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Full text of "Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first[-second] session .."

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER 

INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

USC^^f^^^OMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAKY 

w ''' UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



PART 7 



JANUARY 31, FEBRUARY 1 AND 2, 1952 



I'rinted for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




""^^^-^^^^ij^^ 



UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1952 



PUBLIC 

^.•C Ant) fy^l' 






COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

J. G. SouRWiNB, Counsel 



Internal Security Subcommittee 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 



Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

Robert Morris, Special Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 
U 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of— P&tt 

Blenman, Commander William 2180 

Stufflebeam, Robert E 2121 

Vincent, John Carter 1997-2286 

Appendix I : 

Correspondence from the President to the Vice President of September 
22, 1951, and attachments thereto regarding former Vice President 

Henry A. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944 2286 

Letter to Hon. John E. Peurifoy from John Carter Vincent, dated 

March 7, 1950 2294 

State Department press release of January 6, 1947 22{© 

State Department press release of October 5, 1945 2296 

Appendix II (printed as pt. 7A) 2305-2474 

ni 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1953 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 
The subcommittee met at 9 : 45 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator 
William E. Jenner presiding. 

Present: Senators McCarran (chairman), Ferguson, Jenner, and 
Watkins. 

Also Present : Senators Hayden, Knowland, and Welker ; J. G. Sour- 
wine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and 
Benjamin Mandel, director of research. 
You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS 
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY, WASHINGTON, D. C, AND 
HOWARD REA, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, at the conclusion of the hearing yester- 
day we were up to the period of about December 1942. 

Mr. Vincent. You mean in reading over my — yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To the extent that we were taking things chrono- 
logically we had about reached that point. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You may remember that during the afternoon ses- 
sion yesterday afternoon there was some questioning about your ap- 
proval of a talk which was made by Mr. Service before the IPR or 
before a group of IPR people. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I remember that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Am I correct that it was your testimony that you 
remembered nothing about having authorized such a talk? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I had no recollection of that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, this is the State Department em- 
ployee loyalty investigation hearings before a subcommittee of the 
Ccrtnmittee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate of the 
Eighty-first Congress, second session, part 2, appendix. On page 
2234 appears the text of a document which was apparently entitled 
'"Personal Statement of John S. Service — Part 2." I read this 
paragraph, Mr. Vincent, and ask if it refreshes your memory in that 
regard. 

Shortly after my arrival — 

1997 



1998 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

and lie is referring then to his return to the Department in April of 
1945. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sour WINE (reading) : 

I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis with ttie research 
staff of the IPR in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed 
to me by Edward C. Carter. I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy and 
then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting. This meeting with the 
IPR took place on April 25. I believe that there were 10 or 12 people present. 
Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bisson, Laurence Rosinger, 
and a New Zealander named Belshaw. I did not give a prepared talk, and most 
of the time was spent in answering questions and in general discussion. 

Did you know anything about that at the time? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Were you Chief of the Division at the time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ; yes, 
sir. What was the date of that ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That was 1945, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. I mean the month. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That would have been in April. 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten the exact date, but I left for San 
Francisco about the middle of April. 

(Senator Ferguson took the chair.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there an earlier occasion on which you per- 
sonally had approved Mr. Service's appearance before an IPR group ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have said, sir, that I just don't recall any instance 
pf that kind. 

(Senator McCarran took the chair.) 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Reading from the same hearings, Mr. Chairman, 
from the transcript of proceedings before the State Department 
Loyalty Board, page 2051 of the hearings. This is Mr. Service 
talking : 

The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then 
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come 
over and give an informal off-tbe-record talk to some of their i>eople in the 
Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me 
that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all 
right with me. 

Question : In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the 
IPR? 

"Answer. That is right. 

"Question. And authorized by the Department? 

"Answer. That is correct, and it was quite a customary thing. We had a 
great many officers who did exactly the same when they came back from the 
field and had news, information of interest. I believe that Mr. Oliver Edmund 
Clubb had one of those meetings after he returned from Sinkiang. I know that 
Mr. Raymond P. Ludden was asked for and authorized to give a talk when he 
also returned from China in June, 1945. and I am sure that there are many 
other instances of Foreign Service officers being authorized by the Department 
to meet the research staff of the IPR in these off-the-record background sessions." 

What would be your comments on that Mr. Vincent ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, Mr. Service apparently refreshed his memory. 
I don't recall these people going regularly over to the IPR. What Mr. 
Service says there is no doubt correct, that the people did talk to the 
IPR. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any doubt now, having heard this, 
that you did receive a request from the IPR with regard to Mr. 
Service and passed it on to him and told him it was all right to go ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1999 

Mr. Vincent. No; I have no doubt that Service was testifying 
correctly. 

The Chairman, What is that answer, please ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I originally said I had no recollection 
of this incident, but the question there is whether or not now, having 
heard this, I still have no recollection of that specific incident, but I 
am not doubting the fact that it occurred. 

The Chairman. My understanding is that the question primarily 
was whether you had engaged in the discussion, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is right. 

The Chairman. Now you have no doubt that you did ? 

Mr. Vincent. According to that testimony now, I have no doubt 
that that incident occurred because Service remembers it better than 
I have. 

The Chairman. I just wanted to get your testimony. 

Mr. Sourwine. On December 15, 1945, sir, you were 

Mr. Vincent. Excuse me. Would you repeat that ? 

Mr. Sourwine. On December 15, 1942, you were named counselor 
to the Department of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. There is no such title. 

Mr. Sourwine. Counselor of Embassy, perhaps ? 

Mr. Vincent. Counselor of Embassy in Chungking in 1942. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that what it was ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; if that was the date. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you back in the United States in 1943 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you not know Jack Stachel ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who he is ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How do you know that ? 

Mr. Vincent. From reading the hearings of this committee. I 
don't know his precise work even now from memory. 

Mr. Sourwine. All you know about him is what you have read in 
the hearings of this committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether you ever ate lunch in 
the Tally-Ho Restaurant in Washington ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember eating there, but I could have eaten 
there. I don't remember any instance of eating there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember having lunch there one day in 
April of 1943 with Mr. John Stewart Service and one or two other 
persons ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that instance. I have heard it re- 
ferred to, but I still don't recall it. I may say there that I ate lunch 
every day with various and sundry people and I don't recall that 
luncheon that has been referred to here. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did have lunch on at least one occasion in 
there with Mr. Service, did you say ? 

Mr. Vincent. I mean I might have had lunch. I do not recall 
eating in the Tally-Ho with Mr. Service. I might have eaten else- 
where with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no memory of any time when you did? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that particular one. 



2000 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you say whether on the occasion referred to 
in April of 1943 or on any other occasion about that time you dis- 
cussed with Mr. Service and one or two others ways and means of 
getting rid of Ambassador Hurley as Ambassador to China? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not have any recollection of discussing getting 
rid of Ambassador Hurley at that time. As a matter of fact, I think, 
sir, that you will have to correct the date there because you said 1943. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Hurley was not made Ambassador until 
the fall of 1944. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That would be a good reason for stating that you 
did not discuss it on this date, wouldn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly would. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you now so state ? 

Mr. Vincent. I now so state. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember on the occasion of such a lunch- 
eon or a luncheon about that time discussing Mr. Hurley in any way ? 

Mr. Vincent. Are you still using that date of April 1943 ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Still referring to April 1943. 

Mr. Vincent. April 1943? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. No, I have no recollection of that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you did or did not? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly did not. I didn't even know Ambassador 
Hurley and he wasn't Ambassador. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now we are talking simply about Mr. Hurley, 
whether he was discussed. Did you on the occasion of such a luncheon 
state that the up-and-coming political group in China was the Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mr. Vincent, I have no recollection of making any such statement 
and don't think I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you ever could have made such a 
statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in June of 1943 or about that time while 
you were counselor to the American Embassy in China — ^were you 
counselor of the American Embassy in China in June of 1943 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I had already left Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you leave Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. I left Chungking the latter part of May 1943, or the 
middle of May. I don't recall the exact date. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in the spring of 1943, while you were 
counselor to the American Embassy in China, cable to the Depart- 
ment of State with respect to an interview which you had had with 
Chou En-lai? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in that cable quote Chou as having said : 

Japan anrl Russia will not clash for the time being, but in the future will 
Inevitably fight. Therefore, we welcome American forces to help our guerrillas 
in north China to prepare for joint opposition against Japan in the future. Now 
they, the guerrillas, have been dispatched to occupied territory for intense ac- 
tivity. It is hoped that the American leaders will adopt positive action and send 
an observer to North China. 

Mr. Vincent, I couldn't testify that that is the exact language of 
the telegram. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2001 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that the substance ? 

Mr. Vincent. A telegram was sent, and I would have to refresh 
my memory on the telegram, sir, to be able to say whether that was 
what was actually said. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that the substance? 

Mr. Vincent. That was certainly what Chou would have said, 1 
think, that he would have wanted somebody to be dispatched to North 
China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You said you remembered that you had sent such 
a telegram. 

Mr. Vincent. I remember such a telegram. I don't remember the 
substance of the telegram. 

Mr. SouR^VINE. You do not remember even the substance of the 
telegi-am? Do you remember whether in that cable you stated "The 
Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist lean- 
ings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method 
should be to disparage the Communists as much as possible and be 
sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will 
be approved." 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no recollection of saying that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you did say that? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I did say that. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that have been a fact ? 

Mr. Vincent. He would have to read that again. You mean the 
fellow who sent that should be pro-Nationalist in order 

Senator Ferguson. No ; to get the Nationalists to do it, to consent 
to it. Read it. 

Mr. Sour^vine (reading) : 

The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist leanings. 
Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to dis- 
parage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist 
Government. Then the request will be approved. 

Mr. Vincent. Now your question is could that 

Senator Ferguson. No. Was that a fact? 

Mr. Vincent. It is a fact that certainly the Nationalist Govern- 
ment was very much anti-Communist and would have disliked any 
pro-Communist who was sent up there. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and if you had wanted to do it and have 
it approved you would have had to make it appear that he was pro- 
Nationalist. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think you would have had to do that kind of 
subterfuge. What you would have had done is send a man up there 
who was just a factual reporter on the situation. 

Senator Ferguson. Then that was not a fact ? 

Mr. Vincent. This statement here would be a fact, if it existed, 
that you would not send a pro-Communist to North China. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever send anyone up ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't, but they were sent there in 1944, after I 
left China. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that person pro-Nationalist? 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten who was sent up there. There was 
an Army group sent up there in 1944, and then various and sundry 
other people from the State Department were sent up there in 1944, 
I mean people with Stilwell's headquarters. 



2002 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you now testify that you 
did not make such a report ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not recall the substance of my telegram. 
I recall that a telegram was sent on the basis of Chou En-lai coming 
in and calling on me before I left Chungking in 1943. 

Senator Ferguson. That is why I was trying to find out if that 
was the fact and that could have been in the telegram. You see, this 
committee is handicapped that they can't get records, and they have 
to reply upon testimony. 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would have to refresh my memory by 
seeing the telegram before I could testify that that was in that tele- 
gram. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That telegram is one of the papers which the State 
Department has declined to give us and which the President has de- 
clined to permit the committee to have, is it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether the committee asked for it 
or not 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know that it falls in that category of 
papers ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would, I think, fall in that category. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think that you would be able to see it and 
refresh your memory from it and come back and testify to the com- 
mittee with regard to it? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I could ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you can see it in the State Department, can 
you not? 

Mr. Vincent. I can ask to see it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you try to do that, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell us anything else about that conference 
with Chou En-lai ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't haA^e any other recollection except he 
called before I left to talk with me and to see Acheson, to meet Acheson 
for the first time. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you become Assistant Chief of the Division 
of Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943? 

Mr. Vincent. It was about that time ; yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were detailed to the office of the Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration as special assistant to the Administrator Octo- 
ber 25, 1943? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct, according to this thing. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You stayed there until February 25, 1944; is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. About that time ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. While you were in the FEA office on detail, who 
was the Administrator? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you work in his office ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; he maintained an office up on Fourteenth Street, 
and I worked down in the temporary T or U Building on Constitu- 
tion Avenue. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Currie with FEA at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Currie was Deputy Director. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where did he maintain offices ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2003 

Mr. Vincent. He maintained his office in temporary U or T, down 
on Constitution Avenue. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was your work then closely associated with his ? 

Mr. Vincent. Wliat work I did ; yes. It was not closely associated 
with his because I just did odd jobs down there for the time. I never 
took any active part in running FEA. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was your office close to Mr. Currie's office ? 

Mr. Vincent. Across and down the hall. 

Mr. Sourwine. The same floor ? 

Mr. Vincent. The same floor, I think. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. At that time, sir, was Mr. John Stewart Service in 
China? 

ISIr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this. He was assigned to 
China. Whether he had come home on leave I don't know. I think 
he was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden 
was? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether Ludden was still in China or 
not. I would assume he was. If you will let me refer to this I will 
find out, but I would say he was still in Kumning or Chungking. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Davies, John Paton Davies, Jr., was also in 
Chungking at that time ; wasn't he ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was either in Chungking or New Delhi. He 
spent a great deal of time in New Delhi, India. 

Mr. SouRAviNE. And Mr. John K. Emmerson was second secretary 
at Chungking in 1942 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to this, but he arrived after 
I left Chungking and must have been there. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And Mr. Lattimore was Deputy Director of Pacific 
Operations, OWI? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1943 ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall when Mr. Lattimore took on the job. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was he in Washington at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. If he was Deputy Director of OWI, he would have 
been in Washington. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. "^Vliile you were with the FEA, sir, can you tell the 
committee just what functions or duties you did perform? Wliat did 
you do over there ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be very difficult to say because I never 
had any definite functions. I can tell you what one of the principal 
things was, because I went up for Mr. Crowley to the UNRRA con- 
ference, simply as an observer at the UNRRA conference. That took, 
I should say, the better part of a month of this time. Otherwise, it was 
a matter of the area directors and what not in FEA coming in from 
time to time and asking me specific questions as to factual conditions. 
I was used more or less as a person to be consulted with on conditions 
in China for the brief period I was there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say you were there as an expert, or were 
you there as an adviser and consultant ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I was there to be consulted by the FEA people 
as they might wish to on conditions in China, from which I had just 
returned. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you were consulted?. 



2004 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Who was your immediate superior while you were 
withFEA? 

Mr. Vincent. My immediate superior would have been Currie in 
the position I held. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Who were your principal associates over at FEA? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to think who was over there. You 
see, I was there such a short time. There was a man named Riley, 
I recall his name, who worked with Crowley. I saw him from time to 
time at conference meetings. There was Oscar Cox, who was I think 
legal counsel for the FEA; I just don't recall the others who were 
over there to any great extent. I was trying to think of the area 
director, but I can't place him now. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. You have already explained to the committee, 
have you not, how your detail to FEA was brought about by Mr. 
Currie ? 

Mr. Vincent. I said Mr. Currie asked me to come over and the 
State Department detailed me. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. So far as you know it was initiated by Mr. Currie? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You have already testified in executive session 
about your acquaintanceship with Mr. Lawrence Eosinger. You did 
know him, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. The only distinct recollection I have of meeting him, 
as I think I said, was at the IPR conference in 1945. He was there, as 
I recall it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know him well at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know him socially ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr, SouRWiNE. Did you ever have business dealings with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never recall having any business dealings with him. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was he in your office in connection with your offi- 
cial duties? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall a call from him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Outside of the one meeting you have mentioned did 
you ever attend any meetings with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. He may have been present at this meeting the nature 
of which I do not recall very clearly, of the American delegation to 
the conference which met some time in the late autumn of 1944 before 
the conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. Here in Washington? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it met here in Washington. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was the whole delegation ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the delegation ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever attend any meetings of the IPR or 
functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which Mr. 
Rosinger was present? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified, sir, that T did attend a meeting or 
that I don't have any recollection, but I probably did attend a meet- 
ing in 1938 if Mr. Rosinger was there — I have no recollection of his 
being there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then aside from tlie two meetin^is you have men- 
tioned,- one in 1945, the conference, and one in 1938, and the further 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2005 

possibility that lie might have been at a meetiiipr of the delegates to the 
1945 conference, is it your testimony that otherwise you never attended 
a meeting with Mr. Rosinger ? 

]Mr, Vincent. I have no recollection of attending meetings with 
Mr. Rosinger. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you read his book, War Time Politics in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection distinctly of reading that book. 
I have seen the testimony that it was sent to me, and I apparently re- 
tained the manuscript and was asked by Mr. Bisson to send it back. 
That is in the testimony before this committee. I don't have any 
recollection of whether I read the book in manuscript or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have the book in manuscript form? 

Mr. Vincent. I would assume that I did. 1 would not have recalled 
it had I not noticed that — I mean I would not have known it or re- 
membered it had I not noticed this letter from Bisson to me asking me 
to send it back. Therefore, I must have had it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have no independent recollection of it now ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how that manuscript came to you? 

Mr. Vincent. No. Whether it was mailed to me, handed to me, I 
just don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it sent to you for criticism by the Institute of 
Pacific Relations or some official of that organization? 

Mr. Vincent. I would assume that the fact that he sent it to me in 
manuscript was for me to look it over and see if it had factual mist;ikes 
in it or something else. I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you well acquainted with New York City ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not say I am. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you been there a number of times ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I have been there a number of times. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether the Seville Hotel is locjjted 
in New York City? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where Twenty-ninth and Madison 
would be in New York City ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I mean I would know 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you have ever been to the 
Seville Hotel? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that I don't ever recall having been at 
the Seville Hotel. It makes no impression on my memory at all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you have ever stayed over- 
night there ? 

Mr. Vincent. At the Seville? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say almost positively I never have stayed 
overnight at the Seville. 

]Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet anyone there? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet Agnes Smedley there? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRAviNE. Did you ever meet Louis Gibarti there ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I don't know who Louis Gibarti is, but I didnt 
meet him there. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that name before? 



2006 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I haven't heard the name of Louis Gibarti. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did anyone every tell you to go to the Seville 
Hotel? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever arrange to meet anyone there? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I never arranged to meet anyone there. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. You became Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs 
January 15, 1944? 

Mr. Vincent. I was appointed to it. I see there is a conflict there. 
This would say that I left FEA in February. I became Chief of the 
Division about that time. It says I was with FEA until February, 
but it says I was appointed Chief of the China Division in February. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE, Is that impossible? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr, Sourwine. You could have had the title and rank and still 
be on detail, could you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Raymond Dennett, the 
Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, the question of Amer- 
ican policy in the Far East? 

Mr, Vincent. I have no recollection now of discussing it with 
him, but I would say it would be logical that Dennett as secretary 
would come down and discuss matters in China with me. 

Mr. Sourwine, Why would you discuss American policy in the 
Far East with Mr. Dennett? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't say, sir, that I discussed American policy. 
I might have discussed matters concerning China, factually or other- 
wise, with Dennett. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean to deny that you did discuss American 
policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett ? 

Mr, Vincent. I don't have any distinct recollection of discussing 
policy with Mr. Dennett. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have discussed policy 
with Mr. Dennett ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not have discussed policy which was policy 
that should not be discussed with someone on the outside, but policy 
which was adopted I would have and it would have been carried out. 

Mr. Sourwine. Specifically did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett 
the so-called least common denominator of American policy in the 
Far East, that is, what could safely be said to be the minimum that the 
United States would demand'? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing the least — or in 
those terms. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would that be the kind of policy that had been 
made and could properly be discussed with an outsider ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, you would have to be more precise, I think, 
as to what would be called a least common denominator of American 
foreign policy with regard to China, 

Mr. Sourwine. You would have an opinion about that phrase; 
wouldn't you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Just at this moment the meaning of the least com- 
mon denominator doesn't even arouse in me any recollection of such 
an idea as a least common denominator. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2007 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The question of what could safely be said to be 
the minimum that the United States would demand in its Far East 
policy — would that be a matter that could properly be discussed 
outside the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent, It could be discussed speculatively with Mr. Dennett. 
To demand of whom? I am just trying to clarify that question. 

JNIr. SouRwiNE. I am trying to keep the questions reasonably short. 
Demand in general, or of particular nations, or in regard to particular 
situations. Does that clarification change your answer in any way? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett specifically 
the alternative policies Avhich branched out from the so-called common 
denominator, which were being seriously considered by the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it. but as I say Mr. Den- 
nett was a man whom I knew, not too well, but a man whom I knew 
and thought was a very intelligent man, and I may easily have dis- 
cussed them with him in the matter of trying to get his views and 
benefit by them if he had any views on that. 

JNIr. Sourwine. That would not be a matter of fixed policy or mat- 
ters of policy that had been established; would it? 

INIr. Vincent. No ; because I think from what you are saying here, 
this was looking into the future. 

Mr. Sourwine. These were matters which were being seriously con- 
sidered by the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. Foreign policy with regard to the future in China 
was being considered seriously by the State Department, I should say, 
at all times. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think it would have been entirely proper for 
you to have discussed with Mr. Dennett alternative policies which were 
being seriously considered by the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. If they were not matters of secrecy. 

Mr, Sourwine. Did you ever tell Mr. Dennett or imply to him that 
American policy in the Far East might grow out of Navy demands 
rather than being founded upon a general plan or set of principles into 
which Navy demands would be integrated and by which Navy demands 
would be limited ? 

Mv. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say whether I discussed that 
thing with him or not. That seems to be a very involved matter. I 
imagine that you are referring to a memorandum or something that 
Mr. Dennett himself may have prepared as a result of a conversation 
with me. People came in and out quite frequently. I suppose they 
went out and said they had had a conversation with me ; but I have no 
recollection of discussing a particular problem of that kind with Mr. 
Dennett. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of such a problem ? 

Mr, Vincent. I don't even recall having in mind such a problem of 
the Navy and discussing the matter of policy with relation to the Navy 
in the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson, Had you ever heard that there was a problem of 
Navy there ? 

Mr. Vincent. There was a problem of the Navy in the postwar 
period, of what the position of the Navy was, but it was not one with 
which I was familiar. 



2008 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson, How could you, as the head of this Division, pass 
on these questions if you weren't familiar with all the ramifications ? 

Mr, Vincent. Senator 

Senator Ferguson. How could you help to make policy if you didn't 
know? 

Mr, Vincent, I had a general idea of what was the policy and what 
we wanted out of the war, but as far as 

Senator Ferguson. You mean you were making policy on just gen- 
eral ideas? 

Mr, Vincent. I wasn't making policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you helping to make policy ? 

Mr, Vincent. I was helping to make policy. 

Senator Ferguson, How could you do it on general ideas ? Didn't 
you lead this committee to believe that you didn't have all the facts? 

Mr, Vincent, It was the whole accumulated experience in the Far 
East on which I was depending, but I am not setting myself up here 
as an expert on naval relations in the Far East, 

Senator Ferguson. But if the Navy relations had something to do 
with the question you would have to consider that in order to advise 
on the policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson, Can you give this committee any idea as to what 
the facts were about this Navy entering into this decision ? 

Mr, Vincent. I cannot from the reading of this question that we 
have here, and can't recall from recollection discussing with Mr. 
Dennett. 

Senator Ferguson. Or with anyone ? I am not talking about Den- 
nett now. I am talking about the facts. 

Mr. Vincent. He would have to read that question again. 

Senator Ferguson. Kead it again. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Could I ask a different question, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, early in 1944 were the views and needs 
and pressures of the Navy an important factor with regard to United 
States policy in the Far East ? 

Mr, Vincent, They certainly would have been; yes, sir. You are 
speaking now of the postwar period ? You are speaking of the needs 
of the Navy in China at that particular time or with relation to the 
Far East? 

Mr. Sourwine. I will leave that to your definition. I believe my 
question is clear. 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly would have been of entirely different 
character while we were prosecuting the war, that is, for the next year, 
if this was in 1944 ; but in the postwar period certainly the position 
of the Navy in the Far East had to be given consideration. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did that help at all, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that 
you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the 
Pacific basin? 

Mr. Vincent, Mr. Sourwine, you are again asking me to remember 
what I said to an individual that long ago, and I just do not recall the 
conversation with Mr, Dennett. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2009 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you miglit have so stated or inti- 
mated ? 

Mr. Vincent. That China could not be considered a stabilizing 
power ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That you had no confidence in China becoming the 
stabilizing power in the Pacific basin? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't think that I said that. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. Did you hold that view at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I held the view at that time, now that I recall it, 
wliich may have been misinterpreted here, which was that I did not 
think too much confidence could be placed or too much weight could 
be placed on China becoming the stabilizing influence in the Far East, 
that we would have to look to other means of having stabilization 
there because China was coming out of the war rather weakened. 

Mr. SoTTRWiNE. In other words, you held the view substantially 
which you say you think you did not give to Mr. Dennett? 

Mr. Vincent. That it would be a mistake to count too much on 
China being a stabilizing influence in the Far East at the end of the 
war ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether I expressed it to Mr. Dennett 
or not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you want us to understand that you think you 
did not express it to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I could easily have expressed it to him. 

The Chairman. What is that answer, please ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I could have expressed that opinion to him. 

Mr. SouEWiNE. What is the difference between that opinion and the 
statement that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing 
power in the Pacific basin ? 

INIr. Vincent. Because the statement taken like that out of context 
would mean that I had no confidence in China. This was, in the broad 
picture of China, that it would be a mistake in our policy to place too 
much confidence in China being the stabilizing influence, and I am 
accenting "the" because I just remember having held the view that 
China was coming out weakened from the war and that we could not 
count too much on China. Let's go back to history a little bit. There 
was entirely, it seemed to me, too much weight being placed on China 
for China's own good, that China was being ushered in as one of the 
great powers and that China was going to come out of the war in a 
weakened condition and we would have to do a great deal ourselves 
toward building up China. 

Senator Watkins. May I ask a question at that point. That didn't 
happen to be the view of Mr. Koosevelt, did it? He felt that China 
was to be one of the great powers and seemed to emphasize China's 
importance and her ability to carry on. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was Mr. Roosevelt's policy, to build China up 
as a great power. 

Senator Watkins. As I recall something hns been said recently by 
Mr. Churchill or someone to the effect that they felt Mr. Roosevelt 
had placed too much faith in the ability of China. 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't read Mr. Churchill's statement, but probably 
to come out of the war as the stabilizing influence in the Far East. 

22848—52— pt. 7 2 



2010 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. If China wasn't to be, what was to be the sta- 
bilizing influence in the Far East ? 

Mr. Vincent. We would liave to be the stabilizing influence in the 
Far East in combination with China. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you think we carried that policy 
out? . 

Mr. Vincent. Of trying to be the stabilizing force ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I think we did. 

Senator Ferguson. With what we did with Nationalist China? 

Mr. Vincent. We tried to support the Nationalist Government of 
China. 

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the Marshall mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that that was support of the Na- 
tionalist Government of China? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. The whole intent of that mission certainly 
was to support the Nationalist Government of China by bringing 
about a cessation of civil war and bringing into the Government all 
of the dissident elements, including the Communists, but under the 
Nationalist Government of China and under Chiang Kai-shek. 

Senator Ferguson. Knowing what you do about communism, do 
you think you could stabilize any government by taking the Commies 
into it? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified before it was a matter of 
alternatives, and I thought and the President thought and the Secre- 
tary of State thought that the best alternative was to try to bring about 
a cessation of civil war through the matter of some kind of political 
settlement under a constitutional government arranged by the Chinese 
which would have representation in it of the various non-Kuomintang 
policies. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it is your contention now, you, knowing 
what communism is, that you can stabilize a government by putting 
the Commies in it? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, it wasn't stabilizing a government. It was 
stabilizing a situation, sir. Let me answer, please, sir. It was sta- 
bilizing a situation where your alternatives were civil war or trying 
to bring about some kind of political agreement. The Chinese them- 
selves, the National Government, was trying to do just that. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you cite a case in history where Commu- 
nists have been taken into a government and that that has stabilized 
conditions and tliat they didn't take it over or they had to kick them 
out ; one of the two ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified here, sir, that it was in the back 
part 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. My question is, you state a situation 
in past history where they were. 

Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that in the French Govern- 
ment 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking about what you have already 
testified. 

Mr. Vincent. I say now, then, that an analogous situation is that 
the Communists came into the Government of France at the end of 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2011 

the war, that the Communists came into Government of Italy, and 
were eventually kicked out. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. You had in mind, then, that either 
you would have to kick them out or you can't stabilize the situation 
or they would take it over. 

Mr. Vincent. That would have depended entirely on how the 
Communists conducted themselves in the government. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of a case where they did conduct 
themselves such that you could stabilize the situation and not kick 
them out or they not take it over ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you think that it could be done in 
China? 

Mr. Vincent. Because it was an alternative to civil war in China 
and 

Senator Ferguson. That wasn't my question. Why did you think 
it could be done in China, that you could stabilize it, and not kick 
them out or they not take it over? 

Mr. Vincent. Because you could stabilize the situation by the 
avoidance of civil war, by taking them in on a minority basis with 
the Kuomintang and the major parties maintaining control of the 
government. That would have been stabilization of a situation inso- 
far as the avoidance of civil war was concerned. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think the Chinese Communists would 
€ver have given up their position in the civil war on any philosophy 
such as you now say : that you would take them in and they would 
he in such a weakened condition that you could kick them out? 

Mr. Vincent. I not only thought that, sir 

Senator Ferguson. And lose their position in their civil war. 

Mr. Vincent. I not only thought that, sir, but General Marshall 
thought it. It has turned out not to have been the case. 

Senator Ferguson. It turned out not to be true. 

Mr. Vincent. It turned out the Chinese Communists were not 
prepared to come into the government on a minority basis. 

Senator Ferguson. And on a basis that you could take over their 
position in the civil war and then kick them out. 

Mr. Vincent. But I will say this: that the Chinese Communists 
themselves had joined in these conferences with just that idea in mind, 
because, as I have repeated before, the conferences were going on 
among the various parties, including the Communists, before General 
Marshall ever reached China. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, don't you know that when the 
Chinese were negotiating, as you now say they were, they were nego- 
tiating to better their position in the civil war and to kick the Nation- 
alists out, and not for the purpose that you and General Marshall 
were trying to have it done ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact information as to what were the ideas 
at that time of the Communists. I would say, from what I know now, 
that the Communists never intended to come in and let themselves 
be subordinated, because their very actions show they would not be 
subordinated to tlie Kuomintang. 

The Chairman. Past history had proven at that time that that 
would be the verv result that would follow. 



2012 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Jenner. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. All right, Senator. 

Senator Jenner. Taking that position and that attitude and that 
policy toward China, when General Marshall returned and made his 
report and that program had failed, then what was the next policy or 
position of the Far Eastern Division and our Government toward 
China or Marshall's report back that his mission had failed? 

Mr. Vincent. T]ie next position of the Government toward China 
was to help the government of Chiang Kai-shek. 

Senator Jenner. All right, then, I want to ask you if it is not a 
fact that, although Congress had appropriated the money for military 
aid to Chiang Kai-shek, for the next 15 months after Marshall made 
his report, although the money was appropriated, this Government 
didn't do a single thing for Chiang Kai-shek ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, you are speaking of a period when I was not 
in America. I have no first-hand knowledge of that appropriation. I 
left in 1947. But I do know that arms were turned over to China, 
airplanes. 

Senator Jenner. Following the Marshall mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1947, a considerable amount of arms. 

Senator Jenner. When did Marshall return from China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Marshall returned from China in January 1947. 

Senator Jenner. And for the next 15 months we went ahead arming 
Chiang Kai-shek and giving him aid and support? You state that as 
a fact? 

Mr. Vincent. I can state as a fact that specific instances occur to me 
during the time I was still here, during half of 1947. 

Senator Jenner. All right. That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you testified — didn't you, Mr. Vincent, 
in the executive sessions — that the War Department, for General 
Marshall, made up the directive under which he went to China ? 

Mr. Vincent. That directive was prepared over in the War De- 
partment. 

Senator Jenner. In the War Department? General Marshall 
brought it to you made up ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have described it. Do you want me to describe the 
various steps in that again ? 

Senator Ferguson. Have you already in the open hearing described 
it? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; we haven't discussed it in the open hearings. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We have quite a series of questions on that a little 
later, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Jenner. I would like to return, Mr. Chairman, to one ques- 
tion. I would like to know what was done following Marshall's re- 
turn from China and reporting that his mission had been a failure; 
that Chianc: Kai-shek refused to take the Communists into his gov- 
ernment. Wliat did we then do to aid Chiang Kai-shek ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am working on memory here. One, there was a 
large amount of ammunition at Tsingtao in China. 

Senator Jenner. What kind of ammunition ? 

Mr. Vincent. Rifle ammunition, which was there and was surveyed 
and turned over to the Nationalist Government troops in the Province 
of Shantung. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2013 

Senator Jenner. Did they have rifles to shoot that ammunition 
with? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, I think I testified yesterday, Senator, tliat 
people with much better knowledge of the situation in China have 
testified or stated that Chiang Kai-shek did not lack the military 
equipment in the year 1947 to carry on his campaign ; that, as a matter 
of fact, during that year he was more successful than he had been at 
any time before or after in consolidating his position. 

Senator Jenner. Who in the State Department could give us better 
information about what we did to aid China ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the period 19 

Senator Jenner. Following the Marshall report back that it was a 
failure and that we would wash our hands of Chiang Kai-shek and 
that it was impossible. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say the Secretary of State could do that. 

Senator Jenner. The Secretary of State. You know we had the 
same situation paralleled in Korea. We said we gave them aid, and 
I believe it came out in the evidence in some of the hearings that we 
did give them aid. We sent them some baling wire, I just wonder if 
that was the same policy followed in China, It is the fact that follow- 
ing that 15 months' lull there, during that period, the Chinese Com- 
munists organized in Manchuria and marched down and took over 
the Government, Isn't that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Jenner. That is the result ? 

Mr. Vincent. During 1948. 

Senator Jenner, That is right. 

Senator Watkins. Let me ask a question with respect to this am- 
munition. Were you referring to what I think one of the witnesses 
testified to, an incident in which the ammunition v, as placed out in a 
dump somewhere and indirectly or by some other means Chiang and 
his group were told it was there and they went and helped themselves 
to it, 

Mr. Vincent. That is one of the instances which I was speaking of. 

Senator Watkins. We had a witness as I recall. 

Mr. Morris. That was Admiral Cooke's testimony, sir. 

Senator Watkins. Admiral Cooke said that is what happened. I 
think he also testified or someone testified on that point before this 
committee that they were short of ammunition in this period of time; 
that they didn't have more than about 2 rounds to fight with. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that testimony. Senator. 

Senator Watkins. Have you gone over the testimony before this 
committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. Some of it. I haven't gone over all of it. 

Senator Watkins. I may be mistaken on that, but that is my 
memory. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. ]\Ir. Vincent, did you ever state or intimate to Mr. 
Dennett that the United States, with the tacit approval of Great 
Britain, and with the active support of Australia and New Zealand, 
would be the stabilizing power upon the Eastern Asian Continent? 

Mr. Vincent. I will have to testify again that I cannot recall a 
conversation with Mr. Dennett on that specific subject, but I would 



2014 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

say that that would seem to me to have been a logical position to take ;. 
that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia could 
stabilize conditions in the Far East. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that 
the United States needed to be prepared for what its prospective course 
of action in or with respect to Eastern Asia would cost ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall stating that to Mr. Dennett. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that 
the United States needed work on the development of a formula for 
the problems of the independent areas in Southeast Asia ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall stating that to him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Might you have stated that to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I might have stated that to him. We were very much 
preoccupied at that time with the postwar status of such areas as 
French Indochina, Indonesia. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you think the IPR might be an organization 
which would be a good one td assist in the formulation of that 
formula ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not thinking in terms of the IPR, If I wa& 
speaking to Mr. Dennett, I was speaking to a man who I considered 
to be intelligent and was discussing the matters with him. The idea 
of the IPR, with which my relations were not close except that one 
year, did not enter my mind as an instrument for bringing about 
that policy. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Don't you remember talking with Mr. Dennett at 
a time when he was about to take a job with the American Council of 
the IPR and he said he needed to know what the outlook was, what 
the future of American policy was going to be, to decide what he 
was going to do ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell the committee whether you ever stated 
or intimated to Mr. Dennett that you did not think Russia was a large 
factor in the eastern Asia picture? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not remember that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you have been likely to have made such a 
statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would sound most unlikely that I would say that 
Russia was not going to be a large factor. It w^ould have to be con- 
sidered in connection with the situation that might be described. I 
never in my life thought that Russia was not going to be a factor in 
the Far East. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in January of 1944 hold the view that 
Russia was not a large factor in the eastern Asia picture? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall holding such a view or stating 
it to him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that 
in your opinion Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe 
anci would probably not interfere to upset the status quo in China? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall making such a statement to Mr. 
Dennett. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you could have made such a state- 
ment? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't believe I could. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2015 

Mr. Vincent. No ; it was not a fact. 

Mr. SocKwiNE. You did not hold that view yourself? 

(No response.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask Mr. Mandel, who 
has been sworn for the purpose of all of these hearings, if he can 
identify that as a photostat of a document taken from the IPR files. 

Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of a document from the IPR 
files. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Will you identify it by the heading ? 

Mr. Mandel. The heading is "Confidential," marked "R. Dennett^ 
January 18, 1944, memorandum of conversation with John Carter 
Vincent." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, this memorandum of a conversa- 
tion, as Mr. Vincent surmised, is the basis for the line of questions 
that have just been completed. I don't think it is necessaiy to take 
the time of the committee to read all of it. I would like to read from 
the last page five short paragraphs which are marked "Conclusions" 
and then ask that the entire document be placed in the record at this 
point. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine. Conclusions: 

(1) Vincent certainly implied tliat American policy in the Far East may grow- 
out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of prin- 
ciples into which Navy demands will be integrated or limited. 

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the 
Pacific basin, and questions its stabilizing influences upon the eastern Asiatic 
Continent. 

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great 
Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing 
power. 

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action 
will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for 
the problems of the dei>endent areas in the southeast Asia country. 

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture: 
Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would un- 
doubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably 
not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart. 

The Chairman. You want this instrument inserted in the record 
in toto ? 
Mr. Sourwine. If the chairman please. 
The Chairman. Very well. 
(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 380" is as follows :) 

Confidential R. Dennett. January 18, 1944.. 

Exhibit No. 380 

Memorandum of Conveksation With John Cartee Vincent 

I explained to Mr. Vincent that I was considering a job with the American' 
Council of the IPR, and that I thought it highly desirable to get some inkling: 
of American policy in the Far East with a view to determining (1) the least 
common denominator of that policy — what, that is, everyone was agreed to as 
the minimum that the United States would demand, and (2) the alternative 
policies which branched out from the common denominator which were being 
seriou.sly considered. My purpose, I explained, was to see what the minimum 
was which the American people would be called upon to support, so that I couldi 



2016 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

get a line on what educational work the American Council should be concerned 
with in the next few years, and to see, on possible future policy, what alternative 
proposals were being seriously considered so that IPR research could be geared 
as close to reality as possible. Mr. Vincent indicated the following: 

(1) Consideration of American policy in the Far East is definitely "second 
drawer" and is the concern at the present time of relatively few people in the 
American Government. He personally, and he thought others in the Govern- 
ment, would welcome the publication of material which pointed out just what the 
situation was. Ed Snow has an article on southeast Asia which he cannot 
get published now because of the fear that it will give aid and comfort to the 
•enemy. What Snow says in effect is that Japanese propaganda on increased na- 
tionalism is catching on in Burma and other areas. Vincent thinks that, through 
a slight feeling of guilt, Americans have been building up China in the past 
few years and are still a little ashamed of the small amount of aid going to 
that country. There is a vast difference, he feels, between having a feeling of 
this sort and allowing this feeling to keep (handwritten insert maybe us, not 
clear) from telling the American people what they ought to know. 

(2) There seems to be a general agreement, undertaken at the instigation 
of the British, that dependent areas in southeast Asia will remain undisturbed 
after liberation, and that their future will be worked out at a later date. Vin- 
cent thinks that unless the United States gets on the ball and makes some defi- 
nite suggestiorua for the record pretty soon, it may be too late as no one will 
have notice of what American policy might be. 

(3) Vincent thinks that the first determinative on American policy will be 
the demands of the American Navy for what it considers it needs on the Pacific 
area in the way of bases for defensive purposes. He believes that they will 
"want considerably more than they had before and that, in view of what hap- 
pened in 1941, they will get a receptive hearing on the Hill. The result of their 
demands will be to bring out several consequential questions : 

(a) Granted that the Navy gets what it wants, the first problem facing the 
United States will be to utilize those bases for other than purely negative in- 
fluence of defense of the United States. Vincent believes that the demands of 
the Navy, when met will actually make the United States the "stabilizing power" 
in the Far East. We will be there, and we will have the power. 

(ft) So far as China is concerned, the problem of the United States far 
from being that of building up China to become the stabilizing power, will be to 
keep China from disintegrating. China cannot become industriaized in the 
modern sense unless the United States will literally give her the heavy capital 
machinery; it would, he believes, be possible to increase Chinese purchasing 
power through agrarian reform and improved communications to a point where 
China could support a light industrial economy which would assist in keeping 
her from disintegration. Whether the things that need to be done will be done 
by the conservative Kuomintang is doubtful. In essence, therefore, this means 
the development in China of a "welfare economy" rather than an "industrial 
economy." 

(4) Vincent believed that the British would have no serious objection to the 
implication behind the probable United States Navy demands, that the primary 
interest of Britain would continue to be Western Europe, and that she was not 
prepared to equip and to maintain an adequate force in the Pacific to he tbe "sta- 
bilizing power," and that they would certainly prefer the United States in that 
position than China. This would, of course, mean that Australia and New 
Zealand would gravitate toward the United States in political interest. 

(5) I raised the question as to where British and American interests might, 
in the outline he had presented, come to disagreement. I pointed out that the 
line between a stabilizing power and a dominating power was thin, and that if 
the United States failed to make some provision for dependent areas, or at- 
tempted by the possession of adequate power plus assistance from Australia and 
New Zealand to put the stopper on the development of nationalistic feeling in 
any of the far-eastern areas, the position of the United States as a stabilizing 
power changed to that of a dominating power. This, I suggested, Britain might 
not be opposed to. On the other hand, if the United States did take a lead in 
developing a formula providing expression for nationalistic feelings in southeast 
Asia, I wondered whether the United States and Great Britain might not fall 
out over India, which would, in this situation, certainly attempt to line up as a 
far-eastern nation in order to come under whatever formula the United States 
developed for other parts of southeast Asia. 

Vincent stated that this was precisely the point at which he thought intelligent 
work was needed. It is very apparent that Britian is as unwilling to talk about 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2017 

India as Russia is to talk about Poland — in fact the reason William Phillips is 
still in this country because the British convinced him of the validity of their 
position. Vincent felt that the Indian question might very well be the point 
of major disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. 

(6) I raised the question whether, at this point in the line of reasoning so 
far pursued, it did not become apparent that some mechanism was needed in 
the form of a regional council at the very least, through which the pressures 
developed by nationalistic feelings could be siphoned oft' into discussion and 
open examination, and what the prevailing attitude, if any, was toward the 
British regional ideas. 

At this point Vincent became vague. He indicated that few people other than 
Hornbeck and Blakeslee had done much thinking on the subject, and that 
Blakeslee was all in favor of some sort of international political machinery. 
The implication was that Hornbeck and he had their doubts. He did say that 
Hull was very sympathetic about the problem of dependent areas and thought 
that something should be done, but left the impression that very little had in 
fact been done. He thought that the British were, in all probability, throuuh in 
Hong Kong, and that, although they had little enthusiasm for Hong Kong as a 
base, they might definitely want it developed to a free port. He thought that 
the question of face could be handled by letting British troops retake Hong 
Kong, although he admitted quite a situation would arise if, by any chance, the 
Chinese recaptured the area. 

CONCLUSIONS 

(1) Vincent certainly implied that American policy in the Far East may grow 
out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of prin- 
ciples into which Navy demands will be integrated and limited. 

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the 
Pacific Basin, and questions its stabilizing influence upon the eastern Atlantic 
continent. 

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great 
Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing 
power. 

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action 
will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for 
the problems of the dependent areas in the southeast Asia country. 

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture : Rus- 
sia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would undoubtedly 
be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere 
too greatly to upset the applecart. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you or do you know Maxwell S. Stewart ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of ever meeting Maxwell S. 
Stewart. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you ever read any of his writings? 

Mr, Vincent. I do not recall reading any of his writings. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever read in manuscript form anything 
that Mr. Stewart wrote? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of reading in manuscript form. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say that a manuscript written by Mr. Stew- 
art was not transmitted to you by Miriam S. Farley, of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of the incident. 

The Chairman. Going back to this exhibit, Mr. Sourwine, should 
it not be further identified as to its date ? It is dated January 18, 1944, 
headed "Memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent." 

Mr. Sourwine. The Chairman is correct. 

You recall this incident was referred to yesterday by Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; at which time I said I couldn't recall the inci- 
dent. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you want your testimony to imply that you find 
the incident incredible, or that you are willing to accept the possibility 
that this manuscript may have been transmitted to you, that you may 



2018 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

have read it and that you may have expressed an opinion with regard 
to it? 

Mr. Vincent. I would like my testimony to be that I have no recol- 
lection of the incident as it occurred. 

The Chairman. You are speaking now of what? You used the 
term "manuscript." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, there is in the record of the hearings 
as exhibit No. 176 (page 629, part 2,) a memorandum to W. L. H. from 
M. S. F., presumably to Mr. Holland from Miriam Farley, which 
reads : 

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max 
Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China. 

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent 
among others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that 
he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things 
should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive 
rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to 
leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful 
suggestions on point of detail. 

Then there is more to it, all of which is in our record. It was men- 
tioned at yesterday's hearing. Mr. Morris asked some questions about 
it, and I was endeavoring to find out, thinking it over overnight, if 
there had been any recollection come to Mr. Vincent about it at all. 

The Chairman. Do I understand the witness to testify that he does 
not recall at all having the manuscript or going over it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; that is my testimony, sir. 

Senator Watkins. Would you go so far as to deny that you had 
such a manuscript? 

Mr. Vincent. I just said I do not consider it incredible that I might 
have. 

Mr. Morris. Was it a habit on the part of IPR people to send manu- 
scripts to you for criticism and approval ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not call it a habit. I do not recall other 
manuscripts. 

The Chairman. What do you mean, you would not call it a habit ? 

Mr. Vincent. One would have to define habit. 

The Chairman. Was it customary? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have to say I do not recall other manu- 
scripts being sent to me. Apparently the Rosinger manuscript was 
sent to me. 

The Chairman. Do you recall that? 

Mr. Vincent. Now that this thing has been read, I don't recall the 
incident, but as I say, there was a letter written to me asking me to 
return it, and I have no reason to deny it. 

Senator Ferguson. You were in a position to make policy as far 
as the Far East was concerned ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have said many times I was in a position 
to suggest courses of action or policy to my superiors. 

Senator Ferguson. And you knew that the IPE, was interested in 
the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. It was interested in the Far East. 

Senator Ferguson. What their people were writing for consumption 
here in America would be of interest to you as a foreign officer. 

Mr. Vincent. It would be. I never followed the IPR too closely. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2019 

Senator Ferguson. You thought it was of interest because you be- 
came a trustee in the organization ; is that not true? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The fact that there is evidence in the files that 
they sent you these before they were published would indicate to you 
that they had been sent to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would indicate that they had been sent to me. I 
so testified. 

Senator Ferguson. And you believe that they were valuable, their 
works, in forming public opinion ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't use the word "valuable," no; but I think 
they were of use in forming the public opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that was of greater 
value in forming public opinion than these documents and books and 
papers being written by the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. What I would say offhand is that the IPR did not 
have too wide a circulation. Therefore, I would say that what was 
reported in the national press would probably have had a greater in- 
fluence on public opinion with regard to the Far East than the IPE, 
publications. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that some of these publications, 
and the speeches made from them, were getting into the public press? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say whether they were getting in the public 
press or not. It would certainly be logical to say they were. 

Senator Ferguson. Were not you watching the public press also for 
public opinion? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; but Senator, I could not now say whether I can 
recall whether the IPR was covered in the public press to any great 
extent. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Does it not sound reasonable that if a publica- 
tion came to your desk that could have some effect upon public opin- 
ion in manuscript form for your criticism that you would have read 
it or had somebody read it to report to you so that you could judge 
whether or not it was accurate and you felt that that should be used 
as a molder of public opinion ? Does that not sound reasonable ? 

Mr. Vincent. That sounds reasonable to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you explain where the other facts and 
testimony show that you were submitted these papers that you did 
not so act ? Is it one of neglect ? Is that what you are telling us ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't understand your question, Senator. One of 
neglect if I had not read them ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and did not have somebody read them to 
report to you. Would it not show now neglect on your part? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to have read them ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, or have somebody read them. 

Mr. Vincent. I would not call it neglect. It would depend on 
whether you had time to read them or not. I have already testified 
that I possibly read these publications. It is not incredible. But I 
have no recollection of reading them. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you do not swear now that you did not 
read them ? 

Mr. Vincent. What ? 

Senator Ferguson. You do not swear now that you did not read 
them? 



2020 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I would not swear now that I did not read them. 

Senator Fekguson. All right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever have any connection with 
the China Aid Council ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you or do you know Mrs. E. C. Carter, former 
president of the China Aid Council ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I have no recollection of meet- 
ing Mrs. Carter, but that I probably did meet her at the IPR confer- 
ence if she was there. 

Mr. SouR^viNE. Was the Mrs. E. C. Carter, who was at one time 
president of the China Aid Council, the same Mrs. E. C. Carter who 
was the wife of E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify on that, sir. 

Mr. Soitrwtne. Did you ever ask Mrs. E. C. Carter to send your 
regards to Madam Sun Yat-sen ? 

Mr. Vincent. You have made that question before and I have said 
I have no recollection of asking her to send it to her. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, I show you a publication headed 
"China Aid Council Newsletter," June 1944, and I ask you to look 
at the marked paragraph in the second column. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you see there a reference to yourself ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Mr. SouRWTNE. Would you read that paragraph, sir? 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

John Carter Vincent, in charge of Chinese affairs for our State Department,, 
asked Mrs. Carter to send his regards to Mme. Sun since he knew her well in 
Chungking, and both liked and respected her. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Does that refresh your recollection in any way? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not refresh my recollection, but I don't find 
it incredible that I would have sent my regards to Mme. Sun. 

The Chairman. Wliat is the last part of your answer? 

Mr. Vincent. That I might have sent such a letter of Mme. Sun. 

Mr. Sourwine. How would you have communicated to Mrs. Carter 
your request that she give your regards to Mme. Sun ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I have no recollection of how I might 
have communicated that to her. I have already testified that the 
incident on my own memory, relying on it, I had no recollection of 
the incident. Therefore, I have no recollection of how I might have 
told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun. 

Mr. Sourwine. I understood you, sir, in your answer to that ques- 
tion the first time to indicate that the only occasion on which you 
could have met Mrs. Carter was this IPE. conference you attended. 

Mr. Vincent. I said that was the only occasion I had a recollection 
of meeting Mrs. Carter. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did have a recollection of meeting her there? 

Mr. Vincent. It was the only one I had any recollection of meeting 
her, at the IPR conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recollect that you did meet her at the IPR 
conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no memory of it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2021 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Then it is not the only occasion you remember 
meeting her, because you don't remember meeting her at all, is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. I wouldn't know Mrs. Carter if I 
saw her today. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you send your greetings to Mme. Sun Yat- 
sen through someone you never met or saw before ? 

Mr. VixGEXT. I say this is an incident I have completely forgotten 
about. "Wlien I say that I have no reason to doubt that at some time 
I may have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun, 
that does not alter my testimony that I don't know Mrs. Carter, or 
would not know her if I saw her today. 

Mr. SouRw^ixE. The fact you have no recollection of her or would 
not know her if you saw her is not, in my mind, any reason to doubt 
the accuracy of this statement that you did ask her to give your 
regards to Mme. Sun. 

Mr. VixcEXT. I have said it is possible. I don't recall the incident 
at all. . 

Mr. SotjRWIne. The question was not whether it is possible. Is not 
the mere fact that you do not remember and would not know her if 
3'ou saw her enough in your own mind to make you doubt somewhat 
the accuracy of this paragraph ? Why do you say you have no doubt 
about this paragi'aph ? 

Mr. Vix'CEXT. I just don't recall the incident at all. As I say, it is 
not incredible — put it on a matter of doubt — that I sometimes talked 
with Mrs. Carter, that at some time I met her, which I don't recall, 
and she may have said she was going to see Madame Sun, and I may 
have said, "Go ahead, and give her my regards." I say I have no 
recollection. I am simply speaking with regard to the possible rather 
than something I myself recall. 

Mr. SouRwixE. You have not even entertained the thought that this 
might be something made out of the whole cloth relating to a com- 
pletely nonexistent message ? 

Mr. VixcEXT. I have not considered it from that angle. 

Mr. SouRwiXE. You think that this was in good faith ? 

Mr. Vix'^CEXT. I say again this is possible. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire? 

The Chairmax. Yes. 

Senator Fergusox. Mr. Vincent, do you have the same difficulty m 
your work in the State Department, advising with other officers, of 
remembering things that have happened as you have here on the 
witness stand ? 

Mr. Vix'CEXT. If it is a matter of going back • 

Senator Fergusox. Are you as uncertain in your work there about 
what has happened as you are here? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, this all happened 7 or 8 years ago. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you answer that question ? 

The Chairman. You better answer that question. 

Senator Ferguson. It is necessary for a foreign officer and a diplo- 
mat, such as you are, to remember things for 7 years, is it not ? You 
have to keep them all in mind ? 

Mr. Vincent. These incidents here, as I say, I do not recall. 



2022 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. But are you in as much doubt in conferring 
with State officials on things that have happened as you are before 
this committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, it is a matter of recalling what I would think 
now as details. 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking, Are you usually in as much doubt ? 

The Chairman. I think that is a simple question and easily under- 
stood. Why do 3'ou not answer it ? 

Senator !• erguson. Are you in as much doubt in advising on facts 
with the State olHcials as you are here in this committee? 

Mr. Vincent. If they were matters which I considered of as little 
importance as some of these things brought forward here, I would 
be in the same degree of doubt. In other words, whether or not I 
remembered would be a case whether I can remember them. 

Senator Ferguson. As to whether or not documents passed through 
your hands for criticism in manuscript form is not a minor matter, 
is it? 

Mr. Vincent. It is a matter — I do not know whether you call it 
minor at all. It is a matter which made no impression on me at the 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the only answer you can give to my ques- 
tion as to whether or not you are as uncertain and lack as much knowl- 
edge in your advice to State officials as you do at this committee? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the answer. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, following up what Senator Fergu- 
son has said, if we could return for just a moment to the Maxwell 
Stewart pamphlet, do I correctly understand your testimony with 
regard to that, that while you do not remember anything about the 
incident, you think it is possible that the manuscript was submitted 
to you, that you did read it and you did comment on it as indicated 
by the Miriam Farley memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I used your words. I think it was not in- 
credible that I might have. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not know whether this has been called to your 
attention before. I think perhaps it may have been. I am reading, 
Mr. Chairman, from Wartime China by Maxwell Stewart, the pam- 
phlet referred to in the memorandum which we are discussing. These 
paragraphs appear: 

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel 
elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other 
countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots, populace move- 
ments that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective 
opposition pai'ty in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many 
progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl 
Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Commu- 
nists as agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices. In the past 
the Chinese Communists dealt very harshly and ruthlessly with landlords and 
others who they considered oppressors of the people and expropriated landlord 
estates in order to divide them up among the poor peasants. Today in the inter- 
ests of the united front, the Communists have largely abandoned these extreme 
methods. Their present program is reformist rather than revolutionary. They 
no longer expropriate the property of landlords except that of traitors. In 
fact, they welcome the cooperation of landlords or anyone else who will help 
fight Japan. But they have lowered rents, taxes, and exorbitant interest rates, 
and encouraged education, cooperatives, and other measures of popular improve- 
ment. In addition they have developed a rough and ready system of local 
democracy in the villages under their control. Elected councils have been set 
up in village, town, and district, and the local executive oflficials are also chosen 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2023 

by popular vote. Tax assessment committees made up of local farmers have been 
set up to assure fair administration of taxation. These measures reflecting 
the most deep-seated desires of the Communist peasant have given him the 
feeling of having a stake in the war and have thus succeeded in arousing the 
peasants for support of the war effort. 

Having heard that read, I ask you, sir, does it appeal to you as a. 
factual statement? 

Mr. Vincent. It seems to me to be a statement by Mr. Stewart of 
his opinion of what was the condition in Communist China. 

The Chairman. That is scarcely an answer. That does not answer 
at all. The question is. Does it appeal to you as a factual statement- 
Mr. Vincent. It is certainly a statement of the conditions in that 
area insofar as Mr. Stewart knew them; and I didn't know, and I 
could not judge. 

The Ch.\irman. I do not see why you want to evade the question. 
"Wliy do you not answer it ? The question is, is that a factual state- 
ment. 

Mr. Vincent. I would not be in a position to testify because I had 
never been in the area. I didn't know what the conditions were there. 

Mr. SouKAViNE. Would you, sir, consider it credible that you would 
have read that as part of the pamphlet and then reported that it was 
good and should be published ? 

Mr. Vincent. As this man's statement of his opinion of what was 
liappening in that area, that it could be published. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Would 3'Ou, Mr. Vincent, have read that and then 
reported that you thought it was good and should be published ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall saying whether it was good and should 
be published. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you find it credible that you could have read that 
as part of this j^amphlet, and then reported that you thought it was 
good and should be published ? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought it was good and it should be published in 
bringing information about Communist China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is all. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire? 

The Chairman. All right. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. What did your counsel say to you ? 
■ Mr. Vincent. I didn't hear him. 

Mr. Surrey. I don't believe that is the statement as to what he re- 
members, since he testified he did not remember the incident. 

Senator Ferguson. Hearing this statement, you want to say now 
that as a foreign officer in the State Department, and a former trustee 
of the IPR, that you would allow to go to the public a statement like 
that when you did not know whether it was a fact or not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, it was not a case of my allowing it to go to 
the public. 

Senator Ferguson. If you were to criticize it in manuscript form be- 
fore it was printed, were they not asking you in effect, "Do you ap- 
prove this to be printed and circulated to the public?" Is that not 
what your criticism was asked for ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; not my criticism. They might have completely 
rejected any criticism. 

Senator Ferguson. Surely, but you would have been on record as 
saying you did not agree with it because you either did not know 
what the facts were, or did not believe what he was saying. You 



2024 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

do not think they were submitting it to you just for the English, do 
you ? 

Mr. Vincent. They were submitting it to me as they say there as 
to wliether it would be good for this to be published. So they say in 
this memo. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that is exactly it, whether or not it should 
be handed out to the American public to help crystallize public opin- 
ion, and here you were, a State official, and now you say that you would 
pass it because it was his word, and anything he would say you would 
pass, is that correct? Is that what you want to leave with this 
committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not a case of my passing the thing. It was 
not my document. It was submitted to me to go over. It could be 
published whether I approved it or not. 

Senator Ferguson. But if you did not say anything to the con- 
trary, the IPR would take for granted that you were approving it, is 
that not correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not think so. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not think so ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I was approving it. My approval was not 
necessary to publish IPR documents. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you not mail it back and say to 
IPR, "I am not going to criticize your document. Print anything 
you want to, but I am not going to criticize it. I am not going to 
say whether it is good, bad, or indifferent''? Wliy did you not tell 
them that? 

Mr. Vincent. As I have just said, the whole matter is one I have 
no recollection of what attitude I took on it. I said it is not incredible 
that the incident occurred. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have stated that you are willing to accept the 
fact that it occurred? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. The memo indicates that you have expressed your 
opinion in confidence. You were advising the IPR but you did not 
want the fact that you were expressing an opinion to go out. That 
is the implication of the memo. Does that change your testimony ? 

Mr. Vincent. This memo was not written by me. I cannot myself 
vouch for what my exact attitude was at the time. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. But you still find nothing incredible 
in the memorandum? 

Mr. Vincent. Except the matter of saying, "I have expressed in 
confidence" or the language of the thing, the existence. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you deny that you expressed an opinion in con- 
fidence ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not deny that I told them that. 

Senator Ferguson. With your present knowledge, Mr. Vincent, 
having heard this read, do you say now that it accurately sets forth 
the facts? 

Mr. Vincent. I say now, sir, that I did not know the facts as they 
existed. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now. 

Mr. Vincent. Wliether now this was an accurate statement of what 
was happening ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2025 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, witli your knowledge now is that or is that 
not an accurate statement of the facts? 

Mr, Vincent, Knowing what I do know about Communist China, 
I would not say that was a completely accurate statement of the condi- 
tions in Communist China at that time. 

Senator Ferguson, Would you say now with your present knowl- 
edge that that was a pro-Communist writing? 

Mr. Vincent, I would say that it was a writing which had a slant 
in favor of giving the Communists, I do not think it w^as pro-Com- 
munist, I don't even know that Stewart expected it to be. Stewart 
was writing what he considered to be an account of conditions in 
Communist China, 

Senator Ferguson, Why are you defending Stewart in this answer? 

Mr, Vincent, I don't even know Stewart, 

Senator Ferguson. Knowing it is an inaccurate statement, which 
you have said, why do you doubt that Stewart was trying to put propa- 
ganda out in favor of the Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not call — I have no idea of what Stewart's 
motives were at that time. If he wrote a memorandum, I must assume 
that he was trying to write what he thought was a factual memo of 
conditions in Communist China. 

Senator Ferguson. Suppose he was a Communist, would you still 
give that answer ? 

Mr. Vincent. If he were a Communist, I would say certainly 
he was trying to slant it toward a better understanding of what was 
going on or a sympathetic understanding of what was going on in 
Communist China, 

Senator Ferguson. From that statement, have you any doubt that 
he was pro-Communist in the statement? 

Mr, Vincent, At that time? At the time he made the statement? 

Senator Ferguson, No, from what you know now, 

Mr. Vincent, I would say now on the basis of that statement that 
he probably was pro-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that it is a fair statement to the 
American people ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't know whether it was a fair statement 
because I have to go back again and say I was not familiar with condi- 
tions 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now. Your knowledge of 
the facts now. 

Mr. Vincent. From my knowledge of the facts now, I would say 
that was a statbment which was slanted or sympathetic toward Com- 
munists. 

The Chairman. You were asked the question, do you regard that 
as a fair statement to go to the American people. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it? 

Mr. Vincent. Is it now, or was it then ? 

Senator Ferguson. Knowing what you do now, was it a fair state- 
ment to go to the American people ? 

Mr. Vincent, I would say as a statement of Maxwell Stewart, a 
man who was supposed to learn something about it, that it was not a 
case of it being a fair statement to go to the American public or not. 
It was a case of Maxwell Stewart putting out in IPR a statement. 
And its fairness does not seem to enter into it. 

22848— 52— pt. 7 3 



2026 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. My question is, you as a State official, and a 
United States Government official, knowing what the facts are now, 
knowing what he said, was it or was it not a fair statement to the 
American people ? 

Mr. Vincent, It was a statement to the American people which 
could have misled them as to what conditions were in Communist 
China. 

The Chairman. Therefore, not a fair statement to go to the Amer- 
ican people ? 

Mr. Vincent. I iBnd trouble in saying what is fair when one man 
wants to report. 

The Chairman. If it is misleading, it is not fair ? 

Mr. Vincent. The American public, it w^ould seem to me, would 
have a right to receive anybody's opinion through these kinds of things. 

The Chairman. You have stated in answer to Senator Ferguson 
that it was not a fair statement to go to the American people. Then 
it w\as misleading the American people, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have so testified that the statement itself, slanted as 
it was, would have misled the American people at the time as to con- 
ditions in Communist China. 

Mr. Sourwine. By your previous answer 

Mr. Vincent. From what I know now. 

Mr. Sourwine. By your previous answer, one question ago, do you 
mean to say that you feel the American people have the inalienable 
right to be misled as far as the Communist writers want to mislead 
them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly did not. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, was this statement Communist 
propaganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. In my opinion at that time, I did not so consider it. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now. 

Mr. Vincent. Now I would say, as I look back on it and know 
about communism, it would have misled people as to conditions in 
Communist China. It was painting too rosy a picture of conditions 
there. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, would you say it was Communist 
propaganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would n®t say it was Communist propaganda:, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Why not '^ 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it pro-Communist propaganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. I said that the thing was slanted towards the Com- 
munists and giving an unduly rosy view of what was happening in 
Communist China as I look back on it now. 

Mr. Sourwine. In that regard, it was pro-Communist, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. I find it difficult to define what you mean by pro- 
Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. That phrase is used in the State Department com- 
monly. How does the State Department use it ? 

]Mr. Vincent. Then it was in that sense. If it gave a rosy view it 
would be considered to be slanted toM^ard the Communists and pro- 
Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was propaganda ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2027 

Mr. Vincent. I would not call it propaganda in the sense that Mr. 
Stewart, as far as I know, was trying to report on the situation as he 
saw it. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. We have defined propaganda once. 

Mr. Vincent. Information. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is right, which is put out, which is propa- 
gated, with a view to creating an impact on the people to whom it is 
sent. In that sense this certainly was propaganda. 

Mr. Vincent. In that sense it was. 

Mr. SouiiwiNE. Then it was pro-Communist propaganda, was it 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, it was pro-Communist propaganda. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, do you find as much trouble among 
State officials as you are having here this morning on the question of 
pro-Communist propaganda ? Do they all have as much trouble as 
you have here this morning? 

Mr. Vincent. In looking back upon other situations at times, and 
trying to described what was or was not a pro-Communist situation in 
1943 or 1944, 1 couldn't answer that question, sir, whether they would 
or would not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have trouble at that time in determin- 
ing what was or ^as not pro-Communist or anti-Communist propa- 
ganda ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall an instance of having trouble. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not feel there was any trouble in de- 
termining that back in those days? 

Mr. Vincent. People may have had difficulties in determining what 
was Communist and what was pro-Communist or anti-Communist. I 
don't know that during the war, when they were fighting, that a great 
deal of emphasis was placed on that particular phase of the thing. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, when you say you had no trouble in 
distinguishing pro-Communist and non-pro-Communist matter, is that 
because you had no trouble making the distinction, that is, you were 
always readily able to make the distinction, or is it because you were 
not bothered very often trying to make the distinction? 

Mr. Vincent. I think trying to get it down to a fine point of what 
was or was not pro-Communist was not something that occupied one's 
thoughts too much at that time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It did not occupy very much of your attention ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And that means that if it did not occupy your 
attention, it did not really occupy anyone's attention in the Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, that is not so. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose job was it to pay attention as to whether 
or not the people were being misled by Communist propaganda, if 
it was not yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't say that I was not occupied. I said we were 
not too much occupied. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by that? 

Mr. Vincent. That you didn't examine every document that passed 
over your desk to see whether it was pro-Communist or anti-Com- 
munist. 



2028 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Then it would have been a very easy thing for 
Communists either in or out of the State Department to act with 
immunity and mislead the American people ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't agree with that, sir, because people were cer- 
tainly conscious of the threat of communism. I was myself. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, do you not think that the head of a 
desk in the State Department, the director of a division, should be 
thoroughly conversant with the Communist objectives in the area 
under his jurisdiction, so that he would recognize almost instantly 
Communist propaganda, or their line, if it cropped up in anything 
that came to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I should think he should be alert to such a situation. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you feel that you were, while you were the Di- 
rector of the Far Eastern Division, informed and so alerted with re- 
gard to Communist propaganda and the Communist line in the Far 
East? 

Mr. Vincent. I endeavored to keep myself so. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think, as an alert man, that this state- 
ment that has been read by Mr. Sourwine would go through your 
hands with approval? 

Mr. Vincent. I have already testified that it went through — it did 
not go through my hands with approval insofar as T recall, but I am 
perfectly willing to say that the thing went through. 

Senator Ferguson. With your approval. 

Mr. Vincent. Again, I don't use the word "approval." 

Mr. Morris. The memorandum states that you said it was good and 
worth publishing. 

Mr. Vincent. I am not testifying that the report of what I said 
there is a factual statement of what I said. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you do not contest it? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you do not find it incredible ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might turn to another line of 
questions. 

The Chairman. Try to turn to something that the witness. knows 
something about. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, was Owen Lattimore an adviser to 
Chiang Kai-shek at the time he accompanied Mr. Wallace to China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. He had ceased to be adviser to Chiang Kai-shek 
some time before that, had he not? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he ceased to be adviser to Chiang in the fall 
of 1942. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in China during the period when he was 
adviser to Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. During that period when Mr. Lattimore was ad- 
viser to Chiang, did he make reports directly to the White House ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say with any assurance which way he made 
his reports. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever consider the possibility that he was 
making reports directly to the White House ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2029 

Mr. Vincent. I assumed that he was, since he was sent out by the 
President. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you eyer discuss this possibility with Am- 
bassador Gauss ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall discussing it with Ambassador Gauss. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. As a matter of fact, is it not true that possibility 
was a source of irritation to Ambassador Gauss? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall that the Ambassador did not like the idea of 
having two people reporting out of China. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. How do you know he didn't like the idea if you 
never discussed it with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't say I didn't discuss it with Mr. Gauss. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I thought you said you had no memoi-y of dis- 
cussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was report- 
ing directly to the White House. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not say that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember ever discussing with Mr. Gauss 
the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was reporting directly to the Wliite 
House ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of any particular incident, but 
I do have a recollection that was his attitude at the time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He was irritated at that possibility? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did it irritate you ? 

Mr. Vincent. It did me, too. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did it irritate you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because as Foreign Service officer in the field, it was 
somewhat difficult for us to have a separate reporting office out of 
China on conditions there, and not know what was going on in that 
reporting field. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore had 
not reported directly to the White House? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore, under 
directions he had to report to the White House, showed us what he was 
reporting so we could know as well. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not show you any reports that he filed with 
the White House? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I ever recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, Mr. Vincent, do anything to condition Mr. 
Wallace for his mission to China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified that we met not frequently 
but on several occasions before we started out. I have no distinct 
recollection of memory that I may have prepared him for the mission, 
but I may have ; of factual conditions in China as I saw them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not indicate, in executive session, that you 
did supply him with material in advance of the trip ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is just what I was testifying again now. I 
testified further that I had no distinct recollection of the exact char- 
acter of the material. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you also testify in executive session that you 
had consulted with Owen Lattimore to make preliminary arrange- 
ments for the Wallace trip ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall my exact testimony in executive session, 
but I think it is quite logical that I would have. 



2030 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, did you not say that you had 
discussed the trip with him before the appointment was announced? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I told you, sir, it was quite logical I did, but 
I can't recall any particular discussions with him. But as I say, it cer- 
tainly would have been logical for Lattimore and myself, who were 
going out with him, to have had discussions. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you influenced Mr. Wallace at all on 
his trip ? 

Mr. Vincent. I should hardly see how it would have been impos- 
sible for me not to influence Mr. Wallace on the trip, since I had 
been in China for 20 years, with factual information. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You can "hardly see how it would have been im- 
possible" for you "not to influence"? Straighten that out. 

Mr. Vincent. I say it certainly would have been logical for me to 
have had some influence on Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, you know you did influence 
him? 

Mr. Vincent. What I am trying to say is that I don't recall specific 
influences I had on him. I am trying to give the question or the 
answer a geneial character, rather than saying in what particular 
way I may or may not have influenced him. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am perfectly willing to be general, but perhaps 
you can be a little more specific. Do you really mean that you cannot 
recall any instances in which you influenced him or might have in- 
fluenced him ? You do not mean that, do you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to recall specific instances. 

Mr. Sourwine. Furnishing him material in advance of the trip is 
influencing him, is it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be giving information. 

Mr. Sourwine. Giving advice throughout the trip would be influenc- 
ing him, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Talking with him one evening after having a con- 
versation with Chiang and suggesting you take a certain line the next 
day is influencing him, is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did that, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. On more than one occasion, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to consider specific instances. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is a specific instance, is it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did talk to him and certainly he must have been 
to some degree influenced by me. 

Mr. Sourwine. You know he was, do you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRW^NE. He changed his line at least on one occasion because 
you suggested it, did he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Breaking in on conversations with Chiang to steer 
him in particular directions was influencing the mission was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did that, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2031 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then there is not any question in your mind that 
yon did influence Mr. Wallace in the course and direction of his mis- 
sion, is there ? 

Mr. Vincent. There certainly is no question. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you present at all of the talks between Mr. 
Wallace and General Chiang t 

Mr. Vincent. I was present at all except the first and the last. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there anywhere at any time, in any written 
memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace, any refer- 
ence to a request by General Chiang for the assignment of General 
Wedemeyer as the representative of President Roosevelt? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall no memorandum. It was all oral discussion 
as far as I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Wallace ever tell you orally that General 
Chiang had made a request for the assignment of General Wedemeyer 
or had indicated that he would like to have General Wedemeyer as- 
signed as the President's representative to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall his ever telling me that the General- 
issimo wanted General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know where the first idea of having Gen- 
eral Wedemeyer recommended originated? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection would be that it originated with Mr. 
Alsop. I didn't know Wedemeyer, and I think Mr. Wallace stated 
that he had never known General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You and I have been over this, and I realize I am 
cutting corners on it. I simply wanted to traverse that here for the 
public record in case Senators who were not present at the executive 
session might want to ask questions. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you also testify that it was Mr. Alsop who 
had stopped the proposed recommendation of General Chennault for 
that job? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of my testimony. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that he had done so by saying that General 
Chennault did not want the job ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you read Mr. Alsop's testimony before this 
committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not read it carefully; no, sir. I glanced 
through it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you discussed that matter at all in recent years 
with Mr. Alsop ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not, then, know whether what you have ]ust 
testified was in any way at odds with what Mr. Alsop said? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify in executive session that Mr. Lauch- 
lin Currie played a part in your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified that it was possible that Lauchlin Currie 
was the first one to mention to me that Mr. Wallace was going to 
China. If I could have the testimony I could 

Mr. Sourwine. I just asked. 

Mr. Vincent. That is true. 



2032 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You testified to a fact there. You testified to the 
same fact here. There cannot be any conflict in your testimony. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. So far as you know, who initiated the request for 
your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know, Mr. Wallace initiated it, 

Mr. SoTJRw^iNE. How do you know that Mr. Wallace initiated it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because I testified that we had a conversation one 
time about conditions in China. He called me and we had this conver- 
sation regarding going to China. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that before Mr. Currie had mentioned to you 
the possibility of your going with Mr. Wallace on this mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. 1 don't recall the sequence as to whether Mr. Currie 
mentioned it first or Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first 
one to mention it to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That Mr. Wallace was going to China? 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwt:ne. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one 
to mention to you that you would go along with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the testimony in executive session, but 
as I have said, it is possible that Mr. Currie was the first to mention 
the matter of going. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to distinguish between a knowledge that 
there was going to be a Wallace mission 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Oh, yes? 

Mr. Vincent. And who first initiated the request that I go along. 
In any formal way Mr. Wallace initiated it insofar as the Secretary 
of State was concerned. 

Mr. SouR-\viNE. When Mr. Wallace talked to you about it, he came 
to your office, did he not? 

Mr. Vincent. He came over to the State Department. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. That meeting was arranged? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He did not come without an appointment? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. At the time the appointment was arranged you knew 
what he was going to talk about ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who arranged that appointment? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that I have testified that Mr. Wal- 
lace called, and I said I would come over to his office, but he came 
over to the State Department. But Mr. Currie may have arranged 
the interview. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not know at the time that Mr. Wallace 
called you on the phone that the thing he wanted to discuss with you 
was going on the mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was sure of his going on the mission. 

Mr. Sourwine. No ; your going. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that I was, but as I say, it is logical. 
I am just trying to be factual in the testimony here. Whether Mr. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2033 

Wallace told me he was coming over to talk to me about going on the 
mission with him or whether he was coming to talk about going on 
the mission. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As of now, as of this morning, are you able to re- 
member who first discussed with you the matter of you going on that 
mission with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. From my memory this morning I would have to re- 
peat again that Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss with me the 
mission, but I do not recall whether Mr. Currie was the first one to 
discuss that I would go on the mission. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Why did Mr. Hull send you with Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hull sent me with Mr. Wallace as far as I know 
because I had had 20 years' experience in China, I had just come back 
from China, with 2 years' experience there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wliy did he want to send anybody with Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. Putting it this way, that Mr. Wallace was the one 
wanting someone to be sent with him. I don't know that Mr. Hull 
wanted somebody to be sent with Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember your testimony on this point in 
executive session ? 

Mr. Vincent. I remember my testimony, but you put the question 
differently here. Why did Mr. Hull want somebody to go. I am 
saying after Mr. Wallace had asked for somebody to go, and I had 
been designated by Mr. Hull to go, I referred to a brief conversation 
which Mr. Hull had with me. I am using the word "want," why 
did Mr. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not that conversation indicate to you why Mr. 
Hull wanted you to go ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think you are using what Mr. Hull wanted me to 
be alert to, it already having been decided I was going. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. Tell us about the conversation if you 
will. 

Mr. Vincent. It was a very brief conversation in which Mr. Hull 
told nie to be careful not to let Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, make 
promises to the Chinese that we would be unable to fulfill. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did that not mean to you that Mr. Hull was afraid 
that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese 
authorities ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified in executive session that there was 
a feeling, which I had no knowledge of, that Mr. Wallace in his 
trip to South America the year before had given the impression there 
that we were going to be of greater help to the South American coun- 
tries than was possible. 

Mr. Sourwine. Tlie answer to my question is what, then, yes or 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. What is your question, sir ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that Mr. 
Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to 
the Chinese authorities? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Senator Ferguson (presiding). Did Mr. Wallace make any 
promises ? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I recall. 



2034 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did you on any occasion have to warn him not 
to make promises? 

Mr. Vincent. I never had to warn him that I can recall not to make 
elaborate promises. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you call an elaborate promise ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say promises beyond our own possibility of 
performance ; the matter of support to China 

Senator Ferguson. What did he promise them that you thought was 
within our capabilities of carrying out? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace made no specific promises insofar as 
I can recall to General Chiang other than a continuation, and if pos- 
sible, an augmentation of support for the Chiang Kai-shek govern- 
ment. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Hull 
said elaborate promises ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. You used that word. He just said don't make 
promises to the Chinese that we were unable to fulfill. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you know what we would or 
would not be able to fulfill ? Did Mr. Hull tell you what we could or 
could not fulfill. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hull was not specific in telling me that. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you be of any aid on that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would recognize with my knowledge of China that 
if Mr. Wallace were to go out there and make promises of support 
which could not be carried over the hump in the air, or further sup- 
port of a military nature which was impossible — 

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the military situation 
so that you could advise as to what we could or could not carry over 
the hump ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was familiar enough to know what I would con- 
sider to be an unreasonable request and if I did, I would also be in 
touch with the military people in China who could give me any 
advice that they might wish to. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you never had to use this so-called 
warning ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall did I ever have to stop Mr. Wallace 
from doing something which I thought was going beyond our ability 
to fulfill. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he make any promises at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. The only promises I recall he made was that we were 
going to try to go back and get support for General Chiang's govern- 
ment continued over the hump insofar as it was practical to send 
lend-lease. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the only promise that he made ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the only promise as I recall he made. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he promise to get him a representative — 
Wedemeyer ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, he did not promise him so far as I know unless it 
took place in a conversation at which I was not present. It was only 
the fact that the Generalissimo had given Mr. Wallace the distinct 
impression that he could not get along with Stilwell. What promises 
he may have made in trying to alter that situation to Chiang Kai-shek, 
I don't know. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2035 

Senator Ferguson. You did not quite fill your mission for Mr. Hull, 
did you, when you allowed Mr. Wallace to meet with Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek on the last occasion without you being present? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the 
United States then, and Chiang Kai-shek was President of China, and 
they got in a car and rode to the airport, and I rode in another car. I 
could hardly have insisted on riding with the Vice President when 
he did not invite me. 

Senator Ferguson. But Mr. Hull had told you that you were going 
for a specific purpose, and that was to watch Mr. Wallace so that he 
would not make promises to Chiang Kai-shek, is that not true ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not watch him so he would not. 

Senator Ferguson. What would you do ? 

Mr. Vincent. I could not stay by Mr. Wallace's side all the time 
because as I say, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States. 
I do not think Mr. Hull ever intended that I stick to his side in that 
way. 

Senator Ferguson. But at least you did not hear the last con- 
versation. 

Mr. Vincent. I did not hear the last conversation, but Mr. Wallace 
to my recollection reported it to me going down in the plane. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you report to Mr. Hull that you had not 
been at the last conversation ? 

Mr. Vincent. In my memorandum on the thing it shows very 
clearly I was not at the first or last conference. 

Senator Ferguson. You reported that to Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to resort to the book, but I am quite sure 
it shows clearly in my memorandum that in the last conversation 
General Chiang and Mme. Chiang and Mr. Wallace occupied a car 
going to the airport, and I was not in the car. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you not expect that if any promises 
were made, they may have been made on the last conversation just 
before he would leave? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not say whether they would be made then or at 
some other time. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, counsel. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever make, other than your 
original notes and the memoranda which are printed in the white 
paper, any other memoranda or narrative of the Wallace trip ? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I recall, sir. I think I have testified that 
they were the first notes, which were then transcribed either in writ- 
ing first and then on the typewriter. 

Mr. Sourwine. You kept a copy of what you filed with the Depart- 
ment in that regard, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I kept a copy ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall keeping a copy. I turned it over to 
the State Department when I got back here. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had access to it subsequently ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not subsequently from those notes prepare 
in more narrative style a summary somewhat shorter of what took 
place on the Wallace mission, just a summary record ? 



2036 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I told you in executive session that a 
summary in shortened form was prepared in the State Department. 
I did not prepare it. 

Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you know who did prepare it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recalL It was probably Mr. Stanton who 
prepared it. I could refresh my memory by going up there to see 
whose initials were on it. Mine was a 20-page running thing. As 
usual, it was narrowed down to much shorter pages. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who did prepare it if it was not Mr. 
Stanton ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I could name half a dozen people 
there. It was the kind of a thing that Mr. Stanton might have done, 
it is the kind of thing — who else was in the Division, this was in 1944 — 
there was a Miss Ruth Bacon there who did that kind of thing quite 
frequently, of going through things, she had legal training, she would 
reduce things. I would have to see who the personnel was to guess who 
put the initials on. I do know it was reduced and summarized for the 
Secretary. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was prepared from your notes ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether a copy of that summary was 
ever given to Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a matter of fact whether the sum- 
mary was given to Mr. Wallace or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it would be given to Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it would be logical that it would be given. 

Mr. Sourwine, Do you remember having seen that summary ? 

Mr. Vincent. I remember seeing the summary. I did not prepare 
it myself. It was prepared in the normal procedures of summarizing 
things. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you recognize that summary if you saw it 
again ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I want to ask you, if this, that I show you is in any 
way to you reminiscent of that summary. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is not ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, what I have just shown you, does it appear to 
be a summary of the Vice President's trip ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; this is not a summary of the trip insofar as I 
can see which has anything to do with the memo I wrote, which is a 
summary of the conversations. 

Mr. Sourwine. This that I have showed you refers to the Vice Presi- 
dent in the third person, just as your notes did ; does it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I always referred to him as Mr. Wallace or 
the Vice President. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. This is Henry Wallace's letter of July 10 to the 
President. 

Mr. Sourwine. How do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because I have seen it — I have it right here myself — 
since it was published. I have never seen it before. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2037 

Mr. SonRWiNE. I want to know how you know it was Henry Wal- 
lace's letter? 

Mr. Vincent. I know only by the fact it was published. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it published as Henry Wallace's letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haA^e to see what it is. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What you have is a letter. What I have shown you 
is headed "Summary report of Vice President Wallace's visit in 
China," is it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It is dated the 10th of July 1944, 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was transmitted apparently to the President with 
a note by Mr. Wallace: "Dear Mr. President: I am handing you 
herewith a report on my trip to the Far East. Sincerely yours, H. A. 
Wallace." 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. But it does not say it is Henry Wallace's own re- 
port, does it? He says "a report." 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; he does. 

Mr. Sourwine. And it is in the third person ? 

Mr. Vincent. This ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. The report refers to Mr. Wallace in the third 
person ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. As you said you referred to him in the notes? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
of that report? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. I did not even know of its existence 
until this thing was published here, until the last 3 or 4 months. If 
there is any confusion in your mind about the relationship of that and 
tlie summarization of the memoranda of conversation between Chiang 
Kai-shek and the Vice President, this has no relation to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you sure? 

Mr. Vincent. I am sure. 

Mr. Sourwine. How can you be sure? 

Mr. Vincent. I can be sure because I have seen the summary of 
the memorandum that I wrote on the conversations and I have just 
testified it was prepared by some officer in the Far Eastern Office, and 
was a two or three page summarization of 20 pages, and it followed 
much the same lines as my own, that on such and such a day they 
talked and this was taken up. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you account for the fact, if it was a fact, that 
Mr. Wallace in reporting to the President on his trip, would refer to 
himself in the third person? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot. 

Mr. Sourwine. He did not do that in the Kunming cables, did he? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Here was the Vice President of the United States 
reporting to the President of the United States; do you think it is 
quite the logical thing to do that in a report which he himself had 
written he would refer to himself in the third person ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't testify on the basis of what the logic of Mr, 
Wallace was in using the third person. 



2038 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouEwiNE. On the other hand, if a report had been prepared 
by someone else as a summary of yonr notes, such a report would have 
had to refer to Mr. Wallace in the third person, would it not? 
Mr. Vincent. It would have. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Do you from those facts draw any conclusion as to 
whether the report transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President was 
written by himself or prepared by some other person ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think the report prepared by Mr. Wallace was 
written by him. As I say, I cannot testify 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Of course, a report prepared by him was written 
by him. What I want to know is whether you have any conclusion, 
on the basis of the meager facts now at our joint disposal, as to 
whether this report, a copy of which you have just seen, a copy of 
which you have before you, was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. My belief is that it was in fact prepared by Mr. 
Wallace. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, On what do you base that belief ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because Mr. Wallace transmitted it to the President 
on July 10, so he himself said. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He did not say it was "my report." 

Mr. Vincent. He said, "Here is a report." 

Mr. SouRWiNE. "Here is a report." 

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact knowledge that Mr, Wallace him- 
self prepared the report. My assumption is that Mr. Wallace did 
prepare the report. 

Mr. Sour wine. The heading on that report does not say, "Report 
by Henry Wallace," does it? 

Mr. Vincent. Counsel is just showing me a paragraph out of Mr, 
Wallace's letter to the President in which Mr. Wallace himself says 
here 

Mr, SouRwiNE, What letter to the President ? Is this what I have 
been referring to as the report ? 

Mr, Vincent. No; this is the letter to President Truman of Sep- 
tember 19, 1951, which Mr. Wallace says, "I wrote the July report 
myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the Presi- 
dent." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. On that basis you are testifying this was Mr. Wal- 
lace's report? 

Mr. Vincent. I can reach no other assumption. I have no reason 
why Mr. Wallace should wish to deny or lead to any subterfuge on 
that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And it does not seem queer to you that the report 
was not headed "Report by Henry Wallace," but "Report of the Trip 
of Henry A. Wallace," and it did not refer to the Vice President in 
the first person, but in the third person. 

Mr, Vincent, It is not a matter of my thinking it is queer or not. 
Mr. A\'allacc has testified he wrote it. Why he may have used the third 
person with respect to himself instead of the first person, I don't 
know, 

Mr, SouRwiNE, You cannot account for that? 

Mr, Vincent, I can't account for it, 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Do you not think it is queer ? 

Mr, Vincent. I don't know whether it is queer or not. 

Mr. Sourwine, You would not write a rejDort like that? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2039 

Mr. Vincent. I might under certain circumstances write a report 
like that and not use the first person. 

INIr. SouRwiNE. All right, sir. I would like to talk for just a little 
while about the conversations with General Chiang, using your notes 
as the basis. 

Mr. Vincent. Can I go back just to clear up this matter of the 
possible relationship of this to the summary ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Surely. 

Mr. Vincent. I hope it is clear to you that the summary of those 
conversations has no relation to this. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have so stated, sir, very clearly. 

Mr. Vincent. I just wanted you to be sure of that. 

Mr. Sourwine. I presume you made that statement from your own 
|7ersonal knowledge. 

Mr. Vincent. From my own personal knowledge, and I have tried 
to narrow down who it was in the Department that summarized my 
memoranda of the conversation. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you remember that summary well enough that 
you can say definitely it is not the basis for this report ? 

Mr, Vincent. It has no relation to this. 

]SIr. Sourwine. Your memory in that regard is clear? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right, sir. 

Now I am reading the wliite paper, and if you would like to have 
it before you 

Mr. Vincent. I have it, sir. 

Mr. Surrey. Do you have another copy, Mr. Sourwine ? 

Mr. Sourwine. The chairman has it now. 

You will note on page 550, at the top of the page, you wrote : 

Mr. Wallace expressed the opinion that there should not be left pending any 
question which might result in conflict between China and the U. S. S. R. Pres- 
ident Chiang suggested that President Roosevelt act as an arbiter or middleman 
between China and the U. S. S. R. 

Note. — President Chiang's suggestion was apparently prompted by Mr. Wall- 
ace's earlier statement that President Roosevelt was willing to act as an arbiter 
between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Mr. Wallace made no comment 
at the time. 

By that you mean, unquestionably, that Mr. Wallace made no com- 
ment at the time of President Chiang's suggestion; but your own note 
suggests that Wallace previously made the statement that President 
Roosevelt was prepared to act as arbiter between the Communists and 
Kuomintang? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. May I ask if the record makes it clear that the 
white paper shows on page 549 that what you are reading was pre- 
pared by John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese 
Affairs, on note 11 at the bottom of the page. 

Mr. Sourwine. These are his notes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. These are the notes I made. 

Senator Ferguson. So they are not Stanton's notes; they are your 
your notes. 

Mr. Vincent. No. This is the full text of the memorandum rather 
than the abbreviated form. 

Senator Ferguson. But these were made by you and not Stanton ? 



2040 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir — yes, sir. 
Mr. SouRwiNE, They were made by- 



Mr. Vincent. They were made by me. 
Mr. SouRwiNE. Then the notes continue : 

However, after discussing tlie matter with Mr. Vincent that evening, Mr. 
Wallace made it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast 
that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China 
and the U. S. S. R. 

