INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFOBE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTEATION
OF THE INTEENAL SECUEITY ACT AND OTHEE
INTEENAL SECUEITY LAWS
OF THB
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGEESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 10
MARCH 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, AND 21, 1952
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I ^
' HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC llELATIONS
PART 10
MARCH 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, AND 21, 1952
Printed for the use of the Committee ou the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
88348 WASHINGTON : 1952
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PAT AIcCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON. Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH. North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
J. G. SouRwiNK, Comifiel
Internal Security Stbcujimittee
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. OCONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relatione
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
Robert Morris, Special Counsel
Ben.tamin Mandbl, Director of Research
II
CONTENTS
Page
Testimony of Lattimore, Owen 3277-3674
Appendix I 3680-3714
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008
http://www.archive.org/details/instituteofpacif10unit
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS
TUESDAY, XHARCH 4, 1952
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security
Laws, op the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. G .
The subcommittee met at 10 :15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) pre-
siding.
Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Wat-
kins, and Jenner.
Also present : Senator McCarthy, J. G. Sourwine, committee coun-
sel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel,
research director.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN
ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL— Resumed
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the other day, at the close of
the hearing, I said I had some questions to ask in relation to the reports
that came out of the Moscow meeting.
It was indicated that Mr. Lattimore did not know anything about
these reports that appeared now in the evidence.
Is that still your contention, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. To the best of my recollection, I don't
remember them.
Senator Ferguson. What is it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I say to the best of my recollection, I don't re-
member ever seeing those minutes before.
Senator Ferguson. You wrote Ordeal by Slander ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And you feel that you are responsible for all
that is in it ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Then I ask you to look at page 51. It is a
chapter by your wife :
We had breakfast with Edward C. Carter. Mr. Carter had been secretary-
general of the Institute of Pacific Relations when Owen had edited Pacific
Affairs, and I wanted to see him because McCarthy's speech had dealt at length
with the IPR and Owen's connection with it, all still based on Kohlberg and
China Lobby, and had laid great stress on Owen's one visit to Moscow where
he had spent 10 days with Carter on IPR business in 1936.
3277
3278 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Now, that is the meeting that we were talking about the other day ;
is it not ?
Mr. Lattimore, That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Then I read further :
The present secretary-general, William Holland, and his family, also old
friends of ours, were staying at the Carters', and it made me happy to know
that I had won support and help of all of them. Mr. Carter gave me copies of
old reports he and Owen had made to the IPll about the Moscow visit, and
also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night
before.
Now, where are those reports?
Mr. Lati'imore. We have them in our file now.
Senator Ferguson. Are they the same as this report?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I don't believe so.
Senator Ferguson. Wliy did you not tell us before about these re-
ports ?
Mr. Lattimore. Why should I?
Senator Ferguson. Why should you?
Mr. Latitmore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Were you not sworn to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth ?
Mr. Lattimore. At the time of these hearings, this whole business
that some reports that I had written at that time had been shown to
my wife had completely slipped my mind. It is in a printed book.
Senator Ferguson. "VVlien we produced the reports out of the files
that we obtained up in the barn, did you not indicate to us that you
were in no way responsible for any of those reports, and inferred any
other reports?
Mr. Latitmore. I didn't infer anything of the kind. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Will you produce the reports now that are
mixed in here?
Mr. Lattimore. They are in a })rinted book somewhere. I will try
and find them for you and bring them to you.
Senator Ferguson. Were they made from these typewritten re-
ports ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How do you know that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Because I remember that the general procedure
w^as that when I came back from a trip of that kind, I think I would
write in a sort of letter report.
Senator Ferguson. But here wei-e official reports as if they were
taken at the meetings ; is that not true ?
The Chairman. Answer audibly, please.
Mr. Lattimore. That is what they appear to be; yes.
Senator Ferguson. And did you not infer in j^our answers that you
felt that we should not use that kind of report, because you had no
knowledge of them?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. All that I inferred was that the state-
ments there made about what was being discussed were reports of
my words and were not a stenographic record of what I had actually
said, and I also stated that I did not recall ever having seen those re-
ports.
Senator Ferguson. Do you not suppose that those reports were
used by Carter, at least, in making up the reports ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3279
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea how Carter made up his reports.
Senator Ferguson. It says here that you and Carter made them up.
Mr. Lattimore. I made a report, and Carter made a report, I
beheve.
Senator Ferguson. Is that what this says?
Mr. Lattimore. May I see that?
(A document was handed to the witness.)
Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the report that you made ?
Mr. Lattimore. I will try and find the book in which it is; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Let us have the report. The report was not in
a book ; you did not write the book and give it to them ?
Mr. Laitimore. No, sir; I wrote a report to the IPR, I believe,
which was included in one of the IPR publications.
Senator Ferguson. Did you keep a copy?
]\rr. Laitimore. When I wrote it?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. I may have. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Will you look and see?
Mr. Lattimore. I haven't seen it.
Senator Ferguson. Does that show that you wrote a report or you
and Carter wrote a report?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Mr. Carter gave me copies of old reports. * * *
That is indicating more than one report —
* * * He and Owen had made to the IPR about the Moscow visit.
That would indicate to me that he had made a report and I had
made a report —
And also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night
before.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see that press release ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall ever seeing it, no.
Senator Ferguson. You passed off rather lightly this meeting with
Moscow in your Ordeal by Slander ; did you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't think it was a very important meeting.
Senator Ferguson. You did not think it was important. That is
all at the present time. I will have further questions when we see
your report.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Sourwine, I think you drew my attention to the fact that a
question was pending when we concluded.
Mr. Sourwine. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, according to my
memory. The witness had begun an answer and had not concluded
at the time the recess was called.
The Chairman. Is the record of yesterday's proceedings available ?
Mr. Morris. It will be here in a moment, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris ; you may proceed.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record at this
time the date of the Russian-Japanese Nonaggression Pact that was
signed in 1941 ?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel ?
3280 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Mandel. I read from the World Almanac of 1944, page 36, under
the heading of Japan: "Signed 5 year neutrality pact with Russia
April 13, 1941."
The Chairman. What is the object of that? Will you please con-
nect that up?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness yesterday gave testimony
concerning a meeting that was held in Washington on June 18, 1931,
and we were trying to determine the political atmosphere that pre-
vailed at that time.
The Chairman. Proceed, sir.
Before you proceed, I have here page 5337 of the record of these
proceedings. Mr. Lattimore was under examination by Mr. Morris.
I read from that page to connect it up :
Mr. MoKRis. Wlio was present at the meeting?
Does that give you a connection, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Reference was being had to the luncheon with
Rogov, I believe.
Mr. Laitimore. I don't think it was a luncheon.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is correct. You stated that it was not a
luncheon. I am sorry.
The Chairman (reading) :
Mr. SouKwiNE. It was pretty late in the afternoon to have a luncheon?
Mr. Lattimore. The middle of the afternoon.
Mr. Morris. How long did it last, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.
Mr. Morris. Who was present at the meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. The only person that I clearly recall being present, because I
walked out with him afterward * * *
Do you wish to finish that ?
Mr. Latiimore. The only person I recall was Mr. C. F. Remer,
who was at that time, I believe, connected with OSS, one of the United
States intelligence agencies, and I believe I recall commenting to him
as we went out about some of the questions that had been asked Rogov.
I may say that I remember asking Rogov only one question myself.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, how long did that meeting last?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know.
Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent present ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether he was present or not.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, on our exhibit No. 26, introduced into
the open hearings, is the document f I'om Rose Yardumian, of the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations, to Mr. Edward C. Carter.
The postcript on that reads :
Rogov and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last two and a half hours,
talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.
That is the notation on this letter which describes the meeting that
the witness is now testifying to. That is already in our record, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Ferguson. Does that refresh your memory?
Mr. Lattimore. Not very much.
According to my memory, there would have been more people pres-
ent than that.
Senator Ferguson. Does it refresh your memory that you were there
for several hours, two and a half hours ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3281
Mr. Lattimore. Not very clearly, no.
Mr. Morris. It could have been" longer, too, could it not have been,
Mr. Lattimore ?
At that point it lasted two and a half hours.
Mr. Lattimore. It could have been longer, or it could have been
shorter.
Senator Ferguson. The only Vincent that was indicated there
would have been Vincent of the State Department, would it not?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Up here in the letter itself it is: "talked with
Owen Lattimore, Carl Eemer, and John Carter Vincent."
Mr. Lattimore. I may point out, Mr. Senator, that here was a Kus-
sian who had been in Japanese occupied Shanghai, and it was a
highly proper thing at that time for American Government personnel
to interview such a person and see if they could get any information
out of him.
Senator Ferguson. But there was not any doubt about him being a
Communist, was there ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Nor was there any doubt even of the fact that American Government
personnel should try to get any information they could out of Japanese
occupied Shanghai, in 1944.
Senator Ferguson. But did not your book say that you did not
know any Russians or Communists?
Mr. Lattimore. I think if you will read the context of that, Sena-
tor Ferguson, you will see that it clearly shows that my wife was writ-
ing in 1950, that as of 1950 I didn't know any Russians in this country.
Mr. Morris. When you say you didn't know
Senator Ferguson. Just a mhiute.
Do I understand you want to convey to us now that your wife was
writing and you approved it in your book that, as of the date that
you wrote the book, you did not know any Russians or Communists?
In 1950 ? Why do you limit it to 1950 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am not limiting it in that manner at all, Sena-
tor.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat did you mean by 1950 ?
Mr. Lattimore. This was written in 1950. Where is the reference ?
The Chairman. Just one moment. I would like to have the record
read back there, if you please.
(The record, as heretofore transcribed, was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Lattimore. I limit it to 1950 because it was written in 1950, and
the context clearly shows that she was writing about the general period
of 1950, and the McCarthy charges.
Senator Ferguson. Were you charged as of 1950 of associating with
the Communists on the day that she wrote it ? It does not say anything
about 1950 there.
Mr. Lattimore. I still haven't been able to find the exact reference.
Mr. Morris. It is page 35, Mr. Lattimore. You will probably find it
underlined.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; here is the context.
Senator Ferguson. Read it.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
McCarthy had replied that this is completely untrue. This man has a desk at
the State Department and has access to the files, at least he had until 4 or 5 weeks
ago. He is one of the top advisers on Far Eastern affairs, has been for a long
timie, and they know it.
3282 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Nothing in McCarthy's description fitted Owen, but the thought crossed my
mind that Tydings' description did. He had been on tlie Reparations Mission to
Japan 5 years ago. It was a White House mission, but I just discovered in look-
ing through old records that he Iiad been paid by the State Department. But the
thought was too fantastic. He didn't know any Russians in this country or any
Communists. He didn't have access to any secret material. How could anybody,
even McCarthy, accuse him of being a spy?
Senator Ferguson. You claim that that refers only to the time that
she was writing ?
Mr. LA'rriMORE. That refers to the general period in which she was
writing, and in which McCarthy was saying that I was — apparently
McCarthy meant at that time — the top Soviet agent in this country.
Senator Ferguson. And also does it not say that : "He had been on
the Reparations Commission to Japan 5 years ago" ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Did that refer to the time she was w^riting?
Mr. Lattimore. It would mean that at the time she was wanting,
she was actually stating that 5 years before I had been in Japan.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, would not Mrs. Lattimore have written
"he doesn't know any Russians'' if she were talking about that present
time ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Morris, I think this is a rather quibbling ques-
tion about grammar.
The Chairman. Just a minute.
Mr. Morris. It is not quibbling. She would have said "He doesn't
know any Russians," to bear out your interpretation.
Mr, Lattimore. She is writing a chapter there about her experiences
before I got home from Afghanistan, and slie was saying that as of this
time of her experiences, before I got back from Afghanistan, she was
saying that I didn't know any Russians in this country.
Senator Ferguson. And also she was writing at a time, Mr. Latti-
more, was she not, when you were coming back, and you approved
this?
Mr. Lattimore. She was not writing at that time. She was writing
about it.
The Chairman, Wait until the Senator finishes his question.
Senator Ferguson. But she w^as also writing, and putting it in your
book, and had it distributed after the Tydings hearings; is that not
right ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And did you not feel that that was the end of
all hearings on that question ?
Mr. Lattimore. I certainly hoped it was. However, I M'as already
somewhat aware of the new jjractice of nudtiple jeopardy.
Senator Ferguson, Do you call this multiple jeopardy?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir; I do.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think this was all brought out in the
Tydings hearings ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it w^as quite sufficiently brought out in the
Tydings hearings.
Senator Ferguson. I would think that you would think it was suf-
ficiently brought out there, but we did not.
Now, the Tydings hearings have access to the documents in reply
to this, showing that you did know Communists?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3283
Mr. Lattimore. None of the documents that had been brought out
show that I knew Communists in 1950, or Kussians, in this country.
Senator Ferguson. So you want to limit this now to your activities
in 1950?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I would just like a distinction kept clear
between the period that my wife was quite obviously writing about
and the period ranging up to 10 and more years previously, covered
by these various items from the IPK files that Mr. Morris has been
bringing out.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, when did you leave the IPE,?
Mr. Lattimore. When did I leave it ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. You mean its employ ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. I left its employ in 1941.
Senator Ferguson. When did you cease being a member of the
trustees ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I am still a trustee.
Senator Ferguson. You still are a trustee?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And you think that your activities as far as
this book was concerned, you were limiting them to 1950?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I am saying that my wife's statement was
limited to the general period of 1950.
Senator Ferguson. That did not become your statement by the pub-
lishing of the book?
That is not a legal problem ?
Mr. Lattimore. Would you repeat that. Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. Did it not become your statement when you
published the book ?
Mr. Lattimore. It became the statement in a book published, of
which I was listed as the author, certainly.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you want to answer the question ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the way I want to answer it ; yes.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Chairman, in connection with this mention of the
man Rogoff in this line of questioning, I would like to have a little
background from the previous testimony about this.
Mr. Mandel, will you read from the bottom of page 528 in the
Budenz testimony ?
The Chairman. The Budenz testimony is before this committee?
Mr. Morris. Before this committee, Senator.
The Chairman. Just a moment.
Mr. Budenz w\as then under oath?
Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mandel. (Reading) :
Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you attended which
Mr. Field reported for the IPR?
Mr. Budenz. That was a meeting of 1943 when I began to anticipate and then
thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meeting of the political bureau
at which Earl Browder I know definitely was present, and I believe Robert
William Weiner. His name strikes me because he was not always present at
these meetings, and other members of the Politburo who were not generally
there, including Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had
received word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr.
Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken. It was a
3284 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
communication either iKjrsonally or in some other way. Mr. Field just returned
from a trip and I set the impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore person-
ally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information comins to him from the inter-
national Communist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was
to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say that the
negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive opposition
and that more stress was to be put upon attacking Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. Morris. Did the Communist Party line change at that time?
Mr. BUDENz. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy of this.
They were advised that there was in the course of preparation an article by
Vladimir Rogoff, the Tass correspondent, written at Moscow's request on this
question which would attack the appeasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek.
The Chairman. The Tass correspondent, you say?
Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Can you explain what Tass was?
Mr. BuDENz. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this country and so
far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely.
Mr. Morris. Was this article subsequently communicated to the Daily Worker?
Mr. BuDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. The first
message was received through Grace Granich who had been in charge of the
Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been put out of business by the
Department of Justice, but who continued to maintain her relations with the
Soviet Embassy, consulate, and other sources of information, including commu-
nications to Moscow and we were advised of the coming of this article and then
we received it.
Mr. Morris. And was the Communist line actually changed as a result of these
steps that were taken?
Mr. BuDBNz. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name of T. A.
Bis.son was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to write an article in con-
nection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs publication on this matter explaining
the democratic character of the Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang
Kai-shek and his group represented antidemocracy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the Institute of
Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of Pacific Relations and
its publication Pacific Affairs?
Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. I sort of got the two together.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did T. A. Bisson write an article for
the IPR at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe he did; yos.
Mr. Morris. What was the name of the article, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the name of the article. I recall that
it was not published in Pacific Affairs as implied in the testimony
just read.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, is the article by Mr. Bisson which was
written for the Institute of Pacific Relations in our record now?
Mr. Mandel. It is in our record on page 534 of our hearings.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that article ?
Mr. Mandel. The date of the article is July 14, 1943, published in
the Far Eastern Survey.
Mr. Morris. Is the Far Eastern Survey an official publication of
the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Mandel. It is an official organ of the American Council of the
Institute of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. Let me get this straight, now.
This article that you are about to read, the witness says was not
published in the publication Pacific Relations?
Mr. Lattimore. Not published in Pacific Affairs.
The Chairman. You are now reading from another magazine?
Mr. Morris. There were only two publications of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, one Pacific Affairs and the other Far Eastern
Survey.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3285
The Chairman. And this is from the Far Eastern Survey.
Senator Smith. AVhat connection did he have with that?
Mr. Morris. It is going to be brought out, Senator, the connection
there.
Will you read the two passages ?
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
However, tbese are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might
be called Feudal China ; the other Democratic China. These terms express the
actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the
two Chinas.
Then further:
The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Com-
munist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown ofC the feudal
incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can
be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective.
Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one sup-
porting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which
has freed the peasant — the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over
most of China — from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest
charges as levied by a feudal economy.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, does not Mr. T. A. Bisson there label
Nationalist China feudal China, and Communist China a democratic
China?
Mr. Lattimore. Apparently he does.
Mr. Morris. Did that particular article provoke the Chinese Council
ofthelPR?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I have subsequently read somewhere,
maybe in the transcript of these proceedings, that it did. I had
nothing to do with the article at that lime.
Mr. Morris. Did you read tlie article?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I did. At that time I was exceed-
ingly busy as Deputy Director of OWI in San Francisco, and I don't
believe I was keeping up with the Institute of Pacific Relations' publi-
cations at all.
Mr. Morris. Do you agree with that particular article by Mr.
Bisson?
Mr. Lattimore. I would have to read the whole article to deter-
mine whether I agreed with it.
Mr. Sourwine. Might I ask a question ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You knew about this article, did you not, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. At the time ?
Mr. Sourwine. At the time and here, as of today, yesterday, the
day before yesterday ?
ikr. Lattimore. Subsequently I have seen it mentioned in the tran-
scripts that I have read. I haven't reread the article.
Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, did you not have this article
so clearly in mind that when Senator Ferguson the other day referred
to the matter you corrected him both as to the name of the author and
as to the place where the article had appeared ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I remember it clearly enough for that.
Senator Ferguson. And you knew that that was the change in
policy, did you not ?
3286 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Lattimore. No, sir ; I knew from reading tlie transcript of these
proceedings, and also, I believe, the Tydings proceedings, that this
had been referred to as having something to do with a change in line.
With the article I had no connection whatever. I don't know
enough about the history of the Comnmnist line to know whether that
was in fact a switch in the Communist line; but whether it was a
switch or a continuation of an old line, or whatever it may be, it cer-
tainly did not coincide with what I was saying and writing at the
time.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was a party line, that the
Communists had a party line?
Mr. Lattimore. I know in general that the Communists have a party
line; yes.
Senator Ferguson. When would you say that you acquired that
knowledge ?
Mr. Lattimore. It would be impossible to say.
Senator Ferguson. About when ?
Mr. Lattimore. It would be impossible to say. The party line is
something that is generally associated with Communists.
Senator Ferguson. And has been for years, has it not?
Mr. Lattimore. And has been for years. I don't know how long.
I have never been a specialist in Comnmnist politics, and I have never
made it my business to analyze the Communist Party line or the
switches, or anything of that kind.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, tlien, Mr. Lattimore, that yon
did not at that time read the Bisson article and that the Bisson article
was contrary to things you were writing at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. It is my testimony that, to the best of my recol-
lection, I did not read the article at that time, didn't even know of it
until some vague time later, and most of my knowledge of it at this
moment is based on reading the transcripts of these proceedings.
Mr. Morris. And could it not coincide with what you were saying
at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. If it is a line that says — what is it supposed to have
said ?
Mr. Morris. That Nationalist China was feudal China, and that
Communist China was democratic China.
Mr. Lattimore. All I remember is that as of 1943 I gave a couple
of lectures down at Pomona College in San Francisco.
The Chairman. That is not an answer.
Will you read the question, please, Mr. Reporter? Read Mr. Mor-
ris's question.
(The record, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter).
The Chairman. The question was, Was it contrary to the line you
were writing at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I believe it is completely contrary.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of the Office of War
Information at 111 Center Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated July
2(), 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, signed "Owen," and typed
signature "Owen Lattimore, Director, Pacific Operations."
Mr. Morris, Mr. Lattimore, will you look at that letter and testify
as to whether or not you wrote that letter?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3287
Mr. Lattimore. I must have written this letter, yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you read the first paragraph, please?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. [Reading :]
Dear Bill : Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's
article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing
an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away
a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different ter-
minology. Nevertheless, I think his main points are as sound as you think they
are.
It is just Bossible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month and
if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave.
Mr. Morris. There is no use reading the rest of it unless you care
to, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't need to. This apparently indicates
that I agreed with some opinion that Mr. Holland expressed at that
time which I had not seen. ^
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record ?
The Chairman. It may be received in the record.
(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 512" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 512
Office of War Information,
111 Sutter Street,
San Francisco, Calif., July 26, 19.'f3.
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City 22, N. T.
Dear Bill: Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's
article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing
an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away
a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different
terminology. Nevertheless I think his main points are as sound as you think
they are.
It is just possible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month
and if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave.
I am very much ashamed of having fallen down on my review assignment.
I think I can assure you of the review article by September 15. However, the
difference in publication date is not serious as the dating of the book itself now
makes it a matter of the historical record of stages in Russian opinion about
China, rather than an urgent current presentation.
If the University of California Press write to me for an opinion on Norin's
manuscript, I shall be very glad to give a recommendation.
Yours,
Owen /s/
Owen Lattimore,
Director, Pacific Operations.
Mr. Morris. Did T. A. Bisson go with you when you went to
Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he did.
Mr. Morris. When did you make that trip to Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was in the spring of 1937 sometime.
Mr. Morris. What arrangement did you make for that trip, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. We traveled from Peking by rail up to Shansi
Province, then down south through Shansi Province, then west into
Shensi Province, and got to what I think was the railhead at the city of
Sian, and then we chartered a motor car and drove up to Yenan.
The Chairman. You say we. We was in the party ?
Mr. ISIoRRis. Who accompanied you on that trip ?
3288 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. Mr Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe.
Mr. Morris. Did you confer with Mao Tse-tung when you were in
Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. We had an interview with
The Chairman. The question is: Did you confer with Mao Tse-
tung ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not call it conferring.
Mr. Morris. How much time did you spend with Mao Tse-tung?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. I think there were a couple
of interviews at which he was asked questions, principally by Mr.
Bisson and Mr. Jaflfe. Each of those interviews would probably
last anliour or two. T am not sure how long.
Mr. Morris. Where did you stay? Did you stay at the Foreign
Office in Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. We stayed at, I believe, a sort of hostel that they
liad for visitors.
Mr. Morris. Did you, Mr. Lattimore, confer with Chu Teh ?
' Mr. Lattimore. I would not say that we conferred with him, no.
Mr. Morris. Did you speak with him ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I spoke with him.
Mr. Morris. Did you speak with Chou En-lai ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Did you address a mass meeting in Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. I made some general remarks, yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you write an account of that for-
the London Times, that trip to Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that. JNIaybe I did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked in the corner "F. V. F.
etc." The title is "The Strongholds of Chinese Communism, a Jour-
ney to North Shensi," by Owen Lattimore. In the upper left-hand
corner it says : "Sent by O. L. to Times, London (may not be published,
of course)."
Mr. Morris. Do you recall that article, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't recall it, and I don't recall whether
it was published, or not. I did occasionally publish articles in the
London Times.
Mr. Morris. Then does that recall anything to you, Mr. Lattimore?
The Chairman. You are referring to the exhibit identified by
Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
Does not that purport to be an article that you prepared for the
London Times, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. It certainly appears to be. I had completely for-
gotten it, forgotten about it.
Mr. Morris. Is that a true account of your experiences in Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably it is. I haven't read it yet. May I
read it?
Mr. Morris. You may.
Mr. Lattimore. This is headed "One," indicating that there may
have been a later one. [Reading :]
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3289
(Exhibit No. 513)
Many people at Nanking will tell you that Chinese communism is finished.
The appeal to class war has been drop-ped. The landlords are no longer being
appropriated. The territory held by the Communists is poor in agriculture and
almost barren of other resources. The Communists are already accepting sub-
sidy from Nanking, and are offering to accept incorporation into Nanking's
armies. This must mean, in the end, the "fading army" of the Communists as
a separate political and military force, unless perhaps theiy faintly survive as a
left-wing group within the orthodox Chinese nationalism.
Yet, if this be collapse, the Communists are not in the least anxious to cover
it up. On the contrary, they claim that the present situation is chiefly of their
own asking. It was they who relaxed tlie lockjaw silence of the Sian crisis
last winter with the magic of their united-front slogans. They did not inter-
vene until after Marshal Chiang Kai-shek had been made prisoner by the
mutinous remnants of the old Manchurian armies. When they did intervene, it
was to save the life of the Generalissimo, their mortal enemy of 10 years of civil
war. This they did to show that they were more eager to rally the nation against
Japan than to triumph over Nanking. The implication of what they say is
that they do not intend to wither away in the ravines and loess plateau of north
Shensi. There is more than a hint, in the assured maneuvering of the youthful
veterans who led the Red armies, that they believe already that they have a
negative control strong enough to prevent Nanking from doing what they do
not like, which may yet be converted into positive control and full command
of the situation.
All of this makes north Shensi not only a mystery, but a region in which i)er-
haps can be discovered important clues to the unfolding history of eastern
Asia ; the struggle for unity in Cliina ; the forces welding illiterate millions into
increasingly solid and formidable resistance against Japan; the convergence
on China, from different directions, of Japan and the Soviet Union.
Not knowing of any underground tunnels that would lead me to north Shensi,
I set about planning the journey in trustful innocence. I sent a letter to the
Red capital, by ordinary mail, with my address candidly printed on the back of
the envelope — and got in answer a cordial invitation. Accordingly, I went by
train to Sian, the capital of Shensi, and then by car to Yenan, the Red capital,
about 250 miles to the north.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt at that point?
Is tliat a true account of your preliminary arrangements to Yenan?
Mr. Lattimore. It sounds like it. I liacl completely forgotten
about it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read from the testimony of Mr.
Lattimore, taken in executive session before this committee?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. I am reading from page 71 :
Mr. Morris. And before you went beyond that line —
That is the line separating Communist China from Nationalist
China—
demarkation, it would be necessary to have the Communist authorities' permis-
sion; isn't that right?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. You mean anyone could go up there?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time, the Communists were welcoming anybody who
would go in. The government authorities were trying to stop people from
goinir in.
Mr. Morris. The Nationalist Government?
Mr. Lattimore. The Nationalist Government.
Mr. Morris. So the only objection to going up there would come from the Na-
tionalist Government?
Mr. Lattimore. The only objection came from the Nationalist Government.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not
make any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?
Mr. Lattimore. None whatever.
88348— 52— pt. 10 2
3290 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Which is correct?
Mr. Lattimore. I see no conflict, Senator Ferguson.
Apparently, according to this account, I wrote up to the Reds and
said, ''Would it be all right if I came up ^" and they said, "Sure, fine,"
and I went on up. They didn't make the arrangements.
And, as I state in this article, which I had completely forgotten,
I didn't know about any underground tunnels leading up there. I
just got on a train and went.
Senator Ferguson. Read the last answer.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not
malie any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?
Mr. Lattimore. None whatever.
Senator Ferguson. You did not tell us about writing the letter.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had completely forgotten about it. I wrote
from Peking and I didn't consider that this indicates a prearrange-
ment for travel arrangements at all.
Senator Ferguson. You felt that you could not got in without the
consent of the Communists or you would have never written them.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I wanted to have the whole thing com-
pletely in the open, so I wrote a letter up there saying, "Would it be
all right if I wanted to come?"
I knew in general that all of the newspapermen were trying to get
up there. I don't know whether other newspapermen used the same
method that I did, or not.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know other newspapermen, whether
they did get up ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, other newspapermen did get up.
Senator Ferguson. Who did you take with you ?
Mr. Lattimore. I went with Mr. Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe.
Senator Ferguson. And did your letter state you wanted them to
come along?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection whatever. It may well
have. I don't know about Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, but the suggestion of
going up there was, to the best of my recollection, originally made
to me by Mr. Bisson.
Senator Ferguson. Bisson suggested it?
Mr. LAT'riMORE. I think so ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then, when you wrote, would you not include
Bisson and Jaffe if they were to go along with you?
Mr. Lati^imore. I don't know. It depends on what tiiuo the letter
was written.
Mr. SouRWiNE. To Avhom did you address your letter, Mr. Latti-
more, do you remember that?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea, no.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know anyone in Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't know anyone in Yenan.
Senator Ferguson. Then you would write to the government,
would you not ?
]VIr. Lattimore. I might write to — I don't know that I would have
called it the government at that time.
Senator Ferguson. To whom did you write, then? What would
you write a letter for ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3291
Mr. Lattimore, I would write a letter to indicate that I was not
somebody trying to sneak in; that T was just somebody who wanted
to come up.
Senator Ferguson, Who would be inclined to keep you out? You
would have to write to those persons. Who would they be ?
Mr. Lattimore. That would depend, Senator, on what was the
terminology being used at that time. After the Sian incident in De-
cember 1936, the Nationalist Government had given the Communists
up there some kind of status — I don't remember exactly what it was —
and I would presumably write to whatever aduiinistrative organ was
indicated by the terminology of the time.
The Chairman. You wrote a letter up there, but you say now you
cannot recall to whom you wrote it; is that right, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. To whom you addressed the letter is something
you cannot remember?
]\Ir. Lattimore. That is right. It was presumably addressed to
some sort of office rather than a person.
Senator Ferguson. Will you help me ? I have trouble at times with
your testimony along this line, that you know nothing about com-
munism, and at other times it appears to me the testimony indicates
that you know all about communism.
On this, will you know al^out this comnumism in China?
Mr. Lattimore. I knew that there were Communists in northwest
China, and I was very eager to go up and see something about it.
Just not long before that, a 10-year news famine on the Chinese
Communists had been broken by Mr. Snow, who had succeeded in com-
ing up there and coming out with a story that had set every other
newspaperman in China trying to get up there.
Senator Ferguson. Did not this article in the London Times,
whether it appeared or not, that you are reading, did not the first part
of it indicate that you were well familiar with Comnmnists in China
and Communist activities ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; it indicates that I was familiar, as the first
paragraph shows, with what people at Nanking were saying and
thinking, and it indicates, as the second paragraph shows, that I was
familiar with whatever I was able to observe while I was up there,
for about 4 days.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, does not this letter that was
read to you just a few moments ago, July 26, about the Bisson article,
indicate that you knew something about Communists when you said :
Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom be might have
persuaded with the use of a different terminology.
In other words, he was calling, in that article, the Communists of
China the democrats. Did this not indicate that you knew all about
communism and that the line was not to use words here in the articles
to turn people away ? ^
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; it indicates that
Senator Ferguson. What was the terminology that you were talk-
ing about here ?
Mr. Lattimore. I would have to reread the article to know that.
Senator.
Mr. Morris. May I see that, Mr. Lattimore ?
3292 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I am going to suggest that since it is two and a lialf pages long,
rather than to go into the whole thing, I would just like one more
paragraph placed.
But if you care to read the whole thing
Mr. Arnold. I haven't seen it. He would like to read tlie whole
thing.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness has expressed a wish to
read the whole letter.
The Chairman. He may read the whole letter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. For the sake of continuity of the record, Mr. Chair-
man, may I ask that the witness be permitted to read it all the way
through ?
The Chairman. Beginning at the first?
Mr. Sourwine. No, beginning where he left off.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
It took 4 days to get there from Sian and 6 to get back, because the rains
were on and we were driving through the heart of the loess country. The
yellow, wind-dropped soil lies hundreds of feet thick over what used to be the
face of the earth. Tlie hills are smothered, but a network of streams has cut
down to the ancient valley beds, so that the formation is now one of innumerable
plateaux, some of them higher and some lower, but all flat-topped and all divided
from each other by straight-sided ravines. "When it rains, the whole landscape
becomes a nightmare of rather inferior, pale-colored chocolate. The sti-eams
boil up in flood and the cubes of tableland sag and slump. As a matter of fact,
it is not a country made for wheels at all. The local inhabitant prefers pack
mules, when it is dry, and when it is wet, he gives up altogether, because even
a mule skids on wet loess. Only the foreigner, winching and flinching from
the memory of fleas indoors, and the revolutionary, who has been trained to
follow a line even when skidding, stay out in the wet and strive to make progress.
It is not easy, because the newly and crudely made motor road traverses the
pale chocolate nightmare in appalling ascents and descents. From each ravine
it attacks the next cube of tableland at a corner, climbing at angles that are
difficult even for trucks with five gears ; it then rushes across the top of the cube
and falls over the far edge in a series of even more terrifying swoops.
In spite of this, it has become a pilgrim's highway. Chinese educators and
students are going up by the hundred, and many of them stay to take courses
in the Red academy. Foreign visitors are welcomed, and missionaries are be-
ing urged to come up and see for themselves that their preujises are undamaged
and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in pri-
vate, as they like. The only foreign visitors thus far have been Americans,
but the Communists profess impatience to see representatives of other nations,
and judging from the way tliey talk, the first Englishman to arrive will be a
good deal of a hero.
There is in this a slightly wry contract with the history of the last 10 years,
when missionaries fled at tlie whisper of a Red raid, and when Great Britain,
rather than Japan, was the bull's eye in the target of Communist propaganda.
What does this reversal mean? Is this the true end of the long march? When
the ghost army of the Reds was flitting from Kiangsi round by the fringes of
Tibet to the uneasy lands of the partly Muslim, partly Chinese, partly Mongol
northwest, a curious thing became noticeable. Whenever it was officially re-
ported that a detachment of the Red army had been surrounded and annihilated,
that particular column invariably turned up, a little later, 50 or a hundred
miles farther ahead on its appointed line of march. Bearing this in mind I
was particularly eager, when the Sung pagoda overlooking Yenan came in view
to find out whether the famed, almost fabulous, leaders of the Red army showed
any signs of that fading-out so knowingly predicted of them in tlie best semi-
official quarters. As a matter of fact, one of the first things I heard was that
in a blockhouse on another hill, opposite the pagoda, built before the Reds came,
to defend the town from them, there still stand the proclamations offering large
rewards for INIao Tse-tung and Chu Te, dead or alive. The Reds had never
assaulted the town. It was the defense that laded out, leaving only the notices
behind it. Another omen?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3293
Mao Tse-tung, the first of the leaders that I met, did not look faded. In fact,
they say he has put on a little weight during the recent months of relative in-
activity. It is absurd, looking at him, to think of the rumors current for
years that he was about to die of tuberculosis. It would be equally absurd to
think of him as a ravening bandit or as a cold doctrinaire.
The Chairman. Who is that you are speaking of there ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mao Tse-tung.
Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire?
That was your own opinion? That was not what somebody was
telling you?
Mr. Lattimore. That was my opinion at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Indicating that I didn't know much about com-
munism.
Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the revolutionary people that you
were talking about following the line that you referred to before ?
Mr. Lattimore. I presume he would be generally included, yes.
• Senator Ferguson. You knew about the party line, then?
Mr. Lattimore. I knew there was such a thing, yes.
Senator Ferguson. And you knew how Communists followed it,
as indicated in your remarks in there ?
Mr. Lattimore. Generally speaking, yes.
Senator Ferguson. That was specific ; was it not ?
Mr. Lattimore. What ?
No; it is just a general reference to the fact that there is such a
thing as a Communist line, and that Communists follow the line even
when they skid, or try to.
Senator Ferguson. All right, proceed.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
In the course of a few days I saw him in many moods ; at interviews that
lasted for hours; at meals, at the theater (in the church of the English Baptist
Mission), where sketches and short plays were being put on that substituted
United Front propaganda for Communist indoctrination. One of my most vivid
impressions was on the evening of my departure. The room was full ; Chu Te
and Chou En-lai had their heads together over a statement to the press; others
were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken "out" —
for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet
entirely free. I happened to glance at Mao Tse-tung, who was sitting in the
middle of it all. His head had sunk forward a little, his arms hung limp, his
face was expressionless, and his eyes without luster. He had completely
withdrawn himself from his surroundings. Then someone spoke to him, and
he joined in at once, as though he had subconsciously kept up with all the
conversation going on around him.
This is a trivial example of a flexibility that is really amazing. Mao Tse-tung
can range from the widest philosophical concepts on which the Communist
IK)licy is based to the narrowest detail of practical application, without haste,
without delay, and without the slightest blurring of focus. He has fire and
passion, but so matured and tempered that there seems to be no personal
warping of his thought; and yet, in a long extemporaneous discussion of a
complicated subject there will not be a single cliche (and Chinese is more full
of cliches than even English) ; every phrase has a personal stamp.
It would be misleading, however, to give too many personal details about
Mao, Chu Te, and other leaders. So little is known of the inside workings of
the Communist movement in China that it is almost always spoken of in terms
of its leading personalities. At Yenan a contrast is immediately noticeable:
The Communists themselves never speak of Nanking in terms of Chiang Kai-
shek, or any other leader. They stick to estimates of groups and movements
and economic, social, and political forces.
From this alone it is obvious that they are not either bandit's preying on
society or condottieri aiming at power for the sake of power. This is as true
3294 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
now that they have compromised ou a united front as it was when they were
at open war witla Nanking. Some of tlieir more positive characteristics I shall
try to describe in a second article.
Senator Ferguson. Did you do that ^
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. If I did, it must be in this file.
I don't have it.
Senator Ferguson. How would this get into the IPR files?
Mr. Lattimore. Evidently I sent it, marked in the top corner FVF,
who was at that time, I believe, secretary of the American Council.
Senator Ferguson. Who was that?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Field, F. V. Field.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have to have clearance by Field ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Why would you send this article to Field?
Mr. Lattimore. I was following the usual IPR practice of send-
ing articles for information to the IPR office, and since Mr. Field
was the secretary, he was the obvious person to send it to.
The Chairman. This instrument that is being discussed is not in
the record. Do you wish it in the record?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 513" and was
read in full by Mr. Lattimore beginning on page 3289.)
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was all of your time taken by
the IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. I cannot understand why you would be sending
this to Field, an article that you were trying to sell to the London
Times.
Mr. Lattimore. It was an article I was sending to the New York
office, Mr. Field being secretary.
I had just been up to a then still mysterious and exciting part of
China that everybody was trying to get to, and I thought that my best
chance of writing an article would be for the London Times.
But rather than write a long description of a journey that I knew
would be of interest to the New York office, since, after all, the IPR
was studying China, among other countries, I simply sent a carbon
copy of the article. That would be my present reconstruction of what
happened.
Senator Ferguson. Were you paid personally or was the IPR paid
on an article like this ?
Mr. Lattimore. On an article like this, I would be paid personally.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This goes back just a little way, Mr. Lattimore:
Did you find Yenan in any way crowded with non-Communist
tourists ?
Mr. Latitmore. Yes ; I should say fairly crowded.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You have said several times that everyone was try-
ing to get up there.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was everyone able to get up there?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3295
Mr. Lattimore. No; not everybody. A number of people were
stopped by the Chinese Government authorities.
I remember in the papers at the time there was a good deal of talk
about the fact that the correspondent of the New York Herald Trib-
une was forced to leave the plane on which he was trying to fly up
there.
Mr. SouRWiNE. How did you send up your original letter asking
if vou could come?
Mr. Lati'IMORe. Judging from the account that has just been read
out, I stuck it in the mail with my return address on the back, and
it went on up.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Were the mails operating into Communist-held
China?
Mr. Lattimore. They were ; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you not say in this article that as you were
ready to leave, they were crowding around to give you messages,
because communications were difficult, or words to that effect?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether those communications were
given to us, or not. There were, I think, several cars leaving at the
same time.
The Chairman. The question is : Do you not say in this article that
they were crowding around to give you messages? That is the
question.
Mr. Lattimore. I am trying now to throw my memory back. Let's
see
The Chairman. You do not have to tlirow your memory back. It is
right there in the article.
Mr. Lattimore. It is 15 years or more.
The Chairman. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. Do you want me to read that passage again ?
The Chairman. Yes. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore.
The question is : Do you not say in that article that they were crowd-
ing around to give you messages?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
others were arguing, laughing, giving verhal and written messages to be taken
out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not
yet entirely free.
I suppose that indicates that the mails were censored. *
Senator Ferguson. That was not the question. The question was
whether or not they were giving to you and your party the messages.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe they were.
As far as my recollection goes, Mrs. Edgar Snow was up there at the
time and asked us to take a letter back to her husband for her, and I
believe — here my memory is extremely uncertain — that she may have
also asked us to take down to her husband some of the material that
she had been collecting up there so as to have it in Peking when she
got back.
Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, there was one lady.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. You wrote this wliole paragraph around the
fact that Mrs. Snow wanted you to take a letter to her husband.
Mr. Lattimore. That is all that I remember that our party took out.
Senator Ferguson. No ; I did not ask you what you took out at all.
I want to know what you were describing in that article, and now
3296 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
you leave us with the opinion that all you were doing was describing
the fact that Mrs. Snow was sending a letter down to her husband
with you or one of your party.
Mr. Arnold. May he read the article again ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
But it is what he is telling us what he meant by that, now.
Mr. Arnold. I thought it was what was in the article.
The Chairman. Let him read the article again.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken
out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet
entirely free.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The important thing, Mr. Lattimore, is that ques-
tion of what the communications between the Red world, as you have
spoken of it, and the outside world, were.
I do not mean to labor the point, sir, but I would like to know:
Are you testifying here that you sent your letter to Yenan and
received an answer through the ordinary course of the mails; that
you made_ no special arrangements to have that letter delivered
in Red China ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is that your testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is my testimony.
And if I had received no reply to that letter, I would have con-
sidered it an indication of the extent to which the Red region was still
being blockaded or sequestered, or whatever you like to call it.
The Chairman. All right, Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Does the word "others" describe Mrs. Snow
alone ?
Mr. Lattimore. At this moment, I have no recollection, sir. There
were a number of people preparing to leave Yenan at that time, and
I was just giving a journalist's general impression of what was
going on.
I think the fact that I was writing it for a London newspaper,
with a hope of publication, is a fairly obvious indication that it was
nothing that anybody regarded as surreptitious.
Senator Ferguson. But you do not mean to convey the idea, do
you, that when you were selling these articles you were not writing
the truth?
Mr. Lattimore. I was certainly writing the truth as I understood
it at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Then we would take the idea that it was more
than Mrs. Snow that wanted to send articles out.
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably, it was. That is the way it reads.
Then I will distinguish from that as significant that the only
things that I remember our party taking out were some messages and
manuscripts of Mrs. Snow's.
I think the way to settle this would be to ask some of the other
people who were up there at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Where was this particular meeting that you de-
scribe Mao sitting in the meeting ?
Mr. Lattimore. Somewhere in one of the offices in Yenan, I sup-
pose, or guest rooms, or hostel, or somewhere.
Senator Ferguson. But it was not a public place ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3297
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, yes ; everything there was pretty public.
Senator Fergusox. Was not he one of the leaders of this movement?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, he was one of the leaders in the movement.
Senator Ferguson. Who was the head of that government ?
Mr. Latitmore. He was.
The Chairman. Referring to whom ? Mao Tse-tung ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mao Tse-tung; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Was not this in one of his residences, or offices ?
Mr. Lattiimore. I don't recall clearly at the time, but I would say
it was much more probably at the guest hostel where a lot of them
came to say good-by to people who were leaving.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I have a bypath I would like to
follow briefly, if I may, for 2 or 3 minutes.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were with Mr. Bisson in Yenan ; is that right,
Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Tliat is right.
Mr. SoURWiNE. When you were in Japan in the fall of 1945, did
you see Mr. Bisson there?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I met Mr. Bisson very briefly.
As I remember, the United States strategic bomb survey mission
was arriving in Tokyo just about the time the reparations mission
was leaving, and ]Mr. Bisson was attached to the strategic bomb sur-
vey, and I saw him just before he left Tokyo.
Mr. SdURWiNE. Did you travel anywhere with him in Japan in the
fall of 1945 ?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't believe I did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Shiro Takeda?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know Nobuyoshi Nakamura ?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't believe I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know Teiji Koide?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I do.
Mr. SouRw^NE. Do you know who any of those three men are?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I cannot place them.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did they accompany you to or within Japan in
1945 ?
jNIr. Lattimore. Not than I can recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you make any trips with them ?
Mr. LA-rriMORE. I don't think so. Let me see. I don't think I made
any trips out of Tokyo.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you go around Tokyo with them? Did they
accompany you, or did you accompany them in Tokyo on any oc-
casions ?
Mr. Lattimore. I may have. I can't recall it at the moment.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Thank you.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I add into the record at this
time an article which appeared in the New Masses on October 12,
1937,byMr. Philip Jaffe?
The Chairman. We have a peculiar situation here now. You
have the witness saying that he did not know these parties named
by counsel.
Mr. Lattimore. That I don't recall them. I don't believe I met
them.
3298 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. And that they may have conducted him around
Tokyo.
Do ,you want to straighten that out, or not?
Mr. Lattimore. I would like to explain, Mr. Chairman, a number of
times in these hearings the names of people have been mentioned whom
I totally failed to recall, and later on some memorandum or other docu-
ment is brought out which indicates that I did meet them. This is part
of the whole procedure, which I should very respectfully like to
criticize.
The Chairman. That part will be stricken from the record. You
are not here for the purpose of criticizing ; you are here for the purpose
of testifying under oath, and you are under oath.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record the
article by Philip J. Jaffe who, as the witness has testified, was one of
the four people in his party at Yenan ?
This appeared in the New Masses of October 12, 1937.
The Chairman. You had better listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, would you let me ask one question,
before Mr. Morris proceeds ?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, you referred in your testimony to
interviews with Mao Tse-tung.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Smith. How many interviews did you have with him ? You
mentioned several hours. How many times did you interview Mao
Tse-tung, or were you present with him in the interview?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I myself personally, not more than two.
Senator Smith. Were you present when others were interviewing
him?
Mr. Lattimore. As far as I remember, the only interviewing was
done by others.
Senator Smith. Who were present with you at those interviews?
What other individuals ?
Mr, Lattimore. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Bisson and Mr.
Jaffe.
Senator Smith. Were Mrs. Snow and Mrs. Jaffe present at those
interviews ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so.
Senator Smith. Were any other individuals present besides you
and Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Snow and Mr. Bisson ?
Mr. Lattimore. The only other person that I recall was a young
Chinese who was acting as Mr. Mao's interpreter.
Senator Smith. So that each time you had an interview with Mao
Tse-tung, it was just the three or four of you?
]\Ir. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Smith. So it was more or less, then, you might say, a private
interview or private hearing with Mao Tse-tung, was it not?
Mr. Lattimore. It was.
I don't know whether "private" is the right word to characterize
it. He was giving some foreigners some information for publication
if they felt it. So I wouldn't call it very private.
Senator Smith. Did he give you permission to publish everything
he said to you there ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3299
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my recollection, that was the basis
on which the interviews were held, just like a journalistic interview
which is for the purpose of publication.
Senator Smith. At that time he was the commander in chief, was
h^ not, and the head man, so to speak, of the Chinese Connnunists?
jSIr. Latomore. Yes; that would be my assumption. I don't know
exactly how the connnittee structure of the Communists went at that
time ; whether he was regarded as a member of a committee or as the
individual head.
Senator Smith. Did he not have a residence, an official residence?
Mr. Lattimore. He had a small mud house off in a corner of the
town.
Senator Smith. You do not mean to convey the impression just
now, then, do you, that he just met you around in any particular public
places ?
Mr. Lattimore. He also met us around in public places.
Senator Smith. How many times?
Mr. Lattimore. We were there 4 days. I don't remember whether
we saw him each of those 4 days, or not.
Senator Smith. Did you inquire about the people in attendance at
the Red academy which you mentioned ?
Mr. Lattimore. Xot in detail ; no.
Senator Smith. Did you write an article about the work being done
in the Red academy ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I did, unless there is a second article
for the London Times here, in which I said something about it.
Senator Smith. I believe that is all at the moment, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right ; Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive in the record the article
I described, namely, the newspaj)er article of October 12, 1937, written
by Philip J. Jatfe, who was one of the party of four accompanying
Mr. Lattimore on this trip to Yenan, about which we have had testi-
mony today ?
The Chairman. Where do you get that ?
Mr. Morris. This is from the New Masses of October 12, 1937.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it can be tied in to Mr. Latti-
more's visit.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read two passages here
which relate to the witness today.
Mr. Arnold. Do you have a copy ?
Mr. Morris. No ; we do not.
Senator Smith. Is the New Masses a Communist publication ? Is
it true, or is it not?
What is the proof you have up to now ?
ISIr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you give us the document on the
New Masses ?
]Mr. Mandel. The New Masses was cited as a Communist periodical
by the Attorney General Francis Biddle in September 1942.
Mr. Morris. I am now reading from page 5, column 1. This is by
Mr. Jafl'e, who accompanied Mr. Lattimore, according to Mr. Latti-
more's testimony, on that trip to Yenan :
While in Yenan our party which included beside myself, T. A. Bisson of the
Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs,
3300 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
stayed at the foreign office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement.
We had barely finished our first dinner in Yenan, when guests arrived : Ting
Ling, China's foremost woman writer ; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, the only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy
Snow, wife of tlie American writer, Edgar Snow, and many Communist leaders.
Before long, we were talking and singing in a variety of languages. In the
midst of our animated discussion, somebody entered quietly and sat down.
''Comrade Mao" someone said — Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the then
Chinese Soviet Government.
I would now like to turn to page 10, reading from column 2.
The Chairman. The same article?
Mr. Morris. The same article, sir.
The Chairman. By whom ?
Mr. Morris. By Philip J. Jaffe, who was one of the people on that
trip.
Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by
Chu Teh—
Who is now the head of the Chinese Communists; is he not, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't answer that.
Mr, Morris (reading) :
Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students of the
People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from other
schools. * * *
The Chairman. I would like to have you go back to the first excerpt
you read there, where it speaks of those who were there.
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Will you read it again, please ?
Mr. Morris (reading) :
While in Yenan our party, which included besides myself T. A. Bisson of the
Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed
at the Foreign Ofiice. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had
barely finished our first dinner in Yenan when guests arrived : Ting Ling, China's
foremost woman writer ; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen ; the
only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife
of the American writer, Edgar Snow ; and many Communist leaders. * * *
The Chairman. I want to refer to that one remark about the only
two non-Chinese in the region.
Mr. Morris. "The only two non-Chinese then in the region." That
is in contradiction of the testimony we have had here today ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. The witness stated here today that there were
many people there.
Mr. Lattimore. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I didn't state they
were there at the time I was there. A number of them got there before
I was there and a number got there after I was there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, I asked you if you found the place
crowded with tourists.
Mr. Lattimore. Chinese. Chinese are also tourists sometimes.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, were you restricted in any way
while you were there?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I would say I was.
Senator Ferguson. How?
Mr. Lattimore. One of my principal interests in being there was to
try to find out how the Communists were dealing with minority groups
such as the Chinese Moslems and the Mongols.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3301
This was near to Mongol territory. And I heard while I was there
that there was a school for such people situated just outside of Yenan,
very close, and I repeatedly asked to be taken there and allowed to
interview people. But this was not permitted.
Finally, they said that they would bring in a delegation from there,
and they brought in a number of what they called students in a school
for minorities that they had there. These included Moslems, Tibetans,
Mongols, and various tribal people like Lolos and so forth. And they
had a Chinese there in charge of them, and he was an English-speaking
Chinese, and he started to ask them various routine questions in
Chinese.
Presumably, part of their education in this school was that they
were all learning Chinese, which he would then interpret into English.
Having spotted a couple of Mongols, I started talking to them in
Mongol. They were delighted to find someone who spoke Mongol
and began to respond very eagerly. But the Chinese in charge of
them became so obviously agitated at my having direct access to them
without his control that I broke it off for fear of getting the poor
boys into trouble.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have a camera?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I did.
Senator Ferguson. Were you restricted in taking pictures?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think we were restricted at all in taking
pictures.
Senator Ferguson. You seem to have a very fine memory on this
conversation when you had the Chinese interpreter who brought in
these people.
Mr. Lattimore. Naturally. These Chinese minorities were my
special subject of interest and research study.
Senator Ferguson. You did not mention them, though, in your
article, did you, in the London Times ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether I mentioned them in a sub-
sequent article, if there was one, or not.
Senator Ferguson. Will you try and find if you have a copy of that
article ?
Mr. Lattimore. Surely I will.
The Chairman. Does Mao Tse-tung speak English ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did he speak Russian?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
Senator O'Conor. IMr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, was any conversation had, prior
to your addressing the students, as to under what circumstances you
would address them, or in what manner?
Mr. Lattimore. No. There was an address of some sort by, I think,
Chu Teh, who was presiding. And he said : "We have many visitors
here, including some foreign visitors, and we welcome them all," and,
you know, that kind of thing. And then somebody who was stand-
ing beside them said, "One of these foreigners talks Chinese; how
about having him come up?" and there was a sort of clamor from the
crowd, and they said, "Make the foreigner talk Chinese."
So I, unwilling, scrambled on the platform. At that time I had
never made a public speech in Chinese ; I had nothing prepared, and
3302 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
SO I got up and made some remarks. And there were a lot of guffaws
because I used rather colloquial language instead of formal lecture
language, and then I scrambled down.
There was a mixture of laughter and applause.
Senator O'Conor. About what were your remarks?
Mr. Lattimore. A general kind, that we were very glad to be up
there and we thanked them for their hospitality, and we wanted to
see what was going on — that sort of thing, you know.
Senator O'Conor. How about Mr. Jaffe's and Mr. Bisson's re-
marks ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether they made remarks or not.
If they did, it would have to be through interpreters, of course.
Senator O'Conor. Of course, you noted Mr. Jaffe's reference to the
article in the New Masses.
Mr. Lattimore. I skipped that. Did he say they addressed the
Senator Ferguson. Yes. He said three of them.
Senator O'Conor. All three of them addressed.
Will you read that please, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris (reading) :
Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Clui
Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself. * * *
Senator O'Conor. That is to what I was referring.
What have you to say with reference to their addressing the group ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection of what they were talking
about. Senator. My recollection is one of sort of mingled pleasure
at having been able to scramble througli a speech in Chinese and em-
barrassment in having made slips in the use of colloquial language
that made people laugh. So I was not psychologically in the right
mood for paying close attention to what other people were saying.
Senator O'Conor. In view of the other observations that were made,
as to the difficulties confronting others in getting up there, the impres-
sion is left, at least on me, that you were not only welcome, but that
you were given more or less free rein to do as you pleased while you
were there. Would that be correct ?
Mr. Lattimore. Roughly correct, Senator.
If I may explain, we were certainly given remarkable opportunities
to interview people and to ask questions.
As I say, I personally found restriction on my movements and op-
portunities when I tried to get into the one thing that interested me
most.
I can't answer for the journalists who got there before me and got
there after me, except in the general sense that the newspaper accounts
published by such people at the time all laid stress on at least the
relative frankness and willingness to talk of Communist leaders when
interviewed up there.
Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, the only other question I would
like to ask is this : You have previously indicated or stated that you
are unfamiliar with the Communist line and with Communist teach-
ings and precepts.
In the article in the London Times, in your reference to Mao, you
not only speak quite approvingly of him, but you indicate that lie was
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3303
quite adept at speaking on the philosophies and other things. How do
you know that he was adhering to those things of the Communist line
if you did not know the Communist line ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the impression that I got by sitting by
while Bisson and Jaffe were interviewing him. And this was the
general period when, by agreement between both the Communists and
the Nationalist Government, the united front was being worked out,
and they were asking him a lot of technical questions about "What do
you mean by 'united front'?" et cetera, et cetera.
And my impression, from listening to those answers, was that he
was in full command of exactly what he meant and exactly what he
didn't mean.
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any form or type of
letter of introduction or credentials ; anything of that sort, to present
there to Mao's government, or Mao's officials when you arrived ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I don't think we had anything whatever of
the kind.
Senator Smith. Were you just accepted at face value by Mao and
his attendants ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right. That was the practice at the time.
Senator. They were accepting any kind of journalists, particularly
any foreign visitor who would come up.
Senator Smith. I thought you told us earlier, though, that you
feared you would have some trouble getting up there, and that was
the reason you wrote that first letter. That there was a line beyond
which the Communists did not allow journalists to come, except by
prearrangement.
Mr. Lattimore. No. I don't think my writing them a letter implies
that at all. All I was doing was trying to let the Communists know
that I had the intention to come up there and see things, if I was al-
lowed to see things, and that I was not trying, so to speak, to sneak in
on them.
Senator Smith. Do you recall where you posted that letter ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think just in an ordinary letter box in Peking
City.
Senator Smith. I missed that.
Mr. Lattimore. I would
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to leave that as soon as I
have Mr. Lattimore identify one picture in this article.
Mr. Lattimore, I offer you page 7 and call your attention to the top
picture.
The Chairman. Page 7 of what ?
Mr. Morris. That is the New Masses article which has been intro-
duced into the record, Mr. Chairn^an.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it admitted, Mr. Morris?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you admit it into evidence?
The Chairman. The article may be admitted. It will have to be
copied out of there.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 514" and is as
follows:)
3304 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 514
[New Masses, October 12, 1937]
China's Communists Told Me — A Specialist in Far Eastern Affairs Inter-
views THE Leading Men of Red China in Their Home Territories
(By Philip J. Jaffe)
Fifteen clays before Japanese troops opened fire on a Chinese garrison near
Peiping, I was seated in the one bare room which is the home of Mao Tse-tung,
the political leader of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of the
interview Mao Tse-tung said to me: "Japan cannot stop now. Japan wants
to swallow China. Its next step will not be long delayed. You ask about the
future of the united front? The united front is inevitable because Japan's
invasion farther into the heart of China is inevitable."
Twenty-four hours later, in the military headquarters of the former Chinese
Red Army, only two big rooms, walls covered with huge military maps, I asked
the most famous of the Communist commanders. General Chu Teh: "Why do
you think that General Chiang Kai-shek will have to accept the aid of the Red
Army?"
Chu Teh replied : "A form of the united front has now existed for several
months and has resulted in a large measure of internal peace. The Chinese
bourgeoisie, however, is not easily able to forget its ten-year tight against
the Red Army. But when the war with Japan eventually begins, it will not
be a question of what the bourgeoisie wants ; they will have to have the Red
Army. In a war with Japan, it will not only be a question of regular troops.
China must also depend on its peasants and workers whom the Communists
alone can lead. It is not merely the numbers of the army which count ; it is
the mass population as well. If Chiang Kai-shek thinks that he can raise a
large army to fight Japan, without at the same enrolling the masses as the
backbone of the struggle, then he will be rudely disappointed. No war against
Japan can be successful without a correct organization of the peasants and
workers, and this only the Red Army can successfully carry out."
Two weeks later I know that the prophecy made by the two famous leaders
of the former Chinese Red Army had been fulfilled. On July 7, Japan invaded
North China. On August 22, the first stage of the united fi'ont — that of military
cooperation — was concluded between the Nanking and Red Armies. In the
words of the official communique fi'om Nanking, "the Chinese government and
the Communist army have been fighting for the last ten years ; this is the
oflScial conclusion of the war." Mao Tse-tung has since been appointed governor
of the former Soviet region, now renamed the Special Administrative District.
Chu Teh has been appointed commander in chief of the former Red Army, now
called the Eighth Route Army. Chou En-lai, another outstanding Comumnis^t
with whom I spoke, is the official Communist representative on the general staff
in Nanking.
Mao Tse-tuny, political leader. — Yenan is the capital of the former Soviet
region. On June 21, after four days' travel from Sian, the capital of Shensi
province, scene of the Chiang Kai-shek incident of last December, through semi-
starved villages, on bridgeless rivers, and roads deep with gullies, we finally
passed through the beautiful, ancient main gate of Yenan. We were greeted
at the gate by Agnes Smedley, the distinguished American writer and an old
friend of the Chinese people. While in Yenan our party which included beside
myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore,
editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed at the Foreign Ofticf , The building was soon
buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished car first dinner in Yenan,
when guests arrived : Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer ; Li Li-san,
an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen ; the only two non-Chinese then in the region ;
Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow ;
and many Communist leaders. Before long we were talking and singing in a
variety of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion somebody entered
quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao," someone .said — Mao Tse-tung, the
political leader of the tlien Chinese Soviet Government.
We spent many hours with him after that evening — at interviews, during
meals, at the theater — and we were increasingly impressed by the complete
sincerity and lack of ostentation that is so typical of him and of the other leadei's
we saw. It was during these visits that we grew to feel his tremendous force,
a force likely to be overlooked at first because of the low, even voice, the quiet
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3305
restraiut of his movemeuts, aud the beautiful bands, almost too delicate for a
soldier, but so dextrous with the writing brush. But the quiet voice speaks with
brilliance and authority, the movements of the tall, slim body with slightly
stooped shoulders are sure and well coordinated. Like all other Red Army
commanders, Mao wears exactly the same uniform as the rank-and-file soldiers,
eats the same food, sleeps on the same sort of k'ang (a low, long bed of stone),
avoids all social ceremonies, and altogether lives an extremely simple life. It
becomes easy to understand the tremendous personal appeal which Mao has
as a leader. This leadership dates from the first organizational meeting of the
committee which organized the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1920.
Mao was an important figure at that meeting.
Our interviews with Mao Tse-tung were many and on a host of topics : the
evolution of Nanking's policy ; the inner political struggle within Nanking ; the
Sian incident ; the united front ; the student movement ; the role of other powers
in Far Eastern affairs ; and the perspective of China's future development, etc.
But since Mao Tse-tung asked me to transmit a message to the American people,
it is perhaps best to confine his remarks to those concerning America and its
isolationist policy.
"Though there are many Americans who are isolationist in principle," he
began, "America is not and cannot be isolationist. America is in this respect
like other capitalist countries; part proletariat, part capitalist. Neither one
nor the other can be isolationist. Capitalism in the imperialist countries is world-
wide, and so is the problem of liberation which needs the effort of the world
proletariat. Not only does China need the help of the American proletariat,
but the American proletariat also needs the help of the Chinese peai^.aits and
workers. The relation of American capitalism to China is similar to. that of
other capitalist countries. These countries have common interests as well as
conflicting ones— common in that they all exploit China, conflicting in that each
wants what the other has, as exemplified by the conflict between Great Britain
and the United States, as well as between Japan, Britain, and the United States.
If China is subjugated by Japan, it will not only be a catastrophe for the Chinese
people, but a serious loss to other imperialist powers."
At this point Mao was handed a wireless message announcing both the fall of
Bilbao and the resignation of France's premier, L^on Blum. We discussed the
probable causes of both these events. Mao clearly showed his grasp of the world
situation, despite the isolating distance. "We took time oft" to answer a host of
questions, this time by him. What is comparative strength of the Socialist
and Communist Parties in America? Did we know the life stories of John L.
Lewis and Earl Browder? The strength of the American labor unions? The
Trotskyites? American official opinion on the Far East?
Then Mao Tse-tung continued : "The Chinese revolution is not an exception ;
it is one part of the world revolution. It has special characteristics, but funda-
mentally it is similar to the Spanish, French, American, and British struggles.
These struggles are all progressive. Therein lies their similarity. It is this
similarity that evokes the broad sympathy of the American masses and their
concern with the fate of the Chinese people. We, on our part, are also concerned
with the fate of the American people. Please convey this message to your people.
The difference between our peoples lies in this : the Chinese people, unlike the
Americans are oppressed by outside invaders. The American people are, of
course, oppressed from the inside, but not by feudal forces. It is the hope com-
mon to all of us that our two countries shall work together."
Chu Teh, military leader. — Though Chu Teh is known to the outside world
for his military exploits, his other activities are many and varied. We first met
Chu Teh in a class he was teaching on the "Fundamental Problems of the
Chinese Revolution." Wearing spectacles, he could very well have been mis-
taken for a professional teacher. At the People's Anti-Japanese Military Polit-
ical University at Yenan, he teaches both military tactics and Marxist-Leninist
principles. From 1922 to 1925, Chu Teh studied political and economic science,
philosophy, and military strategy in Germany. As a result he speaks German
freely. His favorite recreations are reading, conversation, horseback riding,
and basketball. The latter sport is a subject for much fun among the troops.
His love for the game is greater than his ability and he can often be found hang-
ing about a group which is choosing sides. If he is not picked, he quietly moves
on to the next court in the hope that there his luck w^ill turn. My gi'eatest dis-
appointment ^t Yenan was that rain ruined an appointment we had to play
basketball with him.
88348— 52— pt. 10 3
3306 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Eighth Route Army, is the personification
of the spirit of these armies which for 10 years have been continuously victorious
in the face of overwlielming odds. His career has been devoted mainly to the
military side of revolutionary activities. Fifty-one years old, he has taken part
in the entire development of modern China, from the overthrow of the Manchu
dynasty in 1911 to the pi-esent struggle against Japan. Beginning with August
1, 1927, when together with another famous Red commander. Ho Lung, he organ-
ized the Nanchang uprising, he participated in exploits which have now become
legend. In November 1931, the first All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi, be-
stowed upon him the title of commander in chief of the army. Even in Nan-
king I heard many call Chu Teh the greatest military genius in all China.
There is strength and assurance in that square, stocky figure, in that strong
peasant face, weather-beaten by a life of campaigning, and in those small bright
eyes which are quite hidden when he laughs, and he laughs frequently. We took'
a picture of him standing with legs apart and hands on hips. That is Chu Teh.
"The Red Army in this region under our direct command numbers about ninety
thousand," he began. "This force occupies a contiguous territory extending
from North Shensi to East Kansu and South Ninghsia. From Yenan to Sanyan
there are some partisan troops in Kuomintang uniforms. In this region pro-
fessional full-time partisans number from ten to twenty thousand. The number
of part-time partisans is much larger ; their duties are to maintain order in their
districts.
"Of the ninety thousand regular troops here, only twenty to thirty thousand
come from the original Kiangsi district. About thirty thousand were recruited
on the way, chiefly in Szechwan, and the rest are from local areas.
"In other partisan areas there are various groups numbering from one to three
tliousand soldiers, but it is hard to estimate the total figure ; we ourselves are not
certain about this. These partisan areas are located in soiithern Shensi (south-
west of Sian), the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border,
northeastern Kiangsi, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Hunan
border, the Kiangsi-Hunan border, and the Shensi-Szechwan border. Connec-
tions with several of these are still maintained, but not with all ; and these con-
nections are irregular and uncertain." Asked if we might publish this, Chu
Teh replied "It doesn't matter. The fact is well known throughout China."
Having seen many Red troops carrying on their maneuvers with excellent new
rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, and the ubiquitous Mausers, we were
curious to know how well armed they were as a whole. Chu Teh replied, "Our
regular ninety thousand troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region are in gen-
eral well armed. Other equipment, such as clothes, food, and supplies, is not
satisfactory. Although it greatly improved after the Sian incident, it is still far
from sufficient. Though we had established contact with Chang Hsueh-liang
before the Sian affair, it was only during the two v/eeks following the actual
incident that any large quantity of munitions, clothing, and food reached ns."
As Chu Teh continued the conversation, punctunted frequently by his broad,
genial smile, he came to the discussion of his well-known theory of the military
tactics necessary to defeat Japan, namely, to avoid decisive engagements in the
early stages in favor of guerrilla tactics to encircle the enemy and harass it
until its morale was shattered. We wanted to know something about the Man-
churian volunteers. Were they really well organized or were they mere hungry
"bandits"?
"At first." Chu Teh said, "the Manchurian volunteers were largely impoverished
peasants and the scattered remnants of the defeated Manchurian troops. They
operated without a plan, could not accomplish much, and finally were almost
destroyed. The Communist Party then began to organize new peasant detach-
ments, who were later joined by what remained of the original volunteers. As
a result, most of these formerly leaderless forces have been converted into im-
portant detachments with wide popular support. This year there has been some
increase in the number of volunteers along the Korean border, in eastern Feng-
tien, and in eastern Kirin. The increase has been more systematic than hitherto.
New groups have recently been formed in Jeliol and Chahar. About three months
ago a report to me stated that the total number of Manchurian volunteers ranged
from fifty to sixty thousand." In reply to a statement made by the Japanese to
the effect that 70 percent of the Manchurian volunteers are Communists, Chu Teh
said that this was not an exaggeration.
On the United Front. — Of all the questions facing China and the former Soviet
area the most important is that of the united front. No one in Soviet China
knows the details of the negotiations more intimately than Chou En-lai, vice
chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and second in importance only
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3307
to Mao Tse-tung. It was he who carried on all the negotiations with Chiang
Kai-shek. Born thirty-nine years ago of a mandarin family, Chou En-lai joined
the revolutionary movement in 1911. Upon his return to China in 1924 fi"om
a stay abroad, he became chief of the political department of the Whampoa
Military Academy under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. It is said that even
today the generalissimo has a great fondness for Chou. When asked why the
united-front conversations were then not moving very fast, Chou En-lai said :
"The form of the Chinese united front is quite different from that in Europe or
the United States. In China two parties fought each other for ten years. The
Communist Party representing the proletariat and peasantry was a revolutionary
party with its own areas and military forces as well as its own social, political,
and economic system. The Kuomintang represented the ruling social groups
throughout the rest of China. But the position of the Chinese bourgeoisie was
such that the obstacles arising from their class position could not forever bar
a united struggle against Japan. The bourgeoisie of China have at last come to
realize that tlie Japanese invasion harms all classes and that, standing alone,
they are too weak to safeguard China's freedom and independence."
Up to the time of Japan's most recent invasion, the united-front negotiations
had progressed quite slowly though not without positive results. Internal peace
had been achieved, and the two armies no longer fought each other. Confisca-
tion of land in the Soviet regions was abolished. The name of the Red Army
was changed. Dramatic troupes began to tour the countryside to teach the
peasants the meaning of democratic elections. Nanking began to contribute a
considerable,* though as yet insufficient, sum of money monthly to the Soviet
area. Technical difficulties made a complete united front often seem impossible.
But Japan's military aggression scattered all the major obstacles.
The land proWem. — Ever since October 1935, when the main body of the Com-
munist armies from Central and South China began to arrive in north Shensi,
their immediate objectives have been twofold. First, to build a permanent base
for internal development, and second and more important, to use this base as a
spearhead for unifying all elements in China for a successful war of defense
against the invading Japanese militarists. Despite the fact that the former
Soviet area, the largest single contiguous territory ever held under Communist
rule, stated as one of the most economically backward areas in China, the wel-
fare of the peasants and workers has been improved considerably. There is not
sufficient room here to tell all that we saw and heard, but a few high spots, in
the words of Po K'u, one of the important leaders of the region, will perhaps
shed some light.
Po K'u's home and office is in the abandoned compound of an English Baptist
mission. When we expressed surprise at finding religious pictures hanging on
his walls. Po K'u said that he left the compound just as he found it in the hope
that the missionaries would return.
In reply to several questions on the land confiscation problem, Po K'u said
in quite good English: "When the first Soviets were established in 1933 in
Shensi, all the good land along the river banks was in the hands of rich land-
lords who used the great famine of 1930 as a lever for confiscating this land.
From then until the Sian incident in December 1936, all this land was divided
among the peasants ; all taxation and levies were abolished ; democratic liberty
was extended to all; peasants built up their own armed forces for their pro-
tection instead of relying on landlords' forces; and peasants enjoyed the aid
and direction of the Soviet government to increase production, improve the
land, and develop constimer cooperatives.
"After the Sian incident when the unitefl-front organizations had already
begun, the redivision of land among the peasants was stopped in districts oc-
cupied after the beginning of the negotiations. In general, the ownership of
land is not the main problem in this territory. Land is plentiful, for Shensi is
thinlv populated, with an average of one family to every thirteen miles. The
form' of exploitation and, therefore, the main problems are usury and excessive
interest rates on money and cattle. Land rents and money lending rates,
therefore, have been reduced drastically. The maximum rent now permitted in
the Soviet areas is 30 percent of the land produce, and peasants can bargain
with landlords to further reduce this percentage, while the money-lending
rate has been reduced from a general 10 percent monthly rate to a maximum
of 2 percent. Even last year, when warfare was still going on, the Soviet
government spent one hundred thousand dollars for ploughs, seeds, etc., while
this year there will be an additional cash distribution of sixty thousand dollars."
Apparently there has been a great deal of confusion about this abandonment
of land confiscation. Mao Tse-tung's pithy words perhaps explain it most
3308 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
simply. He said : "It is not so much a question now of whether our lands be-
longs to the peasants or the landlords, but whether it is Chinese or Japanese."
The same reasoning is applied by the Communist leaders to the larger question
of China as a whole. To all of them "it is not a qiiestion now of which general
controls which province, but whether the land will remain Chinese or come
imder Japanese control. If the latter should happen, the original problem
disappears."
Life in the Special Administrative District. — Our visit, however, did not con-
sist only of a series of interviews. We visited stores and shops, noting with
interest how nmch cleaner and more orderly they were than any we had seen
<m otir trip, and how relatively well-stocked they were. And the cheesecloth
covering the food for sale stood in marked contrast to the cities in non-Soviet
areas where the only coverings we had seen were armies of flies. Even the
dogs, the most miserable of all living things in China, were active and barking.
Anyone who has seen the worm-eaten, starved, gaunt dogs of China, too weak
to move out of the way of a passing vehicle, will understand the meaning of
that.
Culturally, too, the Soviet region is making great strides. Besides Yenan,
the iiresent capital, three other cities are being developed as cultural centers:
Tingpien, Yenchang, and Chingyang. Anti-Japanese academies and dramatic
groups are the axes around which the cultural life is being developed. Study
classes, reading room, theatricals, dances, lectures, and mass meetings are
regular features of life in the Soviet territories. We were amused to hear
the universal complaint of all librarians. "They keep the books out too long."
But most interesting and important of all was our visit to the theater. A
troupe of players was scheduled to go on the road the following day, and they
graciously went through their repertoire for us as well as for their own de-
lighted audience. In a packed auditorium, seated on low, narrow, backless
wooden benches, before a crude stage whose footlights were flickering candles,
we sat through four hours of amazingly excellent plays, superbly acted. With
perfect realism (so different from the classical Chinese theater) and delightful
humor, they presented plays designed to teach the peasants how to vote and how
to unite. They explained the value of cleanliness, of vaccination, of education,
and the stupidity and danger of superstitions. At one point, for instance, one
character complained of being tired. "We weren't tired on our seven thousand-
mile march," was the reply. And the audience roared as did Mao- Chu Teh,
and the rest of the leaders who sat next to us, having as good a time as any-
one. The high spot of the evening was a really professional performance of a
scene from Gorki's Mother, which had been given at the Gorki memorial evening
celebrated in Yenan, and a Living Newspaper by the young people on such
subjects as bribery, bureaucracy, and hygiene. All these plays were being sent
out to the villages.
Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu
Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the one thousand five hun-
dred cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University
and about five hundred from other schools. Here are some questions asked of
me. "What is the position of woman in the U.S.A.? How do American workers
live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roose-
velt's N.R.A. campaign? What is the present situation in the Left literary move-
ment in America? What do the American people think of our long march
west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event
of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain,
and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.
This stress on the role of the United States is altogether typical of the reac-
tion throughout China. These people have ti-aditionally considered Americans
as their friends and they do not w^ant us to fail them now. A few days after our
arrival in Shanghai, I received a letter from Agnes Smedley which tells better
than I am able how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in
the former Soviet regions.
"In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I
speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I
want to tell on that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the
effect of that meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to
roll in. I have no reason to tell yeu tales. But the meeting, and your speech
in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people. One was so moved by
it that he could not sleep that night but spent the night writing a poem in praise
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3309
of you all. I enclose the poem. It is not good from the literary viewpoint. But
from the viewixtint of the emotion behind it, it is of value. It is a deeply pas-
sionate poem. It is not good enough to publish, but it is good enough to carry
next to your heart in the years to come. To that meeting, it may interest you
to know", came delegations sent by every institution. Many institutions could
not cross the rivers. But they sent activists, groups of six to a dozen. They
later gave extensive reports. I am getting those reports from instructors day
by day. All are deeply impressed and moved and grateful to you and all of you.
There has never been anything like this here before."
Mr. Lattimore. Do you want me to read the caption of this photo-
graph ?
Mr. Morris. Please.
Mr. Lattimore. The photograph is captioned :
Troops marching through the main gate of Yenan to their drill grounds. The
crouching figure with the camera is Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs.
Mr. Morris. Is that a picture of you, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. As well as a man can identify a rather distant pro-
file picture of himself, I would say so, yes.
Mr. Morris. Is there any evidence there of your being supervised ?
Mr. Lattimore. There is no evidence in that picture, except, of
course, that this was an arranged parade. I suppose you might call
that being supervised.
The Chairman. Did they parade for you by arrangement?
Mr. Lattimore. As I recall, we asked if we could take some photo-
graphs of
The Chairman. Wait a minute. I asked if they paraded for you by
arrangement.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I believe it was by arrangement.
My recollection is rather hazy, but I believe we asked if we could
take some pictures of troops.
The Chairman. You reviewed them?
Mr. Li\TTiM0RE. No, sir.
And they said, "We will have some troops out on the parade ground
tomorrow and you can come and take pictures, if you like."
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Senator Watkins. May I ask a question?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Watkins. Was this before, or after you were adviser to
the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was long before.
The Chairman. What was that question ?
Senator Watkins. I asked him if it was before or after he was ad-
viser to the Generalissimo.
Mr. Lattimore. I may say. Senator, that the Generalissimo was
very much interested in my having been up there at that time, and
we had quite a talk about it.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like now to get back to Rogoflf
and War and the Working Class, which started out this questioning
aljout the change in line.
The Chairman. All right.
jSIr. Morris, We have introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, as
our exhibit Xo. 26, the letter from Rose Yardumian to Mr. Edward
Carter. I would like to read it at this time.
3310 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This is January 20, 1944 :
Dear Mr. Carter : I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the tele-
grams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morn-
ing and he told me that he had received your wire, but was sure that 1 would
understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk
with Rogoff. He mentioned the RogofE articles In War and the Working Class
and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles
here. * * *
Mr. Lattimore, is it your testimony that you know nothing of those
articles in War and the Working Class at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe at that time I knew nothing about it.
Mr. Morris. So Rose Yardumian knew about it, but you did not?
Mr. Lattimore. I know about that now ; yes.
Mr. Morris. I mean is it your testimony that at that time, Rose
Yardumian, who wrote this letter, knew about the articles of Rogoff
AVar and the Working Class, but that you did not ?
Mr. Lattimore. That would be my presumption from the wording
of the letter that she knew about it. I don't recall knowing about the
article at all. I did get hold of the article later on, I think several
years later, and looked it up.
Mr. Morris. Did you know Rose Yardumian?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I knew her.
Mr. Morris. She was the secretary of the Washington office of the
IPR, was she not ?
JNIr. Lattimore. I believe she was.
I can't recall now whether she was the secretary or one of the girls
in the office, or what.
Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this
committee that she was on the board of a Communist piiblication last
year in Communist China?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't remember seeing that.
Mr. Morris. You did not read that part of your testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so. No. I read so nuich testimony,
I am not sure of the details.
Mr. Morris. I am continuing reading now :
* * * He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's
office, they would not refuse to see him. I am not sure that 1 understand the
mechanizations of our State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my try-
ing to get in touch with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had con-
sulted with Hornbeck.
Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymon-
ville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed
to get in touch with our office then.
Rogoff visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little
talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at
5 : 30. Rogoff said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meet-
ing ; that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the
fact that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the
Institute of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. * * *
Do you understand the reasoning of Mr. Rogoff there, Mr. Latti-
more ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am afraid I don't.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
* * * Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people
together at their home this evening — the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a
few others — but time is very short and many of these people have already made
plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. How-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3311
ever, RogofE is coming into our office at 2 o'cloclc today. Bill is planning to take
him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Car-
ter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements to
take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places.
I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him, as I know that there
are many people hei-e would have enjoyed hearing him.
Sincerely yours,
Rose
Rose Yardtjmian.
P. S. — I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted to date.
P. P. S. — Rogoft" and Bill have l^een at the Cosmos Club for the last 21/2 hours
talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.
The Chairman. To whom was that letter addressed ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Edward C. Carter, of the International Secretariat.
The Chairman. What is the date of that 'I
Mr. Morris. January 20, 1944.
The Chairman. That is in the record, is it not ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.
This bears on the knowledge that the Institute of Pacific Kelations
had with respect to Eogoff's article, which, according to testimony
before this committee, signalized the cliange in Conmmnist Party
thinking in 1943.
Mr. Lattimore, did yon know Mr. Vladimir Komm in this country ?
IMr. Lattimore. Yes. I met him at the Yosemite Conference of the
IPK in the summer of 1936, at which he was one of the two, I think,
Soviet delegates.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet Mr. Motiliev in this country?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; at the same time,
Mr, Morris. Have you ever met INIr. Litvinoff in this country?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I called on Mr. Litvinoff when I was Chiang
Kai-shek's adviser when I was back here on leave in 1942.
Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you see ^Ir. Litvinoff?
Mr. Lattimore. One, I think.
Mr. Morris. Have you ever seen jMr. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambas-
sador in this country?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I have seen him in this country. I
saw him in Chungking.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever give him or his office something for the
Soviet pouch?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe that it would be accurate to describe
it as giving it to him for the Soviet pouch. I wrote to him stating
that I would like to try to make a trip to Outer Mongolia and as there
was no Outer Mongolian representation in this country, I would ap-
])reciate it if he would convey my request to the Outer Mongolian
Embassy, or whatever it may be, in Moscow.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever meet Mr. Gromyko in the
United States ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I ever did.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did yon make an arrangement with
IMr. Gromyko to have your book Solution in Asia published in the
Soviet Union ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I did. I seem to remember reading
something about that in the testimony. Carter may have suggested
it, or something of that sort.
Mr. Morris, But it is your testimony that you did not, is it?
3312 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. My memory is very vague on the subject, but I
don't think that I did myself.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these two letters, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February
26, 1945, addressed to Mrs. Owen Lattimore, Ruxton, Md., with the
typed signature of Edward C. Carter.
Mr. Morris. And the second?
Mr. Mandel. The second is a photostat of a carbon, a document,
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated INIarch 3,
1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of
Edward C. Carter.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these letters read
into the record at this time since they bear on the series of questions
being addressed to the witness.
The Chairman. Very well.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 515 and
516," and were read by Mr. Mandel.)
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read those two letters, please?
Mr. Mandel. The letter of February 26, 1945 (exhibit No. 515) :
Dear Eleanor: This is just to tlianli you for your lovely hospitality on Sun-
day. Your place is so lovely, the food so good, and the conversation so stimulat-
ing that I do want you to know what great pleasure and profit you gave me.
I had a good talk with Owen on the train and I hope I can be of a little
assistance in carrying out his project.
A part of my purpose in getting a number of low-cost copies of Solution in
Asia fits right into the build-up which is desirable as preparation for getting
an invitation from across the water for Owen to go abroad.
I have discovered that Owen's 40-percent discount is better for the IPR than
anything we can get from the publisher. I would be grateful therefore if you
could have 12 copies sent me as speedily as possible to-gether vpith your bill.
Ever gratefully yours,
Edward C. Carter.
The second letter is dated March 3, 1945 (exhibit No. 516) :
Dear Owen : Would you be willing to do a review of Rowe's book China Among
the Powers for Pacific Affairs?
Our reviewers still have to do their reviews as a labor of love even though
they may have no burning affection for the book to be reviewed. If you are
willing to undertake this task we would like to have your review by March 27,
but if this is impossible and you could do it for us later we would prefer to
have a review from your pen in a subsequent issue rather than to get a sub-
stitute writer for the next issue. If you will accept I will, of course, send
you immediately a reviewer's copy of the book.
As soon as possible after recepit of extra copies of Solution in Asia I am
going to descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the plans for exploring the
feasibility of your recent proposal.
I felt that of all the speakers you did by far the best job at the town hall.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what did Mr. Carter mean when he
said he was going to "descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the
plans for exploring the feasibility of your recent proposal" ?
Mr. Lattimore. Subject to the limitations of being able to say
what was in another man's mind
Mr. Morris. He is talking about "your recent proposal," Mr. Latti-
more.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3313
Mr, Lattimore. I would saj' that my "recent proposal" must have
been my same old proposal that went on for years and years, of trying
to get into Outer Mongolia.
Mr. Morris. And that bore no relation to having a publishing of
Solution in Asia done for Soviet internal consumption?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea what that would be.
Mr. Morris. You have read ISIr. Carter's testimony on that point,
liave you not?
Mr. Latitmore. Yes, I have read it.
Mr. Morris. Which is contradictory to what your understanding-
was at that time ?
jVIr, La'itimore. No. In what way ?
Mr. Morris. Did he not testify that there was such a project?
Mr. LAi^riMORE. A project for
Mr. Morris. Having the Soviets publish a version of your book, a
copy of your book, an edition of your book.
Mr. Laitimore. Oh, I didn't remember that. As far as I can see
from this present correspondence, he was trying to get some copies of
my book to send — what is it now — to send presumably to Russia, but
whether the project included a translation or a Russian edition, I
don't know.
Mr. Morris. You did send copies of Solution in Asia to the Soviet
Union, did you not?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I sent them to Mr. Carter. I don't think I
remember sending any to the Soviet Union.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?
Mr. ISIandel. This is a photostat of a memorandum. In the corner
is "OL.'' This is a j^hotostat from the documents from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. It reads as follows :
(Exhibit No. 517)
Distribution of 12 copies of Solution in Asia —
and these names are listed :
W. K. Hancoclf — for review 3-12-45 — Mrs. V. L. Pandit
K. P. Clien
Gromyko (2) — 1 for Ztiukov
Kisselev — for Kemenov and Voi
Litvinoff — for Yarga and Voitinsky
3-14-45 — Stepanov — for Mikoyan (for Lozovsky and Voitinsky??)
The Chairman. What do you want done with that ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, from your knowledge of IPR docu-
ments, the fact that "OL'' appears in the upper right-hand corner
indicates, does it not, that you were to get a copy of that distribution
made of your book ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably. AVell, it w^ould mean — I question that
I had received a copy.
Is that my initial? I mean did I initial that to show I had received
it, or did somebody else ?
Mr. SouR^VINE. Look at the photostat and see if those are your
initials.
Mr. Lattimore. No, the "OL" there isn't my w^riting.
Mr. Morris. But from your knowledge of markings of institute
papers, does that not indicate to you that that meant a copy of that
should go to you for distribution ?
3314 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. Very probably; yes. It might mean simply that
it was to be put in the "OL" file in the IPR office. I wouldn't be able
to tell you.
Mr. SoDRAViNE. Mr. Morris, could you find out from the witness if
he knows who these people are that are mentioned here ?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
May we have that introduced in the record first ?
The Chairman. It may be introduced in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 517" and was
read in full.)
The Chairman. What is the question?
Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Lozovsky, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I do.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Voitinsky ?
Mr. Lattimore. Voitinsky I met in 1936.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Stepanov?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't place him.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Mikoyan ?
Mr. Lai"it]M()Re. I presume he is the same Mikoyan whose name
I have seen in the press as a Soviet official.
The Chairman. The question is do you know him?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't know him.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Zhukov ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I do.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Kemenov ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't place him.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Varga ?
Mr. Lattimore. ^Ir. Varga ? I know that he is a Soviet economist,
but I don't think I have met him.
Mr. Morris. But you know who these people are?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
The Chairman. Is Gromyko's name in there ?
Mr. Morris. Gromyko's name does appear there ; yes, sir.
Do you know Mr. Gromyko ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I met him.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, identification of these men can be made
at a later time.
Mr. Lattimore. The other names at the top of this list, Mr. W. K.
Hancock, I don't think I have ever heard of him.
Mrs. V. L. Pandit is, of course, the recent Indian Ambassador in this
country.
K. P. Chen is one of the leading bankers of China.
Senator Ferguson. Is he in China now?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe he is in Hongkong. I am not sure.
The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you know that Soviet officials col-
lected information on economic geography and statistics from United
States Government departments for the IPK in the United States ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't know that. At least, I don't believe
I ever knew it. It would seem to me to be quite an ordinary procedure,
if they did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have here the minutes of a meeting
of April 2, 1936, and I am asking Mr. Mandel if he will identify this
document.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3315
The Chairman. Meeting of what?
Mr. Morris. Meeting in Moscow.
Mr. Manclel will identify it.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting, April 2, 1936, Moscow :
Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, H. M. Harondar."
Mr. Morris. "H. M." is different from Harondar ; is it ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Will a copy of that be made available to Mr. Lattimore,
please?
This is April 2, 1936.
Mr. Lattimore, will you read the sixth paragraph on the front page,
which begins with "Motiliev."
Mr. Lattimore. The sixth ?
Mr. Morris. The one that says :
Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving * * *.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Motiliev said that he was Interested in receiving from the United States more
material on the economic geography of the country ; the official publications of
Government departments, particularly the statistical reports.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did the IPR serve as a conduit for the
Soviet officials to receive such information from the United States?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea.
Mr. Morris. I ask you to turn, Mr. Lattimore, to page 2 and take
up the second item there on the top of the page, "II. In re: Pacific
Affairs."
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present.
Mr. Morris. Why should that discussion be postponed until Voitin-
sky was present, Mr. Lattimore? Did you know at that time Mr.
Voitinsky was the head of the far eastern section of the Comintern?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I did not.
As far as my recollection serves, Voitinsky was the editor, or one of
the editors, of the publication which was regarded as the official pub-
lication of the Soviet council of the IPR and, therefore, would be a
natural person to include in an editorial conference.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, may I call your attention to VII on
page 3, just about the middle.
Mr. Lattimore. "In re International Secretariat Policy" ?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
The Chairman. What do you want ?
Mr. Morris. I want Mr. Lattimore to read it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECG's report on the policy. He
thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might be
some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu criticizing
the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky was here.
Mr. ]MoRRis. And then, finally, Mr. Lattimore, I would like you to
turn to the last page.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
3316 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. Who is "ECC" ?
]\Ir. Lati'imori:. Mr. Edward C. Carter.
Mr. Morris. Beginning in the first paragraph on the last page, Mr.
Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this —
I don't know what "this" is —
when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any
critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions
about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents but as to its juridical posi-
tion as to the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and
negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of
articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you know at that time Mr. Voitin-
slry's position with the Communist International ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, does your research of Pacific Affairs at
this period of time indicate that anything appeared therein along the
description I just gave?
Mr. Mandel. In the issue of September 1936 of Pacific Aifairs
Mr. Morris. That is just shortly after the meeting you were dis-
cussing, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Mandel. Cited under the title '"Literature on the Chinese Com-
munist Movement" is the following notation of an article on British
imperialism in China, from the Communist International, No. 6,
November 1924, and another article by Mr. Voitinsky, entitled "The
Situation in China," from the Communist International, No. 21, April
1925.
This is taken from Pacific Affairs of September 1936, listing the
writings of G. Voitinsky.
Mr. Morris. And you were editor at that time, were you not, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Of Pacific Affairs; yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, might that whole document be received
into the record ?
The Chairman. It may be received into the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 518" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. .518
Meeting April 2, 1936, Moscow: Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. I>attimore, H. M.
■ Harondar
1. In re exchange of books and periodicals.
ECC said that of the member countries those most interested in Soviet ma-
terials are the English, Chinese, and American Councils. The American Council
is best equipped to use them. The two Chinese who know Russian are at present
not in China. In England the Russian materials are used by some of the
members of the Chatham House, but the staff is not able to make full use of them.
Since the American Council could best use the books, the decision was to have
the main IPR collection in New York temporarily.
HM explained that the exchange was very successful to date, but that there
was difficulty in choosing what books were wanted because it was impossible to
tell about their contents without some kind of bibliographical exchange.
Motiliev said that it would be po.ssible to provide almost all the materials
printed in the Soviet Union. Since the American Council is interested in books
on the Soviet Union in general, it will be necessary to work out a system for
selection.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3317
Harondar said that he had already sent to New York the list of all the periodi-
cals which the U. S. S. R. IPR is receiving for I\Irs. Barnes to choose which ones
were wanted in the U. S. He said that he now received librai-y cards of all the
books on pertinent subjects, with a short resume of the contents. He will have
these sent to the U. S. to serve as a basis for selection.
Motiliev said that the annual plan figures and the publications of the statistical
institute would be sent regularly without a preliminary exchange of the bibli-
ographical cards.
Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the U. S. more material
on the economic geography of the country ; the official publications of Govern-
ment departments, particularly the statistical reports.
Harondar said that their library on Japan, in English, was meagre and they
would like more books on this. If it is possible to have sent from America the
Japanese Government reports in English, they would like to have them.
ECC said that Usiiibe should be able to furnish those.
Lattimore asked if there were important materials in Mongolian and Chinese
available here.
Motiliev said that there is very little. There is a magazine published in
Mongolia in Russian. There is also a Russian newspaper in Buriat-Mongolia.
There are ftlongolian and Chinese newspapers for those peoples in the Soviet Far
East. All of these can be sent.
Motiliev said that there was very little use made of latinized Chinese due to
the difficulties of retaining contacts and connections with older Chinese literature
and with contemporary publications in China. The Chinese newspai)er occasion-
ally publishes a supplement in latinized Chinese.
Motiliev said that it was easy to get materials on Buriat-Mongolia, but more
tlifficult on Mongolia. Harondar will check on the publications available here
in Mongolian.
Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of U. 8. S. R. Handbook published by
Gollanz. He aLso gave HM the latest number of Sovietskie Kraebedenie which
is devoted entirely to Buriat-Mongolia. He shows Lattimore the new Mon-
golian Atlas and said that he would try to get a copy for him.
B. In re Exhibit of periodicals at Yosemite.
ECC explained that at Yosemite he wanted to have an exhibit of the most
important periodicals appearing in the U. S. S. R. on the Far East, the Soviet
Far East, and on the U. S. S. R. in general. He would like two copies of the
monthly and quarterly magazines and four of the weekly magazines.
IMotiliev said that there were few magazines on the Far East as such, but
many general magazines that had important information on the Far East.
II. In re Pacific Affairs.
The di.scussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present.
III. In re the appointment of a Soviet member of the staff of the Sec'y GenT.
Motiliev said that this question could not be settled immediately, but he would
like to know what type of person was wanted.
ECC said that the Soviet member should be able to do the following :
1. Visit the IPR library in N. Y. to find out in what particular fields it was
weak.
2. To visit the other important libraries in the country at universities to
find out how far they are equipped to supply people who are studying the Soviet
Union.
3. To prepare summaries in English and descriptions of the Soviet periodicals
for the exhibit in Yosemite.
4. To meet the people working in the universities on the Soviet Union.
5. To help on Pacific Affairs.
Motiliev said that this meant the Soviet member should be one of the leading
people in the IPR group here and well-informed on the Far East, etc. This
would be very difficult, because the institutions where such people are working
are very hesitant to let them go ftu- a long period. In principle he felt that
such an arrangement would be a good thing.
IV. In re Motiliev's visits en route to Y'osemite.
ECC reported that Liu Yu-Wan was very anxious to meet Motiliev in Shang-
hai. Liu Yu-Wan has now been made secretary of the Society for Sino-Soviet
Cultural Relations, of which the Soviet ambassador is one of the officers.
Motiliev said that he was not sure that he would get to Shanghai before Liu
Yu-Wan had left.
ECC said that Liu Yu-Wan was ready to wait for him. He also w^ants to
come to Moscow after the conference.
3318 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ECC reported the invitation to Motiliev from Chatham House. Chatham House
suggested that the middle of May might be a good time for such a visit.
iNIotliliev said that it would be very difficult for him to do it. This year
is a very busy one for him since the first volume of the Atlas is to appear during
the year. Likewise Voitiusky is very busy, as editor of the new quarterly. How-
ever, it might be possible to arrange for someone else to visit London. Motiliev
is planning to finish his reports during the end of April and May. He considers
that it is less important for him to visit England than China, since the opinions of
leading English are more easily found in their articles and books than is the case
with the Chinese.
V. In re Soviet participation at Yosemite.
(a) Personnel : ECC said that he was anxious to have as large a delegation as
possible. He suggested that Romm would be very acceptable to the other coun-
tries. He also mentioned Neymann.
Motiliev said that this could not I)e settled immediately. Romm would un-
doubtedly represent Izvestia, and might be a member of the delegation.
(6) Documentation: Motiliev reported :
1. The Symposium on the Soviet Far East is almost ready. The last articles
are going to be received soon. By the end of May it should be printed in English.
2. The Symposiixm on international relations in the Pacific Area will be ready
at the same time. Most of the articles in it will be entirely new, but they may
translate some of the articles from Tikhi Okean. He asked that HM give an
opinion as to which articles would be more interesting.
3. Nationality Policy in the Soviet Far East. This paper was to be prepared
by Dimanshtein. H»^ is very busy and not very prompt. His secretary says that
he probalily cannot do it before the conference, but maybe it will be done
afterwards.
4. Paper on Pacific relations in general, in connection with the fifth round-table.
This paper is being prepared by Motiliev. It should be ready in May. He does
not know how long and full he will be able to make it.
Motiliev asked if May would be too late for the papers.
ECC said that it would be too late for Australia and New Zealand, but in any
case the most important use of the documentation comes after the conference.
Motiliev said that It might be possible to send mimeographed copies earlier.
He said that the two symposiums would be of value for several years and that
the Symposium on the Soviet Far East would be printed in 50,000 copies, since
there was no such study in existence here.
Motiliev said that part of the Standard of Living study should be done by the
conference. This is being written by Kravel who is vice president of Gosplan
and director of all the statistical work.
VI. In re finance and budget.
ECC said that he would discuss this later alone with Motiliev.
VII. In re international secretariat policy.
Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECC's report on the policy.
He thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might
be some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu
criticizing the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky
was here.
VIII. In re HM's visit to Buriat Mongolia.
Motiliev said that he would be only too glad to ari-ange it, but due to the
unstable conditions there, it was impossible to arrange it at present. Last
year when he inquired as to the possibilities, the military institutions objected.
At present Americans are allowed in Birobidjan. With Buriat-Mongolia it is
just a question of time until the conditions become normal. If HM wants
to visit other minor nationalities, as for instance in the Caucasus, it can be
arranged.
IX. In re Lattimore's visit to Mongolia.
Motiliev said tliat the same thing applies to Mongolia as to Buriat-Mongolia,
but there the question is more complicated since Mongolia is an independent
country. Mongolia now is constantly ready for war and conditions are very
unstable.
There is a Mongolian representative in Moscow, with whom Motiliev spoke
when Lattimore first applied for permission. This representative did not refuse,
but said he would have to write to Ulan Bator for permission and seemed reluctant
to ti*y to get permission. Moreover, there would not have been sufficient time
to arrange this.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3319
Motiliev did not try to get permission through Narkomindel. Since the
U. S. S. R. IPR is in no way connected with the Narkomindel, he couldn't try
to get permission from them witliout the approval of I>attimore and the Institute.
Lattimore said that he would rather not go by getting permission via Nar-
komindel.
Motiliev said that it would then be necessary to wait until conditions improved.
X. In re Soviet critique of international policy of IPR.
Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this when Voitinsky was
here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general
policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions about Pacific Affairs,
not as to its policy and contents, but as to its juridical position as the instru-
ment of tlie IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in con-
nection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in
some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.
Motiliev said that although there were few subscriptions to Pacific Affairs
here, it was read by many specialists and they found it very interesting.
Lattimore said that he would also like to discuss the institutional position
of Pacific Affairs.
Motiliev said that the circulation of Tikhi Okean was between 3,000 and 5,000.
The circulation is limited by a lack of paper rather than a lack of readers. "When
he was in the Far East he had great difficulty in finding any copies and it is
impossible to get back numbers.
Mr. Lattimore. May I point out that at that time, I don't think
that my knoAvledge of tlie Russian set-np included any assumption
that the fact that a man had printed something for the Communist
International meant that he held a position on the Comintern.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you offer to supply military infor-
mation to the Soviet officials of the Listitute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel. will you identify this document, please?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding with that, I
am not clear on one position, back on page 4.
The Chairman. Of the last exhibit ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
* * * he said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection
with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some
way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.
In these previous minutes of the meeting we found that there was
to be a line or policy, and we find articles carrying that out.
What do you say is meant by "the U. S. S. R. IPR position"?
Your wife just handed j^ou a paper. Is that in relation to it?
Mr. Lattimore. That is in relation to the previous questioning
here several days ago about the question of line in Pacific Affairs, on
which I should like to make some amplifying remarks.
Senator Ferguson. You can make those later.
Mr. Lattimore. All right.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have, though, what you mean
here, or what was meant here by the "U. S. S. R. IPR position."
Mr. Lattimore, I have no recollection of Avhat that meant. That
is something I didn't write. I don't remember ever seeing these
minutes before, and it seems to me the wording is rather obscure, but
may have something to do with institutional arrangements at that
time.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, does it not sound reasonable that
if you and Mr. Carter were to make up reports on this meeting later —
which you claim that you did and which was in your possession at the
time you wrote the book — that you would get the minutes that were
taken, which are now before you?
3320 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. No ; it doesn't, Senator, I don't think that, as of
1950, I knew there were such minutes.
Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about 1950. I am talking
about the time that you claim the reports were written.
Mr. Lattimore, No ; I would write a report on my own recollections
of what there was to report about.
I remember that at the Yosemite Conference in 1936 I was called
upon to make a report to some kind of special committee for the pur-
pose, on the editorial problems and policy of Pacific Affairs, and
]:)resumably there was some reference there to the visit that I had just
then recently made to Moscow, the details of which were presumably
then much more fresh in my head.
Senator P'erguson. But is it not clear, from the minutes of the
meetings that were taken by the IPR and placed in their files, that
there was to be a U. S. S. E. policy line ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How do you explain the expression that I read ?
Mr. Lattimore. The expression that concerns the "preventing the
]:)ublishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R.
IPR position."
And I say that is an obscure wording, which at this time I can't
identify, especially as I didn't write it and don't believe I have ever
seen it before.
Senator Ferguson, But taking all the other documents that we
have had on the IPR, your meeting in Moscow, is it not a fair infer-
once that there was a policy line and that that is the policy line that
(hey were talking about there ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, I see no reason for such an inference.
May I, Senator Ferguson, at this moment advert to the question of
line, as it was discussed the other day, because I think we may have
been talking
Senator Ferguson. I don't have any question now, but I just want
to say that I cannot agree with the witness' explanation that he has
given at all.
Senator Smith. May I ask one question about this line ?
The Chairman. All right, Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, where this memorandum, prepared,
l)y Mr. Carter, says :
He said there would be discussions aud negotiations in connection with the
question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful
to the U. S. S. R. IPR position—
does not that sentence indicate that the U. S. S. R. position and the
IPR position were one and the same, because it is in the singular and
refers to the positions of the two ?
Mr. Lattimore. That wouldn't be my conclusion. Senator.
Senator Smith, It would not be?
Mr, Lattimore, No,
Senator Smith, What would be your conclusion about that, then ?
Mr, Lattimore, Well, as I said, I think this wording is very ob-
scure, but it seems to me that it refers to a U, S, S, R. and IPR posi-
tion and possibly the relationship between the two.
Senator Smith, It does not say "positions," Does not that sentence
indicate that they are one and the same, U, S, S, R. IPR position?
Mr. Lattimore, No, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3321
Senator Smith. If there had been two, would not that have said
two, phiral?
Mr. Lattimore. To put what I said before in a different way, it
might refer to the position of the U. S. S. E. in the IPR.
Senator Smith. Of course, it did not say that, though, did it?
Mr. Lattimore. No. That is what I say, that my interpretation is
unauthoritative and I think the whole wording is obscure.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was not there a new policy laid
down at the Moscow meetings ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; not in my opinion.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were there not articles published in
Pacific Affairs that the Soviet officials not like and brought up with
you?
Mr. Lattimore. There had.
Mr. Morris. And did not you and Mr. Carter say that there had
been mistakes in publishing?
Mr. Lattimore. I would have to review the transcript at that point.
Senator Ferguson. And, Mr. Lattimore, did they object, after the
meeting in Moscow, to any articles ?
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't recall offliand.
Senator Ferguson. But they had before ?
Mr. Lattimore. If you will look over again those Moscow memo-
randa, one of the things that stands out is that we were trying to get
the Russians to promise to contribute articles, which never came
through.
Senator Ferguson. That was not my question at all.
Mr. Morris. That is, you and Harriet Moore ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the IPR.
Mr. Morris. Who was with you at the time ?
Harriet Moore was present, was she not, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think she was one of those present; yes.
Mr. Morris. Was she a Communist at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Morris. Was Kathleen Barnes present at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
Mr. Morris. She was present at these meetings, was she not?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so.
Mr. Morris. Was she a Communist at that time, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Morris. You know they both have refused to testify before
this committee, on the ground that their answers would incriminate
them, when asked whether or not they were members of the Commu-
nist Party.
Mr. Lattimore. They have done so, to my great astonishment and
distress.
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, there is one other question I would
like to ask Mr. Lattimore.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever have a copy of the
U. S. S. R. handbook, the Soviet Handbook ?
Mr. Lattimore. In English, or Russian?
Senator Smith. I do not know. Either one.
88348— 52— pt. 10 4
3322 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. Is that an IPR publication ?
Senator Smith. No.
I refer to the third paragraph from the bottom on page 1 of the
exhibit — and it mentions your name up in there — where it says :
Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of U. S. S. R. Handbook published
by GoUanz. * * *
Then it also refers to this :
He shows Lattimore the new Mongolian Atlas and said that he would try to
get a copy for him.
Do you remember that handbook ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't remember that handbook.
Senator Smith. You do not have it?
Mr. Lattimore. I may have it ; I don't know.
Senator Smith. All right.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, I think we will recess now until 1 : 30,
if that will be satisfactory to the Senators.
(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon-
vene at 1 : 30 p. m., of the same day.)
after recess
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. You may pro-
ceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Senator, I had reached the question, did you offer to
supply military information to Soviet officials through the Institute
of Pacific Relations, and the witness, I believe, had answered no.
Mr. Lattimore. I had answered that I had no recollection. Since
my memory, however, is incomplete, if you have a document to re-
fresh my recollection I shall be glad to see it.
]\Ir. Morris. Have you identified that document, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. INIandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting April 6; Motiliev;
ECC; OL; FD; Harondar; HM," and then the penciled note 1936.
Mr. Morris. Who is FD, Mr. Lattimore ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. I don't know who FD was. It may have been one
of Mr. Carter's secretaries.
Senator Ferguson. How many people had gone over to this meet-
ing in Moscow?
Mr. Lattimore. My wife and I came from Peking, accompanied
by Miss Tyler, who had been doing some research on teaching of
English in China, and we were met in ISIoscow by Mr. Carter, Miss
Moore, and a secretary of INIr. Carter's whose name I forget.
Senator Ferguson. Could that be the name that has been given
to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is why I suggested that might be, FD, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Who is Harondar?
Mr. Lattimore. He was secretary of the Soviet Council of the IPR.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not you discussed mili-
tary activities at all at that meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no present recollection of it whatever.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will this be introduced into the record?
The Chairman. Yes. Have you identified it ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3323
The Chairman. This is a photostat of a document?
Mr. Morris. It is of a document taken from the files of the Institute
of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. And so testified by Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Morris. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. It ma}- be inserted in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 519" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 519
Meeting April 6 ; Motiliev ; ECC ; OL ; FD ; Harondar ; HM
ECC explained about Cressey's proposed study of Soviet geography. Motiliev
said that in principle he welcomed the idea, as there was so little work done in
English on this phase of the Soviet Union. He asked whether the plan included
economic geography. ECC answered that while it would be largely physical
geography, some attention would be paid to economic geography. ECC gave
Motiliev a copy of Cressey's outline and Motiliev said that he would discuss it
later.
In re the preliminary agenda for the Conference: Motiliev said that the ques-
tions on the Soviet Union included in the section headed "International Implica-
tions" reflect a negative valuation of the Soviet Far Eastern policy. E. G. the
question "Does the industrialization of the Far East work for or against the
Peace Policy" is all right taken by itself, but wlien grouped with many other
questions of this nature, the general impression is unfavorable to the policy.
Motiliev said that some of the questions would be very ditficult to answer, since
the delegation did not represent Narkomindel e. g. the questions of the strategic
significance of industrialization and the questions on Sinkiang.
Motiliev said that it was not correct to lump Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia
in one question. Outer Mongolia is an independent state while Sinkiang is part
of China. The policy in regard to Sinkiang is just a detail of the general policy
in regard to China. It is true that Sinkiang is very closely linked to the U. S.
S. R. economically due to its geographical position, but it is part of China politi-
cally. Likewise Outer Mongolia should be called the Mongolian People's Re-
public to keep clear the difference in status between these places.
Motiliev said that the questions reflect the fears of their Far Eastern policy
rather than the real essence of it.
Some of the questions which are included in the Soviet section would be im-
possible for them to answer, e. g. the question of whether or not other powers
would let the U. S. S. R. give China aid in its reconstruction ; question in re Ger-
man-.Tapanese alliance which belongs in the section on the balance of power; the
question in re U. S. recognition (No. 47).
In the questions on other countries many of the real problems of the Pacific are
not treated adequately, e. g. the question of naval rivalry ; of English-.Iapanese-
Chinese relations; of America n-.Iapanese relations and American interests in
China; of American public opinion in re the Far East (does the opinion of the
authors of Empire in the East, not including Pfeffer, reflect the opinion of the
general people, of the intelligensia, or of the controlling groups of bankers, etc.?) .
Many of these questions need additions and changes.
Motiliev said that some of the more fundamental problems and analyses
would be included e. g. in his data paper he was going try to show that Orchard's
analysis of Japan was illogical. (Lorwin agreed with Motiliev's criticisms of
Orchard.) He feel that the analysis is superficial. Orchard finds that the
density of population and the lack of land are the fundamental problems for
Japan. If this is true then expansion is the only way out, and this justifies
expansion as in the increases of the whole nation. Orchard's contentions are
not supported statistically. Penrose, for instance does not come to the same
conclusions about the population. Motiliev will try to prove that the funda-
mental problems are in the internal structure of the society and can be solved
by changing that structure. One of the main problems is the fact that there
are remnants of feudalism mixed up with capitalism. For instance 70 percent
of the agricultural population are tenants.
Another interesting question is about the real causes for the American with-
drawal from the Philippines. Motiliev found Quincy Wright's analysis very
convincing.
3324 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Motiliev said that there were many articles in Pacific Affairs with which
they did not agree. After the organizational question of P. A. has been dis-
cussed, they would like to discuss some of these articles.
In re question 48, on the effect of U. S. recognition of the U. S. S. R., ECC said
that Roosevelt probably thought that recognition had prevented Japanese in-
vasion of Siberia. Motiliev said that the main thing that had prevented that
was the military preparation of the U. S. S. R. U. S.-U. S. S. R. relations
have not been close. They have been passive both economically and politically.
Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should
be included e. g. the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian
Islands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic import-
ance of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to
know of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fuelling station very
near Kamachatka, which is in reality a military base.
Motiliev suggested that in order to prepare the final agenda, each Coimcil
be asked to submit proposals and changes. These suggestions should then be
sent to the Councils concerned with the question for approval or disapproval.
He does not want to have questions included which are embarrassing to any
of the Councils. ECC said that previously those questions were included which
were approved by three or four Councils. The publication of the preliminary
agenda in IPR Notes was done in an effort to get such criticisms and suggestions
from all the Councils.
Motiliev said that another interesting question was whether the position re-
flected in Empire in the East was due to the fact that questions of internal
recovery had been so important in the last few years. If this were so, the
position might be just temporary.
Motiliev said that the British Policy in the Pacific was the key to the situa-
tion. The policy is very indefinite and vaccilating, just as in the European
policy of England. While it was possible to see the general line, it was impossible
to know what the policy would be tomorrow. He asked about the possibility of
a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and expressed the opinion that in the
next few years it would be impossible, and on the contrary there would be grow-
ing contradictions between England and Japan. OL said that in an article by
Asiaticus for PA on Financial Imi>erialism in the Far East, the opinion was
expressed that England was drifting toward recognition of Japanese pre-
dominance in North China ; consolidation of British influence and interests in
South China ; and the establishment of a "common hunting ground" in the
Yangtze valley. At the same time Japan will not recognize a British sphere in
China, even if it is of much smaller size. OL said that there was great opposi-
tion to the Anglo-Japanese alliance in England from the navy, the interests on
the China Coast, the home financial interests, and from the Dominions. This
is reflected in the British attitude toward the Philippines. Motiliev said that
the British want tlie U. S. to keep the Philippines to act as a wall between Japan
and the Empire.
Motiliev said that in the U. S. S. R. the general opinion as to the cause of
the U. S. liberation of the Philippines was that they were very complex. The
interests of the sugar industry were very important but not decisive. Here it is
considered that it was a conscious step taken by the U. S. government to bring
greater British activity in the Pacific. This is the idea expressed by Quincy
Wright. Another idea is that from the military point of view the U. S. is glad
not to have to protect the Philippines which are practically impossible to de-
fend. On the other hand the independence is not real and for the next ten years
the U. S. has the right to defend and use the Islands for military bases.
01 asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the ques-
tion of air bases in the Pacific. Motiliev said tliat formerly the Soviet attitude
was that war in the Pacific between Japan and the U. S. was impossible because
of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has changed
this. The question of Guam is considered important here. Motiliev said that
the Trans-Pacific air service was considei*ed primarily of military importance
in the Soviet Press, but it of course had some commercial value. ECC said that
he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the British Im-
perial line out of that service; and partly because of the American idea that
China was the great potential market for the U. S. INIotiliev said that at present
the competition between different countries on technical aspects of aviation
is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes was of greatest signi-
ficance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists on this question
here.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3325
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph of that
document ?
The Chairman. The last paragraph, did you say ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question
of air bases in the Pacific. ^lotiliev said tliat formerly the Soviet attitude was
that war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States was impossible be-
cause of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has
changed this. The question of Guam is considered impoi'taut here. Motiliev
said that the Trans-Pacific Air Service was considered primarily of military
importance in the Soviet press, but it of course had some commercial value.
P^CC said that he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the
British Imperial line out of that service ; and partly because of the American
idea that China was the great potential market for the United States. Motiliev
said that at present the competition between different countries on technical
aspects of aviation is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes
was of greatest significance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists
on this question here.
The Chairman. What is the next question ?
Mr. Morris. Wlien you dealt with the Soviet officials in Moscow, Mr.
Lattimore, did you deal with them as if they could possibly be Com-
munist intelligence agents?
Mr. Lattimore. No. We, at least I, assumed that they were all con-
nected with the Soviet Government in one form or another, but we
had no knowledge of the individual status of the people beyond the
way they described themselves when — you know, when we were intro-
duced, and so on.
Of course, at the present time, I would generally assume that any
Soviet citizen or subject is an intelligence agent or a potential one.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, back when you were discussing
these problems with these people, you knew that they were Govern-
ment officials?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, anything that you told them
could be used by their Government ?
Mr. Lattimore, Of course it could.
Senator Ferguson. Well then, how do you distinguish between an
intelligence agent now and one then ?
Mr. Lattimore. I suppose I mean in terms of belonging to organized
intelligence services of any country. But, of course, we had no great
concern on the subject since nobody connected with the IPE. had access
to secret information of any kind. We were entirely an organization
dealing with published materials in the open market, and international
discussion.
Senator Ferguson. "Wliy w^ere you then discussing this question
of war bases in the Pacific ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was asking if they would be interested in an
article in Pacific Affairs on the subject. During my editorship of
Pacific Affairs in those years, we published an article on submarine
warfare as related to possibilities of submarine warfare, as related
to Japan. That was by an American author.
We had an- article on the significance of the Dutch Navy in the
Pacific generally, that was by a Dutch naval officer or former naval
officer. We had articles on guerrilla warfare in China, and so forth.
3326 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. But, Mr. Lattimore, if a person had written the
article that you had an interest in mind, in the first sentence, he would
have had to obtain some information from the United States along
that line.
Mr. Lattimore. I wouldn't say so. Senator. That is, any more
than we had to obtain information from Government sources for
the other articles we wrote on general questions of strategy in the
Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. Where would you get the information if you
did not get it from our Government?
OL asked if there was any special interest in tlie U. S. S. R. about the question
of air bases in the Pacific.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, Senator, as of 1936 I should say that the ob-
vious question in that connection was Singapore, about which a great
deal had been published. There had been a good deal of discussion
about whether Singapore, as an air base, was a substitute for a naval
base or in addition to its use as a naval base, and so on.
There was wide area of discussion of that kind of problem.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever write any articles or have them
written on this question?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; we never did, and I don't believe — no, I think
I can be quite sure in saying that we didn't even approach anyone
to write such an article.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read another paragraph
here.
Mr. Lattimore. Is this from the same minutes?
Mr. Morris. From the same minutes. I am reading now a para-
graph beginning with "Motiliev said that questions" — it is in the mid-
dle of page 2 :
Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should be
included, e. s-, the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian Is-
lands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic importance
of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to know
of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fueling station very near
Kamchatka, which is in reality a military base.
Then there are other paragraphs here along the same nature. Mr,
Chairman, the whole thing is in the record.
I would like to ask Dr. Lattimore: In view of the desires being
expressed by the Soviet officials here, whether or not General Bar-
mine's testimony to the effect that the Soviet military intelligence was
using IPE as a cover shop to secure military information from the
United States and from Japan and China, whether or not that
becomes plausible.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I think it is absolutely implausible. It seems
to me that these are perfectly legitimate questions for general discus-
sion as possibilities for articles in an international publication in 1936.
We did, in fact, have articles on the Soviet fisheries in the North
Pacific, and on the disputes between the Russians and the Japanese
over those fisheries, involving Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands,
and so on. So if you want to be very far-fetched and say that this
kind of thing was intelligence information, it was intelligence infor-
mation about the Russians rather than to them.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3327
Senator Ferguson. Is that not a fact, that Mr. Carter has already
testified that when he returned from some of these trips he reported
toourG-2? . o . -17
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that testimony, Senator J^er-
guson.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that you had never heard that
he had ?
Mr. Lattimore. This is the first time I remember hearing it.
Senator Ferguson. Were you ever requested to report to G-2 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have been asked to meet with various groups of
people
The Chairman. That is not the question.
Mr. Lattimore. Of our Armed Forces after returning from trips ;
not specifically G-2, as far as I know.
Senator Ferguson. If it was not specifically, when you returned
is it not true that you reported to some of our Armed Forces?
Mr. Lattimore. I was asked to give general talks about my observa-
tions abroad to groups that included military personnel, yes.
Senator Ferguson. And did it not include G-2 officers?
Mr. Latitmore. I couldn't be precise about that without having a
list of the people who attended.
Senator Ferguson. And were you not asked questions about it?
Mr. Lattimore. My memory is very unclear at the present time. I
think that I was asked my opinion about this and that, yes.
Senator Ferguson. That being true, did you not feel that the Rus-
sian authorities would be questioned by at least their intelligence
officers, if they were not intelligence officers themselves?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. As of 1936 I had no feelings of the kind
because I didn't have experience of that kind.
Senator Ferguson. You have had no feeling about it atall?
Mr. Lattimore. I had no feeling about it at all. If questions of real
military importance had come up, I would certainly have mentioned
them to, for instance, Colonel Faymonville, who was our military
attache in Moscow under Ambassador Bullitt.
Mr. Morris. Was that not the Colonel Faymonville who was sent
back because he was too pro-Soviet, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know for what reason he was sent back.
I know that there is a tribute to him in a book by former Assistant
Secretary Sumner Welles as being the best-informed military officer
we had on Russia.
Senator Ferguson. Of course, that would not conflict with the fact
that he was pro-Russian?
Mr. Lattimore. As far as I knew Colonel Faymonville, I had no
reason to consider him pro-Russian.
Senator Ferguson. How many times would you say that you had
been interviewed by our authorities on the question, for instance, of
this trip to Moscow ?
Mr. Lattimore. On this trip to ISIoscow, I don't remember any ques-
tioning. I do remember having dinner at the American Embassy with
various Embassy personnel, at which Colonel Faymonville and others
were present, and which the general subject of our talks with the Rus-
sians was a part of the topic of conversation.
Senator Ferguson. ^Y[\o was the Ambassador at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. William Bullitt.
3328 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Did you visit any high Russian officials at that
time?
Mr. Lattimore. At Ambassador Bullitt's suggestion, he took me to
see a Russian official. I think he was a Vice Commissar of Foreign
Affairs, or something of that sort.
Senator Ferguson. And what did you talk about?
Mr. Lattimore. I gave some opinions on Inner Mongolia. May I
explain ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Just about at this time, there had been some clashes
on the Outer Mongolia frontier, between the Russian and Mongol
forces and the Japanese. Roy Howard had just had an interview with
Stalin, at which Stalin had made what was then considered a sensa-
tional statement that the Russians would defend Outer Mongolia in
case of any invasion.
Li connection with this, Ambassador Bullitt asked me about supple-
mentary information from Inner Mongolia. I didn't know Outer
Mongolia. But he was asking about general conditions in Inner Mon-
golia. And I told him what I knew, and my opinions about it as of
that time, and I believe I mentioned the fact that the Russians had at-
tacked my publications on the subject and had very strongly insinuated
that I was pro-Japanese, and so on.
Mr. Bullitt said, "Well, I think what you are saying is extremely
interesting, and I think the Russians ought to hear about it. Suppose
I fix up an appointment. Would you mind talking to them?"
I said, "No; I will say to them just what I have said to you, if you
think that is all right."
So he made the appointment and took me down there and, in his
presence, I talked with the Soviet Vice Commissar.
Senator Ferguson. Did you meet anyone else ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe we met anyone else.
Senator Ferguson. Just the one occasion ?
Mr. Lattimore. I know it was just that one occasion.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, miglit I inquire ?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine. Is this Colonel Faymonville that you are speaking
of here, is he the same Colonel Faymonville about whom Mr. Carter
wrote you in June of 1941, that letter which went into the record
yesterday ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you saying now that you knew Colonel Fay-
monville as early as 1936 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I first met him in Moscow in 1936.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. Carter knew that you
knew him ?
Mr. Lai^iimore. I presume he did, since we were both in Moscow
at the same time. He may have forgotten, of course.
Mr. Sourwine. In his letter of June 20, 1941, Mr. Carter suggested
that if you had time in San Francisco you and Mr. Holland might
want to arrange a private talk with Colonel Faymonville, and he
gave the headquarters, and then he described him to you.
He said, "He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and atj
ease if he had luncheon with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday." ■
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3329
That was that hincheon with Ambassador Oumansky, was it not?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And he said, "I think yon get the idea. It may
be that if yon get the same favorable impression of him which Har-
riet Moore and I have, he might be someone who conld be exception-
ally nseful to yon and the Generalissimo at some fntnre time in
Chungking."
Would you take it from that that Mr. Carter knew that you knew
Mr. Faymonville ?
Mr. Lattimore. It is not clear to me from that whether he knew
it or not. I would assume he knew it since we were both in Moscow
at the same time and dined at the Embassy together, and so on.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know definitely whether Mr. Carter knew
that you were acquainted with Colonel Faymonville?
Mr, Lattimore. I don't know definitely.
Mr. SotjRwiNE. Thank you.
Mr. Lattimore. May I explain a little bit more? One reason why
I personally was very much interested in Colonel Faymonville was
the fact that he had started life as an expert on Japan rather than
Russia. He spoke Japanese in addition to Russian, and there were
very few American military or civil personnel who had that kind of
accomplishment. Hence, I would think that Faymonville's opinions
on questions in northeast Asia, involving both Japan and Russia,
would be valuable opinions.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Before this next document, Mr. Chairman, I would
like the record to show that the last paragraph makes no mention
of Mr. Lattimore supplying an article.
The first sentence is: "OL asked if there was any special interest
in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific."
Mr. Lattimore, did Soviet officials collect economic and financial
information on China and Japan for the IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether they did or not, but
if 3^ou have a document on the subject to refresh my memoiy I shall
be glad to see it.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Morris, are you about to leave this document?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Before we leave, may I ask a question ?
You will recall, Mr. Lattimore, that on a previous occasion we have
discussed here the meeting of the 8th of April.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. That was the meeting at which the minutes indi-
cated that you had spoken of an article by a Communist writer to
be published in Pacific Affairs.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
IMr. Sourwine. And we had some colloquy about whether you were
referring to Asiaticus. The memorandum subsequently, that is, in
one of its latter paragraphs, did mention Asiaticus.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I believe some point was made of the fact that that
]nention of Asiaticus in the same memorandum was quite some time
subsequent to the mention of an article by the Communist writer.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
3330 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. I would like to call your attention to the fact tliat
in this document, being the minutes of the meeting of April 6, there
is also mention of Asiaticus, and I ask yon if you recall that there
had been such mention at the conference which this document pur-
ports to recount?
Mr. Lattimore, No ; I don't recall it.
This, again, is a copy of some minutes that I don't remember
seeing at the time or since. But, looking over those previous min-
utes, something has occurred to me which might clarify the questions
you were asking me at that time about deadline for Pacific Affairs,
and so on.
There are two points here : One is that I was not in control of
the daedline of Pacific Affairs; that thatw as all handled in Wash-
ington, and sometimes — in New York, I mean — and sometimes I
didn't know until an issue came out exactly what was in it.
The other thing is that very possibly, as subject matter for these
discussions with the Kussians, I had with me carbon copies of what
I was expecting to be in the "June issue of Pacific Affairs, and that
therefore the next issue would refer to the September issue. That
is a possibility. But it might straighten things out.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Lattimore, as bearing on the question of
whether the article by Asiaticus did appear in the June issue, was
in fact in existence at the time of these conferences, you will note
that at the bottom of page 2, beginning in the middle of the para-
graph, these minutes read :
OL said that in an article by Asiaticus for PA on financial imperialism in
the Far East, the opinion was expressed that England was drifting toward
recognition of Japanese predominance in north China ; consolidation of British
influence and interests in south China, and the establishment ot a "common
hunting ground" in the Yangtze Valley.
That would indicate that the article was in being at that time,
would it not?
Mr. Lattimore. It would indicate that it was in being in manu-
script.
Mr. Sourw^ine. At least in manuscript ?
Mr. Lattimore. At least in manuscript ; yes.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, 1 want to offer at this time for
the appendix of the record an article about Gen. Philip R. Faymon-
ville, military aide to President Eoosevelt, who "has spent 15 years in
the U. S. S. P. His views on Soviet aims are somewhat at variance
with 'Red menace' tales."
Tliis is an article in the Daily People's World, Friday, February
18, 1949.
I think this paper has been described, has it not?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir; described in connection with the Senator
Knowland comment.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; the editorial. And also of the ad con-
cerning the witness' book.
Mr. Morris. That is described as a Communist paper?
Mr. Mandel. That is correct.
The Chairman. You want that to go into the appendix of the
record ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3331
The Chairman. All right.
(The document referred to appears in the appendix of the record
as exhibit No. 472 on 3700.)
Mr. Morris. The next question is, Did Soviet officials like the mili-
tancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite
take the same line ?
The ChairjMan. Let us hear the question again.
Mr. Morris. The question to Mr. Lattimore is, Did Soviet officials
like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs
could not quite take the same line?
Mr. Lattimore. They may have.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 11, 1939, addressed to
Mr. Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.
The Chairman. It will be shown to the witness.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that
lett^^r?
Mr. Lattimore. I must have received it. I don't recall it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?
Tlie Chairman. It has been identified.
Mr. Morris. I would like the witness to read that letter, commenc-
hig at the outset.
JNIr. Lattimore. Dated July 11, 1939, on board steamshijD Aquitania.
(Exhibit No. 520)
Dear Owen : The Chinese are more unanimously enthusiastic about Pacific
Affairs than the members of any other group.
I might mention, of course, that this means the Chinese of the
official Chinese Council :
Franklin Ho was immensely impressed by Guenther Stein's The Yen and
the Sword. Ushiba assured me that the office of the Japanese Council was taking
seriously your request for additional Japanese articles. Motylev was eager
for much more intimate factual details giving both very recent economic infor-
mation and also personal observations as to what is going on in China and Japan.
As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Jaffe, he likes the mili-
tancy of Amerasia. He recognizes that Pacific Affairs cannot quite take this line
but lie still insists that no one can legitimately criticize you if you do decide
to adopt his request to you of 3 years ago that Pacific Affairs come out strong
consistently and repeatedly for the collective system.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt your letter
there ? Is that not going back to your meeting with them in Moscow ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is going back to that meeting and indicating
that apparently Motylev considered that for 3 years I have not ful-
filled his suggestion that Pacific Affairs take a stronger line de-
nouncing Japanese aggression.
Senator Ferguson. Does it not also show the opposite, that also you
had agreed at that time with the Russians to take a line for the
Russians 'I
Mr. Lattimore. No, it doesn't. It indicates that at that time the
Russians repeatedly brought up the idea that Pacific Affairs should
take an editorial line of characterizing Japanese policy in China as
aggression, and we repeatedly pointed out that Pacific Affairs was
controlled by a number of National Councils, and that we had to try
3332 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to please everybody, and usually wound up by displeasing somebody
in practically every issue.
Senator Ferguson. Had the Kussians asked you to use your maga-
zine, the Pacific Affairs, to advocate the collective system?
Mr. Lattimore. What is clearly meant here by collective system is
collective security system.
The Chairman. Now go back to the question, please.
Senator Ferguson. Did he request you, when you were in Mos-
cow
Mr. Lait'imore. I don't remember that request in Moscow. As I
remember just now, the minutes don't show it, but Carter after 8 years
apparently feels that that was the general tenor of the conversation.
Senator Ferguson. But is not that all they are talking about?
Mr. Lattimore. Because characterizing the Japanese policy in
Asia as aggression would be one way of saying, "Well, there ought to
be some collective security measures taken through the League of
Nations to stop it."
Senator Ferguson. Did not Eussia enter into a pact with Japan on
this question ?
Mr. Lattimore. The next year.
Senator Ferguson. The next year ?
Mr. Lattimore. Some 8 months later.
Senator Ferguson. And does not this indicate that at least one
thing was discussed, that collective system by you and the Russian
people at the Russian meeting in Moscow ?
Mr. Lattimore. That indicates that from Mr. Carter's recollection
3 years later, it was that we talked about collective security.
iSenator Ferguson. Does it say collective security there ?
Mr. Lattimore. It seems to me that the context clearly indicates
collective security.
The Chairman. The question is: Does it say collective security.
Can you not answer that question ?
Mr. Lattimore. What it says is "come out strong consistently and
repeatedly for the collective system." And I can read the context in
no other way than meaning collective-security system.
The Chairman. All right, Senator, are there any further questions ?
Senator Ferguson. Not at the moment.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, did you want Mr. Lattimore to con-
tinue reading ?
Mr. Morris. Yes. But my question was — there were two points
that I made there — one of the questions was did Soviet officials collect
economic and financial information on Japan through the IPR, and
did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why
Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line.
Question two was partly answered by the first paragraph, but it
will not be answered until we get to the paragraph starting:
One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese
internal economic and financial position.
However, if the witness would like to read the whole letter, I have
no objection.
Mr. Lattimore. I answered Senator Ferguson that the difference
referred to here between Amerasia and Pacific Affairs can easily and
clearly be established ; namely, that Amerasia did repeatedly charac-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3333
terize Japanese policy in China as imperialism, Amerasia being an
^Vmerican magazine published in America, and therefore quite able
to be strong on such a subject; whereas, Pacific iVffairs, being under
the control of a number of National Councils, some of whom objected
to characterizing one member of the Institute as an aggressor, was
always much milder in that respect.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have any doubt that the Amerasia
was a Communist magazine ?
Mr. Lattimore. It never occurred to me to think that Amerasia was
a Communist magazine. If you will go back over the issues of Amer-
asia at the time that was connected with it, up to 1941, you will see
that it could not be characterized as even a left-wing magazine in those
years [reading] :
Both he and Voitinsky regret that there is no evidence of our having taken
seriously their request for this 3 years ago. They feel the necessity for this was
never greater than today. Their insistence was of great interest to me for two
reasons. First, because it is evidence that they treat the IPR seriously and
have orderly memories of their suggestion. Second, because it contraverts the
assertions of the reactionaries in Paris, London, and Washington that the retire-
ment of Litvinoff meant that the Kremlin was throwing over its commitment to
tlie collective system.
Could you use the present appearance of Sir Arthur Salter's "Security — Can It
Be Retrieved?" as the occasion for an early full length treatment that will be so
fundamental as to appeal to the more thoughtful members of the institute in
every member country and so militant as to convince Motylev and Voitinsky
that we are responding to their suggestion.
One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese
internal economic and financial position. Happily this will be supplied bjr
Chi's study for the inquiry. (You have doubtless seen his Virginia Quarterly
article.) I am going to reopen with Jessup and Angus the question of publica-
tion of some Inquiry material in Pacific Affairs when it is of such a nature as
to fit in with your own policy as editor and when it is of a kind which will
make important and authentic information of which scholars and statesmen are
in need available to a wide Pacific Affairs audience.
Your many friends all along the line inquired for you and sent you their
warmest greetings. All are asking when your book will be published.
I learned in one or two quarters that Miss Virginia Thompson's book on Indo-
china is not being taken seriously because there is a criticism of Pelliot or an
implied criticism of Pelliot's position. Do you happen to know what would be
the basis of this and whether scholars in other countries regard Pelliot with
the same degree of infallibility as he regards himself?
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. That letter is in the record, Mr. Chairman; is it not?
The Chairman. Very well, it is.
(The document, as previously read in full by the witness beginning
on p. 3331 was marked "Exhibit No. 520.")
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the
Office of War Information?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. My recollection is imper-
fect on the subject. If you have a document to refresh it, I would be
glad to see it. But in the meantime I can tell you to the best of my
recollection what the situation w^as.
The Chairman. Just a minute.
Mr. Morris. Did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the OWI ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I didn't. I have some recollections on the
subject, but I don't believe that they included my employiiig him.
The Chairman. Can you say you did or you did not, Mr, Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I did not.
3334 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Did you offer to employ Y. Y. Hsu in the OWI?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I did not. If you would allow me to state
my recollection on the subject
Mr. Morris. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. Then we will see if it corresponds with whatever
documents you have. ^
Mr. Morris. Please do.
Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that the Office of War Informa-
tion, the New York office, needed materials to put out in Chinese
language material to be sent to China, that the library resources for
that kind of thing in New York were very restricted, and that a request
was made to the New York office of IPR to know whether OWI could
draw on the IPR's file of Chinese materials ; that this w^as consented
to and that Y. Y. Hsu was the man who was in charge of that material
in the IPR office at that time.
Mr. Morris. How well did you know Mr. Hsu?
Mr. Lattimore. Eather slightly.
Mr. Morris. Did he ever visit you at your home ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. He and his wife visited us in Baltimore.
Mr. Morris. How frequently ?
Mr. Lattimore. Once, I think.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever visit him at his home ?
Mr. Lattimore. We went and had dinner with him and his wife on
Long Island somewhere once, I think.
Mr. Morris. Did you know at that time of his Communist record?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not.
Mr. Morris. Where is Mr. Hsu now ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe he is in China.
Mr. Morris. Is he an official of the Red Chinese Government?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no knowledge on the subject.
Mr. Morris. But you do believe he is in Red China ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe he is in Red China.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, would you put into the record at this time
Mr. Y. Y. Hsu's Communist record as it existed in 1942 ?
Mr. Mandel. I have here a clipping from the Daily Worker of
December 14, 1929, page 5.
Senator Ferguson. What date ?
Mr. Mandel. 1929.
The Chairman. Just a moment. What was the date of these dinner
parties ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what is the date of the dinner party at
your home and Mr. Hsu's home that you just testified to ?
Mr. Lattimore. After the war, I think.
Mr. Morris. That is sometime subsequent to 1945 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think so ; yes.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel.
Mr. Mandel. This article describes, and I quote :
Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will protest against
the butchery of thousands of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and
will denounce the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for
war against the Soviet Union, fatherland of the workers of the world.
Listed as speakers at these meetings are the following, who have
recently been indicted as Communist leaders. I read the name of
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3335
I. Amter, Alexander Traclitenberg, and, listed also as a speaker, Y. Y.
Hsn.
I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker of November
6, 1933, which says, in part, that 38 workers' organizations have en-
dorsed the Commnnist Farty ticket and program in the New York
mnnicipal elections. Listed as endorsing that program and ticket
is Y. Y Hsn.
The Chairman. That was what date, the date of that ?
Mr. Morris. That, Mr. Chairman, was 1933.
Mr. Mandel. I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker
of August 13, 1928, page 1, which describes that 15 workers partici-
pated in a Chinese tag day under the auspices of the Committee to Aid
the Chinese Trade-Unions, and it lists also the names of individuals
who were arrested in connection with that tag day.
Among those arrested was Y. Y. Hsu, spelled here S-h-u, secretary
of the New York Worker Peasant Alliance. A photograph is given
with the article.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may these go into the record?
The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 521" and
areas follows:)
[Source : Daily Worker, December 14, 1929, p. 5]
Smash Attack on Haiti, U. S. S. R. — Mass Meets Mobilize Against
Imperialism
Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will potest against
the butchery of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and will denounce
the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for. war against
the Soviet Union, Fatherland of the workers of the world.
Meetings will be held at St. Luke's Hall, 12.5 West 130th St.; Manhattan
Lyceum, 66 East Fourth St. Speakers, H. Benjamin, Anna Daman, George
Siskind, James Mo. Bryant Hall, Sixth Ave. near 42d St. Speakers, I. Amter,
Max Bedacht, Harriet Silverman, Joseph Boruchowitz, Alexander Trachtenberg,
T. H. Li, Sam Darey. Rose gardens, 1.347 Boston Rd., Bronx. Speakers, Bill
Dunne, T. Y. Hu, Leon Plott, G. Green, H. Sazer. 318 Grand St., Brooklyn.
Speakers, J. L. Engdahl, Rose Wortis, J. Williamson, Y. Y. Hsu. Hopkinson
Mansions, 428 Hopkinson Ave., Brooklyn. Speakers, M. J. Olgin, Otto Hall,
T. P. Hu, Gertrude Welsh. Bohemian Hall, Second and Woolsey Aves., Astoria,
L. I. Speakers, A. Markoff, Richard Moore, Tong Ping.
Tomorrow afternoon at 1 : 15 New York workers are urged to gather at Park
Row and Broadway in front of the Federal Building to demonstrate against
Wall Street's oppression, aided by the Washington Executive Council, of the
Colonial and American workers and its attacks on the Soviet Union.
Dozen of organizations will participate in these demonstrations. At the
Bryant Hall meeting, which takes place at 6 o'clock instead of 8, as at other
demonstrations, leading members of the Needle Trades Workers' Industrial
Union will speak also on the organization movement among the dressmakers
and the false strike of the I. L. G. W. U.
[Source: Daily Worker, November 6, 1933, p. 2]
Thirty-eight Workers' Organizations Endorse Communist Party Program —
Party's Fight for Masses' Needs Cited in Statement — Industrial Unions,
Unemployed, Councils, AVomen's Councils Among Backers of Red Can-
didates
New York. — Thirty-eight workers' organizations liave endorsed the Commu-
nist Party ticket and program in the New York municipal elections. No other
has shown dally its stubborn and ceaseless fight in the shops and streets for the
3336 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
needs of the masses, says the statement signed hy tliese unions, unemployed
councils, and fraternal organizations.
Headed by such fighting unions as the Marine Workers Industrial Union, the
Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union, the Steel and Metal Workers Indus-
trial Union, the organizations supporting the Communist Party state :
"Only the Communist Party as the party of the working class represents the
interests of the entire working iwpulation, stands squarely on the principle
that the provision of adequate food, clothing and shelter, and the defense of
the rights and living standards of the workers are the primary issues in this
campaign."
Among the organizations signing endorsement for the Communist candidates
are the Unemployed Councils, Friends of the Soviet Union, Councils of Working
Class Women, Anti-Imperialist League, Workers Ex-Servicemen's League, and
the Labor Sports Union.
Needle Trade Industrial Union :
Ben Gold, General Secretary
Louis Hyman, I'resident
Irving Potash, Secretary
Isadore Weisberg, Manager, Dress Dept.
Joseph Boruchowitz, Manager of Cloak Dept.
Samuel Burt, Fur Dressing Dept.
Ben Stallman, Org. of Bathrobe Dept.
Dominick Montello, Org. of Custom Tailors
Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union
James Lustig, Organizer
James Matlis, Secretary
Marine Workers Industrial Union :
Roy Hudson, National Secretary
Thomas Ray, Secretary
Food Workers Industrial Union :
Jay Rubin, General Secretary
William Albertson, Org. of Hotel and Restaurant Dept.
Sam Kramberg, Org. of Cafeteria Dept.
