(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first[-second] session .."

^ 



^ 



cM>. 



^^^i)..i^.L^^ K 



: \\^\\\ 




t 



3^ 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER 

INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



PART 11 



MARCH 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 25, AND 27, 1952 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




yjpifrfn Biwn i oo Bi i mnu 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
S8318 WASHINGTON : 1952 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, Nortli Dakota 

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Wasliington HOMER FERGUSON, Micliigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana 

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utali 

WILLIS SMITH, Nortli Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON. New Jersey 

J. G. SoDRwiNE,' Counsel 



Internal Security Subcommittee 

PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 



Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, .Mississippi, Chairman 
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan 

Robert Morbis, Special Counsel 
Benjamin Maxdel, Director of Research 

II 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — Page 

Chi, Harriet Lavine 3949 

Fairbank, John K 3715 

Greene, Jerome D -_ 3849 

Holland, William L 3889 

Lockwood, William W 3862 

Matusow, Harvey M 3823 

Rowe, Professor David N 3967 

Thorner, Daniel 3955 

III 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



MONDAY, MABCH 10, 1953 

United States Senate, 
sxjbcommittee to in^^stigate the administration 

OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 12 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, 
Senate Office Buildin<?, Hon. Pat McCarran, presiding. 

Present : Senators McCarran and Smith. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris, 
subcommittee counsel ; and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Before the hearing with respect to Mr. Lattimore is 
called to order, may I call attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that 
another witness, Mr. John K. Fairbank, has been subpenaed to appear 
at this time, on the expectation that by this time we would have con- 
cluded hearing Mr. Lattimore's testimony. 

I should like respectfully to ask the Chair briefly to open a record 
on Mr. Fairbank, for the purpose of determining if he is here in 
response to the subpena and instructing him with respect to returning. 

The Chairman. We will suspend the hearing on Mr. Lattimore 
momentarily so that Mr, Fairbank may make his presence known, if he 
is here. 

Mr. Fairbank. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am here, sir, but not in response to subpena; in 
response to a request to be heard. 

The Chairman, Very well. 

Were you not subpenaed ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that Mr. Fair- 
bank be instructed to return at 3 o'clock tomorrow for his executive 
session. 

The Chairman. Is that convenient for you, Mr. Fairbank ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; it can be done. 

The Chairman. That is about as convenient as we can possibly con- 
jecture here at this hearing now, if you will kindly return at 3 o'clock 
tomorrow afternoon for executive session. 

Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Chairman, Mr, Fairbank has furnished the 
committee with a voluntary statement, and I now ask that this state- 
ment be admitted into the record at this time. 

3715 



3716 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

The Chairman. The statement will be admitted in the record. 

(The statement referred to was read by John K. Fairbank, 41 
Winthrop Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., on March 12, 1952.) 

The Chairman. Let me make this statement in connection with the 
statement presented, and all others from now on : It will not be read 
by the witness. Under the rule of the committee and under the rule 
of the Senate, it will be submitted to the committee and its staff for 
consideration, and interrogation will follow the witness' presence 
here tomorrow in executive session. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that this statement 
is admitted as a part of the record in the executive hearings ? I think 
that ought to be clear. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

Senator Smfth. Therefore, it will not be made public now ; is that 
right? 

The Chairman. It will not be made public now. 

Mr. Fairbank. Do I understand, Mr. Chairman, that it will be paix 
of the public record later? 

The Chairman. That is a matter the committee will have to deter- 
mine. 

At the present time it will be in executive hearings. 

Mr. Fairbank. Then may I enter a protest for not being allowed to 
make that public statement, sir? 

The Chairman. You may enter your protest, if you want it, but the 
rule is as I have stated. 

Senator Smith. I judge that what Mr. Fairbank is raising is 
whether or not he will be prohibited from giving that statement after 
he testified in executive session. 

Is that what you want to do ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would like to have the opportunity to present it 
in the public session, if I may. 

The Chairman. That is a matter the committee will have to con- 
sider and determine. 

Do you want Mr. Fairbank sworn at this time, Mr. Sourwine ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I do not think it is necessary, sir. We can do that 
when he comes in for executive session. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

(Thereupon, at 2 : 10 p. m., the committee proceeded to other busi- 
ness.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1952 

U:nited States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Seclrity Act and Other Internal 
SECURiTr Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 :30 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 
424, Senate Office Building, Hon. WiUis Smith presiding. 

Present : Senators Smith, Watkins, and Ferguson. 

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin 
Mandel, research director. 

Senator Smith, The hearing will come to order. 

I would like to say that Senator McCarran is not able to be here 
this morning, so he asked me to open the hearing and preside, at least, 
for the time being, until he can get here. 

The other day when Mr. Fairbank was here, Chairman McCarran 
made a ruling as to the admission of statements. He has talked to 
me over the phone about that, and he wishes me to make this state- 
ment: 

One of the problems that this committee is concerned with and has 
to face is the bulk of the record, and the recent statement which we 
have gone over was a very bulky document with many charges and 
accusations against committee members and others. 

The committee has felt that in the future we should accept no state- 
ments except the statements, oral statements, made under questioning 
by this committee. 

However, the witness this morning, Mr. Fairbank, had had no notice 
of the committee's decision to restrict statements to be received by the 
committee, even though statements may be submitted to the committee 
and filed for future reference. 

So Senator McCarran wishes me to say that, lest there be some mis- 
apprehension, in perfect good faith, on the part of Mr. Fairbank and 
others, as to the committee's ruling the other day, we are going to 
allow Mr. Fairbank to read the statement and then he will be cross- 
examined on the statement as we go along and at the end of it. But 
that is not a change in the decision of the committee concerning the 
future not to allow statements to be read verbatim because of the 
great length of time it takes and the possibility that a witness who 
is not acting in good faith might load the committee up with such 
tremendous bulk that we could never finish this job. 

But for the present, Mr. Fairbank will be allowed to read his state- 
ment and then he will be examined. It may be that there will be 
breaks in the statement at which we can stop him and have cross- 
examination on a part of it. 

3717 



3718 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

There is one thing that yon have not done that you should have done, 
Mr. Fairbank. Under the rules of the Senate, there should have been 
enough copies filed for one for each Senator. Do you have extra copies 
here which you could pass around to us now ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir, Senator. I just gave, I believe to Mr. 
Manclel 

Mr. Morris. You sent in three or four copies to the Senators just 
this morning. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, and I believe previously I sent in one a week or 
10 days ago, and two on Monday morning. 

Senator Smith. How many is that all together that you have sent in ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Three previous to today, and I just gave three, I 
think, a moment ago. 

Senator Ferguson. We have seven members, Mr. Fairbank. 

Senator Smith. We have seven members besides the members of the 
staff. Therefore, we need several more copies . of your statement. 
Do you have some available now ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir; I do. 

Senator Smith. Will you let us have those ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir. 

Senator Watkins. For the purpose of the record, since you made 
the statement about the ruling of the committee, I want to say that I 
was not present when that ruling was made, and I did not know there 
was going to be any such ruling. 

I have heretofore stated that this is a seven-man committee and 
that I make up my own mind on whatever is to be done here, and I 
may be overruled by the majority. 

But I was not present, I did not know such a ruling was going to be 
made. I have a feeling that when a witness comes before the com- 
mittee and seems to go out of his way to be contemptuous of the 
committee and abuse the committee from the very first, almost the very 
first, sentence, that he is offering in his statement, that there may be 
some consideration to refusing him to submit insults to the committee 
and to the Senate, and to the people who send the Senators here. After 
all, we are speaking for them. 

But I feel on the whole that witnesses should be given a pretty fair 
latitude, particularly when their reputations have been questioned, to 
make some answers as they would like to make within the rules of 
decency and fair play. 

I do not think they should be permitted to come in and accuse a lot 
of other people, unless they have the evidence to back it up, and I do 
not think they should be permitted to abuse the Senate. 

Senator Smith. I may say to the Senator that my cursory examina- 
tion of the first part of Mr. Fairbank's statement does not seem to be 
of quite the flavor of Professor Lattimore's statement. 

Senator Watkins. I think it is entirely different, from what I have 
read of it. 

Senator Smith. What did you say? 

Senator Watkins. I said I think it is entirely different, from what 
I have read of it. 

Senator Smith. Of course, I think we all have to be reminded that 
one of the procedures so frequently adopted, as was demonstrated in 
the Communist case before Judge Medina in New York, the Com- 
munist case in California, the hearing going on now before the Sub- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3719 

versive Board, and perhaps that has been tried before this committee, 
is to vilify and abuse the committee with the hope that attention may 
be distracted from the person who is being examined, if there is any- 
thing against him. 

I think all of us who had any experience in trying a lawsuit know 
that one of the favorite stunts of anybody charged, or his counsel 
charged, is to try the prosecuting attorney or some witness on the other 
side. So I did not take too seriously, although I resented them, the 
suggestions of Professor Lattimore. 

But I do wish that Mr. Fairbank may have every opportunity to 
explain anything he wishes to say about the facts. After all, what 
we are here to do is to collect facts. 

I can realize that a person whose name may have been mentioned in 
one of these matters cannot quite stick to the facts always because 
human emotions are involved. 

But I do want to be certain that Mr. Fairbank may have every op- 
portunity to state any fact that he wishes to. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to finish my statement. 

I wanted to make the statement now because, as I heard the state- 
ment that the Chair made, as I understood it, it may refer to cases 
coming in the future. I want to be on record now that I do not agree 
with the point that they cannot read these statements. But, with 
some reasonable limitation on the matter that I mentioned, that they 
cannot come in here and insult the Senate and the committee from the 
very first. 

If they have a fair statement and want to give a factual statement, 
I do not see any reason why they should not read it. 

I would not want to be bound by what was said here on any future 
rulings on any future witnesses, because we may have a lot of witnesses 
here before we finish these hearings, not only this hearing but other 
hearings. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I feel this way about a state- 
ment : The witness should understand that what he is filing he is 
willing to swear to. You see, when these statements are prepared, 
they are not sworn to and they are filed. But if a witness is willing 
and it is competent and relevant evidence rather than just conclu- 
sion that a witness has, he ought to be able to put it before the com- 
mittee as sworn testimony. 

I think that is what we are facing this morning. If the witness 
does not read it, then it is not really sworn testimony, and it gets 
into our record and becomes a part of the official record. But it is 
never sworn to. 

Then you come to the question, let us say, of immunity. As soon 
as it becomes a part of our record, he has the right of immunity even 
though it is not sworn to. Our practice in this particular hearing 
has always been that the witnesses are always sworn. 

Mr. Fairbank yesterday, when I presided in an executive session, 
was sworn. Of course at that time I did not know of the state- 
ment having been filed because I was not present when it was put 
into the record the other day. 

But if a man is willing to read a statement, under his oath, that 
is one thing, and if it is material and relevant. I do not think we 
ought to just take a statement and put it in the record and make 
it a part of the official record when a man is not swearing to it. 



3720 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Therefore, I think he ought to read it so that we can cross-examine 
him as he goes along. I noticed here that he was complaining of 
hearsay. 

Senator Smith. Before we get to the body of it, do you not think 
the witness might go ahead, and then we will cross-examine him? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I3ut I think we ought to examine whether 
his statements are hearsay, because that is the only way you can tell 
what the facts are. 

Senator Smith. I think Senator McCarran's ruling the other day, 
because I was present and I quite agreed with him, that we should 
not take up the tim^ of the committee reading long, long statements 
that will keep up from ever finishing these hearings, is rather im- 
portant. But apparently Mr. Fairbank's statement is 17 pages, with 
some exhibits, whereas Professor Lattimore's statement was some 
50 pages with a great deal of abuse in it. 

But now I am sure Mr. Fairbank understands that everything he is 
submitting in his statement is sworn testimony for which he is re- 
sponsible as an individual. 

Mr. Fairbank. I should be sworn now, I believe, too. 

Senator Smith. We will do that. Will you stand and raise your 
right hand, please ? 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give in this 
hearing before a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the 
United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIEBANK, CAMBEIDGE, MASS., 
ACCOMPANIED BY EICHARD WAIT, ESQ. 

Mr. Wait. Should I identify myself ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Wait. Richard Wait, of the firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart, in 
Boston, counsel for Mr. Fairbank. 

Senator Smith. All right. I do not know, Mr. Wait, whether you 
know the rules under which we have been allowing counsel to partici- 
pate here. 

Mr. Wait. My understanding is that I am not to interrupt. 

Senator Smith. That is it. If the witness wishes to ask you some- 
thing as to his rights, and whether he should answer this or that ques- 
tion or not, then he is to have the right to ask you that question. But 
you are not to prompt his answers. 

Mr. Wait. I will not prompt his answers. 

Senator Smith. And you will not attempt to suggest answers to 
him. I am sure that you can understand the committee has to have 
that sort of a rule because sometimes we have counsel that are not 
hesitant about being obstreperous in places they should not be, per- 
haps. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think also if counsel wants to 
ask a question, if he will put it to the Chair, the Chair will then rule 
as to whether or not it ought to be asked, and the Chair will ask it 
or not ask it, as the Chair believes relevant. 

Mr. Wait. It is entirely within the decision of the Chair. I will 
not be obstreperous. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3721 

Senator Sjviith. All right, sir. Mr. Fairbank, you will proceed. 

Mr. Fairbank. Some 7 months ago this subcommittee began its in- 
vestigation of the question whether subversive Communist influence on 
our far eastern policy may have operated through the Institute of 
Pacific Relations. Many accusations have been made by witnesses 
and many documents read into the record. Having been accused of 
communism by witnesses last August and having requested a hearing 
at that time, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and testify 
in answer to those accusations. 

Throughout these hearings the subcommittee has been grappling 
with the problems posed b}^ Communist subversion. We know today 
that this is a real and vitally serious problem. Communist totali- 
tarianism stands fully exposed as a form of statism which would 
trample down the legal safeguards of the individual and grind all 
persons under the heel of an all-powerful government. We Ameri- 
cans are basically opposed to statism — Nazi, Communist, or any other 
kind, I should like to quote briefly a statement on "Freedom of 
Speech" inserted in the Congressional Record last October 2 by Sena- 
tor Bridges and 24 other Senators, including Senator Ferguson, Sena- 
tor Jenner, and Senator Watkins of this subcommittee 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, the Chair observes right here an 
illustration of what Senator McCarran had in mind about loading 
the record with extraneous matters. 

This is not a statement of fact as to whether or not you ought to 
be suspected or charged. This a precise illustration of one of the 
difficulties the committee has met in wishing to give everybody a full 
chance to be heard, and yet being faced with quotations from the 
Congressional Record or what somebody said. 

I mention that now because I am sure that I want to be very clear 
why such a ruling must be recognized and enforced in the future to 
prevent just such statements that have no bearing on the facts in 
3'Our particular case. 

Mr. Fairbank. I should be happy to shorten this quotation. 

Senator Ferguson. It has been read on the Senate floor and it is 
familiar to the Senators. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. My object is to call attention to the state- 
ment of the Senators, which I think is an excellent statement in sup- 
port of the freedom of speech. 

So I will omit this quotation, although I think it is an excellent 
quotation, and I put it in here because I support it. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Fairbank, when you come to the question 
of the freedom of speech, it is your freedom and the other people's 
freedoms. It concerns both freedoms, is that not right ? 

JSIr. Fairbank. Yes, indeed. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you feel that j^ou have the same 
right to say things in this hearing, even though they might be con- 
sidered by the other people to be accusations, is that not correct ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; if I feel the}^ are true. 

Senator Ferguson. Because 3'ou start out by saying, "Many ac- 
cusations have been made by witnesses * * *." That all depends 
upon the viewpoint of the witness, is that not true ? 

A person who thinks a statement is false says it is an accusation. 
The person who makes the statement and contends it is true does not 
say it is an accusation. He says it is the truth, does he not ? 



3722 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. That is true psychologically. I don't want to argue 
about this. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to know your view on it. That is why 
I stated it. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think there are statements that can be called 
factual, more factual, and other statements that can be called more 
accusatory. For example, a hearsay statement, it seems to me, is 
more in the nature of being accusatory. 

Senator Ferguson. But if the person says and designates that it 
is hearsay, and the committee wants to accept it, that is something 
else. You see, there is no rule here in the committee, and I think that 
is something worth w^liile knowing, saying that you cannot receive 
hearsay. 

For instance, in courts of law certain hearsay statements are admis- 
sible. One of them is when a man was born. He can state when he 
was born by what somebody told him. Do you understand ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. So hearsay is a relative term. So you get down 
here on the case of whether we want to admit hearsay. We may say 
that hearsay, under the circumstances, is good evidence, and we may 
say it is bad evidence. 

For instance, this statement, I think, that you put in here is hearsay 
about this Congressional Record. Or did you read it yourself ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I read it from a sheet of the Congressional Record. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you have knowledge that it was in the 
Record ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I do not feel that I am coming here to make accusa- 
tions in the sense that I understand them. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume that that is true. And you say a state- 
ment here now under oath, you say it is because you believe it to be 
true, is that not right ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. May I make one observation of the witness? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. About that understanding that we have freedom 
of speech in this country, when witnesses go before a tribunal such as a 
court, for instance, they do not have complete freedom of speech. 
They are not free to go in there and berate the court and abuse the 
court in the presence of the court, or all respect for institutions would 
fall down. 

So they do not have the freedom to say anything they please to the 
judge and the court. They might get outside and say it, but they do 
not say it in his presence in the courtroom. So you are coming before 
a tribimal of the United States Senate. It is not a court, it is an 
investigating group which sometimes may hear hearsay evidence that 
may lead to other evidence. That is the investigatory process. It is 
not a case like when you are on trial where you have certain rights to 
present your case this way or that way. It is just one of those matters 
that is incidental to investigations. 

Sometimes people are accused of things because it comes out in the 
investigation. We do not pass judgment on whether the accusations 
are right or wrong, true or false, but we do have to hear them. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, you understand that all testimony 
taken before this committee has been sworn testimony ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3723 

Mr. Faikbank. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. And yon nnderstand, of conrse, as long as this com- 
mittee requires a witness who is to testify to be sworn, that that is all 
tlie committee can do. The committee cannot guarantee the truth or 
untruth of his statements. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am fully aware, and I fully support the concept 
that a senatorial investigation cannot be bound by judicial procedure. 
It must be absolutely free to admit any sort of evidence. 

Senator Smith. I do not mean that. I meant that when this com- 
mittee requires a person to be sworn, to tell the truth before they do 
testify, that is as far as this committee can go toward being responsible 
for the truth or untruth of the testimony. You, of course, understand 
that. 

We do not know this morning whether you are going to tell the 
truth or not. We have presumed that you would tell the truth. But 
somebody that you may make some statement against may say it is not 
the truth. Therefore, all we can do is to swear you to tell the truth. 

When we have done that, we have done all we can do. 

My. Faikbaxk. I think we agree on the principle here. 

Ssnator Smith. All right, let us go ahead, then, and get through 
this statement. 

Mr. Fairbank. Then I will continue after the quotation. 

Senator Smith. The quotation from the Congressional Record is 
just discussing the freedom of speech. If you want to read it, go 
ahead and read it. But we do want to hurry. 

I notice the first six pages of your statement are discussion and 
conclusions, and it is on page 7 before you get to any real facts about 
yourself. But go ahead whichever way you want to do it. 

Mr. Fairbank. This declaration of 25 Senators last October was, of 
course, directed against the danger of Government withholding of 
facts which the American public ought to have. Unless we have 
access to the facts, in all their variety and diversity, our free demo- 
cratic process cannot go on. 

You are of course aware that the IPE, Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, claims to be interested in getting at the facts and making them 
available. It claims — 

to stand for objective fact-finding, free discussion in which many viewpoints 
are represented, and tlie dissemination of reliable up-to-date information. 

The question which this subcommittee has been pursuing is the 
question whether and, if so, how far the IPR may have been sub- 
verted from this worthy aim by conspiratorial Communists, and used 
as a tool to mislead and confuse the American public, and undermine 
our far eastern policy in the Soviet Russian interest. This question 
indicates a fact we must face, that Communist subversion tried to 
make use of freedom of speech in order to set up a statism which, 
once in power, would deny freedom of speech and all our other free- 
dom. The Communist technique of using freedom to subvert freedom 
is more insidious and cunning than any we have faced in the past. 

Americans are beginning to agree that when confronted with the 
"clear and present danger" of this new Communist totalitarian sub- 
version, we must set certain limits to our individual freedoms in order 
to preserve our general freedom. Obviously this doctrine if carried 
to excess could lead us astray. Yet the fundamental dishonesty of 



3724 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the Communist, his effort to seem loyal and democratic while really 
conspiring and obeying a foreign totalitarianism, leave us little al- 
ternative. It is on this basis, I assume, that this committee has felt 
it desirable to admit hearsay testimony as evidence, which is com- 
patible with the fact that this is a legislative fact-finding investiga- 
tion and not a judicial procedure. 

Many Americans facing this problem are reaching the conclusion 
that proved Communists cannot be trusted in positions of responsi- 
bility as teachers any more than they could be as Governmental officials. 
In other words, an honest and loyal Communist does not exist. The 
FBI, the loyalty and security boards, and congressional committees 
each in their own way are therefore investigating American personnel 
in the Government and now to some extent in the research centers and 
universities, including private research agencies such as the IPR. I 
do not see how objection can be raised against the principle that some 
procedure of investigation is desirable in the public interest. _ 

However, the manner of investigation is important. An inefficient 
investigation may do the public interest more harm than good. Un- 
wise procedures may really confuse the issue and weaken us instead 
of getting at the facts. If 1,000 loyal non-Communists were seriously 
damaged in the process of finding one Communist, for example, it 
might prove to be an inefficient operation, not really helping the pub- 
lic interest. 

With these considerations in mind I should like to take myself as 
one example 

Senator Ferguson. Before you take that, I think you have agreed 
in this statement so far that the committee has a right and reallya 
duty to look into the question of whether or not Communists did 
infiltrate the IPK because the IPK was an institution that was trying 
to form opinion in Government as well as opinion among the public. 
Is that not correct? 

Mr. Fairbank. I believe I would not want to make so blanket a 
statement as that. I would be happy to give you my formulation of 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you say here? You say that — 

* * * the Government and now to some extent in the research centers and 
universities, including private research agencies such as the IPR. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I say that because there is investigation going 
on of individuals all of the time, insofar as they are of potential value 
to the Government. The Government is investigating them in order 
to use them. 

Senator Ferguson. But do you not think that the Government has 
a right to investigate an institution like the IPR? 

Mr. Fatrbank. I think the senatorial committee has a right to in- 
vestigate anything, it seems to me. 

Senator Ferguson. But particularly the IPK, where it was taking 
information, distributing among the public, distributing to public 
officials that information? 

For instance, we have an example here of Mr. Carter advising 
them to be sure and get to General Marshall and other people a cer- 
tain book, and to see that certain Senators got it and read it. 

If that was the province, and I say it was the province, if they 
wanted to do it, of the IPE doing that, is it not then proper that the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3725 

Senate of the United States, through this committee, look into the 
question as to whether or not that book — let us take that particular 
book — was written by a person that had pro-Soviet Communist lean- 
ings or even was a Communist? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that is perfectly proper, if the Senate com- 
mittee so decides. 

Senator Ferguson. That, I think, is what they have decided. You 
may proceed. 

]\Ir. Fairbank. I am discussing a matter of judgment in the case. 

Senator Smith. Let us get along. If you can read a little bit faster, 
Mr. Fairbank, it will assist. 

Mr. Fairbank. With these considerations in mind I should like to 
take myself as one example, the example I know most about, and 
indicate, with due respect, certain places where I think the committee 
on reflection may agree that their procedure has caused unnecessary 
damage or failed to gain effective results. I am aware from the rec- 
ord that I am ])robably regarded here with grave suspicion as a Com- 
munist or Communist sympathizer. I challenge such a view in the 
most absolute terms, and I appreciate the chance to testify against it. 

I am a loyal American. I am engaged in one form of American 
free enterprise. My university is a private American corporation 
and I work under it with a responsibility as a professor to use my 
own initiative and ingenuity, to inaugurate and carry on my own re- 
searches, and run my own professional activities. My university 
exercises great care in the selection of professors but, once selected, it 
gives them maximum opportunity to use their own judgment and 
follow their own inspiration in carrying on their work. We believe 
tliat the individual professor can contribute most when given 
both the opportunity and the responsibility of freedom. This 
is the American system. As a China specialist I have been engaged for 
over 20 years in this kind of intellectual enterprise. 

Now I submit that, just as our American process of government 
requires freedom of speech and freedom to criticize the Government, 
as tlie declaration of '25 Senators has stated, so our American process 
of education and research cannot go on without certain freedoms — 
specifically, the freedoms of thought and contact. A China specialist 
like myself must dig into all aspects of a question, just as a news 
reporter should seek to dig into all aspects of a news stoiy. Like a 
journalist, a university research worker must have and exercise free- 
dom of contact — freedom to talk to people of all shades of opinion, 
even when he violently disagrees with them. Only by examining all 
sides can we keep that intellectual grasp on our problems which will 
keep us intellectually better-based and more flexible, adaptable and 
powerful than our totalitarian Communist enemy. 

The point of all this is in my case that I have exercised my American 
freedom of contact througliout my 23 years as a China specialist. 
Year after year I have consistently tried to meet and talk with per- 
sons of all shades of opinion, including Communists and pro-Com- 
munists. I have considered this my duty, and I feel sure that on reflec- 
tion tliis committee will not question the necessity that a China special- 
ist under our American system should have such freedom of contact. 
Contact with all sorts of persons is especially necessary for sound 
study of a foreign area, like China, on which we need all the informa- 
tion we can ffet. 



3726 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. That brings us to the point, then, of agreeing 
with you that you have and should have this right of contact. Then 
there should never be any question on the part of a witness to be 
examined on those contacts and, if it is true, freely admit that he had 
contacts with Communists, pro-Communists, and so forth. Is that 
not correct ? 

Mr. Faiebank. I agree ; very definitely. 

Senator Ferguson. So there is nothing that should be hidden with 
that freedom, that it was exercised, is that not correct ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; I see no reason to hide. 

The question before this committee, I submit, is not whether I 
should have had such broad contact with persons of all sorts con- 
nected with China, but whether I engaged in such contact as a loyal 
American or engaged in it subversively. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not the nub of the whole situation? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think so. 

The fact of my contact with all sorts of persons concerning 
China should be assumed as a matter of course, just as it is assumed 
for a press correspondent. The real question is whether I used this 
contact disloyally, or in the course of this contact was used by others 
with disloyal intent. 

Getting down to cases, I should like first to state my own anti- 
Communist view for the record. Last September I sent Senator 
McCarran a notarized denial of communism dated September 6, 
1951, with the request that he file it in the public record of this 
committee. Since I never received any acknowledgment of this let- 
ter, I now reaffirm for the record my original unacknowledged state- 
ment : 

I, John King Fairbank, resident at 41 Winthrop Street, Cambridge 38, 
Mass., do hereby solemnly declare under oath that I am not now and never 
have been a member of the Communist Party, that I do not now subscribe, 
believe in or adhere to the doctrines of communism or Marxism-Leninism, 
that I have never done so in the past, and that I have never knowingly at- 
tended or participated in activities of the Communist Party. 

In the intervening 5 months since I submitted this denial the 
subcommittee has published and distributed five printed volumes of 
testimony in which a series of witnesses, after having executive ses- 
sions with the committee, have testified here publicly in such a way 
as to slander or deframe me. 

Senator Ferguson. There you claim it is slander and defamation 
because it was untrue, the testimony. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. If the testimony was true, then, of course, 
it would not be slander or defamation ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I don't think so. 

Senator Ferguson. But your testimony is that they are untrue? 

]Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Using these five volumes of testimony, a columnist like Fulton 
Lewis, Jr., has been able, as on December 6, 1951, to repeat a long 
list of these defamatory statements about me which have been given 
congressional imnnuiity. I am happy to say that other journalists, 
the press services and the newspapers had taken note of my denial 
of communism at the time I first made it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3727 

Fiutlier, I believe the committee's information concerning me lias 
been made inaccurate by the inclusion in the record of erroneous 
testimon}'. Out of several examples I submit the following 

Senator Ferguson. AYhen you use the word "erroneous" there, 
Avhat do you mean by that ? 

Jklr. Fairbanks. Well, statements of something contrary to fact. 
I don't say lies because that means the intent is to be erroneous. 
But the fact is not as stated in such a case. 

Senator Watkins. As I underestand it, you are not criticizing 
the committee's taking, but the testimony itself is what you are 
criticizing? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. I say the information has been made in- 
accurate because this testimony has come before the conunittee. 

Senator Watkins. Of course, you understand we get a lot of testi- 
mony and some of it is not worth very much, but some of ii: may be 
Avorth something. We cannot determine at the time it is being 
presented whether it is worth very much or not. That is, in advance 
we do not know. 

Senator Smith. In other words, Mr. Fairbank, if we limited the 
right of another witness who might be antagonistic to you to say what 
he believed to be the truth, then we would have to limit you. 

Of course, no one should be limited in presenting his side of the 
question. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir. I think my criticism, and wdiich I come to 
later and which I want to put in, is as to the general discretion that 
has been used in the procedure of the committee; not as to principle. 

Senator Smith. You understand, of course, that we cannot hear but 
one witness at a time ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir. 

1. In response to committee questions, William M. McGovern testi- 
fied publicly under oath on September 18 : 

Senator Ferguson. William M. McGovern is also a professor in a 
school, is he not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And you think the committee is probably all 
right in asking a professor to come down here and testify ? 

Mr. Faiebank. I would not want a ban on professors testifying. 

Senator Ferguson. You would not put a ban on professors testi- 
fying? 

Mr. Fairbank. But I think some professors are better than others. 

Senator Ferguson. I wall have to agree because I have been in 
college. 

Senator Smith. "WHiere is JNIr. McGovern? 

Mr. Fairbank. Northwestern University. 
.Senator Smith. All right. Proceed, Mr. Fairbank. 

Mr. Fairbank. This is the quotation of Mr. McGovern's testimony : 

I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937-38. He and Mr. 
Lattimore went to Peking at the same time for a very short period. At the same 
time, Mr. Reischauer, Mr. Lattimore, and Mr. Fairbank were all in Peking. * * * 

The actual fact is that I was not in Peking at any time between the 
end of 1935 and the beginning of 1916. I was not in China any time 
between 1935 and 1942. I spent the winter of 1937-38 at Harvard. 

88.S48 — 52— pt. 11 2 



3728 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

T have never gone to Peking with Mr, Lattimore. I have never been in 
Peking at the same time as Mr. Reischauer. I do not recollect ever 
having seen Dr. McGovern in Peking. His sworn testimony is entireb/ 
mitrue, false, and erroneous. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever been in Peking when Mr. Latti- 
more was there? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I met him there. 

Mr. Morris. Was that in 1935 ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I met Mr. Lattimore in 1932 in Peking, and he went 
away later that year, and he came back subsequently, 1933 or 1934, and 
I saw him again. 

I am not sure exactly which years he was there. He moved around. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever go to Peking with Mr. Lattimore 
at the same time for a very short period? Forget the dates for a 
moment. 

Mr. Fairbank. I do not recall ever having traveled to Peking with 
Mr. Lattimore. 

Senator Ferguson. But at one time you were there for a short period 
with Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; I was there for 4 years, and during that 4-year 
period, from early 1932 to the end of 1935, Mr. Lattimore was there at 
different intervals. 

Mr. Morris. So you were there in 1935 with Mr. Lattimore and not 
1937-38, is that right? 

Mr. Fairbank. Whether he was there in 1935 I don't recall, because 
he had taken this job of editor of Pacific Affairs. I can ask my wife 
whether she recalls. 

Well, I could research that. I can trj^ to recollect. She thinks he 
was. 

Senator Smith. Let us see what his answer was. 

Mr, Fairbank. My wife thinks he probably was there in 1935. 

Senator Smith. If you should discover that that was in error as to 
the date, you can advise the committee. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Watkins, With respect to Mr. McGovern, I assume that 
you have corroboration in the records at Harvard University showing 
you were there during the period you so testified, and you probably 
refreshed your recollection on that. You checked to see where you 
were at that particular time when Mr, McGovern said you were in 
China? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I did, I have been in China only three times 
and I remembered, of course, exactly when. But my wife was with me, 
and we checked back and forth. 

Senator Watkins, If it became highly material to any question be- 
fore the committee, the committee might deem it necessary to have 
corroboration because we have the flat statement that you were there 
and you say you were not. 

It would be a help to the committee if you could submit to us some 
record evidence that you would have that you were in Harvard at that 
time. We would appreciate it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to now leave the words "entirely 
untrue" in here when you think that you were in Peking at the same 
time Lattimore was, in the year 1935 ? You take it that if he used the 
wrong date, that that makes it entirely wrong. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3729 

Mr, Fairbank. Well, I wouldn't like to give way to Mr. McGovern 
particularl3^ There are other things that he said that are also wrong. 

Senator Ferguson. Yon can point out what you claim to be wrong. 
But I am wondering on this one point whether you now want to leave 
the record "entirely untrue" when you do say that you were there 
with Mr. Lattimore at the same time, in 1935, instead of 1937-38. 

Mr. Fairbank. I would still say, judging by his text, which is all 
I have to go by, that it is entirely untrue. 

Mr. Morris. Is there any significance to the date 1935 as opposed 
to 1937-38? He did not imply anything about that particular time 
that would not be equally true about a different time? The dates 
have no significance whatever, do they ? 

Mr. Fairbank. You see, his first statement is : "I saw Mr. Fairbank 
in Peking in the same winter of 1937-38." 

I was not there, I did not see Mr. McGovern there, and that state- 
ment is completely wrong. 

Senator P'erguson. Did you see him in the winter of 1935? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; I don't recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know McGovern in Peking? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I don't recall meeting him in Peking. I met 
him first when he came to Harvard to lecture. 

Senator Smith. When was that? 

Mr. Fairbank. Either 1939-40 or 1940-41. 

Senator Smith, Mr. Fairbank, did you have to go back to refresh 
your recollection as to whether it was 1935 or what date that you 
were in Peking ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I remember that. I have often put that on 
statements of my life history, and so f ortli. 

Senator Ferguson. What professorship does Professor McGovern 
hold? 

Mr. Fairbank. He is in political science. 

Senator Ferguson. At Northwestern University? 

Mr. Fairbank. Northwestern University. 

Senator Ferguson. He is a full professor? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Kecognized in the trade as a professor in po- 
litical science? 

Mr. Fairbank. He has his critics. 

Senator Ferguson. And I suppose you find you have yours ? 

Mr. P AiRBANK. Yes; I do. But he is criticized for some things I 
am not. 

Senator Smith. The point that I understood Senator Ferguson was 
trying to make was that the date 1937-38 might have been an error 
of time as to Mr. McGovern's statement. 

Mr. I^'airbank. Well, if he substituted any other years it would 
be e(iuall3^ wrong. 

Senator Smith. Any other years other than 1935 ? 

Mr. Fairbank. He says: 'T saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the 
same winter of 1937-38." 

If you put in 1934, '35, '36, '37, '38, '39, '40— any of those years— it 
would be wrong. In my recollection, I did not see him in Peking. 

Senator Ferguson. But that does not say he did not see you. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is true. 



3730 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. He says "I saw." He is not saying you saw 
him. 

Mr. Fairbank. He may well have seen me across a room somewhere, 
and I didn't notice him. But he then goes on to sa}' he has had long 
discussions with me, in his testimony. 

Senator Watkins. In Peking, does he saj^ that he had these dis- 
cussions with you in Peking ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that comes up later. He says that he saw 
me — and I have left this out to shorten the record — he says he saw me 
in China in the spring and summer of 1945, when I was not in China. 
That is what the record seems to say. It is a little bit ambiguous. But 
it is just another of these imaginings of his. 

Senator Watkins. In other words, what you are trying to say is 
that you never did see him in Peking, and you were not there when he 
was there, at least when he was visible to you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is right. 

Senator Watkins. But you did not have any discussions with him 
in Peking? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Ever ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, ever. 

Senator Watkins. That makes it clear. We want to make it clear, 
we want to be sure that that is what you testify. 

Mr. Fairbank. In other Avords, I can only conclude that his imag- 
ination has played him falsely on this at great length. 

Senator Watkins. We want to get that straightened out. 

Mr. Fairbank. Mr. McGovern says, in his testimony on page 1025, 
"I have met the Fairbanks. I first saw them in Harvard when I was 
teaching at Harvard." 

Senator Ferguson. Is he w^rong on that? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; that is correct. And I haven't picked that up 
because that is when I first saw him, when he was teaching in Harvard. 
But when was that? In my recollection, I am quite certain it was 
1939-40 or 1940^1. I think he just has things jumbled. 

2. As an example of a distorted half-truth let me call attention to 
Elizabeth Bentley's testimony about me on August 14, 1951. She 
stated that I carried a letter from Madame Sun Yat-sen (whom she 
called "a top Chinese Communist") to the China Aid Council, which 
was a constituent member of United China Relief, but is termed by 
Miss Bentley a "spy ring." 

My answer is, first, that in 1943 competent American observers 
definitely did not regard Madame Sun as a Communist, nor did I. 

Senator Ferguson. Elizabeth Bentley was a spy herself. Do you 
not think that she may have known what she was saying there, that 
Madame Sun Yat-sen was a top Communist, Chinese Communist? 
Could that not have been true, she being a Communist? 

Mr. Fairbank. On that kind of question, the conflict of testimonj^ 
it seems to me the circumstances of the witness have to be taken into 
account, whether the witness is acquainted with the subject at close 
hand or at distant hand. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but here she is a Communist spy in this 
country. Do you not think that she might know that this Madame Sun 
Yat-sen was a Communist and, further, that she knew that the China 
Aid Council was a member of the United China Relief, and that 
that was a spy ring ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3731 

She being a spy herself, would she not have more knowledge than 
the general public? 

You say, in 1943 competent American observers definitely did not 
regard Madame Sun as a Communist, "nor did I." 

Senator Smith. The point about that, Mr. Fairbank, is that Miss 
Bentley might have been in a better position to know whether or not 
she was a spy than you would linve been in a position to know 
about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is right. 

Mr. Fairbank, Let's leave me out of it because, of course, I am not 
interested. But let us compare ^liss Bentley 's testimony with that 
of A. T. Steele. I have a low opinion of spies, and I think Miss 
Bentley, having been in this spy business, may not be as reliable in the 
thought processes. 

Senator Ffrguson. But do you not think she had an opportunity 
for a better knowledge than a lot of people outside of it? Is it not 
true that a lot of Communists do work outside in devious ways, and 
particularly when they are spies ? 

Here was our Government, FBI and all, G-2, and all of the other 
agencies, that did not know that she was a spy, apparently did not 
know it, until she personally went and confessed that she was a spy. 

Mr. Fairbank. That was in the United States. Now, A. T. Steele 
was in China. Miss Bentley was not. Let's compare Mr. A. T. Steele 
as a witness with Miss Bentley. 

Mr. Morris. Do you feel Professor Steele is qualified to testify, 
Mr. Fairbank, to know whether a secret Communist is a Communist? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think he is qualified to have an opinion as to a 
person like Madame Sun Yat-sen, and more qualified than Miss Bent- 
ley, who had never met Sun Yat-sen and, so far as I know, had never 
been in China. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the madame is a Com- 
munist now ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't know now. 

Mr. Morris. She is an official of the Chinese Government. 

Mr. Fairbank. The Government is a so-called coalition, so they 
can take in the others. There is a fiction for their control. But 
whether she is a Communist, that is a different matter. 

Senator Ferguson. Let us get down to what a Communist is. Are 
you talking here of a Communist only if they are party members ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I recall your definition of the other day. In my 
own thinking, that definition is a double thing, and has to be applied 
in both its parts. 

Senator Ferguson. There is an "or" in there. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. I mean both parts should be considered. One 
part of the definition is that the person takes Communist Party disci- 
pline. And in that case, I would say that is a Communist Party mem- 
ber. I mean, that is a genuine Communist. 

Now, the "or" part — could we have that definition read? It is a 
person who furthers the aims. 

Senator Smith. Let us take your definition as you set out on page 
7 of your statement : 

* * * never, have been a member of the Communist Party, that I do not now 
subscribe, believe in, or adhere to the doctrines of communism or Marxism- 
Leninism * * *. 



3732 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Is that not a pretty all-embracing definition of communism, what 
you said there ? I thought you covered that quite well. I noticed it 
when I read it this morning. 

Mr. Fairbank. 1 would include in my denial both being a Conmiu- 
nist and being a fellow-traveler. 

Senator Smith. Yes ; I understood that. 

Mr. Fairbank. And the term "fellow-traveler,'' I think, is included 
in your definition of Communist. We could operate on that basis, if 
you would like. 

Senator Watkins. You understand a fellow-traveler to be the per- 
son who has the same ideas, who does not actually become a member 
of the party. Is that not what you have in mind ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say a fellow-traveler is a person within a 
certain zone, and there are gradations in that zone. A person who is 
not a member of the party and does not receive orders, but receives 
suggestions, or is sympathetic and picks up ideas, and finds out what 
is being thought by Communists, and then goes along with them 

Senator Watkins. Does not the fellow-traveler suggest the very 
idea that he is traveling with the Communists in the same direction ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. That is what I thought a fellow-traveler meant, 
someone who is moving right along with the Communists. He would 
not be in the party necessarily, and he would not need to be called a 
Communist. But he would be going right along witli the same idea. 

Mr. Fairbank. But when the term "fellow-traveler" is used. I think 
you have a shading off into people who don't realize that they are ac- 
cepting Communist inspiration or stimulus, who tliink that they are 
liberals. 

Senator Watkins. They may be thinking independently and still 
going along the same lines, and yet they would be fellow-travelers. 
Their aim is exactly the same. 

They want to go to the same place, and they travel in the same 
direction. 

Mr. Fairbank. In my definition, you have this gradation of people, 
and the aim of the fellow-traveler may be in much more idealistic terms 
and much less discipline, and much less concrete than the Communist 
aims. 

Senator Watkins. A shading between different types of fellow- 
travelers. But- within the class there are fellow-travelers and fellow- 
travelers. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, indeed, and you shade off from that into fuzzy- 
minded liberals and other categories. 

Senator Watkins, They are almost as dangerous as these fuzzy- 
minded liberals, are they not, if they are going to the same place and 
want to arrive at the same place as the Communists ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Perhaps a liberal is more dangerous than a Com- 
munist. 

Senator Watkins. And perhaps the fuzzy-minded is not quite so 
dangerous because he cannot quite say it so convincingly. But at the 
same time, he is going in the same direction. 

Mr. Morris. May I get into the second part of this paragraph ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Fairbank, with respect to your statement 
there about the China Aid Council, I have a question. In connection 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3733 

with Miss Bentley's testimony that Mildred Price, the executive secre- 
tary of the China Aid Council, was in fact the Communist agent 
running that, we subpenaed Miss Price before this committee, and 
she refused to answer whether or not she was a Communist on the 
ground that her answer might incriminate her. 

Do you not think that there is reason for someone to conclude, in 
view of that testimony, not only the testimony of Miss Bentley but 
the subsequent deportment of Miss Price before this committee, that 
there was some ground for believing the truth of those allegations ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Which allegations, sir? 

Mr. Morris. Namely that the China Aid Council was a Communist 
organization. 

If the executive secretary refuses to answer whether or not she, in 
fact, was a member of the Communist Party, would there not be a 
qu-estion ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Miss Price refusing to answer has distressed me, 
as you can understand. I had believed, judging by what she said and 
her conduct, that she was not a Communist. 

Now, the fact that she refused to testify suggests to my mind that, 
at some time, she had had some connection which she is now reluctant 
to divulge. 

Senator Ferguson. Not only reluctant but refuses on the ground 
it would tend to incriminate her. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. ' That is possible, perhaps, for an earlier period 
than when I knew her. I met her in 1946, and I became — whatever 
you call it — on this list of the China Aid Council in 1947. We will 
come to that later, perhaps. 

Senator Ferguson. Are you having trouble now with the proposi- 
tion as to whether or not Miss Price deceived you ? Is that what is 
wrong ? 

Mr. Fairbank. How do you mean having trouble ? 

Senator Ferguson. I mean, you say that you are distressed over the 
fact that she refused to answer, and that you now think that she could 
be a Communist. 

Do you now think that, with her testimony that she refuses to 
answer, leaves you in the position now that she deceived you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is possible, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not more than possible ? Is it not probable ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am not sure it is probable. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think yet that she deceived you? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; because I have certain other evidence. 

Senator Ferguson, Did she ever tell you that she was not a Com- 
munist ? 

jVIr. Fairbank. I don't recall any such conversations on the subject 
at all. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume that you never asked her, "Are you a 
Communist?" 

Mr. Fairbank. There is no use asking a person if they are a Com- 
munist. 

Senator Watkins. In those days back there, they probably would 
have admitted it. They were rather proud of it. 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't think so. 

Senator Watkins. We had a fellow around here that seemed to have 
been in very high esteem at the time, with the Communists, and they 
did not object at all. 



3734 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Do you think it is possible, Professor that Madame 
Sun Yat-sen was deceiving you at the same time ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I must go by the evidence I have. I must form my 
judgment and take the risk in contact with anyone. 

Mr. Morris. Tlie fact that she is an official of the Chinese Com- 
munist Government, and together with the other testimony before this 
committee, that she was, in fact, a Communist since 1926 to the 
contrary ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. I have other evidence. For the record, she 
is not in the category of a Communist but of a democratic personage, 
and so on. I should like, if you wish, to go into the China Aid Council. 

Senator Smith. No, I think the point Mr. Morris was trying to 
bring out was that it is entirely possible and maybe probable that 
Madame Sun Yat-sen has fooled you as to whether or not she was or 
was not a Communist in the light of present situations and her con- 
nections. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir. That possibility applies to thousands of 
people. I mean the possibility is alway there. 

When you are dealing with an area which is having a Communist 
revolution, you have always got the question, "Is this person possible 
under cover and one of them?" But you have to make up your mind 
as best you can because you just cannot avoid contact with everybody. 

Senator Smith. What you meant when you were saying down here 
about not relying on Miss Bentley and any other spy, you meant what 
we would say down our way that you would take what they say with a 
grain of salt. 

Mr. Fairbank. A very large grain of salt, very unpalatable. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you would not take it at all ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, not in opposition to the testimony of a man 
like Art Steele, A. T. Steele. He is, I think, a very fine and reliable 
person. 

Senator Ferguson, I see. 

Senator Smith. Go ahead and read the statement, and we will 
proceed. 

Mr. Morris. "Wliat then is the distorted half-truth. Professor Fair- 
bank, that you mentioned there after No. 2 ? 

I mean, you did take the message, did you not, to the China Aid 
Council ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is the half that is true, and the half that I be- 
lieve is untrue is that Madame Sun was a Communist at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. What about the China Aid Council ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I did not consider it a spy ring at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. It was not whether you considered it, it was 
whether Miss Bentley knew whether it was or not, as to what she 
testified to. You are saying that is a half-truth. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am willing to set myself up for my own purposes 
as a judge for the China Aid Council in opposition to Miss Bentley 
because I must go by all of the evidence I have, not just by Miss 
Bentley. And on all of that basis, I judge it was not. 

Senator Ferguson. You are saying as far as Miss Bentley's testi- 
mony was concerned it was a distorted half-truth 

Mr. Fairbank. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. ^Yhen she said that the China Aid Council was 
a constituent member of the United China Belief. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3735 

Mr. Fairbank. She didn't say that. She said it was a spy ring. 

Senator Ferguson. You say here, I am reading your text, not hers, 
''which was a constituent member of the United China Relief but is 
termed by Miss Bentley a spy ring," 

Mr. Fairbank. That is the way the text reads. 

Senator Ferguson. Do j^ou say she said a half-truth when she said 
that and it was distorted ? 

Mr. Fairbank. When she said it was a spy ring ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Even though the executive secretary comes in 
here and refuses to answer as to whether or not she was a Communist 
when she was operating that organization ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Perhaps we should define spy ring. You have 
front organizations. 

Senator Ferguson. Aren't they all spy rings ? Do they not function 
as such ? If there is any knowledge that they get, do they not funnel 
it over to the Kremlin ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I wouldn't think so in all cases because a spy ring 
has to operate on a certain operational basis of spying, and a front 
may be just for publicity. 

Senator Ferguson. And it may be for spying, too. 

Mr. Fairbank. A spy ring in the China Aid would get statistics on 
child care in China, and not much else. 

Senator Ferguson. If it did get anything else. 

Mr. Fairbank. They were wasting their time if they had a spy 
ring in the China Aid Council. I think we should distinguish be- 
tween a front and an organized spy ring and different kinds of these 
things. 

Senator Watkins. Will it not be a good cover up for a spy ring to 
be enlisted in aid for children ? 

Mr. Fairbank. They could find out all about children. 

Senator Watkins. Yes, and they could find out about a lot of other 
things while they were there, could they not? Would that not be 
an excellent front, an excellent cover for an intelligence investigator ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't know. I was trying to collect some intelli- 
gence during the war, and I wouldn't have gone to a child welfare 
organization particularly. 

Senator Ferguson. What was your cover? 

Mr. Fairbank. I didn't have to have a cover. I was under the 
American Embassy. 

Senator Ferguson. The American Embassy was your cover. 

Mr. Fairbank. It is not a cover. It is right out in the open. 

Senator Watkins. This other was out in the open, too. It was an 
aid society. 

Mr. Fairbank. An embassy is supposed to collect intelligence. 
The China Aid Council is not supposed to be a spy ring. 

Senator Smith. I think what they are getting at, Mr. Fairbank, 
as you doubtless know, we did have in the South an organization 
known as the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. That 
sounded awfully good to a lot of people. It turned up finally as a 
Communist organization and so declared. I am sure you remember 
that. It was in the press generally. That is an illustration of a 
group taking a grandiose sounding name, Southern Conference for 
Human Welfare. Nothing could have appealed to us any more than 
that if that was what it was, but it turned out to be a Communist-front 



3736 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

organization. I think that is what some of the gentlemen are getting 
at when they said yon probably didn't know that this was a spy ring. 
1 understood you were not 

Mr. Fairbank. I think it might be useful to distinguish an infil- 
tration effort which has not taken over an organization but is trying 
to, and, second, a front which has been taken over, and third, a spy 
ring which is really set up for espionage, for passing material. Those 
are three different things. 

Senator Ferguson. But is it not true that they use all of their 
organizations in the obtaining of facts and evidence which is con- 
sidered spying ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. From all I understand of communism, I don't 
believe that they use a front for espionage necessarily. It may be 
too dangerous. It may be just not feasible, if you have a front 
operating, to do a publicity job and then to try to do an espionage 
job of passing secret messages and that kind of thing that you have 
to do in espionage. In this case here, because of Miss Price's testi- 
mony, I would say that there was an effort at infiltration. That 
would be the indication, probably. This effort of infiltration may 
have got to a certain extent. I don't know. That is just the question 
that is raised by her testimony. But you then get to a second point 
where the thing is a front. I don't think the China Aid Council had 
got to that point. If I thought so, I certainly would not have had 
anything to do with it. Then you get to the third point where it is 
a spy ring, and that is where I saj it is untrue. 

Senator Ferguson. You think that wdien this Price girl Avas ex- 
ecutive secretary of the China xVid Council, that it was not a front? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. I did not think it a front at the time. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not ask you, Professor, whether you 
thought it was. I am now asking you whether it w^as a front. 

Mr. Fairbank. No. One possible Communist in a thing does not 
make a front, according to the definition I am giving you where 
infiltration is being attempted but the thing has not yet been captured. 
Tliere are many places where the Communists are trying to infiltrate. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think this China Aid Council was 
captured ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The successor agency is a cajitured Communist 
front, and that is why I have liad nothing to do with it. It is called 
the China Welfare Appeal. One of m}^ reasons for thinking Miss 
Price probably was not a Communist at the time I went into the 
China Aid Coimcil was that she was the person thrown out by this 
real front that was organized, the China Welfare Appeal at the 
time that the China Aid Council ceased to operate. Miss Price was 
on the receiving end of a very dirty deal there and thrown out of her 
job. That is her testimony that I take into account in thinking that 
her refusal to incriminate herself indicates perhaps an earlier con- 
nection, but not that she was organized as a Communist when I knew 
this thing in 1946 and 1947. 

Senator Watkins. On the contrary, could it not be possible that 
under the circumstances if they had taken Miss Price in this obviously 
Communist outfit, it would have been a revelation that she had previ- 
ously been a Communist ? They wouldn't have taken her unless she 
was. It would have been giving aw^ay what had been going on if they 
had taken her. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3737 

Mr. Fairbank. There was a fight there of some kind. There was 
great acrimony. The Communist group who had infiltrated just broke 
out and took the contact with Madam Sun away. 

Senator Watkins. Miss Price refused to testify about the activities 
of this organization and her own connection simply on the basis that it 
might incriminate her. That is fairly strong evidence to most Ameri- 
cans of what the realization was. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Fairbank, and Mr. Chairman, at the risk of 
laboring this point I have the letterhead of the China Aid Council, 
and I see on the six-man executive committee you have Dr. Ch'ao-Ting 
Chi who is now an official of the Communist government. Will you 
concede that he is a Communist? 

Mr. Fairbank. He is a man who was reported to me to have been 
either a Communist or connected with the Communists quite early in 
his career in the early thirties or perhaps earlier than that, and many 
Chinese, of course, have done that and broken away. When I saw 
him in Chungking in 1943 he was the highly trusted official under 
the Premier, Dr. Kung, who was in charge of the management of 
the foreigTi currency stabilization, which was the key operation of 
the Chinese Nationalist Government. At that time this man, Dr. Chi, 
told me, and in fact he pulled out and showed me his Kuomintang 
Party card. Maybe he was doing that just to make an effect. It just 
happens that he did that. 

Senator Smith. The question now is will you now concede that he 
was? Is that your question? 

Mr. Morris, That is my question. Senator. 

Mr. Fairbank. Knowing how many Chinese have shifted back 
and forth, I cannot claim that Chi was necessarily a Communist at 
that time in the sense of this definition. He may be just a gifted 
opportunist who is able to land on his feet. He may be a man who 
had dnal membership in both the Communist and the Nationalist 
Parties. 

Senator Smith. Let's read that question again. Mr. IMorris, state 
it again. I thought it was a simple question whether or not you would 
not concede now that he was or had been a Communist regardless of 
these explanations that might be made. 

Mr. Fairbank. There is no question now he is working with the 
Communists, and for the purpose of this definition he is either a fellow 
traveler or a Communist. 

Mr, Morris. Would you say the same thing for Israel Epstein ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Would you say the same thing for Elsie Fairfax- 
Cholmeley ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; as of now. 

Mr. Morris. And they were all active in the China Aid Council. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, I have here a list of the persons on the letter- 
head of the China Aid Council at the time that I gave it my name. 
This is a letter from the head of it, Mrs. Carter, whom I have never 
regarded as a Communist or a fellow traveler, it is dated January 23, 
1947. On this letterhead the first person is Madam Way Dow Ming, 
who was the wife of the Chinese Ambassador to the United States. 
I knew Madam Way and, of course, she is not a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, is it not true 

Mr. Fairbank. There are other people of that type. 



3738 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. That in every organization of this nature where you 
do have a group of Communists — and I have named Elsie Fairfax- 
Chohneley, Israel Epstein, Ch'ao-ting Chi, Mildred Price — that they 
for strategic purposes will take people into the organization who are 
not Communists, and from the point of their advantage conspicuously 
not Communists ? So when you cite the names of people who are not 
Communists on oath, are you not in fact bringing out the precise nature 
of the Communist organization, namely, something that is operated ■ 
by a small score of Communists and which in fact have other people 
who are not Communists identified with it? 

Mr. Fairbank. You are there describing a front which has been 
captured by the Communists. That is the way it would work. How- 
ever, there is this other category that I have mentioned of an organi- 
zation that is being infiltrated by the Communists before they have 
got it. Infiltration is very difficult to avoid, and in this particular 
case this infiltration was well known to me because I saw Epstein's 
name on this letterhead at the time I joined this thing. 

Mr. Morris. What year was that? 

Mr. Fairbank. 1947. That infiltration in my view had not taken 
over the China Aid Council at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Do you think it was well known at that time that 
Epstein was what you say a fellow traveler of the Communists ? 

Mr, Fairbank. I would say so because he had been with the Ameri- 
can Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which was 
rightly named a subversive organization by the Attorney General. 
My reason for joining this thing at the time when General Marshall 
came back from China was along the line of General Marshall's effort 
to hold the two sides together. I believed in that Marshall policy in 
China. I know it has been criticized. I think it was worth trying. 
I joined this just 3 weeks after Marshall had come back and made 
his statements in January 1947 saying that the hope of China was to 
keep the sides together and to avoid a civil war. 

Senator Ferguson. Dr. Fairbank 

Mr. Fairbank. It is in that spirit that I went into this. 

Senator Ferguson. On the question that we are investigating, as to 
whether or not IPR was penetrated or was circulating Communist 
propaganda or fellow-traveling propaganda — pro-Communist propa- 
ganda — I wonder whether you will answer the question as to the weight 
to be given to the fact that Edward C. Carter wrote a letter on June 12, 
1947. 

Mr. Morris. That is the same time that you knew Israel Epstein, is 
it not, Professor Fairbank, in 1947? You just testified that you con- 
sidered Epstein to be a Communist in 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. Or a fellow traveler. 

Mr. Fairbank. Or a fellow traveler. 

Senator Ferguson. June 12, 1947. 

Dear Miss Ford : This is to acknowledge Epstein's Tlie Unfinished Revolntion 
in China, whicli yon so Ivindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read 
two-thirds of it and liope to complete it within a few days. 

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting 
it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, 
Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, .John Foster Dulles, and John Carter 
Vincent, of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make 
certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3739 

might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an 
admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my 
recommendation. 

What do you think of that ? 

Mr. Fairbank. As to the proposition of reading a book by a Com- 
munist, I urge my students to read the writings of Mao, and I think 
all of us ought to read the writings of Lenin and of Stalin. 

Senator Ferguson. But why do you think Mr. Carter, as the head 
of IPR, was trying to use that means of getting a Comnaunist book 
read by these officials ? What do you think he was trying to do ? 

Mr. Faikbank. I don't feel like taking the responsibility for Mr. 
Carter. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you not say to a student if you gave him 
a Communist book, "This is by a Communist," but were they going 
to tell my colleagues that this was by a Communist? No; they were 
getting Little-Brown to do it because Senator Vandenberg might have 
been suspicious. Carter thought, if he would try to get them to read 
it. What do j'ou think of that kind of business ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I admire Mr. Carter for certain good qualities and 
things that he has done. 

Mr. INIoRRis. Is this one of them ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would not have done that myself. I do not want 
to take responsibility for everything that he has done along that line. 

Senator Ferguson. Professor, you wouldn't send to me a book by 
a Communist to get me to read it, would you, and not tell me it was 
by a Coimnunist? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read the P. S. on this letter? 

Senator Smith. All right. 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

P. S. — I liave not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, how- 
ever, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions 
from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy. 

So that indicates that Mr. Epstein was in on this, does it not, 
Professor Fairbank ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am sorry, I didn't follow that. 
Mr. Morris. I will read it again : 

I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, 
that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from 
him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy. 

Does that not indicate to you that Epstein was in on this with 
Carter? 

Mr. Fairbank. He was informed by Carter. 

Mr. JNIorris. All right. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think on this whole thing it would help if we 
looked at the book 

Senator Ferguson. Let us forget what is in the book. 

Mr. Fairbank. Because the book was the thing that was going to 
have the influence. That book, if you will look at it you can see, is 
based on the hand out stuff from the Chinese Communists and it 
doesn't pretend not to be. It quotes time after time the Chinese Com- 
munist radio, and all their phony statistics and that kind of stuff. It 
is perfectly obvious that that is a book which is pro-Communist, which 



3740 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

has been reviewed that way. I tell my students that is a book that 
puts together the Communist story on the liberated areas. Epstein 
was putting together this story and putting it out. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not just what Carter was trying to keep 
away from the Senators when he said 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't gather it was suppressed. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

A letter from me might lead a few or' them to think I was recommending it 
because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly 
discount my recommendation. 

Then going over in the same letter : 

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open 
mind. 

Mr. Fairbank. Sir, this has come up before in the testimony. 
Senator Ferguson. Yes, but you have not been here before. 
Mr. Fairbank. You want my opinion on that? 

Senator Ferguson. Xo. I am going to read and then I will ask you 
some questions : 

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open 
mind. Probably he was generally acquainted with most of the material, but he 
has probably never seen it organized so logically. 

That is the book that you describe as phony Communist propaganda. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am sorry. I said with phony Communist statis- 
tics. Communist statistics are always phony. 

Senator Ferguson. Communist statistics are phony. Here is the 
head of the institute saying this about John Carter Vincent. Don't 
you think he was trying to get the Communist line to Vincent in a 
well organized logical way and that he was trying to get it to these 
Senators and to the Secretary of State so as to influence their opinion 
on the Chinese policy ? Is there anything else that you can read from 
that letter ? 

Mr. Fairbank. This is a question of Mr. Carter and his personality 
and the way he does things. 

Senator Ferguson. No, it is a question of what the IPR was doing 
under Carter. 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't see that that follows, sir, because IPK is a 
much broader organization than Edward C. Carter, and this one letter 
of his may have been balanced by a number of others on other books. I 
haven't seen the files of the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. Just look at the next sentence. "If he were 
sold" — talking about Carter — "on the book he might persuade General 
Marshall to read it from cover to cover." Here is a book that you 
recognize as Communist sending it to the Secretary of the Far Eastern 
Division here in 1947 — this is June 1947. Marshall is then over in 
China trying to create a combination of the two governments. 

Mr. Fairbank. He had come back then. In the beginning of 1947 
he came back. He came back in January 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. He is still working on it. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think we disagree here about what is a book. I 
think that a book of this kind is something that you can take and 
look at and not be infected by. I think that General Marshall in 
particular is well able to look at a book from any source and make up 
his mind about it and not be overwhelmed or infected or led astray. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3741 

It seems to me that Mr. Carter's idea of spreading this book and I 
don't know how many other books he may have spread on other 
aspects, anti-Communist or anything else — this is only one book, I 
don't know the rest of the record on Mr, Carter and his book spreading, 
but it seems to me the spreading of this particular book is allowing 
people in the Government to see material which is pretty plainly 
pro-Communist. I don't believe that that is an undercover job. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, if you had wished to get a copy of 
this book into the hands of the men -who have been mentioned by 
Senator Ferguson, you would have been willing to have done it on 
your own initiative openly and above board, would you not ? 

My. Fairbank. Surely. 

Senator Smith. You would not have sought the intervention of 
Little-Brown & Co. to have gotten it to them without their appreciating 
or having been told that it was in effect Communist propaganda. You 
wouldn't have done that yourself, would you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I might well have asked my publishers to distribute 
it. I don't know what was in the mind of Mr. Carter in that ambig- 
uous phrase about having the publisher do it instead of himself. 

Senator Smith. You heard what was read there about what his 
plans were. 

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Let me read you more of his plans. 
The thing that I am having difRculty with this morning is your defense 
of the IPR on this item. 

Mr, Fairbank. Let's establish what is my defense of the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. From your answers, is all I can say. 

Mr. Fairbank. I haven't said that. 

Senator Ferguson. I have some of your answers. Let's go a little 
further. He says : "Of course many will say that Epstein is a special 
pleader." You have said that. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is how I described him. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound 
analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. 

He is in a way advocating a sound analysis of the world with these 
phony statistics in this Communist-written book; is he not? He is 
advocating that in that sentence ; is he not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. He is advocating that it be seen, that it be looked at. 

Senator Watkins. Read from cover to cover also. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that all ? Is that all he is trying to do ? Let's 
go a little further and find out. "I hear that the New York Times 
has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publi- 
cations will make as wise a choice," 

He certainly wanted a favorable report on this book, didn't he, 
and he tliought the one man who could do it was Owen Lattimore. 

Mr. FAreRANK. I would say that Mr. Carter was promoting that 
book. 

Seiiator Fer<;uson. I think your answer 

Senator Watkins. Is obviously correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am not sure that the promotion of a book which 
is pretty obviously pro-Communist 

Senator Ferguson. Not if it is out in the open. Why did he not 
say "Here is a pro-Communist book. Here is a book that has phony 



3742 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

statistics in it. Let's <?et it to the Senators ; let's get it to the Secretary 
of State, to try to influence their opinion. Tell them that it is a 
phony." He didn't do that ; did he ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have forgotten the phrase he uses there about his 
publisher sending it instead of himself. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Let's go on a little further, what he knows 
about this book, "I imagine the Kuomintang government will put 
the book on the 'forbidden' list for import in China." 

You would have thought so, too, would you not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Probably. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton 
Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Chris- 
topher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Yat-sen, and a few others, before 
the bronze curtain falls. 

In other words, get it in before the Government prohibits it from 
going in. 

Mr. Fairbank. May I ask. Senator — excuse me, do you want to 
continue ? 

Senator Ferguson. No ; that is the end of it. 

Mr. Fairbank. Do you want me on the basis of this letter to con- 
demn the IPR? 

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you this question: Do you not 
think that the IPR. on this particular case — let's isolate it — through 
Mr. Carter, was trying to influence the foreign policy of the United 
States of America in its relation to China and the Far East? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir. I think that Mr, Carter was trying to do 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you isolate Carter from the IPE, and 
why do you do it? 

Mr. Fairbank. Because of the nature of the IPR. It is a private 
organization. It is a vei\y disjointed decentralized kind of thing. It 
has these two main lines of work, one that Carter has organized, mainly 
of conferences, the other that William Holland has organized, mainly 
of a publication program which I think has made a real contribution 
in getting materials published, sound materials. 

Senator Ferguson. That is why I tried to isolate this and get it in 
one case. Didn't Carter, the IPR, try to do this? It is among the 
IPR papers that we take. 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say Mr. Carter was making that effort to 
promote tliat book, but I don't believe it is fair to say that the IPR 
as an organization is characterized by that incident. 

Senator Ferguson. You know that an organization must be respon- 
sible to its officers for what they do, is that not true ? 

Mr. Fairbank. And its members. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, its members, if they know what is going on. 
Were you on the board at this time ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You were a trustee? 

Mr. Fairbank. In 1947 I became a trustee. 

Senator Ferguson. I take for granted you were not consulted about 
this. 

Mr. Fairbank. Certainly not. That was not an official act in my 
view. That was not an act of the IPR. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3743 

Senator Ferguson. Will yon tell me wliy the IPE does not rise up 
in righteous wrath against Carter on this particular isolated case? 

Mr. Fairbank. There liave been criticisms. 

Senator Ferguson. If you had known he wrote that letter, what 
would you have said as a trustee ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would have said that is a private letter. 

Senator Ferguson. What would you have said? How are you 
going to take him away from the organization that he is so closely 
allied with ? What would you have said ? Did you know about this 
letter? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I never heard of it. If the IPR were better 
organized we would have written "personal" at the top of that because 
I suppose it was on IPR stationery. It is a Government procedure 
which is very desirable. 

Senator Ferguson. But he did not. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is true, I imagine. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I have the book for a minute? I will 
ask you some more questions later. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, let me ask you this : Wlio in the IPR 
exercised more authority or performed more services for and in the 
name of the IPR that Mr. Carter ? Anyone ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is a rather broad question because of the nature 
of the IPR. I don't mean to take your time unnecessarily, but you 
know how it is set up with these 10 different councils. 

Senator Smith. I am just asking who in all that group acted for 
and in behalf of the IPR more than Mr. Carter. 

Mr. Fairbank. I wouldn't say that any one person acted for and on 
behalf of the whole organization. It wasn't set up to operate that 
way. It had groups and these numbers operated, and then it had 
committees and the committees operated, very loosely. 

Senator Smith. Regardless of how loose it may have been, and I 
can quite agree that that is probably true, is it not a fact that Mr. 
Carter acted to a great extent for and on behalf of the IPR than any 
other individual? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would not be certain about his acting for and on 
behalf in a formal sense. There is no question that he was very active 
as a person. 

Senator Smith. Wlio else performed to a greater extent for and on 
behalf of the IPR than Mr. Carter? I put that question that way. 

Mr. Fairbank. There is a head of the American Council of the IPR^ 
whicli he was not. Tliere is a head of the International Council of 
the IPR, which he was not. There is a head of each national council 
in each country, which he was not. 

Senator Smith. Can you name the names of those men offhand? 

jNIr. Fairbank. I can get them out of a book. 

Senator Smith. Can you name them offhand? 

Mr. Fairbank. He has had continuity. 

Senator Smith. Can you name them offhand yourself? You can't, 
can you, no one else can, but you can name Mr. Carter, can you not? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, I think he has been associated with the IPR 
continuously over a long period. 

Senator SaiiTii. And represented in more different ways than any 
other one individual. 

88348— 52— pt. 11 3 



3744 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Faiebank. I think you need to distinguish what is formal rep- 
resentation and what is Mr, Carter's activity being known as an IPR 
man. 

Senator Smith. What you are trying to say as I understand is that 
there may have been times when Mr. Carter acted beyond tlie scope 
of his authority. 

Mr. Fairbank. There again I don't know that his authority was 
ever specifically statutorily limited because of this looseness of organi- 
zation. 

Senator Smith. I was trying to help you out a little. 

Senator Watkins. Let me ask you this question. Was he the 
spokesman for the IPR, internationally, and generally regarded as 
such ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say in human terms he was one of the most 
active people among the group who tried to build up this private 
organization to have conferences and promote research. He was one 
of the most active. 

Senator Watkins. He was in charge of the office, he was the execu- 
tive secretary, he wrote the letters, he carried out the policies decided 
upon by the board, did he not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. He did at certain times. 

Senator Watktns. While he was the executive secretary he did 
whatever the board wanted him to do. 

Mr. Fairbank. There have been others. 

Senator Watkins. They gave him a lot of general authority, as a 
matter of fact, according to the testimony. 

Mr. Fairbank. There had been other executive secretaries. There 
were other people in a statutory position who had superior power to 
him. 

Senator AYatkins. But they were not the spokesman. They didn't 
speak. The}^ did not write for it. They were not active, were they? 

Mr. Fairbank. You see, one point about the IPR has always been 
that it has no spokesman because it does not take a position in the 
Constitution and in every book it publishes it is stated the IPR does 
not take a position on matters of policy of any kind. 

Senator Ferguson. But when they publish the book and circulate 
it they take a position in publishing it, do they not? 

Mr. Fairbank. Like any magazine, like Foreign Affairs or the New 
York Times. They say we put this out as something that may con- 
tribute, but they put out a tremendous mmiber of these tilings and 
only a very small proportion have any leftist tinge. 

Senator Smith. Let me ask you the question : With respect to this 
letter I believe you said you had never heard of it before. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I saw it in the testimony. 

Senator Smith. Therefore it was not authorized to be written by 
the governing board or the trustees of the IPR. 

Mr. Fairbank. Certainly not. 

Senator Smith. Therefore, to that extent that was a surreptitious 
maneuver by Mr. Carter, was it not, to do just what he was saying 
should be done there about getting this book across to these people 
without saying openly this is a Communist propaganda book? 

Mr. Fairbank. Mr. Carter has been associated with the IPR and 
has been so useful partly because he is a promoter by temperament. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3745 

Senator Smith. But you would say that was a surreptitious ma- 
neuver by him, would you not? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't think so. He sent a copy to one person and 
to other people the letter is in the file. The whole thing is wide open. 

Senator Smith. It was surreptitious as far as you were concerned, 
was it not, because you did not know about it ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Surreptitious means you are trying to keep it from 
somebody. He did not try to keep it. If I called him up he would 
send me a copy. 

Senator S^hth. I am not talking about the book now. There is a 
difference between the book and the maneuver, the method. He didn't 
tell you he was doing this, did he? 

]\Ir. Fairbank. Certainly not: but I didn't ask him. 

Senator Smith. To that extent he kept it from you, did he not? 

Mr. Fairbank. I wouldn't want him to send me copies of everything 
he does. 

Senator Smith. I didn't say the book. I said the maneuver, the 
method he adopted. 

Mr. Fairbank. As far as his relation to me, I bein<^ a trustee and 
he writing this letter, I don't feel that it was surreptitious of him not 
to send me a copy of this letter because his letter was a personal letter, 
a personal act. 

Senator Smith. Has the board ever repudiated that maneuver of 
Mr. Carter's? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Senator Smith. Wliy ? 

iMr. Fairbank. It has been under fire ever since this came out. No 
board under fire wants to start repudiating people. 

Senator Ferguson. Why do you not come out when you are under 
fire and say this was a mistake ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, personally, I would be happy to say so. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you say now. 

Mr. Fairbank. From my personal point of view, but purely in a 
personal matter of judgment. 

Senator Ferguson. But is it not true that the trustees held Carter 
out to do this or similar acts, to circulate books, to get information 
about the Far East out to the public, out to public officials? Was 
that not one of his jobs? You said you hired him because he was 
a promoter. 

Mr. Fairbank. We didn't hire him. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, he was hired by somebody. 

Senator Smith. Who hired him ? That may be interesting. Who 
did hire Mr. Carter? 

Mr. Fairbank. This is a question, how does a private organization 
get born ? 

Senator Smith. He "horned" it, did he not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't believe he was one of the first founders. I 
believe it began in Hawaii about 1925 with some people in the YMCiL 
and in business. They brought in some professors. They have al- 
ways had this tripartite business, scholarship, and so on. Mr. Carter 
became interested in it — I don't know why I should repeat his life 
history. I don't know it as well as he does. 

Senator Ferguson. Now answer my question. 

Mr. Fairbank. He began to work in it. 



3746 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. You said he got working in it and was being 
paid by yon. Now answer my question. Did not you people on the 
board of directors hold out to the public that he was authorized to 
promote just such matters concerning the Far East? Did you not 
hold it out to the public and to the public officials? 

Mr. Fairbank. Being a trustee, I in effect gave him or any other 
officer a vote of confidence. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think I would still give them a vote of confidence. 

Senator Ferguson. After seeing this letter ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; because this letter, while I don't approve of it, 
I don't think tore down the foundations of our state. I don't think 
it is highly subversive. I think it was an error in judgment in my 
own view 

Senator Ferguson. You said they were phony statistics about the 
Communists in China. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think we have got to know more about the Com- 
munists, including their phony statistics. We have to know more 
about them in every possible way in order to deal with them. The 
IPE. is committed to that proposition, that you put out as much in- 
formation as you can. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean to say that the policy in the Far 
East was the proper policy as far as you, as a historian, are concerned ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Now we leave the IPE, I trust, because the policy of 
the State Department is one that I supported when General Marshall 
was trying — I do support that policy. 

Senator Ferguson. You support that policy ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I was in China at the time and I saw no alternative 
to head off the civil war except that effort. 

Senator Ferguson. So if this book influenced our policy in the Far 
East it was perfectly all right as far as you are concerned ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Let me put it this way : As a professor I favor books 
of all kinds being available to all kinds of people. If a publisher is 
willing to put out a book and if a fellow is willing to spend any time 
looking at it, I think that is up to him. I think evei'ybody has to have 
that opportunity to look at this stuff. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that the public ought to know 
who his author is, who he really is, whether he is a Communist ? Is 
that not just the purpose of this letter, to keep them from knowing 
that ? The people he wanted to influence ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have said 

Senator Smith. Let us see if you cannot answer that question because 
we have been getting a little far afield. Answer yes or no. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you say "yes" ? 
(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Fairbank. The question is, should not Mr. Carter have adver- 
tised Epstein as a Communist when he advertised the book or when 
he promoted it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. That was in 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. Epstein was following the Communist line. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3747 

Mr. Fairbank. I have said here that I regarded him as either a 
fellow traveler or a Communist. Mr. Carter did not take the stand 
of labeling Epstein as a subversive character. 

Senator Smith. The question is, when that was put in circulation 
should he not have done that? 

Senator Ferguson. Should he have? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say he should have only if he had evidence, 
only if he believed that Epstein was a subversive character. Maybe 
his opinion of Epstein disagrees with mine. Who am I to judge Mr. 
Carter's opinion of a third party ? 

Senator Ferguson. You were not so careful about McGovern in your 
testimony this morning, were you ? 

]Mr. Fairbank. That was as to a matter of fact. This has to be a 
matter of opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Wait. Now wait a minute. 

Mr. Fairbank. In 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. You say you knew the facts here about Epstein. 

Mr. Fairbank. I testified I do now. 

Senator Ferguson. You knew the facts about being in China, 

Mr. Fairbank. Could I distinguish between the fact of a man's 
being in Peking in 1937, which is a physical thing, and the fact or 
opinion, whichever you want to call it, that a man is a Communist? 
My opinion was that Epstein was a Communist ; but I had no factual 
proof. 

Senator Ferguson. Does this letter of Carter's not indicate that he 
knows what this fellow is, this special pleader, as he calls him, and so 
forth, and how he has organized it so well ? He knows it is going to 
be prohibited by the Chinese from coming in. Now let's get it in first. 

I will ask you this question : Isn't this exactly how the Communists 
do things ? Isn't it exactly like they do things ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't follow that exactly. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think that this is what is known as 
the party line to get material that is communistic into the hands of 
people who do not know or have reason to believe it is communistic ? 
Is that not part of the party line ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have pointed out, first, this book was pretty ob- 
viously pro-Communist. 

Senator Smith. Let us see if we cannot answer the questions as we 
go along. 

Mr. Fairbank. We have three in succession. Let's have them one 
after the other. 

Senator Ferguson. Is this not exactly the party line ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; not necessarily. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that the Communists do not try to get 
Communist literature out in the hands of people who do not know 
or have reason to believe that it is the Communist literature, but that 
is their line, that is the way they penetrate public opinion. Is that 
not true ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; I am well aware of that effort of the Com- 
munists. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I ask you whether that is not the party 
line. 

Mr. Fairbank. A line is a policy. The operation is what you are 
describing, I think. The line is a policy. 



3748 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Is this not the way they do it? 

Mr. Fairbank. It is the way they operate ; yes. Others also- 



Senator Ferguson. As far as this particular case was concerned 
Carter was following the party line. 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir. The party line 

Senator Ferguson. Party operation. 

Senator Smith. You mean the method of party operation. 

Mr. Fairbank. The question is was Carter following the Commu- 
nist method. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. We define that Communist method as putting 
out 

Senator Ferguson. This kind of method. 

Mr. Fairbank. Putting out something without indicating its 
source. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Knowingly. 

Senator Ferguson. Knowingly or having reason to believe it was 
the Communist propaganda. 

Mr. Fairbank. First, I don't know Avhether Carter thought that 
Epstein was a Communist or not. I can't testify to that. 

Senator Fei^guson. That wasn't what I asked you, whether you 
knew it. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am trying to answer your question. 

Senator Ferguson. I asked you whether it was the party line and 
whether he was following the line. Whether he did it consciously or 
unconsciously we will have to determine. 

Mr. Fairbank. That word "line," sir, ought to be modified. 

Senator Ferguson. I know you do not like the word "line." 

Mr. Fairbank. It is a technical term. 

Senator Ferguson. You know what I mean. 

Senator Smith. They were following the Communist method of op- 
eration. That is the question you are willing to answer, rather than 
the party line. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. He was following the Communist method. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think many promoters follow a Communist method 
of operation in these terms. Many promoters follow that method. 
All kinds of lobbyists around the country. 

Senator Smith. That is what Mr. Carter was doing here, was it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; but that doesn't indicate he is doing a Com- 
munist operation. Because there are all kinds of American promoters. 

Senator Ferguson. We will draw that conclusion. We will have to. 

Mr. Fairbank. Surely. 

Senator Smith. What is the next question ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I trust I have made myself clear on that. You can 
have a parallel type of operation, where a man is trying to promote 
something, and many Americans do it but they are not necessarily 
Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. You read this letter ; did you not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have read it before ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think there is evidence in this letter 
that Carter knew that this fellow was a Communist or a fellow traveler, 
as you describe him ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3749 

Mr. Faikbank. I do not know how Mr. Carter would state that in 
his own mind. It seems to me plain that Mr. Carter knew he was sym- 
pathetic to the Communists and this was a Communist view, and he 
said so in the letter. 

Senator Ferguson. But he said to conceal that part and get it over 
there before they close in on them and put the bronze curtain down, 
get it to these Senators and the Secretary of State and this adviser to 
the Secretary. 

Mr. Fairbank. He was promoting it. There is no question about 
that. 

Senator Watkins. You do not think that was a function of Mr. 
Carter as executive secretary of the IPR? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am sure it was a personal act. 

Senator Watkins, Purely personal ? It would not have been car- 
rying out any of his duties in the IPR in doing that, according to your 
version. 

JMr. Fairbank. I don't believe that is a regular function of his to 
undertake personal promotion. 

Senator Watkins. You were a trustee at the time and you would 
know. 

Mr. Fairbank. There were 60 trustees scattered around the country 
and we met maybe once a year. 

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, the trustees left the opera- 
tion of the IPR almost entirely to Mr. Carter, didn't they, to the ex- 
ecutive secretary? 

Mr. Fairbank. Only 

Senator Watkins. They met once a year, scattered all over the coun- 
try and they necessarily could not follow it if they returned over the 
operation to him and he in effect was their spokesman. 

Mr. Fairbank. In one respect. 

Senator Watkins. And so held himself out. 

Mr. Fairbank. In the organization of the conferences. In the same 
way they left to a vote of confidence of a committee the question of re- 
search. Then they had the question of finance and international or- 
ganizations and so forth. 

Senator Watkins. When they met once a year how long would they 
meet? 

Mr. Fairbank. All day. 

Senator Watkins. Spend 1 day on it ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is all. 

Senator Watkins, And then turn this plan loose with the operation. 
He was the voluble member of the IPR, the vocal member I should 
have said. 

Mr, Fairbank, I think it would be a misconception to consider the 
IPR as a highly integrated network, with a centralized head who could 
manipulate this thing and just make bells ring all over the country 
and influence opinion that way. 

Senator Watkins. He apparently did. You say you did not think 
it was organized that way, but that is the way it was actually operating, 
was it not? 

. Mr, Fairbank. Not to my knowledge, sir. I think it is a distorted 
thing, loosely organized. 

Senator Watkins. We did not know about it but we are now calling 
it to your attention. 



3750 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. I read that and I know it is the kind of thing Mr. 
Carter would do as an individuaL 

Senator Watkins. He did not make any distinguishing remarks 
to indicate that that was purely personal on his part and not as secre- 
tary of the IPE, did he? 

Mr. Fairbank. We are operating here with a private agency, and 
I agree it is not tightly organized. 

Senator Smith. May I ask you now, Mr. Fairbank, the question I 
asked you away back and we sort of lost track of it. Mr. Carter was 
a full-time employee of the IPR. There were a few other full-time 
employees, were there not? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Not very many? 

Mr. Fairbank. Most of the work of the IPR was done by the people 
who were on committees and who donated their time, people like re- 
search committees and others who were handling publications. Most 
of the work is in publications. 

Senator Smith. I am trying to pin this down to get what were the 
duties and necessarily opportunities of Mr. Carter. He was really 
what we might call, determine as, and call the head man of the IPR 
organization. 

Mr. Fairbank. I do not think so, sir. 

Senator Smith. Who 

Mr. Fairbank. It was not set up that way. 

Senator Smith. Among all the employees or officers of the IPE, who 
exercised more authority or more control or spent more time on the 
IPE affairs than Mr. Carter? Just give us the name because we cer- 
tainly would like to get him up here. 

Mr. Fairbank. If you take William L. Holland, he was then in 
charge of the research and publications much of the time. That was 
a full-time job. 

Senator Smith. All right, he was a subordinate of Mr. Carter, was 
he not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Not always. 

Senator Smith. Sometimes, we will say. We will say it that way. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am not sure how that subordination works. 

Senator Smith. Did he recognize himself as subordinate to Mr. 
Carter? 

Mr. Fairbank. You see, we are discussing a 20-year period here. 
These people shifted around. 

Mr. SoTJR^viNE. Did he eventually succeed Mr. Carter? 

Mr. Fairbank. In which position, secretary general? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In any position. 

Mr. Fairbank. I have briefed myself on my own affairs here, but 
I haven't briefed myself on the IPE. 

Senator Smith. You were a trustee? 

Mr. Fairbank. The way these people shifted around is sometimes 
confusing. 

Mr. SoTTRwiNE. You were a trustee, and you have at least shown 
some interest in defending Mr. Carter, which, so far as I am concerned, 
is entirely all right. Now I am asking you who in the IPE organiza- 
tion, if anybody, was over and above Mr. Carter. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is very plain. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Tell us that. If it is plain, tell us that. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3751 

Mr. Fairbaxk. The Pacific Council of the IPR. It is called that. 
It represents all the different constituent bodies that had a head. The 
constituent head of it was the head of the IPR. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Who was that ? 

Mr. Fairbank. For a long time it was Dr. Dafoe, a man in Canada. 
At another time it was Dr. Tarr. Another time it was Corbett, pro- 
fessor from Yale. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You don't mean to com.pare the extent of their activi- 
ties with Mr. Carter's, do you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. In my office, I come in 1 hour a day, and my secre- 
tary works all the time. The amount of work done 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You better leave that out because, you see, I am a 
university trustee, too, and I have always said that professors work 
an hour a day and the rest of us do the work. Some of my professors 
won't like that. 

Mr. Fairbank. Sir, I spend the rest of the time in the library. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Oh. Anyhow, can you name anybody who was over 
and above Mr. Carter in directing the affairs of the IPR? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, indeed. I can very definitely do that. 

Mr. Sourw^ine. Who? 

Mr. Fairbank. The head of the Pacific Council. That was a man 
elected about every 3 years and he had the authority of being the head 
of the IPE. Mr. Carter was a paid siicretary general. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What was this man's name ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The man shifted every 3 years. Dr. Tarr, from 
Canada, is one man. Another one I remember 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. During the term of his office 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He didn't move to New York to the headquarters? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. This is a case where you have a private organ- 
ization. There are paid employees of it. The heads of the organ- 
izations take the responsibility. They met twice a year, usually, at an 
international gathering. It has to be. It traveled to England this 
past month, or wherever it was. Tliey set down the main policies. 
They approve the main research program and the conference program, 
and then the paid people have to do the operating. 

Mr. SouRW^iNE. Who would 3'ou say is the head of Harvard Uni- 
versity ? I believe that is your school, is it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. This is a very interesting point. The head of Har- 
vard University is the Harvard Corp. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is the organization. 

Mr. Fairbank. And not President Conant. He is the president. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Wlio is the administrative head of Harvard 
University ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The provost, who acts for the president. Even 
Harvard University is a little bit disjointed. 

Senator SivnTH. It really has gotten that reputation, not to my 
way of thinking, maybe. Don't you laiow, Mr. Fairbank, just simply 
and plainly, that Mr. Carter, whatever way he may have been denomi- 
nated, was really the head man in the IPR when it came to exercising 
the functions that were supposed to be exercised by the IPR ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir. 

Senator Smith. You do not think Carter was the head man then? 



3752 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. That is a constitutional question. The constitution 
of the IPR does not set him up as the head man. 

Senator Smith. Do you not know that the records which we seized 
were seized on his farm, in his barn, and he had custody of them? 
How can you sit there and say 

Mr. Fairbank. My secretary has my files. She does not run me. 

Senator Smith. Does she have a farm she secrets them in, or a 
barn ? 

Mr. Fairbank. They are not that big. 

Senator Smith. You know that is not comparable, Mr. Fairbank. 
Do you not know that Mr. Carter was the head administrative officer 
of the IPR in its dealings with the public and with everybody else, 
that he was the head administrative officer? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't mean to quibble here. 

Senator Smith. That is what you are getting to. I do not want 
you to quibble, either, because I want to give you a chance. 

Mr. Fairbank. I would have to say no to your question specifically 
but I would like to explain it. 

Senator Smith. Who then is over and above Mr. Carter ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The Pacific council. 

Senator Smith. The individuals. What individual has authority? 

Mr. Fairbank. The head of the Pacific council. 

Senator Smith. Wliat individual has authority over and above Mr. 
Carter ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The head of the Pacific council. 

Senator Smith. Have you read the evidence of the efforts which Mr. 
Carter made to get money hither and yon for this institute and to 
carry on its work ? You know he was the main ramrod, to put it an- 
other way, do you not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. He was certainly the most active person. And there 
were other people very active. 

Senator Ferguson. "VYhen did you become a trustee ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I was elected first on April 11, 1944. 

Senator Ferguson. 1944. 

Mr. Fairbank. I did no active participation in any trustee activi- 
ties. I was in Government service. 

Senator Ferguson. When did Kohlberg make certain charges 
against the IPR? 

Mr. Fairbank. I met Mr. Kohlberg in China 

Senator Ferguson. No. When did he make the charges? 

Mr. Fairbank. After that. 

Senator Ferguson. After you became a trustee. 

Mr. Fairbank. After I met him in China in 1943. I think it was 
about 1944 or after. 

Senator Ferguson. He made some charges about the IPR ; did he 
not? 

Mr. Fairbank. Oh, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And did the trustees investigate them? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you find this letter? 

Mr. Fairbank. Let me get straight my position as a trustee. 

Senator Ferguson. Wait. I am not asking you about your posi- 
tion as a trustee. 

Mr. Fairbank. I was not a trustee in 1946. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3753 

Senator Ferguson. Did they investigate him ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The investigation went on, as I understand it, in 
1946. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it not going on in 1945 ? 

Mr. Fairbank. It may well have been. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it not go on in 1947 ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am not sure how much further it went on in 1947, 
because the whole thing was discussed and voted on before 1947. 
Isn't that right ? I don't remember these dates. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it not voted on when you were there? 

Mr. Fairbank. As to that, I am not sure. There was a gap, you 
see, when I was not a trustee after 1944. 

Senator Ferguson. Whom did you have investigate this thing; 
Carter? — when Kohlberg made his charges. 

Mr. Fairbank. My recollection is that a committee of businessmen 
connected with the American council of the IPR formed an investigat- 
ing committee, and they went into that. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. When did you file this letter in the 
barn ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I guess it wasn't in the barn yet; was it? It was 
in the New York office. 

Senator Ferguson. Why didn't they find it in the New York office? 

Senator Smith, I would have been a lot easier. 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say that for them to find that letter would 
have taken much more money and time than they had. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, it was too big a job to be done, 
so they just went blithely over it, whitewashed it, and said everything 
was fine. We are being accused here for ^nding these things, as I 
understand it ; that we are going too deeply into this thing. Is that 
not one of the charges ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I didn't know you were being accused, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The committee. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am not accusing anybody of that. 

Senator Ferguson. No, but is that not one of the charges against 
the committee? 

Mr. Fairbank. You see, I don't know what that investigating com- 
mittee may have found. They may have read this letter and they 
may have said, "Here is Carter promoting again, and God help us," 
or something. 

Senator Ferguson. But they didn't tell the public "God help 
them." 

Mr. Fairbank. They had to decide on the basis of that letter and 
all the other letters. There were lots of them. You haven't put out 
all the other letters because it is this one letter that you have pointed to. 

Senator Smith. We have not got to all of them yet. 

Senator Ferguson. Should this not be criticized by the trustees, 
this letter? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think, if you are going to scrutinize an executive 
officer who has been a paid employee, you have to take this into account 
the total picture of what he has done. It is only fair to the man. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see the cagey letter? 

INIr. Fairbank. That was written back in the 1930's from Owen 
Lattimore. 

Senator Ferguson. It was in 1938 ; yes. 



3754 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. That was 8 years before. 

Senator Ferguson. That was a designation as to what he was doing. 
He didn't resent that. He went right along with it. 

Mr. Fairbank. We have had a lot of discussion here, and I don't 
want to take the responsibility for this cagey letter you speak of. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you to. I am wondering 
^vhether or not now you are satisfied with the investigation that was 
made by the IPK. itself. Are you satisfied with that investigation? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am afraid so. I think that investigation was 
judging on the broad proportions, the main content of the activity 
of the IPE. vis-a-vis Mr. Kohlberg's charges. Mr. Kohlberg's charges 
were quite specific in some cases and they were quite general in other 
cases. Those people dealt with hini as best they could. 

Senator Ferguson. There was a charge by Kohlberg that there was 
penetration of the Communists into this organization. We now find 
that 11 of those people that did write and penetrated this organiza- 
tion have refused to testify on the ground that it would tend to in- 
criminate them as to whether or not they were Communists. 

Mr. Fairbank. I haven't that list. May I get that list of 11, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; you can get that list. 

Mr. Fairbank. Because 1 have heard of only three or four. 

Senator Ferguson. It is 11 ; is it not? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir ; it is 11. 

Mr. Fairbank. There is the fact. The IPE, membership is some- 
thing like — what is it ? — 1,500 or so. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am not talking about the membership ; 
I am talking about Kohlberg's charges. The membership didn't pene- 
trate this. , 

Mr. Fairbank. These 11 are all employees? 

Senator Ferguson. No; the writers for it. 

Mr. Fairbank. Some are just members or some are writers. 

Senator Ferguson. No; they are writers. The 11 had something to 
do with Avriting for the IPR, and that was Kohlberg's charge. 

Mr. Fairbank. Is it possible that there were perhaps 200 or 300 
writers in all ? 

Senator Ferguson. It could be. 

Mr. Fairbank. And that this is maybe 2 or 3 or 4 percent of those 
writers ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So, then, you think Kohlberg wasn't justi- 
fied unless they got more than .lO percent Communists? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am quite ready to state that I think an infiltration 
effort was made in the IPR and I don't think it got very far. 

Senator Ferguson. If it got 11 in there. 

Mr. Fairbank. As indicated by 11. Eleven is a very small number 
of writers out of 200 or 300 or maybe 500 that they have had. 

Senator Ferguson. Does it not indicate now that the secretary 
knew of the penetration and that he was helping it along by this letter 
that I just read to you here, the Epstein booklet? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that is going rather far. 

Senator Ferguson. How far do you want to go ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Not that far. 

Senator Ferguson. How far? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think you have to build this up by specific in- 
stances, as you are doubtless doirig, but not just one specific instance. 



INSTITFTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3755 

Senator Ferguson. I am talking abont this letter. 

Mr. Fairbank. We are trying to generalize here abont hundreds of 
articles and books and hundreds of people. You name 11 persons, and 
then you say there is this one letter. I think that indicates 

Senator Ferguson. I can show you man}- letters, but you can't do it 
all at once. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. What about this letter ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think we are debating here a question of propor- 
tion. 

Senator Ferguson. That is your answer now to my question? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am not sure I remember your question. 

Senator Smith. We have just had a quorum call. I think we will 
now recess. There is one question I would like to ask you. Senator 
Ferguson can come back to these others later. When you were talking 
about these records, did you ever attend a meeting in Mr. Carter's 
barn in Lee, Mass., of people interested? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I have never been to his barn, and have never 
been to Lee, Mass. 

Senator Smith. Wherever it is, you have never been to Mr. Carter's 
barn where the papers are ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Senator Smith. We vrill recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Wliereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the hearing Avas recessed until 2 p. m. 
the same day. ) 

afternoon session 

Senator Smith. The hearing will come to order. 
Wliere were we at the time of recess ? 

Senator Ferguson. Page 9, 1 think, after the word "I" on line 5. 
Mr. Fairbank. That is right. You would like me to continue read- 
ing, Senator? 

Senator Smith. Yes ; if that is your wish, ]\Ir. Fairbank. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., 
ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD WAIT, ESQ. 

]Mr. Fairbank. I had just referred to Miss Bentley's statement, and 
I was replying that competent American observers definitely did not 
regard Madame Sun as a Communist in 1943, nor did I. This con- 
tinues. 

As the widow of Sun Yat-sen, the so-called Father of the Chinese 
Republic and the so-called permanent director of the Kuomintang, 
Madame Sun seemed to be trying to stay above party. I attach below 
the expert opinions of reputable American correspondents, beginning 
with A. T. Steele of the New York Herald Tribune. 

Senator Smith. There is a question there. We don't want to cut 
anything out that you want to put in, but that manifestly is an un- 
sworn opinion of somebody. If his evidence is going to be here he 
ought to be here to cross-examine. 

Mr. Fairbank. All of these people I am quoting are out of the 
country, I think; so it isn't possible. 

Senator Smith. From the standpoint of the committee we ought to 
have only facts here. I do not want to cut you off or quibble Ibout 



3756 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

little things. But you are starting out to quote somebody who isn't 
here for us to cross-examine. The question is whether or not we 
should go ahead and put that in. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, if I have it right, the exhibit is 
October 5, 1951 ; so, it couldn't have been possibly known by the witness 
at the time that he brought this matter over. That was in what year ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't follow on this, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not have the Steele article — you did 
not know what his opinion was — when you brought the parcel over, 
or whatever it was. 

Mr. Fairbank. Let me explain. This letter from Steele is written 
to me at my request. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. Over his signature. 



Senator Ferguson. But in 1951- 



Mr. Fairbank. Yes : and I have a photostat of it. 

Senator Ferguson. But you did not know at the time that the 
fact occurred that Miss Bentley was talking about. 

Mr. Fairbank. He is testifying as to his recollection. I am testi- 
fying as to mine. He is corroborating me; that is all I am pro- 
posing. 

Senator Smith. But the point is that he is not sworn. 

Mr. Fairbank. He can't be ; he isn't in the country. 

Senator Smith. That is the point. I laiow you appreciate the 
situation. 

Mr. Wait. Sir, may I suggest something to the witness? I think 
it could be shortened down and kept within its limits here. 

Senator Smith. All right. 

Mr. Fairbank. Mr. Chairman, I have consulted my counsel, and 
I would say this : That I have received certain letters, and I have here, 
if the committee would like to see them, photostatic copies, and I be- 
lieve these letters to be genuine ; they were in response to queries that 
I made, and they, in my view, are from reputable correspondents who 
were named in the statement here. As a basis of having received these, 
I feel they corroborate my view. It isn't necessary to quote the un- 
sworn testimony of these persons ; so. I can move on to another page. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; but, so the record is clear, they are all 
dated after the fact; they are dated just recently. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, indeed. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, can't we agree on this: Beginning 
with the words "I attach," on page 9 — if your counsel will observe 
there — the rest of that page and all of page 10 is a quotation from 
letters or newspaper statements? Now, if you wish to submit those 
for further examination by the committee, that will be all right. But, 
could not those two pages be stricken out and get down to page 11, 
where you are beginning to talk about the facts ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Might it be usual, sir, if I gave you these tran- 
scripts and they were put into the record of the committee. They 
are not very long, and they do bear on this point, which I think is a 
matter of fact that you want to get at, and we won't have to read 
them and take your time. 

Senator Smith. The committee will be glad to consider them. 
Whether we should load the record with the opinion of somebody else 
not sworn is a different thing. In other words, a person could bring 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3757 

in here a dozen, a hundred, or a thousand letters from people which 
would be ex parte statements, and one which we would not have a 
chance to cross-examine unless they were present. Manifestly, the 
committee cannot <>o that far. But you may file those letters, and 
the staff members will examine them. If you wish to make any fur- 
ther point later about them, I for one would be perfectly willing to 
let 3'ou do it. 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have a question? 

Mr. Fairbank. I was consulting them, 

Mr. Wait, I agreed with the chairman that these should be filed. 

Mr. Fairbank, Could I pass these over to you, sir. This is a letter 
from Archibald Steele, dated Ankara, Turkey, October 5, 1951, a 
photostat. This is a letter from Tillman Durclin, dated Hong Kong, 
September 21, 1051, a photostat. This is a letter from Brooks Atkin- 
son, dated New York Times, New York, September 26, 1951, a photo- 
stat. This is a letter from Christopher Rand, dated Hong Kong, 
October 23, 1951. 

This is a letter from Robert P. Martin dated Nieraan Foundation, 
Cambridge, Mass., October 4, 1951. 

This is a photostat of the New York Times editorial page for Satur- 
day, August 21, 1948, an editorial headed "China Reports." That is 
what is covered in this. 

Senator Smith. That is material, as I understand, Mr. Fairbank, 
Avhich you gathered in preparation for this hearing. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. And which you are going to tender to our com- 
mittee so that we may make whatever use we wish to with it. Then 
that would mean that you will not have to go through reading pages 9 
and 10, but can go to the top of page 11 where you start on the facts 
again, 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. All right, we will proceed that way. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos, 557A, B," 
and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 557-A 

China Reports 

(New York Times editoi-ial on Mme. Sun, August 21, 1943) 

If there is one person in China who is recognized by most Chinese as stand- 
ing above party and politics it is Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the father of 
modern China but a great lady in her own right. If there is one activity to 
which no ideological strings are attached, although a great deal of its work is 
done in areas held by the Communists, it is the China Welfare Fund, which 
she heads. Its work is told in a small booklet recently released by the China 
Aid Council, Inc., 1790 Broadway, which forwards American contributions to 
Madame Sun at the Fund's headquarters, 86 Kwantung Lu, Shanghai. 

The booklet explaining the work of the China Welfare Fund is titled "Madame 
Sun Reports." It might well have been called "China Reports." For one of 
Madame Sun's cardinal principles is that help shall be given by the Fund only 
to those who help themselves. As an earnest of this attitude the Fund's strong- 
est drive is made in China itself, where one-quarter of its money is raised. The 
booklet itself explains how Chinese of all political creeds cooperate in Madame 
Sun's woi'k and how the recipients of grants from the Fund use its money only 
as a starting point for organization of their activities. 

The most spectacular work of the China Welfare Fund has been in the Com- 
munist-held areas of North China — not to help communism but to aid innocent 
and suffering people. Through the impetus of money and materials sent in 



3758 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

by the Fund, a system of hospitals— called International Peace Hospitals or, just 
by their initials, IPH's — and medical schools have been established in areas 
that have never had such service before. They are all small. They all have 
been harassed, first by the war against Japan and since 1945 by civil war. But 
they have continued to grow and to carry to people who never before had known 
relief from pain in illness, or even the rudiments of sanitation and preventive 
medicine, the marvels of modern medical care and of sanitary practices that 
can keep in check the epidemic diseases that in ages past have decimated whole 
areas almost overnight. 

No American who has been in China and who has had an opportunity to 
investigate the work of Madame Sun's Welfare Fund but who has enthusi- 
astically endorsed it. Contributors can know that their money will go ro help 
the Chinese people regardless of creed or political party. 



Exhibit No. 557-B 

Cogitations of a Spy 

(Copy of article in Moscow journal New Times, January 18, 1950, p. 23) 

Last year's summer conference of the Harvard University staff heard four 
papers on U. S. policy in the Far East. These papers have now been published 
in the form of a pamphlet entitled "Next Step in Asia." 

One of them — "Communism in China and the New American Approach to 
Asia," by a certain John K. Fairbank — outlines a program of action which 
amounts in brief to this — that the United States must try to undermine the 
Asian national-liberation movements from within. 

"The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses 
China," Fairbank writes, "cannot be achieved merely by setting up static 
military defence lines nor by arms shipments from abroad, but only by com- 
petition from rival groups within the country which make an equally valid 
use of the sources of revolutionary power." 

Fairbank wants to wrench the peoples of Asia away from the democratic, anti- 
imperialist camp. In regard to China, he realizes, the United States is most 
unlikely to achieve results. "Our more active policy," he therefore declares, 
"should centre on non-Communist Asia" — Southeast Asia, Japan. Southern Ko- 
rea, and also India. For these countries he proposes a rapid mobilization and 
allocation of American "specialized personnel," who would be able to "develop 
direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities" and "assist local leaders." 