That was one occasion when you pulled the Vice President back 
from what might have been a commitment? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, because the Vice President himself had in- 
formed me of his conversation with the President in which he jotted 
down notes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Which was that he could tell Chiang Kai-shek that 
he would be glad to be helpful in anyway to bring about a settlement 
of the difficulties between the Kuomintang and the Communists. 
That was his statement to me. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. You wanted Mr. Wallace to make it perfectly clear 
to Chiang that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as ar- 
biter between China and the U. S. S. K ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wanted him to make it clear because he himself 
told me that was just exactly what the President wanted him to do, 
was to be an arbiter if it was needed or asked for between the Kuomin- 
tang and the Communists, and not between Russia and China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you mean to say that the President had told Mr. 
Wallace and that you knew about it that he, President Roosevelt, was 
willing — ready, willing and able, shall we say — to act as an arbiter be- 
tween the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what Mr. Wallace told me that the Presi- 
dent told him. Whether he used the word "arbiter" or not 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Intermediary? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, or help settle their difficulties. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you told Mr. Wallace about this situation and 
persuaded him to make it clear to President Chiang the next morning 
before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as 
arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R., did you also make it clear 
to him that the President was willing to act as arbiter between the 
Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I reminded Mr. Wallace that that was what he had 
told me and Chiang apparently misunderstood it to mean arbiter 
between Russia and China. 

Mr. Sourwine. But when Mr. Wallace made his position clear to 
President Chiang, the generalissimo, the next day before breakfast, 
did he express that distinction to him, or did he simply make it clear 
that Roosevelt was not available as an arbiter between China and 
Russia ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not present at that conversation. 

Mr. Sourwine. You reported in your notes 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Wallace reported the conversation to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. I see. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether Mr. Wallace made this clear 
to him. From his own statement to me of this conversation before 
breakfast 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2041 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Go ahead. 

Mr. Vincent. He told me tliat he had made it clear to Chiang that 
the President had not intended to suggest that he be a mediator be- 
tween China and Russia. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Your notes do not indicate anything beyond the 
unavailability of President Roosevelt as a mediator between Russia 
and China. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your notes do not indicate any availability as a 
mediator between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. 

Mr. Vincent. The notes here state "President Chiang's suggestion 
was apparentl}' prompted by Mr. Wallace's earlier statement that the 
President was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists 
and the Kuomintang." 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. So Mr, Wallace must have made an earlier statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. To the Generalissimo. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. Which, as far as I can figure here, was misinterpreted 
by the generalissimo because it says here, "Mr. Wallace made no 
comment at the time." 

Mr. Sourwine. What I am trying to get at is whether when he went 
to Chiang the next morning before breakfast to correct this false 
impression, against which you had warned him the night before, 
whether he did it in such terms as to negative his original statement 
with regard to President Roosevelt's availability as an arbiter between 
the Connnunists and the Kuomintang, or w^hether he made it clear 
that he was simply fearful that Chiang had broadened his statement 
to carry a meaning that he had not intended. 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot add anything to what is said here, but it 
would appear here that all he did was to straighten out the miscon- 
ception that the President was willing to be a — what do you call it — a 
mediator between U. S. S. R. and China. 

Mr. SouR^^^NE. All right. Bearing on the question of your influence 
on Mr. Wallace, which we discussed before, this is another incident 
where you did have a considerable influence, is it not ? 

INIr. Vincent. Yes. It is a case where Mr. Wallace had himself 
been misunderstood and I pointed out to him that the generalissimo 
had misunderstood him. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is evidence of the fact that Mr. Wallace was re- 
ceiving and listening to your advice. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, we find this statement farther down on the 
same page, referring to a conversation which Mr. Wallace had had in 
Tashkent with Ambassador Harriman. 

Mr. Wallace suggested that Dr. Soong discuss the matter with Mr. Vincent who 
had probably a better idea of the contents of the memorandum since he had had 
a number of conversations with Ambassador Harriman. 

(Note. — That evening Dr. Soong asked Mr. Vincent about the matter, requesting 
to see any notes that Mr. Vincent might have made. Mr. Vincent said that he 
had only his memory to rely upon.) 

Was that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

22^48— 52— pt. 7 4 



2042 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You had no notes? 

Mr. Vincent. I had not made notes of the conversation. 

Mr. SouRwiNE (reading) : 

And informed Dr. Soong of those portions of the memorandum which he thought 
it appropriate and judicious to give him. 

Wliat portions of the memorandum did you withhold from Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the portions I withheld from him. I 
only recall what I had told him. There may have been things in Mr. 
Harriman's memorandum which were highly injudicious to show him. 
1 had no memorandum. We are speaking now of Mr. Harriman's 
memo which he showed me in Tashkent. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you write this in your notes because you knew 
there had been portions of the memorandum which you thought it 
inappropriate or injudicious to give to Chiang and which you had 
therefore withheld, or did you merely use this language to protect 
yourself against any eventuality? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say from reading this that I had knowledge 
of some comments that were in Mr. Harriman's memo which would 
not have been wise to give him. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. At any rate, that is the impression intended to be 
conveyed ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I take it at the time you were talking with Dr. 
Soong, the Harriman memo was clear in your mind? 

Mr. Vincent. Fairly clear, yes. I noted this 

Mr. SouRWiNE. How long before had it been that you had seen that 
memo? 

Mr. Vincent. Possibly a week or 10 days. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was quite recent at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Sourwine, I do not see any other member 
of the committee here, and I want to be on the floor, so I will have 
to recess at this time. Senator McCarran and I have a meeting with 
other Senators at 2. I would have to put this at 2 : 30, so we will recess 
until 2 : 30. 

Mr. Morris. May I ask Mr. Vincent one question ? 

Mr. Vincent, you testified that you did not know Agnes Smedley ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you look at that picture, and see if you ever met 
that woman ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no recollection of meeting Agnes Smedley. 

Mr. Morris. There is another picture here. According to the back 
she is identified as the first one on the lower left. That is the same 
woman ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. May the record show that these photographs and 
pictures which have been shown to Mr. Vincent are pictures of Agnes 
Smedley, if that is the fact ? 

Senator Ferguson. I think there is testimony on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. The pictures have not been identified. 

Mr. Morris. The picture has the caption "Agnes Smedley" and there 
is a designation "Agnes." 

Mr. Sourwine. How can that be identified for our record ? Will you 
read what is on the back of it? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2043 

Mr. Vincent. "Front row, left to right, Agnes Smedley" and some- 
body else. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. That will be marked an exhibit, and so will 
the pamphlet. 

(The pictures referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 381 and 381A" 
and were filed for the record.) 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Just for the sake of the record, I want to ask Mr. 
Vincent if he will put his initials somewhere on the back of the picture 
as the picture shown here. That is for his protection. 

Senator Ferguson. And the same under her name. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Just on the back of that photograph, to identify 
that as the one that is shown you, and which you have not recognized. 

Mr, Surrey. Put "Shown to me this date.'' 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Whatever you wish. Otherwise, we could put in 
any picture. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess until 2 : 30. 

(Thereupon at 11:55 a. m,, a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., 
the same day.) 

AFTER recess 

Senator Ferguson (presiding). The committee will come to order. 

Mr, SouRWiNE, Mr, Vincent, at the noon recess, we were discussing 
the notes you made of the Wallace mission, 

Mr, Vincent, Yes, sir, 

Mr, SouRwiNE, I had read an excerpt from page 550 of the white 
l)aper with regard to a conversation you had w^ith Mr. Soong, Dr, 
Soong, about the discussions of Mr, Wallace with Mr. Harriman, at 
Tashkent? 

Mr, Vincent, Yes. 

Mr, SouRWiNE, Reading further from your notes : "Specifically," 
meaning Mr, Vincent — 

he told Dr. Soong that Mr. Stalin had agreed to President Roosevelt's point 
that support of President Chiang was advisable during the prosecution of the 
war, that Mr. Stalin had expressed a keen interest in there being reached a 
settlement between the Kuouiintang and the Chinese Communists, basing hie 
interest on the practical matter of more effective fighting against Japan rather 
than upon any ideological considei'ations ; that Mr. Stalin had criticized the 
suspicious attitude of the Chinese regarding the Sakhalin agreement with 
Japan, and that Mr. Stalin felt the United States should assume a position 
of leadership in the Far East. 

Is that your own best summary of what you told Dr, Soong at that 
time ? 

Mr, Vincent. That is my best summary of that, sir. 

Mr, SouRwiNE, Do you have a present re ollection of the Harri- 
man conference with Stalin as it was recounted to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were not present at that, were you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. And I haven't seen the memorandum of 
that conversation with Stalin since that time. 

Mr. Sourwine, Can you tell the committee, sir, whether, in say- 
ing in your notes that Stalin based his interest in a settlement between 
the Kuomintang and tlie Chinese Communists on the practical mat- 
ter of more effective fighting rather than upon any ideological con- 
siderations, you are .stating something which Mr, Stalin himself had 
. told Ambassador Harriman, or stating merely Ambassador Harri- 



2044 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

man's nnderstaiiding of Stalin's attitude, or stating merely your own 
interpretation of it ? 

Mr, Vincent. So far as I was capable of remembering the memo- 
randum, I was reporting what Mr. Harriman had told me had taken 
place in his conversation w^ith Stalin. 

Mr. SouRW^iNE. In other words, it is your impression, your under- 
standing, that Stalin liimself had made the distinction, had said, "I am 
interested in this from the standpoint of fighting tlie Japanese" rather 
than from the standpoint of any ideological consideration ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of what Mr. Harriman told 
me. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Going over to page 553 of the white paper, the 
paragraph that begins near the bottom of the page, we find this sen- 
tence : "Mr. Vincent inquired as to the progress of conversations be- 
tween the Communist representative in Chungking" — how do you pro- 
nounce that name ? 

Mr. Vincent. Lin Tso-han. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. "And the Kuomintang representatives of which 
Dr. Chiang Tse-che was chief." 

You were, in other words, saying in effect, "Let's talk about the ques- 
tion of how the negotiations are getting along beteween the National- 
ists and the Communists" ? 

Mr. Vincent. We liad an interest in how they were getting along. 
Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador, had indicated that they were talking. 

Senator Ferguson. They were what? 

Mr. Vincent. That they were discussing this matter among them- 
selves. I hadn't been back for a year, but this Lin Tso-han — I don't 
know who lie was, but apparently I was told that he was a Commu- 
nist delegate at tliat time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Just before that, a different matter had been under 
discussion; is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. I will have to read this to see, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is a change of subject. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was then one of the occasions where you brought 
about a change of subject in the conversations; is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I woiddn't say it was a very abrupt change in 
subject. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No ; I did not characterize it as abrupt. You were 
opening up a new subject; you were changing the focus at that point. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that because you did not want Mr. Wallace 
to discuss the other point? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I mean, I have no recollection of that being 
in my mind, to change the subject. The conversation may have lapsed, 

Mr. Sourw^ne. It was probably because this was a matter of par- 
ticular interest to you and you wanted it brought up; right? 

Mr. Vincent, That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you any instructions as to what to dis- 
cuss in China when Mr. Wallace was there? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean, did we receive any instructions from 

Senator Ferguson. From the State Department ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2045 

Mr. Vincent. No; the State Department gave me no specific in- 
structions as to what line of instructions, line of conversations ; no. 

Senator Ferguson. They had given you warning, Mr. Hull had, 
not to permit Mr. Wallace to make promises; is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. But you had no instructions as to what to 
take up ? 

Mr. Vincent. Myself; no. 

Senator Ferguson. With the respective parties? 

Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Gauss himself was the Ambassador 
there, and any instructions about what was to be taken up would 
have come from him. 

Senator Ferguson. But he did not give you any instructions? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Gauss did not give me any instructions. I talked 
with him, when I got there. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you figure the Wallace mission was ? 
What were you trying to accomplish ? 

Mr. Vincent. As far as I was told at the time, it was the return 
of the visit that Madame Chiang had made to the United States the 
year before. I never did know exactly what. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that the only purpose; just a return 
courtesy call? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, then it was, too, just that occasion for Mr. 
Wallace to have conversations with Chiang Kai-shek. 

Senator Ferguson. But what was he to accomplish ? He was not to 
promise anything. What was he to accomplish ? 

Mr. Vincent. You ask me something there, Mr. Chairman, that 
I don't know, what he was supposed to accomplish. He had himself 
a little note that he referred to from time to time, as to his con- 
versations with Roosevelt before he left. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, whatever instructions he had 
came from the President ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And whatever instructions you had were that 
of a warning from the Secretary of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is all I know, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know wiiether the Secretary of State 
had any mission for Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection that Mr. Wallace ever saw the 
Secretary of State before he went out. He may have; but I say I 
don't know what he did. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you know that, if INIr. Wallace, was 
making a promise, he did not have a direct authority from the Presi- 
dent to make it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because from time to time Mr. AVallace would refer 
to these rough notes he had taken in his conversations with the Presi- 
dent, and the main idea of this was to go out and talk to Chiang Kai- 
shek about the situation in China and bring it back and report to him, 
insofar as I knew. 

Senator Ferguson. What were some of the things that Mr. Wallace 
had on these notes that he was to accomplish in China ? 



2046 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. There is only one of them that I recall right now, and 
that was to try to bring about some kind of cessation or better rela- 
tions between the Chinese groups for more effective fighting in 
China. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, were you at that time to get a 
combination of the Nationalists and Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. For more effective military operations. 

Senator Ferguson. For more effective military operations? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the emphasis at that time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will the Senator pardon me ? 

Do you mean that Mr. Wallace had been given instructions, to your 
knowledge, by the President, which were, in effect, a forerunner of 
instructions given General Marshall? 

Mr. Vincent. My meaning there is that Mr. Wallace, himself, told 
me that the President had indicated to Chiang that he was prepared 
to act as adviser or mediator to get them together, which showed 
that the President even at that time had an interest in trying to settle 
the internal dispute in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Very good. 

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed. 

Mr. Souravine. Mr. Vincent, still on that same page, and going back 
just a little bit above the passage that I read in my last question, you 
were recounting the remarks of Chiang, were you not — "it was his 
statement * * *" to quote your words as a matter of fact — "the 
Communists follow the orders of the Third International." It that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't see that here. Yes, I do. 

This is Chiang speaking ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you. It is not you speaking is it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I will have to read this to see. 

Mr. Sourwine. xind it would not be Mr. Wallace, would it? 

Mr. Vincent. That is General Chiang speaking there. 

Mr. Sourwine (continuing) : 

The Chinese Government cannot oi)enly criticize the Communists for their 
connection with the Third International because it is afraid of offending the 
V. S. S. R. * * *. 

That was Chiang himself, was it not ? 

JSIr. Vincent. That is a report as well as I understood Chiang's 
statement. 

Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

Mr. Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United 
States — 

That is Wallace speaking, your report of what he said? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine (continuing) : 

and said that he could not understand the attitude of the Chinese Communists 
as described by President Chiang. President Chiang said that this difference 
in the attitude of the American and the Chinese Communists might be explained 
by the fact that there was no possibility of the American Communists seizing 
power ; whereas, the Chinese Communists definitely desired to do so in China. 

Now, going back to your reference to Mr. Wallace, can you give us 
any further details about Mr. Wallace's reference to the patriotic 
attitude of the Communists in the United States ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2047 

Mr. Vincent. No more than there is right there, sir. I was trying 
to be just an accurate reporter of the conversations that were taking 
place. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Just how did Mr. Walhxce refer to it? Did he say, 
"In our country the Communists are patriotic," or do you remember 
just what kind of words he used? 

Mr. Vincent. Other than what I have here, at this time, I do not 
recall. This was put down at the time. 

Mr. Sour"svine. This is a generalization of what he said ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, he probably had more words to say, but I put 
down here all I could recall at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. All you could recall at that time, and all you can 
recall now, is that he referred to the American Communists as pa- 
triotic ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Souewine. You do not know what he meant by that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what he meant by that. That is his 
statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. He then said — and you are referring to Wallace — 
that "* * * the United States was far removed from the U. S. S. R." 
Is that Wallace or Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. That is Chiang, I think. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is Chiang — "but that the U. S. S. R. would not 
feel safe if the Communists were not in power in China. He then 
laughingly remarked * * *." That is still Chiang, is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

* * * He tben laughingly remarked tbat the Chinese Communists were 
more communistic than the Russian Communists. 

Do you know why Generalissimo Chiang should laugh about that? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. He did laugh ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it your understanding that he was referring 
to the Chinese Communists being more communistic than the Russian 
Communists in the sense that they lived a more communal life, or that 
they were more indoctrinated with the principles of Marxist-Leninist- 
Stalinist communism ? 

Just how did he refer to it? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't tell you. I don't know what was in the 
Generalissimo's mind at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did you understand it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I understood him to mean that they were more dan- 
gerous. 

Mr, Sourwine. More dangerous ? 

Mr. Vincent. More communistic. It wasn't a case to my mind, but 
I was trying to remember here, that he wasn't referring to the fact 
that their doctrines were more of a Russian doctrine, but from his 
point of view they were a greater menace. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was saying that the Chinese Communists were 
more dangerous, more dangerous to him than the Russian Com- 
munists ? 



2048 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And lie was laughing about it? 

Mr. Vincent. He did. 

Mr. SoTJEwiNE. Now, turning over to page 554, in the second para- 
graph, we find this sentence — and may I ask, sir, throughout these 
if, on any case in reading these, you feel that they are being taken out 
of context, will you please so say and indicate the whole context which 
should be read? These are necessarily notes which jumped around 
among a lot of subjects. 

I am trying to read all of a note that had to do with a particular 
subject that was pertinent to the question. 

If, in your opinion, I fail, please call attention to it. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think I have taken anything improperly 
out of context, so far? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that you did. I would have to read 
the whole thing, but it doesn't seem so to me. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. This sentence is on page 554 : 

President Roosevelt should bear in mind that the Communists could not openly 
use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use the U. S. A, 
opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands. 

That is a statement by Chiang, as you report it; is that correct? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwaNE. Do you know^ whether Mr. Wallace reported that 
to the President at any time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether Vice President 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Whether Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, reported 
that to the President at any time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he did or not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not do so in his Kunming cable, did he? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He did not do so in this report which was trans- 
mitted under the January 10 date, did he? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to reread that to see. Do you want 
me to read that ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. No. Do you know whether he did ? 

I will rephrase the question. The report will speak for itself. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he did. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. All right. Do you think that was a fair statement? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it w^as a statement of Chiang, and I think it 
was a fair statement from his point of view that that is what he thought 
actually at the time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Without regard to what he thought, was it a fact 
at the time that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R. 
for support but that they could and did use the U. S. A. opinion to 
force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that the Communists were using 
U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think they were making any effort in that 
regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. They probably were,, which I don't recall. They 
probably were. At least, Chiang Kai-shek felt they were. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. JS'o, I am asking you what you thought. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2049 

Did you know of any efforts that the Communists were making in 
that regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any at that time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you realize at that time that the Communists 
would like to have the force of the United States public opinion 
back of accession by the Kuomintang to Chinese Communist demands? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I think there were people reporting that. The 
press were reporting it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No, I say, did you realize that that is what the Chi- 
nese Communists wanted? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time? 

Mr. Souewine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I am trying to think whether I had any obvious 
reason for realizing it at that time, that this is a flat statement of 
Chiang Kai-shek, and I am trying to think of what other evidence 
there might be, I mean, that would have come to my attention. 

And as I say, I can't think of any specific thing that the Communists 
were doing at that time to try to influence American opinion in their 
favor. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not know, and you do not now recall, any- 
thing that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence 
American public opinion? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I'm afraid I don't. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you keep close track of what the Com- 
munists were doing in America ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of what the American Communists were doing in 
America ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To sway public opinion? 

Mr. Vincent. In this country? 

Senator Ferguson, Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You anticipated, from what was said here, that 
they apparently were doing something? 

Mr. Vincent. That the Communists were doing something, that 
the Chinese Communists were doing something ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, that the Communists in this country were 
doing something to sway opinion here that would sway opinion over 
in China. 

Mr. Vincent. In this statement? 

Senator Ferguson. You do not find anything in there to that effect ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I thought we were talking about Chinese Com- 
munists in here, and I think that is what Chiang Kai-shek was talk- 
ing about. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Chinese Communists. Were there 
any? 

Mr. Vincent. I was trying to recall specific instances. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know any Chinese Communists in this 
country ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not at that time, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, going down to the bottom of page 554 
of the White Paper, we find this paragraph 

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment. 



2050 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Do you think the IPE, might have been acting to sway public 
opinion, as a pro-Communist organization ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so, sir. 

Senator Feeguson. You found no evidence in any of these writings 
that have been shown to you or that you have read ? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time ? No. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time or up to that time. 

Mr. Vincent. Up to that time ? 

Senator Fekguson. Nothing in any of these documents ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall anything up to that time of evidence 
that the IPR was trying to sway. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you known of any pro-Communist activi- 
ties in America up until that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1944? No, I don't. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, up to the time this trip was made. You 
did not know that the Communists had been active along any line? 

Mr. Vincent. I w^as not following Communist propaganda or lines 
at that time, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that you had no knowledge about any of their 
activities in America? 

Mr. Vincent. I had no knowledge of their activities in this country 
at that time, in 1944. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that generally true in the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say it was generally true in the State 
Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it true in your Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that it was generally true in my 
Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was assigned in your Department to keep 
track of what was going on among the Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say no one was particularly assigned in the 
Far Eastern Office to keep track. 

Senator Ferguson. That is, as far as you know, there was not any 
one looking into that question at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the Far Eastern Office, no, no one that I know of. 

Senator Ferguson. No one that you knew. And do you not think 
you would know^ if there was someone ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I would know if there was someone in 
the Far Eastern Office specifically assigned to that task. There were 
people in the State Department who did have such jobs to do, I be- 
lieve. They were security. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they report to your Department? 

Mr. Vincent. They didn't report to me. I don't know whether 
they reported to the higher-ups. 

Senator Ferguson. At least, in your Department, they did not 
report ? 

Mr. Vincent. To me. 

Senator Ferguson. You said that there were people to look out for 
the security because of Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You know, then, they were a menace. Is that 
not true ? 

Mr. Vincent. That the Communist ideal was a menace ; yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2051 

Senator Fergusox. You knew that? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But no one was assigned to look into the prob- 
lem as to what they may be doing to change opinion here in America 
as far as China was concerned ? 

Mr. Vincent. Nobody in the Far Eastern Office that I taiew of, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. No one in the Far Eastern Office. And that 
covered China? 

Mr. Vincent. That covered China. 

Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness. 

Mr. Sourwine. The paragraph at the bottom of page 554, is : 

Mr. Wallace was asked whether it was not possible to reach an understanding 
on a lower level with a view to maximum use of forces in the north. Mr. Vincent 
asked what President Chiang thought would be the adverse effects of sending 
the United States Army Intelligence group to Communist areas now without 
awaiting settlement. 

Now, that was another occasion, was it not, on which you shifted 
the focus of the conversation ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. On the next page, which is your account of the dis- 
cussions of the morning of June 23 : 

Mr. Wallace reported conversations with General INIarshall and with Secretary 
Stimson before leaving America in regard to China's situation in an endeavor 
to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, 
but are interested in the prosecution of the war. He and Mr. Vincent had de- 
cided upon this line of approach the night before in order to avoid further 
lengthy discussion of the Communists, per se. 

That is, is it not, another instance in which you had guided the 
course of the conversation through a conference with Mr. Wallace 
alone, and not with Chiang ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, where I had given Mr. Wallace the best of my 
advice which I thought would save time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. and he had taken it ? 

Mr. Vincent. But let me say here that these conversations are not 
fully reported because I didn't take a note on everything, and the con- 
versation would go on for 3 hours. This is my quick note on what was 
said. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. But you have, I am sure, endeavored to bring 
out all of the salient, all of the important points of the conversation! 

Mr. Vincent. I had endeavored to ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you were a trained observer in that regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. So it is reasonable to assume that you have covered 
all of the important points, all of the salient points of the 
conversation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't promise that I have covered every salient 
point, because, as I say, this whole thing can be read and these conver- 
sations covered 3 hours. I was trying to clarify, because there would 
be very lengthy discussions, which then had to be translated, on the 
Communists, per se. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you did not deliberately leave anything out ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't deliberately leave anything out. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was a case where, the night before; that is, 
June 22, there had been a rather involved conversation about the Com- 
munists, per se; is that correct? 



2052 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. That would be correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And you wanted to avoid the continuance of that 
discussion the next day, so you discussed with Mr. Wallace what kind 
of an opening- approach could be made to avoid it ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And Mr. Wallace took that line in opening the con- 
versation the next day ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, what he was trying to do, according to your 
statement here, is to persuade President Chiang that we, that is, the 
United States ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That we, the United States. 

Mr. Sourwine. That we are not interested in Chinese Communists,, 
but are interested in the prosecution of the war. You mean only in 
the prosecution of the war ; right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Interested in the Communists from the standpoint of 
the prosecution of the war. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Only from that standpoint? 

Mr. Vincent. Only from that standpoint. 

Mr. Sourwine. Just so that the record can be completely clear, by 
saying that Mr. Wallace reported his conversations with General 
Marshall and Secretary Stimson in an endeavor to persuade President 
Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, and so 
forth, you do not mean any implication that he was just trying to per- 
suade Chiang of something, do you? 

Mr. Vincent. No; he reported it as a fact, and it was simply to 
get the conversations down to what he thought was some kind of 
progression along, to disabuse his mind of the fact that we were 
interested in comminiism and Communists in China, as such. 

Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, you were not interested, Mr. Wal- 
lace was not interested, and the Government of this country was 
not interested in the Chinese Communists, per se, but only in the 
progress of the war against Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was what he had come out there to discuss, 
getting on with the war. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, from what was said on page 554, 
of what President Chiang had said about the Communists, particu- 
larly what they were doing in this country, did that not indicate to 
you that we should have an interest in it if we wanted a real prosecu- 
tion of the war ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; because at that time, Mr. Chairman, what we 
were trying our best to do was to get some kind of joint military 
activity. 

The Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese, and the Kuo- 
mintang were jBghting the Japanese, and it was the hope of Mr. Wal- 
lace, of me, of the Army authorities, and the President to get those 
groups fighting in some kind of joint effort. 

Senator Ferguson. But did he not indicate the fact that the Com- 
munists were acting as they were acting, that that was interfering 
with the prosecution of the war, and that they were trying to use 
America, or American Chinese, to influence the opinion in the Far 
East? 

Mr. Vincent. Influence opinion in the Far East, that is what his 
testimony, his statement, was here. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2053 

Senator Ferguson. All right; after you heard that, and returned 
to this country, did you pay any attention to Communist activities 
in this country as far as they related to the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. To whatever came to my attention, I did ; but I don't 
recall any specific instance of the Communist activity in this country, 
Chinese Communist activity. 

Senator Ferguson. You had great difficulty in determining whether 
or not propaganda or literature or statements were pro-Communist; 
have you not? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I haven't ; I don't think. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not? You would say this testimony 
did not indicate that you had difficulty in determining when a thing 
was pro-Communist? 

"V\nien I read a Communist statement yesterday, you did not recog- 
nize it as pro-Communist? 

Mr, Vincent. I think I testified that I could not readily have a 
definition of what I would call procommunism. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know if the statement that I read to 
you yesterday did not indicate to you that it was pro-Communist? 
Would you tell me what procommunism was back at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I haven't got a ready definition of what one 
would call procommunism in 1944. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, you know what the State Department 
means when it uses the phrase "pro-Communist"? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you not heard that phrase used in the State 
Department ? 

• JNIr. Vincent. The State Department uses it in many contexts, I 
would say. 

Mr. SouR^vINE. It does not always mean the same thing when used 
as a phrase ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. It may mean one thing at one time and another 
thing at another time? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what it would mean at any time. 

Mr. Sourwine. It does not mean that? 

Mr. Vincent. There is one time when procommunism might mean 
sympathy, or, at another time, people working for communism or 
Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, have you not had any warning 
in the State Department about what is or is not pro-Communist, so 
that you may guard against Communist activity in the State De- 
partment? 

JNIr. Vincent. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, any warning that one 
had about what is procommunism. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think you have had any warning? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew it was a menace, because you had a 
Security Department; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you know of no instructions or warning 
as to what communism really was or its menace? 



2054 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I know of no warnings that were given an officer in 
the State Department to alert him to what was a warning against 
communism or procommunism. 

Senator Ferguson. Then Communists might have been working 
right in the very Department. 

Mr, Vincent. But that was a matter of the Security Division, to 
try to find out whether Communists were working in the State De- 
partment. 

Senator Ferguson. I see; so it was not up to the Department it- 
self, it was up to some distant security officer 

Mr. Vincent. No; that was an integral part of the Department, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How many security officers worked in your 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any ? 

Mr. Vincent. In my Division ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that any worked in my Division, because 
it was a separate Division. 

Senator Ferguson. How would they be able to tell whether or not 
you had pro-Communists or even Communists in your Department, if 
none of them worked in there ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would assume that they made investigations of the 
people as they were employed. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you think that you can tell by an inves- 
tigation when you employ a person as to whether or not he is a 
Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't know whether you can or not. That 
was the intent of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you think that by asking a man if he 
was a Communist you would ascertain the fact as to whether or not 
he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think you would, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think you would ? 

Mr, Vincent. I do not think you would; but there were security 
investigations even back in those days, I imagine. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you only imagining that there were security 
investigations back in those days? 

Mr. Vincent. I am saying that because I have not any direct famil- 
iarity with how the Security Division operated. 

Mr. SouRWTNE. Mr. Vincent, just to clear up one little point before 
we go back to your notes, is it your desire to leave the impression with 
the committee that the State Department considers that procommu- 
nism or the phrase "procommunism" is a relative phrase, that it covers 
a rather broad field of conduct, some of which is relatively harmless 
and some of which is serious? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I would want to leave that impression, 
but I just simply can't make what would be a definition of pro- 
Communist. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When the State Department uses the appellation 
"pro-Communist," the State Department is always referring to a seri- 
ous problem; is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2055 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The State Department does not use the phrase "'pro- 
Communist" to mean merely some one who has a slight ideological 
aberration from the normal ; does it ? 

Mr. Vincent. If they were using the phrase carelessly, I don't know. 

I mean that the common use 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Does the Department of State use the phrase "pro- 
Communist" carelessly ? 

Mr. Vincent. What I was about to say, I don't recall frequent use of 
the phrase "pro-Communist" by the Department of State. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The question of frequency has not been asked, sir. 
The question is when the Department of State uses that phrase, if it 
does use that phrase, how is it meant ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is meant to describe a person who is sympathetic 
with communism. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that is all ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what I would say would be a simple definition 
of "pro-Communist." 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is a definition. Now, can we talk about pro- 
communism in the frame of that definition from now on ? 

Mr. Vincent. I should think we could ; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. All right, fine. 

Now, reading from page 555 of the white paper : 

Mr. Vincent again stressed the point that whereas he appreciated that Presi- 
dent Chiang was faced with a very real problem in handling negotiations for a 
settlement with the Communists, the American Army was also faced with a 
very real problem with regard to obtaining intelligence from North China. 

That was, was it not, another occasion when you brought up in these 
conversations the matter of sending a mission to North China? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. I was doing it after conversations 
with the American military there in Chungking, with the full knowl- 
edge and agreement of Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now we find this sentence : 

He- 
referring to you — 

pointed out that the American Army had no interest whatever in the Commu- 
nists, but that it had for very urgent reasons an interest in carrying on the war 
against Japan from China. 

Now, when you stated that the American Army had no interest 
whatever in Communists, did you mean to imply that the American 
Army had no interest either for or against the successes of the Com- 
munists in China? 

Mr. Vincent. What that meant, by that, is that the American 
Army, to disabuse Chiang's mind of anything, they had no interest in 
the support of the Chinese Communists, per se. They wanted to get 
intelligence out of North China. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you realize at the time, did you feel at the time, 
that the American Army had any interest adverse to the success of the 
Chinese Communists in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. The American Army's, at that time, interest was pri- 
marily, sir, the prosecution of the war against the Japanese, and 1 
cannot vouch for what the Army's attitude was toward the Chinese 
Communists other than as the Chinese Communists were useful to the 
Army in prosecuting the war against the Japanese. 



2056 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Then your answer must be, must it not, that you did 
not know at the time of any adverse interest which the Army had to 
the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. That the American Army at that time was not in the 
position to take an adverse attitude because tlie Chinese Communists 
themselves were fighting the Japanese. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Then what you were saying, is it not correct, is that 
the American Army had no interest either for or against the Chinese 
Communists at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. In taking a position against the Chinese Communists, 
no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, going down into the next paragraph, sir, you 
were recounting what President Chiang had said, were you not, when 
you said this : 

Much pressure has been brought to bear by the United States Government to 
have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists, but the 
United States Government has exerted no pressure upon the Communists. 

Mr. Vincent. That is a statement, as I can see — is that Chiang say- 
ing that? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking if it was not. I believe it was. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. The sentence itself does not attribute it. but in con- 
text it seems clear you were reciting what Chiang had said. 

He said that the American Government should issue a statement 
that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Govern- 
ment. He said that the United States Army attitude supported the 
Communists and requested Mr. Wallace, upon his return to America, 
to make it clear that the Communists should come to terms with the 
Chinese Government. That is all what Chiang said to Mr. Wallace 
and you, is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. In your opinion, was Chiang stating matters factu- 
ally as they then existed, when he said that? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that Chiang was overstating the matter 
when he says that the American Army here — where is that state- 
ment ? — that the United States Army attitude supported the Commu- 
nists. I have no knowledge that that was a factual statement. 

Mr. Sourwine, Was it a factual statement that much pressure had 
been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the 
Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that that is also an overstatement. 

Mr. Gauss had frequently spoken to Chiang, and so had some of the 
military commanders, about the vital necessity of their getting to- 
gether in a military way for the prosecution of the war against Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you do not think that constituted much pres- 
sure ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think it would constitute much pressure. I 
mean, it wasn't pressure in the sense of intervening. It was just from 
time to time the Chinese themselves were trying to get together. 

The pressure was brought to bear as much by Chinese leaders to 
bring about some settlement and that therefore we were not introduc- 
ing any subject that the Chinese were not familiar, of not themselves 
anxious to accomplish. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2057 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The question, sir, is not who else brought pressure, 
but whether the United States brought much pressure. 

Mr. Vincent. The United States had certainly expressed its inter- 
est in many cases. I think "pressure" would be an overstatement — 
had expressed its interest in some kind of a settlement. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did you not tell us just a few 
minutes ago that Mr. Wallace's mission to China was to do that very 
thing ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. "Wallace's mission to China was to tell Chiang 
Kai-shek that the President was prepared, himself, if there was any 
opportunity for it — he would be glad to assist in getting them to- 
gether; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you not figure that that was some pres- 
sure, to send the Vice President out to see the President of China, to 
tell him to get together with the Communists, and if he could not do it 
alone, the President of the United States would mediate or help to get 
them together ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly say that was expressing an interest 
in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it not more than an interest? Was it not 
indicating that that is what the President wanted done ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think that it is what you would call exerting 
pressure. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, did not the President of the United 
States at that time, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, hold a position in 
world affairs and in world esteem such that if he conveyed a message 
directly to the sovereign of another nation through the second execu- 
tive officer of this Nation, it could not fail to have a profound effect? 

Mr. Vincent. It could not fail to have a profound effect. 

Mr. Sourwine, Then was that not exerting substantial pressure, 
when he so conveyed his wishes and expressed his desires ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it true, sir, that the United States Government 
had exerted no pressure upon the Communists to reach a settlement 
with the Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Vincent. The United States Government had no contact with 
the Communists, and I know of no pressure that was brought to bear 
on them. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was a true statement, then, was it not? 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

Do you change your testimony? You say that the United States 
Government had no contact, when they sent the Vice President out 
there ? 

JSIr. Souravine. This is with the Communists. 

Mr. Vincent. With the Communists in China. 

Senator Ferguson. But with the President of China. 

Mr. Vincent. With the Communists. The question here — would 
you restate your question ? 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you want to let it stand that we 
did not exert, as a nation, any pressure on the Chinese Government — 
that is, the Nationalists? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I have just testified that we did exert pressure 
on them. 

Senator Ferguson. Did we in any way see the Communists ? 

22S4S— 52— pt. 7 5 



2058 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. We did not see the Communists at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Wallace see any Communists up there? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that Mr. Wallace saw any Communists 
on his visit to Chungking. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you think over and see whether or not he 
did while he was in China on this mission ? 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did he see Madame Sun Yat-sen while he was there ? 

Mr. Vincent. He saw Madame Sun Yat-sen. 

Mr. Morris. She is a Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. She was not a Communist that he knew of at that 
time. I didn't know of her at that time as a Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn she was a Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. When she first went to Peking, and when I heard that 
she was a Communist, I had no direct knowledge that she was a 
Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Wallace go to any place where the 
Communists were in domination? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time, he did not go ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Feruson. Then as far as you know, he saw only Nationalist 
officials? 

Mr. Vincent. He saw only Nationalist and provincial officials, and 
American officials. 

May I read from your own hearings here? This is Mr. Wallace^s 
testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted your knowledge. 

Mr. Vincent. But I was saying, in fact : 

He- 
meaning the President — 

asked me not to see the Comnnmists at all, since a visit by the Vice President of 
the United States might be misunderstood as indicating that our country favored 
the Communist cause. 

That is Mr. Wallace's testimony here. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you any such instructions ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had no such instructions. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know, Mr. Vincent, up until the time 
you left the Far Eastern desk, or had any connection with it, that there 
were Communist fronts in this country ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I would have known there were Communist 
fronts in this country. I don't know now what specifically they might 
have been. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know any of them? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall them now. This would be in 1946-47. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you leave the Far Eastern desk? 

Mr. Vincent. I left in 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. What part of 1947? 

Mr. Vincent. The middle of 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. Up to that time, do you know of any ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't name any now. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of the Committee for a Demo- 
cratic Far Eastern Policy ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2059 

Mr. Vincent. Now that you mentioned it, I have heard of it ; yes, 
sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether or not that was a Com- 
munist front? 

Mr. Vincent. I have heard since it was; I don't know whether I 
knew then it was or not. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't specify now that I did know at that time it 
was a Communist front. 

Senator Ferguson. You know now that the former Attorney Gen- 
eral had found it to be a Communist front? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and I don't know at what time he found it to 
be a Communist front. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you name any ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I can't, 

Mr. Morris. How about the China Aid Council ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether the Chinese Aid Council was 
a Communist front at that time or not. 

Senator Ferguson. And you are unable to name any Communist 
fronts ? 

Mr. Vincent. From the memory of that time, I probably knew of 
them, but from my memory now, I can't recall what you would call a 
Communist-front organization. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what a Communist-front organ- 
ization is? 

Mr. Vincent. It is an organization which does not take on real 
Communist character, but it is a front for the Communists, just what 
it says. 

Senator Ferguson. You have read some articles and books and 
pamphlets by the IPK? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Would 3'OU say that they were or were not a 
Communist front? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say they were Communist front, from 
what knowledge I had of them at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you that. I said, from what has 
been read here. 

Mr. Vincent. No, I would not say they were a Communist-front 
organization. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not say that? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You may j^roceed. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We have established, then, have we not, Mr. Vin- 
cent, that in that one particular, that double-barreled statement, 
Chiang was correct when he said that pressure had been brought to 
bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Govern- 
ment reach a settlement with the Communists, but that the United 
States Government had not exerted pressure upon the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, at the bottom of that paragraph, you will note 
the sentence : 

Mr. Vincent again pointed out that solution of President Chiang's important 
problems of relations with the (Communists and the U. S. S. R. need not precede 
the dispatch of military observers to North China. 



2060 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouEWiNE. That was another occasion, was it not, on which you 
turned the conversation ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. And I will tell you why, because I 
myself had been in contact with the Army, and it was a matter which 
appealed to me because of their advice as one of the utmost importance. 
I had just been in Chungju, where we had B-29's flying out. There I 
was told of the urgent need for getting people into North China, to 
get Intelligence there for them, and it seemed to me to be the most 
urgent problem there was at the time, to try to get some kind of mili- 
tary group into this North China area. 

It was a vacuum in all of our Intelligence work. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And at that time, that is, at the conclusion or very 
near the conclusion of the morning session of June 23, you finally won 
your point and President Chiang said that the military observers 
would be permitted to go. Is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, over on to page 556, in the third paragraph 
from the bottom, we find this statement : 

Mr. Vincent suggested that the best defense against communism in China was 
agrarian reform. 

That is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the 
conversation ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Where is that statement ? 

Mr. Sourwine. It is just this far down the page, here. 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to see it. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is, I believe, the third sentence in the paragraph, 
but I began with it because it appears to be a new thought at that time, 
and I am trying to find out if that is right. 

Mr. Vincent. That is a statement that, as I say, I would have made. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes; it is another occasion on which you changed 
the focus of the conversation. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I think in that case Mr. "Wallace said that unity 
should express itself in the welfare of the people if communism was 
to be avoided. 

Now, this was when we were having a conversation and the welfare 
of the people was mentioned. It was largely an agrarian population, 
and I simply added to that that the best defense against communism 
would be agrarian reform, meaning the welfare of the people. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was the first mention of agrarian reform at 
that point in the conversation ? 

Mr. Vincent. Agrarian reform is not a change in the subject. It 
is discussing the same subject but introducing a new idea. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is, shall we say, a particularization of the general 
subject of the welfare of the people? 

Mr. Vincent. Just exactly. 

Mr. Sourwine. And to that extent, can we agree that what you did 
was, if not to change the conversation, to narrow it down to the 
agrarian reform at that point? 

Mr. Vincent. To narrow it down or to add to it that, for the welfare 
of the people, being 80 percent agriculture, agrarian reform would 
certainly contribute to the welfare of the people. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2061 

Mr. SouKWiNE. The welfare of the people is a broader term, is it 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Soura\t:ne. So when yon spoke of agrarian reform, you were 
narrowing the subject, if the previous subject had been the welfare 
of the people ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I was interpreting it down, sir. 
I was interpreting what the welfare of the people was. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you mean that welfare of the people was wholly 
agrarian reform? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I did not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Then there must have been some area of welfare of 
the people outside of agrarian reform ? 

Mr. Vincent. There would be, yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then the term "agrarian reform" is narrower than 
the term "welfare of the people"; is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. In this context, yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then you were narrowing it down, were you not? 

Mr. Vincent. If you wish it that way, it was narrowing it down, 
but not much, when you have 80 percent of your population that are 
agricultural. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I do not know why we quibble about this, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. Because, in my own mind, that was not. It was just 
simply an explanatory statement of whether it would be welfare 
rather than narrowing it down. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, if we will look at the very last sentence, be- 
ginning on page 556 : 

Mr. Vincent made a brief recapitulation of the morning's conversation, and 
asked President Cliiang wlietlier Ills understanding was correct that the observer 
group might proceed to North China as soon as it was organized. 

That was another occasion on which you swung the conversation 
back to the matter of sending observers into Communist-held North 
China. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. And your purpose, I take it, was to be sure that the 
consent which Chiang had granted at the end of the morning session 
was nailed down, so to speak? 

Mr. Vincent. This was a summary of the morning conversation, 
and I inquired again whether I had correctly understood. 

Mr. Sourwine. That one point, you wanted to be sure there was 
no misunderstanding about it? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. On page 558, in the third paragraph from the top 
of the page, we find this : 

A conference with regard to Pacific affairs was desirable, and the United States 
would be the logical place for such a conference. 

Now, that was Chiang speaking ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't found that place yet, sir. 

Mr. SouR\viNE. Page 558, the third paragraph from the top. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, that is Chiang. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then you say : 

Madame Chiang interpolated to suggest that it be called the "North Pacific 
Conference." Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two re- 



2062 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

lated but separate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet 
representatives in regard to their problems, and a conference of nations border- 
ing on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said — 

that is, you said, is that correct ? 
Mr. Vincent. Yes. 
Mr. SouBWiNE [reading] : 

He said that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior 
to any North Pacific conference. 

Now, that was another occasion in which you directed the trend of 
the conversation ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. And I directed it at that time in 
keeping with what was my earlier understanding we have spoken of 
here, that the President's indication was to keep out of — not keep out 
of, but to not be a mediator between the Chinese and the Russians, 
wliich I would have interpreted a North Pacific conference to have 
been at that time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, in effect, what you were telling Chiang, was 
it not, was this : that he would have to settle his differences with the 
Chinese Communists before he could expect any American help with 
regard to a North Pacific conference such as Madame Chiang and he 
M-ere urging? 

Mr. Vincent. I was expressing the opinion that a conversation be- 
tween the Chinese and Soviet — I am speaking of the U. S. S. R. now, 
not the Chinese Communists — that a Sino-Soviet negotiation would 
be preferable in advance of any North Pacific conference. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I realize that that is what it says here, sir. But 
I had understood you, in your last answer, to say that you were fol- 
lowing what you understood to be the President's desire to separate 
the question of conversations betw^een the Chinese and Russia from 
the question of conversations between the Kuomintang and the 
Chinese Communists. 

Did I misunderstand you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was true. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Did I misunderstand? 

Mr, Vincent. No. But here we are speaking of Chiang intro- 
ducing the subject of conferences with the U. S. S. R,, and here we 
are speaking of possible conferences between the U. S. S. R. and 
China. 

Senator Ferguson. Taking your last view, did you not know that 
the Communists of China were under the control and domination of 
theU. S. S. R.? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time I did not know that they were under 
the control and domination of the U. S, S. R. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first come to that conclusion ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified already it was about 1945 that 
I began to recognize the fact that the Chinese Communists were being 
directed from Moscow. As a matter of fact, in those days. Ambassador 
Hurley and the others had generally accepted the idea that the Rus- 
sians were not interfering on the side of the Chinese Communists in 
China. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not believe Chiang when he told you and 
Mr. Wallace, when he told you that the Chinese Communists took 
their orders from the Third International? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2063 

Mr. Vincent. We had no evidence that that was the case. 

Mr. SouEWiNE. You did not consider Chiang's statement as 
■evidence ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat had you to the contrary, that you did not 
believe Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. Because there had been visitors to Moscow, and Mos- 
•cow had itself said several times that they were not interfering in 
China, and we saw no evidence of it at that time. They weren't get- 
ting material aid. 

Senator Ferguson. But you had Chiang's statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. That they were supported ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. "V\^iose statement did you have that it 
was not a fact? 

Mr. Vincent. We had the statements of people who were observers 
that did not see any evidence of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlio ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I mean observers in China, that we saw no 
evidence that the Russians were in any way giving any aid to the 
Communists. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. John Stewart Service had so reported, had he 
cot? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether he reported it or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. And Mr. Ludden, did he so report ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any report from Ludden. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Emmerson so report ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall those reports. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that a view held by Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it a view of Edgar Snow ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the view of Edgar Snow. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it a view held by Israel Epstein ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't read Epstein's book, so I don't know. 

I know 6 months later it was a view held by Ambassador Hurley 
when he came back from Moscow, when he reported they were not 
supporting the Communists. And we saw no visual evidence of it 
there. When you mention these people, did they report it, I do not 
recall it. 

But it was a generally accepted view of Gauss and all others, and 
all of us there. Therefore, it could have been of the names that you 
have mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you felt Chiang was wrong? 

Mr. Vincent. That any direct aid was given to the Chinese Com- 
munists ? We saw no evidence of it. 

Senator Ferguson. We were not talking about aid, we were talking 
about under the influence. Are you talking about aid ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was talking about aid or influence. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us talk about influence? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what influence the Russians were exert- 
ing in Yenan at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. If any ? 

Mr. Vincent. If any. I just don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Chiang said they were, is that not right ? 



2064 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to read his statement here to see whether 
he said they were influencing him or not. Do you recall what page 
that was on ? 

My recollection was that Chiang said that the Communists were not 
being aided by Russia. 

Senator Ferguson. Not openly. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, as I say, I can't find that quotation I was 
just trying to remember. 

Senator Ferguson. Here it is, on page 554 : 

Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese 
Commuuists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need 
for settlement. 

So Chiang did claim they were connected, did he not? He said 
they were linked. 

ISIr. Vincent. The quotation I had in mind, or the reference I had 
in mind, Mr. Chairman, was : 

President Roosevelt — 

this is Chiang speaking — 

should bear in mind that the Communists do not openly use the U. S. S. R. for 
support, but that they could and did use U. S. A. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right, openly. But down at the next 
part, where Mr. Wallace pointed out that if, as President Chiang 
stated, the Chinese Communists were linked witih the U. S. S. R., then 
there was even greater need for settlement. 

That indicated clearly that they were so linked, did it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I mean, Mr. Wallace is certainly giving an "if" 
clause. 

Senator Ferguson. If they were as Chiang contended : Chiang was 
contending that they were linked. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any evidence that they were 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. That they were not linked ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You had at least Chiang's word that they 
were. Did you have any that they were not ? 

Mr. Vincent. We were taking it purely from the standpoint of 
what was brought to them, and I don't recall any evidence that we 
had that they were getting support from 

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about support. I am talk- 
ing about being linked with them. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; we had no evidence that I know of, other than 
Chiang's statement, that tliey were linked with them at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you did not take that state- 
ment? 

Mr. Vincent. That statement, that is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I just want to be sure that the record speaks truly 
with regard to this matter of a North Pacific conference, 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. What page is that? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Page 558. Your note says : 

Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two related but sepa- 
rate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2065 

regard to their problems, and a conference of nations bordering on the North 
Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said — 

that is, you said — 

that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any 
North Pacific conference. 

Now, in view of that whole conversation right at that point, what 
Chiang had said, what Mrs. Chiang had said, what you said, I ask you 
were you not, in effect, telling Generalissimo Chiang that his nation 
could not expect any United States aid in bringing about a North 
Pacific conference until it had first settled its matters with Soviet 
Russia ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was indicating that it was preferable, from my 
mind, that they settle their own differences before they would call to- 
gether a general North Pacific conference; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How does that differ from the way I phrased it? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, you will have to rephrase. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you not getting across to him the idea that 
he had better settle his affairs with Soviet Russia before he could ex- 
pect any aid from this country in setting up a North Pacific con- 
ference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not want to say it that way. I much prefer 
to say it my own way. It is that I was expressing an opinion that 
it would be advisable for them to settle their own differences before 
you got into any general North Pacific conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you making it clear to him that that was only 
your own, individual opinion and you were not intending to reflect 
the opinion of the American Government? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that General Chiang himself would 
have taken it in this conversation as an expression of my opinion in 
any discussion carried on there. 

Mr. Sourwine. And not reflecting the opinion of your Government? 

]Mr. Vincent. Not as reflecting it as the opinion of my Government. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean in such conversation, on a very high dip- 
lomatic level, you would ever be presumed to have expressed an 
opinion not in complete accordance with that of your Government? 

Mr. Vincent. He would expect it to be in accord, but he didn't 
at that time, I don't believe, because he simply introduced the subject 
that very morning and I couldn't have had any consultation with the 
Government and, therefore, be expected to express a Government 
opinion. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not expressing a Government opinon in 
a strict diplomatic sense. But he did know, as you have said, that 
he had a right to expect what you said to be in accord with your Gov- 
ernment's opinion, did he not? 

Mr. Vincent. He would have a right to expect, although he had no 
reason to expect, I had consulted the Government, and was therefore 
speaking a Government opinion. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace was there. If there had been a Gov- 
ernment opinion to be transmitted, protocol would have required 
transmission through Wallace, would it not? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 



2066 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr, SouEwiNE. But you were the Chief of the Far Eastern Di- 



vision 



Mr. Vincent. Chief of the China Division. 

Mr. SoiJRwiNE. Did General Chiang know that? 

Mr. Vincent, He did. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He would expect that you would be familiar with 
your Nation's policies, would he not, particularly in that field ? 

Mr. Vincent. He would. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So that when you expressed an opinion, he, having 
a right to expect that you would not have expressed an opinion which 
was at odds with your Nation's policies, and knowing that you knew 
what your Nation's policies were, would be expected to think that 
you were expressing an opinion which was, in essence, the policy of 
your country, would he not ? 

Mr. Vincent. There, again, you have to go back to the nature of 
these conversations. He suddenly introduces a subject here, and 
there was no attempt on my part to give him the feeling I was speak- 
ing Government policy. 

They had introduced, as a speculative idea, "Why not have a North 
Pacific conference?" I expressed an opinion, and he certainly knew 
that I had no chance to express Government opinion at that time. 

Mr, SouEwiNE, Let us ask this question : Were you telling him that 
in your opinion he had better settle his differences with Soviet Russia 
before he looked for any help from the United States ? 

Mr, Vincent, I was giving it as my opinion that it would be pre- 
ferable for them to settle their own differences before we emerged in 
international conferences as suggested by him, 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Very well. 

Senator Ferguson, Are you through? 

Mr, SouRwiNE, Yes, 

Senator Ferguson. You were an expert on China ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To be an expert on China, do you think you 
should have known what was going on by the Communists in China? 

Mr, Vincent, I tried my best to keep myself informed on what 
was going on. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you know that there was a volume in exist- 
ence, AVorkers of All Countries, Unite, volume 7, Congress of the 
Communist International ? 

Mr, Vincent, I don't recall the volume. When was it published? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there was such a book in 
1939? 

Mr. Vincent, I don't recall the book. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you know of the 23d to the 32d sittings, 
Continuation of Discussion on Comrade Dimitrov's Report? That is 
the manuscript cited to you yesterday and you couldn't recognize his 
pro-Communist leanings. Now I show you on page 293 of that, what 
the Communists in Russia themselves said about the Chinese Com- 
munists and ask you to read it into the record, 

Mr. Vincent. You mean right here? 

The ideological, political, and organizational growth of the Communist Party 
in China is explained by the fact that it is being led by the Leninist Com- 
munist International, by the fact that it can utilize the experience of all sec- 
tions of the Communist International and, primarily, the valuable experience 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2067 

of the leading section of the Communist International — the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. 

Senator Ferguson. With that in mind you say you were correct 
in not giving any weight to Chiang's statement to Wallace and to 
you, as I read to you ? 

Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese 
Communists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need 
for settlement — • 

and that you as an expert on China should have known that you 
should take Chiang's word ? 

Mr. Vincent. If I read this 

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it the duty of someone in the State 
Department to know that, and to advise you as Chief of the section ? 
That is what I am trying to get at. 

Mr. Vincent. I know that and I had no knowledge of this at that 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you try to find out what the Communists of 
China were ? 

Mr. Vincent. When I was in China, certainly I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you find out ? That book was in existence 
then. 

Mr. Vincent. We were viewing the problem of the Communists 
in China at that time, not this time, at that time, from the stand- 
point of fact that both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang 
were fighting the Japanese, and that was the context in which we 
viewed it. 

Senator Ferguson. We have gotten off the subject. Let us go 
back. They were talking about the Communists of China being 
agrarian reformers, isn't that true? 

Mr. Vincent. Who is "they"? 

Senator Ferguson. The people. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you heard it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had heard it ; yes. I don't know whether you are 
speaking of Government people. 

Senator Ferguson. Here you have the writings of the Communist 
International telling you who the Chinese Commuists are, Chiang 
telling you who they were, and you and Mr. Wallace came to the 
conclusion there was nothing in what Chiang told you, isn't that true ? 

Mr. Vincent. That at that time that the Chinese Communists 
were not being directed from Moscow ? 

Senator Ferguson. That was in 1944? 

Mr. Vincent. That was in 1944. 

Senator Fi.rguson. Prior to that time there was a statement in the 
book by the Communist themselves, is that not correct? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember, Mr. Vincent, testifying with 
regard to the question of any proposal that the Communists in China 
receive arms from America? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean testifying in executive session? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, or here. 

Mr. Vincent. In executive session. I don't recall down here. In 
executive session I remember testifying that toward the end of 1944 



2068 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

or early in 1945 the idea became generally bruited that we were going 
to try to make landings in north China, and my testimony upstairs in 
executive session was to that effect. I had a talk with General Wede- 
meyer in March of 1945 suggesting to him the possibility of getting 
arms to the Chinese Communists. That was the nature of the con- 
versation. Mr. Grew himself had earlier in that year suggested that 
any troops that could be used to fight the Japanese should be used. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, that the pro- 
posal for arming the Communist Chinese was made formally and 
officially to Chiang within 2 weeks of the Wallace conversations with 
liim. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall it was made formally and officially to 
him. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. Can you say it was not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say that it was not. 

Mr. SoTiRwiNE. Do you think it might have been ? 

JVJr. Vincent. Within 2 weeks of the Marshall mission ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No, within 2 weeks of the Wallace mission. 

Mr. Vincent. I mean of the Wallace mission. I do not recall that 
it was formally made that there should be arms within 2 weeks of the 
Wallace mission. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall the date of Mr. Wallace's Kunming 
cable? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The date of his Kunming cable was about June 26, 
I should say, is that right, or 28 ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was drafted on the 2Gth and dispatched about 
the 28th, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that within less than 10 days after 
that message that the President of the United States sent a message 
to Chiang Kai-shek proposing the arming of the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the message. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that there had been one sent? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the fact of a message telling them to 
arm the Chinese Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did you ever write any memo- 
randum that might have been used by the President, as to communism 
in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever asked or did you have super- 
vision of any document or memorandum of advice to anyone on com- 
munism in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Reports were made from the field 

Senator Ferguson. No, no ; I am talking about you. 

Mr. Vincent. I know I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see a report on it ? 

Mr. Vincent. On communism as such in China ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall a report on communism in China. 
Reports were made by officers who were out in the field from time to 
time. To what extent they got to the President 

Senator Ferguson. But you never saw them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I saw them, the dispatches coming in from the field 
reporting on conditions in China including conditions 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2069 

Senator Ferguson. As to wliat commimism was ? 

Mr. Vincent. As to what their idea of communism was, yes. Are 
yon — I am talking about conditions in Communist China as far 

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about conditions. I am talk- 
ing about the party activity and whether or not it was under 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall anything like that? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you then help to make the policy of 
the United States toward the Communists in China if you didn't hav© 
any support ? 

Mr. Vincent. You made up your mind that the Communists were 
in China because of the reports you got of conditions in the Chinese 
Comunist area. 

Senator Ferguson. Why didn't you look at what the Communists 
themselves said ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not studying that at that time. You mean the 
earlier documents ? 

Senator Ferguson. How could you advise without studying it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because we were faced with the situation there. 
Again I say, the Communists of China were fighting the Japanese. 
AVe were not studying what their ideological content was at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Dichi't Chiang tell you there was a difference 
between the Communists in China, which wanted to take over the Gov- 
ernment, and those in America? Now we find very little difference 
when we uncover what was going on in America, that they had the 
same intent there in China as they had here, to actually take over, but 
they had a much better chance in China. Isn't that what Chiang 
told you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. You discounted that entirely ? 

Mr. Vincent. No one discounted it ; no, sir. What we were trying 
to get there was an agreement to fight against the Japanese. It 
wasn't a case of discounting or not discounting it. 

Senator Ferguson. How could you get that when the Chinese Com- 
munists wanted to become the government and were therefore fighting 
against Chiang? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; but the Chinese Communists at that time were 
protesting that they did not want to take over the Government, not 
that that made it necessarily true, but the all-important fact was to 
utilize these Communist armies to fight the Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. Today would you believe a Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you back in those days? 

Mr. Vincent. I believed that the Chinese Communists were really 
fighting the Japanese and that is what we wanted them to do. 

Senator Ferguson. So you believed the Chinese Communists at 
that time 

Mr. Vincent. Wanted to fight the Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. Did you believe Chinese Communists 
back in those days ? 

Mr. Vincent. Wlien the Chinese Communists told me they were 
fighting the Japanese and we had visual evidence of it; yes. 



2070 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. But the fact that they didn't want to take over 
the National Government of China or the Government of China — 
did you believe them ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that any of them protested they were 
not going to take over the Government. 

Senator Ferguson. I thought you included that in one of your 
answers. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall including it. That the Chinese Com- 
munists had told me they did not want to take over the Government? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall that. 

Mr. SouRA^aNE, Just so the record may be clear, sir, did you have 
any visual evidence that the Chinese Communists were fighting the 
Japanese? 

Mr. Vincent. Did I ? No ; I never visited the areas. But people 
who did visit the areas reported they were fighting the Japanese. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had evidence of that kind in reports of wit- 
nesses? You used the phrase "visual," and I just wanted to clear that 

up. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, who were some of these people who re- 
ported that the Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese? 

Mr. Vincent. I remember one American coming down from the 
National City Bank, passing through, and he had seen conditions 
there. I don't recall what others. 

Mr. Morris. Who was he ? Will you tell us who he was ?_ 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall his name. I don't recall his name. 

Mr. Morris. Can you give us the name of anybody who visually saw 
the Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think this was a man from the National City Bank. 
Excuse me. I haven't finished my answer. 

Mr. Morris. If you know of anybody who visually experienced the 
Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese, will you give us the names 
of those people? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall the names of those people, but there were 
people coming in and out, so far as I recall, who did make reports, and 
there were newspaper reports to that effect, also of battles here, there, 
and yonder. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, did you have any connection what- 
ever or any cooperation between the military intelligence of the War 
Department and the State Department? Was there close cooperation 
during the war? 

Mr. ViNCEN^T. Between military intelligence in the War Department 
and the State Department? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I should say there would be. I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I want to show you a page from the 
Chinese Communist Movement, dated July 5, 1945. That is before 
the war ended. "Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 
Washington, D. C." This is "d." I ask you to read what the military 
intelligence said about the Communists in China. I will ask you then 
what you know about it. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

The Chinese Communist movement is part of an international Communist move- 
ment. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2071 

follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environ- 
ment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy, which 
in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Com- 
munists have supported loyally and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and 
have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you explain why you as an expert and the 
head of this Division didn't know what the military intelligence 
thought about the Communists of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. What is the date of this? 

Senator Ferguson. July 5, 1945, but it says from the beginning it 
was that. Here is the front page, 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether this was available to me or not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you ever seen it before? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeing it before. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for at least that much co- 
operation between the State Department, which was making policy in 
relation to the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Communist 
government in China, that you wouldn't get that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I don't recall seeing it. I am not saying I did 
never see this ; but 

Senator Ferguson, Was it, Mr. Vincent, that the State Department 
at that time was not even slightly interested in communism? 

Mr. Vincent. Certainly it is not the case. The State Department 
was interested in communism. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, then, why did you not know about 
what the Communists themselves had written, what our own G-2 
in the War Department had written? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that you have to change 
your idea of what we were trying to do if we can pin this down to the 
specific situation we are talking about in China at that time, of trying 
to bring about some kind of military activity of a greater nature 
against the Japanese. That is what I am speaking of, a consciousness 
of what the international position of the Communists was 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman 

Senator Ferguson. You told me you discounted what Chiang said, 
that you and Mr. Wallace didn't believe what he said. Now I am 
showing 3^ou these two documents and ask you as an expert on China 
why you didn't have that evidence along with Chiang's statement 
and now why you would discount his statement. You would not do 
it today ; would you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I would not do it today. 

JSIr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, now that his intelligence report 
has been brought up and since it has been declassified, may I respect- 
fully suggest that it be ordered printed as an appendix to the hearings 
of this subcommittee. 

Senator Ferguson. It is too large 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It is not elsewhere available. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Under the circumstances, if it is not available 
in any other form, I will receive it and have it in the appendix of 
this report, because I think this is the kind of thing that may convince 
the American peoj^le of what was going on. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It is an important historical document. 

Mr. Morris. There will be other references to it, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. I will receive it in evidence now. 



2072 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to is printed as appendix II of this part.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, you remember in discussing tlie matter 
of Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable, great stress was laid upon the recom- 
mendation that General Stilwell be replaced? 

Mr. Vincent. The necessity of replacing General Stilwell. Yes; 
that was in our minds something that was necessary. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know anything as to what effect that may 
have had upon the President or upon American policy? 

Mr. Vincent. The effect of the recommendation? 

]\Ir. SouRWiNE. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. I should think it was taken seriously by the President 
and the interested departments of government. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What evidenced that ? 

Mr. Vincent. The evidence of it was, so far as I can figure, that 
Stilwell was eventually relieved. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. What do you mean by eventually ? 

Mr. Vincent. Within a matter of 2 or ?> months. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If the President had very shortly after receiving 
the Kunming cable taken a step directly contrary to that recommenda- 
tion, would that indicate to you that he was not very much impressed 
by the Wallace cable and the Wallace recommendation ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would. It would have to. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. If he had taken such a step, that is, directly op- 
posite to the Wallace recommendation, and then had a matter of 2 
months or so after that changed his mind, would it indicate to vou 
that it was something other than Mr. Wallace's recommendation that 
caused General Wedemeyer to be sent out ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say it was taking Mr. Wallace's recommen- 
dation plus whatever other thing happened. 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Do you know whether the President did in fact 
very soon after receiving the Kunming cable take a step contrary 
to the recommendation therein made with regard to Stilw^ell? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. I recall — and I think it was a War Depart- 
ment-White House matter — that Stilwell was authorized to go over 
to Chiang and see him and recommend a unified command of all 
troops in China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wliat did that mean ? 

Mr. Vincent. That meant, so far as I can recollect, that Stilwell 
was to assume command of all forces in China. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Didn't that necessary imply the arming of the 
Chinese Communists ? 

Mr. Vincent. If Stilwell was going to take over all command? 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Certainly. 

Mr. Vincent. It would imply the arming of them under his com- 
mand and utilizing them as a unified army. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That was, then, a proposal for arming the Chinese 
Communists, wasn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. If it had been carried out in the way that I under- 
stood Stilwell wanted to carry it out, it w^ould. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It was a proposal for arming the Chinese Commu- 
nists, whether it was carried out or not, wasn't it ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2073 

Mr. Vincent. It was a proposal that Stihvell would take command 
of all the troops, and I assume it would have followed from that that 
the Chinese Communists would have been utilized. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It was necessarily implicit, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know when that proposal was made ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall wlien it was made. 

J\Ir. SouRAViNE. Because of the question of how long after the 
Kunming cable it was made, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to refer 
to page 1970 of State Department employee loyalty investigation 
hearings, previously referred to here, part 2, appendix, where, from 
the personal statement of John Stewart Service, appears this para- 
graph [reading] : 

On July 7 the headquarters received a telegram from President Roosevelt to 
be delivered personally to Chiang Kai-shek. This was the first of a series of 
messages recommending that, in view of the desperate military situation in 
China, Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies. I have no knowledge 
of the background or origin of this recommendation. Stilwell himself was in 
Burma, and the chief of staff seemed to be surprised. The message was con- 
sidered to be of such importance that the chief of staff determined that tliere 
should be no Chinese interpreter and that we should not follow the normal pro- 
cedure of allowing the message to go through an intermediary. I was therefore 
ordered to accompany the cliief of staff and to translate the telegram, phrase 
by phrase, to the Generalissimo himself. This was in effect a proposal that 
the Chinese Communists be armed, since it was taken for granted that if Gen- 
eral Stilwell was to command all Chinese armies, this would include tlie Com- 
munists and that they would therefore be eligible to receive a share of American 
equipment. This was, so far as I know, the first such recommendation. On 
July 15— 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat is the date of this statement ? 

Mr. Sourwine. The date of that was July 7, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What year? 

Mr. Sourwine. 1944. Wliich is 9 days after the Kunming cable 
was transmitted. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that while you were in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was while I was on my way back. I think I 
arrived back on the 10th of July. 

Mr. Sourwine (continuing reading) : 

On July 15 there was a second telegram from the President which I again was 
required to intepret for the Chief of Staff. I have been sure since then that my 
presence on these unpleasant occasions helped to contribute to Chinese animosity 
toward me and to their conviction that I was again the instigator of a very 
unwelcome demand. 

It is understandable how General Chiang should have considered that 
an luiwelcome demand, is it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. We had evidence later that it was an unwelcome 
demand. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlio was the Chief of Staff they were mention- 
ing in there ? 

Mr. Vincent. General Marshall. 

Mr. Sourwine. No ; it is the Chief of Staff of General Stilwell. 

Mr. Vincent. The Chinese Chief of Staff to Stilwell ? 

Mr. Sourwine. It would have been the American Chief of Staff. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall who the American Chief of Staff to 
Stilwell was at that time. 



22S48 — 52 — pt. 7 € 



2074 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Who do you think they were talking about m 
that cablegram there? 

Mr. Vincent. When they say Chief of Staff ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. If the Chief of Staff at that time was still Ho Ying 
Chin, it was Ho Ying Chin ; but there was another man named Chen 
Cheng who was Chief of Staff at one time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He is not named in Mr. Service's statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, to revert to a subject that we pre- 
viously discussed, you remember the question of whether you asked 
for or received any security information on Max Granich. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Then let me ask you this question : Did you at 
the time of the question of the treatment of Mr. Granich and his pub- 
lication — do you recall that occasion ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you at that time ask for or receive any 
security report on Mr. Granich ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall asking for any. I seem to recall 
somewhere that a security report was included in that large file. That 
was my testimony, I think, last time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If you did testify that you neither asked for nor 
received a separate security report, was that testimony in error ? 

Mr. Vincent. That if I asked for it ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Or received a separate security report. 

Mr. Vincent. I said that so far as I can recall there was probably 
in that batch of papers, that I went over hurriedly, a security report 
on him. I do not recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I am referring to such a security report as you 
would have had to sign for. You know what the procedure is in 
regard to that. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any security report that I had to sign 
for. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Haven't you ever sent for a security report that you 
had to sign for when you received it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall that. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never have ? 

Mr. Vincent. Back in those days; no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you on or about June 20, 1944, attend a confer- 
ence at which John Stewart Service was present? 

Mr. Vincent. What time? 

Mr. Sourwine. About June 20, 1944. That would have been while 
you were in China with Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. Vincent. John Service would have been present at a confer- 
ence that I would have had with General Ferris about this very mis- 
sion into the north China area. But there was also the fact that 
Service himself attended one of the meetings in Chiang Kai-shek's 
house with General Ferris. 

Mr. Sourwine. Other than those two occasions, did you on or about 
June 20, and while you were in China with Mr. Wallace, attend a con- 
ference at which John Stewart Service was present? 

Mr. Vincent. Those are the only two that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember a conference at which John Stew- 
art Service and General Stilwell were both present ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2075 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. I do not recall, and I don't think lie was 
in China during the period of our visit. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember a conference at which John Stew- 
art Service and Owen Lattimore were both present? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, unless Owen Lattimore was present at this 
conference with General Ferris about sending a mission into north 
China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say there was not a conference which you 
attended at which John Stewart Service, Owen Lattimore, and Gen- 
eral Stilwell were all present? 

Mr. Vincent. I can say that the best I can recall I had a conference 
with General Ferris, but my recollection as to General Stilwell is that 
he never came north during this visit of ours, so that would eliminate 
him, and, insofar as whether Lattimore was present, I do not recall. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. If John Stewart Service or anyone else has reported 
such a conference, would you accept the report as true? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that his memory was in error because 
my distinct recollection is that General Stilwell never set foot in 
■China while the Wallace Mission was in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters 
at Yunnan while he was in China in 1944 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was a visit by the Vice President to Yunnan dis- 
cussed at all while he was over there ? 

Mr. Vincent. A visit to Yenan ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yunnan is what I am talking about. 

Mr. Vincent. Which is the same as Kunming. I want to get the 
Chinese straight. One of them is Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n, which is 
another name frequently used for Kunming. Yenan, Y-e-n-a-n, was 
the capital of the Province of Shensi, of the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. You had better repeat your question and spell 
the word. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters 
at Yenan, Y-e-n-a-n, while he was in China in 1944? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at 
Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n? 

Mr. Vincent. There is no Communist headquarters at Yunnan 
that I know of, and if there were I am quite sure Mr. Wallace didn't 
visit it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was the question of a visit to Yenan discussed with 
Ambassador Gauss ? 

Mr. Vincent. It may have been, but I don't know that it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was he opposed to such a visit ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say Mr. Gauss would have been opposed to 
a visit to Yenan. By the Vice President, you are speaking of ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. We have already had the Vice President's testimony 
himself that he had been told by the President not to visit the Com- 
munist territory, and he did not visit it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who coded the Kunming cable for 
transmission ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not. It was sent out in Army code, so I 
assume that it was coded by some Army personnel. 



2076 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. How do you know that it was sent in Army code ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because it was handed over to the Army and sent 
down to New Delhi for transmission from there. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To whom was it handed for transmission? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you hand it over to somebody for transmission ? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection would be that Mr. Alsop handed it 
over to whoever would transmit it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what became of the original copy ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Owen Lattimore accompany you and Mr. Wal- 
lace to Kunming? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he stay with you while you were there? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that Mr. Wallace and I stayed 
at Chennault's headquarters and that Mr. Lattimore stayed some- 
where else, I don't know where. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would General Chennault have been either de- 
sirable or acceptable as the President's personal representative to 
Chiang so far as you know? 

Mr. Vincent. He would have been acceptable to General Chiang, 
as I have already testified. I don't know whether he would have 
been acceptable — Did you say to the President? 

Mr. Sourwine. No. Would he have been either desirable or ac- 
ceptable from the standpoint of the War Department, do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent, I do not know, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you hear a view expressed with regard to that? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't Mr. Alsop express the view that General 
Chennault would not have been acceptable? 

Mr. Vincent. To the War Department ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. If he did I don't recall it. It was the general under- 
standing that General Chennault would stay where he was and do 
the flying there. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you and Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking, 
you stated that you did visit Madame Sun Yat-sen? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Atcheson, the counsellor of the Embassy, 
go with you? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether Atcheson went with us or 
not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Sun Fo at that conference? 

Mr. Vincent. Sun Fo was, as I recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace was there? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have testified to that. And I thought Sun 
Fo was present, and there was possibly another Chinese, but I don't 
know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Madame Sun request Mr. Wallace and America 
to help the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refresh my memory on that, but 
Madame Sun I know was in favor of bringing about some kind of 
united front to fight the Japanese. Whether that would be construed 
as aiding the Communists I don't recall. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2077 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she indicate that she regarded the Chinese 
Communists as the oppressed ? 

Mr. Vincent. 1 (io not recall such phraseology, but Madame Sun 
Yat-sen had such ideas with regard to oppressed peoples. She was a 
very humanitarian woman and would have felt keenly about people she 
felt were oppressed, but whether she specifically mentioned the Com- 
munists as being oppressed I don't know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she express any views with regard to broaden- 
ing the political power of the Communists in China and permitting 
them to participate in the government? 

Mr. Vincent. I would think she did. I am testifying here from 
memory and also from my knowledge of Madame Sun Yat-sen, that 
she would have made such a suggestion. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What views did she express in that regard? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the exact views, but she was in favor 
of broadening the base of the government, like many people elsewhere, 
and I would have assumed that, that would include bringing in the 
Communists. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Was the question of replacing Stilwell discussed at 
all at that conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall; but I say I am trusting to my 
memory. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think it might have been ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't believe Madame Sun Yat-sen would have 
raised the issue of replacing • 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you raise it or Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't think that the question would have 
been raised, of replacing Stilwell, at this meeting with Madame Sun 
Yat-sen. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say that Stilwell was not discussed? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot say from my memory that Stilwell was not 
discussed, but I think it would seem to me illogical that we would 
have discussed with Madame Sun Yat-sen the replacement of General 
Stilwell. 

Mr. Morris. A^liy would it have been illogical ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because Madame Sun at that time was a private citi- 
zen so far as we were concerned, and the whole problem of replacing 
General Stilwell would have been to my mind a very delicate one. 

Senator Ferguson. You were discussing the question of war and 
the relation of the Communists. 

Mr. Vincent. This involved the future of an American military 
officer there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Why did you go to see Madame Sun ? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified before that the President — and the Vice 
President himself was so anxious to meet her and wanted to make a 
courtesy call. 

Mr. Sourwine. Why ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because she was the wife of the President of China, 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 

Mr. Sourwine. She was a very important person, was she not ? 

Mr. Vincent. She was an important person, but not politically at 
that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. She was not politically important ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't believe she would have been considered po- 
litically important at that time in China. She was an influence among 



2078 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

liberal groups, but politically insofar as the Government was con- 
cerned, she didn't have any position and I would not have considered 
that she was of great influence in the councils of the Government in 
China then. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Wasn't she an outstanding spokesman, if not the 
outstanding spokesman, for the Chinese Communists at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not have considered her such ; that she was 
an outstanding spokesman for the improvement of conditions in China^ 
but to say that she was an outstanding spokesman for the Communists 
as such I do not recall that she was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Wasn't it generally recognized in the diplomatic 
service at that time, pai'ticularly among those in China, in the Foreign 
Service, that Madame Sun was a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think we recognized her as a Communist then. 
She had been associated with the Communists as early as 1926. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And had never ceased that association, had she? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether she was a member of the Communist Party, 
I have testified before that we generally looked upon her as a person 
who was sympathetic toward the Communists. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And had been since 1926 ; that is the date you men- 
tioned ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, that is the date, but when the northern march 
came, in 1925 or '26. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And had never ceased to be associated with them 
and sympathetic to them? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, That was well known ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. She was an outstanding figure in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. She was a very — I don't know whether you call it 
outstanding. Yes; an outstanding figure. The wife of the former 
President was an outstanding figure. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there any woman in China who was more out- 
standing at that time than Madame Sun Yat-sen, with the exception 
of Madame Chiang ? 

Mr. Vincent. And the possible exception of Madame H. H. Kung, 
her other sister. I would say that Madame Sun Yat-sen, depending 
on what group you are speaking of, would be looked upon as an out- 
standing woman, either before or after Madame Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Sourwine. She was certainly the outstanding pro-Communist 
woman in China, was she not? 

Mr. Vincent. She would have been so considered if you called her 
pro-Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did call her pro-Communist ? 

Senator Ferguson. You called her that. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did she say anything at the meeting of you and Mr. 
Wallace to indicate she was anti-Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. She did not, as I recall it, but as I say I am trying to 
recall the conversation from memory. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 
o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 15 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m., 
Friday, February 1, 1952.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



FEIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1953 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To In\^stigate the Administration of 
THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws 
OF the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., Senatoi 
Homer Ferguson presiding. 

Present: Senator Ferguson. 

Also present: Senator Knowland, Senator Kem; J. G. Sourwine. 
committee counsel; Eobert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Ben- 
jamin Mandel, director of research. 

Senator Ferguson. The Committee will be in order. 

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS 
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, did you in the summer of 1944 know 
that you had been recommended by Mr. Lauchlin Currie as one of 
the Government delegates to the IPK, conference to be held the follow- 
ing winter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know that Mr. Lauchlin Currie recom- 
mended me as a delegate to the IPR conference in 1945. 

Mr. Sourwine. That would be the 1945 conference? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever talk to you about it at all, going as a 
Government delegate to that conference? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall talking to him about going to the con- 
ference; no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. Dennett, the secretary of the 
IPR, was worried about whether Mr. Grew would let you attend 
that conference? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I recall speaking to Mr. Grew about attending 
the conference, but I didn't know that Mr. Dennett was worried that 
I couldn't attend. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that Mr. Grew had expressed the 
view to Mr. Dennett that, since the conference would be discussing' 
postwar plans, he. Grew, didn't see how anyone in the Department 
could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would nat- 
urally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself, 
upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements? 

2079 



2080 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't know that Mr. Grew told that. Is that 
what Mr. Dennett told? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The question w^as whether you knew of that. 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't know of that incident. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss with anyone in the IPR the 
problem raised by Mr. Grew's attitude in that regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't think so. I sat in on a panel at the dis- 
cussions there, at the IPR, and what turn those panel discussions took 
I could not possibly recall today. 

Mr. SouRAviNE. Did you know that Mr. Dennett had written to Mr. 
William C. Johnstone of the IPR, stating that "either Grew has got to 
be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come?" 

Mr. Vincent. No; I did not know that. 

Senator Ferguson. Come where? 

Mr. Vincent. To the IPR conferences, yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether anything was done about 
changing Mr. Grew? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Grew, when he spoke to you about the mat- 
ter, express any objection to your attending the conference? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that he did, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did he say when he spoke to j^ou about it ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I don't recall, Mr. Sourwine, what Mr. Grew 
would have said. He made no objection to my going, because it was 
mentioned to him. It was cleared with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. You volunteered that you did remember talking to 
Mr. Grew about it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. What do you remember about that conversation? 

Mr. Vincent. The only thing I remember is that I mentioned it to 
Mr. Grew, and Mr. Grew took no exception to my going. 

Mr. Sourwine. We mentioned yesterday the question of the report 
transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President after he returned to this 
country from his mission to China. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace ever ask you for any suggestions 
with regard to that report? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never discussed it with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I never discussed that written report of his after he 
got back here with him. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never discussed with him at any time the ques- 
tion of whether he was going to make a report to the President? 

Mr. Vincent. Only that I testified in executive session that he told 
me he was going over to see the President when he got back. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never saw a rough draft of that report or notes 
for that report? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Nor ever suggested any language for possible in- 
clusion ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall doing that. 

Mr. Sourwine. So far as you know, did Owen Lattimore see the re- 
port or suggest language for inclusion or submit language ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that question, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ' 2081 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, wasn't it unusual for a man to go 
out on a foreign-policy matter like Mr. Wallace's trip and then make 
a report to the President, and no copy of that go to the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have called that unusual ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be unusual. 

Mr. Vincent. It would seem to me to be unusual, and I was sur- 
prised that he had ever done it when the question arose as to whether 
he had made one. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other occasions where peo- 
ple would be sent out, particularly not on a secret mission, because you 
went along, a State Department official who made reports to the Presi- 
dent, and no copies or any reports went to the Secretary of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall any. 

Senator Ferguson. Could it have been that the President heard 
about the fact or something had happened about Mr. Grew's warning 
to you to not allow Mr. Wallace to make promises, that the report was 
not made back to Mr. Grew to ascertain whether promises were made? 

Mr. Vincent. You are talking about Mr. Hull. I don't think that 
that would be a connection, but I would just have to give that as an 
opinion, because I don't think anybody knew. I never told Mr. Wal- 
lace, for instance, that Mr. Hull had told me to see to that. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not tell Mr. Wallace that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I didn't tell Mr. Wallace that Mr. Hull had made 
this one remark to me about his not — ■ — 

Senator Ferguson. Was this an unusual proceeding, to send a man 
out like that from the President? He had sent Mr. Lattimore at one 
time on the same kind of mission ; had he not? 

Mr. Vincent. No. It was a different kind of mission. Chiang Kai- 
shek himself had asked for somebody, and Lattimore went out. The 
Vice President Avent out at the President's suggestion for a brief trip 
to consult with Chiang Kai-shek and to return, as I understood it, the 
courtesy call of Madame Chiang the year before. 

Mr. Morris. Who recommended Mr. Lattimoro, for that trip, the 
1941 trip, to the Generalissimo? 

Mr. Vincent. The President recommended him so far as I know. 

Mr. Morris. Who was the one who arranged for the appointment ; 
do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know who arranged for his appointment to 
go out to be with Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Morris. Was it your testimony, Mr. Vincent, that you did not 
know who made the arrangements for Mr. Lattimore to go out? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know who made the arrangements for him 
to go out other than that the President sent him out at Chiang's re- 
quest. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Mr. Currie made the 
recommendation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Mr. Currie had been sent out 
by the President at one time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Currie was sent out by the President at one time 
while I was there. 

Senator Ferguson. While you were there. Did a report go back to 
the State Department from Mr. Currie on that trip ? 



2082 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't know, Mr. Chairman, whether one did or 
not. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever heard of one ? 

Mr. Vincent. I myself never saw a report that Currie made of his 
trip to China in 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. How were you able to coordinate these matters 
in the field, in the State Department, and in the "White House, if you 
did not know what these reports were showing or what these people 
found, or at least a report on that report telling you what they had 
found. 

Mr. Vincent. You are asking me something that I don't really feel 
competent to say, what the relationsliip was with the White House. 
The Vice President had gone out under instructions of the President. 
I have testified that it seems to me to be curious that we did not see his 
report. But why it was not sent over, I don't know. I don't know 
about Mr. Currie's report. I never saw a report of Mr. Currie's when 
he went out in 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. You were head of the China desk ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That was a very important position ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think now, looking back, that the whole 
China situation was handled properly by the State Department, given 
the attention it should have, and the care ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it was given as much attention as we were 
capable of giving it, sir; yes. I certainly gave it my full time and 
attention. I had nothing else to do but that. 

Senator Ferguson. But your information on communism as shown 
by yesterday's testimony was limited ? 

Mr. Vincent. Was limited to the reports we got in from the field, I 
said yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien you were in the field, did you ever make a 
report on communism, when you were in the field in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have those reports ? 

Mr. Vincent. There is one in the State Department that I recall 
now, made sometime in the year 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you give us a little better description so 
that we may ask for it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't give you the date, sir ; but I know it was 
written in 1942, and I can tell you more or less what was said in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was a rather long report, but I can remember some 
of the thoughts that were in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell us what was in it if you can. 

Mr. Vincent. That was a report which I wrote in which I dis- 
tinctly recall saying that the Chinese Communist leaders were defi- 
nitely Communists and not agrarian democrats. The general argu- 
mentation of the dispatch was to the effect that the Kuomintang or the 
National Government could cut the ground out from under the Com- 
munists if they would take some reform measures in the matter of 
land and in general handling of the popular difficulties of the Chi- 
nese people. I would have to reread it 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the substance? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2083 

Mr. Vincent, That was the general argumentation it was pointing 
out, as I said before and testified upstairs. 

Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We referred yesterday to your conversation with 
Madame Sun? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And the question was asked, then as to wliether 
General Stilwell had been discussed ; and, as I recall it, you said you 
did not remember whether that had been discussed. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I said I did not remember that it was discussed. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any 
other representative of the American Government get an expression 
of view from any Chinese Communist source on Stilwell's removal ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not get any from any Communist source. I 
would doubt very seriously if Mr. Wallace got any expression of view 
on the removal of Stilwell. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know of any other report from a Commu- 
nist source that was received by an American representative on the 
question ? 

Mr. Vincent. Expressing a view on the removal of Stilwell? 

Mr. SouR^vINE. On Stilwell's removal. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall any. 

Mr. SbuRwiNE. Did you send in separate reports to the State De- 
partment or to the President while you were in China w^ith Mr. Wal- 
lace, that is, any reports other than the notes that you transmitted? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember Sergei Goglidze ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I remember Sergei Goglidze as the man who 
made the toast during the trip in Siberia at some time or other. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you now remember that toast ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can look here and find it. 

Mr. SouR"\viNE. Do you remember that it was made ? 

Mr. Vincent. I remember that the toast was made now. I would 
not have remembered it, as I testified in executive session, had not 
Mr. Wallace made a record of it in his book. There were hundreds of 
toasts made during that time, and it did not impress me. 

Mr. Sourwine. How many toasts were there at this particular 
dinner? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say there were probably as many toasts as 
there were guests, but I could not say with any exactitude. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that a dozen, fifteen ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't even recall the occasion of the 
toast or the luncheon or the dinner, whichever it was. Usually in this 
group there were six or seven of us and probably an equal number of 
Russians, which would make as you say 12 people. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did they drink the toast in ? 

Mr. Vincent. They drank the toast usually in vodka. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was this ])articular toast to you and Mr. Lrattimore 
the first toast that was drunk? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say, Mr. Sourwine, whether it was the 
first, the middle one 

Mr. Sourwine. Or the fifth or the tenth ? 

Mr. Vincent. I see your point, but I cannot say whether it was the 
last one or the first one. 



2084 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson, Do you see where it is leading ? 

Mr. Vincent. I see where it is leading. 

Senator Ferguson. We understood you then, the larger the dinner 
party, the more toasts, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. May I make the statement here that Mr. Wal- 
lace did not drink vodka. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He is the fellow who reported the Goglidze toast in 
detail in his book. 

Senator Ferguson. He seems to be the only one who remembered it^ 

Mr. Vincent. It made no impression on me, but I won't say it was 
because it was the tenth toast. 

Mr. Sourwine. On the way back from China, sir, did you and Mr. 
Wallace fly? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Lattimore with you in the plane ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you do on the way back ? Did you work ? 
Did you have work to do? 

Mr. Vincent. We worked as much as we could. We were doing 
fairly high flying and we were fairly sick one day flying back. We had 
to fly at 22,000 feet with no particular apparatus for it. But most of 
the time was taken up in assisting Mr. Wallace in writing a speech 
which he was to give in Seattle the first week of July. I have forgotten 
the date. We got back here by the 10th so he must have given the 
speech on the 8th or the 9th in Seattle. 

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, as soon as he got back he was to give 
this speech and you worked on that on the way back ? 

Mr. Vincent. We worked on that on the way back. 

Mr, Sourwine. Was Mr. Alsop with you ? 

Mr, Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you read the Wallace book, Mr. Vincent,, 
where the toast was quoted ? 

Mr. Vincent, I never read through it, sir. He sent me a copy and 
I regret to say I never did take the time to read that book. 

Senator Ferguson, Would you not think that would be valuable in 
your position in the State Department? Here he had gone out and 
made this trip and came back. 

Mr. Vincent, As I say, I glanced through it but I never read it 
with any care. It was not concerned with my area. It was concerned 
with Siberia. 

Mr. Sourwine. So the record may be clear about the toast we are 
talking about, we are all referring to the toast where Goglidze said 
"To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on 
China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future." Is 
that right? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is the toast. 

Mr. Vincent. That is the toast as Mr. Wallace has reported it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you approve the book ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I did not approve the book. You mean did I 
approve of its contents or did I approve of it in advance of its 
publication? 

Senator Ferguson. No; its contents. 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to testify, because I have just said 
that I only glanced through it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2085 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know enough about it to approve or 
•disapprove ? 

Mr. ViN(^,ENT. I don't know enough about what Mr. Wallace had 
in the book. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat did you think this toast meant when you 
heard it? 

Mr. Vincent. I simply thought it was the kind of a toast that a 
man would make as you usually make toasts, overstating the case but 
recognizing at least a fact which was that I at least — I don't know 
whether Lattimore did — had a certain amount of responsibility with 
regard to the future of China, since I was at that time Chief of the 
•China Division. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I beg your pardon, sir, but I think your answer may 
give an impression that you don't intend. The chairman's question 
was, What did you think when you heard the toast? and you have 
testified here, as I understood it, that you don't remember hearing it. 

Mr. Vincent. That is quite correct. What I mean is what do 1 
think of the toast now. At the time the toast was given, as I say, I 
have no recollection of the toast being given. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, those toasts were given at that dinner party, 
and I have no memory of it and would not have remembered it had 
not Mr. Wallace made a report of it in his book. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you at that time believe that you did share 
a great responsibility for the future of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't put it a great responsibility, but as Chief 
of the China Division I had some responsibility for the future of 
China insofar as American relations with China would have any 
effect on the future of China. 

Senator Ferguson. Were these people Communists who were giving 
this dinner? 

