time the chief Far East agent of the
Comintern.
OKAMOTO — Instituted North Kiangsu branch of Japanese People's Emancipa-
tion League after dissolution of Auhwei, South Kiangsu, and North Kiangsu
branches of Japanese Anti-War Association [League?] for amalgamation
into new organization.
OKANO, Susumu. — The best known member of the Japanese Communist Party
is OKANO Susumu who makes his headquarters at Yenan, China, in asso-
ciation with the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. His
real name is said to be SAKAMO Tetsu.
OKANO was born in 1892 and was left an orphan when quite young.
An older brother put him through a commercial school and then Keia
University. His interest in the labor movement dates from 1913 when he
was active in the Yu Ai Kai, one of the earliest of Japanese trade unions.
His interest in the Russia^i revolution took him to Russia. Later he went
to England where, reportedly, he aided in founding the British Communist
Party. His inflammatory speeches then caused Scotland Yard to suggest
his departure from the country. After spending some time in France, Ger-
many and Swtizerland he returned to Japan and assisted in the inaugura-
tion of the Japanese Communist Party under KATAYAMA Sen in 1922.
Shortly afterward he was arrested and spent most of his time in jail vintil
1931. In 19.32 he went to Soviet Russia as a delegate of the .Japanese Com-
munist Party to the Third Internationale. After KATAYAMA'S deatn in
1933 OKANO became spokesman for the party in Moscow and in 1935 was
elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist
International. One source stated in 1944 tliat OKANO had not been in
Japan for 12 years but had occasional underground contact with Communist
groups there. Another source stated in 1944 that he smuggled himself quietly
into North China in 1937 and worked underground against the Japanese
Array until he transferred his activities to Yenan sometime during 1943.
Since his arrival in Yenan OKANO has organized the Japanese People's
Emancipation League which has absorbed the less effectual Japanese Anti-
War League in numerous places. He also has provided the dynamic leader-
ship which the zealous but inexperienced membership required. He iftsists
that the League is not Communistic. In addition, he has established the
Japanese Communist League and the Japanese Workers' and Peasants'
School which trains Japanese ex-prisoners of war as well as a few Chinese
for propaganda work at the front.
Members of the United States Army Observer Section who interviewed
OKANO at Yenan last September reported his program for .Japan's emanci-
pation as one of moderation and gradual development toM'ard socialism
through "democratic" processes. A Yenan broadcast in December 1944
stated that OKANO attended the second session of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ninghsia Border Region People's Congress, a privilege which the 8th Route
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 2469
Army allows to one or two Japanese honorary members of this and other
border region assemblies. The National Herald, Chungking, reported his
return last June from a visit to Soviet Russia. OKANO is reported to be
soft-spoken, physically healthy and energetic, and intellectually alert and
keen.
OELOV, Andrew — Very competent Soviet Russian surgeon in the Bethune In-
ternational Peace Hospital in Yenan. Arriving in Yenan via Lanchow with
permission of the Kuomintang he has been in the Chinese Communist area
for almost three years.
PAX Ch'en-pang — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ninghsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
P'AN Tzu-nien — Publisher of the Hsin-hna Jih-pao, Chinese Communist news-
paper in Chungking since at least 1943. Identified as a member of the Cen-
tral Committee of the CCP.
P'ENG Te-huai — Deputy Commander of the 18th Group Army since August 1937.
Dynamic, loathes procrastination, gruff, forthright in manner and speech,
a great wit. Of excellent health and endurance. Walked most of the 6,000
miles of the "Long March" frequently giving his horse to a tired or wounded
comrade. Non-smoker and teetotaler, late to retire and early to rise.
Author of many treaties on military strategy and tactics. Directs field
operations, while Commander CHU Te serves more in a general staff ca-
pacity. He was born of prosperous peasants in Hunan Province in 1900.