Thus, according to Fairbank's plan, the Amei'ican intelligence service is to seek 
out traitors and agents-provocateurs of the Hatta and Shahrir type, and to 
worm its men into the Communist Parties and other progressive organizations. 
Besides the training of special agents for this purpose, Fairbank proposes that 
the American missions, and such American organizations as the YMCA, should 
become more active. He also suggests establishing American "research insti- 
tutes," tourists' "field stations," and similar footholds in the Asian countries. 

The meaning of Fairbank's plans becomes still more evident after a glance at 
this Harvard history professor's record. The war found John K. Fairbank in 
China, where he had been living for seven years, and where he remained during 
the war, and for some time after its conclusion. In 1942-43, he was special 
assistant to the American Ambassador at Chungking ; in 1945-4G, head of the 
"U. S. Office of War Information in China" — in other words, an American intel- 
ligence agent of no small calibre. And this, it seems, remains his basic trade 
at Harvard as well. His professorial thoughts turn persistently in one direc- 
tion : that of using learned institutions and scientific study as cover for espionage 
and sabotage. 

Mr. Fairbank. Beginning at tlie top of page 11 : 

Secondly, regarding Miss Bentley's lialf truth as I have aheady 
stated on my own initiative to the Department of the Army, I did 
indeed accept a letter from Madame Sun and bring it back to the 
head of the China Aid Council when I returned from Chungking in 
December 1943. I understood Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly 
proper report on her medical relief work, to which the China Aid 
Council contributed. I brought back several other letters or pack- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3759 

ages along with Madame Sun's letter, as travelers usually did in war- 
time China, and they all passed through the regular customs censor- 
shij) inspection. I have no recollection or knowledge of what was in 
Madame Sun's letter in 1943. If I had thought it was Communist, 
I would not have carried it. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I just inquire then, about your statement, 
that "I understand Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper 
report." If you did not know what was in it, how do you get that 
statement ? 

Mr. Fairbank. An understanding, in my view, is a possible basis of 
one's action, whereas knowledge by seeing is something a little bit 
more. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a conversation with her as to what 
was in the letter or package or whatever it was you were bringing over 
in 1943? 

Mr. Fairbank. ]\Iy recollection of that period is not very precise. 
I was leaving Chungking in a great hurry, seeing a great many officials. 
I believe I went to call on her to say goocl-by. I had seen her once or 
perhaps twice before. I don't recall precisely the details of that 
period, I am sorry. 

Senator Ferguson. Here is the difficulty with receiving a statement 
like that in the record : I understood you to say in the statement, and 
it is under oath, "'I understand Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly 
proper report on her medical relief work, to which the China Aid 
Council contributed." Now, what is the basis of that statement? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, the basis, very definitely, is my experience in 
that period at the end of November, and the beginning of December 
1943, in Chungking, when I was preparing to come back to this 
country. Now we come to the question what exactly was that ex- 
perience ? You see I obtain the impression from that experience, and 
I testify as to that. 

Senator Smith. I think, though, Mr. Fairbank, we ought to get 
down to the specific question asked. You say, "I understood Madame 
Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report on her medical relief work." 
Now, how can you say that, we are asking you, how can you say that in 
view of the further fact you stated just now that you did not read the 
letter and did not see the letter ? How do you know what was in the 
letter, whether it was a report or not? She might have been asking 
for more funds and not reporting at all. 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't want to repeat myself unnecessarily, but I 
distinguished, I think, a moment ago, between understanding, which 
is an intellectual impression, a conviction one receives. 

Senator Smith. It is supposed to be derived from some observation 
of facts, though, is it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Now, what are the facts that you observed that 
caused you to reach the conclusion that this was a perfectly proper 
report ? 

]Mr. Fairbank. Those are the things that I do not recollect, and I 
am testifying as to tlie impression that I received from that experience 
of those facts. I think that is a very common thing in this kind of 
testimony. This is one very small incident, a long time ago, in a verv 
crowded period of my activity. 

88.'?4S— 52 — pt. 11— — 4 



3760 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. But are you not also making objections to this 
committee receiving that kind of testimony ? Isn't that your criticism 
of the Budenz testimony ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't believe my testifying as to my understand — 
it is hearsay, I didn't hear it from anyone else, it is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; but you have to get it from facts. 

Mr. Fairbank. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. What are the facts? 

Mr. Fairbank. My experience at that period. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the experience? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, there are a number of different possible ex- 
periences I may have had, and I am not sure which one I had, either 
in talking to Madame Sun or not. 

Senator Smith, The point about it is, Mr. Fairbank, you made a 
statement that you understood it was a perfectly proper report, how 
come you make such a statement unless you say the report or read it, 
or had it read to you, or had it explained to you ? How come you make 
such a statement, that it was a perfectly proper report? 

Mr. Fairbank. I can make such a statement only on the basis of 
memory. 

Senator Smith. You say you do not have a memory. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I do have a memory. 

Senator Smith. About what was in the letter? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; about my understanding. 

Senator Smith. We are talking about the letter now. 

Mr. Fairbank. I have testified now — let me read it again. "I have 
no recollection or knowledge of what was in Madame Sun's letter." 

Senator Smith. I am willing to take that as a statement of fact, if 
that is true. 

Mr. Fairbank. Then I also testify I understood her letter was per- 
fectly proper. Those are both facts, in my view. 

Senator Ferguson. But you say "I brought back several other letters 
or packages along with Madame Sun's. Were they from somebody 
else, or were they Madame Sun's letters ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, someone else. People in my office, friends of 
mine, and I don't recall precisely who they were. One was from my 
photographer, who was working there, to his girl. 

Senator Ferguson. You say it was unsealed, this letter, Madame 
Sun's letter? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't have the recollection of those details. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, at least you didn't read it? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recollect that I did. 

Senator Smith. Did you have it read to you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recollect that it was. 

Senator Smith. Did you have anybody read it and tell you what was 
in it? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recollect that. 

Senator Smith. You see, we are just testing the reasonableness of 
your statement and your conclusion here, to see whether or not you 
really had any foundation for the statement as to what you under- 
stoocl. Now, of course, if you had heard it read, or if Madame Sun 
had told you what was in the letter, that might have been one way of 
communicating what was in the letter, and therefore you would have 
an understanding from it. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3761 

Mr. Fairbank. In other words, you want to test on what basis I 
achieved this understanding. 

Senator Smith. That is it, precisely. 

Mr. Fairbank. And I am sorry I don't have details to offer. 

After several years of testimony concerning Communists Louis 
Budenz remembered my name for the first time, so far as I know, in 
response to the committee counsel's question last August. ^ He dis- 
claimed any personal direct knowledge but referred to official party 
"reports" which were obviously unavailable. The entire interchange 
-of two sentences hardly took 15 seconds and was as follows [reading] : 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist? 
Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir ; not by personally meeting him but by official reports, 
particularly in 1945. 

No further questions were put to Budenz by committee counsel as to 
the specific factual evidence for his very serious charge, and may I 
suggest this is rather similar to the point you just made about me. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he not say they were official reports, and 
you say now apparently they were unavailable because they were 
•Communist reports and he is no longer a Communist and would't 
have them ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is what I say. I will continue. No further 
questions were put to Budenz by committee counsel as to the specific 
factual evidence for his very serious charges, which was left hanging 
in the public record, unsubstantiated and yet unassailable for libel. 
This allegation has of course been associated with my name ever 
since in the press and in the public mind, and I cannot help feeling 
that the committee's procedure has been a bit out of line with the 
American tradition of fair play. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now explain that. What was the 
fair plaj^ that you thought was violated by the committee's procedure ? 

Mr. Fairbank. If I were in the committee's position, I would want 
a witness like Mr. Budenz, in making a charge, which is so very 
damaging, to offer a little more, at least in the way of the circum- 
stances, in which he received a basis for this charge. I really would. 
I think it would be only proper to the American rights of the indi- 
vidual, who should not be needlessly attacked, because this is, I think, 
a very damaging charge. I have suffered under it. It has been very 
expensive to me. It has damaged my university, it has damaged 
my work, which is more important, perhaps, than myself. I think 
my work is very important for this country, I really do. This sort 
of damage, before I would have it inflicted or executed in a committee 
session, I think I would try to get more circumstances as a basis. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not the answer say "Yes" and then he 
explained it'^ It was not from personal knowledge, he said, it was 
only — I am paraphrasing his words it was only by official reports, 
particularly in 1945. 

Mr. Fairbank. Could I suggest, for example 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what is the American tradition there that 
is violated ? That is, of fair play. 

Mr. Fairbank. Suppose, sir, that it were a legal proceeding, just 
for supposition, and you were questioning this man. You were rep- 
resenting a client, suppose you were representino^ me, and you were 
cross-questioning Mr. Budenz. You would hardly have stopped at 



3762 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

this point. Would you not have said, "Official reports of what kind?" 
It doesn't even say Communist Party reports. And reports from 
whom and to whom ? And are they reports based merely on the press, 
or based on something in this country or reports coming from China 
or what? You see, there are many questions to be asked. 

Senator Ferguson. Did the press print that answer ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The press printed only this. 

Senator FERGUisox. Wliat? 

Mr. Fairbank. Tliat I have quoted. 

Senator Ferguson. The quotes. 

Mr. Fairbank. Because tliere was nothing else in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not that indicate that all he knew about 
it was from an official report ? 

Mr. Fairbank. If this is all he knew, then he would suggest that 
the committee is a bit out of line with the American tradition of fair 
play in putting that out. 

Senator Ferguson. The committee does not put this out, it becomes 
part of the record. It is just like your statement last night, when you 
released it to the press. Dr. Fairbank. You released it. These official 
meetiugs that are held in open session, the press is here, and they 
print it. 

Mr. Fairbank. Perhaps I am under a misapprehension, but I have 
understood that the committee has followed a practice of having execu- 
tive sessions, such as I had yesterday, partly for the purpose of going 
over prospective points of testimony to avoid unnecessary damage to 
American citizens. I just heard that. 

Senator Smith. You approve of that system, do you not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, I do. 

Senator Smith. The point, I think, Mr. Fairbank, and I can appre- 
ciate what you were getting at, is that you seem to think that Mr. 
Bundenz was used as a witness against you in an action where you 
were being tried. You, of course, know we are not trying you, we are 
not trying anybody. 

Mr. Fairbank. Surely. 

Senator Smith. So that you think we should go further and cross- 
examine Mr. Budenz to see what the basis of this is, and whether he 
knows anything else about it. That is what j^ou mean, is it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir ; if it is correct, as I have understood. 

Senator Smith. The point is, when you make a statement here to us 
today, if we are satisfied, if we know nothing else except what you said, 
then that is your statement under oath. 

Mr. Fairbank. Surely. 

Senator Smith. Of course, we might say something that would draw 
all sorts of implications that were unfounded. Of course, we should 
not do that as a committee. We asked Budenz a question, he gave us 
an answer. Now, we are not responsible for whether that is truthful 
or not. When we finally wind up this whole hearing we may get to 
the point of expressing our opinion of what parts of the testimony are 
true and what parts are not. But we have not gotten that far yet. 
We have given you this chance to refute the very things Budenz said. 
I do not know what else we can do. 

Mr. Fairbank. I appreciate this chance to refute it, which I am 
attempting to do. Shall I continue ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3763 

Mr. Fairbank. As for recent assertions tliat I was proposed along 
with my wife, but without our knowledge, for some kind of project of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, to work in some fashion along with 
Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and others, I never heard of this 
proposal before it was recently made public. 

Senator Ferguson. You draw a conclusion that there is an assertion 
that you and your wife had been on some kind of a project of the Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency. Is that where you were proposed by Mr. 
Da vies ? How do you account for Mr. Davies proposing this, if you 
did not know anything about it? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am sorry, I don't want to hold you up. I was look- 
ing, sir, for a five-column headline of the Boston Post, and this derived 
from testimony here, as I understood from the news story, by a certain 
Mr. Munson. 

Senator Fp:rguson. Yes, a responsible, as far as the committee knew, 
former agent of the CIA appeared before this committee, and he had, 
as evidence to refresh his memory, a statement to the effect that John 
Davies proposed you to him. Now, what should the committee do, 
refuse to take that testimon}'? 

Mr. Fairbank. Sir, I have not suggested that the committee should 
not have done that, in this statement of mine here. And I believe 
you had a question just a moment ago about Davies' proposing this: 
How could lie do it without my knowledge ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, he did without my knowledge. 

Senator Ferguson. All right, he did it without your knowledge. 
But how could we refuse to take Munson's testimony that this is what 
Davies did? Davies was an employee of the United States Govern- 
ment in the State Department. He proposes your name, and I think 
your wife's name, to the Central Intelligence Agency, along with 
Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong and others. 

Mr. Fairbank. In making this statement, I am not, b}^ any means 
suggesting that every act of this committee has been unfair, by no 
means. 

Senator Ferguson. What could we have done in that case? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have only mentioned that in this previous con- 
nection with Badenz. Now, in this connection with CIA I am going 
on to build up your record for you. Since I am here today, and 
Munson was here before, I am offering my testimony. And it is not 
testimony which criticizes the committee, as far as I read it. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not any personal knowledge as to 
whether Davies did what Munson said ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have no knowledge, no. 

Senator Smith. Then so far as you know, Davies might or might 
not have done that. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. And is it a fact that Davies sent a recommendation 
for you along with Anna Louise Strong and others, and you say you 
didn't know anything at all about it? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is right. 

Senator Smith. And at the time this committee did not know any- 
thing about it, so it is testimony that has been adduced here, after 
the events took place, if in fact it did take place. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 



3764 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Smith. Go ahead. 

Mr. Fairbank. The Department of State, evidently quoting CIA 
has pointed out "that the controlled use or exploitation of persons of 
all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with and 
customary in the business of intelligence, and that a suggestion of 
this kind carried no implications of disloyalty. 

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that statement? 

Mr. Fairbank. From a release of the Department of State, a press 
release. 

Senator Ferguson. When ? Have you got the press release ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Department of State, for the press, No. 128, Feb- 
ruary 18, 1952. The third paragraph has that statement in it. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I see it? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Apparently the State Department issued a press 
release after Mr. Munson testified, isn't that right? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, that is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. And they give, apparently, "the Department is 
advised". They don't say who advised them. 

Mr. Fairbank. No, that is why I say "evidently" quoting CIA. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there any evidence here that they were quot- 
ing CIA? 

Mr. Fairbank. Someone must have advised them, and who would 
advise them about CIA ? That was my thought. That is why I put 
"evidently" in as my word in the testimony. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) ; 

The facts given by Mr. Lyle M. Munson's appearance before the Senate In- 
ternal Security Committee on February 15, versions of vehich appeared iu- 
the press, have been known to the Department and to the subcommittee. 

Wlio are they talking about ? Do you know ? 

Mr. Fairbanks. I am not certain. Perhaps it is this subcommittee, 
I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

This matter was thoroughly examined by the Department at the time it 
occurred, more than 2 years ago, and found to be groundless in any implication 
that Mr. John P. Davies was suggesting anything inimical to the security inter- 
ests of the United States. 

Senator Smith. There has not been any suggestion here in the 
suggestion of these names, that they were inimical, was there ? There 
is no charge such as that made by the committee. 

Mr. Fairbank. This committee does not make charges, I know. 

Senator Ferguson. The Department said that they knew about him 
sending your name in there. Is that not right ? They say "has been 
known to the Department and to the subcommittee." Isn't that right ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the Department is advised, they go on— 

that the controlled use of exploitation of persons of all shades of political com- 
plexion is perfectly compatible with and customary in th«' business of intelli- 
gence, and that a suggestion of this kind carried no implication of disloyalty. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. They are talking about Davies. 

Mr. Fairbank. Not in that statement. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3765 

Senator Ferguson. They are trying to clear Davies by a press 
release. 

Mr. Fairbank. May I say that last paragraph you just quoted 

Senator Ferguson. "Of all political shades." 

Mr. Fairbank. That refers to people like myself, does it not ? 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Exploitation of all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with 
and customary in the business of intelligence and that a suggestion of this kind 
carried no implication of disloyalty. 

They are talking about Davies' disloyalty, are they not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, I read that to mean that I am not disloyal just 
because Davies proposed, without my knowledge, that I should be 
used in connection with somebody who is pro-Communist. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you read it? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is the way I understand that, yes. The press, 
you see, played up, as you may recall, the idea that Davies had sug- 
gested that some accused or alleged Communists should be all put 
together in master-minding some propoganda. The people men- 
tioned were Smedley, Strong, Snow, and myself, and two others who 
have not been accused of being Communists. But now you see, in 
the public press, because of the statement of Budenz here, I am now 
labeled as a person who has been accused of being Communist. That 
is the tag for my name in the press. What else could the press do ? 

Senator Ferguson. Did they not only print the testimony of 
Munson ? 

Mr. Fairbank. There was a report on Munson's testimony, stories 
were written. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you think this committee know- 
ing this press release — it is a subcommittee, that would be this sub- 
committee, and the State Department has known this for several 
years — of what Davies did, would not bring it to the public attention, 
as part of the IPK hearings? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, I don't get any connection with the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not know that Davies had some con- 
nection with the IPR ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I had not heard that. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't remember it. 

Senator Ferguson. He was in the Far East, on this question of 
policy, as to whether or not 

Mr. Fairbank. I was in China but I did not because the Chinese 
revolution — I mean, you know, people are there. People even go to 
IPR conferences without really being a part of the IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Fairbank, what would you say if Mr. Davies 
acknowledged before this committee that he did in fact recommend 
you for CIA work ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That would be further evidence of a factual nature. 
And you see, my testimony here is not to criticize the committee. 

Mr. Morris. Would }^ou dispute his statement? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir, that is his statement, if it is his statement. 

Mr. Morris, Do I take it you are disputing Mr. Munson's statement? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am trying to get the record straight, and I haven't 
seen Mr. Munson's statement in detail. 



3766 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Smith. In this press release which you have produced here, 
it starts off by saying — 

The facts given by Mr. Lyle H. Munson's appearance, "the facts" before the 
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on February 15, versions of vphich ap- 
peared in tlie press, had been known to the Department and to the subcommittee. 

That is a statement of fact that they did know these facts which Mr. 
Munson testified about. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is quite possible. 

Senator Smith. Did you not know about it, maybe, but whoever 
testified did know about it ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. All right, go ahead, Mr. Fairbank. 

Mr. Fairbank. My statement continues, sir. My friend John P. 
Davies had cabled me as follows : 

Security considerations prevent me from adding to Department statement but 
if qualified ofiicers want details they should approach top CIA and State officials. 
In general can say never regarded you [or] Wilma as having same outlook as 
Smedley, Strong or potentially their collaborators but as presenting views and 
approaches widely divergent from theirs. 

Senator Smith. '\^niat he is saying there is that even if your name 
was recommended he did not put you in the same classification as 
Smedley and the others ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read the statement that Munson 
put in the record ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, I have had no access to that, sir. I haven't been 
in Washington enough to come up here and look at it. I don't know 
whether it would be available to me. * 

Senator Smith. I will come back and let you see that, because I 
think you ought to see that. 

Mr. Fairbank. I have never met Anna Louise Strong, nor had any 
contact with her. At the risk of being accused of making a so-called 
incriminating confession or a so-called startling revelation, I wish 
to volunteer the statement that I did know Agnes Smedley. Our 
acquaintance illustrates what I mean by "freedom of contact" as one 
of the freedoms necessary for research workers as well as for journal- 
ists. Among many hundred people I have seen professionally in the 
past 20 years, I saw the late Agnes Smedley on several occasions. 
She was alwaj^s outspokenly pro-Communist, with which I never 
agreed. She was also a writer with unique first-hand experience 
among the Chinese Communist guerrillas. 

I first met Miss Smedley in 1932 in Shanghai through an intro- 
duction from my aunt. My uncle — Gilbert E. Roe — had at one time 
given her legal advice in New York. In January 1933 Miss Smedley 
came to Peking, where my wife and I were living in a Chinese house, 
and arranged with us to stay several days in our extra courtyard, 
which we normally rented to a succession of paying house guests. 
She busied herself in organizing the China League for Civil Rights, 
and interviewed Dr. IIu Shih and other liberals for the purpose. 
From her conversation there was no doubt whatever of her strong 
pro- Communist views. We saw her a third time in Shanghai in late 
1934, and did not see her again for 12 years. 

On January 12, 1947, Miss Smedley spoke at the Boston Community 
Church and I recall I was invited to luncheon to meet her. She had 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3767 

traveled with Chinese guerrilla forces as a war correspondent and 
written about it. but had contracted serious dysentery and seemed 
broken in health. In March 1947 she came to receive treatment at 
the Lahey Clinic in Boston and at that time stayed a few days in my 
house. I invited in some of the local people interested in China and 
Miss Smedley spoke of her interviews with the Chinese Communist 
general, Chu Teh, whose biography she was writing. She was, as 
usual, outspokenly pro-Communist so that her bias was self-evident. 

Over the years I have similarl}^ invited numerous non-Communists 
and anti-Communists to my house for similar informal sessions, in- 
cluding ambassadors, cabinet ministers, and other officials of the Chi- 
nese Nationalist Government, as well as American oflicials and 
scholars. Such contact lias never meant that these persons agreed 
politically with me, nor I with them. At an American university 
we are not afraid of ideas from any quarter. We oppose the totali- 
tarian statist kind of orthodoxy which some Americans, in a panic of 
fear, have been encouraging. 

I shall be glad to take up in detail all the testimony and docu- 
mentation concerning me which have been presented to this committee. 

They have generally stressed my contacts rather than my views. 
This is perhaps understandable because my writings and speeches are 
a matter of public record, available for all to see, and they have been 
distiiiictly non-Communist or anti-Communist. For your record I 
submit a body of excerpts which include practically everything I 
have written on the subject of communism. I should be glad to be 
questioned further about my views. I think they are more important 
than incidental individual contacts. 

My book, The United States and China, received the Willkie Award 
of the American Political Science Association as the best book on 
international relations published in 1948. This is a high honor, not 
carelessly conferred, bj^ the American Political Science Association. 
My part of another book, Next Step in Asia, published in 1949, was 
so constructively anti-Communist that it was denounced in the Moscow 
journal New Times, a copy of which is attached as an exhibit, as the 
"cogitations of a spy." In particular, Moscow denounced my assertion 
in that book in 1949 that — 

The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses China 
cannot be achieved merely by setting up static military defense lines nor by arms 
shipments from abroad, but only hy competition from rival groups within the 
country which make an equally valid use of the sources of revolutionary power. 

Moscow also denounced me because I proposed that in non-Com- 
munist countries of Asia there should be, and here they are quoting 
me — 

a rapid mobilization and allocation of American "specialized personnel," wha 
would be able to "develop direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities" and 
"assist local leaders." 

This is the end of their quotation of me, and my quotation of them. 
As the Russian Communists put it, in their own terminology, and 
this is a quotation from them, "Fairbank wants to wrench the peoples 
of Asia away from the democratic, anti-imperialist camp." End of 
quotation from the Russians, 

This is, of course, quite true : I do want to wrench the peoples of 
Asia away from the Soviet camp. A glance at my writings will indi- 



3768 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

cate how definitely they have aimed at this anti-Russian purpose. I 
think I can say without immodesty that my knowledge of modern 
China and the contacts I have had over the past 20 years make it 
possible for me to be of help in checking communism in Asia. I want 
to be of help. I am gratified to know that the Russians fear my activi- 
ties and writings as a threat to their success. But I cannot be of help 
in this fight if I am discredited and repudiated by my own people. 
Prior witnesses before this committee have sought to do just this, and 
they have done it through irresponsible and unsubstantiated charges. 
Unless they are right, they are helping Russia. I know they are 
wrong. I believe also that upon a consideration of the entire record 
this committee must inevitably come to the same conclusion. 
The Russians also say, and this is a quotation — 

professional thoughts turn persistently in one direction, that of using learned 
institutions and scientific study as cover for espionage and sabotage. 

That is the end of the quotation from the Russians. 

Mr. Morris. From what source? 

Mr, Fairbank. The same source, the New Times. I have a photo- 
stat. 

Mr. Morris. It is all in there ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Mr. JMoRRis. The dates are clearly marked. 

Mr. Fairbank, Yes, January 8, 1950. This Russian charge must 
be noted in connection with some of the insinuations spread abroad 
as a result of testimony before this committee. It produces a con- 
fusing picture: I am charged by Communist Russia with being a 
secret agent of the west, and I am charged before this Senate com- 
mittee with being a secret agent of Russia. These charges are 
equally absurd and false. But there is a disquieting similarity be- 
tween one aspect of the procedures of the Cormnunist Russians and 
of this committee — both have been jumping to conclusions on the 
basis of hearsay evidence and scattergun accusations. 

Senator Watkins. Just a moment. You are saying that the com- 
mittee has jumped to a lot of conclusions? 

Senator Smith. Tell us what conclusion. I think that is a good 
point. 

Senator Watkins. I just wondered. I had not thought the com- 
mittee had made any expression. We had not w^ritten a report on 
this yet. 

Mr. Fairbank. May I consult my counsel ? 

Senator Smith. All right, go ahead. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, I agree, the committee has not made a con- 
clusion, and my statement here represents a criticism which I main- 
tain. I think the wording of it is not precisely correct. I would 
be happy to reword it. 

Senator Watkins, TVliat do you intend to say there? Let us 
get that. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that the committee 

Senator Watkins. You assume such a fair attitude all along on this 
matter, that I was quite disturbed when I see you going off. 

Mr. Fairbank. I agree with your point, that this is literally 
not a correct statement. I would like to express my view, which is, 
nevertheless, I am afraid, a critical one on this point. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3769 

Senator Watkins. You have a right to be critical, if you wish to 
be, yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that the committee has made possible a 
situation, and done it unnecessarily in some cases, where these scat- 
tergun accusations, and hearsay evidence, are put forth, and the public 
is led to a conclusion, by the fact of this evidence being put forth. 

Senator Watkins. We call in witnesses here, we ask them to 
answer questions, we swear them to tell the truth, and we try to get 
at these matters that we are directed by the Congress to investigate. 
We can't be responsible for what the answers are that they come up 
with. We simply have a duty to perform, and then we go along. We 
can't take them all at once. Tlie newspapers play them up when- 
ever Ave hold public hearings. If we do not hold public hearings, 
the people are dissatisfied, and if we do, the people named are dis- 
satisfied. So no matter which way we go, we get into difficulty. 
As far as I can see, the committee has been fair. We have not made 
conclusions. There may have been individual members that have 
made statements, but that is their right to do so. But the commit- 
tee has not made any conclusions, and won't do so, until they write a 
report, if they do write a report on this matter. 

Mr. Fairbank. I subscribe to the committee's system, and I wish 
to have it confirmed, if you wish to confirm it, the system of having 
executive sessions so that unnecessarily damaging or relatively unsub- 
stantiated scattergun accusations, hearsay evidence, that does not 
seem warranted entirely, that kind of thing can be sifted out and not 
put into the public record. 

Senator YV^atkins. I can confirm that we have held many executive 
sessions on many other lines other than the investigation of the IPB-, 
and its influence, that have been going on all of the time. I have 
taken part and have presided over many of those. I know that in 
many instances there, I am satisfied that the t: ; timony that was 
brought in, the investigation showed that that matter should not be 
released, that there w^as very little justification for some of the state- 
ments that were made. But they have not all been made public, and 
all of them probably will never be made public. 

Mr. Fairbank. Then the committee made a decision, did it not, that 
the accusation of Budenz, for example, was a substantial accusation 
which should come out through the committee procedure, attacking 
me as Budenz did, in effect. 

Senator Watkins. He made a statement on a lot of people, and he 
was a man who was on the inside on this thing, and he was a witness 
who had the information. Wherever that information led, if he was 
willing to swear directly, and his testimony had been taken by the 
courts, had been believed by the juries, there is no reason for us to 
completely discredit him on our judgment alone, after he had been 
used by the Government itself on prosecutions. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, what you sav here today is tanta- 
mount to saying that Mr. Budenz is just a liar, is it not? That is 
what you say, is it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. As regards me, very definitely. 

Senator Smith. That is what I mean. That is what you said. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Now, do you think that we should jump to a con- 
clusion that you are right and he is wrong, any more than we should 



3770 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

jump to a conclusion that he was right and you were wrong? It is 
sworn testimony. 

Mr. Fairbank. That does not operate equally. It is not that I call 
him a liar or that he calls me a liar. But he calls me a Communist, 
and he is an expert on communism. When I call him a liar, it doesn't 
hurt him the least. It is when he calls me a Communist that hurts 
me. 

Senator Watkins. What was the quote that you have pertaining to 
you? 

Mr. Fairbank. It is two pages back here, page. 11. Committee 
counsel says : "Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist ? " 
Budenz says, "Yes, sir." That is about all he says. Now, I think that 
not to screen that out not only did me a disservice but w^as, I would 
think, jumping to a conclusion in the sense that you decided, you 
sort of jumped to a conclusion, that this was worth putting in a 
public record without any more substantiation. You have evidently 
decided that in your executive session, and then it went ahead and 
it came out. Committee counsel asked a question. Committee coun- 
sel wouldn't do that unless the thing had been on the docket, so to 
speak, I mean the list of persons. Mr. Morris wouldn't bring it up 
just off his own back. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Fairbank, there were documents introduced into 
the record at the same time. You have read the testimony, have vou 
not? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have not seen any documents about me being a 
Communist. 

Mr. Morris. There are documents in here. 

Mr. Fairbank. But no connection with Mr. Budenz. 

Mr. Morris. But there were documents introduced at the same time,, 
were they not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. You mean they are the basis for the committee's 
concluding I was a Communist? 

Senator Smith. We have not concluded that at all. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am glad to hear that. 

Senator Smith. What you are fussing about is because Mr. Budenz 
came here and testified against you. There have been other witnesses 
who have testified against him, and I imagine there will still be some 
disparity of statements between people that continue to come before 
us. But we haven't reached a point in deciding who is right and who 
is wrong. If it is sworn testimony, I do not know how we could refuse 
to hear Mr. Budenz on his sworn testimony any more than we have 
a right to refuse to hear you on your sworn testimony. 

Mr. Fairbank. We have just had an exchange on that same point. 
I think that his testimony is much more damaging as testimony than 
my testimony is damaging as testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. But, Mr. Fairbank, do you not in effect accuse 
him of perjury? You say lying. Well, lying under oath is perjury. 

Mr. Fairbank. Of course, I have my private view of him as a liar. 
But in this statement I don't need to go as far as to say it is perjury 
on his part because I just don't know what basis he had, if any. 

Senator Watkins. But he says, "I know that he is a Communist." 
That was all he said. 

Mr. Fairbank. If he had a basis, it seems to me it should have been 
indicated. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3771 

Senator Watkins. I do not know if I was here when he stated it. 

Senator Ferguson. He gave as the basis that it was in a record. 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't think you can accept anything from me that 
is a statement of reports. 

Senator Ferguson. You want it definitely opened to show all the 
surrounding facts and circumstances; is that right? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I want it left out because it isn't true. 

Senator Ferguson. How could we strike that out now ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, specifically on this point of jmnping to con- 
clusion, and, in answer to your question, I think this committee, in 
the case of Budenz' testimony about me, if it was no more in executive 
session than it is in the public session here recorded, would have been 
following a better procedure, more fair, to say, "Well, we just won't 
bring that into the public session because it doesn't get us anywhere." 

Xow, you have there, to balance, the fact that it does damage an 
operation of which I am responsible for training American person- 
nel to deal with the Asian problem. That is at Harvard University. 
I am not just an isolated individual. I operate in a university. There 
is a big investment there and a lot of people. We shouldn't damage it. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what Mr. Davies said about you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Senator Ferguson. You read there, in sworn testimony, the state- 
ment referred to. 

Mr. Fairbank. Which Davies is that? 

Senator Ferguson. John P. Davies, Jr. I have marked the parts 
m a statement that was made by Munson right after the conversation 
he had with Davies. He is going to put you as the head of these people, 
and he is going to put you in an office. Now you read it. 

Senator Smith. You mean read it into the record? 

Senator Ferguson. It is official. 

Senator Smith. Suppose you read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Read it aloud. 

Mr. Fairbank. This is Friday, February 15, 1952, this subcommit- 
tee. And this is a public session? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Smith. John P. Davies — you know who he is ? 

Mr. Fairbank, He is a good friend of mine. And he wouldn't do 
me any damage. 

Senator Ferguson. Read what he said about you. 

]Mr. Fairbank. This is what Mr. Munson says that Mr. Davies says, 
is that correct? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank (reading) : 

Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that the above-mentioned persons should 
he used by OPC, and that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared 
by them would represent the proper approach. Mr. Davies said that he would 
he perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit 
charged with producing such materials. He said that he was aware that they 
were considered Communists by some uninformed person^, but that they were 
not Communists, but only very politically sophisticated. 

And the word "politically" is in parentheses. 

It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an 
office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington, probably New York 
or Boston, and that, through a cut out of OPC choosing, these persons provide 
not only guidance but actually produce materials for OPC utilization. 



3772 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

That is Mr. Munson's statement, and whether Mr. Davies said that 
is still another question, is it not? 

Senator Ferguson. I know you do not believe Davies said it. But 
Munson swears to it and files Ihis memorandum that he made at the 
time. And the State Department release indicates that they knew 
about it. 

Mr. Fairbank. ^lay I comment that Mr. Davies seems to think 
that the more politically sophisticated you get, the more leftist you 
are, which I wouldn't agree with. I don't know that Mr. Davies would 
say that either, really. It is a sort of a silly statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Does he not really say that they are going to 
put you in an office and, as heading up this group, that Munson says 
that he is going to put you in the office ; that that is the suggestion of 
Davies, and that is what Davies is saying? — you are to head up the 
group, and you are to be unknown because you are going to have a 
cut-out. 

Mr. Fairbank. Mr. Munson says that is what Mr. Davies says. 
What are we talking about, sir ? 

Senator Ferguson. You are criticizing the committee taking testi- 
mony. 

Mr. Fairbank. About Mr. Budenz ; not about this. 

Senator Ferguson. I knoAv; you want to pass this over, but I am 
going back to it. 

Mr. Fairbank. I will go back to it; I don't know what the point is. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the same thing that you are criticizing 
Budenz about. Whom are we going to believe, Mr. Fairbank, on this 
Munson-Davies story? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think you should take Mr. Munson's story. I 
think that is fine to put in the record. I think I should have a chance 
to reply to it. I am having a chance ; that is good. 

Senator Ferguson. We are going to give you a chance. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you do not object, then, to our putting this 
statement in of what Mr. Davies said? 

Mr. Fairbank. What Mr. Munson said Mr. Davies said. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; I don't object to it, sir ; and, I want to make it 
plain, I do not regard every act of this committee unfair, or anything 
of that kind. I am just pointing to certain things that have dam- 
aged me. 

Senator Smith. At the time you made your comments on the com- 
mittee accepting Budenz' testimony, you didn't know about the ex- 
istence of this evidence ; did you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. This comment in here, on Budenz' testimony? 

Senator Smith. No; in the record you just read from. 

Mr. Fairbank. That was in the press; that I read was in the press, 
and I knew about that when I wrote this statement here. 

Senator Smith. You don't like Mr. Budenz' testimony because he 
accused you of being a Communist. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is right. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Budenz might not like your testimony be- 
cause 

Mr. Fairbank. I can't accuse him of being a Communist. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3773 

Senator Smith. You accuse him of being a perjurer, and I imagine 
your counsel will tell you 

Mr. Fairbank. I haven't accused him of perjury, because I don't 
know. 

Senator Smith. You said he lied ; has not told the truth before this 
committee. That is perjury. And I am sure your counsel will ad- 
vise you that there is no law against being a Conununist, but it is a 
felony to be a perjurer. Therefore, what you have said about him, if 
3^ou do indeed accuse him of being a perjurer, is far worse than what 
he said about you. You did not realize that ; did you ? I mean, in all 
fairness you did not realize it ? 

Mr. Faibrank. I think probably this is a good legal point, but 
could we bring in good common sense, too? 

Senator Ferguson. You want to throw the law out and bring in 
the common sense ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would, in this way. 

Senator Watkins. It happens that the law and common sense are 
in line on that. 

Mr. Fairbank. Liars are called liars all around the country, but 
it doesn't get them into the trouble it does if they are called Commu- 
nists by ex-Communists who say they had a factual basis for know- 
ing ib. I say calling a man a Communist in 1950 or 1951 is a very 
serious thing, and calling him a liar is a run-of-the-mill thing. It 
happens all of the time in politics. 

Senator Ferguson. Even under oath. 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, lying is an original sin. 

Senator Ferguson. Are we not trying to combat and fight perjury, 
too? 

Mr. FAnmANK. Of course. But this specific investigation is against 
communism. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but it does not want any perjured testi- 
mon}^ 

Mr. Fairbank. Certainly not. 

Senator Smith. Go ahead. We will probably ask you some more 
questions further down the page. 

Senator Watkins. I do not know the record on what Mr. Budenz 
was asked that day. I have not seen it, and I do not think I w^as 
present. I would like to call him back, since you say that there is not 
any basis for that, and we will investigate a little further to see what 
his basis is. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think it would be very good. 

Senator Watkins. I think he probably will be called, and we will 
go into it. 

Mr. Fairbank. Particularly if someone can suggest the questions of 
cross-examination. 

Senator Ferguson. I will make a suggestion to your counsel that 
he prepare a list of questions that he wants on that point. 

Mr. Fairbank. It would be very useful. 

Senator Ferguson. We may all be surprised what Mr. Budenz 
knows. 

Mr. Fairbank. Wliile no one questions the sincerity of this commit- 
tee in seeking to combat communism, I think some of its methods have 
been dangerously at fault. It has turned our traditional American 
freedom of contact into totalitarian "guilt by association." 



3774 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 

Senator Smith. We better ask you a question on what you mean 
by that, "totalitarian 'guilt by association'." "Totalitarian" isn't any 
too sweet a word in American understanding now ; is it ? 

Mr. Fairbank. This is a frankly critical statement of the commit- 
tee, and it is about the only one I have put in. 

Senator Smith. Let's see whether it is truthful or not. What is 
the basis on which you say that this committee has turned "our tradi- 
tional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by asso- 
ciation ?' " Just what do you mean by those words ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Let's take the case of IPK. I was told this morning 
that there were 11 persons who had refused to incriminate themselves. 
If you think this is off the track, we can stop it, but the IPE strikes me 
as an example. 

Senator Ferguson. I have seen this carried in the press; some of 
the press carried only your criticisms of the committee. There was 
none of the praise that you had for the committee in the beginning. 
Now, you explain that statement. 

Senator Smith. What is the meaning of your words "totalitarian 
'guilt by association'," as referred to this committee? Can you tell 
us what you mean ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; it has to be done by examples. I propose to 
begin with an example of the IPR. . 

Senator Smith. Cannot you tell us in simple language, Mr. Fair- 
bank? You are a man of great ability and educational experience. 
Cannot you tell us just what you mean by those words? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Or is that a fantastic statement of just a nebulous 
conclusion you reached without any foundation for it ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir ; I think there is a foundation. 

Senator Smith. Wliat is it that this committee has done that justi- 
fies that conclusion of yours in those words ? 

Mr. Fairbank. It has said that because Miss Bentley — I mean, the 
situation has developed where it appears to the public that because 
Miss Bentley 

Mr. Morris. A^Hiat do you mean by "appears to the public" ? Wliat 
are the facts, Mr. Fairbank ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Of course, I can begin sentences here all afternoon 
and never finish them. 

Mr. Morris. Please give us facts, Mr. Fairbank. You can justify 
any erroneous facts with the statement you just made, what "appears 
to the public." 

Senator Smith. What are the facts that justify you in using the 
language "totalitarian 'guilt by association,' " as applied to this 
committee ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, let's start at it this way: the word "totali- 
tarian" I associate with the idea of "guilt by association." So, it is one 
thing. Let's decide on tlie idea there. The totalitarians — the Com- 
munists, the Nazis, and those people^iave a tendency to go by the 
associations a person has rather than following the idea of freedom 
of contact. I think that is plain. 

Senator Smith. Do you think that is all that "totalitarian" means? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I am just trying to get one idea set up here: 
totalitarian "guilt by association." If you are unorthodox in a Com- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3775 

mimist country, your head may go off ; you may go into a concentra- 
tion camp or anything. 

Senator Smith. We are familiar with that. But I want to find out 
what you can tell us. 

Mr. Fairbank. I can if I can finish the sentence. It may be a long 
sentence. Here we have the example of 11 persons — said this morn- 
ing — having refused to incriminate themselves and who have been 
connected with IPE,. This was put forward, as I got it, as a very 
serious charge against the IPE, case, indicating that the IPR has had 
a really subversive influence — I got that impression; maybe I was 
wrong — because of these 11 persons. Who are these 11 persons : Field 
and Aloore, and they have been pretty definitely connected with the 
IPE.. That is two persons. Now, DeCaux, a man who was a trustee 
for a while and went to a conference. Mildred Price, a person who 
paid $6 and was a member for a few years, without taking any active 
part. 

Senator Ferguson. Did she write any articles ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; she wrote no articles, as far as I know. And, 
then, Lawrence Eosinger, a research worker for 2 years, 1948 and 
1950. And, then, two people named Keeney, who had no connection 
with the IPE, as far as I can find out. I just called Bill Holland at 
limchtime, and he says he knows of no connection. Perhaps we are 
wrong there, but we would like to see it. 

Now, Mandel wrote a book on the Soviet Union, which the IPE 
sponsored, but was not employed by the IPE. Then a man named 
Allen wrote one or two articles in Pacific Affairs; no other connection. 
Then a man named Deane wrote one article; no other connection. 
And, then, Kathleen Barnes, who was a junior employee in the early 
1930's. Those are the 11 persons. They are associated with the IPE 
to some degree, and two of them. Field and Moore, obviously have 
associated with the American council of the IPE in an important way, 
and that is an important point, but the nine others were not in an 
important way, and in some cases no way that I know about. That 
is association. And guilt is alleged from that association, against the 
IPE, in general, as an organization. Now, look at that organization. 
There are 60 trustees, and, you know, very responsible people. Gen- 
eral Marshall is still a trustee in spite of all these attacks. They are 
scattered all over the country. With 11 councils, now 10 councils, in 
countries all around the Pacific area. In England, the Eoyal Insti- 
tute of International Affairs, a very respectable conservative organ- 
ization, is part of the IPE, but the IPE in the public mind, because 
of "guilt by association," stands condemned as a Communist front or 
some kind of thing — nobody knows exactly what — because of reiter- 
ated statements here. 

That, I think, is real criticism. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Mr. Field's connection with 
the IPE? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I have mentioned that. 

Senator Ferguson. He was practically one of the operators; was 
he not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. He was in the American council of the IPR. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Was he a Communist ? 

88348— 52— pt. 11 5 



3776 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. He became one. I didn't know of his becoming a 
Communist until after 1940. I just don't know Field. 

Senator Ferguson. When in 1940 ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't know Field; I have met him a few times. 

Senator Ferguson. When in 1940? 

Mr. Fairbank. JMaybe it was 1941 — ^I don't know — about that time. 

Senator Ferguson. What makes you place that date 1940 or 1941, 
for Field's becoming a Communist ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, I have read a great deal from these hearings, 
and people keep talking about this question "When did Field become 
a Communist?" I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Have you heard the testimony of Mr. Weyl, who was a 
Communist at the same time, who said he became one in 1936 or 1935 ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I haven't heard that testimony; I am sorry. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, I still get back to see if you can give 
me an answer. 

Mr, Fairbank. I did try to give you an answer. 

Senator Smith. I do not think you have touched it remotely. You 
say, "It" — this committee — "has turned our traditional American 
freedom of contract into total itarian 'guilt by association,' " and you 
think you have explained what you meant by those words. 

Mr. Fairbank. I have talked about "guilt bj^ association." 

Senator Smith. I am not talking about your talking about "guilt 
by association." I am asking you if you think you have answered 
the question as to the basis of fact for your statement "It has turned 
our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt 
by association.' " 

Mr. Fairbank. I think I have answered it, and done quite well. 

Senator Smith. You think you have ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. I do not think anybody else thinks so, because I 
cannot understand your talking about all of these other things when 
you said this committee "has turned our traditional American free- 
dom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by association,' " 

Mr. Fairbank. It may well be not the intent of the committee to 
have done that, but it seems to me that is what has happened from 
these hearings. 

Senator Watkins. You know that the purpose of this investigation 
is to find out ultimately if it had any effect, and to see if it still has 
effect, as a matter of guarding the internal security of the United 
States. You know this investigation isn't finished yet. We are still 
working on it. Would you have us disregard completely the matter of 
association ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Not at all. 

Senator Watkins. Do you not think it has a proper place as a part 
of the evidence ? 

Mr. Fairbank. It should be taken into account. 

Senator Watkins. There is an old adage, isn't there, that you are 
judged by the company you keep? I think my mother taught me 
that when I was a small boy. "Eemember, when you go out, the 
people you go with. You are going to be judged by that." That goes 
back in my memory, and I think it goes a few hundred years beyond 
that. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3777 

Mr. Fairbank. But I am sure you will agee, tliat judging by the 
company you keep is not judging by the individual, and that in this 
country we are to judge by the individual, and that your mother would 
want you to judge not by somebody you might meet or somebody seen 
with, but by your own qualities and integrity and character, as an 
individual. That is not guilty-by-association, that is judgment on the 
person. 

Senator Watkins. I understand all of that. But this is only one 
item. You say we shouldn't regard it. I think we would be neglect- 
ing our duty if we did not consider it. If a man runs around, for 
instance — this is a hypothetical situation — if a man is found in the 
company of people who are notoriously known to be thieves, he prob- 
ably wouldn't be accepted by a bank as a teller, or anything of that 
sort. 

Mr. Fairbank. Surely, he might have been a detective. 

Senator Watkins. He might be a detective. It is possible but not 
likely he would be a detective and then go in and get a position in the 
bank. But, as a matter of fact, that is one of the elements in every 
case. Now, we are hearing that along with the rest of them. We have 
the direct and positive statements of witnesses with respect to you 
and others. That is only one element. So, what you in effect try to 
say there is that we have prejudged you, and we have made a judgment 
on it simply by association. I see that in the press, occasionally. That 
is all the}^ think we have before us. That is only one element. That 
is only one piece of evidence. It may have some weight and it may 
not have any. But we certainly should not ignore it. 

Mr. Fairbank. But may I ask about the judgment that is going 
on here about the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Senator Watkins. There has been no judgment yet. We cannot be 
responsible for what the editors and the columnists do as they go 
along. They do it to us as well as to you, incidentally. You are not 
the only one on the receiving end. 

Senator Smitii. Mr. Fairbank, do you subscribe to these two sen- 
tences from a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States : 

One's associates, past and present, as Avell as one's conduct, may properly be 
considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial one's 
reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps. 

Do you subscribe to that ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; reputation determined in part by the company 
you keep. 

Senator Smith. There is, of course, I think — and other witnesses 
have brought it up — statements made outside this committee about 
judgment. 

The next sentence I want to inquire about 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would not like to leave that. 
I want to ask some questions. 

Senator Ssiith. This is in the case of AcUer v. Board of Education, 
New York, i\Ir. Justice Minton writing the opinion, March 3, 1952. 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to ask whether or not the "witness does 
not think that Mr. Field's association with the IPR was more than 
just association, as used by your expression guilt-by-association. 

Mr. Fairbank. To be sure it was with the IPR activities. My ref- 
erence was to the persons, all of the persons, connected with the IPR. 



3778 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Now, Field is associated with those persons in the IPR. The IPR 
is not a person, it is an operation. And people are associated in an 
organization. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get the idea that this committee 
was drawing the conclusion that anybody connected with the IPR as 
a trustee was a Communist ? And, if so, wliere did you ever get that 
idea? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that would be going too far. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, is that not what you are saying here, "It 
has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totali- 
tarian guilt-by-association" ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The committee has not attacked all the trustees of 
IPR. The witnesses before the committee have not attacked 

Senator Ferguson. And the connnittee has not gotten a report out. 
The committee has not done anything yet, but asked questions. 

Mr. Fairbank. I misspoke m^^self. The witnesses before the com- 
mittee have not attacked all of the people of the IPR. 

Senator Smith. Of course not. We know there are plenty of good 
names of people that were sucked into the IPR. 

Senator Watkins. But according tx) the conclusion, I think the argu- 
ment is being made that they probably all would be open to attack 
because they were associated with the other people. Of course, that 
would be very, very small evidence to convict them on or to charge 
them with. 

Mr. Fairbank. Could I just refer to your statement, Mr. Chairman, 
people sucked into the IPR? Now, that perhaps has a connotation. 

Senator Smith. Well, I had in mind things that have come out in 
the evidence about the efforts of Mr. Carter and others to get people to 
come into the IPR and pay the dues and put up money for it. 

Mr. Fairbank. By being sucked in, you meant that they were 
brought into something undesirable, did you not ? 

Senator Smith. I did not say that at all. You may be sucked into 
conversation with a very charming group of ladies, for instance, you 
may be brought into that. In fact, a lot of people have been sucked 
into this hearing here, because they are interested in what you are 
going to say. 

Senator Watkins. That has no evil connotation. 

Senator Ferguson. Your next sentence clearly indicates what you 
want to convey to the public, "The committee has made a presumption 
of guilt rather than of innocence." Where did you get that? Did 
you ever see a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations by this 
committee ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, I did not believe that a senatorial committee 
would allow an ex-Communist, who has testified about a great many 
people, some correctly and some incorrectly, to make an accusation of 
a person like myself who is not an isolated individual working in the 
Institute of Pacific Relations where the institution's good will and 
good name was important, would allow a man to make an accusation 
like that against me, unless the committee was making some sort of 
presumption. 

Senator Smith. Do you not think we should have heard you today ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Definitely. I think you should have heard me last 
September. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3779 

Senator Smith. You have been denominated by at least one as an 
ex-Communist. 

Mr. Fairbank. Not ex, sir, that would be a great honor. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not seen any report by this committee 
or any conclusion, have you, on you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir. I have been judging by the operation of 
the committee. 

Senator Smith. So you want to condemn the committee here and 
say that it has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence. 
Now you cannot state one single fact to justify that, can you? And 
you have sworn to that. You realize that you have sworn to that 
statement ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir, and I state the fact which I alleged just 
now that the committee through its operation of having an executive 
session and screening the whole thing and putting it out in public, 
which we all have discussed and agreed was the operation, allowed 
Budenz to make an accusation against me which apparently had no 
more basis than what was in the record here, which was damaging to 
me and which could only have been made, it seems to me, that decision 
to have him testify that way could only have been made by people 
who really were prejudging and saying, "This man we are attacking 
because he says he is a Red." 

Senator Smith. Do you not think turnabout is fair play, if we 
heard him we should hear you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that system is good. I think discretion 
needs to be used in the operation of any system. 

Senator Smith. You would like this committee when they run across 
your name in some of these documents to delete that and keep that in 
executive session? You do not mean that, do you, Mr. Fairbank? 
You do not think this committee ought to show any favoritism be- 
tween you and Mr. Budenz when we have taken sworn testimony ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I do not know about favoritism between me and 
Budenz. You are putting us on the same level as if I was coming 
before you to attack him when he had not attacked me. I am not 
doing that. I am not going around accusing people of being an 
ex-Communist. 

Senator Smith. Of course I do not know which one of you is right. 

Senator Watkins. I am interested in knowing the witness' view on 
this. Do you not know it to be a fact that there may be other evidence 
in the record, probably is, bearing on this question of whether you 
are or are not a Communist or you were or were not a Communist? 

Mr. Fairbank. There may be. 

.Senator Watkins. When we get through we can go through that 
mass of evidence. We take it over a long period of time, day after 
day. We cannot judge on every one of these accusations because 
the investigation is not completed. In the end we may be able to 
say positively there is not anything that reflects on this man, the 
evidence does not justify such a conclusion. 

Inevitably in an investigation by a committee of Congress, if we 
are going to follow any of the established procedures, how can we 
avoid taking evidence as we go along? You agree we probably should 
have the right to do it, you agree in a measure with it. How can we 
avoid taking evidence as we go along? 



3780 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. Do you, sir, have all the evidence in the open session 
which comes into the executive session? In that case, why do you 
have the executive session ? 

Senator Watkins. I cannot answer entirely that question, whether 
all of it comes out or not. I do not know. I am not present. We 
have two or three different task groups in this committee investigating 
so many different fields that I could not answer. 

I told you this morning in some cases if evidence presented or talk 
presented or rumors presented to the committee in executive session 
do not stand up, I do not think the committee would ever reveal it. _ 

Mr. Fairbank. I wish that had been done in my case. I think 
you can understand my case. 

Senator Watkins. You had a man swearing positively that he 
knows you to be a Communist. 

Mr. Fairbank. But all evidence in executive session is under oath. 

Senator Watkins. Certainly, but it is a direct, positive charge. 
There is no wishy- washiness about the charge of Budenz. He just 
said, "I know him to be a Communist." 

Mr. Fairbank. Sir, you understand my position, do you not? 

Senator Smith. I can understand your not liking what Budenz says. 
You know the saying, "No fellow who ever felt a halter draw had a 
good opinion of the law." You have heard that expression, I am sure. 
I bet your counsel has. I can understand how you do not like what 
Budenz said. I am not blaming you for disliking it, but I am talking 
about the unfairness of your statement here that we have, that this 
committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence, 
and we have done nothing of the sort. 

I do not know where you get the basis for such an outrageous state- 
ment. It is just as bad against us as anything Mr. Budenz has made 
against you because you are swearing to this. 

Mr. Fairbank. I am not damaging you. 

Senator Smith. You cannot quote any instance that would justify 
that conclusion. I am pointing that out not for the purpose of argu- 
ment but for the purpose of showing you that you have done the very 
same thing you have found fault with Budenz for doing, accusing 
somebody without foundation. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that not true? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think you can appreciate my situation. I do think 
I have a foundation. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you think it is true if you have a founda- 
tion. You are swearing to it, are you not? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have a foundation for not approving what the 
committee has done. 

Senator Smith. I asked you what is the foundation for your state- 
ment that the committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than 
of innocence. 

Mr. Fairbank. I have stated that. I have a foundation. It is that 
you have allowed Mr. Budenz to testify, as he did, after an executive 
session where presumably no more evidence was presented than was 
presented in the open session, namely, no evidence at all. That is my 
position. 

Senator Smith. You say that means that we made a presumption of 
guilt rather than of innocence. We have not said a word about you. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3781 

Mr. Fairbank, justifying a statement that we made a presumption 
against you at all. 

Mr. Fairbank. But Budenz testified only in answer to the commit- 
tee counsel, "Do you know?" and the committee therefore initiated the 
question and brought me into it. Budenz did not bring me into it 
except as the committee did. 

Senator Smith. You do not know whether we have a report to that 
effect or not. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is another question. As you have them, please 
bring them forth. 

Senator Smith. Do you want us to bring forth unsubstantiated re- 
ports ? 

Mr. Fairbank. If they are not substantiated, why do you use them ? 

Senator Smith. If they are unsubstantiated we do not use them. 

Mr. Fairbank. Then you are in a position of letting Budenz go 
ahead. 

Senator Smith. But he swore you were a Communist. You turn 
around and say he is a perjurer. Some instrumentality may have to 
decide who is telling the truth. I do not know, and I am not attempt- 
ing to say. 

Mr. Morris. On this point documents have been submitted to the 
witness as of yesterday in executive session. We had a paper, the 
probative value of which we could not determine, and what we did was 
let the witness have it overnight in order that he might look at it and 
very thoroughly come to a sound conclusion as to whether we should 
put any probative value on it. I would like the record to show that 
he has had it overnight, and it can be considered evidence, the proba- 
tive value of which we cannot determine, but we have asked him to 
look at it. 

So I think in that sense, to that extent, certainly Professor Fair- 
bank has been unwarranted in some of the statements he has been mak- 
ing. He has had this document overnight. 

Is that not true ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Would you like me to bring this up and report to 
you on it? 

Senator Ferguson. Professor Fairbank, is it not true that some 
other agency of Government has been considering this question as 
far as you are concerned ? 

Mr. Fairbank. You are referring to the Department of the Army ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. Of course their decision was taken on August 17, 
whereas the testimony against me here by Miss Bentley was on August 
14. Now I don't know whether there was a casual connection or not. 

Mr. Morris. This newspaper you had overnight is dated 1950, is 
it not? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. Let us examine this newspaper if you like. 
It is interesting. 

Senator Ferguson. You say here that we have already made up 
our minds as far as you are concerned. Is that correct? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, in a few words, I come here now 5 months 
after I was accused by Budenz to defend myself. I think you can 
say I am coming to defend myself, to defend my good name. Now 
that could only happen if I was accused, and I was accused 5 months 
ago. That is a situation which has grown up under the auspices of 



3782 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

this committee where I was presumably judged very questionable, 
dubious, or guilty, and it has to be cleared up now. 

Senator Ferguson. You are a college professor. You are familiar 
with court trials ? 

Mr. Fairbank, Not awfully, but I can consult my counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. There are many times that a paper, an affidavit, 
or a bill of complaint or a declaration is filed in the court against a 
man, and he is only a witness, and his name is in it. He does not have 
a chance to answer at all. Now is that not what we are talking about 
here as far as you are concerned ? You are having this time to answer. 

Mr. Faibrank. There is also the consideration of national interest 
sometimes as to override personal liberties and rights, that is true. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, should lie finish that sentence or go into it ? 

Senator Smith. Go ahead. He did not finish reading that para- 
graph, did he ? 

I believe you read down to "the result." 

Mr. Fairbank. It has made a presumption of guilt rather than of 
innocence. The result has been wholesale and indiscriminate attack 
on American China specialists, whose effective work must depend in 
part upon freedom of contact. In other words, we are attacked for 
doing the very thing we have to do to serve our country. 

We must all fight Communist subversion. But to preserve our 
democratic freedoms, we must conduct the fight accurately — with 
sights and a rifle and not with a blunderbuss ; with facts, not hearsay 
and suspicion ; with faith, not fear. 

Senator Smith. I would like to ask you a question there, Mr. Fair- 
bank. You say the result has been wholesale and indiscriminate at- 
tack on American China specialists, whose effective work must de- 
pend in part upon freedom of contact. It is true, is it not, that before 
so many of these China specialists got to work on our situation in the 
Far East we had several million Chinese on our side? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir. 

Senator Smith. And today we have none on our side practically? 

Mr. Fairbank. I could go further than that, sir. I could say when 
I was in China, until 1946 China was still largely on our side, and 
shortly after that I left China, and China became Communist. Was 
that because I had been in China ? 

Senator Smith. It was probably because somebody else went over 
there. There was a change in policy ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say that China went Communist mainly 
because of the Chinese situation. Perhaps we disagree on this, but 
my fundamental view on this is that the Americans couldn't make 
a terrific difference one way or the other in the China sense. We might 
have done better or worse, but whatever we did we were outsiders and 
that vast mass of people in a country as big as this and three times 
as numerous, it is a terrible thing to deal with on the other side. 
You could only deal with it by working inside through some kind of 
Chinese organization, the way the Russians are doing. 

Senator Smith. We did have a change in policy in China ? 

Mr. Fairbank. We had a policy of supporting the Nationalist 
Government. We gave them quite a lot of support. 

Senator Smith. Then we did change that policy, did we not, and 
try to amalgamate the Communists and Nationalists? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3783 

Mr. Fairbank. You are referring to tlie Marshall mediations? 

Senator Smith. Somebody tried to amalgamate them. 

Mr. Fairbank. No. I was there at the time. We were trying to 
get the Chinese Communists not to fight a civil war but to lay down 
their arms, and Marshall's military arrangement would have brought 
their divisions bridaged in with superior numbers of Nationalist 
divisions. 

Senator Smith. He tried to amalgamate them. 

Mr. Fairbanks. If it had worked, they would have been immobil- 
ized, and they could not have taken over. The chances are that they 
couldn't have taken over, but it didn't work. 

Senator Smith. After that conditions in China began to deterior- 
ate? 

Mr. Fairbank. It was deteriorating very steadily. 

Senator Smith. You do not think there is hope for us to accom- 
plish anything worth while in China with any of our programs ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I thing we have to have a program toward China. 
We have to make an effort. It has to be ideological. That is why 
I feel I am very important. That is why I don't want to be damaged 
by being accused as a Communist. 

Senator Smith. I believe if we had kept the professors away from 
there, the better we would have been in China. The more we send 
over there, the worse they get. 

Senator Watkins. Mr. Chairman, I read from page 6 of the wit- 
ness' own statement : 

The question before this committee, I submit, is not whether I should have had 
such broad contact with persons of all sorts connected with China, but whether 
I engaged in such contact as a loyal American or engaged in it subversively. The 
fact of my contact with all sorts of persons concerning China should be assumed 
as a matter of course, just as it is assumed for a press correspondent. The real 
question is whether I used this contact disloyally, or in the course of this contact 
was used by others with disloyal intent. 

Certainly we have the right to make investigation and take testi- 
mony. In effect you admit you had a lot of these contacts. You admit 
it is a perfectly proper procedure to find out just what the nature of 
those contacts was, whether you were there as an investigator in the 
objective sense, or whether you were there as an associate of those 
folks. That is all there is to this statement, and I think that is why 
your own statement contradicts what we had a right to do. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear the expression of "guilt 
by association"? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am afraid I just can't recall. It is a rather recent 
term that has been used more recently than before. It might have 
been written by some eighteenth century fellow. I just don't remem- 
ber it. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not know when you first ran into that 
phrase ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear it used by the Communists 
in some of their writings? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don t recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear this expression "free- 
dom of contact" ? 



3784 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't know. I sort of invented this to try to 
express my idea. I don't think it is a new term, but it does express my 
idea. 

Senator Ferguson. You think that is your own expression, "free- 
dom of contact" ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am sure many people have said it many times 
before. I just don't know where. 

Senator Ferguson. You used the two expressions, "guilt by asso- 
ciation" and then the counterremark of "freedom of contact," is that 
right ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Suppose you have a situation where people are in 
contact or in association in a sort of neutral waj. One interpretation 
is that because we are associated the guilt of one is transmitted to 
another or presumed to be attached to another because he associates. 
According to freedom of contact, you do not go that far, and you say 
that these people may have contact, but you have to take them as 
individuals, by cases as persons, according to what they do and 
think, and judge them on their merits as persons. 

I think that is more of the American tradition. I am sure you do. 

Senator Ferguson. Now you used this expression as if it is a crime 
because of your associates, the people look on it as a crime because you 
have associated with somebody. Is that not right? Is that not the 
way you have used that ? 

Mr. Fairbank. People impute guilt because of contact. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. That is guilt by association. I think I agree with 
you. 

Senator Ferguson. And you claim that the man has a right to that 
freedom of contact without public opinion feeling that there is some 
guilt by that association, by that contact ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think on the whole the individual should be given 
the benefit of doubt. This is a matter of degree between extremes. 
Particularly a press correspondent or a diplomat or a professor or 
researcher where they are working in a foreign country, they have to 
see people in that foreign country. If the country is going Commu- 
nist they probably have to see some Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. It would apply to a lawyer? 

Mr. Fairbank. Surely. 

Senator Ferguson. If he was found associating with criminals, you 
do not think that ought to affect his reputation as a lawyer ? 

Mr. Fairbank. It might be his business. 

Senator Ferguson. It might be, certainly, and it might not be. 

INIr. Fairbank. I think this is a matter of degree ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am trjdng to get at here. You 
think the public has no right to say that association has anything to 
do with it. 

]Mr. Fairbank. Isn't that an extreme statement, sir ? Isn't that one 
end of the spectrum here ? 

Senator Ferguson. You know what the Supreme Court said ? 

Mr. Fairbank. It said in part by association. 

Senator Watkins. That is all we have said, is it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, but, you see, the thing that strikes me over 
and over again in connection with the IPK, the committee, it does 
not seem to me, has really dealt with this matter of the publications 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3785 

of the IPR. N'ow thei-e have been certain publications picked out 
and jumped on and some of them rightly so. Incidentally, Epstein's 
book we discussed this morning is not an IPR publication. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Mr. Fairbank. But the great bulk of IPR publications, which is 
the main thing it has done — it has worked year to year getting those 
available — most of those books are useful, good books and we couldn't 
get along without them. 

Senator Smith. We have not attacked them. 

Mr. Fairbank. When you attack the organization you have made 
it more difficult for those boooks to come out. The IPR has to fold 
up, and somebody else has to do that job. IPR is a private agency 
trying to do this job in an honest, factual waj. 

Senator Smith. Somebody else might have a different view. 

Mr. Fairbank. In general, yes. 

Senator Smith. We have heard testimony about IPR. I expect we 
know a lot more about it than you do, even though you were a member. 

Senator Ferguson. You know they have given us most of the books 
they published, do you not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. But they have not been read, I should imagine. 

Senator Smith. We could not sit here and read all those books. 
You do not think that, do you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would suggest that in so im]:)ortant a matter as 
this, with people involved and reputations and everything, that a re- 
search staff of one or two people, if 7/ou could find a budget to go 
through the IPR publications and read the whole works and line 
them up, it would be a proper service. 

Senator Smith. We have lined up some of them. 

Mr. Fairbank. Instead of just picking out the bad eggs you might 
find in the basket. 

Senator Smith. If they are bad, there is no reason to disturb the 
good eggs. You do not think we should involve the good because 
there may be some bad ? 

Mr. Fairbank. You see, if they have all the IPR label and the IPR 
label becomes a garbage word, it is all garbage. That is what I mean 
by guilt by association among books. 

Senator Watkins. The object of thi? committee is to protect the 
internal security of the United States. We are only looking for those 
things that may involve the security. You may jBnd something just 
like it was in Japan with Sorge and Ozaki; there were only two of 
them apparently, and yet they did incalculable damage to the Germans 
and the Japanese, just those two fellows. 

Now, you cannot go out after the whole group. Ninety-nine percent 
of them probably are all right, very tine people and good citizens, but 
these spies work in with people and ingratiate themselves and become 
very powerful peo]ile, and they are never suspected. They were not 
suspected until the very last thing, until they had done tlie damage. 

Senator Smith. I believe Mr. Fairbank had finished reading his 
stfitpment. Mr. Morris, do von have anv questions to ask of Mr. Fair- 
bank? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. I would like to ask Professor Fairbank about a 
newspaper that was given to him last night. Professor Fairbank, 
you read Chinese, do you not? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I do. 



3786 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Have you read the Central Daily News of September 
3, 1950, which was given to you last night? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have read one passage. 

Mr. Morris. Did you read the passage which purported to be the 
confession of Mr. Li Peng ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I read the passage in his confession w^hich referred 
to me and others. 

Mr. Morris. We had a translation made by the Library of Con- 
gress, and that translation reads : 

Wittingly or unwittingly, they — 

referring to you and two other State Department people — 

leaked out diplomatic secrets which were transmitted through the embassies of 
third countries into the ears of Soviet intelligence personnel. 

Is that an accurate translation of that passage ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Could I see the transcript? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. This committee knows nothing about Chinese, 
Professor Fairbank. We are going to rely on you to translate it. 

Mr. Fairbank. Do you have also tlie synopsis statement you showed 
me last night? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. You recall I was given this synopsis statement to 
look at as a basis for comparison with the Chinese text ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Mr. Fairbank. I made that comparison, and I have here a report on 
that comparison. 

Senator Smith. Could you answer his question ? 

Mr. Morris. Why do you not translate it for us, Professor ? 

Senator Smith. He asked you about a translation. Can you not 
answer that question ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am reading here from a special edition of the 
Central Daily News which contains a transcript, stated transcript, 
of a statement made by a Chinese named Li Peng. The passage which 
1 was shown last night in English synopsis reads as follows. Shall I 
read this ? 

Mr. Morris. You see, we have two translations, the one I gave you 
and the one you were shown last night. The committee vouches for 
the authenticity of neither one. All we can do is send it to the Library 
of Congress for translation. 

Mr. Fairbank. The one I see today is more accurate. I will read 
you the one given last night. 

Mr. Morris. That is the one we told you we would have the first 
thing in the morning. 

Senator Smith. . You want him to read both of them ? 

Mr. Morris. I think the second one is the one we will address our- 
selves to. It is the one I brought up for the record. 

Mr. Fairbank. And you want just the references to myself ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. I think it is just as well, Senator, al- 
though I do not know, there are two other names mentioned there. I 
think we should try to restrict this just as much as possible. 

Senator Smith. If that does not involve Mr. Fairbank. 

Mr. Morris. It does involve Mr. Fairbank, but two other people in 
the State Department. I think it would be my preference, Senator, 
that we not mention the other two names at this time. 



INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS 3787 

Senator Smith. Is that all right with you, Mr. Fairbank ? 
Mr. Fairbank. I will leave out the other names. 
Mr. Morris. Unless Mr. Fairbank feels he has to mention them. 
Mr. Fairbank (reading) : 

In addition, at the time the person in charge of information and intelligence 
in the American Embassy, the Director General of the United States Information 
Service, Fairbank — 

and then certain other persons are named — 

were all persons who were fundamentally dissatisfied with the Nationalist Gov- 
ernment. Their prejudices frequently superseded their duties to maintain se- 
crecy relating to the nation's concern. Wittingly or unwittingly they leaked out 
diplomatic secrets which were transmitted through the embassies of third coun- 
tries into the ears of Soviet intelligence personnel. 

As I understand it, this translation was made at the Library of Con- 
gress, and I should say it is substantially accurate. It is more accurate 
than the one you showed me last night. 

Mr. Morris. The one showed you last night, Professor, was shown 
to you with apologies because it was made up hurriedly and we told 
you we were having another one prepared. 

Mr. Fairbank. It is labeled "synopsis?" 

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Fairbank. The part that I examined. 

Mr. Morris. You do know from the reading of the transcript that 
that purports to be a confession of Li Peng who was executed by the 
Chinese Nationalists for being a Soviet espionage agent? 

Mr. Fairbank. So I understand. 

The part that I have examined I would confirm reads as follows : 

Wittingly or unwittingly disclosed diplomatic secrets which then were trans- 
mitted by way of the embassies of third party countries to the blank intelligence 
officers' ears. 

Now this is a peculiar thing here, but the Chinese character where 
I said "blank" and which in the interpretation, the translation, reads 
"Soviet," is missing from the Chinese text. I don't know why. The 
context would indicate that it should be Soviet at that point. But 
here is the place where that character should be, and it is missing in 
the text. There is just a blank spot there. I don't understand that. 

Now I can go ahead with more description of this. 

Senator Ferguson. Doctor, when did you first hear that there might 
be some question about leaks to other embassies or through other 
embassies to the Soviet from China? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have not heard of any charge against me of leaks. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not say of charges against you. I just say 
there was some question of leaks through our Embassy to other embas- 
sies or through them to the Soviets. 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recall hearing of any particular case, and 
I don't recall hearing, in other words, of leakage. 

Senator Ferguson. You never heard of it until you saw this paper 
last evening? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; I don't think so. You see, for one thing I was 
not concerned in the Embassy in 1945 and 1946 with intelligence. The 
statement is incorrect. I was concerned with an information program 
which was under the auspices of the Embassy, but operationally sepa- 
rate, and which was entirely a clear output operation of information 
material, not an intelligence operation at all. 



3788 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did you not indicate this morning that you did- 
get some evidence of some intelligence ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is when I was earlier in China in 1942 and 1943 
under the Embassy more directly. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you never heard that there might have 
been a leak or was a leak ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recall any such story. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that there were leaks to the 
British and from the British to the Soviets ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have heard a story of a leak to a British paper, 
and I don't know what the details of it are. We discussed that last 
night. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you hear of that ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Last autumn. 

Senator Ferguson. That was before this was printed ? What is the 
date of this paper ? 

Mr. Fairbank. September 3, 1950, and the testimony is dated April 
1950. I heard of this after this was printed. Whether it is the same 
thing I have no way of knowing. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 658" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 558 
[Source: China Daily News, September 3, 1950] 




Note.— In tlie smaller illustration the blank character discussed by Mr. Fairbank is in 
the third column from the right and would be the fifth character up from the bottom. 

(The material below is a translation of the illustration) 

It will be recalled that it was in 1945 that United States Ambassador to China 
(Patrick J.) Hurley personally went to Yenan, In October, Mao Tse-tung 
arrived in Chungking, and came to an agreement in talks with the government 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3789 

to solve internal political controversies by political means. At the end of 
December (George C.) Marshall arrived at the subsidiary capital (Chungking), 
bearing the title of Special Representative of the President of the United States. 
At the beginning of the next year, the government convened the Political 
Consultative Confei'ence, composed of various parties and groups. This vras 
follovped by the issuance of the cease-fire orders, the reorganization of the units 
of the armed forces, the establishment of the Executive Headquarters after the 
return to the capital (Nanking), and Marshall's six successive trips to Lushan 
(Kuling). During this whole period, peace talks were being conducted like 
an endless string for a period of two years. During those two years, the conduct 
of the internal and foreign policies of our country can be said to be centered 
around relations with the United States. It is only natural that the intelligence 
collection work of the Soviet Union was also directed along these lines. But 
the interests of different countries were at variance, so that the degree of interest 
and the points of concentration were also dissimilar. By coincidence, during 
these few years, the two successive American Ambassadors to China were Hurley 
and (J. Leighton) Stuart. One of them conducted himself in the direct-line 
approach of a military man. The other was an educator endowed with broad 
sympathies toward worldly affairs. Both of them lacked the strict training of 
career dliplomats in keeping secrets. In addition, at the time, the person in 
charge of information and intelligence in the American Embassy, the Director- 
General of the United States Information Service, (John K.) Fairbank, and his 
successor, as well as the person assisting Ambassador Stuart in the formulation 
of China policy, the Counselor with Ministerial rank, were all persons who were 
fundamentally dissatisfied with the National Government. Their prejudices 
frequently superseded their duties to maintain secrecy relating to the nations 
concerned. Wittingly or unwittingly, they leaked out diplomatic secrets, which 
were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into the ears of the 
Soviet intelligence personnel. 

Mr. Morris. Now in connection with the translation, Mr. Chairman, 
we have a problem. I would be inclined to suggest, Mr. Chairman, 
that we accept Professor Fairbank's translation of that document, and 
then the staff can confirm through special sources the translation that 
he gives us here. 

Senator Smith. Do you have a copy of the photostat you are going 
to put in the record ? 

Senator Fergusois". It has some names in it that you want to keep 
out. 

Mr. Fairbank. Could I spot geographically for you the place where 
this blank occurs? 

Senator Ferguson. Wliy not put a circle there? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would rather not mark this. It is a blank already. 
If somebody will look here, it is in the center of here on one side. 

Mr. Wait. Could it be stated that it is directly opposite the middle 
of the picture appearing on the mat sheet? 

Senator Ferguson. Read it the way it is and then read it the way 
you think it should be. 

Mr. Fairbank. The way it is : 

Wittingly or unwittingly disclosed leaks of foreign policy or diplomatic secrets, 
then by way of 

Mr. Morris. Those are the aforesaid three people, one of whom 
mentioned is you ? 
Mr. Fairbank. Yes, and the other two are in the Embassy also. 



3790 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 

* * * then by way of third party countries' embassies transmitted to 
blank — 

that is pidgin-English, but that is where the blank comes — 

intelligence officers' ears. 

Senator Ferguson. So the word "Soviet" is out of it ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. I don't know why because the context would 
make it perfectly plain it should be Soviet. That is what they are 
talking about. 

Senator Smith. What is the next question, Mr. Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. I have some questions I would like to address to the 
witness. 

Senator Smith. All right, sir. 

Senator Watkins. Were you giving a literal translation or the 
substance ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That was literal, sort of pidgin-English. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Fairbank, have you ever carried messages or un- 
censored mail from Communists in China to Communists in the United 
States ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir ; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever carry messages from Madame Sun Yat- 
sen to the China Aid Council ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I carried a message or a letter. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever carry messages for Israel Epstein to 
persons in the United States ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever receive messages from Chen Han-seng 
and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, the wife of Israel Epstein, to persons 
in the United States ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Received from them for persons in the United 
States ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. No. I received in Kweilin, and I have accepted 
the letter in your evidence as being substantially probably correct, 
I received from them reports or something to take to Chungking, and 
not only to Chungking 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you took it from Kweilin to Chung- 
king ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is right. 

Mr. MoREis. They were messages from Chen Han-seng and Elsie 
Fairfax-Cholmeley ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. I am willing to accept that although I do not 
recollect the details, the incident. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have here reference to exhibit 112 
in our public record which reads as follows, being a letter from Israel 
Epstein to W. L. Holland : 

Deak Hoixand : I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters 
on Saturday. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3791 

One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, 
Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other 
academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions. 

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. "Would 
like to have these back when you are through. 

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of 
it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. 
and Elsie. 

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? 
I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York. 
Sincerely, 

(Signed by I. Epstein). 

September 6. 

Will you identify H. and Elsie in that letter, please ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would assume that refers to the Chinese research 
man, Chan Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley. 

Mr. MoREis. Will you concede that Chan Han-seng and Elsie Fair- 
fax Cholmeley are Communists, Professor Fairbank? 

Mr. Fairbank. As of today I do not know. As of 1943, I did not 
consider them Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Fellow travelers? 

Mr. Fairbank. Chan Han-seng was reputed to have been a Com- 
munist and to have broken away from them. 

Senator Ferguson. What about the lady ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I did not have any impression of her politics. She 
was an English girl, escaped from Hong Kong. I did not, incidentally, 
have any ideas that what they were giving me was anything to do 
with Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but did you consider her a fellow traveler ? 

Mr. Fairbank. At that time in Kweilin I would not have said so. 
A fellow traveler being someone who promotes Communist interests ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. She was working for the Chinese Industrial Coop- 
eratives, which was not a Communist project. 

Mr. Morris. You say it was not a Communist project? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Mr. Morris. Who was the head of the Chinese Industrial Cooper- 
atives ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Technically Dr. H. H. Kung, but the most famous 
man connected with it is a New Zealander, Kewi Alley. 

Mr. Morris. He is still in China ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I believe he is today. 

Mr. Morris. And the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives is also known 
as Indusco, is it not? 

Mr. Fairbank. Indusco is an American cooperative which repre- 
sents them here. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. Now, you were associated with Indusco, were 
you not, Professor Fairbank ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, I was, and I secured evidence on that at your 
request. 



88348 — 52 — pt. 11 6 



3792 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. You were connected with Indusco for what period of 
time? 

Mr. Fairbank. We have reference here to one of those connections 
where I give my name to be on an advisory board. The date when I 
did that I have found no record of. Presumably it would be after I 
left Government service and returned to this country, presumably 
1946 or 1947. However, I have secured from my secretary by tele- 
phone the following information as to my separation from Indusco, 
if you would like it. 

Mr. Morris. Yes, I would, Professor. 

Mr. Fairbank. There is in my files in Cambridge a form letter from 
Indusco, mimeographed, sent out to persons addressed "Dear Friend," 
dated November 1950, no day, just November 1950, and on the back I 
believe I and my wife are included in a list of the advisory board. 

Mr. Morris. Is that the one about the Bailie Memorial Technical 
Training School? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think so. 

Mr. Morris. That is the one I have here. 

Mr. Fairbank. The same letter, probably the same form or circular 
letter. 

I wrote to Miss Ida Pruitt on January 8, 1951, and my letter included 
this statement : 

Noting that Peter Townsend has written in China Weekly Review about CIC — 

That means Chinese Industrial Cooperatives — 

I wonder if it is still meant to be functioning. Naturally I think we would both 
want to disassociate ourselves from it in the present state of affairs in China. 

Mr. Morris. Because you felt it was serving a Communist purpose? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is the end of quotation. 

I then have another of these form letters sent out by Miss Pruitt 
on Industrial stationery, dated April 6, 1951, in my files in Cam- 
bridge on the back of which is listed an advisory board which does 
not include my name or that of my wife. 

Mr. Morris. That is at a time subsequent ? 

Mr. Fairbank. April 6, 1951, subsequently. 

Mr. Morris. Is Peter Townsend the husband of Eose Yardumian? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And Rose Yardumian was secretary of the Washington 
office of the IPR? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; she was about 1944, at some time during the 
war. 

Mr. Morris. So you will concede that Indusco is an organiza- 
tion that is now serving Communist purposes? 

Mr. Fairbank. You said so. That is no inference drawn from Miss 
Yardumian marrying Peter Townsend ? 

Mr. Morris. No. I mean over all. Based on your experience with 
Indusco and what you know about it and knowing that they are now 
operating in Communist China, you would concede they are an 
instrument of the Communist organization ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, you have the Christian Church still operat- 
ing in China, but it is under difficulties, and I would assume that the 
Industrial Cooperatives either have been taken over or in great danger 
of being taken over or at least are being pushed around. I don't 
know the fact of that situation in China. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3793 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Fairbank, will you identify that as a letterhead 
of the organization about which we have been talking? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, indeed. This is the letterhead of Indusco, 
Inc., American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, 
honorary chairman, Admiral Harry E. Yarn ell, office in New York. 

Senator Smith. Do you want that in the record ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

(The document referred td was marked "Exhibit No. 559," and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 559 

Honorary Chairman : Admiral Harry E. Tarnell. 

Honorary Vice Chairman : Frances Curtis, Marshall Field, Owen Lattimore. 

INDUSCO INC. 

American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 
"Gung Ho" — ^Work Together 

439 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y. 
Telephone MUrray Hill 3-3792 

November 1950. 

Dear Friend : The weekly letters from the Bailie Memorial Technical Training 
School in Sandan tell of the progress in the projects which your gifts have 
helped to make possible. There is so much to be said for the remarkable job 
the school has done and continues to do. 

There is the desert land that grows wheat, vegetables, and flax where nothing 
grew before. There are the numerous production centers that turn out cloth, 
cbemicals, rugs, pottery, machines, glass, paper, and many other articles where 
nothing was produced before. Most important of all are the young people — 
future machinists, chemists, animal husbandry experts, cooperative specialists, 
scientific farmers and producers for the villages of China — who but a few years 
ago were poverty-stricken youngsters without a future or hope. -• 

What a truly great gain for freedom from want. 

What makes it meaningful to us is that Americans join with people from all 
over the world to help make the Sandan Bailie School a living center of inter- 
national good will, where your friendship is a concrete and creative thing. 

I want to urge you to continue to keep the Sandan Bailie School a splendid 
example of this friendship and help. The cost of running the school had 
decreased considerably because of the school's ability to supply many of the 
things it needs. But our help — and it is getting through to them and getting 
through in record time these days— is needed for teachers' salaries, for new 
teaching equipment, for replacement of worn equipment, for medical supplies 
in the school hospital, and for development of experimental projects. 

We would like to be able to say to Sandan at Christmas — "your American 
friends are with you ; we can promise the funds you need to carry you to the 
next year's harvest." 

Won't you send us as generous a check as you can today? 
Very sincerely, 

[s] Ida Pruitt 
Ida Pruitt. 

Board op Directors : Maxwell S. Stewart, Chairman ; Rev. Dwight J. Bradley, D. D., 
Vice Cliairman ; Ida Pruitt, Secretary ; Charles S. Gardner, Treasurer ; T. A. Bisson, 
Frances Curtis, Mrs. Frederick B. Fisher, Talitha Gerlach, Carl Goderez, Helen M. 
Harris, Mrs. Philip Jaffe, 01«a Lang, Mrs. Owen Lattimore, Bishop S. Harrington Littell, 
Rev. William H. Melish. Walter Rautenstrauch, Alfred B. Sidwell, Nym. Wales, Richard 
Watts, Jr., C. Martin Wilbur, Thomas Wright. Representative in China, Rewi Alley. 

Officers of Inddsco, Inc. 

President, Maxwell S. Stewart ; Vice President, Mrs. Gifford Pinchot ; Secretary, Mrs. 
Owen Lattimore ; Treasurer, Charles S. Gardner. 



3794 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



Mrs. Anne Archbold 

Mrs. Hugo Black 

Percy S. Brown 

J. Lossing Buck 

J. Henry Carpenter 

Y. G. Chen 

Evans Clark 

Harry G. Clement 

Dr. Alfred E. Cohn 

Mrs. John G. Coolidge 

Wayne Coy 

Mrs. Wayne Coy 

Errol Edgerton Crouter 

Mrs. Errol Edgerton Crouter 

Mrs. Lauchlin Currie 

Michael M. Davis 

J. W. Decker 

Hugh De Lacey 

Nicholson J. Eastman 

Thomas H. Eliot 

Gertrude Ely 

John K. Fairbank 

Mrs. John K. Fairbank 

Mrs. John H. Finley 

Margaret Forsythe 

Mrs. Manuel Fox 

Msgr. Paul Hanly Furfey 

John Garfield 

L. Carrington Goodrich 



Advisory Board 

Mrs. Henry F. Grady 

Michael Greenberg 

Anne Guthrie 

William B. Hale 

Mrs. John H. Hammond 

Marion H. Hedges 

John R. Hersey 

Rt. Rev. H. W. Hobson, D. D. 

Richard W. Hogue 

Arthur N. Holcombe 

Arthur W. Hummel 

Mrs. Henry A. Ingraham 

Philip Jaffie 

Anthony Jenkinson 

Hon. Nelson T. Johnson 

Mrs. Nelson T. Johnson 

Mrs. Anne Hartwell 

Johnstone 
William C. Johnstone, Jr. 
Albert E. Kane 
Alice V. Keliher 
Mrs. Henry Goddard Leach 
Msgr. L. G. Ligutti 
Mrs. Goodhue Livington 
Mrs. Frederick W. 

Longfellow 
W. C. Lowdermilk 
Dr. Lu Gwei-djen 
Mrs. Paul V. McNutt 

Technical Consultants 



Rufus G. Mather 

Mrs. Helen Hill Miller 

Homer L. Morris 

Philip Murray 

Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham, 

D. D. 
Nathaniel Peflfer 
Mrs. Warren Lee Pierson 
Arthur Upham Pope 
Stephen Raushenbush 
Gerald Richardson 
Dr. G. Canby Robinson 
Daisy Piske Rogers 
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Mrs. Francis B. Sayre 
Mrs. George C. Shattuck 
Vincent Sheean 
Lewis S. C. Smythe 
Michael Straight 
Betty Gram. Swing 
Deems Taylor 
Rose Terlin 

Mrs. Pherbia Thornburg 
Russel Tyson 
Roy Veatch 
Jerry Voorhis 
Mrs. John Paul Welling 
Mary Jane Willett 
Mrs. Quincy Wright 



Karl T. Compton ; Morris L. Cooke ; Dana J. Demorest ; Daniel S. Eppelsheimer ; Ronald 
W. Gurney ; Clark B. Millikan ; Robert A. Millikan. 

Mr. Fairbank. Mr. Chairman, there was read just now a letter 
about Kweilin and H. and Elsie and so on. Could I call your atten- 
tion to a letter written by Mr. Holland at my request inasmuch as the 
letter just read refers to Mr. Holland ? I mean I am just a third party 
in that letter. My name is just mentioned. Mr. Holland is a prin- 
cipal, and I have a letter from him which I have given a photostat of 
to Mr. Morris. Would it be useful in the record ? 

Mr. Morris. Why don't you tell us of your conversation with Mr. 
Holland about that, and as to Mr. Holland's letter itself, why not allow 
that to go in the record when Mr. Holland is here. You can tell us 
what you like about Mr. Holland and the conversation. 

If the witness wants to tell us about his conversation with Mr. Hol- 
land, I suo;gest that we accept that into the record but allow 
Mr. Holland's letter to go over until Mr. Holland is here. 

Mr. Fairbank. This will probably just delay you, and there is not 
much to say except that I phoned Mr. Holland and said, "Will you 
send me your comment on these four different letters you were con- 
nected with which incidentally referred to me, since you (Holland) 
were a principal and I was just connected" 

Senator Smith. He did that ? You can refer that to us and we will 
have that to examine Mr. Holland when he comes. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. He makes plain incidentally in that respect 
that these reports that I was bringing were those of the Chinese Indus- 
trial Cooperatives, in 1943 at the time when it was under the National- 
ist Government of China. 

There is also a letter from Grjil'.am Peck of which I gave you a 
photostat. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Lawrence K. Eosinger ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, sir; I know him. I have met him several 
times. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that Mr. Rosinger was the editor of the 
last large publication of the IPR ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3795 

Mr. Fairbank. He was the editor of the State of Asia which was 
a symposium. 

Mr. Morris. That was financed by the Eockefeller Foundation, 
was it not, and it was an extensive project of the IPR? 

Mr. Fairbank. It is a thick book of some 500 pages because it is 
the putting together of chapters by a lot of people. I don't know how 
big a project I would call it. 

Mr. Morris. Was it your practice to review manuscripts of Law- 
rence K. Rosinger ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I recall seeing one manuscript of his. I of course 
review perhaps 30 or 40 manuscripts every year. As a i)rofessor, 
they are sent to me and people from different parts of the country 
say, "Will you kindly read and give us your comments?" publishers, 
authors, and students and so on. I recall receiving this manuscript of 
Rosinger's which you have reference to. 

Mr. Morris. Now I want to call your attention, Professor Fairbank, 
to our exhibit No. 128. This is already in the record, Mr. Chairman. 
It is addressed to John Fairbank, and it reads : 

Dear John : I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime 
politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and 
give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some 
weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State 
Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, 
but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole 
thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 
onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because 
Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to 
change his plans because of his illness and lack of time. 

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then 
for a few minutes. 
Yours, 

W. L. Holland. 

Now Avill you relate to us the references in that letter? You did 
review the manuscript of Mr. Rosinger? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. I feel quite certain that I did because you 
have these letters in the record and I have a general, vague recollec- 
tion. This manuscript of Rosinger was sent to me in Washington and 
I looked at it, at least at the latter part. Here is the book that re- 
sulted from the manuscript. 

Mr. Morris. Did other people in the State Department contribute 
to this pamphlet? I mean that is the reference in there, "waiting 
for some comments from people in the State Department." 

Mr. Fairbank. As to that, I don't know. I note you have in your 
record that reference to — will you check me on this? This is from 
memory. Don't you have a letter from Rosinger to Holland saying, 
"I am waiting for the comments of Hiss and Fairbank," dated De- 
cember 30 or something, 1943 ? 

Mr. Morris. Is this the letter to which you refer. Professor? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; this is the one I have seen in your testimony. 
I had no previous knowledge of it. I assume that refers also to this 
Rosinger manuscript. That is just my assumption. 

This letter is from Holland to me. Would you like me to read it ? 

Mr. Morris. I wish you would. 



3796 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. Holland says to me in a letter dated February 23, 
1952, referring to page 482 of the committee's testimony : 

Lawrence K. Rosinger, then on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, had 
at my invitation written a research report for the IPR on Chinese Wartime 
Politics, later published by the Princeton University Press. Following the 
regular practice of the IPR, I sent copies of the first draft to a number of quali- 
fied people for criticism. Among these were several Government officials, in- 
cluding John Carter Vincent, Alger Hiss, both of whom were then concerned with 
Chinese affairs, and yourself. From the dates it would seem that when Ros- 
inger wrote, December 30, 1943, I actually had not yet sent you the manuscript 
because, as appears on page 479 of the hearings, it was not until February 21, 
1944, that I sent it to you, apparently because other people had been slow send- 
ing in their comments. 

Rosinger's study was a competent piece of scholarly work, did not propagate 
any Communist line, and was not based on classified reports. It was favorably 
reviewed in the press and learned journals. 

That agrees substantially with my recollection, I have no recol- 
lection of Vincent or Hiss having seen this or I having been connected 
with their seeing it or having discussed it with them. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Maxwell Stewart made a con- 
tribution ? 

Mr. Fairbank. He wrote a pamphlet, Wartime China. 

Mr. Morris. Does not the reference in this letter of Rosinger's to 
Holland say "Thanks for the comments from Stewart"? From that 
is it not apparent that Stewart himself made contributions to the 
Eosinger article? 

Mr. Fairbank. That I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. You were telling us about Stewart's pamphlet. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. You have a letter in which I made reference 
to Stewart's pamphlet. It is in your testimony. I have here a copy 
of that pamphlet also. My connection with it is indicated in the 
letter that I wrote which is in your testimony. I don't know whether 
I have a copy of tluit letter here, but perhaps we could see that here 
somewhere. 

At any rate, I criticized that pamphlet for being too outspokenly 
or undiplomatically critical. 

Mr. Morris. This is exhibit No. 176, Mr. Chairman. May the wit- 
ness read the first two paragraphs of this letter or the first three 
paragraphs ? 

Senator Smith. All right. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. This is not actually about me at all, but it 
is a memorandum from Miss Miriam Farley to Mr. Holland dated 
February 4, 1944. You are interested in the second 

Mr. Morris. I wish you would read the first three. 

Mr. Fairbank (reading) : 

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max 
Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China. 

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent, 
among others. Vincent said (in confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he 
thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should 
be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewrit- 
ing. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave 
the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions 
on points of detail. 

I am now editing the manuscript in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, 
Vincent, and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor 
of toning it down any more. Nevertheless, I am making some changes along 
lines recommended by Fairbank, though not very likely enough to satisfy him 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3797 

completely. My position is that I am willing — in fact, anxious — to go to any 
lengttis to avoid offending Cliinese sensibilities, providing this does not destroy 
the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to 
provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. 
It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary 
Americans would not get anything out of it. 

Those are the first three paragraphs. Would you like my oomment 
on these? 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; I would like to have your point of view on it. 

Mr. Fairbank. I have here a photostat of a letter from Miss Farley 
to me dated February 19, 1952, which gives her recollection of tliis 
transaction. 

Mr. Morris. No ; I would like to have your own recollection. 

Mr. Chairman, that, you see, would be what Miss Farley thinks about 
this at some subsequent time. 

Senator Smith. You can leave that with the committee and we can 
go into that when, as, and if. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 559 A" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 559-A 

Fab Eastern Subvey 

office of the editor 

American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street, 
New York 22, N. Y. 

Febeuaby 19, 1952. 
Professor John K. Fairbank, 

121 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Dear John : I doubt if this will be much help to you but here goes. I do 
remember discussing with you Max Stewart's pamphlet, "War-time China," 
although I recall few details, only the general impression. We had sent the 
manuscript for comment to you and several others. You then called me on 
the telephone — I think at my home, it must have been on a holiday, or perhaps 
In the evening — and we had quite a long conversation. So far as I now recall 
you did not raise any objection to the content of the pamphlet, i. e., on the 
ground that it was inaccurate or biased or otherwise not up to proper re- 
search standards, although you may have criticized at least some passages. 
Your principal contention as I recall it, which you put very forcefully, was 
that publication of this material at this time might be harmful to Chinese- 
American relations in general and to relations between the IPR and its China 
Council in particular. You feared that the pamphlet would arouse hostile 
reactions in China and might lead to the China Council's leaving the IPR. 
I disagreed with you on the main point ; I felt that it was the IPR's duty to 
present to the American public a true picture, as nearly as humanly possible, 
of conditions in Nationalist China, giving the dark side as well as the bright, 
although I also felt that as China was our friend and ally the less pleasant 
features ought to be described and explained in a friendly and sympathetic, 
not in a hostile or critical manner. I felt that a sound relationship between 
China and America could not in the long run be based on concealment of facts 
from the American public, and that it was better for the American public to 
learn the facts from China's friends than from her enemies. ("China," of 
course, meant Nationalist China.) Also I did not believe that publication 
of the pamphlet would cause the China Council to leave the IPR. 

As I recall it I did, partly as a result of your comments and partly on the 
basis of my own judgment, persuade Max Stewart to modify some passages in 
the original manuscript in order to make them as palatable as possible to Chinese 
opinion without actually suppressing or distorting important facts. 

As I remember it my discussion with you was concerned chiefly if not en- 
tirely with Max Stewart's account of Nationalist China, not with the brief 
passage on the Chinese Communists which has been cited in McCarran com- 
mittee hearings. 



3798 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I do not recall the date of my conversation with you, in case that matters, 
but as the pamphlet was published in April 1944 it must have been two or three 
months before that. 

You might be interested in the following extract from a letter, dated April 6, 
1944, which Tyler Dennett wrote to Raymond Dennett, then secretai*y of the 
American IPR : 

Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the 

internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it 

seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating 

circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. It ought to do some good even 

in Chungking. There may be enough new developments between now and the 

end of the year to require some additions or supplements to the text but I 

should suppose it would do for the documentation for the next conference. 

It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR. 

(That's all he said about the pamphlet; the rest of the letter dealt with other 

subjects.) Raymond Dennett passed the letter on to Peggy Stewart and myself 

with the following note : "Tyler is not prone to make comments of this sort — I 

know, having been around him these many years. I think you are due a bow !" 

This is probably not relevant to your problem but might be of use in case anyone 

should ask you what you thought of the content of the pamphlet, as distinct from 

the advisability of publishing it in 1944, since it indicates that Tyler Dennett, 

who was hardly a Red, found nothing objectionable in it. 

I purposely wrote the above before refreshing my memory by looking up the 
memorandum from me to Bill Holland quoted on page 629 of volume II of the 
hearings. As you see, the two accounts of my conversation with you are not in- 
consistent, although the one written in 1944 is naturally more sjiecific. 
If you wish, you may show this letter to anyone you like. 

Warmest regards and good luck. I hope to see you at the Boston FEA meeting. 
Sincerely yours, 

Miriam 

Miriam S. Farley. 

Mr. Morris. One thing that did not appear in this pamphlet is the 
paragraph which reads in this fashion : 

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel 
elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other 
countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass-roots populist move- 
ments that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective 
opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many 
progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx 
or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists 
as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic processes." 

Those views are contrary to the views which you have expressed 
before this committee, are they not? That is page 45. Would you 
care to read it? 

Mr. Fairbank. You are referring there to the opinion expressed 
by Maxwell Stewart in a pamphlet published in 1944. 

Mr. Morris. Is that not the same pamphlet that we are discussing 
in this letter ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think it is; yes. Maxwell Stewart makes this 
statement which you have quoted, and this statement is a rather broad 
one. I mean it does not say these Communists are mere agrarian 
reformers, which was the Communist line at one time in this country. 

Mr. Morris. It says everything but that, Professor. 

Mr. Fairbank. It quotes Raymond Gram Swing. 

Mr. Morris. It does not express disapproval with Raymond Gram 
Swing on the subject. 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say on the whole that this goes along with 
the idea of the Chinese Communists being different from the Russian 
Communists in a peculiarly Chinese way, and that idea was quite wide- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3799 

spread up to this period and even later among Americans and among 
observers in China. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever hold that view ? 

Mr, Fairbank. At this time I think I would have subscribed to the 
statement that the Chinese Communists were in many ways like the 
Russian Communists and in many ways not like the Russian Com- 
munists. In other words, you had to describe them not by applying 
the cliches of Russia but looking at their activity on the Chinese scene. 
I have studied that since then, and we have a book coming out which 
goes into the whole history of Chinese Communist ideology and our 
analysis is that it has been remarkably Leninist in its form of organ- 
ization. We don't know how close the tie-up has been with Russia at 
all times. Of course we know there is a tie-up today. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Fairbank, you see Miss Farley writing to 
Holland in this letter says : 

Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner and 
recommended rather extensive rewriting. Doubtless he thought the pamphlet 
might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent made 
a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail. 

Mr. Fairbank. Of course you have taken a quotation from that 
letter and sought to link it up with this paragraph on page 45 of this 
pamphlet, have you not? 

Mr. Morris. I am talking about the whole pamphlet. 

Mr. Fairbank. Fine, I am glad to know that. 

Mr. Morris. "The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and 
John Carter Vincent among others." 

Obviously you read the whole pamphlet. 

Mr. Fairbank. I assume I read it through. 

Mr. Morris. If we are looking at the pamphlet, we can address our- 
selves to particular items in that pamphlet. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Is this not one of the important paragraphs in that 
manuscript ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would not say it is the key paragraph. It is on 
page 45. 

Mr. Morris. Here is a pamphlet that represents the Chinese Com- 
munists to the American people as agrarian reformers. Would you 
not say that is an integi-al part of that pamphlet? 

Mr. Fairbank. I say you go too far in saying it represents them 
as agrarian reformers and nothing else. 

Mr. Morris. It snjs "agrarian radicals trying to establish demo- 
cratic practices." 

Mr, Fairbank. And quoting Swing above, you find it resembling 
Communist movements in other countries. In other words, Stewart 
was trying to do a balanced job. I think he is an honest man myself. 
I thouglit this pamphlet at the time was a realistic thing. As a matter 
of fact, in another connection I have made a list of the table of con- 
tents here of this pamphlet. I would like to leave that with you. It 
is just extracted here. It indicates the headings that Stewart put into 
this thing. 

The main headings are "Wartime China," "China's wartime activi- 
ties," "Obstacles to China's war effort," "Political divisions," and the 
Communists are just one of a dozen things there. This whole thing 
is an effort to explain China to the American people at a time when 



3800 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the censorship of wartime prevented the American people from under- 
standing the realities of the Chinese situation. This is something that 
lies behind our disaster in China, the fact that we did not really know 
what was going on, and we did not make the effort we could have made 
for reform progi'ams in China before it was too late. 

Mr. JMoRRis. Do you think if more people had read that pamj^hlet 
we would have been better off in China ? 

Mr, Fairbank. I think we would have been. 

I do not think this one paragraph in here outweighs that pamphlet. 
There is praise in here of the Generalissimo and everything else. 
Given the amount of left-wing stuff that was flying around, it seems 
to me Stewart fell for very little of it at this time. 

Mr. Morris. May the professor's notations on the pamphlet be put 
in the record ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 560" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 560 

War-Time China 

(By Maxwell Stewart) 

Wartime China : Political divisions : 

China's New Strength Business-Banking Group 

China Fights In Spite of Internal Political Science Group 

Difficulties The CC Group 

Wishful Thinking vs. Understand- The Army 

ing China Three Important Generals 

China's wartime achievements : Secret Police 

Serious deficiency of Supplies. T. V. Soong 

Supply Routes Chiang Kai-shek's Leadership Es- 

War-Time Economic Progress sential 

Industrial Cooperatives The Communists 

Birth of Political Unity Agrarian and Political Policies 

Age-Okl Divisions Subordinated Military Efficiency 

Unity for National Liberation Kuomintang-Communist Relations 

Steps Toward Democracy Threat of Civil War 

The People's Political Council Kuomintang Demands 

Criticism of Draft Constitution Federation of Chinese Democratic 

Put Yourself in Chinese Boots Parties 

Obstacles to China's war effort: Strengthening China's War Effort: 

Inflation feapply Routes 

Pnnv PlflTinin? ^^^^^ Reorganization 

1 001 Planning ..^^^ ^^^ ^jj^ ^^^ ^^^ q^^,, 

Speculation Strong War Government Needed 

Farm Problems Ctiioa Plans for the Future : 

Inflation Multiplies Difficulties Industrial Potentials 

Graft, Abuse of Laws Cause Unrest Goals 

Military Weakness Need For Irrigation 

Traditions To Be Overcome Democracy's Future 

Mr. Morris. Did you read T. A. Bisson's article in Far Eastern 
Survey in July 1943, Professor ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. That article came to China when I was there, 
and I must have read it. I remember very well it made quite a reac- 
tion from the Chinese Government. 

Mr. Morris. That was the one that made reference to Communist 
China as a democratic China and Nationalist China as a feudal China ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3801 

Mr. Morris. What was your view as to that particular pamphlet ? 

Mr. Fairbank, As I recall, at that time in Chungking, the summer 
of 1943, with the circumstances of the war effort bogging down and 
all of those things that were going on that seemed disastrous for the 
future, those of us that were out there, including me and practically 
everybody I know, welcomed a pamphlet or a book, the things of 
Hanson Baldwin or Pearl Buck, which had a much wider distribution 
in the Reader's Digest and Life magazine, and also Bisson's article of 
which there were 300 copies or a thousand in Far Eastern Survey, 
welcomed criticism which was realistic. 