Mr. Vincent. Goglidze was a Communist. And I also assumed 
that any other Russian present, and there were usually a half dozen, 
were Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. You felt that he was pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I felt that he was a Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and therefore would be pro- Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right, isn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. We have found one man now who is really pro- 
Communist. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, he was a Communist, and I would naturally 
assume that he was pro-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You may take the witness. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore assisted at all 
with the preparation of Mr. Wallace's Seattle speech, the one that 
was prepared in the airplane on the way back ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of his helping, but 
I would say it was quite logical that Lattimore would have helped 
with it because a portion of the speech was given over to conditions 
as Mr. Wallace found them in Siberia. Mr. Wallace himself had 
made, as I have noted, as we went along, copious notes on his Siberian 
trip, and to what extent he relied upon Lattimore I don't recall. 



2086 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were any of the conversations with Chiang men- 
tioned in the Seattle speech ? 

]\lr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't recalL I wonld have to have the 
speech here, but I am quite sure they weren't. May I say that the 
speech, if you haven't seen it, I don't know whether I have it here or 
not, was taken up hirgely with an estimate of the postwar commer- 
cial relations between the west coast of the United States and the 
Pacific area. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember whether the preparation of that 
speech took up your available work time while you were on the plane 
on the way back ? 

Mr. Vincent. Pretty much so. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You didn't have time to do any other work on the 
way back ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall doing any other work. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. After you got back from Chungking, sir, were you 
consulted about the question of establishing a Washington informa- 
tion center on the tJ. S. S. E. ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; not to my recollection. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Mr. Currie talk to you about that matter? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no present knowledge of his ever talking tO' 
me about it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know that the Council of American Soviet 
Friendship had requested the establishment of such an information 
center ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, as far as I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you go to see Mr. Currie soon after you got 
back from Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall the occurrence, but I would prob- 
ably have seen Mr. Currie soon after I got back. I know one time 
was at one of the early meetings attended, was one of the meetings 
that he held in his office at the time he was still holding his meetings 
of far-eastern people. 

Mr. Sourwine. What was discussed? 

Mr. Vincent. In those meetings ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. General far eastern things. I don't think records 
were made of them or anything. I attended only one meeting, and it 
seemed to be, as I have testified in executive session, meetings of ex- 
perts from various departments in regard to far eastern problems. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you state definitely that you did or did not 
meet with Mr. Currie soon after you got back from Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot state definitely. If you would like for me 
to say, I would have considered it logical that I did see him soon after 
I got back. He was the White House assistant who was at that time 
under presidential direction, I suppose, to inquire into far eastern 
matters. 

Mr. Sourwine. He naturally would have been interested in the 
results of your trip, would he not? 

Mr. Vincent. He certainly would have been. You mean after we 
got l)ack from the Wallace trip ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; he would have been interested. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2087 

Mr. SouRWiNE. He had talked with you about it before you went ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It was logical that he would talk with you about it 
after you got back ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know Mortimer Graves ? I believe you have 
testified on that point. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I have met him. 

INIr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember reading in the hearings of this 
committee, exhibit No. 177, page 631, part 2, introduced on August 25, 
1951, being a note from Mr. Graves to ECC, presumably E. C, Carter, 
reading : 

I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendsliip to call together 
a few people in Washington for a discussion of a Washington information center 
on the U. S. S. R. I can't spend any time on the matter myself, but am quite 
willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with 
Russian war relief plans or anytliing of that sort? If so, I won't participate. 
Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to 
see John Carter Vincent just back from Chungking. 

Mr. Vincent. Is that in 1943 or 1944 ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I am unable, sir, to place the date of this, and that 
is why I was asking you. 

Mr. Vincent. I thought you had said whether it was after I came 
back from the Wallace mission or whether it was when I came back 
from China for the first time. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I was simply asking you about the Wallace mission. 

Mr. Vincent. There is no date on it. What is your question, sir, 
or is that a question ? 

Mr. Sour WINE. Whether you had an appointment with Mr. Currie 
or an arrangement to see him after you did get back. 

Mr. Vincent. As I have just testified, I have no recollection of see- 
ing him. You have read this. It w^ould be logical for me to see him. 
I was trying to correct that in this sense, that in 1944, although Currie 
had still retained his White House position, at that time he was 
already operating as Deputy Director of the FEA. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would it have been logical for Mr. Currie to have 
consulted you about the question of a Washing-ton information center 
for U. S. S. R., if that matter had been brought to him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not consider it logical, and I have no recol- 
lection of being consulted on that matter. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You think it probably was coincidental that in Mr. 
Graves' note that matter was mentioned in the same note with the 
sentence about Mr. Currie waiting to see you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the way I had interpreted this letter. I saw 
it in my hurried reading of the transcript. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how well Mr. Currie knew Mr. Graves ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; I couldn't testify on that. I don't know to 
what extent the relationship was, or the closeness of the relationship 
between those two. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever, Mr. Vincent, take part in the draft- 
ing or preparation of a message to Chiang Kai-shek for the signa- 
ture of President Roosevelt ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. That is the message that we referred to in 
executive session, I think. 



2088 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SoTD^wiNE. Are you referring to the message which appears on 
page 560 of the white paper, the message under date of July 14, 1944 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am referring to the message which we discussed in 
the executive session, which I think is that message. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. Would you see if that is the message you refer 
to? 

Mr. Vincent (after examining white paper). Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Would you tell us, sir, what part you took in the 
drafting or preparation or submission of that message ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was the drafting officer of that message. I would 
not want the inference drawn from that that I had the sole responsi- 
bility for its contents. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it substantially changed after it left your 
hands ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, it was not substantially changed as far as I can 
recall, but I am speaking now of in the matter of what kind of infor- 
mation was wanted in the message. I have no recollection of consulta- 
tion with anybody, but I imagine that Mr. Wallace himself had in 
some way indicated to me what kind of message he w^anted to go out, 
but I cou' ^n't testify on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. That message refers to two other documents, does 
it not? 

Mr. Vtvtcent. Yes. 

Mr. . ltrwine. Do you have any recollection of those two other 
rY^iv. -^nts? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. As I have testified before, sir, I see they 
are mentioned here but I have no recollection of the contents of those 
two documents. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about the general tenor of 
those two other documents ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, 
quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have looked that up. You asked me that once before 
in the executive session. As I testified then, I have no recollection of 
that. I have looked it up now and have found that it was a message 
drafted in the special assistant's office in the State Department, Mr. 
McDermott, and that it passed through the China Division and was 
initialed by Mr. Chase, who was working for me, and by me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
of it? 

Mr. Vincent. I had nothing that I recall to do with its preparation. 
It was prepared in the office of the special assistant. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know it was going to be prepared before it 
was presented to you for initialing ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of having any knowledge of it 
before it was sent up to me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wliere was that message to be transmitted when you 
approved it ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would be transmitted to Mr. Gauss, the American 
Ambassador in Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. Anywhere else ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the only direction of it that I know of. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2089 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you in any sense order the distribution of that 
document ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Or direct where it should go ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not direct it or have anything to do with draft- 
ing it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is this a copy of the document in question, sir? 

Mr. Vincent (witness examining document). I have a copy here. 

Mr. Sourwine. I would much rather talk about your copy, if you 
have a copy here. 

Mr. Vincent. I have it here, if you would like to have it. 

Mr. Sourwine. May I see it, please ? 

Mr. Vincent. That, I may explain, Mr. Sourwine, is a photostat of 
a press conference held by Mr. McDermott, the press man in the State 
Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. "What you have here, then, is not a copy. What you 
have here is a photostat of an actual transcript of a press conference 
at which Mr. McDermott read it, is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Working from that may I ask the witnt^s, is that 
paper of mine a copy of the document ? 

Mr. Vincent. There are differences. The one I have here is longer 
than the report that you have here in this document. 

Mr. Sourwine. May we have the copy that you have thett A.nd 
will you tell us. Is that a photostat of the original State Departii.,p 
records ? 

Mr. Vincent. This is a photostat of a press conference held by 
Mr. McDermott. 

Mr. Sourwine. A photostat of a transcript? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. That transcript is in the official records of the State 
Department ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. Let me say this : This telegram as it is quoted 
here is quoted from the original telegram insofar as I am able to 
testify, but I haven't got the other telegram in. front of me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you present? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I was not present. 

Mr. Sourwine. May we have that? 

Mr. Vincent. This was in 1950. I was in Switzerland when that 
happened. 

Mr. Sour^vine. This is Mr. McDermott's press release of Friday, 
June 2, 1950? 

Mr. Surrey. It begins on page 4 in connection with this item. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is addressed. Embassy, Chungking, from Hull, 
July 25, 1944. 

July issue of Amerasia possibility of using Japanese Communist, 8us2imu 
Okano, in role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping Japanese people to establish Oov- 
ertiment that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy. Magazine, 
however, voices uncertainty as to whether the American State Department "will 
support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor 
the so-called 'liberal elements' in .Japan's present ruling class." 

Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout eastern China should 
be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guerrilla 
forces that are now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in north, but 

22848^52— pt. 7 7 



2090 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

also in central and southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material, 
technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why United 
States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen 
their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to current political situation 
in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow the policy adopted 
toward guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were 
eventually superseded by military necessity. 

Magazine denounces "incredible and preposterous statement" of General Lo 
Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and condemns the 
Information Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan 
on forces that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been stead- 
fastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Gov- 
erament. It is asserted that vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000 
Japanese, with not more than 116 tanljs, at time when approximately 250,000 
Central Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks 
that form iron ring blockading the Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to 
have information proving that northern guerrilla forces have carried on their 
resistance to Japanese and have jpersistently continued their work of educating 
people to participate in that resistance, despite constant "mopping up" campaigns 
by Japanese and hostility on part of Chinese Government. Article points out 
that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have 
enlisted enthusiastic support of local population. Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps, 
according to Amerasia, has won the support of local population sufficiently to 
enable them to withstand both Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and repeated 
efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they 
defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kowloon Railway, article re- 
ports, that although Japanese have controlled both terminals for over 2 years, 
they have not been able to run a single through train. 

Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations 
can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recognition 
of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison of- 
ficers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance for success 
of our future offensive against Japanese. 

Signed by Hull, HMB, SA/M. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the same, as I checked it. 

Mr, SouEWiNE. Yes. 

You said it was longer. What did you have in mind that was in 
this that was not in the other? 

There is a word or two variation, but not in length. 

Would the only difference be that a few articles such as "the" and 
"a" have been left out in the cable text that was read? 

Senator Ferguson. 1 think that is it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This does not purport to be a cable text, does it? 

Mr. Vincent. It doesn't seem to me to be, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you familiar with the preparation of messages 
for sending by cable in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I am not familiar with that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you ever prepare messages for sending by cable? 

Mr. Vincent. I prepare messages for sending by cable, but so far 
as distribution ; no. I just prepare the message on a cable form, yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you prepare a message for sending by cable, 
do you abbreviate it ? Do you use "cablese" or do you write the mes- 
sage out and leave it to someone else on the cable desk to abbreviate it? 

Mr. Vincent. I write it out in ordinary English except for the pos- 
sibility of the elimination of some ai'ticles. 

Mr. Sourwine. Isn't that the message as it was written out in ordi- 
nary English and perhaps what Mr. McDermott read at the press 
conference was the "cablese"? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't testify on that, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2091 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Can you tell us what those distribution symbols at 
the bottom of that message mean, or what any of them mean ? 

Mr. Vincent, No. I could simply hazard the guess that these are 
distribution symbols which the office of Mr. McDermott used to put 
on them. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You don't know what they meant? Or what any 
of them mean ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think that last, "State FC/L,'] is foreign liaison, 
but I couldn't be sure whether that is the designation or not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this message may be put 
in the record at this point immediately 'following the text of Mr. Mc- 
Dermott's press conference which was read into the record. 

Senator Ferguson. It may be received, and it will show the 
variation. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 387," and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 387 
Secret (July 28, 1944.) 

(Message sent:) Chungking, China, July 25 (1005), Hull (Secretary) 

FAR EAST 

The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibilitj/ of using the Japanese 
Communist, Susiimu Okano, in the role of a ''Tito for Japan'' in helping the 
Japanese people to establish a Oovernnient who will discard the aggressive aims 
of the present ruling oligarch}/. — The magazine, however, voices uncertainty as 
to whether the U. S. State Department "will support the program advocated by 
Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called liberal elements' 
in Japan's present ruling class." 

The same issue proposed that the opposition to Japan throughout Eastern 
China should he strengthened by the Allies' establishing close working relations 
with the guerrilla forces now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in 
the North, but also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities 
with material, technical, and financial aid. The article insists there is no reason 
the U. S. and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen 
their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to the current political situa- 
tion in Chungking. Amerasia advocates the Allies follow the policy adopted to- 
ward the guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were 
eventually superseded by military necessity. 

The magazine denounces the "incredible and preposterous statement" of Gen- 
eral Lo Tse-Kai that the Eighth Route Army has never fought the Japanese and 
condemns the Information Minister's attempt to put the blame for Japan's vic- 
tories in Honan on forces that, for a long time, have been prevented from fight- 
ing and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other 
essentials by the Central Government. It is asserted the vital Honan campaign 
was won by only 40,000 Japanese, with not more than 116 tanks, at the time 
when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only 
a short distance away in barracks that form an iron ring blockading the Eighth 
Eoute Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving the northern guer- 
rilla forces have carried on their resistance to the Japanese and have persistently 
continued their work of educating the people to participate in that resistance, 
despite the constant "mopping up" campaigns by the Japanese and the hostility 
on the part of the Chinese Government. The article points out that though 
poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted the 
enthusiastic support of the local population. The Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps, 
according to Amerasia, has won the support of the local population sufficiently 
to enable them to withstand both the Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and' 
the repeated efforts on the part of the Central Government to uproot them. Sc 
effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride the Canton-Kow- 
loon railway, the article reports, that although the Japanese have controllecJ 



2092 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

both terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single 
through train. 

Amerasia contends the time has passed when internal political considerations 
can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recogni- 
tion of the potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of 
liaison officers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance 
tor tlie success of the U. S. future offensive against the Japanese. 

GOMINCH F-0 

GOMINCH F-20 

Op-13 

Op-16 

Op-16-1 

OP-16-F • 

OP-20-G 

OP-16-A-3-1 

State FC/L 

Exhibit No. 377-A 

Januaey 2, 1952. 
Mb. John Caeter Vincent, 

State Department, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Vincent : Due to unforeseen circumstances, your appearance before 
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will have to be postponed from 
January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25. 

We had previously notified you that you would be asked to bring certain 
documents to enable the Committee to have full access to the facts. We are 
enclosing herewith a list of the documents which you are requested to bring 
with you. 

We are notifying the State Department of our request in the interest of 
assuring full cooperationjin the fulfillment of this request. 
Sincerely, 

Pat McCarran, Chairman. 

(The 32 categories requested are the same as those appearing on pages 1915 
and 1916.) 



Exhibit No. 377-B 

Department of State, 
Washington, January IJf, 1952. 

My Dear Senator McCarran : I have received your letter of January 2, 1952, 
postponing the date of my meeting with your Subcommittee on Internal Security 
from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25. 

On September 7, 1951, I wrote you from my post at Tangier, Morocco, denying 
the allegation made by Budenz before your Subcommittee that I was a member 
of the Communist Party. I also requested an opportunity to appear before 
your Subcommittee in the event that you had any doubts as to my loyalty. I 
received no reply to my letter. 

On November 9, 1951, after my return to Washington on home leave, I wrote 
you again. I then advised you that I had had an opportunity to read not only 
Budenz' testimony of August 23, 1951, before your Subcommittee, but also his 
subsequent reiteration of the same allegations on October 5, 1951, and that I 
desired an opportunity to meet with your Subcommittee before Christmas, be- 
cause of my scheduled return to Tangier at the beginning of the year, for the 
purpose of denying publicly under oath the false testimony of Budenz. 

On December 3, 1951, in reply to j'our letter of November 30, I stated that I 
could postpone my departure for my post in order to meet with your Sub- 
committee on January 11. 

In response to my request, the Department of State has again authorized 
a delay in my departure in order to meet with your Subcommittee on January 
24 or 25. I hope there will be no further postponements. I consider it highly 
important in the public interest as well as my own that I meet with your Sub- 
committee, but it is also in the public interest that I resume my duties in 
Morocco as soon as practicable. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2093 

With regard to your request that I bring with me State Department docu- 
ments designated under 32 separate categories, I have to inform you that this is 
a matter for consideration by the Department of State. My own desire is, as it 
has been from the beginning, to assure you and other members of the Sub- 
committee that I am and always have been a loyal American official and 
citizen and to make available to you any further information that I may have to 
assist your Subcommittee in its inquiries regarding the internal security of the 
United States. 
Sincerely, 

[s] John Carter Vincent. 
John Caktee Vincent. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. I should like to ask that instructions be given to the 
staff to ask the State Department to send down here someone who is 
familiar with their distribution symbols and can testify to what is 
meant by the distribution symbols at the bottom of this. May we ask 
that that person be down here at the beginning, if not before the con- 
clusion this morning, at the beginning of the afternoon session? 

Senator Ferguson. If they can come down right away. See whether 
they can come immediately because it may help the witness on the 
matter. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. May we then pass over this until we have that testi- 
mony ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I would like to ask some questions, but I 
will reserve them until that goes in. 

I notice it is marked "secret." How do you have a secret press 
release ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, the first time I ever saw this thing it 
would have been marked "secret." I have no explanation of that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The press release was in 1950, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. The press conference was in 1950. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So Mr. McDermott, having read it to the press in 
1950, removed the secrecy injunction and it need not be regarded? 

Senator Ferguson. At the time you understood it was a secret 
document ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I am quite surprised to see that document marked 
"secret." It may have been marked "restricted" when it went out. 
Usually telegrams from State going to Chungking at that time used 
naval radio, and they had to be sent oiit in some kind of code. I was 
surprised to see that thing marked "secret." 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you on or about August 18, 1944, write a letter 
dated that date, August 18, 1944, to Mr. Kaymond Dennett accepting 
an invitation to become a member of the board of trustees of the 
American Council of the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. 1 have no recollection of the date, but I would say I 
must have written a letter accepting this invitation at some time. 
Therefore, I have no reason to question that the date is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Haven't you stated or implied here that your nam- 
ing as a trustee was without your consent, that you had nothing to do 
with it, that they just named you and you learned about it? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. You mean that I had no idea that 
they were going to name me? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have already testified that I had spoken to 
Mr. Grew about the matter of becoming a trustee. If I did not, in 



2094 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

executive session, it was my intention to. As I say, 1 testified that I 
had no recollection of a letter, but a letter may have been written and 
I don't deny that Mr. Dennett may have informed me that I was being 
elected or may have asked me wether I could be elected. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether instructions or orders were 
ever sent to Ambassador Hurley to stop trying to save the Chinese 
Nationalists ? 

Mr. Vincent, No, sir ; I have no recollection of a telegram telling 
him to stop trying to save the Chinese Nationalists. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. "Instructions and orders" is a little more broad 
than "a telegram." 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection at all of Mr. Hurley being 
instructed or ordered. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever send or assist in sending such orders 
or instructions to Mr. Hurley ? 

Mr. Vincent, Not as far as I recall, sir. 

Mr. SouR^viNE. Was it, in 1944 and 1945, a Communist objective or 
aim to achieve removal of the Japanese Emperor so as to give the Com- 
munist type of "democratic elements" an opportunity to move into 
the government of Japan ? 

]VIi', Vincent. Was it the Chinese Communist aim ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. In 1944, yes. 

Mr, Vincent, I couldn't testify as having any knowledge on that 
subject, sir, I have no knowledge now and don't recall ever having 
any that that was an objective of the Chinese Communists. 

Mr. Sour WINE. Was it, at about that time, a policy objective or 
aim of the Communists to secure removal from participation in Jap- 
anese affairs of the existing business and political leaders, and the 
breaking up of large business organizations and existing financial 
control so as to bring about social and economic disorders and permit 
the communistic democratic elements to take over? 

Mr. Vincent. You asked me to testify and I have no personal 
knowledge of that aim. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You don't know what the Communist aims and ob- 
jectives were? 

Mr. Vincent. With regard to Japan at that time. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you favor, or seek to further, either of the two 
objectives about which I have just inquired, that is, either the removal 
of the Emperor or the removal from participation in Japanese affairs 
of existing business and political leaders and the breaking up of large 
business organizations and existing financial control ? 

Mr, Vincent, In my position after I came into the State Depart- 
ment as chairman of SWNCC, both matters were discussed. We 
will take the first one first, which is the removal of the Japanese Em- 
peror, There was a great deal of discussion as to his standing 

Senator Ferguson, Will you speak a little louder. 

Mr. Vincent, As to his standing trial as a war criminal. My rec- 
ollection, without notes in front of me, is that my position was stated 
fairly clearly in a radio forum address in early October 1945, in which 
I said that the Japanese Emperor or the institution of the Emperor, if 
the Japanese decided to retain the Emperor must be radically modi- 
fied. That is my attitude on the Emperor question, 

Mr, Sourwine, What did you mean by radically modified? 

Mr, Vincent, I meant that the institution of the Emperor which 
theretofore or up to that time had been what we call an absolute mon- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2095 

archy would have to be modified into a constitutional monarchy if 
the Japanese retained the Emperor with responsibility to the elected 
representatives of the Japanese people. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. With regard to the matter of securing removal from 
participation in Japanese affairs of existing business and political 
leaders and the breaking up of large organizations, did you favor, 
or seek to further, that? 

Mr. Vincent. At the time I took over my chairmanship of SWNCC 
that was already adopted policy. I had no argument with the policy. 
I thought the breaking up of the large combines would further the 
economic development of Japan along democratic lines, along lines 
that would encourage the healthier economic development and away 
from what I would call the feudalistic capitalistic system of Japan. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Isn't it clear, then, sir, to you, that although you 
do not remember having any knowledge as to whether either of these 
things were Communist aims or objectives, since you did favor them 
you must have felt at the time that they were not Communist objec- 
tives ? Would that be correct ? 

To put it another way, sir, you would not have favored these two 
things knowing that they were Communist objectives, would you? 

Mr. Vincent. I W'Ould not have favored them because they were 
Communist objectives. I cannot be responsible for any coincidence 
of papers' worked out in the State Department in which I had a part 
and what the Communists at that time wished to accomplish. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know anything about the withdrawal of 
the Marines from China? 

Mr. Vincent. The withdrawal of the Marines from China was a 
matter under discussion almost continuously during early 1946; yes, 
sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did the State Department have anything to do with 
that? 

Mr. Vincent. The State Department from time to time under 
pressure from public opinion here was interested in withdrawal of 
the Marines as soon as it could be accomplished without endangering 
our position in North China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have anything to do with that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I presumably took a position as subordinate officer 
in the State Department on the withdrawal I knew that I favored it, 
but the actual withdrawal, which was not completely accomplished 
.until after I left for Switzerland, I would not recall a specific instance 
of my favoring the withdrawal except under the circumstances in 
which as I say when they were no longer needed. That was reiterated 
and reiterated in press conferences I remember held by the Secretary 
and the Under Secretary in response to press questions, when are the 
Marines going to be withdrawn. The answer always was, when they 
can be spared. Chiang Kai-shek himself had welcomed their being 
in there, but he himself had also stated in public, as I recall, that 
they would be withdrawn as soon as they had accomplished whatever 
mission they were there for, one of which was to assist in the Japanese 
surrender. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, have you ever visited 155 East Forty- 
seventh Street in New York City, apartment 7-D, or any apartment 
in that building? 



2096 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Wliat would be the biiildiiifr? I have no recollection. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. 155 East Forty-seventh Street. 

Mr. Vincent. My knowledge of New York is not very clear, but I 
was just saying that I have visited people in New York — 155 East 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Forty-seventh Street. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of visiting anyone there. If 
you would try to refresh my memory 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever meet anyone there ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have a meal at Anthony's Steak House 
at 627 Lexington Avenue ? 

Mr. Vincent. At Anthony's Steak House ? I don't recall it, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. In 1944 and 1945 who in the State Department had 
authority with regard to the issuance of visas, do you recall? 

Mr. Vincent. I could look it up here, sir. I don't recall who the 
head of the Visa Department was. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was only a preliminary question. The second 
question is, did you ever have anything to do with instructing em- 
bassies to issue visas ? 

Mr. Vincent Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever indirectly or directly instruct, that is, 
yourself or through your subordinates, the issuance ef visas to any 
alien Communist writers ? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that I do not recall ever giving any 
instructions or causing to be issued visas to anybody, including Com- 
munists. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were a member of the Board of Trustees of 
the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the year 
1945? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were not a member of that board during any 
other year? 

Mr. Vincent. Not unless the trusteeship ran over to some period 
into 1946. I don't know when they changed their trustees. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not contribute to the American Council 
during 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I have any recollection of, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. During any other year? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I have any recollection of. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking leading questions because we are cover- 
ing territory that has been covered in executive session. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you given to understand that even though you 
were a member of the board of trustees, you were not expected to 
contribute ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any definite statement being made to 
me that I would not be expected to contribute. I know I did not 
contribute. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that you were the only member of 
the Board of Trustees of the American Council of IPR in that year 
who was listed as a complimentary member? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't know why it was that you were a com- 
plimentary member ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2097 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

tjenator Ferguson. Why do you think they wanted you on the 
board ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified in executive session, sir, that it 
was the kind of organizatioij that would like to have in it somebody 
from the State Department. 
Mr. SouRwiNE. Why ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was the Chief of the China Division. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Why did they want somebody from the State De- 
partment on the board ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because they had had people from the State De- 
partment before. Dr. Hornbeck had been in it. They wanted some- 
body from the State Department. I don't know whether there was 
anybody else in that particular year from the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that to lead the public, which was reading 
their books, pamphlets, and so forth, to believe that it had the backing 
of the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify to that, whether that was their 
intention. 

Mr. Sourwine. What do you think they had in mind? Were you 
told? 

Mr. Vincent. I was never told what they had in mind. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you went on didn't you inquire anything 
about it? "Here, I am a trustee, and what am I to do?" 

Mr. Vincent. No, I did not inquire what I was supposed to do. 
My understanding was that many people were trustees who never 
took any active part in the IPR trusteeship meetings. I don't even 
know whether they have trusteeship meetings. I presume they do 
have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where did you get that understanding? 

Mr. Vincent. From looking at the number of people who were on 
it, who couldn't possibly, it seems to me, be called together for trustee 
meetings. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever attended a trustee meeting? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever talked to anybody about a trustee 
meeting ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever asked anybody who attended trustee 
meetings ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you ever asked anybody whether you would 
be expected to attend trustee meetings ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. How many people did you know, approximately, 
having their names on the board of trustees ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall how many people there were. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were there as many as 50 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to see the letter. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were there as many as 500 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; there wouldn't be 500. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wliat difficulty would there have been about calling 
together any lesser number than 500 ? 



2098 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I would say because the names they had, like for 
instance in 1949 General Marshall, I would assume that General Mar- 
shall didn't go to trusteeship meetings. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You never inquired ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't know to this day whether he did or not ; 
do you? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Your testimony is then, you want it to stand, that 
simply from the number of names on the board of trustees you assumed 
that it would not be an obligation of a trustee to attend meetings ? 

Mr. Vincent. From the character of the names on there I would 
have assumed that not all the trustees went to the meetings, but I don't 
know. I would have to change the testimony, then, that I don't know 
who attended the meetings other than the fact that I didn't attend 
meetings. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean there were names on that list of board 
of trustees who were obviously stooges or phoneys to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, they were prominent people who I would have 
thought didn't come all the way, or to a trusteeship meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see anything unusual about prominent 
people being members of the board of trustees of the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did it occur to you that prominent persons probably 
wouldn't attend the meetings of that board ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am simply trying to explain now that there was 
no occurring to me at that time whether people did or did not attend. 
You were asking me. 

Mr. Sourwine. You just stated that from a perusal of the list of 
the board of trustees you arrived at the conclusion that the trustees 
were not expected to attend meetings. 

Mr. Vincent. I only perused, so far as I can recall, the list of the 
board of trustees only after I came back to the United States this 
time, seeing a list of the board of trustees in the hearings exliibited 
here. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was not at the time that you had accepted 
trusteeship ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I perused it and came to the conclusion. 

Mr. Sourwine. At that time you had no knowledge whatsoever as 
to what the duties of a trustee were ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had no knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. You never inquired of anybody ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. You wrote a letter accepting trusteeship, member- 
ship on the board of trustees, with no knowledge as to what the duties 
were and without inquiring of anybody what the duties would be? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you think, Mr. Vincent, this name of 
yours, being in the State Department, at the China desk, conveyed to 
the public as a trustee of the IPR ? 

IMr. Vincent. You have asked me that, sir, and I don't know what 
the public would derive from that. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you think it would convey to the 
public when you accepted ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2099 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, I did not think, in accepting, of any 
effect my name as a trustee would have on the public. 

Senator Ferguson. You never thought of that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not think of that. I did not take myself in a 
vein that the public would be impressed by my being on the board of 
trustees. 

Mr. SouR'WTNE. You thought of yourself in terms of a State Depart- 
ment official when you thought of yourself as going on the board of 
trustees of IPR, didn't you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was a State Department official. 

Mr. Sourwine. You thought of yourself in that connotation and 
not just as John Carter Vincent, private citizen ; didn't you? 

Mr. Vincent. That I wouldn't want to testify, whether I thought 
at all that that was the reason I was being put on there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Haven't you stated that you knew they wanted 
State Department people on ? 

Mr. Vincent. I knew they had State Department people on there 
before. Dr. Hornbeck had been on. 

INIr. Sourwine. Didn't you state they wanted you because you were 
a State Department person ? 

Mr. Vincent. Because I was in the China Division ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Of the State Department. 

Mr. Vincent. Because I knew China. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew China and they wanted to convey, 
apparently, the idea that they had a trustee on this board who knew 
China and who was an expert and was directly connected with the 
United States Government. That is apparent; isn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. It would certainly be logical, but you asked me 
whether I thought in those terms in accepting it. I am not trying to 
quibble. 

Senator Ferguson. No; and I am not trying to quibble with you, 
but the only way I can get an answer is as to what you did think. If 
you didn't think, I am not going to get an answer. Did you think at 
that time what this would mean to the public ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have told you, Mr. Chairman, I did not think of 
what it would mean to the public. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the IPR have a democratic method of electing 
its trustees ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what method the IPR had for electing 
its trustees, Mr. Sourwine. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see any of the literature of the IPR 
as to how your name was listed ? Isn't it true they put under your 
name that you were with the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never seen any of that literaturee, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, didn't you write to them to give 
instructions as to how your name was to be listed in the roll of those 
who attended the convention in 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. How my name was to be listed ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Exactly. Didn't you write to the IPR telling them 
that you were listed as (then giving your title) but that it was not 
necessary to use the whole title, including "Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs"? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall writing and telling them how to list 
me. I wouldn't have thought I had to write, but if I did it is certainly 



2100 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

something which has slipped my memory. They knew I was Chief of 
the China Division. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes, of course they did, and they did list you that 
way, didn't they ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, they did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you through, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever see the ballot for the election on which 
you were elected a member of the board of trustees ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know that your name was one of six names 
on that ballot under the subheading "Washington," with the instruc- 
tion at the top, "vote for six" ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What duties, if any, did you perform as a member 
of the board of trustees of IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. As far as I can recall I performed no duties at all as 
a member of the board of trustees of IPR. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You have indicated that perhaps you were sought 
as a member of that board because of your expertness in your field. 
While you were a trustee did the IPR ever call upon you, as a trustee, 
for expert advice or opinion ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I have already testified, I saw members of the IPR 
from time to time. Mr. Dennett, as I have already testified, came to 
see me. Wliether they came to see me in my capacity as a trustee of the 
IPR, whether they came to see me simply to discuss, as many people 
did, conditions in the Far East. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, IPR people came to see you 
before and after you were a trustee, didn't they ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there any increase in the number of them that 
came to see you while you were trustee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of any increase or decrease 
of the numbers. 

Mr. Sourwine. Any increase after you became or decrease after 
you ceased to be ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear of any charges of the IPR being 
controlled by a Communist or pro-Communist group ? 

Mr, Vincent. No, I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever read a report on the IPR prepared by a 
State Department investigator ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see such a report ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know such a report had been made? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To the present date do you know that such a report 
was made ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge even to the current date that 
such a report was made. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know the State Department had been 
called upon for such a report and had refused to produce it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not know that. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2101 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you read the hearings of this committee with 
regard to the IPK? 

Mr. Vincent. Not all of them, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you at any time take any action for the purpose 
of bringing about a change or changes in the Department of State 
personnel assignments for the handling of far eastern matters? 

Mr. Vincent. The matter of changes in persomiel in far-eastern 
matters was handled by the administrative section in personnel. I 
can't recall any instances of making their suggestions as to where peo- 
ple would go. I do recall that — I am thinking now of the ones that 
made an impression on me — remember recommending that Mr. Stan- 
ton be made Ambassador to Siam or Minister to Siam at the time, that 
was in 1945. But insofar as interfering or directing the assignment. 
of people, I may have made recommendations from time to time as to 
assignments. I cannot recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. While you were Director of the Far Eastern Divi- 
sion, were people hired in that Division without your knowledge, con- 
sent, or approval ? 

Mr. Vincent. While I was Director? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that I won't be consulted as Director of 
the Far Eastern Office in regard to people being hired unless it was 
a matter of hiring a new secretary or a higher officer. 

Mr. Sourwine. Anyone who was going to deal with policy would 
have to have your approval, wouldn't he? 

Mr. Vincent. Practically, yes; theoretically he wouldn't have to 
have my approval. 

Mr. Sourwine. The Secretary could always go over your head? 

Mr. Vincent. Go over my head and just send somebody in the office. 

Mr. Sourwine. But as a matter of form that wasn't done? You 
had the confidence of your superiors? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were therefore consulted about personnel 
changes in your department, were you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of a major nature, of an important nature. 

Mr. Sourwine. Which involved policy? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever initiate any such changes ? 

Mr. Vincent. We are speaking of the Far Eastern Office, are we, 
when I was Director, that period ? 

Mr. Sourwine. They are certainly people dealing with the handling 
of far eastern matters. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, but I mean, I am speaking of a period now, be- 
cause when I was Director of the Far Eastern Office I had much more 
to do with the organization of that office that I did when I 'was Chief 
of the China Division, and there was a Director and an Assistant 
Director. I am speaking when I was Director. 

Mr. Sourwine. I think that is obvious. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. I recall recommending the man who took the China 
Division at that time, who was Mr. Bill Turner. I am trying to 
think of the organization of the office. He was a Foreign Service 
officer whom I suggested to take that job. 

^ Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, you made many recommenda- 
tions, didn't you, during the course of your tenure ? 



2102 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I thought you wanted me to recall them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No. I am just trying to establish the fact that you 
were the active head of that Office, that you were not a figurehead, 
that you did initiate recommendations, and pass on the recommenda- 
tions of others. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever give any information to any person 
or i^ersons outside the Department of State regarding changes sought 
or effected in the State Department's assignment of personnel for the 
handling of far eastern matters. 

Mr. Vincent. Will you read that again ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. Did you ever give any information to any 
person or persons outside the State Department regarding changes 
sought or effected in the State Department's personnel assignments 
dealing with far eastern matters ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of such conversations outside. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did any of your associates do so with your knowl- 
edge? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of their doing it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall stating at a dinner in 1945 that "for 
3 years I worked at nothing but to get the Communists and the 
Nationalist Government together in China." 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think you might have said that? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I might have said that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would it have been a true statement at that time? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been a true statement at that time; 
to get the Nationalists and the Communists to settle their differences. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever engage in a private correspondence 
with personnel of the Embassy staff in Chungking? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. I am not much of a personal 
correspondent. At some time I exchanged a personal letter with some- 
body, George Atcheson or somebody else, but I have no recollection of 
personal correspondence. 

Mr. SoURwiNE. Did you ever carry on such personal correspondence 
by way of the diplomatic pouch ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would there have been anything wrong with that 
if you had ? 

Mr. Vincent. In getting things to Chungking it was about the 
only way we had of getting them there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there anything wrong in carrying personal stuff 
or sending personal stuff in a diplomatic pouch? 

Mr. Vincent. There is now, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there then ? 

Mr. Vincent. To Chungking there was not because Chungking 
was an exception because it was so difficult to get in there. I don't 
know when the regulations were put in, but I know now you are ex- 
pected not to use the pouch for purely personal matters, unless you 
put stamps on the letters ; or, in some places, exception is made for it. 
1 don't know what the regulations are. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had something when you were in China that 
you wanted to bring back with you, couldn't you have put it in a 
pouch and brought it back even though it was personal to you ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2103 

Mr. Vincent. In Chungking during the war years you could. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Couldn't you do that from another station ? 

JNIr. Vincent. Putting personal things in a Government pouch now 
is discouraged. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Suppose you had a friend and he said, "I want to get 
this back to tlie States, and I am afraid if I carry it I will have trouble 
with the authorities or will lose it, I will be questioned about it, you 
take it back for me," would you not be authorized to do that ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are speaking of when ? During the war years 
in China ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. In the war years in China people who were trusted, 
people who were Government people, did use the pouch for that pur- 
pose. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. But currently you are not supposed to put things in 
the pouch. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean except in the China situation you 
couldn't do it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what prevailed in other areas. I am 
speaking only of the one that I had any knowledge of, that communi- 
cations with Chungking were very difficult in those war years. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. You have been at other stations, at other posts, was 
it permitted from other posts? 

Mr. Vincent. In Bern, where I most recently served, using the 
pouch for transmission of personal letters was discouraged. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever use the pouch for bringing any- 
thing back to this country for a friend ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, but I may have from Chungking. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have anything to do with bring- 
ing the manuscript of Berlin Diary back to this country? 

Mr. Vincent. I brought it through Spain ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How did you carry it? 

Mr. Vincent. I put it in my trunk. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who owned Berlin Diary at that 
time ? 

Mr. Vincent. William Shirer was the author of the notes that I 
brought in my trunk through Spain in 1940. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was a matter of accommodation ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was a matter of accommodation, because at that 
time Shirer was afraid that if it came out in private hands, that the 
Spaniards would see it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it correct to say you favored political settlement 
of the dispute between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist 
Government in China? 

Mr. Vincent. It is correct to say so, and I may add that Chiang 
Kai-shek on numerous occasions said he favored political settlement, 

Mr. Sourwine. What did you mean by that phrase, "political set- 
tlement"? 

Mr. Vincent. I meant that they would settle their differences in 
political conferences, as they were trying to, in order to avoid, as I 
say, a disastrous civil war. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Chiang Kai-shek mean the same thing when 
he used the same phrase ? 



2104 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent, Chiang Kai-shek would mean the same thino;^ of 
bringing them into the Nationalist Government in some manner which 
would avoid conflict between them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When you attended that conference of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations in 1945, did you do so as a member of the 
board of trustees or as a member of the American delegation to the 
conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection, sir, is that I attended as just one 
member of the delegation. . 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were invited to attend the conference some- 
time before you were elected a trustee, were you not? 

Mr. Vincent. You have spoken to me of a letter here from Den- 
nett in regard to my becoming a trustee and I don't recall whether 
I was asked to be a trustee before I was asked to go to the meeting. 
I would say that I was asked, my best recollection on attendance at 
the conference, being asked to be a trustee was somewhere near about 
the same time, but which came first or second, I don't know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you not invited to a conference in the late 
summer of 1944 or earlier? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have placed the time later but I have not 
clear memory as to what the time was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were given several months' notice, in any 
event ? 

Mr, Vincent. I would say so. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Mr. Philip C. Jessup had recom- 
mended you for inclusion in that American delegation to the IPR 
conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You have stated you made no speech at the con- 
ference ? 

Mr, Vincent, I made no speech that I recall at the conference. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you make a lengthy statement, 10 minutes or 
longer, at any discussion at the conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall making any lengthy discussion. I may 
have talked 5 minutes, and my recollection, as I testified in executive 
session, is that I took very little part in the panel discussions, 

Mr, SouRWiNE, After you got to Hot Springs, were you included 
in any preliminary meetings of any groups other than the conference 
groups in the official meetings and sessions of the conference? 

Mr. Vincent. You are asking me to recall that ? 

I don't. I do not recall any political meeting. I should imagine 
the American group met. I don't know of any other meetings. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The American delegation group had met before you 
left to go to Hot Springs, had they not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SoiJR\viNE. You testified in regard to that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I am talking of a meeting with not all but some 
members of the American group after you got to Plot Springs. 

Mr. Vincent. I think that tlie American delegation met, whether I 
attended all the meetings, every morning before the panel discussions 
took place, but whether every member of the American delegation was 
present at those morning meetings — I was not regularly present, but 
my memory as best as I can bring it to bear on this matter that I have 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2105 

forgotten a great deal about, is that the American delegation did hold 
meetings preliminary to the day's discussions. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know Julian Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Soura\t:ne. What do you know about him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I know that in 1944 Julian Friedman was assigned to 
the Far Eastern Office, that he worked in the China Division for a 
matter of about a year, and that subsequently he went to China as a 
labor attache. 

My recollection is that before he came into the Far Eastern Office, 
that he had worked in some other office or division in the State Depart- 
ment concerned with labor matters. 

Mr. Souewine. What was his position in the Far Eastern Office ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was simply one of the junior members of the staff. 
He had no specific duties except that he was trying to learn something 
about China preparatory to going out to China as a labor attache. 
That is my recollection. 

Mr. Souewine. Did he not have a title of some kind ? Was he just 
a clerk ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; he was one of those types of people — I am trying 
to think now what we called them in those days. He was not a Foreign 
Service officer and he was not Foreign Service reserve, because that 
title was created later. 

Foreign Service auxiliary, I think, is what they called it at that 
time, but I don't know whether he was Foreign Service auxiliary 
or not. 

Mr. Souewine. I read you a description of Mr. Friedman, and ask 
you if it is correct : 

Julian Friedman was born June 2, 1920, in New York City. Immediately upon 
graduation from tlie Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he was hired by 
the State Department in 1943 as a junior divisional assistant in international 
economic affairs. 

Mv. Vincent. That was the job that he had before he came to the 
Far Eastern Office. 

Mr. Souewine. You do not know what the job was when he came 
to the Far Eastern Office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether he had that title of junior 
divisional assistant, because it was a departmental title. 

Mr. Souewine. What did that title meaij? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say it meant just what it says, a junior 
divisional assistant, somebody who assisted as a junior in a division. 

As I say, I don't know what division he was in, but I think he was 
in that division of labor. 

Mr. Souewine. Was it about equivalent to third assistant super- 
visor of auxiliary functions? 

Mr. Vincent. It would depend on the man, but it was just about 
that. 

Mr. Souewine. He certainly took no demotion w^hen he came into 
the Far Eastern Office, did he ? 

Mr. Vincent. Wliether his title was changed or not, I don't know, 
but I don't think he would have taken a demotion in salary. 

Mr. Souewine. Did you have anything to do with bringing him into 
the Far Eastern Office? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

2284S— 52— pt. 7 8 



2106 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you approve ? 

Mr, Vincent. I neither approved nor disapproved. I don't think 
I was consulted. The first time I saw him, he was assigned to the 
office. 

Mr. SoiTRWiNE. You were Chief of the China Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. Chief of the China Division. Assignments were 
made then to the Far Eastern Office, and people were assigned then to 
the Division. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. You mean- he was just foisted upon you without 
consultation with you at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of being consulted on the em- 
ployment of Julian Friedman. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean in the State Department the superiors 
will say to the head of a division, "Move your desk over in the corner, 
we are going to put another desk in the opposite corner, we have a 
man that is coming in here who is going to work with you" ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. You mean his employment and transfer to the 
Far Eastern Office. I had nothing to do with that. After he came 
into the Office, he was no doubt assigned to the China Division. I was 
probably consulted by Mr. Ballantine or Mr. Grew as to whether that 
was an assignment for him. I have no recollection of interfering 
with the assignment one way or the other. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you at least consulted, then, when they moved 
him into your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I must have been consulted. 

Mr. Sourwine. I mean physically, the room that you occupied. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I would have been consulted. But you asked 
me whether I remember being consulted. I don't remember being 
consulted but it would be logical to be consulted. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did approve bringing him in ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your testimony you did not initiate that in any 
way at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. But the suggestion for moving him into your office, 
for desk space roughly corresponding to your own, was not your 
suggestion ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. It came, I suppose, as a matter of discussion 
between Ballantine and myself or someone else as to whether I needed 
new personnel in the China Division. 

Mr. Sourwine. A person coming into that Office would have seen 
two desks, one on his right and one on his left, in the corners opposite 
the door? 

Mr. Vincent. Wliether that was the Office — I know what you are 
speaking of now, when Friedman first joined the Division, but the 
Office when he occupied space with me was one of those large State 
rooms. 

Mr. Sourwine. A person coming in the door would have seen two 
desks, one on his right and one on his' left? 

Mr. Vincent. People coming in the room would have seen a desk 
of a secretary immediately on the left. She did not have an outside 
room. They would have seen in the left-hand corner, as I recollect it, 
another desk. In the right-hand corner, on the far side, they would 



I 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2107 

have seen my desk and, as I recollect it, there was another desk against 
the wall immediately to the right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that being occupied ? 

Mr. Vincent. That other desk was not occupied except as people 
came into the Division as visitors. General Hurley occupied it, inci- 
dentally, for a month. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you and Mr. Friedman share a secretary? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether he used the same secretary as 
I did or not, but if she wasn't busy, I would assume he did. 

Mr. Morris. Who occupied that desk ? 

Mr. Vincent. People would come in. I remember that General 
Hurley, when he visited the United States in ]\Iarch, General Hurley 
and I sat there in the room. I gave him my desk and I sat in the 
corner desk for about a month, but there would have been other 
people. We had very little room and there would have been other 
people to use that desk who were visiting from the field. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any security check that was 
ever made on Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't know of a security check on him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Friedman what ma- 
terial or information might be shown to Andrew Eoth ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you describe Mr. Friedman's full duties ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have tried to do that in executive session, sir. I 
wound up with the fact that he did just whatever job was assigned 
to him from time to time, to read dispatches when they were of par- 
ticular interest on social or labor matters. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did anybody ever assign work to him, other than 
you, when he was occupying office space with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify exactly on that. I don't know 
whether the director or the deputy director would have assigned some. 
They could have assigned it to him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mainly ; and, insofar as you know, any assignment 
he got came from you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Assignments he would have gotten were mainly from 
me. 

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of assignments did you give him? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, he just did what other people gave him, 
just worked in the office and did jobs of reading dispatches when 
they were of one concern or another. 

Mr. Sourwine. When he would read a dispatch, he would do it 
because you assigned him to do it? 

Mr. Vincent. Either I or my deputy, the Assistant Chief. 

Mr. Sourwine. Generally, you gave him most of the assignments? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to testify exactly on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. You just did testify on that. Did you not say that 
generally you gave him most of his assignments ? 

Mr. Vincent. I said generally I would give him most of the assign- 
ments, or my deputy. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did, on occasion, assign him to read dispatches; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. When you asked him to read a dispatch, why did 
you want him to read it ? 



2108 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. In order for himself to become informed on it and, 
as the system was in those days, to put briefings on the dispatches so 
you would not have to read the whole dispatch. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He was briefing dispatches for you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRw^NE. Did he ever prepare any memoranda for you on 
dispatches ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any memoranda, but he probably did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The briefings did not constitute memoranda? 

Mr. Vincent. If you call a brief on the thing a memorandum. But 
sometimes, depending on the length, it would be a memorandum on 
one subject or another, but I don't remember any. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever rough draft anything for you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether he did or not. He had the 
work there and he could have. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he there in July 1946 ? 

Mr. Vincent. In July 1946? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to look up his record here, if you have 
that book ; but I think he had already gone to Shanghai. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever dictate to your secretary for your sig- 
nature ? 

Mr. Vincent. He probably did. 

Mr. Sourwine. If he had so dictated, would his initials ever appear 
anywhere on the letter or paper ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would have been normal procedure ; if he had 
dictated a letter for my signature, it would have his initials in the 
lower left-hand corner. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did he not do that with some frequency ? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether frequently or not, I assume he did. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had a man there who was in your Division 
whom you considered was competent to do the work. You gave him 
a lot of routine correspondence to handle for you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Probably. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you say "probably" ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, he was there ; I don't recall any specific in- 
stance. I don't recall any general instance, but he certainly was there 
earning whatever he was making and doing work. I would have 
assigned him to answer this letter or that letter. The answer is "Yes." 

Senator Ferguson. You did do so ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not confine his assignments to reading dis- 
patches and preparing briefings for you? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You gave him other work ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And that other work included the preparation of 
certain correspondence ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can only say that it is logical to say that he would 
have prepared correspondence. 

Mr. Sourwine. What other kind of work did you give him? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't think of the specific types of work. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he kept busy ? 

Mr. Vincent. He seemed to be busy to me. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2109 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you have him run errands for you, personal 
errands ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recalh 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did he ever do any research for you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would have been possible, that I had asked him 
to look into something, read something, to let me know what was 
in it. 

Mr. SouinviNE. That was one of his functions, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sour WINE. I believe you stated that you never investigated his 
loyalty record. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I never have. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You never asked for his loyalty file ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. His security file? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think in executive session you, yourself, said he was 
in San Francisco, so I know it from your report that he was in San 
Francisco. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Independently of anything I might have said, do 
you have any knowledge as to where he is ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; because I testified in executive session I 
didn't know where he was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. For the record, on the question of what I said, I 
told you that information had come to the committee that he was at 
the University of California. That does not necessarily place him at 
San Francisco, but he might be only a "bay" away. 

Mr. Vincent. I am sorry. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Why was he dropped or terminated at the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge as to why he was dropped or 
whether he himself resigned. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You never discussed that matter with anyone? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall discussing it. I was in Bern and I 
don't know the date when he was dropped or resigned. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did anyone every tell you that Friedman was sus- 
pected of being the source of leaks ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. I have seen that in the testimony here but at 
the time he was working with me nobody told me, as far as I know, 
that he was suspected of leaking. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No one ever made those charges to you or told you 
about such charges or such suspicions ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall anybody coming to me and ac 
cusing him of leaking. 

Senator Ferguson. You were never questioned about leaks ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you not think you would recall an im- 
portant matter like being questioned about leaks ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief. 

Senator Ferguson. Think a moment. Were you ever, while you 
were in the State Department, questioned about leaks from the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Questioned about leaks from the State Department? 



2110 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. To my knowledge and belief, I don't recall being- 
questioned about leaks from the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever asked any questions about the 
loyalty of any employees in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. I have been questioned about the 
loyalty of people after I got out to Bern because we would get letters 
from the Security Division there about people who had served or 
who had lived in Switzerland. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what we are trying to get at. 

Mr. Vincent. That is a system that was initiated. I am describing 
now a system which the State Department has which you call checks 
on people who apply for jobs. 

Senator Ferguson. When did that start? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say definitely when it started. 

Senator Ferguson. About when ? 

Mr. Vincent. It had started when I went to the field, when I went 
out to Bern in 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. Up until 1947, had you ever been- questioned 
about leaks in the Department? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever been questioned about the loyalty 
of any person in the State Department ? 

Mr. V incent. In the State Department ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, prior to going into the field in the middle 
of 1947. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall being questioned about leaks or 
loyalty of people in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Since you went to Bern, have you been ques- 
tioned about leaks in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall. Our office used to get letters, but I 
don't recall being questioned about leaks in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. You had charge of the Far East desk at one 
time? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it not true that in the Amerasia case the 
papers were taken from the State Department or had been in the 
State Department and got to Amerasia and were published ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. And found in their office ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever questioned by anyone about those 
papers or how they may have gotten out of that office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to think whether I was or not. 

The reason I am hesitating here is because I am trying to figure — 
it is a perfectly logical question — as to what the logical answer would 
be. 

Senator Ferguson. I suggest that you think about it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you say, Mr. Vincent, you were trying to think 
what a perfectly logical answer would be? 

Mr. Vincent. I said it is a logical question. 

Senator Ferguson. I have already given the question. Do not 
worry about the question being logical. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2111 



Mr. Vincent. I was trying to think whether at the existing time 

Senator Ferguson. Can you not remember a thing like that, as 
important as it would be, about leaks or about papers being taken 
from the State Department, that you were questioned about it? 

Mr. Vincent. That is just what I am trying to do, Senator, to see 
whether I can recall anybody asking me about the leaks in connection 
with the Service case, and I am trying to think of anybody I might 
have known in the Security Division that might have come up and 
questioned me about it. I think somebody did come up from the Secu- 
rity Division or somebody was sent up by the Security Division that 
did ask where papers were kept and asked about them at that time, 
what the files were. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell us what you know about that investigation. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of the thing except that 
it was on the matter of where files were kept. 

Senator Ferguson. Where files were kept. Anything else? 

Mr. Vincent. Where files were kept in connection with the avail- 
ability of papers to one person or another. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the explanation now as to the question- 
ing? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the explanation, as far as I can remember. 

Senator Ferguson. As to the investigation that was made? 

Mr. Vincent. As to the investigation, the only one I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. How long did it take to complete the investiga- 
tion, as far as you were concerned? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't know whether it was 10 minutes, 
20 minutes, 30 minutes. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you no recollection at all? 

Mr, Vincent. No ; I can't recall back in 1945 how long a conversa- 
tion I might have had. 

Senator Ferguson. You saw in the newspapers the question in the 
Amerasia case? 

Mr, Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that not refresh your memory ? Was it not 
about that time you were questioned? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought you meant the length of time. It was at 
the time of the Amerasia case, and I didn't even recall this in execu- 
tive session, but I now think somebody came up. 

Senator Ferguson. You now only "think" there was some one. Do 
you know? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall somebody came up. I am trying to think 
who it was that came up, whether he came from the Security Di- 
vision, whether he was sent up from the Security Division to ask how 
we kept papers, and that is all I recall of that particular instance. 
I thought you asked me of the length of the conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. All they did was to come in and ask how you 
kept the papers? 

Mr. Vincent. That is my recollection of what the thing was about. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your best recollection ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all you can give this committee? 



2112 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent, Well, I mean the whole investigation was in con- 
nection with the disappearance of papers from the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about your share in it. 

]VIr. Vincent. That is my recollection of my share in it. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all you were questioned about ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is all I recall being questioned about. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that not an important matter to the State 
Department, papers being removed ? 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly was. 

Senator Ferguson. Did some of them come out of your files ? 

Mr, Vincent. I have since learned that some of them came out of 
my files; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And the only examination that was made is 
what you have told us about here this morning ? 

Mr, Vincent. That somebody was sent up by the Security Division. 
I imagine I can add to that ; they asked me whether 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would do more than imagine. 

Mr, Vincent, I say it was in connection with the Amerasia case 
and in connection with the disappearance of these papers that the 
man came up. 

Senator Ferguson, First, when I asked the question, you had abso- 
lutely forgotten about that. 

Mr, Vincent. I had forgotten whether anybody had come up or not. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the Amerasia case was so un- 
important that you had forgotten anybody had asked you about 
papers or leaks or anything else ? 

Mr. Vincent. The Amerasia case took place in 1945, I was trying 
to do my best to remember if in any way I was questioned about the 
Amerasia case, and I have told you all I know, 

Mr. Morris, Do you think it is possible you may have been a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party in 1945 and now have forgotten it ? 

Mr, Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You think you would remember that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am sure I would remember that. 

Senator Ferguson. As far as you were concerned, did you make an 
investigation about the papers that were taken from your files? 
Whom did you question ? 

Mr, Vincent. I did not know at that time who, or what papers 
had been taken from the files. Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. You mean they never told you what papers they 
were talking about when they investigated? 

Mr. Vincent. The FBI was keeping the papers, and I do not 
know what the exact papers were that were taken from the files. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to an FBI officer? 

Mr, Vincent, There may have been an FBI ofhcer sent up by 
Security. 

Senator Ferguson, Just may have been ? Do you not know if an 
FBI officer came in he would show you his picture and credentials? 

Mr, Vincent, No; because I don't recall being interviewed by an 
FBI officer except possibly on this one occasion. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us get it a little more definite than "pos- 
sibly." Did you make an investigation about the papers or the leaks 
in your office? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not make an independent investigation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2113 

Senator Ferguson". Were you asked to make an investigation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall being asked to make an investigation. 

Senator Ferguson. And the only thing that you can recall now is 
someone coming to you and asking where you kept the files; is that 
right ? 

Mr. Vincent. And who had access to the files. 

Senator Ferguson. And who had access to them. Is that all ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is all I can recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you as to wliether or not you gave 
these papers to someone outside? 

Mr. Vincent. They might have, but I don't recall their asking me. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think they might have ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think they might have, and my answer would have 
been "No." 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you as to whether or not you gave 
the papers to Roth or Jaffe ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are asking me whether they did or didn't. I 
don't recall whether they did or didn't ask me whether I gave the 
papers. 

Senator Ferguson. They may have missed asking you that, the man 
in charge ? 

Mr. Vincent. That may have been one of his questions, and my an- 
swer would have been "No." 

Senator Ferguson. It may have been. Did you know Roth ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had seen Roth come in and out of the Department ; 
yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Had he ever been in your office? 

Mr. Vincent. He had been in the office one time or another calling 
on Friedman. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you any questions about Fried- 
man? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you any questions about Roth and 
Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether they did or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you whether Roth had ever been 
in your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't recall this conversation, whether 
they asked me specifically about Roth or not. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the best you can do for this committee 
about this investigation of the leaks and the removal of papers from 
your files ? 

Mr. Vincent. From my memory, that is the best I can do. 
_ Senator Ferguson. You do not think this committee has been en- 
lightened about this problem ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have liked to enlighten the committee more, 
but I do not recall exactly. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask whether John Service came in and 
out of your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. They probably did. 

Senator Ferguson. Just probably? 

Mr. Vincent. When I say that, I am not recalling the conversation, 
but it certainly would have been logical to ask for the disappearance 



2114 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

of the papers whether Service could come in or out of my office, and 
my answer would have been "Yes." 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have as much trouble giving the De- 
partment heads and so forth, in your office, information as you do this 
committee of happenings in the past ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, that question was asked me yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. And I ask it again. 

Mr. Vincent. I answered it yesterday the same as I will answer 
today. If the Department asked me questions about something that 
happened 7 years ago, I would have equal difficulty. 

Senator Ferguson. This was an important matter, the removal of 
papers from your office. 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly was. 

Senator Ferguson. It cast a reflection on you personally: did it 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly could have. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that all, just "could have"? Did you not 
take this matter seriously when this man came? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was it? 

Mr. Vincent. I said he was somebody sent up by the Security 
Division of the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you question Friedman about the papers? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall interviewing Friedman about the 
papers. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it not strike you that, if Friedman was in 
the office and Roth came in to see Friedman and the papers were re- 
moved, you ought to ask Friedman about it? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That never struck you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. As I say, I wasn't, myself, conducting the in- 
vestigation. As I say, I didn't interview or question Friedman 
about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Even though you were not conducting the ex- 
amination, Mr. Vincent, I would have thought, and now think, that 
you would have been more interested in it than you have displayed to 
this committee. I must tell you frankly that I do not think you have 
been frank on this investigation that I have been asking you about. 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have tried to be frank. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not believe you have been. I refer to the 
record, and the record will speak for itself. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, when was the so-called Amerasia case ? 
When were the papers discovered in the office of Amerasia ? Do you 
know? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say the latter part of March or early April 
1945. 

Mr. Sour WINE. Toward the end of 1945, was there any fear in the 
Institute of Pacific Relations that there might be further investiga- 
tions growing out of the Amerasia case ? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you repeat that question ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there any fear in the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions that there might be further investigations growing out of the 
Amerasia case? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall them, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2115 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you ever consulted by anyone connected with 
the Instiute of Pacific Relations about the possibility of surveillance 
or other activity which might drag the Institute of Pacific Relations 
into some kind of turmoil in connection with subversive charges? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge was I consulted about it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Specifically, did Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore or Mr. 
Lattimore ever see you about such a matter? 

Mr. Vincent. If they did, I am afraid I would have to make my 
usual statement, I don't recall their seeing me. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to state if 
what I hand him is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

Mr. Mandel. It is. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is a carbon copy of a letter, is it not ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. And attached to it is an original of a letter ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. To whom is the carbon copy letter addressed? 

Mr. Mandel. Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council, Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. Signed by whom ? 

JNIr. Mandel. Signed, Mrs. Marguerite Ann Stewart, Acting Ad- 
ministrative Secretary. 

Mr. Sourwine, How is the other letter addressed ? 

Mr. Mandel. "Dear Peggy" and refers to Mrs. Marguerite Stewart, 
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. How is it signed ? 

Mr. Mandel. Betty Ussachevsky. 

Mr. Sourwine. May I have those ? 

This letter, which is dated December 12, 1945, addressed to "Dear 
Eleanor," reads as follows: 

I am going to read the whole letter, but we will get down to the 
meat in the coconut toward the end. 

I have discussed the matter of your pinch hitter in Washington with ECO 
and he tells me that Phil Lilienthal is out of the picture. With Hilda gone, 
Pacco is too understaffed to spare him. 

Do you know who Phil Lilienthal was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified I have no recollection who Phil 
Lilienthal was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who the "Hilda" was that he re- 
ferred to ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not by that name. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who it might have been ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. By that name or any other name ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not unless you give the last name. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Hilda i\.ustern? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I testified I didn't know Hilda Austern. I said 
I thought she was secretary to Carter. I may be wrong on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who Pacco is, that is referred to? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Reading the next paragraph of the letter : 

As you surmised, he is not particularly interested in either Gretchen Green 
or Eleanor Perkins. I thought your suggestion about an old IPRite advisory 



2116 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

committee meeting at a regular weekly luncheon a masterful one, and think 
it should be started at once by you so that it will be in full swing for the new- 
comer. With regard to your accompanying suggestion of Ellen Atkinson, ECO 
asked how pink she is. I think this query was motivated by Betty's worries 
with regard to possible future trouble and, in that event, Carter does not favor 
Ellen's being associated with the IPR. He is, however, open to argument on 
this matter if you feel strongly that she has no pink reputation. 

In the meantime, I have consulted the staff and Larry suggests Lillian CoviUe 
and Audrey Menefee, both of whom, I understand, have recently been let out 
of FCC. 

Do you know Menefee ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I think, if the Audrey Menefee was connected 
as a script writer with NBC. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. That was Selden Menefee. 

Mr. Vincent. That I don't know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether Audrey Menefee is related to 
Selden Menefee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE (reading) : 

Miss Coville, in particular, sounds rather good and has already told Larry 
she would like a job in the IPR. Enclosed is a bit of dope about these two 
prepared by Shirley and Larry. Will you be good enough to try to get in touch 
with them and interview them? 

I just received a note to Eugene Staley from Betty. Please tell her that he 
is the executive secretary of our San Francisco office and, in future, mail to 
him should be directed there. I shall forward this letter. 

Now we come to what I characterize as the meat in the coconut : 

We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter, 
and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with 
John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know 
on these things. 

Now, does that aid your recollection at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. It does not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know why Marguerite Ann Stewart, the 
acting administrative secretaiy of IPR, referred to you in a letter 
to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council of IPR as a trusted 
friend who might be in the know ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. One of the "knows" was whether this party 
was pink or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what "these things" referred to? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

Do let me know what you think of Coville and Menefee as soon as you have 
had a chance to sound them out. 
As ever, 

(Mrs.) Marguerite Ann Stewart, 

Acting Administrative Secretary. 

Did you know Marguerite Ann Stewart ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether she is any relation to 
Maxwell Stewart? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. This second letter addressed to "Dear Peggy" and 
dated December 5, is on the Stationery of the American Council of 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2117 

IPR. I will read tlie first paragraph. It appears to be of little 
relevance : 

Dear Peggy : I was very horrified to discover that I had not sent one of 
the school orders to you with the batch that I sent after we had moved here. 
I am enclosing it in this letter. It is dated October 25. I discovered it in a file 
box which I have just got around to sorting out. I hope that you can feel 
assured that we won't have any more delays like this and I am very sorry. I 
would fill this out myself except that Eleanor's pamphlet is listed and I think 
it better that you handle that request ; also, so far we have established no 
machinery to take care of school discounts. The latter is something I'll take 
up with Tillie soon. Also, today it is quite difiicult to get at our publications 
because of some workmen who are tearing apart a floor. I won't go on about 
this difficulty ; it makes me absolutely profane. 

This is the paragraph which is referred to in the previous letter 
when they said : 

We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter, 
and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with 
John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know 
on these things. 

Now, I would like you to listen to this, if you will, and I am going 
to ask you when I am through whether you had any conversations 
or discussions about the subject matter of this letter with Mrs. Latti- 
more, Owen Lattimore, or anyone else connected with IPR. 

Something that has been on my mind these last few days and which I haven't 
yet mentioned to Eleanor since she has been in Ruxton, is a bit of news that 
j'ou should have. I was told that there would again be all the business that 
preceded the arrest of the six. The warning was that this time-tailing, mid- 
night raids, et cetera, tapping of wires might get started in an effort to establish 
a "Communist ring" and that the IPR would definitely be on the list, and that 
people who had been questioned during the case would be on the list as possible 
suspects in this ring. I must say that this warning has only made me angry 
and it hasn't in any way, or won't stop normal business here. The office of 
course, is quite accessible for searching, but I am at a loss as to what can 
be construed that is in our possession as being evidence of communism. At 
the same time, it is good to know that this process is going on because it shows 
that the "open" fight over on the Hill is employing under-cover methods that 
are malicious in intent. If this report is true, I am not sure whether or not 
the under-cover activities are being instigated by a small group of Republicans, 
by the Un-American Committee whom Hurley has stirred up, or by the FBI itself. 
However, it is dirty and it is quite possible to believe that every attempt to 
distort and twist facts will occur, and because of that we should be prepared 
to be on the offensive. That this whole mess of name-calling, the obscuring of 
issues, and all the red herrings that have cluttered up the perspective in the 
past is emerging again has made me feel sick; however, Peggy, I hope that 
people like you can insist that we take a belligerent stand if we are dragged 
in. Of course, I am not sure whether this information is true, but I can well 
believe it. 

Cordially, 

[S] Betty. 

Betty Ussachevskt. 

Now, did you ever discuss the subject matter of that letter as such 
or as a subject with Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Mr. Owen Lattimore, 
or anyone else in the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, discussing the subject matter of 
that letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, can you not be more definite? 
Can you not be more definite after hearing that letter read ? 



2118 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge, I can be that definite, 
to the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not discuss the subject 
matter of that letter with anyone. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard of the subject of that 
letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of the subject of that letter? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No; I had not heard that the IPR was going to be 
under investigation. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you heard of any of the other things ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I had not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore 
any question having to do with surveillance of IPR members, search- 
ing of the IPR offices, or possible attempts to check the IPR for 
communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no current knowledge of having such a con- 
versation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have had such a conversa- 
tion ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't deny that the Lattimores may have mentioned 
to me at some time they were afraid of the IPR. I have to testify 
1 have no knowledge at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. I want that answer to my question read back. 

(The answer referred to was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Ferguson. What do you say now ? 

Mr. Vincent. What I said then was, in answer to Mr. Sourwine's 
question, I do not deny it is possible they did discuss it with me. 

Senator Ferguson. Discuss what with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. The fact that the IPR might have been under in- 
vestigation. 

Senator Ferguson. This letter is dated December 5, 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that the first mention of red herring, Mr. 
Vincent ? 

Senator Ferguson. In connection with communism. 

Mr. Vincent. I can't testify as to whether it was the first men- 
tion. 

Senator Ferguson. You know the words "red herring" in relation 
to investigations of communism became rather prominent later? 

Mr. Vincent. I heard that, yes, sir, when I was in Switzerland. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were in Switzerland in 1947 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was in 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Here we have a girl wlio is worried about a possible 
investigation that might involve the IPR, using the phrase "red her- 
ring" in a letter to Mrs. Stewart. Mrs. Stewart forwards that letter 
to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore and suggests that Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore 
get in touch with you about the matter. 

Can you say definitely you never saw this letter of Betty Ussa- 
chevsky's ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can say to the best of my knowledge and belief I 
never saw that letter. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say definitely you never were told about it ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2119 

Mr. Vincent. I can say definitely I have no recollection of ever 
being told about it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is a dijfferent thing. 

]\Ir. Vincent. I am trying to say to the best of my knowledge and 
belief I did not see that letter nor was I told about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think you would remember that 
letter if you saw it before ? , 

Mr. Vincent. I think I would, yes, and therefore I am testifying 
to the best of my knowledge and belief I didn't see that letter. 

]\Ir. Sourwine. May these two letters be inserted in the record at 
this point ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, they will be received. 

(The letters referred to are Exhibit No. 382-A and No. 382-B, and 
are read in full.) 

Senator Ferguson. You did have a conversation with one or both 
of the Lattimores ? 

Mr. Vincent. From time to time ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. About the IPK, and its connection with com- 
munism ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, my testimony was that I said it would have 
been possible to have had a conversation but I do not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. That does not help this committee at all, that it 
could be possible that you had such a conversation. I am asking you, 
did you ever have a conversation ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, I did not, but I am also testifying in response to your question 
that they might have mentioned it to me at some time. I am speaking 
now from my memory of 5 years ago. 

Senator Ferguson. Which do you think is the more probable, that 
they did or did not? You have given both ways in the record, as I 
recall it. Which is right ? 

Did they ever talk to you about the IPR and communism ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am testifying that I have no recollection of their 
talking to me about communism in the IPR, but I am saying I am not 
denying that such a thing is possible for them to have discussed it 
with me, but based on my memory, on my memory, I do not recall such 
a conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. You are not a lawyer, are you? 

Mr. Vincent. I am not a lawyer. 

Senator Ferguson. You understand that you are under oath ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And have been under oath ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator L erguson. And are you giving now your best answer? 

Mr. Vincent. I am giving you the best answers. 

Senator Ferguson. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am telling you I have no recollection about the 
conversation in regard to that. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you what the conversation 
was. I am asking you whether you ever had a conversation with 
both or either of the Lattimores about the IPR and communism. 

Mr. Vincent. I am telling you that I have no recollection of that 
conversation. 



2120 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. That does not say that you did not have the 
conversation. It merely says now you have no recollection. 

Mr. Vincent. That is perfectly correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a mental reaction at the present time 
that you have no — — 

Mr. Vincent. My memory does not inform me that I had a con- 
versation. 

Senator Ferguson. So if we could prove you did, it would only be 
a matter that you did not remember it at this particular moment ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is perfectly correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I would like to clean up one thing about Mr. Fried- 
man. I have read you part of a description of Mr. Friedman. I 
would like to read the rest of it and ask you if it is accurate, so far 
as you know. 

At the time of the Amerasia investigation, he — 

that is Friedman — 

held the rating of Division Assistant in the office of John Carter Vincent, Chief 
of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the 
United States Department of State? 

Is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. What are you reading from, sir? I have already 
testified that he might have had the title of "Division Assistant." I 
did not recall his exact title. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Vincent, you were a pretty close friend of 
the Lattimores? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think now, after hearing these letters 
read to you, that they should have come to you and discussed this 
matter with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, we can go back to that again. I have said 
already that it is quite possible that the Lattimores had discussed it 
with me, but I cannot recall the occasion of any such discussion. 

It could have happened later, but I went to Moscow with Mr. Byrnes 
4 or 5 days after that letter was written, but the conversation could 
have taken place after I returned. 

Mr. SouR^\aNE. Did you have Julian Friedman with you in San 
Francisco at the United Nations Conference? 

Mr. Vincent. Julian Friedman was out in San Francisco at the 
United Nations Conference working on the Secretariat of the Con- 
ference. 

I was assigned to the office that was set up under Mr. Ballantine to 
keep contact with the far eastern delegation. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not have any contact with Mr. Friedman at 
San Francisco? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I saw Mr. Friedman at San Francisco. You 
asked me whether he was assigned to me at San Francisco. 

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you whether you had him with you in San 
Francisco. 

Mr. Vincent. My answer is that he was in San Francisco at the 
same time I was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the assignment to 
San Francisco ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2121 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall having anything to do with it. He, 
himself, independently tried to get the job. 

There was a notice around to try to get people on the Secretariat, 
and he got that job for himself. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that assignment away from your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. That assignment was away from my office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you not asked to approve that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have had to be asked to approve it. 

Mr. Sourwine. So you know you did approve it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Either I approved it or the Deputy Chief of the 
Division approved it. I don't know who approved it. He asked for 
permission to go to San Francisco, and he would have had to ask 
permission from me. AVho actually signed the order for him to go to 
San Francisco, I don't know. It wouldn't have been me, to sign his 
orders. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess here until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., this 
same day.) 

afternoon session 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mv. Chairman, this morning it was ordered that a 
request be made of the State Department to send someone down here 
who was familiar with their distribution of documents and their dis- 
tribution coding. I believe such a man is here. I would ask that he 
be sworn and that we hold JVIr. Vincent on the stand while I ask a few 
questions of this gentleman from the State Department. 

The Chairman. All right. Do you solemnly swear the testimony 
you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Stuftlebeam. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF EOBEET E. STUFELEBEAM, CHIEF, DIVISION OF 
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. Sourwine. What is your name, sir? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. Kobert Stufflebeam. 

Mr. Sourwine. And your position with the Department of State ? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. Chief of the Division of Communications and 
Records. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Stufflebeam, I hand you a document which this 
morning was placed in the record of this committee. Will you read 
the heading? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. The underscored portion ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. Just enough to identify what the document is. 

Mr. Stufflebeam. This document is headed "Far East," and the first 
sentence reads : 

The July issue of the Amerasia suggests possibility of using the Japanese 
Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping the 
Japanese people to establish government — 

Is that sufficient ? 

122848— 52— pt. 7—9 



2122 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouEwiNE. That is a two-page paper, is that correct ? 

Mr. Sttjfflebeam. That is a two-page paper. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And in the lower left-hand corner of the second 
page appear some symbols ? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. There are a number of symbols there, which 
appear to be Navy organizational units. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you say those are distribution symbols, those 
are symbols indicating the distribution of this paper? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. If the Navy uses a system similar to the system 
used by the State Department, those would probably be distribution 
symbols. 

Mr. Sourwine. Those are not State Department distribution 
symbols ? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. No. Navy. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you sufficiently familiar with the Navy Depart- 
ment distribution symbols to tell us what those symbols mean ? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. I am not f amilar enough to know what organiza- 
tional units these would stand for. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, it appears that we have gone to the 
wrong place for our information. Perhaps we owe Mr. Stufflebeam an 
apology. I would suggest that he be excused and that we make a re- 
quest of the Navy Department that they send us a man to try to 
identify these symbols. 

The Chairman. There are none of those symbols that you can 
identify, is that right ? 

Mr. Stufflebeam. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it instructed, Mr. Chairman, that the staff request 
the Navy Department to send someone up here ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. May we hold this matter in abeyance until the Navy 
Department man gets here ? 

The Chairman. The matter will stand in abeyance. 

Mr. Sourwine. Thank you, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS 
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, do you remember testifying in execu- 
tive session about the question of whether you ever gave or arranged 
a luncheon for members of the IPR at the Blair Lee House ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; I do. 

Mr. SouuwiNE. Would you briefly summarize your testimony in 
that regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. May I refer to the testimony? I think I testified 
then that 1 had no distinct recollection of it, that luncheons and din- 
ners were given there, and that I did not know of any luncheon or 
dinner particularly that I had given. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you testify that you might have arranged such 
luncheon ? 

Mr, Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. And that if you had, while you would have been 
host, the State Department would have paid for the luncheon? 

Mr. Vincent. If I said I was host, I might have been host. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2123 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You said you might have been ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have since investigated to find out what this func- 
tion is, which is the only one that I recall having any part in. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what I wanted to find out, if you had 
checked up. 

Mr. Vincent. May I say that I found out that it occurred on Jan- 
uary 23, 1945, after the termination of the IPR conference in Hot 
Springs. 

Mr. Sour WINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. That is was a reception arranged primarily for tha. 
foreign delegates who had attended that conference. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. That is, delegates from foreign nations? 

Mr, Vincent. Delegates from foreign nations. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Who had attended the IPR conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Who had attended the IPR conference. 

Mr. Sour WINE. I said it was a reception. You mean it was a. 
luncheon ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; a reception. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. At the Blair Lee House ? 

Mr. Vincent. The one I have in mind now. I don't recall a lunch- 
eon. It was a reception at which Mr. Grew — because at that time Mr. 
Grew was Under Secretary but was familiar with the area and famil- 
iar with some of the people, that Mr. Grew would act as host to this 
group of I would say distinguished foreigners. I have copied down 
here the names of some of them. If you would like me to 

Mr. SouR\^^NE. We would like those in a moment, sir, but I would 
like to ask you first what did you have to do with arranging this 
luncheon. 

Mr. Vincent. As far as the record shows 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I beg your pardon. This reception. 

Mr. Vincent. This reception. Insofar as the record will show, I 
asked that invitations be sent down to Hot Springs, and I think it was 
there that I gave these people their invitations to attend this reception. 
I may have made a preliminary survey to see whether they would be 
in W^ashington at that date rather than just asking them without any 
anticipation that they would be there. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So while Mr. Grew was the host, you were the, shall 
we say, major-domo of the affair? 

Mr, Vincent. I was the fellow who arranged for the foreigners. 
There were Americans present, too, which Mr. Ballentine, in the State 
Department who was Director of the Far Eastern Office, kindly ar- 
ranged there to get the foreigners together. 

Mr. Sourwine. How many people were there altogether, do you 
know? 

Mr. Vincent. About 60, sir, 

JNIr. Sourwine. Is there anywhere in existence a guest list for that 
reception ? 

Mr. Vincent. There is, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have it? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether we have it here or not. It is 
in existence. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you furnish it to the committee? 

Mr. Vincent. I can furnish it to the committee, yes sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have copied off certain names ? 



2124 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



Mr. Vincent. I have copied off quickly certain of the names. Not 
all 60 of them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I am going on and ask you to give us those names in 
a moment, but would you agree now that you will furnish the com- 
mittee with the complete guest list? 

Mr. Vincent. I agree to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. May it be ordered, Mr. Chairman, that that list 
when furnished be inserted in the record at this point? 

The Chairman. Such will be the order. 

(The document referred to is Exhibit No. 383 and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 383 

List of Guests Invited to a Reception To Be Given by the Honorable Joseph C. 
Gbew, Undee Secretary of State, in Honor of Delegates to the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, on January 23, 1945, at Blair-Lee House at 6 O'Clock 



IPR delegates and officials : 
Bailey, K. H. (Australia) 
Bolton, Hon. Frances P. (United 

States) 
Belshaw, Horace (New Zealand) 
Bundle, Ralph (United States) 
darter, Edward C. (United States) 
Chiang, Mon-lin (China) 
Dennett, Raymond (United States) 
Eggleston, Sir Frederic (Aus- 
tralia) 
Farmer, "Victor (United Kingdom) 
Gyaw, the Honorable Sir Htoon 

Aung (United Kingdom) 
Hart, Admiral T. C. (United 

States) 
Johnstone, Wililam C. (United 

States) 
Kunzru, H. N. (India) 
McDougall, Sir Raibeart (United 

Kingdom) 
Horizon, Colonel Victor (France) 
Naggiar, Paul Emile (France) 
Pramoj, M. R. Seni (Thailand) 
Rao, B. Shiva (India) 
Reid, E. (Canada) 
Shao, Yu-lin (China) 
Turner, Bruce (New Zealand) 
Visman, Franx H. (Netherlands) 
Watt, Alan S. (Australia) 
Yang, Yun-chu (China) 
Yeh, George (China) 
Zafra, Urbano A. (Philippines) 



The Secretary 

The Under Secretary 

Mr. Dunn 

Mr. McLeish 

Mr. Acheson 

Mr. Clayton 

Mr. Hackworth 

Mr. Pasvolsky 

Mr. Edwin Wilson 

Mr. Mathews 

Mr. Blakeslee 

Mr. Ballantine 

Mr. Dooman 

Mr. Stanton 

Mr. Lockhart 

Mr. Dickover 

Mr. Vincent 

Mr. Meyer 

Mr. Steintorf 

Mr. Williams 

Mr. Moffat 

Mr. Dickey 

Mr. Taft 

Mr. Julius Holmes 

Mr. Haley 

Mr. Peck 

Mr. Fearey 

Mr. Friedman 

Mr. Sol Bloom 

Mr. Eaton 

Senator Connally 

Senator Hiram Johnson 



Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Will you tell us the names you have copied off ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have copied off some of the more prominent ones. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When did you see that list? 

Mr. Vincent. I saw that list a matter of 3 days ago, sometime 
this week after the question was raised. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You got it from the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I got it from the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Very good. 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, there were about 60 guests. The for- 
eigners included, I shall say, Chiang Mon-lin, who was the prin- 
cipal Chinese delegate 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you spell these names for the reporter ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2125 

Mr. ViNCE]srr. Chiang Mon-lin — C-h-i-a-n-g M-o-n-l-i-'ji. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Who is he? 

Mr. Vincent. He was the principal Chinese delegate, if I recollect. 
He was on the Chinese delegation. 

Sir Andrew McFayden — M-c-F-a-y-d-e-n — I think that is the way 
it is spelled. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Before you talk about Mr. McFayden, was the 
Chinese gentleman you mentioned Nationalist Chinese or did he have 
some other connection? 

Mr. Vincent. He was Nationalist Cliinese. 

Mr. SouE^^^[NE. Is he still ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know what position he occupies now. He 
was with the Nationalists and was an adviser. He is primarily an 
educationalist, who had been president of a university before the Jap- 
anese invasion. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To save questions, as you mention each one of these 
names will you give a little thumbnail sketch about him and what 
his connection is so far as you know it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Sir Andrew McFayden was the British or United 
Kingdom delegate. I had never met him before and don't know what 
his position was other than as a leading delegate for the British. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To the IPR conference. 

Mr. Vincent. To the IPR. There was a Mr. Naggiar. He was 
French, and I don't know what his position was at that time, but he 
later became the French delegate to the Far Eastern Commission. 

There was Sir Frederic Eggleston, who was at that time Austral- 
ian Minister in Washington. He attended the conference. 

There was a Mr. Zafra of the Philippine delegation. I know no 
more about him. 

There was a Mr. George Yeh, of China. He came over from England 
and was at that time in the Chinese Embassy at Hongkong. 

There was a Mr. Belsliaw, of New Zealand, whom I camiot identify 
any further than that I recall the man. 

There was a Mr, Bailey, of Australia. He was a member of the 
staff of the Australian legation, if I remember correctly. 

There was a Mr. Eeed, of Canada. 

There was a Mr. Shao Yu-Lin, of China. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you spell that? 

Mr. Vincent. Shao Yu-Lin ; S-h-a-o Y-u-L-i-n. He was with the 
Chinese Government at that time and if he still occupies the same po- 
sition he had when I was in China, he was with an information service 
with the government. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think he still occupies the same position 
that he had when you were in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know what position he occupies now, sir. 
I haven't heard of him for years. He was a friend of mine in Chung- 
king, and my testimony was if when he came over here in 1945, he still 
occupied the position when I had known him in Chungking, it would 
have been in connection with some kind of information service in the 
government. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is just another way of testifying that at the 
time you knew him in Chungking he was in some kind of information 
service, right? 



2126 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I thought you asked me whether he was now 

in it ; in the Chinese Government. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I did. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. But you didn't mean to suggest that you think he is? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. All right. 

Mr. Vincent. There was a Mr. Turner, of New Zealand; a Mr. 
Farmer, of the United Kingdom. There was a Mister or Sir, Sir I 
have it, Sir Gyaw, of Burma. There was Colonel Morizon, of France. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do any of those people have Communist connec- 
tions ? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I know, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know anything more about Mr. Belshaw 
than you have told us ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Belshaw ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not know any more than I have told you 
about him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You do not know, then, whether he had any Com- 
munist connections ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that the complete list as you copied it? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the complete list. There were probably twice 
that many. 

Mr. SouR^VINE. How many names are there on that list? 

Mr. Vincent. There are 15, but there is a Mr. Pramog of Siam, who 
I see I skipped. 

Mr. Sour WINE. On what basis did you select the 16 names that you 
have there? 

Mr. Vincent. I have selected the 16 names primarily on the basis 
that they would be available to come to a reception in Washington. 
Many of them were going back to their homes. 

Mr. Sourwine. No. You are answering that question in the con- 
notation of why did you select them to be invited. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am glad to have that information. But what I 
meant was when you copied these 16 names down from the list of 60 
on what basis did you copy these 16 ? Were they the only 16 foreigners 
or were they the only 16 people whose invitations you were responsible 
for or in what other category did they fall that you chose to copy 
down these names? 

Mr. Vincent. I copied these names down, my recollection, as being 
a representative of the people who were there. 

Mr. SouRW^NE. This is a representative list of the people who were 
there? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Sourwine. These approximately 25 percent is a cross-section of 
those who were there, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were there any Americans there? 

Mr Vincent. I was coming to that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine, Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. There was also present Mr. Carter, Edward Carter. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2127 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Edward C. Carter? 

Mr. Vincent. Of IPR, Edward C. Carter. Mr. Dennett of the 
IPR. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Raymond? 

Mr. Vincent. Raymond. There was present Admiral Hart, re- 
tired at that time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was he connected with IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. He was a member of the American delegation. That 
was the reason for his inclusion here. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that Tommy Hart, what is his first name ? 

Mr. Vincent. The one who was in the Far East. I would not be 
able to know what his first name was. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he a Senator at one time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, he was a Senator at one time. 

Senator Ferguson. Tom Hart, then. 

Mr. Vincent. There was Mr. Johnstone, William Johnstone, 
George Washington University. 

Mr. Sourwine. He was with IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. There was Mrs. Frances Bolton of the United 
States Congress. 

Mr. Sourwine. A Representative from Ohio ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, at that time, and a member of the American 
delegation to the IPR conference. There was Sol Bloom, Mr. Eaton, 
both of the United States Congi^ess, House of Representatives. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that Dr. Eaton ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. And there was Senator Connally. 

I could not say with complete assurance that every one of these came 
because the check list I have did not show. I mention that simply 
because I do not have down Senator Johnson, Hiram Johnson, be- 
cause there was a clear indication that he could not come. 

From the Department we had besides Mr. Grew, who was host, and 
myself, there was Mr. Dunn and here I have given just a few of the 
names. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that James C. Dunn ? 

Mr. Vincent. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary. There was Mr. 
Will Clayton, Under Secretary. There was Ballantine, of course. 
Mr. Dooman. Mr. Matthews, who at that time was Director of the 
European Office. Mr. Julius Holmes. There was Mr. Acheson. 

Mr. Sourwine. Dean Acheson? 

Mr. Vincent. Assistant Secretary at that time; yes. There was 
Charles Taft. 

Mr. Sourwine. Charles P. Taft? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. And Mr. Hackworth. 

That is all I have here. This is far from complete. 

Mr. Sourwine. George Hackworth? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; the American list, I mean the list from the State 
Department — I cannot be too sure how many of them came to it — 
was made up in the State Department and I don't know how many 
came. Looking back on it, I didn't even put the name down here. I 
think that the Secretary was included on the list but I would doubt 
that the Secretary got over to that reception. 

Mr. Sourwine, That was a very strong top-level representation 
from the State Department, wasn't it ? 



2128 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; and for that reason I question whether every one 
of them came. My recollection is that Mr. Will Clayton came. I am 
sure Mr. Grew came. They were all invited. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. An effort was made to get them there ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. You say the State Department paid for this recep- 
tion? 

Mr. Vincent. The State Department. It was a State Department 
reception. I remember looking up, which I had not known before, 
how must it cost, and the reception for 59 or 60 people cost only $53, 
which was a fairly good bargain. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You didn't serve any food; did you? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, we served food. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the decision as 
to who would be invited to this reception other than the suggestions 
that you have already said you made with regard to the foreign 
delegates ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the ones who were down — No, I don't recall mak- 
ing any selection from the State Department people. 

Mr. Sourwine. I mean did you designate or name or suggest any of 
those foreign delegates who were there ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You made out that list ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was the one who would have handed them their 
invitations. My recollection is that the list was made up down in the 
IPR there. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is the list of people to be invited ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did that include the IPR people, the Americans 
also? 

Mr. Vincent. It included those that I have mentioned here. 

Mr. SouR^viNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. The IPR people that I have mentioned. 

Mr. Sourwine. And possibly some others. 

Mr. Vincent. Possibly some others. 

Mr. Sourwine. If there were any IPR people invited they were on 
the list that was made up down at the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. But the IPR didn't make up a list of the State De- 
partment people they wanted or did they ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; not that I recall. The IPR did not make up the 
State Department list. In these papers I have seen the statement 
made that Mr, Ballentine said he would take care of the foreign list. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that at your request? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. It would have been the normal 
thing, I think, to do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who initiated the request for the State Department 
people? 

Mr. Vincent. There is no record up there that I initiated it, but 
Mr. Ballantine would have understood the idea was to have these 
foreigners entertained by State Department people. 

Mr. Sourwine. Whose idea was that originally? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't remember. It could have been mine, but 
as I say, whether I initiated or thought up the idea or whether it was 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS - 2129 

somebody in the IPR who thought it would be an excellent idea 
or whether it was even Ballantine who thought it would be a good 
idea, but I think 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember receiving a letter, Mr. Vincent, 
in December of 1944 about the matter of this affair? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify that as a photostat of 
a letter from the IPR files ? 

Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of a letter from the IPR files. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I show you this, Mr. Vincent, and ask you 

The Chairman. Please identify it as to date. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I was going to ask Mr. Vincent to read it, sir. 

The Chairman. I just wanted to identify it for the record. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This is a letter dated December 19, 1944, and signed 
Raymond Dennett, secretary, addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent, 
Department of State, Washington, D. C. 

Would you read it, sir, and then tell us if that refreshes your recol- 
lection in any way ? 

Mr. Vincent. Read it just to myself? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If you wish, or aloud, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. (Examining document.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To what extent does that refresh your recollection ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that it refreshes my recollection to the 
extent that now that I see this letter it tells me how the matter was 
first initiated. 

Mr. Sour^vine. Tell us how the matter was first initiated. 

Mr. Vincent. This matter was first initiated presumably by my 
speaking to or writing to Mr. Dennett about the matter. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that all that you can remember now ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is all I can remember now. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right, Mr. Chairman, would you prefer that this 
letter be read into the record now or would you rather have it inserted ? 

The Chairman. I think you might read it into the record now. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is fairly short, sir. 

Dear Mr. Vincent: I was very pleased indeed with your suggestion that 
you might be able to arrange either for Mr. Grew or yourself to have seven or 
eight of the top members of the conference to a luncheon at Blair-Lee House 
in the week following the conclusion of our meeting. If it is acceptable to you, 
I would suggest that you try for a reservation at the Blair-Lee House January 
23 or 24, as Mr. Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee wishes to have 
a luncheon on the Hill on Monday, January 22. 