Alteration Painters Union : Morris Kushinsky, Secretary
Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union :
Fred Biedeukapp, Organizer
Isadore Rosenberg, Secretary
Building Maintenance Workers Industrial Union : Mort Sher, Secretary
Drygoods Workers Union :
Louis Kfare, Vice Chairman
Chester Fierstein, Chairman
Furniture Workers Industrial Union: Morris Pizer, Secretary
Independent Cari^enters Union :
Isaac Berman, Organizer
Herman Bogartz, Secretary
Nathan Ellin, Treasurer
Taxi Workers Union :
Harold Eddy, Organizer
Abner Feigin, Financial Secretary
Cleaners and Dyers Union : Max Rosenberg, Secretary
Laundry Workers Industrial Union : Sam Berland, Secretary
Building and Construction Workers League :
Jack Taylor, Secretary
Sam Nessin, General Secretary
Trade Union Unity Council :
Andy Overgaard, Secretary
Rose Wortis, Assistant Secretary
Sheppard, Organizer
Office Workers Union : liaura Carmon, Organizer
Unemployed Council :
Israel Amter, National Secretary
Carl Winter, Secretary of Greater New York
Richard Sullivan, Org. of Greater New York
International Labor Defense :
William Lawrence, Secretary, New York District
William Patterson, National Secretary
William Fitzgerald, Org., Harlem Section
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3337
Workers International Relief:
Pauline Rogers, New York City Secretary
Alfred Watrenkneclit, National Secretary
Friends of the Soviet Union : B. Friedman, Secretary
Anti-Imperialist League :
William Simons, National Secretary
John Bruno, Secretary, New York
Anti-Imperialist Alliance: Y. Y. Hsu, National Secretary
Workers Ex- Servicemen's League :
Harold Hickerson, National Secretary
Joseph Singer, Secretary, City Committee
Emanuel Levin, National Chairman
P. Cashione
Council of Working Class Women :
Clara Bodian, Secretary
Clara Shavelson, Educational Director
Sarah Licht, Org. Secretary
Labor Sports Union : Mack Gordon, Secretary, New York District
International Workers Order :
Max Bedacht, National Secretary, Jewish Section
Harry Schiller, New York City Secretary
Sadie Doroshkin, Secretary City Central
Russian Mutual Aid : Joseph Soltan, President, New York District Committee
English Workers Clulis :
J. Landy
Edith Zucker
Finnish Workers Federation
Jewish City Club Committee
[Source : Daily Worker, New York, Monday, August i;^, 1928]
Fifteen Jailed by New York Police in Retjef Collections for Chinese Trade-
Unionists — Aruests Aided by Followers of Kuomintang — Soliciting With-
out Permit Charged
Fifteen workers, who participated in the Chinese Tag Day under the auspices
of the Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions, were arrested yesterday
in Chinatown. They were charged with "soliciting without a permit" and were
released on $500 bail each, furnished by the local International Labor Defense.
The collectors are to appear at the First District Court, White and Center Sts.,
at 9 a. m. today (Monday), where they will be defended by Jacques Buitenkant,
retained by the New York Section of the International Labor Defense.
Those arrested were Y. Y. Shu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant
Alliance ; David Wee, 27 ; H. T. Tsiang, 28 ; David Kanner ; Max Postolsky, 21 ;
W. Martin, IS; Du Peld, 22; Yekelchik; M. Levin, 12; I. Kleinman, 19; R. Kleid-
mann, 20 ; B. Winnick, 17 ; B. Rosenberg, 22; and L. Chansik.
[Picture head: Arrested Leader]
Above is Y. Y. Sliu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant Alliance, who
was among the 15 workers arrested yesterday. Shu was active in the Chinese
Relief Tag Days held yesterday and Saturday. Thousands of dollars were con-
tributed by the workers of New York to aid the Chinese workers in their fight
against imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. Photo was taken dur-
ing the recent antiwar demonstration at Union Square.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, vvill you identify these next two docii-
menis?
Mr. Mandfx. Tliis is a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 24, 1942, addressed
to Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information. It has a type-
written signature of Yung-ying Hsu. It is dated April 24, 1942.
Mr. INIoRRis. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?
The Chairman. It has been identified as having come from the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.
88348— 52— pt. 10 5
3338 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter for us, please '.
The Chairman. To whom is it addressed ?
Mr. Mandel. To Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information.
[Reading:]
(Exhibit No. 522)
Dear Sir: It is a great pleasure to receive your letter of the 21st instant. I
have just requested my alma mater, Lelancl Stanford University, for a transcript
of my academic records to enable me to fill out the application blank with
greater accurai-y. The application will be sent to you at the earliest possible
time.
Under Mr. Edward C. Carter's capable, enlightening and benevolent leader-
ship I find my work in the Institute of Pacific Relations extremely interesting
and enjoyable. However, if you think I can be of any help to your work, I will
ask Mr. Carter to release me from my present position.
As you have been associated with the Institute, you might agree with me
that its equipment and environment are a great asset to writers either on or for
the Far East. For the past 14 months I have been in charge of the Chinese
collection here. It might be beneficial for both the institute and the Coordinator
of Information that part of the work of the latter be done in the former. It
is my opinion that Mr. Carter would be glad to offer the facilities of his organiza-
tion to the war effort and welcome such an arrangement.
Permit me, sir, to express my deep appreciation of both your and jNIr. Owen
Lattimore's kindly attention.
Sincerely yours.
The Chairman. Who is it signed by ?
Mr. Mandel. Yung-ying Hsu.
Senator Ferguson, that is Y. Y. Hsu?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
The Chairman. It will be inserted.
(The previous document as read by counsel was marked "Exhibit
No. 522.")
The Chairman. Let us get this straight. Y. Y. Hsu and Yung-ying
Hsu are one and the same individual %
Mr. Morris. Is that right, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lati^more. Probably, yes. I don't know anj^thing about the
Y. Y. Hsu of the 1920's or 1936's. This is all new to me.
Mr. Morris. It is your testimony you did not know the Communist
record of Y. Y. Hsu ?
Mr. Laitimore. Yes; that is my testimony. I have no recollection
of it.
The Chairman. Did you receive copies of the Daily Worker?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. That is, as they were i.ssued ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. At no time?
Mr. Lattimorpl At no time.
The Chairman. You were not a contributor to the Daily Worker ?
Mr. Laitimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. Nor a subscriber ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, when you were with the OWI,
did you make any investigation prior to employment of personnel?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. Investigation of personnel was the fimc-
tion of a separate personnel branch of OWI.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether they made any examina'
tion or investigation of personnel?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3339
Mr. Latitmore. I believe that all people employed by OWI, includ-
ing myself, were subject to investigation by the Civil Service Commis-
sion which, my recollection is, was able to check with other investigat-
ing agencies, such as the FBI.
Senator Ferguson. Were there any investigations for security pui^
poses, to 3'our knowledge ?
j\Ir. Lattimore. Well, there was an investigation of individuals
before they could be hired.
Senator P'erguson. That is what I had in mind.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is along the security line?
Mr. Lattimore. I think every single person had to be investigated
along lo3'alty and security lines.
The Chairman. When w^as OWI set up first ? Do you remember ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know the precise date. Senator. It grew out
of COI, Coordinator of Information, which was at some time split into
OSS and- OWL
The Chairman. You did not come in then until it was OWI ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. And you came into it after what year, or about
what time ?
Mr. Lattimore. I came into it, I think, in late December 1942.
The Chairman. Wliat is the date of these articles in the Daily
Worker?
Mr. Morris. The last one is 1933, Senator, the latest one is 1933.
Mr. Lattimore, I had asked you the question in connection with that
letter Mr. Mandel read, what your recollection is of the kindly atten-
tion referred to in the last paragraph that you showed to Mr. Hsu.
Mr. Lattimore. I have no present recollection whatever. May I
say that the set-up of OWI at that time, as far as Chinese work was
concerned, was that all radio transmissions
The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, I do not think you are answering
the counsel's question now. If you want to go back, if you want to go
back to a former question, that would be something else.
Mr. Lattimore. I am explaining why it is difficult for me to answer
this question, Senator.
The Chairman. Read the question, IVIr. Reporter, of the counsel,
Mr. Morris.
( The record was read by the reporter.)
The Chairman. That was his answer.
Mr. Lattimore. The Chinese personnel of the New York Office were
under Mr. Barnes' jurisdiction, not under mine.
The Chairman. That does not belong to this question. That be-
longs to another question asked by Senator Ferguson. If you want
to let it stand that way, it is all right, but it involves the thing more.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any dealings with Mr. Hsu
when he was, as he says there, in charge of the Chinese collection
of thelPR?
Mr. Lattimore. No, no direct dealings, as far as I remember.
Mr. :Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?
Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of a document from the files
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, showing a letterhead of the Office
of War Information, 111 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated
March 12, 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland and signed "Owen."
3340 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall sending that letter to
Mr. Holland^
Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't recall sending it to him, but obviously
I sent it.
Mr. Morris. Does that look like your .signature at the bottom'^
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, it is.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please?
Mr. Mandel. It is to Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. :
(Exhibit No. 523)
Dear Blll : Several weeks ago I was in New York, but only on Saturday and
Sunday, and saw no one but people in our own office, except for the fact that I
had lunch in the Hsu's apartment with old Prof. Chi and his wife and Harriet Chi.
Anytime that it would be useful to you to have Hsu working out here for the
IPR, we should be very glad to take him on as a part-time consultant or research
man for our Chinese Section.
Would you let me know if you have any ideas on the subject that I could help
to follow up?
We are enjoying being in San Francisco again. Feels just like home (only
a hell of a lot more crowded). David is taking Chinese lessons, writing and all.
Love from us too to Doreen, Mrs. McGari-y, and Patricia.
Yours,
Owen.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted into the record?
The Chairman. It may be inserted.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 523'' and was
read in full.)
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, is that meeting that you had in Mr.
Hsu's apartment still another meeting in addition to the one you
testified to took place out on Long Island somewhere?
Mr. Lattimore. Probably the same, but I am not sure.
Mr. Morris. You also testified the other was after the war, did 3'ou
not?
Mr. Lattimore. I thought it was after the war ; yes.
Mr. Morris. And on Long Island ?
The Chairman. This is a different meeting. This was not on Long
Island, as I understand it. This was in New York.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know from this letter whether the apart-
ment was in New York or on Long Island.
Mr. Sourwine. Where was Mr. Hsu's apartment, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recollect. The only place that I recollect is
an apartment on Long Island, and I thought I was there after the
war.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recollect an apartment on Long Island which
was ]\Ir. Hsu's apartment?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. So that if Mr. Y. Y. Hsu Avas not living on Long
Island in 1943, this was a different apartment and a separate and
second visit ; is that right ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. All right.
Mr. Morris. And you knew Mr. Hsu well enough for him to be the
only person you visited for that Avhole weekend ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I say here "saw no one but people in our
office."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3341
The Chairman. Now go back to the question again. What is your
question ? Do you know JNIr. Hsu well enough so that he is the only
one you visited during that weekend %
Mr. Morris. In addition to the people in your own office?
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether I had lunch outside the
office with anybodjj else, or not.
Mr. Morris. Is that Harriet Chi mentioned in the first paragraph,
was she ever your secretary %
Mr. Lattimore. She was my secretary for about 2 weeks in 1936.
Mr. Morris. She is the wife of the Chao-ting Chi that we have
talked about at great length in this testimony, is she not?
Mr. Lattimore. She was at one time.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, w^ill you accept that into the record %
The Chairman. The one that has been read ?
It is in the record.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Jack Dinichi Kimoto
as a translator for the Office of War Information?
]\lr. Latitmore. I have no recollection of it.
But if you have a document there to refresh my memory, I may be
able to recall.
]Mr. Morris. Xow, INIr. Lattimore, have you ever met the Chinese —
and here I am afraid I must spell them for you — C-h-a I-a-o M-u?
Mr. Lattimore. Not that I can recall, unless he was one of the
numerous staff we had at OWI, or unless you have some document
there that I can refresh my memory with.
Mr. Morris. How about Mr. Kung P-eng ?
Mr. Laiitmore. The same answer.
]\lr. Morris. Did you ever meet those two gentlemen in China ?
Mr. Lattimore. In China?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
JSIr. Lattimore. I don't believe so ; no.
Mr. Morris. I wish you would recall, Mr. Lattimore, whether you
ever met those two gentlemen in China.
Mr. Lattimore. If you could bring forward something
Mr, Morris. That is, at the time you were adviser to the Generalis-
simo.
jNIr. Lattimore. I don't recall the names at all, but they may be
people that I met in connection with my official duties, working for
the Generalissimo.
]\Ir. MoRius. Did you ever pass on to them reports and information
of any kind ?
^Ir. Lattimore. Again, not that I recall, unless you can refresh
my necessarily imperfect memory.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever send coded messages to Yenan while you
were in Chungking?
]Mr. Latttmore. Coded messages to Yenan ?
The Chairman. While you were in Chungking.
Mr. Lattimore. No, I wouldn't believe so, unless it was in connec-
tion with some of my official duties.
Mr. Morris. It is possible that you may have done it in connection
with your official duties ?
jVlr. Lattimore. I should say so.
3342 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattiniore, after you sent your dispatch to Lauch-
lin Currie on November 25, 1941, urging a rejection of the modus
vivendi, will you tell us what your itinerary was through December
7,1941?
On the 25th you sent to Lauchlin Currie, on the 25th of November
1941, a dispatch suggesting that the proposed modus vivendi, whereby
a truce would be effected, a temporary truce would be effected, between
.Fapan and the United States in order to avert a war — you remember
that dispatch, do you not, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, of course ; I was not urging the modus vivendi.
Mr. Morris. You sent the dispatch, did you not, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I was reporting at the Generalissimo's re-
quest. I was reporting his action to that proposal.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you tell us what your itinerary
was after you sent that dispatch on November 25, from Chungking,
sir?
Where did you go up until December 7, 1941 ?
Mr. Lattimore. Beginning at the end of that, I remember that on
December 7 — that is. Pearl Harbor day — I was in Chungking, and I
don't believe that I was out of Chungking between those two dates.
Mr. Morris. Were you in Hong Kong at that time, Mr, Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Possibly ; no I wasn't.
Mr. Morris. When were you in Hong Kong ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was in Hong Kong — let's see — I was in Hong-
Kong once between July, when I went out to Chungking, and Pearl
Harljor. But I don't memember the exact time. I believe it was
earlier than November — more likely September or October.
But my memory is not at all clear.
Mr. Morris. And how about December 8 ?
Mr. Lattimore. December 8?
December 8 I was booked to fly from Hong Kong on a clipper ship
which was sunk at its moorings in Hong Kong. I never went down.
Mr. Morris. You were to go to Hong Kong by ship ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I was to fly to Hong Kong by plane from
Chungking, and catch the Pan-American Clipper to fly for home. At
something like 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, before my plane was due
to take off, one of the Generalissimo's aides rang me up and said the
Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor, "so your trip is obviously off."
Mr. Morris. And then what did you do after that, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Then I stayed in Chungking until I left for Amer-
ica via Burma and the "hump" sometime early in 1942.
Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Chi over there at that time I He flew over
with you when he went to the Generalissimo's assignment, did he not?
Mr. Lattimore. He and Genei-al Chennault and I all went out on the
same plane ; yes.
Mr. Morris. And you frequently saw him while you were serving
that term with the Generalissimo, did you not?
Mr. Lattimore. I saw him fairly frequently, because he was one
of the confidential secretaries of H. H. Kung, who was very, very
close to the Generalissimo.
Mr. Morris. And all during that time, it is your testimony, is it
not, that you did not know that he was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3343
Mr. Morris, Mr. Lattimore, you have testified, have you not, that
you did not know that James S. Allen was a Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right. To the best of my knowledge, I
never knew that he was a Communist until quite recently.
Mr. Morris. Did you testify that you never met James S. Allen?
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge I never met him.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have an exhibit No. 53 which has
already been introduced in open session. This is a carbon copy of a
letter from I\Ir. Carter to Mr. Holland. I would like to show it to Mr.
Lattimore and ask him if reading the last paragraph of that will re-
fresh his recollection on the negative answer he gave to the question.
The Chairman. Does that bear any identification as having been
admitted ?
Mr. iNIoRRis. That has been admitted and is exhibit No. 58.
]Mr. Arnold. May we have a copy?
Mr. Morris. I ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last paragraph.
Mr. Lattimore. The last paragi'aph of this letter from Mr. Carter
to Mr. Holland says :
Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet policy in the Pacific, made up of
some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present
were Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Nuhle, Bisson, Moore,
Field, James Allen. Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.
Mr. Morris. Does not that letter indicate that you and Mr. Allen
met together ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it does, Mr. ISIorris. I have seen
this before, when it was issued as an exhibit, and I believe that it is a
mistake on Mr. Carter's part. Maybe he had a list of people who had
been invited to such a conference, but I don't remember taking part
in it, and there is at least one person there besides Mr. Allen whom I
never remember meeting.
I note that in this letter he says : "last week," and he may have been
writing from a faulty recollection.
Mr. Morris. Do you know that James S. Allen has testified before
this committee that he did attend that meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't know that.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know, ISIr. Lattimore, what the group is
that is referred to?
Mr. Lattimore. I have only a very imperfect recollection of the fact
that at that time, 1940, Professor Corbett of Yale, who is an expert on
Roman law and international law, and later made a special study of
Soviet law, was conducting some kind of a study, I believe, under the
auspices of the IPR.
Mr. Sourwine. And his students were referred to as "Corbett's
group;" is that what you mean?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't know whether they were students or
other people who took part in a discussion group under the auspices
of the IPR, or exactly what the arrangement was.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you a member of that group, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I was.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you attend any meetings of that group ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember attending this or any other
meeting.
The Chairman. Would you say that you did not attend that meet-
ing that is referred to there ?
3344 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my recollection, I never attended that
meeting; no.
The Chairman. The names there are all familiar to you, are they
not?
Mr. Lattimore. Not all of them; no. There is somebody here
named Mnhle, whom I can't place at all.
The Chairman. That is the only one that is not familiar to you?
Mr. Lattimore. The others are familiar to me, that is, they are peo-
ple I know or know of, know of slightly.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore. I am now going to call your attention
to our exhibit 455, which was introduced into the record on February
21, 1952. It takes the form of a memorandum on Philippine research,
dated April 14, 1938, WWL to ECC. WWL is Mr. Lockwood, is it
not, and ECC is Mr. Carter?
I ask you if, in the course of your duties as editor of Pacific Affairs,
which you were at that time, that memorandum would have been in
the purview of the documents available for your research ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Before that question is answered, I think the ques-
tion before the question last asked was not responded to.
I think the record should show that in response to the previous
question, Mr. Lattimore nodded, but made no sound.
Mr. Morris. The nodding was yes, was it?
Mr. Lattimore. The nodding was that I was prepared to look at
this exhibit.
This exhibit I have also seen, because it was previously issued.
Until I saw it, I had no previous recollection of it, and I believe that
I never saw it before. You will see that it is headed "Research." I
was not connected with American Council Research at that time, and
I was not in New York at that time. I was living in California, and
had not been in New York for a couple of years.
The Chairman. When did you first see that document ?
Mr. Lattimore. Some months ago, after it had been released by
this committee.
Mr. Morris. Some months ago, that is February 21, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. February. I thought you read February 21, 19 — —
Mr. Morris. No, 1952.
Mr. L.\TTiM0RE. 1952?
Mr. Morris. This, Mr. Chairman, is obviously what Mr. Lattimore
is referring to, judging by the period of time, and is a copy of the
letter, and the Institute of Pacific Relations also retained a copy
of this letter. So a copy is also available in their office.
The paragraph I would like to read, since you have seen it, Mr.
Lattimore, is the third paragraph on the second page.
The Chairman. Let us go back and get the letter from whom to
whom?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lockwood is writing to Mr. Carter. This is in
1938, at a time when Mr. Lattimore is the editor of Pacific Affairs.
He has testified that in 1938 he was on the west coast.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris. The paragraph reads:
Are you in touch with James Allen? I uuderstand he is going to the islands
in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the
agrarian question was n)ost interesting and gave evidence of heing a careful
and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3345
United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even
though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-
determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic.
Does not that indicate to you, Mr. Lattimore, tliat the people in
the New York office knew that James S. Allen was a Communist?
^Ir. Lattimore. It certainly indicates that Mr. Lockwood thought
he had a Communist ideology.
Senator Ferguson. Of course, that would not make him a Com-
munist, would it?
Mr. Lattimore. Xot necessarily a Connnunity Party memher.
Senator Ferguson. Did he ask you anything about membership I
IVIr. Lattimore. I thought that question was usually asked with
regard to membership, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. I think you had better watch the questions and
do not read into this "membership'' if it is not in it.
Mr. Lattimore. All right.
There are, after all, Senator, many are, and have been, many
general Marxist writers who are sometimes loosely called Commu-
nists who have never engaged in Communist organizations.
Senator Ferguson. That is all right. If you want to answer the
particular question that way, and if you want to give that answer as
far as Allen is concerned, is that your opinion?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I don't have enough to go on to make any
opinion one way or the other.
Senator Ferguson. Then why did you giA'e us that answer ?
Mr. Lattimore. Because I didn't want to make my opinion positive
in one sense or another when I don't know enough about it to be
positive.
]Mr. Morris. ]Mr. Lattimore, did you know that Mr. Allen at that
time was associated with the Daily Worker?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr, Morris. Did you read the testimony before this committee that
lie was an agent for the Communist International?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I have seen some reference to that in the
transcript; yes.
Mr. jNIorris. And do you not know that he had a byline in the Daily
Worker for a long ])eriod during the war, and was known as the
foreign editor of the Daily Worker?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know all of that in detail. According to
my recollection at the time of the Tydings hearings 2 years ago, the
fact was brought up that he had some sort of Daily Worker connection.
I don't remember the details. But I believe that that was the first
I know of it.
Mr. Morris. Does it not show at least a lack of coordination, let us
say, Mr. Lattimore, that the New York office should know that James
Allen was a Communist, and that you, as editor of Pacific Affairs,
for which he was writing, should not know that?
Mr. Lattimore. I think no more lack of coordination that was
fairly general around the IPR office. After all, we were not a
Government office with chains of command and regular protocol on
what went to who, when, and how, and so on.
]Mr. ]Morris. When you wanted to be in touch with Mr. Allen, how
did you get his address ?
3346 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably I got it either from the IPR or per-
haps he wrote to me. I don't know.
Mr, Morris. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Morris, if I might interpose at that point:
Your question was when you wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen,
"How did you get his address?"
I do not believe the witness means to say that when he wanted to
get in touch with Mr. Allen, Mr. Allen wrote to him.
Is that what you meant to say, Mr. Lattimore?
]\Ir, Lattimore. Mr. Allen may have written to me in connection
with the fact that I published a couple of articles, and I may have had
his address that way.
Mr. Sourwine. The question was, when you wanted to get in touch
with Mr. xillen, how did you get his address?
Mr. Lattimore. Well. I don't remember.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection on the subject, but if you
have a document there I shall be glad to have my memory refreshed.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 27, 1939, addressed to
Mr. Owen Lattimore from Frederick V. Field.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that docu-
ment ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't recall receiving it.
Mr. Morris. Will you read it, Mr. Lattimore? It is short.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Dear Owen : Carter's office reports that James Allen may be reached at —
Then I can't read this clearly —
* * * 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street—
I think it is —
New York City.
Sincerely yours,
(The document as previously read by the witness was marked "Ex-
hibit No. 524," as above.)
Mr. Lattimore. I presume that Mr. Field was at that time — when
was this, 1939 ?
I think he was still secretary of the American IPR. So, presumably,
I wrote to him for the address.
Mr. Morris. Did you not testify several days ago that at that time
you realized that Frederick Field was at that time a member of the
Communist Party?
Mr. Laiitmore. No, sir; I didn't. I testified that in 1952, seeing
a letter wa-itten by Field in 1939, I w^ould now say that my memory
may have been in error by 2 years as to the time when I thought he
was beginning to be a close fellow traveler of the record.
However, that projection of my memory back from 1952 to 1939
is not worth a great deal.
After all, the way people were writing about Russia and Russian
policy in 1939 was pretty loose.
Senator Ferguson. ]\lr. Lattimore, did you not, in your voluntary
statement that you brought in here, say that you knew Field was a
Communist in the 1940's ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3347
1 even corrected you to show what you had said.
Mr. Lattomore. I think I said that I believe that by the 1940's he
had become a Communist, or something of that sort. I forget the
exact wording.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
You are now talking about 1950. Well, then, did you know that
in the lOlO's, back in the 1940's, he was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No; as of the 1950's, I remember that in the 194:0's
I considered him a Russian fellow traveler, or possibly a Communist
fellow traveler. But I don't remember when I began to feel that
way.
The Chairman. You came in here with your statement voluntarily.
Do you recall your statement? It was to the effect that he was a
Communist in the forties.
Mr. Lattimore. I said in my statement
Senator Ferguson. What page is that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Page 14 —
I had no reason to consider him a Communist during the period when he was
secretary of the American IPR in the 1930's, althougli I have no doubt he became
one during tlie 1940's.
That is, I have, in 1952, no doubt that he became one during the
1940's. I may say that that is based not so much on my own recol-
lection as on some testimony that I read in the transcript of the hear-
ings of Mr. Carter here, much of which was entirely new to me.
Senator Ferguson. Then there are some truths in this hearing that
you take for granted ?
Mr. Lattimore. My opinion of Mr. Carter has always been that
he is an extremely honest man.
Senator Ferguson. Is that where you got the idea "although I have
no doubt that he became one during the 1940" ?
Mr, Lattimore. As I say, it is partly from recollection, which is
very vague, and difficult for me to specify as to year, but I also read
some things in Mr. Carter's testimony which would now, in 1952,
indicate to me that Field definitely became a Communist in the
1940's.
Senator Ferguson. Then it would indicate that Carter's testimony
shows the fact to be that Field l)ecame a Communist in the 1940's?
Mr, Lattimore. Not Carter's opinion, but some of the facts given by
Carter.
Senator Ferguson. The facts given by Carter. It would, therefore,
appear that while Field was connected with the Institute of Pacific
Relations, he was a Communist, and Carter's facts show it; is that
correct ?
Mr. Lait^imore. As of 1952 they create a strong presumption.
]\Ir. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, have you read the testimony of Mr.
Nathaniel Weyl before this committee, which was to the effect that
Mr. Field became a Communist in 1935?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I haven't. Is that part of the
Mr. Morris. That is public testimony.
Mr. Lattimore. Has that part of the transcript been printed yet?
Mr. Morris. It has not been printed yet. But you do read tran-
scripts that the Institute of Pacific Relations obtains in New York, do
you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I read some of them ; by no means all of them.
3348 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. But they are available to you.
Will you identify that letter, Mr. Manclel ?
Mr. jSIaxdel. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 3, 1938, addressed to
Mr. James S. Allen, care of American Express Co., Manila, Philippine
Islands. It has the typed signature of Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you recall having written
that letter to Mr. Allen.
Mr. Lati^imore. I don't recall having written it, but I obviously
wrote it.
Mr. IMoRRis. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
(Exhibit No. 525)
Dear Allen : Immediately on receipt of your letter of which I herewith en-
close a copy, I wrote to your American address. As I received no reply, and the
deadline for the December number of Pacific Aifairs was fast approaching, I
iiad perforce to schedule the letter for publication without reply for you.
That must be a misprint for "from you" :
I added an editorial note to the effect that we expected a reply from you
for our March number.
Now I have just heard from your wife, giving your Manila address. Although
it is too late for you to send a reply for December publication, I am forwarding
this by clipper mail in the hope that it may reach you before you leave the
I'hilippines. I hope that this will not merely give you extra time before our
March number, but possibly enable you to make a last-minute check-up on the
data on which you founded your original statements.
As your article appeared to me, as a nonexpert, to have every external char-
acteristic of careful observation and reasoned statement, while the vigor of
the attached letter of refutation indicates great confidence on the part of the
protesting company, I shall be extremely interested in following up, in due
course, the discrepancy between the two statements.
Please note, by the way, my new permanent address, as given above.
Yours very sincerely.
Mr. Morris. May that be inserted into the record, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 525" and read
in full.)
Mr. Morris. To what extent did you know James Allen's wife?
Mr. Lattimore. I never met her, to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. Morris. What name did she use when you spoke to her?
Mr. L vmMORE. I don't think I spoke to her. My recollection of
this correspondence is that — what was the date of that letter from
Field giving his address?
Mr. Morris. That is April 27, 1939.
Mr.. Lattimore. April 27, 1939. This is previous. I must have
written to Allen care of IPR, or whatever address I had for him, and
the letter was presumably forwarded to his wife who told me that he
was out of the country.
Mr. Morris. When did she tell you, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I presume she told me by letter.
Mr. Morris. How did she sign letters — Mrs. James S. Allen?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.
Ml'. Morris. Do vou know that James Allen is not the man's name
at all?
Mr. Lattimore. I have seen recently something in the newspapers to
that effect. That was the first of it I knew.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3349
Mr. Morris. How did she identify herself when she spoke to you
or wrote to yon ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably as Mrs. Allen.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the man we have been discussing, James
S. Allen, has testified before this committee and he stated that his
name is Sol Auerbach, but that he writes in these various publica-
tions under the name of James S. Allen.
Mr. Lattimore. Incidentally, Mr. Morris, I am all confused about
this man Allen. I got the impression some time ago — I think it may
have been at the time of the trial of the 11 Communists in New York —
from reading the press, that Mr. Allen was a Negro, Now I am sure,
if I had met a Negro expert on the Philippines, I would remember it.
Now, I see that his name is given as Sol Auerbach which doesn't
sound to me like a Negro name, so I don't know what he is.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard the name Sol Auerbach?
Mr. Lattimore. Auerbach, I don't believe I ever have ; no.
Mr. Morris. May I take one more letter ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Morris. There has been identified a letter, Mr. Chairman, as
exhibit 49, August 2, 1951 : This is a letter that Mr. Lattimore wrote
to Mr. Allen in 1939. Would you care to read it, Mr. Lattimore?
This is to Mr. James S. Allen.
Mr. Lattiiniore. It is dated February 27, 1939, addressed to Mr.
James S. Allen, 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street,
Apartment 42, New York City [reading] :
Dear Ali.en : Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from
my office and Ivind of crowded for time.
It was good to hear from you again, and I am only sorry that your Letter to
the Editor was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have
to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as
set xip to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to
the Philippine Branch of the IPR.
What about some more on the Philippines sometimes? We are really rather
hard-pressed to get enough material that is not directly about the Japanese war
on China. At the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we
couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right
away, if it would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed
"radical" stuff on the islands. Have you done any work in French Indochina,
the Malay Straits, or Netherlands Indies?
By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in
the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend
entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions.
The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just
members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us.
I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so, I very much hope
that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Soitrw^ine, May I inquire ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, can you explain why you were con-
cerned over the reaction of the Philip])ine IPR to your publication of
fundamental stuff on the Philippine Islands?
Mr. Lattimore. Was that the reaction of the Philippine IPE. I was
concerned about, or the reaction of the tobacco company ^
Mr. Sotjrwixe. The letter said, sir —
at the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't
guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it
3350 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed "radical" stuff
on the islands.
I was asking what was the basis for your feeling that the Philippine
IPK would be concerned about your printing fundamental stuff on
the Philippine Islands ?
Mr. Lattimore. I suppose it was because of that protest from the
tobacco company that disliked Allen's article. The Philippines coun-
cil was one of the councils from which we had often tried unsuccess-
fully to get articles.
Then I got an article from somebody who had been to the Philip-
pines, which raised a controversy in the Philippines. So I suppose the
Philippines council might be concerned about it.
Incidentally, the tobacco company's criticism of Allen's figures and
statements had raised absolutely no question of his being a Com-
munist, and as far as concerns the conditions that he dealt with the
accuracy of his investigation seems to be fully upheld by the report
of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs appointed
by the President of the United States.
The Chairman. Are you reading that, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Are you reading that from some document ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am reading that from some notes I have pre-
pared.
The Chairman. Why do you not answer the question without read-
ing it ?
Who presented that to you ? Where did you get that?
Mr. Lattimore. I asked my wife for it.
Senator Smith. Is that a memorandum you prepared yourself, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; it is a memorandum that I prepared myself.
Senator Ferguson. When did you prepare that?
Mr. Lattimore. In preparation for these hearings.
Senator Ferguson. When did you prepare that ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am not quite sure at what time. I have been pre-
paring for these hearings for months.
Senator Ferguson. Let us get a definite answer to this question :
When did you prepare this document ?
Mr. Lattimore. In the course of preparing for these hearings.
Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the closest you can get to it?
Mr. Lati'Imore. That is the closest I can get to it.
The Chairman. Within how many months? Within a period of
liow many months ?
Mr. Lattimore. Within a period of approximately 8 months.
Senator Ferguson. AVliat made you think that you might be asked
about this article and about Allen? Wliat made you think that you
might be asked about this article and Allen ?
Mr. Latomore. Because of previous testimony, both at the time
of the Tydings hearings and before this committee, for example
Senator Ferguson. Did you refresh your memory about Allen, try
to find any of these letters to him ?
Mr. Lattimore. I looked u]) to see what I might have on the subject
(jf Allen. Then I looked up the question of the situation at that time
in the Philippines.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3351
Senator Ferguson. What is it that your counsel wants to call to
your attention ?
Mr. Lattimore. The entries on the subject of Sol Auerbach in the
printed transcript of this hearing, part 1, July.
The Chairman. What date ?
Mr. LArriMORE. Part 1, July 25, 26, 31 ; August 2, 7, 1951.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, it is the import of your testimony to
the effect that James S. Allen's article was not a Communist article ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the import of my testimony.
The Chairman. "VAHiat did you mean by the word "radical" in
that?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I meant the word radical, in quotes, in the
sense that as of that time any article which was contested by a planta-
tion company about conditions of plantation labor might have been
called radical by the plantation company.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean you did not here use it in the sense of
fundamental ?
Mr. Latitmore. Here I did not use it in the sense of fundamental,
and I had it in quotes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, knowing what you do now about James
S. Allen, do you think that he still could write an article that would
not be a Communist article ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Morris, I don't know any way of preventing a
Communist from occasionally taking an intelligent interest in an im-
portant problem. I should think that under certain circumstances a
Communist would be quite capable of writing an article that could
not be regarded as slanted in a Communist direction.
The Chairman. Even if he was writing under an assumed name?
Mr. Lattimore. Even if he was writing under assumed names.
Other people also write under assumed names.
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow
morning at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 3 : 15 p. m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at
10 a. m., Wednesday, March 5, 1952.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
WEDNESDAY. MARCH 5, 1952
United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration or the Internal
Security Act and other Internal Security
Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington,, D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10 :15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room
424, Senate Office Building:, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.
Present : Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, CConor, Ferguson,
und Watkins, and Jenner.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN
ARNOLD— Resumed
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you have a copy of the letter that
you mentioned in the article to the London Times yesterday, of per-
mission to go to Yenan?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't have it.
Mr. Morris. You do not have a cop}' of that.
Mr. Lattimore. did you ever express disagreement with the policy
of the United States Government, that all aid to China should go
through the accredited Chinese Nationalist Government?
Mr. Latiimore. I have no recollection of that, but my recollection
isn't complete. If you have a document I would be glad to discuss it.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever recommend or protest that aid should
be given to the Chinese Communists lest the United States appear
partisan in withholding aid from the Chinese Communists?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that, either, but again my recol-
lection isn't complete.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever prepare a j^rotest to an article written
by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell, in the Reader's Digest, in 1945,
wdiich was destined for the New York Times, over the signature of
Thomas Lamont?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I participated in that.
Mr. Morris. Will you explain what happened at that time, Mr.
Lattimore I
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Eastman and Mr. Powell had printed in the
Reader's Digest which cast slurs on me and others. I wrote to the
Reader's Digest and asked for an opportunity to reply, received what
88348— 52— pt. 10 6 3353
3354 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I considered a very curt and rude reply, and a little bit later, I be-
lieve, Mr. Carter wrote to me and suggested that a letter be published,
be offered to the New York Times for publication. He believed that
Mr. Thomas Lamont might sign such a letter, and suggested that I
draft it so that what I considered the relevant material would be in it.
Mr. Morris. So the views in that memorandum were your views?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know about the final state oi it. I pre-
pared a draft.
The Chairman, The question is, are the views in that draft your
views ?
Mr. Lattimore. In the views in my original draft were my views;
yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read the letter that actually ap-
peared in the New York Times ?
Mr. Lat^tmore. I don't think a letter did appear in the New York
Times.
Senator Ferguson. Did it appear anywhere?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents,
please ?
Mr. Mandel. This is photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated Jime 14, 1945,
addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward
C. Carter.
Attached thereto is a photostat of a letter to the editor of the New
York Times, consisting of five pages. It is unsigned.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you will look at that and an-
swer whether or not that letter is addressed to you, whether that
is a copy of a letter addressed to you, and whether the draft therein
is your draft.
(A document was handed to the witness.)
The Chairman. As I understand it, all of this matter, a photo-
static copy of which was presented to the witness here, was taken
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct,
Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lattimore. The letter from Mr. Carter to me is clearly writ-
ten by him and received by me. If I may just look at this draft
here —
I do not believe the di-aft is entirely my draft. I think it is probably
a combined draft of some sort.
Senator Ferguson. Whose work besidee yours?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know, unless it was Mr. Carter or if he
asked somebody else in New York to help him.
Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Lamont know anything about this
subject ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I believe there was some correspondence be-
tween Mr. Carter and Mr. Lamont on the subject.
Senator Ferguson. But did he know anything personally about
it, or was he merelv the mouthpiece for you and Mr. Carter?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Lamont had long been interested in China.
Senator Ferguson. He had been ?
_ Mr. Lattimore. I believe he had long been interested in China; yes,
sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3355
Senator Ferguson. What do you say is in this document that is not
yours ?
Mr. Lattimore. It is impossible for me to recall at this time ex-
actly what phrases were mine and what phrases were somebody else's.
The Chairman. Is it a matter of phrases, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Maybe partly a matter of phrases, partly, perhaps,
a matter of paragraphs.
The Chairman. Is it a matter of substance?
Mr. Lattimore. May I read it out, Mr. Chairman ?
Mr. Morris. Before doing that, you will be given that opportunity,
Mr. Lattimore; I would like to ask a few questions beforehand.
Will you read that letter that accompanies the draft ?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
(Exhibit No. 526)
Dear Owen : Although last night's suggestion for ghost writing for a down-
town big shot has certain attractive features, my second thought is that my
original suggestion should not be lightly discarded.
You are a pretty big shot yourself and a great many people will listen to you.
If on further thought you think that there would be even greater advantages
in the proposal advanced last evening, I am willing to exploiv the possibility
of it, but my original suggestion still is my first choice.
Sincerely yours,
Mr. Morris. At this point, Mr. Chairman, will you receive both
the draft and the letter into evidence?
The Chairman. The draft and the letter have been identified as
having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations
and will be received in evidence.
(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 526," which was
read in full above, and "Exhibit No. 527," which is as follows:)
To the Editor of the New York Times :
The San Francisco Conference has shown us that Soviet Russia is a country
with which we can cooperate. The statesmanship of the Russian delegates, and
concessions made by the Soviet Government, have contributed to this fortunate
outcome. Tensions have eased, especially in Europe.
On the other hand there is cause for uneasiness in a new trend, which is now
developing, toward criticism of Soviet motives and Soviet policies in Asia. We
shall be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President Tru-
man's first Big Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. When
that meeting is held public interest and public comment and si^eculation will
inevitably he drawn toward Russia's position, and Russia's relationship to us,
in Asia and the Pacific. We shall do well to prepare now for the thinking which
will absorb our interest then. Should we prepare ourselves for this occasion
by hardening, within our minds, the assumption that Soviet and American in-
terests in Asia are inherently in conflict with each other? Ought we not rather
to search for a larger framework of policy within which American and Soviet
interests can be accommodated to each other"?
An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influential
magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake in
China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that
there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President
Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Communists, and "bring under totalitarian regi-
mentation 450 million people." To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on
the authoritativeness of several of those Americans who have, in fact, contributed
most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary China
and Contemporary Russia— including Owen Lattimore, Harrison P'orman, and
EMgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both Ameri-
can and Soviet policy in China. In making such a review, w^e should examine
American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make (Mir criticisms where
they are due.
3356 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Under Pearl Harbor, the American policy was to support China while avoiding,
as far as possible, a direct challenge to Japan. Since Pearl Harbor, our policy
has been to give China the maximum aid permitted by difficulties of transport and
the demands of other theaters of war. We have also, until quite recently, en-
couraged political unity in China, in order to facilitate the most effective resist-
ance in Japan.
Soviet Russia has followed a parallel policy. Even during the period when there
was a danger that Russia might be attacked from two sides by Germany and
Japan, the Soviet Government accepted whatever risk there might be in giving
aid to China. Moreover, Soviet aid, like American aid, encouraged political unity
in China. No attempt was made to channel Soviet aid toward the Chinese Com-
munists. All aid was delivered, with no restrictions attached, to the National
Government lieaded by Generalissimo Cliiang Kai-shelc. After the German
invasion of Russia the flow of aid understandably decreased ; but Madame Chiang
has given us an authoritative statement of the extent and significance of Soviet
aid up to 1941. Writing in Liberty magazine (January 21, 1941) she said :
"Intellectual honesty constrains me to point out that throughout the first three
.years of resistance, Soviet Russia extended to Cliina, for the actual purchase of
war materials and other necessities, credits several times larger than the credits
given by either Great Britain or America. Both these countries, indeed, cii'cum-
scribed tlieir advances with conditions which prevented even one cent of the
money from being used for badly needed munitions, equipment, or war materials
of any kind * * * when Japan protested through the Ambassador at Moscow
that the aid extended was a breach of neutrality, Russia did not wilt, or surren-
der, or compromise, but continued to send supplies of arms to China. It will
doubtless be said that Russia has been aiding China for selfish interests. In
reply to this I may point out that Russian help has been unconditional."
Russian and American policy in China can be made parallel, and we know from
experience, not by guesswork, tliat the Russians are capable of contributing, at
the very least, an equal share in making the policies of the two countries parallel.
At the present moment there is a danger that the parallel policy may not
continue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen
from American policy. Whereas Russian policy has never yet demanded the
inclusion of the Cliinese Communists in the benefits of Russian aid to China,
American policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefits of Ameri-
can aid. Recent statements by General Hurley, our Ambassador to Chungking,
and General Wedemeyer, the ranking American officer in the theater, have re-
stricted the benefits of Lend-Lease to the forces politically identified with Presi-
dent Chiang Kai-shek, and have restricted American personnel from acting in
ways that might benefit forces other than those politically identified with Presi-
dent Chiang.
As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited
channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one
political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the
Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese.
American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the
Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this diver-
gence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame
cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians should
in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could
justify themselves on the groimd that they were merely following an American
precedent.
Many issues are here involved. Not the least of them is the possibility of a
complete reversal of the time-honored American policy of supporting the terri-
torial and political integrity of China. American aid to one party in China,
leading to Riissian aid to another party, could easily result in inflicting on
China a terrible civil war, following more tban eight years of heavy sacrifice in
a war for national survival. American policy, which traditionally has always
opposed the partition of China, might thus actually precipitate a partition by
making the government of part of China dependent on American control and
virtually compelling political opponents of that government to look for foreign
support elsewhere.
To those who can think of American policy only in terms of an anti-Russian
coalition, like the authors of the article in Reader's Digest from which I have
quoted, such a prospect may seem to be only a bold move in power-politics. It
is ironical to recall that one of them, Mr. Eastman, was long a supporter of
Leon Trotsky, and is the translator of his works. Were Leon Trotsky in the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3357
Kremlin today, and not Marshal Stalin, the prospect of the division of China
between Russia and America, setting the stage for a world war between
Communism and capitalism, might well be enticing to American Communists of
the Trotskyist persuasion.
To other Americans it should be alarming to contemplate the possibility of
an irrevocable reversal of historic American policy in China, leading to irre-
mediable antagonism between us and Soviet Russia, threatening the foundations
of world security that have been laid at San Francisco with Russian aid, and
luaking America responsible for a new world phase of the politics of hostility.
The safeguard against these dangers lies not in limited support of one nation,
or one party within a nation, but in wider and better-balanced cooperation with
China, with Russia, and with Great Britain. Mr. Owen Lattimore, in his recent
Solution in Asia, has wisely warned against an American policy which would
make the Chinese Government "dependent on us to the point where it cannot
deal with other governments without our backing," and has urged that "it is
essential that America should cease to lie so conspicuously the main link between
China and the United Nations. Our interests are great, but they are not isolated.
China policy must be brought into proper liaison with our Soviet and British
policies."
Our interest — and it can be made a common interest with Great Britain and
Russia — is that China should be strong, united, and independent. Only a
China which is strong because it is united, and therefore capable of true inde-
pendence, can inspire the permanent confidence of the American people and
provide the conditions for expanding investment and trade which are needed
by the rest of the world almost as much as they are needed by China herself.
At President Truman's forthcoming meeting with the others of the Big Three
the necessary adjustments can and should l)e made, and they should have the
widest support throughout tlie American Nation. American policy should be
brought back to its traditional support for a politically and territorially united
China, and this paramount requisite for the future stability of Asia should not
be jeopardized by factious attacks on any of our allies.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Might I ask a question there, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Morris. We are still on the same subject.
The Chairman. Yes ; yon may.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, would von look at page 3 of this
draft?
This is the draft of the article?
Mr. Latiimore. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The paragraph at the bottom of that page.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. It says :
As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited
channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors
one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the
Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese.
American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when
the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisian activity. If this
divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the
blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Rusisans
should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they
could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an
American precedent.
Can you say Avhether that is one of the portions of the draft which
is yours?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe that was probably mine ; yes. This is in
line with the thinking that was very common at the time, of w^hich I
was aware, as I said in my statement, prepared statement for this
committee, on page 44 :
Some experienced observers were already beginning to believe the Chiang Kai-
.^hek part of free China was In danger of being completely conquered by the
Japanese. Some of these observers, including American military officers, even
3358 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
felt that the Aniericau Governmeut ought to assert its i-ight to seud supplies to
the CoDimunist areas of resistance.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you believe what you wi-ote here in this para-
graph that I have just read ?
Mr. Laitimore. Why, certainly, I believed it at the time; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did j'ou realize that this paragraph includes the
statement that: "* * * the Russians," at this time, which was
1945 ; "* * * ai-e still scrupulously refraining from partisan
activity" ?
Did you believe that?
The Chairman. Just a moment, Mrs. Lattimore.
The Chair has borne with you now for several days in what appears
to be your whispered answers to the witness on the stand. If it oc-
curs again, the Chair will be constrained to have you moved from
your position. I do not like to do that. I want to be as courteous to
you as I can. The Chair is not going to endure tliis much longer.
That is an end to it, and that is all.
Mr. Lattimore. Your question, Mr. Sourwine ?
Mr. Sourwine. Do you realize, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph
infers the statement that at the time, that is, in June of 1945, the Rus-
sians were, to use the words of the article : "Still scrupulously re-
fraining from partisan activity."
Did you believe that at the time ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believed that at the time, and I should like to ask
permission to read a note on the subject in a printed book by General
Chennault.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might pursue this for just a
moment before we have any extraneous matter put in ?
The CiL\iRMAN. Vei-y well.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you not testify here, sir, I believe the day be-
fore yesterday, that you have believed, and now believe, since 1940,
the Russians were supporting and have been supporting the Chinese
Communists?
]\Ir. Laitimore. I cleai'ly remember making that statement. The
support of the Russians to the Chinese Communists during the war
period, to the best of my knowledge, then and at this time, was j)roga-
ganda support, moral support, anything except direct support in the
way of arms and supplies.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think, sir, that that support, such as you
speak of, even it was confined to moral support, propaganda support,
and all of the other support short of arms, do you think that meets the
description "scrupulously refraining from partisan activity?"
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I believe it does, Mr. Sourwine. I believe the
Russian support of those years emphasized the need for continuing
unity in China, and not resorting to civil war at a time when all Chinese
ought to be fighting the Japanese.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe, Mr. Lattimore, that the Russians
were strictly impartial as between the Chinese Communists and the
Chinese Nationalist Government?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no doubt, Mr. Sourwine, that the Russians
were not impartial. But whatever their reasons, they were at that
time, as far as I know to tliis day, scrupulously following an inter-
national policy of supporting the joint Chinese resistance to the
Japanese.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3359
Mr. SoURWiNE. Is that what you meant when you said the day
before yesterday that the Chinese Communists were being supported
by Russia?
Mr. LATriMORE. That is what I meant, yes. I did not mean military
support or support of supplies.
I should like at this moment to read tliis citation from General
Chennault, which I found quite recently when I was looking over the
I'ecords.
The Chairman. Refer that to the counsel, please.
Mr, Morris. What relevancy does that have, Mr. Lattimore?
The Chairman. Before we go into that, just refer it to the counsel,
please.
Have you got it with you i
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think I have it.
The Chairman. Let us have it, please.
Now you may pursue your questions. You may read it at a later
time.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last document?
Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon copy of a letter which was taken from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 19, 1945, ad-
dressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C.
Carter.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you recall having received that
letter.
(A document was handed to the witness.)
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't recall receiving it, but obviously I did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record?
The Chair3Ian. It has been established as having come from the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please ?
Mr. Lattimore. This one?
Mr. Morris. Yes, the one I just handed you.
This is already introduced, I understand, as exhibit 29, in the
printed hearings, before this committee.
Mr. SouRW^iNE. Could we have an extra copy for Mr. Arnold?
Mr. Arnold. Thank you.
Mr. Morris. Would you read that, Mr. Lattimore, please?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Dear Owen : Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late
last evening I went up to One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I
discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be
gone all summer.
I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his
advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to
sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally sug-
gested the possibility of his father.
He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so,
though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and
doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday.
;Mr. Morris. Excuse me, Mr. Lattimore. Who is the person he
referred to there as the son ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know of my own knowledge, Mr. Morris. I
presume, from reading the transcript of these hearings, that it is Mr.
Corliss Lamont, the son of Mr. Thomas Lament.
3360 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. At the time you received this letter from Mr. Carter,
he presumed that you knew who the son would be when he wrote
this letter, did he not?
Mr. Laitimore. I presume so.
Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony that you may have known that
the son at that time was Corliss Lamont, but at least the testimony to
date has refreshed your recollection on that score ?
Mr. Lattimore. The testimony to date has refreshed my recollection
on that score, and I presume that I knew^ at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Is there any doubt about that, that you knew
who the son was ?
Mr. La'itimore. No, I presume there was no doubt about it, sir.
Mr. Morris. Why was Mr. Carter using the cryptic language em-
ployed there?
]\Ir. Lait-imore. You would have to ask Mr. Carter that.
Mr. Morris. Will you continue reading, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing.
I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him, with as strong
and tactful a letter as I can write on the off chance that he might be willing to
do something.
There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly, and this is
at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4.
Is that the same 3 and 4 that is on this mimeographed copy?
This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They
say tiiat the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, et cetera, while
you put it in reverse.
I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Latti-
more admits that Manchuria is to become a pai't of the Soviet Union. Do you
see any way of avoiding this?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
P. S. — May I make one more suggestion, that is, that you add a final paragraph
in which the author puts in a plea for a strong, united, independent China, a
China which would in.spire confidence of the American people in general, and -a
Cliina which would give confidence to those American businessmen who seek
mutually advantageous trade between the United States and China?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that original of the draft
again, and the paragraph questioned about, the paragraph Mr. Sour-
wine questioned you about.
It does appear at the bottom of page 3 and the top of page 4.
Mr. Lattimore. Of the original ?
Mr. Morris. Of the one that we have been discussing.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Does not that appear to be the same paragraph?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right, yes. That is page 3 of the mimeo-
graphed copy.
Mr. Morris. And, Mr. Chairman, to complete this episode, I would
like to put into the record the answer of Mr. Thomas Lamont, wdiich
he w^'ote on July 5, 1945, wherein he declined the invitation of Mr.
Carter to publish the draft over his signature in the New York Times.
Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostatic copy of a letter dated July 5,
1945, addressed to Edward C. Carter from Thomas W. Lamont, on his
letterhead.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3361
Mr. Morris. Will you receive that into the record, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. It is a j^art of the files of the Institute of Pacific
Relations '?
Senator Ferguson. Could the whole letter be read into the record?
Mr. Morris. It reads as follows :
(ExHiBrr No. 528)
Many thanks for yours of Jmie 29. You are too flattering about my casual
letters to the New York Times. I, too, have been concerned over the steady
drip against Russia by various commentators. ]Max Eastman has always been
a weather cock, veering from pro-Trotsky to bitter anti-Soviet. Powell I had
thought better of.
I iiave read the Reader's Digest article and have gone over with care your
memorandum. In effect I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times
a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy, and to
make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in north-
west China. Quite aside from any question of transport to such a remote
region, the principle involved seems to be that I should assume knowledge of
the situation, and of the proper policy to be drawn from same, more adequate
than our Government has.
Of course, I have no such knowledge and could not justify myself in attempt-
ing to correct the policy adopted. My way would always be first to seek
information from the department at Washington. As a matter of fact, even
in my letters to the Times when any possible question of current policy was
involved, I have first shown the letters to the Department of State, not for
approval, but for clearance as to any question of crossing wires.
You know your China better than I do, for my stay there was hardly more
than a month or two. But we both realize how exceedingly complicated the
situation is and is bound to be. Chiang's government now loosely rules all
eastern and southern China (subject to Japanese occupation). The area
includes all the great cities. Now. if Chiang has his doubts as to the effec-
tiveness of the Chinese Comnunust armies against the .lapanese, and such
question has been many times raised, and if Chiang is fearful that once Japan
is ousted, then those northern armies will turn on him, perhaps he is justified
in feeling that the meager supplies available for China should be furnished
for his armies, and not for the other boys. In your memorandum you point
out that Russia has been scrupulous to send supplies to Chiang alone. Well,
if that be true, why is that not additional argument for iis to do the same?
I am really discussing things about which I have no first-hand information.
And in reading your memorandum I may well have just been stupid. Am I all
wrong?
With personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
T. W. Lamont.
The Chairman, It will be inserted into the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 528," and
was read in full.)
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, after hearing that read do you
now say that the Institute of Pacific Relations was not trying to in-
fluence public opinion?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I do not say that.
I say that I had been, I and others had been, attacked in a grossly
distorted article in the Reader's Digest, that I had tried to get space
for a reply and had been refused.
Senator Ferguson. IVlio refused you?
Mr. Lattimore. The editors of the Reader's Digest, to whom I
wrote directly.
Senator Ferguson. Have you copies of those letters?
Mr. Lattimore. I haven't found them, but I remember the incident
very clearly.
3362 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Carter then, as an individual, suggested to me that there might
be a Tray of finding publications somewhere else. He suggested that
I write a letter myself as is clear here from his letter to me of June
14.
My feeling was that I was disgusted with the whole business, and
that if the Reader's Digest wouldn't allow me space for reply, I didn't
want to go to the New .York Times individually, but if ]SIr. Carter
thought that there was an individual or possibly a ^oup of individuals
who would put forward the view, or part of the view that I shared, I
would not mind making a draft of material.
That is a question of individual action and not a question of the
action of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Senator Fekguson. Was the Institute of Pacific Relations attacked
in any way in the article in the Reader's Digest?
Mr. Lathmore. That I don't recall.
Senator Ferguson. Was not your book. Solution in Asia, which
the testimony in this record now shows from one witness, used as
Communist propaganda, for the line here in America by the Com-
munist Party?
Is that not a fact ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, Senator. I believe you are in error. I
believe there has been testimony here that Communist bookshops
sold my book along with other non-Communist books as background
reading.
The Chairman. That is not the question.
Senator Ferguson. That is not my question. You heard the testi-
mony read here of the witness who said that it was used as the back-
ground for Communist line in America, and that book was being at-
tacked in this article in the Reader's Digest. Is that not a fact?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I don't believe that the record shows tJiat
anybody testified that it was being used as a background for the Com-
munist-line propaganda.
I believe the testimony shows that it was sold as background read-
ing. The book was also criticized in Communist publications.
The Chairman. You distinguish between background reading and
backgi'ound what?
Senator Ferguson. For the Communist line?
Mr. Lattimore. Certainly I do.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat is the difference? Wliat is the difference
between backgi-ound reading for a Communist and Communist-line
reading ?
Mr. LATriMt)RE. The difference in this case is that my book was sold
in a gi^eat many bookshops besides Connnunist booksliops, and that
Communist publications criticized by views.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read testimony at this point into
the record ?
Senator Ferguson. I wish you would read what the witness said
about the Communist line.
Mr. Morris. This is the testimony of Mr. Matusow taken in executive
session on February 13, 1952. Mr. Mandel is interrogating Mr.
Matusow [reading] :
Mr. Mandel. Did the bookshop —
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3363
lliat is, the Communist bookshop —
ever promote any of the publications of Owen Lattimore?
Mr. Matusow. Yes, it did.
Mr. Mandel. Will you tell us about that?
Mr. Matusow. The book, Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, published by
Little Brown & Co.—
Mr. Mandel. AVhat year?
Mr. Matusow. 1945 — it was one of the books used in the bookshop and sug-
gested reading for a background of the party line, the Communist Party line,
in Asia.
Mr. Mandbx. What do you mean by suggested reading?
Mr. Matusow. You see, this was the Jefferson School Book Shop, and there
were many courses conducted.
During this period, as I said, the war in China, the Communist revolution in
China, was taking place, and many people professed a great interest in that, and
the party, the Communist Party, line, as disseminated had not caught up with
the tide of events, we might say. The party had been caught for a while flat-
footed in the terms of the actual literature put out by the Communist Party
interntaional publishers.
Things were moving too fast for them. The State education committee got
together and decided which books would be good background material, and which
supported the Communist Party line.
They came out with a decision that Solution in Asia was one of those books
which could give a Communist Party member a correct line, a Communist line,
on the Asiatic situation in China and China specifically.
That is the end of the pertinent testimony.
Senator Ferguson. Was the IPK concerned with this dispute in the
Reader's Digest ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Then what did Mr. Carter have to do with it?
Why did you not defend yourself instead of using the ruse of having
Laniont, as if it was something for the IPR to be concerned with?
Mr. Lattimore. I attempted to put my point of view before the
editors of the Readers Digest and was refused an opportunity.
Mr. Carter then took the initiative in suggesting that some other
way be found of publishing the vie^v which I and many others held
at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Were you an employee of the Government of the
L^nited States at the time this was going on ?
INIr. Lattimore. I don't believe so, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You gave as your address on June 20, 1945, the
OWI here in Washington, If you Avere not a member what were you
doing in the OWI ?
]Mr. Laitimore. June 20, 1945?
Senator Ferguson. I wnll get the exact date here. On June 20,
1945, you wrote a letter to Matthew Connelly, the secretary of the
President, and you gave tele])hone OWI, Washington, REpublic 7500,
Extension 72228.
If you were not an employee, what were you doing in the OWI ?
Mr. Laitimore. At that time I was an occasional consultant to the
OWI. and if I had been in Washiuiiton cm any day which Mr. Con-
nelly telephoned me at my home in Ruxton and couldn't find me, he
could have very likely have found me at OWI.
Senator Ferguson". Then you were an employee of the United
States Government ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was an occasional considtant, which meant that I
was an employee on any day that I actually worked there to act as
consultant.
3364 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. How much did you receive a day as being a
consultant.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. The records will show, doubtlessly.
Senator Ferguson. Were you or were you not on the payroll of
the United States Government while this was going on with Mr.
Lamont ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was an independent citizen who was
occasionally consulted and on the days when I was consulted I re-
ceived a consultant's fee, or whatever you like to call it, from the
United States Government.
It had absolutely no limiting effect on my expressing my own views
as a citizen.
Senator Ferguson. How much did you draw from the United
States Treasury in 1945 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know, sir. I am sure that the records would
show.
Senator Ferguson. We will get that and put it in the record, if it
is not one of those matters that is a secret and we cannot obtain it.
It may be the question that your employment was that way, as you
indicate now.
Mr. Arnold. If there is any question of secrecy, we will waive it,
Senator.
Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you this : I was asking you the
other day about the article of Bisson, where the party line was changed
in relation to China in 1943. That has been discussed quite a bit in
this record.
The question came up as to changing the line and calling the Com-
munists of China democrats, and that their government was the de-
mocracy, and that the Nationalist Government was the feudal system.
Now, I ask you whether that was not the same kind of a question
that was raised in the article in the Reader's Digest, and I ask you to
read, on page 15, ''Deception No. 1." See whether the IPR was in-
volved. Kead it out loud.
The Chairman. What page is that, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. 15.
Mr. Morris. May that whole article, and it is only nine pages, go
into the record at this point?
( See exhibit No. 549, p. 3498, for article. )
Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson, may I say first that I never dis-
cussed the Bis.son article with anybody as a change in the Communist
line ; did not consider it to be anything of the kind.
Senator Ferguson. Your memory is becoming much better on the
Bisson article as we go along.
Now, will you read this "Deception No. 1"?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Deception 1 : That Russia is a "democracy" and that China can therefore
safely be left to Russian "influence."
Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous con-
ception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the
blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39, as a "triumph
for democracy." He now urges our Government in a book called Solution in
Asia to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in central
Asia.
Senator Ferguson. AVill you read it so as to give the quotes out of
your book, so that we can tell what is a quote and what is not a quote?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3365
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in Central
Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his boolv on its jacket.
He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in
actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the
Russian border, than they are in the sign series of Anglo-Saxon democracies
which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.
This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was
filled with jazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be advertised
as more academic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, how-
ever, it legitimized the dictatorsliip of the Russian Communist Party (article
126). Stalin himself, addressing tlie Congress which I'atified the draft of the
constitution, frankly stated this fact :
"I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force
the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and preserves unchanged the
present leading position of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union only
one party can exist, the party of Communists" (Pravda, November 26, 19.36).
In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 1938, only one
candidate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party
and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony
has not been repeated and would make no difference if it had. The constitu-
tion is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is
shot or sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia full regions are given up
to these concentration camps, where from 15 to 20 millions —
Footnote :
Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red army, estimates that
the number is about 12 million. Boris Souvarine, French historian of Bol-
shevism, estimates 15 million. Victor Kravchenko, recently resigned from the
Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, who has visited many camps
and had official relations with their managements, says these estimates are low
and puts the figure at 20 million.
Senator Ferguson. Would you let me liave it ?
Mr. Lattimore, I cite this as an example of an extremely unfair
attack on me, wliicli makes one brief quotation from what I wrote en-
tirely out of context. It says that I recommended that the United
States cheerfully accept something which I did not recommend that
the United States cheerfully accept, then ties it in with a whole lot
of extraneous matter which has no concern whatever with me.
It was against that kind of treatment that I protested to the edi-
tors of the Header's Digest.
Senator Ferguson. And it was this that you were trying to answer
by getting Mr. Lamont, over his own signature, to write your let-
ter?
Mr. Latitmore. I was not trying to get ]\Ir. Lamont over his own
signature to answer my own letter. I was acceding
Senator Ferguson. You say that this record does not show that?
Mr. Lattimore. I do, Senator. The record shows that I was acced-
ing to a request from Mr. Carter.
Senator Ferguson. What did Mr. Carter have to do with it ?
Mr. Latti3iore. Mr. Carter wrote to me and made some suggestions,
to which I acceded.
Senator Ferguson. Have you a copy of his letter, Carter's letter to
you ? Is that the one that was read ?
Mr. Lattimore. This is the one that was read.
Senator Ferguson. Who approached Carter first? Did he ap-
proach you, or did vou approach him ?
Mr. Lattimore. %ly distinct recollection is that he approached me.
I am sure you can check that by asking him.
3366 ixstitutp: of pacific relations
Seiiiitor Ferguson. Who else did you contact on one of the dis-
putes, as to wliether or not America should furnish aid to the Com-
munists, direct aid to the Communist army and not through the Na-
tional Government or the Government of Ohina ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember consulting anybody.
Senator Ferguson. Did you consult anybody?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember consulting anybody.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not you did consult
anyone. Think about it.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember consulting anybody, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. This was just about the time that you were
talking — what is the date on that ? The 19th of June?
Mr. Lattimore. 14th of June and 19th of June, from Mr. Carter;
yes.
Senator Ferguson. The 10th of June was when you Avrote the first
letter, as I recall that letter. Did the fact that you wanted to go and
see the President have anything to do with this dispute you were
having?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; it had nothing whatever to do with this
dispute. At that time I held certain views on China. The whole sub-
ject of China was a subject of very keen public discussion at the time.
I, like others, was reading and talking about it. I, like others, was
writing or trying to write on the subject. My views were my own.
Senator Ferguson. Will you give us some of the others that were
talking along the same line that you advocted, of giving aid to the
Communists in China and building them up ?
The Chairman. Do you understand the question, Mr. Lattimore?
If not, we will have it read back to you.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I understand the question, Mr. Chairman.
Are you ready, Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I am ready.
Mr. Lattimore. I cannot possibly recall offliand as of 1952 exactly
who was writing and discussing these subjects in 1945. I M'ould be
glad to look up the record for you, if you are intei-ested.
Senator Ferguson. The reason I ask that question, in one of your
letters — I think it was the one to Mr. Matt Connelly — you said: "The
views I represent."
Wliose views did you represent?
Mr. Lattimore. My own.
Senator Ferguson. Did you mean, when you said the "views I rep-
resent," your views alone?
Ml-. Lattimore. I can't recall exactly what I meant 7 or 8 years ago
in writing that letter. I presume I meant my own views and pos-
sibly— don't want to quibble about it — I may have represented what
I considered to be a body of views then current.
Senator Ferguson. A^Hiose views were they outside of yours?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know at this time. I have pointed out in
the statement I prepared for this committee that these views were
held by many of the American observers in China, including military.
Senator Ferguson. Did you advocate that the Soviet tJnion take
over and annex Manchuria?
Mr. Latpimore. No, I don't believe I did.
The Chairman. Can we have an answer to that ? That seems to be
a clear-cut question.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3367
Mr. Arnold. I wish you would read the record back. I think we
answered it.
The Chairman. I want an answer. Did you or did you not^ He
did not answer. He answered "I don't believe I did."
Mr. Lattimore. I will change that answer, Senator.
I am sure I didn't.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what Mr. Carter was then talking
about ?
There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly and this is at
the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possibility is precisely what your
critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely go-
ing to annex Manchuria and so forth, while you put it in reverse. I would hate
to have your critics ijounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that
Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of
avoiding it?
Mr. Lati'uviore. Apparently, Mr. Carter thought my wording was
unclear and ought to be made clear.
Senator Ferguson. The question is, did you discuss with Carter the
question of Manchuria becoming a part of Russia ?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo. I am certain I didn't. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Did 3"ou — do you know anyone else besides your-
self that was advocating the sending of material. Army equipment and
so forth, to the Communists in China and not have the Nationalist
Government take care of the government in China ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was a view that was quite prevalent
The Chairman. Do you know anyone else?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, the American military, or a large part of the
American military in China.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in touch with the State Department
policy at this time ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; not particularly.
The Chairman. In any way ?
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what our policy was?
Mr. Lattimore. As far as it could be seen from the newspapers and
so on, I knew it.
Senator Ferguson. What was our State Department's policy as of
June 10 on this question ?
The Chairman. Wliat year?
Senator Ferguson. 1945.
Mr. Lattimore. Subject to an imperfect recollection, Senator, I
believe that this was a period of controversy in which statements were
being made by, I think. General Hurley and others, which resulted
in a great deal of public discussion and a general belief that State
Department policy as of that moment was unclear.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to going to the "Wliite House, did you
give any information to any Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. That I was going to do so, you mean?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe I did.
Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to any radio commentators?
Mr. Lattimore. Not that I can recall. I frequently — no, not fre-
quently— I occasionally saw radio commentators and newspapermen
at that time.
3368 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. Senator, I think the date of that Wliite House
matter should be in the record.
Senator Ferguson. The date of July 3 was the date that you went
to the Wliite House ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't have the documents before me, Senator.
I will accept your date.
Senator Ferguson. Was the draft of the memorandum that you
left with the President the day you were there dated July 3 ?
Mr. Lattimore. Was it ?
Senator Ferguson. The draft that you left with the President, it is
dated the 3d.
Mr. Lattimore. It is dated the 3d, yes, the 3d of July.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the day you were there ?
Mr. Lattimore. I presume so ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what day of the week you were
there ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall what day of the w^eek it was.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anybody having knowledge,
outside of the White House and you, that you were going to the White
House ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall at this moment. I wouldn't have
]-egarded — yes, I do. I know that I talked with President Bowman,
of Johns Hopkins, about the whole idea of writing to the President,
and asking for an opportunity to speak with him.
I quite likely talked to other people about it. There was no secrecy
about the subject.
Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to any radio conunentators as to
anything that you would take up with the President?
Mr. Lattimore. I may have. My recollection doesn't include it.
The manner of your questioning, Senator, suggests that maybe you
know I did.
The Chairman. That will be stricken. He says he does not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. But I am at least fair on the question suggesting
that you might.
I will be a little more explicit.
Did you have any conversation or any direct or indirect communi-
cation with Drew Pearson before you went to the White House?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe so, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the night before you went
to the White House, or at least before you went to the White House,
it was announced by Drew Pearson as to one thing that you would
take up at the IVliite House?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't know that.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know that?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear it ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think I did.
The Chairman. Pardon me. Senator.
Mr. Reporter, will you read back the last two or three questions and
answers? My attention was taken away.
(Thereupon, the portion of the record referred to, as heretofore
recorded, was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Lattimore. I may have heard later, of course.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3369
Senator Ferguson. Did you know Drew Pearson at that time ?
Mr. Lat^i'imoke. I don't think I had ever met him. I may have,
but I doubt it, at that time.
Senator Ferguson. 1945 ; right before June 3^
Mr. Lattimore. July 3.
Senator Ferguson. July 3. Thank you for correcting me.
JNIr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think at that time I knew Drew Pear-
son,
Senator Ferguson. When you went to the White House, was there
any member of the State Department present at the meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I believe it was only the President and
myself.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know David Karr, a leg man for Drew
Pearson ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't believe I ever met him.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know any representative prior to that
time of Drew Pearson ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I didn't, to the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how Drew Pearson would know
that you were going to the White House ?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I think a lot of people would like to know
how Drew Pearson knows a lot of things.
The Celvirman. That answer will be stricken. The question is
did you know how he knew that you were going to the White Housed
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't believe he could possibly have
known from me.
Senator Ferguson. You quote him quite elaborately in your Ordeal
by Slander, do you not?
Mr. Lattimore. You mean that I quoted him 5 or 6 years later about
something quite different, yes, I did. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you say there was no member of the
State Department present at your conversation when the President
was there ?
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my recollection it was only the
President and myself.
Senator Ferguson. The President knew in advance what you
wanted to discuss with him ?
Mr. Lattimore. In general, yes, in the letter I had written to him
sometime before. The memorandums that I left with him had not
been submitted to him before.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not, while you were
in the White House, you saw any member of the State Department ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, but I had a very brief conversation with Mr.
Joseph Grew, at that time, I think. Under Secretary of State or Assist-
ant Secretary, or something of that kind, who was waiting in the
anteroom to see the President, and who came over to speak to me.
Senator Ferguson. AYell, now, did you talk to him before you saw
the President?
Mr. Lattimore. I forget whether it was before I saw the President,
or after. I didn't really talk to him. He came over and asked me
one question which I answered.
Senator Ferguson. What was the question?
Mr. Lattimore. The question was whether I had ever lived in
Japan for any consecutive period, and the answer was "no."
88348 — 52— pt. 10 7
3370 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator P^erguson. And what did he say?
Mr. Lattimore. He said, to the best of my recollection, he said, "I
thon*iht so."
Senator Ferguson. Is that the only conversation you had with the
Under Secretary ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is tlie only conversation.
Senator Ferguson. And was that before you went in to the Presi-
dent, or after?
Mr. T^iATriMORE. As I say, I forgot whether it was before or right
after.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss Ambassador Joseph Grew with
the President ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was his name mentioned?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Drew Pearson announced
on the radio, I think it was the night before or a few days before,
if you went in Monday morning which, I think, was the f3rd of
July — I may be incorrect on that date — that Drew Pearson announced
that you were going to the A^^iite House to ask the President not to
appoint Ambassador Joseph Grew as an adviser in the Far East ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall that. If Mr. Pearson said that, he
was completely in error, wdiich sometimes happens with even om-
niscient columnists.
Senator Ferguson. And you think he is one ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I think it is a mark of the trade of col-
umnists to appear to be as omniscient as possible.
Senator Ferguson. I wnll ask you who you had in mind. Do you
have a copy of your memorandum to the President ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I have a copy of it here.
Senator Ferguson. No ; it is the copy of the letter.
Mr. Lattimore. The copy of the letter ?
Senator Ferguson. The last paragraph.
The Chairman. That is the letter to the President?
Senator Fercjuson. Yes, the letter to the President dated the 10th
of June 1945 :
With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy
toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with
either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.
Who were you talking about ?
Mr. Latomore. I was talking about advisers who are not associated
with the formulation or the im|)lementation of that policy as re-
cently })racticed. I had nobody particularly in mind.
I remember quite clearly that part of the occasion of my asking
for this interview was that American policy in the Far East, and
particularly with regard to China, was becoming controversial in the
papers, and I thought it was a good moment for an impartial review.
Senator Ferguson. Was Joseph Grew one of the people you were
talking about?
Mr. Lai^tmore. As an impartial adviser?
Senator Ferguson. In that paragraph, is he ojie of the |)eople that
you were talking about ?
Mr. La'itimore. Well, Mr. Grew at that time was, as I say, an
associate — no ; an assistant or
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3371
The Chairman. That is susceptible of an answer of "Yes"' or "No,"
and then yon may explain, Mr. Lattiniore. The question calls for
an answer of "Yes" or "No."
Mr. Lattimore. The answer was "Yes"; Mr. Grew was one of those
who were concerned with American policy in the Far P^ast.
I don't know Avhether he was concerned with policy toward China.
Senator Fergi'son. Was he one of the formulators ?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't answer as to the internal structure of the
fornudation of ])olicy at that time, Mr. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the implementers ?
Mr. Lattimore. Neither can I answer that question, except that he
was a high executive officer of the State»Department.
Senator Ferguson. He had been in China in the Far East ; had he
not?
Mr. Lattimore. He had been in Japan. I don't know about China.
Senator Ferguson. He had been in Japan and had been the Am-
bassador to Japan?
Mv. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Was Vincent one of the formulators ?
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you that. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the implementers ?
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you that, except that he had a posi-
tion in the State Department at that time. As I say, I don't know
what the chain of command in the State Department was at that
time as between policy formulation and policy implementation.
Senator Ferguson. You knew Ballantine ; did you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I knew Mr. Ballantine.
Senator Ferguson. Is his name Joseph or Thomas ?
ISIr. Lattimore. Joseph.
Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the formulators ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember, Senator, whether Ballantine
had at that time already retired from the State Department, or not.
Senator Ferguson. He had not at this time.
Mr. I^ATTiMORE. He had not at that time.
Senator Ferguson. AVas he one of the implementers ?
Mr. LA'rriMORE. Again I don't know- enough about the internal
structure of the State Department to answer.
Senator Ferguson. Who were you talking about here, that you
were telling the President in a letter?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I was not talking about wdio, I was talk-
ing about what. I was saying that I thought it would be a good
idea to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed.
And, as an extension of impartially reviewed, I didn't think that
a policy could be impai-tially reviewed by those wdio had been recently
making or practicing it.
Therefore, I suggested that outside people who had not recently
been concerned be called in for such an impartial review.
The Chairman. I think the excerpt should be read again to the
witness, Senator.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy
toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with
either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently prac-
ticed.
3372 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Laitimore. I think that is quite a clear suggestion, Senator.
I should say, to anybody in Government, that would be a suggestion
that a question of policy be reviewed by some kind of a board, the
individual members of which had not recently been connected with
the question to be reviewed.
I believe that is not unknown practice in the conduct of government.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Now, will you state, Mr. Lattimore, what the policy was that you
describe as "recently practiced" ?
What was the policy?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I was somewhat unclear on the subject,
Senator, or I wouldn't have suggested a review. I thought that I,
myself, and a good many other people, could do with some clarifi-
cation.
Senator Ferguson. You wanted people that had nothing to do
with the policy, and you now tell us that you did not know what the
policy was ?
The Chairman. He said he was unclear on it.
Mr. Lattimore. I said I was unclear on it.
Senator Ferguson. Tell us what you knew about the policy that
you were objecting to, that you wanted reviewed, and you were telling
the President that he ought to get people who had nothing to do
with the policy.
That would indicate it was a very erroneous policy, would it not?
Mr. Lattimore. Not necessarily, Senator. I think that is quite
clearly stated in the second paragraph of my letter to the President.
Senator Ferguson. Tell us what the policy was.
Mr. Lattimore. May I read that?
Senator Ferguson. I want an answer to the question as to what
the policy was.
The Chairman. What was the policy to which he was objecting;
is that right?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
You said that policy "as recently practiced."
The Chairman. Confine yourself to the question, will you, please,
Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I cannot at this moment give you an
accurate statement of what I thought in 1945 the policy was.
But my letter to the President, and the second paragraph of my
letter to the President, clearly shows what I thought made review
and discussion desirable.
May I read that article?
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.
You said in the article that you wanted Lamont to write, that one of
the policies was that they were not furnishing arms to the Communists,
and you wanted a change in that policy, did you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. May I consult my own statement on that ?
Senator Ffjjguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. The Senator has just restated what he thinks was
my opinion. Senator McCarran, and I should like to see what my
opinion was.
The Chairman. I understood he has quoted from the Lamont letter.
Mr. Laitimore. He has paraphrased it.
Senator Ferguson. I paraphrased it.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3373
The Chairman. All right. What do you want to read from, the
Laniont letter?
Mr. Lattimore. From the proposed draft for a letter by Mr. La-
mont; yes. Following page 3 of the mimeographed copy [reading] :
As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited
channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors
one political group against all others and is withheld from one maj<n' group, the
Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese.
Amei'ican aid to China has thus become politically pai'tisan at a time when thei
Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this di-
vergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the
blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians
should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they
could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an
American precedent.
I think this shows concern, Senator, that American policy should
not furnish the Russians with a pretext for direct intervention in the
internal policies of China.
Senator FerCxUSon. Do you say, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph
did not convey the idea that you were favoring aid to the Communists
as well as to the Nationalists?
Mr. Lattimore. This paragraph. Senator, clearly shows that I be-
lieved that the Comminiist armies, as armies in combat with the
Japanese, could be of greater use if some of the American supplies to
China were used by them.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, going to your letter of June 10
to the President, do you not, in other words, say the same thing in this
paragraph [reading] :
Until quite recently, great care was taken to avoid any inference that America,
in aiding China as a nation, was committing itself to all-out support of one party
in China's domestic affairs. There now appears to be a fundamental change.
Public statements by men regarded as spokesmen for American ix)licy encourage
many Chinese to believe that America now identifies the Chinese Government with
one party and only one party, connuits itself to the maintenance of that party,
'and may in the future support that party in suppressing its rivals.
The Chairman. What is your question ?
Senator Ferguson. What is the diiference between the two state-
ments, the paragraph that you read, begining with, "As a result xlmeri-
can aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels,"
and so forth ?
Mr. Lattimore. The two paragraphs. Senator, state or restate, in
somewhat different ways, my concern about the same primary question ;
namely, that our aid to China, as a nation and an ally, should not be
allowed to involve us in partisan support.
It has always been my belief that one of the mistakes of American
policy was to treat China in that way, differently from the way in
which we treated, say Great Britain. We never in Great Britain spec-
ified aid in terms of the Conservative Party or the Labor Party.
At the end of the war, when the British had an election and the
Labor government came in instead of Churchill, we did not attem])t
to affect that election by saying that, "Unless Churchill is reelected,
we won't play."
I believe that a great deal of damage was done by creating, in fact,
an impression that China was committed not to a nation, but to a
party.
3374 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Is that your explanation as to the difference
between these two paragraphs^
Mr. Lattimore. That is my explanation as to the similarity between
these two paragra])hs.
Mr. SouRWiNE. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Go ahead.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, did you regard the Chinese Nation-
alists and Chinese Communists as just two eom])eting political parties
iu China?
Mr. Lattimore. I regarded them as, among other things, two com-
peting parties in China.
Mr. Sourwine. You would have had them treated on the basis
of two comj)eting jiolitieal parties, as we treated the competing politi-
cal parties in England, which you used as an example; is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. In terms of the war against Japan, I was in favor
of using any forces that would fight the Japanese and thereby diminish
American casualties.
As regards domestic politics, I was afraid that support for one party
against another party in Chinese domestic politics would lead to
failure rather than success.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, going now to your letter of June
10, 1945, in the first ])aragraph, about the policy which you were talk-
ing about in the last paragraph, you say there :
There appears now a major change in our iwlicy. * * *
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. What was the policy, and what was the change?
Mr. Lattimore. The policy is stated in the first sentence of the
letter :
When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shels, on the recommendation of President
Koosevelt, appointed me his political adviser in 1941, the policy of the United.
States was to support a United China. There appears now to be a major change
in our policy, which may invite the danger of a political and even a territorial
division of China and the further danger of conflict and rivalry between America
and Russia.
I have not looked up the context of the Times in the newspapers of
the day, but I believe I am correct in stating that this refers to state-
ments that were beginning to be made in the press at the time by — I
ho])e I am not quoting him incorrectly — General Hurley and others,
indicating that thei'e was a conflict of opinion among top American
personnel on tliis subject.
And I though that if there were such a conflict, it would be sound
]n'actice to have an impartial review of American policy by people not
lecently involved in it.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, you indicated in one of your
answers tliat you tliought I drew the wrong conclusion about that you
were advocating aid to the Comnnniists.
I want to read from the Lamont letter, in the second paragraph:
* * * in effect, I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter
urging our Government to alter its apparent i)resent policy and to make available
lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in Northwest China.
Did not Mr. Lamont understand your article to mean that you were
advocating that they send lend-lease supplies directly to the (>)nnnu-
nists, as a government?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3375
The Chairman, Listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore.
Senator Ferguson. Did not Mr. Laniont draw the conclusion that
you Mere asking him to write a letter to the Times under his name, for
your benefit, in a dispute that you were having with some men that
wrote an article in the Reader's Digest, that you were advocating a
change in America's policy of only giving lend-lease to the National-
ists of China, being the Government of China, and that you were advo-
cating that the lend-lease goods go directly to the Communists as well
as to the Nationalists ?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson, I believe that if you will read
that letter as a whole, you will see that Mr. Lamont was stating a tenta-
tive opinion, which he carefully modified by saying tliat he had been
out of touch for some time.
Senator Fer(;uson. Mr. Lattimore, had you ever used any other man
or woman as you were trying to use Lamont in this letter to the. New
York Times ?
]Mi'. Laitimore. Senator, I was not trying to use Mr. Lamont, and
1 don't believe that I have made it a usual practice to ask other people
to write for the papers for me.
Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you whether you inade it the usual
practice ; I asked you whether you ever did it.
Mr. Latitmore. I don't recall anything of the kind, Senator.
I would like to emphasize at this moment that
The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that if you did you
would recall it?
Mr. Lattimore. I should think it would be quite likely. It would
depend on how serious the matter was.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, how many memorandums did
you leave with the President?
Mr. Lattimore. I left him 2 one-page memoranda, which are in the
mimeographed exhibit here run together like one memorandum; one
on Japan policy as related to China, and one on China policy.
Senator Ferguson. Did you tell us in your statement, on page 33,
where you mentioned going to the President, that you had left any
memorandum with him?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I did.
Senator Ferguson. Why not?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't see why I should have. I said that I tried
to see the President, and I think it is quite the usual practice when
one goes to see the President, to leave a memorandum of what the inter-
viewer would like to talk about.
Senator Ferguson. You say, then, that you did not feel that in
this statement you should give us anything other than the fact that
you had written a letter, "I wrote to the President expressing my
views on China policy"?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson, "And the President, in response, asked me to
come to see him, and I did."
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. "Our conference lasted about 3 minutes."
Mr. Lattimore. Tliat is right.
Senator Ferguson. "Neither my letter nor my visit had the slightest
effect on American policy."
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
3376 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. What was the policy that you tried to affect, so
that we can ascertain whether or not it had any effect on the American
policy ?
Mr. Lattimore. The policy, as I have thought I saw it at the time,
was to drift into a position of appearing to take sides in Chinese
domestic politics, which I thought was an alarming drift.
Senator Ferguson. It was not to furnish material to the Com-
munists ?
Mr. Lattimore. In my interview with the President ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. You stated it in your letter when you asked him
to aid both sides.
Mr. Lattimore. I was not thinking of that as aid to the Com-
munists ; I was thinking of that as prosecution of the American policy
of not promoting a divided China and of prosecuting the war against
Japan as actively as possible.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, were you not trying, at the exact
time, to influence American public opinion by getting Mr. Lamont to
write a letter to the New York Times so that it would be published to
the world under his name, to get aid to the Communists ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Ferguson, I was not trying to get Mr. Lamont
to do anything.
The Chairman. You can answer that "Yes" or "No."
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No."
I was acceding to Mr. Carter's request, suggestion to furnish some
material for a letter to be signed by Mr. Lamont, which he could accept
or reject, and which he finally rejected.
It was my opinion at that time that part of avoidance of a dis-
astrous split in China, as the end of the war was approaching, was to
spread American aid over all forces fighting the Japanese and avoid
creating a pretext for the Russians to take a hand in Chinese internal
politics.
Senator Ferguson, Did Carter know that you were going to the
White House ?
Mr, Lattimore. No, sir; I am sure he didn't.
Senator Ferguson, So the Institute of Pacific Relations had noth-
ing to do with this visit?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you review the policy after you had been
to the White House?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. To know whether or not you had influenced it.
Mr. Latitmore. Oh, I am speaking simply from my general recol-
lection, which I think has been tested over a good many years, that
I have never had any influence on American policy.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that a man who had written a
book entitled "Solution in Asia" might have an influence on the Pres-
ident if he went to see him personally and left a memorandum with
him, particularly where he advocates getting a new set-up in the State
Department to review the policy?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
When I asked for that interview I was not thinking of myself as
the author of any particular book. I was thinking of myself as a
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3377
person who had been familiar with President Koosevelt's policy in
China at the time that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appointed me
as his adviser.
Senator Ferguson. Did yon ever have a conversation with anyone
connected with the State Department along this line, of the change in
policy, or the policy?
Mr. Lati^imore. I don't recall, nnless I casnally talked with State
Department people as I did with newspaper people, people back from
China, everybody who was interested in the snbject at the time.
As I say, this was a subject of very general discussion at the time.
Senator Ferguson. With whom would j'ou say you had talked
about it ?
Mr. Lattimore. At this time, Senator, I couldn't possibly tell you.
Senator Ferguson. Ion did not have a very long conversation with
Mr. Grew about it, did you?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't.
Senator Fp^rguson. Mr. Ballantine ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Dooman ?
Mr. Lattimore. Dooman ?
Senator Ferguson. Dooman ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that after you went to see the
President, that within a short time Mr. Grew left the Department;
was replaced ?
Mr, Lattimore. I couldn't tell you today, Senator Ferguson, when
Mr. Grew resigned.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that shortly after you went to the
White House, that Mr. Ballantine was replaced ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the calendar of events in that con-
nection. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Do you not know, as a matter of fact, that after
you went to the White House, that in a short time ]Mr. Dooman was
replaced, Eugene Dooman ?
Mr. Lattimore. I recall that there was a change at that time. I
believe that these were senior personnel who were reaching normal
retirement age in any case.
Senator Ferguson. And do you not know that afte'r you went there,
that your friend that you placed so highly in your statement here to
this committee, Mr. John Carter Vincent, was promoted and took over
the work of the Far East ?
Mr. Lattimore. I remember that Mr. Vincent, after his return from
China, was promoted in the State Department, which at that time I
would certainly have regarded as an excellent promotion ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. And do you not know that it took place after you
had been at the "\Miite House ?
Mr. Lattimore. Until I looked up these memoranda. Senator, I
wouldn't have recalled which came first.
Senator Ferguson. But is it not a fact that it did take place, that the
three replacements happened after you were there, that the promotion
of Mr. Vincent and the others took place after you were there?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, you seem to be trying to impute to me
power that
3378 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. Cannot you answer "Yes" or "No" ?
Please answer it. Do not argue with the Senator.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, you are now saying that these promotions
took place subsequently.
Senator Ferguson. Well, the record shows it.
Mr. Lattimore. So you say. I haven't looked up the record.
Senator Ferguson. That being a fact, how can you tell the world
tliat you did not have any influence on the policy ?
Mr. Lat^'imore. I don't think I had the slightest influence on the
policy. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the Marshall mission was to
China '^
Mr. Lattimore. I know that General Marshall went out to China ;
yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know what was in his instructions?
The Chairman. The question is Did you know what was in his
instructions ?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know at the time, no. I know very roughly
now.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you want to tell this com-
mittee, this Senate, that you, as a private citizen, after having this
dispute with the Reader's Digest in the writing of the memorandum
for Lamont and the writing of the letter to the President and the
urging to the President, that you had to see him, in fact, before he
went to Potsdam ; that after you had been there, you failed or neglected
to look into the State Department or its policies after that date and
you cannot tell us what happened ? Is that what you want to leave
with this committee?
Mr. Lattimore. No, Senator. What I want to leave with this com-
mittee is that this extremely brief interview with the President had
no consequences whatever, as far as I ever knew.
Nobody in the White House or in the State Department called me
back to consult me on any steps that were about to be taken.
Senator Ferguson. That doesn't answer my question, Mr. Latti-
more.
Mr. Latitmore. Well, I don't believe that this very brief interview
of mine with the President had any consequence at all.
Senator Ferguson. We are having gi-eat difficulty in getting from
you this morning what policy you wanted changed. What 1 want to
know is why you tell this committee in your statement that what
you wanted done and what you presented to the President, had not the
slightest — and you use the word "slightest" — etfect on American policy,
and you never followed it up to know what the Marshall mission to
China w^as.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I don't believe that my interview with
the President or uiy letter to him or the meuioranda that I left with
him had the slightest effect.
Senator Ferguson. How can you tell us whether it had the slightest?
Mr. Lattimore. I am not telling you whether it had the slightest.
Senator Ferguson. Yon did in your statement. You told the whole
world that it had the slightest effect, on the top of page 34.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it had the slightest effect.
Senator Ferguson. Read your statement of what you told us.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3379
Mr. La'itimore. "Neitlier my letter nor my visit had the slightest
effect on American policy."
I believe that is a true statement.
Senator Fercuson. Is not there in issue today before tliis com-
mittee the (|uestion as to \vhether or not you had any influence on our
American foreign policy?
Mr. Lattimork. If you choose to put it that ^vay, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not in issue as to whether or not the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations, of which you were a trustee at this time,
had any influence on the foreign policy of America?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I think that my brief contact with the
President on this occasion had no effect whatever on American policy,
and it certainly had no connection with the Institute of Pacfic Rela-
tions.
The CiiAiRMAx. Again, that is not an answer to the question.
Read the question, Mr. Reporter.
(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the
reporter, as follows:)
Senator Ferguson. Is not there in issue today before this committee the ques-
tion as to whether or not you had any influence on our American foreign policy?
Mr. Lattimore. That is your statement of the issue. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, I am not willing to allow you
to draw the conclusion, and have it become final, as to whether or
not you had the slightest influence on American policy.
That is why I am asking these questions.
And I am sorry it is taking so long.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator. I am sorry. I can say that, to the best of
my knowlege and belief
The Chairman. Just a moment.
Senator Ferguson. That is the reason why it is taking so long here.
You gave us many conclusions. We discovered many of them were
based purely upon hearsay and that you asked this connnittee to draw
those conclusions with you.
I, for one, as a Senator, am not willing to take your conclusions
when I think there are outstanding facts, and I want to question you
about those facts.
]\Ir. Lattimore. Go ahead and question. Senator.
Senator Fergison. Let us take the memorandum that you left with
the President. You say that you did not go there for the purpose of
influencing him.
I would like now for you to answer why you went.
Mr. Lattimore. Did I say that I did not go there for the purpose
of influencing him ?
Senator Ferguson. That is the inference you leave.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you go there for the purpose of influencing
the President ?
Senator Ferguson. Did you go there for that purpose ?
The Chairman. Answer that "Yes" or "No," now, and then make
an explanation.
Did you go there for the purpose of influencing the President?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; of course, I did.
3380 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Did you write the Lamont letter with the in-
tent that you were going to try to influence the State Department,
the President, and the public ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What was its purpose?
Mr. LAT'riMORE. I acceded to Mr. Carter's request to draft some
material for a letter by Mr. Lamont for the specific and limited pur-
pose of correcting gross distortions of my views which had appeared
in the Eeader's Digest.
Senator Ferguson. Will you say that the Reader's Digest raised the
question about your advocating the sending of lend-lease, or any other
materiel, to the Chinese Communists as a government? Was that
raised in the Reader's Digest issue?
Mr. Lat'I'imore. I have not recently read the Reader's Digest, and
I can't answ^er for their editorial intentions. I can only speak to the
point that I considered that what they published was grossly unfair
to me.
Senator Ferguson. Did they publish anything that was grossly
unfair to you about your advocating the sending of lend-lease or any
other materiel to the Chinese Communists ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe that they said that I advocated that.
Did they?
Senator Ferguson. No ; I do not think so. I wondered wh}^ put it in
the Lamont letter.
Mr. Lattimore. Because the Reader's Digest had misrepresented
my views, and I wanted to make a statement of what my views ac-
tually were.
Senator Ferguson. How would your views in the letter that you
gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the
]:)ublic as your views ? You do not say in the Lamont letter than "Owen
Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advo-
cate it.
Mr. Lattimore. May I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I wish you would.
The Chairman. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Latti-
more ?
Mr. Lattimore. I would
Senator Ferguson. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas
Lamont to advocate that he had advocated.
Mr. Lattimore. Carter had asked me to provide him with some
material. My reference to
The Chairman. What are you reading from now?
Mr. Lattimore. From this draft that I sent to i\Ir. Carter.
The Chairman. To Mr. Carter ?
Mr. Lattimore. To Mr. Carter ; yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont.
Senator Ferguson. He had a man take it to Lamont.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the anthnritativeness of several
of those Americans * * * inchulins Owen Lattimore. Harrison Forman,
and Edsar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both
American and Soviet policy in China.
The Chairman. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the
question read?
Senator Ferguson. Is that the answer ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3381
Mr. LA'rriMORE. That is the answer.
Senator Fergusox. Did tlie Dio:est article raise the question of your
advocating the furnishing of tliis material to Communist China?
Mr. Lattimore. The Digest article, as you will see from that extract
that I recently read into the record, describes me as advocating that
the American Government — I think the words were — cheerfully
accept things which I did not advocate the American Government
cheerfully accepting.
The Chairmax. That does not answer the question of the Senator.
I want tliat question read to the witness again.
And I ask you, Mr. Lattimore, to answer it, if you please, if you care
to answer it. If you do not, you may say so..
Read the question of the Senator from Michigan.
(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the re-
porter, as follows :)
Senator Ferguson. How would your views in tlie letter that you gave to La-
niont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views?
You do not say in the Laniont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this.''
You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.
Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman. I submit that is responsive.
The Chairman. The Chair does not think so.
Mr. Arnold. Well, then, try and answer it.
Mr. Lattimore. Will you read it again?
(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was again read by
the reporter, as follows:)
How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his
signature, how would they get to the public as your views?
The Chairman. That is the gist of the question.
Mr. Arnold. I would like to have read the balance of the question.
The Chairman. Read the whole thing,
Mr. Arnold. I do not want to say much here.
Would you read the answer back? Because, with all due respect,
I believe — —
Mr. Lattimore. Would you read my previous answer back.
Tlie Chairman. Read that entire portion of the record.
(The portions of the record referred to, as heretofore transcribed,
were read by the reporter as follows :)
Senator Ferguson. How woiild your views in the letter that you gave to La-
mont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views?
You do not say in the Lamont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You
wiinted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.
Mr. Lattimore. ]\Iay I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft?
Senator Ferguson. Y'^es, I wish .vou would.
The Chairman. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I would
Senator Ferguson. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas Lamont
1o advocate that he had advocated.
Mr. Lattimore. Carter had asked me to provide him with some material. My
reference to
The Chairman. What are you reading from now?
Mr. Lattimore. From this draft that I sent to Mr. Carter.
The Chairman. To Mr. Carter?
Mr. Lattimore. To Mr. Carter, yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont.
Senator Ferguson. He had a man take it to Lamont.
Mr. Lattimore. "To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authorita-
tiveness of several of these Americans * * * including Owen Lattimore,
3382 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Harrison Forman. and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites
a review of both American and Soviet Policy in China."
The Chairman. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the question
read?
Senator Ferguson. Is that the answer?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the answer.
Senator Ferguson. I will put another question to you along the
same line.
You were asking Mr. Lamont to raise an issue in the letter to the
New York Times that was not raised, you say, in the Digest article,
and tliat issue was America's policy being changed to send annnuni-
tion, lend-lease, and military aid of any description to the Commun-
ist government in China.
Now I ask you, in your raising that new issue, as to whether or not
you were asking Mr. Lamont to raise it, not in your name, but in his
name; that that was his opinion, that it should be done so as to influ-
ence the President of the United States, the State Department offi-
cials, and tlie American public?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I think that is a complete mis-
construction.
Senator Ferguson. Why were you advocating it, then, in the
Lamont letter?
Mr. LAi^riMORE. In the first place, I was not advocating a change in
American policy; I was advocating a continuity of American policy
of supporting united Chinese resistance as a whole to the Japanese.
Mr. Carter had suggested that I write a letter myself to the New
York Times. I didn't want to do it because I was disgusted with the
wliole subject.
The Chairman. That has been gone over now. I do not see why
we should go over it again.
Senator Ferguson. I realize, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Carter
twisted your aim and finally compelled you to write the memorandum
to Lamont.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But let us get back about this policy.
You say that you did not advocate the change. Then 1 ask you why
you say there in your letter that there now appears to be a funda-
mental change, and in the last paragraph you say :
Witli the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's i>olicy
toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with
either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.
That indicates clearly that tliere was a change in the policy.
Senator SMrrH. Is that the letter to tlie President, Senator? You
did not say what letter it is.
Senator Ferguson. The letter to the President dated June 10, 1945.
Now, do you say there never was a change ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not say there never was a change. I
said I did not advocate a change, that I advocated the maintenance of
the continuity of American policy.
Senator Ferguson. But you indicated in the letter that America had
changed its policy, and you wanted them to go back to the old policy;
is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I think that is not quite correctly stated.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3383
I indicated in my letter to the President that a change was coming
about in America policy.
I thought that such a change, if it finally took place, would raise
very serious questions, and I advocated an impartial review of the
whole subject. I was not myself advocating a change.
Senator Ferguson. What you claim now you AVere trying to do was
to prevent a change.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I was saying that before any change was
made there should be an impartial review of policy.
Senator Ferguson. Did we not have a policy not to furnish aid to
the Communists as such?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I don't believe our policy was formulated
in those terms.
Senator Ferguson. What was it?
Mr. Lattimore. Our policy was formulated in terms of aid to the
nation of China and in terms of not encouraging any form of split or
civil war in China while the really very desperate war for survival
against Japan was going on.
Senator Ferguson. Now let us get to the letter or memorandum that
you left with the President. Is this the only memorandum that you
left with the President?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the only one.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not this memorandum
was ever sent to the State Department?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I have no knowledge whatever.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know as to whether or not Mr. Vincent,
who was promoted to take over the far-eastern work of the State De-
partment, ever saw your memorandum ?
•Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it very nnich, indeed, but I have no personal
knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to him about it ?
Mr. Lat'itmore. I don't believe I did.
Senator Ferguson. Let us examine it.
Senator Watkins. I would like to know : Is the witness undecided
on that? He said. "I don't believe I did."
You would know, would you not, whether you did or did not talk
on a matter as important as this ?
The Chairman. We will get that answer.
Senator Watkins. I am a little disturbed on the witness having a
keen memory on so many things and how his answer is "I don't be-
lieve I did.''
The Chairman. I am trying to get him to answer "Yes" or "No" for
4 days, and I still get that answer.
Mr. Watkins. I would like to know if he answers "Yes" or "No''
on that.
The Chairman. I did not know.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I can't answer "Yes" on that.
Senator Watkins. Can you answer "No"?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't answer "No" on that, either.
This was a period of acute and active discussion all over America at
that time on questions of foreign policy. I would certainly talk to
anybody whom I met in those days about my duties.
Senator Watkins. Were you meeting ]Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Lattimore. I met him occasionally.
3384 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. Did you talk with him about our foreign policy
durino; that period of time?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Watkins. How can you remember that, if you cannot re-
member the other ?
Mr. Lattimore. Because I remember that Mr. Vincent, like all the
State Department people I know, was an extremely correct member
of the Foreign Service, who would talk with people outside the Gov-
ernment only in extremely restricted terms of getting information
from them, but not giving information to them.
Senator Watkins. You do admit, however, during that period of
time, or about that time, that you did have conversations with him ?
Mr. Latitmore. Yes, I had conversations with him in that general
period, and in those conversations I would certainly express my views,
as I have always expressed my views — completely openly, whether
po])ular or not.
But what I can't guarantee, and what I think extremely unlikely,
is that I ever talked to anybody in terms of a complete repetition of
the memorandum that I left with the President.
The natural course of events would be that I would talk about what-
ever topic seemed to me to be of iiiterest, wdiich would naturally over-
lap with the subject matter of memoranda like this.
But I can't say that I ever discussed with anybody these matters in
precisely the terms or the words that I presented them to the President.
Senator Watkins. Did you have conversation with him prior to
presenting the memorandum to the President?
Mr. Lattimore. I certainly had conversations prior, in time, to this
memorandum.
Senator Watkins. Is it not, as a matter of fact, very likely that if
you met him at all, this subject was on your mind ? You felt it was
so important that you wanted to take it to the President, that you
would discuss it with your friends in the State Department, a man
that you knew?
JVfr. Lattimore. In terms of going to see the President, no.
Senator Watkins. Before you went to the President, would you
not discu!-s it with them first, before you finally went to him ?
Mr. Lattimore. In terms of my interest in the subject
The Chairman, He did not ask you about t^rms of anything.
Mr. Lattimore. I thought he did.
Senator Watkins. I did not ask about terms. Did you discuss it
with them ?
Mr. Lattimore. I talked of this whole tojiic of policy in China and
controversy beginning to rise over policy in China with all and sundry.
Senator Watkins. You were very nuich alarmed about it, as a
matter of fact ; were you not?
Mr. Latitmore. I wouldn't say, perha])s, very much alarmed. I
don't want to quibble. I would say very much concerned.
Senator Watkins. You thought it of enough importance to take
it to the President ; did you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Certainly I was very much concerned.
Senator Watkins. You "would not 'take it to the President unless
you were somewhat alarmed at the drift that American policy was
taking at that time : would you ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3385
Mr. Lattimcre. I will accept your word, Senator. My own word
ATonld have been "concerned."'
Senator Watkins. "What I want to find out is the basis for yonr
statement that you do not believe you discussed it with him when you
said you were discussing it with all and sundry.
Mr. Lattimore. No, no. That I discussed the actual memorandum
with him.
Senator Watkins. You could not discuss that because it had not
been prepared beforehand. I am talking about your conversations
immediately prior to your going to the President.
Mv. Lattijiore. No.
Undoubtedly, my conversations with all and sundry touched on this
general field.
Senator Watkins. And if you talked to Mr. Vincent you probably
talked to him about it?
Mr. Laitimore. And I probably mentioned what I thought about
it, yes.
Senator "Watkins. But you say you do not believe you did not.
You said awhile ago you did not believe you did not.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
I want to make it quite clear, and not to get confused by the ques-
tioning, that I am trying to distinguish between talking with State
Department people and other people about the general topic of in-
terest— which, of course, I would do at that time — but that I do not
believe that I discussed with anybody a project for leaving a memo-
randum with the President, or the words in which I should draw up
that memorandum.
The Chairman. State Department people do not come into the term
"all and sundry."
Senator "Watkins. I thought they were Americans and they would
come in with the rest of them.
Mr. Arnold. Do you think they come in with "sundry" ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not all. but ])erhaps sundry.
Senator Watkins. As I recall. Mr. Lattimore, you have at great
length pointed out how close a friend Mr. Vincent was and other
people in the State Department, particularly three of them that you
felt so keenlv about here a few days ago, and it seems to me that if
vou knew them that well, it would only be a natural thing that you
would discuss with them, if they were available at all, this thing you
had in mind, this thing you felt was really dangerous to the country
and it would be to the best intrests of the country if you had a change
in that policy.
That is what I wanted to know: If you did not discuss with them,
prior to going to the President, the very project you had in going
there and leaving that memo with him.
Mr. Lattimore. No : I did not discuss that very project.
And I Avant again. Senator Watkins, if I may. to make very clear
my admiration of the training and disci]:)line which enables State
Department men. when talking with members of the general public,
always to restrict their contribution to the conversation to such mat-
ter as are generallv known in the press, so that they don't reveal the
inside workings of the State Department while, at the same time,
as good State Department men should, they acquire a knowledge of
88348— 52— pt. 10 8
3386 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
both the factual kiiowle(l<i:;e and the opinions of others. That is ex-
actly the way the certain State Dejiartnient
Senator Watkins. If yon did talk with them, yon did not get any
sympathy from them, any support or encouragement; did you?
Mr. Lattimore. I never got from them any inside dope.
Senator "Waticins. But shortly after yon had been there, at least
one of those men was ap]winted to a very important position: Mr.
Vincents
Mr. Lattimoke. AVhich 1 think, Senator, was clearly in the cards
at the time, in terms of his special knowledge, seniority, regular
process of people going up.
Senator Watkins. You say it was in the cards. Did you not have
in inind when yon went to the President
Mr. Lai-toiore. No, sir.
Senator Watkins. To get such a change?
Mr. Lattimore. In my memorandum to the President. I pointed
out
The (^HAiRMAN. The (juestion is, Did you not have that in mind?
Mr. Lattimore. I wanted to show what T did have in mind, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt just a moment?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. These letters and memorandum were made part
of the record and not actually received in evidence.
I do not know wdiether or not they have been distributed. I now
move that they become officially part of the record.
We have been reading from them, and I move they be distributed
because I know it is difficult for the press to follow this. It is the
only medium we have for the public to know what is going on.
The Chairman. I will have to have them designated.
Senator Ferguson. I will designate them as follows:
They refer to his testimony, pages 33 and 34.
The first is the letter dated June 10, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to
the President, and was marked "Exhibit No. 473."
The second is a copy of a letter from the White House, tlie Presi-
dent, on June 14, 1945, to Mr. Lattimore.
The third is a Western Union wire from Matthew A. Connelly,
Secretary to the President, to Mr. Owen Lattimore.
Next is a copv of a letter from Owen Lattimore to the Presi-
dent, dated June 20, 1945.
Next is the memorandum for the President, which was left with
the President in two parts, but is now as one in this memorandum;
interview of the 3d day of July 1945.
Last is a letter dated June 20, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to
Matthew Connelly.
That is where I cited the OWI address.
The Chairman. Do you ask that they be inserted in the record?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, made part of the record.
The Chairman. Very well; they will be inserted in the record.
Mr. SouRw^NE. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that these were offered
for the record several days ago, subject to the Chair's determination.
The (Chairman. That is correct. At that time they had not been
referred to in the record.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3387
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 530-A,
530-B, 530-C, 530-D, 530-E," and are as follows:)
Exhibit No. 530-A
The White House,
Washiiif/ton, June I4, 1945.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
The Johns Hopkhis Unircr.sity,
Baltimore, MJ.
My Dear Mr. Lattimore: I appreciate very imich yours of .Imie tenth.
The Chinese situation is developing- alrinht. The polic-y has been definitely
outlined to the Chinese. The Russians and the British and ourselves have
reached an agreeinent which I think is in the best interest of China.
I would be glad to discuss it with you sometime, if you feel inclined.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Harry Truman.
Exhip.it No. r.3(1-P.
[ Telegram ]
WA21(il7— GOVT— Washington. D. C, 29 52 9P.
Dr. Owen Lattimore,
The Johns Hopkins Universiti/, Ball i more, Md.:
The President will be glad to see you 11 : 30 a. m., Tuesday, July 3. Please
confirm. Regards.
Matthew A. Connexly.
Secretary to the President.
Exhibit No. .".30-C
June 20, 1945.
Hon. PIarry S. Truman,
President of the United States,
The White Hou^e, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President: I most sincerely appreciate your letter of June 14, and
the opp<n-tunity you offer me for a discussion of policy in China.
If the views which I earnestly wish to place before you for your consideration
.should be of any value to you, they would be of more value before your forth-
coming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.
In the hope of causing the mininuim inconvenience in taking up some of your
heavily burdened time, I am writing to your secretary, Mr. Connelly, asking
if it will be po.ssible to arrange an appointment soon after your return from
San Francisco.
Yours very sincerely,
OL : ec.
[s] Owen LATTiitoBE.
Exhibit Xo. 530-D
Intei'view of July 3, 1945.
;Memorani)u.\i for the President
Japan Policy as Related to China Policy
Japan, politically, now banks everyting on the hope of peace terms that will
make possible a come-back and another war. The only possible come-back is as
leader of an Asiatic coalition under the racial battle cry of '"down with the white
man." Therefore, unlike Germany, where the principal Nazi underground will
be in Germany, the Japanese underground nuist be largely in other parts of
Asia. China is the key to this problem.
Like Germany, Japan must also do its best to pit the Western Allies against
Russia. China is also the key to this jiroblem.
3388 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Therefore, in China the Japanese problem is not Whether they are going to
be defeated, but How to manage the process of beinK defeated to their own future
advantage. The Japanese have already begun to handle this problem by seeing
to it that their defeat contributes to both the political and the territorial disunity
of China. Where they can manage to retreat in favor of Chiang Kai-shek and
not in favor of Communist guerrillas, they do so. Where there are no Commu-
nists, they try to retreat in favor of provincial, regional, or war-lord troops,
instead of Chiang Kai-shek troops, so as to contribute to territorial disunity.
They hope that, if China can be led into both ideological civil wars of landlords
against peasants and regional civil wars of provinces against the Central Gov-
ernment, Japan will not be eclipsed during its years of postwar weakness.
To counteract this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work
steadily for peace, unity, and modern political foi-ms.
At the same time Japan hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and
America to be "soft" with "antirevolutionary" Japanese big business and to wink
at the fact that big business in Japan is as militarist as the militarists.
To handle American policy in the new phase, it is necessary to make adjust-
ments to the fact that China, rather than Japan, is now the key to Far Eastern
policy as a whole. In most government agencies at the present time the tendency
is to find Japan-trained men in higher policy-making posts than China-trained
men, simply because Japan used to be a more important Great Power than China.
CHINA POLICY
There are two alternatives in China :
1. Division of the country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists : This
would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for
which he would give anything America wants ; and, for the Communists, a
similar policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual
consequences would almost inevitably be war between America and Russia.
2. A unified China : To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang
and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia,
and Britain to build up China as a whole. The Comnuuiists would have to accept
minority standing as a long-term status ; but Chiang would have to give them
real power within a coalition government, propoi'tionate to their real strength,
not just token representation.
In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having dic-
tatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American
policy ; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political
change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang.
Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have imlimited
power in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks
that America is on the fence, but will be stampeded into jumping down on his
side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against 'the
Bolshevik menace." Influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a
long-term conservative trend, with Republican ascendance, and that Henry Luce,
Walter Judd, etc., have guessed the trend correctly.
The basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2. It can be success-
fully worked. Chiang is tenacious but has shown in the past that he knows
when to give in and try a new policy. But he will only play ball if America and
Russia, with Bi'itish approval, make it plain that they are going to be joint
umpires. America alone cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement
with the Communists involving real concessions ; but, if Washington and Moscow
agree, both Chungking and Yenan will carry out the agreement.
Exhibit No. 530-E
June 20, 1945.
Mr. Matthew Connelly,
Secretary to the President,
The White House, Washinrjton, D. C.
Dear Mk. Connelly : On June 14 the President wrote to me that he would be
glad to discuss with me some questions of policy in China which I had ventured
to raise in a letter to him on June 10.
Since I am most anxious that the views which I represent should be laid before
the President for his consideration before his forthcoming meeting with Prime
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3389
Minister Churcliill and Marshal Stalin, I hope very much that you will find it
possible to arrange an appointment for me as soon as possible after the President's
return from San Francisco. I can l)e reached through the following points :
Home address (postal) Ruxton, Md.
Telephone (home) Towson 846.
Telephone (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore) University 0100, Ext. 72.
Telephone (OWI, Wasliingtou) Republic 7500, Ext. 72228.
Yours very sincerely,
[s] Owen Lattimore.
OL : ec.
Senator Ferguson. I had many more questions, Mr. Chairman, but
1 tliink perhaps Senator Watkins Avoukl want to continue.
Senator WATiiiNs. I will let it go now.
Senator Fergusox. I would like to recess. I have no questions on
the document itself.
The Chairman. What is the pleasure of the committee about re-
convening (
Senator Ferguson. Any time the Chair desires, I will come back.
I would also like to put in the record, for your information, Mr.
Lattimore, the fact on the Clubb case that, as I understand, Mr. Ache-
son, at a press conference, now said that he did reverse the board in
the Clubb case and reinstated Mr. Clubb ; that his finding was opposite
to the board.
That is for your information. I asked you about it, and you seemed
to know nothing about it the other day.
I will put that press release in.
The Chairman. We will recess now until 1 : 30.
(Thereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at
1 : ?>0 p. m., same day.)
after recess
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman, the witness had a quotation from
General Chennault's book which you said we would read later.
The Chairman. I do not know Avhether it is a quotation or not.
There is an excerpt here which was handed to me ; and, without the
opportunity to present it to the committee, I withheld action on it.
It presents certain phases that I should think would be for the con-
sideration of the committee.
Mr. Arnold. It is very short, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It is short.
Mr. Arnold. And you can strike it if you think so. Could it be
read subject to being stricken?
The Chairman. No. I will submit it to the committee just as soon
as I get the opportunity.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I proceed?
The Chairman. This presents a phase of quoting an excerpt, pre-
sumably quoting an excerpt, from a publication by a party who is
not present, not subject to cross-examination or to inquiry. But
those phases will be presented to the committee.
Mr. Arnold. I would appreciate it because many such quotations
are in the record.
Senator Ferguson. May I proceed ?
The Chairman. You may proceed.
3390 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Fek(;usox. Mr. Lattiiiiore, if von will place before your-
self the letter to Times by Mr. Laniont.
Mr. IMoRRis. Designed for Mr. Lamont.
Senator Fergusox. Designed; yes; written by you to be placed in
the Times, if possible, by ]\Ir. I^amont. The second paragraph is
what I am interested in. 1 want to go back to this change.
You seem to know in these letters much al)out the policy, but I
do not find it in the ansAver that you are making here. Let us take
one of these quotes :
On the other hand, there is causp for uneasiness in a new trend, which is
now developin.i; toward criticism of Hoviet motives and Soviet iiolicies in Asia.
We shaU be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President
Trnnian's first Bii;- Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin.
What was that trend, and who was responsible for the new trend
that you are talking about?
ISIr. Lattimore. May I say that I have not loo^ced up the newspaper
record of the period. I assume that it was part of the trend toward
feeling that Russia was not a country we could cooperate with, wdiile
there was also at the same time, the general period of the San Fran-
cisco conference, a very strong feeling among many people that post-
war cooperation would be possible.
I thouglit that as much public discussion of that as possible w^ould
contribute to a well-informed i)ublic opinion.
Senator Fer<;uson. And it was ]iublic opinion you were trying to
sway? V/hat you call a well-informed public, but it w-as public
opinion that you wanted to sway ?
Mr. Lattimore. I wanted to contribute to public opinion.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not want to sway it any way ?
Mr, Lattimore. I wanted to advocate my own opinions and to have
them honestly discussed like anybody else's opinions, and I resented
the manner in Avhicli my opinions had been misrepresented in the
article in the Reader's Digest.
Senator Fercjuson. You claim to be an authority on China aiul the
Far East, did you not?
Mr. Lattimore. 1 claim to be a person who has studied China and
the Far East for many years. I do not and have never claimed to be
an exclusive authority.
Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you wdiether it was an exclusive
authority. That would be another question. But were you an
authority?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that would be a (juestion for somebody
else's judgment, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Your counsel suggests that you are too modest.
I could only suggest, maybe, that you are not truthful enough on it,
and I want to read something for that.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, may I say that I resent it?
Senator Ferguson. You may resent it, but let me ask you to read
now. where you have not been modest, when you printed it under
another man's name. Read the last paragraph.
Mr. Lattimore. On this J^age?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influen-
tial magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3391
in China." by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that
there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President
Chiang Kai-shek to tlie Chinese Communists, and "'bring under totalitarian regi-
mentation 4.")0,000,()00 people." To bolster this case, the article casts doubts on
the authoritativeness of several of tliose Americans who have, in fact, contrib-
uted most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary
China and contemporary Russia — including Owen Lattimoi'e, Harrison Forman,
and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both
American and Soviet policy in China. In making sucli a review, we should exam-
ine American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make our criticisms
where they are due.
Senator FERGuyox. You were perfectly willing- to have Mr. Thomas
Lamont call you an authority.
Mr. Lattimore. This was something that I had submitted to INIr.
Carter at his request to be submitted to Mr. Lamont.
Senator Fergusox. I have heard that a dozen times.
The CnAiRMAX. Answer the question.
Senator Fergusox. We will move along quickly here if you will
keep to the answer.
You were perfectly willing to have Mr. Thomas Lamont tell the
public that you were an authority.
Mr. Lattimore. If he approved of the wording, he could do so.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not request him to approve through
your agent, Mr. Carter ?
]Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I made no such request. I submitted a
rough draft of a memorandum.
Senator Fergusox. Why did you put your name in there ?
Mr. Lattimore. Because my reference was to Eeader's Digest and
the article in the Reader's Digest, and my name was a part of it.
Senator Fergusox. And you did not hesitate to say that you were
an authority as well as Mr. Forman and Mr. Fdgar Snow ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't hesitate.
Senator Fergusox^ Going to this sentence :
We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in Cliina in
order to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan.
What was the change there that you were talking about ?
Mr. Lattimore. May I ask where that quotation is from ?
Senator Fergusox. The next paragraph after the one you com-
pleted reading, on page 2.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Fergusox. I suppose the word "Under'' is "Before," "Be-
fore Pearl Harbor," or is that "after" ?
Yes; because the next sentence says "Since," so that word appar-
ently, instead of "Lender Pearl Harbor"
INlr. Lattimore. It probably is "L'ntil Pearl Harbor."
Senator Fergusox^ It is in that paragraph.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. [Reading:]
Since Pearl Harbor, our policy has been to give China the maximum aid per-
mitted by difficulties of transport and the demands of other theaters of war.
We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China in order
to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan.
Senator Fergusox. What was the chano-e?
Mr. Lattimore. The change, as I recall it, in the discussion of
the period — I repeat, I have not looked up the newspaper record of
the time — was that it was being advocated that we should restrict
3392 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
aid entirely to Chiang Kai-shek's own armies while other people be-
lieved that as we approached the coast of China, as we w^ere nearing
Japan, made direct contact with the Chinese armies on the mainland,
we should also be entitled to cooperate with the Communists and
Communist-led guerrillas.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, these letters and this memoran-
dum were written prior to the end of the war between the United
States and Japan?
Mr. Lattimore. They were written as the end of the war was
rapidly approaching, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that it was rapidly approach-
ing?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; it was the general opinion at the time because,
through General MacArthur's island-hopping campaign, in combina-
tion with the United States Navy, we were getting wnthin reach of
both the home islands of Japan and the mainland of China.
Senator Ferguson. You knew, then, that the war was about over?
Mr. Laitimore, I didn't know. My feeling was that the war was
approaching an end.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that during the war there were
battles between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists ?
Mr. Lattimore. There were some clashes, yes.
Senator Ferguson. How many divisions or armies did Chiang Kai-
shek have to put on his border up at the Communist border to pre-
serve the integrity of his rule ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the figure. Senator, but I do recall
that in the opinion of some of the American diplomatic and military
representatives in China, some of those troops were being unneces-
sarily immobilized.
Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. My question was
how many did he use on the border?
Mr. Laitimore. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Did he use any ?
Mr. Lattimore. There were troops at the corner of northwest China
where Chiang Kai-shek's free China and the Communist-held part of
China joined.
Senator Ferguson. But it is your contention now that they were not
there to keep the Conmiunists from moving into the Nationalist terri-
tory ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; it is my contention that many of the Americans
in the field at the time considered that the blockade of the Com-
munists was unnecessarily large and severe, immobilized an uneces-
sarily large number of Chiang's troops.
Senator Fergi son. But they did inunobilize some of his troops?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And at the very time that at least Chiang Kai-
shek felt that it was necessary to preserve his own army to keep the
Communists back, you were advocating arms and supplies and muni-
tions to the Communists ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; you are talking about two different situa-
tions.
Senator Ferguson. Please do not tell me what I am talking about.
1 am just asking you the question.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3393
Mr. Lattimore. Well, in my opinion, then, Senator, there were two
different situations. One was during the period when the United
States had no access and no hope of immediate access to the coast of
China.
The second was the period when we were rapidly approaching the
coast of China and when many people thought, as was discussed in
the press at the time, I remember, that the Japanese would withdraw
from the home islands of Japan and make a last stand in Manchuria,
in Avhicli case the question of combined American-Chinese operations
on the mainland against Manchuria would have been very important.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now let us go back to the question
I Avas asking.
In June of 1945 was it not true that Chiang Kai-shek had im-
mobilized some of his troops against Japan and in order that he may
protect his army from the Chinese Communist Army?
Mr. Lattimore. It is true, Senator, that he had immobilized part
of his army. It is also true that in the opinion of many American
observers there at the time it was unnecessary.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, we are not going to get through
today unless we can get the answers to these questions. I can stay
over here as long as you can stay over there.
Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman, he is answering.
The Chairman. Jnst a minute, counsel. I told the counsel when
he first commenced this hearing as to what their limitations were.
When he wants advice, he can ask you for advice. You will not par-
ticipate in the proceedings.
Mr. Arnold. I am sorry. Senator. He permitted me to read the
answer to the question before, and I thought I could be helpful in the
proceedings by merely striking out the last part of that answer.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I think ought to be stricken out,
and if he will just stick to the answers he and I will get along.
The Chairman. You just tell the witness to answer the question,
and you will give him some pretty good advice.
Mr. Arnold. I think he is trying, Senator.
Mv. Lattimore. I think the trouble here. Senator Ferguson, is
merely that
Senator Ferguson. Are you answering my question?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Mr. Lattimore. I cannot accept your statement of the question as
if it were my opinion on the question.
Senator Ferguson. It was a fact, therefore you would have to know.
Did you or did you not know whether or not Chiang Kai-shek was
demobilizing or, as you called it that, part of his troops between his
part of China and the Communist part of China, to protect his part
of China from the Communists ?
Mv. Lattimore. I knew that he was immobilizing part of his troops
in that area, and I also knew that many Americans in China con-
sidered that he was immobilizing in excessive number.
The Chairman. That is no part of the answer. That is another
part.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was in June
1945?
3394 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. La'fiimoke. Generally speaking in that period ; yes,
Senator Febguson. Yes. And that was the very time that you were
advocating Mr. Lamont, over his signature, to advocate that we
furnish to the Communists in China munitions and arms. You can
answer that question "Yes"" or "No."'
Mv. Lattimore. I don't think that question is susceptible to a "Yes"
(u- "No"' answer. Senator.
llie Chairman. Do you want to answer it "Yes" or "No,"" or not
answer it ? Just say whether you do or do not.
jNIr. Lati^imore. No; I don't want to answer it "Yes" or "No."
Senator Ferguson. Then I will take it for granted that the two
documents speak for themselves, the answer before and the documents.
Mr. Lat'I'imore. I should like to explain. Senator, that I am referring
to a new situation, not an old one.
The Chairman. If you say you cannot answer the question, there is
no explanation, if you cannot answer it "Yes"' or "No."' If you cannot
answer it, you cannot answer it.
Mr. Lattimore. May I not explain why I can't answer it. Senator?
Senator Ferguson. No; I did not ask you that question, to explain
why.
Mr. Lattimore, we will go to the document that you wrote for the
President. I will just take the China part. The Japanese part, I
think, speaks for itself, at the present time [reading] :
Division of tlie country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. This
would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for
which he would give anything America wants : and for the Communists, a similar
policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual consequence
would almost inevitably be war between American and Russia.
Mr. Lattimore. That is prefaced. Senator, by the statement, "There
are two alternatives in China."
Senator Ferguson. Yes. That was one of them. Is that true?
Mr. Lattimore. That was one of them; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat made you think that if America gave
Chiang Kai-shek support, Russia would give the Communists support?
Mr. LAT-riMORE. I was not certain of it. I thought that this was a
]n'obability or one of the alternatives, and I so stated it. Obviously,
I had no positive knowledge. I was stating a theory or opinion.
The Chairman. This is the memorandum to the Presiclent ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; the memorandum.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. This was advice to the President?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that this is what would ha]:)pen.
Mr. Sourwine. Might I ask a question, Mr. Cliairman?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine. At that point, Mr. Lattimore, as a matter of fact,
did you not then know^ that the Russians were supporting the Chinese
Communists ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, I did not know that they were sup-
porting them in any sense of giving them arms, and I don't believe that
at that time they were giving them arms.
We have been over that previously. I certainly considered that the
Communists had the moral and political support of the Russians.
The Chairman. Did you know that Russia was supporting them?
That is the question.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3395
Mr. Lattimore. I know that Russia was supporting them in that
sense, but not in the sense of arniino; them.
Senator Fkrguson. Going back to your Lamont letter, I read you
this:
At the present moment, there is a danger that the parallel policy may not
continue.
You are talking about the previous paragraph, where it says:
Riissian and American policy in China can he made parallel, and we know
from exiierieiice, not hy .uuesswork, that the Russians are <-upahle of contrihutini;
at the very least an etjual share in makinii" the policies of the two countries
liarallel.
AAliere did you get that information;! That was from experience
and not from guesswork.
Mr. Lattimore. From exj)erience and from my work with Chiang.
Kai-shek 1 knew that Russia and America had followed a parallel
])olicy in China of encouraging united resistance to the Japanese,
Senator Ferguson. When did you cease being adviser to Chiang
Kai-shek?
Mr. Lattimore. In 1942 ; at the end of 1942.
Senator Ferguson. Going to the next paragraph :
At the present moment there is dancer that the parallel policy may not con-
tinue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen
from American policy.
What change did we make ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was referring again there, Senator, to the changes
t hat I thought I saw coming about from statements in the press at the
time.
Senator Ferguson. The next sentence :
Whereas Russia's policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of China Com-
numists in tlie benefit of Russian aid to China. American policy has recently
explicitly excluded them from the benefit of American aid.
Where did you get that information?
Mr. Lattimore. From the press, I believe.
Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe so. Reference to the press of the time
would show.
Senator Ferguson. So up to that time Conmiunist Russia was not
asking that Communist China be included in its aid?
Mr. La'itimore. I believe that is true. That is supported by that
quotation from General Chennault written after the end of the war,
which I wished to read into the record.
Senator Ferguson. I know you want to get that in, but we will get
that in later.
In your statement to the President you said, "For the Communists
a similar policy of getting Russia's support with similar re-
sults * * *.""
Wliy did 3'ou say that their policy would not continue to give aid
to Cliiang Kai-shek? Was it for the reason that they were, at that
time, able to have the Yalta agreement where we were to give them
certain benefits out of China, and was it that they were about to
make a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing Chiang Kai-shek
us the real i:-overnment of China ?
3396 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Was that their reason for not stipulating or not saying that they
wanted to aid the Communists in China ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no means of knowing what their policy was
at that time, Senator,
My paragraph clearly refers to anticipation of a future situation.
Senator Ferguson. Your paragraph does not, if I might go back to
it. "Whereas Russia's policy has never" — you are telling Mr. Lamont
that the Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of Com-
munists, Chinese Communists, in the benefit of Russian aid to China.
America's policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefit of
American aid.
Mr. Latomore. On which page is that ?
Senator Ferguson. On page 3.
Mr. Lattimore. I undoubtedly believed that was true at the time,
and I believe it is true, too.
Senator Ferguson. Then you knew it?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I say that Russian policy has never yet de-
manded the inclusion of the Chinese Communists, et cetera. That is
obviously stated to the best of my knowledge at the time.
Senator Ferguson. You were going to ask Mr. Lamont to put it in a
statement over his signature ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I was not going to ask Mr. Lamont to put
it in a statement over his signature.
Senator Ferguson. You were just going to ask Mr. Carter, who w^ent
to Mr. Lamont's son in order that they may get it put over his signa-
ture, is that the way you want to leave it ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I was supplying some material which could
be considered, used, or rejected by Mr. Lamont, according to his
judgment.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know what Mr. Lamont's son's thinking
was?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard about it?
Mr. Lattimore. I had heard about him vaguely.
Senator Ferguson. Just vaguely?
Mr. Lattimore, Just vaguely.
. Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to Mr, Carter after you received his
letter mentioning the son?
Mr, Lattimore. I don't believe I did. There w^as just this cor-
respondence, and then I believe Mr. Carter sent me a copy of Mr.
Lamont's letter to him, and there the matter dropped.
In other words, Mr. Lamont had exercised, according to his own
judgment, exactly the option that was implied in my submitting any
material at all.
Senator Ferguson, Why did you not go to see Mr. Lamont?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know Mr. Lamont. The idea was not
mine. The whole idea came from Mr. Carter.
Senator Ferguson. Did you state to Mr. Carter to tell Mr. Lamont
that you, as an authority, were writing this article foi- the New York
Times, and to tell Mr. Lamont who was writing it ?
]\rr. Lattimore. No, sir, Mr. Carter asked me for a draft, and I
gave him a draft.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he represented it as
your thinking or as Carter's thinking?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3397
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know wliether or not Laniont knew
that you prepared the draft ?
Mr. Lattimore. I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Let us take the next statement in your China
policy.
A unified China : To unify Cliina, there must be a settlement between Chiang'
and the Connuunists and simultaneously an agreement between) America,
Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole.
At that very time that you were wa'iting to the President, you
said that up to that time Russia showed no desire or requirement,
let me put it that way, that there was to be a unification between the
Communists and the non-Comnninists in China. Is that not true?
That, is, to at least require her aid to be gjiven only to the one?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Fer(;uson. You said Russia's policy has never yet de-
manded
Mr. Lattimore. Has never yet demanded, that was true to the
best of my knowledge.
The Chairman. That is the Lamont article?
Senator Ferguson. That is the Lamont article.
At the same time, you were telling the President this :
To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Com-
munists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain
to build up China as a whole. The Commimists will have to accept minority
standing as a long-term status ; but Chiang would have to give them real power
within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token
representation.
You wrote that ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. I wrote both of those, one referring to the past,
and one referring to a problem that I anticipated in the future.
Senator Ferguson. And you were then advocating to the President
a coalition government ?
Mr. Laitimore. No, sir, I was stating to the President, as I believe,
an alternative. Let me see, I supported the second alternative.
Senator Ferguson. So you were telling the President that the
Communists would have to accept a minority standing as a long-
term status, but Chiang would have to give them real power within
a coalition government ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And proportionate to their real strength, not
just token representation.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right. That was my assessment of the
situation that I thought was coming up.
Senator Ferguson. Is that not exactly what General Marshall went
to China to do ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe that is roughly what w^as indicated in the
directive to General Marshall, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Is that not what Mr. Carter gave as one of the
ways of solving the problem when he got the first memorandum out
on the Marshall mission ? It is, Vincent that I mean.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. You have seen the Vincent testimony?
3398 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Laitimoke. I liave read througli it, yes. There was a great
deal of it, and I don't remember every bit of it in detail.
Senator Ferguson. Do yon remember the memorandum of Decem-
ber 9, 1945?
Mr. LAT'nMORE. No; I don't. I would like to see it to refresh my
memory.
The Chaikman, That is by Vincent?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, Vincent.
The Chairman. And Vincent was then in what position (
Senator Ferguson. He had been promoted to what position, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you exactly, at that time, whether
he was head of the China desk or of the whole Far Eastern Division.
1 believe it was one or the other.
The Chairman. He was head of the Far East, was he not?
Mr. Lattimore. 1 am not sure, sir, when he was promoted from
head of the China desk to head of the Far Eastern Division.
Mr. Morris. He was head of the Far Eastern Division on Decem-
ber 7, 1945.
Mr. Lattimore. He was?
Senator Ferguson. Will you read the memorandum?
Mr. Lattimore. This seems to be signed "J. F. B."
Senator Ferguson. On the other side it is "Fe : Vincent." Wlio is
J. F. B.?
Mr. Morris. That is James F. Byrnes.
Senator Ferguson. But it was written by Vincent.
Mr. Lattimore. Is tliat what the notation indicates?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, that is what it indicates. Will you read it?
Mr. Lattimore (reading from exhibit No. 389 of hearings before
this committee) :
The President and the Secretary <if State aie hoth anxious that the uniticatiou
of China l)y peaceful, democratic uietliods lie achieved as soon as possible.
At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Coniniittee of the Senate
on December 7. the Secretary of State said :
"During the war the immediate goal of the Tinted States in ("hina was to
promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring
their combined power to liear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range
goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development
of a strong, united, and democratic China.
"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Govern-
ment of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement
of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as
we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that tlie government of
(Jeneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory liase for a de-
veloping democracy. But we also lielieve tiiat it must be liroadened to include
the rei)resentatives of tliose large and well-organized groups who are now with-
out any voice in the Government of China.
"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience,
and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solutitm depends primarily
upon the good will of the ('liinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our
intiuence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that
influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage con-
cessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the
other factions."
Senator Ferguson. Is that not just what you were saying in your
second letter, that the Communists would have to accept a minority
standing as a long-term status, but Chiang would have to give them
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3399
real power within a coalition g:overnment proportionate to their real
strength, not just token representation ?
The Chairman. That is the memorandum to the President ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lattimore. That indicates close, similar thinking.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read the next paragraph (
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his special rei>-
reseiitative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practieable
manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set
forth above.
Senator Ferguson. That is the end of the coalition government ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably. [Reading:]
Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Gov-
ernment to call a national conference of representatives of the major political
elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a
cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.
Senator Ferguson. Would that not indicate that your second al-
ternative, a unified China, was exactly what the State Department
and the President were doing?
Mr. Lattimore. It indicates that my thinking was similar to that
which led the State Department or the State Department and the
Armed Forces in combination to that decision. I see no cause and
etl'ect relationship.
The Chairman. This memorandum had been placed liefore the
President before General Marshall was sent abroad (
Senator Ferguson. Yes, by almost 6 months.
How can you then say, with this in mind, Mr. Vincent writing it,
that youhad not the slightest effect, or your memorandum did not have
the slightest effect ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am convinced. Senator, that it did not have the
slightest effect. 1 saw the President for about 3 minutes. 1 got a
Presidential brush-off in a nice, polite way, and I went out.
I should say it is much more likely that the State Department formed
its o])inions from the material gathered in the field in China, where I
had not been recently, from its own representatives, and from military
representatives.
Senator Ferguson. Is this the first time that you told us you had a
brush-off' from the President ?
Mr. Lattoiore. I had said that I had seen the President for about
3 minutes.
Senator Ferguson. You left a memorandum with your arguments
in it?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that is included in the classification of a
polite brush-off.
Senator Ferguson. Will you get for the witness a copy of the white
paper ?
(Document handed to witness.)
Mr. Lattimore. :May I at this moment. Senator, read into the record
the President's letter to me ?
Senator Ferguson. You mean the first letter where he stated the
policy was already formed ?
JSIr. Lattimore. That is right.
3400 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; you can read that.
The Chairman. It is in the record already.
Mr. Lattimore. "Well, may I refer to the fact that tlie President had
already told me that atfairs in China were well in hand?
The Chairman. In the meantime, Mr. Vincent had been promoted ?
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew was put out, Mr. Ballantine was put
out, and Mr. Dooman was put out.
Mr. Lattimore. In the meantime of what, may I ask?
The Chairman. In the meantime between the time you left the
memorandum with the President and the time Marshall was sent to
Asia. Is that right ?
INIr. Lattimore. Also in the meantime the President was telling me
that affairs concerning China were well in hand.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And you in all earnestness, utmost earnestness,
told him to have the Amei'ican policy in China impartially reviewed
by advisers "who are not associated with either formulation or imple-
mentation of the policy as recently practiced.''
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, Senator, that indicates that I thought that an
impartial review would be more authoritative and have results than
any personal opinions of mine.
Senator Ferguson. Let us look at page 10 of the letter of transmittal
by Mr. Acheson.
By the way, what was Mr. Acheson's position with the State De-
partment when you went to see the President ?
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He was in the State Department, was he not?
Mr. Lattimore. That is my general recollection. I can't tell you
exactly.
Senator Ferguson. He held a high position ?
Mr. Lattimore. I suppose so.
Senator Ferguson. Well now, there was a letter of transmittal of
the wliite paper, and if you will turn to page 10 of that, which is signed
l)y Dean Acheson, you may start and read what he says on the letter
of transmittal of the white paper to the public.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
When peace came, the United States was confronted with tliree possihle al-
ternatives in China :
1. It could have pulled out lock, stock, and barrel.
2. It could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists
to destroy the Communists.
8. It could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as
much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a
compromise between the two sides.
Senator Ferguson. Riglit there, is that not exactly what you told
the President ?
Mr. Lattimore. That indicates similai* thinking but no cause and
effect.
Senator Ferguson. No cause and effect. Woidd you think, then,
that the only way Ave could get a cause and effect would be for the
President to say, or have Dean Acheson say in here, "This was the
policy proposed by Owen Lattimore, the authority on the far eastern
affairs"?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3401
Senator Ferguson. How would you get it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think one of the gaps in our knowledge here is
whether the President ever transmitted my memoranda to the Depart-
ment of State, or whether they were ever considered or accepted. I
have never heard they were.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the President
would submit your memorandum if he had any intentions of following
it to the men who were responsibile for that policy in the State De-
partment, with the expression in the letter that you wanted them all
taken out of the authority ?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I don't know how matters were handled,
matters of policy were handled, at that time between the White House
and the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read on, Mr. Lattimore, from Dean
Acheson's letter, the Secretary of State. It is on page 10, continuing.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
The first alternative would, and I believe American pnblic opinion at the
time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international respon-
sibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had
made a determined effort to be of assistance.
Senator Ferguson. That is after the war and, naturally, that would
not be included in your suggestion to the President because you were
talking as to when the war was on. Is that not correct ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Continue reading.
Mr. Lattimore. I was talking while the war was on, but looking
forward to postwar situations.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Latitmore (reading) :
The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and
in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to
destroy the Communists during the 10 years before the war. Now, after the war,
the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopu-
lar. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the
areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military
officials. The Communists, on the other hand, were much stronger than they
had ever been, and were in control of most of North China.
Senator Ferguson. There, if thev had followed in June of 1945 your
suggestion of giving arms to the Communists, they would have been
even stronger than they were as Acheson found them, is that not true ?
The Chairman. That is, the Communists would have been ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; not necessarily true, Senator. I was looking
forward to a final phase of the war when, like many other people, I
expected that there might be considerable fighting on the mainland
of China for the recovery of Manchuria in case the Japanese made
a last stand there, and I think it is highly hypothetical what might
have come out of that one way or another. It is something that never
happened and therefore one could not tell what the results would have
been.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say now that they would not have
been stronger if they had received the arms that you suggested ?
Mr. Lattimore. I say I have no way of knowing.
Senator Ferguson. I think the committee can draw that conclusion.
Go on and read the next part.
88348— 52— pt. 10 9
3402 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces, which was later to be
tragically demonstrated, the Comnuinists probably could have been dislodged
only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have
sanctioned such a colossal ccmimitment of our armies in 194:i or later. We
therefore came to the third alternative policy, wliereunder we faced the facts
of the situation and attempted to as.sist in working out a modus vivendi which
would avert civil war but, nevertheless, preserve and even increase tlie in-
fluence of the Nationalist Government.
Senator Ferguson. That is really what yon were advocating in the
nnified China.
Mr. Lati'imore. That indicates a similar line of thought, but not
cause and effect.
Senator Ferguson. Will you explain what you mean by cause and
effect ?
Mr. Lattimore. It does not indicate that the policies adopted
were based on any recommendation of mine, and I submit that it was
an obvious probability that the State Department based its policy
on its own information and military information from the field in
China.
Senator FeR(;uson. Mr. Lattimore, why are you disclaiming so
vehemently that you had any influence on the State Department when
their policy did follow the line that you suggested ? Is there a rea-
son ?
Mr. Lattimore. There is a reason. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. What is it?
Mr. Lattimore. The reason is that there was a general category of
thinking along this line at the time, that I participated in it, and
that I think it would be an absurd exaggeration for me to claim that
I molded policy.
Senator Ferguson. Then it is only because you would feel it would
be an exaggeration ?
Mr. Lattimore. Exaggeration is a relative word. I put before it
absurd, an absurd — if you prefer, I will say an absurd invention.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. But you had in the Lamont memorandum
said that you were one of tlie authorities on the Far East. You sought
the President's audience. You took the memorandum and left it
there.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not intend to influence him as an au-
thority?