Hated by his stepmother. Attended an old fashioned Chinese school where
he was often beaten. . At the age of nine he was denounced by his family as
unfllial and sent out into the world. He worked as a cowherd, coal-miner,
shoe-maker's apprentice, and dyke-builder until 16 when he returned home
and was taken in by a rich uncle. During a rice famine in Hunan, he stir-
red up 200 peasants to attack the house of a merchant known to have large
stores of rice. He joined the Army at 18, eventually received a commission
and was sent to the Hunan Military School, graduating a battalion com-
mander. There he discovered Marx and other Communist literature.
Among his troops he began Marxist course in political training and organ-
ized soldiers' committees. In 1926 he married a girl who belonged to the
Socialist Youth but they became separated during the Revolution and he
has not seen her since 1928.
P'ENG joined the CCP in 1927, revolted from the Kuomingtang Army in
July 1928 and joined the "Red Army" with his troops. The 5th Red Army
was organized under his command. In April 1930 he was put in command
of the 3rd Army Corps which joined forces with CHU Te's 1st Army Corps
to become the First Front Army under CHU. Arriving in the Northwest in
193.5 after the "Long March" he was put in direct command of the 1st Front
Red Armv and made C-in-C of all Northwest Red Armies until the arrival
of CHU Te in late 1986.
When the United China Front was formed, CHIANG Kai-shek appointed
P'ENG Deputy Commander of the 18th Group Army in Shansi. In 1940 he
was member of the Central Committee of the CCP and member of the Su-
preme National Defense Council in Chungking. In 1942 he was reported
Chief of the General Staff of the Communist Military Council, also "Vice
Chairman of the same Council. In 1943 he was reported in the field com-
manding forces in southeast Shansi, also member of the Central Committee.
Po-ku^ — see CH'IN Pang-hsien.
ROSENTHAL, Dr. — Austrian or German Jewish surgeon who has been working
for the Chinese Communist 18th Group Army in Shantung Province since
1943. Before that he was with the New 4th Army for two years having
escaped to the region from Shanghai.
ROY, M. N. — Indian. Conmiunist agent attaelied to the Kuomintang Govern-
ment in Hankow in 1927. His alleged indiscretion in revealing to WANG
Ching-wei the Comintern's instructions to the Chinese Communists is reported
to have been a factor causing the Kuomintang-Communist break. BORODIN
was said to have asked for Roy's withdrawal.
SHANG Ying— see HSIANG Ying.
SHU Fan-t'ing — Identified in 1943 as head of the Chinese Communist adminis-
tration in Northwest Shansi. Said to be a former member of the T'ung-meng
Hui.
SU Yii — Commanding General and Political Commissar of the 1st Division of the
New 4th Army in the Central Kiangsu Military Region. In February 1941
he was appointed Commander of the 1st Division and has been Political
Commissar of this division since 1943.
2470 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
*SSU Ko-ching — Appointed Acting Director of the United Front Department of
the Chinese Communist Party to replace CH'EN Shao-yii, March 1944.
SUN Chih-yiian — Identified in 1943 as a member of the Political Committee of
the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.
SUNG Jen-ch'iung — Commanding General of the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military
Region. In 1940 he was reported Commander of the Communist Southern
Hopeh Military Area.
SUNG Shao-wen — Chairman of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Gov-
ernment when last reported in 1943. He is not a member of the CCP.
T'AN Chen-lin — Commander of the 6th Division of the New 4th Army when last
reported in 1943. In 1941 he was also temporary Political Commissar of
his division.
T'AN Cheng — Vice Director of Political Headquarters of the 18th Group Army,
and Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Bor-
der Region Government. Author of "Report on Political Work in the Army".
T'ANG T'ien — Identified in 1942 as a commander in the 18th Group Army".
*TENG Chih-hui — Reported in 1944 as Political Commissar of the 4th Division of
the New 4th Army.
