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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



HEARINGS 

BEFOBE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTEATION 

OF THE INTEENAL SECUEITY ACT AND OTHEE 

INTEENAL SECUEITY LAWS 

OF THB 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGEESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



PART 10 



MARCH 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, AND 21, 1952 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I ^ 

' HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER 

INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC llELATIONS 



PART 10 



MARCH 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, AND 21, 1952 



Printed for the use of the Committee ou the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
88348 WASHINGTON : 1952 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PAT AIcCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington HOMER FERGUSON. Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

WILLIS SMITH. North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

J. G. SouRwiNK, Comifiel 



Internal Security Stbcujimittee 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. OCONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 



Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relatione 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

Robert Morris, Special Counsel 
Ben.tamin Mandbl, Director of Research 
II 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Testimony of Lattimore, Owen 3277-3674 

Appendix I 3680-3714 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2008 



http://www.archive.org/details/instituteofpacif10unit 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS 



TUESDAY, XHARCH 4, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 

Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security 

Laws, op the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. G . 
The subcommittee met at 10 :15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) pre- 
siding. 

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Wat- 
kins, and Jenner. 

Also present : Senator McCarthy, J. G. Sourwine, committee coun- 
sel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, 
research director. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN 
ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL— Resumed 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the other day, at the close of 
the hearing, I said I had some questions to ask in relation to the reports 
that came out of the Moscow meeting. 

It was indicated that Mr. Lattimore did not know anything about 
these reports that appeared now in the evidence. 

Is that still your contention, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. To the best of my recollection, I don't 
remember them. 

Senator Ferguson. What is it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I say to the best of my recollection, I don't re- 
member ever seeing those minutes before. 

Senator Ferguson. You wrote Ordeal by Slander ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And you feel that you are responsible for all 
that is in it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I ask you to look at page 51. It is a 
chapter by your wife : 

We had breakfast with Edward C. Carter. Mr. Carter had been secretary- 
general of the Institute of Pacific Relations when Owen had edited Pacific 
Affairs, and I wanted to see him because McCarthy's speech had dealt at length 
with the IPR and Owen's connection with it, all still based on Kohlberg and 
China Lobby, and had laid great stress on Owen's one visit to Moscow where 
he had spent 10 days with Carter on IPR business in 1936. 

3277 



3278 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Now, that is the meeting that we were talking about the other day ; 
is it not ? 

Mr. Lattimore, That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I read further : 

The present secretary-general, William Holland, and his family, also old 
friends of ours, were staying at the Carters', and it made me happy to know 
that I had won support and help of all of them. Mr. Carter gave me copies of 
old reports he and Owen had made to the IPll about the Moscow visit, and 
also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night 
before. 

Now, where are those reports? 

Mr. Lati'imore. We have them in our file now. 

Senator Ferguson. Are they the same as this report? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I don't believe so. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliy did you not tell us before about these re- 
ports ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Why should I? 

Senator Ferguson. Why should you? 

Mr. Latitmore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you not sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At the time of these hearings, this whole business 
that some reports that I had written at that time had been shown to 
my wife had completely slipped my mind. It is in a printed book. 

Senator Ferguson. "VVlien we produced the reports out of the files 
that we obtained up in the barn, did you not indicate to us that you 
were in no way responsible for any of those reports, and inferred any 
other reports? 

Mr. Latitmore. I didn't infer anything of the kind. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you produce the reports now that are 
mixed in here? 

Mr. Lattimore. They are in a })rinted book somewhere. I will try 
and find them for you and bring them to you. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they made from these typewritten re- 
ports ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you know that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Because I remember that the general procedure 
w^as that when I came back from a trip of that kind, I think I would 
write in a sort of letter report. 

Senator Ferguson. But here wei-e official reports as if they were 
taken at the meetings ; is that not true ? 

The Chairman. Answer audibly, please. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is what they appear to be; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you not infer in j^our answers that you 
felt that we should not use that kind of report, because you had no 
knowledge of them? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. All that I inferred was that the state- 
ments there made about what was being discussed were reports of 
my words and were not a stenographic record of what I had actually 
said, and I also stated that I did not recall ever having seen those re- 
ports. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not suppose that those reports were 
used by Carter, at least, in making up the reports ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3279 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea how Carter made up his reports. 

Senator Ferguson. It says here that you and Carter made them up. 

Mr. Lattimore. I made a report, and Carter made a report, I 
beheve. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what this says? 

Mr. Lattimore. May I see that? 

(A document was handed to the witness.) 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the report that you made ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I will try and find the book in which it is; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us have the report. The report was not in 
a book ; you did not write the book and give it to them ? 

Mr. Laitimore. No, sir; I wrote a report to the IPR, I believe, 
which was included in one of the IPR publications. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you keep a copy? 

]\rr. Laitimore. When I wrote it? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. I may have. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you look and see? 

Mr. Lattimore. I haven't seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that show that you wrote a report or you 
and Carter wrote a report? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Mr. Carter gave me copies of old reports. * * * 

That is indicating more than one report — 

* * * He and Owen had made to the IPR about the Moscow visit. 

That would indicate to me that he had made a report and I had 
made a report — 

And also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night 
before. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see that press release ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall ever seeing it, no. 

Senator Ferguson. You passed off rather lightly this meeting with 
Moscow in your Ordeal by Slander ; did you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I didn't think it was a very important meeting. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not think it was important. That is 
all at the present time. I will have further questions when we see 
your report. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Sourwine, I think you drew my attention to the fact that a 
question was pending when we concluded. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, according to my 
memory. The witness had begun an answer and had not concluded 
at the time the recess was called. 

The Chairman. Is the record of yesterday's proceedings available ? 

Mr. Morris. It will be here in a moment, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris ; you may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record at this 
time the date of the Russian-Japanese Nonaggression Pact that was 
signed in 1941 ? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel ? 



3280 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel. I read from the World Almanac of 1944, page 36, under 
the heading of Japan: "Signed 5 year neutrality pact with Russia 
April 13, 1941." 

The Chairman. What is the object of that? Will you please con- 
nect that up? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness yesterday gave testimony 
concerning a meeting that was held in Washington on June 18, 1931, 
and we were trying to determine the political atmosphere that pre- 
vailed at that time. 

The Chairman. Proceed, sir. 

Before you proceed, I have here page 5337 of the record of these 
proceedings. Mr. Lattimore was under examination by Mr. Morris. 
I read from that page to connect it up : 

Mr. MoKRis. Wlio was present at the meeting? 

Does that give you a connection, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Reference was being had to the luncheon with 
Rogov, I believe. 

Mr. Laitimore. I don't think it was a luncheon. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is correct. You stated that it was not a 
luncheon. I am sorry. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

Mr. SouKwiNE. It was pretty late in the afternoon to have a luncheon? 
Mr. Lattimore. The middle of the afternoon. 
Mr. Morris. How long did it last, Mr. Lattimore? 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. 
Mr. Morris. Who was present at the meeting? 

Mr. Lattimore. The only person that I clearly recall being present, because I 
walked out with him afterward * * * 

Do you wish to finish that ? 

Mr. Latiimore. The only person I recall was Mr. C. F. Remer, 
who was at that time, I believe, connected with OSS, one of the United 
States intelligence agencies, and I believe I recall commenting to him 
as we went out about some of the questions that had been asked Rogov. 

I may say that I remember asking Rogov only one question myself. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, how long did that meeting last? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent present ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether he was present or not. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, on our exhibit No. 26, introduced into 
the open hearings, is the document f I'om Rose Yardumian, of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations, to Mr. Edward C. Carter. 

The postcript on that reads : 

Rogov and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last two and a half hours, 
talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent. 

That is the notation on this letter which describes the meeting that 
the witness is now testifying to. That is already in our record, Mr. 
Chairman. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. Does that refresh your memory? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not very much. 

According to my memory, there would have been more people pres- 
ent than that. 

Senator Ferguson. Does it refresh your memory that you were there 
for several hours, two and a half hours ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3281 

Mr. Lattimore. Not very clearly, no. 

Mr. Morris. It could have been" longer, too, could it not have been, 
Mr. Lattimore ? 

At that point it lasted two and a half hours. 

Mr. Lattimore. It could have been longer, or it could have been 
shorter. 

Senator Ferguson. The only Vincent that was indicated there 
would have been Vincent of the State Department, would it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Up here in the letter itself it is: "talked with 
Owen Lattimore, Carl Eemer, and John Carter Vincent." 

Mr. Lattimore. I may point out, Mr. Senator, that here was a Kus- 
sian who had been in Japanese occupied Shanghai, and it was a 
highly proper thing at that time for American Government personnel 
to interview such a person and see if they could get any information 
out of him. 

Senator Ferguson. But there was not any doubt about him being a 
Communist, was there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Nor was there any doubt even of the fact that American Government 
personnel should try to get any information they could out of Japanese 
occupied Shanghai, in 1944. 

Senator Ferguson. But did not your book say that you did not 
know any Russians or Communists? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think if you will read the context of that, Sena- 
tor Ferguson, you will see that it clearly shows that my wife was writ- 
ing in 1950, that as of 1950 I didn't know any Russians in this country. 

Mr. Morris. When you say you didn't know 

Senator Ferguson. Just a mhiute. 

Do I understand you want to convey to us now that your wife was 
writing and you approved it in your book that, as of the date that 
you wrote the book, you did not know any Russians or Communists? 
In 1950 ? Why do you limit it to 1950 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am not limiting it in that manner at all, Sena- 
tor. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat did you mean by 1950 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. This was written in 1950. Where is the reference ? 

The Chairman. Just one moment. I would like to have the record 
read back there, if you please. 

(The record, as heretofore transcribed, was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Lattimore. I limit it to 1950 because it was written in 1950, and 
the context clearly shows that she was writing about the general period 
of 1950, and the McCarthy charges. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you charged as of 1950 of associating with 
the Communists on the day that she wrote it ? It does not say anything 
about 1950 there. 

Mr. Lattimore. I still haven't been able to find the exact reference. 
Mr. Morris. It is page 35, Mr. Lattimore. You will probably find it 
underlined. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; here is the context. 
Senator Ferguson. Read it. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

McCarthy had replied that this is completely untrue. This man has a desk at 
the State Department and has access to the files, at least he had until 4 or 5 weeks 
ago. He is one of the top advisers on Far Eastern affairs, has been for a long 
timie, and they know it. 



3282 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Nothing in McCarthy's description fitted Owen, but the thought crossed my 
mind that Tydings' description did. He had been on tlie Reparations Mission to 
Japan 5 years ago. It was a White House mission, but I just discovered in look- 
ing through old records that he Iiad been paid by the State Department. But the 
thought was too fantastic. He didn't know any Russians in this country or any 
Communists. He didn't have access to any secret material. How could anybody, 
even McCarthy, accuse him of being a spy? 

Senator Ferguson. You claim that that refers only to the time that 
she was writing ? 

Mr. LA'rriMORE. That refers to the general period in which she was 
writing, and in which McCarthy was saying that I was — apparently 
McCarthy meant at that time — the top Soviet agent in this country. 

Senator Ferguson. And also does it not say that : "He had been on 
the Reparations Commission to Japan 5 years ago" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Did that refer to the time she was w^riting? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would mean that at the time she was wanting, 
she was actually stating that 5 years before I had been in Japan. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, would not Mrs. Lattimore have written 
"he doesn't know any Russians'' if she were talking about that present 
time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Morris, I think this is a rather quibbling ques- 
tion about grammar. 

The Chairman. Just a minute. 

Mr. Morris. It is not quibbling. She would have said "He doesn't 
know any Russians," to bear out your interpretation. 

Mr, Lattimore. She is writing a chapter there about her experiences 
before I got home from Afghanistan, and slie was saying that as of this 
time of her experiences, before I got back from Afghanistan, she was 
saying that I didn't know any Russians in this country. 

Senator Ferguson. And also she was writing at a time, Mr. Latti- 
more, was she not, when you were coming back, and you approved 
this? 

Mr. Lattimore. She was not writing at that time. She was writing 
about it. 

The Chairman, Wait until the Senator finishes his question. 

Senator Ferguson. But she w^as also writing, and putting it in your 
book, and had it distributed after the Tydings hearings; is that not 
right ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you not feel that that was the end of 
all hearings on that question ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I certainly hoped it was. However, I M'as already 
somewhat aware of the new jjractice of nudtiple jeopardy. 

Senator Ferguson, Do you call this multiple jeopardy? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir; I do. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think this was all brought out in the 
Tydings hearings ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think it w^as quite sufficiently brought out in the 
Tydings hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. I would think that you would think it was suf- 
ficiently brought out there, but we did not. 

Now, the Tydings hearings have access to the documents in reply 
to this, showing that you did know Communists? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3283 

Mr. Lattimore. None of the documents that had been brought out 
show that I knew Communists in 1950, or Kussians, in this country. 

Senator Ferguson. So you want to limit this now to your activities 
in 1950? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I would just like a distinction kept clear 
between the period that my wife was quite obviously writing about 
and the period ranging up to 10 and more years previously, covered 
by these various items from the IPK files that Mr. Morris has been 
bringing out. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, when did you leave the IPE,? 

Mr. Lattimore. When did I leave it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. You mean its employ ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. I left its employ in 1941. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you cease being a member of the 
trustees ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I am still a trustee. 

Senator Ferguson. You still are a trustee? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you think that your activities as far as 
this book was concerned, you were limiting them to 1950? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I am saying that my wife's statement was 
limited to the general period of 1950. 

Senator Ferguson. That did not become your statement by the pub- 
lishing of the book? 

That is not a legal problem ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Would you repeat that. Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Did it not become your statement when you 
published the book ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It became the statement in a book published, of 
which I was listed as the author, certainly. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you want to answer the question ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the way I want to answer it ; yes. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Chairman, in connection with this mention of the 
man Rogoff in this line of questioning, I would like to have a little 
background from the previous testimony about this. 

Mr. Mandel, will you read from the bottom of page 528 in the 
Budenz testimony ? 

The Chairman. The Budenz testimony is before this committee? 

Mr. Morris. Before this committee, Senator. 

The Chairman. Just a moment. 

Mr. Budenz w\as then under oath? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mandel. (Reading) : 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you attended which 
Mr. Field reported for the IPR? 

Mr. Budenz. That was a meeting of 1943 when I began to anticipate and then 
thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meeting of the political bureau 
at which Earl Browder I know definitely was present, and I believe Robert 
William Weiner. His name strikes me because he was not always present at 
these meetings, and other members of the Politburo who were not generally 
there, including Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had 
received word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr. 
Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken. It was a 



3284 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

communication either iKjrsonally or in some other way. Mr. Field just returned 
from a trip and I set the impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore person- 
ally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information comins to him from the inter- 
national Communist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was 
to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say that the 
negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive opposition 
and that more stress was to be put upon attacking Chiang Kai-shek. 

Mr. Morris. Did the Communist Party line change at that time? 

Mr. BUDENz. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy of this. 
They were advised that there was in the course of preparation an article by 
Vladimir Rogoff, the Tass correspondent, written at Moscow's request on this 
question which would attack the appeasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek. 

The Chairman. The Tass correspondent, you say? 

Mr. BuDENz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Can you explain what Tass was? 

Mr. BuDENz. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this country and so 
far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely. 

Mr. Morris. Was this article subsequently communicated to the Daily Worker? 

Mr. BuDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. The first 
message was received through Grace Granich who had been in charge of the 
Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been put out of business by the 
Department of Justice, but who continued to maintain her relations with the 
Soviet Embassy, consulate, and other sources of information, including commu- 
nications to Moscow and we were advised of the coming of this article and then 
we received it. 

Mr. Morris. And was the Communist line actually changed as a result of these 
steps that were taken? 

Mr. BuDBNz. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name of T. A. 
Bis.son was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to write an article in con- 
nection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs publication on this matter explaining 
the democratic character of the Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang 
Kai-shek and his group represented antidemocracy. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the Institute of 
Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of Pacific Relations and 
its publication Pacific Affairs? 

Mr. BuDENz. That is correct. I sort of got the two together. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did T. A. Bisson write an article for 
the IPR at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe he did; yos. 

Mr. Morris. What was the name of the article, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the name of the article. I recall that 
it was not published in Pacific Affairs as implied in the testimony 
just read. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, is the article by Mr. Bisson which was 
written for the Institute of Pacific Relations in our record now? 

Mr. Mandel. It is in our record on page 534 of our hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that article ? 

Mr. Mandel. The date of the article is July 14, 1943, published in 
the Far Eastern Survey. 

Mr. Morris. Is the Far Eastern Survey an official publication of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. It is an official organ of the American Council of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. Let me get this straight, now. 

This article that you are about to read, the witness says was not 
published in the publication Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not published in Pacific Affairs. 

The Chairman. You are now reading from another magazine? 

Mr. Morris. There were only two publications of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, one Pacific Affairs and the other Far Eastern 
Survey. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3285 

The Chairman. And this is from the Far Eastern Survey. 
Senator Smith. AVhat connection did he have with that? 
Mr. Morris. It is going to be brought out, Senator, the connection 
there. 
Will you read the two passages ? 
Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

However, tbese are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might 
be called Feudal China ; the other Democratic China. These terms express the 
actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the 
two Chinas. 

Then further: 

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Com- 
munist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown ofC the feudal 
incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can 
be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. 
Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one sup- 
porting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which 
has freed the peasant — the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over 
most of China — from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest 
charges as levied by a feudal economy. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, does not Mr. T. A. Bisson there label 
Nationalist China feudal China, and Communist China a democratic 
China? 

Mr. Lattimore. Apparently he does. 

Mr. Morris. Did that particular article provoke the Chinese Council 
ofthelPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I have subsequently read somewhere, 
maybe in the transcript of these proceedings, that it did. I had 
nothing to do with the article at that lime. 

Mr. Morris. Did you read tlie article? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I did. At that time I was exceed- 
ingly busy as Deputy Director of OWI in San Francisco, and I don't 
believe I was keeping up with the Institute of Pacific Relations' publi- 
cations at all. 

Mr. Morris. Do you agree with that particular article by Mr. 
Bisson? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would have to read the whole article to deter- 
mine whether I agreed with it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Might I ask a question ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You knew about this article, did you not, Mr. 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At the time ? 

Mr. Sourwine. At the time and here, as of today, yesterday, the 
day before yesterday ? 

ikr. Lattimore. Subsequently I have seen it mentioned in the tran- 
scripts that I have read. I haven't reread the article. 

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, did you not have this article 
so clearly in mind that when Senator Ferguson the other day referred 
to the matter you corrected him both as to the name of the author and 
as to the place where the article had appeared ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I remember it clearly enough for that. 

Senator Ferguson. And you knew that that was the change in 
policy, did you not ? 



3286 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr, Lattimore. No, sir ; I knew from reading tlie transcript of these 
proceedings, and also, I believe, the Tydings proceedings, that this 
had been referred to as having something to do with a change in line. 

With the article I had no connection whatever. I don't know 
enough about the history of the Comnmnist line to know whether that 
was in fact a switch in the Communist line; but whether it was a 
switch or a continuation of an old line, or whatever it may be, it cer- 
tainly did not coincide with what I was saying and writing at the 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was a party line, that the 
Communists had a party line? 

Mr. Lattimore. I know in general that the Communists have a party 
line; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. When would you say that you acquired that 
knowledge ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would be impossible to say. 

Senator Ferguson. About when ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would be impossible to say. The party line is 
something that is generally associated with Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. And has been for years, has it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. And has been for years. I don't know how long. 
I have never been a specialist in Comnmnist politics, and I have never 
made it my business to analyze the Communist Party line or the 
switches, or anything of that kind. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, tlien, Mr. Lattimore, that yon 
did not at that time read the Bisson article and that the Bisson article 
was contrary to things you were writing at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. It is my testimony that, to the best of my recol- 
lection, I did not read the article at that time, didn't even know of it 
until some vague time later, and most of my knowledge of it at this 
moment is based on reading the transcripts of these proceedings. 

Mr. Morris. And could it not coincide with what you were saying 
at that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. If it is a line that says — what is it supposed to have 
said ? 

Mr. Morris. That Nationalist China was feudal China, and that 
Communist China was democratic China. 

Mr. Lattimore. All I remember is that as of 1943 I gave a couple 
of lectures down at Pomona College in San Francisco. 

The Chairman. That is not an answer. 

Will you read the question, please, Mr. Reporter? Read Mr. Mor- 
ris's question. 

(The record, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter). 

The Chairman. The question was, Was it contrary to the line you 
were writing at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I believe it is completely contrary. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of the Office of War 
Information at 111 Center Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated July 
2(), 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, signed "Owen," and typed 
signature "Owen Lattimore, Director, Pacific Operations." 

Mr. Morris, Mr. Lattimore, will you look at that letter and testify 
as to whether or not you wrote that letter? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3287 

Mr. Lattimore. I must have written this letter, yes. 
Mr. Morris. Will you read the first paragraph, please? 
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. [Reading :] 

Dear Bill : Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's 
article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing 
an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away 
a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different ter- 
minology. Nevertheless, I think his main points are as sound as you think they 
are. 

It is just Bossible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month and 
if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave. 

Mr. Morris. There is no use reading the rest of it unless you care 
to, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't need to. This apparently indicates 
that I agreed with some opinion that Mr. Holland expressed at that 
time which I had not seen. ^ 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record ? 

The Chairman. It may be received in the record. 

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 512" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 512 

Office of War Information, 

111 Sutter Street, 
San Francisco, Calif., July 26, 19.'f3. 
Mr. W. L. Holland, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, 

New York City 22, N. T. 

Dear Bill: Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's 
article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing 
an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away 
a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different 
terminology. Nevertheless I think his main points are as sound as you think 
they are. 

It is just possible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month 
and if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave. 

I am very much ashamed of having fallen down on my review assignment. 
I think I can assure you of the review article by September 15. However, the 
difference in publication date is not serious as the dating of the book itself now 
makes it a matter of the historical record of stages in Russian opinion about 
China, rather than an urgent current presentation. 

If the University of California Press write to me for an opinion on Norin's 
manuscript, I shall be very glad to give a recommendation. 
Yours, 

Owen /s/ 
Owen Lattimore, 
Director, Pacific Operations. 

Mr. Morris. Did T. A. Bisson go with you when you went to 
Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he did. 

Mr. Morris. When did you make that trip to Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was in the spring of 1937 sometime. 

Mr. Morris. What arrangement did you make for that trip, Mr. 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We traveled from Peking by rail up to Shansi 
Province, then down south through Shansi Province, then west into 
Shensi Province, and got to what I think was the railhead at the city of 
Sian, and then we chartered a motor car and drove up to Yenan. 

The Chairman. You say we. We was in the party ? 

Mr. ISIoRRis. Who accompanied you on that trip ? 



3288 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe. 

Mr. Morris. Did you confer with Mao Tse-tung when you were in 
Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We had an interview with 

The Chairman. The question is: Did you confer with Mao Tse- 
tung ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not call it conferring. 

Mr. Morris. How much time did you spend with Mao Tse-tung? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. I think there were a couple 
of interviews at which he was asked questions, principally by Mr. 
Bisson and Mr. Jaflfe. Each of those interviews would probably 
last anliour or two. T am not sure how long. 

Mr. Morris. Where did you stay? Did you stay at the Foreign 
Office in Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We stayed at, I believe, a sort of hostel that they 
liad for visitors. 

Mr. Morris. Did you, Mr. Lattimore, confer with Chu Teh ? 
' Mr. Lattimore. I would not say that we conferred with him, no. 

Mr. Morris. Did you speak with him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I spoke with him. 

Mr. Morris. Did you speak with Chou En-lai ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you address a mass meeting in Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I made some general remarks, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you write an account of that for- 
the London Times, that trip to Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that. JNIaybe I did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked in the corner "F. V. F. 
etc." The title is "The Strongholds of Chinese Communism, a Jour- 
ney to North Shensi," by Owen Lattimore. In the upper left-hand 
corner it says : "Sent by O. L. to Times, London (may not be published, 
of course)." 

Mr. Morris. Do you recall that article, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't recall it, and I don't recall whether 
it was published, or not. I did occasionally publish articles in the 
London Times. 

Mr. Morris. Then does that recall anything to you, Mr. Lattimore? 

The Chairman. You are referring to the exhibit identified by 
Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman. 

Does not that purport to be an article that you prepared for the 
London Times, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. It certainly appears to be. I had completely for- 
gotten it, forgotten about it. 

Mr. Morris. Is that a true account of your experiences in Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably it is. I haven't read it yet. May I 
read it? 

Mr. Morris. You may. 

Mr. Lattimore. This is headed "One," indicating that there may 
have been a later one. [Reading :] 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3289 

(Exhibit No. 513) 

Many people at Nanking will tell you that Chinese communism is finished. 
The appeal to class war has been drop-ped. The landlords are no longer being 
appropriated. The territory held by the Communists is poor in agriculture and 
almost barren of other resources. The Communists are already accepting sub- 
sidy from Nanking, and are offering to accept incorporation into Nanking's 
armies. This must mean, in the end, the "fading army" of the Communists as 
a separate political and military force, unless perhaps theiy faintly survive as a 
left-wing group within the orthodox Chinese nationalism. 

Yet, if this be collapse, the Communists are not in the least anxious to cover 
it up. On the contrary, they claim that the present situation is chiefly of their 
own asking. It was they who relaxed tlie lockjaw silence of the Sian crisis 
last winter with the magic of their united-front slogans. They did not inter- 
vene until after Marshal Chiang Kai-shek had been made prisoner by the 
mutinous remnants of the old Manchurian armies. When they did intervene, it 
was to save the life of the Generalissimo, their mortal enemy of 10 years of civil 
war. This they did to show that they were more eager to rally the nation against 
Japan than to triumph over Nanking. The implication of what they say is 
that they do not intend to wither away in the ravines and loess plateau of north 
Shensi. There is more than a hint, in the assured maneuvering of the youthful 
veterans who led the Red armies, that they believe already that they have a 
negative control strong enough to prevent Nanking from doing what they do 
not like, which may yet be converted into positive control and full command 
of the situation. 

All of this makes north Shensi not only a mystery, but a region in which i)er- 
haps can be discovered important clues to the unfolding history of eastern 
Asia ; the struggle for unity in Cliina ; the forces welding illiterate millions into 
increasingly solid and formidable resistance against Japan; the convergence 
on China, from different directions, of Japan and the Soviet Union. 

Not knowing of any underground tunnels that would lead me to north Shensi, 
I set about planning the journey in trustful innocence. I sent a letter to the 
Red capital, by ordinary mail, with my address candidly printed on the back of 
the envelope — and got in answer a cordial invitation. Accordingly, I went by 
train to Sian, the capital of Shensi, and then by car to Yenan, the Red capital, 
about 250 miles to the north. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt at that point? 

Is tliat a true account of your preliminary arrangements to Yenan? 

Mr. Lattimore. It sounds like it. I liacl completely forgotten 
about it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read from the testimony of Mr. 
Lattimore, taken in executive session before this committee? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. I am reading from page 71 : 

Mr. Morris. And before you went beyond that line — 

That is the line separating Communist China from Nationalist 
China— 

demarkation, it would be necessary to have the Communist authorities' permis- 
sion; isn't that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. You mean anyone could go up there? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time, the Communists were welcoming anybody who 
would go in. The government authorities were trying to stop people from 
goinir in. 

Mr. Morris. The Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Lattimore. The Nationalist Government. 

Mr. Morris. So the only objection to going up there would come from the Na- 
tionalist Government? 

Mr. Lattimore. The only objection came from the Nationalist Government. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not 
make any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in? 

Mr. Lattimore. None whatever. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 2 



3290 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Which is correct? 

Mr. Lattimore. I see no conflict, Senator Ferguson. 

Apparently, according to this account, I wrote up to the Reds and 
said, ''Would it be all right if I came up ^" and they said, "Sure, fine," 
and I went on up. They didn't make the arrangements. 

And, as I state in this article, which I had completely forgotten, 
I didn't know about any underground tunnels leading up there. I 
just got on a train and went. 

Senator Ferguson. Read the last answer. 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not 
malie any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in? 
Mr. Lattimore. None whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not tell us about writing the letter. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had completely forgotten about it. I wrote 
from Peking and I didn't consider that this indicates a prearrange- 
ment for travel arrangements at all. 

Senator Ferguson. You felt that you could not got in without the 
consent of the Communists or you would have never written them. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I wanted to have the whole thing com- 
pletely in the open, so I wrote a letter up there saying, "Would it be 
all right if I wanted to come?" 

I knew in general that all of the newspapermen were trying to get 
up there. I don't know whether other newspapermen used the same 
method that I did, or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know other newspapermen, whether 
they did get up ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, other newspapermen did get up. 

Senator Ferguson. Who did you take with you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I went with Mr. Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe. 

Senator Ferguson. And did your letter state you wanted them to 
come along? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection whatever. It may well 
have. I don't know about Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, but the suggestion of 
going up there was, to the best of my recollection, originally made 
to me by Mr. Bisson. 

Senator Ferguson. Bisson suggested it? 

Mr. LAT'riMORE. I think so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, when you wrote, would you not include 
Bisson and Jaffe if they were to go along with you? 

Mr. Lati^imore. I don't know. It depends on what tiiuo the letter 
was written. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. To Avhom did you address your letter, Mr. Latti- 
more, do you remember that? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea, no. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you know anyone in Yenan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't know anyone in Yenan. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you would write to the government, 
would you not ? 

]VIr. Lattimore. I might write to — I don't know that I would have 
called it the government at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. To whom did you write, then? What would 
you write a letter for ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3291 

Mr. Lattimore, I would write a letter to indicate that I was not 
somebody trying to sneak in; that T was just somebody who wanted 
to come up. 

Senator Ferguson, Who would be inclined to keep you out? You 
would have to write to those persons. Who would they be ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That would depend, Senator, on what was the 
terminology being used at that time. After the Sian incident in De- 
cember 1936, the Nationalist Government had given the Communists 
up there some kind of status — I don't remember exactly what it was — 
and I would presumably write to whatever aduiinistrative organ was 
indicated by the terminology of the time. 

The Chairman. You wrote a letter up there, but you say now you 
cannot recall to whom you wrote it; is that right, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. To whom you addressed the letter is something 
you cannot remember? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. That is right. It was presumably addressed to 
some sort of office rather than a person. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you help me ? I have trouble at times with 
your testimony along this line, that you know nothing about com- 
munism, and at other times it appears to me the testimony indicates 
that you know all about communism. 

On this, will you know al^out this comnumism in China? 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew that there were Communists in northwest 
China, and I was very eager to go up and see something about it. 

Just not long before that, a 10-year news famine on the Chinese 
Communists had been broken by Mr. Snow, who had succeeded in com- 
ing up there and coming out with a story that had set every other 
newspaperman in China trying to get up there. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not this article in the London Times, 
whether it appeared or not, that you are reading, did not the first part 
of it indicate that you were well familiar with Comnmnists in China 
and Communist activities ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; it indicates that I was familiar, as the first 
paragraph shows, with what people at Nanking were saying and 
thinking, and it indicates, as the second paragraph shows, that I was 
familiar with whatever I was able to observe while I was up there, 
for about 4 days. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, does not this letter that was 
read to you just a few moments ago, July 26, about the Bisson article, 
indicate that you knew something about Communists when you said : 

Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom be might have 
persuaded with the use of a different terminology. 

In other words, he was calling, in that article, the Communists of 
China the democrats. Did this not indicate that you knew all about 
communism and that the line was not to use words here in the articles 
to turn people away ? ^ 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; it indicates that 

Senator Ferguson. What was the terminology that you were talk- 
ing about here ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would have to reread the article to know that. 
Senator. 

Mr. Morris. May I see that, Mr. Lattimore ? 



3292 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I am going to suggest that since it is two and a lialf pages long, 
rather than to go into the whole thing, I would just like one more 
paragraph placed. 

But if you care to read the whole thing 

Mr. Arnold. I haven't seen it. He would like to read tlie whole 
thing. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness has expressed a wish to 
read the whole letter. 

The Chairman. He may read the whole letter. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. For the sake of continuity of the record, Mr. Chair- 
man, may I ask that the witness be permitted to read it all the way 
through ? 

The Chairman. Beginning at the first? 

Mr. Sourwine. No, beginning where he left off. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

It took 4 days to get there from Sian and 6 to get back, because the rains 
were on and we were driving through the heart of the loess country. The 
yellow, wind-dropped soil lies hundreds of feet thick over what used to be the 
face of the earth. Tlie hills are smothered, but a network of streams has cut 
down to the ancient valley beds, so that the formation is now one of innumerable 
plateaux, some of them higher and some lower, but all flat-topped and all divided 
from each other by straight-sided ravines. "When it rains, the whole landscape 
becomes a nightmare of rather inferior, pale-colored chocolate. The sti-eams 
boil up in flood and the cubes of tableland sag and slump. As a matter of fact, 
it is not a country made for wheels at all. The local inhabitant prefers pack 
mules, when it is dry, and when it is wet, he gives up altogether, because even 
a mule skids on wet loess. Only the foreigner, winching and flinching from 
the memory of fleas indoors, and the revolutionary, who has been trained to 
follow a line even when skidding, stay out in the wet and strive to make progress. 
It is not easy, because the newly and crudely made motor road traverses the 
pale chocolate nightmare in appalling ascents and descents. From each ravine 
it attacks the next cube of tableland at a corner, climbing at angles that are 
difficult even for trucks with five gears ; it then rushes across the top of the cube 
and falls over the far edge in a series of even more terrifying swoops. 

In spite of this, it has become a pilgrim's highway. Chinese educators and 
students are going up by the hundred, and many of them stay to take courses 
in the Red academy. Foreign visitors are welcomed, and missionaries are be- 
ing urged to come up and see for themselves that their preujises are undamaged 
and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in pri- 
vate, as they like. The only foreign visitors thus far have been Americans, 
but the Communists profess impatience to see representatives of other nations, 
and judging from the way tliey talk, the first Englishman to arrive will be a 
good deal of a hero. 

There is in this a slightly wry contract with the history of the last 10 years, 
when missionaries fled at tlie whisper of a Red raid, and when Great Britain, 
rather than Japan, was the bull's eye in the target of Communist propaganda. 
What does this reversal mean? Is this the true end of the long march? When 
the ghost army of the Reds was flitting from Kiangsi round by the fringes of 
Tibet to the uneasy lands of the partly Muslim, partly Chinese, partly Mongol 
northwest, a curious thing became noticeable. Whenever it was officially re- 
ported that a detachment of the Red army had been surrounded and annihilated, 
that particular column invariably turned up, a little later, 50 or a hundred 
miles farther ahead on its appointed line of march. Bearing this in mind I 
was particularly eager, when the Sung pagoda overlooking Yenan came in view 
to find out whether the famed, almost fabulous, leaders of the Red army showed 
any signs of that fading-out so knowingly predicted of them in tlie best semi- 
official quarters. As a matter of fact, one of the first things I heard was that 
in a blockhouse on another hill, opposite the pagoda, built before the Reds came, 
to defend the town from them, there still stand the proclamations offering large 
rewards for INIao Tse-tung and Chu Te, dead or alive. The Reds had never 
assaulted the town. It was the defense that laded out, leaving only the notices 
behind it. Another omen? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3293 

Mao Tse-tung, the first of the leaders that I met, did not look faded. In fact, 
they say he has put on a little weight during the recent months of relative in- 
activity. It is absurd, looking at him, to think of the rumors current for 
years that he was about to die of tuberculosis. It would be equally absurd to 
think of him as a ravening bandit or as a cold doctrinaire. 

The Chairman. Who is that you are speaking of there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mao Tse-tung. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire? 

That was your own opinion? That was not what somebody was 
telling you? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was my opinion at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. Indicating that I didn't know much about com- 
munism. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the revolutionary people that you 
were talking about following the line that you referred to before ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume he would be generally included, yes. 
• Senator Ferguson. You knew about the party line, then? 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew there was such a thing, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you knew how Communists followed it, 
as indicated in your remarks in there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Generally speaking, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That was specific ; was it not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. What ? 

No; it is just a general reference to the fact that there is such a 
thing as a Communist line, and that Communists follow the line even 
when they skid, or try to. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, proceed. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

In the course of a few days I saw him in many moods ; at interviews that 
lasted for hours; at meals, at the theater (in the church of the English Baptist 
Mission), where sketches and short plays were being put on that substituted 
United Front propaganda for Communist indoctrination. One of my most vivid 
impressions was on the evening of my departure. The room was full ; Chu Te 
and Chou En-lai had their heads together over a statement to the press; others 
were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken "out" — 
for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet 
entirely free. I happened to glance at Mao Tse-tung, who was sitting in the 
middle of it all. His head had sunk forward a little, his arms hung limp, his 
face was expressionless, and his eyes without luster. He had completely 
withdrawn himself from his surroundings. Then someone spoke to him, and 
he joined in at once, as though he had subconsciously kept up with all the 
conversation going on around him. 

This is a trivial example of a flexibility that is really amazing. Mao Tse-tung 
can range from the widest philosophical concepts on which the Communist 
IK)licy is based to the narrowest detail of practical application, without haste, 
without delay, and without the slightest blurring of focus. He has fire and 
passion, but so matured and tempered that there seems to be no personal 
warping of his thought; and yet, in a long extemporaneous discussion of a 
complicated subject there will not be a single cliche (and Chinese is more full 
of cliches than even English) ; every phrase has a personal stamp. 

It would be misleading, however, to give too many personal details about 
Mao, Chu Te, and other leaders. So little is known of the inside workings of 
the Communist movement in China that it is almost always spoken of in terms 
of its leading personalities. At Yenan a contrast is immediately noticeable: 
The Communists themselves never speak of Nanking in terms of Chiang Kai- 
shek, or any other leader. They stick to estimates of groups and movements 
and economic, social, and political forces. 

From this alone it is obvious that they are not either bandit's preying on 
society or condottieri aiming at power for the sake of power. This is as true 



3294 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

now that they have compromised ou a united front as it was when they were 
at open war witla Nanking. Some of tlieir more positive characteristics I shall 
try to describe in a second article. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you do that ^ 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. If I did, it must be in this file. 
I don't have it. 

Senator Ferguson. How would this get into the IPR files? 

Mr. Lattimore. Evidently I sent it, marked in the top corner FVF, 
who was at that time, I believe, secretary of the American Council. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was that? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Field, F. V. Field. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have to have clearance by Field ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Why would you send this article to Field? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was following the usual IPR practice of send- 
ing articles for information to the IPR office, and since Mr. Field 
was the secretary, he was the obvious person to send it to. 

The Chairman. This instrument that is being discussed is not in 
the record. Do you wish it in the record? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 513" and was 
read in full by Mr. Lattimore beginning on page 3289.) 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was all of your time taken by 
the IPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. I cannot understand why you would be sending 
this to Field, an article that you were trying to sell to the London 
Times. 

Mr. Lattimore. It was an article I was sending to the New York 
office, Mr. Field being secretary. 

I had just been up to a then still mysterious and exciting part of 
China that everybody was trying to get to, and I thought that my best 
chance of writing an article would be for the London Times. 

But rather than write a long description of a journey that I knew 
would be of interest to the New York office, since, after all, the IPR 
was studying China, among other countries, I simply sent a carbon 
copy of the article. That would be my present reconstruction of what 
happened. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you paid personally or was the IPR paid 
on an article like this ? 

Mr. Lattimore. On an article like this, I would be paid personally. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This goes back just a little way, Mr. Lattimore: 
Did you find Yenan in any way crowded with non-Communist 
tourists ? 

Mr. Latitmore. Yes ; I should say fairly crowded. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You have said several times that everyone was try- 
ing to get up there. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was everyone able to get up there? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3295 

Mr. Lattimore. No; not everybody. A number of people were 
stopped by the Chinese Government authorities. 

I remember in the papers at the time there was a good deal of talk 
about the fact that the correspondent of the New York Herald Trib- 
une was forced to leave the plane on which he was trying to fly up 
there. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. How did you send up your original letter asking 
if vou could come? 

Mr. Lati'IMORe. Judging from the account that has just been read 
out, I stuck it in the mail with my return address on the back, and 
it went on up. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Were the mails operating into Communist-held 

China? 

Mr. Lattimore. They were ; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you not say in this article that as you were 
ready to leave, they were crowding around to give you messages, 
because communications were difficult, or words to that effect? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether those communications were 
given to us, or not. There were, I think, several cars leaving at the 
same time. 

The Chairman. The question is : Do you not say in this article that 
they were crowding around to give you messages? That is the 
question. 

Mr. Lattimore. I am trying now to throw my memory back. Let's 
see 

The Chairman. You do not have to tlirow your memory back. It is 
right there in the article. 

Mr. Lattimore. It is 15 years or more. 

The Chairman. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. Do you want me to read that passage again ? 

The Chairman. Yes. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore. 

The question is : Do you not say in that article that they were crowd- 
ing around to give you messages? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

others were arguing, laughing, giving verhal and written messages to be taken 
out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not 
yet entirely free. 

I suppose that indicates that the mails were censored. * 

Senator Ferguson. That was not the question. The question was 
whether or not they were giving to you and your party the messages. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe they were. 

As far as my recollection goes, Mrs. Edgar Snow was up there at the 
time and asked us to take a letter back to her husband for her, and I 
believe — here my memory is extremely uncertain — that she may have 
also asked us to take down to her husband some of the material that 
she had been collecting up there so as to have it in Peking when she 
got back. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, there was one lady. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. You wrote this wliole paragraph around the 
fact that Mrs. Snow wanted you to take a letter to her husband. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is all that I remember that our party took out. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; I did not ask you what you took out at all. 
I want to know what you were describing in that article, and now 



3296 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

you leave us with the opinion that all you were doing was describing 
the fact that Mrs. Snow was sending a letter down to her husband 
with you or one of your party. 

Mr. Arnold. May he read the article again ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

But it is what he is telling us what he meant by that, now. 

Mr. Arnold. I thought it was what was in the article. 

The Chairman. Let him read the article again. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken 
out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet 
entirely free. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The important thing, Mr. Lattimore, is that ques- 
tion of what the communications between the Red world, as you have 
spoken of it, and the outside world, were. 

I do not mean to labor the point, sir, but I would like to know: 
Are you testifying here that you sent your letter to Yenan and 
received an answer through the ordinary course of the mails; that 
you made_ no special arrangements to have that letter delivered 
in Red China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is that your testimony ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is my testimony. 

And if I had received no reply to that letter, I would have con- 
sidered it an indication of the extent to which the Red region was still 
being blockaded or sequestered, or whatever you like to call it. 

The Chairman. All right, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Does the word "others" describe Mrs. Snow 
alone ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At this moment, I have no recollection, sir. There 
were a number of people preparing to leave Yenan at that time, and 
I was just giving a journalist's general impression of what was 
going on. 

I think the fact that I was writing it for a London newspaper, 
with a hope of publication, is a fairly obvious indication that it was 
nothing that anybody regarded as surreptitious. 

Senator Ferguson. But you do not mean to convey the idea, do 
you, that when you were selling these articles you were not writing 
the truth? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was certainly writing the truth as I understood 
it at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Then we would take the idea that it was more 
than Mrs. Snow that wanted to send articles out. 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably, it was. That is the way it reads. 

Then I will distinguish from that as significant that the only 
things that I remember our party taking out were some messages and 
manuscripts of Mrs. Snow's. 

I think the way to settle this would be to ask some of the other 
people who were up there at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Where was this particular meeting that you de- 
scribe Mao sitting in the meeting ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Somewhere in one of the offices in Yenan, I sup- 
pose, or guest rooms, or hostel, or somewhere. 

Senator Ferguson. But it was not a public place ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3297 

Mr. Lattimore. Oh, yes ; everything there was pretty public. 
Senator Fergusox. Was not he one of the leaders of this movement? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, he was one of the leaders in the movement. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was the head of that government ? 

Mr. Latitmore. He was. 

The Chairman. Referring to whom ? Mao Tse-tung ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mao Tse-tung; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not this in one of his residences, or offices ? 

Mr. Lattiimore. I don't recall clearly at the time, but I would say 
it was much more probably at the guest hostel where a lot of them 
came to say good-by to people who were leaving. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I have a bypath I would like to 
follow briefly, if I may, for 2 or 3 minutes. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were with Mr. Bisson in Yenan ; is that right, 
Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Tliat is right. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. When you were in Japan in the fall of 1945, did 
you see Mr. Bisson there? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I met Mr. Bisson very briefly. 

As I remember, the United States strategic bomb survey mission 
was arriving in Tokyo just about the time the reparations mission 
was leaving, and ]Mr. Bisson was attached to the strategic bomb sur- 
vey, and I saw him just before he left Tokyo. 

Mr. SdURWiNE. Did you travel anywhere with him in Japan in the 
fall of 1945 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't believe I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Shiro Takeda? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe I do. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know Nobuyoshi Nakamura ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't believe I do. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know Teiji Koide? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I do. 

Mr. SouRw^NE. Do you know who any of those three men are? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I cannot place them. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did they accompany you to or within Japan in 
1945 ? 

jNIr. Lattimore. Not than I can recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you make any trips with them ? 

Mr. LA-rriMORE. I don't think so. Let me see. I don't think I made 
any trips out of Tokyo. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you go around Tokyo with them? Did they 
accompany you, or did you accompany them in Tokyo on any oc- 
casions ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I may have. I can't recall it at the moment. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I add into the record at this 
time an article which appeared in the New Masses on October 12, 
1937,byMr. Philip Jaffe? 

The Chairman. We have a peculiar situation here now. You 
have the witness saying that he did not know these parties named 
by counsel. 

Mr. Lattimore. That I don't recall them. I don't believe I met 
them. 



3298 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. And that they may have conducted him around 
Tokyo. 

Do ,you want to straighten that out, or not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would like to explain, Mr. Chairman, a number of 
times in these hearings the names of people have been mentioned whom 
I totally failed to recall, and later on some memorandum or other docu- 
ment is brought out which indicates that I did meet them. This is part 
of the whole procedure, which I should very respectfully like to 
criticize. 

The Chairman. That part will be stricken from the record. You 
are not here for the purpose of criticizing ; you are here for the purpose 
of testifying under oath, and you are under oath. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record the 
article by Philip J. Jaffe who, as the witness has testified, was one of 
the four people in his party at Yenan ? 

This appeared in the New Masses of October 12, 1937. 

The Chairman. You had better listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, would you let me ask one question, 
before Mr. Morris proceeds ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, you referred in your testimony to 
interviews with Mao Tse-tung. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Smith. How many interviews did you have with him ? You 
mentioned several hours. How many times did you interview Mao 
Tse-tung, or were you present with him in the interview? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I myself personally, not more than two. 

Senator Smith. Were you present when others were interviewing 
him? 

Mr. Lattimore. As far as I remember, the only interviewing was 
done by others. 

Senator Smith. Who were present with you at those interviews? 
What other individuals ? 

Mr, Lattimore. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Bisson and Mr. 
Jaffe. 

Senator Smith. Were Mrs. Snow and Mrs. Jaffe present at those 
interviews ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so. 

Senator Smith. Were any other individuals present besides you 
and Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Snow and Mr. Bisson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The only other person that I recall was a young 
Chinese who was acting as Mr. Mao's interpreter. 

Senator Smith. So that each time you had an interview with Mao 
Tse-tung, it was just the three or four of you? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Smith. So it was more or less, then, you might say, a private 
interview or private hearing with Mao Tse-tung, was it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was. 

I don't know whether "private" is the right word to characterize 
it. He was giving some foreigners some information for publication 
if they felt it. So I wouldn't call it very private. 

Senator Smith. Did he give you permission to publish everything 
he said to you there ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3299 

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my recollection, that was the basis 
on which the interviews were held, just like a journalistic interview 
which is for the purpose of publication. 

Senator Smith. At that time he was the commander in chief, was 
h^ not, and the head man, so to speak, of the Chinese Connnunists? 

jSIr. Latomore. Yes; that would be my assumption. I don't know 
exactly how the connnittee structure of the Communists went at that 
time ; whether he was regarded as a member of a committee or as the 
individual head. 

Senator Smith. Did he not have a residence, an official residence? 

Mr. Lattimore. He had a small mud house off in a corner of the 
town. 

Senator Smith. You do not mean to convey the impression just 
now, then, do you, that he just met you around in any particular public 
places ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He also met us around in public places. 

Senator Smith. How many times? 

Mr. Lattimore. We were there 4 days. I don't remember whether 
we saw him each of those 4 days, or not. 

Senator Smith. Did you inquire about the people in attendance at 
the Red academy which you mentioned ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xot in detail ; no. 

Senator Smith. Did you write an article about the work being done 
in the Red academy ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I did, unless there is a second article 
for the London Times here, in which I said something about it. 

Senator Smith. I believe that is all at the moment, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. All right ; Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive in the record the article 
I described, namely, the newspaj)er article of October 12, 1937, written 
by Philip J. Jatfe, who was one of the party of four accompanying 
Mr. Lattimore on this trip to Yenan, about which we have had testi- 
mony today ? 

The Chairman. Where do you get that ? 

Mr. Morris. This is from the New Masses of October 12, 1937. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it can be tied in to Mr. Latti- 
more's visit. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read two passages here 
which relate to the witness today. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you have a copy ? 

Mr. Morris. No ; we do not. 

Senator Smith. Is the New Masses a Communist publication ? Is 
it true, or is it not? 

What is the proof you have up to now ? 

ISIr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you give us the document on the 
New Masses ? 

]Mr. Mandel. The New Masses was cited as a Communist periodical 
by the Attorney General Francis Biddle in September 1942. 

Mr. Morris. I am now reading from page 5, column 1. This is by 
Mr. Jafl'e, who accompanied Mr. Lattimore, according to Mr. Latti- 
more's testimony, on that trip to Yenan : 

While in Yenan our party which included beside myself, T. A. Bisson of the 
Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, 



3300 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

stayed at the foreign office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. 
We had barely finished our first dinner in Yenan, when guests arrived : Ting 
Ling, China's foremost woman writer ; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen, the only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy 
Snow, wife of tlie American writer, Edgar Snow, and many Communist leaders. 
Before long, we were talking and singing in a variety of languages. In the 
midst of our animated discussion, somebody entered quietly and sat down. 
''Comrade Mao" someone said — Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the then 
Chinese Soviet Government. 

I would now like to turn to page 10, reading from column 2. 
The Chairman. The same article? 
Mr. Morris. The same article, sir. 
The Chairman. By whom ? 

Mr. Morris. By Philip J. Jaffe, who was one of the people on that 
trip. 

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by 
Chu Teh— 

Who is now the head of the Chinese Communists; is he not, Mr. 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't answer that. 

Mr, Morris (reading) : 

Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students of the 
People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from other 
schools. * * * 

The Chairman. I would like to have you go back to the first excerpt 
you read there, where it speaks of those who were there. 
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you read it again, please ? 
Mr. Morris (reading) : 

While in Yenan our party, which included besides myself T. A. Bisson of the 
Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed 
at the Foreign Ofiice. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had 
barely finished our first dinner in Yenan when guests arrived : Ting Ling, China's 
foremost woman writer ; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen ; the 
only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife 
of the American writer, Edgar Snow ; and many Communist leaders. * * * 

The Chairman. I want to refer to that one remark about the only 
two non-Chinese in the region. 

Mr. Morris. "The only two non-Chinese then in the region." That 
is in contradiction of the testimony we have had here today ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The witness stated here today that there were 
many people there. 

Mr. Lattimore. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I didn't state they 
were there at the time I was there. A number of them got there before 
I was there and a number got there after I was there. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, I asked you if you found the place 
crowded with tourists. 

Mr. Lattimore. Chinese. Chinese are also tourists sometimes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, were you restricted in any way 
while you were there? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I would say I was. 

Senator Ferguson. How? 

Mr. Lattimore. One of my principal interests in being there was to 
try to find out how the Communists were dealing with minority groups 
such as the Chinese Moslems and the Mongols. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3301 

This was near to Mongol territory. And I heard while I was there 
that there was a school for such people situated just outside of Yenan, 
very close, and I repeatedly asked to be taken there and allowed to 
interview people. But this was not permitted. 

Finally, they said that they would bring in a delegation from there, 
and they brought in a number of what they called students in a school 
for minorities that they had there. These included Moslems, Tibetans, 
Mongols, and various tribal people like Lolos and so forth. And they 
had a Chinese there in charge of them, and he was an English-speaking 
Chinese, and he started to ask them various routine questions in 
Chinese. 

Presumably, part of their education in this school was that they 
were all learning Chinese, which he would then interpret into English. 

Having spotted a couple of Mongols, I started talking to them in 
Mongol. They were delighted to find someone who spoke Mongol 
and began to respond very eagerly. But the Chinese in charge of 
them became so obviously agitated at my having direct access to them 
without his control that I broke it off for fear of getting the poor 
boys into trouble. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a camera? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you restricted in taking pictures? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think we were restricted at all in taking 
pictures. 

Senator Ferguson. You seem to have a very fine memory on this 
conversation when you had the Chinese interpreter who brought in 
these people. 

Mr. Lattimore. Naturally. These Chinese minorities were my 
special subject of interest and research study. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not mention them, though, in your 
article, did you, in the London Times ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether I mentioned them in a sub- 
sequent article, if there was one, or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you try and find if you have a copy of that 
article ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Surely I will. 

The Chairman. Does Mao Tse-tung speak English ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did he speak Russian? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so. 

Senator O'Conor. IMr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, was any conversation had, prior 
to your addressing the students, as to under what circumstances you 
would address them, or in what manner? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. There was an address of some sort by, I think, 
Chu Teh, who was presiding. And he said : "We have many visitors 
here, including some foreign visitors, and we welcome them all," and, 
you know, that kind of thing. And then somebody who was stand- 
ing beside them said, "One of these foreigners talks Chinese; how 
about having him come up?" and there was a sort of clamor from the 
crowd, and they said, "Make the foreigner talk Chinese." 

So I, unwilling, scrambled on the platform. At that time I had 
never made a public speech in Chinese ; I had nothing prepared, and 



3302 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

SO I got up and made some remarks. And there were a lot of guffaws 
because I used rather colloquial language instead of formal lecture 
language, and then I scrambled down. 

There was a mixture of laughter and applause. 

Senator O'Conor. About what were your remarks? 

Mr. Lattimore. A general kind, that we were very glad to be up 
there and we thanked them for their hospitality, and we wanted to 
see what was going on — that sort of thing, you know. 

Senator O'Conor. How about Mr. Jaffe's and Mr. Bisson's re- 
marks ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether they made remarks or not. 
If they did, it would have to be through interpreters, of course. 

Senator O'Conor. Of course, you noted Mr. Jaffe's reference to the 
article in the New Masses. 

Mr. Lattimore. I skipped that. Did he say they addressed the 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He said three of them. 

Senator O'Conor. All three of them addressed. 

Will you read that please, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Clui 
Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself. * * * 

Senator O'Conor. That is to what I was referring. 

What have you to say with reference to their addressing the group ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection of what they were talking 
about. Senator. My recollection is one of sort of mingled pleasure 
at having been able to scramble througli a speech in Chinese and em- 
barrassment in having made slips in the use of colloquial language 
that made people laugh. So I was not psychologically in the right 
mood for paying close attention to what other people were saying. 

Senator O'Conor. In view of the other observations that were made, 
as to the difficulties confronting others in getting up there, the impres- 
sion is left, at least on me, that you were not only welcome, but that 
you were given more or less free rein to do as you pleased while you 
were there. Would that be correct ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Roughly correct, Senator. 

If I may explain, we were certainly given remarkable opportunities 
to interview people and to ask questions. 

As I say, I personally found restriction on my movements and op- 
portunities when I tried to get into the one thing that interested me 
most. 

I can't answer for the journalists who got there before me and got 
there after me, except in the general sense that the newspaper accounts 
published by such people at the time all laid stress on at least the 
relative frankness and willingness to talk of Communist leaders when 
interviewed up there. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, the only other question I would 
like to ask is this : You have previously indicated or stated that you 
are unfamiliar with the Communist line and with Communist teach- 
ings and precepts. 

In the article in the London Times, in your reference to Mao, you 
not only speak quite approvingly of him, but you indicate that lie was 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3303 

quite adept at speaking on the philosophies and other things. How do 
you know that he was adhering to those things of the Communist line 
if you did not know the Communist line ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the impression that I got by sitting by 
while Bisson and Jaffe were interviewing him. And this was the 
general period when, by agreement between both the Communists and 
the Nationalist Government, the united front was being worked out, 
and they were asking him a lot of technical questions about "What do 
you mean by 'united front'?" et cetera, et cetera. 

And my impression, from listening to those answers, was that he 
was in full command of exactly what he meant and exactly what he 
didn't mean. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any form or type of 
letter of introduction or credentials ; anything of that sort, to present 
there to Mao's government, or Mao's officials when you arrived ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I don't think we had anything whatever of 
the kind. 

Senator Smith. Were you just accepted at face value by Mao and 
his attendants ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. That was the practice at the time. 
Senator. They were accepting any kind of journalists, particularly 
any foreign visitor who would come up. 

Senator Smith. I thought you told us earlier, though, that you 
feared you would have some trouble getting up there, and that was 
the reason you wrote that first letter. That there was a line beyond 
which the Communists did not allow journalists to come, except by 
prearrangement. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. I don't think my writing them a letter implies 
that at all. All I was doing was trying to let the Communists know 
that I had the intention to come up there and see things, if I was al- 
lowed to see things, and that I was not trying, so to speak, to sneak in 
on them. 

Senator Smith. Do you recall where you posted that letter ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think just in an ordinary letter box in Peking 
City. 

Senator Smith. I missed that. 

Mr. Lattimore. I would 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to leave that as soon as I 
have Mr. Lattimore identify one picture in this article. 

Mr. Lattimore, I offer you page 7 and call your attention to the top 
picture. 

The Chairman. Page 7 of what ? 

Mr. Morris. That is the New Masses article which has been intro- 
duced into the record, Mr. Chairn^an. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it admitted, Mr. Morris? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you admit it into evidence? 

The Chairman. The article may be admitted. It will have to be 
copied out of there. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 514" and is as 
follows:) 



3304 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 514 

[New Masses, October 12, 1937] 

China's Communists Told Me — A Specialist in Far Eastern Affairs Inter- 
views THE Leading Men of Red China in Their Home Territories 

(By Philip J. Jaffe) 

Fifteen clays before Japanese troops opened fire on a Chinese garrison near 
Peiping, I was seated in the one bare room which is the home of Mao Tse-tung, 
the political leader of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of the 
interview Mao Tse-tung said to me: "Japan cannot stop now. Japan wants 
to swallow China. Its next step will not be long delayed. You ask about the 
future of the united front? The united front is inevitable because Japan's 
invasion farther into the heart of China is inevitable." 

Twenty-four hours later, in the military headquarters of the former Chinese 
Red Army, only two big rooms, walls covered with huge military maps, I asked 
the most famous of the Communist commanders. General Chu Teh: "Why do 
you think that General Chiang Kai-shek will have to accept the aid of the Red 
Army?" 

Chu Teh replied : "A form of the united front has now existed for several 
months and has resulted in a large measure of internal peace. The Chinese 
bourgeoisie, however, is not easily able to forget its ten-year tight against 
the Red Army. But when the war with Japan eventually begins, it will not 
be a question of what the bourgeoisie wants ; they will have to have the Red 
Army. In a war with Japan, it will not only be a question of regular troops. 
China must also depend on its peasants and workers whom the Communists 
alone can lead. It is not merely the numbers of the army which count ; it is 
the mass population as well. If Chiang Kai-shek thinks that he can raise a 
large army to fight Japan, without at the same enrolling the masses as the 
backbone of the struggle, then he will be rudely disappointed. No war against 
Japan can be successful without a correct organization of the peasants and 
workers, and this only the Red Army can successfully carry out." 

Two weeks later I know that the prophecy made by the two famous leaders 
of the former Chinese Red Army had been fulfilled. On July 7, Japan invaded 
North China. On August 22, the first stage of the united fi'ont — that of military 
cooperation — was concluded between the Nanking and Red Armies. In the 
words of the official communique fi'om Nanking, "the Chinese government and 
the Communist army have been fighting for the last ten years ; this is the 
oflScial conclusion of the war." Mao Tse-tung has since been appointed governor 
of the former Soviet region, now renamed the Special Administrative District. 
Chu Teh has been appointed commander in chief of the former Red Army, now 
called the Eighth Route Army. Chou En-lai, another outstanding Comumnis^t 
with whom I spoke, is the official Communist representative on the general staff 
in Nanking. 

Mao Tse-tuny, political leader. — Yenan is the capital of the former Soviet 
region. On June 21, after four days' travel from Sian, the capital of Shensi 
province, scene of the Chiang Kai-shek incident of last December, through semi- 
starved villages, on bridgeless rivers, and roads deep with gullies, we finally 
passed through the beautiful, ancient main gate of Yenan. We were greeted 
at the gate by Agnes Smedley, the distinguished American writer and an old 
friend of the Chinese people. While in Yenan our party which included beside 
myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, 
editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed at the Foreign Ofticf , The building was soon 
buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished car first dinner in Yenan, 
when guests arrived : Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer ; Li Li-san, 
an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen ; the only two non-Chinese then in the region ; 
Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow ; 
and many Communist leaders. Before long we were talking and singing in a 
variety of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion somebody entered 
quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao," someone .said — Mao Tse-tung, the 
political leader of the tlien Chinese Soviet Government. 

We spent many hours with him after that evening — at interviews, during 
meals, at the theater — and we were increasingly impressed by the complete 
sincerity and lack of ostentation that is so typical of him and of the other leadei's 
we saw. It was during these visits that we grew to feel his tremendous force, 
a force likely to be overlooked at first because of the low, even voice, the quiet 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3305 

restraiut of his movemeuts, aud the beautiful bands, almost too delicate for a 
soldier, but so dextrous with the writing brush. But the quiet voice speaks with 
brilliance and authority, the movements of the tall, slim body with slightly 
stooped shoulders are sure and well coordinated. Like all other Red Army 
commanders, Mao wears exactly the same uniform as the rank-and-file soldiers, 
eats the same food, sleeps on the same sort of k'ang (a low, long bed of stone), 
avoids all social ceremonies, and altogether lives an extremely simple life. It 
becomes easy to understand the tremendous personal appeal which Mao has 
as a leader. This leadership dates from the first organizational meeting of the 
committee which organized the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1920. 
Mao was an important figure at that meeting. 

Our interviews with Mao Tse-tung were many and on a host of topics : the 
evolution of Nanking's policy ; the inner political struggle within Nanking ; the 
Sian incident ; the united front ; the student movement ; the role of other powers 
in Far Eastern affairs ; and the perspective of China's future development, etc. 
But since Mao Tse-tung asked me to transmit a message to the American people, 
it is perhaps best to confine his remarks to those concerning America and its 
isolationist policy. 

"Though there are many Americans who are isolationist in principle," he 
began, "America is not and cannot be isolationist. America is in this respect 
like other capitalist countries; part proletariat, part capitalist. Neither one 
nor the other can be isolationist. Capitalism in the imperialist countries is world- 
wide, and so is the problem of liberation which needs the effort of the world 
proletariat. Not only does China need the help of the American proletariat, 
but the American proletariat also needs the help of the Chinese peai^.aits and 
workers. The relation of American capitalism to China is similar to. that of 
other capitalist countries. These countries have common interests as well as 
conflicting ones— common in that they all exploit China, conflicting in that each 
wants what the other has, as exemplified by the conflict between Great Britain 
and the United States, as well as between Japan, Britain, and the United States. 
If China is subjugated by Japan, it will not only be a catastrophe for the Chinese 
people, but a serious loss to other imperialist powers." 

At this point Mao was handed a wireless message announcing both the fall of 
Bilbao and the resignation of France's premier, L^on Blum. We discussed the 
probable causes of both these events. Mao clearly showed his grasp of the world 
situation, despite the isolating distance. "We took time oft" to answer a host of 
questions, this time by him. What is comparative strength of the Socialist 
and Communist Parties in America? Did we know the life stories of John L. 
Lewis and Earl Browder? The strength of the American labor unions? The 
Trotskyites? American official opinion on the Far East? 

Then Mao Tse-tung continued : "The Chinese revolution is not an exception ; 
it is one part of the world revolution. It has special characteristics, but funda- 
mentally it is similar to the Spanish, French, American, and British struggles. 
These struggles are all progressive. Therein lies their similarity. It is this 
similarity that evokes the broad sympathy of the American masses and their 
concern with the fate of the Chinese people. We, on our part, are also concerned 
with the fate of the American people. Please convey this message to your people. 
The difference between our peoples lies in this : the Chinese people, unlike the 
Americans are oppressed by outside invaders. The American people are, of 
course, oppressed from the inside, but not by feudal forces. It is the hope com- 
mon to all of us that our two countries shall work together." 

Chu Teh, military leader. — Though Chu Teh is known to the outside world 
for his military exploits, his other activities are many and varied. We first met 
Chu Teh in a class he was teaching on the "Fundamental Problems of the 
Chinese Revolution." Wearing spectacles, he could very well have been mis- 
taken for a professional teacher. At the People's Anti-Japanese Military Polit- 
ical University at Yenan, he teaches both military tactics and Marxist-Leninist 
principles. From 1922 to 1925, Chu Teh studied political and economic science, 
philosophy, and military strategy in Germany. As a result he speaks German 
freely. His favorite recreations are reading, conversation, horseback riding, 
and basketball. The latter sport is a subject for much fun among the troops. 
His love for the game is greater than his ability and he can often be found hang- 
ing about a group which is choosing sides. If he is not picked, he quietly moves 
on to the next court in the hope that there his luck w^ill turn. My gi'eatest dis- 
appointment ^t Yenan was that rain ruined an appointment we had to play 
basketball with him. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 3 



3306 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Eighth Route Army, is the personification 
of the spirit of these armies which for 10 years have been continuously victorious 
in the face of overwlielming odds. His career has been devoted mainly to the 
military side of revolutionary activities. Fifty-one years old, he has taken part 
in the entire development of modern China, from the overthrow of the Manchu 
dynasty in 1911 to the pi-esent struggle against Japan. Beginning with August 
1, 1927, when together with another famous Red commander. Ho Lung, he organ- 
ized the Nanchang uprising, he participated in exploits which have now become 
legend. In November 1931, the first All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi, be- 
stowed upon him the title of commander in chief of the army. Even in Nan- 
king I heard many call Chu Teh the greatest military genius in all China. 

There is strength and assurance in that square, stocky figure, in that strong 
peasant face, weather-beaten by a life of campaigning, and in those small bright 
eyes which are quite hidden when he laughs, and he laughs frequently. We took' 
a picture of him standing with legs apart and hands on hips. That is Chu Teh. 

"The Red Army in this region under our direct command numbers about ninety 
thousand," he began. "This force occupies a contiguous territory extending 
from North Shensi to East Kansu and South Ninghsia. From Yenan to Sanyan 
there are some partisan troops in Kuomintang uniforms. In this region pro- 
fessional full-time partisans number from ten to twenty thousand. The number 
of part-time partisans is much larger ; their duties are to maintain order in their 
districts. 

"Of the ninety thousand regular troops here, only twenty to thirty thousand 
come from the original Kiangsi district. About thirty thousand were recruited 
on the way, chiefly in Szechwan, and the rest are from local areas. 

"In other partisan areas there are various groups numbering from one to three 
tliousand soldiers, but it is hard to estimate the total figure ; we ourselves are not 
certain about this. These partisan areas are located in soiithern Shensi (south- 
west of Sian), the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border, 
northeastern Kiangsi, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Hunan 
border, the Kiangsi-Hunan border, and the Shensi-Szechwan border. Connec- 
tions with several of these are still maintained, but not with all ; and these con- 
nections are irregular and uncertain." Asked if we might publish this, Chu 
Teh replied "It doesn't matter. The fact is well known throughout China." 

Having seen many Red troops carrying on their maneuvers with excellent new 
rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, and the ubiquitous Mausers, we were 
curious to know how well armed they were as a whole. Chu Teh replied, "Our 
regular ninety thousand troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region are in gen- 
eral well armed. Other equipment, such as clothes, food, and supplies, is not 
satisfactory. Although it greatly improved after the Sian incident, it is still far 
from sufficient. Though we had established contact with Chang Hsueh-liang 
before the Sian affair, it was only during the two v/eeks following the actual 
incident that any large quantity of munitions, clothing, and food reached ns." 

As Chu Teh continued the conversation, punctunted frequently by his broad, 
genial smile, he came to the discussion of his well-known theory of the military 
tactics necessary to defeat Japan, namely, to avoid decisive engagements in the 
early stages in favor of guerrilla tactics to encircle the enemy and harass it 
until its morale was shattered. We wanted to know something about the Man- 
churian volunteers. Were they really well organized or were they mere hungry 
"bandits"? 

"At first." Chu Teh said, "the Manchurian volunteers were largely impoverished 
peasants and the scattered remnants of the defeated Manchurian troops. They 
operated without a plan, could not accomplish much, and finally were almost 
destroyed. The Communist Party then began to organize new peasant detach- 
ments, who were later joined by what remained of the original volunteers. As 
a result, most of these formerly leaderless forces have been converted into im- 
portant detachments with wide popular support. This year there has been some 
increase in the number of volunteers along the Korean border, in eastern Feng- 
tien, and in eastern Kirin. The increase has been more systematic than hitherto. 
New groups have recently been formed in Jeliol and Chahar. About three months 
ago a report to me stated that the total number of Manchurian volunteers ranged 
from fifty to sixty thousand." In reply to a statement made by the Japanese to 
the effect that 70 percent of the Manchurian volunteers are Communists, Chu Teh 
said that this was not an exaggeration. 

On the United Front. — Of all the questions facing China and the former Soviet 
area the most important is that of the united front. No one in Soviet China 
knows the details of the negotiations more intimately than Chou En-lai, vice 
chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and second in importance only 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3307 

to Mao Tse-tung. It was he who carried on all the negotiations with Chiang 
Kai-shek. Born thirty-nine years ago of a mandarin family, Chou En-lai joined 
the revolutionary movement in 1911. Upon his return to China in 1924 fi"om 
a stay abroad, he became chief of the political department of the Whampoa 
Military Academy under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. It is said that even 
today the generalissimo has a great fondness for Chou. When asked why the 
united-front conversations were then not moving very fast, Chou En-lai said : 
"The form of the Chinese united front is quite different from that in Europe or 
the United States. In China two parties fought each other for ten years. The 
Communist Party representing the proletariat and peasantry was a revolutionary 
party with its own areas and military forces as well as its own social, political, 
and economic system. The Kuomintang represented the ruling social groups 
throughout the rest of China. But the position of the Chinese bourgeoisie was 
such that the obstacles arising from their class position could not forever bar 
a united struggle against Japan. The bourgeoisie of China have at last come to 
realize that tlie Japanese invasion harms all classes and that, standing alone, 
they are too weak to safeguard China's freedom and independence." 

Up to the time of Japan's most recent invasion, the united-front negotiations 
had progressed quite slowly though not without positive results. Internal peace 
had been achieved, and the two armies no longer fought each other. Confisca- 
tion of land in the Soviet regions was abolished. The name of the Red Army 
was changed. Dramatic troupes began to tour the countryside to teach the 
peasants the meaning of democratic elections. Nanking began to contribute a 
considerable,* though as yet insufficient, sum of money monthly to the Soviet 
area. Technical difficulties made a complete united front often seem impossible. 
But Japan's military aggression scattered all the major obstacles. 

The land proWem. — Ever since October 1935, when the main body of the Com- 
munist armies from Central and South China began to arrive in north Shensi, 
their immediate objectives have been twofold. First, to build a permanent base 
for internal development, and second and more important, to use this base as a 
spearhead for unifying all elements in China for a successful war of defense 
against the invading Japanese militarists. Despite the fact that the former 
Soviet area, the largest single contiguous territory ever held under Communist 
rule, stated as one of the most economically backward areas in China, the wel- 
fare of the peasants and workers has been improved considerably. There is not 
sufficient room here to tell all that we saw and heard, but a few high spots, in 
the words of Po K'u, one of the important leaders of the region, will perhaps 
shed some light. 

Po K'u's home and office is in the abandoned compound of an English Baptist 
mission. When we expressed surprise at finding religious pictures hanging on 
his walls. Po K'u said that he left the compound just as he found it in the hope 
that the missionaries would return. 

In reply to several questions on the land confiscation problem, Po K'u said 
in quite good English: "When the first Soviets were established in 1933 in 
Shensi, all the good land along the river banks was in the hands of rich land- 
lords who used the great famine of 1930 as a lever for confiscating this land. 
From then until the Sian incident in December 1936, all this land was divided 
among the peasants ; all taxation and levies were abolished ; democratic liberty 
was extended to all; peasants built up their own armed forces for their pro- 
tection instead of relying on landlords' forces; and peasants enjoyed the aid 
and direction of the Soviet government to increase production, improve the 
land, and develop constimer cooperatives. 

"After the Sian incident when the unitefl-front organizations had already 
begun, the redivision of land among the peasants was stopped in districts oc- 
cupied after the beginning of the negotiations. In general, the ownership of 
land is not the main problem in this territory. Land is plentiful, for Shensi is 
thinlv populated, with an average of one family to every thirteen miles. The 
form' of exploitation and, therefore, the main problems are usury and excessive 
interest rates on money and cattle. Land rents and money lending rates, 
therefore, have been reduced drastically. The maximum rent now permitted in 
the Soviet areas is 30 percent of the land produce, and peasants can bargain 
with landlords to further reduce this percentage, while the money-lending 
rate has been reduced from a general 10 percent monthly rate to a maximum 
of 2 percent. Even last year, when warfare was still going on, the Soviet 
government spent one hundred thousand dollars for ploughs, seeds, etc., while 
this year there will be an additional cash distribution of sixty thousand dollars." 

Apparently there has been a great deal of confusion about this abandonment 
of land confiscation. Mao Tse-tung's pithy words perhaps explain it most 



3308 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

simply. He said : "It is not so much a question now of whether our lands be- 
longs to the peasants or the landlords, but whether it is Chinese or Japanese." 
The same reasoning is applied by the Communist leaders to the larger question 
of China as a whole. To all of them "it is not a qiiestion now of which general 
controls which province, but whether the land will remain Chinese or come 
imder Japanese control. If the latter should happen, the original problem 
disappears." 

Life in the Special Administrative District. — Our visit, however, did not con- 
sist only of a series of interviews. We visited stores and shops, noting with 
interest how nmch cleaner and more orderly they were than any we had seen 
<m otir trip, and how relatively well-stocked they were. And the cheesecloth 
covering the food for sale stood in marked contrast to the cities in non-Soviet 
areas where the only coverings we had seen were armies of flies. Even the 
dogs, the most miserable of all living things in China, were active and barking. 
Anyone who has seen the worm-eaten, starved, gaunt dogs of China, too weak 
to move out of the way of a passing vehicle, will understand the meaning of 
that. 

Culturally, too, the Soviet region is making great strides. Besides Yenan, 
the iiresent capital, three other cities are being developed as cultural centers: 
Tingpien, Yenchang, and Chingyang. Anti-Japanese academies and dramatic 
groups are the axes around which the cultural life is being developed. Study 
classes, reading room, theatricals, dances, lectures, and mass meetings are 
regular features of life in the Soviet territories. We were amused to hear 
the universal complaint of all librarians. "They keep the books out too long." 

But most interesting and important of all was our visit to the theater. A 
troupe of players was scheduled to go on the road the following day, and they 
graciously went through their repertoire for us as well as for their own de- 
lighted audience. In a packed auditorium, seated on low, narrow, backless 
wooden benches, before a crude stage whose footlights were flickering candles, 
we sat through four hours of amazingly excellent plays, superbly acted. With 
perfect realism (so different from the classical Chinese theater) and delightful 
humor, they presented plays designed to teach the peasants how to vote and how 
to unite. They explained the value of cleanliness, of vaccination, of education, 
and the stupidity and danger of superstitions. At one point, for instance, one 
character complained of being tired. "We weren't tired on our seven thousand- 
mile march," was the reply. And the audience roared as did Mao- Chu Teh, 
and the rest of the leaders who sat next to us, having as good a time as any- 
one. The high spot of the evening was a really professional performance of a 
scene from Gorki's Mother, which had been given at the Gorki memorial evening 
celebrated in Yenan, and a Living Newspaper by the young people on such 
subjects as bribery, bureaucracy, and hygiene. All these plays were being sent 
out to the villages. 

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu 
Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the one thousand five hun- 
dred cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University 
and about five hundred from other schools. Here are some questions asked of 
me. "What is the position of woman in the U.S.A.? How do American workers 
live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roose- 
velt's N.R.A. campaign? What is the present situation in the Left literary move- 
ment in America? What do the American people think of our long march 
west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event 
of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, 
and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. 

This stress on the role of the United States is altogether typical of the reac- 
tion throughout China. These people have ti-aditionally considered Americans 
as their friends and they do not w^ant us to fail them now. A few days after our 
arrival in Shanghai, I received a letter from Agnes Smedley which tells better 
than I am able how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in 
the former Soviet regions. 

"In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I 
speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I 
want to tell on that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the 
effect of that meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to 
roll in. I have no reason to tell yeu tales. But the meeting, and your speech 
in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people. One was so moved by 
it that he could not sleep that night but spent the night writing a poem in praise 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3309 

of you all. I enclose the poem. It is not good from the literary viewpoint. But 
from the viewixtint of the emotion behind it, it is of value. It is a deeply pas- 
sionate poem. It is not good enough to publish, but it is good enough to carry 
next to your heart in the years to come. To that meeting, it may interest you 
to know", came delegations sent by every institution. Many institutions could 
not cross the rivers. But they sent activists, groups of six to a dozen. They 
later gave extensive reports. I am getting those reports from instructors day 
by day. All are deeply impressed and moved and grateful to you and all of you. 
There has never been anything like this here before." 

Mr. Lattimore. Do you want me to read the caption of this photo- 
graph ? 

Mr. Morris. Please. 

Mr. Lattimore. The photograph is captioned : 

Troops marching through the main gate of Yenan to their drill grounds. The 
crouching figure with the camera is Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Morris. Is that a picture of you, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. As well as a man can identify a rather distant pro- 
file picture of himself, I would say so, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Is there any evidence there of your being supervised ? 

Mr. Lattimore. There is no evidence in that picture, except, of 
course, that this was an arranged parade. I suppose you might call 
that being supervised. 

The Chairman. Did they parade for you by arrangement? 

Mr. Lattimore. As I recall, we asked if we could take some photo- 
graphs of 

The Chairman. Wait a minute. I asked if they paraded for you by 
arrangement. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I believe it was by arrangement. 

My recollection is rather hazy, but I believe we asked if we could 
take some pictures of troops. 

The Chairman. You reviewed them? 

Mr. Li\TTiM0RE. No, sir. 

And they said, "We will have some troops out on the parade ground 
tomorrow and you can come and take pictures, if you like." 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Senator Watkins. May I ask a question? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. Was this before, or after you were adviser to 
the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was long before. 

The Chairman. What was that question ? 

Senator Watkins. I asked him if it was before or after he was ad- 
viser to the Generalissimo. 

Mr. Lattimore. I may say. Senator, that the Generalissimo was 
very much interested in my having been up there at that time, and 
we had quite a talk about it. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like now to get back to Rogoflf 
and War and the Working Class, which started out this questioning 
aljout the change in line. 

The Chairman. All right. 

jSIr. Morris, We have introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, as 
our exhibit Xo. 26, the letter from Rose Yardumian to Mr. Edward 
Carter. I would like to read it at this time. 



3310 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

This is January 20, 1944 : 

Dear Mr. Carter : I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the tele- 
grams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morn- 
ing and he told me that he had received your wire, but was sure that 1 would 
understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk 
with Rogoff. He mentioned the RogofE articles In War and the Working Class 
and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles 
here. * * * 

Mr. Lattimore, is it your testimony that you know nothing of those 
articles in War and the Working Class at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe at that time I knew nothing about it. 

Mr. Morris. So Rose Yardumian knew about it, but you did not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I know about that now ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. I mean is it your testimony that at that time, Rose 
Yardumian, who wrote this letter, knew about the articles of Rogoff 
AVar and the Working Class, but that you did not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That would be my presumption from the wording 
of the letter that she knew about it. I don't recall knowing about the 
article at all. I did get hold of the article later on, I think several 
years later, and looked it up. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Rose Yardumian? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I knew her. 

Mr. Morris. She was the secretary of the Washington office of the 
IPR, was she not ? 

JNIr. Lattimore. I believe she was. 

I can't recall now whether she was the secretary or one of the girls 
in the office, or what. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this 
committee that she was on the board of a Communist piiblication last 
year in Communist China? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't remember seeing that. 

Mr. Morris. You did not read that part of your testimony ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so. No. I read so nuich testimony, 
I am not sure of the details. 

Mr. Morris. I am continuing reading now : 

* * * He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's 
office, they would not refuse to see him. I am not sure that 1 understand the 
mechanizations of our State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my try- 
ing to get in touch with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had con- 
sulted with Hornbeck. 

Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymon- 
ville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed 
to get in touch with our office then. 

Rogoff visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little 
talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 
5 : 30. Rogoff said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meet- 
ing ; that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the 
fact that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the 
Institute of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. * * * 

Do you understand the reasoning of Mr. Rogoff there, Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am afraid I don't. 
Mr. Morris (reading) : 

* * * Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people 
together at their home this evening — the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a 
few others — but time is very short and many of these people have already made 
plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. How- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3311 

ever, RogofE is coming into our office at 2 o'cloclc today. Bill is planning to take 
him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Car- 
ter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements to 
take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places. 

I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him, as I know that there 
are many people hei-e would have enjoyed hearing him. 
Sincerely yours, 

Rose 

Rose Yardtjmian. 

P. S. — I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted to date. 
P. P. S. — Rogoft" and Bill have l^een at the Cosmos Club for the last 21/2 hours 
talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent. 

The Chairman. To whom was that letter addressed ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Edward C. Carter, of the International Secretariat. 

The Chairman. What is the date of that 'I 

Mr. Morris. January 20, 1944. 

The Chairman. That is in the record, is it not ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

This bears on the knowledge that the Institute of Pacific Kelations 
had with respect to Eogoff's article, which, according to testimony 
before this committee, signalized the cliange in Conmmnist Party 
thinking in 1943. 

Mr. Lattimore, did yon know Mr. Vladimir Komm in this country ? 

IMr. Lattimore. Yes. I met him at the Yosemite Conference of the 
IPK in the summer of 1936, at which he was one of the two, I think, 
Soviet delegates. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet Mr. Motiliev in this country? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; at the same time, 

Mr, Morris. Have you ever met INIr. Litvinoff in this country? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I called on Mr. Litvinoff when I was Chiang 
Kai-shek's adviser when I was back here on leave in 1942. 

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you see ^Ir. Litvinoff? 

Mr. Lattimore. One, I think. 

Mr. Morris. Have you ever seen jMr. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambas- 
sador in this country? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I have seen him in this country. I 
saw him in Chungking. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever give him or his office something for the 
Soviet pouch? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe that it would be accurate to describe 
it as giving it to him for the Soviet pouch. I wrote to him stating 
that I would like to try to make a trip to Outer Mongolia and as there 
was no Outer Mongolian representation in this country, I would ap- 
])reciate it if he would convey my request to the Outer Mongolian 
Embassy, or whatever it may be, in Moscow. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever meet Mr. Gromyko in the 
United States ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I ever did. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did yon make an arrangement with 
IMr. Gromyko to have your book Solution in Asia published in the 
Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I did. I seem to remember reading 
something about that in the testimony. Carter may have suggested 
it, or something of that sort. 

Mr. Morris, But it is your testimony that you did not, is it? 



3312 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. My memory is very vague on the subject, but I 
don't think that I did myself. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these two letters, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 
26, 1945, addressed to Mrs. Owen Lattimore, Ruxton, Md., with the 
typed signature of Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. And the second? 

Mr. Mandel. The second is a photostat of a carbon, a document, 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated INIarch 3, 
1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of 
Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these letters read 
into the record at this time since they bear on the series of questions 
being addressed to the witness. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 515 and 
516," and were read by Mr. Mandel.) 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read those two letters, please? 

Mr. Mandel. The letter of February 26, 1945 (exhibit No. 515) : 

Dear Eleanor: This is just to tlianli you for your lovely hospitality on Sun- 
day. Your place is so lovely, the food so good, and the conversation so stimulat- 
ing that I do want you to know what great pleasure and profit you gave me. 

I had a good talk with Owen on the train and I hope I can be of a little 
assistance in carrying out his project. 

A part of my purpose in getting a number of low-cost copies of Solution in 
Asia fits right into the build-up which is desirable as preparation for getting 
an invitation from across the water for Owen to go abroad. 

I have discovered that Owen's 40-percent discount is better for the IPR than 
anything we can get from the publisher. I would be grateful therefore if you 
could have 12 copies sent me as speedily as possible to-gether vpith your bill. 
Ever gratefully yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

The second letter is dated March 3, 1945 (exhibit No. 516) : 

Dear Owen : Would you be willing to do a review of Rowe's book China Among 
the Powers for Pacific Affairs? 

Our reviewers still have to do their reviews as a labor of love even though 
they may have no burning affection for the book to be reviewed. If you are 
willing to undertake this task we would like to have your review by March 27, 
but if this is impossible and you could do it for us later we would prefer to 
have a review from your pen in a subsequent issue rather than to get a sub- 
stitute writer for the next issue. If you will accept I will, of course, send 
you immediately a reviewer's copy of the book. 

As soon as possible after recepit of extra copies of Solution in Asia I am 
going to descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the plans for exploring the 
feasibility of your recent proposal. 

I felt that of all the speakers you did by far the best job at the town hall. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what did Mr. Carter mean when he 
said he was going to "descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the 
plans for exploring the feasibility of your recent proposal" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Subject to the limitations of being able to say 
what was in another man's mind 

Mr. Morris. He is talking about "your recent proposal," Mr. Latti- 
more. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3313 

Mr, Lattimore. I would saj' that my "recent proposal" must have 
been my same old proposal that went on for years and years, of trying 
to get into Outer Mongolia. 

Mr. Morris. And that bore no relation to having a publishing of 
Solution in Asia done for Soviet internal consumption? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea what that would be. 

Mr. Morris. You have read ISIr. Carter's testimony on that point, 
liave you not? 

Mr. Latitmore. Yes, I have read it. 

Mr. Morris. Which is contradictory to what your understanding- 
was at that time ? 

jVIr, La'itimore. No. In what way ? 

Mr. Morris. Did he not testify that there was such a project? 

Mr. LAi^riMORE. A project for 

Mr. Morris. Having the Soviets publish a version of your book, a 
copy of your book, an edition of your book. 

Mr. Laitimore. Oh, I didn't remember that. As far as I can see 
from this present correspondence, he was trying to get some copies of 
my book to send — what is it now — to send presumably to Russia, but 
whether the project included a translation or a Russian edition, I 
don't know. 

Mr. Morris. You did send copies of Solution in Asia to the Soviet 
Union, did you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I sent them to Mr. Carter. I don't think I 
remember sending any to the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document? 

Mr. ISIandel. This is a photostat of a memorandum. In the corner 
is "OL.'' This is a j^hotostat from the documents from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. It reads as follows : 

(Exhibit No. 517) 
Distribution of 12 copies of Solution in Asia — 
and these names are listed : 

W. K. Hancoclf — for review 3-12-45 — Mrs. V. L. Pandit 

K. P. Clien 

Gromyko (2) — 1 for Ztiukov 
Kisselev — for Kemenov and Voi 
Litvinoff — for Yarga and Voitinsky 

3-14-45 — Stepanov — for Mikoyan (for Lozovsky and Voitinsky??) 

The Chairman. What do you want done with that ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, from your knowledge of IPR docu- 
ments, the fact that "OL'' appears in the upper right-hand corner 
indicates, does it not, that you were to get a copy of that distribution 
made of your book ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably. AVell, it w^ould mean — I question that 
I had received a copy. 

Is that my initial? I mean did I initial that to show I had received 
it, or did somebody else ? 

Mr. SouR^VINE. Look at the photostat and see if those are your 
initials. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, the "OL" there isn't my w^riting. 

Mr. Morris. But from your knowledge of markings of institute 
papers, does that not indicate to you that that meant a copy of that 
should go to you for distribution ? 



3314 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. Very probably; yes. It might mean simply that 
it was to be put in the "OL" file in the IPR office. I wouldn't be able 
to tell you. 

Mr. SoDRAViNE. Mr. Morris, could you find out from the witness if 
he knows who these people are that are mentioned here ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

May we have that introduced in the record first ? 

The Chairman. It may be introduced in the record. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 517" and was 
read in full.) 

The Chairman. What is the question? 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Lozovsky, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I do. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Voitinsky ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Voitinsky I met in 1936. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Stepanov? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't place him. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Mikoyan ? 

Mr. Lai"it]M()Re. I presume he is the same Mikoyan whose name 
I have seen in the press as a Soviet official. 

The Chairman. The question is do you know him? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't know him. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Zhukov ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I do. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Kemenov ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't place him. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Varga ? 

Mr. Lattimore. ^Ir. Varga ? I know that he is a Soviet economist, 
but I don't think I have met him. 

Mr. Morris. But you know who these people are? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

The Chairman. Is Gromyko's name in there ? 

Mr. Morris. Gromyko's name does appear there ; yes, sir. 

Do you know Mr. Gromyko ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I met him. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, identification of these men can be made 
at a later time. 

Mr. Lattimore. The other names at the top of this list, Mr. W. K. 
Hancock, I don't think I have ever heard of him. 

Mrs. V. L. Pandit is, of course, the recent Indian Ambassador in this 
country. 

K. P. Chen is one of the leading bankers of China. 

Senator Ferguson. Is he in China now? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe he is in Hongkong. I am not sure. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you know that Soviet officials col- 
lected information on economic geography and statistics from United 
States Government departments for the IPK in the United States ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't know that. At least, I don't believe 
I ever knew it. It would seem to me to be quite an ordinary procedure, 
if they did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have here the minutes of a meeting 
of April 2, 1936, and I am asking Mr. Mandel if he will identify this 
document. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3315 

The Chairman. Meeting of what? 

Mr. Morris. Meeting in Moscow. 

Mr. Manclel will identify it. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting, April 2, 1936, Moscow : 
Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, H. M. Harondar." 

Mr. Morris. "H. M." is different from Harondar ; is it ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will a copy of that be made available to Mr. Lattimore, 
please? 

This is April 2, 1936. 

Mr. Lattimore, will you read the sixth paragraph on the front page, 
which begins with "Motiliev." 

Mr. Lattimore. The sixth ? 

Mr. Morris. The one that says : 

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving * * *. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Motiliev said that he was Interested in receiving from the United States more 
material on the economic geography of the country ; the official publications of 
Government departments, particularly the statistical reports. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did the IPR serve as a conduit for the 
Soviet officials to receive such information from the United States? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea. 

Mr. Morris. I ask you to turn, Mr. Lattimore, to page 2 and take 
up the second item there on the top of the page, "II. In re: Pacific 
Affairs." 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present. 

Mr. Morris. Why should that discussion be postponed until Voitin- 
sky was present, Mr. Lattimore? Did you know at that time Mr. 
Voitinsky was the head of the far eastern section of the Comintern? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I did not. 

As far as my recollection serves, Voitinsky was the editor, or one of 
the editors, of the publication which was regarded as the official pub- 
lication of the Soviet council of the IPR and, therefore, would be a 
natural person to include in an editorial conference. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, may I call your attention to VII on 
page 3, just about the middle. 

Mr. Lattimore. "In re International Secretariat Policy" ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

The Chairman. What do you want ? 

Mr. Morris. I want Mr. Lattimore to read it, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECG's report on the policy. He 
thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might be 
some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu criticizing 
the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky was here. 

Mr. ]MoRRis. And then, finally, Mr. Lattimore, I would like you to 
turn to the last page. 
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 



3316 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. Who is "ECC" ? 
]\Ir. Lati'imori:. Mr. Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Beginning in the first paragraph on the last page, Mr. 
Lattimore. 
Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this — 

I don't know what "this" is — 

when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any 
critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions 
about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents but as to its juridical posi- 
tion as to the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and 
negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of 
articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you know at that time Mr. Voitin- 
slry's position with the Communist International ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, does your research of Pacific Affairs at 
this period of time indicate that anything appeared therein along the 
description I just gave? 

Mr. Mandel. In the issue of September 1936 of Pacific Aifairs 

Mr. Morris. That is just shortly after the meeting you were dis- 
cussing, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Mandel. Cited under the title '"Literature on the Chinese Com- 
munist Movement" is the following notation of an article on British 
imperialism in China, from the Communist International, No. 6, 
November 1924, and another article by Mr. Voitinsky, entitled "The 
Situation in China," from the Communist International, No. 21, April 
1925. 

This is taken from Pacific Affairs of September 1936, listing the 
writings of G. Voitinsky. 

Mr. Morris. And you were editor at that time, were you not, Mr. 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Of Pacific Affairs; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, might that whole document be received 
into the record ? 

The Chairman. It may be received into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 518" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. .518 

Meeting April 2, 1936, Moscow: Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. I>attimore, H. M. 