Mr. Latitmore. I hoped to influence the President primarily toward
an impartial review of problems of policy as they then stood.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know any way that you could have
put this proposition up to the President in any stronger language
or way than you did?
Mr. LA-miMORE. I stated my oj^inions to the President as clearly
as I could, based on the best knowledge available to me at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read now the rest of your letter. I
want to ask you some questions about it, about your argument in
your memorandum to the President.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having
dictatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American
policy ; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political
change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 3403
Shall I go on '?
Senator Fkrguson. That was part of your argument telling him
tliat the unified China was what you were asking him for?
Mr. Lati'imore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And that we would have to insist upon pretty
drastic political changes, including the limitation of the personal
power of Chiang. That meant a coalition government, did it not,
taking the Communists in?
Mr. Lattim(^re. That meant a coalition government, yes. That
ineant recognition of the fact that, in my opinion, the Communist-
controlled |)art of China could not be conquered by the force available
to Chiang.
Senator Ferguson. Up until that time, had you ever known a gov-
ernment that had survived when it took in the Communists and made
a coalition government ?
]\Ir. Laitimore. I don't recall that there was a previous example,
Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that communism was such at
that time that it was impossible to have such a coalition government
and have it successful, without it becoming a Communist government?
Mr. Lai^more. No; I did not think so. If I thought so, I would
have made different proposals.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read the next paragraph?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have unlimited
j)ower in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks
that America is on the fence, hut will he stami>ede(l into jumping down on his
side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against the "Bol-
.shevik menace." Intluential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-
term conservative trend, with Republican ascendance, and that Henry Luce
Walter .Judd, et cetera, have guessed the trend correctly.
Senator Ferguson. There you were warning the President that
Chiang, if he got aid from America alone, and there was not aid going
to tlie Communists, and there was not a coalition government, that he,
in a civil war, would be against the Communists, the Bolshevik menace,
jind you [nit that in quotations, is that correct?
Mr. L.\nTiM()RE. That is correct. I mean, that is correct as far as
it being in quotations. It is not correct so far as your interpretation
of wliat I was saying.
Senator Ferguson. Why did you put it in quotations?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know why I put it in quotations at that
time. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. You must have believed that it was not quite ac-
curate, the Bolshevik menace, or you would not have put it in quotes.
Mr. Latfimore. No; my general opinion at the time was that com-
munism in China could be contained, so to speak, and that the Gen-
eralissimo could maintain the ascendancy.
Senator Ferguson. Even in a coalition government?
Mr. Lattimore. Even in a coalition government, or, in fact, the
oidy way he could would be through a coalition government.
Senator Ferguson. What did you think to be the diiference between
the Republican policy on that and the President's policy, when you
say "influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-
term conservative trend" ( AAHiat do you mean there by ''conservative
trend"?
3404 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know exactly what I meant by conservative
trend in 1945, but it is clearly here in connection with Republican
ascendance and the mention of what I identified at that time as the
opinions on China policy of Mr. Luce and Congressman Judd.
The Chairman. He was predicting the election of Stassen, perhaps,
Mr. Lattimore. I was saying that that was the way that Chiang's
advisers were talking to him.
Senator Ferguson. How did you learn that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I knew some of Chiang's advisers quite well.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you get this information, in this
country or in China ?
Mr. Lattimore, My latest information on the subject was in this
country.
Senator Ferguson. "Wlio gave it to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. A Chinese connected with the Chinese Government.
Senator Ferguson. Who was he ?
Mr. Lattimore. One man w^hom I recall particularly was one of
Chiang's oldest and closest associates, a Mr. Tseng Yang-fu.
Senator Ferguson. "N^-liere is he now ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know where he is now.
Senator Ferguson. When was the last you saw of him ?
Mr. Lattimore. The last I saw of him was when he was in this
country in 1945, received medical treatment at the Johns Hopkins
Hospital, and then stayed with me for several days before going back
to China.
Senator Ferguson. Is he in China or Formosa ?
Mr. Lattimore. I presume he is in Formosa.
Senator Ferguson. Have you heard from him in Formosa ?
Mr. Lattimore. May I ask my wife?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; you may inquire from your wife.
Mr. Laitimore. The last I heard of him — no, this is previous.
This is just before he came here, so I don't remember when I heard
from him last.
Senator Ferguson. May we see the memorandum?
Mr. Lattimore. Surely. [Document handed.]
Senator Ferguson. Read the next paragraph.
The Chairman. The next paragraph of what?
Senator Ferguson. Of the memorandum to the President: "The
basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2."
That is the one that appears to be at least the same line as was
carried out in the white-paper letter of transmittal; is it not?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the one that indicates that I belong to that
general school of thinking ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. "It can be successfully worked," you say.
"Chiang is tenacious, but has shown in the past that he knows when
to give in and try a new policy."
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
But he will only play ball if America and Russia, with British approval, make
it plain that they are going to be joint umpires.
Is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3405
Senator Ferguson. What you wanted, then, was a policy where
Russia and America, and with at least the consent of Britain, were to
be umpires in running China 'I
Mr. Lattimore. I believe not the umpires in running China. I be-
lieved that the situation coming up at the end of the war in China was
one that the United States would not be able to control single-handed.
I thought it had to be part of a general international agreement.
Seiuitor Ferguson. What do you mean by joint umpires?
Mr. Lattimore. Joint umpires in the sense that primarily, if the
Communists accepted a minority position in a coalition government,
it would have to be seen to that they didn't try to get away with any
monkey business.
Senator Fergusox. And you think that America should have stepped
in and Russia would have stepped in, to keep the Communists in line?
Mr. Lattimore. I thought, as I said in the final sentence here :
America, alone, cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement with the
Communists involving real concessions; but if Washington and Moscow agree,
l)oth Chungking and Yenan will carry out the agreement.
Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that at Yenan the Communists
would have had to have carried it out, if Russia had said so?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know that I could have said so authorita-
tively at that time, Senator, and, at the present time, the degree of in-
dependence of the Chinese Communists from the Russians is a matter
of considerable debate.
Senator Ferguson. Then you are not one of those observers that
believe that the Communists in Korea today are under the control of
the Communists in Moscow?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no final answer on that. Senator. All I am
aware of is that there is one school of thought that believes the situation
is primarily controlled by the Chinese Communists, and another school
of thought that believes that the whole thing is dictated from the
Kremlin.
Senator Ferguson. What do j^ou think about it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't have sufficient information to make a strong
declaration of opinion in either direction.
Senator Ferguson. At least you do not think they are controlled by
Russia, you do not have any evidence that they are?
Mr. Lattimore. My opinion is that they are more allies of Russia
than subordinates of Russia, and I believe that the Russians would
have considerable difficulty in running China completely.
Senator Ferguson. Then it may be that Russia could, in your opin-
ion, act as a neutral in any truce?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. The whole wording here does not indicate
neutrality. It indicates an agreement between the great powers of
America, Russia, and Britain and, therefore, an agreement between
interested parties.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that in 1946 Mr. Acheson, Secre-
tary of State — and which was just about a year after the memorandum
was given — took somewhat the same line before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know it, Senator. I shouldn't be surprised.
As I say, this was part of a general school of thought, to which I was
a minor adherent, and not, I think, a shaper of that school of thought.
3406 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to
make, as a part of the record here, the memorandum and the press
release; that is, the memorandum to (xeneral Marshall out of the
white paper that is set forth in our record, and the letter of trans-
mittal, so that it would all be in and not be taken out of context.
I would like to have the testimony of Dean Acheson before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee as of June 19, 1946, a hearing on
H. R. 6795, become a part of the record.
Mr. Morris. Tliat portion of the testimony relating to the subject,
Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, relating to the subject. I would like to
have that read into the record at this time.
The Chairman. It may be read.
Senator Ferguson. I w^ould like to have it read at least down to
page 5, if Mr. Mandel would read it into the record.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Mandel. Testimony of Dean Acheson before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, June 19, 1946, hearings on H. R. 6795 [reading] :
Chairman Bloom. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Secretary, your statement, coupled with that of Secretary
Patterson and that of General Marshall, I think constitutes not only a reason,
but shows the necessity for the enactment of this legislation. So I shall ask
no questions.
Chairman Bloom. Dr. Eaton.
Mr. Eaton. In my judgment, I consider the association with China in the
future as probably of more importance to the destiny of the Nation and the
world than any other single relationship. That is wliy I am strongly in favor
of this legislation.
I notice on page 3 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, that General Marshall
arranged for the training by our American people, with the use of American
equipment, of certain Communist leaders who are to become incorporated into
the National army. Are those fellows now fighting the National army in Man-
churia ?
Mr. Acheson. No. I think the situation is this, Mr. Eaton : I do not believe
that any such training has gone on in the past, or is now going on. What Gen-
eral Marshall was asked to do and agreecl to do, and what is necessary to be
done, is that when the plan for the amalgamation of the two armies is accepted
and begins to go into effect, those units of the Communist army which are going
to be amalgamated with the National army will receive a period of training from
60 to 90 days before they march out to join their opposite numbers in the other
army. The plan roughly contemplates that a certain number of months from
the day on which it is to go into effect certain divisions of the Communist army
and certain divisions of the National army will be amalgamated. When that
occurs it is essential that the troops from the Communist side which go into
the troops of the new Chinese Army have a mininnim of the same sort of train-
ing that their compatriots have had. Some of the divisions in the present
National army have been trained by United States forces. These American
training forces that we are talking about will be forces that will take a Com-
munist outfit which is to be amalgamated with the new army and put it in
shape so that it can readily go into the outfit. That is the program.
Mr. Eaton. The objective of General Marshall's plan is that when tlie Com-
munist forces are taken into the National army, he will then have a Nationalist
army, not an army composed of two parts, one Nationalist and one Communist.
What guaranty have we, since history has taught us a few lessons, I hope,
that that will be the actual situation?
Senator Ferguson. Who asked that question?
Mr. Mandel. Mr. Eaton. [Reading:]
Mr. Acheson. You know better than an.vone in the world. Dr. Eaton, there
is no guaranty about anything in human affairs ; but the problem they are
facing in China is one, at the present time, of having two armies separated
in organization, space, and everything of that sort. Now, if those armies can
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3407
he amalgamated unit by unit — not trying to take one whole army and put it
with the other, but by taking separate units of each army and integrating
them in one force — then the chances of division are tremendously reduced.
Mrs. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, how many Communists is it anticipated will be
trained under the proposed plan?
Mr. AcHESoN. I think that they will try to take all the units that are going to
be put into the new army immediately preceding their joining the new army
and give them a 60- or 90-day schooling.
Mrs. Rogers. But, can you give us any approximate number that will be
trained?
Mr. AcHESON. I do not know. If the total size of the army is going to be
60 divisions, I do not know what proportion of the personnel would be Communist.
Mrs. Rogers. Could you get that proportion for us?
Mr. Acheson. The information that I have had handed me is that of the 60
divisions which are contemplated the personnel which would l)e equivalent to
50 divisions will come from the national army and the personnel which would
be equivalent to 10 divisions will come from the Communist army.
Mrs. Ro<",ers. That question will be asked on the floor. That is the reason
I wanted to have that information.
Mr. Acheson. Five-sixths will be taken from the national army and one-sixth
from the Communist army.
Chairman Bl(X)M. Mr. Chiperfield.
Mr. CHiPEKFiEi.D. Mr. Secretary, besides the assistance this country gave to
China which you have recited in your statement, did not the United States also
furnish credit amounting to $900,000,000?
Mr. AcHESON. I presume you are referring to the $500,000,000 loan made in
1942.
Mr. Chiperfiet.d. There was not any particular reason for not mentioning
that ; it was simply because you were referring to the military assistance?
Mr. Acheson. That is correct.
Mr. Chipekfield. I have no questions now, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Rogers. Do you think that China will turn to Russia if we do not offer
the assistance?
Mr. Acheson. I have no views cm that subject. I am sure that we will assist
China. I do not think I want to speculate on what would happen if we did not.
Mrs. Rogers. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China
whereby she would not use our arms against us?
Mr. Acheson. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter.
There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country
except in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter.
Under the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ
force against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That
is the technical and legal answer to your question.
I think we can rest assured that the Chine.se will not do that.
Mrs. Rogers. I suppose a fight could start before that was decided, could
it not?
Mr. Acheson. Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think
so.
Chairman Bi>oom. The Chair thinks that we should not go into that.
Mr. Acheson. I am sure that we do not need to worry.
Mrs. Rogers. I think if there were any way to have an agreement it would
be very helpful. I thought in the passage of lend-lease we should have some
agreement with the nations. I find it impossible, and many other members find
it impossible, to find out just exactly what is going on in lend-lease. That is
all I have.
Chairman Bloom. Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. I have no questions at this time.
Chairman Bloom. Mr. Vorys.
Mr. Vorys. Mr. Secretary, sooner or later, and probably sooner, the question
mav arise as to whether our furnishing arms to the Republic of China is in
accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and I note in
your statement you mentioned the obligations of the Charter for the preservation
of peace, at various times. I think it would be very helpful if you would spell
out for us who are not as familiar with the provisions as you are and our
chairman and our ranking Republican member, who were there when it was
drafted, just how this operates.
3408 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, I have some material from the
Congressional Record here that I should like to read into this record
as pertinent to my own thinking in the year 1945.
Senator Ferguson. I am going to ask you about what Mr. Acheson
was thinking in 1946. Do you know what change there was between
June of 1945 and June of 1946, other than the peace, other than the
stopping of the shooting? I do not mean the peace.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know about the change. General Marshall
had been carrying on his mission in China, had succeeded in halting
the civil war to a certain extent, and was trying to negotiate a form
of settlement that would leave the dominant control of power in the
hands of Chiang Kai-shek.
Senator Ferguson. Did you recognize at the time what Mrs. Rogers
apparently recognized in 1946; that is, in 1945 when you were asking
for this unity, particularly the aid to the Communists, and the unifica-
tion by virtue of a joint government? Such as is said here [reading] :
Mrs. Rogers. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby
she would not use our arms against us ?
Then Mr. Acheson said :
Mr. Acheson. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter.
There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country
in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter. Under
the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ force
against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That is the
technical and legal answer to your question.
Did you have the same view back in 1945 ? You talked about the
Charter and the protection under the Charter, and what had happened.
Did you think all we had to do to stop a war was to veto it ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I don't think I referred to the Charter at all.
My view was that the postwar situation in China was one that could
be kept manageable only by international agreement.
Senator Ferguson. Mrs. Rogers then said, to that answer, when he
ended up by saying "I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will
not do that," meaning they would not use the arms we gave them
against us, Mrs. Rogers said : "L suppose a fight could start before
that was decided ; could it not?"
Then Mr. Acheson seems to be quite surprised at that, because he
said : "Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us ? I do not think
so."
Had you the same idea ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not have the same idea. My ideas
went no further in June — July 1945 than a belief that the situation in
China could only be controlled by agreement between the major
powers.
Senator Ferguson. And then Chairman Bloom said :
The Chair thinks that we should not go into that.
Mr. Acheson. I am sure that we do not need to worry.
Was that your thinking at the time : that there was no worry about
bringing these Communists in and bringing Russia into this Chinese
situation ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. You are making, I tliink, an unjustifiable
link between Mr. Acheson's worries in 1946 and the problem that I
was trying to consider in 1945.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3409
Senator Ferguson. The only thing I can see now is the difference
that we did not give the Communists arms ; but, if so, there may have
been some worry back in those days.
Is it not true that as soon as they did get arms we found them
moving down in North Korea, down across the imaginary line that we
used to divide the country; and, in November of the same year, we
find the Communists in China using arms against the United States.
]Mr. Lattimore. I would not put it quite the same way, Senator.
Senator Ferouson. How would you put it?
Mr. Lattimore. I would put it that, when we supplied arms in
large quantities to armies that proved incompetent to use them, they
passed very rapidly into the hands of the Chinese Communists and
were turned against our policy.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was the reason for your going
to the President with this letter and this memorandum the point that
you felt that Ambassador Grew, Mr. Dooman, and Mr. Ballantine
were opposed to your views and your philosophy ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. My feeling was, as is shown in my letter
and memoranda quite clearly, that controversial problems of Ameri-
can policy were arising, and that the most important thing to do was
to get an impartial review.
Senator Ferguson. Did you, directly or indirectly, contact Dean
Acheson about your visit to the Wliite House ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Fer.^uson. Were you surprised when you saw Ambassador
Grew coming out of the President's office the morning that you called
on him?
By the way, it was Tuesday morning, the 3d, instead of Monday.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; it struck me as quite natural to see — I still
forget whether he was Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary of
State — him in the President's anteroom.
Senator Ferguson. You did not get the urge to say, "xA.mbassador
Grew, I am going to talk about the Far East. Will you not come into
the President's office and we will talk it over together?"
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I didn't think it was a privilege of a citizen
going in to see the President to do the President's inviting for him.
Senator Ferguson. Did you think that you were just acting as a
private citizen when you took this message to the President?
Mr. Lattimore. I did.
Senator Ferguson. No more?
Mr. Lattimore, No more.
Senator Ferguson. And no less ?
Mr. Lattimore. And no less.
Senator Ferguson. That is all at the present time.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the
Congressional Eecord pertinent to the general question of discussion
of the subject of China in 1945 that I should like to read into the
record.
The Chairman. Let me see it first, please.
Senator Ferguson. I have something before he puts that in, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Lattimore. One is from Re])resentative Walter Judd, and the
other is from Representative Mike Mansfield.
3410 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I said that I would produce for
the minutes a matter concerning the Secretary of State. 1 have, from
the ticker, this announcement as of 11 : 3.3 this morning, 3-5, meaning
today [reading] :
Secretary Adiesoii said todav he personally had cleared Foreign Service
Officer O. Ednuind CUibb after the State Department's Loyalty and Security
Board had decided Clubb was a security risk.
Last evening I asked Mr. Michael McDermott to furnish to me a
CODY of all press releases by the State Department, or any officer
thereof, concerning the Clubb case. At about 1 : 25 he called me and
said that they had not assembled them all, but that he would send
them up to me. I will want to put those into this record also, becaiise
I think it is very material to the issue that we cannot get information
from the officers under oath but when they desire it they can release
statements to the press. ..i •
I am o-oing to ask that the whole matter be taken up m this com-
mittee as to the Clubb case so that we may get it under sworn testi-
mony and not only in press releases.
You will note that this says "The State Department Loyalty and
Security Board has decided Clubb was a security risk."
That is under the McCarran rider to the appropriation bill and not
the President's Loyalty Board, the question of security.
I believe that, uiider the law, he has absolute discretion to discharge
a person for security risk ; but, if they try the person under the loyalty
and then he sets aside an order of the Loyalty Board, the Appeal
Board of the Loyalty Board would have the right to post-audit.
But, if they do it under the security risk, there is no right for the
Appeal Board to come into the picture at all. This would be a method
of cutting off the Appeal Board. It seems significant that this is
done in this way, after the Service case was reversed by the Loyalty
Appeal Board. " I think the record ought to show that.
The Chairman. Let me say to you. Senator, that this matter was
taken up in the Appropriations Committee, incidentally, and the sub-
stance of Mr. Humelsine's statement was— and I quote the substance
only—that he was precluded from giving the information to the
committee.
As far as 1 am concerned, whether it be m this committee or in
the Appropriations Committee, the matter should and must be gone
into. If men, after having been considered unfit to continue in
service by the Loyalty Board, are relieved of that decision so that
they may become "inheritors of pensions from the (Tovernment, it is
time forCongress to take very decisive action.
Do you have something else that you want to say?
Senator Fercsuson. Mr. Chairman, I might say that last evening
I had asked the State Department also, by letter, to furnish to the
Ai)i)ropriations Committee the number of employees that have been
allowed to resign, or have resigned after a loyalty case has been
started, the number of employees that have resigned or have been
permitted to resign after an investigation of their loyalty was started,
the amount of salary of each such employee and the amount of pension
that they are now drawing.
The Chairman, I might say to you that that request was also made
by Mr. Humelsine by the chairman of the subcommittee having the
appropriation at hand. I understancl it is being prepared.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3411
Senator Ferguson. I did not have the privilege of being here, and
I did not have the privilege of being in the Appropriations Subcom-
mittee, of which I am a member, and I asked that it be furnished to
you. I did not know that it was going to be furnished to you, or I
would not have asked.
The Chairman. The two excer])ts here, assertedly from the Con-
gressional Record, I think counsel will check with the Congressional
Record ; and, if they are to go in, they will go in in context, and I will
reserve the ruling on the matter.
As regards this matter that was submitted to the Chair this morn-
ing, asserted to be a quotation from General Chennault, I have sub-
mitted this to the committee.
Is there any objection to its going into the record?
Senator Ferguson. I have read it, and I have no objection.
The Chairman. If there is no objection, it will go in the record.
On the other, the ruling of the Chair will be withheld until we can
check the context of the Congressional Record.
Mr. Arnold. May the witness read it at this point ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. LAT-riMORE. The quotation is from Way of a Fighter, by Claire
Lee Chennault, published in New York, 1949. That is well after the
end of the war. It is chapter 5, page 61 [reading] :
Soon after .lapan attacked at Shaniihai, the Chinese sent an official call for
help to all the major powers. Only Russia responded. The Russians didn't
pause to play partisan politics or trip over ideological folderol when their
national interests were at stake in China. All of the Soviets' aid went to the
Central Government of the Generalissimo. The Russians had had no love for
the Generalissimo since the 1927 split when he drove the Russian-supported
Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and slaughtered them by the thou-
sands. For nearly "20 years he fought a ruthless war of extermination against
communism in China. The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo solely
because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing Japan,
and they supported him exclusively, igncn-ing the Chinese Communist armies,
which badly needed external support.
Mr. Morris. As of what time was General Chennault writing there ?
Mr. Lattimore. He is describing the early years of the war in
China, before Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Morris. That is not apparent, however, from that article; is it?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; it is apparent that this aid began when Japan
was attacked at Shanghai, which would be the summer of 1937.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first get that memorandum ?
Mr. Lattimore. This one?
Senator Fergltson. Yes; that information.
Mr. Lattimore. I think about 2 weeks ago. I had a moment to
spare in my university office, and 1 noticed there was this book by
General Chennault which was in the book case. I pulled it out just
to look through it, to see if there might be anything pertinent, and
then ran on to this passage.
Senator Ferguson. And it backs up what part of your thinking
as of that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. It backs up my thinking that, while the Russians
supported the Chinese Connnunists politically and in their world
propaganda, they disregarded them during the period of the war in
China in favor of assistance to China as a nation, delivered exclusively
through Chiang Kai-shek.
3412 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that could have been for the
purpose of their getting the Yalta agreement, and also getting the
agreement or the treaty with the Nationalist Government, not being
quite sure that the Communists could not throw out the Nationalists?
Mr. Lattimore. That is not my interpretation, Senator, My inter-
pretation is that the Russians were afraid of Japan and would sup-
port anything that was against Japan.
The Chairman. Do you know that General Chennault has testi-
fied before the watchdog committee of the Appropriations Committee
and before the Appropriations Committee itself of the Senate in
reference to that subject?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. You did not know that. Are there any further
questions?
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire, I have a few
loose ends we can tie up here.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. First, Mr. Lattimore, with regard to the letter and
memoranda to the White House, wdiich has been discussed here at
some length today, do you feel that the letter itself, the letter of June
10, adequately conveyed to the President, and did you intend by it
to convey to him, your belief that the Chinese Communists were then
and had been since at least 1940 supported by Russia, along with what
I assume was your belief stated here that "If America then identified
itself with one party, Russia would be justified in following that lead
in committing itself to the other major party"; namely, the Com-
munists ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, my letter wns intended solely to
indicate to the President that I would like very much to see him and
lay my opinions before him.
The Chairman. I would like to have the question read. It is an
involved question. I would like to have it read.
(The record was read by the reporter.)
The Chairman. You use the term "letter" there. 1 wonder if it
would be clarified to say "memoranda."
Mr. Sourwine. No, I meant letter, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lattimore. The letter w\as intended to convey only what was
in the letter, and the matter that was in the memoranda was matter
that I considered only when I sat down to write the memoranda.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you care to assert a belief, Mr. Lattimore, as to
whether there is any intellectual dishonesty of this letter of June 10
to the President?
Mr. Lattimore. I should say, Mr. Sourwine, that I should resent
any indication of intellectual dishonesty.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you intend to mislead the President in that
letter?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. In your letter of June 10, addressed to the Presi-
dent
The Chairman. By that last question, do you mean to intend to
this committee that you meant to lead him and that you presented an
honest view in leading him?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3413
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, I meant to imply solely that I wanted to
have a chance to put some opinions before the President.
The Chairman. It was for the purpose of leading the President,
was it not ? It was for the purpose of influencing his judgment, was it
not? It was net just for the purpose of laying a paper before him.
Mr. Lattimore. I certainly hoped that the President would con-
sider my opinions. To that extent, I wanted to influence him. I did
not want to influence him exclusively. I took it for granted that the
President would consider the opinions of many people.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If you will look at your letter of June 20 to the
President, June 20, 1945, the middle paragraph, the second para-
graph, quoting from the letter : "Your forthcoming meeting with the
Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin."
I ask you, sir, did you have any private information with regard
to that forthcoming meeting?
Mr. Latttmore. No, I didn't. My best recollection is, in looking
over these memoranda, that that had not been — that that had just come
out in the press and, therefore, made me feel that if anything I had
to say was worth consideration at all, it was worth consideration at
that time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You refer, of course, by that, to the Potsdam
meeting ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think that must be the Potsdam meeting.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Would you be surprised to learn that the public
announcement of the Potsdam meeting had not vet been made on the
20th of June?
Mr. Lattimore. I should be very mueh surprised. Had it not been
mentioned in the press?
Mr. Sourwine. I do not know what the fact is, sir. I am just mak-
ing a record as to your recollection as to whether you had any private
recollection.
Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that I had no private recol-
lection.
Mr. Sourwine. Looking up to the memorandum itself, sir, I have
just three questions about it.
There were some things in this memorandum that were intended
as recommendations, were there not, and I speak of that portion of
the memorandum which is labeled as related to Japanese policy as
related to China policy.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. This paragraph, the third paragraph, to counter-
act this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work
steadily for peace, unity, and modern political forms, was in the
nature of a recommendation ; was it not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I should agree to that ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. It called for an American policy favoring unity
in China ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; that is right.
Mr. Sourwine. And that was the American policy for some time
thereafter, was it not?
Mr. Lattimore. It was.
Mr. Sourwine. The next paragraph says, at the same time, Japan
hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and America to be soft
3414 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
with antirevolutionary Japanese.big: business That was was it not,
an implicit recommendation against a soft policy with Japanese big
business ?
Mr. Laitimore. Implicitly; yes.
Mr SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, American policy was a haid
policy with Japanese big business thereafter ; was it not '•
Mr". LA-rriMORE. No, not particularly hard; not hard, not soft. In
^Mi?SouRwiNE. At the end of that memorandum you find this sen-
tence [reading] :
In most Govenuiient agencies at the present time the tendency is to find
Japin'Slned men in higher policy-makir.g posts than ^^-^-^J^^^^' ^^"^-
ply because Japan used to be a more important i;reat power than China.
That is an implicit recommendation for more China-trained men in
hio-her policy-making, posts, is it not ?
'^Ir. Latiimore. Yes ; it is. p^ i i u
Mr SoTiRWiNE. And the State Department thereafter had a sub-
stantial number more of China-trained men m high-policy posts;
did it not?
Mr. La'itimore. It did. i it ^ i
I would say that there is no question of cause and effect here.
Mr SouRWiNE. Can you name some of those China-trained men
who came into power in higher policy-making posts at a period subse-
quent to the date of this memorandum ? .
Mr. Latomore. I think I am correct m saying that it was after this
memorandum that Mr. Vincent was promoted. , . ,, .
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to piit in the record
here a quotation from The Present Situation and the ^ext Tasks It
is a draft resolution of the national board. Communist Political Asso-
ciation, as amended and approved by the national committee on June
^%he^source is Political Affairs, of July 11)45, pages 579 to 591, Earl
Browder, Editor. i •. • . ^i a
I will ask that our director, Mr. Mandel, read it into the recoid
Mr Mvnuel. These are excerpts from the draft resolution ot the
National Board of the Communist Political Association :
Now that the war against Hitler Germany has been won, the American eco-
non < rovalists, like their British Tory counterparts are alarmed at tbe strength-
ened positions of world labor, at the den.ocrati.- advan<-es ui Europe and at the
n,s rge of the national liberation movements in the coh.nml and independent
" .unti-ies ^ * * They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against-
the Soviet Union * * *
That is from page 580.
Further, from page 581 :
It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why
Washington along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing
a strong^ united and democratic China ; why they bolster up the reac-tionary, in-
competent Chiang Kai-sheli regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to
terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reac-tionary bul-
wark in the Far East. It accounts, too, for the renewed campaign of antl-So^ let
slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and
cooperation * * *
I'heii on page 584 : ^'Remove from the^ State Department all pro-
fascist and reactionary officials *
The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine has one more question.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3415
Senator Fergusox. Just a moment.
Mr. Mandel, I take, from your experience as director of this com-
mittee, that is what is known as the commie Hne as of that time 'i
Mr. Maxdel. That was a resolution presented to the Plenary meet-
ing'. That is a full meeting of the national committee of the Com-
munist Political Association, which was held June 18 to 20, 1945, and
sets the line for the coming period.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Chairman. "VVliere ^
Mr. Mandel. In the United States. That was held in New York
City. It sets the line for the United States.
The Chairman. Who was then the head of the Comnnmist Party?
Mr. Mandel. In this same issue of the Political Affairs, the state-
ment of Jacques Duclos, which laid the basis for the removal of Earl
Browder, is included in this issue and the resolutions included here
marked the change of line of the Communist Party from one of
cooperation with the Ignited States and Great Britain to one of hostil-
ity; which was symbolized by the removal of Browder and the selec-
tion of Eugene Dennis as the executive secretaiy.
The Chairman. Senator Smith, do you have any questions?
Senator Smith. I have two questions. They are very short.
Mr. Lattimore, did you know young Lamont ?
Mr. Lattimore. In 1945 ?
Senator Smith. Yes ; at the time this letter was prepared, when you
prepared that communication '(
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think I had ever met him at that time.
Senator Smith. Had he been active at that time in the Institute of
Pacific Relations?
Mr. Lattimore. No: I don't believe so.
Senator Smith. Do you know" whether or not Mr. Carter knew him
at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. It is evident that Mr. Carter knew him to the extent
of seeing him at that time ; but how well he knew him, I don't know.
Senator Smith. You do not know of any relations that existed be-
tAveen Mr. Carter and the Institute of Pacific Relations and young Mr.
Lamont ?
Mr. Latt'imore. No, sir.
Senator Smith. You had never met him then ?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time, I don't believe I had met him.
Senator Smith. Did you get acquainted with him shortly thereafter ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not shortly thereafter, I don't think.
At sometime thereafter, after the war, he spoke at a meeting of the
Foreign Policy Association in Baltimore, and I met him then.
Senator Smith. At the time you pi-epared this proposed letter for
Mr. Lamont, Sr., to sign, did you know then Mr. Lamont. Jr.'s politi-
cal thinking on communism?
Mr. Lattimore. I knew nothing whatever about him, sir.
Senator Smith. Did Mr. Carter at that time, Avhen he proposed this
plan for you to prepare the text for a letter for young Mr. Lamont to
get old Mr. Lamont to sign ; did Mr. Carter tell you anything at all
about young Mr. Lamont's signature?
Mr. Lattimore. He told me no more than is in that letter.
Senator Smith. That is all.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Sourwine.
3416 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr SoTJRWiNE. I have one more question on the memorandum.
The memorandum on China policy starts out with: "There are two
ahernatives in China." . , ^i , . ,
Did you intend in that memorandum to state or imply that there were
two, and only two, alternatives in China, m the context h
Mr. LA-rriMORE. I presume so. , .1 • i i •
Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, was there not a third choice very
clearly indicated ?
Mr.'LATTiMORE. Whatis that? t^ • i 1 4-^
Mr. SouRWiNE. To wit, American support of Chiang Kai-shek to
drive the Communists out or overcome them?
Mr. Lattimore. I think, if you call that an alternative, it is certainly
taken up here by implication ; isn't it?
Mr. Sourwine. You think it is?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. -, p ^i . j i. „^,.^^
Mr. Sourwine. You intended to have regard for that and to cover
in your memorandum for the President, did you ?
Mr Lattimore. That is the way I read this memorandum.
Mr" Sourwine. You question whether it was, in fact, an alternative.
It is, as a matter of fact, an alternative which Dean Acheson recog-
nized ; is it not ?
Mr. Lattimore. After the end of the war ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No. Is it? ,, . , -^x.
I thought the third alternative that Mr. Acheson gave was with-
drawal from China. ■ ^^ ^. 4.- f
Mr. Sourwine. Did not Mr. Acheson recognize the alternative ot
all-out American aid to Chiang ?
Mr. Lattimore. Maybe he did. • .-u
Mr Sourwine. Let us go back to you. Did you recognize the
alternative of all-out American aid to Chiang at the time you wrote
this memorandum ? ^ • iv ^ ^ ^ ;„f^
Mr Lattimore. I don't think the term "all-out aid" had come into
use then, and I doubt if those were the terms in which I was thinking.
Mr Sourwine. Did you, in whatever terms you thought ot it, tlunk
of the alternative of American aid to Chiang against the Chinese
Communists for the unification of his nation under him by eliminating
the Communist forces as a revolutionary force?
Mr. Lattimore. I think this is implied m this memorandum, Mr.
Sourwine. , t n ^^i • i ^ -j. *. ^.i „
Mr. Sourwine. Is your answer, then, that you did think of it at the
time you wrote this memorandum ?
Mr. Lattimore. I suppose I must have. ,. ^ . . , ^ ,
Mr. Sourwine. You could not have implied it without having
thought it, could you ? .
Mr. Lattimore. I can only read this memorandum now with the
interpretation I put on it in 1952.
Mr Sourwine. Do you mean you have now no memory ot whether
you thought of that alternative at the time you wrote this memo-
Mr Lattimore. The only memory I have is that I placed before the
President what I thought were the two alternatives : Division of the
country, or unification of the country.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3417
And, under division of the country, I envisaged the possibility
of American support for one side and Kussian support for the other.
The Chairman. Mr. Morris has a question.
INIr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, in connection with the memorandum
you prepared for ISIr. Carter, do you know whether that memorandum
was shown to Mr. Bisson before it was sent to Mr. Lamont ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no clear recollection on that subject, but if
you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.
Mr. Morris. I just want your recollection at this time, Mr. Latti-
more.
The Chairman. He says he has no recollection.
Is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't believe I have.
Maybe I should have.
Wa's it mentioned in JNIr. Carter's testimony, or something of that
sort?
Mr. ]\Iorris. I will give you the executive session minutes of your
testimony, Mr. Lattimore.
At the bottom of the page there, does that refresh your recollection ?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, yes [reading:]
Mr. MoEKis. Now, I would like to introduce into the record in conjunction
with this, and I would like to show, first of all, to Mr. Lattimore, a memorandum
from the files of the institute, "TAB from ECC," "TAB" generally standing for
Mr. Bisson and "ECC" standing for Mr. Carter, dated June 20, 1945, and ask
you if that means anything to you?
And I replied that I had never seen this before, it has my initials
on it, but I didn't recall seeing it before.
Mr. ISIoRRis. Does that refresh your recollection that it was shown
to Mr. Bisson ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. Is your answer "that is right"?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
The Chairman. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning.
(Thereupon, at 3:25 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at
10 a. m., Thursday, March 6, 1952.)
88348— 52— pt. 10 10
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1952
United States Senait:,
Subcommittee To Ixvestigate the Administration
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Commiittee on the Judiciary,
Washing tan., D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10 : 15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.
Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Watkins,
and Jenner.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director, and
Senator McCarthy.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Morris, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY
ABE rORTAS, COUNSEL— Resumed
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did Mr. Carter ever ask you for the
best possible Soviet defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland?
Mr. Latitmore. I believe I remember some correspondence on that
subject; yes.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what you remember about that?
The Chairman. The question was : Did Mr. Carter ever ask you ?
He said he believes he remembers some correspondence on this.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I should be glad to have my memory , re-
freshed, if you have correspondence.
Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, let us go ahead without refresh-
ing memories. Let us find out what the witness now knows.
The Chairman. But he does not tell you what he knows. He says
lie believes that he received some communication, in answer to a ques-
tion, "Did Mr. Carter ever ask you?"
Senator Ferguson. That does not take a memorandum to refresh
your memory.
Mr. Lattimore. The best of my recollection at the moment is
that I think Mr. Carter wrote to me on the subject of the Russian in-
vasion of Finland and asked my opinion on the subject.
Senator Ferguson. When was that, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably about the time of the invasion of
Finland.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know when that was ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was the winter of 1940-41, wasn't it?
3419
3420 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Fp:rguson. That was from the IPR. I mean he was repre-
senting the IPR ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I believe it was an individual inquiry on his
part.
Senator Ferguson. A personal matter ?
Mr. Lattimore. A personal matter.
Senator Ferguson. And he wrote you about it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe so.
Senator Ferguson. And did you answer ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yos.
Senator Ferguson. What was your opinion ? What did he want to
know about the invasion of Finland ?
]\Ir. Lattimore, My recollection is — and, as I say, it is not very
precise — that at that time there was a great deal of discussion about
the significance of the Russian invasion of Finland.
My feeling was that the invasion of Finh^nd was an outrageous
thing on the part of the Russians, but I also believed that the politics
of Europe at that time had sunk to a pretty low level.
The previous betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France had
created a situation in which there was a general scramble for advan-
tage among the great powers, and the ethics of international relations
were not very conspicuous.
Senator Ferguson. So you would say, then, that if France and
Britain did something, then you think that the morals were lowered
so as to justify Russia in doing something like the invasion of Finland ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think that I thought — I am sure that I
didn't think that the Russian invasion of Finland was justified, be-
cause I supported the local branch in Baltimore that was of some sort
of organization that was collecting fluids for Finland,
On the other hand, I remember that at that time there were some
people who were advocating going to war with Russia on the subject
of Finland, and that seemed to me to be a rather unrealistic proposition.
Senator Ferguson. Did Carter ever ask you for a pro or a con
opinion ?
Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that he asked me for my opinions
on the subject.
I would have to see the correspondence again.
Senator Ferguson. But did you take that he had an opinion ?
Mr. LAi'riMORE. I don't remember whether he had an opinion or not,
or whether he was trying to form an opinion and was asking me what
I thought of it.
Senator Ferguson, And that time was he pro-Russian ?
Mr, Lattimore. I wouldn't be able to say. No ; I don't think he was
particularly pro-Russian.
Senator Ferguson, Now, wait ; you "don't think," You put in the
word "particularly."
Was he pro-Russian, or do you want the answer to be that he was
not particularly pro-Russian ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think that he was pro-Russian,
Senator Ferguson. Was he pro-Soviet at that time?
Mr. Lattimore, No; I don't think he was pro-Soviet.
Senator Ferguson. You do not think so ?
Mr, Lattimore. No; I don't think so.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3421
Senator Ferguson. What did Britain and France do that you
thought justified Eussia, or the Soviets, invading Finland?
Mr, Lattimore. I did not think that the British and French had
done anything that justified Russia in invading Finland. At least,
that is my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. You mentioned them here this morning. What
did they do to mitigate Finland's aggression ?
Mr. Lattimore. I thought that the British and French had be-
trayed Czechoslovakia and had thereby contributed to creating a very
nasty situation in Europe, in which everybody v^as engaged in a
bare-faced scramble for power, and ethical considerations were being
trampled underfoot.
Senator Ferguson. Will you explain what the "betrayal" was —
so the record will show it — of Britain and France, of Czechoslovakia ;
what you thought it was ?
Mr. Lattimore. My recollection, without looking up the documents
of the time, is that the French had a treaty of mutual defense of
some kind with Czechoslovakia and the British had some kind of
treaty or understanding for the support of France — and let me see —
I believe the Russians also had a treaty for the support of Czecho-
slovakia; that the Czechoslovaks appealed to the French, but the
French and British, at Munich, decided to put pressure on the Czecho-
slovak s to surrender their western defense system to Hitler, and that
tliat destroyed the security system for the containment of Gennan
aggression that had been built up after the First World War.
Senator Ferguson. And because Britain and France had failed to
carry out their treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia, you felt that had
something to do with a justification of the Soviets invading Finland,
did you ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not think it was justification.
Senator Ferguson. Then why did you mention it, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. LATriMORE. I don't think I called it a justification. Senator. _
Senator Ferguson. You mentioned here this morning — what is it?
Mitigation ?
Senator Smith. Are we not getting off the beam a little bit, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Ferguson. I think this is important.
Senator Smith. I just wonder if it is because I can understand
that if it was a trail — and I am inclined to think a little bit it was —
that is something about another question entirely, about the Czecho-
slovakian situation.
I assume that what Dr. Lattimore meant was that that so lowered
the level of public morals in Europe that that was one of the reasons
understanding Russian aggression in Finland.
The Chairman. In other words, the morals were so lowered by the
Czechoslovakia!! incident that anything might follow.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that is right.
Senator Smith. Yes. The Russians might be encouraged to do
anything.
i happen to know a little bit about that, because the Russians had
agreed to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia — Dr. Benes wrote me that,
incidentally— if England and France bad laid down on Czecho-
slovakia.
3422 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I want to go ahead, except I am thinking of the time we are
taking.
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to go ahead.
Now, you say that was a personal matter between you and Mr.
Carter.
Mr. Lattimore. That is the best of my recollection.
The Chairman. Wait just a minute.
• Mr. Carter was then the secretary-general of the Institute of Pacihc
Relations, just the same as he has been all the time; is that right?
Mr. Lati'IMOre. That is right. • , * •
But Finland was not connected with the Pacific or with Asia, and
any correspondence between me and Mr. Carter on the subject would
not have been institute correspondence, but personal correspondence.
Senator Ferguson. If it was personal correspondence, would Mr.
Field have anything to do with it?
Mr. Lattimore. I don\ remember whether Mr. Field had anything
to do with it, or not.
Senator Ferguson. Would he be consulted if it was personal cor-
respondence ?
Mr. Lattimore. Might be. Anybody in Mr. Carter s and my per-
sonal acquaintainceship might have been consulted.
As I remember, at that time, everybody was talking to everybody
else, and a good many people were writing to a good many people
about this.
Here was one of the most perplexing situations that had ever arisen
in the history of Europe.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, your long answers.
Will you tell us now whether or not you felt at the time that Mr.
Carter asked you about the Soviet invasion of Finland that he was
pro-Soviet? ^ .
Mr. Lattimore. No; I would not say he was pro-Soviet.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Morris, do you have a letter?
The Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please ?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 26,
1940, addressed to Owen Lattimore, Esq., with the typed signature of
Edward C. Carter.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that letter and ask you if
you can recall having received that?
Mr. Lattimore. This must be the letter that I recall.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?
The Chairman. Yes.
I want to know if that is an answer that you recall having received.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I recall having received it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?
Mr. Lattimore. This is dated April 26, 1940 [reading] :
ExiiiRiT No. .531
Dkab Owen
Senator Ferguson. What was your address at that time? Will
you give it?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3423
Mr. Laitimore. My address was Johns Hopkins, [Reading :]
Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convinc-
ing (I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers) statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s
justification for the Finnish campaign? The Soviets clearly regard the action
as a necessary defense measure. Three-fourths of the rest of the world still
regards it as unprovoked aggression.
Have you yourself written or are you writing anything along this line?
Sincerely yours,
This is dated April 26, 1940.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record?
The Chairman. Yes, it will be admitted into the record.
(Document referred to was marked ''Exhibit No. 531" and was read
in full beginning on p. 3422.)
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, would that indicate as to whether
or not Mr. Carter was pro-Soviet?
Mr, Lattimore, No, sir,
I would say that this indicates that Mr. Carter was trying to form
an opinion on the subject and that, as a necessary part of forming
an opinion on the subject, he was trying to find out whether there had
been a convincing statement from the Russian point of view or of the
Russian point of view ?
The Chairman. He says, "Where in English or French or Russian
has there appeared the most convincing" — and then in parentheses :
"I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers."
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. "Bourgeoisie readers" are non-Soviet readers; are
they not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Non-Soviet, and, I should say, non-Communist.
The Chairman. And he wanted to convince the non-Soviet reader.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I do not agree that he wanted to convince
a non-Soviet reader.
The Chairman. He said, "I mean convincing to bourgeoisie read-
ers" ? What does that mean ?
Mr. Lattimore. He is obviously considering himself as a non-Soviet
and non-Communist person, and, as such, he wants to know where the
Russian case is stated for people like himself.
He obviously means he wants to compare it with other opinions.
The Chairman. Just a moment. Read the sentence again.
So as to make it complete, leaving out the parentheses, it states :
AVhere in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most con-
vincing * * * statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s justification for the Finnish
campaign?
Mr. Lattimore. That is riarht.
The Chairman. That is what he is looking for; is it not?
Mr. Lattimore. I would say that is a reasonable step for an im-
partial man to take when he was trying to assemble evidence and
opinions on a very complicated problem.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was this, or was it not, an
IPR matter?
Was he trying to do this personally?
Mr. Lattimore. I should say that that letter is clearly a personal
letter and not an organizational, institutional letter.
3424 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, when we get to a case like this,
do you not see anything in this letter at all to indicate that Mr.
Carter was pro-Soviet in this letter ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I see nothing of the kind. I see he states
that: "Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regards it as un-
provoked aggression."
Senator Ferguson. Yes. But is he not asking you to give him the
best possible defense for the Russians ?
Mr. Lattimore. He is trying, it is obvious, to find that out
The Chairman. Just a moment. Let us hear the question.
Please read the question, Mr, Reporter.
I am asking you to address yourself to the question.
(Thereupon, the pending question, as above transcribed, was read
by the reporter.)
The Chairman. That can be answered "Yes" or "No," then you
can explain, if you wish.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Obviously, as a part of trying to inform himself on all points of
view of a very complicated question, which was the subject of great
political discussion at the time.
The Chairman. You have to read that into the letter, do you not,
that last statement of yours ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where do you get the idea that he wanted all
points of view when he was trying to get the best for the Russians
and said nothing about any other point of view at all ^
Mr. LA-rriMORE. He is saying: "Three-fourths of the rest of the
world still regard it as unprovoked aggression."
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And does he not also in the letter assume
that you would be writing on the Soviet side when he said, "Have
you yourself written, or are you writing anything along this line?"—
meaning along the line of the Soviet side ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He does not?
Mr. Lattimore. I consider it impossible to read any such implica-
tion into the letter.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, you said that this was not an organ-
izational letter.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Field sent a copy of that letter ?
Mr. Latoimore. I don't know. It doesn't say here that he was.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, did he venture an answer to Mr. Carter's
questions ?
Mr. Lattimore. That I don't recall.
Mr. Morris. You cannot recall anything on that ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. No.
Senator Smith. May I ask you this question :
Was 129 East Fifty-Second Street the address of the Institute of
Pacific Relations?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, that was.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?
Mr Mandel. I have here a memorandum from the files of the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations, dated April 30, 1940, headed "Memo-
randum to: E. C. C. from F. V. F.»
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3425
The Chairman. Who is ECC and who is FVF ?
Mr. Morris. That is presumably Mr. Edward C. Carter and Fred-
erick Vanderbilt Field.
Mv. Chairman, this letter bears on the question about which the wit-
ness is now testifying, and I would like Mr. Mandel to read this letter
into the record.
The Chairman. Let me see it. •
Senator Ferguson. It that original out of the files of the IPR?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please ?
Mr. Mandel. April 30, 1940: "Memorandum to: E. C. C. from
F. V. F."
Mr. Morris. This is 4 days after the previous letter, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
Exhibit No. .532
I noticed, in a letter from you to Lattimore, or vice versa, which passed over
my desk today, a question about good sources for the Soviet point of view on the
Finnish campaign. I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued
by Soviet Russia Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland — A Documented
Survey." It contains most of the pertinent documents and if you are looking for
an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think, as
good as anything which has come to hand.
Mr. Morris. Will that be admitted into the record, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. It may be admitted into the record.
(Document deferred to was marked "Exhibit No. 532" and was read
in full.)
Mr. Fortas. Excuse me.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to ask your counsel something ?
Mr. Fortas. He said "no."
Mr. INIorris. Mr, Lattimore, do you notice there in the first line
that Mr. Field is looking upon you and Mr. Carter as interchangeable
in connection with that particular query ? He could not recall whether
the letter was from Carter to Lattimore, or Lattimore to Carter.
Mr. Lattimore. I would not say, Mr. Morris, that he regards me
and Carter as interchangeable.
The Chairman. He is speaking of the language now, Mr. Lattimore.
The first line of the note reads : "I noticed, in a letter from you to
Lattimore or vic€ versa which passed over my desk today * * *."
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Morris' question is : Do I regard that as indi-
cating that Field says that Lattimore and Carter were, or regarded
Lattimore and Carter as interchangeable ?
Mr. Morris. With respect to this query.
Mr. Lattimore. With respect to this query.
The Chairman. That is not the question.
Mr. Lattimore. My answer is "No," and I would like to explain.
Mr. Fortas. We want the question read.
The Chairman. Reframe the question. You can get at it in an-
other way.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate
to you that, with respect to this particular query, namely, where to
find the most convincing, to bourgeoisie readers, defense of the Soviet
invasion of Finland, did he not consider in his mind that you and
Carter were interchangeable with respect to being the originator of
that particular query ?
3426 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. My answer is "No."
May I explain?
Tlie Chairman. I do not think it is necessary for an explanation.
The answer is "No." That is all there is to it.
It is a question of the construction of the language.
Mr. Lattimore. I think I have something pertinent to say on the
subject. . .
The Chairman. I do not think there is anything pertinent. When
you say "no, it is not interchangeable," then it is not interchangeable.
That is your decision. . „
Mr. Lai'timore. May I explain why I think the answer is JNo >.
The Chairman. No. The language speaks for itself.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, it appears that Mr. Field had
on his desk that particular day, which would seem to be the 30th of
April, the Soviet literature. War and Peace in Finland; would it not?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And that when it passed over the desk, he was
not quite sure whether it was a letter from you to Carter, or Carter
to you ? -(.^11
]\Ir. Lattimore. No, sir ; that is not my construction of the language.
Senator Ferguson. That is not your construction >.
The Chairman. Just a moment, Senator.
If there is any more evidence of expression in the rear of the room,
any more disturbance in the rear of the room, the room will be
cleared. I have said that once or twice before. I hope it will not
occur lagain. , • t-» • r^ i
Mr. Morris. JNIr. Lattimore, did you know that Soviet Kussia loday
was a Soviet publication? . „ -r i , i v
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No, at that time. I don t believe
at that time I knew the publication Soviet Kussia Today at all.
Mr. Morris. Did you know at that time that Frederick V. P leld
was a Communist? n ^■
Mr. Lai-itmore. No, sir; I didn't. To the best of my recollection,
I did not believe then that he was Communist—
The Chairman. Just a moment.
A moment ago, in listening to the question, 1 think the Chair ruled
erroneously, and I want to correct my ruling. I refused to permit
the witness to explain his view on the first two lines, or three lines
of the letter. I think I ruled hastily and I want to correct that ruling.
I want him to have that opportunity.
You may have it now.
Mr. P'oRTAS. We want the question and the answer read back.
The Chairman. You may have the question and the answer read
back, if you want to clarify your position.
Mr. Lattimore. Y"es. May I?
The Reporter (reading) :
Mr Moiiius Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate to you that,
with respect to this particular query, namely, where to tind tlie most convincing,
lo h(.uri;eoisie readers, defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland, did he not
considei- in his mind that you and Carter were interchangeaitle with respect to
Iteing the ori^'inator of that particular (luery?
The Chairman. The reason why I changed my ruling is^that I
caught the expression "in your mind" as to what was in Mr. Carter s
mind. . ,
Senator Ferguson. And not what was in Field s mmd ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3427
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. FoRTAs. In Mr. Lattimore's mind.
The Chairman. It is liis analysis of wliat might liave been in the
writer's mind.
Mr. FoRTAS. He said Carter. I thonght he said Lattimore.
The Chairman. That is right^ In his analysis.
If he wants to give it after looking at the language and listening
to the question again, I think the Chair was erroneous in its ruling.
Mr. Lattimore. I simply wanted to explain. Mr. Chairman, that
it was the practice in the institute to circulate letters and copies of
letters to everybody in the office and people outside the office, and my
construction of this language is simply that Mr. Field remembered
seeing some correspondence some days before and hadn't bothered to
look up who wrote the correspondence when he sent this little note
to Mr. Carter.
The Chairman. That is a fair explanation of it, if you can guess
what was in the writer's mind.
He is making a guess at it, and that is all there is to it.
Let us proceed.
Senator Smith. With that language, ''vice versa.'' I do not quite
agree with the chairman.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever seen before that time the publica-
tion Soviet Russia Today?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I had.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever furnish a document to Mr. Carter
in reply to his letter?
Mr. Lattimore. I recall writing to Mr. Carter expressing some
opinions. I don't recall the exact language.
Senator Ferguson. But did you furnish a documejit?
Mr, Latiimore. Do you mean a document other than writing him
a letter?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Laitimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Senator P^erguson. Did he ever ask 3^ou for any more than an an-
swer to his letter?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't recall that he did. I don't believe he did.
Senator Ff:rguson. Did vou ever read AVar and Peace in Fin-
land?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't think I ever read it.
Mr. Morris. Did you endeavor to answer his question about what
is nicest convincing to bourgeoisie readers in defense of the Soviet in-
vasion of Finland ?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo; I don't believe I did. I believe that what I
did was to expi-ess my own opinions about some of the factors in-
volved.
Mr. Morris. As the most convincing defense?
Mr. LA'rriMoRE. Xo. I don't recall. I don't believe that I responded
to any such point, that I simply wrote down some general observations
that were in my mind at the time as to what I thought about the
situation.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not
reply to this particular query of Mr. Carter?
Mr. LAT'riMoRE. To the question about some source in English,
French, or Russian?
3428 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I replied to that point.
Mr. Morris. Did you attempt to give the best possible defense of the
Soviet invasion of Finland ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I believe that I expressed my own opinion.
My own opinion may have included some expression about what sort of
case I thought the Russians could make for themselves, or something
of that sort.
But I certainly did not do any research on the subject.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the memo-
randum from Field to Carter indicated that Field believed Carter
wanted a pro-Soviet opinion?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. The language is : "A question about good
sources for the Soviet point of view."
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Which, it seems to me, would be a reasonable point —
let me repeat once more — for anybody who was trying to find out what
the score was on Finland.
The Chairman. The language of this note is, again, interesting.
This was a note from Frederick V. Field to the secretary general of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Carter.
He says in this note : "I notice, in a letter from you to Lattimore or
vice versa, which passed over my desk today * * *." In other
words, the note which Carter had written to you passed over Field's
desk. You said that you did not know whether or not that note was
referred to Mr. Field.
It is evident, from this letter, that it had been referred to Mr. Field.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. And he says : "A question about good sources for
the Soviet point of view on the Finnish campaign."
Then he refers Carter to what he considers a good source :
I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued by Soviet Russia
Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland — A Documented Survey." It con-
tains most of tlie pertinent documents —
This was Field giving advice to Carter, who had written you.
* * * It contains most of tlie pertinent documents and if you are looking
for an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think,
as good as anything which lias come to hand.
He was rather praising it ; was he not ?
Mr. Lattimore. He was rather what?
The Chairman. Praising it. In other words, he was recommending
it.
Mr. Lattimore. He was recommending that anybody who wanted to
find out what the Soviet point of view was would find in this publica-
tion the documents which the Russians had considered it pertinent to
publish.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that Field's statement was pro-
Soviet ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?
Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 29,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3429
1940, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen
Lattimore. In the upper part of the sheet we have the initials F. V. F.
and K. B., presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Kathleen
Barnes.
Mr. Morris. Does K. B. stand for Kathleen Barnes ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably.
Senator Ferguson. Would you explain what you believe those
initials mean on the top of that photostat ?
Mr. Lattimore. Wliat I believe they mean?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. My assumption would be that Mr. Carter had
initialed them for circulation in the office to Kathleen Barnes and
Frederick V. Field.
Senator Ferguson. And your name being on the top would indi-
cate that it was later to be filed, I assume, under your name?
Mr. Lattimore. Probably woidd be put in the file of Carter's cor-
respondence with me; yes.
Mr. Morris. So, certainly the Institute of Pacific Relations con-
sidered it an organizational letter, did it not, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I wouldn't say so.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it still indicates what is before
you now, that this is purely a personal matter between you and Mr.
Carter?
]\Ir. Lattimore. As far as I was concerned, it was a purely personal
matter between me and Mr. Carter.
Senator Ferguson. That was not the question.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I would still say it.
Senator Ferguson. From the evidence before you
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And what has been produced here in the case?
Mr. Lai-timore. Knowing, as I do, that it was Mr. Carter's regular
practice to circulate a great deal of his personal correspondence to
other people.
The Chairman. "Wliat was the address of the Institute of Pacific
Relations ?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lattimore. 129 East Fifty-second, I think.
The Chairman. What is the address on the letter?
Mr. Lattimore. 129 East Fifty-second.
The Chairman. That was the address of the Institute of Pacific
Relations.
All right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph in
your letter.
]\Ir. Chairman, first, will it be admitted into the record ?
The Chairman. It has been identified by Mr. Mandel, has it not,
as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
ISIr. Morris. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It may be admitted into the record.
3430 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 533'' and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 533
300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1940.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.
Dear Carter: Thanks very iiiucli for putting me wise to the correspondence
and editorial comments in the Herald-Tribune. I thought your letter was per-
fectly justifiable, and the tone taken by the editorial writer in commenting on it
rather nasty. I enclose a copy of the letter I have just written them.
With regard to the Gayer book on "American Economic Foreign Policy," am I
to understand that Holland has received a review copy, or that he is merely rec-
ommending it to youV Let me know if I should write for a review copy. Off-
hand, I should concur with the selection of Pluniptre as reviewer.
We are so far advanced in the process of getting the June issue of Pacitic Af-
fairs through the press that it would be difficult now to get in the suggested
notice of the nonparticipation committee pamphlet "Shall America Stop Arm-
ing Japan," for reasons of both time and space. What should be our future
policy about matters of this kind? Would it not be making Pacific Affairs too
"American" for subscribers abroad?
Your (luestion al)Out where to find the most convincing statement as to the
Soviet justification for tlie Fiimish campaign is one that I have been asking my-
self. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this prob-
lem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It
seems to me that even If the Russians had more detailed, plausible and docu-
mented evidence of "plots'' in or concerning Finland than I have yet seen, and
even if they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic
point of view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland.
On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain smugness in the peojjle who
either unconsciously assume or explicity state that what Russia did, after a great
war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French iind British
did in letting down first Spain and then Czeclioslovakia. The Russians may have
been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing : but as far as
the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective securit.y and the honoring of
treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers
with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others. The moral guilt of
Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others, since if you assume
that there is an absolute morality, then by definition tliere can be no degree of
morality; but if justification be jileaded. the Russians can point out that they did
not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can cla'ni that there is a difference
between being the first to start aggression and committing what might be called
an act of "self-protective aggression" after the general sci'ainble had begun.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
P. S. — Who is in charge of the Pacific Council Library now that Lilienthal has
left? I should like to know if you have, and if I may borrow, "League of Nations
Mission of Educational Experts: The Reoi-ganization of Educati(tn in China,"
Paris, 1032.
Mr. Lattimore. The paragraph reads :
Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the
Soviet justificati<m for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking
myself. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this prob-
lem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It seems
to me that even if the Russians had more detailed, plausible and documented
evidence of "jilots" in or concerning Finland that I have yet seen, and even if
they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic point of
view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland.
On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain snuigness in the ijeople
4 ho either unconsciously assume or explicitly state that what Russia did, after
a great war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French
and British did in letting down first Spain and then Czechoslovakia. The Rus-
sians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3431
tliiiij;. but as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security
and the honoriuir of treaties until these principles had been violated by some
(if the jrreat powers with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others.
The moral guilt of Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others,
since there can be no de.gree of morality; but if justification be pleaded, the
Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression,
and can claim that there is a difference between being the first to start aggres-
sion and committing what might be called an act of "self-protective aggression,"
after the general scramble had begun.
The expression "self-protective aggression" is in quotes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were yon thereby answering Mr. Car-
ter's query as to what was the most convincing statement as to the
Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't think I was. I was replying to Mr.
Carter's letter as a whole anci not to a particular point of it.
Mr. Morris. Is that your answer, Mr. Lattimore, or Mr. Fortas"
answer^
Mr. Lattimore. My answer has been introduced by the phrase,
"Your question about where to find the most convincing statement
as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I
have been asking myself."
But the language shows that I had not looked up the matter.
May I add a word of explanation?
The Chairman. You Mere asking yourself for a justification of
the Russian invasion, were 3'ou not ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I was not.
The Chairman. That is what you say here.
Mr. Lattimore. I was asking where to find the most convincing-
statement.
The Chairman. You said it was a question that you had been asking
yourself.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. In other words, like Mr. Carter, I thought
that here was an extremely complex and confusing question, and I
would like to know more evidence on all sides.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, was that your answer to my question, or
was that Mr. Fortas' answer to my question ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was my answer to your question.
Mr. Fortas. Mr. Morris, I object. I don't think that is called for.
The Chairman. I have not caught Mr. Fortas suggesting an.swers
as yet.
Mr. Fortas. No, sir: and you won't.
Mr. Chairman, I believe I should be given the courtesy of making a
statement. I unconsciously and without deliberation commented on
Mr. Morris' question, I am afraid, audibly. I said that that is not
what Mr. Carter had asked JNIr. Lattimore.
And the record speaks for itself.
Mr. Morris' question was whether this was the most convincing-
statement of the Soviet position that Mr. Carter had asked for. Now,
that is not what the record shows Mr. Carter asked Mr. Lattimore for.
The Chairman. I do not think you intentionally broke in.
Mr. Fortas. I did not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. As long as we are all testifying, Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. I hope that that will not occur again.
Senator, you were asking.
3432 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I was going to ask a question on that, in
line with what the Chair asked.
Your question about where to find the most couvincting statement as to the
Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking
myself.
Mr. Lattimore, does not that clearly indicate that you stated to
Carter that you had been asking yourself just what he asked you ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. Something to justify the Finnish campaign.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; not something to justify the Finnish cam-
paign ; a statement of the Soviet point of view as a necessary ingredient
for anybody who was trying to find out what the score was on Finland.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat, Mr. Lattimore, was a "self-protective
aggression" ?
Mr. Lattimore. I presume, in 1952
Senator Ferguson. No, no. In 1940.
Mr. Lattimore. In 1952, trying to reconstruct what I was thinking
in 1940, 12 years previously, that I meant here that — what is it now
Senator Ferguson. "Self-protective aggression."
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; that if justification be pleaded I presume that
the Russians might put up a case of saying that this was self -protective
aggression after other people had started aggression.
I might add that I doubt if anywhere in the record have the Russians
ever admitted to such a thing as self-protective aggression.
Senator Ferguson. Have you had any trouble solving, in your own
mind, the problem as to who was the aggressor in Korea ?
Mr. Lattimore. The aggressor in Korea was clearly the North
Korean Communists.
Senator Ferguson. And you would not say that Russia now calls
that "self -protective aggression" ?
Mr. Lattimore. I would doubt very much if the Russians would
admit to such a damaging formula.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, when you wrote that letter, did you
really believe that Russia had only become a treaty breaker because
Britain and France had set her a bad example?
The Chairman. Are you referring now to Mr. Lattimore's letter
of April 29, 1940 ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is correct.
Mr. Lattimore. May I have your question again, Mr. Sourwine?
Mr. Sourwine. Did you really believe that Russia had become a
treaty breaker only because she had been set a bad example by Britain
and France ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember what I meant at the moment,
Mr. Sourwine, beyond the language of this letter.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, I am using plain English.
Mr. Lattimore. The language of this letter does not support the
twist that you are trying to put on it, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. What are you saying in that letter? Are you not
saying in that letter that Russia really stood by her treaties until
Britain and France set her a bad example, and then she became way-
ward?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3433
Mr. Lattimore. No. I am saying :
The Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do
this very thing. But as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collec-
tive security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been
violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing and
betrayed by others.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What do you mean by that?
Mr. Lattimore. I meant there that there were two possibilities.
One was tliat the Kussians may have been feeling and hoping for
years for a chance to do this very thing.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. You underlined the "may," did you not?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I put that in as a possibility, and I doubt if
any pro-Soviet or pro-Communist person would have allowed for that
possibility.
The Chairman. What is the other ?
Mr. Sourwine. Now, you said, "as far as the evidence goes."
Mr. Lattimore. Then I said, "as far as the evidence goes."
Obviously, as far as the evidence known to me went at that time.
jNIr. Sourwine. What I want you to do, ]\Ir. Lattimore, is to put
into different language what you meant there. You are a man very
facile with language. Express your thought there another way.
Mr. FoRTAS. He wants to consult with me.
The Chairman. All right.
(Consultation between witness and counsel.)
The Chairman. Just before proceeding, I would like to have the
record read back just a little. I think Mr. Lattimore said there were
two — I do not think he called them alternatives, but he dwelt on one.
One was that Russia may have for a long time been hoping for this,
or that is the substance of it.
The other was something else. He did not dwell on the other.
Mr. Morris. The other alternative was that the Russians had stood
by collective security and the honoring of treaties until the treaty
structure had been violated by others.
The Chairman. And that they had taken that as a justification;
is that right ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, not that they had taken it as a justification.
But I suggested that if justification be pleaded, the Russians can
point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression.
Mr. Sourwine. I accept that as an answer, Mr. Chairman. I think
the witness has rephrased what he said in the letter.
The Chairman. I think it is an answer.
Do you accept that as an answer ?
Mr. SouR^viNE. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right, proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. INIr. Lattimore, do you recall making an effort, after a
Soviet protest, to prevent the appearance of an article by Mr. L. M.
Hubbard, in 1938, from appearing in Pacific Affairs?
Mr. Lattimore. Do I recall what ?
Mr. Morris. Your making an effort to prevent an article by Mr.
L. M. Hubbard from appearing in Pacific Affairs.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember that. If you have a docu-
ment to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.
Mr. Morris. You do recall some controversy about Mr. Hubbard's
article, do you not?
88348— 52— pt. 10 11
3434 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. La'fi'imore. I do recall that Mr. Hubbard wrote an article. I
don't recall a controversy.
The Chairman. The question is, Do you recall a controversy about
Mr. Hubbard's article? It calls for a simple answer, "Yes" or "No."
Mr. Laitimork. I don't recall a controversy beyond the fact that —
now, wait a niinue.
Mr. FoRTAs. What year was this, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. In 1938. That is in the question.
The Chairman. Do you recall a controversy about Mr. Hubbard's
article?
Just answer that, if your memory serves you.
Mr. Latiimore. I remember not exactly a controversy, but a ques-
tion of whether another point of view should also be expressed.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?
Mr. Mandel. 1 have here a photostat of carbon copy of a letter from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1938,
addressed to Dr. V. E. Motylev, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, with the
typed signature of Owen Lattimore, and the initials ECC, in the upper
lefthand corner.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Mandel, what you mean, is it not, is that you
have there a photostat of a document from the files of the IPR? Is
that correct ?
Mr. Mandel. That is correct.
Mr. Morris. The document itself was a carbon copy of a letter.
Mr. Mandel. That is correct.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I show you this document and ask you
if you recall having sent it?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall having sent it. But I obviously
did send it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record.
The Chairman. That document, as I understand it, is a photostatic
copy of a document in the nature of a carbon copy, found in the files
of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. The witness says he obviously had sent it.
It will be received into the record.
(The document i-eferred to was marked "Exhibit No. 534" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. .534
1795 California Street,
t^iin Franciffco, Calif., February 8, 1938.
Dr. V. E. MoTYi.Ev,
20 Razin Street, Moscoiv.
Dkar Dr. Motyi.kv: Inuiiediately on receipt of .V(inr letter of in .Taniiai'y I
ciihled yon reqne.stini^ an article on possibilities of constrnctive international ac-
tion, to be considered as part of a general defense auainst inipei-ialist and fasciKSt
aggression; this article to be nsed as the leading contribntion in onr June
nnmbei-.
I hope very much that you will be able to provide such an article. Naturally,
I have suggested only geiuM'al terms : the particular terms are for you to decide.
I may adcl that in the December number I tried to set a tone that would enccmrage
such articles from all sf)Urces. The response up to date has not been too encourag-
ing; therefore it will be all the moi-e helpful to me if you can now supply the
suggested article.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3435
In regard to L. M. Hubliard's article. I have carefully noted your criticisms.
I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question
of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real difiiculty is this : the member-
ship of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." These nations
continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual
members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticising the
USSR. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so, they will
criticise Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy
its usefulness.
Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic
in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor
imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the cir-
cumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favor publi-
cation of positive and constructive articles, while not prevent'mn entirely the
expression of negative and defeatist views. This means that whenever we find it
impossible to prevent publication of such an article as this one by Hubbard
we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an
article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with
them constructively.
Now as to L. M. Hubbard bimself. Of course I do not propose to print his
article simply because he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard of Chatham House.
The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert"
of the P>ank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is con-
sidered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article
would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institiite of Inter-
national Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan — thus damaging its in-
fiuence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the Hub-
bard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications with
Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation.
In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action:
(1) I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs.
A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter.
(2)' I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to with-
draw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. It however, he
officially insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it, in our
June number.
(3) Finally. I urge yon to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be
published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later
than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House insists
on publication of the original article.
In concluding this letter I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at
this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more
suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my
ability, within the limits impo.sed on me by the different national bodies which
have a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs, I shall publish only material
which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the USSR
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with indis-
pensable assistance.
Yer.v sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
The Ch AIRMAN. In ofoino: along here, we have not attempted to nnin-
ber or designate tliese documents. They .should be numbered in the
record when the record is ]~>ut up. They should be numbered or
desiginited so that they will have some designation.
The Chair has not attempted to do it, bu^ it must be done.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, under a previous order of the Chair,
these documents were ordered numbered consecutively as introduced.
They have not been marked, however. Avhich T think is what the Chair
is referring to.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter commencing
with paragraph 3, which is where the pertinent reference commences?
3436 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Lattimore (reading) :
In regard to L. M. Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms.
I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the ques-
tion of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real diflSculty is this : The
membership of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." * * *
Mr. Morris. That "democratic" is in quotes, is it not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; "democratic nations" is in quotes [reading] :
* * * These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free
speech. Many individual members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the
purpose of criticizing the U. S. S. R. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent
them from doing so, they will criticize Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet
propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness.
Senator Ferguson. That organ of Soviet propaganda is in quotes.
]\Ir. Lattimore. Is in quotes, yes [reading] :
Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic
in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor
imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the circum-
stances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favor publication
of positive and constructive articles, while not preventing entirely the expression
of negative and defeatest views. This means that whenever we find it impossible
to prevent publication of such an article, as this one by Hubbard, we should at
least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which
deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them con-
structively.
Now as to L. M. Hubbard himself. Of course, I do not propose to print his
article simply t)ecause he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House.
The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert"
of the Bank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is con-
sidered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article
would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan — thus damaging its
infiuence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the
Hubbard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications
with Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation.
In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action :
1. I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs.
* * *
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that paragraph was?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't [reading] :
* * * A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter.
2. I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to withdraw
the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. If, however, he officially
insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it. in our June
number.
3. Finally, I urge you to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be
published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later
than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House
insists on publication of the original article.
In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at
this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more
suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my
ability, within the limits imposed on me by the different national bodies which
liave a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs. I shall publish only material
which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the
U. S. S. R. Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with
indispensable assistance.
Very truly yours,
Owen Lattimore,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ^ 3437
May I comment ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. This letter begins with a paragraph not yet read
into the record, showing that I had received a letter from Mr. Motylev,
evidently a letter criticizing the article I was about to publish.
Senator Fergusox. Had you submitted it to Motylev in order that
he could censor it?
Mr. Latiimore. No ; not for censorship.
In the course of the usual practice of Pacific Affairs, I liad circu-
lated the article in advance.
Senator Ferguson. To whom did you circulate those that were pro-
Soviet? Who in America censored them or looked them over for
the pro-Soviet article?
Mr. Lattimore. All articles were circulated to those who might be
considered most interested, in the first place. Many of them were
sent additionally to people who might be considered to have no posi-
tion one way or the other.
The Chairman. That is not an answer to the question.
Senator Ferguson. That does not answer my question.
The Chairman. That is not an answer to that question at all.
Read the question, Mr. Reporter.
The question was propounded twice.
Mr. LA'riTMORE. I recall only one article.
The Chairman. Just a moment.
(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the
reporter. )
The Chairman. I think there was more. He doubled back.
Senator Ferguson. You say you circulated this because it was
anti-Soviet. It is clear from the letter that you did that. I want to
know
Mr. Lattimore. In the same way-
The Chairman. Let the Senator ask his question, and answer it.
Senator Ferguson. To whom did you submit pro-Soviet articles
so that they could be censored, or, as least, criticized before they were
published ?
Mr. Laitimore. That would depend on the content of the article.
Any article would be circulated
Senator Ferguson. Suppose it was an article criticizing Russia,
written by a United States writer.
Mr. Lattimore. An article criticizing Russia by a United States
writer would be circulated to the Russians, also to the British, Chi-
nese, Japanese, and so on.
Senator Fergusqn. Suppose it was an article by Soviet Russia, pro-
Soviet. Who criticized it for the United States ?
Mr. Lattimore. The New York office would look after that.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Field?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether it would be Mr. Field, or
who it would be. It would also be circulated to the Japanese, Chinese,
British, et cetera.
Senator Ferguson. Did you think that ^Ir. Field was a competent
critic to determine whether or not an article should be changed that
was a pro-Russion article?
3438 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. In 1938 I thoii^dit that Mr. Field was one of the
critics to whom such an article might be circulated.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
]Mr. LA-rriMORE. You will remember that in the record there was
an article by a Soviet contributor, which I personally disliked very
much and which was finally put in because the Chinese Council said,
"Oh, go ahead and print it^ it is the Soviet i^oint of view and every-
body knows it is''; although the Japanese continued to object.
Mr. SouRWiNE. May I mquire, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.
I cannot quite understand why you would take an article by this
Britisher and send it to the Russians, which is in effect sending it to the
Russian Government, for their connnent on that article as to whether
or not you should or should not print it.
Mr. Lattimore. It was part of regular practice. It was the same
for all other councils.
Senator Ferguson. And you had stricken out one anti-Soviet para-
graph, at least ?
Mr. Laitimore. Which was undoubtedly also covered in my cor-
res|)ondence with the British.
This is only a part of the record, and the full record would show
my correspondence with the British as well.
"Senator Ferguson. I would like to see it all.
Mr. Lattimore. So should I, Senator.
The Chairman. The question was asked now about having stricken
one out ; that is, the Soviet phase of it, at least.
Did you, or did you not in the letter so state?
Mr. Lattimore. The letter so states.
Senator Ferguson. You said it was the most objectionable, indi-
cating there were other objectionable ones that were anti-Soviet. But
that was the most?
Mr. LAT-riMORE. That was evidently my opinion at the time.
And may I add that this was undoubtedly covered in correspondence
with the British, too.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to see the article.
Mr. Latitmore. This was a period when all of us were leaning over
backward trying to drag the Soviets into more contributions to Pacific
affairs, and more participation in the Institute, and I remember clear-
ly that the attitude taken was, "Let's get the Russians out of this
business of just criticizing and stalling; let's get them to make some
contributions and then make them realize that they are getting only
the same treatment as other peoi^le."
You can see that this whole letter is an attempt to explain to a
Russian, who is unfamiliar with the practice of free speech and criti-
cism in democratic countries, how things worked and that Russia
was not being particularly singled out as an object of anti-Soviet
propaganda; that we frequently published articles unacceptable to
other councils.
This was recognized practice at the time.
Senator Ferguson. When you had a pro-Soviet article, to whom
did you submit the article so that an anti-Soviet could appear in the
same edition?
You were indicating liero that you were going to do that on the
reverse.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3439
Mr. LA-rriMORE. I referred already to the case of an article — I
believe it was by Voitinsky— which attacked both the Japanese and
the Chinese, and I asked both the Chinese and the Japanese to reply,
A\hich they didn't.
Senator Ferguson. Did you send them copies of the articled
Mr. Lattimore. I sent them copies of the article in advance.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr, Chairman, may I inquire \
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it not your understanding, Mr. Lattimore,
that the Soviets would not permit the editing or changing of their
articles^
Mr. Lattimore. That question was brought up in one of the con-
ferences at Moscow, and we were still then in the frame of mind that
many people had in those years
The Chairman. Just a moment. I want to get the question. 1
want to get the question and see whether you are ansAvering it.
(The record Avas read by the reporter.)
The Chairman. The question was what Avas your understanding.
Mr. Laitimore. My understanding is that quite recently Mr. Chair-
man, in those memoranda
The Chairman. The question is Avas it not your understanding, re-
ferring to that particular time.
Mr. Lattimore. My understanding was that the Russians had made
that demand. My recollection Avas that Ave Avere still hoping to Avean
them aAvay from this Soviet rigidity Avhich has since become more
familiar to all of us.
Mr. SouRAviNE. You had had that made clear to you in the con-
ferences in Moscow in 1936. that the Russians would not permit their
articles to be changed or edited l
Mr. LAT'riMORE. That had been made clear, that that Avas the Soviet
attitude, and Ave had not accepted, from our point of vieAV, the idea
that that attitude could not be changed.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever strike out of a Soviet article a part
that you thought Avas objectionable?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I did.
Senator Ferguson. Will you produce that?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't produce it, but I remember that that very
question came up in the case of the article by Voitinsky.
Senator Ferguson. Then Avill you produce it so that Ave Avill have
it here on the record.
The Chairman. Was the article jiublished?
Mr. Latfimore. The article was ])ublished.
Senator Ferguson. The IPR Avould be able to do that for you.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, I don't think they can do it. You have
all of the IPR documents.
Senator Ferguson. They can come doAvn here and look through the
papers.
The Chairman. The IPR must have it if it Avas published. It
must l)e in the files of the IPR.
Mr. Lattimore. I remember Avriting to Mr. Carter my strong ob-
jections to the Avhole tone of that Soviet article.
Senator Ferguson. That Avas not my question. Did you strike any
of it out?
Mr. Lattimore. I struck some of it out.
3440 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Will you produce or have the institute pi^^ace
for this record what you struck out?
The Chairman. The question is to produce the article, and I think
it calls for the printed article.
Mr. FoRTAs. Senator, may I inquire whether we may have access
to the IPR files in vour possession for the purpose of searching for
that?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, you can look through them. I ask the
Chair that you be permitted to do that.
Mr. FoRTAS. Not for the article. The article would not show what
was cut out. It would require access to the files.
The Chairman. The article, he said, was printed.
Mr. FoRTAS. Yes, but it would not show what was deleted.
The Chairman. But he could designate where the deletion was.
Mr. SouRW^iNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might submit, I do not believe
the files of the IPR would contain editorial material of Pacific Affairs.
Would they, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. That I couldn't tell you.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were not the Pacific Affairs files kept separately?
Mr, Lattimore. The Pacific Affairs files were kept separately by
me, but I think in large part in duplicate in the New York office.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You have made a point, sir, that, as Pacific Affairs
editor, you were employed by the International Council of IPR.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. The files which this committee has are the files of
the American Council of the IPR.
Can you tell the committee whether your files of Pacific Affairs
were duplicated in the files of the American Council of the IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know, Mr. Sourwine, whether they were
kept in the files of the American IPR or in a separate file box in the
New York office.
But Pacific Affairs, the handling of the printing and distribution
of Pacific Affairs, was done from New York, and I sent copies of all
manuscripts and correspondence in the normal course of operation to
the subeditor in New York.
Mr. Sourwine. To the American IPR did j^ou send such manu-
scripts and correspondence?
Mr. Lattimore. To the person who was acting as the subeditor of
Pacific Affairs in New York.
Mr. Sourwine. Who was that?
Mr. Lattimore. In those years I think it was Miss Catherine Porter.
Mr. Sourwine. This committee is interested in thb relationship be-
tween Pacific Affairs and the American Council of IPR and has
touched on that subject before and understood you to say that you
were making a clear distinction that you were not employed by the
American Council of IPR, that you were working for the Interna-
tional IPR.
Mr. Lattimore. That is quite right.
Mr. Sourwine. If, as a matter of fact, your correspondence and
records of documents and manuscripts were filed with the American
Council of IPR, that is a germane and important point, and we would
like to know what your best memory is on it.
Mr. Lattimore. IVIy best memory is that duplicates of all corre-
spondence and manuscripts were sent to Miss Porter in New York.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3441
Mr. SouRWiNE. What happened to the original ?
The Chairman. Miss Porter was with whom or with what organi-
zation, rather?
Mr. Lattimore. She was with the IPR, and she may have been — I
couldn't recall ; the records will undoubtedly show it — she was prob-
ably working part time with the American Council and part time for
the Pacific Council.
Senator Watkins. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes,
Senator Watkins. Was this Hubbard article actually published in
Pacific Affairs ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; it was.
Senator Watkins. Did the Russians send in a reply to it?
Mr. Lattimore. No; as usual, they didn't. This was one more
case of our trying to get something out of them so that there could be
equal treatment. I think that article — I may be wrong in saying it —
was by Voitinsky ; that article that we published was on railway ques-
tions in jManchuria by a Soviet correspondent. I believe that was the
only one we ever got out of them.
Senator Watkins. You asked them to reply and send it in early so
you could publish it in the same number ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right, and they never sent it.
Senator Watkins. Suppose they had sent in a reply, what would
have been your action witli respect to that reply ?
Mr. Lattimore. It would have gone straight to Chatham House,
among other councils. The top carbon copy would have gone to
Chatham House.
Senator Watkins. Would you have published that, with the others
having a chance to criticize and tell what they thought about the reply
article ?
Mr. Lattimore. It would have been subject to the same sort of back-
and-forth correspondence between a number of councils and
individuals.
The Chairman. The question is, Would you have published it?
Mr. Lattimore. The publication would have followed exactly the
same course as in the case of the Soviet article.
The Chairman. The Senator wants to know if you would have pub-
lished the article.
Mr. Fortas. Could we have the question read back ?
Senator Watkins. I did not think I asked that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It may be read back.
(The record was read by the reporter.)
Senator Watkins. Would you have published it, the reply without
first submitting it to these others ?
Mr. Lattimore. Definitely not.
Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, you were rushing him to get
it in so you would have had it there in time. You would not have had
time to do that, would you ?
Mr. Lattimore. I wanted to get it out of him as early as possible ;
but, if there had been a cable or a letter from the British saying that
they objected to it, then it would have been held over to a later num-
ber. That kind of thing frequently happened.
3442 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. As I got from this situation, you were right up
against a deadline, and you would not have time to do all of this, send
it around and have it circulated around.
Mr. Lattimore. We always, Senator, tried to get articles as early as
])ossible, es])ecially from these non-English-si)eaking councils, because
they were always falling behind deadlines, and we were usually giv-
ing them a deadline ahead of the real deadline so as to give ourselves
a little margin of time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have a real deadline, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. No; not as a newspaper regards it, sir. With a
quarterly magazine there is always
Mr. SouKwiNE. I did not mention newspaper. Did you have a real
deadline, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. We had a flexible sort of a deadline.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I think jVIr. Sourwine asked a ques-
tion just now that had been answered, and 1 think maybe we ought to
clear it up now. That is to say where the files of Pacific Affairs were
located, if, indeed, they were located anywhere else except at the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Sourwine. That was not cleared up. Senator.
Senator Smith. I can see how the editorial files might have been in
Mr. Lattimore's possession or in one of the other's ])ossession. Why
not ask Mr. Lattimore specifically whether or not the files that would
have contained the original articles which, when compared witli the
article which was printed, would have shown what was deleted,
whether he has that file or whether he knows where it is.
Mr. Lattimore. I had that file', and I think I can tell you exactly
what happened. I kept original files in the same office in which I
worked at Johns Hopkins.
At that time I was considered half time with Johns Hopkins and
half time with the institute. Then I left, went out to China, did
various war jobs, came back to Johns Ho))kins. and did not want to
resume the editorship of Pacific Affairs.
I remember at that time writing to the New York office and saying:
'"Here I have a lot of back files of Pacific Affaiis. Do you want them
shipped to New York or shall I junk them ^'' The answer was: "We
think the duplicate files here are sufficient, so yoti can just junk that
stuff you have in Baltimore.''
Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean by the Xew Yoi'k office, Mr.
Lattimore? The New York office of what ^
Mr. LAT-riMORK. The Xew York odlce of IPK.
Mr. Sourwine. The International Council or the American Council ?
Mr. LA'rriMORE. The two offices were together. I don't recall
clearly, but on this case I would probably have written to Mr. Carter
as secretary-general, therefore representing the International IPR.
Senator Smith. Well, now, were those files actually junked, or do
yo\i still have them somewhere in your office '.
Mr. Latitmore. No, sir; they were junked.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it your o]:»inion, sir, as the former editor of Pacific
Affairs, that the best place to look foi- old files of Pacific Affairs is in
the files of the American Comicil of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Lattimore. The best place to look would be in the storage files
of Pacific Affairs. Whether they have been amalgamated witli the
American Council files or not is something I just don't know about.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ^ 3443
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire ?
Mr. Lattimore. I ceased to have any concern.
Senator Ferguson. Who wrote the headings for the articles ?
Mr. Lattimore. Sometimes the author; sometimes I, myself.
Senator P>.rguson. In the Hubbard article, who wrote it?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what it was?
Mr. Lattimore. AVhat the article was?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Chairman. The article or the heading ?
Senator Ferguson. The heading.
Mr. Fortas. The question is the heading.
Mr. Lattimore. There are two articles by L. E. Hubbard ; that is,
the one that is being given here — it is a misprint — ^by L. M.
Senator Ferguson. The one of October 1937.
Mr. Lattimore. One of June 1938, called A Capitalist Appraisal of
the Soviet LTnion, and one of September 1938, The Standard of Living
in the Soviet Union.
Senator Ferguson. When did you get the article from Plubbard,
the one A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union ?
Mr. Lattimore. Published in June 1938? I don't know when I
got it. Maybe several weeks ahead, maybe several months ahead.
Senator Ferguson. The letter to Motylev is February 8, 1938, and
he had apparently had the article before that. Did you not get it
around October, when the man wrote ?
Mr. Lattimore. Did he write it in October ?
Senator Ferguson. There is another footnote on it : "This article
was written in October 1937."
I notice that tlie editor edited this even in the article. Apparently
you put the heading on, "A capitalist appraisal of the Soviet Union,"
and your first footnote is: "This article was written in October 1937."
Your second footnote is: "In 1937 production rose to 1,000
pounds — Ed."
You were seeing that the people were advised when the article
was written. He had written, in his article, 1925, 667 pounds of
grain. I will read what it says :
Since Russia has always been self-suflScient in food, the average consump-
tion per head of population must be determined by the production per head
of population. The most important constituent in the total food supply is
grain. Official Soviet figures show that the total quantity of wheat and rye
produced per head of population since 1925 has varied as follows : 1925, 677
pounds ; 1926, 731 pounds ; 1927, 666 pounds ; 1928, 590 pounds ; 1929, 550 pounds ;
1930, 696 pounds ; 1931, 503 pounds ; 1932, 480 pounds ; 1933, 681 pounds ; 1934, 672
pounds ; 1935, 697 pounds. This is an average of about 632 pounds —
Now you put the "2" in and refer down to your own footnote, and
you make this memorandum : "In 1937 production rose to over 1,000
pounds."
Why did you do that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably because that was a recent statistic
that had come to hand since the author wrote his article.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you get it?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably from the New York office. We had
several people there doing research on Soviet economics, and so forth.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think you may have got that from
3444 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Field to make it appear that these figures were all wrong because
it was a capitalist appraisal ?
Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it. I think it would be much more likely
that we got it from somebody who was able to read economic
materials.
Senator Ferguson. On page 174 you have a footnote 3 giving differ-
ent figures than he gave.
Mr. Lattimore. More recent figures ; is that right ?
Senator Ferguson. No. You give :
Professor Prokopovich, in his Bulletin No. 104, published by the Slavonic
Institute in Prague, gives the following comparison of the purchasing power
of the price of a quintal of wheat and rye in 1913 and 1932.
The item that you corrected was :
There is no doubt that the purchasing power of the peasants' money income
now is less than prewar.
Now, to contradict that, you publish, as an editor's note, something
different.
Mr. FoRTAS. Senator, may the witness see that ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; I am going to show it to him later.
Then you make a correction on page 177 : "Figures for 1936 include
all footwear, for previous years only leather footwear."
Then on page 184 there is a criticism, or this sentence is used :
The greater part of the collective farm peasant's income consists of a dividend
in kind from the farm produce after all State requirements have been filled, and,
as an individual, he has no choice in the policy of the farm nor in the work he
must do.
You have carried it in "6" and you call it an editor's footnote. You
put this in :
This does not agree with the account in Soviet Communism, a New Civiliza-
tion, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, second edition, London, 1937 — Ed.
How do you account for that correction ?
Mr. LAT'riMORE. I suppose somebody had found this other statistic
and put it in.
Senator Ferguson. Who was working on this article besides you?
Mr. LAT'ruviORE. I have no idea who may have worked on it in the
New York office.
Senator Ferguson. This article annoyed you to have published it,
did it not; it was quite a corn to you to have to publish this article?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was trying to avoid a break with the
Soviet Union. I was trying to get them into the works and get them
to participate in the give and take of the other councils.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not do the best by these footnotes to
appease the Soviets?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I would not say so.
Senator Ferguson. You would not say so?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. You do not think that last quote that I gave
you, No. 6, was an appeasement to the Soviets?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think so. I think it was an attempt
to balance tlie article, and may I say that the whole such editorial
changes were referred
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3445
The Chairman. Just a minute. Strike that last from the record,
Mr. Reporter. When you are asked to pause, please, Mr. Lattimore,
pause.
Senator Ferguson. Have you found anything in this record so far,
and I am excluding yours now, on the part of Carter or Field that
has been pro-Soviet. I do not think I have found an answer from you
that anything was ever pro-Soviet.
I am asking you, can you point out anything that you have heard
in the record by Field or Carter that was pro-Soviet?
The Chairman. In the record of this hearing?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; in the record of this hearing.
Mr. Lattimore. No; not in any objectionable sense.
Senator Ferguson. Are you qualifying it? Objectionable to you?
That is the difficulty in this hearing. You want to be the sole judge,
judge.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I merely wish to be
Senator Ferguson. I am not asking whether it is objectionable. I
am asking whether it was pro-Soviet.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; not in the sense of furthering
The Chairman. The answer is "No" ?
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No."
Senator Ferguson. Even the letter this morning ?
Mr. Lattimore. Even the letter this morning.
Senator Ferguson. From Carter to you, about the invasion of
Finland ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was an attempt to get all sides of a ques-
tion by a man who had not yet made up his mind. I don't think
that can be called pro- Soviet.
Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore, you were
against publishing any anti-Soviet articles, were you not?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people to
participate in the working of the institute.
Senator Watkins. Let me read you this sentence from your letter.
In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that
at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find
more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles.
That is a part of your letter. That expressed your views.
Mr. Lattimore. That expressed part of what I thought was a
diplomatic approach to these rigid and unbending
The Chairman. The question is, did that express your views?
Answer that question.
Mr. Lattimore. It expressed my attempt to be diplomatic.
Senator Watkins. At that time, were you anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet
in your own views ?
Mr. Lattimore. As best I can recall, Senator, at that time I was
not pro-Soviet, and in the workings of the institute I was trying to
get the Soviet people to participate.
The Chairman. All right ; let us proceed.
Mr. Lattimore. I was certainly anti-Communist.
Senator Watkins. I had a question there with respect to that.
Mr. Lattimore. I was not anti-Soviet participation in the institute,
certainly.
3446 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. Did you realize there was any danger from a
Communist philoso]^]iy and the Communist progi'am at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. As for 1938 I did not consider that they were dan-
gerous ; no.
Senator Watkins. And when you said that you agreed with this
sentiment, they ought not to publisli anti-Soviet articles, you would
be against any kind of an anti-Soviet article that might reveal even a
dangerous situation that was coming up?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people into
l^articipation in the IPR, and for that purpose I was willing to limit
the number of articles that were direct attacks on the Soviet until we
could get them in and make them realize that they were not being
given any treatment different from any other council.
Senator Watkins. You said that you should not publish these anti-
Soviet articles.
Mr. Lattimore. Obviously trying to placate Mr. Motylev and try-
ing to get him to be a little more cooperative than he had been in
the past, or ever was in the future.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire so the record
will be very clear on this. If you changed the article in any way from
the author, did you always say "Ed.," indicating it was editor, if there
was a footnote ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. I not only did that, but I also referred
it back to the author himself.
Senator Ferguson. Will you try and show us, then, the corre-
spondence showing whether or not these footnotes all have been sub-
mitted to the author or not ?
Mr. Lattimore. As far as the record of these documents may show
them, I will certainly try to.
The Chairman. As I understand, the record of these documents
and the record that he kept, let us see if I have this clear, the files
that he kept have been destroyed. Am I correct in that assumption
from his answers?
Mr. Lattimore. The files that I kept I had been told to junk because
it was considered that the duplicate files in NeAv York were sufficient.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you in fact junk them?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did.
Senator Ferguson. I might say that on page 174 appears " — Ed." ',
meaning editor. On the other pages there are uo "Ed." 's on them or
" — Ed.," except on the last one that I read, where I read the "Ed.," on
page 184.
Mr. Lattimore. The other notes would be the author's own notes.
Senator Ferguson. Then wnll you get us the correspondence or try
to find the correspondence between you and the author approving the
editor's notes ?
Mr. Latitmore. If they can be found in the files yoti possess, I will
be glad to try.
Mr. FoRTAS. Senator, so the record may be clear, do I understand
that it was the first footnote and the last footnote to which you re-
ferred that have ''Ed." and the other ones to which you referred do not
have "Ed."?
Senator Ferguson. I did not read "Ed." on those, either,
Mr. SouRAviNE. Mr. Chairman, if I may intrude here, I am inter-
ested in the witness' suggestion that the first place to start looking for
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3447
these is the files that the committee has. I asked the witness earlier
if he felt that the best place to look was in these files, and I understood
his answer to imply that he did not think so.
I would like to ask again, sir, do you think that the most likely
place to find remainino; files of Pacific Affairs is in the files of the
American Council of IPR, which this committee now possesses?
Mr. Lattimore. I assume that you had all of the files, all of the
back files, and that they might include international files as well as
xVmerican council files.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If we do not have international files, do you still
feel that the best place to look would be in the files of the American
council, which this committee has?
Mr. Lattimore. As I said, Mr. Sourwine, I don't know anywhere
else to look.
Mr. SouRwixE. Do you have any resources for attempting to deter-
mine what became of those carbons which you were told were adequate
records ?
Mr. Lattimore. None whatever.
Mr. Sourwine. There is no one you could ask what became of them ?
Mr. Lattimore. I could ask the IPR people if they had amalga-
mated the international files with the American council files. May I
explain why I think so?
My understanding is that those back files had been moved up to
]\Ir. Carter's barn, partly because of lack of space in the Xew York
office
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, pardon the interruption.
The Chairman. That is not an explanation.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you not testify here, sir, that you had no knowl-
edge about those files being in the barn, or where they were, until you
read in the newspaper that this committee had seized the files?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right. But I don't think that alters the
explanation I was just giving.
The Chairman. That is not an explanation of anything, because
you do not know.
Mr. Lattimore. I think there is a
The Chairman. Just a moment. I am not going to argue with the
witness, and I do not want the witness arguing with the Chair.
Mr. Lattimore. I thought the record showed that I had a pertinent
point, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. I thought Mr. Lattimore answered a question I
asked him if he had been in the barn, and I thought he said ''Yes.''
Was that before or after the documents were in there ?
Mr. Lait^'imore. I couldn't even tell you that. I don't know which
year they were moved up there.
Senator Smith. Do you know how many times you were in the
barn ?
Mr. Lattimore. Maybe four or five times.
Senator Smith. Did you ever have any conferences or meetings
there with Mr. Carter or anybody else in the barn ?
Mr. La'i^itmork. Yes. Part of the barn was fitted up as a sort of
conference room.
Senator Smith. That was with respect to IPR nuitters?
Mr. Lattimore. That was with respect to IPR mattei-s, and I be-
lieve that the only occasions that I was there were on matters of the
3448 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
International IPR, the Pacific council, rather than the American
council.
Senator Smith. You never saw any of the IPR records in that barn,
the question Mr. Sourwine just referred to ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I remember there were file cases there, but I
don't know what was in which ones. I know that Mr. Carter was
planning to write a history of the IPR, and, therefore, he would have
legitimate reason to have Pacific council files there as well as Amer-
ican council files.
Senator Smith. He sort of took over that job?
Mr. Lattimore. After he retired he was going to spend some time
on writing a history of tlie IPR.
The Chairman. Who has a question ?
Mr. Sourwine. I have one, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask it.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. You destroyed the files of Pacific Affairs, is that
right, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I junked them.
Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean by junked them?
Mr. Lattimore. I told my secretary that we didn't want these files
any more, and would she have the janitor take them out.
Mr. Sourwine. Where was this at the time, over at Johns Hop-
kins?
Mr. Lattimore. At Johns Hopkins.
Mr. Sourwine. When did you do this?
Mr. Lattimore. I think in 1945 or 1946, after I had returned to the
Hopkins from my war jobs.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it your testimony that you had none of the files
of Pacific Affairs in your possession or under your control after 1946?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. When these files were junked, as you say, were they
taken out by the janitor ?
Mr. Lattimore. The next time I came into my office they weren't
there.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what was done with them ?
Mr. Lattimore. I haven't the faintest idea.
Mr. Sourwine. You know we had a case over in an investigation
before the other body where a witness initially testified that he put
certain papers in the wastebasket and later on he said, "They didn't
ask me what I did with the wastebasket."
Mr. Fortas. Mr. Chairman, could we have a few minutes' recess?
The Chairman. We will recess at 12. Is that all right?
Mr. FoRTAs. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider this article by L. E.
Hubbard an anti-Soviet article?
If you have difficulty answering that question, I call your attention
to the last paragraph of the letter we have been discussing.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think. Mr. Morris, at that time 1 was com-
petent to judge an economic article on the economics of Soviet Russia.
I considered it an article that the Russians considered anti-Soviet.
Mr. Morris. I am just using your expression of anti-Soviet there
in the last paragraph.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3449
The Chairman. Eeacl the last paragraph. Read the first sentence
of the last paragraph.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at
this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more
suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles.
Mr. IMoRRis. Did you consider this article an anti-Soviet article?
Mr. Lattimore. I considered it an article that the Russians consid-
ered anti-Soviet.
The Chairman. The question is did you consider it an anti-Soviet
article. It is asking for your own consideration.
Mr. Lattimore. I consider that I was incompetent to judge on the
subject. Maybe if I looked over the correspondence
The Chairman. That is the answer.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what did you mean in paragraph 3 of
that letter, that criticism of Pacific Affairs as an organ of Soviet
propaganda would largely destroy its usefulness ?
Mr. FoRTAS. That is not quite the quote.
Mr. Morris. What did you mean by that ?
Mr. FoRTAs. That is not quite the quote.
Mr. Lattimore. I said :
If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so —
that is, prevent people from criticizing the U. S. S. R. —
they will criticize Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely
destroy its usefulness.
You Avanted to know what I meant by that ?
Mr, Morris. What did you mean by "that, yes?
Mr. Lattimore. 1 meant to try to educate the Russians to an under-
standing of the practice in democratic countries that if you publish
pro and con articles you are not necessarily engaged in a campaign
against some one particular country, something that we never got them
to understand.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that next letter ?
Mr. ]Mandel. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, evidentlv a photostat of a carbon from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 10, 1938,
addressed to a Miss Harriet INIoore, American-Russian Institute, 56
West Forty-fifth Street, Xew York, N. Y. It is unsigned.
Mr. Morris. What is the address of the letter, the mailing address?
Mr. Mandel. It comes from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New
York.
Mr. Morris. Is this the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations
at that time ?
Mr. ]SL4lndel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Just a moment now. I want Mr. Mandel to testify.
Is this a photostatic copy of a paper found in the files of the Pacific
Relations, the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The reason I raise that question is that you say
"evidently." I want to clear it as to whether it is or is not. It is;
is that right?
Mr. Mandel. It is.
88348— 52— pt. 10 12
3450 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record
inasmuch as the first parao;raph in this letter relates to the controversy
that we have now been taking testimony on?
The Chairman. Let me look at it.
Mr. Morris. "Mr. Chairman, it is an unsigned letter, but it did
emanate from the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. It is addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, American-
Russian Institute, 5(i West Forty-fifth Street, Xew York. Very well,
it will be received in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 535" and is
as follows:)
p]xiiiniT No. 53.")
129 East Fifty-second Street.
Neic York City, February 10, 1<J38.
Miss Harriet Moore,
Anicrican-Riissinri Institute,
56 West Forty-fifth Street, Neiv York, N. Y.
Dkar Harriet: Has Owen Lattimore written you about Motylev's protest over
the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a copy. Lattimore feels that our
relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we are
asking Motylev to write for the same issue a re.ioinder. Now. Motylev will
probably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considei'ing getting both you
and Gradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder
that can possibly be produced.
Before starting in on it, however, I should like to talk with you so as to get
your reaction to the proposal.
Tuesday afternoon, your father and mother put on a swell cocktail party for
me (or rather for the IPR) at the Casino. It was delightful to see them both
and to see your brother. You will probably hear from the family as to who
attended. The only academic people were Sam Harper and Hazard. Howard
Vincent O'Brien of the Daily News was there, and Mrs. T. Kenneth Boyd. As
for the rest, I'll have to get the list from your family as I just couldn't rt>member
the names of everyone that I met. After the meeting was over. Harper and
Hazard endorsed an aside that I made with reference to your competency.
At luncheon yesterday with Sewell Avery. I took the same line.
I wonder wiiether you can spare a little time to see me on, say, Monday
afternoon, the 14th?
Sincerely yours,
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the first paragraph,
please?
Mr. Laitimore (reading) :
Dear Harriet: Has Owen Lattimore written to you about Motylev's protest
over the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a coi)y. Lattimore feels that
our relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we
are asking Motylev to write for the same issue a rejoinder. Now, Motylev will
pi-obably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considering getting both you
and Oradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder
that can possibly be produced.
Before starting in on it, 1 should like to talk with you so as to get your reaction
to the proposal.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, at that time, did you know that Harriet
Moore was a Communist^
Mr. Lattimore. No; I did nol. and I did nol consider her a Com-
numist.
Seiuitor Feu(!Uson. Who woidd yoii say wrote tliis letter, Mr. Lat-
timore, from its text?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no way of knowing.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3451
The Chairmax. It is associated with your correspondence with Mr.
Carter, is it not?
Senator Ferguson. Did you strike out enouji:h of it to have it a])i)eas-
iiio; to the Russians, with your editor's notes?
Mr. Laitimore. I don't think the editor's notes were appeasin<«-
the Russians, hut apart from that ■
Mr. Fortas. What is tlie question?
Senator Ferguson. The question is, did they ever write this masterly^
))enetratiiio-, penetrating- and masterly, rejoinder and take the sting
out of this capitalist article?
The Chairman. That can be answered yes or no.
Mr. FoRTAs. Senator, I do not think so.
The Chairman. Did you ever write, yes or no? #
Mr. FoRTAs. Did you ever write, yes or no, but not with that
addendum.
Senator Ferguson. I am going- to frame the ciuestions, Mr. Fortas,
not you.
Tlie Chairman. You are not going to i)ass on these questions, Mr.
Fortas,
Senator Ferguson. What is the answer to my c^uestion, Mr. Latti-
more ?
The Chairman. Read the question to the witness.
(The record w^as read by the reporter.)
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe any masterly rejoinder was ever
written, but we did publish, in June 19o8, an article called The Rate
of (xrowth in the Soviet Union, which might be considered as an article
balancing the Hubbard article. That article is listed by A. W. Canniff,
and recently, when I was looking through copies of Pacific Affairs, 1
noticed that A. W. Canniff was described as a pseudonym.
That may have been the result of this — this pseudonym may repre-
sent the article wdiich is suggested in this letter. But my recollection
is not at all clear on the subject.
Senator Ferguson. Who wrote the article ?
Mr. Lattimore. Who wrote the Canniff article?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. I was trying to recall that, and I haven't been able
to recall it. When I saw that it was a pseudonym, I searched my
memory to see if I could remember who it was.
Senator Ferguson. Why would it be written by an alias?
Mr. Lattimore. That is what I couldn't imagine at the time I saw
it. Now, from this letter here
The Chairman. Which letter do you refer to now, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I am referring to this unsigned letter to Miss
Harriet Moore of February 10, that it may have been a joint research
article done by Miss Harriet Moore and Mr. Gradjansev, and that
for purposes of simplification they wrote it under a pseudonym in-
stead of a joint name. This is pure speculation on my part.
Senator Ferguson. But it appears that at least Miss Moore has
refused to ansAver whether or not, when she was working on this job,
she was a Communist, and her ground assigned was that it would tend
to incriminate her.
I think you have indicated that that was sufficient proof to you to
jjrove that she was a Communist,
3452 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. That would certainly raise that presumption in
my mind. But as I have also said quite recently, in 1938 I had no
reason whatever to consider Miss Moore a Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Who was the gentleman there, Gradjansev?
Mr. Lattimore. The other was Mr. Gradjansev, who was a White
Russian.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether that is the same Mr. Gradjansev
who was dismissed from General MacArthur's headquarters for left-
wing activity ?
Mr. Lattimore. I did not know that he was dismissed for left-
wing activity. I know he worked for a while under SCAP.
Mr. Morris. Did you know he was dismissed ?
Mr. Latiimgre. Xes ; I knew he was dismissed.
Mr. Morris. What reason did you believe was the cause of his dis-
missal ?
Mr. Lathmore. The reason I heard was that he had given some
cigarettes to some Japanese. He was a man who didn't smoke, and
he used his cigarette ration to give to some Japanese who were doing
some economic work for him, and this was considered, I believe, to be
black-marketeering.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that the American-
Russian Institute was affiliated with the Soviet organization Voks?
Mr. Lattimore. I have been asked that question before, and I did
not know it.
Mr. Morris. Did you know it was cited by the Attorney General as
a subversive organization, the American-Russian Institute?
Mr. Lattimore. I had heard that, and then I heard that that deci-
sion had been revoked .
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document,
please ?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 24, 1938, addressed
to Owen Lattimore, with a typed signature of G. E. Hubbard. It is
a photostat of a carbon from the files of the institute.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this document, and ask if
you can recall having received that letter.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall having received it, but obviously I
did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?
Mr. Fortas. May we have a copy ?
Mr. Morris. I am sorry, we do not have copies of that.
Mr. Lattimore. You want me to read the full letter?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. This is dated February 24, 1938 [reading] :
Exhibit No. 536
Deae Lattimore : I have received your letter of February 8 about the articles
by my brother (whose initials by the way are L. E. not L. M.).
It is my first sight of the article as I sent the only copy I had to your New
York office as I explained at the time. As it now stands after your pruning,
I confess I can't quite understand why the trouble has arisen. Barring the last
two paragraphs, which verge on politics, it seems to me a thoroughly unemotional,
well-documented and slightly overstatistical, statement of economic conditions
in Russia. Whether the picture it gives is one-sided only a very well informed
person can tell ; knowing my brother I am perfectly certain that there is
absolutely no intentional distortion. Any criticistm of the Soviet system by a
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3453
writer brought up in the capitalist school, and vice vei'sa, is, I should imagine,
likely to be regarded as prejudiced by the other side, but I find it hard to under-
stand why the present piece of work should be classed as "anti-Soviet."
I should have thought that this was a clear case for a "correcting" article
from the IPR Soviet Council if they disagiee with the writer's factual state-
ments, his interpretation of the figures, or his description of the working of the
collectivist system. If Mr. Motylev had contended that the article contained
definite misrepresentations, and was in a position to show that this is so, the
same question of principle would arise which we considered in connection with
the Asiaticus article in the June 1936 issue of Pacific Affairs; but it would
almost seem from the quotations you give from his letter that his objection is
much more general and such as would extend to any critical review of economic
conditions in the U. S. S. R. if we were not favorable to the system. If so, the
question of excluding such contributions from Pacific Affairs is, as you say, one
of policy. But surely one of policy for the IPR as a whole, rather than for
Chatham House. As regards Chatham House responsibility our view would be
that the contribution was an individual one, the fact that it went through me
being merely the result of my attempt to fulfill your request for grist for Pacific
Affairs and in such circumstances I am sure that Chatham House would not
wish to accept responsibility. Macadam and I feel that the question of risk
which publication would imply for relations with the Soviet Council can only
be estimated by Carter and yourself and that a decision on this point could not
very well be asked of our committee.
I really think that it comes back after all to the question of editorial prin-
ciple, and of editorial decision. Obviously no one would want to see the rela-
tions of the Soviet with the IPR torn by the publication of anything appearing
in Pacific Affairs, and if Mr. Motylev is not prepared to accept the article as an
honest attempt at analysis by an informed foreign observer, written without
political arriere-pensee although from an admittedly capitalist viewpoint, and
to counter it by a rejoinder written from the Bolshevik standpoint, it may be
wiser, as a matter of principle, to close Pacific Affairs to the discussion of
Russian internal affairs and so to exclude the present article. I should hope,
however, that Mr. Motylev would consent to see the matter in that light and to
meet criticism of things in his own country just as we had to meet what was, I
submit, much less objective criticism of ourselves in the Asiaticus article.
I am not referring to my brother as he is really not concerned with IPR
internal politics, so will you deal with him direct as and when necessary? I am
afraid that he was not warned that his manuscript would have to pass the fire
of Moscow criticism. I ought no doubt to have remembered your practice and
told him.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) G. E. Hubbabd.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received for the record?
The Chairman. It will be inserted.
(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Ex-
hibit No. 536" and was read in full.)
Senator Ferguson. May I ask one question ?
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Ferguson. IVliat was the name of the man or the writer
that wrote tlie counter-article for June ?
JNIr. Lattimore. Canniff.
Senator Ferguson. You put a note on that. You seemed to know
who Andrew W. Canniff was, because you said this, and you have
the article follow the Hubbarcl article :
Readers of Pacific Affairs are accustomed to our policy of printing articles
that express different and sometimes opposite points of view. We do this for
something more than the interest of good debate, a more important aim of our
editorial policy is to let our readers know as far as we possibly can what is
really happening in all the subjects that are of interest to the Institute of
Pacific Relations. "We, accordingly, print the following article by an author
who uses almost exactly the same figures as Mr. Hubbard, but comes to an
entirely different conclusion. Mr. Canniff has recently been studying the agri-
cultural economics of both the Soviet Union and Manchuria — Ed.
3454 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS *
You said that yoii knew this man. He had been studying it. You
did not say lie was writing under an alias.
Mr. LA'rriMORE. Yes, I did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. In this?
Mr. Lattimore. It is in the list of authors at the beginning of
the
Senator Ferguson. In this note you did not.
Mr. LA-rriMORE. Not in the note, no. It was in the description of
authors at the beginning.
The Chairman. My recollection is that you said this morning you
did not know who this w^as.
Mr. Laitimore. I said that I didn't recall.
Senator Ferguson. Who was it?
Mr. Lattimore. I should say from that description of somebody
who had been studying agricultural economics in both Kussia and
Manchuria, that it was probably Mr. Gradjansev.
Senator Ferguson. And he was the man who was mentioned in the
article with Harriet Moore to write the masterly piece?
The Chairman. Is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. That is somebody else's language.
Senator Ferguson. To prepare the masterly rejoinder?
Mr. Lattimore. That is somebody else's language, not my lan-
guage.
The Chairman. We will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was recessed to reconvene at
2 p. m., the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p. m., upon the expiration of
the recess.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
You may proceed, Mr. MoitIs.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you in 1945 recommend Fred-
erick V. Field as a person to work with the Defense Advisory Com-
mission of the United States?
Ml'. Lattimore. No, I don't lielieve I did, Mr. Morris. I have
seen some reference to that possibility in the transcript, but I don't
recollect doing so.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a jihotostat of a document from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of Pacific Alfairs,
Telei)hone: University 0100, extension 48, appearing in upper right
hand corner, and Please Address Reply to: 300 Gilman Hall, Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., api)earing under letterhead of
Pacific Affairs, dated SeptemV)er 10, 11)40, addressed to Mr. Fred-
erick V. Field, signed Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask if you
recall having written it?
Mr. Latitmore. No, I doirt recall having written this.
Mr. Morris. Is that your signature?
Mr. Lattimore. That is my signature. I must have written it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?
Mr. Lattimore. This is to Frederick V. Field.
The Chairman. What is the date of it ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3455
Mr. Lattimoke. Dated September 10, 1940. [Reading:]
ExHiRiT No. .")3T
Dear Fred : This morning a Mr. S. Taylor Ostrander, of room 303, 1424 K
Street. Washington, D. C, rang me up to asli where to get hold of an economist
competent to deal with .Japanese wartime fiscal policies. I at once gave him your
name and told him that on account of getting the new edition of the Economic
Handbook ready for publication, you would be in touch with the right people.
He said that he already had you on his list to ring up, and went on to ask
about other people. I think I forgot to say at the beginning of this letter that
he is connected with one or another branch or su!)division of the Defense Ad-
visory Commission. I then gave him Grajdanzev's name, as l)eing both a trained
economist and currently working in original .Japanese material. I pointed out
that for his purposes the fact that Gra.jdanzev does not yet have his citizenship
might be a barrier, but he told me that in some cases they proceed by appointing
someone to a general job, with salary allowances for taking on assistants for
such purposes at this.
Yours very sincerely,
[s] Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Cliairniaii. may it be received into the record?
The Chairman. It may be received into the record.
(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 537" and
was read in fulL)
The Chairman. What is that other name there?
Mr. Lattimore. Grajchinzev.
The Chairman. Who was he ?
Mr. Lattimore. He was the man referred to this morning, a White
Russian, who was at that time in New York. And I tliink he was
doing some work, maybe part time or for the IPR.
Mr. Morris. Was what you wrote to Mr. Fiekl tliere the truth,
Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Why, yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Manclel, will you identify that document for the
record ?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of tlie Institute of
Pacific Relations, headed "E. C. C. from A. G. — copies to O. L. and
M. F." It is undated.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may be this be read into the record?
The Chairman. I would like to have the initials identified.
Is anyone competent to. identfy them?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, on the basis of your experience with
the Institute of Pacific Relations, could you tell us who used the
initials E.C.C J
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. E. C. Carter.
Mr. Morris. A. G.?
Mr. Lattimore. A. G. would be Andrew Grajdanzev, I think.
Mr. Morris. O. L. ?
Mr. Lattimore. Myself.
Mr. Morris. M. F. ?
Mr. Lattimore. Miriam Farley, I think.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I ask on this recommen-
dation of Field, of September 10, 1940?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. We have had some difficulty in getting an
answer, Mr. Lattimore, as to just when you came to the conclusion
3456 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
that Field was a Communist. You said in your statement that it was
in the forties.
Did you withdraw any of these recommendations after you came
to the conclusion that he was a Communist, or did you let them stand ?
Mr. Lattimore. Excuse me, Senator, this is not a recommendation
of Mr. Field for an intelligence job.
Senator Ferguson. You are writing to Field :
I at once gave him your name and told him that on account of getting the
new edition of the Economic Handbooli for publication, j-ou would be in touch
with the right people.
You mean for somebody else to
Mr. Lattimore. I thought that Field would know I'etter than I
would who was competent to work with Japanese wartime fiscal policy.
Senator Ferguson. And then did you think that Field at that time,
as a Communist, would be a proper person to get them in touch with
the Communists ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe that on September 10, 1940, I
thought Mr. Field was a Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Can you give us the date when you did come to
that conclusion ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I can only come to the conclusion on the
basis of my present knowledge and recollections that Mr. Field prob-
ably became a Communist in the 1940's sometime.
The Chairman. That is, you came to the conclusion in the forties.
I think you stated in your statement — see if I quote you correctly
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think so. Senator.
The Chairman. When did you come to the conclusion?
I think this question has been asked and answered two or three times.
When did you come to the conclusion that Mr. Field was a Com-
munist ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am now of the conclusion that he became a Com-
munist probably sometime in the 1940's, but I don't know when I
first came to that conclusion.
The Chairman. Have you no way of telling this committee when
you came to that conclusion ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. Let me see the Harriet Moore letter of this
morning.
Mr. Lattimore, this was the same man that you had recommended,
you had recommended Grajdanzev's name, and he was the one who
was being recommended to "prepare the most penetrating and mas-
terly rejoinder that can possible be produced to the anti-Communist
article by Hubbard." And it was put in your magazine in June of
1938; is that correct?
Mr. Lattimore. The recommendation and the wording are not mine,
Senator.
The Chairman. That is not the question now. Listen to the
question.
Senator Ferguson. But he is the same man who was recommended
for that job and did write the pro-Soviet article.
Mr. Lattimore. I cannot accept your characterization of that article
as pro-Soviet, Senator.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3457
Senator Ferguson. I realize that you have said that you see nothing,
you have not seen anything pro-Soviet.
But is not that what you were telling Molotov, that if that article
went in, in effect you would try and get, allow him to write an article?
And then the facts come out here that someone is writing Harriet
Moore, who turns out to be a Communist, and to get Harriet Moore
to get this gentleman to write "the most penetrating and masterly
rejoinder that can possibly be produced."
And you put the headline on this article by Hubbard that was a
capitalist article, and you followed it with this article that was sup-
posed to carry out what you had in mind with the Soviets, of having
a counterarticle.
Would not that make it pro-Soviet ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chair3iax. The answer is no.
Mr. Lattimore. ISIay I explain ?
I asked the Soviet Council to put in an article of their own, which
would obviously have been pro-Soviet. Failing that, I w^anted to get
an article that would present another treatment of the same material
used by Mr. Hubbard, and, as far as my intentions were concerned,
they were not to produce an article that would be Soviet propaganda,
or anything of the kind.
I had at that time no reason whatever to suppose that Harriet
Moore was Communist, and I had no reason whatever to suppose that
Grajdanzev was Communist, or pro-Communist.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I revert back — I do not like to do
this — to previous testimony?
The Chairman. All right.
;Mr. Morris. But on Friday, a letter written by Mr. Field to Mr.
Lattimore, dated October 3, 1939, was presented to Mr. Lattimore on
the general bearing of whether he knew at that particular time that
Field was a member of the Communist Party, or connected with the
Communist movement ideologically.
Mr. Lattimore read Mr. Field's letter, which contained the following
paragraphs :
If I were to try and work out my own thoughts on Soviet policy I think I
should start by attempting to compare the conditions of the present war, the
second imperialist war, with those of the first imperialist war. I should first
say that both wars were similar in that they were imperialist wars, in the
Marxist sense of the word. I should immediately add, however, that they con-
tained an essential difference, the difference being the concrete existence of the
Soviet Union with 21 or 22 years of revoluntionary experience now as con-
trasted with its nonexistence during the first war.
The next stop would be, I believe, to recall the slogans of revolutionary groups
during the first war ; namely, to transfer the imperialist war into a civil war
or into a series of civil wars. This object came off only in Czarist Russia dur-
ing the last war, though pretty substantial attempts were made in a number of
other countries. I judge that the slogan of the present war is exactly the same,
but that again the concrete existence of the Soviet Union makes its application
in the present war something quite different than in 1914-18. The problem to-
day from a revoluutionax-y point of view is the same as it was in 1914 ; the Brit-
ish must get rid of their Chamberlains, the Germans of their Hitlers, the French
of their Daladiers. But this time the Soviet Union operates as a powerful and
concrete force to aid in these civil war efforts.
The Chairman. ^Vliose letter is that?
Mr. INIoRRis. Mr. Field to Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.
At the time, as I recall, we presented this letter to Mr. Lattimore.
3458 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
He conceded that his memory was wrong by several years in his esti-
mate that Field was a Communist.
Mr, FoRTAs. Mr. Chairman, may we see that transcript?
The Chairman. Just a moment, Mr. Fortas.
Mr. Fortas, the Chair and you got along pretty well for about 7 or
8 days. We hope we will get along for the rest of this time.
Mr. Fortas. I join you in that hope, Mr. Chairman.
Just a moment, Mr. Lattimore. I think Mr. Morris sent for the
transcript.
Mr. Morris. I think we can get on while we are waiting for that,
Mr. Chairman, to save time.
The Chairman. The transscript should be here and his answer
should be read back to him.
Mr. Morris. The question is on page 5149 of the transcript.
Mr. Lattimore, perhaps you will read it, commencing with the
question put to you by Mr. Morris.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Mr. Lattimore, when you received that letter
Mr. Morris. That is the letter that I had just read, is it not, Mr.
Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore, That is right [reading] —
did you consider that that was evidence that Mr. Field had vigorous Com-
ninist sympathies?
Mr. Lattimoke. I don't remember receiving the letter, and my recollection has
been that I began to think that Mr. Field was a close fellow travelei- of the
Russians at the time of the American Peace Mobilization, which I think was
1941. Wasn't it? But judging from this letter, my memory was in error by
about 2 years.
Mr, Morris, In other words, you knew he had these vigorous pro-
Communist sympathies in 1939?
Mr, Lattimore, That is what I said at that time, Mr, Morris, I
thought the matter over subsequently, and it seems to me that 1 ought
not to go too far in characterizing my very vague recollections of that
time years ago.
It seems to me that, reading again this letter of Mr, Field's to me,
that an equally possible explanation is that I might have thought at
the time that tliis was just another example of an American intellectual
interested in Russian problems indulging in the kind of amateur in-
terpretation of ideology that has since become such a prevalent habit.
Mr. Morris. In other words, Mr. Lattimore, you want to change
your testimony of last Friday; is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. I should like to amend my testimony to that extent,
to say that my recollection of Avhat I thought at the time is not at all
clear.
The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, we have been in these hearings now
some 7 or 8 days. You realize that during all of that time and now you
are under oath?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, Senator, I do.
1 also realize that many pieces of evidence have been presented to
me in many ways with other people's phrasings and wordings, and
that under the i)ressure of cross-examining, I may at times have ad-
mitted to using other people's words and saying things that I didn't
quite mean myself, or that I would have said if I had had time for
mature consideration, or if I had been less fatigued.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3459
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, that brings us to the question
that you expect this body to pass upon the question and, with tliis
statement, how are we going to tell whether you are telling the truth,
or not, either from fatigue or a willful intent not to tell it?
What are we going to do? Are we going to sit here for 8 days and
now have you tell us that you are not responsible for what you have
told us? Is that what you want to tell us now?
Mr. Lattimore. No, Senator. I am merely saying that after many
days of interrogation about matters that happened many years ago,
I am not at all surprised that I should have become somewhat con-
fused in my recollections, and I don't wish to nuake too strong a claim
that my recollection of periods so long ago is accurate.
The Chairman. You have no doubt that Field is a Connnunist
now, have you ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe he probably is, Senator.
The Chairman. Allien did you come to that conclusion? Now let
us go backward.
Mr. Lattimore. As I said, I don't remember exactly when I came
to that conclusion.
The Chairman. Then the date that you gave us in your first
answer may be just as correct as that which you are giving us now;
is not that right?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I would like to stand on my statement in
the record. Senator, in my prepared statement.
The Chairman. Which statement do you wish to stand on?
Mr. Lattimore. In my prepared statement, page 14, that I have
no doubt he became one during the 1940's.
The Chairman. Which statement do you wish to stand on? The
one that you gave last Friday, which you read back, or the one that
you gave today ?
Mr. Lattimore. The one that I read back was an admission that my
memory might have been in error by a couple of years. It may have
been in error by a couple of years, or it may have been in error by
more than that.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, is it that you want to change
your testimony because you are confronted with this letter of recom-
mending
Mr. L-vnTMORE. No, sir; this letter is not a letter recommending
Mr. Field. This is a letter stating that Mr. Field
Senator Ferguson. Wait a minute. Recommending that they get
in touch with Mr. Field to get someone to work on the Defense Ad-
visory Connnission?
You would not say, would you, that a Communist was a proper
person to recommend someone in 1940 to work on the Defense Ad-
visory Commission ?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I would think — I don't know what I
thought at that time.
The Chairman. What do you say now?
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it now ?
The Chairman. What do you say now? That is the question.
Mr. Lattimore. May I state rather carefully what I think now ?
Senator Ferguson. I hope everything you say is stated carefully.
INIr. Lattimore. What I think now is that the intelligence services
of the United States are entitled to make use of any individual, any
3460 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
source of information that they may think valuable to themselves
under such conditions of security as the intelligence services may de-
vise, which an outsider like myself cannot lay down.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you continue to read the document?
Mr. Mandel. I am reading from the document marked "E. C. C.
from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F."
(Exhibit No. 538)
{ International Secretariat)
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5-',th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Tile following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but prob-
ably appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not have the numbers of
these two from August 29) :
[Trud, August 29, p. 4]
Lattimore on the National Policy of the Soviet Union
New York, August 27 (TASS) — In the magazine Far Eastern Survey there
appeared an article by Lattimore, the Director of the School of International
Relations, who accompanied Wallace during his recent trip to the Soviet Union
and China, on the basis of his personal observations Lattimore regards highly
the Soviet national policy (policy in respect to the nationalities), observing that
from the moment of the establishment of the Soviet regime all nationalities
of the Middle Asia and other regions, formerly oppressed, received an oppor-
tunity to develop widely their economy, national culture, language, and so on.
Lattimore describes the present prosperity of the so-called backward peoples
prosecuted pitilessly under Czarism.
Lattimore points out that his knowledge of the Russian and Mongolian
languages permitted him to talk with Many Kazakhs, Buriato-Mongols, Turko-
mans, and representatives of other nationalities, and from these conversations
he obtained valuable information that shows welfare and prosperity of these
peoples freed by the Soviet Constitution.
Lattimore compares the position of the national minorities in the Middle Asia
in the Czarist time and under the present regime. As an example, Lattimore
gives the fact that Kazakhstan, a country populated formerly by the nomads,
now became an industrialized country which has its own industry, own engi-
neers, and a large percentage of the Stakanovites among the workers.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what role did Mr. Grajdanzev play in
this kind of transaction? Did he read the Soviet press and find
favorable references to you and passed them on to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. I would like to see this, but there is no hurry
about it.
I have very little knowledge of what Mr. Grajdanvez's work was at
that time. My general recollection is that he was working on such
Russian language materials as the IPR had available.
Mr. Morris. Was it a practice of his to notify you of any such
favorable references in the Soviet press ?
Mr. Lattimore. Certainly not a practice. I presume that, as a
friend of mine, if he ran across something that would interest me he
would send it to me.
I should like very much to ask for the text of my original article in
Far Eastern Survey, because, from my hearing — and I have not yet
read it — of that Soviet extract there, I should say that it is obviously
not a straight quotation from what I wrote, but partial quotations in-
terwoven with phrases put in by the Soviet writer.
Mr. Morris. And, Mr. Lattimore, you would like your article to
go into the record with this Soviet interpretation ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3461
Mr. Lattimore, I certainly should.
This Soviet interpretation or misinterpretation.
The Chairmax. Where is the article?
Mr. JNIoRRis. We can obtain it and put into the record.
The Chairman. Very well. I think it should go in with an ex-
hibit, if you are goinor to introduce the exhibit.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of this ?
Mr. Morris. It is probably 1944, Senator, in connection with the
mention of the "recent trip." He accompanied Mr. Wallace on a
'"recent" trip.
Senator Ferguson. Maybe you can help us with the date, Mr. Latti-
more. You look at that.
Mr. Lattimore. I have a document here, Senator, which my wife is
looking for now, which I should like to enter into the record as per-
tinent to this question of Soviet nationality.
The Chairman. I would like the article to which this document
refei-s and to which you have testified. We want that first.
Mr. Lattimore. This one here ?
The Chairman. You have referred to a document that you wrote.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; in the Far Eastern Survey.
The Chairman. We want that first, if you please.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't have that with me.
Mr. FoRTAs. Is your staff sending for that, Senator?
Mr. SouRwiNE. They are looking for it, Mr. Fortas.
Mr. FoRTAs. Do you want Mr. Lattimore to wait until you find it?
The Chairman. If you want to go into some question*, as an inser-
tion in the record
Mr. SouRwiNE. Here is a copy of the Far Eastern Survey, 1944, sir,
the bound volume. Perhaps you can find that article.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, does this amount about to what
would be classed as someone sending you a newspaper clipping?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; roughly.
Senator Ferguson. And did you save it?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think I did.
Senator Ferguson. Did 3'ou protest it was wrong?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you write back and say, ''This is wrong"?
Did you get in touch with the papers that printed it and say, "I deny
this"? Did you do that?
]Mr. Lattimore. No, Senator.
The Chairman. I might interpret this as being either a digest of a
newspaper quotation or a newspaper article or it might be a newspaper
article [reading] :
The following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but probably
it appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not haye the numbers of these
two from August 29).
Then in what appeared to be headlines, caps, appears :
Lattimore on the National Policy of the Soviet Union —
which might be construed as being a
Senator Ferguson. Copy of a clipping.
The Chairman. Yes. Otherwise, I do not know what it is.
Mr. Lattimore. This appears to be the article: "Minorities in the
Soviet Far East," by Owen Lattimore, in the Far Eastern Survey of
August 23, 1944.
3462 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
It is not very lon<i:. May I read it into the record?
Mr. Morris. Put it into the record, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is two printed pages or more, is it not, Mr. Latti-
more ?
Mr. Lattimore. Almost exactly two printed pages.
The Chairman. I want something to be done with this photostatic
copy that we are passing around here.
Do you offer this for the record? If so, what is its authenticity?
Where does it come from?
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Mr. Mandel identified it, sir, as a letter having been
taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. It is not a letter. It shows on its face that it is not
a letter.
Mr. Morris. It is a memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. Do you swear now that you never saw this docu-
ment, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection of seeing it.
Senator Ferguson. It appears to have been sent to you with your
initials on it. Is that correct?
Mr. Lattimore. May I have a look?
It is headed E. C. C.' from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F.
The Chairman. From that, Mr. Lattimore, would you say it was
evidently a communication of some sort from E. C. C. to the other
parties?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo, sir; from Mr. Grajdanzev, to Mr. Carter, with
copies to myself and Miss Farley.
The Chairman. A communication from.
Mr. Lattimore. A communication from, yes.
I have no recollection of ever seeing it before. The point is im-
material, how^ever. It w^as obviously intended for me to see.
The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record.
With it should go the article.
Mr. Morris. May it be i)laced in the record, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. The article will be placed in the record.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 538," which
was read in full by Mr. Mandel, and "539," as follows :)
Exhibit No. 539
[Source : Far Eastern Survey, August 23, 1944, pp. 156, 157, and 158]
MiNOKITlES IN THE SOVIET FAR EaST ^
(By Owen Lattimore)
On many occasions durinji- a brief recent journey through the Soviet Far East
and Centrjil Asia I was struck by the obvious success of the Soviet policy toward
its minority peoples, and by the international importance of this policy. The
essentials of the Soviet method are simple. The Russians work by removing
legal, social, and e<'onomic obstacles to the progress of minority peoples and
"backward" i>eoi)les. These peoples are then free to work out their own progress
according to their own capacities. The method is anything but paternalistic.
Because the people work out their own progress, they feel that everything which
they accomplish is their own, not something charitably bestowed on them.
^ Mr. Lattimore, Director of the Page School of International Relations and coauthor of
The Making of Modern China, accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his recent
trip to the Far Bast.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3463
The chief obstacle removed by Soviet action was, of course, the "old order" of
Tsarism, with its legal discriminations and its policy of favoring privileged
uronps among non-Kiissiaii minoi'ities. in order to use them as instruments for
ruling the iui[)rivileged. For this reason the minority peoples, who feel that their
local self-government is their own, also feel that the Soviet State as a whole is
their own. This accounts for an outstanding difference in the psychology of
minorities in the Soviet Union and in America. With us, minority rights are
largely identified with the right to nonccmformity. Consequently Americans
sometimes ask, "What would happen if one of these Soviet minorities were to
try to use its minority rights to attempt to set up laws, institutions, and prac-
tices conflicting with Marxist doctrines and Soviet orthodoxy?" The answer
api>ears to l>e that this would be the last thing that would occur to their minds,
not the first. All of them have a long history of oppression. Since, in all their
long history, only the S(jviet Government ever freed them from discrimination
and gave them the opportunity of progress, they identify their own interest with
the Soviet interest, and in everytliing which they do to advance their own par-
ticular interest their instinct is also to advance the general Soviet interest, not
to encroach upon it, because the general Soviet interest is the primary safeguard
of their own particular interest.
Within the framework of the Soviet economic order and state structure, Soviet
policy has been to encourage the national pride and sense of cultural or com-
munity identity of minority groups. In Soviet Asia, this includes peoples like
the Buryat Mongols, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and the Tungusic tribes, whose
languages, traditions, and way of life ai'e very different from those of the
Russians. Tliey encourage these peoples to go aliead and assert. their independ-
ence in all cultural forms — costume, theater, art, and so forth — and to work
out their own adaptation to tlie general structure of tlie Soviet Union.
Although many of the places visited were new to me, some of the peoples were
not new, as I had known Mongol. Kazakh, and Kirghiz nomads, Turkish-si)eak-
ing oasis dwellers, and Tungusic forest tribes on the southern side of tlie
Russo-Chinese border in Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Familiarity with
several of the cultures which are spread on both sides of tlie border, and an
ability to speak Mongol and a certain amount of Russian, made it possible for
me to get some valuable indications, even in a very short time, as to how con-
tented and prosperous these people are as members of the complicated Soviet
system of peoples, republics, and autonomous communities — uniform in some
respects and vaiiegated in others.
SOVIET POLICY IS FLEXIBLE
The actual way in which Soviet policy works is naturally not uniform in all
places and among all groups. The Yakuts, for instance, seemed to me to have
integi-ated themselves with the Soviet order less than such peoples as the
Buryats. This is not surprising because the Yakuts are a tough-fibered people
who have long been noted more for their ability to extend their own culture
to other sub-Arctic peoples than for their absorption of Russian culture. More-
over, they live in small, widely scattered and isolated communities in which
the spread of education in schools, by radio, and so forth, is less uniform than
it is in more closely settled regions.
Among people who are few in niunbers, also, it is difficult to preserve a
separate culture. The Khakass near Minusinsk, for instance, are so minor a
minoVity that they tend to merge with the Russians rather than to preserve
their own way of life.
In Buryat Mongolia, on the other hand, there is no doubt whatever that the
Buryats are running their own show. This is also true in Uzbekistan and in
Kazakhstan.
In the great Kazakh Republic, which extends from the Chinese frontier to
the Caspian Sea, the national autonomy policy is most succes.sful. Among the
Kazakhs before the revolution there had been a long tradition of hostility to the
Russians and the Tsarist Russians had never attempted to recruit Kazakhs as
troops. An attempt to conscript them into labor battalions led to rebellions in
1916, even before the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the present war, however,
Kazakhs have supplied whole divisions of cavalry to the Soviet army. Since few
of them speak Riissian they are brigaded in their own units under their own
officers. The Russians speak admiringly of the battle record of these Kazakhs.
While Kazakh nomadic herding is flourishing, the Kazakhs — like most no-
3464 msTiTUTE of pacific relations
mads — also show a marked aptitude for machines and industry. At Kara-
ganda, in the Kazakh Republic, there are some of the largest open-cut coal mines
in the world. About a third of the miners are Kazakhs. Kazakh engineers and
technicians are being trained there, and there is a high percentage of Stakhano-
vites whose output is liigher than the norms on wliicli wage rates are based. The
head of tlie mines is a third-generation miner from tlie Don. When I asked him
if he planned to stay on after the war, he replied, "No, I shall go back to the
Don. The Kazakhs will want to run their own mines."
One detail of policy interested me as being particularly significant. Primary
education is in the language of the people and in general Russian is not taught in
their primary schools. In high schools Russian is taught as a second language
for a few hours each week. In the universities, where they are advanced enough
to have their own universities, Russian is compulsory. Conversely, when Rus-
sians are living as a minority group in an area that is overwhelming Kazakh or
Mongol, the Russians have the same privilege of having their own primary
schools ; but for Russian children the Kazakh or Mongol language is compulsory.
Thus the cultural autonomy of these various minorities within the bounds of
Soviet Asia is maintained, and the minority languages are given a prestige value.
All of this is important because it will have repercussions far beyond the
Russian frontier. There has been a steady movement of attraction toward Russia
set up among a number of Cenetral Asian peoples. The Russians do not need to
propagandize among them. These peoples are attracted toward Russia because
of the success and prosperity of their cousins on the Russian side of the frontier
and there are bound to be some important international consequences of this
tendency.
MOBILITY IN BORDER REGIONS
Along most of the Soviet border the political frontiers are artificial, and
identical or closely similar peoples live on both sides of the line. Tliis is true
not only along the Chinese but along the Iran and Afghanistan frontiers as
well. In the 19th century political development in that part of the world was in
abeyance. Central Asia was in suspended animation except for the superficial
conquests by Tsarist Russia. If there was oppression on one side of the line
there was a tendency for some of the people to skip over to the other side ; but
such movements did not express a choice between the two different systems of
government.
The general impression today among their neighbors is that the people on
the Soviet side of the border are well off. They are envied for the law, order,
and security which they enjoy and for their individual and community prosperity.
If there is turmoil in Chinese Turkistan or Iran or Afghanistan, many people will
want to move to get away from the trouble and Soviet territory is the nearest
area which looks safe and untroubled. This is a comparativel.v recent develop-
ment. During the Soviet revolution there was a bad time of turmoil, and ele-
ments which were opposed to the revolution moved to the Chinese side and into
Iranian and Afghan territory ; but that period is now over.
The situation is one which requires adjustment of American thinking. We
still tend to assume, whenever Soviet influence is noticeable in an Asiatic com-
munity, that ignorant people have been "misled by Communist propaganda."
To think in this way is to mislead ourselves. The Soviet prestige in Asia
today has little to do with propaganda. It is noteworthy that Soviet prestige
is highest among those who are nearest to the Soviet frontier and influenced
primarily by what they know, and by the practical comparisons which they are
able to make. Among such people the Soviets are rated highly not because
of promises of what they might do for others, but because of the impressive
evidence of what they have actually done in raising their own standards.
Everywhere in the Soviet Far East there is a noteworthy age uniformity among
those who are running local affairs. Whether Russian, Buryat Mongol, or
Kazakh, the average age of people in high positions seems to be between 30 and
35. They ai'e a postrevolutionary generation, old enough to have had the new
education and young enough to be free of the old social cleavages. To them the
present order is right, inevitable, and, above all- their own.
The implications of the Russian policy are evident. China and the Soviet
Union have a common frontier in Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang), and
Manchuria, and along this frontiier minority populations occupy large and strat-
egically ini' ^rtant areas. Anywhere along the frontier, except in Manchuria,
you could move the line 800 miles south, and still affect the personal destinies
of no Russians and very few Chinese. This situation gives these minorities
a great deal of bargaining power. Therefore, their political importance is
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC JIELATIONS 3465
great. They have more option than weak minority populations usually have.
They can get what they want by taking sides. This is true to some extent even
as far as Iran and Afghanistan.
The war in Far East is being won largely by air and naval power in the
Pacific. Yet in spite of these victories at sea and in the air, the political
situation which will develop inland on the continent is likely to be largely
out of reach of naval power and carrier-based aircraft. The possibility of a
political outcome of this kind has not entered into the political thinking of
America to the degree that it should have.
Mr. Lattimore, And I should like in the record also my competent
statement, before reading my own article, that this citation from the
Soviet press is a typical piece of Soviet propaganda ; namely, taking
isolated phrases from my article and adding phrases of their own.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you make an effort to get a yearly
review of Pacific Affairs into the New Masses?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. But if you have a docu-
ment to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.
The Chairman. That answer does not seem to carry cogency, "I
don't believe I did, but if you have a document." You certainly know
whether you did, or not. That was a publication.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't. I have no recollection of it at
all.
The Chairman. Do you want to say that you do not know that you
tried to get these documents in?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. Do you want to say "No" to the question as pro-
pounded to you?
Mr. Lattimore. The question is "No; I do not remember doing
any such thing."
The Chairman. The answer is "No," you mean ?
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No."
The Chairman, All right.
Mr. Mandel. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute
of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1937, headed "Memo : F. V. F.
from C. P."
F. V. F. presumably is Frederick V. Field, and C. P. is presumably
Caflierine Porter.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received into the record?
The Chairman. Just a minute, now.
Frederick V. Field is an established character here in this hearing.
How about the other one ? Who is the other one ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you know whose initials C. P. are ?
Mr. Lattimore. C. P., I think, is Catherine Porter, who was the
New York subeditor of Pacific Affairs.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the content of this memorandum bears
on the questions put to the witness.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read that, please ?