The two terms "democratic" and "feudal" I think are cliche terms 
and not particularly realistic. That is not all of Bisson's pamphlet. 

I do have a copy of Baldwin's article in Reader's Digest of August 
1943 in which he says that China is not a nation in our sense of the 
word but a geographer's expression. Boy, did they hit the ceiling in 
Chungking, That was a terrible thing to say from the point of view 
of the Nationalist Government. Baldwin said that, trying to be realis- 
tic about the problem we faced in China. Bisson's was in that general 
category. 

Now in retrospect I do not support his use of these terms, "demo- 
cratic" and "feudal." Those are cliche terms. He may have picked 
them up from Communist inspiration or stimulus to him. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that not the change in the party line at 
that time ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I was in China at that time and was in no position to 
judge whether it was or not. 

Senator Ferguson. You say he may have picked them up from 
Communist inspiration ? 

Mr. Fairbank. They used the term "democratic" for many years 
before that about Communist China and "feudal" about Nationalist 
China. I think the change of line that has been suggested among the 
Communists in that period was something about attacking Chiang 
more vigorously, breaking up the united front. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever advocate giving the Communists 
Army material in 1945 ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The question never came to me. I was not in that 
line of work. Now if it had come to me, I am not sure what I would 
have done. I recall that in that period a lot of people wanted to try 
to get more war effort in China ; General Stilwell, as a matter of fact, 
General Donovan. 

Senator Ferguson. Is it not a fact that Chiang Kai-shek had to 
keep part of his army engaged to try to keep the Communists from 
attacking him? 

Mr. Fairbank. That was part of the civil war situation. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Then if you had given them arms you 
would have been making the job harder for him and making our own 
job harder. 

Mr. Fairbank. If they had used them against the Japanese, it 
would have helped. That was the old Stilwell argument. I was not 
in this argument. I was there with the Embassy and not dealing with 
that subject. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever advocate it ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, I never did because I was in no position to do so. 



3802 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. I offer you this letter, Professor Fairbank. I will ask 
Mr. Mandel to identify that letter. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 19, 
1945, addressed "For T. A. Bisson," and it is signed by JKF with 
the typed signature of John K. Fairbank. 

Mr. Morris. Will you look at that and see if you can recall having 
written that letter ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, I don't recall writing it. I would like to read 
it though. The initials are not mine at the bottom definitely. 

Mr. Morris. They are not yours ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, I would not recognize those as initials made by 
me. I don't make my initials that way. If you will allow me to read 
it a minute, I have not seen this before. 

Mr. Morris. Please do. 

Mr. Fairbank. Now I have read that. I would say as to those 
initials that are not mine, that must be my secretary signing for me. 
I had a Chinese girl as secretary. She makes the type of initial which 
is the same general type that I would make with a bar for the top of 
a "J," probably signing for me. This sounds to me like a letter that 
I would have written. 

Mr. Morris. May that be received in the record ? 

Senator Smith. All right. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 561" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 561 

(Chungking) 
September 19, 1943. 
For T. A. BissoN. 

Dear Tom : I send berewith a Cliinese translation of your recent article in Far 
Eastern Survey, whifh has been published together with the May 10 article by 
Pearl Buck. The publisher is doubtless a fake, and one naturally suspects that 
it was done by the opposition party. Many people, however, have distributed 
typed copies of the English versions of both articles, and this booklet was given 
me by a nonparty member. 

I send this souvenir to indicate the great value of such critical expressions as 
an influence in the local political scene. No one here doubts that you have really 
helped to hold the situation together by indicating that American criticism 
would be very outspoken and direct if tiie KMT (Kuomintang) went through 
with the proposal for a liquidation of their opponents by force. Officials here are 
truly hypersensitive to American opinion, partly because American help is re- 
garded as essential for postwar development. One good observer has suggested 
to me. however, that the recent decision of the CEC (Central Executive Com- 
mittee) not to use force now was prompted in part by CKS' (Chiang Kai-sliek) 
realisation that many leaders in the provinces are restive and would seize any 
opportunity to shake off central government control ; in other words, American 
opinion was perhaps not as influential as the fear to start any internal military 
operations here lest potential warlords or provincial separatists take advantage 
of the resulting commotion and deny or decrease central government authority. 
This tendency to break up is of course aggravated by the communications 
breakdown. 

We are appalled and amused here by the American editorials praising the 
KMT (Kuomintang) for its decision to be democratic, as proved by postponing 
the constitution and end of tutelage to an indefinite future. I hope some Ameri- 
cans realize the situation and are using their praise as a weapon, but it is almost 
too much to hope for. 

I am sorry I cannot write at length, but I thought I would give you some fan 
mail, at least. 

Best regards, 

JFK 

(John K. Fairbank). 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3803 

Mr. MoKRis. Professor Fairbank, will you read that, please? 

Mr. Fairbank. "For T. A. Bisson." It is dated September 19, 1945. 

Dear Tom : I send herewith a Chinese translation of your recent article in Far 
Eastern Survey, which has been published together with the May 10 article by 
Pearl Buck. The publisher is doubtless a fake, and one naturally suspects that 
it was done by the opposition party. Many people however have distributed 
typed copies of the English versions of both articles, and this booklet was given 
me by a nonparty member. 

Mr. Morris. Can you recall this particular Chinese translation of 
Bisson 's article? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Mr. Morris. Is your testimony you cannot recall that? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Mr. Morris. Can you recall who gave you that particular booklet 
then ? You say, "this booklet was given me by a nonparty member." 
Who was that. Professor? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't have a recollection. You asked me about 
such a translation yesterday. I didn't remember it. I don't today. 

Mr. Morris. You say, "The publisher is doubtless a fake." Does 
that recall anything to you ? 

Mr. Fairbank. With my knowledge of Chungking during that pe- 
riod — you see, this is evidently something published in Chinese and 
so a publisher's name is attached to it. My statement, "The pub- 
lisher is doubtless a fake," would suggest it was probably a Communist 
source publishing this translation. That is what you would expect. 
All these things that were critical were immediately picked up by 
the Communists and spread around. 

Mr. Morris. You say it was given to you by a nonparty member. 

Mr. Fairbank. That might have been almost anybody. You see, 
I was head of the American Publication Service of the American Em- 
bassy. I was buying Chinese books every day. Things were coming 
in and out of the office. I don't recall that. 

Mr. Morris. It is your testimony you do not recall this episode at 
all, Professor? 

Mr. Fairbank. A letter like this which I am inclined to acknowl- 
edge I think I must have written, this helps me to reconstruct, but 
I have no more recollection than I had yesterday. In other words, 
I don't recall the incident. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time, I think the whole 
letter is in and the professor's opinions of the Chinese Government 
expressed in the letter speak for themselves unless you have something 
else. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think it is important to indicate what I mean by 
this letter. 

Mr. Morris. Would you like to continue ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

Mr. Fairbank. I will continue reading the letter first. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank (reading) : 

I send this souvenir to indicate the great value of such critical expressions as 
an influence in the local political scene. No one here doubts that you have 
really helped to hold the situation together by indicating that American criticism 
would be very outspoken and direct if the KMT (Kuomintang) — 



3804 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I wonder why that is in — 

went through with the proposal for a liquidation of their opponents by force. 
Officials here are truly hypersensitive to American opinion, possibly because 
American help is regarded as essential for postwar development. One good 
observer has suggested to me, however, that the recent decision of the CEC 
(Central Executive Committee) not to use force now was prompted in part by 
CKS' (Chiang Kai-shek) realization that many leaders in the province are 
restive and would seize any opportunity to shake off Central Government con- 
trol ; in other words, American opinion was perhaps not as influential as the 
fear to start any internal military operations here, lest potential war lords 
or potential separatists take advantage of the resulting commotion and deny 
or decrease Central Government authority. This tendency to break up is, of 
course, aggravated by the communications breakdown. 

Would you like my comment on that? 

Mr. Morris. If you have something to add ; yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. The point of that statement is — look, you have 1945 
on this. You have the wrong date on this thing. I think the photo- 
stat is 1943. 

Mr. Morris. 1943 is right. The stencil is wrong. The Bisson article 
did appear in 1943. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. Let us get that straight. So this is wartime 
China, and the war effort is the object of the American people in 
China. In the summer of 1943, there were various very extensive 
rumors that the people in the Nationalist military organization, Hu 
Chung-han is the man mentioned, had a plan for attacking the Com- 
munists in Northwest China, which would have used the better part of 
their troops, those that were held down there, plus a lot more probably, 
with American equipment, starting a civil war at the time that the 
Japanese were by no means defeated in China or anywhere else, and 
when we were making every effort, by turning programs, by bringing 
stuff over the hump, by every possible means, to hold China in the war. 
Now the whole idea that they should start a civil war in the middle 
of 1943 would have been a disaster to the American cause in China 
and the American war effort against Japan. I am sure the policy of 
the Embassy was against that and my view was against that. 

I am saying to Bisson here that I thought his article helped to 
oppose that idea in Free China at that time. 

Now, you see the spot that Americans are in, in this kind of Chinese 
situation, because the article, Bisson's article, criticizes the Central 
Government. On the one hand, the Central Government is very sensi- 
tive, and on the other hand the Communists will pick it up and start 
beating the Central Government with it, spreading it all around and 
saying "Yah, yah, the Americans are criticizing the Nationalist Gov- 
ernment." 

Senator Ferguson. Could that not be a reason for Bisson writing 
the article ? 

Mr. Fairbank. That is the possible reason, but knowing Bisson, 
who was my student in 1940, 1 don't believe he would knowingly play 
the Communist game. 

Mr. MoRRTs. You do know he joined the Committee for a Demo- 
cratic Far Eastern Policy, subsequently? 

Mr. Fairbank. I do; I would not do it myself. I still don't feel 
justified in calling him some name. 

Mr. Morris. Are you going to read the rest of that, Professor ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't know whether you need it. 

Mr. Morris. It is in the record. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3805 

Did you use "care of Lauchlin Currie" in the White House, as your 
address during the war, Professor ? ^ 

Mr. Faiebank. I used it on some occasions when I received mail 
which was sent to me at his office, because of the fact that I had been 
assigned officially to work by Dr. James Phinney Baxter, head of the 
Research and Analysis Branch of Strategic Services, in which I was 
the head of the China section. 

Since Lauchlin Currie was the central coordinating person as Ad- 
ministrative Assistant to FDR, he was the logical person with whom 
should be attached as a liaison officer a person from the Coordinator 
of Information, and this was worked out in the fall of 1941. 

Mr. MoRKis. How long did you use that address ? 

Mr. Fairbank. During the winter of 19-11-42 in Washington I went 
repeatedly, sometimes every day I would drop in at Currie's office. 
Part of the time I was on assignment there to do a report, a recess 
report, which was done for the Coordinator of Information, and pub- 
lished, confidential classification, I think in January of 1942. It was 
on American aid to China, trying to give the whole story which Currie 
had the record of, of setting up General Chennault and the Flying 
Tigers, trying to give aid to Free China. Tlie main burden was that 
the aid had been too little and too late. I was there for that purpose. 

"Wlien I came back from China at the beginning of 1944 I was 
again under OSS, and this liaison arrangement was still in a sort of 
status quo ante. 

I transferred in March of 1944 to the Office of War Information, 
and the man who brought me in there, George Taylor, urged that I 
continue this liaison relation with Currie, because Currie was in the 
White House, working on China. So I continued to drop in his office. 
He had an extra office. I did not do any work for him. 

Mr. Morris. Did Currie have access to your correspondence? 

Mr. Fairbank. Not that I know of. 

Mr. Morris. Did he ever prepare any material on the basis of your 
correspondence that you know of ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; during the war when I was in China I was 
under the American Embassy and I had really three jobs. First, I 
was collecting Japanese documents and sending them back for intelli- 
gence purposes. That was paid for by OSS, who sent me out. 

The second job was that I was the representative in the Far East 
of the Library of Congress, and for that purpose collecting Chinese 
publications, which eventually were brought back to collections in 
this country. 

The third job was that I was under the Embassy, working on some 
of their cultural-relations activities. Now, tliis cultural-relations 
activity of the Embassy was in connection with these other people, 
the same sort of people that I was dealing with on these publications, 
I mean intellectuals. That was my special line. I was getting pub- 
lications from them ; I was giving publications to them, I was dealing 
with cultural relations. 

In that connection, in the Embassy I developed a number of projects 
which were for the purpose of helping Chinese intellectuals. I can 
give you a long list of these projects and cumber up the record. I 
don't want to bother you with all these activities, projects to help 
Chinese intellectuals. 



3806 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

There was one in particular on which I got Currie's help. I sent 
him letters occasionally. Every little while when I was writing to 
various people I would write to him, and one of these projects was 
arrangement in Kunming by which the American Army there that 
had a big base invited some Chinese professors to come and lecture 
to the American troops, trying to have good will and solve some of 
our public-relations problems in China. 

Now, to indicate the nature of that kind of work I have here a letter 
of commendation from the State Department, from the Embassy, 
which may be of interest to you — I can show it to you. 

Mr. Morris. We may save time, Professor. I have here a letter 
which Mr. Mandel will identify. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a photostat of an original 
on the letterhead of the White House, dated May 22, 1943, addressed 
to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and signed by Lauchlin Currie. 

Mr. Morris. JSIr. Chairman, this obviously makes reference to the 
testimony being given by the witness. May it be received in the 
record ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

(The document referred to, subsequently read in full in the record 
by Mr. Morris, was marked "Exhibit No. 562.") 

Mr. Morris. It reads. Professor — 

The White House, 
Washington, May 22, 19^S. 

Dear Carter : I am enclosing some material on the plislit of tbe intellectuals 
in China, mainly from the personal correspondence of John Fairbank. I am 
afraid that I cannot let you have more oflBcial stuff, but I will be glad to show it to 
you if and when you come to the office. I know that you will use this material 
discreetly and protect John in such a way that his views cannot possibly be 
carried back to the Chinese. 

I had a good letter from Graves, which made his position clear, but which, 
I am afraid, means that he is not available for this particular job — 

Is that Mortimer Graves ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would assume so. 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

I am therefore relying more than ever upon you. As time is pressing, I hope 
that you will have some good word for me shortly. 
Sincerely, 

Lauchlin C. 

It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, the Institute of Pacific 
Eelations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. 

Mr. Fairbank. It is certainly the type of project, and there were 
several of those projects. I considered them important. It was im- 
portant to save these Chinese professors, keep them alive, and keep 
them coming our way, because you know how important they are in 
the Chinese scene. The Communists have them now, and that is one 
of the Communists' strengths. They have them under control. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Guenther Stein ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I met him in Chungking during the war. 

Mr. Morris. Did you Iniow him to be a Communist ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; I did not. 

Mr. Morris. Did you express interest in his writings ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I know, of course, this letter in your record, and 
I think this is the only expression of interest that I can imagine. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3807 

Mr. Morris. You refer to Exliibit No. 84, Professor ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Volume II, page 378, it refers to Guenther Stein's 
stuff. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. Will you read that for us, please? 

Mr. Fairbank. It is a memorandum from Lockwood to Carter, 
and Holland, giving, only their initials, but I assume that is pretty 
obvious, is it not ? 

June 24, 1942. 
A furthei' comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: 
AVhen I mentioned it to .John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in see- 
ing it and summoned together his China staiT, wlio all voiced a similar interest. 

I note, if I may call it to the attention of the committee, on page 
378 committee counsel inserted the statement "Now, at that time, Mr. 
Fairbank was associated with the OWI." 

Senator Ferguson. Were you? 

Mr. Fairbank, I was not, sir. I think it would be worth while 
to correct that error. 

Senator Smith. What were you connected with at that time? 

Mr. Fairbank. The Research and Analysis Branch of the Office 
of Strategic Services. 

Senator Smith. That was OSS ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Wliich had been set up on June 13. I had been 
with that Research and Analysis Branch for the preceding year. 
That part of OWI which amalgamated in that branch was not in 
that branch. So I was not in the predecessor of OWI. 

Mr. Morris. You subsequently did go to OWI ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I did, after my return in 1943. Do you want 
these corrections for the record ? 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

Mr. Fairbank. On page 378 the committee counsel says : 

I would like to read this into the record, Mr. Chairman, as evidence of the 
fact that the Office of War Information at that time vras expressing a great 
deal of interest in seeing Guenther Stein's — as Mr. Lockwood says— "stuff," iu 
Washington. 

On page 383, committee counsel says : 

* * * Fairbank, vpho was then head of the China Section of OWI — 

and then the statement is made : 

In other words, the Office of War Information was actively promulgating 
Guenther Stein's material — so it apparently served another function at that 
time, did it not. General? 

General Wiixoughby. I would agree with you ; yes. 

And on page 399, committee counsel says : 

.Tohn Fairbank. Mr. Chairman, was head of the China desk of OWI at that 
time. 

General Willoughby. I would say, as an interested bystander, that this let- 
ter is almost conclusive and highly indicative of the techniques that they em- 
ploy in recommending each other and disseminating their work. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean Communist work? 

General Willoughby. People then ran from comumnism to fellow-traveling, 
befuddled liberals, and whatever that category has been described so often in 
the current press reports. 

I think that testimony is based on this misconception. 

S834S— 52— pt. 11 7 



3808 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. That you were in OWI ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You were in the Research and Analysis Branch of 
OSS? 

Mr. Fairbank. I was in the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. 

Senator Ferguson. That was a secret-service branch; was it not? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir; that was not. That was the group which 
has now become part of the State Department. Of course, it was 
classified work, very definitely, and we were doing a wartime job. 

Senator Ferguson. It was even more classified than OWI ; was it 
not? 

Mr. Fairbank, I don't know how you have more or less. "Confi- 
dential" is "confidential," and "secret" is "secret" all over the Gov- 
ernment. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it all secret ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; in this Research and Analysis Branch we got 
large collections of printed matter from the public domain. We filed 
all kinds of newpaper clippings. W^e had a clipping service, got 
materials fi'om abroad. 

We did everything we could to bring up the i-ecord in one place of 
what was going on, in China, in this case. When Lockwood came to 
see us there was absolutely no idea of shoAving him classified material 
or trading classified material. You see, he says that we "might be 
asked to trade." Now, I have here his letter dated February 19, 1952, 
giving his recollection of this memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not read this yet. 

Mr. Fairbank. I will read that memorandum. 

Mr. Morris. The Research and Analysis Section of OSS was the 
agency, was it not, that supplied information to the people who were 
formulating war plans? 

Mr. Fairbank. They were, among others, yes. 

Mr. Morris. The gravity of supplying Guenther Stein's stuff, as 
this memorandum says, to that agency is even more serious, is it not,, 
than in the case of OWI ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say it is even more essential, because the 
people formulating war plans need to have every kind of material 
come in which they are well able to evaluate. 

Mr. Morris. Were you gathering Guenther Stein's material as Com- 
munist material? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, we were gathering it as material coming out of 
China by a man who was a reporter, who had a status as a correspond- 
ent, and who was a reputable correspondent at that time. 

Mr. Morris. You did not label it as Communist material; did you? 

Mr. Fairbank. We had no occasion to. 

You will see that Lockwood's memorandum describes how it was 
rather factual, not dealing with policy, nothing to do with the Com- 
munists, and so on. That is Lockwood's statement. 

Mr. Morris. Do you acknoAvledge that Guenther Stein was a Com- 
munist agent? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have read sections of the book by General Wil- 
loughby, where that is alleged, and a case is built up. 

If you ask me : Would I feel happy in dealing with Guenther Stein 
now ? — I would not. I would suspect him. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3809 

Mr. Morris. Did you suspect him at this time ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Mr. Morris. Did you send any caveat in the material that you sent 
in to the OSS at this time ? 

Mr. Fairbank. The material was not sent in, as far as I know. It 
came to our files, and our files had all this kind of newspaper stuff. 
You see, this came out through the censorship of the Kuomintang by 
radio as a regular news dispatch to the IPE, instead of newspapers, 
and they paid for it. They were trying to get material out of China 
that would give them some factual information. 

Senator 1"erguson. Were they trying to get Communist material? 

Mr. Fairbank. Not that I know of. 

Senator Smith. You had better read this letter. 

Mr. Fairbank. The memorandum says: 

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington : When 
I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it, and 
summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John 
also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in 
return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however. 

Senator Ferguson. What v/as the trade ? 

Mr. Fairbank. There was no trade that I know of. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the proposed trade ? 

Mr. Fairbank. This, of course is Lockwood's statement, not mine. 
T can only infer from this. T do not recollect this conversation. We 
had lots of people coming in. I can only infer from this that I may 
have said — this is supposition — that if the IPR is doing a research 
project and they are giving us unclassified material from the public 
domain w^iich has come through the Kuomintang censorshii) by M^ay 
of radio, from Stein, for example, then, as noblesse oblige, they 
could come and look at our open newspaper files, of which we had a 
big supply. 

Senator Ferguson. Would they not have had access to those news- 
paper files without any trade ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Thej^ could have, but perhaps not in so convenient a 
form. You see, we were tr3dng to get material from all around. 

I am not sure that I made that statement. That is Lockwood's 
declaration. I have here the letter, he being the material person con- 
nected with it. 

Did I give j^ou a co]>j of this letter ? 

Mr. Morris. No. Why don't you leave it, professor, and we will take 
it up with Holland. 

Mr. Fairbank. I think I gave you the letter from Lockwood last 
night. 

Mr. Morris. Did you oppose bombing of Manchurian Red China, 
professor ? 

Mr. Fairbank. At what time ? 

Mr. Morris. In May 1951. 

Mr. Fairbank. I went to the meeting of the xVssociated Harvard 
Clubs m Chicago in May 1951. I believe it was in May. 

Mr. Morris. Did you write in the Harvard Crimson that vou op- 
posed the bombing of Manchurian Red China ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes ; I did. I spoke at that meeting. It was pub- 
lished, and I gave my reasons at that time. 



3810 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Is the article you wrote at that time a fair expression 
of your views ? 

Mr. Fairbank. As of that time, certainly. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this is the Harvard Crimson of Wednes- 
day, May 9, 1951, which contains an article by John K. Fairbank, class 
of 1929. 

Is that the article you wrote, Professor Fairbank? 

Senator Smith. Do you want to put that in the record? 

Mr. Morris. May it go in the record ? 

Senator Smith. Yes, we can put that in the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 563" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 563 

[From the Harvard Crimson, Wednesday, May 9, 1951] 

Fairbank Opposes Extending Conflict to China, Sees No Real Advantage in 
Bombing Manchuria — Pkofessor Says Airplane Attacks Woltld Spub 
Chinese on, Not Destroy Militaey Power 

(By John K. Fairbank '29, Professor of History) 

The furious debate as to how much further we should go in fighting China is 
rather skimpy in its analysis of the situation inside Cnina. The leaders of 
American public life seem pretty vague about the actual state of things among 
the Chinese people. 

It is safe to say that none of them, any more than the rest of us, have swung 
a hoe in a paddy field or experienced the hatred of landlords ("feudalism") and 
foreign invaders ("imperialism") which has been the lot of so many of the 
Chinese people. Although we are muc-h handicapped by the Communist news 
barrier and propaganda blackout, there are at least a few major points which 
can be kept in mind. 

In the tirst place, China, even more than Korea, provides a type of military 
terrain with which we have not had much experience. I refer not to the fact 
that the country is big nor to the fact that it is heavily populated, but to the re- 
markable density of the agrarian population in the countryside on the flood plains 
of the great rivers where the bulk of the Chinese populace live. 

As the Japanese found to their cost over a decade, a densely populated country- 
side has some of the characteristics of a country-wide city in that the rural 
population are numerous and ubiquitous, and every peasant is a potential par- 
ticipant in military operations as an auxiliary for espionage, communication, 
transportation or other services. 

The .lapanese found that sending a military column through the densely popu- 
lated Chinese countryside was a different proposition from sending one against 
an enemy in an unpopulated terrain. The chief result of this feature of the 
Chinese countryside is the tendency for invading spearheads to bog down, lose 
their communications and fight a war of rapier-against-haystack. 

•WHAT IS worth bombing? 

Another military feature in China is the comparative lack of installations 
which ai-e worth bombing. South and Central China where most of the people 
live is served by a network of waterways which make railroads largely unneces- 
sary. The significant thing about the Canton-Hankow line is not that a single 
track connects these two major centers but that a single track is all they need 
between them in "normal" times. 

Bombing canals is hard work compared to bombing railroad tracks since the 
bomb craters are just as likely to improve and deepen, as to injure, a river or 
canal s.vstem. 

Similarly, the industrial production of China is incredibly small compared to 
the size of the country; and the age-old self-sufficiency of the farm economy 
is still great enough to make our experience in Germany and Japan no guide for 
China. The wartime bombing of Germany and Japan is said by many specialists 
to have been a much overrated operation in respect to its military effect. The 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3811 

physical set-up in China would inevitably make bombing much less effective than 
in those cases. 

ON TO GREATER EFFORT 

The danger is therefore that the bombing campaign proposed by General Mac- 
Arthur, instead of being a knock-out blow, would be a campaign of harassment 
and pin pricks which would spur the Chinese people on to an ever greater military 
effort against us without destroying their military potential as we might hope. 

After all there is a great deal of land in China, much of it marked by towns 
and villages, but there are few major concentrations of industrial capacity. Out- 
side of Manchuria, automotive engines are probably not yet produced anywhere 
in this whole great country, nor are we likely to Gnd any petroleum cracking 
plants, much less roller bearing factories like those of Schweinfurt or centers 
of aircraft production. 

The probable military ineffectiveness of our bombing campaign makes it some- 
thing to think twice about since we can of course be sure of its psychological 
effectiveness, both in mobilizing the Chinese populace against us and also prob- 
ably in losing us allies or admirers elsewhere in Asia. 

GENERAL OVER- ALL FALLACY 

This concept of somehow solving our problem in Korea by lighting elsewhere 
strikes me as part of a general over-all fallacy — namely, the tendency to 
expect that -we can get desirable results in Asia by the application of greater 
force. There is no question about the need of punishing aggression by force and 
being constantly prepared to use force against Russian and other Commimist 
expansion as a general proposition. 

There is considerable question, however, whether the enlarged application of 
force in Asia by itself can solve any problems for us there. For example, the 
Chinese Communist regime has been reported by most observers to be a good 
deal more efficient and effective in handling some of China's problems that its 
predecessor. 

The successful campaign to stop inflation and the efforts to increase produc- 
tion are examples of greater governmental efficiency, even though combined with 
some of the Communist methods of deceiving people by lying propaganda and con- 
trolling them by fear of the police. 

Supposing that we were eventually able by force to destroy the present power 
of the Chinese Communist regime, what would take its place? I doubt if any- 
one but Chiang Kai-shek believes that he could form a government to take over 
and administer again the 400 millions of the Chinese subcontinent. The strength 
of the Chinese Communist regime, which is now being manifested against us, 
has not been built in a day but over a whole generation of activity in organizing 
the peasantry in the populous countryside. 

It may bring China no happiness, even though the trains may run on time, 
but the fact remains that it has certain elements of strength and organization 
which have been acquired painstakingly and over a period of more than a 
decade. What would we put in its place? Where are the program and the per- 
sonnel to take over? 

No doubt, our best chance of finding them would be in Formosa, where many 
competent administrators and patriotic Chinese remain. But there is little 
sign that this island of 7 million with its quarter of a million Nanking Govern- 
ment refugees can provide the personnel and leadership now to run China. 

If we were to have a program of bombing, we would need an equally important 
program of recruiting and training the young people and the civil servants who 
could establish a regime and meet the needs of the Chinese populace. The only 
alternative is chaos and the continued totalitarianism to which it conduces. 

Thus, the advocates of force to suppress Communism in Asia, if they have 
their way, can no doubt destroy the Communist power holders in various i>laces. 
But they give us no indication of what would come afterward. Are we to take 
over and run Asia with American personnel? Can we find competent puppets? 
1)0 we seek a new colonialism? Or do we exi)ect western libertarian democracy 
to appear miraculously overnight? 

The fact is that Asia has a background of political despotism and this tradition 
lends itself to the modern totalitarian developments. Our best chance of getting 
stability in the Far East, in addition to a balance of power system between China 
and Japan, lies in securing a situation in which revolutionary China is checked 
from being warlike abroad or toward us while left to work out her own destiny 
internally. 



3812 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

BEST FOB EUSSIA 

It may be impossible for China to have any regime but a totalitarian one for 
some time to come, and we must assume that a purely totalitarian regime will 
be aggressive and militaristic toward us. 

But this unhappy prospect does not seem to me to lead to the conclusion that 
an all-out war with China now would serve our interests. On the contrary, it 
might provide the best opportunity for Russia to take Western Europe and put us 
in a forked stick. 



William M. Simmons, President William S. HoLBnooK III, Business Manager 

Rudolph Kass, Managing Editor Robert L. Wiley, Jr., Advertising Manager 

David L. Ratnek, Editorial Chairman Maklowe A. Sigal, Photographic Chairman 

Frank B. Gilbert, Associate Managing Edward J. Codghlin, Jr., Sports Editor 
Editor 

The Harvard Crimson 

cambridge, mass. 

(Full text enclosed with passages marked. For release : Thursday, May 10, 1951) 

Bombing Manchuria would spur the Chinese on to a greater military effort 
against America and would not destroy their military potential, John K. Fair- 
bank, noted far eastern expert, warned today. 

Such a United States move would also probably lose allies and admirers else- 
where in Asia, Fairbank added. Fairbank outlines, instead, a different approach 
which he calls "our best chance." 

While agreeing that aggression must be punished by force, Fairbank — a 
Harvard history professor — said, "There is considerable question, however, 
whether the enlarged application of force in Asia by itself can solve any problems 
for us there. 

"For example, the Chinese Communist resime has been reported by most 
observers to be a good deal more efficient and effective in handling some of 
China's problems than its predecessor." 

The statement — appearing in the Harvard Crimson, the university daily — 
continues, "Thus, the advocate of force to suppress communism in Asia, if they 
have their way, can no doubt destroy the Communist power holders in various 
places. But they give its no indication of what would come afterv.ard. * * * 
Do we expect western libertarian democracy to appear miraculously overnight?" 

Fairbanks says that "our best chance of getting stability in the Far 
East * * * lies in securing a situation in which revolutionary China is 
checked from being warlike abroad or toward us while left to work out her own 
destiny internally." 

Although agreeing that China may continue to have an aggressive totalitarian 
government, Fairbank concludes "this unhappy prospect does not lead to the 
conclusion that all-out war with China now would serve our interests. 

"On the contrary," he says, "it might provide the best opportunity for Russia 
to take Western Europe and put us in a forked stick." 

Mr. Morris. Is that your article, Professor ? 

Mr. Fairbank. This is an article for the Harvard Crimson. It is 
not the occasion that I speak of, over which President Conant was 
presiding, in Chicago. 

Mr. Morris. Did you write this article ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I am sure. Nobody else would put this picture in 
but the Harvard Crimson, surely. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that go in the record ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank. Would you like me to comment on this? 

Senator Smith, Is that your picture? 

Mr. Fairbank. It is hard to identify, but that is it. 

Senator Smith. We will put that in. 

Mr. Morris. Have you on a number of occasions asked recognition 
of Red China? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have at certain times. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3813 

Mr. Morris. Did yon make the statement in 1950 that recognition 
of and veto power for Red China in the United Nations would not be 
detrimental to the United States? 

Mr. Fairbank. I believe that came up in a debate with Admiral 
Cook, possibly, or somewhere. 

Mr. Morris. I am making reference to your article that appeared 
in the Reporter of January 3, 1950. I think you say here, Professor 
Fairbank : 

In this context, diplomatic recognition is only the first step. Since Russian 
aid to Chinese Communists during the civil war has been relatively meager, we 
have little basis for applying the Stimson doctrine. 

The change of government in China has followed a genuine civil war, and not 
military aggression from outside. Diplomatic relations, so necessary in our 
dealings with Communist Russia, are equally necessary, now that the cold war 
extends to Communist China. 

Recognition is not moral approval, only realism. The Chinese veto in the 
United Nations can have only a little more nuisance value than the present 
Russian veto. 

Mr. Fairbank. Could I see that ? 

I would be inclined to acknowledge that ; yes. 

Mr. IMoRRis. I have several other quotations. 

Mr. Fairbank. May I add the comment, that was long before we 
were fighting the Chinese. 

Mr. JMoRRis. Is it your testimony that the Chinese Communists 
changed their nature between 1950 and the present date? It is the 
same Chinese organization ; is it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I would say they changed their relationship to us. 
They became more overtly armed, militarily aggressive enemies. 

Mr. Morris. It is a matter of degree ; is it not ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Their intent, I would say, has remained very similar 
all along. The problem is: How do we deal with that intent? That 
is Wiiere the argument comes. 

Mr. Morris. In the same article you wrote : 

The hardest idea for us to accept about China today is the seeming paradox 
that the new Peking regime is both Communist and popular. It is definitely 
a Communist regime, and in the Russian camp. Yet it shows promise on its 
record thus far of being the best government that modern China has had. 

Mr. Fairbank. Could I have the date of that? I am sure I said 
that. 

Mr. Morris. That is the same article; that is January 3, 1950. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; that is about the time when the British were 
recognizing it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may this whole article go in the record? 

Senator Smith. Yes; it may be inserted into the record. Do you 
want to read any more now? 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 564" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 564 

[Source: The Reporter, January 3, 1950, pp. 23-25] 

In Search oi^ a China Policy 

When Mr. Acheson told the world last August, in the State Department's White 
Paper on China, that we look forward to a reassertion of "the democratic individ- 
ualism of China," he was using our best political vocabulary. But his good 
phrase was unexpectedly seized upon by the propagandists of Communist Peking 



3814 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

and turned against us with devastating effect; for "individualism," translated 
Into Cliinese, has become a garbage word, meaning everyone-for-himself-and- 
devil-take-the-hindmost. The Chinese Communists neatly identified it with the 
disruptive antisocial selfishness that disgraced the last days of the Kuomintang. 

The misunderstanding between Washington and Peking is more than verbal. 
The plain fact is that Asia is very different from America, socially, culturally, 
ideologically — in all the institutions and values of everyday life. We speak in 
different language systems, with only part of our vocabularies translatable with 
any accuracy. Our legal conceptions were so different a century ago that west- 
erners demanded the right to be tried in China by western law under extraterri- 
toriality, a system only recently ended. It is not surprising that neither Sun 
Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek was ever able to put up a reasonable semblance of 
Anglo-Saxon parliamentary democracy. 

So now that a new order has come to China, the American mind is ill-equipped 
to deal with it. As the world's oldest surviving revolutionaries and youngest 
defenders of the established order, we fail to appreciate the attitudes and feel- 
ings of revolutionary Asia. We assume that the American ideals of political 
freedom and economic development, having been good enough for us, are gocd 
enough for the Chinese, Indonesians, Japanese, and Filipinos. With our in- 
stinctive horror of the totalitarian police state and the evil deeds of Russian 
imperialism, we assume that no intelligent Asiatic could really desire Com- 
munism or, having been duped into it, could avoid eventual disenchantment. 

If we appi'oach Asia on these terms we will be defeated. This has just hap- 
pened in China, where we backed a decadent regime in the effort to secure a 
"strong, united, and democratic" China, independent of Russia and friendly to 
ourselves. Had China been an industrialized democracy of western Europe, a 
revivified Kuomintang might be in power today. But China is uniquely different 
and Asiatic, densely populated but thinly industrialized, intensely self-conscious 
but noncohesive, one of the oldest civilized states in the world, convulsed by 
the newest revolution. 

In forming a new policy toward China we must face several very tough 
and unpleasant realities. If we want to maintain any contact with China at 
all we have to recognize the new Chinese Communist regime. Yet recognition 
will not necessarily preserve for our one thousand or more missionaries, our 
trading firms, our students, professors, and our journalists the position and 
influence which they have had in modern China heretofore. We have to fit our 
China policy into a larger over-all policy toward Asia. Yet our effort to put the 
Japanese economy on its feet (so as to take it off our necks) will continue to 
provoke the bitter enmity of patriotic Chinese. 

In tackling all these problems, our fi-eedom of choice is narrower than we 
may think. If we no not recognize the Chinese Communist government, Rus- 
sia will have even greater influence in China. If we do not encourage Japanese 
trade with China, Japan will become an even greater financial burden and a 
more dangerous political powder keg. We are the losers and cannot expect to 
be the choosers as much as we were before. What we have to offer may interest 
Asia less than we expect. We must assess wherein our real contribution can be — 
mainly in material goods and technology, or in the realm of ideas and values. 

Our first need is therefore to face the truth. No amount of bluster, nor the 
sending of marines (or even legionnaires) can keep the Chinese Communists from 
putting consuls like Angus Ward in jail if they choose to. We may feel certain 
there are Russian machinations behind the scenes, but we have to deal with 
China as though it were an independent foreign state. Chinese patriotic sen- 
timent demands this with complete sincerity. If the Chinese people are in reality 
falling victim to police terror and the Russian squeeze, we have to let them 
find it out for themselves. 

Meanwhile, as advisers and foreign friends, our influence is at a low ebb. It 
falls steadily lower as Nationalist planes, gifts of the United States, continue 
to drop American-made bombs on open Chinese cities. The American public 
forgets that since VJ-day our aid to Chiang has contributed to the killing and 
maiming of many thousands of Chinese civilians. More than a thousand bombing 
casualties have been reported from Shanghai since the Communist take-over — 
enough to blacken our name and strengthen the Communists' moral position. 

The hardest idea for us to accept about China today is the seeming paradox 
that the new Peking regime is both Communist and popular : It is definitely a 
Communist regime and in the Russian camp, yet it shows promise, on its record 
thus far, of being the best government that modern China has had. This 
proposition is hard to take. In recent years some Americans have preferred to 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3815 

think that the Chinese Communists were mere "agrarian reformers," do-gooders 
in the countryside, and not real Communists committed to the police state and 
allegiance to Moscow. Many Americans have chosen, on the other hand, to 
■deny altogether the record of Chinese Communist good works and reforms for the 
peasant masses. Either of these beliefs — that the Communists weren't real 
Communists, or that they weren't real reformers — was a way out. But now 
we are up against it. Mao Tse-tung has taken over China with a minimum of 
slaughter and is making some initial progress in solving China's gigantic prob- 
lems, while proclaiming his allegiance to Moscow. 

Revolutionary Asia seems a paradox to us partly because we don't understand 
its degrees of social and economic difference from the West. The old order of 
personal government (landlord rule in the countryside and oflacial corruption 
in the towns) is so far below our own modern standards that a party dictatorship, 
which seems a backward tyranny to us, may seem a forward step in Asia. The 
Chinese people are not yet accustomed to the protection of a legal system which 
is independent of the government in power, nor do they take the rights of free 
assembly and political self-expi-ession as matters of course. The mere preserva- 
tion of order, the lessened fear of arbitrary seizure by the police, have been a 
relief to Chinese intellectuals after their experiences under the Kuomintaug. The 
fact that the new regime may at any time resort in its turn to arbitrary arrest 
and coercion makes it no worse than its predecessors. It will be judged by the 
■Chinese masses according to their traditional touchstone — whether there is 
enough rice to eat. 

Our ignorance of China leads to sad miscalculations. We overestimated the 
Nationalist armies' will to fight and oversupplied them with American arms. 
We sent them field-artillery pieces, key tools for capturing walled cities. But 
the Nationalists held the walled cities and the Communists remained dispersed in 
the countryside, where artillery could not reach them. When the besieged Na- 
tionalists grew demoralized, the artillery began to change hands, and soon the 
cities did too. Since our armament of Chiang outran his troops' desire to use it, 
the Communists today have the best-armed forces in Chinese history, American- 
equipped. 

We can make similar mistakes in other parts of Asia. Suppose, for example, 
that our economic-development plans overlook the social effects of industrializa- 
tion. Done our way, industrialization will create big cities in Asia, which will 
•draw their cheap labor from the farms of the countryside. But this w'ili disrupt 
the old family relationships, upset the traditional amenities of the individual's 
life within his community of kin and neighbors, and make him the more ready 
to give his allegiance to revolutionary causes. American-style industrializa- 
tion in the crowded East may increase the material satisfactions of the Indo- 
nesian or the Indian, and yet also increase his psychological frustration and 
spiritual dissatisfaction. All these things are interrelated, and our technological 
aid cannot help having deep social repercussions. Our well-meant injections of 
technology into underdeveloped economies under Point Four can be misused to 
entrench backward regimes in power, and so lead us into a whole series of 
disasters like the one we have suffered in China. 

These unhappy facts suggest that American policy can no longer afford to 
project American ideals into Asia unless they are translated into Asiatic terms. 
The freedom of the individual, the democratic process, the good life we seek to 
defend, seem to most Asiatics to be all right for Americans, but beyond their 
•own reach. They must settle for what they can achieve in their own countries, 
with the meager resources at hand and the historical traditions they have in- 
herited — through Communism, if no better means presents itself. Can America 
■offer an alternative, not in New York or Washington, but in Batangas Province 
and the paddy fields outside Bangkok? 

Our forebears, as traders, missionaries, and educators, began the revolutionary 
process in Asia. It is high time that we took a hand in helping it along. Con- 
tainment of Communism, to keep it out of countries undergoing social metamor- 
phosis, is like containing a forest fire. It is better to build a back-fire. 

It is not beyond our capabilities to work closely with the native non-Commu- 
nist leadership of xisia, once we acquire the will and the vision. Asia is still our 
farthest West, the final frontier to which our westward expansion has brought 
us. It is now also our strategic frontier, where American ways and ideals are on 
trial, a border area of cultural ferment and change where modern science can 
either remake the ancient East or else enslave it. We will bear some responsi- 
bility for the outcome. 



3816 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Our policy must be cast in a new pattern of relations between the American 
people and peoples of Asia. Elements of this new pattern may be suggested as a 
series of operating principles. 

First, American private citizens and private agencies must be enlisted and 
given opportunity to work in Asia — business corporations and private enter- 
prisers, missionary and student workers, teachers and technicians of all kinds. 
They should not be dominated by government, but advised and helped. We 
must avoid our recent error in China, where we tunneled enormous amounts 
of aid into the government channels of China and overloaded them. We should 
not place our bets on governments but on the long-term interests of peoples, and 
we should seek to work with the peoples of Asia at all possible levels of planning 
and technical development. Naturally, the governments of the new Asia will 
be largely "socialist"' in their plans for the future, since their countries generally 
lack a strong middle class. 

Second, our new contact with Asia, both private and governmental, must be 
on a basis of equality and reciprocity. First of all, Asia's independent sover- 
eignty and freedom of action must be fully acknowledged. This means the full 
recognition of nationalist aspirations in Indonesia, Viet-Nam, and other areas, 
even when we know that the new leadership is weak and untried. Colonialism 
and the old Anglo-Dutch imperium in Southeast Asia are finished, and we cannot 
till the vacuum with a new American imperialism of our own invention. Our 
only recourse, as a trading power at a great distance, is to nurture nationalist 
movements and try to treat them as independent even while they are weak. 

Finally, insofar as we can plan our part of this relationship with the new 
nations of India and Southeast Asia, we must seek to keep it balanced and 
integrated within an over-all program, so that military armament does not 
outrun social reform, and industrial development does not overshadow the welfare 
of peasants. Trade among Far Eastern countries, for instance, is quite as 
necessary as trade with us. 

If we regard China with these considerations in mind several principles 
emerge : First, we must help the various new nations of the Far East to work 
their way toward political independence and economic development, so that 
increasingly they form a local international community, a segment of the world 
order. Japan is an integral part of this community and must trade with it. 
Such a gi'owth must inevitably attract Chinese participation. Yet China is not 
likely, in our lifetime, to be in a position, economically or strategically, to domi- 
nate this community. 

Second, our interest is to maintain as best we can our contact with the Chinese 
people, rather than to push them behind a Russian-type iron curtain. Their 
new government, having ridden to power on a wave of nationalism, is in no 
mood to accept Russian dictation and police surveillance in its domestic affairs. 
It is by no means certain yet that the Chinese Communists want to subordinate 
themselves fundamentally to Russia, or that they wish to eliminate American 
contact, or that, if they do, they can succeed soon. No matter what the Chinese 
Communists want, China is still oriented toward the West in many ways. We 
should try to keep it so, neither by hostility nor by appeasement, but by standing 
on solid American principles : national independence, economic welfare, personal 
freedom. These are positive things we are for, not against, and in our relations 
with Communist China we should mainly talk about them, rather than about 
"anti-Communism." 

In this context diplomatic recognition is only a first step. Since Russian 
aid to the Chinese Communists during the civil war has been relatively meager, 
we have little basis for applying the Stimson doctrine. The change of govern- 
ment in China has followed a genuine civil war, not military aggression from 
outside. Diplomatic relations, so necessary in our dealing With Communist 
Russia, are equally necessary now that the cold war extends to Communist 
China. 

Recognition is not moral approval, only realism. A Chinese veto in the United 
Nations can have only a little more nuisance value than the present Russian 
veto. Meanwhile, persistent nonrecognition would constitute desertion of the 
century-old American interest in the Chinese people — a denial of American 
principles of humanitarianism, and friendship for the four hundred millions 
of China. Recognition is a necessary first step in our continuing competition 
with Russian influence in China. To withhold recognition beyond the time 
when the State Department can work out the details would be defeatist and 
essentially isolationist. It would be playing into Russia's hands. Our aim 
must be to follow a middle course, free of the illusory hopes and fears that have 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3817 

dogged our China policy in the past, ready to deal with the Communists in China 
but under no compulsion to take their terms, without expecting either that their 
regime could be destroyed by our hostility or that it could be enticed out of the 
Russian orbit by appeasement. 

— John K. Faireank. 

Mr. Morris. There is nothing you want to call our attention to in 
that article, Professor? 

Mr. Fairbank. Well, it is difficult for the American public to un- 
derstand the problems of government in China and how ineffective 
modern government there has been. It is because of the fact that the 
Communists are totalitarian and bring in a strict control, that in the 
honeymoon period, when they are first in there are certain apparent 
gains for the populace. They get a better food supply in the cities, 
they get peace and order and that sort of thing. That is the honey- 
moon period. And that has given way long since, of course, to the 
period when the Communists' squeeze begins to operate to get every- 
body in his spot under control, isolated, and being used by the Com- 
munist state. 

But nevertheless you have, I think, if 3'ou are dealing with China, to 
recognize how the Chinese people are reacting to the Communists, and 
in that honeymoon period of 1950 they were reacting on the whole 
much more happily that we would have reacted, because we don't like 
Communists in this country, and they are in China. 

Mr. Morris. In that same article you also advocated, did you not, 
that we should put pressure on Japan to trade with China ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recall. It may be that. "Pressure" I don't 
recall. 

Mr. Morris. Well, "urge Japan." 

Mr. Fairbank. As a general proposition I would say today that 
Japan is going to explode or collapse on our hands if trade cannot be 
developed from Japan with other countries, and it is a real tough 
problem : how is Japan going to feed her people by trade without doing 
something or other with the Chinese mainland? 

Mr. Morris. That is your opinion today, is it. Professor ? 

Mr. Fairbank. It is, yes. We are really up against it. 

Mr. Morris. That is substantially the same thing you said in this 
article. 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. It is a continuing problem. It is a very, very 
tough one. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell the committee what positions you have 
held in the Government in the past? 

Mr. Fairbank. Beginning in August 1941, 1 went to Washington to 
join this Coordinator of Information Office. I remained in it until 
about Augitst of 1942, when I was sent to China under OSS, but 
specifically under the interdepartmental committee for the acquisi- 
tion of foreign publications, which was doing the job I described, in 
China. 

Having reached China, I think in September 1942, I stayed there 
under the American Embassy, until the end of 1943, and came back 
in December, and was in Washington, home from the field, with that 
interdepartmental committee, in January and February of 1944, and 
I believe I moved into OWI, at Mr. Taylor's invitation, in March 1944. 

I remained in OWI in Washington, or in China, until it became the 
Interim International Information Service after the war, and, in 



3818 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

turn, became the United States Information Service about 1946, or 
before then, perhaps. I remained with that until the summer, July 
or August, of 1946. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Professor, if there are other writings of yours 
that we come across, may we verify that they are your writings by 
consulting your attorney? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, indeed. Consult me directly, too. 

Mr. Morris. I will not take any more time introducing articles at 
this time. 

I have no more questions. 

Senator Smith. Are there any more questions ? 

Senator Ferguson. No. 

Senator Smith. Is there anything else you wish to say, Mr. Fair- 
bank? 

Mr. Fairbank. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you feel that you have had a full hearing? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes, I do. We haven't covered everything. Of 
course, we could keep on forever. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have anything more that you want to 
add? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't want to be sentimental, but I feel we have 
here the democratic process in operation. 

I regard the American Senate as one of the citadels of the democratic 
process and it is within that context that I have said anything critical 
that I may have said. But I have the greatest respect for the Amer- 
ican Senate and for the Senators, in their efforts to deal with these 
problems. 

I feel that I have had a full hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to confer with counsel as to 
whether or not he has any question ? 

Mr. Wait. No ; except to thank you very much. 

Senator Smith. Mr. Fairbank, did you read Professor Lattimore's 
statement about his testimony ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I have read a copy ; j^es. 

Senator Smith. Wlien did you and he confer about your respective 
statements, if you did, indeed, confer ? 

Mr. Fairbank. We have not conferred about these statements. I 
sent him a copy yesterday. He had not seen it before — that is, my 
statement. His statement was sent to me when he was sending it out. 
I received a copy in Cambridge. I had not seen it before. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when that was ? 

Senator Smith. Did you read it? 

Mr. Fairbank. I read it just a few days later. 

Senator Smith. Do you know when that was that you got a copy ? 

Mr. Fairbank. It was well after the beginning of the hearings, 
about a week later. It came in the mail. 

Senator Smith. Now, you sent him a copy of your statement yes- 
terday, I believe you said ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Smith. Had you had any telephone conversation, or any 
correspondence with him during the time you prepared your 
statement ? 

Mr. Fairbank. After I prepared my statement and sent it down, I 
sent it down here, you recall, on February 29, to be here in time for 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3819 

March 3, which was the first date I was given. I actually came to 
Washington by error, not having been held by the telegram which 
went on Saturday. So I was here the week end before last, in Wash- 
ington, at my house. 

Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore stopped there as they came in to Washing- 
ton from Baltimore. I saw them then. I saw him again here yester- 
day or the day before. He talked at that time about his hearing, and 
so on. I did not show him my statement. 

Senator Smith. Did he counsel you to make an attack on the com- 
mittee, or suggest to you that you do that ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No ; I do not recall that he did. 

Senator Smith. Did he make some suggestions along that line? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recall actual words, but I certainly have the 
impression that his advice to me, if I had asked him for it, would have 
been — at least I got the impression this is what I should do — that I 
should be vigorous and outspoken and not hesitate to state what I 
really thought. Now, I don't recall any counsel to me to make any 
attack on the committee. 

I think it is quite plain that my approach to this whole thing has 
been a little bit different. At least I feel the response has been differ- 
ent, and I am gratified by that, because I feel we are on common 
ground here. 

Senator Smith. If you had followed what you thought, after talk- 
ing with him, was his line of advice, you would have been much more 
critical than you were in your state;. lent, would you i;ot ( 

Mr. Fairbank. My modifications of that statement were made after 
I had read it over several times, and I would not say it was as a result 
of Mr. Lattimore's suggestions, because he did not see the sttitement, 
and he had no opportunity to make those suggestions. 

Senator Smith. But the restraint which you may have shown in 
your statement was not provoked by any advice from Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think that is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. When he saw you at your home here in Wash- 
ington, he had made the attack on the committee ? 

Mr. Fairbank. And he had been attacked in return for some time. 
It was after a whole week. 

Senator Ferguson. He had made the attack? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you had his copy at that time? 

Mr. Fairbank. I really don't recall. The copy that I received I 
left in Cambridge. It wasn't around when he was present. He was 
very tired and not much interested in discussing anything. 

Senator Ferguson. But he did discuss an attack on the committee? 
You stated that he said you should be vigorous. 

JVIr. Fairbank. I am not sure that he did. 

Senator Ferguson. Why are you having trouble on this statement ? 
It has just been recent. 

Mr. Fairbank. It is a week ago. I am under oath here. I do not 
want to misrepresent a conversation which was very casual and brief. 
He was tired. He didn't want to say much of anything. He was on 
his way. He thought that I was going on the next day. 

When I told him he was on the next day, then he felt even more tired, 
and sort of depressed, and pretty soon they left. 

Senator Ferguson. Was your statement completed at that time? 



3820 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Fairbank. It was completed, mimeograplied, and submitted to 
you. 

Senator FERousoisr. It has not been changed since then ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Only the modifications that' I sent, that I called to 
your attention in tAvo or three sentences on the last page. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you change on the last page ? 

Mr. Fairbank. We can compare those modifications. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you change the sentence: "It has made a 
presumption of guilt rather than of innocence"? 

Mr. Fairbank. I merely made it an independent sentence. These 
clianges were made for clarity and in a wa}' they were mollified rather 
than sharpened. 

If you would like to compare these two copies 

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss that sentence with Mr. Latti- 
more ? 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I did not discuss my statement with him at all 
in any way. That is very definite. That was a policy on my part. 
I did not want to. 

Senator Ferguson. When you wrote that paragraph on page 17, next 
to the last paragraph, did you have a copy of his statement? 

Mr. Fairbank. I may have — I don't know, but his statement did not 
influence my statement. I will make that as a flat assertion. 

Mr. Wait. Perhaps I could refresh his recollection on that. 

Senator Smith. That is all right with me, counsel, 

Mr. Wait. That was written in my office, and we discussed it at 
considerable length. It was discussed with Mr. Fairbank and me 
and my partner, who thought he was coming down. It was at least a 
week before March 3 that we arrived — there may have been some slight 
revision, but it was mimeographed in my office. I have never seen that 
one. 

Senator Smith. You understand that the chairman is trying to 
compliment Mr. Fairbank on being more restrained ? 

Senator Ferguson. But you know that Mr. Lattimore had attacked 
the committee for bad faith, in his statement ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I don't recall those words, but it certainly was an 
all-out — well, a lot of things were said. 

Senator Smith. Several words. 

Mr. Fairbank. Several words ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you intending by that paragraph to attack 
the good faith of the committee? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir. I say very definitely in both these: "No 
one questions the sincerity of this committee," and that means good 
faith. 

Mr. Wait. The conference that we had at which this was drafted 
was on February 25. I remember Mr. Fairbank calling me on Sat- 
urday, the 2od. I had just gotten back from a skiing holiday. 

We then got word it was to be set for the 3d, which I could not 
attend because I was moderating at the time in Harvard. 

We got together on Monday, which was the 25tli, and apparently 
Lattimore had not gotten the statement out at that time. 

Senator Smith. At that time Professor Lattimore had communi- 
cated with you, though. You had had some sort of communication 
with him ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3821 

Mr. Fairbank. When I wrote this statement ? 

Senator Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Fairbank, I don't recall any talk about statements, or any- 
thing of that sort. 

Senator Smith. How long had you known Professor Lattimore? 

Mr. Fairbank. I knew him quite w^ell. I stopped and saw him 
at Christmas time, as we were coming through Baltimore. He had 
been up in Cambridge. His son is going to college there. And we 
have seen each other back and forth. 

In supporting Mr. Lattimore, as I have, ever since he was attacked, 
2 years ago — and I have the documents here somewhere — I have con- 
sistently inserted a clause that I do not agree with everything he has 
said by any means. I make that plain. 

I merely say I think he is an honest man, and it is all right for 
him to be heard. 

Mr. Morris. You will supply, will you not, the translation of that 
transcription that appeared in the Chinese newspaper? 

]STr. Fairbank. Yes ; I have it here. 

Mr. Morris. That is our only copy. Professor. 

Mr. Fairbank. We have typed out 

Mr. Morris. You have the translation already? 

Mr. Fairbank. Yes; we have copies, and can distribute it, if you 
want. 

Senator Smith. Are there any other questions? 

Mr. Wait. I am to get, I understand, documentations that Profes- 
sor Fairbank was at Harvard the academic year 1937 and 1938 and 
we are also to get the date in 1935, to find out whether Lattimore was 
in Peiping at that time. 

Mr. Morris. We will have Mr. Lattimore here again. I think the 
latter we can ask him about. 

Mr. Wait. Then I will simply get the material with reference to 
his being in Cambridge during the academic year 1937 and 1938. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Senator Smith. Is there anything else? 

Is there anything else you have to say, Mr. Fairbank? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, thank you. 

Senator Smith. Will you let us know if anything occurs to you 
and you want to come back and give it to us ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Thank you. 

Senator Smith. Up to now, then, do you think the committee has 
been perfectly fair with you in this hearing today ? 

Mr. Fairbank. I think this hearing today has allowed me an oppor- 
tunity to express myself; it certainly has. I think the intent of this 
committee hearing was certainly veiy fair. 

I am afraid I can't go all the way of saying what really would be 
inconsistent with what I have said here, which is a really considered 
opinion, about the committee in general. 

Senator Smith. Have you anything else you want to say now, 
today? 

Mr. Fairbank. No, sir. 

Senator Smith. You have had a full chance to have your say ? 

Mr. Fairbank. Certainly; on the things we have covered. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything else you want to cover ? 



3822 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONE 

Mr. Fairbank. No; I do not think there is. I appreciate the atti- 
tude that you gentleman have had. 

Senator Smith. You have not gotten the impression that was the 
attitude we had toward Mr, Lattimore from what he had said ? 

Mr. Fairbank. From the j^ress reports, too, I must agree ; yes. 

Senator Smith. If you want to fuss with the press, you can pick 
out whichever one of those men 3^ou want to go after and take him on. 

All right. If there is nothing further, the hearing will adjourn. 

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m. the connnittee recessed, subject to the 
call of the Chair.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



THUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1952 

United States Senate, 

SUBGOMMI'ITEE To INVESTIGATE THE AdMINISTR-\- 

TION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY AcT AND OtHER 

Internal Security Laws or the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C . 

The subcommittee met, at 10: 30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
457, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland presiding. 

Present : Senators Eastland, O'Conor, and Ferguson. 

Also present : Eobert Morris, subcommittee counsel. 

Senator Eastland. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Mr. Matusow, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are 
about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judi- 
ciary is the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Matusow. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF HARVEY M. MATUSOW, DAYTON, OHIO 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Matusow, will you give your full name and ad- 
dress to the reporter, please. 

Mr. Matusow. Harvey M. Matusow, 1308 Grand Avenue, Dayton, 
Ohio. 

Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation ? 

Mr. Matusow. I am a staff member of the Ohio Un-American Activ- 
ities Commission. It is a joint committee of the Ohio State Assembly. 

Mr. Morris. For how long have you held that position? 

Mr. Matusow. Since my release from the Air Force, in December. 

Mr. Morris. December 9 

Mr. Matusow. 1951. 

Mr. Morris. JNIr. Matusow, did you serve in World War II'? 

Mr. Matusow. I did. 

Mr. Morris. What service were you with % 

]\Ir. IMatusow. United States Army, the Infantry, in Europe. 

Mr. Morris. Were you a member of the American Youth for 
Democracy ? 

Mr. Matusow. I was. 

Mr. Morris. Is the American Youth for Democracy a Communist 
organization? 

Mr. Matusow. It was. It is no longer in existence. 

Mr. Morris. What were the circumstances surrounding your join- 
ing the American Youth for Democracy ? 

Mr. Matusow. I was just a kid out of the armed services and look- 
ing for something. I was just psychologically right for being re- 
cruited into the American Youth for Democrac}'. 

3823 

S8H48 — 52 — pt. 11 8 



3824 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Did you subsequently join the Communist Party? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, in October 1947. 

Mr. Morris. Who recruited you into the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. A few of the ckib members of the A YD, one Julie 
Sheik. 

Mr. Morris. And who else ? 

Mr. Matusow. One Lee Scharf . 

Mr. Morris. How long had you been a member of the American 
Youth for Democracy before you joined the Communist Party? 

Mr. Matusow. About 1 year. 

Mr. Morris. Did you in the course of your activities with the Com- 
munist Party, become disillusioned with the principles of that 
organization ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Morris. What did you do at that time? 

Mr. Matusow. I contacted the FBI in New York. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us approximately when that was? 

Mr. Matusow. Early February 1950. 

Mr. Morris. When you contacted the FBI in New York, did they 
show interest in the information that you possessed at the time? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; they did. 

Mr. Morris. Did they urge you to stay in the Communist Party and 
report to them ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; they did. 

Mr. Morris. And did you so report to the FBI the activities and the 
information that you discovered in the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. I did, until January 1951, when I was expelled from 
the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Wliy were you expelled from the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. The charge was that I was suspected of being an 
OSS agent. 

Senator Ferguson. What is OSS? 

Mr. Matusow. Office of Strategic Services. 

Senator Ferguson. Not the FBI? 

Mr. Matusow. Not the FBI. 

Senator Ferguson. They had not caught on to the FBI? 

Mr. Matusow. No, sir. It was a matter of circumstances, and 
witch hunting in the party. 

Mr. Morris. Was tliere an OSS in existence at that time, Mr. 
Matusow ? 

Mr. Matusow. No ; there was not. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they start their own loyalty program within 
the party to find out whether there were any subversives in the party? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, sir. As they called them, "enemy agents." 

Senator Ferguson. But they started their own loyalty program. 

Mr. Matusow. During my whole time in the Communist Party, 
they adhered to witch hunting and purges. 

Senator Ferguson. But they had their own loyalty program, find- 
ing out if they had disloyal people in the party? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. They had a former New York City 
police conducting interrogations. 

Senator Eastland. Who was he? 

Mr. Matusow. I didn't get the name, sir. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3825 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Matusow, did you vrork at a Communist Party 
book shop while iu the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I worked at three different book shops. 

Mr, Morris. Will you tell us what they were? 

Mr. Matusow. The Jefferson School Book Shop; that is, at the 
Jefferson School of Social Science, 565 Sixth Avenue, in New York. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us what the Jefferson School is. 

Mr. Matusow. It is the Communist Party educational institution 
in New York. They state that they are a school which studies Marx- 
ism and Leninism. They are run by the Communist Party educa- 
tional department, national educational department. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that from your own experience ? 

Mr. IVIatusow. Yes, when I M'orked at the school. 

Mr. Morris. That is one of the three Communist Party book shops 
that you were associated with? 

Mr. Matusow. Right. 

Mr. Morris. What w^ere the other two ? 

Mr. Matusow. The other was the Workers Book Shop, at 48 East 
Thirteenth Street. At the time it was located in the national head- 
quarters of the Communist Party, and was a part of the Communist 
Party literature-distribution set-up. 

Mr. Morris. That is openly affiliated with the Communist Party; 
is it not ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; it was. 

Mr. jMorris. What was the third? 

Mr. Matusow. The third was the Camp Unity Book Shop, at a 
summer camp in New York State, At that time I was on the payroll 
of the Communist Party State literature department, and receiving my 
checks from tliem. 

Senator Ferguson. How much were you getting? 

Mr. Matusow. It varied, sir. The maximum was $45 a week at any 
one time. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you working at other jobs? 

Mr. Matusow. No. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever stay at Camp Unity ? 

Mr. JVIatusow. Yes ; I managed the book shop there in the summer 
of 1049. 

Mr. Morris. Was that a Communist Party camp ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; it was run by the Communist Party. 

Mr, Morris. Completely by the Communist Party. It isn't an in- 
filtrated group; is it? 

Mr. Matusow. No; it was set up originally by the Communist 
Party. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know of the Committee for Democratic Far 
Eastern Policy? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Morris. Was that a Communist organization ? 

JSIr. Matusow. Yes; set up by the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. How do you know that ? 

]Mr. Maitjsow. In meetings with James Nesi, a teacher at the Jef- 
ferson School and a lecturer at their camp. 

Mr. Morris. What do you mean by the camp ? 

Mr. Matusow. That was in 1948, Camp Sherw^ood, in Monticello, 
N. Y. 



3826 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Is that a Communist camp ? 

Mr. Matusow. A Jefferson School camp, and in that relation Com- 
munist Party-dominated. Mr. Nesi is an instructor at the Jefferson 
School, and one of the lecturers of the Committee for Democratic 
Far Eastern Policy. I was very friendly with Mr. Nesi, and we used 
to discuss the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. On 
more than one occasion. I had visited in the office of the committee 
at 799 Broadway and picked up certain material, such as China Digest, 
which was published in Hong Kong, and I believe later became Peo- 
ple's China, published in Peking, distributed through the Com- 
mittee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. Also distributed there 
was a publication turned out monthly or every 2 or o months, whenever 
they got their material, called Letters From China, which were let- 
ters from Chinese Communists who at the time were behind the lines 
when Chiang Kai-shek was still on the mainland. It was part of the 
propaganda set-up in the United States. They mimeographed this 
letter-sheet. 

Senator Ferguson. What were they trying to do with this literature 
in the United States? 

Mr. Matusow. In 1948 they set up a program of what they called — 
I will quote from this, if I may 

Mr. Morris. What is that vou are quoting from? 

Mr. Matusow. This is a study outline prepared and issued by the- 
New York State education department of the Communist Partv, 
35 East Twelfth Street, New York. 

Mr. Morris. Where did you get that, Mr. Matusow ? 

Mr. Matusow. It was given to me when I was in the party to help 
prepare an educational program for the Communist Party club that 
I was in. 

Mr. Morris. Do you remember wdio gave it to you ? 

Mr. Matusoav. It was handed down through the county educa- 
tional department. At that time I believe the county educational 
director was Ted Bassett. 

Senator Ferguson. Was this a pamphlet or a booklet that was 
circulated to everybody, non-Communist as well as Communist? 

Mr. Matusow. No, sir; this was circulated to leaders of the Com- 
munist Party only. 

Senator Ferguson, So that it was advisory to you ? 

Mr. Matusow\ That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. As a Communist. 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. It is entitled "The Great Victories in 
China, and the New Dangers of American Imperialist Intervention. 
Club Discussion Outline on the Significance of the Recent Events 
in China, and the Tasks of All of the Clubs." 

On page 5, paragraph 3, underlined, ''Support the greetings to the 
liberation fighters of China," issued by the Committee for Demo- 
cratic Far Eastern Policy. At that time their address was 111 West 
Forty-second Street. 

Senator Ferguson. Am I right in saying, then, that the purpose 
was to try and keep America out of the Far East as far as it would 
harm the Communists taking over of all of China ? 

Mr. Matusoav. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And this literature was to go out among Chi- 
nese in New York, or all of them ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3827 

Mr. Matsow. I might cite the example of this greeting to the 
liberation fighters in China, and the future greeting was a scroll. 
It said, "Recognition of the People's Republic of China." At one 
rally the Progressive Party had at the Yankee Stadium in Septem- 
ber 1948, where I believe some 65,000 people were in attendance, the 
Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, in conjunction with 
party workers, had circulated those petitions and gotten a great 
number of signatures. They used that to collect money. They put 
out little buttons that looked like the Red Cross buttons with a red flag 
crossed with an American flag, and urged you to wear that, too. 
And also published a magazine called Far East Spotlight. 

Senator Eastland. "VVliat is the name of the book that you want 
to show? 

Mr. Morris. Go ahead, Mr. Matsusow. 

Mr. Matusow. I believe I was saying that they published the 
magazine called Far East Spotlight, which was set up by the party, 
the Communist Party, distributed through the Communist Party 
literature set-up. I differentiate between something that was not 
published by the Communist Party or recommended by them, in 
that it might have just been sold in the book shop, and material 
that was actually distributed through the party organization, in the 
• clubs. 

Senator Ferguson. The party book shop, was this book shop a Com- 
munist book shop ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right, operated by the Communist Party. 

Senator Ferguson. Operated by the Communist Party? 

Mr. Matusow. There were three of them in New York. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume that tliey sold all kinds of books, non- 
■ Communist as well as Communist, as a front ? 

Mr. Matusow. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. They only sold Communist or pro-Communist 
boolvs ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. And they had to be orthodox Communist books, did 
they not, Mr. Matusow? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. No deviation from the party line. 
I would like to cite the example of a book that was published in 1949, 
entitled "Tomorrow's China," by Anna Louise Strong. That book 
was published by the party in New York, as well as a pamphlet on 
Korea, by Miss Strong. Three or four weeks after publication date, 
the Soviet Union expelled Anna Louis Strong as being a spy, and 2 
days after that expulsion became known the Communist Party took 
all of the books off the shelves, and they haven't been sold since. 

Senator Ferguson. "Were you in the store at that time ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. You were working for the party as a member? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator PV.rguson. Could you explain how that got to the book 
■store ; what the pipeline is ? 

Mr, Matusow. On Miss Strong's book? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; why it was taken out in 2 days. I want 
to try to get the pipeline from Moscow, whether she was expelled, to 
your book store, to take the books off the shelf, what the party line 
would be, and how the line was conducted. 



3828 unTstitute of pacific relations 

Mr. Matusow. Well, the announcement was made in the press — 
New York Times, Herald Tribune, et cetera, and in other papers — 
saying Miss Strong had been expelled from the Soviet Union. The 
party did not act on that yet, because they did not have the party's 
fact. If they just acted on the basis of a story in the New York Times, 
for instance, there would be dissension in the ranks of the party. 
They waited until a correspondent for, maybe Tass, or one of the Com- 
munist newspapers here in the United States, for instance, had gotten 
copy on it for distribution, or a Daily Worker correspondent. 

For instance, Joseph Starobin was in Europe. I don't know if he 
was there at that time. But there has usually been a Daily Worker 
correspondent in Europe. 

Mr. Morris. Is this actually what happened or is this your specu- 
lation? 

Mr. Mattjsow. This is not speculation. 

Senator Ferguson. He is giving me how this chain of command 
comes from Moscow over here to stop this sale in the book shop. 

Mr. INIatusow. That is correct. When either the correspondent 
or somebody in the position of leadership or know-how, I don't know 
who the person was 

Senator Ferguson. You can't name the person, but you are giving- 
me the modus operandi. 

Mr. Matusow. The information would be received in New York 
It might also have been received at the time through its Cominform 
Journal, a newspaper called For a Lasting Peace, for a People's 
Democracy. At that time the New York State or the national com- 
mittee of the Communist Party would hold a meeting and decide 
"We will not support or sell the book Tomorrow's China by Anna 
Louise Strong, and it will be taken off the bookshelves." The State 
literature director, one Bordofsky, at that time issued an order to the 
bookshop to just take the books off the shelf. 

Senator O'Conor. You mentioned before that there were three such 
stores in New York under direct control of the Communists. Do you 
happen to know whether simultaneous action was taken at all three 
at about the same time ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct; just a phone call was all that was 
necessary. 

Senator O'Conor. But regardless of the type or the manner in 
which the word was communicated, what was the result as to their 
action, whether it was uniform and taken at the same time or not. 

Mr. Matusow. Taken at the same time. Within a 5-minute period 
you could not find a copy of the book. 

Senator O'Conor. In any one of the three stores ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Eastland. You say that the only books that were carried 
in those three bookstores were official Communist publications, is 
that right? 

Mr. Matusow. No, sir; I did not state that. I stated that anti- 
Communist books, for instance, a book by Whittaker Chambers, would 
not be carried in the Communist Party bookshop, nor would a book 
on economics that did not teach Marxist economics be carried, but books 
of other publishers that were written by Marxist or Leninist writers 
were carried. 

Senator Eastland. They were Communist publications I 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3829 

Mr. Matusow. Written by Communists but not by a Communist 
Party publishing house. There is a difference. 

Senator Eastland. The difference was that books that were not 
published by an official Communist publishing house were carried 
provided the book was promoting Communist policy, is that right? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Now, did you carry books by Owen Lattimore? 

Mr. Matusow. We did, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Why? 

Mr. Matusow. In 1948, as I think this document will show, the 
Communist Party literature set-up had not caught up with the fast- 
moving events in China j that is, the war in China and the setting up 
of the Chinese Communist Government. The only material they had 
published by the Communist Party, either International Publishers 
or New Century Publishers, were a pamphlet by Mao Tse-tung, the 
Turning Point in China, and China's New Democracy. Two pam- 
phlets, nothing else. Well, the party had to get the line dissemi- 
nated. People were asking "What is the line on China?" And we 
had instructions in the bookshop that came down from the New York 
State educational department of the Communist Party, to refer the 
members of the party to the following books : The Unfinished Revolu- 
tion in China, by Israel Epstein, and Mr. Epstein was a member of 
the Communist Party and an instructor at the Jefferson School. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, sir; I did. Solution in Asia, by Owen Lat- 
timore, was used in the Communist book shop at the Jefferson School 
and the workers' book shop. It was required or recommended read- 
ing for students at the school. The book, Red Star Over China, 
by Edgar Snow, was also recommended reading. The book — I am 
trying to think of the name of it — by Harrison Forman, the title 
slips my mind at this point, was another one of the books that was 
recommended reading. Those books I just outlined were basically 
the books that the party stated carried out party line on China. 

Senator Eastland. Now, you said that the party stated that these 
books carried the party line on China. Now, you were a Communist, 
were you not ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Did you consider those authors Communists? 

Mr. Matusow. On the basis of the reading? You mean in actual 
dues-paying Communist Party members? 

Senator Eastland. Well, you draw a distinction now. Did you 
consider those authors Communists ? 

Mr. Matusow. My own opinion at the time ; yes ; I did. 

Senator Eastland. You considered Lattimore a Communist, you 
considered Snow a Communist, and you considered Epstein a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. Epstein I knew was a Communist 
on the basis of his work at the school. 

Senator Ferguson. But that does not necessarily mean that every- 
body that wrote a book that was sold in that book shop was really a 
member of the party ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever carry a card ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I did. 



3830 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. And when did you stop carrying a card ? 

Mr. Matusow. In 1949. The party no longer issued cards. 

Senator Ferguson. So you had a card up to 1949 ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you said that your mental reaction of the 
three people that wrote the books, Epstein, Lattimore, and Snow, was 
that they were Communists. Will you give us a definition of what 
you meant by the term "Communist" when you said they were 
•Communists? 

Mr. Matusow. In thinking, their political ideology, on the basis 
of their books, to use the party's terms, I felt that they agreed with 
and adhered to the principles of dialectical materialism, or Marxist 
philosophy, and perpetrated the line through tlieir books. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand those were the only kind of 
books that were sold in those book shops, that if it was not party lit- 
erature it was not sold ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. It did not make any difference whether the per- 
son consciously or unconsciously followed the line ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But if the line was actually in the book, do I 
understand then it was sold in the bookshop ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And if they consciously carried it, then you 
would consider that person a Communist. Now, unconsciously, would 
he only be a fellow traveler? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes. I would like to point out an example of the 
book which does not deal with the subject of China, of an example of 
somebody who wrote a book and was not a Communist, and the book 
carried the party line. There was a book called, I believe, American 
Freedom and Catholic Powder, by Paul Blanshard, which was pub- 
lished while I was still at the bookshop. That book adhered to the 
Communist line in relation to the Catholic Church. It was a good 
text as far as it went. They would not recommend the book because 
in the book Mr. Blanshard stated he was opposed to communism. 
Though he carried the party line through in his book, it was not 
considered recommended reading for Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Because of that one sentence, or that one line, 
and not meanins: the party line, but the fact that he had mentioned 
that he personally was opposed to communism, they felt that that was 
enough deviation from the line that they would not sell that book in 
their bookshop? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how many such bookshops were 
in the United States? 

Mr. Matusoav. I stated the three in New York. There was a book- 
shop in Boston, there was one in Washington, D. C, Chicago, Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 

Senator Ferguson. Is there one in Detroit ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; there was one in Detroit. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the name of it ? 

Mr. Matusow. Most of the bookshops were called Progressive Book- 
shops. I don't remember the names of all of them. 

Senator Ferguson. Some catch phrase? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3831 

Mr. Matusow. Usually dealing with the word "progressive" or 
"world" bookshop. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think you could get us the names of all 
these bookshops in the various cities ? Do you know any way you can 
get them? 

Mr. Matusow. I might be able to. I am going to New York tonight, 
and in New York I might be able to get the list of them. I might say 
that most of them are out of business now, except the one in California, 
the California Labor School Bookshop, and one in Los Angeles that is 
still operating that I know of. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why they are out of business? 

Mr. Matusoav. A certain amount of publicity in certain cities had 
been given to the bookshops, and they were highlighted and therefore 
couldn't operate. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean to tell me that only Communists 
bought in these bookshops, or were they open to the world? 

Mr. Matusow. They were open to the public. 

Senator Ferguson. The name "Communist" did not appear in any 
way with it ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Eastland. He has gone further than that, though. He 
said that the books that he mentioned, that Communist Party members 
were advised that those books represented the Communist Party China 
policy. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Eastland. That was Lattimore's book. 

Senator Ferguson. But I am getting a general idea, rather than 
just Lattimore's book, that if I came in to that bookshop to buy a 
book, I wouldn't know anything about it being a party-line book. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But suppose I come in as a Communist. Did you 
ever have anybody come in the bookshop and say, "I am a Communist, 
and I want such a book" ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, in my position in the bookshop, I knew by sight 
probably 10,000 Party members in New York. I had seen them at 
various mass meetings or they knew me to be a Communist. We will 
put it that way. On that basis, many people would come in to me and 
say, "We are holding a club educational at this meeting," at so and so 
club tonight, and "we have to prepare for the subject of China." They 
might not have had this outline or had the outline and wanted to 
expand on it. "What book is recommended to supplement the outline 
or recommended reading for the club?" That happened on many 
occasions. On the question of China, I was told to recommend Red 
Star Over China by Snow ; and Solution in Asia by Lattimore. I left 
out one before — and that was Agnes Smedley's books — in that other 
group. Israel Epstein's book and Harrison Forman's book Report 
From Red China. 

Mr. Morris. On the China group ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator O'Conor. Could I ask one question: You stated that you 
were instructed to recommend. By whom, just what method was fol- 
lowed to give you the authority or the word that that was to be the 
book or books recommended ? 

Mr. Matusow. That came down from the New York State educa- 
tional department of the Communist Party, through the State litera- 
ture director who was a member of that commission. 



3832 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator O'Conor. Did it last over any considerable period ? I mean, 
was there any revocation of it or any change in that regard? 

Mr. Matusow. It lasted over the period of my employment in the 
bookshops, and that was 1948, and through December 1949. 

Mr. Morris. Did you handle through the Communist Party book- 
shops the IPR pamphlet, Job in the Pacific? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; we did. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything in particular that you recall about 
that particular pamphlet? 

Mr. Matusow. Job in the Pacific, I believe, was written by Henry 
Wallace, put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was used in 
the same light as the books we have just mentioned, in that we sup- 
plemented Mao Tse-tung's pamphlet, the title there "China Today," 
or rather "New Democracy in China," or "Turning Point in China," 
with the pamphlet by Henry Wallace put out by the IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the publication New China 
Daily News ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I was. 

Mr. Morris. What was the New China Daily News ? 

Mr. Matusow. I was told by Mr. Jim Nesi, one of the lecturers for 
the Committfee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, that the New 
China Daily News was the Chinese language version of the Daily 
Worker in New York, and that its editor, a Mr. Chu Tong, I believe, 
was a member of the party. 

Mr. Morris. Did Chu Tong ever lecture at the Jefferson School? 

Mr. Matusow. He did. I was present when Mr. Tong lectured 
at the Jefferson School. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it not be possible for Chu Tong to lec- 
ture at that school, if he was not a Communist? 

Mr. Matusow. No, it would not, not in that period of time. 

Senator Ferguson. Was that because of a rule that that school was 
actually teaching Communist line and Communist principles? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. I will state, though, when the school 
was originally set up, they did have non-Communists lecturing and 
teaching but in 1948, or after the indictment of the Communist Party 
leaders, in 1948, the policy of the school was no lecturer or instructor 
at the school — I mean, nobody can lecture or teach at the school, unless 
they are a member of the party. 

Senator Ferguson. You being in the educational line of the Com- 
munist Party would know something about this school first-hand, is 
that it? 

Mr. Matusow. I worked at the school. 

Senator Ferguson. You worked at the school. 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. In what capacity? 

Mr. Matusow. I worked in the bookshop at the school. 

Senator Ferguson. The bookshop at the school. 

Mr. IVIatusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. That, I assume, was a Communist bookshop. 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. The same as these other bookshops. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. "WTiat was the name of the one here in Wash- 
ington ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3833 

Mr. Matusow. I just don't remember the name of it offhand. It 
■closed about a year ae:o. 

Senator Ferguson. There was once a cooperative bookshop. What 
was the name of it? The Washington Bookshop. Was that it? You 
ai'e going to try to get those names. Did you know a man by the 
name of Chi ? 

Mr. Matusow. No, I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. You know something personally about this 
newspaper that you were talking about, the Communist newspaper ? 

Mr. Morris. The New China Daily News. 

Mr. Matusow. As I stated, members of the Communist Party who 
I discussed that with at the time of Mr. Chu Tong's lecture at the 
Jefferson School stated that it was a Chinese Party newspaper, con- 
trolled by the party. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you sell newspapers in your bookshops ? 

Mr. Matusow. We did not have any call for the China Daily News. 

Mr. Morris. That was a Chinese language paper, was it not? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not that newspaper, 
the New China Daily News, was a Chinese sheet? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I stated it was. 

Senator Ferguson. You are sure of that ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And you also knew, as a matter of fact, that Chu Tong 
•was a member of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. It w-as not only your deduction from the fact that he 
■was a lecturer at the Jefferson School ? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, at that time just to make doubly sure that 
we did not offend people when they lectured at the Jefferson School, 
in my position at the bookshop, I had to cover the lertures in that on 
any given subject I had to prepare certain literature for sale and dis- 
tribution to tiie audience. And before anybody lectured, I usually 
made doubly sure by checking with the director of the school as to 
whether that person is a member of the Communist Party or whether 
it be known that they are a member of the Communist Party, and 
how far can we go on distribution of literature. In other words, can 
we sell Communist Party literature, material published by the party. 

Senator Ferguson. Under the name and label. 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. In the question of this one lecturer, 
I was told, "Yes, Mr. Tong is a. member of the Communist Party, 
and you can sell Communist Party literature at the affair." 

Senator Ferguson. You mean to tell us then some people were 
Communists but the Communist Party did not want it known that 
they were actually members of the party ? 

Mr. MATUSow^ That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And some were known and it did not make any 
difference whether the}^ were held out to the world by the Communists 
themselves as Communist members ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; at times. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would allow you to sell books, actu- 
ally published under the label or the name of the Communist Party, 
if they were to be known as Comnmnists. 



3834 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Matusow. Eight. Or if they had not so much been known ias 
Communists or whether or not they would be personally offended at 
times, or certain members of the audience who t^Qj would attract. 
I mean, you use a certain name to get a group of people to a lecture,, 
and if you feel that you are going to oifend or alienate your audience 
by openly saying so and so is a Communist or the material here is 
being published by the Communist Party. If we know we would 
alienate those people, we didn't at the time distribute Communist 
Party literature. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know the Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Asso- 
ciation ? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, the information I had about it was in relation 
to the China Daily News and information gotten from the Committee 
for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. And I recall the day, I believe, 
the official announcement that, I believe they called it, the New People's 
Republic of China was established, the Red flag of China was run up 
over the building of the Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association 
in New York City. 

Mr. Morris. "VVho told you that? 

Mr. Matusow. That came down from the Committee for Democratic 
Far Eastern Policy. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Israel Epstein to be a Comunist Party 
member ? 

Mr. Matusow. I stated, "Yes"; I did. 

Mr. Morris. And you also knew that he was a lecturer at the Jejffer- 
son School? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you know he was a member ? 

Mr. Matusow. They stated, on the question of employment at the 
Jefferson School, a prerequisite in 1948 and '49, that you had to be a 
member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have occasion to visit Frederick V. Field's 
library ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances? 

Mr. Matusow. The address, I believe, is 26 West Twenty-sixth 
Street. And prior to a trip that I had taken to Puerto Rico in 1949, 
under the auspices of the Communist Party, I was told to go to the 
Frederick V. Field Library on Twenty-sixth Street and there I would 
be able to find all the reference material that I would need to prepare 
myself for the trip to Puerto Rico. 

Mr. Morris. And you did go to the library ? 

Mr. Matusow. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Before you leave that, did you meet Field? 

Mr. Matusow. I have seen him at other occasions, not at the library. 

Senator Ferguson. Not at the library. 

Mr. Matusow. You see, he turned this house over to a number of 
groups, the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the Civil 
Rights Congress, the Council on African Affairs, and a few other 
groups that used his house that he turned over to the party. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you get into the library to use it? 
Could anyone go in and use it ? 

Mr. Matusow. It was open to the public. 

Senator Ferguson. It was open to the public. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3835 

Mr. Matusow. Well, that is, the party public. You can call up 
and make an appointment and go up there. They had two librarians 
on duty. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to tell us that it was his library 
-at that time, or had he disassociated himself from the library? 

Mr. Matusow. No, it had his name on it, the Frederick V. Field 
Library. 

Senator Ferguson. Where was it located ? 

Mr. Matusow. 26 West Twenty-sixth Street. I might be wrong 
on the 26. It might be 26 or 25. 

Senator Ferguson. How large a library was it ? 

Mr. IVIatusow. One of the largest I had seen of a private nature. 

Senator Ferguson. Did it have Communist books in it published 
by tlie Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, the Political Affairs, Daily Worker, Masses in 
Main Stream, New Masses, Main Stream, every publication that the 
party put out was in the library. Communist Party pamphlets and 
books. 

Senator Fergus(jn. Were any non-Communist books in it? 

Mr. Matusow\ Yes, they had that, as I say, for reference. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know William Mandel ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Morris. Was William Mandel a member of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; he is. 

In 1949, when I was working at the Jefferson School Camp, and 
managing the book shop there, my duties were to handle the dis- 
tribution of the literature for its lecturers that appeared at the camp 
during the summer. Mr. Mandel was one of the lecturers. There 
again I had to find out in advance whether someone was a member 
of the party, for the purpose of literature distribution. Mr. Mandel 
at the time lectured on his book, I believe it was called Handbook 
to the Soviet Union or Handbook to Russia. I met him and we 
talked at length about the question of the Soviet Union and the party. 
I mean, I spent a number of hours with him at that visit, and the 
year before at the Jefferson School Camp, the same situation ex- 
isted. 

Senator Ferguson. From your conversation, then, you are telling 
us that he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Matusow. More than my conversation. Officials of the New 
York State Communist Party notified me that he was a Communist. 
In my conversation with him, we discussed questions of the Com- 
munist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have any dealings with Evans Carlson? 

Mr. Matusow. Not directly; just the question of, first, the Ameri- 
can Youth for Democracy publication. Youth, in two specific issues 
there were articles or references made to Evans F. Carlson. One was 
an article which he coauthored with Paul Robeson, on the question 
of — I don't believe I remember the title. The other one was a photo- 
graph or a reproduction of a letter that he had written to the national 
office of the American Youth for Democracy. This one club in New 
York, had written him a letter asking if they could use his name for 
the club, the Evans Carlson Club, and he wi'ote a letter back stating 
he was pi-oud to be associated with the American Youth for Democ- 



3836 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

racy, and that they could go ahead and use his name. It was repro- 
duced and used in the magazine. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether or not he was a member of ther 
Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. When a book, a biography of Evans F. Carlson, came 
out, called The Big Yankee, it came out in 1948, it was first distrib- 
uted by the Communist Party Book Club, the Liberty Book Club, in 
New York. I had a number of discussions in relation to the book, 
with, again, this Jim Nesi of the Committee for Democratic Far 
Eastern Policy. And Nesi stated that in the 1930's, when Carlson 
had been to China, he was very close to Mao Tse-tung and helped train 
remnants of the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army for the 
Chinese Communists. That was before Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know the publication China Today ? 

Mr. Matusow. I know of the publication China Today and have 
seen back issues of it. 

Mr. Morris. It is no longer published, is it, Mr. Matusow? 

Mr. Matusow. It is not. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know, from your Communist experience, if 
that was a Communist publication ? 

Mr. Matusow. If I may quote from this outline here. 

Mr. Morris. By all means. Mr. Chairman, will you receive this 
whole outline into the record ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes; we will admit it. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 565" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 565 

[Stamped:] Library of Haevey M. Matusow 

THE GREAT VICTORIES IN CHINA AND THE NEW DANGERS OF 
AMERICAN IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION 

Club Discussion Outline on the Significance of the Recent Events in 
China and the Tasks of all Clubs 

(Issued by: New York State Education Dept, Communist Party, 35 East 12 
Street, New York City, November 20, 1948) 

China Discussion Outune 

1. victories of the people's liberation aemy in china 

The victories of the Chinese Red Armies over the Chiang Kai-sliek dictator- 
ship novp embrace Manchuria and Northern China, an area embodying 200 mil- 
lion people. 

1. Chinese People's Liberation Armies move steadily forvpard from victory 
to victory. 

Manchuria is completely in hands of the People's Lil:)eratiou Army. The Lib- 
eration Armies have moved into North China and are moving on Peiping and 
Nanking. 

An area comprising some 200 million people of China is in the hands of the 
People's liberation forces. 

Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, speaking of the 
shift of the Chinese liberation forces from the defensive to the oftensive, said 
in a speech on December 25, 1947 : "This is a great event. * * * Once it has 
talen place, it will of necessity move toward nation-ividc victory." 

It is moving toward nation-wide victory. On Nov. 10, 1948, Chu Teh, Com- 
mander in Chief of the People's Liberation Armies, said : "The complete libera- 
tion of China is near." 

2. Demoi-alization, defeatism, disintegration, pessimism and economic chaos 
permeates the Kuomintang areas. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3837 

3. The coalition of democratic forces in China, led by the Chinese Communist 
Party, has steadily broadened its base and influence among the people while that 
of Chiang Kai-shek narrows and he becomes daily more isolated. 

II. THE MAGNITUDE AND MEANING OF THE VICTOKlES OF THE CHINESE LIBEBATION 

FORCES 

1. Mao Tse-tung, in his speech "The Turning Point", delivered December 25, 
1947, said : 

"This is a turning point in history. * * * This is a great event. This event 
is great because it occurs in a country of 450 million people. Once it has taken 
place it will of necessity move toward nation-wide victory. This event, further- 
more, is great because it occurs in the eastern part of the world tvhere there is a 
population, totalling more than one billion {half the population of mankind)" 
suffering from the oppression of imperialism. The turn of the Chinese people's 
war of liberation from the defensive to the offensive cannot but bring jubilation 
and encouragement to the oppressed nations. At the same time, it is also a form 
of aid to the oppressed peoples now struggling in various countries of Europe 
and the Americas.'" 

2. American imperialism, center of world reaction, main prop of the colonial 
system, is severely weakened by the disastrous defeat it is suflering in China. 
This aids the struggle of the progressive, anti-imperailist people within the 
United States as well as all other peoples who are fighting American imperialist 
exploitation. 

3. China is a "preview" of the futility of the Marshall Plan program. In 
China it has now been fully demonstrated that no amount of American dollars 
poured in to support an oppresive, reactionary government can bring either 
recovery or stabilization nor can it destroy the people's movement for greater 
democracy and independence. 

Henry Wallace's statement is completely borne out : "More and more it becomes 
certain" that the Chinese fiasco will be the first to drive home to the American 
people the complete bankruptcy of our foreign policy." 

Hence the struggle in China poioerfully aids the democratic people's strxiggle 
for world peace and is of im measurable aid to change our foreign policy. 

4. Leadership and contribution of the Chinese Communist Party, especially of 
Mao Tse-tung. 

These victories have been won under the leadership of the Communist Party, 
which is the acknowledged leader of a broad coalition of all democratic forces. 
The Party, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, was able to apply the universal 
science of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete situation in China, especially in 
respect to: (a) agrarian revolution; (b) the nature of the new democracy in 
China ; (c) the role and building of the Communist Party. 

III. ON THE NATUBE OF THE WAR 

The war in China is a liberation war for independence. 

"The war launched by him (Chiang Kai-shek) is a counter revolutionary war 
directed by American imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation 
and the liberation of the Chinese people. * * *" 

— Mao Tse-tung in Tiuming Point, P. 4. 

That is why all progressive forces in America sympathize with and support 
this war of the Chinese people as a just war for national liberation. 

It must be underscored that American imperialism has emerged in the postwar 
period as the chief buhcark of the decaying colonial system. 

American imperialism has buttressed, aided,- and armed British, French, and 
Dutch imperialism in the struggle against the liberation movements of Asia, such 
as the French against Viet Xam, the Dutch against Indonesia, British in Malaya 
and P.urma. Its own role in Philippine,s and Korea. 

No place in the world has American imperialism, in its own right, intervened 
on so vast a scale and in so many ways as in the most decisive of all Far Eiistern 
countries — China. 

A. Nature of American Intervention in China 

1. Total cost to American taxpayer — 6-10 billion dollars (breakdown at- 
tached) in the form of — 

Direct military intervention by U. S. Army, Navy, Marines, Air Corps. 
Va.st military program to train and equip Chiang Kai-shek's armies under 
the name Magic (U. S. Military Assistance Group in China). 



3838 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Similar program for Cliinese Navy based on American built and operated 
naval base at Tsingtao. 

Transfer of Chiang's armies to civil war fronts by American planes and 
vessels. 

American troops have guarded Chinese lines of communications. 

Enormous American munition dumps have been turned over to Chiang's 
forces. 

Under illegally extended lend-lease hundreds of millions of dollars worth 
of military equipment transferred to Chiang from Okinawa and other Pacific 
Islands. 

B. Purpose of U. S. Policy of Intervention 

1. To stop the march of the Chinese people toward democracy and independ- 
ence under the slogan of "containing Communism." 

2. To gain military control over China and extend military bases against the 
U. S. S. R. 

3. To stem the upsurge of colonial liberation movements in whole Far East, 
which is profoundly affected by what happens in China, thereby endangering 
the rich monopoly holdings of Western European nations and America in the 
Far East. 

IV. FUTUKE AMEr.IOAN ROI.E IN CHINA 

Further intervention by Truman Administration, unless balked by the action 
of the people, may take any of the following forms : 

1. Direct military intervention — landing of American Marines (Vice Adm. 
Badger, C. O. American Naval forces in China declared on Nov. .5, that he is con- 
sidering landing of marines in Shanghai and sending American naval vessels 
up the Yangtse to protect American lives and property. U. S. may provide 
hombers, airplanes, for onslaught against industrial cities (Manchuria) in hands 
of Communists. Also American military personnel to direct operation's, as in 
Greece. 

Chiang, it is reported, may declare Shanghai an open city and invite American 
troops in to protect it from advancing Communist forces. 

2. Truman Administration finding Chiang useless to it may give direct support 
to a number of local war lords in an effort to stave of£ nation-wide victory for the 
Communists. 

3. Pour more funds into China in an attempt to bribe wavering elements in the 
Chinese democratic front and split their ranks, causing disunity and chaos, 
prolong the civil war, perpetrate killing of Chinese people, delay consolidation 
of victory. 

Although all these forms of intervention must fail in long run — they mean 
throwing away more of the American workers' money, accelerating infiation at 
home and further blackening the name of the U. S. in the eyes of the Chinese 
people whose suffering would be prolonged. 

Our own struggle against U. S. imperialism would receive setback if U. S. 
imperialism were able to win even limited objectives in China. Hence, activity 
to halt intensified intervention is urgent. Wall Street's policy in the Far East 
is based on rebuilding and strengthening Japan as a war base and the Japanese 
as gunmen for the Wall Street gangsters. 

Program of Action 

1. Demand a reversal of present disastrous Truman policy, complete with- 
drawal of American military forces in China and cessation of all forms of inter- 
vention. Connect this with the fight for world peace, for withdrawal of armed 
forces from Greece, Turkey, etc., and for negotiations with the Soviet Union. 

Plan an effective program of action for your club against intervention 
against the Chinese people. These actions should be based on the type 
of work the club is engaged in, such as — 

Distribute agitation folder on China in your shop, community, etc. 

2. Bring the Chinese issue to the American people through forums, meetings, 
literature. 

3. Tie China issue with our inflation at home. Make the point that Truman 
cannot fulfill his pledges for progressive legislation on the domestic front while 
carrying out an imperialist, reactionary war-making foreign policy. Show the 
oneness of domestic and foreign policy. 

4. Enlist the speakers and the help of the Committee for a Democratic Far 
Eastern Policy in preparing educational material for the broad masses of people. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3839 

Support the actions initiated by the Committee Against American Intervention 
in China. 

5. Read and sell subscriptions to the Committee's publication "Spotlight on 
the Far East," for the most authoritative and progressive approach on all Far 
JBastern questions. 

Support the campaign of ''Greetings to the LiberatJ^on Fighters of China." 
Issued by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, 111 West 42d St. 

Role of the American Progressive Movement in Aiding the Struggle of the 
Chinese Liberation Movement Against American Imperialism and Chinese Semi- 
Fevdalism. 

"The victory of the working class in the developed countries and the liberation 
of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without 
the formation and the consolidation of the United Revolutionary Front. 

"The formation of a United Revolutionary Front is impossible unless the 
proletariat of the oppressor nations renders direct and determined support to 
the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of 
''their own country'." 

— Stalin : Foundations of Leninism. 

1. The American progressive movement has a long and honorable record of 
support to the Chinese people's movement in the past. 

a. 1934 — American Friends of the Chinese People, and its magazine "China 
Today" mobilized support for the struggles of the Chinese people. 

b. 1938 — Boycott against Japanese goods. 

c. 1938 — Longshoremen on West Coast stopped shipments of scrap to 
Japan. 

d. 1945 — Newly constituted C. P. USA resolution on China and subsequent 
Times Square demonstration against Hurley mission. 

e. GI demonstration in Pacific theatre. 

2. 1946 — At present we must self-critically admit there has been a serious 
lack of education, discussion and action in support of the world-shaking struggle 
of the Chinese people against "our own imperialism," American imperialism. 

Bibliography 

Mao Tse-tung — Tiirning Point in China — China's New Democracy. 
A. A. Zhdanov — International Situation. 

Supplementary for Speakers 

Mao Tse-tung — New Democracies in China. New China (pamphlet). 
uopwa/16. 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify that, Mr. Matusow. 

Mr. Matusow. Issued by the New York State Educational Depart- 
ment, Communist Party, 35 East Twelfth Street, New York, Novem- 
ber 20, 19-18 ; title "The Great Victories in China and the New Dangers 
of American Imperialist Intervention. Club discussion outline on 
the significance of the recent events in China and the tasks of all 
clubs." 

Mr. Morris. Did you receive that from your official position in the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, as a club leader in one of the Communist Party 
clubs. On page 5, paragraph 1, I would like to quote this in relation 
to the tasks of the Communist Party, its context here : 

The American progressive movement has a long and honorable record of 
support to the Chinese people's movement in the past ; A. 1934. American friends 
of the Chinese people and the magazine China Today mobilized support for the 
struggles of the Chinese people. 

Relating to the Chinese Communists, we were told to use this in our 
discussion. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, if you had any research to be done, 
and if you went to China Today, you could accept China Today as an 
orthodox source of information ; is that right ? 

88348— 52— pt. 11 9 



3840 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Mattjsow. That is right, carrying the party line. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you tell us when you were working in 
the bookshops as to whether or not there was a large or small sale of 
Solution in Asia ? 

Mr. Matusow. I wouldn't like to give you an exact figure. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, that is the reason I use the word large 
or small. 

Mr. Matusow. Well, it wasn't a large sale. All of the books I have 
mentioned on China had a large sale in that period. We sold a num- 
ber of Solution in Asia and the Agnes Smedley books, and the Edgar 
Snow book, Eed Star Over China, and 

Senator Ferguson. What about the Epstein book? 

Mr. Matusow. The Epstein book had the largest sale because it was 
the newest book at the time. Solution in Asia, I believe, was pub- 
lished in 1945. The Epstein book came out in late 1947 or early 1948. 

Mr. Morris. Would you say now that the Solution in Asia book did 
not have a large sale? 

Mr. Matusow. It has a smaller sale than the Unfinished Revolu- 
tion in China. 

Senator Eastland. Because it was an earlier book? 

Mr. Matusow. Correct. 

Senator Eastland. But you also say that the Chinese organization 
in the State of New York had instructed you that the book. Solution 
in Asia, represented official Communist policy? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Eastland. And therefore you would have promoted the 
sale? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like if you think it is within 
the scope of the inquiry to ask the witness some questions on the 
Book and Magazine Guild. The Book and Magazine Guild was a 
local of the United Office and Professional Workers Association. It 
had a contract with the IPR to cover the employment of the employees 
of the institute. 

Senator Eastland. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Were you a member of the United Ofiice and Profes- 
sional Workers of America ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I was. 

Mr. Morris. Were you a member of the Book and Magazine Guild ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; local 18. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Were you a member of the Communist Party 
when you were a member of that union ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; I was. 

Mr. Morris. Could you, from your own experience, testify that the 
Book and Magazine Guild was controlled by the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; I can. 

Mr. Morris. How do you know that? 

Mr. Matusow. All of "the locals, local 16, 18, and a few of the other 
numbers, were located in a building on Twenty-ninth Street, at the 
office of the United Office and Professional Workers of America. 
The leaders of that union I knew to be party members because I at- 
tended the Communist Party meetings with them. The head of the 
local 16, Norman Aronson, some of the business agents, one was Jack 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3841 

Greenspan, a former head of the AYD ; Winifred Norma ; the Com- 
munist Party author, Aaron Kramer, and the head of the pLacement 
bureau or union hiring hall, Ethel Beech. I had had a nuniber of 
meetings with these people in relation to concentration in certain shops 
or places of employment that were under contract to the UOPWA, 
and the Book and Magazine Guild. The policy of the Communist 
Party that was set up by the State Union Committee in New York, 
disseminated to the union and carried forward, was that all organiza- 
tions such as trade-unions that had contracts with UOPWA, all 
political organizations, such as the American Labor Party, the Com- 
munist Party, et cetera 

Senator Ferguson. What others? 

Mr. Matusow\ The American Labor Party, the Progressive Party, 
the Communist Party; all fraternal organizations or nonprofit or- 
ganizations, which IPR fitted in that category and was one of the 
shops or places that were mentioned. They included some direct 
Communist Party fronts, like the Committee for Democratic Far 
Eastern Policy, People's Songs, Inc., Civil Rights Congress, Council 
on African Affairs, Institute of Pacific Relations, et cetera. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you deal with the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations as a front? 

Mr. ]\Iatusow. No ; what I am stating here, I didn't refer to all of 
these organizations as fronts. I am stating that all organizations that 
fit into the category of nonprofit organizations or had dealt in any 
way with anything of a political nature, that the party felt would be 
3 place to infiltrate. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know the Lawyers Guild ? 

Mr. Matusow. No; I had no contact with them. Well, as I say, 
the policy here was that when a vacancy existed in any of these shops, 
that in the 10-day interim period they had to supply somebody to 
fill the vacancy 

Mr. Morris. That is when the employer had the opportunity to fill 
the vacancy. 

Mr. Matusow. Well, the contract, I believe, all of the contracts with 
these organizations had stated that if the union cannot furnish suit- 
able personnel within 10 days, the employer could seek out personnel 
eke where. But the part}' concentration policy was that within that 
10-day period "We shall furnish a Communist Party member to 
that organization." 

Senator Ferguson. You mean to say that the union would come to 
you during that 10 days to supply a Communist Party member? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, they wouldn't directly come to me. 

Senator Ferguson. No, iDut the Communist Party. 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. They would, through certain mem- 
bers in the union, who were in the various youth clubs, for instance, 
or community clubs. Word would be sent down that there was a 
vacancy in a shop, and somebody was needed, and always somebody 
is unemployed to do clerical work, and they would send that person 
up to get employment. 