■ Harondar 

1. In re exchange of books and periodicals. 

ECC said that of the member countries those most interested in Soviet ma- 
terials are the English, Chinese, and American Councils. The American Council 
is best equipped to use them. The two Chinese who know Russian are at present 
not in China. In England the Russian materials are used by some of the 
members of the Chatham House, but the staff is not able to make full use of them. 
Since the American Council could best use the books, the decision was to have 
the main IPR collection in New York temporarily. 

HM explained that the exchange was very successful to date, but that there 
was difficulty in choosing what books were wanted because it was impossible to 
tell about their contents without some kind of bibliographical exchange. 

Motiliev said that it would be po.ssible to provide almost all the materials 
printed in the Soviet Union. Since the American Council is interested in books 
on the Soviet Union in general, it will be necessary to work out a system for 
selection. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3317 

Harondar said that he had already sent to New York the list of all the periodi- 
cals which the U. S. S. R. IPR is receiving for I\Irs. Barnes to choose which ones 
were wanted in the U. S. He said that he now received librai-y cards of all the 
books on pertinent subjects, with a short resume of the contents. He will have 
these sent to the U. S. to serve as a basis for selection. 

Motiliev said that the annual plan figures and the publications of the statistical 
institute would be sent regularly without a preliminary exchange of the bibli- 
ographical cards. 

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the U. S. more material 
on the economic geography of the country ; the official publications of Govern- 
ment departments, particularly the statistical reports. 

Harondar said that their library on Japan, in English, was meagre and they 
would like more books on this. If it is possible to have sent from America the 
Japanese Government reports in English, they would like to have them. 

ECC said that Usiiibe should be able to furnish those. 

Lattimore asked if there were important materials in Mongolian and Chinese 
available here. 

Motiliev said that there is very little. There is a magazine published in 
Mongolia in Russian. There is also a Russian newspaper in Buriat-Mongolia. 
There are ftlongolian and Chinese newspapers for those peoples in the Soviet Far 
East. All of these can be sent. 

Motiliev said that there was very little use made of latinized Chinese due to 
the difficulties of retaining contacts and connections with older Chinese literature 
and with contemporary publications in China. The Chinese newspai)er occasion- 
ally publishes a supplement in latinized Chinese. 

Motiliev said that it was easy to get materials on Buriat-Mongolia, but more 
tlifficult on Mongolia. Harondar will check on the publications available here 
in Mongolian. 

Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of U. 8. S. R. Handbook published by 
Gollanz. He aLso gave HM the latest number of Sovietskie Kraebedenie which 
is devoted entirely to Buriat-Mongolia. He shows Lattimore the new Mon- 
golian Atlas and said that he would try to get a copy for him. 

B. In re Exhibit of periodicals at Yosemite. 

ECC explained that at Yosemite he wanted to have an exhibit of the most 
important periodicals appearing in the U. S. S. R. on the Far East, the Soviet 
Far East, and on the U. S. S. R. in general. He would like two copies of the 
monthly and quarterly magazines and four of the weekly magazines. 

IMotiliev said that there were few magazines on the Far East as such, but 
many general magazines that had important information on the Far East. 

II. In re Pacific Affairs. 

The di.scussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present. 

III. In re the appointment of a Soviet member of the staff of the Sec'y GenT. 
Motiliev said that this question could not be settled immediately, but he would 

like to know what type of person was wanted. 
ECC said that the Soviet member should be able to do the following : 

1. Visit the IPR library in N. Y. to find out in what particular fields it was 
weak. 

2. To visit the other important libraries in the country at universities to 
find out how far they are equipped to supply people who are studying the Soviet 
Union. 

3. To prepare summaries in English and descriptions of the Soviet periodicals 
for the exhibit in Yosemite. 

4. To meet the people working in the universities on the Soviet Union. 

5. To help on Pacific Affairs. 

Motiliev said that this meant the Soviet member should be one of the leading 
people in the IPR group here and well-informed on the Far East, etc. This 
would be very difficult, because the institutions where such people are working 
are very hesitant to let them go ftu- a long period. In principle he felt that 
such an arrangement would be a good thing. 

IV. In re Motiliev's visits en route to Y'osemite. 

ECC reported that Liu Yu-Wan was very anxious to meet Motiliev in Shang- 
hai. Liu Yu-Wan has now been made secretary of the Society for Sino-Soviet 
Cultural Relations, of which the Soviet ambassador is one of the officers. 

Motiliev said that he was not sure that he would get to Shanghai before Liu 
Yu-Wan had left. 

ECC said that Liu Yu-Wan was ready to wait for him. He also w^ants to 
come to Moscow after the conference. 



3318 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

ECC reported the invitation to Motiliev from Chatham House. Chatham House 
suggested that the middle of May might be a good time for such a visit. 

iNIotliliev said that it would be very difficult for him to do it. This year 
is a very busy one for him since the first volume of the Atlas is to appear during 
the year. Likewise Voitiusky is very busy, as editor of the new quarterly. How- 
ever, it might be possible to arrange for someone else to visit London. Motiliev 
is planning to finish his reports during the end of April and May. He considers 
that it is less important for him to visit England than China, since the opinions of 
leading English are more easily found in their articles and books than is the case 
with the Chinese. 

V. In re Soviet participation at Yosemite. 

(a) Personnel : ECC said that he was anxious to have as large a delegation as 
possible. He suggested that Romm would be very acceptable to the other coun- 
tries. He also mentioned Neymann. 

Motiliev said that this could not I)e settled immediately. Romm would un- 
doubtedly represent Izvestia, and might be a member of the delegation. 

(6) Documentation: Motiliev reported : 

1. The Symposium on the Soviet Far East is almost ready. The last articles 
are going to be received soon. By the end of May it should be printed in English. 

2. The Symposiixm on international relations in the Pacific Area will be ready 
at the same time. Most of the articles in it will be entirely new, but they may 
translate some of the articles from Tikhi Okean. He asked that HM give an 
opinion as to which articles would be more interesting. 

3. Nationality Policy in the Soviet Far East. This paper was to be prepared 
by Dimanshtein. H»^ is very busy and not very prompt. His secretary says that 
he probalily cannot do it before the conference, but maybe it will be done 
afterwards. 

4. Paper on Pacific relations in general, in connection with the fifth round-table. 
This paper is being prepared by Motiliev. It should be ready in May. He does 
not know how long and full he will be able to make it. 

Motiliev asked if May would be too late for the papers. 

ECC said that it would be too late for Australia and New Zealand, but in any 
case the most important use of the documentation comes after the conference. 

Motiliev said that It might be possible to send mimeographed copies earlier. 
He said that the two symposiums would be of value for several years and that 
the Symposium on the Soviet Far East would be printed in 50,000 copies, since 
there was no such study in existence here. 

Motiliev said that part of the Standard of Living study should be done by the 
conference. This is being written by Kravel who is vice president of Gosplan 
and director of all the statistical work. 

VI. In re finance and budget. 

ECC said that he would discuss this later alone with Motiliev. 

VII. In re international secretariat policy. 

Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECC's report on the policy. 
He thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might 
be some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu 
criticizing the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky 
was here. 

VIII. In re HM's visit to Buriat Mongolia. 

Motiliev said that he would be only too glad to ari-ange it, but due to the 
unstable conditions there, it was impossible to arrange it at present. Last 
year when he inquired as to the possibilities, the military institutions objected. 
At present Americans are allowed in Birobidjan. With Buriat-Mongolia it is 
just a question of time until the conditions become normal. If HM wants 
to visit other minor nationalities, as for instance in the Caucasus, it can be 
arranged. 

IX. In re Lattimore's visit to Mongolia. 

Motiliev said tliat the same thing applies to Mongolia as to Buriat-Mongolia, 
but there the question is more complicated since Mongolia is an independent 
country. Mongolia now is constantly ready for war and conditions are very 
unstable. 

There is a Mongolian representative in Moscow, with whom Motiliev spoke 
when Lattimore first applied for permission. This representative did not refuse, 
but said he would have to write to Ulan Bator for permission and seemed reluctant 
to ti*y to get permission. Moreover, there would not have been sufficient time 
to arrange this. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3319 

Motiliev did not try to get permission through Narkomindel. Since the 
U. S. S. R. IPR is in no way connected with the Narkomindel, he couldn't try 
to get permission from them witliout the approval of I>attimore and the Institute. 

Lattimore said that he would rather not go by getting permission via Nar- 
komindel. 

Motiliev said that it would then be necessary to wait until conditions improved. 

X. In re Soviet critique of international policy of IPR. 

Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this when Voitinsky was 
here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general 
policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions about Pacific Affairs, 
not as to its policy and contents, but as to its juridical position as the instru- 
ment of tlie IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in con- 
nection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in 
some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position. 

Motiliev said that although there were few subscriptions to Pacific Affairs 
here, it was read by many specialists and they found it very interesting. 

Lattimore said that he would also like to discuss the institutional position 
of Pacific Affairs. 

Motiliev said that the circulation of Tikhi Okean was between 3,000 and 5,000. 
The circulation is limited by a lack of paper rather than a lack of readers. "When 
he was in the Far East he had great difficulty in finding any copies and it is 
impossible to get back numbers. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I point out that at that time, I don't think 
that my knoAvledge of tlie Russian set-np included any assumption 
that the fact that a man had printed something for the Communist 
International meant that he held a position on the Comintern. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you offer to supply military infor- 
mation to the Soviet officials of the Listitute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel. will you identify this document, please? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding with that, I 
am not clear on one position, back on page 4. 

The Chairman. Of the last exhibit ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

* * * he said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection 
with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some 
way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position. 

In these previous minutes of the meeting we found that there was 
to be a line or policy, and we find articles carrying that out. 

What do you say is meant by "the U. S. S. R. IPR position"? 

Your wife just handed j^ou a paper. Is that in relation to it? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is in relation to the previous questioning 
here several days ago about the question of line in Pacific Affairs, on 
which I should like to make some amplifying remarks. 

Senator Ferguson. You can make those later. 

Mr. Lattimore. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have, though, what you mean 
here, or what was meant here by the "U. S. S. R. IPR position." 

Mr. Lattimore, I have no recollection of Avhat that meant. That 
is something I didn't write. I don't remember ever seeing these 
minutes before, and it seems to me the wording is rather obscure, but 
may have something to do with institutional arrangements at that 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, does it not sound reasonable that 
if you and Mr. Carter were to make up reports on this meeting later — 
which you claim that you did and which was in your possession at the 
time you wrote the book — that you would get the minutes that were 
taken, which are now before you? 



3320 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; it doesn't, Senator, I don't think that, as of 
1950, I knew there were such minutes. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about 1950. I am talking 
about the time that you claim the reports were written. 

Mr. Lattimore, No ; I would write a report on my own recollections 
of what there was to report about. 

I remember that at the Yosemite Conference in 1936 I was called 
upon to make a report to some kind of special committee for the pur- 
pose, on the editorial problems and policy of Pacific Affairs, and 
]:)resumably there was some reference there to the visit that I had just 
then recently made to Moscow, the details of which were presumably 
then much more fresh in my head. 

Senator P'erguson. But is it not clear, from the minutes of the 
meetings that were taken by the IPR and placed in their files, that 
there was to be a U. S. S. E. policy line ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you explain the expression that I read ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The expression that concerns the "preventing the 
]:)ublishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. 
IPR position." 

And I say that is an obscure wording, which at this time I can't 
identify, especially as I didn't write it and don't believe I have ever 
seen it before. 

Senator Ferguson, But taking all the other documents that we 
have had on the IPR, your meeting in Moscow, is it not a fair infer- 
once that there was a policy line and that that is the policy line that 
(hey were talking about there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, I see no reason for such an inference. 

May I, Senator Ferguson, at this moment advert to the question of 
line, as it was discussed the other day, because I think we may have 
been talking 

Senator Ferguson. I don't have any question now, but I just want 
to say that I cannot agree with the witness' explanation that he has 
given at all. 

Senator Smith. May I ask one question about this line ? 

The Chairman. All right, Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, where this memorandum, prepared, 
l)y Mr. Carter, says : 

He said there would be discussions aud negotiations in connection with the 
question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful 
to the U. S. S. R. IPR position— 

does not that sentence indicate that the U. S. S. R. position and the 
IPR position were one and the same, because it is in the singular and 
refers to the positions of the two ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That wouldn't be my conclusion. Senator. 

Senator Smith, It would not be? 

Mr, Lattimore, No, 

Senator Smith, What would be your conclusion about that, then ? 

Mr, Lattimore, Well, as I said, I think this wording is very ob- 
scure, but it seems to me that it refers to a U, S, S, R. and IPR posi- 
tion and possibly the relationship between the two. 

Senator Smith, It does not say "positions," Does not that sentence 
indicate that they are one and the same, U, S, S, R. IPR position? 

Mr. Lattimore, No, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3321 

Senator Smith. If there had been two, would not that have said 
two, phiral? 

Mr. Lattimore. To put what I said before in a different way, it 
might refer to the position of the U. S. S. E. in the IPR. 

Senator Smith. Of course, it did not say that, though, did it? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. That is what I say, that my interpretation is 
unauthoritative and I think the whole wording is obscure. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was not there a new policy laid 
down at the Moscow meetings ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; not in my opinion. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were there not articles published in 
Pacific Affairs that the Soviet officials not like and brought up with 
you? 

Mr. Lattimore. There had. 

Mr. Morris. And did not you and Mr. Carter say that there had 
been mistakes in publishing? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would have to review the transcript at that point. 

Senator Ferguson. And, Mr. Lattimore, did they object, after the 
meeting in Moscow, to any articles ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't recall offliand. 

Senator Ferguson. But they had before ? 

Mr. Lattimore. If you will look over again those Moscow memo- 
randa, one of the things that stands out is that we were trying to get 
the Russians to promise to contribute articles, which never came 
through. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question at all. 

Mr. Morris. That is, you and Harriet Moore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Who was with you at the time ? 

Harriet Moore was present, was she not, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think she was one of those present; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Was she a Communist at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. Was Kathleen Barnes present at that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so. 

Mr. Morris. She was present at these meetings, was she not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so. 

Mr. Morris. Was she a Communist at that time, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. You know they both have refused to testify before 
this committee, on the ground that their answers would incriminate 
them, when asked whether or not they were members of the Commu- 
nist Party. 

Mr. Lattimore. They have done so, to my great astonishment and 
distress. 

The Chairman. Senator Smith. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, there is one other question I would 
like to ask Mr. Lattimore. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever have a copy of the 
U. S. S. R. handbook, the Soviet Handbook ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In English, or Russian? 

Senator Smith. I do not know. Either one. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 4 



3322 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. Is that an IPR publication ? 
Senator Smith. No. 

I refer to the third paragraph from the bottom on page 1 of the 
exhibit — and it mentions your name up in there — where it says : 

Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of U. S. S. R. Handbook published 
by GoUanz. * * * 

Then it also refers to this : 

He shows Lattimore the new Mongolian Atlas and said that he would try to 
get a copy for him. 

Do you remember that handbook ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't remember that handbook. 

Senator Smith. You do not have it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I may have it ; I don't know. 

Senator Smith. All right. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, I think we will recess now until 1 : 30, 
if that will be satisfactory to the Senators. 

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon- 
vene at 1 : 30 p. m., of the same day.) 

after recess 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. You may pro- 
ceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I had reached the question, did you offer to 
supply military information to Soviet officials through the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, and the witness, I believe, had answered no. 

Mr. Lattimore. I had answered that I had no recollection. Since 
my memory, however, is incomplete, if you have a document to re- 
fresh my recollection I shall be glad to see it. 

]\Ir. Morris. Have you identified that document, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. INIandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting April 6; Motiliev; 
ECC; OL; FD; Harondar; HM," and then the penciled note 1936. 

Mr. Morris. Who is FD, Mr. Lattimore ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. I don't know who FD was. It may have been one 
of Mr. Carter's secretaries. 

Senator Ferguson. How many people had gone over to this meet- 
ing in Moscow? 

Mr. Lattimore. My wife and I came from Peking, accompanied 
by Miss Tyler, who had been doing some research on teaching of 
English in China, and we were met in ISIoscow by Mr. Carter, Miss 
Moore, and a secretary of INIr. Carter's whose name I forget. 

Senator Ferguson. Could that be the name that has been given 
to you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is why I suggested that might be, FD, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Who is Harondar? 

Mr. Lattimore. He was secretary of the Soviet Council of the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not you discussed mili- 
tary activities at all at that meeting? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no present recollection of it whatever. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will this be introduced into the record? 

The Chairman. Yes. Have you identified it ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3323 

The Chairman. This is a photostat of a document? 

Mr. Morris. It is of a document taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. And so testified by Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Morris. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. It ma}- be inserted in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 519" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 519 

Meeting April 6 ; Motiliev ; ECC ; OL ; FD ; Harondar ; HM 

ECC explained about Cressey's proposed study of Soviet geography. Motiliev 
said that in principle he welcomed the idea, as there was so little work done in 
English on this phase of the Soviet Union. He asked whether the plan included 
economic geography. ECC answered that while it would be largely physical 
geography, some attention would be paid to economic geography. ECC gave 
Motiliev a copy of Cressey's outline and Motiliev said that he would discuss it 
later. 

In re the preliminary agenda for the Conference: Motiliev said that the ques- 
tions on the Soviet Union included in the section headed "International Implica- 
tions" reflect a negative valuation of the Soviet Far Eastern policy. E. G. the 
question "Does the industrialization of the Far East work for or against the 
Peace Policy" is all right taken by itself, but wlien grouped with many other 
questions of this nature, the general impression is unfavorable to the policy. 

Motiliev said that some of the questions would be very ditficult to answer, since 
the delegation did not represent Narkomindel e. g. the questions of the strategic 
significance of industrialization and the questions on Sinkiang. 

Motiliev said that it was not correct to lump Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia 
in one question. Outer Mongolia is an independent state while Sinkiang is part 
of China. The policy in regard to Sinkiang is just a detail of the general policy 
in regard to China. It is true that Sinkiang is very closely linked to the U. S. 
S. R. economically due to its geographical position, but it is part of China politi- 
cally. Likewise Outer Mongolia should be called the Mongolian People's Re- 
public to keep clear the difference in status between these places. 

Motiliev said that the questions reflect the fears of their Far Eastern policy 
rather than the real essence of it. 

Some of the questions which are included in the Soviet section would be im- 
possible for them to answer, e. g. the question of whether or not other powers 
would let the U. S. S. R. give China aid in its reconstruction ; question in re Ger- 
man-.Tapanese alliance which belongs in the section on the balance of power; the 
question in re U. S. recognition (No. 47). 

In the questions on other countries many of the real problems of the Pacific are 
not treated adequately, e. g. the question of naval rivalry ; of English-.Iapanese- 
Chinese relations; of America n-.Iapanese relations and American interests in 
China; of American public opinion in re the Far East (does the opinion of the 
authors of Empire in the East, not including Pfeffer, reflect the opinion of the 
general people, of the intelligensia, or of the controlling groups of bankers, etc.?) . 
Many of these questions need additions and changes. 

Motiliev said that some of the more fundamental problems and analyses 
would be included e. g. in his data paper he was going try to show that Orchard's 
analysis of Japan was illogical. (Lorwin agreed with Motiliev's criticisms of 
Orchard.) He feel that the analysis is superficial. Orchard finds that the 
density of population and the lack of land are the fundamental problems for 
Japan. If this is true then expansion is the only way out, and this justifies 
expansion as in the increases of the whole nation. Orchard's contentions are 
not supported statistically. Penrose, for instance does not come to the same 
conclusions about the population. Motiliev will try to prove that the funda- 
mental problems are in the internal structure of the society and can be solved 
by changing that structure. One of the main problems is the fact that there 
are remnants of feudalism mixed up with capitalism. For instance 70 percent 
of the agricultural population are tenants. 

Another interesting question is about the real causes for the American with- 
drawal from the Philippines. Motiliev found Quincy Wright's analysis very 
convincing. 



3324 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Motiliev said that there were many articles in Pacific Affairs with which 
they did not agree. After the organizational question of P. A. has been dis- 
cussed, they would like to discuss some of these articles. 

In re question 48, on the effect of U. S. recognition of the U. S. S. R., ECC said 
that Roosevelt probably thought that recognition had prevented Japanese in- 
vasion of Siberia. Motiliev said that the main thing that had prevented that 
was the military preparation of the U. S. S. R. U. S.-U. S. S. R. relations 
have not been close. They have been passive both economically and politically. 

Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should 
be included e. g. the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian 
Islands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic import- 
ance of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to 
know of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fuelling station very 
near Kamachatka, which is in reality a military base. 

Motiliev suggested that in order to prepare the final agenda, each Coimcil 
be asked to submit proposals and changes. These suggestions should then be 
sent to the Councils concerned with the question for approval or disapproval. 
He does not want to have questions included which are embarrassing to any 
of the Councils. ECC said that previously those questions were included which 
were approved by three or four Councils. The publication of the preliminary 
agenda in IPR Notes was done in an effort to get such criticisms and suggestions 
from all the Councils. 

Motiliev said that another interesting question was whether the position re- 
flected in Empire in the East was due to the fact that questions of internal 
recovery had been so important in the last few years. If this were so, the 
position might be just temporary. 

Motiliev said that the British Policy in the Pacific was the key to the situa- 
tion. The policy is very indefinite and vaccilating, just as in the European 
policy of England. While it was possible to see the general line, it was impossible 
to know what the policy would be tomorrow. He asked about the possibility of 
a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and expressed the opinion that in the 
next few years it would be impossible, and on the contrary there would be grow- 
ing contradictions between England and Japan. OL said that in an article by 
Asiaticus for PA on Financial Imi>erialism in the Far East, the opinion was 
expressed that England was drifting toward recognition of Japanese pre- 
dominance in North China ; consolidation of British influence and interests in 
South China ; and the establishment of a "common hunting ground" in the 
Yangtze valley. At the same time Japan will not recognize a British sphere in 
China, even if it is of much smaller size. OL said that there was great opposi- 
tion to the Anglo-Japanese alliance in England from the navy, the interests on 
the China Coast, the home financial interests, and from the Dominions. This 
is reflected in the British attitude toward the Philippines. Motiliev said that 
the British want tlie U. S. to keep the Philippines to act as a wall between Japan 
and the Empire. 

Motiliev said that in the U. S. S. R. the general opinion as to the cause of 
the U. S. liberation of the Philippines was that they were very complex. The 
interests of the sugar industry were very important but not decisive. Here it is 
considered that it was a conscious step taken by the U. S. government to bring 
greater British activity in the Pacific. This is the idea expressed by Quincy 
Wright. Another idea is that from the military point of view the U. S. is glad 
not to have to protect the Philippines which are practically impossible to de- 
fend. On the other hand the independence is not real and for the next ten years 
the U. S. has the right to defend and use the Islands for military bases. 

01 asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the ques- 
tion of air bases in the Pacific. Motiliev said tliat formerly the Soviet attitude 
was that war in the Pacific between Japan and the U. S. was impossible because 
of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has changed 
this. The question of Guam is considered important here. Motiliev said that 
the Trans-Pacific air service was considei*ed primarily of military importance 
in the Soviet Press, but it of course had some commercial value. ECC said that 
he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the British Im- 
perial line out of that service; and partly because of the American idea that 
China was the great potential market for the U. S. INIotiliev said that at present 
the competition between different countries on technical aspects of aviation 
is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes was of greatest signi- 
ficance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists on this question 
here. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3325 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph of that 
document ? 

The Chairman. The last paragraph, did you say ? 
Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question 
of air bases in the Pacific. ^lotiliev said tliat formerly the Soviet attitude was 
that war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States was impossible be- 
cause of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has 
changed this. The question of Guam is considered impoi'taut here. Motiliev 
said that the Trans-Pacific Air Service was considered primarily of military 
importance in the Soviet press, but it of course had some commercial value. 
P^CC said that he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the 
British Imperial line out of that service ; and partly because of the American 
idea that China was the great potential market for the United States. Motiliev 
said that at present the competition between different countries on technical 
aspects of aviation is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes 
was of greatest significance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists 
on this question here. 

The Chairman. What is the next question ? 

Mr. Morris. Wlien you dealt with the Soviet officials in Moscow, Mr. 
Lattimore, did you deal with them as if they could possibly be Com- 
munist intelligence agents? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. We, at least I, assumed that they were all con- 
nected with the Soviet Government in one form or another, but we 
had no knowledge of the individual status of the people beyond the 
way they described themselves when — you know, when we were intro- 
duced, and so on. 

Of course, at the present time, I would generally assume that any 
Soviet citizen or subject is an intelligence agent or a potential one. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, back when you were discussing 
these problems with these people, you knew that they were Govern- 
ment officials? 
Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, anything that you told them 
could be used by their Government ? 
Mr. Lattimore, Of course it could. 

Senator Ferguson. Well then, how do you distinguish between an 
intelligence agent now and one then ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I suppose I mean in terms of belonging to organized 
intelligence services of any country. But, of course, we had no great 
concern on the subject since nobody connected with the IPE. had access 
to secret information of any kind. We were entirely an organization 
dealing with published materials in the open market, and international 
discussion. 

Senator Ferguson. "Wliy w^ere you then discussing this question 
of war bases in the Pacific ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was asking if they would be interested in an 
article in Pacific Affairs on the subject. During my editorship of 
Pacific Affairs in those years, we published an article on submarine 
warfare as related to possibilities of submarine warfare, as related 
to Japan. That was by an American author. 

We had an- article on the significance of the Dutch Navy in the 
Pacific generally, that was by a Dutch naval officer or former naval 
officer. We had articles on guerrilla warfare in China, and so forth. 



3326 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. But, Mr. Lattimore, if a person had written the 
article that you had an interest in mind, in the first sentence, he would 
have had to obtain some information from the United States along 
that line. 

Mr. Lattimore. I wouldn't say so. Senator. That is, any more 
than we had to obtain information from Government sources for 
the other articles we wrote on general questions of strategy in the 
Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. Where would you get the information if you 
did not get it from our Government? 

OL asked if there was any special interest in tlie U. S. S. R. about the question 
of air bases in the Pacific. 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, Senator, as of 1936 I should say that the ob- 
vious question in that connection was Singapore, about which a great 
deal had been published. There had been a good deal of discussion 
about whether Singapore, as an air base, was a substitute for a naval 
base or in addition to its use as a naval base, and so on. 

There was wide area of discussion of that kind of problem. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever write any articles or have them 
written on this question? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; we never did, and I don't believe — no, I think 
I can be quite sure in saying that we didn't even approach anyone 
to write such an article. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read another paragraph 
here. 

Mr. Lattimore. Is this from the same minutes? 

Mr. Morris. From the same minutes. I am reading now a para- 
graph beginning with "Motiliev said that questions" — it is in the mid- 
dle of page 2 : 

Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should be 
included, e. s-, the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian Is- 
lands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic importance 
of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to know 
of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fueling station very near 
Kamchatka, which is in reality a military base. 

Then there are other paragraphs here along the same nature. Mr, 
Chairman, the whole thing is in the record. 

I would like to ask Dr. Lattimore: In view of the desires being 
expressed by the Soviet officials here, whether or not General Bar- 
mine's testimony to the effect that the Soviet military intelligence was 
using IPE as a cover shop to secure military information from the 
United States and from Japan and China, whether or not that 
becomes plausible. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I think it is absolutely implausible. It seems 
to me that these are perfectly legitimate questions for general discus- 
sion as possibilities for articles in an international publication in 1936. 

We did, in fact, have articles on the Soviet fisheries in the North 
Pacific, and on the disputes between the Russians and the Japanese 
over those fisheries, involving Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, 
and so on. So if you want to be very far-fetched and say that this 
kind of thing was intelligence information, it was intelligence infor- 
mation about the Russians rather than to them. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3327 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not a fact, that Mr. Carter has already 
testified that when he returned from some of these trips he reported 

toourG-2? . o . -17 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that testimony, Senator J^er- 

guson. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that you had never heard that 

he had ? 

Mr. Lattimore. This is the first time I remember hearing it. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever requested to report to G-2 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have been asked to meet with various groups of 
people 

The Chairman. That is not the question. 

Mr. Lattimore. Of our Armed Forces after returning from trips ; 
not specifically G-2, as far as I know. 

Senator Ferguson. If it was not specifically, when you returned 
is it not true that you reported to some of our Armed Forces? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was asked to give general talks about my observa- 
tions abroad to groups that included military personnel, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And did it not include G-2 officers? 

Mr. Latitmore. I couldn't be precise about that without having a 
list of the people who attended. 

Senator Ferguson. And were you not asked questions about it? 

Mr. Lattimore. My memory is very unclear at the present time. I 
think that I was asked my opinion about this and that, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That being true, did you not feel that the Rus- 
sian authorities would be questioned by at least their intelligence 
officers, if they were not intelligence officers themselves? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. As of 1936 I had no feelings of the kind 
because I didn't have experience of that kind. 

Senator Ferguson. You have had no feeling about it atall? 

Mr. Lattimore. I had no feeling about it at all. If questions of real 
military importance had come up, I would certainly have mentioned 
them to, for instance, Colonel Faymonville, who was our military 
attache in Moscow under Ambassador Bullitt. 

Mr. Morris. Was that not the Colonel Faymonville who was sent 
back because he was too pro-Soviet, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know for what reason he was sent back. 
I know that there is a tribute to him in a book by former Assistant 
Secretary Sumner Welles as being the best-informed military officer 
we had on Russia. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, that would not conflict with the fact 
that he was pro-Russian? 

Mr. Lattimore. As far as I knew Colonel Faymonville, I had no 
reason to consider him pro-Russian. 

Senator Ferguson. How many times would you say that you had 
been interviewed by our authorities on the question, for instance, of 
this trip to Moscow ? 

Mr. Lattimore. On this trip to ISIoscow, I don't remember any ques- 
tioning. I do remember having dinner at the American Embassy with 
various Embassy personnel, at which Colonel Faymonville and others 
were present, and which the general subject of our talks with the Rus- 
sians was a part of the topic of conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. ^Y[\o was the Ambassador at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. William Bullitt. 



3328 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did you visit any high Russian officials at that 
time? 

Mr. Lattimore. At Ambassador Bullitt's suggestion, he took me to 
see a Russian official. I think he was a Vice Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs, or something of that sort. 

Senator Ferguson. And what did you talk about? 

Mr. Lattimore. I gave some opinions on Inner Mongolia. May I 
explain ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. Just about at this time, there had been some clashes 
on the Outer Mongolia frontier, between the Russian and Mongol 
forces and the Japanese. Roy Howard had just had an interview with 
Stalin, at which Stalin had made what was then considered a sensa- 
tional statement that the Russians would defend Outer Mongolia in 
case of any invasion. 

Li connection with this, Ambassador Bullitt asked me about supple- 
mentary information from Inner Mongolia. I didn't know Outer 
Mongolia. But he was asking about general conditions in Inner Mon- 
golia. And I told him what I knew, and my opinions about it as of 
that time, and I believe I mentioned the fact that the Russians had at- 
tacked my publications on the subject and had very strongly insinuated 
that I was pro-Japanese, and so on. 

Mr. Bullitt said, "Well, I think what you are saying is extremely 
interesting, and I think the Russians ought to hear about it. Suppose 
I fix up an appointment. Would you mind talking to them?" 

I said, "No; I will say to them just what I have said to you, if you 
think that is all right." 

So he made the appointment and took me down there and, in his 
presence, I talked with the Soviet Vice Commissar. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you meet anyone else ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe we met anyone else. 

Senator Ferguson. Just the one occasion ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I know it was just that one occasion. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, miglit I inquire ? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is this Colonel Faymonville that you are speaking 
of here, is he the same Colonel Faymonville about whom Mr. Carter 
wrote you in June of 1941, that letter which went into the record 
yesterday ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you saying now that you knew Colonel Fay- 
monville as early as 1936 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I first met him in Moscow in 1936. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. Carter knew that you 
knew him ? 

Mr. Lai^iimore. I presume he did, since we were both in Moscow 
at the same time. He may have forgotten, of course. 

Mr. Sourwine. In his letter of June 20, 1941, Mr. Carter suggested 
that if you had time in San Francisco you and Mr. Holland might 
want to arrange a private talk with Colonel Faymonville, and he 
gave the headquarters, and then he described him to you. 

He said, "He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and atj 
ease if he had luncheon with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday." ■ 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3329 

That was that hincheon with Ambassador Oumansky, was it not? 
Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And he said, "I think yon get the idea. It may 
be that if yon get the same favorable impression of him which Har- 
riet Moore and I have, he might be someone who conld be exception- 
ally nseful to yon and the Generalissimo at some fntnre time in 
Chungking." 

Would you take it from that that Mr. Carter knew that you knew 
Mr. Faymonville ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It is not clear to me from that whether he knew 
it or not. I would assume he knew it since we were both in Moscow 
at the same time and dined at the Embassy together, and so on. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know definitely whether Mr. Carter knew 
that you were acquainted with Colonel Faymonville? 

Mr, Lattimore. I don't know definitely. 

Mr. SotjRwiNE. Thank you. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I explain a little bit more? One reason why 
I personally was very much interested in Colonel Faymonville was 
the fact that he had started life as an expert on Japan rather than 
Russia. He spoke Japanese in addition to Russian, and there were 
very few American military or civil personnel who had that kind of 
accomplishment. Hence, I would think that Faymonville's opinions 
on questions in northeast Asia, involving both Japan and Russia, 
would be valuable opinions. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Before this next document, Mr. Chairman, I would 
like the record to show that the last paragraph makes no mention 
of Mr. Lattimore supplying an article. 

The first sentence is: "OL asked if there was any special interest 
in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific." 

Mr. Lattimore, did Soviet officials collect economic and financial 
information on China and Japan for the IPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether they did or not, but 
if 3^ou have a document on the subject to refresh my memoiy I shall 
be glad to see it. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Morris, are you about to leave this document? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before we leave, may I ask a question ? 

You will recall, Mr. Lattimore, that on a previous occasion we have 
discussed here the meeting of the 8th of April. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was the meeting at which the minutes indi- 
cated that you had spoken of an article by a Communist writer to 
be published in Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

IMr. Sourwine. And we had some colloquy about whether you were 
referring to Asiaticus. The memorandum subsequently, that is, in 
one of its latter paragraphs, did mention Asiaticus. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe some point was made of the fact that that 
]nention of Asiaticus in the same memorandum was quite some time 
subsequent to the mention of an article by the Communist writer. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 



3330 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I would like to call your attention to the fact tliat 
in this document, being the minutes of the meeting of April 6, there 
is also mention of Asiaticus, and I ask yon if you recall that there 
had been such mention at the conference which this document pur- 
ports to recount? 

Mr. Lattimore, No ; I don't recall it. 

This, again, is a copy of some minutes that I don't remember 
seeing at the time or since. But, looking over those previous min- 
utes, something has occurred to me which might clarify the questions 
you were asking me at that time about deadline for Pacific Affairs, 
and so on. 

There are two points here : One is that I was not in control of 
the daedline of Pacific Affairs; that thatw as all handled in Wash- 
ington, and sometimes — in New York, I mean — and sometimes I 
didn't know until an issue came out exactly what was in it. 

The other thing is that very possibly, as subject matter for these 
discussions with the Kussians, I had with me carbon copies of what 
I was expecting to be in the "June issue of Pacific Affairs, and that 
therefore the next issue would refer to the September issue. That 
is a possibility. But it might straighten things out. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Lattimore, as bearing on the question of 
whether the article by Asiaticus did appear in the June issue, was 
in fact in existence at the time of these conferences, you will note 
that at the bottom of page 2, beginning in the middle of the para- 
graph, these minutes read : 

OL said that in an article by Asiaticus for PA on financial imperialism in 
the Far East, the opinion was expressed that England was drifting toward 
recognition of Japanese predominance in north China ; consolidation of British 
influence and interests in south China, and the establishment ot a "common 
hunting ground" in the Yangtze Valley. 

That would indicate that the article was in being at that time, 
would it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would indicate that it was in being in manu- 
script. 

Mr. Sourw^ine. At least in manuscript ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At least in manuscript ; yes. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, 1 want to offer at this time for 
the appendix of the record an article about Gen. Philip R. Faymon- 
ville, military aide to President Eoosevelt, who "has spent 15 years in 
the U. S. S. P. His views on Soviet aims are somewhat at variance 
with 'Red menace' tales." 

Tliis is an article in the Daily People's World, Friday, February 
18, 1949. 

I think this paper has been described, has it not? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir; described in connection with the Senator 
Knowland comment. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the editorial. And also of the ad con- 
cerning the witness' book. 

Mr. Morris. That is described as a Communist paper? 

Mr. Mandel. That is correct. 

The Chairman. You want that to go into the appendix of the 
record ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3331 

The Chairman. All right. 

(The document referred to appears in the appendix of the record 
as exhibit No. 472 on 3700.) 

Mr. Morris. The next question is, Did Soviet officials like the mili- 
tancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite 
take the same line ? 

The ChairjMan. Let us hear the question again. 

Mr. Morris. The question to Mr. Lattimore is, Did Soviet officials 
like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs 
could not quite take the same line? 

Mr. Lattimore. They may have. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 11, 1939, addressed to 
Mr. Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. 

The Chairman. It will be shown to the witness. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that 
lett^^r? 

Mr. Lattimore. I must have received it. I don't recall it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record? 

Tlie Chairman. It has been identified. 

Mr. Morris. I would like the witness to read that letter, commenc- 
hig at the outset. 

JNIr. Lattimore. Dated July 11, 1939, on board steamshijD Aquitania. 

(Exhibit No. 520) 

Dear Owen : The Chinese are more unanimously enthusiastic about Pacific 
Affairs than the members of any other group. 

I might mention, of course, that this means the Chinese of the 
official Chinese Council : 

Franklin Ho was immensely impressed by Guenther Stein's The Yen and 
the Sword. Ushiba assured me that the office of the Japanese Council was taking 
seriously your request for additional Japanese articles. Motylev was eager 
for much more intimate factual details giving both very recent economic infor- 
mation and also personal observations as to what is going on in China and Japan. 

As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Jaffe, he likes the mili- 
tancy of Amerasia. He recognizes that Pacific Affairs cannot quite take this line 
but lie still insists that no one can legitimately criticize you if you do decide 
to adopt his request to you of 3 years ago that Pacific Affairs come out strong 
consistently and repeatedly for the collective system. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt your letter 
there ? Is that not going back to your meeting with them in Moscow ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is going back to that meeting and indicating 
that apparently Motylev considered that for 3 years I have not ful- 
filled his suggestion that Pacific Affairs take a stronger line de- 
nouncing Japanese aggression. 

Senator Ferguson. Does it not also show the opposite, that also you 
had agreed at that time with the Russians to take a line for the 
Russians 'I 

Mr. Lattimore. No, it doesn't. It indicates that at that time the 
Russians repeatedly brought up the idea that Pacific Affairs should 
take an editorial line of characterizing Japanese policy in China as 
aggression, and we repeatedly pointed out that Pacific Affairs was 
controlled by a number of National Councils, and that we had to try 



3332 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

to please everybody, and usually wound up by displeasing somebody 
in practically every issue. 

Senator Ferguson. Had the Kussians asked you to use your maga- 
zine, the Pacific Affairs, to advocate the collective system? 

Mr. Lattimore. What is clearly meant here by collective system is 
collective security system. 

The Chairman. Now go back to the question, please. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he request you, when you were in Mos- 
cow 

Mr. Lait'imore. I don't remember that request in Moscow. As I 
remember just now, the minutes don't show it, but Carter after 8 years 
apparently feels that that was the general tenor of the conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. But is not that all they are talking about? 

Mr. Lattimore. Because characterizing the Japanese policy in 
Asia as aggression would be one way of saying, "Well, there ought to 
be some collective security measures taken through the League of 
Nations to stop it." 

Senator Ferguson. Did not Eussia enter into a pact with Japan on 
this question ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The next year. 

Senator Ferguson. The next year ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Some 8 months later. 

Senator Ferguson. And does not this indicate that at least one 
thing was discussed, that collective system by you and the Russian 
people at the Russian meeting in Moscow ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That indicates that from Mr. Carter's recollection 
3 years later, it was that we talked about collective security. 

iSenator Ferguson. Does it say collective security there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It seems to me that the context clearly indicates 
collective security. 

The Chairman. The question is: Does it say collective security. 
Can you not answer that question ? 

Mr. Lattimore. What it says is "come out strong consistently and 
repeatedly for the collective system." And I can read the context in 
no other way than meaning collective-security system. 

The Chairman. All right, Senator, are there any further questions ? 

Senator Ferguson. Not at the moment. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, did you want Mr. Lattimore to con- 
tinue reading ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. But my question was — there were two points 
that I made there — one of the questions was did Soviet officials collect 
economic and financial information on Japan through the IPR, and 
did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why 
Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line. 

Question two was partly answered by the first paragraph, but it 
will not be answered until we get to the paragraph starting: 

One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese 
internal economic and financial position. 

However, if the witness would like to read the whole letter, I have 
no objection. 

Mr. Lattimore. I answered Senator Ferguson that the difference 
referred to here between Amerasia and Pacific Affairs can easily and 
clearly be established ; namely, that Amerasia did repeatedly charac- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3333 

terize Japanese policy in China as imperialism, Amerasia being an 
^Vmerican magazine published in America, and therefore quite able 
to be strong on such a subject; whereas, Pacific iVffairs, being under 
the control of a number of National Councils, some of whom objected 
to characterizing one member of the Institute as an aggressor, was 
always much milder in that respect. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have any doubt that the Amerasia 
was a Communist magazine ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It never occurred to me to think that Amerasia was 
a Communist magazine. If you will go back over the issues of Amer- 
asia at the time that was connected with it, up to 1941, you will see 
that it could not be characterized as even a left-wing magazine in those 
years [reading] : 

Both he and Voitinsky regret that there is no evidence of our having taken 
seriously their request for this 3 years ago. They feel the necessity for this was 
never greater than today. Their insistence was of great interest to me for two 
reasons. First, because it is evidence that they treat the IPR seriously and 
have orderly memories of their suggestion. Second, because it contraverts the 
assertions of the reactionaries in Paris, London, and Washington that the retire- 
ment of Litvinoff meant that the Kremlin was throwing over its commitment to 
tlie collective system. 

Could you use the present appearance of Sir Arthur Salter's "Security — Can It 
Be Retrieved?" as the occasion for an early full length treatment that will be so 
fundamental as to appeal to the more thoughtful members of the institute in 
every member country and so militant as to convince Motylev and Voitinsky 
that we are responding to their suggestion. 

One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese 
internal economic and financial position. Happily this will be supplied bjr 
Chi's study for the inquiry. (You have doubtless seen his Virginia Quarterly 
article.) I am going to reopen with Jessup and Angus the question of publica- 
tion of some Inquiry material in Pacific Affairs when it is of such a nature as 
to fit in with your own policy as editor and when it is of a kind which will 
make important and authentic information of which scholars and statesmen are 
in need available to a wide Pacific Affairs audience. 

Your many friends all along the line inquired for you and sent you their 
warmest greetings. All are asking when your book will be published. 

I learned in one or two quarters that Miss Virginia Thompson's book on Indo- 
china is not being taken seriously because there is a criticism of Pelliot or an 
implied criticism of Pelliot's position. Do you happen to know what would be 
the basis of this and whether scholars in other countries regard Pelliot with 
the same degree of infallibility as he regards himself? 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. That letter is in the record, Mr. Chairman; is it not? 

The Chairman. Very well, it is. 

(The document, as previously read in full by the witness beginning 
on p. 3331 was marked "Exhibit No. 520.") 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the 
Office of War Information? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. My recollection is imper- 
fect on the subject. If you have a document to refresh it, I would be 
glad to see it. But in the meantime I can tell you to the best of my 
recollection what the situation w^as. 

The Chairman. Just a minute. 

Mr. Morris. Did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the OWI ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I didn't. I have some recollections on the 
subject, but I don't believe that they included my employiiig him. 

The Chairman. Can you say you did or you did not, Mr, Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I did not. 



3334 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Did you offer to employ Y. Y. Hsu in the OWI? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I did not. If you would allow me to state 
my recollection on the subject 

Mr. Morris. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. Then we will see if it corresponds with whatever 
documents you have. ^ 

Mr. Morris. Please do. 

Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that the Office of War Informa- 
tion, the New York office, needed materials to put out in Chinese 
language material to be sent to China, that the library resources for 
that kind of thing in New York were very restricted, and that a request 
was made to the New York office of IPR to know whether OWI could 
draw on the IPR's file of Chinese materials ; that this w^as consented 
to and that Y. Y. Hsu was the man who was in charge of that material 
in the IPR office at that time. 

Mr. Morris. How well did you know Mr. Hsu? 

Mr. Lattimore. Eather slightly. 

Mr. Morris. Did he ever visit you at your home ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. He and his wife visited us in Baltimore. 

Mr. Morris. How frequently ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Once, I think. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever visit him at his home ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We went and had dinner with him and his wife on 
Long Island somewhere once, I think. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know at that time of his Communist record? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Where is Mr. Hsu now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe he is in China. 

Mr. Morris. Is he an official of the Red Chinese Government? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no knowledge on the subject. 

Mr. Morris. But you do believe he is in Red China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe he is in Red China. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, would you put into the record at this time 
Mr. Y. Y. Hsu's Communist record as it existed in 1942 ? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a clipping from the Daily Worker of 
December 14, 1929, page 5. 

Senator Ferguson. What date ? 

Mr. Mandel. 1929. 

The Chairman. Just a moment. What was the date of these dinner 
parties ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what is the date of the dinner party at 
your home and Mr. Hsu's home that you just testified to ? 

Mr. Lattimore. After the war, I think. 

Mr. Morris. That is sometime subsequent to 1945 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think so ; yes. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. This article describes, and I quote : 

Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will protest against 
the butchery of thousands of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and 
will denounce the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for 
war against the Soviet Union, fatherland of the workers of the world. 

Listed as speakers at these meetings are the following, who have 
recently been indicted as Communist leaders. I read the name of 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3335 

I. Amter, Alexander Traclitenberg, and, listed also as a speaker, Y. Y. 
Hsn. 

I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker of November 
6, 1933, which says, in part, that 38 workers' organizations have en- 
dorsed the Commnnist Farty ticket and program in the New York 
mnnicipal elections. Listed as endorsing that program and ticket 
is Y. Y Hsn. 

The Chairman. That was what date, the date of that ? 

Mr. Morris. That, Mr. Chairman, was 1933. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker 
of August 13, 1928, page 1, which describes that 15 workers partici- 
pated in a Chinese tag day under the auspices of the Committee to Aid 
the Chinese Trade-Unions, and it lists also the names of individuals 
who were arrested in connection with that tag day. 

Among those arrested was Y. Y. Hsu, spelled here S-h-u, secretary 
of the New York Worker Peasant Alliance. A photograph is given 
with the article. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may these go into the record? 

The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 521" and 
areas follows:) 

[Source : Daily Worker, December 14, 1929, p. 5] 

Smash Attack on Haiti, U. S. S. R. — Mass Meets Mobilize Against 

Imperialism 

Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will potest against 
the butchery of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and will denounce 
the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for. war against 
the Soviet Union, Fatherland of the workers of the world. 

Meetings will be held at St. Luke's Hall, 12.5 West 130th St.; Manhattan 
Lyceum, 66 East Fourth St. Speakers, H. Benjamin, Anna Daman, George 
Siskind, James Mo. Bryant Hall, Sixth Ave. near 42d St. Speakers, I. Amter, 
Max Bedacht, Harriet Silverman, Joseph Boruchowitz, Alexander Trachtenberg, 
T. H. Li, Sam Darey. Rose gardens, 1.347 Boston Rd., Bronx. Speakers, Bill 
Dunne, T. Y. Hu, Leon Plott, G. Green, H. Sazer. 318 Grand St., Brooklyn. 
Speakers, J. L. Engdahl, Rose Wortis, J. Williamson, Y. Y. Hsu. Hopkinson 
Mansions, 428 Hopkinson Ave., Brooklyn. Speakers, M. J. Olgin, Otto Hall, 
T. P. Hu, Gertrude Welsh. Bohemian Hall, Second and Woolsey Aves., Astoria, 
L. I. Speakers, A. Markoff, Richard Moore, Tong Ping. 

Tomorrow afternoon at 1 : 15 New York workers are urged to gather at Park 
Row and Broadway in front of the Federal Building to demonstrate against 
Wall Street's oppression, aided by the Washington Executive Council, of the 
Colonial and American workers and its attacks on the Soviet Union. 

Dozen of organizations will participate in these demonstrations. At the 
Bryant Hall meeting, which takes place at 6 o'clock instead of 8, as at other 
demonstrations, leading members of the Needle Trades Workers' Industrial 
Union will speak also on the organization movement among the dressmakers 
and the false strike of the I. L. G. W. U. 



[Source: Daily Worker, November 6, 1933, p. 2] 

Thirty-eight Workers' Organizations Endorse Communist Party Program — 
Party's Fight for Masses' Needs Cited in Statement — Industrial Unions, 
Unemployed, Councils, AVomen's Councils Among Backers of Red Can- 
didates 

New York. — Thirty-eight workers' organizations liave endorsed the Commu- 
nist Party ticket and program in the New York municipal elections. No other 
has shown dally its stubborn and ceaseless fight in the shops and streets for the 



3336 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

needs of the masses, says the statement signed hy tliese unions, unemployed 
councils, and fraternal organizations. 

Headed by such fighting unions as the Marine Workers Industrial Union, the 
Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union, the Steel and Metal Workers Indus- 
trial Union, the organizations supporting the Communist Party state : 

"Only the Communist Party as the party of the working class represents the 
interests of the entire working iwpulation, stands squarely on the principle 
that the provision of adequate food, clothing and shelter, and the defense of 
the rights and living standards of the workers are the primary issues in this 
campaign." 

Among the organizations signing endorsement for the Communist candidates 
are the Unemployed Councils, Friends of the Soviet Union, Councils of Working 
Class Women, Anti-Imperialist League, Workers Ex-Servicemen's League, and 
the Labor Sports Union. 

Needle Trade Industrial Union : 

Ben Gold, General Secretary 

Louis Hyman, I'resident 

Irving Potash, Secretary 

Isadore Weisberg, Manager, Dress Dept. 

Joseph Boruchowitz, Manager of Cloak Dept. 

Samuel Burt, Fur Dressing Dept. 

Ben Stallman, Org. of Bathrobe Dept. 

Dominick Montello, Org. of Custom Tailors 

Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union 

James Lustig, Organizer 

James Matlis, Secretary 
Marine Workers Industrial Union : 

Roy Hudson, National Secretary 

Thomas Ray, Secretary 
Food Workers Industrial Union : 

Jay Rubin, General Secretary 

William Albertson, Org. of Hotel and Restaurant Dept. 

Sam Kramberg, Org. of Cafeteria Dept. 
Alteration Painters Union : Morris Kushinsky, Secretary 
Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union : 

Fred Biedeukapp, Organizer 

Isadore Rosenberg, Secretary 
Building Maintenance Workers Industrial Union : Mort Sher, Secretary 
Drygoods Workers Union : 

Louis Kfare, Vice Chairman 

Chester Fierstein, Chairman 
Furniture Workers Industrial Union: Morris Pizer, Secretary 
Independent Cari^enters Union : 

Isaac Berman, Organizer 

Herman Bogartz, Secretary 

Nathan Ellin, Treasurer 
Taxi Workers Union : 

Harold Eddy, Organizer 

Abner Feigin, Financial Secretary 
Cleaners and Dyers Union : Max Rosenberg, Secretary 
Laundry Workers Industrial Union : Sam Berland, Secretary 
Building and Construction Workers League : 

Jack Taylor, Secretary 

Sam Nessin, General Secretary 
Trade Union Unity Council : 

Andy Overgaard, Secretary 

Rose Wortis, Assistant Secretary 

Sheppard, Organizer 
Office Workers Union : liaura Carmon, Organizer 
Unemployed Council : 

Israel Amter, National Secretary 

Carl Winter, Secretary of Greater New York 

Richard Sullivan, Org. of Greater New York 
International Labor Defense : 

William Lawrence, Secretary, New York District 

William Patterson, National Secretary 

William Fitzgerald, Org., Harlem Section 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3337 

Workers International Relief: 

Pauline Rogers, New York City Secretary 

Alfred Watrenkneclit, National Secretary 
Friends of the Soviet Union : B. Friedman, Secretary 
Anti-Imperialist League : 

William Simons, National Secretary 

John Bruno, Secretary, New York 
Anti-Imperialist Alliance: Y. Y. Hsu, National Secretary 
Workers Ex- Servicemen's League : 

Harold Hickerson, National Secretary 

Joseph Singer, Secretary, City Committee 

Emanuel Levin, National Chairman 

P. Cashione 
Council of Working Class Women : 

Clara Bodian, Secretary 

Clara Shavelson, Educational Director 

Sarah Licht, Org. Secretary 
Labor Sports Union : Mack Gordon, Secretary, New York District 
International Workers Order : 

Max Bedacht, National Secretary, Jewish Section 

Harry Schiller, New York City Secretary 

Sadie Doroshkin, Secretary City Central 
Russian Mutual Aid : Joseph Soltan, President, New York District Committee 
English Workers Clulis : 

J. Landy 

Edith Zucker 
Finnish Workers Federation 
Jewish City Club Committee 

[Source : Daily Worker, New York, Monday, August i;^, 1928] 

Fifteen Jailed by New York Police in Retjef Collections for Chinese Trade- 
Unionists — Aruests Aided by Followers of Kuomintang — Soliciting With- 
out Permit Charged 

Fifteen workers, who participated in the Chinese Tag Day under the auspices 
of the Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions, were arrested yesterday 
in Chinatown. They were charged with "soliciting without a permit" and were 
released on $500 bail each, furnished by the local International Labor Defense. 
The collectors are to appear at the First District Court, White and Center Sts., 
at 9 a. m. today (Monday), where they will be defended by Jacques Buitenkant, 
retained by the New York Section of the International Labor Defense. 

Those arrested were Y. Y. Shu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant 
Alliance ; David Wee, 27 ; H. T. Tsiang, 28 ; David Kanner ; Max Postolsky, 21 ; 
W. Martin, IS; Du Peld, 22; Yekelchik; M. Levin, 12; I. Kleinman, 19; R. Kleid- 
mann, 20 ; B. Winnick, 17 ; B. Rosenberg, 22; and L. Chansik. 



[Picture head: Arrested Leader] 

Above is Y. Y. Sliu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant Alliance, who 
was among the 15 workers arrested yesterday. Shu was active in the Chinese 
Relief Tag Days held yesterday and Saturday. Thousands of dollars were con- 
tributed by the workers of New York to aid the Chinese workers in their fight 
against imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. Photo was taken dur- 
ing the recent antiwar demonstration at Union Square. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, vvill you identify these next two docii- 
menis? 

Mr. Mandfx. Tliis is a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 24, 1942, addressed 
to Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information. It has a type- 
written signature of Yung-ying Hsu. It is dated April 24, 1942. 

Mr. INIoRRis. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record? 

The Chairman. It has been identified as having come from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 5 



3338 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter for us, please '. 
The Chairman. To whom is it addressed ? 

Mr. Mandel. To Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information. 
[Reading:] 

(Exhibit No. 522) 

Dear Sir: It is a great pleasure to receive your letter of the 21st instant. I 
have just requested my alma mater, Lelancl Stanford University, for a transcript 
of my academic records to enable me to fill out the application blank with 
greater accurai-y. The application will be sent to you at the earliest possible 
time. 

Under Mr. Edward C. Carter's capable, enlightening and benevolent leader- 
ship I find my work in the Institute of Pacific Relations extremely interesting 
and enjoyable. However, if you think I can be of any help to your work, I will 
ask Mr. Carter to release me from my present position. 

As you have been associated with the Institute, you might agree with me 
that its equipment and environment are a great asset to writers either on or for 
the Far East. For the past 14 months I have been in charge of the Chinese 
collection here. It might be beneficial for both the institute and the Coordinator 
of Information that part of the work of the latter be done in the former. It 
is my opinion that Mr. Carter would be glad to offer the facilities of his organiza- 
tion to the war effort and welcome such an arrangement. 

Permit me, sir, to express my deep appreciation of both your and jNIr. Owen 
Lattimore's kindly attention. 

Sincerely yours. 

The Chairman. Who is it signed by ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yung-ying Hsu. 

Senator Ferguson, that is Y. Y. Hsu? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted. 

(The previous document as read by counsel was marked "Exhibit 
No. 522.") 

The Chairman. Let us get this straight. Y. Y. Hsu and Yung-ying 
Hsu are one and the same individual % 

Mr. Morris. Is that right, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lati^more. Probably, yes. I don't know anj^thing about the 
Y. Y. Hsu of the 1920's or 1936's. This is all new to me. 

Mr. Morris. It is your testimony you did not know the Communist 
record of Y. Y. Hsu ? 

Mr. Laitimore. Yes; that is my testimony. I have no recollection 
of it. 

The Chairman. Did you receive copies of the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. That is, as they were i.ssued ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. At no time? 

Mr. Lattimorpl At no time. 

The Chairman. You were not a contributor to the Daily Worker ? 

Mr. Laitimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Nor a subscriber ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, when you were with the OWI, 
did you make any investigation prior to employment of personnel? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. Investigation of personnel was the fimc- 
tion of a separate personnel branch of OWI. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether they made any examina' 
tion or investigation of personnel? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3339 

Mr. Latitmore. I believe that all people employed by OWI, includ- 
ing myself, were subject to investigation by the Civil Service Commis- 
sion which, my recollection is, was able to check with other investigat- 
ing agencies, such as the FBI. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there any investigations for security pui^ 
poses, to 3'our knowledge ? 

j\Ir. Lattimore. Well, there was an investigation of individuals 
before they could be hired. 

Senator P'erguson. That is what I had in mind. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is along the security line? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think every single person had to be investigated 
along lo3'alty and security lines. 

The Chairman. When w^as OWI set up first ? Do you remember ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know the precise date. Senator. It grew out 
of COI, Coordinator of Information, which was at some time split into 
OSS and- OWL 

The Chairman. You did not come in then until it was OWI ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. And you came into it after what year, or about 
what time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I came into it, I think, in late December 1942. 

The Chairman. Wliat is the date of these articles in the Daily 
Worker? 

Mr. Morris. The last one is 1933, Senator, the latest one is 1933. 

Mr. Lattimore, I had asked you the question in connection with that 
letter Mr. Mandel read, what your recollection is of the kindly atten- 
tion referred to in the last paragraph that you showed to Mr. Hsu. 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no present recollection whatever. May I 
say that the set-up of OWI at that time, as far as Chinese work was 
concerned, was that all radio transmissions 

The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, I do not think you are answering 
the counsel's question now. If you want to go back, if you want to go 
back to a former question, that would be something else. 

Mr. Lattimore. I am explaining why it is difficult for me to answer 
this question, Senator. 

The Chairman. Read the question, IVIr. Reporter, of the counsel, 
Mr. Morris. 

( The record was read by the reporter.) 

The Chairman. That was his answer. 

Mr. Lattimore. The Chinese personnel of the New York Office were 
under Mr. Barnes' jurisdiction, not under mine. 

The Chairman. That does not belong to this question. That be- 
longs to another question asked by Senator Ferguson. If you want 
to let it stand that way, it is all right, but it involves the thing more. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any dealings with Mr. Hsu 
when he was, as he says there, in charge of the Chinese collection 
of thelPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, no direct dealings, as far as I remember. 

Mr. :Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of a document from the files 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, showing a letterhead of the Office 
of War Information, 111 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated 
March 12, 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland and signed "Owen." 



3340 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall sending that letter to 
Mr. Holland^ 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't recall sending it to him, but obviously 
I sent it. 

Mr. Morris. Does that look like your .signature at the bottom'^ 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, it is. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please? 

Mr. Mandel. It is to Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. : 

(Exhibit No. 523) 

Dear Blll : Several weeks ago I was in New York, but only on Saturday and 
Sunday, and saw no one but people in our own office, except for the fact that I 
had lunch in the Hsu's apartment with old Prof. Chi and his wife and Harriet Chi. 

Anytime that it would be useful to you to have Hsu working out here for the 
IPR, we should be very glad to take him on as a part-time consultant or research 
man for our Chinese Section. 

Would you let me know if you have any ideas on the subject that I could help 
to follow up? 

We are enjoying being in San Francisco again. Feels just like home (only 
a hell of a lot more crowded). David is taking Chinese lessons, writing and all. 

Love from us too to Doreen, Mrs. McGari-y, and Patricia. 
Yours, 

Owen. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted into the record? 

The Chairman. It may be inserted. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 523'' and was 
read in full.) 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, is that meeting that you had in Mr. 
Hsu's apartment still another meeting in addition to the one you 
testified to took place out on Long Island somewhere? 

Mr. Lattimore. Probably the same, but I am not sure. 

Mr. Morris. You also testified the other was after the war, did 3'ou 
not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I thought it was after the war ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. And on Long Island ? 

The Chairman. This is a different meeting. This was not on Long 
Island, as I understand it. This was in New York. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know from this letter whether the apart- 
ment was in New York or on Long Island. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where was Mr. Hsu's apartment, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recollect. The only place that I recollect is 
an apartment on Long Island, and I thought I was there after the 
war. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recollect an apartment on Long Island which 
was ]\Ir. Hsu's apartment? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. So that if Mr. Y. Y. Hsu Avas not living on Long 
Island in 1943, this was a different apartment and a separate and 
second visit ; is that right ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. 

Mr. Morris. And you knew Mr. Hsu well enough for him to be the 
only person you visited for that Avhole weekend ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I say here "saw no one but people in our 
office." 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3341 

The Chairman. Now go back to the question again. What is your 
question ? Do you know JNIr. Hsu well enough so that he is the only 
one you visited during that weekend % 

Mr. Morris. In addition to the people in your own office? 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether I had lunch outside the 
office with anybodjj else, or not. 

Mr. Morris. Is that Harriet Chi mentioned in the first paragraph, 
was she ever your secretary % 

Mr. Lattimore. She was my secretary for about 2 weeks in 1936. 

Mr. Morris. She is the wife of the Chao-ting Chi that we have 
talked about at great length in this testimony, is she not? 

Mr. Lattimore. She was at one time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, w^ill you accept that into the record % 

The Chairman. The one that has been read ? 

It is in the record. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Jack Dinichi Kimoto 
as a translator for the Office of War Information? 

]\lr. Latitmore. I have no recollection of it. 

But if you have a document there to refresh my memory, I may be 
able to recall. 

]Mr. Morris. Xow, INIr. Lattimore, have you ever met the Chinese — 
and here I am afraid I must spell them for you — C-h-a I-a-o M-u? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not that I can recall, unless he was one of the 
numerous staff we had at OWI, or unless you have some document 
there that I can refresh my memory with. 

Mr. Morris. How about Mr. Kung P-eng ? 

Mr. Laiitmore. The same answer. 

]\lr. Morris. Did you ever meet those two gentlemen in China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In China? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

JSIr. Lattimore. I don't believe so ; no. 

Mr. Morris. I wish you would recall, Mr. Lattimore, whether you 
ever met those two gentlemen in China. 

Mr. Lattimore. If you could bring forward something 

Mr, Morris. That is, at the time you were adviser to the Generalis- 
simo. 

jNIr. Lattimore. I don't recall the names at all, but they may be 
people that I met in connection with my official duties, working for 
the Generalissimo. 

]\Ir. MoRius. Did you ever pass on to them reports and information 
of any kind ? 

^Ir. Lattimore. Again, not that I recall, unless you can refresh 
my necessarily imperfect memory. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever send coded messages to Yenan while you 
were in Chungking? 

]Mr. Latttmore. Coded messages to Yenan ? 

The Chairman. While you were in Chungking. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I wouldn't believe so, unless it was in connec- 
tion with some of my official duties. 

Mr. Morris. It is possible that you may have done it in connection 
with your official duties ? 

jVlr. Lattimore. I should say so. 



3342 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattiniore, after you sent your dispatch to Lauch- 
lin Currie on November 25, 1941, urging a rejection of the modus 
vivendi, will you tell us what your itinerary was through December 
7,1941? 

On the 25th you sent to Lauchlin Currie, on the 25th of November 
1941, a dispatch suggesting that the proposed modus vivendi, whereby 
a truce would be effected, a temporary truce would be effected, between 
.Fapan and the United States in order to avert a war — you remember 
that dispatch, do you not, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, of course ; I was not urging the modus vivendi. 

Mr. Morris. You sent the dispatch, did you not, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I was reporting at the Generalissimo's re- 
quest. I was reporting his action to that proposal. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you tell us what your itinerary 
was after you sent that dispatch on November 25, from Chungking, 
sir? 

Where did you go up until December 7, 1941 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Beginning at the end of that, I remember that on 
December 7 — that is. Pearl Harbor day — I was in Chungking, and I 
don't believe that I was out of Chungking between those two dates. 

Mr. Morris. Were you in Hong Kong at that time, Mr, Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Possibly ; no I wasn't. 

Mr. Morris. When were you in Hong Kong ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was in Hong Kong — let's see — I was in Hong- 
Kong once between July, when I went out to Chungking, and Pearl 
Harljor. But I don't memember the exact time. I believe it was 
earlier than November — more likely September or October. 

But my memory is not at all clear. 

Mr. Morris. And how about December 8 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. December 8? 

December 8 I was booked to fly from Hong Kong on a clipper ship 
which was sunk at its moorings in Hong Kong. I never went down. 

Mr. Morris. You were to go to Hong Kong by ship ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I was to fly to Hong Kong by plane from 
Chungking, and catch the Pan-American Clipper to fly for home. At 
something like 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, before my plane was due 
to take off, one of the Generalissimo's aides rang me up and said the 
Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor, "so your trip is obviously off." 

Mr. Morris. And then what did you do after that, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Then I stayed in Chungking until I left for Amer- 
ica via Burma and the "hump" sometime early in 1942. 

Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Chi over there at that time I He flew over 
with you when he went to the Generalissimo's assignment, did he not? 

Mr. Lattimore. He and Genei-al Chennault and I all went out on the 
same plane ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. And you frequently saw him while you were serving 
that term with the Generalissimo, did you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I saw him fairly frequently, because he was one 
of the confidential secretaries of H. H. Kung, who was very, very 
close to the Generalissimo. 

Mr. Morris. And all during that time, it is your testimony, is it 
not, that you did not know that he was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3343 

Mr. Morris, Mr. Lattimore, you have testified, have you not, that 
you did not know that James S. Allen was a Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. To the best of my knowledge, I 
never knew that he was a Communist until quite recently. 

Mr. Morris. Did you testify that you never met James S. Allen? 

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge I never met him. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have an exhibit No. 53 which has 
already been introduced in open session. This is a carbon copy of a 
letter from I\Ir. Carter to Mr. Holland. I would like to show it to Mr. 
Lattimore and ask him if reading the last paragraph of that will re- 
fresh his recollection on the negative answer he gave to the question. 

The Chairman. Does that bear any identification as having been 
admitted ? 

Mr. iNIoRRis. That has been admitted and is exhibit No. 58. 

]Mr. Arnold. May we have a copy? 

Mr. Morris. I ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last paragraph. 

Mr. Lattimore. The last paragi'aph of this letter from Mr. Carter 
to Mr. Holland says : 

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet policy in the Pacific, made up of 
some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present 
were Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Nuhle, Bisson, Moore, 
Field, James Allen. Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning. 

Mr. Morris. Does not that letter indicate that you and Mr. Allen 
met together ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it does, Mr. ISIorris. I have seen 
this before, when it was issued as an exhibit, and I believe that it is a 
mistake on Mr. Carter's part. Maybe he had a list of people who had 
been invited to such a conference, but I don't remember taking part 
in it, and there is at least one person there besides Mr. Allen whom I 
never remember meeting. 

I note that in this letter he says : "last week," and he may have been 
writing from a faulty recollection. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that James S. Allen has testified before 
this committee that he did attend that meeting? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't know that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know, ISIr. Lattimore, what the group is 
that is referred to? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have only a very imperfect recollection of the fact 
that at that time, 1940, Professor Corbett of Yale, who is an expert on 
Roman law and international law, and later made a special study of 
Soviet law, was conducting some kind of a study, I believe, under the 
auspices of the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. And his students were referred to as "Corbett's 
group;" is that what you mean? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't know whether they were students or 
other people who took part in a discussion group under the auspices 
of the IPR, or exactly what the arrangement was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Were you a member of that group, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I was. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you attend any meetings of that group ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember attending this or any other 
meeting. 

The Chairman. Would you say that you did not attend that meet- 
ing that is referred to there ? 



3344 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my recollection, I never attended that 
meeting; no. 

The Chairman. The names there are all familiar to you, are they 
not? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not all of them; no. There is somebody here 
named Mnhle, whom I can't place at all. 

The Chairman. That is the only one that is not familiar to you? 

Mr. Lattimore. The others are familiar to me, that is, they are peo- 
ple I know or know of, know of slightly. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore. I am now going to call your attention 
to our exhibit 455, which was introduced into the record on February 
21, 1952. It takes the form of a memorandum on Philippine research, 
dated April 14, 1938, WWL to ECC. WWL is Mr. Lockwood, is it 
not, and ECC is Mr. Carter? 

I ask you if, in the course of your duties as editor of Pacific Affairs, 
which you were at that time, that memorandum would have been in 
the purview of the documents available for your research ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Before that question is answered, I think the ques- 
tion before the question last asked was not responded to. 

I think the record should show that in response to the previous 
question, Mr. Lattimore nodded, but made no sound. 

Mr. Morris. The nodding was yes, was it? 

Mr. Lattimore. The nodding was that I was prepared to look at 
this exhibit. 

This exhibit I have also seen, because it was previously issued. 

Until I saw it, I had no previous recollection of it, and I believe that 
I never saw it before. You will see that it is headed "Research." I 
was not connected with American Council Research at that time, and 
I was not in New York at that time. I was living in California, and 
had not been in New York for a couple of years. 

The Chairman. When did you first see that document ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Some months ago, after it had been released by 
this committee. 

Mr. Morris. Some months ago, that is February 21, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. February. I thought you read February 21, 19 — — 

Mr. Morris. No, 1952. 

Mr. L.\TTiM0RE. 1952? 

Mr. Morris. This, Mr. Chairman, is obviously what Mr. Lattimore 
is referring to, judging by the period of time, and is a copy of the 
letter, and the Institute of Pacific Relations also retained a copy 
of this letter. So a copy is also available in their office. 

The paragraph I would like to read, since you have seen it, Mr. 
Lattimore, is the third paragraph on the second page. 

The Chairman. Let us go back and get the letter from whom to 
whom? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lockwood is writing to Mr. Carter. This is in 
1938, at a time when Mr. Lattimore is the editor of Pacific Affairs. 
He has testified that in 1938 he was on the west coast. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. The paragraph reads: 

Are you in touch with James Allen? I uuderstand he is going to the islands 
in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the 
agrarian question was n)ost interesting and gave evidence of heing a careful 
and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3345 

United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even 
though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self- 
determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic. 

Does not that indicate to you, Mr. Lattimore, tliat the people in 
the New York office knew that James S. Allen was a Communist? 

^Ir. Lattimore. It certainly indicates that Mr. Lockwood thought 
he had a Communist ideology. 

Senator Ferguson. Of course, that would not make him a Com- 
munist, would it? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xot necessarily a Connnunity Party memher. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he ask you anything about membership I 

IVIr. Lattimore. I thought that question was usually asked with 
regard to membership, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you had better watch the questions and 
do not read into this "membership'' if it is not in it. 

Mr. Lattimore. All right. 

There are, after all, Senator, many are, and have been, many 
general Marxist writers who are sometimes loosely called Commu- 
nists who have never engaged in Communist organizations. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all right. If you want to answer the 
particular question that way, and if you want to give that answer as 
far as Allen is concerned, is that your opinion? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I don't have enough to go on to make any 
opinion one way or the other. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you giA'e us that answer ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Because I didn't want to make my opinion positive 
in one sense or another when I don't know enough about it to be 
positive. 

]Mr. Morris. ]Mr. Lattimore, did you know that Mr. Allen at that 
time was associated with the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. 

Mr, Morris. Did you read the testimony before this committee that 
lie was an agent for the Communist International? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I have seen some reference to that in the 
transcript; yes. 

Mr. jNIorris. And do you not know that he had a byline in the Daily 
Worker for a long ])eriod during the war, and was known as the 
foreign editor of the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know all of that in detail. According to 
my recollection at the time of the Tydings hearings 2 years ago, the 
fact was brought up that he had some sort of Daily Worker connection. 

I don't remember the details. But I believe that that was the first 
I know of it. 

Mr. Morris. Does it not show at least a lack of coordination, let us 
say, Mr. Lattimore, that the New York office should know that James 
Allen was a Communist, and that you, as editor of Pacific Affairs, 
for which he was writing, should not know that? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think no more lack of coordination that was 
fairly general around the IPR office. After all, we were not a 
Government office with chains of command and regular protocol on 
what went to who, when, and how, and so on. 

]Mr. ]Morris. When you wanted to be in touch with Mr. Allen, how 
did you get his address ? 



3346 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably I got it either from the IPR or per- 
haps he wrote to me. I don't know. 

Mr, Morris. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Morris, if I might interpose at that point: 
Your question was when you wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen, 
"How did you get his address?" 

I do not believe the witness means to say that when he wanted to 
get in touch with Mr. Allen, Mr. Allen wrote to him. 

Is that what you meant to say, Mr. Lattimore? 

]\Ir, Lattimore. Mr. Allen may have written to me in connection 
with the fact that I published a couple of articles, and I may have had 
his address that way. 

Mr. Sourwine. The question was, when you wanted to get in touch 
with Mr. xillen, how did you get his address? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well. I don't remember. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection on the subject, but if you 
have a document there I shall be glad to have my memory refreshed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 27, 1939, addressed to 
Mr. Owen Lattimore from Frederick V. Field. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that docu- 
ment ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't recall receiving it. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read it, Mr. Lattimore? It is short. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Dear Owen : Carter's office reports that James Allen may be reached at — 

Then I can't read this clearly — 

* * * 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street— 

I think it is — 

New York City. 

Sincerely yours, 

(The document as previously read by the witness was marked "Ex- 
hibit No. 524," as above.) 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume that Mr. Field was at that time — when 
was this, 1939 ? 

I think he was still secretary of the American IPR. So, presumably, 
I wrote to him for the address. 

Mr. Morris. Did you not testify several days ago that at that time 
you realized that Frederick Field was at that time a member of the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. Laiitmore. No, sir; I didn't. I testified that in 1952, seeing 
a letter wa-itten by Field in 1939, I w^ould now say that my memory 
may have been in error by 2 years as to the time when I thought he 
was beginning to be a close fellow traveler of the record. 

However, that projection of my memory back from 1952 to 1939 
is not worth a great deal. 

After all, the way people were writing about Russia and Russian 
policy in 1939 was pretty loose. 

Senator Ferguson. ]\lr. Lattimore, did you not, in your voluntary 
statement that you brought in here, say that you knew Field was a 
Communist in the 1940's ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3347 

1 even corrected you to show what you had said. 

Mr. Lattomore. I think I said that I believe that by the 1940's he 
had become a Communist, or something of that sort. I forget the 
exact wording. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

You are now talking about 1950. Well, then, did you know that 
in the lOlO's, back in the 1940's, he was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; as of the 1950's, I remember that in the 194:0's 
I considered him a Russian fellow traveler, or possibly a Communist 
fellow traveler. But I don't remember when I began to feel that 
way. 

The Chairman. You came in here with your statement voluntarily. 
Do you recall your statement? It was to the effect that he was a 
Communist in the forties. 

Mr. Lattimore. I said in my statement 

Senator Ferguson. What page is that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Page 14 — 

I had no reason to consider him a Communist during the period when he was 
secretary of the American IPR in the 1930's, althougli I have no doubt he became 
one during tlie 1940's. 

That is, I have, in 1952, no doubt that he became one during the 
1940's. I may say that that is based not so much on my own recol- 
lection as on some testimony that I read in the transcript of the hear- 
ings of Mr. Carter here, much of which was entirely new to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Then there are some truths in this hearing that 
you take for granted ? 

Mr. Lattimore. My opinion of Mr. Carter has always been that 
he is an extremely honest man. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that where you got the idea "although I have 
no doubt that he became one during the 1940" ? 

Mr, Lattimore. As I say, it is partly from recollection, which is 
very vague, and difficult for me to specify as to year, but I also read 
some things in Mr. Carter's testimony which would now, in 1952, 
indicate to me that Field definitely became a Communist in the 
1940's. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it would indicate that Carter's testimony 
shows the fact to be that Field l)ecame a Communist in the 1940's? 

Mr, Lattimore. Not Carter's opinion, but some of the facts given by 
Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. The facts given by Carter. It would, therefore, 
appear that while Field was connected with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, he was a Communist, and Carter's facts show it; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Lait^imore. As of 1952 they create a strong presumption. 

]\Ir. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, have you read the testimony of Mr. 
Nathaniel Weyl before this committee, which was to the effect that 
Mr. Field became a Communist in 1935? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I haven't. Is that part of the 

Mr. Morris. That is public testimony. 

Mr. Lattimore. Has that part of the transcript been printed yet? 

Mr. Morris. It has not been printed yet. But you do read tran- 
scripts that the Institute of Pacific Relations obtains in New York, do 
you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I read some of them ; by no means all of them. 



3348 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. But they are available to you. 

Will you identify that letter, Mr. Manclel ? 

Mr. jSIaxdel. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 3, 1938, addressed to 
Mr. James S. Allen, care of American Express Co., Manila, Philippine 
Islands. It has the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you recall having written 
that letter to Mr. Allen. 

Mr. Lati^imore. I don't recall having written it, but I obviously 
wrote it. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

(Exhibit No. 525) 

Dear Allen : Immediately on receipt of your letter of which I herewith en- 
close a copy, I wrote to your American address. As I received no reply, and the 
deadline for the December number of Pacific Aifairs was fast approaching, I 
iiad perforce to schedule the letter for publication without reply for you. 

That must be a misprint for "from you" : 

I added an editorial note to the effect that we expected a reply from you 
for our March number. 

Now I have just heard from your wife, giving your Manila address. Although 
it is too late for you to send a reply for December publication, I am forwarding 
this by clipper mail in the hope that it may reach you before you leave the 
I'hilippines. I hope that this will not merely give you extra time before our 
March number, but possibly enable you to make a last-minute check-up on the 
data on which you founded your original statements. 

As your article appeared to me, as a nonexpert, to have every external char- 
acteristic of careful observation and reasoned statement, while the vigor of 
the attached letter of refutation indicates great confidence on the part of the 
protesting company, I shall be extremely interested in following up, in due 
course, the discrepancy between the two statements. 

Please note, by the way, my new permanent address, as given above. 
Yours very sincerely. 

Mr. Morris. May that be inserted into the record, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 525" and read 
in full.) 

Mr. Morris. To what extent did you know James Allen's wife? 

Mr. Lattimore. I never met her, to the best of my knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. What name did she use when you spoke to her? 

Mr. L vmMORE. I don't think I spoke to her. My recollection of 
this correspondence is that — what was the date of that letter from 
Field giving his address? 

Mr. Morris. That is April 27, 1939. 

Mr.. Lattimore. April 27, 1939. This is previous. I must have 
written to Allen care of IPR, or whatever address I had for him, and 
the letter was presumably forwarded to his wife who told me that he 
was out of the country. 

Mr. Morris. When did she tell you, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume she told me by letter. 

Mr. Morris. How did she sign letters — Mrs. James S. Allen? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. 

Ml'. Morris. Do vou know that James Allen is not the man's name 
at all? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have seen recently something in the newspapers to 
that effect. That was the first of it I knew. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3349 

Mr. Morris. How did she identify herself when she spoke to you 
or wrote to yon ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably as Mrs. Allen. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the man we have been discussing, James 
S. Allen, has testified before this committee and he stated that his 
name is Sol Auerbach, but that he writes in these various publica- 
tions under the name of James S. Allen. 

Mr. Lattimore. Incidentally, Mr. Morris, I am all confused about 
this man Allen. I got the impression some time ago — I think it may 
have been at the time of the trial of the 11 Communists in New York — 
from reading the press, that Mr. Allen was a Negro, Now I am sure, 
if I had met a Negro expert on the Philippines, I would remember it. 

Now, I see that his name is given as Sol Auerbach which doesn't 
sound to me like a Negro name, so I don't know what he is. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard the name Sol Auerbach? 

Mr. Lattimore. Auerbach, I don't believe I ever have ; no. 

Mr. Morris. May I take one more letter ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. There has been identified a letter, Mr. Chairman, as 
exhibit 49, August 2, 1951 : This is a letter that Mr. Lattimore wrote 
to Mr. Allen in 1939. Would you care to read it, Mr. Lattimore? 

This is to Mr. James S. Allen. 

Mr. Lattiiniore. It is dated February 27, 1939, addressed to Mr. 
James S. Allen, 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street, 
Apartment 42, New York City [reading] : 

Dear Ali.en : Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from 
my office and Ivind of crowded for time. 

It was good to hear from you again, and I am only sorry that your Letter to 
the Editor was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have 
to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as 
set xip to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to 
the Philippine Branch of the IPR. 

What about some more on the Philippines sometimes? We are really rather 
hard-pressed to get enough material that is not directly about the Japanese war 
on China. At the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we 
couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right 
away, if it would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed 
"radical" stuff on the islands. Have you done any work in French Indochina, 
the Malay Straits, or Netherlands Indies? 

By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in 
the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend 
entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions. 
The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just 
members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us. 

I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so, I very much hope 
that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally. 
Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Soitrw^ine, May I inquire ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, can you explain why you were con- 
cerned over the reaction of the Philip])ine IPR to your publication of 
fundamental stuff on the Philippine Islands? 

Mr. Lattimore. Was that the reaction of the Philippine IPE. I was 
concerned about, or the reaction of the tobacco company ^ 

Mr. Sotjrwixe. The letter said, sir — 

at the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't 
guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it 



3350 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed "radical" stuff 
on the islands. 

I was asking what was the basis for your feeling that the Philippine 
IPK would be concerned about your printing fundamental stuff on 
the Philippine Islands ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I suppose it was because of that protest from the 
tobacco company that disliked Allen's article. The Philippines coun- 
cil was one of the councils from which we had often tried unsuccess- 
fully to get articles. 

Then I got an article from somebody who had been to the Philip- 
pines, which raised a controversy in the Philippines. So I suppose the 
Philippines council might be concerned about it. 

Incidentally, the tobacco company's criticism of Allen's figures and 
statements had raised absolutely no question of his being a Com- 
munist, and as far as concerns the conditions that he dealt with the 
accuracy of his investigation seems to be fully upheld by the report 
of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs appointed 
by the President of the United States. 

The Chairman. Are you reading that, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are you reading that from some document ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am reading that from some notes I have pre- 
pared. 

The Chairman. Why do you not answer the question without read- 
ing it ? 

Who presented that to you ? Where did you get that? 

Mr. Lattimore. I asked my wife for it. 

Senator Smith. Is that a memorandum you prepared yourself, Mr. 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; it is a memorandum that I prepared myself. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you prepare that? 

Mr. Lattimore. In preparation for these hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you prepare that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am not quite sure at what time. I have been pre- 
paring for these hearings for months. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us get a definite answer to this question : 
When did you prepare this document ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In the course of preparing for these hearings. 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the closest you can get to it? 

Mr. Lati'Imore. That is the closest I can get to it. 

The Chairman. Within how many months? Within a period of 
liow many months ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Within a period of approximately 8 months. 

Senator Ferguson. AVliat made you think that you might be asked 
about this article and about Allen? Wliat made you think that you 
might be asked about this article and Allen ? 

Mr. Latomore. Because of previous testimony, both at the time 
of the Tydings hearings and before this committee, for example 

Senator Ferguson. Did you refresh your memory about Allen, try 
to find any of these letters to him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I looked u]) to see what I might have on the subject 
(jf Allen. Then I looked up the question of the situation at that time 
in the Philippines. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3351 

Senator Ferguson. What is it that your counsel wants to call to 
your attention ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The entries on the subject of Sol Auerbach in the 
printed transcript of this hearing, part 1, July. 

The Chairman. What date ? 

Mr. LArriMORE. Part 1, July 25, 26, 31 ; August 2, 7, 1951. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, it is the import of your testimony to 
the effect that James S. Allen's article was not a Communist article ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the import of my testimony. 

The Chairman. "VAHiat did you mean by the word "radical" in 
that? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I meant the word radical, in quotes, in the 
sense that as of that time any article which was contested by a planta- 
tion company about conditions of plantation labor might have been 
called radical by the plantation company. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean you did not here use it in the sense of 
fundamental ? 

Mr. Latitmore. Here I did not use it in the sense of fundamental, 
and I had it in quotes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, knowing what you do now about James 
S. Allen, do you think that he still could write an article that would 
not be a Communist article ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Morris, I don't know any way of preventing a 
Communist from occasionally taking an intelligent interest in an im- 
portant problem. I should think that under certain circumstances a 
Communist would be quite capable of writing an article that could 
not be regarded as slanted in a Communist direction. 

The Chairman. Even if he was writing under an assumed name? 

Mr. Lattimore. Even if he was writing under assumed names. 
Other people also write under assumed names. 

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow 
morning at 10 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 3 : 15 p. m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a. m., Wednesday, March 5, 1952.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



WEDNESDAY. MARCH 5, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 

Administration or the Internal 
Security Act and other Internal Security 

Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington,, D. C. 
The subcommittee met at 10 :15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
424, Senate Office Building:, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding. 
Present : Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, CConor, Ferguson, 
und Watkins, and Jenner. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director. 
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN 

ARNOLD— Resumed 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you have a copy of the letter that 
you mentioned in the article to the London Times yesterday, of per- 
mission to go to Yenan? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't have it. 

Mr. Morris. You do not have a cop}' of that. 

Mr. Lattimore. did you ever express disagreement with the policy 
of the United States Government, that all aid to China should go 
through the accredited Chinese Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Latiimore. I have no recollection of that, but my recollection 
isn't complete. If you have a document I would be glad to discuss it. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever recommend or protest that aid should 
be given to the Chinese Communists lest the United States appear 
partisan in withholding aid from the Chinese Communists? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that, either, but again my recol- 
lection isn't complete. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever prepare a j^rotest to an article written 
by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell, in the Reader's Digest, in 1945, 
wdiich was destined for the New York Times, over the signature of 
Thomas Lamont? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I participated in that. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain what happened at that time, Mr. 
Lattimore I 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Eastman and Mr. Powell had printed in the 
Reader's Digest which cast slurs on me and others. I wrote to the 
Reader's Digest and asked for an opportunity to reply, received what 

88348— 52— pt. 10 6 3353 



3354 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I considered a very curt and rude reply, and a little bit later, I be- 
lieve, Mr. Carter wrote to me and suggested that a letter be published, 
be offered to the New York Times for publication. He believed that 
Mr. Thomas Lamont might sign such a letter, and suggested that I 
draft it so that what I considered the relevant material would be in it. 

Mr. Morris. So the views in that memorandum were your views? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know about the final state oi it. I pre- 
pared a draft. 

The Chairman, The question is, are the views in that draft your 
views ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In the views in my original draft were my views; 
yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read the letter that actually ap- 
peared in the New York Times ? 

Mr. Lat^tmore. I don't think a letter did appear in the New York 
Times. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it appear anywhere? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents, 
please ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated Jime 14, 1945, 
addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward 
C. Carter. 

Attached thereto is a photostat of a letter to the editor of the New 
York Times, consisting of five pages. It is unsigned. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you will look at that and an- 
swer whether or not that letter is addressed to you, whether that 
is a copy of a letter addressed to you, and whether the draft therein 
is your draft. 

(A document was handed to the witness.) 

The Chairman. As I understand it, all of this matter, a photo- 
static copy of which was presented to the witness here, was taken 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct, 
Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Lattimore. The letter from Mr. Carter to me is clearly writ- 
ten by him and received by me. If I may just look at this draft 
here — 

I do not believe the di-aft is entirely my draft. I think it is probably 
a combined draft of some sort. 

Senator Ferguson. Whose work besidee yours? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know, unless it was Mr. Carter or if he 
asked somebody else in New York to help him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Lamont know anything about this 
subject ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I believe there was some correspondence be- 
tween Mr. Carter and Mr. Lamont on the subject. 

Senator Ferguson. But did he know anything personally about 
it, or was he merelv the mouthpiece for you and Mr. Carter? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Lamont had long been interested in China. 

Senator Ferguson. He had been ? 
_ Mr. Lattimore. I believe he had long been interested in China; yes, 
sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3355 

Senator Ferguson. What do you say is in this document that is not 
yours ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It is impossible for me to recall at this time ex- 
actly what phrases were mine and what phrases were somebody else's. 

The Chairman. Is it a matter of phrases, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Maybe partly a matter of phrases, partly, perhaps, 
a matter of paragraphs. 

The Chairman. Is it a matter of substance? 

Mr. Lattimore. May I read it out, Mr. Chairman ? 

Mr. Morris. Before doing that, you will be given that opportunity, 
Mr. Lattimore; I would like to ask a few questions beforehand. 

Will you read that letter that accompanies the draft ? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

(Exhibit No. 526) 

Dear Owen : Although last night's suggestion for ghost writing for a down- 
town big shot has certain attractive features, my second thought is that my 
original suggestion should not be lightly discarded. 

You are a pretty big shot yourself and a great many people will listen to you. 

If on further thought you think that there would be even greater advantages 
in the proposal advanced last evening, I am willing to exploiv the possibility 
of it, but my original suggestion still is my first choice. 
Sincerely yours, 

Mr. Morris. At this point, Mr. Chairman, will you receive both 
the draft and the letter into evidence? 

The Chairman. The draft and the letter have been identified as 
having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
and will be received in evidence. 

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 526," which was 
read in full above, and "Exhibit No. 527," which is as follows:) 

To the Editor of the New York Times : 

The San Francisco Conference has shown us that Soviet Russia is a country 
with which we can cooperate. The statesmanship of the Russian delegates, and 
concessions made by the Soviet Government, have contributed to this fortunate 
outcome. Tensions have eased, especially in Europe. 

On the other hand there is cause for uneasiness in a new trend, which is now 
developing, toward criticism of Soviet motives and Soviet policies in Asia. We 
shall be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President Tru- 
man's first Big Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. When 
that meeting is held public interest and public comment and si^eculation will 
inevitably he drawn toward Russia's position, and Russia's relationship to us, 
in Asia and the Pacific. We shall do well to prepare now for the thinking which 
will absorb our interest then. Should we prepare ourselves for this occasion 
by hardening, within our minds, the assumption that Soviet and American in- 
terests in Asia are inherently in conflict with each other? Ought we not rather 
to search for a larger framework of policy within which American and Soviet 
interests can be accommodated to each other"? 

An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influential 
magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake in 
China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that 
there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President 
Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Communists, and "bring under totalitarian regi- 
mentation 450 million people." To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on 
the authoritativeness of several of those Americans who have, in fact, contributed 
most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary China 
and Contemporary Russia— including Owen Lattimore, Harrison P'orman, and 
EMgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both Ameri- 
can and Soviet policy in China. In making such a review, w^e should examine 
American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make (Mir criticisms where 
they are due. 



3356 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Under Pearl Harbor, the American policy was to support China while avoiding, 
as far as possible, a direct challenge to Japan. Since Pearl Harbor, our policy 
has been to give China the maximum aid permitted by difficulties of transport and 
the demands of other theaters of war. We have also, until quite recently, en- 
couraged political unity in China, in order to facilitate the most effective resist- 
ance in Japan. 

Soviet Russia has followed a parallel policy. Even during the period when there 
was a danger that Russia might be attacked from two sides by Germany and 
Japan, the Soviet Government accepted whatever risk there might be in giving 
aid to China. Moreover, Soviet aid, like American aid, encouraged political unity 
in China. No attempt was made to channel Soviet aid toward the Chinese Com- 
munists. All aid was delivered, with no restrictions attached, to the National 
Government lieaded by Generalissimo Cliiang Kai-shelc. After the German 
invasion of Russia the flow of aid understandably decreased ; but Madame Chiang 
has given us an authoritative statement of the extent and significance of Soviet 
aid up to 1941. Writing in Liberty magazine (January 21, 1941) she said : 

"Intellectual honesty constrains me to point out that throughout the first three 
.years of resistance, Soviet Russia extended to Cliina, for the actual purchase of 
war materials and other necessities, credits several times larger than the credits 
given by either Great Britain or America. Both these countries, indeed, cii'cum- 
scribed tlieir advances with conditions which prevented even one cent of the 
money from being used for badly needed munitions, equipment, or war materials 
of any kind * * * when Japan protested through the Ambassador at Moscow 
that the aid extended was a breach of neutrality, Russia did not wilt, or surren- 
der, or compromise, but continued to send supplies of arms to China. It will 
doubtless be said that Russia has been aiding China for selfish interests. In 
reply to this I may point out that Russian help has been unconditional." 

Russian and American policy in China can be made parallel, and we know from 
experience, not by guesswork, tliat the Russians are capable of contributing, at 
the very least, an equal share in making the policies of the two countries parallel. 