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
Owen has raised the question of our getting yearly reviews of Pacific Affairs
into the New Masses, the Nation, the New Republic, and so on. He wanted me
to ask you about this. His suggestion was that we might have such reviews
start in August when the conference is on. Do you think there is any possibility
of wangling a thing like this in so short a time? ; ,
88348— 52— pt. 10 13
3466 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted in the record?
The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record for the purpose
stated by Mr. Morris.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 540" and was
read in full.)
Mr. Morris. JNIr. Lattimore, did Mary van Kleeck write for Pacific
Affairs an article on the Moscow trials?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Mary van Kleeck was at that
time a member of the Communist Party ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Did Mr. William Henry Chamberlin subsequently
write an article in Pacific Affairs on the Moscow trials?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, he did.
Mr. MoKRTs. AVhat was your reaction to ha vino; received that?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time, I can't recall, Mr. Morris.
]Mr. Morris. Was Chamberlin's article published in Pacific Affairs ?
Mr. Latitjuore. Yes, it was.
Mr. Morris. Did you at the same time write an answering article to
Mr. Chamberlin's letter?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I wrote an article which was my own com-
ment on the whole question of the trials.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please?
Mr. Mandfx. This is a document taken from the files of the Institute
of Pacific Kelations, dated July 5, 1938, headed "ECC from CP."
Mr. Morris. Mr. (^hairman, the contents of the memorandum iden-
tified by Mr. Mandel bear on the last question addressed to the wit-
ness.
Mr. Mandel, will you read it, please?
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
Exhibit No. 541
July 5, 193S.
ECC from CP : Here is a copy of a letter from Chamberlin (June 13) intended!
for publication in Pacific Affairs. I have air mailed a copy to Owen and have
sent a copy to Harriet Moore requesting her to write Owen by air.
Have you any comments to be passed on to Owen? Do you think at this
point Miss van Kleeck should see Chamberlin's letter, or shall we wait?
Mr. INIoRRis. May it be received into the record, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. It may be received into the record.
(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 541" which was
in full above and "Exhibit No. 541A*' which appears as follows :)
Exhibit No. 541-A
Comment and Cokrb:sponi)ence
[Piiciflc Affairs, vol. IX, No. 3, September 1938, pp. 370-372]
Mr. Chamberlin's successor as Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science*
Monitor, Demaree Bess, has published in the Saturday Evening? Post, which is
hardly a pro-Soviet organ, the story of an American engineer working for the
Soviet Government. This foreigner, though not "called as an independent ex-
pert witness," describes how his work was hampered by men who were later
convicted of sabotage.
Why should Mr. Chamberlin be surprised that no letters, memoranda, or
minutes of meetings of the conspirators were adduced in evidence? The testi-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3467
niouy makes it clear by inference that the work of all the conspirators interlocked
so closely with that of loyal citizens that, if they had risked much in writing,
they would have been caught much sooner.' As for the suggestion that the new
head of the secret service is likely to abuse his power just as Yagoda did, it is
obvious that the publicity given in the Soviet Union itself to Yagoda's turpitude
is a safeguard against any such thing.
Mr. Chamberlin's remarks about the "striking contrast between the magnitude
of the confessions and the meagerness of the results" are too rhetorical. The
verbatim records of the trials are entirely credible in the way they describe the
descent from grandiose ideas to futile deeds. The ideas were so grandiose that
they could not have been carried out except with enthusiastic popular backing.
It requires no adroit casuistry to conclude that, apart altogether from disputes
over theory, the majority of the people in the Soviet Union are unwilling to risk
the improved life which they are beginning to enjoy, after the sufferings first of
the revolution and then of the "undeclared civil war" of the Five-Year Plan.
The authorities are beginning to make good on the promises of reward held out
for the sacrifices necessary to establish Socialism in a country with unoi-ganized
resources. Those rewards, though not yet dazzlingly great, are so widely dis-
tributed that no general revolt in the face of visibly growing success could
possibly be expected except by emotionally biased antagonists like Trotsky.
The "gross discrepancies" in evidence to which Mr. Chamberlin refers appear
to be subjective. AVhere conspirators within a country are in only intermittent
and furtive contact with exiles abroad, it is hardly a "gross discrepancy" to coiuit
on the future aid of exile accomplices whom you do not yet know to be dead. Nor
am I emotionally disturbed by the fact that the Norwegian authorities denied
the inconvienient airplane that came to Oslo. This seems to me a not vex'y hair-
raising example of diplomatic usage. In much more actutely uncomfortable
circumstances, it may be recalled, the British Government was unable even to
imagine what submarines could be torpedoing British ships off the ports of Spain.
[Pacific Affairs, September 1938, pp. 370-372]
Then we come to the well-known phenomena of "sinister pressure" and "grovel-
ling repentance." In reading the verbatim reports of the trials, I naturally
went over most closely the testimony and confessions of the only two of the
accused whom I had ever met personally, because these were men whom I could to
some extent visualize. They were Radek and Ilakovsky. I think that the dis-
tinguished personage of the IPR in whose company I called on Radek, and the
British diplomat in whose house I met Rakovsky, would both agree that there was
nothing out of character in the testimony of either man. Both of them not only
gave perfectly coherent evidence, but psychologically convincing accounts of the
way in which they were enmeshed.
The real point, of course, for tho.se who live in democratic countries, is whether
the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think
that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read
Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every per-
son in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have
been discovered and rectified. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the
discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can
hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly,
whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the Party"
or "someone in the Government." That sounds to me like democracv.
O. L.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record the
article referred to in this testimon}^, signed "O. L." in the Pacific
Affairs of September 1938, which commences on page 370, together
with the preceding article, which is signed William Henry Chamber-
lain, Tokyo, June 1938, which ends on page 370.
The Chairman. Have you properly connected the article with the
excerpt that has just been inserted in the record ?
1 See review (p. 401 ) b,v J. N. Hazarrl of proceedings of the Bukharin trial.
3468 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you testify that is the same article
referred to in the memorandum ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe it is.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read the last paragraph in Mr.
Lattimore 's article ?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. This is an article signed "O. L." — presumably, Mr.
Lattimore, and I think the witness has identified it as such.
Have you not, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether
the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. * * *
And the reference is to the Moscow trials, Mr. Chairman.
* * * I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most
widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny
of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses
have been discovered and rectified. * * *
The words "and rectified'" are italicized.
* * * A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse
or the rectitication of it ; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but
give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he
finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the
government." That sounds to me like democracy.
The Chairman. By whom is that article ?
Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ferguson. Would that indicate, Mr. Lattimore, that you
thought these trials were democracy in action i
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. It sounded like democracy.
Senator Ferguson. It sounded like democracy in action?
Senator Smith. Would you like to see it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I should like to see it.
It sounds to me like exactly what it says, that the consequence of
people in Russia
The Chairman. I understood it is the last paragraph.
What is the question, Mr. Morris, please ?
Mr. Morris. The questioning on tliis subject has been finished,
Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lattimore has requested that he see the article.
The Chairman. There is no question pending, then ?
Mr. Morris. No question pending.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris. May I continue with the next question ?
Mr. Lattimore. The point here — replying to Senator Ferguson's
question — I tliink it is that I said that conditions which — and here I
quote :
Give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future
he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the
government." That sounds to me like democracy.
That is, that I think it is democratic when citizens can protest
against things done by party members or Government members.
Senator Ferguson. To what are you referring?
Mr, Lattimore. I may say that this was a disappointed hope. It
didn't develop that way.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3469
Senator Ferguson. Did you think that the trials were such an ex-
pression ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I was clearly distinguishing tliere between
the trials and the results of the trials.
Senator Ferguson. The result of the trials was death to many of
the people, is not that true ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is true.
Senator Ferguson. Did you think that that designated democracy ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I thought that an atmosphere in which
citizens could protest against abuses would be democracy.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think that that was a protest of the
citizens, or a protest of the Government departments ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was referring to articles in the press which I had
seen at that time, saying that after the trials of these people in Russia,
a lot of whom were officials, these press articles said that people in
Russia were beginning to act a little more independently toward their
official bureaucracy, and I thought that was an encouraging sign.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did E. Herbert Norman w^rite for Pa-
cific Atfairs?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir ; I believe he did.
Mr. Morris. LTnder what name did he write for Pacific Affairs?
Mr. Lattimore. Under the name of E. Herbert Norman, as far as
1 remember.
Mr. Morris. Did he ever use a nom de plume ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think he did.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please ?
Mr. ]\La.ndel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. The original document was a carbon
copy. It is dated May 30, 1940. It is from 129 East Fifty-second
Street, New York, N. Y., addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the
typed signature of Edward C. Carter. And it says in the corner:
■■•Penciled note copy to WLH."
Mr. Morris. Mv. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask you if
you can recall having seen it?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think I recall having seen this.
Mr. Morris. Do you mind reading that letter, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. 'The letter is dated May 30, 1940..
(Exhibit No. 542)
Dear Owen : Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the
eve of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He
is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the fi?ld of
Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures
of the Meiji period.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways
of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific
Affairs.
I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on
contemporary matters, providing he writes under a nom de plume.
I imagine that by novt^ you have read his Inquiry book, ".Japan's Emergence as
a Modern State." This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet
appeared in the Inquiry Series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of
continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form
or another.
Sincerely yours.
The Chairman. You stated to counsel just a few minutes ago that
you did not believe that that writer wrote under a nom de plume.
3470 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore, No.
The Chairman. Do you wish to change your answer now ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I do not wish to change my answer. I don't
believe he did.
May I say that this is quite obviously a reference to the fact that it is
usual practice for diplomatic personnel of our own country and other
countries to sign a non de plume rather than their own names. An
outstanding example, of course, is the Mr. X article by George Kennedy
in Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Morris. Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Norman has been
identified before the conunittee as having been a member of the
Communist Party ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have seen that reference in the transcript. I have
also seen some of the Canadian press protests on the subject.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this
time an excerpt from the publication China Today, which Mr. Mandel
AAill identify?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the magazine China Today, for
March 19o6, which is the official organ of the American Friends of the
Chinese People.
On page 121 of this magazine we find the following :
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People
It is with great pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in
Canada and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian
r'riends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto of
Gen. Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, chairman of the Canadian League Against
War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted in the
formation of the new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday,
February 8, with 80 present, Gen. Fang Chen-wu, with whom China Today
readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which included
a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews with the
Prime Minister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu mass
meeting in Toronto held in ('entral Technical School on February 9 and attended
by 1,500, a group of 'AO met at Wymilwood, Queen's Park, and organized a Cana-
dian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was elected and
is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan * * *.
Mr. Morris. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman.
May that article go into the record ?
The Chairman. What is the object ? What is its significance ?
Mr. Morris. AA^e are questioning the witness about his association
and the publication of articles by Mr. E. H. Norman. According to
that article, E. H. Norman was tlie secretary of a Canadian subdi-
vision of the American Friends of tlie Chinese People. We would like
to have something in the record to show that the American Friends
of tlie Chinese People is a Communist-front organization.
The Chairman. I think that should come along now if this is in-
serted in the record.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like at this point, then, to
introduce the testimony of Mr. Morris L. Appelman, who was mem-
ber of the Communist Party and a member of the Communist cell
that ran the American Friends of the Chinese People. I would like
his testimony covering that to be ])ut into the record in its entirety.
The Chairman. Was that taken in executive session or open
session ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3471
Mr. Morris. In executive session, Mr. Chairman, on January 11,
1952.
The Chair:man. You can read sufficient of it now to tie this in,
if it can be tied in.
Mr. Morris. ^Nlr. Mandel is exaniinino; Mr. Appehnan [reading] :
Exhibit No. 542A
Mr. Mandel. Then in May 1035, you were contributing editor of China Today?
Mr. Appelmax. I don't remember that title, but apparently I was if I was listed
as such.
Mr. aiANDEL. What was China Today?
Mr. Appelman. It was a publication of the American Friends of the Chine.se
People.
Senator Eastland. What is the American Friends of the Chinese People?
Mr. Appelman. A front organization of the Communist Party.
And then on page 6, Mr. Morris questioning :
In connection with the American Friends of the Chinese People, did you as
a matter of fact belong to it?
Mr. Appelman. Yes, sir. I don't remember whether it was a dues-paying
organization, but I was identified with it.
Mr. Morris. Were you sent there by the Communist Party?
Mr. Appelman. Yes.
Mr. IMoRRLs. Who in the party sent you?
Mr. Appelman. It was either Crace Maul or Esther Carroll or both, because
they were my two contacts.
Mr. Mor.Ris. Is Grace Maul Grace Granich?
Mr. Appelman. The same party.
Mr. MoRRLS. You have been identitied with both these people?
Mr. Appelman. They were lioth definitely party members; and, so to speak,
my party liaison was with them. At that time I was. At the time they first
contacted me I had been exi:)elled ; I was not a party member in good standing;
and they were my supervisors so to speak, in that organization.
Mr. Fortas, would you like to see that testimony ?
Mr. Fortas. No.
The Chairman. What is the relevancy of that testimony with this
witness ?
Mr. FoRTAs. That is my point..
Mr. Morris. The American Friends of the Chinese People ^vas an
organization with which Mr. Xorman was connected, and we are now
asking Mr. Lattimore if he published articles by Mr. Norman.
The Chairman. Just a moment, until the Chair rules on this.
The testimony of Mr. Appleman may be inserted in the record. Do
you want it in full ?
iMr. Morris. Just those portions that I read, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That is in the record now.
The exhibit China Today may be inserted in the record for what
it is worth at the present time.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 542 and
5-42A", which was read in fidl. No. 543 is as follows :)
ExHiBLP No. .543
[Source: China Today, March 19.36, p. 121. Published monthly at 168 West 23d Street,
New York. N. Y.. by the American Friends of the Chinese People 1
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People
It is with gi-eat pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in Canada
and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian
Friends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto
of General Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, Chairman of the Canadian League
Against War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted
3472 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
in the formation of tlie new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday
February Sth with eighty present, General Fang Clien-wu, witli whom China
Today readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which
included a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews
with the Prime INIinister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu
mass meeting in Toronto held in Central Technical School on February 9th and
attended by 1,500, a group of thirty met at Wymilwood, Queen's Parlv, and organ-
ized a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was
elected and is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan,
Professor John F. Davidson of Upper Canada College, and A. R. Menzies, a
"Victoria College student who was born in China. One of the important members
of this group is William Arthur Deacon, Literary Editor of the Mail and Empire
of Toronto, who wrote a splendid interview with General Fang for his paper.
We in the United States extend our heartiest greetings to our friends in Canada
and we urge them to keep in close contact with us and we in turn pledge our-
selves to work in close cooperation with them.
The importance of the Far East in the whole problem of war and peace is
rapidly becoming a matter of common knowledge. It is therefore very signifi'cant
and hopeful that groups of "Friends of the Chinese People" have been organized
in several countries. America, France, England, Holland, and now Canada have
joined the international front of those whose chief aim is to help the Chinese
people in their struggle for national liberation, the realization of which will play
a most powerful role for peace throughout the Far East and the whole world.
We urge other countries to follow and join this rapidly forming "International
Friends of the Chinese People."
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Morris, before refusing your kind offer to show
me that transcript, I assume there is no reference to Mr. Lattimore
by name.
Mr. Morris. There is no reference to Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. FoRTAS. Then I don't care to see it.
The Chairman. It has to do with the writer. That is the tie-in, I
understand.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what article did Mr. Norman write
in Pacific Affairs?
Mr. Lattimore. I have been lookinjr for it, Mr. Morris, and I don't
find an article listed for the period when I was editor.
Mr. Morris. Was there one subsequent to that ?
iNIr. Lattimore. I believe there was one at some time ; yes,
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were you acquainted with Mr, Evans
F. Carlson?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I was.
Mr. Morris. What was your association with Mr. Carlson?
Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Carlson first when he was in the Amer-
ican Marine Guard in the Embassy in Peking, and I saw him maybe
tAvo or three times here in America.
Mr. Morris. Did a'ou ever give him advice?
The Chairman. Just a moment. I want to go back to this offer
of the exhibit that the Chair has admitted in evidence as part of the
record.
The question was propounded to the witness as to whether or not this
writer had been a contributor to the publication while he was editor.
He says "No," in substance. You cannot hold him responsible for
something that was done in the publication before he was in charge of it.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could it not be admitted as some
evidence as far as the institute is concerned ?
The Chairman. It may go in to that extent, but I do not want it to
go to the extent of tying in this witness to any collaboration with the
Avriter through the introduction of these exhibits-
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3473
The Chairman. The whole matter goes to the weight of the thing
rather than to its admissibility.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I think the observation you are mak-
ing is worth while to make at this time. I think we must bear in
mind that our prime investigation is of the IPR and that we are not
trying Mr. Lattimore.
The Chairman. That is correct.
Senator Smith. I notice that some of the newsmen and some of the
columnists continue to refer to the fact that we are trying Mr. Latti-
more. I have not felt I have been trying Mr. Lattimore, and I do not
believe any of the rest of the committee have felt that way.
The Chairman. Mv. Lattimore came here at his own request as a
witness to testify, to clear his record, apparently, of statements that
have been made by witnesses who testified with reference to him. He
is not on trial.
Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, the letter read into the record previous
to the introduction of these exhibits contained an offer from Mr. Carter
to have Mr. Norman write for Pacific Affairs under a nom de plume ;
and, in view of the testimony this morning about the appearance of
the nom de plume, we had no way J3ut to ask Mr. Lattimore whether or
not, as a matter of fact, Mr. Norman did write it.
The Chairman. I am admitting the exhibits, but I want to limit their
significance — that is all — because they address themselves to the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations rather than to Mr. Lattimore.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Lattimore, you knew Mr. Norman, did you not?
Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Norman at that time very slightly. 1
think I had met him once or twice when I was at the office of the
Institute of Pacific Relations in New York. I knew him later in
Japan when I was in Japan with the Pauley reparations mission.
Mr. Morris. How frequently did you see Mr. Norman at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. I saw him quite frequentl}^ at that time.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you give advice to Evans Carlson
as to whether or not he should stay in the Navy or leave the Navy?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I remember very distinctly that Carlson told
me that he was thinking of resigning from the Marine Corps, and I
urged him not to.
Mr. Morris. Why did you urge him not to, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Because I thought that a man of his expert knowl-
edge in China would be useful to the Nation in his service in the
Marine Corps.
Mr. Morris. Do you know that Mr. Carlson was chairman of the
Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy^
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't know that.
Mr. Morris. Have you not testified in executive committee that
you thought that organization was a Communist organization?
Mr. Lattimore. May I see my testimony on that ? My present rec-
ollection of it is rather blank, I am afraid.
Mr. Morris, That is page 91, Mr. Lattimore. You may read any
part of it into the public record.
Mr. Lattimore. My testimony in executive session was as follows :
Mr. Morris. Do you know the organization Committee for Democratic Far
Eastern Policy?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I do.
Mr. Morris. Have you ever been associated with that in any way?
3474 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. No. I was asked to subscribe to it, and I replied that since 1
was at that time writing syndicated newspaper articles as an independent
commentator I did not want to subscribe to any partisan organizations of that
kind. However, right at the end of the war, they were bringing out some fairly
interesting information that was not readily available elsewhere, and I sent in a
subscription and asked them to send me their material.
Mr. Morris. Do you believe that is a Communist organization?
Mr. Lattimore. I should say that it certainly has become a fellow-traveling
organization. I don't know whether it is Communist, or not. I am not an expert
on the shades of difference between fellow-travelers and Communists.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last letter, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 27, 1939, addressed
to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Ow^en Lattimore. It
is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document, and it was previously
used as exhibit No. 154.
Mr, Lattimore. Mr. Lattimore, will you identify that letter as
having been written by you ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that in our record now^, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. That is exhibit 154.
Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please ?
Mr. Lattimore. The date is March 27, 1939. [Reading :]
Dear Cartke: Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson.
If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing
to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a
favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be I'estrained from
giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had
quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigiied his commission in order
to speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of
soon l)eing disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much
that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is
no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent
impi'essions by which to gauge his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China."
I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write
you again.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a document from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1940, addressed to Maj. Evans
F. Carlson, American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese
Aggression. The typed signature is "Owen Lattimore." It is a car-
bon copy of a letter.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having written that let-
ter?
Mr. Lattimore. I recall it now.
Mr. Morris. Will you read it, please, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore, It is dated February 8, 1940. [Reading :]
Dear Evans: What a dope I am ! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous
candid portrait of yourself.
Don't give anybody else too much the idea that it is a Herculean job to make
the fur fly in Baltimore. If anybody should come along all ai'dor and enthusiasm,
why break his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it
should be easier in the future.
Yours.
Senator Ferguson. Let me see that letter.
Mr. Morris, Mr. Chairman, will it be received in the record?
The Chairman, It will be received in the record.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3475
(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Ex-
hibit No. 544'' and was read in full.)
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, Avill you identify those two documents?
Mr. jNIandel. I have here a photostat of an article from the Daily
Worker, of March 16, 1944, the editorial page, which is an article
with the following heading: "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute
to Sun Yat-sen, Chinese Communists."
Then it continues :
Following are excerpts from the address delivered by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carl-
son, at Sun Yat-sen Day Tribute Meeting, Sunday, March 12, Metropolitan
Opera House.
Mr. Morris. Does that appear in the Daily Worker?
Mr. Maxdel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What do you want to do with this one?
]VIr. jNIorris. Will that be received in the record, Mr. Chairman?
This is an article about Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, which appeared
in the Daily Worker.
The Chairman, "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute to Sun Yat-
sen, Chinese Communists."
This is a photostat clipping from the Daily Worker, is that correct,
Mr. Mandel?
Mr, JNIandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Will that be received into the record, Mr, Chairman?
The Chairman, It will be admitted into the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 545" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 545
Lt. Col. Carlson's Tribute to Su.\ Yat-Sen, Chinese Communists
Following are excerpts from the address delivered ty Lt. Col. Evans. F.
Carlson, at Sun Yat-sen Day tribute meeting, Sunday, March 21, Metro-
politan Opera House.
Fifteen years ago this coming June it was my rare privilege to participate in
the ceremonies at Nanking, China, attending the State Burial of the Father of
the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen. I was there as a member of the
personal staff of Admiral Mark Bristol, then commanding our Asiatic Fleet.
This man of humble birth, by his unshakable confidence in the dignity of the
human being, regardless of his race, creed, or color, and by his unselfish devotion
to the cause of bringing to the four hundred millions of his native China the hope
and freedoms of the democratic way of life, overthrew the Imperial Ching dynasty
and set the pattern which gave birth to the Republic and which has enabled his
coumtrymen to resist for nearly seven years every effort of Japan to enslave
them.
We of the United States of America cannot escape our debt to Sun Yat-sen.
The debt is rendered more poignant by the knowledge that we failed Doctor Sun
back in 1923. in his hour of need. Failing to secure our support he turned to
another great democratic people, tlie Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who
provided the financial and moral aid which enal>le Chiang Kai-shek to accomplish
the task of uniting China under one government in 1938. Today we enjoy the
benefits of this luiity through the magnificent efforts of China, under Generalis-
simo Chiang's leadership, to contain Japan's armies in Eastern Asia as we advance
against the common enemy across the Pacific.
HAILS sun's principles
Doctor Sun is best known for the political philosophy which he evolved, called
the San Min Chu I, or Three Principles of the People. This philosophy, sub-
scribed to by all political groups in China today regardless of their complexion,
combines the best of the political doctrines of ancient China vdth those principles
3476 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of democratic doctrines of Britain, the U. S. S. R., and tlie United States which
Doctor Sun felt were most suitable to the needs and temi^erament of the Chinese
people. Some of his ideas regarding the application of these principles indicates
the universal scope of his iwlitical thinking.
His principle of Nationalism relates to the fundamental need for people to be
organized Into a sovereign state. In ('hina the principles had a two-fold applica-
tion : (1) to induce a feeling of nationalism throughout all the people of this
vast country; and (2) to regain for China the sovereign rights which had been
impaired through the instrumentality of the Unequal Treaties Imposed by foreign
powers.
The Principle of Democracy Doctor Sun interpreted as the "People's sover-
eignty," or control of government by the people. He contemplated that the
people's will would be exercised through suffrage, the recall, the initiative, and
the referendum. For the administration of government he added to ttie executive,
legislative, and judicial branches we know, the old Chinese institution of exam-
ination (comparable to our civil service) and censorship (most nearly akin to our
supreme court). The application of these principles indicate the universal scope
of his political thinking.
China is administered today under this quintuple form of government, but the
people have not yet attained the right of suffrage. Instead the nation is governed
by the Kuomintang party.
TELT.S OF THREE-FOIJ> PKOGRAM
Doctor Sun contemplated that suffrage would be attained through a three-fold
program. Fii-st there was to be the Period of Military Conquest, during which
China would become united under the Kuomintang Party. Then would follow
the Period of Political Tutelage, during which the party would govern while the
people were being politically educated. Finally, suft'rage would be conferred on
the people and the nation would enter the final i>eriod of Representative Govern-
ment. The Period of Political Tutelage has prevailed since 1928.
The most discussed and least understood of the Three Principles is that of the
People's Livelihood. In effect. Doctor Sun's conception of this principle boils
down to state socialism. He aimed to improve the livelihood of all the people,
and he proposed to do this through social and economic reform, nationalization of
transportation and communication, direct taxation and socialized distribution
through cooperative societies.
While, as I said a few moments ago, all political groups within China subscribe
to his Three Principles of the People, all groups do not interpret the principles
in the .same way, and emphasis in the application of the various principles differs
with the groups. Tlie Kuomintang, under the aegis of Chiang Kai-shek, has
brought Nationalism to a high peak. The Chinese Communist Party, which, from
the nature of its works, I would term the Social-Democratic Party, goes in more
for improving the people's livelihood and preparing them for the exercise of
representative government.
You hear much about the activities of the Kuomintang Party, which constitutes
the national government at Chungking. Let me say a word about the less pub-
licized Social-Democratic group which operates mostly in the northern provinces
and largely behind the lines of the Japanese army. In the early years of the
Sino-Japanese war I spent a number of months with this group, i found that
its military successes were due in large measure to the democratic political action
of the people and to the solid integrity of its leaders.
HONORS COMMUNIST FIGHTERS
Recently I had a report from Professor Michael Lindsay, formerly of the
faculty of Yenching University, and now pre.sent with this group, on the activities
of the group up to the end of last year. Profe.ssor Lindsay tells me that the
military agencies of this group, the 8th Route and New Fourth Armies, are con-
taining about 350,000 Japanese troops. These Chinese armies operate for the
most part In small mobile columns which engage the enemy daily. Activities
have been extended northeast of Peiplng and Into southern Manchuria, where
they constitute a constant threat to the Japanese lines of communication with
China. These armies, with their militia units, now number about one million
men.
One feature of the administration in the northern provinces that is significant
is the extent of the public school system as well as of the adult education pro-
gram. There are 7,500 schools operating in the Shansi-Hopei area, west of the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3477
Peiping-Hankow railroad, and in tliis same area 300,000 adults had learned to
read and write by the middle of 1943. People in this area, out off from Free
China by Japanese military units, not only participate in the war effort, but
govern themselves through their elected representatives. Thus are the principles
of Doctor Sun being brought into full realization.
One exponent of Doctor Sun's principles who merits special mention, is his
widow, the former Sing Ling Soong. Madame Sun has consistenly and per-
sistently, since her husband's death in 1925, endeavored to bring about the com-
plete realization of his aspirations. Quiet and self-effacing, she is less well-
known abroad than her sister, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but in China she has a
large and loyal following.
Madame Sun places only one interpretation on the teachings of her distinguished
husband: the literal application of the principles of Nationalism, Democracy,
and the People's Livelihood. She understands the self-discipline and self-sacri-
fice which their application requires, and she begins with herself. None who
has visited her can have failed to be impressed by the simplicity of her life, her
love for humanity and her unremitting effort to improve the livelihood of her
fellow citizens. I have known Madame Sun for many years, and her friendship
has been an unfailing source of inspiration.
Mr. Morris. What is the other one, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. I have here the original of an article from a magazine
entitled "Youth," the official organ of the American Youth for Democ-
racy, which had been cited as subversive by the Attorney General.
This issue is evidently undated, and on page 5 of this issue we have
the following article headed "We Fought For Peace; by National
Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMCR
(Retired), Paul Robeson, cochairmen."
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carlson has been identified before
this connnittee as having been a member of the Communist Party.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you offering just this article for the record,
Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Sour^vine.
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Morris, we have not seen these two articles offered
for the record. Is there any reference in them to Mr. Lattimore by
name, in either of them ?
Mr. Morris. No.
Senator Ferguson. I wonder if the significance or the meaning of
this letter of February 8, 1940, from Owen Lattimore to Carlson is
clear, where Mr. Lattimore starts out with : "What a dope I am ! I
forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself."
Was there a memorandum in the paper, or in this envelope, or do
you mean what followed as being the "glamorous candid portrait?"
Mr. Lattimore . I should say, Senator, that it probably is a refer-
ence to a snapshot that was enclosed, a snapshot of himself, a camera
snapshot.
Senator Ferguson. You did not mean to convey that the language
was the portrait?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Then you say: "Don't give anybody else too
much the idea," and so forth. What did you mean by that?
Read it and tell us what you meant by that.
Mr. Lattimore [reading] :
Dear Evans : What a dope I am !
The Chairman. How did you spell the word "dope?"
Mr. Lattimore. D-o-p-e.
The Chairman. You did not use "u," did you?
3478 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. No. I said :
What a dope I am ! I forgot to give you the enclosed ghimorons candid por-
trait of yourself.
Don't give anybody else too much the idea that Lt is a Herculean job to make
the fur fly in Baltimore.
Senator Ferguson. Could you stop right there now ? What did you
mean by that ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think my recollection is probably correct, Senator,
that I was referring to Colonel Carlson coming to Baltimore to speak
for the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Ag-
gression. Among other speakers we had for it were Dr. Walter Judd,
now Congressman Judd, also Admiral Harry Yarnell.
* * * If anybody should come along all ardor and enthusiasm, why break
his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it should be easier
in the future.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat "swell work" were you talking about ?
Mr. Lattimore. Swell work in raising funds for the American Com-
mittee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression.
The Chairman. Mr. Morris, you have an exhibit here that you have
offered for the record. Up to this point, I have not been able to catch
your connection to tie it in here w4th either the Institute of Pacific
Relations or the witness on the stand.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore gave testimony today, Mr. Chairman,
about his having given advice to the author of that article, that he
should stay in the Navy and not resign. We had some questioning on
that point.
Reference was also made to Colonel Carlson's membership in the
Communist Party. That article is an article that Carlson wrote for
the American Youth for Democracy publication, and that bears on
Colonel Carlson's political persuasions in connection with the advice
offered to him by Mr. Lattimore, who told him he should have stayed
in the Navy, where he would be more potent.
Mr. FoRTAs. Do you mean the article refers to it?
Mr. Morris. It bears on his political identity. He is writing for
a Communist publication.
Mr. Lattimore. On his political identity at the time I gave him
that advice ?
The Chairman. Wait a minute.
Did I understand that this organization, of which Carlson was a
member, was listed as a subversive organization b}- the Attorney Gen-
eral?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.
Again I say it goes to the weight of its worthwliileness.
(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 546'' and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 546
We Fought For Peace
(By National Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMCB.
(retired) Paul Robeson, cochairmen)
[Source: Youth, Published by American Youth for Democracy, February 1947, p. 5]
During the war, American youth carried their ideals for a postwar world into
battle. Their gims spoke the hope of an era of permanent, democratic peace,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3479
The rhythm of marching feet sounded their aspirations for an economic future
quite in contrast to the homeless, blaclv-market ridden land to which they
returned.
They fought hard and they fought well in their battle against the enemy.
But their enemies were not only Hans or Tayaka. Their enemies were the
philosophies that held one man is better than another because of the color of his
skin or the religion that he practiced ; that democracy is an archaic system
that must be replaced by fascism ; and that the armed might of imperialism
can rule the world. Side by side the democratic peoples of the world, American
youth defeated the advocates of these philosophies.
The youth of America had good cause to fight as they did under the leadership
of Franklin Roosevelt. They remembered well how his courageous leadership
had saved the post-World War I generation from the chaos of the Hoover de-
pression. They knew from experience how his fight for a better America had
enabled many of them to finish school, to improve their living standards and to
enjoy the full benefits of American democracy.
With Franklin Roosevelt, the youth of America envisaged a world free from
the scourge of war. They knew that his policy of friendship and unity of all
United Nations held the key to peace as well as victory. Translated into prac-
tical terms, it meant an incessant battle for economic democracy, for colonial
independence, for minority rights and for the spirit of friendly cooperation
among the Big Three powers.
F. b. R. did not live to see the peace he worked so hard to win. He did not
live to see that peace threatened by dangerous voices in our midst who are al-
ready crying for a new war — a new and terrible conflagration that will wipe
out democracy as it lashes the earth with the weapons of an atomic age.
But today, others, particularly the youth of America, are fighting along the
battle lines set by F. D. R. Through the AYD, through the National Com-
mittee to Win the Peace and through every other democratic channel of people's
expression, American youth are working to return our Nation to the program
of F. D. R.
The future of the youth of America is inextricably woven into the pattern
this country sets for itself in the immediate period to come. The voice of youth
will play a major role in determining that pattern.
Together witli the youth of America, the National Committee to Win the
Peace will work to crystalize public opinion on a course which will enable us
to live in peace with all nations of the world — on a course which will enable us
to steer clear of a war whicli might be precipitated by forces which are inimical
to the best interests of the youth and people of America.
Only if our country follows such a course will the ideals of F. D. R. and the
youth of America for a better postwar world be fulfilled.
Mv. ^Morris. IVIr. Lattimore, did you ever serve as a member of the
board of directors of the American-Russian Institute?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I may have, for a year.
If you have a document to refresh my recollection, I should be glad
to see it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 21, 1940, addressed to Miss
Harriet L. jMoore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-
fifth Street, New York City, with the typed signature of Owen Latti-
more. The document is a photostat of a carbon copy.
Mr. iSIoRRis. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall having written that
letter ?
j\Ir. Lattimore. Yes; I recall it. And it shows that my recolTection«
was wrong.
The Chairman. All right, he recalls it.
Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please ?
Mr. Lattimore. The date is October 24, 1940, to Miss Harriet L.
Moore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street,
New York City.
3480 INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS
(Exhibit No. 547)
Dear Hakbiet: I am afraid that I cannot serve on the board of directors of the
institute, but I thinlv you will appreciate my reasons.
My primary interest, and the only field in which I speali with any authority,
is the Far East. At the present time, of all times, I do not want to run the
risk of having anything I may say about the Far East discredited by people who
say "You can't trust a word he says about China, because he is interested in
cultural relations with the Soviet Union."
Yours very sincerely.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record?
The Chairman. It will be received into the record.
(The document previously read in full by the w^itness was marked
"Exhibit No. 547".)
The Chairman. Wliat is the next one ?
Mr. Morris. Mr, Mandel, will you identify this document, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "On board M. V. Georgic^ en
route to New York." It is dated October 19, 1937, addressed to
W. L. Holland, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is
a phototsat of a carbon copy.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read the handwritten notations
on the top ?
Mr. Mandel. At the top are the following handwritten notes
[reading] :
Copies to OL— to share with RP & ED.
CHS— to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT.
The Chairman. Can somebody interpret those initials, please, who
they were, for the record ? Who were the parties ?
Mr. Morris. Mr, Lattimore, will you identify the parties?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
OL— to share with RP & ED.
The Chairman. Is that your signature to the letter, "OL" ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; this is a circulation notation, to be sent to
"OL" and for "OL" to share with "RP" and "ED."
The Chairman. Who are they. Who is "RP" ?
Mr, Lattimore. "RP" I think was an Englishman named — I for-
get his name — Page or something like that, who was working for
the IPR in Shanghai.
"ED," I think, is Elizabeth Downing.
Then the other initials are "CHS— to share with HM, CP, EEC,
KB, CT." Presumably, that means Chen Han-seng, to share with
Harriet Moore, Catherine Porter, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley, Kathleen
Barnes, Charlotte Tyler.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of this document is that a
copy of it had been sent to Mr. Lattimore, and the questioning will bear
on his knowledge of the contents of this memorandum.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you offering that for the record, Mr. Morris?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer this for the record.
"The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record.
(The document ire.ferr^d to was marked "Exhibit No. 548" and is
as follows:)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3481
Exhibit No. 548
Copies to 01. — to share with RP & ED
CHS— to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT
On Board "M. V. Georoic," en Route to New York,
19th October, 1937.
W. L. Holland, Esq.,
% Kokusai Kyokai, 12 2-cJiomc Marnnoiichi, Kojimaclii-ku,
Tokyo, Japan.
De.\b Bill: The pace in and following Moscow has been such that I can only
now begin a piecemeal report to you on visit and discussions. Today I will
group mv answers around the agenda which I prepared for a meeting of the
praesidium on August 13 and August 17. To give you the trend, I will italicize
the agenda which formed the basis of these two formal meetings, but there were
many other conversations so that the information contained in this letter was
not entirely conveyed at those two stated meetings.
1. THANKS TO SOVIET COUNCIL FOR ARRANGING SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FAR EASTERN
VISIT
Here I gave a rather full account of what I regarded as the deeper significances
of the visit. V. B. M. explained the difficulties in makincr the arrangements but
his great satisfaction that the object of the visit had been achieved, namely,
better equipment of the Secretary-General for his work.
This led to a very extended discussion of possible developments in the war
in China. The sketch made by V. E. M. and Y. P. B. in August has thus far
been proved both fundamental and accurately prophetic. To describe it here
would make this letter, which must be long anyhow, too bulky. It would also
make the letter interesting.
n. RESEARCH
.4. Letter from Holland to Bremman dated June 28, 1937.
(1) Enf/lish or American editions of Standards of Living Repot'ts.
(2) Report on North Pacific fisheries.
B. Letter from Holland to Carter dated June 28, 1937.
"The other place of research which ice should like to have started in the
Soviet Union is a report on Soviet foreign policy mith special reference to the
Far East and the countries having membership in the IPR. Each national coun-
cil is being asked to prepare a similar report, necessarily presenting its oun
national point of view.
"In connection with the studies on the economic development of dependent
territories in the Pacific it might be interesting for them to prepare a report on
the administration and economic development of its Far Eastern territories in-
habited by minor nationalities, contrasting this loith the customary methods of
V,^ester7i Colonial administration.
"There is one further point. Motileff in discussing the Land Utilization
studies at Yosemite spoke with some enthusiasm about securing an extensive
and very illuminating report on land utilization and agricultm-al development
in the Soviet Far East. There would be widespread interest in such a report
and I hope you will take the matter up again with him and assure him of our
desire to have the study done and to do ichaterer we can to facilitate its publi-
cation in English. Besides this Motileff spoke of supplying material for the
new edition of the Economic Handbook. On this point hotcevcr I assume that
Miss Mitchell will be tvell armed with specific requests and suggestions since the
preparation of the new edition has already been star-ted under Mr. Field's
direction."
With reference to English or American editions of the Standard of Living
Reports, the praesidium is hospitable to the idea in principle, but is very reluctant
to have these handled on any but a commercial basis. They do not wish to have
publications subsidized for this makes their work liable to attack as propaganda.
If some English or American publisher will not take the studies on a commercial
basis it is probable that it could be published through the English Workers Press
or tlirough International Publishers.
88348-^52— pt. 10 ^^14
3482 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
With reference to a report on the North-Pacific fisheries, the praesidium wants
to know precisely what tlie objective of tlie Institute is for this study. There are
so many approaclies that the praesidium does not wish to set a lot of people to
work on every aspect of Soviet Far Eastern fislieries without knowing with very
great precision, what you and Alsherg want. In this connection, please see my
letter to Alsberg of V. E. M. thought that the fisheries question had been
better treated in the Pacific Fisherman than it had in Pacific Affairs. He had
sent Miller Freeman the latest data in Jiily. Some time when you are in Tokyo
you may wish to look up Juikoff, an expert on fish, who is attached from time
to time to the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo.
If the Japanese I. P. R. or the American I. P. R. set the pace in the studies of
the fishery question or if you and Alsberg give a precise outline of just what the
purpose of the study is, it will be very easy for the Soviet I. P. R. to make the
necessary start on the study.
With reference to a report on Soviet foreign policy in the Far East, V. E. M.
wonders whether you wish it treated primarily from the historical point of view
or with the emphasis on contemporary manifestations of Soviet foreign policy.
If the latter is what you want, the situation is a little difficult because of the lack
of connection between the Soviet I. P. K. and the Foreign Ofiice, as prescribed by
I. P. R. custom. It may be helpful if you would suggest an organizing principal
for all of the Councils for their monographs in this field.
With reference to your suggestions that the praesidium prepare a report on
the development of the Far Eastern Territories inlial)ited by Minor Nationalities,
for contrast with the customary methods of Western Colonial administration, I
have already written you (see my letter of September 29) that it is quite im-
possible for the Soviet I. P. R. to prepare a report for such a purpose. The INIinor
Nationalities are in no sense "colonial"' areas. If you want a monograph on this
subject it is a legitimate request to make of the Soviet I. P. K., but only if it is
completely disassociated from preparation for the Round Table on Colonial
Problems.
With reference to Land L^tilization there is a voluminous report on this sftbject
for '34, '35, '36, on which someone is working. But it probably cannot be brought
up to date until the second half of next year. Then someone should go to the
Far East for the purpose of correcting and supplementing the statement.
With reference to the new edition of the Economic Handljook. I had nothing
to say as Field had not supi)lied me with an outline of his proposed procedure in
this matter. When a specific request is made to Motylev I think he will respond.
But I didn't get the idea that he regarded this project as one to which everything
else should be subordinated.
III. PACFFIC ATFAIRS
Lattimore's urgent desire for Soviet articles for Pacific Affairs, for example,
Voitiriskifs article in TikMi Olcean, ivhich tvas translated and used in Amerasia,
ironld have been ideal as a contribution to Pacific Affairs.
This has been covered in my letter to Lattlmore of September 12, a copy
of which I have already sent you.
IV. AGENDA FOR 1039 CONFERENCE
A. Comment of Soviet Council.
B. Replies fro)n other Councils.
The Soviet Council prefers the methodology of our April proposal to that
followed at Yosemite. At the same time the praesidium does not feel so strongly
in this matter as to desire to have their vote weigh too decisively. They feel
that as one of the newest Councils they would prefer to throw in their lot with
the wishes of the majority of the older Councils. The Council favors the inclu-
sion of the current crisis in the Far East in the agenda of the next Conference.
The Soviet Council had not yet received the Kingston proposals when I was in
Moscow. They had seen the Chatham House memorandum of August 3rd and
Miss Harriet Moore's important contribution on methods and objectives.
v. INTERIM MEETINGS OF PACIFIC COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE,
HANKING, APRIL 21-28, 1938
A. Af/enda.
B. Soviet participation.
If the meetings are held in Naidving the Soviet Council will aim to be repre-
sented. The Soviet Council would have preferred a meeting in October 1937^
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3483
in England to a meeting in China in April 1938, partially because of distance,
but principally because of the advantage of getting Great Britain to assume
greater interest and responsibility in the I. P. R. through acting as host.
VI. PACIFIC COUNCIL FINANCE
I referred to Dafoe's letter of March 30th in which he referred to Lord Astor's
letter stating that the Chatham House increase of its gift was defended on the
ground that it would enable the Institute to get more money from the other
Councils.
The praesidium was glad that Chatham House had increased its contriljution
to $750, but sorry that it had not raised it to .$1,000. The U. S. S. R. will con-
sider increasing its contribution to .$3,000.00 next year. If all the other Councils
would increase, they would do likewise, but they do not feel that it is sound for
them to give more than Great Britain which in reality they are already doing
if you take everything into consideration. The Soviet Council is the only
Council which has never taken a penny from the International liesearch Fund.
Nearly every Council, except the American and Canadian have got more from
the Research Fund than they have contributed to the General Purposes budget.
Furthermore, the Soviet Council this year took care of all my expenses from
the time I arrived in Vladivostok until I reached Moscow, and thus in fact added
'several hundred dollars to the Pacific Council's income, though this item will
not show in our books. The Soviet I. P. R. is prepared to supplement its contri-
bution to the Pacific Council by helping to meet the Ruble needs of staff mem-
bers like Miss Moore and Lattimore when they travel on study tours in the
U. S. S. R.
VII. IXF0R:\[AL report ox I. p. R. developments in japan, PHILIPPINES, AND CHINA
Here I gave a survey of the difficulties and promise of the three Far Eastern
Councils. I described the favorable financial outlook in Japan and China and
indicated that I feared that few if any of the hoped for contributions would now
actually be paid to either Council. I referred to the promises of increased finan-
cial support of the Philippine Council and the bearing this might have in ulti-
mately creating .something more substantial than that which has existed in the
past. The praesidium asked very penetrating questions regarding the Institute
in the three countries.
VIII. CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R. EEGAKDING THE WORK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT SINCE YOSEMITE
The praesidium was so conscious of its failure to cooperate in supplying
articles for Pacific Affairs that little was said under this heading. Fears with
reference to Problems of the Pacific will not it appears be realized. I saw an
advance copy of the volume in London and was able to write Motylev a letter
which will I think end his anxiety. The only real criticism was with reference to
Cressy whom the praesidium recognized was not a representative of the I. P. R.
and had only been recommended by the I. P. R. as in Class B. Motylev felt that
Cressy was exceedingly conservative and in many important fields uninformed.
For example, he criticized the Atlas because Manchuria and the Outer Mongolian
People's Republic were not .shown in the same colors as indicating an identic
political status.
Motylev nevertheless, was very glad that the Atlas had been able to pay Cressy
between 3,800 and 4,000 Rubles for eight days work on the Atlas, thus providing
for all of his Ruble needs throughout the extensive journeys which Motylev ar-
ranged for him to different parts of the Union.
IX. WORK PLANS OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT FOR THE COMING
YEARS CARTER, MITCHELL, HOLLAND, CHEN HAN-SENG, LATTIMORE, MOORE, PYKE, ETC.
Here I gave the best foreca.st I could of staff plans. Motylev was sorry that
Mitchell had been unable to come to Moscow and that I had not applied earlier
for permission for Holland to accompany me to the Far East. The pdsition with
reference to Lattimore's going to Outer :\longolia is set forth in my letter to
Lattimore of September 12, a copy of which I sent you. The position with refer-
ence to Miss Moore's going to Buryat, Mongolia is set forth in my letter to her
of September 12, a copy of which I have also sent you.
3484 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
X. COMMENTS BY OFFICERS OF THE V. S. S. R. I. P. R. ON PRESENT CRISIS IN THE
FAR EAST
This, as indicated above, calls for a separate memorandum.
XI. MOTYLEV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR CARTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (AUGUST 10, 1923)
When I reached Vladivostok, Bremman told me that Dr. Motylev hoped that
it would be possible for me to take my family for a fortnight to the Crimea at
the end of tlie Moscow visit. Motylev renewed this invitation on our arrival,
but because of previous engagements in Western Europe, and the growing serious-
ness of the crisis in the Far East, we had to decline with thanks this very kind
invitation.
Arrangements were made, however, for us to take a fascinating three-day trip
in the Moscow-Volga Canal, going as far as Kalinin. We made interesting
visits to the parks, to the Red Army Club, to one of the big stadiums for a soccer
game between Dynamo and the Red Army, and spent all of August 18 at the
great aviation field outside of Moscow watching some hundreds of airplanes
celebrating the annual Civil Aviation Day.
We saw a good many of the staff of the American Embassy, although Mr.
Davies was away on his yacht in the Baltic. We saw the British Ambassador,
and several of his staff, had long talks with both the Chinese and Japanese
Ambasi^adors, with Litvinova, and, of course, with several of the foreign journal-
ists. Mr. and IVIrs. Barnes extended many courtesies including a cocktail party
for many of the foreign journalists the day we left. On August 21st Motylev
gave a dinner, attended, among others, by Smirnov, the new head of Vox,
Vinogradoff, Foreign Office referent for England and the United States, Wine-
berg, of the Anglo-American section of the Foreign Office, Miss , one of the
editorial staff of Isvestia. Voitinsky we did not see as he had not returned
from his holiday. It so happened that our visit to Moscow came at a time when
several members of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. Council were away on vacation.
Hai'ondar had been borrowed for six months to assist in the Soviet Building at
the Paris Exposition. We had two good talks with him in Paris.
One evening Motylev took us to the movie "Na Vostoke." This is a film
version of Pavlenko's novel which has gone through edition after edition since
its publication a few months ago. I am told though it is a novel, it contains
a surprising amount of military information regarding the position of the Red
Army in the Far East. You will remember Harriet Moore's review of this book
in the September Pacific Affairs.
We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov.
Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova, and myself were present. Smirnov wanted
to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute
could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding
•of the work and program of the A. R. I. and hoped tliat more substantial coopera-
tion could be built up in the future. I read betv/een the lines that Vox felt that
the A. R. I. gave letters of introduction to Vox to any American tourist who
requested one and thus they had no basis for discrimination as to who was en-
titled to a lot of time and who could best be liandled by Intourist. If Vox knew
in advance of the specific social opinions and interests of important Americans,
they could make very much better use of their limited staff. Smirnov wanted
a long explanation as to why the A. R. I. still retained a certain internationally
known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board of directors..
Just before I left, Smirnov luckily bad a long letter from Osgoode Field, the
President of the A. R. I., which I gather set his mind at rest at several points.
The A. R. I. bad recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to
know very much either about the A. R. I. or about the social views of its members.
I used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of the
A. R. I., namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the member-
ship was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that
perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section
of American public opinion.
XII. OTUEB BUSINESS
A. Memorandum from Chatham Hoiise dated August 3rd, 1937
This memorandum arrived after our first conversation on preparation for
the next conference. On one of these occasions Motylev emphasized how eager
the Soviet I. P. R. is to have the Institute deal with current controversial issues.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3485
Unless the Institute courageously continues to face the most pressing and funda-
mental controversies, it cannot render its largest service.
B. What steps will be taken to insure intelligent and significant revieics of Great
Soviet World Atlas in principal countries. How secure a feiv advance
copies with memorandum on principal points of significance
Motylev indicated that the first edition of the Atlas would be 10,000 copies.
These would be used up almost immediately. He really hoped that the first
edition would not be widely reviewed because then the overseas demand for
copies might exceed the number available. He would, of course, see that one
copy was sent to the International Secretariat and to each National Council.
C. Recommendation as to duration Miss Harriet Moore's visit to Buryat Mongolia
ECC was asked to write a formal letter to Dr, Motylev a few months in advance
of Miss Moore's proposed visit to Buryat Mongolia, describing the purpose of the
visit and its duratioh. It was suggested that an application for .say two months'
residehce in Buryat Mongolia be thade. A major diffl;illty was, of cour.se, the
matter of military secrets. A minor difBclilty might be the question of .suitable
living quarters as the Btiryat Mongols draw no lines between the sexes.
D. Could Bremman spend at least 3 months as a member of the Internntional
Secretariat in 1938 or 1939
Motylev indicated that the Soviet Council mii.'^t provide a Soviet staff member
for the International Secretariat for a few months prior to the next Conference ;
but whether Bremman himself could be spared was another question, Bremman
as you know is one of the Japanese experts in the Academy of Science (Insti-
tute of World Politics and Economics). He is only able to give part time to the
work of the I. P. R. He is exceedingly al)le and would be quickly annexed by
the American Council if we ever station him in New 'Sfork.
E. Procedure with reference to members of the Internatimial Secretariat and
the Secretariats of the National Councils visiting the Soviet Union in the
future
This question was raised as a result of Shiman's long delay in getting a visa.
The full details of this are covered in my letter to Field of August 20th, a copy
of which I enclose.
In general the Soviet I. P. R. will always find it ea.sier to get visas for senior
staff members, who come for longish visits rather than for junior members who
contemplate visits of only a few days. Very great regret was expressed by
Motylov that Field had not notified him, in advance, of Shiman's plans.
F. The internal situation in the Soviet Union
The discussion of this topic by Motylov and Bremman was one of the most
interesting and enlightening experiences in the whole cour.se of my visit. But
thi.s better be covered in a separate memorandum which I hope some day to be
able to prepare.
G. Suggestions from Soviet Council to the Secretary-Generpl regarding making
the loork of the International Secretariat more efficient
The praesidium had no suggestions to make.
H. How secure promptly several copies of the folloiolng publications of the In-
stitute of World Politics and Economics. Provisional titles only
(a) Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria
(&) Guerrilla Warfare in Manchuria
(c) Symposium 07i China
id) Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in
Japan
{e) Financial situation in Japan
if) Position of the Working Class iti Japan
(g) Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourivitch
(h) Dissertation by Levina (?) developing Lenin's idea that Capitalism is
acceptable to the United States peasant because of the absence of feudal factors.
Motylev and Bremman said that some of the foregoing titles were not phrased
accurately, some are completed, and some may never be published.
Notice of publication of any of the.se studies will presumably appear in Tikhii
Okean. Miss Moore should be asked to notify the Secretary-General when any
of them are forthcoming, with a view to deciding whether translation is desirable.
3486 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I. Other business lOS proposed by the officers of the U. 8. S. R. I. P. R.
There were several general conversations with reference to the attitude of
other Councils to the present a.csression in the Far East. Surprise was ex-
pressed that the American intelligensia is so silent ; even the interesting discus-
sions at the annual meeting of the American Council revealed a lack of funda-
mental information as to the actual forces that are operating in Japan. Both
Reichshauer and Warnshuis took the optimistic and inaccurate view of trends
in Japan which were not refuted in a clear-cut way in the ensuing discussion.
Similarly there is little evidence in the discussions of the Royal Institute in
Loudon, of a fundamental understanding of the Far Eastern situation. Is it not
possible for the American and British Councils to make such a clear-cut analysis
of the forces at work in the Far East as will reveal to their publics the nature
and danger of the present aggression? Should not the Institute in all countries
be the foremost organization in making highly fundamental analyses? Could
not the American and British Councils hold special meetings and express opin-
ions on contemporary questions while they are acute?
A special conference convened by the American Council, if adequately reported
and publicized, could give a fundamental analysis of the whole Far Eastern sit-
uation which might be of the greatest importance to public opinion throughout
the world. The imperialistic fallacy of men like Orchard should be dealt with
in a clear-cut way by the American Council of which he is a member.
Reverting to the program for the next Conference, the Soviet I. P. R. is not
deeply concerned with shipping and trade competition in the Pacific because of
the Soviet's foreign-trade policy.
With reference to the two reports on Standards of Living ; the first part
should be completed by the end of December and the second half by the end of
January. I think, however, that the first report, namely that by Krivetsky, is
more certain of completion than that by Professor Kravel. I seem to remember
Motylev saying that Kravel's work had been interrupted either by serious ill-
ness or by his transfer to another and more urgent job.
With reference to the symposium on the Far East ; Krasavtsev stayed on in
the Soviet Far East after Bremman and I left in order to see all of the authors
personally and make arrangements for checking all of the manuscripts.
Both Motylev and Bremman were eager to know of developments in the I. P. R.
in all of the member countries. They discussed many of the ideas put forward
at Yosemite by members from the various countries. They had enjoyed the
visits after Yosemite of Liu Yu-wan, of Van Walrec of the Pacific Institute in
Amsterdam. They were much impressed by Lattimore's statement that if the
Soviet I. P. R. would only furnish a regular series of articles for Pacific Affairs
it would be much easier for him to bring the editorial policy into a real focus
than it is at present.
Doubtless this letter will raise many questions on which you will want further
clarification. Plea.se, therefore, write me fully after you have read it.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
]\Ir. MoRRi.s. I ask you now to turn to page 5 of the stencil copy, Mr.
Lattiniore. Will you read the paragraph commencing at the top of
the page ?
Mr. Lattimore. ISIay I look at the document of the whole to see the
relevance of the particular paragraph to the whole?
Mr. Morris. Yes, you may, Mr. Lattimore.
(The witness examined the exhibit.)
Mr. Lattimork. I found here the name Pyke. That must be "'R. P."
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, tlie questioning, you see, is about the
American-Russian Institute, and you find the reference to that com-
mences, I believe, on page 5. The whole thing will be in the record.
Mr. Lattimore. What is the paragraph you wanted me to read?
Mr. Morris. The top of page 5.
Senator Ferguson. Before he reads that, might I inquire?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you found the reports on your visit to
Moscow, that you were going to look up for me, referred to in your
Ordeal bv Slander?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3487
Mr. Lattimore. No, I haven't found it yet. I haven't had an oppor-
tunity to go and look for it. I can tell you in general what its nature
is.
Senator Ferguson. No, we want to see the report.
Mr. Chairman, even though we recess Mr. Lattimore's testimony,
might we hold it open until we get those reports, until we see whether
they ought to go into the record ?
Mr. Lattimore. There was no report solely on the Moscow meetings.
It was my report to the committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations
on my work as editor of Pacific Affairs, which included a reference to
the Moscow visit. There was no separate report on the Moscow visit.
Senator Ferguson. The report that was referred to in the record.
Mr. Lattimore. In the testimonv, sure.
Shall I read?
Mr. Morris. Yes, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov.
Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova and myself were present. Smirnov wanted
to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute
could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding
of the work and program of the ART and lioped that more substantial coopera-
tion could be built up in the future. I read between the lines ■
"I" meaning Carter.
Senator Ferguson. And "ARI" meaning what ?
Mr. Lattimore. American-Russian Institute.
"I" and ''myself" all the way through here is Carter.
I read between the lines that Vox felt that the ARI gave letters of introduction
to Vox to any American tourist who requested one and thus they had no basis
for discrimination as to who was entitled to a lot of time and who could best
be handled by Intourist. If Vox knew in advance of the specific social opinions
and interests of important Americans, they could make very much better use of
their limited staff. Smiruov wanted a long explanation as to why the ARI still
retained a certain internationally known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board
of directors.
Do you want me to go on ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, please.
Mr. Lattimore. This is still Carter :
.Just before I left Smirnov luckily had a long letter from Osgood Field, thQ
president of the ARI, which I gather set his mind at rest at several points. The
ARI had recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to know
very much either about the ARI or about the social views of its members.
I'used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of
the ARI, namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the member-
ship was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that
perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section
of American opinion.
The Chairman. The "ARI*' stands, again, please, for what?
Mr. Lattimore. American-Russian Institute.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you correct our record in connection
with whether or not the American-Russian Institute is now listed as a
subversive organization by the Attorney General ?
Mr. Mandel. A member of the stall called the Justice Department
after this morning's session, in that regard, and was told that the
present status of the American-Russian Institute of New York, which
has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General on April 24, 1951,
3488 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
renuiins the same. This was told the member of the staff by Mrs.
Keene, of Mr. Foley's office. . ^ , t^ i -d
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you serve with the Pauley Kepara-
tions Mission in Japan?
Mr. Lati'imore. Yes, I did.
Mr Morris. For what period of time did you so serve i
Mr Lattimore. I think from about maybe late October or No-
vember 1945 to late January or possibly the beginning of February
Mr. Morris. During that time, were you on the State Department
^^Mr Lattimore. Yes. My recollection is that the staff were paid
through the State Department, although they were regarded—-
The Chairman. How the staff were paid makes no difference. Were
you on the State Department payroll ; yes or no ?
Mr. Latiimore. I would say yes and no, Senator.
May I explain ?
The Chairman. Speaking of yourself, not of the staff.
Mr Lattimore. Speaking of myself, my understanding was that
the Pauley Mission was a White House mission, not a State Depart-
ment mission, but for some reason of Government arrangements that
I don't know, my pay checks came through the State Department.
Tlie Chairman. The declaring of that whole statement is your
answer that you were on the State Department payroll. So what is
the use of wasting time?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I should say— well, I won t quibble about
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were you the third ranking member of
that mission .
Mr Lattimore. Oh, about third or fourth, I should say.
Senator Ferguson. Were you going to read this document?
Mr. Morris. I am sorry. Senator. Did you want to go into that i
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I wanted to ask a question.
Who was the director who was anti-Soviet on this board, do you
know ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea. r, . i.r
Senator Ferguson. Do you know in this that you read, what they
mean by "social opinion" and "social views"?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You have not any idea?
Mr. Lattimore, No. It would be a matter of speculation.
Senator Ferguson. How would you speculate?
Mr. Lattimore. If you want me to speculate. Senator
Senator Ferguson. Yes. . ,
Mr Lattimore. The first recollection that would come to my mind
is that they wanted to know those views because they gave capitalists
and anti-Communists better treatment than they did Communists.
At least, so I was told when I was in I^Ioscow, by Mr. Demaree Bess,
who was then correspondent to the Christian Science Monitor, and i
expressed amazement that after the hostile way they criticized my
writing, they had allowed me to make a trip to Moscow to look at
their Siongolian research work. And he said, "Oh, that is quite
simple." He said, "If they consider a person anti-Soviet they always
treat him much better."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3489
The Chairman. I do not think the question calls for you to quote
anybody else.
Mr. Lattimore. That was, of course, as of 1936.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions. Senator?
Senator Ferguson. You do not think that the words "social views"
meant Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it. But is pure speculation on my part.
I don't think my speculation is very authoritative.
Senator Ferguson. You received this at the time. It indicates that
it was passed to you.
]\Ir. Laitimore. It indicates it was passed to me, yes. I don't recall
readino; it, and I presume I put it on one side as something that didn't
have any particular concern to me.
The Chairman. That was by Mr. Carter, was it not?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were you listed as a special consultant
Avith the Pauley Mission staff?
Mr. Laitimore. I believe that was my rank, or title, or whatever
you call it, listino;.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, when you testified in executive session
before this committee, we asked you if you helped draft the Pauley
reparations report, and you testified "quite largely."
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Is that correct?
Mr. Lattimore. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, Mr. Morris, in his opening pre-
pared statement, it is my memory that Mr. Lattimore referred to the
Pauley report as a report which "I wrote." Is that not correct, Mr.
Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I am not sure whether I wrote or drafted, or some-
thing.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is on page 26, the fifth line from the bottom.
Mr. Latitmore. I have it on 27.
Mr, Fortas. You must have different pages.
Mr. Lattimore. Is this the reference you mean, Mr. Sourwine :
When I was in Japan with the Pauley mission at the end of 1945, I did play
a major part in drafting; a reparations report in close conference with Mr.
Pauley.
Mr. Sourwine. No, I am referring to this statement which is at
the bottom of page 26, which is the copy I have here, and which is
one of the copies you distributed on the opening day :
Mr. Dooman claimed that the Pauley report which I had written provided for
turning Japan into a pasture.
Mr. Lattimore. I think, Mr. Sourwine, that must be a reference to
a statement by IVIr. Dooman.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you, in fact, write the Pauley report?
Mr, Lattimore. No, I played a large part in drafting it.
The Chairman. All right, let us go on,
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, by bringing together a lot of loose
ends here, I believe we can finish in about an hour and a half tomorrow.
Senator Ferguson. Why do we not recess until then ?
Mr. Morris. Mr, Sourwine has a question today.
The Chairman. There was submitted to the chairman yesterday a
matter of the insertion into the record of excerpts from the Con-
3490 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
gressional Record. I had Mr. Sourwine and other members of the
staff look up the question of context.
Mr. Sourwine, wliat did you find as regards those excerpts?
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, the excerpts were two in number.
They are referred to on page, or beginning on page 5635 of the
record of this committee of yesterday. Mr. Lattimore said :
Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the Congressional Record
pertinent to the general question of discussion of the subject of China in 1945
that I should like to read into the record.
The Chairman. Let me see it first, please.
Senator Ferguson. I have something before he puts that in, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lattimore. One is from Representative Walter Judd and the other is
from Representative Mike Mansfield.
Senator Ferguson then went forward with the matter he had, after
which the chairman said :
The two excerpts here, assertedly from the Congressional Record, I think
counsel will check with the Congressional Record and, if they are to go in,
they will go in in context, and I will reserve the rviling on the matier.
With regard to these two excerpts, I have here the original sheet
as furnished by Mr. Lattimore, and also a longer excerpt from the
Congressional Record, showing the point at which each of these ap-
peared in context. If the Chair deems it not improper, I would like to
ask the witness a question or so about these and then lay the whole
thing in the record, or offer it for the record.
The Chairman. Very well. I do not want to go too far in ques-
tioning the witness.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, did you prepare these excerpts?
Mr. LAT-riMORE. May I see the typing? I think that would show
whether I did or not.
(Documents handed to the witness.)
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I did this actually myself.
Mr. Sourwine. You offered them for the record. Do you know
who did prepare them ?
Mr, Lat^itmore. No, I couldn't tell you exactly, Mr. Sourwine.
Several people at the Hopkins have very kindly volunteered to help
me by looking up references, and so on, and I think this must be from
one of them. But 1 don't know which one.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you take any steps before you offered these for
the record to satisfy yourself that they were not out of context?
Mr. Lattimore. I made no check. I accepted them as excerpts from
the Congressional Record.
The Chairman. I think the Chair will hold its ruling further in
the matter at this time.
Senator Ferguson. Until the witness at least can vouch for these?
The Chairman. Yes. We will stand in recess until 10 : 30 to-
morrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 3: 37 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 10 : 30 a. in., Friday, March 7, 1952.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1952
United States Senate,
Si:bcommi ri'EE To Investigate the Adminisi^ration
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, or the Committee on the Judiciary,
W ashing on^ D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10 : oa a. m., pursuant to recess, in room
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) pre-
siding.
Present : Senator McCarran,
Also Present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Of the Senators belonging to the Internal Security Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Smith has been called
hastily to his home in North Carolina on official matters. Senator
O'Conor is away on official matters, and Senator Eastland has been
called away.
The belief of the committee is that as many as can listen to this
testimony should listen to it. For that reason, it is the conclusion
of the committee that this matter goes over and is recessed now until
10 : 30 Monday morning.
(Whereupon, at 10:37 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to recon-
vene at 10 : 30 a. m., Monday, March 10, 1952.)
3491
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1952
Unite!) States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal.
Securitt Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presid-
ing.
Present : Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Watkins.
Also present: Senator McCarthy and Senator Mundt.
Present also: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Morris, you may proceed.
Senator Ferguson. 'Mr. Chairman, I have a question I would like to
ask.
The Chairman. Very well.
TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABE FORTAS,
COUNSEL— Resumed
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, did you put into the record in
the Tydings committee the memorandum that you left at the White
House on July 3, 1945 ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you put into the record the letter that you
wrote to the President as of that time?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is, June 10, 1945.
Did you at all discuss the visit to the White House, before the Tyd-
ings committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I was asked whether I had made such a
visit, and I replied that I had.
Senator Ferguson. But you did not give the letter or the memo-
randum ?
]Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I was not asked for them.
Senator Ferguson. You were not questioned, then, about those let-
ters at all, were you?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think you did state that you had been
to the White House in 1945 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe that was stated in the record; yes.
3493
3494 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. But iiotlniio; more than just you had visited
there ?
Mr. Latttmore. That is riglit.
Senator Ferguson, Mr. Lattimore, did you consider the Soviet
Government a normal government, or did you consider it an inter-
national conspiracy?
Mr. Lattimore. When?
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you tlie question when if you will
tell me whether you ever did.
In your opinion, what was it? A normal government, or was it
an international conspiracy?
Mr. Lattimore. In my opinion, the Government of Russia was the
revolutionary of Russia and different from any other government.
Senator Ferguson. So you did recognize, in the early thirties, that
the Soviet Government was different tlian the normal government of
nations ?
Mr. Latiimore. Well, it was the only government of its kind.
Senator Ferguson. When did 3'ou come to the conclusion, if you
ever did, that it is a conspiracy and has in mind installing its form
of government world wide?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I believe that involves questions of re-
lations between the Russian Government, the Comintern, and the Com-
munist Parties of various countries on which I am not versed.
The Chairman. The question is, "V^^ien did you come to the con-
clusion ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You said it was different than other
governments ; it was the only government of its kind.
The Chairman. When did you come to that conclusion? That is
the question.
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is that I have not come to that con-
clusion.
/May I explain ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
IVIr. Lattimore. I have not come to that conclusion because I don't
know how the structure of international relations is set up as between
the Russian Government and the various Communist Parties.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever study the Russian
language?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I have studied the Russian language.
Senator Ferguson. Do you speak it ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't speak it. I read it quite freely.
Senator Ferguson. Did you show tlie exhibits that we have now
on the record, of your visit to the White House, that is, the memo-
randum and the letter, to any member of the Ty dings committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Ferguson. Or the staff ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. How do you account, Mr. Lattimore, for not
making that part of the record? Did you not think that was mate-
rial on the question as to whether or not you ever had anything to do
with the foreign Policy of the Far East, as far as the President or
the State Department was concerned ?
Mr. Lattimore. I did not think it was material. The question of
whether the committee wanted to see it was up to them.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3495
Senator Ferguson. How would tliey know that it existed? You
did not disclose it to any of them.
JNIr. Lattimore. They knew that I had visited the White House.
Senator Ferguson. That is your only explanation, is it, for not
disclosing at that time your memorandum, your stand on the Far
East, and your letter ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. No. I would add to that, that as a citizen I would
not take the initiative in revealing the details of a citizen asking to see
the President of his country.
Senator Ferguson. You disclosed at least the letter to this com-
mittee in your voluntary statement ; did you not ?
]Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think so. I disclosed the fact that •
Senator Ferguson. Have you a copy of your statement? "Will you
read it ?
The Chairman. The answer, as I understand it, then, is no.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now I am asking him to look on the bot-
tom of page 24.
Mr. FoRTAS. It is No. 6.
Mr. Lattimore. Thirty-three I have here, No. 6 :
In 194.5, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my
views on China policy. Tlie President, in response, aslied me to come to see
liim, and I did.
Senator Ferguson. So you disclosed it to the President and to the
public prior to coming into this hearing. What was the difference
betAveen this hearing and the Tydings committee hearing so that you
did not want to disclose the fact that you had written to the President ?
Mr. Lattimore. I did not sa}' that 1 did not want to disclose the
fact that I had written to the President, I said here that — I told the
Tydings committee that I had seen the President, and in this state-
ment I said that I had written to the President and asked if I could see
him. I see no discrepancy.
Mr. Fortas. No; that is not right.
Senator Ferguson. Your counsel corrects 3'Ou.
Mr. Lattimore. I wrote to President Truman expressing my views
on China policy.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You did not say that you just wrote a
letter. You say in this statement that you had written a letter ex-
pressing your views on China policy. You knew that the Tydings
committee was investigating a question, and one of the questions w^as
whether or not you had been an influence on our foreign policy, or
what you had to do with it.
Why did you not disclose what you did in this memorandum to us ?
Why did you not disclose it to the Tydings committee so that they
could have gone into it?
You cite the case, do you not, that the Tydings committee has found
you absolutely innocent of everything? Why did you not disclose
that fact to them ?
Mr. Lattimore. 1 told the Tydings committee that I saw the
President.
Senator Ferguson. Why did you not tell them that you had written
a memorandum of your views on the Far East or on China ?
Mr. Lattimore. I told the Tydings committee that I had seen the
President. If they wanted to know more about it, I was perfectly
prepared to answer.
3496 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them that ?
Mr, Lattimore. I don't remember the transcript of the Tydings
committee at that point. I certainly didn't refuse to answer any
questions.
Senator Ferguson. You are aware of the fact that you were sworn
at that time to give them all the facts, were you not ? The truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
Did you not think that, as part of your visit, if you left a memoran-
dum, that that was material to the issue as well as giving your views
in a letter which you expressed here ? You did not even disclose to this
committee that you had left a memorandum with the President, in
your voluntary statement.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I understand that when I am sworn to
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that is an
undertaking to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth in response to questions.
Senator Ferguson. You came in and were sworn, and you read
this statement to this committee. Will you let me see it, please?
You read this statement. No. 6, at the bottom of page 33 :
In 1945, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my
views on China policy. The President, in response, aslied me to come to see
him, and I did. Our conference lasted about 3 minutes.
Now, Mr. Lattimore, you produce here a letter giving your views
on the matter. You swore, when you read this, that it was the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
Now I ask you, why did you not then, instead of leaving the idea
that you had left nothing with the President, but talked with him for
just 3 minutes, why did you not produce, as part of this memor-
andum
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings
transcript ?
The Chairman. Just a minute. Let the Senator conclude his
question.
Senator Ferguson. Why did you not then give to the committee
the fact that you had written the memorandum and left it with
the President? How can you say that that is an accurate statement?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings
transcript ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. But I am still asking you the question
not on the Tydings transcript at all, but wdiat you told this com-
mittee. You did not mention in this statement to the committee
when you were telling them that was the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, that you had left the memorandum ; you
said merely that you had written a letter to him. How do you ac-
count for that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I have already said that I, as a citizen,
do not believe in taking the initiative in revealing what a citizen
talks about to his President when he sees him.
If the committee wants to ask for it— and this committee did —
it is not in my power to refuse. But the responsibility lies with the
committee. I see no obligation to volunteer anything of that kind.
Senator Ferguson. What was the difference between your state-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3497
ment on your views of the China policy in your letter than those in
the memorandum that yon left with the President? What is the
difference ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry. I don't understand the question.
Senator Ferguson. You said that you did not want to disclose what
you said to the President.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And do you think that that is the reason for
stating it this way, that you only wrote a letter and saw- him for 3
minutes and did not tell us that you left the memorandum?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I see nothing wrong in that whatever.
Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you whether you saw anything
wrong. Is that a statement of the whole truth?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I repeat that the question of the truth is
a question of what the committee asks me.
The Chairman. You were asked. Is that a statement of the whole
truth ? Do you want to answer that ?
Senator Ferguson. What you said to the committee in your mem-
orandum.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, it is impossible, in one memorandum, to
state the whole truth of the whole range of things that the committee
may be interested in, or of what has already been in the transcript.
I provided here a basis on which the committee could question me,
and on which it has questioned me.
Senator Ferguson. And is that your explanation ?
Mr, Lattimore. That is my explanation.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have the witness see the record
now in the Tydings committee, if he wants to.
The Chairman. Is the Tydings committee record available?
record l\lfi5^ifyi on which the witness asked for the Tydings committee
ever, but if he wants to'see'tlie ^i'ya'S'i^^iG^s^.^P^^^it^^ee record what-
Senator Ferguson. Yes. He had nsked to see ir '^""'"'^
Mr. Fortas. Senator you don^t have the reference to this portion
ot the Tydings record, do you ? ^
Senator Ferguson. No.
Mr. Fortas. This will take some time.
TwYJ'o^P^^®^^^- Then we can get it later.
1 hat is all X L,^e ^^ ^j^^ ^^^^^^^ ^.^^
over ihe w^k en d dfscl™^ understand a review of the record
'^Kl Max Eastina for thl Readei's'l^-!;'^fl ''^''''t\^y ^- ?• P<^-ell
the record. May it be done at this tim 3"' ^"'^ "'' ^'"^ ''''''''^ "^^«
not s^rve'^nr"'^- ^'" ^''' '^'''' ^'''' ^^^^^^^^^d? My memory does
helou&il^: ";!i"rr'' '''''^^r^ '"f -^J^ '^'^ ^^^t -^^k that
Mr, Thomas Lai on to sin "^^™°f "^^"^" ^^j^h Mr. Carter wante<l
the article in Ser's Dfo;stT^^V"'"n''"t^S' addressed itself to
-liie i^iiAffiMAN. It may be inserted in the record
88348— 52— pt. 10 15
3498 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 549" and is as
folloAYS :)
Exhibit No. 549
[Source: Reader's Digest, June 1945, article entitled "The Fate of the World Is at Stake
in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell (pp. 13-22, inclusive) ]
The Fate of the World Is At St.a.ke in China
Periodicals in Allied countries do not hesitate to publish blunt opinions
^Yhen their national interest is at stake. Criticism of American policy
and of individual Americans by official Russian journals, for instance,
has been extreme. We can hardly expect to keep the respect of the otlier
United Nations if our press — supposed to be the freest in the world —
does not speak up just as boldly. Especially in relation to our friendly
neighbor China, a plain-spoken report of the facts and a frank discussion
of American policy are imperative. — The Authors.
China is a giant among nations. Larger than all Europe, its population is one-
fourth of the human race. And this giant is waking up. Following the example
of Japan and Russia, it is entering the industrial age.
Therefore, the question wliether China goes democratic or totalitarian is tlie
biggest political question of today. In war or peace the weight of this giant
of manpower may well be decisive in settling the fate of the world.
China at present is split into three parts. IManchuria and the eastern half,
including most of the seaboard, are occupied by Japan. A northwestern region
not fai^from the Soviet border is held by the Chinese Communist Party. The
rest of China is still under the Chiang Kai-shek government, which commands
the loyalty of an immense majority of Chinese everywhere.
Chiang Kai-shek is the successor of Sun Yat-sen.' father of the Chinese revolu-
tion and founder of the Kuomintang (People's Party), which is dedicated to
these three aims : National independence, political democracy, and the people's
welfare. From 1927 to 1937 Chiang defeated the war lords; crushed the at-
tempt of the Communists, Moscow-led, to seize power; and united under the
Kuomintang practically all China except the smali northwest region into which
his armies drove the Communists. Through popular and powerful enough to
make himself permanent dictator, Chiang set a date, November 12, 1937, for a
constitutional convention. Japan attacked in July of that year, and the con-
vention had to be postponed. With victory now in sight, he ho^ --'- "
again— November 12, 1945--Sun Yat:f.eTi'.^J];"-<fii'^ Communists formed a united
fronfwoVf uTe lluomintang and' promised to fight under Chiang Kai-shek. But
they cooled off after the Stalin-Hitler pact and finally renounced their promise.
Explaining that theye were "revolutionaries, not reformers," they declared them-
selves and'^their Red Army independent. They now have their own government,
coin their own monev, run their own party-controlled newspapers and suppress
all others. Thev recently declared a boycott against Chiang's effort to pro''-^-^_
a democratic republic, denouncing his constitutional convention, 6 ^^'"^
fore its delegates are elected, as a slaves' congress ^j^i.
J. B. Powell, born not far from minmbal Mo., gj^--':^^^^
versity of Missouri and taught 4 years m tl|e^^\o^\;.;.^^'';,;rL editor of the
in China throughout the penod between tjp ^X he woricr He was at the
China Weekly Review, a liberal louriial kno|^ n ^";'T^.\ „\f ,^^,/ n^er papers and
same time correspondent for the Ma^-J'e'^tei Guaidian an(i uiei i i
edit^ed for several months the d«Uy China Press in Shanghai. (He says he
-U^^Sr^;^?take.f ^Iciier by ^e ^r'^at^^S^'J'^ t^^^eS
of the inhuman treatment he received, ^^'V^^^S^^n ember 194'' Mr -
i;-S;^^t:;sSsl'a^i^^wi;i^"-^
thP titlo "Mv 2,") Years in China." ,, ., ,....„: — ,
Powell
cMillan under
the development of the Soviet regime and the Comintern.
Suc7i is the present state of China's hope for democracy Japan we aie jw
sure will be driven out; but whether ^lanchuna and north China, which oiQ
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3499
the principal makinixs of srreat industry, will fall to the Communists and thus
ultimati^ly s\Yin,a: the whole gigantic nation down the totalitarian road is un-
determined. We Americans cannot evade our responsibility in this, for the ques-
tion which social system prevails in China is identical with the question whose
leadership prevails — that of democratic America or of totalitarian Russia.
American modes of influence are cultural persuasion ; the example of pros-
perity ; skilled technical assistance ; capital investment ; and, above all, military
and economic supplies. Russia's weapons are conspiratorial organization and
party-controlled propaganda, leading to seizure of power and a liquidaticm of all
democrats and, if necessity arises, military invasion in the name of liberation.
Russia cannot furnish capital, an example of prosperity, technical assistance,
or supplies on a scale comparable to ours. This gives us the trump cards if we
play our hand with clear understanding of the forces involved.
The Communists know this and are doing their best to cloud our understand-
ing of these forces. A flood of books, articles, reviews, news dispatches, lectures,
and radio broadcasts is pouring across our country, dedicated to the sole purpose
of confusing American public opinion about the situation in China. There are
four main points in this deception now being practiced upon us, all equally false
and all aimed at persuading us to abandon another 450 million people to the
totalitarian infection spreading from Russia.
DECEPTION 1. THAT RUSSIA IS A "DEMOCRACY" AND THAT CHINA CAN THEREFORE
SAFELY BE LEFT TO RUSSIAN "INFLUENCE"
Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous con-
ception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the
blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 193G-39 as "a triumph
for democracy." He now urges our Government, in a Ijook called Solution in Asia,
to accept cheerfully the spread of '"the Soviet form of democracy" in central Asia.
His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book on its jacket :
He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested
in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across
the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon de-
mocracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.
This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was
filled with .iazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be adver-
tised as more democratic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government,
however, it legitimized the dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (art.
126). Stalin himself, addressing the congress which ratified the draft of the
constitution, frankly stated this fact :
"I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in
force the regime of the dictatorship of. the working class and preserves
unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party. In the
Soviet Union only one party can exist, the party of Communists (Pravda,
November 26, 1936)."
In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 193S, only one can-
didate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party,
and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony
has not been repeated, and would make no difl'erence if it had. The constitution
is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is shot or
sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia whole regions are given up to these
concentration camps where from 15 to 20 millions * of Russian citizens are dying
a slow death at hard lal)or. That is the kind of "democratic practices" the
Chinese would see "across the Russian border" if they could look. But looking
is not permitted by totalitarian states.
First of all, then if our policy in China is to be wise, we must hold in steady
view the fact, frankly admitted by Stalin and once vigorously stated by
President Roosevelt as follows : "The Soviet Union is a dictatorship as absolute
as any other dictatorship in the world."
If this dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China, the cause of democracy
in Asia is lost. As is well known, these tentacles need not include invading
♦Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red arm.v, estimates that the
number is about 12,000,000. Boris Sonvarine, French historian of bolshevisni. estimates
15,000,000. Victor Kravchenko. recently resljrned from the Soviet Purchasing Commission
in Washington, who has visited man.v camps and had official relations with their manage-
ments, says these estimate.s are low and puts the figure at 20,000,000.
3500 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Sovi<4 troops, but only the native Communist parties now giving allegiance to
the Soviet Union and taking their directives from Moscow. When these Com-
munist parties get control of a neighboring state, the Moscow dictatorship and
its fellow travelers call that a friendly government. It is by means of these
Communist-controlled "friendly governments" — not by overt military conquest —
that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spreading frem the Soviet Union,
in Asia as in Europe.
Hence, for those who cannot swallow deception No. 1, there is another. We
shall quote from a recent book, Report from Red China, by Harrison Forman :
DECEPTION NO. 2. "THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AIIE NOT COMMUNISTS NOT ACCORD-
ING TO THE RUSSIAN DEFINITION OF THE TERM. I SAW NOT THE SLIGHTEST TANGIBLE
CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA."
Forman is backed up by Edgar Snow, the best-known popularizer of the pro-
Communist view, with the remark that the Chinese Communists and their leader
Mao Tse-tung, "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of estab-
lishing communism in China in the near future."
To unmask this deception, you need only go to the Daily Worker's book shop
on Thirteenth Street, New York City, pay 25 cents for Mao Tse-tung's book,
China's New Democracy (1941), published with an introduction by Earl Browder
(1945), and read the book. You will find that the "Lenin of China" is a devout,
orthodox, and obedient disciple of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and gives un-
qualified allegiance both to Soviet Russia and the Communist world revolution.
Here are a few quotations from Mao's book :
"The world now depends of communism for its salvation, and so does
China."
"We cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union
or from the victory of the anticapitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan,
Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany."
"No matter whom you follow, so long as you are anti-Communist you are
traitors."
Mao explains learnedly that communism in China has two stages : First, the
present stage of "New Democracy," which is but a preparation for the second
stage : i. e., "proletarian revolution" and the establishment of collectivism on
the Soviet model. Mao excoriates those who do not understand this, and insists
that "the second stage must follow the first closely, not permitting a capitalist
dictatorship to be inserted between them." ("Capitalist dictatorship" is Mao's
term for democracy as we understand it.)
How different this is from Edgar Snow's dulcet assurance that the Chinese
Communists "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of estab-
lishing Communism in China in the near future."
Mr. Snow also says, "Long before it became defunct, the Comintern ceased to
have much direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party." The fact is that
JNIao Tse-Tung was one of three Chinese members of the Executive Committee
of the Comintern from 1935 to its dissolution in 1943. At the last congress of
the Russian Communist Party the growth of the Chinese Party was enthusias-
tically reported and the Party congratulated on becoming "tempered in the fires
of civil war and national war," and on "building a Soviet regime." Mao sent
the congress a "flaming Bolshevik greeting" lauding the Russian Soviet system
and concluding with "Long live Comrade Stalin !"
The Chinese Communist Party is the darling of Moscow and of Communists all
over the world. Its national congress has actually met in Moscow. All its
maneuvers, even the most "reformist," have been executed under orders from
the Kremlin. A glance in the Moscow Party press is enough to prove that there
has been no let-up of this intense concern with the Chinese Communist Party.
Obviously, the success of the Chinese Communists in building a Red Army and
establishing an independent nation just over their border — a nation whose
leader declares, "We cannot be separated from the Soviet Union" — would only
intensify the interest of the heads of the Soviet Union.
To complete the record of this deception : In the translation of Mao's book,
Earl Browder omitted words and passages which would, if printed in America,
expose his own game of playing democratic patriot in order to get his henchmen
into positions of power. In the Chinese edition Mao is outspoken in advocating
the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and explaining that democracies like
England and the United States are "capitalist dictatorships," which "have be-
come, or are about to become, blood-stinking military dictatorships of the
capitalist class." "On the point of death," they have become "imi)erialist" and
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3501
will soon be replaced by "the newest Soviet-style socialist republic, a dictatorsliip
of the proletariat."
He explains that in this respect there is no difference between the "Eastern
(i. e., Japanese) imperialist" and "the s. o. b. Imperialists of the West." (The
Chinese epithet is fouler, but s. o. b. will do.) All this, which is of the essence of
Mao's orthodox Communist position, is omitted from the American edition.
The Chinese Communist Party is more honest. Late in 1944 it passed a reso-
lution "accepting American demands to establish military bases in the North-
west," but adding- : "We are heir to the orthodoxy of Marx and Engels which
calls for a class revolution of the workers and pea.sants. * * * The coopera-
tion of the Chinese Communist Party with the United States is a temporary
strategy. * * *"
That disposes of the propaganda myth that the Chinese Communists are not
Communists.
DECEPTION NO. 3. THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE FIGHTING THE JAPS, AND THAT
THE CHINESE NATIONAL ARMY IS NOT
The truth is that the Chinese Communists are lighting the Japs enough to hold
their border, but not enough to make it worth while for the Japs to move in and
clean them out. This can be seen by a glance at the map. The front east of
Yenan, where the Communists claim they have an army of 450,000 soldiers heroi-
cally fighting the Japs is stationary. It hasn't moved since Japan came up to the
Yellow River in 1938. Although the Japanese have attacked in some areas,
there have been no real battles. American military observers agree that a virtual
truce has existed in several front sectors, especially along the railways supplying
Japanese forces fighting American and Chungking troops in the south.
Where Chiang Kai-shek's National Army fights, the record of bloody and heroic
battles has been spread on the pages of the world press for years. We all know
of the great struggles in 1937 and 1938 in which the flower of Chiang Kai-shek's
armies was lost together with such modern armaments as China possessed.
China has received only a trickle of aid as against the flood of lend-lease sent to
Russia, but Chiang's armies have fought on. There were at least 100,000 casual-
ties in the battles they fought last year on Chinese soil, and certainly 85,000 in the
furious Burma campaign which has broken the blockade by reopening the Stilwell
road.
Casualties among Chiang's troops run to over four times the total number of
soldiers the Communists claim to have.
The tragic fact is that while fighting the Japs a little, but never enough to
menace Japanese communication lines to the war against Chiang in the south,
the Communists are also waging "revolutionary war" against the Chinese Na-
tional Army. When the war began, the Chinese Communists Central Committee
declared : "In Chinese politics the decisive factor is military power. We must
in the course of the war of resistance, expand as far as possible the military
power of the Party as the basis for capturing the revolutionary leadership in
the future." Since Pearl Harbor Mao naturally has been willing to let the
"s. 0. b. Western imperialists" finish the Japs while he concentrates on "capturing
the revolutionary leadership."
This makes less astounding the statement of Lin Yutang : "For every Japanese
the Communists claim to have killed they have killed at least five Chinese, for
every town they have captured from the Japanese they have captured 50 towns
from other Chinese." It explains Congressman Walter Judd's statement that
when, last summer, the Japanese armies raided down fi'om the north through
four to six hundred miles of country the Communist claim to control, they got
free passage. Not a single one of the hundreds of trains carrying Japanese
soldiers and supplies was derailed. (Congressman Judd, of Minnesota, served
10 years as a medical missionary in China, and saw communism first hand. He
revisited the country last September and October.)
While this process of Commuui-st revolution is going forward accoi'ding to a
published schedule, such fables as the following are related by Harrison Forman
and solemnly quoted in a review of his book by Edgar Snow :
"In the 7 years of war the Communists have fought over 92,000 battles. They
have killed and wounded 1,100,000 * * * and captured 150,000 of the enemy.
* * * For the same period the Communists suffered over 4(K),000 casualties."
Ninety-two thousand battles in 7 years is 36 battles a day, or one battle every
40 minutes. In these battles the Communists, although a good number of them
were armed only with "old blunderbusses, mines, or any weapon at hand," are
3502 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
alleged to have knocked off enemy troops at the rate of 20 per hour, or one every
3 minutes — this without allowing for mealtime or rest hours, night or day, for
7 years running. Hesides these astronomical achievements, the deeds of our
Marines at Tarawa or (luadalcanal are, of course, mere child's play.
It is doubtful if a more fantastic tale was ever told with a straight face to
the American people. And we repeat : To expose it, you have only to look up
the documents and use your brains.
DECEPTION NO. 4. THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS A FASCIST, AND THAT HIS TOTALITARIAN
REGIME IS PREVENTING THE COMMUNISTS FROM ESTABLISHING DEMOCRACY
What kind of "democracy" the Communists aim to establish we have heard
from their leader : a "Soviet-style dictatorship of the proletariat." Not only
Chiang Kai-shek but everyone in the world who intelligently opposed this
kind of dictatorship is denounced as a fascist. This has been the Communist
smear techni(iue ever since Hitler broke his pact with Stalin.
Chiang's regime is not democratic. When he assumed power in 1926, it was
the opinion of the leaders of the Kuomintang that only a military dictatorship
could achieve the unity and independence of China. Until that should be achieved
China, thanks as much to the Communists as to foreign intruders and war
lords, could not create a democratic republic. V.'hether they were right or wrong,
it is certain that, except for the Connnunists and their subservience to INIoscow,
Chiang has achieved both the unity and independence of China ; and he is
moving toward a democratic republic.
He once remarked to Ambassador Hurley : "If I become a dictator I will
be forgotten, like all dictators in our history, within 48 hours of my death.
But if I sincerely work to return power to the people, I will be remembered
as the George Washington of China. Can there be any doubt of my choice?"
Chiang's speech of last INIarch, in which he set the date for constitutional
convention, is sensible and convincing. It concluded :
"Upon the inauguration of constitutional government, all political parties
will have legal status and enjoy equality. The Government has offered to
give legal recognition to the Conmiunist Party as soon as the latter agrees
to incorporate its army and local administration in the National Army and
Government. The offer still stands. * * *
"I am optimistic of national unification and the future of democratic
government in our country."
No one, comparing Chiang's speech with the schedule of steps toward prole-
tarian dictatorship drawn up by Mao T.se-Tung, could fail to see which of the
two is on the road to democracy. Chiang has permitted the publication of a
Communist daily in his capital throughout the war, while Mao will not even ad-
mit a correspondent of any Kuomintang, or non-Party, newspaper in his capital.
There is a maddening press censorship under Chiang, but under Mao there is no
free press to censor. That is a rough indication of how things stand.
The Chinese Communist regime is a ruthless party dictatorship, camouflaged
like Russia's with ceremonial elections, but ruled with executions, purges, con-
centration camps. The Chinese National Government has tabulated, with name,
place, date, and circumstance, the persons known to have been oflicially nuirdered
by the Communists as "traitors and Trotskyites" from April 1989 to October
1944. They total 34.758, of whom 26,834 were military personnel, 3,009 govern-
ment officials, 1,387 Kuomintang Party workers, and the rest civilians. This
does not include the unnumbered Chinese soldiers killed by the Communists in
combat action against Chiang's troops.
The fact that China under Chiang is not yet democratic is the very thing that
makes the Conuuunist danger so great. If the Chinese knew freed<mi and pos-
sessed it, they would be less ready victims of the totalitarian infection. Hav-
ing known little but the arbitrary rule of rival war lords, and then tlie equally
arbitrary enforcement of national unity by the Kuomintang, they are as open to
this infection as the Russian peasants were who had known only the regime of
the Czar. They are poised at a cross road, ready to go either way — the way of the
Russian totalitarian state toward which Mao and the Chinese Connnunist Party
are pointing, or the way of American democracy toward which Chiang and the
Kuomintang are pointing. This is why the Chinese liberals, as even pro-Soviet
reporters admit, while fighting for more freedom under Chiang, are not for the
Communists.
What Chiang needs is our political understanding, technical assistance, loans,
investments, munitions, and supplies in support of his plan to introduce con-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3503
stitutional goverumeut and make China democratic. The two most important
items on this list at the moment are supplies and understanding. Supplies our
State Department has recently, to the relief of all wise men. decided to give to
Chiang, and not to the Communists. But we must give understanding too.
It shows no understanding to demand of an anti-Communist government that
it "unite" with Communists. An American foreign policy based on this mis-
take may very soon prove fatal, not only from the standpoint of democracy hut
of every American interest in Asia. Put yourself in the place of Chiang Kai-
shek and you will see why. Chiang has fought the Communists in bloody war
and desperate intrigue for 20 years. He gained his power by saving China from
a Communist revolution in 1927. He knows the Communists. He knows that
one word from Stalin — and no word from anywhere else in the world — could
in-odur-e the "unity" some critics are so irritatingly urging him to pull out
of a hat.
Chinese courtesy will survive a lot of irritation. But Chinese patriotism
has a limit beyond which it will not go. And there lies behind our pressure upon
Chiang for a "unity" he cannot acliieve, an implication that can only infuriate
Chinese patriots. The implication is that the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge at
Cairo to return Manchuria to China at the end of the war may, if unity fails,
be interpreted to mean turn over Manchuria to the Stalin-dominated Communist
govei-nment of Yenan.
Washington rumor, reported in the New York Times, even says that Stalin
was promised a free liand in Manchuria for his help in the war against Japan.
But Stalin may never have asked for Manchuria. That is not his method of
expansion. All Stalin needs in order to establish his power in Manchuria is a
"friendly government" : a quick march in there by Mao's Red Arrhy, followed by
the usual made-to-ordei- puppet state. Our acquiescence in that operation will
be sufficient to sell out Chiang — sell out the hope of democracy in China, and
the hope of a strong independent American ally in Asia.
Chiang's loyalt.v to the Western democracies, and to America in particular,
throughoiit the long war for Manchuria has been inflexible. It survived our
unlimited export of war materials to .Japan ; it survived our "defeat Hitler
first" policy and the loss of Burma and ^lalaya. which enabled the Japanese to
Itlockadi^ China, and prolonged her sufferings interminably: it survived the Stil-
well incident; it has survived the recent, Communist-kindled flare of anti-
Chinese slander in the American press: it has even survived, so far. our inane
demand for "unity" (with armed x'evolutionists who are waging war against
him). But it will not survive the knowledge that we propose to turn over
to Stalin, through the agency of these revolutionists, the richest lands of China
about which, essentially, the whole war with Japan has been fought.
Chiang, because of his belief in Western institutions, has stood like a rock
against those in his party who advocate a rapprochement with Russia as against
his close friendship with the United States. But should it become apparent
that we intend to bargain away all North China for the sake of Russia's
help in the war, will Chiang be able to resist this pressure? With what argu-
ments can he answer those Chinese patriots who will su'-igest that China do
her own bargaining witli Russia, and renounce the policy of special trust in
the United States? Only the smoke-screen of deception laid down by the Com-
munists and their fellow travelers blinds us to this momentous question, and
all it entails — for us and for world democracy.
These pro-Communists are playing the same game in Asia that succeeded so
brilliantly in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, for instance, on his principle
of "arming anyliody who will kill a Hun,'' Churchill sent munitions and sup-
plies to the rebel Tito, veteran Comintern organizer and agent of Moscow,
enabling him besides Idlling Huns to wage a civil war against our ally, the
legitimate government, whose troops were commanded by General Mikhailovitch.
Mikhailovitch was also killing Huns, but he had not the backing of Mo.scow,
and he had no propaganda machine with which to counter this same four-
sided lie: Russia is a democracy, Tito is not a Communist. Tito is fighting the
enemy and Mikhailovitch is not, and Mikhailovitch is a "fascist."
Except for Chiang's loftier position as head of his government for IS years,
the situation in China is ominously similar. And the choice for us is inescap-
alile : Either we face the facts and side with the growth of democracy, or we
swallow the lies and endorse the totalitarian strangulation. There was never a
plainer or more simple issue before a United States Government.
But there is one big difference — tliat is the size of China. To sell out Chiang
Kai-shek to the Chinese "Tito'' will not add a paltry 13 million to the totali-
3504 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tarian Colossus. It will bring under totalitarian regimentation 450 million
people. This vast population, united in their policy with the Soviet totalitarian
empire of some 200 million, would certainly threaten the hope for a democratic
world. When Iran and India followed China, as they almost certainly would,
that would mean a solid block of 1 billion people under a totalitarian regime.
Facing such a prospect, it seems obvious that as intelligent democrats we
nuist abandon the whole policy of meek appeasement toward Communist prop-
aganda and power in China. Even Russia will have greater resi>ect for us if
we make unmistakably clear our loyalty to those free institutions which have
enabled our American nation to arm, equip, feed, and rescue from destruction
a half of the planet. If we really believe in democracy, let us implement that
belief with a peaceable but clear-headed, informed and resolute campaign to pro-
mote the democratic way of life throughout the earth.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I am presenting you a list of names.
I am going to ask you, in connection with that list of names, the fol-
lowing two questions. Perhaps we can save some time on it, if you
will advert to this for just a minute.
The question wall read in every case : In your dealings with the
following people, did you know or did you have any reason to believe
that they were Communists? That will be the question.
If you had no dealings with them, of course, you will have the
opportunity to say so at the outset. So the question in connection
with each one of these individuals will be:
Did you know, or did you have any reason to believe that they were
Communists ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. That this person was Communist?
Mr. Morris. Tliat this particular person was a Communist, in your
dealings wnth that particular person.
Senator Ferguson. Do you not include otherwise? Whether it was
in his dealings with them that he knew they were Communist, or other-
wise knew they were Communist ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, or otherwise knew.
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Morris, if you are going to ask that question about
all these people, may I ask you to reframe it now?
Mr. Morris. All right, let us take one.
In your dealings with Solomon Adler, did you know, or did you
have any reason to know, that Solomon Adler was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Smith. Wait a minute, Mr. Morris. Is that presupposing
that he had dealings with Solomon Adler?
Mr. Morris. Senator Smith, I indicated that if he had no dealings
with the man he would, of course, have the opportunity to so state at
the time.
Senator Smith. All right.
The Chairman. Do you understand the question, now, Mr. Latti-
more ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think so.
Mr. I'ORTAS. Two questions.
Mr. Morris. There were two questions; that is right.
Mr. Sourwine. May I rephrase the question, just in case there is
any doubt about it? It might not do any harm to say it once more.
Mr. Morris wall read a name. The reading of the name presumes that
Mr. Lattimore had dealings with the person. If he has had no deal-
ings with the person, he is to say so. Otherwise, INIr. Lattimore is to
indicate his answer to the question as to whether, in his dealings with
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3505
this person, or otherwise, he ever knew or had any reason to believe
that the named person was a member of the Communist Party.
Tlie Chairman. Was a Communist.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was a Communist, all right.
Mr. Morris. The second name is Hilda Austern.
]VIr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. H. W. Baerensprung.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. How well did you know H. W. Baerensprung?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I saw him once when he came to this coun-
try, and I knew him as a person who had been reorganizing Chiang
Kai-shek's police force.
Mr. Morris. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so.
Mr. Morris. Joseph F. Barnes.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Fortas. Just a moment.
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Morris, may we have it understood, if you
are going to conduct the examination this way, that by the witness
answering these questions, he does not personally name any statement,
or no inference is permissible as to whether he thinks or does not think
that they were Communists ?
Mr. Morris. That is right. The question is addressed to his knowl-
edge as to whether or not he knew them to be Communists.
The Chairman. Or had reason to believe.
Mr. Morris. Or had reason to believe ; that is right. Senator.
Kathleen Barnes.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; until the question came up to her refusing to
testify.
Mr. Morris. Joseph M. Bernstein.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever
met him.
Mr. Morris. Charles Bidien.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever
met him.
Mr. Morris. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs while you
were the editor of Pacific Affairs ?
Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it very much. I don't believe I have ever
seen that name before.
Mr. Morris. Mr. T. A. Bisson.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Albert Blumberg.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever met him, and I am not sure
M'ho is meant.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Michael Borodin.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Michael Borodin I never met. I have seen him
once and I assume he is a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten.
Mr. Fortas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of clarification?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Fortas. Again I understand the question is : Did j^ou have any
reason to know that they were Communists, or to believe that they
were Communist at the time that you were dealing with them ?
3506 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. No. The question is: Did you, in your dealings
with them, or in any other way, know or have reason to believe that
this person Avas a Communist ?
Mr. FoRTAS. At any time?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Lattlimore. I certainly never had any dealings with Mike
Borodin.
Mr. Morris. You did not encounter Borodin, did you ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't encounter him. He was at a meeting
in Moscow when I was there in 1936 with Mr. Carter and somebody
afterward told me that tliat was Borodin.
Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten.
The Chairman. My understanding is that — see if my recollection
is correct — that you said, in answer to the former question, that you
believed he was a Communist. Am I in error on that?
Mr. Latimore. I believe that he is a Communist simply from my
reading of Chinese history in the 1920's.
Tlie Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recognize that name and I don't believe
I ever met any such person.
Mr. Morris. Did you prepare an article for the committee of the
American-Russian Institute, the chairman of which was Louise K.
Bransten ?
Senator Watkins. Is that Louise R. or Louise A. Bransten ?
Mr. Morris. Louise R. Branstein is the name.
Mr. FoRTAS. It is wi-ong on the list.
Mr. Morris. It is wrong on the list ; that is right. Louise R. Bran-
sten. Do you remember preparing an article for the American-Rus-
sian Institute, of which she was acting as chairman?
Mr. Lattimore. I am not sure this is the same thing, Mr. Morris,
but I remember publishing an article in the American Quarterly on
the Soviet Union, or something.
Mr. Morris. Does that refresh your recollection ?
Mr. Lati'imore. No, it doesn't. Tlie article here appears to be an
article that I published in Far Eastern Survey, and it may have been
reprinted by this publication. But I don't recall ever seeing it be-
fore.
Mr. Morris. Did you give permission to have it republished?
Mr. Latitmore. Not that I recall. It is quite possible.
The Chairman. Did you prepare the article ?
jNIr. Lattimore. I prepared an article for the Far Eastern Survey.
The Far Eastern Survey may have considted me on permission to
have it rej)ublished elsewhere, but I don't recall it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may the article, as it appears in this
particular document, be introduced into the record?
Senator Smith. Does Mr. Lattimore identify this article?
The Chairman. He has not identified the article.
Mr. Lattimore. I have identified the article by title. Let me look
and see if it is the same article.
Yes; this is the same article. It is marked "By permission of Far
Eastern Survey, American Council of the Institute of Pacific Re-
lations."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3507
Witliout comparing the two articles, I would not know whether
this is a complete reprint, or not.
Senator Smith. I think we might have it understood there that
Mr. Lattimore will have a chance to review that, sentence by sentence,
if he wishes to.
The Chairman. I tliink he should be given that chance before it
goes in.
Senator Smith. It can be put in with his right to apply to it any
changes he finds necessary in order to make it conform.
The Chairman. You may return to this article at a later time, after
Mr. Lattimore has had a chance to look at it.
All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Earl Browder.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I considered him a Communist.
Mv. ]\IoRRis. When did you meet Mr. Browder, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall what year it was, but I went down
once when I was about to leave for China. I went down to the offices
of the American Communist Party and called on him to see if I could
get some leads to find out about the Communists in China, and I got
a complete brush-off.
Mr. Morris. Did anyone arrange that meeting for you, Mr. Latti-
more ?
Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that I just walked down there.
Mr. Morris. You walked in cold ?
Mr. Lattimore. Walked in cold.
Senator Smith. Let me ask a minute.
, That was before you started for China on one occasion, was it not?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Smith. Up to that time, had you ever met Browder before ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Smith. Had you ever had any dealings with him since
that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. He came down and testified before the Tydings
committee, but I didn't see him.
Senator Smitpi. Did you ever attend a conference or meeting when
he was present?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Mr. FoRTAS. Will you try to place that, approximately?
Senator Smith. I recall reading somewhere about Mr. Lattimore's
conference with jNIr. Browder before he left for a trip to China. I do
]iot know what the date was.
Mr. Lattimore. It was before the Tydings committee I testified to
that.
Senator Smith. I do not remember where I had seen it. I believe
3^ou do refer to that in your book.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
The Chairman. That he had a conference with Browder?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I wouldn't call it a conference.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did you testify that took place in 1936, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. It may have been in 1936.
Mr. Morris. Herman Budzeslawski.
Mr. Lattimore. I believe that I identified that name from an article
by a woman columnist, Dorothy Thompson. She wrote an article in
3508 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tlie Saturday Evening Post about him. I met him once at the office
of Overseas News Agency at the time when I was writing syndicated
articles for them, and so w\as he, under a different name, wdiich I
forget.
Mr. Morris. CoukI you try to recall what that other name is, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I could try, but I am very vague on the subject. I
believe it is probably in that article by Dorothy Thompson.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you did not know, or had no
reason to believe, that he was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Dr. Norman Bethune.
Mr. Lattimore. I know his name only by reading. I don't believe
I ever met him.
Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe that he was Coni'
munist?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think I have seen that stated.
Mr. Morris. Angus Cameron?
Mr. Lattimore. Angus Cameron, I have no reason to believe was a
Communist.
Mr. Morris. Have your dealings with Angus Cameron been exten-
sive, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. No, not at all. I met him once. I have never had
any dealings with him.
Mr. Morris. How many books of yours has he published, Mr. Lat-
timore?
Mr. Lattimore. He was a member of a firm that has published
several books of mine, but the handling of my books for publication
by that firm was never through him.
Mr. Morris. Through whom was it?
Mr. Lattimore. It was through Mr.^ — oh, I would have to go a
long way back — wait a minute. My first two books were published
by tliat firm at the. end of the 1920's and I dealt with — I think he was
the then head of the firm, wdiose name was Max something. He has
since died. And my more recent books through that firm have all been
handled through Mr. Stanley Salmen.
Mr. Morris. Will you spell that, please ?
Mr. Lattimore. S-a-1-m-e-n.
Mr. ]\Iorris. Evans Carlson. Evans F. Carlson.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Were your dealings with him extensive ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I wouldn't say they were extensive.
Mr. Morris. How frequently have you met General Carlson ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I used to see him socially quite a bit in the
19?>0's, when he was at the American Marine Guard at the Embassy in
Peking, and I have seen him maybe three times in this country, three
or four times.
Mr. Morris. Did you advise him at the time of his considered
resignation from the Marine Corps in 1939 that he would be more
effective in serving the cause of China by "staying in the Marine Corps"
rather than resigning.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think that wording is exact.
Mr. Morris. What is your recollection of it, Mr. Lattimore, of what
is in the record. I would like to have your testimony on it.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3509
Mr. Lattijniore. My recollection is that I thought it would be a pity
for him to resign from the Marine Corps. I thought that his knowl-
edge and experience would be of better service to this country in the
Marine Corps.
Mr. Morris. Abraham Chapman.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I have ever met him.
Mr. Morris. Do you know he was a writer for the Institute of Pacific
Eelations publications ?
JVIr. Lattimore. I remember some correspondence on the subject at
a time when I was on the research committee of the IPR, but I never
met him.
Mr. Morris. Chen Han-seng.
Mr. Lattimore. Chen Han-seng, at the time I knew him, I had no
reason to believe was a Communist.
Mr. INIoRRis. "Where is he now ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have heard that he is in China.
Mr. Morris. That is Eed China?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Your dealings with Chen Ilan-seng were quite exten-
sive, were they not, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I knew him when he was doing research for
the IPE, and then he worked two academic years at Johns Hopkins.
Mr. Morris. Under your sponsorship ?
Mr. Lattimore. Under iny direction.
Mr. Morris. Chew Shi Hong.
Mr. Lattimore. I am not quite sure who is meant there by Chew
Shi Hong.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may we come back to that ?
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. IMoRRis. Harriet Chi.
Mr. Lattimore. Harriet Chi, yes, I knew slightly ; had no reason to
believe was a Communist.
Mr. ]\Iorris. She was your secretary at one time, was she not ?
Mr. Lattimore. She worked as my secretary for, oh, 10 days or 2
weeks, in 1936, I believe.
Mr. Morris. She is the wife of Chao-Ting Chi, who is now an official
of the Chinese Communist Government, is she?
Mr. Lattimore. She is ; or was.
Mr. Morris. The next name ; will you pronounce that next name, Mr.
Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I pronounce it "Chow Moo" (ChTao Mu).
Mr. Morris. Is that a feminine or a masculine name?
Mr. Lattimore. 1 couldn't tell.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you have had no dealings with that
person ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. It may be somebody I had met in
China. I can't place the name.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you had no dealings with that per-
son while you were acting as an adviser to the Generalissimo?
Mr. Lattimore. 'No; I can't testify exactly to that. I met so many
people once or twice while I was working for the Generalissimo.
Mr. Morris. Do you know where that particular person is now?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't.
3510 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Cliu Tong.
Mr. Latiimore. Chu Tong 1 met maybe twice while he was working
for the Institute of Pacific Eelations.
Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe, or did you know at
that time that he was a Communist?
Mr. LAi^riMORE. No ; I did not consider him a Communist.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose :
Mr. Morris occasionally rephrases the question, and I think it should
be made clear to the witness that even so, that does not change it for
subsequent names. The question remains for each name, first, the
assumption that the witness has had dealings with this person. If
not, he is to so state.
Then the question is : Did you, in your dealings with this person, or
in any other way, know or have any reason to believe that this person
was a Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. In the case of Chu Tong, there was some question of
his loyalty record being reviewed by — I forget whether it was the
Security Board of OWI or the Civil Service, or both of them, and the
question came up whether he should be considered as a person who
should be discharged for loyalty.
And I believe the record shows that the grounds were considered
insufficient.
The Chairman. Back there a few names there w^as one to whom
the witness referred as having been under him at Johns Hopkins.
What name was that?
Mv. Morris. Chen Han-seng.
Mr. Laitimore. Chen Han-seng.
The Chairman. I understand he testified he is now in Red China.
Mr. Lattimore. So I believe. I heard that recently.
The Chairman. I do not think the question embraced whether or
not he knew or had reason to believe that he was a Communist.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think it did, Mr. Chairman. I certainly did
not believe him to be a Comnumist at that time.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this copy of a civil service
paper, the first line of which makes reference to Chew Sih Hong. In
connection with the difficulty we had in identifying who that was, I
ask you if that would refresh your recollection.
Mr. Lattimore. That would mean that Chew Sih Hong and Chu
Tong are probably the same person. Many Chinese have two })er-
sonal names, and sometimes one is used and sometimes the other. Chu
would be the family name.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, was that a matter of your recollec-
tion, or was that only a statement as to what the paper that Mr. Morris
handed you indicates ?
Mr. Lattimore. The paper that Mr. Morris handed to me indicates
that it was the same person.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have any recollection as to whether that is
true, whether they were the same person ?
Mr. Lattiiniore. No, not without reading the document through
again. But I am willing to assume they were the same person.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think if you read the document through it
would refresh your recollection?
Mv. Lattimore. Does the document also refer to 1dm as Chu Tong?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3511
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Chairman, I call attention to the fact that the let-
ter refers to Chew Sih Hong, the middle name appearing here as S-i-h.
On this list it is S-h-i ; that is, on the list that Mr. Morris supplied.
The Chairman. That is a matter that will have to be straightened
out by the witness.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The American spelling of Chinese names and sylla-
bles is a fearful and wonderful thing, is it not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, I remember now. I was thinking of this as a
Mr. Chew, which would be a common Chinese name, but I see that he
is referred to here as IVIr. Hong. And I remember now old Dr. Chi
telling me something that I didn't know before, that the family name
there is Tong, or Hong, which is pronounced one way in Fukien Prov-
ince and the other way in other provinces of China.
The Chairman. Let us clear it up now.
Did you know him ? Did you have dealings with him ?
Mr. LATa^iMORE. I knew him. I saw him a couple of times at the
New York office of the IPR.
The Chairman. Did you know him to be, or have reason to believe
that he was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No. There was this question raised by the Civil
Service Commission and, as I say, my recollection is that it was de-
cided that the evidence was insufficient.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you now recollect, sir, that the two names on this
list, Chew Sih Hong and Chew Tong are the same person?
Mr. Lattimore. They must be the same person ; yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will this document that reflected the
witness' recollection on that point be introduced into the record, for
that purpose ?
Mr. Sourwine. Simply as the document that was shown to the
witness, and which he read ?
Mr. JVIoRRis. Which he read.
The Chairman. It may be inserted for that purpose. I do not
know what else is in here.
You are not holding him responsible for what else is in here, are
you?
Mr. Morris. No, sir.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 550" and is as
follows.)
Exhibit No. 550
Office of the Chief Law Office,
November llf, 19J,3.
The Commission.
(Through Mr. Smith and the Executive Director and Chief Examiner.)
I am submitting herewith as a unit the cases of Chew Sih Hong and Dr.
Kung Chuan Chi, employees of the Office of War Information. These cases are
being submitted together because both individuals are serving in the same sec-
tion, and it appears that Mr. Hong was employed at the recommendation of Dr.
Chi who in turn was employed by Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Opera-
tions of the OfRce of War Information.
The case of Mr. Hong was previously before the Commission and analyses of
the facts in his case were furnished by the undersigned and by Mr. Cannon. We
both took the position that Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry
Alliance, reputed to be an organization affiliated with the Commimist Party, and
the China Daily News, said to l)e a publication by and for Chinese Communists,
and his references and associations, were such as to warrant a finding of in-
eligibility. The Commission transmitted to the Office of War Information a
3512 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
proposed memorandum opinion in the case of Mr. Hong and under date of Novem-
l)er 30, 1942, Mr. Elmer Davis in a letter to Commissioner Flemming stated that
in view of the information which we furnished him, Hong was terminated at the
close of business November 15, 1942. The Commission thereupon advised the
Office of War Information under date of December 8, 1942, that the Commission
has concluded that a finding of ineligibility is necessary and that the Commis-
sion's records have been noted to show that Mr. Hong's services were terminated
at the close of business on November 15, 1942, as reported in the letter from Mr.
Elmer Davis of November 30, 1942. Previously the Commission had approved
the finding of ineligibility and this action was recorded in Minute 4 of December
4, 1942.
In a letter dated July 27, 1943, Rear Admiral R. P. McCullough referred to
previous correspondence regarding Mr. Hong and stated that the letter of
November 30, 1942, from the Office of War Information to the effect that Hong
had been terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942, was somewhat
in error because Mr. Hong had been separated from the New York office of the
Office of War information on November 15, 1942, for duty with the Army and
that when he returned in the spring of 1943 he was again employed in the
New York office of the Office of War Information, that office not knowing that
Hong had been declared ineligil)le by the Civil Service Commission. Admiral
McCullough accordingly requested that the Commission reconsider the case
of Mr. Hong. Mr. Moyer then sent the file to the Investigations Division so that
an interview might be had with Mr. Owen Lattimoi'e, Head of the San Fran-
cisco office of the Office of War Information. Mr. Lattimore was accordingly
interviewed in San Francisco and on a later date Mr. Steely interviewed Ad-
miral McCullough and Mr. Marsh of the Office of War Information regarding
]Mr. flong, Mr. Owen Lattimore being also present during this interview. Mr.
Steely reported among other things that Mr. Lattimore stated that he wished to
keep Mr. Hong on the job, that Mr. Lattimore had an efficient set-up in the
Chinese section in the New York office of the Office of War Information and
wanted to keep it that way, that he had explicit confidence in Dr. Chi, that
Mr. Hong is under careful supervision and even if he were a Communist he
is not in a position where he can do any damage, that the selection of suitable
Chinese was a delicate matter, and it is extremely difficult to obtain a com-
petent employee who does not have connections which might constitute leaks
in the organization, that imder the present set-up with Dr. Chi and Mr. Hong
there have been no incidents of confidential information getting into unauthor-
ized channels and that there had been no attempts on Mr. Hong's part to use
his present position for the spreading of Communist propaganda. Mr. Lattimore
also pointed out that Mr. Hong was recently used by the Army to teach Chinese
to 224 officers in India. Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know Mr. Hong
but he did know Dr. Chi and is relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation and
knowledge of Mr. Hong.
During the interview in San Francisco Mr. Lattimore made an extended
statement regarding Mr. Hong and Dr. Chi and also furnished the investigator
with a copy of a letter which he had written to Mr. Joseph Barnes under date
of June 15, 1943. The statement of ]Mr. Lattimore during the interview and
the copy of his letter to Mr. Barnes are appropriately identified in the file. It
would be a difficult tiling to attempt to summarize Mr. Lattimore's lengthy
statement or his letter to Mr. Barnes. However, the gist of his comments is
that he does not know Hong personally but based on his knowledge of the situ-
ation, neither the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance nor the China Daily News
are Communistic. He then proceeded to give rather involved reasons for his
conclusions. He said that he had known Dr. Chi, who is about 70 years of age, in
Cliina, that he was a respected and cultured man, and that his knowledge of
Dr. Chi is such that he has implicit faith and confidence in his integrity and
ability. He told Dr. Chi to select the person he wanted to assist him and Dr.
Chi selected Mr. Hong. This was the first time that Mr. Lattimore had any
knowledge of Mr. Hong at all.
Among other things Mr. Lattimore said :
"Of course, I have no concrete proof that Hong is not a Communist but in
the absence of concrete proof I think there is a prime facie case to show that
he is not a Communist. I know there is a law preventing the hiring of Com-
munists. Personally and frankly I would not be too worried if an individual
Comnmnist were in Hong's position. This is becaxise he would not be able to
form a 'cell' and could not get away with anything. He could not commit
verbal sabotage, and all of the work coming out of the New York office has to
clear through me."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3513
On a later occasion ]\Ir. Lattimore stated to our investigator in part :
"Now I know that the various factions smear a non-Conformist by charging
Him with Iteing a Communist. However, the Chinese Government dare not
■come out in the open and intervene in such domestic problems. I merely say
this : If your people have gone to the Chinese Ambassador or any other
Chinese Government representative and such Chinese representative has told
you that tliis man Hong is suspected of being a Communist, tlien I say you
should discount such evidence and certainly should not declare the man
ineligible merely on that kind of evidence. It is true that I don't know any-
thing about Hong personally except wliat I have learned from Dr. Chi. It
is also true that he could be a Communist without my knowledge. It is also
true that he could have hoodwinked Dr. Chi. However, until concrete evi-
dence is presented that he is a Communist then I believe that based on Dr.
Chi's standing and reputation and ability, his judgment that Hong is not a
Communist is a prime facie case in favor of Hong and should not be reversed
on the testimony that you may have received from anyone representing the
Chinese Government or for tliat matter on the testimony of any Chinese."
It will be noted that the sum and substance of Mr. Lattimore's testimony is that
lie does not know Mr. Hong, that he does know Dr. Chi, that he has full faith in
Dr. Chi and was willing to employ Hong on Dr. Chi's recommendation, that he
does not know whether Hong is a Communist, but does not think he is and that
even if Hong were a Communist, he would still like to retain Hong in the sei'vice
because Hong could do no harm in his position.
In his letter to Mi\ Barnes, Mr. Lattimore outlined the entire situation as he
understood it, described the relationship between Hong and Dr. Chi, and then said :
'As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me
and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American government agency,
there will be no dif33eulty with either man, no irresponsible playing with
Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction. The retention of
both men is therefore a guarantee to the secrecy and security of the woi'k
of OWI as well as a guarantee of tlie confident fulfillment of directives.
I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know
that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given tlie time to worlv on it,
I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full
details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Conuuittee of OWI would
be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Cliinese factional
politics, to their source ; but I should not like to see us placed in a po.sition
where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire
people who would actually be the nominee of factions not imder our control."
The foregoing letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Barnes was written in strict
confidence and is not to be quoted to any outside source.
The evidence before the Commission at the time unfavorable action was
originally taken in the case of Mr. Hong tended to indicate rather strongly that
Hong is a Communist and engaged in activities having for their purpose support
of Conmumist party interests. The recent investigation and interviews have
not changed the evidence and have, on the contrary, elicited some information
tending to strengthen the position that Hong is pro-Communist. Thus it was
iirought out in addition to all of tlie other information that Hong was active in
the American Student Union during his school years.
The evidence indicated tliat Hong is pro-Communist. The question now for
determination is wliether his em])loyment should be approved because of the
slronj- representations of Mr. Lattimore that Hong is probably not a Communist,
but even if he is a Commiuiist, Mr. Lattimore still wishes to retain him because
Hong will work under close supervision and will not l>e able to do any harm.
On tlie one hand it can he argued that since we are reasonably convinced that
Ilong is pro-Communist, it is our responsibility to require his removal notwith-
standintr Mr. Lattimore's representations. On the other hand the Commission
could, if it wished, take the position that since Mr. Lattimore has assumed re-
sponsibility, the Commission can afford to permit Hong's retention in the service.
If ttie Commission takes the latter position it will be tantamount to saying that
although we believe the individual is a Communist, we will he willing to rate
him eligible provided the employing agency is willing to assume the responsibility.
I doubt that the Commission can aiford to avoid the issue in this manner. If
we believe Hong is a Communist then we should rate him ineligible.
Do we believe Hong is a Communist? The Commission's original finding was
based ?in Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and with
the China Daily News. Much of the information regarding the Communistic
8S348~52— pt. 10 16
3514 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
nature of the Alliance and the newspaper came from Chinese, some of whom
were connected with competing newspapers. We ourselves have not read the
China Daily News. Mr. Lattimore states he has read some of the issued and
has found nothing Communistic in them, although he admits there might have
been something Communistic in the issues which he has not read. Mr. Lattimore
has spent years in China and from his statement and letter to Mr. Barnes it
would appear that he is thoroughly familiar with the various political factions.
His conclusion is that Hong's connections, in the light of his knowledge of the
situation, do not necessarily point to pro-Communism. In matters of the Chi-
nese, Lattimore is somewhat of an expert and his opinion is entitled to consid-
erable weight.
Since we have no direct evidence that Hong is a Communist, and since the
original decision was based on the circumstances of Hong's connections and
in view of Mr. Lattimore's representations, I am ready to reach the conclusion
that possibly we made an eri-or in the case of Mr. Hong ; I am, therefore, ready
to recommend that Mr. Hong be rated eligible for retention in his position in
the Office of War Information.
In the case of Dr. Chi, I recommended in my memorandum of May 7, 1943,
that he be rated eligible. Mr. Smith did not agree with me. The Commission
has not yet acted on the case of Dr. Chi. For the reasons stated in my memoran-
dum of May 7, 1943, I again recommend that Dr. Chi be rated eligible.
Alfred Klein,
Acting Chief Law Officer.
CX : FS : ODS.
September 17, 1943.
Mr. Moyeb: I do not believe I clearly understand Mr. Lattimore's point of
view regarding the cases of Chi and Hong. It seems that he is, in effect, sug-
gesting that whatever evidence we may have, short of being positive and direct,
tending to show the applicants to be commuiiistically inclined is entitled to
very little weight and that his judgment, based on his personal knowledge of
Chi and on Chi's appraisal of Hong, should prevail. However, as pointed out
by Mr. Klein, there is no absolute proof that the applicants are Communists
and in view of Lattimore's knowledge of the complicated Chinese political situa-
tion, gained through years of residence in China, I am also willing to change
my previous recommendation for both applicants from ineligibility to eligibility.
Farrar Smith.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Frank V. Coe.
Mr. Lattimore. No. I knew ]\Ir. Coe very slig-htly. I met him
several times here in Washington wlien he was a Government servant.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever attend an Institute of Pacific Relations
meeting with Mr. Coe?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe that Mr. Coe was at one of the interna-
tional conferences of the IPR.
The Chairman. Did you attend that meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I was also there.
The Chairman. That was the question.
I was asking him to complete the answer, because the question em-
braced whether or not he met him.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall attending a caucus meet-
ing of the IPR at Hot Springs, in conjunction with Mr. Frank V.
Coe?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall it. But if you have a document
to refresh my memory, it may
Mr. Morris. I offer you now exhibit No. 298, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Already in our record.
Mr. Morris. Already in our public records, 293.
Senator Smith. Which Hot Springs is it?
Mr. Morris. That is Virginia.
The Chairman. This is with reference to Frank V. Coe, is it ?
Mr. Morris. Frank V. Coe ; that is right, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3515
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember ever seeing this document before.
Mr. Morris. Does that document recall a caucus meeting of the IPR
that you attended, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, it is headed "Preliminary meeting of the
American delegation."
Mr. Morris. Do you remember attending a preliminary meeting of
the American delegation of the IPR?
]\Ir. LATriMORE. No ; I don't remember, but such preliminary meet-
ings were quite a common procedure before international conferences.
Mr. Morris. Does not that document purport to be the minutes of
that meeting, at which Mr. Jessup presided?
Mr. Lattimore. I must have been there, but, as I say, I do not recall
the meeting.
Mr. Morris. Does not that document show that you spoke on several
occasions ?
Mr. Lattimore. The document indicates that I spoke on several
occasions.
Mr. Morris. Does not that document indicate that Mr. Frank V.
Coe was present?
Mr. Lattimore. It indicates that Mr. Coe was present.
I note also that this is not a stenographic transcript and
The Chairman. You have not been asked about that. I have warned
you on several occasions; I have tried to get you not to interject
statements after the Chair's ruling.
You were asked a question as to whether or not that refreshed your
recollection as to whether or not you had met Mr. Frank V. Coe.
^Ir. Lattimore. It does not refresh my recollection that I met him
there, but, quite obviously, he and I were there at the same time.
May I add that the record is not a stenographic transcript and that
I don't hold myself responsible for the way in which I may be quoted
here.
The Chairman. You were not asked as to that, or as to whether
you were responsible.
Mv. Morris. Mr. Henry Collins, is the next name.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name, and I don't believe I have
met him.
The Chairman. What do you want done with this exhibit in the
hands of the witness ?
Mr. Morris. That has already been introduced as exhibit No. 293,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Laughlin B. Currie.
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No."
Mr. Morris. Hugh Deane.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever met him. I think he is a man
who may have been a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor,
but I don't believe I have ever met him.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Len DeCaux.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Len DeCaux I have met once or twice and had
no reason to believe to be a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Ellen DeJong.
Mr. Lattimore. I met her occasionally over some years in the IPR
and had no reason to believe her a Communist.
3516 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. MoKRis. She was a staff meiiiber of the IPK, was she not?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe she was for a short period.
Mr. Morris. Is she now known as Ellen Atkinson ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. INIoRRis. Do you know what she is doing now ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't.
Mr. Morris. Theodore Draper?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I have ever met him.
Mr. Morris. Did you have anv associations with him in connection
with the IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I ever did. I don't recall his
name as associated with the IPR at all.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Laurence Duggan.
Mr. Lattimore. I never met Mr. Duggan.
Mr. Morris. Mr. James Dolsen.
Mr. Latitmore. That is a new name to me. I can't place it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Israel Epstein.
Mr. Latitmore. Mr. Israel Epstein I knew slightly and did not
consider him a Communist, but did believe him to be an ardent sup-
porter of Chinese Communists.
Mr. Morris. Do you know where he is now ?
Mr. Lattimore. It has been stated in the press that he has gone
abroad.
Mr. Morris. Is he in Red China now ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know.
Mr. Morris. Do you know that he was recently feted in Red China?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't.
Mr. Morris. Is he the husband of Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, he is.
Mr. Morris. Was Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley a staff member of the
IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. She was for a period, I believe, 3^es.
Mr. Morris. Is she now in Red China?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know.
Mr. Morris. Dolly Eltenton.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I met her several times in California. I be-
lieve she worked for a while for the California office of IPR. I had
no reason to believe and have no reason to believe she is a Com-
munist.
Mr. Morris. John K. Fairbank.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, could I intrude at that point?
Have you, Mr. Lattimore, given us your full recollection with regard
to Mi-s. Eltenton?
Mr. Lai'timore. Yes; I believe I have. I knew her very slightly.
Mr. Sodrwine. Did you know her husband ?
Mr. Laitimore. I think I met him maybe once or twice at the time
that she was working for the IPR.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever visit in his home ?
Mr. Laiitmore. I think my wife and I may have had dinner there
once.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. and Mrs. Eltenton ever visit in your home?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you just ask your wife if she recalled?
Mr. Lattimore. That is risht.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3517
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she say she did not ?
Mr. Lattiiniore. She said she did not.
]Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Eltenton alone ever visit in your home ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so.
Mr. SouRWiNE. "\V:is Mrs. Eltenton at one time secretary to Jack
Oakie?
Mr. LA'rriMORE. I don't remember exactly what her position was.
She had some secretarial position at the California IPE,.
The Chairman. Let's go back, then. The question was was she ever
sceretary to Jack Oakie.
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't answer that.
The Chairman. Why cannot you answer it ?
Mr. Lattimore. Because all I remember is that she worked at the
California office, and precisely in what capacity I don't recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she leave IPR to go with the American-Russian
Institute?
Mr, Lattimore. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was she with the American-Russian Institute as a
paid employee after she left IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. SouRwiNE. At the time that there was a visit to the home of the
Eltentons by you and ]\Irs. Lattimore, was she then with the Ameri-
•can-Russian Institute?
Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that she was with the IPR.
The Chairman. At that time?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time.
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Sourwine, can we have a date, a year ?
Mr. SouRAViNE. I would be very interested to have the date and year
of the household visit.
Mr. Laitimore. I think the only time at which we knew Mrs. Elten-
ton and her husband was in the first half of 1938, when they were living
in Berkeley.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you told the committee all that you know
about Mr. Eltenton ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have told everything that I can recall. I have
a very shadowy recollection of both of them.
Mr. Sourwine. All right.
Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the testimony before the
House Un-American Activities Committee in connection with Dolly
Eltenton and her husband George Charles Eltenton ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
]\Ir. ISIoRRis. You have not read it ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. The next name on the list is John K. Fairbank.
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is no.
Mr. Morris. You do know John K. Fairbank well, do you not ?
Mr. Latttmore. I know him ; yes.
Mr. Morris. Do you know him well, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Fairlv well.
Mr. Morris. Did he ever work for you in the Office of War Infor-
mation ?
Iklr. Lattimore. No. He never worked under me.
Mr. Morris. Was he not head of the China Division of the Office of
War Information ?
3518 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Lattimore. I don't recall that. My recollection is that he
worked for the Office of War Information — no that he worked in the
American Embassy in Chungking collecting documents, I believe, for
colleges and universities and research work over here, and then trans-
ferred to the OWI.
But the precise dates and precise character of his service in OWI I
didn't have anything to do with and I don't remember.
Mr. ISIoRRis. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I remember her, and I had no reason to con-
sider her a Communist at that time.
Mr. Morris. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang.
jNIr. Lattimore. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang, I met first in Chungking when
he was one of the deputies to Chiang Kai-shek, and I met him after-
ward in this country.
Mr. Morris. Was he ever a guest at your home ?
Mr. Lattimore. He stayed overnight at my house once.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever travel in the United States with him?
]\Ir. Lattimore. Let me see, I think I traveled from Philadelphia
to Baltimore with him once. I had gone up to Bryn INIawr, where I
was requested to act as his translator in a speech he made at Bryn
Mawr College.
Mr. Morris. And is it your testimony you did not know or had no
reason to believe he was a Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. Had no reason to believe he was a Communist.
Anything but.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever introduce him to anybody as your Com-
munist friend?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am sure I didn't.
Mr. Morris.. Did you persuade him to go back to Communist China ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't.
Mr. JNIoRRis. Did you ever discuss the prospects of his return to
Communist China, with anybody ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I believe that I may have talked in general
terms about his going back to China, but I don't think it was Com-
munist China at that time. My view of him was that he was one of
the strongly democratic Chinese who had never joined the Reds and
was not likely to.
The Chairman. To come back again, to whom are you referring?
Mr. Lattimore. Gen. Feng Y'hsian, once known as the Christian
general of China.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this
time two newspaper articles in connection with the last man about
whom we have been interrogating Mr. Lattimore ?
The Chairman. Where do they come from, and what is their back-
ground ?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the New York Times of January
15, 1948, page 14, and a photastat of another article from the New
York Times, of September 6, 1948, pages 1 and G, in reference to
Feng Yu-hsiang.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you cause those photostats to be made from the
original papers ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is this the date at which, or about which the wit-
ness knew this party ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3519
Mr. FoRTAS. What is the date of those photostats ?
Mr. Morris. That is September 1948.
When did you last see Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. The last time I saw him was when he stayed at our
house. He and, I think, a son-in-law of his stayed overnight at our
house.
Mr. Morris. What is his son-in-law's luime, Mr. Lattimore'^
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. When was that, Mr, Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't recall the exact year. Perhaps my wife can.
The Chairman, Where were you living? In Baltimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, outside of Baltimore. Ruxton,
Mr. Morris, It was in connection with the trip that he made to the
LTnited States, was it not, obviously, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr, Lattimore, In connection with ?
Mr. Morris. The visit must have been at the same time he visited
the United States.
]\Ir. Lattimore. At the same time, yes. He had been appointed by
Gen. Chiang Kai-shek to make a study of hydroelectric enterprise in
tliisi country, and I remember his telling me that he hacl taken
thousands of feet of motion-picture film in connection with that.
Mr, Morris. He met with a violent death, did he not, Mr. Latti-
more ?
j\Ir. Lattimore. He died in a fire aboard a Soviet ship, I believe,
in tlie Mediterranean somewhere.
The Chairman. What is the basis for the introduction of these
exhibits?
Mr. Morris, j\Ir, Chairman, one article describes the death that
Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang came to, and the other was an article indicating
when he ariived, which would tend to be corroborative of the time
that Mr. Lattimore did meet Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.
Mr. FoRTAs. What is the date?
The Chairman. It is supposed to be September 1948.
Mr. IMoRRis. Both are September 19-18.
Mr, FoRTAs. You say that there is a date as to the time when he ar-
rived, whicli tends to corroborate the witnesses' testimony, and pre-
sumably you are referring to a date given in the story.
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Mr. FoRTAs. I wondered if you would state that to the witness,
because we haven't seen the article.
The Chairman, There is one here of the New York Times of Jan-
uary 15, 1918, page 14; one of the New York Times, September 6,
1948, page 1, and another from the New York Times dated September
6, 1948, page 6,
ISIr, Sourwine. That is a run-over of the former story.
Senator Smith. Could we not clear it up, Mr. Chairman, by letting
the witness and his counsel examine those right now ?
The Chairman. I want to know what is the basis for the introduc-
tion of them. They do not refer to this witness, as I understand it.
]Mr. Morris. But they do refer, Mr, Chairman, to Gen. Feng Yu-
hsiang, about whom we have been interrogating this witness, and they
do place the time of his visit to the United States during the time of
the visit when Mr. Lattimore testified he did have Gen. Feng Yu-
hsiano; in his home.
3520 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chaikman. Did it have any connection with tlie Institute of
Pacihc Kehitions?
Mr. MoRWs. No, sir; not wliat we are puttino- in the record at tliis
time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Chair is going to withhold the ruling on that
for the time being.
You may proceed with some other matter.
Mr. Morris. Julien R. Friedman.
Senator Smith. May I ask one question before we leave that?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, with respect to Gen. Feng Yu-
hsiang, that he made several thousand feet of moving picture film
Mr. Lattimore. Made or had been given.
Senator Smith. Did you see any of those yourself?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't.
Senator Smith. You did not know whether any of them were made
of just public utilities, or whether some of them might have been
made of military installations. Do you have any information either
way?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no information wdiatever.
This was in the period when there was a great deal of talk about a
possible TVA on the Yangtze, and that sort of thing, and the Chinese
Government w^as very much interested in large-scale hydroelectric
enterprises,
Mr. Morris. Julian R. Friedman?
Mr. Lattimore. Is he a man who worked for the State Department
at one time?
Mr. M(^RRis. Yes. He was an assistant to John Carter Vincent at
the time he was Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State
Department.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, then, I knew him slightly and had no reason
to believe him a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in Mr. Vincent's office in the State
Department ?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't recall meeting him there, no. I think when-
ever I met him it was socially. If he was in Mr. Vincent's office, I
may well have met him.
Senator Ferguson. I think the facts show that he had a desk in
the same office with Mr, Vincent, if that will help you.
Mr. Lattimore. I may quite well have met him in Mr. Vincent's
office, but if so it was so inconsequential that I retain no memory
of it.
Mr. Morris. You did say whenever you did meet Mr. Friedman it
was at social gatherings, Mr. Lattimore. Will you tell us about
those ?
Mr. Lai'itmore. Well, I -just remember meeting him occasionally.
He may have been at one or more IPR conferences, or something of
that sort.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet him as the Hot Springs convention in
1944?
Mr. LATriMORE. If he was there, then I must have met him there?
Mr. Morris. But that is the best you can testify to about your asso-
ciation with Julian Friedman ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3521
Mr. Morris. Mr. Harry Gannes ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name.
Mr. Morris. Did Chen Han-seng write a review of his book for
Pacihc Affairs while you were the editor of it ?
Mr. Latt^imore. I don't recall. He may well have. Could you f^ive
me the year of that? • "
Mr. Morris. December 1937.
Mr. Lattimore. That is quite possible, but my recollection of re-
views m Pacific Affairs is not very good, partly because while I was
editing Pacific Affairs from abroad many reviews went in without
my having seen the original manuscripts.
Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony you did not recall Harry Gannes
at all ?
INlr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mark Gayn «
Mr. Lattimore. jMr. Mark Gayn I met at the Press Club in Tokyo,
I believe, for the first time. That would be the winter of 1945-46.
and I think I saw liim once in this country.
Mr. Morris. What was that occasion ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was just before he was going to Europe on
some kind of writing assignment, so I was told.
Mr. Morris. Did he ever confer with you ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, it certainly wasn't a conference. It was a
casual meeting.
Mr. Sourwine. Just a moment, Mr. Morris. If I may interpose,
the witness has not yet answered the main question about Mr. Gayn.'
The question is : In your dealings with this man, or in any other way,
did you know or have any reason to belieA-e that he was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; T didn't.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Louis Gibarti ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you do not recall havino- a
meeting with Mr. Louis Gibarti? ^
Mr. Lattimore. I certainly don't recall it. If you have a document
somewhere, it might refresh my memory.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Harold Glasser?
Mr. Lai-timore. I don't place that name either.
Mr. Morris. G-1-a-s-s-e-r.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name.
Mr. Morris. Did you encounter him on the Pauley Keparations
Mission ?
Mr. Latitmore. He wasn't a member of the mission.
The Chairman. The question is: Did you encounter him?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall it.
The Chairman. That is, on the Pauley Reparations Mission.
Mr. Morris. It is your testimony you did not encounter or run into
Harold Glasser in connection with the Pauley Reparations Mission?
Mr. Latimer. I don't recall it. In Tokyo?
Mr. Morris. At any place.
Mr. Lattimore. Or here ? I just don't place the name.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Max Granich ?
Mr. Lattoiore. Mr. ]Max Granich I know from the transcript of
these hearings. I have never met him, but there is in the record the
3522 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
fact that I once wrote him a letter declining to join the board of China
Today, which he edited.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Michael Greenberg?
Mr SouRWiNE. Jnst a moment, please. The Avitness has not yet
answered the question: Did he, in his dealings with this man, know
him or had any reason to believe he was a Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. In my dealings with him, I had no reason to believe
he was a Communist. -,. , , -, ^^ .^ ^. rri „
Mr SouRWiNE. The question is a little broader than that, ihe
question is: In your dealimrs with him, or in any other way, clid you
have reason to believe or did you know him to be a Communist i
Mr L\TTiMORE. No, I didn't know him to be a Communist, and i
didn't believe him to be a Communist. China Today at that time was
not a magazine that I recognized as a Communist front.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Michael Greenberg? t ^i • i
Mr Lattimore. Mr. Michael Greenberg I knew slightly. 1 think
I met him at the New York office of the IPR and, of course I know
that he later became managing editor, or some such title, o± i^acitic
Affairs after I had left. I knew him very slightly.
]\Ir. Morris. You used his services, did you not, m the IFK f
Mr Lattimore. I don't recall using his services.
Mr Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, pleased
Mr SoiiRwiNE. If I may interrupt, please, before the document
comes in Here again we have a situation where the major question-
that is, whether the witness in his dealings or m any other way knew
or had reason to believe this person was a Communist— has not been
Mr L vrTiMORE. No ; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.