Senator Ferguson. So that a Communist would get the job. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, and they high-lighted these organi- 
zations that I just mentioned. There were others, but I don't recall 
all of the names of all of the organizations. 



3842 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. So you were endeavoring to get as many Com- 
munist Party members into organizations, charitable and otherwise, 
that were dealing in political questions, like the IPR. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the more Communist members you could 
get into the staff and into the employees, the better off the Communist 
Party would be. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And IPR was one of those unions that you know 
that the Communist Party recommended members to ? 

Mr. Matusow. One of the organizations that the union, through 
the Communist Party, would send party members up to get em- 
ployment. 

Senator Eastland. Was Paul Robeson a Communist? 

Mr. Matusow. I don't know whether he was directly. I did be- 
long to a club with his son, but not with him directly. 

Senator Eastland. His son was a Communist? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What is the son's name ? 

Mr. Matusow. Paul Robeson, Jr. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the publishing firm Little, 
Brown and Co.? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; I am. 

Mr. Morris. They published Solution in Asia. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know of anybody in that organization who is 
a Communist? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; I belonged to a Communist Party club with 
Harry Mclntyre, the son of the former President of Little, Brown. 
I believe Mr. Mclntyre died a few years ago, and Harry Mclntyre was 
one of the main beneficiaries in the will. 

Mr. Morris. It was the son of Harry Mclntyre ? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, we called him Harry Mclntyre. He was 
recruited at Columbia University. 

Mr. Morris. But the son is the one who was a member of the Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr. Matusow. I belonged to a club with the son. 

Mr. Morris. A Communist club ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; a Communist Party youth club on the lower 
East Side of New York. 

Senator Ferguson. If it does not take too long, will you tell us how 
they recruited at the university ? 

Mr. Matusow. In 1945, a fellow named Art Saha, with a few other 
fellows, set up a Marxist study group, not called a Communist Party 
club. That is, using the principles of academic freedom to attract 
students who are interested in learning all sides of the subject. They 
get a number of people in the Marxist study group, and on the basis 
of their appearances there, they would attempt to recruit, and were 
successful in many cases. 

Senator Ferguson. When they recruited you, did they recruit you 
directly as an invitation to join the Communist Party? 

Mr. Matusow. In 1947 ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. In 1947? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3843 

Senator Ferguson. So they used this Marxist club as a kind of a 
front to tell who was interested before they would approach them? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were recruited directly into the 
party 

Mr. Matusow. Not through the Marxist club, but through the AYD, 
on the same principle. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the same principle. Do you know how 
many members there were in New York ? 

Mr. Matusow. W'ell, I know the NYC student section of the Com- 
munist Party, and I got this from a 1948 convention report of the 
Communist Party, New York County, stated 900 students on the 
campuses of New York City schools are members of the party. The 
total city membership was approximately 25,000. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know the publication Science and Society? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; I do. 

Mr. Morris. Was that a Communist publication ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; it was. 

Mr. Morris. How do you know that, Mr. Matusow ? 

Mr. Matusow. Science and Society was a publication that was re- 
quired reading for members of the Communist Party and distributed 
through the party organization rather than solely through the party 
book shops. 

Mr. Morris. Could you tell us what role James S. Allen had in the 
Communist Party? Tell us, based upon your own experience in the 
Party. 

Mr. Matsow. James S. Allen was, and still is, I believe, one of 
the leading theoreticians on the question of minority groups and the 
colonial question. In 1935 or 1936 he wrote a book called Negro 
Question in the United States, which, when I left the party, was be- 
ing revised as a basic text for Negro people. He also wrote a book on 
the reconstruction period, called Reconstruction. He wrote one called, 
I believe. War Minority and Capital. 

Senator Ferguson. Were those books all party -line books ? 

Mr. Matusow. Published by the party, not by any publisher but 
by the party itself. I believe he had a total of eight or nine books pub- 
lished by the Communists over a period of 1935 to the present day. 

Mr. Morris. He was also the foreign editor of the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. And his affiliation with the Com- 
munist Party was as well known to the members of the party and 
people close to the party as that of, for instance, Earl Browder. 

Mr, Morris. Do you think, from your experience in the Communist 
Party, Mr. Matusow, that a man like Fred Field could be active in 
the Communist organization, interested in an organization for 10 
years, without expressing and advocating Communist principles? 

Mr. Matusow. No; he could not. He would have to, sometime in 
that 10 years, advocate Communist principles. In the magazine China 
Today, he did. 

Senator Ferguson. China Today you sold in the book shops. 

Mr. Matusow. No; we didn't. It was mostly for reference mate- 
rial. I had seen and read copies of the book at the Jefferson School 
library. According to this, in 1934, and I believe Mr. Field was one 
of the editors of China Today in 1934 



3844 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Are you testifying now to Frederick Vander- 
bilt Field being a Communist? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. How do you know that? 

Mr. Matusow. When I worked at Communist headquarters at 35 
East Twelfth Street I got that information. I was a full-time em- 
ployee of the Communist Party at one time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that when you people worked 
for the Communist Party, in the positions that you were, that when 
you got that information you relied on it? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, if it came down from a State or a functionary 
of the party, somebody in a position to know, you had to take it on 
its merit. You presumed that a full-time employee or a State officer 
of the Communist Party is not lying about something. If a man 
says to me John Doe is a member of the Communist Party, and he is 
an organizer and has access to membership roles, and so forth, I am 
not going to think he is lying. 

Senator Ferguson. And you are not going to question it? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. How did they catch on that you were giving 
information outside of the party line ? 

Mr. Matusow. They never did. It seemed that in 1948 and 1949, 
I had sold 326 subscriptions to the Sunday Worker in about a 9-week 
period, and they didn't believe it was possible for anybody to do that. 

Senator Ferguson. They did not think that a good Communist 
could be disloyal to the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, they thought I was just too active, and they 
felt that anybody who is too active in the party, doing too much work, 
must have an ulterior motive. It was strictly a matter of witch 
hunting and circumstantial evidence. 

Senator Ferguson. You know, they talk a lot about witch hunting 
outside. They talk about witch hunts here in Washington, of trying 
to discover or disclose who are Communists in the United States Gov- 
ernment. They use that expression, do they not? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you Communists use it in your own organ- 
ization. 

Mr. Matusow. No; they never did. I am using it because that is 
actually what it is. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did they try to ferret out disloyal mem- 
bers to the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes ; they did. But in most cases, when they booted 
somebody out of the party, they very seldom had anything to base 
it on. 

Senator Ferguson. I thought you said in the beginning they were 
always trying to ferret out disloyal members. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And trying to ascertain whether or not they 
may be spies in their own organization. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what method did they have to discover 
spies ? 

Mr. Matdsow. Well, they took a quote from one of Lenin's docu- 
ments where it says that anybody who is too active or works very hard, 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3845 

you know, over and above that of the normal party members, is some- 
body who you might suspect because usually he is the agent provo- 
cateur. 

Senator Ferguson. That is how they found you. That is, they got 
suspicious of you. 

Mr. Matusow. Right. 

Senator Ferguson. Because you did something over and above the 
line of duty, did they not? 

Mr. Matusow. They called it that; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And they thought that because you had sold — 
how many? 

Mr. Matusow. 326, in 9 weeks. 

Senator Ferguson. 326 subscriptions, that you came, probably you 
did come, within the definition of a saboteur. 

Mr. Matusow. Or somebody who would be looked upon with sus- 
picion. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and that is how they really discovered 
and got you out ? 

Mr. Matusow. One of the things. They also found in my library 
some issues of the Communist Party organ Political Affairs that I 
had purchased in a second-hand bookshop, that had the stamp of the 
Office of Strategic Services on the front cover. There were six 
covers. In fact, I was working in Communist Party headquarters 
at the time, and picked them up in a second-hand bookshop, next 
door to Communist Party headquarters. That was in 1948, and I 
brought them up to party headquarters, and showed them to a few 
people and we had a good laugh about it. But in 1951, somebody 
brought that up to me. 

Senator Ferguson. And said that because you had them, they dis- 
counted the fact that you actually bought them in a second-hand 
bookshop and thought you had them from the OSS? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. Then they claimed that I was get- 
ting a disability compensation from the Government for injuries sus- 
tained in the last war, which I was. But they didn't believe that. 
They thought I was getting income from somebody else. 

Senator Ferguson. Eather than from the Government? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. So they have a means of checking on the loyalty 
of their members. 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, and they maintain dossiers on most of the 
membership. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they find these in your library ? Had they 
gone into your library ? 

Mr. Matusow. I had brought them up to party headquarters 
when I bought them, and I imagine somebody up there made a 
note of it, and put it on file, and 2 years later it was brought out on 
charges. 

Senator Ferguson. Then there is quite a bit of suspicion among 
members of the Communist Party as to whether or not there is 
disloyalty in the party itself. 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, sir; and there was another charge, and they 
stated that I committed an act of white chauvinism and the charge 
was that I was working for a Negro newspaper, Amsterdam News 
in New York, and because I was working for a Negro group, I was 



3846 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

keeping a Neg^o out of a job, for a short period of time, and that I 
was not contributing to the working class or to the class struggle, 
because I worked for this anti-Negro newspaper. 

Senator Ferguson. It was a Negro newspaper. 

Mr. Matusow. Yes; it was the Amsterdam News and because I 
worked for that newspaper that was opposed to the struggles and the 
jBghts of the Negro people. 

Senator Ferguson. But it was still a Negro newspaper? 

Mr. Matusow. And I recall the person who made that charge, 
and I said, "What did he do?" and he said he sewed mink coats in 
the garment district of New York. 

Senator Ferguson. When they suspended you, did they give you a 
trial ? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, a good kangaroo court. 

Senator Ferguson. Tell us something about the trial, how did they 
try you ? 

Mr. Matusow. I was called up to Communist Party headquarters 
and sat in the back room on the twelfth floor, at 35 West Twelfth 
Street. This former New York policeman and Communist Party 
member conducted the interrogation along the lines that I just men- 
tioned, "Were you an OSS agent, where clo you get your money, how 
much money does your father have, how much money does your mother 
have. Did you sell so many subscription to the Daily Worker, how 
come you were able to do that?" At the end of the meeting, I said, 
"What are the specific charges?" They said, "There are none." I 
said, "What are they?" and they said they can't say. "You tell us." 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a lawyer ? 

Mr. Matusow. No, it doesn't exist in the party. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it an open hearing? 

Mr. Matusow. No. 

Senator Ferguson. How many people were at the trial ? 

Mr. Matusow. Two. 

Senator Ferguson. The two you mentioned ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. And anybody else present? 

Mr. Matusow. Nobody. 

Senator Ferguson. Just the three of you ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And at the end, what happened ? 

Mr. Matusow. They told me if I know what is good for me, I better 
stay away from Communist meetings and Communist groups or I 
might get into some trouble, and at that point I picked up my hat and 
stole away. 

Senator Ferguson. They announced the verdict right there. 

Mr. Matusow. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. The policeman and the other man ? 

Mr. Matusow. Just one of them, Joe Bucholt. 

Senator Ferguson. What was his connection with the party? 

Mr. Matusow. He was a State organizer of the Labor Youth League 
and a State chairman of the Communist Youth movement in New York 
State. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he announce the verdict? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes, he did. And then it was announced in the Daily 
Worker about 5 days later. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3847 

Senator Ferguson. What did it say in the Daily Worker ? 

Mr. Matusow. That I was expelled from the Communist Party for 
being an "enemy agent." I had engaged in irregularities in the sub- 
scription drive in 1949. I had just come back from the Southwest. 
They gave a description of me, and that was all. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you call an official ouster ? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. On the basis of that, I was thrown 
out of a few meetings since. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you tried to get back into some meetings? 

Mr. Matusow. I attended a few. I attended one 2 months ago, 
in Ohio, 

Senator Ferguson. What happened to you there? 

Mr. Matusow. I got away with it until I testified before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities, and they found out who I 
was and were very unhappy about it. I tried covering the founding 
convention of the National Negro Labor Council, for the Dayton 
News; tried to cover that meeting. As soon as I arrived, I was in- 
formed that since I was expelled from the Communist Party, I could 
not cover the meeting of the National Negro Labor Council, which 
is supposedly a non-Communist group. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have to have any particular method 
of getting into these Communist meetings ? 

Mr. Matusow. Well, if you walk in and know their terminology 
and when to laugh and when to be mad, you can get away with it, 
if they don't know your face. 

Senator Ferguson. But you have to know the party line to sit in 
there? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And you have been able to use the right smile 
or the right anger and so forth, to stay in some of the meetings? 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think this will help you with the Com- 
munists, this meeting here this morning? It is public. 

Mr. Matusow. I don't think it will hurt me, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You may have a hard time getting in their 
meetings ; is that it ? 

Mr. Matusow. I doubt it. 

Senator Ferguson. You think you can still get in some ? 

Mr. Matusow. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. You appreciate that you are under oath here. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that what you are saying here about certain 
people is under oath. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that what you say about their work is 
under oath. 

Mr. Matusow. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. And you want to leave the record stand now just 
as it is? 

Mr. Matusow. Right again, sir. 

Mr. Morris. No further questions. 

Senator Eastland. Thank you, sir. 

We will recess. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 35 a. m. the subcommittee recessed subject to 
the call of the Chair.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS 



WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1952 

United States Seis^ate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF THE Internal, Security Act and Other Internal. 

Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 :15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding. 

Present: Senators Eastland, Watkins, and Ferguson. 

Also present : Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin 
Mandel, research director. 

Senator Watkins. The committee will be in session. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Greene, will you be sworn. 

Senator Watkins. Stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear 
the testimony you will give in the matter now pending before the sub- 
committee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will 
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mr. Greene. I do. 

Senator Watkins. You may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF JEROME D. GEEENE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CHAIR- 
MAN, AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 
1929-33, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that Mr. 
Greene has been called here today at the suggestion of the institute as 
a person who has known the institute for many years and who, accord- 
ing to the institute, is in a position to testify before this inquiry today. 

Senator Watkins. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have a statement that you would like to put in 
the record? 

Mr. Greene. Yes, and I would like to read it. 

Mr. Morris. You would like to read it? 

Mr. Greene. I would like to read it, yes. It will take about 6 
minutes, I suppose. 

Senator Watkins. Proceed. 

Mr. Morris. That is perfectly all right. You go ahead, Mr. Greene. 

Mr. Greene. The heading of my statement states the offices I have 
held in the Institute of Pacific Relations which is my main competence 
to speak. Some of my experience in various positions I have held in 
the meantime have a bearing on it, and I wonder if you would like 

3849 



3850 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

me to go into my previous experience at all and the positions I have 
held or not. 

Senator Watkins. As background, Mr. Greene, I think if you 
want to give us a brief outline. We don't want to spend too much 
time on it. 

Mr. Greene. My interest in the Far East is primarily due to the 
fact that I was born there. My father was a Christian missionary in 
Japan. I lived there in my boyhood. I came home to go to school and 
college. After a considerable period at Harvard in administrative 
posts I became manager of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Re- 
search. Later I was the chief executive and organized the Rockefeller 
Foundation. I was in there for 4 years. Then I went into the bank- 
ing business for 15 years, during which I made four trips to the Far 
East and had a considerable acquaintance with people out there. I 
might say in particular that I had dealings with five members of the 
Japanese Cabinet, three of whom were Prime Ministers, one was Min- 
ister of Finance, all assassinated because they stood in the way of mili- 
tarist demands which culminated at Pearl Harbor. 

On returning after 15 years, in 1932, to my great surprise I was 
invited to serve as professor of international politics at the Univer- 
sity College of Wales in England, a position for which I felt no quali- 
fication because I had not had the discipline and training of a scholar, 
but I was told they didn't want a pundit, they wanted somebody who 
was familiar as a businessman with political conditions, which have to 
be considered in connection with national credits. 

Senator Watkins. You are an American, are you not? 

Mr. Greene. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. A natural-born citizen ? 

Mr. Greene. I vote for President. Many people think the Consti- 
tution says that you have to be a native citizen. It doesn't. It says 
you have to be a natural-born citizen. I am a natural-born citizen. 

Senator Watkins. Anyway, you are a citizen and did not come in 
by naturalization. 

Mr. Greene. No ; I did not. 

Senator Watkins. I just asked that because when you suggested 
they asked you over to Wales to be a professor over there that was 
something rather extraordinary; was it not? 

Mr. Greene. Well, as a matter of fact, I think they were very 
anxious to have an American. The chair that I held was founded by a 
rich Welshman, Lord Davis, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson, and 
he called the chair the Woodrow Wilson Professorship of Interna- 
tional Politics, so there was perhaps a certain propriety in my being 
there. 

I then came back and I have been in various trusteeships in Boston, 
which have kept me busy, but I consider myself retired. 

Mr. Morris. Professor, would you like to read your statement? 

Mr. Greene. I would like to ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Yes, by all means. 

Mr. Greene. I think I can be most helpful to the subcommittee in 
its inquiry into the conduct of the Institute of Pacific Relations by 
a statem.ent of the origin, purposes, and activities of the institute, as 
to which my testimony as one of its founders may be considered com- 
petent. As a matter of fact, I wrote the constitution in 1927. My 
most active connection with the institute was limited to the period 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3851 

from 1927 to 1933. In 1932 I went to Great Britain for 2 years, except 
for a brief return to the United States to attend the institute's con- 
ference in 1933 at Banff. On returning to this country in 1934 I 
moved my residence from New York to Cambridge. I continued as 
a trustee and a member of the executive committee and attended 
meetings until 1939. After that it became impossible for me to attend 
meetings regularly and I therefore resigned. I continued, however, 
to keep fairly well informed about the institute's activities and publi- 
cations. In a general way, not in a detailed way. 

A group of public-spirited persons in Honolulu and the Pacific 
coast, alarmed by the bitterness of nationalistic feeling and the ap- 
parent conflict of national interests in the countries bordering the 
Pacific, felt that something should be done to promote international 
understanding and thus avert a crisis that might lead to war. Let us 
])ut an end, they said, to making faces at each other and exchanging 
verbal recriminations from opposite sides of the Pacific, and instead 
organize periodic conferences at which unofficial but competent people 
from different countries can sit round a table and try to reconcile 
their divergent interests by frank discussion leading to mutual en- 
lightenment, if not agreement. 

The decision to try such an experiment in the promotion of mutual 
understanding and good will was made at a preliminary conference 
held in Honolulu in 1925, which I did not attend, with members from 
the American mainland, Hawaii, China, Japan, Korea, the Philip- 
pines, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The meeting demon- 
strated so well the advantages of such a conference that it was decided 
to form a national group in each country and at a second conference, 
2 years later, to form a federation of such groups in an international 
body. The national groups were duly formed in advance of the 1927 
conference, with the addition of a group from Great Britain, and 
each came prepared with papers on matters of timely importance 
(121 in all) which were circulated to all members of the conference 
and furnished reference material for the discussions. Observers at- 
tended from the League of Nations and the International Labor 
Office. 

While national antagonisms were not without some emotional ex- 
pression, particularly by the Japanese and Chinese, the discussions 
were held under admirable restraint and exhibited a degree of mutual 
forbearance and good will that fully realized the hopes of the mem- 
bers. The greatest importance was attached to research and publica- 
tion both by the national groups and under the auspices of an inter- 
national research committee. Not the least important byproduct of 
the conference was the formation of acquaintances and friendships 
among the participants. 

Thus a pattern was set for future conferences, and before adjourn- 
ment a constitution was adopted providing for the establishment of 
a Pacific Council consisting of one member from each national group 
and having charge of the institute's affairs between conferences, to 
call conferences, and to secure the funds needed for the conferences 
and for the international research committee. I had the honor of 
presiding over the Pacific Council from 1929 to 1931, having suc- 
ceeded Dr. Wilbur and being in turn succeeded by Newton D. Baker. 
With the foregoing statements as my background, I shall give the re- 
sult of my experience and observation as regards the integrity of the 



3852 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

institute in adhering to its exclusive aims of competent, disinterested 
research, of fact-finding in the areas of possible conflict, and of con- 
ference in which divergent views could be frankly expressed and 
efforts made to reconcile them. 

To guard against any temptation for the institute as such to espouse 
one side of an international dispute, whether as between nations or 
as between political, economic, or social theories, the rule was estab- 
lished from the beginning and strictly adhered to that no resolutions 
should ever be passed concerning such matters. Neither the institute 
nor anyone purporting to speak for it could advocate one international 
or domestic policy or another. It merely sought to make available 
to the public in the several countries the facts bearing on a dispute, 
including such national or individual divergences of opinion or inter- 
est as a dispassionate judgment would take into account. 

The record of research, publication, and conference during the past 
25 years reveals many differences of opinion, not only between na- 
tional groups but also between individuals in the same group. In the 
publications of the institute the sole responsibility for opinions ex- 
pressed and facts presented has rested in the authors. This wise 
policy has also been adopted by other private research organizations 
and is admirably expressed in every issue of that distinguished quar- 
terly. Foreign Affairs, as follows : 

The articles in Foreign Affairs do not represent any consensus of beliefs. 
We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the senti- 
tnents they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others ; 
but we hold that by keeping clear of mere vagaries, Foreign Affairs can do more 
to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than 
it can be identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for 
the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which ajppears in its 
pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to 
appear there. 

Similar disclaimers are applied to all publications of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

As a citizen I would deplore any evidence that the Institute of 
Pacific Relations or any other organization either purposely or as a 
tool of a foreign power attempted to influence or control the policy 
of our Government. As one of the founders of the institute I would 
be shocked and humiliated by any evidence that it had thus betrayed 
its fundamental ideals. The hundreds of members of the institute 
in all parts of this country, representing every variety of political and 
economic views, and united only in their confidence in its spirt and 
methods, would not tolerate such a betrayal if they had grounds for 
suspecting it. I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been 
impaired. 

Senator Watkins. Let me ask you a question at that point, Mr. 
Greene. "I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been im- 
paired." In other words, if that means what it seems to mean, you 
have examined all the evidence and you have given the institute a 
complete clearance and acquittal of any accusations of any kind. 

Mr. Greene. I can't say that I have made an examination of every- 
thing that has been published and written, but I have kept fairly 
close track of the adherence to the general policy that I have men- 
tioned. I may say that yesterday I went through the minutes during 
the years when I was less in contact with the institute, and time and 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3853 

again the caution was insisted upon that the institute as such took 
no position on any question whatever, political or economic. 

Senator Watkins. When you say "I have seen no evidence that their 
confidence has been impaired" 

Mr. Greene. I mean by that if they had done what has been al- 
leged, there would have been any number of members, including my- 
self, who would have made the most violent protest. 

Senator Watkins. If you had known it, I do not think there is 
any doubt about it. If you had known that some things were going 
on, for instance, which have been called to the attention of this com- 
mittee, you probably would have protested. 

Mr. Greene. I don't know whether I would have protested or not. 
It depends on what it was. 

Senator Watkins. Have you read the evidence before this 
committee ? 

Mr. Greene. I have read some of it. I don't know whether I would 
have protested or not because I think some of the things which may 
have been objected to in this committee are things which represent 
a legitimate or at least a frank divergence of opinion. That is one 
thing which the institute stands for all the time, the freedom to ex- 
press their opinions. 

Senator Watkins. Some of the evidence may have been of that 
character, but I liave listened to a great deal of it and I am trying to 
catch up on the reading of tliis evidence, and it seems to me that there 
is something there which certainly requires explanation. 

Mr. Greene. I think I perhaps cover that a little bit by what I 
say further. 

Senator Watkins. When you said "I have seen no evidence," I 
wondered just how far you had gone, if you had read the complete 
hearings. 

Mr. Greene. There would have been a very general protest by the 
membership at a departure from what they all recognize as funda- 
mental principles. That does not mean that the institute controls 
the utterances of every individual ever connected with it. It didn't 
mean that. But it meant that the institute as an institute was very 
careful to protect the integrity of its fundamental principles as I have 
outlined them. 

Senator Watkins. Just how close were you to the operations of the 
Insitute of Pacific Relations after you were president? Were you 
a member of the board of trustees ? 

Mr. Greene. I was a member of the board of trustees I think until 
1940. Up to that time, up to 19,39, I attended with some regularity. 
After that I found that I could not, and I resigned for that reason. 

Senator Watkins. How often did you meet? 

Mr. Greene. I think the executive committee met, I think, once a 
month. 

Senator Watkins. Did you meet with them once a month? 

]Mr. Greene. I met with them occasionally but not regularly. 

Senator Watkins. Where did they meet? 

Mr. Greene. Tliey met in New York. 

Senator Watkins. Could you tell us about how much of the time — 
because this has something to do with what you have said there and 
probably what you will say. I would like to get the background in 



3854 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the record of just how close to the operation of this association you 
were during this period of years. 

Mr, Greene. I was living in Boston. I wasn't living in New York. 
I wasn't dropping into the office all the time. I didn't pretend to 
have that kind of familiarity. But at the meetings that I did attend 
I learned what decisions were before them and what publications 
were in prospect or had been completed. There was no shred of evi- 
dence that there was anything there inconsistent with what we were 
aiming to do. 

I confess an element in my confidence was my confidence in some 
of my colleagues. I mention that later here. 

Senator Watkins. Just which ones? 

Mr. Greene. I place it first in Mr. Holland. I think that the com- 
mittee has got to weigh, as I have said later here, the perfectly patent 
integrity of people who are testifying before it as against allegations 
and insinuations by some of your witnesses 

Senator Watkins. Tliere have been of course witnesses here 



Mr. Greene. Who have nothing like the record and reputation that 
these people have. 

Senator Watkins. That may be true, but at the same time if you 
are investigating a matter of this kind that has to do with the secu- 
rity of the United States, you know that you can't for instance get 
people who are operating in an apparatus like the Communists have 
had here who probably have the best reputation. They wouldn't 
have. The only way you can get any evidence of what was going on 
is by some of the men themselves telling you about it. 

Mr. Greene. I deal with one instance of that later on in my paper, 
if you will allow me. 

Senator Watkins. I want to find out just how much contact you 
had with the actual operations of this group. I would like to ask 
you this : Is it not a fact that the principal activities of the associa- 
tion were turned over, that is, the carrying out of the policies was 
turned over to the executive secretary ? 

Mr. Greene. Naturally, yes; any executive is supposed 

Senator Watkins. He was given rather wide latitude, rather wide 
powers to go ahead and carry out the policies as he interpreted them. 

Mr. Greene. So long as he had the confidence of his employers. 

Senator Watkins. During the time that you were president who 
was the executive secretary ? 

Mr. Greene. In 1931 Mr. Edward Carter became secretary general. 
I can't remember when his term expired or when his tenure expired. 

Senator Watkins. Then who followed him during the time you had 
direct contact with the association? 

Mr. Greene. I think Mr. Lockwood was secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Barnes became secretary up until 1934. 

Mr. Greene. Yes. 

Mr. Morris, And then Mr. Field was secretary, 

Mr, Greene, Yes, I can't remember those dates. I knew Barnes 
pretty well. 

Senator Watkins. During each of these secretaries you were in 
close touch, attending these executive meetings that you have spoken 
of? 

Mr. Greene. I saw them occasionally ; yes. 

Senator Watkins. Occasionally. How often? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3855 

Mr, Greene. I don't want to overstress my familiarity with it. The 
main point of my paper is to bring out the fact that nothing ever hap- 
pened to my knoAvledge to change the poHcy of the responsible people 
who were the trustees. I am dealing later in this statement with what 
may have been done by people who had some connection with the 
institute which didn't in the least affect that general policy of the 
trustees. 

Senator Watkins. Do you not concede that it would be possible for 
a subversive movement to infiltrate if they tried, an organization of 
this kind which was left largely to one or two men to operate ? 

Mr. Gkeene. I can imagine their trying it, yes; and I can also 
imagine their being very much disappointed in the results. 

Senator Watkins. We will see as you go on. I thought maybe in 
support of this statement you made you could outline how 

Mr. Greene. I have seen no evidence of it. 

Senator Watkins. You probably haven't, and maybe a good many 
other people haven't, because they were not in contact with it. 

Mr. Greene. I wish most emphatically to place on the record with 
this committee my conviction that the institute has not departed from 
its declared principles. No evidence that it has can be construed from 
the extreme views or misconduct of individuals, or from that "Broad 
hospitality to divergent ideas" which is not only accepted, but stoutly 
defended. On the other hand, no one whose conduct or writing is 
open to a serious question of subservience to a foreign power or of ad- 
vocating the overthrow of our Government by violence has the slight- 
est claim to immunity because of a connection with the IPR or any 
other organization. That is individual responsibility and deserves 
the strictest scrutiny by law enforcement agencies. 

As regards American policy toward China, it is not easy to say, even 
with the advantage of hindsight, just what it should have been. An 
overconfident judgment on that point betrays ignorance rather than 
political insight. For the problem has been a baffling one at every 
stage, and still is. The problem of mutual understanding between cul- 
tures, manners, and methods of thought and action as far apart as 
those of China and the United States is a formidable one. That is one 
of the many problems that the Institute of Pacific Relations set itself 
to study; but what remains to be learned and to penetrate popular 
understanding is vast compared with the little that has been learned. 
But of one thing we can be sure ; the technique of independent research 
and conference is right. 

Your committee has been concerned about the possibility of Com- 
munist infiltration in the staff or among writers of IPR publications. 
This raises two questions; first, has there been any such infiltration; 
and second, if so is there any evidence that has compromised the insti- 
tute's fundamental policy of abstaining from expressing, or even for- 
mulating, corporate judgments or actions in favor of or against gov- 
ernmental action ? 

As for infiltration I do not exclude the possibility that it has been 
attempted. Its results must have been disappointing to any who 
made the attempt. For I know no evidence that the institute has ever 
succumbed to any such insidious influence that may secretly have been 
brought to bear on it. 

At this point I should like to interpolate some observations bearing 
on the much-discussed question of guilt by association. During the 

88348— 52— pt. 11 10 



3856 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

period following our recognition of the Soviet Government, when the 
iron curtain was less tightly drawn than it is today, many Americans, 
and especially so-called young liberals, cherished the vain hope that 
by promoting friendly contacts between the American people and the 
Eussian people and by making an open-minded study of the workings 
of the Communist system, national antagonisms might be softened. 
Some went so far as to make the Soviet Government regard them as 
friends in a political sense and thus as possible tools of Soviet policy. 

The Stalin-Hitler alliance destroyed the illusions of most of these 
young people, but the record of their Russian contacts remained to 
plague them. The question of their guilt by association can be justly 
considered only in the light of their subsequent behavior when the 
sinister implications of fellow traveling along the Communist line 
gained a clearer significance. These young people and some of their 
elders may have been suckers for Soviet propaganda, but they were no 
more fooled than were the Russians who had counted on them as tools 
of Soviet intrigue. Yet their credibility as loyal Americans today 
seems often to have been less accepted than that of Communist turn- 
coats whose guilt by association was that of admitted traitors. 

If I may, I would like to say I am tempted to adopt a verse of Scrip- 
ture by saying there seems to be more joy in the heaven of Washing- 
ton investigation authorities over one avowed American Communist 
or foreign spy, who has professed conversion to democratic ideals 
than over 90 and 9, whether once taken in by Soviet deception or not, 
who always were and still are loyal Americans. 

Communists love confessions, whether it be to justify the punish- 
ment of their political victims or to save their own skins. 

Mr. MoRRi«. That is not part of your statement. 

Mr. Greene. No. 

Senator Watkins. Are you adopting that? Did somebody else 
say that ? 

Mr. Greene. No, sir; I thought of that after I had finished my 
speech. 

Senator Watkins. So you want to make that part of your state- 
ment ? 

Mr. Greene. Yes. 

So far as the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned, I do not 
believe that in the staff or among the members there were any indi- 
viduals, whatever their relations with Russians or with subversive 
organizations may have been alleged to be, who succeeded, if they 
tried, in deflecting the institute by a hair's breadth from its princi- 
ples as I have stated them. Even in the case of Frederick V. Field, 
who ceased to be employed by the IPR in 1940 and was requested in 
1947 to resign from the board of trustees, when his commitment to the 
Communist line became manifest, long before the present investiga- 
tion, his earlier excellent services in administration and research 
showed nothing but complete fidelity to the corporate policies of the 
institute. He was the author of an economic handbook of the Pacific, 
an objective, scholarly, and authoritative work. During the period 
of my most frequent association with Field, especially in connection 
with three IPR conferences, I admired his industry, ability, and liked 
him personally. I was subsequently pained and shocked by his de- 
fection, almost as a father would feel whose "Son had betrayed his 
confidence. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3857 

I have spoken above of the young so-called liberals who were be- 
guiled into interest in, or sympathy with, communism. Their rad- 
icalism contained two elements. The first, and I think the dominant 
one, was a revolt against reactionary attitudes and against baing ex- 
pected to accept ready-made economic and social doctrines. They 
were determined to be critical and to think for themselves. It was 
often a rather callow and juvenile attitude deserving a tolerant 
sympahty rather than contempt. Nothink did more to goad and 
confirm it than the intolerance and stand-patism of some of their 
elders. The manifestation of the latter qualities, in niy opinion, tends 
to produce more pinks and reds than all Moscow's efforts in that di- 
rection, which the common sense of the American people can be 
trusted to reject. Most of us are prone to take the radicalism of 
young people too seriously. It is something like measles, from which 
most of them recover. 

The second element in youthful radicalism is youthful idealism. 
This is its saving grace, and a failure to recognize it tends rather to 
confirm than to cure the radicalism. 

The inclusion of Russia, having obviously large territorial interests 
in the Pacific area, in the international body of the Institute of Pa- 
cific Relations at a time when she had diplomatic relations with all 
the other countries concerned, was a matter of elementary fairness and 
common sense. An organization for the study of international rela- 
tions in the Pacific that left out of account Russia could not pretend 
to be making a comprehensive or realistic study of the area. The 
Russians had to be offered membership. In 1929, on my way to the 
IPR conference in Kyoto, Japan, I went by way of Moscow for the 
express purpose of asking the Soviet authorities to permit an unoffi- 
cial group of Russians to attend the Kyoto conference. I went first 
to the head of the official Society for Cultural Relations and was re- 
ferred by him to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinoff. 
He was civil, not not too cordial. "My colleagues," he said, "do not 
like going to international conferences only to be treated like pariahs." 
But quickly he added, "though personally I find it stimulating." He 
finally consented to allow two Soviet newspaper correspondents in 
Japan to attend the conference as observers. At the same time, how- 
ever, an official Soviet newspaper denounced the institute as a tool of 
Wall Street imperialists. 

Before the following conference held in Shanghai in 1931 the for- 
mation of a Soviet unit of the institute was authorized but no dele- 
gates were sent to that conference. It was hardly surprising that 
Russian participation in the institute amounted to little and was 
abandoned in 1939. The pattern of unofficial representation was 
hardly to be appreciated by a country whose citizens were not free to 
express their own opinions. Free discussion violated the most sacred 
of Soviet principles. 

In conclusion allow me to express the hope that in weighing the 
testimony heard in this investigation so far as it relates to the in- 
tegrity of the Institute of Pacific Relations, your honorable committee 
will give due weight to the matter of the integrity of its most res])on- 
sible leaders, witli whom I have felt it an honor to be associated — Ray 
Lyman "Wilbur, NeAvton D. Baker, Cary L. Alsberg, Pliilip C. Jessup, 
. and Robert G. Sproul. Not one of them would have tolerated the 



3858 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

slightest departure from those principles for which the institute has 
always stood and without which it could have made no claim on their 
interest and support. Integrity and loyalty, after all, are factors in 
the light of which irresponsible charges and malicious innuendoes 
have little weight in unprejudiced minds. 

Mr. MoREis. Mr. Greene, how much of the proceedings before this 
committee have you read? 

Mr. Greene. I liave glanced through I think a couple of volumes. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

Mr. Greene. I don't pretend to be familiar with them at all. 

Mr. Morris. You served on the nominating committee of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations in the year 1941, did you not, Mr. Greene ? 

Mr. Greene. Probably ; if that says so. 

Mr. Morris. Is that the last time you served ? 

Mr. Greene. I think so ; yes. It must have been. 

Mr. Morris. I am going to offer you this, which is a list of staff 
members and the make-up of the nominating committee in 1941, Mr. 
Greene. 

The nominating committee in 1941 was made up of Miss Harriet 
Moore, chairman; Frederick V. Field; and you, Jerome D. Greene. 
We also have ex officio Edward C. Carter and Ray Lyman Wilbur. 
Can you recall that particular meeting, Mr. Greene? 

Mr. Greene. No; I certainly cannot. I must have been very de- 
pendent on my colleagues to suggest names of people that I didn't 
know. Some of them I did know. 

Mr. Morris. What was the function of the nominating committee 
to your recollection? 

Mr. Greene. It was to prepare a list of nominations for action by 
the trustees. 

Mr. Morris. Does this not indicate that Miss Moore, Mr. Field, and 
yourself made up a list of officers to serve ? 

Mr. Greene. I think so; yes. I don't know how far Mr. Carter 
and Mr. Wilbur made suggestions. 

Mr. Morris. Were the ex officio members actually present, do you 
know ? 

Mr. Greene. I suppose so ; but I don't know that Dr. Wilbur was. 
I suppose Carter must have been ; I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. You cannot recall this particular meeting? 

Mr. Greene. I don't recall it particularly; no. These things are 
pretty formal things. A list of names is gotten together. Somebody 
draws up a list. Then somebody makes suggestions of additions or 
omissions. Then we agree, and the thing is done. That was 11 years 
ago. I don't remember. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Greene, we have had testimony from several wit- 
nesses that both Miss Moore and Mr. Field were Communists. We 
brought both Miss Moore and Mr. Field down to answer the charges, 
and both of them elected to refuse to answer the question whether or 
not they had been Communists, on the grounds that their answer 
would incriminate them. 

Mr. Greene. I am ashamed of them for doing so. 

Mr. Morris. Then as we look at this nominating committee in 1941, 
which is made up of Miss Moore, Mr. Field, and yourself, with the 
two ex officio members, do you think it is possible that they in the light 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3859 

of that evidence which I have just mentioned could have exercised 
some Communist influence on the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Greene. I think the best judgment as to that would be formed 
hT somebody who is familiar with the persons nominated. 

Mr. Morris. You were present, though, Mr. Greene, at this meeting 
of the nominating committee. 

Mr. Greene. I can't pretend that I knew everybody on the list. 

Mr. Morris. I am just talking about the nominating committee 
there. According to this list. Miss Harriet Moore, chairman, Fred- 
erick V. Field, Jerome D. Greene, Edward C. Carter, ex officio, Ray 
Lyman Wilbur, ex officia. 

Mr. Greene. Now, the question is. Whom did they nominate ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. We have the list here. 

Mr. Greene. I w^ould have to be shown that list to refresh my 
memory. 

Mr. Marks. We have a list here, Mr. Morris, of people they nom- 
inated. 

Mr. Greene. The chairman was Ray Lyman Wilbur, the vice chair- 
man Miss Ada L. Comstock, then William R. Herod, Philip C. Jessup, 
Benjamin H. Kizer, Philo W. Parker, Robert Gordon Sproul, acting 
secretary Edward C. Carter, assistant secretary Miss Katrine R. C. 
Greene, treasurer Francis S. Harmon, Mrs. Rose W. Landres. I can't 
read any infiltration into that list. 

Mr. Morris. The question, though, Mr. Greene, is do you think in 
view of the testimony we have had about Miss Moore and Mr. Field 
who were your associates on this nominating committee, that it is 
possible in view of that evidence that they may have caused some 
Communist influence to have been brought into the institute? 

Mr. Greene. No. Quite the contrary. I think it is a manifestation 
of the fact that whatever leanings they may have had in that direction, 
which I suppose would develop progressively during that general 
period, had no visible effect in the direction of infiltration or affecting 
the make-up of the slate of officers. To me it is a very gratifying 
evidence. I will admit that from your point of view it looks mighty 
suspicious. Miss Moore refused to answer, Mr. Field refused to 
answer. But as a matter of fact those people were perfectly capable 
of understanding the limitations of qualities for membership in the 
institute and observed those limitations. 

Mr. Morris. I draw your attention to the secretariat at that time, 
Mr. Greene. I made a list of that on that same page. Did you know 
Mr. Chen Han-seng in the secretariat of that year ? 

Mr. Greene. No. Would you like me to tell you who I did know ? 

Mr. Morris. No. This is the secretariat now. Do you know what 
the function of the secretariat was in the IPR ? 

Mr. Greene. It was a staff to which the general secretary assigned 
various jobs of publication, research, and various administrative 
things. They were the staff, the method by which the general secre- 
tary carried out his work. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Marks, do you have a question ? 

Mr. Marks. The secretary to which you are referrmg is the Pacific 
council, the international council. I believe Mr. Greene's associa- 
tions were with the American council, is that correct, Mr. Greene? 
So we wouldn't 

Mr. Greene. Yes ; the American council. 



3860 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. Cannot the witness explain? Does he under- 
stand ? 

Mr. Marks. I am sorry, I was just going to suggest that it is 11 
years ago and he might not recall 

Senator Watkins. He can say so. 

Mr. Marks. All right. 

Senator Watkins. In court or anywhere else the witness does his 
own testifying. 

Mr. Morris. Your point, Mr. Marks, is that this is the international 
secretariat. 

Mr. Marks. I think that is right. You can ask him the question. 

Mr. Morris. Where was the international secretariat lodged, Mr. 
Greene ? 

Mr. Greene. At that time in New York. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Did you have any experience with the people 
mentioned on this list of the secretariat ? 

Mr. Greene. This list that you gave me ? . 

Mr. Morris. Yes; the secretariat list. That was in the same year 
these people served on the secretariat and, as Mr. Marks pointed 
out, it is of the international council. 

Mr. Greene. I remember Miss Austem, Ruth Carter, P. E. Cor- 
bett — is that the Corbett, of Portland, Ore. ? 

Mr. Lockwood. No. 

Mr. Morris. The point is, Mr. Greene, if you feel any of those 
people were Communists at the time. 

Mr. Greene. I certainly did not; no. Nobody had any anxieties 
on that point at that time, I can assure you. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that four of those people are now in 
Red China? 

Mr. Greene. No ; I don't know that. 

Mr. Morris. Several of them are officials of the Red Chinese Gov- 
ernment. 

Mr. Greene. I will depend on you for that information. 

Mr. Morris. I think that is all in our hearings here, Mr. Greene. 
I don't like to supply information. I should only ask you questions. 

Did you know, for instance, that Y. Y. Hsu, Chen Han-seng, and 
Ch'ao-ting Chi are now three officials of the Chinese Communist 
government? Shouldn't that give us reason to believe that perhaps 
these people were exercising a Communist influence on the Institute 
of Pacific Relations at that time ? 

Mr. Greene. I can see no sign of it. Even in the case of Field, 
as long as he was there, there is not the slightest evidence that he 
was working in that direction. His final defection, as I recall it, 
came as a shock and a grief to everybody. 

Mr. Morris. You did not closely supervise the work of these 
people, though ? 

Mr. Greene. No. 

Mr. Morris. You know, for instance, that Michael Greenberg has 
been identified as a Communist here. As I said, Harriet Moore. And 
Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is now over in Red China. 

Mr. Greene. By identified, you mean proved to be? 

Mr. Morris. People who were in the Communist movement to- 
gether with them and who have abandoned the Communist move- 
ment have so testified. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3861 

Mr. Greene. Yes. The testimony I suppose is unequivocably ac- 
curate ? 

Mr. Morris. We don't know. 

Mr. Greene. The strong presumption is against the character of 
the witnesses affecting the work that the IPR carried on under these 
auspices. 

Senator Watkins. I will say to you that some of these witnesses 
have testified in the courts of the United States and they liave been 
believed by juries and they have been used by the prosecuting arm 
of the Government as genuine witnesses wlio were telling the truth. 
So when you say that the presumption is against them, I think that 
may be in your mind, but the fact of the matter is that the Government 
has taken an entirely different position. 

Mr. Greene. I am not passing upon the guilt or innocence of those 
people. I am talking about the effect upon the policies of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. 

Senator Watkins. You were characterizing these people, and I am 
just calling your attention to the fact that the presumption is not 
against them. The presumption has been that they were telling the 
truth, because the Government has taken them and used them as 
witnesses. 

Mr. Greene. I have not said there was a presumption in their favor. 
I am saying there is no presumption in favor of the charge that they 
affected the institute. It is perfectly possible for some of these people 
who were extremely leftist to be competent secretaries and clerks and 
researchers. It is perfectly possible that they could give good services, 
and if the service they rendered turned out to have a Communist slant, 
it would have been rejected. 

Senator Watkins. If it had been known. I take it for granted, Mr. 
Greene, no one is thinking for a moment that you would knowingly 
have taken a Communist in and put him in any of these positions. 

Mr. Greene. No. 

Senator Watkins. Because as we understand communism it is part 
of their doctrine to overthrow this Government by force and violence. 

Mr. Greene. Therefore 

Senator Watkins. I take it many of these men — in fact I think the 
large majority of them are men of very high character and would not 
for a moment have stood for anything of that nature had they known 
it, but that isn't our problem. We know that many organizations in 
this country have been infiltrated by Communists because they could 
not have accomplished the things they have accomplished unless they 
had done that. They have done it in other nations and there is no 
reason why we shouldn't look at it. It is our job to find out whether 
it is true or not true. 

Mr. Greene. The best evidence as to whether the infiltration, if it 
took place, was successful is to how it was effected in the utterances, 
in the publications of the institute. So I think a search of the very 
voluminous records of the IPR is your source for any indication that 
the responsible activities of the institute had that leaning. 

Senator Watkins. That is one source. 

Mr. Greene. I feel almost like challenging you to produce any 
evidence that the publications of the institute show that tendency on 
the part of the institute. There has to be a wide hospitality to diver- 
gent views. As a matter of fact, apart from the question of totali- 



3862 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

tarianism, which identifies the Nazis and the Soviet people pretty 
closely, apart from that you can't prevent having people thinking of 
the philosophical merits of Marxism. Even Tolstoy was a philosophi- 
cal anarchist. Those differences of theoretical opinion have got to 
be recognized, and there is no way of controlling individual beliefs 
or expressions as far as that goes. But so far as disloyalty to the 
Government goes, the evidence has got to be apparent in the only way 
in which the Institute of Pacific Relations expresses itself, which is 
through its publications and conferences, 

Mr. Morris. Do I take it, then, Mr. Greene, that the summation on 
these two items of your testimony on this score is that even if Harriet 
Moore and Frederick V. Field served with you on this committee, 
and were Communists at that time, in your opinion they did not give 
expression to any Communist ideas or Communist purposes? 

Mr. Greene. Involving the Institute of Pacific Eelations, certainly. 
I say that positively. 

Mr. Morris. If there were Communists on this list of the secretariat, 
you feel that their expressions and their writings did not reflect their 
Communist connections 

Mr. Greene. I wouldn't say that at all. 

Mr. Morris. In the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Greene. As far as the responsibility of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations is concerned, they did not affect it. 

Mr. Morris. Then at the same time you did not know the individual 
work of these people on the secretariat ? 

Mr. Greene, I became acquainted with Miss Harriet Moore I think 
for the first time at Banff in 1933. I knew of her as an extremely 
able, I believe summa cum laude, graduate of Bryn Mawr College. 

Mr. Morris, I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Watkins, I have none, 

Mr. Morris. Mr, Lockwood, 

Mr, Greene, Do you excuse me, then ? 

Senator Watkins, Yes; and thank you for your testimony. 

Call your next witness, Mr, Morris. 

Mr. Morris, Mr, Lockwood, 

Senator Watkins, Mr, Lockwood, will you stand and be sworn. 
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give in the matter 
pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the 
United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Lockwood. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, N. J., ACCOM- 
PANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL 

Mr. Morris. Do you have a statement, Mr. Lockwood ? 
Mr. Lockwood. 1 have, 

Mr, Morris. Would you like that to go into the record or would 
you lilve to read it ? 

Mr, Lockwood, I would like your permission to read it if I may. 
Senator Watkins, I would rather he read it because then he is 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3863 

under oath. Otlierwise, there is a question whether it is sworn to 
or not. 

Mr. LocKwooD. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to ap- 
pear before this committee as a witness and to place at its disposal 
such information as I have concerning the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

For many years I have been closely associated with the American 
Council of the Institute as a staff member, a trustee, and an Ameri- 
can citizen professionals concerned with research and teaching in 
the far-eastern field. From 1935 to 1940 I was on the American 
council's research staff, and was its secretary from 1941 to 1943. Since 
1946 I have been a member of the board of trustees of the American 
IPR, and have had occasion to use the institute's publications ex- 
tensively in following far-eastern affairs. For 15 years or more, 
therefore, I have had a fairly close knowledge of its activities; par- 
ticularly I should say those of the American council. 

First let me say I fully share the aversion of members of this com- 
mittee to communism and all its works. I believe that totalitarian- 
ism in any form is a threat to every ideal we cherish in American 
life, and every hope of betterment in the rest of the world. 

It is for this very reason that I was first attracted to the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, and have long cooperated in its activities. For 
the preservation of free institutions depends upon knowledge and its 
wide dissemination. And knowledge depends upon free inquiry, such 
as the institute was organized to encourage in our relations with the 
vast, turbulent, and little-understood continent of Asia. No one 
would be more indignant than I to discover that the IPR had be- 
come, wittingly or unwittingly, the tool of Communist conspiracy or of 
Soviet designs upon the free world. 

The truth is, in my opinion, that the Institute of Pacific Relations 
has never been subverted to Communist ends. From fairly extensive 
knowledge of its operations I believe it has remained true to its 
principles of nonpartisan investigation and free discussion. If the 
Communists tried to use it to further their designs, then on the rec- 
ord they failed. One need not endorse every single publication or 
action associated with the institute to affirm this conviction. It rests 
on an appraisal of the full record. 

The outstanding fact about the institute is the tremendous contribu- 
tion it has made to knowledge of the Pacific area. For this the whole 
free world is in its debt. It has striven to provide the first require- 
ment of an intelligent and successful approach to Asia : an understand- 
ing of its basic facts and problems, arrived at by free inquiry. This 
is hardly a Communist objective, nor one which the Communists 
welcome. They themselves view everything from the premise of a 
rigid and infallible dogma, prescribed for everyone. They can suc- 
ceed in Asia only as the democratic world fails to understand and 
deal intelligently with the forces at work. The best guaranty of this 
is dispassionate study, and an open market for free ideas where we 
may search for the truth. 

Now free inquiry means controversy, of course, in a situation as 
explosive as that of Asia. For a decade the Far East has been an 
arena of war and revolution. Facts were often scanty ; interpretations 
differed; feelings often ran high. Anyone with a knowledge of the 
problems of operating the Institute of Pacific Relations in this tense 



3864 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

atmosphere can testify to the difficulties. Especially with the advan- 
tage of hindsight it is not difficult to point out certain errors of 
judgment. 

Nevertheless, it is striking fact that the great body of scholars and 
close observers of far-eastern affairs in all countries outside Commu- 
nist control will testify to the good faith of the institute's leaders, and 
its large measure of success in maintaining high standards of 
objectivity. 

Senator Watkins. Do you take in all of its leaders in that broad 
generalization ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. The great body of scholars and close observers of 
far-eastern affairs, Mr. Chairman. I don't exclude the possibility, in 
other words, that an individual here and there may take a critical 
view, and I think almost all persons with knowledge of the institute's 
activities would find a good many points here and there which they 
would feel was subject to criticism. 

Senator Watkiks. In other words, you do not mean by that that 
these people would approve men like Field and some others who have 
refused to answer the question — the $64 question as we put it — 
whether or not they have ever been Communists or are now Commu- 
nists, Wlien they refuse to answer that you don't mean that these 
people would approve those individuals. Some of them have been 
active in the institute. 

Mr. LocKwooD. Mr. Chairman, I can't really generalize about the 
opinions of a great many people here on any specific issue of that sort. 

Senator Watkins. I think you are taking in a lot of territory when 
you say all of these people will testify unless you have contacted 
them to find out whether they will or won't. 

Mr. LocKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I think my phraseology was that 
the great body of scholars and close observers. This does not mean 
100 percent but means an overwhelming majority, and that is my im- 
pression based on considerable acq,uaintance with, particularly of 
course, the American scholars and other people especially interested 
in the Far East. 

Senator Watkins. You go so far as to say that they will testify, and 
I assume that that is an opinion, although you don't say so. 

Mr. LocKwooD. Mr. Chairman, on that point just to support the 
point, I call attention to a great many letters, copies of which I have 
seen, letters written in recent months reaffirming the confidence of 
these people who know the institute in its integrity and its gi*eat 
contribution to knowledge. 

Senator Watkins. Do you know whether any of them have ever 
read the record that is being made in this matter before the com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. Mr. Chairman, I can't generalize, again, about 
that except to say that I have seen, that Mr. Holland has shown me 
just now, a number of copies of letters received within the last 2, 3, 
or 4 weeks 

Senator Watkins. That is hardly an answer to my question. Do 
you know whether or not any of these close observers and scholars 
have ever seen the record of the hearings or have read the testimony 
that has been presented here in this matter. 

Mr. LocKwooD. I can't say of course how many such people have 
read the record of the hearings. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3865 

Senator Watkins. Have you read it? 

Mr. LocKwooD. I have read considerable parts, not all. 

Senator Watkins. Newspaper accounts or the actual record? 

Mr. LocKwooD. I have followed the newspaper accounts generally 
and have read a considerable part of the record insofar as it has 
appeared to date in print. 

Senator Watkins. You mean you have had the volumes of testi- 
mony ? 

Mr. LocKWOOD. Yes; especially those parts bearing directly on 
the institute. 

Senator Watkins. You may proceed. 

Mr. Lockwood. I should like to make three points more explicitly 
concerning the record of the Institute of Pacific Relations. These 
are fundamental to the committee's investigation, as I understand its 
purpose. , 

The first is the wide and diversified character of the institute's 
associations, necessary to the conduct of its work. 

The second is the support and participation it has enjoyed gen- 
erally from scholars and men of affairs in all Pacific countries, except 
those behind the iron curtain. 

The third concerns the actual character of its publications and its 
conferences which, far more than associations alone, provide the real 
criterion by which it should be judged. 

On the first point — associations — the most casual inspection of the 
institute files will show (a) how diverse have been its contacts in 
the United States and other IPR countries; and (b) how overwhelm- 
ingly non-Communist those associations have been. 

Only by the narrowest and most partisan selection of facts can it 
be made to appear that the participation of Communists or Commu- 
nist sympathizers bulks significantly in the record. To conjure up 
this picture it is necessary to ignore the vast majority of people who 
have dominated the institute program and who cannot be labeled 
Communist in any way, shape, or form. It would be necessary, for 
example, to pass over most of American Council's 50 trustees and 
1,000 to 2,000 members, not to mention their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom, the Pacific Dominions, China, or Japan. It would be nec- 
essary to ignore almost all of the 300 or more books published by the 
institute, as well as the contents of Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern 
Survey over 25 years. It would be necessary to disregard hundreds 
of leading citizens of the United States and other countries who have 
made up the IPE. conferences held periodically since 1925 to discuss 
the problems of the Pacific. These facts are a matter of public record, 
easily verifiable. 

If association alone is the test, indeed, it would be easier to conjure 
up a picture of the institute as Wall Street, rather than Communist, 
controlled. Some of the most influential policy makers in the insti- 
tute have been distinguished representatives of American business. 
Prominent American corporations have also been among its leading 
financial supporters. It is hard to believe that this group, along with 
some of our greatest foundations and large numbers of individual 
members, could have been duped to finance Communist subversion 
through the institute. 

The charge of "Wall Street control" is exactly the one that the 
Communists make, of course. The institute is denounced in Russia 



3866 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

as the tool of American capitalism. Apparently the Soviet author- 
ities never viewed the IPR with anything but deep suspicion. The 
best evidence of their attitude, I suggest, is their refusal to let Soviet 
scientists take any significant part in institute research or confer- 
ences. On the occasion of the latest conference, held at Lucknow, 
India, in 1950, the institute was bitterly assailed in the Soviet press 
as "one of the unofficial channels by which American imperialism 
exercises influence over the Asian countries." 

Both pictures are false, I submit. In fact, the IPE, has provided 
a forum and coordinating center for cooperative study of Pacific prob- 
lems on the widest possible platform. For this it has required and 
invited the participation of all sorts of people. Its corresponding 
obligation, of course, was to see that it did not allow itself to fall under 
the domination of any particular group with any particular ax to 
grind. I believe it has succeeded in doing this about as well as hu- 
manly could be expected. Certainly its associations, so far as they 
are the test, have been — to repeat — overwhelmingly non-Communist 
in character. 

My second point about the institute is its reputation for integrity 
among people professionally concerned with the study of the Far 
East. Few Americans acquainted with its work take seriously the 
charge that it has been Communist-controlled, or that it has sought 
improperly to influence American policy. 

This can be readily ascertained by questioning any number of uni- 
versity presidents, professors, newspaper editors, foundation offi- 
cials, business people or other men of affairs who actually know the 
institute. Many of them have publicly defended it since these hear- 
ings began, though their views receive far less publicity than those 
of irresponsible critics. They are the people most familiar with its 
books and periodicals, its round-table conference, and its various 
services to the world of scientific research. They should know whether 
the institute has perverted its ideals, and specifically whether it has 
lent itself to Communist purposes. 

From such informed persons, both here and abroad, you can get 
criticism on many details and phases of the IPR program. For 25^ 
years nevertheless they have given it their confidence and loyal sup- 
port. When we speak of the institute we speak mainly of these peo- 
ple, for they are the writers and members and contributors who have 
carried on its work. To indict the IPR is virtually to indict a whole 
generation of study of the international problems of the Pacific in 
the United States and other institute countries. 

Finally, and most important, the real test of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations is its actual record of achievement — its output. 

Here the record is easy to judge in one respect, and difficult in 
another. It is easy in that the institute's chief activity from its in- 
ception has been the collection and publication of information and 
ideas about the Pacific area. Its hundreds of books and thousands of 

Periodical issues are on the shelves of libraries all over the world, 
here is nothing mysterious about them ; they speak for themselves. 
For example, the IPR inquiry series on the Sino-Japanese conflict 
exists in the form of 30-odd volumes published between 1938 and 
1945. It is unnecessary to search through office correspondence for 
clues as to its character. These books are readily accessible to anyone 
who cares to examine them. For the most part they are factual studies 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3867 

of the course of wartime developments in China and Japan, and the 
policies of the Western Powers toward the conflict. 

The difficulty in appraising IPR publications is that, while they are 
a matter of open record, they are also very voluminous. It is difficult 
for anyone to give a summary judgment who has not worked with 
them for a long time. And the hostile critic can easily select individ- 
ual items, still more particular sentences or passages, to "prove" almost 
any kind of bias. Without going into details, I should like briefly to 
offer two observations. They are based on acquaintance with a large 
pavt, though not all, of the IPR literature. 

First, the gTeat bulk of institute research and publication has con- 
sisted of nonpolitical studies of Pacific countries — resources, trade 
and investment, agriculture, industrialization, living standards, press 
and public opinion, treaty relations, and so forth. Totaling tens, of 
thousands of pages, they cover an enormous area of subject matter. 
They include basic researches which all scholars use, for example, J. 
Lossing Buck's monumental work on Chinese agriculture, G. C. Allen's 
and T. Uj^eda's studies of Japanese industry, or the volumes of J. S. 
Furnivall, the English authority on southeast Asia. To evaluate the 
influence of the institute it is necessary first and foremost to appraise 
this extensive research program. 

Second, a much smaller share of institute publications, and particu- 
larly its periodicals, deal with political problems of a more contro- 
versial nature. It is to the institute's credit, I believe, that it never 
shied away from controversial issues. This would have been the safe 
and easy thing to do. But equally the institute would not have served 
the purpose for which it was formed. For example, in 1938 the 
Japanese objected vehemently to IPR studies of the war in China. 
When the institute went ahead anyway, they withdrew on this issue. 
I have already referred to the general distrust of the IPR by the Rus- 
sians, and their refusal to take any effective part in its work. At vari- 
ous times the institute also aroused the ire of groups in Britain, in 
Holland, in China and the United States, because of the way certain 
problems were handled in the IPR forum of publications and con- 
ference discussions. 

This is what you must expect of course, if you are going to face the 
real issues of the day. The alternative is to retreat to some ivory 
tower — if any remains. Actually the IPR constituency always in- 
sisted on frank discussion of conflicts in the Pacific, without the exclu- 
sion of any view entitled to consideration, and without the organiza- 
tion itself becoming identified with any single view. How well the 
institute succeeded can only be judged in terms of the record as a 
whole, and by people who take the trouble to find out the real content 
of its publications and related activities. 

I am myself convinced that no consistent IPR line has ever existed, 
except for an underlying faith in the ideals of democracy, nonaggres- 
sion, and human betterment. 

It is true that institute publications and discussions have inevitably 
reflected the general range of information, interest and opinion cur- 
rent among scholars and writers in the Far Eastern field. This is 
necessarily so, since few IPR books or articles are staff-written. A 
program of this scope could only be carried on through the voluntary 
cooperation of hundreds of experts and laymen in the United States 



3868 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

and other IPR countries. If it has been inadequate — say, in the 
foretelling the course of events in China — it has reflected in the main 
the limitation of insight and prophecy under which all such people 
have worked. The remedy for these shortcomings is a greater and 
better-equipped effort, for there is no other way a democracy can 
proceed. 

These are very general remarks, I realize. To people familiar with 
the Institute of Picific Relations they will even seem commonplace: 
the diverse character of its associations, its reputation for integrity, its 
substantial record of research. They can readily be verified by anyone 
who will inquire into the facts. 

Senator Watkins. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lockwood, do you believe that a person can be a 
Communist for a long period of years and yet not give expressed to 
thoughts and ideas that are Communist thoughts and views ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. Mr. Chairman, I am by no means an expert on com- 
munism, but I should think it would be difficult for a person to be a 
Communist in the full sense of the word — that is, subscribing to the 
basic philosophy of Marxism-Leninism — and submitting to the disci- 
pline or the organization without giving expression sooner or later cer- 
tainly to the line, the views that that implies. 

Mr. MoRKis. And purposes, too. 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You heard the testimony of Mr. Greene in connection 
with his attending this nominating committee meeting of 1941. There 
we had the arrangement by which Miss Moore was the chairman, Mr. 
Field was a member of the nominating committee and Mr. Green was 
the third member. As you know, Miss Moore and Mr, Field have been 
identified by witnesses before this committee as Communists, so we 
brought them in and asked them whether or not they had been, and 
they refused to answer on the grounds it would incriminate them. 
Do you think that we can draw any probative conclusions from the 
fact that Moore, Field, and Greene served together on a nominating 
committee to select officers for the Institute of Pacific Relations? Do 
you think that it is fair to assume that there was some Communist 
influence ipso facto from that fact? 

Mr. LocKWOOD, I think the best evidence as to whether there was or 
not is represented in the list of nominations which it was the responsi- 
bility of that committee to present. If I may, I would like to identify 
the persons whose names Mr. Greene read off. As he pointed out, I be- 
lieve, Ray Lyman Wilbur was, I think, then still president of Stanford 
University and, of course, at one time a Cabinet member under Presi- 
dent Hoover. 

Miss Comstock was president of Radcliffe College; William R, 
Herod was at the time either vice president or president of the Inter- 
national General Electric Co. ; Philip C. Jessup, professor at Columbia 
LTnivprsity; Benjamin Kizer, an attorney of Spokane, Wash.; Philo 
W. Parker, president of Standard Vacuum Oil Co. : Robert Gordon 
Sproul, president of the University of California. Those five people 
were named as vice chairmen; Edward C. Carter as acting secretary, 
and Mrs. Katrine Greene as assistant secretary. Both of them, of 
course, were staff members. Francis S. Harmon was an executive of — 
I am not sure I have the exact title — the Motion Picture Producers 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3869 

Association. And Mrs. Rose Landres, assistant treasurer, a staff 
member. 

Mr. Morris. You were secretary of IPE, for a while ; were you not, 
Mr. Lockwood? 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes. I was secretary from about, I think, Novem- 
ber 1941 to early summer of 1943. 

Mr. Morris. As secretary, you would have dealings with this secre- 
tariat—would you not ? — that we have been discussing this morning. 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes; I would have dealings of various kinds with 
them in connection, of course, with the fairly close working relation- 
ships w^hich existed in certain phases of the IPE. program between 
the American council and the international secretariat. 

Mr. Morris. Did you hear complaints at any time that any of 
these people listed on the secretariat at that time were Communists? 

Mr. Lockwood. Did I hear complaints at this time ? 

Mr. Morris. 1941. You have a list of these; have you not? 

Mr. Lockwood. I do not recall any complaints or allegations at the 
time that any of these people were Communists. I am relying here, 
of course, on memory. 

Mr. Morris. !< or instance, do you recall Roger S. Greene complain- 
ing about the Communist nature of the secretariat ? 

Mr. Lockwood. I have no recollection of that. May I add a further 
supplementary remark: that it would not surprise me if people had 
expressed criticism of views expressed by one person or another on 
this list. It is rather a long list, and it is difficult for me to recall 
exactly correspondence and comment going on at this time 10 years 
ago. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lockwood, the members of the secretariat are the 
people who actually did the work around the IPR office; were they 
not ? — under supervision, of course. 

Mr. Lockwood. They were people who did the office work. Actually, 
an overwhelming majority of the books, the contents of the periodicals, 
w^ere written by outside people all over the world. The conferences 
were made up largely of nonstaff people. These people were — I am 
testifying now, Mr. Chairman, about a staif with which I was not 
directly connected, but they were in various capacities — they include, 
for example. Professor Corbett, a distinguished expert from McGill 
and now at Princeton, who was there engaged in a specific study of 
the postwar plans. They ranged from Professor Corbett, on the 
one hand, to people whose functions and responsibilities were, I 
think, entirely clerical or administrative. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents, please? 

Mr. Mandel. These are letters, carbon copies of letters, from the 
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The first one is a letter 
dated January 20, 1942, addressed to Mr. Roger S. Greene from Wil- 
liam W. Lockwood, secretary. The second one is a letter addressed to 
Mr. W. W. Lockwood, dated January 23, 1942, signed "Roger S. 
Greene." And the third, which really should precede the others, is a 
letter dated January 16, 1942, addressed to William W. Lockwood, 
signed "Roger S. Greene". 

Mr. Morris. Can you identify that exchange of correspondence, Mr. 
Lockwood? [Documents handed to Mr. Lockwood.] 

Mr. Morris. Can you identify those as having been written by you 
and to you, Mr. Lockwood? 



3870 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. LocKwooD. They appear to be carbon copies of correspondence 
exchanged between Mr. Greene and me on the dates indicated. 

Senator Watkins. You don't doubt their accuracy ; do you ? You 
do not doubt the fact that they are copies of the o ctual correspondence ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. No. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may they be received into the record? 

Senator Watkins. They may be received. 

(The tliree letters referred to were received and marked, respec- 
tively, "Exhibits No. 568, No. 569, and No. 570" and are read in 
full below). 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lockwood, will you read the letters, please. Read 
them aloud, please. 

Mr. LocKwooD. The first is the letter dated January 16, 1942, signed 
by Mr. Roger S. Greene, 348 Lincoln Street, Worcester, Mass. : 

Exhibit No. 568 

Dear Mb. Lockwood : Before the next annual meeting that is, the 1943 meet- 
ing — will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations 
to the board of trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of vacancies 
to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their 
preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any 
members would care to undertake. 

For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal char- 
acter, his judgment during the past 2 years has been so strange that it seemed 
to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to be 
nominated, surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of him. 
When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of 
the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I knovr that they 
do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting so much 
to radical views on political, economic, and social subjects on which radical 
views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line and to flop 
suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive. The 
latter habit is the reverse of encouraging intellectual freedom. 
Yours sincerely, 

Roger S. Greene. 

Mr. Morris. Who was Roger S. Greene, Mr. Lockwood ? 

Mr. Lockwood. I was acquainted with Mr. Greene at this time and 
over a period of several years, not closely but through occasional 
contact, and I cannot identify him specifically as to his institutional 
connections. I believe that at one time he was connected with the 
Peking Union Medical College in Peking, China, and was undoubtedly 
a member of the American council at this time, as indicated. 

Senator Watkins. You think he was an official in the American 
council ? 

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure whether I can verify 
that from 

Mr. Morris. Perhaps Mr. Holland can help us on that. 

Mr. Holland. Mr. Greene, from my recollection, was a member. 
I have no recollection that he was ever a trustee or officer. He is a 
brother of Mr. Jerome Greene, and it is true he had been an official of 
the Peking Union Medical College in China. He returned from 
China, I think, somewhere around 1941 ; and, as I recall it, was fairly 
active in this country in organizing the committee to boycott trade in 
war materials with Japan. 

Mr. Morris. He was a member of the American delegation to the 
seventh conference. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3871 

Wouldn't it appear on the basis of this letter, Mr. Lockwood, that 
Mr. Greene was registering, a complaint about the political orientation 
and political complexion of the secretariat and stall that we have been 
talking about ? 

Mr, Lockwood. No^ If I understand the letter, Mr. Morris, that is 
not the nature of his complaint. 

Mr. Morris. He says there [reading] : 

When Chinese, of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of 
the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they 
do, it would appear to be time to more cautious. 

There is a flat assertion on Mr. Greene's part at that time. 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes, but the purpose of Mr. Greene's letter, as I 
read it, is to comment on the manner of electing trustees to the board 
of American council. In that connection he makes this comment on 
Mr. Field. From memory, I am unable to establish the link here 
between these two paragraphs and exactly what his meaning is. Per- 
il aps my reply will indicate something. May I refresh my memory? 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

Mr. Lockwood. Do you wish me to read it ? 

Mr. Morris. Will you read it, please ? 

Mr. Lockwood. This is a letter to Mr. Roger S. Greene, dated Jan- 
uary 20, 1942, and signed by me in my capacity as secretary of the 
American council : 

Exhibit No. 569 

Dbiab Mb. Greene : Thank you very much for your note on the procedure 
followed in submitting nominations to the American council's board of trustees. 
I agree with you that the present method is not very satisfactory. Some people 
feel as you do : that it looks too much like a perfunctory "railroading" job. 
Others — for example, one of our most interested members, whom I saw yester- 
day — would prefer that we make the board self -perpetuating in some fashion and 
not bother them with a ballot at all. Some time this year I hope to be able to give 
the matter careful consideration and work out a more suitable plan. Frankly, 
since taking office late in 1941, I have been so preoccupied with immediate ques- 
tions of wartime program that I have not been able to give this matter tbie 
attention it deserves. 

I also am completely unable to understand and justify Fred Field's political 
reasoning during the past 2 years At the same time, his long experience with 
the IPR and his high technical competence in the lield make him, in my opinion, 
an exceedingly valuable trustee. As for the present staff, it is hard for me to 
see how anyone could believe that it merits the criticism you cite. Actually, the 
staff represents a wide range of political opinion, and in this respect it is quite 
representative of American public opinion at large. This is as it should be ; don't 
you think? 

With best regards, I am, 
Sincerely yours, 

Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary. 

Mr. Chairman, I would conclude from my own letter that the ques- 
tion at issue here is the nomination of Mr. Field to membership on 
the board of trustees; and Mr. Greene's feeling, for the reasons he 
indicates, is that Mr. Field is an inappropriate nominee. 

Do you wish to comment briefly on this question of nominations 
and elections to the board? 

Mr. Morris. I was going to get to that, Mr. Lockwood. Perhaps 
you had better read the third letter, too, and then we can discuss the 
whole thing. 

88348— 52— pt. 11 11 



3872 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. LocKwooD. Right. A letter to Mr. Lockwood dated January 
23, 1942, and signed by Roger S. Greene. 

Mr. Marks. I note that the date is marked in pencil on this copy, 
January 23, 1942. It is not typed in. I don't think that is very 
significant. 

Exhibit No. 570 

Mr. Lockwood (reading) : 

My Dear Mr. Lockwood: Thanks for your letter of January 20. Perhaps I 
took too seriously some of the criticisms that I have heard of the alleged leftist 
tendencies of many of the IPR staff. I may say that, except in Field's case, they 
never gave me any direct concern, though at times I thought I detected a kind 
of sentimental attitude toward Soviet Russia that seemed to me somewhat 
amateurish. I quite agree that a variety of opinion should be represented. My 
contention was not that Field should necessarily be excluded but that one should 
not be compelled to vote for him. 

With regard to election of trustees, I should myself have no objection to a 
self-perpetuating system. That might actually produce more thorough considera- 
tion or candidates than the present plan. 

The War Department public-relations office has asked me to join a panel of 
speakers to go to Army camps. I have, of course, consented, though the new 
kind of audience to be faced causes me some anxiety. As I understand that 
you suggested my name, I may later be asking you for suggestions. In the 
meantime I expect to have additional information from Washington that will 
answer some of the questions that have arisen in my mind on this matter. 
Sincerely yours, 

Roger S. Greene. 

May I say in elaboration that the question of Mr. Field raised by 
Mr. Greene here is not a question of membership on the staff of the 
American council or of the international secretariat, but the nomina- 
tion of Mr. Field to the board of trustees. May I say, if my memory 
is correct, Mr. Field did serve as trustee for several years after the 
war. The dates I don't recall, but evidently it included 1942. 

(Senator Eastland took the chair.) 

Mr. Morris. There are two issues I would like to ask you about, 
Mr. Lockwood. One is the complaint on the part of Mr. Greene that 
members of the staff were, as he said, too much under Russian Soviet 
influence. Then he distinguished here. He says [reading] : 

I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic, and social 
subjects on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow 
a party line and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with 
the party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging intellectual 
freedom. 

I say isn't that at least evidence that at that time Mr. Roger Greene, 
the brother of Jerome Greene, who testified here today, was complain- 
ing to you about the nature of the staff that we have been discussing? 
I presume it is the same staff a copy of which you have in front of 
you. 

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Morris, I believe that Mr. Greene's statement 
is that certain Chinese were saying that too many of the IPR staff are 
too much under Russian Soviet influence; and, while you may think 
he implies some degree of agreement with that, that is not his own 
statement as given in the letter. 

In the second place, I would interpret the latter part of his para- 
graph, which you just read, to refer to Mr. Field, though it is a 
little ambiguous, I grant, as it is stated. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3873 

Mr. MoREis. It talks about the stajff there. It talks in the plural. 
He says "too many of the IPE. staff are too much under Russian Soviet 
influence." 

Mr. LocKWOOD. This is his quotation of the opinion of certain 
Chinese. 

Mr. Morris. He doesn't say that ; does he ? 

Mr. LocKWOOD (reading) : 

When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many 
of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that 
they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. Then he goes on to make his independent 
statement. 

Mr. LocKWOOD. Yes. With the exception of that sentence in the 
middle of the paragraph, ail of the other sentences in the paragraph 
refer to Mr. Field and the question of his nomination to the board of 
trustees. 

Mr. Morris. Then the part that I read doesn't refer to Mr. Field. 
Anyhow, Mr. Lockwood, you yourself have complained in the past,, 
have you not, to individual members of the institute that there were 
too many pro-Communists on the staff ? 

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Morris, I don't recall any such complaint. 

Senator Eastland. Did you think that? 

Mr. Lockwood. That there were too many ? 

Mr. Morris. That there were many pro-Communists on the staff. 

Mr. Lockwood. You are speaking now of the American council 
staff? 

Mr. Morris. It doesn't make any difference, either the secretariat 
staff or the American council staff. 

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Morris, I knew the American council staff fairly 
well, and, and I do not believe now and I do not recall ever believing 
that there were, as you say, too many pro-Russian Communists on the 
staff'. 

Senator Eastland. Russian Communist. Any kind of Communist. 
American Communists. 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes. 

Senator Eastland, Was it j'our opinion that there were any Com- 
munists on the staff? 

Mr. Lockwood. Of the American council ? 

Senator Eastland, Or the secretariat. 

Mr. Lockwood. I am aw^are of course of the allegations that have 
been made before this committee. So far as my own personal knowl- 
edge is concerned, I do not know of any Communists on the staff of it. 

Senator Eastland. He said pro-Communists. 

Mr. Lockwood. Pro-Communists? 

Senator Eastland. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Marks. May I ask— — 

Senator Eastland. No, sir. I want an answer to that question. Is 
he the attorney ? 

]Mr. Morris. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. I want an answer to the question. 

]\Ir. Lockwood, I was just trying to interpret the word "pro-Com- 
munist" in naming my answer. Let me put it this way. If by "pro- 
Communist" you mean someone who subscribes to the basic philoso- 
phy of communism and systematically followed the gyrations of the 



3874 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Communist Party line in international affairs, then I am not aware 
that there were any Communists by that definition of the term on the 
staff of the American council. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever tell, for instance, Mr. Dennett that you 
thought there were any pro-Communists on the staff? Raymond 
Dennett was your successor, was he not? 

Mr. LocKwooD. After an interlude he followed me. I do not re- 
call telling Mr. Dennett that there were pro-Communists on the staff. 

Senator Eastland. Was Mr. Frederick V. Field a member of the 
staff? 

Mr. LocKwooD. Mr. Field was a member of the staff from, I think, 
1934 to 1940 ; perhaps earlier than that. At any rate, his staff con- 
nection was terminated in 1940. Of course, I am well aware of the 
activities and expressions of opinion of Mr. Field in recent years 
which would certainly create a strong presumption that in this period 
at any rate if not an active party member, he is at least thoroughly pro- 
Communist in his outlook. So far as the period when I knew him on 
the staff of the American council is concerned, I did not know then and 
do not know now of any Communist associations, and in his IPR ac- 
tivities and the handling of his IPR responsibility I saw no evidence 
whatsoever that he was attempting to intrude partisan views or dis- 
playing a lack of objectivity and so on. As has already been pointed 
out, I think his chief writings for the institute consisted of two books ; 
the first was a study of American participation in the Chinese con- 
sortium which was to ray recollection a thoroughly objective study. 
The second was an economic handbook of the area, a very dry and full 
but useful collection of economic statistics, with a foreword by Mr. 
Newton D. Baker. In his writings therefore, as well as in his con- 
duct of American council affairs I did not find the evidence which one 
would presume to be there if he had been at the time a genuine Com- 
munist. I don't attempt to say whether he was or was not. If he was, 
then I am puzzled to explain the lack of evidence of this in his activity. 

Mr. Morris. How about some of the other members of the secre- 
tariat? Do you know of the work of Chen Han-seng? 

Mr. LocKWOOD. I am generally familiar with one or two books which 
he has written on economic studies of Chinese agriculture, yes, and 
I have had some activity with him informally over a period of time 
in New York. 

Mr. Morris. Would you say now, in view of all the evidence before 
this committee and as you have experienced yourself, that Chen Han- 
seng was at that time a pro-Communist ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. I would not exclude that possibility certainly. 

Mr. Morris. How about Ch'ao-ting Chi? 

Mr. LocKwooD. I would not exclude the possibility there, though 
in Mr. Chi's case his record is difficult to interpret. After the time 
when he left the IPR or subsequently he became, as you recall, a high- 
ranking and evidently trusted official of H. H. Kung, the Minister of 
Finance in Chungking. 

Mr. Morris. All this time he was' active in the Communist-controlled 
publication, China Today; was he not? 

Mr. LocKwooD. That I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that ? 

Mr. LocKWOOD. I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. How about Elsie Fairf ax-Cholmeley ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3875 

Mr. LocKWooD. My recollection is that she was on the staff of the 
national secretariat in a secretarial capacity. I had casual personal 
acquaintance with her, and from that would not have had any basis 
for supposing that she was a Communist. 

Mr, Morris. Do you know that she and her husband are now in 
Communist China ? 

Mr, LocKwooD. I have heard that ; yes. 

Mr, INIoRRis, Does that change your opinion of her ? 

Mr. LocKWOOD, Is my opinion now different from what it was 10 
years ago ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes, 

Mr. LocKWOOD, I would say that so far — I am not at all familiar 
really with her activities in recent years, but so far as I have heard 
about them they would indicate to me certainly a very friendly atti- 
tude toward the Chinese Communists. 

Senator Eastland. In fact 

Mr. LocKWOoD. One which I did not see displayed, however, at the 
time she was on the staff. 

Senator Eastland, I understand ; but you have now changed your 
opinion ? 

Mr, LoGKwooD, If I may I would like to leave it as I stated it. 

Senator Eastland. I want you to answer the question "yes" or "no" 
and then explain it. Have you now changed your opinion ? You said 
you know they are in Communist China. Have you changed your 
opinion ? 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes ; I would have certainly much more, some reason 
now to take a different view than I did at the time. 

Senator Eastland. You have changed your opinion of Mr. Fred- 
erick V. Field, too, have you not? 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. How about Andrew Grajdanzev? Did you consider 
him to be pro-Communist at that time? Were there not frequent 
complaints at the office about Mr. Grajdanzev's writings? 

Mr. Lockwood. I am trying to recall whether I have enough infor- 
mation on it to answer the question. Mr, Grajdanzev wrote, I recall, 
a book on Formosa, which was mainly a compilation of factual mate- 
rial, I remember him as having strong views on the need for land 
reform, for example, in Japan and along the line of General Mac- 
Arthur's subsequent program, 

Mr, Morris. How about his pro-Communist expressions? 

Mr. Lockwood. I don't recall, Mr. Morris, pro-Communist expres- 
sions which would lead me to make a general statement. 

Mr. Morris. How about Michael Greenberg ? In view of the testi- 
mony that has been brought out about Michael Greenberg, would you 
revise your opinion of him now ? 

Senator Eastland. Ask him if he knows about the testimony. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know about the testimony concerning Michael 
Greenberg ? 

Mr. Lockwood. I recall it has been alleged — by whom I don't remem- 
ber — that he was or is a Communist, 

Mr. Morris. Prof. Karl August Wittfogel and Elizabeth Bentley 
have both testified that he was a Communist to their own personal 
knowledge. 



3876 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Eastland. Does that change your opinion of him ? 

Mr. Marks. What is the question? The opinion of whether he 
is now 

Senator Eastland. The opinion which he, the witness, expressed. 

Mr. LocKWOOD. In other words, what was my opinion at the time? 

Mr. Morris. You expressed the opinion, did you not, Mr. Lock- 
wood, that none of these people at that time were pro-Communist in 
their activity or in their expressions. 

Mr. LocKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I think my statement referred to 
the American council staff, and this is the international secretariat 
staff, which I kjiew much more casually and concerning many of 
whom I really lack the knowledge to express an opinion. 

Mr. Morris. Do you believe- 



Mr. LfOCKWooD. I wish to be responsive to the question, but- 



Mr. Morris. Do you believe that at that time these people were 
pro-Communists in their writings and in their activities? 

Mr. LocKWooD. Eecognizing the allegations that have been made 
here, I have not personally knowledge which would lead me to con- 
clude that they were in a general sense. May I say there in elabora- 
tion that particularly when it comes to the Far East over this 
period, over the period from 1937 to 1945, it is especially difficult 
to apply the test in terms of whether views expressed did or did 
not parallel the Communist line. 

Mr. Morris. You had no difficulty coming to a conclusion in read- 
ing your statement, Mr. Lockwood. 

Mr. LocKWOOD. May I continue? 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

Mr. LocKwooD. From 1937 on of course there was one issue in the 
Far East, namely the Japanese invasion of China. On this issue 
the Russian opinion, the opinion expressed in the Russian press and 
so on was very anti-Japanese. At the same time there were a great 
many Americans non-Communist in their general philosophy who 
also were anti-Japanese. Therefore, there was a parallelism of out- 
look which ranges all the way from extreme Communists on the 
one hand and Mr. Henry L. Stimson on the other, who headed the 
boycott movement against the Japanese. 

Similarly, in China, in the internal conflict within China, the 
Communists were of course bitterly anti-Chiang Kai-shek through 
most of this period, but so were many others heavily critical. This 
makes it difficult, I think, to judge the presence or absence of com- 
munism in a person's outlook by the particular things they happened 
to say about Japanese aggression or Chinese policy. 

Mr. Morris. Yes; but knowing what you now know, will you 
concede that there was reason to believe that at that time some of these 
people were at least pro-Communist in their activities and in their 
writings ? 

Mr. LocKWOOD. I certainly would not exclude that possibility. 

Senator Eastland. You would not exclude that possibility. 

Mr. LocKwooD. That is right. 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Y. Y. Hsu, on this list ? 

Mr. Lockwood. Very slightly. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that he is now an official of the Chinese 
Communist Government ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3877 

Mr. LocKWOOD. So I have heard. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Owen Lattimore at that time? 

Mr. LocKWOOD, Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you consider now that any of his activities or writ- 
ings were pro-Communist? 

Mr. LocKwooD. Many of the opinions tliat Mr. Lattimore expressed 
of course liave coincided in one way or another with the Communist 
line. Many of the opinions he has expressed to my recollection have 
not. I find it difficult, therefore — I find it impossible, in fact, from my 
knowledge of his writings to believe that he has been consistently a fel- 
low traveler or a Communist. 

Senator Eastland. We will recess until 2 o'clock. I want you back 
at 2, please, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m. the committee was recessed until 2 p. m. 
the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Senator Eastland. The committee will come to order. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, ASSISTANT DIEECTOK, 
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OP PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, N. J., ACCOM- 
PANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL— Resumed 

Mr. Morris. In connection with the nominating committee, how did 
that operate, Mr. Lockwood ? 

Mr. LoGKWOOD. During the time that I was secretary of the council, 
as I recall, and in later years when I have been a member of the nomin- 
ating committee, my recollection is about as follows : There would be 
sometimes preliminary discussion or correspondence considering vari- 
ous possibilities. The amount of actual personal meetings which the 
nominating committee would have would depend on the possibility of 
getting all the people together and Avhat issues were to be considered. 
In advance of the date when the nominations were to be put forward 
the committee would come to some agreement on the slate to be pro- 
posed to the board. 

Mr. Morris. Then the nominating committee would come out with 
one slate, would it not? 

Mr. LocKwooD. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Then the membership would vote on the administration 
slate? 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. During the time that you were secretary was there 
any eifort made to destroy the files of the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations ? 

Mr. Lockwood. I am aware of only one incident, which has been 
brought to my attention within the last few months, indicated in a 
memorandum to Mr. Field and from me, a memorandum which I can't 
quote exactly but of which I think I can give the substance, if you 
wish. 

Mr. Morris. Please do, yes. 

Mr. Lockwood. It makes reference to certain correspondence which 
had come in from our San Francisco office, from the secretary of our 
San Francisco division 



3878 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. What is his name ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. John Oakie, 0-a-k-i-e, if my memory is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Is this the letter you refer to ? ""Perhaps I am a Casper 
Milquetoast * * *"? 

Mr. LocKwoOD. May I see it ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. Would you look at that, please. Will you read 
that aloud? Do you recall writing that letter? 

Mr. LocKwooD. No, sir ; I don't. 

Mr. Morris. You do not. Will you read it aloud, please. 

Mr. LocKWOOD. Yes [reading] : 

Exhibit No. 571 
FVF from WWL : 

Perhaps I am a Casper Milquetoast, but with all the investigations which 
have been carried on or are likely to be undertaken in "Washington, I am a 
little nervous about any documents coming to rest in our files which suggest 
any questionable dealings between the American council and private corpora- 
tions, especially as regards the relations of those corporations with the Gov- 
ernment. There are one or two passages in this file of correspondence which 
for a person who is out to get us might suggest something improper. 

If you agree, I suggest destroying the compromising parts of Oakie's letters 
of February 14 (first paragraph) and January 23 (third paragraph, first sen- 
tence). In addition, Sherlock Holmes suggests that you throw this note in the 
wastebasket and direct Oakie to destroy the carbons of these two letters 
together with your letter of instruction to him. 

Senator Eastland. What is the writing in longhand? Do you 
recognize that handwriting ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. I think that is presumably from Field's writing. It 
is signed with the initial "F." 

P. S. — We have a lot worse already filed — just remember where the bad 
stuff is for der Tag. 

Signed "F." 

Mr. Morris. Now do you recall having written that memorandum ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. I don't recall having written it; but I presume it is a 
photostat of a memorandum which I did write. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will vou identify this document, please. 

Senator Eastland. It came from the files. 

Mr. Marks. There is one word in handwriting. The word "ques- 
tionable" is in Mr. Lockwood's handwriting. Maybe that would help 
him identify it. Did you notice that word in handwriting? 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify that first, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Kelations dated February 23, 1939, headed "FVF 
from WWL," with some penciled notes and the initial "KS," Lock- 
wood's name at the upper right-hand corner, and the penciled note — 
"I have no idea what this means." Clayton Lane, June 1950. 

Mr. Morris. Whose initial is after the penciled note ? 

Mr. Mandel. "F." 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record? 

Senator Eastland. It is admitted into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 571" and was 
read in full:) 

Mr. Marks. You don't know whether that is your handwriting? 

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Marks calls attention to the word written in 
pencil here and I cannot identify the writing. 

Mr. Morris. You cannot ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3879 

Mr, LocKwooD. I cannot. 

Mr. Morris. Does this memorandum recall any episode to yon, Mr. 
Lockwood ? 

Mr. Lockwood. No, Mr. Morris, it does not. It does recall a problem 
of a general character which was always in my mind at the time, and 
if you wish I will explain that. 

Mr. Morris. We would like to have your testimony on this particular 
episode. 

Mr. Lockwood. I have no recollection of this episode except for 
what is contained in this memorandum. 

Mr. Morris. Have you any questions on that ? 

Senator Eastland. No questions. 

Mr. Lockwood. May I make one comment ? 

Mr. Morris. Surely, Mr. Lockwood. 

Mr. Lockwood. I recall that at this time the American council was 
engaged in a number of research studies relating to American trade 
and investment and other particularly economic subjects, that is, trade, 
investment, et cetera, in the Far East, and of course at the same time 
we were receiving contributions for the support of the council's gen- 
eral program from a number of prominent American corporations, 
including certain corporations on the Pacific coast like the American 
President Lines, Crockett National Bank, and so on. For this reason 
we were always acutely conscious of the problem of preserving not 
only the substance of the integrity and independence in our research 
work with respect to the sources of financial donations, but also avoid- 
ing even the appearance of bias or control or influence of improper 
character. My inference, therefore, which I think is supported by 
the substance of this memorandum, is that certain passages in this cor- 
respondence seemed to suggest or might be taken by some outsider to 
suggest an improper relationship with certain American business con- 
cerns. This was evidently the reason why I was uneasy about its 
going in the files. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those letters, please. 

Mr. Maxdel. I have here a carbon copy of a letter from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 4, 1942, addressed 
to American People's Fund, 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City, 
from William W. Lockwood, secretary. 

Senator Eastland. It will be admitted in the record. 

Mr. Morris. How many letters have you there, Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel. Seven. 

Mr. Morris. Were all those seven letters taken from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Mandel, Yes ; they were. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lockwood, may I show you these eight letters and 
ask you if you can recall having written those ? 

(Witness examining documents.) 

Senator Eastland. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lockwood, do you recognize those letters as copies 
of the letters having been written by you ? 

Mr. Lockwood. Those appear, all of them, to be letters or memo- 
randa written by me. Some of them deal with subjects which I recall, 
and others quite beyond my present memory. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may they be received in the record. 

Senator Eastland. That has already been ordered. 



3880 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 572 A, B, C, 
D, E, F, G, and H," and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 572-A 

September 4, 1942. 
American People's Fund, 

16 West 12th Street, New York City. 
Dear Sirs : The purpose of this letter is to make application for a grant of 
$2,500 from the American People's Fund toward the educational and research 
program of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. 

The reasons for this request, and the purposes to which the requested sum 
would be devoted, are sketched in the following paragraphs : 

I. current program of the ipr 

War in the Pacific has created an unprecedented demand for authoritative 
information on the peoples and problems of the Far East. This has doubled 
and redoubled the demands on the Institute of Pacific Relations, the sole private 
agency wholly devoted to objective study of the Pacific area. 

There have been urgent requests from many quarters for I. P. R. studies — 
published, in proof, or in manuscript. Institute research volumes will be found 
on scores of Government desks in Washington, London, Canberra, New Delhi, 
and Chungking. Far eastern experts trained by the IPR are in a dozen war 
agencies of the United States. American council members now in key positions 
in the Pacific world include J. C. Grew, former Ambassador to Tokyo ; W. H. 
Staudley, Ambassador to Moscow; Henry F. Grady, who recently headed the 
special economic mission to India, and Owen Lattimore, personal political ad- 
viser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 

Large numbers of American council pamphlets have been purchased by the 
Army and Navy for use in training camps and on shipboard. Few educational 
tasks are more important today than that of meeting this need on the part of the 
armed forces. 

Editors, radio commentators, business firms, teachers and students likewise 
call on the institute daily for library and information services. United China 
Relief has relied heavily on the IPR staff in planning aid to China. The Ameri- 
can Council on Education has asked its help in a new effort to improve teaching 
on the Far East in secondary schools. Other agencies have requested assistance 
in radio and motion-picture projects. 

So far the institute has managed to meet these and many similar demands 
which have flooded into its offices since Pearl Harbor. It is greatly in need of 
additional staff and financial resources, however, to cope with the wholly new 
situation created by the war. 

Twenty-one IPR books and reports have been rushed to completion since the 
outbreak of hostilities. Together with earlier studies, particularly the IPR 
Inquiry Series on the far eastern conflict, they provide information vitally needed 
for the war effort, as well as for postwar settlement and reconstruction in the 
Pacific. 

This basic IPR research is in turn the foundation for various educational 
services to the American public : 

Popular pamphlets like China — America's Ally ; Meet the Anzacs ; Asia's 

Captive Colonies ; Our Far Eastern Record. 
A weekly radio program, Spotlight on Asia. 
School texts and teaching materials. A new series of five cheap textbooks on 

the peoples of the Far East will be published in September. 
A biweekly bulletin of reliable information on the Pacific area, the Far 
Eastern Survey — widely used by editors, college students, and adult-educa- 
tion groups. 
Conferences by American citizens on wartime and peacetime cooperation 
among the United Nations — for example, recent week-end conferences in 
Princeton, Cleveland, and Seattle, and teacher meetings in Houston, Chi- 
cago, Des Moines, and San P''rancisco. 
Advice to Government agencies on far eastern personnel and research ma- 
terials. 
The knowledge, contacts and educational experience necessary for this diversi- 
fied program could not be improvised overnight. They are the product of many 
years of preparation. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3881 

Founded in 1925, the institute consists of a series of national councils in 10 
countries of the Pacific. Together they cooperate in international research and 
conferences. One of these councils is the American council, a nonprofit member- 
ship corporation under the direction of an elected board of trustees now headed 
by President Robert G. Sproul, of the University of California. The council's 
1942 budget of .$80,000 is provided in part by foundation grants, and in part must 
be secured through contributions from members and friends. 

The IPR has been responsible for the bulk of the pioneering study of the past 
15 years on economic, political, and social developments in the Far East. It 
has sought to mobilize the best scholarly resources of a dozen countries for this 
common purpose. Among the institute's inost active leaders have been out- 
standing scholars and men of affairs like Newton Baker, Ray Lyman Wilbur, 
and Philip C. Jessup of the United States ; John W. Dafoe of Canada ; Hu Shih 
and W. W. Yen, of China ; R. H. Tawney, of Great Britain ; Walter Nash, of 
New Zealand ; H. J. van Mook, of the Netherlands Indies, and V. Motylev of the 
U. S. S. R. 

One of the products of its work has been the training of a whole new genera- 
tion of young scholars equipped with the scientific and linguistic tools for far 
eastern study. This training program now urgently requires expansion in the 
United States. Present and future needs for trained experts far exceed the 
available supply ; this is a serious bottleneck in Government agencies and in 
American education, 

n. NEW NEEDS AND PLANS 

The opportunities of the IPR today arise directly from the critical war situa- 
tion in the Pacific. The next 5 years will be the most fateful in a century in the 
relations of America with the Orient. Together with her United Nations part- 
ners, America must reverse the tides of military defeat and in the victory over 
Japan and her Axis partners. In so doing she must also create a basis of mutual 
confidence between the western democracies and their allies in Asia — one which 
will survive the strain of victory and place the future relations of East and West 
on a new footing of equality and interdependence. 

A vital role can be played in this by the IPR. Its international task, first of 
all, is to mobilize all its resources among the United Nations for cooperative 
study of the issues of a future peace settlement, and, most important, of their 
implications for war time policy and attitudes. 

This international program is shared by all the IPR councils — especially the 
British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, Chinese, Soviet, Dutch, and Ameri- 
can. The first stage is being planned around an international study meeting on 
wartime and postwar cooperation in the Pacific, to be held next December in this 
country. This conference will be one in the regular series of IPR conferences : 
Virginia Beach, 1939; Yosemite, 1936; Banff, 1933; Shanghai, 1931, etc. 

In preparation for this meeting, a series of studies are in progress, partici- 
pated in by leading scholars and men of affairs, members of the IPR from the 
countries of the United Nations fighting in the Pacific. Out of this conference 
study will grow a continuing program of research and discussion. The special 
IPR research series on the far eastern war. now numbering 20 volumes, provides 
the indispensable foundation for this evolving inquiry. 

The American council naturally is being called upon to play a leading role 
in this international process. It hopes to draw on the best intellectual resources 
available in this country, and to give the widest possible dissemination of results. 
In the critical period of the next 6 months it needs special funds to accomplish 
this purpose. 

No less important than the above research and international conference 
program is the whole field of popular education on the Far East. The war has 
opened up an unprecedented opportunity, with the public now awakened at 
last to the importance of the Pacific half of the world, and eager for knowledge. 
The IPR has an immense store of information packed in its scores of research 
publications. This now needs to be disseminated in simplified forms to a wide 
audience. 

Fortunately the American council has a tested program and staff in this field. 
Its staff is already overburdened, however, and seriously needs expansion. The 
past 8 months show that there is a new opportunity at almost every turn, if the 
personnel and funds can be secured to capitalize on the situation. 

For example : 

1. There is a great demand for popular pamphlets and teaching materials 
on the peoples of the Far East and the problems of war and postwar settlement 



3882 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

in this area. American schools and colleges are deplorably lacking in authentic 
materials on Asia ; today for the first time teachers realize this and are seeking 
to remedy the situation. Experience shows that sales returns will now cover 
publication costs on new pamphlet materials, but not the staff and overhead 
expenses incidental to the program. 

2. During the past year the IPR has experimented successfully with its own 
radio program on the Far East, and with documentary films. Both of these 
new channels of education should now be exploited on a large scale. 

The newly completed IPR motion picture. Know Your Enemy — Japan, is 
exfjected to find a wide audience through defense councils, the Army and Navy, 
schools, adult-education groups, etc. It should be followed this year with a 
series of additional educational films on modern India, China, the colonial areas 
of southeast Asia, etc. Similarly, the success of the council's weekly CBS pro- 
gram, Spotlight on Asia, argues for a more ambitious radio effort presented in 
more dramatic terms and with still more effective techniques. Both projects 
call for a staff person with the special competence required and with a full-time 
assignment to develop a program. 

3. The education of the American worker in international affairs is something 
scarcely touched yet by adult-education groups. A new opportunity now presents 
itself, particularly in war industries. To capitalize on it requires a special 
approach taking into account the interests, vocabulary and outlook of the worker. 
The council would like to recruit for its staff a young person directly from the 
field of labor organization and education, and to provide him with modest funds 
for travel, conference, and publication. With this might be linked certain work 
with editors and writers of cheap fiction magazines having a mass appeal ; there 
are indications that they might welcome assistance in presenting more objective 
information and attitudes on the peoples and problems of the Far East. A 
successful demonstration of the possibilities here might revolutionize traditional 
programs in popular education on international affairs. 

For some time the council has been working at least experimentally in all 
the above fields. It has a membership of 1,300 citizens scattered from Maine 
to Hawaii, a number of regional offices, long-established contacts with many 
educational groups, valuable library collections, and a nucleus of highly trained 
staff. It has two other assets especially important in this war period : a long- 
standing reputation for objective, nonpropagandist study, and membership in 
a working international community of scholars and educators from many 
vcountries. 

To push ahead rapidly and vigorously along these new lines of wartime 
education, however, it is in great need of added staff and working funds. The 
opportunity unquestionably is there : the problem is only to find the resources to 
realize it. If this can be done, the IPR will be in a position to make a funda- 
mental contribution toward a new understanding of the Far East at a decisive 
tui'ning point in the history of our relations with the billion people of Asia. 

The council will greatly appreciate a contribution to its 1942 budget in fur- 
therance of the objectives outlined above. If any further information is desired, 
we shall be glad to supply it. 
Sincerely yours, 

Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary. 

P. S. — For your records, I am forwarding a copy of the council's latest annual 
report, 1940^1. The 1941-42 report will be published shortly and will be mailed 
to you when it becomes available. 



Exhibit No. 572-B 

November 18, 1936. 
Mr. Roy Veatch, 

1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D. C. 

Dear Roy : I am sorry to have delayed so long in answering your request for 
suggestions as to possible candidates for the new Philippine office. I have been 
away from the office several days and this has held up the matter. 

Fred and Carter and I have all discussed the question and have picked out 
several possibilities. On a number of them our information is rather incom- 
plete, and, consequently, it is difficult to arrange them in a very definite order 
of priority. Obviously the appointment is of great importance, however, and 
we are anxious to see a thoroughly first-rate man in the position. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3883 

From what we know of him, Kenneth Colegrove is a promising person. His 
little pamphlet on "Militarism in Japan" seems to be a first-rate job, and Fred 
got a very favorable impression of him personally in a recent interview. Our 
personal contact with him, however, has not gone beyond this brief meeting. 
Possibly he suffers the handicap of having worked largely in the field of govern- 
ment rather than economics, but I should imagine that you would be primarily 
concerned in getting a man of first-rate ability with a broad understanding of 
far eastern affairs rather than a technician in the field of trade, etc. 

There come to mind the names of a number of people whom you must know 
better than we. There is Bill Stone, for example, who should be able to do a 
corking good job. What about Hayden, former vice governor, or Arthur Young, 
formerly of the State Department and recently with the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance? Both of them should have a thorough understanding of the Far East, 
combined with a good deal of administrative experience. Is either one avail- 
able, and does either have the qualifications you are looking for? 

One of the very best men you could have in that position is Phil Jessup, pro- 
fessor of international law at Columbia. Whether you would be able to secure 
him is a question, but he is a person of great promise. I have heard him men- 
tioned as a successor to Butler at Columbia. Another possibility is Bisson. As 
you know, he is a first-rate research man with a liberal social philosophy. I 
am somewhat doubtful as to whether he has the right personal qualifications; 
for the office, and perhaps his greatest contribution can be made riglit where he- 
is. It may also be true that his known views would disqualify him, but we- 
would put him well up on the list of possibilities. 

In addition, there are several other people, largely from the academic fieli?, 
who might be worth your consideration. These include Nicholas J. Spykman,' 
professor of international relations at Yale, Joseph Barnes, formerly secretary 
of the American council and now with the Herald Tribune. Charles E. Martin, 
professor of international law at the University of Washington, and Rupert 
Emerson of Harvard. Spykman we do not know very well, and perhaps his 
Dutch origin would disqualify him. Joe Barnes would probably do well if he 
could be lured away from journalism. Martin is perhaps the most available 
of these three, but the least imaginative. He is greatly interested in the Far 
East, and was an active participant in the l^osemite conference, though his 
approach is primarily that of the international lawyer. Rupert Emerson oc- 
curs to us as a possibility, largely because of his studies of colonial government in 
British Malaya under the auspices of the Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of Inter- 
national Research. 

It is apparent that there is a dearth of people with some special knowledge 
of the Philippines or of economic tendencies in the Far East. I am wondering 
whether you do not know someone of the Princeton group like Fetter or Whittle- 
say who might merit consideration. I wonder too whether Dr. Ernest Gruening 
might not be able to propose a likely candidate. Of course, I personally do not 
think you could do better than to kidnap Fred Field. He could do a superb job, 
but his departure from here would leave our organization completely flattened 
out. The papers report that Tugwell is out of a job. Now there is your man. 