At the present moment there is a danger that the parallel policy may not 
continue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen 
from American policy. Whereas Russian policy has never yet demanded the 
inclusion of the Cliinese Communists in the benefits of Russian aid to China, 
American policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefits of Ameri- 
can aid. Recent statements by General Hurley, our Ambassador to Chungking, 
and General Wedemeyer, the ranking American officer in the theater, have re- 
stricted the benefits of Lend-Lease to the forces politically identified with Presi- 
dent Chiang Kai-shek, and have restricted American personnel from acting in 
ways that might benefit forces other than those politically identified with Presi- 
dent Chiang. 

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited 
channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one 
political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the 
Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. 
American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the 
Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this diver- 
gence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame 
cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians should 
in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could 
justify themselves on the groimd that they were merely following an American 
precedent. 

Many issues are here involved. Not the least of them is the possibility of a 
complete reversal of the time-honored American policy of supporting the terri- 
torial and political integrity of China. American aid to one party in China, 
leading to Riissian aid to another party, could easily result in inflicting on 
China a terrible civil war, following more tban eight years of heavy sacrifice in 
a war for national survival. American policy, which traditionally has always 
opposed the partition of China, might thus actually precipitate a partition by 
making the government of part of China dependent on American control and 
virtually compelling political opponents of that government to look for foreign 
support elsewhere. 

To those who can think of American policy only in terms of an anti-Russian 
coalition, like the authors of the article in Reader's Digest from which I have 
quoted, such a prospect may seem to be only a bold move in power-politics. It 
is ironical to recall that one of them, Mr. Eastman, was long a supporter of 
Leon Trotsky, and is the translator of his works. Were Leon Trotsky in the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3357 

Kremlin today, and not Marshal Stalin, the prospect of the division of China 
between Russia and America, setting the stage for a world war between 
Communism and capitalism, might well be enticing to American Communists of 
the Trotskyist persuasion. 

To other Americans it should be alarming to contemplate the possibility of 
an irrevocable reversal of historic American policy in China, leading to irre- 
mediable antagonism between us and Soviet Russia, threatening the foundations 
of world security that have been laid at San Francisco with Russian aid, and 
luaking America responsible for a new world phase of the politics of hostility. 

The safeguard against these dangers lies not in limited support of one nation, 
or one party within a nation, but in wider and better-balanced cooperation with 
China, with Russia, and with Great Britain. Mr. Owen Lattimore, in his recent 
Solution in Asia, has wisely warned against an American policy which would 
make the Chinese Government "dependent on us to the point where it cannot 
deal with other governments without our backing," and has urged that "it is 
essential that America should cease to lie so conspicuously the main link between 
China and the United Nations. Our interests are great, but they are not isolated. 
China policy must be brought into proper liaison with our Soviet and British 
policies." 

Our interest — and it can be made a common interest with Great Britain and 
Russia — is that China should be strong, united, and independent. Only a 
China which is strong because it is united, and therefore capable of true inde- 
pendence, can inspire the permanent confidence of the American people and 
provide the conditions for expanding investment and trade which are needed 
by the rest of the world almost as much as they are needed by China herself. 

At President Truman's forthcoming meeting with the others of the Big Three 
the necessary adjustments can and should l)e made, and they should have the 
widest support throughout tlie American Nation. American policy should be 
brought back to its traditional support for a politically and territorially united 
China, and this paramount requisite for the future stability of Asia should not 
be jeopardized by factious attacks on any of our allies. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Might I ask a question there, Mr. Chairman? 
Mr. Morris. We are still on the same subject. 
The Chairman. Yes ; yon may. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, would von look at page 3 of this 
draft? 

This is the draft of the article? 

Mr. Latiimore. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The paragraph at the bottom of that page. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It says : 

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited 
channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors 
one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the 
Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. 
American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when 
the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisian activity. If this 
divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the 
blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Rusisans 
should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they 
could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an 
American precedent. 

Can you say Avhether that is one of the portions of the draft which 
is yours? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe that was probably mine ; yes. This is in 
line with the thinking that was very common at the time, of w^hich I 
was aware, as I said in my statement, prepared statement for this 
committee, on page 44 : 

Some experienced observers were already beginning to believe the Chiang Kai- 
.^hek part of free China was In danger of being completely conquered by the 
Japanese. Some of these observers, including American military officers, even 



3358 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

felt that the Aniericau Governmeut ought to assert its i-ight to seud supplies to 
the CoDimunist areas of resistance. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you believe what you wi-ote here in this para- 
graph that I have just read ? 

Mr. Laitimore. Why, certainly, I believed it at the time; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did j'ou realize that this paragraph includes the 
statement that: "* * * the Russians," at this time, which was 
1945 ; "* * * ai-e still scrupulously refraining from partisan 
activity" ? 

Did you believe that? 

The Chairman. Just a moment, Mrs. Lattimore. 

The Chair has borne with you now for several days in what appears 
to be your whispered answers to the witness on the stand. If it oc- 
curs again, the Chair will be constrained to have you moved from 
your position. I do not like to do that. I want to be as courteous to 
you as I can. The Chair is not going to endure tliis much longer. 

That is an end to it, and that is all. 

Mr. Lattimore. Your question, Mr. Sourwine ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you realize, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph 
infers the statement that at the time, that is, in June of 1945, the Rus- 
sians were, to use the words of the article : "Still scrupulously re- 
fraining from partisan activity." 

Did you believe that at the time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believed that at the time, and I should like to ask 
permission to read a note on the subject in a printed book by General 
Chennault. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might pursue this for just a 
moment before we have any extraneous matter put in ? 

The CiL\iRMAN. Vei-y well. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not testify here, sir, I believe the day be- 
fore yesterday, that you have believed, and now believe, since 1940, 
the Russians were supporting and have been supporting the Chinese 
Communists? 

]\Ir. Laitimore. I cleai'ly remember making that statement. The 
support of the Russians to the Chinese Communists during the war 
period, to the best of my knowledge, then and at this time, was j)roga- 
ganda support, moral support, anything except direct support in the 
way of arms and supplies. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think, sir, that that support, such as you 
speak of, even it was confined to moral support, propaganda support, 
and all of the other support short of arms, do you think that meets the 
description "scrupulously refraining from partisan activity?" 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I believe it does, Mr. Sourwine. I believe the 
Russian support of those years emphasized the need for continuing 
unity in China, and not resorting to civil war at a time when all Chinese 
ought to be fighting the Japanese. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you believe, Mr. Lattimore, that the Russians 
were strictly impartial as between the Chinese Communists and the 
Chinese Nationalist Government? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no doubt, Mr. Sourwine, that the Russians 
were not impartial. But whatever their reasons, they were at that 
time, as far as I know to tliis day, scrupulously following an inter- 
national policy of supporting the joint Chinese resistance to the 
Japanese. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3359 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Is that what you meant when you said the day 
before yesterday that the Chinese Communists were being supported 
by Russia? 

Mr. LATriMORE. That is what I meant, yes. I did not mean military 
support or support of supplies. 

I should like at this moment to read tliis citation from General 
Chennault, which I found quite recently when I was looking over the 
I'ecords. 

The Chairman. Refer that to the counsel, please. 

Mr, Morris. What relevancy does that have, Mr. Lattimore? 

The Chairman. Before we go into that, just refer it to the counsel, 
please. 

Have you got it with you i 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think I have it. 

The Chairman. Let us have it, please. 

Now you may pursue your questions. You may read it at a later 
time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last document? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon copy of a letter which was taken from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 19, 1945, ad- 
dressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. 
Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you recall having received that 
letter. 

(A document was handed to the witness.) 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't recall receiving it, but obviously I did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record? 

The Chair3Ian. It has been established as having come from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please ? 

Mr. Lattimore. This one? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, the one I just handed you. 

This is already introduced, I understand, as exhibit 29, in the 
printed hearings, before this committee. 

Mr. SouRW^iNE. Could we have an extra copy for Mr. Arnold? 

Mr. Arnold. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. Would you read that, Mr. Lattimore, please? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Dear Owen : Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late 
last evening I went up to One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I 
discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be 
gone all summer. 

I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his 
advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to 
sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally sug- 
gested the possibility of his father. 

He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so, 
though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and 
doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday. 

;Mr. Morris. Excuse me, Mr. Lattimore. Who is the person he 
referred to there as the son ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know of my own knowledge, Mr. Morris. I 
presume, from reading the transcript of these hearings, that it is Mr. 
Corliss Lamont, the son of Mr. Thomas Lament. 



3360 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. At the time you received this letter from Mr. Carter, 
he presumed that you knew who the son would be when he wrote 
this letter, did he not? 

Mr. Laitimore. I presume so. 

Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony that you may have known that 
the son at that time was Corliss Lamont, but at least the testimony to 
date has refreshed your recollection on that score ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The testimony to date has refreshed my recollection 
on that score, and I presume that I knew^ at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any doubt about that, that you knew 
who the son was ? 

Mr. La'itimore. No, I presume there was no doubt about it, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Why was Mr. Carter using the cryptic language em- 
ployed there? 

]\Ir. Lait-imore. You would have to ask Mr. Carter that. 

Mr. Morris. Will you continue reading, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. 
I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him, with as strong 
and tactful a letter as I can write on the off chance that he might be willing to 
do something. 

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly, and this is 
at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. 

Is that the same 3 and 4 that is on this mimeographed copy? 

This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They 
say tiiat the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, et cetera, while 
you put it in reverse. 

I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Latti- 
more admits that Manchuria is to become a pai't of the Soviet Union. Do you 
see any way of avoiding this? 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

P. S. — May I make one more suggestion, that is, that you add a final paragraph 
in which the author puts in a plea for a strong, united, independent China, a 
China which would in.spire confidence of the American people in general, and -a 
Cliina which would give confidence to those American businessmen who seek 
mutually advantageous trade between the United States and China? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that original of the draft 
again, and the paragraph questioned about, the paragraph Mr. Sour- 
wine questioned you about. 

It does appear at the bottom of page 3 and the top of page 4. 

Mr. Lattimore. Of the original ? 

Mr. Morris. Of the one that we have been discussing. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Does not that appear to be the same paragraph? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right, yes. That is page 3 of the mimeo- 
graphed copy. 

Mr. Morris. And, Mr. Chairman, to complete this episode, I would 
like to put into the record the answer of Mr. Thomas Lamont, wdiich 
he w^'ote on July 5, 1945, wherein he declined the invitation of Mr. 
Carter to publish the draft over his signature in the New York Times. 

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostatic copy of a letter dated July 5, 
1945, addressed to Edward C. Carter from Thomas W. Lamont, on his 
letterhead. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3361 

Mr. Morris. Will you receive that into the record, Mr. Chairman ? 
The Chairman. It is a j^art of the files of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations '? 

Senator Ferguson. Could the whole letter be read into the record? 
Mr. Morris. It reads as follows : 

(ExHiBrr No. 528) 

Many thanks for yours of Jmie 29. You are too flattering about my casual 
letters to the New York Times. I, too, have been concerned over the steady 
drip against Russia by various commentators. ]Max Eastman has always been 
a weather cock, veering from pro-Trotsky to bitter anti-Soviet. Powell I had 
thought better of. 

I iiave read the Reader's Digest article and have gone over with care your 
memorandum. In effect I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times 
a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy, and to 
make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in north- 
west China. Quite aside from any question of transport to such a remote 
region, the principle involved seems to be that I should assume knowledge of 
the situation, and of the proper policy to be drawn from same, more adequate 
than our Government has. 

Of course, I have no such knowledge and could not justify myself in attempt- 
ing to correct the policy adopted. My way would always be first to seek 
information from the department at Washington. As a matter of fact, even 
in my letters to the Times when any possible question of current policy was 
involved, I have first shown the letters to the Department of State, not for 
approval, but for clearance as to any question of crossing wires. 

You know your China better than I do, for my stay there was hardly more 
than a month or two. But we both realize how exceedingly complicated the 
situation is and is bound to be. Chiang's government now loosely rules all 
eastern and southern China (subject to Japanese occupation). The area 
includes all the great cities. Now. if Chiang has his doubts as to the effec- 
tiveness of the Chinese Comnunust armies against the .lapanese, and such 
question has been many times raised, and if Chiang is fearful that once Japan 
is ousted, then those northern armies will turn on him, perhaps he is justified 
in feeling that the meager supplies available for China should be furnished 
for his armies, and not for the other boys. In your memorandum you point 
out that Russia has been scrupulous to send supplies to Chiang alone. Well, 
if that be true, why is that not additional argument for iis to do the same? 

I am really discussing things about which I have no first-hand information. 
And in reading your memorandum I may well have just been stupid. Am I all 
wrong? 

With personal regards. 
Sincerely yours, 

T. W. Lamont. 

The Chairman, It will be inserted into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 528," and 
was read in full.) 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, after hearing that read do you 
now say that the Institute of Pacific Relations was not trying to in- 
fluence public opinion? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I do not say that. 

I say that I had been, I and others had been, attacked in a grossly 
distorted article in the Reader's Digest, that I had tried to get space 
for a reply and had been refused. 

Senator Ferguson. IVlio refused you? 

Mr. Lattimore. The editors of the Reader's Digest, to whom I 
wrote directly. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you copies of those letters? 

Mr. Lattimore. I haven't found them, but I remember the incident 
very clearly. 



3362 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Carter then, as an individual, suggested to me that there might 
be a Tray of finding publications somewhere else. He suggested that 
I write a letter myself as is clear here from his letter to me of June 
14. 

My feeling was that I was disgusted with the whole business, and 
that if the Reader's Digest wouldn't allow me space for reply, I didn't 
want to go to the New .York Times individually, but if ]SIr. Carter 
thought that there was an individual or possibly a ^oup of individuals 
who would put forward the view, or part of the view that I shared, I 
would not mind making a draft of material. 

That is a question of individual action and not a question of the 
action of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Fekguson. Was the Institute of Pacific Relations attacked 
in any way in the article in the Reader's Digest? 

Mr. Lathmore. That I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not your book. Solution in Asia, which 
the testimony in this record now shows from one witness, used as 
Communist propaganda, for the line here in America by the Com- 
munist Party? 

Is that not a fact ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, Senator. I believe you are in error. I 
believe there has been testimony here that Communist bookshops 
sold my book along with other non-Communist books as background 
reading. 

The Chairman. That is not the question. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not my question. You heard the testi- 
mony read here of the witness who said that it was used as the back- 
ground for Communist line in America, and that book was being at- 
tacked in this article in the Reader's Digest. Is that not a fact? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I don't believe that the record shows tJiat 
anybody testified that it was being used as a background for the Com- 
munist-line propaganda. 

I believe the testimony shows that it was sold as background read- 
ing. The book was also criticized in Communist publications. 

The Chairman. You distinguish between background reading and 
backgi'ound what? 

Senator Ferguson. For the Communist line? 

Mr. Lattimore. Certainly I do. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat is the difference? Wliat is the difference 
between backgi-ound reading for a Communist and Communist-line 
reading ? 

Mr. LATriMt)RE. The difference in this case is that my book was sold 
in a gi^eat many bookshops besides Connnunist booksliops, and that 
Communist publications criticized by views. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read testimony at this point into 
the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would read what the witness said 
about the Communist line. 

Mr. Morris. This is the testimony of Mr. Matusow taken in executive 
session on February 13, 1952. Mr. Mandel is interrogating Mr. 
Matusow [reading] : 

Mr. Mandel. Did the bookshop — 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3363 

lliat is, the Communist bookshop — 

ever promote any of the publications of Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, it did. 

Mr. Mandel. Will you tell us about that? 

Mr. Matusow. The book, Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, published by 
Little Brown & Co.— 

Mr. Mandel. AVhat year? 

Mr. Matusow. 1945 — it was one of the books used in the bookshop and sug- 
gested reading for a background of the party line, the Communist Party line, 
in Asia. 

Mr. Mandbx. What do you mean by suggested reading? 

Mr. Matusow. You see, this was the Jefferson School Book Shop, and there 
were many courses conducted. 

During this period, as I said, the war in China, the Communist revolution in 
China, was taking place, and many people professed a great interest in that, and 
the party, the Communist Party, line, as disseminated had not caught up with 
the tide of events, we might say. The party had been caught for a while flat- 
footed in the terms of the actual literature put out by the Communist Party 
interntaional publishers. 

Things were moving too fast for them. The State education committee got 
together and decided which books would be good background material, and which 
supported the Communist Party line. 

They came out with a decision that Solution in Asia was one of those books 
which could give a Communist Party member a correct line, a Communist line, 
on the Asiatic situation in China and China specifically. 

That is the end of the pertinent testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the IPK concerned with this dispute in the 
Reader's Digest ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Then what did Mr. Carter have to do with it? 
Why did you not defend yourself instead of using the ruse of having 
Laniont, as if it was something for the IPR to be concerned with? 

Mr. Lattimore. I attempted to put my point of view before the 
editors of the Readers Digest and was refused an opportunity. 

Mr. Carter then took the initiative in suggesting that some other 
way be found of publishing the vie^v which I and many others held 
at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you an employee of the Government of the 
L^nited States at the time this was going on ? 

INIr. Lattimore. I don't believe so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You gave as your address on June 20, 1945, the 
OWI here in Washington, If you Avere not a member what were you 
doing in the OWI ? 

]Mr. Laitimore. June 20, 1945? 

Senator Ferguson. I wnll get the exact date here. On June 20, 
1945, you wrote a letter to Matthew Connelly, the secretary of the 
President, and you gave tele])hone OWI, Washington, REpublic 7500, 
Extension 72228. 

If you were not an employee, what were you doing in the OWI ? 

Mr. Laitimore. At that time I was an occasional consultant to the 
OWI. and if I had been in Washiuiiton cm any day which Mr. Con- 
nelly telephoned me at my home in Ruxton and couldn't find me, he 
could have very likely have found me at OWI. 

Senator Ferguson". Then you were an employee of the United 
States Government ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was an occasional considtant, which meant that I 
was an employee on any day that I actually worked there to act as 
consultant. 



3364 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. How much did you receive a day as being a 
consultant. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. The records will show, doubtlessly. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you or were you not on the payroll of 
the United States Government while this was going on with Mr. 
Lamont ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was an independent citizen who was 
occasionally consulted and on the days when I was consulted I re- 
ceived a consultant's fee, or whatever you like to call it, from the 
United States Government. 

It had absolutely no limiting effect on my expressing my own views 
as a citizen. 

Senator Ferguson. How much did you draw from the United 
States Treasury in 1945 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know, sir. I am sure that the records would 
show. 

Senator Ferguson. We will get that and put it in the record, if it 
is not one of those matters that is a secret and we cannot obtain it. 

It may be the question that your employment was that way, as you 
indicate now. 

Mr. Arnold. If there is any question of secrecy, we will waive it, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you this : I was asking you the 
other day about the article of Bisson, where the party line was changed 
in relation to China in 1943. That has been discussed quite a bit in 
this record. 

The question came up as to changing the line and calling the Com- 
munists of China democrats, and that their government was the de- 
mocracy, and that the Nationalist Government was the feudal system. 

Now, I ask you whether that was not the same kind of a question 
that was raised in the article in the Reader's Digest, and I ask you to 
read, on page 15, ''Deception No. 1." See whether the IPR was in- 
volved. Kead it out loud. 

The Chairman. What page is that, Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. 15. 

Mr. Morris. May that whole article, and it is only nine pages, go 
into the record at this point? 

( See exhibit No. 549, p. 3498, for article. ) 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson, may I say first that I never dis- 
cussed the Bis.son article with anybody as a change in the Communist 
line ; did not consider it to be anything of the kind. 

Senator Ferguson. Your memory is becoming much better on the 
Bisson article as we go along. 

Now, will you read this "Deception No. 1"? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Deception 1 : That Russia is a "democracy" and that China can therefore 
safely be left to Russian "influence." 

Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous con- 
ception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the 
blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39, as a "triumph 
for democracy." He now urges our Government in a book called Solution in 
Asia to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in central 
Asia. 

Senator Ferguson. AVill you read it so as to give the quotes out of 
your book, so that we can tell what is a quote and what is not a quote? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3365 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in Central 
Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his boolv on its jacket. 

He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in 
actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the 
Russian border, than they are in the sign series of Anglo-Saxon democracies 
which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. 

This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was 
filled with jazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be advertised 
as more academic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, how- 
ever, it legitimized the dictatorsliip of the Russian Communist Party (article 
126). Stalin himself, addressing tlie Congress which I'atified the draft of the 
constitution, frankly stated this fact : 

"I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force 
the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and preserves unchanged the 
present leading position of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union only 
one party can exist, the party of Communists" (Pravda, November 26, 19.36). 

In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 1938, only one 
candidate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party 
and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony 
has not been repeated and would make no difference if it had. The constitu- 
tion is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is 
shot or sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia full regions are given up 
to these concentration camps, where from 15 to 20 millions — 

Footnote : 

Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red army, estimates that 
the number is about 12 million. Boris Souvarine, French historian of Bol- 
shevism, estimates 15 million. Victor Kravchenko, recently resigned from the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, who has visited many camps 
and had official relations with their managements, says these estimates are low 
and puts the figure at 20 million. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you let me liave it ? 

Mr. Lattimore, I cite this as an example of an extremely unfair 
attack on me, wliicli makes one brief quotation from what I wrote en- 
tirely out of context. It says that I recommended that the United 
States cheerfully accept something which I did not recommend that 
the United States cheerfully accept, then ties it in with a whole lot 
of extraneous matter which has no concern whatever with me. 

It was against that kind of treatment that I protested to the edi- 
tors of the Header's Digest. 

Senator Ferguson. And it was this that you were trying to answer 
by getting Mr. Lamont, over his own signature, to write your let- 
ter? 

Mr. Latitmore. I was not trying to get ]\Ir. Lamont over his own 
signature to answer my own letter. I was acceding 

Senator Ferguson. You say that this record does not show that? 

Mr. Lattimore. I do, Senator. The record shows that I was acced- 
ing to a request from Mr. Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. What did Mr. Carter have to do with it ? 

Mr. Latti3iore. Mr. Carter wrote to me and made some suggestions, 
to which I acceded. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you a copy of his letter, Carter's letter to 
you ? Is that the one that was read ? 

Mr. Lattimore. This is the one that was read. 

Senator Ferguson. Who approached Carter first? Did he ap- 
proach you, or did vou approach him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. %ly distinct recollection is that he approached me. 
I am sure you can check that by asking him. 



3366 ixstitutp: of pacific relations 

Seiiiitor Ferguson. Who else did you contact on one of the dis- 
putes, as to wliether or not America should furnish aid to the Com- 
munists, direct aid to the Communist army and not through the Na- 
tional Government or the Government of Ohina ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember consulting anybody. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you consult anybody? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember consulting anybody. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not you did consult 
anyone. Think about it. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember consulting anybody, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. This was just about the time that you were 
talking — what is the date on that ? The 19th of June? 

Mr. Lattimore. 14th of June and 19th of June, from Mr. Carter; 
yes. 

Senator Ferguson. The 10th of June was when you Avrote the first 
letter, as I recall that letter. Did the fact that you wanted to go and 
see the President have anything to do with this dispute you were 
having? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; it had nothing whatever to do with this 
dispute. At that time I held certain views on China. The whole sub- 
ject of China was a subject of very keen public discussion at the time. 

I, like others, was reading and talking about it. I, like others, was 
writing or trying to write on the subject. My views were my own. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us some of the others that were 
talking along the same line that you advocted, of giving aid to the 
Communists in China and building them up ? 

The Chairman. Do you understand the question, Mr. Lattimore? 

If not, we will have it read back to you. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I understand the question, Mr. Chairman. 

Are you ready, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I am ready. 

Mr. Lattimore. I cannot possibly recall offliand as of 1952 exactly 
who was writing and discussing these subjects in 1945. I M'ould be 
glad to look up the record for you, if you are intei-ested. 

Senator Ferguson. The reason I ask that question, in one of your 
letters — I think it was the one to Mr. Matt Connelly — you said: "The 
views I represent." 

Wliose views did you represent? 

Mr. Lattimore. My own. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you mean, when you said the "views I rep- 
resent," your views alone? 

Ml-. Lattimore. I can't recall exactly what I meant 7 or 8 years ago 
in writing that letter. I presume I meant my own views and pos- 
sibly — don't want to quibble about it — I may have represented what 
I considered to be a body of views then current. 

Senator Ferguson. A^Hiose views were they outside of yours? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know at this time. I have pointed out in 
the statement I prepared for this committee that these views were 
held by many of the American observers in China, including military. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you advocate that the Soviet tJnion take 
over and annex Manchuria? 

Mr. Latpimore. No, I don't believe I did. 

The Chairman. Can we have an answer to that ? That seems to be 
a clear-cut question. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3367 

Mr. Arnold. I wish you would read the record back. I think we 
answered it. 

The Chairman. I want an answer. Did you or did you not^ He 
did not answer. He answered "I don't believe I did." 

Mr. Lattimore. I will change that answer, Senator. 

I am sure I didn't. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what Mr. Carter was then talking 
about ? 

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly and this is at 
the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possibility is precisely what your 
critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely go- 
ing to annex Manchuria and so forth, while you put it in reverse. I would hate 
to have your critics ijounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that 
Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of 
avoiding it? 

Mr. Lati'uviore. Apparently, Mr. Carter thought my wording was 
unclear and ought to be made clear. 

Senator Ferguson. The question is, did you discuss with Carter the 
question of Manchuria becoming a part of Russia ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo. I am certain I didn't. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Did 3"ou — do you know anyone else besides your- 
self that was advocating the sending of material. Army equipment and 
so forth, to the Communists in China and not have the Nationalist 
Government take care of the government in China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was a view that was quite prevalent 

The Chairman. Do you know anyone else? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, the American military, or a large part of the 
American military in China. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in touch with the State Department 
policy at this time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; not particularly. 

The Chairman. In any way ? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what our policy was? 

Mr. Lattimore. As far as it could be seen from the newspapers and 
so on, I knew it. 

Senator Ferguson. What was our State Department's policy as of 
June 10 on this question ? 

The Chairman. Wliat year? 

Senator Ferguson. 1945. 

Mr. Lattimore. Subject to an imperfect recollection, Senator, I 
believe that this was a period of controversy in which statements were 
being made by, I think. General Hurley and others, which resulted 
in a great deal of public discussion and a general belief that State 
Department policy as of that moment was unclear. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to going to the "Wliite House, did you 
give any information to any Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. That I was going to do so, you mean? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to any radio commentators? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not that I can recall. I frequently — no, not fre- 
quently — I occasionally saw radio commentators and newspapermen 
at that time. 



3368 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. Senator, I think the date of that Wliite House 
matter should be in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. The date of July 3 was the date that you went 
to the Wliite House ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't have the documents before me, Senator. 
I will accept your date. 

Senator Ferguson. Was the draft of the memorandum that you 
left with the President the day you were there dated July 3 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Was it ? 

Senator Ferguson. The draft that you left with the President, it is 
dated the 3d. 

Mr. Lattimore. It is dated the 3d, yes, the 3d of July. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the day you were there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume so ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what day of the week you were 
there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall what day of the w^eek it was. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anybody having knowledge, 
outside of the White House and you, that you were going to the White 
House ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall at this moment. I wouldn't have 
]-egarded — yes, I do. I know that I talked with President Bowman, 
of Johns Hopkins, about the whole idea of writing to the President, 
and asking for an opportunity to speak with him. 

I quite likely talked to other people about it. There was no secrecy 
about the subject. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to any radio conunentators as to 
anything that you would take up with the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. I may have. My recollection doesn't include it. 
The manner of your questioning, Senator, suggests that maybe you 
know I did. 

The Chairman. That will be stricken. He says he does not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. But I am at least fair on the question suggesting 
that you might. 

I will be a little more explicit. 

Did you have any conversation or any direct or indirect communi- 
cation with Drew Pearson before you went to the White House? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe so, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the night before you went 
to the White House, or at least before you went to the White House, 
it was announced by Drew Pearson as to one thing that you would 
take up at the IVliite House? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't know that. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think I did. 

The Chairman. Pardon me. Senator. 

Mr. Reporter, will you read back the last two or three questions and 
answers? My attention was taken away. 

(Thereupon, the portion of the record referred to, as heretofore 
recorded, was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Lattimore. I may have heard later, of course. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3369 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Drew Pearson at that time ? 

Mr. Lat^i'imoke. I don't think I had ever met him. I may have, 
but I doubt it, at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. 1945 ; right before June 3^ 

Mr. Lattimore. July 3. 

Senator Ferguson. July 3. Thank you for correcting me. 

JNIr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think at that time I knew Drew Pear- 
son, 

Senator Ferguson. When you went to the White House, was there 
any member of the State Department present at the meeting? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I believe it was only the President and 
myself. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know David Karr, a leg man for Drew 
Pearson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't believe I ever met him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know any representative prior to that 
time of Drew Pearson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I didn't, to the best of my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how Drew Pearson would know 
that you were going to the White House ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I think a lot of people would like to know 
how Drew Pearson knows a lot of things. 

The Celvirman. That answer will be stricken. The question is 
did you know how he knew that you were going to the White Housed 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't believe he could possibly have 
known from me. 

Senator Ferguson. You quote him quite elaborately in your Ordeal 
by Slander, do you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. You mean that I quoted him 5 or 6 years later about 
something quite different, yes, I did. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you say there was no member of the 
State Department present at your conversation when the President 
was there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my recollection it was only the 
President and myself. 

Senator Ferguson. The President knew in advance what you 
wanted to discuss with him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In general, yes, in the letter I had written to him 
sometime before. The memorandums that I left with him had not 
been submitted to him before. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not, while you were 
in the White House, you saw any member of the State Department ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, but I had a very brief conversation with Mr. 
Joseph Grew, at that time, I think. Under Secretary of State or Assist- 
ant Secretary, or something of that kind, who was waiting in the 
anteroom to see the President, and who came over to speak to me. 

Senator Ferguson. AYell, now, did you talk to him before you saw 
the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. I forget whether it was before I saw the President, 
or after. I didn't really talk to him. He came over and asked me 
one question which I answered. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the question? 

Mr. Lattimore. The question was whether I had ever lived in 
Japan for any consecutive period, and the answer was "no." 

88348 — 52— pt. 10 7 



3370 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator P^erguson. And what did he say? 

Mr. Lattimore. He said, to the best of my recollection, he said, "I 
thon*iht so." 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the only conversation you had with the 
Under Secretary ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is tlie only conversation. 

Senator Ferguson. And was that before you went in to the Presi- 
dent, or after? 

Mr. T^iATriMORE. As I say, I forgot whether it was before or right 
after. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss Ambassador Joseph Grew with 
the President ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Was his name mentioned? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Drew Pearson announced 
on the radio, I think it was the night before or a few days before, 
if you went in Monday morning which, I think, was the f3rd of 
July — I may be incorrect on that date — that Drew Pearson announced 
that you were going to the A^^iite House to ask the President not to 
appoint Ambassador Joseph Grew as an adviser in the Far East ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall that. If Mr. Pearson said that, he 
was completely in error, wdiich sometimes happens with even om- 
niscient columnists. 

Senator Ferguson. And you think he is one ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I think it is a mark of the trade of col- 
umnists to appear to be as omniscient as possible. 

Senator Ferguson. I wnll ask you who you had in mind. Do you 
have a copy of your memorandum to the President ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I have a copy of it here. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; it is the copy of the letter. 

Mr. Lattimore. The copy of the letter ? 

Senator Ferguson. The last paragraph. 

The Chairman. That is the letter to the President? 

Senator Fercjuson. Yes, the letter to the President dated the 10th 
of June 1945 : 

With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy 
toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with 
either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced. 

Who were you talking about ? 

Mr. Latomore. I was talking about advisers who are not associated 
with the formulation or the im|)lementation of that policy as re- 
cently })racticed. I had nobody particularly in mind. 

I remember quite clearly that part of the occasion of my asking 
for this interview was that American policy in the Far East, and 
particularly with regard to China, was becoming controversial in the 
papers, and I thought it was a good moment for an impartial review. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Joseph Grew one of the people you were 
talking about? 

Mr. Lai^tmore. As an impartial adviser? 

Senator Ferguson. In that paragraph, is he ojie of the |)eople that 
you were talking about ? 

Mr. La'itimore. Well, Mr. Grew at that time was, as I say, an 
associate — no ; an assistant or 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3371 

The Chairman. That is susceptible of an answer of "Yes"' or "No," 
and then yon may explain, Mr. Lattiniore. The question calls for 
an answer of "Yes" or "No." 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer was "Yes"; Mr. Grew was one of those 
who were concerned with American policy in the Far P^ast. 

I don't know Avhether he was concerned with policy toward China. 

Senator Fergi'son. Was he one of the formulators ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't answer as to the internal structure of the 
fornudation of ])olicy at that time, Mr. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the implementers ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Neither can I answer that question, except that he 
was a high executive officer of the State»Department. 

Senator Ferguson. He had been in China in the Far East ; had he 
not? 

Mr. Lattimore. He had been in Japan. I don't know about China. 

Senator Ferguson. He had been in Japan and had been the Am- 
bassador to Japan? 

Mv. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Was Vincent one of the formulators ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you that. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the implementers ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you that, except that he had a posi- 
tion in the State Department at that time. As I say, I don't know 
what the chain of command in the State Department was at that 
time as between policy formulation and policy implementation. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew Ballantine ; did you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I knew Mr. Ballantine. 

Senator Ferguson. Is his name Joseph or Thomas ? 

ISIr. Lattimore. Joseph. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he one of the formulators ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember, Senator, whether Ballantine 
had at that time already retired from the State Department, or not. 

Senator Ferguson. He had not at this time. 

Mr. I^ATTiMORE. He had not at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. AVas he one of the implementers ? 

Mr. LA'rriMORE. Again I don't know- enough about the internal 
structure of the State Department to answer. 

Senator Ferguson. Who were you talking about here, that you 
were telling the President in a letter? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I was not talking about wdio, I was talk- 
ing about what. I was saying that I thought it would be a good 
idea to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed. 

And, as an extension of impartially reviewed, I didn't think that 
a policy could be impai-tially reviewed by those wdio had been recently 
making or practicing it. 

Therefore, I suggested that outside people who had not recently 
been concerned be called in for such an impartial review. 

The Chairman. I think the excerpt should be read again to the 
witness, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy 
toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with 
either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently prac- 
ticed. 



3372 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Laitimore. I think that is quite a clear suggestion, Senator. 

I should say, to anybody in Government, that would be a suggestion 
that a question of policy be reviewed by some kind of a board, the 
individual members of which had not recently been connected with 
the question to be reviewed. 

I believe that is not unknown practice in the conduct of government. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Now, will you state, Mr. Lattimore, what the policy was that you 
describe as "recently practiced" ? 

What was the policy? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I was somewhat unclear on the subject, 
Senator, or I wouldn't have suggested a review. I thought that I, 
myself, and a good many other people, could do with some clarifi- 
cation. 

Senator Ferguson. You wanted people that had nothing to do 
with the policy, and you now tell us that you did not know what the 
policy was ? 

The Chairman. He said he was unclear on it. 

Mr. Lattimore. I said I was unclear on it. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell us what you knew about the policy that 
you were objecting to, that you wanted reviewed, and you were telling 
the President that he ought to get people who had nothing to do 
with the policy. 

That would indicate it was a very erroneous policy, would it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not necessarily, Senator. I think that is quite 
clearly stated in the second paragraph of my letter to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell us what the policy was. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I read that? 

Senator Ferguson. I want an answer to the question as to what 
the policy was. 

The Chairman. What was the policy to which he was objecting; 
is that right? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

You said that policy "as recently practiced." 

The Chairman. Confine yourself to the question, will you, please, 
Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I cannot at this moment give you an 
accurate statement of what I thought in 1945 the policy was. 

But my letter to the President, and the second paragraph of my 
letter to the President, clearly shows what I thought made review 
and discussion desirable. 

May I read that article? 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

You said in the article that you wanted Lamont to write, that one of 
the policies was that they were not furnishing arms to the Communists, 
and you wanted a change in that policy, did you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. May I consult my own statement on that ? 

Senator Ffjjguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. The Senator has just restated what he thinks was 
my opinion. Senator McCarran, and I should like to see what my 
opinion was. 

The Chairman. I understood he has quoted from the Lamont letter. 

Mr. Laitimore. He has paraphrased it. 

Senator Ferguson. I paraphrased it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3373 

The Chairman. All right. What do you want to read from, the 
Laniont letter? 

Mr. Lattimore. From the proposed draft for a letter by Mr. La- 
mont; yes. Following page 3 of the mimeographed copy [reading] : 

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited 
channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors 
one political group against all others and is withheld from one maj<n' group, the 
Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. 
Amei'ican aid to China has thus become politically pai'tisan at a time when thei 
Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this di- 
vergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the 
blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians 
should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they 
could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an 
American precedent. 

I think this shows concern, Senator, that American policy should 
not furnish the Russians with a pretext for direct intervention in the 
internal policies of China. 

Senator FerCxUSon. Do you say, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph 
did not convey the idea that you were favoring aid to the Communists 
as well as to the Nationalists? 

Mr. Lattimore. This paragraph. Senator, clearly shows that I be- 
lieved that the Comminiist armies, as armies in combat with the 
Japanese, could be of greater use if some of the American supplies to 
China were used by them. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, going to your letter of June 10 
to the President, do you not, in other words, say the same thing in this 
paragraph [reading] : 

Until quite recently, great care was taken to avoid any inference that America, 
in aiding China as a nation, was committing itself to all-out support of one party 
in China's domestic affairs. There now appears to be a fundamental change. 
Public statements by men regarded as spokesmen for American ix)licy encourage 
many Chinese to believe that America now identifies the Chinese Government with 
one party and only one party, connuits itself to the maintenance of that party, 
'and may in the future support that party in suppressing its rivals. 

The Chairman. What is your question ? 

Senator Ferguson. What is the diiference between the two state- 
ments, the paragraph that you read, begining with, "As a result xlmeri- 
can aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels," 
and so forth ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The two paragraphs. Senator, state or restate, in 
somewhat different ways, my concern about the same primary question ; 
namely, that our aid to China, as a nation and an ally, should not be 
allowed to involve us in partisan support. 

It has always been my belief that one of the mistakes of American 
policy was to treat China in that way, differently from the way in 
which we treated, say Great Britain. We never in Great Britain spec- 
ified aid in terms of the Conservative Party or the Labor Party. 

At the end of the war, when the British had an election and the 
Labor government came in instead of Churchill, we did not attem])t 
to affect that election by saying that, "Unless Churchill is reelected, 
we won't play." 

I believe that a great deal of damage was done by creating, in fact, 
an impression that China was committed not to a nation, but to a 
party. 



3374 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Is that your explanation as to the difference 
between these two paragraphs^ 

Mr. Lattimore. That is my explanation as to the similarity between 
these two paragra])hs. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, did you regard the Chinese Nation- 
alists and Chinese Communists as just two eom])eting political parties 
iu China? 

Mr. Lattimore. I regarded them as, among other things, two com- 
peting parties in China. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would have had them treated on the basis 
of two comj)eting jiolitieal parties, as we treated the competing politi- 
cal parties in England, which you used as an example; is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. In terms of the war against Japan, I was in favor 
of using any forces that would fight the Japanese and thereby diminish 
American casualties. 

As regards domestic politics, I was afraid that support for one party 
against another party in Chinese domestic politics would lead to 
failure rather than success. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, going now to your letter of June 
10, 1945, in the first ])aragraph, about the policy which you were talk- 
ing about in the last paragraph, you say there : 

There appears now a major change in our iwlicy. * * * 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the policy, and what was the change? 
Mr. Lattimore. The policy is stated in the first sentence of the 
letter : 

When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shels, on the recommendation of President 
Koosevelt, appointed me his political adviser in 1941, the policy of the United. 
States was to support a United China. There appears now to be a major change 
in our policy, which may invite the danger of a political and even a territorial 
division of China and the further danger of conflict and rivalry between America 
and Russia. 

I have not looked up the context of the Times in the newspapers of 
the day, but I believe I am correct in stating that this refers to state- 
ments that were beginning to be made in the press at the time by — I 
ho])e I am not quoting him incorrectly — General Hurley and others, 
indicating that thei'e was a conflict of opinion among top American 
personnel on tliis subject. 

And I though that if there were such a conflict, it would be sound 
]n'actice to have an impartial review of American policy by people not 
lecently involved in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, you indicated in one of your 
answers tliat you tliought I drew the wrong conclusion about that you 
were advocating aid to the Comnnniists. 

I want to read from the Lamont letter, in the second paragraph: 

* * * in effect, I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter 
urging our Government to alter its apparent i)resent policy and to make available 
lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in Northwest China. 

Did not Mr. Lamont understand your article to mean that you were 
advocating that they send lend-lease supplies directly to the (>)nnnu- 
nists, as a government? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3375 

The Chairman, Listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not Mr. Laniont draw the conclusion that 
you Mere asking him to write a letter to the Times under his name, for 
your benefit, in a dispute that you were having with some men that 
wrote an article in the Reader's Digest, that you were advocating a 
change in America's policy of only giving lend-lease to the National- 
ists of China, being the Government of China, and that you were advo- 
cating that the lend-lease goods go directly to the Communists as well 
as to the Nationalists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson, I believe that if you will read 
that letter as a whole, you will see that Mr. Lamont was stating a tenta- 
tive opinion, which he carefully modified by saying tliat he had been 
out of touch for some time. 

Senator Fer(;uson. Mr. Lattimore, had you ever used any other man 
or woman as you were trying to use Lamont in this letter to the. New 
York Times ? 

]Mi'. Laitimore. Senator, I was not trying to use Mr. Lamont, and 
1 don't believe that I have made it a usual practice to ask other people 
to write for the papers for me. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you whether you inade it the usual 
practice ; I asked you whether you ever did it. 

Mr. Latitmore. I don't recall anything of the kind, Senator. 

I would like to emphasize at this moment that 

The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that if you did you 
would recall it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should think it would be quite likely. It would 
depend on how serious the matter was. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, how many memorandums did 
you leave with the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. I left him 2 one-page memoranda, which are in the 
mimeographed exhibit here run together like one memorandum; one 
on Japan policy as related to China, and one on China policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell us in your statement, on page 33, 
where you mentioned going to the President, that you had left any 
memorandum with him? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Why not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't see why I should have. I said that I tried 
to see the President, and I think it is quite the usual practice when 
one goes to see the President, to leave a memorandum of what the inter- 
viewer would like to talk about. 

Senator Ferguson. You say, then, that you did not feel that in 
this statement you should give us anything other than the fact that 
you had written a letter, "I wrote to the President expressing my 
views on China policy"? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson, "And the President, in response, asked me to 
come to see him, and I did." 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. "Our conference lasted about 3 minutes." 

Mr. Lattimore. Tliat is right. 

Senator Ferguson. "Neither my letter nor my visit had the slightest 
effect on American policy." 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 



3376 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. What was the policy that you tried to affect, so 
that we can ascertain whether or not it had any effect on the American 
policy ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The policy, as I have thought I saw it at the time, 
was to drift into a position of appearing to take sides in Chinese 
domestic politics, which I thought was an alarming drift. 

Senator Ferguson. It was not to furnish material to the Com- 
munists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In my interview with the President ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You stated it in your letter when you asked him 
to aid both sides. 

Mr. Lattimore. I was not thinking of that as aid to the Com- 
munists ; I was thinking of that as prosecution of the American policy 
of not promoting a divided China and of prosecuting the war against 
Japan as actively as possible. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, were you not trying, at the exact 
time, to influence American public opinion by getting Mr. Lamont to 
write a letter to the New York Times so that it would be published to 
the world under his name, to get aid to the Communists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Ferguson, I was not trying to get Mr. Lamont 
to do anything. 

The Chairman. You can answer that "Yes" or "No." 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No." 

I was acceding to Mr. Carter's request, suggestion to furnish some 
material for a letter to be signed by Mr. Lamont, which he could accept 
or reject, and which he finally rejected. 

It was my opinion at that time that part of avoidance of a dis- 
astrous split in China, as the end of the war was approaching, was to 
spread American aid over all forces fighting the Japanese and avoid 
creating a pretext for the Russians to take a hand in Chinese internal 
politics. 

Senator Ferguson, Did Carter know that you were going to the 
White House ? 

Mr, Lattimore. No, sir; I am sure he didn't. 

Senator Ferguson, So the Institute of Pacific Relations had noth- 
ing to do with this visit? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you review the policy after you had been 
to the White House? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To know whether or not you had influenced it. 

Mr. Latitmore. Oh, I am speaking simply from my general recol- 
lection, which I think has been tested over a good many years, that 
I have never had any influence on American policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that a man who had written a 
book entitled "Solution in Asia" might have an influence on the Pres- 
ident if he went to see him personally and left a memorandum with 
him, particularly where he advocates getting a new set-up in the State 
Department to review the policy? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

When I asked for that interview I was not thinking of myself as 
the author of any particular book. I was thinking of myself as a 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3377 

person who had been familiar with President Koosevelt's policy in 
China at the time that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appointed me 
as his adviser. 

Senator Ferguson. Did yon ever have a conversation with anyone 
connected with the State Department along this line, of the change in 
policy, or the policy? 

Mr. Lati^imore. I don't recall, nnless I casnally talked with State 
Department people as I did with newspaper people, people back from 
China, everybody who was interested in the snbject at the time. 

As I say, this was a subject of very general discussion at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. With whom would j'ou say you had talked 
about it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At this time, Senator, I couldn't possibly tell you. 

Senator Ferguson. Ion did not have a very long conversation with 
Mr. Grew about it, did you? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't. 

Senator Fp^rguson. Mr. Ballantine ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Dooman ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Dooman ? 

Senator Ferguson. Dooman ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that after you went to see the 
President, that within a short time Mr. Grew left the Department; 
was replaced ? 

Mr, Lattimore. I couldn't tell you today, Senator Ferguson, when 
Mr. Grew resigned. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that shortly after you went to the 
White House, that Mr. Ballantine was replaced ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the calendar of events in that con- 
nection. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not know, as a matter of fact, that after 
you went to the White House, that in a short time ]Mr. Dooman was 
replaced, Eugene Dooman ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I recall that there was a change at that time. I 
believe that these were senior personnel who were reaching normal 
retirement age in any case. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you not know that afte'r you went there, 
that your friend that you placed so highly in your statement here to 
this committee, Mr. John Carter Vincent, was promoted and took over 
the work of the Far East ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I remember that Mr. Vincent, after his return from 
China, was promoted in the State Department, which at that time I 
would certainly have regarded as an excellent promotion ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you not know that it took place after you 
had been at the "\Miite House ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Until I looked up these memoranda. Senator, I 
wouldn't have recalled which came first. 

Senator Ferguson. But is it not a fact that it did take place, that the 
three replacements happened after you were there, that the promotion 
of Mr. Vincent and the others took place after you were there? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, you seem to be trying to impute to me 
power that 



3378 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. Cannot you answer "Yes" or "No" ? 

Please answer it. Do not argue with the Senator. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, you are now saying that these promotions 
took place subsequently. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, the record shows it. 

Mr. Lattimore. So you say. I haven't looked up the record. 

Senator Ferguson. That being a fact, how can you tell the world 
tliat you did not have any influence on the policy ? 

Mr. Lat^'imore. I don't think I had the slightest influence on the 
policy. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the Marshall mission was to 
China '^ 

Mr. Lattimore. I know that General Marshall went out to China ; 
yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what was in his instructions? 

The Chairman. The question is Did you know what was in his 
instructions ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know at the time, no. I know very roughly 
now. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you want to tell this com- 
mittee, this Senate, that you, as a private citizen, after having this 
dispute with the Reader's Digest in the writing of the memorandum 
for Lamont and the writing of the letter to the President and the 
urging to the President, that you had to see him, in fact, before he 
went to Potsdam ; that after you had been there, you failed or neglected 
to look into the State Department or its policies after that date and 
you cannot tell us what happened ? Is that what you want to leave 
with this committee? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, Senator. What I want to leave with this com- 
mittee is that this extremely brief interview with the President had 
no consequences whatever, as far as I ever knew. 

Nobody in the White House or in the State Department called me 
back to consult me on any steps that were about to be taken. 

Senator Ferguson. That doesn't answer my question, Mr. Latti- 
more. 

Mr. Latitmore. Well, I don't believe that this very brief interview 
of mine with the President had any consequence at all. 

Senator Ferguson. We are having gi-eat difficulty in getting from 
you this morning what policy you wanted changed. What 1 want to 
know is why you tell this committee in your statement that what 
you wanted done and what you presented to the President, had not the 
slightest — and you use the word "slightest" — etfect on American policy, 
and you never followed it up to know what the Marshall mission to 
China w^as. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I don't believe that my interview with 
the President or uiy letter to him or the meuioranda that I left with 
him had the slightest effect. 

Senator Ferguson. How can you tell us whether it had the slightest? 
Mr. Lattimore. I am not telling you whether it had the slightest. 
Senator Ferguson. Yon did in your statement. You told the whole 
world that it had the slightest effect, on the top of page 34. 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it had the slightest effect. 
Senator Ferguson. Read your statement of what you told us. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3379 

Mr. La'itimore. "Neitlier my letter nor my visit had the slightest 
effect on American policy." 

I believe that is a true statement. 

Senator Fercuson. Is not there in issue today before tliis com- 
mittee the (|uestion as to \vhether or not you had any influence on our 
American foreign policy? 

Mr. Lattimork. If you choose to put it that ^vay, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not in issue as to whether or not the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations, of which you were a trustee at this time, 
had any influence on the foreign policy of America? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I think that my brief contact with the 
President on this occasion had no effect whatever on American policy, 
and it certainly had no connection with the Institute of Pacfic Rela- 
tions. 

The CiiAiRMAx. Again, that is not an answer to the question. 

Read the question, Mr. Reporter. 

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the 
reporter, as follows:) 

Senator Ferguson. Is not there in issue today before this committee the ques- 
tion as to whether or not you had any influence on our American foreign policy? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is your statement of the issue. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, I am not willing to allow you 
to draw the conclusion, and have it become final, as to whether or 
not you had the slightest influence on American policy. 

That is why I am asking these questions. 

And I am sorry it is taking so long. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator. I am sorry. I can say that, to the best of 
my knowlege and belief 

The Chairman. Just a moment. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the reason why it is taking so long here. 
You gave us many conclusions. We discovered many of them were 
based purely upon hearsay and that you asked this connnittee to draw 
those conclusions with you. 

I, for one, as a Senator, am not willing to take your conclusions 
when I think there are outstanding facts, and I want to question you 
about those facts. 

]\Ir. Lattimore. Go ahead and question. Senator. 

Senator Fergison. Let us take the memorandum that you left with 
the President. You say that you did not go there for the purpose of 
influencing him. 

I would like now for you to answer why you went. 

Mr. Lattimore. Did I say that I did not go there for the purpose 
of influencing him ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is the inference you leave. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you go there for the purpose of influencing 
the President ? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you go there for that purpose ? 

The Chairman. Answer that "Yes" or "No," now, and then make 
an explanation. 

Did you go there for the purpose of influencing the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; of course, I did. 



3380 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did you write the Lamont letter with the in- 
tent that you were going to try to influence the State Department, 
the President, and the public ? 
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. What was its purpose? 

Mr. LAT'riMORE. I acceded to Mr. Carter's request to draft some 
material for a letter by Mr. Lamont for the specific and limited pur- 
pose of correcting gross distortions of my views which had appeared 
in the Eeader's Digest. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you say that the Reader's Digest raised the 
question about your advocating the sending of lend-lease, or any other 
materiel, to the Chinese Communists as a government? Was that 
raised in the Reader's Digest issue? 

Mr. Lat'I'imore. I have not recently read the Reader's Digest, and 
I can't answ^er for their editorial intentions. I can only speak to the 
point that I considered that what they published was grossly unfair 
to me. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they publish anything that was grossly 
unfair to you about your advocating the sending of lend-lease or any 
other materiel to the Chinese Communists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe that they said that I advocated that. 

Did they? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; I do not think so. I wondered wh}^ put it in 
the Lamont letter. 

Mr. Lattimore. Because the Reader's Digest had misrepresented 
my views, and I wanted to make a statement of what my views ac- 
tually were. 

Senator Ferguson. How would your views in the letter that you 
gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the 
]:)ublic as your views ? You do not say in the Lamont letter than "Owen 
Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advo- 
cate it. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I wish you would. 

The Chairman. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would 

Senator Ferguson. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas 
Lamont to advocate that he had advocated. 

Mr. Lattimore. Carter had asked me to provide him with some 
material. My reference to 

The Chairman. What are you reading from now? 

Mr. Lattimore. From this draft that I sent to i\Ir. Carter. 

The Chairman. To Mr. Carter ? 

Mr. Lattimore. To Mr. Carter ; yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont. 

Senator Ferguson. He had a man take it to Lamont. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the anthnritativeness of several 
of those Americans * * * inchulins Owen Lattimore. Harrison Forman, 
and Edsar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both 
American and Soviet policy in China. 

The Chairman. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the 
question read? 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the answer ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3381 

Mr. LA'rriMORE. That is the answer. 

Senator Fergusox. Did tlie Dio:est article raise the question of your 
advocating the furnishing of tliis material to Communist China? 

Mr. Lattimore. The Digest article, as you will see from that extract 
that I recently read into the record, describes me as advocating that 
the American Government — I think the words were — cheerfully 
accept things which I did not advocate the American Government 
cheerfully accepting. 

The Chairmax. That does not answer the question of the Senator. 
I want tliat question read to the witness again. 

And I ask you, Mr. Lattimore, to answer it, if you please, if you care 
to answer it. If you do not, you may say so.. 

Read the question of the Senator from Michigan. 

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the re- 
porter, as follows :) 

Senator Ferguson. How would your views in tlie letter that you gave to La- 
niont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? 
You do not say in the Laniont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this.'' 
You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman. I submit that is responsive. 
The Chairman. The Chair does not think so. 
Mr. Arnold. Well, then, try and answer it. 
Mr. Lattimore. Will you read it again? 

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was again read by 
the reporter, as follows:) 

How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his 
signature, how would they get to the public as your views? 

The Chairman. That is the gist of the question. 

Mr. Arnold. I would like to have read the balance of the question. 

The Chairman. Read the whole thing, 

Mr. Arnold. I do not want to say much here. 

Would you read the answer back? Because, with all due respect, 
I believe — — 

Mr. Lattimore. Would you read my previous answer back. 

Tlie Chairman. Read that entire portion of the record. 

(The portions of the record referred to, as heretofore transcribed, 
were read by the reporter as follows :) 

Senator Ferguson. How woiild your views in the letter that you gave to La- 
mont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? 
You do not say in the Lamont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You 
wiinted Thomas Lamont to advocate it. 

Mr. Lattimore. ]\Iay I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft? 

Senator Ferguson. Y'^es, I wish .vou would. 

The Chairman. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would 

Senator Ferguson. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas Lamont 
1o advocate that he had advocated. 

Mr. Lattimore. Carter had asked me to provide him with some material. My 
reference to 

The Chairman. What are you reading from now? 

Mr. Lattimore. From this draft that I sent to Mr. Carter. 

The Chairman. To Mr. Carter? 

Mr. Lattimore. To Mr. Carter, yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont. 

Senator Ferguson. He had a man take it to Lamont. 

Mr. Lattimore. "To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authorita- 
tiveness of several of these Americans * * * including Owen Lattimore, 



3382 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Harrison Forman. and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites 
a review of both American and Soviet Policy in China." 

The Chairman. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the question 
read? 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the answer? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the answer. 

Senator Ferguson. I will put another question to you along the 
same line. 

You were asking Mr. Lamont to raise an issue in the letter to the 
New York Times that was not raised, you say, in the Digest article, 
and tliat issue was America's policy being changed to send annnuni- 
tion, lend-lease, and military aid of any description to the Commun- 
ist government in China. 

Now I ask you, in your raising that new issue, as to whether or not 
you were asking Mr. Lamont to raise it, not in your name, but in his 
name; that that was his opinion, that it should be done so as to influ- 
ence the President of the United States, the State Department offi- 
cials, and tlie American public? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I think that is a complete mis- 
construction. 

Senator Ferguson. Why were you advocating it, then, in the 
Lamont letter? 

Mr. LAi^riMORE. In the first place, I was not advocating a change in 
American policy; I was advocating a continuity of American policy 
of supporting united Chinese resistance as a whole to the Japanese. 

Mr. Carter had suggested that I write a letter myself to the New 
York Times. I didn't want to do it because I was disgusted with the 
wliole subject. 

The Chairman. That has been gone over now. I do not see why 
we should go over it again. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Carter 
twisted your aim and finally compelled you to write the memorandum 
to Lamont. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But let us get back about this policy. 

You say that you did not advocate the change. Then 1 ask you why 
you say there in your letter that there now appears to be a funda- 
mental change, and in the last paragraph you say : 

Witli the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's i>olicy 
toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with 
either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced. 

That indicates clearly that tliere was a change in the policy. 

Senator SMrrH. Is that the letter to tlie President, Senator? You 
did not say what letter it is. 

Senator Ferguson. The letter to the President dated June 10, 1945. 

Now, do you say there never was a change ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not say there never was a change. I 
said I did not advocate a change, that I advocated the maintenance of 
the continuity of American policy. 

Senator Ferguson. But you indicated in the letter that America had 
changed its policy, and you wanted them to go back to the old policy; 
is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I think that is not quite correctly stated. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3383 

I indicated in my letter to the President that a change was coming 
about in America policy. 

I thought that such a change, if it finally took place, would raise 
very serious questions, and I advocated an impartial review of the 
whole subject. I was not myself advocating a change. 

Senator Ferguson. What you claim now you AVere trying to do was 
to prevent a change. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I was saying that before any change was 
made there should be an impartial review of policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Did we not have a policy not to furnish aid to 
the Communists as such? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I don't believe our policy was formulated 
in those terms. 

Senator Ferguson. What was it? 

Mr. Lattimore. Our policy was formulated in terms of aid to the 
nation of China and in terms of not encouraging any form of split or 
civil war in China while the really very desperate war for survival 
against Japan was going on. 

Senator Ferguson. Now let us get to the letter or memorandum that 
you left with the President. Is this the only memorandum that you 
left with the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the only one. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not this memorandum 
was ever sent to the State Department? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I have no knowledge whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know as to whether or not Mr. Vincent, 
who was promoted to take over the far-eastern work of the State De- 
partment, ever saw your memorandum ? 

•Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it very nnich, indeed, but I have no personal 
knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to him about it ? 

Mr. Lat'itmore. I don't believe I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us examine it. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to know : Is the witness undecided 
on that? He said. "I don't believe I did." 

You would know, would you not, whether you did or did not talk 
on a matter as important as this ? 

The Chairman. We will get that answer. 

Senator Watkins. I am a little disturbed on the witness having a 
keen memory on so many things and how his answer is "I don't be- 
lieve I did.'' 

The Chairman. I am trying to get him to answer "Yes" or "No" for 
4 days, and I still get that answer. 

Mr. Watkins. I would like to know if he answers "Yes" or "No'' 
on that. 

The Chairman. I did not know. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I can't answer "Yes" on that. 

Senator Watkins. Can you answer "No"? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't answer "No" on that, either. 

This was a period of acute and active discussion all over America at 
that time on questions of foreign policy. I would certainly talk to 
anybody whom I met in those days about my duties. 

Senator Watkins. Were you meeting ]Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. Lattimore. I met him occasionally. 



3384 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. Did you talk with him about our foreign policy 
durino; that period of time? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Watkins. How can you remember that, if you cannot re- 
member the other ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Because I remember that Mr. Vincent, like all the 
State Department people I know, was an extremely correct member 
of the Foreign Service, who would talk with people outside the Gov- 
ernment only in extremely restricted terms of getting information 
from them, but not giving information to them. 

Senator Watkins. You do admit, however, during that period of 
time, or about that time, that you did have conversations with him ? 

Mr. Latitmore. Yes, I had conversations with him in that general 
period, and in those conversations I would certainly express my views, 
as I have always expressed my views — completely openly, whether 
po])ular or not. 

But what I can't guarantee, and what I think extremely unlikely, 
is that I ever talked to anybody in terms of a complete repetition of 
the memorandum that I left with the President. 

The natural course of events would be that I would talk about what- 
ever topic seemed to me to be of iiiterest, wdiich would naturally over- 
lap with the subject matter of memoranda like this. 

But I can't say that I ever discussed with anybody these matters in 
precisely the terms or the words that I presented them to the President. 

Senator Watkins. Did you have conversation with him prior to 
presenting the memorandum to the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. I certainly had conversations prior, in time, to this 
memorandum. 

Senator Watkins. Is it not, as a matter of fact, very likely that if 
you met him at all, this subject was on your mind ? You felt it was 
so important that you wanted to take it to the President, that you 
would discuss it with your friends in the State Department, a man 
that you knew? 

JVfr. Lattimore. In terms of going to see the President, no. 

Senator Watkins. Before you went to the President, would you 
not discu!-s it with them first, before you finally went to him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In terms of my interest in the subject 

The Chairman, He did not ask you about t^rms of anything. 

Mr. Lattimore. I thought he did. 

Senator Watkins. I did not ask about terms. Did you discuss it 
with them ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I talked of this whole tojiic of policy in China and 
controversy beginning to rise over policy in China with all and sundry. 

Senator Watkins. You were very nuich alarmed about it, as a 
matter of fact ; were you not? 

Mr. Latitmore. I wouldn't say, perha])s, very much alarmed. I 
don't want to quibble. I would say very much concerned. 

Senator Watkins. You thought it of enough importance to take 
it to the President ; did you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Certainly I was very much concerned. 

Senator Watkins. You "would not 'take it to the President unless 
you were somewhat alarmed at the drift that American policy was 
taking at that time : would you ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3385 

Mr. Lattimcre. I will accept your word, Senator. My own word 
ATonld have been "concerned."' 

Senator Watkins. "What I want to find out is the basis for yonr 
statement that you do not believe you discussed it with him when you 
said you were discussing it with all and sundry. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, no. That I discussed the actual memorandum 
with him. 

Senator Watkins. You could not discuss that because it had not 
been prepared beforehand. I am talking about your conversations 
immediately prior to your going to the President. 

Mv. Lattijiore. No. 

Undoubtedly, my conversations with all and sundry touched on this 
general field. 

Senator Watkins. And if you talked to Mr. Vincent you probably 
talked to him about it? 

Mr. Laitimore. And I probably mentioned what I thought about 
it, yes. 

Senator "Watkins. But you say you do not believe you did not. 
You said awhile ago you did not believe you did not. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

I want to make it quite clear, and not to get confused by the ques- 
tioning, that I am trying to distinguish between talking with State 
Department people and other people about the general topic of in- 
terest — which, of course, I would do at that time — but that I do not 
believe that I discussed with anybody a project for leaving a memo- 
randum with the President, or the words in which I should draw up 
that memorandum. 

The Chairman. State Department people do not come into the term 
"all and sundry." 

Senator "Watkins. I thought they were Americans and they would 
come in with the rest of them. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you think they come in with "sundry" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not all. but ])erhaps sundry. 

Senator Watkins. As I recall. Mr. Lattimore, you have at great 
length pointed out how close a friend Mr. Vincent was and other 
people in the State Department, particularly three of them that you 
felt so keenlv about here a few days ago, and it seems to me that if 
vou knew them that well, it would only be a natural thing that you 
would discuss with them, if they were available at all, this thing you 
had in mind, this thing you felt was really dangerous to the country 
and it would be to the best intrests of the country if you had a change 
in that policy. 

That is what I wanted to know: If you did not discuss with them, 
prior to going to the President, the very project you had in going 
there and leaving that memo with him. 

Mr. Lattimore. No : I did not discuss that very project. 

And I Avant again. Senator Watkins, if I may. to make very clear 
my admiration of the training and disci]:)line which enables State 
Department men. when talking with members of the general public, 
always to restrict their contribution to the conversation to such mat- 
ter as are generallv known in the press, so that they don't reveal the 
inside workings of the State Department while, at the same time, 
as good State Department men should, they acquire a knowledge of 

88348— 52— pt. 10 8 



3386 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

both the factual kiiowle(l<i:;e and the opinions of others. That is ex- 
actly the way the certain State Dejiartnient 

Senator Watkins. If yon did talk with them, yon did not get any 
sympathy from them, any support or encouragement; did you? 

Mr. Lattimore. I never got from them any inside dope. 

Senator "Waticins. But shortly after yon had been there, at least 
one of those men was ap]winted to a very important position: Mr. 
Vincents 

Mr. Lattimoke. AVhich 1 think, Senator, was clearly in the cards 
at the time, in terms of his special knowledge, seniority, regular 
process of people going up. 

Senator Watkins. You say it was in the cards. Did you not have 
in inind when yon went to the President 

Mr. Lai-toiore. No, sir. 

Senator Watkins. To get such a change? 

Mr. Lattimore. In my memorandum to the President. I pointed 
out 

The (^HAiRMAN. The (juestion is, Did you not have that in mind? 

Mr. Lattimore. I wanted to show what T did have in mind, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt just a moment? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. These letters and memorandum were made part 
of the record and not actually received in evidence. 

I do not know wdiether or not they have been distributed. I now 
move that they become officially part of the record. 

We have been reading from them, and I move they be distributed 
because I know it is difficult for the press to follow this. It is the 
only medium we have for the public to know what is going on. 

The Chairman. I will have to have them designated. 

Senator Ferguson. I will designate them as follows: 

They refer to his testimony, pages 33 and 34. 

The first is the letter dated June 10, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to 
the President, and was marked "Exhibit No. 473." 

The second is a copy of a letter from the White House, tlie Presi- 
dent, on June 14, 1945, to Mr. Lattimore. 

The third is a Western Union wire from Matthew A. Connelly, 
Secretary to the President, to Mr. Owen Lattimore. 

Next is a copv of a letter from Owen Lattimore to the Presi- 
dent, dated June 20, 1945. 

Next is the memorandum for the President, which was left with 
the President in two parts, but is now as one in this memorandum; 
interview of the 3d day of July 1945. 

Last is a letter dated June 20, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to 
Matthew Connelly. 

That is where I cited the OWI address. 

The Chairman. Do you ask that they be inserted in the record? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, made part of the record. 

The Chairman. Very well; they will be inserted in the record. 

Mr. SouRw^NE. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that these were offered 
for the record several days ago, subject to the Chair's determination. 

The (Chairman. That is correct. At that time they had not been 
referred to in the record. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3387 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 530-A, 
530-B, 530-C, 530-D, 530-E," and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 530-A 

The White House, 
Washiiif/ton, June I4, 1945. 

Mr. Owen Lattimore, 

The Johns Hopkhis Unircr.sity, 

Baltimore, MJ. 
My Dear Mr. Lattimore: I appreciate very imich yours of .Imie tenth. 
The Chinese situation is developing- alrinht. The polic-y has been definitely 
outlined to the Chinese. The Russians and the British and ourselves have 
reached an agreeinent which I think is in the best interest of China. 

I would be glad to discuss it with you sometime, if you feel inclined. 
Sincerely yours, 

[s] Harry Truman. 

Exhip.it No. r.3(1-P. 

[ Telegram ] 

WA21(il7— GOVT— Washington. D. C, 29 52 9P. 
Dr. Owen Lattimore, 

The Johns Hopkins Universiti/, Ball i more, Md.: 
The President will be glad to see you 11 : 30 a. m., Tuesday, July 3. Please 
confirm. Regards. 

Matthew A. Connexly. 
Secretary to the President. 



Exhibit No. .".30-C 

June 20, 1945. 
Hon. PIarry S. Truman, 

President of the United States, 

The White Hou^e, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. President: I most sincerely appreciate your letter of June 14, and 
the opp<n-tunity you offer me for a discussion of policy in China. 

If the views which I earnestly wish to place before you for your consideration 
.should be of any value to you, they would be of more value before your forth- 
coming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. 

In the hope of causing the mininuim inconvenience in taking up some of your 
heavily burdened time, I am writing to your secretary, Mr. Connelly, asking 
if it will be po.ssible to arrange an appointment soon after your return from 
San Francisco. 



Yours very sincerely, 
OL : ec. 



[s] Owen LATTiitoBE. 



Exhibit Xo. 530-D 



Intei'view of July 3, 1945. 
;Memorani)u.\i for the President 

Japan Policy as Related to China Policy 

Japan, politically, now banks everyting on the hope of peace terms that will 
make possible a come-back and another war. The only possible come-back is as 
leader of an Asiatic coalition under the racial battle cry of '"down with the white 
man." Therefore, unlike Germany, where the principal Nazi underground will 
be in Germany, the Japanese underground nuist be largely in other parts of 
Asia. China is the key to this problem. 

Like Germany, Japan must also do its best to pit the Western Allies against 
Russia. China is also the key to this jiroblem. 



3388 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Therefore, in China the Japanese problem is not Whether they are going to 
be defeated, but How to manage the process of beinK defeated to their own future 
advantage. The Japanese have already begun to handle this problem by seeing 
to it that their defeat contributes to both the political and the territorial disunity 
of China. Where they can manage to retreat in favor of Chiang Kai-shek and 
not in favor of Communist guerrillas, they do so. Where there are no Commu- 
nists, they try to retreat in favor of provincial, regional, or war-lord troops, 
instead of Chiang Kai-shek troops, so as to contribute to territorial disunity. 
They hope that, if China can be led into both ideological civil wars of landlords 
against peasants and regional civil wars of provinces against the Central Gov- 
ernment, Japan will not be eclipsed during its years of postwar weakness. 

To counteract this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work 
steadily for peace, unity, and modern political foi-ms. 

At the same time Japan hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and 
America to be "soft" with "antirevolutionary" Japanese big business and to wink 
at the fact that big business in Japan is as militarist as the militarists. 

To handle American policy in the new phase, it is necessary to make adjust- 
ments to the fact that China, rather than Japan, is now the key to Far Eastern 
policy as a whole. In most government agencies at the present time the tendency 
is to find Japan-trained men in higher policy-making posts than China-trained 
men, simply because Japan used to be a more important Great Power than China. 

CHINA POLICY 

There are two alternatives in China : 

1. Division of the country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists : This 
would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for 
which he would give anything America wants ; and, for the Communists, a 
similar policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual 
consequences would almost inevitably be war between America and Russia. 

2. A unified China : To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang 
and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, 
and Britain to build up China as a whole. The Comnuuiists would have to accept 
minority standing as a long-term status ; but Chiang would have to give them 
real power within a coalition government, propoi'tionate to their real strength, 
not just token representation. 

In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having dic- 
tatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American 
policy ; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political 
change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang. 

Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have imlimited 
power in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks 
that America is on the fence, but will be stampeded into jumping down on his 
side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against 'the 
Bolshevik menace." Influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a 
long-term conservative trend, with Republican ascendance, and that Henry Luce, 
Walter Judd, etc., have guessed the trend correctly. 

The basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2. It can be success- 
fully worked. Chiang is tenacious but has shown in the past that he knows 
when to give in and try a new policy. But he will only play ball if America and 
Russia, with Bi'itish approval, make it plain that they are going to be joint 
umpires. America alone cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement 
with the Communists involving real concessions ; but, if Washington and Moscow 
agree, both Chungking and Yenan will carry out the agreement. 



Exhibit No. 530-E 

June 20, 1945. 
Mr. Matthew Connelly, 

Secretary to the President, 

The White House, Washinrjton, D. C. 
Dear Mk. Connelly : On June 14 the President wrote to me that he would be 
glad to discuss with me some questions of policy in China which I had ventured 
to raise in a letter to him on June 10. 

Since I am most anxious that the views which I represent should be laid before 
the President for his consideration before his forthcoming meeting with Prime 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3389 

Minister Churcliill and Marshal Stalin, I hope very much that you will find it 
possible to arrange an appointment for me as soon as possible after the President's 
return from San Francisco. I can l)e reached through the following points : 
Home address (postal) Ruxton, Md. 
Telephone (home) Towson 846. 

Telephone (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore) University 0100, Ext. 72. 
Telephone (OWI, Wasliingtou) Republic 7500, Ext. 72228. 
Yours very sincerely, 

[s] Owen Lattimore. 
OL : ec. 

Senator Ferguson. I had many more questions, Mr. Chairman, but 
1 tliink perhaps Senator Watkins Avoukl want to continue. 

Senator WATiiiNs. I will let it go now. 

Senator Fergusox. I would like to recess. I have no questions on 
the document itself. 

The Chairman. What is the pleasure of the committee about re- 
convening ( 

Senator Ferguson. Any time the Chair desires, I will come back. 

I would also like to put in the record, for your information, Mr. 
Lattimore, the fact on the Clubb case that, as I understand, Mr. Ache- 
son, at a press conference, now said that he did reverse the board in 
the Clubb case and reinstated Mr. Clubb ; that his finding was opposite 
to the board. 

That is for your information. I asked you about it, and you seemed 
to know nothing about it the other day. 

I will put that press release in. 

The Chairman. We will recess now until 1 : 30. 

(Thereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
1 : ?>0 p. m., same day.) 

after recess 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman, the witness had a quotation from 
General Chennault's book which you said we would read later. 

The Chairman. I do not know Avhether it is a quotation or not. 
There is an excerpt here which was handed to me ; and, without the 
opportunity to present it to the committee, I withheld action on it. 
It presents certain phases that I should think would be for the con- 
sideration of the committee. 

Mr. Arnold. It is very short, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. It is short. 

Mr. Arnold. And you can strike it if you think so. Could it be 
read subject to being stricken? 

The Chairman. No. I will submit it to the committee just as soon 
as I get the opportunity. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I proceed? 

The Chairman. This presents a phase of quoting an excerpt, pre- 
sumably quoting an excerpt, from a publication by a party who is 
not present, not subject to cross-examination or to inquiry. But 
those phases will be presented to the committee. 

Mr. Arnold. I would appreciate it because many such quotations 
are in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. May I proceed ? 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 



3390 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Fek(;usox. Mr. Lattiiiiore, if von will place before your- 
self the letter to Times by Mr. Laniont. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Designed for Mr. Lamont. 

Senator Fergusox. Designed; yes; written by you to be placed in 
the Times, if possible, by ]\Ir. I^amont. The second paragraph is 
what I am interested in. 1 want to go back to this change. 

You seem to know in these letters much al)out the policy, but I 
do not find it in the ansAver that you are making here. Let us take 
one of these quotes : 

On the other hand, there is causp for uneasiness in a new trend, which is 
now developin.i; toward criticism of Hoviet motives and Soviet iiolicies in Asia. 
We shaU be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President 
Trnnian's first Bii;- Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. 

What was that trend, and who was responsible for the new trend 
that you are talking about? 

ISIr. Lattimore. May I say that I have not loo^ced up the newspaper 
record of the period. I assume that it was part of the trend toward 
feeling that Russia was not a country we could cooperate with, wdiile 
there was also at the same time, the general period of the San Fran- 
cisco conference, a very strong feeling among many people that post- 
war cooperation would be possible. 

I thouglit that as much public discussion of that as possible w^ould 
contribute to a well-informed i)ublic opinion. 

Senator Fer<;uson. And it was ]iublic opinion you were trying to 
sway? V/hat you call a well-informed public, but it w-as public 
opinion that you wanted to sway ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I wanted to contribute to public opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not want to sway it any way ? 

Mr, Lattimore. I wanted to advocate my own opinions and to have 
them honestly discussed like anybody else's opinions, and I resented 
the manner in Avhicli my opinions had been misrepresented in the 
article in the Reader's Digest. 

Senator Fercjuson. You claim to be an authority on China aiul the 
Far East, did you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. 1 claim to be a person who has studied China and 
the Far East for many years. I do not and have never claimed to be 
an exclusive authority. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you wdiether it was an exclusive 
authority. That would be another question. But were you an 
authority? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think that would be a (juestion for somebody 
else's judgment, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Your counsel suggests that you are too modest. 
I could only suggest, maybe, that you are not truthful enough on it, 
and I want to read something for that. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, may I say that I resent it? 

Senator Ferguson. You may resent it, but let me ask you to read 
now. where you have not been modest, when you printed it under 
another man's name. Read the last paragraph. 

Mr. Lattimore. On this J^age? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influen- 
tial magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3391 

in China." by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that 
there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President 
Chiang Kai-shek to tlie Chinese Communists, and "'bring under totalitarian regi- 
mentation 4.")0,000,()00 people." To bolster this case, the article casts doubts on 
the authoritativeness of several of tliose Americans who have, in fact, contrib- 
uted most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary 
China and contemporary Russia — including Owen Lattimoi'e, Harrison Forman, 
and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both 
American and Soviet policy in China. In making sucli a review, we should exam- 
ine American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make our criticisms 
where they are due. 

Senator FERGuyox. You were perfectly willing- to have Mr. Thomas 
Lamont call you an authority. 

Mr. Lattimore. This was something that I had submitted to INIr. 
Carter at his request to be submitted to Mr. Lamont. 

Senator Fergusox. I have heard that a dozen times. 

The CnAiRMAX. Answer the question. 

Senator Fergusox. We will move along quickly here if you will 
keep to the answer. 

You were perfectly willing to have Mr. Thomas Lamont tell the 
public that you were an authority. 

Mr. Lattimore. If he approved of the wording, he could do so. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not request him to approve through 
your agent, Mr. Carter ? 

]Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I made no such request. I submitted a 
rough draft of a memorandum. 

Senator Fergusox. Why did you put your name in there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Because my reference was to Eeader's Digest and 
the article in the Reader's Digest, and my name was a part of it. 

Senator Fergusox. And you did not hesitate to say that you were 
an authority as well as Mr. Forman and Mr. Fdgar Snow ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't hesitate. 

Senator Fergusox^ Going to this sentence : 

We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in Cliina in 
order to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan. 

What was the change there that you were talking about ? 

Mr. Lattimore. May I ask where that quotation is from ? 

Senator Fergusox. The next paragraph after the one you com- 
pleted reading, on page 2. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Fergusox. I suppose the word "Under'' is "Before," "Be- 
fore Pearl Harbor," or is that "after" ? 

Yes; because the next sentence says "Since," so that word appar- 
ently, instead of "Lender Pearl Harbor" 

INlr. Lattimore. It probably is "L'ntil Pearl Harbor." 

Senator Fergusox^ It is in that paragraph. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. [Reading:] 

Since Pearl Harbor, our policy has been to give China the maximum aid per- 
mitted by difficulties of transport and the demands of other theaters of war. 
We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China in order 
to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan. 

Senator Fergusox. What was the chano-e? 

Mr. Lattimore. The change, as I recall it, in the discussion of 
the period — I repeat, I have not looked up the newspaper record of 
the time — was that it was being advocated that we should restrict 



3392 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

aid entirely to Chiang Kai-shek's own armies while other people be- 
lieved that as we approached the coast of China, as we w^ere nearing 
Japan, made direct contact with the Chinese armies on the mainland, 
we should also be entitled to cooperate with the Communists and 
Communist-led guerrillas. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, these letters and this memoran- 
dum were written prior to the end of the war between the United 
States and Japan? 

Mr. Lattimore. They were written as the end of the war was 
rapidly approaching, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that it was rapidly approach- 
ing? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; it was the general opinion at the time because, 
through General MacArthur's island-hopping campaign, in combina- 
tion with the United States Navy, we were getting wnthin reach of 
both the home islands of Japan and the mainland of China. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew, then, that the war was about over? 

Mr. Laitimore, I didn't know. My feeling was that the war was 
approaching an end. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that during the war there were 
battles between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. There were some clashes, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How many divisions or armies did Chiang Kai- 
shek have to put on his border up at the Communist border to pre- 
serve the integrity of his rule ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the figure. Senator, but I do recall 
that in the opinion of some of the American diplomatic and military 
representatives in China, some of those troops were being unneces- 
sarily immobilized. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. My question was 
how many did he use on the border? 

Mr. Laitimore. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he use any ? 

Mr. Lattimore. There were troops at the corner of northwest China 
where Chiang Kai-shek's free China and the Communist-held part of 
China joined. 

Senator Ferguson. But it is your contention now that they were not 
there to keep the Conmiunists from moving into the Nationalist terri- 
tory ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; it is my contention that many of the Americans 
in the field at the time considered that the blockade of the Com- 
munists was unnecessarily large and severe, immobilized an uneces- 
sarily large number of Chiang's troops. 

Senator Fergi son. But they did inunobilize some of his troops? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And at the very time that at least Chiang Kai- 
shek felt that it was necessary to preserve his own army to keep the 
Communists back, you were advocating arms and supplies and muni- 
tions to the Communists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; you are talking about two different situa- 
tions. 

Senator Ferguson. Please do not tell me what I am talking about. 
1 am just asking you the question. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3393 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, in my opinion, then, Senator, there were two 
different situations. One was during the period when the United 
States had no access and no hope of immediate access to the coast of 
China. 

The second was the period when we were rapidly approaching the 
coast of China and when many people thought, as was discussed in 
the press at the time, I remember, that the Japanese would withdraw 
from the home islands of Japan and make a last stand in Manchuria, 
in Avhicli case the question of combined American-Chinese operations 
on the mainland against Manchuria would have been very important. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now let us go back to the question 
I Avas asking. 

In June of 1945 was it not true that Chiang Kai-shek had im- 
mobilized some of his troops against Japan and in order that he may 
protect his army from the Chinese Communist Army? 

Mr. Lattimore. It is true, Senator, that he had immobilized part 
of his army. It is also true that in the opinion of many American 
observers there at the time it was unnecessary. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, we are not going to get through 
today unless we can get the answers to these questions. I can stay 
over here as long as you can stay over there. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman, he is answering. 

The Chairman. Jnst a minute, counsel. I told the counsel when 
he first commenced this hearing as to what their limitations were. 
When he wants advice, he can ask you for advice. You will not par- 
ticipate in the proceedings. 

Mr. Arnold. I am sorry. Senator. He permitted me to read the 
answer to the question before, and I thought I could be helpful in the 
proceedings by merely striking out the last part of that answer. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I think ought to be stricken out, 
and if he will just stick to the answers he and I will get along. 

The Chairman. You just tell the witness to answer the question, 
and you will give him some pretty good advice. 

Mr. Arnold. I think he is trying, Senator. 

Mv. Lattimore. I think the trouble here. Senator Ferguson, is 
merely that 

Senator Ferguson. Are you answering my question? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Lattimore. I cannot accept your statement of the question as 
if it were my opinion on the question. 

Senator Ferguson. It was a fact, therefore you would have to know. 
Did you or did you not know whether or not Chiang Kai-shek was 
demobilizing or, as you called it that, part of his troops between his 
part of China and the Communist part of China, to protect his part 
of China from the Communists ? 

Mv. Lattimore. I knew that he was immobilizing part of his troops 
in that area, and I also knew that many Americans in China con- 
sidered that he was immobilizing in excessive number. 

The Chairman. That is no part of the answer. That is another 
part. 

Senator Ferguson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was in June 
1945? 



3394 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. La'fiimoke. Generally speaking in that period ; yes, 

Senator Febguson. Yes. And that was the very time that you were 
advocating Mr. Lamont, over his signature, to advocate that we 
furnish to the Communists in China munitions and arms. You can 
answer that question "Yes"" or "No."' 

Mv. Lattimore. I don't think that question is susceptible to a "Yes" 
(u- "No"' answer. Senator. 

llie Chairman. Do you want to answer it "Yes" or "No,"" or not 
answer it ? Just say whether you do or do not. 

jNIr. Lati^imore. No; I don't want to answer it "Yes" or "No." 

Senator Ferguson. Then I will take it for granted that the two 
documents speak for themselves, the answer before and the documents. 

Mr. Lat'I'imore. I should like to explain. Senator, that I am referring 
to a new situation, not an old one. 

The Chairman. If you say you cannot answer the question, there is 
no explanation, if you cannot answer it "Yes"' or "No."' If you cannot 
answer it, you cannot answer it. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I not explain why I can't answer it. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. No; I did not ask you that question, to explain 
why. 

Mr. Lattimore, we will go to the document that you wrote for the 
President. I will just take the China part. The Japanese part, I 
think, speaks for itself, at the present time [reading] : 

Division of tlie country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. This 
would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for 
which he would give anything America wants : and for the Communists, a similar 
policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual consequence 
would almost inevitably be war between American and Russia. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is prefaced. Senator, by the statement, "There 
are two alternatives in China." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That was one of them. Is that true? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was one of them; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat made you think that if America gave 
Chiang Kai-shek support, Russia would give the Communists support? 

Mr. LAT-riMORE. I was not certain of it. I thought that this was a 
]n'obability or one of the alternatives, and I so stated it. Obviously, 
I had no positive knowledge. I was stating a theory or opinion. 

The Chairman. This is the memorandum to the Presiclent ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; the memorandum. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. This was advice to the President? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that this is what would ha]:)pen. 

Mr. Sourwine. Might I ask a question, Mr. Cliairman? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Sourwine. At that point, Mr. Lattimore, as a matter of fact, 
did you not then know^ that the Russians were supporting the Chinese 
Communists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, I did not know that they were sup- 
porting them in any sense of giving them arms, and I don't believe that 
at that time they were giving them arms. 

We have been over that previously. I certainly considered that the 
Communists had the moral and political support of the Russians. 

The Chairman. Did you know that Russia was supporting them? 
That is the question. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3395 

Mr. Lattimore. I know that Russia was supporting them in that 
sense, but not in the sense of arniino; them. 

Senator Fkrguson. Going back to your Lamont letter, I read you 
this: 

At the present moment, there is a danger that the parallel policy may not 
continue. 

You are talking about the previous paragraph, where it says: 

Riissian and American policy in China can he made parallel, and we know 
from exiierieiice, not hy .uuesswork, that the Russians are <-upahle of contrihutini; 
at the very least an etjual share in makinii" the policies of the two countries 
liarallel. 

AAliere did you get that information;! That was from experience 
and not from guesswork. 

Mr. Lattimore. From exj)erience and from my work with Chiang. 
Kai-shek 1 knew that Russia and America had followed a parallel 
])olicy in China of encouraging united resistance to the Japanese, 

Senator Ferguson. When did you cease being adviser to Chiang 
Kai-shek? 

Mr. Lattimore. In 1942 ; at the end of 1942. 

Senator Ferguson. Going to the next paragraph : 

At the present moment there is dancer that the parallel policy may not con- 
tinue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen 
from American policy. 

What change did we make ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was referring again there, Senator, to the changes 
t hat I thought I saw coming about from statements in the press at the 
time. 

Senator Ferguson. The next sentence : 

Whereas Russia's policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of China Com- 
numists in tlie benefit of Russian aid to China. American policy has recently 
explicitly excluded them from the benefit of American aid. 

Where did you get that information? 

Mr. Lattimore. From the press, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe so. Reference to the press of the time 
would show. 

Senator Ferguson. So up to that time Conmiunist Russia was not 
asking that Communist China be included in its aid? 

Mr. La'itimore. I believe that is true. That is supported by that 
quotation from General Chennault written after the end of the war, 
which I wished to read into the record. 

Senator Ferguson. I know you want to get that in, but we will get 
that in later. 

In your statement to the President you said, "For the Communists 
a similar policy of getting Russia's support with similar re- 
sults * * *."" 

Wliy did 3'ou say that their policy would not continue to give aid 
to Cliiang Kai-shek? Was it for the reason that they were, at that 
time, able to have the Yalta agreement where we were to give them 
certain benefits out of China, and was it that they were about to 
make a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing Chiang Kai-shek 
us the real i:-overnment of China ? 



3396 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Was that their reason for not stipulating or not saying that they 
wanted to aid the Communists in China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no means of knowing what their policy was 
at that time, Senator, 

My paragraph clearly refers to anticipation of a future situation. 

Senator Ferguson. Your paragraph does not, if I might go back to 
it. "Whereas Russia's policy has never" — you are telling Mr. Lamont 
that the Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of Com- 
munists, Chinese Communists, in the benefit of Russian aid to China. 

America's policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefit of 
American aid. 

Mr. Latomore. On which page is that ? 

Senator Ferguson. On page 3. 

Mr. Lattimore. I undoubtedly believed that was true at the time, 
and I believe it is true, too. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you knew it? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I say that Russian policy has never yet de- 
manded the inclusion of the Chinese Communists, et cetera. That is 
obviously stated to the best of my knowledge at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. You were going to ask Mr. Lamont to put it in a 
statement over his signature ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I was not going to ask Mr. Lamont to put 
it in a statement over his signature. 

Senator Ferguson. You were just going to ask Mr. Carter, who w^ent 
to Mr. Lamont's son in order that they may get it put over his signa- 
ture, is that the way you want to leave it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I was supplying some material which could 
be considered, used, or rejected by Mr. Lamont, according to his 
judgment. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what Mr. Lamont's son's thinking 
was? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard about it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I had heard about him vaguely. 

Senator Ferguson. Just vaguely? 

Mr. Lattimore, Just vaguely. 

. Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to Mr, Carter after you received his 
letter mentioning the son? 

Mr, Lattimore. I don't believe I did. There w^as just this cor- 
respondence, and then I believe Mr. Carter sent me a copy of Mr. 
Lamont's letter to him, and there the matter dropped. 

In other words, Mr. Lamont had exercised, according to his own 
judgment, exactly the option that was implied in my submitting any 
material at all. 

Senator Ferguson, Why did you not go to see Mr. Lamont? 

Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know Mr. Lamont. The idea was not 
mine. The whole idea came from Mr. Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you state to Mr. Carter to tell Mr. Lamont 
that you, as an authority, were writing this article foi- the New York 
Times, and to tell Mr. Lamont who was writing it ? 

]\rr. Lattimore. No, sir, Mr. Carter asked me for a draft, and I 
gave him a draft. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he represented it as 
your thinking or as Carter's thinking? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3397 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know wliether or not Laniont knew 
that you prepared the draft ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us take the next statement in your China 
policy. 

A unified China : To unify Cliina, there must be a settlement between Chiang' 
and the Connuunists and simultaneously an agreement between) America, 
Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole. 

At that very time that you were wa'iting to the President, you 
said that up to that time Russia showed no desire or requirement, 
let me put it that way, that there was to be a unification between the 
Communists and the non-Comnninists in China. Is that not true? 
That, is, to at least require her aid to be gjiven only to the one? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Fer(;uson. You said Russia's policy has never yet de- 
manded 

Mr. Lattimore. Has never yet demanded, that was true to the 
best of my knowledge. 

The Chairman. That is the Lamont article? 

Senator Ferguson. That is the Lamont article. 

At the same time, you were telling the President this : 

To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Com- 
munists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain 
to build up China as a whole. The Commimists will have to accept minority 
standing as a long-term status ; but Chiang would have to give them real power 
within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token 
representation. 

You wrote that ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. I wrote both of those, one referring to the past, 
and one referring to a problem that I anticipated in the future. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were then advocating to the President 
a coalition government ? 

Mr. Laitimore. No, sir, I was stating to the President, as I believe, 
an alternative. Let me see, I supported the second alternative. 

Senator Ferguson. So you were telling the President that the 
Communists would have to accept a minority standing as a long- 
term status, but Chiang would have to give them real power within 
a coalition government ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And proportionate to their real strength, not 
just token representation. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. That was my assessment of the 
situation that I thought was coming up. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not exactly what General Marshall went 
to China to do ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe that is roughly what w^as indicated in the 
directive to General Marshall, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not what Mr. Carter gave as one of the 
ways of solving the problem when he got the first memorandum out 
on the Marshall mission ? It is, Vincent that I mean. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember that memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. You have seen the Vincent testimony? 



3398 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Laitimoke. I liave read througli it, yes. There was a great 
deal of it, and I don't remember every bit of it in detail. 

Senator Ferguson. Do yon remember the memorandum of Decem- 
ber 9, 1945? 

Mr. LAT'nMORE. No; I don't. I would like to see it to refresh my 
memory. 

The Chaikman, That is by Vincent? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Vincent. 

The Chairman. And Vincent was then in what position ( 

Senator Ferguson. He had been promoted to what position, Mr. 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you exactly, at that time, whether 
he was head of the China desk or of the whole Far Eastern Division. 
1 believe it was one or the other. 

The Chairman. He was head of the Far East, was he not? 

Mr. Lattimore. 1 am not sure, sir, when he was promoted from 
head of the China desk to head of the Far Eastern Division. 

Mr. Morris. He was head of the Far Eastern Division on Decem- 
ber 7, 1945. 

Mr. Lattimore. He was? 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read the memorandum? 

Mr. Lattimore. This seems to be signed "J. F. B." 

Senator Ferguson. On the other side it is "Fe : Vincent." Wlio is 
J. F. B.? 

Mr. Morris. That is James F. Byrnes. 

Senator Ferguson. But it was written by Vincent. 

Mr. Lattimore. Is tliat what the notation indicates? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, that is what it indicates. Will you read it? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading from exhibit No. 389 of hearings before 
this committee) : 

The President and the Secretary <if State aie hoth anxious that the uniticatiou 
of China l)y peaceful, democratic uietliods lie achieved as soon as possible. 

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Coniniittee of the Senate 
on December 7. the Secretary of State said : 

"During the war the immediate goal of the Tinted States in ("hina was to 
promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring 
their combined power to liear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range 
goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development 
of a strong, united, and democratic China. 