TENG Fa — Member of the Central Committee and member of the Political Bu-
reau of the Chinese Communist Party when last reported in 1943. He is an
outdoors man of action, full of enthusiasm and mischief. Native of Canton,
of a working-class family. He was once a foreign-style cook on a Canton-
Hong Kong steamer. A leader in the great Hong Kong shipping strike in
1924. He became a Communist, entered Whampoa Military Academy, and
participated in the Nationalist Revolution. He joined the Chinese Commu-
nist Army in Kiangsi after 1927. In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he
was appointed member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central
Executive Committee. He was chief of the Chinese Communist Secret Police
in 1937 when his head was worth $50,000 to the Kuomintang.
T'ENG Tai-yiian — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
TENG Ying-ch'ao (Mrs. CHOU En-lai)— Member of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party. She is said to have met CHOU En-lai about 1919
in a Tientsin jail where they and other radical students had been imprisoned
for participation in student demonstrations. She was then attending a nor-
mal school in Tientsin, and was member of the radical society "Awaken"
which CHOU also joined upon release from prison. She was a member of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1940 and at the same
time a member of the 1st People's Political Council, Chungking 1940. In 1943
she was a member of the 3rd People's Political Council in Chungking.
TING Ling (CHIANG Ping-chih) — Well-known woman writer engaged in organ-
izing cultural activities in the Northwest. She was born in Hunan Province
in 1905. She studied at the Ping Ming Girls' School founded by CH'EN Tu-
hsiu. She entered Shanghai University's Department of Literature in 1924.
Her first novel "Hsiao Shuo", published in 1927, immediately attracted atten-
tion in the literary world. Since then she has written a great many novels
and short stories. In 1931 she edited a magazine "Pel Ton" ("The Great
Dipper") organ of the Left Writers' Union in China. At first she tended to
be an anarchist, then after 1927 swung more to the left, especially after the
death of her husband, the well-known novelist HU Yeh-p'ing in February
1931. She was arrested as a Leftist writer in May 1933, and imprisoned for
two years, then released under surveillance in Nanking. In November 1936,
she left Nanking for Sian, where she arranged to join the Chinese Com-
munists in Shensi.
TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss) — "Chief of Women" and member of the Central Committee
of the CCP when last reported in 1943. She has held the former post since at
least 1940.
TS'AI Shu-fan — Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported
in 1943.
TS'AO I-ou — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
TS'AO Lan-ju — Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Nin-
gsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.
TSENG Hsi-sheng — Political Commissar, Central Anhwei Base of the New 4th
Army. In 1941 he was a member of the Political Committee of the 7th Divi-
sion of the New 4th Army.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2471
TSENG Shan— Member of the political Bureau of the CCP and Chief of Minorities
Department of the Secretariat of the CCP when last reported in 1943. In
1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was chosen People's Commissar for Internal
Affairs by the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee. In 1940 he
was a member of the Central Committee and Chief of Minorities of the
Chinese Communist Party.
TSENG Sheng— Commander of Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla
Corps operating in the Canton-Hong Kong area. About 34 years old. He
was active in the 1935 Student Anti-Japanese Movement. Attended Canton
Chung-shan University. Conunander of the former 8rd Detachment, which
became a part of the Kwangtung People's Anti- Japanese Guerrilla Corps in
1940.. He was sent by the New 4th Army in 1939—40 to the Canton-Hong
Kong area to organize gueri'illa resistance. His present Vice Commander,
WANG Tso-yao, joined him with the former 5th Detachment late in 1940.
In spite of Kuomintang extermination campaigns against them, TSENG'S
corps helped many Kuomintang officials escape to Free China after the
fall of Hong Kong.
TSO Ch'i- — Member of the Political Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region Government. Former Political Commissar of a regiment of
the ISth Group Ai-my. He lost liis right arm in anti-Japanese action.
TSUI Chiu-pai— see CH'I'- Ch'iu-po.
TUAN Chi-nien — Identified in 1943 by a Kuomintang source as a Chinese Com-
munist and member of the CH'EN Shao-yii clique.