I hope these suggestions may be of some use to you. They do not exhaust the 
possibilities by any means, but the list may include one or two names that you 
have overlooked. We shall be greatly interested in the choice that is made. 

If you are still expecting a visit from Fred and me, how would Tuesday, 
December 1, suit your convenience? We might come down that day if you can 
assemble your group. 
Sincerely yours, 

Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr. 
WWL : AA 



Exhibit No. 572-0 

November 15, 1937. 
Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, 

Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 

Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Hamilton : At Mr. Frederick Field's suggestion, I am sending you 
herewith a manuscript of a pamphlet on American policy in the Far East which 
we are shortly to publish. 



3884 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

We should be very grateful if you or someone in the Far Eastern Division 
would consent to look over this manuscript and send along any criticisms or 
suggestions which you might care to make. It often happens that outsiders 
writing upon these subjects make errors of factual statement or interpretation 
which can readily be pointed out by those to whom these matters are of direct 
And official concern. Before issuing this pamphlet to the public we would wel- 
come suggestions and comments from someone who speaks with authority in 
this field. I should add that this pamphlet is not intended to be a review of 
details of American policy nor an argument for any particular line of policy, 
but a simple presentation of the general background and of the major issues 
today. 

I shall greatly appreciate any suggestions which you will care to make. 
Sincerely yours, 

Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr. 



Department op State, 
Washington, November 30, 1937. 
Confidential 
Mr. William W. Lockwood, Jr., 

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. 
Dear Mr. Lockwood : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 
15, 1937, with which you enclosed a manuscript entitled "America and the Far 
Eastern War, World in Arms," with the request that I or someone in the Far 
Eastern Division look over the manuscript and send along any criticisms or sug- 
gestions which we might care to make. In accordance with that request the 
manuscript has been studied in the Division and certain comments thereon as to 
statements of fact are set forth in a memorandum attached to this letter. You 
will realize, of course, that neither the Division of Far Eastern Affairs nor the 
Department of State should be cited as the source of these comments. 
Sincerely yours, 

[s] Maxwell M. Hamilton. 
Enclosures : 

Memorandum. 

Secretary Hull's statement of July 16, 1937. 
Manuscript. 
(Penciled note:) Envelope double-sealed in wax. 



Exhibit No. 572-D 

Jantjart 4, 1938. 

IPE representative in WASHINGTON 

BL from WWL : 

If, as your letter indicates, the proposal for an IPR Washington representa- 
tive has come up for discussion, there are a few suggestions I might offer as 
to the functions which such a person might perform. Obviously it is important 
to have rather definitely in mind what our representative could most usefully 
do before laying any plans, even though it is true that a resourceful and ener- 
getic person would naturally create his own job to a large extent. 

As for Washington "society,"' I never made much nse of the black or white tie 
in Washington, and I don't know what the possibilities really are. Doubtless 
there are potential contributors there, but f see little reason to suppose that we 
should set out to cultivate directly the elderly dowagers of Washington any more 
than the social set of any other city. 

Nor is it likely that Washington is a particularly opportune place for a local 
educational program. Outside of the comparative small circle of government 
people, Washington is a rather provincial town with a good deal of the lethargy 
of a huge bureaucracy hanging over it, and with so much public affairs as its 
daily business that it is bored with the whole thing and is rather unreceptive to 
lectures, dinners, discussion groups, etc. 

The really important contacts in Washington are as follows: 

(1) administrative officials and legislators. 

(2) newsmen. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3885 

(3) private educational agencies (League of Women Voters, National 
Council; FPA, WIL, etc. 

(4) embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation. 

(5) universities. 

It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups, first, 
to extract from them the information, aid, and support which they can give to 
our national program, and second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of 
himself to them in a variety of ways. 

Given our present program and set-up, it should be recognized, I think, that 
the value of a Washington ofiice would be somewhat limited. It would become 
invaluable, however, as our program develops along new lines, as it is likely 
to do. The present limitations in this regard are threefold : First, as long as 
our chief and almost sole current publication is the Survey, we have little prac- 
tical use for the political information for which Washington is the preeminent 
source, both its ofBcial and its newsmen. If we did get the hot dope from tiie 
State Department, what would we do with it? 

Second, as long as our publications deal mainly with the general course of 
events in China and Japan rather than with the specific American angle of such 
events or with American affairs which have some relation to the Far East, Wash- 
ington contacts are also of limited aid. Excepting for the embassies — and this is 
a doubtful exception — I doubt if one can get in Washington a great deal of news 
from the Far East which is not available here. Its preeminence is as a source of 
information on what is going on in the United States, and the value of an IPR 
agency there would depend in part on how much we propose to concern ourselves 
with American shipping, investments, education, public opinion, etc. 

Third, our value to the people in Washington and the welcome we would receive 
depend on what we can give them in the way of information as to events, publi- 
cations, and what not in the Far East. It would hinge on whether our contacts 
through our international set-up enable us to offer anything of distinctive value. 
At present the IPR is so loosely knit and our contacts in the Far East so hap- 
hazard that we have little to offer in Washington through the continuous personal 
relationship which an IPR man might have there. The people there already 
have access to most of our sources of information and more besides. We can 
offer them a limited educational outlet and the support of our research program 
such as it is, it is true, and in this way we can enlist the interest and support of 
persons anxious to enlighten public opinion. On the whole, however, an IPR 
man starting out in Washington today, would find himself in the position of going 
hat in hand for information and assistance rather than bringing something the 
people there are eager to get. 

There are a good many things an IPR agency in Washington could do and it 
might be a swell job for someone to tackle. If there are limitations such as I 
have described and if they should be overcome, one way of contributing to this 
end would be for someone to start in down there. Some of the possibilities are 
as follows : 

(1) The Washington bureaus — agriculture, commerce, tariff, maritime, etc., are 
stuffed full of information on all aspects of American economic life and of 
economic developments abroad. Moreover, for most subjects of this sort with 
which we deal there are men who have spent their lives cramming up on the 
data and they are usually quite willing to cooperate with outsiders. I should say 
that roughly, a third of the Survey should be devoted to American-Far Eastern 
topics and that such studies can be done in Washington better than anywhere 
else. One obvious function of an IPR agency, then — although not the most 
important one — would be to serve as a branch of the New York research staff for 
the execution of certain projects. Moreover, the ideas and information picked 
up in Washington through this broadened contact might help to shape our whole 
program more realistically. 

(2) Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time 
drifting around among officials, Congressmen, and newsmen, developing personal 
contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an 
issue of Pacific relations and policy arose (Bill Stone has done this rather suc- 
cessfully, especially as regards armaments and naval policy). The importance 
of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connection. 
The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters in 
the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their dispatches. 
Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group since their offices are 
practically all in one building ,and since Washington is a comparatively small 
place. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompt- 
ing various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc. 



3886 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

As regards Congressmen, we should have to be quite wary. Under no circum- 
stances do we want to engage in lobbying. By slow personal contact, however, a 
relationship with the IPR which is now totally lacking might be built up 
informally. It is not diflHcuIt to imagine that under the circumstances of the 
last six months this contact might be valuable. The same, I think, can be said 
of relationships with administrative officials, and especially with the junior 
group who do most of the real brain work in Washington. This part of the 
job ought to be thoroughly enjoyable providing it was not aimless, and in the 
end it would be helpful all around. 

The value of such contacts with Congress, the State Department, and the 
correspondents would depend in part, I should think, on whether we plan to go 
into the field of political journalism. If we do, an agency in Washington would 
be just as indispensable for us as for the FPA. I doubt that we want to go 
very far in this direction, but as matters now stand we lack channels for 
effectively using the political information to be had in Washington. If we 
should eventually take over Amerasia or if we should start a mimeographed 
news sheet for American Council members, or something like that, it would 
be different. In any case if we expand along the lines of regional educational 
activities, a Washington bureau might be helpful in a variety of ways. 

(3) The universities in Washington are rather poor on the whole, and there is 
no use looking to them for a lot of good re.seareh in our field (Brookings stands 
in a somewhat different category). Nevertheless, there is a good deal of educa- 
tional effort in the field of public affairs and a growth of specialised training for 
government work. Our man might be able to associate himself with these ac- 
tivities through doing some teaching, taking part in discussion groups, etc., but 
this sort of thing would not add up to a great deal in its value to the IPK. 

(4) Another minor phase of the opportunity in Washington is a closer relation- 
ship with a handful of private agencies, including the ones named above, with 
the embassies, and with such offices as the ILO. etc. This need not be rated very 
high in the scale, for such contacts can be maintained from New York, but it 
would be all to the good if we had a man on the spot. 

(5) One more function of the IPR representative, and doubtless a fairly 
troublesome one, would be to trundle foreign visitors around. 

Thus the job suggests a combination of research and of contact work both to 
secure and supply current information and to pick up leads for our general 
national program. I dare say it would be something of a gamble at the start, 
but it seems to be a logical step in expansion. This step is especially important— 
in fact, it is essential — if we are to move further and further away from a strict 
research program appealing only to the academic world. It goes without saying 
that the individual chosen for the job would have to know his onions and be able 
to make his way as a person; otherwise he can do us a lot of damage. 

Incidentally, as a measure of economy it might be possible for the IPR repre- 
sentative to share the office and secretarial services of the FPA in Washington. 



Exhibit No. 572-E 

January 28. 1941. 
Miss Ruth Carter, 

Institute of Pacific Relations, 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. 

Dear Ruth : In answer to your Father's note I do not think I had better accept 
this radio engagement. Some time in the near future I shall probably be 
taking a jump across the country. If I sign up for March 5th in New York, I'm 
likely to find that this is just when I want to be in, say. Sun Valley. I think, 
therefore, that I had better be counted out although I regret to turn down the 
suggestion because right now people ought to be as helpful on this sort of thing 
as possible. 

As soon as I can dig up my copy of Corbett's manuscript I will send it along 
as requested by your Father. I have it at home with the intention of preparing 
a critical note but perhaps someone else can put it to better use. 

Stevens of the R. F. told me Friday that an urgent request had come from 
some Government department for an emergency training course in the Japanese 
language. Someone in Washington wants 30 or 40 competent language people 
overnight. A special course may be organized this spring, possibly at Harvard. 
Stevens mentioned this in passing and I didn't have a chance to get details. 
My information may not be quite accurate but further dope could doubtless be had 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3887 

from him. Your Father may be interested in knowing about this. It's ironical 
that the country neglects a matter of this Ivind over a long period of time 
despite the obvious need and then suddenly someone wakes up and wants a 
whole generation of trained linguists at 9 a. m. on Monday morning. 

Alger Hiss of the State Department was surprised to learn from me last week 
that Fred had resigned from the American council. I mention this because I 
rather inferred from what he said that some people in Washington may have 
associated Fred's views as expressed in the October AMERASIA as the present 
"line" of the American council. 

If and when the American council has another discussion conference on far- 
eastern policy I wish that Alger Hiss could be invited. Unless he felt too much 
muzzled I think that he could make a valuable contribution. 

One of the men in the State Department showed me two letters — or was it 
three — from Bill Elliott of Harvard more or less apologizing for the pro-Japanese 
slant of Mrs. Schumpeter's book and emphatically dissociating himself and the 
Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau from this point of view. This same State Department 
economist told me that he had concluded Mrs. Schumpeter's book was useless as 
source material because of its uncritical acceptance of Japanese sources. 
Sincerely yours. 

Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary. 
WWL : JB 



Exhibit No. 5T2-F 



Copies to ECC and WLH 
December 23, 1942. 



Mr. Lauchlin Currie, 

Room 228, State Department Building, 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Lauch : Enclosed herewith is a staff memorandum on the high points of 
the aiont Tremblant Conference. You may feel free to use the memorandum 
confidentially in any way you wish. 

Brief summaries of this sort never succeed in conveying the color and vitality 
of the round-table process, but I hope you may nevertheless find this of some 
value. 

The IPR now has the job of building on the foundation of this postwar discus- 
sion. In this connection we ought presumably to establish contacts with 
Governor Lehman's office — both to insure that full use is made of whatever value 
there may be in the conference documentation and discussion, and also to see what 
further IPR work would be most useful for the purpose of Governor Lehman's 
progi'am. After the first of the year we would like to discuss this with you. 

In a few days 1 will send you under separate cover a new set of IPR schoolbooks 
on the countries of Asia. They are just out and are already getting an enthu- 
siastic reception. One wishes that the State Department's Cultural Relations 
Division and the Ofiice of Education could see their way to assisting substantially 
in developing work of this type. The Rockefeller Foundation has now decided 
not to go extensively into this field, thus leaving pretty flat for the moment the 
ambitious plans of the IPR and American Council on Education for capitalizing 
on the new interest in the Far East among school authorities. 

One other matter — Wilma Fairbank has just written to say that she does not 
feel that she can accept our offer to her of the Washington IPR secretaryship. 
If you happen to think of anyone who might be a candidate, we would welcome 
nominations. 

Sincerely yours, 

Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary. 



88348—52— pt. 11 12 



3888 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 572-G 

Copies to: ECC 
MSF 
RL 
HM 
TGS 

Apeil 9, 1943. 

Mr. Feedeeick V. Field, 

American Peoples Fund, Inc., 

16 West Twelfth Street, Neio York City 
Dear Fred : This is to express the thanlis and appreciation of the American 
council for the action of the board of the American Peoples Fund, Inc., in voting 
a grant of $2,500 to the American council for the year 1943. 

I hope to see you shortly to discuss the questions raised in your letter of the 
seventh. At the moment Harriet Moore is out of the office with German measles, 
so perhaps we had better wait her return. 
Sincerely yours, 

Wm. W, Lockwood, Secretary. 



American Peoples Fund, Inc., 
16 West Tioelfth Street, New York City, April 7, 1943. 
Mr. William W. Lockwood, 

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y. 
Deiab Bill: Your allplcation for a grant from the American Peoples E\ind 
was considered at a meeting of the board of directors on April 2. The board 
voted a grant of $2,500 to be paid in one sum or installments at the discretion of 
the officers during the calendar year 1943, with the added reservation that before 
an initial payment is made projects of mutual interest to the IPR and the fund 
shall be worked out in greater detail with the directors of the fund. 

The IPR memorandum on a labor program for the American council, received 
the day of our board meeting, seems to indicate in general the kind of educa- 
tion and research on Pacitic affairs which the fund's directors would like to see 
launched in cooperation with labor groups. I look forward to an opportunity 
to discuss more fully the possibilities of this program. 
Sincerely, 

Frederick V. Field. 



Exhibit No. 572-H 

May 18, 1943. 
To : ECC. 
From: WWL, 

Thank you for the invitation to the May 27 meeting on collective security. It 
now looks as though I would not be in Washington on that date, but off some- 
where writing the final report on Lehman Study. If I am there, however, I 
would like very much to attend. 

A day or two after the last meeting, Alger Hiss spoke to me and said he felt 
that the purpose of the series was not clear, either from the selection of people 
attending or the agenda. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know that Frederick Field was the head of 
the American People's Fund ? 

Mr. Lockwood. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you recall having written to the American People's 
Fund asking them for a grant ? 

Mr. Lockwood. I recall that the American People's Fund did make 
a contribution to the American council and I presumably had corre- 
spondence with them in that connection. 

I would like to point out if it is appropriate 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3889 

Mr. LocKWOOD. There are two points I would like to make. One 
is that the total contribution from this source was, as I remember, 
$2,000, $3,000, or $3,500 perhaps in a year, in relation to a total budget 
of anywhere from $70,000 to $100,000. Second, that to my knowledge 
no conditions of any kind were attached to the contribution, nor was 
understood to be present by the council. 

Mr. Morris. You testified that the contributions from this source, 
American People's Fund, was $3,500 ? 

Mr. LocKwooD. No, sir. 

Senator Ex\stland. Two to three. 

Mr. LocKWOOD. I don't remember the amount; two or three thou- 
sand or $3,500. The record of course will show. 

Senator Eastland. Has Mr. Holland been sworn ? 

Mr. Morris. No ; he has not been sworn yet. 

Senator Eastland. Hold up your right hand. Do you solemnly 
swear the testimony you are about to give the Internal Subcommittee 
of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate will 
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mr. Holland. I do. 

Senator Eastland. Do you remember what that contribution was ? 

Mr. Holland. To the best of my recollection. Senator, it is $3,500. 

Senator Eastland. That is all. 

Mr. Morris. For what year was that? Is that for one year, Mr. 
Holland? 

Mr. Holland, That I can't quite recall. I think we do have a record 
of it in one of the annual reports or financial statements. 

Senator Eastland. Will you get that information, please, and put 
it in the record ? Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions of Mr. Lockwood. Have you 
anything else, Mr. Lockwood ? 

Mr. Lockwood. No, sir ; I think not. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland. 

TESTIMONY OP WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECEETAEY GENERAL, 
INSTITUTE OF PACIEIC RELATIONS, EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIR- 
MAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ACCOM- 
PANIED BY STUART MARKS, COUNSEL 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, do you have a statement with you ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement 
here which I would like the permission of the committee to read. 

Senator Eastland. Will you give me a copy? 

Mr. Morris. This is your second statement, is it not, Mr. Holland? 

Mr. Holland. That is true. 

Senator Eastland. 1 am going to order the statement printed in 
the record. 

Mr. Holland. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that you do not 
wish me to read it, then? I am just asking for information. I am 
not aware of the significance of your remark. 

Mr. Morris. The problem, Mr. Holland, is that Senator Eastland 
is pressed for time. 

Mr. Holland. I see. 



3890 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. The point is, everything in this statement is true, is 
it not? 

Mr. Holland. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. It is going to be put into the record in its entirety. 
Will yon make available copies of all of this to the press ? 

Mr. Holland. I will be glad to do so. 

Senator Eastland. In fact, he has already done so. 

Mr. Holland. Yes ; I have. 

Mr. Morris. So would any additional advantage accrue to you if you 
read the statement? 

Mr. Holland. I don't believe so, Mr. Chairman, 

Mr. Morris. You have been here before, have you not, Mr. Holland ? 

Mr. Holland. I have. 

Mr. Morris. You have made a statement. 

Senator Eastland. If you want to read it, I will let you read it. 

Mr. Holland. I appreciate your courtesy, sir. I think in that case 
if I might I would like simply to mention rather briefly four or five 
of the main points so as not to take up your time. 

Mr, Marks. There is one small point on this. There are two 
appendixes. 

Mr. Morris. We haven't come to that yet. 

Mr. Marks. They are referred to in the statement. It is just a 
question of what is going to be in the record. I didn't understand 
that the Senator said what would happen to these, Mr. Morris. He 
mentioned that he would order that statement into the record. 

Mr. Morris, That is right, 

Mr, Marks, But I wondered whether the Senator had ruled upon 
the appendixes, 

Mr. Morris. Yes, there is a question about the appendixes. I sug- 
gest, Mr. Holland, that you submit them to the Chair for consideration, 

Mr. Holland. Very well, 

Mr. Morris. You have noticed, Mr. Chairman, that the appendixes 
are not sworn statements. 

Mr. Holland. That is true. 

Mr. Morris, At the same time many of the statements in appendix I 
go back as far as 1947, 1 believe. In fact, the last man who gave testi- 
mony is now dead. 

Mr. Holland. I have now removed those from this particular col- 
lection, Mr. Morris. These include testimonials covering the years 
1950 or later. 

Senator Eastland. I will take that under advisement. 

Mr, Morris, There are two of those. 

Senator Eastland. I say I will take them under advisement. 

You may file them for consideration of the committee, 

(Mr, Holland's prepared statement follows :) 

Statement by William L. Holland, Secretary General, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions FOR Presentation to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal 
Security at His Second Public Hearing on March 19, 1952 

I am presenting this statement partly in order to supplement the prepared 
statement which I submitted in my previous hearing on October 10, 1951, and 
partly to clarify a number of points which have emerged from subsequent 
hearings of the subcommittee. I respectfully ask permission to read it, as other 
witnesses have been given this privilege and I was not give the opportunity to 
read my previous statement of October 10. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3891 



I believe such a statement is now needed because the subcommittee's hearings 
have gone on so long and ramified so far beyond the organization and activities 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations that it is increasingly difficult for the ordi- 
nary person to know precisely what the subcommittee is really trying to investi- 
gate or to establish. At times it has appeared as if the subcommittee were 
conducting a general inquiry into American Par Eastern policy. At other times 
the subcommittee seems to have been investigating the private opinions and 
writings of certain individuals. Again, at other times, the subject of inquiry 
seems to have been the opinions, policies, hopes, and programs of the Communist 
Party. 

A considerable part of the hearings has been devoted to matters which have 
no clear and direct relationship to the aims and work of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. Supposedly the institute is the object of investigation, and the printed 
record of the hearings carries the words "Institute of Pacific Relations" in 
prominent type on the top of the front page. Yet large sections of some volumes 
concern questions which have nothing whatever to do with the institute, or 
contain views of persons who have exerted no influence whatever in the policies 
or program of the institute. 

The subcommittee has the power to frame its own rules of procedure and to 
enlarge the scope of its inquiry as it pleases. But I feel it would be only fair 
that the subcommittee should make a more consistent effort than it has done 
hitherto to point out to the press and the public when it is really investigating 
the institute and when it is concerning itself with other problems, persons, or 
organizations which have little or nothing to do with the institute. 

On the assumiJtion that the subcommittee wishes to observe the "high standard 
of evidence and truly objective approach" to which Senator McCarran referred 
at the opening session last July, I venture to point out a few ways in which 
the subcommittee has thus far failed to take certain obvious steps which would 
seem essential to any impartial inquiry into an organization. 

In the first place, the subcommittee has thus far given no public indication 
of having made any careful analysis and appraisal of the hundreds of books, 
pamphlets, conference papers, and articles which have been issued under IPR 
auspices during the past quarter century and by which it is mainly known to 
the scholarly world and to the general public. The IPR officers and most rea- 
sonable people maintain that its publications are by far the most important 
evidence of the institute's value as a nonpartisan research organization and 
are the true measure of its influence in advancing knowledge about far eastern 
and Pacific countries. 

On March 1 and again on August 13, 1951, after the subcommittee's counsel 
had assured me of his desire to study any materials which the institute's officers 
wished to submit, I sent several hundred representative publications of the 
institute covering a wide range of countries, topics, and periods of time. How- 
ever, many weeks later at the time of my own hearing on October 10, I observed 
the packages in which these publications had been sent lying still unopened 
outside his office. There is still no evidence in the subcommittee's record to 
indicate that the institute's publications have been analyzed. 

I recognize that the Senators with their many other duties may not feel that 
they have the time to read and appraise a substantial portion of the institute's 
published output. It may also be that the subcommittee's staff lacked the 
time or expert knowledge to analyze some of the numerous specialized or techni- 
cal publications of the IPR. Nevertheless, it would seem only rea.sonable to 
expect that after these many months during which they have found time to 
make the most minute examination of old and often inconsequential IPR cor- 
respondence files, they would have been able to insert into the public record a 
general description and analysis of the content of at least a representative 
sample of the institute's publications. 

If the subcommittee is unable to take this necessary step, then I suggest that 
the time has come for it to seek the independent opinion of outside Far Eastern 
scholars who are familiar with the IPR's research activities and publications 
and can readily supply a professional appraisal of them. There are many 
eminently qualified persons who are available and have played no significant 
part in the formulation or execution of IPR programs. I have in mind such 
people as current or past presidents of the Far Eastern Association (which 
is the principal learned society of far eastern specialists). 

The IPR, like other voluntary private research organizations in the field of 
international affairs, can exist and continue to maintain its reputation and 



3892 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

financial support only to the extent that it preserves proper standards of scholar- 
ship, accuracy, balance, and comprehensive coverage. Its success or failure in 
doing this must be measured by the professional judgment of qualified scholars 
and experts in the field. This statement remains true even though there are 
bound to be cases where the experts will differ among themselves on particular 
issues or publications. 

From my own long and intimate acquaintance with the institute's confer- 
ences, research projects and publications, I am confident that any dispassionate 
examination of the approximately 1,190 titles (containing about 114,460 pages) 
and the 18,480 pages of periodical articles which the IPR has issued or spon- 
sored will show that only a tiny fraction deal with communism. Of this frac- 
tion, only a very small portion could he described even by the most hostile critic 
as Communist propaganda. There were, of course, a few documents which 
were clearly labeled as Communist and which were presented for informa- 
tional purposes. As I pointed out in my statement of October 10, 19.51, no IPR 
publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies 
or programs. 

I stress the importance of such an independent appraisal of IPR publications 
because we are here concerned with the great principle of freedom of expression 
and freedom of scholarly publication generally. In the course of the subcom- 
mittee hearings, a very small number of articles, pamphlets, or books (or fre- 
quently isolated or unrepresentative passages from them) have been cited as 
examples of IPR publications which someone has alleged to contain Communist 
propaganda. Yet, because of the subcommittee's failure to describe the character 
of the overwhelmiug majority of the IPR publications, the general public, reading 
about the investigation in the newspapers, is likely to get the idea that much 
of the material published or sponsored by the IPR is somehow tainted with 
communism. The fact is, however, that no one has made any such allegation 
either before the subcommittee or elsewhere. 

That is why I think the subcommittee should make it clear to the public 
that not even the most biased witness called has alleged that anything more than 
an infinitesimal proportion of the institute's total output could be called 
communistic. 

Having said that, let me now make it plain that I do not think the value and 
integrity of the institute should be judged by the very negative test of how little 
pro-Communist material it has published. It should be judged far more by the 
test of its positive contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge and 
public luiderstanding of Far Eastern and Pacific area problems. I would note 
that such contributions to knowledge in the present state of affairs in the Far 
East certainly ought to include descriptive and unemotional accounts of Com- 
munist policies and practices in such areas as China and southeast Asia. 
There Avould indeed be something seriously wrong with the IPR if, for fear of 
attack by partisan critics, whether Communist or anti-Communist, it became 
so timed as to refrain from publishing articles or books which described what 
important Communist governments or groups are saying or doing in the Far 
East. 

II 

Let me turn now to the allegation that the Communists secretly got control of 
the IPR in past years and exerted, through it, a sinister influence on the policies 
of the Government. Much of the evidence so far produced on this point before 
the subcommittee is flimsy and not even plausible. Some of the assertions 
made by witnesses are, I believe, demonstrably untrue, while others are vague or 
irrelevant. A good many documents from the IPR's ov,'n files have been intro- 
duced, often out of context, and with the most farfetched interpretation put on 
them. 

I believe that the American press and public are intelligent and fair-minded 
enough to make their own interpretation. Visits to Moscow, conversations with 
Russian Communists, and the like, can be interpreted only by a violent distor- 
tion of meaning as evidence of some secret Communist conspiracy. It is in- 
credible that if IPR people were really engaged in a secret conspiracy they would 
have left such voluminous, frank, and detailed written records and have allowed 
the FBI to examine them. The same facts can, however, be interpreted much 
more reasonably as part of the normal operations of a nonpartisan international 
organization engaged in work in or concerning many countries, including 
Russia. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3893 

Now just suppose that the second interpretation is correct, that the IPR is 
what its officers and members claim it is, a private researcli organization trying 
to advance public knowledge of Asia. That would account for the fact that vari- 
ous IPR people who have been questioned by the subcommittee about things that 
happened or were written 10 or 15 years ago have often had to reply that they 
don't remember, or that their memory was inaccurate. Only if you start out 
with the idea that these people were conspirators would such answers seem 
evasive. If you start with tlie idea that these people were perfectly innocent, 
then their conduct appears quite normal. It would be extraordinary to find 
someone who could give, olThand, a full, precise account of a letter that he wrote 
a decade ago or a casual conversation that he had with a colleague, which was 
part of his normal routine of work and didn't seem unusual or important at the 
time. 

What, then, can be said of allegations that Communists "infiltrated" the IPR? 
First of all it should be noted that the word "infiltrate" in this context is a 
very nebulous term, with many different meanings for different people. To some 
people, however, the testimony before the subcommittee may suggest that a good 
many years ago some Communists hoped or tried to use the IPR to spread dis- 
guised Communist propaganda. It does not show that they succeeded in this 
aim. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that if such an attempt was 
made, it failed ignominiously. 

The clearest proof of this lies in the IPR's publications, which are its principal 
activity, and which have not followed a particular line but have represented 
many different and often conflicting schools of thought. 

Why did the Communists fail to make any appreciable headway in the IPR? 
Very few people in the 1930s and early 1940s in the IPR or elsewhere believed 
there was any serious danger of Communist infiltration. Investigation of the 
political beliefs or afiiliations of its employees or members or writers to keep 
out anyone who might be a Communist sympathizer was alien to the traditions 
of American scholarly research. 

The reason why the Communists could not get control of the institute was 
simply because the IPR has operated on the democratic principles of free inquiry 
and open discussion, and Communist propaganda cannot succeed in such an 
atmosphere. 

Anybody who is an American citizen can join the American IPR, whatever his 
political beliefs or afiiliations. Hence the membersliip of the American IPR is a 
pretty good cross section of American opinion, and if there are any Communist 
members they are swamped in the mass, as they are in Amei-ica as a whole. 

To do its research the IPR has always sought the services of tlie best-qualified 
scholars it can find. It does not inquire into their political affiliations, only into 
their scholarly competence, but actually very few of the persons who have written 
for the IPR have even been alleged to be Communists. If any Communist author 
ever got his work publislied by the IPR by passing himself off as a non-Com- 
munist, it was only because in that piece of writing he had confined himself to 
accurate, factual reporting or had watered down his Communist views to the 
point of invisibility. 

There is a moral in all this which all Americans today might do well to remem- 
ber. It is that in the long run we cannot fight communism merely by looking 
under the bed for Communists. We have to be working for something, not merely 
against something. In the IPR's case it has been working for the advancement 
of knowledge through free, rational, scientific study and democratic discussion. 
If any disguised Communist got into the organization, he could not do any harm 
in an atmosphere of open discussion. He was not able to infect a healthy 
organism. 

Being strongly opposed to communism myself, I think it right to combat Com- 
munist propaganda and expose Communist activities. But I think we ought 
always to remember that if, in our zeal for combatting communism, we jettison 
our American ideas of fair play, free inquiry and free speech, then we are really 
laying ourselves wide open to communism itself. 

Ill 

May I now call attention also to an indirect result of the subcommittee's 
activities which not only affects the IPR itself but may have vei'y serious 
results for innocent people? There are thousands of loyal and respectable 
people who have had some connection with the TPR in its 27 years of existence — 
as members, or employees, or delegates to conferences, or members of study 



3894 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

groups, or contributors to its publications, or publishers of its books — and 
against whom witnesses before the subcommittee have made no charges whatever. 
If. as the result of headlines inspired by the subcommittee's hearings, the 
IPR comes to be associated in the public mind with the idea of a Communist 
conspiracy, or espionage or subversive activities, any of these people may, 
in the present climate of American opinion, suffer serious injury, even though 
no one has ever suggested that they had anything to do with communism or 
espionage. 

It therefore seems to me urgently necessary that the subcommittee should 
in fairness make it very clear in a public way, and repeatedly, that the many 
loyal citizens who have worked or been associated with the IPR are not 
suspect on that account. 

Moreover, the allegations mostly refer to things that are said to have 
happened many years ago. So far as I know, no one has seriously made the 
claim that the IPR today is under Communist control. (Of course, I am 
certain that it was never under Communist control — and I have been with 
the organization since 1929.) 

But even the most biased witnesses before the subcommittee would probably 
agree that there is no reason to impugn the reputation of the IPR as it exists 
today — an organization which is doing a much-needed job of advancing American 
knowledge of the Far East. 

IV 

I now come to another example of how the subcommittee has thus far 
neglected to take an obvious step to bring out the truth about the institute's 
claim to be a nonpartisan organization. I refer to the question of whether 
the IPR or its officers have attempted to influence the policy of the State 
Department in a pro-Communist direction. Surely one of the best ways to 
find out the truth on this question would be to seek information from the men 
who were responsible officers of the Department concerned with Far Eastern 
affairs during the period when the alleged attempts took place, and could 
thus speak with knowledge. I therefore urge the subcommittee to call on 
such present or former senior officials as Stanley K. Hornbeck, Joseph C. 
Grew, Maxwell Hamilton, Eugene Dooman, Abbot Low Moffatt, Joseph W. 
Ballantine, Walter Butterworth, and John Allison and ask them whether they, 
or other Department officials to their knowledge, ever received or sought advice 
in United States foreign policy from the IPR or its officers. Mr. Ballantine 
has already written the IPR that he knows of no such cases of IPR advice 
being offered or requested. 

At least one of these officials, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, has already been 
questioned by the subcommittee in executive session, and part of his testimony 
has been made part of the public record. If Dr. Hornbeck was asked in 
executive session the question suggested above, neither the question nor the 
reply has been made public. Mr. Eugene Dooman also testified at an earlier 
public session but not on the institute, and there is no indication wJiether 
he was asked the above question. I think the public, the IPR officers, and 
the members of the subcommittee have a right to know how the above- 
mentioned officials would answer such a question. It is my firm belief that their 
replies would show that the State Department in fact never allowed its 
formulation or execution of United States foreign policy to be shaped by advice 
from the IPR. 

The subcommittee's counsel has made a labored effort to imply that the presence 
of some present or former American IPR employees or trustees at the State 
Department's conference on Far Eastern problems in October 1949 is an indica- 
tion of IPR "influence." This contention will not hold water. It was made 
perfectly clear that the persons present (from banks, universities, and research 
institutions) were not speaking for the organizations to which they were at- 
tached, but only for themselves. Indeed, it is noteworthy that neither of the 
institute's two executive officers (Mr. Clayton Lane and myself) was invited to 
the conference. Moreover, it was plain that among those persons attending, who 
happened to have some present or past connection with the IPR, there was no 
identity of views. 

V 

The subcommittee has made much of the fact that several people, alleged to be 
connected with the IPR, have refused to state under oath whether they are or 
were Communists. Most of these, as the subcommittee must have known, never 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3895 

had any significant connection witli the institute. Only four of them were ever 
IPR officers or employees. Only two (including Mr. Frederick V. Field) had 
ever held executive positions and neither, while holding these positions, ever 
gave any sign of departing from the institute's tradition of nonpartisan research 
or of allowing it to be used for Communist propaganda purposes. 

Personally, I regret and deeply deplore the action of the persons who refused 
to answer. I know that their refusal creates a suspicion in the minds of some 
people that they really were Communists at one time. Nevertheless, suspicion 
is not proof of guilt, and one can envisage circumstances in which a person, 
especially if already accused by others of having been a Communist or "consid- 
ered" as a Communist, would decline to answer even though knowing the accusa- 
tion to be untrue. Moreover, the refusal of the four above-mentioned persons 
certainly does not prove that they were Communists when they were IPR em- 
ployees. I can only reaffirm that their writing and other work for the IPR was 
good, and in their conduct as IPR employees there was no ground for criticism. 

I stress this particularly in the case of Mr. L. K. Rosinger, since it was I who 
engaged him in 1948 to prepare a survey since published as "The State of Asia." 
Rosinger already had an excellent reputation as a writer and lecturer on the 
Far East and had been for several years the Far Eastern specialist of the Foreign 
Policy Association. In his work for the IPR, I found him completely candid 
and honorable and a scrupulously careful researcher who sought and gladly 
accepted criticism of his manuscripts and meticulously respected the institute's 
tradition of scholarly work. Many other Far Eastern scholars who know him 
and his writings could testify in the same way about him. I recognize that many 
will now feel doubtful about his past affiliations. Personally I feel certain that 
he was not a Communist when he worked for the IPR. Even though I have 
sometimes disagreed with him on specific points, I do not believe that his writings 
and lectures were those of a Communist. 

In a memorandum dated October 8, 1951, to me, Mr. Rosinger made the follow- 
ing remarks which I still believe to be sincere and truthful : 

"I have worked at the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of three years : 
from September 1939 through August 1940, and again from September 1948 to 
mid-October 1950. Neither in these years nor at any other time have I .seen even 
the slightest evidence of the existence of any 'cell,' Communist or othei'wise, 
within the IPR or in connection -with it. In reading IPR publications over the 
years, I have not observed in them an adherence to any particular approach to 
Far Eastern questions, but rather a variety of viewpoints. As far as my own 
work is concerned, my sole guide in everything I have written has been my 
independent judgment of the facts, based on painstaking study, without adherence 
to any line. Communist or otherwise. In accordance with standard IPR pro- 
cedure and my own desire, the books I have written for the IPR have been sub- 
mitted before publication to specialists of widely different viewpoints in an effort 
to insure balance and accuracy. It has been my practice to take such outside 
comments into account in revising my manuscripts for publication." 

VI 

The subcommittee has made repeated references to T. A. Bisson's article, 
"China's Part in a Coalition War" in the Far Eastern Survey for July 14, 1943. 
This point deserves special attention because it concerns one of the serious and 
specific charges made against Mr. Bisson and the IPR. namely that this article 
was written and "planted" in the magazine on Instructions from American Com- 
munist leaders as part of a plan to attack the Chinese Nationalist Government 
and play up the Chine.se Communists as agrarian reformers. It seems extraor- 
dinary therefore that the subcommittee has not yet taken the obvious step 
of asking the author for a statement on the matter. 

As a matter of elementary fairness to Mr. Bisson and the IPR, I maintain 
that the subcommittee should take note of his memorandum of September 15, 
1951, to me in which he states : "In my experience with the institute I saw not 
the slightest evidence that the organization was part of a 'Soviet espionage net- 
worlv' or that it contained a 'Communist cell' that was influencing its policies. 
I am not and have not been a Communist and I deny most emphatically that any 
of the numerous articles appearing under my name in institute publications 
was written at the behest or under the influence of the Communist Party." (In 
the appendix to this statement I present the full text of Mr. Bisson's memoran- 
dum with an accompanying letter of commendation from Gen. Courtney Whitney, 
his former chief in SCAP Headquarters, Tokyo.) 



3896 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I request the subcommittee to make these documents part of the printed record 
and also to insert as exhibits in the record the whole text of Mr. Bisson's article, 
"China's Part in a Coalition War" together with Dr. C. L. Hsia's reply to it and 
Mr. Bisson's further comment in the August 11, 1943, issue of the Far Eastern 
Survey. 

VII 

For the same reasons of fairness I ask the subcommittee to insert as exhibits 
in the record the other documents in the appendix, consisting of letters or state- 
ments which the institute has received from several other persons who have been 
accused by witnesses before the committee and have not yet had an opportunity or 
have not been able to appear pu))licly before the subcommittee. (Joseph 
Barnes, Benjamin Kizer, Laurence E. Salisbury, and Marguerite A. Stewart), 
together with memoranda, prepared by me and my staff, correcting misleading 
impressions which have appeared in the subcommittee's hearings concerning the 
content of three IPR publications : Land of the Soviets, Wartime China, and Our 
Job in the Pacific. 

VIII 

In a recent letter to the institute's legal counsel, the chairman of the subcom- 
mittee has indicated that he may be prepared to consider the possibility of al- 
lowing me to present a number of testimonials and other statements from Far 
Eastern specialists and other persons well qualilled to speak of the value of the 
institute's work. Accordingly, I submit herewith, as appendix II, a preliminary 
collection of such statements with the request that they be made part of the 
subcommittee's printed record. I also respectfully request the permission of the 
subcommittee to present, before the subcommittee completes its work, additional 
statements of this kind which the IPR may receive from qualified persons in this 
country and abroad. 

IX 

As an institute officer, with some natural pride in its purposes and achieve- 
ments, I would be less than human if I did not feel some resentment at the way 
in which the subcommittee has sometimes operated. By the one-sided character 
of its earlier proceedings, I feel that it has permitted the good name of the IPR 
to be blackened in the eyes of the public and its work to be misrepresented by 
witnesses who are utterly ignorant of its aims and methods and clearly unquali- 
fied to express opinions on it. Nevertheless I have made, and am still eager to 
make, an earnest effort to aid the subcommittee in completing its inquiry in a 
more orderly and impartial manner. The institute officers did not and do not 
object to a fair and comprehensive investigation of its past or present work 
and will not be afraid to acknowledge current or former mistakes if these are 
clearly demonstrated on the basis of an impartial appraisal of all the evidence. 

The institute officers will not hesitate to admit, if the evidence justifies it, 
that Communists or ex-Communists may have been employed on the IPR staff 
or have written for its publications. The possibility of this, and the possibility 
of Communist attempts to influence the character of the institute's pul»lications, 
has always been recoguiz 'd. This is a risk which the IPR has shared with 
dozens of other organizations. 

But on the kind of evidence thus far produced by the subcommittee I cannot 
see that any fair-minded person would agree that the institute was either 
controlled by the Communists or successfully infiltrated and "taken over by 
Communist design and made a vehicle for attempted control and conditioning 
of American thinking and American policy with regard to the Far East." These 
were the words used by Senator McCarran in an interview given to U. S. News 
and World Report on November 3 6, 1951. Even more emphatically do I reject 
and deny the slanderous insinuations which hnve emerged from some of the 
subcommittee hearings that the institute has been an espionage organization. 

Similarly I reject the repeated but tmsubstantiated suggestions of some 
subcommittee members that the Institute officers or staff were engaged in a con- 
spiracy to advance Communist or Russian aims and I protest, as legally and mor- 
ally unwarranted, the continued assumption of an unproved conspiracy (which 
I am certain did not exist) as the excuse for the admission of flimsy and untested 
hearsay testimony. I do not question the right of the subcommittee to listen 
to hearsay testimony, but I do challenge the use of spurious arguments which 
would give such hearsay a wholly unjustified legal validity. 

Because I believe that there is still time for the subcommittee to conclude its 
work in an impartial manner and thus perform a valuable public service as well 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3897 

as render justice to the IPR and to the many loyal citizens who are connected 
with it, I earnestly appeal to the subcommittee to accede now to the reasonable 
requests v.'hich the American IPR chairman, Mr. Gerard Swope, and the insti- 
tute's legal counsel made last year and which have not yet been answered. 
Those requests included the following : that the institute officers be given access 
to its files which the subcommittee illegally seized over a year ago ; and that the 
institute officers be granted adequate opportunity (with due notice and sufficient 
time for preparation) to reply to chai'ges against it. 

My main purpose in making this statement has been to appeal, in a spirit of 
reasonableness, to the basic American instinct of fair play. The uncovering of 
subversive forces is, of course, a serious business and one which must continue 
to engage the full energies of such highly competent professional agencies as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice. The IPR officers 
have cooperated loyally and gladly with those agencies ever since the institute 
invited the FBI to examine its tiles in ly'iO, and are still cooperating actively. 
I suggest, in no flippant sense, that the excessive concentration of attention which 
the siibcommittee is giving to the IPR is undeservedly flattering to this small 
and unexciting organization. I have sometimes rubbed my eyes in wonderment 
that this institute, with its tiny staff of only 4 senior members and 11 junior and 
clerical workers, can be the object of so much valuable senatorial time and 
expenditure of public funds. 

I have tried, but vainly, to adjust my mind to the idea that all those dull IPR 
publications on my shelves, most of them so specialized and uninteresting that 
it is a constant struggle to find publishers for them, can somehow have been an. 
instrument of Communist siibversion or espionage. I have tried to imagine that 
the hundreds of informal letters and interoffice memoranda, some thoughtful, 
some dull, some silly, jocular, and inconsequential, which were casually stored 
in never-locked office files, can now by some jisychological change of political 
climate be transformed into sinister evidence of infiltration and diabolical under- 
mining of FnitPd States Far Eastern policy planners. I have asked myself: 
Can it be possible that this institute, which for decades had the warm and active 
cooperation of conservative Chinese scholars and businessmen and_ prominent 
men in the Chinese Nationalist Government, which received financial support 
from such groups right up to 11)49 when the Communists took over the country, 
could have worked to bring about the Communist victory in China? 

I have tried liard to imagine these things, but my imagination balks at such 
leaps into the world of fantasy. And so. in all earnestness, I urge the subcom- 
mittee members to ask themselves: May we not have been given a wrong steer? 
Might it not be wise instead to look into the real motives of those who induced 
the" subcommittee to launch this investigation by illegally seizing the IPR files 
and who obviously wish to thwart free scholarly inquiry and discussion on the 
vitally important problems of the Far East? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, are there any parts of this prepared 
statement that yon won Id like to have emphasized ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes, I think I can do it quite briefly if you will per- 
mit me. 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

Mr. Holland. 'On page 2, 1 stress and earnestly bring to the atten- 
tion of the subcommittee the fact that we believe that a much more 
detailed and serious attempt should be made by the subcommittee staff 
before it concludes its work to analyze the content and balance and 
general scholarly standing and validity of the very large quantity of 
publications which the institute has put out, and a large selection of 
which I sent many months ago to the subcommittee. For reasons 
that the two previous witnesses today have given, we feel that these 
publications constitute the major test and measurement of the value 
of the institute's work. 

Senator Eastland. What about your present files? I think the 
staif will have to have access to them. 

Mr. Holland. To our present files, sir? 

Senator Eastland. Certainly. 



3898 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Holland. Mr. Chairman, the situation as I understand it at 
the moment is that the staff of the committee has complete access to 
any and all files of the institute whether here or in New York, and 
Mr. Morris and Mr. Mandel have in fact been through our files there 
and made a number of selections. 

Senator Eastland. All right. 

Mr. Holland. That remains the case, I think. Those are open at 
all times. 

Mr. Morris. The committee is exploring the possibility of making 
these available to you for a period of the next few weeks, Mr. Holland. 
I think you have asked for a period of 1 month. 

Mr. Holland. That is one of the other points in my statement here. 

Mr. Morris. If you would be willing to have someone work here in 
the Senate building, most of the files would be accessible to you up- 
stairs. If you have someone there, they would be working under the 
same conditions that our people work under, not the most agreeable 
conditions, but at any time you want to do that, the committee wants 
you to have full access to all those files. 

Mr. Holland. I wish to express the thanks for this. I take it that 
this is the formal answer to the request which our counsel have ad- 
dressed to te committee which up to now has not been answered. 

Mr. Morris. You can appreciate that it would be impossible for us 
to turn them back to you again because many of them are still being 
used. At the same time you require for your side of this maybe 
something in here that supplements some of the evidence that we have. 

Mr. Holland. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I might say in 
passing that I think this is a substantial evidence of what I could call 
fairness on the committee's part and I would like that to be noted. 

The other point which I want to stress in my statement is the fact 
that, as we think, the most conclusive evidence of the failure of any 
possible attempts at Communist infiltration in the Institute of Pacific 
Relations in the past years is to be found in the character of its con- 
ferences and publications, that had there been a successful infiltration 
this must have shown itself in the bias of the publication. 

Senator Eastland. Would all these Communists be swarming 
around you if they didn't penetrate your organization? 

Mr. Holland. Senator Eastland, I think you asked me that question 
last time I was here, and I felt obliged to answer as I do now, that I do 
not find evidence of a large swarm of Communists, as you put it. 

Senator Eastland. You do not find evidence of a large swarm of 
Communists in your organization? 

Mr. Holland. I find evidence of a small number of people who are 
alleged to have been Communists. 

Senator Eastland. Wlio were they? How many Communists were 
in your organization there? 

Mr. Holland. Sir, I can tell you the name of only one whom I feel 
positive was a Communist at the time that he either worked for IPR. 
or is — — 

Senator Eastland. That is Field, is it not ? 

Mr. Holland. No, sir; it is not. 

Senator Eastland. You do not think Frederick V. Field is a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Holland. I indicated in my last testimony that I regard him 
as a 100 percent fellow traveler but at the time he worked for the 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3899 

institute I did not so feel and even now I am not convinced that he 
was a Communist at that time. In his recent activities as I indicated 
I regard him as a decided pro-Communist. 

Senator Eastland. You think he is a pro-Communist but not a 
Communist ? 

Mr. HoLiiAND. I have no evidence, sir, that he was a party member, 
but his actions were such that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow 
traveler. 

Senator Eastland. How many pro-Communists did you have 
swarming around your organization? 

Mr. Holland. Sir, I cannot accept your word "swarming" or even 
the implication that there are a large number. If you want my candid 
opinion, I would emphasize based on testimony which has come out 
before this committee, I would say there are possibly three or four 
people whom I can think of whose subsequent actions suggest to me 
that they may have been Communists, but whom I cannot feel there 
is certainty. I am quite willing to name those. I would say that in 
his subsequent activities there is a likelihood that Mr. Chi was a Com- 
munist. I have not seen evidence which convinces me that he was 
a Communist when he worked for the IPR. On the contrary, the 
evidence is the other way, that he was 

Senator Eastland. Come, now. Who else was pro-Communist ? 
Name the others. 

Mr. Holland. The only other ones it seems to me there is a reason- 
able possibility that they may have been — I can't say more than that — 
are Mr. Y. Y. Hsu 

Senator Eastland. Is that all ? 

Mr. Holland. I said three or four, Mr. Chairman. The other one 
that I want to mention here is Mr, Israel Epstein, and I judge him 
simply by his actions in the last 2 or 3 years. 

Senator Eastland. Yes. Here is testimony that is undisputed that 
one of the big shots in the institute wrote a book, and that book was 
laid down by the Communist Party — not a front organization but by 
the Communist Party — as party doctrine in this country. The stu- 
dents of communism, Communist Party members — the testimony is 
undisputed — were instructed to read that book to get the official Com- 
munist policy for Asia. That does not arouse any suspicion — no ques- 
tion mark — in your mind that that man was a Communist? 

Mr. Holland. Sir, I will have to ask you to whom you are refer- 
ring. 

Senator Eastland. Mr. Lattimore. 

Mr. Holland. If it is Mr. Lattimore's book. Solution in Asia, or 
Situation in Asia, then I have to point out to you, sir, that these were 
not IPR books and Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the institute 
at that time and had not been for many years. 

Senator Eastland. He molded your policies. You know that. 

Mr. Holland. No, sir ; I deny that categorically, sir. These books 
had nothing to do with the institute. They were written many years 
after Mr. Lattimore ceased to be and he was not even in a position 
where he could influence the policy of the institute. 

Senator Eastland. It is very strange, then, to me that these people 
were all wool and a yard wide when they worked for IPR., when their 
actions to any reasonable mind would tend to show that they were, to 
say the very least, fellow travelers and under discipline. Then later 



3900 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

when it gets out and they openly affiliate with Communists, you say 
they might have been years later, but they were all right when they 
were with us. How do you know that ? 

Mr. Holland. Sir, I have indicated I do not know for sure. 

Senator Eastland. Then why do you make the statement that they 
were not Communists when they were with your organization? 

Mr. H0L1.AND. Because there is no conclusive evidence that they 
were, sir, and I believe that a committee like this should base its find- 
ings, as I should, on conclusive evidence. I do not think 

Senator Eastland. You think we should be reasonable men. 

Mr. Holland. I do not rule out the possibility, sir, that these people 
may secretly have been Communists. 

Senator Eastland. Of course. 

Mr. Holland. The only ones that I feel there is a reasonable pos- 
sibility on that, are these ones that I have just now mentioned. I felt 
I should do that in frankness. 

Senator Eastland. Is there anything else that you want to point 
out there, Mr. Holland ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes. I want just to point out that in this statement 
I suggest one or two courses of action which it would seem to me, 
if taken by the committee, would insure a more fair-minded appraisal 
at the end of the committee's work of the true nature of the institute. 
One of those is that one of the best waj^s of testing the quality of the 
institute's public work is to seek the opinion of qualified professional 
peofjle in the far-eastern field. I know I have no power to tell the 
committee how to conduct its work, but I do suggest 

Senator Eastland. Wait a minute. That is a question that the 
committee will go into. 

Mv. Holland. I recognize that, Mr. Chairman, but I do mention 
this is one of the points in my statement. 

The next one is that a great deal has been made out of the fact that 
the institute has in undesirable or improper ways influenced the policy 
of this country, particularly the far-eastern policy. I suggest that 
one of the crucial ways in which to test the truth or the falsity of that 
allegation is very simply to ask the responsible officers who were con- 
nected with the Far Eastern Division of the State Department over 
those years, and I therefore venture to suggest here that the com- 
mittee ask this question of such people as Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Grew, 
Mr, Maxwell Hamilton, Mr. Eugene Dooman, Mr. Abbot Low Mof- 
fatt, Mr. Joseph Ballantine, Mr. Walton Butterworth, and Mr. John 
Allison. 

Senator Eastland. Did you read Mr. Dooman's testimony ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes, sir; and I remember very clearly that Mr. 
Dooman spoke to me immediately afterward in this room and said that 
he had made a point of not discussing the affairs of the IPR. 

Senator Eastland. That testimony stands for itself. 

Mr. Holland. But it was not concerned about the IPR, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

Senator Eastland. I think it was. I think it very definitely was. 

Mr. Holland. I will have to register m}^ disagreement on that, 
sir. 

Senator Eastland. You may proceed. 

Mr. Holland. I wish also to register this fact — and I do this again 
because I think I should be frank with the committee — that I per- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3901 

sonally very mucli regret and deplore the action of tlie persons here 
who have refused to answer the question of whether they were or 
were not Communists. I know that their refusal to do this creates a 
suspicion in the minds of some people that really were at some time 

Senator Eastland. That suspicion is reasonable, is it not? 

Mr. Holland. I have indicated that I recognize it does create a 
suspicion in the minds of some people. 

Senator Eastland. It is a reasonable suspicion, is it not? 

Mr. Holland. I wish to state what I have 

Senator Eastland. No ; I want you to answer my question. 

Mr. Holland. My answer, sir, is that in some of these cases it 
seems to be a reasonable suspicion and in some it does not. In par- 
ticular I want to emphasize that suspicion is not proof of guilt, and 
at least in some cases I am myself certain that these people were not 
Communists when they worked for the IPR. 

Senator Eastland. Wouldn't you think that man w^ho is accused 
of treason to his country — that is what a Communist is — who is accused 
of being the very vilest and lowest creature that there is, when he is 
asked the question whether he is guilty or not, would be most anxious 
if he wasn't guilty to say he was not guilty ? 

Mr. Holland. That is the way I myself would react, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Eastland. Why, of course. 

Mr. Holland. But I do know that there are circumstances in wdiich 
a person to whom it has been indicated that there are three or four 
witnesses who are prepared to testify against him to this fact, would 
decline to answer even though he himself felt that the accusation was 
untrue, simply because he would feel that in the event of a perjury 
suit his w^ord would not stand up against the words of four or five 
other witnesses. 

Senator Eastland. Any man W' ould be most anxious to answer such 
a question, and you know that, Mr. Holland. 

Mr. Holland. I am afraid I cannot alter my testimony on this 
point, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Eastland. All right. 

Mr. MoERis. Mr. Chairman, we have had difficulty trying to sub- 
pena as witnesses 19 people wdiose correspondence and w^hose associa- 
tion with the Institute of Pacific Relations have arisen in connection 
with this investigation. We have asked Mr. Holland if he would aid 
us in locating these people, and Mr. Holland has written us a letter, 
together with various comments to the whereabouts of these 19 people. 
I would like Mr. Holland's letter with his qualifications and with his 
answer to go into the record. 

Senator Eastland. Did you write such a letter, sir? 

Mr. Holland. I did, sir. I am glad to have it go in the record. 

Senator Eastland. It will be placed in evidence. 

Mr. MoERis. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Holland has ventured to give us 
where these 19 people are now. 

Senator Eastland. That is fine. 

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 573," and is as 
follows : ) 



3902 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



John W. Davis 
Allen Wardwell 
William C. Cannon 
Hall Park McCullough 

J. HOWLAND AtlCHINCLOSS 

Edwin S. S. Sunderland 
Theodore Kiendl 
Montgomery B. Angell 
George A. Brownell 
Walter D. Fletcher 



Exhibit No. 573 

Carroll H. Brewster 
Leighton H. Coleman 
Edgar G. Crossman 
Ralph M. Carson 
Frederick A. O. Schwarz 
Marion N. Fisher 
Porter R. Chandler 
EwEN Cameron Macveagh 
Thomas O'G. Fitzgibbon 
Edward R. Wardwell 



S. Hazard Gillespie, Jr. 
D. Nelson Adams 
Andrew Y. Rogers 
Taggart Whipple 
Charles H. Willard 
Frank L. Polk 
Morton Fearet 
John C. Hover 



Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl 
15 Broad Street 

NEW YORK, N. Y. 

Cable Address : Stetson 

March 4, 1952. 
Re Institute of Pacific Relations. 
Hon. Pat McCarran, 

Chairman, Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 

Room 42^-C, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Senator: We acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 26, 1952, 
relating to our letter of November 13, 1951. 

With reference to Mr. Holland's next appearance before the subcommittee, we 
again request that because of the press of business Mr. Holland not be called 
before March 19. Your cooperation in this respect will be much appreciated. 

As to Mr. Jerome D. Greene, Prof. John K. Fairbank,- and Mr. Herbert S. Little 
we believe that the subcommittee ought to call those gentlemen if it is interested 
in obtaining a fair picture of IPR activities. We think, too, that you ought to 
call Prof. William W. Lockwood, to whom we referred in our letter of October 16, 
1951. If you desire to hear them, we suggest that you communicate with them 
directly and make arrangements with them concerning their traveling expenses 
and fix dates convenient to them. In order to facilitate your communication 
with them, we are enclosing their addresses. 

We object to your including within the term "Institute of Pacific Relations 
people" persons on your list whose relation with IPR is and was, as you know 
from testimony already received by your subcommittee, insignificant or of short 
duration in the fairly remote past. We likewise object to the unfair implication 
in your last two sentences that the IPR ought to know the present whereabouts 
of such persons, or that the IPR has any "good offices" for bringing them before 
your subcommittee. The subcommittee itself is aware from documents and 
other testimony received by it in earlier hearings that several of the persons 
named in your list are not in the country, and are not now connected with the 
IPR. In order to assist the subcommittee, however, Mr. Holland has prepared 
the enclosed list setting out all the information available to him concerning the 
whereabouts of the persons named. 

We wish to repeat once again the request made in our letter of October 16, 1951, 
that you return to us the IPR records you seized, illegally, at Lee, Mass. In 
letters to Mr. Morris dated October 9, 1951, and December 4, 1951, Mr. Marks 
requested the return of papers which the IPR turned over to you on the under- 
standing that you would complete your examination of them and return them to 
the IPR within a short time after receipt. Some of these papers have now been 
in your hands 11 months. Will you please let us know when you intend to return 
them. As we indicated in our letter of October 16, your continued retention of 
these papers and the papers seized at Lee is one of the factors making it im- 
possible for us currently to prepare a defense of our client. We therefore assume 
that in accordance with the request set forth in our letter of October 16, 1951, 
we will be allowed at least a month after your counsel has finished introducing 
evidence to study the whole record with a view to suggesting further evidence or 
to providing a statement for consideration of the Senators, or both. 
Very truly yours. 



[s] Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3903 

Mr. Jerome D. Greene, 54-A Garden Street, Cambridge, Mass. 

Mr. Herbert S. Little, 1510 Hoge Building, Seattle, Wash. 

Prof. John K. Fairbank, 127 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, 

Mass. 
Prof. William W. Lockwood, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 

Alfairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 

THE FOLLOWING HAVE NEVER BEEN EMPLOYED ON THE IPB STAFF 

Solomon Adler (now working at the Economic Research Institute at Cambridge 
University, England. Never an IPR member). 

Anthony Jenkinson (last address, 133 West Forty-fourth Street. Might be located 
through Allied Labor News, 401 Broadway, New York. Canceled IPR mem- 
bership June 1947). 

Anna Louise Strong (according to some reports is living in California. Could 
probably be reached through her last publishers, Doubleday Doran, New York. 
Never an IPR member). 

Victor Yakhoutoff (listed in New York telephone directory. Never an IPR 
member). 

Ella Winter (address unknown. Subcommittee has files. Never an IPR member) . 

Israel Epstein (reported in earlier hearings of subcommittee as having left this 
country in 1951 with his wife, who was formerly Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley. 
Later reported as having left England for Hong Kong or China). 

Fred W. Poland (address unknown but possibly in Canada. Never an IPR 
member but attended 1945 IPR conference. Might be located through Cana- 
dian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto. Is Canadian citizen). 

Andrew Roth (now in London, England, as correspondent for The Nation, New 
York. Could probably be reached through The Nation. Canceled IPR mem- 
bership June 1947). 

Guenther Stein (exact address unknown but has been reported as working as 
newspaper correspondent for Hindustan Times in Geneva, Switzerland. Can- 
celed IPR membership March 1946. Was temporary IPR correspondent in 
Chungking in 1943). 

Michael Lindsay (now lecturer. National University of Australia, Canberra, 
Australia. Never an IPR member but attended 1947 IPR conference). 

Abraham Chapman (last address, 76-23 Commonwealth Boulevard, Bellrose, 
Long Island, N. Y. IPR membership lapsed May 1947). 

Andrew Steiger (last address, 49 Claremont Avenue, New York. Canceled IPR 
membership April 1947.) 

THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN IPB EMPLOYEES IN PAST YEARS 

Y. Y. Hsu (last heard of in Shanghai, China, March 1947. Employed as trans- 
lator and research assistance by IPR international secretariat, New York, 
1941^5). 

Michael Greenberg (last address. Trinity College, Cambridge University, Eng- 
land. Now reported working in a business firm in Switzerland. Employed 
by IPR international secretariat, 1941-42). 

Chi Ch'ao-tiug (last address, Research Department, Central Bank of China (1949). 
Reported in newspapers as Chinese Communist government's nominee for 
United Nations Economic and Social Council. Employed as research asso- 
ciate by IPR international secretariat. May 1938- January 1941). 

Chen Han-seng (last address. Care of Asia Institute, New York. Now reported 
to be in China. Employed as research associate by IPR international secre- 
tariat, 1935-39. Later employed at University of Washington, University of 
Pennsylvania, and Johns Hopkins University). 

Rose Yardumian (now married to an Englishman, Peter Townsend, and living 
in London, England. Latest address : 34 Lyndale Avenue, London NW 2. 
Employed by IPR 1942-45. IPR membership lapsed May 1948). 

Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley (last address, 235 Rutledge Street, Brooklyn, N. Y. 
Reported by subcommittee as having left the United States in 1951 with her 
husband, Israel Epstein. Was employed as secretary by IPR international 
secretariat, 1935-39).* 

Ellen Atkinson (last address, 3447 South Wakefield Street, Arlington, Va. IPB 



♦Canceled IPR membership April 1947. 
88348— 52— pt. 11 13 



3904 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

membership lapsed 1951, Employed as junior research associate by American 
IPR, February 1940-August 1941). 

Mr. Holland. May I continue briefly for a moment ? 

I also have pointed out in my statement that one of the most serious 
allegations made against the institute has been the fact, according to 
some witnesses, that an article called China's Part in a Coalition War, 
published in our magazine the Far Eastern Survey in 194:3, was writ- 
ten by the author, Mr. T. A. Bisson, on instructions of the American 
Communist Party as part of a plan to discredit the Chinese Nation- 
alist Government and to play up the Chinese Communists as demo- 
crats and agrarian reformers. I feel in justice to Mr, Bisson that 
the committee should either call him to get his own sworn statement 
on that or if that is not possible because he is in California, just as a 
matter of fairness to him the committee should take note of his memo- 
randum to me, which is one of the documents in that green volume 
there, in which he said specifically : 

In my experience with the institute I saw not the slightest evidence that the 
organization was part of a "Soviet espionage networli" 

Senator Eastland, Wait a minute. 

Mr. Holland. I am quoting from his memoranda. 

Senator Eastland. It is just a self-serving memorandum in which 
we are denied the right of cross-examination. You are smarter than 
that. That is propaganda that you are trying to get in this record. 

Mr. Marks. I object to that. 

Senator Eastland. I do not care what you object to now. I am 
running this hearing. I want all of that stricken, and we are going to 
subpena Mr. Bisson and take his testimony under oath. 

Mr. Holland. That is far more satisfactory, I agree, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Not some self-serving propaganda. 

Mr. Holland. Sir, I point this out simply because after this long 
delay when the accusation has been on the record Mr. Bisson has not 
had a chance to answer it. If you will recall 

Senator Eastland. We are taking these people as fast as we can 
get to them and we do not need to be lectured, Mr. Holland, by you or 
anybody else as to procedure. You have just stated that we have con- 
ducted the hearing fairly. 

Mr. Holland. I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Bisson will be 
given a chance to testify on this point. That is all I ask for. 

Mr. Morris. In this connection you see there have been some 60 
people named as Communists, Mr. Holland, and it is a very difficult 
thing to bring all of them in, particularly inasmuch as we are having 
such a great deal of difficulty in locating most of them. As you your- 
self admitted, 5 of them are in Red China now, and there are at least 
10 or 15 others who are in Europe somewhere. So I think Mr. Bis- 
son is one of the few people we haven't called. He is out on the west 
coast. We were hoping that he might be East some time before we 
do it. 

Mr. Chairman, there is one affidavit in here by Mr. Kizer that we 
were going to introduce into the record during the course of events. 
May I say that in that case will an exception be made inasmuch as it 
is a sworn statement, and will Mr. Kizer's statement go into the record 
at this time ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3905 

Senator Eastland. I will have to read it. Where is it ? 

Mr. Holland. In the blue one. I might say there is another sworn 
statement by Mrs. Marguerite A. Stewart, which is there, too. 

Senator Eastland. Yes, I will admit that into the record. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Stewart is on the east coast here. 

Mr. Holland. She is in New York. 

Mr. Morris. It may be that we will be able to bring her down with- 
out too much difficulty. It would be a clear imposition to bring Kizer 
all the way over just to affirm that. 

(The Kizer affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 574" and is as fol- 
lows:) 

Exhibit No. 574 

Kizer 
State of Washington, 

County of Spokane: 

Benjamin H. Kizer, being first duly sworn, on his oath, says : My attention has 
been called to the testimony of Louis Budenz, on August 22d, 1951, before the^ 
Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee, in which he testified that I am a 
member of the Communist Party. This aflidavit is made in reply to that charge. 

This testimony is wholly false. I am not now, nor was I ever at any time a 
member of the Communist Party, nor have I ever been a communist, nor have 
I ever been in sympathy with communist doctrine. 

Budenz further testified that he knew of my membership "through oflicial 
information given me by Jack Stachel, and also by the district leader of the 
Party in Washington, Henry Huff." 

This is likewise wholly false. I never even knew Jack Stachel or Henry Huff 
or either of them, and I have never had any dealings with them or either of 
them. I do not remember ever to have heard of the names of either of these 
men, until I read them in the testimony of Budenz. Nor have I ever known or 
met Louis Budenz. 

I have never even contemplated any kind of association or connection with 
the Communist Party, or with any organization avowing communist principles^ 
which I have always held, and to which I remain devoted. Communism's totali- 
tarianism is exactly as contrary to my democratic outlook. 

I have lived a happy and contented life in this little city of Spokane ever since 
I was twelve years old. I have never aspired to hold political ofiice of any kind, 
and have been content with my life as a lawyer and private citizen. 

I have always been deeply grateful for the privilege of being an American 
citizen, living under our federal and state constitutions, to whose basic principles 
I am attached, and have tried to express my gratitude for these inestimable 
privileges by serving my community and my state in a considerable number of 
civic and state uncompensated tasks. 

I do not hesitate to avow my membership in the American Council of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, later known as the American Institute of Pacific 
Relations. I became a member of the Institute in 1933, became a trustee in 1935, 
and have served as such trustee ever since save for the year of 1946. I have also 
served as one of its vice chairmen in 1936-1939. My experience with the Insti- 
tute is that it is a research and conference-holding organization of the highest 
repute and integrity, engaged in collecting and publishing scholarly studies pre- 
pared by leading specialists and students of the Pacific Area and the Far East. 
Of its many publications that I have read in the last 18 years, I have never 
discovered any that were communistic in tenor, or that tended toward commu- 
nism. If I had ever detected communist influence in the Institute, I would have 
resigned at once. Since I have not done so, I propose to continue my membership 
In it. 

[s] Benjamin H. Kizeb. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of September 1951. 
[seal] [s] (signed) Eua Hope, 

Notary PuMic in and for the State of Washington, residing at Spokane, Wash. 

Senator Eastland. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 
Mr. Morris. Have you anything else, Mr. Holland ? 
Mr. Holland. The only other thing I request is indicated in my 
statement, that in accordance wnth the earlier letter from Senator 



3906 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

McCarran indicating that the committee might be prepared to admit 
into its record a number of testimonial letters written by qualified far 
eastern specialists, I now request that those be admitted, and this 
includes the earlier ones which were sent to the committee some 
months ago. I am willing to exclude those older ones prior to 1950, 
but I would like to have added the very recent ones included in this 
yellow volume here which have come in quite recently. I think that 
IS all I need to say, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Eastland. That is a matter for the whole committee. We 
will let him file it for consideration of the committee. 

Do you have further questions? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, I have. 

Mr. Holland, did you employ the pseudonym of Sinicus ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what publications you wrote for under 
that name ? 

Mr. Holland. Only one. I wrote one article in what is called the 
International Journal, the publication of our Canadian affiliate, the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs. I am willing to give you 
the reason why I did so because I have very rarely done this. 

Mr. Morris. Did you write under the name of Sinicus for any other 
publication ? 

Mr. Holland. No. 

Mr. Morris. Did you write for the publication China Today under 
the name of Sinicus ? 

Mr. Holland. No ; I didn't know there was such. 

Mr. Morris. You didn't know there was a Sinicus ? 

Mr. Holland. No ; I didn't know that. 

Senator Eastland. Wliere did you get the name ? 

Mr. Holland. I invented it, Mr. Chairman. The reason for my 
doing this, I wrote this article on the present economic situation in 
China just before our international conference in England in 1947. 
It was suggested to me by some of our Canadian friends that since we 
were going to have this conference at which some Chinese would be 
present, it would be unfortunate if I gave the impression of expressing 
opinions on a current very controversial situation in China, and there- 
fore I adopted this device of using a pseudonym. 

Senator Eastland. No one suggested the name ? 

Mr. Holland. No. It was my own. I chose it partly because it was 
a mixture of something to do with China and also sounded like as if 
it had something to do with "cynical," 

Senator Eastland. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, did you know Miss Lucy Knox? 

Mr. Holland. Yes, I did. She was a stenographer in the very early 
days of the institute in Honolulu in 1929, and I think worked partly 
for the China branch of the institute in 1931. Subsequently after she 
left the institute in 1932 I think she did some work for the Lytton 
Commission in the Manchurian incident and then went to Moscow. I 
think for some years there she worked in some capacity, I don't exactly 
what, on the Moscow Daily News. 

Mr. Morris. Her mailing address is the Moscow Daily News ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes. I wrote her a letter there myself. 

Mr. Morris. Why would you refer to her as ''"my dear comrade 
Lucy"? 



mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3907 

Mr. Holland. I was not aware I had done so, but I know one of the 
letters I wrote her was in a flippant vein in which I kidded her and 
said she was in the wrong country if she wanted to study revolutions 
because she ought to be back here — this was in the early days of the 
New Deal — and see a real social revolution going on. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon of a letter and the carbon comes from 
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 27, 1934, 
addressed, "Miss Lucy Knox, Moscow Daily News," with the typed 
signature of W. L. Holland. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, can you recall having written that letter ? 

Mr. Holland. I don't precisely recall it, but I am sure it is one that 
I have written, Mr. Morris. I note that in the letter I describe myself 
as a capitalist. I don't know why. But I see I refer to myself as 
"which my capitalist eye." I was apparently asking Miss Knox to 
try and get an article from B and I think B was the well-known Soviet 
figure, Borodin, who had played an important part in the Chinese 
Nationalist revolution. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes, sir. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 576" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 576 

129 East Fifty-second Street, 
'New York City, January 27, IdSIt. 
Miss Lucy Knox, 

Moscoxv Daily News, Petrovski Per. 8, 

Moscow, Russia. 

My Dear Comrade Lucy: Your letter about Uzbeks and things in Russia 
excited the office enormously. I showed it to Lasker, Barnes, and Lattimore 
before sending it on to the Keesings (whose address, by the way, is 14 Northwick 
Mews, St. John's Wood, London, N. W. 8, England). There was much discussion 
as to whether we should not print most of the letter as it stands, but we finally 
decided to ask you to expand it without abandoning its slightly evangelical style, 
and let us have it for an article in the June issue of Pacific Affairs. This is not 
a request, but a peremptory demand, so you had better start getting to work. 
Quite seriously, we want the article to be as vivid and enthusiastic as the letter 
itself. At the same time, I hope you will find occasion, here and there, to expand 
one or two of the slight criticisms which my capitalist eye seems to see lying 
hidden in your letter. I have no desire at all to prove that the Soviet policy 
toward minority peoples is all blah or all wrong, but we should really like to 
know, in as objective a fashion as possible, just how much of tlie existing cultures 
are being preserved or are worth preserving and how far the Russification which 
you speak about is inevitable in spite of all official protests to the contrary. 

We are really counting on the article from B., and I hope you will keep prodding 
him, if you are on sufficiently good terms to do that sort of thing. 

I hope you safely received the $50 which I sent along with my Christmas card 
to you. Doreen and I leave New York about March 1st. travelling in the general 
direction of Japan. I shall have a fortnight in Honolulu and then go on to Tokyo, 
leaving Doreen with her mother for about a month in Hawaii before she rejoins 
me. It is going to be great fun looking for a house in Tokyo. We hope to get 
comfortably installed just in time for the Japanese agrarian revolution or the 
war with either Russia or the United States. Everybody in this coiantry has 
quite decided that the war is coming very soon, but there is a little doubt as to 
whom Japan is going to fight. The only thing in this country which distracts 
attention from the war and keeps young men from rushing to enlist are the 
controversies in every household about how much the dollar is really worth, 
and whether the workers of the country are all going to rebel when the Civil 
Works Administration stops doling out its millions to all the unemployed. We 



3908 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

are having great fun in the New York office of the Institute just now, with 
hundreds of waiters and bellboys picketing the Waldorf Astoria. 
With best wishes, 
Sincerely yours, 

W. L, Holland. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon of a letter, the carbon being taken 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Kelations, dated November 
8, 1934, addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, and the typed signature of 
W. L. Holland, research secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, I ask you if you recall having written 
that letter. 

Can you recall having written that letter, Mr. Holland? 

Mr. Holland. Again I do not recall it precisely, but I feel quite 
certain that it is a letter from me. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read the last paragraph, please ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes. The last paragraph, addressed to Miss Moore, 
who was apparently then in England : 

I quite envy you your job and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a 
result of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay forever in Russia, but will 
at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps 
this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent terri- 
tories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality 
problems of the natives. Here's to the day. 

The Doreen mentioned in here is my wife. 

Senator Eastland. What did you mean "here's to the day" ? 

Mr. Holland. I cannot honestly remember, Mr. Chairman. I think 
in all honesty I ought to say it seems an extraordinarily silly and 
flippant thing to me now to have said at any time, but in the previous 
paragraphs I notice that I was suggesting that Miss Moore, who was 
about to undertake a study of Asian peoples, the Asian sections of the 
Soviet Union, I Avas suggesting that she ought to treat them as some 
of our other studies had been treated; namely, as problems of the 
government of dependent territories. 

Senator Eastland, That statement in there was a letter to a lady 
in Moscow, "Dear Comrade" ? 

Mr. Holland. I am sorry, this is not the one. This is a different 
one. 

Senator Eastland. I understand that, but there is another letter 
which went in here, addressed "Dear Comrade" that was a flippant 
statement. 

Mr. Holland. Certainly. 

Senator Eastland. How many of those flippant statements 

Mr. Holland. I think there are very few in my total record. 

Senator Eastland. How many ? 

Mr. Holland. Probably half a dozen. I don't know since I have not 
seen them. 

Senator Eastland. Those things are cumulative ; are they not ? 

Mr. Holland. They are. 

Senator Eastland. That is a circumstance. Wouldn't you consider 
it so, sir? 

Mr. Holland. It shows that at that time I was being much too 
casual and flippant about matters which I ought not to have been. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 577" and is as 
follows :) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3909 

Exhibit No. 577 

November 8, 1934. 
Miss Harriet Moore, 

Care of Mr. E. C. Carter, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, 

London, S. W. 1. 

Dear H.vrriet : I was greatly pleased to learn from Carter and from your letter 
of September 25 to him that you will be able to work for the Institute for 6 
mouths in Russia. As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Carter, 
I strongly approve your first choice of study, namely, Nationality Problems 
and the Soviet Union. I believe that you should give practically all your time 
to this work and that you should only take up the question of standards of 
living, if the Moscow group agrees to appoint you as an assistant on a standards 
of living study to be carried out under their auspices. I suggest this simply 
because I believe we should encourage the new Soviet group to participate directly 
in tJie international research program and not because I have any doubt what- 
ever about your own ability to do a good piece of research in the question of 
standards of living. As a matter of fact I think that you and Mr. Carter should 
try by all means possible to arrange things so that you will at least be kept 
closely in touch witli all stages of any standards of living study which the 
Moscow group carries out. This again is not because I question the capacity of 
the research workers whom the Soviet group may choose, but simply because 
you will be able to point out to them many points which will be very interesting 
to foreign readers, but which they themselves might be apt to take for granted 
or to neglect. 

As regards the study of nationality problems I know too little about the ques- 
tion to presume to advise you. My only suggestion is, however, that you should 
tackle the work on the understanding that it will form an integral part of our 
studies in cultural relations. This means that it should be linked up in some 
way with the study which Owen Lattimore is going to make of cultural rela- 
tions on the northern and western frontier in China, particularly since the 
same people of Mongolia and Turkestan are now being brought into intimate 
contact with a totally different kind of cultural influence from Russia. In this 
work I presume you will want to study how far the Soviet policy of encouraging 
autonomy in matters of language, custom and art is actually working out in 
practice or how far the process of Russiafication is going on in spite of the 
official wishes of Moscow. 

A second part of your work, it seems to me, should be an attempt to treat the 
problem as a question of the government of dependencies and minority peoples. 
In this work you might proceed somewhat along the lines suggested in Kessing's 
two books on Samoa and Philippines and his earlier syllabus on dependencies and 
native peoples prepared for the 1931 conference. In this you will presumably 
discuss questions of political autonomy, economic policy, social and educational 
policy looking at the question from the point of view of observing whether the 
impact of a socialist modern civilization brings about the same kind of cultural 
disintegration among traditional civilizations, as has been the case in other parts 
of the world under capitalist imperialism. 

I am asking both Keesing and Lattimore to let you know as soon as possible 
what other points they think might be brought up in your study. The only 
other point I should like to make is that your work should be confined as far as 
possible to the eastern part of Russian Central Asia and to Siberia and the Far 
East. That is to say, I think you should exclude the problems of southeastern 
Russia and the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan. 

I am writing separately to Mr. Carter suggesting one or two specific points 
which he should ask the Moscow group to study, when they decide to go ahead 
with a research program on the question of standards of living. 

I quite envy you your job and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a re- 
sult of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay for ever in Russia, but will 
at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps 
this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent ter- 
ritories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality 
problems of the natives. Here's to the day. 

With kindest regards. 
Sincerely yours, 

W. L. Holland, Research Secretary. 

WHL:MI. 

Copies to Mr, Field. 

Mr. Loomis. 
Mr. Carter. 



3910 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please ? 

Mr. Mandel. It is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 6, 1942, addressed to 
Miss Agnes Smedley, with the typed signature of W. L. Holland. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, can you recall having written that letter ? 

Mr. Holland. I feel certain this is a genuine letter which I wrote. 
I don't recall it. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read the first paragraph ? 

Senator Eastland. Wait a minute. Did I understand you to say 
you feel certain this is not ? 

Mr. Holland. No, no, that it is a genuine letter. I don't happen 
to recall writing it. 

Mr. MoRRRis. Will it be admitted into evidence ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes, I will admit it. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 578" and is as fol- 
lows:) 

Exhibit No. 578 

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, 

February 6, 1H2. 
Miss Agnes Smedley, 

R. R. 2, Box 57, Ojai, Calif. 

Dear Miss Smedley : This is to acknowledge your letter of January 31 about 
Mr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. The Chens are old and very close friends of mine 
and I am as eager as you are to do everything possible to assist them. Mr. Car- 
ter and I will make inquiries about the possibility of having them put on some 
exchange list of war prisoners. I think you will realize, however, that we have 
to move very cautiously since it is at the moment very unlikely that any Chinese 
will be included in lists of prisoners handled by the American Red Cross. It 
might even be highly dangerous for the Chens if their names were included in a 
list that eventually came to the attention of the Japanese authorities. 

There is always the chance that Han-seng and his wife have been able to con- 
ceal themselves among the million or more other Chinese in Hong Kong and that 
they may succeed in escaping in disguise via Kowloon or Masao (?). We have 
had reports that several thousand people have already escaped in this way. 
From what I know of Han-seng's previous experience in China he would be pretty 
resourceful in escaping if the Japanese were not able to discover him as soon 
as they occupied Hong Kong. I realize, of course, that because of his wife's ill- 
ness he may have decided to stay, but even so he may be in hiding and planning 
to escape. 

I know it seems absurd, but I think that nationality is going to play a large 
part in the question of compiling lists of prisoners. However, we shall certainly 
make discreet inquiries without revealing Chen's name and will do everything 
we can to find out whether the Chens are actually still in Hong Kong, and if so, 
to get them released. 

We have heard that several other members of our Institute are also in Hong 
Kong including Dr. Franklin L. He and Mr. W. L. Lin, as well as the wife and 
family of our Chinese secretary, Mr. Liu-Yu-wan. 
Sincerely yours, 

W. L. Holland. 

Senator Eastland. Read it, please. 
Mr. Holland. All right, sir. 

Dear Miss Smedley : This is to acknowledge your letter of January 31 about 
Mr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. The Chens are old and very close friends of mine 
and I am as eager as you are to do everything possible to assist them. Mr. 
Carter and I will make inquiries about the possibility of having them put on 
some exchange list of war prisoners * * * — 

The Chens at this time were at Hong Kong — 

* * * I think you realize he will have to move very cautiously since It is 
at the moment very unlikely that any Chinese will be included in list of prison- 
ers handled by the American Red Cross. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3911 

Senator Easti^nd. Chen was a Communist ; was lie not ? 

Mr. Holland. At this time to my knowledge and belief he was not, 
sir. 

Senator Eastland. Since then? 

Mr. Holland. I have not even now seen any evidence that he is, 
bnt the fact is that in the last year he went back to Communist China 
and is taking part in a publication there. 

Senator Eastland. A Commimist publication ? 

Mr. Holland. A Communist publication. 

Senator Eastland. In Communist China. And you do not think 
he is a Communist ? 

Mr. Holland. It seems to me much more likely that, like other 
Chinese, he changed his mind and decided to throw his lot with 
the i^resent Chinese Government. 

Senator Eastland. I see. There is always an excuse. 

Mr. Holland. Not always, sir, but in this case I feel sure 

Senator Eastland. O. K. Go ahead. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, the institute was instrumental in bring- 
ing Chen over here, was it not? 

Mr. Holland. Some years later. 

Mr. Morris. When was he brought over here ? 

Mr. Holland. In the first place he was brought over here beiore 
the war, about 1938, I would guess, and he was brought back again 
after the war around 1943 or 1944. 

JSIr. Morris. I see. Chen Han-seng was also associated with the 
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy; was he not? 

Mr. Holland. In recent years he was ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know under what name he wrote for the Com- 
mittee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy ? 

Mr. Holland. I am not sure. I know that he wrote some things 
under the pseudonym of Eajanond Brooke, but whether he did for 
this particular organization or not I don't know. 

Senator Eastland. Was that a Communist- front organization? 

Mr. Holland. I regard it so, sir. 

Senator Eastland. But you do not regard him as a Communist? 

Mr. Holland. I said specifically just a moment ago, sir, that in 
recent years I think there were indications. 

Senator Eastland. Go ahead and read the letter. 

Mr. MoREis. Mr. Chairman, I would rather not have Mr. Hol- 
land read the letter. I would like to find out to what extent the 
institute was instrumental in having Chen Hen-sang come to this 
country. 

Mr. Holland. In the first place before the war. I can't recall 
the exact details, but it is probably true that the institute invited 
him to come here as a research worker to undertake the study of 
some aspect of Chinese agricultural problems. I think it has to do 
with something in the problems of the southernmost province of 
China. At that time he was a well-known and very reputable, 
authority on Chinese agricultural problems. He was a member of 
one of the most distinguished 

Senator Eastland. What year are you speaking of ? 

Mr. Holland. When he was brought here either 1937 or 1938. 

Mr. Morris. Then you attempted to get him exchanged as a war 
prisoner ? 



3912 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Holland. I am not sure whether we did attempt, Mr. Chair- 
man. The point is Miss Smedley had written us a letter earnestly 
begging us to try to help him escape from Hong Kong. In fact he 
and one or two others did escape, but not with our help. 

Mr. Morris. Was Miss Smedley a Communist ? 

Mr. Holland. I have no means of knowing. I have been told that 
she was never a Communist member, that she tried very hard to be 
made a member of the Chinese Communist Party but was never in 
fact accepted by the Chinese Communists. 

Mr. Morris. She is dead now ; is she not ? 

Mr. Holland. She is dead. I have always regarded her as a very 
decided pro- Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Where is she buried ? 

Mr. Holland. I have no idea, sir. 

Mr. Morris. You know she is buried in Communist China? 

Mr. Holland. Miss Smedley ? 

Mr. Morris. Weren't her ashes scattered over Communist China? 

Mr. Holland. The only thing I know about her is she bequeathed 
her estate, whatever it was, to a Chinese Communist general. 

Senator Eastland. That is right. 

Mr. Holland. I don't remember her being buried in China. I don't 
believe she is. 

Senator Eastland. At her request, at the request of this lady who 
willed her property 

Mr. Holland. Ten years later. 

Senator Eastland. To a Communist general and whose ashes are 
scattered over Communist China, at her request, you attempted, your 
organization attempted, your non- Communist organization attempted, 
to get a Communist writer exchanged as a war prisoner, and there is 
no communism involved at all? That is your testimony? 

Mr. Holland. I wish to dispute your statement, Senator, because 
at this time we knew this man, we had no knowledge that he was a 
Communist when he was interned in Hong Kong in 1941. We did 
know that he had had an excellent reputation as a Chinese scholar. 
He was widely known throughout the world. 

Senator Eastland. There are just dozens of cases 

Mr. Holland. I cannot feel any apology for having helped the 
Chinese escape from the Japanese. 

Senator Eastland. I am asking a question, based on your sworn 
testimony. There are dozens of these cases where a man is not a 
Communist when he affiliates with you, so you say, ajid then several 
years later you say he is a Communist now. 

Mr. Holland. This is simply a fact, sir. Many people are changed. 
There are hundreds and hundreds of well-known Chinese intellectuals 
and officials who changed their minds in the last few years. 

Senator Eastland. Is it not a fact that those people when they 
were in this country around the Institute of Pacific Relations, at- 
tempting to mold the policy of this Government, were hiding the fact 
that they were Communists? 

Mr. Holland. I dispute every part of your statement. Senator. 
They were not attempting to mold policy. There is no evidence that 
they were Communists at that time. 

Senator Eastland. All right. We will submit that on the record^ 

Proceed, Mr. Morris. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3913 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify this letter, Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Kelations, photostat of a memo, dated January 3, 
1941, marked ECC from WLH. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, can you recall having whitten that letter ? 

Mr. Holland. I believe that Iwrote this letter, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read the first paragraph, please ? 

Mr. Holland. There is a letter to Mr. Edward C. Carter, who was 
then my chief : 

Thank you for your memoranclum of December 28 about Chi's future work. 
I agree that is probably wise in accepting a job with Universal — 

Universal was Universal Trading Corp. — 

and you are right in thinking that I would prefer him to finish his IPR assign- 
ment in the next 6 months. Accordingly, I enclose a note to Chi approving his 
plan of hiring Mr. Y. Y. Hsu for an initial period of 2 months beginning as soon 
as possible on a date suitable to Chi and Hsu, the arrangement to be subject to 
renewal or revision after I have conferred further with you and Chi about it — 

There seems to be a word missing — 

early next month. This will enable Chi to make a start on the project and at 
the same time will not commit us indefinitely if we find the arrangement is not 
working out well. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record ? 
Senator Eastland. He has read it already in the record. 
Mr. Morris. He has read the first paragraph. 
Senator Eastland. All right, I will admit all of it. 
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 579" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 579 

GiANNiNi Foundation, 
Univeksity of California, 
Berkeley, Calif., January 3, 19Jfl. 
ECC from WLH : 

Thank you for your memorandum of December 28 about Chi's future work. I 
agree that he is probably wise in accepting the job with Universal, and you are 
right in thinking that I would prefer him to finish his IPR assignment in the 
next six months. Accordingly, I enclose a note to Chi approving his plan of 
hiring Mr. Y. Y. Hsu for an initial period of two months, beginning as soon as 
possible on a date suitable to Chi and Hsu, the arrangement to be subject to 
renewal or revision after I have conferred further with you and Chi about the 
early next month. This will enable Chi to make a start on the project and at 
the same time will not commit us indefinitely if we find that the arrangement is 
not working out well. 

From your knowledge of Chi's financial situation and his obligations to Uni- 
versal, do you personally think that the proposed division of funds is a reasonable 
one? The grant we have made to Chi was $1,250, this being intended to represent 
five months salary at $250 monthly. In addition we agreed to pay up to $600 for 
incidental expenses involved in the collection of materials in China and have 
already paid $100 for this purpose. 

Enclosed : Letter to Chi and copy. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please ? 
Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations dated December 28, 1940, headed WLH from ECC. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, can you recall having received that letter? 
Obviously it is from Mr. Carter to you, is it not? 
Mr. Holland. Yes. 
Mr. Morris. I am going to ask you to read the first two paragraphs. 



3914 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Holland. I don't recall it, but it seems to be the preceding letter 
to what I have iust read. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Chairman, will that be admitted into the record? 

Senator Eastland. The whole letter? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 580," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 580 

December 28, 1940. 
WLH From ECC : 

Chi is at last recovered though he still looks rather pulled down by his suc- 
cession of three illnesses. 

His contract with K. P. Chen expires early in January. Since his return, 
however, the Universal people here in New York have given him a formal 
invitation to join permanently their research and administrative staff in a very 
important relationship, Chi feels that he has no alternative but to accept for 
the following reasons : (1) It appears to be a patriotic duty ; (2) it will give him 
access to materials that would not otherwise be available but which will be 
essential for his completing the assignment that the IPR has given him; (3) 
it enables him to provide for the support of his wife and children and makes it 
unnecessary for him to live the uncertain life of depending on lecture engage- 
ments which so interfere with an orderly scholary life. 

He asked me whether in view of this new job he should take a couple of years 
to finish the assignment you gave him at Berkeley, or whether you and I would 
prefer to have him finish it in the next six months. I told him ijrovisionally that 
I thought you would prefer the latter course and I knew I would. The latter 
course he could adopt, provided with the grant you have made him you would 
approve of his hiring a research assistant who can read the Chinese periodicals 
and make the first draft of the report under Chi's direction. The assistant he 
has in mind is Y. Y. Hsu, a graduate in economics of Stanfoi'd. Hsu has been 
working for Chi's father, knows Chi's outlook and method of work, and accord- 
ing to Chi, is first-class. Chi would employ Hsu at $125 a month, paying this 
out of the grant you have made, and would use the balance for his own time in 
supervising Hsu's work and in writing the final report. 

At the moment I haven't by me the details of your commitment to Chi, and Chi's 
commitment to you, so I cannot say how Chi's proposal will strike you. Please 
write me frankly as to your wishes. Hsu if employed, would have a desk in the 
IPR ofl^ce and would keep up our Chinese files. Chi will have to keep office 
hours every day at Universal, but as the office is at 5th Avenue and 52nd Street, 
he will always be in easy reach. 

Now that Chi's future is assured, I am hoping that we can get a higher and more 
regular rate of production out of him than when his life was disordered by un- 
certainity. Let us hope that our wishes in this matter will be realized. 

Mr. Morris. I would like you to read the first two paragraphs, Mr. 
Holland, as I have several questions to ask you. 
Mr. Holland (reading) : 

Chi has at last recovered, though he still looks rather pulled down by his 
succession of three illnesses. 

His contract with K. P. Chen expires early in January. Since his return, 
however, the Universal people here in New York have given him a formal invi- 
tation to join permanently their research and administrative staff in a very im- 
portant relationship. Chi feels that he has no alternative but to accept for the 
following reasons: (1) it appears to be a patriotic duty; (2) it will give him ac- 
cess to materials that would not otherwise be available but which will be es- 
sential for his completing the assignment that the IPR has given him ; (3) it en- 
ables him to provide for the support of his wife and children and makes it un- 
necessary for him to live the uncertain life of depending on lecture engagements 
which so interfere with an orderly scholary life. 



Mr. Morris. The next paragraph? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3915 

Mr. Holland. Yes [reading] : 

He asked me whether in view of this new job he should take a couple of years 
to finish the assignment you gave him at Berkeley, or whether you and I would 
prefer to have him finish it in the next 6 months. I told him provisionally that 
I thought you would prefer the latter source and I knew I would. The latter 
course he could adopt, provided with the grant you have made him you would 
approve of his hiring a research assistant who can read the Chinese periodicals 
and make the first draft of the report under Chi's direction. The assistant he 
has in mind is Y. Y. Hsu, a graduate in economics of Stanford. Hsu has been 
working for Chi's father, knows Chi's outlook and method of work, and accord- 
ing to Chi, is first-class. 

Mr. Morris. Will you pause at this point. What was meant by Iiq 
"knows Chi's outlook"? 

Mr. Holland. I am afraid I can't be sure. This is Mr. Carter's 
letter to me. I myself would interpret it that he knew Dr. Chi'g 
analysis of Chinese society. Chi w^as the author of a well-known book 
on the key economic areas in Chinese civilization. And the assign- 
ment which we were giving him was a report on wartime economic 
developments in China. 

Mr. Morris. Are you aware of the Communist record of Y. Y. Hsu 
which has been introduced into our record ? 

Mr. Holland. I think I read in the press or in the transcript some 
allegations but I don't recall the details that you have in mind. 

Mr. Morris. Is that Y. Y. Hsu's first contact with the institute? 

Mr. Holland. So far as I know, yes; but I can't be sure about that. 

Mr. Morris. It would seem from that, would it not, Mr. Holland, 
that Chi brought Hsu into the IPE ? 

Mr. Holland. This would suggest that he recommended him in the 
first place as an assistant for himself. 

Mr. JMoRRis. Can you recall any experience with Hsu before that? 

Mr. Holland. No ; I cannot. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Eelations dated April 25, 1940, marked "con- 
fidential," addressed to W. L. Holland from Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, can you recall having received that let- 
ter from Mr. Carter? 

Mr. Holland. I believe this is a letter which I received from Mr^ 
Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Will that be received into the record, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Eastland. Yes, sir. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 581" and is as 
follows :) 



3916 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 581 

Institttte of Pacific Relations 

Amsterdam London Manila Moscow New York Paris Shanghai 
Sydney Tokyo Toronto Wellington 

OFFICE OF THE SECBETAKY-GENERAL 

129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y. 

25th April, 1940. 
Confidential (hand written) 

W. L. Holland, Esq., 

Care Oiannini Foundation, University of California, 

Berkeley, Calif. 

Dear Bill : K. P. Chen is asking Chi to go to China with him, sailing on May 
15 to act as his personal research secretary. Chi is to keep his files, draw up 
memoranda, and carry forward such studies as will reinforce Mr. K. P. Chen's 
highly responsible work. It will not be a government position, so Chi will be 
much more free than would be the case if he was on the government payroll. 
Chen will, I think pay Mrs. Chi here in New York $250 monthly and in addition 
will take care of all of Chi's expenses out to China, in China, and back from 
China. Chi will travel with Chen, stay with Chen, eat with Chen, travel all 
over the new highways and investigate various economic and other projects. 

I am keen to have Chi accept this offer, both because it will give Chi invaluable 
contacts and materials for his later research "The Principle of Economic Recon- 
struction in China" and also because it enables him to render an immediate 
direct service to his country as a patriotic Chinese at a very crucial period in 
Chinese history. 

Incidentally, it overcomes the diflSculty of which you have just written with 
reference to a grant from the International Research Fund for Chi's project 
now that the Rockefeller Foundation has failed us in the matter of a fellowship 
for Chi. 

As I understand it you have felt that the International Research Committee 
could not make a grant of say $2,500 or even $2,000 for Chi to make a study 
to be undertaken in New York and Berkeley. If, however, it were possible for 
Chi to get out to China and possibly get two or three first class Chinese working 
under his direction in Chungking and Kunming, I surmise that you think you 
could get a grant not to exceed $2,500 for a study somewhat like that which Chi 
has proposed, but under a slightly difCerent title. 

I agree with you that a great deal of the work for such a study can only be 
done effectively in China by someone in touch with the actual work of recon- 
struction. It is certainly true that even so well-informed a person as Chi in an 
attempt to lay down principles of reconstruction from America can hardly fail 
to be academic. 

I knov.' that he feels this just as strongly as you do. This is one of the reasons 
for his feeling obligated to accept Mr. K. P. Chen's invitation. It gives him a 
grass roots opportunity such as that which you feel is so fundamental. 

In the development of the Chi study, it is desirable for you to tell Chi that you 
will have to coordinate his study with that of Chen Han-seng on Agrarian Prob- 
lems in Southwest China and W. Y. Lin's Migration of Capital into Southwest 
China, I understand that you recognize the need of integrating all of these 
studies with the China Council's effort to complete the study of industrialization 
ot Southwest China originally assigned to D. K. Lieu. 

I am sending off this news about Chi before it becomes public in the hope that 
you can send me by air mail your reaction and thus put me in a position to take 
it up with Chi immediately in a preliminary way preparatory to his having a 
conference with you en route to China. 

I will write later about the P. T. Chen project and also about Miss Mitchell's 
views. I am returning your copy of Chi's tentative outline. 
•Sincerely yours, 

[s] Edward C. Carter. 
Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Who was Adam Von Trott? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3917 

Mr. Holland. Von Trott I didn't know very well, but as I recall 
it, he was a German, a Prussian, of rather aristocratic background in 
Germany, who chose to start at the wrong end, who was implicated in 
the coup against Hitler and was one of those who was executed. At 
that time or just before he had risen to a high position, I think he was 
chancelor or something in the German Foreign Office in the middle of 
the war. Before the war, I think about 1939, or thereabouts, he had 
been a Rhodes scholar. He has been educated in England and knew 
Lord Lothian, the then British Ambassador here, very well. I think 
partly through Mr. Carter he was suggested as a person who ought to 
spend the third year of his Ehodes scholarship in the Far East before 
he went back to Germany. He, therefore, came to this country for a 
few months and actually attended our conference at Virginia Beach in 
1939 and then went on across the country and visited Japan and China 
and went back through Russia to Germany. I believe while he was 
here he contacted a number of German scholars, most of them exiles, 
whom he had known previously, but what the purpose of that was I 
was not informed. I do know that he had some contact with the 
former German chancelor who was at Harvard University, Bruning, 
but that part of his work I don't know. I saw relatively little of him, 
and I must confess I was quite startled when I heard that he had 
taken part in the coup against Hitler, because I was extremely suspi- 
cious of him mj^self . He seemed to me much more like a Nazi who was 
trying to ingratiate himself with Americans, and I was very dubious 
indeed whether he was really on the level in trying to pretend that he 
was critical of the Nazi regime. I don't know even now whether he 
was pla^dng a double game. 

Mr. Morris. Did he work with the Soviet forces in that 1944 
uprising? 

Mr. Holland. I had not known this but I think in one of our execu- 
tive sessions you mentioned that, but that was news to me. 

Mr. Morris. You don't know anything further on that from your 
own experience ? 

Mr. Holland. No, I don't. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please? 

Mr. Mandel. It is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations dated January 17, 1940, headed WLH from ECC, 
and attached thereto is another memorandum dated January 16, 
1940, a memorandum to ECC from FVF. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, I wonder if you can reall that particular 
memorandum ? 

Mr. Holland. I don't recall it, but the note on the bottom of the 
reply is in my handwriting, and I undoubtedly received it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record? 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 582," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 582 

January 17, 1940. 
WLH from ECC : 

"With reference to the enclosed from Fred, I shall reply that Mangahas is no 
longer on the Secretariat, that von Trott continues, that Chi continues, and also 
Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley. Is Fred right that Wittfogel is 
still working on the book for the I. R. C? 



3918 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

(pencilled note:) Yes, but that is no reason for regarding him as a research 
associate. I doubt if the book will be ready for two years and it will have prac- 
tically no bearing on our current program even though it may be a monument of 
scholarship. 

WLH 

January 16, 1940. 
Memorandum to : ECC. 
From: FVF, 

Continuing our correspondence regarding the important question of who, if 
anyone, is to list Wittfogel on his staff, I shall be very glad indeed to recommend 
to you whichever move you wish to make. If you think it is advisable to drop 
Wittfogel from your current listing, it can probably be done on the ground that 
Wittfogel is no longer spending the major portion of his time on Pacilic Council 
work. If it is done, however, it is quite clear that Mangahas and von Trott 
v.onld also have to be dropped from the category of "Fellows" in the PACIFIC 
AFFAIRS listing. I suppose Chi would have to be dropped from the Secretariat, 
to be consistent. Or is he still working for you? I am not entirely clear as to 
the status of Chen Han-seng or Elsie Fairfax-Chomeleg. I had thought that 
she, if not Chen, had been loaned to the China IPR in which case I should not 
think that she would be listed as a member of the Secretariat. 

I mention tliese other names because I feel that it is important to be con- 
sistent in this matter, particularly in view of the fact that, if I am not mistaken, 
Wittfogel is still writing a book for the I. R. C, representing the first volume of 
his interpretation of Chinese economic history. 

I shall be very glad, if you drop Wittfogel, to write him a letter telling him 
that he can henceforth, for some time, regard himself as a research fellow of 
the American Council. But in return for this I am afraid he will have nothing 
but such a letter in his files. 

Mr, Morris. Will you tell us what position Dolly Eltenton had in 
the Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. Holland. I don't believe I can answer completely. The only 
part I know is relatively recent. In 1947 when we held our conference 
in England she was already there. She is a Britisher. I asked her to 
serve temporarily as a secretary on the conference staff at that meeting^ 
in Stratford, England. I know that previously — I have forgotten the 
circumstances and dates — she had worked either part time or for a 
period in the San Francisco brancL of the American Institute of 
Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a document from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations dated November 29, 1942, addressed to "Dear Bill" 
signed "Phil." 

Mr. Morris. Can you recall having received that letter, Mr. 
Holland? 

Mr. Holland. I don't recall it, Mr. Chairman, but it is undoubtedly 
from ni}^ colleague, Mr. Philip Lilienthal, the present editor of Pacific 
Affairs. 

Senator Eastland. It will be admitted in evidence. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 583," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 583 

Lilienthal 
WWL 
ED 

KRCO 
RET 
WLH 
15 Macondray Lane, 
San Francisco, November 29, 1942. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3919 

Dear Bill : Thanks for your note of the 14th, with its enclosure of the letter 
from Hinder which I was extremely interested to read. Will you please pass on 
to her the enclosed note, or send it to her if she isn't at the Conference? Did her 
latter-day Shanghai experiences take any of the starch out of her? Somehow 
I imagine that nothing short of the apocalypse could do that. 