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Govern- 
ment of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement 
of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as 
we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that tlie government of 
(Jeneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory liase for a de- 
veloping democracy. But we also lielieve tiiat it must be liroadened to include 
the rei)resentatives of tliose large and well-organized groups who are now with- 
out any voice in the Government of China. 

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience, 
and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solutitm depends primarily 
upon the good will of the ('liinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our 
intiuence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that 
influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage con- 
cessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the 
other factions." 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not just what you were saying in your 
second letter, that the Communists would have to accept a minority 
standing as a long-term status, but Chiang would have to give them 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3399 

real power within a coalition g:overnment proportionate to their real 
strength, not just token representation ? 

The Chairman. That is the memorandum to the President ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Lattimore. That indicates close, similar thinking. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read the next paragraph ( 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his special rei>- 
reseiitative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practieable 
manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set 
forth above. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the end of the coalition government ? 
Mr. Lattimore. Presumably. [Reading:] 

Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Gov- 
ernment to call a national conference of representatives of the major political 
elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a 
cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that not indicate that your second al- 
ternative, a unified China, was exactly what the State Department 
and the President were doing? 

Mr. Lattimore. It indicates that my thinking was similar to that 
which led the State Department or the State Department and the 
Armed Forces in combination to that decision. I see no cause and 
etl'ect relationship. 

The Chairman. This memorandum had been placed liefore the 
President before General Marshall was sent abroad ( 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, by almost 6 months. 

How can you then say, with this in mind, Mr. Vincent writing it, 
that youhad not the slightest effect, or your memorandum did not have 
the slightest effect ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am convinced. Senator, that it did not have the 
slightest effect. 1 saw the President for about 3 minutes. 1 got a 
Presidential brush-off in a nice, polite way, and I went out. 

I should say it is much more likely that the State Department formed 
its o])inions from the material gathered in the field in China, where I 
had not been recently, from its own representatives, and from military 
representatives. 

Senator Ferguson. Is this the first time that you told us you had a 
brush-off' from the President ? 

Mr. Lattoiore. I had said that I had seen the President for about 
3 minutes. 

Senator Ferguson. You left a memorandum with your arguments 
in it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think that is included in the classification of a 
polite brush-off. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you get for the witness a copy of the white 
paper ? 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. Lattimore. :May I at this moment. Senator, read into the record 
the President's letter to me ? 

Senator Ferguson. You mean the first letter where he stated the 
policy was already formed ? 

JSIr. Lattimore. That is right. 



3400 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; you can read that. 

The Chairman. It is in the record already. 

Mr. Lattimore. "Well, may I refer to the fact that tlie President had 
already told me that atfairs in China were well in hand? 

The Chairman. In the meantime, Mr. Vincent had been promoted ? 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew was put out, Mr. Ballantine was put 
out, and Mr. Dooman was put out. 

Mr. Lattimore. In the meantime of what, may I ask? 

The Chairman. In the meantime between the time you left the 
memorandum with the President and the time Marshall was sent to 
Asia. Is that right ? 

INIr. Lattimore. Also in the meantime the President was telling me 
that affairs concerning China were well in hand. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you in all earnestness, utmost earnestness, 
told him to have the Amei'ican policy in China impartially reviewed 
by advisers "who are not associated with either formulation or imple- 
mentation of the policy as recently practiced.'' 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, Senator, that indicates that I thought that an 
impartial review would be more authoritative and have results than 
any personal opinions of mine. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us look at page 10 of the letter of transmittal 
by Mr. Acheson. 

By the way, what was Mr. Acheson's position with the State De- 
partment when you went to see the President ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't tell you, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was in the State Department, was he not? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is my general recollection. I can't tell you 
exactly. 

Senator Ferguson. He held a high position ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I suppose so. 

Senator Ferguson. Well now, there was a letter of transmittal of 
the wliite paper, and if you will turn to page 10 of that, which is signed 
l)y Dean Acheson, you may start and read what he says on the letter 
of transmittal of the white paper to the public. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

When peace came, the United States was confronted with tliree possihle al- 
ternatives in China : 

1. It could have pulled out lock, stock, and barrel. 

2. It could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists 
to destroy the Communists. 

8. It could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as 
much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a 
compromise between the two sides. 

Senator Ferguson. Riglit there, is that not exactly what you told 
the President ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That indicates similai* thinking but no cause and 
effect. 

Senator Ferguson. No cause and effect. Woidd you think, then, 
that the only way Ave could get a cause and effect would be for the 
President to say, or have Dean Acheson say in here, "This was the 
policy proposed by Owen Lattimore, the authority on the far eastern 
affairs"? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3401 

Senator Ferguson. How would you get it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think one of the gaps in our knowledge here is 
whether the President ever transmitted my memoranda to the Depart- 
ment of State, or whether they were ever considered or accepted. I 
have never heard they were. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the President 
would submit your memorandum if he had any intentions of following 
it to the men who were responsibile for that policy in the State De- 
partment, with the expression in the letter that you wanted them all 
taken out of the authority ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I don't know how matters were handled, 
matters of policy were handled, at that time between the White House 
and the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read on, Mr. Lattimore, from Dean 
Acheson's letter, the Secretary of State. It is on page 10, continuing. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

The first alternative would, and I believe American pnblic opinion at the 
time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international respon- 
sibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had 
made a determined effort to be of assistance. 

Senator Ferguson. That is after the war and, naturally, that would 
not be included in your suggestion to the President because you were 
talking as to when the war was on. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Continue reading. 

Mr. Lattimore. I was talking while the war was on, but looking 
forward to postwar situations. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Latitmore (reading) : 

The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and 
in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to 
destroy the Communists during the 10 years before the war. Now, after the war, 
the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopu- 
lar. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the 
areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military 
officials. The Communists, on the other hand, were much stronger than they 
had ever been, and were in control of most of North China. 

Senator Ferguson. There, if thev had followed in June of 1945 your 
suggestion of giving arms to the Communists, they would have been 
even stronger than they were as Acheson found them, is that not true ? 

The Chairman. That is, the Communists would have been ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; not necessarily true, Senator. I was looking 
forward to a final phase of the war when, like many other people, I 
expected that there might be considerable fighting on the mainland 
of China for the recovery of Manchuria in case the Japanese made 
a last stand there, and I think it is highly hypothetical what might 
have come out of that one way or another. It is something that never 
happened and therefore one could not tell what the results would have 
been. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say now that they would not have 
been stronger if they had received the arms that you suggested ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I say I have no way of knowing. 

Senator Ferguson. I think the committee can draw that conclusion. 
Go on and read the next part. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 9 



3402 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces, which was later to be 
tragically demonstrated, the Comnuinists probably could have been dislodged 
only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have 
sanctioned such a colossal ccmimitment of our armies in 194:i or later. We 
therefore came to the third alternative policy, wliereunder we faced the facts 
of the situation and attempted to as.sist in working out a modus vivendi which 
would avert civil war but, nevertheless, preserve and even increase tlie in- 
fluence of the Nationalist Government. 

Senator Ferguson. That is really what yon were advocating in the 
nnified China. 

Mr. Lati'imore. That indicates a similar line of thought, but not 
cause and effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain what you mean by cause and 
effect ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It does not indicate that the policies adopted 
were based on any recommendation of mine, and I submit that it was 
an obvious probability that the State Department based its policy 
on its own information and military information from the field in 
China. 

Senator FeR(;uson. Mr. Lattimore, why are you disclaiming so 
vehemently that you had any influence on the State Department when 
their policy did follow the line that you suggested ? Is there a rea- 
son ? 

Mr. Lattimore. There is a reason. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. What is it? 

Mr. Lattimore. The reason is that there was a general category of 
thinking along this line at the time, that I participated in it, and 
that I think it would be an absurd exaggeration for me to claim that 
I molded policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it is only because you would feel it would 
be an exaggeration ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Exaggeration is a relative word. I put before it 
absurd, an absurd — if you prefer, I will say an absurd invention. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. But you had in the Lamont memorandum 
said that you were one of tlie authorities on the Far East. You sought 
the President's audience. You took the memorandum and left it 
there. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not intend to influence him as an au- 
thority? 

Mr. Latitmore. I hoped to influence the President primarily toward 
an impartial review of problems of policy as they then stood. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know any way that you could have 
put this proposition up to the President in any stronger language 
or way than you did? 

Mr. LA-miMORE. I stated my oj^inions to the President as clearly 
as I could, based on the best knowledge available to me at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read now the rest of your letter. I 
want to ask you some questions about it, about your argument in 
your memorandum to the President. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having 
dictatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American 
policy ; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political 
change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 3403 

Shall I go on '? 

Senator Fkrguson. That was part of your argument telling him 
tliat the unified China was what you were asking him for? 

Mr. Lati'imore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And that we would have to insist upon pretty 
drastic political changes, including the limitation of the personal 
power of Chiang. That meant a coalition government, did it not, 
taking the Communists in? 

Mr. Lattim(^re. That meant a coalition government, yes. That 
ineant recognition of the fact that, in my opinion, the Communist- 
controlled |)art of China could not be conquered by the force available 
to Chiang. 

Senator Ferguson. Up until that time, had you ever known a gov- 
ernment that had survived when it took in the Communists and made 
a coalition government ? 

]\Ir. Laitimore. I don't recall that there was a previous example, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that communism was such at 
that time that it was impossible to have such a coalition government 
and have it successful, without it becoming a Communist government? 

Mr. Lai^more. No; I did not think so. If I thought so, I would 
have made different proposals. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you read the next paragraph? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have unlimited 
j)ower in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks 
that America is on the fence, hut will he stami>ede(l into jumping down on his 
side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against the "Bol- 
.shevik menace." Intluential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long- 
term conservative trend, with Republican ascendance, and that Henry Luce 
Walter .Judd, et cetera, have guessed the trend correctly. 

Senator Ferguson. There you were warning the President that 
Chiang, if he got aid from America alone, and there was not aid going 
to tlie Communists, and there was not a coalition government, that he, 
in a civil war, would be against the Communists, the Bolshevik menace, 
jind you [nit that in quotations, is that correct? 

Mr. L.\nTiM()RE. That is correct. I mean, that is correct as far as 
it being in quotations. It is not correct so far as your interpretation 
of wliat I was saying. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you put it in quotations? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know why I put it in quotations at that 
time. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You must have believed that it was not quite ac- 
curate, the Bolshevik menace, or you would not have put it in quotes. 

Mr. Latfimore. No; my general opinion at the time was that com- 
munism in China could be contained, so to speak, and that the Gen- 
eralissimo could maintain the ascendancy. 

Senator Ferguson. Even in a coalition government? 

Mr. Lattimore. Even in a coalition government, or, in fact, the 
oidy way he could would be through a coalition government. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you think to be the diiference between 
the Republican policy on that and the President's policy, when you 
say "influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long- 
term conservative trend" ( AAHiat do you mean there by ''conservative 
trend"? 



3404 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know exactly what I meant by conservative 
trend in 1945, but it is clearly here in connection with Republican 
ascendance and the mention of what I identified at that time as the 
opinions on China policy of Mr. Luce and Congressman Judd. 

The Chairman. He was predicting the election of Stassen, perhaps, 

Mr. Lattimore. I was saying that that was the way that Chiang's 
advisers were talking to him. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you learn that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I knew some of Chiang's advisers quite well. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get this information, in this 
country or in China ? 

Mr. Lattimore, My latest information on the subject was in this 
country. 

Senator Ferguson. "Wlio gave it to you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. A Chinese connected with the Chinese Government. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was he ? 

Mr. Lattimore. One man w^hom I recall particularly was one of 
Chiang's oldest and closest associates, a Mr. Tseng Yang-fu. 

Senator Ferguson. "N^-liere is he now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know where he is now. 

Senator Ferguson. When was the last you saw of him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The last I saw of him was when he was in this 
country in 1945, received medical treatment at the Johns Hopkins 
Hospital, and then stayed with me for several days before going back 
to China. 

Senator Ferguson. Is he in China or Formosa ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume he is in Formosa. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you heard from him in Formosa ? 

Mr. Lattimore. May I ask my wife? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; you may inquire from your wife. 

Mr. Laitimore. The last I heard of him — no, this is previous. 
This is just before he came here, so I don't remember when I heard 
from him last. 

Senator Ferguson. May we see the memorandum? 

Mr. Lattimore. Surely. [Document handed.] 

Senator Ferguson. Read the next paragraph. 

The Chairman. The next paragraph of what? 

Senator Ferguson. Of the memorandum to the President: "The 
basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2." 

That is the one that appears to be at least the same line as was 
carried out in the white-paper letter of transmittal; is it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the one that indicates that I belong to that 
general school of thinking ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. "It can be successfully worked," you say. 
"Chiang is tenacious, but has shown in the past that he knows when 
to give in and try a new policy." 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

But he will only play ball if America and Russia, with British approval, make 
it plain that they are going to be joint umpires. 

Is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3405 

Senator Ferguson. What you wanted, then, was a policy where 
Russia and America, and with at least the consent of Britain, were to 
be umpires in running China 'I 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe not the umpires in running China. I be- 
lieved that the situation coming up at the end of the war in China was 
one that the United States would not be able to control single-handed. 
I thought it had to be part of a general international agreement. 

Seiuitor Ferguson. What do you mean by joint umpires? 

Mr. Lattimore. Joint umpires in the sense that primarily, if the 
Communists accepted a minority position in a coalition government, 
it would have to be seen to that they didn't try to get away with any 
monkey business. 

Senator Fergusox. And you think that America should have stepped 
in and Russia would have stepped in, to keep the Communists in line? 

Mr. Lattimore. I thought, as I said in the final sentence here : 

America, alone, cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement with the 
Communists involving real concessions; but if Washington and Moscow agree, 
l)oth Chungking and Yenan will carry out the agreement. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not true that at Yenan the Communists 
would have had to have carried it out, if Russia had said so? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know that I could have said so authorita- 
tively at that time, Senator, and, at the present time, the degree of in- 
dependence of the Chinese Communists from the Russians is a matter 
of considerable debate. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you are not one of those observers that 
believe that the Communists in Korea today are under the control of 
the Communists in Moscow? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no final answer on that. Senator. All I am 
aware of is that there is one school of thought that believes the situation 
is primarily controlled by the Chinese Communists, and another school 
of thought that believes that the whole thing is dictated from the 
Kremlin. 

Senator Ferguson. What do j^ou think about it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't have sufficient information to make a strong 
declaration of opinion in either direction. 

Senator Ferguson. At least you do not think they are controlled by 
Russia, you do not have any evidence that they are? 

Mr. Lattimore. My opinion is that they are more allies of Russia 
than subordinates of Russia, and I believe that the Russians would 
have considerable difficulty in running China completely. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it may be that Russia could, in your opin- 
ion, act as a neutral in any truce? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. The whole wording here does not indicate 
neutrality. It indicates an agreement between the great powers of 
America, Russia, and Britain and, therefore, an agreement between 
interested parties. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that in 1946 Mr. Acheson, Secre- 
tary of State — and which was just about a year after the memorandum 
was given — took somewhat the same line before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I didn't know it, Senator. I shouldn't be surprised. 
As I say, this was part of a general school of thought, to which I was 
a minor adherent, and not, I think, a shaper of that school of thought. 



3406 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to 
make, as a part of the record here, the memorandum and the press 
release; that is, the memorandum to (xeneral Marshall out of the 
white paper that is set forth in our record, and the letter of trans- 
mittal, so that it would all be in and not be taken out of context. 

I would like to have the testimony of Dean Acheson before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee as of June 19, 1946, a hearing on 
H. R. 6795, become a part of the record. 

Mr. Morris. Tliat portion of the testimony relating to the subject, 
Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, relating to the subject. I would like to 
have that read into the record at this time. 

The Chairman. It may be read. 

Senator Ferguson. I w^ould like to have it read at least down to 
page 5, if Mr. Mandel would read it into the record. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mandel. Testimony of Dean Acheson before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, June 19, 1946, hearings on H. R. 6795 [reading] : 

Chairman Bloom. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Secretary, your statement, coupled with that of Secretary 
Patterson and that of General Marshall, I think constitutes not only a reason, 
but shows the necessity for the enactment of this legislation. So I shall ask 
no questions. 

Chairman Bloom. Dr. Eaton. 

Mr. Eaton. In my judgment, I consider the association with China in the 
future as probably of more importance to the destiny of the Nation and the 
world than any other single relationship. That is wliy I am strongly in favor 
of this legislation. 

I notice on page 3 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, that General Marshall 
arranged for the training by our American people, with the use of American 
equipment, of certain Communist leaders who are to become incorporated into 
the National army. Are those fellows now fighting the National army in Man- 
churia ? 

Mr. Acheson. No. I think the situation is this, Mr. Eaton : I do not believe 
that any such training has gone on in the past, or is now going on. What Gen- 
eral Marshall was asked to do and agreecl to do, and what is necessary to be 
done, is that when the plan for the amalgamation of the two armies is accepted 
and begins to go into effect, those units of the Communist army which are going 
to be amalgamated with the National army will receive a period of training from 
60 to 90 days before they march out to join their opposite numbers in the other 
army. The plan roughly contemplates that a certain number of months from 
the day on which it is to go into effect certain divisions of the Communist army 
and certain divisions of the National army will be amalgamated. When that 
occurs it is essential that the troops from the Communist side which go into 
the troops of the new Chinese Army have a mininnim of the same sort of train- 
ing that their compatriots have had. Some of the divisions in the present 
National army have been trained by United States forces. These American 
training forces that we are talking about will be forces that will take a Com- 
munist outfit which is to be amalgamated with the new army and put it in 
shape so that it can readily go into the outfit. That is the program. 

Mr. Eaton. The objective of General Marshall's plan is that when tlie Com- 
munist forces are taken into the National army, he will then have a Nationalist 
army, not an army composed of two parts, one Nationalist and one Communist. 
What guaranty have we, since history has taught us a few lessons, I hope, 
that that will be the actual situation? 

Senator Ferguson. Who asked that question? 
Mr. Mandel. Mr. Eaton. [Reading:] 

Mr. Acheson. You know better than an.vone in the world. Dr. Eaton, there 
is no guaranty about anything in human affairs ; but the problem they are 
facing in China is one, at the present time, of having two armies separated 
in organization, space, and everything of that sort. Now, if those armies can 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3407 

he amalgamated unit by unit — not trying to take one whole army and put it 
with the other, but by taking separate units of each army and integrating 
them in one force — then the chances of division are tremendously reduced. 

Mrs. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, how many Communists is it anticipated will be 
trained under the proposed plan? 

Mr. AcHESoN. I think that they will try to take all the units that are going to 
be put into the new army immediately preceding their joining the new army 
and give them a 60- or 90-day schooling. 

Mrs. Rogers. But, can you give us any approximate number that will be 
trained? 

Mr. AcHESON. I do not know. If the total size of the army is going to be 
60 divisions, I do not know what proportion of the personnel would be Communist. 

Mrs. Rogers. Could you get that proportion for us? 

Mr. Acheson. The information that I have had handed me is that of the 60 
divisions which are contemplated the personnel which would l)e equivalent to 
50 divisions will come from the national army and the personnel which would 
be equivalent to 10 divisions will come from the Communist army. 

Mrs. Ro<",ers. That question will be asked on the floor. That is the reason 
I wanted to have that information. 

Mr. Acheson. Five-sixths will be taken from the national army and one-sixth 
from the Communist army. 

Chairman Bl(X)M. Mr. Chiperfield. 

Mr. CHiPEKFiEi.D. Mr. Secretary, besides the assistance this country gave to 
China which you have recited in your statement, did not the United States also 
furnish credit amounting to $900,000,000? 

Mr. AcHESON. I presume you are referring to the $500,000,000 loan made in 
1942. 

Mr. Chiperfiet.d. There was not any particular reason for not mentioning 
that ; it was simply because you were referring to the military assistance? 

Mr. Acheson. That is correct. 

Mr. Chipekfield. I have no questions now, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. Rogers. Do you think that China will turn to Russia if we do not offer 
the assistance? 

Mr. Acheson. I have no views cm that subject. I am sure that we will assist 
China. I do not think I want to speculate on what would happen if we did not. 

Mrs. Rogers. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China 
whereby she would not use our arms against us? 

Mr. Acheson. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter. 
There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country 
except in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter. 
Under the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ 
force against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That 
is the technical and legal answer to your question. 

I think we can rest assured that the Chine.se will not do that. 

Mrs. Rogers. I suppose a fight could start before that was decided, could 
it not? 

Mr. Acheson. Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think 
so. 

Chairman Bi>oom. The Chair thinks that we should not go into that. 

Mr. Acheson. I am sure that we do not need to worry. 

Mrs. Rogers. I think if there were any way to have an agreement it would 
be very helpful. I thought in the passage of lend-lease we should have some 
agreement with the nations. I find it impossible, and many other members find 
it impossible, to find out just exactly what is going on in lend-lease. That is 
all I have. 

Chairman Bloom. Mr. Gordon. 

Mr. Gordon. I have no questions at this time. 

Chairman Bloom. Mr. Vorys. 

Mr. Vorys. Mr. Secretary, sooner or later, and probably sooner, the question 
mav arise as to whether our furnishing arms to the Republic of China is in 
accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and I note in 
your statement you mentioned the obligations of the Charter for the preservation 
of peace, at various times. I think it would be very helpful if you would spell 
out for us who are not as familiar with the provisions as you are and our 
chairman and our ranking Republican member, who were there when it was 
drafted, just how this operates. 



3408 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, I have some material from the 
Congressional Record here that I should like to read into this record 
as pertinent to my own thinking in the year 1945. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going to ask you about what Mr. Acheson 
was thinking in 1946. Do you know what change there was between 
June of 1945 and June of 1946, other than the peace, other than the 
stopping of the shooting? I do not mean the peace. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know about the change. General Marshall 
had been carrying on his mission in China, had succeeded in halting 
the civil war to a certain extent, and was trying to negotiate a form 
of settlement that would leave the dominant control of power in the 
hands of Chiang Kai-shek. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you recognize at the time what Mrs. Rogers 
apparently recognized in 1946; that is, in 1945 when you were asking 
for this unity, particularly the aid to the Communists, and the unifica- 
tion by virtue of a joint government? Such as is said here [reading] : 

Mrs. Rogers. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby 
she would not use our arms against us ? 

Then Mr. Acheson said : 

Mr. Acheson. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter. 
There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country 
in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter. Under 
the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ force 
against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That is the 
technical and legal answer to your question. 

Did you have the same view back in 1945 ? You talked about the 
Charter and the protection under the Charter, and what had happened. 
Did you think all we had to do to stop a war was to veto it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I don't think I referred to the Charter at all. 
My view was that the postwar situation in China was one that could 
be kept manageable only by international agreement. 

Senator Ferguson. Mrs. Rogers then said, to that answer, when he 
ended up by saying "I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will 
not do that," meaning they would not use the arms we gave them 
against us, Mrs. Rogers said : "L suppose a fight could start before 
that was decided ; could it not?" 

Then Mr. Acheson seems to be quite surprised at that, because he 
said : "Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us ? I do not think 
so." 

Had you the same idea ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not have the same idea. My ideas 
went no further in June — July 1945 than a belief that the situation in 
China could only be controlled by agreement between the major 
powers. 

Senator Ferguson. And then Chairman Bloom said : 

The Chair thinks that we should not go into that. 
Mr. Acheson. I am sure that we do not need to worry. 

Was that your thinking at the time : that there was no worry about 
bringing these Communists in and bringing Russia into this Chinese 
situation ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. You are making, I tliink, an unjustifiable 
link between Mr. Acheson's worries in 1946 and the problem that I 
was trying to consider in 1945. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3409 

Senator Ferguson. The only thing I can see now is the difference 
that we did not give the Communists arms ; but, if so, there may have 
been some worry back in those days. 

Is it not true that as soon as they did get arms we found them 
moving down in North Korea, down across the imaginary line that we 
used to divide the country; and, in November of the same year, we 
find the Communists in China using arms against the United States. 

]Mr. Lattimore. I would not put it quite the same way, Senator. 

Senator Ferouson. How would you put it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would put it that, when we supplied arms in 
large quantities to armies that proved incompetent to use them, they 
passed very rapidly into the hands of the Chinese Communists and 
were turned against our policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was the reason for your going 
to the President with this letter and this memorandum the point that 
you felt that Ambassador Grew, Mr. Dooman, and Mr. Ballantine 
were opposed to your views and your philosophy ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. My feeling was, as is shown in my letter 
and memoranda quite clearly, that controversial problems of Ameri- 
can policy were arising, and that the most important thing to do was 
to get an impartial review. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you, directly or indirectly, contact Dean 
Acheson about your visit to the Wliite House ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Fer.^uson. Were you surprised when you saw Ambassador 
Grew coming out of the President's office the morning that you called 
on him? 

By the way, it was Tuesday morning, the 3d, instead of Monday. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; it struck me as quite natural to see — I still 
forget whether he was Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary of 
State — him in the President's anteroom. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not get the urge to say, "xA.mbassador 
Grew, I am going to talk about the Far East. Will you not come into 
the President's office and we will talk it over together?" 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I didn't think it was a privilege of a citizen 
going in to see the President to do the President's inviting for him. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think that you were just acting as a 
private citizen when you took this message to the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. No more? 

Mr. Lattimore, No more. 

Senator Ferguson. And no less ? 

Mr. Lattimore. And no less. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all at the present time. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the 
Congressional Eecord pertinent to the general question of discussion 
of the subject of China in 1945 that I should like to read into the 
record. 

The Chairman. Let me see it first, please. 

Senator Ferguson. I have something before he puts that in, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr. Lattimore. One is from Re])resentative Walter Judd, and the 
other is from Representative Mike Mansfield. 



3410 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I said that I would produce for 
the minutes a matter concerning the Secretary of State. 1 have, from 
the ticker, this announcement as of 11 : 3.3 this morning, 3-5, meaning 
today [reading] : 

Secretary Adiesoii said todav he personally had cleared Foreign Service 
Officer O. Ednuind CUibb after the State Department's Loyalty and Security 
Board had decided Clubb was a security risk. 

Last evening I asked Mr. Michael McDermott to furnish to me a 
CODY of all press releases by the State Department, or any officer 
thereof, concerning the Clubb case. At about 1 : 25 he called me and 
said that they had not assembled them all, but that he would send 
them up to me. I will want to put those into this record also, becaiise 
I think it is very material to the issue that we cannot get information 
from the officers under oath but when they desire it they can release 
statements to the press. ..i • 

I am o-oing to ask that the whole matter be taken up m this com- 
mittee as to the Clubb case so that we may get it under sworn testi- 
mony and not only in press releases. 

You will note that this says "The State Department Loyalty and 
Security Board has decided Clubb was a security risk." 

That is under the McCarran rider to the appropriation bill and not 
the President's Loyalty Board, the question of security. 

I believe that, uiider the law, he has absolute discretion to discharge 
a person for security risk ; but, if they try the person under the loyalty 
and then he sets aside an order of the Loyalty Board, the Appeal 
Board of the Loyalty Board would have the right to post-audit. 

But, if they do it under the security risk, there is no right for the 
Appeal Board to come into the picture at all. This would be a method 
of cutting off the Appeal Board. It seems significant that this is 
done in this way, after the Service case was reversed by the Loyalty 
Appeal Board. " I think the record ought to show that. 

The Chairman. Let me say to you. Senator, that this matter was 
taken up in the Appropriations Committee, incidentally, and the sub- 
stance of Mr. Humelsine's statement was— and I quote the substance 
only—that he was precluded from giving the information to the 
committee. 

As far as 1 am concerned, whether it be m this committee or in 
the Appropriations Committee, the matter should and must be gone 
into. If men, after having been considered unfit to continue in 
service by the Loyalty Board, are relieved of that decision so that 
they may become "inheritors of pensions from the (Tovernment, it is 
time forCongress to take very decisive action. 

Do you have something else that you want to say? 
Senator Fercsuson. Mr. Chairman, I might say that last evening 
I had asked the State Department also, by letter, to furnish to the 
Ai)i)ropriations Committee the number of employees that have been 
allowed to resign, or have resigned after a loyalty case has been 
started, the number of employees that have resigned or have been 
permitted to resign after an investigation of their loyalty was started, 
the amount of salary of each such employee and the amount of pension 
that they are now drawing. 

The Chairman, I might say to you that that request was also made 
by Mr. Humelsine by the chairman of the subcommittee having the 
appropriation at hand. I understancl it is being prepared. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3411 

Senator Ferguson. I did not have the privilege of being here, and 
I did not have the privilege of being in the Appropriations Subcom- 
mittee, of which I am a member, and I asked that it be furnished to 
you. I did not know that it was going to be furnished to you, or I 
would not have asked. 

The Chairman. The two excer])ts here, assertedly from the Con- 
gressional Record, I think counsel will check with the Congressional 
Record ; and, if they are to go in, they will go in in context, and I will 
reserve the ruling on the matter. 

As regards this matter that was submitted to the Chair this morn- 
ing, asserted to be a quotation from General Chennault, I have sub- 
mitted this to the committee. 

Is there any objection to its going into the record? 

Senator Ferguson. I have read it, and I have no objection. 

The Chairman. If there is no objection, it will go in the record. 

On the other, the ruling of the Chair will be withheld until we can 
check the context of the Congressional Record. 

Mr. Arnold. May the witness read it at this point ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. LAT-riMORE. The quotation is from Way of a Fighter, by Claire 
Lee Chennault, published in New York, 1949. That is well after the 
end of the war. It is chapter 5, page 61 [reading] : 

Soon after .lapan attacked at Shaniihai, the Chinese sent an official call for 
help to all the major powers. Only Russia responded. The Russians didn't 
pause to play partisan politics or trip over ideological folderol when their 
national interests were at stake in China. All of the Soviets' aid went to the 
Central Government of the Generalissimo. The Russians had had no love for 
the Generalissimo since the 1927 split when he drove the Russian-supported 
Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and slaughtered them by the thou- 
sands. For nearly "20 years he fought a ruthless war of extermination against 
communism in China. The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo solely 
because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing Japan, 
and they supported him exclusively, igncn-ing the Chinese Communist armies, 
which badly needed external support. 

Mr. Morris. As of what time was General Chennault writing there ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He is describing the early years of the war in 
China, before Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Morris. That is not apparent, however, from that article; is it? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; it is apparent that this aid began when Japan 
was attacked at Shanghai, which would be the summer of 1937. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get that memorandum ? 

Mr. Lattimore. This one? 

Senator Fergltson. Yes; that information. 

Mr. Lattimore. I think about 2 weeks ago. I had a moment to 
spare in my university office, and 1 noticed there was this book by 
General Chennault which was in the book case. I pulled it out just 
to look through it, to see if there might be anything pertinent, and 
then ran on to this passage. 

Senator Ferguson. And it backs up what part of your thinking 
as of that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It backs up my thinking that, while the Russians 
supported the Chinese Connnunists politically and in their world 
propaganda, they disregarded them during the period of the war in 
China in favor of assistance to China as a nation, delivered exclusively 
through Chiang Kai-shek. 



3412 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that could have been for the 
purpose of their getting the Yalta agreement, and also getting the 
agreement or the treaty with the Nationalist Government, not being 
quite sure that the Communists could not throw out the Nationalists? 
Mr. Lattimore. That is not my interpretation, Senator, My inter- 
pretation is that the Russians were afraid of Japan and would sup- 
port anything that was against Japan. 

The Chairman. Do you know that General Chennault has testi- 
fied before the watchdog committee of the Appropriations Committee 
and before the Appropriations Committee itself of the Senate in 
reference to that subject? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You did not know that. Are there any further 
questions? 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire, I have a few 
loose ends we can tie up here. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Sourwine. First, Mr. Lattimore, with regard to the letter and 
memoranda to the White House, wdiich has been discussed here at 
some length today, do you feel that the letter itself, the letter of June 
10, adequately conveyed to the President, and did you intend by it 
to convey to him, your belief that the Chinese Communists were then 
and had been since at least 1940 supported by Russia, along with what 
I assume was your belief stated here that "If America then identified 
itself with one party, Russia would be justified in following that lead 
in committing itself to the other major party"; namely, the Com- 
munists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, my letter wns intended solely to 
indicate to the President that I would like very much to see him and 
lay my opinions before him. 

The Chairman. I would like to have the question read. It is an 
involved question. I would like to have it read. 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

The Chairman. You use the term "letter" there. 1 wonder if it 
would be clarified to say "memoranda." 

Mr. Sourwine. No, I meant letter, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Lattimore. The letter w\as intended to convey only what was 
in the letter, and the matter that was in the memoranda was matter 
that I considered only when I sat down to write the memoranda. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you care to assert a belief, Mr. Lattimore, as to 
whether there is any intellectual dishonesty of this letter of June 10 
to the President? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should say, Mr. Sourwine, that I should resent 
any indication of intellectual dishonesty. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you intend to mislead the President in that 
letter? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I did not. 

Mr. Sourwine. In your letter of June 10, addressed to the Presi- 
dent 

The Chairman. By that last question, do you mean to intend to 
this committee that you meant to lead him and that you presented an 
honest view in leading him? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3413 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, I meant to imply solely that I wanted to 
have a chance to put some opinions before the President. 

The Chairman. It was for the purpose of leading the President, 
was it not ? It was for the purpose of influencing his judgment, was it 
not? It was net just for the purpose of laying a paper before him. 

Mr. Lattimore. I certainly hoped that the President would con- 
sider my opinions. To that extent, I wanted to influence him. I did 
not want to influence him exclusively. I took it for granted that the 
President would consider the opinions of many people. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If you will look at your letter of June 20 to the 
President, June 20, 1945, the middle paragraph, the second para- 
graph, quoting from the letter : "Your forthcoming meeting with the 
Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin." 

I ask you, sir, did you have any private information with regard 
to that forthcoming meeting? 

Mr. Latttmore. No, I didn't. My best recollection is, in looking 
over these memoranda, that that had not been — that that had just come 
out in the press and, therefore, made me feel that if anything I had 
to say was worth consideration at all, it was worth consideration at 
that time. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You refer, of course, by that, to the Potsdam 
meeting ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think that must be the Potsdam meeting. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Would you be surprised to learn that the public 
announcement of the Potsdam meeting had not vet been made on the 
20th of June? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should be very mueh surprised. Had it not been 
mentioned in the press? 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not know what the fact is, sir. I am just mak- 
ing a record as to your recollection as to whether you had any private 
recollection. 

Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that I had no private recol- 
lection. 

Mr. Sourwine. Looking up to the memorandum itself, sir, I have 
just three questions about it. 

There were some things in this memorandum that were intended 
as recommendations, were there not, and I speak of that portion of 
the memorandum which is labeled as related to Japanese policy as 
related to China policy. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. This paragraph, the third paragraph, to counter- 
act this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work 
steadily for peace, unity, and modern political forms, was in the 
nature of a recommendation ; was it not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should agree to that ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. It called for an American policy favoring unity 
in China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; that is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. And that was the American policy for some time 
thereafter, was it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was. 

Mr. Sourwine. The next paragraph says, at the same time, Japan 
hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and America to be soft 



3414 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

with antirevolutionary Japanese.big: business That was was it not, 
an implicit recommendation against a soft policy with Japanese big 

business ? 

Mr. Laitimore. Implicitly; yes. 

Mr SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, American policy was a haid 
policy with Japanese big business thereafter ; was it not '• 

Mr". LA-rriMORE. No, not particularly hard; not hard, not soft. In 

^Mi?SouRwiNE. At the end of that memorandum you find this sen- 
tence [reading] : 

In most Govenuiient agencies at the present time the tendency is to find 
Japin'Slned men in higher policy-makir.g posts than ^^-^-^J^^^^' ^^"^- 
ply because Japan used to be a more important i;reat power than China. 

That is an implicit recommendation for more China-trained men in 
hio-her policy-making, posts, is it not ? 

'^Ir. Latiimore. Yes ; it is. p^ i i u 

Mr SoTiRWiNE. And the State Department thereafter had a sub- 
stantial number more of China-trained men m high-policy posts; 
did it not? 

Mr. La'itimore. It did. i it ^ i 

I would say that there is no question of cause and effect here. 

Mr SouRWiNE. Can you name some of those China-trained men 
who came into power in higher policy-making posts at a period subse- 
quent to the date of this memorandum ? . 

Mr. Latomore. I think I am correct m saying that it was after this 
memorandum that Mr. Vincent was promoted. , . ,, . 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to piit in the record 
here a quotation from The Present Situation and the ^ext Tasks It 
is a draft resolution of the national board. Communist Political Asso- 
ciation, as amended and approved by the national committee on June 

^%he^source is Political Affairs, of July 11)45, pages 579 to 591, Earl 

Browder, Editor. i •. • . ^i a 

I will ask that our director, Mr. Mandel, read it into the recoid 
Mr Mvnuel. These are excerpts from the draft resolution ot the 
National Board of the Communist Political Association : 

Now that the war against Hitler Germany has been won, the American eco- 
non < rovalists, like their British Tory counterparts are alarmed at tbe strength- 
ened positions of world labor, at the den.ocrati.- advan<-es ui Europe and at the 
n,s rge of the national liberation movements in the coh.nml and independent 
" .unti-ies ^ * * They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against- 
the Soviet Union * * * 
That is from page 580. 
Further, from page 581 : 

It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why 
Washington along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing 
a strong^ united and democratic China ; why they bolster up the reac-tionary, in- 
competent Chiang Kai-sheli regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to 
terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reac-tionary bul- 
wark in the Far East. It accounts, too, for the renewed campaign of antl-So^ let 
slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and 
cooperation * * * 

I'heii on page 584 : ^'Remove from the^ State Department all pro- 
fascist and reactionary officials * 

The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine has one more question. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3415 

Senator Fergusox. Just a moment. 

Mr. Mandel, I take, from your experience as director of this com- 
mittee, that is what is known as the commie Hne as of that time 'i 

Mr. Maxdel. That was a resolution presented to the Plenary meet- 
ing'. That is a full meeting of the national committee of the Com- 
munist Political Association, which was held June 18 to 20, 1945, and 
sets the line for the coming period. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Chairman. "VVliere ^ 

Mr. Mandel. In the United States. That was held in New York 
City. It sets the line for the United States. 

The Chairman. Who was then the head of the Comnnmist Party? 

Mr. Mandel. In this same issue of the Political Affairs, the state- 
ment of Jacques Duclos, which laid the basis for the removal of Earl 
Browder, is included in this issue and the resolutions included here 
marked the change of line of the Communist Party from one of 
cooperation with the Ignited States and Great Britain to one of hostil- 
ity; which was symbolized by the removal of Browder and the selec- 
tion of Eugene Dennis as the executive secretaiy. 

The Chairman. Senator Smith, do you have any questions? 

Senator Smith. I have two questions. They are very short. 

Mr. Lattimore, did you know young Lamont ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In 1945 ? 

Senator Smith. Yes ; at the time this letter was prepared, when you 
prepared that communication '( 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think I had ever met him at that time. 

Senator Smith. Had he been active at that time in the Institute of 
Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Lattimore. No: I don't believe so. 

Senator Smith. Do you know" whether or not Mr. Carter knew him 
at that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It is evident that Mr. Carter knew him to the extent 
of seeing him at that time ; but how well he knew him, I don't know. 

Senator Smith. You do not know of any relations that existed be- 
tAveen Mr. Carter and the Institute of Pacific Relations and young Mr. 
Lamont ? 

Mr. Latt'imore. No, sir. 

Senator Smith. You had never met him then ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time, I don't believe I had met him. 

Senator Smith. Did you get acquainted with him shortly thereafter ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not shortly thereafter, I don't think. 

At sometime thereafter, after the war, he spoke at a meeting of the 
Foreign Policy Association in Baltimore, and I met him then. 

Senator Smith. At the time you pi-epared this proposed letter for 
Mr. Lamont, Sr., to sign, did you know then Mr. Lamont. Jr.'s politi- 
cal thinking on communism? 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew nothing whatever about him, sir. 

Senator Smith. Did Mr. Carter at that time, Avhen he proposed this 
plan for you to prepare the text for a letter for young Mr. Lamont to 
get old Mr. Lamont to sign ; did Mr. Carter tell you anything at all 
about young Mr. Lamont's signature? 

Mr. Lattimore. He told me no more than is in that letter. 

Senator Smith. That is all. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Sourwine. 



3416 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr SoTJRWiNE. I have one more question on the memorandum. 
The memorandum on China policy starts out with: "There are two 

ahernatives in China." . , ^i , . , 

Did you intend in that memorandum to state or imply that there were 

two, and only two, alternatives in China, m the context h 

Mr. LA-rriMORE. I presume so. , .1 • i i • 

Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, was there not a third choice very 

clearly indicated ? 

Mr.'LATTiMORE. Whatis that? t^ • i 1 4-^ 

Mr. SouRWiNE. To wit, American support of Chiang Kai-shek to 
drive the Communists out or overcome them? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think, if you call that an alternative, it is certainly 
taken up here by implication ; isn't it? 

Mr. Sourwine. You think it is? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. -, p ^i . j i. „^,.^^ 

Mr. Sourwine. You intended to have regard for that and to cover 
in your memorandum for the President, did you ? 

Mr Lattimore. That is the way I read this memorandum. 

Mr" Sourwine. You question whether it was, in fact, an alternative. 

It is, as a matter of fact, an alternative which Dean Acheson recog- 
nized ; is it not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. After the end of the war ; yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. Is it? ,, . , -^x. 

I thought the third alternative that Mr. Acheson gave was with- 
drawal from China. ■ ^^ ^. 4.- f 

Mr. Sourwine. Did not Mr. Acheson recognize the alternative ot 

all-out American aid to Chiang ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Maybe he did. • .-u 

Mr Sourwine. Let us go back to you. Did you recognize the 

alternative of all-out American aid to Chiang at the time you wrote 

this memorandum ? ^ • iv ^ ^ ^ ;„f^ 

Mr Lattimore. I don't think the term "all-out aid" had come into 

use then, and I doubt if those were the terms in which I was thinking. 
Mr Sourwine. Did you, in whatever terms you thought ot it, tlunk 

of the alternative of American aid to Chiang against the Chinese 

Communists for the unification of his nation under him by eliminating 

the Communist forces as a revolutionary force? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think this is implied m this memorandum, Mr. 

Sourwine. , t n ^^i • i ^ -j. *. ^.i „ 

Mr. Sourwine. Is your answer, then, that you did think of it at the 

time you wrote this memorandum ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I suppose I must have. ,. ^ . . , ^ , 

Mr. Sourwine. You could not have implied it without having 

thought it, could you ? . 

Mr. Lattimore. I can only read this memorandum now with the 

interpretation I put on it in 1952. 

Mr Sourwine. Do you mean you have now no memory ot whether 

you thought of that alternative at the time you wrote this memo- 
Mr Lattimore. The only memory I have is that I placed before the 

President what I thought were the two alternatives : Division of the 

country, or unification of the country. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3417 

And, under division of the country, I envisaged the possibility 
of American support for one side and Kussian support for the other. 

The Chairman. Mr. Morris has a question. 

INIr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, in connection with the memorandum 
you prepared for ISIr. Carter, do you know whether that memorandum 
was shown to Mr. Bisson before it was sent to Mr. Lamont ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no clear recollection on that subject, but if 
you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it. 

Mr. Morris. I just want your recollection at this time, Mr. Latti- 
more. 

The Chairman. He says he has no recollection. 

Is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't believe I have. 

Maybe I should have. 

Wa's it mentioned in JNIr. Carter's testimony, or something of that 
sort? 

Mr. ]\Iorris. I will give you the executive session minutes of your 
testimony, Mr. Lattimore. 

At the bottom of the page there, does that refresh your recollection ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Oh, yes [reading:] 

Mr. MoEKis. Now, I would like to introduce into the record in conjunction 
with this, and I would like to show, first of all, to Mr. Lattimore, a memorandum 
from the files of the institute, "TAB from ECC," "TAB" generally standing for 
Mr. Bisson and "ECC" standing for Mr. Carter, dated June 20, 1945, and ask 
you if that means anything to you? 

And I replied that I had never seen this before, it has my initials 
on it, but I didn't recall seeing it before. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. Does that refresh your recollection that it was shown 
to Mr. Bisson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. Is your answer "that is right"? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

The Chairman. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow 
morning. 

(Thereupon, at 3:25 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a. m., Thursday, March 6, 1952.) 



88348— 52— pt. 10 10 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1952 

United States Senait:, 
Subcommittee To Ixvestigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Commiittee on the Judiciary, 

Washing tan., D. C. 
The subcommittee met at 10 : 15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding. 
Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Watkins, 
and Jenner. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director, and 
Senator McCarthy. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Morris, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY 
ABE rORTAS, COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did Mr. Carter ever ask you for the 
best possible Soviet defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland? 

Mr. Latitmore. I believe I remember some correspondence on that 
subject; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what you remember about that? 

The Chairman. The question was : Did Mr. Carter ever ask you ? 

He said he believes he remembers some correspondence on this. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I should be glad to have my memory , re- 
freshed, if you have correspondence. 

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, let us go ahead without refresh- 
ing memories. Let us find out what the witness now knows. 

The Chairman. But he does not tell you what he knows. He says 
lie believes that he received some communication, in answer to a ques- 
tion, "Did Mr. Carter ever ask you?" 

Senator Ferguson. That does not take a memorandum to refresh 
your memory. 

Mr. Lattimore. The best of my recollection at the moment is 
that I think Mr. Carter wrote to me on the subject of the Russian in- 
vasion of Finland and asked my opinion on the subject. 

Senator Ferguson. When was that, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably about the time of the invasion of 
Finland. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when that was ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was the winter of 1940-41, wasn't it? 

3419 



3420 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Fp:rguson. That was from the IPR. I mean he was repre- 
senting the IPR ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I believe it was an individual inquiry on his 
part. 

Senator Ferguson. A personal matter ? 

Mr. Lattimore. A personal matter. 

Senator Ferguson. And he wrote you about it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe so. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you answer ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yos. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your opinion ? What did he want to 
know about the invasion of Finland ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore, My recollection is — and, as I say, it is not very 
precise — that at that time there was a great deal of discussion about 
the significance of the Russian invasion of Finland. 

My feeling was that the invasion of Finh^nd was an outrageous 
thing on the part of the Russians, but I also believed that the politics 
of Europe at that time had sunk to a pretty low level. 

The previous betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France had 
created a situation in which there was a general scramble for advan- 
tage among the great powers, and the ethics of international relations 
were not very conspicuous. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would say, then, that if France and 
Britain did something, then you think that the morals were lowered 
so as to justify Russia in doing something like the invasion of Finland ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think that I thought — I am sure that I 
didn't think that the Russian invasion of Finland was justified, be- 
cause I supported the local branch in Baltimore that was of some sort 
of organization that was collecting fluids for Finland, 

On the other hand, I remember that at that time there were some 
people who were advocating going to war with Russia on the subject 
of Finland, and that seemed to me to be a rather unrealistic proposition. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Carter ever ask you for a pro or a con 
opinion ? 

Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that he asked me for my opinions 
on the subject. 

I would have to see the correspondence again. 

Senator Ferguson. But did you take that he had an opinion ? 

Mr. LAi'riMORE. I don't remember whether he had an opinion or not, 
or whether he was trying to form an opinion and was asking me what 
I thought of it. 

Senator Ferguson, And that time was he pro-Russian ? 

Mr, Lattimore. I wouldn't be able to say. No ; I don't think he was 
particularly pro-Russian. 

Senator Ferguson, Now, wait ; you "don't think," You put in the 
word "particularly." 

Was he pro-Russian, or do you want the answer to be that he was 
not particularly pro-Russian ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think that he was pro-Russian, 

Senator Ferguson. Was he pro-Soviet at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore, No; I don't think he was pro-Soviet. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think so ? 

Mr, Lattimore. No; I don't think so. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3421 

Senator Ferguson. What did Britain and France do that you 
thought justified Eussia, or the Soviets, invading Finland? 

Mr, Lattimore. I did not think that the British and French had 
done anything that justified Russia in invading Finland. At least, 
that is my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned them here this morning. What 
did they do to mitigate Finland's aggression ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I thought that the British and French had be- 
trayed Czechoslovakia and had thereby contributed to creating a very 
nasty situation in Europe, in which everybody v^as engaged in a 
bare-faced scramble for power, and ethical considerations were being 
trampled underfoot. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain what the "betrayal" was — 
so the record will show it — of Britain and France, of Czechoslovakia ; 
what you thought it was ? 

Mr. Lattimore. My recollection, without looking up the documents 
of the time, is that the French had a treaty of mutual defense of 
some kind with Czechoslovakia and the British had some kind of 
treaty or understanding for the support of France — and let me see — 
I believe the Russians also had a treaty for the support of Czecho- 
slovakia; that the Czechoslovaks appealed to the French, but the 
French and British, at Munich, decided to put pressure on the Czecho- 
slovak s to surrender their western defense system to Hitler, and that 
tliat destroyed the security system for the containment of Gennan 
aggression that had been built up after the First World War. 

Senator Ferguson. And because Britain and France had failed to 
carry out their treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia, you felt that had 
something to do with a justification of the Soviets invading Finland, 
did you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I did not think it was justification. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you mention it, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. LATriMORE. I don't think I called it a justification. Senator. _ 

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned here this morning — what is it? 
Mitigation ? 

Senator Smith. Are we not getting off the beam a little bit, Mr. 
Chairman? 

Senator Ferguson. I think this is important. 

Senator Smith. I just wonder if it is because I can understand 
that if it was a trail — and I am inclined to think a little bit it was — 
that is something about another question entirely, about the Czecho- 
slovakian situation. 

I assume that what Dr. Lattimore meant was that that so lowered 
the level of public morals in Europe that that was one of the reasons 
understanding Russian aggression in Finland. 

The Chairman. In other words, the morals were so lowered by the 
Czechoslovakia!! incident that anything might follow. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; that is right. 

Senator Smith. Yes. The Russians might be encouraged to do 
anything. 

i happen to know a little bit about that, because the Russians had 
agreed to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia — Dr. Benes wrote me that, 
incidentally— if England and France bad laid down on Czecho- 
slovakia. 



3422 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I want to go ahead, except I am thinking of the time we are 
taking. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to go ahead. 

Now, you say that was a personal matter between you and Mr. 

Carter. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the best of my recollection. 

The Chairman. Wait just a minute. 
• Mr. Carter was then the secretary-general of the Institute of Pacihc 
Relations, just the same as he has been all the time; is that right? 

Mr. Lati'IMOre. That is right. • , * • 

But Finland was not connected with the Pacific or with Asia, and 
any correspondence between me and Mr. Carter on the subject would 
not have been institute correspondence, but personal correspondence. 

Senator Ferguson. If it was personal correspondence, would Mr. 
Field have anything to do with it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don\ remember whether Mr. Field had anything 
to do with it, or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Would he be consulted if it was personal cor- 
respondence ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Might be. Anybody in Mr. Carter s and my per- 
sonal acquaintainceship might have been consulted. 

As I remember, at that time, everybody was talking to everybody 
else, and a good many people were writing to a good many people 
about this. 

Here was one of the most perplexing situations that had ever arisen 
in the history of Europe. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, your long answers. 

Will you tell us now whether or not you felt at the time that Mr. 
Carter asked you about the Soviet invasion of Finland that he was 
pro-Soviet? ^ . 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I would not say he was pro-Soviet. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Morris, do you have a letter? 

The Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 26, 
1940, addressed to Owen Lattimore, Esq., with the typed signature of 
Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that letter and ask you if 
you can recall having received that? 

Mr. Lattimore. This must be the letter that I recall. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

I want to know if that is an answer that you recall having received. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I recall having received it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please? 

Mr. Lattimore. This is dated April 26, 1940 [reading] : 

ExiiiRiT No. .531 

Dkab Owen 

Senator Ferguson. What was your address at that time? Will 
you give it? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3423 

Mr. Laitimore. My address was Johns Hopkins, [Reading :] 

Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convinc- 
ing (I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers) statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s 
justification for the Finnish campaign? The Soviets clearly regard the action 
as a necessary defense measure. Three-fourths of the rest of the world still 
regards it as unprovoked aggression. 

Have you yourself written or are you writing anything along this line? 
Sincerely yours, 

This is dated April 26, 1940. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record? 

The Chairman. Yes, it will be admitted into the record. 

(Document referred to was marked ''Exhibit No. 531" and was read 
in full beginning on p. 3422.) 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, would that indicate as to whether 
or not Mr. Carter was pro-Soviet? 

Mr, Lattimore, No, sir, 

I would say that this indicates that Mr. Carter was trying to form 
an opinion on the subject and that, as a necessary part of forming 
an opinion on the subject, he was trying to find out whether there had 
been a convincing statement from the Russian point of view or of the 
Russian point of view ? 

The Chairman. He says, "Where in English or French or Russian 
has there appeared the most convincing" — and then in parentheses : 
"I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers." 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. "Bourgeoisie readers" are non-Soviet readers; are 
they not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Non-Soviet, and, I should say, non-Communist. 

The Chairman. And he wanted to convince the non-Soviet reader. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I do not agree that he wanted to convince 
a non-Soviet reader. 

The Chairman. He said, "I mean convincing to bourgeoisie read- 
ers" ? What does that mean ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He is obviously considering himself as a non-Soviet 
and non-Communist person, and, as such, he wants to know where the 
Russian case is stated for people like himself. 

He obviously means he wants to compare it with other opinions. 

The Chairman. Just a moment. Read the sentence again. 

So as to make it complete, leaving out the parentheses, it states : 

AVhere in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most con- 
vincing * * * statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s justification for the Finnish 
campaign? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is riarht. 

The Chairman. That is what he is looking for; is it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would say that is a reasonable step for an im- 
partial man to take when he was trying to assemble evidence and 
opinions on a very complicated problem. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, was this, or was it not, an 
IPR matter? 

Was he trying to do this personally? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should say that that letter is clearly a personal 
letter and not an organizational, institutional letter. 



3424 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, when we get to a case like this, 
do you not see anything in this letter at all to indicate that Mr. 
Carter was pro-Soviet in this letter ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I see nothing of the kind. I see he states 
that: "Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regards it as un- 
provoked aggression." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. But is he not asking you to give him the 
best possible defense for the Russians ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He is trying, it is obvious, to find that out 

The Chairman. Just a moment. Let us hear the question. 

Please read the question, Mr, Reporter. 

I am asking you to address yourself to the question. 

(Thereupon, the pending question, as above transcribed, was read 
by the reporter.) 

The Chairman. That can be answered "Yes" or "No," then you 
can explain, if you wish. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Obviously, as a part of trying to inform himself on all points of 
view of a very complicated question, which was the subject of great 
political discussion at the time. 

The Chairman. You have to read that into the letter, do you not, 
that last statement of yours ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Where do you get the idea that he wanted all 
points of view when he was trying to get the best for the Russians 
and said nothing about any other point of view at all ^ 

Mr. LA-rriMORE. He is saying: "Three-fourths of the rest of the 
world still regard it as unprovoked aggression." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And does he not also in the letter assume 
that you would be writing on the Soviet side when he said, "Have 
you yourself written, or are you writing anything along this line?"— 
meaning along the line of the Soviet side ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He does not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I consider it impossible to read any such implica- 
tion into the letter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, you said that this was not an organ- 
izational letter. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Field sent a copy of that letter ? 

Mr. Latoimore. I don't know. It doesn't say here that he was. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, did he venture an answer to Mr. Carter's 
questions ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That I don't recall. 

Mr. Morris. You cannot recall anything on that ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Smith. May I ask you this question : 

Was 129 East Fifty-Second Street the address of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, that was. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please? 

Mr Mandel. I have here a memorandum from the files of the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations, dated April 30, 1940, headed "Memo- 
randum to: E. C. C. from F. V. F.» 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3425 

The Chairman. Who is ECC and who is FVF ? 

Mr. Morris. That is presumably Mr. Edward C. Carter and Fred- 
erick Vanderbilt Field. 

Mv. Chairman, this letter bears on the question about which the wit- 
ness is now testifying, and I would like Mr. Mandel to read this letter 
into the record. 

The Chairman. Let me see it. • 

Senator Ferguson. It that original out of the files of the IPR? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please ? 

Mr. Mandel. April 30, 1940: "Memorandum to: E. C. C. from 
F. V. F." 

Mr. Morris. This is 4 days after the previous letter, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

Exhibit No. .532 

I noticed, in a letter from you to Lattimore, or vice versa, which passed over 
my desk today, a question about good sources for the Soviet point of view on the 
Finnish campaign. I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued 
by Soviet Russia Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland — A Documented 
Survey." It contains most of the pertinent documents and if you are looking for 
an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think, as 
good as anything which has come to hand. 

Mr. Morris. Will that be admitted into the record, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. It may be admitted into the record. 

(Document deferred to was marked "Exhibit No. 532" and was read 
in full.) 

Mr. Fortas. Excuse me. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to ask your counsel something ? 

Mr. Fortas. He said "no." 

Mr. INIorris. Mr, Lattimore, do you notice there in the first line 
that Mr. Field is looking upon you and Mr. Carter as interchangeable 
in connection with that particular query ? He could not recall whether 
the letter was from Carter to Lattimore, or Lattimore to Carter. 

Mr. Lattimore. I would not say, Mr. Morris, that he regards me 
and Carter as interchangeable. 

The Chairman. He is speaking of the language now, Mr. Lattimore. 

The first line of the note reads : "I noticed, in a letter from you to 
Lattimore or vic€ versa which passed over my desk today * * *." 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Morris' question is : Do I regard that as indi- 
cating that Field says that Lattimore and Carter were, or regarded 
Lattimore and Carter as interchangeable ? 

Mr. Morris. With respect to this query. 

Mr. Lattimore. With respect to this query. 

The Chairman. That is not the question. 

Mr. Lattimore. My answer is "No," and I would like to explain. 

Mr. Fortas. We want the question read. 

The Chairman. Reframe the question. You can get at it in an- 
other way. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate 
to you that, with respect to this particular query, namely, where to 
find the most convincing, to bourgeoisie readers, defense of the Soviet 
invasion of Finland, did he not consider in his mind that you and 
Carter were interchangeable with respect to being the originator of 
that particular query ? 



3426 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. My answer is "No." 
May I explain? 

Tlie Chairman. I do not think it is necessary for an explanation. 
The answer is "No." That is all there is to it. 

It is a question of the construction of the language. 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I have something pertinent to say on the 

subject. . . 

The Chairman. I do not think there is anything pertinent. When 
you say "no, it is not interchangeable," then it is not interchangeable. 
That is your decision. . „ 

Mr. Lai'timore. May I explain why I think the answer is JNo >. 

The Chairman. No. The language speaks for itself. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, it appears that Mr. Field had 
on his desk that particular day, which would seem to be the 30th of 
April, the Soviet literature. War and Peace in Finland; would it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And that when it passed over the desk, he was 
not quite sure whether it was a letter from you to Carter, or Carter 

to you ? -(.^11 

]\Ir. Lattimore. No, sir ; that is not my construction of the language. 

Senator Ferguson. That is not your construction >. 

The Chairman. Just a moment, Senator. 

If there is any more evidence of expression in the rear of the room, 
any more disturbance in the rear of the room, the room will be 
cleared. I have said that once or twice before. I hope it will not 

occur lagain. , • t-» • r^ i 

Mr. Morris. JNIr. Lattimore, did you know that Soviet Kussia loday 

was a Soviet publication? . „ -r i , i v 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No, at that time. I don t believe 

at that time I knew the publication Soviet Kussia Today at all. 
Mr. Morris. Did you know at that time that Frederick V. P leld 

was a Communist? n ^■ 

Mr. Lai-itmore. No, sir; I didn't. To the best of my recollection, 
I did not believe then that he was Communist— 

The Chairman. Just a moment. 

A moment ago, in listening to the question, 1 think the Chair ruled 
erroneously, and I want to correct my ruling. I refused to permit 
the witness to explain his view on the first two lines, or three lines 
of the letter. I think I ruled hastily and I want to correct that ruling. 
I want him to have that opportunity. 

You may have it now. 

Mr. P'oRTAS. We want the question and the answer read back. 

The Chairman. You may have the question and the answer read 
back, if you want to clarify your position. 

Mr. Lattimore. Y"es. May I? 

The Reporter (reading) : 

Mr Moiiius Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate to you that, 
with respect to this particular query, namely, where to tind tlie most convincing, 
lo h(.uri;eoisie readers, defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland, did he not 
considei- in his mind that you and Carter were interchangeaitle with respect to 
Iteing the ori^'inator of that particular (luery? 

The Chairman. The reason why I changed my ruling is^that I 
caught the expression "in your mind" as to what was in Mr. Carter s 
mind. . , 

Senator Ferguson. And not what was in Field s mmd ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3427 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Mr. FoRTAs. In Mr. Lattimore's mind. 

The Chairman. It is liis analysis of wliat might liave been in the 
writer's mind. 

Mr. FoRTAS. He said Carter. I thonght he said Lattimore. 

The Chairman. That is right^ In his analysis. 

If he wants to give it after looking at the language and listening 
to the question again, I think the Chair was erroneous in its ruling. 

Mr. Lattimore. I simply wanted to explain. Mr. Chairman, that 
it was the practice in the institute to circulate letters and copies of 
letters to everybody in the office and people outside the office, and my 
construction of this language is simply that Mr. Field remembered 
seeing some correspondence some days before and hadn't bothered to 
look up who wrote the correspondence when he sent this little note 
to Mr. Carter. 

The Chairman. That is a fair explanation of it, if you can guess 
what was in the writer's mind. 

He is making a guess at it, and that is all there is to it. 

Let us proceed. 

Senator Smith. With that language, ''vice versa.'' I do not quite 
agree with the chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever seen before that time the publica- 
tion Soviet Russia Today? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I had. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever furnish a document to Mr. Carter 
in reply to his letter? 

Mr. Lattimore. I recall writing to Mr. Carter expressing some 
opinions. I don't recall the exact language. 

Senator Ferguson. But did you furnish a documejit? 

Mr, Latiimore. Do you mean a document other than writing him 
a letter? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Laitimore. No ; I don't believe I did. 

Senator P^erguson. Did he ever ask 3^ou for any more than an an- 
swer to his letter? 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't recall that he did. I don't believe he did. 

Senator Ff:rguson. Did vou ever read AVar and Peace in Fin- 
land? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo, I don't think I ever read it. 

Mr. Morris. Did you endeavor to answer his question about what 
is nicest convincing to bourgeoisie readers in defense of the Soviet in- 
vasion of Finland ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo; I don't believe I did. I believe that what I 
did was to expi-ess my own opinions about some of the factors in- 
volved. 

Mr. Morris. As the most convincing defense? 

Mr. LA'rriMoRE. Xo. I don't recall. I don't believe that I responded 
to any such point, that I simply wrote down some general observations 
that were in my mind at the time as to what I thought about the 
situation. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not 
reply to this particular query of Mr. Carter? 

Mr. LAT'riMoRE. To the question about some source in English, 
French, or Russian? 



3428 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I replied to that point. 

Mr. Morris. Did you attempt to give the best possible defense of the 
Soviet invasion of Finland ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I believe that I expressed my own opinion. 
My own opinion may have included some expression about what sort of 
case I thought the Russians could make for themselves, or something 
of that sort. 

But I certainly did not do any research on the subject. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the memo- 
randum from Field to Carter indicated that Field believed Carter 
wanted a pro-Soviet opinion? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. The language is : "A question about good 
sources for the Soviet point of view." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. Which, it seems to me, would be a reasonable point — 
let me repeat once more — for anybody who was trying to find out what 
the score was on Finland. 

The Chairman. The language of this note is, again, interesting. 
This was a note from Frederick V. Field to the secretary general of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Carter. 

He says in this note : "I notice, in a letter from you to Lattimore or 
vice versa, which passed over my desk today * * *." In other 
words, the note which Carter had written to you passed over Field's 
desk. You said that you did not know whether or not that note was 
referred to Mr. Field. 

It is evident, from this letter, that it had been referred to Mr. Field. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. And he says : "A question about good sources for 
the Soviet point of view on the Finnish campaign." 

Then he refers Carter to what he considers a good source : 

I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued by Soviet Russia 
Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland — A Documented Survey." It con- 
tains most of tlie pertinent documents — 

This was Field giving advice to Carter, who had written you. 

* * * It contains most of tlie pertinent documents and if you are looking 
for an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think, 
as good as anything which lias come to hand. 

He was rather praising it ; was he not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He was rather what? 

The Chairman. Praising it. In other words, he was recommending 
it. 

Mr. Lattimore. He was recommending that anybody who wanted to 
find out what the Soviet point of view was would find in this publica- 
tion the documents which the Russians had considered it pertinent to 
publish. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that Field's statement was pro- 
Soviet ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 29, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3429 

1940, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen 
Lattimore. In the upper part of the sheet we have the initials F. V. F. 
and K. B., presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Kathleen 
Barnes. 

Mr. Morris. Does K. B. stand for Kathleen Barnes ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you explain what you believe those 
initials mean on the top of that photostat ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Wliat I believe they mean? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. My assumption would be that Mr. Carter had 
initialed them for circulation in the office to Kathleen Barnes and 
Frederick V. Field. 

Senator Ferguson. And your name being on the top would indi- 
cate that it was later to be filed, I assume, under your name? 

Mr. Lattimore. Probably woidd be put in the file of Carter's cor- 
respondence with me; yes. 

Mr. Morris. So, certainly the Institute of Pacific Relations con- 
sidered it an organizational letter, did it not, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I wouldn't say so. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it still indicates what is before 
you now, that this is purely a personal matter between you and Mr. 
Carter? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. As far as I was concerned, it was a purely personal 
matter between me and Mr. Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not the question. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I would still say it. 

Senator Ferguson. From the evidence before you 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And what has been produced here in the case? 

Mr. Lai-timore. Knowing, as I do, that it was Mr. Carter's regular 
practice to circulate a great deal of his personal correspondence to 
other people. 

The Chairman. "Wliat was the address of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Lattimore. 129 East Fifty-second, I think. 

The Chairman. What is the address on the letter? 

Mr. Lattimore. 129 East Fifty-second. 

The Chairman. That was the address of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

All right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph in 
your letter. 

]\Ir. Chairman, first, will it be admitted into the record ? 

The Chairman. It has been identified by Mr. Mandel, has it not, 
as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

ISIr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It may be admitted into the record. 



3430 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 533'' and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 533 

300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, 

Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1940. 
Mr. E. C. Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, 

New York City. 

Dear Carter: Thanks very iiiucli for putting me wise to the correspondence 
and editorial comments in the Herald-Tribune. I thought your letter was per- 
fectly justifiable, and the tone taken by the editorial writer in commenting on it 
rather nasty. I enclose a copy of the letter I have just written them. 

With regard to the Gayer book on "American Economic Foreign Policy," am I 
to understand that Holland has received a review copy, or that he is merely rec- 
ommending it to youV Let me know if I should write for a review copy. Off- 
hand, I should concur with the selection of Pluniptre as reviewer. 

We are so far advanced in the process of getting the June issue of Pacitic Af- 
fairs through the press that it would be difficult now to get in the suggested 
notice of the nonparticipation committee pamphlet "Shall America Stop Arm- 
ing Japan," for reasons of both time and space. What should be our future 
policy about matters of this kind? Would it not be making Pacific Affairs too 
"American" for subscribers abroad? 

Your (luestion al)Out where to find the most convincing statement as to the 
Soviet justification for tlie Fiimish campaign is one that I have been asking my- 
self. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this prob- 
lem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It 
seems to me that even If the Russians had more detailed, plausible and docu- 
mented evidence of "plots'' in or concerning Finland than I have yet seen, and 
even if they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic 
point of view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland. 
On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain smugness in the peojjle who 
either unconsciously assume or explicity state that what Russia did, after a great 
war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French iind British 
did in letting down first Spain and then Czeclioslovakia. The Russians may have 
been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing : but as far as 
the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective securit.y and the honoring of 
treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers 
with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others. The moral guilt of 
Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others, since if you assume 
that there is an absolute morality, then by definition tliere can be no degree of 
morality; but if justification be jileaded. the Russians can point out that they did 
not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can cla'ni that there is a difference 
between being the first to start aggression and committing what might be called 
an act of "self-protective aggression" after the general sci'ainble had begun. 
Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 

P. S. — Who is in charge of the Pacific Council Library now that Lilienthal has 
left? I should like to know if you have, and if I may borrow, "League of Nations 
Mission of Educational Experts: The Reoi-ganization of Educati(tn in China," 
Paris, 1032. 



Mr. Lattimore. The paragraph reads : 



Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the 
Soviet justificati<m for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking 
myself. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this prob- 
lem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It seems 
to me that even if the Russians had more detailed, plausible and documented 
evidence of "jilots" in or concerning Finland that I have yet seen, and even if 
they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic point of 
view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland. 

On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain snuigness in the ijeople 
4 ho either unconsciously assume or explicitly state that what Russia did, after 
a great war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French 
and British did in letting down first Spain and then Czechoslovakia. The Rus- 
sians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3431 

tliiiij;. but as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security 
and the honoriuir of treaties until these principles had been violated by some 
(if the jrreat powers with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others. 
The moral guilt of Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others, 
since there can be no de.gree of morality; but if justification be pleaded, the 
Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression, 
and can claim that there is a difference between being the first to start aggres- 
sion and committing what might be called an act of "self-protective aggression," 
after the general scramble had begun. 

The expression "self-protective aggression" is in quotes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were yon thereby answering Mr. Car- 
ter's query as to what was the most convincing statement as to the 
Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't think I was. I was replying to Mr. 
Carter's letter as a whole anci not to a particular point of it. 

Mr. Morris. Is that your answer, Mr. Lattimore, or Mr. Fortas" 
answer^ 

Mr. Lattimore. My answer has been introduced by the phrase, 
"Your question about where to find the most convincing statement 
as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I 
have been asking myself." 

But the language shows that I had not looked up the matter. 

May I add a word of explanation? 

The Chairman. You Mere asking yourself for a justification of 
the Russian invasion, were 3'ou not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I was not. 

The Chairman. That is what you say here. 

Mr. Lattimore. I was asking where to find the most convincing- 
statement. 

The Chairman. You said it was a question that you had been asking 
yourself. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. In other words, like Mr. Carter, I thought 
that here was an extremely complex and confusing question, and I 
would like to know more evidence on all sides. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, was that your answer to my question, or 
was that Mr. Fortas' answer to my question ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was my answer to your question. 

Mr. Fortas. Mr. Morris, I object. I don't think that is called for. 

The Chairman. I have not caught Mr. Fortas suggesting an.swers 
as yet. 

Mr. Fortas. No, sir: and you won't. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe I should be given the courtesy of making a 
statement. I unconsciously and without deliberation commented on 
Mr. Morris' question, I am afraid, audibly. I said that that is not 
what Mr. Carter had asked JNIr. Lattimore. 

And the record speaks for itself. 

Mr. Morris' question was whether this was the most convincing- 
statement of the Soviet position that Mr. Carter had asked for. Now, 
that is not what the record shows Mr. Carter asked Mr. Lattimore for. 

The Chairman. I do not think you intentionally broke in. 

Mr. Fortas. I did not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. As long as we are all testifying, Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. I hope that that will not occur again. 

Senator, you were asking. 



3432 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I was going to ask a question on that, in 
line with what the Chair asked. 

Your question about where to find the most couvincting statement as to the 
Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking 
myself. 

Mr. Lattimore, does not that clearly indicate that you stated to 
Carter that you had been asking yourself just what he asked you ? 
Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. Something to justify the Finnish campaign. 
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; not something to justify the Finnish cam- 
paign ; a statement of the Soviet point of view as a necessary ingredient 
for anybody who was trying to find out what the score was on Finland. 
Senator Ferguson. Wliat, Mr. Lattimore, was a "self-protective 
aggression" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume, in 1952 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. In 1940. 

Mr. Lattimore. In 1952, trying to reconstruct what I was thinking 

in 1940, 12 years previously, that I meant here that — what is it now 

Senator Ferguson. "Self-protective aggression." 
Mr. Lattimore. Yes; that if justification be pleaded I presume that 
the Russians might put up a case of saying that this was self -protective 
aggression after other people had started aggression. 

I might add that I doubt if anywhere in the record have the Russians 
ever admitted to such a thing as self-protective aggression. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you had any trouble solving, in your own 
mind, the problem as to who was the aggressor in Korea ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The aggressor in Korea was clearly the North 
Korean Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. And you would not say that Russia now calls 
that "self -protective aggression" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would doubt very much if the Russians would 
admit to such a damaging formula. 
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead. 
Mr. SouRwiNE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman? 
The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, when you wrote that letter, did you 
really believe that Russia had only become a treaty breaker because 
Britain and France had set her a bad example? 

The Chairman. Are you referring now to Mr. Lattimore's letter 
of April 29, 1940 ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is correct. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I have your question again, Mr. Sourwine? 
Mr. Sourwine. Did you really believe that Russia had become a 
treaty breaker only because she had been set a bad example by Britain 
and France ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember what I meant at the moment, 
Mr. Sourwine, beyond the language of this letter. 
Mr. Sourwine. Now, I am using plain English. 
Mr. Lattimore. The language of this letter does not support the 
twist that you are trying to put on it, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. What are you saying in that letter? Are you not 
saying in that letter that Russia really stood by her treaties until 
Britain and France set her a bad example, and then she became way- 
ward? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3433 

Mr. Lattimore. No. I am saying : 

The Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do 
this very thing. But as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collec- 
tive security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been 
violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing and 
betrayed by others. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What do you mean by that? 

Mr. Lattimore. I meant there that there were two possibilities. 
One was tliat the Kussians may have been feeling and hoping for 
years for a chance to do this very thing. 

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. You underlined the "may," did you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I put that in as a possibility, and I doubt if 
any pro-Soviet or pro-Communist person would have allowed for that 
possibility. 

The Chairman. What is the other ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you said, "as far as the evidence goes." 

Mr. Lattimore. Then I said, "as far as the evidence goes." 

Obviously, as far as the evidence known to me went at that time. 

jNIr. Sourwine. What I want you to do, ]\Ir. Lattimore, is to put 
into different language what you meant there. You are a man very 
facile with language. Express your thought there another way. 

Mr. FoRTAS. He wants to consult with me. 

The Chairman. All right. 

(Consultation between witness and counsel.) 

The Chairman. Just before proceeding, I would like to have the 
record read back just a little. I think Mr. Lattimore said there were 
two — I do not think he called them alternatives, but he dwelt on one. 

One was that Russia may have for a long time been hoping for this, 
or that is the substance of it. 

The other was something else. He did not dwell on the other. 

Mr. Morris. The other alternative was that the Russians had stood 
by collective security and the honoring of treaties until the treaty 
structure had been violated by others. 

The Chairman. And that they had taken that as a justification; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, not that they had taken it as a justification. 

But I suggested that if justification be pleaded, the Russians can 
point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression. 

Mr. Sourwine. I accept that as an answer, Mr. Chairman. I think 
the witness has rephrased what he said in the letter. 

The Chairman. I think it is an answer. 

Do you accept that as an answer ? 

Mr. SouR^viNE. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right, proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. INIr. Lattimore, do you recall making an effort, after a 
Soviet protest, to prevent the appearance of an article by Mr. L. M. 
Hubbard, in 1938, from appearing in Pacific Affairs? 

Mr. Lattimore. Do I recall what ? 

Mr. Morris. Your making an effort to prevent an article by Mr. 
L. M. Hubbard from appearing in Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember that. If you have a docu- 
ment to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it. 

Mr. Morris. You do recall some controversy about Mr. Hubbard's 
article, do you not? 

88348— 52— pt. 10 11 



3434 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. La'fi'imore. I do recall that Mr. Hubbard wrote an article. I 
don't recall a controversy. 

The Chairman. The question is, Do you recall a controversy about 
Mr. Hubbard's article? It calls for a simple answer, "Yes" or "No." 

Mr. Laitimork. I don't recall a controversy beyond the fact that — 
now, wait a niinue. 

Mr. FoRTAs. What year was this, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. In 1938. That is in the question. 

The Chairman. Do you recall a controversy about Mr. Hubbard's 
article? 

Just answer that, if your memory serves you. 

Mr. Latiimore. I remember not exactly a controversy, but a ques- 
tion of whether another point of view should also be expressed. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document? 

Mr. Mandel. 1 have here a photostat of carbon copy of a letter from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1938, 
addressed to Dr. V. E. Motylev, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, with the 
typed signature of Owen Lattimore, and the initials ECC, in the upper 
lefthand corner. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Mandel, what you mean, is it not, is that you 
have there a photostat of a document from the files of the IPR? Is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Mandel. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. The document itself was a carbon copy of a letter. 

Mr. Mandel. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I show you this document and ask you 
if you recall having sent it? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall having sent it. But I obviously 
did send it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record. 

The Chairman. That document, as I understand it, is a photostatic 
copy of a document in the nature of a carbon copy, found in the files 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. The witness says he obviously had sent it. 

It will be received into the record. 

(The document i-eferred to was marked "Exhibit No. 534" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. .534 

1795 California Street, 
t^iin Franciffco, Calif., February 8, 1938. 
Dr. V. E. MoTYi.Ev, 

20 Razin Street, Moscoiv. 

Dkar Dr. Motyi.kv: Inuiiediately on receipt of .V(inr letter of in .Taniiai'y I 
ciihled yon reqne.stini^ an article on possibilities of constrnctive international ac- 
tion, to be considered as part of a general defense auainst inipei-ialist and fasciKSt 
aggression; this article to be nsed as the leading contribntion in onr June 
nnmbei-. 

I hope very much that you will be able to provide such an article. Naturally, 
I have suggested only geiuM'al terms : the particular terms are for you to decide. 
I may adcl that in the December number I tried to set a tone that would enccmrage 
such articles from all sf)Urces. The response up to date has not been too encourag- 
ing; therefore it will be all the moi-e helpful to me if you can now supply the 
suggested article. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3435 

In regard to L. M. Hubliard's article. I have carefully noted your criticisms. 
I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question 
of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real difiiculty is this : the member- 
ship of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." These nations 
continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual 
members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticising the 
USSR. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so, they will 
criticise Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy 
its usefulness. 

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic 
in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor 
imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the cir- 
cumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favor publi- 
cation of positive and constructive articles, while not prevent'mn entirely the 
expression of negative and defeatist views. This means that whenever we find it 
impossible to prevent publication of such an article as this one by Hubbard 
we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an 
article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with 
them constructively. 

Now as to L. M. Hubbard bimself. Of course I do not propose to print his 
article simply because he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard of Chatham House. 
The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert" 
of the P>ank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is con- 
sidered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article 
would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institiite of Inter- 
national Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan — thus damaging its in- 
fiuence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the Hub- 
bard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications with 
Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation. 

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action: 

(1) I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs. 
A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter. 

(2)' I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to with- 
draw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. It however, he 
officially insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it, in our 
June number. 

(3) Finally. I urge yon to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be 
published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later 
than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House insists 
on publication of the original article. 

In concluding this letter I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at 
this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more 
suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my 
ability, within the limits impo.sed on me by the different national bodies which 
have a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs, I shall publish only material 
which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the USSR 
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with indis- 
pensable assistance. 
Yer.v sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 

The Ch AIRMAN. In ofoino: along here, we have not attempted to nnin- 
ber or designate tliese documents. They .should be numbered in the 
record when the record is ]~>ut up. They should be numbered or 
desiginited so that they will have some designation. 

The Chair has not attempted to do it, bu^ it must be done. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, under a previous order of the Chair, 
these documents were ordered numbered consecutively as introduced. 
They have not been marked, however. Avhich T think is what the Chair 
is referring to. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter commencing 
with paragraph 3, which is where the pertinent reference commences? 



3436 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr, Lattimore (reading) : 

In regard to L. M. Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms. 
I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the ques- 
tion of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real diflSculty is this : The 
membership of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." * * * 

Mr. Morris. That "democratic" is in quotes, is it not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; "democratic nations" is in quotes [reading] : 

* * * These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free 
speech. Many individual members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the 
purpose of criticizing the U. S. S. R. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent 
them from doing so, they will criticize Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet 
propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness. 

Senator Ferguson. That organ of Soviet propaganda is in quotes. 
]\Ir. Lattimore. Is in quotes, yes [reading] : 

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic 
in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor 
imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the circum- 
stances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favor publication 
of positive and constructive articles, while not preventing entirely the expression 
of negative and defeatest views. This means that whenever we find it impossible 
to prevent publication of such an article, as this one by Hubbard, we should at 
least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which 
deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them con- 
structively. 

Now as to L. M. Hubbard himself. Of course, I do not propose to print his 
article simply t)ecause he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House. 
The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert" 
of the Bank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is con- 
sidered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article 
would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institute of Inter- 
national Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan — thus damaging its 
infiuence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the 
Hubbard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications 
with Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation. 

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action : 

1. I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs. 
* * * 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that paragraph was? 
Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't [reading] : 

* * * A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter. 

2. I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to withdraw 
the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. If, however, he officially 
insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it. in our June 
number. 

3. Finally, I urge you to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be 
published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later 
than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House 
insists on publication of the original article. 

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at 
this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more 
suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my 
ability, within the limits imposed on me by the different national bodies which 
liave a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs. I shall publish only material 
which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the 
U. S. S. R. Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with 
indispensable assistance. 
Very truly yours, 

Owen Lattimore, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ^ 3437 

May I comment ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. This letter begins with a paragraph not yet read 
into the record, showing that I had received a letter from Mr. Motylev, 
evidently a letter criticizing the article I was about to publish. 

Senator Fergusox. Had you submitted it to Motylev in order that 
he could censor it? 

Mr. Latiimore. No ; not for censorship. 

In the course of the usual practice of Pacific Affairs, I liad circu- 
lated the article in advance. 

Senator Ferguson. To whom did you circulate those that were pro- 
Soviet? Who in America censored them or looked them over for 
the pro-Soviet article? 

Mr. Lattimore. All articles were circulated to those who might be 
considered most interested, in the first place. Many of them were 
sent additionally to people who might be considered to have no posi- 
tion one way or the other. 

The Chairman. That is not an answer to the question. 

Senator Ferguson. That does not answer my question. 

The Chairman. That is not an answer to that question at all. 

Read the question, Mr. Reporter. 

The question was propounded twice. 

Mr. LA'riTMORE. I recall only one article. 

The Chairman. Just a moment. 

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the 
reporter. ) 

The Chairman. I think there was more. He doubled back. 

Senator Ferguson. You say you circulated this because it was 
anti-Soviet. It is clear from the letter that you did that. I want to 
know 

Mr. Lattimore. In the same way- 



The Chairman. Let the Senator ask his question, and answer it. 

Senator Ferguson. To whom did you submit pro-Soviet articles 
so that they could be censored, or, as least, criticized before they were 
published ? 

Mr. Laitimore. That would depend on the content of the article. 
Any article would be circulated 

Senator Ferguson. Suppose it was an article criticizing Russia, 
written by a United States writer. 

Mr. Lattimore. An article criticizing Russia by a United States 
writer would be circulated to the Russians, also to the British, Chi- 
nese, Japanese, and so on. 

Senator Fergusqn. Suppose it was an article by Soviet Russia, pro- 
Soviet. Who criticized it for the United States ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The New York office would look after that. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Field? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether it would be Mr. Field, or 
who it would be. It would also be circulated to the Japanese, Chinese, 
British, et cetera. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think that ^Ir. Field was a competent 
critic to determine whether or not an article should be changed that 
was a pro-Russion article? 



3438 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. In 1938 I thoii^dit that Mr. Field was one of the 
critics to whom such an article might be circulated. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? 

]Mr. LA-rriMORE. You will remember that in the record there was 
an article by a Soviet contributor, which I personally disliked very 
much and which was finally put in because the Chinese Council said, 
"Oh, go ahead and print it^ it is the Soviet i^oint of view and every- 
body knows it is''; although the Japanese continued to object. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. May I mquire, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. 

I cannot quite understand why you would take an article by this 
Britisher and send it to the Russians, which is in effect sending it to the 
Russian Government, for their connnent on that article as to whether 
or not you should or should not print it. 

Mr. Lattimore. It was part of regular practice. It was the same 
for all other councils. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had stricken out one anti-Soviet para- 
graph, at least ? 

Mr. Laitimore. Which was undoubtedly also covered in my cor- 
res|)ondence with the British. 

This is only a part of the record, and the full record would show 
my correspondence with the British as well. 

"Senator Ferguson. I would like to see it all. 

Mr. Lattimore. So should I, Senator. 

The Chairman. The question was asked now about having stricken 
one out ; that is, the Soviet phase of it, at least. 

Did you, or did you not in the letter so state? 

Mr. Lattimore. The letter so states. 

Senator Ferguson. You said it was the most objectionable, indi- 
cating there were other objectionable ones that were anti-Soviet. But 
that was the most? 

Mr. LAT-riMORE. That was evidently my opinion at the time. 

And may I add that this was undoubtedly covered in correspondence 
with the British, too. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to see the article. 

Mr. Latitmore. This was a period when all of us were leaning over 
backward trying to drag the Soviets into more contributions to Pacific 
affairs, and more participation in the Institute, and I remember clear- 
ly that the attitude taken was, "Let's get the Russians out of this 
business of just criticizing and stalling; let's get them to make some 
contributions and then make them realize that they are getting only 
the same treatment as other peoi^le." 

You can see that this whole letter is an attempt to explain to a 
Russian, who is unfamiliar with the practice of free speech and criti- 
cism in democratic countries, how things worked and that Russia 
was not being particularly singled out as an object of anti-Soviet 
propaganda; that we frequently published articles unacceptable to 
other councils. 

This was recognized practice at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. When you had a pro-Soviet article, to whom 
did you submit the article so that an anti-Soviet could appear in the 
same edition? 

You were indicating liero that you were going to do that on the 
reverse. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3439 

Mr. LA-rriMORE. I referred already to the case of an article — I 
believe it was by Voitinsky— which attacked both the Japanese and 
the Chinese, and I asked both the Chinese and the Japanese to reply, 
A\hich they didn't. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you send them copies of the articled 

Mr. Lattimore. I sent them copies of the article in advance. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr, Chairman, may I inquire \ 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it not your understanding, Mr. Lattimore, 
that the Soviets would not permit the editing or changing of their 
articles^ 

Mr. Lattimore. That question was brought up in one of the con- 
ferences at Moscow, and we were still then in the frame of mind that 
many people had in those years 

The Chairman. Just a moment. I want to get the question. 1 
want to get the question and see whether you are ansAvering it. 

(The record Avas read by the reporter.) 

The Chairman. The question was what Avas your understanding. 

Mr. Laitimore. My understanding is that quite recently Mr. Chair- 
man, in those memoranda 

The Chairman. The question is Avas it not your understanding, re- 
ferring to that particular time. 

Mr. Lattimore. My understanding was that the Russians had made 
that demand. My recollection Avas that Ave Avere still hoping to Avean 
them aAvay from this Soviet rigidity Avhich has since become more 
familiar to all of us. 

Mr. SouRAviNE. You had had that made clear to you in the con- 
ferences in Moscow in 1936. that the Russians would not permit their 
articles to be changed or edited l 

Mr. LAT'riMORE. That had been made clear, that that Avas the Soviet 
attitude, and Ave had not accepted, from our point of vieAV, the idea 
that that attitude could not be changed. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever strike out of a Soviet article a part 
that you thought Avas objectionable? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you produce that? 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't produce it, but I remember that that very 
question came up in the case of the article by Voitinsky. 

Senator Ferguson. Then Avill you produce it so that Ave Avill have 
it here on the record. 

The Chairman. Was the article jiublished? 

Mr. Latfimore. The article was ])ublished. 

Senator Ferguson. The IPR Avould be able to do that for you. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, I don't think they can do it. You have 
all of the IPR documents. 

Senator Ferguson. They can come doAvn here and look through the 
papers. 

The Chairman. The IPR must have it if it Avas published. It 
must l)e in the files of the IPR. 

Mr. Lattimore. I remember Avriting to Mr. Carter my strong ob- 
jections to the Avhole tone of that Soviet article. 

Senator Ferguson. That Avas not my question. Did you strike any 
of it out? 

Mr. Lattimore. I struck some of it out. 



3440 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Will you produce or have the institute pi^^ace 
for this record what you struck out? 

The Chairman. The question is to produce the article, and I think 
it calls for the printed article. 

Mr. FoRTAs. Senator, may I inquire whether we may have access 
to the IPR files in vour possession for the purpose of searching for 
that? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, you can look through them. I ask the 
Chair that you be permitted to do that. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Not for the article. The article would not show what 
was cut out. It would require access to the files. 

The Chairman. The article, he said, was printed. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Yes, but it would not show what was deleted. 

The Chairman. But he could designate where the deletion was. 

Mr. SouRW^iNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might submit, I do not believe 
the files of the IPR would contain editorial material of Pacific Affairs. 
Would they, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. That I couldn't tell you. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were not the Pacific Affairs files kept separately? 

Mr, Lattimore. The Pacific Affairs files were kept separately by 
me, but I think in large part in duplicate in the New York office. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You have made a point, sir, that, as Pacific Affairs 
editor, you were employed by the International Council of IPR. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. The files which this committee has are the files of 
the American Council of the IPR. 

Can you tell the committee whether your files of Pacific Affairs 
were duplicated in the files of the American Council of the IPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know, Mr. Sourwine, whether they were 
kept in the files of the American IPR or in a separate file box in the 
New York office. 

But Pacific Affairs, the handling of the printing and distribution 
of Pacific Affairs, was done from New York, and I sent copies of all 
manuscripts and correspondence in the normal course of operation to 
the subeditor in New York. 

Mr. Sourwine. To the American IPR did j^ou send such manu- 
scripts and correspondence? 

Mr. Lattimore. To the person who was acting as the subeditor of 
Pacific Affairs in New York. 

Mr. Sourwine. Who was that? 

Mr. Lattimore. In those years I think it was Miss Catherine Porter. 

Mr. Sourwine. This committee is interested in thb relationship be- 
tween Pacific Affairs and the American Council of IPR and has 
touched on that subject before and understood you to say that you 
were making a clear distinction that you were not employed by the 
American Council of IPR, that you were working for the Interna- 
tional IPR. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is quite right. 

Mr. Sourwine. If, as a matter of fact, your correspondence and 
records of documents and manuscripts were filed with the American 
Council of IPR, that is a germane and important point, and we would 
like to know what your best memory is on it. 

Mr. Lattimore. IVIy best memory is that duplicates of all corre- 
spondence and manuscripts were sent to Miss Porter in New York. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3441 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What happened to the original ? 

The Chairman. Miss Porter was with whom or with what organi- 
zation, rather? 

Mr. Lattimore. She was with the IPR, and she may have been — I 
couldn't recall ; the records will undoubtedly show it — she was prob- 
ably working part time with the American Council and part time for 
the Pacific Council. 

Senator Watkins. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Yes, 

Senator Watkins. Was this Hubbard article actually published in 
Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; it was. 

Senator Watkins. Did the Russians send in a reply to it? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; as usual, they didn't. This was one more 
case of our trying to get something out of them so that there could be 
equal treatment. I think that article — I may be wrong in saying it — 
was by Voitinsky ; that article that we published was on railway ques- 
tions in jManchuria by a Soviet correspondent. I believe that was the 
only one we ever got out of them. 

Senator Watkins. You asked them to reply and send it in early so 
you could publish it in the same number ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right, and they never sent it. 

Senator Watkins. Suppose they had sent in a reply, what would 
have been your action witli respect to that reply ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would have gone straight to Chatham House, 
among other councils. The top carbon copy would have gone to 
Chatham House. 

Senator Watkins. Would you have published that, with the others 
having a chance to criticize and tell what they thought about the reply 
article ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would have been subject to the same sort of back- 
and-forth correspondence between a number of councils and 
individuals. 

The Chairman. The question is, Would you have published it? 

Mr. Lattimore. The publication would have followed exactly the 
same course as in the case of the Soviet article. 

The Chairman. The Senator wants to know if you would have pub- 
lished the article. 

Mr. Fortas. Could we have the question read back ? 

Senator Watkins. I did not think I asked that, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. It may be read back. 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Watkins. Would you have published it, the reply without 
first submitting it to these others ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Definitely not. 

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, you were rushing him to get 
it in so you would have had it there in time. You would not have had 
time to do that, would you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I wanted to get it out of him as early as possible ; 
but, if there had been a cable or a letter from the British saying that 
they objected to it, then it would have been held over to a later num- 
ber. That kind of thing frequently happened. 



3442 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. As I got from this situation, you were right up 
against a deadline, and you would not have time to do all of this, send 
it around and have it circulated around. 

Mr. Lattimore. We always, Senator, tried to get articles as early as 
])ossible, es])ecially from these non-English-si)eaking councils, because 
they were always falling behind deadlines, and we were usually giv- 
ing them a deadline ahead of the real deadline so as to give ourselves 
a little margin of time. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have a real deadline, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; not as a newspaper regards it, sir. With a 
quarterly magazine there is always 

Mr. SouKwiNE. I did not mention newspaper. Did you have a real 
deadline, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We had a flexible sort of a deadline. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I think jVIr. Sourwine asked a ques- 
tion just now that had been answered, and 1 think maybe we ought to 
clear it up now. That is to say where the files of Pacific Affairs were 
located, if, indeed, they were located anywhere else except at the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Sourwine. That was not cleared up. Senator. 