Mr* SouRWiNE. The question is assuming that you did have deal-
intrs with the person. There is, of course, no objection to expatiating
oifthat, but I keep coining back to it because the mam question is
whether you knew or had reason to believe that the person was a
Communist. ,. , ,, n , i
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I knew him very slightly and had no reason
to believe him a Communist.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel. ^ .i ci 4=
I^Ir ISIandel. This is a photostat of a document from the hies ot
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 28, 1941, froni 300 Gil-
man Hall, Johns Hopkins University, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter,
with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. It is a photostat ot a
carbon copy. , ^ .^ i i
Mr. Morris. INIr. Lattimore, I offer you that document and ask you
if you can recall having written it. ,, , . .,^ -^ i . t
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall having written it, but i
obviously did. . ^ -, nr t 4^4^- ?
Mr Morris. Will you read the second paragraph, Mr. Lattimore_{
Mr. Lattimore. "The three points raised by Greenberg are, i
think, decisive." ^ , .,
Mr. Morris. Do you remember what the three points were m con-
nection with that paper by Greenberg?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; but the first sentence of the letter is :
Herewith I am returning the docket of uapers relative to Bloch's proposal
for an analysis of the Russo- Japanese Pact,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3523
• "^fi^''\l^'^^J ^? ""V"' the latter to object to the fact that the peoi^le
111 the New 1 ork office don't seem to realize that quarterly maffiiziAes
liave^to deal iii rather long terms of reference, whereas the Fa? East-
ern burvey, which was a fortnightly publication, dealt with things
that were closer to the neAvs.
The Chairman. Now get back to the question
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record?
Ihe Chairman. It may be admitted in the record.
(Ihe document referred to was marked ''Exhibit No. 551" and is as
loUows :) '
Exhibit No. 551
WLH
ED
300 GiLMAjy Hall, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. E. C. Carter, Baltimore, Md., April 28, WJ,1.
Institute of Pacific Relaticm,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.
Dear Carter : Herewith I am returning the docket of papers relative to Bloeh's
proposal for an analysis of the Russo-Japanese Pact
The three points raised hy Greenberg are, I thinlv decisive
There is- another thing that I think should be borne in mind whenever pro-
posals of this kind come up. Everybody at 129 East Fifty-second StreeJ who
does any writing seems to me to be dominated by the routine and rhvthm of
^ar Eastern Survey— and to be unconscious of the fact. The old Far Eastern
Survey, I should hastily add. There are already signs that the new Far Eastern
Survey IS doing a Moses on them and leading them out of the wilderness
,, ^"t/^f ^aj^it f. m"«l to which I refer is still there and still dominant ' It is
r vnf f, n'i l^T thnik'ug that the art of writing something that is a combination of
piotound philosophy and snap judgment on something that happened a week
ago or at most two weeks ago. dpyeiicu a ^^eelv
This just won't do for a quarterly. You have to drop the idea that vou are
writing about something that happened a week or ten davs ago. You have to
cast your mmd forward at least three months— four is safer. It is not a ques-
tion of what people are guessing about the Russo-Japanese Pact now, but what
they will be thinking about it in September. The essential approach involves
the computing of two factors: (1) By September, what impress willremain on
people s minds of the actual wording, the diplomatic and political timing and
the immediate effects of the Russo-Japanese Pact? (2) By September, what
win be the general character of the consequences flowing from the Pact' I do
not mean sensationally accurate prophesies of who will be sipping tea and who
^^ All /"^^""^ vodka. I mean a broadly correct anticipation of main trends
All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must
combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with
the panorama of the future.
It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic
of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. At the time, or any time, did you have any reason to
believe that Michael Greenberg was a Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, while we are on the document, may
I go out of order a minute and ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last
paragraph of this letter?
The Chairman. That is on the second page.
Mr. Morris. It is on the second page.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong oft the topic of
the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.
3524 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This is apparently for reasons of time limit.
Mr. Morris. Would you explain what you meant by that reference,
Mr. Lattimore?
The Chairman. Read that ao;ain, Mr. Lattimore, please.
Mr. Lattimore. May I read the preceding sentence also?
The Chairman. Just read what you did read. I want to get that.
What did you read when you were asked to read ?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of
the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.
Mr. Morris. Read the preceding paragraph, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. The preceding paragraph is [reading] :
All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must
combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with
the panorama of the future.
Mr. Morris. What did you mean by ihe reference that you were
switching Anna Louise Strong off of the topic of the Fourth Route
Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army?
Mr. Lattimore. I can only speculate on that, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Was Anna Louise Strong doing an assignment for you
at that time?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether she was doing an assign-
ment or had volunteered an article.
Mv. Morris. But is it not apparent from your reading of your own
letter, Mr. Lattimore, when you say you switched her off one topic and
onto anothei', that she was obviously working for you in some capacity?
Mr. Lattimore. No; not necessarily. She may have volunteered
an article on one topic and I suggested that she take up another topic.
Mr, Morris. At least to that extent she was working for you, if you
could switch her from one to the other, even though she was volun-
teering ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I think if a correspondent is trying to place
an article with a publication, that correspondent is working for him-
self or herself until the article is accepted.
Mr. MoiiRis. Were the Fourth Route Army and the Eighth Route
Army both Communist armies?
Mr. Lattimore. The Eighth Route Army was a Communist army.
The Fourth Route Army was an army organized by Chiang Kai-shek
which contained both Communists and non-Communists.
Mr. Morris. And it ultimately became a Communist army; did it
not?
Mr. Lattimore. Part of it did ; yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you explain the reference of taking Anna Louise
Strong from the Fourth to the Eighth Route Army ?
The Chairman. What is meant by that language ?
Mr. Lattimore. As I say, I can only speculate on it at this dis-
tance, but in view of the fact that I was talking about the subject of a
quarterly magazine not writing off the top of the news, and in view of
the fact that this letter was written in 1941, it may be that the Fourth
Route Army was known at that time only from recent newspaper re-
ports, and I thought it was difficult to give a balanced long-term treat-
ment of it, whereas the Eighth Route Army had been known for a
long time, and was a subject that could be written about in the terms
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3525
of a quarterly magaziiie, rather than a subject for some publication
that was staying close to the daily headline.
The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that the Eighth Army
was a Communist army ?
Mr. Lattimoke. The Eighth Army was a Connnunist army.
The Ciiaibman. And you switched her from the Fourth Route
Army to the Eighth Route Army; is that right? Is that what the
language says?
Mr. Lattimoke. The language says I switched her off one topic
and onto another topic, presumably in terms that she would write
about one topic rather than another. The Eighth Route Army at that
time was under Chiang Kai-shek's command, although it was a Com-
munist army.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did you know at that time that Anna Louise Strong
was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I did not.
Mr. Morris. Had you any reason to believe that she was a Com-
munist ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe that she was.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that she w\as?
]Mr. Lattimore. No ; I never learned that she was.
Senator Ferguson. That is up to this date ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is up to this date. I don't consider her a
Communist.
Mr. Morris. Dr. H. Hatem?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't place that name at all.
Mr. Morris. Is it vour testimony you had no connection with Dr.
Hatem ?
Mr. Lattimore. None that I can recall. There may be something
in the files about it, but I completely fail to place the name.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I just want to know if the
record shows what Mr. Lattimore's definition of a Communist is in
these answers. He is answering that he never knew Anna Louise
Strong to be a Communist, even up to this date, and had no reasons to
believe.
What is your definition in these answers of the words "a Com-
munist" ?
j\[r. Lattimore. A Communist, I suppose, is a known Communist.
Senator Ferguson. A knoM-n Communist? They did not ask you
that, as I understood the question.
Mr. Lattimore. I have no reason to believe that Anna Louise Strong
is a Communist.
The Chairman. That is not the question.
Senator Ferguson. What I have been trying to find out now is that
you have answered many questions here, and one of them was as to
whether or not you ever knew or had reasons to believe that Anna
Louise Strong was a Communist.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe she was a Communist.
Senator Ferguson. But I want to know- what the word "Communist"
means to you wdien you are answering these questions.
]\Ir. Lattijiore. I had no reason to believe that she was a member
of the Communist Party,
Senator Ferguson, That was not the question at all, wdiether or not
she was a member of the party. Is that what you understood all of
3526 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
these other questions from No. 1 down to mean : that you knew or had
reasons to believe they were members of the party ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Are you talking about card-carrying Com-
munists ?
INIr. Lattimore. Senator, I am not an expert on the subject of card-
carrying Communists versus, noncard-carrying Communists.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, would you include at least, in
the question with relation to Anna Louise Strong, as to whether or not
she was under the discipline of the Communist Party ?
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge of Anna Louise
Strong, which is rather slight, I had no reason to believe that she was
under any discipline except her own.
Mr. Morris. She was the editor of the Moscow Daily News, was she
not, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think she was. Was she?
Senator Ferguson. Did you not know she was ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't recall that.
Mr. Morris. You have reviewed her books, have you not, Mr. Lat-
timore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have reviewed at least one book of hers.
Mr. Morris. That was in what year ; 1935 ?
Mr. Lattimore. Possibly.
Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Chairman, along this line of questioning we have
not been putting documents into the record for fear we would not be
able to finish this up very quickly.
The Chairman. You do not have to be afraid about finishing up
very quickly. We are going to go on with this hearing until it is con-
cluded. Do not be afraid about time.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should define what we
mean as a Communist wdien w^e ask the witness a question. That is to
say, whether we are referring just to a card-carrying Communist, a
member of the Communist Party, or whether we are also including in
that category those persons who we know are generally classified as
Comnmnists because they follow the Communist line.
The latter would be a much broader definition. Perhaps we should
say to the witness here just which of those two we mean, whether we
mean strictly a card-carrying Communist or whether we mean a
person that may or may not be a card-carrying Communist but yet
does follow the Communist line. I think that is what Senator Fer-
guson is driving at.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I am driving at.
Senator Smith. I am sure the witness would rather have it cleared
that w^ay.
Senator Ferguson. Whether or not they were voluntarily follow-
ing the line.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would this definition be acceptable: In this list
of questions, when we refer to the word "Communist," the committee
means a person who is, using the Senators words, who is or has been
willingly cooperative or collaborating with Communists for the fur-
therance of Communist purposes.
Senator Ferguson. That is a good definition,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3527
J\lr. SouRwiNE. Using that as the definition of Communist, Mr.
Lattimore, are there an}^ of tJie answers you have given with regard to
these people that you would want to change ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am afraid, Mr. Sourwine, that those are definitions
that I can't accept. I haven't been conducting a private investigation
service, and all I can speak to is my personal knowledge of people or
knowledge of their writings, or something like that.
The Chairman. Do you want that answer to stand in reply to the
question propounded by Mr. Sourwine ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir.
The CriAiRjviAN. In other words, you do not accept the definition
given you nor the explanation given you by Mr, Sourwine or the mem-
bers of this committee, is that right ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, whether or not you accept it
if you are advised that that is what the committee means by interro-
gating you as to wliether or not you had knowledge of whether they
were Communists, do you, or do you not, stand by your previous an-
swers that none of these individuals whom you have negatived were
known to you to be Communists ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. because phrases have been used like "gen-
erally classified as Communists," and I just don't understand exactly
what that means. I don't think it is a precise enough definition
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully request that the
question be repeated ?
The Chairman. Just a minute, Mr. Fortas.
Senator O'Conor. I will repeat it. My question is, and I will
rephrase it, whether or not you accepted the definition as given by
Mr. Sourwine, I would like to ask you Avhether or not any of the per-
sons about whom you have been interrogated were known to you to
be acting m furtherance of Communist objectives or of beino- identi-
fied with Communist undertakings. ^
Mr. Laitimore. I think the answer would be "No," Senator
The Chairman. What is the answer? What is your answer not
what you think? '
Mr. Latfimore. My ansAver, without reviewing in detail all of these
names, is no. In the case of Anna Louise Strong
Mr. Sourwine. In order to answer that question you have to re-
view those names.
Senator O'Conor. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. In the case of Anna Louise Strong, slie was known
for many years as a writer who gave sympathetic accounts of condi-
tions m parts of Soviet Russia that she visited. Later on she was a
person who wrote accounts very friendly to the Chinese Communists
ot what she saw in Communist China.
The question of whether doing a thing of that kind was honest re-
porting by the person concerned of facts as she saw them, or whether
It was a question of deliberately furthering the cause or interests of
the Chinese Communists or the Russian Communists, is a subjective
evaluation for which I don't have the data. Therefore, I say that as
far as my knowledge is concerned, she was not a Communist
Senator O'Conor. You have not, I think, Mr. Lattimore, answered
fully. Our question is not as to whether the person's writings may
m fact, have been of aid and assistance, as well as if the person will-
3528 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
fully was actino- in furtherance of Communist objectives and was
lending himself or herself to the furtherance of Communist objectives,
to the best of your knowledge.
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge, I never considered
that Anna Louise Strong was willfully furthering the interests of
the Chinese or Russian Communists in the dishonest sense of dis-
regarding her own judgment.
The Chairman. Just a minute. Let me have that answer, please
That is an avoidance of the question. Read me the answer.
( The record was read by the reporter.)
The Chairman. That 'is a willful avoidance of the answer. It is
going to be stricken.
Answer the question. Will you read the question back to the wit-
ness, please, the question of the Senator from Maryland ?
(The record was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge, no.
Senator O'Conor. Is that applicable to all of the other individuals ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think it is. As I say, again, without review-
ing each individual name
Mr. SouRwiNE. The witness has repeated. He says that again with-
out reviewing these names. In order to answer that question, he must
review these names, and the record should shoAv that he has reviewed
these names. Otherwise, the answer means nothing.
Mr. Morris. Will you review the names and answer the question,
Mr. Lattimore ? , . ^ • -, <• . .i
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I do not think, m deference to the
question answered, that we have a sufficient understanding now that
there is an understanding between tlie committee and the witness as to
what is meant by the word "Communist."
For instance, he uses expressions like "willfully" and whether a per-
son is "dishonest." If she was a Communist, no one could say she was
dishonest in her judgment. I think w^e ought to take a minute here and
o-et an agTeement on what we mean by the word "Communist" in
these questions. I think this is very material.
The Chairman. You cannot prevent the witness from inserting a
word of his own which is not used by the interrogator, and that is what
he has been doing all along. ■ ,^ -,,, o
Mr. FoRTAs. Mr. Chairman, I think the word "willful ' was Senator
O'Conor's word.
Senator Ferguson. I had used the expression once knowingly.
Mr. FoRTAS. Senator, there have been so many questions, I wonder if
the committee could not rephrase the question and put it to the witness.
I think this is just a case of confusion because of different terminology
used by the interrogators.
The Chairman. Senator O'Conor's question was very clear and very
distinct. It will be read back to the witness again if need be.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I ask this question of the
witness : Mr. Lattimore, did you say about the handbook written by
Anna Louise Strong, This Soviet World, as reviewed by you on pages
611-612 :
Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy,
originality and individuality and the foreign idea of regimentation.
The Chairman. Wliat is the question, Senator?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3529
Senator Ferguson. I asked him if he wrote that about the book that
was written b}^ Anna Louise Strong.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall writing that, but I am willing to accept
this extract. I would like to see the full context.
Mr. Morris. "Wliat year is that, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. September 1945, Pacific AflFairs.
Mr. IMoRRis. Mr. Chairman, while we are getting that article, may
we have the question redirected to Mr. Lattimore ?
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson's question ?
Mr. Morris. No ; Senator O'Conor's question. And may we have the
witness's last answer ?
The Chairman. You will have to read back to get Senator O'Conor's
question.
Senator O'Conor. I said, Mr. Lattimore, apart from whether you
accepted the definition as repeated by Mr. Sourwine, whether, in your
responses to the questions concerning this list of individuals, you meant
that you had no knowledge that any one of those individuals had acted
m furtherance of Communist objectives or were identified with Com-
munist undertakings ?
Mr. Lattimore. To my knowledge ?
Senator O'Connor. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is no, to my knowledge, as far as my
knowledge extends. JMay I add a word or two there ?
When, esj^ecially in the early 1930's, I read an attempt to describe
sometliing that was going on in some part of Soviet Russia that was
friendly in the sense that it didn't have in every other paragraph,
"Remember these, all murderers," or something of that kind, I thought
it was an honest attempt to observe and report what was going on in
Russia. My assumption would not be that that was done in purpose
of furthering the spread of Communists.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, on this point may Mr. Mandel read
into the record Anna Louise Strong's contributions to the Communist
publications as of that time ?
The Chairman. Wait a minute. What are you reading from?
Mr, Mandel. From a record I have accumulated. The sources are
all given.
i\Ir. Morris. Mr. Mandel has been sworn as the research director,
and he will give the sources of each individual item as he comes to
it, Senator.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Mandel. Moscow Daily News of July 2, 1933, published in
Moscow for English-speaking people in the Soviet Union and through-
out the world. Miss Anna Louise Strong is associate editor. She
also was a writer for tlie following Communist publications: The
Liberator of INIarch 1923, page 21; Soviet Russia Today, December
1931, page 5 : the New Masses of June 28, 1938, page 15 ; the Sunday
Worker of December 21, 1935, page 3; the Labor Herald — that is the
Communist Labor Herald— of March 1921, page 16; the Worker's
Monthly of January 1925, page 108 ; Soviet Russia Today of March
1937, pages 14 and 15.
Mr. Morris. This is the article, Mr. Lattimore, that you made
reference to that you reviewed. [Document handed.]
The Chairman. I understand there is some confusion as to the
date. Is that right? What is the question now pending?
88348— 52— pt. 10 17
3530 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
]Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, asked Mr. Latti-
more whether or not lie had made a certain statement in reviewing
Anna Louise Strong's book, and he wanted to see the whole text.
He has been given the text, and he now may make any change in that
that is necessary.
The Chairman. What is the question, the question by Senator
Ferguson ?
Mr. Lattimore. It refers to a particular sentence which I have
here.
The Chairman. I want the question, if I can get it.
Senator Ferguson. Can you identify what I asked you in the
book?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I found it.
Senator Ferguson. Is it accurate?
Mr. FoRTAs. Would you read it back, Senator ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think it is accurate. The sentence is:
Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy,
originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of "regimentation."
Did you want to ask me anything further on that. Senator ?
Senator Ferguson. No, but I was troubled with your answer about
Miss Strong, whether you knew she was a Communist. I attributed
the difficulty to the point that you and I were not thinking about the
word "Communist" in the same light. I could not understand how
you could answer that you did not think she had connection with the
Communist Party. That is the reason I said to the Cliair that I hope
now we might have an understanding as to what this word means that
we have been using here in this last group of questions about these
persons from Adler to wdiere you are now,
Mr. Lattimore. Do you want to make a new definition ?
Mr. Morris, Mr, Sourwine, you had addressed a definition to the
Chair.
Mr, Sourwine, AVould the committee wish to use this definition:
Communist means a person under Communist discipline, or who has
voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Commu-
nist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives.
The Chairman. Do you know that to apply to any of those names
that have been referred to you ?
Mr. Latttmore, I would say not, subject to the times at which 7
knew these various people and various contributions that they sub
mitted.
Mr. Sourwine. You have now reviewed the list, have you, Mr
Lattimore ?
Mr, Lattimore, I have reviewed the list. I notice that there is, fc
instance, besides Anna Louise Strong
Mr. ]\IoRRis. This is the list down as far as Michael Greenberg.
That is as far as we have gotten, ]Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. No, Dr. Hatem, I think.
Mr. Morris. Yes, we had gone to Hatem. You are right.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, of course, tliere are various people to whom
I have referred, like Earl Browder, knowing that he was a Commu-
nist and — what is his name — Borodin, assuming that he was a Com-
munist. There is Israel Epstein, who I once reviewed as writing a
book that was partisan on the side of the Chinese Communists.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3531
Mr. Morris. Yes, but you testified that you had no reason to believe
that he was a Communist while you knew him, did you not'^
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I did not consider him at that time to be a
Communist. I considered him a partisan of the Communists. How
that is affected by Mr. Sourwine's definition I don't know.
Senator Fergusox. How is it affected in your mind ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, at that time, I considered him, at the time
I reviewed his book, I considered that he gave a partisan statement
in favor of the Chinese Communists. But as of the year that book
was written, exactly what that meant in terms of Russian Communists
and American Communists would be something else again.
Many people were writing extremely favorable accounts of the
Chinese Communists at that time. I think perhaps I could say that,
at that time, using a very loose term — which again is not really a
satisfactory definition in itself — I would consider Epstein a fellow
traveler of the Chinese Communists.
Mr. SouRwixE. Mr. Chairman, if the committee accepts this defi-
nition, and I assume that is the case with regard to its question, then
the question is, putting this definition in place of the word ''Commu-
nist,'' first we assume that you had dealings with the person named,
and if not, please state that, then in your dealings with this person,
or in any other way, did you know or have reason to believe that this
person was a person under Communist discipline or who had volun-
tarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist
Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives.
Taking that as the question, Mr. Lattimore, and looking back over
these names, down as far as that of Dr. Hatem, are there any of the
answers which you gave in the negative which you would like to
change or qualify?
Mr. Lattimore. I think no, with the exception of Israel Epstein,
whom I mentioned here, and possibly Abraham Chapman. I can't
remember exactly what the correspondence was. I never met him
personally, but I seem to remember that the question was raised in
the research committee of the IPR that he had done some kind of
work from the Communist point of view, or as a Communist, or some-
thing of that kind. I don't recollect the exact terms.
The question was raised whether his work should be published a<
all. and, if so, how it should be described or presented. But as I say^
I don't remember the details.
Mr. SouRwixE. And you had that in mind, did you, when you pre-
viously answered the question about him ?
Mr. Lattimore. When I previously answered the question about
him, I had in mind that I did not, of my personal knowledge, know
him to be a Communist. I think so— I am not sure. I would like to
have the transcript read back. I am getting a little bit confused with
all of these going back and forth from one name to the other. If we
go back in the transcript to the raising of the name of Abraham Chap-
man, perhaps I could be clearer.
Mr. Sourwixe. The transcript will speak for itself, sir. But the
question is, Now that you have been somewhat more confined by the
committee's definition of "Communist," what is your answer with
regard to Mr. Chapman?
]Mr. Lattimore. ]My answer with regard to Mr. Chapman is that I
had no pei-sonal dealings with him, and therefore did not personally
3532 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
know him or consider him to be a Communist. But that I believe, and
without seeing the correspondence again, I can't remember exactly
what it is about, that the question of his being a Communist or sup-
porting a Communist presentation, or something of the kind, may
have been raised.
The Chairman. Would you say you had reason to beheve, then,
tliat he was a Communist or a fellow traveler ?
Mr. Lattimore. It would be impossible for me to be more precise
there, Mr. Chairman, without seeing the original correspondence
again and reviewing it. I don't want to be unjust to anybody.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Ferguson. Might I ask a question ?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Down to where we are on the names now, what
would your answer be, and you have given us a definition of "fellow
traveler," as to knowing or having reason to believe that any of these
people were fellow travelers?
Mr. FoRTAs. Senator, I am not sure tliat he has defined ^^fellow
traveler."
The Chairman. He has used it alternately.
Mr. Lattimore. I used the term, and I believe I said that it was in
itself a loose and unsatisfactory definition.
Senator Ferguson. As loose and as unsatisfactory as it is to you,
what do you sav about my question?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Let the record show the witness is examining the
list.
Mr. Lattimore [after examining the document]. No. I don't be-
lieve I had any reason, at the time I knew^ any of these people, to con-
sider that they were fellow travelers, with the exception or partial
exceptions already indicated.
Mr. Morris. And that includes Mr. Israel Epstein, is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. That would include Mr. Epstein, whom I certainly
considered at the time to have written a partisan book, that was parti-
san on the side of the Chinese Communists.
The CHAumAN. Before you made that last answer, you had occasion
to, and did, review the list of names on which you have been interro-
gated. Is that right?
Mr, Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. What is your answer on Earl Browder? I see
his name under the B's.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I had already mentioned that I considered
him to be a Communist at the time. So I understood that he was not
affected bv this review.
Tlie Chairman. I think the connnittee will recess at this point. We
will recess until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12: 15 p. m.. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p. in. of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
The hearing reconvened at 2 : 10 p. m., upon the expiration of the
recess.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3533
TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THUEMAN
AENOLD, COUNSEL— Eesiimed
The Chairmax. You may proceed now.
Mr, Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, over the recess, I was trying to recall
as much as I know about Anna Louise Strong, who has been mentioned
here, and I do believe that I recall that at one time she was working
for a paper in Moscow, I don't remember in exactly what capacity, but
in view of the fact, I should say that that would classify her as some-
body who was knowingly working with the Russians at that time.
I may say that my memory is unclear partly because what was on the
top of my memory was the newspaper stories about her being arrested
in Russia and thrown out.
The Chairman. She was working with the Russians at that time,
did you say ?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time.
How conscious of that I was in the 1930"s, at the time that I pub-
lished material by her, is completely beyond my recollection.
The Chairman. And at the time she was working for the Russians,
the Russian Government was a Communist government ; is that true ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. What was the year?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall that. I think Mr. Morris read into
the record something, but I don't recall what year was mentioned.
Senator Ferguson. Can you place about the year ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't. My general recollection is that she
went to Russia very early after the revolution, but I don't know the
details of her career.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, AVhen Anna Louise Strong came back
from Moscow after her difl'erences with the Soviet Government there,
did she stop to visit you at Baltimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; she stopped over briefly one afternoon.
Mr. JNIoRRis. How soon after her return from Moscow was that ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. I think it must have been within a
few days after she landed in New York.
Mr. Morris. How long did she stay visiting you ?
JVIr. Lattimore. jNIaybe an hour or so.
Mr. Morris. What did you discuss with her at that time ?
:Mr. Lattimore. Well, it really wasn't a discussion. She was telling
us about being arrested and thrown out.
Mr. Morris. When you say "us," whom do you mean ?
Mr. Lattimore. My wife and myself.
Mr. Morris. Was anybody else present?
Mr. Kvttimore. No.
Mr. Morris. Why did she go to see you at that time, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea.
The CiL^iRMAN. Do we understand that she visited you at your
home ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any further business she might
have had in Baltimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.
Senator Ferguson. Did she express any ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; not that I recall.
3534 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
]Mr, SouRWiNE. Were you living in Ruxton at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. All right ; let us get along.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Joan Chase Hinton ?
Senator Ferguson. Just before you go to that: Did Miss Strong
leave you any letters or memorandums or reports or anything?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, are you getting back to this list now?
Mr. Morris. Yes ; I am getting back to the list now.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Just so that the record will be clear on this after-
noon's session, and to refresh the witness' recollection of the question,
the question with respect to each one of these names, the reading of
the name assumes that the witness has had some dealings with the
person. If not, the witness is requested to so state when the name is
read.
The Chairman. Some dealing or some acquaintance.
Mr. Sourwine. That is right, sir.
Then the question is : In your dealings with his person, or in any
other way, did you ever know or have reason to believe that this person
is a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and
knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members
in furtherance of the Communist Party objectives?
The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, do you understand that as applying
to each name as we go down the list.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Joan Chase Hinton.
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No." I knew her very slightly.
J\Ir. Morris. Do you know any other members of her family ?
Mr, Lattimore. Yes. I know her mother.
Mr. Morris. Who is her mother, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Her mother is the head of a school in Vermont.
Mr. Morris. What is her name ?
Mr. Lattimore. Carmelita.
Mr, Morris. Are you a member of the board of that school, Mr.
Lattimore?
Mr. Laitimore. No ; I don't think so.
Mr. Morris. Have you ever been a member of the board of that
school ?
Mr, Lattimore. No ; I don't think I have.
Let me ask my wife.
I don't think so, no.
Mr. Morris. Have you ever lectured or taught there at any time?
Mr. Lattimore. I never taught there. My son went to school there,
md once or twice when I was up there I spoke at school gatherings.
Mr. Morris, On how many occasions ?
Mr. Lai-timore, Maybe a couple,
Mr, Morris, In what connection did you meet Joan Chase Hinton?
Mr. Lai-timore. As Mrs. Hinton's daughter.
Mr. Morris. Do you know any other members of the family ?
Mr. Ijatitmore. I met her brotlun-, who was at that time farm man-
ager of the school.
Mr. Morris. What is his name?
Mr. Lattimore. William.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3535
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record an
article written by Joan C. Hinton, from Communist China, in Sep-
tember 1951.
The Chairman. I will deal with that in just a minute.
There was another matter here referred to the Chair this morning
that I did not rule on, and that was the matter of the clippings from
the New York paper.
Mr. Morris. Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.
The Chairman. I would like to have had a better foundation laid
for their admission with reference to this witness.
Mr. Morris. Would you like me to do that now, sir ?
The Chairman. Yes. If you have anything better than what you
have offered, I would like to have it.
Mr. Morris. It is nothing better, sir. We were interrogating the
witness on the time he met Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, who was the subject
of those articles. Those articles clearly placed the period that Gen-
Feng Yu-hsiang was in the country as September 1948, sir.
The Chairman. You are not attempting to bind this witness by any-
thing that is in these statements, are you?
Mr. Morris. No.
The Chairman. You are simply using these for the purpose of
trying to fix a date ; is that correct ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, sir. And the general nature of the
identity of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.
The Chairman. They may be admitted for that purpose.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 552, 552A"
and are as follows:)
ExHiDiT No. 552
[New York Times, January 15, 1948, p. 14]
Feng Proclaims His Exilk ; Will Work Against Chiang
[Picture of Gen. Feng Yu-lisiang]
Feng Yu-lisiang, the "Christian general'" of China, who has been a prominent
figure there for 30 years, formally assumed the role of a political exile yesterday
In an interview in his apartment at 839 West End Avenue, General Feng said
he pleaded guilty to the charge of disloyalty made against him last week in
Nanking.
Asserting that as far as he was concerned his ties with the Chinese Govern-
ment, headed by President Chiang Kai-shek, were "totally severed," the gen-
eral said he would devote himself from now on to work on behalf of a new
revolutionary movement founded recently in Hong Kong.
This movement, he explained, was set up by delegates of "various democratic
groups" within China. It includes segments of the Nationalist Party (the Kuo-
mintang) that disagree with President Chiang and also representatives of the
Chinese Communists, he stated.
The aim of the new association for which General Feng will act as a sort of
spokesman in this country, is the overthrow of President Chiang's "reactionary
and dictatorial regime," he said.
3536 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 552 A
[New York Times, September 6, 1948, pp. 1 and 6]
Feng Dead In Russian Ship Fieb ; War Lord To Talk To Reds
(By the Associated Press)
Moscow Septemlter 5.— The death of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, China's fabulous
"Christian general," aboard a Russian ship in the Black Sea was announced in
the Moscow press today. General Feng was 07 years old.
The newspapers Fravda and Izvestia said that the former war lord and a
daughter perished in an accidental fire aboard the Russian motorship Pobeda
near the end of a voyage from New York to Odessa. The news of General
Feng's death came when the ship docked at Odessa.
The newspapers said that the blaze resulted from careless handling of motion-
picture film. They said that there were other victims of the fire but gave no de-
tails other than to' note that General Feng's daughter was killed.
(The Poieda was the ship upon which Mrs. Oksana S. Kasenkina and tne
Samarins Russian school teachers who defied the Soviet authorities by remaining
here were to have sailed from New York. The ship left here July 31.)
[Special to the New York Times]
London, September 5.— A Tass dispatch from Odessa recorded by the Soviet
monitor here tonight, said of the Pobcrfrt'.? trip:
"At Cairo she took on board more than 2,000 Armenian repatriates who were
brought to Batum. On August 31 the Po-beda sailed from Batum to Odessa. On
the way a fire broke out on board the motorship as a result of the careless
handling of cinema films, which caught fire. There are victims aboard, among
them Chinese Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and his daughter. The motorship has been
brought to Odessa. An investigation is under way."
Nanking, China, September 5 (AP).— Moscow reports of the death of General
Feng were received with reserve by Chinese Government oflicials today.
The ofiicial spokesman, Hollington Tong. said there would be no immediate
comment on the reported death of the former Government leader who was ex-
pelled from the Kuomintang (Government party) after leading an opposition
movement in the United States to President Chiang Kai-shek.
Feng's Relative Tells Ol^ Hobby
Berkeley, Calif., September 5 (AP).— General Feng's daughter-in-law today
raised the possibility here that he might have lieen tlie victim of his own motion-
picture hobby. , ... .
She said he had taken with him some personal movies and a quantity or
films of the American hydroelectric and reclamation projects that he had been
studying. •, , j i <-
Notified of the report of his death, she said she and her husband had last
heard from the general in a letter postmarked in Egypt (apparently when the
ship stopped there) saying merely that he would be unable to write again for
some time. ,^^4.1,
The general's son Feng Hung-chi, is a mechanical engineering student at the
University of California." He was so overcome by grief that his wife spoke for
him. .
She said that they had not known what route the general was taking to
China but that all the rest of the family was with him.
This included General Feng's wife; a second son, Paul Feng; two young
daughters, Mildred and Dora; and an elder daughter, Lita, with her husband,
Robert Lo. ^ t^
Lita was a premedical student at the College of the Pacific, Stockton, Calif.,
until last January, when she went to New York and was married to Mr. Lo.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3537
The Soviet report did not nial^e clear wtiich of tbe tliree daughters was
killed.
The general's widow is the former Li Teh-chuan, who once was a YWCA
secretary in Peiping. She was known to many Americans there and in Chung-
king as a brilliant woman, greatly interested in her husband's stormy .career.
Feng a Critic of Chiang's Regime
In a speech in this country in December General Feng, a severe critic of
the Government of President Chiang Kai-shek, said that he would not return
to his native land because he would be killed if he did so.
He made the speech shortly after he had been ordered to return to Nanking.
He was sent here, a year before, ostensibly to study water-conservation projects,
but in reality it was as a political exile. He spent most of his time rallying
support to oppose the present Chinese Government.
A well-known war lord for more than 30 years,, he was described by his
friends as "the Christian general" and by his enemies as a turncoat. He was
a leading executive of the Chinese Government during World War II but broke
completely with it in the last 2 years.
His opposition to the Nanking Government, which he charged with corruption
and inefficiency, led him to cooperate with the Communists, although he always
denied that he was a Communist or that he favored the Soviet Union. He
accused the Chinese Government of using the Communist threat as a bogy to
obtain more loans from the United States.
"The so-called Russian threat to China is being used by the Chinese Govern-
ment for its own purposes," he said once. "I am not a Communist and am not
for Russia. But I know of no proved evidence that the Russians are helping
the Chinese Communists."
Another time he denied that Chinese Communists actually practiced com-
munism. He said they were carrying out the principles set forth by Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic, under wliom he fought in the revolu-
tion of 1911.
At first, however, the Chinese Communists were wary of him. They de-
nounced him for his political program which, they said, would onlv eliminate
President Chiang without changing the basic social and political character of
the Chinese Government.
But, in April of this year, it was reported that coalition had been established
between the Communists and exiled Chinese political groups, including General
Feng, on the basis of a platform calling for the overthrow of President Chiang,
opposition to the United States, and the setting up of a left-wing united front
regime in China.
Shortly afterward, it was reported that General Feng was in Europe on his
way to north China for conferences with the Communists on the formation of a
rebel government. It was then said that he would travel through Russia to
China. That was the last word heard about him until the reports of his death.
Soldier, poet, and politician, he had been a leading figure on the Chinese scene
since 1913, when he became commander of a brigade that was one of the most
formidable units of the Chinese Army.
Behind him was a background of dire poverty, common to the masses of Chi-
nese peasantry. He was born in 1880 of coolie parents. He recalled later that
in a period of more than 10 years he ate meat only once.
In some unknown manner, however, he entered military school and then the
Army, rising until he became an important officer. He' was baptized in the
Methodist faith in 1913, converted his troops, and was said to have led them
into battle singing Onward, Christian Soldiers. In an interview in New York
in 1948, he denied tlie legend that he had baptized platoons of men by squirting
water from a hose on them.
His career as a war lord had its ups and downs. Sometimes he was a power
in politics; at other times he was in exile or on a farm writing poetrv — he pub-
lished five volumes of poetry in China.
He was an eloquent speaker, a formidable debater, and a blunt critic of the
missteps of his colleagues. He was tall— six feet, three inche.s — and emphasized
his humble origins by wearing the coarse blue gown of the peasant. His critics
added that underneath he wore silk-lined furs.
Some Chinese leaders called him a noisy bumpkin, but he always exercised
a great influence on the masses of Chinese people. The troops that served under
3538 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
him achieved a reputation for sobriety and discipline unique in war-torn China.
Smolving, gambling, and loose living were forbidden ; and, it was reported, daily
attendance at prayer meetings was part of his army's routine.
Despite this, some domestic and foreign critics maintained that his methods
were too brutal. This, they said, was the reason he never held a prominent
place in Chinese affairs for long.
In 1924 he executed a bold coup that for a time put him at the head of the
Government. The cost, however, was a reputation for treachery that never was
overcome. Two years later he was forced to flee from China and took refuge
in Moscow.
Among the posts he later held were State Councillor of the National Govern-
ment, Minister for Military Affairs, member of the National Military Council,
commander in chief of the People's Allied Anti-Japanese Army in the 1930's, and
a leading commander of Chinese forces in World War II. He was a member of
the Kuomintang from 1918 until his expulsion on January 7 of this year.
The Chairman. It seems to me we had another article here that was
not admitted.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore was going to compare this article with
the original that he wrote, Mr. Chairman, and rather than take up the
time, he agreed to do that later on.
The Chairman. You have not had the time to do it yet; have you,
Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Not yet. Senator.
Senator Smith. I understand that would be subject to any comment
he wishes to make.
The Chairman. Yes. We will give him a chance to go through it.
All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this article is entitled "Why China
Wants Peace." It appears in the People's China of September 16,
1951. It is written from Communist China and bears this preliminary
introduction [reading] :
Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic-
bomb explosion in the New Mexican Desert. A graduate of Bennington College,
Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin
and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assist-
ant at the atom-bomb project in Los Alamos. An active member of the Asso-
ciation of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and Gov-
ernment control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She
came to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her
American husband in an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia.
With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to
know the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with
the Chinese people, joining with them in their great work of peaceful con-
struction.
May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 553," and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 553
WHY CHINA WANTS PEACE
(By Joan C. Hinton, September 16, 1951)
Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic
bomb explosion in the New Mexican desert. A graduate of Bennington College,
Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin
and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assist-
ant at the atom bomb project at Los Alamos. An active member of the Associa-
tion of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and govern-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3539
ment control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She came
to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her American
husband in an animal breeding farm in Inner Mongolia.
With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to know
the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with the
Chinese people, joining with them in their great work "of peaceful construction.
Federation of American Scientists,
11 -'i9 L Street NW., Washington 6, D. C, U. 8. A.
Dear ]Mr. Wolfe and the FAS : Yesterday I received your application for re-
membership in the Federation of Scientists. As I am just now almost directly
under your feet, in Suiyuan Province, Inner Mongolia — where it takes two weeks
for mail to arrive by donkey from the nearest railroad — I must say I was rather
surprised and pleased to receive your application, and in two months' time at
that.
You asked, "What has been happening- to you since you were an FAS member?"
As it was just the FAS and the questions with which it deals which drove me to
China, I thought I would take the opportunity to write to you, though I should
have told you long ago why my dues stopped coming.
As you probably do not remember me, let me begin by telling you a bit of my
history. From as early as I can remember, I was determined to become a
scientist. Even in grammar school, I can especially remember forcing the
teachers to let me study Faraday's The Candle instead of taking Latin. In high
school I concentrated on chemistry, oblivious to all my other courses. Finally,
in college, I settled on physics, building a Wilson cloud chamber in my sophomore
year and spending as much time as I could getting in the way of the cyclotron
boys at Cornell. From college I went to Wisconsin where I studied as a graduate
student for two years. As people became more and more scarce, disappearing to
secret places, I became restless too and finally ended up at Los Alamos where
I worked another two years on the "W. B."
Then came the bomb and Hiroshima and the mass migration of atomic scien-
tists to Washington. I first joined the association of Los Alamos scientists, and
then spent some six weeks in Washington working for the FAS. Your pamphlet
mentions the "enthusiastic if inexperienced emissaries" now flocked to Wash-
ington. I am afraid both these statements applied to me aboTe anybody else —
especially the inexperience. I will never forget my chagrin when I went to a
certain Senator's office to get some information and the secretary condescend-
ingly looked up at me asking, "Is this in connection with school work?"— me, an
atomic scientist, coming to Washington to fight for scientific freedom and world
peace— the very nerve of her. Well, my heart was in the right place anyway.
From Washington I went to Chicago as an assistant in the Institute for
Nuclear Studies, and later as a Fellow. By 1948, I had about one more year
to go for my degree. In physics I could not have dreamed of a better oppor-
tunity for studying— I loved it. I was just beginning to get the feel of quantum
mechanics— as though it were a part of me instead of something strange in text-
books. I was devouring Dirac and what I could get hold of on statistical me-
chanics. Yet the better things became for me in physics, the more depressed I
became. Ever since that morning when we sat on a hillock south of Albu-
querque and felt the heat of that bomb 25 miles away, something had started to
stir m me. It forced me to Washington. Then I forced it down and left for
Chicago, but it refused to stay down. The Truman doctrine, the Marshall
Flan, the stagnation of the Atomic Energy Commission in the U. N.— how could
one just sit still in a laboratory and ponder in the depths of statistical me-
chanics. The memory of Hiroshima— 150,000 lives. One, two, three, four, five
SIX * * * one hundred and fifty thousand— each a living, thinking, human
being with hopes and desires, failures and successes, a life of his or her own-
all gone. And I had held that bomb in my hand. Could I sit and pounder Dirac?
What was science for? For the sake of Science? That is what I had thought
1 M, ^f' 1^"* ^'^ ^^^ pondered over Dirac and then suddenly 150,000 people were
killed. Were we to blame? We were only studying science, finding out how
the world was put together. Was the government to blame— really? Do we
not have any say as to what our life work is to be used for? Are we puppets
or human beings? Can we not vision the world of tomorrow? Will it be a
world of destruction and misery, agonising death by radiation or will it be a
world where mountains are moved by atomic bombs to change the course of
rivers and make rich green land out of deserts? Where is our imagination?
By 1948 I could not stand it any longer. My friends all seemed to be going
back into secret work. Were they crazy? Were we who studied physics tq
3540 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
spend all our lives thinkins: up means of mass extermination? Even my fellow-
ship money came from the Navy. We were doing nonsecret work at the time.
We needed some deuterium for our accelerator. In the room where I studied
there was only a little space in the corner for a desk, the rest of the room was
piled with cases of heavy water right up to the ceiling for the argon. We asked
for some. Nowhere in America could we get any. Finally we sent to Norway
and two little bottles were sent back to us with a picture of a Viking ship and
a little note saying, "I thought you had civilian control."
In Washington, a friend of mine had asked me to go to China. I had refused. .
I was determined to become a physicist. But the idea kept gnawing at me. It
would not let me go, until finally I felt like I was being caught in a horrible trap.
No matter where you turned, you were faced by war, secret work, the Navy, the
Army, and madmen locked in their laboratories thinking up new and better
methods of total destruction. Suddenly, I made up my mind and left. But it
was not easy. The love of science and physics was pretty strong. Of all my
notebooks and books I only had room for two in my trunk. I sat for a long time
looking at those books, then took Joos and the handbook of physics and chemistry
and set out for China alone with a terrible emptiness in my heart. I had broken
away from everything I ever had desired or known. I broke away because I had
to. I had to find out what was going on in the world outside of physics. What
was happening to the peoples of the world— so I came to China, to see America
from the outside and to understand the tremendous upheaval going on inside
Asia.
WHAT I LEARNED IN CHINA
And what have I learned in the three years since I have been in China? Per-
haps the main thing is that the people of the East do not want war. That the
peoples of the East are not interested in America. They are occupied with build-
ing up their own countries, pulling them out of their centuries of feudalism,
changing them as fast as possible into modern, industrialised lands with abun-
dance for all— lands where beggars cease to exist, and slums and "Maxwell
Streets" are things of the past that the children read about in history books.
Everything is for peaceful production, for building, for life, for the i)eople—
and i learned something else — that these people can get along perfectly all right
without America. I used to think that American aid would mean a lot to China.
A country so backward — how could she develop without American help? But
where there is a will there is a way and the Chinese people have a will so strong
that nothing America can do will ever stop it. They will think of plenty of ways
and they will develop fast. The only obstacle to their development would be a
war. They are not afraid of America. If she must fight, China will show that
she is made of steel— but China will never start a war, war is against her every
interest.
I know that you may ask, "How do you know? They are just filling you with
propaganda, you fool !" So I will not talk any more in generalities. I will only
tell a few things from my experience. The first is the conditions I found in
Kuomintang, China. I spent a year in Kuomintang territory, and all that time
it never ceased to amaze me why we (America) should be giving millions of
dollars of aid to such a stupid, corrupt, conceited, useless government as the
government of the Kuomintang. .lust one example will suffice (though anybody
who lived in Shanghai for just a few months at that time could cite countless
examples). That is, the business of the "gold yuan."
For the fun of it, I kept a logarithmic plot of the inflation and it was a fairly
straight line. I have forgotten just now what the period was, but the line was
pretty steep. It was steep enough so that towards the end, prices would double
or even triple in a day. I remember especially how carefully I had to plan to
buy a jackknife. I went to a certain place (of which kind Shanghai was teem-
ing) early in the morning with a briefcase to cash one American dollar. The
briefcase having been duly loaded full of Chinese notes, I tore as fast as I could
to the store and emptied them out on the counter before the price could rise. A
briefcase full of notes for a jackknife? The poor storekeepers were in a ter-
rible fix. They had to either not count the money and get stuck short or hire
several extra hands just for counting money and lose that much in wages any-
way. And the banks were in an impossible state. The cost of shipping and
counting money was far beyond the value of the money. In fact, it was not even
worth the paper it was printed on. The clerks in the banks were peering out
from behind heaps of bills piled up to the ceiling. "Money, money everywhere,
but not a crumb to eat." And so, of course, in order to stay alive one had to put
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3541
one's wealth into something besides paper money : in silver dollars, American
dollars or goods, and the barter system flourished.
Then the government announced its "currency reform." Under penalty of
death all gold, silver, American dollars, and hoarded goods were to be turned
in to the banks and exchanged for the new stable "gold yuan." Every day the
paper had pictures of people being shot for disobeying their order. Houses were
searched. Anybody found guilty was dragged off to prison. Thousands upon
thousands of ordinary folk turned in the little bit of savings they had in return
for paper "gold yuan."
For a week or two, as I remember, prices remained stable. Then whisperings
began in the black market — and soon they broke — the "gold yuan" fell off its
pedestal. To where? Right smack on the extrapolation of the exponential infla-
tion curve which I had been plotting all year. What did this mean? Only that
the government had previously printed this tremendous excess of notes, had held
them out of circulation for a week or two until as much gold and silver, etc., as
could be collected from the people was taken in, and then let go, leaving the
whole population wuth nothing but worthless scraps of paper. Thousands upon
thousands of people left without a cent of savings — the biggest, most cold-blooded
mass robbery in history or ever dreamed of. And the gold and silver was pocketed
by the "Big Four" — the ruling families of China and shipped to America and other
safe places as fast as possible before liberation. At the time I was too stupid to
realize what was happening. I naively assujned that this time maybe the govern-
ment was finally really planning to do something about the inflation. It was only
after that point fell so perfectly on my curve that the truth began to dawn. But
even then, it took me a long time to really realise the treachery, the calculated
cold-blooded intent of these criminals who called themselves a government. And
it was these crooks to whom America was sending millions of dollars worth
■)t "aid" — guns, bombs, tanks, trucks, and a trickle of powdered milk.
Enough for the Kuomintang. Perhaps the next thing I might mention is
the liberation of Peking. American papers always implied that the Chinese
Communists were supplied by Russia. So I rather expected to see Russian
weapons as the People's Liberation Army marched past. But in the whole
parade which I watched for three or four hours, I never saw a single Russian
weapon. A few old Japanese guns, but mostly new American trucks, cannon,
tanks, guns, and trucks with "United States Army" written on the side in white
letters as plain as day. The soldiers laughed when you asked them about it
and said, "Uncle Sam sends them to Chiang and Chiang sends them to us."
Then again, people told me that foreigners would never be allowed to travel
alone in the liberated areas. That the Communists would keep a pretty close
eye on the travellers and be sure only to let you see what they wanted you to.
In the back of my mind, I thought perhaps this might be true, too. I was
all prepared to have an escort wherever I might choose to go and in the begin-
ning I was given one. I wanted to go and visit a friend of mine who was
staying at a place about 100 miles away, so I was supplied with a guide and
went. But on coming back, my friend explained that I was used to travelling
and could find the way back by myself and without further ado. I was left
to go back alone. So again, the American press was wrong. Nobody was watch-
ing me, they were only helping me. I was free to look at whatever I liked.
That was the first time and it has been that way ever since. When I go to a new
place, someone is always ready to help me out to find the way. Once I have
become familiar with the place I am left completely fx-ee.
My first job was working in an iron factory packed away in the mountains
of Shensi. What were they making there? They were melting up American-
made hand grenades, shells, wings from crashed planes sent from America to
Chiang, steel and aluminum of weapons sent by America to kill them and
making them into cooking pots, ploughs, and hoes. They were transferring
these things of destruction into useful tools to build up a new and prosperous
China, making wagon wheels and pumps and gates for irrigation canals. Ameri-
cans would prol)ably not even realise it was a factory and tliey would laugh
at it when told so — not even a lathe, nothing but the hands of the i^eople.
Everything was made by hand. liut Americans might do a little thinking,
too. The Chinese with their bare hands are building up a new nation, while
the Americans with their tremendous industrial strength are preparing to de-
stroy mankind. The Chinese are not afraid ; they are just sorry. If America
were not preparing for war — if she were not threatening China at every point —
China could put even more effort into construction, into building better homes
for her people, into eliminating floods, into stabilising crops, into bringing in
3542 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
machinery and transforming their land from one of despair and poverty into
one of prosperity, enlightenment, a nation of scientists working for the en-
richment of mankind. But America seems bent on war. So Cluna will con-
tinue her construction despite America. She will keep on putting all she has
into the betterment of the living conditions of her people. But at the same
time she will never stop watching America. She will not tolerate any high-
handed action against her sovereignty. She is not afraid and her people
know how to fight and know what they are fighting for. Anyone who came to
work at that factory could not help but learn this. The irresistible strength of
New China seemed to permeate everything, even the silent walls of the caves
at night, waving black shadows and crimson reflections from the furnaces
^Vince then all of China has been liberated and she now has more regular fac-
tories dav bv day. Skilled mechanics and engineers are being trained, ihougn
some places' still work by hand, others are forging ahead still faster with ma-
chines while others are using machines to make machines. It will not take
At present I am working on an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia. Of
what I have learned here I will only say the following: that I was amazed to
hear Acbeson— a responsible representative of the U. S. government— say that
the Soviet Union was "annexing whole territories" of Northeast China and
Inner Mongolia to herself. I have lived here two years. So far I have only
seen one thing Russian, that is, ten Soviet stallions given to our farm for breed-
ing purposes, along with apparatus for artificial insemination. What are we
doing with these stallions? We are breeding the farmers' horses and tiie Mon-
golian ponies, improving the horses of Mongolia. The farmers come for miles
around to get their horses bred. The stallions were given to China under the
A"-reement signed last year— an Agreement of friendship and mutual assistance
between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese are free to use them where
and as they see fit The Soviet Union does not interfere. To the peasants here,
the Soviet Union is symbolized by these stallions, sleek-haired, refined, bigger
than anything they have ever seen before and with no stud fees. The silent
eyes of these ten stallions tell more to the Mongolian horsemen than any amount
of insinuating speeches that Acheson ever could. If this is what is meant by
being annexed by the Soviet Union then they would just as soon ! They are not
afraid of words, they only believe in what they see. And what do they see as
far as America is concerned? Again, it is not empty words of friendship which
impress them It is bombing planes, guns, and tanks given to the Kuomintang.
In our farm's cornfield are two old craters from American-made bombs. No
amount of speeches from American diplomats can erase these holes and the
people do not easily forget.
CHINA WANTS PEACE
The people of China want peace. The people of the world want peace, includ-
ing the people of America. Though I supposed I have been away too long to
still be considered a member of the American scientists, yet I personally still
feel as though I am one of you. I have written you to let you know( at least
the story of one of your members. One person refusing to work on secret
projects refusing to work on war, of course, does no good. But all of you at
home united together have a very special strength in your hands. I only want
to say to you: Use your strength, use whatever you can to work actively for
peace and against war. As long as there is war, science will never be free. Are
we scientists going to spend our lives in slavery for madmen who want to destroy
the world? At home one gets frightened. Listening to so much war talk one
begins to believe that if we do not prepare for war the other side will and then
we will be destroyed. But now I have been living on the other side for some
time and know for sure that this is a lot of lies, that China wants peace and is
working for peace with all she has. She will never attack America, nor will
any of her allies. If you people would only believe this, if you could only see
for yourselves as I am seeing, then, I am sure you would not hesitate for a
minute to work for peace with every ounce of strength you have.
So long for now and remember me to whomever is there that I might know.
Sincerely, „ , ^, .
(Signed) Joan Hinton, People s China.
June 4, 1951.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, it may be that we want to identify by
Mr. Mandel the nature of the publication, People's China.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3543
Mr. Lattimore, are you acquainted with that publication, People's
China ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I am not acquainted with it. One of two
copies have been sent to my office from China, presumably in the hope
of getting a subscription, but I couldn't say I am acquainted with it.
Mr. Morris. The next name on the list, Mr. Lattimore, is Alser
Hiss. ' *=
Mr. Lattimore. In the terms of the question, I did not consider
him to be Communist at the time I knew him.
Mr. Morris. That is in connection with Alger Hiss?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Philip Jaffe.
Mr. Lattimore. The same answer.
Mr. Morris. You did not believe him to be a
Mr. Lattimore. To be a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Anthony Jenkinson.
Mr. Lattimore. Same answer.
Mr. Morris. How extensive was your experience with Anthony
Jenkinson ?
Mr. Lattimore. My acquaintance with him was very slight. I
met him at the Yosemite conference of 1936, of the IPR, and I believe
I didn't meet him again until after the war, or toward the end of the
war, when he started a publication called Allied Labor News, in New
York.
Mr. Morris. It is your testimony you did not know or had reason to
believe that the Allied Labor News was a Communist publication?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I had no reason to believe that.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, at the time you are testifying,
as I understand it, your answers relate only to the time you knew
them
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Back when they were writing or had some con-
nection with you in relation to the Institute?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, there have been a couple of names since then.
I don't think I have seen Mr. Jaffe since, oh ten years or so, and all
the knowledge I have of him since then is from the press.
Senator Ferguson. We asked you if you knew or had reason to be-
lieve, and your answer would infer now that up to this time you did
not know, nor did you have reason to believe that Hiss was a Com-
munist, or that Jaffe was a Communist. Do you want that answer
to stand?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I don't believe that I know of any evidence
that Mr. Hiss is a Communist.
Senator Ferguson. Was a Communist ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. Or was a Communist.
Oh, wait a minute. There was a story in the papers the other day ;
that is right.
Senator Ferguson. It was under oath, was it not?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe it was, yes.
Mr. Morris. Are you referring to the testimony of Nathaniel Weyl ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to change your testimony as to
Mr. Hiss now ?
3544 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr Lattimore. No. I can't speak to that, Senator Ferguson. I
don't know the witness or his reliability or its connection with other
evidence. I don't consider myself competent to give an answer.
Senator Ferguson. How much evidence does it take to convince
you that a person is a Communist? I wonder how much evidence it
takes to have you answer that you do know. .
Mr. Lattimore. Perhaps, Senator, this committee could give me a
definition of how much evidence I ought to take.
Senator Ferguson. I want to know what your answers mean. 1
am trying to judge this case from answers and the record.
Do I understand, then, that from all you read about Mr. Hiss, all
that was in the paper or anything else, all that you heard about it,
that, under the definition that we gave you, you would say you had
no knowledge or reason to believe that Mr. Hiss was a Communist,
or ever was a Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, if I may elaborate on my answer, all i
know about Mr. Hiss is that
The Chairman. That is not answering the question. You are ]ust
avoiding the question.
Mr. LAT-riMORE. I am simply saying. Senator, that 1 haven t fol-
lowed the news about Hiss very carefully in the press. I don't con-
sider myself an authority on the subject.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I remind the witness again of
precisely what the question is? He has been reminded of it time and
again, and the Senator, in his question, embraced the reminder.
Senator Ferguson. The same thing is true m relation to Mr. Jaffe,
is it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall that I ever seen it testified that Mr.
Jaffe was a Communist.
Senator Ferguson. You never heard that he was ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall any testimony to that effect, no. It
may have been in the transcripts of this committee, but I have read
such an enormous amount of them that I
Senator Ferguson. I am just wondering if, after reading this
record, if you did not have some notion at least that Hiss and Jaffe
were Communists. What is your answer to that?
Mr. Lattimore. I would say that sworn testimony to the effect
that Hiss was a Communist would come within the definition, "Rea-
son to believe"; but I don't remember any sworn testimony in the
case of Mr, Jaffe.
Senator Ferguson. So you would say now that yon do have rea-
sons to believe that Hiss was a Communist, do you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I would say to that extent, yes.
Senator Ferguson. You qualified that answer by saying "to that
extent," that somebody swore that he was; is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. But you do not believe so.
Mr. Lattimore. I have no personal knowledge about it.
Senator Ferguson. But you have no reason to believe ?
Mr. Lattimore. I consider that sworn testimony is some reason to
believe. Butit is not the same thing as conviction, is it?
Senator Ferguson. I am asking you. To you it is not, is it ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. To my mind, conviction is conviction, and
accusation is accusation.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3545
Senator Smith. It might come in the middle ground of conchision
from testimony.
The Chairman. All right, gentlemen, let us proceed.
]Mr. INIORRis. The next name is Mary Jane Keeney.
Mr. Lattimore. May I take the two names together ?
Mr. Morris. Mary Jane and Philip Keeney?
Mr. Lattimore. Mary Jane and Philip Keene}'.
Mr. Morris. You may, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. My knowledge of them is extremely slight and I
had no reason to believe that they were Communists.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet Philip Keeney in Japan ?
Mr. Lattimore. I met him, yes, when some grou]) that he was com-
ing out with had just arrived. I met him when I was going into a
building and lie was coming out. We stopped and shook hands.
Mr. Morris. Had you known him before ?
Mr. Lattimore. I had met him slightly here in Washington, yes.
Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you meet with him in
Japan, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that was the only occasion.
Mr. Morris. Robin Kinkead.
Mr. Lattimore. No reason to believe that he was a Communist.
Mr. Morris. You did know him, and had dealings with him, did
you not?
Mr. Lattimore. He was on the staff of OWI in San Francisco when
I was there.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Benjamin Kizer.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. You do know Mr. Kizer, do you ?
Mr. Lattimore. I know ]\Ir. Kizer.
Mr. Morris. He is a member of the board of trustees in the Insti-
tute of Pacij&c Relations, is he not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Whether he still is, I don't know. He may very
well be.
Mr. Morris. On how many occasions have you seen Mr. Kizer ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have seen Mr. Kizer off and on over a period of
years.
The Chairman. Was he a member of the board ?
Mr. Lattimore. He was a member of the board at one time, I be-
lieve.
Mr. Morris, The next name is Sergei Kournakoff.
Mr. Lattimore. I can't place that name.
Mr. ]MoRRis. The next name is Corliss Lamont.
Mr. Lattimore. I have met Mr. Lamont, I believe, once, and have
had no reason to believe him a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Olga Lang.
Mr. Lattimore, The same answer, no.
Mr. JNIoRRis. On how many occasions have you met Olga Lang?
Mr. Lattimore. I met her in China when she was married to Karl
August Wittfogel. I don't recall whether I have ever met her since
in America, or not.
Mr. Morris. Did she write articles for Pacific Affairs ?
Mr. Latitmore. I think she wrote an article for Pacific Affairs,
Mr. Morris, The next name is Michael Lindsay.
88348— 52— pt. 10 18
3546 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. I know Mr. Lindsay very slightly. I think I met
him once in this country, and have no reason to believe him a Com-
munist.
Mr. Morris. The next name is T. B. Lowe.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't ])lace that name.
Mr. INIoRRis. Do you know of anyone who used the pseudonym T.
B. Lowe?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't recall that.
Mr. Morris. Did you and Mr. Bisson ever team up and write an
article under that pseudonym?
Mr. LATriMORE. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Morris. Are you sure of it, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall writing an article jointly with Mr.
Bisson at all.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you do not know the name T. B.
Lowe ?
Mr. Latfimore. T. B. Lowe ? Is that meant to be T. B. Lowe ?
Mr. Morris. No. H. Lowe is the name I am asking now.
Mr. Lattimore. T. B. Lowe is a new name to me.
Mr. Morris. That means nothing to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. IMoRRis. How about the name H. Lowe ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't place that, either.
Mr. Morris. Next is Duncan C. Lee.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name at all.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you have never met Duncan C.
Lee?
Mr. Latttmore. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, I
have never met him.
Mr. Morris. The next name is ISIr. William Mandel.
Mr. LATriMORE. I think this is the William Mandel who worked
for a time for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I forgot whether
he was an employee or whether he did a research job. He did some
work on Soviet Russia, of some kind.
Mr. Morris. And you have done some work on his books, have you
not, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that when I w^as a member of the research
committee, the manuscript, or part of the manuscript of one of his
books was sent to me for looking over.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether he worked for the Hoover
Library ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't.
Mr. Morris. Did you not introduce Mr. Mandel to Mr. Stefans-
son?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Morris. Selden Menefee is the next name.
Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Menefee very slightly a good many
years ago here in Washington. I haven't seen him for some years, and
have no reason to believe him a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Robert T. Miller.
Mr. Lattimore. I can't place that name, except I believe recalling
that it came up in the transcript of hearings of Mr. E. C. Carter.
But I still don't place the name. I am sure I have never met him.
Mr. Morris. The next name is P. T. Moon.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3547
Mr. Laitimore. I can't place that name.
Mr. IMoRRis. Harriet L. Moore.
Mr. Lattimore. Harriet L. Moore, I have no reason to consider
a Communist at the time I knew her. Her recent refusal to answer
the question whether she had ever been a Communist raises a strong
presumption that she is or was at some time a Communist.
Mr. Morris. And you have known her for many years, have you
not, JNIr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo. I knew her slightly in the lOSO's and saw
her again very occasionally afterwards.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, the record of these meetings in Mos-
cow, that we have introduced into the record at great length, shows
that she and you attended all those meetings together.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right, yes.
Mr. Morris. She has also been a leader of the Institute of Pacific
Relations. In fact, she acted as secretary, did she not, Mr. Latti-
more, at the time that you were associated with the institute?
Mr. Latttmore. I don't remember. If it was, it was probably at
the time when I was out of the country, because I don't recall her act-
ing ill that capacity.
Mr. Morris. You did have many long and extensive dealings with
Miss Moore, did you not, Mv. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I would not say. Not long or extensive.
Mr. Morris. The next name is E. Herbert Norman.
]Mr. Latti3iore. The answer is no.
Mr. Morris. When did you last see Mr, Norman ?
Mr. Lattimore. In 1947, at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific
Relations in Stratford, England.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet Mr. Norman in Japan ?
Mr. Lattimore. I met him in Japan in the winter of 1945-1946.
Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you meet him in Japan ?
Mr. Lattimore. Fairly frequently. I don't recall.
Senator Ferguson. Just before you pass that: Did you ever have
any negotiations or know of any negotiations between yourself, Nor-
man, General Thorpe, Emerson, and Fairbank, or any of them?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I recall the suggestion being made that I
should take a job as a civilian employee under General Thorpe, but
nothing in the way of negotiations, and certainly nothing in the way
of negotiations with — what was the name — Emerson.
Senator Ferguson. Emerson, Fairbank.
Mv. Lattimore. Emerson, Fairbank, Norman, and Thorpe.
Senator Ferguson. And you.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of the move to try to bring
Japanese Communists back into Japan ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson, You never knew of any ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations about it?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe I did. I believe that, in fact, I
know that at the time I was in Japan, some, at least, of the Japanese
Communists who had been in China during the war, they either re-
turned to Japan when I was there or had already returned at the time
I got there. I don't know which.
3548 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. But those that returned while you were there,
did you know of any moves at all among any of those people that I
have named to get the Japanese or Japanese Communists back into
Japan ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. In the way of moves to get them back, I don't
know a thing about it.
Senator Ferguson. Let us say other than moves, just to get them
back.
Mr. Lattimore. No. All I know is the bare fact that several of
the Japanese came back. What the arrangements were I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know of any negotiations or efforts to
get tliem back?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did vou ever talk to General Thorpe about any
of that?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't talk with General Thorpe on that
subject at all, as I recall.
Senator Ferguson. Nor with Norman?
Mr. Lattimore. Nor with Norman,
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear any conversation between
Thorpe and Norman?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Oleta O'Connor.
Mr. Latttmore. I don't place that name at all.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a postal card announcing a
meeting. It is dated March 5, 1938. The post card reads as follows :
The Interprofessional Association presents a symposium, "Is Chamberlain
yielding to fascism?"
Speakers : Miss Lillian Phillips, lecturer on foreign affairs ; Miss Oleta O'Con-
nor, chairman, county committee, Communist Party ; Mr. Owen Lattimore, Di-
rector, Institute of Pacific Relations, noted author, and editor of Pacific Affairs.
Chairman : John D. Barry.
Questions and discussion from the floor.
The meeting is dated Thursday March 10, at Sorosis Hall, 536
Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif. Admission 35 cents.
Mr. Sourwine. What year is it, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. 1938.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall speaking at such a meet-
ing?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I can't recall any such meeting. I don't be-
lieve there was one.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, would you, under the circumstances,
receive that into evidence ?
The Chairman. It may be received into evidence for what it is
worth.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 554" and
appears on p. 3549.)
Mr. Morris. The next name is Hotzumi Ozaki.
Mr. Lattimore. I remember reading that name in connection with
press stories about the Sorge case in Japan, I believe, and I believe
that I also saw in the transcript of these hearings that Ozaki was at,
I think, the Yosemite Conference of the IPR in 1936, but I don't
believe I met him.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 554
3549
Mr. Morris. Were you ut tliat conierence^
Mr. Lattimore. I was at that conference, but I don't recall meeting
him.
Mr. Morris. The next name is P'eng Kung.
Mr. Lattimore. Is that the same P'eng Kung, or Kung P'eng, that
was mentioned several days ago ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lat'timore. I believe that that is the name of a secretary of
Chou En-lai, whom I met in Chungking when I had one or two con-
versations with Chou En-lai under the instructions of Chiang Kai-
shek.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that whenever you met Kung
P'eng, it was under the direction of the generalissimo ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was within the generalissimo's directive to keep
in touch with Chou En-lai on certain points.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Mr. Fred W. Poland.
3550 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose, I think that
the witness' statement gives rise to a fair inference with regard to the
Communist connection of Kung P'eng, or P'eng Kung, but there was
not a direct answer on that.
Might we liave that for the record ?
Mr. Lattimore. I see. Yes.
I assume that she was a Communist. I can't answer to that of
personal knowledge, because I believe the Communists at that tnne
were using a number of people simply because they could speak
English and not necessarily members of the party.
There may be other evidence on the subject.
INIr. Morris. Do you know where Kung P'eng is now ?
IVIr. Lattimore. No ; I don't.
I^Ir. Morris. The next name is Fred W. Poland.
I^Ir. Lattimore. Yes; I remember meeting Mr. Poland once at the
Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR in 1942— would that be 1943—
1942, I guess. .
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that is the only occasion on which
vou met Mr. Poland?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever met him before or since.
Mr. Morris. He was an active member of the secretariat of the IPK,
was he not, of the international IPR ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe he was. My recollection is that
he was somebody who was brought along for the Canadian secretariat
of that meeting.' I may be wrong on that.
Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe, or do you know that
lie is a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe.
Mr. Morris. Do you know that he was one of the defendants m the
Canadian espionage case ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was just going to add I remember seeing some-
thing about that in the press. But I believe he was acquitted;
wasn't he?
Mr. Morris. The next name is Lee Pressman.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Pressman, I have met maybe a couple of times
here in Washington. At that time I had no reason to believe him a
Communist, but I believe that since then— has he refused to testify,
or did he testify that he was one ?
Mr. Morris. "I believe'he has acknowledged, Mr. Lattimore, that he
was a member of the Communist Party.
Mr. Lattimore. I see.
Mr. Morris. What was the occasion for your meeting Mr. Press-
man in Washington, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, a couple of times socially. I don't recall the
circumstances. I had no particular conversation with him. I just
remember him as a person who was there.
J^Ir. Morris. The next name is Mildred Price.
Mr. Latfimore. I don't believe I have ever met :Mildred Price. Her
name has come up in these transcripts, but I don't believe I have ever
met her. . j. i /-n •
Mr. Morris. You know she was the executive secretary of the China
Aid Council, do you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. From the transcripts of these hearings, yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3551
Mr. Morris. You belonged to the China Aid Council, did you not,
Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I did. Did I ? I would be glad to
have my memory refreshed, but I doubt if I did.
Mr. Morris. You made financial contributions to it, did you not?
Mr. Lattimore. That is quite likely, yes.
I made financial contributions to the pet schemes of Madame Chiang
Kai-shek and her sisters, Madame Kung and Madame Sun Yat-sen.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you gave the contributions to
the China Aid Council and yet you did not know Mildred Price,
who was the executive secretary of that organization.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. You knew and you know the China Aid Council w^as
an affiliate of the American League Against War and Fascism ; is that
not correct?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't know that.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Ludwig Rajchman.
Mr. Lattimore. I met Mr. Rajchman, or Dr. Rajchman, a number
of times here in Washington wdien he was working with Dr. T. V.
Soong, who was at that time the head of China Defense Supplies,
1 think, and I have met him once since the end of the war, at the United
Nations.
Mr. Morris. He is a member of the Soviet Polish delegation, is he
not, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I have seen something to that effect in the press.
I don't know when he became one.
At the time I saw him in the United Nations, it was my under-
standing that he was a member of the United Nations employee staff
and not a delegate of Poland.
Mr. Morris. But he was sent there by Soviet Poland, was he not ?
Mr. Lattimore. 1 am not clear on that. There are several subdivi-
sions of the bureaucracy of the United Nations, and I don't know
which one he belonged to.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Samuel Rodman.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever rent an office from Samuel Rodman ?
Mr. Lattimore. Did I ever rent an office from him ?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
The Chairman. "Wliere?
Mr. Morris. Were you acquainted in Washington ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe so.
Mr. Morris. Were you acquainted with an organization called the
Committee of One Thousand ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have heard that name certainly, but I can't place
it today.
Mr. JSIoRRis. Is it your testimony you did not know that the Com-
mittee for One Thusand used the office of the Institute of Pacific
Relations as its headquarters ?
Mr. Lattimore. That certainly is my testimony ; yes.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Lawrence K. Rosinger.
Mr. Lattimore. I knew" Mr. Rosinger slightly over a period of years
when he worked for Foreign Policy Association, and afterward In-
stitute of Pacific Relations. I had no reason to believe him a Com-
3552 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
munist until lie refused to testify before this committee, which creates
a strong presumption.
Mr. SouRwiNE. When did you last see Mr. Kosinger, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. In New York, in the office of the Institute of Pa-
cific Kelations, oh, probably more than a year ago.
Senator Ferguson. After these hearings, had started, after the rec-
ords were obtained ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it was after the hearings had started.
It may have been after the seizure of the files.
Senator Ferguson. Do you mean after the seizure of the files ?
Mr. Lattimore. It may have been. I am not quite sure of that.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you recall anything about your conference or
discussion or talk with him at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I think the sole topic was the question of a
piece, a contribution on Mongolia and Tibet, which my wife and I were
writing for a book that he partly wrote and partly edited.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Andrew Koth.
Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Roth very slightly in Washington
about 1945 and had no reason to consider him a Communist.
Mr. Morris. You reviewed the manuscript of his book, did you not,
Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I reviewed the manuscript of his book and wrote a
recommendation for the publishers.
Senator Ferguson. A few days before the arrest of Mr. Roth and
Mr. Jaife, was Mr. Roth at your residence in Baltimore?
Mr. Lattimore. He came over to Baltimore ; yes.
The Chairman. The question was: Was he at your residence in
Baltimore?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he was.
Senator Ferguson. ^Y}\o was present at that meeting ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. John Stewart Service.
Senator Ferguson. Anybody else ? Roth, Service
Mr. Morris. Was Rose'Yardumian there?
Mr. Lattimore. I think she was, but I have never been surei
whether she was or not.
Senator Ferguson. Anybody else?
Mr. Lattimore. A couple of professors from Johns Hopkins, and
tlieir wives.
Senator Ferguson. Wlio were they?
' Mr. Lattimore. Professor Carter, of the School of Geography, and
Professor Moose, of the Department of Political Science.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat was that occasion to liave the professors
there and have Service and Roth there, and possibly another?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, they were a couple of professors whom we
at that time— I thinly they were both pretty new at the Hopkins and
we knew them verv slightly and thought they might be interested in
meeting some people interested in the Far East, and asked them out.
Senator Ferguson. You knew, then, that Mr. Roth and Mr. Service
were coming to your home, did you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. How long before they came did you know ?
Mr. Lattimore. Two or three days, probably.
Senator Ferguson. What was the occasion of having Mr. Roth and
Mr. Service, and possibly the other person, there?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3553
Mr. Lattimore. Well, Mr. Service I hadn't seen since lie had been
in Chungking, and I wanted to see him.
Mr. Eoth, I think, had been asking if he could come over and show
me his manuscript. So we just thought to put the two things to-
gether and asked them to come over, I think it was one Saturday or
Sunday afternon. And I tliink the day before, on the campus, I ran
into these two professors and suggested that they might be interested
to come out for a picnic lunch.
Senator Ferguson". Did Mr. Eoth bring his manuscript with him ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; he brouglit it with him.
Senator Ferguson. Was it in a proof form ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether it was — I am sure it wasn't in
typed script. It might have been in either galley or page proof.
Senator Ferguson. Galley or page proof.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
I am not at all clear on that. It might even have been in typed
script.
My wife says she thinlvs it was in proof.
Senator Ferguson, In proof ?
Mr. Lattimore. In proof; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Wliere were you examining the proof ?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, I tliink it was in the living room. I am not
sure.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see it on the bed, laid out on the
bed in the bedroom ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not that I can recall. It may have been there
becatise when guests came in they were shown into the spare bedroom
and put their coats and things there.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it would be laid out on the bed
under those circumstances,
Mr. Lattimore. It might very easil}^ had if he had been carrying it
loose.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there were any
papers from the State Department laying out on your bed, or a bed in
3' our home (
Mr, Lattimore. I am sure there weren't.
Senator Ferguson. You are sure of it ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. At least, if there were, I didn't see them.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that one of these college profes-
sors had stated that there were papers on the bed ?
jVIr. Lattimore. I believe there was something of that kind in the
Tydings testimony. I am sure it was wrong.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to the professor about it ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't.
Senator Ferguson. You did not think it was important enough to
ask the professor if he did happen to see those papers there?
Mr. Lattimore. I asked the other professor, and he recalled seeing
nothing of the sort. I didn't ask the professor who gave that testimony,
because I have a sort of dislike for talking with informers.
Senator Smith. Did j'ou regard him as an informer?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I don't believe he gave any testimony at all.
I believe he gave information to Senator McCarthy.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, then, if I understand it correctly,
if someone went to a person who had knowledge of the facts, either
3554 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
some member of a committee or a staff member, if that person gave the
truth as he saw it, would you class him as an informer?
Mr. Lattimore. I would certainly say that a colleague of mine, on
a university faculty, if he thought he recalled anything of the sort,
should have come and checked it with me, frankly.
Senator Ferguson. Suppose he saw it and you did not see it. Sup-
pose he saw it and you did not see it. Suppose that Service and/or
Roth did have these papers in your bedroom
Mr. Lattimore. I still think that, as a matter of frank relationships
between members of the same faculty, he should have come and told
me about it.
Senator Ferguson. And for that reason, you would not interview
him or ascertain whether or not he did know of those facts ?
Mr. Lattimore. Certainly not ; no.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you feel ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the way I reacted to it.
Senator Ferguson. And have you never talked to him since?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever spoken to him since?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is he still on the faculty?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes,
]\Ir. Morris. Who was the other professor involved there, Mr. Lat-
timore ?
Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get the name of this man.
What w\as the name of the professor who was the "informer"?
Mr. Lattimore. Professor Carter.
Senator Ferguson. What branch of the school was he in?
Mr. Lattimore. School of geography.
Senator Fj:rguson. Was he interested in the Far East?
Mr. Lattimore. Not specially, I don't believe.
Senator Ferguson. Then why did you invite him there?
Mr. Latti:more. Well, the school of geography was the pet project
of President Isaiah Bowman of the school, who regarded geography
and international relations as very closely related.
I thought any intelligent member of the faculty would, as of that
time, be interested in meeting somebody recently back from the Far
East and somebody who was writing on problems of the Far East.
If I had met a couple of other members of the faculty, I might
just as well have invited them.
Senator Ferguson. Did you review the book or these manuscripts
in the presence of Professor Carter and the other professors?
Mr. Latttmore. My recollection of that is not very clear, I think
that I sat on a window seat by a large sort of picture window looking
out on the lawn where everybody was gathered and rapidly went
through the manuscript or proof.
Senator Ferguson. How long did you spend on the proof?
Mr. Lattimore. Maybe half an hour or so.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the professor, or both pro-
fessors, were sufficiently intelligent so that they would recognize what
a proof was ?
Mr. Lattimore. It would depend on how closely they had looked.
Senator Ferguson. AVhat kind of paper was the proof on?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3555
Senator Fergusox. And you reviewed the book in about a half hour,
then '^
Mr. Lattimore. I went through the book very rapidly.
Senator Ferguson. How many pages would you say it had?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, I think when it was published it was about a
250-page book.
Senator Ferguson. How long would these galley proofs be, in
length?
Mr. Lattimore, I don't remember whether the}- were galley, or page
proof. Galley proof usiuilly runs, I think, about two and a half
book pages per galley.
Senator Ferguson. It would be easily recognized, would it not?
Mr. Lattimore. I should think so.
Senator Ferguson. Can you recall, sitting at the window, whether
or not it was galley proof or page proof ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't recall. I have read so many proofs in
my life, it is hard to remember which one I read on a specific occasion.
Senator Ferguson. Do you really feel a man would be mistaken
about seeing pages on a bed if he attended a meeting, even though
they were galley proof, or page proof ?
Mr. Lattimore. He might be.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in the room where the gentlemen
put their coats?
^Ir. Lattimore. I may have shown them up to the room.
Senator Ferguson. Who, would you say, came first ?
The Chairman. Of the two, or of the group?
Senator Ferguson. Of the group.
Mr. Lattimore, I have no idea.
Senator Ferguson. You have not any idea ?
Mr. Lattimore. No idea.
Senator Ferguson. How long afterward was Roth arrested and
Service arrested ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was a very short time afterward. I forget ex-
actly what. I believe
Wait a minute. On that question of the stuff being on the bed, I
seem to remember that tlie information, as repeated by Senator Mc-
Carthy, was that Professor Carter's wife went into the room to change
a baby's diaper and told him that she had seen something on the bed,
or something.
This being a room which is used partly as an office, there might have
been papers of nw own l3'ing around there.
Senator Ferguson. Tlien you would not say that the professor or
his wife did not see papers on the bed ?
Mr. Lattimore. They may have. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Even though his wife saw it and told her hus-
band, then you thought he was an informer and you never went to
ask him about them ?
Mr. Lattimore. I certainly did think he was an informer; yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you read the testimony before this
committee that Roth's book Dilemma in Japan — and, of course, the
galley proofs were of that book, were they not — that that was passed
by the Communist Party of the United States before it was published?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember reading that testimony. Can
you tell me whose testimony that was ?
3556 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris, Have you read the article that appeared in the Daily
Worker of June 26, 1945, which reads :
Roth's forthcoming book, Dilemma in Japan, dissects the State Department's
past mistakes and current fallacies, and, in the author's words, it exposes Under
Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito.
Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co., announced the bonk would come
out in September.
Did you read that testimony, Mr. Lattiniore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I saw a photostat or a mimeograph of part
of that excerpt from the Daily Worker. May I point out, how-
ever
The Chairman. The question is: Did you read that testimony?
Mr. La'itimore. I don't recall whether I read that testimony. I do
recall, however, that at the time I was talking with Mr. Koth about
his book, he told me that it had all been cleared in the Office of Xaval
Intelligence.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, who was the other professor at that
meeting that we have been discussing?
Mr. Lattimore. Professor Moos.
Mr. Morris. Is he related to Elizabeth Moos?
Mr. Lattimore. What Elizabeth Moos?
Mr. Morris. The mother of AVilliam Remington. I think she was
a recent defendant in the American Peace Crusade.
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe he is any relative whatever.
Mr. Morris. He is not ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know Mr. Remington?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Paul Robeson, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. I have met JVIr. Paul Robeson once. Let me see, it
was in 1942' — when he was out in San Francisco, and he sang, he re-
corded some songs to be broadcast over the radio. I believe he was
also asked to do the same thing for radio to Europe from the New
York office.
Mr. Morris. Did you attend a meeting at whicli Mr. Paul Robeson
was present, in the home of Mrs. Edith Field ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not a meeting. I went to dinner at Mrs. Field's
mother's house, and Mrs. Field and Robeson were there and, I think,
also Max Yergan, whose name comes down here later.
Mr. Morris. Were they all present at that dinner party?
Mr. Lattimore. At that dinner party; yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you answer the question with respect to Paul
Robeson ?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time I had no reason to consider Mr.
Robeson a Communist; judging from what I have read about him in
tlie press more i-ecently, he may very likely be one.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Kimi Kazu Saionji.
Mr. Lattimore. I remember a K. K. Saionji — I am not sure about
the personal names there — who was a member of the secretariat of
the Japanese IPR.
Mr. Morris. Was he the secretary of the Japanese Council of the
IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe he was at one time; yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3557
Mr. Morris. Would you answer the questions with respect to Mr.
Saionji?
jNIr. Laitimore. I had no reason to believe him a Communist.
JNIr. Morris. Do you know that he was a defendant in the Sorge
espionage case?
Mr. Lait'imore. I believe I read in the press that he was arrested
at that time, but set free.
Mr. Morris. He was given a suspended sentence, was he not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Was he ? I didn't recall that.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Helen Schneider,
]Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name at all.
Mr, Morris. As a staff worker on the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. A staff worker in the Amerasia office ?
Mr, Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Isidore Schneider ?
]Mr, Lattimore. No,
Mr. Morris. The next name is M. C. Shleesnyak.
Mr. Lattimore. I knew Dr. Shleesnyak when he was at the Johns
Hopkins for about a year as secretary of the Arctic Institute of
America.
Mr. Morris. How well did you know Mr. Slileesnyak?
Mr. Lattimore. Not very well. We visited back and forth a certain
amount, dined at their house and they dined at ours.
Mr. Morris. Did they ever stay with you at your home over night ?
JNIr. Lattimore. I don't believe they did. I don't think so.
INIr. Morris. Did they ever visit you in your home in Vermont ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. We may have seen them at Stefansson's, the
next farm.
Mr. Morris. Did they stay at Stefansson's ?
Mr. Lattimore, I believe they came up there. I believe that was
the first time we met them. That was before they had come to
Hopkins.
Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Shleesnyak accompany you on your trip to
the Arctic ?
Mr. Lattimore, No. I would say that I accompanied him. He or-
ganized a trip up to Point Barrow for — let's see — it was on behalf of
the Arctic Research Institute, which was doing some work at Point
Barrow, and President Bronk of the Hopkins, was one of the trustees
of that and was unable to go and asked me to go as his deputy,
Mr. Morris. Did you know at that time that Mr. Shleesnyak had
been a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not.
Mr. Morris. Did you know that he was a registered Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not. Mr. Sleesnyak told me that he had
in one election in New York voted the Communist ticket and that, under
New York rules, this required his registering accordingly, but that he
had never lieen a Communist and that the matter had been cleared
with Xaval Intelligence.
Mr. ISIoRRis. Did you intervene with Naval Intelligence on his behalf
at the time the question of his security in his making a trip to the Arctic
had come up ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. You did not?
3558 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't at that time know there was such a ques-
tion of security.
Mr. Morris. Where is Mr. Shleesnyak now ?
Mr. Lattimore. He is at the Weizmann Institute in Palestine.
Mr. Morris. What is he doing there?
Mr. Lattimore. He is doing some kind of research on ecology.
Mr. Morris. To what extent have you been active in the Arctic
Institute?
Mr. Latiimore. I would say that I have not been active at all.
Mr. ^Iorris. You did know Mr. Shleesnyak ; did you not ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. I knew liim, and when the Arctic Institute was
brought to the Jolms Hopkins for a period I welcomed it. It was an
extension of interest in interrelations and they used to hold seminars
there, and I attended several seminars.
In fact, I believe I gave a seminar once myself.
Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Stefansson active in the Arctic Institute?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Stefansson I believe is; yes.
INIr. Morris. Is Mr. Stefansson a close friend of yours, Mr. Latti-
more? • T J. •
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Stefansson has been a good friend of mine
since, oh, 10 years or so.
Mr. Morris. And Mr. Stefansson is closely associated with Mr.
Shelesnyak, is he not, or has been in the past?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know how closely.
Mr. Morris. At least, you know on one occasion he stayed over-
night at Stefansson's home?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right; yes.
Mr. IMoRRis. Would you tell us the physical connections between
Stefansson's home in Vermont and your home in Vermont ?
Mr, Lattimore. Stefansson has a farm where he spends the sum-
mer in Vermont, and about half or three-quarters of a mile away,
through the woods, there is another farm, which he detached from his
holding and sold to my wife and myself.
Mr. Morris. The next name on the list is Agnes Smedley.
Mr. Lattimore. Agnes Smedley I knew slightly during the 1930's.
I did not consider her a Communist. I did consider her a partisan of
the Chinese Communists.
That, incidentally, was not in the 1930's, as I recall, but m the
1940's.
Senator Ferguson. Wliat do you mean by a partisan of the Chinese
Communists? ,
Mr. Lattimore. Wait a minute. Yes, I did know her m the thirties,
because in 1937 she was up in Yenan ; tliat is right.
Senator Ferguson. And did you not know that the Chinese Com-
munists were controlled by the Russian Communists out of Moscow?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I didn't know that.
Senator Ferguson. You never knew that?
Mr. Lattimore. No. It is very much a disputed question among
experts on the subject.
I rather inclined to the view that the Chinese Communists have, at
least in the past, been more or less autonomous.
Senator Ferguson. Is that why you say that she was a partisan, she
was probably a fellow traveler of the Chinese Communists? Is that
what you want to classify her as ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3559
Mr. Laitimoke. Subject to the extreme vagueness of the term fellow
traveler; yes.
Senator Ferguson. You have used it.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I used it saying that it was a vague and un-
satisfactory term.
Senator Ferguson. But you do not think that she bordered on the
definition now that we have given you as a Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. From my slight acquaintance with her, she
was what you might call an unruly and rebellious type that would
be likely to get thrown out of any party she joined.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you know of any American
that was, in your opinion, a Chinese Communist, that belonged to the
Chinese Communist group ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Of the Russian Communists?
Mr. Lattimore. I suppose there have been of the Russian Com-
munists, but I couldn't name any.
The Chairman. The quastion is do you know?
Senator Ferguson. Know anybody.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Under this definition that we are now using on
communism ?
Mr. Lattimore. That were members of the Russian Communist
Party?
Senator Ferguson. I did not say members of the party. I do not
want to say members of the party. I mean just affiliated with it, as
we gave you the definition.
Mr. Sourwine. Does the Senator mean using "Communist" in the
sense of a person under Communist discipline, or who has voluntarily
or knowingly cooperated and collaborated with Communist Party
members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I suppose Anna Louise Strong, in working
for a Communist-owned paper in Moscow, but
Senator Ferguson. Smedley?
Mr. Lattimore. Smedley I don't believe was ever in Russia. "Was
she?
Senator Ferguson. Would that keep her from being a Communist
within the definition that we have given you of Communists?
Mr. Lattimore. I thought you meant the other definition; I am
sorry.
No. As far as I knew Agnes Smedley, which was very slightly,
she had a great deal of interest in China and either not much interest
in Russia or I didn't know much about it.
In China she was particularly known for her support in writing up
of the new Fourth Army, which was a mixed Communist and Chiang
Kai-shek army.
And, as I recall, in her book on that army, she is much more enthu-
siastic about the non-Communist commander of the army than she
was about the Communist second in command of the army.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, you knew that she willed her property
to Chu-Teh, the Chinese Communist general; did vshe not?
Mr. Lattimore. I read that in the press ; yes.
3560 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. And you know that Mildred Price, who was the execu-
tive secretary of the China Aid Council, was her executor under her
last will and testament?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember reading that.
The Chairman. Are you acquainted with Earl Browder?
Mr. Lattimore. Only to the extent of having gone to his office once.
The Chairman. You are acquainted with him.
Mr. Lattimore. 1 would not call that acquaintance ; no.
The Chairman. You would not call that an acquaintance. All
right.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Edgar Snow.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not and do not consider him a Communist
under these definitions.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Richard Sorge.
Mr. Lattimore. Richard Sorge I never met under that or any other
name, as far as I know.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever receive a letter from Mr. Sorge?
Mr, Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Ordway Southard.
Mr. Lattimore. Ordway Southard I do not know. He is a man who
bought from me and the Stef anssons the farm that we had in joint
ownership. I never met him and had nothing to do with the transac-
tion and didn't know that he was or had been a Communist until it
was published in the press later.
Mr. Morris. In other words, you do know, it has been published in
the press, that he was an active niember of the Communist Party ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was published in the press that he had been a
candidate for Governor of Alabama on the Communist ticket, or
something of that sort.
Mr. Morris. Would that satisfy you that he was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. That would satisfy me that he was a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did, then,
deed your property to Mr. Southard, to Mr. and Mrs. Southard?
Mr. Lattimore. I sold that property ; yes.
Mr. Morris. Did you testify in that fashion in executive session be-
fore this committee ?
Mr. Laitimore. Did I ?
■ Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this? It will just
take a minute.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. I am going on to the next question. Perhaps Mr.
Mandel can find that reference there.
It is you testimony you did deed your property, you and Mr.
Stefansson and Mrs.' Stef ansson and Mrs. Lattimore, did deed the
property that you held in common, to Mary and Richard Southard?
Mr. Lattimore. We sold it ; yes.
Mr. Sotjrwine. Is it Mary and Richard Southard, or Mary and
Ordway Southard?
Mr. Morris. Mary and Ordway Southard.
The Chairman. The question is. Did you deed it to those parties
named ?
Mr. Lattimore. We sold it ; yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3561
The Chairman. Did you deed it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't understand the technical term "deed."
Mr. Morris. Did you sign the deed?
The Chairman. Did you sign a deed or conveyance?
Mr. Laitimore. We signed whatever papers were necessary for
the transaction; yes.
The Chairman. Do you not know what a deed is ?
Mr. Lattimore. No/sir. I understand there are deeds of gift and
all kinds of deeds, but, to my simple mind, I sold it.
The Chairman. Was this deed a gift ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you a document and ask if you
ever have seen it.
Mr. Mandel, will you identify the document I have presented to
Mr. Lattimore, please?
Mr. LArriMORE. No; I don't believe I have seen this. It is not my
signature or my wife^s signature. It nuist have been done by proxy,
by an attorney in Bethel, Vt.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel will you identfy that and these two docu-
ments, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat that I ordered made of a warranty
deed No. 481, between Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson
and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.
]Mr. Morris. Did you cause that document to be photostated ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Where is the original ?
Mr. Mandel. The original is at the Bethel town clerk's office.
The Chairman. Where?
Mr. Mandel. In Vermont.
The Chairman. Is that a photostat of the original document on file,
recorded there?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. And you caused it to be photostated ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr, Morris. Will 3-011. identify the other two documents, Mr.
Mandel?
Mr. ]\Iandel. This is a photostat of a mortgage deed. No. 241, be-
tween Ordway Southard and Mary Southard, on the one hand, and
Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson, of Bethel, on the other,
and also Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. And the third document?
Mr. Mandel. The third is a photostat of a warranty deed No. 467.
with the names of Viljahmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, and
Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that come from the same source, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. It comes from the same source.
Mr. Morris. And the fourth one?
Mr. Mandel. The fourth one is a mortgage deed with the names
of Ordway Southard and Mary Southard and Viljahmur Stefansson
and Evelyn Stefansson and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.
The number is 241.
Mr. Morris. Was that taken from the original record?
Mr. Mandel. From the same source ; yes, sir.
88348— 52— pt. 10 19
3562 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman, I want to know if these are photostats of original
documents on file and recorded in some official place.
Mr. Mandel. They are photostats of documents in the files of the
clerk's office at Bethel, Vt.
Senator Ferguson. Do they file deeds in the clerk's ofiice ? Is it a
town clerk, or a register of deeds, or what ?
What I do not understand is how these mortgages could have typed
signatures on them if they are photostats of the original papers that
are on file. And the signatures on the Stefansson-Lattimore deed look
to be in the same handwriting, the husband's and the wife's. The
L's are identical.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Mr. Stefansson signed on your
behalf in this connection, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. We gave power of attorney to
somebody, either Mr. or Mrs. Stefansson, or to Mr. Bundy, of Bethel,
Vt., who is an attorney.
Senator Ferguson. They are not signed under a power of attorney.
Mr. Lattimore. They aren't?
Senator Ferguson. No.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall testifying in executive ses-
sion here on July 13, 1951, in this fashion :
Mr. Morris. And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr.
Stefansson to sell it on our behalf.
Mr. Morris. You gave him the power of attorney?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, and we were rather pressed for money at that time,
owing to extraordinary expenses forced on us by Senator Joseph McCarthy and
needed some cash and we sold the farm.
Mr. Lattimore. That was certainly my recollection at the time, yes.
Mr. Morris. And yet you testified here today that you did sell the
property to Mr. and Mrs. Southard.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, through somebody holding a power of at-
torney.
Mv. Morris. Did you make out a power of attorney at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. I suppose I must have.
Mr. Morris. It does not appear on these documents.
Senator Smith. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question?
Mr. Lattimore, I notice that there is a certificate by Mr. and Mrs.
Stefansson before someone up in Vermont. There appears to be here
an acknowledgment by you and Mrs. Lattimore before Elizabeth
Carroll. You will note that she certified that you and Mrs. Lattimore
personally appeared. Is that right, or not?
Mr. Laittmore. "State of Vermont" is crossed out and "State of
Maryland" put in.
Senator Ferguson. At Baltimore.
Mr. Arnold. The signature is not on here. I do not understand that
at all.
Senator Smith. Yes, it is further down there.
Senator Ferguson. Do you see the acknowledgment?
Senator Smith. Then right below that is a certificate by the notary
who says they personally appeared.
Mr. Arnold. And it is not a signature that appears on here.
The Chairman. Wait a minute. We ought to be able to get this
straightened out. There has to be a ground made for the admission,
if you are going to offer it.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3563
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear now what
happened. The clerk up there made a copy in his own handwriting,
of what was in the record, and then photostated his own handwriting
instead of photostating, the original in the record. Then that ap-
pears to be in the same handwriting.
Senator Smith. Do you know Elizabeth H. Carroll, the notary
public ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it must be one of the secretaries at Johns
Hopkins who has a power of notary.
Senator Fergusox. But then you did make a deed and acknowledged
it before one of the secretaries in Baltimore, von and your wife ; is that
right?
Mr. Laitimore. "We sold it. We didn't handle the transaction.
The entire transaction was handled by the Stef anssons.
Senator Ferguson. That was not my question.
Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry.
Senator Ferguson. Is it a fact that you and your wife went before
a notary, or a notary came before you two and took your acknowledge-
ment and vou signed the deed to this property up in Vermont? Is
that right ?
Mr. Lattimore. I suppose that is the story ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Can you only get "suppose" on that ? Cannot
you tell us whether that is or is not a fact? It happened in 1950. In
deeding your property away, you cannot give us a better answer than
'"suppose."
]\Ir. Lattimore. Well, Senator, the correspondence on the subject
Avas conducted primarily between my wife and the Stefanssons, and
they handled the entire transaction on our behalf.
And then apparently we were assured that everything was in order
and some papers were sent down to be notarized, and we got them
notarized.
Senator Ferguson. And you had to swear that it was your free act
and deed. You were transferring real estate. Do vou not recall that
at all?
]Mr. Lattimore. I recall that we were authorizing the Stefanssons
to get jointly owned property sold. I had full confidence in the
Stefanssons getting
The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, this was done in Baltimore.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; in Baltimore.
It was not what Stef ansson did, but what you did.
Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry. I am not quite sure what you are
driving at. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. I know. That is the trouble with your answers.
You do not know what I am driving at. Do not try to figure out
what I am driving at. I am just asking you a question.
Did you, or did you not, go before a notary and swear that that
was your
The Chairman. It is an acknowledgment.
Senator Ferguson. Let me read it to you :
* * * personally appeared and acknowledged this instrument by them,
sealed and subscribed" to be their free act and deed.
Did you or did you not do that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Evidently I did.
3564 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to put in the word "evidently"?
Mr. Lattimore. All right; I did.
I am just saying I don't remember the transaction at all, sir. I
mean the details of the transaction. All. I remember is that we
managed to get rid of our farm.
The Chairman. Xever mind the details of the transaction, Mr.
Lattimore.
Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman, he said that he did. What more can
he say ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; after considerable effort.
Senator Smith. Let me ask Mr. Lattimore one question.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Senator Smith. How many deeds have you ever signed before, Mr.
Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. For the sale of property ?
Senator Smith. That is what I mean, yes.
Mr. Lattimore. I can't remember any others for the sale of pro-
perty. I signed papers for the purchase of property on which I built
my house near Baltimore, and I am afraid I will have to tell you that
I can't remember a single detail of it.
Senator Smith. I just have in mind that I have had clients to
acknowledge documents tliat they relied upon me as counsel, and I was
just wondering what implication should be drawn from the fact that
this acknowledgement was that way.
Mr. Lattimore. We had counsel. We had an attorney in Bethel, a
Mrs. Bundy, who, together with the Stefanssons, handled the details
of the transaction. And so we had full confidence that everything
was being legally done and that we would get our money.
The Chairman. Were you and Mrs. Lattimore negotiating for the
sale of this property for some time?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. Letters had i)assed between Mrs. Lattimore and
the purchasers, or between you and the purchasers; is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. No, none had passed between us and the purchasers.
The Chairman. I understood you to say a few minutes ago that
some letters had passed, that correspondence had passed between Mrs.
Lattimore and someone else for the purchase of the disposal of the
property.
You knew you wei'e going to dispose of it, did you not?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. When these instruments were shown to you, they
were shown to you in Baltimore and you acknowledged them in Balti-
more, according to the face of the instruments.
Now, do you say you did, or did not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I did acknowledge them ; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you at that time, Mr. Lattimore, know to whom
the property Avas being deeded ?
Mr. Lattimore. We may have known that it was somebody named
Southard, but we didn't know anything about them.
Mr. Sourwine. You had the deed in front of you, did you not? You
signed it.
Mr. Latitmore. I suppose I must have known, but not knowing who
Mr. Southard was, it made no particular impression on our mind.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3565
You see, this property was not simply being sold on our behalf;
it was property that we jointly owned with Mr. and Mrs. Stefansson,
and since we had an attorney actintr for us in Bethel, and since the
Stefanssons were acting in their own interest as well as ours, we didn't
consider it necessary to take any special precautions in supervising
the details.
Mr. MoEEis. Mr. Lattimore, you testified in executive session that
you did not sell that property to the Southards, did you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I testified that it was sold on our behalf by the
Stefanssons, I think. That was my recollection at the time.
Mr. Morris. But, Mr. Lattimore, there is the testimony and the
record.
The Chairman. Read the record again.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr.
Stefansson to sell it on our behalf.
Mr. Lattimore. I think that is a true statement, yes.
Mr. Morris. Then that is not true testimony, is it, Mr. Lattimore,
in view of tlie fact that this deed has been presented to you today ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think there may be a confusion here about the
word "sell'- perhaps. I don't know. It sounds to me like a techni-
cality.
Mr. Morris. How much did you pay for that property when you
boupht it, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. We paid for it, according to the notes I have — this
was, as I say, outlying property belonging to the Stefanssons. It
had a very tumbledown farmhouse on it and
The Chairman. How much did you pay for it ?
Mr. Laitimore. We bought a half interest in it from the Stefans-
sons for $1 and considerations. The considerations were that we were
to put the house on the property in order.
Mr, Morris. How much did you sell it for ?
Mr. Lattimore. We sold our share of it for $2,000.
Mr. Morris. Do you hold a mortgage on that property today ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I believe it has been paid off.
Our cost in putting the property into order was something in excess
of $2,000.
Mr. Morris. The next name on the list is Mr. Stefansson's name.
Mr. Lattimore. Right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairmaii, may they be received into the record ?
The Chairman. Wait a minute. I would like to have it cleared up.
I am not going to rule on that now. I am going to find out just
what the context is, why they should be received. I am going to
withhold ruling on that at the present time.
(For the chairman's acceptance of exhibits Xo. 555A, No. 555B, and
No. 555C, see p. :-)60T. The exhibits follow.)
Mr. Morris. The next name is Mr. Stefansson's name, Mr. Latti-
more.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. What is Mr. Stefansson's first name?
Mr. Lattimore. Vilhjalmur.
Mr. Morris. Are you a close friend of Mr. Stefansson's ?
3566 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore, I have been a good friend of his for 10 years or
so; yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Did you at any time have reason to believe that he
was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
IVIr. Morris. The next name is Gunther Stein.
INIr. Lattimore. The same answer.
I knew Mr. Stein extremely slightly ; met him maybe two or three
times in Chungking in 1941 and 1942, and saw him, I think, once in this
country at the end of the war or after the end of the war.
]VIr. Morris. On several occasions you have praised his writings,
have you not, Mr. Lattimore?
INIr. Lattimore. On one occasion, I believe, I wrote a review of a
book of his and on another occasion I wrote to Prof. McMahon Ball
in Australia, commending Stein as a good economist on Japan.
Mr. Morris. Therefore, you must have known something about Mr.
Stein before you would so commend him ; is that not correct ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. I had seen some of his writings ; yes, sir.
j\Ir. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, when did you first have reason to
believe that Mr. Stein was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I have ever had reason to believe
he is a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Do you know that he has been identified as having
been involved in the Sorge espionage case by General Willoughby ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have seen that reference.
I also understand that Stein has denied it.
Mr. Morris. Would you be willing to accept his denial ?
Mr. Lattimore. Who am I to judge?
]Mr. INIoRRis. The next name is Sabelle Yardumian Stein.
Mr. Lattimore. I presume that is the name of the present Mrs.
Stein, whom I met once very briefly here in Washington with her
husband.
Mr. Morris. And she is the sister of Rose Yardumian ; is she not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I understand ; yes.
Mr. Morris. And Rose Yardumian was someone who acted as your
secretary for many years ; was she not ?
]Mr. Lattimore. No; she didn't. She worked, I think, for the
Washington office of the IPR at one time. She never had worked as
my secretary,
]Mr. ]MoRRis. At least you would often dictate letters, would you not,
which would bear the initials at the bottom "OL : y" ?
Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it very much.
Mr. Morris. That was a frequent notation, was it not, on your out-
going letters ?
Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it. I don't think I dictated — I can't re-
member dictating any letters in the Washington office of the IPR.
INIr. Morris. Then where would the notation "OL:y" come from?
What would that mean, Mr. Lattimore? That notation that fre-
quently appeared in the letters that we have before us ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was probably my secretary in Baltimore, Mrs.
Margaret Young.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you say "Margaret" Young, or "Marguerite"
Young ?
INlr. Lattimore. "Margaret."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3566A
Exhibit No. 555A
■Rncw all ff^cn bv tfjcse l^reacrtts: ?
^»««™
4^nO
i*^'
iv
3566b institute of pacific relations
Ostbil T".^.n Glsrk'5 "f f i:<;, B<)th :1 , V»rnnnt . f^>irch 13.195i;.
r,B'<b«rt i.3uni;,-,"-,.n Ci :rK ".f thi T•^:n -f 3^thel,in ts^s County !>f
Sir. (*'r,ini .'.at; -^f Vjr«.irit,,ho,vin- b;; la« th-J cust^iy of th'J r*)al
»3tat3 fic^i jj ";■ ■.-- o.ii iisn,b«rabj certify that tt-« k/^iagrf^ph'
r9fi-'x c 7 -a tb: rsvsrae alia h^Tdof is an ezsct raj;.»TijclIr,n
•s{ a rsc-r . Ii, Bo-.:< ,J ' rajs 48i ^f e^li Bethjl ^in i i?ao-ir;3.'
\
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3566C
Exhibit No. 555B
«'j»roM<;B OtMi
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rh.n »» »fa>»)iu o^V* 4 » .i »a-. vK-ta»r4, -• «»#£« «t5« »K«. . „
&«!. «^ « r48 J I VaxjcariU.
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3566d institute of pacific relations
tietnei Tf^v,;; Ciirit's O.'rica.Sethcil.Vsra^nl . ilarch 15,125i.
r.H^Usrt .T^ivii Ci«rk -f thsi Tn»n -t B^thal,ln '.h^ Cnunty nf
"inU^r,sn.i -tit^ •-■; Vartsnnt.having by la» ti-d oj3t-,y
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bars-.? l3 j;^ e. 1 ■. 1- ! ' ■', ..ctirn n/ a rucnra i.. 5-i^k 39,
To*^n Clark
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3566e
Exhibit No. 555C
tkncvr all iTjcn bv tbesc l^resent*:
-sSSi
3566f institute of pacii'TC relations
Bathal Town Cisrk's Of f lo2.3«th :i, V^r :,i'>r.t. ^'.ircr. 1.3,i95a.
I.iiAbsrt ,i.;iJ;. ,^,ro.<n i;i3r>i nr tr.cj T^,»n of i:;- i.^ i , In l>-,i:
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?.ig3 467 if sjiJ asti-l w.ira ?.20-.rir>,
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To»n Ci.rk
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3567
Mr. Morris. Did you kiiow that Rose Yardumian was in Communist
China last year?
Mv. Lattimore. Yes; I did.
Mr. Morris. In connection with a Chinese Communist publication ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't know that.
Mr. ]\Iorris. The next name is Andrew Steiger.
IVIr. Lattiiniore. I don't believe I have ever met Mr. Steiger person-
ally. I think that the extent of my contact with him is when he did
a large part of the drafting of a book for then Vice President Wallace,
the manuscript of which was sent down to me before publication.
Mr. INIoRRis. But it is your testimony you never met with Mr. Steiger
in that connection?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I never met with him in that connection.
Mr. Morris. Or in any other connection?
Mr. Lattimore. Or in any other connection that I can remember.
Mr. Morris. You did have dealings, though, to that extent, did you
not, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. To that extent ; yes. And I think maybe one ex-
change of correspondence.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Anna Louise Strong, Mr. Chairman,
and I believe we have covered that in previous questioning.
After that we have Madam Sun Yat-sen.
Mr. Lai^tmore. Madam Sun Yat-sen I knew slightly in Chungking
in 1941^2, and had no reason to consider her a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Did you see ]\Iadam Sun Yat-sen in connection with
your visit to China with Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I did. I think some members of the
mission called on her; but I don't believe I was with them.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Daniel Thorner.
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No."
Mr. Morris. You do know Daniel Thorner?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I know him. He worked under me for a year
at Johns Hopkins University.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Kyuichy Tokuda.
Mr. LxVTTiMORE. Could you identify him more closely? I don't
identify the name Kyuichy, This may be a man named Tokuda who
was regarded as one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party
in 1945.
Mr. Morris. Did you deal with that gentleman ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't deal with him. I had one interview in
which I questioned him.
Mr. Morris. What was the date of the interview ?
Mr, Lattimore. I was ti-ying to find out whether there was any
difference in point of view between the Japanese Communists who
had been in jail in Japan during the war and those who had been
in China during the war and had come back, who were a subject of
considerable speculation among Americans in Japan at that time.
But I didn't succeed in seeing any of those who had come back from
China. So the furthest I got was an interview in which I asked ques-
tions of Mr. Tokuda.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Mr. Chainnan, there is a possibility of a typo-
graphical error in this name Kyuichy. Perhaps it should end with an
"i" instead of with a "y". I would like to ask the witness if that makes
any difference in his answer.
3568 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. No; it doesn't maike any difference. Kyuichy
would be his personal name, and in transcribing Japanese names
a "y" in that position at the end would be unusual, but spelling it
one way or the other doesn't make me remember what his first name
actually was.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Solomon Trone.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Trone I met once in India in 1949, when he
was acting as a special economic and technical adviser to Prime
Minister Nehru. I believe that is the only time I met him, and I had
no reason to term him a Communist.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Shigato Tsuru.
Mr. Lattimore. This Mr, Tsuru I met in Japan in the winter of
1945-46. I met him maybe two or three times, and I had no reason
to consider him a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in company with Mr. Herbert Nor-
man ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether or not he was Mr. Herbert
Norman's roommate back in the United States?
Mr. Lattimore. That I don't know.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether he was connected with the
publication Science and Society ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, at that point, there should be noted
the possibility of a typographical error. That name is spelled on
this list S-h-i-g-a-t-o. It probably should be S-h-i-g-e-t-o. Does that
make any difference, Mr. Lattimore, in your answer?
Mr. Lat^tmore. No, I couldn't tell you which one is correct.
Mr. Morris. Do you know where he is now, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. I presume he is in Japan.
Mr. Morris. Do you know what he is doing in Japan ?
Mr. Laitimore. No; I don't.
Mr. Morris. When did you last hear from Mr. Tsuru ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have never heard from him.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Mary Van Kleeck.
Mr. Lattimore. Mary Van Kleeck I have never met. She wrote
one article in Pacific Affairs in 1936 or '37, and I had no reason U>
consider her a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Is that the article that we had testimony about the other
day?
Mr. Latitmore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. In the Moscow trials?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
• Mr. Morris. The next is John Carter Vincent.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Vincent I have known since about 1930, off and
on, when we happened to be in the same town. I had no reason to
consider him a Communist.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Nym Wales.
Mr. Lattiiniore. Nym Wales I knew very slightly when she was the
wife of Edgar Snow, and that was in Peking in the 1930's. I don't
believe I have ever seen her in this country, and I have no reason to
consider her a Communist.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Harry Dexter White.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3569
Mr. Lat^timore. Mr. AMiite I met maybe three times here in Wash-
ington in 1941-42, in connection with briefings on financial policy in
China. I had no reason to consider him a Communist.
The Chairman. Is Harry Dexter White the individual connected
with the Treasury Department?
Mr. Lattimore. He was connected with the Treasury Department ;
yes.
Mr. Morris. He was the Under Secretary of the Treasury, was he
not?
Mr. Lattimore. I forget what his exact rank was.
The CHAiEMAiSr. Did he fall out of the window ? I believe he died
a violent death,
Mr. Morris. He died a violent death; yes. Wait a minute, now.
Excuse me, Senator. Apparently he died of a heart attack.
The next name is Ella tVinter.
Mr. Lattimore. Ella Winter wrote one article in Pacific Affairs in
about 1936 or 1937. I had never met her, and had no reason to con-
sider her a Communist.
Mr. Morris. The next name is Victor Yakhontoff.
Mr. Lattimore. Victor Yakhontoff I don't believe I have ever met.
He contributed an article — maybe he contributed an article to Pacific
Affairs, I am not sure.
Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Carter ever discuss his political feelings with
you?
Mr. Latfimore, He may have. If you have a document to refresh
my memory I might be able to recall something about it. I haven't
even heard of him since the middle 1930's some time.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did you not deny here on last Friday, Mr. Lattimore,
that you did not know that Mr. Yakhontoff was a Communist or pro-
Soviet?
Mr. Lattimore. I certainly didn't know that he was a Communist or
pro-Soviet.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, dated January 25, 1943, addressed to Owen Latti-
more from Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy.
Mr. IMoRRis, INIr. Lattimore, I ask you if you can recall having re-
ceived that letter.
Mr. Arnold. Do you have copies ?
The Chairman. Are there copies available ?
Mr. Morris. Yes; here you are. [Document handed.]
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't recall receiving this. I obviously did.
Mr. Morris. Will you read it, please. Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Exhibit No. .5.56
Dear Owen : General Yakhontoff called to see me today to offer his services
to the IPR. Someone had told him that the IPR was greatly expanding its
program and he would like to be employed for any research work which we
might assign to him. I had to tell him that, while we had plans for expansion,
we hadn't yet found the funds and that so long as the present situation persisted
I could make no proposals to him. He told me that he had recently written you
offering his services. Personally, I think his record is good. He is frankly
pro-Soviet but has never been and is not now a party member. He is a United
States citizen. He is full of energy, lectures with very great success, and has
3570 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to his credit some fairly good books which would have probably been much
better if he had had the benefit of working under your direction. He feels
himself pretty competent not only on Soviet, but also on far eastern affairs.
I think that if you are considering additions to your staff you may want to give
some thought to the possibility of using him.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Harriet Moore in Chicago with the sug-
gestion that if she knows any reason why you should not consider him she
write you direct.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record ?
The Chairman, It may be admitted into the record.
(The document previously read in full by the witness was marked
"Exhibit No. 556".)
Mr. Morris. The next name is Rose Yardumian.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; she has been mentioned before. I knew her
very slightly when she w^orked in the IPR office here in Washington
temporarily some time during the war years. I had no reason to
consider her a Communist.
Mr. Morris. The last name is Max Yergan.
Mr. Laitimore. Max Yergan has been mentioned before, and I
don't know anything more about him than what I said then.
Mr. Morris. In other words, you remember meeting him at the
dinner party at the home of Edith Field ?
Mr. Lattimore. Once.
Mr. Morris. And you did not, at that time, have any reason to be-
lieve he was a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. Quite so.
]\rr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have some documents I would like
Mr. Lattimore's identification of, and I will put them into the record
without any questions.
I also have a few other questions of a miscellaneous nature to ask
of the witness.
The Chairman. I think, however, that we will have to recess at this
time. We do not like to put this hearing off, but it looks as though we
are rather crowded with overwork. Will it be satisfactory to the
members of the committee if the matter went over until the day after
tomorrow at 10 o'clock or 10 : 30 ?
Senator O'Conor. May I just ask one question?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, I was anxious, just before get-
ting away from the list, to ask you if there was any reason for, you
might say, the equivocation in regard to your reference to Paul
Robeson. At the time you were asked the question as to whether you
had reason to believe that he had communistic leanings or affiliations,
your answer was that he may very likely be one.
You had previously indicated that you like to speak in plain English,
and that you do not indulge in fancy or round-about terms.
Do you want to leave that there ? Apparently everybody in America
knows him to be what he is. I was wondering whether you desire to
leave it in that state.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I wasn't trying to equivocate there. It is
simply that I have seen in the press references that lead me to believe
that he is either a Communist or a very close fellow traveler, or
something of that kind. I have not made an analysis of it. I am not
a student of Paul Robeson.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 3571
Senator O'Conor. Of course, 3^011 have known of the various activi-
ties in which he has engaged, and of his statements given in various
parts of tlie world which have been strictly anti-American and pro-
Soviet ?
Mr. Lattimore. I know of some of those in a general way. I would
be hard put to cite you the exact ones. I was merely trying to come
within the wording of this definition about "what do you know now,"
et cetera.
Senator O'Coxor. All right. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All riaht, we will recess until Wednesday morning
at 10 : 30.
(Whereupon, at 3 : 44 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 10 : 30 a. m., Wednesday, March 12, 1952.)
88348 — 52 — pt. 10 20
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS
FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 1952
United States Senate,
SUBCOMMITI'EE To INVESTIGATE THE AdMINISTRxVTION
or THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. O.
The subcommittee met at 1 : 45 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, and Ferguson.
Senator Mundt.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire. I would like to
request, Mr. Chairman, that the committee ask the State Department,
and also the President, for the statement and the letter that was
mailed by Mr. Lattimore to the President on the 10th of June 1945,
and also the statement that was left by Mr. Lattimore at the White
House on July 3. Also, if they have it on the calendar, the time that.
Mr. Lattimore called on the President, the length of time he was with
the President.
The Chairman. The request will be made for the authorities men-
tioned. Let me say that the Chair ruled some daj^s ago with reference
to the filing of statements. The reorganization plan, the reorganiza-
tion law, set up some years ago, provides, among other things :
The committee shall, so far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing
before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony at
least 24 hours before hearing, and to limit their oral presentation to brief sum-
maries of their argument. The committee staffs shall prepaid digests of such
statements for the use of the committee members.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I had also asked Mr. Lattimore
to point out in the Tydings committee the testimony given to that
committee in relation to his visit to the White House. I wondered
whether he has that.
TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN
ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL— Resumed
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I have not been able to find that, and to
the best of my belief it isn't there, and I had simply forgotten about
the whole business at the time of the Tydings hearings and didn't
run across those papers until later. I mentioned them in my state-
ment to this committee because they had been mentioned in previous
testimony here which reminded me of it.
3573
3574 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. How many times had you called on the Presi-
dent of the United States ?
Mr. Lattimore. Only that once, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that is the one that you say you entirely
forgot ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you had been questioned about your rela-
tions with the foreign policy of the United States, wliether or not you
had any influence on it ; is tliat right ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; that is right.
Senator Ferguson. And that is the only time that you ever saw a
President about the foreign policy, and you forgot it i
Mr. Lattimore. Well, Senator
The Chairman. Just a moment. Answer the question.
Senator Ferguson. Is that true ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe that is what is true. Senator. My memory
is getting more and more mixed up because of the way the questions
have zigzagged across.
Senator Ferguson. Those are not zigzag questions, and they are not
mixed-up questions.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; what I mean, Senator, is the questioning as
a whole has gone back and forth over a great many years, and it is get-
ting increasingly difficult for me to remember what I remembered
when.
Senator Eastland. Difficult to remember what you talked to the
President of the United States about on your visit to him ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. He visited the President once and forgot it. That
is the answer.
Mr. Lattimore. The questioning, Senator, before the Tydings com-
mittee was entirely in the context of what Government positions I had
held, and I think it is quite natural that this other occasion didn't enter
into my
The Chairman. There is no question pending.
Senator Ferguson. One of the big questions, Mr. Lattimore, was
whether or not you had ever had any influence upon the foreign policy
of the United States. And you now say to this committee that the time
you visited the President and left a memorandum with him, and the
fact that you had written the letter with a statement as to what you
thought the foreign policy was, that when you were giving the testi-
mony in relation to your influence upon the foreign policy, you forgot
the only time that you had ever been there, and you didn't give it to
the Tydings committee, and you came before this connnittee and said
that that connnittee had acquitted you of everything, given you a clean
bill of health, and that we were to* be criticized for not giving you the
same on the Tydings committee hearing.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator, if tliat interview with the President had
had the slightest effect
The Chairman. Let me get that question, please. That is an in-
volved question.
Senator Ferguson. That was just a summation of what I take this
testimony to be. I am going to ask you some otlier questions and see
how your memory is on those. Do you remember coming back with Mr.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3575
Wallace and Mr. Vincent from the Far East when you made a trip
with them ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. What kind of a plane had yon, do you know?
Mr. Lattimore. A four-enjoined plane.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how many people came back on
that trip ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea?
Mr. Lattimore. Let me see, there was Mr. Wallace, Mr. Vincent,
Mr. Hazard, and myself, and the military personnel of the plane.
Senator Ferguson. Pardon?
Mr. Lattimore. And the military personnel of the plane, I think
six or seven people.
Senator Ferguson. Is that all ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that is all; yes.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anybody else on the plane? Think
about it.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe so.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you land in the United States?
Mr. Lattimore. We landed, I think, at Fairbanks, Alaska, and
then we landed in Canada, and then I think we flew straight — no ; I
am not sure whether we flew straight to Seattle or made an inter-
mediate landing somewhere.
Senator Ferguson. Were the same people on the plane the whole
trip?
5lr. Lattimore. Yes ; I think so.
Senator Ferguson. The same people.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And no more?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
Senator Ferguson. Then you went from Seattle to where?
Mr. Lattimore. From Seattle straight to Washington.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not stop anywhere?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I remember stopping once, but I can't re-
member whether it was on the way from Canada to Seattle or on the
way from Seattle to Washington.
Senator Ferguson. Did you stop at Great Falls?
Mr. Lattimore. Great Falls, that is the name of the place.
Senator Ferguson. That is the name?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And do you remember having your picture
taken at Great Falls?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. You do not? Do you remember the people that
were on the plane having their pictures taken at Great Falls ?
Mr. Lattimore. On the way out to China or on the way back?
Senator Ferguson. On the way back.
Mr. Lattimore. A group picture ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember the photographer placing
Mr. Wallace in the center of the group ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
3576 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. You do not?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember that there were at least 10
Russians on that plane?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. You do not remember that?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. You would remember that if it had happened ?
Mr. Lattimore. I should think so.
The Chairman. What is the answer?
Mr. Lattimore. I should think so.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who wrote Mr. Wallace's speech
that he made in Eussian to some group ? He made a speech in Russian,
did he not; he read it?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know who wrote it?
Mr. Lattimore. He wrote it himself, I believe.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know a Boris Pregel ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. Of Russia.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. You say Mr. Wallace wrote the speech himself
and delivered it, read it? ^ ^ , .. ^^
Mr. Lattimore. He wrote the speech himself, and I believe Mr.
Hazard translated it into Russian for him.
Senator Ferguson. You can't recall now of a group picture of the
Russians and you and Mr. Wallace being taken at the airfield m
Great I'alls?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time.
The Chairman. Would you say that such an incident did not
occur?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection oi it.
Tlie Chairman. Well, just answer my question. Would you say it
did not occur?
Mr. Lattimore. I would say it didn't occur ; yes ; as tar as my recol-
lection. Senator. I have been asked to bring in some supplementary
TTi *i 1'PTi n 1
Senator Eastland. I have a question. Did you know Dr. Cole-
grove ?
Mr. Lattimore. Colegrove; yes.
Senator Eastland. How long did you know him?
Mr. Lattimore. I have known him off and on since the 1930 s.
Senator Eastland. Did you ever offer him employment?
Mr." Lattimore. I don't believe I did. I remember his testifying to
that effect, but I don't recall offering him employment. ^
Senator Eastland. Well, do you deny that you offered him a ]ob
when you were with OWI ? , , , .
Mr. Laitimore. No ; I don't deny it ; I ]ust don't remember it.
Senator Eastland. You do not remember whether you offered him
the Japanese desk or not in OWI?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember that at all.
Senator Eastland. You have read his testimony before this
committee ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3577
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Eastland. He states that, at a meeting with you, you offered
him a job, that you stated that the Chinese Communists "were real
democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no
connection with Soviet Russia."
Now, was that testimony true or false ?
Mr. Lattimore. In my opinion it is false. Senator. I don't remem-
ber meeting him at the airport, as he says, and I don't remember any
such conversation, and I don't think such a conversation is likely.
Senator Eastland, Would you remember having dinner with him ?
Mr. LATriMORE. No.
Senator Eastland. Dr. Colegrove states that, under oath, you were
advocating the murder of the Japanese Emperor and his family.
Was that statement true or false?
Mr. Lattimore. That statement is false. Senator; and as I recall,
Mr. Colegrove was referring there not to conversation but to a book that
I wrote, and there is nothing of the kind in the book.
Senator Eastland. It was to a conversation ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Eastl.\nd. He stated that you were following the same line
that the Japanese Communists had followed ?
The Chairman. Is that a question. Senator ?
Senator Eastland. Yes, sir. I asked him if that was true.
The Chairman. His attention is being taken up now with something
else. Will you listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore. please ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think that is true. Senator.
Senator Eastland. You do not think it is true ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I can't tell you what the line of the Japa-
nese Communists was on the subject.
Senator Eastland. Was it your opinion that the Emperor of Japan
should be killed ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Eastland. That is all.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, I have been requested to bring in
supplementary material. May I offer it now ?
The Chairman. Wlio made the request ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think sometimes the Chair and one request was,
I remember, from Senator Ferguson.
The Chairman. You may lay it before the chairman.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. Here is a publication of the Institute
of Pacific Relations with my 1936 report on Pacific Affairs, which
Senator Ferguson requested. Then I was also requested to bring in
the letter from the Department of State, inviting me to lecture, in
1946, to the State Department personnel. I was also asked to identify
in the transcript the question of the dating of General Barmine's
statements about 1933 or 1935-36, and I have analyzed that with
the appropriate references to the text. ,
May I ask, also, Senator, if the exhibits that I attached to my state-
ment to this committee and that I asked to have entered into the record
have been entered ?
Mr. Morris. I think, Mr. Sourwine, you were going to take that
matter up today. Are you ?
The Chairman. That is going to be taken up at a later time.
3578 INSTITUTE or pacific relations
Mr. Sour WINE. At the time that we concluded with Mr. Lattimore's
testimony on the last previous occasion, when he was on the stand, we
were discussing two excerpts which he had offered for the record.
Our record is incomplete with regard to those. There is also here
certain material under the heading of "Chinese history project" and
also with regard to who wanted to recognize Red China, and I think
one other item which Mr. Lattimore offered initially and on which
the Chair has not yet ruled.
]\Ir. Lattimore. May I renew my request that that be entered into
the record ?
The Chairman. The Chair will take the matter up again.
Mr. Lattimore. And I wish to offer some material that I prepared
with respect to my book. Solution in Asia, in view of the testimony
which the committee accepted yesterday.
The Chairman. Was that requested^
. Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, this is an offer of evidence.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I might say at the time, since it has
come up, that the staff is prepared and does recommend with regard
to this material earlier submitted by Mr. Lattimore, that the Chair
admit it for printing in the appendix of the record, and order that it
be footnoted back to the point in the record at which Mr. Lattimore
first asked that it be introduced.
The Chairman. All riglit. The Chair will pass on that later on.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, will you point out in this book
where your report is?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I marked that, on 76.
The Chairman. Mr. Morris, if you wish to proceed, you may
proceed.
Mr. Arnold. May we have a ruling on this offer ?
The Chairman. I will rule on it later on.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of saving time, Mr.
Lattimore and his attorney on the one hand and I on the other, have
stipulated on the authenticity of certain letters, IS letters, that I
would like to introduce into the record as a single unit.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have a list of those ?
Mr. Morris. I have a list, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have that list, Mr. Arnold ?
Mr. Arnold. Yes.
Mr. Morris. That has been presented to Mr. Lattimore and his at-
torney. They have gone through the list, and I would like them now
to state that "they appear to the witness to be copies of organizational
documents that were either sent by him or to him.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, with at least one exception which is minutes
of a conference or something.
Mr. Morris. Which was that, now ?
Mr. Lattimore. This one here.
Mr. Morris. July 9, 1934.
Mr. Lattimore. July 9, 1934.
Mr. Morris. And wliat comment have you on that?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, that also appears to be a copy of an original
document, but it isn't a letter to mo or from me.
Mr. Morris. This is a meeting at which you were present and the
initialed paragraph liere, "Mr. Lattimore produced the statement
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3579
showing the distribution of Pacific Affairs as of July 9, as follows."
That is right ?
Mr. Lattimqre. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may those documents be introduced
into the record?
The Chairman. There is a stipulation, as I understand, between
counsel and counsel for the witness that these are correct photostatic
copies ; is that right ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, sir.
The Chairman. And that thev appear or are taken from where ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. ISIandel will testify
The Chairman. Well, they are stipulated.
Mr. Morris. They have been taken from the files of the institute.
The Chairman. Very well. They may be admitted into the record.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may speak clearly,
may I show Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Arnold this list, and ask if this
is the list, physically, of the documents with respect to which the
stipulation has been made.
Mr. Arnold. I assume it is.
Mr. Sourwine. May we have the list you have.
This is now, Avhat I have in my hands, the list of the documents
with respect to which there is a stipulation.
Mr. Arnold. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Then will the chairman order that these be inserted
and printed.
The Chairman. They may be inserted and printed.
Mr. Morris. In every case the copies were sent to the witness and
his attorney, except for the third item on the list, that is dated April
18, 1935, San Francisco. May we have that particular one?
Mr. Lattimore. Is this the one ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, that is the one.
The Chairman. What about that?
Mr. Morris. That is covered in the list, Mr. Chairman.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 566 A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S" and are as follows :)
Exhibit No. 566-A
Pacific Center,
1795 CALIFORNIA Stbe:et,
Sa7i Francisco, Calif., August 18, 1938.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Carter: Your telegram of the sixth arrived a few days before we left
camp. As you urged me "to consider resigning from Amerasia at an early
date," it seemed wise both to think the matter over very carefully and to await
your comment on my withdrawal of an article from the new number of Amerasia.
Arriving here yesterday, I found your letters of August 8 and 10; also possible
for me to attempt to balance the general nature of the problem and the par-
ticular merits of the case.
To begin with, I need hardly assure you how anxious I am to make any con-
cession consistent with elementary ideas of dignity and propriety, that might
help you in your difficult diplomatic handling of Japanese demands, and further
the major interests of the Institute. This is no time at which to allow individ-
ual intrasigeance to threaten the smooth working of the Institute as a whole.
At the same time, I cannot but regret that the Japanese Council should have
been allowed to make a debating point of this intrinsically unimportant per-
3580 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
sonal issue. It would have been easy for me to withdraw from Amerasia
a few months ago ; it would be easy a few months hence. To withdraw Just
at this moment, "under fire," would be for me personally a minor disagreeable
incident ; for the whole Institute, it seems to me, it would establish a dangerous
precedent There would be two regrettable consequences. In the first place, the
whole matter would be regarded and reported in Japan as a "victory how-
ever minor. In the second place, a false issue would be substituted for the real
issue For the appearance of my name on Amerasia cannot possibly be the real
issue The character of what I write in Amerasia differs in no definable respect
from what I publish in a number of other journals. The "line" of Amerasia,
as the organ of a group, differs in no way from the "line" which I have been
steadily advocating as an individual, for over a year, in a number of other pub-
lications Accordinglv. for nie to retire from Amerasia under Japanese pressure
would not seriously affect my output of such personal influence as I may have,
but would establish, for the whole Institute, the dangerous precedent that a
single National Council is entitled to influence, for long range, the writings of
staff members of the Institute in other countries.
Reviewing the whole matter afresh, it seems to me essential to reconstruct
the whole "case history" in brief :
(1) Amerasia was planned and launched while I was out of America. I sup-
posed at the time that I was being invited to join the board simply in order to
make it clear that Amerasia was not intended to displace Pacific Affairs or be
a rival to it. There was thus a justifiable reason for asking me to join the
hoard. , , , T T^- ij
(12) I understood that the matter had been discussed between you and Field.
I had no reason to believe you disapproved.
(3) As a member of the board, I have remained throughout a figurehead.
Owing to distance from America, I could not take part in editorial deliberations.
(4) As an individual contributor, what I have written for Amerasia— regard-
less of what Amerasia's "line" is supposed to be— does not differ in any respect
from what I have written for Pacific Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Affairs,
International Affairs, Asia, and so forth. It is not as if I reserve a special
brand of "anti-Japanese" utterance for Amerasia. I have never written anything
that did not come under one of two categories: (a) What I know; and (&) what
I think Under either category, it is more or less an accident where I publish.
In this connection, it would also be legitimate to recall to the Japanese Council
that I was generallv considered, a few years ago, to be on the whole a "realist'
whose views could 'be, and were, quoted in support of Japanese policies. Any
subsequent changes in these views have come about since I have been under the
full influence of the IPR, with access to the material furnished by all of its
national councils and research undertakings.
(5) Coming to the actual question of resignation, it seems to me that either:-
(ff) I should have been requested not to join the board of Amerasia in the first
place- or (6) I should have been requested to resign some months ago, in order
to forestall Japanese criticism; or (c) I might be requested to resign a few
months hence, in order to avoid the appearance of successful Japanese inter-
vention in the affairs of an American publication catering to American readers.
(6) A graceful compromise, possibly, might be the publication of a paragraph
in an early number of Amerasia, to the effect that I have been obliged, owing
to pressure of work consequent upon taking up a new position at Johns Hopkins,
to withdraw temporarily from the editorial board.
Would you let me know what you think of this? Bear in mmd, of course,
that any personal sensitiveness on my part is not to be given undue considera-
tion I want the particular aspects of the case to be put on record, but this does
not mean that I want the particular aspects to be allowed to distort the general
aspects However, it would be a legitimate method of bringing the particular and
the general into focus, I think, to ask the Japanese Council whether their pro-
posed ban will immediately or ultimately be extended to such Pacific Council
officers and International Committee chairmen as Dafoe, in his editorial capac-
ity • Walsh, as editor of Asia, and Hubbard, as a publicist.
Passing on to the question of efforts to secure Japanese collaboration on Pacific
Affairs I am sending vou such copies of correspondence as I have available here.
This is all of recent date, owing to the fact that I have not had all permanent
records with me since leaving Peiping. Helen Wiss, however, could furnish you
with more from the New York files of copies of my correspondence. Holland
should also be consulted, as he has labored incessantly to get Japanese material
for us.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3581
One minor point, in conclusion: Tour reference tn tha ni-Hni^ «wi <- -n-
Pays for Japanese Rule" in the June number of Pn^ifi. xL^^ ^\^^^. ^^''^^
fied my responsibility as a translator? but i^t as a c^mment.^^^^ '•*^^''";
material, you and I and others have so often deplored ' """^ ^^ Japanese
Youi-s very sincerely,
(Signed) Owen Lattimore.
Exhibit No. 566-B
WLH
300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. E. C. Carter, Baltimore, Aid., March 20, mi.
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, Netv York City.
Dear Carter : Our June issue will approximately mark the fourth anniversnrv
art cfe'^'fth!^ ^'^^"'"- \ *^"^^ '' ^«"1^^ be appropriate for me to wiSe the leS
aitic e of the Lssue under some such title as "Four Years," reviewing the hi^to?v
and development of the war and estimating its present potentSmies" ^
Since this issue will be the first after thapassing of the Lease Lend Bill I thinl-
he Sn^i'""-'''^'-! "' '■'''' ''''''''' ^«"1^^ ^'^^ lil^^ ^^ articl^that wou d'cas? up
the leckoning on America. Where does she stand, how did she get there whe?e
excfusi^eiv f 'T \nT = ?" ''^^"■''^^^ ^^-^t^^ «^ '"^"^^ «" ^^-"^^le would key it'aTmos?
.IITI / *'' *^^ Atlantic and Great Britain. For Pacific Alfairs we need some-
one who has an expert knowledge of the Far East and a comprehensive unde?
0 RussH B;fS'Vh^f."^f ''^^"'} "^^ 'I'''''' '" ^'^^•«^^^' t« *^^ ^'"ited s7ate?S
to Thi? suoi^Lfn^.^^^T? '^ '"'''° ^ "i^"" "1^^ ^^ ^^' ^- ^- ^i'^^^"- ^^^ould you agree
M-f ^ n if ,^^- ^^ '^'^ cannot get Bisson, what would you think of Kate
Mitchell : She has not the first-hand knowledge and authority Oiat Bisson has
Pacific'AffaiJs ■''' '°^ ^-^^'^P^tent mind, and she would be a new contriCor to
me^Un^'^ The^Tof ?*?"'^ ^'''' 'T^ '^^^^^ photographs from the Princeton
Sn nnf^w f ''f- ""''^ ""r"'^^ "" beginning, as I have to work slowly in
broken patches of spare time.' I am sorry that these pictures were taken on a
TWpf' T^?^ '^r'' ^^"^ "" ^^'^-^ *b^ negatives were Lt separatefy numbeied
Therefore the only way of identifying each picture is bv these sample prints
So I sugges that you mark lightly on the back of each print how manv copies
you would hke. Send them back to me, and I'll gradually fill up the complement
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
^^^, Exhibit No. 366-C
xLCC
Extract From Letfer Dated San Francisco, April 18, 1935, Owen Lattimobe
to Catherine Porter
1 find around here that the knowing Mr. John Thompson of the San Francisco
L>aily Aews has an explanation of the Moscow trials which is widely accepted
It IS simply that Stalin is getting rid of all the people "who knew him when" so
as to monopolize control of the political machine. To me this simply does not
make sense because even from the little I know of the personalities of 1917 1918
3582 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
it is clear that a number of the people who have since come to be classified as Old
B^sheviks did not properly belong to the famous closely welded core of the Co^^
munist Party. On the contrary, many of them were radicals who belonged to
urfringe of the Party and many of them had already been known for years as
ob'^tinate ijartisans of one or another varmnt theory.
As a leLler, I should like to find a good article on the Who s Who of the Old
BoTseviks, sorting out who was really a close follmver ot Lenin '^"^l ^^'^^^ ^Jf ,f
more or less loosely harnessed sidekick whom only Lenin's genius could keep pull-
higtn the traces. As an editor. I don't know whether I should prompt anyone
to'write such an article at the present time.
Initialed: "ECC."
Exhibit No. 566-D
300 GILMA^- Hall. Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., January 9, 1939.
Mr. L. V. Haroxdar, .^ „ , ^.
CoiinvU of the U. 8. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations rr ^ v r
20 Razin Street, Moscoiv, U. 8. S. R.
Dear AIr. Harondar: Thank you very much for the copy of your letter to Mr
Holland of December 13th. The "Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the
Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R." arrived in due course and I am arrang-
ine- to have it noticed in Pacific Affairs. ^ ., .■ ^.^
Please let me know if there is any possibility at all of Soviet contributions to
Pacific Affairs We have now grown in circulation, and I think in infiuence to
fie highest e -el since Pacific Affairs has been published. This makes all the
more c^onspicuous the lack of Soviet contributions. It ^-ould greatly improve our
position if we could have, from time to time, articles directly sponsored by the
Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
With warm good wishes for the New Year.
Yours very sincerely, ^^^ ^^^^ Lattimore.
OL : Y.
Exhibit No. 566-E
Pacific Affairs
Royal Institute of International Affairs,
10 St. James Square,
London, 8. W. I., 2d November 1936.
Frederick V. Field, Esq.,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
NeiD York City, U. S. A.
Dear Fred- There is one by-product of my Canadian trip that I wished I could
havltalked over with you before leaving. I found both in Montreal among the
hfgh up head offic^ executives of Canada's nearest imitation of New Yoi-k, and
among the evil servants and not quite head of department administrators of
mtawa an extremelv lively interest in Chinese communism and in the crisis
Confronting The Nanking government. When I started to talk I had a few
geS ?as suci as t£e theory that the Nanking government would go on
fommomis^ng up to the last desperate moment rather than risk everything on an
oSm resiftance! and also a very strong feeling that the Communists because
S their e?hS^ to resistance and their repeated ofi:ers of a united front have
been gaining the support of ordinary democratic and patriotic nationalists as
wen a?of Marxists. These general impressions I had not ^^-^-"f^d in anyexy
nrecise manner As a result of questions asked, etc.. 1 tound m>selt giadually
SS- the Swing position, of the correctness of which I am not qinte sure. I
should be grateful f?r any criticisms, either your own or those of Chen and
^^The^neople who are most active in making the position in China, are not any of
the ChS parties but the Japanese. They have worked with gi-eat ski 1 on
maxims derived from a close study of the older Chinese history and particularly
S fm asions from the northern frontier. Owing to the strong ^^l^^'^l^f ^f i>, ^t^|
twentieth century of many factors that were operating m the history of China
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3583
before the nineteenth century, they have succeeded in reproducing with remark-
able accuracy the familiar phenomenon of the breakup of China under barbarian
invasion. They know how to strike along the lines of regional cleavage and also
along the lines of cleavage between the country-landlord-scholar-gentry and the
peasantry. In this way they have apparently justified the good old contention
that the Chinese are an antiquated people with no cohesion or solidarity of any
modern kind.
Actually this kind of thing can only be pushed up to a certain point, because in
spite of the survival of old factors, there are also new factors at work which
beyond a given point influence developments increasingly rather than decreas-
ingly. What I mean is that the Japanese although using troops and armaments
of a modern kind could invade China on the archaic plan of invasion, but when it
comes to consolidating the conquest the old precedents fail and they find the
foundations of triumph crumbling under them as in Manchuria. The archaic con-
quest cannot provide dividends of a modern kind.
When we consider the whole process from the side of Nanking we see more
clearly the interaction of old and new factors. Nanking facing the Japanese
invasion has all the regional and social weaknesses of the old order in China,
but it also has other weaknesses of a different kind which are due to the fact
that the Nanking government represents primarily those elements in China
which correspond to Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and so on in Japan, but which are less
highly developed than their Japanese counterparts. They stand for the in-
vasion of the older China by a capitalism modeled on that of Western countries
and capable of undercutting western and Japanese capitalism in open competi-
tion, but not so strong as foreign capitalism in its control of political and
military auxiliaries.