I suppose that you'll be in Canada when this reaches you. I hope that it'& 
going to be a very interesting and almost enjoyable meeting, and that the weather 
will be decent. If you think of it, will you send me a list of those in attendance ; 
I'd like to know who's going to sleep Avith whom. Dolly Eltenton left for the 
east last night. It's a good thing that she's going, and I think that you'll find 
her a nice gal to have arovind. She's very wide awake and enterprising, and 
very amusing, too. I'm sure that you won't need to be reminded that she is still 
a bit new to the IPR, its names and customs, and that it would doubtless make 
the Conference more valuable to her if someone were to keep a friendly eye on 
her for the first day or two until she's had a chance to get her bearings. Will 
Doreen and the Graces be going along to Canada with you, or have you detailed 
them to polish the keys of your piano in your absence? I think that you finally 
showed sense in getting the piano, and I'm sure that it will give you and the 
family a great deal of pleasure. The thought of your being able to play a piano 
imder your own roof, after so much time, gives me a lot of the afore-mentioned 
pleasure. 

You've surely heard of the little discussion group which met in the local 
IPR office a couple of times 2 weeks ago to hash over the Japanese problem. I 
was able to attend one of the meetings and thought it good enough to warrant 
more groups of the kind. WTiat made this particular meeting interesting to me 
was the presence of several persons of some influence in the community who 
were frankly anti-Japanese to the extent of wishing to disenfranchise the Japa- 
nese-American citizens after the war. The IPR simply lias got to take greater 
cognizance of this sort of attitude than I think it has done in the recent past. 
In fact, the deliberations of your present meeting won't have much validity 
unless the 'enlightened intellectuals are compelled to descend occasionally from 
the realm of pure theory and dirty their hands with dealing with the great un- 
washed. I hope that you and Dolly Eltenton will be able to formulate some sort 
of program whereby the IPR, at least in the city, will be able to enlist the sup- 
port of conservative groups which are not in the hal>it of letting their thoughts 
cross national boundaries. P.ut before this can be done, the IPR will have to 
secure c(msiderable factual information on, let's say, the record of the Japanese 
in America, and then have it presented by men who are known to be hard-headed. 
Much as I like Galen and admire the work that he is doing, it seems to me that 
anything that he touches nowadays is at once suspect because he himself, by 
virtue of his record in this Japanese business, is suspect. None of this, however, 
implies that I think the IPR, in any of its manifestations in this country, should 
engage in anti-Japanese activities. I most certainly do not think so. 

News of myself is not especially electrifying. I'm still messing about on the 
Oakland docks, not accomplishing a great deal but managing to keep fairly calm 
through the device of telling myself, every hour on the hour, that I might be in 
the army instead of a free agent and thus mustn't complain. Nevertheless,, 
sometimes I think that I could load the ships singlehanded more quickly 
than actually they are loaded. In the past months, while riding to ard fro on the 
Key trains, I've been learning to read Italian and have now got to the point 
where I can read the local rag, L'ltalia, without too much cheating. It's a 
pleasant language, I think, and I'm having fun with it in a harmless sort of way. 
I believe that I must be the first person ever to have learned to read Italian with- 
out the express purpose of reading Dante. 

A few days ago I moved from the hotel to a little flat on Macondray Lane, on 
Russian Hill and not far from Telegraph Hill. It's a nice neighborhood, with 
more grass and trees than paving. Really my dump is a house rather than a 
flat, and the occupants of the other half of the house are not here now, so I'm a 
landholder. It's an attractive and extremely unusual sort of place (a flagged 
walk before the house, a good view of the Bay and Alcatraz, no auto traffic nearby,, 
monk's cloth on the walls, a fireplace, lots of books left by the previous tenant 
whom I know of old, and the sort of neighborhood which is not unlike Greenwich 
Village in its informality but is far, far more attractive in its physical aspects. 
There are disadvantages in the present set-up, but on the whole they're not toO' 
serious. Only I do wish that the ceiling would leak a little less, or at least that 
the carpet would dry more quickly. 

88348— 52— pt. 11 14 



3920 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mother wrote at length on the subject of the lecture which she heard you give 
some weeks ago on China, at the Women's University Club in New York. She 
said that you were perfectly marvelous. Later she wrote that a talk by Sir 
George Sansome had been rescued from utter failure by remarks which you 
made at its close. Isabel tells me that you're giving a course at the New School, 
and I wonder if you're enjoying it. 

Well, I've written a far longer letter than you deserve. Don't forget to send 
me a list of the Conference personnel if you have an extra one, along with 
whatever scandalous matter you may have on tap. Please give my fondest 
greetings to the gals. All the best to you. 
Yours, 

[s] Phil. 

(Penciled:) If George Glazebrook shows up at the Conference, please give my 
best. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, are yoii acquainted with tlie testimony 
before the House Un-American Activities Committee in connection 
with Charles and Dolly Eltenton ? 

Mr. Holland. No, I am not. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, can you recall a meeting of the board of 
trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1947, where a vote 
was taken on whether or not Mr. Field should be continued as a mem- 
ber of the executive committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Holland. No, I cannot remember this occasion. I have heard 
about it of course because it was a momentous occasion, but I don't 
believe I was present and I was not myself at this time a member of the 
American IPR. So I have only heard about it afterward. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat did you hear about it, Mr. Holland ? 

Mr. Holland. That there was a great deal of discussion as to 
whether it was proper for Mr. Field because of his activities and 
writing for Communist magazines, such as New Masses, to remain 
on the board of trustees. I know that the upshot of it was that Mr. 
Carter wrote a letter to Field saying that he thought under the 
circumstances he should offer his resignation and that Field wrote 
back rather resentfully, implying he didn't think it was very fair, but 
nevertheless submitting his resignation. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record at 
this time from the minutes of the board of trustees of March 18, 1947, 
which has been made part of the public record on page 483 of the hear- 
ings held by the subconmiittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, the following notations from the minutes : 

With regard to Mr. Field, President Sproul had been of the frank opinion that 
the best way out might be for Mr. Field to agree to withdraw from the executive 
committee. During the course of the discussion, Mr. Dean and Mr. Gilchrist 
had pointed out that Mr. Field was one of the most valuable and objective mem- 
bers of the executive committee and that they had never known him to show 
any political bias whatever as far as the IPR had been concerned. They also 
argued that if Mr. Field were removed from the committee, it would be wel- 
comed by Mr. Kohlberg, who would then concentrate his efforts on getting rid of 
other members who participate actively in the IPR. They had further pointed 
out that Mr. Field had been reelected to the board with a majority — that, in 
fact, he had received a majority of the votes of the California members. It was 
noted in this connection that the nominating committee in preparing the ballots 
for the new board of trustees informed the entire membership that Mr. Field was 
a member of the editorial board of the New Masses. 

Then later on, on page 485 : 

Mr. Dean then called for a vote on the question of whether Mr. Field should 
be included in the executive committee for 1947. Fourteen trustees voted ia 
favor of Mr. Field's serving on the executive committee for 1947 and one voted 
against. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3921 

Does that square with your recollection of the episode as you heard it ? 

Mr. Holland. No ; I must say that this is news to me. I knew there 
was a vote and there was disagreement, but it implies to me that after 
this, despite the vote, there must have been private conversations of 
people who frankly told Mr. Carter that they didn't see how they could 
continue to raise money for the IPR. It was as a result of this that 
Mr. Carter finally wrote the letter to Mr. Field asking him to resign. 
I am afraid I don't remember the dates of that, and I am speaking here 
only from what other people have told me, including Mr. Carter. But 
I was not in the meeting and I am afraid I had not read that par- 
ticular thing or known that the vote was so strongly in favor of Mr. 
Field. 

Mr. Marks. What was the date of that meeting, Mr. Morris, please? 

Mr. MoRKis. March 18, 1947. 

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations datecl June 13, 1940, addressed to Mr. 
W. L. Holland, care of the Giannini Foundation, with the typed 
signature of Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Can you recall having received that letter, Mr. 
Holland? 

Mr. Holland. I don't recall receiving it, but it seems to me to be 
an authentic letter. 

Mr. Morris. Would vou read the second and third paragraphs, 
Mr. Holland? 

Mr. Holland. This letter says I am enclosing a series of letters 
Hanwell from Block, Block from Hanwell, Field to Block, and Han- 
well from Block [reading] : 

As I remember it, you are ultimately to be the doctor on the Hanwell manu- 
script. To what extent do you wish to give avuncular advice to Hanwell now 
before it is too late. Please retuz'n all of this correspondence ultimately unless 
you wish to have Mrs. Ward make copies for your files. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that go in the record ? 
Senator Easti.and. It will be admitted in the record. 
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 584," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 584 

129 East 52nd Street, 
tieijo York City, June 13, 1940. 
Mr. W. L. Holland, 

c/o Oiannini Foundation, 

University of California, Berkley, Calif. 

Dear Bill : For your private information I enclose a docket containing the 
following : 

Letter to Norman Hanwell from Kurt Bloch dated March 27, 1940. 
Letter to Kurt Bloch from Norman Hanwell dated April 25, 1940. 
Memorandum from Fred Field to Kurt Bloch dated June 4, 1940. 
Letter to Norman Hanwell from Kurt Bloch dated June 4, 1940. 
It is an exciting melange of different points of view with a grand climax in 
which Fred Field assumes a gorgeous sound and fatherly role. 

As I remember it, you are ultimately to be the doctor on the Hanwell manu- 
script. To what extent do you wish to give avuncular advice to Hanwell now 
before it is too late. Please return all of this correspondence ultimately unless 
you wish to have Mrs. Ward make copies for your files. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edwabd O. Caeteb. 



3922 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please. 

Mr. Mandel. This is the original of a memo from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Kelations, dated June 4, 1940, headed, "WLH" 
from "ECC." 

Senator Eastland. It will be admitted into the record. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 584-A" and is as 

follows :) 

Exhibit No. 584^A 

June 4, 1940. 
WLH from ECC : 

Your letter of May 27, asking whether Field and I have been thinking of the 
effect on the program of the IPR of the United States entry into the war, I 
shall share with him and my colleagues of the Secretariat. 

Field alone can siieak for the American Council. I do know that he has been 
giving a great deal of thought to the very questions you raise. 

The attitude of Alexander, Corbett, and Shepherd has been to question the 
Chatham House action in placing itself at the disposal of the British Govern- 
ment. I have no idea what Field's attitude to that or to a similar proposal on 
behalf of the American Council would be. 

My own feeling is that principal tasks for the International Secretariat should 
include the following : 

(1) Accelerating and deepening our work on the Inquiry. This should in- 
clude the kind of correlative study which Corbett is aiaking of the relations of 
the Asiatic and European wars and of international organization after the wars 
are over. Here the IPR is doing something which may be more fundamental 
than the work of any other society anywhere in the world. It won't be fully 
accomplished if we do not think out new ways of going to Corbett's aid. 

Mr. Morris. Will you read the secoiid paragraph of that, Mr. 
Holland? 

Mr. Holland (reading) : 

Field alone can speak for the American Council. I do know that he has been 
giving a great deal of thought to the very questions you raise. 

Mr. Morris. What is meant there by "Field alone can speak for the 
American Council," Mr. Holland? 

Mr. Holland. I will have to read the whole letter. 

Mr. Morris. All right. 

Mr. Holland. This memorandum from Mr. Carter to me in June 
1940 begins : 

Tour letter of May 27, asking whether Field and I have been thinking of the 
effect on the program of the IPR of the United States entry into the war, I shall 
share with him and my colleagues of the Secretariat. 

Then the second paragraph says : 

Field alone can sipeak for the American Council. I do know that he has been 
giving a great deal of thought to the very question you raise. 

I assume from this that I had written a letter asking both Mr. Carter 
and Mr. Field what their views were, and since Mr. Carter at that 
time was the Secretary of the international IPR, not of the American 
Council, he is here dissociating himself and making it clear that Field 
is the one who will have to give the answer so far as the American IPR 
is concerned, and then he goes on to make some comments relating to 
the international. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations dated April 26, 1940, headed WLH from ECC. 

Mr. Morris. Can you recall having received that memorandum 
from Mr. Carter, Mr. Holland? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATION'S 3923 

Mr. Holland. I don't recall receiving it and I don't know what the 
allusion is, but as far as I can tell it seems like an authentic memo- 
randum from the IPR files. 

Mr. Morris. This makes reference to Abend's dispatch. Does that 
recall any episode to you ? 

Mr. Holland. No ; I am afraid it doesn't. 

Mr. Morris. It ends up saying : 

Fred has received an avalance of congratulations, among others from Jessup, 
Shotwell, Bruce, Bliven, Goodrich, Hu Shih, Mrs. Jessup, and a great many 

others. 

Mr. Holland. I am afraid I don't recall the incident. 
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced? 
Senator Ferguson (presiding). Yes; it will be received. 
(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit 585," and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 585 

April 26, 1940. 
WLH from ECC : 

It is perfectly all right to show Rowell and Oakie Abend's dispatch and poster 
that appeared in the Times on April 22 and Field's letter which appeared the 
next day, but I don't think there is any point in showing them my letter, as my 
activities in this matter might be misunderstood in certain quarters. 

Fred has received an avalanche of congratulations, among others from Jessup, 
Shotwell, Bruce, Bliven, Goodrich, Hu Shih, Oumansky, Mrs. Jessup, and a great 
many others. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, can you recall the circumstances of 
Michael Greenberg's coming into the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Hollant). I can't recall them exactly, Mr. Chairman. I do know 
that somewhere about 1938 — I am afraid I can't even remember the 
year correctly, but it was somewhere in that period just before or just 
after the Second World War began in Europe that Mr. Greenberg, 
who I think at that time had been on a fellowship at Harvard, making 
a study of early British trade with China, was invited, I think by 
Mr. Carter to come on as a research assistant or editorial assistant 
to the International Secretariat of the IPR. Then later after Mr. 
Lattimore ceased to be editor of Pacific Affairs in 1941, Mr. Green- 
berg I think was given the title of managing editor. Mr. Carter and 
I at that time being the actual editors, but Mr. Greenberg was respon- 
sible for the production job and most of the donkey work. 

Mr. Morris. Who sponsored him in the institute ? 

Mr. Holland. That I don't recall, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter please. 

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations dated May 6, 1940, addressed to W. L. 
Holland, with the typed signature of E. C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, do you recall having received that letter? 

Mr. Holland. As before, I don't recall it but it seems to me to be 
an authentic letter from Mr. Carter, telling me that Mr. Greenberg 
apparently wants to work for the IPR. 

Mr. Morris. May that be received in the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received in evidence. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 586," and is as 
follows:) 



3924 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 586 

129 East Fifty-Second Street, New York, N. Y., May 6, 19/fO. 
W. L. Holland, Esq., 

Oiannini Foundation, University of California, 

Berkeley, Calif. 

Dear Bill : Michael Greenberg visited us last week. He seems to be more 
eager than ever to have the advantage of study and collaboration as a member 
of the International Secretariat. He would like to spend a year studying the 
effect of the European war on the Far East. 

I wonder whether, if he does this well, this should not be a good Inquiry study. 
Or would it be more appropriate in the International Research Series or as an 
unclassified Secretariat paper? 

I have told him that the Secretariat is long on ideas but short on money. He is 
going to try to get the authorities at Harvard to make his Choate Fellowship 
next year applicable to work in the New York office even though it is supposed 
to be awarded for study at Harvard. If the Secretariat can carry on its activities 
at the University of California and Johns Hopkins, I can see no reason why 
Harvard shouldn't conversely carry on its activity at Fifty-second Street. 

Please write me frankly. 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Toledano, a Mexican ? 

Mr. Holland. No ; I have never had the pleasure of meeting him. 
I have heard of him. 

Mr. Morris. Was he active in the Institute of Pacific Relations' 
affairs ? 

Mr. Holland. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Will you identify that letter, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is an original memorandum from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 12, 1949, headed 
"WLH" from "ECC." 

Mr. Morris. Can you recall that particular document, Mr. Holland? 

Mr. Holland. This is a note from Mr. Carter to me saying would 
there be any point in our considering inviting Lombardo Toledano as 
an observer to the Mont Tremblant conference. 

I have never met him but Greenberg speaks enthusiastically about him. 

Then in my handwriting underneath I have put : 

Might it be a good scheme. Better see him first. 

Then, "Lunch," with a query. Underneath I put : 

Greenberg suggests Sr. Rosas of the Mexican Embassy. 

Mr. Morris. Do you consider Toledano to be a Communist ? 

Mr. Holland. I can't say. I have certainly heard him described 
in press reports as being a very strong Communist sympathizer, but 
I am afraid I haven't followed his career enough to kiiow whether he 
is considered a party member or not. 

Mr. Morris. Ordinarily would Greenberg's recommendation for a 
conference like Mont Tremblant conference be enough to warrant a 
recommendation ? 

Mr. Holland. No ; it was rather exceptional because normally since 
we don't have a Mexican council, it would only be guests or observers 
who would come from those countries. I would say Greenberg's rec- 
ommendation would be given very low priority in any such case, not 
because of Greenberg but because he was just a junior staff member. 

Mr. Morris. What further factor caused you to think that was a 
good idea? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3925 

Mr. Holland. I can't recall, Mr. Morris, and I can only assume that 
I thought that it would be a good idea to have a Mexican; but that 
is only a supposition. I can't recall the exact reasoning. 

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 587" and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 5S7 

October 12, 1942. 
(Penciled:) ECC. 
WLH from ECC : 

Would there be any point in our considering inviting Lombardo Toledano of 
Mexico City as an observer to Mont Tremblant? 

I have never met him, but Greenberg speaks enthusiastically about him. 
(Penciled:) Might be a good scheme. Better see him first. Lunch? WLH. 
Greenberg suggests Sr. Rosas of the Mexican Embassy. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please. 

Mr. Mandel. I have a group of documents. One is a carbon copy 
of a memorandum dated April 16, 1940, headed "WLH" from "ECC." 
Attached thereto is an original memorandum dated April 16, 1940, 
headed "HA, KM" from ECC and signed with the handwriting sig- 
nature of "Kate". 

Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Tsuru active in the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, Mr. Holland? 

Mr. Hoij:.and. Not to my knowledge. In the last 2 years he is 
now in Japan and as an important professor in Japan He contrib- 
uted one document to our last conference in Lucknow in 1950. I think 
he is a member of the present Japanese IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Is he related to Saionji, who was the secretary of your 
Japanese Council ? 

Mr. Holland. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

I wonder if you recall having received that document from Mr. 
Carter? 

Mr. Holland. I don't remember the incident, but this is a note from 
Mr. Carter: 

Tsuru came to see us last week and the following day at my suggestion he 
brought in Mrs. Tsuru for a visit. She is studying music and is exceptionally 
bright and attractive. She is some kind of relative of Saionji's. 

Tsuru would like Yasuo's job on the secretariat, though I think that if 
Harvard, offered him an appointment that would be his first love. 

Mayeda spoke to me in the highest terms of Tsuru and said that he thought 
he would be an admirable successor to Yasuo and that I could quote Mayeda 
to this effect in a cable to Tokyo. I have taken no action in this matter for' 
two reasons: (1) I wished to consult you and get your final judgment on Tsuru; 
(2) I learned from a young Foreign Office fellow named Matsumoto who is 
on his way to the Japanese Embassy in London, that he feels it is of the* 
utmost importance that either Usiba or Saionji succeed Yasuo. Matsumoto has 
told them that they are wasting their time mixing in internal politics in Japan, 
and that it is high time they got out of the Tokyo atmosphere and got the 
kind of view that they can best get in New York. 

Of course, if there is a chance of either Ushiba or Saionji coming, it might 
be a mistake to put forward Tsuru's name. What is your advice? Of course, 
Yasuo's ideal successor would be Yasuo. 

Mr. Morris. What was the actual termination of that episode? 
Yasuo became associated? 

Mr. Holland. Not to the best of my recollection, because in fact 
we did get another man from Tokyo whose name was Matsuo, Neith- 
er Ushiba nor Saionji was able to come, but we did finally get anoth- 



3926 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

er man to succeed Yasuo, Neither of these people. Tsuru as far 
as I know never was appointed in the IPR. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will the letter be received ? 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received in evidence. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 588" and is as 
follows : ) 

Exhibit No. 588 

April 16, 1940. 
(Penciled:) HA and KM ret ECC. 
WLH from ECC : 

Tsuru came to see us last week and the following day at my suggestion 
he broiight in Mrs. Tsuru for a visit. She is studying music and is exceptionally 
bright and attractive. She is some kind of relative of Saionji's. 

Tsuru would like Yasuo's job on the secretariat, though I think that if 
Harvard offered him an appointment that would be his first love. 

Mayeda spoke to me in the highest terms of Tsuru and said that he thought 
he would be an admirable successor to Yasuo and that I could quote Mayeda 
to this effect in a cable to Tokyo. I have taken no action in this matter for 
two reasons: (1) I wished to consult you and get your final judgment on 
Tsuru; (2) I learned from a young foreign office fellow named Matsumoto 
who is on his way to the .Japanese Embassy in London, that he feels it is of 
the utmost importance that either Ushiba or Saionji succeed Yasuo. Matsumoto 
has told them that they are wasting their time mixing up in internal politics 
in Japan, and that it is high time they got out of the Tokyo atmosphere and 
got the kind of view that they can best get in New York. 

Of course, if there is a chance of either Ushiba or Saionji comong, it might 
be a mistake to put forward Tsuru's name. What is your advice? Of course, 
Yasuo'S ideal successor would be Yasuo. 



April 16, 1940. 

{Penciled:) HA 
KM 

From ECC: 

You will, I think, be interested in the attached copy of my letter to Holland 
regai'ding an eventual successor to Yasuo. Have you any comments? 

(Penciled:) From the point of view of contacts with the Japanese Council, 
it would certainly be better to get someone who knows the IPR ropes in Tokyo. 
However, if that proves impossible, I should say Tsuru would be excellent for 
general research and translation work, as well as providing an intelligent 
Japanese point of view on the Far Eastern situation. I know Norman regards 
him very highly. 

Kate. 

Mr. Holland. This other memorandum seems to be from Kate 
Mitchell, also saying it would be better to get somebody from Tokyo. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what Kate Mitchell's salary was 
inthelPK? 

Mr. Holland. No, I am sorry, Senator Ferguson, I don't recall 
that. 

Senator Ferguson. Was she considered a minor or a major em- 
ployee ? 

Mr. Holland. In two different stages. She began in a very minor 
capacity as a sort of secretarial assistant. I would say in tlie last 
few years of her work there she was promoted to be a research as- 
sistant because by that time she had written a rather serious book on 
the industrialization of eastern Asia. I am afraid I don't recall 
what salary she was getting. 

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3927 

Mr. Mandel. This is an original document dated November 22, 
1934, on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed 
to W. L, Holland, 306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, and it is signed by 
Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, do you recall having received that docu- 
ment from Mr. Carter ? 

Mr. Holland. This seems to me to be an authentic letter which Mr. 
Carter sent me. I don't recall receiving it, but there is no doubt that 
I did. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will this be received into the record. 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 589" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 589 

(Penciled) SU 

Carter 
Office of the Seceetart-General 

The iNSTiTtTTE OF Pacific Relations 

HONOLULU, HAWAII 

Chatham House, 10, St. James' Square, London, S. W. 1 

November 22, 19S4. 
W. L. Holland, Esq., 

S06 Osaka Building, Tokyo. 
Dear Bill : Here are copies of Kantorovitch's letters to me of October 15th, 
16th, 20th, and 21st, and also of my replies. Would you, on my behalf, take up 
with Urumatsu the question of sending all of the Japanese IPR publications to 
Kantorovitch. Of course, the list is not large, but it is symbolical as well as 
actual, and it is of great importance that, at the earliest convenient date, every- 
thing that has been published in Japanese since the beginning of the Japanese 
IPR be sent to Moscow. 

In my letter to Kantorovich, you will see the reasons that I have given for 
choosing New York instead of Honolulu as the depository for the Soviet publi- 
cations. Ultimately I hope that there will be a Russian speaking member on 
the staff of both the Chinese and Japanese Councils, so that the fullest use can 
be made of materials in the Russian language. 

I am counting on you, of course, also to explore with Urumatsu the question 
of whether the Japanese Council will want to have some Soviet publications 
sent to them. (Penciled.) We don't want to ask for any until we are sure 
they will be used. 

Sincerely yours, 

[s] Edward Carter, 

Edward C. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, this is Carter writing to you : 

Here are copies of Kantorovitch's letters to me of October 15th, 16th, 20th, and 
21st and also of my replies. Would you on my behalf take up with Urumatsu the 
question of sending all of the Japanese IPR publications to Kantorovitch. Of 
course, the list is of great importance that, at the earliest convenient date, 
everything that has been published in Japanese since the beginning of the 
Japanese IPR be sent to Moscow. 

"Was it a practice of the institute to send all the records and files at the 
request of the Soviet council? 

Mr. Holland. No ; it was not the records and files, Mr. Morris. The 
practice was to exchange the publications. In other words, all of the 
national councils usually made a practice of sending complimentary 
copies of their publications to all of the other national councils. Kan- 
torovitch as I recall it at this time, was the secretary of the Soviet 



3928 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

council which had only just recently been started. Mr. Carter appar- 
ently had been visiting there and was stirring me up to see that the 
Japanese IPR sent this new council their own publications ; in other 
words, the back numbers, and so on. 

Mr. Morris. It was only the actual publications, nothing to do with 
the files. 

Mr. Holland. Nothing to do with the files. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Manclel, will you identify that letter, please ? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a carbon of a two-page letter from the files 
of the Institute of Pacific Eelations dated November 23, 1934, ad- 
dressed to A. J. Kantorovitch, 20 Basin Street, Moscow, II. S. S'. R. 
There is no signature. In the upper left-hand corner it says, "WLH 
for your information, ECC." 

Mr. Morris. Do you recall that particular document? 

Mr. Holland. Again I don't recall it; but it seems to me to be an 
authentic letter and is, I should judge, following up the practice which 
I just described a moment ago. In other words, Mr. Carter is here 
suggesting that this exchange process be continued and that the books 
received from the Soviet council be kept in the New York office. 

Mr. Morris. Do you see the paragraph there, Mr. Holland, that be- 
gins, "Neiv York has a great advantage over Honolulu"? 

Mr. Holland. Do you wish to read it? 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; would you please read that ? 

Mr. Holland. Yes [reading] : 

* * * As what may be a temporary depositary, New York has a great ad- 
vantage over Honolulu in that, in addition to a considerable Russian-speaking 
American population in New York, there are always a considerable number of 
Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, whom we have always 
found ready to assist the IPK whenever requested. The Pacific Council's Li- 
brary can supplement the Russian collection — 

and so on. 

Mr. Morris. To what extent was that true, Mr. Holland, with re- 
spect to employees of the Amtorg? 

Mr. Holland. I am afraid I can't speak with any knowledge at all, 
Mr. Morris. I had nothing to do with these Soviet publications nor 
any contact myself with the Soviet consulate or Amtorg at that time. 
My assumption from that letter is that the assistance he refers to is 
assistance in the matter of translation, but I can't be sure. You would 
have to ask Mr. Carter. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received ? 

Senator Ferguson. It will be received in evidence. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 590" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 590 

W. L. H. For your information. E. C. C. 

Chatham House, 
10, St. James's Square, 
London, S. W. 1., November 23, 1934. 
A. J. Kantorovich, 

20 Razin Street, Moscoio, U. S. 8. R. 
Dear Mr. Kantorovich : This is in reply to your letter of October 20th, propos- 
ing a most interesting and useful exchange of publications between the Soviet 
group and the Pacific Council. Immediately I received your letter, I discussed 
the matter with several of my colleagues, including Frederick V. Field, the newly 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3929 

•elected secretary of the American Council, and Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, who serves 
jointly on the staff of the American and Pacific Councils. 

In view of the fact that, at present, we have no Russian-speaking member on 
our staff in Honolulu, I have decided for the next two years to establish at New 
York the Pacific Council's depositary for all Soviet and Russian language pub- 
lications. Mr. Field has offered housing and free library service for the Pacific 
Council's Russian collection, so that during this two-year experimental period, 
I wish to have all of the Soviet publications that you are able to send, addressed 
not to Honolulu, but to : Pacific Council's Library, 129, East 52nd Street, New 
York. 

Mrs. Barnes, who, as you know, has a good command of the Russian language, 
and has studied in the Soviet Union, will be in charge of the Russian collection, 
which you are aiding us to establish. As what may be a temporary depositary, 
New York has a great advantage over Honolulu in that, in addition to a con- 
siderable Russian-speaking American population in New York, there are always 
a considerable number of Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, 
whom we have always found ready to assist the IPR whenever requested. The 
Pacific Council's Library can supplement the Russian collection in the New York 
Public Library and Library of the California University. 

In recognition of the Pacific Council's making the American Council its dei>os- 
itary for the Soviet publications which you decribed in your letter of October 
20th, Mr. Field has undertaken to supply the Soviet IPR with copies of all the 
English language IPR publications and a small but very carefully selected num- 
ber of English language books on the Pacific Area not published under the aus- 
pices of the IPR be also sent to you. I am hoping that if Mr. Field's first ship- 
ment of books from New York has not yet reached you, it will, nevertheless, be 
in Moscow well in advance of my arrival on December 23rd. 

With reference to the rather extensive shelf of books in the general field of in- 
ternational affairs published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs here 
in London, I wish to report that I made a special appeal to the IPR Committee 
of the Royal Institute at its meeting on November 20th, immediately following 
my arrival in London. The Committee listened most sympathetically to my ap- 
peal, but, while favouring the recommendation in principle, they could not give 
an immediate affirmative answer because the matter has to be acted on both 
by the Finance Committees will probably be reached before I arrive in Moscow. 
I feel quite certain that some of their most important publications will be made 
available, though it may not be possible for them to donate their entire shelf. 
I ought to add that the secretary of the IPR Committee informed me that all the 
publications of the Royal Institute are sent automatically to the Library of the 
Communist Academy. 

Copies of a few of the very recent books of the IPR were, I think, presented 
to your oflice by Miss Moore on her arrival in Moscow. 

I am writing to the secretaries of the Japanese and Chinese Councils with 
reference to IPR literature in the Japanese and Chinese languages, but it may 
be that it will take a little time to work out a satisfactory basis of interchange 
with Shanghai and Tokyo because of the fear which a number of the police offi- 
cials in some of the Far Eastern cities still have of Soviet scientific publications. 
It may pay to leave the final consummation of the arrangements till I am able 
to explore all aspects of the matter with my colleagues Liu in Shanghai and Uru- 
matsu in Tokyo. 

Sincerely yours, 



Mr. IMoRRis. Mr, Chairman, I have here four letters from Mr. Car- 
ter and one letter to Mr. Holland, which Mr. Mandel will identify and 
Mr. Holland will look at them, and may they be admitted into the 
record without comment, unless Mr. Holland may want to comment. 

Will you identify those documents as documents having been taken 
from the files of the institute ? 

Mr. Mandel. First we have a photostat of a document dated April 
18, 1940, addressed to W. L. Holland, signed Edward C. Carter. Second 
is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations dated March 5, 1937, addressed to Mr. Wm. L. 
Holland, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. Then next 



3930 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

is an original letter on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions marked "urgent" dated February 8, 1937, addressed to Mr. Wil- 
liam L. Holland, and signed by Edward C. Carter. Then we have 
a letter here dated January 9, 1935, from the files of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland and signed A. J. 
Kantorovitch. Attached thereto is a memorandum from the files of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations dealing with a visit of the secre- 
tary general. It is headed "The Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R. (Soviet 
Council of the IPR)." 

Finally, there is a photostat of a document from the files of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 22, 1941, addressed to Mrs. 
Martha Czarnowska, with no signature, but the title here is research 
secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, I wonder if you would identify those 
documents for the record, please. 

Mr. Holland. The first letter of April 18 from Mr. Carter appears 
to me to be an authentic letter which I received. 

Mr. Morris. Go ahead, Mr. Holland. 

Mr. Holland. The second letter, the 5th of March, Mr. Carter to 
me, apparently referring to a copy of the proceedings of the trials of 
the Soviet generals, I don't recall but it seems to me to be an authentic 
letter. 

The letter of February 8 from Mr. Carter to me, apparently sug- 
gesting a number of changes in a manuscript which Miss Moore seems 
to have had something to do, also seems to me to be an authentic 
letter. 

The letter from Kantorovitch to me, addressed to me in Tokyo, Jan- 
uary 9, 1935, the material sent along, a report on the activities of the 
Soviet council to be put in our house bulletin, IPR notes. That seems- 
to be an authentic copy. 

Finally, the letter of April 22, 1941, addressed by the research secre- 
tary to Mrs. Martha Czarnowska 

Mr. Morris. Do you know who she is, Mr. Holland ? 

Mr. Holland. I am afraid I don't — Oh, yes'; I do now. I couldn't 
remember at first. This is the married name of the daughter of Dr. 
Ludwig Rajchman and she had prepared a book of maps' on the Far 
East for us. These are my comments on the first draft of the maps, 
pointing out errors. I think undoubtedly the letter is mine. 

Mr. Morris. What was Rajchman's connection with the institute? 

Mr. Holland. Rajchman so far as I know had no connection, but 
I believe he may have attended one conference as an observer, possibly 
in 1931 when he was working for the Chinese Nationalist Government 
on behalf of the League of Nations. 

Mr. Morris. You have seen the testimony in our record about the 
recommendation that he attend the Mont Tremblant conference? 

Mr. Holland. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You know of no other activity of his ? 

Mr. Holland. No. I met him once or twice in New York on casual 
visits when he had great pride in his daughter and spoke to me a num- 
ber of times about how pleased he was at the book, these maps that she 
had done. 

Mr. Morris. He is now with the Polish Soviet delegation, is he 
not? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3931 

Mr. Holland. I am afraid I don't know that. I thought he was 
connected with the International Children's Emergency Fund. 

Mr. Morris. Is he with the Polish delegation now ? 

Mr. Holland. I am afraid I don't know. 

Mr. Morris. He could be in that capacity, but he could be repre- 
senting Poland ? 

Mr. Holland, He could be in both, surely. 

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits 591-A, 591-B, 591-C, 
591-D, 591-E" and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 591-A 
Institute of Pacific Eelations 

Amsterdam London Manila Moscow New York Paris Shanghai 
Sydney Tokyo Toronto Wellington 

OFFICE OF THE SECKETARY-GENEKAL 

129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y. 

April 18, 1940. 
W. L. Holland, Esq., 

Care of Oiannini Foundation, Berkeley, Calif. 

Dear Bill: It is difficult to condense aE that Cripps said, for I think I must 
have heard him speak a total of five hours. 

In general his analysis is similar to that of Holland, Field, and Carter. 

I did not hear his talk on India, but learned from Shridharani and Margaret 
Taylor that he seemed to have a pretty rounded understanding of Indian prob- 
lems and a high regard for Nehru and Gandhi. He is reported to fear that the 
premature launching of civil disobedience might lead to a prolonged and bloody 
civil war. 

With reference to the United Front he feels that in the present period it is 
growing stronger and that the Generalissimo is disciplining the rightists. He is 
agnostic as to the continuation of Kuomintang-Communists cooperation after 
Japanese pressure is withdrawn. 

He gave a vivid picture of Sinkiang and its two-fisted ruler. Trade for geo- 
graphical reasons is primarily with the U. S. S. R. There are Russian experts, 
but as far as he could discover no Russians in administrative positions. The 
relations between Sinkiang and Chungking are formal, correct, and cooperative, 
but the ruler in Sinkiang has pretty nearly full independence. He is keener on 
Sinkiang for the Sinkiangese than he is for either Russia or China, but he accepts 
the Generalissimo as his chief. 

Cripps gave an inside picture of the reasons for the breakdown of the Anglo- 
French negotiations in Moscow before the war. He feels that the British could 
have come to terms with Russia if they had treated the Russians as equals 
instead of inferiors. Just before the Finnish-Russian war began Cripps was 
trying to bring London and Moscow together. But the efforts of the British 
Embassy in Stockholm to dissuade the Finns from coming to terms with Moscow 
prevented his being, I gather, a mediator between Maisky and Halifax. 

In Chungking he talked to the Soviet Ambassador who personally approved 
of Cripps going on to Moscow from Sinkiang. This was presumably approved by 
Halifax. Cripps had long talks with Molotov and on his return to Chungking 
with, I assume, the approval of Clark Kerr, sent a lengthy cable to London 
urging in the strongest terms renewed effort on the part of London to establish 
some relations with Moscow. 

I imagine that supplementing his cable will be one of the principal aims of 
Cripps on his return to London. He and Geoffrey Wilson sailed last Saturday 
on the Rex. I assume that he will get home before Italy comes off the fence. 

Cripps spoke in high terms of CIC and of the educational possibilities of the 
CIC if propei-ly staffed as a method of adult education in democracy. 

Cripps had talks with Arita, Grew, Craigie, and others in Tokyo and, I 
think, felt that Grew and Craigie in their two speeches had the same objectives 
but that Grew had done it in the right way and Craigie in the wrong way. 

After Tokyo, Cripps visited Formosa. And he has seen a great many people 
in Washington, Baltimore, and New York. To a large and predominantly right- 



3932 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

wing dinner at Council House he made a very able talk principally on the Far 
East, and all of the capitalist members with whom I talked afterward were full 
of admiration for the balance, vividness, and accuracy of his analysis. No one 
in the room seemed to share the bitter view of Cripps that some English tory and 
some English labor leaders take. 

I myself am worried at the continued hostility to the U. S. S. R. on the part 
of the Washington and London governments. I am afraid that if the British 
do not take a different line in their relations with Moscow they will suffer. 

It seems to me that it would be a great mistake for the Allies to go to war 
with the U. S. S. R., even though some of them may think that the Allied cause 
would more quickly gain American support if the Allies were fighting both Russia 
and Germany instead of Germany alone. 

Mrs. Kittredge has just had a letter from her husband who was in Oslo the 
week before the invasion and left Oslo as the Germans came in. During that 
week end he saw the head of the university, the Foreign Minister, the Trustees 
of the Nobel Fund, and many similar people. They were all feeling a new 
strength, a new sense of Scandinavian solidarity. They felt that Scandinavia 
had now once more found its soul as a result of the Soviet invasion of Finland 
and the German sinking of Scandinavian ships, and now Norway was going to 
gird itself so as to make certain that there should be no further German aggres- 
sion. Apparently not a single Norwegian of all those that Kittredge saw had 
the slightest suspicion during that week end of what was to befall them on 
Tuesday. 

Sincerely yours, 

[s] Edward C. Carter 
Edward C. Cartee. 

P. S. — Unless you get the information from other sources, please do not report 
to others what I have said regarding Ci'ipps' negotiations with Maisky and 
Molotov. 



Exhibit No. 591-B 

129 East 52nd Street, 
New York City, March 5, 1937. 
Mr. WuxiAM L. Holland, 
Food Research Institute, 

Stanford University, California. 
Dear Bill : You will, think, be able to help people who have been perplexed by 
the recent Moscow Trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a copy 
of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collgium of the Supreme 
Court. January 23-January 30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies 
and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it 
fascinating and will want to read it all the way through. 

I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires 
will want to read it also. 

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of 
Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. 
It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists 
attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they 
are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials not withstanding. 

When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would 
most appreciate it, it should be put in the Library of the I. P. R. in San Francisco, 
Sincerely yours, 

Edward C. Carter. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3933 

Exhibit No. 591-C 
Institute of Pacific Relations 

Amsterdam Honolulu London Manila Moscow New York Paris 
Sydney Tokyo Toronto Wellington 

OFFICE OF THE SECBETARY-GIENEKAL 

129 East 52nd Street, 
islew York City, February S, 1937. 
Air Mail. 
( Penned : ) Urgent. 

Dear Bill : Enclosed is a copy of Motylev's letter to me of the 15th of January 
regarding the manuscript for the Soviet chapter of Problems of the Pacific. As a 
result of a conversation with Harriet I have just wired you as follows : 

Air mail me copy all you have written in problems regarding Takayanagi- 
Motylev discussion. 
When you read Motylev's letter you will realize that Harriet and I are helpless 
in dealing with Motylev's paragraph 4 without seeing how you have treated this 
incident. 

Now we will deal with Motylev's points as far as is necessary seriatim. 
Harriet is mildly upset that after we had all voted in favor of eliminating her 
first paragraph the manuscript was sent to Motylev with this still intact. It is 
easy, therefore, for Harriet to accept Motylev's strong plea for eliminating this. 
She desired that it be eliminated and thought it had. 

(1) Harriet feels that we should put Motylev's reply to Takayanagi in direct 
quotes (unless you have done it in your chapter) but that we should not yield to 
Motylev with reference to direct quotes of his other statements for two reasons ; 
first, we have used direct quotes for a good many of his statements ; second, where 
we have not done so his English was so involved that Harriet feels indirect speech 
more successfully expresses his ideas. 

(2) Harriet is willing out of deference to Motylev to give the spokesman in 
her chapter greater authority by building them up in the manner proposed by 
Motylev, especially in relation to the German-Japanese discussion. You can use 
your own judgment about adopting a similar procedure in your own chapter. 

(3) Harriet feels that we can include Yoshizawa's reply to Mr. Sarraut as 
proposed by Motylev. 

(4) If you have quoted Takayanagi in full in your chapter, Harriet's proposal 
is that she quote Motylev's reply in full in her chapter and cross-reference it to 
the quotation of your chapter. This would end the Soviet chapter. Does such a 
proposal meet with your approval? 

(5) Motylev's suggest accepted. 

(6) 1st paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted. 

2nd paragraph— Instead of putting paragraphs from the Constitution into the 
body of the text, my proposal is that they be quoted in a footnote. Harriet would 
recommend that we merely make a footnote to these clauses instead of quoting 
them if you would prefer to save space, (Penned) otherwise Harriet accepts 
my proposal. 

(7) 1st paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted. 
2nd paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted. 

3rd paragraph — Harriet proposes to change the sentence regarding "dumping" 
from a statement of fact to a point raised by members of the Conference. In 
its new form it will read "Some members asserted that in the past certain markets 
have been affected by so-called Soviet dumping." 

4th paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted. 

5th paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted. 

6th paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted. 

7th paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted by omitting. 

Sth paragraph- — Motylev's suggestion accepted (His original manuscript used 
both terms indiscriminately). 

9th paragraph — Motylev's suggestion accepted. 



3934 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

10th paragraph— We assume that Motylev's suggestion is carried out in sub- 
stance in the various chapters and that, therefore, there is no need of an appendix 
of Chairmen's statements. Before writing Motylev, However, we would like 
from you a clarification of this point. 

Sincerely yours, r -, t^ , /■ ^ rt 4- 

rs] Edward C. Carter 

Edward C. Cabteb, 

Enclosure. ■ 

(Penned:) Please reply by air at the earliest momeif ». 



(Exhibit No, 591-D) 

Januart 9, 1935. 

Mr. W. L. Holland, 

/. P. R. Notes, Editorial and PulUcation Office, 
306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, Japan. 
Dear Mr. Holland: I enclose herewith the quarterly report of the Pacific 
Institute of U. S. S. R. to I. P. R. Notes, which was promised in our letter of 
December 20, and about which Mr. E. C. Carter cabled you from London. 

I hope it will reach you in due time to appear in the next issue of the 
I. P. R. Notes. 

Sincerely yours, 

[s] A. J. Kantorovich. 



The Pacific iNSxiTtrTE of U. S. S. R. ( Soviet Council of I. P. R. ) 

VISIT op THE SECRETARY GENERAL 

At the end of December 1934, the Soviet Council was visited by Mr. E. C. Carter, 
Secretary General of the IPR, who stayed in Moscow from December 20, till the 
31st. The Secretary General's party included the following members: 
Miss Kate Mitchell, permanent private secretary. 
Mr. Stephanus V. C. Morris of Lenox, Mass. 

Mr. Simon Wingfield Digby of Sherborne Castel, Dorset, England. 
The party of the Secretary General was joined by Miss Harriet Moore, a member 
of the IPR staff, who is at the present time a resident in Moscow where she is 
doing research work on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

On December 29, the Secretary General was received by the People's Commissar 
of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov. 

During his visit the Secretary General had two conferences with the Praesidium 
of the Soviet Council (Mr. V. E. Motylev, President; Mr. G. N. Voitinsky, 
Vice President; Mr. A. J. Kantorovich, Secretary General of the Council), and 
was in daily intercourse with Mr. Kantorovich. 

The Secretary General availed himself of the opportunity to renew his contact 
with different scientific institutions of the U. S. S. R. partly connected with the 
Soviet Council of the IPR. Mr. E. C. Carter and his party have had interviews 
with The Chamber of Commerce, The Institute of World Economics and World 
Politics of the Communist Academy, The Supreme Board of the Great Northern 
Sea Passage, The All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Coun- 
tries, The Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas, 
The Institute of Oceanography, The Institute of Soviet Construction and Law, two 
Agrarian Institutes. Some of these institutions the Secretary General visited in 
person, while some sent representatives who took part in conferences arranged 
at the office of the Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R. 

During the Secretary General's stay in Moscow the Praesidium of the Soviet 
Council had the opportunity of discussing and adjusting several questions pertain- 
ing to the current work of the Soviet Section and its plans for the future. 

CONFERENCE PREPARATION 

During the Secretary General's visit the question of the agenda of the next 
IPR Conference and of the data papers to be prepared for this Conference has 
been discussed in Moscow. 

The Praesidium of the Soviet Council informed the Secretary General that it 
has no objections to the agenda as stated in the circular letter of the Secretary 
General dated Amsterdam, December 18. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3935 

However, the Soviet Group does not agree with the proposal of the American 
Council to shift the qiiestion of International Status of Manchoukuo to item "C" 
of the agenda (Soviet Far East). The Soviet Council's suggestion is to leave 
this question as originally proposed by the Secretary General's circular or to 
transfer it to items "D" and "A". 

■* EXCHANGE OF PUBLICATIONS 

With the assistance of the Secretary General, an agreement has been tenta- 
tively established betwef ^ the American Council and the Soviet Unit for exchange 
of publications along the following lines : 

1. Exchange of all publications issued by the respective Councils. 

2. Exchange of all important books published in both comitries dealing 
with the Far East. 

3. (Subject to further adjustment.) Exchange of a collection of standard 
books of a general character on the Soviet Union and U. S. A., respectively. 

4: 4: ^ ^ * H: ^ 

PUBLICATIONS 

The following monographs are in the course of preparation by the Soviet 
Council, as part of the documentation for the 1936 conference : 

1. Economic Struggle on the Pacific Ocean, by Professor V. E. Motylev, 
President of the Soviet Council. 

2. The National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Soviet Far East, 
by Mr. S. M. Dimantshtein, Head of the Institute of Minor Nationalities. 

3. Results and Prospective Plans of Socialist Construction in the Soviet 
Far East, by the research staff of the State Planning Commission in the 
Soviet Far East. 

It is expected that these monographs will be ready in Russian towards the end 
of August or the beginning of September of the current year. Later on they 
will be translated into English and published in this language. 

At the same time the Soviet Council has decided to proceed with the publica- 
tion of a symposium of articles on a number of important questions pertaining 
to the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. 

The preliminary outline of contents is as follows : 

Relations between Japan and China during the World War. 

Reasons of the Denunciation of the Washington Treaty and the Situation in 

the Far East. 
Problem of Unification of China. 

Social and Economic Consequences of the War and the Crisis in Japan. 
Anglo-Japanese Struggle for the World Markets. 
The Silver Problem and the Colonial Countries in the Far East. 
Ideological War Preparation in Japan. 
Economic, Social and Political Development of the Soviet Far East during 

the First and Second Five Year Plans. 
National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the Northern 

Regions of Siberia. 
Establishment of the Autonomous Jewish District in Birobidjan. 
Significance of the Great Northern Sea Passage. 
The symposium will be published in English and will probably consist of 
about three or four hundred pages. It is expected that the manuscript will be 
ready at about the middle of the current year. 



MISCELLANEOUS 

The Secretary General of the Soviet Council started to collect a library of 
Russian and Foreign books on the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. 

A complete catalogue has been prepared of all literature published in Russian 
in the Soviet Union beginning with 1922 on questions pertaining to the Far East 
and the Pacific Ocean, including those on the Soviet Far East. 

******* 

On invitation from the Secretary General of the IPR the Soviet Council 
decided to undertake the preparation of a report on the subject of the Legal 
Status of Aliens in the U. S. S. R. to be incorporated into an international 
handbook on the subject to be published by the IPR. 

88348— 52— pt. 11 15 



3936 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Similarly on the suggestion of the Secretary General the Soviet Council will 
submit as a contribution to the international study on this subject a report on 
communications in the Soviet Far East. 

Both reports are expected to be ready around March 15th. 

******* 

The Soviet Group suggested that all National Councils prepare a brief 
bibliographical survey of the literature on subjects which are of interest for 
the IPR published in their respective countries, which surveys could be circulated 
every three months or so. 

Exhibit No. 591-E 

Copy to ED 
GiANNiNi Foundation, 
Univeesity of California, 
Berkeley, Calif., April 22, 19J,1. 
Mrs. Marta Czarnowska, 

The Lodge, 8080 Rockville Pike, 

Bethesda, Md. 

Dear Mrs. Czarnowska : Thank you very much for your letter of April 16 and 
for the five maps. I have now had an opportunity to examine these with some 
care, and as a result have decided to send them back to you instead of sending 
them to our New York ofiice as I had originally intended. 

I am doing this because, as you will see from the pencilled annotations on the 
maps, there are a number of errors which ought to be corrected. In addition to the 
points I have marked, I am sorry to note that there are also a number of puz- 
zling inconsistencies between one map and another, e. g., your location of prin- 
cipal Australian railways differs somewhat as between maps 3 and 4. In map 5, 
although you show the principal Malayan and Thailand railways you omit 
the coastal line of Indo-China and also the important east-west line running 
east from Chuchow almost to Hangchow and Ningpo in eastern China. More- 
over, you show the railways across northern Manchuria, but not the important 
south Manchurian and Korean lines. Incidentally in this map I should prefer 
you to include the principal lines in the Japanese occupied regions. In maps 
3 and 4, you show a line running from Bangkok into southern Indo-Ohina, 
whereas the line actually stops at the frontier. You also show a railway run- 
ning south from the Trans-Siberian to Ulanbator, but I doubt very much whether 
this railway has been constructed. 

In map 1, you show the Chinese east-west railway from Chuchow to Hang- 
chow, as if it were uninterrupted, whereas actually several miles of it are under 
Japanese control at Nangchang. On this map you also use the French "Baie 
de Cam Ranh" instead of the English, Cam Kanh Bay. I am also puzzled to 
know what the word "Hungsuhi" just below Kunming refers to and also why 
you have used abbreviations for towns like Changsha, Kweilin, etc., when there 
seems to be plenty of room to print them in full. 

On Map 2, I wonder why you have given the names of tin mines in Burma 
and the Netherlands Indies but not in the other countries, and similarly why you 
have not indicated the location of oil wells in Burma. It will be necessary to 
add an explanatory note to map 2. indicating that you have included India, 
south China and Australia as part of southeast Asia. Most definitions of 
southeast Asia exclude those areas. 

I note that you mostly use the word "Thai" instead of the more correct 
English form Thailand, even in cases where there is room to print the full name. 
In map 4, it would be desirable to substitute the word "Auckland" for "Devon- 
port" in New Zealand, as the latter is simply a suburb of Auckland. For the 
French island Uvea northeast of Fiji you should either use the native names 
Uvea and Futuna, or the English names Wallis and Home. The southern 
part of the Solomon group is British and the northern half is part of the Aus- 
tralian mandated territory. Western Samoa should be called New Zealand 
mandate and not British. You should also include the important phosphate 
island Nauru on the equator west of the Gilberts. 

These errors and inconsistencies are so numerous that I feel it is essential 
for you to correct them before I send them to our New York oflBce, as otherwise 
they may create a rather bad impression on our editorial staff. I am somewhat 
surprised that you did not give me the opportunity to examine the preliminary 
sketches of the maps so that I could have pointed out these matters in advance 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3937 

and thus saved you the trouble of making corrections in the finished drawings. 
I hope it will be possible for you to make these corrections promptly and return 
the maps to me for further examination before I send them to New York. In 
the meantime, I am authorising our treasurer to send you a preliminary pay- 
ment of $75 and will instruct her to send the balance on receipt of the corrected 
drawings. Until these corrections are made, I think we had better postpone 
definite plans for doing additional maps, although I think it is probably that we 
shall want you to do at least two more of the whole Pacific area, showing 
principal lines of communication and transport. 

I am sorry to say that it has not yet been possible for us to make satisfac- 
tory arrangements for the text to accompany these maps. However, we have 
now secured a competent person and hope to be able to persuade him to do work 
so that the text and tlie maps together could be issued as a pamphlet late this 
summer. 

While I agree with you that it would have been preferable to have a new and 
up to date edition of the Atlas of Far Eastern Politics, it was financially im- 
possible for us to arrange this, and accordingly we adopted the second best 
procedure of importing the 375 remaining copies of the English edition. We 
shall probably include an explanatory note in these, stating that a supplementary 
pamphlet will be issued later this year. I am afraid there would be no use in 
our asking Hudson to write the additional text as he is so busy with war work 
that he had to abandon another piece of writing that he had begun for the IPR. 
The copies of the English edition are probably on the way, and I am desperately 
hoping that they will not be torpedoed. Since there is no question of an Ameri- 
can edition (as Distinct from the English edition which we have purchased out- 
right from Faber and Faber) it will not be necessary for you to send me a copy of 
your contract. 

I am not sure when I shall be returning to New York, but there is a possi- 
bility that I may make a short visit toward the end of the summer. I shall, 
of course, let you know when I am coming. In the meantime, please do not 
hesitate to call at our New York office if you want further information or books. 
Miss Downing, Miss Greene, Miss Farley, Miss Porter, Mr. Greenberg, Mr. 
Grajdanzev, and Mr. Matsue will all be willing to help you on specific points. 
In the meantime, however, the important thing is to complete the cori-ections 
on the present maps. 

With best wishes. 
Sincerely yours, 

— , Research Secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Marks, I have here a score of other documents. 
It would save the time of everybody if we could work out a stipulation 
in connection with letters to be introduced into the record. I think 
Senator Ferguson has some questions to ask possibly in connection 
with your statement. 

Mr. Marks. If Mr. Holland w-ants to make a comment on any of 
these letters, will there be a way we can do that ? 

]Mr. Morris. Surely. 

Senator, we are going to stipulate as to the introduction of other 
documents, but I thought you perhaps would like to ask Mr. Holland 
some questions now on the basis of the statement. 

Senator Ferguson. I have gone over the statement but I don't 
care to ask any questions at this time. 

Mr. Holland. Might I inquire, Mr. Morris, perhaps to facilitate 
our work, in the case of letters originating with Mr. Carter, if we are 
going to do it by the stipulation method, would it not be just as easy to 
ask his to identify his own letter? I have no objection to this, but 
usually it would seem to be better if the sender of the letter can identify 
it. That is of course for you to decide. 

Mr. Morris. Will you see Mr. Carter in the near future ? 

Mr, Holland. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. There is one letter that he is very anxious to have, and 
w^e have now found the letter. You can take with you a copy if you 
like. 



3938 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Holland, Very good. 

Mr. Morris. That is the July 10, 1938, letter that has been disturb- 
ing him. I will give you one and send one to him, both. 

Mr. Holland. All right, thank you. 

May I inquire as a matter of time-saving, Mr. Chairman, if I should 
wish to make comment on any of these letters that we go over together, 
may I also make comments on any other letters affecting me which 
have been previously introduced into the testimony and about which 
I have not been questioned? 

Senator Ferguson. It will be understood if you send it in and it is 
in writing, it is considered as part of the testimony and under oath. 

Mr. Holland. Yes ; I will be glad to do that. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. That it is sworn testimony. 

Mr. Holland. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. When Mr. Fairbank was on the stand here he intro- 
duced a memorandum in connection with an explanation on your 
part of episodes that had taken place involving him. At the time! 
he tried to have that introduced into the record, it was pointed out to* 
him that the testimony was that of Mr. Holland and it wasn't sworn 
testimony and should be deferred until you were here. Are you ac- 
quainted with that document? 

Mr. Holland. I am. I have a carbon copy of it here. 

Mr. Morris. Do you swear that the answers given in those — are 
there four? 

Mr. Holland. Four; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Are those four points true to the best of your knowl- 
edge? 

Mr. Holland. They are. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may they be received in the record at 
this time? 

Senator Ferguson. Under those circumstances it may be received 
as sworn testimony. 

Mr. Holland. Do you have Mr. Fairbank 's original copy? 

Mr. Morris. We have the original copy. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 592," and 
is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 592 

institxjte of pacific relations 

office of the secketaey-general 

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y. 

Febeuaey 23, 1952. 
Professor John K. Fairbank, 

41 Winthrop St., Cambridge 38, Mass. 
Dear John : Here are my explanations or comments on the references to you 
which appear on pages 436, 482, 651, and 652 of the Senate Judiciary Subcom- 
mittee on Internal Security Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Page 436: Israel Epstein's letter to me refers to you as having come in from 
Kweilin and of his having received something, through you, from "H. and Elsie." 
Epstein wrote this note to me in Chungking when I was visiting there in Sep- 
tember 1943 with Mr. E. C. Carter at the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. Epstein 
was then an accredited foreign correspondent in Chungking (he wrote some 
, articles for the New York Times, I recall) and I had asked him and some 
Chinese colleagues, including Dr. Ta Chen, the well-known sociologist, to collect 
material for an I. P. R. study of wartime labor problems in China. Epstein was 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3939 

also doing some work for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives in China and he 
gave me some of their field reports to bring back to their New York office. His 
reference to "H. and Elsie" means Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax 
Cholmeley, both of which were then working in Kweilin for the Chinese Indus- 
trial Cooperatives. I assume that you brought back some of the field reports 
from Kweilin to Epstein in Chungking and that these were among the reports 
which he gave me to bring back to New York. 

Page 482 : Lawrence K. Rosinger, then on the staff of the Foreign Policy Asso- 
ciation, had at my invitation written a research report for the I. P. R. on China's 
Wartime Politics (later published by the Princeton University Press). Follow- 
ing the regular practice of the I. P. R. I sent copies of the first draft to a number 
of qualified people for criticism. Among these were several Government offi- 
cials, including John Carter Vincent, Alger Hiss (both of whom were then con- 
cerned with Chinese affairs), and yourself. From the dates, it would seem that 
when Rosinger wrote (Dec. 30, 1943), I actually had not yet sent you the MS, 
because (as appears on page 479 of the Hearings) it was not until Feb. 21, 1944, 
that I sent it to you, apparently because other people had been slow sending in 
their comments. Rosinger's study was a competent piece of scholarly work, 
did not propagate any communist line, and was not based on classified reports. 
It was favorably reviewed in the press and learned journals. 

Page 651 : I was writing Prof. Chien Tuan-sheng, the well-knovsTi Chinese 
Political Scientist, then teaching at the Southwest Associated University in 
Kunming about his research report for the IPR on Chinese Government and 
Politics (later published by the Harvard University Press). r>ecause of the 
great uncertainties and delays in sending bulky manuscripts by ordinary mail 
from China at that time (April 1944), I suggested as a precaution that the 
author might try to have it sent by the diplomatic bag to you in Washington. 
This would have involved Chien's getting someone in the U. S. Consulate or in 
one of the government agencies in Kunming to forward the MS. Because of the 
abnormal state of the mails, such favors were sometimes extended to prominent 
scholars in China. Whether a draft of (initialed: WLH) the MS was actually 
sent in this way I do not recall, but I think it very unlikely, as I remember that 
the completion of the study was delayed for several years and you will recall 
that Chien himself finished the final draft in Cambridge about 1947. I certainly 
have no record or recollection that any draft of his MS was received by the IPR 
office via the diplomatic bag or via you. As you know, Chien was a highly 
respected person in Kuomintang circles and there was nothing in his report of a 
pro-communist nature, nor was any of it based on classified materials. This 
seems to be a case of my having suggested a possible course of action which in 
fact was not adopted because of the author's delay in finishing his study. 

Page 652 : Here I apparently sent you a letter addressed to Liu Yu-wan, then 
Secretary of the China Institute of Pacific Relations and asked you to inquire 
whether it could be taken by hand or sent via the APO to Liu in Chungking. 
What the letter to Liu was about I don't recall, as he was the person with whom 
I normally corresponded about all IPR business in China. Whether you did in 
fact send it to him by hand or via APO I also don't know. I note that I gave 
you an opportunity to decline my request. Liu was not and is not a communist 
sympathizer. In fact he later became the Nationalist Chinese Minister in Korea 
and is now on the Nationalist Chinese delegation at the United Nations. My 
reason for asking you to forward the letter to him was, of course, to avoid the 
very long delays of the ordinary mails (sometimes over three months). 
Sincerely, 

[s] Bill 

William L. Holland, Secretary General. 

P. S. — I would remind you that during the period covered by the above letters 
I was research secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations and that the China 
Institute of Pacific Relations was one of the most important national councils of 
the organization. My colleagues and I were making special efforts at this time 
to keep the China Council alive and participating actively in the over-all IPR 
research program. The China IPR was never pro-communist. Qn the contrary 
it was largely supported by Dr. H. H. Kuug and Dr. T. V. Soong. 

[s] WLH. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else, Mr. Holland, that you would 
like to request the committee to do at this time ? The files will be 
available. The bulk of the files will be available to you starting 



3940 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

today. I think if you get in touch with Mr. Hasser here, he will try 
to make the working conditions as agreeable as possible. I assure 
you that they are not agreeable at any time. In that way you can 
show us things that should go into the record in order to correct a 
wrong impression given by any letter, if that is the case. 

Mr. Marks. Do you know whether you now have plans to call 
any more people concerning the Institute of Pacific Eelations ? 

Mr. Morris. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Marks. Counsel would like time after the close of your receipt 
of testimony about the institute to prepare a statement or to advise 
our client. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Marks, it is assumed, however, at all times that 
while this thing has been going on you have been taking cognizance 
of the matter and making preparations. 

Mr. Marks. Yes, but until today of course we haven't had the ad- 
vantage of being able to examine our files and to examine what 
is going on in the light of what the files show. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Mr. Chairman, at the same time it is understood by the commit- 
tee that while these hearings are going on you are taking cognizance 
and preparing whatever answers you consider appropriate. 

Mr. Marks. We are doing our best under the circumstances. 
There is the question of getting hold of transcripts, and so forth. 
There are apparently only five printed parts. Again I must say 
that it is going to take us a while, just as it has taken you quite a 
while, to go over those files. 

Senator Ferguson. How long does counsel think it will take? 

Mr. Marks. I don't know what they look like. Senator Ferguson. 
I have never seen them. I imagine they are pretty voluminous. I 
would like to hear Mr. Morris give an estimate of how long it would 
take to go over the files. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland requested a month in his letter. That is 
what the committee has agreed upon. 

Mr. Marks. I wonder whether Mr. Holland was referring to the 
month that we requested to prepare something in the nature of a 
defense after the testimony had been closed. 

Mr. Holland. I will have to refer back'to the phraseology of the 
letter. I don't recall. 

Mr. Morris. The month referred to by the committee, Mr. Marks, 
is that as of today the files are available, and they will be available for 
30 'days. That doesn't mean that is all it is, but that is the way it 
stands. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the way it stands at the present time. 

Mr. Marks. I understand. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. There is one letter that Mr. Carter had particular 
reference to. A copy of that may be picked up today. 

Mr. Marks. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. I can't think of anytliing else. 

Mr. Holland. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to have it go on 
record that while in the past I have registered some objections to pro- 
cedure, I feel that what Mr. Morris has just proposed is very fair and 
satisfactory, and not only that, but Senator Watkins' actions this 
morning in permitting the two previous witnesses to read their state- 
mens is very much appreciated by us. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3941 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to read anything now into the 
record ? 

Mr. Holland. No ; I have already done that as far as I think it was 
necessary. 

Senator Ferguson. I am sorry my work today has been such that 
I could not be here except now. 

Mr, Morris. I think that it is well that the record shows, Mr. Chair- 
man, that if you do care to have the privilege of reading it, the state- 
ment has been given out to the press, it does go into the record with the 
full force as if it had been read into the record, and I think that very 
little would be gained if you did read it. Senator Eastland was 
pressed for time. 

Mr. Holland. I understand. 

Senator Ferguson. That is why I say, if you want to read it 
now 

Mr. Holland. I appreciate your offer. I don't believe it is neces- 
sary, sir. The only point I would put forward as a request — I know 
the committee will have to pass on it — is that in line with the earlier 
letter from Senator McCarran the committee do give favorable con- 
sideration to the idea of introducing the testimonial letters we have 
received and also those letters and the replies there which concern 
people whom you are not going to call to give direct testimony. In 
other words, where people have been accused and are not in a position 
to come and testify for themselves, if they can submit a statement, even 
though technically it may seem hearsay, I feel it is only fair that it 
should be taken into account. But that is for the committee to decide. 

Mr. Morris. The only one we haven't settled on in that category is 
Mr. Bisson and Mr. Barnes. 

Mr. Holland. Yes ; in that particular group. 

Mr. Morris. Barnes has not been connected with the institute since 
when ? 

Mr. Holland. 1934. 

Mr. Morris. He has been a member of the board of trustees since 
then. 

Mr. Holland. No; I think not. 

The other three documents, there are three memoranda prepared 
by me analyzing three IPR pamphlets in an attempt to show that 
earlier descriptions of them in the testimony were not, in my opinion, 
balanced. If necessary, I would like to have the privilege of swear- 
ing to those three documents at the back of that green book. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you swear to those ? 

Mr. Holland. I do, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I will receive them as part of the evi- 
dence. 

Mr. Morris. Those three publications. 

Mr. Holland. They are all memoranda on the three publications. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 593A, No. 
593B, No. 593C," and are as follows:) 

Exhibit N'o. 593-A 

Memorandum on "Land of the Soviets" by Marguerite A. Stewart 

During testimony by Louis Budenz before the McCarran Subcommittee, 
August 22, 1951 (Hearings, Vol. 10, p. 1101 et seq.), the Subcommittee's research 
director, Benjamin Mandel, read aloud three excerpts from "Land of the So- 



3942 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

viets" by Marguerite A. Stewart, and published in 1942 by the Webster Pub- 
lishing Co., for the American IPR. These were taken from a larger collection 
of such excerpts which was filed for the record as Exhibit No. 142. Budenz was 
asked to comment on the excerpts and said they represented "thoroughly a 
Communist point of view." 

Mrs. Stewart denies this emphatically, stating that "Land of the Soviets" 
represented no viewpoint but her own. Both Mr. and Mrs. Stewart affirm that 
they have never been Communists or Communist sympathizers. In their associa- 
tion with the IPR, they have given no evidence of Communist sympathies. 
Budenz's comment was made on the basis of three short passages taken out of 
context and quoted by Mandel. There is nothing to indicate that Budenz had 
ever read the book which he bi'anded as "Communist." 

During the testimony of Raymond Dennett (Hearings, Vol. 17, pp. 1786-92), 
further excerpts from "Land of the Soviets" were read into the record by 
Mandel. The excerpts cited by Mandel in Exhibit No. 142 are obviously selected 
as being favorable to the Soviet Union. Mandel failed to mention that the book 
also contained many passages giving the darker side of the Russian picture. 
Examples are given on the attached sheets. 

In her introductory chapter (p. 2), Mrs. Stewart stated : 

"Americans * * * want the facts, both bad and good, about the Rus- 
sian people and the system under which they live. Most people have be- 
come confused, at one time or another, by conflicting descriptions of life 
in the Soviet Union. Some returning visitors have pictured it as a land of 
perfection, and others have described it in the blackest possible terms. As 
a matter of. fact, neither is correct. Like other countries, Russia has bril- 
liant successes as well as dark failures in its record." 

This impartial approach is not that of a Communist. But since Mrs. Stewart 
sought to give both sides of a complex picture, it is obviously possible to go 
through her book and pick out isolated passages showing Russia in either a 
favorable or an unfavorable light. 

Another important fact about the book which Mandel did not mention is that 
it was published in 1942. Since 1942 many things have happened which have 
changed the climate of American opinion about Russia. If Mrs. Stewart were 
to write, and the IPR to publish, a book about Russia in 1951, its content and 
tone would be different from those of a book published nine years ago. 

In 1942 the United States was fighting a war and the Soviet Union was its 
ally. At that time government officials, leaders of all parties, businessmen, and 
militai'y men, including Winston Churchill and General MacArthur, were warmly 
praising the Soviet war effort. Our American ambassador to Russia was lavish 
in his praise of the Soviets and their achievements. Whatever their private 
opinions of the Soviet system, patriotic Americans were refraining from hostile 
statements which might disrupt the inter-Allied cooperation that w^as vitally 
necessary to win the war. This book sought to give a sympathetic picture of 
life in the Soviet Union, although not an uncritical one. At that time, many 
American business and political leaders were praising Russia in much more 
unqualified terms than did Mrs. Stewart in this book. 

During the war many Americans hoped that peaceful cooperation between 
Russia and the democratic countries would be possible in the postwar period. 
This hope was doomed to disappointment by the aggressive policies pursued by 
Russia. The virtual conquest by Russia of Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and 
Czechoslovakia, the provocative actions of Russia in Eastern Germany incidents 
like the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty and the arrest of William Oatis, Soviet 
military aid to North Korea and China — such things are uppermost in Americans' 
minds when they think of Russia today, and it is hard to remember the days 
when everyone was cheering Russian victories at Stalingrad. But as none of 
these events had happened in 1942, it is obvious that Mrs. Stewart could not 
include them in her book, nor could they have affected her attitude at that time. 
It is clearly unfair to judge an author in the light of events ivhich had not 
occurred at the time she tcrote, or to brand as Communist a hope and assump- 
tion which, though it was later to be proved illusory, was held by many patriotic 
Americans in the war years. 

During a discussion of "Land of the Soviets" (Hearing, Vol. 17, p. 17S6), 
Mr. Morris, counsel for the committee, said : "It is important, Mr. Chairman, 
to know ivhether or not this ["Land of the Soviets"] is a typical publication of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations." Nevertheless the committee failed to bring 
out in public testimony facts which clearly indicate that this pamphlet is not 
typical of the publications of the Institute, or even of the series of high-school 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3943 

texts of which it formed a part. It is noj: typical of institute publications 
because (1) it is not a research volume, (2) it deals with the Soviet Union and 
not with a purely Pacific or Asian country. 

Russia does not fall within the Institute's normal area of study, except for 
its policies in the Far East and that part of its territory which lies in Asia. 
Only a tiny fraction of the Institute's hundreds of publications deal with 
Russia as such, and in its research program it has never attempted to survey 
conditions, problems, and policies of the U. S. S. R. as a whole. The pamphlet, 
"Land of the Soviets", which is not a research publication, was prepared 
at the special request of the Webster Publishing Company, which wanted a 
pamphlet on Russia because of public interest in that country during the war 
years. 

This pamphlet was one of a series of nine high-school texts published hy 
the American IPR and the Webster Publishing Co. between 1942 and 1946. 
Some of them were written by well-known anti-Communist v/riters. The full 
list is as follows : 

"Modern Japan" by William Henry Chamberlin (1942) 
"Changing China" by George E. Taylor (1942) 
"Peoples of the China Seas" by Elizabeth Allerton Clark (1942) 
"Land of the Soviets" by Marguerite A. Stewart (1942) 
"Land Down Under" by C. Hartley Grattan (1943) 

"Twentieth Century India" by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal (1944) 
"Behind the Open Door" by Foster Rhea Dulles (1944) 
"Spotlight on the Far East" by Joseph M. Bernstein (1945) 
"China Yesterday and Today" by Eleanor Lattimore (1946) 
So far as the institute is aware none of these pamphlets, with the exception 
of "Land of the Soviets," has ever even been accused of containing Communist 
bias. Yet this one pamphlet has been singled out for extended discussion by 
the committee and held up by it for public censure. The effect of this procedure 
is to undermine public confidence in the hundreds of Institute publications 
against which no charges whatsoever have been made or could be made. 

W. L. Holland, 
Executive Vice Ohairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations. 

New York, Octoler 6, 1951. 

Excerpts From Land of the Soviets 

"* * * Even the Russians themselves admit that their results (of eco- 
nomic planning) have not been altogether satisfactory. They have had great 
difiiculty keeping a balance between industry and agriculture. Faulty plans 
have led to breakdowns and waste. They have suffered from a shortage of skilled 
labor and have had difiiculty preventing men from changing jobs too rapidly. 
Their overhead costs, overstaffing, and red tape are well known. Many more 
man-hours are consumed in a Russian factory than for a similar quantity of 
production in the United States. Spoilage and breakage, while declining, have 
been high" (pages 49-50). 

"And all Europe was aware of the fact that many i)easants in the Ukraine 
and other districts had bitterly resisted the Soviet farm program in the early 
1930's. Hadn't they killed off most of their cattle and eaten them as a protest 
against efforts to put them on collective farms under the First Five- Year Plan? 
Hadn't they brought about a serious lack of foods in 1933 by refusing to sow 
sufiicient crops to feed the cities? And, as a punishment, hadn't the Moscow 
government forcibly removed thousands of offenders to new farms in Siberia or 
to dig canals or fell trees in the far-off Arctic?" (page 53) . 

"* * * in the middle 1920's * * * the peasants suddenly took the posi- 
tion that they wouldn't sell their products unless they could be assured of an 
equal amount of manufactured goods in exchange. Since factory materials were 
still scarce and expensive, it was impossible to comply with these demands, 
whereupon the peasants — particularly the wealthier ones, who could afford to — 
hoarded their grain, refusing to sell it to the government at the price established 
by law" (page 55). 

"As a result of this overenthusiastic organizing, the first year fift.v-five percent 
of the peasants found themselves members of kolkhozes, when in all too many 
cases they were not sure they wanted to join. * * * The situation was made 
worse b.v the fact that the government, which had planned to collectivize only 
about twenty percent of the peasant population that year, was not prepared for 
such a large number. It didn't have enough tractors * * * fully half the 



3944 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

new collectives covild not get equipment at all. The peasants felt tricked and 
cheated" (pages 57-58). 

"People in other countries have been bitterly critical, not so much of the 
collectives themselves, as of the punishments the Soviets meted out to those who 
opposed the kolkhoz movement. The government made serious mistakes" 
(page 59). 

"By far the most serious example of organized resistance with which the 
Soviets had to cope was the sabotage (sab-o-tazh), or intentional destruction 
of property, of some of the large peasants of the rich Ukraine. In protest against 
the large proportion of grain they had had to sell to the government, which was 
at that time storing grain as an insurance in case of a possible attack at the 
hands of Japan, they suddenly refused to cultivate more land than was necessary 
for their personal needs" (page 60). 

"* * * the agricultural policy of the Soviets in the years following 1918 
had been ruthless and drastic" (page 54). 

"The Supreme Soviet, however, is not the national lawmaking body in the 
sense that our Congress is. The Supreme Soviet usually meets for a few days 
twice a year, during which time it takes many actions almost without debate. 
The real decisions are made elsewhere, and the Supreme Soviet does little more 
than ratify them. All important matters have been threshed out in advance 
within the Communist Party" (pages 6.5-66). 

"In actual practice citizens are not yet always assured of these basic rights. 
Critics of the Soviet Union have charged that they were set forth in the Con- 
stitution solely for propaganda purposes. They declare that these rights have 
frequently been violated by the Government. What does freedom of speech 
amount to, they ask, when no Russian is permitted to criticize basic government 
policy or to form a capitalist party to rival the Communist Party? And how 
can you have freedom of the press when all newspapers and magazines are con- 
trolled by the government? And what about the purge (purj) of 1933-36 
when thousands of Soviet citizens were seized and their homes searched — was 
this in keeping with the Constitution? These are basic questions. Few will 
deny that the Soviet press is rigidly controlled or that the Russians do not 
interpret freedom of speech to include opposition to government policies" 
(page 71). 

"It is true, too, that Russians of every walk of life were caught in the net ot 
the purge. No one knows how many were tried and sentenced. Charged with 
plotting with foreign agents to overthrow the government and committing acts 
of sabotage, they were spirited away from their homes and imprisoned. Scien- 
tists, engineers, writers were brought to trial. * * * There were competent 
western observers who, while convinced of the guilt of some of the prisoners, 
expressed the belief that many of those who confessed were not guilty but were 
being punished as a sort of political vengeance" (pages 72-74). 

"People are still quite free to attend places of worship. But all possible means 
of propaganda were employed — through the press, the radio, theater, movies, 
lectures, and anti-religious museums — against the church. Sunday and religious 
holidays were done away with. A Society of the Godless was formed" (page 79). 

"Both countries (Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany) are frankly dictatorships. 
Political opposition has been ruthlessly suppressed in both ; each permits but 
one legal political party" (page 81). 

'We don't want a foot of any other country's territory, but we'll fight to the 
death for every inch of our own. Ever since 1921 this slogan has been quoted 
widely in Russia. Westerners who had followed Soviet developments were 
amazed, therefore, at the Soviet occupation, in 1939 and 1940, of the territories 
taken from them in 1917 — eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia 
(bes-fl-ra-bi-a), and especially at the invasion of Finland" (page 87). 

"Lenin and his followers had made no secret of the fact that they believed in 
the principle of world revolution" (page 89). 



Exhibit No. 593-B 

"War-Time China" 

(By Maxwell S. Stewart) 

During the Budenz testimony (Hearings, Vol. 10, p. 1099), after Mr. Budenz 
had testified that Maxwell Stewart was a Communist, Mr. Mandel read a short 
excerpt from "War-Time China," a pamphlet written by Mr. Stewart and pub- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3945 

lished by the American IPR in 1944. The excerpt, which dealt with the Chinese 
Communists, was described by Biidenz as deceiving the American people. 

A more authoritative opinion than that of Budenz is that of the late Dr. Tyler 
Dennett, noted authority on the Far East, member of the State Department before 
1931, and later president of Williams College. In a letter to his son, Raymond 
Dennett, then Secretary of the American IPR, dated April 6, 1944, Dr. Dennett 
said : 

"Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the 
internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it 
seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating 
circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. * * * it's about the best 
booklet I have seen out of the IPR." 

Mr. Stewart's pamphlet is an account of the situation in China at the time of 
writing (1944). It describes the heroic efforts and achievements of China in her 
struggle with Japan, and also the detei'ioration of conditions in China as a result 
of 7 years of war. In discussing the problem of Nationalist-Communist rela- 
tions,' the author presents the positions of both parties as stated by themselves. 
Only 3 pages out of 61 are devoted to conditions in Communist-controlled areas, 
where the war effort against Japan is described as relatively better organized 
than that in the Nationalist area. The tone of the pamphlet is generally very 
friendly to China and to Chiang Kai-shek, as is shown in the following quota- 
tions : 

"* * * the degree of national unity that has been achieved in China since 
1937 under ChiangKai-shek's leadership is truly remarkable" (p. 16). 

"Even Chiang's enemies pay tribute to the skill with which he has maintained 
the stability of the National Government during the past 15 years. It is doubtful 
whether any other Chinese leader could have held the government together during 
this critical period. Chiang's real authority derives from his own outstanding 
qualities of leadership and from the enormous prestige which he enjoys among 
all factions in China and among the people at large" (p. 42). 

"There is every reason to believe that the creation of a strong war government 
headed by Chiang Kai-shek and supported by positive assistance from the United 
Nations would be extremely well received within China" (p. 56). 

"Today China is recognized as one of the 'Big Four' powers of the world" 
(p. 3). 

"In the future, China will be counted on as one of the chief guardians of peace 
in the Pacific basin" (p. 5). 

"We have been filled with admiration at the way in which the people of China, 
in the face of almost incredible hardships and disappointments, have stood up to 
the Japanese year after year without giving in" (p. 6). 

"* * * the miracle of Chinese resistance — and it is miraculous — has not 
been accomplished without a price. China has suffered tremendous losses in men 
and materials. Her people have undergone physical hardships almost incon- 
ceivable to us. Not least is the psychological strain of seven years of unremit- 
ting warfare, with the hope of large-scale aid from her allies still unfulfilled" 
(p. 7). 

"When measured against the handicaps which she has had to overcome, China's 
war effort is truly impressive" (p. 20). 

"China is not as strong, either economically or politically, as she was in 1937. 
The drain on her resources has been too great. We must grasp this fact if we are 
to discharge our obligations as friends and allies of the Chinese people" (p. 22). 

"Chiang's ability to take his country more actively into the war will rest on the 
concrete arrangements which are made to provide the Chinese armies with mod- 
ern equipment and adequate supplies" (p. 56). 

"At present. China is passing through a very difficult phase in her history — one 
in which she greatly needs the sympathy, understanding and forbearance of her 
friends abroad" (p. 58). 

"With her vast population and undeveloped resources, China may be expected 
to take her place among the great powers of the world. * * =* in the postwar 
period China will need American help — American capital, technical aid and 
diplomatic backing. China deserves our continued support, which, indeed, is in 
our own interest as well as hers" (p. 63). 

"INIost of all, perhaps, Americans can help China by trying to understand the 
magnitude of the task which she faces in transforming an ancient medieval 
society into a modern democratic nation. Only if we appreciate her difficulties 
as well as her achievements can we deal fairly with China. And we must remem- 



3946 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

ber that many of the difficulties which she faces today and in years to come are 
the result of seven years of war in which China fought our battle almost un- 
aided" (p. 63). 

William L. Holland, 
Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations. 
October 6, 1951. 

Exhibit No. 593-C 

Memorandum on "Our Job in the Pacific" 

During the public hearing before the McCarran Subcommittee on September 
26 Mr. Benjamin Mandel, the subcommittee's research director, read into the 
record several quotations from a pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, written by 
Henry A. Wallace and published by the American Institute of Pacific Relations 
in 1944. These quotations were torn from their context in such a way as to 
give a completely distorted impression of what Mr. Wallace had written. While 
the entire text of the pamphlet was put in the record as an exhibit, the Senators 
present had to rely on the bits that were read aloud. So did the press, and many 
newspaper picked up the Free Asia quotation mentioned below, so that news- 
paper readers throughout the country received a false idea of the nature of this 
Institute publication. 

This quotation, as read by Mr. Mandel, was as follows : 

"Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a 

great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest 

to have become a freedom bloc in fact. * * *" (page 24). 

The complete text of this passage quoted below, makes clear that Mr. Wallace 

was contrasting the independent countries of Asia with those which at that 

time were still under colonial rule : 

"Whereas after the war we shall find Asia economically still largely in 
a stage of primitive agriculture, politically -we shall find it divided in two 
parts : Free Asia and Subject Asia. While Lincoln's phrase cannot be ap- 
plied literally, yet in the larger sense it is true that neither a country nor a 
region can indifinitely continue to exist half slave and half free. 

"Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a 
great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest 
to have become a freedom bloc in fact. It will include the Philippines, which 
has been promised its independence, Korea, which has also been promised 
freedom in due course, and Thailand, which though independent before 
Japan's conquest, is one of the small countries which could probably not 
preserve its freedom except as part of a larger structure of free nation. 

"Subject Asia or Colonial Asia will include the countries whose present 
rulers have not yet committed themselves to definite dates for the emanci- 
pation of their colonial subjects. If peace came tomorrow, this would in- 
clude India, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, and a great 
many small Pacific islands. 

"This large bloc cannot be described as 'antifreedom', but rather as 'not 
yet having freedom'. It is to our advantage not to perpetuate this division 
but to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of Free Asia 
will grow and the area of Subject Asia continually diminish" (page 24). 
Another passage quoted out of context by Mr. Mandel was as follows : 

"The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China 
by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal af- 
fairs" (page 28). 
In the pamphlet, this is immediately preceded by the following (pages 27-28) : 
"Dr. Hu Shih [former Ambassador of the Chinese Nationalist Government 
to the United States] has described as follows the importance of Sino-Russian 
friendship. 

" 'It is my sincere hope that the time will come when China and the 
Soviet Union may work shoulder to shoulder not only in fighting a common 
foe, but in all time to come. With a common frontier extending nearly 
five thousand miles, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme 
of peace, nonaggresslon, mutual assistance, and general security, some- 
what along the same lines as the latest British-Soviet treaty. The historical 
example of 3.500 miles of undefended common frontier between Canada and 
the United States can be emulated by China and Russia to our mutual 
benefit. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand such a mutual under- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOQSTS 3947 

standing between these two great countries which comprise three-quarters 
of the continent.' " 
In all, Mr. Mandel quoted five short passages from the pamphlet, all of which 
mentioned Russia. They are completely unrepresentative of the contents of the 
pamphlet as a whole, in which only about three pages deal with Russia out of a 
total of 43 pages of Mr. Wallace's text. The principal argument advanced by 
Mr. Wallace was in favor of a program of economic aid to Asia, with main 
emphasis on agriculture. Many other postwar problems were also discussed, 
including the colonial problem (see above), the future of Japan, America's 
strategic needs, international organization, etc. In fact, many of Mr. Wallace's 
arguments were very similar to those which have in recent years been adopted 
as the underlying basis of the E. C. A. and technical assistance programs for the 
Far East. 

In view of allegations (e. g. by Louis Budenz on August 22) before the sub- 
committee that institute publications had followed the Communist line by 
criticizing the Nationalist Government of China, it is pertinent to call attention 
to the following quotation from pages 28-29 of Mr. Wallace's pamphlet : 

"[China] has maintained through seven years of war a unity which many 
doubted. She has also maintained steadily the pledge that she is fighting 
for the democratic order defined in Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the 
People.' This pledge has been confirmed by a promise to call a constitu- 
tional convention within a year after the end of hostilities. China will then 
have her historic opportunity to refute the skeptics who have so long main- 
tained that regionalism and factionalism are incurable blemishes of the 
Asiatic political heritage. The use which China makes of this opportunity 
will have an effect far beyond her own borders. The steadfast leadership 
of President Chiang Kai-shek, which has already made China a world power, 
is an assurance that China's political aspirations are not limited to her own 
but stand for the hopes and progress of all Asiastic peoples." 

William L. Holland, 
Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations. 
October 1951. 

Senator Ferguson. Might I suggest if you have anyone send in a 
statement, let's say other than a character witness or something like 
that, that it be sworn to. 

Mr. Holland. Yes, in affidavit form. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, fine. 

And then the committee can consider it in a different light than 
just a plain statement. 

Mr. Morris. Before you came in, Senator Ferguson, Mr. Holland 
had submitted this list of testimonials. 

Senator Ferguson, They are in a different category. They are not 
necessarily statements of fact. They are more character witnesses or 
testimonials as to what their opinions are. But if a person wanted to 
deny a statement that is in the record which is already under oath, 
at least he should do it by affidavit. 

Mr. Holland. I understand, sir. 

Mr. Morris. That leaves us with the question of what to do with 
these 19 people that we can't locate. Senator. We have asked Mr. 
Holland to make suggestions as to how to find them, and there will be 
at least those 19, Senator, who will not be called in here. We have 
made every effort to get in touch with them. 

Senator Ferguson. That is a situation that everybody faces. 

Mr, Holland, Might I comment, though, that as I recall one or 
two of them were people who it would seem to me can be reached fairly 
easily by the Senate committee, I seem to recall that Mr. Yakhon- 
toff — I don't know his present job, but I happen just for the sake of 
finding out I looked up in the New York telephone book and find him 
listed there, so it should not be too difficult to locate him. 



3948 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. That is why I think counsel suggested if you 
know of any information, you let us know. 

Mr. Morris. Are there any of the others you think are available, 
Mr. Holland? 

Mr. Holland. I think I gave all the information I could. Some 
of that is vague, I know. I would like to ask this question : In the 
case of the people who are in Europe, does the committee wish to 
write and ask them whether they wish to or propose to make a com- 
ment or denial ? 

Senator Ferguson. If they want to make a denial and do it under 
oath 

Mr. Holland. In their case is it permissible for them to get an af- 
fidavit from an American consulate ? 

Senator Ferguson. I suggest they do it under oath. 

Mr. Holland. I wondered what the legal status was. 

Senator Ferguson. When it comes in the cormnittee will pass upon 
admitting it. 

Mr. Holland. In that case I take it it is in order for me to write 
those people and say, if you wish to make a denial, do so, but have it 
sworn to before an American consul. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sworn testimony. 

Is there anything else? 

Mr. Morris. I think that is all. 

Senator Ferguson. You want to recess until what date? 

Mr. Morris. We have an executive session at 10 tomorrow and we 
may open up after that. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow in 
executive session. 

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m. the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., 
Thursday, March 20, 1952.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1953 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF the Internal, Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. G. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 : 30 a. m., in room 424, 
Senate Office Building?, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding. 
Present : Senator Ferguson, 

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin 
Mandel, director of research. 

Senator Ferguson. The committee will come to order. 
Will you raise your right hand and be sworn, please ? 
You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before the 
subcommittee, a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the 
United States Senate, you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 
Mrs. Chi. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF HARRIET LEVINE CHI, NEW YORK, N. Y., 
ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL, JOSEPH EORER 

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address, please? 

Mrs. Chi. Harriet Levine Chi, 406 East Thirteenth Street, New 
York City. 

Mr. Morris. What is your present occupation, Mrs. Chi ? 

Mrs. Chi. I am an office worker. 

Mr. Morris. What oflice do you work at? 

Mrs. Chi. I decline to answer that question because my answer may 
incriminate me. 

Mr. Morris. You decline to give your present employment to the 
committee because your answer may incriminate you ? 

Mrs. Chi. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. What was the occupation you held before your present 
position, Mrs. Chi? 

Mrs. Chi. I had a gift shop. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Chi, are you presently married? 

Mrs. Chi. I am. 

Mr. Morris. Who was your husband? 

Mrs. Chi. Ch'ao-ting Chi. 

Mr. Morris. Where is he ? 

Mrs. Chi. In China. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know what he is doing in China? 

394 'J 



3950 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mrs. Chi. I believe he is vice president of the Bank of China. 

Senator Ferguson. That is Communist China? 

Mrs. Chi. That is the bank in Peking. 

Mr. Morris. When did you last hear from your husband, Mrs. Chi? 

Mrs. Chi. I don't remember exactly when. 

Mr. Morris. Has it been in the last 2 years ? 

Senator Ferguson. Can you place it in years ? 

Mrs. Chi. Yes, within the last 2 years. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Chi, have you ever been an employee of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations? 

Mrs. Chi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What year ? 

Mrs. Chi. 1936. 

Mr. Morris. Did you act as secretary to Mr. Owen Lattimore during 
that period ? 

Mrs. Chi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Wliere did you act as secretary to Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mrs. Chi. In New York City and in Lee. Mass. 

Mr. Morris. In whose home in Lee, Mass., or whose office ? 

Mrs. Chi. Well, at Mr. Lattimore's office, home. 

Mr. Morris. In New York City? Mr. Lattimore's office in New 
York? 

Mrs. Cm. No. 

Mr, Morris. His office in Lee, Mass. ? 

Mrs. Chi. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Was his office in his home ? 

Mrs. Chi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you put into the record the China 
Daily News of March 12. 1952 ? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a copy of the China Daily News of New 
York dated March 12, 1952, and I have a translation from an article 
in that paper which has been certified by the Orientalia Division of 
the Library of Congress. 

China Will Take Part in International Economic Conference Preparatory 
Work Being Vigorously Pursued at Capital Preparatory Committee Com- 
posed OF Nan Han-Cheng, Ma Yin-Chu, and Others 

[Special to this newspaper] 

According to a Peking dispatch of the Hsinhua (New China) News Agency, for 
the sake of promoting international economic cooperation, an International 
Economic Conference, initiated by industrial and commercial leaders of many 
nations, is due to convene in Moscow in the early part of April. In China, 
national financial and economic workers, persons in the fields of industry and 
commerce, cooperative workers, trade-union workers, and students of economics, 
have organized a National Preparatory Committee. The National Preparatory 
Committee consists of 14 members ; they are : Nan Han-Cheng 

Mr. Morris. Will you just give us the names of those on the com- 
mittee relating to the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. Mandel. Included in this list is member of the Preparatory 
Committee of the Chinese National Industrial and Commercial Asso- 
ciation, Chi Chao-ting, member of the board of directors and assistant 
manager of the Bank of China. 

Mr. Morris. Is that your husband ? 

Mrs. Chi. I believe so. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3951 

Mr. Mandel,. Further, we find also the name of Chen Han-seng, 
vice chairman of the Chinese Economic Society. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know that gentleman ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question because my answer may 
incriminate me. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may this go into the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. It will become a part of the record. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit 594" and made a part of the 
record.) 

Exhibit No. 594 

The Library of Congress, 
Reference Department, Division of Orientalia, 

Washington, D. C, March 19, 1952. 
Internal Security Subcommittee, 

424-C Senate Office Building, Washington 25, D. C. 
(Attn: Miss Marion Walker.) 
Dear Sirs : We bave carefully checked the enclosed translation, regarding 
the International Economic Conference, against the Chinese text, which was 
published in the March 12, 1952, issue of the China Daily News, New York. We 
tind that it is an accurate translation. We may point out, however, that the 
names of some of the persons mentioned in the article are not transcribed ac- 
cording to the Wade-Giles system, which is generally used in this country. We 
have noted in the margins of the translation the standard Wade-Giles forms. 
Sincerely yours, 

[s] Edwin G. Beal, Jr., 
Acting Chief, Orientalia Division. 

China Will Take Part in International Economic Conference Preparatory 
Work Being Vigorously Pursued at Capital Preparatory Committee 
Composed of Nan Han-Cheng, Ma Yin-Chu, and Others 

[Special to this newspaper] 

According to a Peking despatch of the Hsinhua (New China) News Agency, 
for the sake of promoting international economic cooperation, an International 
Economic Conference, initiated by industrial and commerceial leaders of many 
nations, is due to convene in Moscow in the early pai-t of April. In China, 
national financial and economic workers, persons in the fields of industry and 
commerce, cooperative workers, trade union workers, and students of economics, 
have organized a National Preparatory Committee. The National Preparatory 
Committee consists of the 14 members ; they are : Nan Han-cheng, President of 
the Chinese People's Bank ; Ma Yin-chu, President of Peking University ; Liu 
Ning-yi, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Trade Union Association; Chang Nai- 
chi. Member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese National Industrial 
and Commercial Association ; Chi Chao-ting, Member of the Board of Directors 
and Assistant Manager of the Bank of China ; Leo Jen-ming, Vice Minister of 
the Ministry of Trade ; Chen Wei-chi, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Textile 
Industries ; Meng Yung-chien, Vice Director of the Council of the Chinese Na- 
tional Cooperative Association : Li Chu-chen, Chairman of Tientsin Industrial 
and Commercial Association ; Sheng Pi-hua, Chairman of Shanghai Industrial 
and Commercial Association ; Hsu Ti-hsin, Vice Chairman of the East China 
Financial and Economic Council ; Chen Han-seng, Vice Chairman of the Chinese 
Economic Society ; Liu ' Tse-chiu, Director of the Culture and Education De- 
partment of the Chinese Trade Union Association ; Lu Hsu-cho, Manager of the 
China Export and Import Company. The National Preparatory Committee is 
now making contact with the International Preparatory Committee and the 
Preparatory Committees of other nations, to carry on the preparatory work. 

— China Daily News, New York, March 12, 1952. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Chi, when did you marry Chi Chao-ting? 
Mrs. Chi. 1934. 

88348— 52--pt. 11 16 



3952 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. How long did you live with Mr. Chi ? 
Mrs. Chi. I don't think I want to answer that. It is a personal 
question. I am separated from him now. 

I will change that after conferring with counsel ; we were separated 
in 1947. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he living in this country at that time ? 
Mrs. Chi. No. 

Senator Ferguson. He was living in China ? 
Mrs. Chi. He was. 

Mr. Morris. At the time of your employment, at the time of the 
commencement of your employment with the IPE, who was it that 
recommended you for employment, Mrs. Chi ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds. 

Mr. Morris. You refuse to answer who recommended you for a po- 
sition in the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mrs. Chi. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Who recommended you as an aide to Owen 
Lattimore while you were in the institute, do you know ? 

Mrs. Chi. That I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not remember that ? 

Mrs. Chi. No. 

Senator Ferguson. How long did you work in Lee, Mass. ? 

Mrs. Chi. Three weeks. 

Senator Ferguson. Wliat did you work at there, the same kind of 
work that you worked 

Mrs. Chi. Secretarial work, typing. 

Senator Ferguson. Owen Lattimore was doing what kind of work 
there ? 

Mrs. Chi. I don't recall. He was writing I suppose, but I couldn't 
remember in any detail what he was doing. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he writing for the institute? The work 
you were doing was institute work ? 

Mrs. Chi. Yes ; it was institute work. 

Senator Ferguson. Was he writing, these articles that you were 
acting as his secretary on, IPR work ? 

Mrs. Chi. I assume it was IPR work. I can't remember in detail 
what work he was doing. 

Senator Ferguson. But your salary was being paid by the IPR ? 

Mrs. Chi. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Chi, have you done any writing on your own ? 

Mrs. Chi. No. 

Mr. Morris. You do not write ? 

Mrs. Chi. I do not. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Y. Y. Hsu ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the previous reason 
because my answer may tend to incriminate me. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Chen Han-seng ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer for the same reason. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever been in China ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us to what extent you have traveled in 
various countries of the world ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3953 

Mr. Morris. Well now, Mrs. Chi, we have had testimony before this 
committee that you were a member of the Communist Party. Were 
you in fact ever a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason. 

Mr. Morris. Did you ever meet Mr. Nathaniel Weyl ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever adhere to the principles of the 
Communist Party ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever advocate the principles of the 
Communist Party ? 

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason. 

Senator Ferguson. I take it that when you say "the same reason," 
you mean on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you ? 

Mrs. Chi. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. So that the record may be clear. 

Mr. Morris. I cannot think of anything else, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. We will recess until 2 o'clock today. 

Mr. Morris. This witness, however, is excused ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, you are excused. 

(Wliereupon, at 11 : 40 a. m., the subcommittee recessed to recon- 
vene at 2 p. m. of the same day.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 1952 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To In^t:stigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 
The subcommittee met at 4 : 45 p. m., pursuant to call, room 424 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding. 
Present: Senator Ferguson. 

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee comisel, and Benjamin 
Mandel, director of research. 

Senator Ferguson. The subcommittee will come to order. 
The witness will be sworn. 

Raise your right hand. You do solemnly swear, in the matter now 

pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Committee 

on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, that you will tell the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Thorner. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL THOENER, BALA-CYNWYD, PA., ACCOM- 
PANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, JOSEPH A. EANELLI 

Senator Ferguson. State your full name and your address and 
your occupation. 

Mr. Thorner. My name is Daniel Thorner. My address is 127 
Birch Avenue, Bala-Cynwyd, Pa., and I am employed at the University 
of Pennsylvania as an assistant professor. 

Senator Ferguson. What are you professor of? 

Mr. Thorner. I am assistant professor of economic history, and I 
teach primarily on modern south Asia, which is primarily India and 
Pakistan, and I also teach economics. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Morris, do you have something you want to 
put into the record ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

All during the Lattimore hearings we did not take the time out to 
introduce this letter into the record, and it is part of the record in 
connection with our testimony about Alger Hiss. 

Senator Ferguson. Will the research director, Mr. Mandel, read 
it into the record ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon copy of a letter dated February 21, 
1952, addressed to Hon. Dean Acheson, The Secretary of State, from 
Pat McCarran, chairman : 

3955 



3956 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Exhibit No. 608 

My Dear Mr. Secretary : A witness before the Senate Internal Subcommittee^ 
Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, testified yesterday that, in the course of her official duties 
at the Department of State, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of 
Alger Hiss taken at Yalta which were available to her in her work of postwar 
planning. 

Dr. Fluegel was an employee of the Department from 1942 to 1948. 

On the basis of this testimonj', the Internal Security Subcommittee agreed that 
these hand-written notes of Alger Hiss should be made available in the original,, 
or photostatic duplicate, to the committee. 

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated. 

(The document read by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 608"^ 
and was read in fulL) 

Mr, MoRBis. Mr. Chairman, the committee has not as yet received 
an answer to that letter. 

Senator Ferguson. Here is another letter to which we have received 
an answer, being dated March 19, 1952. 

Mr. Mandel, would you read that letter? 

Mr. Mandel. This is addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, from Car- 
lisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State, 
dated March 19, 1952: 

Exhibit No. 609 

My Deiar Senator McCaeran : Reference is made to your letter of March 3, 
1952, in which you inquired of the action being taken by the Department on 
the questions raised in your letter of August 27, 1951. Reference is also made 
to the Department's September 1, 1951, acknowledgement of your August 27, 1951, 
letter. In your previous correspondence you requested information concerning 
an alleged meeting held at the State Department on October 12, 1942, in which 
Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of 
State, and Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, 
participated. 

I regret the delay that has occurred in replying to your previous letter, but 
it was found necessary to begin anew a complete search of the Department's 
files. As indicated in the Department's reply of September 1, 1951, a thorough 
but unsuccessful search of Departmental files for a copy of such a memorandum 
was made in response to a similar request from a member of Congress in 1950. 
More recently, research and inquiry among oflicers formerly with the Depart- 
ment have furnished some details regarding the meeting between Mr. Welles 
and Mr. Browder. 

From the Department's investigation of this matter it would appear that: 

(1) An interview did take place October 12, 1942, between Mr. Welles and 
Mr. Browder concerning United States policy in the Far East. We have been 
unable to determine from our records whether Mr. Robert Minor and Mr. Laugh- 
lin Currie participated in this meeting. 

(2) Our information indicates that a memorandum reflecting United States 
policy in the Far East was prepared and handed to Mr. Browder by Mr. Welles 
at the conclusion of their meeting. While the Department has been unable to 
locate a verified copy of such a memorandum, it would nevertheless appear from 
the information available that the memorandum inserted into the Daily Worker 
by Mr. Browder was identical with the memorandum which was handed Mr. 
Browder by Mr. Welles. 

In the event that further information is found bearing on this matter, it will 
be furnished you promptly. 
Sincerely yours, 



(For the Secretary of State). 

(The above letter read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit 
No. 609.") 

Senator Ferguson. Mr, Mandel, as research director of the com- 
mittee in this matter, have you a copy of the memorandum that was in- 
serted in the Daily Worker ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3957 

Mr. Mandel. We have it. That has become part of our record. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you refer to the page number ? 

Mr. ]\L\NDEL. Page 599. 

Senator Ferguson. They do not, of course, say in this letter how 
they know that that was a copy that was in the Daily Worker, except 
that they verified that it is. 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. No other explanation has been made as to why 
they cannot find a copy of this memorandum in the State Department, 
Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. No explanation. 

Senator Ferguson. Except this letter. 

Mr. Mandel. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Thorner, this v:as not concerning your testi- 
mony. We will now proceed with your testimony. 

Mr. Thorner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, do you teach now at the University of 
Pennsylvania ? 

Mr. Thorner. I do, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. What do you teach there ? 

Mr, Thorner. I teach courses on the history of India, on contempo- 
rary India. At times I have participated in seminars, and they teach 
some economics. It isn't the same each year. 

Mr. Morris. Are you a full professor? 

Mr. Thorner. Oh, no. I am a research assistant professor of 
economic history. 

Mr. Morris. Do you belong to any far eastern and Asiatic societies ? 

Mr. Thorner. You mean societies concerning 

Mr. Morris. Academic societies, 

Mr. Thorner. Academic societies concerned with the Far East ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr, Thorner. I belong to the Far Eastern Association. 

Mr. Morris. Is that all ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe that is so, Mr. Morris. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you in the past belonged to any others? 

Mr. Thorner. I was a member of the Institute of Pacific "Relations 
for, I should say, about 4 years; perhaps 5. I joined in 1944. I con- 
tinued to receive their quarterly journal, but I found that you can 
subscribe to the journal without being a member of the Institute of 
Pacific Relation and there is a considerable savings involved when you 
are on as low a salary as I am. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, did you hold a fellowship at the Walter 
Hines Page School at Johns Hopkins University ? 