Senator Smith. I can see how the editorial files might have been in 
Mr. Lattimore's possession or in one of the other's ])ossession. Why 
not ask Mr. Lattimore specifically whether or not the files that would 
have contained the original articles which, when compared witli the 
article which was printed, would have shown what was deleted, 
whether he has that file or whether he knows where it is. 

Mr. Lattimore. I had that file', and I think I can tell you exactly 
what happened. I kept original files in the same office in which I 
worked at Johns Hopkins. 

At that time I was considered half time with Johns Hopkins and 
half time with the institute. Then I left, went out to China, did 
various war jobs, came back to Johns Ho))kins. and did not want to 
resume the editorship of Pacific Affairs. 

I remember at that time writing to the New York office and saying: 
'"Here I have a lot of back files of Pacific Affaiis. Do you want them 
shipped to New York or shall I junk them ^'' The answer was: "We 
think the duplicate files here are sufficient, so yoti can just junk that 
stuff you have in Baltimore.'' 

Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean by the Xew Yoi'k office, Mr. 
Lattimore? The New York office of what ^ 

Mr. LAT-riMORK. The Xew York odlce of IPK. 

Mr. Sourwine. The International Council or the American Council ? 

Mr. LA'rriMORE. The two offices were together. I don't recall 
clearly, but on this case I would probably have written to Mr. Carter 
as secretary-general, therefore representing the International IPR. 

Senator Smith. Well, now, were those files actually junked, or do 
yo\i still have them somewhere in your office '. 

Mr. Latitmore. No, sir; they were junked. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your o]:»inion, sir, as the former editor of Pacific 
Affairs, that the best place to look foi- old files of Pacific Affairs is in 
the files of the American Comicil of the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Lattimore. The best place to look would be in the storage files 
of Pacific Affairs. Whether they have been amalgamated witli the 
American Council files or not is something I just don't know about. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ^ 3443 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I ceased to have any concern. 

Senator Ferguson. Who wrote the headings for the articles ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Sometimes the author; sometimes I, myself. 

Senator P>.rguson. In the Hubbard article, who wrote it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what it was? 

Mr. Lattimore. AVhat the article was? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

The Chairman. The article or the heading ? 

Senator Ferguson. The heading. 

Mr. Fortas. The question is the heading. 

Mr. Lattimore. There are two articles by L. E. Hubbard ; that is, 
the one that is being given here — it is a misprint — ^by L. M. 

Senator Ferguson. The one of October 1937. 

Mr. Lattimore. One of June 1938, called A Capitalist Appraisal of 
the Soviet LTnion, and one of September 1938, The Standard of Living 
in the Soviet Union. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you get the article from Plubbard, 
the one A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Published in June 1938? I don't know when I 
got it. Maybe several weeks ahead, maybe several months ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. The letter to Motylev is February 8, 1938, and 
he had apparently had the article before that. Did you not get it 
around October, when the man wrote ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Did he write it in October ? 

Senator Ferguson. There is another footnote on it : "This article 
was written in October 1937." 

I notice that tlie editor edited this even in the article. Apparently 
you put the heading on, "A capitalist appraisal of the Soviet Union," 
and your first footnote is: "This article was written in October 1937." 

Your second footnote is: "In 1937 production rose to 1,000 
pounds — Ed." 

You were seeing that the people were advised when the article 
was written. He had written, in his article, 1925, 667 pounds of 
grain. I will read what it says : 

Since Russia has always been self-suflScient in food, the average consump- 
tion per head of population must be determined by the production per head 
of population. The most important constituent in the total food supply is 
grain. Official Soviet figures show that the total quantity of wheat and rye 
produced per head of population since 1925 has varied as follows : 1925, 677 
pounds ; 1926, 731 pounds ; 1927, 666 pounds ; 1928, 590 pounds ; 1929, 550 pounds ; 
1930, 696 pounds ; 1931, 503 pounds ; 1932, 480 pounds ; 1933, 681 pounds ; 1934, 672 
pounds ; 1935, 697 pounds. This is an average of about 632 pounds — 

Now you put the "2" in and refer down to your own footnote, and 
you make this memorandum : "In 1937 production rose to over 1,000 
pounds." 

Why did you do that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably because that was a recent statistic 
that had come to hand since the author wrote his article. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get it? 

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably from the New York office. We had 
several people there doing research on Soviet economics, and so forth. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think you may have got that from 



3444 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Field to make it appear that these figures were all wrong because 
it was a capitalist appraisal ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it. I think it would be much more likely 
that we got it from somebody who was able to read economic 
materials. 

Senator Ferguson. On page 174 you have a footnote 3 giving differ- 
ent figures than he gave. 

Mr. Lattimore. More recent figures ; is that right ? 

Senator Ferguson. No. You give : 

Professor Prokopovich, in his Bulletin No. 104, published by the Slavonic 
Institute in Prague, gives the following comparison of the purchasing power 
of the price of a quintal of wheat and rye in 1913 and 1932. 

The item that you corrected was : 

There is no doubt that the purchasing power of the peasants' money income 
now is less than prewar. 

Now, to contradict that, you publish, as an editor's note, something 
different. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Senator, may the witness see that ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I am going to show it to him later. 

Then you make a correction on page 177 : "Figures for 1936 include 
all footwear, for previous years only leather footwear." 

Then on page 184 there is a criticism, or this sentence is used : 

The greater part of the collective farm peasant's income consists of a dividend 
in kind from the farm produce after all State requirements have been filled, and, 
as an individual, he has no choice in the policy of the farm nor in the work he 
must do. 

You have carried it in "6" and you call it an editor's footnote. You 
put this in : 

This does not agree with the account in Soviet Communism, a New Civiliza- 
tion, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, second edition, London, 1937 — Ed. 

How do you account for that correction ? 

Mr. LAT'riMORE. I suppose somebody had found this other statistic 
and put it in. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was working on this article besides you? 

Mr. LAT'ruviORE. I have no idea who may have worked on it in the 
New York office. 

Senator Ferguson. This article annoyed you to have published it, 
did it not; it was quite a corn to you to have to publish this article? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was trying to avoid a break with the 
Soviet Union. I was trying to get them into the works and get them 
to participate in the give and take of the other councils. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not do the best by these footnotes to 
appease the Soviets? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I would not say so. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not say so? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think that last quote that I gave 
you, No. 6, was an appeasement to the Soviets? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think so. I think it was an attempt 
to balance tlie article, and may I say that the whole such editorial 
changes were referred 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3445 

The Chairman. Just a minute. Strike that last from the record, 
Mr. Reporter. When you are asked to pause, please, Mr. Lattimore, 
pause. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you found anything in this record so far, 
and I am excluding yours now, on the part of Carter or Field that 
has been pro-Soviet. I do not think I have found an answer from you 
that anything was ever pro-Soviet. 

I am asking you, can you point out anything that you have heard 
in the record by Field or Carter that was pro-Soviet? 

The Chairman. In the record of this hearing? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; in the record of this hearing. 

Mr. Lattimore. No; not in any objectionable sense. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you qualifying it? Objectionable to you? 
That is the difficulty in this hearing. You want to be the sole judge, 
judge. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I merely wish to be 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking whether it is objectionable. I 
am asking whether it was pro-Soviet. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; not in the sense of furthering 

The Chairman. The answer is "No" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No." 

Senator Ferguson. Even the letter this morning ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Even the letter this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. From Carter to you, about the invasion of 
Finland ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was an attempt to get all sides of a ques- 
tion by a man who had not yet made up his mind. I don't think 
that can be called pro- Soviet. 

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore, you were 
against publishing any anti-Soviet articles, were you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people to 
participate in the working of the institute. 

Senator Watkins. Let me read you this sentence from your letter. 

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that 
at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find 
more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. 

That is a part of your letter. That expressed your views. 

Mr. Lattimore. That expressed part of what I thought was a 
diplomatic approach to these rigid and unbending 

The Chairman. The question is, did that express your views? 
Answer that question. 

Mr. Lattimore. It expressed my attempt to be diplomatic. 

Senator Watkins. At that time, were you anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet 
in your own views ? 

Mr. Lattimore. As best I can recall, Senator, at that time I was 
not pro-Soviet, and in the workings of the institute I was trying to 
get the Soviet people to participate. 

The Chairman. All right ; let us proceed. 

Mr. Lattimore. I was certainly anti-Communist. 

Senator Watkins. I had a question there with respect to that. 

Mr. Lattimore. I was not anti-Soviet participation in the institute, 
certainly. 



3446 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. Did you realize there was any danger from a 
Communist philoso]^]iy and the Communist progi'am at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. As for 1938 I did not consider that they were dan- 
gerous ; no. 

Senator Watkins. And when you said that you agreed with this 
sentiment, they ought not to publisli anti-Soviet articles, you would 
be against any kind of an anti-Soviet article that might reveal even a 
dangerous situation that was coming up? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people into 
l^articipation in the IPR, and for that purpose I was willing to limit 
the number of articles that were direct attacks on the Soviet until we 
could get them in and make them realize that they were not being 
given any treatment different from any other council. 

Senator Watkins. You said that you should not publish these anti- 
Soviet articles. 

Mr. Lattimore. Obviously trying to placate Mr. Motylev and try- 
ing to get him to be a little more cooperative than he had been in 
the past, or ever was in the future. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire so the record 
will be very clear on this. If you changed the article in any way from 
the author, did you always say "Ed.," indicating it was editor, if there 
was a footnote ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. I not only did that, but I also referred 
it back to the author himself. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you try and show us, then, the corre- 
spondence showing whether or not these footnotes all have been sub- 
mitted to the author or not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. As far as the record of these documents may show 
them, I will certainly try to. 

The Chairman. As I understand, the record of these documents 
and the record that he kept, let us see if I have this clear, the files 
that he kept have been destroyed. Am I correct in that assumption 
from his answers? 

Mr. Lattimore. The files that I kept I had been told to junk because 
it was considered that the duplicate files in NeAv York were sufficient. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you in fact junk them? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did. 

Senator Ferguson. I might say that on page 174 appears " — Ed." ', 
meaning editor. On the other pages there are uo "Ed." 's on them or 
" — Ed.," except on the last one that I read, where I read the "Ed.," on 
page 184. 

Mr. Lattimore. The other notes would be the author's own notes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then wnll you get us the correspondence or try 
to find the correspondence between you and the author approving the 
editor's notes ? 

Mr. Latitmore. If they can be found in the files yoti possess, I will 
be glad to try. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Senator, so the record may be clear, do I understand 
that it was the first footnote and the last footnote to which you re- 
ferred that have ''Ed." and the other ones to which you referred do not 
have "Ed."? 

Senator Ferguson. I did not read "Ed." on those, either, 
Mr. SouRAviNE. Mr. Chairman, if I may intrude here, I am inter- 
ested in the witness' suggestion that the first place to start looking for 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3447 

these is the files that the committee has. I asked the witness earlier 
if he felt that the best place to look was in these files, and I understood 
his answer to imply that he did not think so. 

I would like to ask again, sir, do you think that the most likely 
place to find remainino; files of Pacific Affairs is in the files of the 
American Council of IPR, which this committee now possesses? 

Mr. Lattimore. I assume that you had all of the files, all of the 
back files, and that they might include international files as well as 
xVmerican council files. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. If we do not have international files, do you still 
feel that the best place to look would be in the files of the American 
council, which this committee has? 

Mr. Lattimore. As I said, Mr. Sourwine, I don't know anywhere 
else to look. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Do you have any resources for attempting to deter- 
mine what became of those carbons which you were told were adequate 
records ? 

Mr. Lattimore. None whatever. 

Mr. Sourwine. There is no one you could ask what became of them ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I could ask the IPR people if they had amalga- 
mated the international files with the American council files. May I 
explain why I think so? 

My understanding is that those back files had been moved up to 
]\Ir. Carter's barn, partly because of lack of space in the Xew York 
office 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, pardon the interruption. 

The Chairman. That is not an explanation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you not testify here, sir, that you had no knowl- 
edge about those files being in the barn, or where they were, until you 
read in the newspaper that this committee had seized the files? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. But I don't think that alters the 
explanation I was just giving. 

The Chairman. That is not an explanation of anything, because 
you do not know. 

Mr. Lattimore. I think there is a 

The Chairman. Just a moment. I am not going to argue with the 
witness, and I do not want the witness arguing with the Chair. 

Mr. Lattimore. I thought the record showed that I had a pertinent 
point, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Smith. I thought Mr. Lattimore answered a question I 
asked him if he had been in the barn, and I thought he said ''Yes.'' 

Was that before or after the documents were in there ? 

Mr. Lait^'imore. I couldn't even tell you that. I don't know which 
year they were moved up there. 

Senator Smith. Do you know how many times you were in the 
barn ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Maybe four or five times. 

Senator Smith. Did you ever have any conferences or meetings 
there with Mr. Carter or anybody else in the barn ? 

Mr. La'i^itmork. Yes. Part of the barn was fitted up as a sort of 
conference room. 

Senator Smith. That was with respect to IPR nuitters? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was with respect to IPR mattei-s, and I be- 
lieve that the only occasions that I was there were on matters of the 



3448 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

International IPR, the Pacific council, rather than the American 
council. 

Senator Smith. You never saw any of the IPR records in that barn, 
the question Mr. Sourwine just referred to ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I remember there were file cases there, but I 
don't know what was in which ones. I know that Mr. Carter was 
planning to write a history of the IPR, and, therefore, he would have 
legitimate reason to have Pacific council files there as well as Amer- 
ican council files. 

Senator Smith. He sort of took over that job? 

Mr. Lattimore. After he retired he was going to spend some time 
on writing a history of tlie IPR. 

The Chairman. Who has a question ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I have one, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask it. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Sourwine. You destroyed the files of Pacific Affairs, is that 
right, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I junked them. 

Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean by junked them? 

Mr. Lattimore. I told my secretary that we didn't want these files 
any more, and would she have the janitor take them out. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where was this at the time, over at Johns Hop- 
kins? 

Mr. Lattimore. At Johns Hopkins. 

Mr. Sourwine. When did you do this? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think in 1945 or 1946, after I had returned to the 
Hopkins from my war jobs. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your testimony that you had none of the files 
of Pacific Affairs in your possession or under your control after 1946? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. When these files were junked, as you say, were they 
taken out by the janitor ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The next time I came into my office they weren't 
there. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what was done with them ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I haven't the faintest idea. 

Mr. Sourwine. You know we had a case over in an investigation 
before the other body where a witness initially testified that he put 
certain papers in the wastebasket and later on he said, "They didn't 
ask me what I did with the wastebasket." 

Mr. Fortas. Mr. Chairman, could we have a few minutes' recess? 

The Chairman. We will recess at 12. Is that all right? 

Mr. FoRTAs. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider this article by L. E. 
Hubbard an anti-Soviet article? 

If you have difficulty answering that question, I call your attention 
to the last paragraph of the letter we have been discussing. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think. Mr. Morris, at that time 1 was com- 
petent to judge an economic article on the economics of Soviet Russia. 
I considered it an article that the Russians considered anti-Soviet. 

Mr. Morris. I am just using your expression of anti-Soviet there 
in the last paragraph. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3449 

The Chairman. Eeacl the last paragraph. Read the first sentence 
of the last paragraph. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at 
this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more 
suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Did you consider this article an anti-Soviet article? 

Mr. Lattimore. I considered it an article that the Russians consid- 
ered anti-Soviet. 

The Chairman. The question is did you consider it an anti-Soviet 
article. It is asking for your own consideration. 

Mr. Lattimore. I consider that I was incompetent to judge on the 
subject. Maybe if I looked over the correspondence 

The Chairman. That is the answer. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what did you mean in paragraph 3 of 
that letter, that criticism of Pacific Affairs as an organ of Soviet 
propaganda would largely destroy its usefulness ? 

Mr. FoRTAS. That is not quite the quote. 

Mr. Morris. What did you mean by that ? 

Mr. FoRTAs. That is not quite the quote. 

Mr. Lattimore. I said : 

If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so — 

that is, prevent people from criticizing the U. S. S. R. — 

they will criticize Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely 
destroy its usefulness. 

You Avanted to know what I meant by that ? 

Mr, Morris. What did you mean by "that, yes? 

Mr. Lattimore. 1 meant to try to educate the Russians to an under- 
standing of the practice in democratic countries that if you publish 
pro and con articles you are not necessarily engaged in a campaign 
against some one particular country, something that we never got them 
to understand. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that next letter ? 

Mr. ]Mandel. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, evidentlv a photostat of a carbon from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 10, 1938, 
addressed to a Miss Harriet INIoore, American-Russian Institute, 56 
West Forty-fifth Street, Xew York, N. Y. It is unsigned. 

Mr. Morris. What is the address of the letter, the mailing address? 

Mr. Mandel. It comes from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New 
York. 

Mr. Morris. Is this the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
at that time ? 

Mr. ]SL4lndel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Just a moment now. I want Mr. Mandel to testify. 

Is this a photostatic copy of a paper found in the files of the Pacific 
Relations, the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The reason I raise that question is that you say 
"evidently." I want to clear it as to whether it is or is not. It is; 
is that right? 

Mr. Mandel. It is. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 12 



3450 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record 
inasmuch as the first parao;raph in this letter relates to the controversy 
that we have now been taking testimony on? 

The Chairman. Let me look at it. 

Mr. Morris. "Mr. Chairman, it is an unsigned letter, but it did 
emanate from the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. It is addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, American- 
Russian Institute, 5(i West Forty-fifth Street, Xew York. Very well, 
it will be received in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 535" and is 
as follows:) 

p]xiiiniT No. 53.") 

129 East Fifty-second Street. 
Neic York City, February 10, 1<J38. 
Miss Harriet Moore, 

Anicrican-Riissinri Institute, 

56 West Forty-fifth Street, Neiv York, N. Y. 

Dkar Harriet: Has Owen Lattimore written you about Motylev's protest over 
the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a copy. Lattimore feels that our 
relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we are 
asking Motylev to write for the same issue a re.ioinder. Now. Motylev will 
probably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considei'ing getting both you 
and Gradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder 
that can possibly be produced. 

Before starting in on it, however, I should like to talk with you so as to get 
your reaction to the proposal. 

Tuesday afternoon, your father and mother put on a swell cocktail party for 
me (or rather for the IPR) at the Casino. It was delightful to see them both 
and to see your brother. You will probably hear from the family as to who 
attended. The only academic people were Sam Harper and Hazard. Howard 
Vincent O'Brien of the Daily News was there, and Mrs. T. Kenneth Boyd. As 
for the rest, I'll have to get the list from your family as I just couldn't rt>member 
the names of everyone that I met. After the meeting was over. Harper and 
Hazard endorsed an aside that I made with reference to your competency. 

At luncheon yesterday with Sewell Avery. I took the same line. 

I wonder wiiether you can spare a little time to see me on, say, Monday 
afternoon, the 14th? 

Sincerely yours, 



Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the first paragraph, 
please? 

Mr. Laitimore (reading) : 

Dear Harriet: Has Owen Lattimore written to you about Motylev's protest 
over the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a coi)y. Lattimore feels that 
our relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we 
are asking Motylev to write for the same issue a rejoinder. Now, Motylev will 
pi-obably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considering getting both you 
and Oradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder 
that can possibly be produced. 

Before starting in on it, 1 should like to talk with you so as to get your reaction 
to the proposal. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, at that time, did you know that Harriet 
Moore was a Communist^ 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I did nol. and I did nol consider her a Com- 
numist. 

Seiuitor Feu(!Uson. Who woidd yoii say wrote tliis letter, Mr. Lat- 
timore, from its text? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no way of knowing. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3451 

The Chairmax. It is associated with your correspondence with Mr. 
Carter, is it not? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you strike out enouji:h of it to have it a])i)eas- 
iiio; to the Russians, with your editor's notes? 

Mr. Laitimore. I don't think the editor's notes were appeasin<«- 
the Russians, hut apart from that ■ 

Mr. Fortas. What is tlie question? 

Senator Ferguson. The question is, did they ever write this masterly^ 
))enetratiiio-, penetrating- and masterly, rejoinder and take the sting 
out of this capitalist article? 

The Chairman. That can be answered yes or no. 

Mr. FoRTAs. Senator, I do not think so. 

The Chairman. Did you ever write, yes or no? # 

Mr. FoRTAs. Did you ever write, yes or no, but not with that 
addendum. 

Senator Ferguson. I am going- to frame the ciuestions, Mr. Fortas, 
not you. 

Tlie Chairman. You are not going to i)ass on these questions, Mr. 
Fortas, 

Senator Ferguson. What is the answer to my c^uestion, Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

The Chairman. Read the question to the witness. 

(The record w^as read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe any masterly rejoinder was ever 
written, but we did publish, in June 19o8, an article called The Rate 
of (xrowth in the Soviet Union, which might be considered as an article 
balancing the Hubbard article. That article is listed by A. W. Canniff, 
and recently, when I was looking through copies of Pacific Affairs, 1 
noticed that A. W. Canniff was described as a pseudonym. 

That may have been the result of this — this pseudonym may repre- 
sent the article wdiich is suggested in this letter. But my recollection 
is not at all clear on the subject. 

Senator Ferguson. Who wrote the article ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Who wrote the Canniff article? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. I was trying to recall that, and I haven't been able 
to recall it. When I saw that it was a pseudonym, I searched my 
memory to see if I could remember who it was. 

Senator Ferguson. Why would it be written by an alias? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is what I couldn't imagine at the time I saw 
it. Now, from this letter here 

The Chairman. Which letter do you refer to now, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am referring to this unsigned letter to Miss 
Harriet Moore of February 10, that it may have been a joint research 
article done by Miss Harriet Moore and Mr. Gradjansev, and that 
for purposes of simplification they wrote it under a pseudonym in- 
stead of a joint name. This is pure speculation on my part. 

Senator Ferguson. But it appears that at least Miss Moore has 
refused to ansAver whether or not, when she was working on this job, 
she was a Communist, and her ground assigned was that it would tend 
to incriminate her. 

I think you have indicated that that was sufficient proof to you to 
jjrove that she was a Communist, 



3452 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. That would certainly raise that presumption in 
my mind. But as I have also said quite recently, in 1938 I had no 
reason whatever to consider Miss Moore a Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was the gentleman there, Gradjansev? 

Mr. Lattimore. The other was Mr. Gradjansev, who was a White 
Russian. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether that is the same Mr. Gradjansev 
who was dismissed from General MacArthur's headquarters for left- 
wing activity ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I did not know that he was dismissed for left- 
wing activity. I know he worked for a while under SCAP. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know he was dismissed ? 

Mr. Latiimgre. Xes ; I knew he was dismissed. 

Mr. Morris. What reason did you believe was the cause of his dis- 
missal ? 

Mr. Lathmore. The reason I heard was that he had given some 
cigarettes to some Japanese. He was a man who didn't smoke, and 
he used his cigarette ration to give to some Japanese who were doing 
some economic work for him, and this was considered, I believe, to be 
black-marketeering. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that the American- 
Russian Institute was affiliated with the Soviet organization Voks? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have been asked that question before, and I did 
not know it. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know it was cited by the Attorney General as 
a subversive organization, the American-Russian Institute? 

Mr. Lattimore. I had heard that, and then I heard that that deci- 
sion had been revoked . 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document, 
please ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 24, 1938, addressed 
to Owen Lattimore, with a typed signature of G. E. Hubbard. It is 
a photostat of a carbon from the files of the institute. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this document, and ask if 
you can recall having received that letter. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall having received it, but obviously I 
did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please? 

Mr. Fortas. May we have a copy ? 

Mr. Morris. I am sorry, we do not have copies of that. 

Mr. Lattimore. You want me to read the full letter? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. This is dated February 24, 1938 [reading] : 

Exhibit No. 536 

Deae Lattimore : I have received your letter of February 8 about the articles 
by my brother (whose initials by the way are L. E. not L. M.). 

It is my first sight of the article as I sent the only copy I had to your New 
York office as I explained at the time. As it now stands after your pruning, 
I confess I can't quite understand why the trouble has arisen. Barring the last 
two paragraphs, which verge on politics, it seems to me a thoroughly unemotional, 
well-documented and slightly overstatistical, statement of economic conditions 
in Russia. Whether the picture it gives is one-sided only a very well informed 
person can tell ; knowing my brother I am perfectly certain that there is 
absolutely no intentional distortion. Any criticistm of the Soviet system by a 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3453 

writer brought up in the capitalist school, and vice vei'sa, is, I should imagine, 
likely to be regarded as prejudiced by the other side, but I find it hard to under- 
stand why the present piece of work should be classed as "anti-Soviet." 

I should have thought that this was a clear case for a "correcting" article 
from the IPR Soviet Council if they disagiee with the writer's factual state- 
ments, his interpretation of the figures, or his description of the working of the 
collectivist system. If Mr. Motylev had contended that the article contained 
definite misrepresentations, and was in a position to show that this is so, the 
same question of principle would arise which we considered in connection with 
the Asiaticus article in the June 1936 issue of Pacific Affairs; but it would 
almost seem from the quotations you give from his letter that his objection is 
much more general and such as would extend to any critical review of economic 
conditions in the U. S. S. R. if we were not favorable to the system. If so, the 
question of excluding such contributions from Pacific Affairs is, as you say, one 
of policy. But surely one of policy for the IPR as a whole, rather than for 
Chatham House. As regards Chatham House responsibility our view would be 
that the contribution was an individual one, the fact that it went through me 
being merely the result of my attempt to fulfill your request for grist for Pacific 
Affairs and in such circumstances I am sure that Chatham House would not 
wish to accept responsibility. Macadam and I feel that the question of risk 
which publication would imply for relations with the Soviet Council can only 
be estimated by Carter and yourself and that a decision on this point could not 
very well be asked of our committee. 

I really think that it comes back after all to the question of editorial prin- 
ciple, and of editorial decision. Obviously no one would want to see the rela- 
tions of the Soviet with the IPR torn by the publication of anything appearing 
in Pacific Affairs, and if Mr. Motylev is not prepared to accept the article as an 
honest attempt at analysis by an informed foreign observer, written without 
political arriere-pensee although from an admittedly capitalist viewpoint, and 
to counter it by a rejoinder written from the Bolshevik standpoint, it may be 
wiser, as a matter of principle, to close Pacific Affairs to the discussion of 
Russian internal affairs and so to exclude the present article. I should hope, 
however, that Mr. Motylev would consent to see the matter in that light and to 
meet criticism of things in his own country just as we had to meet what was, I 
submit, much less objective criticism of ourselves in the Asiaticus article. 

I am not referring to my brother as he is really not concerned with IPR 
internal politics, so will you deal with him direct as and when necessary? I am 
afraid that he was not warned that his manuscript would have to pass the fire 
of Moscow criticism. I ought no doubt to have remembered your practice and 
told him. 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) G. E. Hubbabd. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received for the record? 

The Chairman. It will be inserted. 

(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Ex- 
hibit No. 536" and was read in full.) 

Senator Ferguson. May I ask one question ? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Senator Ferguson. IVliat was the name of the man or the writer 
that wrote tlie counter-article for June ? 

JNIr. Lattimore. Canniff. 

Senator Ferguson. You put a note on that. You seemed to know 
who Andrew W. Canniff was, because you said this, and you have 
the article follow the Hubbarcl article : 

Readers of Pacific Affairs are accustomed to our policy of printing articles 
that express different and sometimes opposite points of view. We do this for 
something more than the interest of good debate, a more important aim of our 
editorial policy is to let our readers know as far as we possibly can what is 
really happening in all the subjects that are of interest to the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. "We, accordingly, print the following article by an author 
who uses almost exactly the same figures as Mr. Hubbard, but comes to an 
entirely different conclusion. Mr. Canniff has recently been studying the agri- 
cultural economics of both the Soviet Union and Manchuria — Ed. 



3454 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS * 

You said that yoii knew this man. He had been studying it. You 
did not say lie was writing under an alias. 

Mr. LA'rriMORE. Yes, I did, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. In this? 

Mr. Lattimore. It is in the list of authors at the beginning of 
the 

Senator Ferguson. In this note you did not. 

Mr. LA-rriMORE. Not in the note, no. It was in the description of 
authors at the beginning. 

The Chairman. My recollection is that you said this morning you 
did not know who this w^as. 

Mr. Laitimore. I said that I didn't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Who was it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should say from that description of somebody 
who had been studying agricultural economics in both Kussia and 
Manchuria, that it was probably Mr. Gradjansev. 

Senator Ferguson. And he was the man who was mentioned in the 
article with Harriet Moore to write the masterly piece? 

The Chairman. Is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is somebody else's language. 

Senator Ferguson. To prepare the masterly rejoinder? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is somebody else's language, not my lan- 
guage. 

The Chairman. We will recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 
2 p. m., the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p. m., upon the expiration of 
the recess. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

You may proceed, Mr. MoitIs. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you in 1945 recommend Fred- 
erick V. Field as a person to work with the Defense Advisory Com- 
mission of the United States? 

Ml'. Lattimore. No, I don't lielieve I did, Mr. Morris. I have 
seen some reference to that possibility in the transcript, but I don't 
recollect doing so. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a jihotostat of a document from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of Pacific Alfairs, 
Telei)hone: University 0100, extension 48, appearing in upper right 
hand corner, and Please Address Reply to: 300 Gilman Hall, Johns 
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., api)earing under letterhead of 
Pacific Affairs, dated SeptemV)er 10, 11)40, addressed to Mr. Fred- 
erick V. Field, signed Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask if you 
recall having written it? 

Mr. Latitmore. No, I doirt recall having written this. 

Mr. Morris. Is that your signature? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is my signature. I must have written it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please? 

Mr. Lattimore. This is to Frederick V. Field. 

The Chairman. What is the date of it ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3455 

Mr. Lattimoke. Dated September 10, 1940. [Reading:] 

ExHiRiT No. .")3T 

Dear Fred : This morning a Mr. S. Taylor Ostrander, of room 303, 1424 K 
Street. Washington, D. C, rang me up to asli where to get hold of an economist 
competent to deal with .Japanese wartime fiscal policies. I at once gave him your 
name and told him that on account of getting the new edition of the Economic 
Handbook ready for publication, you would be in touch with the right people. 

He said that he already had you on his list to ring up, and went on to ask 
about other people. I think I forgot to say at the beginning of this letter that 
he is connected with one or another branch or su!)division of the Defense Ad- 
visory Commission. I then gave him Grajdanzev's name, as l)eing both a trained 
economist and currently working in original .Japanese material. I pointed out 
that for his purposes the fact that Gra.jdanzev does not yet have his citizenship 
might be a barrier, but he told me that in some cases they proceed by appointing 
someone to a general job, with salary allowances for taking on assistants for 
such purposes at this. 

Yours very sincerely, 

[s] Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Cliairniaii. may it be received into the record? 

The Chairman. It may be received into the record. 

(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 537" and 
was read in fulL) 

The Chairman. What is that other name there? 

Mr. Lattimore. Grajchinzev. 

The Chairman. Who was he ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He was the man referred to this morning, a White 
Russian, who was at that time in New York. And I tliink he was 
doing some work, maybe part time or for the IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Was what you wrote to Mr. Fiekl tliere the truth, 
Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Why, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Manclel, will you identify that document for the 
record ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of tlie Institute of 
Pacific Relations, headed "E. C. C. from A. G. — copies to O. L. and 
M. F." It is undated. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may be this be read into the record? 

The Chairman. I would like to have the initials identified. 

Is anyone competent to. identfy them? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, on the basis of your experience with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, could you tell us who used the 
initials E.C.C J 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. E. C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. A. G.? 

Mr. Lattimore. A. G. would be Andrew Grajdanzev, I think. 

Mr. Morris. O. L. ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Myself. 

Mr. Morris. M. F. ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Miriam Farley, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I ask on this recommen- 
dation of Field, of September 10, 1940? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. We have had some difficulty in getting an 
answer, Mr. Lattimore, as to just when you came to the conclusion 



3456 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

that Field was a Communist. You said in your statement that it was 
in the forties. 

Did you withdraw any of these recommendations after you came 
to the conclusion that he was a Communist, or did you let them stand ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Excuse me, Senator, this is not a recommendation 
of Mr. Field for an intelligence job. 

Senator Ferguson. You are writing to Field : 

I at once gave him your name and told him that on account of getting the 
new edition of the Economic Handbooli for publication, j-ou would be in touch 
with the right people. 

You mean for somebody else to 

Mr. Lattimore. I thought that Field would know I'etter than I 
would who was competent to work with Japanese wartime fiscal policy. 

Senator Ferguson. And then did you think that Field at that time, 
as a Communist, would be a proper person to get them in touch with 
the Communists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe that on September 10, 1940, I 
thought Mr. Field was a Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you give us the date when you did come to 
that conclusion ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I can only come to the conclusion on the 
basis of my present knowledge and recollections that Mr. Field prob- 
ably became a Communist in the 1940's sometime. 

The Chairman. That is, you came to the conclusion in the forties. 
I think you stated in your statement — see if I quote you correctly 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think so. Senator. 

The Chairman. When did you come to the conclusion? 

I think this question has been asked and answered two or three times. 

When did you come to the conclusion that Mr. Field was a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am now of the conclusion that he became a Com- 
munist probably sometime in the 1940's, but I don't know when I 
first came to that conclusion. 

The Chairman. Have you no way of telling this committee when 
you came to that conclusion ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Let me see the Harriet Moore letter of this 
morning. 

Mr. Lattimore, this was the same man that you had recommended, 
you had recommended Grajdanzev's name, and he was the one who 
was being recommended to "prepare the most penetrating and mas- 
terly rejoinder that can possible be produced to the anti-Communist 
article by Hubbard." And it was put in your magazine in June of 
1938; is that correct? 

Mr. Lattimore. The recommendation and the wording are not mine, 
Senator. 

The Chairman. That is not the question now. Listen to the 
question. 

Senator Ferguson. But he is the same man who was recommended 
for that job and did write the pro-Soviet article. 

Mr. Lattimore. I cannot accept your characterization of that article 
as pro-Soviet, Senator. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3457 

Senator Ferguson. I realize that you have said that you see nothing, 
you have not seen anything pro-Soviet. 

But is not that what you were telling Molotov, that if that article 
went in, in effect you would try and get, allow him to write an article? 

And then the facts come out here that someone is writing Harriet 
Moore, who turns out to be a Communist, and to get Harriet Moore 
to get this gentleman to write "the most penetrating and masterly 
rejoinder that can possibly be produced." 

And you put the headline on this article by Hubbard that was a 
capitalist article, and you followed it with this article that was sup- 
posed to carry out what you had in mind with the Soviets, of having 
a counterarticle. 

Would not that make it pro-Soviet ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chair3iax. The answer is no. 

Mr. Lattimore. ISIay I explain ? 

I asked the Soviet Council to put in an article of their own, which 
would obviously have been pro-Soviet. Failing that, I w^anted to get 
an article that would present another treatment of the same material 
used by Mr. Hubbard, and, as far as my intentions were concerned, 
they were not to produce an article that would be Soviet propaganda, 
or anything of the kind. 

I had at that time no reason whatever to suppose that Harriet 
Moore was Communist, and I had no reason whatever to suppose that 
Grajdanzev was Communist, or pro-Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I revert back — I do not like to do 
this — to previous testimony? 

The Chairman. All right. 

;Mr. Morris. But on Friday, a letter written by Mr. Field to Mr. 
Lattimore, dated October 3, 1939, was presented to Mr. Lattimore on 
the general bearing of whether he knew at that particular time that 
Field was a member of the Communist Party, or connected with the 
Communist movement ideologically. 

Mr. Lattimore read Mr. Field's letter, which contained the following 
paragraphs : 

If I were to try and work out my own thoughts on Soviet policy I think I 
should start by attempting to compare the conditions of the present war, the 
second imperialist war, with those of the first imperialist war. I should first 
say that both wars were similar in that they were imperialist wars, in the 
Marxist sense of the word. I should immediately add, however, that they con- 
tained an essential difference, the difference being the concrete existence of the 
Soviet Union with 21 or 22 years of revoluntionary experience now as con- 
trasted with its nonexistence during the first war. 

The next stop would be, I believe, to recall the slogans of revolutionary groups 
during the first war ; namely, to transfer the imperialist war into a civil war 
or into a series of civil wars. This object came off only in Czarist Russia dur- 
ing the last war, though pretty substantial attempts were made in a number of 
other countries. I judge that the slogan of the present war is exactly the same, 
but that again the concrete existence of the Soviet Union makes its application 
in the present war something quite different than in 1914-18. The problem to- 
day from a revoluutionax-y point of view is the same as it was in 1914 ; the Brit- 
ish must get rid of their Chamberlains, the Germans of their Hitlers, the French 
of their Daladiers. But this time the Soviet Union operates as a powerful and 
concrete force to aid in these civil war efforts. 

The Chairman. ^Vliose letter is that? 

Mr. INIoRRis. Mr. Field to Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman. 

At the time, as I recall, we presented this letter to Mr. Lattimore. 



3458 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

He conceded that his memory was wrong by several years in his esti- 
mate that Field was a Communist. 

Mr, FoRTAs. Mr. Chairman, may we see that transcript? 

The Chairman. Just a moment, Mr. Fortas. 

Mr. Fortas, the Chair and you got along pretty well for about 7 or 
8 days. We hope we will get along for the rest of this time. 

Mr. Fortas. I join you in that hope, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a moment, Mr. Lattimore. I think Mr. Morris sent for the 
transcript. 

Mr. Morris. I think we can get on while we are waiting for that, 
Mr. Chairman, to save time. 

The Chairman. The transscript should be here and his answer 
should be read back to him. 

Mr. Morris. The question is on page 5149 of the transcript. 

Mr. Lattimore, perhaps you will read it, commencing with the 
question put to you by Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Mr. Lattimore, when you received that letter 

Mr. Morris. That is the letter that I had just read, is it not, Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore, That is right [reading] — 

did you consider that that was evidence that Mr. Field had vigorous Com- 
ninist sympathies? 

Mr. Lattimoke. I don't remember receiving the letter, and my recollection has 
been that I began to think that Mr. Field was a close fellow travelei- of the 
Russians at the time of the American Peace Mobilization, which I think was 
1941. Wasn't it? But judging from this letter, my memory was in error by 
about 2 years. 

Mr, Morris, In other words, you knew he had these vigorous pro- 
Communist sympathies in 1939? 

Mr, Lattimore, That is what I said at that time, Mr, Morris, I 
thought the matter over subsequently, and it seems to me that 1 ought 
not to go too far in characterizing my very vague recollections of that 
time years ago. 

It seems to me that, reading again this letter of Mr, Field's to me, 
that an equally possible explanation is that I might have thought at 
the time that tliis was just another example of an American intellectual 
interested in Russian problems indulging in the kind of amateur in- 
terpretation of ideology that has since become such a prevalent habit. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, Mr. Lattimore, you want to change 
your testimony of last Friday; is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should like to amend my testimony to that extent, 
to say that my recollection of Avhat I thought at the time is not at all 
clear. 

The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, we have been in these hearings now 
some 7 or 8 days. You realize that during all of that time and now you 
are under oath? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, Senator, I do. 

1 also realize that many pieces of evidence have been presented to 
me in many ways with other people's phrasings and wordings, and 
that under the i)ressure of cross-examining, I may at times have ad- 
mitted to using other people's words and saying things that I didn't 
quite mean myself, or that I would have said if I had had time for 
mature consideration, or if I had been less fatigued. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3459 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, that brings us to the question 
that you expect this body to pass upon the question and, with tliis 
statement, how are we going to tell whether you are telling the truth, 
or not, either from fatigue or a willful intent not to tell it? 

What are we going to do? Are we going to sit here for 8 days and 
now have you tell us that you are not responsible for what you have 
told us? Is that what you want to tell us now? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, Senator. I am merely saying that after many 
days of interrogation about matters that happened many years ago, 
I am not at all surprised that I should have become somewhat con- 
fused in my recollections, and I don't wish to nuake too strong a claim 
that my recollection of periods so long ago is accurate. 

The Chairman. You have no doubt that Field is a Connnunist 
now, have you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe he probably is, Senator. 

The Chairman. Allien did you come to that conclusion? Now let 
us go backward. 

Mr. Lattimore. As I said, I don't remember exactly when I came 
to that conclusion. 

The Chairman. Then the date that you gave us in your first 
answer may be just as correct as that which you are giving us now; 
is not that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I would like to stand on my statement in 
the record. Senator, in my prepared statement. 

The Chairman. Which statement do you wish to stand on? 

Mr. Lattimore. In my prepared statement, page 14, that I have 
no doubt he became one during the 1940's. 

The Chairman. Which statement do you wish to stand on? The 
one that you gave last Friday, which you read back, or the one that 
you gave today ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The one that I read back was an admission that my 
memory might have been in error by a couple of years. It may have 
been in error by a couple of years, or it may have been in error by 
more than that. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, is it that you want to change 
your testimony because you are confronted with this letter of recom- 
mending 

Mr. L-vnTMORE. No, sir; this letter is not a letter recommending 
Mr. Field. This is a letter stating that Mr. Field 

Senator Ferguson. Wait a minute. Recommending that they get 
in touch with Mr. Field to get someone to work on the Defense Ad- 
visory Connnission? 

You would not say, would you, that a Communist was a proper 
person to recommend someone in 1940 to work on the Defense Ad- 
visory Commission ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I would think — I don't know what I 
thought at that time. 

The Chairman. What do you say now? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it now ? 

The Chairman. What do you say now? That is the question. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I state rather carefully what I think now ? 

Senator Ferguson. I hope everything you say is stated carefully. 

INIr. Lattimore. What I think now is that the intelligence services 
of the United States are entitled to make use of any individual, any 



3460 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

source of information that they may think valuable to themselves 
under such conditions of security as the intelligence services may de- 
vise, which an outsider like myself cannot lay down. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you continue to read the document? 

Mr. Mandel. I am reading from the document marked "E. C. C. 
from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F." 

(Exhibit No. 538) 

{ International Secretariat) 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1 East 5-',th Street, New York 22, N. Y. 
Tile following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but prob- 
ably appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not have the numbers of 
these two from August 29) : 

[Trud, August 29, p. 4] 
Lattimore on the National Policy of the Soviet Union 

New York, August 27 (TASS) — In the magazine Far Eastern Survey there 
appeared an article by Lattimore, the Director of the School of International 
Relations, who accompanied Wallace during his recent trip to the Soviet Union 
and China, on the basis of his personal observations Lattimore regards highly 
the Soviet national policy (policy in respect to the nationalities), observing that 
from the moment of the establishment of the Soviet regime all nationalities 
of the Middle Asia and other regions, formerly oppressed, received an oppor- 
tunity to develop widely their economy, national culture, language, and so on. 
Lattimore describes the present prosperity of the so-called backward peoples 
prosecuted pitilessly under Czarism. 

Lattimore points out that his knowledge of the Russian and Mongolian 
languages permitted him to talk with Many Kazakhs, Buriato-Mongols, Turko- 
mans, and representatives of other nationalities, and from these conversations 
he obtained valuable information that shows welfare and prosperity of these 
peoples freed by the Soviet Constitution. 

Lattimore compares the position of the national minorities in the Middle Asia 
in the Czarist time and under the present regime. As an example, Lattimore 
gives the fact that Kazakhstan, a country populated formerly by the nomads, 
now became an industrialized country which has its own industry, own engi- 
neers, and a large percentage of the Stakanovites among the workers. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what role did Mr. Grajdanzev play in 
this kind of transaction? Did he read the Soviet press and find 
favorable references to you and passed them on to you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would like to see this, but there is no hurry 
about it. 

I have very little knowledge of what Mr. Grajdanvez's work was at 
that time. My general recollection is that he was working on such 
Russian language materials as the IPR had available. 

Mr. Morris. Was it a practice of his to notify you of any such 
favorable references in the Soviet press ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Certainly not a practice. I presume that, as a 
friend of mine, if he ran across something that would interest me he 
would send it to me. 

I should like very much to ask for the text of my original article in 
Far Eastern Survey, because, from my hearing — and I have not yet 
read it — of that Soviet extract there, I should say that it is obviously 
not a straight quotation from what I wrote, but partial quotations in- 
terwoven with phrases put in by the Soviet writer. 

Mr. Morris. And, Mr. Lattimore, you would like your article to 
go into the record with this Soviet interpretation ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3461 

Mr. Lattimore, I certainly should. 

This Soviet interpretation or misinterpretation. 

The Chairmax. Where is the article? 

Mr. JNIoRRis. We can obtain it and put into the record. 

The Chairman. Very well. I think it should go in with an ex- 
hibit, if you are goinor to introduce the exhibit. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of this ? 

Mr. Morris. It is probably 1944, Senator, in connection with the 
mention of the "recent trip." He accompanied Mr. Wallace on a 
'"recent" trip. 

Senator Ferguson. Maybe you can help us with the date, Mr. Latti- 
more. You look at that. 

Mr. Lattimore. I have a document here, Senator, which my wife is 
looking for now, which I should like to enter into the record as per- 
tinent to this question of Soviet nationality. 

The Chairman. I would like the article to which this document 
refei-s and to which you have testified. We want that first. 

Mr. Lattimore. This one here ? 

The Chairman. You have referred to a document that you wrote. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; in the Far Eastern Survey. 

The Chairman. We want that first, if you please. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't have that with me. 

Mr. FoRTAs. Is your staff sending for that, Senator? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. They are looking for it, Mr. Fortas. 

Mr. FoRTAs. Do you want Mr. Lattimore to wait until you find it? 

The Chairman. If you want to go into some question*, as an inser- 
tion in the record 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Here is a copy of the Far Eastern Survey, 1944, sir, 
the bound volume. Perhaps you can find that article. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, does this amount about to what 
would be classed as someone sending you a newspaper clipping? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; roughly. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you save it? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Did 3'ou protest it was wrong? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you write back and say, ''This is wrong"? 
Did you get in touch with the papers that printed it and say, "I deny 
this"? Did you do that? 

]Mr. Lattimore. No, Senator. 

The Chairman. I might interpret this as being either a digest of a 
newspaper quotation or a newspaper article or it might be a newspaper 
article [reading] : 

The following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but probably 
it appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not haye the numbers of these 
two from August 29). 

Then in what appeared to be headlines, caps, appears : 

Lattimore on the National Policy of the Soviet Union — 

which might be construed as being a 

Senator Ferguson. Copy of a clipping. 

The Chairman. Yes. Otherwise, I do not know what it is. 

Mr. Lattimore. This appears to be the article: "Minorities in the 
Soviet Far East," by Owen Lattimore, in the Far Eastern Survey of 
August 23, 1944. 



3462 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

It is not very lon<i:. May I read it into the record? 

Mr. Morris. Put it into the record, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It is two printed pages or more, is it not, Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Almost exactly two printed pages. 

The Chairman. I want something to be done with this photostatic 
copy that we are passing around here. 

Do you offer this for the record? If so, what is its authenticity? 
Where does it come from? 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Mr. Mandel identified it, sir, as a letter having been 
taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. It is not a letter. It shows on its face that it is not 
a letter. 

Mr. Morris. It is a memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you swear now that you never saw this docu- 
ment, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection of seeing it. 

Senator Ferguson. It appears to have been sent to you with your 
initials on it. Is that correct? 

Mr. Lattimore. May I have a look? 

It is headed E. C. C.' from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F. 

The Chairman. From that, Mr. Lattimore, would you say it was 
evidently a communication of some sort from E. C. C. to the other 
parties? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo, sir; from Mr. Grajdanzev, to Mr. Carter, with 
copies to myself and Miss Farley. 

The Chairman. A communication from. 

Mr. Lattimore. A communication from, yes. 

I have no recollection of ever seeing it before. The point is im- 
material, how^ever. It w^as obviously intended for me to see. 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

With it should go the article. 

Mr. Morris. May it be i)laced in the record, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. The article will be placed in the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 538," which 
was read in full by Mr. Mandel, and "539," as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 539 
[Source : Far Eastern Survey, August 23, 1944, pp. 156, 157, and 158] 

MiNOKITlES IN THE SOVIET FAR EaST ^ 

(By Owen Lattimore) 

On many occasions durinji- a brief recent journey through the Soviet Far East 
and Centrjil Asia I was struck by the obvious success of the Soviet policy toward 
its minority peoples, and by the international importance of this policy. The 
essentials of the Soviet method are simple. The Russians work by removing 
legal, social, and e<'onomic obstacles to the progress of minority peoples and 
"backward" i>eoi)les. These peoples are then free to work out their own progress 
according to their own capacities. The method is anything but paternalistic. 
Because the people work out their own progress, they feel that everything which 
they accomplish is their own, not something charitably bestowed on them. 



^ Mr. Lattimore, Director of the Page School of International Relations and coauthor of 
The Making of Modern China, accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his recent 
trip to the Far Bast. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3463 

The chief obstacle removed by Soviet action was, of course, the "old order" of 
Tsarism, with its legal discriminations and its policy of favoring privileged 
uronps among non-Kiissiaii minoi'ities. in order to use them as instruments for 
ruling the iui[)rivileged. For this reason the minority peoples, who feel that their 
local self-government is their own, also feel that the Soviet State as a whole is 
their own. This accounts for an outstanding difference in the psychology of 
minorities in the Soviet Union and in America. With us, minority rights are 
largely identified with the right to nonccmformity. Consequently Americans 
sometimes ask, "What would happen if one of these Soviet minorities were to 
try to use its minority rights to attempt to set up laws, institutions, and prac- 
tices conflicting with Marxist doctrines and Soviet orthodoxy?" The answer 
api>ears to l>e that this would be the last thing that would occur to their minds, 
not the first. All of them have a long history of oppression. Since, in all their 
long history, only the S(jviet Government ever freed them from discrimination 
and gave them the opportunity of progress, they identify their own interest with 
the Soviet interest, and in everytliing which they do to advance their own par- 
ticular interest their instinct is also to advance the general Soviet interest, not 
to encroach upon it, because the general Soviet interest is the primary safeguard 
of their own particular interest. 

Within the framework of the Soviet economic order and state structure, Soviet 
policy has been to encourage the national pride and sense of cultural or com- 
munity identity of minority groups. In Soviet Asia, this includes peoples like 
the Buryat Mongols, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and the Tungusic tribes, whose 
languages, traditions, and way of life ai'e very different from those of the 
Russians. Tliey encourage these peoples to go aliead and assert. their independ- 
ence in all cultural forms — costume, theater, art, and so forth — and to work 
out their own adaptation to tlie general structure of tlie Soviet Union. 

Although many of the places visited were new to me, some of the peoples were 
not new, as I had known Mongol. Kazakh, and Kirghiz nomads, Turkish-si)eak- 
ing oasis dwellers, and Tungusic forest tribes on the southern side of tlie 
Russo-Chinese border in Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Familiarity with 
several of the cultures which are spread on both sides of tlie border, and an 
ability to speak Mongol and a certain amount of Russian, made it possible for 
me to get some valuable indications, even in a very short time, as to how con- 
tented and prosperous these people are as members of the complicated Soviet 
system of peoples, republics, and autonomous communities — uniform in some 
respects and vaiiegated in others. 

SOVIET POLICY IS FLEXIBLE 

The actual way in which Soviet policy works is naturally not uniform in all 
places and among all groups. The Yakuts, for instance, seemed to me to have 
integi-ated themselves with the Soviet order less than such peoples as the 
Buryats. This is not surprising because the Yakuts are a tough-fibered people 
who have long been noted more for their ability to extend their own culture 
to other sub-Arctic peoples than for their absorption of Russian culture. More- 
over, they live in small, widely scattered and isolated communities in which 
the spread of education in schools, by radio, and so forth, is less uniform than 
it is in more closely settled regions. 

Among people who are few in niunbers, also, it is difficult to preserve a 
separate culture. The Khakass near Minusinsk, for instance, are so minor a 
minoVity that they tend to merge with the Russians rather than to preserve 
their own way of life. 

In Buryat Mongolia, on the other hand, there is no doubt whatever that the 
Buryats are running their own show. This is also true in Uzbekistan and in 
Kazakhstan. 

In the great Kazakh Republic, which extends from the Chinese frontier to 
the Caspian Sea, the national autonomy policy is most succes.sful. Among the 
Kazakhs before the revolution there had been a long tradition of hostility to the 
Russians and the Tsarist Russians had never attempted to recruit Kazakhs as 
troops. An attempt to conscript them into labor battalions led to rebellions in 
1916, even before the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the present war, however, 
Kazakhs have supplied whole divisions of cavalry to the Soviet army. Since few 
of them speak Riissian they are brigaded in their own units under their own 
officers. The Russians speak admiringly of the battle record of these Kazakhs. 

While Kazakh nomadic herding is flourishing, the Kazakhs — like most no- 



3464 msTiTUTE of pacific relations 

mads — also show a marked aptitude for machines and industry. At Kara- 
ganda, in the Kazakh Republic, there are some of the largest open-cut coal mines 
in the world. About a third of the miners are Kazakhs. Kazakh engineers and 
technicians are being trained there, and there is a high percentage of Stakhano- 
vites whose output is liigher than the norms on wliicli wage rates are based. The 
head of tlie mines is a third-generation miner from tlie Don. When I asked him 
if he planned to stay on after the war, he replied, "No, I shall go back to the 
Don. The Kazakhs will want to run their own mines." 

One detail of policy interested me as being particularly significant. Primary 
education is in the language of the people and in general Russian is not taught in 
their primary schools. In high schools Russian is taught as a second language 
for a few hours each week. In the universities, where they are advanced enough 
to have their own universities, Russian is compulsory. Conversely, when Rus- 
sians are living as a minority group in an area that is overwhelming Kazakh or 
Mongol, the Russians have the same privilege of having their own primary 
schools ; but for Russian children the Kazakh or Mongol language is compulsory. 
Thus the cultural autonomy of these various minorities within the bounds of 
Soviet Asia is maintained, and the minority languages are given a prestige value. 

All of this is important because it will have repercussions far beyond the 
Russian frontier. There has been a steady movement of attraction toward Russia 
set up among a number of Cenetral Asian peoples. The Russians do not need to 
propagandize among them. These peoples are attracted toward Russia because 
of the success and prosperity of their cousins on the Russian side of the frontier 
and there are bound to be some important international consequences of this 
tendency. 

MOBILITY IN BORDER REGIONS 

Along most of the Soviet border the political frontiers are artificial, and 
identical or closely similar peoples live on both sides of the line. Tliis is true 
not only along the Chinese but along the Iran and Afghanistan frontiers as 
well. In the 19th century political development in that part of the world was in 
abeyance. Central Asia was in suspended animation except for the superficial 
conquests by Tsarist Russia. If there was oppression on one side of the line 
there was a tendency for some of the people to skip over to the other side ; but 
such movements did not express a choice between the two different systems of 
government. 

The general impression today among their neighbors is that the people on 
the Soviet side of the border are well off. They are envied for the law, order, 
and security which they enjoy and for their individual and community prosperity. 
If there is turmoil in Chinese Turkistan or Iran or Afghanistan, many people will 
want to move to get away from the trouble and Soviet territory is the nearest 
area which looks safe and untroubled. This is a comparativel.v recent develop- 
ment. During the Soviet revolution there was a bad time of turmoil, and ele- 
ments which were opposed to the revolution moved to the Chinese side and into 
Iranian and Afghan territory ; but that period is now over. 

The situation is one which requires adjustment of American thinking. We 
still tend to assume, whenever Soviet influence is noticeable in an Asiatic com- 
munity, that ignorant people have been "misled by Communist propaganda." 
To think in this way is to mislead ourselves. The Soviet prestige in Asia 
today has little to do with propaganda. It is noteworthy that Soviet prestige 
is highest among those who are nearest to the Soviet frontier and influenced 
primarily by what they know, and by the practical comparisons which they are 
able to make. Among such people the Soviets are rated highly not because 
of promises of what they might do for others, but because of the impressive 
evidence of what they have actually done in raising their own standards. 

Everywhere in the Soviet Far East there is a noteworthy age uniformity among 
those who are running local affairs. Whether Russian, Buryat Mongol, or 
Kazakh, the average age of people in high positions seems to be between 30 and 
35. They ai'e a postrevolutionary generation, old enough to have had the new 
education and young enough to be free of the old social cleavages. To them the 
present order is right, inevitable, and, above all- their own. 

The implications of the Russian policy are evident. China and the Soviet 
Union have a common frontier in Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang), and 
Manchuria, and along this frontiier minority populations occupy large and strat- 
egically ini' ^rtant areas. Anywhere along the frontier, except in Manchuria, 
you could move the line 800 miles south, and still affect the personal destinies 
of no Russians and very few Chinese. This situation gives these minorities 
a great deal of bargaining power. Therefore, their political importance is 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC JIELATIONS 3465 

great. They have more option than weak minority populations usually have. 
They can get what they want by taking sides. This is true to some extent even 
as far as Iran and Afghanistan. 

The war in Far East is being won largely by air and naval power in the 
Pacific. Yet in spite of these victories at sea and in the air, the political 
situation which will develop inland on the continent is likely to be largely 
out of reach of naval power and carrier-based aircraft. The possibility of a 
political outcome of this kind has not entered into the political thinking of 
America to the degree that it should have. 

Mr. Lattimore, And I should like in the record also my competent 
statement, before reading my own article, that this citation from the 
Soviet press is a typical piece of Soviet propaganda ; namely, taking 
isolated phrases from my article and adding phrases of their own. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you make an effort to get a yearly 
review of Pacific Affairs into the New Masses? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. But if you have a docu- 
ment to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it. 

The Chairman. That answer does not seem to carry cogency, "I 
don't believe I did, but if you have a document." You certainly know 
whether you did, or not. That was a publication. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I don't. I have no recollection of it at 
all. 

The Chairman. Do you want to say that you do not know that you 
tried to get these documents in? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you want to say "No" to the question as pro- 
pounded to you? 

Mr. Lattimore. The question is "No; I do not remember doing 
any such thing." 

The Chairman. The answer is "No," you mean ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No." 

The Chairman, All right. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1937, headed "Memo : F. V. F. 
from C. P." 

F. V. F. presumably is Frederick V. Field, and C. P. is presumably 
Caflierine Porter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received into the record? 

The Chairman. Just a minute, now. 

Frederick V. Field is an established character here in this hearing. 
How about the other one ? Who is the other one ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you know whose initials C. P. are ? 

Mr. Lattimore. C. P., I think, is Catherine Porter, who was the 
New York subeditor of Pacific Affairs. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the content of this memorandum bears 
on the questions put to the witness. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read that, please ? 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

Owen has raised the question of our getting yearly reviews of Pacific Affairs 
into the New Masses, the Nation, the New Republic, and so on. He wanted me 
to ask you about this. His suggestion was that we might have such reviews 
start in August when the conference is on. Do you think there is any possibility 
of wangling a thing like this in so short a time? ; , 

88348— 52— pt. 10 13 



3466 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted in the record? 

The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record for the purpose 
stated by Mr. Morris. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 540" and was 
read in full.) 

Mr. Morris. JNIr. Lattimore, did Mary van Kleeck write for Pacific 
Affairs an article on the Moscow trials? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Mary van Kleeck was at that 
time a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. William Henry Chamberlin subsequently 
write an article in Pacific Affairs on the Moscow trials? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, he did. 

Mr. MoKRTs. AVhat was your reaction to ha vino; received that? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time, I can't recall, Mr. Morris. 

]Mr. Morris. Was Chamberlin's article published in Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. Latitjuore. Yes, it was. 

Mr. Morris. Did you at the same time write an answering article to 
Mr. Chamberlin's letter? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I wrote an article which was my own com- 
ment on the whole question of the trials. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please? 

Mr. Mandfx. This is a document taken from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Kelations, dated July 5, 1938, headed "ECC from CP." 

Mr. Morris. Mr. (^hairman, the contents of the memorandum iden- 
tified by Mr. Mandel bear on the last question addressed to the wit- 
ness. 

Mr. Mandel, will you read it, please? 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

Exhibit No. 541 

July 5, 193S. 
ECC from CP : Here is a copy of a letter from Chamberlin (June 13) intended! 
for publication in Pacific Affairs. I have air mailed a copy to Owen and have 
sent a copy to Harriet Moore requesting her to write Owen by air. 

Have you any comments to be passed on to Owen? Do you think at this 
point Miss van Kleeck should see Chamberlin's letter, or shall we wait? 

Mr. INIoRRis. May it be received into the record, Mr. Chairman? 
The Chairman. It may be received into the record. 
(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 541" which was 
in full above and "Exhibit No. 541A*' which appears as follows :) 



Exhibit No. 541-A 

Comment and Cokrb:sponi)ence 
[Piiciflc Affairs, vol. IX, No. 3, September 1938, pp. 370-372] 

Mr. Chamberlin's successor as Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science* 
Monitor, Demaree Bess, has published in the Saturday Evening? Post, which is 
hardly a pro-Soviet organ, the story of an American engineer working for the 
Soviet Government. This foreigner, though not "called as an independent ex- 
pert witness," describes how his work was hampered by men who were later 
convicted of sabotage. 

Why should Mr. Chamberlin be surprised that no letters, memoranda, or 
minutes of meetings of the conspirators were adduced in evidence? The testi- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3467 

niouy makes it clear by inference that the work of all the conspirators interlocked 
so closely with that of loyal citizens that, if they had risked much in writing, 
they would have been caught much sooner.' As for the suggestion that the new 
head of the secret service is likely to abuse his power just as Yagoda did, it is 
obvious that the publicity given in the Soviet Union itself to Yagoda's turpitude 
is a safeguard against any such thing. 

Mr. Chamberlin's remarks about the "striking contrast between the magnitude 
of the confessions and the meagerness of the results" are too rhetorical. The 
verbatim records of the trials are entirely credible in the way they describe the 
descent from grandiose ideas to futile deeds. The ideas were so grandiose that 
they could not have been carried out except with enthusiastic popular backing. 
It requires no adroit casuistry to conclude that, apart altogether from disputes 
over theory, the majority of the people in the Soviet Union are unwilling to risk 
the improved life which they are beginning to enjoy, after the sufferings first of 
the revolution and then of the "undeclared civil war" of the Five-Year Plan. 
The authorities are beginning to make good on the promises of reward held out 
for the sacrifices necessary to establish Socialism in a country with unoi-ganized 
resources. Those rewards, though not yet dazzlingly great, are so widely dis- 
tributed that no general revolt in the face of visibly growing success could 
possibly be expected except by emotionally biased antagonists like Trotsky. 

The "gross discrepancies" in evidence to which Mr. Chamberlin refers appear 
to be subjective. AVhere conspirators within a country are in only intermittent 
and furtive contact with exiles abroad, it is hardly a "gross discrepancy" to coiuit 
on the future aid of exile accomplices whom you do not yet know to be dead. Nor 
am I emotionally disturbed by the fact that the Norwegian authorities denied 
the inconvienient airplane that came to Oslo. This seems to me a not vex'y hair- 
raising example of diplomatic usage. In much more actutely uncomfortable 
circumstances, it may be recalled, the British Government was unable even to 
imagine what submarines could be torpedoing British ships off the ports of Spain. 



[Pacific Affairs, September 1938, pp. 370-372] 

Then we come to the well-known phenomena of "sinister pressure" and "grovel- 
ling repentance." In reading the verbatim reports of the trials, I naturally 
went over most closely the testimony and confessions of the only two of the 
accused whom I had ever met personally, because these were men whom I could to 
some extent visualize. They were Radek and Ilakovsky. I think that the dis- 
tinguished personage of the IPR in whose company I called on Radek, and the 
British diplomat in whose house I met Rakovsky, would both agree that there was 
nothing out of character in the testimony of either man. Both of them not only 
gave perfectly coherent evidence, but psychologically convincing accounts of the 
way in which they were enmeshed. 

The real point, of course, for tho.se who live in democratic countries, is whether 
the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think 
that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read 
Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every per- 
son in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have 
been discovered and rectified. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the 
discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can 
hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, 
whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the Party" 
or "someone in the Government." That sounds to me like democracv. 

O. L. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record the 
article referred to in this testimon}^, signed "O. L." in the Pacific 
Affairs of September 1938, which commences on page 370, together 
with the preceding article, which is signed William Henry Chamber- 
lain, Tokyo, June 1938, which ends on page 370. 

The Chairman. Have you properly connected the article with the 
excerpt that has just been inserted in the record ? 

1 See review (p. 401 ) b,v J. N. Hazarrl of proceedings of the Bukharin trial. 



3468 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you testify that is the same article 
referred to in the memorandum ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe it is. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read the last paragraph in Mr. 
Lattimore 's article ? 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. This is an article signed "O. L." — presumably, Mr. 
Lattimore, and I think the witness has identified it as such. 

Have you not, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether 
the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. * * * 

And the reference is to the Moscow trials, Mr. Chairman. 

* * * I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most 
widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny 
of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses 
have been discovered and rectified. * * * 

The words "and rectified'" are italicized. 

* * * A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse 
or the rectitication of it ; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but 
give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he 
finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the 
government." That sounds to me like democracy. 

The Chairman. By whom is that article ? 

Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ferguson. Would that indicate, Mr. Lattimore, that you 
thought these trials were democracy in action i 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. It sounded like democracy. 

Senator Ferguson. It sounded like democracy in action? 

Senator Smith. Would you like to see it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should like to see it. 

It sounds to me like exactly what it says, that the consequence of 
people in Russia 

The Chairman. I understood it is the last paragraph. 

What is the question, Mr. Morris, please ? 

Mr. Morris. The questioning on tliis subject has been finished, 
Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lattimore has requested that he see the article. 

The Chairman. There is no question pending, then ? 

Mr. Morris. No question pending. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. May I continue with the next question ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The point here — replying to Senator Ferguson's 
question — I tliink it is that I said that conditions which — and here I 
quote : 

Give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future 
he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the 
government." That sounds to me like democracy. 

That is, that I think it is democratic when citizens can protest 
against things done by party members or Government members. 

Senator Ferguson. To what are you referring? 

Mr, Lattimore. I may say that this was a disappointed hope. It 
didn't develop that way. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3469 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think that the trials were such an ex- 
pression ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I was clearly distinguishing tliere between 
the trials and the results of the trials. 

Senator Ferguson. The result of the trials was death to many of 
the people, is not that true ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think that that designated democracy ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I thought that an atmosphere in which 
citizens could protest against abuses would be democracy. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that that was a protest of the 
citizens, or a protest of the Government departments ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was referring to articles in the press which I had 
seen at that time, saying that after the trials of these people in Russia, 
a lot of whom were officials, these press articles said that people in 
Russia were beginning to act a little more independently toward their 
official bureaucracy, and I thought that was an encouraging sign. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did E. Herbert Norman w^rite for Pa- 
cific Atfairs? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir ; I believe he did. 

Mr. Morris. LTnder what name did he write for Pacific Affairs? 

Mr. Lattimore. Under the name of E. Herbert Norman, as far as 
1 remember. 

Mr. Morris. Did he ever use a nom de plume ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think he did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please ? 

Mr. ]\La.ndel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. The original document was a carbon 
copy. It is dated May 30, 1940. It is from 129 East Fifty-second 
Street, New York, N. Y., addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the 
typed signature of Edward C. Carter. And it says in the corner: 
■■•Penciled note copy to WLH." 

Mr. Morris. Mv. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask you if 
you can recall having seen it? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think I recall having seen this. 

Mr. Morris. Do you mind reading that letter, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. 'The letter is dated May 30, 1940.. 

(Exhibit No. 542) 

Dear Owen : Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the 
eve of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He 
is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the fi?ld of 
Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures 
of the Meiji period. 

I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways 
of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific 
Affairs. 

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on 
contemporary matters, providing he writes under a nom de plume. 

I imagine that by novt^ you have read his Inquiry book, ".Japan's Emergence as 
a Modern State." This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet 
appeared in the Inquiry Series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of 
continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form 
or another. 

Sincerely yours. 

The Chairman. You stated to counsel just a few minutes ago that 
you did not believe that that writer wrote under a nom de plume. 



3470 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore, No. 

The Chairman. Do you wish to change your answer now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I do not wish to change my answer. I don't 
believe he did. 

May I say that this is quite obviously a reference to the fact that it is 
usual practice for diplomatic personnel of our own country and other 
countries to sign a non de plume rather than their own names. An 
outstanding example, of course, is the Mr. X article by George Kennedy 
in Foreign Affairs. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Norman has been 
identified before the conunittee as having been a member of the 
Communist Party ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have seen that reference in the transcript. I have 
also seen some of the Canadian press protests on the subject. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this 
time an excerpt from the publication China Today, which Mr. Mandel 
AAill identify? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the magazine China Today, for 
March 19o6, which is the official organ of the American Friends of the 
Chinese People. 

On page 121 of this magazine we find the following : 

Canadian Friends of the Chinese People 

It is with great pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in 
Canada and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian 
r'riends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto of 
Gen. Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, chairman of the Canadian League Against 
War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted in the 
formation of the new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday, 
February 8, with 80 present, Gen. Fang Chen-wu, with whom China Today 
readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which included 
a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews with the 
Prime Minister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu mass 
meeting in Toronto held in ('entral Technical School on February 9 and attended 
by 1,500, a group of 'AO met at Wymilwood, Queen's Park, and organized a Cana- 
dian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was elected and 
is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan * * *. 

Mr. Morris. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman. 

May that article go into the record ? 

The Chairman. What is the object ? What is its significance ? 

Mr. Morris. AA^e are questioning the witness about his association 
and the publication of articles by Mr. E. H. Norman. According to 
that article, E. H. Norman was tlie secretary of a Canadian subdi- 
vision of the American Friends of tlie Chinese People. We would like 
to have something in the record to show that the American Friends 
of tlie Chinese People is a Communist-front organization. 

The Chairman. I think that should come along now if this is in- 
serted in the record. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like at this point, then, to 
introduce the testimony of Mr. Morris L. Appelman, who was mem- 
ber of the Communist Party and a member of the Communist cell 
that ran the American Friends of the Chinese People. I would like 
his testimony covering that to be ])ut into the record in its entirety. 

The Chairman. Was that taken in executive session or open 
session ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3471 

Mr. Morris. In executive session, Mr. Chairman, on January 11, 
1952. 

The Chair:man. You can read sufficient of it now to tie this in, 
if it can be tied in. 

Mr. Morris. ^Nlr. Mandel is exaniinino; Mr. Appehnan [reading] : 

Exhibit No. 542A 

Mr. Mandel. Then in May 1035, you were contributing editor of China Today? 

Mr. Appelmax. I don't remember that title, but apparently I was if I was listed 
as such. 

Mr. aiANDEL. What was China Today? 

Mr. Appelman. It was a publication of the American Friends of the Chine.se 
People. 

Senator Eastland. What is the American Friends of the Chinese People? 

Mr. Appelman. A front organization of the Communist Party. 

And then on page 6, Mr. Morris questioning : 

In connection with the American Friends of the Chinese People, did you as 
a matter of fact belong to it? 

Mr. Appelman. Yes, sir. I don't remember whether it was a dues-paying 
organization, but I was identified with it. 

Mr. Morris. Were you sent there by the Communist Party? 

Mr. Appelman. Yes. 

Mr. IMoRRLs. Who in the party sent you? 

Mr. Appelman. It was either Crace Maul or Esther Carroll or both, because 
they were my two contacts. 

Mr. Mor.Ris. Is Grace Maul Grace Granich? 

Mr. Appelman. The same party. 

Mr. MoRRLS. You have been identitied with both these people? 

Mr. Appelman. They were lioth definitely party members; and, so to speak, 
my party liaison was with them. At that time I was. At the time they first 
contacted me I had been exi:)elled ; I was not a party member in good standing; 
and they were my supervisors so to speak, in that organization. 

Mr. Fortas, would you like to see that testimony ? 

Mr. Fortas. No. 

The Chairman. What is the relevancy of that testimony with this 
witness ? 

Mr. FoRTAs. That is my point.. 

Mr. Morris. The American Friends of the Chinese People ^vas an 
organization with which Mr. Xorman was connected, and we are now 
asking Mr. Lattimore if he published articles by Mr. Norman. 

The Chairman. Just a moment, until the Chair rules on this. 

The testimony of Mr. Appleman may be inserted in the record. Do 
you want it in full ? 

iMr. Morris. Just those portions that I read, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. That is in the record now. 

The exhibit China Today may be inserted in the record for what 
it is worth at the present time. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 542 and 
5-42A", which was read in fidl. No. 543 is as follows :) 

ExHiBLP No. .543 

[Source: China Today, March 19.36, p. 121. Published monthly at 168 West 23d Street, 
New York. N. Y.. by the American Friends of the Chinese People 1 

Canadian Friends of the Chinese People 

It is with gi-eat pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in Canada 
and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian 
Friends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto 
of General Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, Chairman of the Canadian League 
Against War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted 



3472 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

in the formation of tlie new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday 
February Sth with eighty present, General Fang Clien-wu, witli whom China 
Today readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which 
included a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews 
with the Prime INIinister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu 
mass meeting in Toronto held in Central Technical School on February 9th and 
attended by 1,500, a group of thirty met at Wymilwood, Queen's Parlv, and organ- 
ized a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was 
elected and is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan, 
Professor John F. Davidson of Upper Canada College, and A. R. Menzies, a 
"Victoria College student who was born in China. One of the important members 
of this group is William Arthur Deacon, Literary Editor of the Mail and Empire 
of Toronto, who wrote a splendid interview with General Fang for his paper. 

We in the United States extend our heartiest greetings to our friends in Canada 
and we urge them to keep in close contact with us and we in turn pledge our- 
selves to work in close cooperation with them. 

The importance of the Far East in the whole problem of war and peace is 
rapidly becoming a matter of common knowledge. It is therefore very signifi'cant 
and hopeful that groups of "Friends of the Chinese People" have been organized 
in several countries. America, France, England, Holland, and now Canada have 
joined the international front of those whose chief aim is to help the Chinese 
people in their struggle for national liberation, the realization of which will play 
a most powerful role for peace throughout the Far East and the whole world. 
We urge other countries to follow and join this rapidly forming "International 
Friends of the Chinese People." 

Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Morris, before refusing your kind offer to show 
me that transcript, I assume there is no reference to Mr. Lattimore 
by name. 

Mr. Morris. There is no reference to Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Then I don't care to see it. 

The Chairman. It has to do with the writer. That is the tie-in, I 
understand. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what article did Mr. Norman write 
in Pacific Affairs? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have been lookinjr for it, Mr. Morris, and I don't 
find an article listed for the period when I was editor. 

Mr. Morris. Was there one subsequent to that ? 

iNIr. Lattimore. I believe there was one at some time ; yes, 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were you acquainted with Mr, Evans 
F. Carlson? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I was. 

Mr. Morris. What was your association with Mr. Carlson? 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Carlson first when he was in the Amer- 
ican Marine Guard in the Embassy in Peking, and I saw him maybe 
tAvo or three times here in America. 

Mr. Morris. Did a'ou ever give him advice? 

The Chairman. Just a moment. I want to go back to this offer 
of the exhibit that the Chair has admitted in evidence as part of the 
record. 

The question was propounded to the witness as to whether or not this 
writer had been a contributor to the publication while he was editor. 
He says "No," in substance. You cannot hold him responsible for 
something that was done in the publication before he was in charge of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could it not be admitted as some 
evidence as far as the institute is concerned ? 

The Chairman. It may go in to that extent, but I do not want it to 
go to the extent of tying in this witness to any collaboration with the 
Avriter through the introduction of these exhibits- 
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3473 

The Chairman. The whole matter goes to the weight of the thing 
rather than to its admissibility. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I think the observation you are mak- 
ing is worth while to make at this time. I think we must bear in 
mind that our prime investigation is of the IPR and that we are not 
trying Mr. Lattimore. 

The Chairman. That is correct. 

Senator Smith. I notice that some of the newsmen and some of the 
columnists continue to refer to the fact that we are trying Mr. Latti- 
more. I have not felt I have been trying Mr. Lattimore, and I do not 
believe any of the rest of the committee have felt that way. 

The Chairman. Mv. Lattimore came here at his own request as a 
witness to testify, to clear his record, apparently, of statements that 
have been made by witnesses who testified with reference to him. He 
is not on trial. 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, the letter read into the record previous 
to the introduction of these exhibits contained an offer from Mr. Carter 
to have Mr. Norman write for Pacific Affairs under a nom de plume ; 
and, in view of the testimony this morning about the appearance of 
the nom de plume, we had no way J3ut to ask Mr. Lattimore whether or 
not, as a matter of fact, Mr. Norman did write it. 

The Chairman. I am admitting the exhibits, but I want to limit their 
significance — that is all — because they address themselves to the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations rather than to Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Lattimore, you knew Mr. Norman, did you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Norman at that time very slightly. 1 
think I had met him once or twice when I was at the office of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations in New York. I knew him later in 
Japan when I was in Japan with the Pauley reparations mission. 

Mr. Morris. How frequently did you see Mr. Norman at that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I saw him quite frequentl}^ at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you give advice to Evans Carlson 
as to whether or not he should stay in the Navy or leave the Navy? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I remember very distinctly that Carlson told 
me that he was thinking of resigning from the Marine Corps, and I 
urged him not to. 

Mr. Morris. Why did you urge him not to, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Because I thought that a man of his expert knowl- 
edge in China would be useful to the Nation in his service in the 
Marine Corps. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that Mr. Carlson was chairman of the 
Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy^ 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't know that. 

Mr. Morris. Have you not testified in executive committee that 
you thought that organization was a Communist organization? 

Mr. Lattimore. May I see my testimony on that ? My present rec- 
ollection of it is rather blank, I am afraid. 

Mr. Morris, That is page 91, Mr. Lattimore. You may read any 
part of it into the public record. 

Mr. Lattimore. My testimony in executive session was as follows : 

Mr. Morris. Do you know the organization Committee for Democratic Far 
Eastern Policy? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I do. 

Mr. Morris. Have you ever been associated with that in any way? 



3474 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. No. I was asked to subscribe to it, and I replied that since 1 
was at that time writing syndicated newspaper articles as an independent 
commentator I did not want to subscribe to any partisan organizations of that 
kind. However, right at the end of the war, they were bringing out some fairly 
interesting information that was not readily available elsewhere, and I sent in a 
subscription and asked them to send me their material. 

Mr. Morris. Do you believe that is a Communist organization? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should say that it certainly has become a fellow-traveling 
organization. I don't know whether it is Communist, or not. I am not an expert 
on the shades of difference between fellow-travelers and Communists. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last letter, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 27, 1939, addressed 
to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Ow^en Lattimore. It 
is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document, and it was previously 
used as exhibit No. 154. 

Mr, Lattimore. Mr. Lattimore, will you identify that letter as 
having been written by you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that in our record now^, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. That is exhibit 154. 

Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The date is March 27, 1939. [Reading :] 

Dear Cartke: Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. 
If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing 
to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a 
favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be I'estrained from 
giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had 
quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigiied his commission in order 
to speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of 
soon l)eing disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much 
that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is 
no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent 
impi'essions by which to gauge his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China." 

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write 
you again. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a document from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1940, addressed to Maj. Evans 
F. Carlson, American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese 
Aggression. The typed signature is "Owen Lattimore." It is a car- 
bon copy of a letter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having written that let- 
ter? 

Mr. Lattimore. I recall it now. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read it, please, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore, It is dated February 8, 1940. [Reading :] 

Dear Evans: What a dope I am ! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous 
candid portrait of yourself. 

Don't give anybody else too much the idea that it is a Herculean job to make 
the fur fly in Baltimore. If anybody should come along all ai'dor and enthusiasm, 
why break his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it 
should be easier in the future. 
Yours. 

Senator Ferguson. Let me see that letter. 

Mr. Morris, Mr. Chairman, will it be received in the record? 

The Chairman, It will be received in the record. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3475 

(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Ex- 
hibit No. 544'' and was read in full.) 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, Avill you identify those two documents? 

Mr. jNIandel. I have here a photostat of an article from the Daily 
Worker, of March 16, 1944, the editorial page, which is an article 
with the following heading: "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute 
to Sun Yat-sen, Chinese Communists." 

Then it continues : 

Following are excerpts from the address delivered by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carl- 
son, at Sun Yat-sen Day Tribute Meeting, Sunday, March 12, Metropolitan 
Opera House. 

Mr. Morris. Does that appear in the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Maxdel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What do you want to do with this one? 

]VIr. jNIorris. Will that be received in the record, Mr. Chairman? 

This is an article about Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, which appeared 
in the Daily Worker. 

The Chairman, "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute to Sun Yat- 
sen, Chinese Communists." 

This is a photostat clipping from the Daily Worker, is that correct, 
Mr. Mandel? 

Mr, JNIandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will that be received into the record, Mr, Chairman? 

The Chairman, It will be admitted into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 545" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 545 

Lt. Col. Carlson's Tribute to Su.\ Yat-Sen, Chinese Communists 

Following are excerpts from the address delivered ty Lt. Col. Evans. F. 
Carlson, at Sun Yat-sen Day tribute meeting, Sunday, March 21, Metro- 
politan Opera House. 

Fifteen years ago this coming June it was my rare privilege to participate in 
the ceremonies at Nanking, China, attending the State Burial of the Father of 
the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen. I was there as a member of the 
personal staff of Admiral Mark Bristol, then commanding our Asiatic Fleet. 

This man of humble birth, by his unshakable confidence in the dignity of the 
human being, regardless of his race, creed, or color, and by his unselfish devotion 
to the cause of bringing to the four hundred millions of his native China the hope 
and freedoms of the democratic way of life, overthrew the Imperial Ching dynasty 
and set the pattern which gave birth to the Republic and which has enabled his 
coumtrymen to resist for nearly seven years every effort of Japan to enslave 
them. 

We of the United States of America cannot escape our debt to Sun Yat-sen. 
The debt is rendered more poignant by the knowledge that we failed Doctor Sun 
back in 1923. in his hour of need. Failing to secure our support he turned to 
another great democratic people, tlie Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who 
provided the financial and moral aid which enal>le Chiang Kai-shek to accomplish 
the task of uniting China under one government in 1938. Today we enjoy the 
benefits of this luiity through the magnificent efforts of China, under Generalis- 
simo Chiang's leadership, to contain Japan's armies in Eastern Asia as we advance 
against the common enemy across the Pacific. 

HAILS sun's principles 

Doctor Sun is best known for the political philosophy which he evolved, called 
the San Min Chu I, or Three Principles of the People. This philosophy, sub- 
scribed to by all political groups in China today regardless of their complexion, 
combines the best of the political doctrines of ancient China vdth those principles 



3476 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

of democratic doctrines of Britain, the U. S. S. R., and tlie United States which 
Doctor Sun felt were most suitable to the needs and temi^erament of the Chinese 
people. Some of his ideas regarding the application of these principles indicates 
the universal scope of his iwlitical thinking. 

His principle of Nationalism relates to the fundamental need for people to be 
organized Into a sovereign state. In ('hina the principles had a two-fold applica- 
tion : (1) to induce a feeling of nationalism throughout all the people of this 
vast country; and (2) to regain for China the sovereign rights which had been 
impaired through the instrumentality of the Unequal Treaties Imposed by foreign 
powers. 

The Principle of Democracy Doctor Sun interpreted as the "People's sover- 
eignty," or control of government by the people. He contemplated that the 
people's will would be exercised through suffrage, the recall, the initiative, and 
the referendum. For the administration of government he added to ttie executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches we know, the old Chinese institution of exam- 
ination (comparable to our civil service) and censorship (most nearly akin to our 
supreme court). The application of these principles indicate the universal scope 
of his political thinking. 

China is administered today under this quintuple form of government, but the 
people have not yet attained the right of suffrage. Instead the nation is governed 
by the Kuomintang party. 

TELT.S OF THREE-FOIJ> PKOGRAM 

Doctor Sun contemplated that suffrage would be attained through a three-fold 
program. Fii-st there was to be the Period of Military Conquest, during which 
China would become united under the Kuomintang Party. Then would follow 
the Period of Political Tutelage, during which the party would govern while the 
people were being politically educated. Finally, suft'rage would be conferred on 
the people and the nation would enter the final i>eriod of Representative Govern- 
ment. The Period of Political Tutelage has prevailed since 1928. 

The most discussed and least understood of the Three Principles is that of the 
People's Livelihood. In effect. Doctor Sun's conception of this principle boils 
down to state socialism. He aimed to improve the livelihood of all the people, 
and he proposed to do this through social and economic reform, nationalization of 
transportation and communication, direct taxation and socialized distribution 
through cooperative societies. 

While, as I said a few moments ago, all political groups within China subscribe 
to his Three Principles of the People, all groups do not interpret the principles 
in the .same way, and emphasis in the application of the various principles differs 
with the groups. Tlie Kuomintang, under the aegis of Chiang Kai-shek, has 
brought Nationalism to a high peak. The Chinese Communist Party, which, from 
the nature of its works, I would term the Social-Democratic Party, goes in more 
for improving the people's livelihood and preparing them for the exercise of 
representative government. 

You hear much about the activities of the Kuomintang Party, which constitutes 
the national government at Chungking. Let me say a word about the less pub- 
licized Social-Democratic group which operates mostly in the northern provinces 
and largely behind the lines of the Japanese army. In the early years of the 
Sino-Japanese war I spent a number of months with this group, i found that 
its military successes were due in large measure to the democratic political action 
of the people and to the solid integrity of its leaders. 

HONORS COMMUNIST FIGHTERS 

Recently I had a report from Professor Michael Lindsay, formerly of the 
faculty of Yenching University, and now pre.sent with this group, on the activities 
of the group up to the end of last year. Profe.ssor Lindsay tells me that the 
military agencies of this group, the 8th Route and New Fourth Armies, are con- 
taining about 350,000 Japanese troops. These Chinese armies operate for the 
most part In small mobile columns which engage the enemy daily. Activities 
have been extended northeast of Peiplng and Into southern Manchuria, where 
they constitute a constant threat to the Japanese lines of communication with 
China. These armies, with their militia units, now number about one million 
men. 

One feature of the administration in the northern provinces that is significant 
is the extent of the public school system as well as of the adult education pro- 
gram. There are 7,500 schools operating in the Shansi-Hopei area, west of the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3477 

Peiping-Hankow railroad, and in tliis same area 300,000 adults had learned to 
read and write by the middle of 1943. People in this area, out off from Free 
China by Japanese military units, not only participate in the war effort, but 
govern themselves through their elected representatives. Thus are the principles 
of Doctor Sun being brought into full realization. 

One exponent of Doctor Sun's principles who merits special mention, is his 
widow, the former Sing Ling Soong. Madame Sun has consistenly and per- 
sistently, since her husband's death in 1925, endeavored to bring about the com- 
plete realization of his aspirations. Quiet and self-effacing, she is less well- 
known abroad than her sister, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but in China she has a 
large and loyal following. 

Madame Sun places only one interpretation on the teachings of her distinguished 
husband: the literal application of the principles of Nationalism, Democracy, 
and the People's Livelihood. She understands the self-discipline and self-sacri- 
fice which their application requires, and she begins with herself. None who 
has visited her can have failed to be impressed by the simplicity of her life, her 
love for humanity and her unremitting effort to improve the livelihood of her 
fellow citizens. I have known Madame Sun for many years, and her friendship 
has been an unfailing source of inspiration. 

Mr. Morris. What is the other one, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here the original of an article from a magazine 
entitled "Youth," the official organ of the American Youth for Democ- 
racy, which had been cited as subversive by the Attorney General. 

This issue is evidently undated, and on page 5 of this issue we have 
the following article headed "We Fought For Peace; by National 
Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMCR 
(Retired), Paul Robeson, cochairmen." 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carlson has been identified before 
this connnittee as having been a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you offering just this article for the record, 
Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Sour^vine. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Morris, we have not seen these two articles offered 
for the record. Is there any reference in them to Mr. Lattimore by 
name, in either of them ? 

Mr. Morris. No. 

Senator Ferguson. I wonder if the significance or the meaning of 
this letter of February 8, 1940, from Owen Lattimore to Carlson is 
clear, where Mr. Lattimore starts out with : "What a dope I am ! I 
forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself." 

Was there a memorandum in the paper, or in this envelope, or do 
you mean what followed as being the "glamorous candid portrait?" 

Mr. Lattimore . I should say, Senator, that it probably is a refer- 
ence to a snapshot that was enclosed, a snapshot of himself, a camera 
snapshot. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not mean to convey that the language 
was the portrait? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you say: "Don't give anybody else too 
much the idea," and so forth. What did you mean by that? 

Read it and tell us what you meant by that. 

Mr. Lattimore [reading] : 

Dear Evans : What a dope I am ! 

The Chairman. How did you spell the word "dope?" 

Mr. Lattimore. D-o-p-e. 

The Chairman. You did not use "u," did you? 



3478 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. No. I said : 

What a dope I am ! I forgot to give you the enclosed ghimorons candid por- 
trait of yourself. 

Don't give anybody else too much the idea that Lt is a Herculean job to make 
the fur fly in Baltimore. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you stop right there now ? What did you 
mean by that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think my recollection is probably correct, Senator, 
that I was referring to Colonel Carlson coming to Baltimore to speak 
for the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Ag- 
gression. Among other speakers we had for it were Dr. Walter Judd, 
now Congressman Judd, also Admiral Harry Yarnell. 

* * * If anybody should come along all ardor and enthusiasm, why break 
his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it should be easier 
in the future. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat "swell work" were you talking about ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Swell work in raising funds for the American Com- 
mittee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression. 

The Chairman. Mr. Morris, you have an exhibit here that you have 
offered for the record. Up to this point, I have not been able to catch 
your connection to tie it in here w4th either the Institute of Pacific 
Relations or the witness on the stand. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore gave testimony today, Mr. Chairman, 
about his having given advice to the author of that article, that he 
should stay in the Navy and not resign. We had some questioning on 
that point. 

Reference was also made to Colonel Carlson's membership in the 
Communist Party. That article is an article that Carlson wrote for 
the American Youth for Democracy publication, and that bears on 
Colonel Carlson's political persuasions in connection with the advice 
offered to him by Mr. Lattimore, who told him he should have stayed 
in the Navy, where he would be more potent. 

Mr. FoRTAs. Do you mean the article refers to it? 

Mr. Morris. It bears on his political identity. He is writing for 
a Communist publication. 

Mr. Lattimore. On his political identity at the time I gave him 
that advice ? 

The Chairman. Wait a minute. 

Did I understand that this organization, of which Carlson was a 
member, was listed as a subversive organization b}- the Attorney Gen- 
eral? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record. 

Again I say it goes to the weight of its worthwliileness. 

(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 546'' and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 546 

We Fought For Peace 

(By National Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMCB. 
(retired) Paul Robeson, cochairmen) 

[Source: Youth, Published by American Youth for Democracy, February 1947, p. 5] 

During the war, American youth carried their ideals for a postwar world into 
battle. Their gims spoke the hope of an era of permanent, democratic peace, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3479 

The rhythm of marching feet sounded their aspirations for an economic future 
quite in contrast to the homeless, blaclv-market ridden land to which they 
returned. 

They fought hard and they fought well in their battle against the enemy. 
But their enemies were not only Hans or Tayaka. Their enemies were the 
philosophies that held one man is better than another because of the color of his 
skin or the religion that he practiced ; that democracy is an archaic system 
that must be replaced by fascism ; and that the armed might of imperialism 
can rule the world. Side by side the democratic peoples of the world, American 
youth defeated the advocates of these philosophies. 

The youth of America had good cause to fight as they did under the leadership 
of Franklin Roosevelt. They remembered well how his courageous leadership 
had saved the post-World War I generation from the chaos of the Hoover de- 
pression. They knew from experience how his fight for a better America had 
enabled many of them to finish school, to improve their living standards and to 
enjoy the full benefits of American democracy. 

With Franklin Roosevelt, the youth of America envisaged a world free from 
the scourge of war. They knew that his policy of friendship and unity of all 
United Nations held the key to peace as well as victory. Translated into prac- 
tical terms, it meant an incessant battle for economic democracy, for colonial 
independence, for minority rights and for the spirit of friendly cooperation 
among the Big Three powers. 

F. b. R. did not live to see the peace he worked so hard to win. He did not 
live to see that peace threatened by dangerous voices in our midst who are al- 
ready crying for a new war — a new and terrible conflagration that will wipe 
out democracy as it lashes the earth with the weapons of an atomic age. 

But today, others, particularly the youth of America, are fighting along the 
battle lines set by F. D. R. Through the AYD, through the National Com- 
mittee to Win the Peace and through every other democratic channel of people's 
expression, American youth are working to return our Nation to the program 
of F. D. R. 

The future of the youth of America is inextricably woven into the pattern 
this country sets for itself in the immediate period to come. The voice of youth 
will play a major role in determining that pattern. 

Together witli the youth of America, the National Committee to Win the 
Peace will work to crystalize public opinion on a course which will enable us 
to live in peace with all nations of the world — on a course which will enable us 
to steer clear of a war whicli might be precipitated by forces which are inimical 
to the best interests of the youth and people of America. 

Only if our country follows such a course will the ideals of F. D. R. and the 
youth of America for a better postwar world be fulfilled. 

Mv. ^Morris. IVIr. Lattimore, did you ever serve as a member of the 
board of directors of the American-Russian Institute? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I may have, for a year. 