The instinct of the interests represented by Nanking is to play for time in
which to develop up to the Japanese level of strength. This is hopeless. The
Japanese, because they have advanced further on a line of development parallel
to that of the Nanking Chinese, can always prepare for invasion more rapidly
than Nanking can prepare for resistance. Nanking, squeezing its eyes tightly
shut and cling to the hope of a resistance always deferred to some future date,
naturally compromises in various directions. Of these the most nearly practical
is the line of working for foreign support on the theory that some such nation
as America or England will eventually decide that it is better to support Nanking
than to acquiesce in the total Japanese conquest of China.
In the circumstances the tactics of the Japanese are to keep pushing Nanking
from one partial surrender to another while their strategy is to refrain from
making the pressure so high as to startle any other nation into active alliance
with Nanking or to stampede Nanking itself into desperate resistance. Nan-
king has already yielded so much that in the event of resistance leadership
would pass rapidly to the Communists. This is the last thing that the Japanese
want. They know that in the first set battle they could shatter the regular
battalions of Nanking; but the remnants would then be raised up under Com-
munist leadership and resistance would spread over the whole countryside.
Then the Japanese would be at war with a continent and would have to dis-
perse their armed forces over a tremendous territory. What Japan wants
is to keep Nanking's armies intact in order not to have to fight the Com-
munists. The showdown will come at a moment, which the Japanese are at
present deferring as much as Nanking itself. The Japanese have involved
themselves in a tremendous gamble in which their hope of success rests entirely
on the possibility of edging Nanking step by step into a position in which
it will appear a hopelessly bad bet for either British or American support.
Then, at a moment which will have to be very carefully prepared, the Jap-
anese will unmask their final ultimatum and risk everything on the assump-
tion that Nanking will capitulate and not make a pseudo-Samson gesture of
pulling down the pillars of the temple. They will then be able to use Nanking's
armies with only a stiffening of their own troops to crush Communism, and
so be able to hold their own main forces mobile and in reserve. The program
may involve the elimination of Chiang K'ai Shek, which the Japanese have so
frequently threatened, but obviously it is based on the assumption that they
can reach a point of indirect control at which thev can tip over Chiang K'ai Shek
without spilling the rest of Nanking into the lap of the Communists.
In the circumstances the hope of the Communists must lie in the precipitation
of a war in which Nanking will take the lead at first, only to be defeated and
to let the leadership lapse for the Communists to take over. If they succeed,
the situation will not be parallel to either Manchuria or Abyssinia, as many
3584 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
people assume. In Manchuria the armies of Chans Hsueh-liang held together
long enough to prevent general popular resistance from getting underway, and
also the situation was clouded by the sham intervention of the League of Na-
tions. In Abyssinia the quaint emperor, knowing that his position in his own
country was more that of a conqueror than that of a genuine national ruler,
was unable to rely on the dispersed tribal resistance that alone could have
bogged down the Italians' advance, but bent every effort to the creation of a sham
modern army which gave the Italians exactly what they needed: a chance to
attack a fixed focus of resistance; and this resistance lasted long enough to
let the Italians get so far into the country that popular and tribal resistance
became hopeless.
In the present situation in China the existence of the Communists alters every-
thing. If the resistance is begun soon enough— that is before the Japanese
have got in far enough so that they can use Nanking and its armies as a shield
to carry before them in fighting the Communists — Tlien the kind of war that
would result would be more nearly parallel to the civil wars and wars of inter-
vention in Russia. Once the formal armies of Nanking were cracked in the
absurd effort to meet the Japanese on ground on which the Japanese are in-
finitely superior, the private soldiers and many of the noncommissioned and
junior ofticers of the defeated armies could be raised up again and combined
with the peasants and workers to build up a genuine national resistance. The
Japanese would no longer be fighting bankers and factory owners, whose great
wealth made them nervous and ready to compromise, but would be at war
with mud huts and impoverished farms, against which the use of tanks and air-
planes would involve a maximum expenditure of wealth for a minimum acquisi-
tion of wealth. In such a situation the Cliinese Conununists would actually be
better off than the Russians were to start with ; for the first Red armies were
led by amateurs, while the Chinese would have from the beginning veteran mili-
tary and political organizers and a nucleus of hardbitten partisan armies already
inured to that kind of war.
How much of all this lucubration is approximately sound?
England is appallingly depressing. We are living in one of those incredible
English suburban houses that make you feel like a furniture maggot. I start
my Russian lessons on Monday and that is the only cheerful prospect in sight. I
have already interviewed the man and he seems to promise an intelligent, com-
petent and rapid approach, which will give results. For everything else I sub-
scribe to the pronouncement of Wardsworth : "England is a fen of stagnant
waters." Tlie national fog includes the newspapers. George Taylor said m
his last article for us that there is a conspiracy of silence in the press about the
real issues in China. The same is true of Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and the
Soviet Union. The London metropolitan press no longer deserves its immense
nineteenth century reputation. It is not that the news is fabricated but that
it is distorted and partially suppressed in such a manner that the true signifi-
cance of events does not come through. ^ ^ ,
The other night w^e went to an extremely interesting dinner of the Central
Asian Society, the membership of which is, of course, exaggeratedly die-hard but
which has more significance at the present moment than it did a few years
ago The speeches were rabid. Sir Francis Lindley, formerly Ambassador to
Japan, said that the real issue in the Far East was not between the survival of
China or the conquest of China by Japan, but between the conquest of China
by Japan or by Communism. In such a choice the British interest must ob-
viously lie with Japan. This noble sentiment was loudly hear-heared. It is
true that Lindley is said to be disgruntled because he was not reappointed to
Japan, and that tlie meeting was strictly private and not reported to the press,
but it is also true that every one present regarded him as speaking for the or-
dained leaders of the British people. You will be pleased to hear that Eleanor
and I were presented to this choice assemblage from the speakers' table and
our names applauded. However, I had the pleasure of exchanging paralysed
expressions with Dame Rachel Crowdy during the speeches.
All the best from this bedraggled company.
Yours. ,-,. ,, ^
(Signed) Owen Lattimore.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3585
Exhibit No. 566-F
(Hand-made letters: IPR)
The Johns Hopkins University,
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
Office of the Director,
,, „, Baltimore, Md., January 10, 1951.
Mr. William L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Bill : Thank you for your letter of December 13, and for sending me an
advance copy of the collection of documents on Soviet Far Eastern Policy com-
piled by William Mandel. I have not had time to go through the documents
but I read with interest the introductory chapter by Max Beloff I noted
particularly his definition of the two methods of studying Soviet relations with
other countries : either setting out the Soviet record "as the Russians see it" •
or attempting to give a more rounded presentation by giving something of the
context in which the Russians behave as they do.
I have passed the copy over to E. H. Carr, who is a visiting lecturer here
for a couple of months. I have not yet had his comments, except for the fact
that when I gave him the copy, he remarked that he thought that in general
Mandel was apt to be lacking in a critical approach.
From what I have seen of Beloff's work, he is a careful scholar, and I am
therefore much interested in your proposal to get a later and more extended
analytical study from him, together with a collection of documents.
Sincerely as ever,
(s) Owen
(t) Owen Lattimorje, Director.
Exhibit No. 566-G
Pencilled in : "WLH— You will find this good reading, ECC."
300 Oilman Hall, The Johns Hopkins University,
,, . T^ J^aitimore, Md., October 11, 1938.
Mr. A. J. Grajdanzev,
San Francisco.
Dear Andrew : As usual, I have let several letters from you accumulate before
replying, but I hope this will not deter you from continuing to write often
because I find them extremely useful and by referring to them I have formed
a still higher opinion of your judgment of the course of political events all over
the world.
First, however, al)out you and Mary. I think you are doing the right thing
about trying to arrange your own application to get on the quota. It seems to
me that there is a good chance that this will succeed, and if it does it may
simplify the problem for Mary. I am assuming, of course, that you will let
me know without any delay if there is anything whatever that I can do.
Aext, about the bibliography by Nasu, published by the Japan I. P. R. In view
'^,.,.^^.^^ t^^t it simply lists titles with practically no comment on contents I
think It IS unnecessary for us to have a review in PACIFIC AFFAIRS
I have been comparing your last letter with a note from Chen Han-seng, who
ascribes the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist to the lack of political firmness—
especially the lack of a people's front in Czechoslovakia. I assume that since
you also anticipated the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist, either with or without
-tJritish and French support, you must also have detected this weakness. I confess
my own judgment was not so accurate. Up to the last minute it seemed to me
that even the defeatist groups in Czechoslovakia itself and in France and in
c^reat Britain had been maneuvered into a position which made "peace at any
price" impossible.
Naturally I agree with you that even if one had counted on the betrayal of
Czechoslovakia, it would have been impossible to predict the shameless and
intamous manner of the betrayal. This being the case, it is at least a good thing
that Hitler s recent speech told the British whom they may have in their govern-
ment and whom they may not have. This pretty well destroys the Chamberlain
3586 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
claim to "peace with honor" because it so iusoleutly emphasizes the dishonor.
Moreover, the full extent of the British and French defeat is rapidly becoming
visible, and it is a good thing that this should be realized at once. For even the
Chamberlain assumption that Hitler will not be cautiht in a channel which leads
him away from Western Europe and straight toward the Soviet Union is now
being disproved. In fact, the Soviet Union is not being either encircled or
isolated but both its political position and its strategic position have been un-
doubtedly strengthened. Politically the Soviet Union is now free of treacherous
and undependable alliances. At the same time Hitler and Mussolini now have to
face the choice: whether to attack a country which is unmistakably prepared
to defend itself or to go on attacking Great Britain and France, which have
just as unmistakably shown that they can be bullied and robbed. In the circum-
stances, there can hardly be a doubt. It is Britain and France which will lose,
not the' Soviet Union. Moreover, Great Britain and France will have to start
sacrificing their own interests, as the supply of victims like Czechoslovakia and
Spain is running out. (Even in Czechoslovakia and Spain, of course, it is not
only the Czechs and the Spanish who lose but the British and French also. ) How-
ever, it is possible that the next major encroachments will not actually be in
Western Europe but in the Near East and the Far East. In China it is highly
probable that the Japanese will disguise their failure to secure a sweeping victory
over tlie Chinese by bullying the British and French out of Shanghai and Hong-
kong, forcing them to close the Canton and Indochina routes of military supplies
to China. In this case what China loses will be nothing to what the British and
French lose, for the Chinese are now in a position in which the supply of foreign
munitions (always exaggerated in importance by most connuentators) is day by
day of less importance than the internal organization of the Chinese people itself.
Lack of British and French support will force the Kuomintang wing of the United
Front to take pi-ecisely those measures which have already been proved effica-
cious in the North and* which the Kuomintang would have avoided as long as it
could rely on British and French aid.
In strategic questions the Soviet Union is also strengthened. It does not have
to defend the awkward salient of Czechoslovakia but can dig itself in on its
own frontier, while any attack from Europe will have to move a long way from
the Fascist centers of strength and pass through the doubtful areas of east
Europe and the Balkans where all kinds of national and other rivalries, though
perhai)s driven underground by the temporary gain of Germany in strength and
prestige, will continue to smolder. In the Far East, also, it is almost to be
hoped that the Japanese will .succeed in taking Hankow — after suitably heavy
losses, of course ; for this would at last demonstrate that even Hankow cannot
be made a "decisive" victory by Japan but only expose the Japanese to increased
perils on both flanks as popular resistance is organized south of the Yangtze and
the already organized popular resistance in the north develops to even more
effective forms of warfare. In this latter regard the taking of Hankow would
divert all or most of the munitions received from the Soviet Union into the
strategic area of the Eighth Route Army which has until now been starved of
them. This means two things : A shorter distance to be traversed from the Soviet
Union, and probably a more effective employment of the munitions by the Eighth
Route Army than by the main armies of Chiang Kai-shek.
In short, dangerous as the situation is all over the world (including North and
South America, where the results of the Munich betrayal cannot but strengthen
agents of reaction) I cannot see any possibility of the simultaneous attack from
east and west which alone could threaten the Soviet Union. There are certain
parallels and of course many differences between the "isolation" of the Soviet
Union and the "isolation" of the United States which I do not know how to assess
properly.
In the meantime, we are settling down very happily here in Baltimore and
looking forward to an extremely interesting winter.
Yours ever,
(t) Owen Lattimobe.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3587
Exhibit No. 556-H
(Initials) CHS. KM.i
SuNsm' Fakm,
Lee, Mass., August 8, 1938.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.
Dear Owen : Needless to say Holland and I appreciated greatly your letter of
the 28th, Fred will be telling you on your arrival in San Francisco of Takayan-
agi's visit and the serious situation which has arisen between the Japanese
Council on the one hand and the Chairman of the Pacific Council and the Secre-
tary General on the other.
Where we have made mistakes we want to rectify them. Where disagreement
is due entirely to misunderstanding we want to get complete understanding. It
is a fairly complicated situation because at the moment British and Dutch
cooperation in the Secretariat Inquiry is partly conditioned by whether or not
the Japanese Council itself cooperates.
Holland and I feel that every possible adjustment should be made that does
not impair either the project or the integrity of the International Secretariat's
capacity to serve all of the Councils. As Fred will have told you Takayanagi was
never more friendly, clear, or sincere. He has made a very deep impression on
me. He has come on a very difiicult errand.
Speaking of Takayanagi, Dr. Dafoe wrote me on July 25th as follows :
"For him personally I have, of course, the highest respect. Privately I have
no doubt he needs our sympathy and understanding ; and to the extent that it
can be done without capitulation, we must show him respect, attention and
consideration."
In view of this situation and in view of the fact that it is a matter of common
knowledge that Amerasia was founded to "take a line," Holland and I feel
that the position of the International Secretariat will be stronger if you drop off
of the board of Amerasia. I have just wired you therefore as follows :
"Many thanks for yours twenty-sixth. Holland self generally support your
view on your role as expert and would not urge you seriously restrict your writ-
ing. But we both feel your official connection with Amerasia is legitimate
Japanese ground for complaint and in view of present strained relations would
urge you consider resigning from board at an early date and for experimental
period of say three months refrain from contributing signed articles to Amerasia."
We hope that this is not making an unfair request. We do not wish you to
restrict your writing except for what we feeel is the expression of rather
definitely provocative personal opinions as in your recent review of the Utley
pamphlet.
Field will doubtless be showing you the papers he has which set forth the
Japanese objections.
Borton has the theory that between the time that the Japanese Council pub-
lished its acceptance of the Secretariat project in the Annual Report of the In-
ternational Association, and the sending of Viscount Ishii's cable of protest to
Dafoe and me, some very stiff action must have been taken against the Japanese
I. P. R. either by the war office or the foreign office.
Yasuo is still optimistic and still believes that, when the Japanese Council
realise that the Inquiry is not intended to name aggressors and is not intended
to make findings and judgments and that we generally desire Japanese coopera-
tion, they will cooperate.
Hoping to hear from you soon, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Caeteb.
88348— 52— pt. 10 21
3588 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 566-1
(Initials) wlh. km. For advice.
300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., March 9, 1939.
Mr. F. V. Field,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.
Dear Fred: Thanks very much indeed for your note about the good old
Amerasia question. You have put very clearly the one essential question : that
my vFithdrawal would be an admission that Amerasia is an activity not in keep-
ing with the work of the IPR or its staff. I guess I was groping toward this,
but had not quite grasped it. I wish I had put it more clearly in my letter to
Carter. This makes it all the more essential, I think, that you and Carter and
I should talk this over altogether at the same time, a thing I do not think we
have yet done.
In the meantime, however, I think that if Chi is appointed to Carter's staff,
you could go ahead and withdraw my name.
(Pencilled in: Agree WLH.)
Very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
OL:Y.
Exhibit No. 566-J
(Pencilled in) "Copies: Tarr, Holland."
Royal York Hotel,
Toronto, November IJf, 1938.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
300 Oilmore Hall, the Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md.
Dear Owen : I have been discussing with Dafoe and Tarr the whole question
of freedom in writing and speaking on the part of members of the Secretariat,
in view of the possibility that the whole matter may be aired at the January
meeting of the Pacific Council. Tarr commented on your role as editor in the
following terms. He does not favor making Pacific Affairs neutral, but rather
making it more lively, fundamental, and provocative. He suggests, for example,
that instead of putting your most challenging articles into Amerasia or else-
where, you put them into Pacific Affairs, sending an advance manuscript to the
Council that might take exception so as to permit of simultaneous publication
of the ablest comment or counter statement by the Council concerned. If it is
absolutely impossible to get the reply in time, provocative articles by the editor
should have a conspicuous foreword indicating that the editor is aware that his
views are likely to be seriously challenged by members of Council, and
that therefore an advance copy of the article has been sent to that Council
with an urgent invitation for a full reply in time for publication in the next
issue. Tarr thinks it is very important to make it clear to the whole I. P. R.
constituency that the editor has made every effort to be inclusive and to get the
fullest and ablest contributions from Japanese and from believers in the Japa-
nese cause, so that if the Japanese do not play ball, there will be prima facie
evidence that they are suffering simply through default.
Tarr and I would like to have your reaction to this proposal. You and Hol-
land and I are in an extraordinarily difficult position as the servants and em-
ployees of eleven Councils with as disparate and antithetical views as charac-
terize these Councils at the present time. It may be that we will have to confess
one day that the I. P. R. was conceived in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of fi*ee
inquiry and that it can no longer be sponsored by Councils in countries where
this tradition has been repudiated. In the meantime, the actual position is
that we are responsible to all eleven Councils and are obliged to do our best
to give the fullest expression to the views they hold.
With reference to your note commenting on McWilliams' letter, I have a ter-
rible feeling that I suggested that you delete the allusion to the fjict that Japan
and Russia have been the least responsive to your repeated appeals for coopera-
tion. In doing so, I was by indirection proposing something which is contrary
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3589
to Tarr's present proposal that we not only continue to invite Japanese contribu-
tions, but publicize the fact that we have repeatedly sought them.
Since talking with Tarr and Dafoe, I have received this copy of your immensely
interesting "hypotlienuse" article with the indication that it has been submitted
to Anierasia subject to my approval. I do not approve of its going to Amerasia
over your signature in its present form, because I do not think it is cricket for
the editor of Pacific Affairs, even in his private capacity, to indulge in ridicule
of the youth of Japan who have been driven off to fight in China. The "flying
trapeeze" paragraph is so gorgeous that I hate to object to it, but object I think
I must.
As a means of making Tarr's suggestion concrete, I am wondering what you
would consider to be the pros and cons of sending this article by the first steamer
to Saionji, indicating that it is the best analysis of the situation you can make
in the light of Asiatic history and present world forces. You could then state
that you would like to publish in the same issue the work of whatever writer
the Japanese Council feels is best qualified to put forward an able challenge to
this thesis, with a view to giving the Pacific Affairs public throughout the world
the soundest possible basis for making up their own minds on the question.
If you should decide to send it, there are one or two other points at which it
should be edited, as at the moment it is addressed to an American and not to an
international audience. My only other comment on the article, which has nothing
to do with the foregoing, is whether in the light of the recent statement by R. A.
Butler, Under Secretary for Foreign xVffairs, in the Hoiise of Commons explain-
ing that the British Government is not planning to invest in reconstruction under
Japanese rule, there should not be a slight twist to the phrase you use on page 4.
Of course, as you have written it, you are very cagey, for you simply say that the
British are "talking about" investing. I do not for a moment believe that Butler's
statement removes the possibility that they may actually do so.
Have you ever dropped in to see the immaculate Suma, Counselor of the
Japanese Embassy in Washington, who was so long in Nanking and such an in-
timate friend of Matsumoto? He is reputed to be an exceedingly able person
and has been abroad enough to know how to state things in terms intelligible to
the western world. Would there be any point in interesting him in writing for
Pacific Affairs, adopting the Chatham House device for Foreign Office reviewers,
a nom de plume?
Sincerely yours,
(t) Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 566-K
October 26, 1936.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square,
London, S. W. I. England.
Dear Owen : Here is a clipping from yesterday's New York Times on a sub-
ject which was of interest to you sometime ago. Can't you find somebody in
London who can write a first rate article on British communications with the
Far East, both commercial and military.
Best regards.
Sincerely yours,
Frederick V. Field.
Exhibit No. 566-L
[Telegram]
Lee, Mass., August 20.
(Initialled: L F )
Owen Lattimore,
1795 California Street,
Saji Francisco, Calif. :
Do not understand Amerasia mix-up on Review but congratulate Axnerasia for
printing it. In view developments here this week desire withdraw at least
temporarily suggestion you resign Amerasia Board. We can discuss that on your
arrival.
E. C. Carter.
3590 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 566-M
300 GiLMAN Hall, Johns Hopkins Universitt,
Baltimore, Md., March 8, 19S9.
Mr. F. V. Field,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.
Dear Fred : Recently Carter wrote to me bringing up once more the question
of my resigning from Amerasia. I have been cudgeling my brains about this
and I wonder if you will agree that the following are the salient i)oints to be
considered :
Carter says that this would be a good time for me to withdraw when the Secre-
tariat is not actually under fire from Japan ; Carter adds that he is considering
giving a Secretariat appointment to Chi ; apparently, as Chi is a Chinese, it would
not be necessary to ask him to resign from Amerasia; at the same time Carter
thinks it would be a bit too much to have two members of the International
Secretariat on the Board of Amerasia, and this is a further reason for asking me
to resign.
Points on the other side :
Your main reason originally for asking me to join Amerasia was that it would
indicate that there was no rivalry between the two publications. This argument
still holds. In fact, if I were to withdraw now, it might be taken to mean that a
strain had developed between Am,erasia and Pacific Affairs.
As regards withdrawing from Amerasia while not under fire, that is a perfectly
good point, but on the other hand, it seems to me that by doing so a perfectly
good bargaining counter would be wasted. If the Japanese dislike my remaining
on Amerasia as much as all that, it might turn out that there would be a quid pro
quo which they would offer to get me off.
Of course, the think taken as a whole is much more psychological than anything
else anyhow. I should hate being hustled off Amerasia by Japanese importunity
when the Japanese are treating free speech and opinion the way they are in their
own country. Yet I also hate the idea of neatly ducking out of the line of fire
during a lull in controversy.
So much for my point of view. What about yours? I wish we could consult,
but failing that I am herewith giving you authority to withdraw my name from
the editorial board of Amerasia if Chi should be appointed to Carter's staff. If
something should go wrong with that arrangement, then the whole question will
not be so urgent and I may have an opportunity to discuss this with you and
Carter at the same time a little later on. I am sending a copy of this letter to
Carter.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
OL: Y.
Exhibit No. 566-N
Pacific Affairs
Published Quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations
In pencil : note and ret. to ECC.
300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., March 8, 1939.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Paciflc Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.
Dear Carter: I am sorry to have taken so long replying to your letter sug-
gesting again my resignation from Amerasia. I have written to Eleanor about
this, and today I have written to Fred Field, as you will see from the attached
carbon copy. The trouble is I am a i>erson of excessively vacillating character,
as you have already discovered, and hate having to make a decision while I am
off on my own without anyone to consult. The letter to Field gives what seems
to me the chief pros and cons of the question. As you see, I have authorized
him to take my name off in case you should confirm your decision to appoint
Chi to your staff. This ought to take care of any emergency aspects of the
ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3591
question, and the other aspects I should like to be able to discuss with you and
Field simultaneously, as you are both concerned in addition to myself.
Yours very sincerely,
(s) Owen Lattimore
(t) Owen Lattimore.
OL:Y.
Exhibit No. 566-P
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, February 15, 1939.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
c/o Presidents House, Q-rinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa.
Dear Owen : In your letter to W. Macmahon Ball of February 6, you write the
following :
"I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the
original with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a
general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can
reprove me when I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentle-
man."
In your Pacific Affairs report to the Pacific Council at I'rinceton you vei7
kindly said :
"Mr. Carter was consulted on all material that differed in the slightest
from the ordinary routine; and this of course meant that his colleagues
were also drawn into consultation."
Under these circumstances and in view of our earlier correspondence, I am
wondering whether the time has not now come for you to withdraw from the
Amerasia board. I remember that you were willing to do so last year, but that I
withdrew my request because I heard that the Japanese were undertaking
economic reprisals against the I. P. R. in San Francisco.
Now that relations are, for the time being at least, established once more on
a basis of confidence and cooperation between the International Secretariat and
the Japanese Council, I am wondering whether it would require any great self-
sacrifice on your part to withdraw from the Amerasia Board.
One of the reasons for my raising this matter at this time is that I am now
inviting Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve for a number of months as a member of the
International Secretariat. For perfectly obvious reasons I do not wish to ask
him to withflraw from the Amerasia Board. I do feel, however, that having
botli you and Chi publicized as on the Amerasia* Board is open to question.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Caktee.
Exhibit No. 566-Q
129 East Fiftt-second Street,
New York' City, August 10, 1938.
Confidential.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.
Dear Owexn : As you will read between the lines, what I am trying to do is :
(1) To make a few minor concessions so as to see whether efforts at face-saving
are efficacious; (2) to clear up misunderstandings between the Secretary-Gen-
eral and Tokyo; (3) to apologize for any mistakes, if mistakes have been made;
(4) to preserve all that is essential.
As you know, from the very start there has been a misunderstanding between
Fred and me about your role on Amerasia. He thought in the very first instance
that my saying that there was no objection to his talking to you about Amerasia
meant that I approved of his inviting you to serve on the Amerasia board. I was
surprised when I first learnt that you had accepted a position on the board.
I was not only surprised but disapproved. I was reluctant to raise the issue at
the time and still am. Why should I be cracking down on free speech when I
am attacking more highly placed persons all over the world for doing the same
thing?
I am particularly eager, if you can conscientiously do so, to have you resign
from Amerasia before the circulation of the next issue which contains a flaming
3592
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
article by Peffer which is likely to be the last straw for many Japanese readers
of Amerasia. This is not to say that I disapprove of Peffer writing that kind
of article, nor do I disapprove of Ameraisa publishing it, but it is the kind of
wholesale condemnatory diatribe which cannot, as I conceive it, be sponsored
by a member of the International Secretariat so long as the Japanese Council
is a full member of the Pacific Council. Needless to say I have not mentioned to
Takayanagi the fact that before his arrival I raised with you the question of
your relationship to Amerasia.
SiBce he has come and from letters from other visitors from Japan, I gather
that some members of the Japanese Council feel that you are not quite fair in
editing Pacific Affairs. I gather that some of them have noted that when Hub-
bard wrote his article criticizing the Soviet Union, you made it possible for an
author, friendly to Russia, to print a reply in the same issue. Also in the June,
1938, issue in which the article by Yanaihara on the Problems of Japanese Ad-
ministration in Korea was printed, there was your editorial comment expressing
another point of view, under the title, "What Korea pays for Japanese Rule."
I think the leaders of the Japanese Council imagine that articles and editorials
critical of Japan have not been submitted to them since the war broke out in time
for them to be able to make comments to be included in the same issue of
Pacific Affairs.
If it is not too much trouble, I wish that you or Mrs. Ward would dig out of
your files pertinent quotations from your letters to the Japanese Council over the
past year and a half or two years, in which I know you have repeatedly asked
them for articles and comments on the articles of others.
At this stage I do not wish you to write to Saionji or any other member of
the Japanese Council, jumping on them for lack of cooperation, but I would like
to have, for private reference, during this next highly difficult fortnight, enough
of the actual record of your dealings with Tokyo to enable me to assure people
like Dafoe, if Takayanagi speaks of Pacific Affairs, that you have worked harder
to get participation from the Japanese Council than from any other member
group.
Sincerely yours, (t) Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 566-R
Publications Meeting
New York, July 9, 19S4.
Present : Barnes
Lattimore
Shiman
Ca rter
Austern
Lasker
Mitchel
Mr. Lattimore produced the statement showing the distribution of Pacific
Affairs as of July 9th, as follows :
Paid
Mem-
bers
Ex-
change
Com-
pli-
men-
tary
Paid
Mem-
bers
Ex-
change
Com-
pli-
men-
tary
Foreign:
6
44
65
71
6
15
9
12
13
14
7
44
325
85
"""135"
'"163'
6
5
20
15
9
11
1
8
1
2
1
1
1
15
11
19
14
6
1
2
18
I
10
Foreign— Continued
Poland
1
2
4
1
1
8
1
60
9
407
Sweden...
1
5
China
Switzerland
Straits Settle-
ments
Spain
7
England
Germany
India
U. S. S. R
Palestine
Domestic:
9
Java - -
105
56
3
3
35
14
New Zealand
Philippine Is-
lands
1£
Denmark
United States...
Grand total,
1941 sub-
scriptions...
10
1
Fiji
1
761
855
138
Hungary
Italy
1
3
1
176
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3593
When Mr. Carter congrratulated Mr. Lattimore on this growing circulation.
Miss Austern remarked with much feeling that subscriptions wei'e all very well
but what could be done when they weren't paid. The China Council, for example,
owes over $125 for subscriptions and won't do anything about it. The members
of Chatham House, on the other hand, are extremely prompt in paying up.
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan are all in arrears in pay-
ments.
Mr. Lattimore next raised the question of Herr Hans Pfotenhauer who has
been writing asking to become the exclusive agent for Pacific Affairs in Germany.
While it would be very desirable to have a German agent, Mr. Lattimore felt that
it would not be wise to give anyone exclusive rights. This opinion was shared by
the others present.
Advertising. — In the matter of advertising in Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lattimore
considered that it would be justifiable and desirable if it were restricted to
publishers and books, on an international basis. A real service could be per-
formed in bringing to the attention of readers in other countries such things as
the publications of the Commercial Press, which gets out a great deal of material
in English about which little is known. Mr. Carter said that he would approve
of the plan subject to two conditions :
(1) That it was not started until it could be done on a really international
basis. By this he did not mean that every country in the I. P. R. should
have to be represented but that at least five major countries should be in-
cluded.
(2) That the advertising be confined to really academic subjects.
Bihliooraphical Section. — Mr. Carter briefly described the present situation
with regard to the preparation of bibliographical material in the Chinese, Japa-
nese and Russian fields for use in Pacific Affairs. While in Peiping he and
Holland had proposed that Nankai University and the National Library in
Peiping should collaborate on the preparation of such material, with the China
I. P. R. acting as coordinator. The matter had also been taken up with the
Communist Academy Library in Moscow, which had agreed to furnish material
in the Russian field. Mr. Holland had an assistant in Tokyo who was working
on the preparation of the Japanese material. Mr. Carter had gone ahead with
these arrangements on the strength of Lattimore's cable to him approving the
idea of a bibliographical section.
Mr. Lattimore said that though he had cabled approval of obtaining critical
bibliographical material in the Chinese, Japanese and Russian fields, he was not
at all convinced that this material should go into Pacific Affairs. If a biblio-
graphical section was to be introduced he would strongly advocate that it take
form of an article analysing, criticizing and commenting on the material rather
than a regulation listing of the books. His aim was to get a wider circulation
for the magazine among the general reading public and he felt that it would
make the magazine unbalanced, as well as scare off the kind of i-eaders he was
trying to attract, to include a large bibliographical section and continue to have
only a few regular articles. A well-written article describing what had been
done in the field of Chinese or Russian studies and estimating the relative im-
portance of the books and articles would be of far greater interest and use to all
except advanced scholars in the field.
Mr. Lasker suggested that it might be possible to do a series of subject
bibliographies over a wider range of time, covering, say, the material appearing
in the last five to ten j-ears.
Mr. Barnes asked whether the Pacific Council could not get out the biblio-
graphical IniUetin as a regular service to In.stitute members and entirely separate
from Pacific Affairs. This might be done from the Central Library in Honolulu.
The material and the critical analysis and selection would have to be done in
each country, but it could be then sent to Honolulu and all that would be neces-
sai-y would be to have a librarian who was able to compile and edit the material
into final form.
Mr. Carter explained that Wellington Liu was preparing a brief bibliography
with the idea of its being used in Pacific Affairs and that it might be advisable
to wait until it arrived and then see what kind of stuff it was and how it could
best be used.
The question was dropped for the moment, to be taken up at later interviews
between ECC and OL.
Mr. Lattimore then brought up the question of Mao's article which he felt
should most certainly be printed in Pacific Affairs though it might cause trouble
in both China and Japan. It would be necessary to condense it somewhat and he
3594 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
suggested that C. C. Wang might be asked to do this. There was general agree-
ment that the article should be printed and the ways and means were left to Mr.
Lattimore to decide.
With regard to the future place of printing Pacific Affairs it was felt that in
spite of the lower costs of printing in both China and Japan, the danger of censor-
ship, tlie pressure of the local group, and similar factors made it more desirable
to continue to print in New York and to find a managing editor to be in charge
whi^e Lattimore was away.
Before the meeting adjourned Mr. Lattimore produced a Ph. D. thesis of a
young Chinese studying at Columbia which he said had aroused very favorable
comment and was considered by many to embody an entirely new analysis and
interpretation of China's economic development. The study is called Key Eco-
nomic Areas in Chinese Histonj, as revealed in the development of public works
for water control. Mr. Lattimore explained that the author, Ch'ao-Ting Chi
was trying hard to raise the money to have it published by the Columbia Uni-
versity Press, so far unsuccessfully, and suggested that possibly the I. P. R.
might consider getting it published. It would have to l>e completely rewritten,
as it was practically vmintelligible in its present form. Mr. Lattimore had
already started revising parts of it and was planning to use a section as an
article for Pacific Affairs.
Exhibit No. 566-S
May 16, 1944.
Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi.
Care of Central Bank of China, Chungking.
Dear Chi : I have not forgotten our conversation last September about the
possibility of your doing something further on your study of wartime economic
developments in China. I hope that the chances of your doing this have now
improved as a result of your new job in the Research Department in the Central
Bank, which ought to give you more opportunity for writing. I should appreciate
hearing from you on this matter. Possibly you could send your reply via Adler
or George Taylor or Owen Lattimore.
Our budget situation is such that I doubt if we could put up more than $750
for this particular work, particularly as we invested so much in the original
project. At present prices I realize that $750 amounts to very little, but I doubt
if we can spare more. It will probably be necessary, therefore, to concentrate
on one or two aspects of the subject instead of trying to complete the whole
book. You might let me know you ideas on this.
If possi])le, I should like to have part of your report available as a document
for the I. P. R. conference which is to be held early next January at Virginia
Hot Springs. We should need to receive it by November 30 at the latest.
How are things going in your new job? I would be interested to learn some-
thing about the program of the Central Bank's Research Department and also
to receive some of its publications. Hsu is still working for us, doing a good
job, but we are very much hampered by the difliculty in getting materials from
China. Clippings seem to be terribly delayed in arriving, probably because they
are detained by the American censorship for copying. Carter and I would be
glad to have your off-the-record comments on developments in the China I. P. R.
Please feel free to talk quite frankly to Taylor and Lattimore about this.
Best Wishes.
Sincerely yours,
(t) W. L. Holland.
Mr. Lattimore, do you recall during the hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee 2 years ago, identifying a letter that
you wrote to JNIr. Joseph Barnes on June 15, 1943 ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I do.
IVIr. Morris. Has a copy of that been given to you this morning ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; it has.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record ? That is
a copy made of the letter that was introduced before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee and which was identified as a letter written
by Mr. Lattimore at that time, and which he now affirms that he did
write to Mr. Barnes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3595
The Chairman. Very well, it may be inserted into the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 567" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 567
111 SuTTEK Street,
San Francisco, Calif., June 15, 194S.
Mr. Joseph Barnes,
Office of War Information,
22Jt West Fifty-seventh Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Joe : In your capacity as a member of our Personnel Security Committee
there are certain things which you ought to know about Chinese personnel. It
is a delicate matter for me to tell you about these things because of my recent
oflScial connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason I am
marking this communication secret.
When we recently reduced the number of our Chinese staff in New York it was
quite obvious that there was going to be trouble and that this trouble would
take the form of accusations against the remaining personnel. The fact is that
certain of the persormel with whose services we dispensed had connections out-
side the office. This leads directly into the main question. It is extremely im-
portant from the point of view of security that intelligence information should
not leak out of our office through our Chinese personnel. It is an open secret in
Washington that the security of various Chinese agencies there is deplorable.
Any pipeline from our office to any of those agencies is not a pipeline but prac-
tically an open conduit.
However, it is not only a question of Chinese Government agencies. There
is also a well-organized and well-financed organization among the Chinese in
this country connected with Wang Ching-wei, the Japanese puppet. This can be
traced back to the history of the Chinese revolution as a whole. To present it
in the fewest possible words : Sun Yat-sen was largely financed for many years
by Chinese living abroad. Not only Sun Yat-sen but Wang Ching-wei had close
connections among the overseas Chinese. However much he is a traitor now,
the fact must be recognized that Wang Ching-wei is a veteran of Chinese politics
with connections which he has nourished for many years among Chinese com-
munities abroad, including those in the United States.
Chinese in the United States come almost exclusively from a few localities on
the coast of China, practically every one of which is now occupied by the Jap-
anese. Thus these Chinese in America have both family connections and finan-
cial investments which are under the control of the Japanese, and because of
his years of political organizing work Wang Ching-wei knows all of these con-
nections and can apply pressure through them.
On the other side there is a special organization within the Kuomiutang or
Chinese Nationalist Party at Chungking which is charged with maintaining
political and financial connections with Chinese overseas. This overseas bureau
also has a detailed knowledge of the Chinese communities in America and is
able to apply pressure. Thus there is a very intense conflict going on every day
in every Chinatown in America between the Wang Ching-wei agents and those
of the Kuomintang. It must be remembered that while the Kuomintang is able
to operate in a private way as a political party among Chinese residents in
America, it is also the party which "owns" the Chinese Government and is thus
able to make use of Chinese Government agencies.
Thirdly, there are numerous Chinese in America who are politically unaf-
filiated. There are, of course. Communists but they have neither the money nor
the organization of the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The genuinely
unaffiliated Chinese are a curious compound product of Chinese politics and
American environment. They tend to be intensely loyal to China as a country,
without conceiving that the Kuomintang or any other political organization has
a monopoly right to control of their thoughts and actions. They are like Amer-
icans; they like to give their political allegiance, not to have it demanded of
them. Thev are reluctant to support a regimented series of causes laid down
for them under orders; like Americans, they often give moral and financial
support to a scattered number of causes, some of which may even conflict with
each other to a certain extent.
The conflict between the Wang Ching-wei' organizing group and the Kuomin-
tang organizing group in America cannot be fought out in the open. Both sides
have very good reasons for not courting publicity. Each is anxious to bring into
its fold as many of the unaffiliated Chinese as possible. Each is also anxious
3596 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
not to be exposed as an "un-American" organization or a foreign political group
working on American soil. Both of them accordingly find it very good tactics
not only to cover up themselves but to put pressure on those whom they are
trying to bring under their control, to accuse unaffiliated Chinese of being Com-
munists. This is an accusation which covers up the accuser at the same time
that it puts pressure on the accused.
One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America
is the New China Daily News in New York. This is controlled by an organiza-
tion of laundrymen. I understand that the shareholders number two or three
thousand and that they take an active interest in the newspaper. The essential
thing about these laundrymen is that in the nature of their business they are
independent small-business men. This means that they are on the one hand fairly
vvell insured against Communist theology, since the small-business man of what-
ever nationality is likely to be a man who had made his way by his own initia-
tive and enterprise and is therefore extremely suspicious of collectivist economic
theories. On the other hand, these Chinese small-business proprietors are reluc-
tant to submit themselves unquestiouingly to the control of the vested interests
which have grown up in China in association with the dominant Kuomintang.
The New China Daily News would probably not come under much pressure if it
were not for the fact that it is one of the best edited Chinese papers in America
v/ith a growing circulation. It does not need to be subsidized or supported by a
patron, like many, perhaps the majority, of Chinese papers. It pays dividends
on its own merits. A number of Chinese language papers in America receive
subsidies from the Kuomintang. At least two, and perhaps three, receive sub-
sidies from the Wang Ching-wei group. One or two others trace back to the
group within the Kuomintang which was at one time headed by the late Hu
Han-min, a leader of the right-wing faction within the Kuomintang. The Hu-
Ilan-min group, though once regarded as right-wing conservatives, are now
regarded in China as "old-fashioned liberals" — liberal, so to speak, short of the
New Deal. They are less bitterly involved in Chinatown politics than the Wang
Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The two latter, which are engaged in hand-
ing out carefully colored news and doctored editorial policies, are intensely
jealous of and hostile to an unaffiliated paper like the New China Daily News,
which, so to speak, flaunts its sins by being so readable that the Chinese public
in America buys it for its own sake.
It would be rash to say that there are no Communists connected with the New
China Daily News. Here it is necessary to consider another peculiarity of the
politics of Chinese living out of China. These Chinese are far from being tied
to the chariot wheels of Moscow ; but when it comes to resisting the trend toward
totalitarian regimentation within China they are often willing to support parts
of the program advocated by the Chinese Communists within China. This is
so much a part of the pattern of politics of Chinese living out of China that
it is not uncommon to find wealthy men, even millionaires, supporting the pro-
gram of the Chinese Communists in whole or in part. This was, for instance,
conspicuous in Malaya before the fall of Singapore. For such prosperous and
independent Chinese it was a question either of backing their independent judg-
ment of the steps that needed to be taken toward creating a working democracy
within China, or of paying financial tribute to the Kuomintang, which sometimes
tends to be autocratic, and not infrequently spurns advice from Chinese abroad
at the same time that it demands their financial contributions.
In the specific setting of America, it is the independent small-business man,
like the laundryman, rather than the very few wealthy merchants who most
conspicuously maintain this tradition of political independence. In America,
some of the most wealthy individuals are either committed to Wang Ching-wei
and his puppet Japanese party or at least are hedging until they have a better
idea of how the war is finally going to turn out.
In the circumstances we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese per-
sonnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists we must be
careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused
of being Communists. We have to be at least equally careful of not hiring
people who ai"e pipelines to the Wang Ching-wei or to one or other of the main
factions within the Kuomintang. After all, as an American Government agency
we should deal with the Chinese Government or regular agencies of the Chinese
Government, but should not get in the position of committing ourselves to the
Kuomintang, the political party which controls the Chinese Government, as if
it were itself the Chinese Government. You will recognize the importance of
this proposition and the delicacy which it requires on the operational level.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3597
For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we
can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand by
the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do
not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else.
Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently
to these requirements. Mr. Chi I l)ave known for many years. Until his family
estates were occupied by the Japanese, he was a wealthy landlord. He was
brought up in the older scholastic tradition in China, before the spread of modern
western education, but at the same time he is keenly interested in the national
unification of China and the orderly development of a stable political organiza-
tion there. I know by long experience that he is anything but a Communist ; I
also know that because of bis seniority, his background of independent wealth,
and his superior mentality he is not a man to be pushed around by party bureau-
crats. Chew Hong is a much younger man, but one whom Dr. Chi trusts and of
whose integrity he is convinced. There is something in their relationship of the
old Chinese standards of disciple and master. As long as Dr. Chi stands in the
relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of
an American Government agency, there will be no difficulty with either men, no
irresponsible playing with Chine.se politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction.
The retention of both men is therefore a guaranty to the secrecy and security
of the work of the OWI as well as a guaranty of the confident fulfillment of di-
rectives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I
know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given time to work on it, I
could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details.
I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to
trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their
source ; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting
rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire people who would actually
be the nominee of factions not under our control.
It is for this reason that I have written this long letter to urge you to report
to our Personnel Security Committee the necessity for exercising pronounced
agnosticism when any of our Chinese personnel are attacked.
In the meantime I am doing my best to check over our Chinese personnel in
San Francisco.
Once more I urge you to observe the strictest coufidonee in acting on this
letter, because in certain quarters it might be considered that I am under a moral
obligation to see that OWI is staffed with Chinese who take their orders from
some source other than the American Government.
. Yours,
Owen Lattimore,
Director, Pacific Operations.
Mr. Morris. Was Chu Hong, ayIio was mentioned in that letter, an
employee of the OWI ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. What position did he hold?
Mr. Lattimore. I don'f remember the classification of his position.
He was an assistant translator to Dr. Chi.
Mr. Morris. Do you know if he was also knowai as Chu Tong?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; that is the same man.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, that is admitted into the record is it
not?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Was there a fixed policy determined by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that the Office of War Information would not engage
in any attacks upon the Emperor or his family ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe there was such a ruling. I don't remem-
ber whether it came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever violate this directive or this ruling di-
rectly or indirectly ?
Mr. Lattimore, No, sir.
3598 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Morris. Did you ever try to make use of an attack by Sun Fu on
the Emperor ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I believe that was quoted in part in a broad-
cast from San Francisco.
Mr. Morris. Were you responsible for that broadcast?
Mr. Lattimore. I was responsible as head of the San Francisco of-
fice; yes.
Mr. Morris. Was not that an attack on the Emperor?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that it was not an attack on the
Emperoi- ?
Mr. Laitimore. My testimony is that it was not. My understanding
is that that ruling was that there should be no American attacks on
the Japanese Emperor. This, as I remember, was criticism of some
sort. I don't remember the wording of the Sun Fu article, nor do I
remember what was quoted. But this was quoted as a Chinese opinion
on the subject.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you felt that
the directive which forbade an attack on the Emperor was a prohibi-
tion against American attacks on the Emperor ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is my belief ; yes.
Mr. Morris. And you felt that you could use this attack by Sun Fu,
inasmuch as it was not an attack by an American on the Emperor.
Mr. Lattimore. I believe it was a criticism of some sort. I am
not sure I would use the word "attack."
Mr. Morris. You would change the word from attack to criticism
of the Emperor ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, or the Emperor system or something. I
would have to see the original wording to remember what it was
all about.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you inter-
preted the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruling that there be no attacks or
criticisms of the Emperor or his family, in such a way that you
felt you could use an attack originated by Sun Fu over the Office of
War Information transmitters ?
Mr. Lattimore. And I believe that that was
The Chairman. I want an answer to that, yes, or no, before you
explain it.
Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "Yes," and I believe that that was
checked with Washington at the time.
Mr. Morris. Did a Mr. Clay Osborne ever protest your actions
in connection with this directive ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Who w^as Clay Osborne at the time?
Mr. Lattimore. He was head of the Japanese desk in San Fran-
cisco.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Of OWI?
Mr. Lattimore. Of OWI ; yes.
Mr. Morris. Did he resign as a result of the difficulty that he had
with you at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he did.
The Chairman. Let me get that answer and that question. Did
he resign as a result of the difficulty that he had with you at that time?
Your answer was "Yes, he did." Is that right ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3599
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I wonder if you would, just for the
sake of completing the record here, answer a few questions in con-
nection with the time you spent out of the country.
Mr. Lattiiniore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You were born in Washington, were you not, Mr.
Lattimore ?
Mr, Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. When did you first leave the country, as a* child?
Mr. Lattimore. At the age of 10 or 11 months, I believe.
Mr. Morris. Where did you go then ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. Where or when? My parents took me to Shang-
hai, China.
Mr. ]\Iorris. How long did you remain in China ?
Mv. Lattimore. Untir, I think it was 1912,
Mr, Morris. Then you left China and you went to what country?
Mr. Lattimore. Then I left China and went to Switzerland, where I
was in school for 2 years.
Mr. Morris. That would be from 1912 until 1914.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. And you were at that time, 12 and 14 years of age. '
Mr, Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. You were born in 1900.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. When did you then come back to the United States?
Mr. Lattimore. I first came back to the United States in 1928, I
would say.
Mr. Morris. Wiere were you from 1914 to 1928?
Mr. Lattimore. In 1914 I went to England and I remained at
school in England until very near the end of 1919, and then made an
attempt to go back to China via America, but owing to the postw^ar
shipping shortage in England, I was able to get a passage via Suez
before I could get one via America, so I went back to China via Suez,
arriving there at the end of 1919. I remained in China until 1926,
when I started on a journey overland, through Mongolia and Chinese
Central Asia, into India, which I reached toward the end of 1927.
My wife and I then spent the winter of 1927-28 principally in Rome,
Italy. Then we returned to America through France and England.
Mr. Morris. When did you marry, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. 1926.
Mr. Morris. And you married Eleanore Holgate ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. That brings us up to what year?
Mr. Lattimore. 1928.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Where were you in 1928, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Latitmore. In 1928, the beginning of 1928, I was in Italy.
Then I returned through France and England to this country.
Mr, Morris, And that was now late 1928?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I think it was the spring of 1928. May I check
with my wife on that ?
Mr. Morris. How long did you stay in the United States?
Mr. Lattimore. Until 1929, when 1 went out to China and Man-
churia.
Mr. Morris. How^ long did you stay in China and Manchuria?
3600 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. Until the summer of 1933.
Mr. Morris. And it was then that 3^011 first made arrangements to
be the editor of Pacific Affairs ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; in the summer of 1933 I came back to this
country and then 1 went up to Banff to the conference of the IPR
in Canada, then in the fall we went to New York, and it was hi the
late fall of 1933 that Mr. Carter took up the question of my becoming
editor of Pacific Affairs.
Mr. Morris. How long did you remain in the United States from
that time ?
Mr. Lat'iimore. In the fall of 1934 I went back to China.
Mr. Morris. And how long did you stay in China on that tour?
Mr. Lattimore. Through 1935 and until the spring of 1936, when
I returned to the United States via Russia, Holland, and England.
Mr. Morris. During the period of 1934 to the last time, did you ever
encounter a man named Thompson, an attorney who was a partner of
Clarence Darrow ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Morris. You don't believe so ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall that name at all.
Mr. Morris. Will you continue with that itinerary, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. Then
The Chairman. You have him up to what, now ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. 1936. In the fall of 1936 I went to London, where
I stayed for between 3 and 4 months, and then at the beginning of
1937, my wife and I returned to China via the Suez, and we remained
in China from the spring of 1937 until about the beginning of De-
cember 1937. We then returned to the United States.
Mr. Morris. You stayed in the United States until
Mr. Lattimore. We stayed in the United States, let me see, I think
it was almost Christmas 1937 when we arrived in San Francisco, and
we remained in the LTnited States until 1941, when I went out to China,
at least I think that is right. No; 1939, I made a journey to — we
spent the summer vacation in Sweden and Norway.
Mr. Morris. And then you stayed in the L^^nited States?
Mr. Lattimore. And then stayed in the United States until 1941
when I went out to China to work for Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. Morris. And you say that you had booked a passage on De-
cember 7, that is December 8 across the date line, for Hong Kong ?
Mr. Latitmore. From Hong Koug.
Mr. Morris. You had booked passage from Hong Kong, but at that
time you were in Chungking ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was in Chungking ; yes.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever go to Hong Kong ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't. I was to fly from Chungking to
Hong Kong and catch the Pan American Clipper there.
Mr. Morris. And you say your passage from Chungking to Hong
Kong was canceled ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. What was the reason for the cancellation, Mr. Latti-
more ?
Mr. Lattimore. In the small hours of the morning, one of the
Generalissimo's aides rang me up and told me that Pearl Harbor had
been bombed and that I shouldn't go to Hong Kong.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3601
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you here a list of writings com-
piled by tlie Library of Congress, writings of yours. I ask you if you
will take these. There is no need to do it now, but take these and
check to see that that is a fair list and that everything purportedly
written there by you actually was written by you, and then so advise
the committee. Then we might like to have that, Mr. Chairman, intro-
duced into the records as a list of Mr. Lattimore's writings.
Mr. Lattimore. There seems to be a Mexican edition of one of my
books. I didn't know that existed.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you make the offer on that at a later time, after
it is checked by Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Morris. Yes ; I will.
The Chairman, It will have to be.
Mr. Morris. Now, just one other thing, you have a son David Latti-
more, have you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Did he attend the World Youth Festival in Prague in
1947?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he did.
Mr. Morris. Did you aid him in making plans to attend that?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. Well, actually, he went with a school group.
And the plans were made through the school.
Mr. Morris. Was the World Youth Festival, as far as you know, a
Communist project?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; we didn't understand it to be so at the time.
There were delegations from all kinds of non-Communist countries.
Mr. Morris. Have you subsequently found out that it was a Com-
munist project?
Mr. Lattimore. No. The Communist delegations were very active
at the time, but I wouldn't be able to characterize it as a Communist
project.
Mr. Morris. Do you know who accompanied David on that trip?
Mr. Lattimore. Several people from his own school.
Mr. Morris. Wlio were they ?
Senator Eastland. What school was it?
Mr. Lattimore. The school was Putney School in Vermont, and the
head of the school, Mrs. Hinton, also went to Czechoslovakia that
summer.
Mr. Morris. Wlio was Bertha Hinton ?
Mr. Lattimore. Her daughter.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Bertha Hinton was the one who
was the identifying witness who gave the State Department, when he
applied for his passport, gave him an affidavit of indentification ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't know that. Bertha Hinton was a daugh-
ter-in-law of Mrs. Hinton, not a daughter.
Mr. Morris. How was she related to Joan Hinton ?
Mr. Lattimore. Joan Hinton was her daughter. They were sisters-
in-law.
Mv. Morris. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson?
Senator Ferguson. What did you learn about this youth meeting
that your son went to ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not very much.
3602 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Did you try to learn something about it before
your son went?
]\Ir. Lattimore. We wrote to a woman in the Y^^CA, in New
York — wasn't it ? And asked about the World Youth Congress, and
she wrote back that they did not consider it Communist and they were
sending a delegation from the YWCA.
Senator Ferguson. That is the search that you made before you
allowed your son to go?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. How old was your son at the time ?
Mr. Lattimore. 1947 — that would be 16.
Senator Ferguson. Wlio went with your son ?
Mr. Lattimore. He went with the school group.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know a boy by the name of Michael
Sloan?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he was a schoolmate of my son's.
Senator Ferguson. Did he go ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he went.
Senator Ferguson. Had your son traveled alone before on trips
like this?
Mr. Lattimore. He had gone on school trips.
Senator Ferguson. Abroad ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not abroad; no.
Senator Ferguson. This is the first time abroad ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Who paid his expenses ?
Mr. Lattimore. We did.
Senator Ferguson. Not the school ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not the school ; no.
Senator Ferguson. Did you investigate the meeting afterward?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. So your inquiry was to the YMCA.
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And they said it was not a Communist meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And the son went, and came back, and that is
all you know about it?
Mr. La^fitmore. That is right.
Mr. Arnold. Y^VCA, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Was it the YWCA?
Mr. Lattimore. YWCA, yes.
Senator Ferguson. How many people went from the United
States?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have any idea?
The Chairman. Well, he does not know.
Senator Ferguson. I did want you to hnd in this report that you
handed me, on page 76, you state it starts, a report on the Moscow
meeting ?
Mr. La'itimore. No, there is no — I wrote no specific report on the
Moscow meeting.
Senator Ferguson. You did not even mention it, did you ? I think
I went over every line.
The Chairman. You are referring to what ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3603
Senator Ferguson. A report that lie brought in today, saying that
I had requested the report that he referred to in his statement, no, it
is in his book, Ordeal by Slander, that he obtained up at New York,
from Mr. Carter.
Mr. Lattimore. It was before I came back from Afghanistan. My
wife was given it by Mr. Carter.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, but where is the report that your wife was
given by Mr. Carter ?
Mr. Lattimore. This is it.
Senator Ferguson. About INIoscow ; where is the Moscow matter in
there ?
Mr. Lattimore. This is simply a general report presented at the
international meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1936,
and it takes up the whole question of editorial policy, and gives the
point of view of various countries.
The Chairman. You have been asked for the report of the Mos-
cow meeting. Is it in there?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; there is no report on the Moscow meeting. Mr.
Carter's report is also in this volume, and he mentions it.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the report was printed?
Mr, Lattimore. In 1936, I presume.
Senator Ferguson. "When were you in Moscow ?
]Mr. Lattimore. In the spring of 1936. This was printed after the
Yosemite meeting.
Senator Ferguson. We have what purports to be minutes of the
Moscow meeting, and I understood that you had a report that you had
made on the Moscow meeting. Where is anything in here about the
Moscow meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
The Chairman. What did you call for. Senator, when you asked
him to bring in this exhibit that he has in his hands?
Senator Ferguson. I understood that he had some minutes or he had
a report that he made on the Moscow meeting.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; that is a misapprehension.
Senator Ferguson. Then you have none on that?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I never wrote one.
Senator Ferguson. You never made one ?
Mr. Lattimore. Never made one, no.
Senator Ferguson. Did anybody else ever make one ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Carter here, in his report as Secretary General,
to which my report as editor is appended, states :
Since tlie Banff conference, I have visited the Soviet Union three times, In
June and December 1934, and again in April 1936. In addition to long confer-
ences with members of the Soviet Council regarding problems of r&search, pub-
lication, administration, conference preparation, finance, library exchanges and
participation in Pacific Affairs, the Soviet Council has arranged for me to visit
the headquarters of a number of research institutions working on Far Eastern
and Pacific problems —
et cetera.
Senator Ferguson. He does not mention you being there.
Mr. Lattimore. No; he does not mention anyone except himself.
Senator Ferguson. Is that all he says about the Moscow meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. Do you remember if there is anything else there?
Mr. Morris. May I ask one question while we are waiting?
88348 — 52— pt. 10 22
3604 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Tne Chairman. Yes. I am trying to get this exhibit connected up
here. The Senator from Michigan called for his writing on the Mos-
cow meetings, as I understand it.
Senator Ferguson. You did not understand that that is what I
wanted ?
The Chairman. He brought this exhibit in saying this is what the
Senator called for,
Mr. Lattimore. Here is part of Mr. Carter's report, page 144, the
heading is "Editor of Pacific Affairs." [Reading :]
During the winter following the Banff conference, Mr. Lattimore spoke before
the branches of the Canadian Institute in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Hamil-
ton and at the Empire Club in Toronto.
During 1935 he spol<e before IPR groups in Honolulu ; Pan-Pacific Club, Shang-
hai ; the Rotary Club and the College of Chinese Studies. Peking.
In 1936 he spoke at the Academy of Science, INIoscow, and under IPR auspices
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. He also lectured at the Royal Anthropological
Institute, the Central Asian Society, and the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, in London.
Senator Ferguson. That does not give us a report on the meeting
that the IPR had with the Russians in Moscow, does it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that is covered, sir — there is simply some
reference to long conferences.
Senator Ferguson. What paire was that on?
Mr. Lattimore. Page 23, I think.
Senator Ferguson. I do not want to put the whole book in the
record. Will you read that ?
The Chairman. Does that refer to a Moscow meeting ? Does your
answer say that the book refers to the Moscow meeting?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, it mentions April 1936.
Senator Ferguson. What does it say?
Mr. Lattimore. It is the section that I read about before.
Senator Ferguson. You read it. All right, it is in the record.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. And there is
Senator Ferguson. The correspondence in the minutes seemed to
show a turning point in the activities of the IPR. Where did you
ever make a report to the trustees about that turning point?
Mr. Lattimore. A turning point?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You remember the testimony, where they
talked about the party line.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, it isn't the party line.
Senator Ferguson. Well, they talked about a line.
Mr. Lat^itmore. They talked about an anti-Japanese line. They
talked about mentioning Japan as an aggressor.
Senator Ferguson. And afterward, you struck certain paragraphs,
because they were critical of communism. You put editor's notes in
certain articles afterward. Where did you ever report to the trustee
about the change of the course that IPR was going to have ?
Mr. Lattimore. There was no change of course, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. When did you report to the trustees ?
Mr. Lattimore. The only report that I recall ever writing is the
one that is in this volume here.
Senator Ferguson. And that begins on page 76.
Mr, Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. And there is not a word about the Russian
conference in Moscow, is there ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3605
Mr. Lattimoke. No, there is a reference, however, to the different
points of view about publication of controversial articles, and the
question of editorial responsibility, the question of the functions and
powers of national correspondence, and so on.
The Chairman. The question is, is there any word about Moscow?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever report to the trustees on the
Moscow conference?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, you were in India in 1949, were you
not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Morris. While in India, did you meet with Mr. Nehru?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I did.
Mr. Morris. How long was your meeting with Mr. Nehru ?
Mr. Lattimore. I landed in New Delhi at dawn, I had lunch that
day with Mr. Nehru. Then I saw Mm once or twice at public re-
ceptions. I also
The Chairman. How long was your meeting with Mr. Nehru, is
the question, and I think you can state that in terms of time.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I remember having dinner with him twice,
and staying for a considerable period after dinner talking. I
wouldn't be able to say exactly how much in hours.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, who arranged your luncheon appoint-
ment with Mr. Nehru ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe the Indian Ambassador here, his sister,
Madame Pandit, telegi-aphed out to him that I was coming and he
was therefore notified as soon as I arrived.
Mr. Morris. Did you see Mr. Solomon Trone in India?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Morris. Was he instrumental in arranging any of the meetings
with Mr. Nehru ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; he was not. On one occasion Mr. Nehru, at a
reception, at his house, took me and Mr. and Mrs. Trone and his
top Indian economics adviser into a small room and we sat there
and talked for about maybe a half hour or an hour.
Mr. Morris. Did you proffer any advice to Mr. Nehru on the
policy that India should take ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I was asked some questions about eco-
nomic parallels between India and China and responded to those ques-
tions.
JNIr. Morris. Did you leave any memoranda with Mr. Nehru?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Morris. I have no more questions along those lines.
The Chairman. I sent a note down to counsel just a minute ago.
Maybe he cannot read my writing. I would not blame him if he
didn't.
Mr. Arnold. Monday would be very, very inconvenient, and I
couldn't make it. It would be very inconvenient.
The Chairman. Very inconvenient?
Mr. Arnold. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Monday is the regular meeting day of the Ju-
diciary Committee.
3606 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Gentlemen, we will have to recess this committee at this time, on
account of other matters that must be taken up. Mr. Sourwine will
want to interrogate this witness for several hours on questions that he
has prepared growing out of the record. We will be unable to meet
on Monday, if counsel cannot be here conveniently, and just what
day we can meet on account of the other connnittees, the Chair is not
able to state at this time. But counsel will be advised in ample time
so that he can be here at his convenience. We will try to meet your
convenience.
Mr. Arnold. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Chairman, and any
other day but Monday of that week
The Chairman. We will try and work it out. This committee also
has its members on appropriations and other committees and they
are meeting from time to time. We have to try and straddle the time
so as to get in as much time on this and wind it up as quickly as possible.
Is there any suggestion as to time? I do not like to put it to the
call of the Chair, because that is an indefinite time, and yet that is
about the only way that I can put it at this time, in view of the fact
that we can't make a date certain. Would that be satisfactory to
you, Counsel?
Mr. Arnold. Yes, sir; there are three of us there. Mr. Fortas is
in Texas. The other gentleman is before the Commission, and I have
some rather important matters to study. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The only way I can express it is that I will call you
at the proper time.
Mr. Arnold. How about the other matter ?
The Chairman. I will make a ruling on this other matter later on.
We will recess subject to call.
(Whereupon, the hearing was recessed subject to call of the Chair.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS
FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1952
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. G.
The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.
Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, and Ferguson.
Also present : Senator McCarthy.
J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee
counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.
The Chairman. The committee will be in session.
Senator Ferguson. Before we start the testimony, Mr. Chairman,
1 would like to ask Mr. Lattimore, do you have the quotations you
mentioned in the statement you read to Freda Utley's utterances that
you say she was pro-Nazi ?
TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS— Resumed
Mr. Lattimore. No; I have not completed my collection on re-
vision of those statements yet.
Senator Ferguson. Will you file them as part of your sworn testi-
mony in the record ?
Mr. Lattimore. Surely.
The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine, you may proceed.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, there are several loose ends which
should be taken care of, I believe, before we proceed today with direct
interrogation. The Chair will recall the question of certain deeds of
property by ]Mr. Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore and the authentica-
tion thereof. I now hold the photostats of those deeds and the au-
thentication is on the back of each one by Mr. Robert E. Bundy, town
clerk, in accordance with the form and traditional practice of the
jurisdiction. I submit the Chair may at" this time wish to order they
now be inserted in the record.
The Chairman. Mr. Bundy certifies that the kodagraph reflex
copy on the reverse side thereof is an accurate reproduction of a record
in book 38, page 481 of said Bethel Land Records. That appears on
each of the documents with that authentication. They will be ad-
mitted for the record.
3607
3608 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 555 A, No.
555B, and No. 555C." See p. 3565 for exhibits.)
The Chairman. There was another matter that I think the Chair
did not pass on that it seems to me mijjht be well to have now.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I believe the Chair has reference
to certain material which was offered for the record by Mr. Lattimore
at an earlier date. In connection with some of that, there was men-
tioned earlier, but it did not go in the record at that time some ma-
terial, and one of the items submitted by Mr. Lattimore was an excerpt
from a speech by Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana, which,
according to Mr. Lattimore's note, appears in the Congressional Rec-
ord, volume 91, IV, page 4900, May 22, 1945.
The Chairman. The Chair raised the question at that time as to
whether or not the excerpts were taken out of context.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. It is submitted and the record will speak for
itself on that question.
I request permission of the Chair to read into the record at this
time a portion of the material which the staff considers to be the con-
text in which these particular excerpts appear.
The Chairman. With the idea of admitting the excerpts?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
The Chairman. You may do so.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I will indicate to the chair when we come to the
excerpt submitted by Mr. Lattimore. This is the one from the speech
by Congressman Mike Mansfield :
Exhibit No. 595
The Chinese Communists or the Kungchantang — share-in-production party —
are also an important factor affecting relations between the Soviet Union and
China. The Chinese Communists number about 90,000,000 in the 15 autonomous
areas under their control.
Now begins the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore :
They are, at the present time, more reformists than revolutionists and they
represent the peasant revolt that has often characterized the long years of
Chinese history. They have made many reforms in agricultural areas relative
to the re<luction of rent, taxes, and interest rates. Local democracy is prac-
ticed and many cooperatives have been organized. The Chinese Communists ■
collect their own taxes, make their laws, and issue their paper money. They
maintain a separate state economically, politically, and militarily, and they have
rendered valiant service in the Avar against the Japanese. Possibly 16 divisions
of Nationalist troops of Chiang Kai-shek, under IIu Tsangnan, have been used
to blockade the Communist area. The Soviet Union does not send aid to these
regions of China. However, the future policy of the Soviet toward the Chinese
Comnumists is problematicaL It may be that the divide between Kuomintang,
and Communist China may have repercussions in the relations between Chiang
Kai-shek and Stalin.
The question of Chinese disunity is very important to us. If China can achieve
unity — and the prospects at present are doubtful— she can then be in a strong
position at the final peace conference and eventually in fact as well as in theory,
become a great power and thus powerful enough to maintain the peace in her
part of the world.
If, on the other hand, this unity is not soon achieved, the position of China
and ourselves will become extremely difficult. The U. S. S. R. will, in my opinion,
enter the war against Japan. When that happens the Soviets will, as a matter
of geographical propinquity, depend on and render such aid as is necessary to
the Chinese Communists because they will be in a good position to attack Japanese
concentrations and because there has been and will be in the future— unless
Chinese unity Is achieved — ideological sympathies which will draw the two
together. Should this happen it is quite possible that there would exist in
China two separate and distinct states in the postwar period. One would be
allied to and, in a sense, dependent on Russia ; the other would be, in a sense,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3609
anti-Russian but would be dependent on itself for survival and not on any outside
power. I cannot envisage, if this comes to pass, the United States maintaining
more than a passive interest in Chinese affairs because to do otherwise would
place us in an extremely embarrassing position.
Mr. Chairman, I recall that I did not note the point at which the
excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore ended. It ended with the words
"in the war against the Japanese."
Senator O'Conor. That is difficult to follow. Can you read the
excerpt itself ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. The excerpt by Mr. Lattimore is this :
They are, at the present time, more reformists than revolutionists and they
represent the peasant revolt that has often characterized the long years of
Chinese history. They have made many reforms in agricultural areas rela-
tive to the reduction of rents, taxes, and interest rates. Local democracy is
practiced and many cooperatives have been organized. The Chinese Commu-
nists collect their own taxes, make their laws, and issue their paper money.
They maintain a separate state economically, politically, and militarily, and
they have rendered valiant service in the war against the Japanese.
That was the end of the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore.
In connection with that, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore a couple
of questions.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you regard Mike Mansfield as an expert on
Asia or any portion of Asia?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't knew whether I could answer that question
"Yes" at the present time, Mr. Sourwine.
My recollection is that speech of his was made just after he had
returned from a visit to China, where he went for the purpose of in-
forming himself.
Mr. Sourwine. You offered the excerpt as an indication of what
he thought at that time rather than an indication of what the fact
was?
Mr. Lattimore. I offered it as an indication of rather widely held
opinions at that time.
Mr. Sourw^ine. The question is on the admission of it, Mr. Chair-
man. It has been read in full.
The Chairman. It may be admitted in its entirety so it will not be
taken out of context.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 595" and was
read in full by counsel.)
Mr. Sourwine. The next offer that was made by Mr. Lattimore was
two excerpts from a reprint of a column by Ernest Lindley in the
Washington Post December 7, also a reference to Congressional Eec-
ord, volume 91, part 13, page A5388.
Mr. FoRTAS. The year?
Mr. Sourwine. December 10, 1945, remarks of Walter A. Judd.
It appears that Mr. Judd did make certain remarks. The two ex-
cerpts offered by Mr. Lattimore are as follows :
* ^ * some honest American observers who cannot be accused of Comintern
connections thinli the Chinese Communists are the best foundation on which
to build a united and democratic Cliina. * * *
The real question is : Can China best be unified by unconditional support of
the Central Government or by the use of American influence, with the consent
of the government powers, to bring together the Central Government and the
Chinese Communists and-^still more important — democratic groups in China
which are presently unarmed? The second choice is the better. It may not
succeed. But it should be more thoroughly explored and more deftly pursued.
3610 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
If tlie Chair would permit, I should like to read a page and a half
which shows that material fully in context.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This is from the extension of remarks of the Hon-
orable Walter A. Judd, of Minnesota, in the House of Kepresentatives
on Monday, December 10, 1945, taken from an article by Ernest Lind-
ley, which appeared in the Washington Post on December 7, 1945,
which was entitled, "How Aid China?"
Exhibit No. 596
* * * The cry "Hands off" is coming, within the United States, principally
from two groups: The unreconstructed isolationists and active supporters of
the Chinese Communists. This is an odd alliance. The only characteristic
with its two elements seem to have in common is indifference to the interests
of the United States and to organization of a stable peace.
This observation must carry two qualitications.
Now we come into the quote by Mr. Lattimore :
The first is that some honest American observers who cannot be accused of
Comintern connections think the Chinese Communists are the best foundation
on which to build a united and democratic China. They were overruled, how-
ever, by Roosevelt, who consistently regarded Chiang Kai-shek as the better
bet.
NEEDS DEFT HANDLING
The second qualification is, of course, that no one wants American lives ex-
pended in a civil conflict within China. It might as well be recognized that
prevention of another major conflict will involve the risk of lives — only a tiny
fraction, however, of those which would be lost in another great war. At the
same time, every effort should be, and is being, made to keep American troops
out of the lines of fire in China. Our aid should be confined to weapons and
supplies followed by help in developing transportation and manufacturing.
"Hands off" is a complete negation. It is an abandonment of a historic policy
at the very time it has been accepted by other major powers, and therefore
has its best chance of fruition.
The real questions is : Can China best be unified by unconditional support
of the Central Government or by the use of American influence, with the con-
sent of the other great powers, to bring together the Central Government and the
Chinese Communists and — still more important — democratic groups in China
which are presently unarmed? The second choice is tlie better. It may not
succeed. But it should be more thoroughly explored and more deftly pursued.
Miglit I ask Mr. Lattimore a couple of questions there ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Was this offered for the purpose of sliowing a sit-
uation as it existed or showing what Mr. Lindley thought about it at
the time ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was offered, Mr, Sourwine, as a sample of well-
informed discussion and opinion in Washington at the time.
Mr. Sourwine. It may be, sir ; I have asked you tliis question before,
but in your opinion were either of these excerpts offered by you taken
out of context ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I thought they were sufficiently in context.
Mr. Sourwine. That second one is before the Chair as to ruling
of admissibility.
The Chairman. It may be admitted in its entirety.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 596" and was
read in full by counsel.)
Mr. Sourwine. The Chair also has before it for consideration cer-
tain material offered by Mr. Lattimore, one, a page and a half, headed,
"Who said the Chinese Communists were not real Communists?",
being a quotation from Mr. Patrick J. Hurley and Freda Utley; a
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3611
letter on the stationery of the Chinese history project, addressed
''Dear Owen,'' another letter also addressed "Dear Owen" and signed
"Karl August," apparently from Mr. Wittfogel, who appeared before
this committee; a third and fourth letter also so addressed and so
signed, an excerpt from a book by Alexander Barmine
Mr. i'oRTAS. Was that first letter from Mr. Wittfogel ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. The four are from Wittfogel, letters of March 4,
1945; April T, 1940; November 2, 1941. That one is headed, and the
other one is he«ded, "Sunday night midnight" and has written on it
in pencil "1941"; and a document consisting of three and a half pages
headed ""Wlio wanted to recognize Red China," containing what pur-
ports to be quotes from a number of sources.
The complete accuracy of quotations in that regard the staff has
not had time to determine, Mr. Chairman, and they are offered by
Mr. Lattimore. It is respectfully suggested that the Chair might
wish to rule that this material be printed in the appendix of the
record. It is not sworn testimony, but that it be printed in the appen-
dix of the record and footnoted back to the point at which it was
offered by Mr. Lattimore.
The Chairmax. I think the offer should be divided. Some of it
could be admitted. Wittfogel's could be admitted in all probability.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Does the Chair wish to rule?
The Chairman. I think that can be divided and admitted.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 597 A, B,
C, D," and are as follows: The other documents referred to were
marked "Exhibits 475, 476, and 477" and appear in appendix I, pt. 10,
pp. 3703 through 3706.)
Exhibit No. 497-A
Sponsors : America Council of The Institute of Pacific Relations, New Yorlv City ; Inter-
national Institute of Social Research, New Yorlj City. Director : Karl August Wittfogel.
Advisory Committee ; Homer H. Dubs, Duke University ; L. Carrington Goodrich,
Columbia University ; Ralph Linton, Columbia University ; Karl H. Menges, Columbia
University ; R. H. Tawney. London School of Economics ; George E. Taylor, University
of Washington ; James R. Ware, Harvard University
CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT
Low Memorial Library
Columbia Univkrsity
new york, n. y.
Tel. UNiversity 4-3200, Ext. 593
420 Riverside Drive, March 4, 1945.
Dear Owen : I have delayed writing my weekly Sunday letters for hours be-
cause I could not tear myself away from your Asiatic "solution." By watching
my action, not my words, you can judge how great the power of attraction of
your new book is. You are really an expert to end all experts. I have not read
anything for a long time, that made me think so much about the various aspects
of the postwar world. This is a fascinating story, one, which, I hope, will be
read much and intensely, because you certainly show that the political leaders
have to act quickly, wisely, and boldly, or else. * * * You do not say much
about world war No. Ill, leaving this wisely to the brass hats and brass minds.
You say less about No. IV and V — in my opinion, many questions may not be
decided before and during III (as the short-sighted brass brains think, who have
no long historical breadth), but only before and during IV — or after, but I am
sure, you are right, as solid a peace has to be made as possible in this most art-
fully balanced of all worlds. The breath-taking picture of a world dancing ballet
on a swinging tight rope emerged clearly from your masterly pen.
3612 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This and many more questions have been stirred up by your book. Maybe, I
shall have a chance once to interview you about all those things which I do not
know, but would like to learn through discussion with you.
But beyond and before all this— what about the slightly more remote affairs
of the Liao empire? When I discussed your preface the last time with you, you
suggested 1945, when the book would be done and the conferences over. It is
l()4ri now, what about getting the thing done? You remember that Tawney
thought the manuscripts should be studied for several weeks before an intro-
ductFon could l)e written. This is thoroughness, but it also reflects the fact
that Tawney is far from Inner Asia. You are at home, where he would be a
newcomer. I am sure, you can go over the stuff much faster. How would it be,
if you came here for a day or two, to see whether you can get through with it.
If not, we might see, whether some part of the ms. could be sent to your home
for a couple of days (we are somewhat in difficulty, and this is one of the reasons
why I suggest your working over the ms. here, at least for one, or two, or three
days).
I know you have many friends here with whom you might wish to stay, but
I am sure you know also that you are most welcome to stay in our miserable
guest room, when and if that suits you.
Again, my very warmest thanks for the book. May it shake the people from
their slumber. It has the power to do so. There are, as I said before, a few
questions, where I should like to ask for further explanation or where I beg to
differ, but as a whole, you certainly did a marvelous job.
Yours ever,
Exhibit No. 497B
Officers : Philip C. Jessup, Chairman ; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman ; Miss Ada L.
Comstock, Vice Chairman ; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman ; Philip W. Parker,
Vice Chairman ; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman : Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice
Chairman ; Frederick V. Field, Secretary ; Francis S. Harmon, Treasurer ; Miss Hilda
Austern, Assistant Treasurer
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
1795 California Street, San Francisco. Telephone: TUxedo 3114; 129 Bast
52nd Street, New York City. Telephone: PLaza 3-4700. Cable: INPAREL
New York, April 7, 19',0.
Dear Owen : I want to congratulate you on the new opus. It is out, I got
it, it looks fine, it is fine. I have been going through it, and I have been reading
many parts, some of them twice, and I must say I like it very much indeed.
Although I had seen the manuscript and studied it, the book is so rich and so
intelligent that it seems a new book to me with many things to learn and many
more to think about. You have enriched the literature on your subject, of
which I am just consuming a great deal for my Liao prefaces, very much indeed.
The book has substance, style, vision. It is much more then just a synthesis of
old suff, it contains much little known material and it coordinates it under fresh
and stimulating viewpoints. Congratulations again. ( (pencilled note) I am sure
it will be a standard work in its field.)
I have shown the copy which I got from the Society — as its member, not as
your friend — I have shown it to our oliice, and they all seem excited about it. Dr.
Goodrich hopes that you will let him have a copy, since he, as he said, read the
proofs for you. If that is so, it might not be a bad idea at all to let him have
a copy.
I am very busy, Owen, but I would love to see you. At that oriental meeting
we read our three papers, Yu-ch'uan on the chun of Ch'in, Feng on the social
stratification of Liao, I on the early institutions of China in the light of modern
anthropology. The papers seem to have been all right.
Liao is almost finished, as far as Feng is concerned, but not as far as Karl
August. I am working hard over the text and the footnotes ; there is still much
to be done. Han is in the making now, and so is Chin. I begin to luulerstand
more about the barbarian world of China's frontier than I did ever before. That
is probably the reason why my mind is so open to the message which your new
book has to give.
Love to all of you. When do we meet?
Yours cordially, /S/ Karl August.
/T/ Karl August.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3613
125 Riv'EESiDE Drive,
Between 84 and Soth Street,
Friday, April 12, ^0.
(Address and arrow pencilled)
Dear Owen : These are most pleasant news. I am very glad to learn that you
are coming to New York next week. Do not go to a hotel. My little apartment
upstairs 1(>-D is at your disposal, a bedroom, the study, and the bath. Un-
fortunately we have taken away the telephone, because I practically do not use it.
If you have friends whom you want to ring you up, please give them just our
number (downstairs) : Trafalgar 7-2871.
Have any meals with us which you are free to take at home, particularly the
breakfast and, whenever you can, the dinner, although it seems from your letter
that the two evenings are talcen. If so, that is all right. You must do whatever
you have to do. Please consider our house just as a convenient lodging place
with full freedom for all your movements.
I am so happy to see you soon here, so is Esther. I hope we shall have at least
some chance for a little personal talk. I want you to see our Liao stuff. Chia-
sheng and Yu-chuan will both be very proud to get your book.
Love to all of you.
Yours always,
[s] Karl August.
(Penned:) Do you know when you will arrive? Our oflSce telephone is
Columbia: University 4-3200, extension 593 (or just ask for K. W. the girls
know my name).
Exhibit No. 597-C
CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT
Low Memorial Library
Columbia University
NEW YORK city
November 2, 1941.
Dear Owen : It was awfully good of you to send me a copy of your new book.
Many, many thanks, Owen, and my most cordial congratulations for the prompt
and smooth delivery of this baby. The book looks fine, and it reads fine. I feel —
and I am sure any intelligent reader feels — that a unique amount of exi)erience
and thinking has gone into these pages. There are several points which I want
to include into our Liao volume, but I have to settle down for a more thorough
study first, which I am going to do next weekend.
The pictures are very striking, almost as good as the text, almost. I like your
stories, and the little human features which make your tales so rich.
Lots of good luck for this one too.
Yours ever,
(s) Karl August,
(t) Karl August.
Exhibit No. 597D
CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT
Low Memorial Library
Columbia University
NEW YORK city
Sunday Night (Midnight) 1941.
Dear Owen : Having thought your letter over again — and several times so —
I come to the conclusion that you were more right than not. What you miss, is a
detailed presentation of the first part of the analysis. This I did not give, because
it would have taken me months to get into all the historical material without a
more detailed analysis of the Asiatic oriental societies cannot be given. But
since people generally agree that waterworks are the foundation of the socio-
economic structure of Egypt as well as of Babylonia, the analysis with its "illus-
3614 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
trations" which I could not give now, was not so urgently needed. America was
not discovered from the standpoint of the theory, and America was easier. There,
no huge historical records existed. An abbreviated analysis of the anthropologi-
cal material was possible. This I have attempted.
I have dreamed of a thorough analysis of the great Asiatic societies in the style
of AVirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas. Perhaps / may be able to do it later,
perhaps somebody else will undertake it in the meantime. Let us hope so. Your
critical remarks touched a sore spot, a wish of my own, one which I was not
able to fulfil, at least not at the time being.
The oasis section should be added. This I knew, and in this resiiect I had writ-
ten to you. During this week end I have re-read your Inner Asian Frontiers and
McGovern. The reading of the two books made it clear again to me how abso-
lutely superior your analysis and presentation is not only to his — he is a dwarf —
but to practically everybody who has ventured into an analysis of Wirtschaft
und Gesellschaft of the oasis. Your analysis really seems definite and classic.
I shall follow it for whatever I may write about the Asiatic oases. I hope to be
not too stupid a disciple.
Any wish or suggestion that I might enlarge the book to a considerable extent
hurt me somewhat. I was very, very, very tired, Owen. If a marathon runner
is at the end of his run and just at the edge of his physical collapse, then the
kind of advice of a friend "come on, run faster, run further," cannot be received
with enthusiasm. I am going to explain why the first part gives a concentrated
and condensed picture of the basic mechanism only and* why within the frame
of this book no elahorate analysis can be given (but is not needed either) and
why a more detailed analysis is added for the new and relatively simple field
of America. This will clarify the situation and prepare the reader to expect
what he is going to get, and nothing different. This and a better Maya chapter,
and Spain, and the new Bureaucracy, and a chapter on the oasis is really all I
may still be able to cheat out of my nerves and brains. Then I must fall back
upon the end of Liao and the Ch'in-Han double volume.
Thank you for all the good your letter gave, Owen. I did not want to write
a sad letter. I just did.
Love to all who like me.
Yours cordially,
[s] Karl August
[ t ] Karl Augu st.
Mr. SouRWiNE. These are photostats of letters which you had in
your files ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. They were received by you?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. The other we can pass on. Let us go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. Before we start, Mr. Lattimore, you had
brought in a report that you had mentioned in your book Ordeal by
Slander.
Mr. Lattimore. My wife mentioned it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; in her chapter, but you had adopted it
by publication of the book; is that right?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. It also stated that Mr. Carter had issued a press
release that he had shown you ; is that correct ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe so. Yes; that is correct.
Senator Ferguson. I assume you read that press release in the
morning when you landed. The testimony said :
Mr. Carter gave me copies of the report he and Owen had made to the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations about the Moscow visit and also a copy of a statement
about it he had released to the press the night before.
Mr. Fortas. That is a book ?
Senator Ferguson. One was the report, but the press release appar-
ently you saw ; is that correct ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether I saw that press re-
lease or not.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3615
Senator Ferguson. You approved this statement indicating that
you were approving the press release ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I simply approved the chapter as my wife
wrote it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; and you adopted it as yours?
Mr. Lattimore. I adopted it as a contribution to my book.
The Chairman. You adopted it as yours is the question. Did you
or not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether legally that constitutes
adopting it as mine or not.
Senator Ferguson. Did you, as a matter of fact, adopt it?
Mr. Lattimore. I included it as a contribution by my wife to my
book.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see the press release?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether I did or not. I read a great
deal of stuff in a great hurry at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I want to offer in evidence the
press release that was issued.
The Chairman. Very well.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 598" and is
read in full below.)
Senator Feeguson. I will ask you to read it and then I will ask
you questions about it later.
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Exhibit No. .598
McCarthy charges "baseless," Carter says, in defense of his 1936 visit to
Moscow.
This is from the New York Times, Friday, March 31, 1950, page
3 columns 2 and 3 [reading] :
Edward C. Carter, provost of the New School for Social Research and former
secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, declared last night that
he had visited the Soviet Union in 1936, but explained that the visit had been
in connection with institute matters.
In a formal statement released from his office, Mr. Carter said that he had
"not seen the full text of the remarks" in which Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,
Republican, of Wisconsin, was "reported to have mentioned my name" in the
Senate yesterday in Washington. He termed the Senator's charges in the
case, as in other cases, as "baseless." Mr. Carter formerly headed Russian
War Relief, Inc.
"I was in the midst of a series of visits to national councils of the Institute
of Pacific Relations in the Far East and Europe" in 1936, Mr. Carter recalled.
Owen Lattimore, he added, was homeward bound after a tour as editor of
Pacific Affairs, the quarterly of the organization.
"Mr. Lattimore and I," Mr. Carter continued, "accepted an invitation to
address a meeting of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, where we
spoke of our impressions of the far-eastern situation. During our visit we
conferred with a considerable number of scholars who were specializing in
far-eastern studies.
"We also conveyed to officers of the American Embassy in Moscow our im-
pressions of conditions in countries we had visited. Upon my return to the
United States I discussed details of my trip and conferences at length with
officials of the State Department in Washington."
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, keeping in mind the file, the
reports taken out of the files of the Institute of Pacific Kelations
about which you were questioned, do you think that is a fair analysis
of that report ? . . „ . j. tvt
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I do. I think it is a fair summary ot Mr.
Carter's visit to the USSR.
3616 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it outlined the real things that
were down there and the people that were conferred with?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And the policy that was to be adopted and was
adopted?
Mr. La^ptimore. Well, I would not say that a policy was adopted.
Questions of policy were discussed.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think this fairly sets out the questions
that were discussed ? . ...
Mr. Lattimore. I think it is a fair summary of the visit. It is not
a report on the whole conference.
The Chairman. That is not the question. Answer that question.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it fairly sets out the conferences
you had ? .....
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; for a statement of its length, I think it is per-
fectly fair.
Senator Ferguson. Wait a minute. "For a statement ot its length.
My question is. Do you think that fairly represents to the people of
the United States what took place with you and Carter and the IPR
and the people in Eussia ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I think it does.
Senator Ferguson. I notice there that he conveys the idea, and
you carry it out in your book, because you refer to this press release
that you conveyed to the officers of the American Embassy your im-
pressions of the conditions in the countries "we had visited" and "upon
my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and
conferences at length with officials of the State Department m Wash-
ington."
Mr. Lattimore. May I point out that falls into two parts.
Senator Ferguson. It is all in one quotation.
The Chairman. What is your question. Senator?
Mr. Lattimore. ]\Ir. Carter states : "We discussed with officials of
the American Embassy in Washington," which is quite correct, or
rather, in Moscow, which is quite correct.
Senator Ferguson. Who were the officials you discussed it with ?
Mr. Lattimore. Ambassador Bullitt; Mr. Angus Ward, who was,
I think, the No. 2 man in the Embassy ; I believe Mr. Loy Henderson
was there at that time, too ; and Colonel Faymonville, who was mili-
tary attache.
Senator Ferguson. Who was the Ambassador?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Bullitt.
Senator Ferguson. You discussed it with him ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss all the details?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. What does it say ?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
We also conveyed to officers of the American Embassy in Moscow our impres-
sions of conditions in countries we had visited.
Senator Ferguson. How about the the next sentence?
Mr. Lattimore (reading) :
Upon my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and con-
ferences at length with officials of the State Department in Washington.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3617
That refers to Carter and not myself.
Senator Ferguson. That was conveying to the American people
the details; in fact, everything that was discussed in Russia was dis-
cussed with our State Department; and that is the basis of saying
McCarthy's charges were false because he came back here and dis-
cussed them in detail with the State Department. Is that correct^
Mr. Latti3iore. I can't answer, Senator, for exactly what Mr.
Carter meant when he was describing his own discussions with the
State Department.
Senator Ferguson. You were referring in your book Ordeal by
Slander to a press release and thereby adopting it, that you had been
slandered, and you cited the press release. That is, you referred to
it; that the details of everything that went on in Russia with you
and Carter were discussed by the"United States State Department.
Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson, I am afraid I can't answer
"Yes" to that.
Senator Ferguson. Answer it any way you want to answer it.
Mr. Lattimore. My wife referred to the fact that ]Mr. Carter had
shown her his press release. That is all.
Senator Ferguson. You want to tell us here that, in going over this
the morning you got back, you did not even check up on the press
release, and you used it in the book; is that correct? You referred
to it in the book?
Mr. Lattimore. My wife referred to the book, and I saw no need for
checking on the original press release.
Senator Ferguson. Thereby you adopted it ?
Tlie Chairman. Is that correct, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. That is a legal question, Senator.
I printed it in a book as a contribution by my wife.
Senator Ferguson. You wanted the people to rely upon the book,
did you not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Certainly.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. There are still a few loose ends, Mr. Chairman.
After that there will be a few unrelated questions, then the conclud-
ing questions of the series.
There is in our record as exhibit 539 an article entitled "Minorities
]n the Soviet Far East" by Owen Lattimore which appeared in the
Far Eastern Survey, August 23, 1944, pages 156, 157, and 158. The
question arose as to whether an article entitled "Minorities in the
Soviet Far East" as it appears in the magazine Soviet Culture in
Wartime, No. 3, 1945, being a magazine or pamphlet published by the
American-Russian Institute, of 101 Post Street, San Francisco, was
the same article.
Inquiry was made of Mr. Lattimore's attorney, and I now have a
letter from Mr. Thurman Arnold acknowledging receipt of the enclo-
sures which we sent him to identify the article and stating that Mr.
Lattimore confirms that the article by him. Minorities in the Soviet
Far East, as it appears in the magazine Soviet Culture in Wartime,
No. 3, 1945, is the same as the article published by him in the Far
Eastarn Survey, issued August 23, 1944, pages 156 to 158.
3618 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I would simply like to have Mr. Lattimore confirm that on the
record at this time if that is the fact. I have both the Far Eastern
Survey and the photostat of the other article, if you want to see
them again.
Mr. Lattimore. No. I don't need to see them again. I confirm it
is the same article.
You will note the reprint states that it is by permission of Far
Eastern Survey.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is correct. It carries at the bottom the nota-
tion : "By permission of the Far Eastern Survey, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations."
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall any permission was ever asked there ;
that I ever knew about the reprint being made.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may the cover, the next page about
the authors, and the table of contents, as they appear in the magazine
Soviet Culture in Wartime, No. 3, 1945, be inserted into the record
to establish that the article, Minorities in the Soviet Far East, did
appear in such a publication and that it is the same as the article
published by him in the Far Eastern Survey, issued August 23, 1944,
pages 156 to 158.
The Chairman. It may be inserted into the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 598A" and is as
follows :) (For the article Minorities in the Soviet Far East, as pub-
lished in the Far Eastern Survey, issue August 23, 1944, pp. 156 to
158, seep. 3462.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3619
Soviet Cultuhe io UJartihie
NUMBER
19^5
PuldiAltexi Lf
AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE
101 POST STREET • SAN FRANCISCO 8, CALIF.
25<f^
88348— 52— pt. 10 ^23
3620 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
/7^«/THE AUTHORS
^jioLLAND RnBFRTs is President of the American Russian Institute and Director of Educa-*^
lion of the California Labor School. Until recently he was Professor of I'ducation ai
Stanford University.
EucENF. Mf.dynsky IS Doctor of Pcdnj^ojjy and Professor of the History of Education at
the Lenin Pedagogical Institute in Moscow.
Ernest J Simmoss is Chairman of the Department of Slavic Languages at Cornell Uni-
versity and directed its Intensive Study of Contemporary Russian Civilization. He is
the author of the definitive life of Pushkin and of many other works on Soviet
literature.
OwfN_^;\TTiMORE is Director of the Page School of International Relations and co author**^
of The Mailing oj Modern China. He is author of numerous books and magazine
ai tides on China and the Soviet Union. He is at present Far Eastern Consultant
for the O.W.I.
Peter^L. Kapit-^\ is Academician at the head of the Institute of Physical Problems of the
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
GREf.ohY ZiiBrK^Rc. M.D.. is a New York psychiatrist. He is the author of a History oj
Medical Psychology and of Mind. Medicine and Man.
Alexander Korneicih-k is the author of a number of plays and a Stalin Prize Winner.
He is now Chairman of the Council on Arts of the Ukrainian Republic.
Le"^'p Leonov is one of the great novelists and playwrights of the Soviet Union, and
also a Stalin Prize Winner. His novel Road to the Ocean has just been published
in English.
CvEh Im.iatration: Uningrad. the Cradle of Russian Classical Culture— The City of
Peter, of Pushl^in and of Chail{ovsl{^y.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3621
%^o/ CONTENTS
This 1$ the Hour, by Holland Roberts 4
Soviet Schools, by Eugene Medynsky 5
Note on Nursery Schools 10
Tribute to Alexander Kaun, by Ernest /. Simmons 11
Alexander Kaun Exchange Fellowship U
Minorities in the Soviet Far East, by Owen Lattimore 12
The Organization of Soviet Science, by Peter L. Kapitsa 16
Note on Science 24
Some Aspects of Psychiatry in the U.S.S.R., by Gregory Zilboorg, M.D. . 25
Note on Refresher Courses for Physicians 30
Notes on Music 31
Notes on Films 35
Soviet Theater 36
Scenes from Two Soviet Plays, by Alexander Korneichu]( and
Leonid Leonov 39
Report on the American Russian Institute 48
Drawings by Giacomo Patri
Edited by the Publications Committee of the American Russian Institute y
Louis t R, Bransten, Chairman
3622 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, an offer was made by Mr. Latti-
more for the record of a statement by General Chennault, and I
believe Mr. Lattimore was allowed to read the statement into the
record ; is that correct ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I was.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I would like to inquire whether you regard General
Chennault as an authority on what was taking place in the Far East
at the time he was out there ?
Mr. Lattimore. I consider that he was an authority on that subject
' that he was writing about in that book.
The Chairman. That is not the question. Repeat the question,
Mr. Reporter.
(The question referred to was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Latiimore. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You say you do regard him as an authority on
what he was writing about in that book. What do you mean by
"that book"?
Mr. Lattimore. The book from which I quoted. It is just another
way of phrasing the question, as you put it, what he was writing
about at that time.
Mr. SotTRwiNE. By "that book," do you mean Way of a Fighter,
by Claire Lee Chennault?
Mr. Lattimore. That is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. You think he was an expert with regard to the
matters he wrote about in that book?
Mr. Lattimore. That is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, because of the identification of
General Chennault as in the mind of this witness being an expert on
these matters, I ask permission to read at this time the first page from
the foreword to this book after which I will make an offer for admis-
sion into the appendix of the record the entire foreword. I think it is
significant.
The United States Is Losing the Pacific War
Three years after VJ-day, this country is facing the loss of everything it won
during the four bloody years it took to defeat Japan.
Mr. Fortas. Could we have the date?
The Chairman. This was the book from which the excerpts were
taken?
Mr. Sourwine. This book is copyrighted 1949 by Claire Lee
Chennault.
Mr. Fortas. Thank you.
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
Here are the facts :
Gen. George C. Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Manchuria
were lost to the Chinese Communists, the United States position in southern
Korea would be untenable.
Manchuria has been lost to the Chinese Communists.
General Marshall also told Congress that if the Chinese Communists controlled
North China the United States position in Japan would be "extremely serious."
North China has been lost to the Chinese Communists.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1948
that if the Chinese Communists take the lower Yangtze Valley and Shanghai the
American military bastion on Okinawa will be outflanked and his position in
Japan will be as exposed and untenable as it was in the Philippines during 1941.
As this is written, the Chinese Communists are fighting toward the Yangtze at
Nanking. They are aiming to force a Yangtze crossing and sweep to Shanghai.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3623
A complete Communist victory iu Cliina will channelize the undercurrents of
native unrest already swirling through Burma, India, Malaya, and Indonesia
into another rising tide of Communist victories. The ring of Red bases can be
stretched from Siberia to Saigon. Then the stage will be set for the unannounced
explosion of World War III.
I ask, Mr. Chairman, because of its pertinency, not merely in connec-
tion with the portion I read, but throughout, that this foreword be
ordered printed in the appendix of the record for the reference to this
point in the main body.
The Chairman. This is the book from which an excerpt was taken
by ^Ir. Lattimore and the author of which Mr. Lattimore says was an
expert on Asiatic conditions at that time ; is that correct?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What is the title?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Way of a Fighter. .
The Chairman. The offer may be received and it will be inserted
in the record. -, u^ -, -i -^ kt
(The foreword of the book referred to was marked 'Exhibit ^o.
599A and appears in appendix I, pt. 10, p. 3706.) i • -. at
Mr SouRWiNE. Now, we come to the specific excerpt which Mr.
Lattimore read in the record. I would like to ask permission to read
into the record the portion before and behind it, immediately preced-
ino- and immediately following it in the book so that we may have it
inlhe record in the context in which that lay. Also the last sentence
of the paragraph in which that excerpt appears, since Mr. Lattimore
did not read it. -, -, i i ^i, 4.-
Senator O'Conor. I wonder if you would make clear the portion
Mr. Lattimore quoted. .. , . , ^ cr j:
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes. This is on page 61, and begins chapter 5 ot
the book.
While American diplomats were busy prodding American airmen out of China,
the Red Air Force arrived. The Russians sent four fighter and two l^omber
squadrons completely staffed and equipped to fight the Japs m China, iney
arrived in the fall of 1937, before the fall of Nanking, and stayed foi" / Jear
and a half, leaving just a few months before the European war reached the
shooting stage in the fall of 1939.
Now begins the portion read by Mr. Lattimore :
Soon after Japan attacked at Shanghai, the Chinese sent an official call for
help to all the major powers. Only Russia responded. The Russians didn t
pause to play partisan politics or trip over ideological folderol when their na-
tional interests were at stake in China. All of the Soviets aid went to the
Central Government of the Generalissimo. The Russians had had no love tor
the Generalissimo since the 1927 split when he drove the Russian-supported
Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and slaughtered them by the thou-
sands. For nearly 20 years he fought a ruthless war of extermination against
communism in China. The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo solely
because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing Japan
and they supported him exclusively, ignoring the Chinese Communist Armies,
which badly needed external support.
That is the conclusion of Mr. Lattimore's excerpt.
Japan had been preparing an attack on Russia for 20 years, and unnumbered
shooting rehearsals had been held along the Siberian border. T^he Russians were
willing to help anybody who was fighting and weakening Japan.
When Japanese bombs at Pearl Harbor blasted American officialdom into
more than an academic interest in China, we would have done well to study
Russian policy in China. Thus the United States might have avoided many of
the tragic errors that turned American policy in China into a powerful ladle
stirring anew the witches' broth of Chinese disunity and civil war.
3624 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Chairman, turning to another page in this book, I would like
to ask Mr. Lattimore just one question.
Do you know whether the relations between General Stilwell and
Chiang were cordial or strained ?
Mr. LAi'riMORE. I believe they were cordial at one time and strained
later on.
Mr. SoTiRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, following that up, I should like to
request insertion in the record at this point one paragraph marked
here on page 316 of this book and five consecutively marked para-
graphs beginning on page 317 and concluding on page 318, which
deal with that question. I do not want to take the time of the com-
mittee to read them here now.
The Chairman. Dealing with what question?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Tlie relationship between Chiang and General Stil-
well. That question has come up in connection with this investiga-
tion, and we have here the testimony of a man Mr. Lattimore con-
siders to be an expert on the subject.
The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record.
(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 599" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 599
Way of a Fighter, Claire Lee Chennault, Edited by Robert Hotz, G. P.
Putnam's Sons, New York
(Pp. 316, 317, 318)
* * * Although Stilwell was not seriously concerned with military prob-
lems in China, he did not hesitate to plunge into Chinese politics to further his
ends. By the fall of 1943 his relations with top Chinese leadership were so
bad that his recall was seriously considered. President Roosevelt wrote a note
to Marshall pointing out that Stilwell appeared to have apparently "outlived his
usefulness" in China and should be replaced. Marshall replied that he had
no suitable substitute, and Stilwell stayed on for another critical year.
*******
Stilwell's worst political excursion came during the summer and early fall
of 1944 when he began using the Chinese Communist government of Yenan as
a lever to move the Generalissimo. Although Stilwell was never particularly
interested in Chinese intelligence, he sent an official American military mission
to the Communist capital at Yenan in May 1944 for the alleged purpose of
gathering intelligence. The Chinese Communists were then on extremely thin
military and economic ice. Ever since the fighting between the Communist-
controlled New Fourth Army and Central Government troops along the Yangtze
in 1940, the main Communist armies had been bottled up in Shensi Province be-
tween the Japanese and Central Government. There they were militarily im-
potent and hard pressed to provide the bare necessities of life. Much has been
written by gullible correspondents, some of them with pronounced Communist
sympathies, regarding the vast military effort of the Chinese Communists
against the Japanese. My experience indicated that the Communist military
activities were confined largely to raiding small Japanese outposts for food and
arms. When the Japanese were attacking Central Government troops, the
Communists were generally content to stand idly by. It was significant that
during the Honan campaign in the early spring of 1944 the Communist guer-
rillas did not sabotage a single Japanese troop train moving south down the
Pinghan Railroad to the Yellow River. These trains passed through an area
thick with Red guerrillas.
The American mission to Yenan was hardly established before Stilwell's Chung-
king staff began to proclaim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime
over the Chungking government. Contents of secret reports from the Yenan
mission were freely discussed over Chungking dinner tables by Stilwell's staff
No secret was made of their admiration for the Communists who, they said,
were really only "agrarian reformers" and more lige New Dealers than Com-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3625
munists. The hue and cry charging the Generalissimo witli "hoarding lend-
lease arms"' to tight the Communists was raised with renewed vigor along with
the claim that China's best troops were being used to blockade the Communists
instead of fighting the Japanese. After Stilwell was removed, Wedemeyer con-
ducted an exhaustiv survey of all Chinese army equipment and reported that not
a single American gun or bullet had gone to Chinese armies east of Yunnan with
the exception of the 500 tons belatedly delivered to Kweilin and Liuchow.
The Generalissimo did keep a sizable army at Sian, the gateway to Communist
territory, and they did maintain a patrol on the main communication lines to
Yenan. That they were also defending the Tungkwan Pass, one of the three
vital gateways to West China, was conveniently ignored by Stilwell's staff. Late
in 1944 many of these troops were withdrawn to holster the sagging Salween
offensive, and the Japanese promptly began an offensive aimed at Siam. Only a
sudden and cold winter halted the Japanese short of their goal.
I do not think that Stilwell had any political motives in encouraging his
Chungking staff to function as a public-relations bureau for the Yenan Com-
munists. It was of a piece with his earlier dalliance with the Kuomintang
reactionaries. He was simply unconcerned with anything but his immediate
objectives. The Yenan Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with
many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally
by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him com-
mand their armies. Stilwell never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese
Red Armies. After the end of the Okinawa campaign in the spring of 1945
Stilwell proposed to land his Tenth Army on the Kiangsu coast above Shanghai,
which was controlled by the Chinese Communists. His plan was to join forces
with the Reds, arm them, and turn the combined forces south for an assault on
Shanghai. That this would have encouraged the Chinese Communists to open
rebellion against the Central Government should have been obvious even to Stil-
well. It would also have bottled the Generalissimo up in Chungking as tightly
as he ever was blockaded by the Japanese.
Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the
Chungking government, it was a common joke that Stilwell's headquarters were
developing a private foreign policy with John Davies (Stilwell's political ad-
viser) as secretary of state.
*******
Mr. SouRwixE. One more question with regard to this book. Do
you know whether General Stilwell's removal or replacement was at
the behest or suggestion of Vice President Wallace?
Mr. Lattimore. From reading the testimony before this commit-
tee, I believe it was.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know that there is testimony in our record
that shortly following the transmission by Vice President Wallace of
the Kunming cable, word was sent by the l^Hiite House to China
giving Stilwell increased power ?
Mr. Lattiimore. I don't have a clear recollection of that, no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. On this question also, Mr. Chairman, I should like
to offer for the record from this book the marked paragraphs begin-
ning at the bottom of page 320 continuing to the middle of page 322,
which will speak for themselves, but for the information of the com-
mittee and in the opinion of counsel, they express General Chennault's
feeling that General Stilwell had made himself persona non grata
with Chiang to such an extent that his removal was inevitable.
The Chairman. What is the point?
Mv. SoTTRwiNE. The question has been raised in these things, Mr.
Chairman, as to whether the recommendation made by Mr. Wallace,
whatever that recommendation was, with regard to replacement of
General Stilwell and/or appointment of General Wedemeyer as the^
President's personal representative was a recommendation anti-Com-'
munist, pro-Communist, or having any connection in that regard.
This question here does bear on the solution of that problem.
3626 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. Very well.
(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 600" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 600
Way of a Fighter, Claire Lee Chennaxjlt, Edited by Robert Hotz, G. P.
Putnam's Sons, New York
(Pp. 320, 321, 322)
* * * Allowing Sultan to leave Chungking proved to be a tactical error.
Without his safety valve present, Stilwell was apparently stimulated by the
obvious signs of Chinese weakness for a final joust with his old adversary, the
Generalissimo. On September 19 Stilwell received a radio from President Roose-
velt for delivery to the Generalissimo. One of the two or three Americans who
have ever seen a copy of that message told me it sounded like a communication
from Adolf Hitler to the puppet head of a conquered satellite state. In violent
terms Roosevelt blamed the Generalissimo for China's present plight and pre-
.sented an ultimatum to appoint Stilwell as Chinese commander. The tone of
the message was totally foreign to Roosevelt's usual approach to the Generalis-
simo. There were strong .suspicions that Stilwell had actually written the mes-
sage himself ; sent it "eyes alone" to Washington ; and there the War Depart-
ment had persuaded Roosevelt to sign it and send it back to China.
When the Roosevelt message hit Chungking, Hurley and Nelson were working
with T. v. Soong drafting the final minor details of the agreement on Stilwell's
command. Hurley and Nelson urged Stilwell not to deliver the message. They
believed that the violent tone of the radio would upset the applecart and serve
no useful purpose, since the GeneralLssimo had already agreed to the terms
demanded.
"We've already won the ball game," Hurley told Stilwell.
Stilwell agreed to hold the message. Hurley and Nelson went back to the
Generalissimo's country villa at Huang Shan outside Chungkiag to continue
work on the agreement.
On September 21 Stilwell appeared unexpectedly at Huang Shan and inter-
rupted the conference. Meeting Hurley and Nelson in the Generalissimo's ante-
room, Stilwell explained that he had been thinking about the message and had
changed his mind. He now felt he had no authority to withhold a message from
President Roosevelt to the Generalissimo. Striding past the astonished emis-
saries Stilwell confronted the Generalissimo with the Roosevelt message. The
Generalissimo listened and let Stilwell depart in stony silence. Then he called
in T. v. Soong and exploded.
The Generalissimo told Soong the Poosevelt message was a challenge to
China's sovereignty. He was prepared ro risk anything rather than surrender
China's independence. Stilwell must go even if it meant the end of all American
'aid to China. On this score there could be no compromise.
Stilwell felt that he had scored a tremendous personal triumph. He was
happy that his "hour of vengeance" lias struck and composed an ode to cele-
brate the occasion. In this curious poem Stilwell admitted that he had pre-
sented the message to "break the Peanut's (Stilwell's designation for the Gen-
;eralissimo) face."
I Stilwell's delivery of the Roosevelt message actually killed forever his chance
of getting supreme command in China. In his complete misunderstanding of
Chinese psychology, Stilwell stupidly pushed the Generalissimo into a corner
where he had no alternative but to lash out and fight back with all his power.
Only those who had extensive dealings with Stilwell could understand his
peculiar tactics in this climatic encounter.
The Sino-American pact, once nearing signature, lapsed into deadlock over
the Stilwell issue. For weeks no maneuvering was able to regain the lost mo-
mentum. When Stilwell realized that the Generalissimo would not back down,
he frantically sought a compromise that might prevent the ax from falling on
his own lean neck. One of Stilwell's Chinese military advisers, who was not
aware of the Roosevelt ultimatum, suggested that perhaps Stilwell's dalliance
' with the Chinese Communists might be the root of the trouble. Stilwell promptly
wrote a note to one of his bitterest Chinese opponents. General Ho Yin Chin,
Chinese War Minister. In tliis note Stilwell admitted that he had planned to arm
the Chinese Communists but promised to drop the plan in exchange for re-
taining his post iH China. Stilwell had no authority to make such a promise,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3627
and he later violently denied the existence of the note to Ho. However the full
text of the note appears on page 337 of Stilwell's published diaries with the no-
tation that it was given to Ho in both Chinese and English versions.
Even his last ditch maneuver proved futile. The Generalissimo was still
willing to accept an American over-all commander in China. It could be al-
most anybody but Stilwell. Agreement was quickly reached on bringing Al
Wedemeyer up from Ceylon to take the post. On October 19 the War Department
radioed Stilwell orders to leave China and return to the United States.
*******
Mr. FoRTAS. May I inquire whether there is any reference to this
witness by name in those portions ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. No, there is not.
Mr. Lattimore, I hand you a clipping, or what purports to be a
clipping from the Xew York Herald Tribune of June 22, 1947, ap-
parently a review of a book, No Peace for Asia, written by Harold R.
Isaacs, with the byline reviewed by Owen Lattimore, and I ask you
if you wrote that I
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. SoURWiNE. I ask it be inserted.
The Chairman. It may be inserted.
(The document referred to w^as marked ''Exhibit No. 601" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 601
A PESSIMIST IN THE ORIENT
No Peace for Asia
(By Harold R. Isaacs * * * 295 pp. * * * New York: The Macmillau
■ Company, $3.50)
(Reviewed by Owen Lattimore)
Some years ago Mr. Isaacs published a book called The Tragedy of the Chi-
nese Revolution, with a preface by Leon Trotsky. No book dealing with the
events of 1925-2S in China rivals it in vituperation of both the Communists —
the Stalinist Communists, that is — and Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang
of Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Isaac's dislike of both Stalin and Chiang, and of the
political parties associated with both of them, continues in his new book.
In addition, Mr. Isaacs does not like the colonial policies of Britain, France,
and Holland. Nor does he like American policy in the Far East. Like many
other writers, Mr. Isaacs believes that at the end of the war we had among
the peoples of Asia an incalculable reservoir of good will. If anything good
were to come of the war they looked for it to come from us. Tliey looked to
us much more than they did to Russia. "The swift dissipation of this asset
right after the victory over Japan," says Mr. Issacs, "was by the same token
one of the most extravagant and prodigal examples of conspicuous waste ever
recorded in the annals of the nations."
Mr. Isaacs, in short, gives an analysis of extreme pessimism, with no reser-
vations in favor of the western democracies and even less in favor of Russia.
The one country on which he really lets himself go on a note of something like
romantic admiration, combined, however, with hopeless tragedy, is Indo-China.
Comparing this account wnth his accounts of other countries, the explanation
would seem to be that at the time he was there the situation was one of "pure"
revolution not compromised by expedient deals or aid from anybody. The
Indo-Chinese revolutionaries had not even had the advantages, which the In-
donesians and others had had, of Japanese attempts to organize them and
use them against their imperial rulers. They had begun their fight against the
French. They continued it against the Japanese. They resumed it once more
against the French and against the British supporters and American equip-
ment of the French.
Mr. Isaacs writes well, but even in the brief time since he witnessed the
beginning of the colonial wars it has begun to seem that colonial nationalism
is capable of a prolonged resistance which will prevent the restoration of
imperial rule in anything like as complete a form as he apparently anticipated.
3628 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
An important clew to the whole situation in Asia is the kind of movement
that has developed since the war in what had been the Chinese guerrilla area
behind Japanese lines. These were the only important areas which Mr. Isaacs
does not seem to have visited. Mr. Isaacs, referring to China, writes of "the cold
embrace of Communist totalitarianism" ; but, it appears from other accounts
that it is in these areas that there really is a beacon of hope, because of their
political condition is neither one of romantically tragic desperation nor of doc-
trinaire fanaticism. — Tribune, June 22, 1947.
Mr. SouRwiNE. At the conclusion of this review appears this
language :
Mr. Isaacs, referring to China, writes of "the cold embrace of Communist
totalitarianism" ; but it appears from other accounts that it is in these areas
that there really is a beacon of hope, because their political condition is neither
one of romantically tragic desperation nor of doctrinaire fanaticism.
Do you remember writing that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I remember it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell the committee briefly what you meant
by it?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. That is consonant with other things that I
was writing at the same time that I believed was cause for hope,
especially in north China at that time, because a large part of the
battle against the Japanese had been carried on by people who were
neither Communists nor Kuomintang, and I regarded that as a hope
for the emergence of a middle group.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you intending there to say anything favorable
to tlie Chinese Communists ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Lattimore, you furnished to the Tydings com-
mittee certain correspondence between yourself and a Mr. W, Heissig
and some papers in connection therewith ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. They appear at page 1881 of the Tydings commit-
tee hearings and ending apparently on page 1892. t would simply
like to ask so that they may be properly referred to in our record if
these documents, as they appeared in the Tydings committee hearings,
are accurate copies of what you furnished the Tydings committee?
Have you had occasion to examine that?
Mr. Lattimore. I have not had occasion to examine them since, but
I am sure they are accurate copies.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did furnish these documents to the Tydings
committee and they were accurate and true ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
The Chairman. Do you want anything done about that last matter?
Mr. SouRwiNE. No, Mr. Chairman. It has been identified as to the
page number in a printed Senate hearing. It simply has been reaf-
firmed by the witness. It is available as background for the com-
mittee if they wish it.
You had occasion, in your testimony earlier, to quote from your-
self, I think, with regard to your trip to Yenan, and you made some
mention there of missionaries. Do you recall that ?
Mr. Lattimore. In a general way, yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3629
Mr. SoTJiRwiNE. I show you the transcript of your testimony at the
top of page 5379 of our mimeographed record, where you said, quoting
from yourself :
Foreign visitors are welcomed and missionaries are being urged to come up
and see for themselves that their premises are undamaged and the Chinese
Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in private as they like—
and I ask you, do you remember so testifying ?
Mr. Lattimore. This, I think, is a quotation from the article that I
drafted for the London Times, but apparently was never published ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I remember that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Wliile you were in Yenan, did you see any mis-
sionaries ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, we didn't. We saw some of the missionaries
from Yenan at the first town outside of the territory controlled by
the Chinese Communists, and we told them this on our way back.
Mr. Sourwine. You told them this ?
Mr. Lattimore. Told them that the Communists were saying that
missionaries could come back.
Mr. Sourwine. What did they tell you ?
Mr. Lattimore. They said that they were considering it, but that
they didn't want to get into any political trouble as between Com-
munists and the government.
Mr. Sourwine. Why were they outside Yenan ? Do you know ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know!
Mr. Sourwine. Had they left Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably, since they were outside.
Mr. Sourwine. Do I understand correctly they told you after you
told them the Communists had said they could come, the missionaries
told you they were considering going back but they were afraid they
might get into political trouble if they did ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. That is your testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it on the basis of that experience alone that you
wrote —
Missionaries are being urged to come up and see for themselves that their
premises are undamaged and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach
in public or pray in private as they like?
Mr. Lattimore. Not entirely. My recollection is that the Commu-
nists told us they had previously sent messages to the missionaries to
the same effect.
Mr. Sourwine. That is, missionaries of all faiths ?
Mr, Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. The faith of the missionaries that you talked about
outside Yenan, what faith was that ?
Mr. Lattimore. Those that we talked with outside Yenan were
Protestants. I think they were all English missionaries. I had no
contact with missionaries in Yenan, but I remember telling you about
speaking to some Mongols there and these Mongols said that the
Catholic missionaries in their territory just north of Yenan had not
left.
3630 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did the Mongols say anything to you about whether
the Catholic missionaries that you speak of had been molested in
any way or disturbed ?
Mr. Lattimore. They said they had not been molested.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. 'Chairman, I am not sure how the Chair will
rule on this offer. It may be not precisely an ancient document. Let
me ask one foundation question. This was what year you were m
Yenan ?
Mr. Lattimore. 1937.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I hold in my hand, Mr. Chairman, original copies
of press releases issued by the National Catholic Welfare Conference
News Service under dates, respectively, October 5, 1936, July 5, 1937,
and December 6, 1937. These news releases refer to conditions affect-
ing missionaries in North China at that time. For whatever eviden-
tiary value they may have I ask that they be admitted to the record at
this time.
The Chairman. I do not think your foundation is quite laid.
Mr. SouRwiNE. These are offered in line with what Mr. Lattimore
has said he had offered something to show what was being said at
I don't* offer these as illustrative of the facts, but I do offer them
as indicating what a reputable Catholic news-giving organization was
putting out at that time.
The Chairman. That is in connection with the statement ]ust
made by Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It may be inserted.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 602, 603,
and 604," and are read in full below.)
Mr. Latitmore. May I ask whether those releases refer specincally
to the same area that I was in or to other areas of North China ?
Mr. SouRwaNE. Does the Chair wish to have these read?
The Chairman. Can you answer the question of the witness ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Being much less familiar with China than Mr.
Lattimore, I would prefer to read them. They do refer to North
China.
(Exhibit No. 602)
Rome, September 28 (NCWC— Fides).— According to latest reports, four Cath-
olic missionaries are still held captive by Communists and bandits in China
and Manchukuo. , , t>.t j i
The Reverend Epiphany Pegoraro, O. F. M., and Brother Paschal Nadal,
O. F. M., the first an Italian and the latter a Spaniard, were captured in May
1935 at Mosimien in the Vicariate of Tatsienlu, where they were stationed at
the Leper Asylum. The latest news of them is that they are still alive and are
acting as nurses to the Communists. -, ,. *
The Reverend Henry Kellner, of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart ot
Issoudun, was captured at Shihtsien in January 1936. The Communists have
demanded a ransom of $50,000.
The Reverend Clarence Burns, of the Maryknoll Mission in Fushun, Man-
chukuo, was captured by bandits in February 1936. No word has been received
concerning him for several months.
(Exhibit No. 603)
Lanchow, Kansu, china, June 28 (NCWC— Fides),— The region about Lan-
chow was completely cut ofE from communication with the outside world for
several months in 1930 and 1937, all letters passing into the hands of the
Reds who controlled the district. The Catholic missionaries of Lanchow received
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3631
no news except by radio. Tne lives of priests, brothers, and sisters were never
before in such peril, and since most of them are Germans, besides being Catholic,
they feared that their lot under an eventual Soviet domination would be particu-
larly hard.
The Chinese New Year was observed with apprehension, because at that
time strife had broken out between the Northeast Division of the army and the
troops of the Central Government. Moreover, the rebel officials were making
life hard for the people; the specter of famine had appeared on the horizon;
and the Reds were scoring victory after victory over the Chinese Mohammedans
of the province.
But the tide turned when Government troops arrived and defeated the Reds.
The rebellious forces of the Northeast Army were ordered to leave Lanchow,
and the Government troops took command.
The cities of Liangchow, Kanchow, and farther to the west, Kaotai, were still in
the hands of the Reds, but a band of Tungans (Chinese Mohammedans) made a
surprise attack on Kaotai and killed all the Reds and, unfortunately, many of
the innocent town's folk too. The Mohammedans unwittingly set fire to the
new Catholic church, which was burned to the ground.
The ranks of the Reds have been thinned by a number of terrible battles.
Hundreds of them, together with their hangers-on, have been brought to Kanchow
where they met their end in a big pit prepared for their bodies outside the east
gate. It was revenge of the Tungans who have the reputation of taking no
prisoners.
Many of the poor wretches were baptized by Catholic missionaries before they
reached the pit. Approximately 2,000 wounded were cared for by missionaries.
Brother Phllotheus Guggemoss, of the Catholic mission staff, took sick and died
while nursing the sick and wounded.
The Red invasion of the Vicariate of Lanchow during the past year has
brought a loss of $30,000 (Mexican) to the Catholic mission.
(Exhibit No. 604)
The Hague, November 29. — Word has been received here that the Most Rever-
end Hubert Francis Schraven, Vicar Apostolic of Chengtingfu, China, has been
murdered by bandits in that covmtry. Bishop Schraven, who was a member
of the Congregation of the Mission, was born in Lottum, in this country, October
13, 1873.
The report from China also said that seven other Catholic missionaries were
killed at the time Bishop Schraven met his death. Two of these other mission-
aries were from the Netherlands, three were from France, one from Poland,
and one from Czechoslovakia. Bishop Schraven had labored in China for 40
years.
Mr. Lattimoke. May the record show all of the places mentioned
in those reports, with the exception of one which I don't immediately
identify, namely, Shihtsien, are many hundred miles from any part of
China I visited in that year.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Mr. Lattimore, do you remember a previous occa-
sion during your testimony here when a point arose as to whether
you said or had meant to say that Manchuria was going to be taken
over or had been taken over by the Reds ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't remember that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you ever stated or argued that Manchuria
would be taken over or had been taken over by the Eeds ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall writing about that.
Mr. SouRWixE. Have you ever written or stated to the contrary that
Manchuria was an independent nation and not a puppet state 'I
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I have.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever attempted to convince anyone Man-
churia or Manchukuo was an independent state ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I have.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. ]\Iorris was questioning you to-
ward the end of a previous session about your itinerary and I believe
it covered up to 1941, at which time you went out to China as adviser
3632 msTiTUTE of pacific relations
to Chaing Kai-shek. Could we go on from there and bring it up to
date as rapidly as possible ?
Mr. Lattimore. Surely.
Senator Ferguson. That was the question.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I meant that as a question. Going on from 1941 I
mean. You had told us from 1920 to 1933 you were in China in
Manchuria; in 1933 you went to the Banff Conference of the IPR; in
1935 you went to China and returned by way of Russia, Holland, and
England, arriving in 1936.
In 1936 you went to London for 3 or 4 months. You returned by
way of Suez and in 1937 you went out to China, returned about Christ-
mas time, 1937 ; remained in the United States until 1939, and then a
summer vacation in Sweden and Norway of that year. In 1941 again
you went out to China as adviser to Chiang.
Is that substantially the substance of your testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. Do you want me to go on with times when
I was out of this country and which countries I visited ?
Mr. SouRwiNE, Yes, sir.
Mr. Lattimore. In 1942, 1 returned from China via Burma, India,
and South America.
In the fall of 1942 1 went back to China via the same route.
At the end of 1942, I returned from China with Mme. Chiang
Kai-shek also by the same route— India and South America. In 194 —
I am not sure ; maybe it was toward the end of 1942, I went to the
Mont Tremblant conference of the IPE-. That could easily be checked.
I think that must have been the fall of 1942. That was in Canada.
In 1943, I did not leave this country. In 1944, I flew to Hawaii to
set up OWI work under Admiral Nimitz and on to Australia to set up
OWI work under General MacArthur ; then returned to this country
by the same route.
In the summer of 1944, 1 flew via Alaska to Siberia and China with
Vice President Wallace, returned by way of Outer Mongolia, Siberia,
Alaska, and a stop in Canada, to this country.
In 1945, I spent the summer vacation in Mexico. In 1946, I spent
the summer vacation in Nova Scotia. In 1947, I spent the summer
vacation in Europe, principally France, Czechoslovakia, and England,
attending an IPR conference in England before returning to this
country.
My wife reminds me that I have forgotten going to Japan in the
fall of 1945, with the American Reparations Mission under Ambassa-
dor Pauley, returning early in 1946.
In 1948, 1 don't believe I was out of the country. In 1949 I went to
a Joint American and Indian Conference at New Delhi in India, and
stopped briefly in Pakistan on the way back.
In 1950, in the spring of 1950, I went to Afghanistan via Pakistan
on a mission for the United Nations.
In 1951, I was, at the very end of 1951, a day or two after Christ-
mas— my wife and I flew to England, where we remained for about 3
weeks, returning toward the end of January this year.
I think that is the complete catalog.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, when you left China in 1936, what
route did you take to Moscow? Will you tell us that in as much
detail as you can, please?
Mr. Lati^imore, From Peking to Manchuria, which was then under
Japanese control, to Siberia, then via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3633
Moscow. I made a side trip to Leningrad and then back to Moscow.
Then by train from Moscow to Poland, passing through Poland with-
out a stop-over, and through Germany without a stop-over; then stay-
ing in Holland — I am not sure ; perhaps a week — and in England for
what? — 2 weeks? Something like that. And back to the United
States.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In all, how many times have you been in Moscow,
Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Laitimore. Once.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And that was the occasion when you had your con-
ference with the Soviet IPR officials, the officials of the Soviet council?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Concerning which there has been substantial testi-
mony here, has there not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Considerable, yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, will you tell us on what other occasions did
you have conferences of a similar nature with other councils of the
IPR, other national councils ?
The Chairman. Of the IPR?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I had considerable talk with the Dutch
that same year in — let's see. Where was it now ? Amsterdam, Rot-
terdam, and one other place where the Dutch had centers. I talked
with the man who was acting as Dutch editor and correspondent
for the IPR.
]Mr. Sourwine. If you will pardon me, sir, the way you answered
that question indicates you didn't grasp what I was trying to get at.
Because you wouldn't have had a similar conference to the one you
held in Moscow at several places in Holland. The one you had in
Moscow was a conference, was it not, with the top officials of the
Soviet Council? And you were discussing particularly their views
with regard to what should go into Pacific Affairs. Isn't that correct ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. I want to know on what other occasions, if any,
you had conferences with the top officials of IPR councils from
other countries.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I had similar conferences with the Dutch
in Amsterdam, as far as they could be similar, since I was alone
there and not with Mr. Carter, who was the secretary general. But
I did talk with the top board of the Dutch IPR and also visited
their local boards in a couple of other towns.
Mr. Sourwine. That was in Amsterdam in what year?
Mr. Lattimore. '36.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir ?
Mr. Lattimore. And I had similar conferences with the British
at Chatham House, again with the modification that Mr. Carter
was not present, so it was simply a conference of the editor of Pacific
Affairs, not including the secretary general of the institute.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know of any others ?
Mr. Lattimore. In 1934, on the way out from America to China,
and again in 1937, on the way back from China to America, I had
similar conferences with the Japanese IPR in Japan, again with the
exception that this was myself having the conferences, and without
the presence of the secretary general.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any more ?
3634 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. I also had similar conferences with the top people
of the Chinese IPE in Shanghai and Peking, but not all at the same
time, because their representation was rather split up geographically.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Any more ?
]Mr. Lattimore. I again had conferences with the British at Chat-
ham House in the winter of '36-'37, when I was staying in London
for about 3 months on the way back to China.
Mr. Sourwine. Were those conferences of the same nature that
we are talking about, that is, a top level conference with the national
head of an IPR council with regard to the question of what went into
the magazine of which you were editor?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes,"^ as far as the magazine was concerned. They
didn't concern general IPR research, et cetera, such as was taken up
by Mr. Carter, or by Mr. Holland, when he was traveling.
Mr. SouRw^NE. Are there any more ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is all I can recall at the moment.
Mr. Sourwine. Then would you say that the only conference that
you recall at which the general secretary was present and at which
these general questions of policy as well as the question of what went
into the magazine w^ere taken up, was the one in Moscow in 1936 ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. At the summer conference of the IPR at
Yosemite in 1936, there was a more general conference of a special
committee on Pacific Affairs, with top delegates from a group of
national councils.*
Mr. Sourwine. That was not quite the same thing ; was it ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; not quite the same thing.
Mr. SouRWTNE. Then get back to my original question. Would you
say or would you deny that the conference in Moscow about which
there has been so much testimony here was the only conference of that
nature at which the general secretary of IPR was present?
Mr. Laitimore. Yes; I believe so.
Mr. SouRAviNE. Would you recall ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe so.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having testified here
with regard to whether you ever suggested in any of your writings
that Soviet Russia might be reaching out for Mongolia or might be
planning to take over Mongolia?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't recall that.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall whether you ever did suggest?
Mr. Lattimore. No; not offhand.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever take the opposite tack, that Mongolia
was independent, and that there was no threat of Soviet domina-
tion ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I have frequently written that Outer Mon-
golia is an independent state in the sense of never having been in-
corporated in Russia; but I have also qualified that by describing it
as a satellite state.
Mr. Sourwine. You think now it is a satellite state ?
Mr. Lattimore. Very much so.
Mr. Sourwine. How long have you held that opinion ?
Mr. Lattimore. That would be hard to say. I think it would be
hard to say particularly, because the expression "satellite" is a post-
war expression.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3635
Mr. SouRWiNE. When \\ould you say you first expressed the opinion
that Outer Mongolia was a satellite state, if you did ever express
it?
Mr, Lattimore. Probably about 1945.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, prior to that time, did you take the view or
hold to the view that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of
Russian influence?
Mr. Latt-IMORe. Not free of Russian influence. I thinly in the ter-
minology of that time, before people were using the word "satellite" I
Avould have referred to it more as a Russian protectorate or a state
under Russian protection, or something of that kind.
jSIr. SoURWiNE. Let me rephrase the question, or perhaps I should
ask a different question.
Did you ever take the position or argue that Outer Mongolia was an
independent state free of Russian domination ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I think I did, before the war, describe it as
free of domination.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You have changed your view since then ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think the situation has changed since then.
The Chairjvian. The question is: Have you changed your view?
Mr. Lattimore. I have changed my view, in line with what I con-
sider to be a changing situation.
Mr. Sourwine. When do you think the situation changed? Can
you give an approximate date?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I should say some time after the war, if I had
been able to get to Outer Mongolia, I might have a more sharp opinion
on that, but it is very difficult to determine from outside.
The Chairman. The question is : When do you think the situation
changed ? If you. do not know, you can say so.
Mr, Lattimore. I don't know. Some time after the war.
Mr, Sourwine. When did you first reach the conclusion that Outer
INIongolia was an independent state and free of Russian domination?
Do you know ?
Mr. Lattimore. Some time in the 1930's.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when you first argued that or first
expressed that view publicly?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us now when, in fact, Outer Mongolia
did become an independent state and free of Russian domination ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I would say that— I forget the exact year;
1920 or '21 or somewhere along in there, the Mongols who had pre-
viously declared their independence of China, came into close rela-
tions with Communist Russia, and certainly the Russian influence
from that time on was very strong. But my impression was that it
was primarily at the request of the Mongols themselves.
Mr. Sourwine. You say the Russian influence was very strong
from about 1920 or 1921 on ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, if I understood you correctly, you said a
moment ago that the situation changed after the war. What war did
you mean ? The First World W^ar ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; the Second World War.
Mr. Sourwine. How did it change? Did the Russian domina-
tion become stronger after the First World War ?
88348— 52— pt. 10 24
3636 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. No. I would roughly characterize the 1920's and
1930's as a period when the close relations between Eussia and Outer
Mongolia could hardly be described as Eussian domination, because
it was largely or chiefly at the instance of the Mongol Government
itself.
Mr. SouRWiNE. There was, however, during that time, a large
measure of Eussian influence. Is that your testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. Surely.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And you recognized that at the time?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, surely.
Mr. Sottrwine. And you never argued to the contrary ; is that your
testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
]\Ir. SouRwiNE. All right, sir. Another loose end, quite uncon-
nected with what we have been discussing : You remember testifying
here earlier, I believe on the last day before this one, when you were
on the stand, concerning a YIVCA worker who told you in 1947 that
the World Youth Festival was non-Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. In her opinion ; yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, will you give us the name of that YWCA
worker ?
]Mr. Lattimore. My wife says she believes we have the letter at
home, and we can furnish you with the letter.
Mr. Morris. Was it Talitha Gerlach, Mr. Lattimore ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. It is not a personal letter, is it? It is in rela-
tion to the conference ?
Mr. Lattimore. There is no reason why we shouldn't turn in the
letter. You can have the whole letter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, have you ever used a nom de plume
in your writing ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever have.
The Chairman. Can you answer that more definitely, Mr. Latti-
more?
Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my recollection, I never have.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, does the phrase "Pivot of Asia"
mean anything to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. It is the title of a book that I wrote in collabora-
tion with others at the Page School at the Johns Hopkins, which was
published in 1950?
Mr. Sourwine. With whom did you collaborate?
Mr. Lattimore. Let's see. There were about six or eight people.
Let's see if I can remember them all. Dr. John De Francis.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you spell that for the reporter, please ?
Mr. Lattimore. D-e F-r-a-n-c-i-s.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify him?
Mr. Lattimore. He is professor at the Johns Hopkins.
Mr. Sourwine. And tlie next ?
Mr. Lattimore. Dr. Daniel Thorner, T-h-o-r-n-e-r.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify him, please?
Mr. Lattimore. Who is now at the University of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Sourwine. And the next ?
Mr. Lattimore. Dr. Chen Han-seng, C-h-e-n H-a-n-S-e-n-g, who is
now in China.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3637
Mr. SouRWiNE, Can you identify him, please?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, he had previously worked for the IPR.
Mr. SouRWiNE. He is the same Chen Han-seng that has been dis-
cussed in previous testimony here?
Mr. Lattimore. That's right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. All right.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Cheng Chih-yi, C-h-e-n-g C-h-i-h-y-i.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify him?
Mr. Lattimore. He was a former member of the Academia Sinica,
which was the Chinese Government Research Institute. And he
worked with me at Johns Hopkins for 2 years. I believe he is back in
China now.
Mr. Sourwine. Where in China ?
Mr. Lattimore. In Red China, I think. The last I heard of him he
went back to Hong Kong, but he may be in Red China now. Let me
see.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, when you said he w^as connected
with China, did you mean the Nationalist Government?
Mr. Lattimore. That was under the Nationalist Government, yes.
Prof. Karl H. Menges, K-a-r-1 H. M-e-n-g-e-s.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you identify him ?
Mr. Lattimore. Of Columbia University. Oh, there was also a
chapter contributed by Mrs. Thorner, the wife of Prof. Daniel
Thorner.
Is that the lot?
Mr. SouRw^iNE. To whom are you addressing that question?
Mr. Lattimore. I was asking my wife. My wife assisted in the
editing of the book.
Prof. Tom Weiner, W-e-i-n-e-r, or Thomas Weiner, of Duke Uni-
versity.
I think that is all. Do you remember any others ?
Mr. Sourwine. At the time you collaborated with those persons, did
you know or have any reason to believe that any of them was or had
been a person under Communist discipline, or who had voluntarily and
knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members
in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't believe so.
Senator Ferguson. Just a minute. I don't know whether he an-
swered the question.
Mr. Lattimore. I did not know or believe.
Mr. Sourwine. Did the Rockefeller Institution have anything to do
with the financing of the writing of this book ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. The Carnegie Foundation made a grant-
in-aid.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how much that was ?
Mr. Lattimore. Do I remember how much it was? I don't remem-
ber offhand. I could get the figure for you.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when that grant was made?
Mr. Lattimore. I think probably in 1947. I think probably for the
academic year 1947-48.
Mr. Sourwine. Who was head of the Carnegie Foundation at that
time?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know who was head of it. The member
of the foundation with whom I dealt was Mr. John Gardner.
3638 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was Mr. Alger Hiss ever connected with that
foundation ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. He was connected, as I recall, with the
Carneoie Endowment, which is a different set-up.
Mr. SouRWiNE. All right. And it is your testimony that the Rocke-
feller Foundation had nothing to do with any donation or endowment
or gift in connection with the preparation of this book ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe they had anything to do with it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. All right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever approached or talked to Mr. Hiss
about money to write any books or pamphlets or papers?
]Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Sourwine, do you want that figure? I am not
clear.
The Chairman. The what?
Mr. FoRTAS. The figure, about the amount of money.
Mr. Sourwine. We would like to have it for the record, yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, how many times have you been in
Mongolia ?
Mr. Lattimore. I am afraid I have lost count.
The Chairman. If you can, give us an approximation.
Mr. Lattimore. I first traveled in Mongolia in 1926. This was in
Inner Mongolia. And I visited Inner Mongolia very frequently from
then until 1937, when I left China.
I was in Outer Mongolia once, in 1944, for a brief stop-over on the
way back from China.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, when you left China in 1935 to go to
Moscow, did you go through Inner Mongolia?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; neither Inner nor Outer.
Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire, while you were on that same
point : When you left China, did you know you were going to stop in
Moscow ?
Mr. Lattimore. In 1936?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Latttmore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That was a planned trip ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was at the request of Mr. Carter, C-a-r-t-e-r,
as secretary general.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; and paid for by the institute ?
Mr. Latitmore. And paid for by the institute.
The Chairman. That was a planned trip, was one question.
Senator Ferguson. I thought he answered that "Yes" ; that it was a
planned trip.
Mr. Lattimore. I answered that ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, have you seen an article entitled
"Lattimore Whose Ordeal — ," appearing in the New Leader of March
17, 1952?
Mr. LA'rriMORE. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliich contains a statement that Ambassador Hu
Shih was not given information about your appointment to Chiang
Kai-shek until some time after your conference with Ambassador
Oumansky.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3639
Mr. Lattimore. I have not seen that article ; no.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any knowledge as to when the Chi-
nese Ambassador received information or intelligence with regard
to your appointment as aide to Chiang Kai-shek, adviser to Chiang
Kai-shek ?
Mr. Lattimore. None whatever. The handling on the Chinese
side was through Dr. T. V. Soong rather than through the Chinese
Embassy.
Mr. SouR\viNE. Mr. Chairman, the question came up, and a mem-
ber of the committee asked the staff about it. The staff has wired
Dr. Hu Shih and has a telegram, which I will not offer for the record,
because it is not evidence, which states that he received word only
2 days before Mr. Lattimore left. I bring it up now for the com-
mittee's consideration of a future time as to whether Dr. Hu Shih
should be called as a witness on that point, if it is considered im-
portant to the committee.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. That was 2 days before the official announcement
was made ?
Mr. Lattimore. Two days before the official announcement was
made. I stand corrected.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, did you know they were not
going through the Embassy in relation to your appointment?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know whether Dr. T. V. Soong was clear-
ing with the Embassy or not.
Senator Ferguson. Had you talked to Dr. Soong ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I had.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to your appointment ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Where was that conversation ?
Mr. Lattimore. Wait. I want to be sure of that. It was prior
to the appointment. I am not sure whether it was prior to the recom-
mendation or not.
Senator Ferguson. What was his official position ?
Mr. Lattimore. He was head of China Defense Supplies, which
was an organization set up in this country for the handling of sup-
plies from the United States to China.
Senator Ferguson. Was he connected with the Embassy?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know what the formal connection was
between the Embassy and China Defense Supplies.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you see him?
Mr. Lattimore. At his residence here in Washington.
Senator Ferguson. Here in Washington? Then you do not dis-
pute this telegram, as I understand it?
Mr. Lattuviore. No ; I don't dispute it. I just don't know about it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I resume?
The Chairman. Very well. ,
Mr. SouR^viNE. Mr. Lattimore, you have testified here with regard
to your opinion as to whether your conference with President Tru-
man and the memoranda you left with him and the letter you sent
him had any influence on him. Do you know whether, as a matter
of fact, he gave any consideration to that matter m the days subse-
quent to your leaving of the memoranda with him?
Mr. Latiimore. I have no knowledge of that whatever,
Mr. SouRwiNE. That was on July 3, was it not?
3640 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Mandel, I ask you if that paper which I now
hand you carries a paragraph which you had copied from the book,
Mr. President.
Senator Ferguson. Here is the book. It may be read from the
book.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this paragraph, which
appears on page 122 of the book, may be read into the record at this
point. May I read it?
The CiiAiRiViAN. This is from the book presumably coming under
the authorship of the President of the United States, entitled, "Mr.
President"? Very well. Read it from the book.
Mr. SouRWiNE. This purports to be an entry, a diary entry, by the
President [reading] :
July 4, 1945—
Now, that was the date following your visit to see the President.
Down Potomac on the Potomac with Vinson, Snyder, Rosenman, George Allen,
Steve Early, Charlie Ross, and Matt Connelly. Discussed Russia and Japanese
war, government for Germany, food, fuel, and transportation for Europe,
sterling bloc. Do not feel happy over situation.
Mr. Lattimore, did you ever see a letter from Betty Ussashevsky to
Marguerite Stewart of the American Council of the IPR ?
Mr. Lattimore. Professor who?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Betty Ussashevsky. Do you know who she was?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever see a letter from Betty Ussashevsky to
Marguerite Stewart of the American Council of the IPR, expressing
the fear that IPR was going to be investigated ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I have seen a reference to that in the testi-
mony before this committee.
Mr. Sourwine. The question was: Did you ever see the letter?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am sure I didn't.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss such a letter with your wife ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am sure I didn't.
Mr. Sourwine. You are aware of that letter as it appears in our
record ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that that letter was transmitted to
your wife by Mrs. Stewart with the expressed hope that she would
discuss it with Bill and John Carter Vincent and any other trusted
friends w^ho might be in the know on these things?
Mr. Lattimore. I have seen that reference in the testimony.