TUNG Pi-wu — Chinese Communist Resident Representative in Chungking. Mem-
ber of the Chinese Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. He
was one of the founding members of the Hupeh Branch of the CCP in 1921.
In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was chosen Chairman of the Pro-
visional Supreme Court by the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive
Committee. He was Chairman of the CCP School at Pao-an, Sbensi, in 1937.
In 1940 he was reported as a member of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party ; member of the 2nd People's Political Council in
Chungking; also member of the Council's Resident Committee. Member of
the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist
Party 1943. Standing member, Committee for the Establishment of Con-
stitutional Government, Chungking, October 1943. Member, 3rd People's
Political Council, Chungking, and member of the Council's Resident Com-
mittee 1944. In October 1944 there was much talk of TUNG's accompanying
the People's Political Council's five-man investigation party to Yenan, but
so far as is known, the trip never did take place. He was one of the Chinese
delegates to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.
* WA Bok-san — Reported in 1944 to be a Chinese Communist leader on Hainan
Island.
WANG Chen, Ma.i Gen. Commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division
of the 18th Group Army, Presiding Member of the Brigade Cooperative
Management Committee, Commanding officer of the Yenan Garrison, Com-
manding officer of the Yenan Branch Military Area. He is a hot-tempered
warrior from Hunan Province. In the beginning of 1938 he entered northern
Shensi from northern Shansi, but a part of his brigade was called back from
the front to Nan-ni-wan to do reclamation work in 1939. From 1940 to 1942
the whole brigade was called back by batches to engage in farming. WANG's
brigade spends 70% of its time in military training and 30% in political
and cultural training. He has said that his troops are educated with "IMarx-
ian materialistic dialectics" and "historical materialism." His men seem
healthy and well-fed and have received the first prize for production in
the army. WANG was chosen to escort the Chungking Press Party from
Sian to Yenan in the summer of 1944.
WANG Chia-hsiang — Chairman of the Political Department of the 18th Group
Army. In 1940 he was Director of the Political Department of the 18th
Group Army, also member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau,
and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1942 he was mem-
ber of the Central Committee of the Party and Executive Staff Officer on the
Central Revolutionary Military Council.
WANG Chia-se — Member of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the CCP
when last reported in 1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangai. he held the follow-
ing posts : member. Secretarial Bureau and member. Political Bureau of the
CCP ; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vice Chairman, Chinese Soviet
2472 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Military Affairs Commission. In 1943 he was Chief of Publicity of the
Chinese Communist Party.
WANG Chien-an — Identified in 1943 as Commander of the Chinese Communist
Central Shantung Area.
WANG Clm — Reported as Political Commissar of the New 4th Army in 1938.
No information has been received about him since.
WANG Chu-ch'ing (WANG Tso-yao?) — Guerrilla leader in Tung-kuan area in
Kwangtung. Possibly same as WANG Tso-yao as he seems to be doing the
same thing in the same area. Reported in 1943 by Kuomintang sources as
having had secret dealings with Communist leader TSENG "Sheng.
WANG Ming— see CH'EN Shao-yii.
WANG Po — Reported made Political Commissar of the New 4th Army at time of
reorganization. No information since.
*WANG Shan — Identified in October 1944 as a member of the Shansi-Suiyuan
Liberated Area Administrative Committee. Allegedly a Kuomintang mem-
ber who escaped to the Chinese Communist areas from Japanese occupied
Shansi.
WANG Shih-ying — In 1944 he was reported as director of the 18th Group Army
Office in Yenan.
WANG Tsai-hsing — In 1944 he was reported as section chief of the 18th Group
Army Oflice in Yenan.
WANG Tso-yao — Guerrilla leader who joined forces with TSENG Sheng late in
1940. Vice Commander under TSENG. Commands the former 5th Detach-
ment which since 1940 has been part of the Kwangtung People's Anti-Japan-
ese Guerrilla Corps operating in the Canton-Hong Kong area. He is about
30 years old, former student at Central Ofiicers' School, Canton Branch. He
participated in the 1935 Student Anti- Japanese Movement. Ex-teacher.