If you have a document to refresh my recollection, I should be glad 
to see it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 21, 1940, addressed to Miss 
Harriet L. jMoore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty- 
fifth Street, New York City, with the typed signature of Owen Latti- 
more. The document is a photostat of a carbon copy. 

Mr. iSIoRRis. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall having written that 
letter ? 

j\Ir. Lattimore. Yes; I recall it. And it shows that my recolTection« 
was wrong. 

The Chairman. All right, he recalls it. 

Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The date is October 24, 1940, to Miss Harriet L. 
Moore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, 
New York City. 



3480 INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(Exhibit No. 547) 

Dear Hakbiet: I am afraid that I cannot serve on the board of directors of the 
institute, but I thinlv you will appreciate my reasons. 

My primary interest, and the only field in which I speali with any authority, 
is the Far East. At the present time, of all times, I do not want to run the 
risk of having anything I may say about the Far East discredited by people who 
say "You can't trust a word he says about China, because he is interested in 
cultural relations with the Soviet Union." 
Yours very sincerely. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record? 

The Chairman. It will be received into the record. 

(The document previously read in full by the w^itness was marked 
"Exhibit No. 547".) 

The Chairman. Wliat is the next one ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Mandel, will you identify this document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "On board M. V. Georgic^ en 
route to New York." It is dated October 19, 1937, addressed to 
W. L. Holland, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is 
a phototsat of a carbon copy. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read the handwritten notations 
on the top ? 

Mr. Mandel. At the top are the following handwritten notes 
[reading] : 

Copies to OL— to share with RP & ED. 
CHS— to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT. 

The Chairman. Can somebody interpret those initials, please, who 
they were, for the record ? Who were the parties ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Lattimore, will you identify the parties? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

OL— to share with RP & ED. 

The Chairman. Is that your signature to the letter, "OL" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; this is a circulation notation, to be sent to 
"OL" and for "OL" to share with "RP" and "ED." 

The Chairman. Who are they. Who is "RP" ? 

Mr, Lattimore. "RP" I think was an Englishman named — I for- 
get his name — Page or something like that, who was working for 
the IPR in Shanghai. 

"ED," I think, is Elizabeth Downing. 

Then the other initials are "CHS— to share with HM, CP, EEC, 
KB, CT." Presumably, that means Chen Han-seng, to share with 
Harriet Moore, Catherine Porter, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley, Kathleen 
Barnes, Charlotte Tyler. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of this document is that a 
copy of it had been sent to Mr. Lattimore, and the questioning will bear 
on his knowledge of the contents of this memorandum. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are you offering that for the record, Mr. Morris? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer this for the record. 

"The Chairman. It will be inserted in the record. 

(The document ire.ferr^d to was marked "Exhibit No. 548" and is 
as follows:) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3481 

Exhibit No. 548 

Copies to 01. — to share with RP & ED 

CHS— to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT 

On Board "M. V. Georoic," en Route to New York, 

19th October, 1937. 

W. L. Holland, Esq., 

% Kokusai Kyokai, 12 2-cJiomc Marnnoiichi, Kojimaclii-ku, 

Tokyo, Japan. 

De.\b Bill: The pace in and following Moscow has been such that I can only 
now begin a piecemeal report to you on visit and discussions. Today I will 
group mv answers around the agenda which I prepared for a meeting of the 
praesidium on August 13 and August 17. To give you the trend, I will italicize 
the agenda which formed the basis of these two formal meetings, but there were 
many other conversations so that the information contained in this letter was 
not entirely conveyed at those two stated meetings. 

1. THANKS TO SOVIET COUNCIL FOR ARRANGING SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FAR EASTERN 

VISIT 

Here I gave a rather full account of what I regarded as the deeper significances 
of the visit. V. B. M. explained the difficulties in makincr the arrangements but 
his great satisfaction that the object of the visit had been achieved, namely, 
better equipment of the Secretary-General for his work. 

This led to a very extended discussion of possible developments in the war 
in China. The sketch made by V. E. M. and Y. P. B. in August has thus far 
been proved both fundamental and accurately prophetic. To describe it here 
would make this letter, which must be long anyhow, too bulky. It would also 
make the letter interesting. 

n. RESEARCH 

.4. Letter from Holland to Bremman dated June 28, 1937. 

(1) Enf/lish or American editions of Standards of Living Repot'ts. 

(2) Report on North Pacific fisheries. 

B. Letter from Holland to Carter dated June 28, 1937. 

"The other place of research which ice should like to have started in the 
Soviet Union is a report on Soviet foreign policy mith special reference to the 
Far East and the countries having membership in the IPR. Each national coun- 
cil is being asked to prepare a similar report, necessarily presenting its oun 
national point of view. 

"In connection with the studies on the economic development of dependent 
territories in the Pacific it might be interesting for them to prepare a report on 
the administration and economic development of its Far Eastern territories in- 
habited by minor nationalities, contrasting this loith the customary methods of 
V,^ester7i Colonial administration. 

"There is one further point. Motileff in discussing the Land Utilization 
studies at Yosemite spoke with some enthusiasm about securing an extensive 
and very illuminating report on land utilization and agricultm-al development 
in the Soviet Far East. There would be widespread interest in such a report 
and I hope you will take the matter up again with him and assure him of our 
desire to have the study done and to do ichaterer we can to facilitate its publi- 
cation in English. Besides this Motileff spoke of supplying material for the 
new edition of the Economic Handbook. On this point hotcevcr I assume that 
Miss Mitchell will be tvell armed with specific requests and suggestions since the 
preparation of the new edition has already been star-ted under Mr. Field's 
direction." 

With reference to English or American editions of the Standard of Living 
Reports, the praesidium is hospitable to the idea in principle, but is very reluctant 
to have these handled on any but a commercial basis. They do not wish to have 
publications subsidized for this makes their work liable to attack as propaganda. 
If some English or American publisher will not take the studies on a commercial 
basis it is probable that it could be published through the English Workers Press 
or tlirough International Publishers. 
88348-^52— pt. 10 ^^14 



3482 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

With reference to a report on the North-Pacific fisheries, the praesidium wants 
to know precisely what tlie objective of tlie Institute is for this study. There are 
so many approaclies that the praesidium does not wish to set a lot of people to 
work on every aspect of Soviet Far Eastern fislieries without knowing with very 
great precision, what you and Alsherg want. In this connection, please see my 
letter to Alsberg of V. E. M. thought that the fisheries question had been 

better treated in the Pacific Fisherman than it had in Pacific Affairs. He had 
sent Miller Freeman the latest data in Jiily. Some time when you are in Tokyo 
you may wish to look up Juikoff, an expert on fish, who is attached from time 
to time to the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. 

If the Japanese I. P. R. or the American I. P. R. set the pace in the studies of 
the fishery question or if you and Alsberg give a precise outline of just what the 
purpose of the study is, it will be very easy for the Soviet I. P. R. to make the 
necessary start on the study. 

With reference to a report on Soviet foreign policy in the Far East, V. E. M. 
wonders whether you wish it treated primarily from the historical point of view 
or with the emphasis on contemporary manifestations of Soviet foreign policy. 
If the latter is what you want, the situation is a little difficult because of the lack 
of connection between the Soviet I. P. K. and the Foreign Ofiice, as prescribed by 
I. P. R. custom. It may be helpful if you would suggest an organizing principal 
for all of the Councils for their monographs in this field. 

With reference to your suggestions that the praesidium prepare a report on 
the development of the Far Eastern Territories inlial)ited by Minor Nationalities, 
for contrast with the customary methods of Western Colonial administration, I 
have already written you (see my letter of September 29) that it is quite im- 
possible for the Soviet I. P. R. to prepare a report for such a purpose. The INIinor 
Nationalities are in no sense "colonial"' areas. If you want a monograph on this 
subject it is a legitimate request to make of the Soviet I. P. K., but only if it is 
completely disassociated from preparation for the Round Table on Colonial 
Problems. 

With reference to Land L^tilization there is a voluminous report on this sftbject 
for '34, '35, '36, on which someone is working. But it probably cannot be brought 
up to date until the second half of next year. Then someone should go to the 
Far East for the purpose of correcting and supplementing the statement. 

With reference to the new edition of the Economic Handljook. I had nothing 
to say as Field had not supi)lied me with an outline of his proposed procedure in 
this matter. When a specific request is made to Motylev I think he will respond. 
But I didn't get the idea that he regarded this project as one to which everything 
else should be subordinated. 

III. PACFFIC ATFAIRS 

Lattimore's urgent desire for Soviet articles for Pacific Affairs, for example, 
Voitiriskifs article in TikMi Olcean, ivhich tvas translated and used in Amerasia, 
ironld have been ideal as a contribution to Pacific Affairs. 

This has been covered in my letter to Lattlmore of September 12, a copy 
of which I have already sent you. 

IV. AGENDA FOR 1039 CONFERENCE 

A. Comment of Soviet Council. 

B. Replies fro)n other Councils. 

The Soviet Council prefers the methodology of our April proposal to that 
followed at Yosemite. At the same time the praesidium does not feel so strongly 
in this matter as to desire to have their vote weigh too decisively. They feel 
that as one of the newest Councils they would prefer to throw in their lot with 
the wishes of the majority of the older Councils. The Council favors the inclu- 
sion of the current crisis in the Far East in the agenda of the next Conference. 
The Soviet Council had not yet received the Kingston proposals when I was in 
Moscow. They had seen the Chatham House memorandum of August 3rd and 
Miss Harriet Moore's important contribution on methods and objectives. 

v. INTERIM MEETINGS OF PACIFIC COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE, 
HANKING, APRIL 21-28, 1938 

A. Af/enda. 

B. Soviet participation. 

If the meetings are held in Naidving the Soviet Council will aim to be repre- 
sented. The Soviet Council would have preferred a meeting in October 1937^ 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3483 

in England to a meeting in China in April 1938, partially because of distance, 
but principally because of the advantage of getting Great Britain to assume 
greater interest and responsibility in the I. P. R. through acting as host. 

VI. PACIFIC COUNCIL FINANCE 

I referred to Dafoe's letter of March 30th in which he referred to Lord Astor's 
letter stating that the Chatham House increase of its gift was defended on the 
ground that it would enable the Institute to get more money from the other 
Councils. 

The praesidium was glad that Chatham House had increased its contriljution 
to $750, but sorry that it had not raised it to .$1,000. The U. S. S. R. will con- 
sider increasing its contribution to .$3,000.00 next year. If all the other Councils 
would increase, they would do likewise, but they do not feel that it is sound for 
them to give more than Great Britain which in reality they are already doing 
if you take everything into consideration. The Soviet Council is the only 
Council which has never taken a penny from the International liesearch Fund. 
Nearly every Council, except the American and Canadian have got more from 
the Research Fund than they have contributed to the General Purposes budget. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Council this year took care of all my expenses from 
the time I arrived in Vladivostok until I reached Moscow, and thus in fact added 
'several hundred dollars to the Pacific Council's income, though this item will 
not show in our books. The Soviet I. P. R. is prepared to supplement its contri- 
bution to the Pacific Council by helping to meet the Ruble needs of staff mem- 
bers like Miss Moore and Lattimore when they travel on study tours in the 
U. S. S. R. 

VII. IXF0R:\[AL report ox I. p. R. developments in japan, PHILIPPINES, AND CHINA 

Here I gave a survey of the difficulties and promise of the three Far Eastern 
Councils. I described the favorable financial outlook in Japan and China and 
indicated that I feared that few if any of the hoped for contributions would now 
actually be paid to either Council. I referred to the promises of increased finan- 
cial support of the Philippine Council and the bearing this might have in ulti- 
mately creating .something more substantial than that which has existed in the 
past. The praesidium asked very penetrating questions regarding the Institute 
in the three countries. 

VIII. CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R. EEGAKDING THE WORK OF 

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT SINCE YOSEMITE 

The praesidium was so conscious of its failure to cooperate in supplying 
articles for Pacific Affairs that little was said under this heading. Fears with 
reference to Problems of the Pacific will not it appears be realized. I saw an 
advance copy of the volume in London and was able to write Motylev a letter 
which will I think end his anxiety. The only real criticism was with reference to 
Cressy whom the praesidium recognized was not a representative of the I. P. R. 
and had only been recommended by the I. P. R. as in Class B. Motylev felt that 
Cressy was exceedingly conservative and in many important fields uninformed. 
For example, he criticized the Atlas because Manchuria and the Outer Mongolian 
People's Republic were not .shown in the same colors as indicating an identic 
political status. 

Motylev nevertheless, was very glad that the Atlas had been able to pay Cressy 
between 3,800 and 4,000 Rubles for eight days work on the Atlas, thus providing 
for all of his Ruble needs throughout the extensive journeys which Motylev ar- 
ranged for him to different parts of the Union. 

IX. WORK PLANS OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT FOR THE COMING 
YEARS CARTER, MITCHELL, HOLLAND, CHEN HAN-SENG, LATTIMORE, MOORE, PYKE, ETC. 

Here I gave the best foreca.st I could of staff plans. Motylev was sorry that 
Mitchell had been unable to come to Moscow and that I had not applied earlier 
for permission for Holland to accompany me to the Far East. The pdsition with 
reference to Lattimore's going to Outer :\longolia is set forth in my letter to 
Lattimore of September 12, a copy of which I sent you. The position with refer- 
ence to Miss Moore's going to Buryat, Mongolia is set forth in my letter to her 
of September 12, a copy of which I have also sent you. 



3484 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

X. COMMENTS BY OFFICERS OF THE V. S. S. R. I. P. R. ON PRESENT CRISIS IN THE 

FAR EAST 

This, as indicated above, calls for a separate memorandum. 

XI. MOTYLEV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR CARTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (AUGUST 10, 1923) 

When I reached Vladivostok, Bremman told me that Dr. Motylev hoped that 
it would be possible for me to take my family for a fortnight to the Crimea at 
the end of tlie Moscow visit. Motylev renewed this invitation on our arrival, 
but because of previous engagements in Western Europe, and the growing serious- 
ness of the crisis in the Far East, we had to decline with thanks this very kind 
invitation. 

Arrangements were made, however, for us to take a fascinating three-day trip 
in the Moscow-Volga Canal, going as far as Kalinin. We made interesting 
visits to the parks, to the Red Army Club, to one of the big stadiums for a soccer 
game between Dynamo and the Red Army, and spent all of August 18 at the 
great aviation field outside of Moscow watching some hundreds of airplanes 
celebrating the annual Civil Aviation Day. 

We saw a good many of the staff of the American Embassy, although Mr. 
Davies was away on his yacht in the Baltic. We saw the British Ambassador, 
and several of his staff, had long talks with both the Chinese and Japanese 
Ambasi^adors, with Litvinova, and, of course, with several of the foreign journal- 
ists. Mr. and IVIrs. Barnes extended many courtesies including a cocktail party 
for many of the foreign journalists the day we left. On August 21st Motylev 
gave a dinner, attended, among others, by Smirnov, the new head of Vox, 
Vinogradoff, Foreign Office referent for England and the United States, Wine- 
berg, of the Anglo-American section of the Foreign Office, Miss , one of the 

editorial staff of Isvestia. Voitinsky we did not see as he had not returned 
from his holiday. It so happened that our visit to Moscow came at a time when 
several members of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. Council were away on vacation. 
Hai'ondar had been borrowed for six months to assist in the Soviet Building at 
the Paris Exposition. We had two good talks with him in Paris. 

One evening Motylev took us to the movie "Na Vostoke." This is a film 
version of Pavlenko's novel which has gone through edition after edition since 
its publication a few months ago. I am told though it is a novel, it contains 
a surprising amount of military information regarding the position of the Red 
Army in the Far East. You will remember Harriet Moore's review of this book 
in the September Pacific Affairs. 

We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov. 
Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova, and myself were present. Smirnov wanted 
to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute 
could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding 
•of the work and program of the A. R. I. and hoped tliat more substantial coopera- 
tion could be built up in the future. I read betv/een the lines that Vox felt that 
the A. R. I. gave letters of introduction to Vox to any American tourist who 
requested one and thus they had no basis for discrimination as to who was en- 
titled to a lot of time and who could best be liandled by Intourist. If Vox knew 
in advance of the specific social opinions and interests of important Americans, 
they could make very much better use of their limited staff. Smirnov wanted 
a long explanation as to why the A. R. I. still retained a certain internationally 
known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board of directors.. 

Just before I left, Smirnov luckily bad a long letter from Osgoode Field, the 
President of the A. R. I., which I gather set his mind at rest at several points. 
The A. R. I. bad recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to 
know very much either about the A. R. I. or about the social views of its members. 

I used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of the 
A. R. I., namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the member- 
ship was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that 
perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section 
of American public opinion. 

XII. OTUEB BUSINESS 

A. Memorandum from Chatham Hoiise dated August 3rd, 1937 

This memorandum arrived after our first conversation on preparation for 
the next conference. On one of these occasions Motylev emphasized how eager 
the Soviet I. P. R. is to have the Institute deal with current controversial issues. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3485 

Unless the Institute courageously continues to face the most pressing and funda- 
mental controversies, it cannot render its largest service. 

B. What steps will be taken to insure intelligent and significant revieics of Great 

Soviet World Atlas in principal countries. How secure a feiv advance 
copies with memorandum on principal points of significance 
Motylev indicated that the first edition of the Atlas would be 10,000 copies. 
These would be used up almost immediately. He really hoped that the first 
edition would not be widely reviewed because then the overseas demand for 
copies might exceed the number available. He would, of course, see that one 
copy was sent to the International Secretariat and to each National Council. 

C. Recommendation as to duration Miss Harriet Moore's visit to Buryat Mongolia 
ECC was asked to write a formal letter to Dr, Motylev a few months in advance 

of Miss Moore's proposed visit to Buryat Mongolia, describing the purpose of the 
visit and its duratioh. It was suggested that an application for .say two months' 
residehce in Buryat Mongolia be thade. A major diffl;illty was, of cour.se, the 
matter of military secrets. A minor difBclilty might be the question of .suitable 
living quarters as the Btiryat Mongols draw no lines between the sexes. 

D. Could Bremman spend at least 3 months as a member of the Internntional 

Secretariat in 1938 or 1939 
Motylev indicated that the Soviet Council mii.'^t provide a Soviet staff member 
for the International Secretariat for a few months prior to the next Conference ; 
but whether Bremman himself could be spared was another question, Bremman 
as you know is one of the Japanese experts in the Academy of Science (Insti- 
tute of World Politics and Economics). He is only able to give part time to the 
work of the I. P. R. He is exceedingly al)le and would be quickly annexed by 
the American Council if we ever station him in New 'Sfork. 

E. Procedure with reference to members of the Internatimial Secretariat and 

the Secretariats of the National Councils visiting the Soviet Union in the 
future 
This question was raised as a result of Shiman's long delay in getting a visa. 
The full details of this are covered in my letter to Field of August 20th, a copy 
of which I enclose. 

In general the Soviet I. P. R. will always find it ea.sier to get visas for senior 
staff members, who come for longish visits rather than for junior members who 
contemplate visits of only a few days. Very great regret was expressed by 
Motylov that Field had not notified him, in advance, of Shiman's plans. 

F. The internal situation in the Soviet Union 

The discussion of this topic by Motylov and Bremman was one of the most 
interesting and enlightening experiences in the whole cour.se of my visit. But 
thi.s better be covered in a separate memorandum which I hope some day to be 
able to prepare. 

G. Suggestions from Soviet Council to the Secretary-Generpl regarding making 

the loork of the International Secretariat more efficient 

The praesidium had no suggestions to make. 

H. How secure promptly several copies of the folloiolng publications of the In- 
stitute of World Politics and Economics. Provisional titles only 

(a) Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria 

(&) Guerrilla Warfare in Manchuria 

(c) Symposium 07i China 

id) Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in 
Japan 

{e) Financial situation in Japan 

if) Position of the Working Class iti Japan 

(g) Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourivitch 

(h) Dissertation by Levina (?) developing Lenin's idea that Capitalism is 
acceptable to the United States peasant because of the absence of feudal factors. 

Motylev and Bremman said that some of the foregoing titles were not phrased 
accurately, some are completed, and some may never be published. 

Notice of publication of any of the.se studies will presumably appear in Tikhii 
Okean. Miss Moore should be asked to notify the Secretary-General when any 
of them are forthcoming, with a view to deciding whether translation is desirable. 



3486 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I. Other business lOS proposed by the officers of the U. 8. S. R. I. P. R. 

There were several general conversations with reference to the attitude of 
other Councils to the present a.csression in the Far East. Surprise was ex- 
pressed that the American intelligensia is so silent ; even the interesting discus- 
sions at the annual meeting of the American Council revealed a lack of funda- 
mental information as to the actual forces that are operating in Japan. Both 
Reichshauer and Warnshuis took the optimistic and inaccurate view of trends 
in Japan which were not refuted in a clear-cut way in the ensuing discussion. 
Similarly there is little evidence in the discussions of the Royal Institute in 
Loudon, of a fundamental understanding of the Far Eastern situation. Is it not 
possible for the American and British Councils to make such a clear-cut analysis 
of the forces at work in the Far East as will reveal to their publics the nature 
and danger of the present aggression? Should not the Institute in all countries 
be the foremost organization in making highly fundamental analyses? Could 
not the American and British Councils hold special meetings and express opin- 
ions on contemporary questions while they are acute? 

A special conference convened by the American Council, if adequately reported 
and publicized, could give a fundamental analysis of the whole Far Eastern sit- 
uation which might be of the greatest importance to public opinion throughout 
the world. The imperialistic fallacy of men like Orchard should be dealt with 
in a clear-cut way by the American Council of which he is a member. 

Reverting to the program for the next Conference, the Soviet I. P. R. is not 
deeply concerned with shipping and trade competition in the Pacific because of 
the Soviet's foreign-trade policy. 

With reference to the two reports on Standards of Living ; the first part 
should be completed by the end of December and the second half by the end of 
January. I think, however, that the first report, namely that by Krivetsky, is 
more certain of completion than that by Professor Kravel. I seem to remember 
Motylev saying that Kravel's work had been interrupted either by serious ill- 
ness or by his transfer to another and more urgent job. 

With reference to the symposium on the Far East ; Krasavtsev stayed on in 
the Soviet Far East after Bremman and I left in order to see all of the authors 
personally and make arrangements for checking all of the manuscripts. 

Both Motylev and Bremman were eager to know of developments in the I. P. R. 
in all of the member countries. They discussed many of the ideas put forward 
at Yosemite by members from the various countries. They had enjoyed the 
visits after Yosemite of Liu Yu-wan, of Van Walrec of the Pacific Institute in 
Amsterdam. They were much impressed by Lattimore's statement that if the 
Soviet I. P. R. would only furnish a regular series of articles for Pacific Affairs 
it would be much easier for him to bring the editorial policy into a real focus 
than it is at present. 

Doubtless this letter will raise many questions on which you will want further 
clarification. Plea.se, therefore, write me fully after you have read it. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

]\Ir. MoRRi.s. I ask you now to turn to page 5 of the stencil copy, Mr. 
Lattiniore. Will you read the paragraph commencing at the top of 
the page ? 

Mr. Lattimore. ISIay I look at the document of the whole to see the 
relevance of the particular paragraph to the whole? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, you may, Mr. Lattimore. 

(The witness examined the exhibit.) 

Mr. Lattimork. I found here the name Pyke. That must be "'R. P." 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, tlie questioning, you see, is about the 
American-Russian Institute, and you find the reference to that com- 
mences, I believe, on page 5. The whole thing will be in the record. 

Mr. Lattimore. What is the paragraph you wanted me to read? 

Mr. Morris. The top of page 5. 

Senator Ferguson. Before he reads that, might I inquire? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you found the reports on your visit to 
Moscow, that you were going to look up for me, referred to in your 
Ordeal bv Slander? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3487 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I haven't found it yet. I haven't had an oppor- 
tunity to go and look for it. I can tell you in general what its nature 
is. 

Senator Ferguson. No, we want to see the report. 

Mr. Chairman, even though we recess Mr. Lattimore's testimony, 
might we hold it open until we get those reports, until we see whether 
they ought to go into the record ? 

Mr. Lattimore. There was no report solely on the Moscow meetings. 
It was my report to the committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
on my work as editor of Pacific Affairs, which included a reference to 
the Moscow visit. There was no separate report on the Moscow visit. 

Senator Ferguson. The report that was referred to in the record. 

Mr. Lattimore. In the testimonv, sure. 

Shall I read? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov. 
Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova and myself were present. Smirnov wanted 
to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute 
could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding 
of the work and program of the ART and lioped that more substantial coopera- 
tion could be built up in the future. I read between the lines ■ 

"I" meaning Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. And "ARI" meaning what ? 

Mr. Lattimore. American-Russian Institute. 

"I" and ''myself" all the way through here is Carter. 

I read between the lines that Vox felt that the ARI gave letters of introduction 
to Vox to any American tourist who requested one and thus they had no basis 
for discrimination as to who was entitled to a lot of time and who could best 
be handled by Intourist. If Vox knew in advance of the specific social opinions 
and interests of important Americans, they could make very much better use of 
their limited staff. Smiruov wanted a long explanation as to why the ARI still 
retained a certain internationally known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board 
of directors. 

Do you want me to go on ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, please. 

Mr. Lattimore. This is still Carter : 

.Just before I left Smirnov luckily had a long letter from Osgood Field, thQ 
president of the ARI, which I gather set his mind at rest at several points. The 
ARI had recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to know 
very much either about the ARI or about the social views of its members. 

I'used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of 
the ARI, namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the member- 
ship was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that 
perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section 
of American opinion. 

The Chairman. The "ARI*' stands, again, please, for what? 

Mr. Lattimore. American-Russian Institute. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you correct our record in connection 
with whether or not the American-Russian Institute is now listed as a 
subversive organization by the Attorney General ? 

Mr. Mandel. A member of the stall called the Justice Department 
after this morning's session, in that regard, and was told that the 
present status of the American-Russian Institute of New York, which 
has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General on April 24, 1951, 



3488 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

renuiins the same. This was told the member of the staff by Mrs. 
Keene, of Mr. Foley's office. . ^ , t^ i -d 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you serve with the Pauley Kepara- 

tions Mission in Japan? 
Mr. Lati'imore. Yes, I did. 

Mr Morris. For what period of time did you so serve i 
Mr Lattimore. I think from about maybe late October or No- 
vember 1945 to late January or possibly the beginning of February 

Mr. Morris. During that time, were you on the State Department 

^^Mr Lattimore. Yes. My recollection is that the staff were paid 
through the State Department, although they were regarded—- 

The Chairman. How the staff were paid makes no difference. Were 
you on the State Department payroll ; yes or no ? 

Mr. Latiimore. I would say yes and no, Senator. 

May I explain ? 

The Chairman. Speaking of yourself, not of the staff. 

Mr Lattimore. Speaking of myself, my understanding was that 
the Pauley Mission was a White House mission, not a State Depart- 
ment mission, but for some reason of Government arrangements that 
I don't know, my pay checks came through the State Department. 

Tlie Chairman. The declaring of that whole statement is your 
answer that you were on the State Department payroll. So what is 
the use of wasting time? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I should say— well, I won t quibble about 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were you the third ranking member of 
that mission . 

Mr Lattimore. Oh, about third or fourth, I should say. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you going to read this document? 

Mr. Morris. I am sorry. Senator. Did you want to go into that i 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I wanted to ask a question. 

Who was the director who was anti-Soviet on this board, do you 
know ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea. r, . i.r 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know in this that you read, what they 
mean by "social opinion" and "social views"? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not any idea? 

Mr. Lattimore, No. It would be a matter of speculation. 

Senator Ferguson. How would you speculate? 

Mr. Lattimore. If you want me to speculate. Senator 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. . , 

Mr Lattimore. The first recollection that would come to my mind 
is that they wanted to know those views because they gave capitalists 
and anti-Communists better treatment than they did Communists. 
At least, so I was told when I was in I^Ioscow, by Mr. Demaree Bess, 
who was then correspondent to the Christian Science Monitor, and i 
expressed amazement that after the hostile way they criticized my 
writing, they had allowed me to make a trip to Moscow to look at 
their Siongolian research work. And he said, "Oh, that is quite 
simple." He said, "If they consider a person anti-Soviet they always 
treat him much better." 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3489 

The Chairman. I do not think the question calls for you to quote 
anybody else. 

Mr. Lattimore. That was, of course, as of 1936. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think that the words "social views" 
meant Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it. But is pure speculation on my part. 
I don't think my speculation is very authoritative. 

Senator Ferguson. You received this at the time. It indicates that 
it was passed to you. 

]\Ir. Laitimore. It indicates it was passed to me, yes. I don't recall 
readino; it, and I presume I put it on one side as something that didn't 
have any particular concern to me. 

The Chairman. That was by Mr. Carter, was it not? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, were you listed as a special consultant 
Avith the Pauley Mission staff? 

Mr. Laitimore. I believe that was my rank, or title, or whatever 
you call it, listino;. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, when you testified in executive session 
before this committee, we asked you if you helped draft the Pauley 
reparations report, and you testified "quite largely." 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Is that correct? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, Mr. Morris, in his opening pre- 
pared statement, it is my memory that Mr. Lattimore referred to the 
Pauley report as a report which "I wrote." Is that not correct, Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am not sure whether I wrote or drafted, or some- 
thing. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It is on page 26, the fifth line from the bottom. 

Mr. Latitmore. I have it on 27. 

Mr, Fortas. You must have different pages. 

Mr. Lattimore. Is this the reference you mean, Mr. Sourwine : 

When I was in Japan with the Pauley mission at the end of 1945, I did play 
a major part in drafting; a reparations report in close conference with Mr. 
Pauley. 

Mr. Sourwine. No, I am referring to this statement which is at 
the bottom of page 26, which is the copy I have here, and which is 
one of the copies you distributed on the opening day : 

Mr. Dooman claimed that the Pauley report which I had written provided for 
turning Japan into a pasture. 

Mr. Lattimore. I think, Mr. Sourwine, that must be a reference to 
a statement by IVIr. Dooman. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you, in fact, write the Pauley report? 

Mr, Lattimore. No, I played a large part in drafting it. 

The Chairman. All right, let us go on, 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, by bringing together a lot of loose 
ends here, I believe we can finish in about an hour and a half tomorrow. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do we not recess until then ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Sourwine has a question today. 

The Chairman. There was submitted to the chairman yesterday a 
matter of the insertion into the record of excerpts from the Con- 



3490 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

gressional Record. I had Mr. Sourwine and other members of the 
staff look up the question of context. 

Mr. Sourwine, wliat did you find as regards those excerpts? 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, the excerpts were two in number. 
They are referred to on page, or beginning on page 5635 of the 
record of this committee of yesterday. Mr. Lattimore said : 

Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the Congressional Record 
pertinent to the general question of discussion of the subject of China in 1945 
that I should like to read into the record. 

The Chairman. Let me see it first, please. 

Senator Ferguson. I have something before he puts that in, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Lattimore. One is from Representative Walter Judd and the other is 
from Representative Mike Mansfield. 

Senator Ferguson then went forward with the matter he had, after 

which the chairman said : 

The two excerpts here, assertedly from the Congressional Record, I think 
counsel will check with the Congressional Record and, if they are to go in, 
they will go in in context, and I will reserve the rviling on the matier. 

With regard to these two excerpts, I have here the original sheet 
as furnished by Mr. Lattimore, and also a longer excerpt from the 
Congressional Record, showing the point at which each of these ap- 
peared in context. If the Chair deems it not improper, I would like to 
ask the witness a question or so about these and then lay the whole 
thing in the record, or offer it for the record. 

The Chairman. Very well. I do not want to go too far in ques- 
tioning the witness. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, did you prepare these excerpts? 

Mr. LAT-riMORE. May I see the typing? I think that would show 
whether I did or not. 

(Documents handed to the witness.) 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think I did this actually myself. 

Mr. Sourwine. You offered them for the record. Do you know 
who did prepare them ? 

Mr, Lat^itmore. No, I couldn't tell you exactly, Mr. Sourwine. 
Several people at the Hopkins have very kindly volunteered to help 
me by looking up references, and so on, and I think this must be from 
one of them. But 1 don't know which one. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you take any steps before you offered these for 
the record to satisfy yourself that they were not out of context? 

Mr. Lattimore. I made no check. I accepted them as excerpts from 
the Congressional Record. 

The Chairman. I think the Chair will hold its ruling further in 
the matter at this time. 

Senator Ferguson. Until the witness at least can vouch for these? 

The Chairman. Yes. We will stand in recess until 10 : 30 to- 
morrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 3: 37 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 : 30 a. in., Friday, March 7, 1952.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1952 

United States Senate, 

Si:bcommi ri'EE To Investigate the Adminisi^ration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, or the Committee on the Judiciary, 

W ashing on^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : oa a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) pre- 
siding. 

Present : Senator McCarran, 

Also Present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Of the Senators belonging to the Internal Security Subcommittee 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Smith has been called 
hastily to his home in North Carolina on official matters. Senator 
O'Conor is away on official matters, and Senator Eastland has been 
called away. 

The belief of the committee is that as many as can listen to this 
testimony should listen to it. For that reason, it is the conclusion 
of the committee that this matter goes over and is recessed now until 
10 : 30 Monday morning. 

(Whereupon, at 10:37 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to recon- 
vene at 10 : 30 a. m., Monday, March 10, 1952.) 

3491 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1952 

Unite!) States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal. 

Securitt Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presid- 
ing. 

Present : Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Watkins. 
Also present: Senator McCarthy and Senator Mundt. 
Present also: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Morris, you may proceed. 

Senator Ferguson. 'Mr. Chairman, I have a question I would like to 
ask. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABE FORTAS, 

COUNSEL— Resumed 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, did you put into the record in 
the Tydings committee the memorandum that you left at the White 
House on July 3, 1945 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you put into the record the letter that you 
wrote to the President as of that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is, June 10, 1945. 

Did you at all discuss the visit to the White House, before the Tyd- 
ings committee ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I was asked whether I had made such a 
visit, and I replied that I had. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not give the letter or the memo- 
randum ? 

]Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I was not asked for them. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not questioned, then, about those let- 
ters at all, were you? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think you did state that you had been 
to the White House in 1945 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe that was stated in the record; yes. 

3493 



3494 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. But iiotlniio; more than just you had visited 
there ? 

Mr. Latttmore. That is riglit. 

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Lattimore, did you consider the Soviet 
Government a normal government, or did you consider it an inter- 
national conspiracy? 

Mr. Lattimore. When? 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you tlie question when if you will 
tell me whether you ever did. 

In your opinion, what was it? A normal government, or was it 
an international conspiracy? 

Mr. Lattimore. In my opinion, the Government of Russia was the 
revolutionary of Russia and different from any other government. 

Senator Ferguson. So you did recognize, in the early thirties, that 
the Soviet Government was different tlian the normal government of 
nations ? 

Mr. Latiimore. Well, it was the only government of its kind. 

Senator Ferguson. When did 3'ou come to the conclusion, if you 
ever did, that it is a conspiracy and has in mind installing its form 
of government world wide? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I believe that involves questions of re- 
lations between the Russian Government, the Comintern, and the Com- 
munist Parties of various countries on which I am not versed. 

The Chairman. The question is, "V^^ien did you come to the con- 
clusion ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You said it was different than other 
governments ; it was the only government of its kind. 

The Chairman. When did you come to that conclusion? That is 
the question. 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is that I have not come to that con- 
clusion. 
/May I explain ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

IVIr. Lattimore. I have not come to that conclusion because I don't 
know how the structure of international relations is set up as between 
the Russian Government and the various Communist Parties. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever study the Russian 
language? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I have studied the Russian language. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you speak it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't speak it. I read it quite freely. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you show tlie exhibits that we have now 
on the record, of your visit to the White House, that is, the memo- 
randum and the letter, to any member of the Ty dings committee ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Ferguson. Or the staff ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you account, Mr. Lattimore, for not 
making that part of the record? Did you not think that was mate- 
rial on the question as to whether or not you ever had anything to do 
with the foreign Policy of the Far East, as far as the President or 
the State Department was concerned ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I did not think it was material. The question of 
whether the committee wanted to see it was up to them. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3495 

Senator Ferguson. How would tliey know that it existed? You 
did not disclose it to any of them. 

JNIr. Lattimore. They knew that I had visited the White House. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your only explanation, is it, for not 
disclosing at that time your memorandum, your stand on the Far 
East, and your letter ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. No. I would add to that, that as a citizen I would 
not take the initiative in revealing the details of a citizen asking to see 
the President of his country. 

Senator Ferguson. You disclosed at least the letter to this com- 
mittee in your voluntary statement ; did you not ? 

]Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think so. I disclosed the fact that • 

Senator Ferguson. Have you a copy of your statement? "Will you 
read it ? 

The Chairman. The answer, as I understand it, then, is no. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now I am asking him to look on the bot- 
tom of page 24. 

Mr. FoRTAS. It is No. 6. 

Mr. Lattimore. Thirty-three I have here, No. 6 : 

In 194.5, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my 
views on China policy. Tlie President, in response, aslied me to come to see 
liim, and I did. 

Senator Ferguson. So you disclosed it to the President and to the 
public prior to coming into this hearing. What was the difference 
betAveen this hearing and the Tydings committee hearing so that you 
did not want to disclose the fact that you had written to the President ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I did not sa}' that 1 did not want to disclose the 
fact that I had written to the President, I said here that — I told the 
Tydings committee that I had seen the President, and in this state- 
ment I said that I had written to the President and asked if I could see 
him. I see no discrepancy. 

Mr. Fortas. No; that is not right. 

Senator Ferguson. Your counsel corrects 3'Ou. 

Mr. Lattimore. I wrote to President Truman expressing my views 
on China policy. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You did not say that you just wrote a 
letter. You say in this statement that you had written a letter ex- 
pressing your views on China policy. You knew that the Tydings 
committee was investigating a question, and one of the questions w^as 
whether or not you had been an influence on our foreign policy, or 
what you had to do with it. 

Why did you not disclose what you did in this memorandum to us ? 
Why did you not disclose it to the Tydings committee so that they 
could have gone into it? 

You cite the case, do you not, that the Tydings committee has found 
you absolutely innocent of everything? Why did you not disclose 
that fact to them ? 

Mr. Lattimore. 1 told the Tydings committee that I saw the 
President. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you not tell them that you had written 
a memorandum of your views on the Far East or on China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I told the Tydings committee that I had seen the 
President. If they wanted to know more about it, I was perfectly 
prepared to answer. 



3496 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them that ? 

Mr, Lattimore. I don't remember the transcript of the Tydings 
committee at that point. I certainly didn't refuse to answer any 
questions. 

Senator Ferguson. You are aware of the fact that you were sworn 
at that time to give them all the facts, were you not ? The truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 

Did you not think that, as part of your visit, if you left a memoran- 
dum, that that was material to the issue as well as giving your views 
in a letter which you expressed here ? You did not even disclose to this 
committee that you had left a memorandum with the President, in 
your voluntary statement. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I understand that when I am sworn to 
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that is an 
undertaking to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth in response to questions. 

Senator Ferguson. You came in and were sworn, and you read 
this statement to this committee. Will you let me see it, please? 

You read this statement. No. 6, at the bottom of page 33 : 

In 1945, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my 
views on China policy. The President, in response, aslied me to come to see 
him, and I did. Our conference lasted about 3 minutes. 

Now, Mr. Lattimore, you produce here a letter giving your views 
on the matter. You swore, when you read this, that it was the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 

Now I ask you, why did you not then, instead of leaving the idea 
that you had left nothing with the President, but talked with him for 
just 3 minutes, why did you not produce, as part of this memor- 
andum 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings 
transcript ? 

The Chairman. Just a minute. Let the Senator conclude his 
question. 

Senator Ferguson. Why did you not then give to the committee 
the fact that you had written the memorandum and left it with 
the President? How can you say that that is an accurate statement? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings 
transcript ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. But I am still asking you the question 
not on the Tydings transcript at all, but wdiat you told this com- 
mittee. You did not mention in this statement to the committee 
when you were telling them that was the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, that you had left the memorandum ; you 
said merely that you had written a letter to him. How do you ac- 
count for that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I have already said that I, as a citizen, 
do not believe in taking the initiative in revealing what a citizen 
talks about to his President when he sees him. 

If the committee wants to ask for it— and this committee did — 
it is not in my power to refuse. But the responsibility lies with the 
committee. I see no obligation to volunteer anything of that kind. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the difference between your state- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3497 

ment on your views of the China policy in your letter than those in 
the memorandum that yon left with the President? What is the 
difference ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry. I don't understand the question. 

Senator Ferguson. You said that you did not want to disclose what 
you said to the President. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you think that that is the reason for 
stating it this way, that you only wrote a letter and saw- him for 3 
minutes and did not tell us that you left the memorandum? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I see nothing wrong in that whatever. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you whether you saw anything 
wrong. Is that a statement of the whole truth? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I repeat that the question of the truth is 
a question of what the committee asks me. 

The Chairman. You were asked. Is that a statement of the whole 
truth ? Do you want to answer that ? 

Senator Ferguson. What you said to the committee in your mem- 
orandum. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, it is impossible, in one memorandum, to 
state the whole truth of the whole range of things that the committee 
may be interested in, or of what has already been in the transcript. 

I provided here a basis on which the committee could question me, 
and on which it has questioned me. 

Senator Ferguson. And is that your explanation ? 

Mr, Lattimore. That is my explanation. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have the witness see the record 
now in the Tydings committee, if he wants to. 

The Chairman. Is the Tydings committee record available? 
record l\lfi5^ifyi on which the witness asked for the Tydings committee 
ever, but if he wants to'see'tlie ^i'ya'S'i^^iG^s^.^P^^^it^^ee record what- 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He had nsked to see ir '^""'"'^ 

Mr. Fortas. Senator you don^t have the reference to this portion 
ot the Tydings record, do you ? ^ 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

Mr. Fortas. This will take some time. 

TwYJ'o^P^^®^^^- Then we can get it later. 
1 hat is all X L,^e ^^ ^j^^ ^^^^^^^ ^.^^ 

over ihe w^k en d dfscl™^ understand a review of the record 

'^Kl Max Eastina for thl Readei's'l^-!;'^fl ''^''''t\^y ^- ?• P<^-ell 
the record. May it be done at this tim 3"' ^"'^ "'' ^'"^ ''''''''^ "^^« 
not s^rve'^nr"'^- ^'" ^''' '^'''' ^'''' ^^^^^^^^^d? My memory does 

helou&il^: ";!i"rr'' '''''^^r^ '"f -^J^ '^'^ ^^^t -^^k that 
Mr, Thomas Lai on to sin "^^™°f "^^"^" ^^j^h Mr. Carter wante<l 
the article in Ser's Dfo;stT^^V"'"n''"t^S' addressed itself to 

-liie i^iiAffiMAN. It may be inserted in the record 

88348— 52— pt. 10 15 



3498 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 549" and is as 
folloAYS :) 

Exhibit No. 549 

[Source: Reader's Digest, June 1945, article entitled "The Fate of the World Is at Stake 
in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell (pp. 13-22, inclusive) ] 

The Fate of the World Is At St.a.ke in China 

Periodicals in Allied countries do not hesitate to publish blunt opinions 
^Yhen their national interest is at stake. Criticism of American policy 
and of individual Americans by official Russian journals, for instance, 
has been extreme. We can hardly expect to keep the respect of the otlier 
United Nations if our press — supposed to be the freest in the world — 
does not speak up just as boldly. Especially in relation to our friendly 
neighbor China, a plain-spoken report of the facts and a frank discussion 
of American policy are imperative. — The Authors. 

China is a giant among nations. Larger than all Europe, its population is one- 
fourth of the human race. And this giant is waking up. Following the example 
of Japan and Russia, it is entering the industrial age. 

Therefore, the question wliether China goes democratic or totalitarian is tlie 
biggest political question of today. In war or peace the weight of this giant 
of manpower may well be decisive in settling the fate of the world. 

China at present is split into three parts. IManchuria and the eastern half, 
including most of the seaboard, are occupied by Japan. A northwestern region 
not fai^from the Soviet border is held by the Chinese Communist Party. The 
rest of China is still under the Chiang Kai-shek government, which commands 
the loyalty of an immense majority of Chinese everywhere. 

Chiang Kai-shek is the successor of Sun Yat-sen.' father of the Chinese revolu- 
tion and founder of the Kuomintang (People's Party), which is dedicated to 
these three aims : National independence, political democracy, and the people's 
welfare. From 1927 to 1937 Chiang defeated the war lords; crushed the at- 
tempt of the Communists, Moscow-led, to seize power; and united under the 
Kuomintang practically all China except the smali northwest region into which 
his armies drove the Communists. Through popular and powerful enough to 
make himself permanent dictator, Chiang set a date, November 12, 1937, for a 
constitutional convention. Japan attacked in July of that year, and the con- 
vention had to be postponed. With victory now in sight, he ho^ --'- " 
again— November 12, 1945--Sun Yat:f.eTi'.^J];"-<fii'^ Communists formed a united 
fronfwoVf uTe lluomintang and' promised to fight under Chiang Kai-shek. But 
they cooled off after the Stalin-Hitler pact and finally renounced their promise. 
Explaining that theye were "revolutionaries, not reformers," they declared them- 
selves and'^their Red Army independent. They now have their own government, 
coin their own monev, run their own party-controlled newspapers and suppress 
all others. Thev recently declared a boycott against Chiang's effort to pro''-^-^_ 
a democratic republic, denouncing his constitutional convention, 6 ^^'"^ 
fore its delegates are elected, as a slaves' congress ^j^i. 

J. B. Powell, born not far from minmbal Mo., gj^--':^^^^ 
versity of Missouri and taught 4 years m tl|e^^\o^\;.;.^^'';,;rL editor of the 
in China throughout the penod between tjp ^X he woricr He was at the 
China Weekly Review, a liberal louriial kno|^ n ^";'T^.\ „\f ,^^,/ n^er papers and 
same time correspondent for the Ma^-J'e'^tei Guaidian an(i uiei i i 
edit^ed for several months the d«Uy China Press in Shanghai. (He says he 



-U^^Sr^;^?take.f ^Iciier by ^e ^r'^at^^S^'J'^ t^^^eS 
of the inhuman treatment he received, ^^'V^^^S^^n ember 194'' Mr - 

i;-S;^^t:;sSsl'a^i^^wi;i^"-^ 

thP titlo "Mv 2,") Years in China." ,, ., ,....„: — , 



Powell 
cMillan under 



the development of the Soviet regime and the Comintern. 

Suc7i is the present state of China's hope for democracy Japan we aie jw 
sure will be driven out; but whether ^lanchuna and north China, which oiQ 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3499 

the principal makinixs of srreat industry, will fall to the Communists and thus 
ultimati^ly s\Yin,a: the whole gigantic nation down the totalitarian road is un- 
determined. We Americans cannot evade our responsibility in this, for the ques- 
tion which social system prevails in China is identical with the question whose 
leadership prevails — that of democratic America or of totalitarian Russia. 

American modes of influence are cultural persuasion ; the example of pros- 
perity ; skilled technical assistance ; capital investment ; and, above all, military 
and economic supplies. Russia's weapons are conspiratorial organization and 
party-controlled propaganda, leading to seizure of power and a liquidaticm of all 
democrats and, if necessity arises, military invasion in the name of liberation. 
Russia cannot furnish capital, an example of prosperity, technical assistance, 
or supplies on a scale comparable to ours. This gives us the trump cards if we 
play our hand with clear understanding of the forces involved. 

The Communists know this and are doing their best to cloud our understand- 
ing of these forces. A flood of books, articles, reviews, news dispatches, lectures, 
and radio broadcasts is pouring across our country, dedicated to the sole purpose 
of confusing American public opinion about the situation in China. There are 
four main points in this deception now being practiced upon us, all equally false 
and all aimed at persuading us to abandon another 450 million people to the 
totalitarian infection spreading from Russia. 

DECEPTION 1. THAT RUSSIA IS A "DEMOCRACY" AND THAT CHINA CAN THEREFORE 
SAFELY BE LEFT TO RUSSIAN "INFLUENCE" 

Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous con- 
ception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the 
blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 193G-39 as "a triumph 
for democracy." He now urges our Government, in a Ijook called Solution in Asia, 
to accept cheerfully the spread of '"the Soviet form of democracy" in central Asia. 
His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book on its jacket : 

He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested 
in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across 
the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon de- 
mocracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. 
This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was 
filled with .iazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be adver- 
tised as more democratic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, 
however, it legitimized the dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (art. 
126). Stalin himself, addressing the congress which ratified the draft of the 
constitution, frankly stated this fact : 

"I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in 
force the regime of the dictatorship of. the working class and preserves 
unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party. In the 
Soviet Union only one party can exist, the party of Communists (Pravda, 
November 26, 1936)." 
In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 193S, only one can- 
didate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party, 
and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony 
has not been repeated, and would make no difl'erence if it had. The constitution 
is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is shot or 
sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia whole regions are given up to these 
concentration camps where from 15 to 20 millions * of Russian citizens are dying 
a slow death at hard lal)or. That is the kind of "democratic practices" the 
Chinese would see "across the Russian border" if they could look. But looking 
is not permitted by totalitarian states. 

First of all, then if our policy in China is to be wise, we must hold in steady 
view the fact, frankly admitted by Stalin and once vigorously stated by 
President Roosevelt as follows : "The Soviet Union is a dictatorship as absolute 
as any other dictatorship in the world." 

If this dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China, the cause of democracy 
in Asia is lost. As is well known, these tentacles need not include invading 



♦Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red arm.v, estimates that the 
number is about 12,000,000. Boris Sonvarine, French historian of bolshevisni. estimates 
15,000,000. Victor Kravchenko. recently resljrned from the Soviet Purchasing Commission 
in Washington, who has visited man.v camps and had official relations with their manage- 
ments, says these estimate.s are low and puts the figure at 20,000,000. 



3500 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Sovi<4 troops, but only the native Communist parties now giving allegiance to 
the Soviet Union and taking their directives from Moscow. When these Com- 
munist parties get control of a neighboring state, the Moscow dictatorship and 
its fellow travelers call that a friendly government. It is by means of these 
Communist-controlled "friendly governments" — not by overt military conquest — 
that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spreading frem the Soviet Union, 
in Asia as in Europe. 

Hence, for those who cannot swallow deception No. 1, there is another. We 
shall quote from a recent book, Report from Red China, by Harrison Forman : 

DECEPTION NO. 2. "THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AIIE NOT COMMUNISTS NOT ACCORD- 
ING TO THE RUSSIAN DEFINITION OF THE TERM. I SAW NOT THE SLIGHTEST TANGIBLE 
CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA." 

Forman is backed up by Edgar Snow, the best-known popularizer of the pro- 
Communist view, with the remark that the Chinese Communists and their leader 
Mao Tse-tung, "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of estab- 
lishing communism in China in the near future." 

To unmask this deception, you need only go to the Daily Worker's book shop 
on Thirteenth Street, New York City, pay 25 cents for Mao Tse-tung's book, 
China's New Democracy (1941), published with an introduction by Earl Browder 
(1945), and read the book. You will find that the "Lenin of China" is a devout, 
orthodox, and obedient disciple of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and gives un- 
qualified allegiance both to Soviet Russia and the Communist world revolution. 

Here are a few quotations from Mao's book : 

"The world now depends of communism for its salvation, and so does 
China." 

"We cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union 
or from the victory of the anticapitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan, 
Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany." 

"No matter whom you follow, so long as you are anti-Communist you are 
traitors." 

Mao explains learnedly that communism in China has two stages : First, the 
present stage of "New Democracy," which is but a preparation for the second 
stage : i. e., "proletarian revolution" and the establishment of collectivism on 
the Soviet model. Mao excoriates those who do not understand this, and insists 
that "the second stage must follow the first closely, not permitting a capitalist 
dictatorship to be inserted between them." ("Capitalist dictatorship" is Mao's 
term for democracy as we understand it.) 

How different this is from Edgar Snow's dulcet assurance that the Chinese 
Communists "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of estab- 
lishing Communism in China in the near future." 

Mr. Snow also says, "Long before it became defunct, the Comintern ceased to 
have much direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party." The fact is that 
JNIao Tse-Tung was one of three Chinese members of the Executive Committee 
of the Comintern from 1935 to its dissolution in 1943. At the last congress of 
the Russian Communist Party the growth of the Chinese Party was enthusias- 
tically reported and the Party congratulated on becoming "tempered in the fires 
of civil war and national war," and on "building a Soviet regime." Mao sent 
the congress a "flaming Bolshevik greeting" lauding the Russian Soviet system 
and concluding with "Long live Comrade Stalin !" 

The Chinese Communist Party is the darling of Moscow and of Communists all 
over the world. Its national congress has actually met in Moscow. All its 
maneuvers, even the most "reformist," have been executed under orders from 
the Kremlin. A glance in the Moscow Party press is enough to prove that there 
has been no let-up of this intense concern with the Chinese Communist Party. 
Obviously, the success of the Chinese Communists in building a Red Army and 
establishing an independent nation just over their border — a nation whose 
leader declares, "We cannot be separated from the Soviet Union" — would only 
intensify the interest of the heads of the Soviet Union. 

To complete the record of this deception : In the translation of Mao's book, 
Earl Browder omitted words and passages which would, if printed in America, 
expose his own game of playing democratic patriot in order to get his henchmen 
into positions of power. In the Chinese edition Mao is outspoken in advocating 
the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and explaining that democracies like 
England and the United States are "capitalist dictatorships," which "have be- 
come, or are about to become, blood-stinking military dictatorships of the 
capitalist class." "On the point of death," they have become "imi)erialist" and 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3501 

will soon be replaced by "the newest Soviet-style socialist republic, a dictatorsliip 
of the proletariat." 

He explains that in this respect there is no difference between the "Eastern 
(i. e., Japanese) imperialist" and "the s. o. b. Imperialists of the West." (The 
Chinese epithet is fouler, but s. o. b. will do.) All this, which is of the essence of 
Mao's orthodox Communist position, is omitted from the American edition. 

The Chinese Communist Party is more honest. Late in 1944 it passed a reso- 
lution "accepting American demands to establish military bases in the North- 
west," but adding- : "We are heir to the orthodoxy of Marx and Engels which 
calls for a class revolution of the workers and pea.sants. * * * The coopera- 
tion of the Chinese Communist Party with the United States is a temporary 
strategy. * * *" 

That disposes of the propaganda myth that the Chinese Communists are not 
Communists. 

DECEPTION NO. 3. THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE FIGHTING THE JAPS, AND THAT 
THE CHINESE NATIONAL ARMY IS NOT 

The truth is that the Chinese Communists are lighting the Japs enough to hold 
their border, but not enough to make it worth while for the Japs to move in and 
clean them out. This can be seen by a glance at the map. The front east of 
Yenan, where the Communists claim they have an army of 450,000 soldiers heroi- 
cally fighting the Japs is stationary. It hasn't moved since Japan came up to the 
Yellow River in 1938. Although the Japanese have attacked in some areas, 
there have been no real battles. American military observers agree that a virtual 
truce has existed in several front sectors, especially along the railways supplying 
Japanese forces fighting American and Chungking troops in the south. 

Where Chiang Kai-shek's National Army fights, the record of bloody and heroic 
battles has been spread on the pages of the world press for years. We all know 
of the great struggles in 1937 and 1938 in which the flower of Chiang Kai-shek's 
armies was lost together with such modern armaments as China possessed. 
China has received only a trickle of aid as against the flood of lend-lease sent to 
Russia, but Chiang's armies have fought on. There were at least 100,000 casual- 
ties in the battles they fought last year on Chinese soil, and certainly 85,000 in the 
furious Burma campaign which has broken the blockade by reopening the Stilwell 
road. 

Casualties among Chiang's troops run to over four times the total number of 
soldiers the Communists claim to have. 

The tragic fact is that while fighting the Japs a little, but never enough to 
menace Japanese communication lines to the war against Chiang in the south, 
the Communists are also waging "revolutionary war" against the Chinese Na- 
tional Army. When the war began, the Chinese Communists Central Committee 
declared : "In Chinese politics the decisive factor is military power. We must 
in the course of the war of resistance, expand as far as possible the military 
power of the Party as the basis for capturing the revolutionary leadership in 
the future." Since Pearl Harbor Mao naturally has been willing to let the 
"s. 0. b. Western imperialists" finish the Japs while he concentrates on "capturing 
the revolutionary leadership." 

This makes less astounding the statement of Lin Yutang : "For every Japanese 
the Communists claim to have killed they have killed at least five Chinese, for 
every town they have captured from the Japanese they have captured 50 towns 
from other Chinese." It explains Congressman Walter Judd's statement that 
when, last summer, the Japanese armies raided down fi'om the north through 
four to six hundred miles of country the Communist claim to control, they got 
free passage. Not a single one of the hundreds of trains carrying Japanese 
soldiers and supplies was derailed. (Congressman Judd, of Minnesota, served 
10 years as a medical missionary in China, and saw communism first hand. He 
revisited the country last September and October.) 

While this process of Commuui-st revolution is going forward accoi'ding to a 
published schedule, such fables as the following are related by Harrison Forman 
and solemnly quoted in a review of his book by Edgar Snow : 

"In the 7 years of war the Communists have fought over 92,000 battles. They 
have killed and wounded 1,100,000 * * * and captured 150,000 of the enemy. 
* * * For the same period the Communists suffered over 4(K),000 casualties." 

Ninety-two thousand battles in 7 years is 36 battles a day, or one battle every 
40 minutes. In these battles the Communists, although a good number of them 
were armed only with "old blunderbusses, mines, or any weapon at hand," are 



3502 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

alleged to have knocked off enemy troops at the rate of 20 per hour, or one every 
3 minutes — this without allowing for mealtime or rest hours, night or day, for 
7 years running. Hesides these astronomical achievements, the deeds of our 
Marines at Tarawa or (luadalcanal are, of course, mere child's play. 

It is doubtful if a more fantastic tale was ever told with a straight face to 
the American people. And we repeat : To expose it, you have only to look up 
the documents and use your brains. 

DECEPTION NO. 4. THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS A FASCIST, AND THAT HIS TOTALITARIAN 
REGIME IS PREVENTING THE COMMUNISTS FROM ESTABLISHING DEMOCRACY 

What kind of "democracy" the Communists aim to establish we have heard 
from their leader : a "Soviet-style dictatorship of the proletariat." Not only 
Chiang Kai-shek but everyone in the world who intelligently opposed this 
kind of dictatorship is denounced as a fascist. This has been the Communist 
smear techni(iue ever since Hitler broke his pact with Stalin. 

Chiang's regime is not democratic. When he assumed power in 1926, it was 
the opinion of the leaders of the Kuomintang that only a military dictatorship 
could achieve the unity and independence of China. Until that should be achieved 
China, thanks as much to the Communists as to foreign intruders and war 
lords, could not create a democratic republic. V.'hether they were right or wrong, 
it is certain that, except for the Connnunists and their subservience to INIoscow, 
Chiang has achieved both the unity and independence of China ; and he is 
moving toward a democratic republic. 

He once remarked to Ambassador Hurley : "If I become a dictator I will 
be forgotten, like all dictators in our history, within 48 hours of my death. 
But if I sincerely work to return power to the people, I will be remembered 
as the George Washington of China. Can there be any doubt of my choice?" 

Chiang's speech of last INIarch, in which he set the date for constitutional 
convention, is sensible and convincing. It concluded : 

"Upon the inauguration of constitutional government, all political parties 
will have legal status and enjoy equality. The Government has offered to 
give legal recognition to the Conmiunist Party as soon as the latter agrees 
to incorporate its army and local administration in the National Army and 
Government. The offer still stands. * * * 

"I am optimistic of national unification and the future of democratic 
government in our country." 

No one, comparing Chiang's speech with the schedule of steps toward prole- 
tarian dictatorship drawn up by Mao T.se-Tung, could fail to see which of the 
two is on the road to democracy. Chiang has permitted the publication of a 
Communist daily in his capital throughout the war, while Mao will not even ad- 
mit a correspondent of any Kuomintang, or non-Party, newspaper in his capital. 
There is a maddening press censorship under Chiang, but under Mao there is no 
free press to censor. That is a rough indication of how things stand. 

The Chinese Communist regime is a ruthless party dictatorship, camouflaged 
like Russia's with ceremonial elections, but ruled with executions, purges, con- 
centration camps. The Chinese National Government has tabulated, with name, 
place, date, and circumstance, the persons known to have been oflicially nuirdered 
by the Communists as "traitors and Trotskyites" from April 1989 to October 
1944. They total 34.758, of whom 26,834 were military personnel, 3,009 govern- 
ment officials, 1,387 Kuomintang Party workers, and the rest civilians. This 
does not include the unnumbered Chinese soldiers killed by the Communists in 
combat action against Chiang's troops. 

The fact that China under Chiang is not yet democratic is the very thing that 
makes the Conuuunist danger so great. If the Chinese knew freed<mi and pos- 
sessed it, they would be less ready victims of the totalitarian infection. Hav- 
ing known little but the arbitrary rule of rival war lords, and then tlie equally 
arbitrary enforcement of national unity by the Kuomintang, they are as open to 
this infection as the Russian peasants were who had known only the regime of 
the Czar. They are poised at a cross road, ready to go either way — the way of the 
Russian totalitarian state toward which Mao and the Chinese Connnunist Party 
are pointing, or the way of American democracy toward which Chiang and the 
Kuomintang are pointing. This is why the Chinese liberals, as even pro-Soviet 
reporters admit, while fighting for more freedom under Chiang, are not for the 
Communists. 

What Chiang needs is our political understanding, technical assistance, loans, 
investments, munitions, and supplies in support of his plan to introduce con- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3503 

stitutional goverumeut and make China democratic. The two most important 
items on this list at the moment are supplies and understanding. Supplies our 
State Department has recently, to the relief of all wise men. decided to give to 
Chiang, and not to the Communists. But we must give understanding too. 

It shows no understanding to demand of an anti-Communist government that 
it "unite" with Communists. An American foreign policy based on this mis- 
take may very soon prove fatal, not only from the standpoint of democracy hut 
of every American interest in Asia. Put yourself in the place of Chiang Kai- 
shek and you will see why. Chiang has fought the Communists in bloody war 
and desperate intrigue for 20 years. He gained his power by saving China from 
a Communist revolution in 1927. He knows the Communists. He knows that 
one word from Stalin — and no word from anywhere else in the world — could 
in-odur-e the "unity" some critics are so irritatingly urging him to pull out 
of a hat. 

Chinese courtesy will survive a lot of irritation. But Chinese patriotism 
has a limit beyond which it will not go. And there lies behind our pressure upon 
Chiang for a "unity" he cannot acliieve, an implication that can only infuriate 
Chinese patriots. The implication is that the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge at 
Cairo to return Manchuria to China at the end of the war may, if unity fails, 
be interpreted to mean turn over Manchuria to the Stalin-dominated Communist 
govei-nment of Yenan. 

Washington rumor, reported in the New York Times, even says that Stalin 
was promised a free liand in Manchuria for his help in the war against Japan. 
But Stalin may never have asked for Manchuria. That is not his method of 
expansion. All Stalin needs in order to establish his power in Manchuria is a 
"friendly government" : a quick march in there by Mao's Red Arrhy, followed by 
the usual made-to-ordei- puppet state. Our acquiescence in that operation will 
be sufficient to sell out Chiang — sell out the hope of democracy in China, and 
the hope of a strong independent American ally in Asia. 

Chiang's loyalt.v to the Western democracies, and to America in particular, 
throughoiit the long war for Manchuria has been inflexible. It survived our 
unlimited export of war materials to .Japan ; it survived our "defeat Hitler 
first" policy and the loss of Burma and ^lalaya. which enabled the Japanese to 
Itlockadi^ China, and prolonged her sufferings interminably: it survived the Stil- 
well incident; it has survived the recent, Communist-kindled flare of anti- 
Chinese slander in the American press: it has even survived, so far. our inane 
demand for "unity" (with armed x'evolutionists who are waging war against 
him). But it will not survive the knowledge that we propose to turn over 
to Stalin, through the agency of these revolutionists, the richest lands of China 
about which, essentially, the whole war with Japan has been fought. 

Chiang, because of his belief in Western institutions, has stood like a rock 
against those in his party who advocate a rapprochement with Russia as against 
his close friendship with the United States. But should it become apparent 
that we intend to bargain away all North China for the sake of Russia's 
help in the war, will Chiang be able to resist this pressure? With what argu- 
ments can he answer those Chinese patriots who will su'-igest that China do 
her own bargaining witli Russia, and renounce the policy of special trust in 
the United States? Only the smoke-screen of deception laid down by the Com- 
munists and their fellow travelers blinds us to this momentous question, and 
all it entails — for us and for world democracy. 

These pro-Communists are playing the same game in Asia that succeeded so 
brilliantly in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, for instance, on his principle 
of "arming anyliody who will kill a Hun,'' Churchill sent munitions and sup- 
plies to the rebel Tito, veteran Comintern organizer and agent of Moscow, 
enabling him besides Idlling Huns to wage a civil war against our ally, the 
legitimate government, whose troops were commanded by General Mikhailovitch. 
Mikhailovitch was also killing Huns, but he had not the backing of Mo.scow, 
and he had no propaganda machine with which to counter this same four- 
sided lie: Russia is a democracy, Tito is not a Communist. Tito is fighting the 
enemy and Mikhailovitch is not, and Mikhailovitch is a "fascist." 

Except for Chiang's loftier position as head of his government for IS years, 
the situation in China is ominously similar. And the choice for us is inescap- 
alile : Either we face the facts and side with the growth of democracy, or we 
swallow the lies and endorse the totalitarian strangulation. There was never a 
plainer or more simple issue before a United States Government. 

But there is one big difference — tliat is the size of China. To sell out Chiang 
Kai-shek to the Chinese "Tito'' will not add a paltry 13 million to the totali- 



3504 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

tarian Colossus. It will bring under totalitarian regimentation 450 million 
people. This vast population, united in their policy with the Soviet totalitarian 
empire of some 200 million, would certainly threaten the hope for a democratic 
world. When Iran and India followed China, as they almost certainly would, 
that would mean a solid block of 1 billion people under a totalitarian regime. 

Facing such a prospect, it seems obvious that as intelligent democrats we 
nuist abandon the whole policy of meek appeasement toward Communist prop- 
aganda and power in China. Even Russia will have greater resi>ect for us if 
we make unmistakably clear our loyalty to those free institutions which have 
enabled our American nation to arm, equip, feed, and rescue from destruction 
a half of the planet. If we really believe in democracy, let us implement that 
belief with a peaceable but clear-headed, informed and resolute campaign to pro- 
mote the democratic way of life throughout the earth. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I am presenting you a list of names. 
I am going to ask you, in connection with that list of names, the fol- 
lowing two questions. Perhaps we can save some time on it, if you 
will advert to this for just a minute. 

The question wall read in every case : In your dealings with the 
following people, did you know or did you have any reason to believe 
that they were Communists? That will be the question. 

If you had no dealings with them, of course, you will have the 
opportunity to say so at the outset. So the question in connection 
with each one of these individuals will be: 

Did you know, or did you have any reason to believe that they were 
Communists ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That this person was Communist? 

Mr. Morris. Tliat this particular person was a Communist, in your 
dealings wnth that particular person. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not include otherwise? Whether it was 
in his dealings with them that he knew they were Communist, or other- 
wise knew they were Communist ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, or otherwise knew. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Morris, if you are going to ask that question about 
all these people, may I ask you to reframe it now? 

Mr. Morris. All right, let us take one. 

In your dealings with Solomon Adler, did you know, or did you 
have any reason to know, that Solomon Adler was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Smith. Wait a minute, Mr. Morris. Is that presupposing 
that he had dealings with Solomon Adler? 

Mr. Morris. Senator Smith, I indicated that if he had no dealings 
with the man he would, of course, have the opportunity to so state at 
the time. 

Senator Smith. All right. 

The Chairman. Do you understand the question, now, Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think so. 

Mr. I'ORTAS. Two questions. 

Mr. Morris. There were two questions; that is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. May I rephrase the question, just in case there is 
any doubt about it? It might not do any harm to say it once more. 
Mr. Morris wall read a name. The reading of the name presumes that 
Mr. Lattimore had dealings with the person. If he has had no deal- 
ings with the person, he is to say so. Otherwise, INIr. Lattimore is to 
indicate his answer to the question as to whether, in his dealings with 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3505 

this person, or otherwise, he ever knew or had any reason to believe 
that the named person was a member of the Communist Party. 

Tlie Chairman. Was a Communist. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was a Communist, all right. 

Mr. Morris. The second name is Hilda Austern. 

]VIr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. H. W. Baerensprung. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. How well did you know H. W. Baerensprung? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I saw him once when he came to this coun- 
try, and I knew him as a person who had been reorganizing Chiang 
Kai-shek's police force. 

Mr. Morris. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so. 

Mr. Morris. Joseph F. Barnes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Fortas. Just a moment. 

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Morris, may we have it understood, if you 
are going to conduct the examination this way, that by the witness 
answering these questions, he does not personally name any statement, 
or no inference is permissible as to whether he thinks or does not think 
that they were Communists ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. The question is addressed to his knowl- 
edge as to whether or not he knew them to be Communists. 

The Chairman. Or had reason to believe. 

Mr. Morris. Or had reason to believe ; that is right. Senator. 

Kathleen Barnes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; until the question came up to her refusing to 
testify. 

Mr. Morris. Joseph M. Bernstein. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever 
met him. 

Mr. Morris. Charles Bidien. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever 
met him. 

Mr. Morris. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs while you 
were the editor of Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it very much. I don't believe I have ever 
seen that name before. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. T. A. Bisson. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Albert Blumberg. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever met him, and I am not sure 
M'ho is meant. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Michael Borodin. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Michael Borodin I never met. I have seen him 
once and I assume he is a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten. 

Mr. Fortas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of clarification? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Fortas. Again I understand the question is : Did j^ou have any 
reason to know that they were Communists, or to believe that they 
were Communist at the time that you were dealing with them ? 



3506 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. No. The question is: Did you, in your dealings 
with them, or in any other way, know or have reason to believe that 
this person Avas a Communist ? 

Mr. FoRTAS. At any time? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir. 

]Mr. Lattlimore. I certainly never had any dealings with Mike 
Borodin. 

Mr. Morris. You did not encounter Borodin, did you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't encounter him. He was at a meeting 
in Moscow when I was there in 1936 with Mr. Carter and somebody 
afterward told me that tliat was Borodin. 

Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten. 

The Chairman. My understanding is that — see if my recollection 
is correct — that you said, in answer to the former question, that you 
believed he was a Communist. Am I in error on that? 

Mr. Latimore. I believe that he is a Communist simply from my 
reading of Chinese history in the 1920's. 

Tlie Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recognize that name and I don't believe 
I ever met any such person. 

Mr. Morris. Did you prepare an article for the committee of the 
American-Russian Institute, the chairman of which was Louise K. 
Bransten ? 

Senator Watkins. Is that Louise R. or Louise A. Bransten ? 

Mr. Morris. Louise R. Branstein is the name. 

Mr. FoRTAS. It is wi-ong on the list. 

Mr. Morris. It is wrong on the list ; that is right. Louise R. Bran- 
sten. Do you remember preparing an article for the American-Rus- 
sian Institute, of which she was acting as chairman? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am not sure this is the same thing, Mr. Morris, 
but I remember publishing an article in the American Quarterly on 
the Soviet Union, or something. 

Mr. Morris. Does that refresh your recollection ? 

Mr. Lati'imore. No, it doesn't. Tlie article here appears to be an 
article that I published in Far Eastern Survey, and it may have been 
reprinted by this publication. But I don't recall ever seeing it be- 
fore. 

Mr. Morris. Did you give permission to have it republished? 

Mr. Latitmore. Not that I recall. It is quite possible. 

The Chairman. Did you prepare the article ? 

jNIr. Lattimore. I prepared an article for the Far Eastern Survey. 
The Far Eastern Survey may have considted me on permission to 
have it rej)ublished elsewhere, but I don't recall it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may the article, as it appears in this 
particular document, be introduced into the record? 

Senator Smith. Does Mr. Lattimore identify this article? 

The Chairman. He has not identified the article. 

Mr. Lattimore. I have identified the article by title. Let me look 
and see if it is the same article. 

Yes; this is the same article. It is marked "By permission of Far 
Eastern Survey, American Council of the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations." 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3507 

Witliout comparing the two articles, I would not know whether 
this is a complete reprint, or not. 

Senator Smith. I think we might have it understood there that 
Mr. Lattimore will have a chance to review that, sentence by sentence, 
if he wishes to. 

The Chairman. I tliink he should be given that chance before it 
goes in. 

Senator Smith. It can be put in with his right to apply to it any 
changes he finds necessary in order to make it conform. 

The Chairman. You may return to this article at a later time, after 
Mr. Lattimore has had a chance to look at it. 

All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Earl Browder. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I considered him a Communist. 

Mv. ]\IoRRis. When did you meet Mr. Browder, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall what year it was, but I went down 
once when I was about to leave for China. I went down to the offices 
of the American Communist Party and called on him to see if I could 
get some leads to find out about the Communists in China, and I got 
a complete brush-off. 

Mr. Morris. Did anyone arrange that meeting for you, Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that I just walked down there. 

Mr. Morris. You walked in cold ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Walked in cold. 

Senator Smith. Let me ask a minute. 
, That was before you started for China on one occasion, was it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Smith. Up to that time, had you ever met Browder before ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Smith. Had you ever had any dealings with him since 
that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. He came down and testified before the Tydings 
committee, but I didn't see him. 

Senator Smitpi. Did you ever attend a conference or meeting when 
he was present? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Will you try to place that, approximately? 

Senator Smith. I recall reading somewhere about Mr. Lattimore's 
conference with jNIr. Browder before he left for a trip to China. I do 
]iot know what the date was. 

Mr. Lattimore. It was before the Tydings committee I testified to 
that. 

Senator Smith. I do not remember where I had seen it. I believe 
3^ou do refer to that in your book. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

The Chairman. That he had a conference with Browder? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I wouldn't call it a conference. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did you testify that took place in 1936, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. It may have been in 1936. 

Mr. Morris. Herman Budzeslawski. 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe that I identified that name from an article 
by a woman columnist, Dorothy Thompson. She wrote an article in 



3508 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

tlie Saturday Evening Post about him. I met him once at the office 
of Overseas News Agency at the time when I was writing syndicated 
articles for them, and so w\as he, under a different name, wdiich I 
forget. 

Mr. Morris. CoukI you try to recall what that other name is, Mr. 
Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I could try, but I am very vague on the subject. I 
believe it is probably in that article by Dorothy Thompson. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you did not know, or had no 
reason to believe, that he was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Dr. Norman Bethune. 

Mr. Lattimore. I know his name only by reading. I don't believe 
I ever met him. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe that he was Coni' 
munist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think I have seen that stated. 

Mr. Morris. Angus Cameron? 

Mr. Lattimore. Angus Cameron, I have no reason to believe was a 
Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Have your dealings with Angus Cameron been exten- 
sive, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, not at all. I met him once. I have never had 
any dealings with him. 

Mr. Morris. How many books of yours has he published, Mr. Lat- 
timore? 

Mr. Lattimore. He was a member of a firm that has published 
several books of mine, but the handling of my books for publication 
by that firm was never through him. 

Mr. Morris. Through whom was it? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was through Mr.^ — oh, I would have to go a 
long way back — wait a minute. My first two books were published 
by tliat firm at the. end of the 1920's and I dealt with — I think he was 
the then head of the firm, wdiose name was Max something. He has 
since died. And my more recent books through that firm have all been 
handled through Mr. Stanley Salmen. 

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that, please ? 

Mr. Lattimore. S-a-1-m-e-n. 

Mr. ]\Iorris. Evans Carlson. Evans F. Carlson. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Were your dealings with him extensive ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I wouldn't say they were extensive. 

Mr. Morris. How frequently have you met General Carlson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I used to see him socially quite a bit in the 
19?>0's, when he was at the American Marine Guard at the Embassy in 
Peking, and I have seen him maybe three times in this country, three 
or four times. 

Mr. Morris. Did you advise him at the time of his considered 
resignation from the Marine Corps in 1939 that he would be more 
effective in serving the cause of China by "staying in the Marine Corps" 
rather than resigning. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't think that wording is exact. 

Mr. Morris. What is your recollection of it, Mr. Lattimore, of what 
is in the record. I would like to have your testimony on it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3509 

Mr. Lattijniore. My recollection is that I thought it would be a pity 
for him to resign from the Marine Corps. I thought that his knowl- 
edge and experience would be of better service to this country in the 
Marine Corps. 

Mr. Morris. Abraham Chapman. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I have ever met him. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know he was a writer for the Institute of Pacific 
Eelations publications ? 

JVIr. Lattimore. I remember some correspondence on the subject at 
a time when I was on the research committee of the IPR, but I never 
met him. 

Mr. Morris. Chen Han-seng. 

Mr. Lattimore. Chen Han-seng, at the time I knew him, I had no 
reason to believe was a Communist. 

Mr. INIoRRis. "Where is he now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have heard that he is in China. 

Mr. Morris. That is Eed China? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Your dealings with Chen Ilan-seng were quite exten- 
sive, were they not, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I knew him when he was doing research for 
the IPE, and then he worked two academic years at Johns Hopkins. 

Mr. Morris. Under your sponsorship ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Under iny direction. 

Mr. Morris. Chew Shi Hong. 

Mr. Lattimore. I am not quite sure who is meant there by Chew 
Shi Hong. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may we come back to that ? 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Harriet Chi. 

Mr. Lattimore. Harriet Chi, yes, I knew slightly ; had no reason to 
believe was a Communist. 

Mr. ]\Iorris. She was your secretary at one time, was she not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. She worked as my secretary for, oh, 10 days or 2 
weeks, in 1936, I believe. 

Mr. Morris. She is the wife of Chao-Ting Chi, who is now an official 
of the Chinese Communist Government, is she? 

Mr. Lattimore. She is ; or was. 

Mr. Morris. The next name ; will you pronounce that next name, Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I pronounce it "Chow Moo" (ChTao Mu). 

Mr. Morris. Is that a feminine or a masculine name? 

Mr. Lattimore. 1 couldn't tell. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you have had no dealings with that 
person ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. It may be somebody I had met in 
China. I can't place the name. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you had no dealings with that per- 
son while you were acting as an adviser to the Generalissimo? 

Mr. Lattimore. 'No; I can't testify exactly to that. I met so many 
people once or twice while I was working for the Generalissimo. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know where that particular person is now? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't. 



3510 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Cliu Tong. 

Mr. Latiimore. Chu Tong 1 met maybe twice while he was working 
for the Institute of Pacific Eelations. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe, or did you know at 
that time that he was a Communist? 

Mr. LAi^riMORE. No ; I did not consider him a Communist. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose : 

Mr. Morris occasionally rephrases the question, and I think it should 
be made clear to the witness that even so, that does not change it for 
subsequent names. The question remains for each name, first, the 
assumption that the witness has had dealings with this person. If 
not, he is to so state. 

Then the question is : Did you, in your dealings with this person, or 
in any other way, know or have any reason to believe that this person 
was a Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In the case of Chu Tong, there was some question of 
his loyalty record being reviewed by — I forget whether it was the 
Security Board of OWI or the Civil Service, or both of them, and the 
question came up whether he should be considered as a person who 
should be discharged for loyalty. 

And I believe the record shows that the grounds were considered 
insufficient. 

The Chairman. Back there a few names there w^as one to whom 
the witness referred as having been under him at Johns Hopkins. 
What name was that? 

Mv. Morris. Chen Han-seng. 

Mr. Laitimore. Chen Han-seng. 

The Chairman. I understand he testified he is now in Red China. 

Mr. Lattimore. So I believe. I heard that recently. 

The Chairman. I do not think the question embraced whether or 
not he knew or had reason to believe that he was a Communist. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think it did, Mr. Chairman. I certainly did 
not believe him to be a Comnumist at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this copy of a civil service 
paper, the first line of which makes reference to Chew Sih Hong. In 
connection with the difficulty we had in identifying who that was, I 
ask you if that would refresh your recollection. 

Mr. Lattimore. That would mean that Chew Sih Hong and Chu 
Tong are probably the same person. Many Chinese have two })er- 
sonal names, and sometimes one is used and sometimes the other. Chu 
would be the family name. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore, was that a matter of your recollec- 
tion, or was that only a statement as to what the paper that Mr. Morris 
handed you indicates ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The paper that Mr. Morris handed to me indicates 
that it was the same person. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have any recollection as to whether that is 
true, whether they were the same person ? 

Mr. Lattiiniore. No, not without reading the document through 
again. But I am willing to assume they were the same person. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think if you read the document through it 
would refresh your recollection? 

Mv. Lattimore. Does the document also refer to 1dm as Chu Tong? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3511 

Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Chairman, I call attention to the fact that the let- 
ter refers to Chew Sih Hong, the middle name appearing here as S-i-h. 
On this list it is S-h-i ; that is, on the list that Mr. Morris supplied. 

The Chairman. That is a matter that will have to be straightened 
out by the witness. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The American spelling of Chinese names and sylla- 
bles is a fearful and wonderful thing, is it not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Oh, I remember now. I was thinking of this as a 
Mr. Chew, which would be a common Chinese name, but I see that he 
is referred to here as IVIr. Hong. And I remember now old Dr. Chi 
telling me something that I didn't know before, that the family name 
there is Tong, or Hong, which is pronounced one way in Fukien Prov- 
ince and the other way in other provinces of China. 

The Chairman. Let us clear it up now. 

Did you know him ? Did you have dealings with him ? 

Mr. LATa^iMORE. I knew him. I saw him a couple of times at the 
New York office of the IPR. 

The Chairman. Did you know him to be, or have reason to believe 
that he was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. There was this question raised by the Civil 
Service Commission and, as I say, my recollection is that it was de- 
cided that the evidence was insufficient. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you now recollect, sir, that the two names on this 
list, Chew Sih Hong and Chew Tong are the same person? 

Mr. Lattimore. They must be the same person ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will this document that reflected the 
witness' recollection on that point be introduced into the record, for 
that purpose ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Simply as the document that was shown to the 
witness, and which he read ? 

Mr. JVIoRRis. Which he read. 

The Chairman. It may be inserted for that purpose. I do not 
know what else is in here. 

You are not holding him responsible for what else is in here, are 
you? 

Mr. Morris. No, sir. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 550" and is as 
follows.) 

Exhibit No. 550 

Office of the Chief Law Office, 

November llf, 19J,3. 
The Commission. 

(Through Mr. Smith and the Executive Director and Chief Examiner.) 

I am submitting herewith as a unit the cases of Chew Sih Hong and Dr. 
Kung Chuan Chi, employees of the Office of War Information. These cases are 
being submitted together because both individuals are serving in the same sec- 
tion, and it appears that Mr. Hong was employed at the recommendation of Dr. 
Chi who in turn was employed by Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Opera- 
tions of the OfRce of War Information. 

The case of Mr. Hong was previously before the Commission and analyses of 
the facts in his case were furnished by the undersigned and by Mr. Cannon. We 
both took the position that Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry 
Alliance, reputed to be an organization affiliated with the Commimist Party, and 
the China Daily News, said to l)e a publication by and for Chinese Communists, 
and his references and associations, were such as to warrant a finding of in- 
eligibility. The Commission transmitted to the Office of War Information a 



3512 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

proposed memorandum opinion in the case of Mr. Hong and under date of Novem- 
l)er 30, 1942, Mr. Elmer Davis in a letter to Commissioner Flemming stated that 
in view of the information which we furnished him, Hong was terminated at the 
close of business November 15, 1942. The Commission thereupon advised the 
Office of War Information under date of December 8, 1942, that the Commission 
has concluded that a finding of ineligibility is necessary and that the Commis- 
sion's records have been noted to show that Mr. Hong's services were terminated 
at the close of business on November 15, 1942, as reported in the letter from Mr. 
Elmer Davis of November 30, 1942. Previously the Commission had approved 
the finding of ineligibility and this action was recorded in Minute 4 of December 
4, 1942. 

In a letter dated July 27, 1943, Rear Admiral R. P. McCullough referred to 
previous correspondence regarding Mr. Hong and stated that the letter of 
November 30, 1942, from the Office of War Information to the effect that Hong 
had been terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942, was somewhat 
in error because Mr. Hong had been separated from the New York office of the 
Office of War information on November 15, 1942, for duty with the Army and 
that when he returned in the spring of 1943 he was again employed in the 
New York office of the Office of War Information, that office not knowing that 
Hong had been declared ineligil)le by the Civil Service Commission. Admiral 
McCullough accordingly requested that the Commission reconsider the case 
of Mr. Hong. Mr. Moyer then sent the file to the Investigations Division so that 
an interview might be had with Mr. Owen Lattimoi'e, Head of the San Fran- 
cisco office of the Office of War Information. Mr. Lattimore was accordingly 
interviewed in San Francisco and on a later date Mr. Steely interviewed Ad- 
miral McCullough and Mr. Marsh of the Office of War Information regarding 
]Mr. flong, Mr. Owen Lattimore being also present during this interview. Mr. 
Steely reported among other things that Mr. Lattimore stated that he wished to 
keep Mr. Hong on the job, that Mr. Lattimore had an efficient set-up in the 
Chinese section in the New York office of the Office of War Information and 
wanted to keep it that way, that he had explicit confidence in Dr. Chi, that 
Mr. Hong is under careful supervision and even if he were a Communist he 
is not in a position where he can do any damage, that the selection of suitable 
Chinese was a delicate matter, and it is extremely difficult to obtain a com- 
petent employee who does not have connections which might constitute leaks 
in the organization, that imder the present set-up with Dr. Chi and Mr. Hong 
there have been no incidents of confidential information getting into unauthor- 
ized channels and that there had been no attempts on Mr. Hong's part to use 
his present position for the spreading of Communist propaganda. Mr. Lattimore 
also pointed out that Mr. Hong was recently used by the Army to teach Chinese 
to 224 officers in India. Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know Mr. Hong 
but he did know Dr. Chi and is relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation and 
knowledge of Mr. Hong. 

During the interview in San Francisco Mr. Lattimore made an extended 
statement regarding Mr. Hong and Dr. Chi and also furnished the investigator 
with a copy of a letter which he had written to Mr. Joseph Barnes under date 
of June 15, 1943. The statement of ]Mr. Lattimore during the interview and 
the copy of his letter to Mr. Barnes are appropriately identified in the file. It 
would be a difficult tiling to attempt to summarize Mr. Lattimore's lengthy 
statement or his letter to Mr. Barnes. However, the gist of his comments is 
that he does not know Hong personally but based on his knowledge of the situ- 
ation, neither the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance nor the China Daily News 
are Communistic. He then proceeded to give rather involved reasons for his 
conclusions. He said that he had known Dr. Chi, who is about 70 years of age, in 
Cliina, that he was a respected and cultured man, and that his knowledge of 
Dr. Chi is such that he has implicit faith and confidence in his integrity and 
ability. He told Dr. Chi to select the person he wanted to assist him and Dr. 
Chi selected Mr. Hong. This was the first time that Mr. Lattimore had any 
knowledge of Mr. Hong at all. 

Among other things Mr. Lattimore said : 

"Of course, I have no concrete proof that Hong is not a Communist but in 
the absence of concrete proof I think there is a prime facie case to show that 
he is not a Communist. I know there is a law preventing the hiring of Com- 
munists. Personally and frankly I would not be too worried if an individual 
Comnmnist were in Hong's position. This is becaxise he would not be able to 
form a 'cell' and could not get away with anything. He could not commit 
verbal sabotage, and all of the work coming out of the New York office has to 
clear through me." 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3513 

On a later occasion ]\Ir. Lattimore stated to our investigator in part : 

"Now I know that the various factions smear a non-Conformist by charging 
Him with Iteing a Communist. However, the Chinese Government dare not 
■come out in the open and intervene in such domestic problems. I merely say 
this : If your people have gone to the Chinese Ambassador or any other 
Chinese Government representative and such Chinese representative has told 
you that tliis man Hong is suspected of being a Communist, tlien I say you 
should discount such evidence and certainly should not declare the man 
ineligible merely on that kind of evidence. It is true that I don't know any- 
thing about Hong personally except wliat I have learned from Dr. Chi. It 
is also true that he could be a Communist without my knowledge. It is also 
true that he could have hoodwinked Dr. Chi. However, until concrete evi- 
dence is presented that he is a Communist then I believe that based on Dr. 
Chi's standing and reputation and ability, his judgment that Hong is not a 
Communist is a prime facie case in favor of Hong and should not be reversed 
on the testimony that you may have received from anyone representing the 
Chinese Government or for tliat matter on the testimony of any Chinese." 
It will be noted that the sum and substance of Mr. Lattimore's testimony is that 
lie does not know Mr. Hong, that he does know Dr. Chi, that he has full faith in 
Dr. Chi and was willing to employ Hong on Dr. Chi's recommendation, that he 
does not know whether Hong is a Communist, but does not think he is and that 
even if Hong were a Communist, he would still like to retain Hong in the sei'vice 
because Hong could do no harm in his position. 

In his letter to Mi\ Barnes, Mr. Lattimore outlined the entire situation as he 

understood it, described the relationship between Hong and Dr. Chi, and then said : 

'As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me 

and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American government agency, 

there will be no dif33eulty with either man, no irresponsible playing with 

Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction. The retention of 

both men is therefore a guarantee to the secrecy and security of the woi'k 

of OWI as well as a guarantee of tlie confident fulfillment of directives. 

I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know 

that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given tlie time to worlv on it, 

I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full 

details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Conuuittee of OWI would 

be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Cliinese factional 

politics, to their source ; but I should not like to see us placed in a po.sition 

where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire 

people who would actually be the nominee of factions not imder our control." 

The foregoing letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Barnes was written in strict 

confidence and is not to be quoted to any outside source. 

The evidence before the Commission at the time unfavorable action was 
originally taken in the case of Mr. Hong tended to indicate rather strongly that 
Hong is a Communist and engaged in activities having for their purpose support 
of Conmumist party interests. The recent investigation and interviews have 
not changed the evidence and have, on the contrary, elicited some information 
tending to strengthen the position that Hong is pro-Communist. Thus it was 
iirought out in addition to all of tlie other information that Hong was active in 
the American Student Union during his school years. 

The evidence indicated tliat Hong is pro-Communist. The question now for 
determination is wliether his em])loyment should be approved because of the 
slronj- representations of Mr. Lattimore that Hong is probably not a Communist, 
but even if he is a Commiuiist, Mr. Lattimore still wishes to retain him because 
Hong will work under close supervision and will not l>e able to do any harm. 

On tlie one hand it can he argued that since we are reasonably convinced that 
Ilong is pro-Communist, it is our responsibility to require his removal notwith- 
standintr Mr. Lattimore's representations. On the other hand the Commission 
could, if it wished, take the position that since Mr. Lattimore has assumed re- 
sponsibility, the Commission can afford to permit Hong's retention in the service. 
If ttie Commission takes the latter position it will be tantamount to saying that 
although we believe the individual is a Communist, we will he willing to rate 
him eligible provided the employing agency is willing to assume the responsibility. 
I doubt that the Commission can aiford to avoid the issue in this manner. If 
we believe Hong is a Communist then we should rate him ineligible. 

Do we believe Hong is a Communist? The Commission's original finding was 
based ?in Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and with 
the China Daily News. Much of the information regarding the Communistic 
8S348~52— pt. 10 16 



3514 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

nature of the Alliance and the newspaper came from Chinese, some of whom 
were connected with competing newspapers. We ourselves have not read the 
China Daily News. Mr. Lattimore states he has read some of the issued and 
has found nothing Communistic in them, although he admits there might have 
been something Communistic in the issues which he has not read. Mr. Lattimore 
has spent years in China and from his statement and letter to Mr. Barnes it 
would appear that he is thoroughly familiar with the various political factions. 
His conclusion is that Hong's connections, in the light of his knowledge of the 
situation, do not necessarily point to pro-Communism. In matters of the Chi- 
nese, Lattimore is somewhat of an expert and his opinion is entitled to consid- 
erable weight. 

Since we have no direct evidence that Hong is a Communist, and since the 
original decision was based on the circumstances of Hong's connections and 
in view of Mr. Lattimore's representations, I am ready to reach the conclusion 
that possibly we made an eri-or in the case of Mr. Hong ; I am, therefore, ready 
to recommend that Mr. Hong be rated eligible for retention in his position in 
the Office of War Information. 

In the case of Dr. Chi, I recommended in my memorandum of May 7, 1943, 
that he be rated eligible. Mr. Smith did not agree with me. The Commission 
has not yet acted on the case of Dr. Chi. For the reasons stated in my memoran- 
dum of May 7, 1943, I again recommend that Dr. Chi be rated eligible. 

Alfred Klein, 
Acting Chief Law Officer. 

CX : FS : ODS. 

September 17, 1943. 

Mr. Moyeb: I do not believe I clearly understand Mr. Lattimore's point of 
view regarding the cases of Chi and Hong. It seems that he is, in effect, sug- 
gesting that whatever evidence we may have, short of being positive and direct, 
tending to show the applicants to be commuiiistically inclined is entitled to 
very little weight and that his judgment, based on his personal knowledge of 
Chi and on Chi's appraisal of Hong, should prevail. However, as pointed out 
by Mr. Klein, there is no absolute proof that the applicants are Communists 
and in view of Lattimore's knowledge of the complicated Chinese political situa- 
tion, gained through years of residence in China, I am also willing to change 
my previous recommendation for both applicants from ineligibility to eligibility. 