Mr. Thorner. I did, Mr. Morris, in the year 1947-48. 

Mr. Morris. Wlio arranged for you to have that fellowship at the 
Walter Hines Page School ? 

Mr. Thorner. Mr. Owen Lattimore invited me to accept an ap- 
pointment as a Page School fellow. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know him prior to that? 

Mr. Thorner. Very slightly. 
Senator Ferguson. Wliere had you met him ? 

Mr. Thorner. I had met him, I believe, in Washington, Senator, as 
I explained before, at public luncheons, which were held when visiting 
notables, say, from India or Indonesia would speak, such as the Prime 



3958 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Minister or Ex Prime Minister of Indonesia, or a high Indian official 
would speak to a public luncheon. And I ran into him there. I did 
say that I heard him speak in 1941, but I didn't know him then. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know him when you were working for 
the Government? 

Mr. Thorner. Not at all, Senator. 

Mr. Morris. What positions did you hold with the Governmem, 
Mr. Thorner? 

Mr. Thorner. I joined the Government in 1941 and I worked in 
the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which was headed by 
Colonel Donovan. 

Mr. Morris. Who was instrumental in your obtaining that position? 

Mr. Thorner. In the fall of 1941, it was very difficult for anyone to 
obtain academic employment. I believe that selective service was 
under way, and teaching appointments were becoming short. I could 
not find one and I made inquiries through the American Historical 
Association, since I was trained as a historian, to find out what kind 
of openings there were generally in the Government. And I was told 
that there probably were vacancies — ■ — 

Mr. Morris. Told by whom, Mr. Thorner? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe by some of my former professors at Colum- 
bia University. 

Mr. Morris. Notably 

Mr. Thorner. Notably, I believe, Carlton Hayes. 

Mr. Morris. At that time did William Martin Canning, in his testi- 
mony, before the New York legislative inquiry testify that you were 
a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Thorner. I cannot answer that precisely, Mr. Morris, but I can 
say that I believe that insofar as there were any public hearings, my 
name is not mentioned. I am not acquainted with the private hearings 
at which Mr. Canning testified. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, were you a contributor or a coauthor with 
Owen Lattimore to Pivot in Asia ? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. How manv of you prepared that* volume, Pivot in 
Asia? 

Mr. Thorner. About seven or eight people prepared that volume. 

Senator Ferguson. Who asked you to help on that volume? 

Mr. Thorner. Mr. Lattimore asked me. 

I should say that it was in connection with my special knowledge 
of India. I had been working on India from about 1936 on, and my 
work on that volume had nothing to do with the Far East as such, 
meaning China or Japan, but it did have to do with my own field of 
special interest. That is, the area to which the attention of that 
volume was directed, was Chinese Central Asia, which long has been 
an area of comforting pressures from China, from the Old British 
Empire in India, and from Russia. And the particular part to which 
Mr. Lattimore has asked me to direct my attention was that based upon 
the concern of India, particularly British India with the area. And 
my contribution in particular dealt with the period from 1800 to 1917. 

It is a historical account. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. At the time that you wrote that, I ask you the 
question as to whether or not you were a member of the Communist 
Party? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3959 

Mr. Thorner. I must respectfully decline, Senator, on the grounds 
of the first and fifth amendments and all other constitutional rights 
and privileges available. 

Senator Ferguson. One of the reasons in the fifth amendment is 
that it would tend to incriminate you, is that one of the reasons ? 

Mr. Thorner. That is right, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. The next question is, Were you ever a member 
of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Thorner. I must respectfully decline, on the same grounds. 
Senator. 

Mr. Morris, could I add something to that — if I may continue, Sen- 
ator — that the grounds upon which I claim privilege have nothing to 
do with the Institute of Pacific Relations or with Mr. Owen Latti- 
more ; nor did Mr. Lattimore have any reason to inquire as to any pos- 
sible political connections of mine. 

Senator Ferguson. Wait. You are drawing the conclusion that he 
had no reason. Do you know what his knowledge was of your 
activity ? 

Mr. Thorner. He knew me very slightly, and what he did know 
was not for at least half a dozen years or more, perhaps even 10 years, 
one might say, I had been specializing on India. India is not an area 
which has received much attention in this country. Tliere are very 
few people so qualified. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you write this book ? 

Mr. Thorner. Over the year 1947-48. 

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Lattimore ask you as to w^hether or 
not you were a Communist ? 

Mr. Thorner. Mr. Lattimore did not ask me. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that would have been a perti- 
nent inquiry if you were going to write on a subject such as you and 
Mr. Lattimore were writing on, as to whether or not a person that 
was going to help him write the book was or was not a Communist ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe that Mr. Lattimore was primarily inter- 
ested in my scholarly record, which spoke for itself. 

Senator Ferguson. Wait a minute. Do you think that a record 
indicates as to whether or not a man is or is not a Communist, that is, 
the scholarly part of the record, where he graduated, and so forth ? 

Mr. Thorner. Mr. Lattimore particularly was anxious to have 
some one do a historical background of India's interest in Central 
Asia, particularly the British Empire. 

I must say. Senator, if you will permit, sir 

Senator Ferguson. I will permit you to say what you want to say. 

Mr. Thorner. Thank you very much, Senator; I appreciate that. 
I don't know anyone else who has read for so long and tediously the 
records of British parliamentary debates, particularly concerned with 
India and its external neighbors. 

At one time. Senator, if you will think that this is credible, I read 
every reference to India from the 1840's to the 1870's in the parlia- 
mentary debates, for a much larger work that I projected, but I have 
not been able to get around to completion. 

Senator Ferguson. I would say that would be quite a record of 
reading. 

Mr. Thorner. It increased the strength of my eye glasses, Senator. 



3960 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you the question as to whether or not 
you think that a Communist can write without displaying his Com- 
munist leanings ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe, Senator, that in purely scholarly matters, 
people who are not Communists can make serious errors. I believe 
that no matter what a man's political convictions may or may not be, 
that scholarly work can be done regardless of those political connec- 
tions. 

Senator Fergusox. Do you feel that a Communist can do that? Do 
you think that there is any freedom of thought with a real Communist ? 

Mr. Thorner. Senator, that is a very large question. 

Senator Ferguson. It is not so large. 

Mr. Thorner. I would have to say, in answer to that, that some 
don't ; perhaps some do. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever known one that did have freedom 
of thought? 

Mr. Thorner. Senator, I must respectfully decline to answer that 
question. 

Senator Ferguson. On the ground that it will tend to incriminate 
you? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. I recognize your reason. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, several years ago, Owen Lattimore ap- 
peared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

Mr. Thorner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether or not he sent in your name as 
a person who wrote in a letter on his behalf, expressing respect and 
admiration for his writings at that time ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe, Mr. Morris, to answer that question as pre- 
cisely as I can, that I wrote Mr. Lattimore a letter at that time ex- 
pressing my support of him. I believe that that was a personal 
letter^ it was not a letter intended for a wider public. 

Mr. Morris. Have I refreshed your recollection by showing you the 
appendix of the Tydings hearings, wherein your name appears on 
a list of those who had written such letters ? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes, sir. What I thought you had asked me be- 
fore was whether I had written a letter to this committee, or something 
of that sort. 

Mr. Morris. No. You had written a letter to Lattimore ? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. At that time, were you a member of the Communist 
Party, Mr. Thorner ? 

Mr. Thorner. As I explained before, Mr. Morris, I must respect- 
fully decline to answer that question. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, why did you volunteer a while ago the 
statement that your declination to answer had no bearing on the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore ? 

Mr. Thorner. Because I think that my connection with this in- 
quiry is tangential in the sense that I never worked for the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. I was never an employee of theirs. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever write anything for them? 

Mr. Thorner. I published one part of a work that was later pub- 
lished in full. That is a frequent practice so that you can draw 
attention. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3961 

Senator Ferguson. You did do some writing for them? 

Mr. Thorner. No ; I wouldn't put it quite that way, if I may say so. 

Senator Ferguson. How would you put it? 

Mr. Thorner. I submitted an article to one of their journals to 
publish. -But it was not writing for the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
I publish articles in, I suppose, half a dozen to a dozen journals. 

Senator Ferguson. But did you publish it in their journal? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they pay you for it? 

Mr. Thorner. I think they paid me $25, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. At that time, were you a member of the Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr. Thorner. I must respectfully decline. Senator, to answer that 
question, on the same grounds. 

Senator Ferguson. I recognize your reason. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, may I draw your attention to exhibit 
No. 73 of our public hearings, which is a list of research fellows and 
students at the Walter Hines Page School in the years 1940 to 1951. 

Mr. Chairman, this is already in the record. 

Will you indicate to this committee how many of those people you 
know, Mr. Thorner ? 

Mr. Thorner. I do not know Dr. David F. Aberle. I do not know 
Dr. William M. Austin. 

Mr. Morris. For the sake of brevity, will you just indicate those you 
do know, Mr. Thorner ? 

Mr. Thorner. I know Mr. Schuyler Cammann. 

I know, or knew earlier, Mr. Chih-yi Chang. 

Mr. Morris. He was a collaborator with you on the book Pivot in 
Asia, is that right? 

Mr. Thorner. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Is he now in Red China? 

Mr. Thorner. To the best of my knowledge he is. 

Mr. Morris, Do you know Dr. John DeFrancis ? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Do you see Dr. John DeFrancis very frequently ? 

Mr. Thorner. I have seen him from time to time. 

Mr. Morris. Can you tell us wliether or not Dr. DeFrancis is a 
member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Thorner. I have no reason to believe him to be a member of 
the Communist Party. 

I do not know Mr. Clive E. Glover or the next gentleman. 

I have known Dr. Chen Han-Seng. 

The Dilowa Hutukhtu, I do not know. 

Mr. Ike I have met. 

Mr. Catesby Jones, I have met. 

I have met Mr. Kahin. 

Mr. Morris. Did you say you have met Mr. Catesby Jones ? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes ; I have met Mr. Catesby Jones. 

Mr. Morris. Is Mr. Ike in the Hoover Library now in California? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe he is. 

Mr. Morris. What does Mr. Catesby Jones do now ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe that Mr. Jones is right now at the Walter 
Hines School of International Relations. 

I have met Dr. Karl H. Menges. 



3962 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

I have heard Dr. Michael speak, but I do not know him. 

I do not know Mr. Onon. 

I have heard Dr. Pelzer speak and perhaps exchanged a word or 
two with him. 

I do not know Mr. Ring, 

I do not know Mr. Schraml. 

We can skip myself. 

I cannot pronounce and do not know the next name. 

Mr. Vreeland I may have heard deliver a paper once, but I don't 
know him. 

I do not know Mr. Waibel, and Mr. Thomas Wiener was one of the 
contributors to that book that has been referred to. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, William Canning has testified before 
this committee that you were a member of the Columbia University 
unit of the Communist Party. Were you in fact, a member of the 
Columbia University unit of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Thorner. Mr. Morris, I must respectfully decline, on the same 
grounds. 

Mr. Morris. Prof. Karl Wittfogel has testified before this com- 
mittee that you were active in what he called a Communist study 
group near Columbia University in the years 1937 and 1938. Were 
you a member of such a group ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe that Mr. Wittfogel is under a major mis- 
apprehension. In 1937-38, the year to which he refers, I was presi- 
dent of the Graduate History Club at Columbia University, which 
held regular meetings on the campus and invited distinguished speak- 
ers to come and talk to it. One of the speakers that year was Dr.. 
Wittfogel. 

Now, I should say that he was either second or third speaker. The 
first speaker was a professor of American history; the last speaker 
was Mr. Carlton Hayes. 

Mr. Morris. What was the name of the first speaker ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe it was the later Robert C. Bingham, 

Those meetings, I should say, Mr. Morris, were held in the Men's 
Faculty Club at Columbia University. They were placarded with 
large signs all over the campus. Anyone who wished to come was per- 
fectly welcome so long as he paid for his luncheon. 

Our first meeting was very largely attended. There were about 60 
or 70 people, many more than we expected. Mr. Wittfogel was our 
second speaker and we were confident that on an important topic like 
China, this being right after the fall of Nanking and the Japanese 
push into China, there would be a large attendance. And about 23 
people showed up. There was a table as long as this room, and I 
can still see 35 uneaten grapefruits on that table. Mr. Wittfogel was 
considerably crestfallen at that. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Thorner, do you know of a study group that 
met at the home of Moses Finkelstein ? 

Mr. Thorner. I think if you referred to informal Sunday evening 
music circles, to which different people came at different times, pri- 
marily to hear phonograph records from the excellent music collection 
of Mr. Finley, you would be more accurate in the posing of the question. 

Mr. Morris. Were any Communists present at those groups ? 

Mr. Thorner. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. Were you present at those groups ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3963 

Mr. Thorner. I went to a few. I was fairly young at that time. 
I was not a senior person in any sense. It was an invitation for which 
I was grateful. Generally people there were older. They discussed 
things like Wagner's operas, whether they were bad or whether they 
were good. They listened to Gilbert and Sullivan. They discussed 
art appreciation and such topics. 

Mr. Morris. Did you Imow William Canning? 

Mr. Thorner. Mr. Canning was the reader of students' papers in 
my senior year at the College of the City of New York. He uni- 
formly gave me A's. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Theodore Geiger ? 

]\Ir. Thorner. I do. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Moses Finklestein ? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes ; I do. 

Mr. Morris. He is now Mr. Finley, is he not ? 

Mr. Thorner. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. What university is he connected with now ? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe he is at Rutgers University. 

Mr. Morris. Does he have a fellowship with Ford Foundation, do 
you know ? 

Mr. Thorner. He may very well have. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Edward Rosen ? 

Mr. Thorner. He was one of my teachers at college. 

Mr. Morris. And Benjamin Nelson? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes; I know Mr. Nelson. He was a student on a 
fellowship at Columbia when I came down to Columbia. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have in our record, exhibit No. 77, 
which was introduced in the public session of August 7, 1951, which 
mentions Mr. Daniel Thorner : 

* * * Daniel Thorner who is in the COI working under Scholar Brown's 
direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner — 

and that he was a New York man and he studied at Columbia Uni- 
versity. 

Have you read our exhibit No. 77, Mr. Thorner ? 

Mr. Thorner. Yes ; I have read it. 

Mr. Morris. Are the facts appearing in that letter, which was taken 
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, accurate ? 

Mr. Thorner. I would have to reread the letter in this connection. 

Mr. Morris. By all means, read it. 

Mr. Thorner. Have you indicated who signed this letter, Mr. 
Morris ? 

Mr. Morris. That is a letter from Catherine Porter. 

Of course, just read the portions that refer to you, Mr. Thorner. 

Mr. Thorner. I thought you meant the entire letter. 

Mr. Morris. No; just the facts that refer to you, the bottom para- 
graph of the first page. 

Mr. Thorner. Let me say, first, Mr. Morris, that the statement that 
I probably know more about, the transport problem in India than any 
other person in this country, as of June 2, 1942, at which I was 27 years 
old, is a flattering statement, Mr. Morris. 

Senator Ferguson. You think there may be sonie doubt about that ? 

Mr. Thorner. I think, depending upon your temperament, you will 
allow for exaggeration. 



3964 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

What I am saying is that, first, the news that such a proposal about 
me or that such a letter about me existed, came last summer. That is 
the first knowledge that I had of it. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not know they were considering you 
for any job? 

Mr. Thorner. No ; I did not know at all, and no one mentioned that 
tome. 

The facts of my salary are correct. I was getting either 2,600 or 
3,200 at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Did you attend a luncheon for Michael Lindsay held 
under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations on April 26, 
1946, at Barker Hall at the YWCA ? 

Mr. Thorner. I have no recollection of ever meeting or hearing 
Michael Lindsay. 

As I have said perhaps before, Mr. Morris, my particular field of 
interest is India rather than the Far East. 

Mr. Morris. I offer you a document from the files of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations and call your attention to the fourth name on 
the second page of a list which purports to be a list of people who 
attended the luncheon and ask you if that refreshes your recollection ? 

Mr. Thorner. April 26, 1946. It is perfectly possible that I could 
make an error, but if you would indicate what topic he spoke on 

Mr. Morris. There is nothing that says there that these people 
actually did attend. It could be people who were hoping to attend. 

Mr. Thorner. I believe it was people who were invited to attend; 
that is my guess. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, do you want to receive that into the 
record, inasmuch as the witness does not recall about it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will receive it. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify it ? 

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a list of names for the Michael 
Lindsay luncheon, Washington Office, Institute of Pacific Relations, 
held April 26, 1946, Friday, at 12: 30 p. m., at Barker Hall, YWCA. 

(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 610" 
and is as follows:) 

Michael Lindsay Luncheon, Washington Office, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, April 26, 1946 — Friday, 12 : 30 P. M. — Barker Hall, Y. W. C. A. 

Dr. C. O. Arndt Len De Caux 

Ellen Atkinson Dr. and Mrs. Leslie Falk 

Robert Barnett Mr. Duncan Hall 

Patricia Barnett Dr. E. S. C. Handy 

Milton Berger Mrs. E. S. C. Handy 

Mrs. Boyden Lowell H. Hattery 

Ardeth W. Burks Mrs. Harrison 

Elizabeth Burns Mrs. Isabel Higgins 

H. A. Butts Mr. Janow 

William Brown D. R. Jenkins 

Mrs. Alfred D. Charles Shirley Jenkins 

Irene Corttneff Mrs. Philip Keeney 

Nicholas Cottrell Edward A. Kracke, Jr. 

Mrs. Cabot Coville Mrs. Helen Lamb 

Esther Crane Lewis Lorwin 

Ellei-y Denison Emmanuel S. Larsen 

Karl de Scheinitz Robert M. Magill 

Captain Domke G. W. Morris 

Eleanor Dennison George Masselman 

Joe Du Bois Arthur Mayfield 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3965 

Eaymond Moyer Laura Thompson 

Carl Nelson Daniel Thorner 

Ann Page ' Elizabeth Ussachevsky 

Ruth Pardee Vladimir Ussachevsky 

J. K. Penfield J- Parker Van Zandt 

Eleanor Perkins Dr. Harold Vinacke 

Edwin O. Reischauer Benjamin B. Wallace 

Edward Rice Clifford Watson 

Jav Robinson Guy P. Webb 

H. F. Seitz Mrs. S. M. Wheeler 
John Kita Sako (handwritten) 

Mr. Sassaman Bill Lockwood 

Lauriston Sharp Henry Owen 

Arthur W. Hummel Mr. and Mrs. Bowen 
Robert S. Hummel Smith 

John Stenhouse R. C. 
H. M. Spitzer 

SPEAKEB'S TABLE 

Mr. Michael Lindsay Dr. William C. Johnstone, presiding 

Dr. C. O. Arndt — U. S. Office of Edu- Colonel and Mrs. William Mayer 

cation Mrs. Audrey Menefee 

Mr. Ralph E. Collins — Canadian Mr. Selden Menefee — NBC 

Legation Mr. E. Herbert Norman 

Mr. Len de Caux— CIO Dr. John A. Pollard— IPR 

Colonel Dusenberry — War Department Mr. Arthur Ringwalt — Department of 

Mr. Hubert Graves — British Embassy State 
Mr. Joseph Harsch— CBS 
Dr. Arthur W. Hummel — ^Library of 

Congress 

Mr. Morris. Were you a member of the Institute of Pacific Eela- 
tioiis in October 1946? 

Mr. Thorner. I believe I was, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have a list of Washington, Mary- 
land and Virginia members of the Washington Institute of Pacific 
Relations, but in view of Mr. Thorner's statement that he was a mem- 
ber, I see no need of introducing it at this time into the record. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Have you ever used an alias of any kind at any time, 
Mr. Thorner? 

INIr. Thorner. I must respectfully decline to answer that question, 
on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments, as stated before. 

Mr. Morris. In connection with the statement that you volunteered, 
that your declinations here in answer to certain questions bore no re- 
flection on the Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore, did 
anyone ask you to volunteer that statement ? 

Mr. Thorner. I have no recollection of anyone from the Institute 
of Pacific Relations asking me to write an article under anybody else's 
name. 

Mr. Fanelli. I don't think you understand the question. 

Senator Ferguson. That was not the question at all. 

Mr. Morris. I said, did anybody make a recommendation to you, 
in connection with your testimony here today, that you add that vol- 
untary statement to your answers ? 

Mr. Thorner. No. That is my own. 

Mr. Morris. And nobody made that suggestion or request? 

Mr. Thorner. That is my own. 



3966 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Ferguson. Did anyone contact you in the last year about 
this committee? 

Mr. Thorner. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or about your testimony ? 

Mr. Thorner. No, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. You have not talked to Mr. Lattimore ? 

Mr. Thorner. I have relied upon my counsel. 

Senator Ferguson. Just your counsel ? 

Mr. Thorner. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. But you have not talked ) Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Thorner. I have not talked with Mr. La ■ more about my testi- 
mony. 

Senator Ferguson. Lockwood, or Carter ? 

Mr. Thorner. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that all ? 

Mr. Morris. Nothing further. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all of this witness. 

Mr. Fanelli. Are we excused ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Mr. Thorner. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Before we close the record, I want to say the 
place where the Welles statement to Browder appeared on page 599 of 
the recordj it is exhibit 162. 

I also wish that the research director would ask Mr. Humelsine how 
he accounts for a document that is as important as this not being in the 
files. In particular, it is a document relating to our policy toward 
communism in China, where this statement appears : 

The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, borh 
in diplomatic context and publicity, that the United States favors complete unity 
among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof. 

With regards to the specific charges that "these officials continue the old policy 
of war against the Communists in China," this Government has had no such 
policy, either old or new. This Government has, in fact, viewed with skepticism 
many alarmist accounts of the "serious menace" of "communism" in China. 

How would it be possible that that would not be in the files ? See if 
he has any explanation. 

Mr. Mandel. Are you directing me to write such a letter, Senator ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I direct that such a letter be written to 
obtain that for the record. It is a very important document, and how 
do they account for the fact that it is not in the records? 

If those documents of that kind are not in the records of the State 
Department, then what provision do they have for destroying such 
documents as that ? 

The committee will recess now until tomorrow, the time to be set 
later. 

(Thereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene, 
subject to the call of the Chair.) 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS 



THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1952 

^^ United States Senate 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administkatioi^ 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. 0. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a. m., in room 424, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins, presiding. 

Present: Senator Watkins. 

Also present : Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel ; Benjamin Man- 
del, research director. 

Senator Watkins. The committee will resume session. 

Mr. Morris. Will the record show, Mr. Chairman, that the witness 
has been sworn in executive session ? 

Senator Watkins. Will you give his name? 

I\Ir. Morris. Will you state your name, sir? 

Mr. RowE. David N. Rowe. 

Mr. Morris. What is your address ? 

Mr. RowE. New Haven, Conn., for business. Residence, Hamden, 
Conn. 

INIr. Morris. Professor Rowe, what is your present occupation ? 

Mr. Rowe. I am professor of political science at Yale University. 

Mr. Morris. How long have you held that position? 

Mr. Rowe. I have been connected with Yale since 1943. I have 
been professor since 1950. 

Mr. Morris. What other post do you hold in New Haven and in the 
United States Government? 

Mr. Rowe. I am a member of various committees and things of that 
kind in the university. 

Mr. Morris. Will you specify what they are? 

Mr. Rowe. I am a member of the committee on international studies 
at Yale, which has general charge of the program of graduate studies 
in international relations. 

I have been at various times director of graduate studies and far 
eastern studies at Yale, but am not operating in that capacity as of the 
present time. 

As far as the Government is concerned, my history of employment 
by the Government goes back to the summer of 1941 in any significance 
when I was first attached to the Library of Congress in connection 
with the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Com- 
munications under Dr. Harold Lasswell. 

Mr. Morris. Was that a Coordinator of Information assignment? 

3967 

88348— 52— pt. 11 17 



3968 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. No. That was before. That was before the Coordinator 
of Information Office had been organized. 

Then I was attached to the Department of Justice in the fall of 1941 
in connection with the Special Defense Unit, Department of Justice. 

In the fall of 1941 I was taken on by the Coordinator of Informa- 
tion, which later became OSS, Office of Strategic Services, and in 
that capacity I was sent to China as the first OSS man to reach China, 
in connection with the Pacific war, arriving there just 10 days before 
Pearl Harbor. I remained there until May. 

I came back and got out of OSS in the summer of 1942 and resumed 
my connection with Princeton University, w^here I had been teaching 
up to that point. 

During the war I was a consultant to various Government organi- 
zations, but the main work I did was in connection with our wartime 
training programs on far eastern languages and area studies in wliich 
we had a very large program at Yale University. 

I am a lieutenant colonel in the Military Intelligence Reserve. My 
last tour of active duty was a period of about G weeks in the summer 
of 1950 just after the outbreak of the Korean war. 

I have also been and still am a consultant to the Air Force in 
several different capacities, consultant to Air Force Intelligence, 
operating at top level in Air Force Intelligence ; consultant to General 
Disosway, the director of Air Force training, and various Air Force 
assignments. 

I have worked with the Department of State on several different 
occasions. 

The assignment in Chungking under the Coordinator of Informa- 
tion involved an attachment to the Embassy in Chungking where I 
was officially listed as special assistant to the Ambassador for the 
purposes of carrying on the Coordinator of Information work. 

In the summer of 1948 I took on an 8- weeks' assignment with the 
State Department in the consulate general in Shanghai, where I was 
a special consultant to the information activity, usually called, I 
believe. Voice of America. 

I was employed to take a thorough look at the United States Infor- 
mation Service work in China and to make out a report commenting 
on it, criticizing it, and making suggestions for possible improvement, 
which I did. 

This was rated as a confidential report and was turned in, and after 
I came back I had consultations with the Under Secretary for Public 
Affairs on this sort of thing. 

Senator Watkins. What has been your experience with China ? 

Mr. Ilo^^^:. My experience with China, of course, starts out with the 
fact that I was born in China of missionary parents and lived there 
almost all my life until I became of near college age. 

Senator Watkins. Do you speak Chinese? 

Mr. RowE. Yes; I speak Chinese fluently; have spoken it from 
early infancy, childhood, and grew up bilingual in English and 
Chinese, I cannot remember when I couldn't speak the language. 

Senator Watkins. How old were you when you came back to the 
States to live ? 

Mr. RowE. I came back to go to school in this country, I was in 
my seventeenth year. I proceeded to go through my last year in liigh 
school and 4 years of college and a number of years of graduate train- 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3969 

ing before I ever went back to China again, which was in the summer 
of 1937 when I went back under a Rockefeller Foundation grant to 
allow me to study in Peking, China, for a year. 

Senator Watkins. Were your parents still over there when you 
returned ? 

Mr. RowE. No ; neither parent was there in 1937. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, in the academic field have you been 
active m such organizations as the Far Eastern xYssociation, Institute 
of Pacific Relations, and organizations of tliat nature? 

Mr. RowE. I have never been active in the Far Eastern Associa- 
tion, although I have been a member of the association since its earliest 
founding. 

Mr. Morris. What is that organization ? 

Mr. RowE. The Far Eastern Association is an association of people 
who study the Far East academically, and people who are interested 
in the Far East. It its modeled on the lines of the ordinary and 
regular scholarly organizations like the Political Science Association, 
the American Historical Association, et cetera. 

It publishes a quarterly under the title of The Far Eastern Quar- 
terly, which is filled with learned articles and book reviews, and so 
on, and it holds annual meetings. 

The next one is to be held this coming week in Boston and Cam- 
bridge. It sponsors scholarly monographs. It helps to secure fmids' 
for sponsoring research in the field of far-eastern studies. 

As far as the subject matter is concerned, it runs across all the 
normal lines of subject matter. It is not devoted peculiarly to any one 
of them, but is distinguished from the so-called the American Oriental 
Society by being less exclusively concerned with problems of philology 
and linguistics. 

It is more humanities outside of language and literature, and social 
sciences. 

Mr. Morris. '\^Tiat other such organizations have you been active in ? 

Mr. RowE. The Institute of Pacific Relations, of course. 

Mr. Morris. May I come back to that later ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Are there any others. Professor Rowe ? 

Mr. RowE. Of course, outside of the far eastern field I have been 
active in the American Political Science Association, the American 
Historical Association, the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, 
all of which I have held membership in and am still a member of the 
Political Science Association. 

Mr. Morris. What positions have you held in the Institute of Pa- 
cific Relations? 

Mr. RowE. Starting out with ordinary membership, I believe I 
entered in 1939 — it was no later than 1940 — and then I became a trustee 
of the American IPR. 

Mr. Morris. When did you become a trustee ? 

Mr. RowE. If you will allow me just a second here, I want to get the 
precise date on that. 

I was elected to membership on the board of trustees at the annual 
meeting held February 18, 1947. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you remain a member of the board ? 

Mr. Ro^vE. I remained a member of the board until the early part 
of 1950 when I resiffned. 



3970 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Morris. Why did you resign ? 

Mr. RowE. I resigned for a variety of reasons. 

Mr. Morris. What reason did you give at the time of your resig- 
nation? 

Mr. RowE. At the time of my resignation I plead too many organi- 
zations, too many things to do, and got out on that basis. 

In the spring of 1951 I was approached by Mr. Holland in a letter 
asking me to rejoin the board and at this time I told him that it would 
be futile to suppose or to act as though I had never had any dissatis- 
factions with the IPR, or my situation in it, and at that time I pointed 
out that I thought I had a rather anomalous position of the board of 
trustees and that I was rather convinced that the staff of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations — and I use this word "staff" designedly ; I do not 
wish to characterize the entire membership of the IPR, but that the 
staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations was by and large funda- 
mentally opposed to most of the things I stood for in the Far East. 

I therefore felt that I did not wish to remain a member of the board. 
I asked Mr. Holland in my letter whether there was any prospect of 
there being a different situation for me to be in in the IPR in the 
future, but there was no answer given to that in his subsequent reply. 

I did not think it was likely to change. 

Mr. Morris. So, therefore, on that basis you declined the offer to 
rejoin the board? 

Mr. RowE. To rejoin the board. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any letters covering those points, Pro- 
fessor Rowe, with you ? 

Mr. Rowe. I do not have here a copy of my letter of resignation or 
a copy of the subsequent refusal to rejoin, but I can supply you with 
those documents if you are interested. 

Mr. Morris. I wish you would. 

Mr. Rowe. I will do so. 

Senator Watkins. They may be inserted into the record. 

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 612A, B, and 
C," and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 612-A 

May 29, 1951. 
Dr. David N. Rowe, 

2i// Hall of Graduate Studies, Yale University, 

New Haven, Conn. 

Dear Dave : Tliank you for your note of May 28 returning Dutt's manuscript. 
I agree with you that some of the information in it might be usefully made 
available, possibly in mimeographed form, for limited circulation. However, 
before doing this, I have decided to get some further detailed criticism of the 
study from one or two other readers, including Harold Sprout. 

I realize this must be a very busy time for you, but I do hope you will let me 
know sometime soon how you are coming along with your book on Far Eastern 
security problems. I suppose you will have material for a chapter or two in 
the current Washington hearings. 

Later on, when you are not quite so pressed, I do hope you will consider writ- 
ing an article for Far Eastern Survey on some aspect of American security 
problems in Eastern and Southern Asia. Is there any chance of your being 
able to do this during the summer months? If there is another topic which 
would be more convenient for you, please feel free to tell me. I may tell you 
quite frankly that in making this request, I am concerned not only to get the 
benefit of your long study of Far Eastern security questions, but also to see 
your general point of view on American Far Eastern policy expressed in an 
I. P. R. publication. I am still old-fashioned enough to hope that the I. P. R. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3971 

can be a platform on which a variety of responsible viewpoints can find expres- 
sion. For that reason, I have long been a little sorry that you withdrew from 
the I. P. K., and I would very much like to have you consider the possibility of 
renewing your membership. Later on, if you approved, it would then be possible 
to reappoint you to the Board of Trustees. Since Kay Kennedy's death, we have 
lacked a representative from Yale on our Board. In many ways you are the 
appropriate choice. How about it? 
All good wishes. 
Yours, 

William L. Holland, 
Executive Vice Chairman. 

P. S. — As you may have heard from Milton Sacks, Professor Latourette will 
be writing a short book on American Far Eastern Policy Since 1945 for the 
I. P. R. during the summer. Later on, when he has completed his I'evised out- 
line, I hope to circulate it to a dozen or so Far Eastern specialists including 
yourself for comments and suggestions. I do hope you will be willing to give 
me your views on it. 

(Signed) WLH. 

Exhibit No. 612-B 

June 8, 1951. 
Mr. William L. Holland, 

American Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, 

New York 22, N. Y. 

Dear Bill : Your letter of May 29 raised a number of questions. The first 
of these has to do with the possibility of writing an article for The Far Eastern 
Survey on some aspect of our American security problem in Eastern and South 
Asia. To give you an idea of my situation I need only point out what you 
must already realize, namely, that I have not published one word since the 
volume on Japan which I edited for the Yale Press and which came out last 
September. I now anticipate another full year during which I will do no 
work for publication. Thus the chance of writing articles for any journal is 
almost nil. 

In this connection I would like to talk with you sometime about The Far 
Eastern Survey as a platform for the expression of a variety of responsible 
viewpoints, as you put it. 

As to my withdrawal from the IPR somewhat over a year ago, that is also 
something on which I would be glad to talk with you. In this connection I 
wish to point out that I have also dropped my membership in the American 
Oriental Society. I retain membership in the Far Eastern Association. In 
this organization I am very much on the side lines, but I do not object to this 
as a thing in itself. What I objected to regarding my pi'evious experience as one 
of your trustees was the rather anomalous position in which I found myself. I 
wonder if there would be any change in this respect if I were to come back on the 
board. I tend to doubt it. 

I guess what all this boils down to is my strong feeling that over the years 
the American IPR has taken on a definite character. Quite apart from the 
contents of its publications or the bias of its writers, it seems to me that the 
American IPR is manned primarily by personnel up and down the line to whom 
the kind of thing I stand for in current Far Eastern affairs is probably abhorrent. 
Therefore, it seems to me that for me to rejoin your board would be a useless 
gesture at best. 

As far as I am concerned American IPR can be anything it wants to be. I 
am not interested either in certifying that the American IPR is different from 
what it seems to me to be, or in trying to change it to something else. Within 
obvious limits, I believe in free association, with likemiuded people. I hope 
you will find it possible to accept these statements in the spirits in which they 
are made. 

I do not want to indicate that my resignation from IPR was essentially 
based on matters such as these. I also want to say that I would not have raised 
these matters with you at all except for your letter of May 29 in which you 
asked about my possible willingness to rejoin the American IPR. I do think 
that the position I take above is one on which I am inclined to stand at present. 
I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you about these matters if you feel 
inclined to do so. 



3972 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Many thanks for your letter. I will be glad to look at the revised outline of 
the book you plan on American Far Eastern Policy Since 1945, by Professor 
Latourette. Incidentally, why not appoint him to the board of IFR? He is the 
senior member here at Yale in the field of Far Eastern studies. I do not need 
to tell you of the eminence he has attained in that field. 
Sincerely yours, 

David N. Rowe, 
Professor of Political Science. 
DNR : me. 



Exhibit No. 612-C 

June 26, 1951. 
Dr. David N. Rowe, 

Department of Political Science, Tale University, 

Ne^o Haven, Conn. 
Dear Dave : Many thanks for your letter of June 8 which I am sorry not to 
have answered sooner than this. I greatly appreciated your writing me in such 
a frank and friendly vein, and I very much hope we will have a chance to talk 
about the matter further before long. Do call me me up if you find time when 
you are in New York. I would particularly like your suggestions on the Far 
Eastern Survey. I can quite understand your position in regard to membership 
on the American I. P. R. board, and for the present I suggest we let the matter 
ride, though I may want to revive the question with you next year. In the 
meantime, however, I hope you will take me seriously when I say that I am 
genuinely anxious to do everything I can to refute the impression that the 
American I. P. R. membership is pretty much limited to like-minded people 
of a similar general political outlook. I don't believe that is true today, but 
I would like to make it even more apparent to the outside observer by including 
in our periodicals contributions from more people like yourself. 

In the meantime, let me say that I am grateful for what you are doing to aid 
Milton Sacks in his study of Communism in Indochina, which, as you know, 
I hope to have published under I. P. R. auspices. 
All good wishes. 
Yours, 

WiLTJAM L. Holland, 
Executive Vice Chairman. 
WLH :abs. 

P. S. — I thought you might like to see a copy of the enclosed recent pamphlet 
on the I. P. R. 

]Mr. Morris. Wliile yoit were a member of tlie Institute of Pacific 
Relations were you able to draw any conclusions about the position of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to the international 
politics ? 

Mr. Rowe. This was something that I was very much interested in 
because of my special interest in international affairs. In the political 
science field I am not only a specialist on the Far East from the insti- 
tutional point of view, but I have spent a great deal of my time work- 
ing on the international relations of the Far East, both inside the Far 
East and of the Far East with other areas. 

In my opinion there was a time when the Amerian Council of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations took a very definite position in the inter- 
national field. I have a feeling that a great deal of emphasis has been 
given to the possible efforts of the Institute of Pacific Relations to 
influence American policy makers on far-eastern affairs and on inter- 
national relations. 

I think less attention has been given to the position of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, the American council, as one council among a 
large group of national councils, in which you have a sort of a little 
international society. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3973 

In this little international society, the American Institute of Pa- 
•cific Relations always took pretty strong positions on issues. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give us examples of that, Professor Howe ? 

Mr. RowE. I will give you an example in the open fight which was 
waged between the American council and its people and such people 
as the British, French, and Dutch, for example, and this fight being 
waged on the issue of colonialism and anticolonialism. 

There was a time when the whole International Institute of Pacific 
Relations was threatened with dissolution or at least with the resigna- 
tion of important members. This, I believe, arose over the open policy 
on the part of important American IPR council members of attacking 
the colonial system. 

Mr. Morris. What year was this. Professor Rowe ? 

Mr. RowE. I believe it came to a head about 1945, but these attacks 
had gone on intermittently for years before. I think it came to a 
head in two of the meetings that they held, one at Mont Tremblant 
and the other at Hot Springs, these being international meetings with 
all the various councils represented, and in which the American IPR 
publicly took a very strong position, or the members thereof at least 
took such a position in public against the British, French, and Dutch, 
attacking their position in the Far East. 

You could say that this was merely the reflection of the positions of 
the individuals in the American IPR, reflecting their belief and indi- 
cating what they believed the facts to be, and so on, but the thin line 
between the expression of fact and the advocacy of policy is a very, 
very thin line indeed, and at times of this kind it seemed to me it almost 
entirely tended to disappear, so that the American IPR was labeled, 
and I think pretty accurately and justifiably, by the people in the 
other councils, such as the British, French, and Dutch, as being very 
anticolonial and therefore being very anti-British, French, and Dutch. 

Remember, this happened when the war was still on. 

The importance and significance of this in international affairs, I 
think should not be underestimated at all. The British threatened to 
walk out of the international IPR and so seriously did the Americans 
take the threat that they put up a compromise deal. They promised 
to tone down their utterances. 

They, above all, got a new head of the international IPR in the per- 
son of Prof. Percy Corbett, who was a colleague of mine at Yale at 
the time. 

Professor Corbett's position is an interesting one because, being a 
Canadian — I am not sure whether at this time he had yet acquired 
American citizenship — and working in an American institution, being 
verv friendly to the Americans and very friendly with the American 
IPR, he was almost an ideal individual to mediate between the British 
and Americans. 

All this I cite merely because I think it shows the significance of the 
IPR in international affairs. 

These foreign councils, these non-American councils, that were 
members of the international IPR probably had a far better system 
of liaison with their own home governments than our IPR ever man- 
aged to build up. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe. how does this attack on colonialism 
affect international politics? Would you develop that for us, please? 



3974 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. Of course, the attack on colonialism is right down the 
Russian line from a doctrinal point of view. 

If you go into Marxism, you find very early stated the view which 
they have solidly promoted ever since, that the place to attack cap- 
italism is in the colonial areas. They are the marginal regions, the 
outer regions, the places in which empires tend to decay and where the 
British, French, and Dutch could be best attacked, and, of course, we 
know what has happened since the war along this line. 

The colonialism in the Far East has suffered very serious blows. 

It is not altogether Avithout interest that Mr. Jessup who was so 
prominent with the American IPR was in his official capacity as an 
American representative at the United Nations so strongly in opposi- 
tion to the Dutch and so strongly in support of Indonesian nationalism 
and eventual Indonesian independence, and I am sure that my col- 
leagues among the Dutch would feel that this is a perfect illustration 
of how IPR not only affects American policy making, but how it plays 
international politics. 

Mr. Morris. Have you had any other experiences other than that 
of colonialism ? 

Senator Watkins. May I go back to that in just a minute ? I think 
it has been explained here by so many witnesses from the IPR that this 
organization did not take up the matters of support for any interna- 
tional policies. 

Their whole objective was to get the information from the various 
groups so that people could be better informed. It was more or less a 
fact-gathering organization to get the facts to the people and discuss 
these problems without taking any particular line. 

]Mr. RowE. I would like to present in the strongest terms 

Senator Watkins. That is what I think has been testified. If you 
read these hearings I think you would find that in them. 

Mr. RowE, I would like to present in the strongest possible terms 
my own belief that no such framework as that is adequate to explain 
the terrific friction that arose in the international IPR over this issue 
of the Americans on the one side against the colonial powers on the 
other. 

The business of pure factual information and fact gathering, no 
propaganda, no point of view, is completely irreconcilable with what 
happened. 

Senator Watkins. You understand, do you not, that that is the 
claim of the officials that have testified here in these hearings? 

Mr. RoAVE. I understand that. 

Senator Watkins. Do you take issue with that ? 

Mr. RowE. I very definitely would take issue with it. Actually it 
is very difficult for any research organization to operate without some 
kind of a focus. 

The first effort you make to focus research on problems commits you 
to some kind of a point of view at least by the significance and the im- 
portance of the problem. 

Then, you proceed from there. 

You may say, "All right, we are going to have Mr. A take this up 
from one point of view, and Mr. B take it up from another, so we will 
get all kinds of different approaches to the problem." 

But supposing you only believe in the point of view that Mr. A is 
proposing. Then, you are going to allow a dominant position in vour 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3975 

publications and your allocation of funds, and all this to that single 
point of view. 

It is very, very, very easy to manipulate these research programs in 
such a way that what you come out with is a homogeneous, unified, co- 
ordinated point of view, in spite of the fact that you can always go to 
the multifarious publications of as large an organization as the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations and find something on the other side. 

The problem here is not whether you can find something on the other 
side; the problem is what you have the most of and what is given 
prominent play and what the people talk about when they go into an 
international meeting such as was involved at Hot Springs. 

This is the place where the point of view of the organization is given 
away. 

Senator Watkins. You are speaking of the American council only, 
or of the international ? 

Mr. RowE. I am speaking of the American council in this particular 
case of where they had this fight with the British, French, and Dutch, 
but, of course, we have to understand that in spite of the fact that the 
international council is an international council, the operation was 
centered largely in New York. The money was largely American 
money. 

Senator Watkins. Wlio dominated it? The international? 

Mr. RowE. I would say the Americans dominated it to a large ex- 
tent. If this would not be so, the British would not have threatened 
to get out of the organization as they did. That was the only recourse 
they had. 

Senator Watkins. Did that reach the print of the public press? 

Mr. Row^E. I do not think it did to any great extent. 

Mr. Morris. Did this issue of colonialism come up at any of the 
conferences? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes; it came up very definitely at the conference 
at Hot Springs. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat about at Atlantic City ? 

Mr. RowE. It didn't come up so much at the Atlantic City confer- 
ence. That was an interim conference that was purely supposed to 
deal with operational and organizational functions. 

It was not a subject-matter conference the way the other ones were, 
but at the Atlantic City conference the extent of the friction between 
the British, French, and Dutch, and ourselves, was perfectly clear; I 
think particularly the British and Dutch delegations. 

I was a member of the American council delegation at the Atlantic 
City conference — this was in early '45, I believe — and I was very 
much interested in trying to cooperate with the British. I found this 
extremely difficult because the automatic reaction of the British was 
that any member of the American delegation was not out for their 
good and they were hostile, unfriendly, and in a formal, cold sort of 
way ; not, of course, in an overt fashion, but I couldn't get to first base 
trying to cooperate with the British. 

Mr. Morris. Was there a unity of outlook among the American 
delegation ? 

Mr. RowE. At the Atlantic City conference? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

In other words, did you caucus, or anything, there ? 



3976 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes; there was a regular caucus system. I found 
myself very quickly in a rather embarrassing position. I had been 
invited to be a member of the American delegation by Mr. Carter, 
E. C. Carter ; that is, when he visited us in New Haven one time, and 
1 accepted. 

At that time he asked me whether I would have any objection to 
Mr. Frederick V. Field being a member of the American delegation. 
I think this is a very interesting fact in itself, and I said no, but when 
I got to Atlantic City I found that Mr. Field was not only a member 
of the American delegation, but he was the spokesman for the deU- 
gation. 

In these caucuses the point of view would be put up, Field would 
make the initial pronouncement at the open meetings, and then the 
American members were supposed to speak up in support. 

I am afraid I proved rather uncooperative at this point. I re- 
frained from supporting some of the things Mr. Field said, and I was 
taken to task for it at the time, but I am afraid that I was still rather 
obstinate and did not create a particularly good impression. 

Senator Watkins. Who were the other members of that delegation? 

Mr. RowE. Mr. Jessup was one of them. Mr. Carter, of course, was 
there. This was at the time when they were about to shift over from 
Carter to another general secretary of the American IPR. A guar- 
anty that they would make such a shift was part of the arrangements 
which they made in an effort to placate the British, because the British 
recognized that Carter w^as the spearhead of the anti-British element 
in the American IPR. 

Senator Watkins. Do you think these proceedings and the dis- 
cussion and the friction would be reflected in the minutes of the 
American Institute or of this international group, in the reported 
proceedings of their meetings? 

Mr. RowE. I doubt very much if it would. 

Senator Watkins. For policy reasons, it would be kept out of the 
public ? 

Mr. RowE. That is right. I doubt if that would be reflected, 
although I can't certify on the basis of having read those minutes 
recently at all. 

Senator Watkins. You recognize the fact that what you are saying 
here has an important bearing on much of the testimony that has 
been given here ? 

Mr. RowE. The relationship between this testimony and the pre- 
vious testimony is, of course, something you people have to evaluate, 
but I say this in full willingness to accept the responsibility for what 
I am saying. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, in addition to colonialism, has there 
been anv other element of international politics that you have noticed 
at the IPR as exerted influence ? 

Mr. Rowe. Now, you are speaking of an influence in international 
affairs ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Mr. Rowe. Well, in the early years, of course, there was this whole 
matter of the attitude on the Japanese war against China. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about that ? 

Mr. RowE. The first contact I had with that was in the fall of 
1938. I had just returned from China and had joined the faculty 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3977 

at Princeton University and was invited to attend one of these Ameri- 
can Council IPR meetings held at the Princeton Inn in Princeton, 
N. J., and at that point the general line seemed to be that llie Chinese 
were bound to succeed in their war against the Japanese. 

They were building the Chinese up very strongly, in other words, 
and it went so far that at least one member of the American group 
asserted that if the Chinese kept on fighting the Japanese the way 
they were at that point they would have the Japanese running back 
out of North China within a year's time. 

Well, if this is the best result that fact-finding can give you, I sub- 
mit that it wasn't very good. I took precisely the opposite point of 
view and asserted that the only way the Chinese could win the war 
against the Japanesp was with an extensive external intervention by 
some third power in favor of the Chinese Government. 

This was an unpopular thing to say with those people because 
whereas they were interested, I always though, in supporting and 
encouraging the Chinese, they did not want to dramatize the necessity 
for an overt kind of support and intervention if the Chinese were going 
to win. 

They kept talking all the time about the guerrillas and how the 
Chinese could get all the arms they needed from the Japanese. 

I thought it was a particularly romantic kind of view as far as 
the Chinese war was concerned; but it was the orthodox doctrine at 
this time by most of these people. 

I was definitely in the minority on that business. I do not think 
this sort of thing ever had a serious impact in the international field 
as involving the other international councils. I may be wrong on 
that. It was very early in my association in the IPR and I wasn't 
even yet a member of the organization at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Was there any trouble with the Chinese council? 

Mr. EowE. Oh, j^es; they got into increasing trouble with the 
Chinese council because of the open oppositon to the Nationalist 
Govenrment by members of the IPR. 

The open statements made against conditions under Chiang Kai- 
shek and all that increased more as the war wore on, you see, after 
Pearl Harbor. There wasn't so much of that before Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Watkins. Can you be more specific about those statements 
and say who made them ; where they were made, and when, and under 
what circumstances? 

Mr. RowE. I think that would be a matter of simply searching for 
the record of publications. I think you would find in various IPE 
publications critical articles of this kind. I cannot name you one 
offhand, but the Chinese IPR got into a very disturbed state over all 
tins businei^s because the Chinese IPR was composed largely of people 
affiliated with the Nationalist Government, or at least on its side. 

Mr. IMoRRis. How do you know that the Chinese were disturbed by 
these developments? 

Mr. RowE, I think available correspondence between the IPR mem- 
bers inside the organization indicates that they were taking measures 
to either avoid hostility toward the Chinese IPR or to mitigate the 
effects of their policy. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to ask about the Russian Institute 
and its connection witli the international and its relationship with 



3978 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

the other institutes. How were they getting along with these others 
at that time ? 

Mr. RowE. Which time are you speaking of ? 

Senator Watkins. The time you were just speaking of when this 
discussion about China was going on. 

Mr. RowE. I don't think I could say much of much use along that 
line because I was never in on the inside of that particular thing, on 
the matter of the relations between the American IPR and the general 
IPR and the Soviet Council of the IPR. 

Of course, we all knovv^ the Soviets became increasingly noncoopera- 
tive, but in the early years of the war it seems that they did have a 
regular council and participated to a certain extent in IPR. work, 
but as the war went on they increasingly withdrew and contacts 
diminished. 

It seems to me that is the general history of the thing. 

But I had no connection of any direct kind with these matters. 

Mr. Morris. How active were you in the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations? 

Mr. RowE. I was a trustee. I did not attend meetings more than 
about once a year. That's about all it came to. 

Mr. Morris. How many were held? They were held more fre- 
quently than that, were they not ? 

Mr. RowE. I think so. I was for a while rather more active when 
Raymond Dennett was the executive secretary of the American IPR. 
At that point, Dennett asked me to join the research advisory com- 
mittee and I did so and I participated rather fully in its activities. 

This was the committee that had the job of promoting research 
activities, judging their desirability and undesirability, their value 
or lack thereof, and I attended quite a few meetings of that committee. 

However, my activities on that committee came to a halt, I think 
about 1946. I never had any explanation of the reason for this, but 
my name was just dropped off the membership list. 

Mr. Morris. How do you account for the difference that during the 
time that Dennett was secretary you were more active than after? 

Mr. RowE. I think Dennett made a real effort to broaden out the 
membership on these various policy elements in the American IPR. 
I think he very definitely wanted to get a more general representation 
of points of view. I got along very well with Dennett. I talked with 
Dennett about my failure to understand why I had been dropped off 
the committee. I talked with him about this matter at a considerably 
later date and Dennett said to me, "Well, what did you expect? You 
were different." 

Mr. Morris. What did he mean by that ? 

Mr. RowE. I don't know precisely what he meant by it; but he 
meant that I was in general not in conformity with the views and 
opinions held by the majority of the important members of the IPR, 
I suppose. 

Mr. Morris. Was Owen Lattimore active in the IPR at that time? 

Mr. RowE. He got more active ajrain after the war ended. 

Mr. Morris. What do you mean, again, Professor? 

Mr. RowE. I mean he had been active before. He had been, of 
course, editor of Pacific Affairs and had been very, very active in the 
IPR, both the American IPR and the international IPR. After the 
war ended he came back from his activities in the OWI and he became 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3979 

more active again in American IPR matters. I have theorized that 
maybe it was in connection with this that my name was dropped oif 
that committee, but I have no way to prove whether this was so or 
not. 

Mr. MoRKis. How well have you known Owen Lattimore, through 
the years, Professor Rowe ? 

Mr. Eo^vE. I never knew him well. I first met him in China in 
1937, in the fall of 1937, and I had various purely professional contacts 
with him from time to time. I have spoken on the same lecture plat- 
form with him, and I asked him, for instance, to read a paper at 
Princeton at one of the bicentennial conferences at Princeton, and so 
on, but I have never been a close friend of his. It's been that sort 
of contact. 

Mr. Morris. Have you known Mrs. Lattimore ? 

Mr. RowE. I have known Mrs. Lattimore considerably better, but a 
long time ago. My acquaintance with Mrs. Lattimore was first in 
China in 1921-22 when she and her parents and one of her sisters came 
out to Nanking, the city I lived in. Her father was a professor of 
mathematics and dean at Northwestern University in Evanston, 111., 
and they came out to spend their sabbatical year in Nanking and he 
taught mathematics in the University of Nanking. It was at this 
time that I became rather well acquainted with Eleanor Holgate, as 
she was then, and knew her quite well during that time and the period 
up through the early summer of 1924. At that point she and my 
eldest sister who had become very close friends, went to Peking, and 
I didn't see Mrs. Lattimore again to speak to her until the fall of 1937, 
a period of 13 years or more, and I have seen very, very little of her 
since that time. 

Mr. Morris. Were there any Communist associations that you knew 
of in her life at that time ? 

Mr. RowE. The Communist associations that I knew of in her life 
were in the period 1923-24, around in there. 

Mr. Morris. What were they? 

Mr. RowE. She was acquainted with such a man as Prof. Harry 
Ward, the late Prof. Harry Ward of Union Seminary, New York, and 
with such people as Anna Louise Strong, for example, and the way 
I know this is because at that time she and my sister were planning a 
trip to China from New York going by boat across the Atlantic and 
then planning to cross Russia and Siberia by train to get to Peking 
through Manchuria, and whereas the visa problem did not seem to 
be particularly difficult with Miss Holgate, it was difficult as far as 
my sister was concerned, and I understood that help on this matter 
was gotten from people like Harry Ward and Anna Louise Strong 
through Miss Holgate's intermediation in the matter. 

I was present at one visit she made to Professor Ward's home in 
the spring of 1924. I did not hear all the conversation because part 
of it was conducted out in the garden where she and Professor Ward 
went, but I knew that it was in connection with this matter of a trip 
they were planning through Russia and Siberia. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, have you known the leaders of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations through the years? Are you well ac- 
quainted with them ? 

Mr. Rowe. The question of whether I am well acquainted with 
them is a question which would be hard to answer. 



3980 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

!Mr. Morris. Well, do you know them ? 

IVIr. RowE. I know them ; yes. I know most of them, of the top level 
people, 

Mr. Morris. Will you give us a general idea of what extent you 
know the leaders of the institute such as Mr. Jessup and Mr. Lock- 
wood ? 

]Mr, RowE, If you want to introduce their names one by one I will 
be glad to comment that way, or do you want me to comment on the 
general group? 

Mr. INIorris. The reason for going into this is to show to what ex- 
tent Professor Rowe has known the leaders of the Institute of Pa- 
cific Relations and therefore bears on the qualifications of discussing 
this general subject. 

Senator Watkins. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Jessup? 

ISIr. Rowe. I have known Mr. Jessup both inside and outside of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. He has at various times been associated 
with the Yale Institute of International Studies in informal ways, and 
I knew him in connection with this Atlantic City conference. I 
haven't seen him for several years now. 

Mr. ]\ToRRis. Mr. Biggerstaff? 

]\Ir. Rowe. I know Biggerstaff fairly well. He is a professor of 
history, I believe, at Cornell University and was formerly a student 
at Harvard and studied in Peking. I first met him in this country. I 
couldn't tell you the precise year, but I see him every once in a while. 
I have been on a radio program with him. 

Mr. Morris. How about INIr. Fairbank? 

Mr. Rowe. I have known Fairbank ever since 1936 when he first 
came back to Harvard and joined the faculty there after a period of 
study in China. 

^Ir. Morris. Mr. Rosinger? 

Mr. RoAVE. Could I say one more word on Fairbank ? 

Mr. Morris. I am sorry. 

Mr. R )WE. I would say that I know Fairbank quite well. He and 
I were together in the OSS. He went out to China in 1942 to take 
over the job that I had started up there in 1941 and I have had fre- 
quent professional contacts with him since that time. During the 
year 1930-37 I saw quite a bit of him in Harvard. He was taking some 
courses there at the same time as well as teaching there. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. In your dealings with Professor Fairbank have you 
seen any manifestations of sympathy on his part toward communism 
or Communist movements? 

Mr. Rowe. There is unquestioned sympathy on the part of Fair- 
bank for the Chinese Communists. I say that and feel that very 
stronglv. 

Mr. INIoRRis. How do you know that, Professor Rowe? 

Mr. Rowe. You know it from his writings. You know it from the 
way he talks about Chinese politics. 

Mr. Morris. Have you heard him talk about Chinese politics? 

Mr. 'RowT.. Oh, yes ; I've heard him talk about Chinese politics. The 
most recent time, of course, was out in Denver in January when we 
were on the same platform together and at that time the amount of 
disagreement that might have developed between us was diminished 
by the fact that we decided to get together and see what we could agree 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3981 

on to say in public, but I think any analysis of Fairbank's writings 
shows a very sympathetic attitude toward what he calls the Chinese 
revolution. 

This is one of these phrases that you have to know the meaning of. 
When, for instance, I wrote an article in 1947 — it was published in the 
Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science in 
January 1948 — I sent a copy to iFairbank in which I advocated im- 
mediate American military intervention in favor of the Chinese Na- 
tionalists to prevent the Chinese Communists from coming down out 
of Manchuria and eventually to recover Manchuria. Fairbank wrote 
me a letter in which all he said of any great importance along this 
line was that I was 98 percent wrong because I failed to take into ac- 
count the Chinese revolution. Well, if you don't know what the 
people mean by the Chinese revolution, this phrase they constantly 
use, you don't understand. But what this is is the agrarian revolution : 
the Communists have seized it; we have to back the revolution no 
matter who controls it. And that's the way in which these people 
push when they are sympathetic to the Chinese Communists. 

Now, this is a different thing from saying that a man is either a 
Communist or is generally in favor of communism. It's merely to 
ask however the question : In a specific situation like that in China 
which involves Communists, does he or does he not back the interests 
of the Communists? And in this case tliere was no question certainly 
up to the Korean war but what I would say Fairbank was a con- 
sistent backer in the interests of the Chinese Communists. 

Mr. Morris. You knew Fnirbank in China, did you not? 

Mr. RowE. I never knew Fairbank in China ; no. My first acquaint- 
ance with him was in the fall of 19o6 when he was at Harvard. Then 
I Icnew him in Washington when I came down to join the OSS. I 
have never been with Fairbank while we were both in China. Our 
paths have never crossed there. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know Mr. Rosinger? 

Mr. Ro^vE. Yes; not very well. I first met Rosinger in connection 
with IPR activities in New York, I believe, in 19">8-39 when he was 
a student. I was present at a meeting at Mount Holyoke College in 
the summer of 1947 where he was. I never had much to do with 
Rosinger personally. 

Mr. Morris. Is Mr. William Lockwood one of the leaders of the 
institute ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. I think his position in the American council of 
the IPR lias always been rather an important one and not always 
to be analyzed purely on the basis of what office he has held. Even 
when he is out of the organization, from a formal point of view, while 
he is still maintained as a trustee, for example, he has had a very im- 
portant influence. As a matter of fact, I would say that the control- 
ling people in the American IPR include the following names. These 
are th6 people that really run the thing and that really control the 
making of important policy decisions as distinguished, first, from the 
general membership that has no influence at all, and from the other 
people like the other board of trustee members — take me, for exam- 
ple — that have no real say in the American policy. 

Senator Watkins. Why would you saj' you did not have any? 

Mr. RowE. Because the important decisions are always in the hands 
of an executive committee and the committee will operate so as to 



3982 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

screen out the policy possibilities and then the results of the committee 
activity will be presented to the trustees and all boards of trustees tend 
to take on a rubber stami:) character, and this was no exception. 

Mr, MoREis. As a member of the board of trustees would you ever 
take part in elections ? 

Mr. RowE. I suppose technically, yes ; but actually these things were 
never issues by the time they got down to that level. 

Mr. Morris. When you were a member of the board did you ever 
take part in the election of a secretary ? 

Mr. RowE. Not that I can remember; no. I remember one meet- 
ing of the American board of the IPR at which I was present at which 
the question of an executive secretary to the American IPR to suc- 
ceed Mr. Carter was brought up. It was explained to us that this 
was in the hands of the executive committee or a special committee, I 
think it was in this case, empowered to handle the matter. They 
did not think it was desirable to mention the names of the various 
candidates they were considering. They did not want this to get out 
to the public and they were sufficiently secret about this so they didn't 
even mention these names before the whole board of trustees. Now, 
I had the impression that other members of the board of trustees who 
were not on this particular committee knew who the people were, 
but I never had any knowledge of it, and when Mr. Clayton was 
finally selected it was just as much news to me as it would have been 
if I had been a member of the general public with no connection of 
any kind with the IPR. It is things of this kind that led to my state- 
ment in the letter to Holland that I just never thought I really be- 
longed. 

Mr. Morris. When you say "Clayton," you mean Clayton Lane? 

Mr. RowE. Clayton Lane ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. You were telling us on the basis of your experience 
who the leaders were. 

Mr. RowE. I got started on that: E. C. Carter, Mr. Jessup, Mr. 
Lockwood, Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Biggerstaff, Mr. Fairbank — these 
are the professionals. I want to point out one thing : That all these 
people are professional students either of international relations or 
primarily of Far East with the exception of Mr. Carter w^ho came 
into this IPR thing from an entirely different approach. 

Mr. Morris. How did he come into it ? 

Mr. Ro^vE. I understood that he had been YMCA secretary in his 
early life. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, I give you a list of names of the people 
in the Institute of Pacific Relations around whom our testimony has 
revolved for the most part through all these hearings. There is a 
list of 83 names here and this was a list presented to Mr. Carter at 
the outset of our hearings here on the general theory that these would 
be the people that we would be talking about. I ask you if this list 
was presented to you this morning in executive session and were you 
asked in executive session how many of that particular list you 
know of? 

Mr. Rowe. Yes ; that is true. I replied to your question in execu- 
tive session by marking this list with the marks to indicate which of 
these names were familiar to me from actual personal contact. 

Mr. IVIorris. Familiar and known to you ? 

Mr. Rowe. Yes ; that is right. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3983 

Mr. Morris. Will you supply those names for the record ? 

Again, Mr. Chairman, this again bears on qualifying this witness 
as being in the position of commenting on the various activities of 
these people through this hearing. 

Senator Watkins. You may proceed. 

Mr. RowE. Do you want me to just read the names off? 

Mr. Morris. Just indicate the name. 

Mr. RowE. I will do so : Solomon Adler, Robert Barnett, T. A. 
Bisson, Evans Carlson, Chen Han-seng, O. E. Clubb, Lauchlin Currie,, 
John P. Davies, John K. Fairbank, Frederick V. Field, Julian R. 
Friedman — I am afraid that's one name I omitted this morning — 
Randall Gould — that's another omission — and Andrew Grajlanzev, 
Michael Greenberg, Halclore Hanson, Alger Hiss, Eleanor Lattimore, 
Owen Lattimore, Michael Lindsay, Lawrence K. Rosinger, Mr. K. 
Saionji, John S. Service, Edgar P. Snow, Mrs. Edgar Snow, Mar- 
guerite Stewart, Maxwell Stewart, and John Carter Vincent. I guess 
that's all the names that are on this list that you have just given me 
here. 

Mr. Morris. And they are people you met and conversed with prin- 
cipally in your experiences with the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. RowE. Some principally in connection with the IPR, but oth- 
ers in various capacities. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have dealings with Robert W. Barrett? Did 
you find him to be a leader, one of the people active in the Institute of 
Pacific Relations? 

Mr. RowE. I don't think Barnett was ever a leader in the making 
of IPR policy. He was closely associated with them and my con- 
tact with him initially was at a time when he was supported by a 
grant which was at least administered through the American IPR if it 
was not directly granted by them. I visited him in the IPR offices 
in New York at that time and I have since been in irregular contact 
with him. 

Mr. Morris. In connection with your experiences with Owen Latti- 
more during the course of years have you been in position to follow 
Chinese Communist policy and Communist policy in general on an 
international level ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, very much so ; that's been one of the main interests 
in my study, in political study. 

Mr. Morris. And to what extent do you follow that? 

Mr. RowE. It would be hard for me to tell you what precise pro- 
portion of my time I devote to following it. 

Mr. Morris. I wish you would try. 

Mr. RowE. I certainly try to keep up with the chief policy pro- 
nouncements, for instance, made by the top Chinese Communist policy 
makers. I read very carefully all the available translation I can get 
from the Chinese press and occasionally have to dip over into the 
Chinese material itself. I follow these writings in the content of 
Chinese propaganda and I would say in general I am fairly well 
acquainted with the Chinese Communist Party line over a period of 
years. 

Mr. Morris. How about Chinese politics? Do you follow Chinese 
politics ? 

88348 — 52 — pt. 11 18 



3984 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE, Yes. That is getting increasingly difficult to do these 
days. In the first place, there is less politics and the kind of thing 
"^'e talk about as normal politics. In the second place, the iron curtain 
is intervening and it is more and more difficult to get information out, 
but insofar as I can, I certainly try to keep up with it. 

Mr. Morris. Have you had an opportunity to follow and to read 
the works and the expressions of Owen Lattimore? 

IMr. Ro"ut:. Oh, yes ; I have read various of his books, articles, and 
other piiblications as they have come out from time to time. 

Mr. Morris. I was wondering, ISIr. Chairman, on the basis of the 
experience this professor has had in following the Chinese Communist 
Party line, Communist movements and activities, and at the same 
time his knowledge of Chinese politics and the fact that he has fol- 
lowed the writings and the expressions of Owen Lattimore, if we could 
ask him on the basis of that experience to what extent he can say 
Owen Lattimore's writings and expressions have coincided with the 
Communist Party line. 

Senator Watkins. In other words, you want him to pass some 
judgment as a specialist in this field? 

Mr. INIoRRis. That is right; qualified as he is by the experiences 
he has testified to here, whether he is in a position to give an opinion, 
an expert oninion in this case, on Owen Lattimore. 

Senator Watktns. I think that would be a proper matter to go into 
and a proper matter to testify to in view of his background. 

Mr. jMorris. Will you tell us about your conclusions of Owen 
Lattimore? 

Mr. RowE. I have for a number of years labeled Lattimore as a 
fellow traveler. At the time when the original invest isration of Latti- 
more took place in the spring of 1950 I was asked bv Professor Fair- 
bank to write a testimonial letter on behalf of Mr. Lattimore. I 
wrote Mr. Fairbank a letter, but I refused to try to establish through 
any such letter what I chose to call "innocence by association." I have 
heard of guilt by association. I think this business of tryinc; to estab- 
lish innocence by association is probably equally unjustifiable. 

I said, "I will wait for the evidence to come in. I would be extremely 
surprised if proof were given that Mr. Lattimore was anything but a 
loyal American, but," I said, "since these questions are raised and 
since I can't state whether Mr. Lattimore to my knowledge is a formal 
Communist affiliate, and this seems to be one of tlie important elements 
in this business, I will wait for the evidence to come in." 

I think in the last 2 years even more evidence has come in than 
we ever had before, and I will say now that my subjective opinion, 
which is not based upon a provable statistical approach, for example, 
to the writings of Owen Lattimore in which you could demonstrate 
this thing once and for all — it is not based on any such detailed 
analvsis as that — but my subjective opinion for what it is worth, in 
the light of my knowledge of the subject matter, my 20 years of study 
in the far eastern field, is that as of today among far eastern specialists 
in the_ United States Lattimore is probably the principal agent of 
Stalinism. Now, I use this word "Stalinism" by design. 

Senator Watkins. Wliat do you mean by "agent"? That is the 
important thing. You know, it has been charged that he is the chief 
architect of our foreign policy with respect to China and the Far 
East, and I think some have gone so far as to say he was actually an 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3985 

agent, and by that word they meant that he was an official representa- 
tive in a way in the background or nnder cover. 

Mr. RowE. To show you the meaning that I am attaching to that 
word in this case, I merely want to reiterate what I just said as to 
the fact that I have no positive knowledge by which I could identify 
this man as a formal Comnumist affiliate. In other words, I can't 
prove one way or another whether he was ever an agent of the Russians. 
I think I am now using the word "agent" with the meaning that you 
have in mind. 

Senator Watkins. I do not know whether you know what I have 
in mind. I am trying to find out what you mean. I am trying to 
find out what you have in mind. 

Mr. Howe. When I said he was an agent of Stalinism, I am talking 
about ideologies and ideas and that he is promoting these ideas and 
ideologies. 

Senator Watkins. That is what you had in mind when you described 
him as a fellow traveler rather than a Communist? 

Mr. RowE. That is correct. 

Senator Watkins. All right ; you may proceed now. 

Mr. Morris. What do you mean by Stalinism ? 

Mr. RowE. That is the next thing I was coming to, and what I am 
talking about here is the Stalinist version or historical development 
of Marxism. Let us go back again to this statement I just made. 
As far as far eastern specialists are concerned — that is tiie area in 
which he operated — I don't mean to indicate at all that what you 
have here is a general operator in the Communist ideological field, 
but he is a specialized operator within the field of far eastern studies, 
Asiatic studies, and particularly of Chinese studies, and in this field 
I consider him principal agent for the advocacy of Stalinist ideas. 
Does that clarify my position on that ? 

Senator Watkins. Are you tying that down to the Chinese Com- 
munists ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes; that would be it, but it is not limited to the Chinese 
Communists. It would also involve, for instance, Japanese affairs. 

Mr. Morris. Through the years have you expressed yourself to 
various people on policy being pursued by the United States in the 
Far East? 

Mr. RowE. I have a considerable list of publications on this matter. 

Mr. Morris. I mean, you have expressed yourself on these? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes ; very much so. 

Mr. Morris. Will you develop that for us? 

Mr. RowE. I could make available a copy of my bibliography to 
you in which my articles have been published in which this point of 
view has been promulgated, my point of view on far eastern affairs. 
Over the years, of course, I have as a teacher, for example, promoted 
my point of view and y^ushed my own point of view on far eastern 
affairs. Long before the Pacific war ever began I insisted that you 
will never get a rapprochement of any kind between the Chinese 
Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. I am sure I could docu- 
ment that with the testimony of my colleajiues in this field. 

In 1047 in a public ad(^lrpss given at the University of Michigan at 
Ann Arbor I came out flatly for an American military intervention 
in the Far East subsequent to the collapse of General Marshall's 
efforts to bring the Communists and the Nationalists together. I 



3986 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

based this on the idea that we have tried this, I never thought it v^ould 
succeed, but as long as it has now failed we must now pick somebody 
to back ; since it seems impossible to pick the Chinese Communists to 
back we have to pick the Nationalists to back ; nobody is going to ad- 
vocate backing the Chinese Communists militarily in eastern Asia; 
we must back the Chinese Nationalists. And to this end I advocated — 
and this was an article published later in the January issue in the 
Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science — 
military intervention on the mainland of Asia in order to prevent the 
Chinese Communists from coming down out of Manchuria and in 
order to regain eventually Manchuria back from Chinese Communist 
control. I said that if we don't do this the Communists will win. I 
prophesied that they would be between a year and 6 months in causing 
the collapse of the Chinese Nationalists. This prophecy was, I think, 
clearly borne out by the developments and the facts of history. I fore- 
saw that that would happen. Without it of course nobody would ac- 
cept this point of view either inside of outside of the Government. I 
couldn't get any place with the people in the State Department on this. 

Senator Watkins. Did you trj'^ ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes ; copies of these articles were sent by me to State 
Department people, for example. 

Senator Watkins. Did you ever appear in person before any of 
them, the Secretary of State or others ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes. I never appeared in person before a Secretary 
of State. I have had a conversation with Mr. Acheson, but it was 
before he became Secretary of State. I pushed these lines of policy 
with people like George Kennan, who is the head of the Policy Plan- 
ning Staff, with John Davies in an earlier appearance before the 
Policy Planning Staff, the precise date of which I can't remember now, 
but could easily get out of my files. This was well before the emer- 
gency developed as it developed in 1948 and 1949, but I got nowhere 
with any of this. 

Mr. NoRRis. Did you have any dealings with John Carter Vincent? 

Mr. RowE. Of course I worked in the Embassy with Vincent in 
Chungking in 1941 and 1942 during the time I was there. I have 
never had any dealings with him of this kind since I left Chungking. 
I talked once in a while on policy matters with him there. 

Senator Watkins. "What was the reaction of the members of the De- 
partment of State when you presented these views ? 

Mr. RowE. I would like to present as a very interesting case in 
point the reaction I got out of Mr. Kennan early in 1949. At this 
point the Chinese Communists had not yet taken all of China. There 
was a great territory still available. I came back from a 6i/^ months' 
trip to the Far East during the summer and fall of 1948 convinced 
more than ever that something had to be done militarily by this coun- 
try to stem the Communist tide in eastern Asia. 

I merely point out parenthetically at this point that eventually we 
had to do it and we did it in Korea and we are still fumbling away 
with it, but this has always seemed to me to justify any advocacy of 
an earlier kind of military intervention in the Far East. However, 
when I presented this argument to Mr. Kennan I got two very in- 
teresting reactions from him. I couldn't make sense out of the reac- 
tion, but for better or for worse here it was : 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3987 

First, he said, "China doesn't matter very much. It's not very im- 
portant. It's never going to be powerful." I attributed this kind of 
mistaken view to his complete history of involvement in European 
politics. He approached the Russian problem from the point of view 
of Europe. 

Mr. Kennan said once in my hearing some years before this time 
that the struggle between ourselves and the Soviet Union will be 
resolved somewhere on a line drawn between Stettin on the north and 
Trieste on the south. I considered this an extremely limited view and 
I questioned him at the time about where the Far East came in the 
settlement of our problem with the Soviet Union, but never got any 
satisfactory answ^er out of him. That was the first reaction : China 
is not very important, doesn't count. 

The second reaction he gave me was in response to my response to 
this first one. Wlien he gave me this I said, "China as a thing in itself, 
n.o, but China tied to the Soviet Union is an entirely different busi- 
ness. The Soviet Union and China are natural complements and 
supplements to each other, and you are going to find when the Chinese 
Communists get control the Russians are going to help them. They 
are going to build them up and make them dangerous and difficult." 

At this point Mr. Kennan reacted this way. He said to me, "Wlien 
the Chinese Communists get control over 450 million people," — I be- 
gan to pick up my ears at this, because he seemed to be making some 
implications in the field of power at this time — "the Russians will 
never be able to control them." 

Now, if China is so weak that it doesn't count, this means that the 
Russians will be able to control. If China becomes sufficiently strong 
and gets control of 450 million people, strong enough to control the 
Russians, keep the Russians from controlling them, then you have to 
worry about China. 

I say that you get yourself into a complete logical impasse at this 
point, and I said that if any of my students ever presented me with 
anything that was so completely illogical as this I probably would 
flunk him, but I couldn't flunk Mr. Kennan. That's the kind of 
response I got. I got this with amazing regularity and amazing perti- 
nacity when I approached State Department people. There was a" 
perfect piece of nonsense. These were the top brains of the Depart- 
ment of State. These are the people that are supposed to sit in rooms 
by themselves and think about policies on the highest possible level. 

Senator Watkins. I would say that you had company in that I re- 
call very distinctly others taking that same point of view. In fact, 
without knowing very much about China I took the same point of 
^dew in my first speech in 1947, that we had to reverse our policy in 
China and make good on our guaranty for the independence of Korea« 
and that we should take a very vigorous, affirmative stand, and I know 
others were taking that same position. 

Mr. RowE. I had not been aware of that. Senator. 

Senator Watkins. Well, I am just a Senator from the sticks and 
you probably would not hear anything about it. 

Mr. RowE. It is my fault for not knowing what you said. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, we have, I would estimate very roughly, from 
the questions prepared here, about an hour and a half or 2 hours more 
of testimony. Would you want to take a recess now, or would you 
want to ffo on some more ? 



3988 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. I think it would be a good idea to take the recess 
now and come back into session later. 

]\Ir. Morris. When will you set the time? 

Senator Watkins. We will make it 2 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at 12 :15 p. m., Thursday, March 27, 1952, a recess was 
taken, to reconvene at 2 p. m. the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Senator Watkins. The committee will be in order. Proceed, Mr. 
Morris. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID N. ROWE— Resumed 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, in going back over the material that 
we covered this morning, you were present at the Atlantic City interim 
conference, were you not? 

Mr. Ro^vE. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Were you present at the Hot Springs conference ? 

Mr. RoA\^. No, 

Mr. Morris. Was Jessup at the Atlantic City conference? 

Mr. RoAVE. Yes ; he was. 

Mr. Morris. Did he take an important part in that conference ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes; he was very important. As I said this morning — 
I believe I said it this morning — Mr. Field was the leader, the spokes- 
man, of the American delegation. Yes; I know I covered this. It 
was an interesting thing to me, the precise position that Mr. Jessup 
occupied in relation to myself, and it is sort of an amusing story. 

I was there representing the American council's committee on Re- 
search, research advisory committee, and in the committee meetings 
of the whole conference at which these subjects were discussed, com- 
mittee meetings organized by subject matter in which the representa- 
tives of the various national councils were included, I w'as of course 
a logical individual to represent the American council, but it seemed 
fairly clear to me that Mr. Jessup was asked to attend each one of 
those meetings, and in his extremely effective way acted as the spokes- 
man on the subject of American research interests. 

Now of course I had indicated my "untrustworthiness" as a member 
of the American delegation by refusing to follow the line laid down 
in the caucuses to the exclusion of my own point of view, and maybe 
this is the reason why they wanted to be cautious; but it was a fact. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the difference in the line between 
that advocated by you and that proposed by the caucus? 

Mr. RowE. In general I was trying to take a most conciliatory atti- 
tude toward members of our other national councils like for instance 
I stated it this morning. I tried to be as friendly as I possibly could 
be toward the British. I found this extremely difficult because the 
British^ were extremely suspicious of any member of the American 
delegation. 

As a result, when Field would make the initial leading stntement, 
the other members of the American delegation would follow after and 
support what he said. I am afraid that there were times when I quite 
definitely hung back. I think I would characterize it that way ; that 
was the essence probably of the difference. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3989 

Senator Ferguson. Dr. Rowe, had you any opinion on whether or 
not Field was or was not a Communist? 

Mr. Rowe. Well, at the Atlantic City conference I remember one 
incident. We were discussing informally matters relating to the Far 
East, and I cited as an authority on Chinese agriculture Prof. John 
Lossing Buck, of Nanking, probably one of the greatest authorities 
on Chinese agriculture, i was, I am afraid, rather startled by the 
reaction Field took toward some of the statements put out in Buck's 
book about the relation betw^een Cliinese agriculture and Chinese 
society. 

It seemed fairly clear that Field challenged Buck's authority and 
in the course of doing so followed the Communist line on this matter. 

Senator i erguson. When was that ? 

Mr. lioAVE. That was in the early part of 1945, during the winter of 
1944-45. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you known him prior to that time? 

Mr. RowE. Jield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Row^E. No; I wouldn't say I had known him. I am sure I had 
met him before, but this was the first time I had ever worked in an 
organization with him. 

Mr. jMorris. But at that time in 1945 he did have a leading part in 
the American council ? 

Mr. Rowe. Very much so. As I said this morning, he was indicated 
by Carter to be the spokesman of the American delegation. I want 
to point out this fact, that no appointment, no other appointment than 
Field, could possibly have reinforced as this appointment did the 
suspicions of the British that the Americans were still going to be 
intransigent because Field was known to be a critic of the British on 
such points as colonialism. 

Senator Watkins. Was Jessup on the committee ? 

Mr. Rowa^. He was a member of the delegation. 

Senator Watkins. He did not act as spokesman ? 

Mr. Rowe. No. 

Senator Watkins. "Wlien was that that you mentioned ? 

Mr. RoA\TE. That was on the subject, committee meetings at the con- 
ference. You would have a meeting discussing one of the particular 
subject matters of the conference, and in this case it was research 
plans. I went into this committee, being the American on the dele- 
gation who had been in the research advisory committee of the Ameri- 
can IPR. They sent Jessup along, and Jessup did most of the talking- 
Senator Watkins. That was still in another group ? 

Mr. Rowe. This was in a subgroup of the Atlantic City conference- 
Mr. ISIorris. Was Bill Johnstone at that conference? 

Mr. RowE. Yes; he was there. 

Mr. Morris. Was he in the State Department at that time ? 

IMr. RowTE. I think he was still a dean at George Washington. 

Mr. Morris. He is now in the State Department, is he not? 

Mr. Rowe. Yes; he is connected with the business of the interna- 
tional exchange of persons. He supervises it if and when it happens 
and comes, the Japanese equivalent of the Fulbright business for 
Japan, exchange of students and professors both ways. 

Mr. Morris. Was Carter himself at the delegation? 



3990 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. Carter was there, and Mrs. Carter was there also. I 
remember Mrs. Carter givino; voice to a very interesting expression 
one morning at breakfast., as I remember it, when she said in a rather 
positive way that the only good Chinese were the northern Chinese. 
I suppose this doesn't mean anything very much to any of you, but 
it is a fact that at that time instead of using the term Communist 
Chinese, people used this phrase, northern Chinese, or the Chinese 
of the north. 

You have to get onto the lingo before you can even understand 
what is going on around you. 

Senator Watkins. They meant the Communists ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes ; the only good Chinese were the Communists. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that you indicate now 
it is not an easy thing at times to catch the plain intent of a person 
who wants to give the Communist line ? 

Mr. RowE. You couldn't have said a truer thing. If you have 
been in the middle of the business, you have to study it constantly to 
know what the words and phrases are, the way in which they are used 
at the moment in order to know what people are talking about. That 
is why it is so easy for an uninitiated person or group to be hood- 
winked. 

Senator Ferguson. And to adopt it as being fact ? 

Mr. Rowe. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Whereas as a matter of fact it is not fact but 
Communist propaganda and party line ? 

Mr. Rowe. That is right, it is perfectly possible. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to take you back to the subject that 
we were discussing just before we recessed. You spoke about appear- 
ing before people at the State Department, various ones, and talking 
to them about your views that we ought to get in and support the 
Nationalists and all that sort of thing ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. You mentioned Mr. Kennan. Did you finish 
what you had to say about your interview with Mr. Kennan? 

Mr. Rowe. There is one more thing I would like to bring out about 
that, and I found it extremely interesting. I called for a sophisticated, 
important, and formidable program of political warfare involving 
propaganda, persuasion, even involving what we may term in nice 
language the judicious use of money. A lot can be done with it in the 
Asiatic framework. 

Senator Watkins. Silver bullets ? 

Mr Rowe. Silver bullets. 

"\^nien I put this up to Mr. Kennan, and I put this up as part of my 
presentation, I wouldn't want to leave anybody with the impression 
that I am a person who would rely wholly on military activity. When 
you put this up, Kennan said : "That is impossible. We can't do that 
kind of thing; we don't have people with the kind of know-how to 
conduct sophisticated political warfare." 

I thought this was one of the most f utilitarian, I repeat, futilitarian 
statements I ever heard from a Government official. 

Senator Watkins. Would you know any time in our history in the 
war when we did use so-called silver bullets to win our way? 

Mr. Rowe. I would put it this way : I had always thought that the 
way to justify the use of substantial funds, substantial arms, and 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3991 

things of that kind is on this kind of level instead of as we tried during 
the Pacific war to use them in order to help us fight the war, period. 
You see what I mean? In other words, that aid to the Chinese Na- 
tional Government should have been considered primarily as political 
aid and for its political impact and not in the expectation that you are 
going to get a heavy, strong, important addition to your fighting forces. 

I said this from the start. I think that is the framework in which 
you always had to approach those people. 

Senator Watkins. As a matter of fact, we had been using a lot of 
money in Asia, had we not, with the Chinese ? 

Mr. RowE. You mean at what period, before the war began, before 
Pearl Harbor, for example? 

Senator Watkins. After Pearl Harbor? 

Mr, RowE. Oh, yes ; we used money in the shape of United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation work, famine relief, and all that sort of 
thing. There was a great deal of it used that way. 

Senator Watkins. We used direct help to the Chinese, had we not? 
We had given them cash ? 

Mr. RowE. We made, early in 1942, a $500,000,000 cash grant to the 
Chinese National Government. 

Senator Watkins. Are you acquainted with what went on between 
our representatives and the Communists during the time of the war 
when the Communists were also supposed to be fighting the Japanese ? 
Did we not help them then ? Did we not help the Communists as well 
as the Nationalists to fight the Japanese ? 

Mr. RowE. I didn't think we had in the form of arms, but in the 
shape of medical supplies. 

Senator Watkins. Things that money could buy ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to have you tell us any other people 
that you approached in the State Department because that is a very 
interesting thing if this was called to their attention by a man who was 
qualified ; it is veiy important to know. 

Mr. RowE. There are two other illustrations that I would cite. I 
would point out one feature : that there has not been much of this in 
the last few years. 

Senator Watkins. What? 

Mr. RowE. My getting into the State Department. I have been on 
the wrong side of the fence, so to speak. 

Senator Watkins. You are going the other way, the reverse of what 
they were doing ? 

Mr. RowE. There is one thing people don't like, and that is to be 
reminded of advice thev should have taken before. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that your remark means that 
the State Department seeks advice that is in compliance with what they 
desire to do rather than to get advice to aid them in the formulation 
of a proper foreign policy ? 

Mr. RoAVE. I am glad you, brought it out. You people have prob- 
ably had brought out to you that a lot of attention was paid to the 
meeting at the State Department called in October 1949. 

Senator Watkins. Mr. Stassen and others were there ? 

Mr. RoAVE. Yes. Now it is a very interesting fact that, as far as the 
Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned and the people in its office — 
people that operate it — only those people from the IPR were invited 



3992 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

to this conference with wliom I would violently, for instance, disagree. 

My colleas^ue at Yale, Bernard Brodie, for whom I have great re- 
spect and admiration, was invited to go. Brodie came to me with a 
telegram which was sent to him over the signature of the Secretary of 
State and said, "What is this all about? Why are they inviting me 
to this conference and not yon?" 

I said, "Your guess is as good as mine, but I urge you to go, and I 
will help brief you and do everything I can to help you out." 

Brodie is an expert on the atomic bomb and American armaments 
and military technology and all this, but he hardly knows one Chinese 
from another. I helped brief him, and I think it was Mr. Stassen — 
was it? — that said Brodie was on the right side in the conference. 
I wasn't there. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Mr, Chairman, may I point out that during the testi- 
mony of Mr. Stassen he commented — Stassen commented — that he was 
surprised that Professor Rowe had not been invited in view of his 
experience in that particular field. 

Mr. EowE. Brodie went to Francis Russell, who, on behalf of the 
public-relations people in State, had organized this meeting, set it up, 
and asked Russell why I hadn't been included. Russell said that my 
name had been on two or three of the lists — preliminary lists — for the 
membership of the conference, but that when these lists went up to 
the far eastern desk that my name had been taken off in each case. 

Senator Ferguson. And you are an expert in the Far East? 

Mr. RowE. Senator, I don't personally like the word "expert," but 
I say I am a specialist on the Far East. I spent 20 years studying it. 
I have lived in China almost half of my life, and so unfortunate in 
this particular farmework as to write and say the wrong things. 

Senator Watkins. Wrong things from other people's point of view ? 

Mr. RowE. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean as far as the State Department is 
concerned ? 

Mr. Rowe. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it is your real belief now that you were 
left off because they did not desire your particular viewpoint? 

Mr. Rowe. Yes; and they had reason to know what that particular 
viewpoint was because early in 1949 I had a conference with Mr. 
Butterworth, and this is another one of the contacts. 

Senator Watkins. That is what I wanted. 

Mr. Ro-svE. Mr. Butterworth, accompanied by Mr. Sprouse, and the 
then executive officer of the Far Eastern Division, Mr. Weiofle — the 
three of them — I had a talk with them in Mr. Butterworth's office, and 
I laid out the general line of recommendation that I had been laying 
out for 2 or 8 years before, and I didn't get anywhere with Mr. Butter- 
worth on this. 

It was rather interesting what happened because Mr. Butterworth, 
if you will pardon the phrase I use, treated me to the best illustration 
I could possibly have wanted to find of what is known as a filibuster. 
We were in there about 2 hours, during the course of which he took 
occasion to deliver me a long lecture on the diffi'^ulties that General 
Marshall had had in the negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists. 

I interrupted him two or three times and told him I thought I 
knew that story pretty well, that he was giving me in fact detail 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3993 

that I had not known before, but that I wanted to interrupt and inter- 
ject my own statement. Then, about 10 minutes before I was due 
to go up for an appointment with the Under Secretary for Public 
Affairs, Mr. Butterworth turned to me and said, "Well," or words 
to this effect, "we thought you had something you wanted to say 
to us." 

I more or less opined that I had had, but that time was so short 
that I would leave on his desk a document which I had brought with 
me in anticipation that I might not be able to get my "two bits" 
in, as we say. I walked out with the document remaining on his 
desk. That is the kind of luck I had with Butterworth. It was the 
most complete brush-off anybody could have had. 

Senator Ferguson. When was that ? 

Mr. RowE. Early 1949, about January of 1949 just before Mr. 
Acheson became Secretary of State. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that it could be the reason that 
Butterworth had seen you and had your views that they did not 
invite you down to this other thing ? 

Mr. RowE. That was the only reason I could figure out. Brodie 
was not the only one that remarked about my absence at that confer- 
ence, because other members such as Quigley from ISIinnesota, Fair- 
bank from Harvard, both asked Brodie why I wasn't there. Brodie, 
of course, did not have any answer. 

Senator Watkins. Is that all you have about Mr. Butterworth? 

Mr. RowE. That is right. 

Senator Watkins. Could you go on with the next one? 

Mr. Rowe. Well, this is an earlier one, but it is also the policy- 
planning staff. I believe this happened about 1947 as well as I can 
remember it, 1946 or 1947. I could find the precise date in my files 
in New Haven, as I have all the correspondence. At this point the 
policy-planning staff decided that they would call in a series of 
Far East specialists to consult with them individually a day or so at 
a time on what to do about China. 

I don't know who all these people were, but I do know that Pro- 
fessor Wittfogel was one; I was another, and Professor Biggerstaff 
and Professor Fairbank were the others. I don't know who all else. 
I received a very courteous hearing, but I got nowhere in trying to 
convince Mr. John P. Davies, who was running the particular show 
at the time, that we ought to keep on supporting the Chinese Nation- 
alists. That was my line. 

His line was in general that these people are disorderly; this gov- 
ernment is disorganized; there is no stability in China, and the whole 
thing is going to break up. I said to him, as I remember it, "Well, 
when olcl Chiang Kai-shek wants to restore a bit of order by shooting 
a few people, you people get revolted by the idea, but in some cases 
there is nothing else you can do." 

This evoked a very, very negative response. I am afraid what is 
happening in Korea today shows that there are tim.es when that is 
just what you have to do; but, you see, this outrages the so-called 
liberal mentality. 

Senator Watkins. "Wliat were you urging at this conference? 

Mr. Ro'v^TE. I was urging the continued support of the Chinese Na- 
tional Government by all means. 



3994 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Senator Watkins. You spoke this morning of military aid. Did 
you mean, by that, that we send our own Army, Navy, and Air Force 
to China to back them up ? 

Mr. RowE. I never considered. Senator, that any large-scale in- 
volvement of this kind would have been required if the action had been 
taken at the appropriate time. If the action had been taken before 
the Nationalist collapse set in under Communist pressure, it could 
have been done with a very small representation of American per- 
sonnel. 

I want to give you another very interesting item on this. Wlien I 
was in China in 1948, on that 53/2-month trip I took through China, 
Japan, and southeast Asia, I had two private interviews with Maj. 
Gen. David Barr, who was the commanding general in charge of the 
American military advisory group in Nanking. Barr was telling 
me what I, of course, knew to be true ; namely, that the great problem 
in material aid to the Nationalists was the same problem as was faced 
by Stilwell and Wedemeyer and all the rest of them of seeing to it 
that the aid get efficiently distributed and used in an efficient manner. 
Of course, Wedemeyer went a long distance in the direction of solving 
this by distributing American military personnel down to the company 
level, a one- and two-man number in each case. 

I said to General Barr, "Would this sort of thing work at the 
present time?" 

Barr said to me, "if I had 10,000 American military personnel in 
China, I could see to it that every bit of aid we give to the Chinese 
National Government would be efficiently and honestly used." 

That was in September of 1948, mind you, just a few months before 
the Communist sweep down from Manchuria began. At that point 
he was convinced that that would work. He never got that kind of 
implementation. Of course, he never got the material either. The 
argument against distributing the material was based on that fact: 
That efficient use could not be guaranteed. 

Senator Watkins. You did not have in mind, as I understand it, 
that we send in a large force, either air force, ground troops, or 
naval forces? 

Mr. RowE. No; but the point is that, by refusing and failing to 
do it at the time w^hen it should have been done, we have now got 
ourselves in the position in the Far East where what you are saying is 
precisely what we had to do. The difference is that we are fightmg 
this war in Korea at very heavy cost with Americans. Wliat is it? 
Well over 100,000 casualties, and fighting it in what I consider to be 
a small corner of Asia where, if you win a victory all the way to the 
Yalu River, you haven't done anything world-shaking from the point 
of view of strategy. 

The fact is you do this after you have lost the main issue, which 
is China. I have never been able to make sense out of this sequence 
of events. 

Senator Watkins. In other words, we get into the fight in Korea 
when that is merely the tail of tlie dog? 

Mr. RoAVE. That is correct. Whereas, half of the military involve- 
ment that we have today, if it had been done 3 years earlier in 1947 
instead of today, would have had the effect of preserving China, cer- 
tainly China south of the Great Wall, which is bulk of China, from 
the Chinese Communists. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3995 

Senator Ferguson. Was it not apparent that when you divided 
Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel and put the Communists on 
the one side and the people we were supporting on the other side that 
you were going to have just what has now happened in Korea? How 
could you keep from having a war? 

Mr. RowE. You either would have a war between North Korea and 
South Korea or you would have what neither the North Koreans nor 
the South Koreans could accept — that is, a division of their country. 

Senator Fekguson. That was inevitable? 

Mr. Ro^vE. Precisely. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to know whether with respect to this 
conference with Mr. Davies you advanced your ideas about the kind 
of help we should give. 

Mr. Ro^\'T:. I don't think we ever got down to this kind of discussion 
of helping the Nationalists, because the whole topic of helping the 
Nationalists was so far out of his thinking, as I evaluated his thinking, 
that we never got to the question of how to do it. 

Senator Watkins. You never got down to what to do ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. As I remember, you said there were others there 
besides j-ou and Mr. Davies? 

Mr. RowE. Other State Department personnel ? 

Senator Watkins. Yes. 

Mr. Ro^vE. One of the individuals was — I know his name will come 
to me in a short while. He was a Ph. D. from Chicago University in 
Far East history and studied at Harvard for a couple of years and was 
born in China of missionary parents. It is absurd ; I will think of it 
before the afternoon is over. 

Mr. Morris. It was not Ludden; was it? 

Mr. RowE. No, no. This man has since joined the policy-planning 
staif of the State Department. I will get it for you before we are 
through. It is just one of those lapses of memory. 

Senator Watkins. Have you finished with your statement of what 
occurred between you and Mr. Butterworth ? 

Mr. Ro\^T5. I think that is all I need to say about that. 

Senator Watkins. Then the other gentleman was Mr. Davies ? 

Mr. RowE. That is right. 

Senator Watkins. What about the other? 

Mr. RowE. These were the three outstanding cases of this kind 
where it involves conversations within the State Department office in 
Washington. Of course, in my service abroad I have had reason to 
discuss these matters with people, but never on a basis of being asked 
as an outsider to come in with advice, advice given by someone special- 
izing in these problems as a civilian. 

Senator Watkins. Were you asked to make these contacts ? Were 
you asked to come in and give them your advice ? 

Mr. RowE. I was asked to come in, in the case of the policy-planning 
staff, under Davies. In the case of ButterAvorth, this contact was on 
my general initiative and was arranged from the outside. The same 
was true in the case of Kennan. I had met Kennan before, and I told 
him I would like to come in and talk to him. 

Senator Watkins. Did you get any satisfaction whatsoever with 
Mr. Kennan with respect to your suggestions about the Far East and 
China? 



3996 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. No; my general impression was that he completely 
refused to accept any general approach to the Chinese problem in the 
Far East. 

Senator Watkins. Just what was your approach in some detail ? 

Mr. RowE. My approach was that you have to do what is necessary 
to keep all of China out of control of the Chinese Communists. If 
you don't, then you are going to be faced with a Russian-Chinese 
combination which, although it may take some time to develop the 
results of it, will confront you finally with a shift in the world balance 
of power that will be castastrophic to the interests of the free world. 
That was my general approach. 

As I said this morning, his response was a double one. First, he 
said China was not im.portant. Then he said, "China can't win with 
Russia because the Chinese will become too strong for the Russians to 
dominate." I talked with him at considerable length trying to clear 
up in his own mind the confusion that I thought existed there on this 
business of talking as though the Russians and the Chinese could have 
only one kind of relationship ; that is to say, one in which the Russians 
would dominate the Chinese. This is absolutely incorrect. It doesn't 
fit either the Russian psychology or the Chinese psychology. 

I outlined briefly to Kennan at that meeting the Chinese traditional 
ideology on the subject of international relationships. I teach this 
stuff to my students every year, and it is standard with me to indoc- 
trinate them and teach them this way, involving an entirely different 
feeling about relations than we westerners have. If you go back in 
Chinese history you find, for exam})le, that there have been long 
periods of time in which the only international relations the Chinese 
have had have been with satellite states around the Chinese border. 

There weren't any other nations with which the Chinese vvere in 
contact. Out of this centuries-long experience has come a system for 
the organization of relations between what we would call a dominant 
state, on the one hand, and a satellite, on the other, with this difference, 
namely, that the status of a satellite is an honorable status. 

Senator Watkins. They do not regard it as a subordination? 

Mr. RowE. No, indeed. You can't get anywhere a symbolism of 
that kind. The word "satellite" that we use has a denigrative meaning. 
When we use the word "satellite" it is with the implication that there 
is something wrong with him, but in the Chinese system, well, take 
their relations with Korea. The Koreans had an honorable relation- 
ship with the Chinese over centuries, and the same thing was true of 
Indochina. 

I want to point out to you the fundamental meaning this has in the 
situation where the Koreans and Chinese were both satisfied with the 
relationship under which, for example, the Chinese had a viceroy in 
the Korean capital. This viceroy had as his function seeing to it that 
from the point of international relations Korea was on the right side. 
This was accompanied by a total ideological taking over and a total 
subordination of their foreign policy. 

That is to say, they could not make any independent foreign policy, 
and with a total state of internal self-government. This is an honor- 
able estate. 

Now, let's switch the thing around, and let's point out that if the 
Chinese know how to do that with satellites, they expect it when they 
are satellites. This is the normal thinking about Chinese pattern 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3997 

of their relationship with the Russians. It is: We don't care 
whether the western world thinks Russia is dominating us. That, 
word doesn't express it at all. This is a workable, happy, satisfactory 
marriage for mutual adjustment, mutual interest; that is all it is. 

Senator Watkins. In other words, they would not feel that they 
were the inferior people simply because they were regarded as a 
satellite ? 

Mr. RowE. Let us put it this way : The Chinese in their relationship 
of ideological subordination to the Russians feel privileged, they feel 
privileged. They do not feel that the fact that they swallow a foreign 
ideology puts them in some kind of bad light. They have the inesti- 
mable privilege of becoming disciples of Marx. 

Senator Watkins. How do you reconcile that with the Chinese 
family system ? 

]Mr. RowE. I reconcile it with the whole Confucian system. The 
essential feature of the Confucian system is their belief in authoritar- 
ianism. Here is where you have to study the tradition in order to 
understand what the Chinese Communists are doing. They are im- 
posing a foreign ideology on the masses of the people who are accus- 
tomed to subordination, only they don't call it subordination, it is an 
honorable relationship of father to son. 

That is the basis of the Confucian relationship of father and son. 
It takes a lot of explaining. 

Senator Watkins. For the first lesson in Chinese background I 
think you have done very well. If the students have done as well as 
you have, then they will be all right. 

Mr. RowE. Thank you. 

Senator Watkins. What other members of the State Department 
did you have contacts with in trying to get your views over to them ? 

Mr. RowE. Well, I had this contact I mentioned with the Under 
Secretary for Public Affairs in early 1949 who later became I believe 
the Ambassador to — he had been in the Middle East as a State Depart- 
ment official and was at this time Under Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs, which meant that he runs 

Senator Ferguson. Allen? 

Mr. RowE. Allen, that is the fellow. He runs the Voice of America,, 
United States Information Service, and that is what he was doing at 
that time. With him I came back having had this 8-week contract 
with the consulate general in Shanghai in the summer of 1948, being 
asked, as I said this morning, to make a survey of their public infor- 
mation service in China. 

Senator Watkins. This is for the Chinese Government? 

Mr. RowE. No; for the American consulate general in Shanghai, 
United States Information Service. I reported to him on some of the, 
what I considered to be, obvious defects in our Foreign Service in 
China having primarily to do with the personnel problem, insisting 
that you have to have a team, at least a team comprised of specialists 
on China who know the Chinese language, people who understand 
policy from the official State Department point of view, and then pure 
technicians — that is, radio technicians, publishing technicians, and 
people of that kind — and particularly <;o break down in China a mo- 
nopoly in the acquisition of Chinese language as a skill, which mo- 
nopoly was held in the hands of the so-called political officers who were 
trained as so-called Chinese language officers. You see, the trouble 



3998 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

was that the United States Information Service could never get the 
necessary members of a team of this kind, although they wanted it 
because first they weren't allowed to draw at that time upon the body 
of trained Chinese language officers. 

These people were preserved for the reporting function, the political 
function in the State Department. Second, they weren't allowed to 
train their own people. This was one of the defects I put up that had 
to do with State Department training policy. I didn't get anywhere 
much with Mr. Allen on that ; as a matter of fact, as to the recom- 
mendations I put so much work into, I never saw that they had the 
slightest effect. 

I wasn't too surprised because some of the things that I was asked 
to look at and report on and try to do in Shanghai in 1948 in the sum- 
mer were the same things I had looked at, reported on, and tried to 
do in Chungking in 1941 and 1942, and the situation hadn't changed 
a bit. 

Mr. Morris. Did you confer with Mr. Barnett when he was in the 
State Department? 

Mr. RowE. Never on this sort of thing. I don't think I have ever had 
a contact of this kind with Mr. Barnett. 

Senator Watkins. What was Mr. Allen's position in the State 
Department ? 

Mr. RowE. At that time ? 

Senator Watkins. Yes. 

Mr. RowE. He was, I believe. Director of Public Affairs, that is, 
Under Secretary for Public Affairs. 

Senator Watkins. As I understand it, that long tour that you had in 
China was under the auspices of the State Department ? 

Mr. Ro\VE. The trip in the Far East, 51/0 months in the summer of 
1948, was financed jointly by the Yale University Department of Area 
Studies, by the Yale Institute of International Studies, and by a 
grant to me by the Rockefeller Foundation. 

Senator Watkins. Did you at any time represent anyone besides 
yourself when you went into the State Department and tried to talk 
with these men about this program that you thought ought to be 
adopted ? 