If you could confirm which date you would like to have the luncheon, we 
can keep it open, making up our list after we look the situation over in Hot 
Springs. The reason I ask that you confirm some date is that I suspect that 
Tom Connally may want to have a similar meeting with the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the Senate, and I just don't want to get mixed up on our dates. 

With cordial best wishes and sincerest thanks, I am, 
Sincerely yours, 

Raymond Dennett, Secretary. 

He was secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations; was he not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you testify that your original suggestion was 
to have 7 or 8 of the top members of the conference to a luncheon? 

Mr. Vincent. I can testify after reading that letter, but I would 
not have distinguished between that and the reception, and my testi- 



2130 . INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

mony would be that somewhere along the line we decided to have 
many more than just a luncheon and decide to have a reception. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. That is perfectly clear. You originally suggested 
7 or 8 of the top delegates and between then and the time you held it, 
it grew into a luncheon for 60 people ? 

Mr. Vincent. Reception. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Reception, and a number of IPR people and a num- 
ber of top State Department people ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether the suggestions for the growth 
came from you or from the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether they came from one or the 
other. I would imagine that in this case they came from me, think- 
ing it would be a better idea to get that many people together to try 
to meet some of the State Department people rather than to try to 
be selective and get only a few. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said the IPR made out a list, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. No, my testimony was that down at Hot Springs, 
whether I conferred with IPR people or not, was that I would have 
remembered that I made out the list of these people. 

Mr. Sourwine. I understood you to say that the IPR made out a 
list of the people who were to be invited to this reception, that they 
put on that list the names of the foreign delegates and that they put 
on that list the names of any IPR people who wer,e there, but that the 
names of the State Department people were added separately at the 
Department. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I think if you will check back here 
it was a slip of the tongue. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember testifying to that effect? 

Mr. Vincent. My recollection is that I testified that I chose the 
ones in Hot Springs and that Mr. Ballantine picked the foreign guests, 
I mean the American guests. 

Mr. Sourwine. You do not remember testifying substantially as 
I just recited to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, and I think if you will check back I said that I 
picked out the ones down at the IPR conference, the members down 
there, and Mr. Ballantine chose the ones 

Mr. Sourwine. The record, of course, will speak for itself, but I 
wanted to know what your memory at this time was. 

Mr. Vincent. My memory is that I, with probably some assistance 
from the IPR, went around and found out which ones of the delegates 
would be available for such a reception or luncheon, I don't know 
when the change from one to the other, to be given in Washington on or 
about the 23d. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who picked the IPR people to attend? Did you 
select those people ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was my recollection, and that is what I thought 
I testified, that I picked them in consultation with, I suppose, these 
people themselves and with IPR people. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the IPR give you a list of any kind? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall them giving me a list. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you testify that they didn't give you a list? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot testify they did not give me a list. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2131 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE, But you definitely do not remember that there was 
any list of people from the IPR in connection with this reception? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall ; as I say, I do not recall who picked 
the list. I thought I had picked the list of people by asking them 
and 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not now recall having had any list from 
theIPE? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall having had it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not now recall having testified here con- 
cerning any list from the IPR ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That a list was received by me from the IPR.? I 
do not recall testifying that I received a list. 

Mr. Sourwine. I ask you, Do you recall testifying here concerning 
any IPR list of people to be invited to this reception ? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that I do not recall receiving a list- 
The best of my recollection is that in consultation down there, pre- 
sumably with other people, a list was made out more or less under my 
supervision. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall testifying here 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire. Were you a trustee of the IPR 
at this time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And listed on the letterhead of the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. T suppose I was, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this part of your duties as trustee, do you 
think? 

Mr. Vincent. No. The whole inception of this thing from my point 
of view was to get some of these distinguished foreigners together with 
some of our State Department people who were handling far-eastern 
problems or European problems and to have them meet. The main 
idea was to give them a reception, to give them some entertainment 
here in Washington after the conclusion of the conference there. 

]Mr. Sourwine. When you originally suggested that, sir, and at 
that time you were suggesting a luncheon 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you include in your suggestion among those 
to be invited Mr. Bloom and Mr. Connally and other Members of 
Congress ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; my suggestions had only to do, as I recall it, with 
the foreigners, but again, if Mr. Dennett discussed it I would have 
said promptly it would have been a good idea to have members of 
the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees. 

Mr. Sourwine. If he had suggested it you would readily have 
acceded; would you not? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly would. 

Mr. Sourwine. In fact, did he suggest it or did you subsequently 
suggest that those men should be included ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as the papers in the State Department are 
concerned, I would have thought that Mr. Ballantine, who was in 
charge of getting invitations to the American guests, may have sug- 
gested it himself. 

Mr. Sourwine. Don't you think that this letter that you have just 
read and which I subsequently read aloud, indicates that in acknowl- 
edging your suggestion Mr. Dennett was already bringing in names 



2132 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

of that nature? He mentioned Mr. Bloom and mentioned Mr. 
Connally ? 

Mr. Vincent. That he was trying to get them, but you are asking 
me whether I might have suggested to him originally to get them 
and he tried to get them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You stated, did you not, that you did not originally 
suggest them. 

Mr. Vincent. I said I had no recollection of originally recommend- 
ing Members of the House. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then I asked you whether subsequently you first 
broached it or he did, and I understood you to start saying that you 
thought Mr. Ballantine first brought that subject up. 

Mr. Vincent. I said that I thought Mr. Ballantine, in accordance 
with the memorandum I have seen in the State Department, was left 
with the matter of choosing and getting invitations to the foreigners — 
I mean to the Americans. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To what? 

Mr. Vincent. To the American members. 

]Mr. Sourwine. Are you now testifying that it was Mr. Ballantine's 
decision and Mr. Ballantine's initiative with regard to all of the 
Americans who were invited to this reception? 

Mr. Vincent. Certainly the Americans that came from the State 
Department. I say, I don't see what the point here is, but if Mr. 
Dennett himself first suggested that we have Mr. Bloom and Senator 
Connally and the others, he would have had then to take it up with 
Mr. Ballantine because Mr. Ballantine was in charge of getting out 
the invitations. 

Mr, Sourwine. The point here is very clear, sir. I will try to make 
it apparent. 

Mr. Vincent. I wish you would. 

Mr. Sourwine. Here was a reception which was held by the State 
Department, as a State Department function, which brought together 
high officials of the IPR, high officials of the State Department, and 
foreign delegates to the IPR convention and certain important and 
influential Members of Congress? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. This affair was brought about, you have testified, 
through your initiation originally. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right ? 

Mr. Sourwine. The question arises whether the concept of the whole 
affair as it finally was held was yours or whether your initial con- 
cept was seized upon and, through suggestion or otherwise, expanded 
by the IPR. In other words, to what extent the IPR influenced what 
was ultimately decided with regard to this reception. That is what 
I am trying to get at. If you will address yourself to that we will 
be very grateful. 

Mr. Vincent. I have to address myself to it in the same way that 
I have, that from a reading of Mr. Dennett's letter it would appear 
that he was going to contact the Congressmen. From a reading of 
the memo that I have up in the State Department, that Mr. Ballantine 
was in charge of getting the Americans from the State Department, 
and that insofar as my recollection goes, the foreign guests at Hot 
Springs were chosen by me or in consultation with IPR people. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2133 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That still leaves one category of guests at this re- 
ception, does it not, that you have not mentioned ? To wit, the Ameri- 
can IPR members. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Who suggested their names? Who made up the 
list of American IPR people who were to be brought to this reception ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection. It might have been 
me. It might have been someone else. It might have been somebody 
down there. It would certainly have been very obvious to me to have 
Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have quickly jumped at the suggestion 
of Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have wanted to have Admiral! 
Hart. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would Mrs. Bolton have come under the IPR group- 
or under the congressional group ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mrs. Bolton would have come under the American 
delegation group. She was down there in Hot Springs. She would 
have been one in Hot Springs that I would have contacted to find out 
whether she could come, and the invitation would have been delivered 
to her in Hot Springs. 

Mr. Sourwine, How about American IPR people who were neither 
State Department nor congressional? Who decided which of those; 
people were going to come ? 

Mr. Vincent. Who were neither IPR 

Mr. Sourwine. IPR people who were neither State Department 
nor congressional. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who made the final deci- 
sion. As I say 

Mr. Sourwine. If it wasn't you 

Mr. Vincent. Mrs. Bolton. It would have been to me obvious to 
have Mrs. Bolton. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mrs. Bolton doesn't fall within that category, does 
she ? Mrs. Bolton was congressional, wasn't she ? 

Mr. Vincent. She was congressional but was a member of the 
American delegation and was at Hot Springs. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have stressed that fact several times. I am 
attempting to talk about IPR people who were neither congressional 
nor Stnte Department. There were such, were there not ? 

Mr. Vincent. There were. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. Wlio decided which people, in that categoryy 
were to come ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who decided. I would 
say it would have been quite easy for me to decide. The names here 
seem to me to be obvious people who would come. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a list that included all the IPR people 
who were there ? 

Mr. Vincent. All of the IPR people so far as I know, 

Mr. Sourwine. There will be no names on this list you are going to 
furnish us 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't promise I might not have missed a name. 
The list will be furnished you. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you consult with the IPR about what IPR 
people were going to be invited ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would naturally have consulted with them. I said 
I consulted with the people down there as to who were to be invited, 



2134 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

but I say here are the people that I have on here. I have on here also 
Senator Connally in that group. He was not a member of the 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Of course. It was their suggestion, that is the IPR's 
suggestion, as to what IPK people should be invited, wasn't it? 

The Chairman. Wliose suggestion ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I can't recall. It would be perfectly logical 
for the IPE. to have suggested people who would be coming to this 
reception. As far as I can see here there are four of them who were 
suggested. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. All right, sir. You will furnish the full list ? 

Mr. Vincent. Five of them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You will furnish the full list ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I will furnish the full list. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall whether you ever discussed with Mr. 
Dennett plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't recall discussing that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett the matter 
of IPR. activity in connection with the United Nations Conference in 
San Francisco? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of it, but again I will say I 
quite easily might have discussed with him that question. 

Mr. SoTTRwiNE. Did you ever suggest to Mr. Dennett that it might 
be very desirable for the IPR to put on a series of small dinners dur- 
ing the course of the Conference, the San Francisco Conference, for 
the Far Eastern people at that conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of it, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever express an opinion to Mr. Dennett 
with regard to the necessity or desirability of the IPR providing 
a staff of specialists to be available for consultation during the United 
Nations Conference? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, if I had a conversation of that kind 
with Mr. Dennett I don't recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. AVould you have had a conversation like that with 
him? 

JNIr. Vincent. I could have had a conversation with him like that. 
I knew Mr. Dennett. 

Mr. Sourwine. At a time when the State Department was marshal- 
ling all of its own specialists to go to San Francisco, wasn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. It was, but not all of them. Many people went out 
to the San Francisco Conference. 

Mr. Sourwine. Certainly the Department sent its best qualified peo- 
ple out, didn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. The best available qualified people. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might at that time have expressed 
to Mr. Dennett the desirability of necessity of IPR providing a staff 
of specialists for consultation? 

Mr. Vincent. Consultation at the United Nations ? 
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I do not recall suggesting it to him. You 
mean for the United Nations? 
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. You mean to be on the staff of the United Nations? 
Mr. Sourwine. No. To be available for consultation during the 
Conference, an unofficial expert staff, so to speak. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2135 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I have no recollection of an instance of that 
kind, but it would seem — ■ — 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Would it have been unusual ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would not have been unusual to discuss with Mr. 
Dennett having people out there because there were many foreign 
delegates coming. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Could it be possible that you ever talked with Mr. 
Dennett about that matter in the presence of Alger Hiss? 

Mr. Vincent. Alger Hiss was Secretary-General of the Confer- 
ence. 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. You say could it be possible? I don't recall it, but 
it could be possible. He was in San Francisco if this conversation 
which I don't recall took place in San Francisco. 

Mr. SotJRwiNE. Did you and Mr. Hiss ever confer jointly here in 
Washington with Mr. Dennett about the matter of IPR activity at 
San Francisco? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall, sir, any conversation. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you mean to say by that that you did not ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I said I do not recall such a conference. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. If you conferred with Mr. Dennett about the United 
Nations Conference, did you at that time know that Mr. Dennett had 
also conferred in that connection with Mr. Alger Hiss ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know that, so far as I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Hiss was, as you stated, in charge of arrange- 
ments for the UN Conference at San Francisco, wasn't he? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Hiss was Secretary General of the Conference, 
but I don't know whether he was in charge of arrangements in advance 
of the Conference. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not know whether he was ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a matter of fact whether he was. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know to what extent Mr. Hiss' connection, 
if any, with the UN Conference at San Francisco was known early in 
March of 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. I have testified here that Mr. Hiss was 
at that time in charge of some kind of activities which had been con- 
nected with Dumbarton Oaks. He had left Dr. Hornbeck's office. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it public knowledge at that time that Mr. Hiss 
was in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Fran- 
cisco? That is, in March of 1945 was it know that Mr. Hiss was in 
charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Francisco? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether it was public knowledge or not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it known to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say I don't recall myself whether he was actu- 
ally in charge of arrangements or not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you discuss with Mr. Dennett probable length 
of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall discussing the probable length of the 
conference with him. As I say, I could have. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In early March of 1945 was it the policy of the 
State Department to encourage or to discourage the plans of private 
organizations to be present at the United Nations Conference in San 
Francisco ? 



2136 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. -I can't testify to that from exact knowledge, but I 
would say again that it was probably to encourage private organiza- 
tions to come out to San FranCisco. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think it was State Department policy at 
that time to encourage private organizations to be present in San 
Francisco ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact knowledge of it, but you are asking 
me whether I would have thought it would be and I say yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If you did talk with Mr. Dennett as the questions 
I have asked you would appear to indicate, and as you have not nega- 
tived, if you did so talk with Mr. Dennett, would you say that that 
was not contrary to any general rule or policy of the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have. As I say, I don't recall the conversa- 
tion. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember whether you indicated to Mr. 
Dennett in March of 1945, early March, or about that time, that the 
State Department would welcome a move on the part of the Institution 
of Pacific Relations with regard to defining and making arrangements 
for the Institute's activity in San Francisco in connection with the 
UN Conference? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall the conversation, but 
again I say that it is a perfectly reasonable conversation to have had 
if the IPR were coming out to San Francisco. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever assist or were you ever asked to assist 
in the securing of air priorities for Mr. Dennett or any other official or 
representative of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have assisted them in get- 
ting air priorities to go to San Francisco ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know how I would have been able to get them 
air priorities, but if I did it would be the first time in my recollection 
I ever got air priorities for anybody. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have been asked to assist 
them ? 

Mr. Vincent, I might have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Mandel, can you identify this as having been 
taken from the files of the IPR ? 

Mr. Mandel. This document dated March 5, 1945, addressed to 
Admiral John W. Greenslade, from Raymond Dennett, is a photostat 
of a document in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, this letter is two pages, but I think 
we should take the time to read it. May I have the permission of the 
Chair? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

My Dear Admibal : Saturday I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State Depart- 
ment, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Hiss 
attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the arrange- 
ments for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information is per- 
tinent to our plans. 

I ask you again at that point, suspending the reading for a moment — 
the date of this letter is March 5 — do you know whether on March 5, 
1945, it was general knowledge that Alger Hiss was going to be in 
charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2137 

Mr. Vincent. I still cannot say that I knew it was general knowl- 
edge. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I interrupt there. On March 5, 1945, did 
you know the contents of the Yalta agreement ? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1945 ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On March 5. 

Mr. Vincent. On March 5 I still did not know the contents. I have 
testified to that. 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to get the date. , 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they had been published 
at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. The Yalta agreement ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I am quite certain it had not been published by 
March 5. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you say now that the Yalta agreement or 
agreements were favorable to the U. S. S. R. ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Senator, I testified in executive session that I 
did not think they were favorable. I described them as nearly as I 
could as setting the wheels back, that they were retrogressive, that they 
had the possibilities of setting up a preferential position in Manchuria 
for the Russians, and I spoke of them as agreements which would be 
inimical to our own foreign 

Senator Ferguson. You were very critical of them ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was in July. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien you learned about them you say now that 
you are very critical of their contents ? 

Mr. Vincent. I told you that I was shocked. 

Senator Ferguson. You were shocked. Here is a letter indicating 
that they knew that Hiss had been at that meeting and they wanted in 
effect to make sure that they were going to San Francis'co or that he 
would go there. 

Mr. Vincent. That who was making sure. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. The writer of this letter. 

Mr. Vincent. But the contents of the China portion of the Yalta 
agreement were not public knowledge then. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it was known by the writer of this 
letter? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so. The writer of this letter is Mr. 
Dennett. I do not think so at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it indicate that it might be known by the 
writer of that letter that where Mr. Hiss had been there had been 
very favorable consideration to the Russians, to the Soviets ? In fact, 
it was so favorable that you said it was even shocking to you. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. You make take the witness, Mr. 
Sourwine. 

The Chairman. I think that letter should be inserted in the record, 
and then you may read it. It will be inserted in the record at this 
point. 

22848— 52— pt. 7 10 



2138 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 384," and is as 

follows:) 

Exhibit No. 384 

[Copy — For your information] 

Makch 5, 1945. 
Admiral John W. Greenslade, 

1201 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 
My Dear Admiral : Saturday, I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State De- 
partment, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, 
Hiss attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the 
arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information 
is pertinent to our plans : 

1. The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from 
the IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (a) library 
facilities, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (6) 
office space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many 
people they might accommodate, (c) an offer of any equipment, particularly 
foreign-language typewriters that might be available, (d) the offer of any 
specific housing accommodations, either individual or group, which might be 
arranged through the Bay Region Committee. 

2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section, 
who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget 
could permit it, to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Con- 
ference for the Far-Eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not 
specify the nature of these meetings, it was quite obvious that he felt that the 
IPR could be a very useful means of getting together some of the technical 
people and, possibly, some of the delegates to discuss informally some of the 
matters appearing on the agenda. 

3. Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR 
to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the 
Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped 
with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to 
library and other material. 

4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of 
Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference, he thought it would 
be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of each delegation received 
an appropriate number of copies early in the course of the Conference. 

.5. The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a mini- 
mum of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat 
iji advance. There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations 
from the various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably 
near future. It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delega- 
tions will not be known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference. 

6. Hiss also stated that the Department is not officially encouraging private 
organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to 
discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite appa- 
rent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since 
it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind. 

I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch send 
me immediately the following : 

1. A description of the library facilities — not over 200 words in length. 

2. A statement of whether any office space would be available. I would assume 
that one room at least could be loaned to the Conference, and possibly two, and 
that a total of six people could be given desks. The description should mention 
the size of the room and number of accommodations available. 

3. It might be desirable to consider whether we should not state in the letter 
that a committee to assist in housing had been set up which could probably 
make arrangements to take care of some specified number of people in private 
houses, say 2.5 to 40, or whatever number seems most appropriate. We could 
then state that the committee will not go into action until we receive word that 
their services are desired. 

4. It might be helpful to explore the possibilities of reserving rooms at some of 
the private clubs at 10-day to 2-week intervals, starting a week after the Con- 
ference opened, for possible dinners for groups of 15 or 25 people. These reserva- 
tions might be made in advance to protect us in case it does seem desirable to 
have dinners of the kind suggested. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2139 

If you will have the information forwarded to me at once, I will see that the 
formal letter goes to the State Department. There is no assurance, of course, 
that they will accept any of our offers, but they obviously would welcome the move 
on our part. 

Admiral Home was not in his office, so I shall have to wait until next week 
to find out about air priority. It seems to me that the best procedure would be 
for me to come out for a week or 10 days later this month and help work out 
preliminary plans. I could then return to New York, keep in touch here, and 
return later to San Francisco during the Conference, making arrangements, if it 
seems desirable, for members of the international staff to come periodically to 
assist as well. 

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter from the American Asso- 
ciation for the United Nations, which indicates their plans for Conference partici- 
pation. No doubt Mr. Rowell will be able to keep you in touch with developing 
plans which they may have. 

With vei'y cordial best wishes. 
Sincerely yours, 

Raymond Dennett, Secretary. 

Enclosures. 

( Enclosure sent with original only. ) 

The Chairman. You may continue to read, Mr. Sourwine. 
Mr. Sourwine. Subparagraph 1 : 

The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from the 
IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (a) library facili- 
ties, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (b) office 
space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many people 
the.v might accommodate, (c) an offer of any equipment, particularly foreign- 
language typewriters that might be available, {d) the offer of any specific housing 
accommodations, either individual or group, which might be arranged through 
the Bay Region Committee. 

2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section, 
who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget 
could permit it 

The Chairman. I suggest you listen to this, Mr. Vincent. 
Mr. Sourwine (continuing) : 

to put on a series of small dinners during tlie course of the Conference for the 
far-eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not specify the nature 
of these meetings, it was quite obvious that lie felt the IPR could be a very 
useful means of getting together some of the technical people and, possibly, some 
of the delegates to discuss informally some of the matters appearing on the 
agenda. 

Suspending the reading for a moment, does that paragraph in any 
way refresh your recollection, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. It does. 

Mr. Sourwine. To what extent ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the extent that I have testified before, that it 
was quite possible that I could have talked to Mr. Dennett and now 
I find that I did talk to Mr. Dennett. 

Mr. Sourwine. You now have an independent recollection that 
you did talk with Mr. Dennett about this matter ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I still don't have any independent recollection 
of a meeting with Mr. Dennett in 1945. 

The Chairman. That is not the question. Read the question. Re- 
peat the question. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am simply trying to determine, Mr. Chairman, 
whether Mr. Vincent's memory has in fact been refreshed or whether 
he simply having read this letter is willing to accept what Mr. Dennett 
wrote to Admiral Greenslade as a fact. 

Mr. Vincent. The latter is the case. 



2140 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You are willing to accept what Mr. Dennett wrote 
Admiral Greenslade as a fact ? 
Mr. Vincent. Yes. 
Mr. SouRwiNE. Subparagraph 3 : 

Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR 
to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the 
Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped 
with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to 
library and other material. 

4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of 
Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference — 

He refers there to the conference of the IPR, does he not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I suppose he does. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Security in the Pacific was the title of the report of 
the Hot Springs conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of the Hot Springs conference. 

Mr. Sourwine (continuing) : 

he thought it would be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of 
each delegation received an appropriate number of copies early in the course 
of the conference. 

Conference there means the San Francisco Conference, does it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. So what that states is that Alger Hiss recommended 
that each delegation to the San Francisco Conference receive an ap- 
propriate nuniber of copies of the report of the IPR Hot Springs 
conference? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Subparagraph 5 : 

The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a minimum 
of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat in 
advance — 

You don't know whom he meant by that, do you ? 
Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't. 
Mr. Sourwine (continuing the reading) : 

There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations from the 
various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably near future. 
It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delegations will not be 
known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference. 

Did you furnish to Mr. Dennett any of the information contained in 
that paragraph that I just read, the one that I designated as No. 5 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not, so far as I know. 

Mr. Sourwine. Subparagraph 6 : 

Hiss also stated that the Department is not oflScially encouraging private 
organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to 
discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite appar- 
ent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since 
it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind. 

Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett, sir? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall expressing that view to him, but I 
might easily have made that expression to him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does that fall within your statement that you are 
willing to accept as fact what Mr. Dennett wrote to Admiral Green- 
slade? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; it would fall within fact. I have no reason to- 
deny it. I only say that I don't recall making it. 



1 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2141 

Mr. SouBwiNE (continuing) : 

I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch 
send me immediately the following : 

And thereafter, Mr. Chairman, follows some instructions with regard 
to material to be sent to Mr. Dennett. There is no further mention of 
this witness or of Mr. Hiss. The matter has been placed in the record 
and I suggest it need not be read. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, a question to the witness if I 
may. 

The Chairman. Yes, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. This makes it quite clear that you were con- 
sulted about IPR going to San Francisco. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conference with Mr. Hiss 
about these problems? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall having any conference with Mr. Hiss — 
jointly with him. Mr, Hiss was in the Department and I might have 
had a conference with Mr. Hiss on these problems. 

Senator Ferguson. Would not this letter as a whole indicate that 
you and Hiss had conferred about it and had advised together? 

Mr. Vincent. Not from my recollection of the letter, sir. I would 
have thought here that Mr. Dennett came to see me and came to see 
Mr. Hiss, because there is reference in different paragraphs to what 
Mr. Hiss stated to him and what I said. 

Senator Ferguson. But apparently no conflict. 

Mr. Vincent. No conflict so far as I can see. I would have to read 
it again if there is a conflict in advice, but I don't see any. I don't 
recall any. 

Senator Ferguson. How many delegates had the IPR at San 
Francisco? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't state with any exactitude. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no idea how many they sent out there. 

Senator Ferguson. You were there ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was there. At the time this conversation took place 
I wasn't even expecting to go. It was probably the end of March or 
early April that I was designated to go out for the half time of the 
conference. I attended the first half of the conference and Mr. Stan- 
ton attended the second half as the assistant to Mr. Ballantine. 

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Before I move to another subject I would like to 
revert to two matters. One, you remember I asked you about Mr. 
Belshaw. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know that the State Department Bio-^ 
graphical Division would have had information on Mr. Belshaw in 
case you had wanted it? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that the State Department had a Bio- 
graphical Section at that time, but it might have, yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't know that the State Department main- 
maintained a Biographical Division? 



2142 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent, I know that it does now, but I am trying to place 
the time. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. When did you first learn that the State Department 
maintained a Biographical Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say I don't know when it may have started one, 
I know now that it had one when I went to the field, but I can't recall 
from memory 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It has been since 1945 that you learned that the 
State Department had a Biographical Division, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't testify exactly when the State Department 
maintained a Biographical Section. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know when you were Director of the Far 
Elastern Division that the State Department had a Biographical 
Division ? 

Mr, Vincent, Not as a positive fact, 

Mr, SouRWiNE, You called it a Biographical Section, Did you 
know there was a Biographical Section ? 

Mr, Vincent. You are asking me to say whether I knew there was 
a Biographical Section ? 

Mr, SouRwiNE. That is right, 

Mr. Vincent. I say I can't recall that there was. At the time I may 
have known it, but at the present moment I can't recall whether at that 
time I knew there was in existence a Biographical Section. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You cannot say whether while you were Director 
of the Far Eastern Division you knew whether the State Department 
had a Biographical Division or a Biographical Section ? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot at this moment say 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know it ? 

Mr. Vincent. That at the time I was Chief of the Division I may 
have known it, but at the present moment I am trying tell you that 
I don't know from memory that the State Department had a Bio- 
graphical Section. 

Mr, Sourwine, How did it come into your knowledge that they 
do have a Biographical Section ? 

Mr, Vincent. You mean to my positive knowledge ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I am saying now that when I was in the Far Eastern 
Office I would have known if there was one and may have known it, but 
I don't recall now whether I did know it. 

Mr. Sourwine. How do you know now ? 

Mr. Vincent, I know now because when I went to the field in 1947 
we were asked to send in biographical data on people abroad, 

Mr, Sourwine. Before that time you don't know whether you knew 
it or not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Before that time, as I say, I don't know now that I 
did know then, you see. 

Mr. Sourwine. As Director of the Far Eflstern Division, the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs or as Chief of the China Division, didn't you 
use the Biographical Division or Biographical Section of the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I am trying to tell you that I don't 
recall now whether I did or did riot use it or whether one existed, but 
I would be perfectly willing to say if one existed I would have used 
it and I am quite willing to say it would be perfectly logical for them 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2143 

to have one but on tlie basis of my memory now I haven't a distinct 
recollection of a Biographical Section. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is it a fair inference that you did not seek infor- 
mation from the State Department's Biographical Section or Divi- 
sion with regard to any of these foreign delegates who were invited 
to the Blair-Lee House reception? 

Mr. Vincent. That is a fair assumption. 

]Mr. SouRAViNE. That is the fact, is it not ? 

Mv. Vincent. That is the fact. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you present at any conference or conferences 
between Ambassador Patrick JIurley and General Wedemeyer in 
1945? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified in executive session that General 
Wedemeyer and Mr. Hurley, Ambassador Hurley, came home in 1945, 
in March. I had a conference with General Wedemeyer which I have 
already described which had to do with the equipping of Chinese 
guerrilla Communist troops in north China and on the coast in an- 
ticipation of a landing of American troops in that area. General 
Wedemeyer and I had quite a discussion on that subject. Earlier that 
year, as I recall it, Mr. Grew had indicated that wherever we could 
use Chinese troops that might save American lives, they should be 
used. It was on that basis that I talked to him about it and men- 
tioned tthat to him. I made it clear, however, in talking with General 
Wedemeyer that it was purely a military decision to be made in the 
event it was made. General Wedemeyer himself indicated that he 
had no clear knowledge of the problem of using them but that he 
M'ould look into it when he got out to China, when he returned. Inso- 
far as a conference jointly with Ambassador Hurley and General 
Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley occupied as I testified this morning, 
my desk in my office, and it is quite possible that there were meetings 
between General Wedemeyer, who was home, Mr. Hurley, who was in 
my office, and myself. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. March or April of 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. In March or April of 1945. Mr. Hurley went back 
to China through Russia in April, I think it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that a "Yes" answer to my question or a "No" 
answer or an answer "It is possible, but I don't remember" ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is possible. I would say more than that. I do 
not remember the meeting. I remember the meeting with Wede- 
meyer. I do not remember a conference, but I am saying it is more 
than possible, it is probable that General Wedemeyer came into the 
office where Mr. Hurley was. He was Ambassador, and General 
Wedemeyer was in command of the troops. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you prepare a memo with respect to such a 
conference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I prepared a memo with regard to the Wedemeyer 
conference. I do not recall preparing a memo with regard to a con- 
ference with Mr. Hurley and General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you prepared such a memorandum would it be 
in the State Department files ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would you have a copy ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have a copy ? No, sir. 



2144 INSTITUTE DF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have a copy ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not have a copy. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Of any such memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SotJRWiNE. Would you be able to furnish the committee with 
a copy of any such memorandum if it exists ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid that comes under the provisions of the 
letter from the President to the Secretary of State which we read and 
put into the record here — what day ? Wednesday, or yesterday. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean the release of a 

Mr. Vincent. State Department document. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You think the release of such a document as your 
report on a conference between yourself and Hurley and Wedemeyer 
here in Washington would hamper the free flow of information from 
the Foreign Service field. 

Mr. Vincent. I would be glad to ask the State Department whether 
they would make an exception. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I ask you what you think. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think so. You refer now to a memorandum 
of a conversation with Mr. Hurley and with General Wedemeyer and 
myself ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right. 

Mr. Vincent. I was referring to a memorandum of a conversa- 
tion between General Wedemeyer and myself. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I am trying to find out if you have participated in 
and subsequently prepared a memorandum with regard to a con- 
ference or conferences between General Hurley and General Wede- 
meyer in 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that I have no recollection of pre- 
paring such a memorandum. I was referring to the earlier memo- 
randum of the conversation with General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss such a memorandum with 
Andrew Koth? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I have no knowledge of having discussed 
that memorandum with Andrew Roth ? 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you ever furnish him with a copy of such 
memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give any of the IPR authors access to 
any State Department information ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge of having ever given any of 
them and I am quite sure I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give Andrew Roth access to any 
State Department information? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever give Mark Gayn access to any State 
Department information ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss State Department matters 
with Mark Gayn ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr, Sourwine. With Andi'ew Roth? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2145 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever give Owen Lattimore access to any 
State Department information? 

Mr. Vincent. None that I can ever recall. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters 
with Owen Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. When Owen Lattimore was Director of the OWI 
or Deputy Director we would have discussed State Department mat- 
ters. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. But at no other time ? 

Mr. Vincent. Presumably when I would meet him from time to 
time, yes, we would discuss matters of China. 

The Chairman. I can't hear you. 

Mr. Vincent. We would have discussed China whenever we met 
socially because he was very much interested in the area, but I would 
not have revealed to him confidential information in the State De- 
partment. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Your testimony is that you never did reveal to liim 
any confidential information ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; not so far as I know. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters 
withT. A.Bisson? 
Mr. Vincent. No ; not so far as I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever give him access to any State Depart- 
ment information ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. How about Lawrence Kosinger? 

Mr. Vincent. The same answer there, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief, I haven't given him any. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. How about Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have 
never given her State Department information. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to another sub- 
ject now, the matter of the Japanese surrender policy. Mr. Vincent, 
did you or do you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy 
to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered? 

Senator F:erguson. Mr. Chairaian, I wonder whether I might 
inquire. 

Did any of these people who have been mentioned here as to whether 
or not you gave them confidential information of the State Depart- 
ment, not using each name but you remembering the names, did any 
of them ever ask for any confidential information ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of 
these mentioned here have asked me for confidential information of 
the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. How long had you had Mr. Lattimore under 
consideration for an adviser in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that we had him under consideration 
only in the early spring of 10 — or the late winter of 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. 1945. ^^ 

Mr. Vincent. 1945. He had quit OWI some time before that and 
had gone back to his work at Johns Hopkins. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time it was in 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. I can only testify as to my memory, that it was in 
early 1945, January or February or March. 



2146 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, early 1945. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is what I meant, early sprmg, or the late 
winter of 1944-45. 

Senator Ferguson. After you came home from the Far East with 
Mr. Wallace? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he. employed by the Government when he 
went out with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; he was Deputy Director of the Office of War 
Information. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlien did he leave that department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he employed in the spring of 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. No; he was at the Johns Hopkins University. He 
had gone back to teaching. 

Senator Ferguson. So at the time you recommended his coming 
back, he was employed by the Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was not. He was back at his teaching job at 
Johns Hopkins. 

Senator Ferguson. While he was at Johns Hopkins and before you 
recommended him, did you discuss any of the Chinese problems with 
him in order to ascertain if he was the kind of a man that you would 
want ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I just testified, Senator, that I would have 
discussed Chinese problems with him because he was an old friend, 
and a friend who understood China from my point of view. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, would it not have been necessary to 
discuss what was secret? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; it would not have been necessary to discuss 
what was secret if we were discussing the matter of his coming into 
the State Department on a consultant basis and in a technical capacity. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss communism in China with him 
before you recommended that he be on the advisory staff? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of discussing that as a specific 
subject, but it could have been a subject of discussion. 

Senator Ferguson, Did you ever discuss with anyone the question 
of communism in the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You are sure about that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am sure about that. I have no recollection of dis- 
cussing communism in the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, of course, you dispute what is in these 
letters that were exliibited here this morning? 

Mr. Vincent. The letter that was exhibited this morning — my 
testimony this morning was that I have no knowledge of those sub- 
jects discussed in that letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that the part here indicating 
Carter — which would be you, would it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I should think it would be Edward Carter, Edward 
C. Carter. People don't usually call me Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. They don't? You are named down below as 
John Carter Vincent. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. But as I say here — let me see the context. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2147 

Senator Ferguson. You were considered at that time as a trusted 
friend about this question of communism in the Department, "trusted 
friends who mig^ht be in the know on these things," meaning com- 
munism in the IPR. Is that not true? 

Mr. Vincent. I will have to read the whole letter. The language 
that these people use here, I am not responsible for at all, sir. It isn't 
in this letter. It isn't in this letter here w^hat we are talking about. 
[Witness referring to another letter]. 

Senator Ferguson. The letter we are talking about is an answer to 
another letter that did have it in it. 

Mr. Vincent. No, I would not say that statement there implies by 
its use, as they say, of "trusted friends" that I had a knowledge of 
what was in this paragraph here. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you think Margaret Ann Stewart was 
writing to Eleanor Lattimore about, that "John Carter Vincent, and 
any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things" ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have told you, Senator, I cannot be responsible for 
the language of these people. 

Mr. Sourwine. For the sake of the record, Mr. Senator, may the 
record show, if it is correct, that when Mr. Vincent said "this para- 
graph here," he is talking about the last paragraph of Betty Ussachev- 
sky's letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Next to the last paragraph of the December 
12 letter. 

Mr. Vincent. You are talking about this letter, and I think Mr. 
Sourwine is talking about the long paragraph in this letter. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. When he said, "this paragraph here," I think he 
referred to the long paragraph in the Betty Ussachevsky letter. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. The record shows that. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not also true that in the letter of December 
12, in the next to the last paragraph, that that is what they were 
talking about, this long paragraph in the letter of December 5 ? Is it 
not clear that that is true ? "We are somewhat worried about the pos- 
sibilities outlined in Betty's letter." That is what was outlined in 
Bettys' letter, the long paragraph? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. About communism in the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then she goes on and says, "I hope that you 
will have a discussion." That is to Eleanor Lattimore. She was a 
good, close friend of yours. "* * * have a discussion about this 
with Bill" 

Who is Bill ? Do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent. He would be the head of the American delegation, 
the American office here in Washington — Johnstone, as I called him. 

Senator Ferguson. Bill Johnstone. "And also with John Carter 
Vincent, and any other," indicating that you two were trusted friends, 
but "any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these 
things." 

Did you ever discuss with Eleanor Lattimore and/or Owen Latti- 
more, communism in the IPR ? 



2148 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I testified this morning, Senator, and I testify again 
this evening, that I have no recollection of any such discussion. Soon 
after this letter was written, I left the country, and I do not recall 
any consultation or conversations I had with regard to the matter 
of communism in the IPR, 

Senator Ferguson. But at least by reputation, this letter would 
indicate, and as far as knowledge of Eleanor Lattimore would be 
concerned, that you were a trusted friend, and she could discuss com- 
munism in the IPR with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the apparent intent of this, that I might be 
in the know about — whether it was communism in the IPR she has 
in mind, this covers quite a large field of subjects, this letter in the 
second paragraph. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that paragraph covers quite a bit, but it 
is principally concerning communism in the IPR, and the FBI inves- 
tigation of it, and the stealing of papers from your Department which 
you indicated this morning. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. It refers to the papers that were taken out of 
your office, does it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I will have to read it to see. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Wliat does it mean by the arrest of the six ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. The arrest of the six were the Amerasia group. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; for taking papers ; and part of them were 
taken out of your office ; is that not correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. Taken out of the files. 

Senator Ferguson. Here is a good friend of yours describing you 
in this language, that you are a trusted friend and that you might 
be consulted in regard to the taking of these papers and communism ; 
is that not true ? You do not think Eleanor Lattimore ever discussed 
it with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so, sir; and I cannot, as I have said 
before, be responsible for what a Mrs. Margaret Ann Stewart would 
put in that letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you not expect a good friend of yours to 
at least tell you that, "Here, your papers have come out of your 
office"? 

Mr. Vincent. I would. You are reverting back to the Amerasia 
case? 

Senator Ferguson. The Amerasia case. That is what we are talk- 
ing about in these letters. 

Mr. Vincent. I knew, as I testified this morning, that there was 
an investigation to see how those papers came out. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, when was the investigation ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of Service and the other group ? 

Senator Ferguson. No; you. They investigated you, that is, they 
asked you questions. Wlien was that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to fix the time of the Amerasia case. 
I think it was in April, and sometime during that period in April. 

Senator Ferguson. Of what year ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. April 1945 ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2149 

Mr. Vincent. As I said this morning, it might have been the latter 
part of March. It could not have been much later than that, because 
I left for San Francisco, oh, I should say the 10th or 12th, for the 
United Nations conference. 

Senator Ferguson, That is all at the present time. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, do you or did you know anything about 
a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the 
event Japan surrendered ? 

Mr. Vincent., Yes, sir. I have testified on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. Did you know that such a draft was 
submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the State 
Department on or about May 24, 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified, I think, that I did not at that time have 
any first-hand knowledge of the handling of that paper. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know now that there was such a paper 
submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the Depart- 
ment on or about May 24, 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine, Did you discuss such a paper or such a proposed 
policy with anyone at any time, outside the Department, between 
May 24, 1945, and July 29, 1945 ? 

Mr, Vincent, To the best of my knowledge and belief, no, sir. I 
would doubt that I had any knowledge of the paper, because I was 
not connected with the group that was drafting such a paper. 

Mr. Sourwine. What ultimately happened to that paper, do you 
know? 

Mr. Vincent. That paper was ultimately adopted on the — let me 
see. I have it here. It was adopted by the SWNCC committee on 
August 31, earlier on August 29, but it had to be reopened. May I 
read this thing ? No, I don't need to read this. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that a statement which you prepared ? 

Mr. Vincent. This is a statement which I read to you in the execu- 
tive hearing. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is in the record, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. I am just trying to place in here the date 
it was finally adopted. It was August 31, as I have just testified, it 
was adopted by the SWNCC committee. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was considerably changed between May of 1945 
and the date of adoption, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify to that, because I have just testified 
that I had nothing to do with its formulation until I became — and 
there were no considerably changes in it after I became 

Mr. Sourwine. It was not changed after August — what is the date 
there— 31, 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. August 31, except for some minor changes which, 
if you wish me to, I can reread them, but it would take a long time. 
Mr. Sourwine. You have testified with regard to that. 
Mr. Vincent. I have testified there were only minor changes of 
phraseology after August 31. 

Mr. Sourwine. Prior to August 31, you had nothing to do with 
the far-eastern subcommittee of SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. That was the first meeting, I attended my first 
meeting of the subcommittee of SWNCC on September 1. 



2150 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is right. You took over the next day from 
Mr, Dooman ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you say what view General Marshall took 
with regard to this proposed policy as early as May or June of 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. What attitude he took ? No ; I could not state that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know what view Owen Lattimore took 
about it at any time prior to its adoption by SWNCC? . 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss the matter with Mr. Lattimore 
prior to August 31, 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief did I 
discuss it with him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wlien did you first learn that Mr. Lattimore went 
to see the President about that proposed policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever learning that Mr. Lattimore went 
to see the President about that policy. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Didn't you say in executive session you had learned 
it from our hearings for the first time ? 

Mr. Vincent. If I did, I will stand by that, but I don't recall that. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. You don't remember ever having learned it or 
knowing it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you discuss the matter of that proposed policy 
with anyone in the IPR or representing the IPR prior to the time it 
was adopted by SWNCC ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not, 
sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you thereafter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Did I thereafter? No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mrs, Betty Ussachevsky, the Betty who wrote 
this letter we talked about earlier, of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, ever arrange an appointment with you for Mr. Raymond 
Dennett? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no exact recollection of that, but I wouldn't 
know whether it would be Mrs, Ussachevsky or someone else who 
would arrange an appointment. I don't know what her position was 
at that time. If she was the secretary, I would say she might have 
arranged one, 

Mr, SouRwiNE. You saw Mr. Dennett on a number of occasions, did 
you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. How many times, altogether, have you had inter- 
views or conferences with Mr. Dennett? 

Mr, Vincent, I have no exact knowledge of the number of times, 
Mr. Sourwine, I have had interviews with him. 

Mr, SouRwiNE, Ten; a dozen? 

Mr, Vincent, I would say less than that. 

Mr, Sourwine, Less than 10 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever visit him in his office? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that T recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wliere else have you met him, outside your office? 

Mr. Vincent. I have met him at—I think he was down at the IPR 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2151 

conference in Jannary 1945, and I have testified also that he may 
have been present at a meeting of the American delegation prior to 
going to the IPR conference in 1945. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you or did yon know Mr. Theodore White ? 

Mr, Vincent. I did, as a newspaperman in Chungking, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is he your friend ? 

Mr. Vincent, He is an acquaintance. I would not call him a 
friend. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr, Vincent, I do not know where White is now. 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Do you know what he he is doing now? I don't 
mean now in the sense of this instant, but generally this period. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't. I would assume he is in the news- 
paper business. 

Mr. SotiRwiNE. Is he or was he connected with the Institute of Pa- 
cific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that subject, whether he was 
with the Institute of Pacific Relations. During my time, I don't re- 
call ever running across White. 

Mr. SotJRWiNE. Did you ever discuss with him or with anyone else 
the question of Mr. White's discharge by Mr. Henry Luce? 

Mr. Vincent. No, not that I recall, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You never discussed with anyone the matter of Mr, 
White's discharge ? Is that your testimony ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I am trying to remember, but I can't recall 
any conversation I had with regard to Mr. Wliite being discharged. 
I don't know at what time he was discharged. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Didn't you ever discuss that matter with your su- 
periors in the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I will have to say again, I didn't dis- 
cuss the discharge of White if he was discharged or when he was dis- 
charged. It didn't make any impression on my memory. 

Mr, Sourwine, He never discussed the matter with you ? 

Mr, Vincent, He may have come into the office and discussed it 
with me, but I am telling you frankly, I don't recall any conversation 
with Mr, White about a discussion with him over his being discharged, 

IMr. Sourwine. Do you remember the charge that Mr. Luce was 
seeking a passport to go out to the Far East, and that you attempted 
to influence the denial of that passport ? 

Mr. Vincent. Do I recall the charge ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't anybody ever discuss that with you before? 

Mr. Vincent. Nobody told me I ever tried to interfere with a pass- 
port for Mr. Luce. 

Mr. Sourw^ine. Didn't the Secretary of State ever discuss with you 
or through an intermediary bring up with you, take up with you, have 
taken up with you, the problem presented by an allegation that you 
were somehow mixed up in the denial or refusal of a passport to 
Mr. Luce ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, not to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
It seems to me it is to my mind such an absurd story. There may 
have been an allegation of that kind, but I don't recall it. 



2152 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If the Secretary of State ever quoted you in con- 
nection with that matter, he was misquoting you, then, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent, In connection with denial of Luce's passport. There 
may have been an instance of some kind. I don't want to say here 
under oath that the Secretary of State woukl be misquoting me, but 
I am telling you that I have no recollection of an instance of my hav- 
ing anything to do with the denial of a passport to Mr. Luce. 

Mr. SouinviNE. You apparently consider any such charge as ab- 
surd, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my position. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If the Secretary of State had taken up with you 
the matter of an absurd charge, you certainly would remember it, 
wouldn't you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly think I would remember it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Then can't you testify here as to whether it ever 
was or ever was not taken up with you ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can testify to the best of my knowledge and belief 
it never was taken up with me. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. But you can't testify positively that it was not? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot testify that it was not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you ever called upon for an explanation of 
that matter by any official of the Department? 

Mr. Vincent, To the best of my knowledge, I never was called 
upon. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Or for a statement in connection with it? 

Mr. Vincent. For a statement in connection with it ? No, sir, not 
that I recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You became Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs September 19, 1945, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. September 19. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That was 19 days after you had succeeded Mr, 
Dooman as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We talked a little while ago about a paper circulat- 
ing in May, whether there was a paper circulating in May of 1945 
with regard to post-surrender policy for Japan. I am asking you 
now about a paper entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender 
Policy for Japan," which was an official State Department document. 
Do you know anything about that paper ? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony on the other paper is exactly the same 
paper. So I must have given incorrect testimony before, because I 
had in mind that very paper, the Initial Post-Surrender Policy, as 
to when it was adopted by SWNCC. That is the paper I had in mind 
in the previous testimony. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember testifying in executive session 
that that paper which was adopted August 31 had been in the course 
of preparation for 7 or 8 months ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall testifying. My recollection would be 
that I testified that I didn't know how long it had been in prepara- 
tion, because I was not connected with the drafting of that paper. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that paper communicated to General Mac- 
Arthur ? 

Mr. Vincent. That paper, I think, was communicated to General 
MacArthur in the first week of September. I have the date here 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2153 

somewhere. It was distributed to him, but I don't think I have the 
exact date. My belief would be it was circulated to him sometime 
between the first of September and the time that the President issued 
it with General MacArthur's approval on the 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say it was not communicated to him until 
after it had become a firm United States policy? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my impression, that it was not cir- 
culated to him until after it had become a policy of the SWNCC Com- 
mittee, but it had to be approved by the President and it was cir- 
culated to General MacArthur before it was released by the Presi- 
dent and his consent or his approval to its issuance was made. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is. General MacArthur's approval was 
secured ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That testimony would be, would it not, that the 
paper was not communicated, nor its contents communicated, to Gen- 
eral MacArthur prior to the 31st of August 1945 ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have no knowledge as to whether initial 
drafts or others were communicated to him. I can say that after I 
took over SWNCC, there was quite frequently drafts or suggestions 
requested of General MacArthur in regard to the drafting of a paper. 
The War Department member usually was the one who took the initia- 
tive in referring matters as we went along in drafting. I would 
assume that situation prevailed prior to my being Chairman as well 
as afterward. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Can you say whether it was communicated to Gen- 
eral MacArthur on the 29th of August ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No, I have no information here from which I could 
testify as to when it was, whether it was communicated to him before 
the 29th. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. After the paper was communicated to General Mac- 
Arthur, was it changed in any way ? 

]\Ir. Vincent. After it was communicated to him ? I have just testi- 
fied there were some minor changes, which I can read to you here. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. But only minor changes? 

Mr. Vincent, Only minor changes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Do you remember reading Mr. Dooman's testi- 
mony before this committee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember his testimony with regard to 
this paper ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember that he testified that this paper 
was adopted by SWNCC on the 29th of August, and was on that date 
telegraphed out to General MacArthur as a firm United States policy 
for Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. Now that you read it, I do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe that testimony to be true and ac- 
curate ? 

Mr. Vincent. For the first time it was telegraphed to him ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry, I don't want to expand Mr. Dooman's 
testimony. 

jNIr. Vincent. I do not have here the exact date when it was tele- 
graphed out to him. 

22S48— 52— pt. 7 11 



2154 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You are referring to SWNCC ? 

The Chaieman. Do you believe that to be true and accurate ? That 
is the question. 

Mr, Vincent. As to the exact date, I don't know whether it is 
accurate or not. 

Mr. SouRw^NE. You testified it was communicated to General Mac- 
Arthur after the 31st, and you have testified it was adopted by 
SWNCC on the 31st of August. Now, we have before us Mr. Doo- 
man's testimony before this subcommittee that the paper was adopted 
by SWNCC on the 29th of August and was telegraphed out to Gen- 
eral MacArthur on the 29th of August as a firm United States policy 
for Japan. I am asking you w^iether you believe that testimony by 
Mr. Dooman to be true and correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is not correct insofar as the paper was not finally 
adopted by the top-level, over-all SWNCC Committee until August 
31, 1945. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. When was it adopted by the Far Eastern Subcom- 
mittee of SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. The paper was sent up by the SWNCC Committee, 
to the top SWNCC Committee by the other committee, sometime prior 
to the 31st. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that on the 29th ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that was on the 29th. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether the paper was communicated 
to General MacArthur on the 29th as a firm United States policy for 
Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know as a fact the day it was communicated 
to General MacArthur. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether it was communicated to him 
at all on the 29th? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. I have no positive knowledge of the 
day it was communicated. 

Mr. Sour WINE. If it was communicated on the 29th, would it be 
communicated again after the 31st? 

Mr. Vincent. My own recollection is that it was communicated to 
him as a policy paper that had been adopted by SWNCC, but as I 
say, I do not know the date it was communicated. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean you could have been in error in testify- 
ing that it was communicated after the 31st ; that it might have been 
communicated on the 29th? 

Mr. Vincent. It might have been before ; yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It is a single communication that we are talking 
about, regardless of wliether it was the 29th, 31st, or some other date ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, with regard to the changes made in that docu- 
ment, do you remember what Mr. Dooman said about that? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall completely what he had to say. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember he said, quoting from page 7l7 of 
our hearings : 

These were among the changes that had been made in the paper after it 
had been adopted on the 29th of August (reading) : 

"Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and 
of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall 
be the policy of the Supreme Commander — 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2155 

"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the 
economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort 
solely toward peaceful ends." 

And then Mr. Dooman commented : 

Please do not ask me to explain what that means. 

Was that matter which was inserted in the document subsequent 
to the time of its communication to General MacArthur ? 

Mr. Vincent. That matter was in the paper when it was communi- 
cated to General MacArthur. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That matter was in the paper, was it, at the time 
it was approved by SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. That matter was in it by the time it was approved 
by SWNCC. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In other words, in that regard you contradict Mr. 
Dooman's testimony, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I do, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Dooman said this : 

(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and bank- 
ing combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan's trade 
and industry. 

He was apparently citing that as one of the changes made in the 
paper after its adoption. Do you contradict his testimony in that 
regard ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do, sir, and you will recall at the executive session 
I stated that that language occurred in the paper as early as mid- 
August. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do. 

Did you make any changes or dictate or approve any changes or 
suggest any changes in that paper after you became head of the Far 
Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. Those are the minor changes which I have here of 
which I have been able to find a few. Would you like me to say what 
changes were made ? I don't recall that I dictated them, but after T 
became Chairman of SWNCC there were some minor drafting changes 
made. 

]\Ir. Sourwine. Are you accepting responsibility for whatever 
changes were in fact made after you became head of the Far Eastern 
Subcommittee of SWNCC? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I am not accepting responsibility for any changes 
that were made. The top SWNCC Committee has to be responsible 
for any changes made. Some of those changes were made at top 
SWNCC level. Some of them were made at the SWNCC level. Some 
of them were made at the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if 
I recall. But I have the complete thing, if you would like me to read 
this, of how those minor changes came about. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you testified as to that before? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Fi-om this document here ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I think we can avoid repetition on that point here. 
T tliink the record is clear on it. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have been asked before if you know or have 
knowledge of Yoshio Shiga and Kyuchi Tokuda ? 



2156 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I did not know them. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Do you now know that they were Communist lead- 
ers, Japanese Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not refreshed my memory on it at all. You 
have told me they were. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. But you have no independent knowledge as to 
whether they were, or whether they were in jail in early October of 
1945? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Or as to how they got out of jail ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Souewine. You were asked in executive session whether you 
had heard the report that John K. Emmerson of the State Depart- 
ment, possibly accompanied by another person, went in a staff car to the 
prison on the day Shiga and Tokuda were released, and brought them 
back to their homes in Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. Did I testify that I knew of that incident? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I am asking you. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you know of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I had no knowledge of that, so far as I know. 

Mr. SoTJEWiNE. You have never heard that report? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never heard that report until you gave it to me 
here. 

Mr. Sourwine. If that action was taken, would it have had any 
effect on the Japanese people? 

Mr. Vincent. You are asking me a speculative question there, and 
I don't know that I can answer what effect it would have had for them 
to have been taken from prison at what time. 

Mr. Sourwine. If two Communist leaders who at the conclusion of 
the war were released from prison should be met at the prison gates 
by an official staff car with an official of the United States State De- 
partment, and in that staff car conveyed to their homes, would that 
have any effect on the Japanese people if that fact became generally 
Icnown throughout Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. This was a period — wasn't it ? — when we were releas- 
ing Japanese political prisoners. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that I could testify whether it would or 
would not have an effect. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are an expert on the Far East ; are you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified I am an expert on China. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what "face" means? 

Mr. Vincent. I know what the general oriental concept of "face" 
means. 

Mv. Sourwine. Is that oriental concept held in Japan as well as in 
China? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't give you eact testimony on that, but I 
would say that the Japanese also have some idea of "face." 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it would have given "face" to the Com- 
munists to have two of their leaders picked up in a staff car by a State 
Department official and taken to their homes as soon as they were 
released from prison? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that it would. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2157 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. That would, then, have had an impact on Japan if 
that fact had been known ; would it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. If the fact had been known that they were picked up 
like that, yes ; I would say that it would. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It would have given prestige to Shiga and Tokuda — 
would it not ?— both in their own party and among the Japanese people 
generally ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is possible that it would have. It would depend 
on what Japanese were doing it, or what was the purpose of picking 
them up in the car. 

Mr. Sourwine. I cannot speak of the purpose and neither can you; 
but, knowing what you must know about "face" in the Orient, if the 
very unusual procedure of taking two released prisoners to their homes, 
convoyed by officials of the State Department in a staff car, had fol- 
lowed, it certainly would have given them face ; would it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And to say "give them face" is the same as saying 
it would have enhanced their prestige and the respect in which they 
were held by their people ; would it ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not know why we quibble about these things. 

Do you recall a broadcast dealing with policy with respect to Japan, 
in which General Hilldring and Captain Dennison participated, along 
with yourself? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you participate in the broadcast ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you participate in the preparation of it? 

Mr. Vincent. Of my own script. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you approve of the entire script of that broad- 
cast in advance of the broadcast ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think I did. The others approved theirs, and 
I approved mine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have an opportunity in advance of the 
broadcast to see the whole script ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I had an opportunity to see the whole script 
when it was finally prepared. 

Mr. Sourwine. For what purpose was it shown to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. To familiarize myself, to see how the thing was made 
up by Selden Menef ee. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he was a Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he was a pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know whether he was a pro-Communist. 

Mr. Sourwine. If it was shown at the time prior to the broadcast, 
if you wanted changes made, could you have had them made ? 

Mr. Vincent. In my own script. 

Mr. Sourwine. You could not have had them made in 

Mr. Vincent. In General Hilldring's, or whoever was the third 
person. 

Mr. Sourwine. Captain Dennison. 

Mr. Vincent. Captain Dennison. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are stating that General Hilldring and Captain 
Dennison were solely responsible for what they said ? 



2158 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I am so stating, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this approved by the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. These broadcasts were approved by the State Depart- 
ment. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So, their broadcasts were approved, as well as 
yours ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Who, for the State Department, approved this 
script ? 

Mr. Vincent. The people in the Press Office. They went over them 
to see if they were all right, but not as to policy. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. They were not approved as to policy? 

Mr. Vincent. They were on a higher level. 

Senator Ferguson. Who did approve it as to policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say which man. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose job was it to approve as to policy? Who 
approved yours, as to policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mine was submitted to whoever was above me at 
that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was it that approved your script as to 
policy? 

Mr. Vincent. On October 6th, who could have approved it? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

INIr. Vincent. It would be normally submitted to Assistant Secre- 
tary Benton. It could have been submitted to him because he was 
our public-relations man at that time. It could have been submitted 
to Mr. Acheson. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that a public-relations man 
would pass on the policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. He would pass on the advisability of taking this 
thing and looking into it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that does not answer my question. 

Mr. Vincent. Whether Acheson approved this or not, I don't know. 
It was the policy not to go out and do things without some approval 
by the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliose job was it to approve your script, and 
who did approve it ? 

Mr. Vincent. In this particular case I don't recall who approved 
it. General Hilldring could have approved my script. I could not 
have approved his. 

Senator Ferguson. You were answering his questions. 

Mr. Vincent. General Hilldring at that time was already an Assis- 
tant Secretary of State, and he could, in his position, approve my 
script. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As background, is it not true, sir, that you testified 
in executive session that you had had a session with Mr. Selden Mene- 
fee at which you had, simply talking to him, expressed your ideas, 
that he had made notes of that, that he had gone away and written a 
script and brought that back to you for approval ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the way it was approved? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; but I am speaking now of the whole idea of 
making this kind of thing had to be approved above me. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2159 

Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you tliat question — who conceived 
the idea of making the statement. I was talking about the policy 
that was set forth in that broadcast. 

Mr. Vincent. Who approved the policy set forth in that broad- 
cast ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. The policy set forth, as far as I am concerned in 
this broadcast, had already Jbeen approved, because you will find it was 
taken primarily from approved policy at the time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Who cleared this script for policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. For policy ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I have just stated that I don't know who would have 
cleared this script for policy. In this particular case it might have 
been left up to me to clear it. I was Director of the Far East Office, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what the Senator is trying to determine, 
whether you yourself, as the Director of the Far Eastern Office, could 
have taken responsibility for clearing the script for policy or that it 
had to go to a higher echelon for policy clearance. 

Mr. Vincent. That could have been decided on the basis of whether 
I thought it had to have policy clearance. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall whether this was submitted above me 
to Mr. Acheson to look over, or not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you feel that you were making no departure 
from policy and making no new policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. If I felt I was making new policy, I would have 
submitted it above, but I am testifying I don't know whether it was 
submitted above, to someone else. General Hilldring could have 
cleared the whole memorandum. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you did submit it above, does that indicate you 
felt you were making new policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not necessarily. It would mean I was sending it to 
somebody to read to see what they felt about it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether it was submitted any higher, 
or whether you yourself submitted it for policy? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether it was submitted higher, or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. In that broadcast, sir, did you advocate changing the 
institution of Emperor ? 

IMr. Vincent. I think I can almost quote it. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not want a lengthy answer if you can avoid 
it, sir. We are going to get down to this detailed broadcast. 

Did you advocate changing the institution of Emperor? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that the policy of the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Did you in that broadcast serve notice that the Japa- 
nese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist 
Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the 
Communists or other "liberals" would be permitted, so far as the 
United States is concerned? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to read the whole thing to find out 
whether that is in it. 



2160 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr, SouRWiNE. Is it conceivable to you now that you did so state? 
Did you, in that broadcast, serve notice that the Japanese Govern- 
ment would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that 
even .the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or 
other "liberals" would be permitted? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not? That is a definite and unequivocal 
statement; you did not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, before we discuss this thing in detail, I would 
like to ask Mr. Mandel if there is in existence any public records with 
regard to Mr. Selden Menef ee ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

In the Second Report on Un-American Activities in "Washington 
State, 1948, Report of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee 
on Un-American Activities, under the heading "Appendix — A Com- 
parison of the Communist Party Line and the Activities and Affilia- 
tions of Certain Professors at the University of Washington and Offi- 
cials of the Repertory Playhouse," we find a record of Selden Menefee 
on the following pages, which I offer for the record : 

Pages 341, 344 

Senator Ferguson. Before you read those, who was Menefee ? 

Mr. Vincent. Menefee was a young man I met at this time who 
came in and prepared the transcript for NBC. 

Senator Ferguson. He was working for NBC ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was working for NBC, not for me. 

Senator Ferguson. Not for the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not for the State Department. 

Mr. Mandel. 344, 345, 346, 347, 359, and 360. 

I offer that for the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 385" and filed 
for the record.) 

Exhibit No. 385 

[Source : Second report Un-American Activities in Washin^on State, 1948. Report of the 
Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities) 

[P. 341] 

******* 

SiGNirrcANT Activities and Affiliations, August 1935 to September 1939 

February 7, 1936 — Northwest Veteran — American Civil Liberties Union official 
speaks at auditorium. 

Dr. Harry F. Ward, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, secretary 
of the Methodist Federation for Social Service and chairman of the American 
League Against War and Fascism, failed to speak on one of his advertised sub- 
jects, that of the undesirability of requiring school teachers to take an oath of 
allegiance to the National and State constitutions * * *. Included in the list 
of sponsors for the lecture were four members of the University of Washington 
faculty ; namely, Farquharson, Tyler, Selden Menefee, and Hugh DeLacy. 

[Pp. 344 and 345] 



[May 8, 1937— Sunday News— volume 3, No. 38, Seattle, Wash.] 

Teachers Form State Federation 

Affiliation with the Washington Commonwealth Federation was one of the 
first acts of the newly formed Washington State Federation of Teachers, com- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2161 

posed of teachers' unions from Seattle, Snohomish County, Tacoma, and Bremer- 
ton, when they convened in Seattle last Saturday to form their organization. 

The new federation supersedes the smaller informal Washington Joint Council 
of Teachers, a committee formed a year ago to coordinate the program of teachers' 
unions in the public schools, the university, and the workers' education projects. 

After adopting a constitution the group voted in Hugh DeLacy, councilman- 
elect and discharged university instructor, as president and Hallie Donaldson, 
of the West Seattle High School, as vice president * * *. 

Resolutions adopted asked release of Tom Mooney ; King Eamsey Connor ; 
selection of State Superintendent of Public Instruction Stanley Atwood as 
speaker at the American Federation of Teachers' national convention ; civil- 
service laws for teachers ; and equalization program for State schools ; repeal 
of the Washington, D. C, loyalty oath bill ; continuation of WPA projects at 
union wages ; a referendum on war. 

The American Federation of Teachers is affiliated with the American Federa- 
tion of Labor. Delegates to the Seattle AFL Central Labor Council for the 
teachers union were Selden Menefee, of the University of Washington, and 
Victor Hicks, of the WPA educational project. 

Comment : Affiliation of Local 401, U. of W. Teachers' Union with the American 
Federation of Teachers ; the Washington Commonwealth Federation and resolu- 
tions passed as indicated above, show the beginning of the pattern to be followed 
by them as their program adjusts to the changing pattern of the Communist 
Party line. The Washington State Un-American Activities Committee, as well 
as other agencies, have voluminous files on the radical activities of Selden Mene- 
fee, Victor Hicks, and Hugh DeLacy. The Sunday News was the official organ 
of the Washington Commonwealth Federation and its editorial board, according 
to its masthead on the above date, included among its members Prof. R. G. 
Tyler, Prof. Harold Eby, and ex-Prof. Hugh DeLacy, all of the University of 
Washington. 

[Pp. 346 and 347] 



[April 28, 1938, Daily Worker, statement by Ajnerican Progressives on the 

Moscow trials] 

(This statement also appeared in the May 3, 1938, issue of New Masses.) 
Appendix IX, section 1-6, page 1617. The statement was obviously a docu- 
ment concocted in defense of the line of the Communist Party and undoubtedly 
originated in the headquarters of the Communist Party. The following excerpts 
from the statement seem significant : "We the undersigned, are fully aware 
of the confusion that exists with regard to the Moscow trials and the real 
facts about the situation of the Soviet Union * * * ipj^g measures taken 
by the Soviet Union to preserve and extend its gains and its strength therefore 
fin^ their echoes here, where we are staking the future of the American people 
on the preservation of progressive democracy and the unification of our efforts 
to prevent the Fascist from strangling the rights of the people. American 
liberals must not permit their outlook on these questions to be confused, nor 
allow their recognition of the place of the Soviet Union in the international fight 
of democracy against fascism to be destroyed. We call upon them to support 
the efforts of the Soviet Union to free itself from insidious internal dangers, and 
to rally support for the international fight against fascism, the principal menace 
to peace and democracy." 

Comment : Among Seattle persons whose names were signed to this statement 
were the following: Dr. Garland Ethel, Selden Menefee, Albert Ottenheimer, 
Burton James, and Florence B. James. 

[Pp. 359 and 360] 



[August 31, 1941, Seattle Times] 

An article in this issue reveals that Dr. Ralph H. Gundlach of the University of 
Washington was a visitor in Washington, D. C., the past week end. He attended 



2162 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

sessions of the American Federation of Teachers Convention at Detroit before 
going to Washington D. C. He will go from Wasington to Chicago to read a 
paper on peace movements before the annual sessions of the American Psychology- 
Society. While in Wasington, D. C, Dr. Gundlach has been a guest at the home 
of Professor and Mrs. Selden Menefee. former University of Washington 
faculty members. 

Comment: The files of the Washington State Un-American Activities are 
replete with information relative to activities and affiliations of Selden Menefee. 
^^ » * * * * * 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I offer and ask that it be inserted in the record, a 
photostatic copy of a document, and I ask Mr. Vincent if this is a 
photostatic copy of the State Department's publication of the text 
of this radio program. 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to compare it with this. [Examining 
document.] 

The Chairman. It will be admitted. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 386" and filed 
for the record and is as follows :) 

(Note. — Department of State press release No. 732, text of broad- 
cast appears in appendix.) 

[Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945] 

Our Occupation Policy foe Japan 

participants 

John Carter Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of 
State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordin- 
ating Committee 

Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department 

Capt. R. L. Dennison, United States Navy, Representative of the Navy De- 
partment on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating 
Committee 

Sterling Fisheb, Director, NBC, University of the Air 

[Released to the press October 6] 

Announcer. Here are headlines from Washington : 

General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken 
Up ; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines ; Prom- 
ises Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military 
Fanatics. 

John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto; 
Says That the Institution of the Emporer Will Have To Be Radically Modi- 
fied, and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free 
Assembly and Free Discussion. 

Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil 
Aviation ; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and 
Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan. 

Announcer. This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our 
Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs 
by Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast 
to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service 
men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities 
of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important dis- 
cussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions 
on how to obtain them. 

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast 
on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan". Participating are Mr. John Carter Vin- 
cent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; 
Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department ; 
and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U.S.N., Navy Department representative on the Far 
Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2163 

will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the 
Air. Mr. Fisher — 

FiSHEE. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and 
general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That de- 
bate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans con- 
scious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million 
Japanese. 

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much 
of the confusion surrounding this debate.^ But it also raised many questions — • 
questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have 
asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned — the State, War, 
and Navy Departments — to interpret further our Japan policy. 

General Hilklring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at 
least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down 
our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by tell us just how 
that policy is determined. 

HiLLDRiNG. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will 
try to explain how it is made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee — 
SWING, we call it — formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions 
of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the 
approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of 
StafC to General INIacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces 
in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we 
think he is doing it very well. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chair- 
man does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it. 

Vincent. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far 
Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. 
We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with 
whicli General Hilklring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and 
I sit in an advisory capacity. 

HiLLDRiNG. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the 
Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James 
Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, an^ the Under Secretary 
of the Navy, Artemus Gates. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, I'd like to know whether there is a — shall we say — 
strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. 

Vincent. No ; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There 
is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and 
the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving 
our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment. 

Fisher. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian 
advisers. 

Vincent. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists 
have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has 
welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with 
specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to 
send more and more such people out. 

Fisher. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee. Captain 
Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. 
Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and 
voice in, the policy for Japan. 

Dennison. We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000 
vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played 
in the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country 
separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always 
present a naval problem. 

Fisher. What part is the Navy playing now in that control? 

Dennison. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this 
duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General 
MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil- 
affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the 
former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islanda 

Fisher. Does that include Okinawa? 



1 Bulletin of Sept. 23, 1945, p. 423. 



2164 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Dennison. Yes. 

Fisher. That's not generally known, is it? 

Dennison. No ; I believe not. I'd like to add — besides these immediate duties 
the United States Navy vpill have to exercise potential control over Japan long 
after our troops are vpithdrawn. 

Fisher. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcommittee 
which drafts our occupational policy, can you give us a statement of our over-all 
objectives? 

Vincent. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces 
and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize Japan — 
to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will 
not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world. 

Fisher. And how long do you think that will take? 

Vincent. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the 
.Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this : The occupation will continue 
until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue 
until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its 
form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American 
democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic 
tendencies. 

Fisher. General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan? 

HiLLDRiNG. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clair- 
voyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish 
our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we 
have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned. 

Fisher. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy? 

Hilldring. That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves 
matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. 
I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question. 

Fisher. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it? 

Vincent. Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States 
proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of 
regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries 
interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced 
recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies 
for the control of Japan.^ In addition to the four principal powers in the Far 
East, a number of other powers are to be invited to tiave membership on the 
Commission. 

Fisher. Coming back to our first objective — General Hilldring, what about the 
demobilization of the Japanese Army ? How f ai* has it gone ? 

Hilldring. Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is 
virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning dis- 
armed soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport sys- 
tems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors. 

Fisher. And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of 
Asia? 

Hilldring. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on 
shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. 
Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated ; the return of 
Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place. 

FiSHEB. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the 
Japanese forces scattered through Asia? 

Dennison. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close 
to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for 
the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home. 

Fisher. And what is being done with the Japanese Navy? 

Dennison. The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's 
nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed. 

Fisher. Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military system — 
the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecut- 
ing liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be 
done about that? 

Vincent. That vicious system will be abolished, INIr. Fisher. Not only the top 
chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its 

* See p. 545. 



■INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2165 

hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America 
will have to be substituted for it. 

Dennison. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and 
not an army in the guise of police. 

HiLLDRiNG. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthu'r has already 
abolished the Kempai and political police. 

Fisher. It seems to me that a key position in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, 
is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government, 
from the Emperor on down. 

Vincent. Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in 
the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would 
hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the 
people of Japan must be removed. 

Fisher. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government? 

Vincent. The institution of the Emperor — if the Japanese do not choose to 
get rid of it — will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher. 

Dennison : The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will 
not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent 
to General MacArthur establish that point. 

FiSHEB : Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point. 
Captain Dennison? 

Dennison : I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur 
said: 

"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the 
state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You 
will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our 
relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional 
surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question 
on the part of the Japanese as to its scope. 

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to 
the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does 
not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders 
issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, in- 
cluding the use of force." ^ That's the directive under which General MacArthur 
is operating. 

Fisher. That's clear enough. * * * Now, General Hilldring, you have to 
do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main 
difference between them? 

HiLLDKiNG. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Re- 
duced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again 
breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of 
control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Govern- 
ment, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, and 
our controls must, in general, be imposed locally. 

Fisher. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of 
the national Government in Japan? 

Hilldring. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the 
national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Gov- 
ernment available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole com- 
plicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million peo- 
ple. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By clean- 
ing up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving 
time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the 
Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications. 

Fisher. But some people argue. General, that by utilizing the Japanese Gov- 
ernment we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't 
this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry 
persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression? 

Hilldring. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japa- 
nese gi-oups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy 
requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. 
The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. Re- 
movals are being made daily by General MacArthur. 

Dennison. Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, 
not to support it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had 
to feel out the situation. 



» Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480. 



2166 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Fisher. Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went 
to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite? 

Dennison. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General 
MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has corre- 
spondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those polices. 

Fisher. He certainly has. Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, 
Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me. 

Vincent. Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today 
that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict 
exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it 
will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found 
by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out. 

Fisher. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war 
criminals? 

Vincent. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we 
can say this : All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being 
war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection. 

HiLLDRiNG. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they 
are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is 
applying in Germany are being used in Japan. 

Dennison. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they 
are punished — not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not. 

Fisher. All right. Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let 
me ask you this : Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu — the big indus- 
trialists — who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, 
among the guilty? 

Dennison. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall 
that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals. 

Fisher. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists 
who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power? 

HiLLDKiNG, Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos — militarists — will be 
removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and 
education as well. As a matter of national policy, we ai'e going to destroy 
Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. 
There's no other way to accomplish it. 

Fisher. What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent? 

Vincent. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those 
members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General 
Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines 
have over the economy of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and 
Sumitomo, to name the most prominent. 

Fisher. And the financial combines as well? 

Vincent. Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already 
taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of 
their loot. 

Fisher. Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu". 
Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous? 

Dennison. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. 
Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and 
arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of 
occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought 
about this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be 
arrested and tried as a war criminal. 

Fisher. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany 
has been to send Americans over to rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Faiben- 
industrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in 
Japan. What about that? 

Hilldring. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are not rebuilding the big 
trusts in Germany, we have not rebuilt them, and we are not going to rebuild 
them in the future. The same policy will ])revail in Japan. Moi-eover, not only 
will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans 
or the Japanese to do so. 

Fisher. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes? 

Hilldring. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or 
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as 
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the 
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2167 

modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, 
as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equip- 
ment. 

Vincent. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese econ- 
omy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under 
our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural 
resources to the ends of peaceful living. 

FisHEB. Mr. Vincent, won't this creat a lot of unemployment? Is anything 
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers, 
for example? 

Vincent. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their 
economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and 
the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work 
to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by 
the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all 
the encouragement we can. 

Fisher. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out 
of heavy war industry? 

Vincent. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed 
to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy 
will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more 
and more for their domestic market. 

Fisher. They'll have to have ^otne foreign trade of course to keep going. 

Vincent. Of course, but not the unhealtbful sort they had before the war. 
A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military 
preparations, and not to support her internal economy ; after all, scrap-iron 
and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's 
foreign trade far below the prewar level and still have a standard of living 
comparable to what they had before the war. 

Fisher. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over 
there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our 
policy be on food? 

Hilldring. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he 
does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this 
winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in 
other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy 
populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest 
that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. 
The Japanese will have to gi'ow their own food or provide it from imports. 

Fisher. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going 
to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine? 

Dennison. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy — that's the 
price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships 
shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's 
imports, in order to keep her from rearming — and the best way to do that may 
be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships. 

Fisher. Then, Captain Dennison, wh,at about Japan's civil aviation? A lot 
of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some 
Japanese transport planes to resume operations. 

Dennison. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of Gen- 
eral MacArthur's directive in this field, no civil aviation will be permitted in 
Japan. 

Vincent. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a 
specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency. 

Fisher. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of 
the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialista 
will be? 

Vincent. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agri- 
culture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider dis- 
tribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. 
But those nre things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself— 
and will, we expect. 

Fisher. And the labor unions? What about them? 

Vincent. We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher, 
because that's an essential part of democracy. 

Fisher. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals 
are still in jail. What has been done to get them out? 



2168 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Vincent. General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons 
imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs. 

Fisher. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces 
in Japan, Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces? 

Dennison. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among 
the Japanese. We'll give them eveiT opportunity to draw up and to adopt a 
constructive reform program. 

Vincent. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured 
the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation author- 
ities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political 
parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all 
barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press. 

Fisher. I take all this to mean that the democratic and antimilitarist groups 
will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group 
tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods? 

Vincent. It would be suppressed. One of General INIacArthur's policy guides 
calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan." It 
also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies 
of the government are to be permitted and favored." 

Fisher. And if the democi-atic parties should find it necessary to use force 
to attain their objectives? 

Vincent. In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where 
necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve 
liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force. 

Dennison. We are not interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as 
such. I think we should make that doubly clear. 

Fisher. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been 
the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand 
that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting 
together in one party — a Socialist party. Wliat stand will we take on that. 
General Hilldring? 

Hir.LDRiNG. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every 
encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in 
Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military 
fanatics. 

Fisher. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for 
the democratic forces. 

Hilldring. We're prepared to support the development of democratic govern- 
ment even though some temporary disorder may result — so long as our troops 
and our over-all objectives are not endangered. 

Fisher. I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will 
be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion qf 
nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"? 

Vincent. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not 
to be interfered with. Shintoism. however, as a state-directed religion is to be 
done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there 
will be no place for Shintoism in the schools. 

Fisher. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto. 

Vincent. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemina- 
tion of .Japanese militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology in any form will 
be completely suppressed. 

FisiiER. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That 
will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent. 

Vincent. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their 
schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic leanings 
are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible. 

Dennison. That's where the real change must stem from — the school system. 
The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes 
for the older generation as weU. 

Fisher. And that may take a very long time. Captain Dennison. 

Dennison. How long depends on bow fast we are able to put our directives 
into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through 
all channels — school texts, press, radio, and so on. 

Fisher. What's the basis for your optimism. Captain? 

Dennison. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many 
Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in 
Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, 1 
think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2169 

they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the greal 
majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They 
proved their loyalty there during the war. 

Fisher. What accounts for that loyalty? 

Dennison. Simply that they like the American way of life better. At seven, 
it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they lilie, but as they get older 
they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I 
believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a 
taste of them — of real civil liberties— they'll never want to go back to their old 
ways. 

HiLLDRiNo. I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite 
possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining 
the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack — 
they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoc- 
trinated with one basic idea : obedience. Tliat makes it easier to deal with them. 

Vincent. Or it may make it more difficult. General. It depends on how you 
look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if 
there's to be a real, working democracy in Japan. 

HiLLDKiNG. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. 
And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese 
under the occupation? 

ViNCEi^T. The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent 
indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about 
the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to coop- 
erate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military 
domination they've imdergone, only time and encouragement will bring about 
the emergence of sound, democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle 
the East," or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and 
political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully 
fostered. 

Fisher. Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you. General Hilldring 
and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupa- 
tion policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic 
policy — one that's aimed at giving no encouragement to the imperialists and 
every possible encouragement to the prodemocratic forces which are now begin- 
ning to i-eappear in Japan. 

Announcer. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the 
Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, 
Director of Civil Affairs. War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy 
representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Co- 
ordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Seldeu Menefee. 
This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy," 
presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain 
printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like 
to receive copies of the broadcasts, send $1 to cover the costs of printing and 
mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to 
the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also 
invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special 
State Department program on our Latin-American policy, with reference to 
Argentina and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de 
Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who 
has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the 
Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for 
this important program * * * Kennedy Ludlam si)eaking from Washington, 
D. C. 

Exhibit No. 386A 

Statement on the Establishment of a Far Eastern Commission To Formulate 
Policies for the Carrying Out of the Japanese Surrender Terms ^ 

[Released to the press October 1] 

Mr. James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State of the United States, announced 
that he has received from Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign 



' Issued by the Secretary of State In London on September 29, 1945. 
22848— 52— pt. 7 12 



2170 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Affairs of Great Britain, the consent of the British Government to the proposal 
made by the United States Government on August 22 for the establishment of 
a Far Eastern Commission to formulate policies for the carrying out of the 
Japanese surrender terms. 

The Commission will also be asked to consider whether a Control Council 
should be established and if so the powers which should be vested in it. 

The Soviet Union and China had already given their consent to the establish- 
ment of the Commission. France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and the Netherlands will be invited to become members of the Com- 
mission. The first meeting of the Commission will be convened in Washington 
in the near future. 

In agreeing to the establishment of the Commission Mr. Bevin stated it was 
his understanding that the Commission could determine whether it should meet 
in Washington or Tokyo. Secretary Byrnes confirmed Mr. Bevin's understanding 
and said that the United States representative would be instructed to vote that 
the Commission hold meetings in Tokyo. 

Mr. Bevin also requested that India be invited to become a member of the 
•Commission. Mr. Byrnes said the United States would agree to the request and 
that he would submit the request to the Governments of the Soviet Union and 
China for their approval. 

Mr, SouRWiNE. Do you recognize the format there? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What publication is it? 

Mr. Vincent. State Department Bulletin. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It is from the State Department Bulletin? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, Mr. Manclel, will you state whether that is a 
photostat of certain pages from the State Department Bulletin? 

Mr. Mandel. That was ordered from the Library of Congress by me, 
to be photostated. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is a photostat of certain pages of the State Depart- 
ment Bulletin? 

Mr. Mandel. It is. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in this speech say, Mr. Vincent, "The 
institution of the Emperor, if the Japanese do not choose to get rid 
of it, will have to be radically modified." ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Captain Dennison then quoted part of the directive 
sent to General MacArthur ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Captain Dennison said : 

The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacAi'thur and will not be 
permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wliat is the next paragraph ? 
Mr. Vincent. I can quote a part of it to you. 

Mr. Sour'wt^ne. Will you read the two paragraphs that Captain 
Dennison read with regard to the directive to General MacArthur? 
Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

"The authority of The Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state 
is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will 
exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our 
relations with Japan do not rest on a conti'actual basis, but on an unconditional 
surrender. 

"Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the 
part of the Japanese as to its scope. 

"Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the 
extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not 
prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders 
issued by you by the employment of such measvires as you deem necessary, includ- 
ing the use of force." 

That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2171 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That directive was in line with your own views; is 
that correct? 

Mr, Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, did you, in that radio broadcast, state : 

We have every intention or proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu 
who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hildriug has just said, we 
Intend to break the hold these large family combines have over the economy 
of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, to name the most 
prominent. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I stated that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not state further along 

This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which 
for years has been seared to the requirements of total war. Under our close 
supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources 
to the ends of peaceful living? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. And Mr. Fisher asked : 

Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done , 
to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for 
example? 

And you replied : 

Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic 
problems. They should ]:ut emphasis on farming and fishing and the produc- 
tion of consumer goods. They also have p'( nty of reconstruction work to do in 
every city. 

Mr. Vincent. Will you continue? 
Mr. Sourwine (reading) : 

We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help 
themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement 
we can. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; that is my statement. 
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Fisher then said : 

What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy 
war industry? 

and you replied: 

They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. 
The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be 
to turn that economy in on itself, so that the Japanese will produce more and 
more for their domestic market. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

IsIt. Sourwine. Was that a delineation of a realistic policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was a delineation of a realistic policy that we con- 
sidered at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had considered fehat policy at that time to be 
realistic? 

Mr. Vincent. I considered that policy to be realistic ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. On the basis of all that you as an expert knew about 
the Orient? 

Mr. Vincent. On the basis of all that I knew about the Orient, I 
thought that was a realistic policy at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you consider it now to be realistic ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think now that Japan has to get back its heavy in- 
■dustries, but at that time we had just finished a war against Japan, 



2172 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

where its heavy industries had been used against us for 4 years of war, 
and the objective and idea in mind in that statement was to reduce 
Japan's war-making potential in the future, and at the same time to 
try to provide the Japanese who had lived off those industries, other 
means of living, which, as I say, were light industries and other forms 
of economic activity. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did your background and experience and knowl- 
edge with regard to Japan and the Orient generally lead you to be- 
lieve that the Japanese nation could exist, turned in on itself, as you 
here referred to it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am not an economist, but that was my general be- 
lief, and it was the belief, I think also, of the people who clrafted the 
postsurrender policy for Japan. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Certainly, in any event, that was the belief that you 
were conveying in this radio speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, did you further along state : 

All democratic parties will be encouraged. Tbey will be assured the rights 
of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to 
place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The 
Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom 
of religion, of thought, and of the press? 

Mr. Vincent. Are you asking whether that was a statement by me? 

Mr. Sot7Ra^t;ne. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr, SouRWiNE. Now, did you include in your category of "all demo- 
cratic parties" the Communist Party? 

Mr. Vincent. Just what I have stated here, that it would place no 
obstruction in the way of organization of political parties, ancl that is, 
if not a quote, a paraphrase on the postwar suiTender policy. 

Senator Ferguson. That would include the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would include the Communist Party. That 
would not exclude them. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say "all democratic parties" using "democratic" 
as a generic phrase, all parties included within what you spoke of as 
democratic, including the Communist Party, will be encouraged, will 
be assured the rights of free assembly, and free public discussion, and 
the occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of 
their organization; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I have used the phrase here, "the organization of 
political parties." 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. Did you consider the Commimisi-. 
Party a political party ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was then included, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now did you, after Mr. Fisher said : 

Then, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with 
them, using gangster methods? 

state : 

It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for 
the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says that 
changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Government 
are to be permitted and favored. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2173 

Is that what yon said ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what I said. 

Mr. SouR^VINE. Did that not convey the implicit information that if 
the Government attempted by force to pnt down the Communists, that 
Government's effort would be suppressed ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not draw that inference from it, sir, no. Let 
me read it again. [I^eadinfr document.] 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes; please do. 

Mr. Vincent. I would say here that the inference here is not the 
Government, but if a political group using gangster methods, were 
trying to interfere with the ideas expressed in the previous statement, 
which is that the Japanese would be free to organize political parties, 
that those gangster methods would be suppressed by General Mac- 
Arthur. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wliat do you thing that Mr. Fisher meant by "gang- 
ster methods"? Did he not mean force? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say he meant force. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You understood him to mean force, did you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Does the nationalistic groups that he spoke of, in- 
clude the National Government of China ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The Chinese Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I don't mean to say here that in Japan we 
are talking about a nationalistic group from China that was going to 
try to interfere, using gangster methods, in Japan ; no, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were talking about the nationalistic group in 
Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. Talking about the old military group in Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were talking about any nationalistic group? 

Mr. Vincent. That was trying to use gangster methods. 

Mr. Sourwine. Meaning by that, force ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are talking about Mr. Fisher here. I am trying 
to figure out what Mr. Fisher meant. 

Mr. Sourwine. You understood him to mean the use of force when 
you answered this question ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; gangster methods. 

Mr. Sourwine. By "gangster methods" you meant force? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. What you were saying was that no nationalistic 
group would be permitted to use force against a democratic party; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what you could read into that ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. The democratic parties, you have already testified, 
included the Communist Party; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I have said that the organization of political parties 
would have included and not excluded the Communists. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said your use of the phrase "democratic parties" 
included the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. What you are saying is that no nationalistic group 
would be permitted to use force against the Communist Party ; is that 
right? 



2174 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Mr, Sourwine, Mr. Fisher has used the words "gang- 
ster methods." You are trying to draw this around to the idea that 
gangster methods mean force. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You said that gangster methods meant force. 

Mr. Vincent. And the Government of Japan would not be allowed 
to suppress the Communist Party. That is not what this means at 
all, but gangster methods and nationalistic groups, using gangster 
methods at that time, would not have been what was expected to 
happen in Japan, and General MacArthur, according to his own 
directive — because I quote him here^also says : 

Changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Govern- 
ment are to be permitted and favored. 

Senator Ferguson. You have answered now that the Communist 
Party back when you made that broadcast was a democratic party? 
Mr. Vincent. In the general sense of a political party. 
Senator Ferguson. Yes, democratic political party. 
Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in tlie way of the 
organization of political parties. 

Senator Ferguson. I am taking your answer that it was a democratic 
political party. Do you today hold the same belief ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not say here that I am calling the Communist 
Party a democratic party. It says : 

All democratic parties will be encouraged. 

But later on it says : 

The occupation authorities are to plac eno obstruction in the way of the 
organization of political parties. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you now want to have the record stand 
that the Communist Party was not a democratic party? 

Mr. Vincent. That the Communist Party was not considered, in 
my mind, to be a democratic party insofar as I can recall, but the 
use here would imply that. 

Senator Ferguson. You would include them ? 

Mr. Vincent. You include them in the organization of political 
parties : 

The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the 
organization of political parties. 

Senator Ferguson. Then if it had been a Fascist Party, an Emper- 
or's party, they would have been welcome, because you did not use 
the word, you said, "democratic," so everything that could be called a 
political party was included there, is that not right ? 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

All democratic parties will be encouraged. 

Senator Ferguson. Now we are going back to the word "democratic." 
That is in there, is it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, the Communists are included in the 
democratic parties ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the context of this thing it would be assumed that 
the democratic parties at that time were considered to be 

Senator Ferguson. We will start over again. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2175 

Are you of the same opinion now, that they are a democratic party ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you have changed your mind ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have changed my mind ; yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. These were words of art, were they not ? 

Mr. Vincent. This was giving a broadcast. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Yes, but in the context of this broadcast you meant 
to inchide the Communist Party among the democratic parties about 
which you were speaking ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That would be correct, sir, in the matter of broad- 
casting. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now when Mr. Fisher said : 

And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain 
their objectives — 

Did you reply to him : 

In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary 
to protect our own occupation forces. 

Did you say that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did say that. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Now have you not stated there in two succeeding 
statements, with only one intervening question, that on the one hand, 
if a democratic political party, a democratic party — and in that con- 
notation, that included the Communist Party — should be sought to be 
put down by a nationalistic group, the nationalistic group would be 
suppressed by the Supreme Commander ; and then in the next breath 
you state that if a democratic party — and that included the Com- 
munist Party — sought to achieve its ends by force, our people would 
not interfere or intervene except where necessary to protect our own 
occupation forces ? Is that not true ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what the language here said. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is what you said ? 

Mr. Vincent. But I think you are drawing some very wrong impli- 
cations from the language here. 

Mr. Sourwine. What other implications do you draw ? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly do not draw the implication that if the 
Communist Party became a menace in Japan, that General Mac- 
Arthur would be prohibited from taking action against them, because, 
in the broadcast here I had mentioned the fact in a loose context the 
democratic parties will be encouraged. 

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you earlier if it was not true that in that 
broadcast you had served notice that the Japanese Government would 
not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the 
use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other liberals 
would be permitted. 