Farrar Smith. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Frank V. Coe. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. I knew ]\Ir. Coe very slig-htly. I met him 
several times here in Washington wlien he was a Government servant. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever attend an Institute of Pacific Relations 
meeting with Mr. Coe? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe that Mr. Coe was at one of the interna- 
tional conferences of the IPR. 

The Chairman. Did you attend that meeting? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I was also there. 

The Chairman. That was the question. 

I was asking him to complete the answer, because the question em- 
braced whether or not he met him. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall attending a caucus meet- 
ing of the IPR at Hot Springs, in conjunction with Mr. Frank V. 
Coe? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall it. But if you have a document 
to refresh my memory, it may 

Mr. Morris. I offer you now exhibit No. 298, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Already in our record. 

Mr. Morris. Already in our public records, 293. 

Senator Smith. Which Hot Springs is it? 

Mr. Morris. That is Virginia. 

The Chairman. This is with reference to Frank V. Coe, is it ? 

Mr. Morris. Frank V. Coe ; that is right, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3515 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember ever seeing this document before. 

Mr. Morris. Does that document recall a caucus meeting of the IPR 
that you attended, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, it is headed "Preliminary meeting of the 
American delegation." 

Mr. Morris. Do you remember attending a preliminary meeting of 
the American delegation of the IPR? 

]\Ir. LATriMORE. No ; I don't remember, but such preliminary meet- 
ings were quite a common procedure before international conferences. 

Mr. Morris. Does not that document purport to be the minutes of 
that meeting, at which Mr. Jessup presided? 

Mr. Lattimore. I must have been there, but, as I say, I do not recall 
the meeting. 

Mr. Morris. Does not that document show that you spoke on several 
occasions ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The document indicates that I spoke on several 
occasions. 

Mr. Morris. Does not that document indicate that Mr. Frank V. 
Coe was present? 

Mr. Lattimore. It indicates that Mr. Coe was present. 

I note also that this is not a stenographic transcript and 

The Chairman. You have not been asked about that. I have warned 
you on several occasions; I have tried to get you not to interject 
statements after the Chair's ruling. 

You were asked a question as to whether or not that refreshed your 
recollection as to whether or not you had met Mr. Frank V. Coe. 

^Ir. Lattimore. It does not refresh my recollection that I met him 
there, but, quite obviously, he and I were there at the same time. 

May I add that the record is not a stenographic transcript and that 
I don't hold myself responsible for the way in which I may be quoted 
here. 

The Chairman. You were not asked as to that, or as to whether 
you were responsible. 

Mv. Morris. Mr. Henry Collins, is the next name. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name, and I don't believe I have 
met him. 

The Chairman. What do you want done with this exhibit in the 
hands of the witness ? 

Mr. Morris. That has already been introduced as exhibit No. 293, 
Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. Laughlin B. Currie. 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No." 

Mr. Morris. Hugh Deane. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever met him. I think he is a man 
who may have been a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, 
but I don't believe I have ever met him. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Len DeCaux. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Len DeCaux I have met once or twice and had 
no reason to believe to be a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Ellen DeJong. 

Mr. Lattimore. I met her occasionally over some years in the IPR 
and had no reason to believe her a Communist. 



3516 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. MoKRis. She was a staff meiiiber of the IPK, was she not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe she was for a short period. 

Mr. Morris. Is she now known as Ellen Atkinson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. INIoRRis. Do you know what she is doing now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't. 

Mr. Morris. Theodore Draper? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I have ever met him. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have anv associations with him in connection 
with the IPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I ever did. I don't recall his 
name as associated with the IPR at all. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Laurence Duggan. 

Mr. Lattimore. I never met Mr. Duggan. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. James Dolsen. 

Mr. Latitmore. That is a new name to me. I can't place it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Israel Epstein. 

Mr. Latitmore. Mr. Israel Epstein I knew slightly and did not 
consider him a Communist, but did believe him to be an ardent sup- 
porter of Chinese Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It has been stated in the press that he has gone 
abroad. 

Mr. Morris. Is he in Red China now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that he was recently feted in Red China? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't. 

Mr. Morris. Is he the husband of Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, he is. 

Mr. Morris. Was Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley a staff member of the 
IPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. She was for a period, I believe, 3^es. 

Mr. Morris. Is she now in Red China? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Dolly Eltenton. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I met her several times in California. I be- 
lieve she worked for a while for the California office of IPR. I had 
no reason to believe and have no reason to believe she is a Com- 
munist. 

Mr. Morris. John K. Fairbank. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, could I intrude at that point? 

Have you, Mr. Lattimore, given us your full recollection with regard 
to Mi-s. Eltenton? 

Mr. Lai'timore. Yes; I believe I have. I knew her very slightly. 

Mr. Sodrwine. Did you know her husband ? 

Mr. Laitimore. I think I met him maybe once or twice at the time 
that she was working for the IPR. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever visit in his home ? 

Mr. Laiitmore. I think my wife and I may have had dinner there 
once. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. and Mrs. Eltenton ever visit in your home? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you just ask your wife if she recalled? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is risht. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3517 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she say she did not ? 

Mr. Lattiiniore. She said she did not. 

]Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Eltenton alone ever visit in your home ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think so. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. "\V:is Mrs. Eltenton at one time secretary to Jack 
Oakie? 

Mr. LA'rriMORE. I don't remember exactly what her position was. 
She had some secretarial position at the California IPE,. 

The Chairman. Let's go back, then. The question was was she ever 
sceretary to Jack Oakie. 

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't answer that. 

The Chairman. Why cannot you answer it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Because all I remember is that she worked at the 
California office, and precisely in what capacity I don't recall. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did she leave IPR to go with the American-Russian 
Institute? 

Mr, Lattimore. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was she with the American-Russian Institute as a 
paid employee after she left IPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. At the time that there was a visit to the home of the 
Eltentons by you and ]\Irs. Lattimore, was she then with the Ameri- 
•can-Russian Institute? 

Mr. Lattimore. My recollection is that she was with the IPR. 

The Chairman. At that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Sourwine, can we have a date, a year ? 

Mr. SouRAViNE. I would be very interested to have the date and year 
of the household visit. 

Mr. Laitimore. I think the only time at which we knew Mrs. Elten- 
ton and her husband was in the first half of 1938, when they were living 
in Berkeley. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you told the committee all that you know 
about Mr. Eltenton ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have told everything that I can recall. I have 
a very shadowy recollection of both of them. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the testimony before the 
House Un-American Activities Committee in connection with Dolly 
Eltenton and her husband George Charles Eltenton ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

]\Ir. ISIoRRis. You have not read it ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. The next name on the list is John K. Fairbank. 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is no. 

Mr. Morris. You do know John K. Fairbank well, do you not ? 

Mr. Latttmore. I know him ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know him well, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Fairlv well. 

Mr. Morris. Did he ever work for you in the Office of War Infor- 
mation ? 

Iklr. Lattimore. No. He never worked under me. 

Mr. Morris. Was he not head of the China Division of the Office of 
War Information ? 



3518 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr, Lattimore. I don't recall that. My recollection is that he 
worked for the Office of War Information — no that he worked in the 
American Embassy in Chungking collecting documents, I believe, for 
colleges and universities and research work over here, and then trans- 
ferred to the OWI. 

But the precise dates and precise character of his service in OWI I 
didn't have anything to do with and I don't remember. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I remember her, and I had no reason to con- 
sider her a Communist at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang. 

jNIr. Lattimore. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang, I met first in Chungking when 
he was one of the deputies to Chiang Kai-shek, and I met him after- 
ward in this country. 

Mr. Morris. Was he ever a guest at your home ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He stayed overnight at my house once. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever travel in the United States with him? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. Let me see, I think I traveled from Philadelphia 
to Baltimore with him once. I had gone up to Bryn INIawr, where I 
was requested to act as his translator in a speech he made at Bryn 
Mawr College. 

Mr. Morris. And is it your testimony you did not know or had no 
reason to believe he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Had no reason to believe he was a Communist. 
Anything but. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever introduce him to anybody as your Com- 
munist friend? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I am sure I didn't. 

Mr. Morris.. Did you persuade him to go back to Communist China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. Did you ever discuss the prospects of his return to 
Communist China, with anybody ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. I believe that I may have talked in general 
terms about his going back to China, but I don't think it was Com- 
munist China at that time. My view of him was that he was one of 
the strongly democratic Chinese who had never joined the Reds and 
was not likely to. 

The Chairman. To come back again, to whom are you referring? 

Mr. Lattimore. Gen. Feng Y'hsian, once known as the Christian 
general of China. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this 
time two newspaper articles in connection with the last man about 
whom we have been interrogating Mr. Lattimore ? 

The Chairman. Where do they come from, and what is their back- 
ground ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the New York Times of January 
15, 1948, page 14, and a photastat of another article from the New 
York Times, of September 6, 1948, pages 1 and G, in reference to 
Feng Yu-hsiang. 

Mr. Sourwine. Did you cause those photostats to be made from the 
original papers ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is this the date at which, or about which the wit- 
ness knew this party ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3519 

Mr. FoRTAS. What is the date of those photostats ? 

Mr. Morris. That is September 1948. 

When did you last see Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. The last time I saw him was when he stayed at our 
house. He and, I think, a son-in-law of his stayed overnight at our 
house. 

Mr. Morris. What is his son-in-law's luime, Mr. Lattimore'^ 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. When was that, Mr, Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't recall the exact year. Perhaps my wife can. 

The Chairman, Where were you living? In Baltimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, outside of Baltimore. Ruxton, 

Mr. Morris, It was in connection with the trip that he made to the 
LTnited States, was it not, obviously, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr, Lattimore, In connection with ? 

Mr. Morris. The visit must have been at the same time he visited 
the United States. 

]\Ir. Lattimore. At the same time, yes. He had been appointed by 
Gen. Chiang Kai-shek to make a study of hydroelectric enterprise in 
tliisi country, and I remember his telling me that he hacl taken 
thousands of feet of motion-picture film in connection with that. 

Mr, Morris. He met with a violent death, did he not, Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

j\Ir. Lattimore. He died in a fire aboard a Soviet ship, I believe, 
in tlie Mediterranean somewhere. 

The Chairman. What is the basis for the introduction of these 
exhibits? 

Mr. Morris, j\Ir, Chairman, one article describes the death that 
Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang came to, and the other was an article indicating 
when he ariived, which would tend to be corroborative of the time 
that Mr. Lattimore did meet Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang. 

Mr. FoRTAs. What is the date? 

The Chairman. It is supposed to be September 1948. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Both are September 19-18. 

Mr, FoRTAs. You say that there is a date as to the time when he ar- 
rived, whicli tends to corroborate the witnesses' testimony, and pre- 
sumably you are referring to a date given in the story. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Mr. FoRTAs. I wondered if you would state that to the witness, 
because we haven't seen the article. 

The Chairman, There is one here of the New York Times of Jan- 
uary 15, 1918, page 14; one of the New York Times, September 6, 
1948, page 1, and another from the New York Times dated September 
6, 1948, page 6, 

ISIr, Sourwine. That is a run-over of the former story. 

Senator Smith. Could we not clear it up, Mr. Chairman, by letting 
the witness and his counsel examine those right now ? 

The Chairman. I want to know what is the basis for the introduc- 
tion of them. They do not refer to this witness, as I understand it. 

]Mr. Morris. But they do refer, Mr, Chairman, to Gen. Feng Yu- 
hsiang, about whom we have been interrogating this witness, and they 
do place the time of his visit to the United States during the time of 
the visit when Mr. Lattimore testified he did have Gen. Feng Yu- 
hsiano; in his home. 



3520 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chaikman. Did it have any connection with tlie Institute of 
Pacihc Kehitions? 

Mr. MoRWs. No, sir; not wliat we are puttino- in the record at tliis 
time, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Chair is going to withhold the ruling on that 
for the time being. 

You may proceed with some other matter. 

Mr. Morris. Julien R. Friedman. 

Senator Smith. May I ask one question before we leave that? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Lattimore, with respect to Gen. Feng Yu- 
hsiang, that he made several thousand feet of moving picture film 

Mr. Lattimore. Made or had been given. 

Senator Smith. Did you see any of those yourself? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't. 

Senator Smith. You did not know whether any of them were made 
of just public utilities, or whether some of them might have been 
made of military installations. Do you have any information either 
way? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no information wdiatever. 

This was in the period when there was a great deal of talk about a 
possible TVA on the Yangtze, and that sort of thing, and the Chinese 
Government w^as very much interested in large-scale hydroelectric 
enterprises, 

Mr. Morris. Julian R. Friedman? 

Mr. Lattimore. Is he a man who worked for the State Department 
at one time? 

Mr. M(^RRis. Yes. He was an assistant to John Carter Vincent at 
the time he was Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State 
Department. 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, then, I knew him slightly and had no reason 
to believe him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in Mr. Vincent's office in the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't recall meeting him there, no. I think when- 
ever I met him it was socially. If he was in Mr. Vincent's office, I 
may well have met him. 

Senator Ferguson. I think the facts show that he had a desk in 
the same office with Mr, Vincent, if that will help you. 

Mr. Lattimore. I may quite well have met him in Mr. Vincent's 
office, but if so it was so inconsequential that I retain no memory 
of it. 

Mr. Morris. You did say whenever you did meet Mr. Friedman it 
was at social gatherings, Mr. Lattimore. Will you tell us about 
those ? 

Mr. Lai'itmore. Well, I -just remember meeting him occasionally. 
He may have been at one or more IPR conferences, or something of 
that sort. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet him as the Hot Springs convention in 
1944? 

Mr. LATriMORE. If he was there, then I must have met him there? 

Mr. Morris. But that is the best you can testify to about your asso- 
ciation with Julian Friedman ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3521 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Harry Gannes ? 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name. 

Mr. Morris. Did Chen Han-seng write a review of his book for 
Pacihc Affairs while you were the editor of it ? 

Mr. Latt^imore. I don't recall. He may well have. Could you f^ive 
me the year of that? • " 

Mr. Morris. December 1937. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is quite possible, but my recollection of re- 
views m Pacific Affairs is not very good, partly because while I was 
editing Pacific Affairs from abroad many reviews went in without 
my having seen the original manuscripts. 

Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony you did not recall Harry Gannes 
at all ? 

INlr. Lattimore. That is right. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mark Gayn « 

Mr. Lattimore. jMr. Mark Gayn I met at the Press Club in Tokyo, 
I believe, for the first time. That would be the winter of 1945-46. 
and I think I saw liim once in this country. 
Mr. Morris. What was that occasion ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was just before he was going to Europe on 
some kind of writing assignment, so I was told. 
Mr. Morris. Did he ever confer with you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, it certainly wasn't a conference. It was a 
casual meeting. 

Mr. Sourwine. Just a moment, Mr. Morris. If I may interpose, 
the witness has not yet answered the main question about Mr. Gayn.' 
The question is : In your dealings with this man, or in any other way, 
did you know or have any reason to belieA-e that he was a Communist? 
Mr. Lattimore. No ; T didn't. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Louis Gibarti ? 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you do not recall havino- a 
meeting with Mr. Louis Gibarti? ^ 

Mr. Lattimore. I certainly don't recall it. If you have a document 
somewhere, it might refresh my memory. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Harold Glasser? 
Mr. Lai-timore. I don't place that name either. 
Mr. Morris. G-1-a-s-s-e-r. 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name. 

Mr. Morris. Did you encounter him on the Pauley Keparations 
Mission ? 

Mr. Latitmore. He wasn't a member of the mission. 
The Chairman. The question is: Did you encounter him? 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall it. 

The Chairman. That is, on the Pauley Reparations Mission. 
Mr. Morris. It is your testimony you did not encounter or run into 
Harold Glasser in connection with the Pauley Reparations Mission? 
Mr. Latimer. I don't recall it. In Tokyo? 
Mr. Morris. At any place. 

Mr. Lattimore. Or here ? I just don't place the name. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Max Granich ? 

Mr. Lattoiore. Mr. ]Max Granich I know from the transcript of 
these hearings. I have never met him, but there is in the record the 



3522 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

fact that I once wrote him a letter declining to join the board of China 
Today, which he edited. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Michael Greenberg? 

Mr SouRWiNE. Jnst a moment, please. The Avitness has not yet 
answered the question: Did he, in his dealings with this man, know 
him or had any reason to believe he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In my dealings with him, I had no reason to believe 

he was a Communist. -,. , , -, ^^ .^ ^. rri „ 

Mr SouRWiNE. The question is a little broader than that, ihe 
question is: In your dealimrs with him, or in any other way, clid you 
have reason to believe or did you know him to be a Communist i 

Mr L\TTiMORE. No, I didn't know him to be a Communist, and i 
didn't believe him to be a Communist. China Today at that time was 
not a magazine that I recognized as a Communist front. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Michael Greenberg? t ^i • i 

Mr Lattimore. Mr. Michael Greenberg I knew slightly. 1 think 
I met him at the New York office of the IPR and, of course I know 
that he later became managing editor, or some such title, o± i^acitic 
Affairs after I had left. I knew him very slightly. 

]\Ir. Morris. You used his services, did you not, m the IFK f 
Mr Lattimore. I don't recall using his services. 
Mr Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, pleased 
Mr SoiiRwiNE. If I may interrupt, please, before the document 
comes in Here again we have a situation where the major question- 
that is, whether the witness in his dealings or m any other way knew 
or had reason to believe this person was a Communist— has not been 

Mr L vrTiMORE. No ; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist. 

Mr* SouRWiNE. The question is assuming that you did have deal- 
intrs with the person. There is, of course, no objection to expatiating 
oifthat, but I keep coining back to it because the mam question is 
whether you knew or had reason to believe that the person was a 

Communist. ,. , ,, n , i 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I knew him very slightly and had no reason 

to believe him a Communist. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel. ^ .i ci 4= 

I^Ir ISIandel. This is a photostat of a document from the hies ot 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 28, 1941, froni 300 Gil- 
man Hall, Johns Hopkins University, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, 
with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. It is a photostat ot a 

carbon copy. , ^ .^ i i 

Mr. Morris. INIr. Lattimore, I offer you that document and ask you 

if you can recall having written it. ,, , . .,^ -^ i . t 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall having written it, but i 

obviously did. . ^ -, nr t 4^4^- ? 

Mr Morris. Will you read the second paragraph, Mr. Lattimore_{ 
Mr. Lattimore. "The three points raised by Greenberg are, i 

think, decisive." ^ , ., 

Mr. Morris. Do you remember what the three points were m con- 
nection with that paper by Greenberg? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; but the first sentence of the letter is : 
Herewith I am returning the docket of uapers relative to Bloch's proposal 
for an analysis of the Russo- Japanese Pact, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3523 

• "^fi^''\l^'^^J ^? ""V"' the latter to object to the fact that the peoi^le 
111 the New 1 ork office don't seem to realize that quarterly maffiiziAes 
liave^to deal iii rather long terms of reference, whereas the Fa? East- 
ern burvey, which was a fortnightly publication, dealt with things 
that were closer to the neAvs. 

The Chairman. Now get back to the question 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record? 

Ihe Chairman. It may be admitted in the record. 

(Ihe document referred to was marked ''Exhibit No. 551" and is as 
loUows :) ' 

Exhibit No. 551 

WLH 
ED 

300 GiLMAjy Hall, Johns Hopkins University 
Mr. E. C. Carter, Baltimore, Md., April 28, WJ,1. 

Institute of Pacific Relaticm, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City. 

Dear Carter : Herewith I am returning the docket of papers relative to Bloeh's 
proposal for an analysis of the Russo-Japanese Pact 

The three points raised hy Greenberg are, I thinlv decisive 

There is- another thing that I think should be borne in mind whenever pro- 
posals of this kind come up. Everybody at 129 East Fifty-second StreeJ who 
does any writing seems to me to be dominated by the routine and rhvthm of 
^ar Eastern Survey— and to be unconscious of the fact. The old Far Eastern 
Survey, I should hastily add. There are already signs that the new Far Eastern 
Survey IS doing a Moses on them and leading them out of the wilderness 
,, ^"t/^f ^aj^it f. m"«l to which I refer is still there and still dominant ' It is 
r vnf f, n'i l^T thnik'ug that the art of writing something that is a combination of 
piotound philosophy and snap judgment on something that happened a week 
ago or at most two weeks ago. dpyeiicu a ^^eelv 

This just won't do for a quarterly. You have to drop the idea that vou are 
writing about something that happened a week or ten davs ago. You have to 
cast your mmd forward at least three months— four is safer. It is not a ques- 
tion of what people are guessing about the Russo-Japanese Pact now, but what 
they will be thinking about it in September. The essential approach involves 
the computing of two factors: (1) By September, what impress willremain on 
people s minds of the actual wording, the diplomatic and political timing and 
the immediate effects of the Russo-Japanese Pact? (2) By September, what 
win be the general character of the consequences flowing from the Pact' I do 
not mean sensationally accurate prophesies of who will be sipping tea and who 
^^ All /"^^""^ vodka. I mean a broadly correct anticipation of main trends 

All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must 
combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with 
the panorama of the future. 

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic 
of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army 
Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. At the time, or any time, did you have any reason to 
believe that Michael Greenberg was a Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, while we are on the document, may 
I go out of order a minute and ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last 
paragraph of this letter? 

The Chairman. That is on the second page. 

Mr. Morris. It is on the second page. 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong oft the topic of 
the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army. 



3524 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

This is apparently for reasons of time limit. 

Mr. Morris. Would you explain what you meant by that reference, 
Mr. Lattimore? 

The Chairman. Read that ao;ain, Mr. Lattimore, please. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I read the preceding sentence also? 

The Chairman. Just read what you did read. I want to get that. 
What did you read when you were asked to read ? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of 
the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army. 

Mr. Morris. Read the preceding paragraph, Mr. Lattimore. 
Mr. Lattimore. The preceding paragraph is [reading] : 

All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must 
combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with 
the panorama of the future. 

Mr. Morris. What did you mean by ihe reference that you were 
switching Anna Louise Strong off of the topic of the Fourth Route 
Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army? 

Mr. Lattimore. I can only speculate on that, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Was Anna Louise Strong doing an assignment for you 
at that time? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether she was doing an assign- 
ment or had volunteered an article. 

Mv. Morris. But is it not apparent from your reading of your own 
letter, Mr. Lattimore, when you say you switched her off one topic and 
onto anothei', that she was obviously working for you in some capacity? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; not necessarily. She may have volunteered 
an article on one topic and I suggested that she take up another topic. 

Mr, Morris. At least to that extent she was working for you, if you 
could switch her from one to the other, even though she was volun- 
teering ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I think if a correspondent is trying to place 
an article with a publication, that correspondent is working for him- 
self or herself until the article is accepted. 

Mr. MoiiRis. Were the Fourth Route Army and the Eighth Route 
Army both Communist armies? 

Mr. Lattimore. The Eighth Route Army was a Communist army. 
The Fourth Route Army was an army organized by Chiang Kai-shek 
which contained both Communists and non-Communists. 

Mr. Morris. And it ultimately became a Communist army; did it 
not? 

Mr. Lattimore. Part of it did ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain the reference of taking Anna Louise 
Strong from the Fourth to the Eighth Route Army ? 

The Chairman. What is meant by that language ? 

Mr. Lattimore. As I say, I can only speculate on it at this dis- 
tance, but in view of the fact that I was talking about the subject of a 
quarterly magazine not writing off the top of the news, and in view of 
the fact that this letter was written in 1941, it may be that the Fourth 
Route Army was known at that time only from recent newspaper re- 
ports, and I thought it was difficult to give a balanced long-term treat- 
ment of it, whereas the Eighth Route Army had been known for a 
long time, and was a subject that could be written about in the terms 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3525 

of a quarterly magaziiie, rather than a subject for some publication 
that was staying close to the daily headline. 

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that the Eighth Army 
was a Communist army ? 

Mr. Lattimoke. The Eighth Army was a Connnunist army. 
The Ciiaibman. And you switched her from the Fourth Route 
Army to the Eighth Route Army; is that right? Is that what the 
language says? 

Mr. Lattimoke. The language says I switched her off one topic 
and onto another topic, presumably in terms that she would write 
about one topic rather than another. The Eighth Route Army at that 
time was under Chiang Kai-shek's command, although it was a Com- 
munist army. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did you know at that time that Anna Louise Strong 
was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Had you any reason to believe that she was a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe that she was. 
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that she w\as? 
]Mr. Lattimore. No ; I never learned that she was. 
Senator Ferguson. That is up to this date ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is up to this date. I don't consider her a 
Communist. 
Mr. Morris. Dr. H. Hatem? 
Mr. Lattimore. I can't place that name at all. 
Mr. Morris. Is it vour testimony you had no connection with Dr. 
Hatem ? 

Mr. Lattimore. None that I can recall. There may be something 
in the files about it, but I completely fail to place the name. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I just want to know if the 
record shows what Mr. Lattimore's definition of a Communist is in 
these answers. He is answering that he never knew Anna Louise 
Strong to be a Communist, even up to this date, and had no reasons to 
believe. 

What is your definition in these answers of the words "a Com- 
munist" ? 

j\[r. Lattimore. A Communist, I suppose, is a known Communist. 
Senator Ferguson. A knoM-n Communist? They did not ask you 
that, as I understood the question. 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no reason to believe that Anna Louise Strong 
is a Communist. 

The Chairman. That is not the question. 

Senator Ferguson. What I have been trying to find out now is that 
you have answered many questions here, and one of them was as to 
whether or not you ever knew or had reasons to believe that Anna 
Louise Strong was a Communist. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe she was a Communist. 
Senator Ferguson. But I want to know- what the word "Communist" 
means to you wdien you are answering these questions. 

]\Ir. Lattijiore. I had no reason to believe that she was a member 
of the Communist Party, 

Senator Ferguson, That was not the question at all, wdiether or not 
she was a member of the party. Is that what you understood all of 



3526 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

these other questions from No. 1 down to mean : that you knew or had 
reasons to believe they were members of the party ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you talking about card-carrying Com- 
munists ? 

INIr. Lattimore. Senator, I am not an expert on the subject of card- 
carrying Communists versus, noncard-carrying Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, would you include at least, in 
the question with relation to Anna Louise Strong, as to whether or not 
she was under the discipline of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge of Anna Louise 
Strong, which is rather slight, I had no reason to believe that she was 
under any discipline except her own. 

Mr. Morris. She was the editor of the Moscow Daily News, was she 
not, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think she was. Was she? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not know she was ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't recall that. 

Mr. Morris. You have reviewed her books, have you not, Mr. Lat- 
timore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have reviewed at least one book of hers. 

Mr. Morris. That was in what year ; 1935 ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Possibly. 

Mr. Morris. ]\Ir. Chairman, along this line of questioning we have 
not been putting documents into the record for fear we would not be 
able to finish this up very quickly. 

The Chairman. You do not have to be afraid about finishing up 
very quickly. We are going to go on with this hearing until it is con- 
cluded. Do not be afraid about time. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should define what we 
mean as a Communist wdien w^e ask the witness a question. That is to 
say, whether we are referring just to a card-carrying Communist, a 
member of the Communist Party, or whether we are also including in 
that category those persons who we know are generally classified as 
Comnmnists because they follow the Communist line. 

The latter would be a much broader definition. Perhaps we should 
say to the witness here just which of those two we mean, whether we 
mean strictly a card-carrying Communist or whether we mean a 
person that may or may not be a card-carrying Communist but yet 
does follow the Communist line. I think that is what Senator Fer- 
guson is driving at. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am driving at. 

Senator Smith. I am sure the witness would rather have it cleared 
that w^ay. 

Senator Ferguson. Whether or not they were voluntarily follow- 
ing the line. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would this definition be acceptable: In this list 
of questions, when we refer to the word "Communist," the committee 
means a person who is, using the Senators words, who is or has been 
willingly cooperative or collaborating with Communists for the fur- 
therance of Communist purposes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a good definition, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3527 

J\lr. SouRwiNE. Using that as the definition of Communist, Mr. 
Lattimore, are there an}^ of tJie answers you have given with regard to 
these people that you would want to change ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I am afraid, Mr. Sourwine, that those are definitions 
that I can't accept. I haven't been conducting a private investigation 
service, and all I can speak to is my personal knowledge of people or 
knowledge of their writings, or something like that. 

The Chairman. Do you want that answer to stand in reply to the 
question propounded by Mr. Sourwine ? 
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. 

The CriAiRjviAN. In other words, you do not accept the definition 
given you nor the explanation given you by Mr, Sourwine or the mem- 
bers of this committee, is that right ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, whether or not you accept it 
if you are advised that that is what the committee means by interro- 
gating you as to wliether or not you had knowledge of whether they 
were Communists, do you, or do you not, stand by your previous an- 
swers that none of these individuals whom you have negatived were 
known to you to be Communists ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. because phrases have been used like "gen- 
erally classified as Communists," and I just don't understand exactly 
what that means. I don't think it is a precise enough definition 

Mr. FoRTAS. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully request that the 
question be repeated ? 

The Chairman. Just a minute, Mr. Fortas. 

Senator O'Conor. I will repeat it. My question is, and I will 
rephrase it, whether or not you accepted the definition as given by 
Mr. Sourwine, I would like to ask you Avhether or not any of the per- 
sons about whom you have been interrogated were known to you to 
be acting m furtherance of Communist objectives or of beino- identi- 
fied with Communist undertakings. ^ 

Mr. Laitimore. I think the answer would be "No," Senator 

The Chairman. What is the answer? What is your answer not 
what you think? ' 

Mr. Latfimore. My ansAver, without reviewing in detail all of these 
names, is no. In the case of Anna Louise Strong 

Mr. Sourwine. In order to answer that question you have to re- 
view those names. 

Senator O'Conor. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. In the case of Anna Louise Strong, slie was known 
for many years as a writer who gave sympathetic accounts of condi- 
tions m parts of Soviet Russia that she visited. Later on she was a 
person who wrote accounts very friendly to the Chinese Communists 
ot what she saw in Communist China. 

The question of whether doing a thing of that kind was honest re- 
porting by the person concerned of facts as she saw them, or whether 
It was a question of deliberately furthering the cause or interests of 
the Chinese Communists or the Russian Communists, is a subjective 
evaluation for which I don't have the data. Therefore, I say that as 
far as my knowledge is concerned, she was not a Communist 

Senator O'Conor. You have not, I think, Mr. Lattimore, answered 
fully. Our question is not as to whether the person's writings may 
m fact, have been of aid and assistance, as well as if the person will- 



3528 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

fully was actino- in furtherance of Communist objectives and was 
lending himself or herself to the furtherance of Communist objectives, 
to the best of your knowledge. 

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge, I never considered 
that Anna Louise Strong was willfully furthering the interests of 
the Chinese or Russian Communists in the dishonest sense of dis- 
regarding her own judgment. 

The Chairman. Just a minute. Let me have that answer, please 
That is an avoidance of the question. Read me the answer. 

( The record was read by the reporter.) 

The Chairman. That 'is a willful avoidance of the answer. It is 
going to be stricken. 

Answer the question. Will you read the question back to the wit- 
ness, please, the question of the Senator from Maryland ? 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge, no. 

Senator O'Conor. Is that applicable to all of the other individuals ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think it is. As I say, again, without review- 
ing each individual name 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The witness has repeated. He says that again with- 
out reviewing these names. In order to answer that question, he must 
review these names, and the record should shoAv that he has reviewed 
these names. Otherwise, the answer means nothing. 

Mr. Morris. Will you review the names and answer the question, 

Mr. Lattimore ? , . ^ • -, <• . .i 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I do not think, m deference to the 
question answered, that we have a sufficient understanding now that 
there is an understanding between tlie committee and the witness as to 
what is meant by the word "Communist." 

For instance, he uses expressions like "willfully" and whether a per- 
son is "dishonest." If she was a Communist, no one could say she was 
dishonest in her judgment. I think w^e ought to take a minute here and 
o-et an agTeement on what we mean by the word "Communist" in 
these questions. I think this is very material. 

The Chairman. You cannot prevent the witness from inserting a 
word of his own which is not used by the interrogator, and that is what 
he has been doing all along. ■ ,^ -,,, o 

Mr. FoRTAs. Mr. Chairman, I think the word "willful ' was Senator 
O'Conor's word. 

Senator Ferguson. I had used the expression once knowingly. 

Mr. FoRTAS. Senator, there have been so many questions, I wonder if 
the committee could not rephrase the question and put it to the witness. 
I think this is just a case of confusion because of different terminology 
used by the interrogators. 

The Chairman. Senator O'Conor's question was very clear and very 
distinct. It will be read back to the witness again if need be. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I ask this question of the 
witness : Mr. Lattimore, did you say about the handbook written by 
Anna Louise Strong, This Soviet World, as reviewed by you on pages 
611-612 : 

Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, 
originality and individuality and the foreign idea of regimentation. 

The Chairman. Wliat is the question, Senator? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3529 

Senator Ferguson. I asked him if he wrote that about the book that 
was written b}^ Anna Louise Strong. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall writing that, but I am willing to accept 
this extract. I would like to see the full context. 

Mr. Morris. "Wliat year is that, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. September 1945, Pacific AflFairs. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Mr. Chairman, while we are getting that article, may 
we have the question redirected to Mr. Lattimore ? 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson's question ? 

Mr. Morris. No ; Senator O'Conor's question. And may we have the 
witness's last answer ? 

The Chairman. You will have to read back to get Senator O'Conor's 
question. 

Senator O'Conor. I said, Mr. Lattimore, apart from whether you 
accepted the definition as repeated by Mr. Sourwine, whether, in your 
responses to the questions concerning this list of individuals, you meant 
that you had no knowledge that any one of those individuals had acted 
m furtherance of Communist objectives or were identified with Com- 
munist undertakings ? 

Mr. Lattimore. To my knowledge ? 

Senator O'Connor. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is no, to my knowledge, as far as my 
knowledge extends. JMay I add a word or two there ? 

When, esj^ecially in the early 1930's, I read an attempt to describe 
sometliing that was going on in some part of Soviet Russia that was 
friendly in the sense that it didn't have in every other paragraph, 
"Remember these, all murderers," or something of that kind, I thought 
it was an honest attempt to observe and report what was going on in 
Russia. My assumption would not be that that was done in purpose 
of furthering the spread of Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, on this point may Mr. Mandel read 
into the record Anna Louise Strong's contributions to the Communist 
publications as of that time ? 

The Chairman. Wait a minute. What are you reading from? 

Mr, Mandel. From a record I have accumulated. The sources are 
all given. 

i\Ir. Morris. Mr. Mandel has been sworn as the research director, 
and he will give the sources of each individual item as he comes to 
it, Senator. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Mandel. Moscow Daily News of July 2, 1933, published in 
Moscow for English-speaking people in the Soviet Union and through- 
out the world. Miss Anna Louise Strong is associate editor. She 
also was a writer for tlie following Communist publications: The 
Liberator of INIarch 1923, page 21; Soviet Russia Today, December 
1931, page 5 : the New Masses of June 28, 1938, page 15 ; the Sunday 
Worker of December 21, 1935, page 3; the Labor Herald — that is the 
Communist Labor Herald— of March 1921, page 16; the Worker's 
Monthly of January 1925, page 108 ; Soviet Russia Today of March 
1937, pages 14 and 15. 

Mr. Morris. This is the article, Mr. Lattimore, that you made 
reference to that you reviewed. [Document handed.] 

The Chairman. I understand there is some confusion as to the 
date. Is that right? What is the question now pending? 

88348— 52— pt. 10 17 



3530 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

]Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, asked Mr. Latti- 
more whether or not lie had made a certain statement in reviewing 
Anna Louise Strong's book, and he wanted to see the whole text. 
He has been given the text, and he now may make any change in that 
that is necessary. 

The Chairman. What is the question, the question by Senator 
Ferguson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It refers to a particular sentence which I have 
here. 

The Chairman. I want the question, if I can get it. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you identify what I asked you in the 
book? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I found it. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it accurate? 

Mr. FoRTAs. Would you read it back, Senator ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think it is accurate. The sentence is: 

Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, 
originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of "regimentation." 

Did you want to ask me anything further on that. Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, but I was troubled with your answer about 
Miss Strong, whether you knew she was a Communist. I attributed 
the difficulty to the point that you and I were not thinking about the 
word "Communist" in the same light. I could not understand how 
you could answer that you did not think she had connection with the 
Communist Party. That is the reason I said to the Cliair that I hope 
now we might have an understanding as to what this word means that 
we have been using here in this last group of questions about these 
persons from Adler to wdiere you are now, 

Mr. Lattimore. Do you want to make a new definition ? 

Mr. Morris, Mr, Sourwine, you had addressed a definition to the 
Chair. 

Mr, Sourwine, AVould the committee wish to use this definition: 
Communist means a person under Communist discipline, or who has 
voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Commu- 
nist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives. 

The Chairman. Do you know that to apply to any of those names 
that have been referred to you ? 

Mr. Latttmore, I would say not, subject to the times at which 7 
knew these various people and various contributions that they sub 
mitted. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have now reviewed the list, have you, Mr 
Lattimore ? 

Mr, Lattimore, I have reviewed the list. I notice that there is, fc 
instance, besides Anna Louise Strong 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. This is the list down as far as Michael Greenberg. 
That is as far as we have gotten, ]Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, Dr. Hatem, I think. 

Mr. Morris. Yes, we had gone to Hatem. You are right. 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, of course, tliere are various people to whom 
I have referred, like Earl Browder, knowing that he was a Commu- 
nist and — what is his name — Borodin, assuming that he was a Com- 
munist. There is Israel Epstein, who I once reviewed as writing a 
book that was partisan on the side of the Chinese Communists. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3531 

Mr. Morris. Yes, but you testified that you had no reason to believe 
that he was a Communist while you knew him, did you not'^ 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I did not consider him at that time to be a 
Communist. I considered him a partisan of the Communists. How 
that is affected by Mr. Sourwine's definition I don't know. 
Senator Fergusox. How is it affected in your mind ? 
Mr. Lattimore. Well, at that time, I considered him, at the time 
I reviewed his book, I considered that he gave a partisan statement 
in favor of the Chinese Communists. But as of the year that book 
was written, exactly what that meant in terms of Russian Communists 
and American Communists would be something else again. 

Many people were writing extremely favorable accounts of the 
Chinese Communists at that time. I think perhaps I could say that, 
at that time, using a very loose term — which again is not really a 
satisfactory definition in itself — I would consider Epstein a fellow 
traveler of the Chinese Communists. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Mr. Chairman, if the committee accepts this defi- 
nition, and I assume that is the case with regard to its question, then 
the question is, putting this definition in place of the word ''Commu- 
nist,'' first we assume that you had dealings with the person named, 
and if not, please state that, then in your dealings with this person, 
or in any other way, did you know or have reason to believe that this 
person was a person under Communist discipline or who had volun- 
tarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist 
Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives. 

Taking that as the question, Mr. Lattimore, and looking back over 
these names, down as far as that of Dr. Hatem, are there any of the 
answers which you gave in the negative which you would like to 
change or qualify? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think no, with the exception of Israel Epstein, 
whom I mentioned here, and possibly Abraham Chapman. I can't 
remember exactly what the correspondence was. I never met him 
personally, but I seem to remember that the question was raised in 
the research committee of the IPR that he had done some kind of 
work from the Communist point of view, or as a Communist, or some- 
thing of that kind. I don't recollect the exact terms. 

The question was raised whether his work should be published a< 
all. and, if so, how it should be described or presented. But as I say^ 
I don't remember the details. 

Mr. SouRwixE. And you had that in mind, did you, when you pre- 
viously answered the question about him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. When I previously answered the question about 
him, I had in mind that I did not, of my personal knowledge, know 
him to be a Communist. I think so— I am not sure. I would like to 
have the transcript read back. I am getting a little bit confused with 
all of these going back and forth from one name to the other. If we 
go back in the transcript to the raising of the name of Abraham Chap- 
man, perhaps I could be clearer. 

Mr. Sourwixe. The transcript will speak for itself, sir. But the 
question is, Now that you have been somewhat more confined by the 
committee's definition of "Communist," what is your answer with 
regard to Mr. Chapman? 

]Mr. Lattimore. ]My answer with regard to Mr. Chapman is that I 
had no pei-sonal dealings with him, and therefore did not personally 



3532 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

know him or consider him to be a Communist. But that I believe, and 
without seeing the correspondence again, I can't remember exactly 
what it is about, that the question of his being a Communist or sup- 
porting a Communist presentation, or something of the kind, may 
have been raised. 

The Chairman. Would you say you had reason to beheve, then, 
tliat he was a Communist or a fellow traveler ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would be impossible for me to be more precise 
there, Mr. Chairman, without seeing the original correspondence 
again and reviewing it. I don't want to be unjust to anybody. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I ask a question ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Down to where we are on the names now, what 
would your answer be, and you have given us a definition of "fellow 
traveler," as to knowing or having reason to believe that any of these 
people were fellow travelers? 

Mr. FoRTAs. Senator, I am not sure tliat he has defined ^^fellow 
traveler." 

The Chairman. He has used it alternately. 

Mr. Lattimore. I used the term, and I believe I said that it was in 
itself a loose and unsatisfactory definition. 

Senator Ferguson. As loose and as unsatisfactory as it is to you, 
what do you sav about my question? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Let the record show the witness is examining the 

list. 

Mr. Lattimore [after examining the document]. No. I don't be- 
lieve I had any reason, at the time I knew^ any of these people, to con- 
sider that they were fellow travelers, with the exception or partial 
exceptions already indicated. 

Mr. Morris. And that includes Mr. Israel Epstein, is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. That would include Mr. Epstein, whom I certainly 
considered at the time to have written a partisan book, that was parti- 
san on the side of the Chinese Communists. 

The CHAumAN. Before you made that last answer, you had occasion 
to, and did, review the list of names on which you have been interro- 
gated. Is that right? 

Mr, Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. What is your answer on Earl Browder? I see 
his name under the B's. 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I had already mentioned that I considered 
him to be a Communist at the time. So I understood that he was not 
affected bv this review. 

Tlie Chairman. I think the connnittee will recess at this point. We 
will recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 15 p. m.. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 2 p. in. of the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

The hearing reconvened at 2 : 10 p. m., upon the expiration of the 
recess. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3533 

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THUEMAN 
AENOLD, COUNSEL— Eesiimed 

The Chairmax. You may proceed now. 

Mr, Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, over the recess, I was trying to recall 
as much as I know about Anna Louise Strong, who has been mentioned 
here, and I do believe that I recall that at one time she was working 
for a paper in Moscow, I don't remember in exactly what capacity, but 
in view of the fact, I should say that that would classify her as some- 
body who was knowingly working with the Russians at that time. 

I may say that my memory is unclear partly because what was on the 
top of my memory was the newspaper stories about her being arrested 
in Russia and thrown out. 

The Chairman. She was working with the Russians at that time, 
did you say ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time. 

How conscious of that I was in the 1930"s, at the time that I pub- 
lished material by her, is completely beyond my recollection. 

The Chairman. And at the time she was working for the Russians, 
the Russian Government was a Communist government ; is that true ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the year? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall that. I think Mr. Morris read into 
the record something, but I don't recall what year was mentioned. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you place about the year ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't. My general recollection is that she 
went to Russia very early after the revolution, but I don't know the 
details of her career. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, AVhen Anna Louise Strong came back 
from Moscow after her difl'erences with the Soviet Government there, 
did she stop to visit you at Baltimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; she stopped over briefly one afternoon. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. How soon after her return from Moscow was that ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know. I think it must have been within a 
few days after she landed in New York. 

Mr. Morris. How long did she stay visiting you ? 

JVIr. Lattimore. jNIaybe an hour or so. 

Mr. Morris. What did you discuss with her at that time ? 

:Mr. Lattimore. Well, it really wasn't a discussion. She was telling 
us about being arrested and thrown out. 

Mr. Morris. When you say "us," whom do you mean ? 

Mr. Lattimore. My wife and myself. 

Mr. Morris. Was anybody else present? 

Mr. Kvttimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. Why did she go to see you at that time, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no idea. 

The CiL^iRMAN. Do we understand that she visited you at your 
home ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any further business she might 
have had in Baltimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't. 

Senator Ferguson. Did she express any ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; not that I recall. 



3534 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

]Mr, SouRWiNE. Were you living in Ruxton at that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. All right ; let us get along. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Joan Chase Hinton ? 

Senator Ferguson. Just before you go to that: Did Miss Strong 
leave you any letters or memorandums or reports or anything? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, are you getting back to this list now? 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; I am getting back to the list now. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Just so that the record will be clear on this after- 
noon's session, and to refresh the witness' recollection of the question, 
the question with respect to each one of these names, the reading of 
the name assumes that the witness has had some dealings with the 
person. If not, the witness is requested to so state when the name is 
read. 

The Chairman. Some dealing or some acquaintance. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is right, sir. 

Then the question is : In your dealings with his person, or in any 
other way, did you ever know or have reason to believe that this person 
is a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and 
knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members 
in furtherance of the Communist Party objectives? 

The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, do you understand that as applying 
to each name as we go down the list. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Joan Chase Hinton. 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No." I knew her very slightly. 

J\Ir. Morris. Do you know any other members of her family ? 

Mr, Lattimore. Yes. I know her mother. 

Mr. Morris. Who is her mother, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Her mother is the head of a school in Vermont. 

Mr. Morris. What is her name ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Carmelita. 

Mr, Morris. Are you a member of the board of that school, Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr. Laitimore. No ; I don't think so. 

Mr. Morris. Have you ever been a member of the board of that 
school ? 

Mr, Lattimore. No ; I don't think I have. 

Let me ask my wife. 

I don't think so, no. 

Mr. Morris. Have you ever lectured or taught there at any time? 

Mr. Lattimore. I never taught there. My son went to school there, 
md once or twice when I was up there I spoke at school gatherings. 

Mr. Morris, On how many occasions ? 

Mr. Lai-timore, Maybe a couple, 

Mr, Morris, In what connection did you meet Joan Chase Hinton? 

Mr. Lai-timore. As Mrs. Hinton's daughter. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know any other members of the family ? 

Mr. Ijatitmore. I met her brotlun-, who was at that time farm man- 
ager of the school. 

Mr. Morris. What is his name? 

Mr. Lattimore. William. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3535 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record an 
article written by Joan C. Hinton, from Communist China, in Sep- 
tember 1951. 

The Chairman. I will deal with that in just a minute. 

There was another matter here referred to the Chair this morning 
that I did not rule on, and that was the matter of the clippings from 
the New York paper. 

Mr. Morris. Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang. 

The Chairman. I would like to have had a better foundation laid 
for their admission with reference to this witness. 

Mr. Morris. Would you like me to do that now, sir ? 

The Chairman. Yes. If you have anything better than what you 
have offered, I would like to have it. 

Mr. Morris. It is nothing better, sir. We were interrogating the 
witness on the time he met Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, who was the subject 
of those articles. Those articles clearly placed the period that Gen- 
Feng Yu-hsiang was in the country as September 1948, sir. 

The Chairman. You are not attempting to bind this witness by any- 
thing that is in these statements, are you? 

Mr. Morris. No. 

The Chairman. You are simply using these for the purpose of 
trying to fix a date ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, sir. And the general nature of the 
identity of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang. 

The Chairman. They may be admitted for that purpose. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 552, 552A" 
and are as follows:) 

ExHiDiT No. 552 

[New York Times, January 15, 1948, p. 14] 

Feng Proclaims His Exilk ; Will Work Against Chiang 

[Picture of Gen. Feng Yu-lisiang] 

Feng Yu-lisiang, the "Christian general'" of China, who has been a prominent 
figure there for 30 years, formally assumed the role of a political exile yesterday 

In an interview in his apartment at 839 West End Avenue, General Feng said 
he pleaded guilty to the charge of disloyalty made against him last week in 
Nanking. 

Asserting that as far as he was concerned his ties with the Chinese Govern- 
ment, headed by President Chiang Kai-shek, were "totally severed," the gen- 
eral said he would devote himself from now on to work on behalf of a new 
revolutionary movement founded recently in Hong Kong. 

This movement, he explained, was set up by delegates of "various democratic 
groups" within China. It includes segments of the Nationalist Party (the Kuo- 
mintang) that disagree with President Chiang and also representatives of the 
Chinese Communists, he stated. 

The aim of the new association for which General Feng will act as a sort of 
spokesman in this country, is the overthrow of President Chiang's "reactionary 
and dictatorial regime," he said. 



3536 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 552 A 

[New York Times, September 6, 1948, pp. 1 and 6] 

Feng Dead In Russian Ship Fieb ; War Lord To Talk To Reds 

(By the Associated Press) 

Moscow Septemlter 5.— The death of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, China's fabulous 
"Christian general," aboard a Russian ship in the Black Sea was announced in 
the Moscow press today. General Feng was 07 years old. 

The newspapers Fravda and Izvestia said that the former war lord and a 
daughter perished in an accidental fire aboard the Russian motorship Pobeda 
near the end of a voyage from New York to Odessa. The news of General 
Feng's death came when the ship docked at Odessa. 

The newspapers said that the blaze resulted from careless handling of motion- 
picture film. They said that there were other victims of the fire but gave no de- 
tails other than to' note that General Feng's daughter was killed. 

(The Poieda was the ship upon which Mrs. Oksana S. Kasenkina and tne 
Samarins Russian school teachers who defied the Soviet authorities by remaining 
here were to have sailed from New York. The ship left here July 31.) 



[Special to the New York Times] 

London, September 5.— A Tass dispatch from Odessa recorded by the Soviet 
monitor here tonight, said of the Pobcrfrt'.? trip: 

"At Cairo she took on board more than 2,000 Armenian repatriates who were 
brought to Batum. On August 31 the Po-beda sailed from Batum to Odessa. On 
the way a fire broke out on board the motorship as a result of the careless 
handling of cinema films, which caught fire. There are victims aboard, among 
them Chinese Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and his daughter. The motorship has been 
brought to Odessa. An investigation is under way." 



Nanking, China, September 5 (AP).— Moscow reports of the death of General 
Feng were received with reserve by Chinese Government oflicials today. 

The ofiicial spokesman, Hollington Tong. said there would be no immediate 
comment on the reported death of the former Government leader who was ex- 
pelled from the Kuomintang (Government party) after leading an opposition 
movement in the United States to President Chiang Kai-shek. 



Feng's Relative Tells Ol^ Hobby 

Berkeley, Calif., September 5 (AP).— General Feng's daughter-in-law today 
raised the possibility here that he might have lieen tlie victim of his own motion- 
picture hobby. , ... . 

She said he had taken with him some personal movies and a quantity or 
films of the American hydroelectric and reclamation projects that he had been 

studying. •, , j i <- 

Notified of the report of his death, she said she and her husband had last 

heard from the general in a letter postmarked in Egypt (apparently when the 

ship stopped there) saying merely that he would be unable to write again for 

some time. ,^^4.1, 

The general's son Feng Hung-chi, is a mechanical engineering student at the 

University of California." He was so overcome by grief that his wife spoke for 

him. . 

She said that they had not known what route the general was taking to 

China but that all the rest of the family was with him. 

This included General Feng's wife; a second son, Paul Feng; two young 

daughters, Mildred and Dora; and an elder daughter, Lita, with her husband, 

Robert Lo. ^ t^ 

Lita was a premedical student at the College of the Pacific, Stockton, Calif., 
until last January, when she went to New York and was married to Mr. Lo. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3537 

The Soviet report did not nial^e clear wtiich of tbe tliree daughters was 
killed. 

The general's widow is the former Li Teh-chuan, who once was a YWCA 
secretary in Peiping. She was known to many Americans there and in Chung- 
king as a brilliant woman, greatly interested in her husband's stormy .career. 



Feng a Critic of Chiang's Regime 

In a speech in this country in December General Feng, a severe critic of 
the Government of President Chiang Kai-shek, said that he would not return 
to his native land because he would be killed if he did so. 

He made the speech shortly after he had been ordered to return to Nanking. 
He was sent here, a year before, ostensibly to study water-conservation projects, 
but in reality it was as a political exile. He spent most of his time rallying 
support to oppose the present Chinese Government. 

A well-known war lord for more than 30 years,, he was described by his 
friends as "the Christian general" and by his enemies as a turncoat. He was 
a leading executive of the Chinese Government during World War II but broke 
completely with it in the last 2 years. 

His opposition to the Nanking Government, which he charged with corruption 
and inefficiency, led him to cooperate with the Communists, although he always 
denied that he was a Communist or that he favored the Soviet Union. He 
accused the Chinese Government of using the Communist threat as a bogy to 
obtain more loans from the United States. 

"The so-called Russian threat to China is being used by the Chinese Govern- 
ment for its own purposes," he said once. "I am not a Communist and am not 
for Russia. But I know of no proved evidence that the Russians are helping 
the Chinese Communists." 

Another time he denied that Chinese Communists actually practiced com- 
munism. He said they were carrying out the principles set forth by Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic, under wliom he fought in the revolu- 
tion of 1911. 

At first, however, the Chinese Communists were wary of him. They de- 
nounced him for his political program which, they said, would onlv eliminate 
President Chiang without changing the basic social and political character of 
the Chinese Government. 

But, in April of this year, it was reported that coalition had been established 
between the Communists and exiled Chinese political groups, including General 
Feng, on the basis of a platform calling for the overthrow of President Chiang, 
opposition to the United States, and the setting up of a left-wing united front 
regime in China. 

Shortly afterward, it was reported that General Feng was in Europe on his 
way to north China for conferences with the Communists on the formation of a 
rebel government. It was then said that he would travel through Russia to 
China. That was the last word heard about him until the reports of his death. 

Soldier, poet, and politician, he had been a leading figure on the Chinese scene 
since 1913, when he became commander of a brigade that was one of the most 
formidable units of the Chinese Army. 

Behind him was a background of dire poverty, common to the masses of Chi- 
nese peasantry. He was born in 1880 of coolie parents. He recalled later that 
in a period of more than 10 years he ate meat only once. 

In some unknown manner, however, he entered military school and then the 
Army, rising until he became an important officer. He' was baptized in the 
Methodist faith in 1913, converted his troops, and was said to have led them 
into battle singing Onward, Christian Soldiers. In an interview in New York 
in 1948, he denied tlie legend that he had baptized platoons of men by squirting 
water from a hose on them. 

His career as a war lord had its ups and downs. Sometimes he was a power 
in politics; at other times he was in exile or on a farm writing poetrv — he pub- 
lished five volumes of poetry in China. 

He was an eloquent speaker, a formidable debater, and a blunt critic of the 
missteps of his colleagues. He was tall— six feet, three inche.s — and emphasized 
his humble origins by wearing the coarse blue gown of the peasant. His critics 
added that underneath he wore silk-lined furs. 

Some Chinese leaders called him a noisy bumpkin, but he always exercised 
a great influence on the masses of Chinese people. The troops that served under 



3538 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

him achieved a reputation for sobriety and discipline unique in war-torn China. 
Smolving, gambling, and loose living were forbidden ; and, it was reported, daily 
attendance at prayer meetings was part of his army's routine. 

Despite this, some domestic and foreign critics maintained that his methods 
were too brutal. This, they said, was the reason he never held a prominent 
place in Chinese affairs for long. 

In 1924 he executed a bold coup that for a time put him at the head of the 
Government. The cost, however, was a reputation for treachery that never was 
overcome. Two years later he was forced to flee from China and took refuge 
in Moscow. 

Among the posts he later held were State Councillor of the National Govern- 
ment, Minister for Military Affairs, member of the National Military Council, 
commander in chief of the People's Allied Anti-Japanese Army in the 1930's, and 
a leading commander of Chinese forces in World War II. He was a member of 
the Kuomintang from 1918 until his expulsion on January 7 of this year. 

The Chairman. It seems to me we had another article here that was 
not admitted. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore was going to compare this article with 
the original that he wrote, Mr. Chairman, and rather than take up the 
time, he agreed to do that later on. 

The Chairman. You have not had the time to do it yet; have you, 
Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not yet. Senator. 

Senator Smith. I understand that would be subject to any comment 
he wishes to make. 

The Chairman. Yes. We will give him a chance to go through it. 

All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this article is entitled "Why China 
Wants Peace." It appears in the People's China of September 16, 
1951. It is written from Communist China and bears this preliminary 
introduction [reading] : 

Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic- 
bomb explosion in the New Mexican Desert. A graduate of Bennington College, 
Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin 
and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assist- 
ant at the atom-bomb project in Los Alamos. An active member of the Asso- 
ciation of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and Gov- 
ernment control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She 
came to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her 
American husband in an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia. 

With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to 
know the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with 
the Chinese people, joining with them in their great work of peaceful con- 
struction. 

May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman ? 
The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record. 
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 553," and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 553 

WHY CHINA WANTS PEACE 

(By Joan C. Hinton, September 16, 1951) 

Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic 
bomb explosion in the New Mexican desert. A graduate of Bennington College, 
Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin 
and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assist- 
ant at the atom bomb project at Los Alamos. An active member of the Associa- 
tion of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and govern- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3539 

ment control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She came 
to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her American 
husband in an animal breeding farm in Inner Mongolia. 

With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to know 
the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with the 
Chinese people, joining with them in their great work "of peaceful construction. 

Federation of American Scientists, 

11 -'i9 L Street NW., Washington 6, D. C, U. 8. A. 
Dear ]Mr. Wolfe and the FAS : Yesterday I received your application for re- 
membership in the Federation of Scientists. As I am just now almost directly 
under your feet, in Suiyuan Province, Inner Mongolia — where it takes two weeks 
for mail to arrive by donkey from the nearest railroad — I must say I was rather 
surprised and pleased to receive your application, and in two months' time at 
that. 

You asked, "What has been happening- to you since you were an FAS member?" 
As it was just the FAS and the questions with which it deals which drove me to 
China, I thought I would take the opportunity to write to you, though I should 
have told you long ago why my dues stopped coming. 

As you probably do not remember me, let me begin by telling you a bit of my 
history. From as early as I can remember, I was determined to become a 
scientist. Even in grammar school, I can especially remember forcing the 
teachers to let me study Faraday's The Candle instead of taking Latin. In high 
school I concentrated on chemistry, oblivious to all my other courses. Finally, 
in college, I settled on physics, building a Wilson cloud chamber in my sophomore 
year and spending as much time as I could getting in the way of the cyclotron 
boys at Cornell. From college I went to Wisconsin where I studied as a graduate 
student for two years. As people became more and more scarce, disappearing to 
secret places, I became restless too and finally ended up at Los Alamos where 
I worked another two years on the "W. B." 

Then came the bomb and Hiroshima and the mass migration of atomic scien- 
tists to Washington. I first joined the association of Los Alamos scientists, and 
then spent some six weeks in Washington working for the FAS. Your pamphlet 
mentions the "enthusiastic if inexperienced emissaries" now flocked to Wash- 
ington. I am afraid both these statements applied to me aboTe anybody else — 
especially the inexperience. I will never forget my chagrin when I went to a 
certain Senator's office to get some information and the secretary condescend- 
ingly looked up at me asking, "Is this in connection with school work?"— me, an 
atomic scientist, coming to Washington to fight for scientific freedom and world 
peace— the very nerve of her. Well, my heart was in the right place anyway. 
From Washington I went to Chicago as an assistant in the Institute for 
Nuclear Studies, and later as a Fellow. By 1948, I had about one more year 
to go for my degree. In physics I could not have dreamed of a better oppor- 
tunity for studying— I loved it. I was just beginning to get the feel of quantum 
mechanics— as though it were a part of me instead of something strange in text- 
books. I was devouring Dirac and what I could get hold of on statistical me- 
chanics. Yet the better things became for me in physics, the more depressed I 
became. Ever since that morning when we sat on a hillock south of Albu- 
querque and felt the heat of that bomb 25 miles away, something had started to 
stir m me. It forced me to Washington. Then I forced it down and left for 
Chicago, but it refused to stay down. The Truman doctrine, the Marshall 
Flan, the stagnation of the Atomic Energy Commission in the U. N.— how could 
one just sit still in a laboratory and ponder in the depths of statistical me- 
chanics. The memory of Hiroshima— 150,000 lives. One, two, three, four, five 
SIX * * * one hundred and fifty thousand— each a living, thinking, human 
being with hopes and desires, failures and successes, a life of his or her own- 
all gone. And I had held that bomb in my hand. Could I sit and pounder Dirac? 
What was science for? For the sake of Science? That is what I had thought 
1 M, ^f' 1^"* ^'^ ^^^ pondered over Dirac and then suddenly 150,000 people were 
killed. Were we to blame? We were only studying science, finding out how 
the world was put together. Was the government to blame— really? Do we 
not have any say as to what our life work is to be used for? Are we puppets 
or human beings? Can we not vision the world of tomorrow? Will it be a 
world of destruction and misery, agonising death by radiation or will it be a 
world where mountains are moved by atomic bombs to change the course of 
rivers and make rich green land out of deserts? Where is our imagination? 

By 1948 I could not stand it any longer. My friends all seemed to be going 
back into secret work. Were they crazy? Were we who studied physics tq 



3540 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

spend all our lives thinkins: up means of mass extermination? Even my fellow- 
ship money came from the Navy. We were doing nonsecret work at the time. 
We needed some deuterium for our accelerator. In the room where I studied 
there was only a little space in the corner for a desk, the rest of the room was 
piled with cases of heavy water right up to the ceiling for the argon. We asked 
for some. Nowhere in America could we get any. Finally we sent to Norway 
and two little bottles were sent back to us with a picture of a Viking ship and 
a little note saying, "I thought you had civilian control." 

In Washington, a friend of mine had asked me to go to China. I had refused. . 
I was determined to become a physicist. But the idea kept gnawing at me. It 
would not let me go, until finally I felt like I was being caught in a horrible trap. 
No matter where you turned, you were faced by war, secret work, the Navy, the 
Army, and madmen locked in their laboratories thinking up new and better 
methods of total destruction. Suddenly, I made up my mind and left. But it 
was not easy. The love of science and physics was pretty strong. Of all my 
notebooks and books I only had room for two in my trunk. I sat for a long time 
looking at those books, then took Joos and the handbook of physics and chemistry 
and set out for China alone with a terrible emptiness in my heart. I had broken 
away from everything I ever had desired or known. I broke away because I had 
to. I had to find out what was going on in the world outside of physics. What 
was happening to the peoples of the world— so I came to China, to see America 
from the outside and to understand the tremendous upheaval going on inside 
Asia. 

WHAT I LEARNED IN CHINA 

And what have I learned in the three years since I have been in China? Per- 
haps the main thing is that the people of the East do not want war. That the 
peoples of the East are not interested in America. They are occupied with build- 
ing up their own countries, pulling them out of their centuries of feudalism, 
changing them as fast as possible into modern, industrialised lands with abun- 
dance for all— lands where beggars cease to exist, and slums and "Maxwell 
Streets" are things of the past that the children read about in history books. 
Everything is for peaceful production, for building, for life, for the i)eople— 
and i learned something else — that these people can get along perfectly all right 
without America. I used to think that American aid would mean a lot to China. 
A country so backward — how could she develop without American help? But 
where there is a will there is a way and the Chinese people have a will so strong 
that nothing America can do will ever stop it. They will think of plenty of ways 
and they will develop fast. The only obstacle to their development would be a 
war. They are not afraid of America. If she must fight, China will show that 
she is made of steel— but China will never start a war, war is against her every 
interest. 

I know that you may ask, "How do you know? They are just filling you with 
propaganda, you fool !" So I will not talk any more in generalities. I will only 
tell a few things from my experience. The first is the conditions I found in 
Kuomintang, China. I spent a year in Kuomintang territory, and all that time 
it never ceased to amaze me why we (America) should be giving millions of 
dollars of aid to such a stupid, corrupt, conceited, useless government as the 
government of the Kuomintang. .lust one example will suffice (though anybody 
who lived in Shanghai for just a few months at that time could cite countless 
examples). That is, the business of the "gold yuan." 

For the fun of it, I kept a logarithmic plot of the inflation and it was a fairly 
straight line. I have forgotten just now what the period was, but the line was 
pretty steep. It was steep enough so that towards the end, prices would double 
or even triple in a day. I remember especially how carefully I had to plan to 
buy a jackknife. I went to a certain place (of which kind Shanghai was teem- 
ing) early in the morning with a briefcase to cash one American dollar. The 
briefcase having been duly loaded full of Chinese notes, I tore as fast as I could 
to the store and emptied them out on the counter before the price could rise. A 
briefcase full of notes for a jackknife? The poor storekeepers were in a ter- 
rible fix. They had to either not count the money and get stuck short or hire 
several extra hands just for counting money and lose that much in wages any- 
way. And the banks were in an impossible state. The cost of shipping and 
counting money was far beyond the value of the money. In fact, it was not even 
worth the paper it was printed on. The clerks in the banks were peering out 
from behind heaps of bills piled up to the ceiling. "Money, money everywhere, 
but not a crumb to eat." And so, of course, in order to stay alive one had to put 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3541 

one's wealth into something besides paper money : in silver dollars, American 
dollars or goods, and the barter system flourished. 

Then the government announced its "currency reform." Under penalty of 
death all gold, silver, American dollars, and hoarded goods were to be turned 
in to the banks and exchanged for the new stable "gold yuan." Every day the 
paper had pictures of people being shot for disobeying their order. Houses were 
searched. Anybody found guilty was dragged off to prison. Thousands upon 
thousands of ordinary folk turned in the little bit of savings they had in return 
for paper "gold yuan." 

For a week or two, as I remember, prices remained stable. Then whisperings 
began in the black market — and soon they broke — the "gold yuan" fell off its 
pedestal. To where? Right smack on the extrapolation of the exponential infla- 
tion curve which I had been plotting all year. What did this mean? Only that 
the government had previously printed this tremendous excess of notes, had held 
them out of circulation for a week or two until as much gold and silver, etc., as 
could be collected from the people was taken in, and then let go, leaving the 
whole population wuth nothing but worthless scraps of paper. Thousands upon 
thousands of people left without a cent of savings — the biggest, most cold-blooded 
mass robbery in history or ever dreamed of. And the gold and silver was pocketed 
by the "Big Four" — the ruling families of China and shipped to America and other 
safe places as fast as possible before liberation. At the time I was too stupid to 
realize what was happening. I naively assujned that this time maybe the govern- 
ment was finally really planning to do something about the inflation. It was only 
after that point fell so perfectly on my curve that the truth began to dawn. But 
even then, it took me a long time to really realise the treachery, the calculated 
cold-blooded intent of these criminals who called themselves a government. And 
it was these crooks to whom America was sending millions of dollars worth 
■)t "aid" — guns, bombs, tanks, trucks, and a trickle of powdered milk. 

Enough for the Kuomintang. Perhaps the next thing I might mention is 
the liberation of Peking. American papers always implied that the Chinese 
Communists were supplied by Russia. So I rather expected to see Russian 
weapons as the People's Liberation Army marched past. But in the whole 
parade which I watched for three or four hours, I never saw a single Russian 
weapon. A few old Japanese guns, but mostly new American trucks, cannon, 
tanks, guns, and trucks with "United States Army" written on the side in white 
letters as plain as day. The soldiers laughed when you asked them about it 
and said, "Uncle Sam sends them to Chiang and Chiang sends them to us." 

Then again, people told me that foreigners would never be allowed to travel 
alone in the liberated areas. That the Communists would keep a pretty close 
eye on the travellers and be sure only to let you see what they wanted you to. 
In the back of my mind, I thought perhaps this might be true, too. I was 
all prepared to have an escort wherever I might choose to go and in the begin- 
ning I was given one. I wanted to go and visit a friend of mine who was 
staying at a place about 100 miles away, so I was supplied with a guide and 
went. But on coming back, my friend explained that I was used to travelling 
and could find the way back by myself and without further ado. I was left 
to go back alone. So again, the American press was wrong. Nobody was watch- 
ing me, they were only helping me. I was free to look at whatever I liked. 
That was the first time and it has been that way ever since. When I go to a new 
place, someone is always ready to help me out to find the way. Once I have 
become familiar with the place I am left completely fx-ee. 

My first job was working in an iron factory packed away in the mountains 
of Shensi. What were they making there? They were melting up American- 
made hand grenades, shells, wings from crashed planes sent from America to 
Chiang, steel and aluminum of weapons sent by America to kill them and 
making them into cooking pots, ploughs, and hoes. They were transferring 
these things of destruction into useful tools to build up a new and prosperous 
China, making wagon wheels and pumps and gates for irrigation canals. Ameri- 
cans would prol)ably not even realise it was a factory and tliey would laugh 
at it when told so — not even a lathe, nothing but the hands of the i^eople. 
Everything was made by hand. liut Americans might do a little thinking, 
too. The Chinese with their bare hands are building up a new nation, while 
the Americans with their tremendous industrial strength are preparing to de- 
stroy mankind. The Chinese are not afraid ; they are just sorry. If America 
were not preparing for war — if she were not threatening China at every point — 
China could put even more effort into construction, into building better homes 
for her people, into eliminating floods, into stabilising crops, into bringing in 



3542 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

machinery and transforming their land from one of despair and poverty into 
one of prosperity, enlightenment, a nation of scientists working for the en- 
richment of mankind. But America seems bent on war. So Cluna will con- 
tinue her construction despite America. She will keep on putting all she has 
into the betterment of the living conditions of her people. But at the same 
time she will never stop watching America. She will not tolerate any high- 
handed action against her sovereignty. She is not afraid and her people 
know how to fight and know what they are fighting for. Anyone who came to 
work at that factory could not help but learn this. The irresistible strength of 
New China seemed to permeate everything, even the silent walls of the caves 
at night, waving black shadows and crimson reflections from the furnaces 

^Vince then all of China has been liberated and she now has more regular fac- 
tories dav bv day. Skilled mechanics and engineers are being trained, ihougn 
some places' still work by hand, others are forging ahead still faster with ma- 
chines while others are using machines to make machines. It will not take 

At present I am working on an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia. Of 
what I have learned here I will only say the following: that I was amazed to 
hear Acbeson— a responsible representative of the U. S. government— say that 
the Soviet Union was "annexing whole territories" of Northeast China and 
Inner Mongolia to herself. I have lived here two years. So far I have only 
seen one thing Russian, that is, ten Soviet stallions given to our farm for breed- 
ing purposes, along with apparatus for artificial insemination. What are we 
doing with these stallions? We are breeding the farmers' horses and tiie Mon- 
golian ponies, improving the horses of Mongolia. The farmers come for miles 
around to get their horses bred. The stallions were given to China under the 
A"-reement signed last year— an Agreement of friendship and mutual assistance 
between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese are free to use them where 
and as they see fit The Soviet Union does not interfere. To the peasants here, 
the Soviet Union is symbolized by these stallions, sleek-haired, refined, bigger 
than anything they have ever seen before and with no stud fees. The silent 
eyes of these ten stallions tell more to the Mongolian horsemen than any amount 
of insinuating speeches that Acheson ever could. If this is what is meant by 
being annexed by the Soviet Union then they would just as soon ! They are not 
afraid of words, they only believe in what they see. And what do they see as 
far as America is concerned? Again, it is not empty words of friendship which 
impress them It is bombing planes, guns, and tanks given to the Kuomintang. 
In our farm's cornfield are two old craters from American-made bombs. No 
amount of speeches from American diplomats can erase these holes and the 
people do not easily forget. 

CHINA WANTS PEACE 

The people of China want peace. The people of the world want peace, includ- 
ing the people of America. Though I supposed I have been away too long to 
still be considered a member of the American scientists, yet I personally still 
feel as though I am one of you. I have written you to let you know( at least 
the story of one of your members. One person refusing to work on secret 
projects refusing to work on war, of course, does no good. But all of you at 
home united together have a very special strength in your hands. I only want 
to say to you: Use your strength, use whatever you can to work actively for 
peace and against war. As long as there is war, science will never be free. Are 
we scientists going to spend our lives in slavery for madmen who want to destroy 
the world? At home one gets frightened. Listening to so much war talk one 
begins to believe that if we do not prepare for war the other side will and then 
we will be destroyed. But now I have been living on the other side for some 
time and know for sure that this is a lot of lies, that China wants peace and is 
working for peace with all she has. She will never attack America, nor will 
any of her allies. If you people would only believe this, if you could only see 
for yourselves as I am seeing, then, I am sure you would not hesitate for a 
minute to work for peace with every ounce of strength you have. 

So long for now and remember me to whomever is there that I might know. 

Sincerely, „ , ^, . 

(Signed) Joan Hinton, People s China. 

June 4, 1951. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, it may be that we want to identify by 

Mr. Mandel the nature of the publication, People's China. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3543 

Mr. Lattimore, are you acquainted with that publication, People's 
China ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I am not acquainted with it. One of two 
copies have been sent to my office from China, presumably in the hope 
of getting a subscription, but I couldn't say I am acquainted with it. 

Mr. Morris. The next name on the list, Mr. Lattimore, is Alser 
Hiss. ' *= 

Mr. Lattimore. In the terms of the question, I did not consider 
him to be Communist at the time I knew him. 

Mr. Morris. That is in connection with Alger Hiss? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Philip Jaffe. 

Mr. Lattimore. The same answer. 

Mr. Morris. You did not believe him to be a 

Mr. Lattimore. To be a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Anthony Jenkinson. 

Mr. Lattimore. Same answer. 

Mr. Morris. How extensive was your experience with Anthony 
Jenkinson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. My acquaintance with him was very slight. I 
met him at the Yosemite conference of 1936, of the IPR, and I believe 
I didn't meet him again until after the war, or toward the end of the 
war, when he started a publication called Allied Labor News, in New 
York. 

Mr. Morris. It is your testimony you did not know or had reason to 
believe that the Allied Labor News was a Communist publication? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I had no reason to believe that. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, at the time you are testifying, 
as I understand it, your answers relate only to the time you knew 
them 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Back when they were writing or had some con- 
nection with you in relation to the Institute? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, there have been a couple of names since then. 
I don't think I have seen Mr. Jaffe since, oh ten years or so, and all 
the knowledge I have of him since then is from the press. 

Senator Ferguson. We asked you if you knew or had reason to be- 
lieve, and your answer would infer now that up to this time you did 
not know, nor did you have reason to believe that Hiss was a Com- 
munist, or that Jaffe was a Communist. Do you want that answer 
to stand? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I don't believe that I know of any evidence 
that Mr. Hiss is a Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Was a Communist ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. Or was a Communist. 

Oh, wait a minute. There was a story in the papers the other day ; 
that is right. 

Senator Ferguson. It was under oath, was it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe it was, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Are you referring to the testimony of Nathaniel Weyl ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to change your testimony as to 
Mr. Hiss now ? 



3544 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr Lattimore. No. I can't speak to that, Senator Ferguson. I 
don't know the witness or his reliability or its connection with other 
evidence. I don't consider myself competent to give an answer. 

Senator Ferguson. How much evidence does it take to convince 
you that a person is a Communist? I wonder how much evidence it 
takes to have you answer that you do know. . 

Mr. Lattimore. Perhaps, Senator, this committee could give me a 
definition of how much evidence I ought to take. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know what your answers mean. 1 
am trying to judge this case from answers and the record. 

Do I understand, then, that from all you read about Mr. Hiss, all 
that was in the paper or anything else, all that you heard about it, 
that, under the definition that we gave you, you would say you had 
no knowledge or reason to believe that Mr. Hiss was a Communist, 
or ever was a Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, if I may elaborate on my answer, all i 
know about Mr. Hiss is that 

The Chairman. That is not answering the question. You are ]ust 
avoiding the question. 

Mr. LAT-riMORE. I am simply saying. Senator, that 1 haven t fol- 
lowed the news about Hiss very carefully in the press. I don't con- 
sider myself an authority on the subject. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I remind the witness again of 
precisely what the question is? He has been reminded of it time and 
again, and the Senator, in his question, embraced the reminder. 

Senator Ferguson. The same thing is true m relation to Mr. Jaffe, 

is it ? 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall that I ever seen it testified that Mr. 

Jaffe was a Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. You never heard that he was ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall any testimony to that effect, no. It 
may have been in the transcripts of this committee, but I have read 
such an enormous amount of them that I 

Senator Ferguson. I am just wondering if, after reading this 
record, if you did not have some notion at least that Hiss and Jaffe 
were Communists. What is your answer to that? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would say that sworn testimony to the effect 
that Hiss was a Communist would come within the definition, "Rea- 
son to believe"; but I don't remember any sworn testimony in the 
case of Mr, Jaffe. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would say now that yon do have rea- 
sons to believe that Hiss was a Communist, do you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would say to that extent, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You qualified that answer by saying "to that 
extent," that somebody swore that he was; is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. But you do not believe so. 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no personal knowledge about it. 

Senator Ferguson. But you have no reason to believe ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I consider that sworn testimony is some reason to 
believe. Butit is not the same thing as conviction, is it? 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking you. To you it is not, is it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. To my mind, conviction is conviction, and 
accusation is accusation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3545 

Senator Smith. It might come in the middle ground of conchision 
from testimony. 

The Chairman. All right, gentlemen, let us proceed. 

]Mr. INIORRis. The next name is Mary Jane Keeney. 

Mr. Lattimore. May I take the two names together ? 

Mr. Morris. Mary Jane and Philip Keeney? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mary Jane and Philip Keene}'. 

Mr. Morris. You may, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. My knowledge of them is extremely slight and I 
had no reason to believe that they were Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet Philip Keeney in Japan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I met him, yes, when some grou]) that he was com- 
ing out with had just arrived. I met him when I was going into a 
building and lie was coming out. We stopped and shook hands. 

Mr. Morris. Had you known him before ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I had met him slightly here in Washington, yes. 

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you meet with him in 
Japan, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think that was the only occasion. 

Mr. Morris. Robin Kinkead. 

Mr. Lattimore. No reason to believe that he was a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. You did know him, and had dealings with him, did 
you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. He was on the staff of OWI in San Francisco when 
I was there. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Benjamin Kizer. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. You do know Mr. Kizer, do you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I know ]\Ir. Kizer. 

Mr. Morris. He is a member of the board of trustees in the Insti- 
tute of Pacij&c Relations, is he not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Whether he still is, I don't know. He may very 
well be. 

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions have you seen Mr. Kizer ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have seen Mr. Kizer off and on over a period of 
years. 

The Chairman. Was he a member of the board ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He was a member of the board at one time, I be- 
lieve. 

Mr. Morris, The next name is Sergei Kournakoff. 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't place that name. 

Mr. ]MoRRis. The next name is Corliss Lamont. 

Mr. Lattimore. I have met Mr. Lamont, I believe, once, and have 
had no reason to believe him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Olga Lang. 

Mr. Lattimore, The same answer, no. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. On how many occasions have you met Olga Lang? 

Mr. Lattimore. I met her in China when she was married to Karl 
August Wittfogel. I don't recall whether I have ever met her since 
in America, or not. 

Mr. Morris. Did she write articles for Pacific Affairs ? 

Mr. Latitmore. I think she wrote an article for Pacific Affairs, 

Mr. Morris, The next name is Michael Lindsay. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 18 



3546 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. I know Mr. Lindsay very slightly. I think I met 
him once in this country, and have no reason to believe him a Com- 
munist. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is T. B. Lowe. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't ])lace that name. 

Mr. INIoRRis. Do you know of anyone who used the pseudonym T. 
B. Lowe? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't recall that. 

Mr. Morris. Did you and Mr. Bisson ever team up and write an 
article under that pseudonym? 

Mr. LATriMORE. No, I don't think so. 

Mr. Morris. Are you sure of it, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall writing an article jointly with Mr. 
Bisson at all. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you do not know the name T. B. 
Lowe ? 

Mr. Latfimore. T. B. Lowe ? Is that meant to be T. B. Lowe ? 

Mr. Morris. No. H. Lowe is the name I am asking now. 

Mr. Lattimore. T. B. Lowe is a new name to me. 

Mr. Morris. That means nothing to you ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. IMoRRis. How about the name H. Lowe ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't place that, either. 

Mr. Morris. Next is Duncan C. Lee. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name at all. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you have never met Duncan C. 
Lee? 

Mr. Latttmore. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, I 
have never met him. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is ISIr. William Mandel. 

Mr. LATriMORE. I think this is the William Mandel who worked 
for a time for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I forgot whether 
he was an employee or whether he did a research job. He did some 
work on Soviet Russia, of some kind. 

Mr. Morris. And you have done some work on his books, have you 
not, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think that when I w^as a member of the research 
committee, the manuscript, or part of the manuscript of one of his 
books was sent to me for looking over. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether he worked for the Hoover 
Library ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't. 

Mr. Morris. Did you not introduce Mr. Mandel to Mr. Stefans- 
son? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't think so. 

Mr. Morris. Selden Menefee is the next name. 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Menefee very slightly a good many 
years ago here in Washington. I haven't seen him for some years, and 
have no reason to believe him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Robert T. Miller. 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't place that name, except I believe recalling 
that it came up in the transcript of hearings of Mr. E. C. Carter. 
But I still don't place the name. I am sure I have never met him. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is P. T. Moon. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3547 

Mr. Laitimore. I can't place that name. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Harriet L. Moore. 

Mr. Lattimore. Harriet L. Moore, I have no reason to consider 
a Communist at the time I knew her. Her recent refusal to answer 
the question whether she had ever been a Communist raises a strong 
presumption that she is or was at some time a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. And you have known her for many years, have you 
not, JNIr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Xo. I knew her slightly in the lOSO's and saw 
her again very occasionally afterwards. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, the record of these meetings in Mos- 
cow, that we have introduced into the record at great length, shows 
that she and you attended all those meetings together. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right, yes. 

Mr. Morris. She has also been a leader of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. In fact, she acted as secretary, did she not, Mr. Latti- 
more, at the time that you were associated with the institute? 

Mr. Latttmore. I don't remember. If it was, it was probably at 
the time when I was out of the country, because I don't recall her act- 
ing ill that capacity. 

Mr. Morris. You did have many long and extensive dealings with 
Miss Moore, did you not, Mv. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I would not say. Not long or extensive. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is E. Herbert Norman. 

]Mr. Latti3iore. The answer is no. 

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Mr, Norman ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In 1947, at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations in Stratford, England. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet Mr. Norman in Japan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I met him in Japan in the winter of 1945-1946. 

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you meet him in Japan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Fairly frequently. I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Just before you pass that: Did you ever have 
any negotiations or know of any negotiations between yourself, Nor- 
man, General Thorpe, Emerson, and Fairbank, or any of them? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. I recall the suggestion being made that I 
should take a job as a civilian employee under General Thorpe, but 
nothing in the way of negotiations, and certainly nothing in the way 
of negotiations with — what was the name — Emerson. 

Senator Ferguson. Emerson, Fairbank. 

Mv. Lattimore. Emerson, Fairbank, Norman, and Thorpe. 

Senator Ferguson. And you. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of the move to try to bring 
Japanese Communists back into Japan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson, You never knew of any ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations about it? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe I did. I believe that, in fact, I 
know that at the time I was in Japan, some, at least, of the Japanese 
Communists who had been in China during the war, they either re- 
turned to Japan when I was there or had already returned at the time 
I got there. I don't know which. 



3548 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. But those that returned while you were there, 
did you know of any moves at all among any of those people that I 
have named to get the Japanese or Japanese Communists back into 
Japan ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. In the way of moves to get them back, I don't 
know a thing about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us say other than moves, just to get them 
back. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. All I know is the bare fact that several of 
the Japanese came back. What the arrangements were I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of any negotiations or efforts to 
get tliem back? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did vou ever talk to General Thorpe about any 
of that? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't talk with General Thorpe on that 
subject at all, as I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Nor with Norman? 

Mr. Lattimore. Nor with Norman, 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear any conversation between 
Thorpe and Norman? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Oleta O'Connor. 

Mr. Latttmore. I don't place that name at all. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a postal card announcing a 
meeting. It is dated March 5, 1938. The post card reads as follows : 

The Interprofessional Association presents a symposium, "Is Chamberlain 
yielding to fascism?" 

Speakers : Miss Lillian Phillips, lecturer on foreign affairs ; Miss Oleta O'Con- 
nor, chairman, county committee, Communist Party ; Mr. Owen Lattimore, Di- 
rector, Institute of Pacific Relations, noted author, and editor of Pacific Affairs. 

Chairman : John D. Barry. 

Questions and discussion from the floor. 

The meeting is dated Thursday March 10, at Sorosis Hall, 536 
Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif. Admission 35 cents. 

Mr. Sourwine. What year is it, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. 1938. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall speaking at such a meet- 
ing? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I can't recall any such meeting. I don't be- 
lieve there was one. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, would you, under the circumstances, 
receive that into evidence ? 

The Chairman. It may be received into evidence for what it is 
worth. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 554" and 
appears on p. 3549.) 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Hotzumi Ozaki. 

Mr. Lattimore. I remember reading that name in connection with 
press stories about the Sorge case in Japan, I believe, and I believe 
that I also saw in the transcript of these hearings that Ozaki was at, 
I think, the Yosemite Conference of the IPR in 1936, but I don't 
believe I met him. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 
Exhibit No. 554 



3549 




Mr. Morris. Were you ut tliat conierence^ 

Mr. Lattimore. I was at that conference, but I don't recall meeting 
him. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is P'eng Kung. 

Mr. Lattimore. Is that the same P'eng Kung, or Kung P'eng, that 
was mentioned several days ago ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lat'timore. I believe that that is the name of a secretary of 
Chou En-lai, whom I met in Chungking when I had one or two con- 
versations with Chou En-lai under the instructions of Chiang Kai- 
shek. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that whenever you met Kung 
P'eng, it was under the direction of the generalissimo ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was within the generalissimo's directive to keep 
in touch with Chou En-lai on certain points. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Mr. Fred W. Poland. 



3550 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose, I think that 
the witness' statement gives rise to a fair inference with regard to the 
Communist connection of Kung P'eng, or P'eng Kung, but there was 
not a direct answer on that. 

Might we liave that for the record ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I see. Yes. 

I assume that she was a Communist. I can't answer to that of 
personal knowledge, because I believe the Communists at that tnne 
were using a number of people simply because they could speak 
English and not necessarily members of the party. 

There may be other evidence on the subject. 

INIr. Morris. Do you know where Kung P'eng is now ? 

IVIr. Lattimore. No ; I don't. 

I^Ir. Morris. The next name is Fred W. Poland. 

I^Ir. Lattimore. Yes; I remember meeting Mr. Poland once at the 
Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR in 1942— would that be 1943— 
1942, I guess. . 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that is the only occasion on which 
vou met Mr. Poland? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever met him before or since. 

Mr. Morris. He was an active member of the secretariat of the IPK, 
was he not, of the international IPR ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe he was. My recollection is that 
he was somebody who was brought along for the Canadian secretariat 
of that meeting.' I may be wrong on that. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe, or do you know that 
lie is a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I had no reason to believe. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that he was one of the defendants m the 
Canadian espionage case ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I was just going to add I remember seeing some- 
thing about that in the press. But I believe he was acquitted; 
wasn't he? 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Lee Pressman. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Pressman, I have met maybe a couple of times 
here in Washington. At that time I had no reason to believe him a 
Communist, but I believe that since then— has he refused to testify, 
or did he testify that he was one ? 

Mr. Morris. "I believe'he has acknowledged, Mr. Lattimore, that he 
was a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Lattimore. I see. 

Mr. Morris. What was the occasion for your meeting Mr. Press- 
man in Washington, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Oh, a couple of times socially. I don't recall the 
circumstances. I had no particular conversation with him. I just 
remember him as a person who was there. 

J^Ir. Morris. The next name is Mildred Price. 

Mr. Latfimore. I don't believe I have ever met :Mildred Price. Her 
name has come up in these transcripts, but I don't believe I have ever 

met her. . j. i /-n • 

Mr. Morris. You know she was the executive secretary of the China 

Aid Council, do you not ? 
Mr. Lattimore. From the transcripts of these hearings, yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3551 

Mr. Morris. You belonged to the China Aid Council, did you not, 
Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I did. Did I ? I would be glad to 
have my memory refreshed, but I doubt if I did. 

Mr. Morris. You made financial contributions to it, did you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is quite likely, yes. 

I made financial contributions to the pet schemes of Madame Chiang 
Kai-shek and her sisters, Madame Kung and Madame Sun Yat-sen. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you gave the contributions to 
the China Aid Council and yet you did not know Mildred Price, 
who was the executive secretary of that organization. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. You knew and you know the China Aid Council w^as 
an affiliate of the American League Against War and Fascism ; is that 
not correct? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I didn't know that. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Ludwig Rajchman. 

Mr. Lattimore. I met Mr. Rajchman, or Dr. Rajchman, a number 
of times here in Washington wdien he was working with Dr. T. V. 
Soong, who was at that time the head of China Defense Supplies, 
1 think, and I have met him once since the end of the war, at the United 
Nations. 

Mr. Morris. He is a member of the Soviet Polish delegation, is he 
not, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have seen something to that effect in the press. 
I don't know when he became one. 

At the time I saw him in the United Nations, it was my under- 
standing that he was a member of the United Nations employee staff 
and not a delegate of Poland. 

Mr. Morris. But he was sent there by Soviet Poland, was he not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. 1 am not clear on that. There are several subdivi- 
sions of the bureaucracy of the United Nations, and I don't know 
which one he belonged to. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Samuel Rodman. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever rent an office from Samuel Rodman ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Did I ever rent an office from him ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so. 

The Chairman. "Wliere? 

Mr. Morris. Were you acquainted in Washington ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe so. 

Mr. Morris. Were you acquainted with an organization called the 
Committee of One Thousand ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have heard that name certainly, but I can't place 
it today. 

Mr. JSIoRRis. Is it your testimony you did not know that the Com- 
mittee for One Thusand used the office of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations as its headquarters ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That certainly is my testimony ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Lawrence K. Rosinger. 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew" Mr. Rosinger slightly over a period of years 
when he worked for Foreign Policy Association, and afterward In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations. I had no reason to believe him a Com- 



3552 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

munist until lie refused to testify before this committee, which creates 
a strong presumption. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When did you last see Mr. Kosinger, Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In New York, in the office of the Institute of Pa- 
cific Kelations, oh, probably more than a year ago. 

Senator Ferguson. After these hearings, had started, after the rec- 
ords were obtained ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it was after the hearings had started. 
It may have been after the seizure of the files. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean after the seizure of the files ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It may have been. I am not quite sure of that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you recall anything about your conference or 
discussion or talk with him at that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I think the sole topic was the question of a 
piece, a contribution on Mongolia and Tibet, which my wife and I were 
writing for a book that he partly wrote and partly edited. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Andrew Koth. 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew Mr. Roth very slightly in Washington 
about 1945 and had no reason to consider him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. You reviewed the manuscript of his book, did you not, 
Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I reviewed the manuscript of his book and wrote a 
recommendation for the publishers. 

Senator Ferguson. A few days before the arrest of Mr. Roth and 
Mr. Jaife, was Mr. Roth at your residence in Baltimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. He came over to Baltimore ; yes. 

The Chairman. The question was: Was he at your residence in 
Baltimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; he was. 

Senator Ferguson. ^Y}\o was present at that meeting ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. John Stewart Service. 

Senator Ferguson. Anybody else ? Roth, Service 

Mr. Morris. Was Rose'Yardumian there? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think she was, but I have never been surei 
whether she was or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Anybody else? 

Mr. Lattimore. A couple of professors from Johns Hopkins, and 
tlieir wives. 

Senator Ferguson. Wlio were they? 
' Mr. Lattimore. Professor Carter, of the School of Geography, and 
Professor Moose, of the Department of Political Science. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat was that occasion to liave the professors 
there and have Service and Roth there, and possibly another? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, they were a couple of professors whom we 
at that time— I thinly they were both pretty new at the Hopkins and 
we knew them verv slightly and thought they might be interested in 
meeting some people interested in the Far East, and asked them out. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew, then, that Mr. Roth and Mr. Service 
were coming to your home, did you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. How long before they came did you know ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Two or three days, probably. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the occasion of having Mr. Roth and 
Mr. Service, and possibly the other person, there? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3553 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, Mr. Service I hadn't seen since lie had been 
in Chungking, and I wanted to see him. 

Mr. Eoth, I think, had been asking if he could come over and show 
me his manuscript. So we just thought to put the two things to- 
gether and asked them to come over, I think it was one Saturday or 
Sunday afternon. And I tliink the day before, on the campus, I ran 
into these two professors and suggested that they might be interested 
to come out for a picnic lunch. 

Senator Ferguson". Did Mr. Eoth bring his manuscript with him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; he brouglit it with him. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it in a proof form ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether it was — I am sure it wasn't in 
typed script. It might have been in either galley or page proof. 

Senator Ferguson. Galley or page proof. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

I am not at all clear on that. It might even have been in typed 
script. 

My wife says she thinlvs it was in proof. 

Senator Ferguson, In proof ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In proof; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliere were you examining the proof ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Oh, I tliink it was in the living room. I am not 
sure. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see it on the bed, laid out on the 
bed in the bedroom ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not that I can recall. It may have been there 
becatise when guests came in they were shown into the spare bedroom 
and put their coats and things there. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it would be laid out on the bed 
under those circumstances, 

Mr. Lattimore. It might very easil}^ had if he had been carrying it 
loose. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there were any 
papers from the State Department laying out on your bed, or a bed in 
3' our home ( 

Mr, Lattimore. I am sure there weren't. 