Mr. Sourwine. And you didn't discuss it with your wife?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think I remember discussing it at all.
My wife says she believes I was abroad at the time.
Mr. Sourwine. You were abroad at the time you read it in the
testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; at the time that this letter was sent.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, you have stated that you didn't see it at that
time. You also said you saw it in the testimony.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you see it in the testimony after you got back
to the United States ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3641
Mr. Lattimore. No ; this is referring to 1945, isn't it?
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am referring now to our testimony. You said
you saw this letter in our testimony.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; within the last few w^eeks.
Mr. SoUR\viNE. Now, after you saw that letter in our testimony and
knew what it said about transmittal of the letter to Mrs. Lattimore, are
you testifying here that you didn't discuss it with Mrs. Lattimore?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I haven't discussed it with her.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mrs. Lattimore did, in fact,
discuss that letter with Mr. John Carter Vincent ?
Mr. Lattimore. I would have to ask her.
Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you whether you know.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether, in fact, she did discuss it
with anyone else?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, you remember there has been testi-
mony here about a meeting at the Aldo Cafe in Washington, D. C,
following the testimony before this committee of Mr. Carter, which
was attended by Mr. Carter, you, Mrs. Lattimore, and a fourth party?
Mr. Lat'itmore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you been able to remember yet who that
fourth party was ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; it was a graduate student at Johns Hopkins,
named Mr. Catesby, C-a-t-e-s-b-y, Jones.
Mr. Sourwine. Catesby Jones ?
Mr. Lattimore. Catesby Jones; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you describe Mr. Jones, for the benefit of this
committee, please ?
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Jones is a student in the School of Geography
at Johns Hopkins.
Mr. Sourwine. No, I meant physically. Is he tall, or short?
Does he have a beard ?
Mr. Lattimore. He doesn't have a beard. He has a mustache. He
is fair in color, and taller than I am.
Mr. Sourwine. Slender?
Mr. Lattimore. No, not slender, I should say. .
Mr. Sourwine. Have you talked with Mrs. Lattimore about that
occasion since you testified about it here previously?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I have.
Mr. Sourwine. Is this your own recollection you are testifying from
now, as refreshed?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; it is not my recollection at all. It is that she
reminded me.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you now know that it is true that it was Mr.
Catesby who was there?
Mr. Lattimore. I assume my wife's recollection is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you now know that that is true?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't know that it is true. I am assuming
that it is true.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't actually recollect who the fourth man
was?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't actually remember it at all.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Mr. Catesby ?
3642 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Or Mr. Catesby Jones.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Catesby Jones. Yes; I do.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, having your recollection, as you say, refreshed
by your wife, and still not being able to remember it yourself, did you
have any thought of checking with Mr. Catesby Jones to see whether
he was in fact with you there ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I haven't.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any other person with you there ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; not that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Catesby Jones have any connection with
the IPK, or has he had any ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
Mr. Sourwine. Does he have any connection with Mr. Carter?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am sure he doesn't.
Mr. Sourwine. What connection does he have with you ?
Mr. Lattimore. He is a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, and I am one of the supervisors of his thesis work.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he come over to Washington from Johns Hop-
kins with you on that day ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe he did. I believe we must have
run into him here.
[To Mrs. Lattimore] Do you remember that?
Mr. Sourwine. I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr.
Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember at all.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how he happened to be invited to that
meeting ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I presume we just ran into each other and
went to dinner together.
Mr. Sourwine. You did not just run into Mr. Carter, did you?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I came over to see Mr. Carter, as I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. That was by prearrangement that you had dinner
with Mr. Carter ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think it was by prearrangement. I
think my wife and I came over to see him, and it got along toward
dinner time, and we said, "Let's go and get something to eat."
Mr. Sourwine. You knew he Avas testifying before this committee
on that day ; didn't you ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Sourwine. And you came over to see him after he finished his
testimony?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it was after he finished his testimony ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall what time he finished his testimony ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't. It was some time in the late after-
noon, I think.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how long it was between the time he
finished his testimony and the time you went over there to dinner ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think it was long enough for a casual meet-
ing and then just a suggestion to go eat?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I should think so.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where you casually met ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3643
Mr. Lattimore. Well, we went to the hotel that Mr. Carter was
staying at. Where we met Mr. Jones, I don't remember.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You met him by appointment; didn't yovi?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think so. Mr. Carter?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes; Mr. Carter.
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Carter, by appointment, I think.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It was prearranged, then, wasn't it ?
Mr. Lattimore. To meet him, yes.
The Chairman. We had better get that straightened out. That
same question was propounded to the witness a moment or two ago
and he said "No." Now, was it by prearrangement ? That has been
asked twice, here, and has been answered two ways.
Mr. FoRTAS. I think the previous question was the dinner by pre-
arrangement. Senator.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I think it was.
Mr. FoRTAS. The record will show.
Mr. Lattimore. Could we check that on the record ?
Mr. Sourwine. The record will speak for itself as to the question.
If the witness is now testifying that he did meet Mr. Carter by pre-
arrangement, that is what I was trying to find out.
The Chairman. You can answer that question "Yes" or "No." Was
it by prearrangement that you met jNIr. Carter that day ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was by prearrangement of some sort. May I
elaborate a little bit?
The Chairman. I do not think it needs any elaboration.
Mr. Lattimore. The question is whether it was called in from
Baltimore, or here.
The Chairman. Just a moment. You have answered the question.
Mr. Lattimore. All right.
The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sour^vine. Mr. Chairman, the witness' mention of calling from
Baltimore or calling from here raises an interesting question I would
like to ask.
Does that indicate, sir, that you initiated this meeting with him ?
The Chairman. With whom?
Mr. Sourwine. With Mr. Carter. That you sought to meet Mr.
Carter on that day ?
Mr. Lattimore. That I don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, you said you don't remember whether you
called him from Baltimore or called him from here. That would in-
dicate you remember you called him, wouldn't it?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I called him, but the reason why I say
I don't remember is that he may have let me know from New York
previously that he was coming down here. *
Mr. Sourwine. You mean you may have had a previous under-
standing that you would meet with him after he finished testifying
that day.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether I knew that or not, or
whether he simply told me from New York that he was coming down
liere, and then I had the idea of seeing him here.
Mr. Sourwine. All right, sir.
Turning to another subject, Mr. Lattimore, when did you first meet
Mr. Dean Acheson.
3644 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. I have never met Mr. Acheson.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. You don't Imow liim at all.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know him at all.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you ever corresponded with him?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I have.
Senator Ferguson. On that, could you be a little more definite ? ^ ,
Mr. Lattimore. I am sure that I have never corresponded with
Mr. Acheson. The reason why I say I believe I haven't is that I
may have had occasion in the past to write some letter to the State
Department, where you are supposed to address the letter to the
Secretary.
Senator Ferguson. I wondered about the October 1949 meetings,
whether you were invited. Your wife is now handing you a folder,
and I wondered whether or not you had a wire, as some of the other
people had, or a letter, from the Secretary of State.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I believe that correspondence was in the hands
of Mr. Jessup and the other members of that special committee, Mr.
Case and Mr.— I forget his name. My wife has just reminded me
that I did write a letter or send a telegram to Mr. Acheson requesting
him to release the transcript of my remarks at that 1949 meeting.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is that the only letter or telegram or other com-
munication?
Mr. Lattuhore. That is the only one, I believe.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That you ever sent Mr. Acheson?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Did you ever speak at the Army War College i
Mr. Lai^imore. I have spoken there maybe once, maybe twice.
Mr. SouRW^iNE. Not more than twice ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And at least once ?
Mr. Lattimore. And at least once.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember when ?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, it must have been about 1945 or 1946, pos-
sibly 1947. I am not sure.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know what you talked about?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember 'in detail. Probably some gen-
eral talk on the Far East.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember how your talk was arranged?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember Avho made the contact or who
invited you to speak?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever recommend the assignment or trans-
fer of any person in the State Department to any post in the Far
East?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I ever did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You never made such a recommendation to anyone ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; not that I recall.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever make such a recommendation with
regard to John S. Service?
Mr. LArriMORi-:. No ; I am pretty sure I never did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Miriam Farley?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. T. A. Bisson?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3645
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know of any Communist or pro-Communist
who was employed by the Office of War Information '^
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Either Chinese or American Communist or pro-
Communist ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not tliat I considered Communist or pro-Com-
munist at that time.
Mr. SouR-waNE. Now, leaving aside the question of what you con-
sidered, I want to ask you this question : Do you know of any person,
either Chinese or American, racially, who was employed by the Office
of War Information, who was a person under Communist discipline
or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated
with Comnnniist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party
objectives?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have anything to do with the em-
plovment of anyone to a position of importance with UNRRA —
UNRRA— for China?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know anyone who held a position of
importance with UNRRA for China ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I knew Mr. Beniamin Kizer.
Mr. Sourwine. Is he the only person who fills that specification ?
Mr. Lattimore. He is the only one I can recall at the moment.
Mr. Sourwine. That is, he is the only person who ever held a posi-
tion of importance with LTNRRA for China that you knew?
IMr. Lattimore. That I recall ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And you had nothing to do with his appointment
and made no recommendation with regard to it ?
Mr, Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you acquainted with any member of the United
States Supreme Court?
Mr. Lattimore. I have met Mr. Justice Douglas, and I have met Mr.
Justice Black. I think those are the only two I have met.
Mr. SoumviNE. Did you attend a discussion conference of the Amer-
ican Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Washington on or
about December 9 and 10, 1938?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall it. It would be quite possible.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, attempting to refresh
Mr. Lattimore. Let's see. What date in '38 ?
Mr. Sourwine. December 9 and 10, 1938.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I was in Baltimore at that time, so it is very
likely I would have been invited.
Mr. Sourwine. Attempting to refresh your memory, do you remem-
ber attending such a discussion conference, at which Mr. Stanley
Hornbeck was present?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall it. I have been at various IPR-
sponsored discussions where Mr. Hornbeck w^as present.
Mr. Sourwine. Was he a trustee of IPR at that time ?
Mr. Lattimore. He has been a trustee of the IPR, I believe, in the
past. I don't recall in 1938.
The Chairman. Was he at that time ? That was the question.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.
3646 msTiTUTE of pacific relations
Mr. FoRTAS. May I inquire whether the witness wants a recess ana
whether that is the pleasure of the committee? We have been going
about 2 hours.
The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess for 10 mniutes.
(Short recess.)
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, just before the recess, I asked you
about your attendance at a discussion conference of the American
Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, in Washington, D. C, on or
about December 9 and 10, 1938.
Mr. Latiimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, still attempting to refresh your memory with
regard to such a discussion conference, do you remember attending
such a conference, at which Mr. James Pennfield was in attendance?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember attending such a conference, at
which Mr. Alger Hiss was in attendance ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember attending a conference at which
Mr. or Mrs. Steven Roudabush was in attendance ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwine. You just can't remember any such conference?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I can't.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I have just two or maybe three
questions to ask Mr. Lattimore.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, have you had any Russian visit you
in your home ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think one. You mean one not an American of
Russian origin?
Senator Smith. I mean a person from Russia.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I think one.
Senator Smith. Who was that?
Mr. Lattimore. He was a man named Dolbin, D-o-l-b-i-n, who had
been assigned by the Russians to accompany Mr. Wallace in Siberia,
and then he was attached for a while here ; I am not sure whether
it was the Russian Embassy or the Russian United Nations delegation.
And I invited him over to my house.
Senator Smith. How long did he visit you ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think he drove over for lunch and drove back
the same day.
Senator Smith. Now, when was that ? About when ?
I know it is difficult to remember the exact date.
Mr. Lattimore. Probably 1945. , .
Senator Smith. Now, is the the only Russian individual that visited
your home?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe so.
Senator Smith. Did you never have a Russian individual, on fur-
ther reflection, to visit you as your house guest?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am pretty sure not.
Senator Smith. Was there ever any such occasion where you met a
Russian flying into Baltimore, where you met him at the airport ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3647
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am pretty sure I never met a Russian flying
into Baltimore.
Senator SivirrH. And this one Eussian is the only Russian individual
that has been to your home ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is the only one I can recall.
Senator Smith. All right.
Senator Ferguson. What was the first name of this individual ? I
assume that was the last name you gave.
Mr. Lattimore. That was the last name. I don't remember the
first name.
Senator Smith, May I ask one other question ?
Did you have occasion to have a conference with this same man here
in Washington?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I think I lunched with him once here in
Washington.
Senator Smith. Did you meet with him anywhere else?
Mr. Lattimore. In this country ?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Smith. Now, at how many places did you meet him in
Russia ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, he was attached to Mr. Wallace's party.
The Chairman. How many places did you meet him in Russia?
Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry, Senator. That question is not sus-
ceptible to an answer in terms of numbers, because he accompanied
Mr. Wallace throughout his journey.
Senator Smith. Now, is that the only occasion when you ever saw
him in Russia ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Senator Smith. Did you ever see him in China?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Smith. Was he an official of the Soviet? ■
Mr. Lattimore. He was an official of the Soviet Union ; yes.
Senator Smith. Do you know what position he occupied?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; except that at the time of Mr. Wallace's trip
in Siberia, Mr. Dolbin was described as assigned fi*om the Soviet
Foreign Office.
Senator Smith. You assumed, did you, that he was a loyal Russian
official?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Smith. And consequently a Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I couldn't assume that he was a Communist,
because I understand that many Russian officials are not Communists.
Senator Smith. At that time?
Mr. Lattimore. At that time ; I didn't inquire.
Senator Smith. Did you discuss with him the situation developing
then in China?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; only in the most general terms.
The Chairman. You did discuss it with him ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not with him alone.
The Chairman. Well, it does not make any difference whether it
was with him alone. Did you discuss it with him ?
3548 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr Lattimore. The subject was discussed while we were in Russia,
and I couldn't recollect at this moment whether he was the man who
discussed it or some other member of the party. . , , . ■ ..
The Chairman. Did you have any conference with hmi m the
presence of anyone else, or with anyone else in Russia?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it was always in a group.
Senator Smith. Do you have any idea how many conferences you
had with him, or with him in a group?
Mr Lattimore. No; I don't, because we were traveling m the same
airplane, and therefore nobody would think of it m terms of con-
f erences.
Senator Smith. Do you know where he is now ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea.
The Chairman. That is all. Senator?
Senator Smith. I believe that is all. _
Senator Ferguson. Did this Russian come back with you on the
plane ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. But he came over after ?
Mr. Lattimore. He came over at some later time ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. And how did he contact you ?
Mr. Lattimore. Here?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did he call you?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I think I contacted him.
Senator Ferguson. At the Embassy?
Mr. Lattimore. I called the Embassy ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. How did you learn that he was here ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think f roin the newspapers ; but I am not sure. _
Senator Ferguson. How long would you say he was at your home?
Mr. Lattimore. Two or three hours.
Senator Ferguson. You did not meet him at the airport?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. The Senator asked you if you recalled meeting
any Russian.
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.
Senator Ferguson. Or any Russian coming from the airport to your
home ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Smith. There was one other question.
The Chairman. Verv well. Senator. ^
Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, you told us, and you published in
your book, that Mr. Hamilton Owens flew from here to London for
the purpose of meeting you. You spent the evening together, the night
together, and he flew back the next day.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; we had dinner together at the airport, and we
immediately thereafter boarded the plane for home.
Senator Smith. I thought you said that you spent a night m a
good soft bed for the first time, or something of that kind.
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. That was when the journey was broken, in
Ireland, and there was weather obstruction, and so on.
Senator Smith. Did anyone else meet you with Mr. Owens when you
were in London or in Ireland ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; except that the whole press was there at
the airport.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3649
Senator Smith. I believe you told me you did not know any of
those personally.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Smith. You were not acquainted with any of them?
Mr. Lattimoke. No.
Senator Smith. Did Mr. Owens take you any information with
respect to these charges that had just been made against you?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Smith. Did he have any documents or papers with him
at all?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Smith. "VVliat was the purpose of his meeting you, if you
know, flying across the Atlantic to meet you and flying immediately
back ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I suppose as the editor of a Baltimore paper,
his reaction was "Baltimore boy makes headline."
Senator Smith. He was a personal friend of yours ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I would say a friend and acquaintance of
many years.
Senator Smith. I was just interested in his purpose in flying across
the Atlantic, if you were flying back in the next day or two. Was
there any significance to that?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I think he was proably trying to get a scoop.
Senator Ferguson. Did he go with you to have breakfast with Car-
ter after you landed ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He did not go to that meeting when you saw
t]ie press release?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I saw Carter after I landed.
Senator Ferguson. I thought it was on the occasion of your landing
tliat you saw Carter.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Ferguson. You did not see Carter at all after you landed ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think we did.
[To Mrs. Lattimore.] Did we?
The Chairman. Wait a minute. Your memory is what we want.
Have you a question pending ?
Senator Ferguson. No. I will wait and get the book.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now that the name of Mr. Dolbin has been brought
in, I have one question to ask about him. Did Mr, Wallace meet Mr.
Dolbin ?
Mr. Latitmore. Certainly.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And knew that he was on the plane all the way ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Had some contact with him on the plane all the way ?
Mr. Laittmore. Yes. He was attached to Mr. Wallace as an Eng-
lish-speaking Kussian to facilitate Mr. Wallace's journey.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. He had frequent conversations with him, then,
would you say ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Of a friendly nature ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you, sir, send a message to Mr. Lauchlin Cur-
rie at the White House in November of 1941 or at about that time
3650 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
indicating that Chiang Kai-shek had reacted adversely to the pro-
posed modus vivendi for Japan ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I transmitted such a message at the instruc-
tions of Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. SouRWiNE. He told you to transmit that message to the White
House ^
Mr. Lattimore. That's right.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you urge to Mr. Currie that the President be
told about Chiang's adverse reaction '*.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you in your message to Mr. Currie state that
it was being sent at Chiang's direction ?
Mr. Latiimore. I don't remember. The text of the message was
drafted by myself and Madame Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you discuss with Mr. Vincent the fact that
you had sent or would send or were sending such a message, or your
intention to send such a message'^
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it the purpose of that message to convey a
message from Chiang to the President I
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. My understanding was that Chiang was
using all channels open to him to register in Washington his alarm.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any part in the drafting or prepara-
tion or submission of the message under date of July 14, 1944, the
text of which appears on page 560 of the State Department white
paper, which I now show you %
Mr. Laitimore. August 31, 1944? Is that the one?
Mr. Sourwine. The message under date of July 14, 1944, on page
560.
Mr. Lattimore. I see. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Your answer is "No"? You did not?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. I am assuming, Mr. Chairman, that page refer-
ences to the white paper, which is a standard document, are sufficient
for inclusion in this record by reference?
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you make any suggestions with regard to that
message ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know about it at tlie time?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know it was going to be sent?
Mr. LATriMORE. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know it had been sent?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. My recollection is that
I had no conferences with Mr. Wallace after the plane returned.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about the documents that
that message itself refers to, that is. the Chiang telegram of July 8,
and the letter to Chiang under date of June 12 ?
Mr. Latiimore. No ; I don't know about those.
Mr. Sourwine. You never saw such documents?
Mr. LATriMORE. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with the preparation
or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944,
(juoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine?.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3651
Mr. Lattimore, No ; I don't think I did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know anything about a message sent to
Ambassador Gauss in the fall of 1944, on or about September 19 of
that year, over the signature of Secretary Hull, stating that he, Hull,
and the President, then Roosevelt, were authorizing Ambassador
Gauss to go over and speak very frankly to Chiang Kai-shek about the
urgent need of trying to bring about a greater amount of unity in the
military command of China?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I am quite sure I didn't.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever have anything to do with the drafting
or preparation of that telegram?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I am quite sure I didn't.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know at the time that it Avas to be sent?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I believe this is the first I have heard of it,
unless I noted it in the white paper when I first read it.
Mr. SouRwixE. I am referring to the telegi-am that appears on
page 563 of the white paper, which I show you. Does that change
your answer in any way?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I have no recollection of having anything to
do with that.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know at the time that it had been sent?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know anything about a telegram to Chiang
Kai-shek in the fall of 1944 over the signature of President Roosevelt?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't recollect anything about that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation
of such a telegram?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I am quite sure I didn't. In the fall, when?
Mr. SouRwiNE. In the fall of 1944.
]Mr. Lattimore. What month?
Mr. SouRwiNE. I can't place it more closely.
Mr. Latiimore. No. I am sure I didn't.
INIr. SouRWiNE. Did you have anything to do with the contents of
such a telegram ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am sure I didn't.
Mr. Sour wine. Did you ever discuss such a telegram or the con-
tents or prospective contents of it with Mr. John Carter Vincent?
Mr. Lattimore. No : I don't believe I did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. When did you first meet JNIr. John Carter Vincent ?
Mr. Lattimore. In Peking about 1929 or 1930.
Mr. SouRAvixE. You are sure it wasn't earlier than that?
Mr. Laitimore. Yes. I don't remember meeting him before that.
Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been while you were with Arnold &
Co., Ltd., at Tientsin and Peking?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am sure I didn't know him then.
Mr. Sourwine. That would have been between 1922 and 1926?
Mr. Lattimore. 1922 and 1926; yet. No; I have no recollection of
knowing him at that time.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you regard Mr. John Carter Vincent as an ex-
pert on far eastern affairs?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you good friends ?
Mr. Lattimore. I would say quite good friends.
Mr. Sourwine. When did you last see him ?
Mr. Lattimore. It must have been several years ago.
88348— 52— rt. 10 25
3652 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. You have not seen him recently ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have yon discussed with him any of the hearings
before this subcommittee?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Or his appearance before this subcommittee? Or
his actions liere ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have any correspondence with him about
those matters ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. John Carter Vincent get in touch with you
wlien he got back from Switzerland, in November of 1940 ?
Mr. Lattimore. From Switzerland in November of 1940?
The Chairman. When he got back from Switzerland is the
question.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when he did get back ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I couldn't tell you.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Did you see him in November or December of 1940 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when was the first time after Decem-
ber of 1940 that you did see him?
Mr. Lattimore. The fiist that I can recall seeing him is in Chung-
king when I got there in 1941.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him at all between the time he got
back from Geneva in 1940, in November, and the time he sailed for
Shanghai in January or early February of 1941 ?
Mr. Lattimore. I should say it is quite likely, but I have no
recollection of it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you speak to Mr. Vincent by telephone during
that period ?
Mr. Lattimore. Again all I can say is that it is very likely, but
I don't remember it.
]\Ir. Sourwine. Did you correspond with him while he was away ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I corresponded with him.
Mr. Sourwine. I ask those questions, Mr. Chairman, in connection
with exhibit 379, which is already a part of this record.
Do you know anything about what part, if any, Mr. Lauchlin Currie
played in securing your assignment to accompany Mr. Wallace on
his mission to China ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember Mr. Currie having anything
to do with it.
Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Chairman, could he see exhibit 379?
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about what part, if any,
Mr. Currie played with respect to your assignment in connection with
the Pauley Commission?
Mr. Lattimore. No; as far as I remember he had nothing to
do with it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know about Mr. Wallace's book, Soviet
Asia Mission, before it was published?
]\Ir. Lattimore. Yes. The galley ])roofs were sent to me.
Mr. Sourwine. They were sent to you ? By whom ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3653
Mr. Lattimore. By — what was the man's name ? Mr. Steiger, who
assisted Mr. Wallace in writing the book.
Mr. SouKwixE. Why did he send you the galley proofs ?
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably because my name was mentioned
frequently.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he not say why he sent them to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.
Mr, Sourwine, Did he just send you the proofs with no note,
no message?
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, there must have been a covering letter of
some kind.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't remember what was in it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember what was in it.
Mr. SouRW^iNE. What did you do with the proofs?
Mr. Lattimore. I read through them to check wherever my name
was mentioned and sent them back.
Mr. Sotjrwt:ne. Did you see the manuscript of that book at any
time ?
Mr. Lattimore, No ; I don't think I ever saw the manuscript.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you or Mrs. Lattimore, to your knowledge ever
work on the manuscript for that book ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not to my recollection.
[To Mrs. Lattimore.] You didn't either ; did you ?
No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you correct the proofs at all ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether I did.
Mr. Sourwine, Did you make marginal suggestions?
Mr, Lattimore. If so, they were very few. I don't remember them.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you perform any editorial function with re-
spect to that book or that manuscript ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; nothing that I would call an editorial function.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, do you remember a publication or an article
or literary work that bore Mr. Wallace's name, which your wife had
a hand in the writing of ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I do.
Mr. Sourwine. What was that ?
Mr. Lattimore. It was called "Our Task in Asia" ; was it ?
It was "Our Policy in Asia." Or "Our" something "in Asia."
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with that publication
in an editorial way?
Mr. Lattimore. I think my wife consulted me at times on it.
Mr. Sourwine. You did discuss it Avith her while she was working
on it?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I believe I did.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Did you perform any editorial function with re-
spect to that book ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I wouldn't say so, unless she made any changes
as a result of talking with me.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you write anything for inclusion in that book,
or that manuscript ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I actually wrote anything.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you dictate anything ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think so. I think I talked it over or
talked over parts of it with Mr. Wallace once or twice, but I don't
remember much in detail about it.
3654 INSTITUTE or pacific relations
Mr. SotJRWiNE. Would you say it was wholly Mrs. Lattimore's
work ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; my impression is that it was primarily Mr.
Wallace's work.
Mr. Morris. Are you referriu<? to the pamphlet, "Our Job m the
Pacific"?
Mr. Lattimore. "Our Job in the Pacific." That must be it.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Dennett has testified that that
project was initiated by you. Do you remember that testimony ?
]VIr. Lattimore. I remember some testimony to that effect, that the
IPR asked me to speak to Mr. Wallace about"it, or something of that
sort. That is quite possible.
The Chairman. What is your question, now ?
Mr. Morris. I was asking Mr. Lattimore if he had recalled Mr.
Dennett's testimony on that subject.
Actually, what did happen with respect to it ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember what happened in detail.
The Chairman. Well, what liappened with regard to what ? Let us
get our line straight here.
Mr. Lattimore. I understand Mr. Morris is asking about the initia-
ting of that pamphlet. I don't remember the steps.
Mr. Sour WINE. Did you go to Mr. Wallace about it, or speak to
him about it ?
Mr. Lattoiore. I should say very likely ; but I have no very clear
recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider at that time
that he had knowledge on the subject that w^ould be well worth while
for the world ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I thought that the opinions of the Vice Presi-
dent of the United States were important for the worlcl
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he did not write it alone, and
why your wife helped him ?
Mr. Lattimore. My general recollection is that he had some ideas
about America's increasing importance in the world and about various
things that could be done in the way of development of trade, and
investment, and so on, and that he didn't have first-hand knowledge of
Asia, and therefore wanted some help on it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think the writing of that book w^as his idea ?
Mr. Lattimore. That, I don't remember, whether it w^as his idea
to begin with, or whether the idea came from somebody in the Listi-
tute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was not your idea?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think it was my idea
Mr, Sourwine. You are sure of that?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am not sure about it.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not say that he did not know about
Asia?
Mr. Lattuviore. I don't believe he had ever been in Asia.
Senator Ferguson. And yet you were having him write as an au-
thority, using the name of the Vice President, for the IPR?
Mr. Lattimore. I wasn't having him write.
Senator Ferguson. If one of these witnesses is correct, you instigated
it. You conceived the idea.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3655
Mr. Lattimore. No. I remember, my general recollection, Senator,
is that at that time there was a good deal in the press about Mr. Wal-
lace's ideas of the development of iinindustrialized countries that
would be coming after the war, and presumably those references gave
somebody the idea of getting Mr. Wallace to apply those ideas to what
was eventually described in the pamphlet as ''Our Job in the Pacific."
Senator Ferguson. Now, in writing that, how do you account for the
fact, then, that he got in touch with your wife to help him write the
book ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember what the steps were.
^Ir. SouRwiNE. ]Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at that point? The
witness is in the field of pure conjecture. He has been for the last two
or three answers. If it is true, as he states, that he does not remember,
then his answer has to be "I can't explain it." A conjecture about
what might have happened isn't any kind of an explanation at all.
The Chairman. That is true, but he has been wandering around
in that field for a long while, so there is nothing new about that.
Senator Ferguson. Go ahead with your next question.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with Lauchlin Currie the
matter of assigning or securing Mr. Vincent to accompany Mr. Wallace
to China ? ^
Mr. Latti3Iore. I don't remember. I remember talking with Mr.
Currie before we started, but I don't remember whether that was
before or after Mr. Vincent had been appointed.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, didn't you discuss it first with Mr. Vincent
and then with Mr. Currie?
Mr. Lattimore. That I don't remember.
The Chairman. What is it you do not remember, now, in regard
1o that question, Mr. Lattimore? You do not remember what?
IVIr. Lattimore. I don't remember discussing it first with jNIr. Vin-
cent and then with Mr. Currie. Isn't that the order you put it in?
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember discussing it with Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Lattimore. I remember talking about the trip with Mr. Vin-
cent before we started, but whether it was before he was appointed
or only after he was appointed, I don't remember.
Mr.'SouRwiNE. Do you remember talking about it with Mr. Currie ?
Mr. Lattimore. I remember talking about it with ]Mr. Currie ; but,
again, whether it was before or after the appointment of Mr. Vincent,
I don't remember.
JNIr. Sourwine. I mean, do 3'ou remember talking about Mr, Vin-
cent's appointment with Mr. Currie?
Mr. Latitmore. I don't remember whether Mr. Vincent's appoint-
ment was included in wliat we talked about or not.
The Chairman. That is not the question at all. Will you read
the question, Mr. Reporter?
(The reporter reads, as requested.)
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent has testified that he discussed with you
his fortlicoming trip with Mr. AVallace for some time before he left
on a trip. Please tell us what you remember about those discussions.
]\Ir. Laitimore. I suppose we talked in general about the countries
we were goinfj to be iroino; through, but I don't remember anv details
whatever.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Vincent ask you for advice?
3656 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Laitimore. No ; I don't believe he asked me for advice. He may
have asked me for opinion.
Mr, SouKWixE. Did you give him advice?
Mr. Lattimore. Not that I remember.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you give him opinion ?
Mr. Lati'imore. May I answer that in this way
The Chairman. The question is : Did yon give him opinion?
Mr. Lattimore. If I gave him opinions, they were ahnost certainly
directed to the frontier areas in which I was particularly interested.
Tlie Chairman. Then you did or did not give him opinions ?
Mr. Lattimore. All I can say is that I believe I probably did.
JNIr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember having any discussions with Mr.
Vincent prior to the trip with Mr. Wallace, prior to leaving on that
trip ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have a vague recollection of one or two very
brief meetings.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Do you know how they were arranged ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know who called whom ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is all you can tell us about it?
Mr. Lattimore. That is all I can tell you about it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. On how many occasions during the Wallace mis-
sion did you discuss with Mr. Vincent what had taken place in pre-
vious talks between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall Mr. Vincent discussing that subject
with me.
Mr. SouRWiNE. On how many occasions, if any, during the Wallace
mission did you ever tell Mr. Vincent anything that had taken place
or call his attention to anything that had taken place in a previous
talk between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?
Mr. Lattimore. Did I tell Mr. Vincent ?
Mr, Sourwine. Or call his attention to anything that had taken
place ?
Mr. Lat'itmore. I believe I was present at only one talk between
Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek, and I do not believe that I talked
with Mr. Vincent about it afterward.
May I explain that?
My recollection of the subject of tliat talk is extremely hazy, because
I was acting as one of the interpreters, and I always find it very diffi-
cult to concentrate on interpreting and afterward be able to give a con-
nected account of what was said.
Mr. Sourwine. On how maiiy occasions did you discuss with Mr.
Vincent other matters connected witli the mission?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea.
Mr. Sourwine. A numl)er of occasions (
Mr. Lattimore. Probably a mimber of occasions in a general way,
since it was a continuous trip and we were constantly thrown together.
Mr. SouR'^^^NE. Where did you have those conferences?
Mr. Lattimore. Usually in the plane, I suppose.
Mr. Sourwine. I am talking about times when you were not in the
plane.
Mr. Lattimore. Times when we Avere not in the plane, we were very
frequently quartered separately. So I would say tliat our conversa-
tions were usually on the plane.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3657
Mr. SouRAViNE, Are you meaning to testify that during this trip
with ]Mr. WaUace, you didn't discuss with ]Mr. Vincent matters con-
nected with the mission except when you were on the plane ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that our conversations were ahnost entirely
on the plane. And may I add that I had no conversations with him
on subjects that might be called "in the diplomatic field."
The Chairman. That is not called for in the question, and it is
not even an explanation of your answer. The question did not call
for anything "in the diplomatic field."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it your testimony that except when you were on
the plane you had no conversations with Mr. Vincent during the Wal-
lace tri]) ?
Mr. Latti^iore. Certainly I had conversations with Mr. Vincent,
but I don't recall them separately, or what they were about,
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever confer with him in his room ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever confer with him in your room ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever confer with him out on the street I
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.
Mr. SouRwixE. Were you present at more than one of the confer-
ences between Vice President Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo ; I believe only one.
]Mr. SouRWixE. Did yoii at any time make any memorandum with
regard to the conference at which you were present?
]VIr. Lattimore. Xo ; I don't believe I did.
]\Ir. SouRwix'E. Did you ever transmit any such memorandum to
Mr. Vincent ?
Mr. Lattimore. Xo ; I don't believe I did.
]Mr. SouRWixE. Did you ever transmit to Mr. A^incent or have any
part in the transmission to him of any report or memorandum con-
cerning any conversation between General Chiang and Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe so.
Mr. Sourwixe. Was John Hazard at the talks between Mr. Wallace
and Chiang Kai-shek ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe he was at the one where I was pres-
ent ; and, of course, I can't speak for the ones where I wasn't present.
Mr. Sourwixe. While you were in China with ISIr. Wallace, did you
attend a conference with General Ferris ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I believe that was the one at which I was
acting as one of the interpreters.
Mr. Sourwixe. Was that a conference about sending a mission into
North China?
Mr. Lattimore. The general subject of the conversation was to send
an American observer mission to North China ; yes.
Mr. Sourwixe. Do you remember whether jSIr. John Stewart Service
and ]Mr. John Carter Vincent were both present at that meeting ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether ]Mr. Vincent was present.
I remember jNIr. Service being present, as an assistant interpreter to
General Ferris.
Mr. Sourwixe. Was General Stilwell at that conference ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwixe. General Ferris was his representative ?
3658 institutp: of pacific relations
Mr. Lattimore. I think General Ferris was representing liim. I
believe vre didn't meet General Stihvell all the time we were in China.
Mr. SouRWiNE. During Mr. Wallace's entire mission, you had no
conferences w^ith General Stilwell ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge of an}^ conference be-
tween General Stilwell and John Carter Vincent?
Mr. Lattiisiore. At that time ?
]\Ir. SouRWiXE. Yes, during that Wallace mission.
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I haven't. My recollection is, as I say, that
General Stilwell was not even in China during that time.
Mr. Sourwixe. Do you know why Mr. Wallace recommended that
( jeneral Stilwell be replaced or superseded ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I don't.
Mr. Sourwine. Was General Stilwell pro-Communist?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I should say he was not.
Mr. Sourwine. Was General Stilwell a jNIarshall man?
Mr. Lattimore. I have seen him so characterized in the press. I
couldn't say of my own knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you have so regarded him?
Mr. Lattimore. I had no knowledge on which to base such an
opinion.
Mr. Sourwine. You had and have no opinion on that ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did j^ou accompany Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent
to Kunming?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Where did you sta}'^ while you were there?
Mr. Lattimore. I think I stayed at the American consulate in
town.
Mr. Sourwine. Where did they stay?
Mr. Lattimore. I think they stayed at General Chennault's head-
quarters outside of town.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any reason why you split up?
Mr. Lattimore. No particular reason.
Well, I think lack of accommodations at General Chennault's.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you invited to General Chennault's?
Mr. Lattimore. I had several meals there ; yes.
The Chairman. The question is: Were you invited to General
Chennault's ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You were invited to stay there?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think I was invited to stay there. I
think when we arrived the arrangements were made and I was quar-
tered at the consulate.
Mr. Sourwine. Did 3^ou accompany members of the party on a visit
to Mme. Sun Yat-sen ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether ]Mr. Wallace submitted a
report to the President in writing after he returned from China?
Mr. Lattimore. I know that from the press and from the hearings
before this committee.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you, of your own knowledge, know whether Mr.
Wallace submitted a report to the President in writing after he re-
turned from China?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3659
Mr. Lattimore. Of my own knowledge ; I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Wallace at any time
such a report or the subject of such a report?
Mr. Lattumore. No ; I was excluded from those discussions.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever see a rough draft of such a report or
of memoranda prepared for such a report?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am quite sure I didn't.
Mr. Sourwixe. Did you ever submit any suggested language orally
or in writing for possible inclusion in sucha report?
Mr. Latitmuke. No, sir ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwixe. Such a report would have been a most important
thing in connection with Mr. Wallace's mission, would it not ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwixe. In your contemplation would there have been any-
thing more important than his report to the President?
Mr, Lattimore. I should say that was probably the most impor-
tant thing in his mission.
Mr. Sourwixe. And yet you never discussed it with him?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I was not a member of the State Depart-
ment, and I was excluded from all diplomatic activities.
Senator Fergusox. Were you on any Government jDayroll at that
time ?
Mr. Lattimore. I was representing OWL
Senator Fergusox. You were on that payroll ?
Mr. Lattimore. That's right.
Mr. Sourwixe. Did you make any reports of your own with regard
to the Wallace mission?
Mr. LATTiaioRE. I believe I made a verbal report to Mr. Elmer
Davis.
Mr. Sourwixe. By "verbal," do you mean oral?
Mr. Lattimore. Oral ; yes.
Mr. Sourwixe. Did you make any written report to anybody ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. SouRwix'E. Did you know about the so-called Kunming cable?
Mr. LATTiMoiiE. No ; I don't believe I knew about that until after-
ward.
Mr. SouR"\\TX'E. Did you ever discuss at any time with Mr. Vincent
any matter connected with Mr. Wallace's report to the President?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwixe. Have you seen the document which Mr. Wallace
released as the text of his report to the President?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I believe I have.
Mr. Sourwixe. Had you ever seen the text of that document or
any part of it before?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; it appeared strange to me.
Mr. SouRWix^E. What part did you have, if any, in preparation
of JNIr. Wallace's speech to be given in Seattle upon his return from
China ?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe I had no part in that.
Mr. SouRw^ixE. Did you give him any information for inclusion
in that speech ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I did.
Mr. Sourwixe. Did you talk to him about the speech ?
Mr. Lattimore. No. I knew he was writing the speech; but I
don't believe I talked to him about it.
3660 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Didn't lie ask you for any aid or any material
at all?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I believe he was met by somebody who was
going- to act as his campaign manager, and they went into a huddle
and composed the speech.
Mr. SoiTKWiNE. Didn't Mr. John Carter Vincent work on that
speech on the airplane on the way back ?
Mr. Lattimore. That I can't remember.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you give Mr. Wallace the benefit of notes
you had taken in Siberia to aid him in the preparation of that
speech ?
Mr. Lattimore. I may have. I don't remember.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think that answ^er jibes with the last three
answers you have just given?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether it jibes or not.
The Chairman. The witness is held responsible for his own
answers, and whether they jibe or not is a matter for the conclusion
of the committee.
Mr. SoTTRWixE. Did 3"ou give Mr. Wallace anything? Did you
give him any information, written or oral, or give him anything at
all to aid him in the preparation of that Seattle speech?
Mr. Lattimore. I talked with Mv. Wallace whenever he wanted
to talk to me; but I remember no talks the subject of which was a
speech that he was about to write.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you furnish any substantial part of the factual-
information or the detail upon which that speech was based ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the speech and so can't answer that.
I know that in his book there are several references to information
that he says came from me.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Hazard assist in the preparation of that
speech ?
Mr. Lattimore. That I don't remember.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you go with Mr. John Carter Vincent to see
Mr. Lauchlin Currie after you got back from the Wallace mission?
Mr. Lattimore. Very likely. But I have no recollection.
Mr. Soubwine. I am trying to find out whether you went with
Mr. Vincent or whether you went alone. Can joii not remember?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I can't.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you go alone ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't even remember going to see JNIr. Currie
after that mission.
•Mr. Sourwine. Do you say you didn't go to see Mr. Currie ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I can't say I didn't.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it possible you might have gone to see him on
Diie occasion with Mr. Vincent and on another occasion alone, or that
you might have gone to see him with ]Mr. Vincent and then seen him
for a time alone, Mr. Vincent having retired ?
Mr. Lattimore. It is quite possible.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with the President of the
United States the question of declariug the Japanese Emperor to be a
war criminal ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; to the best of my recollection, I never mentioned
that.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss that with Mr. Vincent?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3661
Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Vincent ? Declaring the Japanese Emperor to
be a war criminal ? No, I don't believe so.
Mr. SouRwiXE. Did yon ever go to see the President about the ques-
tion of the fate of the Emperor ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. To the best of my recollection, I mentioned
Japan only as it is mentioned in that memorandum that you have for
the record, and it was not mentioned at all in conversation.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Vincent your visit
to the President on July 3, 1945?_
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I ever did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever discuss with him the prospect of such
a visit, the fact that you would go or might go?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe so.
Mr. SouRwiXE. Did you discuss with him the fact that you had
written a letter to the President ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you discuss that with anj^one else in the State
Department ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I discussed it with anybody in the
State Department. I believe the only person with whom I discussed
it was the president of my university.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know why General Marshall's directive for
his mission to China was initiated in the State Department?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I have no knowledge of that.
Mr. Sourwixe. Wasn't General Marshall perfectly competent to
draft his own directive?
Mr. Lattimore. That is a subject on which I can't speak with any
authority.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Hadn't General Marshall had a lot of experience in
China?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't speak to that of my own knowledge. I have
seen in the press that he was at one time stationed with the United
States Fifteenth Infantry in Tientsin, I believe in the 1920"s, but I
didn't know him at that time.
Mr. Sourwixe. Well, he had served in China, hadn't he?
Mr. Lattimore. That is my recollection ; yes.
Mr. Sourwixe. But you didn't know that of your own knowledge ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwixe. He had also served in the Philippines, hadn't he?
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know that of my own knowledge, either.
Mr. Sourwixe. Wouldn't that help his knowledge of China and the
Chinese affairs?
Mr. Lattimore. Do you want me to speculate ?
Mr. Sourwixe. Would it?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, it is part of Asia. No, I think the Philip-
pines and China are different enough so that knowledge of the Philip-
pines is not necessarily part of the training of an expert on China.
Mr. Sourwixe. Marshall had to know about China when he was
Chief of Staff; did he not ?
Mr. Lattimore. I presume so.
Mr. Sourwixe. Would you not say that General INIarshall knew
more about Asiatic Affairs when he became Secretary of State than
he did about any other sector of foreign relations?
Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't speak to that.
3662 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yon have no opinion on that?
Mr. Lattimore. No opinion on that.
Mr. SouRwiXE. General Marshall's appointment as Secretary of
State was a good break for Mr. Acheson and John Carter Vincent,
wasn't it?
The Chairman. That interrogation certainly calls for a farfetched
conclusion.
Mr. SouR^VTIS^E. Will the Chair indulge me for just three or four
more questions?
Senator Ferguson. Suppose the witness drew those conclusions pre-
viously. They might be farfetched.
Mr. Sourwine. General Marshall's appointment as Secretary of
State was a good break for Dean Acheson and John Carter Vincent,
wasn't it?
Mr. Latti3iore. I can't speak to that.
Mr. Sourwine. If almost anyone else had become Secretary of
State at that time, w^ouldn't it have been much tougher for them to
put across their ideas of far eastern policy?
Mr. Lattimore. I can't speak to that.
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. The answ^er is "I can't speak
to that." What do you mean by that answer ?
Mr. Lattimore. I have no personal knowledge which would entitle
me to an opinion of any value on that subject.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever express an opinion along that
line ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, think a moment.
Mr. Sourwine. If almost anyone else had become Secretary of
State at that time, wouldn't it have been much tougher for Acheson
and Vincent to put across their ideas with regard to far eastern
policy?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I can't answer that.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you agree that General Marshall's policy in
China deflected the pressure somewhat away from Russia?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I wouldn't be able to agree or disagree with
that.
Mr. Sourwine. Didn't General Marshall bring about a change in
the far estern policy America had been following, a change that in-
volved a softer attitude toward Russia?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I could characterize it in that
way.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever characterize it in that way ?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you agree that the INIarshall policy moved us
away from a show-down with Russia, whereas the policy we had been
following before that time had been a get-tough policy that was
moving us toward a show-down with Russia ?
The Chairman. Well, you do not have to ask your counsel.
Mr. Fortas. Mr. Chairman, these are rather unusual questions.
The Chairman. They may be unusual, but they are in line. He
can answer it "Yes" or "No," or he can say he cannot answer.
Mr. Fortas. Can we have that question again ?
Mr. Sourwine. AVill you agree that the Marshall policy moved us
away from a show-down with Russia, whereas the policy we had been
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3663
following before that time had been a get-tough policy that was mov-
ing us toward a show-down with Russia ?
JNIr. Lattimore. I may have believed so at the time. I have no clear
recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever express that ?
Mr. Lattimore. I might have.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know on what occasion ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
]\Ir. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, was not the same thing true with
regard to Europe, that the Marshall policy deflected the pressure
away from Russia and away from a show-down with Russia?
Mr. Lattimore. That the Marshall policy in China
Mr. SouRwixE. No. Wasn't the same thing true with regard to
Europe, that the Marshall policy deflected the pressure away from
Russia and away from a show-down with Russia ?
Mr. Lattimore. It might have.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Can't you see the comparisoji between the moves
made in China and the moves made in Europe ? Isn't that a fair com-
parison ?
Mr. FoRTAs. Is that a question, too?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Can you tell me what year you are speaking of ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any year in which that was not true ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, I am trying to recall the years in which Gen-
eral Marshall was Secretary of State.
The Chairman. Well, he was Secretary of State to your knowledge
was he not ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would that have been true in 1945, 19i6, and 19i7?
Mr. Lattim(;;re. The reason I am asking, Mr. Sourwine, is that it
seems to me there is an overlap here between what is sometimes called
the Marshall policy in China at a time when Marshall was not yet
Secretary of State, and the Marshall policy in Europe after the time
when Marshall was Secretary of State and when the Marshall plan
became the basis of policy in Europe.
Mr. Sourwine. Don't you think the IMarshall policy in China and
the Marshall policy in Europe were comparable?
]Mr. Lattimore. I think they were comparable, in the sense of trying
to save the situation in both areas.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe that Chinese Communists now are
controlled by Russia or that they are free to determine for themselves
what course they will follow and to make whatever kind of a bargain
they want to make with the Western Powers or with Russia ?
Mr. Lattimore. Now ? Right now ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Right now I would say that the Chinese Com-
munists are clearly ideologically subordinate to Russia. But the de-
gree of Russian operational control is something that is disputed
among dili'erent authorities in the field.
Mr. Sourwine. Would the same thing have been true in 1946 and
1947?
Mr. Lattimore. In 1946-47, I believe the Chinese Communists
would have been perhaps more free to operate on their own.
Mr. Sourwine. You think they would in 1946 or 1947 have been free
to determine for themselves the course they were going to follow, to
3664 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELAtlOiSTS
make whatever kind of a bargain they might want to make with either
the Western Powers or Eussia, as they saw fit ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think that is possible.
Senator Fer(;us()X. When did the change take phice?
Mr. Lattimore. I should say after the Korean war.
Senator Ferguson. After the Korean war? When? Before they
entered into the Korean war?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I would say once the Korean war began.
Senator Ferguson. That is before China got into it ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think Czechoslovakia or Poland would be
free to break away from Russian domination and make peace with
the non-Communist powers on whatever terms they might decide,
without Russian influence?
Mr. Lattimore. Now?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think they could have done it in 1946 or
1947?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, Yugoslavia did at some period subsequent to
1947.
Mr. Sourwine. I spoke of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Mr. Lattimore. Oh, I thought you said Czechoslovakia and Yugo-
slavia. Sorry.
I think that as of 1940—47, there was a reasonable prospect that
Czechoslovakia and Poland might have become much less satellites of
Russia.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think the Chinese Communists at that time
were comparable with Czechoslovakia and Poland in that regard ?
Mr. Lattimore. ]VIore comparable than they are now.
Mr. Sourwine. ISIr. Lattimore, I hold in my hand a clipping of an
article entitled, "The Marshall Policy — A Steady Pattern," by Owen
Lattimore, from the New York Herald Tribune of August 2, 1947. I
ask you if you wrote that article.
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I wrote that.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that may be inserted in
the record at this point.
The CHAiR:\rAN. It may be inserted in the record.
(The material referrecl to was marked "Exhibit No. 605'' and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 605
THE MARSHALL POLICY— A STEADY PATTERN
Europe-China Parallel Demonstrates That East-West Show-Down
Is Still an Illusion
(By Owen Lattimore)
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. — As an old China hand with a snmmer vacation
balcony seat overlookinj; the spectacle of Europe, I have been watching with
absorbed interest the progress of United States policy as directed by Secretary
of State Geor.i;e C. Marshall.
As an old China hand, I probably compare moves made in China with moves
made in Europe more carefully than do most Americans. As an old China hand
who happened to be in Europe at the moment when Czechoslovakia and the other
Slav states turned down the chance to enter the Paris economic discussions, I
have probably been more conscious than many people of the resemblance between
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3665
the result of certain moves made in China and recent moves made in Eiu-oi>e. For
what my views are worth, here they are.
Czechoslovakia knows much more about America than America does about
Czechoslovakia. Judging from the American cables and publications reaching
Czechoslovakia, the prevailing belief is that the line has been drawn much more
sharply than ever before between Russia and her eastern European satellites
and America and Britain and their western European satellites. I am convinced
that this is an illusion. The final lines have not yet been drawn and the final
positions have not yet been taken.
The key to an analysis of the prevailing illusion is to be found by comparing
the Marshall policy in China with the Marshall policy in Europe. In China at
the end of the war the United States began with certain steps in the direction
of a show-down with Russia. These steps may be described as an early version
of the Truman doctrine, and they presumably were taken on the assumption that
a show-down with Russia was either inevitable or desirable. Heavy emphasis
was laid on the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the "only' legitimate
government."
Repeated allusions were made to Russia's treaty obligations to recognize and
give aid and comfort only to that Government. An all-out American effort was
made on an ostentatious scale to complete the equipment of the Kuomintang
armies, even though the war was over, and to transport them to such advanta-
geous positions that, should there be a civil war, it would be a push-over.
Then General Marshall was sent out to China. Instead of continuing in the
direction of a show-down with^ussia, he diverted the policy in the direction
of a show-down between conflicting political and economic ideas in China, and
the conflicting regional groupings of power that were already established there.
He avoided being trapped by the Kuomintang into signing a blank check for
American support in the civil war; but at the same time he continued American
aid and maintained the American strategic positions on such a scale that the
United States can always step back into the field to prevent a complete collapse
of the Kuomintang.
Russian comments on American policy have been every bit as uncomplimentary
as American suspicions of what the Russians may be up to in China. But it is
noteworthy that in China the Russians followed the Marshall lead in the one
respect which was all important : they did not act as though we were retreating.
They did not rush in to follow us u]) or to tread on our heels. It can, in fact,
be said that Russian policy in China has been responsive to American policy,
although there has been no cooperation. As a consequence, if a way ever oi>ens
up for the renewal of negotiations between tlie two sides in the Chinese civil
war on something resembling the original Marshall basis, then the way will
also be open for a Russo-American understanding to underwrite the results of
such negotiations.
In Europe, as in China, we had an early or "Truman"' phase of American
policy, followed by a second or "Marshall" phase. The Truman policy in Greece
and Turkey, like the pre-Marshall policy of trying to set up the best possible
civil war in China, took the form of highly publicized steps toward a show-
down with Russia. The ^Marshall policy in Europe, like the Marshall policy in
China (in spite of all the publicity about a show-down), has in fact deflected
the pressure somewhat away from Russia and placed the emphasis instead on the
European countries between Russia and the west. The original Marshall pro-
posal did not call on the European nations to aline themselves; it called on
them to group themselves.
The work of alinement can be fairly described not as the Marshall proposal,
but as the Bevin policy. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin has in this
respect (to continue the comparison with China), played the part of Chiang
Kai-shek. The British Labor Party has played the part of the Kuomintang.
with the dominant wing convinced tliat a good anti-Russian policy is better than
a good European policy, while the weaker wing trails along but keeps hankering
for a "common policy for all European Socialists."
The Bevin policy in Europe, however — like the Kuomintang policy in China —
has not yet succeeded in forcing a show-down between America and Russia. The
very essence of the situation is that American policy is still in a position of free
maneuver, free to push forward, to draw back, or to modify its direction.
Russia, correspondingly, has not been forced into a corner, but is also still
free to maneuver. And the Russian satellites, about whose alinement with Rus-
sia there has been so much excited comment, are in fact still free to come to
terms with other European states, just as the Chinese Communists are still in
3666 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
a position to come to terms, with strong bargaining power, with the rest of China.
This analysis is confirnied by the fact that neither in China nor in Europe lias
the United States said either "these are all my cards" or "these are all the cards
I am going to play." Still less have we said : "Here is the exact siuu of money
that backs these cards — count it."
And the briefest summing up of the Russian policy is that in Europe, as in
China, it has not been cooperative, it has certainly not been accompanied by
complimentary language, but it has been responsive. It has followed the
Marshall lead. The Russians have reserved for themselves the same freedom
of maneuver that we have kept for ourselves. In Europe, as in China, therefore,
to the extent that Europeans may find that they cannot get on without each
other, America and Russia are free to endorse any renewed trend toward getting
together. — New York Herald Tribune, August 2, 1C47.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Lattimore, I show you an excerpt from the
Congressional Record of January 24, 1947, being extension of remarks
by the Honorable James E. Murray, of Montana, the full text of an
article entitled "Asia and the State Department" by Owen Lattimore,
I ask you if that is the text of an article which you wrote ^
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; that is an article I wrote.
Senator Ferguson. Could I see it?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that may be inserted in
the record at this point. ""
The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.
(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 606" and is as
follows :)
ASIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Extension of Remaeks of Hon. James E. Miteray, of IMontana, in the Senate
OF the United States, Friday, January 24 (Legislative Day of Wednesday,
JANUARY 15), 1947
Mr. Murray. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
appendix of the Congressional Record an article, Asia and the State Depart-
ment, written by Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of
International Relations.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record,
as follows :
Asia and the State Department (by Owen Lattimore)
Washington. — The appointment and speedy confirmation of Gen. George C.
Marshall as Secretary of State have drawn a flood of comment. Most of it is
interesting. Great men are not always interesting men, but General Marshall
is one of the great men of our time who, in spite of his modest avoidance of
publicity, has always had, without asking for it. the interest of the people.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in a book review in the current issue of the Atlantic
IMonthly, says acidly that "small men have now succeeded great men in the
United States, Imt small problems have not succeeded great problems."
General Marshall stands apart from this sweeping condemnation. He is a
great man who can cope with the greatest problems; and it is not only America
that knows it. The world knows it.
Yet in all the comment about General Marshall, and about the problems that
will now come to his desk, one most important combination of circumstances has
been overlooked, and that is the significance, in the bureaucracy of the State
Department, of General Marshall's exceptional experience in Asia and knowledge
of Asiatic affairs. He is the first Secretary of State in our history whose
knowledge of Asiatic affairs is greater than his knowledge of any other sector of
our foreign relations, and the first Secretary of State to step into office directly
from an assignment of topmost policy-making importance in Asia.
Only people who have been dealing with the Far Eastern Division of the De-
partment of State over a period of years can fully appreciate the significance of
the state. It is the literal truth that the upper crust of the State Department
bureaucracy has always tended to reduce policy in Asia to a second or third
priority, as compared to policy in Europe. Men in the Far Eastern Division and
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3667
its subdivisions have had tb waste hours of ingenuity in wi-iggling through
channels to get far eastern questions taken uii — and taken up in time — by Secre-
taries preoccupied with European and Latin-American decisions, controversies,
pressures, and counterpressures.
Particularly damaging to the development of a well-rounded national policy
has been the practice — not dead yet — of subordinating the recommendations of
various far-eastern desks to review by the desks dealing with European powers
which liave possessions and interests in Asia. These things are important in a
bureaucracy, and the State Department is one of the most bureaucratic bureau-
cracies in Washington. The bureaucrats whose vested interests are in European
policy have almost always been able to block, or at least to narrow, the channels
by which the far easterners had to approach the Secretary.
It is true that Dean Acheson, as Under Secretary, has done a great deal to
improve the working of a poor organizational system, by sacrificing an enormous
amount of time to conferences at which all division chiefs have their say in
the presence of other division chiefs. It is true also that the Far Eastern Divi
sion is at present exceptionally strong because its Chief, John Carter Vincent,
in addition to his thorough grasp of far-eastern policy, has had a good deal of
European experience and has a knowledge of European politics which puts hiro
on a level footing with the European experts.
Vincent had the confidence of Byrnes, and he will certainly have the continuin,!?
confidence of Marshall ; but had the successor of Byrnes been almost anyone
but Marshall, Ache-son and Vincent and the Far Eastern Division would have
had to start once more on the old weary treadmill of "briefing" and educating
a Secretary who, through no fault of his own, would instinctively have called the
European expert in and kept the far-eastern specialist waiting in the corridor
whenever he had to make a choice in the allocation of urgent demands on his
time.
While people naturally think of Marshall very largely in terras of his recent
China experience, it is important to recall that this is not his only far-eastern
experience. He had an earlier spell of service in China with the Fifteenth In-
fantry, the American regiment which used to garrison Tientsin, and in that
assignment he had a ringside view of China in the war-lord period. As a
younger man, moreover, he had a brilliant record in the Philippines. Finally,
as Chief of Staff in the war years, he had China within his field of view as
well as Europe and Paissia. It should not be forgotten that "Uncle Joe" Stil-
well, that great man whose greatness has not yet been adequately recognized
either in China or in America was a "Marshall man."
Because of all this, the Marshall appointment has almost as important a
bearing on iwlicy in Japan as on policy in China. The spectacular MacArthur
shadow has fallen across the policy-making functions of Washington from the
moment that General MacArthur set foot in Japan as conqueror, as the symbol
of American policy, and as the exponent of American policy whenever criticized
or even questioned by the Russians, the British, and sometimes the Chinese. It is
not an exaggeration to say that General of the Army Marshall will be the first
and only American since the death of President Roosevelt to approach problems
of policy in Japan without the political and psychological handicap of being
dwarfed by the giant stature of General of the Army MacArthur.
The relationship between the two will not work out in any vulgar controversy.
Both men are too big for that. But Marshall is the Democratic Secretary of
State in an administration which the Republicans can outvote at any time ; and
INIacArthur, in the hero worship of some of the Republicans, is a strange heraldic
figure both a Wild Bull of the Pampas and a Sacred Cow.
Although under Marshall Asiatic policy will take its proper and proportional
place in American world policy without tedious bureaucratic lobbying and maneu-
vering, the other components of our world policy will not lie distorted. Marshall
has a full grasp of the transition from war policy to postwar policy. He has never
succumlied to either the tradition of contempt for the British or the tradition of
implacable hate for the Russians which are characteristic of many of our pro-
fessional Army and Navy men, but there is not the slightest danger that he will
be taken into camp by either the Russians or the British.
We may fairly expect from General Marshall an integration of the policy of
safeguarding and advancing the American interest with a policy of retaining
what needs to be retained from the grand alliance which won the war.
Senator Ferguson. Jnst a moment. Might I inquire?
Did you ask Senator JNIurray to put this in the record ?
88348— 52— pt. 10 26
3668 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimoke. No, sir ; I don't believe I ever knew Senator Murray.
Senator Ferguson. Did you send him a copy of this ?
Mr. Latiimore. No. sir; I don't believe I did.
Senator Ferguson. Where was this distributed?
Mr. Lattimore. That was an article distributed through Overseas
News Agency.
Senator Ferguson. "Asia and the State Department" ; is that right?
That was the name of it ?
Mr, Lattimore. I don't know what title they sent it out under.
Such articles are printed under different heads in different papers.
Is there an indication in which paper that was published?
Senator Ferguson. No. That is why I asked.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded all the questions
I had to ask of this witness.
There is one matter I might call to the attention of the committee
at this time. As the chairman and the members of the committee
know, several requests have been received from persons who have
been named in this hearing for the insertion of statements; that is,
persons who feel that they have in one way or the other been maligned
by this witness, or some other witness have written in asking that
statements be inserted. It has been the policy of the committee, as
the chairman and the committee know, to reply that there is nothing in
the record except material under oath, and that if an affidavit will be
submitted it will be considered.
In the case of Miss Freda Utley, such an affidavit has now been
presented, and I offer it for consideration by the Chair for possible
admission.
The Chairman. I think I have seen the statement before.
It may be inserted in the record.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 607" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. GOT
1717 Twentieth Street NW.,
Washington 9, D. C, March 21, 1952.
To: The Chairman, the McCarran Subcommittee for Internal Security.
Dear Senator: Although I have not appeared as a witness before your com-
mittee, my analysis of Mr. Lattimore's writings before the Tydings committee,
and in my booli The China Story, have evidently caused him suflicient disquiet
for him to have made a special effort to smear me before your committee. Al-
though I feel honored to be included by Mr. Lattimore in the company of dis-
tinguished Americans such as Senator Ivnowland and Admiral Cooke, whom he
also defamed INIr. Lattimore's false and malicious accusation that I have "A
record of pro-Nazi utterances" is calculated to hurt my reimtation should it
go unchallenged.
This accusation of Mr. Lattimore's is based on the same false premises as
those of the Communists and their sympathisers, namely, that to be anti-Com-
munist was to be pro-Nazi, and that to advocate a policy leading to the. enlist-
ment of the German and Japanese peoples into the ranks of the defenders of
freedom is proof of pro-Nazi sentiments. Thus, Mr. Lattimore, before your
committee, has repeated the smear of the Communists and their sympathisers
who condemned my 1940 book on Soviet Ilussia, called The Dream We Lost
in which I wrote that Stalin was even worse than Hitler and even more dan-
gerous— a fact which is now apparent to most of the American people.
Mr. Lattimore and his lawyers were alhiwed the utmost license to smear
me before the Tydings committee, while I was instructed to answer only "yes"
or "no" to their questions and those of Senator Green — a ti'eatment in marked
contrast to your patient hearing of Mr. Lattimore. They endeavored to prove
by quotations out of context, and by citing unfavorable reviews of my books,
Institute of pacific relations 3669
written by Commimist sympathizers, tliat I was "pro-Nazi," because in my 1949
book called The High Cost of Vengeance, I pleaded for an intelligent, just
and merciful policy toward the German people, and showed how those who fa-
vored the Morgenthau plan, or similar policies, were usually pro-Soviet. As I saw
it, it was obvious that if we continued the policy of dismantling German in-
dustries and depriving millions of workers of their jobs, and continued to humili-
ate and revile the defeated people on the assumption that the Communist theory
of collective guilt was valid, we should succeed in driving the despairing German
people into the arms of Soviet Russia. The fact that the Morgenthau plan was
written by Harry Drexter White, identified as a Communist or a Soviet agent
before your committee, proves the truth of my argument that those who ad-
vocated a policy of vengeance were usually pro-Soviet. It is because I am both
anti-Communist and anti-Nazi that I pleaded for the adoption an American policy
which would prevent the Conmiunist conquest of Germany, Japan, and China,
and also prevent the revival of naziism. This fact was recognized by many
reviewers, including William L. White, in the Saturday Review of Literature,
but since you have correctly forbidden Lattimore to quote adverse reviews of
my books I cannot quote the favorable ones either. However I hope it may be
permissible to have inserted in the record the attached letter which I received
from Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, which concerns both The High Cost of Ven-
geance and The Dream We Lost — republished in an abridged version in 1947
under the title "Lost Illusion."
As regards Mr. Lattimore's citations of my 1939 writings concerning the
Chinese Communists, it is true that in 1938 in China at the time of the United
P'ront against Japan, I was, foolishly, led to believe that the Chinese Communists
had adopted a liberal policy. I have explained how this came about in my
"China Story" which Mr. Lattimore, of course, ignores, however, as soon as I
read Edgar Snow's November 1939 interview with Mao Tse-tung, published in
the China Weekly Review in January 1940, I realized and acknowledged my mis-
take. For in that interview Mao made it abundantly clear that the Chinese
Communist Party, like all other Communist parties, favored the Nazi side in the
World War until Germany attacked Russia. Moreover the tirst Russo-Japa-
nese pact, in 1940, led to the Chinese Communists directing their lire against the
Nationalists instead of against the Japanese. From this time onwards I wrote
articles and books showing that the Chinese Communist Party was as completely
under Moscow's control as any other Communist Party in the world. All these
facts are related in my 1947 book called Last Chance in China.
My lawyers have sent a letter to Mr. Lattimore, a copy of which is attached,
demanding that he withdraw his libelous statement that I have a record of pro-
Nazi utterances. This statement is, I understand, unprivileged since it was
given to the press before iNIr. Lattimore read it to your committee.
/s/ Fre»a Uti-EY.
WASHINGTON, D. C, ss: Maech 21, 1952.
Freda LTtley personally appeared before me. Eva B. Adams, a notary public
in and for the District of Columbia, Miss Freda Utle.v, personally known to me,
who being sworn acknowledged the above to be her signature and stated that
the foregoing statement and that all of the facts therein are true except such
facts as may be stated on information and belief and that with respect to such
facts she believes them to be true.
[seal] /s/ Eva B. Adams, NotariiJ'iiblic.
My commission expires February 16, 1956.
Departmext of the Army,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Washinyton 2, D. C, Jidt/ 1949.
My Dear Freda : I have carefully read your last book. The Hight Cost of Ven-
geance. Inasmuch as I have read practically every book that you have written
and many of your magazine articles, I feel qualified to state that The High Cost
of Vengeance is one of your finest contributions to the literary field. I have
often told friends that in my or>inion your book Lost Illusicm will one day be
considered a classic. I think that your latest book, The High Cost of Ven-
geance, has reached similar literary heights. The clear and succinct analysis
of developments in Europe should assist many leaders in arriving at sound con-
3670 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
elusions concerning our unfortunate direction or execution of our responsibilities,
essentially in Germany.
Sincere good wishes for your continued success and congratulations upon a
real accomplishment in the field of decency in human relationships.
Ever faithfully,
/s/ Al
(A. C. Wedemeyek, Lt. General, G. S. C.)
Mr. SoURWixE. I have notliinij further, Mr. Chairman,
]\Ir. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what have your dealings been with
Walther Heissig ?
Mr. Lattimore. I met Mr. Heissig when I w^as in Peking for
about 48 hours, about Christmas time, 1945. He came to see me,
and he offered to buy Mongol books for me, and I left some money
for him. He did buy the books and sent them to me. Since then,
I have been in correspondence with him off and on.
Mr. Morris. Well, now, of what duration was your association
with Mr. Heissig at that time? You said for a 48-hour period.
You didn't see him continuously for 48 hours.
Mr. Lattimore. No. I saw him for about half an hour.
Mr. Morris. Now, did you subsequently intervene on his behalf,
after he had been convicted for 30 years by the military authorities ?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did.
Mr. JMoRRis. Did you intervene in any way on his behalf with the
military authorities ?
]\Ir. Lattimore. I wrote to General Thorpe, who was at that time
in Military Intelligence, and told him that there was such a man,
that I understood him to be in Germany, and that he might have
information useful to General Thorpe.
Mr. Morris. And do you so testify that that is the only effort
you made on behalf of Mr. Heissig?
Mr. Lattimore. I believe so. I answer a little hesitantly, because
I believe that some former German journalist in China used some-
thing presented to a court in Shanghai, something that I had once
written, which he claimed was evidence showing that his ideas were
different from those of the Nazis. And where Heissig was included
in that, I don't know.
Mr. Morris. And is it your testimony that whatever you did on
behalf of Mr. Heissig was done on the basis of your association of
about a half hour in this 48-hour period in 1945 ?
Mr. Lattimore. That's right. Mr. Heissig gave me copies of some
of his publications, and I w\as able to estimate that he was a man
who had been in touch witli Mongol sources of information for sev-
eral years at a time wlien Americans were totally excluded from th«
region.
^Ir, Morris. Had anyone ever told you that Mr. Heissig has trans-
ferred his allegiance from the German staff to the Soviet staff?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I never heard that.
JSIr. Morris. You had no reason to believe that at all?
Mr. Latitmore. No ; I had no reason to believe it at all.
Mr. jNIorris. What had been your associations with INDUSCO?
Mr. Lattimore. Was I trustee of INDUSCO?
Mr. Morris. I would like your own associations, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Lattimore. My own associations I can describe only in a gen-
eral way, that I was very much in favor of INDUSCO and did a good
deal to promote fund raising for INDUSCO in this country and be-
lieved that it was a very constructive activity in wartime China.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3671
Mr. Morris. Are you still an honorary vice chairman of
INDUSCO?
Mr. Lattimore. That I couldn't tell you.
Mr. Morris. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson ?
Senator Ferguson. Not at the present time. No questions no^Y.
The CiiAiRjiAN. Are there any further questions ?
Senator Ferguson. Oh, I did want to ask one question.
In relation to Mr. Fairbank, did you visit Mr. Fairbank in the last
year ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is John K. Fairbank.
Mr. Lattimore. Let's see. Between March 1951 and now?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Almost certainly.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see him here in Washington, or in
Georgetown ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I did.
Senator Ferguson. Did you go to his home, or his mother's home?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did.
Senator Ferguson. When ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it was when he came down here first, ex-
pecting to have a hearing, and then the hearing was deferred, and he
went back.
Senator Ferguson. Did you go to see him to talk over the facts as
to what he might say in his statement ?
Mr. Lattimore. No; I had only a very general conversation with
him.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation about his atti-
tude toward the committee or what it should be or would be?
Mr. Lattimore. In a general way ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. What was it? Wliat was your conversation
with him ?
Mr. Lattimore. Well, that he was going to have a hearing before
this committee.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; but did you have any about his attitude
toward the committee, what stand he would take or should take?
Mr. Lattimore. Not in detail ; no.
The Chairman. In any way?
Mr. Lattimore. In a general way ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. What was the conversation?
Mr. Lattimore. To the effect that he was going to say that the
charges against him were totally unjustified.
Senator Ferguson. Anything else ? Anything about the committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think so.
Senator Ferguson. Nothing at all ?
Mr. Lattimore. Nothing.
Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him how tough you were going to
be to the committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. I had already appeared before the committee.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, it was after you had appeared and read your
statement ?
Mr. Lattimore. That's right.
Senator Ferguson. Then it is just recently that you saw him?
Mr. Lattimore. I told you it was when he came down here to appear.
3672 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Well, but you did not give me the time.
Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry. 1 thought I did. It was when he came
down here expecting to be heard, and then his hearing was deferred
and he went back. I think maybe a week later he came down again.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you come to know that he was
down here to make a statement to the committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. He let us know he "^vas coming dow^n.
Senator Ferguson. How?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether it was by phone or letter, or
what it was.
Senator Ferguson. Did you give him a copy of your statement?
Mr. Lattimore. I have sent him a copy of my statement. I think it
was before then.
Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him that he should be more aggres-
sive against the committee?
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I left that to his judgment.
Senator Ferguson. Nothing was said on that?
Mr. Lattimore. He did not show me a copy of his statement, so I
did not know in detail •
The Chairman. The question is whether anything was said on that
subject.
Senator Ferguson. On what his attitude should be in relation to the
criticism of the committee.
Mr. Lattimore. Well, he told me that his attitude was going to be
that the charges were totally unjustified.
Senator Ferguson. Had the committee charged John Fairbank?
Mr. Lattimore. INIany charges had been made against him before
this committee.
Senator Ferguson. Well, had the committee made any charges?
Mr. Lattimore. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. And did you discuss any charges that the com-
mittee had made?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think we did.
Senator Ferguson. What did you go to see him for ?
Mr. Lattiimore. He was an old friend.
Senator Ferguson. AVas that all ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Not to discuss what he might say and his atti-
tude toward the committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. Not in detail ; no.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you come back to "not in detail." Give
us Avhat you did say about the committee.
Mr. Lattimore.*^ He said that he was going to take a firm stand that
the charges against him were unjustified.
Senator Ferguson. Was that all that Avas said ?
Mr. Lattimore. That was all.
Senator Ferguson. What did you say ?
Mr. Lattimore. I said I was glad to hear it.
Senator Ferguson. How long did you see him ?
Mr. Lattimore. Maybe an hour.
Senator Ferguson. Now, was that before you were asked questions
here about seeing people that were witnesses or going to be witnesses?
]\Ir. Lattimore. No, it was after.
Senator Ferguson. You went to see him after you were questioned ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3673
JNIr. Lattimore. Yes.
ISIr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire at that point, very
briefly : Just to fix the date, I\Ir. Lattimore, you say that this occasion
on which you saw INIr. Fairbank was about a week before lie did in
fact testify before the committee ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it was that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was a day on which he had been scheduled to
appear before the committee and it had been deferred ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it was the day before he had been scheduled
to appear before the conunittee. And when we went to see him, he
said he had just heard that his wife had received a telegram deferring
the hearing.
Mr. SourW'Ine. But he had come down here expecting to be heard;
had he not?
Mr. Lattimore. He had come down expecting to be heard.
Mr. Sourw^xe. He had his statement all ready ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourw^ixe. He did not send it to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. That is right.
]\Ir. Sourwixe. You had sent him a copy of your statement ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Mr. Sourwixe. And he had his statement prepared, and he did not
show it to you ?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Fergusox". Had you sent your statement up to him, up in
Boston '\
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Fergusox. And how long before was it?
Mr. Lattimore. A couple of weeks.
Senator Ferguson. What part of the statement did you think he
would be interested in ?
Mr. Lattimore. I thought he would be interested in the whole thing.
Senator Fergusox. And did you write him a letter at the time?
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think I did.
Senator Fergusox. You just put the statement in an envelope and
mailed it to liim^
Mr. Lattimore. I think he was one among a number of people to
whom I asked my secretary to mail copies.
Senator Fergusox. And that is all you know about it, just that you
mailed him a copy, no remarks or anything^
Mr. Lattimore. That is right, I believe.
Senator Fergusox. But he did not send you a copy of his statement?
Mr. Lattimore. He sent me one subsequently.
Senator Fergusox. When ?
]Mr. Lattimore. After it had been released.
Senator Fergusox. Was yours sent to him before it was released?
Mr. Lattimore. No.
Senator Fergusox. After it was released \
Mr. Lattimore. It was sent after it was released.
Senator Fergusox. Then you released it one day and testified the
next ? Or was that 2 days ?
Mr. Lattimore. I think it was released simultaneously with testi-
mony.
Senator Fergusox. And then you mailed it after that?
3674 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Lattimore. That's right.
Senator Ferguson. I thought you had released it to the press at
least 1 day before.
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so. I think it was sent to the press
at the same time ; marked for release at the opening of the hearing.
Senator Ferguson. Then you sent it to the press ?
Mr. Lattimore. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did any of the papers print any of it before you
testified?
Mr. Lattimore. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. And had you mailed it to Fairbank before you
testified?
Mr. Lattimore. No, I believe that all the copies to friends of ours
went out, oh, some few days later, and some a week or so later, and so
on.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. We are about to close the hearings. Have you
anything you wish to offer or say, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Fortas, Senator, there are various documents that have been
asked for and various types of information that have been asked for.
I assume that those may be submitted.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Lattimore. Beyond that I have nothing further to add at this
time. Senator.
The Chairman. Then the hearings of tlie witness, Owen Lattimore,
are now closed.
But the committee has something to say. What I am going to say
now comes from the unanimous committee that has heard this hearing.
It has been the settled practice of this committee to reserve its con-
clusions, with respect to the substance of testimony that is taken, until
the conclusion of the hearings on the particular matter under investi-
gation. After careful consideration, however, this committee feels
it proper at this time to make a statement with respect to the conduct
of this witness, as a witness, during the time he has been before us. In
doing this, the committee is not reversing its policy of reserving judg-
ment. What the committee has to say now represents facts, not con-
clusions— not the findings of the committee, but its observations with
respect to the deportment and conduct of Mr. Lattimore as a witness.
Mr. Lattimore came here at his own request to appear and testify.
He came with a 50-page statement which was no casual document.
It bore obvious indicia of careful preparation, and the witness testi-
fied he had been working on it for months, and had been assisted by
his counsel. It was released to the press before delivery, and Mr.
Lattimore's invective was scattered to all parts of the country. Many
times when asked if lie had facts to support his insulting conclusions,
the witness replied that he did not.
The committee has been confronted here with an individual so fla-
grantly defiant of the United States Senate, so outspoken in his dis-
courtesy, and so ])ersistent in his efforts to confuse and obscure the
facts, that the committee feels constrained to take due notice of his
conduct. The United States Senate is a constitutional institution,
representing the States and the people thereof. A deliberate affront
to the Senate of the United States, or to the Congress, is not ilecessarily
an affront to the individuals who compose those bodies, but is an affront
to the people of this Nation, who are here represented.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3675
The committee might have had a right to expect tliat a ^Yitness who
claimed to be an objective scholar and a patriotic citizen would first
objectively analyze the past policy of the United States in the Far
East and help point the way to a determination of what has been
wrong, and what corrective measures may be required. The com-
mittee might have had a right to expect that he would lend eager aid
in exposing whatever Communist infiltration there may have been in
the Institute of Pacific Relations, or in any other organization in a
position to exert influence on the thinking of our diplomats and the
conduct of our foreign affairs. The committee might have had a right
to expect that Mr. Lattimore's statement would be calm, temperate,
and factual.
Instead, the committee Avas confronted with an initial fusillade
of invective, and a consistently evasive, contentious, and belligerent
attitude.
Suggestions have been made that the committee should seek to disci-
pline jNIr. Lattimore for his contumacious and contemptuous conduct.
Clearly Mr. Lattimore did, on many occasions, stand in contempt
of the committee. Clearly he took that position voluntarily and in-
tentionally. Mr. Lattimore used, toward the committee, language
which was insolent, overbearing, arrogant, and disdainful. He flouted
the committee, he scoffed at the committee's efforts, he impugned the
committee's methods, and he slandered the committee's staff. His
language was frequently such as to outrage and offend both the com-
mittee as a whole and its members individually and, apparently, with
intent to do so.
There has been no striking back on the part of the committee.
The committee has employed no sanctions against Mr. Lattimore
because, through forbearance, it has been found possible to make
progress without desciplinary action. Despite Mr. Lattimore's re-
calcitrance at many points, the committee believes a record has been
made covering his essential testimony with respect to the major
matters here being investigated.
The fact remains that Mr. Lattimore was alloAved to use the witness
chair as a rostrum from which to attack the committee, its staff, and
its hearings. He was, to use a phrase from his own prepared state-
ment before the committee, "accorded the publicity facilities'' of the
committee's hearings; and the record shows in many ways that neither
Avas he insensible of his opportunity in that regard, nor did he fail
to take advantage of it. There is no other country in the world
where a witness before a committee of the principal legislative body
of the Nation would be granted any such latitude.
Few w^itnesses within the memory of the members of this com-
mittee have been permitted to use language as intemperate, provoca-
tiA'e, and abusive of the committee as IMr. Lattimore used in his pre-
pared statement, which he was permitted to read. No witness, so far
as any member of the subcommittee can recall, ever before Avas given
free rein to read, before a Senate committee, a prepared statement so
clearly contemptuous of the committee and of the Senate.
The committee is aware that in this direction lies one of the pres-
ent dangers to our democratic Avay of life : the fact that there are those
in this country today who seek to use the right of free speech in
furtherance of their efforts to set up a system within which freedom
of speech Avill not exist. But the committee has preferred to err,
3676 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
if at all. on the side of allowiiip: the witness too nnicli latitude, rather
than on tlie side of allowing too little. That preference does not in-
clude any predilection toward allowing a witness to escape reproof for
contumacy.
Contumacy may take many forms, as Mr. Lattimore lias demon-
strated (hiring his appearances here. Willful unresponsiveness is one
of the forms of contumacy often resoi'ted to by disputatious witnesses,
and this witness lias proved himself exjiert at disputation. The com-
mittee frequently found it extremely difficult to get Mr. Lattimore
to give a direct answer; and on numerous occasions he was reluctant
to give any responsive answer at all. This witness, who had stated
he was "not interested in fine or technical distinctions," proceeded
thi'oughout his testimony to split hairs with glib facility.
At times Mr. Lattimore refused to testify with respect to con-
clusions; at other times, he a]ipeared eager to do so; and he did so
testify on a number of occasions. In fact, in some instances he tes-
tified vehemently to conclusions which the committee found itself
unable to draw from facts of record — as in the case of his testimony
that he did not have any influence on United States foreign policy
with respect to the Far East.
On this point, as on other matters of substance, the committee pre-
fers to reserve its own conclusions. However, Mr. Lattimore's tes-
timony is significant with respect to the facts. He testified that he
wrote a letter to the President of the United States, in 1945, making
certain statements with regard to conditions in the Far East, and
urging a review of United States foreign i)olicy with respect to the
Far East, from which review then top officials of the State Department
should be excluded. Mr. Lattimore testified that he saw the Presi-
dent personally, and left with him memoranda suggesting certain
courses of action with respect to Japan and China; and that these
memoranda included a recommendation for giving a larger measure
of high authority to officials with China backgrounds.
Soon thereafter, according to Mr. Lattimore's own testimony, the
then top officials of the State Department were replaced, including
former Ambassador Grew. Further, the number and importance of
top jobs in the State Department, held by ])ersons with China back-
grounds, was increased. Finally this witness testified that the policy
advocated, shortly thereafter, in the so-called directive of December
15, 1945, on China policy, and which our Government sought to carry
out in China, was substantially the same as the policy outlined in
Mr. Lattimore's memoranda with respect to China ; and that the policy
adopted by the United States, with respect to Japan, was substantially
the same as the policy with respect to Japan outlined in Mr. Latti-
more's memoranda.
These facts, to which Mr. Lattimore testified liefore this commit-
tee, went unmeiitioned by him during his testimony before the Tyd-
ings committee.
Mr. Lattimore has testified to having a type of memory with
which the committee is quite familiar. With respect to some mat-
ters, he has demonstrated that his memory is extremely good. But he
has testified that his memory was unreliable with respect to matters
which ordinary men might be ex})ected to remember most clearly.
Very few men forget about their visits to the President of the United
States, if the number of such visits is small. But Mv. Lattimore, who
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3677
said lie saw President Trunuui just once, wanted tliis coniniittee to
believe he had forgotten the incident when he testified before the
Tydings committee with respect to his influence on foreign pohcy.
'Mr. Lattimore also has testified before this committee that all dur-
ing that prior Senate investigation he forgot the fact that he had a
desk in the State Department Building for 4, 5, or 6 months during the
last war.
The precise extent to which Mr. Lattimore gave untruthful testi-
mony before this committee will never be determined. Human limita-
tions will prevent us from ever attaining the complete knowledge of
all his activities which would make it possible to assess each statement
he has made and to catalog fully whatever untruths he may have
uttered. That he has uttered untruths stands clear on the record.
Some of these have been so patent and so flagrant as to merit mention
at this time, as illustrative of the conduct and attitude of the witness.
The witness testified concerning an occasion when he had luncheon
with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. The date of this
luncheon was later placed as during the period when Soviet Russia
elected, for its own purposes, to team up with the Nazi war machine.
But in spite of the anxiety which freemen throughout the world
experienced at the alliance of those two totalitarian colossi, the wit-
ness testified that his luncheon with the Soviet Ambassador took place
after the Soviet Union had abandoned its alliance with the Nazis.
Confronted later with evidence that the meeting took place during
the Hitler-Stalin pact, the witness admitted he had testified incorrectly.
In connection with that same matter, the witness testified there
had been much publicity about his appointment as adviser to Chiang
Kai-shek, at the time of his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador,
with whom he had discussed the appointment, though the record
shows that the announcement of the appointment was not made until
11 days after the luncheon meeting in question.
The witness testified that he never read an article by a ]Mr. T. A.
Bisson which had provoked considerable controversy Avithin the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations in 1943. He testified further that the ex-
pressions of opinion in that article were contrary to what he himself
was writing at that time. Thereafter the witness identified a letter
over his own signature which indicated that he had not only read the
Bisson article but had agreed with it ; and that the only fault he found
with it was that the underlying thoughts could have been expressed
more convincingly.
Mr. Lattimore has given us many plausible but differing answers as
to when.he realized that Frederick V. Field was pro-Communist. The
witness and Field have been shown by frequent and extensive^ testi-
mony to have been closely associated in the Institute of Pacific Re-
lations. The witness initially testified that he discovered that Field
was pro-Communist sometime in the 191:0"s, and not until then. When
presented with a letter which he said he received in 1939, and which
clearly reflected the Communist expressions of Mr. Field, the witness
said that "judging from this letter my memory was in error by about
2 years.''
Later in tlie hearings, the witness was shown to have reconnnended
the same Mr. Field, at a time subsequent to 1939, as a person who
could supijly personnel for the Defense Advisory Commission. There-
upon Mr. Lattimore avoided admitting that he had recommended to
3678 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the Defense Advisory Commission a man whom he knew to be at least
pro-Commnnist, by reversino; his preceding testimony.
In going back to his original position, he stated that at the time
when he testified his "memory was in error by about 2 years," his
admission was not accurate because he was weary from long days of
examinations. This explanation took no account of the fact that the
admission in question took place during the first day of examination
after the witness had finished reading his statement, and apparently
ignored the existence of the letter which had impelled the first change
in testimony on this point.
The witness made no similar claim of being unsure of himself when
lie testified erroneously with respect to handling Mr. Lauchlin Currie's
]nail. In reply to the question "Is it your testimony that you did not,
at the request of Lauchlin Currie, take care of his mail at the Wliite
House when he was away V Mr. Lattimore replied, "that certainly is
my statement."
Subsequently, Mr. Lattimore identified a letter which he had written
in July 1942, which included the statement:
Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he was away and
in view of your telegram of today, I think I had better tell you that he has gone
to China on a special trip. This news is absolutely confidential until released
to the press.
When confronted wnth this letter, the witness said : "Obviously m}'
memory was inaccurate."
AVlien the witness was asked, in connection with discussion of a trip
he had made in 1937 to Communist headquarters in China, "Did you
or anyone in your party make prearrangements with the Communist
Party in order to get in?" he answered, "None whatever." He was
then presented with the text of an article which he had written for
the London Times, and was asked if the statements in that article
were true. After he affirmed that they were, he read into the record
from that article — his own article — the statement : "I sent a letter to
the Red Capital by ordinary mail and got in answer — "cordial invi-
tation."
These are all instances of significant untruths, established as such.
They all concern matters of obvious importance to this committee in
trying to determine the nature of the organization, methods of opera-
tion, and influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The com-
mittee attempts to draw no conclusions from these matters at this time.
Aside from matters of self-contradiction, the record contains also
instances of testimony by this witness concerning matters with respect
to which other witnesses have testified to the exact opposite. Some
of these instances concern matters which are highly relevant to the
subject of the committee's inquiry and which are substantial in import.
For example : Over a period of 2 years, first before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, later before
this committee in executive session, and then again before us in open
session, Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know that Dr. Cli'ao-
ting Chi was a Communist. Mr. Ch'ao-ting Chi was a man shown to
have been an associate of the witness, and the witness admitted the
association. But Mr, Lattimore testified that no one had told him
Ihat Chi was a Communist, or shown him a report that Chi was a
C'onnnunist, or given him any reason whatever to believe that Chi
was a Connminist.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3679
On the other hand, Prof. Karl Wittfogel of Cokunbia University, a
witness before this committee, and E. Newton Steeley of the Review
Board of the Civil Service Commission, have given testimony that
flatly contradicts Mr. Lattimore's clear and unequivocal assertions in
this regard.
Another instance concerns the question of whether Mr. Lattimore
knew that a certain German Communist who wrote under the pseudo-
nym of xVsiaticus for the publication Pacific Affairs while Lattimore
was editing it, was, in fact, a Communist, Mr. Lattimore has flatly
asserted that he did not know or have reason to believe this writer to be
a Communist. Contra, the record contains the testimony of Prof.
Karl Wittfogel that he did tell Mr. Lattimore about the Communist
background and the Communist affiliation of Asiaticus. Minutes of
meetings in Moscow, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, and a letter written by Mr. Lattimore, are among the items
of evidence in the record which also purport to show that Mr. Latti-
more knew or believed Asiaticus to be a Connnunist writer.
One of the most important, relevant, and substantial questions re-
specting which the committee has been seeking the truth is whether
when this witness was working with, and publishing articles for, cer-
tain Communists, he knew them to be Communists. The finding on
this question is essential to a proper characterization of a whole series
of actions by JNIr. Lattimore, and will directly affect the committee's
ultimate findings with respect to the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The shaping of United States policy with respect to China was a
factor in the success of communism in that land, in the establishment
of firm roots for Soviet influence in all Asia and in the subsequent
ordeal through which United States boys now are being taken in
Korea, if this policy in its initial stages, or at any time, was affected
by acts or strategems on the part of anyone having any slightest pur-
pose except the welfare of this Nation, it would be a matter not to be
lightly dealt with, nor one which the American people should easily
overlook or forget. The intimate knowledge which this witness had
of Asia and of Asiatic affairs, coupled with his deliberate and adroit
attempts to mold American thinking with respect to those affairs,
including his effort to establish certain concepts, in the mind of the
Chief Executive of the United States, necessarily bring this witness
within the orbit of any realistic appraisal of this whole situation,
Wlien, in the face of the record, he undertook before this committee
a deliberate attempt to deny or cover up ])ertinent facts, this witness
placed himself in a most unenviable position.
The hearing is closed.
(Whereupon, at 5 : 30 p. m., Friday, March 21, 1952, the hearing
was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)
Appendix I
Exhibit No. 470
[Source: Pacific Affairs, vol XIII, No. 3, September 1940, pp. 279-319]
The United States, China, and the World ^Market
(By William Braiult)
"1. A MODERN MYTH
"The only thing that seems to weather revolution and war in the Far East is
the mvth of a Chinese market of 450 million legendary customers. Disregarding
the historical conditions of the problem, the existence of the Chinese market is
taken simnlv for granted, as if the only things to be decided were how to get at it
and how to" divide it. American writers like to describe this market m rosy
colors as a prospect for American industry ; in dark colors when they discuss it
as a possible vehicle of Japanese competition. Japanese writers like to expatiate
on the disaster of this "vast market' falling to Russia.
•'The truth is that the market problem of China is inseparable from the piob-
lem of tlie world market. No new market of world importance can be opened up
without new investments of capital on a very large scale, and moreover, unless
new markets are opened up, capital itself cannot continue to accumulate and grow.
This is the hurdle, and it is capital that has to take the hurdle, both tor the
sake of itself and for the sake of the market.
"The undeveloped areas of the world that can still be tapped by capital are
inhabited bv the majority of the population of the globt^the -prospective cus-
tomers' of our modern mythology. Geographically, their heaviest concentration
is in \^ia while bv far the heaviest concentration of capital is in Western Europe
and Nortii America. These are the antipodes of our economic globe. The diffi-
cultv is that exchange between the opposite extremes of accumulated capital and
undeveloped market is not the same thing as integration of the two in an
expanded world order that is organically whole. Even if the backward countries
were to be subordinated to the rule of capital, there are well-nigh insurmountable
obstacles— economic, social, and political— to incorporation of them withm the
domain of capital. " . , , <- <-• i>
"China is a huge potential market. The emphasis lies on the word potential .
Before speculating about its dimensions, the conditions that have so long kept it
merely potential should be examined. Two processes in the operation of capital
must be borne in mind— that by which it is accumulated and that by which it is
reinvested for the further development of the market. These processes, more-
over work at two levels— the level obtaining in the advanced countries while
thev' are developing their own internal markets, and the level of more acute
competition when the internal markets have been saturated and the advanced
countries turn to the development of the world market.
"These two levels are bv no means entirely separate, because as long as the
internal market in the advanced countries is capable of substantial further devel-
opment there is a real world market; capital can choose l)etween investment
at home and investment abroad. The world market can l)e justly thought of in
terms of unlimited potentialities. After the saturation of the internal market,
the horizon narrows. The world market is no longer an unknown quantity full of
promising potentialities, but well-known, circumscribed, scanned and measured,
even acquired (in the form of colonies), but with its development still down at
the level of unrealized potentialities. When this phase has been reached, the
problem of the external market for the advanced countries merges into the
pi-obJein of the internal market in the backward countries. To expand the
external market requires the development of the internal market in the backward
countries.
3680
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3681
"This describes, diagrammatifally as it were, the situation of tlie world today.
In India, the other British colonies, and China, alone, capital confronted with
about one billion economically backward people. These people are becoming
increasingly and desperately conscious both of the insupportability of their own
backwardness and of the hopelessness of sufficient capital to lift them out of
it. The very future of mankind depends, of course, on the reestablishment of
normal economic intercourse between the advanced countries and this immense
backward area. Can this be done by the development, through capital investment,
of the stagnant market? The difficulty is aggravated by the fact that in China,
which has become symbolical of the backward area as a whole, there is already
going on a titanic struggle for political liberation from the economic deadlock.
There is, accordingly, no better approach to the problem of the world market
as a whole than through analysis of the different concepts and policies that
interpenetrate and conflict with each other on the Chinese field of battle.
"2. THKEE CONCEPTIONS OF THE CHINA MAKKET
"The twin principles of equal opportunity and of the territorial and adminis-
trative integrity of China imply the interest of Amei'ican capital in the indus-
trialization and the development of the internal market of China as a prerequisite
and concomitant of the penetration of American enterprise. Directly opposed
to the American view and the American interest is the attitude of Japanese
imperialism, which is openly inimical to the building up of native industries and
the development of the internal market in China. As far back as 1932 the Japa-
nese Foreign Office made clear this standpoint in a memorandum to the League
of Nations : 'the development of capitalist enterprise in China will make the
economic activities of all foreign nations in China very difficult or even impossible
to carry on.' ^
"The truth, as brought to light by subsequent events, is that it has not been
'the development of capitalist enterprise' but Japanese aggression launched for
the specific purpose of preventing the development of China by international
enterprise, that has made 'the economic activities of all foreign nations in China
very difficult or even impossible to carry on.' The British, who in 1932 lent a
willing ear to the Japanese argument, were the first to learn later on, with an
unpleasant shock, the real meaning of it. The point, however, is that here we
have concisely stated two diametrically opposed conceptions of the China market :
the Japanese 'New Order in East Asia' and the American 'Open Door.' As the
Japanese and American aspects of a problem which is of world scale, they corre-
spond directly to the difference in the structure of the internal market in Japan
and in America.
"Between these two extremes stands the British conception, which can best be
illustrated by excerpts from a memorandum which Sir Arthur Salter submitted
to the Chinese Government :
"Most of the heavy industries (apart from the 'extractive" industries) musi
probably be considered unsuitable for China at her present stage of develop
ment. They usually demand very expensive capital equipment and need ?
large market."
"Tlie argument here is that the establishment of heavy industry (or, for tha
matter, as will be seen presently, of any large-scale industry) is impossible oi
account of the lack of a large market. It is not pointed out that a large market
on the other hand, could be developed only by the establishment of large-scah
industry. This second point, though crucial, is evaded, and thus the statement oi
the market problem in China is left in a kind of twilight. After discarding from
the outset the possibility of large-scale industry in China (presupposing, b,\
implication, the impossibility of large-scale capital export to China) Sir Arthui
continues :
"Since, with the exceptions indicated, China's industrial development
must depend mainly upon the purchasing power of the Chinese public, il
cannot be too emphatically stated that for China industrialization is not
an alternative to agricultural development. On the contrary, the increase
in the agriculturist's margin of production must be the essential foimda
tion on which industrial development must be built.
"* * * por these as for other reasons, the increase of the production
of the average agriculturist remains the fundamental problem of China'.s
economy, whether that increase is secured by extension of tne areas of
1 Japan Foi-pisn Office, the Present Conditions in China, 1932, p. 39.
-' China and Silver, New York, 1934, p. 93.
3682 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
cultivable land; or a reduction of population (enabling the average farm
holding to be enlarged) ; or improvements in methods of agriculture; or
the development of handicraft or small rural industries by means of which
those living on the land can supplement their agricultural production.^
''The British position is, as can be seen, half-way between the American and
the Japanese. Native industries and the development of the internal market
in China should be encouraged, but only to a strictly limited extent; there
should be industrialization but not much of it. The British expert even pre-
scribed that the rhythm of development should proceed 'stage by stage and
gradually' (p. 89). .
"Yet at that very time (1934), ec(momic and social catastrophe was closing
in on China — not stage by stage and gradually, but by leaps and bounds. In
this, incidentally, China \vas no exception. In no country in the world has
industrialization ever proceeded stage by stage and gradually. Without excep-
tion, industrialization takes place by leaps and bounds, this being in the very
nature of the accumulation of capital. In China, as a late-comer, a backward
country existing side by side with very highly developed countries, this his-
torical economic law of suddenly and forcibly accentuated development has
worked with even more pronounced effect.
"The core of Sir Arthur Salter's argument, and the key to the traditional
British view of the way in whicli the development of China should proceed, is
in his statement that 'the essential foundation of industrial development.' He
does not discuss the practical aspects of 'increasing the agriculturist's margin
of production,' but they have been vividly described by a Chinese investigator :
"While landlords take tlie lion's share of the products of the peasants
in the form of rent, tax collectors who are usualy also landlords and
merchants, talce another considerable share of tlie form of levies, taxes,
subtaxes, and so forth. Debts of the previous year often compel the peasant
to give up the remainder of his meager earnings. If anything is left after
the harvest it is as a rule little more than nothing. All he can do to
maintain life and carry on his tasks during tlie rest of the year is to go
to the landlords. pawnshoi)s, local gentry, grain dealers, groceries, and
sometimes rich peasants, to start the vicious circle of borrowing once again.*
"From this description it is i)lain that, under the conditions actually obtaining
in China, the 'increase in tlie agriculturist's mai'gin of production' is no solution
at all, but, on the contrary, a factor effectively retarding both the industrializa-
tion of China and the development of its internal market. A radical change in
the agricultural feudalism and peasant economy of China is the indispensable
historical prerequisite botli to industrialization and to the development of
China's internal market. The fact nnist be faced what such a change would
be not only radical but revolutionary, and that it would, in its incipient phases
at least, tend inevitably to restrict drastically 'the agriculturist's margin of
production' ; althougli — and because — it would tremendously increase the agri-
culturist's margin of subsistence, and would save millions from famine. The
agriciilturist's margin of production is that part of the results of his labor which
goes to the Cliinese landlord, usurer, and taxgatherer, and to foreign capital.
The practice of increasing this 'margin,' by the process of tightening the farmer's
belt beyond the limit of human endurance, is precisely what has conjured up
economic and social chaos in China.
"Significantly, the Japanese experts do not try to confine the issue to such
empty generalities. They are not afraid to go into the economic and social
structure of China ; but then, they want to prove a point slightly different from
that of the British. The Japanese Foreign Office memorandum already cited
gives the following picture of the econonnc and social structure in which, it
asserts, Chinese Communism is rooted :
"VI. Factors contributing to the rise of the Chinese Communist move-
ment and its future.
"* * * (2) P^conomic Factors:
"Ever since the opening of China to foreign commerce, not only the cost
of living has been increased tlirough the introduction of foreign merchandise,
but the subsidiary industries of the farming community such as sericiiltui'e,
cotton spinning, and tea growing have declined. These economic factors,
combined with political factors enumerated above such as civil war, over-
" Op. Pit., pp. 94 .saq.
'' "Merrlinnt Capital and Usury Capital in Rural China," by Leonard T. K. Wu, in Far
Eastern Survey, New York, March 25, 1936.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3683
taxation and squeeze, have completely ruined agricultural communities.
According to statistics, in the 4 years between 1914 and 1918 lands left un-
cultivated increased by 490,000,000 mu and farming households decreased
by 6.000,000. In 1 year, from 1918 and 1919, the percentage of peasant
proprietors was reduced from 5.3 to 49 percent, while that of tenant farmers
increased from 26 to 32 percent. The middle-class farmers became poor
I)easants, and poor peasants turn proletarians. The industries in China
being still too undeveloped to provide work for the vast proletarian mass,
the majority of the rural unemployed become either bandits or vagabonds,
soldiers or medicants.
"Of the total Chinese population of 400 millions, approximately 336 million
are said to be agricultural. Of these, 55 percent do not own any land:
20 percent belong to the class of petty farmers possessing i to 10 mu of
land : 12 percent are middle-class farmers possessing from 10 to 30 mu
of land ; so-called rich farmers owning 30 mu or more and still larger landed
proprietors make up only 13 percent.
"* * * It is easy to see how the land policy of the Communists re-
ceived the endorsement of an overwhelming majority of the Chinese rural
population. * * * The fact that the Party had behind it Russia, which
has renounced unequal treaties and certain rights and interests concluded
and acquired in China during the Tsarist regime, won popular approval and
confidence in its movement.^
"This picture of Chinese economic and social reality, drawn with a few bold
strokes, contrasts strangely with the prim blue-print of the British expert.
Withal, the two pictures are complementary. From both it is plain that there
is economic breakdown and chaos in China. The protagonist of the status quo
tries to get around this by a scheme for making the peasant, who already suffers
most, suffer a little more. The antagonist of the status quo faces the real condi-
tions boldly, because he is about to tackle them in his own way, by making them
an excuse for aggression. The Japanese endeavors to make a strong case for
himself out of the appalling conditions which actually exist, w-hereas the attempt
to hush them up is the weak point of the British arg-ument. The British expert
expects a peaceful development 'stage by stage and gradually,' the Japanese
braces himself for a violent attempt to overthrow the status quo ; that is why he
emphasizes its intolerability.
"The treatise of the British adviser could be reduced in simple, undiplomatic
and unacademic language to the following propositions : 'Capital export to China
is ruled out by circumstances. Let us, then, omit these circumstances, for they
would mean either Japanese aggression or Chinese antifeudal and anti-
imperialist revolution, or both. Either possibility is distasteful. The best advice
I can give in the circumstances is to muddle through.'
"The Japanese counterproposition could be summarized in equally blunt lan-
guage, as follows : 'The status quo is very honorable. However, considering the
circumstances, particularly that absence of large-scale capital export from the
West which is tacitlv assumed by the British expert to be the cornerstone of the
status quo, it is clearly impossible. The best thing I can do in the circumstances
is to attack.'
"In actual fact, there are three links in the chain: (i) absence of large-scale
capital exports from the West ; (ii) Japanese aggression ; (iii) Chinese struggle
for national liberation. The decisive link is the Chinese struggle for national
liberation, for by its final outcome will be determined the new forms of economic
intercourse between China and the rest of the world. ,
"Both China's foreign policy and the policy of the Kuomintang within China
are intimately tied up with the character of the unfolding Chinese Revolution
since Sun Yat-sen. The one important point of orientation in foreign policy is
the answer to the question whether or not Western capital help is indispensable
for the success of the revolution. The answer itself depends on a definite view
of the character of the revolution. If it is believed, as Sun Yat-sen originally
believed, that the Chinese Revolution must lean, in order to be successful, on
Western capital, the only policy that is possible is one which is resigned to the
inevitably of semi-independence. The signal lesson of postwar history has
been that China cannot successfully evolve 'stage by stage and gradually from
semi-independence to full independence ; though it took some time tor ur. fcun
himself to realize that Western capital would support the Chinese Revolution only
as the rope supports the hanged man. It was the flat refusal of his memorandum
5 The Present Conditions in China, Appendix III, "Communism in China," pp. 29 sqq.
88348 — 52 — pt. 10 27
3684 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to the Versailles Conference wbicli taught him the crucial lesson that the success
of the Chinese Revolution could not be staked on Western capital help.
"The whole conception had to be revised. It became obvious to Sun Yat-sen
that the road to complete independence did not lead through an intermediary
stage of semi-independence. A different course had to be envisaged. The concept
of a period of 'tutelage,' before achieving complete independence and full popular
sovereignty, which had been a cardinal part of his theory, had to be greatly modi-
fied if not eliminated altogether. For the period of tutelage was based on the
assumption of a relatively long period of peaceful development, assured by foreign
capital help. The realization that China would have to shift for itself reacted on
the content and character of the revolution. It is a superficial and one-sided
observation to say that from iiere on the revolution assumed an antiforeign
complexion. This was a mere symptom at most, the thing that struck the foreign
eye.
"The fundamental change consisted in grasping the only alternative left, in
the absence of large-scale foreign capital help: the large-scale mobilization of
the people ; the speeding-up of the rate of the revolution ; struggle instead of
tutelage ; a reaching out for complete independence after the hope of an inter-
mediate stage of semi-independence turned out to be a dangerous self-deception.
This resulted in a fundamental transformation of Sun Yat-senism. With the
changed prospect of the Chinese Revolution thus envisaged by Sun Yat-sen before
his death, a corresponding change took place in the character, content, leader-
ship, and social composition of the revolution. With the mobilizing of the peas-
ants the leadership shifted away from the radical intelligentsia to proletarian
and semiproletarian elements. An agrarian upheaval became manifestly the
content of tlie revolution. In foreign policy there was a degree of reorientation
toward Soviet Russia, initiated by Sun Yat-sen himself.
"The bulk of the Kuomintang officialdom, however, was by no means ready
yet to accept this legacy of Sun Yat-sen. Its leadership contested, frightened by
the plebeian elements and methods of the agrarian revolution, it began to lean
heavily (politically speaking, for its life) on the support of foreign capital. It
lashed out violently against the agrarian revolution and solicited and got the
support of Western capital for its military campaigns.
"It testifies to the greatness of character and acumen of Sun Yat-sen that he
was able to discard the illusion of semi-independence after his experience with
the Versailles peacemakers. Chiang Kai-shek's wasteful efforts to stamp out
Communi.sm (i. e., to crush the agrarian revolution) were a fateful departure
from this final, mature form of Sun Yat-senism. The attempt to attain national
.salvation by pleasing foreign capital was futile. It did not achieve its end but
courted Japanese aggression. Wang Ching-wei, the most consistent protagonist
in the Kuomintang of leaning on foreign capital as a method of keeping down
the 'excesses' of the agrarian revolution and as a guarantee of Chinese semi-
independence, ended up as a .Japanese puppet. The Japanese themselves appre-
ciated better than Wang Ching-wei what was actually going on. The memo-
randum quoted above shows that they were keenly aware of the content and
character of the struggle between Kuomintang and Communists to determine the
agrarian future of China and watched its outcome. They launched their aggres-
sion when it became clear that the Kuomintang could not become an instrument
of Japanese tutelage or, in their vernacular, could not 'cope with the red menace.'
"It was during the abortive period of attempted 'tutelage,' between 1927 and
the beginning of the United Front in 1937, that the problem of the China market
and of its development by foreign capital was threshed out, all of its conditions
posed, its contending forces weighed, its possibilities tested. Any analysis that
tries to solve the problem by overlooking this process and any theoretical solu-
tion of the problem that is not based on the analysis of it is bound to be barren.
.". THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: TWO EXTREMES OF MARIvET DEVELOPMENT
"In the classic examples of capitalism, in Western Europe and the United
States, the creation of the market by merchant capital and its development by
industrial capital occurred in two successive large-scale economic and social
transformations. In the first stage only enough capital had been accumulated to
subordinate the products of handicrafts and home industries to the control of
merchants. In the second stage ca])ltal had become vigorous enough to take over
the whole process of producti-nn. Tbe transition was not primarily a tech-
nological performance (as the label 'industrial revolution' suggests), but required
also a new structure of capital and a new grouping of society.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3685
"The main source of the growth of capital at the first stage was the merchant's
profit on his transactions with the small semi-independent producers. This
primitive precapitalistic method of accumulation has a great survival vitality,
and may be either a progressive or a retarding influence, according to circum-
stances. Even after it has ceased to be the predominant method of accumulating
capital, it often survives after the transition to the second stage. It is a con-
comitant of the Feudal survivals which are never completely eliminated even in
the most highly developed countries. It is the degree of survival that is im-
portant. If the particular circumstances permit the preponderance of merchant
and usuary capital to survive as the prevalent method of accumulating capital,
then the .lump from the first to the second stage in the evolution of capital cannot
be made ; the economy, disintegrated but not yet lifted to a higher level, sticks at
the stage of transition. This is as much as to say that the market has been
created to a certain extent, but is not yet being developed.
'"This has been the case with China, where, as Wu expresses it, 'The operation
of the present system of usuar.v-merchant-landlordism must lead to disintegration
of rural China . . . Usury-merchant-landlordism in China is destroying instead
of creating markets.* ^
"In the evolution of the world market the United States represents the highest
stage of development and China the lowest. Japan, where the transition from
the first to the second stage of the evolution of the market has been accomplished,
but in a peculiar way and not to the required extent, stands historically between
the American and the Chinese extremes. In comparing the development of the
market in these three countries, it is necessary to take into account firstly the
development of tlie internal market, and secondly the internal market as a step-
ping stone to the world market.
"The visible signs of a developed internal market are: (i) a railroad network
stretching over the whole national area; (ii) a customs union and the introduc-
tion of a national tariff: (iii) a unified and centralized currency. All three of
these have been in existence in the United States since the sixties, and all three
are still lacking in China.
"It is significant that Japanese aggression in its drive to destroy the incipient
internal market in China struck crippling blows at precisely these three things,
by occupying the railroads,' seizing the customs, and undermining Chinese
currency through smuggling and through compulsory circulation of the yen.*
"Taking the different countries historically, it may first be noted that in the
United States the moving frontier of westward migration signified the develop-
ment of the internal market. Railroad building was important in effecting both
the westward expansion of the market from the trading and manufacturing
centers of the Atlantic coast and the transition from merchant enterprise to full
industrialism. Until this time, manufacturing had been an appendage of
trading and shipping. It is important to make it clear, however, that they
were not the cause which created it. The appearance of a new kind of market
was not simply a technological miracle resulting from 'the spanning of the
continent.' Both the market and the railroads were created by capital, and
as far as the order of priority is concerned, the railroads followed in the wake
of the expanding market. Having followed the market, however, they also
created new capital and thus contributed to the additional expansion of the
market. This they were able to do because the original great land grants to
the railroad builders were in effect a levy in advance which converted part of
the purchasing power of the farmers into capital, since the very large tracts
of land turned over to the railroads drove up prices for all comers. Capital was
thus created by a form of expropriation which had a distinctly political tone.
" Leonard T. K. Wu, op. cit., p. 68.
T "At the end of 1038, fully two-thirds, or 6,500 kilometers, of the railway mileage of
China proper, was in territory occupied hv Japanese military forces, whereas less than
half of that amount, or about .S,200 kilometers, remained under Chinese control."'
Economic Review of Foreign Countries, 1939. U. S. Department of Commerce, p. 212.
8 "Already, China is stasgering alonfr under five different currency issues, all of differing
values. First, there is the national currency which looks to Chungking for the mainte-
nance of exchange values: .second, there is the (Japanese-controlled) Federal Reserve
Bank of North China, the attempts of which at currency stabilization have been a
lamentable failure ; third, there is the Japanese .yen. circulating in the coastal regions,
which is an unknown quantity ; fourth, there are the Japanese military notes, an entirely
unsecured issue totalling unknown millions, and fifth, there is the Hua-Hsing currency,
issued at Shanghai by the Bank founded by the defunct Nanking reformed government
(Japanese-controlled).
"If the Wang Ching-wei regime should ill-advisedly issue a sixth, it is contended that
the confusion would be terrific and that probably all the interrelated issues would
crash." Despatch from Hallett Abend, in New York Times, April 9, 1940.
3686 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"There followed a second process of expropriation, or preemption, more eco-
nomic in tone, which transferred part of the purchasing power of the farmer
to railroad capital, through the operation of freight rates. This in turn led
to disparity between agricultural and industrial freight rates, and to such phe-
nomena as the freight differential of the Southern States. In the economic
history of capital, this meant that the railroads led the way in the first large-
scale merging of industrial and banking capital. In social history, this was
accompanied by migration on a national scale from the farm to the city. To say
that this widened the social gap and spread the social differential between agri-
cultural and industry is another way of describing the development of the
market.
"China represents the other extreme of market development and railroad build-
ing. The spanning of the American continent was a saga of unbridled competition
in creating and developing a vast internal market. The complete failure to
span the Chinese continent, on the other hand, was the result of stultifying com-
petition between the foreign powers for shares in the undeveloped Chinese
market.' The internal market in China was paralyzed, its economy caught in
the framework of transition between the trading centers of the eastern seacoast
dominated by the foreigners, and the huge precapitalistic hinterland of the west.
China's mass-migration to the west has not followed in the wake of the railroads
but has been an exodus to escape the Japanese.
"Is railroad building, in the circumstances, the panacea? To suggest it is to
put the cart before the horse, the building of railroads before the conditions
requisite to it. Sixty million refugees have to be rehabilitated, and the problem
that led up to this catastrophe has to be solved before the problem of the railroads
can be dealt with. Under the conditions which now exist it is actually the
Japanese military machine that is blazing the trail of the China market. It is
therefore necessary to see what Japanese aggression means in economic terms.
"Reduced to its economic content, Japanese aggression is a primitive attempt
to accumulate capital by land-grabbing and mass expropriation, under military
sanctions. The resort to military methods was possible partly because the
organization of the state power in Japan provided for military power, and par-
ticularly because in China itself the crude war-lord method of 'raising capital'
(thus retarding the development of the internal market) had been presei'ved
for an unduly long period by the intricate interlocking of feudalistic vested inter-
ests in the interior and imperialistic vested interests on the fringe of China.
The way had thus been opened for Japan, becanse already, for a long time, out-
side imperialistic influences had operated as Chinese inside influences by rein-
forcing the native feudalistic elements, which in the specialized form of warlords
took on an imperialistic tinge by becoming puppets of the great powers.
"This peculiar 'peaceful' set-up of a combined feudal-imperaliastic strangle-
hold on the Chinese internal market laid China open to military aggression by
Japan, the very power which combines the characteristics of both feudalism and
imperialism in the most concentrated form. It is accordingly not surprising
that the Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes draw whatever strength they have
from Japanese imperialism and the feudal landlord-merchant-usurer survivals
in China. They represent an alliance of these two forces. Since their failure
is a fair index of Chinese national unification achieved in the process of struggle
against imperialist aggression, their abolition will mean riddance from both
feudalistic and imperialistic vested interests. v
"The disappearance of feudalism is clearly an indispensable prerequisite for
the development of the Chinese internal market. This factor is bound to have
a decisive influence on the forms the economic development of China is going to
assume after the ending of the war. It might proceed under forms different
from those we are familiar with under the name 'internal market.' One of these
forms may be discernible already under war conditions in the shape of the indus-
trial cooperatives of Ssuch'uan. A deviation in economic development away
from the customary market form is, in turn, bound to have a decisive influence
on the form taken by Western capital help and investment. The least one can
say is that capital export to China is not likely to retain the form of a financial
venture, necessitating by its very nature a risk premium.
"Not to recognize that Japan's attempt to conquer China is also an attempt
to link up with an anachronistic internal system from which China is struggling
to free itself means to lose orientation and to forsake objectivity of analysis.
» China and the United States have about the same area In square miles, but the
railroad mileaee of China proper Is about 9,000 miles, against 238,000 miles in the United
States. Statesman's Year Book, London, 1940.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3687
It means underestimating the character of the war and accepting the Japanese
contention that it is a mere 'incident' and at tlie same time overestimating the
possibilities of a Japanese imperialism which pretends that it is establishing a
'New Order' where in actual reality there is nothing but the unbridled reign of
feudal imperialism and a relapse into pre-capitalistic methods of colonial rule.
"If the Japanese attempt at conquest goes no further than its present methods
of plunder and expropriation, the great future market in China, in the modern
capitalistic sense, can be neither created nor developed. This is indeed the
insuperable difficulty that now confronts Japanese imperialism in China, after
its military successes. The various 'Development Companies' remain in the
stage of wistful projects.
"The point can be made plain by a simple comparison. It is as if the railroad
entrepreneurs in America, after having accepted the land grants and pocketed
the money for the railroad shares they had sold, had expressed heart-felt appre-
ciation to" the Government and to the public in general and retired with the curt
statement that conditions for building the railroads were not favorable. Nothing
of the sort happened, however, because conditions were favorable : a steadily
swelling stream of capital, combined with a steady migration from the farms to
industry, created the market which capital needed.
"These are the very conditions that are lacking in China, and in Japan too.
The flood of landless peasants from the villages is there all right, but there is no
steady flow of capital accumulation, no carrying strength of an internal market,
with which it can combine. The primitive method of accumulating capital by
military aggression is not in itself enough of a lever to create and develop the
market. On the contrary, it is a steam roller destroying whatever is left of the
internal market. Japan cannot make good economically in China.
"It .is a reliable index of the degree of structural decay in Japanese economy
that what is required most urgently for its maintenance is no longer additional
markets, but new capital. It cannot recover through increased commodity
exports, but must have capital imports for reexport. After the annexation of
Manchuria the then Minister of Finance warned the Japanese Diet that capital
export to Manchuria would acutely endanger the yen. Japanese imperialism
launched its wholesale aggression against China when it found itself cornered by
the limitations of its own internal market; when the export drive had suffered
a set-back after making the yen more rickety than before ; when the urgency of
capital exports had been superimposed on the necessity of increased commodity
exports.
"A military campaign supported by huge armaments is, of course, a form of
capital export, however freakish. It means that the capital of the country is
drained, concentrated, and switched for the purpose of forcibly expanding the
external market. But it has to be followed up by 'peaceful' or 'genuine' capital
exports in order to make the original outlay effective. It is here that the
Japanese failed. Japan's rulers obviously reckoned on the help, whether grudging
or friendly, of the great capital exporting countries of the West, eager to develop
China as a market. In 1936, the Japanese promoter Aikawa was publicizing
schemes of this kind ; but help was not forthcoming, mainly because of effective
Chinese military resistance, beginning in 1937, and the American reluctance to
cooperate in the 'New Order in East Asia.' All that Japan's rulers could do in
the circumstances was to complain about regrettable Western misunderstandings
and misinterpretation of their intentions, and to fall back on a crude feudalistic
monopolization of China's economic resources in the occupied areas. Ironically,
this way of ruining the internal market is entrusted to what are known as
'development companies.'
"Turning now to the question of the way in which the transition is made, in
economic history, from the mercantile age to that of industrialism, the point
must be made that a tariff-protected internal market constitutes the economic
foundation underlying the political process of national unification and the
emergence of the modern national state. National industrial monopolization of
the internal market is effected by the tearing down of internal tariff barriers
and the erection of an outer tariff wall. The McKinley tariff is a classic case
of protectionism designed to monopolize the internal market. The fact that in
the same period Free Trade held swav in England was due to the unique his-
torical circumstances that Britisli capital virtually monopolized the world market.
British Free Trade was doomed when Britain lost this dominance after the first
World War.
"Against this background of the normal course of market development, China's
tariff' experience stands out in sharp contrast. The Chinese tariff, far from
being a means of protecting the internal market for Chinese capital, was from
3688 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the outset a means by which the undeveloped Chinese market was laid under
tribute to foreign capital, to which Chinese tarift revenues were from the begin-
ning mortgaged.
"After the conditions for industrialization and the full development of the
internal market were established in the United States, the advocates of free
silver, who were the spokesmen of the farming interest, were defeated by the
irresistible sweep of capital. Resistance to a unified currency was broken down
by the forces promoting an unhampered development of the internal market.
In China, on the other hand, the fact that the national economy 'stuck' at the
stage of transition is reflected in the Chinese currency problem. The retention
of silver as the metallic base of currency means that China did not complete the
full transition from commodity economy to money economy. Silver is money,
but not exactly and not definitively ; for .a certain high level of economic ma-
turity must be attained before precious metal can be genuinely invested with
the money function. This can be seen from the way in which a tlight into silver,
and a flight of silver away from the interior and away from the country alto-
gether, is a normal occurrence whenever an economic adversity befalls China.
At a higher level of economic development, such flights could be counteracted
by capital movement. Silver has been looked upon, however, more as a valuable
commodity than a means of exchange. That is why it is always on the jump
for hoarding instead of for accumulation.
"Silver, in this behavior, reflects the predominance of mercantile, preindustrial
exchange within China and in China's dealings with the more highly developed
outside world. Through the manipulation of silver China has been made the
prey of speculation and economic exploitation. At the same time, silver can
serve this function only because of the 'sticking' of China's economy at the
stage of transition. The 'silver question' is accordingly a sympton rather than
an underlying cause ; in case of economic or political adversity the interior is
drained of silver, which flees to Shanghai and from there abroad. Thus the
very presence of trading outposts of the advanced countries accentuates the pre-
vailing economic stagnation and retrogression. Sir Arthur Salter states the
facts :
"China indeed, needing capital development more than almost any country,
is not being capitalized but 'decapitalized' * * *
"The result is not only a starving of new development but also, since the
capital is in the form of silver, the country's currency, a secondary form of
currency deflation, forcing prices down further. * * « The actual mecha-
nism of trade is, indeed, in many cases breaking down.^"
"What Sir Arthur does not see in that capital in the form of silver is, In
China, a symbol of the fact that capital has been kept down at the lower historical
level of merchant and usury capital. What has kept it at this level has been
the fact that it has been easier for foreign capital to draw tribute from the
internal market of China than to make it part of the world market. That is
the point.
"With the precipitous fall in the price of silver after the onset of the world
crisis China's economy was hit particularly hard. The devaluation of the chief
gold currencies increased the price of silver in terms of gold, and thus increased
the economic tribute sent abroad by China. The silver buying program of the
United States Treasury intensified the drain of silver out of China. Eventually,
in November 193.5, China was forced of silver and left with a 'managed currency.'
Managed by what forces, and to what ends'? Chinese currency has always been
managed, both in the sense of having a shaky national standing and in the sense
of being at the mercy of the economic backwardness of China in its intercourse
with the advanced countries. Silver stood for the export of economic tribute,
made more onerous by the lack of capital imports.
"At this point it is useful to apply the comparison with America to the history
of Japanese market development, in which three periods can be conveniently
distinguished. The unification and monopolization of the internal market oc-
curred simultaneously in the two countries, witli the Meiji Ilestoration in Japan
and the Civil War in the United States. However, for a number of reasons,
feudal survivals were destroyed more thoroughly during and after the upheaval
in the United States than they were in Japan. This resulted in the significant
difference that the development of the internal market in Japan instead of pro-
ceeding by a relatively smooth evolution, was prompted spasmodically by subse-
quent wars abroad.
i» Salter, op. cit., pp. 7, 8, 11.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3689
"In America the internal market had great scope in which to open out peace-
fully. This even mad a mitigating effect on the character of the war against
Spain in 1S9S :
"If the State Department and the Navy could have found adequate support
in Congress, the American flag would have been hoisted in Eastern waters
long before the Philippines were wrested from Spain in 1898.
"But it took some time for the country at large to see the spheres of useful-
ness early discovered by the men in high posts of observation. Indeed the
tariff policy introduced by Seward's party colleagues helped to relax tempo-
rarily the early economic interest in Pacific imperialism. Well protected by
high duties in competing goods. American manufacturers commanded for
many years after 1861 an immense and growing market at home, and, vintil
that was saturated, felt no overpowering need for more foreign trading
facilities."
"It is interesting to compare this 'mild' American colonial war with the almost
contemporary Japanese war against China in 1894-95. The Japanese war, in-
stead of being 'toned down' liy the desire to tend to opportunities at home, was
already stimulated by the limitations of the internal market. Lack of opportu-
nity at home encouraged adventure abroad.
"By 1914 the situation had changed so fundamentally that America began to
follow the pattern sketched earlier by Japanese development. America's entry
into the war was urged on by the limitations of the internal market. War activ-
ity, economic and military, promoted a far-reaching and sudden increase in
America's agricultural and industrial production apparatus, and brouglit about
a temporary expansion of the market to absorb the increased producing capacity.
It was the most important turning point in modern history. The country with
the strongest capital equipment entered a claim to an adequate share in the
world market. All the appalling difficulties and vicissitudes of American econ-
omy, gravely accentuated after the outbreak of the Great Crisis in 1929, however,
serve to drive home the signal lesson that for this greatest and best developed
industrial country development of the world market by no means follows auto-
matically on the acquisition of a 'fair share' in the market. The claim can be
asserted by economic and political pres.sure, but actual development responds
only to an increase in capital exports.
"At present we are living under conditions of war, on a world scale, for .a
further redivision of the world market. We should be warned, however, that
the prospect of redivision does not of itself warrant the expectation of a develop-
ment of the Chinese mai'ket, or any undeveloped sector of the world marlset,
'after peace is concluded.' It is essential to remember that the nondevelopment
of the Chinese market was one of the chief underlying factors in unleashing the
second world war which has followed on Japan's aggression in 19.31. It is an
illusion to think that China will arise, out of the holocaust, a 'huge market'
"It would be far more reasonable to assume, by projecting into the future
trends that already exist, that life will reassert itself in forms of human inter-
course modified by sloughing off some of what have hitherto been essential char-
acteristics of the market, the operation of capital, and their concomitant forms
of social and international relations.
"The incipient industrial cooperatives of China are one of these prophetic
trends. They certainly represent a step in the direction of overcoming the
market form of economic relations, for what we mean by 'the market' is not
simply the exchange of goods, but the exchange of goods under strictly defined
historical conditions : hitherto, between private producers.
"A corresponding transformation is bound to affect capital. The sums col-
lected abroad to aid the cooperative movement in China cannot be called capital
in the strict connotation of the term. They are being advanced without expecta-
tion of the return of either principal or interest. Cooperative production is not
being harnessed to the servicing of these "capital outlays.' On the contrax-y, it
is capital which is being harnessed to facilitate cooperative production.
"These are the sproutings of a new economic life which will flourish after
the Japanese military machine has stamped out tlie remaining vestiges of what
used to be the internal market. These new manifestations cannot be easily up-
rooted by Japanese aggression, because they depend primarily on the initiative
of the people, evoked by aggression, and are taking root because they resist
aggression successfully. Do they, however, increase China's 'capacity to re-
ceive'? On the answer to this question hinges the economic future of China, and
" Charles A. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, New York, 1929, vol. II, p. 491.
3690 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of the United States as well. The answer itself, of course, hinges on the out-
come of the struggle in China.
"Assuming the victory of the Chinese people, it can be tentatively suggested
that cooperative production will spread over the whole field of light industry,
on a national scale, and will cease to be a merely local or regional matter.
This in itself, however, presupposes and necessitates the building of heavy
industry, together with means of transport and communication, which will
require huge capital outlays that can be pi-ocured only from abroad.
"Assuming, further, that the required capital can be procured from the United
States, what role will it play in China's economic development? By its very
magnitude, its source of origin, and the fields in which it would be invested,
it would be bound to play an economically superior, but not necessarily a
dominating role. That is, its economic superiority would not be reinforced
politically, and could not be used as a political instrument of pressure. The
control and supervision of a sovereign Chinese Government would assure that,
and at the same time assure the complete safety of the capital.
"In short, this would still be capital export, but of a new, historically
higher type, lacking some of the old political features of 'normal' capital export.
It could not serve to control the Government, for the Government would have
the task of controlling this kind of capital import. Capital import would be
modified by the modified nature of the internal market. Foreign capital would
acquire no claim to property title. China's national wealth, developed and
undeveloped, would henceforth be inalienable. Economic intercourse between
backward China and highly developed America would be based on the cardinal
principle of unchallenged independence and national sovereignty. Yet in the
process of development foreign capital would reap the lucrative remuneration
rightly due to its economic superiority. These profits would represent a tribute
paid by China, but a tribute due solely to China's economic backwardness. It
would thus tend to diminish in the course of China's economic development, and
would not be reinforced by political means. This kind of tribute, shorn of
political features, could not be perijetuated, but it would enable China to reach
the point, in some calculable future, where foreign capital could receive a final
indemnity for services rendered paid out of a steadily mounting export surplus
from China.
"The final question is whether such a relationship would increase China's
'capacity to receive.' The lesson of history from the first to the second World
War is that it is the only possible way in which to increase China's capacity to
receive. American capital is caught in the Far East between war and revolu-
tion. The puny detachments of 20 and 25 million dollars thus far lent to
China are patrols in an economic no-man's land. They do not represent capital
export but short-term self-liquidating commodity credit. This is less than a
palliative. Moreover, this insistence on self-liquidating capital transactions is
ominous. If it practices such extremes of caution, Amei'ican capital risks be-
coming self-liquidating in the true sense.
"What inducements would the relationship outlined above hold out to foreign
capital? Would the inducements be outweighed by the infringements on the
'rights and freedom' of capital? The actual choice is not between freedom and
control, but between control by Japan's imperialist 'New Order' or by the sover-
eign Chinese nation. To put it in another way : Japan can only get control over
foreign capital by reducing China to a colonial status.
"All the rights, privileges, and freedom of foreign capital have not developed
the Chinese market to such an extent that had new capital been attracted, China's
capacity to receive would have been enhanced by it. Quite the contrary. Special
rights and privileges have served as an effective barrier to further capital in-
vestments. The social and economic status of semicolonial China set definite
limits to capital imports. Remer classifies these capital imports under two main
subdivisions : 'Business Investment,' and 'Foreign Obligations of the Govern-
ment.' " The peculiar character of both of these investment forms was deter-
mined by the economic weakness of the internal market and the political weaK-
ness of the Government. They had in common the feature of being mainly
unproductive and highly political, serving t he privileged position, property
claims, and property titles of foreign capital.
"The privilege to be gained by foreign capital was the chief purpose of in-
vestment and the chief criterion in the choice between investment in business or
in Government obligations. The money was invested, in both cases, in gaining
" C. F. Rcmer, Foreign Investments in China, New York, 1933.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
3691
a foothold. That is the main reason why foreign loans petered ont after the in-
tensification of the revolution and after the Japanese onslaught. The various
foreign footholds thus established were converted into bases of Japanese agres-
sion ; in launching its wholesale aggression against China, the Japanese army
seized upon them immediately as military footholds and pawns of blackmail.
This outcome was predictable long before the actual event, from the rate at
which, and the methods by which, the Japanese foothold was augmented, as the
following tables show :
Business investments in China by countries, showing percentage distribution"
1902
1914
1931
MiU.
u. s. $
Percent
of total
Mm.
u. s. $
Percent
of total
Mm.
u. s. $
Percent
of total
150.1
1.0
220.1
17.5
29.6
85.0
29.8
.2
43.7
3.5
5.9
16.9
400.0
210.0
2.36.5
42.0
60.0
136.0
36.9
19.4
21.8
3.9
5.5
12.5
963.4
212.8
273. 2
155.1
95.0
75.0
38.9
36.9
11.1
U. S. A
6.3
3.8
3.0
Total ------- -
503.2
100.0
1, 084. 5
100.0
2, 474. 5
100.0
Holdings of Chinese Government obligations by countries, shoioing percentage
distribution "
1902
1914
1931
Mill.
U. S.$
Percent
of total
Mill.
U. S. $
Percent
of total
Mill.
U. S. $
Percent
of total
110.3
0
26.4
2.2
61.5
79.3
39.4
0
9.4
.8
22.0
28.4
207.5
9.6
32.8
7.3
111.4
127.6
41.8
1.9
6.6
1.5
22.5
25.7
211.6
224.1
0
41.7
97.4
12.0
36.1
38.2
Russia - - - - - -- - --
0
United States - - - -
7.1
16.6
2.0
Total
279.7
100.0
4<>«. 2
100.0
586. 8
100.0
'' Remer, op. cit., p. 99.
" Op. cit., p. 138.
"The chief methods by which the Japanese foothold was augmented were
through British lending to Japan, as in the building of the South Manchuria
Railway, or through British lending to China to pay the war indemnities to
Japan. The Chinese Government has been an indemnity-paying rather than a
capital-importing institution.^^
•'Add to this the major diplomatic intrigues at the end of the first World War :
the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1917, the Lansiug-Ishii agreement of 1919, and
finally the way in which the assembled peacemakers in Versailles cold-shouldered
Kun Yat-sen"s plea for capital help. These data complete the picture showing
why and how Japan gained its oversized foothold; how it used this, and the
footholds of its 'friendly rivals,' for an attack on the whole of China ; and why
tlie Chinese people were eventually constrained to make a stand.
"In the economic and social set-up of an independent China the character
and structure of capital imports would be radically changed. China's capacity
to receive would not he hamstrung by the shakiness of the internal market and
of the Government. The distinction between economic and political investment,
verv vague in a semicolonial China, would disappear insofar as the political
objective of capital export would be eliminatetl. The distinction between busi-
ness investments and Government obligations would fade out correspondingly,
because investment in Government obligations would be economic in nature.
"Bv this radical change, moreover, the safety of capital would be assured.
About the political guarantees an independent China could give for the safety
IS Op. cit.. p. 162.
3692 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of capital there can be no difference of opinion. However, the change in the
nature of economic guarantees needs elucidation. The economic bases of sover-
eignty, like the customs revenue, would no kmger be mortgaged for the servicing
of foreign capital. At the same time cooperative production in light industry,
greatly enhanced by the installation of heavy industry through capital im-
port, would release increasing amounts of Government revenue, out of which
foreign capital investments could be serviced. The increased productivity of
the Chinese people would not be drained into the channels of private accumula-
tion, but a great and increasing leeway would be left for taxation, out of which
the economic tribute to foreign capital could be paid. Simultaneously, the burden
of taxation could to a certain extent be shifted away from agricultural pro-
duction.
"These are the dim outlines of the economic set-up for a free China and its
intercourse with the better developed outer world. One could call it state cap-
italism, supplemented by economic concessions to foreign capital ; but the label
does not matter. What matters is the necessity, for China, of a greatly accel-
erated economic development after the war is over and this can take place only
in an economic and political setting of national freedom. The economic pre-
requisite and counterpart of complete national unification is the nationalization
of China's natural resources. Only if they are nationalized can the state organs
of the sovereign Chinese people employ foreign capital for the utilization and
development of these natural resources on the large scale required. Only in this
way can the Chinese people maintain their sovereignty and turn it to good
account economicall.v.
"This represents a deviation from the norm of development in Western Eu-
ropean or American capitalism ; it is rendered Imperative by the very circum-
stance that China has to make up for its backwardness as compared with
Western Europe or America, and must do so, in order to succeed, not gradu-
all.v but b.v leaps and bounds.
"The alternative is relapse into a colonial status. When the national unity
of America was jeopardized liy the threatening spread of the slave-holding
system, Lincoln made it a strong point that 'this country with its institutions
belongs to the people who inhabit it.' Chinese national sovereignty cannot be
underpropped or asserted in any other wa.v. The required rate of Chinese eco-
nomic development is not possible without full sovereignty. If China emerges
victorious, sovereign control over capital imports is prescribed by the sheer
necessity to maintain its hard-won national independence. As far as American
interests are concerned, it seems fairly certain tliat the principle of the Open
Door can be put into practice in no other way.
4. CAPITAL EXPORT AND KCONO.MIC TRIBUTE
"There are two kinds of economic tribute. In the primitive one, the money
capital of merchants and usurers levies a trilnite from pre-eapitalistic produc-
tion. Here the non-capitalistic producer, coerced by the need of money, gives
sometliing for nothing in every transaction with capital. The later economic
tribute is that paid by the smaller and more weakly organized units of capital
to the larger and more highly developed iniits. This latter form operates within
tlie framework of capitalism, wliile the former is characteristic of exchange
between capitalist and pre-capitalist economic formations.
"The primitive form of economic tribute has the virtue of enabling capital to
take control of a pre-capitalistic economy and lift it to the level of capitalism.
On the other hand, in order to accomplish this, capital itself has to hurdle this
primitive level by developing form merchant enterprise and usury to the level of
industrial capital.
"Whenever, for some reason or other, this historic jump cannot be taken by
capital, we have a situation in which the prerequisites of the market have been
created, by disintegrating the old economy and making it too narrow for the
subsistence of the population, but in which the market itself cannot be developed.
Helf-sufRciency becomes anachronistic. It no longer means what it says, because
it is no longer adequate for subsistence, but is merely self-sufficient in the
sense of not being integrated with the market.
"This makes for social tension and eventually for an attempt on the part of
the people to help themselves in the absence of cnpital help. This has clearly
been the case in China, where it has provided tlie economic c(nnpulsion toward
anti-feudal revolution. To make the point more striking we may take the oppo-
site extreme of market development in the United States. Here the two forms of
economic tribute can still be observed in the economic intercourse between
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3693
industry and agriculture, in all exchanges between tbe pre-capitalistic agri-
cultural producer of the South and all forms of capital, including merchants,
industry, and the banks, capital gets something for nothing. At the present time
this sector of exchange transactions is tending to widen, instead of narrowing
down, which means that the marljet generally is shrinking instead of being
developed. It is in this sense that President Roosevelt's remark that 'the South
is the number one economic problem of the nation' holds true.
"In contrast with the economic tribute paid by the South, the farmer who
himself has capital pays economic tribute of the normal type, because of the
difference in volume and the technological level between agricultural and
industrial capital. This inequivalence tends to diminish as agricultural capital
grows and becomes modernized. It disappeai-s altogether when agricultural
capital is fused with industrial and banking capital, as in certain Californian
farming enterprises which require considerable capital investment, combined
with high technological development. This kind of 'industrialized agriculture,'
however, thrusts growing numbers of marginal farmers back to the pre-capitalistic
level, thus widening the gap between the highest level attained by agricultural
capital, and all other agriculture."
"The difference (and it is all the difference in the world) is that in the case
of the United States the tension sets in a very high level of capitalist develop-
ment, whereas in the case of China it occurs at a very low level, at the very
beginning of industrialization. The interconnection between these two extremes
of market development is that in the United States the market stoppage and
the superabundance of capital associated with it coincides with the cessation
of capital export, whereas in China it is due to lack of capital import. When
this happens, capital export loses its ability to weld economically advanced and
backward areas into a structure of market relations, and the world market
fails to develop.
"The anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution shows that capital
is resisted if it aims at domination and does not at the same time carry forward
market development and industrialization. The subordination of an economy
is a preliminary step; its success depends on whether it leads up to the next
stage, which is the incorporation of the economy in the domain of capital. Mili-
tary subjection might or might not prepare the ground for tliese two successive
stages of a successful colonizing. That depends, by and large, on the level of capi-
talist development on a world scale. In the present period of world capitalism mil-
itary subjection serves not as a preliminary but as a substitute for the economic
process ; as such it means that these two economic objectives are incapable of
attainment. (Italian imperialism in Ethiopia, Japanese imperialism in China.)
China's resistance is focused against Japanese aggression because Japan, not
possessing the power of peaceful penetration, market development, and indus-
trialization by capital export, has launched into a clear-cut attempt to sub-
ordinate and dominate China's economy. The insistence of Japanese spokesmen
that their intentions are misinterpreted' by the West, and that all they want is
to insure the safety of Western capital in China (under Japanse domination)
seems, therefore, very logical. What they do not take into consideration is only
that their own aggression is essentially a militarization of the preceding Western
capital export to China, which also aimed merely at the domination of Chinese
economy and not at its development. The Japanese method is to use arms in-
stead of dollars. The fact that the difference is in methods rather than in
aims accounts for the way in which Western capital hesitates to aid China
resistance.
"Capital export combines 'primitive' and 'normal' economic tribute. If it is
the primitive phase that predominates, capital export does not lift the economi-
cally backward areas from their precapitalistic level, but leaves them stuck at
the state of transition. If, on the other hand, the 'normal' phase predominates,
then capital export to a certain extent v.'orks against itself. For by promoting the
industrialization of backward areas, capital export reduces the gap between their
capital equipment and that of the advanced countries. As the productivity of
backward labor grows by means of capital import, there is a decrease in the
economic tribute it has to pay in the process of exchange with the highly de-
veloped countries. Moreover, with an increasing capital supply from abroad the
rate of interest falls, and economic dependence thus tends to diminish, unless
counteracted by simultaneously increasing political pressure. Since there is
almost always an attempt to enforce continued political dependence, it is a
" See Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Wash-
ington, D. C.
3694 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
fallacy to look upon capital export as an economic category pure and simple, a
vehicle of mere economic exchange between countries at different stages of eco-
nomic development.
"The process as a whole can be termed the law of diminishing returns of
capital export. That is precisely why 'normal' capital export never runs its full
course, and why the industrialization of backward areas by means of capital
import stops short at a certain point. History does not conform to the pattern
of academic economies, which assumes an automatic flow of capital to the back-
ward areas of the world. In terms of history the tiow of capital, far from being
automatic, ceased almost altogether after a point can be fixed at about the out-
break of the Great Crisis in 1929.
"A theoretical conclusion is here suggested : the flow of capital does not obey
physical laws in the sense that capital automatically flows down from the higher
to the lower plateau, from economically highly developed to economically back-
ward countries. The flow continues, by and large, only as long as the graph of
world capitalism moves upward, with expanding markets and growing capital
accumulation mutually reinforcing each other. When these conditions no longer
prevail the line is broken and the classic law of the flow of capital no longer holds.