Mr. RowE. I represented the Yale Institute of International Studies; 
yes. As a matter of fact, the paper that I left on Mr. Butterworth's 
desk that afternoon was a paper on which I had the advantage of 
consulting all of my colleagues in the Yale Institute of International 
Studies, and it represented our joint agreement on what ought to be 
done. 

Senator Watkins. Do you have a copy? 

Mr. RowE. I have a copy in New Haven. 

Senator Watkins. I think it would be well if you could submit a 
copy to this committee. 

Mr, RowE. I will be glad to supply you with a copy. I am positive 
that I can locate it. 

Senator Watkins. Wlien was it offered to the State Department? 

Mr. RowE. It was offered in January 1949. 

Senator Watkins. "^Vhile we are on this subject, do you have any 
views now as to what ought to be done under the current circumstances 
that you could express here? This committee here would want to do 
some constructive work along the line of our internal security and I 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 3999 

presume anything that will preserve us from without as well as from 
within is of great interest to us. 

Mr. RowE. I think I would remove my focus of recommendation 
either directly from China or directly from Korea and point to the 
situation in Indochina as the most immediately dangerous one today. 

Senator Ferguson. Even more than Korea ? 

INIr. RowE. We have, of course, a stalemate which is very unsatis- 
factory; we are not getting anywhere with a settlement. We have 
forces there that can stop anything that the Communists can throw 
at us. 

Senator Ferguson. When is the last that you had any real infor- 
mation on that point ? 

Mr. RowE. If you mean by real information anything outside the 
public print, it has been a good long time. But I think in Indochina 
we don't have anywhere near as satisfactory a situation, if you call it 
that, as we have in Korea. I think Indochina bids fair to present us 
shortly with a very difficult decision, and the trouble with it is that if 
we make an arrangement in Korea by which we stabilize the situation 
there, the Chinese Communists may very well throw their entire force 
or a very, very large segment of their force into the war in Indochina. 

Senator Watkins. Would they trust us — that we will not attack 
if they did that ? 

ISIr. RowE. It is possible. They know we are more trustworthy in 
a situation like that than they are. They are sure of it. 

Senator Watkins. At least they know their own views, and we have 
gone along pretty well on our agreements. 

Mr. RowE. I think in Indochina if they do anything more than they 
are doing now, which involves several thousand technicians and per- 
sonnel that they have in there, if they send in massive forces the French 
will be driven out and Hanoi taken. 

Senator Watkins. Have you ever been in that territory ? 

Mr. RowE. I have never been there. If I were in a position to push 
buttons and get results pushing buttons, and this means that I am 
now talking entirely in unrealistic terms because I haven't any idea 
that I could do anything, I would recommend precisely this: The 
United States issues a positive and open statement that if the Chinese 
intervene that way, in Indochina, there will be a counterbalancing 
American intervention with whatever it takes. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you send ground troops in ? 

Mr. Ro^vE. If necessary. 

Senator Ferguson. You think it is important enough, Indochina, 
to send Ameircan ground troops in ? 

Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you think it was important enough to send 
them into Korea ? 

Mr. Rowe. Absolutely. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you advocate then a stalemate where 
we are at the thirty-eighth parallel as we now propose? 

Mr. Rowe. Well, what I would advocate is that you make every 
effort that you can to get more than a stalemate — that is, a settle- 
ment, which means something that will result in the withdrawal of 
the Chinese Communists out of North Korea or withdrawal out of the 

88348—52 — pt. 11 19 



4000 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

present defense line, combined with the policy of providing a South 
Korean defense force strong enough to hold that business. 

Senator Ferguson. You think that can be done ? 

Mr. BowE. It can be done, I believe. 

Senator Ferguson. How long ? 

Mr. RowE. How long would it take ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; to have the South Koreans able to main- 
tain that line ? 

Mr. Rowe. That might take a year's time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think that Russia would supply the 
North Koreans? 

Mr. RowE. Yes ; they are supply them now. 

Senator Ferguson. In the future, though ? 

Mr. RowE. They would continue to. That is the only place the 
North Koreans can get anything. They have no facilities to make 
anything for themselves. 

Senator Ferguson. And the South Koreans would have to get it 
from us? 

Mr. Rowe. That is right. The manpower is what they can supply, 
nothing else. 

Senator Ferguson. Then suppose that your idea is right, that we say 
they are not allowed to go down into Indochina ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. But they do go down in there after we make this 
settlement ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And they feel our pressure down there. What 
is to stop them from putting another army in Korea ? 

Mr. RowE. Nothing can stop them from breaking a truce any time, 
no matter what you do any place. 

Senator Watkins. Is that not history ? 

Mr. RowE. That is true. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you not anticipate that that is what 
would happen? 

Mr. RowE. It is very possible. I don't have any feeling of confi- 
dence about any agreement we can make with the Communists, in- 
cluding the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. 

Senator Watkins. Then it would be unsafe to trust them? 

Mr. RowE. It would be unsafe to lower your guard; If what you 
are talking about is lowering your guard and decreasing your military 
commitments, then I say it would be completely unsound, quite as 
unsound as was the previous withdrawal prior to the attack from the 
north under the conditions of a South Korean Army armed only with 
so-called defensive weapons. That was the most fantastic decision I 
ever heard of. 

Senator Watkins. Are you acquainted with any of the Communist 
Chinese leaders? 

Mr. RoAVE. I never met them. 

Senator Watkins. You were over there for quite a while with the 
Information Service? 

Mr. Rowe. No; I was only attached to the Information Service 
during that 8-week period in the summer of 1949 in Shanghai. 

Senator Watkins. Did you have any service with the United States 
Intelligence Service? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4001 

Mr. RowE. At present I am a lieutenant colonel in the Army Intelli- 
gence Reserve. My last tour of duty was 6 weeks in the Pentagon 
shortly after the opening of the Korean war. 

Mr. MoRKis. Professor Rowe, were you in the United States Em- 
bassy in China in 1941-42? ' 

Mr. RowE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. What position ? 

Mr. Row^E. I was listed as special assistant to the Ambassador. 

Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent there? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What was his position ? 

Mr. RowE. Counselor of the Embassy. 

Mr. Morris. Was John Stewart Service there? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did Owen Lattimore come to China at that time? 

Mr. RowE. He was there when I arrived there. I arrived in Chung- 
king about 10 days before Pearl Harbor. One of the first acts I per- 
formed in an official capacity was to call on Lattimore as a member 
of the American group. 

Mr. Morris. Were you in a position to observe that Lattimore snn] 
Vincent were closely associated ? 

Mr. RowE. My opinion was, and this was observed only during the 
period of November to early February when Lattimore left to come 
back to this country, that Vincent and Lattimore were very friendly 
indeed, extending to the business of mutual exchange of information, 
and they were both, for instance, interested in the Chinese industrial 
cooperatives. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what they were. Professor ? 

Mr. RowE. The Chinese industrial cooperatives were an effort on 
the part of the Chinese and westerners to organize small-scale pro- 
duction and distribution behind the Japanese lines in free China in 
order to maximize the economic power of the Chinese to resist in free 
China. 

Now one of the features of the Chinese economy is the fact that 
many of the industries were small-scale industries based on handi- 
craft located in the villages, making use of surplus time of the farmer, 
for instance in the winter, making use of work and time of the farm- 
er's wife and so on. 

The Chinese industrial cooperatives tried to provide better tech- 
niques and better tools for this small industry, one of the features 
being that as the Japanese advanced territorially into China, these 
could be picked up and carried away. 

Senator Watkins. You did not mean a moment ago that they were 
actually behind the Japanese lines? 

Mr. RowE. Some of them remained behind the Japanese lines. 1 
mean behind the lines in the free China area beyond the Japanese 
zone. 

Senator Watkins. You are differentiating there from occupied 
China? 

Mr. RowE. That is right, occupied China. 

Now this Chinese Industrial Cooperatives was significant from a 
political point of view. You have to remember that the great task 
of the Chinese National Government was to preserve what little social 



4002 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

and political unity there was in China and to prevent this unity from 
being subverted by people in all kinds of organizations. 

As they say about the Chinese, any time you get three of them to- 
gether, you have an organization. They fvre very organization-minded, 
they come to that very naturally through a long history of social 
organizations typified by their guilds and associations, insiirance sys- 
tems and things of that kind. 

In Chinese history these organizations have often played vital parts 
in Chinese politics. It is in these organizations that revolutionary 
tendencies accompanying the fall of dynasties can be located and 
centered and covered up by these organizations. As a result, the Na- 
tional Government had an iron-bound law for the regulation, regis- 
tration of organizations of this kind. You see, they were faced with 
the fact that in a country like this, tied together as loosely as it was, 
organizations of this kind could be very easily used as centers of dis- 
turbance and political dissidence. They were afraid of these Chinese 
industrial cooperatives and they had some reason to suspect some of 
the people that were interested because if you take, for instance. Dr. 
Chen Han-seng, who has been mentioned in these hearings and in the 
testimony I had read as at least being a Chinese Communist sympa- 
thizer, he was strongly interested in the Chinese industrial cooperative 
movement. 

I talked to these people very often and found that they were 
interested in more than the production of products. They were 
interested in using the organizations for political purposes. 

Senator Watkins. AVlien you said "these people" ? 

Mr. RowE. The Chinese industrial cooperatives. 

Senator Watkins. Wlien you said "these people"? 

Mr. RowE. I am talking of the Chinese industrial cooperatives. 

Mr. Morris. Who were they, Professor ? 

Mr. RowE. In Hong Kong, when I went there in 1941, Chen Han- 
seng was one of them. He was prominent in Hong Kong in support 
of the industrial cooperatives. His wife was there also at the time. 
In China the outstanding European in this business was a New Zea- 
lander by the name of Alley, A-1-l-e-y. 

Mr. Morris. His first name? 

Mr. RowE. R-e-w-e, who described himself to me as an old-line 
New Zealand Socialist. 

Mr. Morris. He is in Red China now, is he not ? 

Mr. RowE. He is in Red China and has enthusiastically welcomed 
the Chinese Communists taking over. 

Mr. Morris. Was Ida Pruitt there ? 

Mr. RowE. She was not in China at that time, but she was active 
in this country and active in what at that time was called Indusco, 
of which I later became a member of their board, which was the Amer- 
ican organization to support the Chinese industrial cooperatives. 

Mr. Morris. Was Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley there ? 

Mr. RowE. I believe she was also on the board. 

Mr. Morris. Was she active? 

Mr. RowE. I never had any contact with her. Other members who 
were involved, other people who were involved were Edgar Snow and 
his wife, Eleanor Lattimore, Miss Gerlach, Mrs. Fisher, wife of a 
bishop in the Methodist Church, and a whole string of other peo- 
ple. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4003 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, I show you our exhibit 559 and ask 
you if that is the letterhead of the organization you are now talk- 
ing" about ? 

Mr. Rowe. Yes, this is it, dated November 1950, but this is a com- 
paratively recent letterhead, and you will find that names of the board 
of directors change, of course, through time. This is not the board 
of directors as it was when I was a member of it. 

Senator Watkins. Had there been any Communist infiltration 
into these cooperatives? 

Mr. Rowe. I can't certify as to that as far as inside of China, but 
I do think, and this is why I resigned from Indusco, and I have avail- 
able a copy of my letter of resignation from the Indusco board, that 
Indusco was very, very heavily taken over by people who were in 
favor of the Chinese Communists — very strongly so. ' These were 
the people who acquainted me with a lot of this terminology like 
"Chinese of the north," and so on. They were always scheming as to 
how they could get their help given to the Chinese of the north. 
They sent it through Shanghai after the war and all that, but one 
of their principal objectives was to get it to the people of the north. 

Senator Watkins. When you say "the}^," who are you talking 
about ? 

Mr. Rowe. The general group on the board at that time — Miss 
Pruitt, Dr. Chen Han-seng, and so forth, the whole group. 

Senator Watkins. They seemed to show more concern over the 
people in the north than south and central China? 

Mr. Rowe. Sir, I used that term, the "people of the north," and 
defined it in the terminology of these people as meaning the Chinese 
Communists. That is what they used the term to cover. 

Senator Watkins. What help were they in a position to give? 

Mr. Ro^vE. Very important technical help involving, for instance, 
machinery, tools, and equipment like that that was hard to buy, 
medical aid, technical advice, they sent o.ver technicians who knew 
something about small scale production to help improve the methods 
of production in the Chinese villages, and this was one reason why I 
was attracted to the thing in the first place, because it did strike at 
the roots of the Chinese production problem in the villages, at the 
roots of the village economy, but I got out of the organization be- 
cause I saw the extent to which these people were interested in pro- 
moting the welfare of the Chinese Communists. 

Senator Watkins. Were they also interested in promoting the in- 
terests of the others? 

Mr. Rowe. As little as they could get away with. 

Senator Watkins. Were there any arguments on the board? 

]\Ir. Rowe. Never anv arguments. 

Senator Watkins. You were on the board. Did you agree with 
them ? 

Mr. Ro"\\'E. I didn't agree with them, but you can't get an argu- 
ment with one man. You can kick up a fuss. 

Mr, Morris. You mean these people controlled the policy of 
Indusco ? 

Mr. Rowe. That is right. 

Senator Watkins. I wondered if it was a subject of discussion ? 

Mr. RoA\T3. Not very much discussion on that. They were also 
interested in evadins; the controls over their activities that the Chinese 



4004 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Government tried to exert through their control of all kinds of or- 
ganizations of this type, as I mentioned before. 

Senator Watkins. That would be substantially along the Com- 
munist way of thinking, too, at that time, would it not ? 

Mr. Eo^^^:. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. In other words, the Communists of the north, 
they were not actually physically under the control of the Nationalist 
Government at that time ? 

Mr. KowE. That is right. 

Senator Watkins. They had their own type of government set-up 
there ? 

Mr. Kg WE. That is correct. 

Senator Watkins. How would you evaluate the effect of these co- 
operatives upon the Chinese political thinking? 

Mr. RowE. Well, I don't think that the effect that these people 
would have liked to have had ever was had. After all, the use of 
cooperatives as a method of organizing anti-Government, anti-Chinese 
Government, activity was a very small element in what eventually 
led to the downfall of the Nationalist Government, which was engi- 
neered by the top Chinese Communist command with Russia helping 
finally on a military basis. It was a large-scale take-over in Man- 
churia with the Russians equipping the Communist Chinese with the 
Japanese arms collected but tipping the balance of power against 
Chiang early in 1948. 

You see, early, in 1945 Chiang won almost every battle he ever 
engaged in with the Communists. This is often lost sight of when 
we talk about the corruption and inefficiency of the National Govern- 
ment. He won as long as he had an even break in armaments. As 
soon as the Japanese armaments got distributed by the Russians, and 
as soon as the Communists got well organized in Manchuria, they then 
began to use against him positional warfare, using artillery combined 
with their normal method of attack, which was a very sophisticated 
use of combined economic warfare and guerrilla warfare. 

The business of shutting the Government up in the cities, cutting 
rails, starving the economy, inducing inflation, inducing bureaucracy, 
all that helped to make the Nationalist resistance a hollow shell long 
before they pushed in and began to win full pitched battles which 
they had not done before that time. That is something people forget. 

Senator Watkins. Were you there while General Marshall was 
there? 

Mr. RowE. No. 

Senator Wations. Were you there any part of the time he was 
there? 

Mr. RowE. No; I was in this country. I will say that I predicted 
flatly tliat Marshall would never be able to get the Communists and 
the Nationalists together. The fact that it worked out that way waJ5 
too bad, but that is the way it was. 

Mr. Morris. Getting back to John Carter Vincent, did you write 
the book, China Among the Powers ? 

Mr. RoAVE. Yes ; that was written by me and published by Harcourt, 
Brace under the auspices of the Yale Institute of International 
Studies. 

Mr. Morris. Did John Carter Vincent ever express criticism of 
your book? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4005 

Mr. EowE. As a matter of fact, the book was sent to liim in page 
proof. I want to correct at this point a statement which he made in 
his testimony, that I had sent the book to him. I did not ; it was sent 
by the Institute of International Studies, and the indication which 
he seemed to leave in the testimony is that this book was published 
by the IPR, which it was not. 

Those two things are both wrong, and I think should be corrected. 

It was very interesting to me that Mr. Vincent, while he praised 
the book primarily, primarily he was in approval of it, criticized it 
at a point the significance of which I could only grasp later and as time 
went on. You may remember that Mr. Vincent accompanied Latti- 
more. Hazard, and Vice President Wallace on that long trip into China 
and Asiatic Russia, around the Chinese borders I think in July 1944. 

It is an interesting fact that the primarily adverse criticism that 
he made of my book had to do with my treatment of Chinese border 
problems, problems of Tibet, Sinkiang, and Manchuria in connection 
with which he mentioned the serious difficulties connected with post- 
war Chinese policy and particularly in regard to Manchuria ; made the 
significant observation that my statement that Manchuria is territori- 
ally a part of China does not cover the question; that Russian in- 
terests in Manchuria could not be so summarily disposed of in this 
manner. 

ISTow this doesn't become terribly important until we see the Yalta 
agreement under which precisely Russian interests in Manchuria were 
recognized, and the Chinese Government was required to recognize 
those interests and to allow the Russians to come back in and reestab- 
lish their pre-1905 position in Manchuria. 

At that point I read this letter and dug it up. Here is the genesis 
of this policy. 

Mr. Morris. What letter are you referring to ? 

Mr. RowE. I am referring to the letter written by Vincent to Pro- 
fessor Dunn commenting on my book. 

Mr. Morris. How did you happen to have a copy of that letter ? 

Mr. RowE. It was in the institute files, and I was asked to answer 
the letter on behalf of Dunn. 

Mr. Morris. Is that a copy of it? 

Mr. RowE. That is a photostat. 

Senator Watkins. That letter seems to praise your book? 

Mr. RowE. As I said, most of the letter supports the book, but 
the interesting thing is the places in which he doesn't support it, 
that is the significant aspect of it. 

Senator Watkins. Will you point those out? 

Mr. RowE. The places here in which he talks about Sinkiang and 
Tibet [reading] : 

With regard to Sinkiang and Tibet, I believe that more serious problems than 
Mr. Rowe seems to anticipate will arise unless China adopts an enlightened 
policy for the treatment of minorities. 

I didn't know what this enlightened policv could be. but the interest- 
ing thing about this is that this is Owen Lattimore. You couldn't 
express Owen Lattimore's views or his interest in Chinese policies 
better than they are expressed right there. 

Senator Watkins. Do you have in mind any part of the writings 
of Lattimore ? 



4006 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. Sure, several books: Inner Asian Frontiers in China, 
Solution in Asia, The Problem of Asia, all those three books are very 
heavily concerned with what we call border problems. Of course, 
these borders happen to bound on the Soviet Union, which makes 
them a far more significant feature in international politics than any 
other part of China on which this letter was written. 

The first Communist inroads into China were made into these bor- 
ders and were worked out in the Yalta agreement of 1945 in which, as 
I say, the Russians were restored to their pre-1905 position in Man- 
churia, involving all kinds of derogation from Chinese sovereignty. 

Another interesting thing about this is that as I read Mr. Vincent's 
testimony here before this committee, Mr. Vincent claimed that when 
he heard about the Yalta agreement he was shocked; that he said the 
Yalta agreement involves derogations from Chinese sovereignty but 
in September 1944 he was talking precisely in terms of taking very 
good account of Russian interests in what he agreed was Chinese terri- 
tory in Manchuria. 

It is obvious to me that this man must have been thinking in the 
very terms that gave rise to the Yalta settlement long before the Yalta 
settlement was made. This man was, as he signed himself, Chief of 
the Division of Chinese Affairs. How anybody can be surprised that 
the Yalta agreement was arrived at would puzzle me greatly. Why 
Mr. Vincent should be shocked by it when he was fully intellectually 
prepared for it far in advance of it is something I can't make head or 
tail of. 

Senator Watkins. Did you ever discuss the matter with him? 

Mr. RowT?.. No, sir. I just found his statement in the testimony he 
gave before this committee a few days ago. I think Mr. Vincent stuck 
his neck out on that ; he really did. 

Senator Watkins. You mean when he wrote this ? 

Mr. Ro^\t:. No; by saying he was so shocked about Yalta when 
months before he had indicated full intellectual preparation for, as 
he says, "not dismissing with such a statement or with the simple 
declaration that Manchuria is an integral part of China." You and 
I know what that kind of statement means. My statement would be 
that it is or isn't an integral part of China. If it is, you keep it a part 
of China, and if it isn't, sure, you let the Russians in. 

Mr. MoRKTs. Mr. Chairman, may that letter go into the record? 

Senator Watkins. It will be made a part of the record. 

Mr. MoERTS. It is a letter. Mr. Chairman, that John Carter Vincent 
sent December 4, 1944, to Mr. Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Director, 
Institute of International Studies at Yale University, of which this 
witness was a part and which this witness handled, discussed. 

(Exhibit No. 613 was marked and is as follows :) 

Department of State, 
Washington, December 4, i944- 
Mr. Frederick Sherwood Dunn, 

Director, Institute of International Studies, Yale University, 

New Haven, Conn. 
Dear Mr. Dunn : With reference to your letter of November 13 and my reply 
of November 15, I have received and read over the page proofs of David Rowe's 
new book, China Among the Powers. 

I was very favorably impressed with Mr. Rowe's book. I coiild not pretend, 
of course, to know whether many of his statements of fact are correct (I assume 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4007 

they are), but I do find myself in general agreement with his conclusions. If he 
errs at all, it seems to me he errs on the side of pessimism, but that might not 
be in effect bad, knowing the general optimism with which Americans usually 
view China. 

With regard to the postwar industrial development of China, I think that Mr. 
Howe, in view of developments during recent months, places too much emphasis 
on nationalization. It looks now (and I realize that such was not the case when 
Mr. Rowe wrote his manuscript) as if the tendency were away from nationaliza- 
tion except in a limited number of fields such as transportation, public utilities, 
and industries directly related to national defense. 

I doubt that the situation in Outer Mongolia (I was there with Vice President 
Wallace in July) will lend itself to the "financial" solution suggested by Mr. 
Rowe. I cannot conceive of Russia's paying China to recognize the independence 
of Outer Mongolia, but I do realize that a solution of the problem must be found. 

With regard to Sinkiaug and Tibet, I believe that more serious problems than 
Mr. Rowe seems to anticipate will arise unless China adopts an enlightened policy 
for the treatment of minorities. 

With regard to Manchuria, I believe, as Mr. Rowe seems to, that the Russians 
do not have territorial ambitions with regard to that area, but I do not think the 
problem can be dismissed with such a statement or with the simple declaration 
that Manchuria is an integral part of China where over 90 percent of the popu- 
lation is Chinese. Manchuria, as you know, has for decades held a somewhat 
autonomous position in China and it will be up to the Chinese Government to 
adopt policies in the postwar period which will really accomplish the integration 
of that area with China proper. 

But I end my letter as I began : Mr. Rowe has written a very good, very in- 
structive, and very useful book, and I am mindful of his own statement that in 
the space allowed he could not cover adequately all the problems that may arise 
in relation to China in the postwar period. 
Sincerely, 

[s] John Carter Vincent, 
Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs. 

P. S. — I am returning the page proofs to you rather than to Harcourt, Brace & 
Co. for disposal. 

Mr. Ro^VE. I handled this letter by Vincent. I wrote the reply of 
the Institute to Vincent. 

Senator Watkins. Do you have the reply? 

Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir. 

Senator Watkins. I think that also ought to go in the record if you 
have it. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 613 A," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 613-A 

Decembee 12, 1944. 
Mr. John Carter Vincent, 

Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Vincent : Your letter of December 4th to Mr. Dunn regarding my 
book, China Among the Powers, has been called to my attention. I am natu- 
rally extremely gratified that you have been able to take the time to read the 
book while it is still in page proof, and also that you have found it possible to 
make such friendly comments respecting it. Coming from one who knows China 
as well as you do, such comments cannot help but be most pleasing to me. 

I note your specific interest in the general field of Chinese border problems. 
As you note, I could not, for want of space, deal with all of these problems in 
much detail. I agree with you as to the complexity of the adjustments that 
must be made in case China's border regions are to be integrated into the body 
of the postwar Chinese state. 

I would like very much to place a copy of my book in our Chungking Embassy. 
Would it be possible to secure your cooperation in sending this book to Ambas- 



4008 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

sador Hurley? If this seems possible, could you let us know and we will send 
you a copy to be forwarded to Chungking. 
With best wishes. 
Sincerely yours, 

David N. Rowe. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness has asked for a 5-minute 
recess at this point. 

Senator Watkins. We will take a short recess. 

(A short recess was taken.) 

Senator Watkins. The committee will resume session. 

Mr. RowE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more that you can tell us about the 
Chinese industrial cooperatives? 

Mr. Ro^\"E. Well, there is a great deal, but I think I have mentioned 
most of the features that are relevant to what we have been talking 
about and what the committee might be interested in. 

Senator Watkins. There is one thing about them. Were they 
Communist creations ? 

Mr. Rowe. No; they were not Communist creations. In my opin- 
ion, they were definitely not Communist creations. But they were 
organizations that were made to order for subversive purposes. 

Senator Watkins. In other words, they were susceptible. 

Mr. RowE. That is right. They could be taken over. 

Senator Watkins. How do they compare with the cooperatives we 
have in this country ? I take it you know something about them. 

Mr. RowE. I don't know anything much. 

Senator Watkins. Farm cooperatives ? 

Mr. RowE. Well, there are marketing devices and insurance and 
groceries and things of that kind. 

Senator Watkins. In China ? 

Mr. RowE. In this country ; are there not? 

Senator Watkins. Well, they are largely farm cooperatives, buy- 
ing and selling. 

Mr. RowE. I know in my home town in Connecticut there is a 
grocery store that is a cooperative. 

Senator Watkins. These farmers have nothing to do with a coop- 
erative of that kind. Theirs is the buying of crops and the supplies 
they need for the operation of their farm. 

Mr. RowE. They get better prices for what they sell in bulk lots, and 
so on. Isn't that the essence of it ? 

Senator Watkins. What I was trying to find out: Are they like 
our cooperatives here? So that we will have something to compare 
them with. 

Mr. RowE. Very little along that line. You see, they were mostly 
industrial, as their name indicates. 

Senator Watkins. In other words, they gathered together hand- 
crafts and so on and sold collectively for these people and bought their 
supplies collectively. 

Mr. RowE. That is right. 

Senator Watkins. It is very much the same type. So that, as a 
matter of fact, they were not the creations of or organized by the Com- 
munists as a part of their Communist program ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, no. 

Senator Watkins. They just tried to use them, as I understand. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4009 

Mr. RowE. You see, Senator, if they had been organizations of that 
sort, they would never have gotten organized in Nationalist territory 
in the first place. 

Senator Watkins. What was their history ? How long were they 
in existence ? 

Mr. RowTE. I don't know precisely how many years. They were 
founded before the Japanese war. 

Senator Watkins, Were they in existence when you were in China, 
living there ? 

Mr. RowE. They were certainly in existence when I was there in 
1937 and 1938. 

Senator Watkins. I was referring to the previous time. 

Mr. RowE. I have no knowledge of that, but I am quite sure they 
were not. 

Senator Watkins. Did you have occasion to get out into the coun- 
try when you were there before ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes. I traveled throughout the interior of the 
Yangtze Valley. 

Senator Watkins. How much did you get acquainted with during 
that time ? 

Mr. RowE. All in the Yangtze area, roughly between Shanghai and 
a place called Kiukiang in the Yangtze Valley area. 

Senator Watkins. Now, going over to another matter that has been 
called to my attention, did you have occasion to get the views of Mr. 
Vincent, John Carter Vincent ? I think he was over there with you at 
the time. 

Mr. RowE. This was in the period of my service in the Chunking 
Embassy in 1941-42, and he was counselor of the Embassy. 

Senator Watkins. You have already characterized what you 
thought about Mr. Lattimore. What about Mr. Vincent? 

Mr. RowE. In Vincent you have an entirely different sort of thing. 
Vincent never expressed any views on policy openly that I ever heard. 
1 never discussed policy problems with Vincent. The main problem 
I had to discuss with Vincent was how I could foster and promote 
the work of the agency of the United States Government that I was 
there representing. That later became the OSS; was at that time 
called the Coordinator of Information — COI. 

Senator Watkins. Did that have anything to do with the informa- 
tion he would gather together as a part of the diplomatic corps ? 

Mr. RowE. Not that he would gather together ; no. I was there in 
an information-gathering capacity, but in the capacity, you might call 
it, of a librarian. I was supposed to gather books, pamphlets, articles, 
and material of that kind, open sources, because in Washington at that 
time we simply did not have that kind of material on China available. 
And I was sent by the Coordinator of Information to do just that job. 

Senator Watkins. To get this information ? 

Mr. Ro"\VE. That is right. And in order to get it over here, since 
we could not send it over physically, on account of the transport 
problem out of western China, we photographed a lot of the stuff on 
film and sent it over in that form. 

You know, that makes it possible to digest it down into a very small 
volume. 

Senator Watkins. How closely did you become acquainted with 
Mr. Vincent while vou were there ? 



4010 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. I wouldn't say "closely," I had mostly business con- 
tacts with him in the Embassy, having to do with the conduct of my 
official business. 

Senator Watkins. Had you ever discussed with him the relative 
merits of the Nationalist and the Communist contentions? 

Mr. Ro^vE. No ; I had not, at that point. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, are you acquainted with the Far 
Eastern Association ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes ; I am a member of the Far Eastern Association. 

Mr. Morris. Do you find that there is any identity of personnel 
between the association and the IPR ? 

Mr. RowE. I think this is a pretty important topic. I would like 
to go back a little way on this one and sketch in some of the back- 
ground. 

Mr. Morris. Please do. 

Mr. RowE. There was a period when the people in the Institute of 
Pacific Relations were rather alarmed by the tendencies that they 
saw arising in Government regarding themselves as an organization. 
It was at this time, as you may know, that the IPR was put on some 
kind of list of subversive organizations in California, I believe, by 
the California Legislature, or a committee or organization thereof. 

Senator Watkins. What time was that ? Would you remember the 
year ? 

Mr. RowE. Let's see. 

Mr. Morris. Maybe Mr. Mandel knows. 

Mr. RowE. I believe this was in the latter part of the war or im- 
mediately thereafter. I believe that is when it comes in. 

Senator Watkins. That would be along in 1945. 

Mr. RowE. Something of that kind, I believe. 

Senator Watkins. When you said that they were becoming quite 
concerned, who do you mean by "they"? The membership of the 
institute, or the staff ? 

Mr. Rowe. I am talking about the staff, the governing people, those 
who ran the thing administratively. 

Senator Watkins. How did you know that? 

Mr. RowE. It was common talk. I could not even cite to you who 
it was that talked this way. But I think of Mr. Holland's name in 
this connection. I couldn't certify that I ever heard Holland say this. 

Senator Watkins. Whom did you hear say it? 

Mr. RowE. It was general common talk among people in the Far 
East business and people connected with the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions. And the problem of what to do if this thing went on further 
and the Institute of Pacific Relations itself was put on, say, a list by 
the Attorney General, for example, and named as a front organization, 
alarmed these people at least enough so that they decided they would 
have to set up some kind of organization to hold the bag for them in 
case this happened. 

Senator Watkins. Well, now, just a moment. You are making 
some charges or statements there, where you ought to have some 
specific instances in mind on which you base that. That is very gen- 
eral. Do you know it of your own knowledge ? Did you discuss it with 
anybody? Was it discussed in your trustees' meetings? Or were you 
a trustee at that time ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4011 

Mr. Ro\VE. This would never be discussed in trustees' meetings. It 
wasn't the kind of thin^. 

Senator Watkins. How do you know they were concerned ? What 
is the evidence ? That is what I am trying to get at. 

Mr. RowE. Let's cite one little item. I don't know whether you will 
consider this the sort of evidence you are after or not, but it is the way 
this kind of information would be picked up. 

At a meeting, I think, of the American Historical Association, at a 
luncheon connected with this, there were at the table several of us, in- 
cluding Mr. Biggerstaff and Mr. Fahs. 

Senator Watkins. These were men on the staff? 

Mr. RowE. No; Biggerstaff was on the board of trustees and was 
involved in the early planning. 

Senator Watkins. Were you at that time on the board of trustees? 

Mr. RowE. I don't believe so; no. 

Senator Watkins. You were a member, I take it, of the association ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. I have been a member of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations between 1938 and the time I resigned in 1950. 

Senator Watkins. Pardon my interruption. Now go back to your 
statement. 

Mr. RowE. Where this matter of forming a new organization was 
brought up, this was what later became the Far Eastern Association^ 
and the question specifically discussed was the question of how this 
organization should be differentiated from the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. At that time, I myself, for example, wrote a memorandum. 
I do not know where you would find this, and I do not know how I 
could ever produce a copy of it. It was on the need for a new organi- 
zation in the Far East field. There was growing dissatisfaction with 
the Institute of Pacific Relations because of the very large part it was 
playing on controversial issues and the part that it took in talking 
about policy, instead of acting as a straight scholarly organization 
with the interest of promoting research and study, serving the in- 
terests of the scholarly fraternity, by affording them publication 
media, meetings at which they could read their papers, and all the ac- 
tivities of a learned society. And I remember writing that at that time 
in connection with this agitation for a new society. 

Senator Watkins. You said "writing." Did you write a letter, or 
an article? 

Mr. Rowt:. I wrote a memorandum on this. I believe this memo- 
randum could be found in the IPR files if you look for it. 

Senator Watkins. It was sent to them; was it? 

Mr. RowE. I think I sent it to Holland. Or it may have been a 
letter or a memorandum I wrote to Biggerstaff and Fairbank and 
other people of that kind. 

Senator Watkins. The purpose, then, was, or it was being dis- 
cussed at that time, to get away from charges like the one that had 
been made by this California committee of the legislature? 

Mr. Ro\\t:. That is the idea, as I understood it, at the time. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, Mr. Mandel has 
the California citation. 

Mr. Mandel. According to the California Committee on Un-Amer- 
ican Activities, in its report of 1948, the American Council of the' 
Institute of Pacific Relations was cited as a Communist front which 
received funds from the American People's Fund, another front or- 



4012 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

ganized and directed by Frederick V. Field as a repository for funds 
to be distributed to Communist enterprises. As a result of later ne- 
gotiations, I believe this citation was withdrawn by the California 
committee. 

Mr. RowE. It never went any farther than that, anyway. And the 
fears that it might, which naturally would be aroused by this kind of 
thing starting in a State legislature, never were justified by subsequent 
events. But the Far Eastern Association was set up, nonetheless. 

Senator Watkins. Who organized that? Do you know? 

Mr. RowE. The moving spirits in this were Fairbank, Fahs, and 
Big;gerstaff. Those are three that I can name from memory. 

Senator Watkins. Did you have any part in this ? 

Mr. Row^E. None whatever. 

Senator Watkins. You joined it; did you not? 

Mr. RoA\T2. Yes; I joined it subsequent to its organization, and I 
am still a member of it, but I have never held an office under it. 

Senator Watkins. Does it have close relations with the Institute 
of Pacific Relations? 

Mr. RowE. That was the point. Senator, that I wanted to develop. 

At the beginning you had a very strong interlocking directorate, 
so to speak, between these two concerns. And a lot of the people that 
you run across in your study of the Institute of Pacific Relations are 
involved on the control directorate of this association. This is Feb- 
ruary 1951. 

The connection and the duplication of personnel, this interlocking 
directorate I talk about, is not as close now as it was at the original 
formation. 

Senator Watkins. Can you point out specifically what it was at 
that time? 

Mr. RowE. In February 1951? 

Senator Watkins. Or whenever you say it was when it was first 
organized, and there was a close interlocking directorate. 

Let us have specific illustrations. 

Mr. RowE. Mr. Holland, for example, was represented on the ad- 
visory editorial board, I believe. And on an organization of the Far 
Eastern Association, which I think has since gone out of existence, 
which was the committee on research work. They now have a mono- 
graph series, and they have as editor of the monograph series Mr. 
Dirk Bodde, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, a very 
strong supporter of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He supports 
it all the time in the public press. Mr. Biggerstaff, who was and 
probably is on the IPR trustees, was secretary in 1950. John K. Fair- 
bank was at that time vice president. Wilma Fairbank was at that 
time news editor of the quarterly. 

Let's see if there are any other of these names. William L. Holland 
was a member of the board of directors in November 1950. Owen 
Lattimore was a member of the board of directors in 1950. George 
E. Taylor was a member of the board of directors in 1950. 

Now, there is a great amount of duplication still at this point. 

It may be said, of course, that the number of far eastern specialists 
in the United States is not very large, and the claim could easily be 
made that these are the most eminent people in the field. But I would 
say that as far as general political views are concerned, all those people 
I named probably share about a 90 percent consensus. And that is 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4013 

the thing I am talking about. They agree with each other on current 
questions of far eastern politics very strongly. 

Senator Watkins. I am not quite satisfied in my mind about the 
evidence, as you say, that this new organization was organized for the 
purpose of having a place to go if the Institute of Pacific Relations 
became unpopular through it being named as a Communist front 
organization. 

Mr. RowE. Well, Senator, I doubt if I can satisfy you. I can't pro- 
vide you with a document. I can't provide you with a copy of any 
statement on this. But I would like to call attention to the fact that 
if this were so, without assuming whether it is or not, it is extremely 
unlikely you will ever find any documentary evidence on it. 

Senator Watkins. Well, I thought maybe if you Avere present when 
this matter was discussed with any of these men who actually organ- 
ized it, that might be evidence. But I will say to you that Professor 
Lattimore, when he was here, objected strenuously because we did not 
cross-examine the other witnesses like we did him. I am not trying 
to give you a workout, or anj^thing of that kind, but if you do have 
evidence I would like to have it. 

Mr. RowE. Yes. It is perfectly understandable. You see, I was 
never closely connected with this new organization in its inception. 
I was in favor of a scholarly organization which would be highly 
differentiated from the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I always 
considered had gone off tlie deep end on trying to make policy, indicate 
lines of policy, engage in propaganda — or you can call it education 
if you want to. 

Senator Watkins. Do you think they were actually engaged in 
propaganda ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, absolutely. 

Senator Watkins. You have made a study of that, I suppose. 

Mr. RowE. As a matter of fact, propaganda and public opinion is 
one of my major technical fields. 

Senator Watkins. I do not want to ask you to do it now, but I 
wonder if you could supply for this committee a listing of the quota- 
tions from the various publications of the institute which, in your 
judgment, indicated clearly that it was engaging in propaganda. 

Mr. RowE. Well, I would say on that. Senator, that the best source 
on that is this pamphlet series, which has a very, very wide dissemina- 
tion. If you do not like the word "propaganda," use anything else* 
Use the word "education" if you prefer it. 

Senator Watkins. Well, call it public information or something of 
that sort. 

Mr. Rowt:. All right. Public information. The persuasion of the 
public with a definite slant, a definite view on far eastern affairs, was 
indeed a major business of this organization. It was conceived of 
under the classification of contributing to general education in this 
country. And there has always been a great job to do in general 
education on the Far East in the United States. 

Mr. Morris. Has that been done. Professor, do you know? 

Mr. RowE. What are you referring to at this point? 

Mr. Morris. I mean this analysis of the publications of the IPR. 

Mr. RowE. Well, there have been numerous cases in which analysis 
of the contents of the IPR publications has been done. I believe 



4014 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. Lattimore supplied you, for instance, in this formal statement 
that he made, with a copy of his analysis of Pacific Affairs during 
the years in which he edited it, in which he makes a tabulation of 
the material, indicating right wing, left wing, neutral authors, what 
proportion of the writings was done by each. But I do not think 
this is a very accurate analysis. I think it is far from satisfactory. 
As a matter of fact, one of my colleagues at New Haven has made 
an analysis, which is not mine. I have not done the work. He did 
it, but it seems to me it is probably a good deal more accurate. 

Mr. Morris. What is his name? 

Mr. KowE. Richard Walker. He is assistant professor of history 
at Yale. He was a student of ours there and got his degree with us 
a few years ago, and then was appointed to the faculty in the liistory 
department. 

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with that study ? 

Mr. RowE. Yes; I have read it, and I have here a portion of it 
in which he gives his statistical analysis of the editorial character, 
the editorial approach, to the Institute of Pacific Relations publica- 
tions, and presents some rather startling figures. 

Senator Watkins. I think probably that ought to be received by 
the committee, for what it is worth. It is, of course, hearsay evidence. 

Without calling the man who prepared it, unless the committee 
thinks he ought to be called, I think that ought to be put into the 
record. 

Mr. Morris. Suppose we accept that and have that scrutinized by 
the director of research, and then if necessary we can call Professor 
Walker down to personally add testimony to what we have already 
done here. 

Senator Watkins. Who is the director of research ? To whom do 
you refer ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel. I mean, it may well lend itself to 
analysis that can be determined as a matter of fact, and we would 
not require Mr. Walker. Yet, if it is necessary to have Mr. Walker 
here, then let us consider that possibility. 

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we find out what it is from Professor 
Rowe before we decide what should be done with it. 

Senator Watkins. That probably is a good suggestion. 

If you will leave a copy with Mr. Mandel, the director of research, 
that will be satisfactory. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe should explain it, though, Mr. Chair- 
man. It will only take a few minutes. 

Senator Watkins. Very well. 

Mr. Rowe. This is an analysis made by Mr. Walker on the basis of 
counting pages put in, contributed to IPR publications, Pacific Af- 
fairs, Far Eastern Survey, the inquiry series monographs, and the 
pamphlet series. 

Using as a basis for this set of statistics, two lists of persons. In 
order to identify these persons, I am going to read from a copy of 
Mr. Walker's manuscript. And this is his manuscript as it reads : 

On pages 679-680 of the "Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup" 
there is a table listing 37 persons as IPR personnel who have been identified 
during the course of the McCarran investigation as sympathetic to communism. 

I want to put in a statement of my own at this point. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4015 

This identification of these people as sympathetic to communism 
is not precisely what the identification was in the testimony introduced 
before your committee here. 

Mr. ^loRRis. It was much more precise. It was either "Communist" 
or "identified with some Communist organization." 

Mr. RowE. Well, the precise identification of these is — 

identified in sworn testimony by witnesses as a member or under the discipline 
or direction or influence of or rendered services to the Communist Party, the 
Soviet Union, or the international Communist movement. 

And I am reading here from the document as it appears in the hearings 
ou the nomination of Mr. Jessup. 

Mr. INIoREis. And that, Mr. Chairman, was not a complete list. 
Mr. RowE. That ends my parenthetical statement. I am going to 
resume reading from Mr. Walker's article. 

To this list can certainly be added the names of three other persons who 
contributed to IPR publications and who were identified as Communists in the 
hearings printed by the McCarran subcommittee : Kate Mitchell, Mrs. Edgar 
Snow, and Philip Jaffe, bringing the list up to 40. 

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups — 

another parenthetical statement : 

The first group is Mr. Holland's group of "47 writers well Iniown 
for their active opposition to communism whose work the IPR has 
published." 

Senator Watkins. That was the group he gave to the committee? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. [Reading :] 

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups to IPR publications 
in number of pages indicates that, even granting the need to weigh the reliability 
of some of the identifications involved, the McCarran probers should indeed look 
into II'R publications on a systematic basis. The following table represents 
a comparison of number of pages contributed by these two groups to the IPR 
publications listed between 1934 and 1947. The initial date marks Owen Latti- 
more's assumption of editorship of Pacific Affairs, and the terminal date is the 
year in which F. V. Field was asked to resign as a trustee of the IPR. The 
period of Owen Lattimore's editorship of Pacific Affairs is listed separately be- 
cause of the controversy which has surrounded his name. It is apparent from 
the table that Mr. Holland's listing includes mainly those contributors whose 
works were published after the terminal date. 

That is 1947. 

Senator Watkins. The terminal date, you mean, of Mr. Lattimore's 
connection with the institute in the capacity of editor ? 

Mr. RowE. I believe that is so. Yes, Senator. 

Now, here are the statistics that come out : 

Pacific Affairs, volumes VII-XIV, No. 2, Owen Lattimore, editor, 
13 of the 47 anti-Communists who contributed; and they contributed 
196 pages, consisting of 21.4 percent of all contributed by either the 
47 anti-Communists or the 40 listed as pro-Communist; only 21 
percent. Number of the 40 pro-Communists who contributed, on the 
other hand, is 18, with 729 pages, comprising 78.6 percent of all the 
pages as between these two groups. In other words, over three times 
as many pages as the other people. 

Then Pacific Affairs, volume XIV, No. 3, to volume XVI, No. 4, 
inclusive: 14 people from the 47 anti-Communists who contributed. 
They contributed a total of 146 pages, constituting 29.2 percent, as 
between these two groups ; 14 of the 40 pro-Communists contributed, 

88348— 52— pt. 11 20 



4016 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

but they contributed 354 pages, constituting 70.8 percent, as between 
these two groups. 

Far Eastern Survey, volume IV, No. 1, to voknne XVI, No. 21: 
Number of the 47 anti-Communists who contributed, 8. They con- 
tributed a total of 196 pages, comprising 34.6 percent of the total 
contributed by the two groups. On the other hand, 16, twice as many, 
of the 40 pro-Communists contributed, and they contributed 370 pages, 
consisting of 65.4 percent of the total contribution of the two groups. 
In other words, twice as much. 

In the inquiry series monographs — these, of course, are books ; not 
articles but books — 4 anti-Communists listed contributed books of 488 
pages, comprising 33.7 percent as between the two groups — 5 of 
the 40 pro-Communists contributed, but they contributed 962 pages, 
comprising 66.3 percent of the total of the two groups, again twice 
as much. 

In the pamphlet series, none of the anti-Communists contributed. 
You will remember, parenthetically, that I pointed to the pamphlet 
series as the prime vehicle for this persuasional activity. 

Senator Watkins. They had a much wider distribution? 

Mr. RowE. Yes. 

Senator Watkins. And they were used, some of them, in the in- 
doctrination of our Armed Forces. 

Mr. RowE, That is right. None of these 47 listed as anti-Com- 
munist by Mr. Holland ever wrote in the pamphlet series, thus con- 
tributing zero pages, zero percent. Four of the forty listed as pro- 
Communists contributed a total of 261 pages, that is, 100 percent of 
all the work done in the pamphlet series. 

The total, just the cumulative total, for the so-called 

Mr. Morris. That is 100 percent. But that is not of the whole- 



Mr. RowE. No. Throughout here this is 100 percent of the con- 
tribution as between these two groups. 

The total pages contributed by the members of this group of 47 
listed by Mr. Holland as anti-Communist was 1,026, constituting in 
the bulk 28.3 percent of the total as between the two groups. The total 
of the pro-Communist writers was 2,656 pages, constituting 71.7 per- 
cent, which comes to about two and a half times as much, cumulative. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I suggest, in connection with these 
statistics — I mean, this is the third time it has come up here, Mr. 
Lattimore mentioned it, Mr. Holland mentioned it, and Professor 
Rowe mentions it. I understand Professor Walker raises the point in 
this article, that I believe comes out today. I understand it is offered 
by way of a criticism of the work of the committee, in the sense that 
the committee has not made such an analysis. I think the staff has 
been working on that for some time, Mr. Chairman. And may we 
receive this, just as a factor, as one of the many methods of approach 
to this task that the committee unmistakably has? 

Senator Watkins. I would say yes, we may receive it, and it may 
be filed with the committee, but not to actually have the whole thing 
made a part of the record. 

Mr. Morris. You see, it will not be for our conclusions. Senator, 
but for the approach that it takes toward our solving this problem. 

May it be received with that understanding? 

Senator Watkins. It may be received. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 



4017 



(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 613B" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 613B 

In his lengthy statement to the committee, Mr. Holland gave a list of 47 
''writers well known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the 
IPR has published. This should dispel any notion that the IPR tended to favor 
authors sympathetic to Communism." Such an ability to distinguish between 
groups of writers for Institute publications evoked no comment by the counsel. 
On pages 679-680 of the "Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup" 
there is a table listing 37 persons as IPR personnel who have been identified 
during the course of the McCarran investigation as sympathetic to Communism. 
To this list can certainly be added the names of three other persons who con- 
tributed to IPR publications and who were identified as Communists in the 
hearings printed by the McCarran Subcommittee : Kate Mitchell, Mrs. Edgar 
Snow, and Philip Jaffe, bringing the list up to 40. 

1. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PUBLICATIONS? 

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups to IPR publications 
in number of pages indicates that, even granting the need to weigh the reliability 
of some of the identifications involved, the McCarran probers should indeed look 
into IPR publications on a systematic basis. The following table represents a 
comparison of number of pages contributed by these two groups to the IPR 
publications listed between 1934 and 1947. The initial date marks Owen Latti- 
more's assumption of editorship of Pacific Affairs, and the terminal date is the 
year in which F. V. Field was asked to resign as a trustee of the IPR. The 
period of Owen Lattimore's editorship of Pacific Affairs is listed separately 
because of the controversy which has surrounded his name. It is apparent from 
the table that Mr. Holland's listing includes mainly those contributors whose 
works were published after the terminal date. 



Publication 



Pacific Affairs, vol. VII-XIV, No. 2, 
Owen Lattimore, Ed 

Pacific Affairs, vol. XIV, No. 3; vol. 
XVI, No. 4 inclusive 

Far Eastern Survey, vol. IV, No. 1; 
vol. XVI, No. 21 

Inquiry Series monographs 

Pamphlet Series 

Total pages: 

For anti-Communist writers 

For pro-Communist writers. 



Number of 
47 anti- 
Commu- 
nists who 

contributed 



1,026 



Pages 

contrib' 

uted 



196 
146 

196 

488 
000 



Percent of 
total con- 
tributed 
by all 87 



21.4 

29.2 

34.6 
33.7 


28.3 



Number of 
40 pro- 
Commu- 
nists who 

contributed 



Pages 

contub- 

uted 



729 

354 

370 
962 
261 



2,656 



Percent 



78.6 

70.8 

65.4 
66.3 
100 



71.7 



In these four published categories the 40 pro-Communist writers contributed 
over 250 percent more pages than the 7 more anti-Communist writers listed 
by Mr. Holland. The list given in the statement does not necessarily "dispel any 
notion that the IPR tended to favor authors sympathetic to communism." These 
proportions would, it can easily be realized, depend in large measure on the 
sympathies of the editor of the particular publication involved. 

Senator Watkins. And I will also say for the committee that we, 
of necessity, cannot make an analysis of the evidence until the evidence 
is all in, and it would be very foolish for us to try to start making 
an analysis of it before we have finished the inquiry. 

Mr. Morris. As I say, as I understand it, the article mentions by 
way of possibly constructive criticism that something should be done 
and it has not been done. 

Senator* Watkins. I anticipate that that is exactly what the staff 
is going to do. Since the charge is made that the over-all picture was 



4018 INSTITUTE OP PACIFIC RELATIONS 

all to the good, and this is a very small percentage — a few writers 
came in, and that was necessary by way of objectivity. So that is 
very interesting. We are not accepting it as completely accurate, 
because we do not know, but it will help our staff in making their 
evaluation. 

Mr. RowE. I want to make my own reaction to this quite clear. I 
have never checked these figures. I haven't, in other words, done 
over again everything that he has done in doing this. So that I can't 
certify, you, see, that you are going to come out with the same per- 
centage points. 

But T will say this: In my opinion, Professor Walker is one of 
the most careful and conscientious research workers you could possibly 
want to have. And I personally, if I were being asked to prepare 
such a thing as this under my auspices, would be glad to accept a 
hundred percent what he says. 

I just give that as a personal impression of what he says. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to make this observation also, that 
I do not think a case should be rested upon the number of pages that 
each group had, one or the other. One very effective writer might 
only have a hundred pages, and if he did a good job in that hundred 
pages, it would have more effect than all the hundreds of thousands 
or millions of words somebody else might write. So, after all, it may 
be a straw, may be some evidence, but it would not be conclusive, in 
my opinion. 

Mr. Morris. I point out that those facts are not facts that are 
available to Professor Walker alone ; that the staff here may under- 
take to check that and come out with a conclusive answer. So it may 
not be necessary to consult with Mr. Walker at all on this. 

Mr. RowE. It would be very easy for you to check these results; 
no problem at all. 

Senator Watkins. I think that would be a problem for the 
committee to take up with the staff, of course. 

Mr. Morris. Had you any experience. Professor Rowe, of editors 
or editorial directors of the IPR editing articles in such a way as to 
reflect a pro-Communist bias? 

Mr. RowE. Yes ; I have. I would like to cite two instances of this 
that are known to me, one from first-hand evidence and the other 
from a statement made to me by one of my students. 

I think maybe I had better introduce the second of these first. 

The first one I will talk about has to do with Mr. Rosinger, in this 
volume he has put out recently, called the State of Asia, I believe it is. 
One of the chapters in this was written by a former student of mine, 
a Dr. Paul Kattenberg, who is now employed in the Research Branch 
of the State Department, a very able and energetic fellow, who was 
asked to write this chapter, and you can refer to it in the published 
volume. The volume was edited by Mr. Rosinger. 

When Mr. Kattenberg submitted his chapter to Mr. Rosinger, he was 
asked to come down and confer with Rosinger regarding it. He did 
so and he came back and reported to me in great excitement because, 
as he said, "Every change he wanted to make involved trying to get 
me to follow the Russian line." 

He said, "I was absolutely amazed by this experience," an(Jhe dilated 
on this at some length. 

Mr. Morris. This is what Kattenberg told you ? 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4019 

Mr. E-owE. This is what Kattenberg told me in my office at New 
Haven. 

That, as I say, is second-hand, but it is the report of an available wit- 
ness and you can check it. He is right here in Washington. 

Senator Watkins. Did the book come out under that sponsorship? 

Mr. KowE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Wai^ins. And was it changed to meet Rosinger's idea ? 

Mr. RowE. I never have seen the original manuscript. I don't know 
what changes were involved in Kattenberg's manuscript. 

Senator Watkins. It would be interesting to know what changes 
were made. 

Mr. Morris. The witness is testifying to a conversation he had with 
Kattenberg. 

Senator Watkins. I realize that. 

Mr. RowE. The second instance is one on which I have documentary 
evidence. This is a manuscript written on communism and the Huk- 
balahap. You know, the Hukbalahap are the local Communist forces 
in the Philippines. They were a cause of great trouble. This was 
written by my colleague at Yale, Assistant Professor of Political 
Science Henry Wells. 

Without commenting on the article — and he later got it published 
in the identical form in which he submitted it to the Institute of 
Pacific Relations — he first submitted it to the IPR, and Miss Miriam 
Farley edited it, and I have here the original editing of this in her 
handwriting, with the suggested emendations and suggested items to 
be struck out, indicated by pencil, and so forth. 

Now, she has some written comments along the line, here, which 
are interesting in themselves, but the things that she wants removed 
from the article are striking. She wants removed from the article 
everything that identifies the Iluks as Communists. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give us examples of that. Professor? 

Mr. RowE (reading) : 

Communist purposes in any locality are always to be understood in terms of 
the available data concerning the pattern of Communist activity the world over. 
Local Communist leaders, as is well known, normally take their cue from 
Moscow * • *. 

Mr. Morris. Is that recommended to be deleted by Miss Farley ? 

Mr. RowE. Cut out ; yes. 

Senator Watkins. Before you go any further, when was this man- 
uscript presented, and when was this editing done? 

Mr. RowE. Let me see. 

Senator Watkins. Give us the approximate time. 

Mr. RowTE. 1949, 1 would say. 

Senator Watkins. That was very recent. 

Mr. RowE. Yes ; that was recent. 

Senator Watkins. That was after the so-called awakening of the 
American people to all these fellow travelers, to what has been going 
on. 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes. 

Then, handwritten in here for insertion, instead of this sort of thing, 
is the following, written by Miss Farley. And I am quoting : 

In one sense, the Huk movement may be viewed as part of a world-wide 
scheme of Communist expansion ; in another sense it is a product of local 
conditions. 



4020 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

That is what she wants substituted. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, the second was what she wanted sub- 
stituted for the first ? 

Mr. EowE. That is right. 

Continuation of what she wanted cut out : 

The Hnkbalaliap in the Philippines. lil<e the Communist-dominated movements 
in tlie archipelagos to the north and south. Janan and Indonesia, is to be re- 
garded as an advance guard, a propaganda-distribution center, and an organi- 
zational pivot in a compaign that looks to the eventual capture of the archipelago 
for the forces of communism. 

This is to be removed from the article on iier recommendation. 

Senator Watkins. Did she have any substitute for that ? 

Mr. RowE. No substitute at this point. Just cut it out. As a mat- 
ter of fact, half the article would have been cut if those recommenda- 
tions were followed. 

Senator Watkins. No reason given as to why that was to be cut? 

Mr. RowE. No reason. 

Next item recommended for omission is this, and you can see that 
about three-quarters of the page is to be cut out [reading] : 

Though their grievances lead them into the Ilukbalahai) — 

this is a recognition of the local grievances — 

the ordinary peasants do not determine its policies and activities. As in all 
Communist-dominated movements, the leaders, not the rank and file, call the 
tune. Recent events have shown that the men who run the Hukbalahap are not 
interested in solving the agrarian problem on non-Communist terms. Their 
agitators use it as a means of gaining adherence for the Communist Party line, 
of spreai^ing anti-American propaganda, and of provoking civil strife under a 
government committed to friendly relations with the United States. Like Com- 
munists everywhere, they seize upon the legitimate grievances of the oppressed 
to advance their own quite different ends. 

To be omitted. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Mr. Chairman, may that be received into the record ? 

But I think probably, in fairness to Miss Farley, we should ask her 
if that is her handwriting on the manuscript. 

Senator Watkins. Well, if it were a court procedure, I would say 
it would be admitted subject to further proof. I think we can receive 
it in evidence here as a part of our investigation. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 614" and is 
herewith inserted.) 

Mr. Morris. But do you suggest that we find out from Miss Farlej 
whether or not that is her handwriting? 

Senator Watkins. Certainlv. We want Miss Farley here. Sh<i 
has been here once, has she not? 

Mr. Morris. No : she hasn't. 

Senator Watkins. I think the suo;gestion is very well made. 

Mr. INToRRis. At least for the limited purpose of asking her if that 
is in fact her handwriting on it. 

Senator Watkins. And you will probably want to know from her 
why, and she will probably want to have the right, and should have 
the right, to tell whv. I do not think we should limit it as to whether 
that is her handwriting. 

Mr. Morris. No ; that is the minimum. Senator. 











































































© bC 


to 

1 


M 


J3 














1 

43 


13 


■0 

© 






13 


W « hi T3 3 


a 

rl 
It 


« « Oi o> • 

•H © -rt «1< X •« 


•d 










ts 


0) 




4tf 


u 


© 




s 


»>• 


4> 4> - 


J 


?'£e':!^2 *^ V 






. 






R 


X 


<M 


4^ 


i 


X 

4> 




OS 


•H TJ « B '"-^ 
rH © © 






•H ► K -H rH h 




3 




, • X • C 






^ 


AJ 




flj 


of 








m 




tJ 


X 


+ 


b ® ► 5 







>0 *-l (l,rH « t .- 

Sow ijiM 4^ 1: 






13 
i-l 

o 


to 
at 






a 
o 
3 






>> 

1:) 


© 
X 





© 
■rl 
r4 

P. 


i 




S 3 J: 

1 to + 
> © ■ 


h< ? 


e 








M 
..rl • 


• Oh. 1 


f J 




•p 


M 


9 




rH 


e- 


t> 


» 





+> 


M 


e< 


hi 


ht r- 


t~ X 


c 3 , 


S 


t^ f-*^ fe - 




U •H 


"H 


a. 




^^5 


•H 

o 







£ 


• 


i 


3 


<2 




i 0. + 


g 5 1 


E X 


V P k 




o o 
<rt o 
ID m 


o 






.g 


OS 
o 

o 

X 


o 
o 

•H 


5 




6X 




w 




© 


1 


c 
m 4 

4> f 

10 « 


. 1 ? 

4> 4 


! 1 ^ ^ 




-J 


• p^ 

OS B"^ 

C CO 

♦> -H W « 


• 
4 -t 


■> 




•C 




o 


+> 


X 




« 


e 




1 


rt -^ 


! "^ "S S 


^4? 


2 82" 


!i 




13 K 




B 




-p 


-p 


(0 


4J 


© 


«s 









•■ a 


', "1^ * 


5 -^ fe •£ 


Ji +* 


» R f~» 


10 


3 3 




■p 


0) 

r-H 




Xi 




a 


Fi 




© 


4" 


^ 


«-i 



1 " 


J 3 1 


1 >3 © 
r4 r-l •« 






< ' 


3 

H 4> 


5) P. 


o 








-p 


o 

E 





* 


© 


49 


4 


4> 


F3 < 


9 ( 

iC PU 


1, -H •© 


■•£ 


^gS-fel 1 ^ 


■^ c 
li © 


•O rH 


o 




n 


CO 


X 


0. 







5 1 


s r i 


> S d c 


© 


HS^ J 


t 


t. "S 


ID .H 


c 






'H 


» 


»-i 


a< 


V 





2 


r-l 


9! ' 


- © < 


Vl r4 «1 


E 


t^ ci.£;>!l 1 


J hi 


fH .C 




>> 

-p 






o 
o 


4^ 


^ 


3 




^ 


X 


SX 


© 1 


9 hi 




1X3 


*H H^w 'J^ 






•H A. 


s 




e 


.«-« 


c 









p 




&- 1 


> 4 


D n © at 


g s 


« 


> 


> P. 






-rt 






o 


-p 


j:^ 


n 




^ 


4> 


Vi 


m 


' 


' i i 


■« -H X V 
B X +> (I. 


V 


-rl to 
© h.U5 


3 



iC © 

•0 


© f? 


rH 


O 




.rl 


+> 


0) 







s 


•rl 


•0 


X < 


I } 


e 


-P 


4> as « 


» 


c >. 


f^ O 


o; 






-c 


^ 


-H 


ci 





p! 




© 


• 4> J 




13 E 


<o 


«i hi • 




^ z^ 


C. 4^ 
4. ;S 


1 


% 










> 


^ 





© 

p 


<H 


t 5 
© 


-1 4 
©A. 4 


■> C ( 




3 C r4 
3 0! K- • 
-1 *-l +> 




hi fcC P. 




3 rH 
rH 


^ 


at 


c 






t> 


C 







43 


© 


ti 


10 © 


« 5? 


J *H W 


c^ 


S -Ih 


p 


J 


^ in 




(»: 




c 


■H 


4" 




si 




X 






P U J 




B r-l fc • 


b ? 




BQ 




•P 05 


- 


oi 


• 




1 


-P 




4> 




4J 


(3 

ii 


J 


S 4 


^ ^ , 


> c hi 
4 n I. © 


g-S 


gs . 


P 


:: ^ 


S — 


6 


c 


« 


p 


R 








■K ■* 


i P ■* 


^ ^ i^ -^ 


t 3 


«1 rH tH 


S 


S S 


o n 


« 




l> 


<M 




O 




© 


4^ 


•e 


4> 




u. (3 


3 C r 


H -rl C 




•^ P 


^ 





■P c 


m 


<li 


s 


o 


e 


-P 


T3 


© 





u 




y"^ 


© r 


■• -K 


3 X JD -rl 


© fc 


* •«! > 




S^ 


w J3 


a! 








ji 







>r 


© 







B) 1; 


M E 


i( C < 


■> _ _ - 


hi 


X 


C 


t3 © 


n 


o 




IB 


-p 


•p 


X 


1 


4i 
© 




r-l 

13 


© 


?! " 


© 

tf 


© 


C «H 

H -rt 4> 



ft. 


4> . « 


a! 


© 

10 •« 






tt 


(^ 


o 


1 


o 




.0 


© 


C 


r-l 


g r 


-1 J3 J 


3 


' S _ „ 


fc<M 


* hi 


u 


» 4^ 


rH • 


o 




o 


■■.:-B^ 




k. 


-P 




V. 


a 






ID fs e 


C 


4> T) « 





© W 'rl 


fl 


© ri 


■rl -O 


$ 


■P 


<n 


m* 


§■ 


■ 3 
X 





s 


0) 


^^ 


>1 

r^ 


0$ 


?. E 


1 


» n © © 






E © OS 


M 


Cu 


p 


3 3 p .p 




m B 


i §S^ !f 




a 


O C 

o a 


o 


g 




1 


o 
u 


o 








M 


,«?■ 


at 


M ■ 


oj 



4 rH J 


2 " fe £ 




© © 
5 & 


^^tsr' 


® 


© 


n <-H 


-p 


o 


V 


he 


o 





4> 


-H 


•p 


£. 


u 


C >> 


D rH 4 


■> *-( 




iH Ko • 1 g 




«) 


C 


o 
■p 


<e 


•P 




-M 


r-l 


S! 


"S 


X 


© 


-1 


"" $■ 


' . * 


> 4i •— 






«s 






























«) 




» 


Ih 


x; 


^ 


o 





© 


4S 


4J 


-H 


fH a >■ 


-< 


" -^ S £ 


•H C -H • Vl 


*; ^ 5 


•o o 


>> 


-rl 


© 


n 


1 


X 


5) 


ci; 


■c* 


a 


•a 


C 


« 


n tr ? X 


rH © -P -H 


c * 


3 J^' 


iH 


»H 


j: 


»H 


■p 


P< 




(0 


* 


a 


G 


© 


t P. - 


4 3 « 


•rH « © C 


^ _? * 


O -P 




(U 


•p 








© 


^ 


u 




4" 






• Oj r 


-i 4> 

H r 


9 « ^ 

4 © 


' 2 .2 •'^ 




X 0, © <! 


►o<-t 


•l 


C K rH 




Oi "O » ff. 


a> 


2 5 


1 S3 


^ 


T) 


(D 


&. 


S 




X 


10 


tJ 


W 




CO 


Qj © 




3 © X 






(3 ti 




C 




K> 


i-< 


a 


4J 


I-. 


B 


© 


r) 


■p 


« 


>> 


3 4 




© © «l hiC tc C~ 


a 


ID 




ss 









i 





© 


3 


t 


c 

a! 


C 1 

© 


© 
P X 


.< r4 
D r4 


e p • -p 
U hi n 




X « • 00 
43 4> <B Oi t> X rH 


■rl . 


■X 0! © « 




(Oh. © 


h. c 


Of > 


T3 


Vl 


^ 




•P 


B, 






1 




© 


-( .• 




J © X 1 


C«tjjQC-H« « 


• H 


■ri 


SI 






Si 




m 


13 




P, 


,H 


Pi 


l! » i 


( 45-4 


HCfS-rlhiO. ft •> 


<D U 


> 


•H 


O 






ID 


in 


C 





01 





Pj ■( 


5 




S 4> rH 


t: rH X 9 O.W a. P 


J3 ti 


•H 


J3 


.c 




(C 


X 


oi 


0} 




•H 


t. 


E 


D 4 


J 1 


C © 


hi 8 


■P «! 


•D 


O 


* 




^. 


+> 


e 


,3 


+> 


X 





■ ^ 




li (0 I 


.C C Uf ^ 


•-\ P. P. 








© <-i o a 


© » -rt 

tn ••-) © 

-P^ C H 

r-l n -rt -H 


si;? 

O O w 

« « 3 


-p < 

© 
o 


■6 •> E 


o « 1 
■p a 

•H O 

n X 
H u o 




^. X 

• P,0 J 
• C -H 

». ©X X -( 




"O Vi o 

5 . © jo 



«/ <-•>>© c> 
A,© B> -P X 

•OX <« O I. 43 

e -P O bO at o 

.-( Sx -a 



avele 
On 
with 

of o 
they 
aleot 

were 
em. t 




le together 
of the deeds 
tiona, what 


^ « X 

tj • -p 
c a 

•J ^ 

•SI* 

■s c 
-p © IN 

BX 1 

t.-P •« 
© * 



BBgS^n-Ssx'&o 



« R O 

« o ^ 



K O hf © 
•H^ gX . 
B V. -H fi r-4 , 



<D a ^ 

rH >> O 


U a! 
ci 




J^ -P -P 
Si O 


■* 



a 3 oe «> 



d .c -a w 
V c « c 

H I) h -P 



■P 


• 
■p 

■H 
■P 

J3 


<s c 

+> 


•1 

H B B 
» g-rt 


O 
>> 
t 


g».5 

t- E b 


<|1 


>>0 E 


s. 


■ri 


o«^ 


^ -p-S 


4> 

•H 


rH 1. 

n « 
• B 

•O «0 OS 


p o ^ 

§21; 


1 

« 

5 


•H tA -rt 


• 

• MO 


• 


^85 


g :« 


e 


■ o 


& • o 



.s^^ 


^ 


BD-p e +- 


»^ 


•^ w 


A! 


O) « c +> 

H 2 fci C 


1 


e p,^ 1 


« t, e B 


(k 

p!*" 


•H c « 








VX Xe 


• ■* 


B -p o • 


B O 






d to 
nment 
nued 
ippir 
toria 
ports 
IK mor 
> stil 




. -3 J3 -H © O 
to t! -P a) j3 si 

^« 2 0,43 3 


-P 


81 01 


rt © +3 --1 -H M -H +J 

to 6 o fc -p o n 

h kC O +> B o «> 
O © B O © rH 






••M ID o <a u 
en 3 -ri B t-i 

•<*" tc «H « -rl 

o> -H +) o! -e 


1 




B 




•HXtf-Pgcr "t 
C e C 2 T3 i! « 




CO ft-a si n o 






«-l >H O <D ^ «>■ £ 




CVJ « •r^ -H rH W 




I. •P 


^Offll,>3«) «C 

& 4> bC B m « 
^i:,.-IB +>.rtCD(. 
>>«InHOVi3 V.C 


; 


o So 
rH -c a<u U M 
^ e hh +> Ih 

fcl X ® B rt O 
4d ^ 4) 






action 
on the 

Ci 
di spate 
series 
holds, 
and are 
to the 


< 

X 

+■ 
c 




B e ? c c » 

CM 
rH 




s ■ 


^ 1 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4021 

Senator Watkins. Because that carries with it some implications 
that perhaps she would want to explain ; and I think, in fairness, she 
should be permitted to explain it. 

Mr. Morris. Where was that published. Professor K-owe? 

]SIr. RowE. I will have to look that up. It will take a minute. But 
I have the necessary documentation on that. 

As we go along, I will say that I have permission from Professor 
Wells to submit this in evidence before the committee. 

Senator Watkins. You mean this entire document? 

Mr. RowE. Yes, sir. 

This is a letter from Professor Wells, 13 March 1952, with a post- 
script : 

As you may recall, the article was published in the winter of 1950 issue of 
American Perspective, in substantially its original form. 

May I interject a request at this point ? 

Would you make a copy of this and give me back the original ? Is 
that feasible ? 

Senator Watkins. We cannot do that until at least we have given 
Miss Farley that opportunity referred to. 

Mr. RowE. I was thinking of a photographic copy, which would 
contain all this. 

Mr. Morris. We will give it back to you within a short time. 

Mr. RowE. I would be satisfied with a photostat, myself. 

Mr. Morris. No ; we will give you the original. 

Did Andrew Grajdanzev study at Yale University under a grant? 

Mr. RoAVE. Andrew Grajdanzev, whose name at that time had been 
changed to Andrew Grad, was at New Haven during an academic year 
under a grant secured on his behalf by Mr. Holland from the Rocke- 
feller Foundation, constituting in effect a subsidy to allow him to carry 
on his research. 

The idea of having him come to New Haven was that we gave him 
the facilities of the library. We gave him consultative privileges with 
the members of the faculty. And we were supposed in general to 
supervise his work. This was in 1947 or 1948, 1 think. 

He spent one academic year there only, although the original intent 
was to have him spend two academic years with us. The reason he 
left at the end of 1 year with us was that we disapproved of his work. 
This was a unanimous agreement on the part of all the faculty there. 

Mr. Morris. Why did you disagree ? 

Mr. RowE. We considered his work not to have sound scholarly 
method in it. It was so bad from that point of view that we finally 
reported adversely to Mr. Holland in a letter signed by myself and 
at least four of my colleagues, everyone of whom, including an econ- 
omist, a sociologist who specialized on Japan, the late John Embree, 
who was my colleague there at Yale ; a geographer, Karl Pelzer, who 
is a great expert on Asiatic geography ; Prof. Chitoshi Yanaga, who 
was associate professor of political science at Yale. And the general 
agreement was that the wonv simply did not stand up from a scholarly 
point of view. 

Mr. Morris. Did it show any pro-Communist bias ? 

Mr. RowE. It is pretty hard to nail anything of that kind down in 
this particular manuscript. The bias of the manuscript was — I think 
you could call it left wing without any strain on the fact, or without 



4022 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

straining the interpretation too much. But that wasn't the funda- 
mental basis of our objection to it. As a matter of fact, we wouldn't 
have raised objection from a point of view aspect. We raised objec- 
tion from a methodology aspect, and we simply came to the con- 
clusion that this man was not a sound scholar in the field. And, as 
I say, it was a unanimous agreement on our part. 

Now, this grant from Rockefeller for Grad, administered through 
IPE. and then through us, was a very unsatisfactory result, but 
it was typical of a number of others done at that time. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any other ? 

Mr. RowE. For instance, there was a grant for T. A. Bisson, secured 
by IPR from Rockefeller Foundation, and there was another one to 
help finance Rosinger, secured from Rockefeller Foundation through 
IPR. 

Mr. Morris. That last was the one that enabled Mr. Rosinger to 
publish this book, the State of Asia ; was it not ? 

Mr. RowE. I believe that is what it was used for. 

Senator Watkins. All these three men did not work at Yale; did 
they? 

Mr. RowE. No; Rosinger and Bisson worked in the IPR head- 
quarters in New York, as I understood it. And then Bisson was later 
sent from New York out to Berkeley, the University of California, 
where he was supported by further grants from Rockefeller Founda- 
tion, and he is still there on the staff of the political-science depart- 
ment in the University of California at Berkeley, as I remember. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bisson has been subpenaed to 
appear before this committee on Saturday. 

Are there any others you care to mention ? 

Senator Watkins. Mr. Rosinger has already been here ? 

Mr. Morris. Rosinger has been here and has refused to say whether 
or not he was ever a Communist. 

Professor, has the IPR been active in obtaining grants from the 
foundations ? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, yes, indeed. A great amount of money has been 
spent this way by the foundations through IPR. After our unhappy 
experience with Dr. Grad, we decided that we would never accept any 
other such grant again ; that if a man were to work at Yale supported 
by a foundation, the grant would be made to this man directly through 
us and not through the Institute of Pacific Relations. Because, 
whereas Mr. Holland indicated that he wanted us to assist Grad in his 
work and to advise him and to generally supervise, when it came 
down to the question of what kind of manuscript this was, and what 
to do with it, Holland took the ball from us and proceeded to act as 
though our objections didn't cut any ice, and this was not going to be 
done by us any more. 

We have had subsequently much more pleasant experiences with 
other people that have been sent directly to us by Rockefeller Founda- 
tion, and for whom we have the whole responsibility, and whom we 
control, and to whom our supervision has sanctions behind it and has 
meaning. But this was not the case in the case of Mr. Grad, which 
was a very undesirable arrangement from our point of view. And it 
meant that Grad was, in effect, controlled by Holland and not by us ; 
with all that that implied in the nature of his work, approval of the 
product, further support. Because after Grad left us, with this bad 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4023 

mark we gave him, Holland went right back and got more money to 
keep on supporting him, and sent him up to Columbia and had him 
affiliated there. 

]\Ir. Morris. Do you know anything, Professor, of the general 
tendency, to integrate studies and to bring about unanimity of agree- 
ment on any particular subject, w^ith the foundation? 

]\Ir. RowE. If I start out on that, Mr. Morris, I hope you will 
restrain me from talking too long. This is one of the subjects that is 
of peculiar and particular interest to me, and on which I am in general 
disagreement with a lot of my colleagues. 

Mr. Morris. Could you discuss it, Professor Rowe, with the limi- 
tations on it, to the extent that, say, Mr. Holland and the IPE. have 
been a factor in this general tendency ? 

Mr. Ro^vE. Well, let's take a possible hypothetical case. Let's as- 
sume that organization A wants to promote point of view B and they 
get money from foundation C and allocate it to a lot of people. They 
want to have a place for these people to work. They want to main- 
tain them. So they send them around to universities like Yale, Co- 
lumbia, and California, three I have mentioned where this actually 
happened, you see. And they hold the final strings. 

Now, of course, in the interests supposedly of efficiency, integration, 
coordination, and all these shibboleths of the American foundation 
point of view, maybe this is a good thing. From my point of view, 
the foundations and these research organizations like the Institute 
of Pacific Relations have gone hog wild on the coordination of re- 
search. They have committed themselves so thoroughly to coordi- 
nation of research that in fact instead of supporting a great variety 
of research projects, which would enrich the American intellectual 
scene through variegation, which is a value I very basically believe 
in, you have a narrowing of emphasis, a concentration of power, a 
concentration of authority, and an impoverishment of the American 
intellectual scene. 

These people like organization. They like to have a man in a 
university, for example, who will take the responsibility for organiz- 
ing research around a narrow topic. This means he acquires a stajff, 
and you go to work on a special project. You may spend $250,000 
or $500,000 working on some narrow field, which may or may not 
ever yield you any results. 

If I were doing the thing, I would talk in terms of supporting in- 
dividual scholars, and not in terms of supporting these highly or- 
ganized concentrated narrow specialized research projects that are 
supported in some of the universities. 

Now, as I said, I am off on a hobbyhorse at this point. But it is of 
particular interest, because by exercising power over research in this 
way, you see, by insisting on the integration of research activity, 
anybody who wants to, can control the results of research in American 
universities. And I think this is a very questionable business that 
the public ought to look at very, very closely, and see whether they 
want a few monopolies of the money, like, for instance, the Rocke- 
feller Foundation, the Carnegie Corp., who have done immense 
amounts of good, to emphasize narrow concentration to the extent 
that they have. 

Mr. Morris. Well, can you think of a particular example of how this 
would be applied, Professor? 



4024 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. Well, I can cite cases in wliicli I think this method has 
been overdone, this kind of an approach has been overdone, cases in 
which a quarter of a million dollars is allocated over a 10-year period 
for research on a narrow topic in Chinese history, let's say, in which 
the graduate students who come into this field in that university are 
pushed into confining their research to this narrow field so as to 
contribute to it; where the personnel drawn into the university is 
drawn into this framework; and where, as a result, the broad gen- 
eral interest in the whole field of Chinese history is made difficult 
to maintain. All this is done in the interest of efficiency, you know, 
the great American shibboleth. 

I often say that if we try to become as efficient as the really efficient, 
supposedly, people, the dictators, then we destroy American scholar- 
ship and everything that it stands for. And I often wonder whether 
my colleagues realize who won the last war. Intellectually speaking, 
this country has a great danger of intellectually trying to imitate the 
totalitarian approach, in allowing people at centers of financial 
power — they aren't political powers in this sense — to tell the public 
what to study and what to work on, and to set up a framework. 

Now, of course, as you know, scholars like freedom. Maybe they 
come up with a lot of useless information. But in my value standard, 
as soon as we diminish the free exercise of unhampered curiosity, free 
curiosity, by channeling our efforts along this line, we then destroy the 
American mentality. Because the great feature of the American men- 
tality is the belief in allowing people to rush off in all kinds of different 
directions at once. Because we don't know what is absolutely right. 
You can't tell that far in advance. 

If I may just continue one moment more. Senator, I would like to 
point out to you that Adolf Hitler very effectively crippled atomic 
research in Germany by telling the physicists what he wanted them 
to come up with. Now, this is true. And if you can do that in atomic 
physics, you can do it 10 times as fast in the so-called social sciences, 
which really aren't sciences at all, where really opinion, differentiation 
of opinion, is the thing that matters and what we stand for- in 
this country. 

That is why I become very much inflamed when I even smell the 
first hint of a combination in restraint of trade in the intellectual 
sphere. 

Now, you see what I am talking about with this interlocking direc- 
torate? That is what bothers me about it. I don't mind if the boys 
go oft' and have a club of their own. That is their own business. But 
when you get a tie-in of money, a tie-in of the promotion of mono- 
graphs, a tie-in of research, and a tie-in of publication, then I say that 
the intellectuals are having the reins put on them and blinders. 

Senator Watkins. Otherwise, they do not get on the team. 

Mr. EowE. That is right. They don't get on the team, and they don't 
get a chance to carry the ball. 

Now, to the faculty member, this means money, income, what he 
lives on. It is vital. It is not just some recreational thing, you see. 

Senator Watkins. What I wanted to ask you was this : As a matter 
of practice, is it not true that in graduate schools of most of our Amer- 
ican universities and colleges, the head of the department usually 
pretty well dictates to the young man who is working for his Ph. D. or 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4025 

master of arts what he is going to write about or what field he is going 
to investigate ? 

]^Ir. RowE. No, sir, Senator, not in any department I have ever been 
connected with. The student is in an open market, where he can go 
and buy the specialty that any professor has got to offer. 

Senator WxYtkins. It has to be approved, though. 

Mr. Ro'v^T]. Oh, yes. It has to be approved. But remember this. 
At this point, you get into the activities of the club. And this is one 
of the ways in which the individual has a chance to assert himself, 
because, as you know, if Mr. X doesn't approve of Mr. Y's project, 
then Mr. Y doesn't have to approve his project. I mean, there is a 
trade back and forth business. 

Senator Watkins. There is an interlocking group. 

Mr. RowE. In the interlocking group it is a different business. This 
has to do with monopoly of funds and support for research work in 
the large. I am not talking now about students and dissertations and 
things of that sort. 

Senator Watkins. This is more or less research when the student is 
taking his work for his Ph. D. and he has to write his dissertation. 

Mr. RowE. But you see, actually, Senator, the only place I know 
of where all students in the field of Chinese history are integrated into 
the study of one 15-year period of Chinese history, is in connection 
with one of these research projects. 

That is the only case in the United States that I know of. I have 
never seen it operate any place else. 

This kind of thing is supported by foundation money. And, of 
course, the temptation is to bring everybody in and integrate, through 
a genteel process of bribery. That is to say, you support the student, 
you give him a fellowship, if he will buy your subject matter area. 
And if you do this for 15 years, the only Ph. D.'s you turn out will be 
people who know that 12-year period or 15-year period of Cliinese 
history. I say this is intellectual impoverishment. 

Senator Watkins. You think that is not true, however, elsewhere? 

Mr. RowE. It is not generally true. 

Senator Watkins. I hope it is not, because I thought maybe it might 
be in some universities I know about. 

Mr. RowE. It is not generally true, but it is the inevitable kind of 
thing which happens with this hot pursuit of efficiency, integration. 
And, of course, remember this. The foundation people have to have 
jobs. They have to have something to administer. They don't want 
to give away the money to the universities and say "Go ahead and 
spend it any way you want." They want to see that the activity pays. 
That is, we have got to have a regular flow of the so-called materials 
of research coming out. We want to see this flow in certain quantity. 
It has to have a certain weight in the hand. And to see that this 
happens, we do not just give it to a university, where they are going 
to allow any Tom, Dick, and Harry of a professor to do his own thing. 
"No, we want an integration." 

As I warned, Mr. Morris, you see — he set me off, here. 

Senator Watkins. I take it that is a pretty good plea for the imi- 
versity as against the foundation. 

Mr. RoAVE. Absolutely. And, as a matter of fact. I couldn't find a 
better illustration of the dangere of consistently over the years do- 



4026 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

nating very large sums of money to organizations, you see, for research 
purposes, than is involved in the very Institute of Pacific Relations 
itself. It is a fine illustration of the fact that power corrupts, and the 
more power you get the more corrupt you get. 

Mr. Morris. Does the Far Eastern Association work with the Insti- 
tute of Pacific Relations on such projects, or is their function different? 

Mr. RowE. There is a general coordination back and forth. 

Mr. Holland, at the outset of the Far Eastern Association, was on 
their relevant committee having to do with publications. Well, any 
banker can recognize that this is an interlocking directorate. At this 
point, the Institute of Pacific Relations, in coordination with the Far 
Eastern Association, has a great deal of influence in the field of publi- 
cation, you see. Not so much sponsorship of research by local grants, 
and so on. They do some of that, too. But if you want to get your 
book published, you go to them, you see, and ask them for a subsidy 
to get it put out. This is done quite a bit. That shows an interrela- 
tionship between these two organizations. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what part does Mortimer Graves have in the 
general field of grants and research? 

Mr. RowE. Well, Mr. Graves is connected with and has been for 
years, the American Council of Learned Societies. This is an organi- 
zation with offices in Washington, and it is a council in which the 
interests of all the various learned societies are promoted and 
advanced. 

For a long time, particularly in the early phases of the develop- 
ment of far eastern studies in the United States, Mr. Graves occupied 
an important position there, because of his interest in the training of 
people to become far eastern specialists. 

Some subsidies are still given to people of this kind through the 
Council of Learned Societies, but this is now merely a trickle to what 
it used to be, and proportionately it is a minor proposition. Most of 
the subsidies are now given otherwise. 

I will say that the biggest single subsidizer of recent far easiem 
studies has been the United States Government, through the GI bill of 
rights. That is a fact. But that is now running out. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, has Mortimer Graves, to your knowl- 
edge, been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. RowE. I don't know much about any activity he had in the 
Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Mr. Morris. He is a member of the present board of trustees, is he 
not, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. RowE. He is very closely involved in anything having to do 
with the far eastern field, far eastern studies. He knows all the 
people. 

For years, he used to keep a card file of people in the field at vary- 
ing stages in their preparation, and during the time when universities 
were expanding in this field, that is, when the university would want 
to set up a department or jjet a man in this field, they would often be 
referred directly to Mr. Graves for recommendations of personnel. 
And he did a very efficient job of keeping records along this line. 

Mr. Morris, Was any inducement ever made to you in connection 
with your membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations that would 
indicate it would be favorable to you to 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4027 

Mr. Ro"\VE. Well, I would say this. I was indoctrinated at some 
point in my education with a general distaste for joining many or- 
ganizations. I have a feeling I got this from my former professor of 
politics at Princeton, Prof. William Starr Myers. But wherever I 
got it, it is a fact. And when I first came back from China and en- 
tered into my first academic job in Princeton in 1938, 1 refrained from 
joining the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

I was approached and invited, but I refrained from joining. And 
I will say that the only reason I ever did join was on account of a letter 
I got from Mr. Lockwood, who was then in the organization, the 
general tenor of which was that young people just starting out in 
the far eastern field are "well advised to become a member of this 
organization." It was a very genteel statement, but the meaning of it 
was quite obvious. And I joined only because I got that letter. It is 
the sort of a letter that a young man beginning in a profession can 
hardly afford to disregard. Five dollars a year to protect yourself? 
O. K. You pay. You join. That is the only interest I had at the 
time. 

I later got involved in the organization, and as I told you this 
morning became a member of the board of trustees in 1947. But in 
1938, well, $5 was pretty important to me in those days. On a salary 
of $2,000 a year, I didn't join more organizations than I had to. 

Senator Watkins. You were not a professional joiner, then, at 
that time ? 

Mr. RoAVE. No, sir. 

Senator Watkins. We have had some witnesses who apparently 
did not take that course. 

Mr. RowE. I only belong to two professional organizations now, 
the Political Science Association and the Far Eastern Association. 

Senator Watkins. I would like to ask your age. 

Mr. RowE. I was born in October 1905, which makes my next birth- 
day coming up 47. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else in your experience that you 
think should be added to our record with respect to our inquiry into 
the Institute of Pacific Relations ? 

Mr. RowE. Let me take a moment to think that over, and see. 

Mr. Morris. Have you told us completely about your experiences 
withlNDUSCO? 

Mr. RowE. Oh, by far not completely, but I think I brought in the 
significant element. 

I do think there is one thing I ought to take care of if I haven't 
done so already. And I don't believe I have entered this. 

Two years ago, almost precisely 2 years ago, dated March 27, 1950, 
I got a letter from Professor Fairbank, circulated as a personal letter 
to various friends and colleagues in far eastern studies, and marked 
"Urgent" in capital letters, requesting that I write a testimonial in 
favor of Professor Lattimore. Did I mention that this morning? 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; you did. 

Mr. RowE. I wanted to cover that, to be sure that it was taken care 
of, precisely what I said at that time. 

Senator Watkins. What did he ask you to do? Just a generaliza- 
tion is all that we have for the record, I think, at this time. 

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, will you put your answer in the 
record ? 



4028 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

Mr. RowE. I would be glad to put in, first, the invitation, second, 
the copy of the letter that Fairbank himself sent to Senator Tydings, 
and third, my reply to the letter from Dr. Fairbank. I will put that 
all in the record, if you want. 

Mr. Morris. Yes ; please do. 

Mr. Chairman, may that be received? 

Senator Watkins. They may be received. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 615, 616, 
617" and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 615 

127 LiTTAUER Center, Harvard University, 

Cambridge, Mass., March 27, 1950. 

Urgent 

A Personal Letter to Various Friends and Colleagues in Far-Eastern 

Studies 

Dear Dave: Having known Owen Lattimore pretty well since 1932, I am 
naturally appalled at McCarthy's reckless and irresponsible name-calling and I 
have no doubt that Owen will give a good account of himself when he gets back 
from Afghanistan early in April. 

Personally, I am thoroughly convinced that Owen Lattimore is a completely 
loyal American. I imagine McCarthy can extract sentences from his voluminous 
writings which, out of context, may sound "pro-Soviet" on some points or issues, 
since Owen has expressed himself freely on many controversial subjects and is 
creative rather than orthodox in his thinking ; but this is far different from being 
actually "pro-Soviet" or disloyal to our country. 

It seems to me all of us in the far-eastern field face the prospect that McCarthy's 
smear tactics in this one case may make our proper professional work more diffi- 
cult for all of us. If Owen Lattimore, a leader in American research and writing 
on Asia and a member and officer of bodies like the Far Eastern Association and 
the Institute of Pacific Relations, remains publicly besmirched as of doubtful 
loyalty, the taint can easily spread to those of us who know him personally 
and/or professionally and we can all be put on the defensive in our efforts to 
contribute to realistic public understanding of our urgent Asiatic problems. If 
American scholars are intimidated or put under public suspicion, in their study 
of Asia, it can contribute to great disasters for the American people, in their 
difficult relations with Asia. 

Naturally, if McCarthy produces some new and convincing evidence about 
Owen to support his sensational charges, I would rely on our government's 
appropriate action to judge the case on its merits. But if Owen is to be judged 
by the record of what he has said and written over the years, I feel a deep obliga- 
tion to testify in some way concerning this record. After all, those of us in the 
field of Far Eastern studies are in a position to judge Owen's published views 
professionally, as Senators and the press and the public are not. It seems to 
me we owe it to our profession (to say nothing of the personal interests of Owen 
Lattimore and of ourselves as individuals), to put our individual opinions on 
record. Our primary object should not be to help a friend (though this may be 
a strong sentiment with you, as it is with me), but to help our country and 
perform our proper function as citizens who are also professional workers. If 
Owen's writings have been anti-American, disloyal, or the like, in our opinion 
as students of the Far Eastern scene, we should let our government and the 
American public know this opinion. Similarly, if we do not think he has been 
"pro-Soviet," as far as we can judge, we should let this be known. 

I therefore urge that you state your opinion for public record at once in a letter 
to Senator Millard E. Tydings, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. Since 
his mail is already mountainous, it would help even more if you would send a 
carbon copy of your letter to Owen's attorney, Mr. Abe Fortas, firm of Arnold, 
Fortas, and Porter, Ring Building, Washington, D. O. 
Sincerely yours, 

John K. Fairbank, 
Professor of History, Harvard University. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4029 

Exhibit No. 616 

Maech 27, 1950. 

copy for youu information 

Senator Millard E. Ttdings, 

Senate Office Building, Washington. D. C. 

Dear Senator Tydings : Senator McCarthy's allegation that Owen Lattimore is 
a "top Soviet agent" seems to me completely incredible, on the basis of my long 
acquaintance with Mr. Lattimore and with his writings. I have specialized on 
Chinese history since 1929, have known Owen Lattimore since 1932, and in the 
course of my professional work have had occasion to read a very considerable 
amount of what he has written, both in books and in articles. I have also heard 
him speak many times and have had conversations with him many times. I have 
never heard him express views or make statements which were disloyal in char- 
acter, and I firmly believe him to be a thoroughly loyal and law-abiding American 
citizen who is devoted to the free, democratic way of life of this country. 

Among his writings, I recall having read in particular The Desert Road to 
Turkestan, High Tartary, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict, The Mongols of Man- 
churia, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Solution in Asia, Situation in Asia, and 
Pivot of Asia, the last of which (on Sinkiang province) I reviewed on the front 
page of the New York Herald Tribune Book Review two weeks ago. I have also 
read a great many of his articles in Pacific Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and other 
journals. I have not agreed with everything that Mr. Lattimore has said in this 
very extensive body of writing, but I am absolutely convinced in my own mind 
that its general tenor has been loyal and not disloyal to the United States and 
that it has not been ''pro-Soviet" nor pro-Communist. 

On the contrary, I regard Owen Lattimore as one of the most creative and 
independent-minded of American scholars on Asia. I further believe that his 
unusual capacity for thinking in terms of the broad and abstract principles of 
historical change and international relations, has undoubtedly led him to make 
statements in some of his books w^hich can be extracted from their context and 
pointed to by some persons with suspicion, providing the context of such state- 
ments is disregarded. He has specialized (and I would say he has become a 
"national strategic asset") on the little-known frontier regions between Russia 
and China, where the Soviet record has to be compared with the Chinese record 
of recent years. As I have stated above, he has made some interpretative state- 
ments and comments with which I personally would not agree, but in no case 
have these statements seemed to me to involve disloyal, anti-American, or pro- 
Communist leanings. 

Considering our urgent national need, in the dire struggle against Russia 
in Asia, for expert knowledge of Asia such as Mr. Lattimore demonstrably 
possesses, it seems to me the national interest demands that the accusation of 
disloyalty against him be thoroughly investigated and publicly disproved, as 
I am confident it will be, so that his future usefulness to his country will be 
impaired as little as possible. 

John K. Faibbank, 
Professor of History, Harvard JJniversittf. 



Exhibit No. 617 

Professor J. K. Faibbank, 

121 Littauer Center, Harvard University, 

Camhridge, Mass. 

Dear John : I received your round-robin letter of March 27 and the enclosure 
of the same date. I subsequently received from you the copy of Paul Line- 
barger's letter to Senator Tydings, all these documents having to do with the 
case of Owen Lattimore and the investigation of him initiated at the sug- 
gestion of Senator McCarthy. 

I would like to indicate to you my view on the subject of your letter. Senator 
McCarthy may fail to prove his charges against Owen Lattimore. However, 
I must confess complete ignorance on the question of his most serious charges. 
I am certainly not qualified to state anything, either pro or con on the ques- 
tion of whether Owen is a Communist agent or not. I suppose that the investiga- 
tion is intended to bring out proof one way or the other on this question. Since, 
however, I have practically no contacts which would provide me with any evi- 



4030 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 

dence on affiliation of this kind one way or another, I believe I am completely 
disqualified to write Mr. Tydings a letter, since such a letter would be based 
upon subjective impression or belief, and not upon knowledge or facts in the 
case. Any such letter might lay me open to a charge of participating in an 
attempt to establish "innocence by association." 

On this matter of subjective impression or belief. I would personally tend 
to follow your opinion that Owen Lattimore is a completely loyal American. 
This has nothing to do with whether Lattimore's writings or public utterances 
contain material which duplicates the Soviet line on Far Eastern Affairs, a sub- 
ject on which I have as yet seen no evidence of careful, scientific investigation 
as a basis of generalized statement. Along this line, I would like to say that 
the second paragraph of your round-robin letter seems pretty much beside the 
point. The question of whether McCarthy can extract sentences from Latti- 
more's writings which, "out of context", might sound "pro-Soviet on some points 
of issue," at least out to be completely irrelevant to your case. It does seem to 
me that the McCarthy investigation so far, as it relates to Lattimore, has 
stressed this sort of thing, without, however, basing evidence upon any scientific 
content — analysis of Lattimore's writings. 

The investigation now seems to have shifted to the question of whether 
Lattimore has had formal or direct affiliations with, or disciplined subordination 
to, established agents or agencies of the Russians. This sounds too fantastic 
to possibly be true. But as I said before it is a subject on which I personally 
have no information that I could offer Senator Tydings and his committee as 
evidenced one way or the other. Therefore, I believe the only course of action 
is to wait for the results of the committee investigation. If, as Owen claims, 
McCarthy's charges will fall flat on their face, all well and good. If, on the other 
hand, these charges should be proved then the fullest possible opportunity ought 
to be given for such proof to be submitted. 

As far as Linebarger's letter of March 27 is concerned, I am fully in agree- 
ment with his views of Owen Lattimore's ideas on our Far Eastern policy. I 
must, however, state that in my opinion the third paragraph of his letter is 
completely irrelevant. Linebarger has used the old tactic, the reverse of the 
"guilt by association" idea, that of reduction to absurdity. The investigation 
itself may quite possibly reduce McCarthy's charges to absurdity, but Line- 
barger's efforts to do so in advance of the submission of whatever evidence 
there is, are to say the least, completely premature. 

There is also no question but that an investigation of this kind may quite 
conceivably result in injury to an innocent person. If and when these charges 
against Lattimore are proved groundless, then I believe that the final paragraph 
of Linebarger's letter calling for a resolution of apology by the Senate to each 
individual who has been injured by this investigation, would become quite 
relevant. 

Sincerely yours, 

David N. Rowe, 
Professor of Political Science. 

Mr. Rowe. These are stenographic copies I hasten to add, that is, 
copies from the originals. They are not photostatic copies. I have 
every reason to believe they are reasonably accurate. 

Senator Watkins. You have seen the originals, and you have read 
them through to see that they conform ? 

Mr. Rowe. You might find a few commas out of the way, but by 
and large, I believe the secretary did a pretty good job. 

Mr. Morris. Are you able to testify that at that time Dr. Fairbank 
was organizing a defense for Mr. Lattimore? 

Mr. Rowe. It seems to me the plain implication from this. He cir- 
culated this around to, as he said, friends and colleagues in the far 
eastern studies. And he asked us to write letters to attorneys for 
Professor Lattimore supporting Lattimore. And my answer I char- 
acterized this morning, and it is embodied in this document. 

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Watkins. I have none, either. 



INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4031 

I want to thank Professor Rowe for coming here. I think he has 
given us a very intelligent discussion of the subject matter. 

Mr. RoAVE. I am glad to be of any service possible. 

I think this is a very important investigation. 

Senator Watkins. I am not attempting to give any judgment as 
to the weight that ought to be given to your various conclusions, 
Mr. Rowe. 

Mr. Rowe. I understand that, sir. 

Senator Watkins. But I think you have been fair and you have 
been responsive to the questions we have asked. 

Mr. Ro\VE. Thank you. 

Mr. MoREis. And, Professor Rowe, this will be returned to you in 
its original form. That is the Welles' article. 

Senator Watkins. The committee will be in recess until tomorrow 
morning at 10 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 4 : 45 p. m., Thursday, March 27, 1952, the hearing 
was recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, March 28, 1952.) 



88348— 52— pt. 11 21 



INDEX TO PART 11 



Note. — The Senate Inteiiial Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to 
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization 
in this index. 

A 

Page 

Abend 3923 

Aberle, Dr. David F 3961 

Acheson, Dean (Secretary of State) 3813,3955-3956,8986,3993 

Adler, Solomon 3903, 3983 

Afghanistan 3909,4028 

Agrarian Institutes 3934 

Agrarian Problems in Southwest China 3916 

Agrarian Reformers 3798, 3815, 3895, 3981 

Alcatraz 3919 

Alexander 3922 

All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries 3934 

Allen, G. C 3867 

Allen, George 3997, 3998 

Allen, James S. (Sol Aurbach ( ?) ) 3842 

Alley, Rewi 3791, 3793, 4002 

Allied Labor News 3903 

Allison, John 3894, 3900 

Alsberg, Gary L 3857, 3932 

Amendments (first and fifth) 3959 

Amerasia 3887 

America and the Far Eastern War, World in Arms 3884 

American 3723-3726, 

3748, 3757, 3767, 3782-3783, 3797, 3802, 3810, 3812, 3814, 3816, 3850, 
3856-3857, 3864, 3866, 3874, 3876, 3879, 3882, 3917, 3932, 3942, 3974, 
3989, 4002, 4007, 4021, 4023, 4028-4030. 

American Communists 3790, 3856, 3873, 3895 

American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. (See 
INDUSCO.) 

American Council of Learned Societies 4026 

American Council on Education 3880, 3887-3888 

American Freedom and Catholic Power 3830 

American Historical Association 3969, 4011 

American Labor Party 3841 

American Military Adviser Group in China. (See MAGIC.) 

American Oriental Society 3969,3971 

American People's Fund 3879,3880,3888-3889,4011 

American Policy in the Far East 3883 

American Political Science Association 3767,3969,4027 

American President Lines 3879 

American Publication Service of the American Embassy 3803 

American Youth for Democracy (AYD) 3823-3824,3843 

Amsterdam 3934 

Amsterdam News 3845-3846 

Amtorg Trading Corp 3928-3929 

Anglo-French Negotiations 3931 

Anglo-Japanese Struggle for the World Markets 3935 

Ankara, Turkey 3757 

Annals of the American xicademy of Social and Political Science 3981, 3986 

APO (Army Post Office) 3939 

Archbold, Mrs. Anne 3794 



n INDEX 

Pae« 

Arita 3931 

Arndt, Dr. C. O 3964 

Arnold, Fortas & Porter 4028 

Aronson, Jack 3840 

Asia 3767-3768. 3771, 3811-3812, 3815-3816, 3863, 3866, 3881-3882, 3885, 3887, 

3893, 3908-3909, 3926, 3943, 3946-3947, 3955, 3959, 3970-3971, 3986, 

3991, 3994, 4028-4029. 

Asia Institute 3903 

Asia's Captive Colonies 3880 

Asiatic 3758, 3815, 3947, 3957, 3990, 4005 

Atkinson, Brooks 3757 

Atkinson, Ellen 3903, 3964 

Atlas of Far Eastern Politics 3937 

Austin, Dr. William M 3961 

Australia 3851, 3881, 3936 

Australian railways 3936 

Austern, Hilda 3859 

B 

Badger, Vice Adm 3838 

Bale de Cam Ranh 3936 

Bailie Memorial Technical Training School 3792-3793 

Baker, Newton D 3851, 3857, 3881 

Baldwin, Hanson 3801 

Ballantine, Joseph W 3894, 3900 

Baltic countries 3944 

Bangkok 3815, 3936 

Bank of China 3950 

Barnes, Joseph F 3854, 3883, 3896, 3907, 3941 

Barnes, Kathleen 3775,3929 

Barnett, Patricia 3964 

Barnett, Robert W 3964, 3983 

Barr, Maj. Gen. David 3994 

Barrett, Edward W 3998 

Berger, Milton 3964 

Bassett, Ted 3826 

Batangas Province 3815 

Baxter, Dr. James Phinney 3805 

Beech, Ethel 3841 

Behind the Open Door ^ 3943 

Bentley, Elizabeth T 3730-3731, 3733, 3755-3756, 3758, 3774, 3781, 3875 

Bernstein, Joseph M 3943 

Bessarabia 3944 

Biggerstaff, Prof 3980, 3982, 3993, 4011-4012 

Bingham, Robert C 3962 

Bisson, T. A 3793, 3800-3804, 3883, 3895-3896, 3904, 3941, 3983, 4022 

Black, Mrs. Hugo 3794 

Blanchard, Paul 3830 

Bliven 3923 

Bloch, Kurt 3921 

Bodde, Prof. Derk 4012 

Book and Magazine