Senator Ferguson. You are sure of it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. At least, if there were, I didn't see them. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that one of these college profes- 
sors had stated that there were papers on the bed ? 

jVIr. Lattimore. I believe there was something of that kind in the 
Tydings testimony. I am sure it was wrong. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to the professor about it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not think it was important enough to 
ask the professor if he did happen to see those papers there? 

Mr. Lattimore. I asked the other professor, and he recalled seeing 
nothing of the sort. I didn't ask the professor who gave that testimony, 
because I have a sort of dislike for talking with informers. 

Senator Smith. Did j'ou regard him as an informer? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I don't believe he gave any testimony at all. 
I believe he gave information to Senator McCarthy. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, then, if I understand it correctly, 
if someone went to a person who had knowledge of the facts, either 



3554 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

some member of a committee or a staff member, if that person gave the 
truth as he saw it, would you class him as an informer? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would certainly say that a colleague of mine, on 
a university faculty, if he thought he recalled anything of the sort, 
should have come and checked it with me, frankly. 

Senator Ferguson. Suppose he saw it and you did not see it. Sup- 
pose he saw it and you did not see it. Suppose that Service and/or 
Roth did have these papers in your bedroom 

Mr. Lattimore. I still think that, as a matter of frank relationships 
between members of the same faculty, he should have come and told 
me about it. 

Senator Ferguson. And for that reason, you would not interview 
him or ascertain whether or not he did know of those facts ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Certainly not ; no. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you feel ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is the way I reacted to it. 

Senator Ferguson. And have you never talked to him since? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever spoken to him since? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is he still on the faculty? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, 

]\Ir. Morris. Who was the other professor involved there, Mr. Lat- 
timore ? 

Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get the name of this man. 

What w\as the name of the professor who was the "informer"? 

Mr. Lattimore. Professor Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. What branch of the school was he in? 

Mr. Lattimore. School of geography. 

Senator Fj:rguson. Was he interested in the Far East? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not specially, I don't believe. 

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you invite him there? 

Mr. Latti:more. Well, the school of geography was the pet project 
of President Isaiah Bowman of the school, who regarded geography 
and international relations as very closely related. 

I thought any intelligent member of the faculty would, as of that 
time, be interested in meeting somebody recently back from the Far 
East and somebody who was writing on problems of the Far East. 

If I had met a couple of other members of the faculty, I might 
just as well have invited them. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you review the book or these manuscripts 
in the presence of Professor Carter and the other professors? 

Mr. Latttmore. My recollection of that is not very clear, I think 
that I sat on a window seat by a large sort of picture window looking 
out on the lawn where everybody was gathered and rapidly went 
through the manuscript or proof. 

Senator Ferguson. How long did you spend on the proof? 

Mr. Lattimore. Maybe half an hour or so. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the professor, or both pro- 
fessors, were sufficiently intelligent so that they would recognize what 
a proof was ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It would depend on how closely they had looked. 

Senator Ferguson. AVhat kind of paper was the proof on? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3555 

Senator Fergusox. And you reviewed the book in about a half hour, 
then '^ 

Mr. Lattimore. I went through the book very rapidly. 

Senator Ferguson. How many pages would you say it had? 

Mr. Lattimore. Oh, I think when it was published it was about a 
250-page book. 

Senator Ferguson. How long would these galley proofs be, in 
length? 

Mr. Lattimore, I don't remember whether the}- were galley, or page 
proof. Galley proof usiuilly runs, I think, about two and a half 
book pages per galley. 

Senator Ferguson. It would be easily recognized, would it not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall, sitting at the window, whether 
or not it was galley proof or page proof ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I can't recall. I have read so many proofs in 
my life, it is hard to remember which one I read on a specific occasion. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you really feel a man would be mistaken 
about seeing pages on a bed if he attended a meeting, even though 
they were galley proof, or page proof ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He might be. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in the room where the gentlemen 
put their coats? 

^Ir. Lattimore. I may have shown them up to the room. 

Senator Ferguson. Who, would you say, came first ? 

The Chairman. Of the two, or of the group? 

Senator Ferguson. Of the group. 

Mr. Lattimore, I have no idea. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not any idea ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No idea. 

Senator Ferguson. How long afterward was Roth arrested and 
Service arrested ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was a very short time afterward. I forget ex- 
actly what. I believe 

Wait a minute. On that question of the stuff being on the bed, I 
seem to remember that tlie information, as repeated by Senator Mc- 
Carthy, was that Professor Carter's wife went into the room to change 
a baby's diaper and told him that she had seen something on the bed, 
or something. 

This being a room which is used partly as an office, there might have 
been papers of nw own l3'ing around there. 

Senator Ferguson. Tlien you would not say that the professor or 
his wife did not see papers on the bed ? 

Mr. Lattimore. They may have. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Even though his wife saw it and told her hus- 
band, then you thought he was an informer and you never went to 
ask him about them ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I certainly did think he was an informer; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you read the testimony before this 
committee that Roth's book Dilemma in Japan — and, of course, the 
galley proofs were of that book, were they not — that that was passed 
by the Communist Party of the United States before it was published? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember reading that testimony. Can 
you tell me whose testimony that was ? 



3556 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris, Have you read the article that appeared in the Daily 
Worker of June 26, 1945, which reads : 

Roth's forthcoming book, Dilemma in Japan, dissects the State Department's 
past mistakes and current fallacies, and, in the author's words, it exposes Under 
Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. 
Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co., announced the bonk would come 
out in September. 

Did you read that testimony, Mr. Lattiniore ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I saw a photostat or a mimeograph of part 
of that excerpt from the Daily Worker. May I point out, how- 
ever 

The Chairman. The question is: Did you read that testimony? 

Mr. La'itimore. I don't recall whether I read that testimony. I do 
recall, however, that at the time I was talking with Mr. Koth about 
his book, he told me that it had all been cleared in the Office of Xaval 
Intelligence. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, who was the other professor at that 
meeting that we have been discussing? 

Mr. Lattimore. Professor Moos. 

Mr. Morris. Is he related to Elizabeth Moos? 

Mr. Lattimore. What Elizabeth Moos? 

Mr. Morris. The mother of AVilliam Remington. I think she was 
a recent defendant in the American Peace Crusade. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe he is any relative whatever. 

Mr. Morris. He is not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Mr. Remington? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Paul Robeson, Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Lattimore. I have met JVIr. Paul Robeson once. Let me see, it 
was in 1942' — when he was out in San Francisco, and he sang, he re- 
corded some songs to be broadcast over the radio. I believe he was 
also asked to do the same thing for radio to Europe from the New 
York office. 

Mr. Morris. Did you attend a meeting at whicli Mr. Paul Robeson 
was present, in the home of Mrs. Edith Field ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not a meeting. I went to dinner at Mrs. Field's 
mother's house, and Mrs. Field and Robeson were there and, I think, 
also Max Yergan, whose name comes down here later. 

Mr. Morris. Were they all present at that dinner party? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that dinner party; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you answer the question with respect to Paul 
Robeson ? 

Mr. Lattimore. At that time I had no reason to consider Mr. 
Robeson a Communist; judging from what I have read about him in 
tlie press more i-ecently, he may very likely be one. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Kimi Kazu Saionji. 

Mr. Lattimore. I remember a K. K. Saionji — I am not sure about 
the personal names there — who was a member of the secretariat of 
the Japanese IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Was he the secretary of the Japanese Council of the 
IPR? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe he was at one time; yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3557 

Mr. Morris. Would you answer the questions with respect to Mr. 
Saionji? 

jNIr. Laitimore. I had no reason to believe him a Communist. 

JNIr. Morris. Do you know that he was a defendant in the Sorge 
espionage case? 

Mr. Lait'imore. I believe I read in the press that he was arrested 
at that time, but set free. 

Mr. Morris. He was given a suspended sentence, was he not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Was he ? I didn't recall that. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Helen Schneider, 

]Mr. Lattimore. I don't place that name at all. 

Mr, Morris. As a staff worker on the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. A staff worker in the Amerasia office ? 

Mr, Lattimore. No. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Isidore Schneider ? 

]Mr, Lattimore. No, 

Mr. Morris. The next name is M. C. Shleesnyak. 

Mr. Lattimore. I knew Dr. Shleesnyak when he was at the Johns 
Hopkins for about a year as secretary of the Arctic Institute of 
America. 

Mr. Morris. How well did you know Mr. Slileesnyak? 

Mr. Lattimore. Not very well. We visited back and forth a certain 
amount, dined at their house and they dined at ours. 

Mr. Morris. Did they ever stay with you at your home over night ? 

JNIr. Lattimore. I don't believe they did. I don't think so. 

INIr. Morris. Did they ever visit you in your home in Vermont ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. We may have seen them at Stefansson's, the 
next farm. 

Mr. Morris. Did they stay at Stefansson's ? 

Mr. Lattimore, I believe they came up there. I believe that was 
the first time we met them. That was before they had come to 
Hopkins. 

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Shleesnyak accompany you on your trip to 
the Arctic ? 

Mr. Lattimore, No. I would say that I accompanied him. He or- 
ganized a trip up to Point Barrow for — let's see — it was on behalf of 
the Arctic Research Institute, which was doing some work at Point 
Barrow, and President Bronk of the Hopkins, was one of the trustees 
of that and was unable to go and asked me to go as his deputy, 

Mr. Morris. Did you know at that time that Mr. Shleesnyak had 
been a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that he was a registered Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not. Mr. Sleesnyak told me that he had 
in one election in New York voted the Communist ticket and that, under 
New York rules, this required his registering accordingly, but that he 
had never lieen a Communist and that the matter had been cleared 
with Xaval Intelligence. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. Did you intervene with Naval Intelligence on his behalf 
at the time the question of his security in his making a trip to the Arctic 
had come up ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. You did not? 



3558 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. I didn't at that time know there was such a ques- 
tion of security. 

Mr. Morris. Where is Mr. Shleesnyak now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. He is at the Weizmann Institute in Palestine. 

Mr. Morris. What is he doing there? 

Mr. Lattimore. He is doing some kind of research on ecology. 

Mr. Morris. To what extent have you been active in the Arctic 
Institute? 

Mr. Latiimore. I would say that I have not been active at all. 

Mr. ^Iorris. You did know Mr. Shleesnyak ; did you not ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. I knew liim, and when the Arctic Institute was 
brought to the Jolms Hopkins for a period I welcomed it. It was an 
extension of interest in interrelations and they used to hold seminars 
there, and I attended several seminars. 

In fact, I believe I gave a seminar once myself. 

Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Stefansson active in the Arctic Institute? 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Stefansson I believe is; yes. 

INIr. Morris. Is Mr. Stefansson a close friend of yours, Mr. Latti- 
more? • T J. • 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Stefansson has been a good friend of mine 
since, oh, 10 years or so. 

Mr. Morris. And Mr. Stefansson is closely associated with Mr. 
Shelesnyak, is he not, or has been in the past? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know how closely. 

Mr. Morris. At least, you know on one occasion he stayed over- 
night at Stefansson's home? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right; yes. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Would you tell us the physical connections between 
Stefansson's home in Vermont and your home in Vermont ? 

Mr, Lattimore. Stefansson has a farm where he spends the sum- 
mer in Vermont, and about half or three-quarters of a mile away, 
through the woods, there is another farm, which he detached from his 
holding and sold to my wife and myself. 

Mr. Morris. The next name on the list is Agnes Smedley. 

Mr. Lattimore. Agnes Smedley I knew slightly during the 1930's. 
I did not consider her a Communist. I did consider her a partisan of 
the Chinese Communists. 

That, incidentally, was not in the 1930's, as I recall, but m the 
1940's. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat do you mean by a partisan of the Chinese 

Communists? , 

Mr. Lattimore. Wait a minute. Yes, I did know her m the thirties, 
because in 1937 she was up in Yenan ; tliat is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And did you not know that the Chinese Com- 
munists were controlled by the Russian Communists out of Moscow? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir ; I didn't know that. 

Senator Ferguson. You never knew that? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. It is very much a disputed question among 
experts on the subject. 

I rather inclined to the view that the Chinese Communists have, at 
least in the past, been more or less autonomous. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that why you say that she was a partisan, she 
was probably a fellow traveler of the Chinese Communists? Is that 
what you want to classify her as ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3559 

Mr. Laitimoke. Subject to the extreme vagueness of the term fellow 
traveler; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You have used it. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; I used it saying that it was a vague and un- 
satisfactory term. 

Senator Ferguson. But you do not think that she bordered on the 
definition now that we have given you as a Communist ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. From my slight acquaintance with her, she 
was what you might call an unruly and rebellious type that would 
be likely to get thrown out of any party she joined. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, do you know of any American 
that was, in your opinion, a Chinese Communist, that belonged to the 
Chinese Communist group ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Of the Russian Communists? 

Mr. Lattimore. I suppose there have been of the Russian Com- 
munists, but I couldn't name any. 

The Chairman. The quastion is do you know? 

Senator Ferguson. Know anybody. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Under this definition that we are now using on 
communism ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That were members of the Russian Communist 
Party? 

Senator Ferguson. I did not say members of the party. I do not 
want to say members of the party. I mean just affiliated with it, as 
we gave you the definition. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does the Senator mean using "Communist" in the 
sense of a person under Communist discipline, or who has voluntarily 
or knowingly cooperated and collaborated with Communist Party 
members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I suppose Anna Louise Strong, in working 
for a Communist-owned paper in Moscow, but 

Senator Ferguson. Smedley? 

Mr. Lattimore. Smedley I don't believe was ever in Russia. "Was 
she? 

Senator Ferguson. Would that keep her from being a Communist 
within the definition that we have given you of Communists? 

Mr. Lattimore. I thought you meant the other definition; I am 
sorry. 

No. As far as I knew Agnes Smedley, which was very slightly, 
she had a great deal of interest in China and either not much interest 
in Russia or I didn't know much about it. 

In China she was particularly known for her support in writing up 
of the new Fourth Army, which was a mixed Communist and Chiang 
Kai-shek army. 

And, as I recall, in her book on that army, she is much more enthu- 
siastic about the non-Communist commander of the army than she 
was about the Communist second in command of the army. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, you knew that she willed her property 
to Chu-Teh, the Chinese Communist general; did vshe not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I read that in the press ; yes. 



3560 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. And you know that Mildred Price, who was the execu- 
tive secretary of the China Aid Council, was her executor under her 
last will and testament? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember reading that. 
The Chairman. Are you acquainted with Earl Browder? 
Mr. Lattimore. Only to the extent of having gone to his office once. 
The Chairman. You are acquainted with him. 
Mr. Lattimore. 1 would not call that acquaintance ; no. 
The Chairman. You would not call that an acquaintance. All 
right. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Edgar Snow. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I did not and do not consider him a Communist 
under these definitions. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Richard Sorge. 

Mr. Lattimore. Richard Sorge I never met under that or any other 
name, as far as I know. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever receive a letter from Mr. Sorge? 
Mr, Lattimore. No ; I don't believe I did. 
Mr. Morris. The next name is Ordway Southard. 
Mr. Lattimore. Ordway Southard I do not know. He is a man who 
bought from me and the Stef anssons the farm that we had in joint 
ownership. I never met him and had nothing to do with the transac- 
tion and didn't know that he was or had been a Communist until it 
was published in the press later. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you do know, it has been published in 
the press, that he was an active niember of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Lattimore. It was published in the press that he had been a 
candidate for Governor of Alabama on the Communist ticket, or 
something of that sort. 

Mr. Morris. Would that satisfy you that he was a Communist? 
Mr. Lattimore. That would satisfy me that he was a Communist. 
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did, then, 
deed your property to Mr. Southard, to Mr. and Mrs. Southard? 
Mr. Lattimore. I sold that property ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you testify in that fashion in executive session be- 
fore this committee ? 

Mr. Laitimore. Did I ? 
■ Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this? It will just 
take a minute. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. Morris. I am going on to the next question. Perhaps Mr. 
Mandel can find that reference there. 

It is you testimony you did deed your property, you and Mr. 
Stefansson and Mrs.' Stef ansson and Mrs. Lattimore, did deed the 
property that you held in common, to Mary and Richard Southard? 
Mr. Lattimore. We sold it ; yes. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Is it Mary and Richard Southard, or Mary and 
Ordway Southard? 

Mr. Morris. Mary and Ordway Southard. 

The Chairman. The question is. Did you deed it to those parties 
named ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We sold it ; yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3561 

The Chairman. Did you deed it ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't understand the technical term "deed." 

Mr. Morris. Did you sign the deed? 

The Chairman. Did you sign a deed or conveyance? 

Mr. Laitimore. We signed whatever papers were necessary for 
the transaction; yes. 

The Chairman. Do you not know what a deed is ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No/sir. I understand there are deeds of gift and 
all kinds of deeds, but, to my simple mind, I sold it. 

The Chairman. Was this deed a gift ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you a document and ask if you 
ever have seen it. 

Mr. Mandel, will you identify the document I have presented to 
Mr. Lattimore, please? 

Mr. LArriMORE. No; I don't believe I have seen this. It is not my 
signature or my wife^s signature. It nuist have been done by proxy, 
by an attorney in Bethel, Vt. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel will you identfy that and these two docu- 
ments, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat that I ordered made of a warranty 
deed No. 481, between Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson 
and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore. 

]Mr. Morris. Did you cause that document to be photostated ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Where is the original ? 

Mr. Mandel. The original is at the Bethel town clerk's office. 

The Chairman. Where? 

Mr. Mandel. In Vermont. 

The Chairman. Is that a photostat of the original document on file, 
recorded there? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And you caused it to be photostated ? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Morris. Will 3-011. identify the other two documents, Mr. 
Mandel? 

Mr. ]\Iandel. This is a photostat of a mortgage deed. No. 241, be- 
tween Ordway Southard and Mary Southard, on the one hand, and 
Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson, of Bethel, on the other, 
and also Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore. 

Mr. Morris. And the third document? 

Mr. Mandel. The third is a photostat of a warranty deed No. 467. 
with the names of Viljahmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, and 
Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does that come from the same source, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. It comes from the same source. 

Mr. Morris. And the fourth one? 

Mr. Mandel. The fourth one is a mortgage deed with the names 
of Ordway Southard and Mary Southard and Viljahmur Stefansson 
and Evelyn Stefansson and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore. 

The number is 241. 

Mr. Morris. Was that taken from the original record? 

Mr. Mandel. From the same source ; yes, sir. 

88348— 52— pt. 10 19 



3562 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman, I want to know if these are photostats of original 
documents on file and recorded in some official place. 

Mr. Mandel. They are photostats of documents in the files of the 
clerk's office at Bethel, Vt. 

Senator Ferguson. Do they file deeds in the clerk's ofiice ? Is it a 
town clerk, or a register of deeds, or what ? 

What I do not understand is how these mortgages could have typed 
signatures on them if they are photostats of the original papers that 
are on file. And the signatures on the Stefansson-Lattimore deed look 
to be in the same handwriting, the husband's and the wife's. The 
L's are identical. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Mr. Stefansson signed on your 
behalf in this connection, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember. We gave power of attorney to 
somebody, either Mr. or Mrs. Stefansson, or to Mr. Bundy, of Bethel, 
Vt., who is an attorney. 

Senator Ferguson. They are not signed under a power of attorney. 

Mr. Lattimore. They aren't? 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall testifying in executive ses- 
sion here on July 13, 1951, in this fashion : 

Mr. Morris. And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it? 

Mr. Lattimore. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr. 
Stefansson to sell it on our behalf. 

Mr. Morris. You gave him the power of attorney? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, and we were rather pressed for money at that time, 
owing to extraordinary expenses forced on us by Senator Joseph McCarthy and 
needed some cash and we sold the farm. 

Mr. Lattimore. That was certainly my recollection at the time, yes. 

Mr. Morris. And yet you testified here today that you did sell the 
property to Mr. and Mrs. Southard. 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, through somebody holding a power of at- 
torney. 

Mv. Morris. Did you make out a power of attorney at that time ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I suppose I must have. 

Mr. Morris. It does not appear on these documents. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question? 

Mr. Lattimore, I notice that there is a certificate by Mr. and Mrs. 
Stefansson before someone up in Vermont. There appears to be here 
an acknowledgment by you and Mrs. Lattimore before Elizabeth 
Carroll. You will note that she certified that you and Mrs. Lattimore 
personally appeared. Is that right, or not? 

Mr. Laittmore. "State of Vermont" is crossed out and "State of 
Maryland" put in. 

Senator Ferguson. At Baltimore. 

Mr. Arnold. The signature is not on here. I do not understand that 
at all. 

Senator Smith. Yes, it is further down there. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you see the acknowledgment? 

Senator Smith. Then right below that is a certificate by the notary 
who says they personally appeared. 

Mr. Arnold. And it is not a signature that appears on here. 

The Chairman. Wait a minute. We ought to be able to get this 
straightened out. There has to be a ground made for the admission, 
if you are going to offer it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3563 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear now what 
happened. The clerk up there made a copy in his own handwriting, 
of what was in the record, and then photostated his own handwriting 
instead of photostating, the original in the record. Then that ap- 
pears to be in the same handwriting. 

Senator Smith. Do you know Elizabeth H. Carroll, the notary 
public ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think it must be one of the secretaries at Johns 
Hopkins who has a power of notary. 

Senator Fergusox. But then you did make a deed and acknowledged 
it before one of the secretaries in Baltimore, von and your wife ; is that 
right? 

Mr. Laitimore. "We sold it. We didn't handle the transaction. 
The entire transaction was handled by the Stef anssons. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. 

Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it a fact that you and your wife went before 
a notary, or a notary came before you two and took your acknowledge- 
ment and vou signed the deed to this property up in Vermont? Is 
that right ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I suppose that is the story ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you only get "suppose" on that ? Cannot 
you tell us whether that is or is not a fact? It happened in 1950. In 
deeding your property away, you cannot give us a better answer than 
'"suppose." 

]\Ir. Lattimore. Well, Senator, the correspondence on the subject 
Avas conducted primarily between my wife and the Stefanssons, and 
they handled the entire transaction on our behalf. 

And then apparently we were assured that everything was in order 
and some papers were sent down to be notarized, and we got them 
notarized. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had to swear that it was your free act 
and deed. You were transferring real estate. Do vou not recall that 
at all? 

]Mr. Lattimore. I recall that we were authorizing the Stefanssons 
to get jointly owned property sold. I had full confidence in the 
Stefanssons getting 

The Chairman. Mr. Lattimore, this was done in Baltimore. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; in Baltimore. 

It was not what Stef ansson did, but what you did. 

Mr. Lattimore. I am sorry. I am not quite sure what you are 
driving at. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. I know. That is the trouble with your answers. 
You do not know what I am driving at. Do not try to figure out 
what I am driving at. I am just asking you a question. 

Did you, or did you not, go before a notary and swear that that 
was your 

The Chairman. It is an acknowledgment. 

Senator Ferguson. Let me read it to you : 

* * * personally appeared and acknowledged this instrument by them, 
sealed and subscribed" to be their free act and deed. 

Did you or did you not do that ? 
Mr. Lattimore. Evidently I did. 



3564 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to put in the word "evidently"? 

Mr. Lattimore. All right; I did. 

I am just saying I don't remember the transaction at all, sir. I 
mean the details of the transaction. All. I remember is that we 
managed to get rid of our farm. 

The Chairman. Xever mind the details of the transaction, Mr. 
Lattimore. 

Mr. Arnold. Mr. Chairman, he said that he did. What more can 
he say ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; after considerable effort. 

Senator Smith. Let me ask Mr. Lattimore one question. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Senator Smith. How many deeds have you ever signed before, Mr. 
Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. For the sale of property ? 

Senator Smith. That is what I mean, yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. I can't remember any others for the sale of pro- 
perty. I signed papers for the purchase of property on which I built 
my house near Baltimore, and I am afraid I will have to tell you that 
I can't remember a single detail of it. 

Senator Smith. I just have in mind that I have had clients to 
acknowledge documents tliat they relied upon me as counsel, and I was 
just wondering what implication should be drawn from the fact that 
this acknowledgement was that way. 

Mr. Lattimore. We had counsel. We had an attorney in Bethel, a 
Mrs. Bundy, who, together with the Stefanssons, handled the details 
of the transaction. And so we had full confidence that everything 
was being legally done and that we would get our money. 

The Chairman. Were you and Mrs. Lattimore negotiating for the 
sale of this property for some time? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. Letters had i)assed between Mrs. Lattimore and 
the purchasers, or between you and the purchasers; is that right? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, none had passed between us and the purchasers. 

The Chairman. I understood you to say a few minutes ago that 
some letters had passed, that correspondence had passed between Mrs. 
Lattimore and someone else for the purchase of the disposal of the 
property. 

You knew you wei'e going to dispose of it, did you not? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

The Chairman. When these instruments were shown to you, they 
were shown to you in Baltimore and you acknowledged them in Balti- 
more, according to the face of the instruments. 

Now, do you say you did, or did not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I did acknowledge them ; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you at that time, Mr. Lattimore, know to whom 
the property Avas being deeded ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We may have known that it was somebody named 
Southard, but we didn't know anything about them. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had the deed in front of you, did you not? You 
signed it. 

Mr. Latitmore. I suppose I must have known, but not knowing who 
Mr. Southard was, it made no particular impression on our mind. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3565 

You see, this property was not simply being sold on our behalf; 
it was property that we jointly owned with Mr. and Mrs. Stefansson, 
and since we had an attorney actintr for us in Bethel, and since the 
Stefanssons were acting in their own interest as well as ours, we didn't 
consider it necessary to take any special precautions in supervising 
the details. 

Mr. MoEEis. Mr. Lattimore, you testified in executive session that 
you did not sell that property to the Southards, did you not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I testified that it was sold on our behalf by the 
Stefanssons, I think. That was my recollection at the time. 

Mr. Morris. But, Mr. Lattimore, there is the testimony and the 
record. 

The Chairman. Read the record again. 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it? 
Mr. Lattimore. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr. 
Stefansson to sell it on our behalf. 

Mr. Lattimore. I think that is a true statement, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Then that is not true testimony, is it, Mr. Lattimore, 
in view of tlie fact that this deed has been presented to you today ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think there may be a confusion here about the 
word "sell'- perhaps. I don't know. It sounds to me like a techni- 
cality. 

Mr. Morris. How much did you pay for that property when you 
boupht it, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. We paid for it, according to the notes I have — this 
was, as I say, outlying property belonging to the Stefanssons. It 
had a very tumbledown farmhouse on it and 

The Chairman. How much did you pay for it ? 

Mr. Laitimore. We bought a half interest in it from the Stefans- 
sons for $1 and considerations. The considerations were that we were 
to put the house on the property in order. 

Mr, Morris. How much did you sell it for ? 

Mr. Lattimore. We sold our share of it for $2,000. 

Mr. Morris. Do you hold a mortgage on that property today ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No; I believe it has been paid off. 

Our cost in putting the property into order was something in excess 
of $2,000. 

Mr. Morris. The next name on the list is Mr. Stefansson's name. 

Mr. Lattimore. Right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairmaii, may they be received into the record ? 

The Chairman. Wait a minute. I would like to have it cleared up. 

I am not going to rule on that now. I am going to find out just 
what the context is, why they should be received. I am going to 
withhold ruling on that at the present time. 

(For the chairman's acceptance of exhibits Xo. 555A, No. 555B, and 
No. 555C, see p. :-)60T. The exhibits follow.) 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Mr. Stefansson's name, Mr. Latti- 
more. 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. What is Mr. Stefansson's first name? 

Mr. Lattimore. Vilhjalmur. 

Mr. Morris. Are you a close friend of Mr. Stefansson's ? 



3566 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore, I have been a good friend of his for 10 years or 
so; yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Did you at any time have reason to believe that he 
was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

IVIr. Morris. The next name is Gunther Stein. 

INIr. Lattimore. The same answer. 

I knew Mr. Stein extremely slightly ; met him maybe two or three 
times in Chungking in 1941 and 1942, and saw him, I think, once in this 
country at the end of the war or after the end of the war. 

]VIr. Morris. On several occasions you have praised his writings, 
have you not, Mr. Lattimore? 

INIr. Lattimore. On one occasion, I believe, I wrote a review of a 
book of his and on another occasion I wrote to Prof. McMahon Ball 
in Australia, commending Stein as a good economist on Japan. 

Mr. Morris. Therefore, you must have known something about Mr. 
Stein before you would so commend him ; is that not correct ? 

]\Ir. Lattimore. I had seen some of his writings ; yes, sir. 

j\Ir. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, when did you first have reason to 
believe that Mr. Stein was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I have ever had reason to believe 
he is a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that he has been identified as having 
been involved in the Sorge espionage case by General Willoughby ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have seen that reference. 

I also understand that Stein has denied it. 

Mr. Morris. Would you be willing to accept his denial ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Who am I to judge? 

]Mr. INIoRRis. The next name is Sabelle Yardumian Stein. 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume that is the name of the present Mrs. 
Stein, whom I met once very briefly here in Washington with her 
husband. 

Mr. Morris. And she is the sister of Rose Yardumian ; is she not ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I understand ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. And Rose Yardumian was someone who acted as your 
secretary for many years ; was she not ? 

]Mr. Lattimore. No; she didn't. She worked, I think, for the 
Washington office of the IPR at one time. She never had worked as 
my secretary, 

]Mr. ]MoRRis. At least you would often dictate letters, would you not, 
which would bear the initials at the bottom "OL : y" ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it very much. 

Mr. Morris. That was a frequent notation, was it not, on your out- 
going letters ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I doubt it. I don't think I dictated — I can't re- 
member dictating any letters in the Washington office of the IPR. 

INIr. Morris. Then where would the notation "OL:y" come from? 
What would that mean, Mr. Lattimore? That notation that fre- 
quently appeared in the letters that we have before us ? 

Mr. Lattimore. That was probably my secretary in Baltimore, Mrs. 
Margaret Young. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you say "Margaret" Young, or "Marguerite" 
Young ? 

INlr. Lattimore. "Margaret." 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3566A 

Exhibit No. 555A 

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3566b institute of pacific relations 



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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3566C 

Exhibit No. 555B 



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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3566e 

Exhibit No. 555C 

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3566f institute of pacii'TC relations 



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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3567 

Mr. Morris. Did you kiiow that Rose Yardumian was in Communist 
China last year? 

Mv. Lattimore. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Morris. In connection with a Chinese Communist publication ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't know that. 

Mr. ]\Iorris. The next name is Andrew Steiger. 

IVIr. Lattiiniore. I don't believe I have ever met Mr. Steiger person- 
ally. I think that the extent of my contact with him is when he did 
a large part of the drafting of a book for then Vice President Wallace, 
the manuscript of which was sent down to me before publication. 

Mr. INIoRRis. But it is your testimony you never met with Mr. Steiger 
in that connection? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I never met with him in that connection. 

Mr. Morris. Or in any other connection? 

Mr. Lattimore. Or in any other connection that I can remember. 

Mr. Morris. You did have dealings, though, to that extent, did you 
not, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. To that extent ; yes. And I think maybe one ex- 
change of correspondence. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Anna Louise Strong, Mr. Chairman, 
and I believe we have covered that in previous questioning. 

After that we have Madam Sun Yat-sen. 

Mr. Lai^tmore. Madam Sun Yat-sen I knew slightly in Chungking 
in 1941^2, and had no reason to consider her a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Did you see ]\Iadam Sun Yat-sen in connection with 
your visit to China with Mr. Wallace ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I did. I think some members of the 
mission called on her; but I don't believe I was with them. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Daniel Thorner. 

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No." 

Mr. Morris. You do know Daniel Thorner? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I know him. He worked under me for a year 
at Johns Hopkins University. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Kyuichy Tokuda. 

Mr. LxVTTiMORE. Could you identify him more closely? I don't 
identify the name Kyuichy, This may be a man named Tokuda who 
was regarded as one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party 
in 1945. 

Mr. Morris. Did you deal with that gentleman ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I didn't deal with him. I had one interview in 
which I questioned him. 

Mr. Morris. What was the date of the interview ? 

Mr, Lattimore. I was ti-ying to find out whether there was any 
difference in point of view between the Japanese Communists who 
had been in jail in Japan during the war and those who had been 
in China during the war and had come back, who were a subject of 
considerable speculation among Americans in Japan at that time. 
But I didn't succeed in seeing any of those who had come back from 
China. So the furthest I got was an interview in which I asked ques- 
tions of Mr. Tokuda. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Mr. Chainnan, there is a possibility of a typo- 
graphical error in this name Kyuichy. Perhaps it should end with an 
"i" instead of with a "y". I would like to ask the witness if that makes 
any difference in his answer. 



3568 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore. No; it doesn't maike any difference. Kyuichy 
would be his personal name, and in transcribing Japanese names 
a "y" in that position at the end would be unusual, but spelling it 
one way or the other doesn't make me remember what his first name 
actually was. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Solomon Trone. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Trone I met once in India in 1949, when he 
was acting as a special economic and technical adviser to Prime 
Minister Nehru. I believe that is the only time I met him, and I had 
no reason to term him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Shigato Tsuru. 

Mr. Lattimore. This Mr, Tsuru I met in Japan in the winter of 
1945-46. I met him maybe two or three times, and I had no reason 
to consider him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in company with Mr. Herbert Nor- 
man ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether or not he was Mr. Herbert 
Norman's roommate back in the United States? 

Mr. Lattimore. That I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether he was connected with the 
publication Science and Society ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, at that point, there should be noted 
the possibility of a typographical error. That name is spelled on 
this list S-h-i-g-a-t-o. It probably should be S-h-i-g-e-t-o. Does that 
make any difference, Mr. Lattimore, in your answer? 

Mr. Lat^tmore. No, I couldn't tell you which one is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know where he is now, Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore. I presume he is in Japan. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know what he is doing in Japan ? 

Mr. Laitimore. No; I don't. 

Mr. Morris. When did you last hear from Mr. Tsuru ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have never heard from him. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Mary Van Kleeck. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mary Van Kleeck I have never met. She wrote 
one article in Pacific Affairs in 1936 or '37, and I had no reason U> 
consider her a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Is that the article that we had testimony about the other 
day? 

Mr. Latitmore. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. In the Moscow trials? 

Mr. Lattimore. That is right. 
• Mr. Morris. The next is John Carter Vincent. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Vincent I have known since about 1930, off and 
on, when we happened to be in the same town. I had no reason to 
consider him a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Nym Wales. 

Mr. Lattiiniore. Nym Wales I knew very slightly when she was the 
wife of Edgar Snow, and that was in Peking in the 1930's. I don't 
believe I have ever seen her in this country, and I have no reason to 
consider her a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Harry Dexter White. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3569 

Mr. Lat^timore. Mr. AMiite I met maybe three times here in Wash- 
ington in 1941-42, in connection with briefings on financial policy in 
China. I had no reason to consider him a Communist. 

The Chairman. Is Harry Dexter White the individual connected 
with the Treasury Department? 

Mr. Lattimore. He was connected with the Treasury Department ; 
yes. 

Mr. Morris. He was the Under Secretary of the Treasury, was he 
not? 

Mr. Lattimore. I forget what his exact rank was. 

The CHAiEMAiSr. Did he fall out of the window ? I believe he died 
a violent death, 

Mr. Morris. He died a violent death; yes. Wait a minute, now. 
Excuse me, Senator. Apparently he died of a heart attack. 

The next name is Ella tVinter. 

Mr. Lattimore. Ella Winter wrote one article in Pacific Affairs in 
about 1936 or 1937. I had never met her, and had no reason to con- 
sider her a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Victor Yakhontoff. 

Mr. Lattimore. Victor Yakhontoff I don't believe I have ever met. 
He contributed an article — maybe he contributed an article to Pacific 
Affairs, I am not sure. 

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Carter ever discuss his political feelings with 
you? 

Mr. Latfimore, He may have. If you have a document to refresh 
my memory I might be able to recall something about it. I haven't 
even heard of him since the middle 1930's some time. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. Did you not deny here on last Friday, Mr. Lattimore, 
that you did not know that Mr. Yakhontoff was a Communist or pro- 
Soviet? 

Mr. Lattimore. I certainly didn't know that he was a Communist or 
pro-Soviet. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, dated January 25, 1943, addressed to Owen Latti- 
more from Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy. 

Mr. IMoRRis, INIr. Lattimore, I ask you if you can recall having re- 
ceived that letter. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you have copies ? 

The Chairman. Are there copies available ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes; here you are. [Document handed.] 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't recall receiving this. I obviously did. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read it, please. Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Lattimore (reading) : 

Exhibit No. .5.56 

Dear Owen : General Yakhontoff called to see me today to offer his services 
to the IPR. Someone had told him that the IPR was greatly expanding its 
program and he would like to be employed for any research work which we 
might assign to him. I had to tell him that, while we had plans for expansion, 
we hadn't yet found the funds and that so long as the present situation persisted 
I could make no proposals to him. He told me that he had recently written you 
offering his services. Personally, I think his record is good. He is frankly 
pro-Soviet but has never been and is not now a party member. He is a United 
States citizen. He is full of energy, lectures with very great success, and has 



3570 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

to his credit some fairly good books which would have probably been much 
better if he had had the benefit of working under your direction. He feels 
himself pretty competent not only on Soviet, but also on far eastern affairs. 
I think that if you are considering additions to your staff you may want to give 
some thought to the possibility of using him. 

I am sending a copy of this letter to Harriet Moore in Chicago with the sug- 
gestion that if she knows any reason why you should not consider him she 
write you direct. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record ? 

The Chairman, It may be admitted into the record. 

(The document previously read in full by the witness was marked 
"Exhibit No. 556".) 

Mr. Morris. The next name is Rose Yardumian. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; she has been mentioned before. I knew her 
very slightly when she w^orked in the IPR office here in Washington 
temporarily some time during the war years. I had no reason to 
consider her a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. The last name is Max Yergan. 

Mr. Laitimore. Max Yergan has been mentioned before, and I 
don't know anything more about him than what I said then. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you remember meeting him at the 
dinner party at the home of Edith Field ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Once. 

Mr. Morris. And you did not, at that time, have any reason to be- 
lieve he was a Communist? 

Mr. Lattimore. Quite so. 

]\rr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have some documents I would like 
Mr. Lattimore's identification of, and I will put them into the record 
without any questions. 

I also have a few other questions of a miscellaneous nature to ask 
of the witness. 

The Chairman. I think, however, that we will have to recess at this 
time. We do not like to put this hearing off, but it looks as though we 
are rather crowded with overwork. Will it be satisfactory to the 
members of the committee if the matter went over until the day after 
tomorrow at 10 o'clock or 10 : 30 ? 

Senator O'Conor. May I just ask one question? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, I was anxious, just before get- 
ting away from the list, to ask you if there was any reason for, you 
might say, the equivocation in regard to your reference to Paul 
Robeson. At the time you were asked the question as to whether you 
had reason to believe that he had communistic leanings or affiliations, 
your answer was that he may very likely be one. 

You had previously indicated that you like to speak in plain English, 
and that you do not indulge in fancy or round-about terms. 

Do you want to leave that there ? Apparently everybody in America 
knows him to be what he is. I was wondering whether you desire to 
leave it in that state. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I wasn't trying to equivocate there. It is 
simply that I have seen in the press references that lead me to believe 
that he is either a Communist or a very close fellow traveler, or 
something of that kind. I have not made an analysis of it. I am not 
a student of Paul Robeson. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 3571 

Senator O'Conor. Of course, 3^011 have known of the various activi- 
ties in which he has engaged, and of his statements given in various 
parts of tlie world which have been strictly anti-American and pro- 
Soviet ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I know of some of those in a general way. I would 
be hard put to cite you the exact ones. I was merely trying to come 
within the wording of this definition about "what do you know now," 
et cetera. 

Senator O'Coxor. All right. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. All riaht, we will recess until Wednesday morning 
at 10 : 30. 

(Whereupon, at 3 : 44 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 : 30 a. m., Wednesday, March 12, 1952.) 



88348 — 52 — pt. 10 20 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 1952 

United States Senate, 

SUBCOMMITI'EE To INVESTIGATE THE AdMINISTRxVTION 

or THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. O. 

The subcommittee met at 1 : 45 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, and Ferguson. 

Senator Mundt. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire. I would like to 
request, Mr. Chairman, that the committee ask the State Department, 
and also the President, for the statement and the letter that was 
mailed by Mr. Lattimore to the President on the 10th of June 1945, 
and also the statement that was left by Mr. Lattimore at the White 
House on July 3. Also, if they have it on the calendar, the time that. 
Mr. Lattimore called on the President, the length of time he was with 
the President. 

The Chairman. The request will be made for the authorities men- 
tioned. Let me say that the Chair ruled some daj^s ago with reference 
to the filing of statements. The reorganization plan, the reorganiza- 
tion law, set up some years ago, provides, among other things : 

The committee shall, so far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing 
before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony at 
least 24 hours before hearing, and to limit their oral presentation to brief sum- 
maries of their argument. The committee staffs shall prepaid digests of such 
statements for the use of the committee members. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I had also asked Mr. Lattimore 
to point out in the Tydings committee the testimony given to that 
committee in relation to his visit to the White House. I wondered 
whether he has that. 

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN 
ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I have not been able to find that, and to 
the best of my belief it isn't there, and I had simply forgotten about 
the whole business at the time of the Tydings hearings and didn't 
run across those papers until later. I mentioned them in my state- 
ment to this committee because they had been mentioned in previous 
testimony here which reminded me of it. 

3573 



3574 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. How many times had you called on the Presi- 
dent of the United States ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Only that once, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is the one that you say you entirely 
forgot ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you had been questioned about your rela- 
tions with the foreign policy of the United States, wliether or not you 
had any influence on it ; is tliat right ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes ; that is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is the only time that you ever saw a 
President about the foreign policy, and you forgot it i 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, Senator 

The Chairman. Just a moment. Answer the question. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that true ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I believe that is what is true. Senator. My memory 
is getting more and more mixed up because of the way the questions 
have zigzagged across. 

Senator Ferguson. Those are not zigzag questions, and they are not 
mixed-up questions. 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; what I mean, Senator, is the questioning as 
a whole has gone back and forth over a great many years, and it is get- 
ting increasingly difficult for me to remember what I remembered 
when. 

Senator Eastland. Difficult to remember what you talked to the 
President of the United States about on your visit to him ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. He visited the President once and forgot it. That 
is the answer. 

Mr. Lattimore. The questioning, Senator, before the Tydings com- 
mittee was entirely in the context of what Government positions I had 
held, and I think it is quite natural that this other occasion didn't enter 
into my 

The Chairman. There is no question pending. 

Senator Ferguson. One of the big questions, Mr. Lattimore, was 
whether or not you had ever had any influence upon the foreign policy 
of the United States. And you now say to this committee that the time 
you visited the President and left a memorandum with him, and the 
fact that you had written the letter with a statement as to what you 
thought the foreign policy was, that when you were giving the testi- 
mony in relation to your influence upon the foreign policy, you forgot 
the only time that you had ever been there, and you didn't give it to 
the Tydings committee, and you came before this connnittee and said 
that that connnittee had acquitted you of everything, given you a clean 
bill of health, and that we were to* be criticized for not giving you the 
same on the Tydings committee hearing. 

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, if tliat interview with the President had 
had the slightest effect 

The Chairman. Let me get that question, please. That is an in- 
volved question. 

Senator Ferguson. That was just a summation of what I take this 
testimony to be. I am going to ask you some otlier questions and see 
how your memory is on those. Do you remember coming back with Mr. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3575 

Wallace and Mr. Vincent from the Far East when you made a trip 
with them ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What kind of a plane had yon, do you know? 

Mr. Lattimore. A four-enjoined plane. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how many people came back on 
that trip ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea? 

Mr. Lattimore. Let me see, there was Mr. Wallace, Mr. Vincent, 
Mr. Hazard, and myself, and the military personnel of the plane. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon? 

Mr. Lattimore. And the military personnel of the plane, I think 
six or seven people. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that all ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think that is all; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there anybody else on the plane? Think 
about it. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't believe so. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you land in the United States? 

Mr. Lattimore. We landed, I think, at Fairbanks, Alaska, and 
then we landed in Canada, and then I think we flew straight — no ; I 
am not sure whether we flew straight to Seattle or made an inter- 
mediate landing somewhere. 

Senator Ferguson. Were the same people on the plane the whole 
trip? 

5lr. Lattimore. Yes ; I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. The same people. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And no more? 

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe so. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you went from Seattle to where? 

Mr. Lattimore. From Seattle straight to Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not stop anywhere? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, I remember stopping once, but I can't re- 
member whether it was on the way from Canada to Seattle or on the 
way from Seattle to Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you stop at Great Falls? 

Mr. Lattimore. Great Falls, that is the name of the place. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the name? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you remember having your picture 
taken at Great Falls? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not? Do you remember the people that 
were on the plane having their pictures taken at Great Falls ? 

Mr. Lattimore. On the way out to China or on the way back? 

Senator Ferguson. On the way back. 

Mr. Lattimore. A group picture ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember the photographer placing 
Mr. Wallace in the center of the group ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 



3576 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. You do not? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember that there were at least 10 
Russians on that plane? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not remember that? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You would remember that if it had happened ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should think so. 

The Chairman. What is the answer? 

Mr. Lattimore. I should think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who wrote Mr. Wallace's speech 
that he made in Eussian to some group ? He made a speech in Russian, 
did he not; he read it? 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who wrote it? 

Mr. Lattimore. He wrote it himself, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know a Boris Pregel ? 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Of Russia. 

Mr. Lattimore. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You say Mr. Wallace wrote the speech himself 
and delivered it, read it? ^ ^ , .. ^^ 

Mr. Lattimore. He wrote the speech himself, and I believe Mr. 
Hazard translated it into Russian for him. 

Senator Ferguson. You can't recall now of a group picture of the 
Russians and you and Mr. Wallace being taken at the airfield m 
Great I'alls? 

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time. 

The Chairman. Would you say that such an incident did not 

occur? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection oi it. 

Tlie Chairman. Well, just answer my question. Would you say it 
did not occur? 

Mr. Lattimore. I would say it didn't occur ; yes ; as tar as my recol- 
lection. Senator. I have been asked to bring in some supplementary 
TTi *i 1'PTi n 1 

Senator Eastland. I have a question. Did you know Dr. Cole- 
grove ? 

Mr. Lattimore. Colegrove; yes. 

Senator Eastland. How long did you know him? 

Mr. Lattimore. I have known him off and on since the 1930 s. 

Senator Eastland. Did you ever offer him employment? 

Mr." Lattimore. I don't believe I did. I remember his testifying to 
that effect, but I don't recall offering him employment. ^ 

Senator Eastland. Well, do you deny that you offered him a ]ob 
when you were with OWI ? , , , . 

Mr. Laitimore. No ; I don't deny it ; I ]ust don't remember it. 

Senator Eastland. You do not remember whether you offered him 
the Japanese desk or not in OWI? 

Mr. Lattimore. No ; I don't remember that at all. 

Senator Eastland. You have read his testimony before this 
committee ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3577 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. He states that, at a meeting with you, you offered 
him a job, that you stated that the Chinese Communists "were real 
democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no 
connection with Soviet Russia." 

Now, was that testimony true or false ? 

Mr. Lattimore. In my opinion it is false. Senator. I don't remem- 
ber meeting him at the airport, as he says, and I don't remember any 
such conversation, and I don't think such a conversation is likely. 
Senator Eastland, Would you remember having dinner with him ? 
Mr. LATriMORE. No. 

Senator Eastland. Dr. Colegrove states that, under oath, you were 
advocating the murder of the Japanese Emperor and his family. 
Was that statement true or false? 

Mr. Lattimore. That statement is false. Senator; and as I recall, 
Mr. Colegrove was referring there not to conversation but to a book that 
I wrote, and there is nothing of the kind in the book. 
Senator Eastland. It was to a conversation ? 
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 

Senator Eastl.\nd. He stated that you were following the same line 
that the Japanese Communists had followed ? 
The Chairman. Is that a question. Senator ? 
Senator Eastland. Yes, sir. I asked him if that was true. 
The Chairman. His attention is being taken up now with something 
else. Will you listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore. please ? 
Mr. Lattimore. I don't think that is true. Senator. 
Senator Eastland. You do not think it is true ? 
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. I can't tell you what the line of the Japa- 
nese Communists was on the subject. 

Senator Eastland. Was it your opinion that the Emperor of Japan 
should be killed ? 
Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. 
Senator Eastland. That is all. 
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, I have been requested to bring in 
supplementary material. May I offer it now ? 
The Chairman. Wlio made the request ? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think sometimes the Chair and one request was, 
I remember, from Senator Ferguson. 

The Chairman. You may lay it before the chairman. 
Mr. Lattimore. Yes, sir. Here is a publication of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations with my 1936 report on Pacific Affairs, which 
Senator Ferguson requested. Then I was also requested to bring in 
the letter from the Department of State, inviting me to lecture, in 
1946, to the State Department personnel. I was also asked to identify 
in the transcript the question of the dating of General Barmine's 
statements about 1933 or 1935-36, and I have analyzed that with 
the appropriate references to the text. , 

May I ask, also, Senator, if the exhibits that I attached to my state- 
ment to this committee and that I asked to have entered into the record 
have been entered ? 

Mr. Morris. I think, Mr. Sourwine, you were going to take that 
matter up today. Are you ? 

The Chairman. That is going to be taken up at a later time. 



3578 INSTITUTE or pacific relations 

Mr. Sour WINE. At the time that we concluded with Mr. Lattimore's 
testimony on the last previous occasion, when he was on the stand, we 
were discussing two excerpts which he had offered for the record. 
Our record is incomplete with regard to those. There is also here 
certain material under the heading of "Chinese history project" and 
also with regard to who wanted to recognize Red China, and I think 
one other item which Mr. Lattimore offered initially and on which 
the Chair has not yet ruled. 

]\Ir. Lattimore. May I renew my request that that be entered into 
the record ? 

The Chairman. The Chair will take the matter up again. 

Mr. Lattimore. And I wish to offer some material that I prepared 
with respect to my book. Solution in Asia, in view of the testimony 
which the committee accepted yesterday. 

The Chairman. Was that requested^ 
. Mr. Lattimore. No, sir, this is an offer of evidence. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I might say at the time, since it has 
come up, that the staff is prepared and does recommend with regard 
to this material earlier submitted by Mr. Lattimore, that the Chair 
admit it for printing in the appendix of the record, and order that it 
be footnoted back to the point in the record at which Mr. Lattimore 
first asked that it be introduced. 

The Chairman. All riglit. The Chair will pass on that later on. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, will you point out in this book 
where your report is? 

Mr. Lattimore. I think I marked that, on 76. 

The Chairman. Mr. Morris, if you wish to proceed, you may 
proceed. 

Mr. Arnold. May we have a ruling on this offer ? 

The Chairman. I will rule on it later on. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of saving time, Mr. 
Lattimore and his attorney on the one hand and I on the other, have 
stipulated on the authenticity of certain letters, IS letters, that I 
would like to introduce into the record as a single unit. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have a list of those ? 

Mr. Morris. I have a list, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have that list, Mr. Arnold ? 

Mr. Arnold. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. That has been presented to Mr. Lattimore and his at- 
torney. They have gone through the list, and I would like them now 
to state that "they appear to the witness to be copies of organizational 
documents that were either sent by him or to him. 

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, with at least one exception which is minutes 
of a conference or something. 

Mr. Morris. Which was that, now ? 

Mr. Lattimore. This one here. 

Mr. Morris. July 9, 1934. 

Mr. Lattimore. July 9, 1934. 

Mr. Morris. And wliat comment have you on that? 

Mr. Lattimore. Well, that also appears to be a copy of an original 
document, but it isn't a letter to mo or from me. 

Mr. Morris. This is a meeting at which you were present and the 
initialed paragraph liere, "Mr. Lattimore produced the statement 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3579 

showing the distribution of Pacific Affairs as of July 9, as follows." 
That is right ? 

Mr. Lattimqre. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may those documents be introduced 
into the record? 

The Chairman. There is a stipulation, as I understand, between 
counsel and counsel for the witness that these are correct photostatic 
copies ; is that right ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. And that thev appear or are taken from where ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. ISIandel will testify 

The Chairman. Well, they are stipulated. 

Mr. Morris. They have been taken from the files of the institute. 

The Chairman. Very well. They may be admitted into the record. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may speak clearly, 
may I show Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Arnold this list, and ask if this 
is the list, physically, of the documents with respect to which the 
stipulation has been made. 

Mr. Arnold. I assume it is. 

Mr. Sourwine. May we have the list you have. 

This is now, Avhat I have in my hands, the list of the documents 
with respect to which there is a stipulation. 

Mr. Arnold. That is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. Then will the chairman order that these be inserted 
and printed. 

The Chairman. They may be inserted and printed. 

Mr. Morris. In every case the copies were sent to the witness and 
his attorney, except for the third item on the list, that is dated April 
18, 1935, San Francisco. May we have that particular one? 

Mr. Lattimore. Is this the one ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, that is the one. 

The Chairman. What about that? 

Mr. Morris. That is covered in the list, Mr. Chairman. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 566 A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S" and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 566-A 

Pacific Center, 
1795 CALIFORNIA Stbe:et, 
Sa7i Francisco, Calif., August 18, 1938. 
Mr. Edward C. Carter, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 

New York, N. Y. 
Dear Carter: Your telegram of the sixth arrived a few days before we left 
camp. As you urged me "to consider resigning from Amerasia at an early 
date," it seemed wise both to think the matter over very carefully and to await 
your comment on my withdrawal of an article from the new number of Amerasia. 
Arriving here yesterday, I found your letters of August 8 and 10; also possible 
for me to attempt to balance the general nature of the problem and the par- 
ticular merits of the case. 

To begin with, I need hardly assure you how anxious I am to make any con- 
cession consistent with elementary ideas of dignity and propriety, that might 
help you in your difficult diplomatic handling of Japanese demands, and further 
the major interests of the Institute. This is no time at which to allow individ- 
ual intrasigeance to threaten the smooth working of the Institute as a whole. 
At the same time, I cannot but regret that the Japanese Council should have 
been allowed to make a debating point of this intrinsically unimportant per- 



3580 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

sonal issue. It would have been easy for me to withdraw from Amerasia 
a few months ago ; it would be easy a few months hence. To withdraw Just 
at this moment, "under fire," would be for me personally a minor disagreeable 
incident ; for the whole Institute, it seems to me, it would establish a dangerous 
precedent There would be two regrettable consequences. In the first place, the 
whole matter would be regarded and reported in Japan as a "victory how- 
ever minor. In the second place, a false issue would be substituted for the real 
issue For the appearance of my name on Amerasia cannot possibly be the real 
issue The character of what I write in Amerasia differs in no definable respect 
from what I publish in a number of other journals. The "line" of Amerasia, 
as the organ of a group, differs in no way from the "line" which I have been 
steadily advocating as an individual, for over a year, in a number of other pub- 
lications Accordinglv. for nie to retire from Amerasia under Japanese pressure 
would not seriously affect my output of such personal influence as I may have, 
but would establish, for the whole Institute, the dangerous precedent that a 
single National Council is entitled to influence, for long range, the writings of 
staff members of the Institute in other countries. 

Reviewing the whole matter afresh, it seems to me essential to reconstruct 
the whole "case history" in brief : 

(1) Amerasia was planned and launched while I was out of America. I sup- 
posed at the time that I was being invited to join the board simply in order to 
make it clear that Amerasia was not intended to displace Pacific Affairs or be 
a rival to it. There was thus a justifiable reason for asking me to join the 

hoard. , , , T T^- ij 

(12) I understood that the matter had been discussed between you and Field. 
I had no reason to believe you disapproved. 

(3) As a member of the board, I have remained throughout a figurehead. 
Owing to distance from America, I could not take part in editorial deliberations. 

(4) As an individual contributor, what I have written for Amerasia— regard- 
less of what Amerasia's "line" is supposed to be— does not differ in any respect 
from what I have written for Pacific Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Affairs, 
International Affairs, Asia, and so forth. It is not as if I reserve a special 
brand of "anti-Japanese" utterance for Amerasia. I have never written anything 
that did not come under one of two categories: (a) What I know; and (&) what 
I think Under either category, it is more or less an accident where I publish. 
In this connection, it would also be legitimate to recall to the Japanese Council 
that I was generallv considered, a few years ago, to be on the whole a "realist' 
whose views could 'be, and were, quoted in support of Japanese policies. Any 
subsequent changes in these views have come about since I have been under the 
full influence of the IPR, with access to the material furnished by all of its 
national councils and research undertakings. 

(5) Coming to the actual question of resignation, it seems to me that either:- 
(ff) I should have been requested not to join the board of Amerasia in the first 
place- or (6) I should have been requested to resign some months ago, in order 
to forestall Japanese criticism; or (c) I might be requested to resign a few 
months hence, in order to avoid the appearance of successful Japanese inter- 
vention in the affairs of an American publication catering to American readers. 

(6) A graceful compromise, possibly, might be the publication of a paragraph 
in an early number of Amerasia, to the effect that I have been obliged, owing 
to pressure of work consequent upon taking up a new position at Johns Hopkins, 
to withdraw temporarily from the editorial board. 

Would you let me know what you think of this? Bear in mmd, of course, 
that any personal sensitiveness on my part is not to be given undue considera- 
tion I want the particular aspects of the case to be put on record, but this does 
not mean that I want the particular aspects to be allowed to distort the general 
aspects However, it would be a legitimate method of bringing the particular and 
the general into focus, I think, to ask the Japanese Council whether their pro- 
posed ban will immediately or ultimately be extended to such Pacific Council 
officers and International Committee chairmen as Dafoe, in his editorial capac- 
ity • Walsh, as editor of Asia, and Hubbard, as a publicist. 

Passing on to the question of efforts to secure Japanese collaboration on Pacific 
Affairs I am sending vou such copies of correspondence as I have available here. 
This is all of recent date, owing to the fact that I have not had all permanent 
records with me since leaving Peiping. Helen Wiss, however, could furnish you 
with more from the New York files of copies of my correspondence. Holland 
should also be consulted, as he has labored incessantly to get Japanese material 
for us. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3581 

One minor point, in conclusion: Tour reference tn tha ni-Hni^ «wi <- -n- 
Pays for Japanese Rule" in the June number of Pn^ifi. xL^^ ^\^^^. ^^''^^ 

fied my responsibility as a translator? but i^t as a c^mment.^^^^ '•*^^''"; 

material, you and I and others have so often deplored ' """^ ^^ Japanese 

Youi-s very sincerely, 

(Signed) Owen Lattimore. 



Exhibit No. 566-B 

WLH 
300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University 
Mr. E. C. Carter, Baltimore, Aid., March 20, mi. 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, Netv York City. 
Dear Carter : Our June issue will approximately mark the fourth anniversnrv 

art cfe'^'fth!^ ^'^^"'"- \ *^"^^ '' ^«"1^^ be appropriate for me to wiSe the leS 

aitic e of the Lssue under some such title as "Four Years," reviewing the hi^to?v 

and development of the war and estimating its present potentSmies" ^ 

Since this issue will be the first after thapassing of the Lease Lend Bill I thinl- 

he Sn^i'""-'''^'-! "' '■'''' ''''''''' ^«"1^^ ^'^^ lil^^ ^^ articl^that wou d'cas? up 
the leckoning on America. Where does she stand, how did she get there whe?e 

excfusi^eiv f 'T \nT = ?" ''^^"■''^^^ ^^-^t^^ «^ '"^"^^ «" ^^-"^^le would key it'aTmos? 
.IITI / *'' *^^ Atlantic and Great Britain. For Pacific Alfairs we need some- 
one who has an expert knowledge of the Far East and a comprehensive unde? 

RussH B;fS'Vh^f."^f ''^^"'} "^^ 'I'''''' '" ^'^^•«^^^' t« *^^ ^'"ited s7ate?S 
to Thi? suoi^Lfn^.^^^T? '^ '"'''° ^ "i^"" "1^^ ^^ ^^' ^- ^- ^i'^^^"- ^^^ould you agree 
M-f ^ n if ,^^- ^^ '^'^ cannot get Bisson, what would you think of Kate 
Mitchell : She has not the first-hand knowledge and authority Oiat Bisson has 
Pacific'AffaiJs ■''' '°^ ^-^^'^P^tent mind, and she would be a new contriCor to 

me^Un^'^ The^Tof ?*?"'^ ^'''' 'T^ '^^^^^ photographs from the Princeton 
Sn nnf^w f ''f- ""''^ ""r"'^^ "" beginning, as I have to work slowly in 

broken patches of spare time.' I am sorry that these pictures were taken on a 

TWpf' T^?^ '^r'' ^^"^ "" ^^'^-^ *b^ negatives were Lt separatefy numbeied 
Therefore the only way of identifying each picture is bv these sample prints 
So I sugges that you mark lightly on the back of each print how manv copies 
you would hke. Send them back to me, and I'll gradually fill up the complement 
Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 

^^^, Exhibit No. 366-C 

xLCC 

Extract From Letfer Dated San Francisco, April 18, 1935, Owen Lattimobe 

to Catherine Porter 

1 find around here that the knowing Mr. John Thompson of the San Francisco 
L>aily Aews has an explanation of the Moscow trials which is widely accepted 
It IS simply that Stalin is getting rid of all the people "who knew him when" so 
as to monopolize control of the political machine. To me this simply does not 
make sense because even from the little I know of the personalities of 1917 1918 



3582 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

it is clear that a number of the people who have since come to be classified as Old 
B^sheviks did not properly belong to the famous closely welded core of the Co^^ 
munist Party. On the contrary, many of them were radicals who belonged to 
urfringe of the Party and many of them had already been known for years as 
ob'^tinate ijartisans of one or another varmnt theory. 

As a leLler, I should like to find a good article on the Who s Who of the Old 
BoTseviks, sorting out who was really a close follmver ot Lenin '^"^l ^^'^^^ ^Jf ,f 
more or less loosely harnessed sidekick whom only Lenin's genius could keep pull- 
higtn the traces. As an editor. I don't know whether I should prompt anyone 
to'write such an article at the present time. 



Initialed: "ECC." 



Exhibit No. 566-D 

300 GILMA^- Hall. Johns Hopkins University, 

Baltimore, Md., January 9, 1939. 



Mr. L. V. Haroxdar, .^ „ , ^. 

CoiinvU of the U. 8. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations rr ^ v r 

20 Razin Street, Moscoiv, U. 8. S. R. 

Dear AIr. Harondar: Thank you very much for the copy of your letter to Mr 
Holland of December 13th. The "Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the 
Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R." arrived in due course and I am arrang- 
ine- to have it noticed in Pacific Affairs. ^ ., .■ ^.^ 

Please let me know if there is any possibility at all of Soviet contributions to 
Pacific Affairs We have now grown in circulation, and I think in infiuence to 
fie highest e -el since Pacific Affairs has been published. This makes all the 
more c^onspicuous the lack of Soviet contributions. It ^-ould greatly improve our 
position if we could have, from time to time, articles directly sponsored by the 
Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

With warm good wishes for the New Year. 

Yours very sincerely, ^^^ ^^^^ Lattimore. 

OL : Y. 

Exhibit No. 566-E 
Pacific Affairs 

Royal Institute of International Affairs, 

10 St. James Square, 
London, 8. W. I., 2d November 1936. 

Frederick V. Field, Esq., 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 

NeiD York City, U. S. A. 
Dear Fred- There is one by-product of my Canadian trip that I wished I could 
havltalked over with you before leaving. I found both in Montreal among the 
hfgh up head offic^ executives of Canada's nearest imitation of New Yoi-k, and 
among the evil servants and not quite head of department administrators of 
mtawa an extremelv lively interest in Chinese communism and in the crisis 
Confronting The Nanking government. When I started to talk I had a few 
geS ?as suci as t£e theory that the Nanking government would go on 
fommomis^ng up to the last desperate moment rather than risk everything on an 
oSm resiftance! and also a very strong feeling that the Communists because 
S their e?hS^ to resistance and their repeated ofi:ers of a united front have 
been gaining the support of ordinary democratic and patriotic nationalists as 
wen a?of Marxists. These general impressions I had not ^^-^-"f^d in anyexy 
nrecise manner As a result of questions asked, etc.. 1 tound m>selt giadually 
SS- the Swing position, of the correctness of which I am not qinte sure. I 
should be grateful f?r any criticisms, either your own or those of Chen and 

^^The^neople who are most active in making the position in China, are not any of 
the ChS parties but the Japanese. They have worked with gi-eat ski 1 on 
maxims derived from a close study of the older Chinese history and particularly 
S fm asions from the northern frontier. Owing to the strong ^^l^^'^l^f ^f i>, ^t^| 
twentieth century of many factors that were operating m the history of China 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3583 

before the nineteenth century, they have succeeded in reproducing with remark- 
able accuracy the familiar phenomenon of the breakup of China under barbarian 
invasion. They know how to strike along the lines of regional cleavage and also 
along the lines of cleavage between the country-landlord-scholar-gentry and the 
peasantry. In this way they have apparently justified the good old contention 
that the Chinese are an antiquated people with no cohesion or solidarity of any 
modern kind. 

Actually this kind of thing can only be pushed up to a certain point, because in 
spite of the survival of old factors, there are also new factors at work which 
beyond a given point influence developments increasingly rather than decreas- 
ingly. What I mean is that the Japanese although using troops and armaments 
of a modern kind could invade China on the archaic plan of invasion, but when it 
comes to consolidating the conquest the old precedents fail and they find the 
foundations of triumph crumbling under them as in Manchuria. The archaic con- 
quest cannot provide dividends of a modern kind. 

When we consider the whole process from the side of Nanking we see more 
clearly the interaction of old and new factors. Nanking facing the Japanese 
invasion has all the regional and social weaknesses of the old order in China, 
but it also has other weaknesses of a different kind which are due to the fact 
that the Nanking government represents primarily those elements in China 
which correspond to Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and so on in Japan, but which are less 
highly developed than their Japanese counterparts. They stand for the in- 
vasion of the older China by a capitalism modeled on that of Western countries 
and capable of undercutting western and Japanese capitalism in open competi- 
tion, but not so strong as foreign capitalism in its control of political and 
military auxiliaries. 

The instinct of the interests represented by Nanking is to play for time in 
which to develop up to the Japanese level of strength. This is hopeless. The 
Japanese, because they have advanced further on a line of development parallel 
to that of the Nanking Chinese, can always prepare for invasion more rapidly 
than Nanking can prepare for resistance. Nanking, squeezing its eyes tightly 
shut and cling to the hope of a resistance always deferred to some future date, 
naturally compromises in various directions. Of these the most nearly practical 
is the line of working for foreign support on the theory that some such nation 
as America or England will eventually decide that it is better to support Nanking 
than to acquiesce in the total Japanese conquest of China. 

In the circumstances the tactics of the Japanese are to keep pushing Nanking 
from one partial surrender to another while their strategy is to refrain from 
making the pressure so high as to startle any other nation into active alliance 
with Nanking or to stampede Nanking itself into desperate resistance. Nan- 
king has already yielded so much that in the event of resistance leadership 
would pass rapidly to the Communists. This is the last thing that the Japanese 
want. They know that in the first set battle they could shatter the regular 
battalions of Nanking; but the remnants would then be raised up under Com- 
munist leadership and resistance would spread over the whole countryside. 
Then the Japanese would be at war with a continent and would have to dis- 
perse their armed forces over a tremendous territory. What Japan wants 
is to keep Nanking's armies intact in order not to have to fight the Com- 
munists. The showdown will come at a moment, which the Japanese are at 
present deferring as much as Nanking itself. The Japanese have involved 
themselves in a tremendous gamble in which their hope of success rests entirely 
on the possibility of edging Nanking step by step into a position in which 
it will appear a hopelessly bad bet for either British or American support. 
Then, at a moment which will have to be very carefully prepared, the Jap- 
anese will unmask their final ultimatum and risk everything on the assump- 
tion that Nanking will capitulate and not make a pseudo-Samson gesture of 
pulling down the pillars of the temple. They will then be able to use Nanking's 
armies with only a stiffening of their own troops to crush Communism, and 
so be able to hold their own main forces mobile and in reserve. The program 
may involve the elimination of Chiang K'ai Shek, which the Japanese have so 
frequently threatened, but obviously it is based on the assumption that they 
can reach a point of indirect control at which thev can tip over Chiang K'ai Shek 
without spilling the rest of Nanking into the lap of the Communists. 

In the circumstances the hope of the Communists must lie in the precipitation 
of a war in which Nanking will take the lead at first, only to be defeated and 
to let the leadership lapse for the Communists to take over. If they succeed, 
the situation will not be parallel to either Manchuria or Abyssinia, as many 



3584 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

people assume. In Manchuria the armies of Chans Hsueh-liang held together 
long enough to prevent general popular resistance from getting underway, and 
also the situation was clouded by the sham intervention of the League of Na- 
tions. In Abyssinia the quaint emperor, knowing that his position in his own 
country was more that of a conqueror than that of a genuine national ruler, 
was unable to rely on the dispersed tribal resistance that alone could have 
bogged down the Italians' advance, but bent every effort to the creation of a sham 
modern army which gave the Italians exactly what they needed: a chance to 
attack a fixed focus of resistance; and this resistance lasted long enough to 
let the Italians get so far into the country that popular and tribal resistance 
became hopeless. 

In the present situation in China the existence of the Communists alters every- 
thing. If the resistance is begun soon enough— that is before the Japanese 
have got in far enough so that they can use Nanking and its armies as a shield 
to carry before them in fighting the Communists — Tlien the kind of war that 
would result would be more nearly parallel to the civil wars and wars of inter- 
vention in Russia. Once the formal armies of Nanking were cracked in the 
absurd effort to meet the Japanese on ground on which the Japanese are in- 
finitely superior, the private soldiers and many of the noncommissioned and 
junior ofticers of the defeated armies could be raised up again and combined 
with the peasants and workers to build up a genuine national resistance. The 
Japanese would no longer be fighting bankers and factory owners, whose great 
wealth made them nervous and ready to compromise, but would be at war 
with mud huts and impoverished farms, against which the use of tanks and air- 
planes would involve a maximum expenditure of wealth for a minimum acquisi- 
tion of wealth. In such a situation the Cliinese Conununists would actually be 
better off than the Russians were to start with ; for the first Red armies were 
led by amateurs, while the Chinese would have from the beginning veteran mili- 
tary and political organizers and a nucleus of hardbitten partisan armies already 
inured to that kind of war. 

How much of all this lucubration is approximately sound? 

England is appallingly depressing. We are living in one of those incredible 
English suburban houses that make you feel like a furniture maggot. I start 
my Russian lessons on Monday and that is the only cheerful prospect in sight. I 
have already interviewed the man and he seems to promise an intelligent, com- 
petent and rapid approach, which will give results. For everything else I sub- 
scribe to the pronouncement of Wardsworth : "England is a fen of stagnant 
waters." Tlie national fog includes the newspapers. George Taylor said m 
his last article for us that there is a conspiracy of silence in the press about the 
real issues in China. The same is true of Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
Soviet Union. The London metropolitan press no longer deserves its immense 
nineteenth century reputation. It is not that the news is fabricated but that 
it is distorted and partially suppressed in such a manner that the true signifi- 
cance of events does not come through. ^ ^ , 

The other night w^e went to an extremely interesting dinner of the Central 
Asian Society, the membership of which is, of course, exaggeratedly die-hard but 
which has more significance at the present moment than it did a few years 
ago The speeches were rabid. Sir Francis Lindley, formerly Ambassador to 
Japan, said that the real issue in the Far East was not between the survival of 
China or the conquest of China by Japan, but between the conquest of China 
by Japan or by Communism. In such a choice the British interest must ob- 
viously lie with Japan. This noble sentiment was loudly hear-heared. It is 
true that Lindley is said to be disgruntled because he was not reappointed to 
Japan, and that tlie meeting was strictly private and not reported to the press, 
but it is also true that every one present regarded him as speaking for the or- 
dained leaders of the British people. You will be pleased to hear that Eleanor 
and I were presented to this choice assemblage from the speakers' table and 
our names applauded. However, I had the pleasure of exchanging paralysed 
expressions with Dame Rachel Crowdy during the speeches. 

All the best from this bedraggled company. 

Yours. ,-,. ,, ^ 

(Signed) Owen Lattimore. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3585 

Exhibit No. 566-F 

(Hand-made letters: IPR) 

The Johns Hopkins University, 

Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, 

Office of the Director, 

,, „, Baltimore, Md., January 10, 1951. 

Mr. William L. Holland, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y. 
Dear Bill : Thank you for your letter of December 13, and for sending me an 
advance copy of the collection of documents on Soviet Far Eastern Policy com- 
piled by William Mandel. I have not had time to go through the documents 
but I read with interest the introductory chapter by Max Beloff I noted 
particularly his definition of the two methods of studying Soviet relations with 
other countries : either setting out the Soviet record "as the Russians see it" • 
or attempting to give a more rounded presentation by giving something of the 
context in which the Russians behave as they do. 

I have passed the copy over to E. H. Carr, who is a visiting lecturer here 
for a couple of months. I have not yet had his comments, except for the fact 
that when I gave him the copy, he remarked that he thought that in general 
Mandel was apt to be lacking in a critical approach. 

From what I have seen of Beloff's work, he is a careful scholar, and I am 
therefore much interested in your proposal to get a later and more extended 
analytical study from him, together with a collection of documents. 
Sincerely as ever, 

(s) Owen 

(t) Owen Lattimorje, Director. 



Exhibit No. 566-G 
Pencilled in : "WLH— You will find this good reading, ECC." 

300 Oilman Hall, The Johns Hopkins University, 

,, . T^ J^aitimore, Md., October 11, 1938. 

Mr. A. J. Grajdanzev, 

San Francisco. 
Dear Andrew : As usual, I have let several letters from you accumulate before 
replying, but I hope this will not deter you from continuing to write often 
because I find them extremely useful and by referring to them I have formed 
a still higher opinion of your judgment of the course of political events all over 
the world. 

First, however, al)out you and Mary. I think you are doing the right thing 
about trying to arrange your own application to get on the quota. It seems to 
me that there is a good chance that this will succeed, and if it does it may 
simplify the problem for Mary. I am assuming, of course, that you will let 
me know without any delay if there is anything whatever that I can do. 

Aext, about the bibliography by Nasu, published by the Japan I. P. R. In view 
'^,.,.^^.^^ t^^t it simply lists titles with practically no comment on contents I 
think It IS unnecessary for us to have a review in PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

I have been comparing your last letter with a note from Chen Han-seng, who 
ascribes the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist to the lack of political firmness— 
especially the lack of a people's front in Czechoslovakia. I assume that since 
you also anticipated the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist, either with or without 
-tJritish and French support, you must also have detected this weakness. I confess 
my own judgment was not so accurate. Up to the last minute it seemed to me 
that even the defeatist groups in Czechoslovakia itself and in France and in 
c^reat Britain had been maneuvered into a position which made "peace at any 
price" impossible. 

Naturally I agree with you that even if one had counted on the betrayal of 
Czechoslovakia, it would have been impossible to predict the shameless and 
intamous manner of the betrayal. This being the case, it is at least a good thing 
that Hitler s recent speech told the British whom they may have in their govern- 
ment and whom they may not have. This pretty well destroys the Chamberlain 



3586 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

claim to "peace with honor" because it so iusoleutly emphasizes the dishonor. 
Moreover, the full extent of the British and French defeat is rapidly becoming 
visible, and it is a good thing that this should be realized at once. For even the 
Chamberlain assumption that Hitler will not be cautiht in a channel which leads 
him away from Western Europe and straight toward the Soviet Union is now 
being disproved. In fact, the Soviet Union is not being either encircled or 
isolated but both its political position and its strategic position have been un- 
doubtedly strengthened. Politically the Soviet Union is now free of treacherous 
and undependable alliances. At the same time Hitler and Mussolini now have to 
face the choice: whether to attack a country which is unmistakably prepared 
to defend itself or to go on attacking Great Britain and France, which have 
just as unmistakably shown that they can be bullied and robbed. In the circum- 
stances, there can hardly be a doubt. It is Britain and France which will lose, 
not the' Soviet Union. Moreover, Great Britain and France will have to start 
sacrificing their own interests, as the supply of victims like Czechoslovakia and 
Spain is running out. (Even in Czechoslovakia and Spain, of course, it is not 
only the Czechs and the Spanish who lose but the British and French also. ) How- 
ever, it is possible that the next major encroachments will not actually be in 
Western Europe but in the Near East and the Far East. In China it is highly 
probable that the Japanese will disguise their failure to secure a sweeping victory 
over tlie Chinese by bullying the British and French out of Shanghai and Hong- 
kong, forcing them to close the Canton and Indochina routes of military supplies 
to China. In this case what China loses will be nothing to what the British and 
French lose, for the Chinese are now in a position in which the supply of foreign 
munitions (always exaggerated in importance by most connuentators) is day by 
day of less importance than the internal organization of the Chinese people itself. 
Lack of British and French support will force the Kuomintang wing of the United 
Front to take pi-ecisely those measures which have already been proved effica- 
cious in the North and* which the Kuomintang would have avoided as long as it 
could rely on British and French aid. 

In strategic questions the Soviet Union is also strengthened. It does not have 
to defend the awkward salient of Czechoslovakia but can dig itself in on its 
own frontier, while any attack from Europe will have to move a long way from 
the Fascist centers of strength and pass through the doubtful areas of east 
Europe and the Balkans where all kinds of national and other rivalries, though 
perhai)s driven underground by the temporary gain of Germany in strength and 
prestige, will continue to smolder. In the Far East, also, it is almost to be 
hoped that the Japanese will .succeed in taking Hankow — after suitably heavy 
losses, of course ; for this would at last demonstrate that even Hankow cannot 
be made a "decisive" victory by Japan but only expose the Japanese to increased 
perils on both flanks as popular resistance is organized south of the Yangtze and 
the already organized popular resistance in the north develops to even more 
effective forms of warfare. In this latter regard the taking of Hankow would 
divert all or most of the munitions received from the Soviet Union into the 
strategic area of the Eighth Route Army which has until now been starved of 
them. This means two things : A shorter distance to be traversed from the Soviet 
Union, and probably a more effective employment of the munitions by the Eighth 
Route Army than by the main armies of Chiang Kai-shek. 

In short, dangerous as the situation is all over the world (including North and 
South America, where the results of the Munich betrayal cannot but strengthen 
agents of reaction) I cannot see any possibility of the simultaneous attack from 
east and west which alone could threaten the Soviet Union. There are certain 
parallels and of course many differences between the "isolation" of the Soviet 
Union and the "isolation" of the United States which I do not know how to assess 
properly. 

In the meantime, we are settling down very happily here in Baltimore and 
looking forward to an extremely interesting winter. 
Yours ever, 

(t) Owen Lattimobe. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3587 

Exhibit No. 556-H 

(Initials) CHS. KM.i 
SuNsm' Fakm, 
Lee, Mass., August 8, 1938. 
Owen Lattimore, Esq., 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 

Dear Owen : Needless to say Holland and I appreciated greatly your letter of 
the 28th, Fred will be telling you on your arrival in San Francisco of Takayan- 
agi's visit and the serious situation which has arisen between the Japanese 
Council on the one hand and the Chairman of the Pacific Council and the Secre- 
tary General on the other. 

Where we have made mistakes we want to rectify them. Where disagreement 
is due entirely to misunderstanding we want to get complete understanding. It 
is a fairly complicated situation because at the moment British and Dutch 
cooperation in the Secretariat Inquiry is partly conditioned by whether or not 
the Japanese Council itself cooperates. 

Holland and I feel that every possible adjustment should be made that does 
not impair either the project or the integrity of the International Secretariat's 
capacity to serve all of the Councils. As Fred will have told you Takayanagi was 
never more friendly, clear, or sincere. He has made a very deep impression on 
me. He has come on a very difiicult errand. 

Speaking of Takayanagi, Dr. Dafoe wrote me on July 25th as follows : 

"For him personally I have, of course, the highest respect. Privately I have 
no doubt he needs our sympathy and understanding ; and to the extent that it 
can be done without capitulation, we must show him respect, attention and 
consideration." 

In view of this situation and in view of the fact that it is a matter of common 
knowledge that Amerasia was founded to "take a line," Holland and I feel 
that the position of the International Secretariat will be stronger if you drop off 
of the board of Amerasia. I have just wired you therefore as follows : 

"Many thanks for yours twenty-sixth. Holland self generally support your 
view on your role as expert and would not urge you seriously restrict your writ- 
ing. But we both feel your official connection with Amerasia is legitimate 
Japanese ground for complaint and in view of present strained relations would 
urge you consider resigning from board at an early date and for experimental 
period of say three months refrain from contributing signed articles to Amerasia." 

We hope that this is not making an unfair request. We do not wish you to 
restrict your writing except for what we feeel is the expression of rather 
definitely provocative personal opinions as in your recent review of the Utley 
pamphlet. 

Field will doubtless be showing you the papers he has which set forth the 
Japanese objections. 

Borton has the theory that between the time that the Japanese Council pub- 
lished its acceptance of the Secretariat project in the Annual Report of the In- 
ternational Association, and the sending of Viscount Ishii's cable of protest to 
Dafoe and me, some very stiff action must have been taken against the Japanese 
I. P. R. either by the war office or the foreign office. 

Yasuo is still optimistic and still believes that, when the Japanese Council 
realise that the Inquiry is not intended to name aggressors and is not intended 
to make findings and judgments and that we generally desire Japanese coopera- 
tion, they will cooperate. 

Hoping to hear from you soon, I am 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Caeteb. 



88348— 52— pt. 10 21 



3588 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 566-1 

(Initials) wlh. km. For advice. 

300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, 

Baltimore, Md., March 9, 1939. 
Mr. F. V. Field, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City. 
Dear Fred: Thanks very much indeed for your note about the good old 
Amerasia question. You have put very clearly the one essential question : that 
my vFithdrawal would be an admission that Amerasia is an activity not in keep- 
ing with the work of the IPR or its staff. I guess I was groping toward this, 
but had not quite grasped it. I wish I had put it more clearly in my letter to 
Carter. This makes it all the more essential, I think, that you and Carter and 
I should talk this over altogether at the same time, a thing I do not think we 
have yet done. 

In the meantime, however, I think that if Chi is appointed to Carter's staff, 
you could go ahead and withdraw my name. 
(Pencilled in: Agree WLH.) 
Very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 
OL:Y. 



Exhibit No. 566-J 

(Pencilled in) "Copies: Tarr, Holland." 

Royal York Hotel, 
Toronto, November IJf, 1938. 
Owen Lattimore, Esq., 

300 Oilmore Hall, the Johns Hopkins University, 

Baltimore, Md. 

Dear Owen : I have been discussing with Dafoe and Tarr the whole question 
of freedom in writing and speaking on the part of members of the Secretariat, 
in view of the possibility that the whole matter may be aired at the January 
meeting of the Pacific Council. Tarr commented on your role as editor in the 
following terms. He does not favor making Pacific Affairs neutral, but rather 
making it more lively, fundamental, and provocative. He suggests, for example, 
that instead of putting your most challenging articles into Amerasia or else- 
where, you put them into Pacific Affairs, sending an advance manuscript to the 
Council that might take exception so as to permit of simultaneous publication 
of the ablest comment or counter statement by the Council concerned. If it is 
absolutely impossible to get the reply in time, provocative articles by the editor 
should have a conspicuous foreword indicating that the editor is aware that his 

views are likely to be seriously challenged by members of Council, and 

that therefore an advance copy of the article has been sent to that Council 
with an urgent invitation for a full reply in time for publication in the next 
issue. Tarr thinks it is very important to make it clear to the whole I. P. R. 
constituency that the editor has made every effort to be inclusive and to get the 
fullest and ablest contributions from Japanese and from believers in the Japa- 
nese cause, so that if the Japanese do not play ball, there will be prima facie 
evidence that they are suffering simply through default. 

Tarr and I would like to have your reaction to this proposal. You and Hol- 
land and I are in an extraordinarily difficult position as the servants and em- 
ployees of eleven Councils with as disparate and antithetical views as charac- 
terize these Councils at the present time. It may be that we will have to confess 
one day that the I. P. R. was conceived in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of fi*ee 
inquiry and that it can no longer be sponsored by Councils in countries where 
this tradition has been repudiated. In the meantime, the actual position is 
that we are responsible to all eleven Councils and are obliged to do our best 
to give the fullest expression to the views they hold. 

With reference to your note commenting on McWilliams' letter, I have a ter- 
rible feeling that I suggested that you delete the allusion to the fjict that Japan 
and Russia have been the least responsive to your repeated appeals for coopera- 
tion. In doing so, I was by indirection proposing something which is contrary 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3589 

to Tarr's present proposal that we not only continue to invite Japanese contribu- 
tions, but publicize the fact that we have repeatedly sought them. 

Since talking with Tarr and Dafoe, I have received this copy of your immensely 
interesting "hypotlienuse" article with the indication that it has been submitted 
to Anierasia subject to my approval. I do not approve of its going to Amerasia 
over your signature in its present form, because I do not think it is cricket for 
the editor of Pacific Affairs, even in his private capacity, to indulge in ridicule 
of the youth of Japan who have been driven off to fight in China. The "flying 
trapeeze" paragraph is so gorgeous that I hate to object to it, but object I think 
I must. 

As a means of making Tarr's suggestion concrete, I am wondering what you 
would consider to be the pros and cons of sending this article by the first steamer 
to Saionji, indicating that it is the best analysis of the situation you can make 
in the light of Asiatic history and present world forces. You could then state 
that you would like to publish in the same issue the work of whatever writer 
the Japanese Council feels is best qualified to put forward an able challenge to 
this thesis, with a view to giving the Pacific Affairs public throughout the world 
the soundest possible basis for making up their own minds on the question. 

If you should decide to send it, there are one or two other points at which it 
should be edited, as at the moment it is addressed to an American and not to an 
international audience. My only other comment on the article, which has nothing 
to do with the foregoing, is whether in the light of the recent statement by R. A. 
Butler, Under Secretary for Foreign xVffairs, in the Hoiise of Commons explain- 
ing that the British Government is not planning to invest in reconstruction under 
Japanese rule, there should not be a slight twist to the phrase you use on page 4. 
Of course, as you have written it, you are very cagey, for you simply say that the 
British are "talking about" investing. I do not for a moment believe that Butler's 
statement removes the possibility that they may actually do so. 

Have you ever dropped in to see the immaculate Suma, Counselor of the 
Japanese Embassy in Washington, who was so long in Nanking and such an in- 
timate friend of Matsumoto? He is reputed to be an exceedingly able person 
and has been abroad enough to know how to state things in terms intelligible to 
the western world. Would there be any point in interesting him in writing for 
Pacific Affairs, adopting the Chatham House device for Foreign Office reviewers, 
a nom de plume? 

Sincerely yours, 

(t) Edward C. Carter. 



Exhibit No. 566-K 

October 26, 1936. 
Mr. Owen Lattimore, 

Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, 
London, S. W. I. England. 
Dear Owen : Here is a clipping from yesterday's New York Times on a sub- 
ject which was of interest to you sometime ago. Can't you find somebody in 
London who can write a first rate article on British communications with the 
Far East, both commercial and military. 
Best regards. 

Sincerely yours, 

Frederick V. Field. 



Exhibit No. 566-L 

[Telegram] 

Lee, Mass., August 20. 
(Initialled: L F ) 
Owen Lattimore, 

1795 California Street, 

Saji Francisco, Calif. : 
Do not understand Amerasia mix-up on Review but congratulate Axnerasia for 
printing it. In view developments here this week desire withdraw at least 
temporarily suggestion you resign Amerasia Board. We can discuss that on your 
arrival. 

E. C. Carter. 



3590 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 566-M 

300 GiLMAN Hall, Johns Hopkins Universitt, 

Baltimore, Md., March 8, 19S9. 
Mr. F. V. Field, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City. 

Dear Fred : Recently Carter wrote to me bringing up once more the question 
of my resigning from Amerasia. I have been cudgeling my brains about this 
and I wonder if you will agree that the following are the salient i)oints to be 
considered : 

Carter says that this would be a good time for me to withdraw when the Secre- 
tariat is not actually under fire from Japan ; Carter adds that he is considering 
giving a Secretariat appointment to Chi ; apparently, as Chi is a Chinese, it would 
not be necessary to ask him to resign from Amerasia; at the same time Carter 
thinks it would be a bit too much to have two members of the International 
Secretariat on the Board of Amerasia, and this is a further reason for asking me 
to resign. 

Points on the other side : 

Your main reason originally for asking me to join Amerasia was that it would 
indicate that there was no rivalry between the two publications. This argument 
still holds. In fact, if I were to withdraw now, it might be taken to mean that a 
strain had developed between Am,erasia and Pacific Affairs. 

As regards withdrawing from Amerasia while not under fire, that is a perfectly 
good point, but on the other hand, it seems to me that by doing so a perfectly 
good bargaining counter would be wasted. If the Japanese dislike my remaining 
on Amerasia as much as all that, it might turn out that there would be a quid pro 
quo which they would offer to get me off. 

Of course, the think taken as a whole is much more psychological than anything 
else anyhow. I should hate being hustled off Amerasia by Japanese importunity 
when the Japanese are treating free speech and opinion the way they are in their 
own country. Yet I also hate the idea of neatly ducking out of the line of fire 
during a lull in controversy. 

So much for my point of view. What about yours? I wish we could consult, 
but failing that I am herewith giving you authority to withdraw my name from 
the editorial board of Amerasia if Chi should be appointed to Carter's staff. If 
something should go wrong with that arrangement, then the whole question will 
not be so urgent and I may have an opportunity to discuss this with you and 
Carter at the same time a little later on. I am sending a copy of this letter to 
Carter. 

Yours very sincerely, 

Owen Lattimore. 

OL: Y. 



Exhibit No. 566-N 
Pacific Affairs 
Published Quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations 
In pencil : note and ret. to ECC. 

300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, 

Baltimore, Md., March 8, 1939. 
Mr. E. C. Carter, 

Institute of Paciflc Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, 
New York City. 
Dear Carter: I am sorry to have taken so long replying to your letter sug- 
gesting again my resignation from Amerasia. I have written to Eleanor about 
this, and today I have written to Fred Field, as you will see from the attached 
carbon copy. The trouble is I am a i>erson of excessively vacillating character, 
as you have already discovered, and hate having to make a decision while I am 
off on my own without anyone to consult. The letter to Field gives what seems 
to me the chief pros and cons of the question. As you see, I have authorized 
him to take my name off in case you should confirm your decision to appoint 
Chi to your staff. This ought to take care of any emergency aspects of the 



ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3591 

question, and the other aspects I should like to be able to discuss with you and 
Field simultaneously, as you are both concerned in addition to myself. 
Yours very sincerely, 

(s) Owen Lattimore 
(t) Owen Lattimore. 
OL:Y. 



Exhibit No. 566-P 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 
New York City, February 15, 1939. 
Owen Lattimore, Esq., 

c/o Presidents House, Q-rinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa. 
Dear Owen : In your letter to W. Macmahon Ball of February 6, you write the 
following : 

"I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the 
original with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a 
general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can 
reprove me when I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentle- 
man." 
In your Pacific Affairs report to the Pacific Council at I'rinceton you vei7 
kindly said : 

"Mr. Carter was consulted on all material that differed in the slightest 

from the ordinary routine; and this of course meant that his colleagues 

were also drawn into consultation." 

Under these circumstances and in view of our earlier correspondence, I am 

wondering whether the time has not now come for you to withdraw from the 

Amerasia board. I remember that you were willing to do so last year, but that I 

withdrew my request because I heard that the Japanese were undertaking 

economic reprisals against the I. P. R. in San Francisco. 

Now that relations are, for the time being at least, established once more on 
a basis of confidence and cooperation between the International Secretariat and 
the Japanese Council, I am wondering whether it would require any great self- 
sacrifice on your part to withdraw from the Amerasia Board. 

One of the reasons for my raising this matter at this time is that I am now 
inviting Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve for a number of months as a member of the 
International Secretariat. For perfectly obvious reasons I do not wish to ask 
him to withflraw from the Amerasia Board. I do feel, however, that having 
botli you and Chi publicized as on the Amerasia* Board is open to question. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Caktee. 



Exhibit No. 566-Q 

129 East Fiftt-second Street, 
New York' City, August 10, 1938. 
Confidential. 

Owen Lattimore, Esq., 

1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. 

Dear Owexn : As you will read between the lines, what I am trying to do is : 
(1) To make a few minor concessions so as to see whether efforts at face-saving 
are efficacious; (2) to clear up misunderstandings between the Secretary-Gen- 
eral and Tokyo; (3) to apologize for any mistakes, if mistakes have been made; 
(4) to preserve all that is essential. 

As you know, from the very start there has been a misunderstanding between 
Fred and me about your role on Amerasia. He thought in the very first instance 
that my saying that there was no objection to his talking to you about Amerasia 
meant that I approved of his inviting you to serve on the Amerasia board. I was 
surprised when I first learnt that you had accepted a position on the board. 
I was not only surprised but disapproved. I was reluctant to raise the issue at 
the time and still am. Why should I be cracking down on free speech when I 
am attacking more highly placed persons all over the world for doing the same 
thing? 

I am