After the fall of Canton, in 1938 he organized the 4th Guerrilla Area in the
Pso-an-Tung-kuan district. He was recognized as an official guerrilla leader
by Kuomintang General HSIANG Han-p'ing, but in the spring of 1940 and
later HSIANG sent troops to suppress WANG.
WU Han-chieh — Identified in 1940 as Director of the Political Department of the
129th Division, 18th Group Army.
*WU Hsin-yu — Identified in December 1944 as Vice Chairman of the Shansi-Sui-
yuan Administrative District.
WU Li-p'ing — Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.
WU Liang-p'ing — According to last known information, dated 1940, he was
member of the Central Committee and Chief of Information of the CCP.
In 1934 at Jui-chiu, Kiangsi he held the following posts ; member. Secre-
tarial Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP; Director of Work
in "White Areas" (non-Communist areas) ; People's Commissar for Eco-
nomics.
WU Man-yu — Representative "labor hero" of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region Government. A peasant aged 51. He has been honored as a produc-
tion leader.
WU Po-hsiao — Identified in 1944 as a Communist writer.
WU Yii-chang — Director of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Cultural
Association. Identified in 1943 as member of both the Central Committee and
the Political Bureau of the CCP. He was reported in 1942 as Chief of the
Inspector-General's Department of the Chinese Communist Military Affairs
Commission. Member of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd People's Political Councils at
Chungking, 1938-1944.
At present his chief activities in Yenan are : publication of "Ch'iln-chung
Pad" ("People's Newspaper"), a vernacular translation of the "Chieh-fang
Jih-pao" ("Emancipation Daily") ; composition of work songs which are
excellent vehicles of propaganda ; preparation of old and new, Chinese and
foreign plays for local consumption.
WU Wen-yii— Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the 3rd
Division, New 4th Army.
YANG Ch'eng-wu — No information later than 1943 when he was reported as a
Chinese Communist general with headquarters 50 km. NW Pao-ting, Hopeh.
He had been operating as a guerrilla leader in North China at least since
1938.
YANG Ching-yii — Identified in 1943 as a member of the Central Committee and
the Political Bureau of the CCP. He was also Director of the Northwest
Political Branch Bureau in 1943.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2473
♦YANG Hsiu-feng — Chairman of the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Re-
gion Government. He was formerly professor in the National Normal Uni-
versity at Peking and member of the National Salvationist Group organized
by Mme SUN Yat-sen and other liberals. He joined the CCP in 1939.
YANG Shang-k'un — Secretary General of the iSth Group Army. In 1943 he
was ideutitied as a member of the Central Committee and the Political
Bureau of the CCP. In January 1934 he was appointed member of the
Secretarial Bureau and concurrently member of the Political Bureau of the
CCP and Minister (Commissar) of Organization of the Soviet Government
at Jui-chin, Kiangsi.
YAO K'ai — Chinese Communist writer. Author of "Chu)ig-kuo Ko-ming" (The
Chinese Revolution), Moscow, 1932.
*YAO Shu-shih — Acting Political Commissar of the New 4th Army in 1944.
YEH Chi-chuang — In summer 1944 he was Trade Director of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Boi'der Region Government, manager of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region Trading Company, and member of the Chairman's Committee
of the Border Region Government.