I ask you again, is it not true you did ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say that is a wrong inference from the language 
of this thing here, Mr. Sourwine, and you know that that is a wrong 
inference from this thing here. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I do not know that is wrong, or I 
would not be urging it here. 

Mr. Vincent. I can tell you flatly, then, that irrespective of the 
language here, it was not the intention of this language to in any way 



2176 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

permit the Communist Party to take over control of Japan or to 
operate in a manner which would be inimical to the occupation of 
Japan. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Or to assist in that objective ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was not in my mind, and I don't think it was 
in anybody's mind in drafting this. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You can see, can you not, how the language can be 
so construed? 

Mr. Vincent. I can see how the language can be so construed. 

Senator Ferguson. This was cleared as to policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. This was cleared — I have testified before that the 
language of this was not particularly cleared as to policy. I think you 
will find in the post-surrender paper that it also contains language 
like that. 

Senator Ferguson. If the language does not clear it, what was 
cleared ? What would you clear in a broadcast if you did not clear the 
language ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would clear whatever there was in over-all policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Does this state an over-all policy ? 

Mr. Vincent. This states an over-all policy in the popular language 
of making a broadcast ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it the policy of our Government at that 
time, that you made the broadcast, to get rid of the Emperor ? 

Mr. Vincent, The policy of the Government to get rid of the 
Emperor ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it to allow the Communists to rise in Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you not exclude the Communists 
from this "democratic political parties" ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, we were thinking, in those times, of the old . 
totalitarian party in Japan, which had been running the Government. 
We were not thinking in terms here of making fine distinctions. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Were you not saying in this speech that any liberal 
party in Japan would even be permitted to use force to gain its ends 
against the then existing Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. Any liberal party? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I will have to read this again. 

That is what I was saying here. He puts the words here in his 
mouth. 

Mr. Sourwine. There are words you put in your own mouth, are 
they not ? 

Mr. Vincent. My reply to him. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said : 

This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese 
may even use force. 

Mr. Vincent, Yes, 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, that included "to achieve ascendancy of the 
Communist Party," did it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I say that the inference you are drawing from that, 
that there was any intention in my language or in the post-surrender 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2177 

document — of which I think I have a copy here — in which you find 
similar language, and to draw the inference from that which can be 
drawn, is entirely correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, if you, sir, as a State Department 
official, had desired on a public broadcast to serve notice on the Jap- 
anese people that the Communists would be permitted to use force 
to gain their ends, and that the United States Government would not 
defend the monarchy, would you have dared to use any more explicit 
terms than were used in that broadcast ? 

Mr. Vincent, I had no such intention of making any 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Answer the question. 

Mr. Vincent. That if I had wanted 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had desired to serve notice in that speech, 
would you have dared to be any more explicit about it than you were 
in that broadcast ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are asking a hypothetical question. 

Senator Ferguson. You are an expert on the Far East. Answer it 
as an expert. It is a hypothetical one. 

Mr. Vincent. It is a hypothetical question. I don't know what I 
would have tried to do. How can I say what I would have tried to 
do it I were trying to get the Communists to take over China, which I 
was not doing ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Could you at this time, October of 1945, have said 
in a radio broadcast that it was the policy of the Communist Party 
against the use of force by any nationalistic group in Japan, but 
that the Communist Party would be permitted to use force in the 
achievement of its ends? Would you have been able to say that? 
Could you have dared to say that in a radio broadcast at that time^ 
in exactly those terms ? 

Mv. Vincent. I would never have even thought of saying it. 

Mr. Sourwine. It would not have been permitted, would it? 

Mr. Vincent. I would never have thought to say that. 

Mr. Sourwine. It would have been completely contrary to the 
policy of the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would have been contrary to the policy of the 
United States. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wliat we have is a speech in which you used lan- 
guage which you now say could be construed in a manner which waSy 
at that time, completely contrary to the policy of the United States? 

Mr. Vincent. I say that you are drawing an inference from state- 
ments here which were perfectly understandable at the time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how those statements were under- 
stood by the Japanese people ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not. I will say that I never had any objec- 
tions to the speech from the Japanese, General MacArthur, or any- 
one else. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you infer now that Mr. Selden Menefee 
inserted this in or do you take full responsibility for this language? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Selden Menefee wrote the language, but I will 
take full responsibility, because I have already testified I went over 
this broadcast. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you seen this record on Mr. Selden 
Menefee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not, sir. 



2178 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that may make a difference as to 
what he intended in this speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. From what you have read there it could make a dif- 
ference, but I doubt it. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that Amerasia back on July 28, 
1944, was advocating allowing the Communist Party to cause an up- 
rising and take over Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I remember, from that document there. 

Senator Ferguson. Who drew this document ? 

Mr. Vincent. Who drew that document ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. In the State Department? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. It was drawn up in the special assistant's office, for 
relations with the press. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, since the chairman has referred to this, our 
specialist from the Navy Department is here. Would the chairman like 
to put him on ? 

Senator Ferguson. I do. But first, did you approve it ? I do not 
know the exhibit number, but I want to receive it as an exhibit. Did 
you approve it? 

Mr. Vincent. It passed over my desk and I initialed it. 

Senator Ferguson. It passed over your desk and you initialed it. 
I ask you whether or not you approved it ? 

Mr. Vincent. My initialing of it would approve sending it to the 
field in response to requests that had come from the field for informa- 
tion as to what publications were saying. 

I did not initiate the action. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean to say now that you only approved 
that it might be sent out ? 

Mr. Vincent. We were sending out other articles. We were send- 
ing out newspaper clippings to Mr. Gauss, over the radio, because of 
a request from him to get reaction in this country. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know who Susumu Okano was? 

Mr. Vincent. Susumu Okano? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. When I testified, I did not. I think Mr. Sourwine 
told me. 

Senator Ferguson. When you testified — ^that means before the ex- 
ecutive session? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is within a week or 2 weeks ? 

Mr. Vincent. A week ago. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know this man ? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't know the man. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did approve language in this release, as 
of July 28, 1944? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that true? 

Mr. Vincent. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. And this language clearly indicates he was a 
Communist, does it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; it does. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any question about it ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2179 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you account for the fact in any way that you 
as an expert on the Far East did not know, certainly, one of the lead- 
inf? Communists, if not the leading Communist, of Japan, by name? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony to you was that I did not know him 
and I could not recall his name. 

Mr. SocTRWiNE. I say : Do you account in any way for the fact 
that you did not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I account for it by the fact that 7 years afterward 
I could not recall the name of a Japanese. • 

Mr. SouKwiNE. Mr. Cliairman, might the record show at this point, 
so there will be no false impression, that while this Amerasia document 
speaks of using the Japanese Communist Okano in the role of Tito 
for Japan, Tito at that time was in a much different position than 
what he is in at the present time ? 

Is that not true, Mr. Vincent, that at that time, in July of 1944, 
Tito was a Communist leader, there had been no break with Commu- 
nist Kussia in Yugoslavia at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. In 1944, Tito was, as I recall it, a guerrilla leader 
in Yugoslavia, but I can't give exact information on it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He was a Communist guerrilla leader ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R. ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R. and, 
it is my recollection, by the United Kingdom. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes? 

Senator Ferguson. Now the second line in this describes Okano as 
a Japanese Communist, does it not? 

Mr. Vincent. The second line in what, sir? I am trying to follow 
you. 

Senator Ferguson. In your release. 

Mr. Vincent. The second line from where ? 

Senator Ferguson. The second line from the top. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, "using the Japanese Communist, Susumu 
Okano." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He was a Japanese Communist; is that 
not correct? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know then that Amerasia was a Com- 
munist front? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you think they meant by this state- 
ment, if it was not a Communist front? 

Mr. Vincent. This was simply, as the policy was, even in Yugo- 
slavia, of using people anywhere we could, to fight the Japanese. 

Senator Ferguson. But this was to do more than fight the Japa- 
nese; it was to establish a Communist Government in Japan, was it 
not? You would not expect the Communists to establish any other 
kind of government than a Communist Government, would you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you were advocating that they estab- 
lish a Communist Government in Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I was not advocating anything. 

This was sent out. 



2180 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. You knew tliat Amerasia was- 



Mr. Vincent. That Amerasia, in writing this article, had expressed^ 
that opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that be pro-Communist? 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly would be pro-Communist. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, we have now our expert from the 
Navy Department, on distribution coding. May we have him as a 
witness ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Will you raise your right hand ? 

You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before this 
subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United 
States you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth? 

Commander Blenman. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM BLENMAN, ASSISTANT 
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND PLANS DIVISION, OFFICE OF 
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY DEPART- 
MENT 

Mr. Sourwine. Commander, will you state your name for the 
record? 

Commander Blenman. Commander William Blenman. 

Mr. Sourwine. What position do you hold in the Department ? 

Commander Blenman. I am the Assistant Director of the Admin- 
istration and Plans Division in the Office of Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

Mr. Sourwine. I hand you a document consisting of two pages. 
Will you read the first couple of lines so we may identify it ? 

Commander Blenman (reading) : 

The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibility of using the Japanese 
Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of * * *. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you look at the lower left-hand corner of the 
bottom of the second page? Do you find there symbols indicating 
distribution ? 

Commander Blenman. I do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us what those symbols mean? 

Commander Blenman. The first one, Comminch F-0 means "com- 
mander in chief, and the Chief of Naval Operations." 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, first of all, does the presence of these symbols 
indicate to you that this document was sent to a number of places or 
a number of categories of places and persons ? 

Commander Blenman. It indicates to me that it received distribu- 
tion within the Navy Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Within the Navy Department? 

Commander Blenman. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then these are people or officers within the Navy to 
whom it went? 

Commander Blenman. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you please proceed? 

Commander Blenman. First one, "Comminch F-O" is the com- 
mander in chief and the Chief of Naval Operations. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2181 

Senator Ferguson. Wlio is the commander in chief? 

Commander Blenman. This means the commander in chief of the 
^avy, sir, who was at that time Fleet Admiral E. J. King. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral King, on July 28, 19i4, was the com- 
mander in chief ? 

Commande*r Blenman. Yes, sir. 

The next symbol "Comminch F-20" is the assistant for Combat In- 
telligence. 

In July, 1944 — I do not have the organization sheets of that particu- 
lar month — so the incumbent at that time I do not know at present. 

"Op-13"' refers to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. 

"Op-13" is the Director of the Central Division. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who that was ? 

Commander Blenman. Reading from the sheet which is dated Au- 
gust 22, 1944, that w^as Capt. O. S. Colclough. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What is the next one ? 

Commander Blenman. "Op-16" is the Director of Naval Intelli- 
gence. 

"Op-16-1" is the Deputy Director for Naval Intelligence. 

"Op-16-F" is the Head of Intelligence Branch in the Naval Intelli- 
gence Division. 

"Op-20-G" is the Communications Division, the Assistant Director 
for Communications and Intelligence. 

The last I am unable to identify positively, but by the first "Op-16" 
it indicates that it belonged to the Naval Intelligence Division. I be- 
lieve it was probably a mailing file section. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Considering that paper as a whole, would you say 
that it is a copy of a State Department document which was circulated 
within the Navy Department, for the information of high-echelon of- 
ficers and intelligence? 

Commander Blenman. Judging from the distribution list, I would 
say "Yes." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The document appears on its face to be originally 
a State Department document ; is that right ? 

Commander Blenman. I would be unable to positively identify it 
as such. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What is the marking in the upper left-hand corner ? 

Commander Blenman. "Message sent, Chungking, China, July 25 
(1005)." 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there a name there ? 

Commander Blenman. It says "Hull (Secretary)." 

Mr. Sourwine. He was Secretary of State ? 

Commander Blenman. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Assuming this document was an official Navy De- 
partment document, the presence of that name would indicate it was 
originally a message sent by Mr. Hull to Chungking, would it not? 

Commander Blenman. It would. 

Senator Ferguson. Over on the second page, does it not have under 
"OP-16-A-3-1" "State FC/L"? 

Commander Blenman. That must be, I believe, some State Depart- 
ment distribution. It is not within the Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. It would indicate that it was distributed in 
.State, also? 

Commander Blenman. Yes, sir. 



2182 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Now, does it indicate in any place that that is 
a Navy document ? 

Commander Blenman. It has no indication of such. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Vincent, you concede that this was 
a State Department document ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I don't think there is anything very mysterious 
there. Our communications with Chungking during the war, and 
the channels being confined, this was made over Navy radio. We have 
had Navy radio personnel in the Embassy at Chungking. This long- 
distribution symbol put on — it was put on as it went out over Navy 
radio. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean if something went out over Navy radio, 
they had a closed circuit of distribution there to the Navy Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; as the telegram goes from the Navy to the State 
Department, the State Department would not have put a distribution 
list for the Navy. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would that be the practice in the Navy Depart- 
ment, if they sent a State Department message to Chungking, to cir- 
culate a copy of it ? 

Commancler Blenman. I Can't testify that was the procedure done 
in those days. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know that to be done during your 
time ? 

Commander Blenman. I have no experience in that regard. 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not want to put you on the spot, sir, I have no 
more questions. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, the date on this is July 28, 1944. The message 
purports to have been sent on July 25, 1944, to Chungking. 

Do you know if that date is correct, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know that the date is absolutely correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have reason to believe it is not correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no reason to believe it is not correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you accept the fact that this document was cir- 
culated in the Navy Department about the 28th of July? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, do you know if this document quotes from the 
August 1944 issue of Amerasia ? It states : "The July issue." 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge if it was quoting from the Au- 
gust issue. It says it was quoting from the July issue ; as far as I know 
anything about it. It is right here, if you want me to read this. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is this? 

Mr. Vincent. This is a press release that I spoke of this morning. 

Mr. Sourwine. That has been ordered in the record, and this docu- 
ment has been ordered in the record, so they will both be in the rec- 
ord for whatever they may speak. But, I would like to ask : Did you 
not know that, in fact, the text quoted was not in the July issue of 
Amerasia but in the August issue of Amerasia ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. It was in the July issue ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I did not draft this. I have no recol- 
lection other than passing over my desk. I don't know whether it 
was in July. It says "July issue." 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2183 

A telegram drafted in Mr, McDermott's office would be the July 
issue ; that would be my assumption. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Do you recall ever urging that China w'ould be used 
as a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union 
in the Far East? 

Mr. Vincent. I recall making a speech some time or other using a 
phrase similar to that. I don't recall urging it. You will have to 
take that whole speech. 

Senator Ferguson. It looks as if we can finish this in 2 hours, but 
we are not going to try it tonight. 

So we will start at 9 : 30 tomorrow morning and continue for 2 hours 
and see whether we can finish. 

Mr. Vincent. I have great confidence in Mr. Sourwine, but he has 
made those 2-hour promises 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, I have made no promises as to 2 hours 
or when we could conclude. 

Mr. Vincent. That is a fact. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Why did you say that I had made a promise of 2 
hours ? 

Mr. Vincent. I correct the statement. You have not made a prom- 
ise. You have said at times you would hope to get through in 2 hours. 

Mr. Sourwine. And I have expressed that hope with the utmost 
sincerity, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I might suggest that if you will get a good 
night's rest and then answer these questions a little more directly, we 
might save some time. 

Mr. Vincent. Thank you. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am informed that the actual order for admission 
into the record of this press conference transcript which Mr. Vin- 
cent has furnished, and this particular document referring to Amer- 
asia, has not been made. 

Would you care to make that order ? 

Senator Ferguson. 1 am entering the order now and will also re- 
ceive what Mr. Mandel read from the Second Eeport, Un-American 
Activities in Washington State, in the record. 

(The document referring to Amerasia and the press conference 
transcript referred to were marked ''Exhibits Nos. 387 (content of 
which appears on p. 2091 ; distribution numbers identified, beginning 
on p. 2180) and 388." No. 388 is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 388 

[Not for the press. For departmental use only] 

Department of State Press and Radio News Conference, Friday, June 2, 1950 

12 : 20 PM, EDST 

Mr. McDekmott. We have a release on the employment of high-ranking sci- 
entists in top-level policy posts in the Department and in key foreign posts, 
which is being handed out to you. I think you will find it interesting (See press 
release No. 579). It is a nice story when you get it down to small print, and 
it may he that you would rather work from that and I think you will find some- 
thing in it. 

There is a story from London this morning to the effect that at the recent meet- 
ing in London the Western Big Three nations liad agreed to let the Western 
German Government establish an armed federal police force, and I have had a 
lot of requests on that this morning. The comment on that is, the question of 



2184 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

strengthening police forces in Germany was raised during the meeting of the 
three Ministers in London. They did not feel, however, that they had sufficient 
data and information to reach a decision. The matter was therefore referred 
to the High Commission for study and discussion with the Germans. No de- 
cision was reached at London as to the nature or size of additional policy units 
for Germany. 

Q. Mac, is that all? 

A. That it all. 

Q. What do they mean by saying that they didn't have sufficient data and in- 
formation? As I recall, out of that three-power meeting there came a very 
detailed statement on the situation of Eastern Germany. 

A. There was a lot of information came out about Eastern Germany, but 
these three Foreign Ministers felt that they didn't have enough information or 
data to reach a decision, so they referred it to the High Commission. 

Q. There has been no decision as yet? 

Q. These stories from London are pretty mutual on that. 

A. Yes. - 

Q. Mac, who brought up the question. Schuman or who? 

A. I dont' know who brought it up over there. 

Q. Can we find out? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Isn't there any rule concerning armed police forces in Western Germany 
now ? They have some sort of arms for the policy force. 

A. I suppose so. 

Q. They must have federal police forces. 

A. I don't know just how the police do that. 

Q. Who had the story, Mac? 

A. It just came oft the ticker and I think there was something before on the 
ticker about it. 

Q. Can we get something about this eventually? 

A. I would rather not express any opinion until McCloy has a chance to work 
it out with the others. 

Q. Do they have authority to make any plan or do they have to make recom- 
mendations? 

A. They will make recommendations which will be discussed with the Gov- 
ernment. 

Q. It was referred to them for study and discussion. 

Q. Was there any decision reached as to the principle involved — whether 
there should be 

A. (Interposing). The whole thing was just turned over to the High Com- 
mission for study and report. 

Q. It is under study by them and it looks as though there was agreement in 
principle. 

A. It is under study by the High Commissioners until they make some report 
to us. 

Q. Did the Commissioners receive any guidance at all? 

A. Of course, they had the benefit of all the discussions between the Min- 
isters. 

Q. That wouldn't affect a policy against rearming Western Germany. 

A. That is not the question. This question is about rearming Western Ger- 
many. That matter has not been discussed at all. What was covered here was 
the matter of arming some police. 

Q. Is this a new thing? The question has been reported before, but what 
I can't get is — I can't get an answer to what our attitude is — if we are against 
the thing? 

A. No; I won't even go that far. The whole thing is under discussion. 

Q. The report from London was about federal police. 

A. I will read the report from London if the UP will give me permission : 

"(German Police) London — The Western Big Three Nations have agreed to 
let the West German Government establish an armed federal police force of 
about 5,000 men, informed sources said. These sources said the police would be 
equipped with light arms, including automatic weapons, and be about one-tenth 
the size of the militarized 'people's police' in the Soviet zone of Germany. In- 
formed sources said the new force was designed to bolster the prestige of the 
West German Government and give it an instrument to help preserve domestic 
order. They said it was not designed as a reply to establishment of the Soviet 
zone 'peoples police.' Informants said the three allied High Commissioners in 
West Germany had been informed of the decision and instructed to begin dis- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2185 

cussions with the Federal German Government on establishment of the force. 
Negotiations will begin this month in Bonn, where the exact composition of the 
police will be worked out." (6/2-GM95SA). 

Q. Mac, you say then that there has been no decision up to the present time? 

A. There has been no decision reached as to the size of the federal force. 

Q. The idea of that is that there has been a decision to establish a police force? 

A. There has not been any decision to establish or increase it — or how many. 

Q. Are there federal police in Germany now? 

A. No ; there are no federal police. 

Q. What was your answer to the query as to whether the Western German 
police now having arms? 

A. I don't know what they carry. 

Q. They must carry something. 

A. They are not federal police, they are local police. They might have pistols. 

Now I am going into a little discourse about practii es in the State Department 
which most of us, of course, know but which some people outside do not. There 
are hundreds of telegrams in the Department every day. The Secretary of State 
does not sign all the telegrams but his name appears on every telegram. There 
are various officers in the Department authorized to sign the Secretary's name 
and put their own initials under it. That seems to be what happened in con- 
nection with a document being discussed in the papers the last two days. There 
are stores about a message in Chungking, concerning an ai'ticle that appeared in 
Amerasia which interested me a lot. I found that the telegram referred to was 
written in my own office, that it was signed in my own office, and initialed in my 
own office, and went out as a matter of routine, following a procedure of long 
standing of keeping our missions abroad informed on what was appearing in the 
public print in the United States concerning their areas. 

I ran through .•^ome of my tlimsiv s auu iound rhai many for a certain period 
went to Chungking. These were not secret telegrams at all. The information 
in these papers has appeared in the newspapers in the United States. 

Q. Did any of your telegrams express any information in the Amerasia case? 

A. None whatever. .Just let me continue. There had gone up to Yenan a 
couple of American newspaper correspondents. They were following their pro- 
fessions of observing what was going on. Their stories were reports of their 
observations to the American people. 

Q. Yenan was the headcpiarters of the Chinese Communists. 

A. I don't know what headquarters this was, but it was in that area. There 
were many stories written by these correspondents which appeared in the press. 
Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was well aware of the shift of the corre- 
spondents to that part of China. On July 10, he wired the Department 

Q. (Interposing.) What year? 

A. 1944 (continuing) that the press correspondents had reportedly returned 
from their visit to Yenan and were en route to Chungking. The Embassy had 
not as yet received from the United States any copies of the press despatches 
or articles written by them, and accordingly did not know whether it had been 
possible for them to make comprehen.sive factual reports. That telegram was 
referred to my office for action, which consisted of clipping newspapers, leading 
articles, leading magazines, and writing a digest compressed into a despatch 
that could be sent by cable, sending the cable to Chungking, and wrapping up 
the despatches and articles and sending them by air nnil. If you want me to, 
I will read a despatch — one of them : (Washington, July 19, 1944, Amembassy, 
Ckungking) "As indicated in following digest, press correspondents who trav- 
eled to Yenan were evidently allowed consideralile latitude in their despatches 
and articles relating to their trip. (Embassy's telegram — July 10.) 

"The corre.spondents in despatches to New York Times. New York Herald- 
Tril)une, and Christian Science Monitor, praised Communists' industrial and 
agricultural achievements, and applauded fighting sp'rit and military achieve- 
ments of Communist troops. New York Times' correspondent on .Tuly 1 re- 
ported finding in Yenan 'hatred of Japanese and determination to defend their 
achievements against all interference.' Same correspondent stressed finding 
realization of nearness of counteroffensive against Japan, in wh'ch Coramuni.st 
armies and guerrillas want to participate to fullr«st. He reported seeing how 
formerly barren country has been transformed into area of intensive cultiva- 
tion, stock breeding, and handicraft industry. Harrison Forman in Herald- 
Tribune on June 2.*^ described Yenan as 'magnificient symbol of tenacity and 
determination of i:>eop]e of this border region of China.' He descrilied how this 
border area, forced by circumstances to become wholly self-reliant since it was 
cut off from outside world three years ago, 'encourages any and every industry, 
22848 — 52 — pt. 7 1?. 



2186 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

small or large, even subsidizing some which admittedly would be unprofitable 
if products they yield could I.e imported, Gueuiher Stein in Christian Science 
Monitor on June '27 declared that any Allied jcommander 'would be proud ta 
command those tou.uh, well-fed, hardened troops whose exercises show both, 
high skill and spirit.' 

"Harrison Forman in June 23 Herald-Tribune described refreshing, informal 
atmosphere of place, declaring : 'No one bothers about ceremony, styles ot cloth- 
ing or time. Everytliing is open and above board, with absolutely no control 
or restrictions on movements, discussions, interviews, visits or photographs, 
while every one, from highest governuient official lo lowliest peasant worker, 
sincerely asks lor criticism and advice for betterment of himself and of work- 
ing conditions.' 

'Hari-ison Forman reported in July 1 Herald-Tribune that Mao Tse-tung 
stated Communists' attiiude on Kuomintang-Communist relations as follows : 
'To support Generalissimo Cliianu Kai-shek, to persist in Kuomintang cooper- 
ation as well as cooperation with whole people of China, to struggle for over- 
throw of Japanese imperialism and to build an independent and democratic 
China.' Guenther Stein quoted Wang Cheng in June 27 Monitor as asserting 
that everyone hopes for achievement of full understanding with Kuomintang, 
'for we have never ceased to recognize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as leader.' 
Communist spt.kesman, Cliou En-lai, according to Harrison Forman in July 9 
Herald-Tribune, declared that 'there is still considerable distance between 
national government's proposal and our suggestions.' Forman in same story 
says Yenun hopes that Chungking will send representatives to Yenan for closer 
examination of situation an i to enter into more comprehensive discussion. 

"Correspondents reported from Sian that that city had had three months' 
notice of their visit, and was 'on its toes.' Guenther Stein in June 1 Monitor 
related that beggars and dogs had been cleared out, and 'the usually clean city 
was cleaner than ever.' New York Times correspondent in June 3 despatch 
. said Sian .'looks and feels like a political and mililary fortress.' Ha reported 
that 'one's actions are not one's private business. Everything is traced, checked 
and counterchecked.' He said he telt like 'a piece on a chess board, with his 
movements circumscribed by fixed rules.' 

"General Hu Chung-nan's chief of staff, General Lo Tse-Kai, flatly told re- 
porters, according to June 3 despatch to New York Times, that Eighth Route 
Army had never fought Japanese since war began, that they had done nothing 
except impede attack of Central Government troops, that all guerillas in Shansi, 
Hopeh, Shantung belonged to Kuomintang, and that if Chungking talks achieved 
any settlement, "we don't hope that they will help us fight the Japanese because 
this is too much to expect. We only hope they will not interfere with us.' 

"New York Times correspondent reported on June 2 that General Hu himself 
declined to answer a question about possible Government-Comuumist under- 
standing, after representative of Clningking Ministry of Inl'ormation, who was 
accompanying party, broke in to say that this question had already been an- 
swered by General Lo. 

"Harrison Forman in June 4 despatch to Herald-Tribune described Kenanpo 
and unoccupied Shansi provincial areas still under Marshal Yen Hsi-shan's 
control as even more Communist than Communist districts adjacent, with which 
relations are strained, and there is little or no contact. 

"Copies of the available despatches and articles are being air mailed to you. 

"Hull 
"(HMB) 
"(SA/M)" (Homer M. Byington) 

Q. Mac, wa.s the correspondent for Amerasia in this group? 

A. I don't know. 

Q. Wiiat about this Amerasia telegram? 

A. Then on July 25 

Q. (Interposing.) All these things that you have read to us have been by 
correspondents? 

A. That is right. 

Q. Did this include Amerasia? Did these reports include everything else that 
was written by all of them — or was Amerasia reporting? 

A. I don't know whether Amerasia was there or not. All I have is the tele- 
grams picked out of the file. 

Following that then, the same people who drafted the telegram I have just 
read to you, and this was not a secret telegram. It was not in the public print, 
it was sent restricted and coded. 

Q. Wii!!t diite was tliatV 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2187 



A. July 25. It was about the Japanese 

Q. (Interposing.) Just a second, Mae. Did you say that has been printed? 
A. It was printed in part. They .have taken quotes out here and there. 
Q. How long is it, Mi^e? 
A. I will just read the whole thing to you, it is 21/3 pages : 

(Amembasst, Chungking from Hull ; July 25, 1944) 

"July issue of Amerasia suggests possibility of using Japanese Communist 
Susumu Okano in role of a 'Tito for Japan' in helping Japanese people to estab- 
lish government that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy. 
Magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to wliether the American State De- 
partment 'will support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will 
prefer to favor the so-called liberal elements in Japan's present ruling class.' 

'•Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout Eastern China 
should be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guer- 
rilla forces that are now operating behind Japanese lines not only in North, but 
also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities with mate- 
rial, technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why 
United States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to 
strengthen their war effort in Asia simply out of deference to current political 
situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow policy adopted 
toward guerrilla "groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were 
eventually superseded by military necessity. 

"Magazine denounces 'incredible and preposterous statement' of General Lo 
Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and ccmdenms Infor- 
mation Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces 
that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly 
refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Govern- 
ment. It is acserted that vital Honan campaign was won l)y only 40,000 Japa- 
nese with not more than llfi tanks, at time when approximately 2.j0,000 Central 
Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks that form 
iron ring blockading Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information 
proving that northern giierilla forces have carried on their resistance to Japanese 
and have persistently continued their work of educating people to participate in 
that resistance, despite constant 'mopping up' campaigns by Japanese and hos- 
tility on part of Chinese government. Article points out that though poorly 
equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted enthusiastic 
sui^port of local population. 

"Kwangtung Guerilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won support of local 
population sufficiently to enable them to withstand l)oth Japanese 'mopping up' 
campaigns and repeated efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them. 
So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kow- 
loon railway, article reports, that although Japanese have controlled both 
terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single through 
train. 

'•Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations 
can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists that immediate recog- 
nition of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of 
liaison officers, technical aid, and munitions, has become of primary importance 
for success of our future offensive against Japanese. 

"Hull 
"(HMB) 
" ( SA/M ) " 

Q. Some of the press dispatches commented that this telegram was an instruc- 
tion to the Embassy concerning action which might be taken against the Japa- 
nese. 

A. The telegram was in no sense an instruction. It merely relayed to the 
Ambassador information which had appeared in the magazine Amerasia. I 
don't think there is any doubt that Ambassador Gauss knew the magazine 
Amerasia and this was merely a digest of an article in it. The telegram was 
drafted I)y a young lady in my office of Current Information and in no way 
could it be considered an instruction from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Gauss 
in Chungking. 

Q. This was endorsed by the State Department? 

A. It was in no sense an endorsement but a transmission of information which 
had appeared in that magazine. 

Q. This is in no case a Department dispatch? 



2188 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

A. No, not at all in the sense you have in mind. It was just a report of what 
had appeared in the public press. I have gone into this in detail so you might 
see what the operation was — the Press OfRce keeping the Ambassador informed 
of what appeared in the American press. . 

Q. I noticed that correspondents in China were quoted in these press dispatches. 
Was Haldore Hanson one of them? 

A. I don't know. 

Q. I was looking for his name. They refer to an AP correspondent but didn't 
quote him by name. 

Q. AP correspondent? 

Q. Can you say why you should deny this so emphatically? 

A. Now, look ! I am not saying' whether this teleuram I have just read you 
exists in any file outside the State Department because I do not know. I do not 
know whether a copy of tliis telegram was in the Amerasia file or whether or 
not it was seized there. What I have is the ofBcial State Department file and 
I am giving you the information from that file. 

Q. Would it be possible for Amerasia to obtain the file? 

A. I don't see how. 

Q. I was wondering what the operation was. 

A. I do not make public press digests sent to the Embassy for their infor- 
mation. 

Q. That was signed by Acheson, wasn't it? 

A. No. It was signed by Hull. 

Stories in the newspapers have said that this telegram was a secret one from 
Hull to Chungking. That is just not true, and I put emphasis on that. Off the 
record. 

Q. What category would it appear in here, or would it be sent out with dis- 
tinguishable instructions, or what? 

A. It was marked restricted and not to be shown to anybody except in para- 
phrase. That was because the material was not secret, it having appeared in 
public print, but it was transmitted in code to save money. We did not want 
lo prejudice the code : hence, the stamp that it was restricted. 

Q. It was signed "Hull" though, wasn't it, Mac? 

A.. It was signed "Hull," just exactly at tliis one. They are all the same. 

Mr. White. Every telegram that has gone out of the State Department has 
been signed by the Secretary of State, so far as I know, from the inception of 
the Department. 

Mr. McDER>roTT. It has to be signed by the Secretary or the Acting Secretary 
in his place, or otherwise it doesn't go out. 

Q. That doesn't mean that he sees everything with his signature? 

A. He never sees them — he wouldn't have time. iMr. Hull never saw all the 
telegrams. The yellow telegrams are incoming, the green one are outgoing. 

Mr. White. The question was asked as to who brought up the question of the 
German police at London and whether the Ministers gave the High Commissioners 
any guidance. 

Prior to the London meeting a letter had been received by the three Goveim- 
ments from Chancellor Adenauer requesting 25,000 central police. This letter 
had not been answered nor had it been discussed prior to the London meeting. At 
that meeting Ciiancellor Adenauer's letter was brought up by the British. Mac 
has told you the position that the Ministers took — namely, that they did not 
feel that they had sufficient information to make any decision on it whatsoever. 
Accordingly, the High Commissioners were asked to study the problem and to 
come up with recommendations. In other words, in answer to the second part 
of the question, the High Commissioners did not, NOT, receive any guidance from 
the Foreign Ministers. 

Q. Link, have the High Commissioners been told to make any recommenda- 
tions by any particular time? 

A. So far as I know, no. The question was dumped in their lap and they were 
told to work it out. 



Q. Thank you, sir. 



SA/M : AW 



M. J. McDermott. 



Senator Ferguson. We will now recess until tomorrow morning at 
9 : 30'. 

(Whereupon, at 4: 15 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
9 • 30 a. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
or the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. O. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 : 30 a. m., Senator 
Homer Ferguson, presiding. 
Present : Senator Ferguson. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel : Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of sresearch. 
Senator Ferguson. The committee will come to order. 
You may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS 
COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA, 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Mr. Vincent, some of the newspapers report to have 
discovered what they appear to have thought was a contradiction in 
our testimony toward the end of yesterday's session. I don't believe 
it was, but I want to be sure that the record speaks true and that we 
have an opportunity to discuss it on that point. There also has been 
an indication that perhaps you were — on yesterday — bulldozed or 
browbeaten or overcome to the point where you said something you 
really didn't mean to say, and if that is the fact I want to give you an 
opportunity to correct it this morning. If I seem to you perhaps to 
oversimplify this, bear with me for a moment. 

When you were making this talk that we discussed — — 

Senator Ferguson. I think he ought to be given an opportunity now. 
Do you want to change or alter or make any explanation of any of 
your testimony as of yesterday ? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I would like to see, if I can, the transcript, 
but it isn't here, is it, of my testimony yesterday ? 

Mr. Sourwine. It has not been delivered yet. It should be here this 
morning by about 10 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you may proceed. You may see the tran- 
script. 

Mr. Sourwine. When we were talking about this radio speech on 
the occupation policy for Japan I had asked you about your use of 
the phrase "democratic parties," and again about your use of the 

1^189 



2190 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

phrase "liberal parties," and whether that included the Communist 
Party of Japan. It is true, is it not, that at that time there were more 
than one political party in Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. You were in this speech endeavoring to divide the 
political parties of Japan roughly into two groups, the monarchistic- 
nationalistic on the one hand, and the democratic-liberal on the other ; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Don't agree with me if it is not 'right. 

Mr. Vincent, That was my general intention, yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You simply were using a label for each of those two 
groups ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You might have called them group A and group B, 
and written a long thesis about what you meant by group A ; but you 
were making a radio speech and you chose a label for group A and 
a label for group B, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The label that you chose for one group was demo- 
cratic parties or liberal parties. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The label you chose for the other group was mon- 
archistic parties or nationalistic parties, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Is that the label I chose [referring to paper] ? I was 
just wondering whether I used that or whether I used reactionary 
parties. 

Mr. SoiJRA\aNE. All right, reactionary parties; for the other group? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I used the word "nationalistic" here, I see. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Right. In which of those two groups did you in- 
tend that the Communist Party of Japan should fall ? In which of 
those two groups did you consider it to be, for the purpose of the 
discussion that you were here undertaking? 

Mr. Vincent. The Communist Party ? 

Mr, SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. If you are asking me in the context of this, I didn't 
consider that it fell in either. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what we are trying to find out, because sub- 
sequently you were asked if you thought that the Communist Party 
was democratic, and of course you very properly said you did not, but 
you were not then talking about the same thing as you were in this 
speech, were you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you repeat that? I am just trying to get it 
straight. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE, Yes, indeed. You were asked if you thought that 
the Communist Party of Japan was a democratic party, and you said 
you did not, 

Mr, Vincent, I correctly testified I did not, 

Mr, Sourwine. In that sense you were not talking about the same 
thing as you were when in the speech you attempted to classify the 
parties of Japan into one of two groups, were you ? 

Mr, Vincent, No, sir. 

Mr. Sottrwine. So in that sense you were not contradicting your- 
self at all, were you ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2191 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say I was, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No. When yon say that the Communist Party 
-does not fall in either of these two t^roiips would you explain that a 
little? 

Mr. Vincent. I would explain that in this way: That in making 
this speech I did not have in mind the Communist Party as falling in 
either group. In other words, I was thinking of democratic parties 
as parties as we think of them, as democratic-liberal parties in this 
country, and in making this speech there was no intention in my mind 
to include Communist parties among democratic parties. 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment, ]\Ir. Vincent. You knew there 
were Communists in Japan. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew that they wanted to bring back to 
Japan a Communist Japanese according to the press release that you 
had prepared and sent out. 

Mr, Vincent. I didn't prepare it, sir, but you are speaking of the 
Amerasia press release. 

Senator Ferguson. You approved it, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had passed it ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew Amerasia was advocating that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew there was a Communist Party in 
Japan ? 

]\rr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew it was active? 

]\Ir. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you excluded it entirely ? 

Mr. Vincent. In speaking of democratic parties I did not have it 
in mind. In speaking of political parties 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you not exclude it by words? 
You told us yesterday, as I recall your testimony, that it was included 
in that. 

Mr. Vincent. Included among the politica]«parties. That was my 
testimony yesterday, sir, that I did not have in mind — I haven't the 
testimony here now — that I did not have specifically in mind, but I 
did not exclude the Communist Party specifically as you have said, 
but I do not think that it can be interpreted here that because I did 
not exclude the Communist Party from a mention of democratic 
parties that it necessarily follows that I included it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it possible that the man who wrote 
that speech had something in mind different than what you had in 
mind? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't testify to that, sir, what he had in mind. 
It is possible, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it is fair to the people of the 
United States to have a State Department official, a high official have 
his broadcast written by a person connected with the radio station 
and then for him to repeat it on the radio ? 

]\Ir. Vincent. ]\Ir. Chairman, I think that is done quite frequently. 
As long as it is gone over. 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking, do you think that is the proper 
thiuff to do? 



2192 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think it is improper. I think it is done 
regidarly. 

Senator Ferguson. You heard this read about the man who pre- 
pared your speech. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it was a good thing to do it? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time I had no suspicion 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about now. I am not talking 
about then. 

Mr. Vincent, I think now it would be, to have a man like that pre- 
pare a script. 

Senator Ferguson. You think it would be now ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, on the basis of the information I now have 
about Menefee. 

Senator Ferguson. You say you would do it now ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. So a man has to be careful who he has work on 
his speeches, isn't that true ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, you don't want us to believe, do you, 
that in making this speech you were unaware of or unconscious of 
the existence of the Japanese Communist Party? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not wish you to. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were attempting to draw a line, and it is always 
a very difficult thing to draw a line, but you were attempting to draw 
a line which would divide the political parties of Japan into two 
groups, is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You say that you didn't mean to include the Com- 
munist Party of Japan in either of those two groups ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yoif certainly would not include the Communist 
Party of Japan in the monarchistic or nationalistic group, would 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you aware that the Communists in Japan, as 
elsewhere, always refer to themselves as democratic, the "real demo- 
crats," as the "true liberals," that the words "democratic" and "liberal" 
are always applied by the Communists to themselves? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I am ; that they quite frequently do that. 

Mr. Sourwine. You realize that when they are used that way by 
the Communists they are understood as including the Communist 
Party ? 

]Mr. Vincent. That when the Communist Party uses it, that they 
frequently refer to themselves as a democratic party. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right. Did you ever have any thought at 
all that your use of the words might be interpreted in Japan as in- 
cluding the Communist Party in this group that you call democratic 
or liberal ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, it could have been interpreted as that, con- 
sidering what you just said. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2193 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Without considering any argument that I may have 
made, on the basis of your own knowledge of Japan, of the Far East, 
do you think that the general use of the phrase "democratic parties" 
or "liberal parties" of Japan would be interpreted by the Japanese 
hearer or reader as including the Communist Party of Japan ? 

]\Ir. Vincent. Yes ; it could have been interpreted as including it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Vincent, the subcommittee hearings mentioned 
the following published paragraph, that is, the hearings of this sub- 
committee on a previous date. I read : 

With the assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Engene 
Dooman, who was chairman of SWNCC, the powerful interdepartmental com- 
mittee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph 
Grew out, the forces in the State DepaHment which were relatively anti- 
imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain direc- 
tives which had been held up in committee theretofore so that the set of direc- 
tives for treatment of Japan which the White House recently released were 
even better than the original directives which had been flown over to MacArthur 
and apparently ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts. 

If I tell you that that paragraph was published about October of 1945, 
could you comment on it. 

Mr. Vincent. I would comment on that paragraph as being a mis- 
statement of fact. I testified yesterday with regard to the develop- 
ment of the postsurrender policy and I can testify again today if you 
would like me to. I testified also in executive hearing that that is not 
correct. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Do you know, sir, who could have revealed the 
information contained in that paragraph, that is, as to who was out and 
what directives were being held up and what was being forwarded ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I cannot. 

Mr. SonRWiNE. Do you know what was referred to in that para- 
graph by the mention of "the forces in the State Department which 
were relatively anti-imperialist"? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you a part of the so-called anti-imperialist 
forces in the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I know of no such designation, and I don't 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall who replaced Mr. Dunn as Assistant 
Secretary of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think, sir, that anybody actually replaced INIr, 
Dunn. 

Mr. Sourwine. Wlio replaced Mr. Grew ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Acheson. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who replaced Mr. Dooman? 

Mr. Vincent. On the SWNCC committee, I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday I had 
just started to ask you about another address which you made. I 
refer now to the address which you made at the Foreign Policy As- 
sociation forum in New York City on October 20, 1945. I believe the 
subject of the forum was BetAveen War and Peace, and your address 
was called The Post War Period in the Far East. Do you recall 
that? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in that address urge that China be used as 
a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union 
in the Far East ? 



2194 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to ^jet the exact phrase (referring to- 
paper). Would you like to know exactly what I said or do you have 
it there? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I have a copy of the speech and intend to put it 
in the record, but I don't want to let that summary stand if you think 
it is an unfair summary. 

Mr. Vincent. What I said here is "China is in a position to form 
a buffer or a bridge in our relation to the Soviet Union in the Far 
East." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Head a little more to get it in context. 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

We will all agree, I believe, that, the bridge concept is preeminently prefer- 
able and that that it shoiild be our policy to make it a fact. I would go further 
and say that only through the cooperation of China, the U. S. S. R. and our- 
selves can the objectives of our policy in the Far East be achieved. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in that speech say anything that might be 
construed in China as semiofficial notice to the Chinese Nationalist 
government that the United States would never cooperate with that 
government in any move against the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to look at the speech, I do not recall 
saying any such thing. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in the speech say : 

In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agree- 
ments which we hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries^ 
It will l»e our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability 
in the Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed 
against the other. 

Mr. Vincent (reading). "Antagonistic toward the other." 

Mr. Sourwine. You said, "Antagonistic toward the other" ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what this press release from the State De- 
partment has. 

Mr. Sourwine. May I see that, sir ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator I^erguson. What position would that place you in? We 
couldn't be anti-Communist, could we? 

Mr. Vincent. I w as not speaking of anticommunism. I was speak- 
ing of the relations of states, Mr. Chairman, and I did not there have 
in mind any ideology. I had in mind that we did not wish to cooper- 
ate with China in a policy which would bring about friction or antag- 
onism with the Soviet Union. 

Senator Ferguson. But don't you understand that the Russian State 
and communism are one thing? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, in this speech 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. My question has nothing to do with the 
speech now. I just asked you the plain question whether or not the 
Russian State, the U. S. S. R. State, and communism are not one and 
the same thing. 

Mr. Vincent. It operates differently, but yes, it is one and the same 
thing in its effect. 

Senator Ferguson. In effect. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How would we fit our policy of not allowing 
communism to expand, if that was our policy in the State Department^ 
and you use this language? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2195 

Mr. Vincent. That is what I am getting at here. We ourselves 
recognized the U. S. S. R., but we do not cooperate with communism. 
In this case I was speaking of the relations of states, which means 
Cliina, Russia, and ourselves, in an attempt to avoid friction in the 
Far East. This was immediately at the close of the war, and anything 
that could have avoided friction and difficulty. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, that meant that we would have to play 
along with the Communists in China. 

Mr. Vincent. That was also a part of our policy at the time, of 
trying to get the National Government and the other parties to settle 
their political differences under the National Government of China, 
that was part of our jDolicy. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you make this speech? 

Mr. Vincent. I made this speech on the 18th of October. I think 
it is 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe it was the 20th, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The 20th of October. What year? 

Mr. Vincent. 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. 19-15. After the war was over. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That meant that our policy after the war. when 
the fighting was over, was to play along \^'ith the Communists in 
Chinal 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't put it that way, sir. The policy was very 
clear. It has been put in General Marshall's directive, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How would you put it? 

Mr. Vincent. I would put it just as I have said before, that there 
was a serious threat in China, I will have to repeat this, of an out- 
break of civil war which would have disturbed relations throughout 
the Far East, and which has disturbed them. At that time it was my 
idea and it was the idea of the other people in the Government of the 
United States, including the President and General Marshall, that 
the best way to avoid that kind of difficulty was to bring about some 
kind of political settlement in China. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. I asked you this before, whether or 
not there were any places in history that you were able to consolidate 
Communists with anti-Communists in a government and not have the 
Communists take over. 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, I have testified before that in France and 
in Italy at the conclusion of the war Communists came into both gov- 
ernments, and that they were eventually eliminated. I have testified 
also that there was never any intention to allow the Communists to 
take over control of the Chinese Government, and the very fact that 
the negotiations broke down was on the basis that the Communists 
were trying themselves to get a greater degree of power in the Govern- 
ment than we or the National Government of China, which was really 
conducting the negotiations, were prepared to grant. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Just so that the record may speak very truly, will 
you look at this, which is — let me identify it first. Mr. Mandel, is that 
a photostat and of what publication? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Department of State Bulle- 
tin dated October 21, 1951. 

Mr. Sourwine. Certain pages thereof? 

Mr. Mandel. Certain pages thereof. 



2196 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Will you look at that paragraph where we differed 
on the language ? Will you look at it as it appears in the Department 
of State Bulletin, which is what I was quoting from, that paragraph 
that begins "In August." Will you read it as it appears there? 

Mr. Vincent (reading) : 

In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agreements 
which vre hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries. It will 
be our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability in the 
Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed against 
the other. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I didn't know whether you had made any point of 
the difference of the words "directed against" or "antagonistic 
toward." 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not. I was just correcting your statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. You see I was reading from the Department of State 
Bulletin and you were reading from the mimeographed release, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Were they not both furnished by the Department 
of State. Do you know which was the way you spoke when you made 
the speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I made it the way it is here. It is much 
more like I made it the way it is here. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. By "here" you mean in the press release ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the press release. 

Mr. Sourwine. Using the word antagonized ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of the State Department's 
instrument, the photostat ? 

Mr. Vincent. It hasn't a date there. 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is marked on there in red pencil, I believe, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. You have "23i/^" in red pencil. This seems to have 
no date on it. Down at the bottom. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is hard to read. October 21, 1951. Is that the 
correct date of that instrument ? 

Senator Ferguson. How could it be 1951 ? 

Mr. Vincent, I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is the date of it, Mr. Mandel ? 

Senator Ferguson. Unless they reprinted it, this was back in 1945. 

Mr. Sourwine. October 21, 1945, would be very close to being cor- 
rect. It is certainly subsequent to the press release. 

Senator Ferguson. About the same time. 

Mr. Vincent. This was released to the press on the 18th of October 
but to be held until October 20, when the speech was given. I can't ac- 
count for the discrepancy there. There may be other discrepancies. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you consider it important ? 

Mr. Vincent. I consider it of no great importance. I prefer the 
word antagonistic to that, and that is the one I used. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you familiar, Mr. Vincent, with the statement 
by President Truman on United States policy toward China under 
date of December 15, 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2197 

ISIr. SouRwiNE. Have you referred to that here as being the same 
thing as the Marshall directive ? 

Mr. Vincent. It is generally called the Marshall directive. 

Mr. SoTJEWiNE. The Marshall directive consisted really of several 
se])arate documents, did it not? 

]\Ir. Vincent. Yes. It consisted of a memorandum to the War 
Department which was included with 

]Mr. Sourwine. From the Secretary of State ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And a letter to General Marshall ? 

INIr. Vincent. And a letter to General Marshall from the President. 

Mr. Sourwine. And a statement by the President, a copy of which 
was included in the letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mv. Sourw^ine. And a copy of a press release, I think, also. 

Mr. Vincent. The press release became, or the press release was, 
the directive. 

Mr. Sourwine. Substantially the same. But Mr. Marshall, Gen- 
eral INIarshall, was given all three of the documents with his letter 
of transmittal ; was he not ? 

Ml". Vincent. Yes. 

Mv. Sourwine. Have you stated what part you had in the drafting 
of that directive ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have, in executive session. 
. Mr. Sourwine. Does your testimony boil down in substance to this, 
that you initially prepared a rough draft, that that rough draft was 
taken over to the military, the War Department, that a new draft was 
prepared expanding your draft from two pages to about six pages, 
that that came back to the State Department and you had an oppor- 
tunity to go over it for changes, and that some few changes w^ere made 
in the State Department, that it then went up and when it came back 
for final approval you had a chance to see it again in its final form be- 
fore it went to the White House. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. May I amend that in one respect just for 
clarity ? 

]\Ir. Sourwine. Please do. 

Mr. Vincent. The paper that I drafted originally was drafted with 
a different idea in mind than what finally came out in the form of a 
press release or directive. I had drafted a short paper to have for 
Mr. Byrnes something as to a statement of what I considered to be 
the problems that faced us and how we might solve them in China, as 
a basis for his discussion. I am trying to get why the other was ex- 
panded because I didn't have in mind writing a directive for Marsliall. 

Senator Ferguson. Yours did not purport to be a directive? 

Mr. Vincent. Mine did not purport to be a directive. 

Senator Ferguson. Alternatives? 

Mr. Vincent. Now you are speaking of a paper which I composed 
about a month earlier. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Which I would like to mention. That was not the 
one that I wrote as of November 28. I am speaking of the alternative 
one which set forth four alternatives for the Secretary witli regard 
to what course we might follow in the Far East. 



2198 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. So there were two papers. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; there were two papers. The other one has no 
connection with the eventual directive other than the fact that one of 
these four alternatives was substantially chosen as a starting point 
for what developed into the policy under Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. When you drew the second paper did you choose 
the alternative that was put in the directive ? 

Mr. Vincent. That had already been chosen. 

Senator Ferguson. Who chose it? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall except that I know it was submitted 
to the President. Whether the President chose it, whether General 
Marshall chose it, whether the Secretary of State chose it, or whether 
they chose it in consultation. I did not choose it ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then when it came back to you again, it came 
back from the War Department as a drafted directive? 

Mr. Vincent. It came hack as a drafted directive, called United 
States policy toward China, as I recall it. I am trying to make that 
distinction, because that isn't what I called my small paper, which was 
just an outline. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You did write a memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Which was the basis for the approximately 6-page 
directive which came back from the War Department ? Is that cor- 
rect ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am trying to get the word "basis." I want to be 
more exact. There has been so much discussion of this whole thing. 

Mr. Sour WINE. You have stated, have you not, that you did write 
a two-page memorandum as to what should be in it? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that the six-page 

Mr. Vincent. No; not what should be in it, but what should form 
the basis for a discussion between Mr. Byrnes and General Marshall. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have that two-page memorandum ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't, sir. It is among the papers in the State 
Department. I am sorry. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In any event, you did write a two-page memoran- 
dum ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; and I have described what its contents were 
here before the committee. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And the directive which came back from the W^ar 
Department 

Mr. Vincent. I testified — and I would like to have it the same way — 
I testified that it did incorporate some of the phraseology and some 
of the ideas in my November 28 thing, but it was an expansion and 
it contained many other matters which were not taken up in mine. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. But you have stated that it contained nothing which 
was contrary to or at odds with what had been your original memo- 
randum ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what I said. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. Did you also draft the memorandum which 
was signed by the Secretary of State, which was one of the three 
documents that went along with the letter of transmittal to General 
3Iarshall? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refresh my memory on that one. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2199 

I don't think I am going to be able to testify from knowledge 
whether I drafted, whether it was drafted in cooperation or after 
discussion with Army officers or not. If I knew factually whether 
I drafted it, I would tell you I drafted it, but then I would add also 
that it was a result of discussion which took place between State and 
War and General Marshall. I would make the same statement that 
if somebody else drafted it, I had also had a part in its preparation. 

Senator Ferguson. You never had any doubt that General Mar- 
shall understood and had a part in the drafting of his directive? 

Mr. Vincent. I never had any doubt but what General Marshall 
knew what was in the directive. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; and had a part in drafting it. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman, we sat for a matter of 3 hours on a 
Sunday morning in December discussing it with General Alarshall. 
We read it over. There were minor phraseology changes made in it, 
and so on. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean. He was part and parcel 
of the making of this directive ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there another question pending? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr, V^iNCENT. He wants to know whether I drafted it, and I am 
afraid I cannot testify as to whether I drafted this memorandum by 
Secretary Byrnes for the War Department. I think a reading of it 
would make it clear that it is in a sense a military — it first sets forth 
what the Secretary of State had said. Then it goes on to enumerate 
certain things which were supposed to be a guide, I think, to General 
Wedemeyer, which came out of the discussion. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean wdiere it says : 

In response to Genei'al Wedeijieyer's recent messages the State Department 
requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I recollect clearly that that also came into the 
discussion on this Sunday morning on December 9. 
■ ]Mr. SouRwiNE. That was strictly a State Department document, 
was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. This memo, yes; except that it was discussed with 
General Marshall in that morning meeting there, because General 
Marshall also had quite an interest in what kind of directive or what 
kind of advice was going out to General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. SouRwixE. This directive, though, did not go to the War De- 
partment for redrafting and then come back to State; did it? 

Mr. Vincent. That I cannot testify, whether the War Department 
had seen it or not. It was an attempt to get instructions out to 
Wedemeyer, and I would say just from knowledge of how things de- 
veloped there, that the War Department did have, not, we will say, 
a matter of drafting, but that they had seen it before and it was a 
matter of agreement as to what kind of memorandum they were going 
to get as a basis for Wedemeyer to operate. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you please from the white paper here iden- 
tify by page which of these documents, or which two if more than one, 
you were referring to when you spoke of the expanded directive that 
came back from the State Department after your two-page memo had 
gone over ? Is it that first one ? 



2200 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No ; it is the one that is marked "62. Statement by 
President Truman on United States Policy Toward China." 

Mr. SouKWiNE. That is the one that you wrote an original two-page 
memo that went to the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. That w^ent to the War Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Went to the War Department, came back to the 
State Department for changes? 

Mr. Vincent. Went back to the War Department and came back 
to State. 

Mr. Sourwine. Came back for a high-level conference at which it 
was approved in the State Department and then finally went to the 
President, Mr. Byrnes taking it over? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Byrnes taking it over. 

Mr. Sourwine. I think General Marshall went with him. 

Mr. Vincent. The two of them I think went over on whatever day 
it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then you did write a two-page memorandum ? • 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Which dealt with the subject matter of this state- 
ment by President Truman, which contains some of the ideas that 
w^ere found in this. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And with which the President's statement was not 
at odds or in controversy. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; as a matter of fact, as I said here in executive 
session, from recollection there was the matter of assisting the Chinese 
to take back Manchuria, the matter of the urgency of bringing about 
some kind of truce to stop the civil war, there was the matter of assist- 
ing the Chinese insofar as it was feasible to bring about a political 
settlement after they ceased fighting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know wdiat became of the original of your 
two-page memorandmn ? 

jNIr. Vincent. Of the original ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I have seen testimony that Mr. Byrnes handed it to 
General Marshall and General Marshall took it. 

Mr. Sourwine. This is a photostat of a document, sir. I ask you if 
you recognize that document. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. What is that document ? 

Mr. Vincent. This document is the memorandum by Secretary 
Byrnes to the War Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is not the memorandum as so transmitted, is 
it ? That is an earlier draft of the memorandum, isn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent. This one ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes; that is, that is not the particular draft which 
was transmitted to the War Department, is it? 

Mr. Vincent. I w^ould have to compare this word for word. 

Mr. SouRWTNE. I don't mean that. I mean as a draft, this is a 
draft which preceded the formal document that was actually trans- 
mitted to the War Department, isn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. From my , examination of this, this looks like it is 
the document which w^as transmitted. 

]\Ir. SouRwaNE. It looks like the document actually transmitted ? 



INSflTUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2201 

• 

Mr. Vincent. Because it is initialed by Mr. J. F, B. ; whether there 
was a subsequent redrafting I don't know. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do your initials appear on that? 

Mr. Vincent. They do, as the drafting officer. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you say you did draft that? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say I did draft it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This is, then, the original of the document for the 
War Department which appears on page 606 of the white paper? 

Mr. Vincent. Insofar as I can testify. This looks exactly like 
it is it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Then you did draft two documents ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. A two-page memorandum which formed 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I won't use the words "formed the basis". A two- 
page memorandum which was in some way, the ideas of which were, 
incorporated into the President's statement? 

JNIr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And this two-page memorandum for the War De- 
partment which the Secretary of State signed? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this memorandum may 
be laid in the record at this point. 

Senator Ferguson. It will become part of the record and received 
in evidence. 

(The document referred to, marked "Exhibit No, 389," is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 389 

[Declassified December 9, 1945] 

MEilORANDUM FOR THE WaR DEPARTMENT 

The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification 
of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. 

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on 
December 7, the Secretary of State said : 

"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to 
promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their 
combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range 
goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of 
a strong, united, and democratic China. 

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government 
of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of 
their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we 
have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a develop- 
ing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the 
representatives of those large ahd well-organized groups who are now without 
any voice in the government of China. 

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience 
and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solution depends primarily 
upon the good will of the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our 
influence is . a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that 
influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage con- 
cessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the 
otlier factions." 

The President has aslied General Marshall to go to China as his special repre- 
sentative tor the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable 
manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set 
forth above. Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the 

2284S— 52 — pt. 7 14 



2202 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

• 

Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major 
political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, 
effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China. 

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department 
requests the War Deiiartment to arrange for directions to him stipulating that : 

(1) He may put into effect the arran.;ements to assist the Chinese National 
Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the 
logistical support of such troops ; 

(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for 
the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater ; 

(3) Pending the outcome of General Marsliall's discussions with Chinese 
leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of 
representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, 
further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China 
ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Man- 
churia, will be held in abeyance : 

(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may 
be immediately perfected, but not conmiunicated to the Chinese Government. 
Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either 
(a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out 
consistently with his negotiations, or (&) that the negotiations between the 
Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the cir- 
cumstances are such as to make the movement necessaiy to effectuate the 
surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in 
the maintenance of international peace. 

[s] J. F. B. 
[s] JCV. 
FE : Vincent : ALM, 
December 10, 1945. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I also ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to offer for 
the record a letter under date of October 3 addressed to Senator Mc- 
Carran and signed by Mr. Humelsine of the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received. 

(The letter referred to was admitted as exhibit No. 390, and read 
in full as follows:) 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I would like permission to read this letter. 

My Dear Senator McCarran : Further reference is made to your letter of 
September 19, 1951, requesting "A draft of General Marshall's directive which 
he took with him when he went to China in 1945" referred to by General Wede- 
meyer in his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Sep- 
tember 15, 1950 ; and also the names of individuals who prepared this directive. 
According to your letter of September 19, General Wedemeyer testified that he 
saw the initials "J. C. V." on the requested directive. 

I am enclosing a photostat of the Department's file copy of the memorandum 
to which, I believe. General Wedemeyer referred. 

Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I Avant to state that this photostat 
which has just been offered for the record is the photostat which was 
submitted with this letter from the State Department. 

This memorandum was one of the enclosures of the President's letter of De- 
cember 15, 1945, to General Marshall. As you are aware, the President's letter 
of December 15, and its enclosures constituted General Marshall's written direc- 
tive for a China mission. 

A search of the Department's files reveal that none of the other documents 
of the Presidential directive which General Marshall took with him to China 
in 1945 bears the initials "J. C. V." or the name of Foreign Service Officer John 
Carter Vincent. 

As to the authorship of the enclosed memorandum, it would be impossible for 
the Department to provide a list of all those who contributed to or edited the 
memorandum. At the time the memorandum was drafted, I\Ir. John Carter 
Vincent was the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and hence tiie 
responsible subordinate ofiicer for the drafting of the memorandum. It should 
be pointed out, however, that in important memorandum of this kind it is 
generally the case that many officers participate in the drafting, even though the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2203 

record copies (such as the enclosed) only show the name of the responsible sub- 
ordinate oflEicer. Since this particular memoiandum was addressed to the War 
Department and since it was signed by Secretary Byrnes and approved by the 
President, it is entirely possible that in addition to Mr. Vincent and other State 
Department officers, military officers as well as Secretary Byrnes and even the 
President may have had a hand in the drafting. 

In this connection, Mr. Acheson's detailed account of the drafting of General 
Marshall's directive is contained on pages 1848 and 1849 of part 3, hearings be- 
fore the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session. 
Sincerely yours, 

Carlisle H. Humelsine. 

So presumably the two-page memorandum which was handed to Gen- 
eral Marshall was never returned to the State Department file I Would 
you assume that from this letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would assimie that from this letter. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That memorandum did bear your initials or your 
name, did it not? 

Mr. VINCENT. It did. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. But it was not in the State Department files in 
October, so presumably it never came back to the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. The original never came back to the State Depart- 
ment, but let me testify here that in my search after I came back from 
leave this time I found a carbon copy of this November 28 document 
to which I refer, which was in the Far Eastern Office files and had 
never gone into the regular State Department files. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. How would you identify that so that we might re- 
quest it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I could identify it by date and I could describe it. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Would you do that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I will put it this way : You don't have to identify it, 
because I would like to have it now to complete this record of all the 
difficulty there has been about the draft. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I am sure we all would because there has been a lot 
of confusion. 

Mr, Vincent. It would be well to have it in. I would like to have 
it. If you would write the State Department there will be no diffi- 
culty in identifying it as the document concerning which Mr. Vincent 
testified here. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Do you think there will be any difficulty in get- 
ting it? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't promise that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You at least are anxious that we should have it? 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to have it now. That I think would 
clarify one other thing in General Weclemeyer's testimony, wdiat docu- 
ment did General Wedemeyer see with my initials on it, and I am 
inclined to think that wdiat he saw was my November 28 memo when 
he testified that he saw something over my initials. 

Mr. Sourwine. Rather than the one 

Mr. Vincent. Rather than this, because although he may have 
seen this here, from the contents too great significance — and I am not 
trying to avoid responsibility — too great emphasis is being placed on 
the fact that my initials are on it, 

Mr. Sourwine. On the question of the significance of this, to what 
extent did you shape the requests of the War Department with regard 



2204 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

to the stipulations that they wanted made, the directive that they 
wanted given to General Wedemeyer? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say that I had my part in them, and I remem- 
ber the discussion on the 9th of December, but I do not recall exactly 
which idea in there is mine and which is General Marshall's or 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Just on the chance that you might recognize one 
of these paragraphs of one of the ideas advanced, it says : 

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department 
requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating^ 
that: 

(1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National 
Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the 
logistical support of such troops. 

Did you have anything to do with putting that into this message? 

Mr. Vincent. As I have testified, that was one of the recommenda- 
tions in my memorandum of November 28. Therefore, whether I put 
that in there or not, it was an idea that I had. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was your memorandum of November 28 a fore- 
runner of this message of Secretary Byrnes as well as a forerunner 
of the President's statement of policy? 

Mr. Vincent. It was a forerunner in time, but I don't think that 
it was the memorandum that was consulted in connection with this. 
As I say, you asked if we were discussing the matter of should or 
should not we send troops to Manchuria, and I was already on record 
in my memorandum of November 28 as favoring that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would it be a fair assumption, then, that since you 
had placed that in your memorandum of the 28th of November, and 
since it is in here in a memorandum which you drafted, you can claim 
some substantial share of the credit for putting it in here? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I could claim some substantial share. I would 
like to have here what were General Wedemeyer's requests. You see, 
that refers to General Wedemeyer's telegram. General Wedemeyer 
probably could also claim a considerable share to everything that is in 
there, because I believe that that was something that General Wede- 
meyer wanted, too. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. These points were in compliance with his request, 
in other words ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr, Sourwine. Point 2 : 

He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the 
evacuation of Japanese troops from the China Theater. 

The same answer, it got in there the same way ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know how. That would be something I could 
have put in on anyone could have put in, because it was a matter of 
generally agreed policy. 

ISIr. Sourwine. Point 3 : 

Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders 
in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representa- 
tives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further 
transportation of Chinese troops to North China, except as North China ports 
may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will 
be held in abeyance. 

Mr. Vincent. The same answer to that one, that it was a matter 
resulting from general discussion and I was in agreement with that 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2205 

idea. Whether I proposed it, whether General Marshall proposed it 
■or somebody else, I don't know. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That also was in response to a recommendation 
of General Wedemeyer ? . 

Mr. Vincent. I should say it was, but I say what we lack here is 
General Wedemeyer's telegram to see whether that was what he 
wanted to do. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Point 4 : 

Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into North China may be 
immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such 
arranaements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) 
that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out con- 
sistently with his nesotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese 
groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are 
such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and 
to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of inter- 
national peace. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, that resulted again from the discussion on 
December 9. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was there any 

Mr. Vincent. From the general discussion on the 9th. I would 
say just purely hazarding a'guess, that the latter one is no doubt, or 
seems to me to be, General Marshall's contribution primarily, because 
he was undertaking this mission and he wanted to know what were tho 
circumstances under which he was going to undertake it. 

Mr. SouRw^NE. Was it the purpose or intent of the group that 
engaged in that general discussion to stymie General Wedemeyer in 
China? 

]Mr, Vincent. No, sir. 

JNIr. SouRAviNE. Was it in anway the purpose or intent to give him 
unrealistic directives, directives which he could not successfully carry 
out or which, if carried out, would render ineffectual if not actually 
ineffective his efforts in China? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't think that crossed anybody's mind. There 
was no intent of that kind. 

Mr. Sourw^ine. Do you feel that this directive in any way ran at 
cross purposes to what General Wedemeyer had reported ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not, but I say in the absence of having General 
Wedemeyer's telegram, which we should have here, we can't reach 
any conclusion. 

Mr Sourwine. It was discussed at top level in the State Depart- 
ment in connection with General Wedemeyer's recommendations? 

Mr. Vincent. With General Wedemeyer's recommendations, and 
in connection with General Marshall's forthcoming mission. 

Mv. Sourwine. Hadn't General Wedemeyer, in point of fact, said 
that it was absolutely impossible for Chiang to make any success in 
Manchuria, that lie should concentrate his efforts in North China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that, Mr. Sourwine. I don't know 
whether he had or not. 

JNIr. Sourwine. If he had said that, what would be the effect of this 
directive which said he could proceed to take Chinese troops into 
Manchuria, but he couldn't take any into North China? 

Mr. Vincent. If he had said it this would be just the reverse effect 
of what he wanted. 



2206 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRA^aNE. Will you look at page 131 of the white paper, please, 
and follow as I read : 

General Wedemkyeb's Reports 

On November 14, 1945, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, 
China Theater, reported to Washington that the National Government was com- 
pletely unprepared for occupation of Manchuria in the face of Communist op- 
position. He also reported his recommendation to the Generalissimo that the 
Cliinese should adopt the immediate objective of consolidating the areas south 
of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze and of securing the overland line of 
communications in that area prior to entry into Manchuria. 

Again on November 20, 1945, he reported as follows : 

"I have recommended to the Gfneralissimo that he should concentrate his 
efforts upon establishinq: control in North China and upon the prompt execu- 
tion of political and official reforms designed to remove the practice of corrup- 
tion by officials and to eliminate prohibitive taxes." 

General Wedemeyer also recommended the utilization of foreign executives 
and technicians, at least during the transition period. He then added : 

"Chinese Communists guerrillas and saboteurs can and probably will, if 
present activities are reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of 
National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly 
and extended campaign. * * * Logistical support for National governmental 
forces and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been 
fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts plus 
the lack of appropriate forces and transport have caused me to advise the 
Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North 
China and the consolidation of his military and political position there prior to 
any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed 
with this concept." 

Among General Wedemeyer's conclusions at that time were the following : 

"1. The Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China 
provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians 
and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent, 
civilian officials. 

"2. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China for months or 
perhaps even years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Com- 
munists is achieved and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested 
in parnyrapb 1. 

"3. He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory 
agreeuients are reached with iiussia and the Chinese Communists. 

'"4. Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of 
Chinese Communist and possibly their own plans in North China and Man- 
churia. These activities are violations of the recent Sino-Russian Treaty and 
related agreements. 

"5. It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached be- 
tween Chinese Communists and the National Government." 

How do you now, having read it, understand that report by General 
Wedemeyer? Do you thnik it counsels moving Chinese troops into 
Manchuria ? 

Mr. Vincent. On the contrary, this counsels not sending them into 
Manchuria. 

Mr. SoumviNE. And what did the directive from the War Depart- 
ment by the State Department say on that point? 

Mr. Vincent. It said it authorized moving troops into Manchuria. 
It told him also to proceed with his plans for North China, but not 
to operate under them until General Marshall had gotten out there and 
figured out the chances of his success. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Where did that overruling of General Wedemeyer 
originate ; do you know ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. It was a military matter, I should 
think, and it was one of Pentagon Building or General Marshall 
himself. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2207 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Coiildirt it have originated with Chiang Kai-shek 
himself ? 

Mr. Vincent. It could have. Chiang Kai-shek was anxious to move 
troops into Manchuria. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think he is the one that overruled Wede- 
mej^er in that regard '( 

Mr. Vincent. I can/t testify factually on that, whether the Gen- 
eralissimo 

]\Ir. SouRwiNE. You say that this directive here, which is made by 
the Secretary of State to the War Department, originated in the 
Pentagon or at a high military level ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would think that those military provisions there 
were the result of discussion between the War Department and the 
State Department. You are speaking now of these four points there? 

IVIr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

]Mr. Vincent. And with General Marshall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wherever they originated, is there any question 
in your mind now that this directive was contrary to what General 
Wedemeyer had himself recommended ? 

Mr. Vincent. It certainly was contrary to what he recommended 
here. Whether there was a subsequent recommendation from him 
I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you going to pass to another subject ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir. 

(The material following was ordered printed in the record at this 
point, by the chairman on April 8, 1952.) 

Outline of Suggested Course of Action in China 
(Drafted by John Carter Vincent on November 28, 1945) 

lA (1) The United States is prepared to assist the Chinese National Govern- 
ment in the transportation of troops to Mancliurian ports to enable China to 
reestablish its administrative control over Manchuria as an integral part of 
China. The United States and the United Kingdom, by the Cairo Declaration, 
are committed to the return of Manchuria to China. The U. S. S. R., in adher- 
ing to the Potsdam Declaration, is also committed to the return of Manchuria 
to China ; and by the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 
194."> the U. S. S. R. pledges itself to respect Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. 
All of these Governments recognize the National Government of China as the 
only legal government in China. Resumption of Chinese sovereignty in Man- 
churia can therefore be properly effected only through reestablishment by the 
recognized National Government of China of administrative control in Man- 
churia. 

2A (2) The United States is prepared to assist the National Government of 
China in effecting the rapid demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops 
in north China. United States marines are in north China for that purpose and 
stand ready to act more directly and effectively in accomplishing that purpose. 
Quite apart from the United States conunitment to assist the Chinese National 
Government in the demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops, the United 
States feels that it has a responsibility of its own, deriving from its adherence 
to the principles and policies which brought it into war against Japan, to effect 
the removal of Japanese troops from China. 

3A (3) The United States recognizes and supports the National Government 
of China on an international level, but it cannot support that Government by 
military in'ervention in an internecine struggle. 

4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable condition to the accomplishment of (2) 
above and a highly advantageous condition to the achievement of the ultimate 
objective of (1) above would be the declaration of a truce between the armies 
of the Nationalist Government and the armies of the Chinese Communists and 
other dissident Chinese armed forces. The United States is prepared to arranger 



2208 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

if so requested by the National Government of China, for a truce between the 
opposing forses. 

5A (5) The truce mentioned in (4) above could have long-term advantage 
for China only if accompanied by the immediate convocation of a national 
conference to seek and find a peaceful solution of China's present political strife. 
The United States is committed to assist the Chinese National Government, in 
every appropriate way, in the achievement of unity, stability, and democracy in 
China by methods of peaceful political negotiation. The United States is pre- 
pared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to reaffirm tliat they 
also are committed to such .a policy. The United States is cognizant of the 
fact that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" 
and believes tnat it would be conducive to peace, unity, and democratic reform in 
China if the bases of that Government were broadened to include other political 
elements in the country. Furthermore, the United States is convinced that the 
existence of autonomous armies such as the army of the Communist Party, is 
inconsistent with and makes impossible political unity in China. It is for 
these reasons that the United States strongly advocates that the Chinese Na- 
tional Government call as soon as possible a conference of representatives of the 
major political elements in the country for the purpose of agreeing upon ar- 
rangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation 
in the Chinese National Government. To be consistent, the National Govern- 
ment should at the same time annoiance the termination of one-party "political 
tutelage." I^pon the institution of a broadly representation government, the 
Chinese Communist forces should be integrated effectively into the Chinese 
National Government army. 

6A (6) The United States is prepared to encourage and support the Chinese 
National Government in its endeavors to bring about peace and unity by the 
creation of a government representative of the various political elements in the 
country. It is also prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom 
to give similar encouragement and support to the Chinese National Government. 

7A If the Chinese Goverument is able to bring about peace and unity along 
the line.s described, the United States is prepared to assist the Chinese Gov- 
ernment in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, to initiate con- 
structive measures for improvement and progress in the agrarian and industrial 
economy of the country, and to establish a military organization capable of 
discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the mainte- 
nance of peace and order. Specifically, the United States is prepared to give 
favorable consideration to the establishment of an American military advisory 
group in China ; to the dispatch of such other advisers in the economic and 
financial fields as the Chinese Government may need and which this Govern- 
ment can supply ; and to Chinese requests for credits and loans, under reason- 
:able conditions, for projects which contribute toward the development of a 
healthy economy in China and the development of healthy trade relations be- 
tween China and the United States. 

FE : J.C.Vincent : hst. 
11-28^5. 



Statement by President Tkuman on United States Policy Toward China, 

December 1.5, 1945 

(Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945) 

IB The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity 
of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of 
the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations 
Organization. 

2B It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united, and demo- 
cratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations 
•Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by 
foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent 
internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now 
and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the 
principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the 
peoples of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would 
indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace 
■of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States 
and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to 
adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2209 

3B The Government of the United States believes it essential : 

(1) That a cassation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the 
National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese 
armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective 
Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces. 

4B (2) That a national conference of representatives of major political 
elements be arranged to de\elop an early solution to the present internal strife— 
a solution which will bring about the unification of China. 

5B The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the pres- 
ent National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government 
in China. It is the proper instrnuient to achieve tJie objective of a unified China. 

6B The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 
1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam 
Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 
1945, are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Man- 
churia to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National GoV- 
ei'nment of the Republic of China. 

7B In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National 
Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance 
with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence 
remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the 
disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United 
States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government 
of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese 
troops in the liberated areas. The United States marines are in North China for 
that purpose. 

8B The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National 
Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and siiecif- 
ically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is con- 
vinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the 
effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to 
United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal 
strife. 

9B The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to 
restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. 
The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, 
unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her 
place as a unified, democratic, and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the 
maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in 
China. 

lOB The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of 
China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity, and democratic 
reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened 
to include other political elements in the coiintry. Hence, the United States 
strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major 
political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give 
those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Gov- 
ernment. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party 
"political tutelage" established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the 
nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. 

IIB The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army 
is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. 
With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies 
should be eliminated as such and all armed, forces in China integrated effectively 
into the Chinese National Army. 

12B In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the 
United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the 
achievement of political unity in China must be marked out liy the Chinese them- 
selves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would 
be inappropriate. The United States Government feels, however, that China has 
a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict 
within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace, a 
responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese 
political and military groups. 

13B As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above,, 
the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every 
reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial 



2210 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



economy, anri establish a military organization capable of rliscliargingr China's 
national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and 
order. In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable 
consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable con- 
ditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy 
economy throughout China and healthy trade relaticms between China and the 
United States. 



Outline of Suggested Course of 
Action in China 

lA (1) The United States is pre- 
pared to assist the Chinese National 
Government in the transportation of 
troops to Manchurian ports to enable 
China to reestablish its administrative 
control over Manchuria as an integral 
part of China. The United States and 
the United Kingdom, by the Cairo Dec- 
laration, are committed to the return 
of Manchuria to China. The U. S. S. R., 
in adhering to the Potsdam Declara- 
tion, is also committed to the return of 
Manchuria to China ; and by the terms 
of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agrep- 
ments of August 1945 the U. S. S. R. 
pledges itself to respect Chinese sov- 
ereignty over Manchuria. All of these 
Governments recognize the National 
Government of China as the only legal 
government in China. Resumption of 
Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria can 
therefore be properly effected only 
through reestablishment by the recog- 
nized National Government of China of 
administrative control in Manchuria. 

2A (2) The United States is pre- 
pared to assist the National Govern- 
ment of China in effecting the i-apid 
demobilization and repatriation of Jap- 
anese troops in north China. United 
States Marines are in north China for 
that purpose and stand ready to act 
more directly and effectively in accom- 
plishing that purpose. Quite apart from 
the United States commitment to as- 
sist the Chinese National Government 
in the demobilization and repatriation 
of Japanese troops, the United States 
feels that it has a responsibility of its 
own, deriving from its adherence to 
the principles and policies which 



{Statement by Prestdknt Trttman 
ON United States Policy Toward 
China, December 15, 1945 

(Department of State Bulletin, De- 
cember 16, 1945, p. 945) 

IB The Government of the United 
States holds that peace and prosperity 
of the world in this new and unexplored 
era ahead depend upon the ability of 
the sovereign nations to combine for 
collective security in the United Nations 
organization. 



6B The United States and the 
United Kingdom by the Cairo Declara- 
tion in 1943 and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics by adhering to the 
Potsdam Declaration of last July and 
by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agree- 
ments of August 1945, are all com- 
mitted to the liberation of China, in- 
cluding the return of Manchuria to Chi- 
nese control. These agreements were 
made with the National Government of 
the Republic of China. 

5B The United States and the other 
United Nations have recognized the 
present National Government of the 
Republic of China as the only legal gov- 
ernment in China. It is the proper in- 
strument to achieve the objective of a 
\inified China. 



TB In continuation of the constant 
and close collaboration with the Na- 
tional Government of tbe Repultlic of 
China in the prosecution of this war, in 
consonance with the Potsdam Declara- 
tion, and to remove possil)ility of Jap- 
anese influence remaining in China, 
the United States has assumed a defi- 
nite obligation in the disarmament and 
evacuation of the Japanese troops. Ac- 
cordingly tne United States has been 
assisting and will continue to assist the 
National Government of the Republic of 
China in effecting the disarmament and 
evacuation of Japanese troops in the 
liberated areas. The United States 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



2211 



Outline of Suggested Cottrse of 
Action in China — Continued 

brought it into war against Japan, to 
effect the removal of Japanese troops 
from China. 



3 A (3) The United States recog- 
nizes and supports the National Gov- 
ernment of China on an international 
level, but it cannot support that Gov- 
ernment by military intervention in an 
internecine struggle. 



4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable 
■condition to the accomplishment of (2) 
above and a highly advantageous con- 
dition to the achievement of the ulti- 
mate ob.iective of (1) above would be 
the declaration of a truce between the 
armies of the National Government and 
the armies of the Chinese Commu- 
nists and other dissident Chinese armed 
forces. The United States is prepared 
to arrange, if so requested by the Na- 
tional Government of China, for a truce 
between the opposing forces. 

5A (5) The truce mentioned in (4) 
above could have long-term advantage 
for China only if accompanied by the 
immediate convocation of a national 
conference to seek and find a peaceful 
solution of China's present political 
strife. The United States is commit- 
ted to assist the Chinese National Gov- 
ernment, in every appropriate way, in 
the achievement of unify, stability, and 
democracy in China by methods of 
peaceful political negotiation. The 
United States is prepared to request the 
U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to 
reafhrm that they also are committed 
to such a policy. The United States is 
cognizant of the fact that the present 
National Government of China is a 
"one-party government" and believes 
that it would be conducive to peace, 
unity, and democratic reform in China 



Statement by President Trttman 
ON United States Policy Toward 
China, December 15, 1945 — Con. 

Marines are in North China for that 
purpose. 

9B The United States has already 
been compelled to pay a great price to 
restore the peace which was first 
broken by .Japanese aggression in Man- 
churia. The maintenance of peace in 
the Pacific may be .ienpard'zed, if not 
frustrated, unless Japanese influehce in 
C^ina is wholly I'emoved and unless 
China takes her place as a unified, 
democratic and peaceful nation. This 
is the ]>urpose of the maintenance for 
the time being of United States mili- 
tary and naval forces in China. 

SB The United States recognizes 
and will continue to recognize the Na- 
tional Government of China and co- 
operate with it in international affairs 
and specifically in eliminating Japanese 
inflience from China. The United 
States is convinced that a prompt ar- 
rangement for a cessation of hostilities 
is essential to the effective achievement 
of this end. United States support will 
not extend to United States military 
intervention to influence tne course of 
any Chinese internal strife. 

3B The Government of the United 
States lielieves it essential: 

(1) That a cessation of hostilities be 
arranged lietween the armies of the 
National Government and the Chinese 
Communists and other dissident Chinese 
armed forces for tne purpose of com- 
pleting the return of all China to ef- 
fective Chinese control, including the 
immediate evacuation of the Japanese 
forces. 



2P, It is the firm belief of this Gov- 
ernment that a strong, united and demo- 
cratic China is of the utmost importance 
to the success of this United Nations 
organization and for world peace. A 
China disorganized and divided either 
by foreign aggression, such as that un- 
dertaken by the Japanese, or by violent 
internal strife, is an undermining in- 
fluence to world stability and peace, 
now and in the future. The United 
States Government has long subscribed 
to the principle that the management of 
internal affairs is the responsibility of 
the peoples of the sovereign nations. 
Events of this century, however, would 
indicate that a breach of peace any- 
where in the world threatens the peace 
of the entire world. It is thus in the 
most vital interest of the United States 
and all the United Nations that the 



2212 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



Outline of Suggested Course of 
Action in China — Continued 

if the bases of that Government were 
broadened to include other political ele- 
ments in the country. E\irthermore, 
the United States is convinced that the 
existence of automonous armies such 
as the army of the Communist Party, is 
inconsistent with and malies impossible 
political unity in China. It is for these 
reasons that the United States strongly 
advocates that the Chinese National 
Government call as soon as possible a 
conference of representatives of the 
major political elements in the country 
for the purpose of agreeing upon ar- 
rangements which would give those ele- 
ments a fair and effective representa- 
tion in the Chinese National Govern- 
ment. . To be consistent, the National 
Government should at the same time 
announce the termination of one-party 
"political tutelage." Upon the institu- 
tion of a broadly representation gov- 
ernment, the Chinese Communist forces 
should be integrated effectively into the 
Chinese National Government army. 



6A (G) The United States is pre- 
pared to encourage and support the 
Chinese National Government in its en- 
deavors to bring about peace and unity 
by the creation of a government rep- 
resentative of the various political ele- 
ments in the country. It is also pre- 
pared to request the U. S. S. R. and the 
United Kingdom to give similar encour- 
agement and support to the Chinese 
National Government. 



7A If the Chinese Government is 
able to bring about peace and unity 
along the lines described, the United 
States is prepared to assist the Chinese 



Statement by President Truman 
ON United States Policy Toward 
. China, December 15, 1945 — Con. 

people of China overlook no opportunity 
to adjust their internal differences 
promptly by means of peaceful nego- 
tiation. 

lOB The United States is cognizant 
that tlie present National Government 
of China is a "one-party government" 
and believes that peace, unity and demo- 
cratic reform in China will be furthered 
if the basis of this Government is broad- 
ened to include other political elements 
in the country. Hence, the United 
States strongly advocates that the na- 
tional conference of representatives of 
major political elements in the country 
agree upon arrangements which would 
give those elements a fair and effective 
representation in the Chinese National 
Government. It is recognized that this 
would require modification of the one- 
party "political tutelage," established 
as an interim arrangement in the prog- 
ress of the nation toward democracy by 
the father of the Chinese Republic, Doc- 
tor Sun Yat-sen. 

IIB The existence of autonomous 
armies such as that of the Communist 
army is inconsistent with, and actually 
makes impossible, political unity in 
China. With the institution of a 
broadly representative government au- 
tonomous armies should be eliminated 
as such and all armed forces in China 
integrated effectively into the Chinese 
National Army. 

4B (2) That a national conference 
of representatives of major political ele- 
ments be arranged to develop an early 
solution to the present internal strife — ■ 
a solution which will bring about the 
unification of Cliina. 

12B In line with its often expressed 
views regarding self-determination, the 
United States Government considers 
that the detailed steps necessary to the 
achievement of political unity in China 
must be worked out by tlie Chinese 
themselves and that intervention by any 
foreign government in these matters 
would be inappropriate. The United 
States Government feels, however, that 
China has a clear responsibility to the 
other United Nations to eliminate 
armed conflict within its territory as 
constituting a threat to world stability 
and peace — a responsibility which is 
shared by the National Government and 
all Chinese political and military 
groups. 

13B As China moves toward peace 
and unity along the lines described 
above, the United States would be pre- 
pared to assist the National Govern- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2213 

Statement by Presiedent Truman 
OuTi.iME OF Suggested Course of on United States Policy Toward 

Action in China — Continued China, December 15, 1945 — Con. 

Government in every reasonable way to nient in every reasonable way to re- 
rehabilitate the country, to initiate con- habilitate the country, improve the 
structive measures for improvement agrarian and industrial economy, and 
and progress in the agrarian and in- establish a military organization ca- 
dustrial economy of the country, and to pable of discharging China's national 
establish a military organization ca- and international responsibilities for 
pable of discharging China's national the maintenance of peace and order. In 
and international responsibilities for furtherance of such assistance, it would 
the maintenance of peace and order, be prepared to give favorable consid- 
Specifically, the United States is pre- eration to Chinese requests for credits 
pared to give favorable consideration and loans under reasonable conditions 
to the establishment of an American for projects which would contribute 
military advisory group in China ; to toward the development of a healthy 
the dispatch of such other advisers in economy throughout China and healthy 
the economic and financial fields as the trade relations between China and the 
Chinese Government may need and United States.- 
which this Government can supply ; and 
to Chinese requests for credits and 
loans, under reasonable conditions, for 
projects which contribute toward the 
development of a healthy economy in 
China and the development of healthy 
trade relations between China and the 
United States. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to inquire about this: Yesterday 
I asked you some questions in relation to an investigation of the Amer- 
asia case, that is, the taking of the paper from your office. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall when that investigation was 
made by the security office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I testified yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that I 
could not recall the exact date of it, it was a matter of days after the 
Amerasia case broke, because I had left — this is my recollection now — • 
that I had left for San Francisco by the middle of April. I don't 
think it took place after I returned. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us whether it was before or after 
you made the donation to the defense fund for Mr. Service ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I could not. No ; I couldn't place the date. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that you would make a donation 
to a defense fund of Mr. Service, one of the people involved in the 
removal of the papers from your office if the security office was making 
an investigation of your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified that I among others made such a donation. 

Senator Ferguson. How much did you donate? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified that I gave $40 or $50, among others, to 
assist him in hiring a lawyer. 

Senator Ferguson. That is his defense fund. I did not misname 
that ; did I ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, it was to defend him, to get a lawyer to de- 
fend him ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that you would give that money 
after your office was being investigated ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have said I do not know when I gave it; yes. I 
would have given it 

Senator Ferguson. Even after 



2214 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. Because he was an old friend, because he had not yet 
been indicted. He was a man who was being accused. 

Senator Ferguson. You say he wasn't indicted ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; he was not. He was brought before — I am. 
working on recollection — he was brought before the grand jury. 

iSenator Ferguson. He was arrested. 

Mr. Vincent. He had been arrested ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How long after he was arrested 

Mr. Vincent. That 1 couldn't say. I must have given it before I 
went to San Francisco. I would have to get the date of when he was 
arrested, but some time within a matter of a week or 10 days. 

Senator Ferguson. Within a week or 10 days after he was arrested. 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you think your oflfice was investigated 
during that period^ 

Mr. Vincent. During that period, yes. I don't place the date. 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't it have been very embarrassing to 
you to be a witness in the case and at the same time be a donor to the 
defense of one of the defendants, you being a State official 'i 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir; it would not have been embarrassing. 

Senator Ferguson. It wouldn't have been i 

Mr. Vincent. A contribution to assist a man who had no funds to 
hire a lawyer would not have been embarrassing to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they say who the lawyer was to be ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; 1 don't recall who the lawyer was. Did who 



say 



Senator Ferguson. The man who collected the fund. 

Mr. Vincent. No. I don't recall who the lawyer was, and I 
don't 

Senator Ferguson. You couldn't give us the name before of the 
man who collected the funds. 

Mr. Vincent. 1 told you 1 did not recall it, but Mr. Mandel recalled 
it to me. That it was a man named Mortimer Graves. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember now that it was Mortimer 
Graves '( 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the incident of Mortimer Graves col- 
lecting it, but I am quite prepared to say that Mortimer Graves did 
coUocl it. As 1 told you betore, 1 didn t recall who physically col- 
lected the money. 

Senator Ferguson. Overnight have you thought anything about the 
matter of the investigation in your office? Could you give us more 
help as to that investigation ? 

JNlr. Vincent. Senator, I am afraid I cannot. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, how well did you know Solomon Adler? 

Mr. Vincent. Solomon Adler I met hrst in 11)41 or early 1942, when 
he came to China to be an assistant to Manuel Fox, who was handling 
the Stabilization Fund in China. 

Mr. Morris. Did you get to know Solomon Adler well ? 

Mr. Vincent. 1 knew Solomon Adler well, as one would knowing 
an official who was working with me in Chungking, where we were 
rather a small community. 