"From 1929 on India and China, traditionally gold and silevr importing coun-
ti'ies, released their gold and silver in increasing amounts to the advanced cred-
itor countries of the West. The balance of payments were radically changed into
the very opposite of their habitual structure. No 'norm' obtained any longer, in
the sense of an academic scheme of the 'normal' course of economic events. The
reversal of the normal trend of capital flow is both a symptom and an aggravat-
ing factor of the economic decay in the advanced countries which Sir Robert
Kindersley was the fli'st to formulate, with refei'ence to Great Britain: 'From
the point of view of the United Kingdom, a progressive deterioration in our
position as a long-term creditor may in the long run result in a substantial and
permanent decline in income from abroad. This would make it difficult to deal
with the continued rise in imports without enforcing upon us a socially disurb-
ing and detrimental reduction in the general standard, in order to lower costs
and raise the volume of visible exports.' "
Capital export defeats itself in the long run. Balking at the prospect of
diminishing returns, it attempts to compensate for the stoppage of capital ex-
port by raising the rate of economic tribute. After all, the motive power of
capital export is not the requirements of industrialization in the backward
country, but the profit requirement of capital in the advanced country. What
might be a definitely too low level of industrialization from the standpoint of the
capital importing country, may therefore be a definitely too high level of indus-
trialization from the standpoint of those who have capital to export from an
advanced country. The stagnation and deterioration of the French colonies
illustrates this point. Here the initial spurt of capital export was predominantly
speculative in character, and the motive for further capital exports was lacking.
Capital export for purposes of industrialization could not possibly match the
profits which had already accrued from sheer speculation and land-grabbing.
Hence the long-standing economic and social grievances of the native population
of the French colonies, the inability to raise the economic standard, the lag of
industrialization behind other colonial empires.^' At the point where a certain
stage of industrialization by means of capital export threatens to upset the usual
■"terms of trade." the trend is reversed by the cessation of capital export.^
The prerequisites for the development of a huge internal market in China
began maturing at a time when the effects of the diminishing returns of capital
export were already clearly shaping up, on a world scale. This is the gist of the
problem. It is aggravated by the fact that the concessions, which are the political
and legal buttresses of the system of economic tribute laid on China, were so
firmly established at the outset that they have not become an economic Chinese
Wall, effectively barring both the development of the internal market in China
and capital export to China.
" "British Oversea Investments in 1935 and 1936" in Economic Journal, London,
Decemlipr 1937, p. 662.
^' On the scandalous and detrimental practices of French finnnce in the colonies see the
■work of the former Minister of Colonies, Albert Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies
Francaise. Paris, 1923.
i» "At the present time China's imports of machinery (valued at .'i!42,000.000 in 1932)
represent only 3/2 percent of her total imports. Textile machinery alone accounts for one-
fifth of the whole." G. E. Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the ■West,
London, 1935, p. 231.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
3695
5. DISINTEGRATION OF THE WORLD MARKET
"The system of economic tribute leads to an eventual reversal of the flow of
capital, and this in turn intensifies the inequity of exchange, and results in a
disintegration of the world market. Adam Smith's optimistic picture of world
free trade as both the result and the vehicle of increasing international division
of labor is hopelessly outmoded. The crashing of the world's leading currencies
in the Great Crisis, beginning in 1929, with repercussions on the world's eco-
nomically backward areas, marks a definite turning point in the competition
between the capital-owning countries and the economic relations between them
and the backward countries. Nor is it a coincidence that both the stoppage of
capital export and the shrinkage of the world market became critical when this
turning point was reached.
"It is important to note the order of succession in the different asi)ects of this
crisis. Retarded industrialization of the colonial and semicolonial countries,
caused by cessation of capital export, followed the crisis in the highly developed
countries\ Colonial retardation then backfired, choking industrial progress all
over the world. While lack of capital prevented industrialization in the back-
ward countries, it was in the most advanced countries, with the most capital,
that the fall in the rate of new industrial production was most conspicuous. What
made the problem of the world market as a whole so acute and desperate was
the way in which nondevelopment of the internal market in the backward areas
coincided exactly with deterioration of the internal market in the advanced
countries.
"Professor Cassel estimates that the normal yearly rate of increase in world
production is 3 percent. The following League of Nations figures show the change
in yearly new production in the postwar period :
Yearly percentage changes of world production {per caput figures)'"
World (excl. U. S. S. R.):
1920-1937
1920-1929
1929-1937
North America:
1920-1937
1920-1929
1929-1937
Production
of crude
foodstuffs
(excl. meat
and milk)
0.6
1.4
-.4
-.9
-1.3
-.4
Manufacture
of consump-
tion goods
1.4
3.1
-.4
.1
1.4
-1.3
Manufactm-e
of producers'
investment
goods
1.5
3.5
-.6
.1
2.5
-2.4
20 World Production and Prices, 1937-38, p. 32.
"Cassel's 'normal' rate of increase is halved in the post-war period. In the pros-
perity decade of the twenties we have the normal rate but it is offset by a de-
cline of production in the following crisis decade.
"If, moreover we take America, economically the most highly developed part
of the capitalist world, representing one-third to one-half of world production,
the picture of the postwar crisis becomes even more striking. The per capita
vearly rate of interest is negligible all through ; in the crisis decade it becomes
Abruptly a minus quantity. The yearly rate of increase in the manufacture ot
producers' investment goods, which is the actual index of expanded production
is for the whole post-war period 1920-37 the same as for the manufacture ot
consumption goods— a startling measure of continued economic stagnation.
"A greatly increased rate of industrialization of the backward areas would
be required to make up for the lagging rate of increase in the advanced coun-
tries. This, however, would necessitate greatly increased amounts of capital
export, which would suddenly change the established system of economic tribute
from the backward countries. Comparing this with the fact that the diminishing
prospect of economic tribute is what militates against further large-scale capital
export, we find ourselves back in our vicious circle.
"Disruption of the unified world currency system is a harbinger of the dis-
integration of the world market. The spreading depreciation of currencies stems
from the inability of debtors to pay. This, in turn, makes worse their 'incapacity
to receive.' The currencies of the backward countries depreciate at a higher rate
3696
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
than those of the advanced countries, thus catastrophically widening the gap
between the two structures, and increasing the amount of capital export that
would be needed to bridge tlie gulf.
"In the second half of the nineteenth century and up to 1914 capital export
increased the amount of economic tribute paid by the colonial and backward
countries. Since the war and especially since 1929, the stoppage of capital
export has raised the rate of economic tribute, in an effort to offset the dwin-
dling amount. What was formerly the normal method of economic intercourse
with the backward areas of the world, through the investment of capital, thus
led up to something that is its very opposite. In the initial spurt of capital ex-
port, the primitive form of economic tribute predominated, because the exchange
was between countries which had capital and countries which were precapital-
istic. By and large, this gave way in the second half of the nineteenth century
to capital export as a vehicle of normal economic tribute, based on differences
in the level of capital equipment. We are now in a third phase, in which capital
export is foundering on the rocks of diminishing returns, on account of what
Sir Arthur Salter calls a 'too high degree of industrialization' in the backward
areas. This phase includes both the last world war and the present one. When
it was no longer profitable to develop backward markets by capital export, an
attempt was made to tighten up the annexation of markets. Then the first world
war broke out, and the development of existing markets yielded in importance
to the acquisition of new markets. The surplus capital which had been em-
ployed in capital export was switched into armaments. This, however, did not
solve the fundamental problem. The reallocation of the world market, divided
into colonies and mandates, did not lead to further market development. The
failure shows up in the following talile of world currency depreciation after 1929 :
Values of currencies as percentage of their gold
imrlty in 1929 "
U. S. A.
Mexico
Philip-
pines
China
Britain
India
Malaya
1928
1929 -.-
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
80.7
59.6
59.4
59.2
59.1
59.1
96.5
96.7
W 94.6
11 85.5
63.9
45.7
33.2
33.1
33.0
32.9
26.2
99.2
99.8
99.8
99.8
99.5
80.6
.59.7
59.3
59.3
.59.3
58.9
110.1
100.0
71.6
53.3
52.5
49.4
48.7
52.0
42.2
41.9
30.2
100.0
99.8
99.9
93.2
72.0
68.1
61.8
59.8
60.5
60.0
59.3
99.9
99.2
98.8
92.3
72.2
68.2
61.9
60.1
60.8
60.4
59.2
99.1
98.7
1930. .- -
98.6
1931
92.4
1932
71.2
1933
67.8
1934 -
62.0
1935
59.8
1936
60.7
1937
60.3
1938 -.-
59.2
21 Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, pp. 228, 229.
"In this table the two chief creditor countries are compared with colonies
and semicolonies. As a result of a currency truce between the two chief creditor
countries, their rate of depreciation has been the same. The currencies of their
colonial dependencies have been depreciated — as a matter of policy — at the same
rate. A higher rate of depreciation would have corresponded more closely to the
economic status of the colonies, compared with the mother countries ; therefore
their currencies were actually overvalued when held at the former ratio. The
explanation is that a higher rate of depreciation would have tended to decrease
their imports and increase their exports, and would have made it diflicult if not
impossible to repay their debts. The enforced repayment of debts from the
colonies was, however, one of the chief means by which the mother country, after
the devaluation of its own currency, was aljle to avoid panic and keep a managed
currency at the desired level of iiarity. This holds true particularly for India
and Great Britain.
"In sharp contrast to this, the currencies of the semi-colonial countries like
Mexico and China were allowed to fluctuate wildly, depreciating at a much
higher rate. The silver-buying program of the Roosevelt administration did not
stop the headlong depreciation but accentuated it by draining away the metallic
base of their currencies.
"The complete failure of this panacea throws light on the fallacy of the mone-
tary theory in vogue. The development of commodity production into a money
economy, and of money into capital, follows two consecutive stages in the eco-
nomic progress of l)ackward countries. The precarious status of a backward
country stuck at the stage of transition is revealed by the unstable equilibrium
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3697
of its currency, 'managed' bj' capital export, or the cessation of capital export,
or the withdrawal of capital. When capital export to backward countries is with-
held, and capital already invested is withdrawn, the currency is bound to dete-
riorate, both in quantity and in exchange parity, under the impact of this double
pressure. The backward economies can no longer depend on the support of the
advanced countries.
"For the economic support withheld and withdrawn there is substituted a 'sup-
port of the currency' by silver buying. This is a complete misnomer, for what
it amounts to in the circumstances is an aggravation of the economic problem,
by stripping silver of its quality as capital and even as money (means of circula-
tion). The silver-buying program, as substitute for capital export and a means
of facilitating the withdrawal of capital, amounts to no more than the manipula-
tion of a particular commodity. It does not support the currency, which can be
supported only by a strengthening of the economy itself. It leads to a 'deflation'
in the backward countries which is really a switching back, through outside influ-
ence, from capital into money and frf)m money into a particular commodity.
This again does not support the currency, but undermines it by rendering it
incapable of serving as the basis of circulation and as a medium of capital
accumulation. Thus it is not only in the quantitative but in this qualitative,
historical sense too that these countries have been 'decapitalized.' The agglom-
eration of gold at the other extreme of market development, in the United States,
is a complementary phenomenon. Oflicial gold hoarding in such unparalleled di-
mensions means that, to that extent, gold ceases to function either as world money
or as the basis of world capital accumulation. Functionally, it is switched back,
by uncontrollable forces, from a general equivalent into a particular precious
commodity.
"From the standpoint of the advanced country the compound result is a wid-
ening gap between its own economic structure and that of the backward coun-
tries, increasing the onus of the economic tribute borne by the backward coun-
tries. TTie economic status of these countries, struck at the stage of transition
between precapitalism and capitalism, becomes absolutely insupportable. They
are forced to help themselves, lest they be strangled at the stage of economic
transition. Hence the accentuation of the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolutions
in both China and Mexico.
"If the liackward countries can no longer rely on capital help, the powers rely
more and more on political pressure as an instrument of economic policy. The
silver-buying program is a remarkable example, for it is used as a sword of
Damocles hanging over these semidependent countries. Mexico's expropria-
tion of foreign capital illustrates the overlapping of the political and the eco-
nomic aspects. American capital, constrained by the economic crisis at home,
tried to speed up the recovery of its original investment in Mexico, and the ac-
curing profits, by wage cuts in the oil industry. This was tantamount to a large
scale withdrawal of capital, disintegrating the Mexican internal market. Mexico
resisted by expropriating the foreign holdings, to which the retort was renewed
pressure: demands for immediate payment, a boycott of Mexican oil, a threat
to withdraw the American Treasury's support of silver. Yet immediate pay-
ment would have been possible only if American finance had extended long-term
credits, to be serviced out of increased sales of Mexican oil to the United States.
The vicious circle is here complete : for this would have been a form of capital
export to Mexico, whereas the trouble had arisen out of the attempt to recover
capital previously exported.
"One of the forms taken by the attempt to escape from the disintegration of
the world market is the creation of huge political-economic-currency blocs, initi-
ated by the creation of the Sterling bloc at the Ottawa conference. This was
followed bv the creation of the Yen bloc by Japan. After the breaking up of
the Gold bloc, France and its dependencies formed a Franc bloc. The United
States, Britain, and France then concluded a make-shift currency truce, which
went to pieces after the outbreak of the war, was engaged in the creation of
a Central and South-Eastern European Mark bloc.
'•In significance, this trend outstrips the schemes of autarchy or a 'federated
Europe.' It is l>oth a symptom of and an aggravating factor in the disintegra-
tion of the world market. This splitting up of the world market into such water-
tight compartments additionally retards the economic development, through in-
dustrialization, of the colonial and semicolonial countries.
"Two examples illustrate the trend. In the Dutch East Indies :
'•Through the Regulation of Industry Ordinance of 1934 and the similar
enactment of 1937, the Government obtained a further broad extension of its
regulatory powers. By this authority, it may now intei-vene in aU branches
3698 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of industry to control the development of established industries or the
creation of new ones. The puri)ose of the ordinance is to prevent 'destruc-
tive competition.' In less generalized terms, it is intended as a restriction
of possible Japanese enterprise in the industries of Netherlands India ; as
a method of insuring the prosperity of present industries which are con-
sidered useful to the country by preventing an increase of production beyond
eftective consumer demands ; as a safeguard against the establishment of
new industries which might threaten existing native industries, for example
the mass production of batiks; and as a means for preventing local produc-
tion from entirely displacing imports in categories for which quotas have been
assigned to the Netherlands or other supplying countries. The last point
represents a new policy, since earlier, whenever local production was able to
supply local demand, permissible imports in protected categories were regu-
larly cut down."
"This is open governmental intervention to prevent, forcibly, further indus-
trialization and the further development of the internal market. It demon-
strates the clash between the requirements of the internal market in the colonies
and those of the capital of the mother counti'y.
"French colonial policy follows the same pattern. 'L'Industrialisation de
rindo-Chinese,' a report submitted by the olHcial Societe d'Etudes et d'lnforma-
tion Economique, gives the following date and conclusions :
"France is the chief provider of Indochina, supplying about one-half of
the colony's yearly imports, which in 1937 were valued at 1,578 million
francs.
"* * * The main difficulty appears to be that it is hard to find a mar-
ket in Indochina or in the neighboring countries which can offer adequate
compensation for any large-scale investment in industry.
"The main conclusion reached was that any large-scale plan for the in-
dustrialization of Indochina was impractical.^^
"This trend is accompanied by the confinement of a major portion of foreign
trade within artificial currency areas. Half of Britain's trade is with the
Empire. The same holds for France, and the tendency is greatly accelerated
by the war. It applies equally to Japan. In 1939 the Japanese balance of trade
was active by more than 600 million yen but after deduction of the trade with the
yen bloc it was passive by 400 million yen.
"The very nature of modern imperialism undergoes a change through these
developments. It relapses into a more sophisticated and destructive eighteenth
century mercantilism. The 'terms of trade' run always against the backward
countries, but less and less so as their industrialization proceeds ; but this is
now being actively interfered with by withholding large-scale capital export,
and by official 'regulation' and dictation. The rapid industrialization of Man-
churia, by lieavy capital export from Japan for military purposes, is only an
apparent exception. Actually, it confirms the rule, for it has not developed the
internal market in Manchuria, but destroyed it, and has not been a genuine export
outlet for Japan, but has further deteriorated the Japanese internal market by
di-aining away capital. As the Shanghai correspondent of the London Economist
puts it :
"Manchurian imports last year rose in value by 40 percent and Man-
churians exports increased by 14 percent, with Japan in each case accounting
for the entire increase. A substantial portion of these increases in the value
of trade resulted from sharp price increases in the Yen bloc countries. How-
ever, the Kwantung Army's influence upon the Tokyo Government proved
strong enough to compel Japan, in spite of her own shortages of all sorts of
commodities, to ship a considerable volume of supplies to Manchuria for the
construction there of the new Japanese continental war industry base. The
M$9;j7,176,000 surplus of imports arose almost exclusively from trade with
Japan. This import surplus was chiefly financed by means of Manchurian
bond and industrial debenture flotations in Japan, where in 1939 Manchurian
issues formed one-third of all nongovernmental bond issues.^*
"These changes, shaping up behind the fire and smoke of war, are more funda-
mental than dreams of a Federated Europe or International Free Trade. Reper-
cussions on the economy of the advanced countries are inevitable. The economic
impoverishment of the backward areas of the world is lucrative while it lasts, but
cannot be kept up. Individual countries may temporarily increase their markets
"Far Eastern Survey, Aug. 16, 1939.
23 Ibid., Feb. 15, 1939.
2< Economist, March 2, 1940, p. 378.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
3699
;it the expense of others, but this is no solution for the world market itself, the
world economic system, and the economic destinies of the backward nations. It
amounts to no more than individual attempts to extend internal markets by the
addition of areas that used to be part of the external market.
"The trend is toward a monopolization, by each power, of its share of the
World market. This monopolization is historically different from the monopoliza-
tion of the internal market and therefore ushers in an epoch of more protracted
and more exacerbated international conflicts and convulsions ; trade wars, cur-
rency war, military collisions.
"To what extent does China share in the market? The figures are illuminating.
"The comparative figures of per capita import and exports show conclusively
the relative economic weakness of China's economy, and serve to reestablish a
sense of proportion for the problem of the Chinese market. They suggest the
amoiints of suddenly increased commodity and capital import that would enable
China to become a 'huge market' for foreign capital. These are the lags that
Sir Arthur Salter advises us to span 'step by step and gradually.'
Per capita trade, hy countries (calendar year 1937)'^
Population
estimates
(thousands)
Per capita
trade
imports
(Current $)
exports
United states
131,514
47. 029
71, 252
466, 786
338, 171
23. 030
25.10
IDS. 20
15. 25
0.60
1.80
2.70
22.90
54.86
12.85
China . - . ..- ..
0.55
2.25
4.40
Imports and exports as percentages of the world
total''
Imports
Exports
1911-13
1935
1936
1937
1911-13
1935
1936
1937
United states ---
8.4
17.4
1.5
1.8
10.0
18.0
3.5
1.7
11.0
19.1
3.6
1.3
11.3
18.6
4.0
1.0
12.4
15.3
1.4
1.5
12.0
12.4
3.8
1.1
11.9
12.1
3.8
1.0
13.2
United Kingdom .- ... .
11.7
3.6
1.0
25 Foreign Commerce Year Book, Washington, D. C, 1938, p. 427.
29 Ibid.
"The figures relate to the situation prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
war, which made them out of date but by no means irrelevant. For the economic
backwardness and prostration of China and the economic lag between China
and the surrounding world Avhich large-scale capital export from the advanced
countries failed to bridge, made Japanese aggression against China possible.
"The second tabulation might suggest the superficial view that China's share
in world trade is almost negligible, and hardly capable of creating a problem
for the time being. Though such a view may suit the conceptions of the adher-
ents of gradualism, the very opposite holds true. Actually, China's share in
the world market is too small not to create a serious problem. The one percent
to the extent of which China participates in the world market is trifling if
compared with the world market, but more than enough to disintegrate China s
economy, and at the same time far from enough to develop China's internal
market. That is the point. The 'negligible' one percent covers the whole cease-
less ferment that makes for wars and revolutions in the Far East. China's one
percent, in relation to the hundred percent which is the world market, accounts
for the contraction of the absolute magnitude that the hundred percent repre-
sents. .
"Take the position of the two rivals— the United States and Japan— m the
world market and the China market. In spite of its spectacular rise in the last
two decades, Japan's share of commodity export in the world market remains
small, and so does its capital export ; but its share in China's trade and capital
import has become second only to Great Britain's. It is exactly the other way
about with the United States. Its share in the world market and m world
88348—52— pt. 10-
-28
3700 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
capital export is second only to that of Great Britain. Its share in the com-
modity and capital import of China remains, however, in spite of an accelerated
rate of growth in the postwar period, trifling compared with those of Great
Britain and Japan.
"These are precisely the factors that determine the trend of the struggle for
the world market. The Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations
observed in 1926 that 'trade is passing from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The
fact that this observation has not been borne out is a fateful comment on the
unfolding of the world mai'ket. The World Economic Survey of the League,
1935-36, from which the statement is quoted, adds :
"The depression years 1929-32 saw a sharp reversal of the trend. The
inherent trading strength of the European countries, combined with the
creditor position of some of them, was such that the fall in export prices
was concentrated mainly upon the agricultural-exporting countries, many
of whom were outside Europe (p. 166).
"The international sugar, tea, tin, rubber restriction schemes aggravated
this reversal of the trend and, at the same time, threw light on its causes and
significance. Capital, in the form of financial investment, dictates the terms of
production and trade. For the agricultural and raw material producing countries
of the East this has meant enforced restriction of production and trade and
enforced retardation of further industrialization and internal market devel-
opment."
"In conclusion, we may state the case broadly as follows :
"From the end of the fifteenth century the center of gravity of the world
market shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. This resulted, at the
time, in a deindustrialization of Northern Italy, which had been the cradle of
capitalistic production. The beginning of a further shift of the center of gravity
from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the first decades of the twentieth century would
have resulted in industrializing the countries of the Far East, had it not
encountered overwhelming obstacles.
"The conclusion is permissible that whereas the shift of the center of gravity
of the world market from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic was a harbinger
of its unfolding, all the obstructions to a further shift from the Atlantic to the
Pacific are indicative of the beginning of disintegration. The obstructions ham-
pering the industrialization of the East are thus intimately connected with those
impeding the expansion and the complete unfolding of the woi-ld market, the
capitalization of the globe."
New York, June 1940.
Exhibit No. 472
[Our Times, People's Daily World, vol. 12, No. 35, Section II. Friday, February 18, 1949]
A GENiaiAL Looks at the Soviet Union
(By Ralph Izard)
Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, military aide to President Roosevelt,
has spent 15 years in the U. S. S. R. His views on Soviet aims are
somewhat at variance with "red menace" tales.
By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor most of the military
"experts" writing for American newspapers were on a diet of newsprint.
They were eating the columns in which they had predicted "defeat of the
Russians" in six weeks, then three months, then six months.
Fortunately for the American people. President Roosevelt did not have to
rely on Hearst generals, Scripps-Howard master minds, and such profoundly
warped military opinion as that purveyed b.v Hanson Baldwin in The New York
Times. In the time of our country's greatest peril, he put his faith in the
intelligence provided him by Philip 11. Faymonville, then a colonel and military
attache in the U. S. Embassy in jNIoscow, now Brigadier General Faymonville,
retired.
=" The military strategic necessities of tine Allies iu the first World War were the most
potent single factor in accelerating the industralization of the East. The same necessi-
ties might evoke a stepping-up of production and export from these countries in the course
of the second World War, but the situation is modified by large existing excess capacities
in these countries, built up and carried through in the postwar period. A consideration
of these changes, however, is beyond the scope of the present article.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3701
Theu. as uow, everytliing General Faymonville reported as the result of a
professional lifetime spent in the Soviet Union ran counter to the barrage of
lies laid down daily in the commercial press. And of the situation today, in
which "the Kussian menace" has replaced "the yellow peril" as a daily source
of scareheads, General Faymonville says :
"There is no Napoleonism in the Soviet Union, no desire for the conquest
of other peoples.
"After 1,000 years of invasions, defense is today the Number One objective
of the Soviet government, and they will not yield one point of that defense.
But there is no such thing in the Soviet Union as hostility to other nations, or a
desire for their conquest."
The general speaks such astringent truths as a matter of personal knowledge
gained during four tours of duty in the Soviet Union. His 15 years of roving
the great land bridge that links Europe to Asia, his knowledge of the Russian
language, his study of history, all combine to make him something far different
than Wall Street's conception of "the very model of a modern major general" —
which, perhaps, explains why he was retired from active duty.
Slender of waist and ruddy of face. General Faymonville was born in San
Francisco, April 30, 1888. A.t the time of the 1906 earthquake and fire he was
living with his family in their newly built home at No. 1 Presidio St. The
general's mother fed and housed dozens of the refugees from the devastated
sectors of the city, and with his father he made a survey of the hundreds who
flooded the Presidio grounds, securing a list of their names for the city authorities.
Unmarried, the general now makes his home in San Francisco's Olympic Club,
since for him there are only three cities in the world worth living in — "San
Francisco, New York, and Moscow." In his retirement, which began last year,
he is continuing his study of history, languages, music, and economics.
Occasionally the general speaks on the Soviet Union. What he has to say is
often unpalatable to those force-fed by the Hearst press. Recently he was
badgered by a questioner in the audience at a lecture he gave before the Council
on World Affairs. The eager heckler asked, "Just where do the Communist
parties of the various nations fit into the Soviet goal of peace?"
The general laughed quietly, then said :
"Communist parties are groups of nationals influenced by certain social and
political doctrines that have grown up in the last 100 years. Such parties
have nothing to do with the Russians. Political and social doctrine knows no
national boundaries."
The general's interest in things Russian began when he was a mere shave-
tail, four years out of West Point, where he stood ninth among the 97 cadets
in the Class of 1912. Stationed on Luzon in the Philippine Islands, he had come
to the conclusion by the time World War I began that in the U. S. Army there
was a glaring lack of knowledge about Russia and the Russians.
In 1918, after less than two years' study of the Russian language, he was
ordered into a situation requiring its daily use. Maj. G^n. William S. Graves had
been appointed commanding officer of an American expeditionary force to Siberia.
For obvious reasons he selected General Faymonville as his ordnance officer.
The Army's Siberian adventure was a direct consequence of British pressure
on Washington. The British Foreign Office sought American soldiers to "re-erect
the Eastern Front." According to General Faymonville, it is due almost entirely
to "President Wilson's stubbornness" that U. S. intervention in Siberia never
assumed the disastrous consequences that would have ensued had Wilson yielded
to the British.
General Graves' orders restricted U. S. troops to guarding certain military
stores "which may be subsequently needed by the Russian forces" ; to repatriating
German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Czech soldiers from Siberian prisoner-of-war
camps, and "to steadying any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which
the Russians mav be willing to accept assistance."
U. S. soldiers were thrown into battle against forces led by the Bolsheviks
along the Ussuri river, shortly after the U. S. troops disembarked. This, the only
large-scale action in which Americans took part, came about as a consequence
of British intelligence, which represented the Czechs the Americans had been
ordered to guard as "menaced by the Bolsheviks."
In the complicated diplomatic maneuvering of that time, the lanks, accord-
ing to G?neral Faymonville, were on hand as much to "keep an eye on the
Japanese," who were trying to take over the Trans-Siberian railway, as for
anv other reason.
But neither the Americans nor any of the other four intervening nations-
Britain, France, China, and Japan— found friends or allies as a result of their
3702 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
action. Tliey found the White armies a rabble led by madmen, nobles, and ex-
Czarist officers who had suddenly found themselves flung in the ashcan by
revolution. But the U. S. Army's Siberian adventure only ended, General Fay-
mouville says today, "wiien all the intervening powers found themselves facing
complete defeat or starvation." Tlien, along with "the westward-bound Czechs,"
the German, Hungarian, and Austrian prisoners, the French, Chinese, and British
military contingents. General Graves and the 8,000 men in his command cleared
through Vladivostok.
General Faymonville was only gone from the bleak, gale-swept vastness for
two years. He returned to the Maritime Provinces in 1921, as the official Amer-
ican military observer to what is now only a footnote to Soviet history. This
was the formation of the Far Eastern llepublic.
Set up as a coalition government nominally independent of Moscow and
the Soviets, the Republic first came to public notice when its delegates appeared
at the Wasliington Arms Conference of 1021. Their credentials unhonored, their
country unrecognized, they proceeded nonetheless with negotiations for exploita-
tion of the oil resources of their area.
These negotiations, conducted with Harry F. Sinclair, later to become involved
in the Teapot Dome scandal, were undertaken in the expectation that U. S. aid
in expelling the Japanese would follow the granting of oil leases. While these
diplomatic maneuvers were going on. General Faymonville was roaming the
Maritimes, from the Pacific Coast to Lake Baikal. He was back in Chita Nov. 13,
1922, when the Republic's national assembly passed what he calls "the most
far-reaching resolution I've ever heard."
The resolution was the direct consequence of an evacuation agreement to
which the Japanese had at last acceded. Thus, says the general, "the national
assembly voted to dissolve itself, to turn over all its powers to a revolutionary
committee, and to affiliate with the new Soviet republics." The great landbridge
stretched unbroken from Europe to the Pacific.
This early experience with Japanese expansionist ambitions, and three later
years as military attache in the Tokio Embassy, prepared General Faymonville
"for the Tanaka' Memorial. Baron Tanaka's blueprint for Japanese conquest
spelled out Nippon's plans as completely as Hitler later outlined those of the
Nazis in his book, Mein Kampf. And it met much the same reception from the
world of capitalism.
Exposed by a Russian newspaperman, the dociiment was belittled as mere
Bolshevik propaganda. What it forecast v\-as nothing less than Pearl Harbor,
Guadalcanal, New Guinea, the Philippines, and all the bloody islands of the
Pacific. General Faymonville vouched for its authenticity at the time it was
published. But his voucher was no more acceptable to those in command of
U. S. foreign policy than is a Stalin peace offer now.
General Faymonville has said of recent American-Soviet developments :
"Despite the different answers found to social problems by the Soviet Union and
the United States, the Russians firmly believe that they can coexist with other
nations widely different in economic structure.
"The Soviet Union is completely sincere in backing global cooperation. Its
leaders want an organized and peaceful world."
After his stay in Tokio, General Faymonville returned to the United States
for further training. Between 1926 and 1931 he attended those Army schools
reserved for the most brilliant officers of field grade and above — the Industrial
College, the Chemical Warfare School, and the top strategy school, the War
College at Fort Leavenworth. Kansas.
He made the White House his home during 1933 and 1934, when he was senior
military aide to President Roosevelt. The President, embarking on a new dip-
lomatic policy that began with U. S. recognition of the Soviet Union, apparently
respected the qualities of mind and personality he found in his senior military
aide. Because in 1934 General Faymonville was asked to return to Soviet terri-
tory as military attache in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow. He stayed until 1939,
first serving with Ambassador William G. Bullitt, then with Joseph E. Davies,
who laid the ground for American-Soviet cooperation to defeat fascism.
This was the period of the Trotskyist trials, of which so much was made in the
U. S. press. Many of those tried were personal acquaintances of General Fay-
monville, and of them he says :
"Tlieir betrayal — or attempted betrayal — of their country, was born of personal
resentment. IMost of them felt that as old Bolsheviks the rewards accorded them
had been inadequate.
"Added to this was the programmatic defeat that they had also suffered. And
moving freely as they did among high foreign officials resident in Moscow, they
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3703
fell in with a group of very active, very intelligent foreign agents. These agents
took advantage of and played upon these points of resentment."
General Faymonville returned to Moscow in 1941, this time as coordinator for
Lend-Lease at the Russian end of the 10,000-mile pipeline. As the man primarily
responsible for the items of equipment received by the Soviet armies, the general
is under no delusion that they were the decisive factor.
"What we sent the Soviet Union was most carefully planned in advance," he
said. ''Basically it was a question as to which would be the most effective, and
which would take the leist shipping space — the finished product, or the machine
that could make that product.
"But of the total of war material used by the Soviet Union against Hitler, no
more than 5 percent was of foreign origin."
What is the most vivid and lasting impression General Faymonville retains
from his 15 years in the Soviet Union?
"The unity of Soviet man," he said, "is the most impressive thing to be found
there. The peoples of the Soviet Union have a vast sense of humanity, of kin-
ship with all mankind.
"Add to this their vast tolerance and their intense curiosity about everything.
They are even intensely curious about such American activities as flagpole sitting,
though they drop such an interest when they find it is without meaning for Soviet
life."
As to the charge usually hurled by the Roman Catholic Church against the
Soviet organization of society — that it is "gross materialism," the general says :
"The special feeling that the Soviet citizen has for the ballet is in itself a refu-
tation of that charge.
"The same thing is true for his deep love of music, and the rapt attention he
gives any stage production."
From this wealth of personal experience with the people of the Soviet Union,
with her leaders in every walk of life, and his close study of Soviet intentions,
General Faymonville knows the "get tough" and "sang up on Russia" schools of
thought now dominating U. S. foreign policy are foredoomed to failure.
"Threats will not divert the Soviet Union from the path it has taken," he says.
"The Soviet peoples are determined to take their place with the greatest nations
of earth, and in this effort they have the complete support of the entire
population."
Furthermore, the storms outridden by the Soviet government since its revolu-
tionary birth in 1917 have given the Soviet peoples "supreme faith in the ability
of their government to win through all situations."
It may be that the American people, halting the present drive to war short of
disaster, will see fit one day to recall General Faymonville to active duty. After
all. he will not be 61 until April 30. General Douglas MacArthur is still on active
duty in Japan at 68.
Perhaps such considerations play some role in the general's thinking in his
present retirement. He is continuing his reading in German, French, Spanish,
and Italian, although he freely admits that his .Japanese is now a bit rusty.
To keep his Russian polished and flexible he is taking an advanced course with
the best instruction he could find in San Francisco — at the California Labor
School.
Exhibit No. 477
Who Wanted To Recognize Red China
Ernest T. Weir, Chairman, 'National Steel Corporation, in Statement on Our For-
eign Situation, January 5, 1951, page 12
"If we refuse to recognize and deal with the present Chinese Government be-
cause it is communistic, we assume the dangerous position of trying to tell the
people of other important nations what kind of government they must have.
"No matter what claims may be made that our attitude toward China is the
result of Chinese aggression iuKorea, I think the fact is very evident that if the
present situation results in extension of the war it will be due to our refusal to
recognize the Chinese Government because it is communistic."
Walter Lippmann, in New York Herald Tribune, January 2, 1950
"In theory * * * we could still refuse, alone among the nations concerned
with Asia, to recognize Red China. We should have to explain this strange situa-
tion by saying that everybody is out of step but father."
3704 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Williajn R. Herod, President, General Electric Company, State Department Con-
ference, October 1949 {October 6-8, "Jessup Conference'')
"I would suggest that we watch the situation daily, and if and when the Na-
tionalists lose control completely and the Communists attain the position of
having machinery of state that we at that time accord them recognition unless
in the meantime there has been some other factor."
William S. Robertson, American and Foreign Poioer Company, State Department
Conference, October 191f9
"Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to associate myself with Mr. Herod in this question
of recognition."
J. Morden Murphy, Vice President, Bunkers Trust Company, State Department
Conference, October 1949
"Therefore, I think that however inconvenient in the Council and in the
Assembly the presence of Chinese Communist members may be, I think we have
to take our cliances when the time comes."
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, State Department Conference,
October 1949
"I would associate myself with those favoring recognition * * * although
I want to say something about timing."
Arthur Holconibc, Harvard Professor, State Department Conference, October
1949
"I go along with those who have spoken and I guess most of us do — perhaps
all — on the question of recognition and the question of timing and I take it that
most of those who have spoken would also add that since to get exactly the right
time is exceedingly difficult, it is better to be too early than too late. At any
rate, that would be my view."
American Friends Service Committee Executive Board, as reported in the New
York Times, January 19, 1950
"In an open letter to Mr. Truman the Quaker organization stated that 'further
intervention will result in the hardening of Chinese resentment against America
and the strengthening of Sino-Iiussian ties. By treating Communist China as
an enemy and by refusing to recognize her,' the letter added, 'we are not isolating
China, we are isolating ourselves and throwing away the chance of influencing
the course of events in the Orient.' "
John A. MacKay, Chairman of the International Missionary Council, at a meeting
of Protestant foreign missionary and tvorld church leaders, as reported in the
New York Times, January 5, 1950
"I think we will be obliged to recognize the new government. Otherwise we
will be alienating the Chinese people who by their attitude repudiated the other
regime."
Student Conference sponsored by the West Point Military Academy and tlw
Carnegie Corporation and attended by 150 students from 52 colleges, as
reported in the Neiv York Times, December 10, 1950
"While expressing opposition to the expansion of communism, the conference
adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the preesnt Chinese regime.
"It proposed that the United States declare itself willing to negotiate with
the Chinese Communists through the United Nations; that the United States
refrain from opposing their admission to the United Nations if the Communists
accepted tlie United Nations resolution on Korea, and that the United States
should not oppose any decision that the United Nations might reach on Formosa."
Exhibit No. 475
One Who Survived
(By Alexander Barmine (pp. 194-95) )
"I began to understand this raid when I learned that the order of search had
been issued by the district attorney of Mons, a city whicli I had never visited
and where I had no friends or correspondents. Mons at that time was the scene
of a miners' strike which Lad been full of dramatic incidents. The miners had
greeted the moderate socialist minister, Vandervelde, with catcalls, had thrown
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3705
several police officers into the canal, and had locked a number of engineers
and mine managers into their offices. Who was behind these excesses? It never
occurred to anyone that the miners might have been sufficiently discontented and
overwrought to resort to violence on their own. No, there happened to be at
Brussels an official Bolshevik agent who pretended to be concerned only with
matters of business but who in reality was doubtless spending his nights manipu-
lating invisible threads which would set in motion a riot in a distant mining
district !
"* * * I knew that the police inspector had submitted a detailed report in
which he made a great point of the Bolshevik insolence of my attitude.
■• 'Police headquarters have got it in for you,' said my Belgian friends. 'Be-
cause of the Mons strikes, I supposed?" * * *
"The Belgian consul general there explained, with an air of considerable em-
barrassment, that he had received categorical instructions to refuse me a visa and
inform me that I was forbidden to cross the Belgian frontier * * *
'"I have since learned, more or less, what lay behind all this comic business.
A former agent of the G. P. U., Agabekov, who had fled to Belgium after making a
mess of various jobs in counterespionage in the Levant, had become the principal
informer for the Belgian police in all matters connected with the Soviets. What
he didn't know he invented. In order to maintain his status, he would himself
recruit Belgians for a fake G. P. U. and then denounce them to the government.
To him it would have been a small matter to invent a participation by the Soviets
in the strikes at Mons."
Exhibit No. 476
Who Said the Chinese Communists Were Not Heal Communists?
Patrick J. Hurlcu. Ambassador to China, in U. S. Relations With China, 1945,
J). 86
"* * * the Communists are not in fact Commmiists, they are striving for
democratic principles ; * * *"
Hallctt Ahend, New York Times correspondent, in My Life in China, 1943, p. 125
"The Chinese Communists are not now, and have not for many years, been
'Communists' in the Soviet Russian meaning of that term — nor in the Lenin-
Trotsky meaning, or in what is now called communist under Joseph Stalin.
The so-called communist movement in China is an agrarian movement, a labor
movement ; it is a party organized against the tenant-farmer system of China,
and against the exploitation of labor by what, before this war, was China's
growing industrialism and capitalism. For years Chinese Communists have
received neither cash nor munitions from Soviet Russia ; even before Hitler
attacked Russia in .June of 1941, when regular shipments of nuinitions were
being made into China over the long desert road through Sinkiang, these muni-
tions went to the Chinese Government, not to the Chinese Reds."
Freda TJtley
"The Chinese Communist Party, however, is less subservient to Moscow than
the artificially created Ccmmunist parties of Europe and Ameri-ca ; it has in
recent years enlisted in its i*anks many prominent intellectuals, men primarily
liberals and patriots ; and it is rooted in a peasant movement in no sense
Bolshevik in its aspiration. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a majority of
its members would obey an order from Moscow to abandon the war of national
liberation for a civil war against Chiang Kai-.shek and Kuomintang * * *,"
p. 279, "Japan's Red Flirtation," Nation. Fel). 21, 1940.
"Communism in China having become almost entirely an agrarian movement,
had by 19.% been transmuted by the logic of history into a movement of peasant
emancipation," p. 252 (China at War).
"The Commnn'sts seemed to me to be the greatest realists in the country, and
in many ways the most modern-minded element. I believe that they are sincere
in saying that what they hope for in China is some form of democratic State,"
p. 2.16 (China at War. 1939).
"Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party long ago abandoned the dream of
establishing its own dictatorship. Now that its social liasis is amongst the
peasants of the most liackward provinces in China, and amongst the middle-class
youth and the liberal reformers, its aim has genuinely become social and political
reform along capitalist and democratic lines," p. 254 (China at War, 1939).
3706 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In 'New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 28, 1939
"* * * the Chinese Communists today neither proclaim nor follow a revolu-
tionary policy fatal to the processing classes or to Chiang Kai-shek himself * * *
"It would probably be better for China, and it would certainly clarify the
position to the outside world, if instead of retaining the name of Communists
they were to call themselves Radicals in the English Nineteenth century meaning
of the word."
In the Nation, Feb. 24, 1940: "Japan's Red Flirtation"
"Since the Chinese Communists abandoned the class war in 1935, they have
both advocated and practiced a policy of agrarian and governmental reform —
not expropriation but rent reduction, not a Communist dictatorship but repre-
sentative government."
Exhibit No. 599-A
Way of a Fighter, Claire Lee Chennault, Edited by Robert Hotz, G. P.
Putnam's Sons, New York, 1949
foreword
The United States is losing the Pacific war.
Three years after V-J day this country is facing the loss of everything it
won during the four bloody years it took to defeat Japan.
Here are the facts :
General George C. Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Man-
churia were lost to the Chinese Communists, the United States position in
southern Korea would be untenable.
Manchuria has been lost to the Chinese Communists.
General Marshall also told Congress that if the Chinese Communists con-
trolled North China the United States position in Japan would be "extremely
serious."
North China has been lost to the Chinese Communists.
General Douglas Mac-Arthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of
1948 that if the Chinese Communists take the lower Yangtze Valley and Shang-
hai the American militai'y bastion on Okinawa will be outflanked and Iiis posi-
tion in Japan will be as exposed an& untenable as it was in the Philippines dur-
ing 1941.
As this is written, the Chinese Communists are fighting toward the Yangtze
at Nanking. They are aiming to force a Yangtze crossing and sweep to Shanghai.
A complete Communist victory in China will cliannelize the undercurrents
of native unrest already swirling through Burma, India, Malaya, and Indonesia
into another rising tide of Communist victories. The ring of Red bases can be
stretched from Siberia to Saigon. Then the stage will be set for the unan-'
nounced explosion of World War III.
I have couiplet(Ml a decade of observing and administering American policy
in Asia. I am convinced that this policy is plunging us into a disastrous repe-
tition of the errors that dragged us into World War II. I can hear the time
fuse of a third world war sputtering in China as it burns toward the final
powder keg, and I (cannot stand idly by without making every effort in my
power to snuff it out.
It was not an easy decision for me to publisli this book. I have had my share
of heartbreaks and have always felt it best to keep my peace. I have no taste
for muckraking as a pastime, and 1 believe it is important for a people to have
confidence in its leaders.
However, it is axiomatic that in periods of crisis a nation must have the very
best of its leadership if it is to survive. The last war seared Russia to its heart.
In the bloody catastrophes of the early war years the Russian leadership was
pared to the hard, competent core that engineered Soviet survival. It is leader-
ship of the very best the Russian can oiler that we face today.
I am not so sure the United States has shaken down to its very best leadership.
Even now the lingering fog of wartime military censorship obscures the sharp
edge of disaster on which we teetered in the spring of 1942 when Japan swept
the southern seas. In the flush of final military victory it was only human to
forget the lessons of the mistakes that led us into jeopardy. In the relief of the
slaughter's end it is all too easy to weary of the battle to keep the peace that
follows every war.
Many of the things in this book have been set down with genuine regret. I
realize that much written here may be painful for some of the personalities
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3707
discussed and that the countercriticism that is sure to come may be personally
distasteful to me. But I can remain silent no longer. The stakes are now too
high. I must take the long chance that by offering my evidence on the last
decade in the Orient I may contribute something to an accurate estimate of the
problems we now face and the direction in which we are drifting. Nothing less
than our national survival depends on how well we understand this drift and
navigate a new course.
China is the key to the Pacific. Politics are variable, but geography is a
constant. It is the geography of China that makes that imhappy land so
important. Whatever sentimental appeal there may be in the American aid
for China, the United States attitude toward China should be based on a
thoroughly realistic appraisal of China's value to the United States.
This country is now engaged in a world-wide struggle with Russia ovei
organization of the world. The problem is whether war with Russia is inevitable
or whether the world can be organized as a cooperative venture in peace. This
decision depends entirely on the shifting balance of strength between the positions
of the United States and Russia.
There is a growing accumulation of intelligence to indicate that Soviet leaders
already consider their Asiatic victories of sufficient strategic importance to tip
the world balance of power decisively in favor of Russia.
The Russians understand the role of China in this balance well. Since the
beginning of the Chinese Revolution in the early 1920's Russians have been
active in bending China to their purpose. After they lost their first chance to
gain control of China in 1927, the Soviet leaders vigorously aided any cause
that might weaken the Japanese program to hitch China to its imperialistic
chariot. Now, with Japan defeated, Russia is again shrewdly exploiting the
weakness of American policy in China to make her most determined bid for
domination of that vast, strategic area.
The Russians seem to learn something from history. They have watched their
German neighbors go down to shattering defeat twice in a two-front war. There
is considerable evidence that the Soviet leaders are determined to avoid that
pitfall. While Germany was a prewar menace on the western flank, Russia
carefully avoided war with Japan despite ample provocation by the Japanese.
Pitched battles using airplanes and tanks were fought on the Manchurian
frontier in 1932 and 1936 between the Russians and Japanese, but the Russians
refused to be baited into a full-scale war. Russia was also wary of taking on
even a badly mauled Japan in 1945 until the Soviet victory over Germany was
complete.
I seriously question that Russia will make anything more than probing
skirmishes in Europe until her Asiatic flank is secure. The flurries of Russian
activity in Europe are largely tests of American policy and smoke screens to
divert attention from the fact that Russia is acquiring vast natural resources,
strategic bases, and securing its most vulnerable flank in the Orient.
The Russians are well aware, even if most Americans are not, of the strategic
implications of China. North China and Manchuria were the industrial bases
that furnished more than one-third of all Japanese war production. From
air bases built for the Americans during the last war at Chengtu, Sian, and
Lanchow in northwest China, all of the vast Russian industry east of the Ural
IMountains is open to air attack. From these same bases and dozens of others
in North China the slender thread of Russian communications between eastern
and western Siberia could be snapped by even a small air force. With North
China controlled by a government friendly to the United States, Russia's only
access to these fields would be across a thousand miles of Turkestan desert. As
ti result of the Communist sweep in China many of these vital fields are already
in the hands of Chinese Communists. From Okinawa, Japan, and the Philip-
pines, American air power can only peck away at the perimeter of Russia's
vitals. From North and central China the same force could strike deeply into
Russia's industrial heart.
These, then, are the stakes for which we are playing in China. If China re-
mains friendly to the United States, the Russians will dare not move deeper
into Europe leaving their vitals exposed on the Asiatic flank. If the Asiatic
flank is secured and American airpower is pushed out beyond a critical range,
then the way will be open for new and more powerful ventures in Europe.
It is now obvious that the United States played its prewar hand in Asia
badly. Initial Japanese aggression in Manchuria during 1931 and 1932 was the
tip-off to the potential aggressors that the world would not be organized on a
basis of collective security. It showed clearly that the Western powers would
not stick together to keep the peace. It is the answer to precisely this same
3708 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
question that the Russians are probing for today. On this answer will depend
their future plans. Our record in China so far has provided them with the
same answer as in 1931. If our China policy continues along its present coux-se
the Russians will probably be justified in concluding that our determination to
preserve the peace is no stronger now than that of the Western nations in
1931-32. In that case, their decision will favor further aggression that can
only lead to war.
After Japanese attacks on Cliina in 1937 the United States failed to enforce its
"Open Door Policy" in China and allowed Japan to exclude us from the Yangtze
and China's costal ports. At the same time the United States sold enormous
quantities of scrap iron, oil, and aviation supplies to Japan. We were awakened
from that fool's dream one Sunday mcjrning by the sound of Japanese bomb?
blasting Pearl Harbor.
Our wartime policy in China failed to retrieve our prewar losses. Primarily
because of the leadership of General Joseph W. Stilwell, we failed to achieve
either the Military or the political objectives desired in China. Not until Stilwell
was succeeded by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer did American policy
in China bear any resemblance to that of two allies fighting a common foe.
Immediately after the war Wedemeyer continued to execute a firm and con-
structive policy. Already he had regained much of the ground lost by Stilwell
and had promising prospects of complete success. Collapse of Japan found the
Generalissimo's armies still in South and West China tar from the vital ports
and industrial centers held by the Jaiianese. Chinese Communist armies, in
contrast, lay along the lower Yangtze Valley and near all the major centers of
North China. But in this race to relieve the Japanese the United States provided
air lift that enabled the Generalissimo's armies to leapfrog Communist forces in
their path and occujiy the key cities. Navy transports later moved other Chinese
divisions to Manchurian ports to begin occupation of the vital area.
To his everlasting ci-edit. Wedemeyer diagnosed the situation accurately and
acted with promptness and decision to avert this initial Communist crisis and
prevent the Chinese Communists from taking over control of China's key areas
from the Japanese. Later Wedemeyer made a thorough study of China's postwar
problems and blueprinted a detailed plan for the type and quantity of American
aid required to help the Chinese effectively reorganize their shattered country.
The recommendations of this report wei'e not only ignored but the report itself
was ruthlessly suppressed, and the American people and their Congress have been
deprived of the testimony of a man who is perhaps our best authority on postwar
China. Even at this late date the Wedemeyer report on China should be made
public.
After a summer of diplomatic maneuvering between the Generalissimo and
Chinese Communist leaders, the civil war broke out into the open again in
October 1945. The Generalissimo's armies still had their American-supplied
equipment. Well equipped with trucks, artillery, machine guns, and mortars,
they began a systematic mop-up of Comnuuiist troops wherever they could be
fovmd. The Generalissimo's offensive was well under way and iirogressing suc-
cessfully when General George C. Marshall reached China in November 1945 as
a special emissary. Marshall has now retired in poor health after devoting
a lifetime of great service to his country. He carries with him the respect of
all those, including myself, who worked with him during the war and of all who
.shared his labors during the trying postwar years.
It was unfortunate that his assignment in China was to carry out a policy
set for him by the State Department that was utterly impossilile to execute.
The failiu-e of Marshall's China missicm had its roots in these faulty orders.
LTnder normal circumstances it would seem less than fair not to ignore rhis epi-
sode in the career of a man who has done so much for his country. However, a
full discussion of this period in our China policy is absolutely essential to under-
stand what is going on in Asia and wliy our national survival is at stake. Here
in Shanghai, with China crunil)ling before my eyes, I have no choice but to discuss
the Marshall mi.ssion frankl.v.
Marsliall was a rigidly disciplined "spit and polish" soldier of the "Black
Jack" Pershing school, and he came to China fresh from five years as the head of
the most powerful military organization in the world. JNIarshall was used to con-
ducting his business through direct orders promptly executed without question.
By the time Marshall reached China that country was reduced to a state of
disorganization where getting things accomplished by the Chinese government
required rare tact, flexibility, and judgment. Only four years of a far less brutal
enemy occupation reduced France to a position where it is still impossil)le to
organize a responsible government. China suffered eight years of occupation
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3709
interlarded with intermittent civil war that left economic chaos and political
turbulence so violent it was impossible for an Occidental to understand it at
first glance. Marshall's judgment of China by his strict soldier's standards and
tight concept of organization could hardly have aided his understanding of the
Chinese problems he came to solve.
Marshall also came to China with a set of orders utterly impossible to carry
out. They were given to him by a State Department that was the source of a
Russian policy now admitted to have been a grievous error. Marshall did not
originate that policy, and, when he became Secretary of State, he was the
leader in the fight to change it. However, in his China mission he was saddled
with these State Department orders ; good soldier that he was, he strove to
carry them out to the letter despite all obstacles and regardless of how hopeless
he himself may have thought the task set for him.
Marshall's orders were to bring an end to the Chinese civil war and stimulate a
coalition government in China b.v taking the Chinese Communists into the exist-
ing government headed by the Generalissimo. These orders were the product
of the Yalta-Potsdam political climate that based American policy on the
assumption that it was both possible and necessary to cooperate with the Rus-
sians. During the period when this utterly mistalven notion guided American
policy it was China that suffered the most serious consequences.
To guide him in this complex and difficult role, Marshall had the conflicting
testimony of two of his close personal friends — Stilwell and Wedemeyer. Un-
fortunately, he accepted Stilwell's version of China and Chinese leadership al-
most at face value. This could not help but complicate his task.
Net result of Marshall's fifteen-month mission to China was much the same
as Stilwell's earlier experience. The trend of a gradually stronger Central
Government was reversed and the military balance shifted again in favor of the
Chinese Communists.
Stripped to its essential, here is what the Marshall mission did to China. It
forced a truce to the Chinese civil war at a time when the Central Government
forces were winning. When the Generalissimo naturally balked at endorsing a
policy that meant military disaster for his forces, Marshall applied pressure
in the Stilwell manner by shutting off the flow of all American military aid to
China including war surplus bought and paid for by the Chinese. This arms
embargo lasted for nearly a year. He also summarily scuttled a Sino-American
agreement made in September 1945 whereby the United States agreed to supply
China with planes and equipment for an eight and one-tliird group air force
including four-engine bombers. Marshall also extracted a promise from the
Generalissimo not to use the Chinese Air Force already in China against the Com-
munists on the grounds that this would constitute offensive action. Restricting
the Chinese Air Force deprived the Generalissimo of his most potent weapon. It
was also implied that discussions regarding a $500,000,000 loan to China could
not be resumed until a truce was effected in the civil war. Marshall did not
know then that the most effective Washington opposition to the Chinese loan
was coming from Henry Wallace, a man whose position on Russia has since
become quite clear.
The truce sponsored and pushed by Marshall, with all the diplomatic resources
of the United States at his disposal, forced the Generalissimo to halt his anti-
Communist offensive at a time when it was on the verge of wiping out large
bodies of Chinese Communist troops. Some fifty truce teams each were dis-
patched to trouble spots all over Cliina. Each was headed by an elderly American
colonel specially picked for his white hair to impress the Chinese. Here are
some specific examples of what they accomplished.
North of Hankow some 200,000 government troops had surrounded 70,000
Communist troops and were beginning a methodical job of extermination. The
Communists appealed to Marshall on the basis of his truce proposal, and arrange-
ments were made for the fighting to cease while the Communists marched out
of the trap and on to Shantung Province, where a large Communist offensive
began about a year later. On the East River near Canton some 100,000 Com-
munist troops were trapped by government forces. The truce teams effected
their release and allowed the Communists to march unmolested to Bias Bay
where they boarded junks and sailed to Shantung.
The worst fiasco was at Kalgan Pass. This gap in the North China Mountains
is a historic gateway between China and Manchuria. At the end of the war
there were no organized Communists in Manchuria. Chinese Communists
flocked from their base in northwest China through the Kalgan Pass to join
the Russian troops in Manchuria. When the Chinese government troops occupied
3710 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Manchuria they found the great industrial centers stripped bare of machinery
and the tremendous arsenals of the famed Japanese Kwantung Army empty.
There was no trace of either the Kwantung Army or its equipment.
Early in 1946 a government offensive captured Kalgan and sealed off tlie pass
trapping nearly a million Chinese Communists in northwest China who were
moving toward Manchuria. The Communists complained that they were merely
returning to their prewar homes in Manchuria. Marshall made strenuous efforts
to get the Generalissimo to open the Kalgan Pass for these Communists.
Eventually the Generalissimo yielded, withdrew his troops in June 1946, and
the Communist horde poured into Manchuria. The Communists then broke the
truce by fortifying Kalgan Pass. A year later Chinese government armies had
to fight a bloody campaign to recapture the pass they voluntarily evacuated under
the truce.
In January 1947 the mystery of what happened to the Japanese Kwantung
Army equipment was solved. The poorly armed Chinese Communists who
marched north the year before now swarmed south from Manchuria armed
with Japanese rifles, machine guns, mortars, tanks, and artillery. They even
had Japanese aircraft but no gas or pilots to operate them. The Russians had
simply turned over the Japanese equipment to the Chinese Communists and
thus endowed them with a rich military legacy.
Conservative estimates of the Japanese military stockpile in Manchuria seized
by the Russians apprise it as sufficient materiel to supply a million men for ten
years of fighting. By using Japanese munitions the Russians avoided the neces-
sity of investing their own resources and are able to claim that no Russian arms
were sent to China. The Manchurian booty represents the total investment the
Russians can afford in China at present. They lack the industry in eastern
Siberia to supply a sustained war effort even for themselves. Transportation
facilities across Siberia are too meager to supply China from the Russian Ural
industrial area.
It was these troops who marched under a safe-conduct of the American-
sponsored truce through Kalgan Pass and returned with Japanese arms that
won the decisive battles in Manchuria in the summer of 1947. They were opposed
by the government's American-trained divisions. While the Communists were
being rearmed by the Russians, the government divisions had their supplies cut
off by what Marshall freely admits was a ten-month embargo on American mili-
tary supplies to China. Since these Chinese divisions had been equipped in the
spring and summer of 1945 their arms, ammunition, and trucks badly needed
replacement. Two years of hard campaigning had worn their rifle barrels
smooth, exhausted their ammunition, and battered the trucks they relied on for
transport and supply. All of their equipment was American and without
American replacements, spare parts, and ammunition it was virtually useless.
It did not take long for the well-armed Communists to chew up the govern-
ment divisions armed only with the worm remnants of two-year old American
equipment and minus an effective air force. The Chinese armies that Stilwell
and Wedemeyer trained in India and West China perished early in 1947 on the
frozen ]Manchurian plains. The stage was set for the final mop-up of Manchuria
in the summer of 1948 and the Communist offensive into North China that at this
writing has swept almost to the north bank of the Yangtze and gravely threatens
Nanking and Shanghai.
Marshall also sought, as part of his orders, to force the Generalissimo into a
variety of political changes including formation of a coalition government with
Communists in the cabinet.
At the time of the ]Marshall mission the Chinese Communists terms for enter-
ing the Chinese National government were "one-third of the cabinet members in-
cluding the War Minister, retention of a Communist army of forty-eight divi-
sions, and the governorships of all provinces where the Communist troops then
claimed occnpntion of a majority of the area. The fate of Czechoslovakia has
since proved how fatal this would have been to the existing government of
China. Inclusion of Comnuinists in a coalition front is a standard preliminary
tactical maneuver in a Conununist seizure of power. It is a technique that may
well be attempted again in China if the Communists feel that an attempt to gain
complete military victory may cost more than they can afford.
The Generalissimo had been dealing with Communists inside and outside the
Chinese government for more than twenty years. He spent part of his educa-
tion in Moscow's Conununist academies. He thoroughly understood the Com-
munist motives and techniques and knew that a Communist minority in a coali-
tion government would actually result in complete Communist domination of
China.
1 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3711
Marshall was then just beginning his political dealings with the Communists.
It is obvious he has learned a good deal about their tactics since then. Mar-
shall's orders in China did not permit him to act as though the struggle between
the Communists and Chinese government were anything more than minor ma-
neuvering between rival political factions. He was not able then to view it as
the basic struggle that it certainly is wherever that issue is drawn. Marshall
had to persist in professing the idea that including Communists in a coalition
government was no more serious than adding a few Republicans to a Democratic
cabinet. Too many Americans tend to interpret the life and death struggles of
foreign politics in the same light as the bitter but by no means fatal rivalry of
American politics. Thei'e is a vast difference.
When his coalition plans collapsed and fighting flared again, Marshall finallj'
gave up his China venture. He returned to the United States with a "plagne
on both your houses" speech that was a remarkable confession that his early
profession of faith in the integrity of the Communists was not .iustified by their
subsequent actions. Marshall's disillusionment over the prospect of working
with Communists on a basis of mutual trust was symptomatic of the general
shift in American policy toward Russia that occurred during roughly the same
period. American policy in Europe was adjusted to this realistic appraisal of
the Communists and their intentions. Our China policy never changed.
While Marshall has done a good job of applying the lessons of his Chinese
political education to Europe, he has been reluctant to undertake the funda-
mental reappraisal of his China policy required by subsequent events. Ctirrent
American aid to China is largely food relief because of the State Department's
insistence that military aid cannot be effective until the Chinese government
inaugurates sweeping political and economic reforms.
In tills policy I believe the State Department has the cart before the horse.
Military aid should have top priority. Without a military decision there can
never be the internal stability required for any effective reforms. Last March
when the Marshall plan for China was presented to Congress, I was appalled to
note that only one-sixth of the program was devoted to the military aid so des-
perately needed.
At the request of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, then headed by
Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey, I flew from Shanghai to Washing-
ton to plead for a more realistic approach to China's problems and a more
intelligent understanding of the United States stake in Asia. My fifty-one-hour
flight in a great circle course from Shanghai to Washington via Northwest
Airlines offered dramatic evidence of how the Pacific world had shrunk when
compared with my initial fourteen-day steamship trip to China in 1937.
I told Congress last March that unless effective military aid was immediately
forthcoming for China, the Chinese Communists would overrun Manchuria and
be well on their way to taking all of North China within six months. Congress
authorized military aid of ■$12.'),000,000 to China, but the summer was spent in
endless dickering with the State Department and National Military Establish-
ment over details of that aid. and not until October of 1948 did these muni-
tions begin to flow to China. By then, seven months after my gloomy prophecy,
the Communists had all of Manchuria and most of North China, and were march-
ing toward Nanking.
The situation is now deteriorating so rapidly in China that I cannot venture
further prophecy on its outcome. However, there are two salient facts of which
I am sure. First is that the United States needs a new and effective policy in
China. This will require a thorough reexamination of our present policy and
our capacity to support any changes. But there is an acute danger that we
may no longer have time for such consideration and that the Communists may
win complete victory in China before a new American policy can be formed.
Reliable reports indicate that the Communist generals ai"e planning to force a
Yangtze crossing early in the spring of 1949. Russians are now reported to be
training a Chinese Communist air force near IMukden to provide the air cover
without which a crossing of the Yangtze might be impossible. Captured Japa-
nese planes and Russian second-line fighters ai'e being turned over to the Chinese
Communist air center.
In view of this situation the immediate goal of the United States must be
some sort of holding action that will prevent a decisive Communist victory while
our China policy is being debated. This action requires neither vast monetary
nor military outlays. Its principal requirement is swift action lest we lose our
chance forever. The recent history of China is studded with examples of how
small, technically well-equipped forces can exert decisive influence in China out
of all proportion to their size.
3712 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This holding action in China to prevent the Communists from organizing the
great Chinese land mass against us is imperative if we are to gain the time
required for a searching analysis of our world-wide foreign policy and the de-
velopment of a sound method of working with the Chinese to replace our present
policy of sticking a finger in the European dike while the Asiatic dam bursts.
My second certainty is that the price of peace in the Pacific world is going
up at an astronomical rate, and we shall eventually have to pay that bill in full.
Looking back over the last decade, we can easily trace the soaring cost of an
effective American policy in China.
During the war, cost of such a program would have been negligible. During
the twin goals of defeating Japan and establishing a strong, friendly Chinese
regime were originally inseparable segments of a common goal. Stilwell's fail-
ure to recognize this fact lost that opportunity and helped set off the chain re-
action that brought us to the brink of the current crisis.
Immediately after the war the cost of China aid rose only slightly. Thanks
to the good work done by Wedemeyer and his staff and the availability of a vast
stock of war surplus in the Pacific bases, the Chinese government could have
been given the military power to withstand aggression and turn to the pressing
problems of internal reform with little additional cost to the American taxpayer.
Marshall's arms embargo on China squandered that opportunity and gave the
Chinese Communists the breathing spell they needed to refurbish their ragged
hordes at the captured Japanese stockpiles in Manchuria.
By the spring of 1948 official estimates of the cost of China aid had risen to
a billion and a half dollars plus establishment of a large American military
mission in China. That opportunity, too, was lost largely as a result of the
State Department's insistence on "economic" aid that did little but waste Amer-
ican dollars, instead of the military aid required. How high the cost will eventu-
ally go or how many further opportunities we will allow to pass without action
I cannot guess. I am only sure that eventually we shall have to pay it in full
just as we had to pay the long-deferred bill for a decade's indifference to the
Orient that Japan presented at Pearl Harbor just seven years ago.
We face essentially the same choice the British faced in 19.38 in Munich. I am
well aware of the dangers of bleeding American economy white through a vast
arms program and foreign aid. That could be as disastrous as military defeat.
But we must face up to our present problem as the British failed to do at Munich.
Then they were appalled at the possible price for resisting German aggression.
They felt they could not afford that cost. Yet that choice only boosted the final
bill to the fantastic total they had to pay. When the bill was finally presented
they had no choice but to pay it or accept the end of their nation. The failure
to pay the price at Munich eventually cost the British five grinding years of war
that eroded their national economy to a bare sustenance level and lost the bulk
of their empire. The United States umst not make the same mistake simolv
because we shrink from facing facts.
Many people now admit the validity of this thesis. Few, however, believe
there is anything we can do about it. Can we really do anything? We most
emphatically can. First we can throw in small, carefully selected military aid
tailored to meet the specific problem of the moment in China — a holding action
to defend the lower Yangtze A^alley and Shanghai. If Shanghai can be held, it
will prevent the Comnnmists from organizing the north bank of the Yangtze well
enough to support a military thrust across the river into South China.
Along with this aid we must send technically .skilled and imaginative leaders
who can improvise to meet rapidly changing situations and who can gain the
confidence of the Chinese with whom they work. The Chinese may not luider-
stand the workings of an internal combustion engine. Init they can see through
a man and tell what makes him tick in an instant. They have been evaluating
human nature for thousands of years and are experts. Naturally the Chinese
will not work effectively with foreigners unless they feel these foreigners are
genuinely sympathetic to their cause and country.
We must recognize that the Orient is a primary field of American interest and
must stop allowing our affairs in this area to be conducted by second-rate men.
We are only now beginning to develop some China experts in the field who show
real promise, but policy in Washington is still formulated by incompetent scrubs
in the State Department, not deemed fit to play in the European game, while men
of Wedemeyer's caliber and ability sit on the side lines.
Many of our so-called China experts contend that things are so bad in China
now that it is impossible to do anything to change them. This is sheer nonsense.
This is the same type of thinking that said it was impossible for China to resist
Japan in 1937. Yet it was Japan who suffered the final defeat.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3713
The experts said the American Volunteer Grdup wouldn't last three weeks In
combat, yet with 250 men and .$8,000,000 we smashed the Japanese air force over
China and kept bombs off Chinese cities for the fii'st time in three years.
The experts wrote ofC China as finished again when the Japanese took Burma
and cut the last land line of supply. They said the air lift across the Hump was
impractical and impossible. The airmen of the Air Transport Command and
China National Aviation Corporation did the impossible by flying more than a
million tons across the Hump and kept China going on airborne supply for as
long as was necessary. The military experts said the Japanese Army would
run the Fourteenth Air Force out of East China, but again a handful of good
men with good airplanes refused to l)e licked. In the spring of 1945 it was the
starving Japanese Army that was getting out of East China as fast as its imder-
fed legs could carry it, and not the Fourteenth Air Force.
Again after the war I was assured by the experts that it would be impossible
for me to organize a new air line in China. Today that air line is flying 4,000,000
ton miles a month. I have been working with Americans and Chinese for so long
now who have been doing the alleged "impossible" for many years that I have
no patience with the ci'itics who are experts only at inventing reasons for doing
nothing. I think it is high time we scuttled them in favor of leaders who have
the imagination, energy, and intelligence to accomplish the so-called impossible.
That is certainly the type of leadership that has made the United States a great
nation.
It is not yet too late for effective action in China. The Chinese Communist
armies are operating off lines of supply that are badly stretched. Their present
position is similar to that of the Japanese at the end of their initial push into
East China in 1944 when they were vulnerable to the stranglehold of airpower.
The Communists are now moving into territory that has not been politically
organized in their favor as well as the northern provinces. The Communists,
like the Japanese before them, do not — as yet — have the air umbrella necessary
to protect their ground offensives against sustained air attacks. It is certainly
not impossible for a small force of stout men who know the terrain to apply the
best of modern equipment against critical Communist weak spots and halt the
advance in its tracks. This would save the lower Yangtze Valley and South and
AVest China as a base in which Chinese nationalism could reorganize, and after
learning the lessons of its defeat, political and military, set out again under its
own steam to liberate the rest of Cliina.
Whatever happens in China's immediate future, if it is considered United States
policy to prevent Communist organization of that country, it is necessary to
maintain this base and maintain some form of non-Communist central govern-
ment in China. If the territory not yet conquered by the Chinese Communists
is allowed to revert to the domination of provincial war lords, it will eventually
be divided, defeated, and absorbed by the Communists piecemeal just like the
small separate states of eastern Europe.
The creation and preservation of a central government has been the historic
role of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in modern China. He has been the driv-
ing will that has held together a country of loose political organization and
primitive communications in even a semblance of national unity. It is significant
that leaders of all the divergent political elements in China except the Com-
munists have appreciated the necessity of Chinese unity. For this reason they
have supported the Generalissimo on broad national issues regardless of their
disagreements with him on internal policy. It is for this reason that I, too, have
loyally supported the Generalissimo during my long residence in China. It was
the Generalissimo who stood between China and surrender to Japan, and it was
the Generalissimo who stood between China and complete chaos after the war.
Whatever the future may hold, it will be necessary to have some centralizing
force to preserve the independent spirit of China and prevent its domination
by foreign powers.
Despite a decade of American bungling in China this country still has a
vast reservoir of good will among the Chinese people. The Chinese government
now has little faith in us because of the long record of broken American promises
and action that only served to strengthen the Communist opposition. In the
coastal ports most Chinese look on the Americans as successors to the British
and French economic imperialists whose only aim is to exploit China for
personal profit. But in the vast hinterland there are millions of Chinese who
still look on the United States as the only hope in establishing a peaceful and
independent China and still remember the American airmen as the reason
Japanese bombs stopped falling.
3714 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
It would not take much concrete effective aid to capitalize on tliis sentiment.
Many Chinese are now accepting the Communists only because they feel the
United States has abandoned China to its fate. At the first real sign of
American interest in China these marginal millions would abandon the Com-
munists.
As a practicing warrior for many years, I am convinced of the complete
futility of war. It settles only problems of the past and creates the new
problems of the future. There is no place in the v7orld today for the narrow,
competitive nationalism that sparks the tinder of war. My long experience
as an airman has taught me the folly of the artificial borders of political states.
The ease with which the airman passes them by with his load of peaceful
commerce or atomic destruction should have served notice long since that they
are no longer necessary.
I am convinced that the people of this planet must ultimately and inevi-
tably move toward a single form of world government if civilization is to survive.
But is our immediate task to see that this world government comes as a mutual
federation of free peoples rather than through the ruthless domination of a
master state enslaving all the others. In this struggle there are still many
battles that cannot be avoided. The most critical of these now is to prevent
the Communists from organizing the vast and rich land mass of China under
their whip and turning its weight against us and the other free peoples of the
world.
Claike Lee Chennault.
Shanghai, China, January lO.'fQ.
INDEX TO PART 10
Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization
in this index.
A
Page
Abend, Hallett ' J 3685, 3705
Abyssinia 3583,3584
Academia Sinica 3637
Academy of Science (Institute of World Politics and Economics) _ 3485. 3604, 3615
Acheson, Dean 3389, 3400,
3401, 3405, 3406, 3407, 3408, 3409, 3410, 3416, 3542, 3644, 3662, 3667
Adams, Eva B 3669
Adler, Solomon - 3504, 3530, 3594
Afghanistan 3282, 3464, 3465, 3603, 3632
Agabekov 3705
Air Transport Command 3713
Alaska - 3224, 3326, 3(532
Albertson, William 3336
Aldo Cafe (Washington, D. C.) 3641
Aleutian Islands - 3324, 3326
Alexander Kaun Exchange Fellowship 3621
Alexander, Wallace M 3612
Allen, George 3640
Allen, James S. (Sol Auerbach) 3343,3344,3345,3340,3348,3349,3350,3351
Allen, Mrs. James S 3348, 3349
Allied Labor News 3543
Alsberg 3482
Alteration Painters Union 3336
Amerasia 3331,
3332, 3333, 3482, 3579, 3580, 3587, 3588, 3589, 3590, 3591, 3592, 3650
America. (See United States.)
American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression 3474, 3478
American Economic Foreign Policy 3430
American Embassy (Chungking) 3518
American Embassy (Pekinir) 3472,3508
American Embassy (Tokyo) 3702
American Embassy (Moscow) 3327, 3329, 3484, 3615, 3616, 3700
American Friends of the Chinese People 3470, 3471
American Friends Service Committee (Executive Board) 3704
American & Foreign Power Co 3704
American Government. (See United States Government.)
American League Against War and Fascism 3551
American Marine Guard 3508
American Peace Crusade 3556
American Peace Mobilization 3458
American Quarterly 3506
American-Russian Institute 3449,
3450, 3452, 3479, 3484, 3486, 3487, 3506, 3517, 3617, 3619, 3620, 3621
American Student Union__ 3513
American Youth for Democracy 3477, 3478, 3479
Amsterdam 3604, 3633
Amter, Israel 3335, 3336
Anglo-Japanese Alliance 3324, 3691
Angus, H. F 3333
Anti-Imperialist Alliance 3337
88348— 52— pt. 10 29 I
II INDEX
Page
Anti-Imperialist League 3336, 3337
Appelman, Morris L 3470, 3471
Appropriations Committee (United States Senate) 3412
Aquitania (steamship) 3331
Arctic Institute of America 3557, 3558
Arctic Research Institute 3557
Arnold & Co., Ltd 3651
Arnold, Thurman 3277, 3353, 3533, 3573, 3605, 3606
Asia 3580, 3628, 3654, 3661, 3667, 3703
Asia and the State Department 3666, 3668
Asiaticus (Hans Moeller) 3324, 3329, 3330, 3453, 3679
Associated Press 3536
Association of Atomic Scientists 3538
Astor, Lord 3483
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll de Jong 3516
Atlantic Monthly ' 3580, 3666
Atomic Energy Commission (UN) 3539
Austern, Hilda (Bretholtz) (Ray) 3505,3592,3593,3612
Australia 3318, 3566, 3592, 3593, 3632
Austria 3592, 3702
Avery, Sewell - 3450
B
Baerensprung, H. W .• 3505
Baldwin, Hanson 3700
Ball, MacMahon W 3566, 3591
Ballantine, Joseph 3371, 3377, 3400, 3409
Bank of England 3435,3436
Bankers Trust Co 3704
Barmine, Gen. Alexander 3326, 3365, 3499, 3577, 3611, 3704
Barnes, Joseph Fels 3337,
3338, 3339, 3484, 3505, 3512, 3513, 3514, 3592. 3593, 3594, 3595
Barnes, Mrs. Joseph Fels (Kathleen) 3321, 3343, 3429, 3480, 3481, 3484
Barry, John D 3548, 3549
Beard, Charles A 3689
Bedacht, Max 3335, 3337
BelofE, Max 3585
Benes, Dr 3421
Benjamin, H 3335
Bennington College 3538
Berland, Sam 3336
Berman, Isaac 3336
Bernstein, Joseph M 8505
Bess, Demaree 3466
Bethune, Dr. Norman 3.508
Best, Emery 3488
Bevin, Ernest .3665
Biddle, Francis 3299
Biedenkapp, Fred 3336
Bidien, Charles 3505
Big Three 3355, 3357, 3390, 3479
Bill of Rights 3365, 3499
Birobidjan 3318
Bisson, T. A 3284-3287, 3290, 3291, 3297, 3298,3209
3300, 3302, 3303, 3304, 3308, 3343, 3364, 3417, 3505, 3581, 3644, 3677
Black, Justice Hugo 3645
Blakeslee 3310
Bloch, Kurt 3522, 3523
Bloom, Representative Sol 3406, 3407, 3408
Blum, Leon 3305
Blumberg, Albert 3505
Bodian, Clara 3337
Bogartz, Herman 3336
Borodin, Michael 3505, 3506, 3530
Borton, Hugh 3587
INDEX III
Page
Boruchowitz, Joseph 3335, 3336
Bowman, Isaiah 3368, 3554
Boyd, Mrs. T. Kenneth 3450
Brandt, William 3680
Bransten, Louise R 8505, 3506, 3621
Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) 3664
Brazil 3592
Bremman, Y. P 3481, 3484, 3485, 3586
Bristol, Admiral Mark 3475
British Foreign Office 3701
British Labor Party 3665
Bronk, Detlev 3557
Browder, Earl 3283, 3305, 3414, 3415, 3500, 3507, 3530, 3532, 3560
Bruno, John 3337
Bryn Mawr College 3518
Budenz, Louis F 3283
Budzeslawski, Herman 3507
Building and Construction Workers League 3336
Building Maintenance Workers Industrial Union 3336
Buitenkant, Jacques 3337
Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the
U. S. S. R 3582
Bullitt, Ambassador William C 8327, 3328, 3616, 8702
Bundy, Mr. Robert E 3562, 3607
Bundy, Mrs 3564
Buriat-Mongolia 3317,3318
Burma 3842, 3623, 3632, 3713
Burma Campaign 3501
Burns, Reverend Clarence 3630
Burt, Samuel 3336
Buryat-Mongolia 3463, 8464, 3483, 3485
Butler, R. A 3589
Byrnes, James F 3398,3667
O
Cairo 350*?
California Labor School ZZZ_ZIIZI__I__II ZZ_ZZ_ZZ 3621, 3703
Cameron, Angus 3508
Canada 3471, 3472, 3575, 8582, 8592, 3632
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People 3470, 3471, 3472
Canadian Institute (Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton) 3604
Canadian League Against War and Fascism 3470,8471
Canadian Legation (Tokyo) 3469
CannifE, Andrew 3451, 3453, 3581
Cannon, Mr 3511
Canton 8586, 8709
Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union, A 3443
Carlson, Brig. Gen. Evans F. (USMCR-Rt.) 3472, 3475, 3477, 3478, 3508
Carnegie Endowment _' 3637, 3638, 3704
Carr, E. H 8585
Carroll, Elizabeth H 8562,3563
Carroll, Esther 3471
Carter, Bill 3343
Carter, Edward C 3277-3280,
3287, 3309, 3313, 3315-3325, 3326, 3328,. 3329, 3331, 3332, 3338,
3343, 3344, 3346, 3347, 3354, 3359, 3360, 3362, 3365, 3366, 3367,
3376, 3380, 3381, 3382, 3391, 3396, 3415, 3417, 3419, 3422, 3423,
3424, 3425, 3426, 8427, 3428, 3429, 3430, 3431, 34.34, 3445, 3447,
8448, 8451, 3453, 3455, 3460, 3462, 3466, 3469, 3473, 8474, 3480,
3483, 3484, 3486, 3487, 3497, 8506, 8522, 3523, 3546, 3569, 3579,
3581, 3582, 8585, 3587, 3588-3594, 3600, 3603, 3615-3617, 3633,
3634, 3638, 3641, 3642, 3643, 3649.
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 8484
Carter, Mrs. (wife of Prof. George Carter) 3555
Carter, Prof. George 3552, 3554
l\ INDEX
Page
Case, Mr 3644
Cashione, P 3337
Cassel. Professor 3G95
Catholic Missionaries (China) 3629,3030,3631
Central Asian Society 3584,3605
Central Technical School (Toronto) 3470,3472
Chamberlain, William Henry 3457, 3466, 3467, 35S5, 3586
Chang, Hsueh-liang 3300, 3584
Chansik, L -- 3337
Chapman, Abraham 3500, 3531
Chatham House 3316,
3318, 3435, 8436, 3441, 3453, 8483, 3484, 3589, 3593, 3633, 3034
Chen, Han-seng 3480,
3481, 8483, 8509, 3510, 8521, 3582, 3585, 3587, 3030, 3037
Chen, K. P 3313, 3314
Chennault, General Claire Lee 3342, 3358,
3359, 3389, 3395, 8411, 3412, 8622, 3624, 8625, 3626, 3658, 3706, 3714
Cheng, Chih-yi 3637
Chew, Tong {see also Hong, Chew-shi and Chu Tong) 3511
Chi, Chao-ting 3333, 3341, 3342, 3509, 3511, 3582, 3588, 3591, 3594, 3678
Chi, Harriet Levine 3340, 3341, 3509
Chi, Rung Chuan 3511, 3512-3514, 3597
Chi, Professor (old) 3340
Chiang, Kai-shek (Generalissimo) 3284,3289
3293, 3304, 3307, 3309, 3311, 3329, 3341, 3342. 3355-3357, 3374, 3377,
3388, 3391-3395. 3397, 3398, 3402-3405, 3408,-3411, 3414, 3416, 8475,
3476, 3498, 3501-3503, 3505, 3509, 3518, 3519, 3524, 3525, 3535-3537,
8541, 3549, 3583. 3586, 3595, 3000, 8608, 3610, 3623-3627, 3632, 3038
3639, 3650, 8651, 3656, 3657, 8665, 3677, 8705, 3706, 3708-3710, 3713
Chiang, Madam Kai-shek 3356, 3477, 3551, 3632, 3650
Chiasheng 3613
Ch'in-Han 3614
Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po-ku) 3307
China 3284,
8287, 3294, 3305-3307, 3818, 3322, 3323, 3825, 3326, 3330, 3333, 3334,
3341, 3349, 3353, 3355, 3356-3357, 3360-3362, 3364, 3366, 3370, 3371,
3373, 3375-8378, 33S2-33S4, 3387, 3388, 3390-3409, 3411, 3413-3415,
3437, 8439, 3442, 3460, 3464, 8472-3477, 3480, 3483, 3490, 3495, 3502-
3504, 3507, 3509, 3511, 3514, 3537-3542, 3545, 3507, 8568, 3581, 8592-
8584, 8589, 8592, 3594, 3596, 3597, 3599, 3600, 3608-3610, 3621, 3623-
3627, 3630, 8632-3636, 3638, 3639, 3645, 3647, 3651, 3652, 3655, 3657-
3659, 3661, 3663, 3664-3670, 3676, 3679-3694, 3696, 3699, 3700-3702,
3705-3714.
China Aid Council 3550,3551,3560
China and Silver 3681
China Among the Powers 3312
China at War j. 3705
China Daily News 3511-3514
China Defense Supplies ^' 3639
China Lobby 3277
China Press 3498
China's Communist Told Me 3304
The China Story 3668,3669
China Today 3470-3472, 3522
China Weekly Review-^ 3498, 3669
China's New Democracy 8500
Chinese Christians 3292
Chinese Communist 3284-8286,
3289, 8291-3293, 3299. 3302, 3303, 3353, 3355-3359, 3361, 3364, 3366,
3307, 3373, 3374, 3376, 3380, 3383, 3388, 3391-3398, 3400-3403, 3405-
3409, 3411, 3412, 3415. 3475, 3498, 3500-3502, 3510, 3527, 3528, 3530-
3532, 3537, 3541, 3558, 3559, 3569, 3577, 35S2-3584, 3595, 3596, 3608-
3610, 3622-3624, 3026, 3628, 3629, 3630, 3645, 3663-3605, 3669, 3682,
3084, 3704-3707, 3709-3714.
INDEX V
Page
Chinese Communist Air Force 3711
Chinese Communist Army 3289,3304,3307,3361,3366,3374,
3393, 3406, 3407, 3503, 3524, 3559, 35S4, 3G23, 3625, 3708, 3709, 3710
Chinese Communist Central Committee 3501
Chinese Communist Government 3334, 3381, 3382, 3509, 3518, 3535
Chinese Communist Party 3289, 3293, 3304, 3305-3307, 3500, 3669, 3678
Chinese Christians 3629
Chinese Embassy (Washington) 3639
Chinese Government Research Institute 3637
Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance 3511, 3512, 3513
Chinese History Project 3578, 3613
Chinese Mohammedans 3631
Chinese Mongols 3300
Chinese Moslems 3300
Chinese Nationalist Government 3285,
328fi. 3289, 3291, 3295, 3303, 3304, 3309, 3353, 3357, 3358, 3361, 3364,
3367, 3373-3375, 3388, 3392, 3398-3402, 3404, 3407, 3411, 3412, 3498,
3502, 3513, 3520, 3535-3537, 3582, 3592, 3596, 3608-3610, 3623, 3624,
3631, 3637, 3669, 3690, 3703-3705, 3710, 3712.
Chinese Nationalist Air Force 3709
Chinese Nationalist Army 3392, 3406, 3407, 3501, 3502, 3559, 3608, 3665
Chinese Soviet Government 3300, 3304
Chinese Tag Day 3337
Chinese Turkistan 3464
Chinsyang 3308
Chiperfleld, Representative 3407
Christian Science Monitor 3466, 3488, 3515
Chou, En-lai 3288, 3293, 3304, 3306, 3307, 3549
Chu, Teh 3288,
3292, 3293, 3301, 3302, 3304, 3305, 3306, 3308, 3559
Chu, Tong (see also Hong, Chew) 3510, 3597
Chungking 3311,
3329, 3341. 3342, 3356, 3388, 3405, 3518, 3537, 3549, 3553, 3566, 3567,
3594, 3595, 3600, 3624, 3626, 3650, 3652, 3685.
Churchill, Winston (Prime Minister) 3355, 3373, 3387, 3389, 3390, 3413
Civil Service Commission 3339, 3510, 3511, 3512
Civil Service Commission, Review Board 3679
Cleaners and Dyers Union 3336
Clubb, O. Edmund 3389, 3410
Coe, V. Frank 3514
Colegrove, Kenneth 3576, 3577
College of Chinese Studies (Peking) 3604
College of Pacific 3536
Collins, Henry 3515
Colonial and American Workers Washington Executive Council 3335
Columbia University 3611, 3637
Columbia University Press 3594
Comintern 3319, 3494, 3498, 3500, 3610
Comintern (Executive Committee) 3500
Commercial Press 3593
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 3473
Comimttee of One Thousand 3551
Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions 3335,3337
Communism in China 3683
Communist Academy Library (Moscow) 3593
Communist Central Military Council (CCP) 3306
Communist China 3295, 3296, 3310, 3509, 3637, 3703, 3704
Communist International 3284, 3316, 3319
Communist Labor Herald - 3529
Communist Party 3283,
3284, 3286, 3311, 3336, 3346, 3362, 3363, 3365, 3457, 3466, 3470, 3471,
3477, 3478, 3494, 3499, 3500, 3502, 350^3506, 3508-3511, 3515-3518,
3521-3527, 3530, 3532, 3534, 3543-3548, 3550, 3557, 3560, 3566, 3568,
3570, 3582, 3597, 3601, 3628, 3637, 3645, 3647, 3668, 3669, 3675, 3701
Communist Party Bookshops 3362
VI ESTDEX
Page
Communist Party (California) 3548
Communist Party (Germany) 3679
Communist Party (New Yorli) 3335,3557
Communist Party (Politburo) 3283,3284
Communist Party (Russia) 3365,
3405, 3446, 3499, 3500, 3528, 3531, 3558, 3559, 3627, 3635
Communist Party (United States).— 3305, 3335, 3357, 3362, 3415, 3507, 3531, 3555
Communist Political Association 3414,3415
Communist Political Association (National Board) 3414
Compania 3349
Comstock, Ada L 3612
Connelly, Matthew A 3363, 3366, 3386, 3387, 3388, 3640
Conservative Party (Great Britain) 3373
Cook-e, Admiral Charles M 3668
Coordinator of Informaion (COI) 3337-3339
Corbett, Prof. Percy E 3343
Corbett's Group 3343
Cornell University 3539, 3621
Cosmos CUib—i 3280, 3311
Councils of Working Class Women 3336, 3337
Council on Arts of the Ukrainian Republic 3621
Council on World Affairs 3701
Cressey, George B 3323,3483
Crowdy, Dame Rachel 3584
Currie, Lauchlin 3310, 3342, 3515, 3649, 3650, 3652, 3655, 3678
Czarist Russia 3457,3464
Czechoslovakia 3420, 3421, 3430, 3585, 3586, 3601, 3631, 3632, 3664, 3665, 3710
D
Dafoe, J. W 3483, 3580, 3587, 3588, 3589, 3592
Daily News 3450
Daily People's World — 3330
Daily Worker 3284, 3334, 3335, 3337-3339, 3345, 3475, 3556
Daily Worker Book Shop (New York) 3500
Daladier 3457
Damon, Anna 3335
Darcy, Sam 3335
Dai-row, Clarence 3600
Davidson, John F 3472
Davies, John P 3484,3625
Davies, Joseph E 3702
Davis, Elmer 3512, 3659
Deacon, William Arthur 3472
Deane, Hugh 3515
DeCaux, Len 3515
Decker, John W 3704
De Francis, Dr. John 3636
Defense Advisory Commission 3454, 3455, 3459, 8677, 3678
DeJong, Ellen 8515
Denmark 3592
Dennis, Eugene 8415
Dilemma in Japan 3555, 3556
Dimanshtein 3818
Dirac 3539
Dissertation by Levina 3485
Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourevitch___ 3485
Dolbin 3646, 3647, 3649
Dolsen, James 3516
Donaldson, Faith 3322. 3328
Doom;in, Eugene 3377, 3400,3409, 3489
Doroshkin, Sadie 3337
Douglas, Justice William O 3645
Downing. Elizabeth 3480, 3481, 3523, 3581
Draper, Theodore 3516
Dream We Lost, The 3668,8669
INDEX vn
Page
Drygoods Workers Union 3336
Dubs, Homer H 3611
Duclos, Jacques ^_ 3415
Duggan, Laurence 3516
Duke University 3611
Dunne, Bill 3335
Du Peld 3337
Dutch Navy ^ 3325
E
Early, Steve 3640
Eastman, Max 3353, 3355, 3361, 3391, 3497, 3498
Eaton, Representative Charles 3711
Eaton, Dr 3406
Economic Handbook 3455, 3456, 3481, 3482
Economic Review of Foreign Countries 3685
Economist 3698
Eddy, Harold 3336
Egypt 3536,3613
Eight Route Army 3304, 3306, 3476, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3586
Ellin, Nathan 3336
Eltenton, Mr. George Charles 3516, 3517
Eltenton, Dolly (Dorothy) 3516,3517
Emmerson 3547
Empire Club (Toronto) 3604
Empire in the East 3323,3324
England. (See Great Britain.)
English Missionaries 3629
English Workers Clubs 3337
Engels 3501
England 3318, 3324, 3374, 3387, 3484
Engdahl. J. L 3335
English Baptist Mission 3293,3307
English Workers Press 3481
Epstein, Israel 3516, 3530-3532
Ethiopia 3693
F
Fairbank, John K 3516, 3517, 3547, 3671, 3672, 3673, 3674
Fairbanks, Alaska 3575
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie 3480, 3481, 3516. 3518
Fang, Gen. Chen-wu , 3470, 3472
Far Eastern Republic 3702
Far Eastern Survey 3284, 3285, 3460-3462, 3506, 3523, 3617, 3618, 3682, 3698
Farley, Miriam S - 3455,3460,3462,3644
Fascist 3586
Fate of the World Is at Stake in China, The 3355. 3390, 3498
Faymonville, Gen. Philip R 3310,3327-3330,3616,3700-3703
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 3339
Federal Reserve Bank of North China 3685
Federation of American (Atomic) Scientists 3539
Feigin, Abner 3336
Feng 3612
Feng, Dora,- ' 3536
Feng, Hung-chi — 3536
Feng, Mildred 3536
Feng, Paul 3536
Feng, General Y'hsiang (Yu-hsiang) 3518-3520, 3535-3537
Ferris, General 3G57, 3658
Field, Edith 3570
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 3283,
3284, 3288, 3343, 3346-3348, 3422, 3424-3429, 3437, 3438, 3444, 3445,
3454-3459, 3465, 3481, 3482, 3485, 3580, 3582, 3587-3591, 3612, 3677
Field, Osgoode 3484, 3487
Fierstein, Chester 3336
Vni INDEX
Page
Fifteenth Infantry (U. S. Army) (Tientsin) 3661,3667
Fiji -, 3592
Financial Situation in Japan 3485
Finland 3420, 3422, 3428, 3430, 3432
Finnish Campaign (see Soviet Invasion of Finland) 3430
Finnish Workers Federation 3337
First All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi 1 3306
Fitzgerald, William 3336
Flemming, Commmissioner 3512
Foley, Mr 3488
Food Workers Industrial Union 3336
Foreign Affairs 3470, 3580
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives (V. S.)__ 3405,3400,3711
Foreign Commerce Year Book 3699
Foreign Investments in China 3690
Foreign Policy Association 3290, 8300, 3304, 3415, 3551
Foreign Relations Committee (United States Senate) 339S, 3594, 3678
Forman, Harrison 3355, 3380, 3381, 3391, 3500, 3501
Formosa 3404,3704
Fortas, Abe 3419, 3493, 3607, 3011
Fourteenth Air Force (United States) 3713
Fourth Route Army. (See New Fourth Route Army.)
France 3420,
3421, 3423, 3430, 3432, 3457, 3500, 3584, 3585, 3586, 3592, 3599, 3627,
3632, 3691, 3697, 3698, 3701, 3703.
Freeman, Miller 3482
French Indochina 3349
Friedman, B 3337
Friedman, Julian R 3520
Friends of the Soviet Union 3336,3337
Fukien Province 351]
Furniture Workers Industrial Union 3336
G
Cannes, Harry 3521
Gardner, John 3637
Gauss, Ambassador 3651
Gayer 3430
Gayn, Mark 3521
General Electric Co 3704
General Looks at the Soviet Union, A 3700
Geneva 36.52
Gerlach, Talitha 3636
German-Japanese Alliance 3323
Germany 3356,
3387, 3414, 3457, 3500. 3584, 3592, 3593, 3633, 3640, 3668, 3669,
3670, 3681, 3701-3703, 3707.
Gibarti, Louis 3521
Glasser, Harold _~ ~ 3521
Gold, Ben __!__! 3336
GoUanz 3317^ 3322
Goodrich, L. Carrington 3611,3612
Gordon, Representative ' 3407
Gordon, Mack 3337
GourevitchJ ~ 34S5
G. P. U. (Soviet Secret Police) ., 12___ 3705
Grajdanzev, Andrew (Andrew Grad) 3343
3450-3452, 3454, 3455, 3456, 3457, 3460, 3462, 3585
Granich, Grace 3284
Granich, Max ~_ 3521
Graves, William S _"___ 3701,3702
Great Britain ~ '329*>
3305, 3356, 3357, 3373, 3404, 3405, 3413, 3415, 3420, 3421 3423 343o"
3432, 3435-3437, 3457, 3467, 3476, 3483, 3500, 3581, 3583-3586. 3589.
3592, 3599, 3600, 3627, 3632, 3633, 3665, 3667, 3681-3683, 3691, 3694,
3696-3700, 3702, 3712.
INDEX IX
Page
Great Falls 3575
Great Soviet World Atlas 3483, 3485
Green, G 3335
Green, Senator 3668
Greenberg, Michael 3522, 3523, 3530
Grew, Ambassador Joseph 3369, 3370, 3371, 3377, 3409, 3556, 3676
Grinnell College 3591
Gromvko, Mr. A 3311-3314
Guadalcanal 3502,3702
Guerrilla Warfare in Manchuria 3485
Guggemoss, Brother Philotheus 3631
H
Haiti 3335
Hall, Bryant 3335
Hall, Otto 3335-
Hancock, W. K .. 3313, 3314
Hankow 3586,3709
Harmon, Francis S 3612
Harondar, H. M 3315-3317, 3322, 3323, 3484, 3582
Harper, Sam 3450
Harvard University 3611, 3704
Hatem, Dr. H 3525, 3530, 3531
Hazard, John N 3450, 3467, 3575-3657, 3660
Hawaii 3592
Hearst Newspapers 3700, 3701
Heissig, Walther 3628, 3670
Henderson, Loy 361G
Herald-Tribnne 3430
Herod, William R - 3704
Hickerson, Harold 3337
High Cost of Vengeance, The 366&
Hinton, Bertha 3601
Hinton, Mrs. Carmelita 3534
Hinton, Joan Chase 3534, 3535, 3538, 3542, 3601
Hinton, William 3534
Hirohito , , 3556
Hiroshima -. 3539
Hiss, Alger , 3310, 3543, 3544, 3638, 3646
History of Medical Psychology : 3621
Hitler, Adolf 3421, 3457, 3502, 3503, 3585, 3586, 3702
Hitler Germany 3414. 3703
Hitler-Stalin Pact 3498, 3677
Ho, Franklin SaSl
Ho, Lung 3306
Ho, Gen. Yin Chin 3626, 3627
Holcombe, Arthur 3704
Plolland 3600, 3633
Holland, William L 3278, 3286, 3287, 3328, 3339, 3340, 3348, 3430,
3469, 3480, 3581, 3582, 3585, 3587, 3588, 3593, 3594, 3627, 3632, 3634
Holland, Mrs. William L. (Doreen) 3340
Honan Campaign 3624
Hong, Chew Shi 3509-3512, 3514, 3597
Hongkong 3314, 3342, 3535, 3586, 3600, 3637
Hoover, Herbert . 3479
Hoover Library 3545
Hornbeck, Stanley K_ , 3310, 3645
Hotz, Robert 3624, 3626, 3703
House of Commons (Ottawa) 3470, 3472
House Un-American Activities Committee 3517
How Aid China 3610
Howard, Rov 3328
Hsu, Yung Ying 3333, 3334, 3335, 3337-3341, 3594
Hu, Han-min 3596
Hu, Dr. Shih 3638, 3639
Hu, T. P , 3335
88348 — 52— pt. 10 30
X INDEX
Page
Hu, T. Y 3335
IIu, Tsangnan 3608
Hubbard 3580, 3581, 3592
Hubbard article , 3450, 3451
Hubbard, G. E 3436, 3452, 3453, 3456, 3457
Hul)bard, L. E 3448, 3450-3452
Hubbard. L. M 3433-3436, 3441, 3443
Hudson, (Roy) , 3336
Hull, Secretary 3651
Humelsine, Carl H , 3410
Hungary 3592, 3702
Hurley, Ambassador Patrick J 3356, 3367, 3374, 3502, 3610, 3626, 3705
Hymau, Louis 3336
Independent Carpenters Union 3336
India 3504,
3512, 3592, 3599, 3605, 3G22, 3632, 3681, 3694, 3690, 3(i99
Indochina 3586, 3699
Indonesia 3623
IXDUSCO 3670
Inner Asian Frontiers 3614
Inner Mongolia 3328, 3538, 3539, 3542, 3638
Intercontinent News (Soviet) 3284
International Affairs 3580
Iiit-criKitional Association (Annual Report of) 3587
International Institute of Social Research 3611
International Missionary Council 3704
International Publishers 3481
Institute of Nuclear Studies 3539
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) 3279-3280,
3284, 3280, 3288, 3310-3316, 3319-3323, 3325-3326, 3329, 33:^, 3333,
3337-3340, 3343, 3346-3348, 3354-3355, 3359, 3361-3364, 3376, 3379,
3415, 3420, 3422. 3424-3425. 3428-3430. 3434-3436. 3430-3442. 3446,
3449, 3450, 3452-3455, 3460, 3462, 3465-3467, 3469, 3473-3474, 3478-
3483, 34S7, 3509-3510, 3514-3517. 3520, 3522-3523, 3543, 3545-3548,
3551. 3509. 3577, 3579-3581, 3585. 35S7-3588, 3590, 3593-3594, 3604,
3(il4-3()lG. 363(), 3638, 3642, 3645, 3654, 3675, 3677-3679.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 3284,
3316, 3334, .3344-3347, 3440-3442. 3447-3448, 3482, 3485-3486, 3500,
3611-3612. 3618. 3640. 3645-3046
Institute of Pacific Relations ( Banff Conference) 3600, 3603-3604, 3632
Institute of Pacific Relations (Kritish Council)— 3316, 3438, 3441, 3486-3487, 3634
Institute of Pacific Relations (California) 3517
Institute of Pacific Relations (Central Library Honolulu) 3593
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese Council) 3285,
3316, 3331, 3438, 3593-3594, 3(534
Institute of Pacific Relations (Dutch Council) 3587, 3633
Institute of Pacific Relations (files) 3283, 3294, 3447
Institute of Pacific Relations (Honolulu) 3604
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference) 3520, 3594
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference Caucus Meeting) 3514-3515
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 3311,
3315, 3440, 3442, 3448, 3483, 3485, 3550, 3587-3588, 3500-3592
Institute of Pacific Relations (.Japanese Council) 3331,
3438, 3482. 3556. 3579, 3580. 3585, 3587, 3589, 3591, 3592, 3633
Institute of Pacific Relati<ms (Mont Treniblant Conference) 3550,3632
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York Office) 3294,
3440, 3442-3443, 3452, 3511, 3512-3523, 3522
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 3430,
3441, 3448. 3482, 3483, 3580, 3587, 3588, 3591, 3592, 3593
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine Council) 3349,3350,3483
Institute of Pacific Relations (Princeton meeting) 3.581
Institute of Pacific Relations (Research Committee) 3509,3531
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Office) 3510
Institute of Pacific Relations (Secretary -general) 3277,3603,3638
INDEX XI
Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (Secretariat Inquiry) 3587
Institute of Pacific Relations (Stratford-on-Avon Conference) 3547,3032
Institute of Pacific Relations (U. S. S. R. Council) 3316,
3317, 3319, 3320, 3321, 3322, 3435, 3436, 3438, 3453, 3481, 3482, 3483,
3484, 3485, 3486, 3582, 3603, 3633.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 3310,3566,3570
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yoseniite Conference) 3311,
3317, 3318, 3320, 3481, 3482, 3483, 3486, 3543, 3548, 3634
Institute of Physical Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R- 3621
Institute of World Politics and Economics 3485
International Friends of the Chinese People 8472
International Labor Defense 3336
International Labor Defense (New York Section) 3337
International Ladies Garment Workers Dnion (I. L. G. W. U.) 3335
International Workers Order 3337
Interprofessional Association 3548, 3549
Intourist 3484
Iran 3464, 3465. 3504
Isaacs, Harold R 3627, 3628
Ishii, Viscount 3."i87
Ital^v 3584, 3693, 3700, 3703
Izard, Ralph 3700
Izvestia 3318, 3460, 3461, 3484, 3536
Jaffe, Philip J. (J. W. Phillips) 3290,
3297, 3298, 3299, 3300, 3302, 3303, 3304, 3308, 3331, 3543, 3544, 3552
Jaflfe, Mrs. Philip J 3290, 32i)8
Japan 3280. 3281, 3289, 3292, 3297, 3304, 3305,
3306, 3317, 3323, 3324, 3325, 3326, 3329, 3332, 3342, 3349, 3356, 3358
3361, 3373, 3374, 3375, 3376, 3382, 3383, 3388, 3391, 3392, 3393, 3394,
3398, 3401, 3411, 3412, 3413, 3414, 3437, 3439, 3452, 34.")0, 3456, 3470,
3472, 3473, 3481, 3483, 3488, 3489, 3498, 3500, 3501, 3503, 3545, 3547,
3548, 3566, 3568, 3580, 3581, 3582, 3583, 3584, 3589, 3591, 3592, 3-593,
3594, 3608, 3609, 3622, 3623, 3624, 3625, 3627, 3628, 3632, 3640, 3650,
3661, 3668, 3669, 3676, 3680, 3682, 3683, 3685, 3686, 3687, 3690, 3691,
3693, 3697, 3698, 3699, 3700, 3701, 3703, 3706, 3707, 3708, 3712, 3713
Japan Policy as Related to China Policy 3387
Japanese Army 3713
Japanese Communist Party 3567, 35 r7
Japanese Embassy (Washington) 3589
Japanese Emperor 3577, 3598, 3660, 3661
Japanese Foreign Office 3681, 3682
Japan's Emergence as a Modern State 3469
Japan's Red Flirtation 3705,3706
Java 3592
Jefferson School Book Shop 3363
Jenkinson, Anthony 3543
Jessup, Philip C 3333, 3515, 3612, 3(>44
Jewish City Club Committee 3337
Johns Hopkins University 3.368, 33S9, 3404,
3423, 3430, 3442, 3448, 3454, 3490, 3509, 3510, 3522, 3552, 3557, 3558,
3563, 3567, 3580, 3581, 3582, 3585, 3588, 3590, 3636, 3638, 3641, 3642
Johnson, Representative 3406
Johnstone, Anne 3310
Johnstone, Bill (William C.) 3310
Joint American and Indian Conference (New Delhi) 3632
Joint Chiefs of Staff 3597, 3.598, 3622, 3706
Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs 3350
Jones, Catesby 3641, 3642, 3643
Judd, Representative Walter 3388,3403,3404,3409,3478,3490,3501,3609,3610
Juikoff 3482
Justice Department 3284, 3487
XII INDEX
K
Pagfr
Kalgan 3709-3710
Kalinin 3484
Kamacliatka 3324, 3326
Kanner, David 3337
Kapitsa, Peter L 3620, 3621
Karr, David 3369
Kasenkina. Mrs. Oksana S 3536
Kazakh Republic 3460, 3463-3464
Keene, Mrs 3488
Keeney, Mrs. Mary Jane 3545
Keeney, Philip Olin 3545
Kellner, Reverend Henry 3630
Kemenov 3313-3314
Kennedy, George 3470
Key Economic Areas in Chinese History 3594
Kfare, Louis 3336
Kiangsi 3292,3306
Kimoto, Jack Dinichi 3341
Kindersley. Sir Robert 3694
Kinkoad, Robin 3545
Kirghiz 3463
Kislova, Miss 3484, 3487
Kisselev 3313
Kizer, Benjamin H 3545, 3612, 3645
Klein, Alfred 3514
Kleinman, I 3337
Kleidmann, R 3337
Knowland, Senator William F 3330, 3668
Kohlberg, Alfred 3277
Koide, Teiji 3297
Korea 3405, 3432, 3622, 3679, 3703-3704, 3706
Korean War 3664
Korneichuk, Alexander 3620-3621
Konrnakoff, Sergei 3545
Krasavtsev 3486
Kravchenko, Victor 3365, 3499
Kravel, Professor 3318, 3486
Kremlin 3333, 3357, 3405, 3500
Krivitsky, Walter 3486
Kung, Madame 3551
Kungchantang 3608
Kung, P'eng 3549, 3550
Kunming 3658
Kunming (American Consulate) 3658
Kunming Cable 3625, 3659
Kuomintang Government 3307. 3337, 3411. 3476. 3498, 3502, 3535, 3536,
3538, 3540-3542, 3586, 3595-3596, 3623, 3627-3628, 3683-3684, 3705
Kwantung Army (Japanese) 3698,3710
Kurile Islands 3324, 3326
Kushinsky, Morris 3336
L
Labor Party (Great Britain) 3373
Labor Sports Union 3336,3337
Lamont, Corliss 3359, 3360, 3396, 3415, 3545
Lament, Thomas W 3353, 3354,
3359, 3360, 3361, 3363, 3364, 3365, 3372. 3373, 3374, 3375, 3376, 3378,.
3380, 3381, 3382, 3390, 3391, 3394, 3395, 3396, 3397, 3402, 3417, 3497
Landy, J 3337
Lang, Olga 3545.
Lansin'j:-Ishii Agreement of 1919 3691
Lasker 3592, 359.'!
Last Chance in China 3669
Lattimore, David 3340. 3601
Lattimore, Owen 3277-3714
INDEX XIII
Page
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor Holgate) 3282,
3283, 3312, 3515, 3516, 3517, 3533, 3552, 3560, 3561, 3564, 3584, 3590,
3599, 8607, 3617, 3641, 3644, 3654.
Lattimore Whose Ordeal 3638
Laundrj' Workers Industrial Union 3336
Lawrence, William 3336
League of Nations 3332, 3584, 3695
League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service 3700
League of Nations Mission of Educational Experts the Reorganization of
Education in China 34.30
League of Nations Statistical Yearbook 3696
Leaning, W. J 3343
League of Nations 3681
Lee, Duncan C 3546
Leland Stanford University 3338, 3621
Lend-Lease Bill 3581
Lenin, V 3582, 3705
Leningrad 3633
Lenin of China 3500
Lenin Pedagogical Institute (Moscow) 3621
Leonov, Leonid 3620, 3621
Levin, Emanuel 3337
Levin, M 3337
Li, Li-san 3300, 3304
Li, T. H 3335
Li, Teh-chuan 3537
Liangchow 3031
Liao 3612, 3613, 3614
Liberator 3498, 3529
Liberty Magazine 3356
Library of Congress 3311
Licht, Sarah 3337
Lilienthal, Philip 34.30
Lin, Yutang 3501
Lindley, Ernest 3609, 3610
Lindley, Sir Francis 3584
Lindsay, Michael 3476, 3545, 3546
Linton, Ralph 3611
Lippmann, Walter 3703
Literature on the Chinese Communist Movement 3316
Little. Brown & Co 3362, 3556
LitvinofC (Litvinov) 3311, 3313, 33.33, 3484
Liu, Wellington 3593
Liii, Yu-wan . 3317, 3486
Lo, Lita 3536
Lo, Robert 3536
Lockwood, William W 3343, 3344, 3345
London 3414, 3450, 3483, .3536, 3589, .3632, 3634, 3648, 3698
London School of Economics ^ 3611
London Times 3288, 3291, 3294, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3353, 3629, 3678
Lorwin, Lewis L 3323
Los Alamos 3538, 3539
Lost Illusion 3669
Low Memorial Library (Columbia University) 3611, 3613
Lowe, T. B 3546
Loyalty Board (Appeal Board) 3410
Lovalty Board (President's) 3410
Lozovsky, S. A 3313, 3314
Luce. Henry 3388, 3403, 3404
Lustig, James 3336
M
Macadam 3453
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 3392, 3452, 3622, 3632, 3667, 3703, 3706
MacKay, John A 3704
MacLeod, A. A 3470-3471
XIV INDEX
Page
MacMillan ^ 349S
IMacMillan Co., The 3627
Mai! and Empire 3472
Makini? of Modern China, The 3462, 3621
Malaya 3596, 3623, 3696
Miinrhester Guardian 3498
Maiichu Dynasty 3306
Manchiikuo 3630-3631
Manchuria 3360,
3^66-3367, 3393, 3401, 3406, 3453, 3454, 3463-3464, 3483, 3498, 3503^
3583, 3599, 3622, 3631-3632, 3687, 3698, 3706-3707, 3709-3712.
IMandel, William M 3546, 3585
Mansfield, Representative Mike 3409, 3490, 3608-8609
Mao, Tse-tung 3288,
3292, 3293, 3297-3298, 3300-3305, 3307-3308, 3500-3503, 3593, 3669
Marine Workers Industrial Union 3336
Markoff, A 8335
Marshall, Gen. George C 3397, 3399, 3400,
3406, 3408, 3622, 3624, 3658, 3661, 3662, 3664r-3667, 3706, 3708-3712
Marshall directive 3601
Marshall Mission 3378, 3708, 3709-
Marshall Plan 3539, 3663, 3771
INIarshall Policy— A Steady Pattern 3664
Marsh, Mr 3512
Ma rtin, W 333T
Marx 3501
MnryknoU Mission in Fushun, Manchukuo 363Q
Masses 3498
Matles, James 3336-
Matsumoto 3589-
Matusow, Harvey M 3362
Maul, Grace 3471
IMcCarthy, Senator Joseph 3277, 3281, 3282, 3553, 3555, 3562, 3615, 361T
McCullough, Rear Adm. R. P 3512
McDermott, Michael 3410
M
McGarry, Mrs 3340
MoGovern . 3614
McKinley Tariff 3687
McWilliams 3588
Medynsky, Eugene 3620, 3621
Meiji Restoration in Japan 3688
Meiu Kampf 3702
Menges, Karl H 3611
Menefee, Selden 3546
Menges, Prof. Karl H 3637
Menzles, A. R 3472
Mexico 3696, 3697
Mikhailovitch, General 3503
Mikoyan 3313, 3314
Miller, Robert T 3546
Mind Medicine and Man 3621
Minorities in the Soviet Far East 3461, 3462, 3617, 3618, 3621
IMinnsinsk 3463
Missionaries of the Sacret Heart of Issoudum 3630
Mitchell, Miss Kate 3481, 3483, 3581, 3587, 3588, 3592
Mitsubishi 3583
Mitsui 3583
Mo, James 3335
Mongolia 3318, 3463, 3488, 3552, 3599, 3634, 3638
Mongolian Atlas 3322
Mongolian People's Republic 3323
Montello, Dominick 3336
Montreal 3582
INDEX XV
Page
Moon, P. T 3546
Moore, Harriet L. (Gelfan) 3816-3318,3321-3323.3329,3343,8449,3450-
3452, 3454, 3456-3457, 3466, 3479, 3480-3481, 3483-3485, 3547, 3570
Moore, Richard 3335
Moose, Elizabeth 3556
Moose, Professor 3552, 3556
Morgenthau Plan 3669
Moscow 3277,
3284, 3317-3318, 3320. 3322, 3327-3329. 3331. 33.82. 3'65. 33^:8,
3405, 3434, 3439, 3466-3467, 3481, 34S3, 3484, 3186-3488, 3499,
3500, 3502, 3503, 3533, ,8536. 3538, 3558, 3559, 3596, 3003-3605,
3614, 3632-3634, 3638, 3702, 3703, 3705.
Moscow Daily News 3526, 3529
Moscow Meetings (1936) 3315, 3316, 3321, 3323, 3547, 3603. 3i;04, 3679
Moscow Trials 3364, 3466, 3468, 3499, 35S1
Moscow Visit 3487, 3614
Moscow-Volga Canal 3484
Mosimien ( China ) 36.80
Motvlev, Dr. V. E. (Motiliev) 3311,
3315-3319, 3822-3326, 3331, 3333, 3434, 3437, 3443, 3446, 3450,
3453, 3457, 3481, 3482-87.
Moyer, Mr 3512, 3514
Mr. President 3640
Mu, Ch'Iao 3341, 3509
Mukden 3711
Munich 3421.3712
Murray, Senator James E 3666, 3667
Murphy, J. Morden 3704
Mussolini 3586
M. V. Oeorgic (Steamship) 3480,3481
My Life in China 3705
My 25 Years in China 3498
N
Nadal, Brother Paschal O. F, M 3630
Nakannira, Nobuyoshi 8297
Nan-ch'ang Uprising 3306
Nankai University (Peiping) 3593
Nanking 32S9. 3281, 3294, 3304-3306, 3475,
3482, 3535-3537, 3582-3584, 3589, 3622-3623, 3685, 3706, 3710-3711
Narkomindel 3319,3823
Nasu 3585
Nation 3465, 3705-3706
National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service 3680
National Committee to Win the Peace 3477-3479
National Library (Peiping) 3593
National Steel Corp 3703
Navy Department 3474
Nazi Underground '. 3387
Needle Trades Worlvers Industrial Union ,8885-3336
Nehru, Prime Minister 3568, 8605
Nelson 3626
Nessin, Sam ,8,886
Netherlands 3,592
New China Daily News 3.596
New Delhi 3605
New Fourth Route Army 3476, 3.523-3,525, 3559, ,3624
New Guinea 3702
New I>eader 3638
New ]\Iasses 3297-3299, 3302-3304~ 3465, 3.529
New Republic 346.5
New School for Social Research 3615
New Statesman and Nation 3706
New York Herald Tribune 3627, 3664, 3666, 3703
XVI INDEX
Page
New York Times 3353-3355,
33G0-3361, 3374-3376, 3382, 3390, 3396, 3503, 3518-3519, 3535, 3589,
3615, 36S5, 3700, 3704-3705.
New York Worker Peasant Alliance 3335,3337
New Zealand 3318, 3592, 3593
Neymaun 3318
Nimitz, Admiral Chester A 3632
No Peace for Asia 3627
Norin 3287
Norman E. Herbert 3469-3473, 3547-3548, 3568
North China 3707-3708
North Korea 3409
North Korean Communists 3432
North Pacific Fisheries 3481-3482
Norway 3467, 3600, 3632
Nuhle 3343
Oakie, Jack 3517
O'Brien, Howard Vincent 3450
O'Connor, Oleta 3548
Odessa 3536
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 3280,3339
Office of War Information (OWI) 3333-3334, 3338-3339, 3341, 3363,
3386, 3511-3514, 3517-3518, 3576, 3597, 3598, 3621, 3632, 3645, 3659
Office of War Information (China Division) 3517
Office of War Information (OWI) (New York Office) __ 3334,3339,3512,3595,3597
Office of War Information (Pacific Operations) 3511
Office of War Information (Personnel Security Committee) 3513, 3595, 3597
Office of War Information (OWI) (San Francisco) 3285, 3287, 3339, 3545
Office of War Information (San Francisco Office, Chinese Section) 3340, 3512
Office of War Information (Japanese Desk, San Francisco Office) 3598
Office of War Information (Security Board) 3510
Office of War Information (Washington) 3363,3389
Office Workers Union 3336
Okinawa 3622, 3625, 3706-3707
Olgin. M. J 3335
One Who Survived 3704
Orchard, John E 3323, 3486
Ordeal by Slander 3277, 3279, 3369, 3486, 3603, 3614, 3617
Orsanization of Soviet Science, The 3621
Osborne, Clay 3598
Oslo 3467
OSS. (See Office of Strategic Services.)
Ostrander, Mr. S. Taylor 34.55
Ottawa 3582
Oumansky, Ambassador Constantine 3329,3638
Our Jol) in the Pacific 3654, 3655
Outer Mongolia 3311, 3313, 3323, 3328, 3483, 3632, 3634-3636, 3638
Over.craard. Andy (Andrew) 3.336
Overseas News Agency 3508, 3668
Owens, Hamilton 3648
Ozaki, Hotzumi 3548
P
Pacific Affairs 3277,
3284, 3299, 3300, 3304, 3309, 3312, 3315-3317, 3319-3321, 3324-3325,
3320-3333, 3344-3345. 3348-3340. 3430, 343.3-3438, 3440-3442, 344.5,
3447-3449, 3451, 34.53-3454, 3465-3467, 3469, 3472-3473, 3482-3484,
3486-3487, 3505, 3521-3522, 3529, 3545, 3548, 3568-3569, 3577, 3579-
3582, 3585, 3588-3594, 3600, 3603-3604, 3615, 3633-3634, 3679-3680
Pacific Institute of Amsterdam 3486
Page. R ,3480
Palestine 3.592
Pan American Clipper 3600
INDEX XVII
Page
Tandit, Mrs. V. L 3313-3314, 3605
Pan Pacific Club (Shanghai) 3604
Panyushkin, Mr. (Soviet Ambassador) 3311
Paris Exposition 3484
Parker, Philo W 3612
Patri, Giacoma 3621
Patterson, William 3336
Pauley 3489
Pauley Reparations Mission 3282, 3297, 3473, 3488-3489, 3521, 3632, 3652
Pavlenko 3484
Pearl Harbor 3391, 3411, 3623, 3700
Pearson, Drew 3368-3370
Pegoraro, Rev. Epiphany, O. F. M 3630
Peiping 3580, 3593
Peiping-Haukow Railroad 3477
Peking 3287, 3290, 3295, 3303-3304, 3322, 3568, 3632, 3634, 3651, 3670
Pelliot 3333
Pennfield, James 3646
P'eng, Mr. Kung 3341
Penrose 3323
People's Allied Anti-Japanese Army (1930's) 3538
People's Anti- Japanese Military-Political University (Yenan)__ 3.300, 3305, 3308
People's China 3538, 3542, 3543
People's Daily World 3700
People's Liberation Army 3541
Peffer, Nathaniel 3323, 3592
Pershing, General s 3708
Philippine Islands 3323-3324, 3348-3349, 3483, 3592-3.593,
3622, 3661, 3689, 3696, 3701, 3702, 3706-3707
Phillips, Lillian 3548, 3549
Ping, Tong 3335
Pinghan Railroad 3624
Pivot of Asia 3636
Pizer, Morris 3336
Piatt, Leon 3335
Plumptre 3430
Foheda (Russian motorship) 3536
Po-ku. (See Ch'in Pang-hsien.)
Poland 3592, 3631, 3633, 3664
Poland, Fred W 3.549, 3.550
Political Affairs 3414-3415
Pomona College (San Francisco) 3286
Porter, Catherine 3440-3441, .3465-3466, 3480-3481, 3581
Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in
Japan 3485
Postolsky, Max 3337
Potash, Irving 3336
Potsdam 3378, 3413, 3709
Powell, .L B 3353, 3355, 3361, 3391, 3497, 3498
Pfotenhauer, Herr Hans 3593
Pra\ da 3365, 3460-3461, 3499, 3.536
Pregel, Boris 3576
Preliminary Meeting of the American Delegation IPR Hot Springs Con-
ference 3.515
Present Conditions in China 3681
Present Situation and the Next Tasks, The 3414
Press Club (Tokyo) 3.521
Pressman, Lee 3550
Price, Mildred (Coy) 3550-3551,3560
Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea 3-592
Problems of the Pacific 3483
Prokopovich, Professor 3444
Pushkin 3621
Putnam's Sons, G. P. (New York) 3624,3826,3706
Putnev School (Vermont) 3601
Pvke, Richard 3481, 3483, 3486
XVni INDEX
B
Page
Radek, Karl 3407
Rajchman, Liidwig 3551
Rakovsky, George 3467
Rate of Growth in the Soviet Union, The '3451
Ray, Thomas 3336
Reader's Digest 3353,
3355-3356, 3361-3365, 3375, 3378, 3380-3382, 3390-3391, 3497-3^98
Red Academy (Yenan) 3292,3299
Reichshaiier 3486
Remer, Carl F 3280, 3281, 3310, 3311,3690
Remington, William - 3556
Report from Red China 3500
Rise of American Civilization, The 3689'
Road to the Ocean 3621
Roberts, Holland 3620, 3621
Robertson, William S 3704
Robeson, Paul 3477, 3556, 3570
Rockefeller Foundation, Inc 3637-3638
Rodman, Samuel - 3551
Rogers, Representative . 3407
Rogers, Pauline 3337
Rogoff, Vladimir (Rogov) 3280,3283-3284,3309-3311
Rome - 3630
Romm, Vladimir 3311, 3318
Roosevelt, President Franklin D 3324,3330,3374,3377,3479,
3499, 3624, 3626, 3650-3651, 3658-3659, 3667, 3693, 3696, 3700, 3702
Roosevelt-Churchill pledge 3503
Rosenberg, B - 3337
Rosenberg, Isadore 3336
Rosenberg, Max 3336
Rosenman - 3640
Rosinger, Lawrence K 3551-3552
Ross, Charlie 3640
Rotary Club, Peking 3604
Rotterdam 3604, 3633
Roth, Andrew 3552-3558
Roudabush, Steven 3646
Roudabush, Mrs. Steven 3646
Rowe, David E 3312
Royal Anthropological Institute (London) 3604
Royal Institute of International Affairs 3435-3436, 3486, 3582, 3604
Rubin, Jay , 3336
Russia 3280, 3329,
3332, 3358-3359, 3361, 3365, 3373-3374, 3376, 33S7-33SS, 3390-3391,
3394-3397, 3403-3405, 3407-3408, 3411-3413, 3417, 3420-3424, 3428,
3430-3433, 3437, 3443, 3449, 3451, 3454, 3460. 3464, 3468-3460, 3498-
3499, 3501, 3529, 3533, 3537, 3541, 3584, 3588, 3600, 3616, 3623. 3632,
3634-3836, 3640, 3646, 3648, 3662-3668, 3680, 3683, 3691, 3707-3711
Russian Army 3365, 3484, 3709
Russian Embassy (Washington) 3646,3648
Russian-Japanese Nonaggression Pact 3279
Russian Military Intelligence 3327
Russian Mutual Aid 3337
Russian Revolution 1917 3463
Rnsso-Chinese Border 3463
Russo-Japanese Pact 3522, 3523, 3669
Russian War Relief, Inc 3615
S
Saigon 3623, 3706
Saion.ii, Kimi Kazu 3550, 3557, 3589, 3592
Salmon. Stanley 3508
Salter, Sir Arthur 3333, 3681, 3682, 3688, 3696, 3699
Saniiirins 3536
San Francisco Daily News 3581
INDEX XIX
Page
Saturday Evening Post 3466, 3503
Saturday Review of Literature 3669
Sazer, H 3335
SCAP 3452
Schiller, Harry 3337
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr 3666
Schneider, Helen 3557
Schneider, Isidore 3557
Schraven, Most Reverend Hubert Francis 3631
Science and Society 3568
Security — Can it be Retrieved 3333
Service, John Stewart 3410, 3552, 3553, 3554, 3555, 3657
Shall America Stop Arming Japan 3430
Shanghai 3281,
3308, 3317, 3411, 3498, 3540, 3586, 3599, 3G22, 3623, 3625, 3634, 3652,
3688, 3698, 3706, 3708, 3710, 3712, 3714.
Shansi Province 3287
Shantung Province 3709
Shavelson, Clara 3337
Shelesnyak, M. C 3557, 3558
Sheusi Province 3304, 3306, 3307, 3541, 3624
Sheppard 3336
Sher, Mort 3336
Shiman 3485, 3592
Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union 3336
Shu, Y. Y. (SeeHsu, Y. Y.)
Sian 3287, 8289, 3291, 3292, 3304, 3306, 3625
Sian Incident 3305, 3307
Siberia 3324, 3365, 3499, 3623, 3632, 3G46, 36G0, 3706, 3710
Silverman, Harriet 3335
Simmons, Ernest J 3620, 3621
Simons, William 3337
Sinclair, Harry F 3702
Singapore 3596
Singer, Joseph 3337
Sinkiang 3323, 3463, 3464, 3705
Siskind, George 3335
Sino-American Pact 3626, 3709
Sino- Japanese War 3476
Situation in China, The 3316
Slavonic Institute in Prague 3444
Smedley, Agnes 3300, 3304, 3308, 3558, 3559
Smirnov 3484,3487
Smith, Mr 3511
Smith, Adam • 3695
Smith, Mr. Farrar 3514
Snow, Edgar 3291,
3300, 3304, 3355, 3380, 3382, 3391, 3500, 3501, 3669
Snow, Mrs. Edgar (see also Nym Wales)— 3295, 3296, 3298, 3300, 3304, 3560, 3568
Snyder 8640
Socialist Party (United States) 3305
Society for Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations 3317
Soltan, Joseph 8337
Solution in Asia 3311, 3312, 3313, 3357, 8362, 3363, 3364, 3376, 3499, 3578
Some Aspects of Psychiatry in the U. S. S. R 3621
Soong, Sing Ling 3477
Soong, Dr. T. V 3551, 3626, 3639
Sorge, Richard I 3560, 3566
Southard, Ordway 3560, 3561, 3562, 3565
Southard, Mrs. Ordway (Mary) 3560,3561,3562,3565
Souvarine, Boris 3365, 3499
Soviet Asia Mission 3652
Soviet China 8306
Soviet Communism a New Civilization 3444
Soviet Constitution ^ 3460
Soviet Culture in Wartime No. 3 3617, 3618, 3619
XX INDEX
Page
Soviet Embassy (Tokyo) 3482
Soviet Far East 3317, 331S
Soviet Foreign Office 3647
Soviet Invasion of Finland 3419,
3420, 3421, 3422, 3423, 3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3430, 3431, 3432, 3445
Soviet Polish Delegation (U. N.) 3551
Soviet Purchasing Commission (Washington) 3499
Soviet Kenion (China) 3308
Soviet Russia 3356, 3431, 3432,
3448, 3457, 3461, 3498, 3527, 3529, 3546, 3634, 3669, 3677, 3684, 3705
Soviet Pussia Today 3426, 3427, 3428, 3529
Soviet Union 3289, 3313,
3317, 3325, 3334, 3335, 3355, 3300, 3365, 3366, 3367, 3390, 3414. 3425,
3444, 3453. 3457, 3460, 3463, 3464, 3466, 3467, 3480, 3494, 3500, 3504,
3537, 3542, 3584, 3586, 3592, 3603, 3608, 3621, 3647, 3679, 3701, 3703
Sovietskie Kraebedenie 3317
Spain 3430, 3467, 3584, 3586, 3592, 3614, 3703
Sproul, Robert Gordon 3612
Stalin, Joseph 3328, 3355, 3357, 3364,
3365, 3387, 3390, 3413, 3499, 3500, 3502, 3503, 3581, 3608, 3627, 3702
Stallraan, Ben 3336
Standard of Living in the Soviet Union, The 3443
Stassen. Harold E 3404
Statesman's Year Book (London) 3686
State Department 3281, 3282, 3310, 3361, 3367, 3369, 3371, 3376,
3377. 3378, 3380, 3382, 3383, 3384, 3385, 3386, 3399, 3400, 3401, 3402,
3410, 3414, 3488, 3494, 3503, 3520, 3555, 3556, 3577, 3601, 3615, 3616,
3617, 3644, 3659, 3661, 3666, 3667, 3676, 3677, 3689, 3709, 3711, 3712
State Department Conference (October 6-8) 3704
State Department (Far Eastern Division) 3398, 3520, 3666, 3667
State Department White Paper 3406, 3650
State Department Loyalty and Security Board 3410
Steel and Metal Workers' Industrial Union 3336
Steely, Mr. E. Newton 3512, 3679
Stefansson, Mr. Vilhjalmur 3546, 3557, 3558, 3560, 3561, 3562, 3563, 3564, 3565
Stefansson, Mrs. Evelyn 3560,3561,3562,3563,3564,3565
Steiger. Andrew 3567, 3653
Stein, Guenther 3331, 3566
Stepanov 3313, 3314
Stewart, Marguerite A 3640
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W 3501,
3503, 3624, 3625, 3626, 3627, 3657, 3667, 3708, 3709
Straits Settlements 3592
Strong, Anna Louise 3523,
• 3524, 3525, 3526, 3527, 3528, 3529, 3530, 3533, 3534, 3559, 3567
The Strongholds of Chinese Communism, a Journey to North Shensi 3288
Suez 3632
Suiyuan Province 3539
Sullivan, Richard 3336
Suma 3589
Sun Fo 359S
Sun, Yat-sen 3300, 3304, 3475, 3476, 3477, 3498, 3537, 3595, 36S3, 3684, 3691
Sun, Madame Yat-sen 3477, 3551, 3567, 3658
Sunday Worker 3529
Sweden 3592, 3600, 3632
Switzerland 3599, 3652
Symposium on China 3485
Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria 3485
Szechwan Province 3306
T
Tanaka, Baron 3702
Takayanagi 3587,3592
Takeda, Shiro 3297
Tarawa 3502
INDEX XXI
Page
Tarr 3588, 3589
Tass 3284,3536
Tawney, R. H 3611, 3612
Taxi Workers Union 3336
Taylor, George 3584, 3594, 3611
Taylor, Jack 3336
Tenth Army (United States) 3625
This Is the Hour 3621
This Soviet World 3528
Thompson 3600
Thompson, Dorothy 3507, 3508
Thompson, John 3581
Thompson, Miss Virginia 3333
Thorner, Daniel 3567, 3636, 3637
Thorner, Mrs. Daniel 3637
Thorpe, General 3547, 3548, 3670
Three Principles of the People or San Min Chu I 3475
Tibet 3292,3552
Tientsin 3651
Tikhi Okean 3318, 3319, 3482, 3485, 3581
Ting Ling 3300, 3304
TiugiMen , 3308
Tito 3503
Todd, Larry 3310
Tokuda, Kyuichy 3567, 3568
Tong, Hollington 3536
Toronto 3470, 3471
Tokyo 3297, 3467, 3469, 3481, 3482, 3521, 3592, 3593, 3702
Trachtenberg, Alexander 3283, 3335
Trade Union Unity Council 3336
The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution 3627
Trans-Pacific Air Service 3324. 3325
Trans-Siberian Railroad 3632, 3701
Treasury Department 3569
Tribute to Alexander Kaun 3620
Trone, Solomon 3568, 3605
Trone, Mrs. Solomon 3605
Trotsky, Leon 3356, 3361, 3467, 3627, 3705
Trud 3460, 3461
Truman Doctrine 3539, 3665
Truman, President Harry S 33.">5, 3357,
3366, 3368, 3370, 3371, 3372, 3375, 3376, 3377, 3378, 3379, 3380, 3382,
3383, 3384, 3385, 3386, 33^7, 3388, 3389, 3390, 3394, 3395, 3397, 3398,
3399, 3400, 3401, 3402. 3J03, 3404, 3409, 3412, 3413, 3416, 3493, 3494,
3495, 3496, 3497, 3573, 3574, 3639, 3640, 3661, 3065, 3676, 3677, 3704
Tseng, Yang-fu 3404
Tsiang, H. T 3337
Tsuru, Shigato 3568
Turkestan 3708
T. V. A 3520
Tydings, Senator Millard E 3282, 3286, 3480
Tydings Committee Hearings 3345,
3350, 3493-3497, 3507, 3573, 3574, 3628, 3668, 3676
Tyler, Miss Charlotte 3322, 3480, 3481
U
Ulan Bator 3318
Unemployed Councils 3336
United Front 3293, 3306, 3.307, 3.5S6, 3669, 3684
Uniled Nations 3357, 3479, 3551, 3632, 3704
United Nations Charter 3407,3408
United Nations (Russian delegalion) 3646
United Nations (San Francisco Conference) 3355
XXn INDEX
Page
United States- 3308, 3325, 3326, 3342, 3350, 3360, 3365, 3374, 3382, 3393, 3394, 3398,
3400, 3409, 3415, 3459, 3172, 3476, 3484, 3498, 3499, 3503, 3536, 3537,
3570, 3574, 3575, 3581, 3583, 3586, 3592, 3595, 3599, 3600, 3602, 3609,
3610, 3615, 3616, 3622, 3627, 3632, 3633, 3639, 3640, 3662, 3663, 3666,
3675, 3676, 3679, 3681, 3684, 3685, 3686, 3688, 3690, 3692, 3693, 3696,
3697, 3699, 3702, 3704, 3706, 3707, 3708, 3709, 3711, 3712, 3713, 3714
United States Armed Forces 3399, 3406, 3541, 3667
U. S. Army 3702
United States Army Chemical Warfare School 3702
United States Army (Department of) 3669, 3701
United States Army Industrial College 3702
United States Army Intelligence (G-2) 8327, 3670
United States Army War College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 3702
United States Army War College (Washington, D. C.) 8643
United States, China, and the World Market, The 3680
United States Department of Agriculture 3693
United States Department of Commerce 3685
United States Government 3305,
3307, 3314, 3315, 3334, 3353, 3355, 3357, 3358, 3363, 3364, 3360, 3373,
3376, 3378, 3379, 3381, 3382, 3384, 338S, 3395, 3403-3405, 3413, 3435-
3436, 3437, 3463, 3465, 3475, 3479, 3500, 3501, 3540, 3541, 3542, 3691
United States Marine Corps 3473, 3474, 3509
United States Army Military Academy (West Point) 3701, 3704
United States Navy 3392, 3473, 3689
United States Navy (Office of Naval Intelligence) 3556, 3557
United States Relations with China (State Department White Paper) — 3705
United States Senate 3674
United States Strategic Bomb-Survey Mission 3297
United States Supreme Court 3645
United States Treasury 3364, 3688, 3697
United States Liberation of Philippines 3324
United States Recognition of the U. S. S. R 3324, 3702
University of California 3536
University of California Press 3287
University of Chicago 3538
University of INlissouri 3498
University of Pennsylvania 3636
University of Washington 3611
University of Wisconsin 3538, 3539
UNNRA 3645
Upper Canada College 3472
Ushiba 3317, 3331
Ussachevsky, Betty 3640
U. S. S. R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 3307, 3317, 3320,
3r!23. 3325, 3326. 3329, 3330, 3335, 3346, 3382, 3423, 3435, 3436, 3449,
3453, 3475, 3476, 3483, 3484, 3487, 3533, 3592, 3G08, 3615, 3695, 3700
U. S. S. R. Air Force 3623
U. S. S. R. Aimv 3498, 3499, 3703
U. S. S. R. Handbook 3317, 3321, 3322
Utlev, Freda 3587, 3610, 3668, 3669, 3705
Uzbekistan 3463
Van Kleeck, Mary 3466, 3568
Van Wiilrec 3486
Varga, Eugene 3313,3314
A'^ersailles ( 'onference 3684
Victoria College 3472
Vincent, John Carter 3280,
3281, 3311, 3371, 3377. 3383, 3384, 3385, 3386, 3397, 3398, 3399, 3400,
3520. 3568. 3640, 3641, 3650, 3651, 3652, 3655, 3656, 3657, 3658, 3659,
3660, 3661, 3662, 3667.
Vinogradoff 3484
Vinson 3640
Virginia Beach Conference (1939) 3482
Virginia Quarterly 3333
INDEX xxm
Page
Vladivostok 3484, 3702
Voi 3313
Voitinsky, G— 3313, 3314, 3315, 3316, 3317, 3318, 3319, 3333, 3439, 3441, 3482, 3484
Vorys, Representative 3407
Vox (Voks) 3452, 3484, 3487
W
Wagenknecht, Alfred 3337
Wales, Nym 3568
Wallace, Henry A 3460, 3461, 3462, 3567, 3575, 3576, 3625, 3632, 3646
3647, 3649, 3650, 3652, 3653, 3654, 3655, 3656, 3657, 3659, 3660, 3709
Wallace Mission 3658, 3660
Walsh 3580
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations 3460,
3462, 3585, 3621, 3636, 3666
Wang, C. C 3594
Wang, Ching-wei 3595, 3596, 3684
War and the Working Class 3309, 3310
War Department 3626, 3627
Ward, Angus 3616
Ward, Mrs 3592
War and Peace in Finland 3425, 3426, 3427, 3428
Wardsworth 3584
Ware, James R 3611
Warnshuis 34S6
Washinjcton Arms Conference of 1921 3702
Washington Post 3609, 3610
Way of a Fighter 3411, 3622, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3706
Webb, Beatrice 3444
Webb, Sidney 3444
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C 3356,
3625, 3627, 3669, 3670, 3708, 3709, 3710, 3712.
Wee, David 3337
We Fought For Peace 3477, 3-178
Weiner, Robert William 3283
Weiner, Tom 3037
Weisberg, Isador 3336
Weizmann Institute (Palestine) 3558
Welles, Sumner 3327
Welsh, Gertrude 3335
Weyl, Nathaniel 3^547, 3543
What Korea Pays for Japanese Rule 3581, 3592
White, Harry Dexter 3568, 3569, 3669
White House ^ 3367,
3368, 3369, 3370, 3377, 3386 3387, 3401, 3409, 3412, 3480, 3493,
3494, 3495, 3573, 3625, 3649, 3650, 3678, 3702.
White, William L 3669
Who Wanted to Recognize Red China 3578, 3611, 3703
Who Said the Chinese Communists Were Not Real Communists 3705
Why China Wants Peace 3538
Wilbur, Ray Lyman 3612
Williamson, J 3335
Willoughby, Gen. Charles A 3566
Wilson, President Woodrow 3701
Wineberg 3484
Winnick 3337
Winter, Carl 3338
Winter, Ella 3569
Wiss, Helen 3580
Wittfogel, Karl August 3545, 3611, 3612, 3613, 3614, 3679
Wolfe, Mr 3539
Workers Ex-Servicemen's League 3336, 3337
Workers International Relief 3337
Workers Monthly 3529
INDEX
Page-
World War I 3421, 3479, 3635, 3691, 3701
World War II 3537, 3538, 3635, 370^
World War III 3623, 3706
World Youth Festival (Fragile) 3601,3636
Wortis, Kose 3335, 3336
Wright, Quincy 3323, 3324
Wu, Leonard T. K 3682,3685
Yakhontoff, Victor A 3569
Yalta Agreement 3395, 3412, 370^
Yanaihara 3581, 3592
Yangtze Valley 3520, 3586, 3622, 3624, 3706, 3708, 3710, 3712, 3713
Yardumian, Rose ( Stein) 3280, 3309, 3310, 3311, 3552, 3566, 3567, 3570
Yarnell, Admiral Harry 3478
Yasuo 3587
Yekelchik 3337
Yellow River 3501, 3624
The Yen and the Sword 3331
Yenan 3289
3290, 3292, 3293, 3294, 3296, 3297, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3304, 3305, 3306,
3308, 3309, 3341, 3353, 3388, 3405, 3501, 3503, 3624, 3625, 3628, 3629
Yenan (American Mission to) 3624
Yenan (Foreign Office) 3288, 3300, 3304
Yenan (Trip to) 3287, 3288
Yenchang 3308
Yenching University 3476
Yergan, Max 3556, 3570
Young, Margaret 3566
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) ^ 3602
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) 3537, 3636
Youth 3477, 3478
Yu-ch'uan 3612, 3613
Yugoslavia 3503,3664
Yunnan . 3625
Z
Zhukov ^ 3313,3314
Zilboorg, Gregory 3620, 3620
Zucker, Edith 333T
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