YEH Chien-ying— General Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army under CHU
Te Specialist in guerrilla tactics. He had been characterized as a habitually
calm, reasonable man who upon occasion is capable of bursting into violent
profanity. He was Director of Studies at the Whampoa Militai-y Academy
when CHAING Kai-shek was Principal. With CHOU En-lai and CH'IN
Pang-hsien he played a large part in negotiations for CHIANG'S release
during the Sian Incident, December 1936. He was Chief of Staff of the 8th
Route Army. When the name of the 8th Route Army was changed to the
ISth Group Army YEH was appointed Chief of Staff and a member of the
army's delegation to the National Government. In September 1939 he was
Dean of the Chinese Army a Guerrilla Training School in south Hunan where
he is reported to have failed as the Government would not grant him suflB-
cient freedom. In 1940 he was listed as a member of the General Committee
of the CCP, but remained at his station in Chungking. He returned to Yenan
in 1941 allegedly because there was "nothing for him to do" in Chungking,
and resumed active duty as Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army.
YEH Hsi-i— see YEH T'ing.
YEH T'ing (YEH Hsi-i) — No information is available about him dated later
than December 1943, but he apparently remains a prisoner of the National
Government. He was captured and imprisoned by the Nationalist forces
during the new 4th Army Incident in January 1941. YEH T'ing is an able
soldier with a distinguished military career. Well-built, stocky, unpreten-
tious, like a merchant in appearance. He was born in Kwangtung province
1898, studied at Weichow Agricultural School 1911. In 1914 he graduated
from the Kwangtung Military School, and attended the Hupeh Military
School 1914—16. In 1919 he graduated from the Paoting Military Academy.
In 1921 he served as a Company Commander in the Kwangtung Provincial
Army. In 1922 he was Commander 2nd Battalion, Guards' Regiment of the
Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton. Next year he became Chief of
Staff. Kwangtung Gendarmerie. In 1925 he was Chief of the Staff Office,
4th Nationalist Army, and participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition
as Commander of the 24th Division of the 4th Army under CHANG Fa-k'uei.
In 1927 YEH and his division rebelled in Kiangsi while enroute to the rescue
of T'ANG Sheng-chih. YEH joined HO Lung in the Nan-ch'ang and Swatow
uprisings that same year, and was reported to have been a leading figure in
the "Canton Commune" of December 1927.
There are contradictory reports about his activities between December
1927 when the Commune failed and the spring of 1938 when the New 4th
Army was organized with him as Commander. One report states he visited
Russia and Germany, traveled through Europe, then retired to Macao.
According to another report he worked with CHU Te. Still a third report
states he did not participate in Kuomintang-Communist hostilities of those
years.
In the spring of 1938 the New 4th Army was organized by CHIANG Kai-
shek who appointed YEH T'ing as Commander. He was also to act as the
Central Government's Political Commissar. The military leadership, how-
ever, is said to have been provided mostly by HSIANG Ying, the Vice Com-
mander. Based on the Kiangsu-Anhwei border near Nanking, the New 4th
Army became famous for its guerrilla tactics against the Japanese in the
2474 INiSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
lower Yangtze valley. YEH is reported to have visited Chungking late in.
1939 to negotiate for more supplies and funds.
Following the "New 4th Incident" of January 1941, YEH and some 200
officers of the New 4th Army were arrested by the Central Government.
They were reported to have been held first at Shang-jao, Kiangsi, then else-
where until early 1943 when they were transferred to a prison in Chungking.
Later CH'EN Ch'eng obtained permission for YEH to reside with him in
En-shih, Hupeh on the personal responsibility of CH'EN ; but soon after YEH
and his family arrived, CH'EN Ch'eng's new command in western Yunnan
made it impossible for CH'EN himself to reside at En-shih. Thereupon
CH'EN suggested to CHANG Fa-k'uei, a friend of YEH's, that the latter
move with his family to Kwangsi. CHANG and LI Chi-shen are reported
to have accepted joint responsibility for YEH and the latter moved to Kwei-
lin. On 19 January 1944 YEH was reported rearrested. A request for his
release was among the resolutions passed by the 2nd People's Political Coun-
cil of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government, December 1944.
YUAN Kuo-p'ing — Identified in 1940 as Chief of the Political Department of the
New 4th Army.
ZENG Pi-shu— see JEN Pi-shih.
X
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