Mr. Morris. When did you learn that Solomon Adler was a member 
of the Comnmnist Party, Mr. Vincent? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2215 

Mr. Vincent. I never learned that Solomon Acller was a member of 
the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. You. did not know of the testimony Miss Bentley gave 
before the Federal grand jury in 1947 to that ett'ect ^ 

Mr. Vincent. 1 do not recall any testimony of Miss Bentley, but if 
she had given any it would not be indicative to me that he was a 
Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any information ever given to you 
while you were an officer in the State Department, from the Govern- 
ment, that certain people ^^•el•e or were not Communists or were not 
such that you should avoid them as Communists or Communist sym- 
pathizers 'i 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. Not that I recall. 

henator Ferguson. You had no idea, then, that there may have 
been subversive agents around? 

Mr. Vincent. Nobody ever informed me. The State Department 
had its own Security Division, that was supposed to look into sub- 
versive agents in the State Department. 

Senator I'erguson. liut a Security Division that does nothing 
would not help you, would it ? I mean, as far as you were concerned, 
it did not give you the names of any people that were Communists or 
had Communist leanings? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall 

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall ever getting a name like Mr. 
Adler? 

Mr. Vincent. I am sure they never gave me Mr. Alder's name. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Vincent, Mr. Alder's name was mentioned in a 
public session of the House Un-American Activities Committee as a 
member of an espionage ring. 

Mr. Vincent. When? 

Mr. Morris. In 1948. 

Mr. Vincent. You. are asking me whether I knew Solomon Adler as 
a Communist ? I did not know Solomon Adler as a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever hear that testimony ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Did you hear Whittaker Chambers' testimony before 
this committee that Solomon Adler was a Communist ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, in executive session, do you remem- 
ber being asked the question as to whether it w^as in any sense the 
tenor of the Marshall directive to invite the Kepublic of China to agree 
to the Communists' terms for a coalition government, or face the pros- 
pect of getting no more aid from the United States? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall it in those terms ; no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, let me ask now : Was it implicit in this Mar- 
shall directive that the Chinese Nationalist Government should have 
pressure brought to bear on it to come to terms with the Communists, 
and was there the clear implication in the directive that until there 
had been a settlement with the Communists there would be no more 
aid from the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. Those were the general ideas under which General 
Marshall went out and started operating. When I say "no more aid," 



2216 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

there was during that period, and I say this just to make the record 
clear, some aid given in south China. I remember money was given 
to build the railroad. But there was to be no military aid. It was to 
be withheld while General Marshall was carrying on. This is quite 
correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I was not talking about anything that happened 
afterward, but only about what was in the letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment on that. Do I understand that 
the idea of the directive was that General Marshall was to go out there, 
and there was to be no aid to the Nationalists until he had made or 
carried out the directive of having a consolidation ? 

Mr. Vincent. The whole matter was entirely in General Marshall's 
hands, sir. And during the period that he was trying to assist the 
Chinese in getting together, military aid was not to be given. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I say. 

Mr. Vincent. Unless he himself suggested it ; other than the mili- 
tary aid of getting and assisting General Chiang Kai-shek to get 
troops into Manchuria. 

Senator Ferguson. Outside of putting troops into Manchuria, the 
Nationalists were to get no aid. 

Mr. Vincent. Of a military character. 

Senator Ferguson. Of a military character, while this was going on. 

Mr. Vincent. It was to be withheld until General Marshall himself 
changed. He was authorized to operate under that kind of basis. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be quite a pressure, would it not, 
on a Nationalist Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would. 

Senator Ferguson. To be told, "You either make this settlement, or 
else you do not get any military aid?" That is what it amounted to, 
is it not? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And the putting of troops into Manchuria was sim- 
ply putting the Nationalist forces in a position which, according to 
General Wedemeyer, was completely untenable, without a satisfac- 
tory settlement with the Chinese Communists; isn't that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is what is in this telegram, as I recall it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So that the record may show the portions of the 
directive which counsel had in mind in asking that question, I ask 
leave to read two paragraphs from President Roosevelt's letter of 
transmittal, which, together with the other documents, constituted 
the directive. 

Senator Ferguson. Very well. 

Mr. Sour WINE (reading) : 

Specifically I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government 
to call a conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring 
about the unification of China and concurrently to effect a cessation of hostili- 
ties, particularly in north China. 

He was telling them to stop fighting, wasn't he? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And a little later on : 

In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders, you 
are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly you may 
state in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance, in 
the economic field, and military assistance — I have in mind the proposed United 
States military advisory group that I have approved in principle — that a China 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2217 

disunited and torn by civil strife could not lie considered realistically as a place 
for American assistance along the lines enumerated. 

I say those are the particular paragraphs counsel had in mind. 
There are perhaps other passages which would carry out the same 
general intent. Is tliat correct i 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think now, from your vantage point of the 
years, that it was correct to urge a coalition between the Nationalists 
and the Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. In the light of the situation as it obtained at that 
time, I still think it was the most feasible part of the policy. 

I have testified many times that it was not the perfect solution, but 
it seemed in our minds, considering the situation in the best light 
we could, that it was better than civil war. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Civil war was actually under way, wasn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. It hadn't broken out all over the place yet. 

Mr. SouPvWTNE. And the Communists weren't all over the place. 
They didn't get all over the place until after the truce was brought 
about in 1948. At this time the Communists were in north China. 

Mr. Vincent. And scattered around Manchuria. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And that is where the hostilities were going on? 

Mr .Vincent, Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And those were the hostilities that Chiang was told 
in this message to cease? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know, sir, that it was an official Soviet 
policy as early as 1938 to demand coalition in China? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I have no distinct knowledge of that being Soviet 
policy. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that the Soviet Ambassador at that 
time had demanded such coalition as the price of Soviet aid? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. And that the Nationalist Government had refused? 

Mr. Vincent, Well, in 1938, the Chinese Communists and the Na- 
tionalists were cooperating to a rather eifective degree in fighting the 
Japanese. I don't know whether you are speaking of coalition, now, 
in the form of bringing about a constitutional government, but so far 
as the military operations were concerned, in 1937 and 1938, and on 
into 1940, there was quite effective cooperation between the two mili- 
tary groups. 

Mr, Sourwine. You have stated, I believe, that you did not see, read, 
or know about, the G-2 report on the Communist Party which was 
delivered to the State Department on July 25, 1945? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall seeing it. That was the one the 
chairman showed me? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. That was made a part of the appendix of this 
record at an earlier session. 

Senator Ferguson, Do you know what Mr, Byrnes' part was in 
this particular directive? Had you any personal knowledge about it? 
Or on what Wedemeyer was to do, or Wedemeyer's report, or anything 
else? 

Mr, Vincent, I know that he sat in and took part in the discussions 
on December 9, which finalized the documents, and he chairmanned 
that meeting. It was in his office. Other than that, I had no dis- 
cussions with him. 

22848— 52— pt. 7 15 



2218 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Was that his language, or his thought, to your 
knowledge ? 

Mr. Vincent. To my knowledge, I could not testify that Mr. Byrnes 
himself has language in here. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, I would like to read, if the chairman 
will permit, one paragraph from page 88 of that G-2 report, which is 
already in the appendix to our record, because I want to ask you if 
this accords with what you knew to be the fact at that time. 

Reports from Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that the Central Government 
military leaders h..ped that if the Communists were admitted to the Govern- 
ment, Soviet Russia would come directly to China's aid. The correctness of this 
attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in 1938 after the first rift in the 
united front. At that time, the Soviet Ambassador presented Chiang Kai-shek 
with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party in China should 
be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. In other words, that the 
Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a promise which 
Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That does accord with your understanding of the 
situation at that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. The situation at that time, yes. I think it does ; al- 
though I have no distinct recollection of the situation at that time. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was this directive to General Marshall, or any part 
of it, or any draft in connection with it, submitted at any time to 
Mr. Dean Acheson ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Dean Acheson was present at the December 9 
conference with General Marshall. 

Mr. Sourwine. How about before that time ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether he saw it. I would say it 
was certainly quite likely that he did see it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it submitted at any time to Mr. Ben Cohen ? 

Mr. Vincent. That I could not say. He was not at the meeting 
on the 9th, and I never heard of his name being mentioned in connec- 
tion with the directive. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything, sir, of a Russian demand 
in 1945 that they participate in the occupation of Japan by sending 
an undetermined number of troops to Hokkaido ? 

Mr. Vincent. Hokkaido ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Hokkaido. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, at that time, I was not in charge of Japan 
affairs, but I do recall the whole matter of discussion as to the basis 
on which troops would be contributed to the general allied occupation 
of Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to revert for once, and I 
apologize to the witness for breaking the thread : I have a document 
that got out of place and should have been placed in the record when 
we were discussing the question of moving troops into Manchuria and 
north China, I hold in my hand a publication, American Policy 
Toward China, by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, statement before 
a joint Senate committee, June 4, 1951, Department of State Publica- 
tion 4255, Far Eastern Series 43, released June 1951, and from page 
24 thereof, I read : 

The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer ; the possi- 
bility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent ; and the possibility of really 
getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly 
diminished. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2219 

I ask, Mr. Chairman, although this is a transcript from a i^revious 
congressional hearing, to avoid reading at length here and so that there 
may be no question of taking out of context, that we insert in the record 
at this time, all of page 24, which will show the date and the context in 
w^hich that paragraph appears. 

Senator Ferguson. It may be inserted. 

(The material referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 391" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 391 

By the end of 1946 we had removed 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand 
under 3 million, from China to Japan — one of the great mass movements of 
people. 

After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese 
Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes 
broke out again between the two parties ; and both the Government authorities, 
the Chinese Government authorities, and the American Government authorities, 
were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out. 

If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems 
which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear. 

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the Government 
forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese 
either disappeared or was gravely diminished. 

The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer ; the possi- 
bility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent ; and the possibility of really 
getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly 
diminished. So, the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese 
Government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese 
Government. 

(Source: Department of State, Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43, 
Released June 1951, p. 24.) 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, reverting to the question of Hokkaido, sir, 
did you know whether advice was sought in the Department of 
State by Secretary Byrnes with regard to that demand, that is, the 
Russian demand of 1945 that they participate in the occupation of 
Japan by sending troops into Hokkaido ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no distinct recollection of it being sought. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were .you ever asked for advice on that point ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall being asked for advice. That was 
a period, I think, prior to my association with Japanese affairs. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether that Russian demand was 
accepted? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You became a Foreign Service officer, class I, in 
December 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, now% I would have to look that up. I assume 
you have looked up the record. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I am simply trying to peg the chronology. That 
record was taken from the Department of State register. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. How well did you know Frederick V. Field ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified before that I met him at the IPR 
conference in Hot Springs. I never knew him even well. I had no 
close association with him at all. I may have met him at a meeting 
preparatory to going down to Hot Springs. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did he ever visit your home ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever visit his home ? 



2220 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he ever visit you elsewhere ? 

Mr, Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SiiuRwiNE. Did you ever meet him by appointment? 

Mr. Vincent. Never by appointment, sir, that I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever meet with him on Forty-eidith Street 
in New York City ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I never met with him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Did you ever give him any information of a con- 
fidential or security nature? 

Mr, Vincent. I did not, sir, 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Did you ever give him any information with the 
l^nowledge or expectation or reason to believe that it would be passed 
on directly or indirectly to the Soviet Government or to an agent of the 
Soviet Government or to the Communist Party ? 

Mr, Vincent, I did not, sir, I have testified that I never had any 
conversations with him other than just casual. 

Mr. ScuRwiNE. Have you ever discussed Japanese policy with him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never discussed Japanese policy with him ; no. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever meet him at the United Nations Con- 
ference at San Francisco? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend him for appointment, for 
promotion, or for a commission in the Armed Forces of the United 
States ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that he had made applica- 
tion for such a commission ? 

Mr, Vincent, I did not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever read any of his writings? 

Mr. Vincent, I don't recall ever reading anything that Field wrote, 
sir, 

Mr, Sourwine. You have testified in executive session, have you not, 
with regard to your failure to recall a man by the name of Joseph 
Gregg? 

Mr. Vincent. I have, 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you asked whether you knew a man by the 
name of Joseph Greenstein ? 

]\[r. Vincent, You mean in executive session? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No; I don't recall your asking me. 

Mr. Sourwine. I wasn't sure whether I had asked. I will tell you 
that Joseph Gregg and Joseph Greenstein are the same person. But 
did you know a man under the name of Joseph Greenstein? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not, 

Mr, Sourwine. Did you ever hear of a plan to assassinate Gen- 
eralissimo Chiang Kai-shek? 

Mr. Vincent. No, unless they are speaking of the arrest of Chiang 
Kai-shek in Sian in 1936. But I didn't hear of any plan to assassinate 
him there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see a memorandum or memoranda 
concerning such a plan in 1945 or 1946? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeine; such a memorandum. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2221 

Mr. SouKwiNE. To your knowledge did such memorandum or 
memoranda ever circulate from the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have said I didn't recall it, so I can't say that I 
have any knowledge of it circulating. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. I think, Mr. Chairman, I should state this for the 
record, in fairness to Mr. Field. At occasions through this hearing, 
questions are asked which may to the witness seem preposterous. I 
do not mean by asking questions to make assertions. It was my un- 
derstanding from the witness himself that he desired here an oppor- 
tunity to testify with regard to any and every charge that had been 
made against him, and I want to say that so far as the staff of this 
committee is able to do so, we are throwing at him everything that we 
have found that Jias been thrown, and giving him an opportunity to 
answer with regard to it. 

Mr. Surrey, Did you mean making it clear to Mr. Field? 

]\Ir. Vincent. I was going to correct that. You intended to say 
"Mr. Vincent." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I intended to say "Mr. Vincent." 

Senator Ferguson. You understand that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I Understand that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you familiar with the report made by Mr. 
Paule}^ after his visit to Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I have seen it. I am not familiar 
with it, now. It was an economic report. 

Mr. Sourwine. Generally speaking, what did that report propose ? 

Mr. Vincent. Generally speaking it dealt with the matter of Japa- 
nese assets, as I recall it, in Manchuria. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Didn't it propose reduction of Japan to an agri- 
cultural community, essentially, with only light industry ? 

Mr, Vincent. I think you are using the same phraseology that was 
in my speech, there. I don't recall that phraseology in Pauley's re- 
port, I couldn't testify whether that is in his report or not, or whether 
it recommended that, sir, because I have no distinct recollection of his 
recommendations. 

Mr. Sourwine. I don't attempt to quote either from Mr. Pauley's 
report or from your speech, and I don't want to foist that upon you. 
I intended merely to ask if that was a summarization of what the 
Pauley report recommended. 

Mr. Vincent. And I have testified that I am not familiar enough 
with it now, after 5 or 6 years, to say whether that was in it or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall now whether you had any reaction 
to that report at the time ? 

Mr. Vincent, No ; I do not recall. 

Mr, Sourwine, Do you recall now whether that report was in line 
witli the views which you had expressed in your radio broadcast 
in October of 1945 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say that I do recall that it was in line 
with that. 

Mr. Sourwine, Did you have anything to do with the preparation of 
the Pauley report? 

Mr. Vincent. Not anything that I can recall sir, no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did any of your associates have anything to do with 
that preparation ? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean my associates in the State Department? 



2222 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Or elsewhere. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Owen Lattimore have anything to do with 
the preparation of that report? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, are you describino; Mr. Owen Lattimore as an 
associate now? He was on the Pauley Commission, and I have testi- 
fied in executive session that I had no knowledge as to what he had 
to do with the report, but I would assume since he accompanied him 
that he had some part in helping draft it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss that report with Mr. Latti- 
more at anytime ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have told you I never had any discussion with 
Lattimore on the report. 

Air. SouRwiNE. Were you in any way responsible for Mr. T. A. Bis- 
son's appointment to the Pauley staff? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, not that I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have anything to do with the appoint- 
ment of anyone else to Mr. Pauley's staff? 

Mr. Vincent. No, not that I can recall. I had nothing to do with 
the Pauley administration that I can think of. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know a man named DuBos, D-u-b-o-s? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know such a man. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know a man named DuBois, Du-B-o-i-s? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my recollection, I don't know a man 
named DuBois. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember testifying with regard to Far 
East Commission 230? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that a paper submitted by the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee to the Far Eastern Commission? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does that mean it was formally approved by the 
State- War-Navy Coordinating Committee? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified, I think, that I have no recollection 
as to formal approval. Sometimes they wenfover to FEC, to the Far 
Eastern Commission, without formal approval, I don't recall whether 
it had what you would call formal approval. But normally it would 
have been sent over by General Hilldring to the FEC. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who prepared that document? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified, I think, that a working group in the 
FE., SWNCC, prepared it on the basis of Edwards' report back from 
Japan. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did it come before the Far Eastern Subcommittee? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that it did, but I would assume that it 
did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you approve it? 

Mr. Vincent. I had a deputy on the Far East Commission then, and 
he approved it or I approved it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was the deputy ? 

Mr. Vincent. Penfield was the man, James K. Penfield. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you identified him here? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I did in executive session, yes, sir, as the 
Deputy Director of the Far East Office. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how this paper reached Japan ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2223 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not know how it reached Japan, but I am 
trying now to recall the statements in executive session, where I made 
the assumption that it reached Japan through the War Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it supposed to reach Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. My understanding at the time was that the War 
Department kept General MacArthur pretty well informed step by 
step as to the type of thinking, the type of papers and the thinking 
on them. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it was to reach Japan ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it in any sense an official State Department 
paper ? 

Mr. Vincent. You mean when it reached him? No, I would not 
call it official, 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it ever made an official State Department 
paper? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall whether it would be called a State 
Department paper or not. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does that designation, "FEC 230," indicate it had 
such status ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, because FEC was not under the State Depart- 
ment. And, you see, all of this is a period after I left the Department, 
this whole matter of the FEC 230 ; and from knowledge of the way 
things went then, the designation of FEC 230 would not have made 
it a State Department document. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anyone who sent this paper or a copy 
■of it to Japan, or to anyone in Japan? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know. I have testified that is probably went 
through. 

Mr. Sourwine. Went through? Were you finished? 

Mr. Vincent. Went through the War Department channels, and 
the War Department kept in pretty close touch, so I understood at 
the time, with General MacArthur. 

Mr, Sourwine. Was this the same document as the document known 
as State Department Document FEC 230 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have never seen that designation of it, but if it was 
called State Department Document FEC 230, that would have been 
its designation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Would such a document have required your endorse- 
ment as Chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ? 

Mr, Vincent, I think I have testified it would not have required 
it. It would have required the endorsement of the SWNCC commit- 
tee, of which General Hilldring was the Chairman, the top committee. 

Mr. Sourwine, Did this contain clauses directing General Mac- 
Arthur to effect wide distribution of income and of the means of 
ownership and trade? 

Mr, Vincent, I would have to refer to the document, sir, before I 
could say that it did. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember? 

Mr, Vincent. I don't recall that, 

Mr. Sourwine. Was this document subsequently printed by James 
Lee Kauffman, a New York lawyer ? 



2224 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I think I have seen testimony to that effect, but I have 
no knowledge myself, that it was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is this, sir, a photostat of the document that we 
have been talking about ? 

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, were you familiar before with FEC 
230? 

Mr. Surrey. I never read it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that look like the document ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, I have no reason to believe this was not a photo- 
stat of it. I was not familiar with it. 

Mr. Sourwine. I offer this document, with a letter of transmittal,, 
showing how it came into the possession of the subcommittee, and I 
ask that they be put into the record at this point. 

Senator Ferguson. They may be received. 

(The material referred to is marked Exhibit No. 392 and is as 
follows:) 

Telephone Rector 2-6541 
Cable Address : "KIVORLEE"^ 
James Lee Kautfman 

counsellor at law 

55 Liberty Street 

New York 5, January 29, 1952. 
Mr. Robert Morris, 

Room 424-C, Senate Office Building. Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Morris : At the request of Mr. Eugene H. Dooman I am enclosing^ 
a copy of FEC-230. When it has served its purpose I would appreciate your 
returning it to this office. 
Sincerely, 

(Signed) Maria McDermott, 

Secretary to Mr. Kauffman. 
McD : MO 
Ene. 

FEC-230 Confidential 

FEC-230 
12 May 194T 

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY ON EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS 
OF ECONOMIC POWER IN JAPAN 

Note by the Secretary General 

1. The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive 
concentrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States 
Representative, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern 
Commission and is referred to Committee No. 2 : Economic and Financial 
Affairs. 

2. Enclosure "A" is the statement of transmittal of tl^e United States Govern- 
ment. Enclosure "B" is the text of the proposed policy. 

3. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document 
which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to 
unauthorized persons or to the press. 

Nelson T. Johnson, Secretary General. 

enclosure "a" 

Statement of Transmittal 

The United States Government desires to present herewith to the Far Eastern 
Commission a report of its mission on Japanese combines, and concurrently to 
recommend for adoption by the Commission certain policies with respect to the 
concentration of economic power in Japanese industry, finance, and trade. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2225 

It is tlie belief of tliis Government that the existence of the Zaibatsu, and the 
monopolistic controls exercised by these giant combines over Japanese economic 
life, have been a major factor in fostering and supporting Japanese aggression. 
The dissolution of excessive private concentrations of economic power is essen- 
tial to the democratization of Japanese economic and political life. It therefore 
constitutes, in the United States view, one of the major objectives of the 
occupation. 

This basic occupation policy with respect to the Zaibatsu is stated in Basic 
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (FEC-014), and is reaffirmed in Basic Initial 
Post-Surrender Directive to SOAP for the Occupation and Control of Japan 
(FECM)15). Substantial steps to implement this policy have already been under- 
taken by the appropriate Japanese authorities, at the direction of or with the 
approval of SCAP, in the organization and operations of a Japanese Holding 
Company Liquidating Commission, in pi'oviding for an economic purge, and in 
initiating other measures with respect to combines, control associations, and 
cartel arrangements. 

To aid in formulation of comprehensive policies, standards, and procedures 
a mission headed by Corwin D. Edwards was dispatched to Japan In January 
1946. Its report is submitted herewith. 

On the basis of tliat report, the United States Government has prepared the 
follovi^ing statement of broad policy with respect to the Zaibatsu question, which 
It desires to submit for approval by the Far Eastern Commission. In many 
respects, this statement incorporates measures which already have been or are 
being Implemented by the appropriate Japanese authorities at the direction of or 
with the approval of SCAP, in accordance with the directives referred to above. 

ENCLOSURE "b" 

Policy on Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power in Japan 

1. Objective. — The over-all objective of occupation policy in dealing with 
excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan should be to destroy such 
concentrations as may now exist, and to prevent the future creation of new 
concentrations. Especial care should be taken to avoid the futile gesture of 
destroying one Zaibatsu class only to create another ; a drastic chanse in the, 
nature as well as the identity of the groups controlling Japanese industry and 
finance should therefore be effected. Realization of this change will require 
achievement of the following specific objectives : 

a. Dissolution of all excessive concentrations of economic power, unless 
technological considerations require their continuation (paragraphs 2, 3, 
4, below). 

6. Elimination of the excessive economic power of persons formerly ex- 
ercising control over these concentrations, and of certain individuals close 
to such persons (paragraphs 5, 6, below). 

c. Support for varied and diffused types of private ownership of elements 
of these dissolved concentrations, as well as support for government owner- 
ship of such of these concentrations as cannot be dissolved and of such ele- 
ments of the dissolved concentrations as do not lend themselves to competitive 
oi>eration (paragraphs 7, 8, below). 

d. Elimination of financial support for excessive concentrations — through 
the divesture of Zaibatsu holdings in banks and insurance companies, through 
an increase in the number of sources of credit, through the termination 
of alliances between financial and nonfinancial institutions, and through elim- 
ination of governn^ent favoritism toward certain financial institutions (par- 
agraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, below). 

c. Destruction of legal support for excessive concentrations — through the 
termination of control legislation, through the creation of an antitrust law, 
through changes in the patent law, through amendments to corporate law, 
and throucrh alterations in current tax law and practices (paragraphs 13, 
14, 15, 18, 17, below). 

/. Strengthening of the instruments necessary to effect the above policies — 
through financial and technical aid to preferred types of purchasers, through 
the creation of public support for anti-Zaibatsu actions of the Japanese 
Government, and through measures to assure the independence of govern- 
ment personnel from Zaibatsu influences (paragraphs 18, 19. 20, below). 
It is considered that the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration will not 
have been fulfilled until the objectives listed above have been met through the 
application of measures specified in succeeding paragraphs. It is also considered, 



2226 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

however, that the means to be employed in compelling the Japanese Government 
to effectuate these measures, and the timing of such means, are matters for 
executive decision by SCAP. In general, the Japanese Government should be 
required to take such administrative, legislative and judicial measures as w^elL 
be consistent vi'ith its structure and constitutional powers and will accomplish 
the policy set out herein. 

2. Definition of an excessive concentration. — For purposes of the policies set 
forth in this paper, an excessive concentration of economic power should be de- 
fined as any private enteri)rise conducted for profit, or combination of such en- 
terprises, which, by reason of its relative size in any line or the cumulative 
power of its position in many lines, restricts competition or impairs the oppor- 
tunity for others to engage in business independently, in any important segment 
of business. 

In applying this standard, it should be presumed, subject to refutation, that 
any private enterprise or combination operated for profit is an excessive con- 
centration of economic power if its asset value is vei'y large ; or if its working 
force (i. e., the working force required to operate its facilities at capacity as 
evidenced by its peak past employment figure) is very large; or if, though 
somewhat smaller in assets or working force, it is engaged in business in various 
unrelated fields, or if it controls substantial financial institutions and /or sub- 
stantial industrial or commercial ones ; or if it controls a substantial number of 
other corporate enterprises ; or if it produces, sells or distributes a large propor- 
tion of the total supply of the products of a major industi-y- 

Absolute size, as well as position within a given industry, is to be considered 
grounds for defining a specified concentration as excessive. It is desii-ed to 
eliminate not only monopolies but al.so aggregations of capital under the control 
of a given enterprise which are so large as to constitute a material potential 
threat to competitive enterprise. 

All larger Japanese enterprises should immediately be surveyed by SCAP in 
the light of the above standards. Uncertainty as to whether any specified enter- 
prise is covered, by these standards should be resolved in favor of coverage since 
it is intended that ownership of the bulk of Japanese large-scale industry should 
be affected by the policies set forth in this paper. It is understood that SCAP's 
Schedule of Restricted Concerns, as amended from time to time in accordance 
♦ with the procedures provided for that purpose, comprehends tlie Japanese en- 
terprises considered to be excessive concentrations within the meaning of this 
paper. / 

3. Dissolution vs. nondis solution of excessive concentrations. — Excessive con- 
centrations of economic power should immediately be dissolved into as many 
nonrelated units as possible, no one of which would be covered by any of the 
defiinitions of an excessive concentration presented in paragraph 2. Such dis- 
solution snould not be effected, however, where the technological need for large 
scale operation is such that dissolution would clearly cause a drastic reduction 
in operating efficiency. It should be presumed, subject to refutation, that such 
a drastic reduction would not result from the dissolution of holding companies ; 
or from the severance of ties of ownership, directorship, and officership between 
operating companies; or from the severance from operating companies of por- 
tions of such companies, where these portions ai"e in unrelated industries, or 
where they have had a separate corporate existence within the last five years, or 
where they are so separated from one another physically and technologically that 
they do not in fact have a common operating management. Treatment of con- 
centrations which are to be dissolved is specified in paragraph 4; treatment of 
concentrations which are not to be dissolved is specified in subparagraph 8 a. 
The provisions of paragraph 5 should apply equally to persons and holdings in 
concentrations which are. and are not, to be dissolved. 

4. Policy with respect to excessive concentrations which are to he dissolved. — 
The following measures should be undertaken with respect to excessive concen- 
trations of economic power which are to l)e dissolved : 

a. All concerns in these excessive concentrations which are merely hold- 
ing companies should be dissolved and divested of their security and property 
holdings. 

ft. The units, other than those described under a above, into which these 
excessive concentrations are broken down should, in the case of nonfinancial 
enterprises (insurance companies being considered financial enterprises), 
be divested of any securities which they may hold in other concerns, in- 
cluding concerns not a part of any excessive concentration of economic- 
power. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2227 

c. All officers (auditors are to be consiflered officers) and directors of 
these operating units, and of operating units in tlie financial field as well, 
should surrender all offices and directorships except those in the company 
in which they are principally engaged, and should be forbidden to acquire 
any offices and directorships outside of whatever company they may be 
Ijrincipally engaged in at any time in the future, except as provided in 
paragraph 16. This policy does not apply to persons specified in paragraph 
5. who will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that paragraph. 

d. Certain contractual and service arrangements between the units into 
which these excessive concentrations have been dissolved should be termi- 
nated, including arrangements for performance of central oflice services, 
interchange of personnel, executive agency, and preferential or exclusive 
trading rights. Resumption of similar arrangements should be prohibited 
for a time sufficient to ensure bona fide severance of the arrangement. 

e. The operating units into which these excessive concentrations are dis- 
solved should grant licenses on nondiscriminatory terms to all applicants 
under patents which they now hold and under licenses which give them 
rights to sublicense ; should surrender any exclusive or preferential riglits 
which they now enjoy under patent licenses granted them by others; and 
during the period of transition, should make available to all comers on non- 
discriminatory terms any technology and patent rights which they make 
available to other concerns which have been a part of the same combine. 
Where the units in question hold license under Japanese patents owned by 
foreigners under terms incompatible with the sense of this paragraph, these 
terms should be renegotiated. Where the licensor will not agree to rene- 
gotiation, the Japanese unit should cease utilizing the license, so that the 
Japanese government can cancel the patent or open up the patent to licens- 
ing on nondiscriminatory terms pursuant to Chapter II, Article 41 of the 
Patent Law. 

/. Mergers of any portions of divested or dissolved concerns should be 
prohibited, except when permission is granted after an affirmative showing 
of public interest. 

5. Treatment of personnel in excessive concentrations. — All individuals who 
have exercised controlling power in or over any excessive concentration of eco- 
nomic powder, whether as creditors, stockholders, managers, or in any other 
capacity, should be : 

a. Divested of all corporate security holdings, liquid assets, and business 
properties. 

&. Ejected from all positions of business or governmental responsibility. 
c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings or from acquir- 
ing positions of business or governmental responsibility at any time during 
the next 10 years. 
All other persons likely to act on behalf of the individuals described above should 
be subjected to the measures specified below. In determining who such persons 
may be, such factors as ties by blood, marriage, adoption or past personal rela- 
ship should be taken into account. (The phrase "past personal relationship" 
is used in the previous sentence chiefly in reference to persons who have been 
placed in positions of substantial responsibility in holding companies or their 
subsidiaries by the Zaibatsu families, but it should also be taken to refer to 
persons otherwise associated wuth the Zaibatsu whom SCAP may consider to 
be acting as "fronts" for the latter.) Such persons should be: 

a. Divested of liquid assets and business propeities, where they possess 
such assets or properties in amounts of any significance ; and divested of all 
corporate security holdings in any excessive concentration of economic 
power and corporate security holdings representing an interest of more 
than 1 percent in any other major private enterpi'ise. 

6. Ejected from all positions in business or government which might be 
used to favor Zaibatsu interests. 

c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings, or from acquir- 
ing positions in business or government which might be used to favor 
Zaibatsu interests at any time during the next 10 years. 
Where any doubt exists as to whether a given person should be covered by the 
above policies, that doubt should be resolved by SCAP in favor of coverage, 
since it is desired to divest a sufficient number of holdings to effect a thorough- 
going transformation of the ownership and control of large-scale Japanese 
industry. 

6. Compensation of divested holdings. — Individuals covered by the definitions 
in paragraph 5 above shall be indemnified, provided that such indemnification 



2228 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

shall be made in such manner and degree as will prohibit their buying back a 
place of power in the Japanese economy. In order to bring this about, it is 
essential that certain measures be taken in the dissolution of excessive concen- 
trations and in the sale of the assets of these persons. The measures set out 
below have been designed with a view to preventing the payment of excessive 
indemnification to the persons covered in paragraph 5 without affecting to the 
same degree and manner the compensation of others who have invested in enter- 
prises considered to be excessive concentrations. The determination of what 
is an excessive indemnification shall be made on the basis of the objectives of 
these measures. Accordingly : 

a. Policies which facilitate the conveyance of divested holdings to new 
owners should not be modified by an effort to obtain any specified degree of 
compensation for the former owners of these holdings. The overriding ob- 
jective should be to dispose of all the holdings in question as rapidly as 
possible to desirable purchasers ; the objective should be achieved even if it 
requires that holdings be disposed of at a fraction of their real value. In 
negotiated sales of divested holdings to desirable types of purchasers, the 
purchasers's ability to pay, rather than the real value of the holding, should 
affect the fixing of prices and terms of payment. 

h. A tax of not less than 90 percent should be levied on any amount by 
which the gross sales price exceeds the August 1945 market price (in the case 
of securities having a market) , or the book value as of the same date (in the 
case of other securities or property). To prevent this tax from resulting 
in injury to non-Zaibatsu individuals, the following priority should govern 
the disposition of funds secured through the sale of divested assets : 

First priority: All taxes due, other than the 90-percent tax referred to 
above, and all liabilities should be paid in full. 

Second priority : All non-Zaibatsu equity holders, where such exist should 
be paid up to the amount of the AiTgust 1945 market price of their holdings 
(or the August 1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market) 
Third priority : The 90-percent tax described above should be paid in full. 
Fourth priority : All the Zaibatsu equity holdings should be paid up to the 
amount of the August 1945 market price of their holdings (or the August 
1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market), and remain- 
ing funds should be distributed among all equity holders in proportion to 
the amount of their holdings. 

To prevent observance of the priorities cited above from resulting in total 
expropriation of Zaibatsu shareholders, proceeds of the 90-percent tax 
should be partially refunded to Zaibatsu shareholders where necessary to 
provide such shareholders with a total compensation not exceeding 15 per- 
cent of the August 1945 market value (or book value where no market ex- 
isted) of their divested holdings. 

In lieu of the 90-percent tax specified above, a steeply progressive tax 
may be specifically imposed (in addition to capital levy) on funds which 
are assigned to the individuals described in paragraph 5 as a result of the 
sale of assets divested from such individuals. 

c. A 75-percent tax be levied on any gain realized through resale of 
divested holdings within 2 years and a 50-percent tax should be levied on 
any gain realized through resale within 4 years. 

d. Sums credited to persons defined in paragraph 5 above as compensation 
should be invested in government bonds, whose total par value will not 
exceed the sum thus credited and which will pay a rate of interest no 
higher than the lowest rate being paid by comparable government bonds. 
Such bonds should not be saleable, transferable, or usable as collateral, 
but should be acceptable for taxes, when all other sources of liquid assets 
have been dissipated, for 10 years from the completion of the sale of such 
holdings. During this period, cash payments, even of interest, should be 
limited to sums required for accustomed living expenses, in order that there 
may be no surplus for investment. 

e. After the process of dissolution and liquidation has been well advanced, 
and before the end of the 10-year freeze period, the program should be 
reviewed to determine whether the sums credited to persons defined in 
paragraph 5 above will be so large as to make probable a revival of Zaibatsu 
power. If it is determined that the probability of such a revival still exists, 
added measures appropriate to the circumstances existing at the time should 
be applied to remove the probability. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2229 

f. Before the freeze is terminated, succession by the owner's heirs should 
be required, coupled with payment of steeply graduated inheritance taxes. 

7. Liquidation of Divested Holdings. — Liquidation of divested securities and 
properties should be effected rapidly in a period of about 2 years from the 
organization of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission. The plan of 
liquidation should allow for : 

o. Pro rata distribution of security holdings to individual stockholders 
of the holding concern other than those specified in paragraph 4 (and in 
some cases to financial institutions which own the holding concern's stock ) . 

b. Exchange and cancellation of securities between companies which hold 
each other's stock. 

c. Negotiated sale of securities and properties. 

d. If necessary to complete the liquidation within about 2 years, invitation 
of bids upon securities from eligible purchasers, and acceptance of the 
highest bids however low such bids may be. 

Liquidation should be effected by the Holding Company Liquidation Com- 
mission, a wholly public agency of the Japanese Government operating under 
close supervision of SCAP. Especial care should be taken not to allow repre- 
sentatives of large-scale business, large-scale trade, or large-scale finance, or 
of political groups, sympathetic to such business, trade, or finance, to have any 
place on this Commission. All nominations to the Commission should be approved 
by SCAP, its personnel should be removable by SCAP, and it should be required 
that all sales effected by the Commission be revocable by SCAP. Public 
announcement should be made of the terms and conditions of all sales. 

8. Sale of divested lioUlings. — In the sale of divested secui'ity and property 
holdings, the overriding objective should be to transfer ownership and control 
of these holdings to groups and individuals in such a way as to secure, in addi- 
tion to the requisite managerial skill, protection against the future creation of 
excessive concentrations of economic power, through a wider distribution of in- 
come and of ownership of the means of production and trade. In order to 
achieve this objective, the following criteria are set forth as a guide to the 
selection of purchasers and should be given priority, in this connection, over 
the purchaser's present ability to pay : 

a. Divested holdings in excessive concentrations of economic power 
which are not to be dissolved for technological reasons, and in other enter- 
prises such as public utilities which do not lend themselves to competitive 
operation, may be subjected to purchase by the national and local govern- 
ments of Japan, provided, such purchases are accomplished and approved 
through democratic processes. Where such concentrations or enterprises 
are not purchased by these governments, their rates and profits should be 
subjected to open and effective regulation by impartial public commissions. 
When the National Government or a local government purchases divested 
equity holdings in a given concern, it should also give consideration to the 
concomitant purchase of non-Zaibatsu equity holdings in that concern. 
Every effort should be made, however, to dissolve all excessive concentra- 
tions of economic power, rather than to assign them to government owner- 
ship or regulation, until and unless the democratization of the Japanese 
Government has proceeded sufficiently to render it a truly trustworthy in- 
strument for economic control. 

&. In connection with nongovernmental purchases, sales to wealthy 
and economically powerful persons and corporations should be held to a 
minimum, in order not to lay the groundwork for the creation of a new 
Zaibatsu class. A decided purchase preference, and the technical and finan- 
cial aid necessary to take advantage of that preference, should be furnished 
to such persons as small or medium entrepreneurs and investors, and to 
such groups as agricultural or consumer cooperatives and trade unions ; 
whose ownership of these holdings would contribute to the democratization 
of the Japanese economy. Every encouragement should be given such per- 
sons and groups to purchase divested holdings, even if they only wish 
to buy a small proportion of the holdings offered for sale in a given enter- 
prise. In the case of negotiated sales, prices should be fixed with special 
reference to such purchasers' ability to pay, as should the time period al- 
lowed for payment of these prices. 

c. No single person, or enterprise, or group of allied persons or enter- 
prises, should be allowed to purchase a number of divested holdings so large 
as to render probable the future creation of a concentration of economic 



2230 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

power approaching in size or character those concentrations defined as 
excessive under paragraph 2. 

d. The purchase of divested holdings in ex-Zaibatsu concerns by the em- 
ployees of such concerns should be encouraged only if a vigorous effort is 
made to disperse ownership widely through the working force in question, 
rather than to concentrate it in a few top executives. To render such 
dispersion possible, provision should be made for financing these purchases 
at low prices over a long period of time, possibly through wage deductions. 
Especial care should be taken to prevent the use of groups of employees in 
ex-Zaibatsu concerns as purchasing screens for persons disqualified from 
making these purchases themselves. 

e. All sales should be screened to exclude cloakes for Zaibatsu and for 
other groups who fall under way of any purge directives or purge para- 
graphs of the Basic Directive. 

The criteria specified above should be adhered to regardless of the wishes of 
non-Zaibatsu stockholders in the enterprises concerned. 

9. Liquidation of Zaibatsu Financial Enterprises.— Divested holdings in Zai- 
"batsu financial and insurance enterprises should be liquidated and disposed of 
in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 for the 
liquidation of nonfinancial enterprises. Policyholders in Zaibatsu insurance 
companies should be aided in buying stock of these concerns which is now owned 
by the Zaibatsu, where the condition of these concerns is sufficiently strong so 
that the policyholders desire to make such purchases. Purchase should be 
facilitated, under these circumstances, by liberal loans on policies, or payment 
should be permitted in the form of a reduction in the face value of policies. 
Zaibatsu insurance companies which are insolvent should be mutualized by 
cutting back the face amount of outstanding policies, where sufficient assets 
still exist to render this procedure practicable. In the reconstitution of insolvent 
financial enterprises, stock held by Zaibatsu holding companies and Zaibatsu in- 
dividuals should be subordinated to that of other stockholders. 

10. Sources of a-edit. — As a fundamental measure to encourage competitive 
operation of the Japanese economy, the number of independent sources of credit 
should be increased substantially, although not to the point where the individual 
banks would be so small as to be unable to secure the diversification of loans 
necessary to banking safety. The strengthening of local savings banks, and 
of rural and urban credit cooperatives, as well as of independent local banks, 
should be encouraged. To this end, the following policies, among others should 
be adopted : 

a. Former owners of independent financial institutions which have been 
merged with Zaibatsu concerns should be encouraged to reestablish their 
old enterprises by forced divestitures. In this connection, a procedure should 
be set up whereby former owners of merged banks, trust companies, or 
insurance companies should have the opportunity, for a limited period of 
time, to compel the institutions into which their organizations were merged 
to divest themselves of assets and liabilities to the extent necessary to re- 
constitute the absorbed institutions in adequate size. 

h. Banks over a size to be specifi 'd by SCAP should be required to split 
themselves into two or more independent units within a stated period, as 
should other banks deemed by SCAP to enjoy a monopolistic position in 
the field which they serve. The permissible size should be set at a level 
sufficiently low to force a significant number of such actions and thus greatly 
Increase the number of independent sources of credit, but sufficiently high 
to guard against the dangers of financial insecurity associated with exces- 
sively small banks. 

11. Financial alliances. — Alliances between any financial and nonfinancial 
enterprises, and alliances among any financial enterprises, should be broken. 
To this end : 

a. Banks and trust companies should be prevented from investing more 
than 10 percent of their capital and reserves in the securities, loans, bills, 
advances, and overdrafts of any one company. 

h. Such concerns should not be permitted to hold, either as Jn owner of 
record or as the holder of a beneficial interest, in their proper, savings, or 
trust accounts, the stock of any other company in an amount which exceeds 
5 percent of the outstanding shares of that company, nor to vote any such 
stock which they may hold. Nor should they be permitted to own any 
stock in a competitor. Exemption should be made to the percentage rule for 
stock acquired in connection with bona fide underwritings and to the per- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2231 

centajie and voting rules for stock acquired in default of loans, but any 
such exemptions should not run loniier than one year. 

c. Officers and directors of any bank or trust company, and persons hold- 
ing 5 percent or more of the stock thereof, should be ineligible to hold any 
office or directorship or similarly large percentage of stock in any other 
company. Exception sliould be made for part-time non-policy-making em- 
ployees, such as attorneys and certifying accountants, but such exceptions 
should be defined as narrowly as possible. 

d. No bank or trust company should be allowed to redeposit more than 
10 percent of its deposits in any one institution other than the Bank of 
Japan. 

12. Eliminotion of financial discrimination. — To eliminate discrimination in 
favor of Zaibatsu banks : 

a. A system of deposit insurance should be instituted, to diminish the 
belief among depositors that accounts in Zaibatsu banks are safer than 
elsewhere. A limit (e. g., of the order of magnitude of ten billion yen) 
should be set to the total amount of deposits which will be insured for a 
single bank. A limit should also be set to the amount of deposits which will 
be insured for a single account. 

&. The Postal Savings System should ultimately be required to deposit 
its funds in ordinary banks, allocating at least 90 percent of what it re- 
ceives in any regional grouping of prefectures among the banks having head 
offices in that region in proportion <-o the assets of such banks. A bank 
ineligible for deposit insurance should also be ineligible to receive the rede- 
posits of the postal savings system. 

c. Legislation should be introduced to improve the standard of com- 
mercial banking and to prevent banks from xmdertaking bu:^iness considered 
unwise for commercial banks. (Performance of investment banking func- 
tions by commercial banks should not be proliibited, however, until suit- 
able alternative agents for these functions become available.) Such legis- 
lation should also assign to the P>ank of Japan, or to some other suitable 
public agency, powers of direction and inspection over other banks, 
whose activities would be required to conform to statutory provisions 
regarding capital, reserves, investment policy, and other matters. The 
discretion which the laws now entrust to the Minister of Finance, in this 
connection, should be greatly reduced, and his functions clearly defined by 
law and made subject to check and review by the Diet. His powers to 
legislate by ordinance and regulation should be strictly curtailed and limited 
to. genuine emergencies. Bank examinations should take place at least 
every 2 years. 

d. The functions and powers of special banks should be defined and 
limited by law, and these banks should not be allowed to engage in ordinary 
banking. The need for the existence of the special banks should be reviewed, 
in order to determine whether certain of these banks might not revert 
to the status of ordinary banks. 

e. All vestiges of private ownership of the Bank of Japan should be 
eliminated. The Board of Directors should be made representative of 
finance, trade, industry, agriculture, and of large, medium, and smaller size 
business. 

/. Competition among banks for customers should be restored through 
such measures as the aboiit'on of the designated bank system and of the 
financial control associations. 

(7. Employees performing responsible functions in the Ministry of Fi- 
nance and government banks should be forbidden to hold the securities of 
any financial institution, and should be ineligible for employment by private 
financial institutions for 2 years after they leave government employment. 

13. (Jovernment support of industrial monopolies. — Laws and practices 
through whicli the Japanese Government has favored the growth of private 
monopolies should be terminated; although that Government should not be 
deprived of its power to regulate the Japanese economy in the public interest. 
To this end : 

a. Laws and ordinances establishing existing control associations or 
special companies should be generally repealed and the associations or special 
companies abolished. The future assumption, by nongovernmental agencies, 
of powers formerly exercised under these laws, should be prohibited. The 
future assumption, by governmental agencies, of such of these powers as 
have no major use other than to support monopolistic bodies and practices 



2232 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

should also be prohibited. Necessary governmental functions formerly- 
performed by control associations or special companies should be trans- 
ferred to appropriate governmental agencies, which agencies should be- 
created where they do not now exist. In cases where SCAP is satisfied that 
current conditions pi'event the government from effectively performing these- 
functions, and is further satisfied tliat effective performance of these func- 
tions is necessary for public purposes, he may allow temporary delegation. 
of these functions by the government to the old control associations or 
special companies or to similar new quasi private bodies, provided that final, 
decisions are made by the government and the rights of appeal to the govern- 
ment against abuse of powers are provided. All quasi private bodies ex- 
ercising such delegated functions should be liquidated as soon as their 
functions can be transferred to appropriate government agencies, or at such 
sooner time as SCAP may find the exercise of their functions to be no longer 
necessary, (For example, where these functions relate to allocation, or 
price and trade control for reconversion purposes, their performance could 
be terminated upon the expiration of the reconversion period.) 

&. All legislation which forbids, or requires governmental approval of,, 
the entry of any new business into an industry, or the expansion of any 
business, should be terminated, except insofar as : 

(1) The right to effect such a restriction is implicit in the antitrust 
legislation suggested below. 

(2) The right to effect such a restriction is necessary in order to 
comply with SCAP directives dealing with industrial disarmament 
and other subjects. 

(3) Nondiscriminatory restrictions for generally accepted public 
purposes, such as protecting the public against fraud, and protecting 
the public health, are concerned. 

(4) Fields of business activity reserved to the national or local 
governments are concerned. In this connection, prewar laws which 
set up clear-cut government monopolies should be left undisturbed ; but, . 
to prevent the use of this type of law to evade other portions of the 
anti-Zaibatsu program, the creation of new government monopolies 
during the period of the occupation should be permitted only in cases- 
where they are in the public interest or where their creation is in 
accordance with the policy for sale of divested holdings to the national 
and local governments described in paragraph 7a above. The petro- 
leum and alcohol monopolies, which were instituted for war purposes, 
should be terminated as soon as possible. 

c. All laws and practices under which the government has favored 
specific private or quasi private enterprises, to the deteriment of poten- 
tially or actually competitive enterprises, should be systematically re- 
viewed, and sucii of these laws and practices as do not have a de- 
monstrable public purpose should be terminated. Insofar as any subsidies 
are allowed to continue, or are granted in the future they should be con- 
trolled by the legislative branch of the government, and provision should 
be made that hereafter their amount, purpose, and effect be disclosed in 
public reports. 
Principles such as those set forth in the preceding subparagraphs should be 
made effective, not only by changes in substantive law, but also by provisions 
giving aggrieved persons the right to attack in the courts any discriminatory 
subsidy, preference, or other practice. 

14. Antitrust law. — A Japanese antitrust law should be enacted, prohibiting, 
among other things : 

a. Concerted business activity which burdens trade, including, but not by 
way of limitation to, such activities as fixing of prices, restriction of sales or 
output, and allocation of markets, commodities, or customers. 

&. Individual or concerted activity which has the purpose or effect of 
coercing business enterprises to conform to business policies, or participation 
in programs carried on by the coercing concern or group which are designed 
to drive selected enterprises out of any line of business, through means which 
include but are not limited to intimidation of a rival's customers or sale to 
a rival at discriminatory prices. 

c. The creation of excessive concentrations of economic powtrs, as such 
concentrations are defined in paragraph 2; (where considerations of struc- 
tural or technological unity require the creation of large concentrations,. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2233 

government ownership or strict regulation of these concentrations should be 
provided for). 

d. Types of industrial growth and of intercorporate connection which are 
particularly likely to lead to monopoly or to excessive size, including mergers 
(i. e., acquisition of any substantial portion of the capital assets) of going 
concerns of other than negligible size which are in competition with one 
another, or mergers of noncompeting concerns wliicli might lead to the cre- 
ation of large scale enterprises capable of developing into an excessive 
concentration of economic power, where such mergers are not explicitly 
found to be required in the public interest. 

e. Types of intercorporate relations (e. g., those described in paragraph 
4 d) which restrain competition. 

This antitrust law should be enforced by a specialized agency operating at a 
high governmental level and exercising broad investigatory and remedial powers. 
Consideration should be given to including in this agency representatives of the 
groups most likely to be aggrieved by excessive corporate growth ; in any event,, 
special care should be taken not to allow representatives of large scale business,. 
or of political groups sympathetic to large-scale business, to be named to this 
agency. 

Exemption from the provisions of this law should be provided for the joint 
activities of cooperatives, where such activities are not coercive or monopolistic,. 
and where they are conducted according to the democratic principles char- 
acteristic of genuine cooperatives. Similar exemption should be provided for 
labor activities other than those involving the restriction of commercial com- 
petition, and for natural monopolies and public utilities insofar as they are 
owned or closely regulated by the government. 

15. Patent law. — The provisions and the manner of enforcing Japanese patent 
law should be revised to ensure that patents in Japan cannot be used to support 
the establishment or perpetuation of concentrations of economic power. 

16. Corporate Law. — The following changes in Japanese corporate law should 
be effected : 

a. Disclosure of relevant facts in selling corporate securities should be 
required, and the fraudulent practices in connection with such sales should 
be prohibited. 

6. Before any call to a meeting of the stockholders of a corporation, the 
management of the corporation shall make full disclosure of all the facts 
necessary for the stockholders to appraise intelligently the proposals to be 
placed before the meeting. 

c. Misleading practices in corporate accounting should be forbidden, and 
minimum standards of disclosure in such accounting should he required. 

d. Interlocking officerships should be prohibited, and officers of one con- 
cern should be prohibited from serving as directors of another. Interlocking 
directorates should be prohibited in the case of competing concerns and in 
the case of concerns which rent, sell, or buy goods or services to or from 
each other in significant amoimts. In the case of other concerns, interlock- 
ing directorates should be allowed to the point where no more than one- 
fourth of the members of any Board of Directors are at the same \time 
directors of other corporations. No one person should, however, be allowed 
to serve on the Board of Directors of more than three corporations. Nothing 
in this paragraph should be taken as in any way modifying the provisions 
of paragraph 11 c. Officers and directors should be prevented from having 
holdings of shares in competing or supplying concerns, and should be pre- 
vented from having holdings of shares in any other enterprises representing 
more than 5 percent of their liquid assets or more than 5 percent of such 
other enterprises' outstanding shares. Officers, directors, and persons hav- 
ing a beneficial interest in or control of any equity issue of a corporation in 
excess of 1 percent of the total issue should be required to report their 
holdings and transactions in all issues of the corporations, and such reports 
should be publicized. Profits of corporate insiders derived from short-term 
transactions in the corporation's securities should be subject to recapture 
by the corporation. 

e. An ultra vires action by a corporation should be grounds for remedial 
action by a stockholder or punitive action by a public agency. Moreover, 
a corporation should be specifically prohibited from entering partnerships, 
either directly or indirectly, or in other respects avoiding the limitations on 
intercorporate relationships. 

22848— 52— pt. T 16 



2234 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

/. It should be required that all shares having par value should be fully 
paid, and that equal voting rights attach to all shares of the same issue. The 
use of no par-value shares should be permitted ; such shares to be offered 
for sale at any time at a value to be decided by the company's board of 
directors. All corporations should be required to adopt the principle of 
preemptive rights in offering nevp shares. 

g. Every effort should be made to assure the independence of Japanese 
auditors, who should be prevented from having direct or indirect aflSliations 
with management and from having conflicting interests in other concerns. 

/(. With stated exemptions for banks, investment trusts, insurance com- 
panies, and possibly other types of financial institutions, the Japanese com- 
pany law should be amended to forbid one corporation from holding the 
stock of another. The use of 100 percent owned subsidiaries should be per- 
mitted, however (subject to the restrictions on mergers outlined under 
paragraph 14 d). 

i. Stockholders should not be undiily hampered in bringing suits against 
management for money damages or for equitable remedies. 

17. Tax and inheritance laws. — In connection with current and impending re- 
visions of Japanese tax law, every effort should be made to favor the wide dis- 
tribution of income and ownership envisaged in this paper, through the following 
means : 

a. Income and inheritance taxes should be very much more steeply grad- 
uated than they are at present. 

&. Property inherited by the head of a house should be subject to the tax 
rates applicable to other heirs. 

c. Diffusion of inherited wealth should be assured by by provision for rea- 
sonably equal distribution among heirs, insofar as estates aggregating con- 
siderable wealth are concerned. 

d. Members of a house should be prevented from deriving significant tax 
advantages from the insolvent status of other members of the house. 

e. The present discretionary power of the Minister of Finance in tax 
matters should he greatly reduced. Tax rates should be fixed by the Diet. 

18. Policy concerning preferred purchasers. — Measures specified below should 
be taken in order to strengthen and democratize preferred categories of pur- 
chasers of divested holdings : 

a. In order to qualify Japanese cooperatives for purchase preference in 
connection with divested holdings, such cooperatives should be freed from 
governmental influence and should be relieved of public functions. They 
shfmld be subject to government supervision, only insofar as srch super- 
vision is necessary to prevent fraud and to ensure compliance with the pro- 
visions of this paragraph. Membership in these cooperatives should be 
voluntary, and requirements for membership therein should be nondiscrim- 
inatory. (In this connection, the minimum contribution or entrance fee 
should be reduced to the point where it will form no obstacle to the mem- 
bership of low income persons.) All participating members should have 
equal votes and officers should be selected by majority vote. The proceeds 
should be divided equally among members or in proportion to the relative 
volume of business, without allowance, beyond a low fixed dividend, for 
contribution of capital. In addition to being converted into genuinely dem- 
ocratic instruments through these and other changes, cooperatives should 
be freed from all legal restrictions which prevent them from engaging in 
various kinds of activities. Specifically, consumers' cooperative societies 
should be recognized and afforded the same tyr/e of privilege as other coop- 
erative societies. The minimum number of members qualifying for reg- 
istration under the Cooperative Societies Law should be raised from the 
present figure of seven to levels which will vary for different types of so- 
cieties but which should be sufficiently high in each case to prevent domina- 
tion by minorities. Genuine cooperative societies should receive such pub- 
lic financial technical aid as may be necessary to their expansion. 

6. Where the possibility exists that trade unions might purchase Zaibatsu 
holdings, all possible technical and financial assistance should be furnished 
the trade unions concerned, provided that these unions are genuine labor 
organizations, and are not acting as cloaks for former owners. As a means 
of providing for trade union ownership of divested holdings, consideration 
should be given to assigning ownership of divested holdings to cooperative 
societies organized especially for this purpose, with a membership parallel 
to that of trade unions. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2235 

c. Small entrepreneurs desiring to purchase divested holdings should 
be given all possible public assistance so tliat they may compete on more 
advantageous terms with large scale business. The Japanese Ministry of 
Commerce should establish a bureau specifically devoted to aiding such 
small business. This bureau should give special support to the performance 
of joint activities of an unrestrictive character by such mutual-aid organiza- 
tions of small entrepreneurs as manufactures' guilds and export guilds. 
Precautions should be taken, however, against domination of these guilds by 
the government or by the larger fii'ms; nor should they be permitted to 
engage in such of their former activities as were in restraint of trade. 

19. ■ Public support. — "Vigorous efforts should be made by SCAP to create 
Japanese public understanding of, and support for, the anti-Zaibatsu program 
through such means as : 

a. Provision for access to recent literature in English about the problems 
of industrial organization. 

h. Publication of SCAP's factual findings about the Zaibatsu. 

c. Encouragement of the organization of a Japanese commission of inquiry, 
representative of a wide range of interests and opinicms, to investigate the 
facts about the Zaibatsu and make public its recommendations. 

d. Attention to the problems of industrial organization, and the dangers 
of monopoly and excessive concentration of economic power in the revision 
of the Japanese educational system. 

e. Provision for contact between the Japanese antitrust agency and similar 
bodies in other countries. 

A special attempt should he made to furnish relevant data to and to secure the 
support of, those groups whose economic interests are most actutely promoted 
by the dissolution of the Zaibatsu ; consumers, small and medium-size business- 
men, trade unions, and cooperatives. 

20. Japanese Government.- — xVn attempt should be made to deprive the Japa- 
nese Government of its former pro-Zaibatsu character, and to prevent renewed 
alliances between the bureaucracy and business interests : 

a. SCAP should make every effort to see that new public agencies estab- 
lished in order to carry out the anti-Zaibatsu program envisaged in this 
paper are staffed with individuals not previously associated with or sym- 
pathetic to large scale business or its political spokesmen. Economist and 
other intellectuals or technical experts hitherto debarred from government 
work because of their anti-imperialist or anti-Zaibatsu views would be de- 
sirable recruits. 

h. In view, however, of the limited availability of such persons, and of 
the uncertain political complexion of the present Japanese bureaucracy, 
SCAP should reduce the discretionary policy-making authority of that 
bureaucracy insofar as the more important issues related to this program 
are concerned. In economic matters at least, the Japanese bureaucracy 
should not be left in a position to usui'p the functions of the legislative 
branch of the government. 

c. Existing government officials performing responsible functions relating 
to the control or regulation of private industrial, commercial, or financial 
enterprises should be discharged where, because of their past employment 
in Zaibatsu concerns or other previous private or public actions, they are 
believed sympathetic to Zaibatsu interests. 

d. Government officials performing responsible functions relating to the 
control or regulation of private commercial, industrial, or financial enter-^ 
prises should be prohibited from holding the securities of any one such pri- 
vate enterprise in an amount which would represent more than 5 percent 
of the official's total wealth, or more than 1 percent of the enterpriser's 
capital value. Reports of all security holdings by such government officials 
should be made public. Such officials should also be prohibited within a 
period of 2 years after their leaving of government employ, from accepting 
private positions which involve their representing, directly or indirectly, 
private enterprises before the government bureaus with which they were 
formerly associated, or from holding positions in any private enterprise 
which is the object of legal action as a result of its alleged violation of any 
of the measures specified in this paper. 

e. Special procedures should be set up to make public the names of govern- 
ment officials holding responsible positions relating to the control or regu- 
lation of private, commercial, industrial, or financial enterprises, so that 
anti-Zaibatsu groups and persons may scrutinize their past records and pro- 
test publicly against appointments which they consider unsuitable. 



2236 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

/. The principle of private redress for injury suffered as a result of gov- 
ernmental action should be recognized in Japanese law. 

21. United Nations and neutral interests. — In the application of measures 
specified in this paper, SCAP should protect the interests of nationals of mem- 
bers of the United Nations in Japan, insofar as this can be accomplished with- 
out limiting the effectiveness of these measures. In general, his objective should 
be to provide adequate, prompt and effective indemnification for property taken 
from such interests to the extent feasible. He should also keep full records of 
any change in the status of such interests which may result from the application 
of these measures. 

22. Nonprofit corporations. — An exception should be made to the provisions of 
this paper affecting interlocking officerships and dii-ectorates insofar as these 
provisions concern nonprofit corporations which are devoted to public, charitable 
and cultural purposes and which do not hold securities of other corporations. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that, as far as you know, this is the 
first time this has been made public ? 

Mr. Vincent. So far as I know. I have never seen it outside of the 
State Department, and it has been years since I ever saw it. I am not 
familiar with it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a 
rally 

Mr. Vincent. Excuse me. The testimony here when asked if I had 
knowledge of MacArthur receiving FEC 230 in any form 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did I ask you that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I thought you did; the channels through which it 
went. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I mentioned MacArthur ? I would be glad to have 
your testimony on that point. 

Mr. Vincent. My purpose is here to show a letter which he wrote 
to Senator McMahon on the 1st of February 1948, in which he states 
that he had received FEC 230. This is a photostat of a letter from 
Douglas MacArthur to Senator McMahon. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is a photostat of a printed copy of that letter, isn't 
it ? Where was that copy printed ? 

Mr. Surrey. It is printed in the Political Reorientation of Japan, 
September 1945 to September 1948, Report of Government Section, 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, at page 783 of the docu- 
ment appendix F. 

Mr. Sourwine. Thank you. 

Do you adopt that testimony? 

Mr. Vincent. I adopt the testimony. 

Mr. Sourwine. I have no objection to counsel stating the fact, but 
counsel hasn't been sworn. Where did you get this photostat ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the State Department. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you order it made, or did someone make it and 
bring it to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. The regular photostat work there; yes. I ordered 
having it made, from the regular people who make photostats. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you had aid in the State Department in 
preparing your case here ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have had aid in collecting documents. 

Senator Ferguson. You have had a private counsel as well as 
counsel in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you see him between sessions ? 

Mr. Vincent. I go back and see the people in the State Depart- 
ment ; not regularly. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2237 

Senator Ferguson. Have they a copy of the transcript? 

INIr. Vincent. That comes out from day to day? Yes, the State 
Department has gotten a copy of it. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you discuss with them the transcript? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't even seen this transcript, myself. 

Senator Ferguson. That wasn't my question. 

Mr. Vincent. I have not discussed the transcript with them. 

Senator Ferguson. When is the last you have been in the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten. I didn't go yesterday. The day 
before yesterday, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see the State Department's counsel? 

Mr. Vincent. I saw people in the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. The counsel ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I wouldn't say the counsel. People in the 
Legal Advisers' Oflice. 

Mr. SouR^VINE. I would like to ask that this document that Mr. 
Vincent has just handed over and identified be placed in the record 
at this point. I have not seen it, but in justice to the witness, it should 
go in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. I will receive it in the record right now. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 393" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 393 
Lettee Feom General MacArthur to Senator Brien MoMahon February 1, 1948 

Reproduced in "Political Orientation of Japan" [report of Government section, 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, September 1945-September 1948] 

Appendix F: 43 

LETTER TO SENATOR BRIEN M'MAHON DEFENDING ECONOMY POLICY 

Tokyo, Japan, 
1 February 1948. 

Dear Senator McMahon : I have your letter of January 22nd and the pages 
from the Congressional Record subsequently received under separate cover, for 
vphich I thank you. 

The discussion of Senator Knowland covers a policy paper of the United 
States formulated by the State, War, and Navy Departments and referred to the 
Far Eastern Commission for consideration by the other ten governments repre- 
sented on that body and to the supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for 
guidance. As the sources of origin, authorship and authority are all in Washing- 
ton and my responsibility limited to the executive implementation of basic 
decisions formulated there, I am hardly in a position ten thousand miles away 
to participate in the debate. 

For your information, however, I did publicly state my views with respect to 
the underlying purpose of the policy paper known as FEC 230 on New Year's Day 
last and subsequently on January 6th, 1948 at San Francisco the Secretary of 
the Army in an address before the Commwealth Club, with marked clarity sum- 
med up the situation as it presently exists. It is somewhat difficult to under- 
stand why these published views did not figure in the discussion of the subject 
matter upon the floor of the Senate, and against the possibility that the texts of 
such statements did not come to your attention I am inclosing herewith copies 
thereof which I should be only too glad to have inserted in the Record as you 
have suggested. 

In any evaluation of the economic potential here in Japan it must be under- 
stood that the tearing down of the traditional pyramid of economic power which 
has given only a few Japanese families direct or indirect control over all com- 
merce and industry, all raw materials, all transportation, internal and external, 
and all coal and other pow*^r resources, is the first essential step to the estab- 



2238 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

lishment here of an econoruic system based upon free private competitive enter- 
prise which Japan has never before known. Even more it is indispensable to 
the growtli of democratic irovernment and life, as the abnorujal economic system 
heretofore in existence can only thrive if the people are held in poverty and 
slavery. 

The Japanese people, you may be sure, fully understand the nature of the 
forces which have so ruthlessly exploited them in the past. They understand 
that this economic concentration not only furnished the sinews for mounting 
the violence of war but that its leaders, in partnersip with the military, shaped 
the national will in the direction of war and conquest. And they understand no 
less fully that the material wealth comprising this vast concentration at war's 
start increased as war progressed, at the forfeiture of millions of Japanese lives, 
as resources of Japan theretofore only indirectly controlled came under direct 
control and ownership. Those things are so well understood by the Japanese 
people that apart from our desire to reshape Japanese life toward a capitalistic 
economy, if this concentration of economic power is not torn down and I'edis- 
tributed peacefully and in due order under the Occupation, there is no slightest 
doubt that its cleansing will eventually occur through a blood bath of revolu- 
tionary violence. For the Japanese people have tasted freedom under the 
American concept and they will not willingly retui*n to the shackles of an au- 
thoritarian government and economy or resubmit otherwise to their discredited 
masters. 

With expressions of cordiality. 
Faithfully yours, 

Douglas MacArthur. 

Mr. Rea, That letter makes reference to- 



Mr. SouEwiNE. Are you going to testify ? 

Mr. Rea. No, sir. I was just calling attention to the fact that that 
letter makes reference to a longer letter expanding on the views of 
the shorter one, of which you already have a copy. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it your opinion that that also should be in the 
record at this point ? 

Mr. Rea. I was going to suggest that. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Have you identified yourself for the reporter ? 

Mr. Rea. My name is Howard Rea. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And you are associated with Mr. Surrey ? 

Mr. Rea. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would like to adopt that as my testimony. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What you are offering is this entire three-page 
photostat? It comes from the same source; is that right, Mr. Rea? 

Mr. Rea. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. May we proceed, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, proceed. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a meet- 
ing of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on Janu- 
ary 24, 1946? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not recollect that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Don't you remember being asked to speak on behalf 
of the Department or to designate a speaker to discuss State Depart- 
ment policy toward Japan at that rally ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it. I didn't speak 
before it, and I have no recollection of being asked to send somebody 
to speak before it. 

Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you recall a Mr. Hugh Borton ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Identify him. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2239 

Mr. Vincent. He was an officer in the Far Eastern Office while 
I was Director. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know that Mr. Borton did speak at the 
rally of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on Janu- 
ary 24, 1946? 

Mr. Vincent. I have just testified that I have no recollection of 
his speaking before it. It is not a matter that is in my memory. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say whether you suggested to Mr. Borton 
that he make this speech? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think it is possible that you did. 

Mr. Vincent. I think it is possible I did. It certainly is quite pos- 
sible that I had a discussion with him, because he was in my office. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say whether you referred to Mr. Borton a 
request which had come to your desk for a speaker to represent the 
Department at that rally? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't say that I have any recollection of it, but I 
am perfectly sure that if oue came, I probably would have referred it 
to one or the other of the people in my office handling Japanese 
American affairs. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you at that time know that the Japanese- Amer- 
ican Committee for Democracy was a Communist-front organization? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember that the Department was at the 
time sending a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall tlint. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. AVasn't there an investigation of Mr. Borton as a 
result of his having made that speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. When was that speech made? 
In 1946? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. January 24, 1946. 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know that Andrew Roth was going to be 
on the program of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy 
on January 24, 1946? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir. 

]\Ir. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether the State Department cleared 
the speech which Mr. Borton gave on that occasion ? 

Mr. Vincent. I simply don't recall the speech or the incident, so 
I don't know whether it was cleared or not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then you did not clear the speech before he gave 
it, did you? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not recall clearing the speech before he gave it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see it? 

Mr. Vincent. I simply don't know, Mr. Sourwine. I just don't 
recall that whole incident. 

Senator Ferguson. You cannot recall ever having heard of it? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall, sir, having anything to do with that. 
As I sav, Borton was in my office, and if you can refresh my memory, 
I would be perfectly happy to. 



2240 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter written 
by Mr. Hugh Borton to Mr. Victor Lasky of the New York World 
Telegram, under date of September 14, on the letterhead of Columbia 
University in the city of New York, dated September 14, 1950. 

In answer to your inquiry of September 13, I am glad to have this opportunity 
of explaining the circumstances of my appearance at a rally of the Japanese- 
American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946. An invitation had 
been received in the Department some weeks earlier for a speaker at the meeting 
to speak on our policy toward Japan. My immediate superior in the Department, 
Mr. John Carter Vincent, was unable to go and referred the matter to me, sug- 
gesting that I make the speech. None of us in the Department were aware at 
that time that the committee was described as a Communist-front organization. 
It was with considerable embarrassment that upon arrival in New York upon 
the evening of the 24th I found that the Department was being accused of send- 
ing a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization. So far as I can 
remember, we were not aware in the Depai'tment that Mr. Roth was to be on 
the program. The speech which I gave on Japanese policy was cleared by the 
Department prior to my giving it in New York. 

After my return to Washington, the Department was naturally upset over the 
matter, but it was too late to rectify the situation. As a result of the newspaper 
articles on the matter, it was read into the Congressional Record. The Depart- 
ment felt, therefore, that a further investigation of me was necessary. I was 
reinvestigated by the Department's security officers. I was not aware of this 
until after the investigation was over, as the Department did not take any action 
in reference to my position, becau.se of the incident. 

Hoping that this answers your questions and if not, you will communicate 
with me further, I am, 
Sincerely yours, 

Hugh Borton. 

Does that refresh your recollection in any way ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am afraid it doesn't. That incident is completely 
out of my mind. It does to the extent that such an incident must 
have arisen. But Borton's letter 

Senator Ferguson. January 24, 1946, you were there? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I was Director of the Far Eastern Office. 

Senator Ferguson. That brings np the same question I asked you 
this morning, about your Security Branch, whether or not there were 
any questions raised about Communist fronts or espionage or es- 
pionage agents, around the Department. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, as I say, I had no knowledge that this was a 
Communist-front organization or that there was an investigation go- 
ing on of Mr. Borton. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This was at the very least a teapot tempest at the 
time, wasn't it? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I should have remembered it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do yoit know whether anyone else in the State 
Department contributed to Mr. Service's defense fund ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall anybody else. I have mentioned 
Mr. Gauss, but he was outside the State Department at that time, 
Ambassador Gauss. 

As to the others, I don't recall who may have contributed. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that there was a solicitation in 
the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. In the Department? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I recall there was something in the Foreign Service 
Journal about sending money to Jack Service. 

Senator Ferguson. Oh, even the Foreign Service Journal 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2241 

Mr. Vincent. Somebody wrote a letter in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Suggesting contributions from people in the 
State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Foreign Service officers. 

Senator Ferguson. And at that time there was an investigation of 
Mr. Service in relation to removing papers? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And Mr. Service now has been removed from 
his service in the Department; and I think, while the document will 
speak for itself, it shows that it was on account of giving unauthorized 
papers out in the Amerasia case. 

Mr. Vincent. I have told you that I have not read it, have not read 
the statement. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. You do not know why he was removed, 
then ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think he was removed for just the reasons you do. 

Senator Ferquson. For giving these papers ; is that not right ? 

Mr. Vincent. The ruling of the Loyalty Eeview Board that there 
was a reasonable doubt. And they based that as I understand it, on the 
Amerasia case. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that there was also a solicita- 
tion of funds in the State Department when Mr. Hiss was accused? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. And that certain donations were made by people 
in the State Department and other branches of the executive branch 
of tthe Government ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was never solicited. I was in Switzerland. But I 
did not know there was any solicitation. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Was your security branch very active, to your 
knowledge ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say it was active. I had no knowledge of 
its activities. It operated as a distinct branch in the State Depart- 
ment and carried on its activities without my knowledge, which I 
think would be the appropriate way for them to do it. 

Senator Ferguson. Had it ever struck your mind while you were 
in the Department that there may be Communist agents at least try- 
ing to get things out of the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. When you ask whether it ever struck my mind, 
yes. It is a reasonable question to ask. But I don't recall, myself, 
being conscious of the fact that there were or that there was a need 
for it. That was the Security Division's job. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the Security Division's job. Well, 
they didn't have a man in your office ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. And it now turns out that Mr. Koth, who was 
connected with the Amerasia case, was coming into your Department 
to see Mr. Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. That's right. 

Senator Ferguson. But it never struck you that you would give it 
any care, about agents being around trying to get information? 

Mr. Vincent. I had no reason at that time to suspect Koth. 



2242 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. To even think about the matter. That is what 
I am getting at. 

Mr, Vincent. No, sir ; I did not think in terms of that. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other cases where they 
raised money in the State Department or put it in the Foreign Service 
Journal, to contribute to some one that was accused of a very serious 
matter like the removing of papers or information from the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, Senator, I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there anything in the Journal about the 
Alger Hiss case? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. You may take the witness. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Your testimony is that you recall nothing about any 
investigation of Mr. Borton in connection with attending this rally? 

Mr. Vincent. My testimony is that, sir. Until it was brought to my 
attention. I do now say that the instance is one that I was certainly 
•conscious of at that time. You asked me now whether I could recall it, 
I did not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You can recall now that there was some measure of 
iuror in the Department about this matter ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can, yes. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. On the question of the newspaper report of it, Mr. 
Chairman, I have an article which appeared in the New York World- 
Telegram of the 23d of January 1946, headed "State Department send- 
ing speaker to pink rally." 

I ask that that be inserted in the record at this point. 

Senator Ferguson. It may be inserted. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 394," and is as 
follows :) 

[New York World-Telegram, January 23, 1946, p. 1] 

State Department Sending Speaker to Pink Rally 

(By Frederick Woltman, World-Telegram Staff Writer) 

Possibly its right hand isn't aware of what its left hand is doing. Or maybe 
the State Department just thrives on punishment. 

At any rate, the State Department is sending an official representative, Dr. 
Hugh Borton, to address a "Rally for a Democratic Japan" in Manhattan Center 
tomori'ow night, where its policies are sure to be lambasted. 

A cospeaker with him on the platform will be Andrew Roth, former lieutenant 
in Navy intelligence now awaiting trial in Washington on a Federal indictment 
•charging him with conspiracy to take confidential Government military records. 
Mr. Roth was relieved of active duty last year following an FBI investigation 
instigated by the State Department itself. 

The rally is being staged by the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy, 
"which lately has been active in promoting the Japanese Communist movement, 
demanding the immediate recall of all American troops in China and assailing 
what it terms our undemocratic foreign policies in Asia. 

The committee, which was started 3 years ago by loyal Japanese-Americans, 
has become heavily larded with Communist influence. Its advisers include such 
well-known Communists or fellow-travelers as Lewis Merrill, president of the CIO 
United Office and Professional Workers, Michael Obermeir, Katherine Terrill, 
Abner Green, and Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. 

Its announcements list Dr. Borton, former teacher of .Japanese at Columbia 
University, as representing the United States State Department. 

In addition to live speakers, including Dr. Borton and Mr. Roth, there will be an 
added feature, a dramatized narration by Canada Lee, the actor. Mr. Lee's latest 
appearance was January 15, when he was given star billing in a Madison Square 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2243 

•Garden Lenin memorial meeting run by the New York State Committee of the 
Communist party. 

The main spealier will be Representative John M. Coffee, Democrat, of Wash- 
ington, who, with one or two exceptions, has managed to get his name on a 
greater number of Communist fronts than any Member of Congress. 

Last summer he joined three other Representatives with the avowed aim of 
putting pressure on the State Department for a more pro-Soviet stand. This time, 
according to the JACD's announcement, Representative Coffee will take up the 
problems of the Indonesians, the Annamese, the people of India, Japan and China. 

REGULAR TICKET OUTLET 

To distribute tickets for the rally, the committee has chosen the regular book- 
shops which the Communists always use as outlets for their literature and ticket 
agencies for their affairs. These are the Worker's Bookshop at the party's head- 
quarters, 50 East Thirteenth Sti'eet, the Jefferson Book Store of the party's 
Jefferson School, the Forty-fourth Street Book Fair and the Guild Book Center. 

In its bimonthly News Letter, the JACD is strongly anti-Chiang Kai-shek and 
favors the Communist regime in China. Last November it protested to President 
Truman against the State Department's role in China as "in ugly contradiction 
between our stated policies and our actions." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I hold in my hand a copy of the pro2;ram for this 
rall}^, or what purports to be a copy of the program for this rally. 

I will ask Mr. Mandel : Is that a photostat of the program for the 
rally in question? 

Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of the announcement of the rally. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I stand corrected. A photostat of the announce- 
ment for the rally. The second page says : "Program" and indicates 
that Dr. Hugh Borton, of the State Department was No. 3 on the 
program and the first speaker, that Andrew Roth, author of Dilemma 
in Japan, was No. 5 on the program and the second speaker; the space 
between them, No. 4 on the program being a soprano who was to give 
two selections. On the next page, endorsers include Israel Epstein, 
Michael Obermeir, and Max Yergan, among others. There is also 
a statement bearing beneath it the facsimile signature of Harold L. 
Ickes, saying : 

There are those in Japan who are struggling to achieve a democratic type 
of government in place of the military tyranny which plunged the nation into 
war and led it down the path to defeat. It is deeply encouraging to me that 
many Japanese-Americans are anxious to further this movement to foster the 
growth of freedom in Japan. This "Rally for Democratic Japan" can be im- 
portant in bringing about a better understanding between our countries, and in 
encouraging Japan on her new road. I send you my greetings and my hope 
that you will carry forward the ideal for which our soldiers fought and died, 
a world in which all people will live in freedom and without fear. 

I don't offer that for the record, but on the basis of all of this 
there is no question in your mind, Mr. Vincent, that there was such 
a rally? 

ISIr. Vincent. Now that you refresh my memory. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or that Mr. Borton spoke ? 

Mr. Vincent. That Mr. Borton spoke. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any question in your mind that he was 
subsequently investigated by the State Department, whether it was 
a thorough investigation or just a gesture that there was an investi- 
gation? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't have any knowledge of that. You would 
have to ask the Security Division. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Borton in your Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. He was in the far-eastern office ; yes. 



2244 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If there had been an investigation of him at the 
time, would you have known about it? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not think I would have. Not necessarily. 
The Security Division procedures were not known to me. They car- 
ried out their investigations. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you advise anyone in the Department at 
that time that you had suggested to Mr. Borton that he make the 
speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. As I say, I can't recall the instance. I don't recall 
whether I told anybody I advised him to make the speech. 

Senator Ferguson. If there has been an investigation of this mat- 
ter — and you assume here this morning that Mr. Borton was right, 
that you had received the invitation, and you could not go, and you 
had in effect obtained him as the speaker. 

Mr. Vincent. That's right. 

Senator Ferguson. Should not that investigation have included 
what you knew about it, that you had the invitation ? Wliy did you 
not know that this was a pink organization? And why did you ask 
one of the men under you to go and make this speech? Would not 
any kind of an investigation have included that? 

Mr. Vincent. Senator, you will have to get security people here to 
testify. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking about security. I am asking 
your opinion as a Foreign Service officer. Should not any investiga- 
tion have included that much at least? 

Mr. Vincent. An inquiry ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; as to what you knew about it. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; it should have. 

Senator Ferguson. Because you were the man who had the invita- 
tion. You were the man who handed it over to Borton. 

Now, could there have been an investigation without at least doing 
that much ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I can't testify on that, to say whether it should 
or shouldn't. The Security Division operated on its own. 

Senator Ferguson. What you are saying about the Security Divi- 
sion leaves this committee, as far as I am concerned, in the position 
that it certainly must conclude that Division was not functioning, 
when it would not make an investigation of this matter and at least 
ask you some very critical and personal questions. I cannot under- 
stand it. Can you understand it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have not testified that they did not ask me. I have 
no recollection of their asking me any questions. 

Senator Ferguson. I cannot understand a man's memory on an 
important matter like that failing him. I do not understand your 
telling me that you cannot remember if they did. You would not say 
they did not. You would not say they did. Now, if you were ques- 
tioned about sending a speaker to a pink organization, do you not 
think that you would remember it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I do not remember it. To ask 
me whether I think I would remember it or not is another question. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, in justice to the witness, I think 
perhaps it should be pointed out that the only evidence we have that 
there was an investigation is a statement by Mr. Borton in a letter 
which is not under oath. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2245 

Senator Ferguson. I am certainly trying to be fair to the witness. 
Borton wrote to the paper and said there was an investigation. And 
I think it is even worse for the State Department if there was not an 
investigation at all. I was giving them the benefit of the doubt, that 
they did conduct some kind of an examination. 

If it turns out that they did not, I think it is even worse for the 
State Department and the Security Branch of it. 

Do you not also ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, there was an investigation, according to Mr. 
Borton. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think there was, now ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no reason to doubt that there was one. 

Mr. SouR"vviNE. Did you, in February 1946, attend a luncheon 
given by the American Council of the IPR in honor of Mr. Owen Lat- 
timore ? 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, I tliink the record ought to be clear 
that any investigation that the State Department has made on the 
question of loyalty or communism is not available to this coimnittee. 
We are helpless along that line. 

Mr. Vincent. It is not available to me, either, Senator. 

You asked about a luncheon ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes. Did you, in February of 1946, attend a lunch- 
eon given by the American Council of IPE, in honor of Owen Lat- 
timore? 

Mr. Vincent, I am afraid I have to testify again that I don't recall 
the luncheon. But I went to many luncheons, and I could easily have 
gone to this one. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You do not recall such a luncheon on February 21, 
1946? 

]\Ir. Vincent, Mr. Sourwine, no. There were many luncheons I 
don't recall, and I don't recall the occasion of this one. 

]Mr. SouRwiNE. How many luncheons honoring Owen Lattimore 
have you ever attended ? 

Mr, Vincent, I am not talking about honoring Owen Lattimore, 
I am just thinking of the luncheons one attends, and I don't recall 
this. 

jMr. SouRwiNE. He is your good friend, is he not? He is your long- 
time friend ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had attended a luncheon in his honor, do you 
not think you would have remembered it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not necessarily. I don't see why I should remember 
now, in 1952, a luncheon in honor of Lattimore. Whether I did or 
didn't is a matter 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say whether you ever have attended any 
luncheons in honor of Owen Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall any luncheons in honor of Owen Lat- 
timore, but I could easily have attended a luncheon in honor of Owen 
Lattimore, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I don't mean to be unduly repetitious, I am try- 
ing to help your memory on this. Do you remember a luncheon of 
that nature at which Mr. William L. Holland of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations acted as chairman ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of the luncheon ? 



2246 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't. 

Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you remember such a Imiclieoii in the pan- 
American room of the Mayflower Hotel ? 

Mr. Vincent. Now you have broadened my memory ; yes. Because- 
I was just in the Mayflower yesterday, and I, myself, was trying to 
recall the last occasion I was thei'e, in the pan- American room. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember ever having been in the pan- 
American room of the Mayflower Hotel at a luncheon honoring Owen 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Vincent. When you say "honoring Owen Lattimore," I don't 
recall that it was honoring Owen Lattimore, but it may have been. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember having been there in 1946 at a 
luncheon given by the IPR Council ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't remember the date, but I do know that on 
some occasion I was there in that Pan American room. I would be 
perfectly willing to tell you, "Yes, I have been there." But I am 
trying to tell you I don't recall the circumstances of the luncheon, Mr. 
Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have an appointment book? Do you keep- 
an appointment book? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not keep an appointment book. When I 
am working in the office, I have a pad on my desk. 

Senator Ferguson, You do not keep a diary ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever kept one? 

Mr. Vincent. Not for many years. I kept one when I first went 
to China ; in 1924. 

Mr. Sourwine. Since you do not yourself remember attending thi& 
luncheon, it would be useless to ask you about any of the other offi- 
cials of the Department who might have joined you at that time in 
paying tribute to Owen Lattimore, is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That's right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, on or about February 23, write a letter 
under that date, to Mr. Edward Carter, executive vice chairman of the 
American Council of the IPR, advising him that you did not feel 
you could accept nomination for a second term as a member of the 
board of trustees of the American Council of IPR.? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that I had no recollection of the 
particular method by which I ceased to be a member of the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. I show you a photostat of a letter, and I ask you 
if it refreshes your recollection. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that a letter which you wrote to Mr. E. C. 
Carter? 

Mr. Vincent. It is. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you have just read that letter. Did you in 
that letter state that it was your belief that it would not be to the best 
interests of the American Council to have on its board of trustees two 
official members from the same office in the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. ' 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was the other official member from the same 
office in the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. Abbott Moffat, who was mentioned there. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2247 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, of which I 
have a photostat, be phxced in tlie record at this point. 

Senator Ferguson, It will be received. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 395" and is as 
follows) : 

Exhibit No. 395 

Address Official Communications to the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. 

Department of State, 
Washington, February 23, 1946, 
Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

Executive Vice Cfiainnan, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
Inc., 1 East S^th Street, Neiv York 22, N. Y. 
■ Dear Mr. Carter : I understand that my office has gotten in touch with your 
IPR ottice here in regard to my nomination for the Board of Directors of the 
American Council, but I shall confirm what I asked them to tell your office here, 
I appreciate A^ery much the nomination for a second term but feel that, in as 
much as Abbot Moffat has also been nominated and has been advised by me to 
accept the nomination, I should decline the nomination. I do this because of 
my belief that it would not be to the best interests of the American Council to 
have on its Board of Directors two ofiicial members from the same office in the 
State Department. I shall of course continue to follow with interest the worlc 
of the Council. 

Sincerely yours, 

/s/ John Carter Vincent 
John Carter Vincent. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, in that letter, state that you would, of 
course, continue to follow with great interest the work of the Amer- 
ican Council of the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think I did, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you, in fact, continue to follow that work with 
great interest ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not say I followed it with great interest ; no. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you on or about April 1, 1946, asked to lend 
your name and support to a membership appeal by the Institute of 
Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall such an appeal. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you in fact lend your name and support in the 
spring of 1946 to a membership appeal by the American Council of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Vincent. Since I say I don't recall I was asking, I don't recall 
lending my name to it ; no. 

Mr. Sourwine. Or the Washington advisory committee of IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall. 

Mr. SouTiw^iNE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel 
what is that a photostat of ? 

Mr. Mandel. That is a photostat of a document headed "Meeting 
of Washington IPR advisory committee at the Lattimores' home, 
March 25, 1946," from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is this the second page of that photostat, of the 
same document? 

Mr. JVIandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I ask that these, as identified, may 
go in the record at this point. 

Senator Ferguson. They will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 396" and is as 
follows : ) 



2248 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 396 

Meeting of Washington IPR Advisory Committee at the Lattimores' home, 

JMaich 25, 1946 

Present: Mr. and Mrs. Robert Barnett, Edward C. Carter, Mrs. Lilian Coville, 
Mrs. Shirley Jenkins, Mr. and Mrs. William Johnstone, Mr. and Mrs. >AIortiraer 
S. Graves, Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Abbott Low Moffat, Catherine Porter, Mrs. 
Elizabeth Ussachevsky, Mr. Pollard. 

Main points discussed during the evening were : 

1. A definite campaign should be developed to point up and increase the quality 
of the Washington program in order to — 

(a) Bring in new members to increase the Washington total to approximately 
500. 

It was felt that many Government workers in the Far East field would .ioin in 
response to a form letter or a personal request. The letter should indicate 
specifically what IPR has to offer this special group: inter alia, periodic publica- 
tions and a list of books which are subject to members' discount. 

Chairman of international relations committees of clubs and organizations, 
and members of local college and university faculties, could also be circularized. 

We should consider a form of membership for people who could pay between 
$10 and $100 annually. 

(6) Strive for income and a budget of from $15,000 (Johnstone) to $25,000 
(Carter). 

2. 1 n order to get the funds needed for a f uU-scale program in Washington, it 
was suggested that — 

(a) Several first-class programs be built around headliners and headline 
topics, such as : 

Harold Ickes (or Abe Fortas), plus a Navy official (or Senator Hart) and Sir 
Carl Berendsen, to discuss Pacific Island bases. Invite, along with regular 
members, a selected group of prospective Supporting Members. (A possible al- 
ternative to an Ickes meeting would be to have a half dozen former Navy offi- 
cers discuss the question, men who have seen service in the Pacific and are full 
of ideas. Miss Cora Du Bois at ORI or Miss Clare Holt could suggest people 
for this program.) John Usene and Lowell Hattery were mentioned, along 
with James Roosevelt. 

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, perhaps on some phase of the colonial question. 
(E. C. Carter to invite by cable after Eleanor Lattimore consults John Carter 
Vincent.) 

Clarence-Gauss on China ; Benjamin Gerig on trusteeships ; Clarence Ropes on 
the Soviet Far East. 

Other speakers under («), or under (&) following, might include: on .Tapan — 
Gen. Ken R. D,\ke, John Emmerson, or John Embree (May) ; on China — Michael 
Lindsey or Edwin A. Locke; on Mongolia — Mr. Cammon (ask through George 
Harris) ; on Thailand — Kenneth Landon or Howard Palmer (May). 

(b) Invitation luncheons (pay as you come) be arranged on other occasions 
if A-1 speakers and topics can be provided. Invited groups would include lead- 
ing editors, writers, and radio and news commentators. Purpose : Attract new 
members from this group and strengthen IPR's "good press." 

(c) New iitei'ature to be prepared, usable in Washington and other IPR 
centers, to help pave the way for showing membership prospects how IPR can 
serve them as it served the Government and regular members during and before 
the war. 

3. That the whole financial and membership campaign be integrated by and 
be made the responsibility of Mr. Pollard, with the immediate help of a List 
Committee (Mrs. Bolton, Mr. and Mrs. Graves, Mrs. Lattimore, Mr. Moffat, Mrs. 
Moorhead. Mrs. Ussachevsky) and a Program Committee (Mr. Barnett, Mr. W. D. 
Carter, Mr. Johnstone, and Mrs. Lattimore). 

4. That top sponsorship be provided by inviting Mr. Sumner Welles to be 
chairman of the Washington membership appeal ; and that other leading foreign- 
affairs personnel, in and out of the Government, be asked to lend their names 
and support also. 

A few such might include : 

Frances P. Bolton Eugene Mf^yer 

Mnrquis Childs Raymond Swing 

Helen Gahagan Douglas Elbert D. Thomas 

Herbert ETiston John Carter Vincent 

Walter Lippmann Henry A. Wallace 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2249 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Because of the desire to conclude today, instead of 
laboring this point, I simply leave it as a part of the record. (Hand- 
ing document to witness.) 

(After pause, witness and counsel reading document.) 

It seems that we gain nothing this way. We might as well read it. 

Senator Ferguson. It is pretty long. Let them read it. I think 
we can save time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Perhaps counsel can read it. 

Now, do you remember whether you knew, or do you now know, 
Mr. Arthur C. Bunce, B-u-n-c-e ? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified, I think, when you asked me — you helped 
my memory — that he was the economic man sent to Korea about the 
1st of January, some time in 1946. I don't recall the time. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember an article or dispatch transmitted 
from Mr. Bunce in his capacity as economic adviser criticizing both 
the military government and United States policy in Korea ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not recall it, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was a copy of that dispatch requested by Mr. 
Philip Lilienthal? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Requested by anyone connected with IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was a copy furnished pursuant to such a request? 

Mr. Vincent. I cannot testify, since I don't know about the incident. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you in the habit of furnishing information 
to Mr. Lilienthal? 

Mr. Vincent. I was not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To others in the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, you have already discussed Mr. Penfield, have 
you not? 

Mr. Vincent. James K. Penfield ; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask Mr. Mandel what this is 
a photostat of. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations of a letter dated September 3, 1946, to Mr. Philip E. 
Lilientlial from Arthur C. Bunce. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, as identified, 
may go into the record at this point. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 397 

Department of State, 
Office of Economic Advisee, 

September 3, 1946. 
Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. T. 
Dear Mr. Lilienthal : Your two letters of June 13 and June 22 were waiting 
for me when I returned from a brief trip back to Washington. If I had visited 
New Yorli, I was planned to call on you ; however, I did not have much time 
because I was recruiting civilians for Military Government in Korea and also 
for my staff. 

When my staff arrives, I may find time to write an article for you dealing more 
narrowly with economic matters. At present, I am too rushed trying to catch 
up with affairs occurring in my absence. The reason that my article was not 

22848— 52— pt. 7 17 



2250 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

acceptable for publication was that it criticized both Military Governments and 
United States policy as well as U. S. S. R. policies and programs. This was not 
felt to be desirable under the hope that the Joint Commission might reconvene. 
The article was sent to the Department as a despatch, however, and Mr. Vincent 
or Mr. Penfield might send you a copy for your own information if you asked them. 

In reply to your letter of August 20, I believe I can help you considerably. 
There is a large amount of unclassified material available in the War Department 
and in the State Department. This material covers the monthly reports from 
Military Government, all press releases, translations of Korea press comments 
and reports on public opinion trends. I am sure these could be made available 
to anyone making a study of Korea. 

A complete set of all unclassified materials has been sent to the Hoover Library 
of War Revolution and I'eace at Stanford University, and you should contact 
Dr. H. H. Fisher regarding the use of this material. The first lot was shipped 
August 8 and additional shipments will follow every three months. 

From your letter I was not sure whether you wanted materials available in 
the United States or in England. I have spoken to Mr. Carmode, the British 
Liaison OflScer, and he tells me that he has not been forwarding materials in bulk 
to London. It would, therefore, appear essential for the study to be made in the 
United States unless the Royal Institute asked Mr. Carmode through the Foreign 
Office to supply them with a complete set of documents. 

Mr. Sunages of the Public Information Division in the War Department is 
coming to Korea to see what further materials can be sent back to Washington 
in order that they may do a better job of informing the public about Korean 
affairs. I will show him your letter and ask him to do what he can to make 
materials available to you. 

In addition, I am asking that the Institute be placed on the mailing list for 
current materials and that any available back issues be forwarded to you. 
Sincerely yours, 

/s/ Arthur C. Bunce 

Arthur C. Bunce, Economic Adviser. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. You have had a number of questions about Solomon 
Adler. I don't think you have been asked this question in just 
this way. 

Do you now or did you ever know that he was a member of the 
Silvermaster spy group ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You took over from Mr. Dooman as head of the Far 
East Committee of SWNCC on the 1st of September, 1945; is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is the first time I acted as chairman of FE- 
SWNCC;yes, sir. 

Mr, Sour WINE. Who recommended your appointment to that post ? 

Mr. Vincent. The Secretary of State or Mr. Acheson ; I don't recall 
which. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You have testified you were called back from a 
vacation to take that job. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And that Mr. Acheson was the first one to speak 
to you about it ? 

Mr. Vincent. About the change. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I am hurrying along here, and if I seem to give in- 
adequate treatment to any of these, please stop me and expand as you 
think desirable. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, in the fall of 1946, prepare or supervise 
the preparation of a draft statement designed to be issued in case 
General Marshall should admit failure of his efforts to stop the civil 
war in China? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. It was drafted in my office. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2251 

Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate he was going to fail ? 
Mr. Vincent. In the fall of 1946, I did anticipate it, and others 

did, too. 

Senator Ferguson. How long after he had been out there did you 
anticipate that he was going to fail ? 

Mr. Vincent. Some time during the summer or early autumn of 
1946, I was afraid it was going to be a matter of failure, although I 
wouldn't want to say now that he was conscious he couldn't pull it out. 
But it looked like that then. 

Senator Ferguson. And he had been there how long then? 

Mr. Vincent. He had been there 9 months then. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you present, or were you instrumental in pre- 
senting, a draft of such a statement to Secretary Byrnes? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified that it would have been logical for 
me to present that draft. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did that draft recommend withdrawal of all aid 
to the Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refresh my memory. The draft is 
right here. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I wish you would, and I wish you would identify 
the draft, if it is to be found in the white paper, as the one you 
prepared. 

Mr. Vincent. It was prepared, as I say, in the Far Eastern Office, 
but in consultation, as my testimony was before, with Army people, 
with economic people. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We are talking now about a draft you prepared in 
the fall of 1946, if there was such a draft. Where is it to be found in 
the Wliite Paper? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, we are talking about the paper here. I have 
told you before that the thing was a matter of consultation with eco- 
nomic people and covers a wide range of subjects. It is a general 
review. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, the draft that is in here is not a draft which 
is identifiable as something which you prepared, is it? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't recall how many stages. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you identify that document in the white 
paper as the one that you prepared ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can identify it that this was the draft that was pre- 
pared. Wlien you speak of "draft," these things go through many 
drafts. 

Mr. Sour WINE. Let's identify what you have in the white paper 
first, and then I think we can clear it up with a few questions. What 
page ? Are you talking about document 63 on page 609 ? No ; I am 
in error. Which one are you talking about ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am talking about the document of December 18, 
1946. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Wliere does it appear ? 

Mr. Vincent. It appears on page 689. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Document No. 114 in the white paper, a statement 
by President Truman on United States policy toward China? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat is its date? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. December 18, 1946. 

Is that the one you are referring to ? 



2252 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. That is the one I am referring to. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, to what extent is that the outgrowth of frui- 
tion of any memorandum which you prepared in the fall of 1946, or 
any draft which you prepared in the fall of 1946 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have testified several times that the draft was a 
composite thing that was prepared. I don't know just what would be 
the fruition of drafts that were prepared and finally approved. 

Senator Ferguson. Does it refresh your memory ? 

Mr. Vincent. Does this? Yes. But you are speaking here of the 
draft that I prepared. What I am trying to get at is that this draft, 
by its very nature 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You did prepare a draft in the fall of 1946, didn't 
you? 

Mr. Vincent. Of this ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. No, no. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall that I personally prepared a draft. 
It was a composite 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you personally, in the fall of 1946, as early as 
October or earlier, prepare or supervise the preparation of a draft 
statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit 
failure of his effort to end the civil war in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall preparing the draft myself, but, yes, 
there was a draft prepared, in anticipation of this very thing that 
came out. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is what I was trying to get at. There was a 
draft prepared that early ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And it was in your office ? 
, Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you helped on it? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no doubt I helped on it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, did that draft subsequently become the docu- 
ment you have identified, document 114 from the white paper? 

Mr. Vincent. It became, in substance, the document here in the 
white paper, so far as I can recall. You are speaking of a draft 
now that was prepared in anticipation of this, and this was the thing 
that was prepared at the time we realized Marshall was coming home. 

Mr. Sourwine. We realize that the draft prepared in your division 
in October may have been thrown in the wastebasket, and this sub- 
stituted. Did that happen? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; not that I know of. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was the draft prepared in your office in fact dis- 
approved, rejected? 

Senator Ferguson. Or approved? 

Mr. Vincent. It may have gone through other drafts, and other 
drafts. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was the initial draft rejected? Or was it sent 
back for correction ? Or did it go along up ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall the exact process of what happened 
to the drafts, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Look at that document. Is that the substance 
of your draft ? So that we can move along. 

Mr. Vincent. It is the result of the thinking that was done in the 
Department, in the War Department, and in the Economic Division, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2253 

as to what should be done. This is the result of the thinking. Wliat 
form some of the earlier drafts took, I don't recall. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That was the point I was getting at. This original 
draft, the first one submitted, back in October, prepared in your office 
under your direction ; was that a draft which included a recommen- 
dation for withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know, without seeing the document, whether 
it recommended that or not, sir. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. You can't say whether that was recommended? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. &0URWINE. And you can't say whether that initial draft state- 
ment was in fact approved ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, 

Mr. SouR^VINE. Can you say whether that original draft statement 
was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
The whole drafting business was a matter of give and take. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have anything to do with the draft of 
President Truman's letter to Chiang in August of 1946? That is on 
page 652 in the White Paper, Document No. 86. 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly think that I participated in the 
drafting of that letter. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you approve it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What was referred to in the fifth paraairaph of 
that letter as the assassinations of distinguished Chinese Liberals at 
Kunming recently ? 

Mr. Vincent. It referred to an incident in Kunming at that time 
where certain Chinese Liberals and intellectuals had been removed 
and killed. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. "\'\'Tio were the intellectuals and liberals who were 
killed, assassinated? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have to refer to the files in the State De- 
partment. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were any of them Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. That I do not know, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know at the time whether any of them 
were Communists? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not know at the time whether any of them 
were Communists, not that I recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This was a pretty tough letter, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Vincent, Well, I don't know whether you would describe it 
as tough or not. It was drafted with the idea in mind of great dis- 
appointment over the failure or the apparent failure of General Mar- 
shall to achieve his objectives. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Look at the sixth paragraph, where it says : 

There is a increasing awareness, however, that the hopes of the people of 
China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reaction- 
aries who are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation by 
failure to understand the liberal trend of the times. 

What persons or groups were referred to there ? 

Mr. Vincent, What particular militarists were referred to I don't 
know. It would probably be such people as among the other groups ; 
what we called the Chen Li-f u clique. 

It would have been, we will say, Gen. Hoy Lee Chin, 



2254 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I am just speaking from memory now of what groups we had in 
mind there. They probably had figured in General Marshall's reports 
back of his mission and would be the groups that he himself had 
indicated to us in his telegrams he thought were interfering. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It refers to a small group of political reactionaries. 
Do you know who they were ? 

Mr. Vincent. I just referred to some of them as, we will say, the 
Chen Li-fu gi'oup. I can't identify any others at the moment; but 
it would have been groups. Because, mind you, this is all based on 
General Marshall's own attitude and own thought of what was hap- 
pening to his mission. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. You think there would have been any possibility 
that the Chinese Government construed this language as an intima- 
tion that the President of the United States regarded Chiang and 
his immediate surrounders as a small group of political reactionaries 
obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation ? 

Mr. Vincent. It could be so construed without the inclusion of 
Chiang. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Was it so intended ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was so intended to indicate that there were small 
groups. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it intended to indicate to him that Ms 
government was being criticized by this sentence ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was. And, as I say, based upon the disappoint- 
ment of the failure of not accomplishing the objective. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there a similar letter written to the head 
of the Communists criticizing them for not cooperating ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not think so, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Look at the last paragraph : 

It cannot be expected that American opinion will continue in its generous 
attitude toward your nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that 
genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal 
problems. Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the 
position of the United States to the people of America. 

How do you interpret that statement, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. I interpret that stateitient to mean it is critical of the 
failure for them to get along, that Chiang Kai-shek, at that time, 
according to General Marshall's report, was himself, or his Govern- 
ment, responsible for the breakdown of the truce negotiations. 

The truce negotiations had broken down, and it was the general 
feeling of Marshall and the rest of us that the responsibility for the 
reopening of the civil war at that time was with the National Govern- 
ment, more than it was with the 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The President is saying there, is he not, "I hold 
you and your Government respo^ sible for the failure to effect an 
agreement with the Communists and if the agreement is not effected 
pretty quick, I am going to tell the American people that that is the 
fact." 

Mr. Vincent. That was that the American people would have to 
know the facts, and which finally was drawn up in the September 18 
memorandum. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you or did you know Arthur Behrstock ? 

Mr. Vincent. Arthur who ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Behrstock, B-e-h-r-s-t-o-c-k. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2255 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir, not that I recall. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. A former chief of the Planning Section, -Civil In- 
formation and Education, Tokyo. 

Mr. Vincent. I have no recollection of knowing him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He never worked with you at any time? 

Mr. Vincent. Not at any time that I know of. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember making an address at Cornell 
University on or about January 21, 1947 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is the approximate time I made it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, in the course of that address, state that it 
would be advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or influT 
ence on the side of the status quo in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I made that speech from notes, and I think I have 
testified that I do not recall what I said in that speech. 

Mr. Sourwine. I have here a clipping of an Associated Press dis- 
patch date-lined Ithaca, N. Y., January 22, and reading: 

John C. Vincent, head of the State Department Far Eastern Division, declared 
tonight that the United States should avoid relying on a preservation of the 
status quo in China and other areas. 

In an address at Cornell University, Mr. Vincent said, "We should use strength 
for our security on short-term expedience. There will be times" he said, "When in 
the short view it will seem advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or 
influence on the side of the status quo. Such a course," he added, "might prove 
short-sighted because it would fail to encourage progressive elements," 

Do you think that is a fair report of your speech at Cornell, sir, 
so far as it goes? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I would say that is a fair report of the speech. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think you were accurately quoted, to the 
extent that you were quoted ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I think I was accurately quoted. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you, in that speech, advising against throwing 
the weight of the United States and its influence on the side of the 
status quo in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not have China particularly in mind there. 
That was a generalized statement, and status quo, from my point of 
view, was economic as well as political. 

It had to do with the areas of southwest Asia, where the colonial 
areas are, there. It was just a general philosophical approach to the* 
problem that a continuation of the status quo, in the sense of not having 
progress, which is very clear there, was not good for the defense of 
the United States. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you include China in your thinking in that 
connection? 

Mr. Vincent. The idea was directed primarily on the idea of South- 
east Asia. But the status quo in China would have possibly had the 
same connotations there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was it clear in your own mind that you did not 
intend to advocate that we should not throw our weight or influence 
on the side of the status quo in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, it depends on what you speak of as the status 
quo. 

Mr. Sourwine. The status quo was Chiang, was it not? 
Mr. Vincent. We recognized the Government of Chiang Kai-shek, 
but we were at that time still working, or Marshall had gone there 



2256 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

with the very idea of assisting the Chinese in working out a coalition 
government, after adopting a constitution. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I do not mean to argue with you. I am simply 
trying to find out whether you included China in your advice there, 
with regard to our not supporting the status quo, or whether it was 
clear in your own mind that you did not include China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not include the National Government of China 
as something that was to be overthrown, if that is your implication. 
But certainly our own policy at that time was to assist the Chinese 
in bringing about a more progressive situation, both in the economic 
as well as in the political field, to adopt a constitution. 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Excuse me, sir. 

Mr. Vincent. Go ahead, I am through. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember making a speech before a luncheon 
session of the thirty -third annual foreign trade commission on Novem- 
ber 12, 1946? 

Mr. Vincent. National Foreign Trade Council ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The Annual Foreign Trade Convention, I believe. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I know the speech you have in mind. It is 
the one on November 12 ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I remember making a speech. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember in that speech stating : 

What is unsound for private capital is \insound for government capital. It 
is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is wide- 
spread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is wasting 
its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war 
exists, where tendencies toward government monopolization exclude American 
business, or where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling, 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I am just reading it here. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes. That was at a luncheon meeting at which 
Ambassador Wellington Koo was present, is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. Ambassador Wellington Koo, as I recall it, also spoke^ 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He followed you, is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. Whether he came first or I came first, I think he was 
the main speaker. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you happen to have there the text of that 
address ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do. 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Would you offer it for the record? 

Mr. Vincent. I would. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you want that copy back ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not particularly. I can get plenty more of them. 

Mr. SotJRWiNE. May this go into the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397A," and 
is as follows:) 

American Business With the Fae East 

(Address by Mr. John Carter Vincent. Director of Far Eastern Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State, before the Thirty-third Convention of the National Foreign 
Trade Council, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, Tuesday, November 12, 
1946, at 2 : 00 p. m.. E. S. T.) 

American business with the Far East began 162 years ago. The Empress of 
China, out of New York, put into Canton on August 30, 1784, after making a 
tortuous six-month voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The vessel's cargo, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2257 

made up of furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, was exchanged at Canton for tea, silk, 
and chinaware. The total investment in the venture was $120,000. The pro- 
moters cleared $30,000. This was good business ; it was private enterprise ; and 
it was mutually beneficial. I hasten to say here that I do not actually know 
how much the Chinese made out of the furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, but having 
had some knowledge of Chinese businessmen, I still think I am safe in saying 
that the benefit was mutual. 

In the course of the 19th century American business with the Far East ex- 
panded. Gradually our trade extended to other portions of the Far East : Japan, 
Korea, the Philippines, Siam, and adjoining areas of Southeast Asia. Through- 
out this period American trade with the Far East was based on sound business 
considerations. We asked for no concessions or special rights ; nor were our 
business dealings based upon exploitation associated with political privilege or 
pressure. 

During the 19th century the basic factor in our close ties with the Far East 
was trade. Our early treaties with China and Japan were framed largely with 
American business in mind. After the Spanish-American War and our assump- 
tion of territorial responsibilities in the Pacific, notably in the Philippines, politi- 
cal and strategic factors gained weight, but on into the 20th century commercial 
and cultural considerations were still to the fore in shaping our policies toward 
the Far East. Our enunciation of the Open Door and our insistence on non- 
discriminatory and most-favored-nation treatment were motivated largely by a 
desire to promote American business and expand international trade relations. 

In his radio address last month Secretary Byrnes gave voice to traditional 
American trade policy in the following words : 

"The United States has never claimed the right to dictate to other countries 
how they should manage their own trade and commerce. We have simply urged 
in the interest of all peoples that no country should make trade discriminations 
in its relations with other countries." 

By 1936 our foreign trade or business with the Far East was valued at close to 
one billion dollars. In the 20-year period from 1915-35 the Far East's share of 
our total exports increased from 5 percent to 16 percent. In 1936 our total direct 
investments in tlie Far East amounted to roughly $335,000,000. 

In making this brief sketch, I have in mind a recent tendency toward taking an 
unbalanced viewpoint of our role in the Far East. Political and military con- 
siderations, as important as they are, seem to me to occupy a disproportionate 
share of present public attention. It is accepted that an all-important objective 
of our policies is to provide for the security of the United States and the mainte- 
nance of international peace, but I think we also have another objective of 
equal importance ; that is, to bring about in the relations between ourselves 
and other states mutually beneficial commercial and cultural exchanges which 
will promote international welfare and understanding. 

These are interrelated objectives. I feel strongly that we cannot be success- 
ful in achieving the kind of security we want, or in maintaining the kind of 
peace we want, unless we take an active and leading part in international com- 
mercial and cultural life. I will go further and say that a strong element in 
our security, and in the maintenance of peace, will be the development of com- 
mercial and cultural ties with other peoples. 

At the same time, it is my conviction that a strong national defense is essential 
to the pursuit of our broader objective of developing commercial and cultural 
relations. We must be equal to the task of encouraging and supporting democ- 
racy and progress. There may be times and occasions when, in the short view, 
it will seem advantageous to our security to throw our weight or influence on the 
side of the status quo ; on the side of those forces calculated to bring about 
immediate or early stability. But history, I believe, will show that strength lies 
on the side of progress. 

In Chicago last April the President said : 

"In the Far East, as elsewhere, we shall encourage the growth and the spread 
of democracy and civil liberties. * * * The roots of democracy, however, will 
not draw much nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic 
distress. It is a part of our strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabili- 
tation and development of the Far Eastern countries." 

Today we are faced with the problem of a return of American business to the 
Far East under conditions which are, to state it mildly, uninviting. Japan is 
a defeated country whose economy must perforce remain under Allied control 
for some time to come. Korea is a liberated country split in half at parallel 38 
between us and the Russians. In China internal strife seriously retards steps 



2258 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

toward economic recovery. In the independent Philippine Republic we are faced 
with a new situation, to which we must adjust ourselves. In Indochina and 
Indonesia a return to normal trade conditions awaits a solution of problems 
presented by the self-governing aspirations of the peoples in those countries. In 
Siam — well, Siamese in Washington tell me that they will be glad to do business 
with any or all of you who will show an interest in their country. 

But the over-all picture is not encouraging and it is not my intention to dress 
it up in attractive colors. In the brief time allotted me I want to say something 
of what we are doing in the various areas of the Far East to brighten the outlook. 

General MacArthur has demilitarized Japan, but it is impossible to proceed 
with plans for postwar Japanese economy until some decision is i-eached with 
regard to the amount and types of industry that Japan vpill be allowed to retain 
and the amount that is subject to removal as reparations. We have reason to 
hope that a decision on the problem of reparations will be reached before the 
end of this year. Our main purpose shall be to achieve a healthy balance in 
Far Eastern economy for the benefit of commerce in the Far East and at the 
same time to insure the effective industrial disarmament of Japan. 

As you know, Japanese overseas trade is controlled on a government-to- 
government basis. An Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan was recently estab- 
lished by the Far Eastern Commission at the request of the United States. Its 
purpose is to advise on the disposition of Japanese exports and on sources of 
Imports. 

Among the present obstacles to a change-over to private trading are in inflated 
and unstable currency and the inadequacy of transport and communications 
facilities. Although it is not possible to say how soon these obstacles can be 
overcome, I might hazard the guess that a resumption of private trade with 
Japan will be possible some time during the latter half of next year, possibly 
sooner. 

In Korea, we are now estopped from putting into operation an over-all economic 
plan by the inability of the Russians and ourselves to reach agreement on a 
unified administration for the coimtry. We want a united Korea and we want 
to assist the Koreans toward self-government and independence. But while we 
continue our efforts to bring about a resumption of discussions in the Joint 
Soviet-American Commission, we cannot mark time. Therefore, we are taking 
measures to improve economic conditions in southern Korea and to bring Koreans 
more and more directly into the administration of their country. In doing so, 
however, we do not lose sight of the fact that a united self-governing Korea 
is the goal we are determined to achieve. 

From what I have said it will be apparent to you why private trading in 
Korea is not now feasible. But the development of a healthy trade relationship 
between Korea and Allied nations is our aim, and consideration is now being 
given to measures which may soon make possible limited trade relations between 
Korea and private business concerns. We hope that Ajnerican business wiU 
take an active interest in Korea. 

Foremost among the problems facing the Philippines is reconstruction. Con- 
gress has approved two measures: the Philippine Rehabilitation Act and the 
Philippine Trade Act of 1946. 

The Rehabilitation Act authorizes a grant of $620,000,000 for the payment 
of war claims of private property holders, for various rehabilitation and train- 
ing projects, and for purchase of surplus property. In addition. Congress has 
authorized a loan of $75,000,000 to the Philippine Government to enable it to 
meet a serious budgetary situation. 

The Rehabilitation Act authorizes a grant of $620,000,000 for the payment of 
war claims of private property holders, for various rehabilitation and training 
projects, and for purchase of surplus property. In addition, Congress has au- 
thorized a loan of $75,000,000 to the Philippine Government to enable it to meet 
a serious budgetary situation. 

The Philippine Trade Act provides that the Philippines shall continue to 
enjoy free trade with this country for a period of 8 years, after which a grad- 
uated tariff will apply until full duties are levied at the end of 20 years. 

We expect to cooperate with the new Republic in meeting the manifold prob- 
lems facing it as an independent state. It may be anticipated that, with a 
return to more normal conditions, the Philippines will again represent a sub- 
stantial and expanding market for American products. 

From the standpoint of business, the areas of Southeast Asia have been of 
interest to the United States primarily as a source of supply for such products 
as rubber, tin, and petroleum. Because of our large purchases of these items 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2259 

our prewar trade was in a chronic state of imbalance, our sales in most years 
being only about one-tenth of our purchases. 

You may recall a recent press statement by the Under Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs, Mr. Will Clayton, to the effect that the United States 
should give greater support to foreign investments of its nationals in strategic 
minerals that are in short supply. This statement has a special application to 
the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Far East generally, as sources of supply 
of a number of strategic and critical materials. Investment along the lines 
proposed by Mr. Clayton should have the effect of increasing the importation of 
American materials into the areas concerned. 

Last but far from least we have China. 

We have signed with China a comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation. Most-favored-nation treatment is provided for individuals and 
corporations. 

The Treaty is somewhat broader in scope than existing United States commer- 
cial treaties in a number of respects. For instance. Article 19 provides for fair 
and equitable treatment as regards the application of exchange controls and 
Article 20 embodies certain commitments with regard to monopolies. It is de- 
signed to meet the needs of present-day commercial relations with China. 

China is expected to collaborate in the establishment of the proposed Interna- 
tional Trade Organization and is one of the "nuclear" countries which have 
agreed to negotiate for the reduction of trade barriers. China will also be urged 
to enter into other multilateral economic conventions having as their objectives 
a promotion of international trade and the solution of international commercial 
problems through consultation and collaboration. Constant effort is being made 
to discourage other countries, including China, from adopting temporary measures 
in the fields of tariffs, trade barriers, and other domestic legislation of a type 
which might jeopardize the successful attainment of this long-range economic 
collaboration. 

Restoration of stability and direction in Chinese economy is retarded by the 
unhappy politico-military situation. The press, I feel, has made abundantly 
clear to you the ups and downs of General Marshall's mission. The National 
Assembly is scheduled to meet in Nanking today for the purpose of considering 
a constitution and reaching certain political decisions in regard to government 
organization. General Marshall hopes, and so do we, that wise counsels — the 
wisdom of China — will prevent the disaster of continued civil discord. Chinese 
economy and the Chinese people are already suffering acutely from the ravages 
of 8 years of Japanese aggression and occupation. They cannot stand much 
more adversity. 

Premier Soong has been reported recently as stating that upwards of 80 per- 
cent of China's expenditures are diverted to military purposes. Because of the 
wide gap between revenues and expenditures China has had to resort to large 
note issues with the inevitable result of accelerating inflation and a progressive 
rise in prices. The foreign exchange that might normally be expected to accrue 
from exports has been negligible in the relation to outgo for imports. Conse- 
quently China's current balance of payments position has continued to 
deteriorate. 

The exchange and foreign trade regulations adopted by China, UNRRA's relief 
and rehabilitation program, and surplus sales and enemy property disposals are 
only temporary palliatives. The Chinese must resolve the present political im- 
passe before any substantial improvement can be expected in China's economic 
situation. 

In this connection I think it worth while to mention what I feel has been in 
some quarters a misinterpretation of General Marshall's mission as being solely 
political in its objective. Chinese econcny is in a vicious circle. General Mar- 
shall is fully aware of this state of afifaij ■ and it has been his purpose to encour- 
age the Chinese to break the vicious ci cle by reaching a political settlement 
that would result in a cessation of civil strife and make possible a revival of 
economic activity. Sooner or later this must be done, and be done by the Chinese. 

Military measures will not accomplish an enduring settlement. That is why 
General Marshall has advocated with such persistency settlement by the demo- 
cratic method of negotiation and agreement. 

In making this brief sketch of current conditions in the Far East I cannot be 
accused of optimism. But I do think the potentialities of an expanding Ameri- 
can business with the Far East exist and can be developed if we go about it in 
the right way. This brings me to a thought which I would like to express and 



2260 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

emphasize. When I use the term "American business" I have in mind all Ameri- 
can business irrespective of whether it has a private, semiofficial, or official 
character. I do not believe that we can have one standard for private business 
and another standard for official business. 

A recent editorial in the New York Times states that our Government should 
base a loan policy upon the important principle "that loans are not gifts, and that 
any country applying for a loan must furnish, like any prospective private bor- 
rower, convincing proof that by virtue of its political, economic, and trade poli- 
cies it is a good credit risk." 

Generally speaking, what is unsound for private capital is unsound for Gov- 
ernment capital ; that is, for the taxpayers' money. I believe it is unsound to 
invest private or public capital in countries where there is wide-spread corrup- 
tion in business and official circles, where a government is wasting its substance 
on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists, whei-e ten- 
dencies toward government monopolization exclude American business, or where 
undemocratic concepts of government are controlling. 

In expressing the foregoing views, I do not of course ignore the advantages of 
cooperation between government finance and private trade or the fact that there 
are fields for the investment of government capital into which it is not feasible 
or attractive for private capital to venture. I have in mind large-range and 
long-term projects, which are basic in character and are fundamentally sound 
from the standpoint of the economy of the country. 

Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden stated some weeks ago in Chicago 
that "the purpose of lending should be to create a net increment to the economy 
of a borrowing country. Therefoi'e, he went on to say, "loans should not be 
made if they enable another government to acquire or dis^ilace existing efficient 
free enterprises, whether they be American in ownership or not." 

In stressing the economic and trade features of our position in the Far East, 
I do not wish to give the impression that I am overlooking other factors. In this 
complicated world in which we are living we must give full consideration to the 
interrelation of the political, cultural, economic, and security factors in our for- 
eign policy. For our policy to be effective there must be harmony among all these 
factors — the teamwork we find in a good basketball team or a fine string quartet. 

The President, in establishing the Committee for Financing Foreign Trade, 
said: "* * * j am anxious that there shall be fullest cooperation between 
governmental agencies and private industry and finance. Our common aim is 
return of our foreign commerce and investments to private channels as soon as 
possible." 

I look upon this statement as a recognition of and a challenge to American 
business. I am in Washington to do my part in carrying out the cooperation of 
which the President speaks. Please call on me if I can be of help to you in meet- 
ing the challenge. 

Mr, SouRWiNE. In discussing that speech, sir, do you recall that 
the newspapers regarded that speech, and particularly the portion 
which I read, as being directed at China ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; some of the newspapers so interpreted it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it so intended ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was intended to be a generalized statement which 
would include China as well. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. You were simply stating, in general, certain truths 
about policies ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was stating in general my attitude toward a general 
situation, which was the conditions under which you wouldn't in- 
vest capital. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I want to take just a few minutes to analyze that 
statement that I read. You said what is unsound for private capital 
is unsound for government capital; is that right? You may use 
this [handing document]. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, do you not think that other factors should 
enter into government expenditure or investment than the factors 
which enter into private expenditure or investment ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2261 

Mr. Vincent. I think there was a following statenient right after 
the one you have quoted. Would you repeat your question ? 

Mr. SoTjRWiNE. You said what is unsound for private capital is un- 
sound for government capital ; did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, I ask you, do you not think that other factors 
should enter into government expenditure or investment than the 
factors which enter into private expenditure and investment? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; I do. But for a political reason. I am speak- 
ing 'here before a bunch of businessmen on the matter of investment 
of capital. This is a business meeting I was speaking at, and to my 
mind, if you will take it as a general statement, it was sound, that the 
government capital should not go into unsound investment. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were talking about government capital as 
against private capital ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you said what is unsound for private capital 
is unsound for government capital ? 

Mr. Vincent. I still think that is true, unless there are political ob- 
jectives to be attained, and then I would not call it investment, I 
would call it political assistance, such as the loans to Greece and 
Turkey. 

Mr. Sourwine. You recognize that there might be political con- 
siderations that would make a difference ? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly do. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, dollars are frequently used as 
instruments of policy or economic warfare by this country ? 

Mr. Vincent. They certainly are. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think we have made investments or loans 
to countries where, at the time, it was unsound policy to make invest- 
ments ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think we have. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has it been the policy of .the State Department to 
recommend against such loans or policies in all cases, as a matter of 
principle ? 

Mr. Vincent. Would you repeat the question? 

Mr. Sourwine. Has it been the State Department practice or policy 
to recommend against such loans or advances in all cases, as a matter 
of principle? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall; no, sir. The State Department, 
where there is a political objective to be attained — that is what the 
State Department would do — such as making advances to Greece or 
Turkey. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, would you not say now, that it 
is often entirely sound for Government capital to be invested in a place 
where the investment of private capital would be unsound? 

Mr. Vincent. Not from a businessman's point of view, and here 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you speaking up there as a businessman or as 
an official of the State Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I was speaking to businessmen and trying to lay down 
what I thought were certain general ideas that would guide the in- 
vestment of capital on the part of the taxpayer without any political 
connotations. 



2262 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You think you made that clear in the speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, you said it is unsound to invest the private or 
public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in 
business and official circles, is that correct ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You think that was true? 

Mr. Vincent. I certainly think it was true. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you want to qualify that statement now in any 
way ? Do you still think it is true ? 

Mr. Vincent. That it is unsound to invest 

Mr. Sourwine. It is unsound to invest private or public capital 
in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and 
-official circles. 

Mr. Vincent. I think, as a general statement, it is quite true. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has the United States ever invested public capital 
in loans or grants, or in any other form of assistance, in any such 
country ? 

Mr. Vincent. I can't recall where you would make that description 
of the country. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you say that, in your opinion, in all of the 
countries to which the United States has provided military or economic 
assistance, loans, grants, or otherwise, they were countries where there 
was no corruption in business or government circles ? 

Mr. Vincent. I couldn't say ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time, what countries were you refer- 
ring to? 

Mr. Vincent. I was making a generalized statement about the 
whole Far East, which would have included China, northeast Asia, 
Japan. 

Senator Ferguson. And any other countries ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, the Philippines are in the Far East. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said it is unsound to invest private or public 
capital in countries where a government is wasting its substance on 
excessive armament; is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. What country were you referring to in that? 

Mr. Vincent. I am referring to just a general — I am making a gen- 
eralized statement, and that would have applied, as you will see earlier 
in this dispatch, where the Chinese were using at least 80 percent of 
their entire budget in military expenditures. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you hold to that statement as true, that it is 
unsound to make public or private investments in countries where a 
government is wasting its substance on excessive armament? 

Mr. Vincent. If you will define the word, and remember I am 
speaking to businessmen as a matter of investment, and I am trying 
to make clear that this was a matter of investment of capital rather 
than the use of capital for political objectives ■ 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you made it clear in the speech? 

Mr. Vincent. Speaking to businessmen, I think they would have 
accepted it, that I was speaking of investment. 

Ml". Sourwine. What percentage of the total national income may a 
government spend for armament for the purpose of resisting, or pre- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2263 

paring to resist, Communist aggression without reaching the point of 
wasting its substance on excessive armament ? 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know. 

Mr. Sourwine. What percentage of its total national income does 
this Government spend on armament, present and past wars, do you 
know ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no figure that comes to my mind. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any idea ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to guess what it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there any absolute standard with regard to what 
is wasting substance on excessive armament, or does it make a dif- 
ference what the armament is for ? 

Mr. Vincent. It would make a considerable difference as to what 
the armament was for. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you consider that factor, of what the armament 
was for, in connection with this speech ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. Again, I was speaking of a generalized situa- 
tion; I was generalizing here. The whole objective of this was, as 
I say, a speech before an American businessman, laying down certain 
general principles, and I did not have in mind political objectives or 
a political situation. 

Senator Ferguson. What was it, just a speech to please these busi- 
nessmen ? 

Mr, Vincent. This speech ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I would like for you to read the whole speech. 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking you, was that the purpose ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was to respond to a group of American business- 
men called the National Foreign Trade Council. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you say it to please them ? 

Mr. Vincent. Most speeches are made with the idea of pleasing, 
but it was supposed to give some general ideas that I had. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were speaking on policy as a State Department 
official, were you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't call this policy. 

Mr. Sourwine. You stated that it is unsound to invest private or 
public capital where the threat or fact of civil war exists; is that 
right? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. SouR'sviNE. Do you think that is' a true statement ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think it is a true statement, when you consider 
that you are speaking of investment of capital, private or public. 

I am not now speaking of whether you might want to use political 
loans or other kind of loans that the Government would give. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, this Government does not have a policy of 
making investments for profit in foreign nations, does it? 

Mr. Vincent. Not for profit, but the Export-Import Bank, for in- 
stance, makes advances to countries, which you would call investment. 

Mr. Sourwine. For what purpose ? 

Mr. Vincent. For the specific purpose of promoting trade or de- 
velopment projects. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was the Export-Import Bank in existence in 1946 ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was. 



2264 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And were you referring, then, to the Export-Import 
Bank when you made this statement? 

Mr. Vincent. Not specifically ; no. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was there any other agency of the United States 
Government that invested public funds in a comparable manner ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, you could not have been talk- 
ing of the investment of public funds for profit in the same sense 
that private funds would be invested when you used the term "invest- 
ment of public funds," could you ? 

Mr. Vincent. Other than, we will say, like the Export-Import Bank 
would make funds available. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The investment of public funds necessarily connotes 
a public purpose; does it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The two are inseparable ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; that is true. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So you stated that the investment of public funds is 
unsound where the threat or fact of civil war exists ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you recall any nations to which the United 
States Government has extended economic or militaiy aid at a time 
when the threat or fact of civil war existed in that nation ? 

Mr. Vincent. Greece, for instance. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yugoslavia? 

Mr. Vincent. But that was an appropriation in Congress, it was 
not an investment. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did the State Department recommend against that 
appropriation? 

Mr. Vincent. The State Department recommended for it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think it was not an investment? 

Mr. Vincent. It was an investment from the standpoint of invest- 
ment in policy. But it was not an investment from the standpoint of 
businessmen's idea of investments. 

Mr. Sourwine. But you have stated that in connection with public 
funds there could not be investments from the businessmen's stand- 
point ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I said that the Export-Import Bank could make 
investments, not for profit. 

Mr. Sourwine. But for a public purpose? 

Mr. Vincent. For a public purpose, but governed by sound business 
principles. 

Mr. Sourwine. How about Yugoslavia? 

Mr. Vincent. That is true. We recently made an investment in 
Yugoslavia, as I recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that unsound? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. How about Korea ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Was that unsound ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said it was unsound to invest public or private 
capital where tendencies toward government monopolization excludes 
American business. Is that right? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2265 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know of any country today where tenden- 
cies toward Government monopolization exclude American business ? 

Mr. Vincent. You have just mentioned Yugoslavia, I don't know 
whether they exclude American business, but I can't imagine American 
business can get into Yugoslavia. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any such tendency in Iran ? 

Mr. Vincent, I am not familiar with conditions in Iran. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have we aided Iran? 

Mr. Vincent. We have. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any such tendency in Egypt ? 

Mr. Vincent. Of Government monopolization ?, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Where tendencies toward Government monopoliza- 
tion exclude American business. 

Mr. Vincent. I am not familiar with conditions in Egypt. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is there any such tendency in Great Britain ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not toward Government monopolization, I shouldn't 
say. Well, Government monopoly, yes, of the industries. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have aided Egypt, have we not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. We have aided Great Britain ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You said it was unsound to invest public capital 
where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling. Is that 
still true ? 

Mr. Vincent. You have just mentioned that we have invested 
money in Yugoslavia, so it is not still true. I don't think you can 
apply this paragraph 

Mr. Sourwine, But it might be true, we still are making unsound 
investments? 

I am asking whether you think it is still true, or whether you 
changed your mind about it ? 

Mr. Vincent. Again I say that I am not speaking of political loans 
in this particular paragraph, and the whole tenor of things now is 
along the lines, more than it was then, of making loans. 

We have had the Marshall plan — not loans but voting money. That 
was not in my mind in making this speech. 

Senator Ferguson, Could it be possible that you were just speaking 
of China ? 

Mr. Vincent, I was speaking generally about the Far East. But 
the application to China is very obvious from the thing. 

Senator Ferguson. And it is not true that you, in this State Depart- 
ment memorandum, it was your idea since the Marshall mission had 
failed in China, that there was going to be no more aid ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And could that be the reason for making this 
speech, right about that time ? Was it not that reason ? 

Mr. Vincent. It was in line with that policy ; yes. 
, Mr. Sourwine. You knew at the time, or right after the speech 
had been made that it was widely interpreted in the press as directed 
at China, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you do anything at that time to correct that 
misconception, if you thought it was a misconception ? 

22848— 52— pt. 7 18 



2266 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No, I did not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You have testified at length about Israel Epstein, 
have you not, and your lack of knowledge of him ? 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't testified at length. I don't know Israel 
Epstein, haven't read his book. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you know that he wrote a book called The Un- 
finished Eevolution in China ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had heard that he did, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you read the book ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not, sir. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you ever have the manuscript of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever have a copy of it ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall ever seeing a copy of it. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Do you know whether a copy of that book was sent 
to you by someone in the IPR ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall their sending it to me, no. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you do anything at all to assist in the prepara- 
tion of that book; ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't have any recollection of doing any assisting 
in that, not to my knowledge and belief. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you call that book to General Marshall's atten- 
tion or direct it to his attention ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I might say now that I am asking questions based 
on exhibit No. 116, page 464, par. 2, before this committee, put in the 
record on August 15. 

Do you know whether General Marshall ever saw or read that book ? 

Mr. Vincent. I do not know that he ever saw it or read it, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see Owen Lattimore's review of the 
book? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeing his review. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Did you ever recall seeing a review of the book by 
Frederick Vanderbilt Field in The New Masses ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any other writing by Mr. Epstein ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I do not, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see or read an IPR publication Notes 
on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, I don't remember reading it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that that study had a supplement 
called "Labor in Nationalist China," by Julian R. Friedman ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I don't recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not Mr. Friedman call that to your attention ? 

Mr. Vincent. He may have, but I don't recall it. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have testified here fully with regard to your 
participation in the briefing of General Wedemeyer and his staff 
before they left for the Far East in July of 1947. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were named Envoy Extraordinary and Minis- 
ter Plenipotentiary to Switzerland in July of 1947? 

Mr. Vincent. That is when I took the oath of office ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who initiated your appointment as 
Minister to Switzerland? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2267 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Acheson. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You became a part of the United States delegation 
to the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information at 
•Geneva in 1948? 

Mr. Vincent. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Sourwt;ne. Did you ever know that an investigation had been 
made by a State Department investigator, an investigation of the 
IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir. 

Mr. Souhwine. I have asked you about that before, have I not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWTENE. Would you be surprised to learn that there had been 
such an investigation? 

Mr. Vincent. Investigations are carried on at all times. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. In view of the fact that you had never seen it, if 
there had been one and it was not sent to you, would not that surprise 
you a little? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, it would, if I had any connection with it at 
the time. But I don't know when the investigation you are speaking 
of took place. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I have here copies of, first, a letter 
addressed by the chairman of this committee to the Secretary of 
State under date of January 12, 1952, as follows. To save time, let 
me summarize this and then ask that both of these letters go into 
the record. I also have the reply of Mr. Humelsine under date of 
January 21. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received after you have summar- 
ized it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The chairman asked for a report submitted to the 
State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare of 
the State Department, an investigation of IPR, and the State Depart- 
ment reply indicates the existence of such an investigation, but says 
that, "The report in question contains investigative material of a 
confidential nature within the scope of the President's loyalty pro- 
gram, and hence is controlled by the President's directive of March 
13, 1948." 

(Letters referred to were marked "Exhibits 398 and 399" and are as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 398 

January 12, 1952. 
The Secretary of State, 
Department of State, 

Washington, D. C. 
My Dear Mr. Secretary : I am informed that in 1948 a report on the Institute 
of Pacific Relations was' submitted to the State Department as a result of the 
investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Department connected 
Avith its New York City office. 

In view of the fact that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee now has 
the Institute of Pacific Relations under study, the State Department findings 
€!hould be of considerable importance. We therefore make a formal request for 
a copy of this report. 

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated. 
Sincerely, 

Pat McCaeran, Chairman. 



2268 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 399 

January 21, 1952:. 
The Honorable Pat McCarkan, 

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. 
My Dear Senator McCarran : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 
January 12, 1952, to the Secretary in which you requested "a report on the 
Institute of Pacific Relations" which "was submitted to the State Department as 
a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Depart- 
ment connected with its New York City office." 

The report in question contains investigative material of a confidential nature 
within the scope of the President's loyalty program and hence is controlled by 
the President's directive of March 13, 1948, a copy of which is attached. 

In accordance with this directive, the Department must respectfully decline 
your request for a copy of the report and has referred your letter to the Office of 
the President. 

Sincerely yours, 

Oaeusle H. Humelsine. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not know about that at all, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not know about it. I was in Switzerland, 
and I have no recollection of it having been brought to my attention. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were not in Switzerland in January of 1952, 
at the time that this request was made ? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I was speaking — you said in 1948, and I told 
you I was in Switzerland in 1948. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Then I intended to ask if you knew about this re- 
quest and the State Department refusal. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know why the State Department concludes 
that this report contains investigative material of a confidential 
nature ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. This was an investigation of the IPR, by its terms ; 
would not that necessarily imply that that investigation of IPR con- 
cerned Government personnel ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't want to read any implication to the letter 
at all. I think it speaks for itself. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you familiar with the President's directive 
that they referred to there ? 

Mr. Vincent. The President's directive about loyalty files? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I haven't read it recently, but I know what it is. 

Mr. Sourwine. It concerns loyalty files of Government employees 
and officials, does it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. By its name I would think it does; but, as I say, I 
can't testify to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. This is in the record ; is it not ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; that is in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the State Department was 
making an investigation? 

Mr. Vincent. Of the IPR? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know a Mr. Clare ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge, I don't know a Mr. Clare. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you think the State Department would 
investigate the IPR? Have you any reasons for knowing? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2269 

Mr, Vincent. I haven't any reason for knowing why they investi- 
gated the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. You were a former trustee, were you not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they consult you about making an inves- 
tigation of the IPR? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that would lead you 
to believe that if the State Department did make an investigation it 
should be kept secret because it would disclose questions of loyalty 
as to State Department employees ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have no knowledge on that subject, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Vincent, you have discussed the notes that you 
prepared for the State Department on the Wallace mission. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you in those notes, or in any memorandum to 
the Department, refer to the fact that Mr. Wallace had sent a cable 
to the President from Kunming? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. I don't recall that that is in the notes at 
all, because the notes were prepared purely on the basis of the con- 
versation with Chiang. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you in any other memorandum to the Depart- 
ment refer to the Kunming cable ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge. You mean from China ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. At any time. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I would have referred to it after I got back to 
the Department, in some memorandum or other, probably, using it as 
a reference or background. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, then, you did write at least one memorandum 
about the Wallace trip other than the notes which are printed in the 
white paper? 

Mr. Vincent. That is not the way you put the question, sir. I 
wrote the memorandum of the conversations. 

What I said was that I had no recollection of any other memo- 
randum on the Kunming cable. But it is quite possible that the con- 
tents of the Kunming cable were referred to, or something in them 
in subsequent memoranda of other telegrams referring to that. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did not mention them in your notes that are 
printed in the white paper, did you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is, you did not mention the Kunming cable 
in those notes ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to find out if you did subsequently write 
a memorandum to inform the Department of the fact that the Vice 
President had sent a cable to the President from Kunming. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I do not recall doing that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any particular reason for wanting to 
keep the Department in the dark about that? 

_ Mr. Vincent. The Kunming cable had gone to the Department, 
sir, from Kunming. I am trying to get at what 

Mr. Sourwine. Did it go to the Department or to the President? 
_Mr. Vincent. Well, it was addressed to the President, but it cer- 
tainly would have been distributed to the Department. 



2270 rNTSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It would have been distributed to the Department t 

Mr. Vincent. That would be my assumption. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. So that you did not find it necessary to make any 
separate reference to it at all ? 

Mr. Vincent. I assumed that it would go to the Department. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. Well, is your testimony that, aside from the notes 
which are in the white paper, you made no other memorandum at all 
about the trip with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Vincent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We have discussed here already, sir, I believe, a 
number of basic Communist documents, and you were asked if you had 
read any of them. Do you remember that ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I will not go over them individually. The list in- 
cludes the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels; State and 
Revolution, by Lenin ; Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder, 
by Lenin ; Foundation of Leninism, by Stalin ; Problems of Commu- 
nism, by Stalin ; History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(Bolshevik), authored by the Central Committee of the CPSU; the 
Program of the Communist Internationale and Its Constitution. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and 
Semi-Colonies, a Resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the 
Comitern. You said you had seen none of them ; is that right ? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified that I had no recollection of reading any 
of them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And you had not seen the G-2 report on commu- 
nism? 

Mr. Vincent. It is the one that the chairman showed me? I had 
no recollection of seeing it. 

Mr. SotJRwiNE. Did you ever see the American Bar Association 
brief on Communism-Marxism-Leninism? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall seeing it, sir. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. This is a copy of it. 

Have you ever recalled seeing it in that format or any other format? 

Mr. Vincent. Not to my knowledge have I even seen it in this form. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It was printed previous to that time as part of th& 
proceedings of the American Bar Association, I believe, which would 
be a different format. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I don't recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever read any of the writings of Mao 
Tse-tung? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I don't recall reading it. 

Mr. Sourwine. I asked those questions, Mr. Chairman, because they 
go to the question of Mr. Vincent's knowledge of Communist docu- 
ments and, in that sense at least, to the question of his knowledge of 
Communist principles, aims, and objectives. 

It was not intended either as an implication that this committee 
felt he should have read those documents, or demands to know why 
he did not study communism, but simply to ascertain the fact of 
what information he had, as background ? 

When were you transferred to Tangiers, Mr. Vincent ? 

Mr. Vincent. The transfer came through, I think, in February,, 
but I didn't go until June. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2271 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Has anyone in the State Department ever ex- 
pressed an opinion to you as to why you were transferred to Tangiers? 

Mr. Vincent. No one expressed an opinion to me other than the — 
they expressed the opinion to me that Mr. Patterson was going to be 
assigned to Bern, and that I would have to leave. 

Senator Ferguson. You were named, were you not, as Minister to 
Switzerland ? 

Mr. Vincent. At that time, I was Minister to Switzerland. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but your appointment was sent up to the 
Senate. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, in 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. In 1947, as Minister to Switzerland? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was never approved ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir, it was approved, in 1947. I went to Switzer- 
land as Minister, and was there for 31/2 years. 

Senator Ferguson. You were named to some other post? Or were 
to be named to some other post ? 

Mr. Vincent. You are speaking of the statement that I was 
going to be named to Costa Rica as Ambassador ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Had you heard that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had heard that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you been consulted about it? 
• Mr. Vincent. I had been informed. I hadn't been consulted. I 
had been informed. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you named? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I was not named. 

Senator Ferguson. Your name was never sent to the Senate on 
that one ? 

Mr. Vincent. My name was never sent to the Senate. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Has anyone in the State Department ever ex- 
pressed an opinion to you as to why you were sent to Tangiers in- 
stead of to some other post ? 

Senator Ferguson. Or to Costa Rica ? 

Mr. Vincent. Let me see. I don't recall that they have. 

Senator Ferguson. There was no explanation, then? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, there was a great deal of press statement. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I am talking about the State Department 
or the Government. Did they ever tell you why you were not going 
to be sent to Costa Rica ? 

Mr. Vincent. They simply told me they were not going to send my 
name up for confirmation in the Senate, and I would go to Tangiers. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they say why ? 

Mr. Vincent. They did not say why, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Who is "they" ? 

Mr. Vincent. The Chief of Personnel. 

Senator Ferguson. Who would that be ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; not the Chief of Personnel. It would be Humel- 
sine. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any correspondence on that ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any cablegrams on it? 



2272 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. No. There was a telephone conversation with Hum- 
elsine. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat was the telephone conversation? 

Mr. Vincent. Hiimelsine simply telephoned me that I was going to 
be sent to Tangiers, asked me if I was prepared to go to Tangiers, and 
I said I was. He said that the Costa Rica appointment was off. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all he told you ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is all he told me. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not ask him why it was off? The 
ambassadorship was a much more important position than going to 
Tangiers, was it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, it was a more important job from the matter 
of title. But the Morrocan job is just as important. 

Senator Ferguson. There is a difference even in the salary, is there 
not? 

Mr. Vincent. There was no difference in salary. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Having achieved the rank of Minister, you retain 
that, do you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. In Tangiers. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, But you are a career foreign officer. Foreign Service 
officer, are you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. I am. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And having obtained the rank of Minister, you 
retain it as Minister ? 

Mr. Vincent. I remain a career Minister. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what I mean. 

Senator Ferguson. What is your pay ? 

Mr. Vincent. At the present, $15,000. 

Senator Ferguson. What would have been the pay as Ambassador? 

Mr. Vincent. $15,000. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you receive from Secretary Acheson a let- 
ter with regard to your appointment to Tangiers ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Or anyone else in the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I received my orders to go to Tangiers, formal orders. 
I never received a letter from anybody. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you get any communication from Mr. Acheson 
with regard to that matter, either before or after the fact ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you return to the United States from Tangiers 
on October 16, 1951 ? 

Mr. Vincent. 15, I think. But we will not quibble over that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you interviewed by reporters on that occa- 
sion ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes ; the reporters came to the boat. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you asked to comment on reports that you 
were returning to testify before this subcommittee ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you then state that you were not in any de- 
fensive position ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you then state to reporters that you would be 
willing to testify if you were asked to do so, but that you had not 
been invited and that you would not volunteei ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2273 

Mr. Vinson. That I don't recall, whether I said all that to them or 
not. The general idea was that I had already written to — let me 
finish this — I had already written, as you know, to Senator McCarran 
expressing my willingness to testify. 

Wliether I, at that time, said to these people that I was not going to 
ask to testify or not, I don't know. 

Senator Feeguson. You had already offered to testify ? 

Mr. Vincent. I had already offered ; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I hold here a newspaper story, an AP dispatch, 
and the particular clipping is from the Washington Star, and it is 
dated New York, October 16, AP. The headline is: "John Carter 
Vincent Back in United States — 'not on defensive'." 

John Carter Vincent, United States Minister to Tangiers, Morocco, charged 
with pro-Communist leanings by Senator McCarthy, returned yesterday on the 
liner Constitution and said he was "not in any defensive position." After con- 
ferring with a State Department official, he was asked about reports he was 
returning to testify at congressional hearings into internal security. "I am 
coming back strickly for a vacation after 4 years aboard," Mr. Vincent replied. 
Pressed further for comments on accusations that he was a Communist sympa- 
thizer, Mr. Vincent said, "I am not in any defensive position. I certainly 
would be willing to testify any time they wanted me to. I have not been asked 
yet, and I am not volunteering." 

Do you think that is an accurate report, sir ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, it is an accurate report of what I had in mind at 
that time. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not a fact ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; that was a fact. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not write to the Senator before that ? 

Mr. Vincent. I wrote to the Senator on September 7, expressing a 
willingness to appear before the committee. I had not at that time 
requested a hearing before the committee. 

Senator Ferguson. You say the willingness was different than a 
request. Did you ever request ? 

Mr. Vincent. I made the request to the committee on November 9. 

Mr. Sourwine. You did send a letter to Senator McCarran under 
date of November 9, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. I ask that that letter, Mr. Chairman, be inserted in 
record. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be inserted. 

(The letter referred was marked "Exhibit No. 400" and is as 
follows:) • 

Exhibit No. 400 

Department of State, 
Washington, November 9, 1951. 
The Honorable Pat McCarran, 

United States Senate. 
My Dear Senator McCarran : You may recall that I wrote to you on Septem- 
ber 7, 1951, from my post in Tangier in regard to Louis F. Budenz' testimony 
before your subcommittee on August 23, 1951. Budenz swore that from "official 
reports" he had received I was a member of the Communist Party. I assured you 
that I was not and never had been a Communist, that I had never worked in the 
interests of other than our own Government and people, and that, if you had 
any doubts on that score, I desired to appear before your committee. I have 
received no reply to my letter. 

On October 5, 1951, Budenz, still under oath, repeated his allegations before 
the subcommittee. 



2274 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I am now home on vacation and have had an opportunity to read the Budenz 
testimony. I am shoclied at the devious manner in which he attempted to support 
his false testimony. 

Convinced that establishment of the facts is essential in a democracy, I request 
and shall welcome an opportunity to meet with your subcommittee to testify 
publicly under oath. 

I must return to my post and official duties after Christmas and therefore 
would appreciate your arranging a public hearing before members of the sul>- 
committee some time this month or early in December. 

Believe me, this is not simply a matter of self-defense. The issue far tran- 
scends personal considerations. We cannot defend democracy with perfidy or 
defeat communism with lies. 
Sincerely yours, 

[s] John Carter "Vincent 
John Caeteb Vincent. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. That letter has been released by the State Depart- 
ment, has it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. It has. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Senator McCarran reply under date of 
November 16, 1951 ? 

Mr. Vincent. He did. I assume you have the date. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is that the text of his reply ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have it here. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I ask that this be inserted in the record at this 
point. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 401" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 401 

November 16, 1951. 
Mr. John Carter Vincent, 

Oifice of the Secretary of State, 

Department of State, Washington, D. C. 
My Dear Mr. Vincent : Your letter of November 9 has been forwarded to me 
here in the hospital. 

I would be happy to hear your testimony, but due to the fact that Congress 
is not in session it may be difficult to do it at the time you desire. I have, how- 
ever, advised my staff of your request, and please be assured that if it is at 
all possible your request will be carried out. 
Sincerely, 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I ask you if that letter was mailed to Senator Mc- 
Carran, the letter of the ninth, your letter of the ninth ? 

Mr. Vincent. I testified before, and it is still my recollection, that 
it was brought down here to the office of Senator McCarran by hand. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right. Did you at that* time know that 
Senator McCarran was ill in a hospital in Reno, Nev. ? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have any help in drafting that letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. In drafting this letter of the ninth ? 

Mr. Sour WINE. Of November 9. 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I had some help in drafting the letter. 

Mr. Sourwtne. Who helped you in drafting? 

Mr. Vincent. I made most of the draft myself, but the letter was 
drafted in the Legal Division of the State Department, there. 

Mr. Sour wine. Who originally suggested drafting that letter? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, myself. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. With whom did you discuss the letter before it 
was sent, other than the Legal Division of the State Department? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2275 

Mr. Vincent. With my own wife. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. With anyone else ? 

Mr. Vincent. Not that I recall, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you disclose to the Legal Division of the State 
Department that you knew Senator McCarran was in a hospital in 
Reno? 

Mr. Vincent. I didn't have to, sir. They knew it themselves. 

Mr. Sourwine. If they knew it and you knew it, why did you send 
the letter down here instead of sending it out to Reno? 

Mr. Vincent. As I testified before, I thought that this was the 
best place to get it, quickly, to his office, where he had a staff here 
and they would see that it was transmitted to him. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the release of 
this letter by the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You say you did ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir. The State Department released it with my 
knowledge. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you suggest the release of it, or did the 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. I suggested the release of it. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. Do you know when that release was decided upon? 

Mr. Vincent. No; I do not. 

Mr. Sourwine. It must have been decided on at least as early as 
the 17th, must it not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Wlien was it released ? 

Mr. Sourwine. The release was given to the press on the 17th for 
release on the 19th, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, it was. That would be a Saturday, I think it 
was. It was decided then 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right, to get the break in the Monday morn- 
ing papers. Is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had had it delivered here on the 9th, is that 
right? The date that it was written? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had delivered it to Senator McCarran's office 
here on the 9th, a letter, knowing that he was in a hospital in Reno, 
and on the 17th you were consenting to a release of a protest to the 
Senator's failure to answer your letter. Is that right? 

Mr. Vincent. I wouldn't call it a protest. It was my request to 
■appear before the committee. 

Mr. Sourwine. You think that the State Department release was 
not a protest against the failure to answer the letter? That is, the 
State Department release under the date of the 19th, which was handed 
to the press on the I7th? Was that not a protest against Senator 
McCarran's failure to answer your letter of the 9th? 

Mr. Vincent. I would not have qualified it as a protest. 

Mr, Sourwine. Did you see the State Department release ? (Pause.) 
Did you see that State Department release? 

Mr. Vincent. I saw the State Department release; yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not that release state, in effect, that your letter 
was being released because of the Senator's failure to answer it ? 



2276 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Vincent. I have forgotten. I didn't draft it. 

Mr. SotJRwiNE. You saw it, did you not ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You assented to whatever was in it?' 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I assented. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It was played up in the newspapers as a protest of 
the Senator's faikire to answer your demand to be heard, was it not? 

Mr. Vincent. It was, sir. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Did you not intend that it should be so played up f 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I did not intend for it to be so played up. But 
it was played up that way. 

What I wanted primarily to do was to put on notice the fact that 
I wanted to appear before the committee. Many people had asked' 
me, "Wliy don't you appear before the committee; why don't you 
appear before the committee ?" and I wanted it known that I had made 
a request. I don't like for it to be interpreted that it was a protest 
over the failure to release that. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you do not think it was so intended by either 
you or the State Department? 

Mr. Vincent. It was not intended as a protest against his failure 
to answer. It was intended by me to put on notice, through the papers, 
that I had made a request to appear before the committee. 

Now, it could be interpreted that way, as you have, too, but I am 
speaking quite frankly here that my idea was to respond to what 
was a general desire that I let it be known that I wanted to come 
before the committee. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you expect Senator McCarran to have an answer 
in your hands within a week after you delivered the letter here to his 
office, when he was in a hospital in Reno ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have told you before that I thought probably the 
staff here in his office could give an answer by telephoning him, and 
giving an answer. 

Mr. Sourwine. That the staff would answer that letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I suppose you thought that the staff would sign 
his name to it, too ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, that the staff would notify me that I could 
appear and set a time. But I thought that 10 days was a sufficient 
time. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you first learn of Mr. Budenz' testimony 
before this subcommittee on August 23 ? 

Mr. Vincent. I learned of it through the press in Tangiers, I 
should say, along the first week in September. 

Mr. Sourwine. And when did you learn of his testimony on August 
5? 

Mr. Vincent. Pardon me. What was the first ? 

Mr. Sourwine. He testified here twice, August 5 and August 23. 
Did you learn about his testimony on both occasions at the same 
time, or did you learn about it at two different times as it occurred, 
shortly after it occurred ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I don't know of the two, I don't know but 
two times that Budenz appeared before the committee, to my recollec- 
tion, August 23 and again October 5. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2277 

But you, 1 think, identified them both as August, August 5 and 
August 23. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. All right, if I am in error, when did you first learn 
about his testimony on October 5 ? 

Mr. Vincent. Let me see. Wlien I got back to the States, in 
November; November 15, 1 was told. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You did not learn about it until you got back to the 
United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I had no knowledge, as I recall it, because I had 
taken the boat on the 8th or 9th, and I did not know of the October 5, 
so far as I know. ' 

Senator Feeguson. Had any testimony been sent to you ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. In Tangiers ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You had never received any testimony? 

Mr. Vincent. No, I had never seen any of the records of this com- 
mittee. 

Mr. Morris. Or reports of the testimony ? 

Mr. Vincent. I think the first time was reports in the press. 

Senator Ferguson. Just press reports ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. I had nothing from the State Department, 
unless there was something in the State Department bulletin at one 
time. But my recollection is that I saw it in the press. 

Senator Ferguson. When was his arrival ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. His arrival here was October 15. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, from October 15 to November 9, you did 
not make any request ? 

Mr. Vincent. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear that Senator McCarran, 
the chairman of this committee, went to the hospital ? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, if you would identify the date, I would say 
I heard of it, reading in the papers, the day it was announced. I have 
forgotten the date that he went to the hospital. 

Senator Ferguson. How long before you wrote the letter of the 9th 
did he go to the hospital ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would say it had been very few days before. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think now that the fact that he went 
to the hospital had anything to do with your writing of that letter? 

Mr. Vincent. Nothing whatsoever, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Nothing whatsoever? 

Mr. Vincent. Nothing whatsoever. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not considered ? 

Mr. Vincent. That was not considered. It was already decided 
to send the letter before we knew that he had gone to the hospital. 
I had. 

Senator Ferguson. You had. Had the Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. The State Department did not make the decision. 
I made the decision. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not talk to them about it until after you 
knew he had gone to the hospital, did you ? 

Mr. Vincent. If you would identify when he went to the hospital — 
I have forgotten. 



2278 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRwiNE. From your own memory. 

Mr. Vincent. That I did not talk with them until after he had 
gone to the hospital ? Yes, I talked with them before he went to the 
hospital. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. About the matter of the release of this letter ? 

Mr. Vincent. Also about the release of the letter, and the drafting 
of the letter. I can assure you that the release of the letter and the 
drafting of the letter did not have anything to do with Senator 
McCarran going to the hospital. 

Mr. Morris. Did it have anything to do with the fact that the Senate 
was out of session, even though at the original timfe when the Senate 
was in session you said you were not requesting a hearing ? 

Mr. Vincent. It had nothing to do with the fact that the Senate wels 
out of session. 

Senaor Ferguson. Whom did you discuss it with in the State De- 
partment ? 

Mr. Vincent. People in the Legal Division, but discussed it not 
as to the decision. 

Senator Ferguson. Who ? I want the name. 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. McJennett. 

Senator Ferguson. Anybody else? 

Mr. Vincent. A young man named Mr. Ousley. They are the only 
two that I remember, 

Mr. SouRWiNE, Are they in the Legal Division of the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Vincent. They are attached to it; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. They are not in the Public Relations Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. They are attached to it. I don't know what their 
actual relationship comes from, but that is where I met Mr. McJennett 
and that is where I know him. 

Mr. Sourwine. In the Legal Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. That is where I had seen him, the first I met him. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not an unusual thing, to put Public 
Relations people under the title of lawyers in the Legal Division,, 
is it? 

Mr. Vincent. It is not unusual ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether it is unusual or usual, sir. I 
only know that I met Mr. McJennett in Mr. Fish's office. 

Senator Ferguson. You thought he was in the Legal Division ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes; I thought he was in the Legal Department. 
I, myself, have since heard that he draws his salary from some place 
else. 

Senator Ferguson. They usually do not put them under Public 
Relations, and it is easier to get them through the appropriation if 
they are in the Legal Division. 

Mr. Vincent. I also notified Mr Humelsine in the State Depart- 
ment I had intentions of doing this, and I also notified Mr. Webb. 

Senator Ferguson. What did Humelsine and Webb say? 

Mr. Vincent. I asked them if they had any objection to me, as a 
Foreign Service officer, taking this action. I wanted to clear with 
them first, and they said "No objection." 

Senator Ferguson. Did you show them the letter? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2279 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know whether they actually saw the letter, 
I have no recollection of showing it to Mr. Webb. I don't know 
whether it went to Humelsine. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them that the chairman of the 
committee was ill in the hospital ? 

Mr. Vincent. Sir, I think they knew it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you talk about it? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; we didn't talk about it. 

Senator Ferguson. You were just assuming, then, that they knew it? 

Mr. Vincent. I would have assumed that they read it in the papers, 
sir. 

And I would like to make my testimony again as clear as I can, 
that the Senator being in the hospital had nothing to do with my 
decision to request an appearance before the committee. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Carl Humelsine know about this release before 
it went out ? Did he see it before it was released ? 

Mr. Vincent. I don't know that Carl Humelsine saw it before it 
was released. I don't know whether he knew it was going to be re- 
leased. 

Senator Ferguson. I will receive those two letters for the record. 

(The letters referred to appear on pp. 2273 and 2274. J 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think a man can be an American Communist 
without being a traitor to the Government of the United States ? 

Mr. Vincent. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think a person who is an employee of the 
United States Government can be a Communist without being a 
traitor? 

Mr. Vincent. He cannot be. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think a person who is an official of the United 
States Government can be a Communist without being a traitor ? 

Mr. Vincent. No ; he cannot be. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it then your belief and contention that to become 
or remain a Communist while an employee or an official of the Govern- 
ment of the United States is a traitorous act ? 

Mr. Vincent. I would certainly say it was. 

Mr. Sourwine. And by "traitorous act," you mean treason? 

Mr. Vincent. Well, now, I am not a legal person so I don't know 
what the charges would be on treason. But in a general sense. 

Mr. Sourwine. To you it means a traitorous act ? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I think that this letter from Mr. 
Vincent to Senator McCarran should also be put into record ; and it 
should be read, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. It is November 19, 1951? 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes [reading] : 

Exhibit No. 401A 

My Dear Senator McCarran : I have been informed that you interpreted my 
action in making public the letter I addressed to y'ou on November 9 as being in 
some way critical of the subcommittee. I regret that you had that impression. 

As you know, Budenz has publicly and falsely called me a Communist in testi- 
mony before your committee. In my position as an official of the American Gov- 
ernment his charge is tantamount to saying that I am a traitor. This, you will 
agree, is a very serious matter, not simply for me, for my country and my 
friends. Under such circumstances, I believe you will understand my motive 



2280 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

in making known tliat I am ready and anxious to appear publicly before your 
committee to refute under oath the Budenz allegations. 

I trust you are recuperating from your illness and will soon be in good healtu. 
Sincerely yours, 

John Carter Vincent. 

Mr. Vincent, before we close, and I have no more prepared questions 
for you, I will say to you that I would like to give you an opportunity 
to correct any false impressions that you think may have been created, 
if you recall any, 

Mr. Vincent. Over the length of the whole 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes ; and I don't mean that I am trying to put you 
on the spot to remember all of the testimony. It is just if there is 
anything that rankles in your mind, I want to give you an opportunity. 

Mr. Vincent. No ; I can't be too sure here that I have used the same 
phraseology in answering in the executive hearing and down here. 

Senator Ferguson. I think that that ought to be put in the record. 
You have no objection, have you, that the transcript of your executive 
session become part of the public record? 

Mr, Vincent. I have no objection, sir, but I am pointing out at this 
time that I can not say that in executive hearings of last week, which 
lasted 3 days, that I have answered exactly the same way. 

Senator Ferguson. I think we ought to make that part of the record. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It has been recommended by the staff and assented 
to by Mr, Vincent and his counsel. But the committee has to meet 
and act on it. 

I believe it will take a majority of the committee to do that. 

Senator Ferguson. I will recommend to the committee that it be 
received. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, you realize, do you not, that your testi- 
mony has, in some respects, contradicted the testimony of other wit- 
nesses, just as it has, in some respects, corroborated it? 

Mr. Vincent. That is true. 

Mr. Sourwine. That you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. 
Wallace; that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Alsop; 
that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Budenz ; that you 
have, in some respects, affirmed what Mr. Budenz says. 

Mr. Vincent. I don't recall affirming anything that Mr. Budenz 
says. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you realize that you have established, by your 
testimony here, that you did have a very substantial influence over Mr. 
Wallace and over the conduct of his mission ? 

Mr. Vincent. True, that is true. 

Mr. Sourwine. And which was one of the points that Mr. Budenz 
made, and something that Mr. Wallace appeared to seek to negative. 

Mr. Vincent. Did he ? I have forgotten that he did. 

Mr. Sourwine. I simply mention those things. 

Mr, Vincent. Yes ; I know. You are not trying to say that the in- 
fluence I had over Mr, Wallace was of the nature of Mr. Budenz' 
statement. 

Mr. Sourwine. I am simply calling to your attention possible fields 
in which you might feel that further clarification was needed so that 
if you think you want that opportunity you can do it now. 

Mr, Vincent, No ; I can't think of any particular. 

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Carter 

Mr. Vincent. Mr. Vincent. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2281 

Senator Ferguson. Have you had a full hearing? 

Mr. Vincent. I have had a full hearing, sir. 

I think I have had a very full hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you believe that it was a fair hearing? 

Mr. Vincent. Yes, sir ; in all intents and purposes a fair hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. And there is nothing that you know now that 
you would want to add ? 

I will give you this opportunity. 

Mr. Vincent. Well, I have nothing to add, sir, except that my coun- 
sel here failed to get these documents into the record. When we were 
speaking of that FEC and Japanese policy. 

Senator Ferguson. I will receive them. 

(The information referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 402" and is 
as follows :) 

Comment of Fak Eastern Commission Policy Decision* 

13 July 1947. 

The policy decision just adopted by the Far Eastern Commission dealing with 
the postsurrender treatment of the Japanese problem is one of the great state 
papers of modern history. It establishes definitely the type, the extent, and the 
scope of Japan's future, and the position the Japanese nation shall occupy in 
relation to the world at large. It not only ratifies the course which thus far has 
been taken, but signifies a complete unity of future purpose among the eleven 
nations and peoples concerned. It at once sweeps aside fears currently felt that 
the great nations of the world are unable to reconcile divergent views on such 
vital issues in the international sphere and demonstrates with decisive clarity 
that from an atmosphere of conflicting interests and opposing predilections may 
emerge common agreement founded upon exi^erience and shaped to a realistic 
appreciation of world conditions and the basic requirements of a progressive 
civilization. For in this agreement have been firmly resisted two insidious con- 
cepts, poles apart but equally sinister — the one which would seek harsh and 
unjust treatment of our fallen foe, and the other which would seek partially 
to preserve and perpetuate institutions and leadership which bear responsibility 
of war guilt. Tlie first would have produced a mendicant country dependent 
upon charity to live, while the second would have encouraged the regrowth of 
antidemocratic forces with the consequent revival of international distrust and 
suspicion. It confirms by the considered action of the representatives of the 
Allied Nations a sound moderate course based upon a concept embodying firm- 
ness but justice, disarmament but rehabilitation, lower standards but the oppor- 
tunity for life — a concept shunning both the extreme right and the extreme left 
and providing for the great middle way of the ordinary man. 

The basic and easily the most essential requirement of the policy — disarma- 
ment and demilitarization — has already been fully accomplished. Even were 
there no external controls, Japan could not rearm for modern war within a 
century. This primary objective has led all aims in the occupation of Japan. 
Japanese military forces have been disarmed, demobilized, and absorbed in 
l^eaceful pursuits, and Japan's remaining war potential has either been destroyed 
or completely neutralized. The political and economic phases of the disarma- 
ment program have been effected through the dissolution of the alliance long 
existing between government and industry, the breaking up of monopolistic com- 
bines and practices which have suppressed private enterprise, and the raising of 
the individual to a position of dignity and hope, with provision made for a new 
leader.ship untainted by war responsibility and both mentally and spiritually 
equipped to further democratic growth. The transition stage of destroying those 
evil influences which misguided Japan's past has been virtually completed and 
the course has been set upon which Japan is now embarked toward a peaceful 
and constructive future. We thus see here the transformation of a state which 
once proclaimed its mastery of war into one which from material impoverishment 
and spiritual dedication now seeks its destiny as a servant of peace. 



*The policy decision, adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947. as FEC 
014/9 and transmitted to SCAP through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS 
Directive Serial No. 82, is a restatement of the United States Initial Postsurrender Policy 
for Japan of August 29, 1945 (Appendix A : 11). 

22848— 52— pt. 7 19 



2282 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

This action representing the agreement of the Allied Nations engaged in the 
I'acitic war not only confirms the postsurrender policies previonsly evolved and 
largely implemented, but it establishes at the same time a norm for the restora- 
tion of peace. Resting squarely upon those same principles and ideals written at 
Potsdam, reaffirmed on the Missouri, and subsequently translated into action 
in the occupation of Japan, this accord provides the entire framework for a 
treaty of peace — a treaty which, if it is to be faithfully honored, should consti- 
tute within itself a charter of human liberty to which the Japanese citizen will 
look for guidance and protection, rather than shun with the revulsion of shame^ 
a treaty which, without yielding firmness in its essential mandates, should avoid 
punitive, arbitrary, and unrealistic provisions, and by its terms set the pattern 
for future peace throughout the world. It should in full reality mark the 
restoration of a peace based upon justice, goodwill, and human advancement. 
Such a treaty may now be approached with the assurance of complete vmderstand- 
ing in principle and full unity of purpose evolving its detail. 

Viewing this international accord in the light of the great strides made by the 
Japanese themselves toward the achievement of those very objectives which it 
prescribes, without confusion, without disorder, and with steady progress toward 
economic recovery despite the destruction of war and defeat, it becomes unmis- 
takably clear that here in Japan we shall win the peace. 



Appendix F : 39 

New Year's Message to thei Japanese People 

1 January 1948. 
To THE People of Japan : 

The design of a remodeled and reconstructed Japan is nearing completion. 
The pattern has been etched, the path has been laid. The development now lies 
largely in your own hands. Success or failure will depend upon your ability to 
practice the simple yet transcendental principles which modern civilization 
demands. 

No occupation, however benevolent and beneficial, can substitute for the 
spiritual uplift which alone can lead to an invincible determination to build a 
future based upon the immutable concepts of human freedom — a social status 
under wdiich full consciousness of individual responsibility must ever remain the 
keystone to the arch of success and progress. 

Individual hardship is inevitable. Your economy, due to the disastrous war 
decisions of your past leaders, is now impoverislied. This can only be relieved 
by employment to the maximum of the energies of your people, by wisdom and 
determination on the part of your leaders, and by the restoration of peace with 
its removal of existing limitations upon international trade. So long as your 
needs continue to be greater than your productive capacity, controls upon your 
internal economy will be essential lest the weaker segments of your population 
perish. Such controls must, liowever, only be temporary and subject to ultimate 
removal in favor of free enterprise. 

Economically, Allied policy has required the breaking up of that system which 
in the past has permitted tlie major part of the commerce and industry and 
natural resources of our country to be owned and controlled by a minority of 
feudal families and exploited for their exclusive benefit. The world has probably 
never seen a counterpart to so abnormal an economic system. It permitted ex- 
ploitation of the many for the sole benefit of the few. The integration of these 
few with government was complete and their influence upon governmental 
policies inordinate, and set the course which ultimately led to war and destruc- 
tion. It was indeed so complete a monopoly as to be in effect a form of socialism 
in private hands. Only through its dissolution could the way be cleared for the 
emergence of an economy conducive to the well-being of all the people — an econ- 
omy embodying the principle of private capitalism, based upon free competitive 
enterprise^ — an economy which long experience has demonstrated alone provides 
the maximum incentive to the development of those fundamental requirements 
to human progress — individual initiative and individual energy. 

Politically, progress toward reform has been equally encouraging. Your new 
constitution is now in full effect, and there is increasing evidence c/C a growing 
understanding of the great human ideals which it is designed to serve. Imple- 
menting laws have reoriented the entire fabric of your way of life to give 
emphasis to the increased responsibility, dignity and opportunity which the in- 
dividual now holds and enjoys. Government has ceased to be totalitarian and 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2283 

has become representative, with its functions decentralized to permit and en- 
coi;rage a maximum of individual thought and initiative and judgment in the 
management of community affairs. Control of every political segment has been 
shifted to permit the selection of a new leadership of your free choice capable 
of advancing democratic growth. 

Socially, many of the shackels which traditionally have restricted individual 
thought and action have been severed and action has been taken to render the 
exercise of police power a matter for individual and community, rather than 
national, responsibility. The judicial system has been freed from executive and 
legislative controls, and laws have been enacted to temper inordinate bureau- 
cratic power by requiring all public officials to justify the trust of public re- 
sponsibility and answer for their acts directly to the people. 

Every Japanese citizen can now for the first time do what he wants, and go 
where he wants, and say what he wants, within the liberal laws of his land. 
This means that you can select your own work, and when you have completed 
it you can choose your own method of relaxation and enjoyment, and on your 
day of rest you can worship as you please, and always you can criticize and 
express your views on the actions of your Government. This is liberty. Yet 
inherent in it are its obligations to act with decorum and self-restraint, and 
become acutely conscious of the responsibilities which a free society imposes 
upon its every segment. 

The future therefore lies in your hands. If you remain true to the great 
spiritual revolution which you have undergone, your nation will emerge and go 
on — if you accept only its benefits without its obligations, it will wither and go 
under. The line of demarcation is a simple one, understandable to all men — 
the line between those things which are right and those things which are 
wrong. The way is long and hard and beset with difficulties and dangers, but it 
is my hope and belief and prayer this New Year's Day that you will not falter. 

Douglas MacArthur. 

Appendix F : 42 

Reply to Criticism of Economic Policy 

1 February 1948. 

(The following was sent as a letter to Mr. J. H. Gipson, The Caxton Printers, 
Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, under date of 24 January, 1948, in reply to Mr. Gipson's 
letter of 27 December 1947, relative to a December release from the Committee 
for Constitutional Government in New York stating that the Occupation is 
fostering socialization of Japanese industries, etc. Permission was later re- 
quested on 31 January 1948, by Mr. Gipson for release to the press and approval 
was radioed on 1 February 1948.) 

Thank you so much for sending me the extract of comments on Japan from 
the December release of the Committee for Constitutional Government in New 
York, with your letter of December 27 which has just reached me. 

I have never heard of this Committee and know nothing about its purpose or 
composition, but its estimate of the situation here is amazing in its complete 
inaccuracy. The existing Government of Japan is fully representative of the 
popular will, elected under throughly democratic processes in accordance with 
the provisions of a constitution patterned in essential respects after our own. 
The only "private enterprise" which has heretofore existed in Japan was neither 
free nor competitive — two fundamental qualifications of American economic 
philosophy which it is my firm purpose to see entrenched in the Japanese system 
before the occupation withdraws. 

Japan has long had a system of ''private enterprise" — but one which per- 
mitted ten family groups comprising only fifty-six Japanese families to con- 
trol, directly or indirectly, every phase of commerce and industry ; all media 
of transportation, both internal and external ; all domestic raw materials ; and 
all coal and other power resources. The "private enterprise" was thus limited 
to a few of feudal lineage, who exploited into virtual slavery the remainder 
of the Japanese people, permitted higher standards of life to others only through 
sufferance, and in search of further plunder abroad furnished the tools for the 
military to embark upon its ill-fated venture into world conquest. The record 
is thus one of economic oppression and exploitation at home, aggression and 
spoliation abroad. As early as 1930, these Japanese industrial combines veered 
in the direction of armaments production and geared the country for war. 
This portrays the private enterprise to which the Committee refers. 



2284 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

As you will see, the very start toward free enterprise is dependent upon 
tearing down so abnormal a structure. For so long as it remains undisturbed, 
it is a standing bid for State ownership, and a fruitful target for Ck)mmunist 
propaganda and coUectivist purposes. The Japanese people, with the exception 
of those who covet the opportunity to exploit this situation for ideological pur- 
poses, and those who have been entrenched within its orbit of political and 
economic power, are overwhelmingly in favor of destroying such a system, and 
unless its destruction is effected peacefully and in due order under the occupa- 
tion, there is little doubt but that if necessai'y the way would be found even 
through the violence of revolutionary means once the occupation is withdrawn. 

In all of these measures in the reformation of Japan, it must be clearly 
understood that we are here dealing with fundamental realities. It does not 
suffice merely to issue an edict that there shall be no socialism, or that there 
shall be no advance of communism or other ideologies opposed to the one in 
which we ourselves firmly believe. For the strength of such an edict vs'ould 
find its measure in the power of Allied bayonets alone. The need has called 
for positive action which, while we yet have time, will superimpose here upon 
a decadent and discredited past a system of government and economics which, 
because their very processes generate a more healthy and virile society, will 
even after our controls are lifted stand as an invincible buttress against the 
inroads of any conflicting philosophies of life. 

In the accomplishment of this purpose, two difficult barriers have stood out 
to bar any progress. The one has dealt with the feudalistic system of land 
ownership under which practically all agricultural land has been owned by a 
relatively few persons of feudal heritage, with all agrarian workers exploited 
under conditions of practical serfdom. This archaic system of land ownership 
is being torn down in order that through sale in small lots those who long have 
worked the soil may have the opportunity substantially to profit from their 
toil. Thereby there will emerge in Japan, from a field theretofore fertile to the 
spread of communism, a new class of small capitalistic landowners which itself 
will stand firm against efforts to destroy the system of capitalistic economy of 
which it will then form an integral part. Needless to say, the communists and 
the land barons alone oppose this reform. 

The other barrier is the one which I have heretofore described, popularly 
known as the Zailiatsu, and in neither case, even despite war enrichment at the 
sacrifice of American blood, has there been any confiscation of property, as the 
principle of just compensation throughout has governed, with untrammelled re- 
course left to judicial appeal in the Japanese courts. The effect of its dissolu- 
tion will be to transform a small number of monopolistic combines into numerous 
competing units and to bring about widespread ownership of the instruments of 
production and trade, thereby erecting a solid bulwark against the spread of 
ideologies and systems destructive of both free enterprise and political freedom 
under democratic capitalism. Otherwise, if business in Japan were allowed to 
continue with its concentration of economic power, it would lead to concentra- 
tion of power in government, and from there the transition to socialism of one 
form or another would be natural, easy of accomplishment, and inevitable. 

The statement of the Committee that "prominent leaders including many out- 
standing friends of freedom have been ousted from the control of industry and 
their places have been taken by incompetent visionaries" finds no basis in fact. 
Apart from action taken with respect to the Zaibatsu, wherein the family mem- 
bers and their appointees are removed from positions of influence in the identical 
enterprises they have heretofore controlled, there have been in all less than 
two hundred and fifty persons removed vinder Allied policy from positions in 
the economy under the purge program. The removal of these persons was due 
to their close identity with the causes which led to war. In the implementation 
of this phase of the occupation program, I have in the exercise of the normal 
discretion accorded a field commander, pursued far less drastic measures 
than were called for by my policy directives from the Allied Powers, shifting 
the emphasis from punitive action to action merely designed to provide for a 
more healthy leadership and one unattainted by war responsibility. Even in 
those cases of persons removed from positions of power, involving the most 
aggravated circumstances, I have, against strong Allied opposition, permitted 
no property confiscation, no deprivation of liberty, no forfeiture of political 
rights, and where restriction upon future economic activity is involved embrac- 
ing but a relatively few persons, I have insured that policy-makers rather than 
technicians were affected, and have left undisturbed a broad field of economic 
activity in which even they might continue to engage without the slightest 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2285 

restriction. If within this small group of persons affected, there are any out- 
standing "friends of freedom," they are unknown to this headquarters, and all 
have had the opportunity, through exhaustively fair hearings before screening 
committees of the Japanese Government and on appeal, to prove any such con- 
tentions. The statement that the places of those few removed have been taken 
by incompetent visionaries is absurd. Such places have in all cases been filled 
by junior executives of long service in the enterprises concerned, who have 
moved up into opportunities which otherwise would not have been available to 
them. 

The Committee's statement that "the government has been flooded with a 
horde of bureaucrats," not unlike the situation in other capitals, is probably true. 
Even so, ou the national level of government there are less than 350,000 ijersons 
so employed, which is not disproportionate to Japan's population of seventy-eight 
million, should standards elsewhere be accepted as a general guide. It is not 
the quantity, however, which has given me most concern, but the quality and 
the inordinate power which the bureaucracy traditionally has arrogated to itself 
in Japan. To cope with this evil, we are now in the process of assisting the 
Japanese Government toward a civil service reform. The pattern already has 
been set tlirough wise and farsighted legislation, the implementation of which 
will be completed within the present year. The basic purpose and effect of this 
reform is to require that all public officials justify the trust of public responsi- 
bility and answer for their acts directly to the people. 

The general statement that the money is unsound, that foreign trade is re- 
stricted by a maze of regulations, and that production is paralyzed is wholly 
misrepresentative in its failure to recognize the following fundamental ami 
controlling facts, i. e., (1) that Japan is a totally defeated nation, still tech- 
nically at war with tlie Allied Powers and luider the controls of military occu- 
pation ; (2) that a primary objective of war and cause of defeat was the destruc- 
tion of Japan's industrial capacity to wage war and ability to transport its 
sinews on the high seas; (3) that Japan has always been dependent for the bulk 
of the raw materials essential to sustain the industrial capacity upon jjrocure- 
ment from abroad, now denied by the economic blockade inherent in the present 
situation; (4) that Japan's shipping afloat has been destroyed, and Manchuria, 
Formosa and Korea, former sources of direct procurement of essential raw 
materials, have been taken away ; and (5) that Japanese money, not unlike that 
even of all of the victor nations, is suffering the severe strain of war-caused 
economic dislocations. 

Finally, the statement that "the net result has been so to paralyze production 
as to leave the Japanese people on the verge of starvation, and that the Americans 
are now called upon to furnish hundreds of millions of dollars to relieve the 
hunger for which our representatives are primarily responsible" is completely 
lacking in realism and false as an indictment. The wonder is that despite the 
lack of needed raw materials, widespread destruction of plant facilities, and 
seizures under Allied policy for reparation payments, the industrial output 
has risen from complete paralysis at war's end to over 40 percent of prewar 
levels. It must be understood that the Japanese people before the war suffered 
a deficiency in indigenous food resources which compelled the importation from 
abroad of approximately 20 percent of food requirements. Add to this natural 
deficiency the fact that over six million Japanese citizens have been repatriated 
to the home islands, with none permitted to leave during the occupation, while 
Manchuria, Korea and Formosa have been removed as sources of food supply, 
and you can understand the actualities which exist. During the occupation 
we have contributed food partially to cover this deficiency, but such contribu- 
tion has not even approximated the importations required during the prewar 
era when industry was at full capacity and there was a smaller population to 
feed. Such action has not been entirely altruistic as under Japan's present 
status the Japanese people are in all practical aspects our prisoners of war, 
and as such entitled to our protection under the international conventions which 
we ourselves historically have never failed to respect. Even so, the Japanese 
people have made diligent effort themselves to solve this deficiency problem, 
and once a healthier economic structure has been erected, there will be seen, 
through the release of long-suppressed energies of a people enslaved, the building 
of that higher productivity which alone comes from a people who are free. 

The foregoing will give you the facts as they exist for comparison with those 
stated by the Committee, which you have been good enough to quote. The pre- 
scription for Japan's economic ills is as crystal clear as it is simple — a structurall 
redesign to make possible the emergence of an economic system based not solely 



2286 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

upon the formula of "private enterprise" to which the Committee alludes, but 
to free private competitive enterprise v^'hich Japan has never before knovi'n, 
and which alone will maximize the energies of the people. Even more, the con- 
clusion of a treaty of peace which would permit the reopening of the channels 
of trade and commerce to make available essential raw materials to feed the 
production lines, woi'ld markets to absorb the finished products, and food to 
sustain working energy. 

Douglas MacArthub. 

Senator Ferguson. You have a notebook. I wonder whether or not 
we could not receive that notebook. You have been reading from it 
as part of this record. 

Mr. Vincent. That notebook, sir, contains scratched out places and 
everything else. I would rather keep it to myself, because I have 
taken practically everything there is out of it. I would prefer to keep 
it to myself, as my own notes. 

Senator Ferguson. You have been reading from it. 

Mr. Vincent. That is right, sir-. 

Senator Ferguson. You feel that you do not want the notebook 
made part of the record ? 

Mr. Vincent. I have made all of it that I want to as part of the 
record, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Will you let the committee have the notebook for 
study, Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Vincent. If I do not need it, I have no objection. But I would 
rather not have it in the record. 

Mr. Sourwine. The Chairman, I think, was asking for it not to be 
made as part of the record, but asking for it just as the committee asks 
for certain other papers to be examined. 

Senator Ferguson. Counsel can look at the notebook and may decide 
on more questioning, if he does. 

We will now recess. Is there any particular time to reconvene ? 

Mr. Morris. I think Tuesday at 10 o'clock is the date, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. We wdll now recess until Tuesday morning at 
10 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 40 p. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952, the hear- 
ing was recessed to reconvene Tuesday, February 5, 1952, at 10 a. m.) 

Appendix I 

HOLD FOR RELEASE 

Confidential: The following correspondence from the President to the Vice 
President and attachments thereto are for automatic release at 7 : 00 p. m., 
E. D. T., Sunday, September 23, 1951. No portion, synopsis, or intimation may 
be published or broadcast before that time. 

please guard against premature publication or announcement 

Joseph Short, 
Secretary to the President. 

September 22, 1951. 
The Honorable the Vice President of the United States, 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Vice President : I am sending you a copy of a letter, together with 
certain documents, which I recently received from INIr. Henry A. Wallace. 

These papers deal with the facts of Mr. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944, 
and the part played by his advisers on that trip. These papers deal with certain 
matters which may be of interest to the Senate and its committees. I am there- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2287 

fore making Mr. Wallace's letter available to you for use in such ways as you 
deem appropriate. 

Very sincerely yours, 

Haeey S. Truman. 

Farvue, South Salem, New York, September 19, 1951. 

Honorable Harry S. Truman, 

President of the United States, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. President : During the last three weeks there has been considerable 
newspaper and radio controversy as to what part John Carter Vincent and Owen 
Lattimore played in my trip to the Far East in 1944. This controversy arose 
from certain testimony before the Senate Committee on Internal Security during 
August. Therefore I have decided to make available to you for what disposition 
you care to make of it the complete tile of my reports to President Roosevelt on 
my Far Eastern trip in 1944. Parts of these reports were at one time looked 
on as secret but with the situation as it is today there is no reason why these 
reports should not be made available to the public. I shall, of course, take no 
steps to publish this letter myself but I wish you to feel completely free to 
handle it in any way which you deem will best minister to the welfare of the 
United States. 

The following comments as well as the documents themselves should clear 
up any confusion as to what I was trying to do in China. The part of various 
individuals in my trip will also be made more clear. In March of 1944 I 
wrote Secretary Hull asking him to designate someone to accompany me on the 
projected trip and the State Department named John Carter Vincent, then 
Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. The OWI sent Owen Lattimore to 
handle publicity matters in China. I passed through Soviet Asia on my way to 
China but China, where the situation was critical, formed the sole subject of 
my recommendations to President Roosevelt. These recommendations were 
contained in two related documents : 

First, a message drafted in Kunming, China, on June 26, 1944, but which, be- 
cause of difficulties of communication from Kunming, was cabled to the President 
from New Delhi on June 28, 1944. This was divided into two parts, the first 
part being a quick resume of the political situation in China and of my talks 
in the days immediately preceding with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ; and 
the second part, a resume of the military situation, its implications and require- 
ments. 

Second, a formal report to President Roosevelt covering whole trip, including 
also certain longer term proposals about American policy in China which I 
presented in person at the White House on July 10, 1944. 

These were the only documents originated by me and contained all recom- 
mendations of mine resulting from the trip. IMr. Vincent, of course, transmitted 
to the State Department the detailed, reportorial account of my conversations 
with the Generalissimo which have already been published in the State Depart- 
ment White Paper. 

There has been testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee that 
Messrs. Vincent and Lattimore were members of the Communist Party at that 
time and were relied on by the party leadership to "guide" me along the party 
line. Hence it is important to specify the parts that these two men took in 
the recommendations that I presented to President Roosevelt. As to Mr. Latti- 
more, he had no part whatever. He did not contribute to and to the best of my 
knowledge knew nothing about either the cable from New Delhi or the formal 
report to the President delivered in Washington. He offered me no political 
advice any time sufficiently significant to be recalled now, and when we were 
together, he talked chiefly about scholarly subjects of a common interest such as 
the history of Chinese agriculture and the relationship of the nomadic tribes 
with the spttled peasantry. 

Mr. Vincent as the designated representative of the State Department was 
naturally consulted by me when we were travelling together. Aside from serving 
as reporter at the meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, his most important part was 
his assistance in the preparation of the two-part cable sent from New Delhi, 
In Kuoming, the knowledge I had already gained in Chungking of the urgency 
of the Chinese situation, and of the grave dangers of the Japanese offensive then 
going on in East China was heavily underlined by General C. L. Chennault's 
presentation to me of the current military picture. In the light of this presenta- 
tion and in response to Chinag Kai-shek's request made of me on June 24 I 



2288 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

decided to cable President Roosevelt on June 26. Mr. Vincent joined in the 
advance discussions of the projected cable, was present while it was drafted, and 
concurred in the result. The finished cable was, of course, mine but I was dis- 
turbed by the fact that I was making far-reaching recommendations without 
having had an opportunity to consult the Theater Commander, General Joseph 
Stilwell. My recommendations were so drastic that Vincent would certainly have 
urged that I get in touch with General Stilwell if he (Vincent) had had objections. 
Instead Vincent concurred in the cables of June 28. 

On the other hand, as both Mr. Vincent and Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
have stated, Mr. Vincent took no part in the preparation of my formal report to 
President Roosevelt on July 10 and to the best of my knowledge was not aware 
of its contents. I wrote the July 10 report myself and went alone to the White 
House to present it to the President. In doing the work of writing I made use 
of various memoranda which had accumulated during the journey, some no doubt 
from Vincent. However, the strongest influence on me in preparing this final 
report of July 10 was my recollection of the analyses offered me by our then 
Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, who later occupied one of the Republican 
places on the Export-Import Bank Board. 

With regard to the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28, it should be 
said that the military recommendations contained therein were the most impor- 
tant contribution I made while in China. These recommendations were that 
China be separated from the command of General Stillwell, that General Wede- 
meyer should be considered in the choice of a new military commander in China, 
and that the new commander should be given the additional assignment of 
"Personal representative" of the President of Chungking. The name and record 
of General Wedemeyer are enough to indicate that the purport of these recom- 
mendations was the opposite of pro-Communist. 

Some months later the change of military command I proposed to the President 
was carried out at the most urgent plea of Chiang Kai-shek. History suggests 
that if my recommendations had been followed when made, the Generalissimo 
would have avoided the disasters resulting from the Japanese offensive in East 
China later that summer. And if Chiang's government had thus been spared 
the terrible enfeeblement resulting from the disasters, the chances are good the 
Generalissimo would have been ruling China tcday. 

The political section of Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 should be 
read with the atmosphere of that time in mind. Much emphasis had been placed 
from the very beginning of the war on the primary importance of "beating the 
Japs," and by the spring of 1944 even the most conservative American publications 
were urging that the Chinese communists could contribute substantially to this 
end. Roosevelt talked to me before I left, not about political coalition in China, 
but about "getting the two groups together to fight the war." Chiang Kai-shek 
for internal political reasons had, on his own initiative so I was informed, opened 
talks between the Nationalists and the Communists but, so he told me, with no 
prospect for success. When I cabled the President that "the attitude of Chiang- 
Kai-shek towards the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little 
prospect for satisfactory long term settlement" I was referring not to "political 
coalition" but to this "military problem" of "getting the two groups together to 
fight the war." On the other hand, when I said that the disintegration 
of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be 
filled in ways which you will understand," I was, of course, warning against the 
possibility of a Communist political triumph in China. 

The July 10 report does not .recommend any political coalition between the 
government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinest communists. It was written, 
however, against a Chinese political background which is still quite unknown to 
most Americans. In brief, one of the worst of several ills from which the 
Chungking government was suffering at the time, was the absolute control of all 
positions of political, military, and economic power by an extreme pro-Asian 
anti-American group within the Kuomintang. This was much emphasized by 
Ambassador Gauss who plainly stated that this group in Chungking was doing the 
Chinese communists' work for them. The more Western-minded, more efficient 
and more pro-American Chinese Nationalist leaders had been so completely 
driven from power that Dr. T. V. Soong's appearance as interpreter at my talks 
with the Generalissimo was authoritatively reported to be his first emergence 
from a sort of informal house arrest, while the most highly praised of the 
Chinese Generals, General Chen Cheng, now Prime Minister in Formosa, had 
been dismissed from all command some months before. These factors are hinted 
at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10 in which it is noted as "significant" that 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2289 

"T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (witli tlie Generalissimo) except 
as interpreter," while General Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Generals 
Chang Fa-lvwei and Pai Chung-hsi as the sort of men who might rally the 
Chinese armies to greater efforts. 

In this concluding section of this final report to President Roosevelt on July 
10, a coalition is in fact suggested but not with the Communists. Instead Presi- 
dent Roosevelt is urged to use American political influence to "support" the 
"progressive banlving and commercial leaders," the "large group of western 
trained men," and the "considerable group of generals and other ofhcers who are 
neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry." In short I 
urged President Roosevelt to help the Genelarissimo's government to help itself, 
by bringing bacli to power the better men in the Chinese Nationalist ranks. 
These better and more enlightened Nationalists, being more able to stand on their 
own feet, were somewhere more independent of the Generalissimo than the ex- 
treme pro-Asia groups. Hence it was necessary to point out to President Roose- 
vlt that if the desired changes were made in the Chinese Nationalist govern- 
ment, the Generalissimo's future would depend on his "political sensitivity," 
and his ability to make himself the real leader of the reconstituted administra- 
tion. Internal reform at Chungking was, in short my proposed means of avoid- 
ing the "revolution" and insuring the "evolution" that are referred to earlier 
in this report of July 10. It is worth noting that the Generalissimo must have 
been thinking along parallel lines, since the extremists began to lose their control 
and Dr. Soong and General Chen Chang were brought back to power by the 
Generalissimo himself during the same month that I rendered my report to 
President Roosevelt. 

Su;h were the recommendations, such was the direction of the influence of 
my trip to the Far East in the spring of 1944. During the years immediately 
following the end of the war my thinking about Chinese problems underwent a 
sharp change. My views during this later period are known as are now my 
views in 1944. Recent events have led me to the conclusion that my judgment in 
1944 was the sound judgment. I append herewith a copy of the two-part Kun- 
ming-Ntw Delhi cable of June 28 in the War Department paraphrase given to 
me when I returned to Washington and of the final report to President Roose- 
velt of July 10 as presented by me to him. 

Wishing you health and strength in shouldering the tremendous burdens ahead, 
Mrs. Wallace joins me in asking you to convey to Mrs, Truman and Margaret our 
best regards, 

Sincerely yours, 

Henry A. Wallace. 

JtJLY 10, 1944. 
The Prestdent, 

The White House. 
Dear Mr. President : I am handing yoia herewith a report on my trip to the 
Far East. 

Sincerely yours, 

H. A. Wallace. 

July 10, 1944. 
Summary Report of Vice President Wallace's Visit in China 

Our first stop in China was at Tihua (Urumchi), capital of Sinkiang province. 
The Governor, General Sheug Shih-tsai, is a typical warlord. The Government 
is personal and carried out by thorough police surveillance. Ninety percent 
(90%) of the population is non-Chinese, mostly Uighur (Turki). Tension be- 
tween Chinese and non-Chinese is growing with little or no evidence of ability to 
deal effectively with the problem. General Sheng, two years ago pro-Soviet, is 
now anti-Soviet, making life extremely difficult for the Soviet Consul General 
and Soviet citizens in Sinkiang. 

There seems little reason to doubt that the difliculties in the early spring on the 
Sinklang-Outer Mongolia border were caused by Chinese attempts to resettle 
Kazak nomads who fied into Outer Mongolia, were followed by Chinese troops 
who were driven back by Mongols. The Soviet Minister in Outer Mongolia 
stated that Mongolian planes bombed points in Sinkiang in retaliation for 
•Chinese bombings in Outer Mongolia. He did not appear concerned regarding 
the situation now. 

22848— 52— pt. 7 20 



2290 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Soviet oflScials placed primary responsibility on General Sheng for their diflS- 
culties in Sinkiang but gur Consul at Tihua and our Embassy officials felt that 
Sheng was acting as a front for Chungking, willing or unwittingly. Sinkiang is- 
an area which will bear close watching. 

Due to bad weather at Chungking, we stopped for 2 hours at the large 20th 
Bomber Command (B-29) airfield near Chengtu. The first bombing of Japan 
had taken place only a few days before. We found morale good but complaint 
was freely made of inability to obtain intelligence regarding weather and. 
Japanese positions in north China and leak of intelligence to the Japanese. 

Summary of conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is contained in a 
separate memorandum. Principal topics discussed were : (1) Adverse military 
situation which Chiang attributed to low morale due to economic difficulties and 
to failure to start an all-out Burma offensive in the spring as promised at Cairo ; 
(2) Relations with the Soviet Union and need for their betterment in order to 
avoid possibility of conflict (Chiang, obviously motivated by necessity rather 
than conviction, admitted the desirability of understanding with USSR, and re- 
quested our good offices in arranging for conference) ; (3) Chinese Government- 
Communist relations, in regard to which Chiang showed himself so prejudiced; 
against the Communists that there seems little prospect of satisfactory or en- 
during settlement as a result of the negotiations now under way in Chungking ; 
(4) Dispatch of the Unit^^d States Army Intelligence Group to north China,, 
including Communist areas, to which Chiang was initially opposed but on last 
day agreed reluctantly but with apparent sincerity; (5) Need for reform in 
China, particularly agrarian reform, to which Chiang agreed without much 
indication of personal interest. 

It was significant that T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions except as 
an interpreter. However, in subsequent conversations during visits outside of 
Chungking he was quite outspoken, saying that it was essential that something 
"dramatic" be done to save the situation in China, that is was "five minutes to 
midnight" for the Chungking government. Without being specific he spoke of 
need for greatly increased United States Army air activity in China and for re- 
formation of Chungking government. He said that Chiang was bewildered and 
that there were already signs of disintegration of his authority. (Soong is 
greatly embittered by the treatment received from Chiang during the past half 
year.) 

Conversations with Ambassador Gauss and other Americans indicated dis- 
couragement regarding the situation and need for positive American leadership 
in China. 

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent called on Dr. Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen. 
Dr. Sun had little to contribute. He was obviously on guard. Madame Sun was 
outspoken. She described undemocratic conditions to which she ascribed lack 
of popular support for government ; said that Dr. Sun Fo should be spokesman 
for liberals who could unite under his leadership; and advised Mr. Wallace tO' 
speak frankly to President Chiang who was not informed of conditions in China. 
Madame Sun's depth and sincerity of feeling is more impressive than her 
political acumen but she is significant as an inspiration to Chinese liberals. 
Dr. Sun Fo does not impress one as having strength of character required for 
leadei'ship but the fact that lie is the son of Sun Yat-sen makes him a potential 
front for liberals. 

Mr. Vincent talked with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, former Foreign Minister and for 
many years Ambassador in London, and to K. P. Chen, leading banker. They 
see little hope in Chiang's leadership. Dr. Quo spoke in support of Sun Fo under 
whom he thought a libei'al coalition was possible. Quo is an intelligent liut not 
a strong character. K. P. Chen said that economic situation had resolved itself" 
into a race against time ; that new hope and help before the end of the year might 
be effective in holding things together. 

Conversations with other Chinese officials in Chungking developed little of 
new interest. The Minister of Agriculture (Shen Hung-lieh, who incidentally 
knows little about agriculture) showed himself an outspoken anti-communist. 
General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, also an anti-com- 
munist, is influential as a political rather than a military general. Dr. Chen 
Li-fu, Minister of Education, a leading reactionary party politician, also had 
little to say. Ironically, he took Mr. Wallace to visit the Chinese Industrial Co- 
operatives which be is endeavoring to bring under his control to, prevent tlieii' 
becoming a liberalizing social influence. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2291 

Convei-sations with provincial government oflBcials were also without much 
significance. As an indication of political trends, there were unconfirmed re^ 
ports that the provincial officials in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provmces 
were planning a coalition to meet the situation in the event of disintegration of 
central government control. In Szechuan province the Governor, Chang Chun, 
is a strong and loyal friend of President Chiang. The loyalty of military fac- 
tions, however, is uncertain. In Kansu province the Governor, Ku Cheng-lun, 
is a mild appearing reactionary who, during his days as Police Commissioner in 
Nanking, earned the title of "bloody Ku." 

Developments subsequent to conversations with General Chennault and Vin- 
cent in Kunming and Kweilin have confirmed their pessimism with regard to 
the military situation in east China. There was almost uniform agreement 
among our "military officers that unification of the Ajnerican military effort irr 
China, and better coordination of our effort with that of the Chinese, was abso- 
lutely essential. It was also the general belief that, the Japanese having during 
recent months made China an active theatre of war, it was highly advisable tO' 
take more aggressive air action against such Japanese bases as Hankow, Canton, 
Nanking and Shanghai. However, the factor of loss of Chinese life at those 
places was recognized as an important consideration. It was the consensus 
that Chinese troops, when well fed. well equipped, and well led, can be effectively 
used. A number of Chinese generals were mentioned as potentially goad lead- 
ers. Among them were Generals Chen Cheng, Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung- 
hsi. 

In Outer-Mongolia there is considerable evidence of healthy progress, military 
preparedness, and nationalistic spirit. Soviet influence is without doubt strong 
but political and administrative control appear to be in the hands of the capable 
Mongols. Any thought of resumption of effective Chinese sovereignty would 
be unrealistic. On the contrary, it is well to anticipate considerable agitation 
in Inner-Mongolia for union with Outer-Mongolia after the war. 

Specific conclusions and recommendations regarding the situation in China 
were incorporated in telegrams dispatched from New Delhi on June 28 (copies 
attached). 

We should bear constantly in mind that the Chinese, a nonfighting people, 
have resisted the Japanese for seven years. Economic hardship and unin- 
spiring leadership have induced something akin to physical and spiritual 
anemia. There is widespread popular dislike for the Kuomintang government 
But there is also strong popular dislike for the Japanese and confidence in 
victory. 

Chiang, a man with an oriental military mind, sees his authority threatened 
by economic deterioration, which he does not understand, and by social unrest 
symbolized in Communism, which he thoroughly distrusts ; and neither of which 
he can control by military commands. He hoped that aid from foreign allies 
would pull him out of the hole into which an unenlightened administration (sup- 
ported by landlords, warlords and bankers) has sunk him and China. 

Chiang is thorough "eastern" in thought and outlook. He is surrounded 
by a group of party stalwarts who are similar in character. He has also, re- 
luctantly, placed confidence in westernized Chinese advisers (his wife and T. V. 
Soong are outstanding examples) with regard to foreign relations. Now he 
feels that foreign allies have failed him and seeks in that and the "communist 
menace" a scapegoat for his government's failure. His hatred of Chinese com- 
munists and distrust of the USSR cause him to shy away from liberals. The 
failure of foreign aid has caused him to turn away from his uncongenial "west- 
ern" advisers and draw closer to the group of "eastern" advisers for whom he 
has a natural affinity and for whom he has been for years more a focal point 
and activating agent of policy than an actual leader. 

At this time, there seems to be no alternative to support of Chiang. There is 
no Chinese leader or group now apparent of sufficient strength to take over the 
government. We can, however, while supporting Chiang, influence him in every 
possible way to adopt policies with the guidance of progressive Chinese which 
will inspire popular support and instill new vitality into China's war effort. At 
the same time, our attitude should be flexible enough to permit utilization of 
any other leader or group that might come forward offering greater promise. 

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has 
the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of 
postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now 
seems more likely the latter. 



2292 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Possible Policy Line Relative to Liberal Elements in China 

Our policy at the present time should no the limited to support of Chiang. 
It is essential to remember that we have in fact not simply been supporting 
Chiang, but a coalition, headed by Chiang and supported by the landlords, the 
M^arlord group most closely associated with the landlords, and the Kung group 
of bankers. 

We can, as an alternative, support those elements which are capable of form- 
ing a new coalition, better able to carry the war to a conclusion and better 
qualified for the postwar needs of China. Such a coalition could include 
progressive banking and commercial leaders, of the K. P. Chen type, with a 
competent understanding both of their own country and of the contemporary 
Western world ; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not lim- 
ited to perpetuation of the old, landlord-dominated rural society of China ; and the 
considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient 
to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry. 

The emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting 
•both American military aid and economic aid, and by the formulation and state- 
ment of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and in regions 
adjacent to China. 

The- future of Chiang would then be determined by Chiang himself. If he 
retains the political sensitivity and the ability to call the turn which originally 
brought him to power, he will swing over to the new coalition and head it. If 
not, the new coalition will in the natural course of events px'oduce its own leader. 



Paraphrase of Vice President Wallace's Message to the President, Drafted in 
Kunming June 26 and Dispatched From New Delhi About June 28 

Message No. 1 

The discussions between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and 
those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking but the attitude 
of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can 
see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement. Chiang has assured me 
that only "political" measures will be used to reach a settlement. 

Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement in relations with Russia and for 
our assistance in bringing about a meeting of representatives of China and 
Russia. I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with 
Russia. 

The economic, political, and military situations in China are extremely dis- 
couraging. The morale of the Chinese is low and demoralization is a possibility 
with resulting disintegration of central authority. With regard to the economic 
situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of 
coping with it. However, a general collapse does not seem imminent. Insta- 
bility and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of con- 
fidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the 
Kuomintang. With regard to the militai-y situation, I can only say that it might 
be worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Potentialities and plans are in 
existence for stiffening China's defense south of the city of Hengyang but there is 
a serious threat that east China may be severed from contact with west China. 
Morale in remaining free China would of course be aflf jcted by such a development. 

Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 on the subject of a U. S. Army 
observer group proceeding to north China to obtain military intelligence, Chiang 
had informed me of his agreement to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could 
be organized. After receipt of your telegram I again discussed the matter in 
detail with Chiang. General Ferris, Chief of Staff in charge of General Stilwell's 
Headquarters at Chungking, was present and we obtained what should prove to 
be the full cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early dispatch and effective 
operation of the group. 

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation ; bewild- 
ered regarding the economic sitwation, and, while expressing confidence in his 
army, distressed regarding military developments. Current military reverses are 
attributed by him to low morale caused by economic difficulties. He is convinced 
that a general offensive in Burma early this year would have bolstered the Chinese 
will to resistance and have prevented military revei-ses. He has assured me that 
the Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their ability but he displays 
discouragement rather than optimism. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2293 

Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better coordinated United States^ 
Government repi'esentation in China. In its military and related political aspects 
our elt'ort in China requires more positive direction and closer cooperation with 
the Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of operations against the 
Japanese. 

Message No. 2 

There is a strong probability that east China will be severed from west China 
in the near future. It is the general opinion that such a development can only be 
prevented by unforeseeable chance. There are various estimates with regard to 
the rapidity with which the Japanese may be able to carry out their intentions. 
Although the time factor may be longer than most people seem to expect, I feel 
that we should be prepared to see all of east China in Japanese hands within three 
or four weeks. 

The loss of east China will nullify our military effort in this area. It will also 
prove a violent political and economic shock to the Chungking regime. 

China may be rendered almost valueless as an Allied military base unless deter- 
mined steps are taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular and military 
morale, both seriously impaired already, must somehow be strengthened. A new 
offensive effort must somehow be organized, primarily guerilla in character 
probably. 

It is necessary also to consider political forces. Disintegration of the Chung- 
king regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways 
which you will understand. 

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available infor- 
mation to show you how serious is the situation. However, the situation is far 
from hopeless and may actually be turned to both military and political advantage 
if the right steps are taken promptly. The Generalissimo is alarmed, anxious for 
guidance, and, I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if wisely approached. 
Insecurity has undermined vested interests in the Government. It should be 
possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the semblance of a united front 
necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to 
organize a new offensive effort. 

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal 
representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton de Wiart ofv 
cupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion 
a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation. 

An American General officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and 
military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears 
that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain 
close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does 
not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political 
considerations. I do not think any oflScer in China is qualified to undertake the 
assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should 
not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to 
a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the 
latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions ; 
(2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordina- 
tion between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he com- 
mand American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no 
substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal di- 
rectly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated 
from General Stilwell's present command. 

Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation 
here to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should 
be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can 
assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far. 

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of 
General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his 
visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang. 

I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number 
of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, 
I regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views. Never- 
theless, I am convinced of the need for the decisive action summarized in the 
final paragraph of my previous message. 



2294 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Amebican Legation, 
Bern, Switzerland, March 7, 1950. 
Hon. John E. Peueifoy, 

Department of State, Washington, D. C. 

T>EAB Jack : I am sorry about all of the trouble that is being raised for you 
as a result of charges made against the Department. You and the Secretary 
have my full conlidence and support, if needed. 

A friend has sent me a copy of the Congressional Record of February 20. 
I gather that I have been "identified" in the press as Senator McCarthy's case 
No. 2. I am, in fact, one of our "foreign ministers" although the job is hardly 
what I would call "high brass." Also, I did misplace a piece of clothing one 
time in 1946. But I must profess myself amazed that the incident became a 
matter of record, if in fact it has as Senator McCarthy's story would seem to 
imply. It was not my piece of clothing. It was a raincoat which some visitor 
left behind in the Far Eastern Office, of which I was Director at the time, and 
which hung there for weeks. One rainy day, having no coat with me, I put this 
raincoat on to go to lunch. Returning, I stopped at a Department washroom 
and forgot to take the raincoat when I left. Some days later, I recalled the 
oversight and called the Building Guard Office, where I learned that the coat 
Lad been found and turned over to the Department's Security or Control Office. 
I have forgotten with whom I spoke in that office, but he informed me that there 
was a piece of paper in the inside breast pocket containing writing in what 
looked like Russian. I explained the history of the coat and asked whether the 
writing gave a clue to ownership. He did not know, but subsequent examination 
showed the writing, as I recall it, to be a practice or exercise in Russian word 
endings or suffixes, presumably the work of someone studying Russian. The 
coat was returned to the Far Eastern Ofl5ce. When we moved from Old State 
to New State in 1947, I appropriated the coat and still have it. That is the 
history of the "clothing." I shall be glad to return the raincoat to the real 
owner, should his memory as to where he left it be revived by Senator McCarthy's 
story. 

As to the main portion of the Senator's statement, I must profess complete 
ignorance. I have ne^ er acted directly or indirectly to provide espionage agents 
of Russia, or any other country, with information in the State Department or 
from any other governmental source. Therefore, the Senator's story, if it is 
intended to apply to me, is simply not true. Furthermore, I do not believe there 
were people in the Far Eastern Office capable of such action. No case of the 
kind ever came or was brought to my attention. 

So much for that. I do not know whether the Department has a "case history" 
on me, but I would like to take this opportunity to let you have briefly a few 
facts concerning me which may be unknown to you, and to state that there are 
no other facts pertinent to the situation which is troubling Senator McCarth.v. 

As to family, just in case the question should arise: My mother died when I 
was a child. My father died in 1938. He was a real-estate agent and an active 
member of the Baptist Church. My stepmother is 76; lives in Macon. Geor.eia ; 
and is as active in the Baptist Church as her age (76) will permit. My brother 
is a banker in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Sister is married to Rear Admiral 
Allan E. Smith, USN, who recently rescued the USS Elissovri. I have various 
and sundry cousins with whom I have virtually lost contact, but I have never 
heard anything derogatory regarding them. I have two nephews who served in 
the Armed Forces during the late war. 

My wife has two brothers, John and Fred Slagle. They are in the insurance 
business, one at Chicago and the other at Kansas City. Both, as I understand it, 
are respected and sturdy Repulilicans. My wife's parents have been dead for 
many years. So much for family. 

As for myself: I have never joined any political organization, "front" or other- 
wise. For one year, I think it was 194.5, I was made an honorary or noncon- 
tributing member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Service abroad has made 
it Impracticable to join a political party. I am a Jeffersonian democrat, a 
Lincolnian republican, and an admirer since youth of Woodrow Wilson. I am 
a member of the Cosmos Club, Washington, the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity, 
and the Baptist Church. 

I have never knowingly associated with American Communists or Communist 
sympathizers. I say "American," because my official duties have from time to 
time caused me to be in contact with foreign Communists. Chou En-Lai. for 
instance (the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Regime), I met in the 
house of Chang Kai-shek. He was head of a Liaison Mission to the Chungking 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2295 

•Government during the war. Here and in Washington, before my assignment 
here, and at other posts abroad, I have met foreign Communists at official or 
social functions. Our relationships have been perfunctory, except where oflScial 
business had to be transacted. 

In 1944, I accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a mission to Cliina. 
I went under instructions from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The pur- 
pose in sending me was to make available to the Vice President my experience in 
China, extending back over 20 years. 

As you know, my association with Far Eastern affairs has been a subject of 
intermittent press criticism. This was especially true while I was Director of 
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs' (September 1945-August 1947). During that 
time I served under Mr. James Byrnes and General Marshall, as Secretaries of 
State. My job was to implement the Government's policies, not to make them. 
It is immaterial that I found myself in accord with those policies. Had I not, 
I would have still attempted to carry them out or asked to be removed from a 
position where it was incumbent upon me to do so. 

Any American, in public or private life, has a right to criticize our policies 
toward China and in the Far East and elsewhere. He does not have the right 
to impugn, simply on the basis of disagreeing with the policies themselves, the 
motives or character of those who are charged with the duty of implementing 
them. I have taken the oath of allegiance and loyalty to my country many 
times during my twenty-five years of service. The last time was in 1947, as 
U. S. Minister to Switzerland, after the Senate had confirmed my appointment. 
One is free to question my ability ; but they cannot, in truth, question my 
loyalty. My record of public service is clear and so is my conscience. 

I regret very much the circumstances that have caused me to feel it necessary 
to make this protest of innocence and loyalty but it is my belief that you and, 
■if you approve, the public, have a right to expect a statement from me. 

With best regard and best wishes. 
Sincerely, 

John Carter Vincent, American Minister. 



Department of State, 

January 6, 19Jp. 
For the press. No. 8. 

Following is the substance of a note delivered by the American Embassy at 
Moscow on January 3, 1947, to the Soviet Foreign Oifice. A similar note has also 
■been delivered by the American Embassy at Nanking to the Chinese Foreign 
•Office. 

"The American Government considers it desirable that the current unsatis- 
factory situation with regard to the status and control of the port of Dairen be 
promptly considered by the Cliinese and Soviet Governments with a view to 
the implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Soviet-Chinese agree- 
ment of August 14, 1945, in regard to Dairen. This Government perceives no 
reason why there should be further delay in reopening the port, under Chin^^se 
•administration, to international commerce as contemplated in the aforementioned 
•agreement. 

"The Government of the United States, while fully appreciating that this is a 
matter for direct negotiation between the Chinese and Soviet Governments, feels 
that it has a responsibility to American interests in general to I'aise the question 
with the two directly interested Governments. It hopes that the abnormal con- 
ditions now prevailing at Dairen may be terminated at an early date and that 
normal conditions may be established which will permit American citizens to 
visit and reside at Dairen in pursuit of their legitimate activities. 

"In the foregong connection this Government also wishes to express the hope 
that agreement can be reached soon for the resumption of traffic on the Chinese 
Changchun Railway. 

"It is believed that prompt implementation of the agreements with regard to 
Dairen and the railway would constitute a major contribution to the reestablish- 
ment of normal conditions in the Far East and the revival of generally beneficial 
commercial activity. This Government therefore would be glad to have the 
assurance of the Chinese and Soviet Governments that all necessary steps to this 
end will be taken in the near future." 



2296 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Enclosure to Letter, January 22, 1952, to Senator McCarran Regarding JoHif 

Carter Vincent 

Department of State, 

October 5, 1945. 
For the press. No. 732 

Confidential release for publication at 7 p. m., e. s. t., Saturday, October 6, 1945. 
Not to be previously published, quoted from, or used in any way 

Following is the text of an NBC network broadcast from the State, War, and 
Navy Departments, the 34th in a series entitled Our Foreign Policy. 

Subject: "Our Occupation Policy for Japan." 
Participants : 

1. Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs for the War 

Department. 

2. Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the OflSce of Far Eastern Affairs, 

Department of State, and Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee- 
of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. 

3. Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. Navy, representative of the Navy Depart- 

ment, on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy 
Coordinating Committee. 

4. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. 
Announcer. Here are headlines fi-om Washington : 

General Hilldring says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese big business, will be broken 
up; states we will not permit Japan to rebuild her big combines; promises pro- 
tection of Japanese democratic groups against attacks by military fanatics. 

John Carter Vincent of State Department forecasts end of National Shinto; 
says that the institution of the Emperor will have to be radically modified, and 
that democratic parties in Japan will be assured rights of free assembly and 
free discussion. 

Captain Dennison of Navy Department says Japan will not be allowed civil 
aviation ; predicts that Japanese will eventually accept democracy, and em- 
phasizes naval responsibility for future control of Japan. 

Announcer. This is the 34th in a series of programs entitled Our Foreign 
Policy, featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Govern- 
ment officials and members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people 
of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women 
overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces 
Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. 
Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them. 

This time ,we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on 
"Our Occupation Policy for Japan." Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department ; Major 
General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department, 
and Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the 
Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. 
They will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University 
of the Air. Mr. Fisher. « * * 

Fisher. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio and gen- 
eral public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has 
served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the 
dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese. 

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much 
of the confusion surrounding this debate. But it also raised many questions — 
questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have 
asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned — the State, War, 
and Navy Departments — to interpret further our Japan policy. Here in the 
studio are three men who help to formulate or to execute this policy from day 
to day. General Hilldring is an executive in his capacity as Director of the 
War Department. Tonight the general is sustituting for the Honorable John J. 
McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, who was originally scheduled to speak 
but who is not now in Washington. Mr. Vincent is chairman of the Far Eastern 
subcommittee which formulates our Japan policy for the approval of the State, 
War and Navy Coordinating Committee, and Captain Dennison is a Navy member 
of this same Subcommittee. All three of our guests are "up to their ears," so 
to speak, in the spadework of formulating our occupation policy for Japan. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2297 

General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, 
that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy 
for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that policy is 
determined. 

Hilldring. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will 
try to explain how it is made. The State, War and Navy Coordinating Com- 
mittee — "SWING," we call it — formulates policy for the President's approval, 
on questions of basic importance. On the military aspect, the views of the Joint 
Chiefs of StafC are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry 
the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation 
forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. 
And we think he is doing it very well. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern Subcommittee of which you are chair- 
man does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it. 
Vincent. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far 
Eastern policy, and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. 
We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with 
which General Hilldring is associated and which Captain Dennison and I sit 
with in an advisory capacity. 

Hilldring. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the 
Secretaries of the three Departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James 
Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secre- 
tary of the Navy, Artemus Gates. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, a lot of people would like to know whether there is a — 
shall we say — strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State 
Department. 

Vincent. No ; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There 
is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and 
the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our 
support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment. 

Fisher. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian 
advisers. 

Vincent. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists 
have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has 
wfelcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with 
specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to 
send more and more such people out. 

FiSHEE. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, Captain 
Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. 
Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and 
voice in, our policy for Japan. 

Dennison. We have a vital interest in it. The large part that the Navy was 
called upon to play in the defeat of Japan is a measure of that interest. Japan 
is an island country separated from us by a broad expanse of ocean. Its con- 
tinued control will always present a naval problem. 

Fisher. What part is the Navy playing now in that control? 
Dennison. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty 
they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General Mac- 
Arthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in Civil Affairs 
administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former 
Japanese Mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands. 
Fishek. Including Okinawa? 
Dennison. Yes. 

Fisher. That's not generally known, is it? 

Dennison. No, I believe not. I'd like to add that besides these immediate 
duties, our Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan, where neces- 
sary, long after our troops are withdrawn. 

Fisher. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as Chairman of the Subcom- 
mittee which drafts our occupation policy, to give us in a word a statement of our 
over-all objectives. 

Vincent. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces 
and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize J.^pan — to 
encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not 
again become a menace to the peace and security of the world. 
Fisher. And how long do you think that will take, Mr. Vincent? 
Vincent. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the 
Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue 



2298 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue 
until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its 
form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American 
democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic 
tendencies. 

Fisher. General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan? 

HiLLDRiNG. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of 
clairvoyance I don't possess. I .iust don't know how long it will take to accom- 
plish our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, 
until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned. 

Fisher. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union, participate in formulating occupation policy and in carrying 
out the actual occupation? 

Hilldring. That is not a question which the soldiers should decide. It involves 
matters of hi?h policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. 
I be'ieve Mr. Vincent should answer that question. 

Fisher. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it? 

Vincent. Immediately following the Japanese surrender the United States 
proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Commission as a means of regularizing 
and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested 
in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced from 
London that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies 
for the control of Japan. In addition to the four principal powers in the Far 
East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the 
Commission. 

Fisher. Coming back to our first objective — General Hilldring, what about 
the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone? 

Hilldring. Disarmament of the Japanese foi'ces in the four main islands is 
virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning dis- 
armed troops to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems 
and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors. 

Fisher. And the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia? 

Hilldring. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on 
shipping are urgent and the return of our own troops is the highest proirity. Re- 
lief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated ; the return of Jaip- 
anese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place. 

Fisher. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the 
Japanese forces scattered through Asia? 

Dennison. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close 
to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for 
the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home. 

Fisher. And what is to be done with the Japanese Navy** 

Dennison. Such remnants as are left might well be destroyed. 

Fisher. Now, there are some other less obvious parts of the military system — 
the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecut- 
ing liberal, antimilitarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be 
done about that? 

Vincent. That vicious system will be abolished. Not only the top chiefs, but 
the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its hold on the 
Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have 
to be substituted for it. 

Dennison. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, 
and not an army in the guise of police. 

Hilldring. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already 
abolished the Kempai and political police. 

Fisher. It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, 
is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese govern- 
ment from the Emperor on down. 

Vincent. One of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the 
constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the constitution which would hamper 
the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible only to the 
people of Japan must be removed. 

Fisher. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government? 

Vincent. The institution of the Emperor — if the Japanese do not choose to 
get rid of it — will have to be radically modified. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2299 

Dennison. The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and 
will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives 
sent to General MacArthur establish that point. 

FisiiER. Can you give us the sense of the directive that covers that point, 
Captain Dennison? 

Den>'ison. I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur 
said, "1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule 
the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 
You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. 
Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an uncondi- 
tional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any 
question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope. 

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to 
the extent that sucli an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does 
not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the 
orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem neces- 
sary, including the use of force." That's the directive under which General 
MacArthur is operating. 

FisHEK. That's clear enough. Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with 
our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference 
between them? 

Hir.LDiaNO. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Re- 
duced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again 
breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of 
control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national govern- 
ment, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government and 
our controls must, in general, be imposed locally. 

FisifEK. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of 
the national government in Japan? 

HiLi.DUiNC,. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the 
national government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese gov- 
ernment available to our use. we would have to operate directly the whole com- 
plicated machine required for the administration of a counti-y of seventy mil- 
lion people. These people differ from us in language, customs and attitudes. By 
cleaning up and using the Japanese government machinery as a toui, we are 
saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we 
are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing 
the specifications. 

Fisher. But some peo[ile argue. General, that by utilizing the Japanese gov- 
ernment, we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't 
this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry 
persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression? 

Hilldring. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Ja- 
panese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy 
I'equires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be re- 
moved. The desires of the Japanese government in this respect are immaterial. 
Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur. 

Dennison. Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not 
to support it. It's lai'gely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to 
feel out the situation. 

FiSHEK. Would you say. Captain Dennison. that when our forces first went 
to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite? 

Dennison. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General 
MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has corres- 
pondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies. 

Fisher. He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians. 
Ml' Vincent. Some of them look pretty guilty to me. 

Vincent. The old gang is on its way out. The Higashi-Kuni Cabinet resigned 
this week, of course. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be 
like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the 
last onf^. If any Japanese offi'ial is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to 
hold office, of course, he will go out. 

Fisher. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet be tried as war 
criminals? 



2300 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Vincent. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we 
can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being 
war criminals will be arrested and tried. Even Cabinet status would be no 
protection. 

HiLLDRiNG. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they 
are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jaclison is 
applying in Germany are being used in Japan. 

Dennison. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they 
are punished — not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not. 

Fisher. All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, 
let me ask you this : Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu — the big indus- 
trialists — who have cooperated with the militarists, and profited by the war, 
among the guilty ? 

Dennison. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall 
that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals. 

Fisher. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrial- 
ists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power? 

Hilldring. Under our policy, all fascists and jingos — militarists — will be 
removed, not only from public oflBce but from positions of trust in industry and 
education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's 
war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. There's 
no other way to accomplish it. 

Fisher. What do you say about the Zaibatsu, Mr. Vincent? 
Vincent. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those 
members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General 
Hilldring has said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines 
have over the economy of Japan — combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
and Tasuda, to name the most prominent. 
Fisher. And the financial combines as well? 

Vincent. Yes. General Mac-Arthur, as you've probably heard, has already 
taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them 
of their loot. 

Fisher. Well, there's no feeling of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu" 
here. * * * Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous? 

Dennison. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. 
Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and 
arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occu- 
pation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about 
this war, the Zaibatsu or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war 
criminal. 

Fisher. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany 
has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farben- 
industrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in 
Japan. What about that? 

Hilldring. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are not rebuilding the big 
trusts in Germany, we have not rebuilt them, and we are not going to rebuild 
them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only 
will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans 
or Japanese to do so. 

Fisher. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes? 
Hilldring. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or 
maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions or implements of war, as well as 
naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the 
reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a 
modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, 
as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment and automotive 
equipment. 

Vincent. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese econ- 
omy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under 
our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural 
resources to the ends of peaceful living. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything 
being done to combat unemployment — among the millions of demobilized soldiers, 
for example? 

Vincent. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving 
their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing, 
and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2301 

work to do in every city. And we have no intention of interfering with any 
attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll 
give them all the encouragement we can. 

Fisher. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of 
heavy war industry? 

Vincent. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries that Japan is allowed 
to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy 
will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more 
and more for their domestic market. 

Fisher. They'll have to have some foreign trade, of course, to keep going. 

Vincent. Of course, but not the unhealthful sort they had before the war, 
A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military 
preparations, and not to support her internal economy ; after all, scrap iron and 
oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign 
trade well below the prewar level and still have a standard of living comparable 
to what they had before the war. 

Fisher. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over 
there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our 
policy be on food? 

Hilldring. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does 
not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this 
winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other 
occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy popu- 
lations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that 
might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The 
Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports. 

Fisher. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going 
to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine? 

Dennison. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy — that's 
the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships 
shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's 
imports, in order to keep her from rearming — and the best way to do that may 
be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships. 

Fisher. Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of 
people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some 
Japanese transports planes to resume operations. 

Dennison. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General 
MacArthur's directive in this field, no civil aviation will be permitted in Japan. 

Vincent. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific 
emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency. 

Fisher. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of 
the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big indus- 
trialists will be? 

Vincent. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agri- 
culture on a more democratic economic base. Our policy favors a wider distribu- 
tion of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But 
those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself — and 
will, I have no doubt. 

Fisher. And the labor unions? What about them? 

Vincent. We'll encourage the development of trade unionism, Mr. Fisher, 
because that's an essential part of democracy. 

Fisher. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals 
are still in jail. What has been done to get them out? 

Vincent. General INIacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons 
imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs. 

Fisher. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces 
in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces? 

Dennison. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among 
the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a 
constructive reform program. 

Vincent. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured 
the rights of free assembly and public discussion. The occupation authorities 
are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. 
The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to 
freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press. 

Fisher. I take all this to mean that all democratic and antimilitarist groups 
will all be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group 
tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods? 



2302 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Vincent. It would be wiped out. One of General MacArthur's directives calls 
for '"the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says 
that "changes in the direction of modifjing authoritarian tendencies of the 
government are to be permitted and favored." 

Fisher. And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to 
attain their objectives? 

Vincent. In that event, the U. S. Supreme Commander is to intervene only 
where necessary to pi'otect our own occupation forces. This implies that to 
achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese may even use force. 

Dennison. We are not interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as such. 
I think we should make that doubly clear. 

Fisher. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been 
the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand 
that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting 
together in one party — a Socialist Party. What stand will we take on that, 
General Hilldring? 

HiLLDRiNG. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every 
encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in 
Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attacks by military 
fanatics. 

Fisher. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way 
for the democratic forces. 

Hilldring. We're prepared to support tlie development of democratic govern- 
ment even though some temporary disorder may result — so long as our troops 
and our over-all objectives are not endangered. 

F^isHER. Mr. Vincent, will we do anything about reforming Japan's election 
laws? 

Vincent. The Japanese themselves have already advocated some reforms in 
the election laws, to reduce the age of male voters from 25 to 20, and to permit 
women of 2.5 years and over to vote. We'll give every encouragement to such 
reforms ; but they can be brought about by the Japanese people themselves, if 
they have a government that does more than pay lip service to democracy. 

Fisher. 1 have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will 
be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that is called National 
Shinto? 

Vincent. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not 
to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, insofar as it is directed by the 
Japanese Government, and is a measure enforced from above by the government, 
is to be done away with. People would not be taxed to support National Shinto 
and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools. Shintoism as a state 
religion — National Shinto, that is — will go. 

Fisher. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto. 

Vincent. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemina- 
tion of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will 
be completely suppressed. And the Japanese Government will be required to 
cease financial and other support of Shinto establishments. 

Fisher. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That 
will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent. 

Vincent. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their 
schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalist leanings 
are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible. 

Dennison. That's where the real change must stem from — the school system. 
The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes 
for the older generation as well. 

Fisher. And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison. 

Dennison. How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives 
into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through 
all channels — school texts, press, radio, and so on. 

Fisher. What's the basis for your optimism, Captain? 

Dennison. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many 
Japanese outside of Japan. The Japanese-Americans in Hawaii used to send 
their children to Japan at the age of about seven, I think, to spend a year with 
their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the 
life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii 
comnletely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during 
the war. 

Fisher. What accounts for that loyalty? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 2303 

Dennison. Simply that they liJce life in America better. At that age, it's the 
Ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they lilie. Well, I believe that the 
people in Japan will like our ways, too. I thinli once they have a taste of them — 
of real civil liberties — they'll never want to go back to their old ways. 

HiLLDRiNG. Im inclined to agree. Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possi- 
ble we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the 
people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack — they've 
been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated 
with one basic idea : obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them. 

Vincent. Or it may make it more dlfiicult, General. It depends on how you 
look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if 
they're to have a real, working democracy. 

HiLLDRiNG. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. 
And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done. 

Fisher. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese 
under the occupation? 

Vincent. Well, recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned 
to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good 
•evidence of a willingness to cooperate witli the occupying forces. But, because 
of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and 
encouragement will bring about tlie emergence of sound democratic leadership. 
We shouldn't try to "hustle the East," or liustle General MacArthur, too much. 
Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, 
wisely initiated and carefully fostered. 

Fisher. Well thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you. General Hilldring 
and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupa- 
tion policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic 
policy — one which is aimed at giving no encouragement to the impei'ialistic, and 
every possible encouragement to tlie prodemocratic forces whicli are now begin- 
ning to reappear in Japan. 

Announcer. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of 
the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department ; Major General John H. 
Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department ; and Captain R. L. Denni- 
son, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War 
and Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by 
Selden Menet'ee. * * * This was the 34th of a series of broadcasts on 
Our Foreign Policy, presented as a public service by the NBC University of the 
_Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at ten cents each in 
coin. If you would like to receive copies of the br-oadcasts, send $1.00 to 
cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large 
orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, 
New York 20, New York. (Let me repeat that address for those of you who wish 
to write it down : Send your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio 
City, New York 20, New York. Ten cents in coin for one broadcast, $1.00 for 
a series of thirteen reprints.) 

NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to 
present a special State Department program on our Latin-American policy, 
with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the Inter-American Con- 
ference at Rio de Janiero. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State 
Spruille Eraden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. 
Briggs, Director of the Office of American Repub'ic Affairs. Listen in next week 
at the same time for this important program. Kennedy Ludlam speaking, from 
\Washington, D. C. ♦ * * 



INDEX TO PART VII 



Note.- — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organ- 
ization in this index. 

A 

Page 

Acheson, Dean 2002, 2124, 2127, 2158, 2188, 2218, 2250, 2272, 2288 

Adenauer, Chancellor 2188 

Adler, Solomon 2214, 2215, 2250 

AFL (American Federation of Labor) 2161 

Allied High Commission 2184,2188 

Allied Powers 2089, 2090, 2091, 2164, 2167, 

2170, 2184, 2186, 2187, 2236, 2237, 2281, 2282, 2284, 2285, 2298, 2299 

Alsop, Joseph 2031, 2070, 2084, 2280 

Amerasia 2088, 2089, 2090, 2092, 2110, 2111, 2114, 2120, 2121, 

2148, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2182, 2183, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2191, 2213, 2241 

American Association for the United Nations 2139 

American B-29's 2060 

American Bar Association 2270 

American Civil Liberties Union 2160 

American Council (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2006, 

2014, 2015, 2016, 2093, 2096, 2115, 2116, 2133, 2245, 2246, 2247. 

American Delegation (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2104,2127,2133 

American Embassy (Moscow) 2295 

American Federation of Labor (AFL) 2161 

American Federation of Teachers National Convention 2161, 2162 

American Government 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 

2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 
2177, 2183, 2187? 2193, 2207, 220S, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2215, 
2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295 

American Legation (Bern) 2294 

American Navy 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180, 2181, 

2182, 2193, 2203, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296 

American Progressives 161 

American Psychology Society . 2162 

Annual Foreign Trade Convention (Waldorf-Astoria Hotel) 2256 

AP (Associated Press) 2188, 2255, 2273 

Armed Forces Radio Service 2162, 2296 

Army Intelligence Group (United States) 2051,2060,2070,2071,2290 

Armed Forces (United States) 2001 

2007, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070-2072, 
2075, 2076, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 
2197-2199, 2200-2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2250, 2252, 
2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301. 

Associated Press (AP) 2188, 2255, 2273 

Atcheson, George 2076, 2102 

Atkinson, Ellen 2116 

Atwood, Stanley 2161 

Austern, Hilda . 2115 

Australian Government 2013-2016, 2170 

Australian Legation (Washington) 2125 

B 

Bacon, Miss Ruth 2036 

Bailey, K. H 2124, 2125 

Ballantine, Joseph W 2106, 2120, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2141 

Bank of Japan 2231 

I 
22848— 52— pt. 7 21 



II INDEX 

Page 

Baptist Church 2294 

Bai-nett, Robert W 2248 

Barnett, Mrs. Robert W 2248 

Bay Region Committee (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2138, 2139 

B.'lirstocls, Artlmr 2254 

Belshaw, Horace 2124, 2126, 2141 

Bentley, Elizabeth 2215 

Benton, Mr. William 2158 

Berendsen, Sir Carl 1 2248 

Berlin Diary 2103 

Between War and Peace 2193 

Bevin, Ernest 2169, 2170 

Bisson, T. A 1998, 2005, 2222 

Blair Lee House 2122, 2124, 2129, 2143 

Blakeslee, George H 2017, 2124 

Blenman, Commander William 2180-2182 

Bloody Ku (Ku Cheng-lun) 2291 

Bloom, Sol 2124, 2127, 2129, 2131, 2132 

Bolshevik 2270 

Bolton, Mrs. Frances 2124, 2127, 2133, 2248 

Bomber Command (20th, Airfield) 2290 

Borton, Huiih 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245 

Braden, Spruille 2260, 2303 

Briggs, Ellis O 2169, 2303 

British Foreign Office 2250 

British Government 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2090, 2091, 2125, 

2104, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2265, 2297 

British Troops (Hong Kong) 2017 

Budenz, Louis Francis 2092, 2274, 2276, 2279, 2280 

Bunce, Arthur C 2249, 2250 

Bunche, Ralph 2124 

Bvington, Homer M 2186 

Byrnes, James F 2120, 2124, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2197, 2198, 

2199, 2200, 2201, 2203, 2204, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2251, 2257, 2295, 2298 



Cairo Declaration 2207, 2209, 2210 

California University ^ 2109 

Cammon, Mr. Schuyler 2248 

Canadian Government 2170 

Canton-Kowloon Railway 2090, 2091 

Carmode. Mr 2250 

Carter, Edward C— 1998,2020,2087,2115,2116,2124,2126,2127,2146,2246,2248 

Carter, Mrs. Edward C 2020,2021 

Carter W. D 2248 

Caxton Printers 2283 

Central Chinese Government 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187, 2201, 2218 

Central Committee (CPSU) 2270 

Central Labor Council, AFL (Seattle Teachers Union) 2161 

Chambers, Whittaker 2215 

Changchun Railway 2295 

Chang, Cliun 2291 

Cliang, Fa-kwei 2289, 2291 

Chase, Mr 2088 

Chen, Cheng 2288, 2291 

Chen, K. P 2290, 2292 

Chen, Li-fu 2253, 2254, 2290 

Chennault, Gen. C. L 2031, 2076, 2287, 2291, 2293 

Chiang Kai-shek 2010, 2013, 2028, 2030, 2031, 

2034, 2035, 2037, 2039, 2040-2043, 2045-2049, 2051, 2052, 2055-2061, 
2083, 2064-2069, 2071-2074, 2081, 2086, 2087, 2095, 2103, 2104, 2186, 
2201, 2206, 2207, 2216, 2217-2218, 2220, 2243, 2254, 2255, 2287-2294 

Chiang Kai-shek, Madame 2045, 2061, 2062, 2065, 2078, 2081, 2291 

Chiang, Mon-lin 2124, 2125 

Childs, Marquis 2248 



INDEX in 

Page 

•^^China Aid Council ^_ 2020, 2059 

China Mission (Henry Wallace Summary Report) 2037, 2038, 2080, 2081 

Chinese Clianwlnm Railway 2295 

Chinese Communist Guerrilla Troops 2090, 2143, 2186, 2206, 2209, 2211 

•Chinese Embassy (Hong Kong) 2125 

Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 2290 

Chinese National Assembly 2259 

Chinese National Military Council 2J18 

Chinese Nationalist Army 2012, 

2073, 2090, 2143, 2202, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212 

Chinese Nationalist Goverment 2001, 

2010-2013, 2044, 2046, 2056-2059, 2070, 2071, 2077, 2078, 2082, 2090, 
2091, 2094, 2102, 2103-2120, 2170, 2173, 2186, 2187, 2194. 2116, 2202, 
2204-2213, 2215-2217, 2219, 2250, 2253-2256, 2288, 2289, 2293, 2295 

Chinese Republic 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215 

Chinese Stabilization Fimd 2214 

Chou En-lai 2000, 2001, 2002, 2186, 2294 

Christian Science Monitor 2185,2186 

Chungking Embassy 1999, 

2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188 

Churchill, Winston 2009, 2293 

CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) 2242 

Civil Affairs (United States War Department) 2162,2169,2296,2303 

•Civil Information and Education (Tokyo) 2255 

Clare, Mr 2267 

Clayton, Will 2124, 2127, 2128, 2259, 2268 

Clubb, Oliver Edmund 11,98 

Coffee, John M 2243 

Cohen, Ben - 2218 

Colclough, Capt. O. S 2181 

Columbia University 2-40 

Combat Intelligence (Navy Department) 2181 

Committee for Constitutional Government in New York 2283 

Committee for a Democratic Far p]astern Policy 2058 

Committee on Foreign Affairs (United States House of Representatives 2129, 

2131 

Committee for Financing Foreign Trade 2260 

Committee on Foreign Relations (United States Senate) 1997, 

2129, 2131, 2201, 2203 

Commonwealth Club (San Francisco) 2237 

Communications Division (Navy Department) 2181 

Communism-Marxism-Leninism 2270 

Communist International 2066, 20r)7 

Communist International (Workers of All Countries, United) 2066 

Communist Manifesto 2270 

Communist Party 20"0, 

2001, 2010, 2013, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2026-2028, 2039-2041, 2044-2055, 
2057-2059, 2061-2064, 2066-2073, 2075-2078, 2082, 2083, 2085, 2')89, 
2091-2095, 2100-2103, 2112. 2121, 21:6. 2146, 2156, 2157, 2160, 2161, 
2172-2180, 2185-2187. 2190-2195. 2206-2209. 2211, 2212, 2214-2220, 
2243, 2253, 2254, 2270, 2273, 2279, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295 

Communist Party (China) 2000, 

2001, 20010-2013, 2022-2026, 2039-2047, 20 !9, 2051-20:8, 2061-2073, 
2075-2078, 2082. 2083, 2094, 2102, 2103, 2146, 2177, 2185, 21S6, 2195, 
2206, 2212, 2216-2219, 2243, 2254, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294. 

Communist Party (Fi-ance) 2010 

Communist Party (Italy) 1011 

Communist Party (Japan) 2089, 

2091, 2121, 2160, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 
2180, 2185, 2187, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193. 

Communist Party (New York State Committee) 2243 

Communist I'arty (Russia) 2047, 2066, 2067, 20^5, 2179, 2270 

Communist Party (United States) 2046, 

2047, 2049, 2053, 2054, 2112, 2160, 2161, 2214, 2215, 2243, 2279, 
2294. 



IV INDEX 

Page 
Comparison of the Communist Party line and tlie activities and affiliations 
of certain professors at the University of Washington 2160, 

2161, 2162, 2]vS3 

Congress (United States) 2127, 2131, 2132, 2162, 2243, 2296 

Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 2242 

Congressional Record 2237, 2294 

Connally, Tom 2124, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134 

Connor, King Ramsey 2161 

Cmistitution. (SS) steamship 2273 

Continuation of discussion on Comrade Dimitrov's report 2066 

Cooke, Admiral Charles Maynard 2013 

Cooperative Societies Law (Japan) 2234 

Cornell University 2255 

Cosmos Club 2294 

Council of American-Soviet Friendship 2086, 2087 

Coville, Lillian 2116, 2248 

Cox, Oscar 20O4 

Currie, Lauchlin 2002, 

2003, 2004, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2079, 2081, 2082, 2086, 2087 

Crowley, George T 2004 

Currie Report 2082 

D 
Daily Worker 2161 

Davies, John Paton, Jr 2003 

DeLacy, Hush 2160, 2161 

Democratic Party — 2294 

Dennett, Raymond , 2006, 

2007, 2008, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2079, 2080, 2093, 2094, 2100, 2124, 
2127, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2150. 
Dennison, Capt. R. L 2157, 

2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2296-2303. 

Detroit American Federation of Teachers Convention 2162 

Dickey, Mr 2124 

Dickover, Mr 2124 

Diet (Japan) 2231, 2234 

Dilemma in Japan j* 2243 

Dimitrov Report (continuation of discussion) 2066 

Dooman, Eugene C 2124, 2127, 2153, 2155, 2193, 2250 

Douglas, Helen Gahagan 2248 

DuBois, Mr. (Josiah) 2222 

DuBois, Miss Cora 2248 

Dumljarton Oaks 2135 

Dunn, James C 2124,2127,2163,2193,2297 

Dyke, Gen. Ken R 2248 

E 

Eastern Germany 2184 

Eaton, Mr 2124 

Eby, Harold 2161 

Edwards, Corwin D 2222, 2225 

Edwards Report 2222, 2225 

Eggleston, Sir Frederic 2124, 2125 

Eighth Route Army 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187 

Elliston, Herbert 2248 

Embree, John 2248 

Emmerson, John K 2003,2063,2156,2248 

Emperor of Japan__ 2094, 2095, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2170, 2174, 2176, 2296, 2298, 2299 

Empress of China (SS) (steamship) 2256 

Ensels 2270 

Epstein. Israel 2063, 2243, 2266 

Ethel, Garland 2161 

European Affairs Office (State Department) 2127 

Export-Import Bank 2263,2264, 2288 



INDEX V 

F 

Page 

Fail-bank, Johu K 2018 

Far East 2121 

Far East Subcommittee of State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee 

( FESWNCC) 2152, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297 

Far Eastern Commission (FEC) 2125 

2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298 

Far Eastern Commission Policy (Economic Power in Japan) 2224 

Farley, Miriam S 2017,2018,2022 

Farmer, Victor 2124, 2125 

Farquharson . 2160- 

Fascist Party 2160, 2166, 2174 

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 2112,2117,2148,2242 

FEA (Foreign Economic Administration) 2002,2003,2004,2006,2087 

P'earey, Mr 2124 

FEC (Far East Commission) 2125 

2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2112,2117,2148,2242 

Federal German Government 2185^ 

Ferris, General 2074, 2075, 2292 

FESWNCC (Far East Subcommittee of State, War, Navy Coordinating 

Committee) 2152, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297 

Field, Fredericli V 2219, 2220, 2221 

Fish, Mr 2278 

Fisher, Sterling. 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2171, 2175, 2296, 2303 

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2105 

Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) 2002,2003,2004,2006,2087 

Foreign Policy Association 2193 

Foreign Relations Committee (United States Senate) 1997 

Foreign Service (United States) 2029,2101,2105,2144,2241,2244,2272 

Foreign Service Journal 2240,2242 

Foreign Trade (Committee for Financing) 2260 

Forman, Harrison 2185, 2186 

Fortas, Abe 2248 

Forty-fourth Street Book Fair 2243 

Foundations of Leninism 2270 

Fox, Manuel 2214 

French Government 2010, 2170 

Friedman, Julian R 2105, 2106, 2107, 2109, 2113, 2114, 2120, 2124, 2241, 2266 

G 

Gates, Artemus 2163, 2297 

Gauss, Clarence E 2029, 

2045, 2063, 2075, 2088, 2178, 2185, 2187, 2188, 2248, 2288, 2290 

Gayn, Mark 2144 

Geneva Conference (United Nations) 2267 

George Washington University 2127 

Gerig. Benjamin 2248 

German Federal Government 2185 

German Government (Western) 2184 

German police 2184, 2185, 2188 

German trusts 2166, 2300 

Germany (Eastern) 2184 

Germany (Soviet zone) 2184 

Gibarti, Louis 2005, 2006 

Gipson, J. H 2283 

Goglidze, Sergei 2083, 2084, 2085 

Government of Australia 2013-2016, 2170 

Government of Canada 2170 

Government of France 2010, 2170 

Government of Great Britain 2013-2017 

2090, 2091, 2125, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207, 2208-2212, 2265, 2297 

Government of Italy 2011 

Government of Japan 2000, 2043, 2044, 2052, 2068, 2069, 2071, 2076, 2089, 

2091, 2094, 2145, 2153 2154, 2157, 2160, 2162, 2104. 2165, 2167, 2168, 
2170, 2172-2176, 2208, 2226, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2283, 2285, 2299, 2301 



VI INDEX 

Pagfr- 

Government of the Netherlands 2170 

Government of New Zealand 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2170 

Government of the Philippines 2170, 2258 

Government of the United States 2012, 2014, 2015-2017, 

2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 
2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193, 2207, 2208-2213, 2215, 
2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295- 

Government pouch 2103 

Granich, Max 2074- 

Graves, Mortimer 2087, 2214, 2248 

Graves. Mrs. Mortimer 2248 

Great Wall of China 2206; 

Green, Abner 2242 

Green, Gretchen 2115- 

Greenslade, Admiral John W 2136,2138,2139,2140 

Greenstein, Joseph 2220^ 

Gregg, Joseph 2220' 

Grew, Joseph C 2068, 

2079, 2080, 2081, 2106, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2129, 2143, 2193 

Guerrilla troops (Chinese Communists) 2090,2143,2186,2206,2209,2211 

Guild Book Center 2248- 

Gundlach, Ralph H 2161, 2162 

Gyaw, Sir Htoon Aung 2124,2125. 

H 

Hackwith, George 2124. 2127 

Haley, Mr 2124 

Harriman, Ambassador W. Averell 2041-2044 

Harris, George 2248 

Hart, Admiral T. C. (Senator) 2124,2127,2248 

Hattery, Lowell 2248 

Herald Tribune (New York) 2185, 2186-- 

Hicks, Victor 2161 

Higashi-Kuni Cabinet (Japan) 2166.2299^ 

Hilldring, Gen. John H 2157-2159, 2162-2169, 2171, 2222, 2223. 2296-2303- 

Hiss, Alger 2135, 2136-2138, 2140, 2141-2142, 2241 

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 2270' 

Ho Ying-Chin 2074, 2290 

Holding Company Liquidating Commission (Japan) 2225,2229' 

Holland, W. L 2018, 2245 

Holmes, J-ulius 2124, 2127 

Holt, Miss Clare 2248- 

Houan campaign 2090, 2091 

Hoover Library (Stanford University) 2250 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 2017, 2097, 2099, 2135^ 

Home, Admiral F. J 2139 

Hot Springs Conference (IPR) 2104,. 

2123, 2130, 2132, 2133, 2140, 2151, 2219 

House of Representatives (United States) 2127,2132 

House Un-American Activities Committee 2117, 2160, 2215- 

-Hoy Lee Chin, General 2253 

Ho, Ying-Ohin 2074, 2290' 

Hu, Chung-nan 2186- 

Hull, Cordell 2033-2035 

2045, 2079, 2081, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2181, 2187, 2188, 22S7, 2295 

Humelsine, Carlisle H 2202, 2203, 2267, 2268, 2271, 2272, 2278 

Hurley, Ambassador 2000, 2063, 2094, 2107, 2117, 2143, 2144 



Ickes, Harold L 2243,2248 

Institute of Pacific Relations 1997 

1998, 2004-2006, 2014-2020, 2023-2025, 2050. 2059, 2080, 2093. 2096, 
2097-2101. 2104, 2114-2119, 2122-2124, 2127-2134. 2136, 2139, 2140. 
2141. 2144, 2146-2148, 2150, 2151, 2219, 2245-2250, 2266-2269, 2294 

Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 2006, 

2014, 2015, 2016, 2093, 2096, 2115. 2116, 2133, 2245, 2246, 2247. 



INDEX vn 

Page 

Institute of Pacific Relations (American delegation) 2104,2127,2133,2147 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Bay region committee) 2138,2139 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs conference) 2104, 

2123, 2130, 2132, 2133, 2140, 2151, 2219 

Institute of Pacific Relations (New York research staff) 1998 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine delegation) 2125 

Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington branch) 1998,2248 

Intelligence Group (United States Army) 2051,2060,2070,2071,2290 

Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan 2258 

Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janiero) 2303 

Italian Government 2011 



Jaffe, Philip J 2113 

James, Burton 2161 

James, Florence B 2161 

Japanese-American Committee for Democracy (JACD) 2238, 

2239, 2240, 2242, 2243 

Japanese-Americans ( Hawaii ) 2168, 2332 

Japanese Army 2090, 2091, 2092, 2164, 2204, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2298 

Japanese Cabinet (Higashi-Kuni) 2166,2299 

Japanese Cooperative Societies Law 2234 

Japanese Diet 2231, 2234 

Japanese Emperor__ 2094, 2095, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2170, 2174, 2176, 2296, 2298, 2299 

Japanese Government 2000, 

2043, 2044, 2052, 2068, 2069, 2071, 2076, 2089, 2091, 2094, 2145, 2153, 
2154, 2157, 2160, 2162, 2164, 2165, 2167, 2168, 2170, 2172, 2173, 2174, 
2175, 2176, 2208, 2226, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2283, 2285, 229Q, 2301. 

Japanese Holding Company Liquidating Commission 2225, 2229 

Japanese Ministry of Finance 2231 

Japanese Navy 2164, 2298 

Japanese Postal Savings System 2231 

Japanese school system 2168 

Japanese secret police — 2164, 2298 

Japanese surrender policy 2145, 

2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281 

Jefferson Book Store 2243 

Jefferson School 2243 

Jenkins, Mrs. Shirley 2248 

Jessup, Philip C 2104 

Johns Hopkins University 2145, 2146 

Johnson, Hiram 2124, 2127 

Johnson, Nelson T 2224 

Johnstone, William C 2080, 2124, 2127, 2147, 2248 

Johnstone, Mrs. William C 2248 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States) 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297 

Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities 
(Second Report of 1948 on Un-American Activities in the State of 

Washington) 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183 

Joint Soviet-American Commission 2258 

K 

Kauffman, James Lee 2223, 2224 

Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark 2248 

King, Fleet Admiral E. J 2181 

Knowland, William F 2237 

Koo, Ambassador Wellington 2256 

Korean Military Government 2249, 2250 

Ku, Cheng-lun (Bloody Ku)— 2291 

Kung Group 2292 

Kung, Madam H. H 2078, 2292 

Kunzru, H. N 2124 

Kuomintang Government 2010, 2011, 2016, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2043, 2044, 2048, 

2049, 2052, 2062, 2067, 2082, 2186, 2218, 2288, 2292 
Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps 2090, 2187, 2206 



VIII INDEX 

L 

Page 

Labor in Nationalist Cliina 2266 

Landon, Kenneth P 2248 

Larry 2116 

Lasky, Victor 2240 

Lattimore, Owen 2003, 

2028, 2029, 2030, 2063, 2075, 2076, 2080, 2081, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2115, 
2117, 2118; 2119, 2120, 2145, 2147, 2150, 2222, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 
2266, 2287. 
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) __ 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2145, 2147, 

2148, 2247, 2248 

League Against War and Fascism 2160 

Lee, Mr. Canada 2242 

Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder 2270 

Lenin 2047, 2066, 2242, 2243, 2270 

Lenin Memorial Meeting (Madison Square Garden) 2242,2243 

Leninist Communist International 2066 

Library of Congress 2170 

Lilienthal, Philip E ^_2115, 2249 

Lin, Tso-ban 2044 

Lindsey, Michael 2248 

Lippmann, Walter . 2248 

Lo, Tse-Kai 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187 

Local 401, U. of W. Teachers Union - 2161 

Locke, Edwin A 2248 

Lockhart, Mr 2124 

Luce, Henry 2151, 2152 

Ludden, Raymond P 1998, 200.3, 2063 

Ludlam, Kennedy 2169, 2303 

M 

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 21.52, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2158, 

2163, 2165. 2166, 2167, 2168. 2169, 2170, 2172, 2174, 2175, 2177, 2193, 
2223, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2283, 2286, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2301, 2302, 2303 

MacLeish, Archibald 2124 

Madison Square Garden (Lenin Memorial Meeting) 2242.2243 

Manhattan Center 2242 

Mao Tse-tung 2186, 2270 

Marines (United States) 2095 

Marshall Directiye 2195, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2202, 2203, 2215 

Marshall, Gen. George C 2011, 

2012, 2013. 2046, 2051, 2052, 2068. 2073, 2098, 21.50. 2195, 2197. 2198, 
2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2215, 2216, 2218, 
2250, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2259, 2265. 2266, 2295. 

Marshall ]\Iission 2012, 2068, 2205, 2254, 2259, 2265 

Marshall Plan 2265 

Marshall Report 2013, 2254 

Marx, Karl 2022, 2047, 2270 

Mathews, Mr 2124, 2127 

Mayflower Hotel (Pan American Room) 2246 

ISIcCarthy. Senator Joseph M 2294, 2298 

McCloy, John .7 2163, 2184, 2296. 2297 

ISIcDermott, Mr. M. J 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2183, 2184, 2186, 2187, 2188 

McDermott, Maria 2224 

McDougall, Sir Raibeart 2124 

McFayden, Sir Andrew 2125 

Mc.Tennett, Mr 2278 

McMahon. Senator Brien 2236, 2237 

Menefee, Audrey 2116, 2162 

Menefee, Selden 2116, 2158, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2169, 2177, 2303 

Merrill, Lewis 2242 

MethoMst Federation for Social Service 2160 

Meyer, Mr 2124 

Meyer, Eugene . 2248 

Military Goyernment (Korea) . 2249,22.50 

Military Intelligence (War Department) 2051,2060,2070,2071,2290 



INDEX IX 

Page 

Ministry of Finance (Japan) 2231 

Missouri (USS) 2294 

Mitsubishi (Japanese big business firms) 2166,2171,2300 

Mitsui (Japanese big business firms) 2166,2171,2300 

Mofeat, Abbot Low 2124, 2246, 2247, 2248 

Mooney, Tom 2161 

Moorhead, Mrs 2248 

Morizon, Col. Victor 2124, 2126 

N 

Naggiar, Paul Emile 2124, 2125 

National Assembly (China) 2259 

National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) 2116,2160,2162,2163,2169,2296,2303 

National City Bank 2070 

National Foreign Trade Council 2256, 2263 

National Military Council (China) 2218 

National Shinto (Japan) 2162,2168,2302 

Nationalist Chinese Army 2012, 

2073, 2090, 2143, 2202, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212 

Nationalist Chinese Government 2001, 2010- 

2013, 2044, 2046, 2056-2059, 2070, 2071, 2077, 2078, 2082, 2090, 2091, 
2094, 2102-2104, 2125, 2126, 2170, 2173, 2186, 2187, 2194, 2196, 2202, 
2204, 2205-2217, 2219, 2250, 2253, 2254-2256, 2288, 2289, 2293, 2295 

Naval Intelligence Division (Navy Department) 2181 

Naval Operations (Office of Chief) 2180,2181 

Navy (United States ) 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 

2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 2202, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296 

Navy radio personnel 2182 

Nazi Party 2169, 2303 

NBC (National Broadcasting Co) 2116,2160,2162,2163,2169,2296,2303 

Netherlands Government 2170 

New Masses 2161, 2266 

News Letter (China Aid Council) 2020 

News Letter (JACD) 2243 

New York Committee for Constitutional Government 2283 

New York Herald Tribune 2185, 2186 

New York State Committee (Communist Party) 2243 

New York Times 2185, 2186, 2260 

New York World Telegram 2240, 2242 

New Zealand Government 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2170 

North Pacific Conference 2061, 2062, 2064, 2065, 2066 

Northwest Veteran 2160 

Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China 2266 

() 

Obermeir, Michael 2242, 2243 

Office of War Information (OWI) 2003, 2145, 2146, 2287 

Okano, Susumu 2089, 2091, 2121, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2187 

Ottenheimer, Albert 2161 

Our foreign policy 2162, 2169, 2296 

Our occupation policy for Japan 2162, 2296 

OWI (Office of War Information) 2003, 2145, 2146, 2287 



Pacific Island bases 2248 

Pai, Chuns-hsi 2289, 2291 

Palmer, Howard 2248 

Pan American Room (Mayflower Hotel) 2246 

Pasvolsky 2124 

Patent law license 2227 

Patterson, Mr 2271 

Pauley, Edwin M 2221, 2222 

Pauley Commission 2222 

Pauley Report 2221 

Peck, Mr 2124 



X INDEX 

Page 

Penfield, James K 2222, 2249, 2250 

Pentagon Building 2206 

Perkins, Eleanor 2115 

Peurifov, John E 2294 

Philippine Government 2170, 2258 

Philippine Rehabilitation Act 2258 

Philippine Trade Act of 1946 2258 

Phillips, William 2017 

Political Reorientation of Japan (Report) 2236,2237 

Pollard, Mr 2248 

Porter, Catherine 2248 

Postsurrender policy for Japan 2145, 

2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163,2169, 2225, 2281 

Postal Savings System (Japan) 2231 

Postwar Period in the Far East 2193 

Potsdam Declaration 2207, 2209, 2210, 2225, 2282 

Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr 2242 

Pramoj, M. R. Seni 2124, 2126 

Presidential Directive 2202, 2267, 2268 

President's Loyalty Program 2267, 2268 

Press and Radio News Conference (State Department) 2183 

Problems of Communism 2270 

Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution 2270 

Quo, Tai-chi 2290 

R 

Radio City 2169, 2303 

Radio New Conference ( State Department) 2183 

Radio personnel (Navy) 2182 

Radio service (United States Armed Forces) 2162 

Rally for Democratic Japan 2242, 2243 

Rao, B. Shiva 2124 

Ranch, Mrs 2138, 2141 

Rea, Howard 1997, 2079, 2122, 2189 

Reid, E 2124, 2125 

Repertorv Plavhouse (University of Washington, Un-American Activities 

of Certain Professors) 2160,2161,2162,2183 

Republic of China 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215 

Republican Party 2117, 2288, 2294 

Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies, Resolution of 

the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern) 2270 

Riley 2004 

Roosevelt, President Franklin D 2002, 

2009, 2010, 2029, 2031, 2037, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2045, 2046. 2048, 2052, 
2057, 2058, 2062, 2064, 2068, 2072, 2073, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2080, 2081, 
2083, 2087, 2144, 2216, 2269, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2292. 

Roosevelt, James 2284 

Ropes, Clarence 2248 

Rosinger, Laurence 1998, 2004, 2005, 2018. 2145 

Roth. Andrew 2107, 2113, 2114, 2144, 2239, 2241, 2242, 2243 

Roval Institute 2250 

Russia 2000, 2014, 2015. 2017, 2039- 

2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062-2067, 2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 
2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 219.3-2196, 2206-2212, 2217, 2218, 2220, 
2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297 

Russian • Troops 2218, 2219 

Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) 2ia3, 2297 

S 

Sakhalin Agreement 2043 

SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) 2225, 

2226, 2227, 2229, 2230, 2232, 2235, 2236, 2281 

Schuman 2184 

Seattle AFL Central Labor Council (Teachers Union) 2161 

Secret Police (Japan) 2164,2298 



INDEX XI 

Page 

Secretariat (United Nations Conference, San Francisco) 2120, 

2121, 2135, 2136, 2138 

Security in the Pacific 2138 

Service, Joliu S 1997, 1998, 1999, 

2003, 2063, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2083, 2113, 2114, 2213, 2214, 2240, 2241 

Seville Hotel 2005, 2006 

Shao, Yu-lin 2124, 2125 

Shen Hung-lieti 2290 

Sheng, Shih-tsai 2289,2290 

Shiga, Yoshio 2155, 2156, 2157 

Shinto, National (Japan) 2162,2168,2302 

Shirer, William 2103 

Shirley 2116 

Short, Joseph 2286 

Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity 2294 

Silvermaster Spy Group 2250 

Sino-Soviet Negotiations 2062, 2065, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210 

Slagel, Fred 2294 

Slagel, John 2294 

Smedley, Agnes 2005, 2042,2043 

Smith, Rear Adm. Allan E 2294 

Snow, Edgar 2016, 2063 

Socialist Party (Japanese) 2168,2302 

Soong, T. V 2041, 2042, 2043, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291 

Soviet-Chinese Agreement 2295 

Soviet Union 2000, 

2014, 2015, 2017, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062-2067, 2071, 
2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 2193- 
2196, 2206-2212, 2217, 2218, 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287, 
2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297. 

Soviet Zone (Germany) 2184 

Spanish-American War 2257 

Stabilization Fund (China) 2214 

Stachel, Jack 1999 

Staley, Eugene 2116 

Stalin, Joseph 2022, 2043, 2044, 2047, 2270 

Stanford University (Hoover Library) 2250 

Stanton, E. F 1998, 2036, 2039, 2101, 2124, 2141 

State and Revolution 2270 

State Department . 1997—1999 

2001, 2002, 2006-2008, 2012, 2013, 2020-2023, 2026-2028, 2032, 2035- 
2037, 2039, 2044, 2045, 2050-2054, 2058, 2066, 2007, 2070, 2071, 2073, 
2079, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2088-2095, 2097-2102, 2105, 2100, 2109- 
2112, 2114, 2120-2124, 2127-2133, 2136, 2138-2149, 2151, 2152, 2156, 
2157-2160, 21G2, 2169, 2170, 2177, 2178, 2181, 2183, 2185, 2187, 2188, 
2191, 2193-2197, 2199, 2200, 2202, 2203-2208, 2210, 2215, 2217-2219, 
2221-2224, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2240-2247, 2249-2253, 2255, 2256, 2261, 
2264, 2267-2272, 2273-2275, 2277, 2278, 2287, 2294-2298, 2303. 

State Department (Biographical Division) 2141, 2142, 2143 

State Department (Building Guard Office) 2294 

State Department (Bulletin) 2170, 2195, 2196, 2208, 2210, 2277 

State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) 1998, 2006, 2008, 2020, 2039, 

2066, 2082, 2088, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2105, 2106, 2120, 2142 

State Department (Division of Communications and Records) 2121 

State Department (Division of Far Eastern Affairs) 1998, 

2002, 2012, 2028, 2037, 2050, 2051, 2058, 2066, 2071, 2099, 2101, 2105, 
2106, 2110, 2120, 2123, 2142, 2152, 2159, 2162, 2169, 2202, 2203, 2219, 
2222, 2239, 2240, 2243, 2251, 2255, 2256, 2294-2298, 2303. 

State Department (Employee Loyalty Investigations) 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241 

State Department (FEC 230) 2222, 2223, 2224, 2236, 2237 

State Department (Legal Advisers Office) 2237, 2274, 2275, 2278 

State Department (Loyalty Board) 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241 

State Department (Office of American Republic Affairs) 2169, 2303 

State Department (Office of Economic Adviser) 2249 

State Department (Office of European Affairs) 2127 

State Department (Press Office) 2158, 2188 



XII INDEX 

Pa" 

State Department (Press and Radio News Conference) 2183 

State Department (Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43) 2218, 2219 

State Department (Public Relations Division) 2278 

State Department (Radio News Conference) 2183 

State Department (Register) 2219 

State Department (Security Division) 2054, 

2110, 2111, 2112, 2215, 2240, 2241, 2243, 2244, 2245 

State Department (White Paper) 2039. 

2049, 2055, 2088. 2201, 2206, 2251, 2253, 2269, 2287 
State, War, Navv Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 2094, 

2095, 2149. 2150, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169. 2193, 

2222. 2223. 2250, 2296, 2297. 

Steak House (Anthony's) 2096 

Stein. Guenther 2186 

Steintorf, Mr , 2124 

Stewart, Mrs. Marguerite Ann 2115, 2116, 2118. 2147. 2148 

Stewart. Maxwell S 2017, 2018, 2022, 2023. 2025. 20.57 

Stilwell, General Joseph 2001, 

2034, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2077, 2083, 2288, 2292. 2293 

Stimson. Secretary Henry L 20.51, 2052 

Stufflebeam, Robert E 2121-2122 

Sumitomo (Japanese big business) 2166, 2171 

Sunagos, Mr 22.50 

Sunday News 21(>1 

Sun Fo 2076. 2290 

Sun. Yat-.sen. Dr 2077. 2209, 2212 

Sun. Yat-sen. Madam 2020, 2021, 2058, 2076, 2077, 2078. 2290 

Surrender Policy for Japan 2145, 

2152, 2153, 21.54, 2162, 2163. 21^9. 2225. 2281 

Surrey. Walter Sterling 1997,2079.2122.2189 

Swing, Raymond Gram 2022, 2248 

SWNCC (State. War. Navy Coordinatins Committee) 2094, 

2095, 2149. 2150. 2152. 2153, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2193. 

2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297. 



Taft. Mr. Charles P 2124, 2127 

Tally-Ho Restaurant (Washington) 1999 

Terrill, Katherine 2242 

Third International 2046, 2062 

Thomas, Elbert D 2248 

Tillie 2117 

Times (New York 2185. 2186. 2260 

Tito for .Japan 2089, 2091, 2121, 2179, 2187 

Tokuda, Kyuchi ^ 2155, 2156. 2157 

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (China) 2259 

Truman, President 203S, 

21.53. 2195. 2196, 2197. 2198, 2200. 2201. 2202. 2203. 2204, 2208, 2210, 
?'?11. 2212. 224.3. 2251 2253 22.54. 2257. 2260 2268. 2286. 2287, 2289 

Truman, Mrs. Harry___I . ' '_ __1 ^ 2289 

Truman. Miss Margaret 2289 

Trusts (German) 2166, 2300 

Turner, Bill 2101, 2117 

Turner, Bruce 2124, 2125 

Twentieth Bomber Command 2290 

Tyler, R. G 2160, 2161 

U 

Un-American Activities Committee (House) 2117, 2160, 2215 

Un-American Activities in Washington State 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183 

Unfinished Revolution in China 2266 

United Nations 2120. 2121. 21,34. 2135. 21.36. 2138, 

2139. 2140. 2141. 2149, 2208, 2209. 2210, 2211, 2212, 2220, 2236. 2''67 
United Nations Conference (Fi-eedom of Information, Geneva) 2267 



INDEX XIII 

Page 

United Nations Conference ( San Francisco) 2120, 

2121, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2149, 2220 

United Nations (Secretariat) 2120, 2121, 2135, 2136, 1:138 

United Uftice and Professional Workers (CIO) 2242 

United Press (UP) 2184 

United States Air Force (USAF) 2290 

United States Armed Forces 2^01, 

200 r, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070-2072, 
2075, 2076, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163. 2167, 217S, 21^0, 21ftl, 21»2, 2193, 
2197-2199, 2200-2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2250, 2252, 
2289, 2290, 22ti2, 2294, 2-96, 2301. 

United States Congress 2127, 2131, 2132, 2162, 2243, 2296 

United States Embassy (Cliungking) 1999, 

2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188 

United States Embassy (Moscow) 2295 

United States Foreign Service 2029, 2101, 2105, 2144, 2241, 2244, 2272 

United States Government .. 2U12, 

2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 
2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193, 
2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2215, 2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 
2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295. 

United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2129, 2131 

United States House of Representatives 2127, 2132 

United States Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan 2145, 

2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281 

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297 

United States Library of Congress 2170 

United States Marines 2095, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211 

United States Navy 2007, 

2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 
2203, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296. 

United States Policy in Korea 2249 

United States Policy toward China 2196, 

2198, 2200, 2208, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2218, 2251 

United States Senate 1997, 2127, 2218, 2268, 2271, 2286 

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1997, 

2129, 2131, 2201, 2203 

United States War D?partment 2012, 

2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2075, 2076, 2143, 2162, 
2163, 2167, 2193, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2206, 
2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 
2296, 2301. 

University of Caliiornia 2109 

University of Stanford (Leland Stanford) 2250 

University of the Air (NBC) 2162, 2163, 2169, 2296, 2303 

University of Washington ( Un-American activities of certain professors ) __ 2160, 

2161, 2162, 2183 

UNRRA (United Nations Rehabilitation Relief) 2003, 2259 

U. of W. Teachers Union (University of Washington) 2161 

UP (United Press) 2184 

tjSAF (United States Air Force) 2290 

Usene, Julm 2248 

Ussachevsky, Betty 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2147, 2150, 2248 

U. S. S. R 2000, 

2014, 2015, 2017, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2046, 2047, 20.59, 2062-2067, 
2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 
2193-2196, 2206-2212, 2217. 2218. 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 
2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297. 

V 

Vincent, John Carter 1997-2121, 2122-2180, 2182-2303 

Visman, Franx H 2124 



XIV INDEX 

W 

Page 

Waldorf-Astoria Hotel (Annual Foreign Trade Convention) 2256 

Wallace, Henry A 2029-2048, 

2051. 2052, 2055-2058, 2060, 2064, 2065, 2067. 2068, 2071, 2072, 

2074-2078, 2080, 2081. 2083, 2084-2088, 2146, 2248, 2269, 2270, 

2280, 2286-2290, 2292, 2295. 

Wallace, Henry (Summary Report of China Mission) 2037, 2038. 2080, 2081 

Wallace, Henry A. (Truman letter) 2038 

Wallace, Mrs. Henry A 2289 

Wallace Mission 2029, 

2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 20.34, 2035, 2036-2043, 2045-2058, 2075, 

2080-2087, 2269, 2270, 2286, 2295. 

Wallace Mission (Goglidze Toast) 2083, 2084 

Wallace Seattle speech 2084, 2085- 

Wang, Cheng 2186 

War Department (Civil Affairs) 2162, 2169, 2296, 2303- 

War Department (United States) 2012,. 

2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2075, 2070, 2143, 

2162, 2163, 2167, 2193, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 

2204, 2206, 2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2250, 2252, 2289, 

2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301. 

Wartime China 2022' 

Wartime Politics in China 2005 

Ward, Harry F 2160 

Washington Commonwealth Federation 2160, 2161 

Washington Star 2273 

Washington State Federation of Teachers 2160 

Washington State Un-American Activities Committee (Second Report of 

1948) 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183 

Washington University (Un-American Activities of Certain Profes- 
sors) 2160-2162, 2183 

Watt, Alan S 2124 

Webb, Mr 2278, 2279- 

Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C 20.31, 2068, 2072, 

2143, 2144, 2199, 2202-2204, 2206, 2207, 2216, 2217, 2266, 2288, 2293 

Wedemeyer Report 2217 

West Seattle High School 2161 

Western Big Three 2183,2184 

Western German Government 2183 

White House 2028, 

2029, 2038, 2072, 2082, 2086, 2087, 2163, 2193, 2287, 22S9, 2293, 2296 

White Paper (State Department) 2039, 

2049, 2055, 2088, 2201, 2206, 2251, 2253, 2269, 2287 

White, Theodore 2151 

Wi]liam.s, Mr 2124 

Wilson, Edwin 2124 

Wilson, Woodrow 2294 

Woltman, Fredericli 2242 

Workers of All Countries, Unite (Communist International) 2066 

Worker's Bookshop 2243 

Woiks Progress Administration (WPA) 2161 

World Telegram (New York) 2240,2242 

Y 
Yalta Agreement 2137 

Yalta Conference 2136, 2137, 2138 

Yang, Yun-chu 2124 

Yasuda (Japanese big business) 2300 

Yeh. George 2124, 2125 

Yersan, Max 2243 

Yoshio, Shiga 2155, 2156, 2157 

Z 

Zafra, Urbano A 2124,2125 

Zaibatsu (big business in Japanese language) 2162,2166, 

2171. 2225. 2227. 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2235, 2284, 2296, 2300 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INYESTICiATE THE ADMINISTEATION 

OF THE INTEENAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHEE 

INTEENAL SECUEITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



PART 7A 
Appendix II 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




Brsfem Bnsiness Brr-'i 
DEC 24 1952 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
22848 WASHINGTON : 1952 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAKY 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Wasliington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

J. G. SODRWINE, Counsel 



Intebnal Seoueity Subcommittee 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER F