^i^f^iilSuilSK^Kii]^^
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTEATION
OF THE INTEENAL SECUKITY ACT AND OTHER
INTEENAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 14
MAY 2 AND JUNE 20, 1952
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
i,.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INYESTICiATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGEESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 14
MAY 2, JUNE 20, 1952
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
88343 WASHINGTON : 1952
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGBR, North Dakota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON. Washington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEPAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
J. G. SoDKWiNE, Counsel
Internal Secturity Subcommittee
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
Robert Morkis, Special Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
II
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS
FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1952
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
New York, N. Y.
The subcommitte met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., Hon Pat Mc-
Carran, chairman, presiding.
Present : Senator McCarran.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; Robert Morris,
subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Morris. Both Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland have been sworn
previously.
The Chairman. Very well ; they have been sworn.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, yesterday afternoon I spent some time
with Mr. Lockwood presenting to him copies of letters written to
him and written by him. He was able to spend the afternoon on this,
and he did make a statement authenticating the documents.
Mr. Mandel, will you identify these for the record, please?
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a list of those documents ?
Mr. Mandel. I have a list which was drawn up under my direction.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that a true list of that batch of documents ?
Mr. Mandel. It is.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you offer that list for the record ?
Mr. Mandel. I can.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, in connection with this list, did you notice
there have been two amendments since it was originally compiled ?
Mr. Mandel. The list is authentic with the exclusion of those.
Mr. Morris. Those amendments are two letters, one a letter from
W. W. Lockwood to Col. William Mayer dated December 26, 1942,
which is file No. 131B. The other is a letter to Philo W. Parker and
others from William W. Lockwood dated December 2, 1942, No.
131B.2. They were both added by Mr. Lockwood yesterday.
The Chairman. The witness identifies everything except those two?
Mr. Morris. No, they have been added to Mr. Mandel's list.
The Chairman. Does he identify those ?
Mr. JNIoRRis. Yes. I am going to introduce his statement on that.
The Chairman. He identifies them as what?
Mr. Morris. JSIr. Mandel will testify that all of the documents on
this list as amended were taken from the files of the Institute of Pa-
cific Relations. It that risht, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
4907
4908 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman, Is that true?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Yesterday Mr. Lockwood stated that he could not be
liere today, and he gave a sworn statement to me which reads :
State of New York,
County of New York, sa :
I have examined the documents described in the list attached hereto as
exhibit A. While many of the documents so described are documents of which
I have no present recollection, I am satisfied that all of the documents listed in
exhibit A are letters or memoranda or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me
or received by me.
^ , [s] William A. Lockwood.
Dated : May 1, 1952.
Present :
[s] Robert Morris
Robert Morris
[s] Stuart Marks
•Stuart Marks
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you there, and that was your client's list?
Mr. Marks. Yes ; that is true.
Mr. SouRwiNE. May the list and the affidavit together with the
documents which are named in that list ba offered for the rex^ord at
this time ?
Tlie Chairman. They may be inserted in the record at this time.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 765 to 771,
inclusive; 773 to 782, inclusive, and 784 to 799 C" and a])i:.ear on
pp. 4958 through 4983.)
The Chairman. Who is this gentleman ?
Mr. Morris. This is Mr. Marks of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunder-
land & Kiendl. He is counsel for Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter.
May the documents be numbered consecutively ?
The Chairman. They may be numbered consecutively in order of
previous exhibits.
Mr. Morris. When Mr. Lockwood appeared. Senator, he author-
ized me to make the statement that the list is accurate.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I offer you a group of documents together
with a list appended thereto. Will you tell us wliat are those docu-
ments and what is that list?
Mr. ]\Iandel. The documents I hold are taken from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations or submitted by officers of the Institute
of Pacific Relations, of wdiich documents I made an itemized list.
Mr. SouRAviNE. The list is that list you made ?
Mr. Mandel. The list is the list I hold in my hand.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that a true and correct list of the documents
that you have in that batch ?
Mr. Mandel. It is.
The Chairman. The list is one thing. The documents are another.
The list was made by you ?
Mr. Mandel. The list was made under my direction from the
documents.
The Chairman. All right. Are you offering the list, so-called, or
are you offering the documents ? I take it that you are offering the
documents.
Mr. Morris. We are going to offer the documents.
Mr. Souravine. The list is in fact an inventory of those documents.
Mr. Mandel. That is correct.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFICi RELATIONS 4909
Mr. Sot RwiNE. Mr. Chairman, we are proffering the list also as
evidence of what this batch of documents contains.
The Chairman. That is all right. That is merely a list that was
made by Mr, Mandel or under his direction, but the documents are
taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Morris. Are all of those documents taken from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Mandel. All except one, which was prepared by Mr. Holland
at our request.
Mr. Morris. What is that?
Mr. Mandel. That is a list of the staff members of the Institute of
Pacific Relations.
The Chairman. As of what date ?
Mr. Mandel. Various dates. There is one list from 1936 to 1943.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may we not consider this at this time ?
That does not belong in there.
The Chairman. I think that is correct. I think that is the best
way to handle that.
Mr. Mandel. The others are all documents from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, NEW YORK, N. Y., AND
EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY
STUART MARKS, ATTORNEY AT LAW
Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, have you had an opportunity to look at
the documents that we have now offered for the record?
Mr. Holland. Yes, I have been through that whole list.
Mr. Morris. Have you in connection with that group of documents
looked at the list that has been compiled by Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Holland. Yes. The list seems to be complete with the excep-
tion of the document you have just removed. I found corresponding
documents to each item in the list. I am prepared to identity all of
the documents with the exceptions which I will name in a moment
as letters or memoranda written by me or received by me in the
course of my work with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. What are the exceptions ?
Mr. Holland. Three exceptions that I wish to note are: One, a
letter which appears to be from me to a man called Harondar, an
official of the Soviet council. He was an official of the Soviet council
of the IPR.
Mr. Morris. ^Vhere does that appear on the list?
Mr. Holl.\nd. That is item No. 4, I believe, and the point is that
it only appears to be the last page of a letter and a copy. It is un-
signed and is not a carbon. While it seems to me like a perfectly
normal letter, I have no means of identifying what the beginning of
the letter was nor do I happen to remember writing this particular
paragraph.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, apparently by mistake we have only
the second page of this letter, and I move that this be stricken from
the list.
The Chairman. Just do not offer it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I believe since this is on the list and since Mr.
Holland has testified about it, it should not be stricken from the list.
4910 INSTITUTE QF PACIFIC RELATIONS
As the chairman suggested, it should be exchided from the offer.
The Chairman. Just remove it from the offer at this time. You
may be able to identify it at a later time.
Mr. Holland. The second exception, which is I think about item
No. 15, your exhibit No. 819, is an unsigned memorandum with the
initials "W. L. H. and K. M. from E. C. C," giving background infor-
mation on the Muslim League in India. This, too, is a letter which
I have no recollection of and is unsigned. It appears to me to be a
perfectly normal kind of memorandum and one which I might well
have seen, but it just so happens that I cannot myself identify it.
The Chairman. Mr. Carter's initials are on there; are they not?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
The Chairman. Does he identify or recall it?
Mr. Morris. It has now been offered to Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. It has every external appearance of being a photo-
stat of an interoffice memorandum of mine to Mr. Holland and Miss
Mitchell. I do not remember it, but it seems to be authentic, and I
do not identify who the author is, what the source of the enclosure is.
The Chairman. How do your initials appear on it; from or to you?
Mr. Carter. The initials "W. L. H. and K. M. from E. C. C." My
signature is not on it. There is a mark here, "Carter," which is not
in my handwriting, but I think it is one of the routine information
memorandums and while I do not remember it specifically, I should see
no reason why it should not be used in the record.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, you say you have a third exception?
Mr. Holland. I have a third one. This is I think about five more
items down the list, your file No. 823. This is the one item already
mentioned, a free distribution list for a memorandum called Korean
Industry and Transport by A. J. G., presumably A. J. Grajdanzev.
I have no recollection of this list, and it would appear to be some-
thing prepared by someone on my staff, but I do recall the memo-
randum, and it is perfectly likely that it was distributed in fact to
the list indicated there.
The Chairman. You make no objection to its being attached?
Mr. Holland. No, sir. The remaining exception is the fifth from
the last, your file No. 862. This is an original letter from a Chinese
by the name of Tseng to S. B. Thomas, and I am prepared to say
that this appears to me to be an authentic copy of a letter sent to a
junior member of my staff who had apparently requested some docu-
ments from a Chinese book agency in Peking.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, you will notice that there is on the letter
from Mr. Tseng a pencil notation, "rewrite for Bill to sign," and the
Bill presumably is you.
Mr. Holland. Yes. The following is a letter from me which I
acknowledge and identify.
Mr. Morris. So even though one-half of the correspondence is
addressed to S. B. Thomas, the answer to that was prepared by you?
Mr. Holland. That is true. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the list which
you just excluded is one which I sent to the committee some weeks
ago.
Mr. Morris. Let me finish this other thing first.
Mr. Chairman, in view of Mr. Mandel's testimony and Mr. Holland's
testimony in connection with these documents, may they all be re-
ceived in the record ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4911
The Chairman. They may all be received into the record.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 800, 802,
804 to 866," and appear on pp. 4984 through 5031.)
The Chairman. You are going to have to be very careful about
identifying these documents because you are putting them in in
clusters, and each one of them should have a serial nmnber.
Mr. Morris. They do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is why I am asking that the list in each case
go in. The documents themselves have been physically examined in-
dividually by the witnessses who are testifying with respect to the
list, which is an accurate list of the documents, and the testimony
of Mr, Mandel and of Mr. Holland, who said he had checked it,
is simply to save the time of the committee and to shorten this hear-
ing. If the list goes in and also the documents, I believe we will have
a clear record on it.
The Chairman. I understand the testimony, first, as to Mr. Mandel,
saying that these are copies of instruments found in the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. Secondly, Mr. Holland identifies
each and every one of these as being instruments that were in the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Am I correct in that?
Mr. Holland. Subject to the qualifications which I have just in-
dicated.
The Chairman. Subject to the qualifications that you made.
Mr. Holland. Finally, Mr. Chairman, just so that there will be
correspondence between the typed list and the documents, I notice two
or three typographical, minor errors. On your file No. 807 it should
read "to W. L. H. from E. C. C." At present you have it reversed. On
your file No. 818 it should read "to W. L. Holland from William T.
Stone" and not William T. Johnstone as you have it in your list.
On your item 837, apparently a slip in the carbon copy — it may not
appear on the original — it should read "to William L. Holland from
Schuyler Wallace." My copy has only S-c-h-u-y-1.
Finally on item 839, missing date figure, "to Scliuyler Wallace from
W. L. Holland," the correct date should be April 12, 1944. I think
it is the carbon that reads March 12, 1944. Otherwise that list seems
to be correct.
The Chairman. As to those corrections suggested by Mr. Holland,
it might be well for you to make the corrections on the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. In other words, evidently an error
has crept in as to these small items. That should be corrected. It is
not an exception taken by the witness. It is just a suggested check,
and his suggestion should be followed up to see that he is correct and
the instrument corrected accordingly.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the list describing the documents which
we have been discussing will be corrected in view of the recommenda-
tions made by Mr. Holland.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, I offer you four documents, and ask you
what they are,
Mr. Holland. These documents are lists of the staff members of
both the Pacific Council and the American Council of the Institute of
Pacific Relations for various periods, namely, 1936 to 1943; 1937 to
1943, 1944 to 1951, and 1944 to 1951.
4912 INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. I think I have a fiftli one, Mr. Holland.
Mr. HorxAND. And a fifth entitled "IPR Staff Members," sub-
mitted by W. L, Holland, date October 10, 1951. All of these docu-
ments, Mr. Chairman, were prepared under my direction at the request
of the subcommittee some weeks ago, the latest date here being October
10, 1951, and to the best of my belief and according to our personnel
records, they present the true facts regarding the lists of employees
and dates of employment of the persons who worked for the Institute
of Pacific Relations, the staff members.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have access to your personnel records in
connection with the preparation of those lists?
Mr. H0L1.AND. I had access to them. I did not myself scrutinize
every personnel card. The list was prepared under my direction by
Miss Ruth Carter, and I have every reason to believe that it is a cor-
rect and complete list.
Mr. Morris. Mr, Chairman, will we insert this in the running re-
cord, or should we put this in the appendix ?
The Chairman. Where do you want it? What do you offer them
for ? Do you offer them for the record ?
Mr. Morris. I offer them for the record.
The Chairman. I think so. They will be inserted in the record.
(The documents referred to were marked Exhibit No. 801 and
appear on p. 4987.)
The Chairman. All that shows is who were the officers of the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations in the respective years mentioned?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
The Chairman. Let the record show that the stenographer in the
outer room closed the door so that the telephoning might go on in the
outer room without disturbing the hearing and that the Chair an-
nounced that this was an open hearing and anyone who came into the
outer room who wished to come in here might come in. This is an
open hearing.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I am offering to Mr. Mandel two
groups of documents.
Mr. Mandel, are those two groups of documents made up of letters
and papers taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Mandel. These are documents from or to Mr. E. C. Carter taken
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. They are either
the original documents or photostats thereof.
The Chairman. The instruments are true and correct photostats of
documents found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. And every one of the dociunents and papers in those
two groups is so classified ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Namely, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific
Relations. Mr. Mandel, what are those two lists ?
Mr. Mandel. From these documents I have authorized a list to be
prepared itemizing each document and describing them.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean you have there a list which constitu*"es
an inventory of the documents which you have just identified and
which you hold?
Mr. Mandel. That is correct.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4913
Mr. Morris. There are two lists, Mr. Chairman; one with each
group.
Mr. Carter, have yon had an opportunity to look at the documents
so identified by Mr. Mandel and described in the list accompanying
those documents ?
Mr. Carter. Yes, I have had the opportunity of hurriedly going
through them.
Mr. Morris. Do they appear to you to be authentic documents?
Mr. Carter. I do not challenge the authenticity of any. There are
some that I don't particularly recollect, but those I will point out when
I go through the list.
Mr. Marks. You do not mean "recollection." You mean you do
not identify because you do not have personal knowledge of them.
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. Marks. But you do not challenge the authenticity.
Mr. Carter. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Do you want to make any particular comment as to
any document on either of those two lists?
The Chairman. As I understand, those minutes were made of con-
ferences. If Mr. Carter after having examined those minutes says that
they appear to him to be true and correct, that is about as far as he
can go unless he made them himself.
Mr. Marks. That is perfectly true.
Mr. Morris. Do you want to make any comment on any of the
documents in these two groups?
Mr. Carter. One such case is item 978, a discussion on collective
security.
Mr. Morris. "^^Hiat is the nature of that document, Mr. Carter?
Mr, Carter, It was a discussion on collective security in 700 Jack-
son Place, Washington, I did not prepare the minutes, I don't
know who they were j)repared by, but I remember the meeting, and
they look like a reasonably accurate job.
Mr, Sourwine, "\^niere is 700 Jackson Place ? Is that the corner of
Jackson Place and Pennsylvania Avenue alongside of the Blair
House ?
Mr, Carter. That is where the Carnegie Endowment Library has
been for many years.
This is to Edward C, Carter from MC, undated.
Mr, Morris. That is right under the exhibit No. 980 ?
Mr. Carter. Yes. I cannot think who MC is, I don't identify
the handwriting either, and it is in collection with a letter to Mr.
Dollard. This is a mimeographed study of Attitudes of American
Soldiers in the Berlin District Toward Our Allies. It is not mine,
and it was originally marked as restricted, but the classification has
been canceled, so it was an open document.
The Chairman. What point do you make in regard to it ?
Mr, Marks. Nothing at all, except I do not exactly know whether
we are authenticating this document as put out by the research library
of the information-education division. We acknowledge it was in
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations if that is what you
want.
Mr, Sourwine. You said the classification is canceled. You mean
it shows on its face by proper authority there has been an official
cancellation of the security classification?
4914 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Marks. Yes. Our only point is if you want us to say what
it IS, we will say it was taken from the files. We did not prepare it.
Mr. Sour WINE. Was it received by you as indicated ?
Mr. Marks. Oh, yes. We have no objection to that.
The Chairman. What is next?
Mr. Carter. There is a handwritten note of mine here, and it is
marked underneath "Dear Kate" in brackets "Enclosure, July 19
note." It should be July 17 notes. It is perfectly routine.
Mr. Marks. One other point on that. We don't understand why
it says "Enclosure." The list says "enclosure." We do not under-
stand why, but it does not make much difference, I guess. The list
says. Senator, "(Enc. July 19 notes)" and the list should be July 17.
We do not understand what the enclosure reference is, but I do not
think it is very significant.
Mr. Carter. With your permission I will let Mr. Marks do this.
The Chairman. That is all right.
Mr. Marks. Item 984. This is a report of conference of March
9. Mr. Carter acknowledges that it is a fairly accurate statement
of what went on, although he did not himself prepare the report.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Just at that point, you say he acknowledges that it
Is fairly accurate. Does he take exception to it on any point with
regard to accuracy ?
Mr. Marks. On those I do not think we ought to be bound because
we had to read those at a terrible clip. If we have to stop now to
examine this page by page, it will keep us here indefinitely. We
would like to reserve comment and check on these things. Mr. Carter
spent just a few minutes to go through this thing and to construe
it to see whether each thing is a fair statement would require a lot
more time, and I don't think he at this time can state more than I
have already stated. I want to suit your purpose.
The Chairman. The question is: Is the instrument found where
it was found ? It is admitted that it was found in the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Marks. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. What it sets out is not a matter for your construc-
tion nor for anyone else's just now. It is a matter for the committee's
construction.
Mr. Marks. Fine. That is perfectly acceptable to us.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, if "the Chair will permit, since I
understand that Mr. Carter is adopting Mr. Marks' statements as his
testimony, is that right, sir?
Mr. Carter. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. With regard to this particular document it might
save time in the future if I ask Mr. Carter a question now.
Mr. Carter, you have had an opportunity to examine that briefly;
is that correct?
Mr. Carter. Very sketchily.
Mr. SouRwiNE. From the examination which you have made of
it, does it appear to you to be a report which was prepared under your
direction or at your behest ?
Mr. Carter. I was present at the meeting. It does not show who
recorded it. The handwritten bits of editorial alterations are not
in my handwriting, and I could not swear who the author or editor
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4915
was. It may have been Mr, W, W. Lockwood. Let me see whether
he was there. Yes ; he was present.
Mr. SouRwiNE. What I am trying to get at is : Was that prepared
by someone who did so as a part of his duties as an official or employee
oiethelPR?
Mr. Carter. Not necessarily, because in the list of attendees there
is typed "W. W. Lockwood, Princeton," and then inserted in hand-
writing after Lockwood's name, "ACIS." That would be the Amer-
ican Committee for International Studies. That might indicate that
he was there in his capacity as an executive of the American Commit-
tee of International Studies, which has no connection with the IPR.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have any knowledge as to how this found
its way into the files of the IPR ?
Mr. Carter. I have no knowledge.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any knowledge as to whether this was
prepared for the files of the IPR ?
Mr. Carter. I have no knowledge one way or the other on that.
Mr. Marks. The next item is 988. Tliis is a memorandum of the
meeting of the Arctic Institute, April 9, which was taken from the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, but not prepared by Mr.
Carter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Carter, do you know by whom it was prepared?
Mr. Carter. I don't remember. With reference to this meeting of
the Arctic Institute, I note that there were present FD and HM. FD
is Faith Donaldson and HM is Harriet Moore. Either one of them
might have prepared the record of the meeting. I don't know which.
There is nothing written, straight typing, and I have no idea which
one of them prepared it or whether they prepared it jointly and sub-
mitted it to me.
Mr. SouR"\^^NE. One of those alternatives?
Mr. Carter. One of those alternatives.
Mr. Marks. The next item is 993. This is a memorandum of an
interview with Mortimer Graves, December 7, 1933, at which Mr.
Carter and Mr. Joseph Barnes were present. I think Mr. Carter will
state that either he or Mr. Barnes prepared this memorandum. He
doesn't remember which.
Mr. Carter. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I would like to ask a question about that. Is Mr.
Barnes' style so similar to your own that you cannot tell them apart
when you look back over them ?
Mr. Carter. This is statistical. It was in 1933.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I think in fairness to you that should be explained
here. It is not a document that is likely enough to make it identi-
fiable; is that the point?
Mr. Carter. It is very short. It is statistical, and there are no
flourishes of authorship or rhetoric in it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The point was if it had been prepared by you we
know you would be prepared to say it was absolutely true and correct ;
is that right ?
Mr. Carter. It makes sense to me.
Mr. SouRWiNE. On that basis since you cannot tell whether it is
yours or Mr. Barnes, I assume you are still able to say that it is true
and correct.
4916 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Carter. It strikes me thorouo:hly as a correct compilation.
Mr. Marks. The next item is 1005, a meeting of the presidium of
the Soviet branch of the IPR. Mr. Carter will state that the report
was prepared either by Harriet Moore or Kate Mitchell. Do you
know which?
Mr. Carter. I have no idea.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Kate Mitchell take shorthand?
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. SotTRwiNE. Harriet Moore did not?
Mr. Carter. Not with the same precision. I don't remember
whether Harriet Moore actually used shorthand or her own shorthand
system.
Mr. Sourwine. And Faith Donaldson had no shorthand system at
all ?
Mr. Carter. Yes. She, if I remember correctly, had sort of a
debutante shorthand.
Mr. Sourwine. I thought you had testified here once — it is an un-
important point — that Faith Donaldson did not write in shorthand.
Mr. Carter. I remember describing her as a champion skier. I
don't remember referring to her shorthand capacity.
Mr. Sourwine. Was she a typist?
Mr. Carter. Oh, yes.
Mr. Marks. The next item is 1008. This is a photostat of what
purports to be a letter from E. V. Harondar to Kathleen Barnes,
June 20, 1935, which Mr. Carter will say was taken from the files of
the Institute of Pacific Relations, but it was not a letter received by
him nor written by him.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any recollection as to whether you
ever saw that letter before the committee presented it to you for
identification ?
Mr. Carter. I don't remember having seen it before. I may have
or I may not. I don't recall it now.
Mr. Marks. Item 1009 is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev.
The list shows the date "3/4/35." It should be "5/4/35."
Mr. Sourwine. Speaking of Mr. Motylev, we have a number of
documents in the file including some of these summaries wherein his
name is spelled M-o-t-i-l-e-v; is that not correct? It is the same per-
son, is it not?
Mr. Carter. That is correct.
Mr. Marks. The next item is 1010. This is a carbon copy of a docu-
ment entitled "Extracts From Letter From Harriet Moore to E. C.
Carter" of March 20, 1935. Can you tell who prepared this ?
Mr. Carter. I cannot discover who typed or prepared this copy,
who selected the extracts. There is no initial or other identifying
mark. It would all depend on who made the extracts as to what its
significance is, I .should assume.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember having seen the document before
or a copy of it?
Mr. Cari^r. I can't at this moment say that I do recollect it.
Mr. Sourwine. It is from the files of the IPR?
Mr. Carter. So Mr. Mandel shows me.
Mr. Sourwine. I mean do you have any knowledge on that point?
Mr. Carter. Not other than Mr. Mandel's certification.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4917
Mr. SouRWiNE. Of course, that is not a matter of your knowledge.
Mr. Carter. No.
Mr. Marks. Item 1011 appears to be a duplicate of 1009.
Item 1013, "Moscow meeting in Motylev's," the date should be
"3/31/86. ■' That is the ('ate shown by the document. It should be
that instead of "3/21/36' thown by the list. The document itself
purports to be a report of what happened at the meeting.
Mr. Carter. Tliis conc^-ns the administrative problems of the in-
stitute and, among others, there were present Harriet Moore, Char-
lotte Tyler, and Faith Donaldson as secretaries, but wiiich one of
tliem, whether all three collaborated in writing out this one page, I
don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Their assignments were such that any or all of them
might have worked on it ?
Mr. CAR1T.R. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE, Mr. Chairman, may we go off the record?
The Chairman. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Chairman. On the record.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, with regard to the remainder of the
documents on this list I believe an acceptable formula has been worked
out which will cover the identification so far as Mr. Carter is able
to make. Is that correct, Mr. Marks ?
Mr. Marks. That is correct, Mr. Sourwine. May I state the na-
ture of this arrangement ?
Mr. Sourwine. Please.
Mr. Marks. Mr. Carter states that all of the documents listed
Mr. Sourwine. From this point on.
Mr. Marks. From this point on of the two lists referred to
The Chairman. And "from this point on'' means what? What is
the point ?
Mr. Sourwine. From the point following the last document identi-
fied in this record and discussed.
The Chairman. Referring to the numbers in the list that you pre-
pared ?
Mr. Marks. Yes ; that is right. There are two lists which I think
Mr. Mandel has already referred to, the last two lists that Mr. Mandel
i-eferred to. These are lists setting forth documents which have just
been presented to Mr. Carter for identification.
The Chairman. And were taken from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations according to the testimony of Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Marks. That is right.
The Chairman, And have been numbered serially under the di-
rection of Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Marks. Up to the point of 1019, and after that there are no
inimbers, and we understand they will be numbered serially from there
on.
Mr. Morris. That is correct.
Mr. Marks. From this point on Mr. Carter states that the docu-
ments wdiich i^urport to be letters or memoranda to him, or copies of
such letters and memoranda, or letters or memoranda from him or
copies of those, are genuine. On the list there are a number of other
documents which are prepared by other persons and which do not in-
4918 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
dicate whether or not they were sent to Mr. Carter or sent by him to
anybody.
As to these, Mr. Carter has no personal recollection of whether or
not they do come from the IPR files, but he has no reason to raise
any question about it.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Marks. That is sufficient.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Morris, Mr. Chairman, may they therefore be admitted into
the record ?
The Chairman. They may be admitted under that agreement,
(The documents were marked "Exhibits Nos. 977 to 1007, 1009, in-
clusive; 1011 to 1031, 1032 to 1068, inclusive; 1070, 1071, 1073 to 1080,
inclusive; 1082 to 1090, inclusive; 1092, to 1095, 1097 to 1112, 1114 to
1122, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5083 through 5197.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. This order includes the two lists which have been
referred to and the documents which have been included on those lists ?
The Chairman. Yes. The lists are merely identification by serial
numbers ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes, sir.
Mr. Marks. That is right.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Has Mr. Carter had an opportunity to examine
the documents which we are now discussing?
Mr. Marks, Mr, Carter has had a chance to examine the documents
now under discussion and identifies them all with certain exceptions
which I shall now enumerate.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And applies them as either documents that were
received by him or which he wrote ?
Mr, Marks, That is right.
This list does not bear exhibit numbers, and I am going to give the
item number as I count down.
Mr, SouRwiNE, Give the item number and the title,
Mr, Marks, All right. This is the fourteenth item on the first
page of this three-page list. It is to WLH from ECC. The date is
given as Marcli 20, 1940. I think it should be March 30, 1940, The
file number is 191.87.
The next is to Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter, with the
file number of the committee 191.37. The date is given as December
19, 1943. I think it should be December 19, 1942, subject to your
check.
The next one purports to be an original of part of a note to "Dear
Dr. White."' It does not bear any date or any signature. It is on the
second page of this list under your No. 172.1. I don't know what
Mr. Carter wants to say about it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Carter, up to this point do you adopt Mr.
Marks' statements as your testimony?
Mr. Carter. I do.
Mr. SouRWiNE. With regard to the document which has just been
handed to you by Mr. Marks what do you want to say about it ?
The Chairman. Dr. White is the name ?
Mr. Marks. It is addressed to "Dear Dr. White," no address.
Mr. Carter. I have no recollection of either side of this page.
Mr. Morris. It is not your handwriting ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4919
Mr. Carter. No.
Mr. Morris. I move it be stricken from the list of documents.
The Chairman. It will just not be inserted.
JNIr. SouRwiNE. It remains on the list, but you withdraw the oifer
of the document ?
Mr. Morris. I do.
Mr. Marks. The next item is a memo handwritten which appears
on your list immediately below the item, the offer of which has been
withdrawn. I hand it to Mr. Carter.
Mr. Sour WINE. Do you know what that is, Mr. Carter?
Mr. Carter. It's in pencil. I don't identify the handwriting.
There is a note regarding treatment of a book written for the IPR
at one time. There is nothing I object to. I simply don't know who
the author was.
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Do you have any reason to believe it did not come
from the IPR files ?
Mr. Carter. No.
Mr. Marks. The next item is to W. L. Holland from C. F. Remer,
dated March 17, 1942, your No. 119.121.
Mr. Holland. I have read this letter and identify it as having been
received by me. There is also the original of this same letter — this is
a carbon copy — in the collection which I have previously identified.
Mr. Marks. The final item is a mimeographed copy of what per-
haps is a telegram from Edward C. Carter to Lauchlin Currie, bearing
the date, mimeographed, September 17, 1941. This appears under
your file No. 119.13. It is listed on the third page of the list.
Mr. Morris. That is a copy we made of the original. We should
have the original rather than the stenciled copy. We will withdraw
the offer.
Mr. Marks. Those are all the remarks and exceptions that we have
to make to that list.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliich you previously generally identified ?
Mr. Marks. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do, you adopt as your testimony all the statements
of Mr. Marks in connection with these lists ?
Mr. Carter. I do.
Mr. Sourwine. May these be inserted in the record ?
The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record with the same
numbers.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1136, 1145,
1203. and 1231," and appear on pp. 5204, 5210, 5245, 5259, i-espec-
tively.)
Mr. Sourwine. So that the record may be clear with regard to this
document, this is the document which was previously mentioned as
the "Dear Dr. White" letter or document, the offer of which was
withdrawn. This is a document, which on the one side, which I shall
designate as face, is marked with an F in ink and has a typed para-
graph, "Dear Dr. White: I understand from Irving S. Friedman,"
and so forth, ending with the words "until the end of the current
month."
On the other side in pencil, handwritten, is, "Dear Malik : I under-
stand that Mr. Friedman," and so forth, closing with the words "at any
time convenient to you. Sincerely yours," and it is unsigned. Mr.
darter, you state that you do not recognize that handwriting ?
4920 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Carter. I do not recognize the handwriting. I would like to
comment for the record that Malik was the Indian official in New
York. It is not the Soviet.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. And you do not recollect it ?
Mr. Holland. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. How do you know which Malik is referred to ?
Mr. Carter. Isn't there some reference here to Friedman ? Fried-
man was an employee of the Indian Government in New York working
under Malik.
Mr. Sour wine. How do you spell it?
Mr. Carter. M-a-1-i-k.
Mr. Sourwine. Wliat you are saying really is because you know of
Friedman's connection you assume that was Malik the Indian rather
than the Russian?
Mr. Carter. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Are you renewing your offer on that now ?
Mr. Morris. I now offer it.
The Chairman. Very well; it will be inserted in its proper place
in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1202," and
appears on p. 5245.)
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have a third envelope which Mr.
Carter was not able to finish reading last night, and I wonder what
we can do with respect to having those received.
Mr. Sourwine. I have a suggestion, if the Chair please.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. If the Chair please, I propose to ask Mr. Mandel to
identify these papers as coming from the files of the IPR and to
identify the list.
The Chairman. Let Mr. Mandel identify them.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Mandel, I hand you a number of documents or
what purports to be a list or inventory of documents. Will you please
identify them?
Mr. Mandel. I have here an inventory of documents taken from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The sheet begins with
a document to ECC and ends with one to A. Hiss. The documents
all come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that list a correct inventory of those documents
and prepared under your direction?
Mr. Mandel. It is ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I- ask the permission of the Chair to
hand this list and the documents in question to Mr. Carter and to ask
that at his early convenience he go through these and examine them
and then furnish the committee with a statement in affidavit form
with regard to them along the lines of the statemens he has previously
made.
The Chairman. All right. Do you want them inserted in the record
now, to be followed by what you request?
Mr. Sourwine. I would request, sir, that tlie documents be put
in the record at this point, but that the affidavit which Mr. Carter
furnishes also go in at this point in the record when he furnishes
it.
The Chairman. All right; is that satisfactory?
Mr. Marks. Yes, it is. Senator
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4921
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1269 to
1291, inclusive; 1293 to 1312, inclusive; and 1314," and appear on
pp. 5272 throu*rh 5303.)
Mr. SouRWiNE, I liand 3^ou additional groups of documents and ask
you if you will identify t?hose.
Mr. Mandel. I have here an inventory of documents from the files
of the Institute of Pacific Relations beginning with one marked
"Atomic Energy and U. S. Int. Policy," and ending with one ad-
dressed to "Secretary, Lithuanian Legation," which is an inventory
of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and
a second batch which is headed "A Second Batch," of which the inven-
tory begins with a document to E. C. Carter and ends with one to
E. C. Carter. This is an inventory of documents from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Mandel, in each case does the list represent an
inventory of the actual documents to which it is attached?
Mr. Mandel. It does.
Mr. Sourwine. The inventory was prepared under your supervi-
sion ?
Mr. ]\f andel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. And the documents themselves are all from the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Mandel. They are.
The Chairman. Are they, or are they photostatic copies?
Mr. Mandel. They include originals, carbons, as taken from the
files, and photostats.
The Chairman. Photostats of instruments in the files ; is that right?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The photostats were made under your direction ?
Mr. Mandel. They were.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the reasons for the recurrence of the
photostats are many. In most cases the reason for it is that we have
gone through the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Fifty-
fourth Street and taken out certain documents there. We returned
the original documents to the Institute of Pacific Relations, but had
them photostated before returning them. That is the reason for the
photostating.
The Chairman. The photostats were not themselves taken from the
files ? The instrument was taken from the files and photostated, and
the photostats are here; is that right?
Mr. Morris. In almost every case. I think in some cases there were
photostats in the IPR files.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr, Chairman, I ask in regard to these two groups
of documents and the list attached thereto that Mr. Mandel has most
recently identified they be offered to Mr. Carter with the same stipu-
lation as the earlier one.
The Chairman. They will be inserted in the record and offered to
Mr. Carter with the same stii^ulation as to his making an affidavit.
(The documents referred to w-ere mai"ked "Exhibit Nos. 889 to 903,
inclusive ; 905 to 954, inclusive ; 956 to 964, inclusive, and appear on
pp. 5031 through 5083.)
Mr. Sourwine. I hold in my hand a file of material which was of-
fered for the recoi-d during Mr. Bogolepov's testimony. The Chair
88348-52-pt. 14 2
4922 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ruled that it would be accepted and inserted in the record, but there
was the proviso that it be offered to Mr. Carter for identification. I
would like to ask has this ever been offered to Mr. Carter and has Mr.
Carter had an opportunity to examine it?
Mr. Marks. No, he has not. He just p;ot it.
]\Ir. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that these documents, which I
shall briefly identify, the first headed ''Confidential, not for distribu-
tion outside the office," under date of August 10, 1934
The Chairman. Where do they come from ?
Mr. Morris. They have been identified by Mr. Mandel at an open
session of the hearing as having been taken from the files of the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations, and they were admitted by you provisionally
on their being recognized by Mr. Carter.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I simply thought, Mr. Chairman, that since the
record at this point does not specifically identify what we are handing
Mr. Carter there should be this identification : Under date of August
10, 1934, headed "Memorandum of Personnel on Soviet Studies."
The next item is called "Confidential, not for distribution outside the
office, Report on Soviet Relations with the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions." The next is to Frederick V. Field from Edward C. Carter
under date of January 16, 1935. The next is headed "Meeting, April
9, Institute of Oceanography ; ECC ; OL ; HM, Harondar."
The next is headed "Report of the V isit of the Secretary General to
Moscow, December 20-31, 1934." The next is a letter or what appears
to be a letter, under date of April, 1934. It is headed "Communist
Academy, Volkhonka, 14 Moscow, U. S. S. R." The next is a letter,
and the date is Hotel Richemond, Geneva, September 12, 1934, and it
begins "Dear Owen,"
Then there is a letter to Senator McCarran under date of March 24
from Carlisle Humelsine and the attachment thereto.
The Chairman. Mr. Carter would have nothing to do with that
last.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The attachment, sir, is the one wliich raises the
question as to whether Mr. Carter can add anything by way of
identification.
The Chairman. These are to be made available to Mr. Carter for
his comment and his affidavit ?
Mr. Souewine. Along the same lines with regard to any identity he
should make, and he should have the privilege if he cares to include
in that affidavit any voluntary statement or comment about it.
The Chairman. All right.
(The documents referred to were previously marked "Exhibit No.
58" and appear on p. 262, pt. I. For the other documents, see exhib-
its 749, 758, 759, 760, 761, 763, respectively. )
Mr. Marks. With reference to comment, it is obvious from the rec-
ord that we have not made any comments on the contents of these.
Mr. SoTTRWiNE. That is correct. It is not completely correct because
in the instance of Malik he had a comment to make.
Mr. Marks. You are right there. %
Mr. SouRwiNE. With regard to any others he has not made a com-
ment. He is not bound, but if he wants to make comment as to these
submitted for study, he is to have the right to include in that affidavit
any comment he desires to make.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4923
Mr. Marks. We would like to reserve whatever rights we have to
comment on the others.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland or Mr. Carter, are you going to offer any
documents to be inserted into the record at this time ?
Mr. Carter. If I may have your permission, Mr. Chairman, on
April 23 1 mailed you in Washington, A Personal View of the Institute
of Pacific Relations, by Edward C. Carter, and in my letter to you
I promised to send a second statement on clarification and correction.
This I now hand you with a covering letter, and here is a copy of
my letter to Senator McCarran for Mr. Morris.
Mr. SouRWiNE. With regard to these documents, Mr. Carter, have
they been prepared by you ?
Mr. Carter. They have.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Are you offering them as part of your testimony,
that is, that the material in here is true to the best of your knowledge
and belief where it is stated to be on knowledge and belief, and if not
so stated it is true ?
Mr. Carter. That is my position.
Mr. Marks. Just one moment, Mr. Sourwine; I am not sure that
Mr. Carter understood the import of that.
Mr. Sourwine. I do not mean to take advantage of him in any V7^j.
Mr. Marks. I understand that, but I think as to everything he states
it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief. He is not using a
pleading style and stating upon information and belief thus and so,
but he is doing his best to represent the facts. Is that all right?
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Carter has handed here a document of over 50
pages, nearly 60 pages, including the appendix, headed "Amplification,
correction, and clarification of testimony." Obviously if Mr. Carter
is going to amplify, correct, and clarify his testimony, he has to do it
under oath.
Mr. Marks. I am sure that Mr. Carter will say that this shall have
the same status as if these things were read orally or stated orally at
any committee hearing.
The Chairman. Under oath?
Mr. Marks. Under oath ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Does he make an affidavit to this ?
Mr. SouRWTNE. No, sir, that is another point. There is no jurat on
this. Whatever the form is immaterial, but the record should show
that Mr. Carter fully adopts this statement, the main text of 49 pages
and the appendix of 7 pages, as a sworn statement presented before
this committee.
Mr. Carter. I do.
Mr. Sourwine. The committee staff of course has had no opportun-
ity to see this until this moment and has of course had no oppor-
tunity to cross examine jSIr. Carter with regard to it. I cannot state
what the staff might desire in that regard.
]\Ir. Carter. Might I ask, ]\Ir. Sourwine, Mr. Chairman, whether
my first statement was received ?
Mr. Sourwine. The statement has been received, but has not been
offered in the record. You are referring to "A Personal View of the
Institute of Pacific Relations." I think it should be under the same
stipulation, that you were offering it as your sworn testimony.
Mr. Carter. I would be agreeable to making the stipulation now so
that it is all formally in your hands.
4924 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr, Chairman, Mr. Carter is stating, as I understand
it, that he offers as his sworn testimony at this hearing his statement
entitled "A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations," which
he transmitted to the chairman in his letter of April 24.
The Chairman. Yes. I think the regular way and most orderely
way would be to have Mr. Carter present when the committee con-
siders that and let him then swear to it. I think you are doing this
by a long-distance operation here. I do not particularly like it, but
we can determine that when we get to it. We can call Mr. Carter
and have him go over his two statements, the one he sent before and
this one, and make any comment on them and then be examined on
them if you want to and let it go in the record. I think that is the
clearer and more satisfactory wa}'. I do not like to insert his first
statement in the record now with a kind of an offhand saying that he
swears to it.
I think it would be best to have him present and swear to it at the
proper time.
Mr, SouRwiNE. Is that the Chair's ruling also with regard to this
document which has just been handed in?
The Chairman, Yes,
]^r. Morris, Mr, Chairman, may I amend Mr, Sourwine's list of
documents included in the material introduced during Mr, Bogole-
pov's testimony, I have been informed by Mr, Mandel — it is a letter
from Carlisle Humelsine and so described in Mr. Sourwine's testi-
mony— that it should not have been included in that list,
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean that material submitted by Mr. Humel-
sine is not such that Mr. Carter would be able to shed any light on ?
Mr. Morris. That is correct, and it may be excluded from the doc-
uments.
Mr. Mandel, that got erroneously in this file [indicating] when it
should be in this [indicating] ?
Mr. ]VL\NDEL. That is right.
Mr. Carter. I accept it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Morris has a few other docu-
ments to be offered for the record,
]\Ir, Morris, Mr, Chairman, we have received an answer from Car-
lisle Humelsine dated April 11, 1952, in reply to your letter of April
2 to the Honorable Dean Acheson of that date. May that go into
the record?
The Chairman, That may go in the record,
(The document referred to was marked ''Exhibit No, 1315-A, B, C,
D, E, F, G, H" and is as follows :)
Exhibit No, 1315-A
Apbil 2, 1952.
Hon. Dean Acheson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Secretary : We have examined carefully the letter of March 19,
1952. fi-om Mr. Carlisle Humelsine in reference to a conference which took place
at the State Department October 12, 1942, between Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Earl
Browder, Mr. Rol)ert Minor, and Mr. Laughlin Currie. In this connection, we
should like to have the full State Department records on this conference pre-
cisely as they appeared.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4925
We should also like to know the steps by which this conference was arranged,
-who was responsible, and the correspondence that was exchanged in connection
therewith.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
Exhibit No. 1315-B
Deputy Under Secretary of State,
Washington, April 11, 1952.
The Honorable Pat McCarean,
United States Senate.
My Dear Senator McCarran : I refer to your letter to the Secretary of April
2 in which you reque.st Department of State records on the conference "which
took place at the State Department, October 12, 1942, between Mr. Sumner Welles,
Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, and Mr. Lauchlin Currie." You also re-
quest information regarding "the steps by which this conference was arranged,
who was responsible, and the correspondence that was exchanged in connection
therewith."
As I stated in my letter to you of March 10, the Department's investigation
into the history of this meeting reveals little more than the fact that Mr. Welles
did meet with Mr. Browder on October 12, 1942, at which time Mr. Welles handed
Mr. Browder a memorandum concerning U. S. policy in the Far East. Although
the Department cannot locate a verified copy of this memorandum, ovir files do
contain several letters in response to request for copies of this memoranduni in
which was stated that "a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr.
Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18 [16], 1942, issue of The Worker."
I enclose two such replies.
A thorough search of the Department's files does not reveal whether either
Robert Minor or Lauchlin Currie, or both, attended the Welles-Browder confer-
ence on October 12, 1942 ; any invitations to Mr. Browder or to anyone else to
attend this meeting; any correspondence in regard to calling the meeting; any
memorandum of conversation or record of the meeting : or any record of who
drafted the memorandum handed by Mr. Welles to Mr. Browder.
Since these may be of interest to you, I am also enclosing copies of the follow-
ing letters which bear on the Welles-Browder meeting : (1) letter from Assistant
Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Mr. Sumner Welles, dated September 26, 1951 ;
(2) reply from Mr. Welles, dated October 10, 1951; (3) letter from Mr. Rusk to
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, dated May 19, 1950; and (4) reply from Dr. Horn-
beck, dated June 7, 1950.
I regret that the Department is unable to provide further information in regard
to the conference to which this letter refers.
Sincerely yours,
Carlisle H. Hxjmelsine,
Exhibit No. 1315-C
Department of State,
Washington, D. C, Novemiber 13, 19/t2.
Mr. Arnold B. Hartley,
Radio Station WGE8, Western at Madison, Chicago, III.
My Dear Mr. Hartley : Mr. Welles has asked me to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter of November 6, 1942, in which you request a copy of the text of
a statement issued by him in regard to the questions of national unity in China
and other United Nations.
It is thought that you may refer to a memorandum which Mr. Welles gave on
October 12 to Mr. Earl Browder in regard to this Government's policy with
respect to China. This memorandum, which was referred to in the press, includ-
ing the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune of October 16, has
not been puMished by the Department. However, a verbatim text of the memo
randum, as given by'lNIr. Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18, 1942.
issue of The Worker.
Sincerely yours,
George Atcheson, Jr.,
Acting Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
4926 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1315-D
Department of State,
Washington, D. C, October 29, 1942.
Mr. Morris U. Schappes,
School for Democracy, 13 Astor Place, New York, N. Y.
My Dear Mr. Schappes : Mr. Welles has asked me to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter of October 26, 1942, in which you request a copy of the text of a
memorandum which he gave on October 12 to Mr. Earl Browder in regard to this
(xovernment's policy with respect to China.
The above-mentioned memorandum has not been published by the Department.
However, a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr. Browder to the
press, appeared in the October 18, 1942, issue of The Worker.
Sincerely yours,
George Atcheson, Jr.,
Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
Exhibit No. 1315-E
Department of State.
Washington, D. C, September 26, 1951.
Hon. Sumnek Welles,
Oxon Hill, Md.
My Dear Mr. Welles : The Department has under consideration a request
from Senator McCarran of Nevada for information concerning a meeting which
purportedly took place between Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr.
Lauchlin Currie, and you at the State Department, October 12, 1942, to discuss
American policy toward China. Mr. Browder testified before a Senate committee
headed by Senator Tydings in May 1950 that you handed him a written state-
ment of the United States Government's views on the Far East at the conclusion
of this meeting.
Although a very careful search has been made of the Department's files, we
have not been able to locate the statement described by Mr. Browder or any
record of your conversation with him. The files do reveal, however, that Mr.
Browder released to the press and the Daily Worker published October 16, 1942,
the text of a memorandum allegedly handed to him by you.
It is realized that it is difficult to recall details of events which transpired
many years ago, but it would be greatly appreciated if you could furnish the
Department such details concerning this matter as you might have available.
In this connection it might be helpful to you to read the enclosed statements by
Mr. Browder taken from the Daily Worker.
I am most reluctant to bother you with this request, but the absence of sufii-
cient information in the Department's files has led us to seek your assistance.
Sincerely yours.
Dean RuBk,
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.
Enclosures : Daily Worker, October 4, 1942, and October 16. 1942.
Exhibit No. 1315-F
Oxon Hill Manor,
Oxon Hill, Md., October 10, 1951.
Hon. Dean Rusk,
Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Rusk : I have been away from home for some time and your letter
of September 26, 1951, has consequently only now been brought to my attention,
I regi-et the delay in replying to your inquiry.
In view of the many years that have passed since the interview of which you
refer in your letter, it is unfortunately very diflacult for me to recollect in any
detail what took place during the course of the interview. Of one thing, however,
I am certain, and that is that any memorandum that may have been handed to
Mr. Browder at that time was not prepared by myself, but by the Far Eastern
Division under the supervision of either Dr. Hornbeek or Mr. Max Hamilton.
There is no copy of any such memorandum in my own files.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4927
I also think I am correct in my recollection that some official of the Far Eastern
Division was present at the interview and subsequently prepared at my request
a memorandum of the conversation that took place.
It occurs to me that it might be helpful to you to consult either Dr. Hornbeck
or Mr. Hamilton since their recollection of what took place at the interview
and of any documentation that might have been prepared with regard to the
interview might be more accurate than mine.
I am very sorry not to be able to be more helpful to you, but neither my memory
nor my own files throw much light on the matter.
Believe me,
Yours very sincerely,
(Signed) Sumneb Welles.
Exhibit No. 1315-G
Mat 19, 1950.
The Honorable Stanley K. Hornbeck,
2139 Wyoming Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.
Mt Dear Dr. Hornbeck : During his recent testimony before the Senate For-
eign Relations Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator Tydings, "Mr.
Earl Browder stated that in October 1942 he called on Mr. Sumner Welles, then
Under Secretary of State, to discuss American policy toward China and that
Mr. Welles handed to him a written statement of the United States Govern-
ment's views on this subject. He further stated that, while the Department
considered that this statement did not represent any change in United States
policy toward China, he did consider it a change in policy and thus an important
document. In subsequent debate in the Senate, Senator Knowland referred to
this portion of Mr. Browder's testimony and expressed the view that this was
an extremely important document since it apparently marked "the turning point
of American policy in China."' Senator Knowland has not requested the De-
partment to furnish him a copy of the statement, together with any other perti-
nent documents leading up to the issuance of the statement.
Alhough a very careful search has been made of the Department's files, we
have not yet been able to locate the statement described by Mr. Browder or any
record of Mr. Welles's conversation with him. The files do reveal, however, that
Mr. Browder released to the press and The Worker published on October IS,
1942, the text of a memorandmn said to have been handed to him by Mr. Welles.
The files also contain memoranda indicating that the matter of Mr. Browder's
call and the statement given him by Mr. Welles were brought to your attention.
It is realized that it is difiicnlt to recall the details of events which trans-
pired many years ago, but it would be greatly appreciated if you would furnish
the Department such details regarding this matter as you can reconstruct from
memory. In this connection, it might be helpful to you to read the enclosed copy
of a dispatch from the Neiv Yo7k Herald Trihune of October 16, 1942, which gives
Mr. Browder's version of his call on Mr. Welles.
I am reluctant to bother you with this request, but the absence of sufficient
information in the Department's files make it necessary for us to seek your
assistance in this regard. Similar inquiries are being made of other officers of
the Department then in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs who might have
some knowledge of the matter.
Sincerely yours.
Dean Rttsk, Assistant Secretary.
Enclosures :
1. Excerpt from The Worker, October 18, 1942.
2. Excerpt from the .Vew York Herald. Tribune, October 16, 1942.
Exhibit No. 1315-H
2139 Wyoming Avenue,
Washington 8, D. C, June 7, 1950.
The Honorable Dean Rttsk,
Assistant Secretary of State.
Dear Mr. Rttsk. In reply to your letter of May 19 regarding statement re-
cently made by Mr. Earl Browder and a memorandum released to the press
4928 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
by Mr. Rrowder and published by The Worker on October 18, 1942, and with
reference especially to your request that I furnish the Department such details
resanlinj; this matter as I can reconstruct from memory.
You will doubtless have been informed by !\Ir. Sprouse that, after the receipt
of your letter under reference, I some days ago spoke with him on the telephone
and informed him that, although I clearly recall having known at the time
that Mr. Welles talked with Mr. Browder and that Mr. Browder thereafter
issued a statement and released therewith the text of a memorandum which
he said had been handed him by Mr. Welles, there was little that I could add
from memory to what is set forth in your letter and the enclosure thereto. At
the same time I offered to come to the Department at any time for he purpose
of discussing the matter or seeing what the files disclose, or both.
That Mr. Welles gave Mr. lirowder a memorandum there can be no doubt.
The account given in that text of the matters to which it relates is, I believe,
substantially accurate. How or by whom that text was drafted I am not able
to say. There are passages in it which might have been drafted by me or by
any one of several officers on duty and concerned with China and relations
with China as of October 1942, and there are passages which might have been
accepted or approved by me but which would not, I believe, have originated with
m§. I recall that Mr. Welles communicated with nie regarding Mr. Browder's call,
and I do not recall at what stage or stages. I believe that he asked in advance
for a memorandum for his (Mr. Welles') information and guidance, and, al-
thoutrh I do not recall the circumstances of the drafting, I believe such a;
memorandum was prepared with participation on my part and for those pur-
poses. I recall being informed after the call that Mr. Welles had given Mr.
Browder a memorandum : and I recall having felt that the text of the mem-
orandum thus given was not entirely such as I would have drafted or recom-
mended for that purpose.
More important, in my opinion, that the question of the origin of the mem-
orandum under reference is the question whether there took place in 1942 a
"change" in American policy regarding China and whether this memorandum
or the facts of the situation to which it related marked a "turning point."
What Mr. Browder may have had in mind when he expressed himself in 1950
to the effect, as stated in your letter, that "he did consider it a change of policy,"
we need not for present purposes attempt to conjecture.
Looking at the text of the memorandum as copied from The Worker of October
18, 1942, I can say : In that memorandum, dealing with and refuting as.sertions
and charges which had been made by Mr. Browder, there was given an obejctive
account of developments in and regarding China and an honest review of what
had been and was the official position of the United States with regard to the
question of "civil strife" in China. A review of the whole history of American
policy in relations to China will show that although the United States had con-
sistently deprecated not only aggression by other countries against China but
civil strife — with or without foment or support by other countries — within China,
the United States had long been committed to the princijile of ncminterveution
in the internal affairs of other countries. It will show also that for many years
before 1942, and in that year, and for some time thereafter the Government of
the United States, in the formulating of official policy regarding China, both kept
in mind and respected that commitment and that i)rinciple. There was official
noting of civil strife in China ; there was official giving of advice that civil strife
be avoided ; there was official collaboration with the Government of China toward
strengthening China's effort in the war; but there was with regard to the civil
conflict within China no official taking of a position either "against" or for any
party or faction. There were on the part of some American nationals some
manifestations in some contexts of a tendency to ignore or misinterpret or dis-
regard official policy, but the thoughts and the acts of such nationals in tho.se re-
spects were their own, not those of their (Jovernment, and were, incidentally, in
most cases favorable to, certainly not "against," the Communists. On the basis
of what I then knew and of what I have from subsecpient study learned, I find
no warrant for an oi)inion or a conjecture that there took place in 1942 a change
in the official attitude and policy of the United States regarding China.
Both "turning point" and "change of policy" came later.
A case could be made for a contention that the "turning ])oint" came at the
time of the Teheran Conference (November-December, 194.'i) ; a better case,
that it came toward the end of the next year, 1944; but .search for a clearly di.s-
cernable and describably "change of policy" leads into and through the year'l945.
It will be recalled that there took place in 1944 — and not until then— the first
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4929
of a series of reorganizations of the Department of State ; that during that year
there were substantial shiftinss of personnel within and outward from the De-
partment, inehidins:, in December, the retirement of Secretary of State Cordell
Hull ; and that thei-e took place in 1945 the Yalta Conference, the death of Presi-
dent Roosevelt, the San Francisco Conference, the capitulation of Germany, the
capitulation of Japan, the Potsdam Conference, the conclusion (with American
encouragement) of an Agreement between the Soviet Union and China, the first
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and, in December, announcement
by President Truman of a "United States Policy toward China" which was then
and thereafter declared to be a "new" policy.
It was then, in the year 194r» — and nt)t before then — that the Government of the
United States, first having taken action inconsistent with tradition and commit-
ment in regard to China, embarked upon what became a course of intervention in
regard to the civil conflict, the conflict between the National Government and
the Communists, in China. It was then that words and action of the Govern-
ment of the United States began to be expressive of an "against" and a "for"
attitude ; then and thereafter that the Government of the United States brought
to bear pressures, pressures upon the National Government, pressures which were
not "against" the Communists but were on their behalf, pressures not to the
disadvantage of the Communists, but, in effect, to the disadvantage of the Na-
tional Government.
To the circumstances of the "change," to the content and purport of the policy
devised in 1945, proclaimed on December 15 of that year, and given expression in
word and in deed since then, and to the gross and the net consequences thereof,
there is no need for attention in the present context. There is however, in my
opinion, great need that in the context of present American involvement as a
leading participant, in a third global conflict, wherein "Communist" totalitarian-
ism is making war both "cold" and "hot", on all States, Governments, peoples,
institutions, organization and persons disinclined to accept domination by it,
there is urgent need that the Government of the United States give solicitous
attention to the question : Must the United States follow to the bitter, tragic and
discrediting end the downward path, in relations with China, on which its feet
were set in the fateful year of military victories and diplomatic vagaries and
vitiations, 1945?
I should welcome an opportunity to talk with you on the implications of query.
Yours cordially and sincerely,
[s] Stanley K. Hornbeck
Stanley K. Hornbeck.
Mr. Morris. This is a copy of a letter, Mr. Chairman, you sent to
the Secretary of State dated May 1, 1952, wherein you renew your
demand for the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta
Conference in 1945. May that go into the record ?
The Chairman. Was there an answer to that ?
Mr. Morris. No.
The Chairman. That may go in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1316" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1316
May 1, 1952.
The Secretary of State,
The State Department, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Secretary : On February 21, 1952, I wrote to you asking that
the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945 be
made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee.
In my letter of February 21st it was pointed out that a witness before the
Subcommittee, Dr. Edna Fluegel, an employee of the State Department from
1&42 to 1948, testified that, in the course of her official duties in the Department,
she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Mr. Hiss.
This letter is written to determine what action has been taken on my request
of February 21, 1952, to you.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
4930 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. The oricrinal request is already in the record.
Mr. Morris. Yes ; and this is the renewal.
These will be made available, Mr. Holland, if you want to see them.
The next will be a copy of a letter by you, Senator McCarran, ad-
dressed to Rear Adm. Robert L. Dennison, dated May 1, 1952, in con-
nection with a request that the Forrestal diaries and papers be made
available to this committee. May that go into the record?
The Chairman. That may go in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 131T" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1317
May 1, 1952.
Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Admiral Dennison : My attention lias been called to the story appearing
in the New York Times today concerning the intention of the White House not
to make available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the diaries and
papers of the late James Forrestal.
As you know, on Decemlier 3, 1951, a subpena was served on the New York
Herald Tribune directing tliat it make available the papers and diaries of Mr.
Forrestal. It is my understanding these are the property of the New York
Herald Tribune. The Subcommittee has been assured by the New York Herald
Tribune that as far as it is concerned it has done everything possible to comply
with the demands of the subpena. The staff of the Subcommittee contacted
you about this matter because it was understood you were holding these papers
for the owners.
The New York Times story referred to above, which credits a White House
source, treats this matter as though the documents in question were Executive
papers and wholly subject to Presidential control.
If for any reason you have decided to refuse to make these subpenaed papers
and diaries available to the Subcommittee, it is requested you directly inform
me, as Subcommittee Chairman, of the position you choose to take.
Kindest personal regards and best wishes.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
Mr. Morris. We have a letter from Mr. Edwin O. Reischauer dated
September 26, 1951, which he requested to go into the record. This was
discussed before. We held it up on the grounds that we had hoped
possibly that we might have a sworn statement by Mr. Reischauer, but,
in view of the fact that we are a little pressed, will you accept this
letter?
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, it is the opinion of counsel that this
letter is distinguishable and should be distinguished from an offer of
proof which is not made in affidavit form, since this letter is a recital
which does not appear to be at variance with the facts ; is that correct,
Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right; it will go in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1318" and is
as follows) :
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4931
Exhibit No. 1318
Harvard University,
Department of Far Eastern Languages,
Boylston Hall, Cambridge S8, Mass., September 26, 1951.
The Honorable Pat McCarran,
Senate Judiciary Committee, United States Senate,
Washington, D. 0.
Db:ar Senator McCarban : I understand that my name was cited before your
committee yesterday as one of a group who had taken a pro-Chinese Communist
stand at a three-day meeting called by the Department of State in October 1949.
I am certain that any examination of the record of those meetings or of my various
writings before or after that time will reveal nothing which could be called pro-
Chinese Communist or in favor of communism in any form. As I recollect the
meetings, my chief role was to present, at the request of the State Department,
a statement on the situation in Japan. I took this opportunity to urge the con-
clusion of a peace treaty with Japan as soon as feasible, in part on the grounds
that this was an important step in our efforts to halt the spread of Communism
there. This opinion subsequently became a generally accepted view in the U. S.
Government, and the peace treaty which Mr. Dulles and Mr. Acheson so ably
brought to successful completion was in part based on such a point of view.
I am sending you this statement so that the records of your committee will not
contain false testimony uncorrected and so that the committee may be warned
of the unreliability of some of its witnesses, such as Professor Kenneth W.
Colgrove, who is quoted as being responsible for the statement in question.
Yours sincerely,
[s] Edwin O. Reischauer,
[t] Edwin O. Reischauer,
Professor of Far Eastern Languages.
September 28, 1951.
Prof. Edwin O. Reischauer,
Harvard University, Department of Far Eastern Languages,
Boylston Hall, Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Professor Reischauer : I have your letter of September 26, 1951, which
will be inserted in the public record of our proceedings.
Sincerely,
Pat ]\IcCarran, Chairman.
Mr. Morris. This is a reply the staff has received in connection with
a compilation. Perhaps this was done by Mr, Mandel. Will you
identify that?
Mr. Mandel. This is a reply from the Library of Congress.
The Chairman. Wliat is the date?
Mr. Mandel. It is dated March 12, 1952. We had asked for in-
formation regarding the activities and career of Madame Sun Yat-sen.
The letter is signed by Ernest Griffith, director of the Legislative
Reference Service. It is a reply to a request from me.
Mr. Morris. Will that go in the record ?
The Chairman. That will go in the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1319," and
is as follows :)
Exhibit No. 1319
Legislative Reference Service
The Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C, March 12, 1952.
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. 0.
(Attention: Miss Walker.)
Gentlemen : With respect to your request concerning Madame S«n Tat-sen's
cooperation with the Communists, we submit the following information. It Is
4932 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
based largely on the articles on Madame Sun in Current Biography, 1944; the
Neiv York Times Magazine, August 11, 1946 ; A'ejo York Herald Tribune, March
7, 1950.
Madame Sun was active in the Chinese revolutionary movement during the
period of the "first united front" in China (1924-27) when the Communists
and Nationalists cooperated under the initial leadership of her husband, Dr.
Sun Yat-sen.
Madame Sun left China in 1927 after the split in the revolutionary movement.
Living abroad, first in Moscow and then in Berlin, Madame Sun was critical
of the National Government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. She re-
turned to China in May 1929, to attend to the removal and reintei'ment of the
remains of her husband.
After the Japanese invasion of China in 1931, Madame Sun urged a united
effort against the Japanese. In 1938, she accepted a seat on the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the Kuomintaug. She had been elected to the post in absentia
in 1929, but refused until this time to lend her pi-estige to the party. However,
she continued to criticize what slie termed the "reactionary minority within the
leadership" of the Kuomintang "which has forgotten the teachings of Sun
Yat-sen."
When the Chinese Communists took Shanghai in May 1949, Madame Sun re-
mained in the city. In the early fall of 1949 she became a "non-Comnmnist"
member and vice chairman of the "People's Political Consultative Council" in
the newly formed "People's Republic of China."
Since that time Madame Sun's name has appeared as author of several ar-
ticles attacking the motives and policies of the United States. Such attacks
have contained references to the "peaceful" intentions of the "Great Soviet
Union" led by the "mighty Stalin" and similar terminology.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Ernest S. Griffith
[t] Ernest S. Griffith. Director.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, if I might revert to the offer of the
letter by yoit to Admiral Dennison, through error for which counsel
is responsible, the document is not here physically at this hearing.
There is in the files of the committee in Washington a letter addressed
to Mr. Morris from Charles Murphy, administrative assistant to the
President, with regard to the Forrestal diaries. I ask the Chair to
order that that letter may be inserted in the record.
The Chairman. Yes; I know of that letter, and it may be inserted
in the record. It has to do with my request for the Forrestal diaries.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1320," and
filed for the record.)
Exhibit No. 1320
The White House,
Washington, April 28, 1952.
Mr. Robert Morris.
Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate. Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morris: It is understood that you have been in touch with Admiral
Robert L. Dennison, the President's Naval Aide, concerning the possibility of
having made available to the Subcommittee on Internal Security certain papers of
the late James V. Forrestal, which are now in the custody of the White House.
I have been requested by the President to advise you that in his judgment the
disclosure of these papers would not be in the public interest.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Charles S. Murphy
[t] Charles S. Murphy.
Special Counsel to the President.
The Chairman. It is a reply made by Mr. Charles Murphy of the
President's staff.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4933
Mr. SouKwiNE. If the Chairman please, it is in a sense not a reply
because the committee had made no request of Mr. Murphy or of the
President.
The Chairman. I understand, but he is makin<; the reply, is he not ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is a letter stating that the President has directed
him to inform the committee the President does not feel the committee
should have the Forrestal diaries.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I offer you a group of letters and a list.
I ask if you will identify the letters and the list.
The Chairman. Take the list first.
Mr. Mandel. This is a list prepared under my direction of lettei*s,
memoranda, and documents from or to Mr. E. C. Carter as taken from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Sgfrwine. Is that list an inventory of the documents and
papers whicli have also been handed to you at this time ?
Mr. Mandel. It is in fact an inventory of these documents.
The Chairman. You better tie them into the record a little bit by
some identification. There are so many that we are handling here
rather loosely. I think you better identify them.
Mr. Mandel. This list begins with A. Von Trott and ends with
E. C. Carter.
The Chairman. Are there numbers of serials?
Mr. Mandel. The documents are numbered and dated.
The Chairman. And the list sets forth the numbers and the dates?
Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.
Ml'. Sourwine. Were the documents themselves taken from the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations^
Mr. Mandel. They were.
Mr. Sourwine. Have these documents been shown to Mr. Carter?
Mr. Marks. Yes, they have, Mr. Sourwine.
The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record.
(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 1123 to
1139, inclusive; 1141 to 1182, inclusive; 1184 to 1223, inclusive; 1125
to 1229, inclusive: 1231 to 1240, inclusive; 1242 to 1254, inclusive;
1256 to 1260, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5198 through 5272.)
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg was the object
of certain statements made by a witness before this committee, Mr.
Owen Lattimore, and he has Avritten in demanding the right to be
heard. The committee has rejected a statement that he gave to the
committee on the theory that it was not a sworn statement.
At the suggestion of the committee he has now made this a sworn
statement. May that be received into the record at this time? He
has presented it in the form of an affidavit.
The Chairman. Is it the same in substance that he made before
he took an oath to it?
Mr. Morris. Previously he was introducing certain letters and cer-
tain material which the committee felt were self-serving and they
were rejected. In lieu of that Mr. Kohlberg has submitted this
affidavit.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I believe it would be clarifying if
the Chair also ordered printed in the record at this point the corres-
pondence in the committee file between Mr. Kohlberg and the com-
mittee on this subject. That would explain it.
4934 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. That will be the order, and this will be inserted
in the record together with the correspondence of the past.
(The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 1321-A, B, C,
and is as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1321-A
March 28, 1952.
Senator Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : As proposed in your letter I enclose affidavit for inclu-
sion in the record of your Hearings.
Briefly it states :
1. References to me by witnesses before you Committee as the China Lobby,
etc.
2. My background and interest in the Far East.
3. Letters from Air Marshal Bishop and Assistant Secretary of Navy Gates
attesting my interest in opposing totalitarianism.
4. Service in Civil Air Patrol.
5. Wartime trip to China and discovery of apparent treasonable activities.
6. Study of IPR and publication of findings November 9, 1944.
7. Answer by four trustees.
8. My answer of December 28, 1944.
9. Special meeting of IPR — my letter to members and defeat of my resolution
for investigation.
10. Formation of American China Policy Association in 1946 and letter of
Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce, October 11. 1945, revealing attitude of
Directors.
11. My appearance before Senate Committees and acquaintance with members
of Foreign Relations Committee of Senate.
12. My connection with Senator McCarthy.
13. Admiral Nimitz, General Marshall, and IPR.
14. Letter to IPR Trustees, March 13, 1952.
15. Letter to Dr. Roscoe Pound.
IG. Closing statement.
Very sincerely yours,
[s] Alfred Kohlberg
[t] AxFREo Kohlberg,
1 West 37th Street, New York, 18, N. Y.
Exhibit No. 1321-B
April 9, 1952.
Mr. Alfred Kohlberg,
1 West 37th Street,
Neiv York 18, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Kohlberg : I have your affidavit of March 28, 1952, which contains
extraneous clippings and supplementary letters.
For inclusion in the record of the Internal Security Subcommittee what you
submit should be all in affidavit form.
Kindest regards,
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
Exhibit No. 1321-C
(Mr. Alfred Kohlberg's affidavit of April 16, 1952 :)
State of New York,
Count!/ of New York, ss:
Alfred Kohlberg, being duly sworn, deposes and says :
That I reside in New York, my office address being 1 West 37th Street, New
York 18, N. Y.
That Professor Owen Lattimore referred to me three times in his statement
read to the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4935
generally referred to as the McCarran Committee. That in addition Professor
Lattimore referred to me several times in his verbal testimony ; that I vpas like-
wise referred to numerous times by other witnesses before tlie McCarran Com-
mittee ; alos by Professor Lattimore and other witnesses before the Tydings
Committee in March, April, May and June 1950; also by Senators Morse and
McMahon during the Joint Committee hearings on the dismissal of General Mac-
Arthur ; and on the floor of the Senate by Senators Lehman, Connally and others.
That beginning in April and May 1950, after Professor Lattimore's statements
to the Tydings Committee, articles and editorials appeared in the Washington
Post, St. Louiy Dispatch, New York Post, New York Compass, New York Daily
Worker, New York Times, The Nation (a weekly), the New Republic (a weekly).
That I was mentioned 17 times in Owen Lattimore's book '"Ordeal by Slander."
That the testimony and articles stated that I was the "China Lobby," that I
was the "man behind McCarthy ;" that "McCarthy's charges were nothing but a
rehash of the irresponsible charges of Kohlberg;" that I was probably secretly
in the pay of the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek ; that I had connec-
tions with a so-called Christian-front, with fascists, with anti-semites ; and an
editorial in the Washington Post entitled "Kohlberg's Klan" suggested further
disreputable connections.
That I have written evidence that in April 1950 one, Robert W. Barnett, form-
erly Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and in 1950 Chief of the
Economic Section of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, advised
certain reporters of the above alleged facts about me and further advised them
that more details could be obtained from an organization in New York called The
Friends of Democracy, headed by Rev. Leon Birkhead ; and that Friends of
Democracy had prepared a three page statement entitled "The Case Against
Alfred Kohlberg."
That the facts concerning my interest and activities in opposing Communism,
and opposing the Chinese Communists, are as follows:
I have been engaged in the import textile business for more than 35 years,
having offices and agents at various times in China, Japan, Iran, France,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. At no time have I ever done any busi-
ness with or had any financial transactions of any character with the Govern-
ment of the United States or any foreign Government, or any subsidiary thereof
(with two exceptions), except for the payment of customs dues and taxes. When
I refer to any business or financial transactions, I include myself personally and
any and all corporations with which I have been actively connected. The ex-
ceptions referred to above were (1) a period of 2 or 3 years during which one
of my corporations acted as agent for the Amtorg Trading Corp. for Russian
linens in the late 20's or early 30's ; and (2) the purchase of some surplus navy
jackets, after V-J Day, from the United States Government.
During these more than 35 years in foreign trade, I came to understand the
wisdom of the now-abandoned Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. The
Monroe Doctrine was designed to prevent the possibility of the building up
of a European empire on this continent, with its resulting constant threat to
our security. The Open Door Policy was designed to prevent any military
empire from adding to its power the resources and manpower of the Chinese
Empire, with a resulting threat to our security in the Pacific.
Therefore when Japan began her all-out war on China in 1937, I contributed
to relief work and addressed some open letters to Congress on America's inter-
est, as I saw it. At the beginning of that war I learned that the Soviet Union
extended aid in military supplies and a Rus'-ian-manned airforce to the Republic
of China. Being in China in the summer of 1938, I learned that the Soviets had
ceased their aid and that Russia had reached agreement with Germany and
Japan. This agreement, which was finally made public as the Hitler-Stalin
Pact of Aug. 23, 1939, I reported in an interview in the New York Times of
Nov. 25, 1938. During the course of said interview I stated, and the New York
Times reported, that Russia, Germany, and Japan had arrived at an agreement
by which Russia "either joined the German-Japanese alliance, or, if she did not
go so far, made peace with Japan and Germany. The arrangement called for
cooperation with Russia by Japan and Germany rather than antagonism, and
provided for withdrawal of Russian support to Chinese forces."
After the war started in Europe the following year, and after the replace-
ment of Neville Chamberlain by Winston Churchill convinced me that Britain
would really fight the Hitler-Stalin-Japanese alliance, being a licensed airplane
pilot. I w'ent to Canada in May 1940 to volunteer, but was rejected because
of age.
4936 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The following month, after the fall of France, I wrote to Wing Commander
Homer Smith of the Royal Canadian Air Force, offering to volunteer, with my
airplane, to fly a suicide mission into any German objective selected by them.
On July 2, 1940, Air Marshal W. A. Bishop wrote me "Wing Commander Smith
has shown me your letter and I wanted to take this opportunity of telling you
how much we appreciate your offer of service, and the offer of your machine.
At the moment, however, the age limit makes it impossible for us to accept your
services, but should this at a later date change, I will get in touch with you."
Thereafter I volunteered to fly a similar suicide mission for the Australians,
the British, and the Chinese ; but was refused.
Finally, after Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941, I wrote Artemus Gates,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, stating in part :
"In May 1940 I volunteered for the R.C.A.F. at Ottawa but was turned down
on account of age. In July 1940 I volunteered to fly any old trainer loaded with
explosives into a troop transport, warship or any other objective. This offer was
refused. In April 1941 I repeated this offer. This last offer is still being con-
sidered, but the Air Attache of the British Embassy in Washington still has no
final decision from London, but is not hopeful of a favorable answer, as the regu-
lations provide for no such service."
"I now make this offer to you ♦ * * Can you use me? Rank and pay are
no object, but I would like two weeks to wind up my affairs. This letter, of
course, is strictly confldential."
On Jan. 8, 1942, Mr. Gates wrote :
"I have your offer very much in mind, in fact, I have not been able to forget it
since you wrote me early in December, but to date I just don't know where such
100 percent unselfish services can be used. Perhaps the opportunity will develop
but I think our battle on the Pacific is going to be a long war.
"Incidentally, a number of officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics have been
acquainted with your sacrifice."
P^ailing to obtain such a commission, I finally served with the Civil Air Patrol
in the antisubmarine patrol in the Gulf of Mexico in the latter part of 1942, and
hold Certificate of Honorable Service of the Department of the Air Force.
I refer to this service and attempted service as an answer to charges and im-
plied charges, referred to above, that I was a Fascist or sympathetic to fascist-
minded groups, with none of whom have I ever had any association whatsoever.
Meantime I had become a Director and in 1941 Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Board of Directors of the American Bureau for Medical
Aid to China. In the Spring of 1943 ABMAC and United China Relief, of
which it had become a part, received unfavorable reports from their staff
men in Chungking about graft and incompetency in the Chinese Army medical
services, which we were aiding. Mr. E. C. Carter, of the IPR, had become head
of the United China Relief Committee that allocated funds to the various
agencies in China, and had recommended for appointment most of the employees
of United China Relief.
I flew to China in June 1943 at my own expense to invetigate. Shortly before
leaving for China, Mr. Lauchlin Currie jjhoned New York and asked me to
see him before going, in his offices in the State Department. He told me at
considerable length of reports being received from China, of incompetence,
corruption and the inability and lack of will on the part of the Chinese to fight.
He told me I could check with Americans in Chungking, and that he would
be pleased to hear my impressions on returning. On arrival in China Dwight
Edwards, head of UCR there. Dr. George Bachman, head of ABMAC, and various
other Americans including some in our Embassy confirmed the reports of cor-
ruption and incompetence.
As none of them had been in the field, I asked their sources, which they
protested were confidential. I therefore felt it necessary to check in the field,
which I did against their advice. After traveling through five provinces by
truck, ambulance, rail, air and horse-back, including 8 days in the 0th War
Area, I found the itemized charges either completely untrue or greatly exag-
gerated.
On returning to America I complained to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Polit'cal
Adviser to the Secretary of State on the Far East, and Joseph Ballantine,
Director Far Eastern Division of the State Department, in a lengthy interview.
1 protested that the untruths were making Chinese-American cooperation dif-
ficult, if not impossible, witli resultant benefit to the Japanese enemy and un-
necessary loss of both Chinese and American lives.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4937
They professed to be unable to do anything about it ; Dr. Hornbeck saying :
"When I see the people that this Department is sending to China, I shake in
my shoes."
It was not until early 1944 that I began to realize that the lies about the
Chinese Government and Army were Communist propaganda ; and that the
main source for spreading them in this country was the Institute of Pacific
Relations. Although I had previously been a member of the Finance Committee
of the IPR and helped raise funds for them, and had previously recognized
that some of the employees were pro-Communist, I had not suspected the
scope of the infiltration. As I had foolishly thrown away all back copies of
their publications, unread, I went to their offices to rebuy such back copies.
They told me that they were out of print.
I therefore went to the public library and from about April to October 1944,
read all articles they had published on the Chinese military and/or political
situation from 1937 to that date. I then read the articles in the New Masses,
an official Communist weekly, and The Communist, an official Communist month-
ly, on the same topics, for the same years.
From these I prepared an 88 page study (frequently referred to in the Mc-
Carran hearings) and sent it with a covering letter to Mr. E. C. Carter and to
each of the Trustees of the IPR and such members and other persons interested
in the Far East as were known to, or suggested to me. (Later the IPR in their
so-called analysis which Mr. Dennett testified was prepared by Mrs. Maxwell
S. Stewart, and not by the Trustees, and in other testimony, charged that my
study contained extracts from only 2 percent of their articles published between
1937 and 1944. This may or may not be literally true, but is irrelevant as I
studied and extracted only their articles on the military and/or political situation
in China. To the best of my memory my extracts covered all or practically all of
their articles in those two fields. I did not attempt to analyze their articles on
other countries than China (even including the U. S. and Canada), nor on other
topics such as economics, industry, transportation, finance, agriculture, folklore,
family life, shipping, missionary activities, fisheries, etc., etc.)
In my covering letter to Mr. Carter, dated Nov. 9, 1944, I said in part :
"Last June I received from United China Relief a copy of a booklet issued
by your IPR entitled 'War-Time China' (IPR Pamphet No. 10). In a recent
advertisement, Rosamund Lee, your Publications Secretary, referring to this
pamphlet states. 'What is the true situation between the Chinese Communists
and the Kuomintang as explained by Maxwell S. Stewart in War-Time China.'
"Frankly, I was shocked at this pamphlet. From start to finish, it seemed
to me a deliberate smear of China, the Chinese and the Chinese Government. I
was especially shocked by the following: 'They (the American, British and
Soviet Governments) have, however, limited their economic and military as-
sistance because of fear that any supplies they send might be used in civil strife
rather than against the Japanese.'
"The statement seems completely at variance with the many statements made
by our President to the effect that all possible aid is being given to China and
will continue to be given to China.
"Three or four years ago, you may recall, I resigned after a dozen years mem-
bership in IPR. You asked me the reason for my resignation and I told you
frankly that I thought you had too many Communists on your staff. You asked
me if I thought you were a Communist, to which I, of course, replied 'No.' You
then told me that you did not question your staff as to their political beliefs :
whether they were Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, Communists, or what
not; that you investigated their qualifications and judged them by their work.
This seemed to me at the time a very businesslike attitude and I withdrew my
resignation.
"After reading the above referred-to booklet, I decided to look into the IPR
publications further. As a result of this reading, I now attach hereto a lot of
clippings from your publications, along with clippings from 'The Communist'
(Official organ of the Communist Party in the U. S. A.) and 'New Masses'
(another Communist organ), also a few other clippings that seem to bear on the
same issues. If you will go throiigh these, I think you will find that your
employees have been putting over on you a not-too-well-camouflaged Communist
line. Your staff publications follow the 'New Masses' line exactly but not quite
so frankly and the 'New Masses' articles are much better documented. In
selecting these, I have had to clip and clip to keep to reasonable length, but I
believe that what is left of each article fairly represents the article as a whole,
as far as same touches on the subjects coverprl
88348— 52— pt. 14 3
4938 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"This study poses the question : What are the Soviet Union's aims in the Far
East? Is there a sinister purpose behind this Communist inspired campaign
to discredit China? Only Marshall Stalin can answer this question.
"But another question has been bothering me as I made this study. This
question is: Is it treason? Does the publication of untruthful statements give
'aid and comfort' to our enemy, Japan, in its attempt to break Chinese unity under
Chiang Kai-shek? This question I propound to your Board of Trustees.
"Look over these clippings and see if you do not think it is time for a house-
cleaning in the IPR. The economic articles (not quoted) sounded to me very
much like undergraduate studies, compiled from studies of Chinese economists
and lacking any practical business background.
"If you agree that a house cleaning in the IPR is long overdue, I will be happy
to help. My suggestions would be :
"1. Fire all the Reds, because the truth is not in them.
"2. Adopt a policy of presenting facts rather than opinions. Identify the
sources of your information.
"3. Name a responsible body to determine policy.
"This last point is suggested to me by what I missed in going through your
last 7 years' publications. I found :
1. No criticism of Japan in those 7 years, except of her rural land system •
2. No single criticism of Communist China ; and '
3. No single criticism of the Soviet Union ; whereas I found :
4. Severe criticism of the Chinese Government, alternating with praise
closely following the alternations of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and of
the Communist press.
"A responsible committee controlling and vouching for your policy would be
very reassuring to the members of, and contributors to your Institute."
This letter was answered, not by Mr. Carter, but by Messrs. Robert G Sproul
Chairman ; Robert D. Calkins, Dean, Columbia Universitv ; G. Ellsworth Huggins'
Treasurer, and Philip C. Jessup. In their answer they said :
"At its December 11 meeting the Executive Committee of the American Council
reviewed Mr. Kohlberg's charges and demands. It desires to report the following :
_ "The Executive Committee and the responsible officers of the American Coun-
cil find no reason to consider seriously the charge of bias. The character of the
personnel associated with the Institute, the long history of its research activities
and the demonstrated value of its research testify to the fact that it has
properly fulfilled its function to conduct impartial research on important issues
even though they are controversial. The Committee believes a full presenta-
tion and discussion of such issues is desirable, even in wartime.
"The Institute of Pacific Relations has, and always has had, a responsible
body to determine policy. The Pacific Council, with which Mr. Carter is
associated, is directed by representatives from the National Councils and that
body, made up of these representatives, determines its policies.
"The general policy of the American Council, which is one of the ten con-
stituent bodies in the Institute, is determined by the Board of Trustees The
Executive Committee acts on behalf of the Board of Trustees, when the Board
is not in session.
"The research conducted by the American Council is under the direction of
Its Research Advisory Committee, to which research planning and policy have
been delegated by the Executive Committee. This Committee formulates and
approves research programs, and it approves the research personnel who are
engaged for their competence to undertake the special assignments required in
the research program. Having hired competent research workers, it is not the
policy of the Committee or of the American Council to censor this findings, but
to publish them as the research results of the authors themselves."
This answer of the 4 trustees, I answered Dec. 28, 1944. My answer follows
(in part) :
''The issue presented to Mr. Carter by my letter of Nov. 9 is :
"Have the publications of the I. P. R. (both American Council and Pacific
Council) closely followed the Communist line in alternate praise and abuse of
the Chinese Government? i. e.
Prior to the Hitler-Stalin past of Aug. 23, 1939 __ Praise
Then until June 22, 1941 (Hitler invasion of Russia) Abuse
Then until Summer of 1943 Praise.
Since Summer of 1943 1 Abuse.
"The issue presented to your Board by my letter of Nov. 9 is : Are these publi-
cations treasonable, inasmuch as they are calculated to give 'aid and comfort' to
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4939
our enemy, Japan, in its attempts by propaganda to break the faith of the
Chinese people in the Government of Chiang Kai-shek?
"Neither of these issues is touched on in your letter of Dec. 19. Wliether they
were discussed at your meeting of Dec. 11 is not stated.
"Your letter states that, having selected competent employees, you let them
publish what they wish, without censorship. Do you consider yourselves re-
sponsible bodies and if so, do you, or do you not, assume responsibility for those
publications by your staff?
"As a member, may I ask your Research Advisory Committee for the quali-
fications as 'experts' of the following staff members who write your articles on
whether, including dates of their visits to China, cities and provinces visited, and
whether you feel their impartiality is attested to, or questioned by, their accept-
ance as authorities by, and contributors to, the American Communist press:
Maxwell S. Stewart
T. A. Bisson
L. K. Rosinger
Y. Y. Hsu
"As a member, I would be interested to know who elected or appointed to
your Board and to your Executive Committee, Mr. Frederick V. Field, Gen-
eralissimo of the White House pickets until their liquidation, Sunday, June 22^
1941, and now featured writer on China for the 'Daily Worker,' 'The Commu-
nist,' and 'New Masses', I would also be interested to know what makes him;
an 'expert' on China.
"In my letter of November 9, I called attention to the fact that in reading^
your publications for the past 7 years, I found no criticism of Japan, Communist
China, or the Soviet Union, but alternating praise and abuse of the Chinese
Government.
"Since that time I have received scores of letters, many from outstanding:
American authorities on the Far East. None was critical, some were non-
committal, the majority were commendatory of my study. A number were from
ex-members of your Institute who resigned because they felt the Institute had
become the not-too-well-camouflaged agent of a foreign power whose way of
life and world-wide tifth column infiltration are antagonistic to the interest of
these United States.
"From that correspondence I attach a letter written to you Oct. 8, 1942, by
Mr. Miller Freeman, Seattle publisher. Mr. Freeman tells me his letter was-
neither answered nor acknowledged. Maybe he, too, should have cleared it
privately with Mr. Carter.
"Before closing, one more quotation — this from signed statement of Upton.
Close :
"'A few days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Mr. Trammell' (head of
NBC) 'himself received a letter from E. C. Carter, head of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, demanding that I be dropped from the air because I was
"anti-Japanese".'
"One of the questions most commonly asked is : "What are IPR's motives
for their current attacks on China.' Possibly your Boards would like to make
a statement on this, explaining why all your articles on the current complicated
situation are written by staff members, none of whom has been in China for
years, while contrary statements by such liberals as Pearl Buck and Lin Yutang
are ignored, and articles from your own Chinese Council are rejected. May I
also ask Mr. Carter whether he personally presented your public criticisms to
Chiang Kai-shek, Ho Ying-chin, Chen Li-fu and Sun-fo in Chungking last year
and what were their answers?"
I then asked for permission to circulate my fellow members. This was
granted by letter from Mr. Raymond Dennett. But when I sent a secretary
by appointment to copy the names, they withdrew permission. I filed suit for
the membership list, which after various court vicissitudes was settled by agree-
ment by the IPR to address on their machine under my inspection any one mail-
ing I might choose to send their members.
In said mailing, dated March 18, 1947, I included a printed resolution appoint-
ing an impartial committee of investigation and a proxy to vote for same. Also
one article from the New Leader and one from Plain Talk, both about the IPR
and wrote my fellow members of the IPR in part as follows :
"By order of the supreme court of the State of New York, this letter is being
mailed to you by the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
"Early in July 1943 I was told by several Americans in Chungking that 'the
Chinese Government was hoarding tanks and guns given them under lend-lease
4940 ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to use against the Japs.' Late in August, having spent six weeks traveling
through Szechuen, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Hunan and Yunnan, I called on Brig.
Gen. Arms, U. S. Army, Commander of the Infantry Training School in Kun-
ming. Among other items I asked why we permitted such hoarding. He laughed
and said he'd heard some good ones, but this took the cake. He said that
nip to that date all the arms and ammunition that had come in had gone to
liim and to the artillery training school; that they were not fully equipped as
yet and, until they were, nothing would be flown in (the air route over the
iump to Kunming being the only route in) for any other force except the air
force whose minimum requirements were the first priority. He explained that
nothing but air-force supplies had come in since May, due to the monsoons.
After the monsoons ended, he expected the resumption of his equipping; and
after that was completed, he explained, General Stilwell was to get full equip-
ment for two of his divisions, and then, after that, 50% was to go to Stilwell and
50% to the Chinese Army- — sometime in 1944. At that moment, he said, not
one tank or gun or rifle or bazooka or cartridge had been turned over to the Chi-
nese Army under lend-lease — hence none could be hoarded.
"On returning to the United States, I spoke of this and other reports with
;some heat and was told by friends that the IPR was the chief culprit in the
spreading of lies about China, and that the motivation back of it was Commu-
nism. I had been a member of the IPR since 1928, but like most businessmen
and (as I later learned) like most of their Board of Trustees, I seldom read
the literature they sent me, and like most people knew nothing about Com-
munism.
"To check on these charges, I read through the Fae Eastern StmvEY and our
quarterly Faciftc Affairs from 1937 to that date (summer of 1944). In my
reading I read every article on the political and military situation in China
and skipped nearly everything else. Then, to learn the Communist line, I read
all the articles on the political and military situation in China in the Netw
Masses (weekly) and The Communist (monthly), both being Communist Party
ofiicial publications.
"In the course of this reading I learned that the IPR and the Communist
publications had switched their attitude or 'line' on the situation in China
several times between 1937 and 1944; both IPR and Communists making the
same switches at the same time. Further I noticed that to some extent they
interchanged writers and both quoted the same authorities ; that they were both
lyrical in their reviews of the same books ; but that, of the three, the New
Masses (possibly because it was franker and more open in taking sides) had the
best documented articles. In fact, if the IPR had disregarded whatever in-
formation sources it had (if any) and relied only on the New Masses, it would
have omitted little that it published on the Chinese military and political
scene.
"After completing my study, I published extracts from the IPR and the Com-
munist press in an 88-page booklet and sent it with a letter to Mr. E. C. Carter
and each of our Trustees and to personal acquaintances interested in China.
(You may have a copy of this and later correspondence for the asking.)
"At that time I thought that Mr. Carter, who was then President of Russian
War Relief, was so busy that he had let some Reds on the staff run off with the
Institute. I called on him and the Trustees to fire these Reds and exercise a real
control over their publications. (That was November 1944.) The answer of the
Executive Committee was to issue a letter stating that they did not think my
charges 'merited serious consideration.' (Two of them told me later that they
had not read the study.) They then turned the charges and study over to the
staff (against whom the charges were filed) to be studied and answered. By
April 1945 the stafC had prepared a 52-page answer of which I only learned in
1946 and of which even the Chairman of the Trustees couldn't get a copy to give
me. I finally obtained a copy by court order in October 1946.
"Since 1944 I have learned much more about the IPR ; its apparently completely
Communist or pro-Communist staff ; that all articles on Far Eastern politics are
written by Communists or pro-Communists (some articles on economic, scientific,
geographic questions are not) ; and that it has ties through interlocking direc-
torates or staff with various Communist or pro-Communist organizations.
"Through its influence in the stafiing of the State Department, Army and Navy
Intelligence, and Far Eastern Divisions ; of UNRRA. of OWI, and even General
MacArthur's staff, our Institute has put considerable niimbers of Communists
and pro-Communists where they could and have done the most possible harm
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4941
and spread the most confusion. How far they have succeeded is strikingly illus-
trated by comparing the present confusion in our attitude to China with the
statement handed to Ambassador Nomura on November 26, 1941, which laid down
the terms on which we would restore peaceful relations with Japan (ruptured
by the blockade declared July 25, 1941). Hull's essential demand was :
" '4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
not support — militarily, politically, economically — any Government or regime in
China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital
temporarily at Chungking.'
"To attempt to prove my statements is impossible in this letter. They are
proven in part by the study and correspondence referred to above, which will
be sent you on request.
"My attempts to arouse Mr. Carter and our Trustees to investigation and
action have failed. Several Trustees, including several of the Executive Com-
mittee have resigned, claiming that they were worried by the charges of com-
munism, but had no time to look into them so thought they'd better get out. Our
Board of Trustees (47) scattered all over the country never meets. The Execu-
tive Committee (10) is chairmanned by a Calif ornian who never attends. The
connections of the others are as per attached sheet. Most of our Trustees are,
of course, not Communists and furthermore don't take Communists very seri-
ously. Their attitude is very similar to that of a witness before the Senate
Atomic Committee, as reported in the New York Sun February 22, 1947, as
follows :
" 'Cameron said that he roomed with Hart and knew that his roommate held
Marxist views, was sympathetic to Russia, and read the Daily Worker, Communist
paper, but did not know that he was a Communist.'
"If our Institute is to be saved for the useful work it can and should do in
soundly and objectively posting American scholars, teachers, and writers on
the Far East, we, the members, will have to do the job. The first step is to appoint
a Board of Investigators to listen to my charges and dig out the facts. Some of
the gentlemen named in the enclosed proxy are known to me, some are not, but
all bear reputations as good Americans informed on the Far East. I have not
asked them if they will serve and cannot do so until I hold sufficient proxies. I
have no doubt that enough will accept to make up a satisfactory board.
"In order to keep this letter within reasonable length, I have omitted going
into the following :
"1. Many of the staff and writers have no real claim to scholarship in
the fields they cover.
"2. Much of the material published is plagiarized for the above reasons.
"3. Our staff and officers were instrumental in forming the violently pro-
Communist 'Committee for a Far Eastern Democratic Policy.'
"4. Our staff and officers were instrumental in maintaining the pro-Com-
munist 'Japanese American Committee for Democracy.'
"5. Our staff and officers conducted a pressure mail campaign to force
NBC to continue the wartime 'Pacific Story'— a Communist-angled dramatic
half hour.
"6. Our staff and officers have sponsored and published books and articles
by such known Communists as Abraham Chapman, Jos. S. Allen, Harriet L.
Moore, Philip Jaffe, Anna Louise Strong, Frederick V. Field.
"7. Members of our Board of Trustees and our staff managed to get
control of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, UNRRA
and OWI, where they loaded all three with pro-Communists. Two of them,
Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, accompanied Henry Wallace to
China in 1944 and talked that adolescent into reporting to Roosevelt that
•we were backing the wrong horse in China' and that 'Chiang Kai-shek's
government would collapse within 90 days.' Just prior to that much heralded
trip of that great friend of the common man, IPR published a booklet
by Henry Wallace, Our Job in the Pacific, which they knew he had not
written.
"8. Four of the six persons arrested in the Amerasia case were connected
with the IPR.
"I no longer believe the officers and Executive Committee can clean up the
Institute.
"After such an Investigating Committee has completed its investigation and
reported, action will then be up to us. Our Trustees will not act and if we
wait until Congressional investigation reaches us, it may be too late to save
our institution and even our good reputation."
4942 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
At the meeting, April 22, 1947, the tellers advised me that they had over 1,100
proxies against the resolution for an investigating committee. I presented 86
but they disqualified about 20, though they refused to show me their proxies.
In the meeting I read my proposed resolution and then stated :
"It would be my intention to present first to this Investigating Committee
witnesses, and by witnesses I mean more than one, who would testify that the
Institute of Pacific Relations is considered by the National Committee of the
Communist Party to be one of its organizations and that certain of the Execu-
tive Committee of the American Institute are members of the Communist Party.
"In addition to these witnesses who would testify to that effect, I would
expect to show that committee that there have been certain misstatements of
fact in the publications of the Institute, that these misstatements of fact follow
a pattern, that the publications of the Institute have been free of criticism of
Japan up to Pearl Harbor except for criticisms of the Japanese rural land
system, and that they have been free of criticisms of Russia up to date, both
Japan and Russia — that is, Siberia — falling within the area covered by the Pacific
Institute.
"I would call attention to the fact that although the Institute has referred
to many documents and in books and pamphlets issued by it has published many
pertinent documents, four of the most pertinent documents referring to the Far
East have always been omitted, and as far as I have been able to find by an
examination of the publications, have never been either printed in full or referred
to by the Institute.
"Those four documents are the Tanaka Memorial, the Resolutions of the
Colonies and Semi-Colonies adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the
Comintern, the program of the Comintern adopted by the same Sixth Congress,
and the note of Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura of November 21, 1941.
"I would also expect to show to that same committee that many of the writers
are not qualified and that there are much better qualified people in certain of
the fields on, for example, the Philippines, Hawaii, than the writers in the
publications of the Institute. They are not qualified, and qualified writers are
available, and, in fact, members of the Institute.
"I would also call to the attention of that committee that American policy
for the Pacific has been a consistent policy and in a traditional policy. That
policy is the policy of the Open Door, proclaimed in 1899 and further confirmed
in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, and that policy calls for the Open Door, for the
Independence and the territorial integrity of China, and that the publications
of the Institute, although they have published vast amounts of material on China,
seldom, if ever, have referred to this policy and its implications.
"I believe that if the opportunity is presented, I can prove each of those state-
ments and also the charges with which you are familiar from the letter sent you
March 20."
Mr. Arthur H. Dean, Vice Chairman of the IPR, presided in the absence of
the Chairman, Robert G. Sproul. He answered my statement, saying that the
IPR was lily-white (not red) and he could vouch for it. The vote cast by the
nearly 100 present, was unanimous against the resolution. A few days later, by
letter, I resigned from the IPR, since which time I have devoted little
attention to it.
Just about a year previous to the above meeting, Mr. J. B. Powell, dean of
the American correspondents in China, and Miss Helen Loomis, a former mis-
sionary teacher in China, had called a small meeting at Miss Loomis' apartment
to form a committee to warn the country of the dangerous policy we were follow-
ing in China. From this meeting came the American China Policy Association,
Inc., of which Mr. Powell was President until his death in 1947, when he was
succeeded for one year by former Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, and Miss
Loomis was Secretary-Treasurer. I was elected Vice President and later Chair-
man of the Board. By resolution the American China Policy Association, Inc.,
limited its members to persons of American citizenship and provided that only
Americans could be brought as guests to its Board meetings, so that America's
interest, only, should be presented for consideration.
Meantime also, I had become publisher and sole financial backer of the magazine
Plain Talk, published from October 1946 to May 1950, as a monthly, and now
merged with The Freeman, a fortnightly.
During these years, and continuing to the present, I have written numerous
open letters to various persons, including Government officials, numerous arti-
cles for magazines, and letters to newspapers, on the general topic of our strug-
gle with World Communism. I have also made speeches on numerous occa-
sions. In all cases I have refused to accept monies, from any source, either for
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4943
articles, speeches or traveling expenses, or as contributions. All expenses have
been paid by me personally or by one of the corporations controlled by me and
interested in these matters.
I have five times appeared at public hearings before Committees of the
Congress — twice on behalf of the American China Policy Association, Inc., and
three times as an individual. Three of the hearings were before the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate and two before the Appropriations Committee
of the Senate.
Other than these appearances my visits to Washington have been mostly
seeking information as to what was going on in the labyrinth of apparent ab-
sence of over-all policy which has led to such disastrous results for America
and the Free World. The only members of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee whom I have ever met are Senators Brien McMahon, H. Alexander
Smith, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Owen Brewster. These were chance meetings.
The only members of that Committee on whom I have ever called are Senators
H. Alexander Smith and Owen Brewster. When Senator Smith returned from
the Far East in 1949, I sent my card in to the Floor and he came to the Senate
Lobby and told me of his impressions. I called on Senator Brewster in New
York once when he was en route to Europe and presented him with copies of
three important Comintern documents.
Sometime in March 1950 one of Senator McCarthy's assistants got in touch
with me and I supplied published material on the Far East and on persons con-
nected with American policy in the Far East. Subsequently, I met the Senator
for the first time. Thereafter Drew Pearson broadcast the statement that I
was backing Senator McCarthy financially. Up to that moment it had not
occurred to me that Senator McCarthy had to pay his staff, as I presumed they
were supplied by the Senate. So I wrote Drew Pearson as follows :
"Your broadcast suggested that Senator McCarthy has been put to heavy
expense in his patriotic work of exposing the traitors who have controlled our
policy in Asia. I think Americans should join in helping pay some of Senator
McCarthy's expenses, so I am going to send him a small check today and hope
others do likewise."
Some days, or a week later, I sent a check for $500 to Senator McCarthy. He
returned it with a polite letter saying that charges that I was the China Lobby
made it inadvisable for him to accept the contribution. Since then. Senator
McCarthy has not suggested, nor have I offered or made a further contribution ;
nor had I ever previously offered or made any contribution to Senator McCarthy.
In the course of my studies (which were those of a businessman with some
background, but not those of a trained student of international affairs), I
learned from persons in a position to know, that at all times for more than
10 years the Communists have maintained control of the Executive Committee
of the IPR and of the staff; and that the few changes made, under pressure of
public exposure, have not altered this control. About .5 years ago an investi-
gator for the State Department spent two days in my files, and after investiga-
tion elsewhere filed a report on the IFR which must have revealed to the State
Department the true facts. In spite of which our Far Eastern destiny still lies
in the hands of IPR-connected officials.
At about the same time an investigator for ONI called on me, said Admiral
Nimitz had been invited to become Chairman of IPR ; that he had asked ONI
to report, and they were making a routine check. Admiral Nimitz did not
become Chairman or a Trustee, but thereafter General Marshall became a
Trustee, in spite of the previously filed report of the State Department investi-
gator.
In a speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, February 29, 1952,
I called on those Trustees of the IPR (of whom some were present) who were
neither Communist nor pro-Communist to rehabilitate themselves with their
fellow Americans by coming forward and publicly revealing who pulled the
strings and who had induced them to lend their protection to the Communists.
On March 1.S, 1952, I wrote to the Trustees in part as follows :
"To Messrs. .Jos. P. Chamberlain, Arthur H. Dean, W. F. Dillingham, Brooks
Emeny, Huntington Gilchrist, W. R. Herod, and Philip C. Jessup:
"In March 1947 I proposed a Resolution for investigation of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, to be voted at a special meeting on April 22, 1947.
"In seeking proxies to oppose my Resolution, a public letter (March 17, 1947)
issued by all of you, denied that there was any need for investigation of the
Institute. Among various inaccurate statements, you said :
" 'The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees has investigated Mr.
Kohlberg's charges and found them inaccurate and irresponsible.'
4944 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"Raymond Denuett, your then secretary, has now sworn before the McCarran
Committee that the above statement was untruthful, and known to you to be so.
"To Messrs. Eugene Staley, Herbert Eloesser, Galen M. Fisher, Mrs. Frank A.
Gerbode, O. C. Hansen, Mrs. E. H. Heller, Eene A. May, Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin,
Mrs. Harold L. Paige, Robert Gordon Sproul, Lynn White, Jr., and Ray Lyman
Wilbur (all of California) :
"On March 31, 1947, you issued a public letter of the same general tenor as
the above, seeking proxies to oppose my Resolution for investigation.
"To Knight Biggerstaff of Cornell; John K. Fairbank, of Harvard; Harold
H. Fisher of the Hoover Library ; Kenneth Scott Latourette, of Yale ; Raymond
Kennedy, of Yale ; Wm. W. Lockwood, of Princeton ; Donald G. Tweksbury of
Columbia :
"You signed statements in the same proxy fight, exonerating the I. P. R. of
the slightest Communist bias.
"To Messrs. Edward W. Allen, Raymond B. Allen, Christian O. Arndt, J. Bal-
lard Atherton, E. C. Auchter, George T. Cameron, Edward C. Carter, D. C.
Clarke, Arthur G. Coons, George B. Cressey, Lauchlin Currie, John L. Curtis,
Len de Caux, K. R. Duke, Clarence A. Dykstra, Rupert Emerson, Frederick V.
Field, Charles K. Gamble, Carrington Goodrich, Henry F. Grady, Mortimer
Graves, R. P. Heppner, John R. Hersey, Paul G. Hoffman, Benjamin H. Kizer,
Daniel E. Koshland, Lewis L. Lapham, Owen Lattimore, Herbert S. Little, Boyd
A. Martin, Charles E. Martin, Abbot Low Moffat, Donald M. Nelson, David N.
Rowe, Gregg M. Sinclair, D. B. Straus, Donald B. Tresidder, Juan Trippe, Sum-
ner Wells, Brayton Wilbur, Heaton L. Wrenn, Louise L. Wright and J. D. Zeller-
bach:
"You were the remaining members of the Board of Trustees of the IPR at the
time my Resolution for investigation was voted on April 22, 1947. Not one of
you voted for my Resolution to investigate.
"Since that time numerous qualified witnesses have testified under oath be-
fore the McCarran Committee that :
"1. Your organization constantly and deliberately followed the Commu-
nist line in its publications.
"2. Some espionage activities were carried on.
"3. More than forty of your staff, Trustees and writers were actual Com-
munists, or espionage agents, or both, and others leaned that way.
"4. That activities in infiltrating our government by such people were car-
ried on both oflicially and unofficially in your name.
"The balance of this letter is addressed only to those of you who are not Com-
munists, or pro-Communist in your sympathies. I suggest that you explain to
the McCarran Committee your defense of the conspiracy in your midst ; stating
names of persons who induced you to protect the guilty, and reasons given ; and
reasons for neglecting the duty incumbent on you as Trustees. For example,
which of you inveigled General Marshall into joining your Board?
"Such confession is the atonement for past injury to our country made by
Louis Budenz and the other ex-Communists who testified. I hesitate to think
you have less regard for our country's welfare than they."
Thereafter I received a letter from Dr. Roscoe Pound, dean emeritus of the
Harvard Law School, and at present, visiting professor at the School of Law,
University of California at Los Angeles, dated March 18, 19.52, in which he said:
"Many thanks for your statement of date March 14 which I am rejoiced to have.
One of the worst offenders in my experience is Professor J. K. Fairbank of
Harvard. He is beyond redemption, but I take pleasure in showing him up on
every occasion. I ran into him first in Nanking where the State Department
information office was a fountain of misinformation."
I further state that the testimony on page 1085 of the MacArthur hearings of
last May by Senator Knowland and General Bradley to the effect that we have
no objectives in Korea ; and the statement near the bottom of page 1556 of
Part 5 of the McCarran hearings by Ambassador George Kennan to the effect
that we have no over-all foreign policy, not even the Open-Door Policy and the
Monroe Doctrine any longer, is conclusive proof either of incompetence on the
part of the State Department, or neglect of America's interests by that Depart-
ment.
Alfred Kohlbebg.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this IGth day of April 1952.
[seal] Pasquale J. Fenico.
Notary Public, State of New York.
Commission Expires March 30, 1954.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4945
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those documents, please?
Mr. Mandel. I have here nine groups of photostats that are stapled
together, and they come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Ke-
lations.
The Chairman. Are they photostats of instruments found in the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations ?
Mr. Mandel. These actual photostats as they are now were found
in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. They were found in photostatic form ?
Mr. Mandel. In photostatic form and stapled as they are now. For
purposes of identification I will read one cover sheet. It reads : "De-
part of State, Office of Research and Intelligence," marked "Re-
stricted," No. 3024.3, Economy of Communist North China, 1937-45;
Land Policy, Description, Analysis of the Chinese Communist Agrar-
ian Policies and of the Results Obtained From These Policies in Com-
munist-Controlled Areas, Washington, D. C, March 8, 1946," and
then there is a rubber stamp in the photostat, "Department of State,
Reference Division, Received January 14, 1947," and another rubber
stamp, "Division of Geography and Cartography, May 13, 1946,
Department of State."
Mr. SouRw^iNE. Don't you think that identifies it adequately?
Mr. Mandel. All right.
Mr. Morris. Have you made up copies of the first sheets of every
one of those documents ?
Mr. Mandel. I have made up copies of nine cover sheets.
Mr. Morris. May we offer for the record Mr. Mandel's copies of
the cover sheets of these documents rather than the documents them-
selves? In other words, the significance of this offering is the na-
ture of the documents found rather than the contents of the docu-
ments. Because of their great bulk I do not recommend that they
be put into the record, but that Mr, Mandel's copies of the cover sheet
in each case be introduced into the record after Mr. Marks, Mr. Hol-
land, and Mr. Carter have had an opportunity to make comment on
them.
Will you accept that?
Mr. Marks. We have not checked those cover sheets.
Mr. Morris. We will get a ruling first.
The Chairman. As I understand it now, the cover sheets were
copied by Mr. Mandel ; is that right ?
Mr. Mandel. That is right.
The Chairman. And you want to offer the cover sheets ?
Mr. Morris. We are going to offer the cover sheets, thereby de-
scribing the nature of the documents found.
The Chairman. Does the cover sheet reflect the nature of the docu-
ment ?
Mr. Mandel. It does.
Mr. SouRWiNE. What you are offering is the cover sheet of the
document; you are not offering Mr. Mandel's copy. The docu-
ments are here, and you are offering the cover sheet of the document
of the record in each case ; is that right?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Mr. Marks. Mr. Mandel has his own copy.
The Chairman. He has a copy of the photostats.
4946 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. The photostats themselves are physically in '
Mandel's hands, and I am simply suggesting that we disregard
Mr.
the
question of any copies that he may have made and that the Chair's
instruction be that the cover sheets of each of these groups of photo-
static documents be put into the record.
Mr. Marks. Fine.
Mr. SouRwiNE. What is ordered into the record is the cover sheet
itself if the Chair so rules.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, could you tell us precisely in what files
they were found ? Is that information possible ?
Mr. Mandel. I could not tell you what cabinet or class of cabinet
it was found in.
Mr. Marks. Do you think they came from Lee, Mass., or do you
think they came from the files you examined here in New York?
Mr. Mandel. I am positive they came from the files of Lee, Mass.
Mr. Marks. I am just trying to locate these things. Did you notice
these things before ? I know you have had a lot of papers. Are these
recent discoveries?
I am going to say frankly right now that Mr. Holland and Mr.
Carter will state that they do not recall having seen those, and I am
just trying to figure out just what did happen.
Mr. Mandel. As I recall, they were in a drawer loosely, not in any
particular folder, and due to the bulk they were withheld pending
further examination and questions to the State Department. It is
correspondence with the State Department regarding these, and
that is why they have not come up until now.
Mr. Marks. Do you recall any correspondence in those boxes about
these boxes or any kind of covering letter ?
Mr. Mandel. No, I do not.
Mr. Marks. And there is no stafi^ memorandum or anything, just
saying that we received these?
Mr. Mandel. That is correct.
Mr. Marks. Perhaps Mr. Morris would like to ask you whether you
or Mr. Carter can identify these,
Mr. Morris. Mr. Holland, do these documents suggest anything at
all to you ?
Mr. Holland. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you had an opportunity to examine them?
Mr. Holland. Yes ; not every page, but I have examined the covers
of each one, and I have a general idea of the nature of the documents.
I have no knowledge of ever having seen this document before, and
no knowledge of its being in the Institute of Pacific Relations' files.
I wish, Mr. Chairman, to note that in the inventory listing of this
document, it is given a committee serial number 500.28, and I won-
dered whether from that Mr. Mandel might be able to locate a little
more precisely where in the files he found it.
Mr. Mandel. The designation was made in the last few days and
covers only the documents that we did not have in our ordinary file
and had to classify roughly for purposes of this hearing.
Mr. SouRwiNE. 1 might say to Mr. Holland if it is important for
him to know how the committee operates in its classification numbers
that that is more in the nature of a library classification. It does not
have a reference back to the source of the document in the IPR files,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4947
but refers only to the evaluation or the tentative evaluation by the
committee staff.
Mr. Holland. Mr. Chairman, my purpose in asking for informa-
tion about the location in the files is because the dates on these docu-
ments I think all relate to late 1945 up to I think either January or
May 1947. To the best of our knowledge the files in Lee did not
include material after 1945.
Mr. SouEWiNE. On that point, the files would of course speak for
themselves.
Mr. Holland. Sure. lexplainthisis the only reason for my asking
for some clarification if it can be provided.
Mr. SotJRWiNE. Mr. Mandel, can you recall whether there have been
other documents in the IPR files of a date as late as 1947 'i
Mr. Mandel. That point has not come up.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Sourwine, would it be proper for me to testify on
this of my own recollection?
Mr. SouKwiNE. Do you want to make a statement or sworn testi-
mony ?
The Chairman. Yes. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you
are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Morris. I do.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MORRIS, SUBCOMMITTEE COUNSEL
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this question has come up, and I have
a vivid and unmistakable recollection of this very question because it
was my understanding when I first began to examine the files last
February and March that the documents contained only letters up to
and including 1945. The first or the second day that I began to exam-
ine the files I found letters in there subsequent to that date.
Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, you called that to my attention
at that time, did you not ?
Mr. Morris. I did, Mr. Sourwine. They number, I would say, at
least in the hundreds in that description. Some of them have been
put in the record. I was pointing that out to Mr. Holland yesterday,
and one I could think of offhand was a letter describing a conference
between Mr. Carter and Mr. Robert T. Miller, which was introduced
in the record the first or second day of our open hearings. There have
been others, and my recollection is that it is at least in the hundreds.
It came as a surprise to me, and I have an unmistakable recollection
on that score.
Mr. Mandel. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that there were two
classes of documents, those taken from the files at Lee, Mass., and those
taken from the New York office. If these had come from the New
York office you would have had photostats of all of them because that
was the arrangement.
Mr. Holland. Yes.
Mr. SouRA^rENE. As far as that goes, the committee staff in its han-
dling of these documents has kept the items which came from the
New York office and those which came from the Lee bam in such a
way that there has been no possibility to be confused.
4948 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. JVIandel. That is correct. They are designated as coming from
the New York office.
Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Holland, do these appear to you to be based on
reports made by the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Holland. No ; I have no indication of that. Yesterday when
I was speaking to you informally I said it might, but on subsequent
looking at them I don't find any sign that they are based except in-
sofar as they contain footnote references to published materials by
the institute. The other comment I wish to make is that in our New
York office here and subsequent to 1945 after the end of the war, the
institute like a number of other research organizations has received
from the State Department a nuinber of declassified documents,
some of which resemble this, but so far as I am aware none of them
have been in this photostat form. They have all been mimeographed
or done on one of these ditto form things, and that is why I am ex-
tremely surprised to have this brought to my attention, because it
is the kind of thing which I myself would be expected to know because
of its subject matter, but, as I say, I have no knowledge or recollection
of having seen it before or knowledge of its being in the institute's
files.
Mr. Marks. Do the declassification documents received always show
on the document that they have been declassified?
Mr. SouRwiNE. I cannot answer it. It should be obvious that it is
possible to have in one's possession a document which does not show
any declassification stamp and which has in fact been declassified,
because if you had a document in your possession at a time when it was
classified and retained it in your possession until after it was declas-
sified, it would be a declassified document.
Mr. Marks. I understand that, but I think the practice is sometimes
to declassify by a covering letter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Perhaps you are sufficiently familiar to testify on
that point.
Mr. Marks. From Mr. Holland's experience, and I would like him
to testify on that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you consider Mr. Holland is able to testify with
regard to Government practices ?
Mr. Marks. Just his own experience in regard to the Institute of
Pacific Relations.
Mr. Holland. From our own experience, Mr. Chairman, in one or
two cases we have received documents subsequent to 1945 from the
State Department in sending along with a group of documents, most
of which had the usual stamp "declassified by order of," and then the
signature of the person — one or two documents did not have this
stamp, but the document was identified in a covering letter transmit-
ting it to us, saying, "We are herewith sending you the following
document."
Nevertheless, this does not
Mr. Marks. You have not completed that sentence, I don't think.
Is that all the letter said ? '
Mr. Holland. Of course, I cannot remember the exact title, but
indicating the title on the document, which on subsequent examina-
tion we have found did not include the usual stamp.
Mr. Marks. But the letter talks about classification. What is it?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4949
Mr. Holland. I can't speak from direct recollection, but I do know
we have one or more letters in our files with inventory documents being
transmitted to us, and in that inventory are items which on subsequent
examination we found referred to documents which did not include
on the cover the usual declassification stamp.
Mr. Marks. Did the letter refer to those documents as declassified,
or was it completely silent ?
Mr. Holland, That I can't say.
The Chairman. Well, we have the testimony here of Mr. Mandel
that these photostats were actually found in the files of the Institute
of Pacific Relations in photostatic form as they are presented to the
committee now ; is that correct ?
Mr. Mandel. That is correct.
The Chairman. Wliat is your offer?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer the cover sheets of each one of
these documents and ask that they be admitted into the record.
The Chairslan. All right.
Mr. SouRWiNE. After the Chair rules on that point and if Mr.
Marks has finished his cross-examination of Mr. Holland, I have a
question I want to ask.
The Chairman. Do you want to cross-examine now ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. I would simply like to ask Mr. Holland this : Since
you did remember such a letter, do you remember who wrote it ?
Mr. Holland. No, because it was not addressed to me. I ascertained
this information by, speaking to our publications secretary yesterday.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Was it an official State Department letter, or merely
from someone in the State Department ?
Mr. Holland. No, it was an official State Department letter which
I can produce. It does not refer to this document because when I
asked for this information, I said, "Have we any record in our file
of a document with this title and serial number?" And it is not there.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I would like to ask that Mr. Holland be directed
to furnish to the committee the letter he speaks of and any other letter
he speaks of, to wit, letters which contain in terms transmittals of
documents which at the time were on their classified list and also that
he indicate which of the documents on that letter so transmitted were
in fact on their classified list.
The Chairman. All right. Your request is that these cover sheets
be inserted ?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(Mr. Mandel, after a subsequent examination of his files, testified
at a hearing held on May 13, 1952, that he had been in error in testi-
fying that the photostats were found in the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations. See pp. 4616 and 4617, pt. 13.)
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 1322 to-
1330, inclusive," and are as foljows:)
4950 LNSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
181101 3
Exhibit No. 1322
(Handwritten:) 097.3
44 Z1092R
no. 3024.1
BESTRICTED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Interim Research and Intelligence Service
research and analysis branch
R & A No. 3024.1
EcoNOMT OF Communist North China, 1937-1945 : Areas of Economic Control
DESCRIPTION
This Study, the first of a series, outlines the territorial basis of the economy
of Communist North China.
Date : 23 November 1945.
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as
amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Copy No.
Restricted.
Exhibit No. 1323
Department of State, Intelligence Reference Division. Received, Aug. 12, 1946.
(Handwritten:) R
097.3
Z1092
no. 3024.5
RESTRICTED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Research and Intelligence
No. 3024.5
Economy of Communist North China, 1937-1945: Standards of Living
description
Analysis of wages, food, clothing, shelter, health care, and other aspects of
standards of living in Communist North China.
Washington, D. C, June 15, 19^6.
Restricted.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4951
Exhibit No. 1324
(Handwritten) R
29 097.3
Z1092
no. 3024.6
KESTEICTED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Research and Intelligence
No. 3024.6
Economy of Coaimunist Nobth China, 1937-1945 : Labor
description
A study of labor policies, labor force, wages and hours, and labor unions in
Communist North China.
Washington, D. C, April 25, 19.^6.
Restricted.
Exhibit No. 1325
Handwritten: 097.3
22 Z1092
#3024.8
1946
eestricted
Economy of Communist North China, 1937-1945: Cooperatives
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Intelligence Research Report
OCL-3024.8
June 30, 1946.
A study of the historical background, types, organization, and development of
cooperatives in Communist areas of North China.
Distributed by Office of Intelligence Coordination aiJd Liaison (OCL),
Restricted.
Exhibit 1326
(Handwritten) 097.3
38 Z1092
#3024.2/45
restricted
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Interim Research and Intelligence Service : Research and Analysis Branch
R. & A. 3024.2
Economy of Communist North China, 1937-45 : Summary of Economic Policies
description
A summary of the economic policies of the Chinese Communists as analyzed
in further detail in the forthcoming parts of the Economy of Communist North
China, 1937-45.
11 December 1945.
Restricted.
(80380)
4952
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1327
(Handwritten:) 097,3
47 Z1092
No. 30243
KESTEICTED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Research and Intelligence
No. 3024.3
Economy of Communist North China, 1937-1945: Land Policy
description
Analysis of the Chinese Communist agrarian policies and of the results obtained
from these policies in Communist-controlled areas.
Washington, D. C, 8 March 1946.
Restricted.
Handwritten: 446
gs
ExHiBrr No. 1328
Handwritten : 57
Illegible initials
097.3
Z1092
#3024.4/47
restricted
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Research and Intelligence
No. 3024.4
Economy of Communist North China, 1937-1945 : Land and Food
description
Analysis of the topographic and agricultural regions, land utilization, and crop
production of Communist North China.
Washington, D. C, April 12, 19.'f6.
Restricted.
Exhibit No. 1329
restricted
Handwritten: 097.3
27 Z1092
#3024.7/46
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Research and Intelligence
No. 3024.7
Economy of Communist North China, 1937-1945 : Industries and Mining
description
A study of the nature and extent of industrial development, types of indus-
trial activity, and geographic distribution of industries in Communist areas.
Washington, D. C, August 20, 1946.
Restricted.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4953
Exhibit No. 1330
Handwritten : #3024.9/46. Other handwritten fijiures crossed out.
24
kestkicted
Economy of Commukist Nokth China, 1937-1945: Finance
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Intelligence Reseaech Repobt
OCL-3024.9
August 26, 1946.
A study of money and banking and the operation of taxation systems in Com-
munist Areas.
Distributed by Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison (OCL).
Restricted.
Mr. Carter. Mr. Mandel recently referred apropros of letters al-
legedly in the Lee files after 1945. There were two sources of the
Senate subcommittee's IPR documents, one at Lee and one in the
New York office. I think I might have pointed out before, Mr. Chair-
man, that in the barn at Lee was a three-drawer wooden cabinet of
my personal papers. Those were taken to Washington at the same
time, and it is conceivable that some of these 1945 and subsequent let-
ters were in my personal file, not in the IPR files.
I do not thiiik that is particularly material, but there is that pos-
sibility.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Could you say whether these photostats were in your
personal files ?
Mr. Carter. My testimony on them is identical with that of Mr.
Holland, that until I saw them in Davis Polk's office yesterday I didn't
remember ever having seen them before.
]Mr. SouRWiNE. Then, you cannot testify whether they were or were
not in your personal files ?
Mr. Carter. No. It was not apropos of that, but to establishing the
date of what the Lee files covered. I thought that in my personal
files there might have been some IPR letters. The thing that recalled
it to me was Mr. Mandel and Mr. Morris's comment with reference
to the Miller letter which was of a date later than 1945.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was that Miller letter in your personal files, or
do you know ?
Mr. Carter. I don't know.
Mr. SoLTRWiNE. Mr. Mandel, can you say whether the so-called per-
sonal files of Mr. Carter were separately identified ?
Mr. jVLyndel. They were not.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, there has come up for attention part
of the witness, Mr. Owen Lattimore's, testimony that he did not clearly
understand the testimony of Mr. Barmine with respect to a certain con-
versation :Mr. Barmine "had with General Berzin. Mr. Chairman, I
feel our public record is clear and unmistakable on this point, particu-
larly if you read two or three pages, and it comes to the very point.
In reading through the executive session testimony of Mr. Barniine
taken on May 5, 1951, several months prior, the thing is even more
clear and more precise. For the sake of clarity I ask that pages 21
8834S — 52 — pt. 14 4
4954 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and 22 of Mr. Barmine's executive session testimony be introduced
into our public record.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, since that obviously requires a rul-
ing by the committee to release executive session testimony, I would
ask Mr. Morris if he would amend his request to be that the chair
at an appropriate time lay before the full committee the question of
inserting in the record such portions of the executive session testimony.
The Chairman. I think that is the correct attitude to take. I think
it should be presented to the subcommittee. At that time let the sub-
committee release it from its executive position.
Mr. SoURWiNE. The chair could order included at this point in the
record such portions of the executive testimony of Mr. Barmine as the
subcommittee rules may be released from the executive session.
The Chairman. That will be the order.
(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 1331 and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 1331
Mr. Bakmine. * * *
In this connection with General Berzin and one of his assistants, we were
discussing possible personnel.
Mr. Morris. Who was his assistant?
Mr. Barmine. He was chief of the second section, Firin.
So there was discussion about the personnel at least and Firin was called to
the discussion and there were exchanges about the possible people among the
Military Intelligence personnel who were at that time in China or had knowledge
of Chinese affairs, and would it be possible to use them.
Several names of Russians, Chinese, Americans, Czechoslovakians, French,
were mentioned.
Now, I want to make the statement that that conversation was in 1935, sixteen
years ago, and I only can tell these conversation were carried by hours and for
weeks. There were so many other problems in our work in the export of arms,
things that you are interested in, it was a very casual and incidental part of it.
I had my hands full of other things, so probably only I can tell to the best
of my recollection whatever remains in my memory.
Mr. Morris. What did he say about the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Barmine. Several names were named of men working for the apparatus
of Military Intelligence there, and suggested, not even suggested, but discussed
the posibility. Two of them were Americans, Lattimore and Joseph Barnes.
*******
Executive Session, Volume 21, May 5, 1951.
Testimony of Alexander Gregory Barmine, pages 21-22 of transcript.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandell, will you identify these two letters, please ?
Mr. Mandell. I have here three photostats which I personally ob-
tained from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur at the Stanford University.
The Chairman. Did you have those photostats made ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur, or
from the files of the Ray Lyman Wilbur Library or some other
library ?
Mr. Mandel. They were files of Ray Lyman Wilbur.
Mr. SouRwiNE, Personal files?
Mr. Mandel. Yes. They were obtained from the Hoover Libr^^ry
at Stanford Univei-sity.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the first of these purports to be a letter
signed by Mr. Edward C. Carter, dated December 30, 1933, to the
members of the American council :
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4955
It gives me great pleasure to announce that at the board of trustees meeting
on December 20 Mr. Joseph Barnes was unanimously selected my successor as
secretary to the American council.
I offer this to Mr. Carter and ask him if he can recall having written
that letter. Does that look like a photostatic copy of a document sent
by you, Mr. Carter?
Air. Carter. Yes.
The Chairman. The question is, Does he recall having sent the
original of that ?
Mr. Carter. I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is a photostatic copy of your signature?
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. Morris. I have here photostatic copies of correspondence be-
tween Mr. Eliot Wadsworth and Mr. Edward C. Carter dated No-
vember 25, 1941, and November 26, 1941. I offer you that, Mr. Carter,
and ask you if those documents recall such an exchange of corre-
spondence that you had ?
Mr. Carter. They appear to be one sent by me and the other re-
ceived by me.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is one of those in fact a letter which you sent and
signed ?
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE, Is it a photostatic copy ?
Mr. Carter. Yes. The signature is not there on either letter.
Mr. Sourwine. This is a photostatic copy of a letter dated Novem-
ber 26, 1941, typed and addressed "Dear Eliot" and is a letter which
in fact you dictated and sent ?
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. The next document is headed "American Red Cross"
and is dated November 25, 1941, to Mr. Edward C. Carter and signed
"Eliot Wadsworth." Is that a copy of a letter you received?
Mr. Carter. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Ma^ they be received in the record ?
The Chairman. They will be received in the record.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1332, 1333,
1333-A, and are as follows :)
Exhibit No. 1332
Amekican Council, Institute of Pacific Rbxations
129 East 52nd St., New York City (top floor)
Telephone PLaza 3-4700. Cable, INPAREL, New York
December 30, 1933.
To the Members of the American Council :
It gives me great pleasure to announce that at the Board of Trustees meeting
on December 20th Mr. Joseph Barnes was unanimously elected my successor as
Secretary of the American Council. He will take office on January 1st, 1934.
For the past two years Mr. Barnes has been a member of the Research staff
of the American Council. He was the editor of the series of studies in Conflict
and Control which were presented as the American Council data papers at the
Banff Conference. He wrote Government Promotion of Foreign Trade in the
United States in that series. In 1932, in collaboration with Mr. Frederick V.
Field, Mr. Barnes wrote two of the American Council's most widely circulated
pamphlets, Conflict in the Far East, 1931-1932, and Behind the Far Eastern Con-
flict. He is the author of several of the American Council's Fortnightly Memo-
randa.
4956 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
At the 1933 annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Mr. Barnes read a paper on The Tactics of the Third International,,
and at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association he presented
a paper on Military Communism. In March 1934, Doubleday, Doran are publish-
ing a symposium which has been planned by Mr. Barnes and written by ten
members of the American Council. The title of the forthcoming book is "Empire
in the East."
After being graduated from Harvard and completing a period of study at the
London School of Economics and in the Soviet Union, Mr. Barnes joined the
staff of the Chase National Bank. From the Chase Bank he returned to Russia
for a further period of study, at the end of which he went to the Far East as a
member of the American Group at the Shanghai Conference in 1931. He joined
the staff of the American Council at the end of that year. In addition to the
higliest research qualifications, Mr. Barnes has shown pronounced executive
ability. He assumes office with the unqualified support of the officers of the
Council.
In connection with my new work as Secretary General of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, Mrs. Carter and I leave San Francisco for Honolulu and the
Far East on January 26th.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Edward C. Carter,
[t] Edwaed C. Caetek.
Exhibit No. 1333
American Red Cross,
Washington, D. C, November 25, 1941.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. T.
Deas Ned : Thanks for your letter of the 21st with a most interesting report
as to the varied activities of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
You certainly have been playing checkers and almost rival Felix Frankfurter
in his reputing activities in recommending young men for positions.
I am certainly glad that you put aside the crown and stuck to your old job
which must be more important all the time.
Enclosed is check for $50, which I am glad to send.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Eliot Wadswoeth.
Exhibit No. 1333-A
November 26, 1941.
Eliot Wadsworth, Esq.,
American Red Cross, Washington, D. G.
Dear Eliot : It was great to get your prompt and generous response to our
appeal. Enclosed is the Assistant Treasurer's receipt.
As you can well imagine, it is satisfying to find that we have been lucky in
developing both a system and an appeal which draws exceedingly able young
people to our staff, whose services subsequently appear invaluable to various
governments.
Allen Wardwell has just spoken very appreciately of Andrew Grajdanzev's
article on Russia's War Potential in the Far Eastern Survey of November 17,
and four departments of the Government have indicated that his article on
the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Problem of Soviet Supply in December
Pacific Affairs is the most authoritative and useful treatment of this all-import-
ant railway which has been prepared in this country.
Again many, many thanks.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Mr. Morris. With respect to these others, they do not require the
presence of these gentlemen here, but they are perfectly willing to
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4957
rstay on. I suggest that they do stay on because they may be of inter-
est to them. The only thing is your time.
The Chairman. My time is coming up right now. I have an ap-
pointment. When would we go on again?
Mr. Morris. We can do it in Washington.
The Chairman. That would be better.
Mr, SouRwiNE. Before we conclude this hearing, I would like to
ask one question of Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland. Do each of you
adopt as your testimony the statements here made in your behalf by
Mr. Marks ?
Mr. Holland. I do.
• Mr. Carter. I do.
Mr. Morris. We have two statements from Mr. Carter which have
been submitted to the committee today, I have not seen either one
of those, but the question comes up. Suppose those statements are
based on letters that are not now in our records; will they be able to
be received in the record ?
The Chairman. They are not admitted in the record of this com-
mittee yet. If you need those letters, you can call on Mr. Carter to
produce them.
Mr. Morris. On several occasions I have invited Mr, Marks and
Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter and others in the Institute to put into
our record, if they feel it is necessary in the sake of justice and fair-
ness, if we have, for instance, introduced a letter of a certain nature,
the reply to that letter. I was hoping that today they might have
some of those things that might go into our record at this time.
Mr. Holland. The selection of those letters is one of the things
why Mr. Carter is working in New York. We do have a few and, as
I recall, Mr. Carter has one section, the appendix to one of his state-
ments, and we will have others that we wish to submit fairly soon.
Mr, SouRwiNE. With the knowledge of the shortage of time that
the chairman has, it seems perfectly clear there is going to have to
be one more session. Could we recess subject to the call of the
chairman ?
The Chairman. All right.
(Whereupon, at 12:15 p, m., the hearing was adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair,)
4958
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 765
To-
From—
Date
Type of
Document
File
Number
Exhibit
Num-
ber
ECC and CP
WWL
1/ 5/37
1/ 5/37
11/15/37
12/ 1/37
1/ 4/38
9/19/38
. 10/10/38
1/ 5/40
7/12/40
3/21/41
4/15/43
12/10/41
12/19/41
12/23/41
1/16/42
2/12/42
3/ 3/42
3/27/42
3/17/42
4/21/42
6/15/42
10/21/42
10/21/42
11/16/42
11/ 6/42
11/19/42
it conf.)
11/19/42
11/27/42
12/ 3/42
12/28/42
4/17/43
9/16/42
10/12/42
10/ 1/42
10/ 9/42
12/29/47
12/26/42
J dated 12/
12/ 2/42
Carbon
4(
tt
It
Photostat.
tt
Carbon
Original.-.
Photostat.
tt
tt
Carbon...
Original...
tt
Copy
Carbon
Photostat.
Carbon. . .
Original.-.
It
Photostat.
tt
It
Original...
Carbon
tt
It
It
Photostat.
tt
tt
Carbon...
Original...
tt
Carbon.-.
21/42)
Original...
191.9
131B.113
119.40
191. 100
119. 146
105. 244
100. 26
191.98
191.2
100.385
131B.42
131B.61
119. 120
105. 202
119.75
191. 197
131B.110
tt
131B.77
105. 322
131B. 117
500.1
191.45
191.45
105. 27
131B.63
131B.13
131B.44
500. 2
131B. 149
131B.57
tt
tt
tt
500. 18
13IB.68
131B. 2
765A
FVF
WWL
766
Fred V. Field
W. W. Lockwood, Jr
Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr
WWL
767
Maxwell M. Hamilton
768
BL
769
WLH
WWL
770
Owen Lattimore .-.
Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr
George V. Blue
771
W. W. Locliwood
773
E C Carter
Wm. W. Lockwood..
774
W W Lockwood
Bob Lynd -
775
ECC MSF WIW HM CP
WWL
775A
Prof O Nve Steieer
Wm. W. Lockwood
776
Wm. W. Lockwood
Lt. Col. B. B. McMahon...
WWL
777
ECC - -
778
Wm W. Lockwood
Roger S. Greene
779
Arthur H. Dean
Wm. W. Lockwood
Joe (8-page memo attached).
WWL
780
Wm. W. Lockwood
781
KB GET WLH et al
782
W. L. Holland
C. F. Remer (COI)...
783
Ma . Hardy C. Dillard
WWL...
784
ECC
785
Wm. W. Lockwood - .
Jesse I. Miller (War Dept.)..
W. W. Lockwood .--
786
Robert W. Bamett
787
ECC - ..
WWL
788
Dr. S. K. Horn beck
W. W. Lockwood
W. W. Lockwood..
789
790
(Attached: Partial" list of U. S.
W. A. M. Burden
Lt Col John W Coulter
Delegation to Mont Trembla:
Wm. W. Lockwood
Wm W. Lockwood
791
792
Wm. Lockwood
Robert N. Magill.-.
Wm. W. Lockwood
793
Laughlin Currie
Anthonv Jenkinson
ECC WLH, RWB
794
Wm. W. Lockwood..
WWL
795
796
Wm. W. Lockwood
tt
Lt. Col. Wm. S. Culbertson
Maxwell S Stewart
Wm. S. Culbertson, Lt. Col.
It
Wm. W. Lockwood
Wm. W. Lockwood .
797
798
799
799-A
W. W. Lockwood
(Enc. letter to Col. W. W. Pett
Philo W Parker and others
Wm. Mayer, Col
igrew from Wm. W. Lockwoo
Wm. W. Lockwood
799-B
799-C
Exhibit No. 7G5-A
WWL to ECO and CP;
Miss Grace Simons, 4122 42nd Street, Long Island City, Apt. 3K, came in
to inquire about a job. She would like to do some kind of writing and research,
but is equipped and willing to do secretarial work.
Miss Simons returned from the Far East a year ago. During her five years
residence in China her experience was as follows :
One year as secretary to Leighton Stuart at Yen-ching; Two years as secre-
tary to Messr. Hogg and MacKay at the National City Bank in Shanghai ; and
a year and a half with Havas in Shanghai doing rewrites and translations from
French. During the past few months, she has been doing secretarial and library
work in the New York office of Havas but is now without employment. I should
judge that she is about 35 years old.
The most intriguing thing about Miss Simons is the fact that she is the
sister of Rahna-Trone of Vincent Sheehan fame.
(Hand written)
REFERENCES
Grace Simons, 4122 42nd St., Long Is. City, Apt. 3-K.
American — Chi — sister of Rahna-Trone, Yenching, sec. to Stuart, Shanghai^
1932-37.
Sec'y — Hogg & MacKay, Nat. City Bank. v
Havas 1^2-
Rewrite & translation French.
NYC — Havas — Editorial & Library wofk.
Secretarial work equipped writing & research.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4959
Exhibit No. 766
Janxjaby 5, 1937.
WWL to FVF:
Re: Study of the U. S. Navy.
While in Chicago I talked with several people, especially with Quincy Wright,
concerning- a research project on the Navy. Wright expressed himself as very
much in favor of the proposal, and was unable to recall very much that has been
done in this field. He thought that the subject would require some prolonged
digging in Congressional hearings, navy reports, etc.
As to persons who know something about the subject, I learned of two.
Wright mentioned Mr. Robert P. Lane, now director of the New York Welfare
Council, 122 East 22d Street. He once did a good deal of work (at Chicago, I
think) on the navy during the first phase of the modern era — 1884-1898. This
work might be made available to us. The second person is John Ross, of the
Institute of International Studies at Yale. He is said to be working on various
aspects of the navy in connection with the Yale studies in American foreign
policy. Another person with an academic interest in the Navy is Joseph P.
Baxter, of Harvard. Doubtless these people, and perhaps others, should be
consulted.
At the present stage, my suggestion would be to proceed as follows :
(1) Secure for Pacific Affairs from some competent person an analysis of the
naval building program since 1933, and especially of the construction and en-
largement of naval and air bases in the Pacific. This could be primarily an
analytical study of the economic and strategic factors. It might be confined to
Pacific bases, which the navy people reckon as second only to ships as an ele-
ment of sea power. (Some experts claim, I believe, that the building of bases
in the Western Pacific would make the fleet something like 50% more effective,
and that the money spent on one battleship might better go into the building
of bases). This article we might secure from some young naval officer who
knows what he is talking about. The editor of the Proceedings of the Naval In-
stitute might be approached for suggestions. Incidentally, we should subscribe
to this publication.
(2) Have Hall continue his present bibliographical work with a view to pre-
paring for Pacific Affairs a bibliography on the U. S. Navy (appropriations,
building programs, operations, strategy, etc.) and a more extensive bibliography
for ofiice reference.
(3) With the knowledge gained from this bibliographical work, we can dis-
cuss with Walter Millis, and also perhaps with Stone of the F. P. A. and the
above-mentioned Ross, Lane and Baxter the possibility of an extended study of
the Navy. If we could arouse the interest of Millis in doing the job, it would
be relatively easy, would it not, to secure funds to finance the project.
Copy to WLH.
Exhibit No. 767
November 1.5, 1937.
Mr. Frederick V. Field,
San Francisco.
Dear Fred : Probably by this time you have given up the American policy pam-
phlet in despair. Here is another draft. Will you please read it at once and
return your comments by air mail? I am unwilling to have it go to press without
your criticisms.
As a matter of fact as things have turned out it is unfortunate that we did
not publish your original draft of this pamphlet weeks ago. I am afraid that
the best opportunity has already passed, although it is still worth while to get
out something. If we have missed the boat I am afraid that it is my responsibil-
ity. When I consented to undertake the job I had no idea of the number of things
which would delay and interrupt its completion or of the diflBculties I would
encounter in this rather unfamiliar field. However, I have learned a good deal
about the subject even though it has been a little expensive for the American
Council and a little trying for Jinny, whose apartment has been littered up with
mountains of clippings for weeks.
I hope that you are finding material to do a first-class job for the Sitrvey on
shipments of war supplies to China and Japan. We should have had a thorough
discussion of this topic before this. So far as the China trade is concerned
I have made a few casual inquiries around here but have been unable to learn
4960 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
anything definite. San Francisco should be a good place to find out about what-
ever stuff is going from Pacific Coast ports. Some stuff, however, may be going
via Europe. I notice that the nineteen planes were loaded on a train headed east
several weeks ago. Another story told of DuPont shipments of TNT by way of
Germany.
Eliot Janeway, with whom Chen and I have had several long talks recently,
is convinced that an embargo on American shipments to Japan, even if under-
taken without the cooperation of other powers, would be a very serious blow
to the Japanese. He says, for example, that this high-test aviation fuel which
the Japanese have recently bought in large quantities is a special kind of gas
which cannot be procured elsewhere. Without it Japanese planes would be
crippled both in respect to speed and efiiciency. Janeway says, furthermore, that
American machinery and machine tools now going to Japan cannot be easily re-
placed. In the case of industries equipped with American machinery constant
replacements are required in the form of parts which are manufactured best
in this country. Japanese steel production, he says, is deficient particularly in
various kinds of alloy steels (manganese, nickel, etc.) and they rely heavily on
American supplies. How much weight should be attached to this point I don't
know. It is difficult to believe that the Japanese are as dependent as Janeway
believes and that they could not carry on readily even though with some diflB-
culties if they can no longer secure American stuff. This is a technical question
on which we are not very well qualified to pass judgment. It would be inter-
esting to get the opinion of businessmen who know the oil and machinery trades
thoroughly.
I have agreed tentatively to tackle the subject of Japan's economic problem
in North China for the Stxr^'ey. Whether there is enough reliable information
to make possible and satisfactory a job remains to be seen. Have you any
suggestions as to how the thing should be tackled and where the best informa-
tion is to be found? Peflfer says that he went to great efforts to collect infor-
mation on this subject and made little headway. Even the best informed people
in North China did not know what was going on.
In response to a letter of mine, Joe Jones, who is now an economic specialist
in the Far Eastern Division, writes that he is now contemplating a study of a
similar nature. He thinks that the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau
of Mines can be enlisted to help. He is willing to supply us with information for
this study but is not yet sure how quickly it can be carried through. He offers
to let me see the basic diplomatic and consular reports on the economic resources
of North China. I shall go down to Washington one of these days and go over
the matter with him.
That reminds me that I am sending a copy of this American policy manuscript
to Maxwell Hamilton with the request that he or someone else in the Division
go over it for us.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.
Exhibit No. 768
December 1, 1937.
Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Hamilton : I am most grateful to you for the suggestions concern-
ing the manuscript America and the Far Eastern War conveyed with your letter
of November .30th. Some of the suggested corrections I am now unfortunately
unable to make because the printing of the pamphlet is already far advanced,
but I appreciate very much this help which you have very kindly given us.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.
. INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4961
Exhibit No. 769
January 4, 1938.
BL from WWL :
IPR Representative in Washington
If, as your letter indicates, the proposal for an IPR Washington representative
has come up for discussion, there are a few suggestions I might offer as to the
functions which such a person might perform. Obviously it is important to have
rather definitely in mind what our representative could most usefully do before
laying any plans, even though it is true that a resourceful and energetic person
would naturally create his own job to a large extent.
As for Washington "society," I never made much use of the black or white tie
in Washington and I don't know what the possibilities really are. Doubtless
there are potential contributors there, but I see little reason to suppose that we
should set out to cultivate directly the elderly dowagers of Washington any more
than the social set of any other city.
Nor is it likely that Washington is a particularly opportune place for a local
educational program. Outside of the comparatively small circle of government
people, Washington is a rather provincial town with a good deal of the lethargy
of a huge bureaucracy hanging over it, and with so much "'public affairs" as its
daily business that it is bored with the whole thing and is rather unreceptive
to lectures, dinners, discussion groups, etc.
The really important contacts in Washington are as follows :
(1) administrative officials and legislators
(2) news men
(3) private educational agencies (League of Women voters. National Council;
FPA, AVIL, etc.)
(4) Embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation
(5) universities
It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups,
first, to extract from them the information, aid, and support which they can give
to Quv national program, and, second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of
himself to them in a variety of ways.
Given our present program and set-up it should be recognized, I think, that
the value of a Washington office would be somewhat limited. It would become
invaluable, however, as our program develops along new lines, as it is likely
to do. The present limitations in this regard are threefold. First, as long as
our chief and almost sole current publication is the Survey, we have little prac-
tical use for the political information for which Washington is the pi'eeminent
source, both its officials and its newsmen. If we did get the hot dope from the
State Department, what would we do with it?
Second, as long as our publications deal mainly with the general course of
events in China and Japan rather than with the specific American angle of such
events or with American affairs which have some relation to the Far East,
Washington contacts are also of limited aid. Excepting for the Embassies —
and this is a doubtful exception — I doubt if one can get in Washington a great
deal of news froin the Far East which is not available here. Its preeminence
is as a source of information on what is going on in the United States, and the
value of an IPR agency there would depend in part on how much we propose to
concern ourselves with American shipping, investments, education, public
opinion, etc.
Third, our value to the people in Washington and the welcome we would re-
ceive depend on what we can give them in the way of information as to events,
publications, and what not in the Far East. It would hinge on whether our
contacts through our international set-up enable us to offer anything of distinc-
tive value. At present the IPR is so loosely knit and our contacts in the Far
East so haphazard that we have little to offer in Washington through the con-
tinuous personal relationship which an IPR man might have there. The people
there already have access to most of our sources of information and more besides.
We can offer them a limited educational outlet and the support of our research
program such as it is, it is true, and in this way we can enlist the interest and
support of persons anxious to enlighten public opinion. On the whole, however,
an IPR man starting out in Washington today would find himself in the position
of going hat in hand for information and assistance rather than bringing some-
thing the people there are eager to get.
4962 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
There are a good many things an IPR agency in Washington could do and it
might be a swell job for someone to tackle. If there are limitations such as I
have described and if they should be overcome, one way of contributing to this
end would be for someone to start in down there. Some of the possibilities are
as follows :
(1) The Washington bureaus— agriculture, commerce, tarifC, maritime, etc.,
are stuffed full of information on all aspects of American economic life and of
economic developments abroad. Moreover, for most subjects of this sort with
which we deal there are men who have spent their lives cramming up on the data
and they are usually quite willing to cooperate with outsiders. I should say that
roughly a third of the Survey should be devoted to American-Far Eastern topics
and that such studies can be done in Washington better than anywhere else. One
obvious function of an IPR agency, then — although not the most important one —
would be to serve as a branch of the New York research staff for the execution of
certain projects. Moreover, the ideas and information picked up in Washington
through" this broadened contact might help to shape our whole program more
realistically.
(2) Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time
drifting around among officials, Congressmen and newsmen developing personal
contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an
issue of Pacific relations and policy arose. (Bill Stone has done this rather
successfully, especially as regards armaments and naval policy.) The import-
ance of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connec-
tion. The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters
in the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their despatches.
Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group since tlieir offices are
practically all in one building, and since Washington is a comparatively small
place. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompting
various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc.
As regards Congressmen, we should have to be quite wary. Under no cir-
cumstances do we want to engage in lobbying. By slow personal contact, how-
ever, a relationship with the IPR which is now totally lacking might be built up
informally. It is not difficult to imagine that under the circumstances of the
last six month this contact might be valuable. The same, I think, can be said of
relationships with administrative officials, and especially with the junior group
who do most of the real brain work in Washington. This part of the job ought to
be thoroughly enjoyable providing it was not aimless, and in the end it would be
helpful all around.
The value of such contacts with Congress, the State Department, and the
correspondents would depend in part, I should think, on whether we plan
to go into the field of political journalism. If we do, an agency in Washington
would be just as indispensalDle for us as for the FPA. I doubt that we want
to go very far in this direction, but as matters now stand we lack channels
for effectively using the political information to be had in Washington. If
we should eventually take over Amerasia or if we should start a mimeographed
news sheet for American Council members, or something like that, it would
be different. In any case if we expand along the lines of regional educational
activities, a Washington bureau might be helpful in a variety of ways.
(3) The universities in Washington are rather poor on the whole, and
there is no use looking to them for a lot of good research in our field (Brook-
ings stands in a somewhat different category). Nevertheless, there is a good
deal of educational effort in the field of public affairs and a growth of special-
ized training for government work. Our man might be able to associate him-
self with these activities through doing some teaching, taking part in dis-
cussion groups, etc., but this sort of thing would not add up to a great deal
in its value to the IPR.
(4) Another minor phase of the opportunity in Washington is a closer
relationship with a handful of private agencies, including the ones named
above, with the Embassies, and with such offices as the ILO, etc. This need
not be rated very high in the scale, for such contacts can be maintained from
New York, but it would be all to the good if we had a man on the spot.
(5) One more function of the IPR representative, and doubtless a fairly
troublesome one, would be to trundle foreign visitors around.
Tlius the job suggests a combination of research and of contact work, both
to secui'e and supply current information and to pick up leads for our general
national program. I dare say it would be something of a gamble at the start,
but it seems to be a logical step in expansion. This step is especially impor-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4963
tant — in fact, it is essential — if we are to move further and further away
from a strict research program appealing only to the academic world. It
goes without saying that the individual chosen for the job would have to
know his onions and be able to make his way as a person ; otherwise he can
do us a lot of damage.
Incidentally, as a measure of economy it might be possible for the IPR
representative to share the office and secretarial services of the FPA in
Washington.
Exhibit No. 770
Septembeb 19, 1938.
WLH f ram WWL :
Several of us had lunch today with Mr. R. Kano, who is a friend of Tsuru of
Harvard and who came in to inquire about the possibility of work in connection
with the Secretariat Inquiry. I referred him to you, of course, and suggested
that he telephone tomorrow or Wednesday to make an appointment. Kano left
Japan three years ago, having involved himself in sufficient difficulty with the
authorities to make it difficult or impossible for him to continue his university
work at Shizuoka. He spent two years at Chicago, receiving his A. B. degree.
Last year he studied economic history at the Sorbonne, and he has just come
over from Paris, hoping to find some opportunity which wiU enable him to sup-
poi't himself in academic work. Tsuru had written him, he says, that he (Tsuru)
might be doing some work on the Secretariat Inquiry, and suggesting that Kano
might assist him. Meanwhile, Tsuru returned to .T.ipan for a brief visit this
summer, and Kano, hearing nothing further from him, has come over anyway.
Kano makes a good impression in terms of personality and intelligence. He
is somewhat leftist — how far I don't know — and his particular interest is in the
economic history of Japan in modern times. He and Tsuru are translating a
Marxist interpretation of the rise of Japanese capitalism, and hoping to publish
it, possibly under assumed names (this is confidential). He says that he can
still go back to Japan, but that he might be denied any university connection,
and for for this reason he prefers, if possible, to remain here for the time being.
He is now awaiting the return of Tsuru, on September 26th, and can be reached
at 73 Martin Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Exhibit No. 771
New Yokk, N. Y., October 10, 1938.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
6 Middleton Court, 'Paddington Road,
Hoinelmid, Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Owen : This wiU introduce to you Arthur L. Pollard, of Knoxville, Ten-
nessee. Mr. Pollard, a successful engineer and businessman who has had a lot to
do with the fertilizer program in the Tennessee Valley, is arranging for a trip
to the Soviet Union next May. He is anxious to talk with you about certain
phases of his plans, and I am sure that you will be glad to make his acquaintance.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.
Exhibit No. 773
Department of State,
Washington, January 5, 1940.
In reply refer to RP.
Mr. William W. Lockwood,
Research Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second iStreet, Neiv York, New York.
My Dear Mr. Lockwood: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of De-
cember 21, 1939, in which you request copies of certain documents.
There are enclosed copies of publications containing the texts of the docu-
ments to which you refer, with the exception of the document described as
"Letter from Department of State to registered manufacturers and exporters
4964 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of aircraft, July 1, 1938." A summary and partial quotation of the letter of
July 1, 1938, will be found in the enclosed copy of The Department of State
Bulletin, August 12, 1939, page 121.
Sincerely yours,
George V. Blue,
George V. Blue,
Acting Assistant Chief,
Division of Research and Publication.
Enclosures :
1. Senate Document No. 55, 72d Congress, 1st Session.
8. Publication No. 296.
3. Conference Series, No. 37.
4. Press release no. 706 of December 20, 1939.
5. The Department of State Bulletin (Publications Nos. 1359, 1363, and
1404).
Exhibit No. 774
American Committee for International Studies,
Princeton, Netv Jersey, July 12 1940.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52 Street, New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter: In talking yesterday (Thursday) with Joe Jones in Wash-
ington, I found that he is very much interested in the whole conception of a
Pacific bloc as we discussed the subject recently at Lee. If you are getting out
a report on those discussions, he would like to see a copy and would also appreci-
ate the chance to talk to Fred Alexander the next time the latter is in Washing-
ton. It's Joseph M. Jones, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department.
Jones, by the way, gives an optimistic impression as regards the possibilities
of future American aid to China. He is very guarded in what he says, but I
rather inferred that he was thinking of monetary cooperation through the Trea-
sury and perhaps also a tightening embargo against Japan. Alger Hiss, on the
other hand, fears that the appeasement move is gaining a good deal of ground
south of Forty-second Street. Hiss, by the way, is probably one of the few gen-
uinely liberal men in the State Department — that is to say, he sees the direct
connection between effective national defense and a strong New Deal policy at
home. A Republican victory in the Fall, he believes, will be the prelude to an
appeasement program, a "back-to-normalcy" movement, and the danger of in-
ternal disintegration.
As you have learned from other sources, the State Department was anything
but pleased with the O'Ryan mission and with the President's interview with
the General. I gather that the official introductions giv^n by the mission are not
going to be very helpful to them, and that Mr. Grew will not be very cooperative.
I spent most of yesterday scouting around in the Latin-American field, trying
to find out what the government proposes to do. When the President issued his
public statement about a hemisphere cartel some weeks ago, they really had no
plan, as a matter of fact, and a good deal of discussion since then has thus far
failed to produce one. There is wide disagreement, with the Department of
Agriculture taking the lead in favoring drastic efforts to reorient and control
trade and currency relations, with the Treasury lukewarm, and with the State
Department divided but inclined on the whole to be cautious and skeptical. If
you would like to see an enthusiastic set of proposals along this line, write to the
American Council on Public Affairs, 1721 Eye Street, for a pamphlet entitled,
"Total Defense." This is the work on a committee headed by Clark Foreman.
It has had such a response in Washington that Foreman and Joan Raushenbush
are now producing a book on the subject. There is the same kind of feverish
activity around Washington now that used to chai'acterize it during the early
days of the New Deal. By comparison, I must confess that the universities I
have been visiting seem like medieval monasteries.
Although innocuous enough, this isn't quite the kind of letter I like to leave
lying around, so will you kindly toss it in the waste basket?
Sincerely yours, ^
Bill, William W. Lockwood, Secretary.
WWL/mn.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4965
Exhibit No. 775
Columbia University in the City of New York
faculty of political science
March 21, 1941.
Dear Bill : I guess it's too late, but why the devil don't you have Joe Barnes
do a book on the Soviet Union rather than Germany? I'd rather read him on the
S. U. than any man I know of. Or he could compare certain aspects of both
Germany and Russia, e. g. :
Relation of economic to political power in each country.
The social structuring of life of the common people at grass roots in each
country.
The freedom allowed the individual in each.
Tolerance of diversity.
Citizenship literacy and devices (press, etc.) serving effective participation as
citizen.
Etc.
Joe is unique in that he knows both Russia and Germany well. Other men
can write on the economic structure of Germany (an important job) but Joe, bet-
ter than anyone else, could bring us Americans a comparative sense of the social
strengths and weaknesses of the two systems.
What we need on both countries is not books pro and con, but candid appraisals
of strengths and weaknesses.
I don't know Hartshorne — only that he has been working on case studies of
Nazis.
Tours,
Bob (Lynd).
(Handwritten) To W. W. Lockwood.
Exhibit No. 775-A
April 15, 1943.
To: ECC
MSF
WLH
MM
CF
From: WWL
Max Stewart called me on Tuesday to say that Peggy Snow had been in to
express to him her concern over the prevailing and increasing lack of knowledge
among even informed people concerning current developments in China. She
felt this very strongly in Washington, and felt that something ought to be done
about it. She wondered whether some new organization and/or journal should
be started to circulate at least within a limited group the information brought
back by people coming from Chungking.
Max doesn't like the idea either of a new organization or of a new journal,
but agrees with her diagnosis of the situation and wonders whether the IPR
can do something about it. He suggested to Peggy Snow, I believe, that she
come in and see Harriet Moore and Mr. Carter.
Two possibilities suggest themselves :
(1) That we make an effort to include more current material on China in the
Survey and in our pamphlets, and
(2) That we redouble our program of meetings in Washington and New York,
taking steps to bring in more non-members from organizations, the press, etc.
Exhibit No. 776
December 10, 1941.
Professor G. Nye Steiger,
Simmons College, Boston, Massachusetts.
Dear Steiger: I am wondering whether I may call on you for assistance in
meeting an emergency demand from the Public Relations Bureau of the War
Department.
4966 INSTITUTE or pacific relations
That Bureau, under Colonel Beukema, whom you probably know, is arranging:
for an educational program on the international position of the United States,
to be carried forward in the army camps this winter. Colonel Beukema has
asked the American Council to cooperate in the supply of materials, including
one item which we would like very much to get you to do.
This is a series of three lectures which are to be prepared within the next
month, printed or mimeographed, and distributed to a large number of officers
in charge of camp programs. These officers in turn will themselves deliver the
lectures in series, and use them as a basis for questions and discussion. It is
proposed that the three lectures be divided chronologically as follows: (1) The
period 1931 to 1934, with some preparatory background; (2) the internal situa-
tion in China and Japan during the period 1934 to 1937, the international setting
of the two countries at this time and events leading up to the outbreak of hos-
tilities in the latter year; and (3) the last four years culminating in the
present war.
Each of the lectures is to be about seventeen pages, double spaced. They
should be simple, factual, as graphic as possible, and directed at an audience of
a high-school level.
The War Department is in a position to pay the author an honorarium of
$10 per day for time expended in their preparation.
There is no one I can think of who could do this job more admirably than you.
You have a thorough command of the facts and a wide experience in writing^
for high-school and college readers. You could also give the papers the char-
acter which would be necessary for effective oral delivery.
Within a day or two I can give you further particulars. I have only just
learned of this over the telephone, but a member of our staff is talking with
Beukema this afternoon and will be back tomorrow with the details.
I hope very much that you will be able to join us in this cooperation with the
government in an exceedingly important enterprise.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary.
(Handwritten:) WLH.
Exhibit No. 777
War Department,
War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
Washington, D. C, December 19, 19^1.
Mr. William W. Lockwood,
Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 129 East 52nd Street, New York City^
New York.
Dear Bill : Colonel Bratton's office appreciated most highly the receipt of the
three publications sent me by you.
Question : May we keep them, or are they to be returned to your office?
In addition, Bratton would especially like to have "British Rule in Eastern.
Asia" and "Malaya in War Time." And, to finish this skimpy letter. Colonel
Bratton wishes that you would look in on him the next time you come to Wash-
ington. Come to my office, 3502 Munitions Building, and I will take you
around to meet him.
Thanks again. Bill. Arrange to have at least a meal at the house when you:
hit Washington.
Sincerely,
B. B. McMahon,
Lieut. Col., General Staff Corps, Coordinating Section.
(Handwritten :) ED War Dept.
(Handwritten : ) ED — Would you write Bratton. I think Bill saw him Friday^
He intended to.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4967
Exhibit No. 778
12/23/41.
To: ECC.
From: WWL.
In response to your inquiry, here is a little more dope on the organization of the
Economic Defense Board (now the Board of Economic Warfare).
Charles Rayner, Assistant Executive Director, is heading the Far Eastern Di-
vision, at least for the time being. All I know of him is that he was once with
the Standard Oil at Singapore, but left in 1917. Apparently he has had no more
recent Far Eastern experience.
Ralph Turner, formerly of the University of Pittsburgh, is Assistant Chief
of the Far Eastern Division. He was taken over from the old Office of Export
Control research unit, where I worked with him last summer. Turner is also
no Far Eastern specialist. However, he is a fellow of some ability, particularly
in seeing the larger outlines of a problem. He also knows that he doesn't
know much about the Far East and is eager for assistance.
Jim Shoemaker, the third person with Far Eastern responsibility, came to the
Office of Export Control last summer from Brown University. He spent some
years teaching in Japan, and has returned there in recent years for occasional
visits.
Slioemaker told me two things in confidence last week :
1.' There are a half dozen rather highly paid jobs still open in the Far Eastern
Division. Shoemal^er himself, however, and perhaps the others, too, are re-
luctant to raid the IPR. (It is interesting that several agencies seemingly take
this view at present.) He raised tlie question of part-time or short-term con-
sultative appointments for IPR staff members, and I assured him that of course
we would do every thing we could to cooperate.
2. Rupert Emerson may undertake, on behalf of the Board, a sizeable study of
America's economic stake in the Far East as affected by the war, and post-war
prospects. Apparently Emerson is restless over the fact that he has been
given little to do thus far in his present job as expert in the Office of Inter-
American Affairs. This office — that is its economic section — is closely linked
with the Board of Economic Warfare. It is possible that Emerson may now be
shifted to the Far Eastern Division for this special job. If it is undertaken, our
staff may be asked to make certain contributions.
Co: WLH
RWB
KB, CP, MSP, MG
Exhibit No. 779
Roger S. Greene,
348 Lincoln Street,
Worcester, Massachusetts, January 16, 1942.
Mr. William W. Lockwood.
American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street. 'New York. N. T.
Dear Mr. Lockwood : Before the next annual meeting, that is the 1943 meet-
ing, will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to
the Board of Trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of names than
the number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no
chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering
process which few if any members would care to undertake.
For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal char-
acter, his judgment during the past two years has been so strange that it seemed
to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to
be nominated surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of
him. When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too
many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know
that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting
so much to radical views on political, economic and social subjects, on which
radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line, and
to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive.
The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging to intellectual freedom.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Roger S. Greene.
4968 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No, 780
February 12, 1942.
Mr. Arthur H. Dean,
4S Wall Street, Netc York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Dean : In February 1941, when you last contributed to the American
Council, the United States was technically at peace with the world. Today we're
fighting a world war, and initially suffering grave reverses on the vast and little-
understood Pacific front.
I think you will agree that the war strikingly confirms a basic thesis of the
Institute of Pacific Relations — that the Pacific is vital to America. As a member,
you will be interested in a brief report on the services of the I. P. R. in the war
crisis.
Since December 7 the I. P. R. has handled a growing stream of inquiries from
business houses, publishers, newspai)ers, radio commentators and teachers. There
have been urgent requests from the Army, Navy, and other government depart-
ments for special reports and for the loan of I. P. R. studies still in manuscript or
proof. I. P. R. books will be found in constant use on scores of Washington desks
today. Large special editions of our pamphlets are being provided at cost to
meet the Army's urgent need for reliable educational materials in its camps. We
are also supplying the War Department with basic lectures on the Far East for
its educational program.
The importance of the Institute as a training center for Far Eastern experts in
recent years is also shown by the number of former I. P. R. statf members
promptly called into important government work. Owen Lattimore, as you know,
is serving, on the nomination of President Roosevelt, as personal advisor to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ; Ch'ao-ting Chi is Secretary-General of the
A. B. C. Currency Stabilization Board ; others are in a dozen key agencies in
Washington.
Government agencies have turned to our staff experts for special studies of the
Japanese economy and of the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
United China Relief has drawn extensively on I. P. R. personnel for planning its
China relief program. The American Council on Eudcation has asked our help
in extending and improving teaching on the Far East in the schools of America.
Few persons realize that it would have been impossible for the I. P. R. to
respond to these national needs so quickly had the Institute not long been
planning for such an emergency. In our research program, for example, that
meant launching some years ago a wide-ranging set of long-term inquiries into
the basic problems and conditions of the Far Eastern countries. Many of these
studies (see our recent catalog) are just coming off the press as they are vitally
needed for the war effort of the United Nations.
Recognizing the importance of Southeast Asia in world politics, the I. P. R.
five years ago initiated a series of studies on the governments, resources and
development of those areas. As a result we are now issuing the only up-to-date,
authoritative books on Thailand, Malaya, Formosa, Burma, as well as new
studies of Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies. Every one of these urgently
needed studies would not have to be made under immense difficulties by defense
agencies if the I. P. R. by its foresight had not done the job.
Other volumes, too, take on a new war significance. What is the industrial
staying power of the Japanese Empire and the Japanese-controlled areas of
China and Indo-China? This question, now so vital to the war effort, has been
the subject of continuous I. P. R. study. The latest results are now being pub-
lished in The Industrialization of the Western Pacific, in Japan's Industrial
Strength, and in Industry in Southeast Asia, not to mention earlier studies of
the Far Eastern economies.
What is the strategic and economic importance of the Soviet Far East for
the war plans of the United States today? The best available information
on this subject is contained in a forthcoming I. P. R. report on Soviet Policy in
the Far East, begun in 1939.
What Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Dutch maps of the Far East are easily
available In American libraries? Pacific Area Maps gives the answer.
What about aviation in the Pacific area after the war with its vast expansion
of aircraft production capacity? An indispensable preliminary for any such
inquiry is the I. P. R. monograph just published as Air Transport in the Pacifi,c
Area, begun eighteen months ago.
Since Pearl Harbor the demands upon the I. P. R. have doubled and trebled.
We see an even bigger opportunity ahead. Both nationally and in cooperation
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4969
with its sister Councils in the ABCDR war partnership, the American Council
ought now to throw all its accumulated resources into the war and postwar
effort of the United Nations in the Pacific.
To help meet this opportunity we are asking you to make your 1942 member-
ship contribution at the present time. If possible, we would greatly appreciate
your increasing it over the sum of $100 which you gave last February.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood.
WWL : JL.
Exhibit No. 781
(Handwritten:) Joe Jones. M. S. F. What would you think of a "Werner
pamphlet right away? Return to W W L file. Sent to Carnegie Endownment
& returned.
Department of State,
Washington, March 3, 19Jf2.
Mr. WiLUAM W. Lockwood,
American Cotmcil, Institute of Pacfic Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.
Dear Bill : There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum which I have prepared
setting forth the most significant conclusions which I drew from the discus-
sions at Princeton last week end.
I am not sure how many agree with me, but I was especially impressed with
Mr. Werner and his contribution. I fear that many who have not read his
books and who were not, therefore, predisposed in his favor may not have been
able properly to understand and appreciate him. In my memorandum I have
tried to place him in his proper setting and to give the essence of his views. So
many people here have been instantaneously impressed by his views that I
venture to send you a copy of my memorandum for whatever use you may wish
to make of it.
Alger Hiss has suggested that it would be exceedingly useful if you could put
out a pamphlet on the conference within the next few days or weeks, stressing
Mr. Werner's contribution, as well as his background and writings. I think
that might be a very good idea. Meanwhile, I am doing all that I can to popu-
larize Mr. Werner's views in the Department, elsewhere in the Government, and
with appropriate Chinese, including T. V. Soong. It doesn't seem to be a very
diflBcult job either because they have seemed to appeal to everyone as extremely
sensible. The surprising thing to me is that they are new. Werner is coming
down to Washington this week and I hope to be able to take him around.
I want to say again that I found the conference not only enjoyable but exceed-
ingly useful, and I think that additional conferences of that nature would be of
considerable usefulness in the near future. All of our ideas are in a state of
flux as they have never been before and for that reason now as never before a
group discussion should help clarify our views. I would appreciate it if you
would convey these views to Mr. Carter. Incidentally I think he did a mag-
nificent job of running the conference.
I have used and am using Mr. Werner's name freely in connection with his
views, while maintaining the rule of secrecy with respect to the views of other
people at the conference. Mr. Werner being a publicist, and his private views
being no different from bis public views, I have not thought it necessary to
follow the conference rule. If you do not agree with me please let me know.
Sincerely,
Joe.
Enclosure.
March 2, 1942.
The week-end conference at Princeton on February 28 and March 1, held under
the auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was
well attended (a list of those participating is attached) and in my opinion the
discussions were well conducted and arrived at significant conclusions. Without
reference to the printed agenda I set forth below the most significant conclusions
which I drew from the discussions.
88348— 52— pt. 14- 5
4970 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I. STRATEGY
The principal contribution to the discussions of strategy was made by Mr. Max
Werner, author of Military Strength of the Powers and Battle for the World.
Mr. Werner was born in Russia and has lived a considerable part of his life in
Germany and France and elsewhere on the European Continent. He Is thor-
oughly familiar with the military literature of the world and writes with great
logic and brilliance. His most recent book, Battle for the World — The Strategy
and Diplomacy of the Second Worid War, was published in April 1941 prior to
the German attack on Russia and. of course, to our entry into the war. This
book is nevertheless exceedingly fresh when read now, even after the events of
1941. His judgments and evaluations both in regard to diplomacy and strategy
have been proved in the year subsequent to the publication of his book nearly
one hundred percent accurate. He has an understanding of strategy, facts, the
mentalities of the general staffs and political leaders in the various countries
in Europe and Asia which is most impressive. His knowledge and interpreta-
tion of Russian military strength, strategy, and diplomacy is particularly impres-
sive, and his correctness has been demonstrated by events. His opinions, there-
fore, in my opinion, merit closest attention.
I summarize briefly below Mr. Werner's analysis of the current situation and
his sugtrestions as to policy, with the addition of a few supplementary factors
brought out by other persons at the Conference which fit into Mr. Werner's
general plan :
War between the United States and Japan has traditionally been conceived as
a naval war where;is in fact the Japanese have employed, in blitzkrieg tempo,
land armies, using mechanical equipment as far as possible, and supported by
airplanes. Japan's successes in Southeastern Asia have made it exceedingly
difficult fdi- us to deal with the situation without confronting the Japanese with
equivalent or superior land forces using the proper equipment and supported by
superior air power. The concentration of American industry for the most part
in tlie eastern regions of the T'nited States, the vast distances between our west
coast and Southeast Asia, and the shortage of shipping space makes it an
extremely difficult matter to accomplish tliat end. Japan must be defeated by a
superior land army using modin-n equipment and air power. Who has in the
Far East an army equipped with modern weapons and supported by air power?
The Soviet Union. The Russian Army is strategically situated near vulnerable
Japanese home bases, is large, well-equipped, and capable of the job of handling
the Japanese. M^n-eover, war between Japan and the Soviet Union is inevitable
within the next few weeks, months, or years and both the Japanese Government
and the Soviet Government realize it. The conflict of interests between Japan
and the Soviet Union is fundamental and the situation is explosive.
We must conceive of the present war as a global war and plan our strategy
along global lines. The Soviet Union is fighting desperately in Europe and it
must at an indefinite time in the future fight in the Far East. We are at war
both with Germany and Japan. It would be an economical division of labor,
which would have great potentialities of reducing the length and cost of the
war, and if we could induce the Russians to employ their Far Eastern army
against Japan while we aid Russia in Europe where transportation and supply
problems are easier for us to solve. Indeed, this may be the only way in which
we can win the war.
How can we induce Russia to employ its Far Eastern army in the common
interest?
(1) By opening up a new front in the West (Mr. Werner did not elaborate
on this point but indicated the front might be in Africa, Italy, or elsewhere, the
main idea being to engage German troops and equipment. He suggested that
thirty British Divisions and thirty American Divisions properly equipped could
handle this matter, with another sixty Divisions in reserve) ;
(2) By furnishing Soviet armies on the European and Asiatic fronts with
from two to three thousand planes monthly and from two to three thousand
tanks monthly (this contribution would be a joint British and American con-
tribution) ;
(3) By concentrating air and submarine power in Alaska and the Aleutian
Islands and coordinating an attack with the Russian attack ;
(4) By equipping Chinese armies in North China as fully as possible for a
coordinated attack in North China and Manchuria.
The foregoing program of course, implies cooperation between the Soviet
Union and the British and American Governments on a full and frank basis.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4971
The ConfeTence generally stressed the necessity of such cooperation. It is
possible to achieve such cooperation. The Russians tried desperately to achieve
a system of collective security in Europe. After Munich they tried sincerely
to obtain some binding alliance with France and Great Britain. The British
and Franch would neither arm themselves adequately against the German
danger (the strength of the Germans and the pitiful weakness of the British
and Franch were well-known to the experts) nor would they ally themselves with
the Soviet Union. Accurately judging German strength, and despairing of
the British and French, the Russians decided to rely upon themselves alone,
signed an agreement with the Germans in August 1939 and proceeded to increase
their armaments as fast as possible and to improve their strategic situation
by absorbing the small Baltic States and by attacking Finland. The Russians
will now be impressed and moved not by words but by the strength which we
are prepared to exert in the common cause.
n. EMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR POTENTLiLS OF COLONIAL PEOPLES
It is frequently said that this war is a war of four-fifths of the people of the
world against one-fifth, that it is a peoples' war, a war for freedom. It is more
accurate to say, however, that it is a war of one-fifth against one-fifth of the
world with the remaining three-fifths of the world indifferent. This remaining
three-fifths of the world consists of Colonial peoples who are insufliciently^
interested and prepared to defend their own territories against attack. We have
seen that the people of Malaya aided the Japanese rather more than they aided
Britain ; that the Burmese are aiding the attacking enemy ; that the peoples
of the Netherlands Indies (the action of the people of Java remains to be seen).
are insufliciently developed, both spiritually and materially, to defend their lands.
Will the peoples of India aid the British in the defense of India, or will they be
indifferent, will they aid the attackers?
How can tlie morale of China be improved further that resistance might be
continued at the highest possible level? (It was recognized that China was
not a colonial country and that China has, of course, been defending herself
with great tenacity ; nevertheless, it was recognized by the Conference that
there are many things which the United States and Great Britain can do
in order to strengthen the morale of the Chinese peoples and increase their
fervor for a continuation of the peoples' war. )
With respect to India it was agreed that in the interest of common defense
and of winning this desperate war the Indians must be given a considerable
measure of independence, that their nationalism must be aroused and inspired
to self-defense, and that India's economic war potentialities be fully developed
with outside aid.
With respect to China it was suggested that steps be taken to accept China
fully and frankly as a full-scale partner in this war and accord her a full
voice in the conduct of the war. She is still being treated as somewhat of an
outsider. It was suggested that steps should be taken at once, as a part
of the war effort, to abolish extraterritoriality in China, to return Hong
Kong to China legally, and to abolish the discrimination against China in our
immigration law. The cause of the "peoples' war" might be greatly en-
hanced by taking these steps.
Australia and New Zealand should be admitted into a fuller participation
in the conduct of the war. They are at present represented in the Pacific
War Council in London but they feel that in some way they should be rep-
resented in the councils at Washington.
(It was commented upon widely how much greater had been the participation
of the Philippine people in the war than in other areas where a less liberal colo-
nial policy had been followed.)
It was the general feeling in the Conference that the old order in Asia was com-
pletely gone and would never be restored ; that the peoples of Asia must be per-
mitted and assisted to become masters in their own houses ; that British and
American superiority must give way to cooperation on a level ; and that both
in the conduct of the war and the organization of peace it is imperative that the
peoples of Asia be given a greater voice.
III. ORGANIZATION FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR (AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE)
This subject was only partially discussed, and no conclusions were reached. It
was, however, generally recognized as an important problem which merits care-
ful consideration in tlie future. Considerable dissatisfaction was expressed with
4972 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the existing set-up with a British-American Chiefs of Staff Group functioning in
Washington and a largely British, largely advisory Pacific War Council oper-
ating in London. It was felt that the smaller nations were too far removed from
decisions taken in Washington, although it was recognized that a diversity of
voices in the Central War Council may lead to confusion.
SR : Jones : MJK/HNS.
Exhibit No. 782
Makch 27, 1942.
To: KB
KRCG
MSF
CP
From : WWL.
The newest government project calling for study of the Far East is a School
of Military Government being organized under auspices of the War Department.
This is to be located at the University of "Virginia under the direction of Major H.
C. Dillard and J. I. Miller. These two gentlemen called on me Tuesday to ask
the cooperation of the I. P. R. in advice on materials, personnel and curriculum.
The purpose of this school is to train oflScers in the techniques and problems of
military government in areas taken over from the enemy.
As the war progresses, and as the military forces are successful large areas
will be freed from Axis domination and will require provisional military adminis-
trations. In many respects the policies followed in this interim period may set
the mold for long-term postwar economic and political readjustment.
It is proposed to provide a selected group of officers with general background and
training for this job. The first course will begin in June and run for approxi-
mately three months. The curriculum will include elementary training in the
organization of the Army and the War Department and legal procedural prob-
lems, and historical experience where it seems applicable. As men are ticketed
for various areas they will be given intensive background courses in the history,
geography, resources, economic and political organization of the area in question.
Dillard and Miller would like our assistance at several points. Immediately
they would like suggestions on Far Eastern personnel available and competent
to give instruction, at least for this first summer period. I would be glad to
have suggestions as to historians, political scientists, geographers, etc. who might
be considered in this connection.
In the second place they want help in building up a library of teaching ma-
terials. On looking over my shelf of recent I. P. R. books, they decided that they
should have virtually all of our books, periodicals and reports. I am sending
them a complete list, eliminating only those things that clearly are not useful,
and in addition including suggestions regarding non-I. P. R. materials.
The headquarters of the School of Military Government at present are in the
new Armory Building, 10th and B Streets, SE., Washington, D. O. (War De-
partment Extension 71951).
(Handwritten:) ECC.
(Handwritten:) ECC: MG— return to ECC.
Exhibit No. 784
War Department,
The School of Military Government,
Washington, April 21, 19^2.
Mr. William W. Lookwood,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relatione,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Mr. Lockwood : Many thanks for your letter of April 17, which reached
us prior to the interview with Mr. Holland.
Mr. Holland made a very favorable impression all around. We are, however,
definitely troubled by the citizenship business. Indeed it is our understanding
that present regulations forbid us to employ on our regular stafif a noncitizen.
The matter is one we are now investigating.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4973
Even if our tie-up with the I. P. R. does not mature this time, there is of
course the possibility that it will in the future. Hence I feel that Mr. Hol-
land's trip was not by any means a fruitless one.
We deeply appreciate the interest you have shown.
Yours very sincerely,
[8] Hardy C. Dillard
Hardy C. Dillakd,
Major, AUS, Director of Instruction.
Exhibit No. 785
June 15, 1942.
Copy
ECC from WWL :
In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of sugges-
tions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I
believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice — say
that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup — on elimination. This list runs too much in
the regular groove as regards non-government people. So far as Washington is
concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key
positions.
Government :
Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska.
Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare.
Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
Rietler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare,
Shoemaker, James, H., Board of Economic Warfare.
Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare.
Wallace, H. A., Vice President, BEW.
Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget.
Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information.
Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information.
Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information.
Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information.
Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture.
Ropes, E. C, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Trade.
Berle, A. A., State Department.
Davies, Joseph, State Department.
Grady, Henry, State Department.
Hiss, Alger, State Department.
Hornbeck, S. K., State Department.
Sayre, Francis B., State Department.
Stinebower, L. D., State Department.
Vince, Jacob, Treasury Department.
White, H. D., Treasury Department.
Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board.
Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
Currie, Lauchlin, White House.
Lubin, I., White House.
Others :
Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross.
Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council.
Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point.
Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News.
Clapper, Raymond, Washington Columnist.
Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register & Tribune.
Dennett, Tyler, Historian.
Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corporation.
Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland.
Field, Frederick V., New York.
Herod, W. R., International General Electric.
Jessup, Prof. Philip C, Columbia University.
Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corporation.
4974 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Xiuce, Henry, Time, Inc.
Jklolyneaux, Peter, Texas Weekly.
Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute.
Schwellenbacli, Judge Lewis B., U. S. District Court, Spokane, Wash. (ex-
Senator).
Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York.
Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War
Relief.
Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives.
Wilkie, Wendell, Attorney.
Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation.
Wilson, C. E., General Electric.
Yarnell, Admiral H. E., U. 'S. N., retired.
(Handwritten:) conference.
Exhibit No. 786
War Department,
Services of Supply,
Office of the Provost Marshal General,
Washinffton, October 21, 1942.
Mr. William W. Lockwood,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, New York.
Dear Mr. Lockwood : I appreciate very much your visit yesterday and the
willingness to cooperate in the War Department's Program for Military Govern-
ment to which it bore evidence.
Pursuant to our agreement that I would supplement the statement contained
in the "Synopsis of War Department Program for Military Government",
copies of which were furnished you yesterday, the following supplemental state-
ment is made.
The reservoir of technical and advisory personnel referred to in the "Synop-
sis" is the group toward the recruitment of which you have volunteered the serv-
ices of your organization. There is, of course, no immediate need for this per-
sonnel ; on the other hand, it will not do to await the need before attempting to
recurit them. Consequently, it is the intention of the War Department to select
this group at once and commission them in the Army Specialist Corps in a status
of leave roithout pay. This will permit these persons to coyitinue in their pres-
ent useful civilian employment until such time as a need arises for thorn, when
they tmll not only have been selected, but will be immediately available for
service.
It is planned, however, after some substantial numbers have been enrolled in
this reserve to ear-mark them for specific areas and then to send them, in
groups, to certain colleges and universities for a brief training period, not to ex-
ceed four weeks, in which they will be given some insight into the principles of
military government, and some background instructions in the areas for which
they have been ear-marked. No effort will, of course, be made during this
training period to instruct anyone in the functional activities for which he has
been selected since the selection of each will have been premised upon the fact
that he is already specially qualified in his own profession. Inasmuch as the
recruitment of this personnel must be accomplished with an eye to the Selective
Service regulations, no person can be emolled in the Army Specialist Corps un-
less he is either over forty-five years of age, or if under forty-five, has been classi-
fied in Class 3 A or in more deferred classifications under the Selective Service
administration.
Your efforts in assisting the War Department in compiling lists of available
personnel for the foregoing purposes will be greatly appreciated, and some early
activity in this direction on your part will be most helpful.
With bi'st wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
Jesse I. Miller,
Acting Chief, Military Government Division.
INFTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4975
Exhibit No. 787
October 21, 1942,
Robert W. Baknett,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
100 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. G.
Dear Bob : The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite
successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless O. S. S.
policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservations ; also he is not yet sure
of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, al-
though uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson
doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed
to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for two
or three days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in dis-
cussion, and these I'll take up with you later.
Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.
Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am
mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say
that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his
return.
I also invited Lon De Caux, C. I. O. publicity director and editor of the C. /. O.
News. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a vei^y favorable
impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.
De Caux suggested Bo?'is ^^huski?}, of the A. F. of L., as another good labor
person for the conference. He is the research director, I believe. If the Nomi-
nating Committee approves, I'd like you and Michael to see him at the Washing-
ton headquarters and extend an invitation. Before doing this, however, you had
better wait lor further word from me.
In the opinion of Hiss, Coe, and Despres, we ought to try to get Berle or Dean
Acheson, or both. More about this later, too.
(Handwritten :)
One important gap in the present line-up is India. The Washington possibili-
ties are Paul Ailing, now political adviser and formerly chief of the State De-
partment's Near Eastern Division; Wallace Murray, present chief; Eric Bee-
croft, and Norman Brown. From what I learned of the two State Department
men, neither would be very useful to us. As between Beecroft and Brown, I'd
like your opinion and Michael's. Despres says that the written work of Brown's
section is first rate — imaginative and pointed. He doesn't know Brown's quali-
fications as a conference iiarticipaut. Bremer thinks well of Brown as more
than the conventional academician. In his favor are not only his position, but
also his academic standing. Although we are paying little attention to this
consideration in making up the American group, it would be desirable, other
things being equal, to include at least one person with senior rank, among schol-
ars in the Asiatic field. But this shouldn't decide the matter unless on other
grounds as well Brown is the best nominee.
Another possibility we might consider is someone from Knox's office or Stlm-
son's. Coe and Hiss mentioned Adlai Stevens{sic) , one of Knox's special assist-
ants. Hiss also suggested with some approval Harvey Bundy, former As-
sistant Secretary of State and now special assistant to Stimson. Then there
is General Little, a Marine general formerly in China, now retired (?). Also
General Magruder, whereabouts unknown. Despres suggested Admiral Hart,
saying that it wouldn't be a bad idea to have someone who would give a pretty
forthright and orthodox Navy view, as this view will greatly influence the post-
war settlement.
Still other suggestions include Robert Sherwood, head of the O. W. I.'s Over-
seas Section, and Gardner Cowles.
Ben Kiser probably will write Congressman Coffee a personal letter, and leave
it to us to follow up with an interview.
In a day or so I'll send a revised list indicating where we now stand on invi-
tations and acceptances.
Reed Hager, by the way, would like very much to see you, and took down your
telephone number. He has been with Rupert Emerson in the office of the O. P. A.
Regional Administrator handling Territories and Possessions. Next week he
probably will shift to the civilian stafT of the Munitions Assignments Board.
This will put him in a key position, as a member of the group working for Hopkins
in this field. His home address is 2031 Huidekoper Place.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary.
4976 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 788
November 16, 1942.
WWL to ECG
• Barnett writes, apparently quoting Hiss, that Hornbeck warmly supports the
invitation to Yarnell, but feels that it would be improper for him to take any
initiative in approaching Secretary Knox, as I suggested he do. Hornbeck's
opinion apparently is that the best procedure would be for you to write directly
to Welles. Attached is a carbon of my letter to Hornbeck, in case you Wish
to use the same form with Welles.
You may want to tell Welles that the American Council has issued conference
invitations to Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Pasvolsky.
Hiss added that Hornbeck and Hamilton would be very glad to have their
expenses paid. I see no reason for us to do this, and I imagine you will agree.
Exhibit No. 789
November 6, 1942.
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
State Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Hornbeck : The American Council is eager to include Admiral Yarnell
as a member of the American group at the Mont Tremblant Conference in De-
cember.
Admiral Yarnell has expressed a keen interest in attending, and suggested
that we write the Secretary of the Navy requesting official approval.
If you think it advisable, we would very much appreciate your taking up
the question with Secretary Knox, supporting our request and indicating the
importance of the Conference.
Sincerely yours,
W. W. LOCKWOOD,
Executive Secretary.
Exhibit No. 790
November 19, 1942.
Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer,
Old National Bank Building,
Spokane, Washington
Dear Ben : Things have moved so fast that I haven't been able to keep you
posted on every development in the assembling of the conference group. In any
case, I know that you wanted us to go ahead on our own intiative.
Enclosed is the list as it stands. Everyone on it has given his final O. K. for
at least part-time attendance. The exception is General Strong, who hopes and
expects to be present, however.
We now run the risk of finding ourselves with a larger group than we wanted.
There are still several people to be heard from — for example, Gideon Seymour,
a Minneapolis journalist, John B. Cook, a Chicago businessman, John Coffee,
and Max Hamilton of the State Department. This results from the fact that
two weeks ago we became alarmed Ijy the lack of response and stepped up the
number of invitations. In the past few days a number of people have came
through.
Considering the circumstances, I believe that we have a good group — good in
the sense that it is diversified and includes a number of able people. The
problem now will be to produce some degree of unity and coherence in the
American presentation at Mont Tremblant. Don't you agree that the American
group as such ought to have a number of meetings of its own ?
Hastily yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood,
Secretarj/.
Copies to : Harriet L. Moore
Philip C. Jessup
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4977
November 19, 1942.
Confidential
Partial List of United States Delegation
Mont Tremblant Conference, December 4-14, 1942
Institute of Pacific Relations
Brown, W. Norman, British Empire Section, OflSce of Strategic Services.
Bunche, Ralph J., British Empire Section, Office of Strategic Services.
CoE, Frank, Assistant to the Director, Board of Economic Warfare.
CuRRiE, Lauchlin, Admiinstrative Assistant to he President.
De Caitx, Len, Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
Dennett, Tyler, former President, Williams College.
Desprees, Emile, Chief, Economic Section, Office of Strategic Services.
Earle, Edward M., Institute for Advanced Study.
Embree, Edwin R., President, Julius Rosenwald Fund, Chicago.
Emeny, Brooks, Director, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland.
Field, Frederick V., Chairman, Editorial Board, Amerasia.
HoRNBECK, Stanley K., Political Adviser, Department of State.
Johnson, Luther A., Congressman, Sixth District, Texas.
KizER, Benjamin H., Chairman, Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
McCoy, General Frank R., President, Foreign Policy Association.
Moore, Harriet L., Secretary, American Russian Institute.
Pasvolsky, Leo, Chief, Division of Special Research, Department of State.
Remer, C. T., Chief, Far Eastern Section, Office of Strategic Services.
Sohwellenbach, Lewis B., Judge, U. S. District Court of Appeals, Spokane.
Shiskin, Boris, Research Director, American Federation of Labor.
Stone, William T., Assistant Director, Board of Economic Warfare.
Straight. Michael, Editor, The New Republic.
Strong, Major General George V., Assistant Chief of StafC (G-2), Department
of War.
Thomas, Elbert H., Senator from Utah.
Viner, Jacob, University of Chicago.
Wilbur, Brayton, President, Wilbur-Ellis Company, importers, San Francisco.
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E., U. S. N., retired.
Exhibit No. 791
(Handwritten:) W. L. H.
November 19, 1942.
Mr. W. A. M. Burden,
Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mn. Burden : I note with interest the press report of your speech the
other day on air transport in the Arctic. This prompts me to ask your advice
and assistance on one or two aspects of our present I. P. R. program.
Early next month the Eighth International Conference of the Institute will
convene at Mont Tremblant, Quebec. Delegates from Britain, the Dominions,
India, China, the Netherlands, and other I. P. R. countries are coming together
for a ten-day round-table session on Wartime and Postivar Cooperation Among
the United Nations in the Paciflc. A number of studies are being prepared for
this conference, which in turn will set the stage for a large-scale I. P. R. inquiry
during the next two or three years into the terms and conditions of postwar
reconstruction in this vast area.
One of the key questions, of course, is the potential role of air transport,
in relation both to military security and to economic development. Although
this is bound to figure in the Mont Tremblant discussions, we have not yet
documented the subject in any special I. P. R. paper.
I wonder whether by any chance you would be willing to prepare a brief
article on the svibject, with special refei-ence to the North Pacific, for publication
in the Far Eastern Sm-vei/. In order to make it available for the conference, we
should have to have the manuscript not later than December 1. Even if this
were out of the question, we should like very much to publish such an article
in the f^urrey.
In the second place, I wonder whether, in your opinion, we ought to endeavor
to arrange for a more extensive study in this field for later publication — say, in
pamphlet form. One difficulty, of course, is that much of the new technical
4978 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
information necessarily is secret for the time being. If this would not preclude
our arranging for an interesting and useful report on the future of air transport
in the Pacific, do you have anyone in mind who might be competent and available
for the job?
As you may recall, last year the I. P. R. published a monograph by Sydney B.
Smith, formerly of the State Department, on At?- Transport in the Pacific Area.
If you haven't a copy, I'd be glad to send you one. It was a pre-Pearl Harbor
study, and therefore is now only of historical interest in its account of the prewar
development of air lines. It might, however, be the basis of a further report
which would take up the question as of the present date, and would deal some-
what more speculatively with the future. You may be interested in a conference
paper on The North Pacific International Planning Project, just issued by the
American Council. It is a memorandum on the future development of Alaska,
the Yukon and the Pacific Northwest, by the chairman and staff of Region Nine,
National Resources Planning Board.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. F. Lockwood,
Secretary.
WWL: wm
Exhibit No. 792
November 27, 1942.
Lieutenant Colonel John W. Coui-ter.
Room 2C766, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Colonel Coxtlteb: In response to your letter of November 24 inquiring
regarding the Eighth International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Re-
lations, December 4-14, 1942, at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, may I suggest that
you consult my letter to Major General George V. Strong, dated Nocember 11?
This letter with its enclosures gave full particulars.
Mr. Robert W. Barnett, the Institute's Washington representatives, can give
you further information if you wish it. His office is at 700 Jackson Place (tele-
phone National 3428).
Sincerely yours,
WWIiCMS.
Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary.
Exhibit No. 793
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C, December 3, 1942.
Mr. William Lockwood,
American Council Institute of Pacifie Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City
Dear Bill: Mr. Remer thanks you for the copy of Mr. Barnett's interviews
with Chinese leaders which you sent him on October 22nd. We have much of this
material on file in the office, so I am returning this copy to you.
I trust that the Mont Tremblant Conference was highly successful.
Best regards,
Bob
Robert N. Maghx.
Exhibit No. 794
Copies to ECC and WHL.
December 28, 1942.
Mr. Lauchlin Cttrrie,
Room 228, State Department Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Laugh: Enclosed herewith is a staff memorandum on the high points
of the Mont Tremblant Conference. You may feel free to use the memorandum
confidentially in any way you wish.
Brief summaries of this sort never succeed in conveying the color and vi-
tality of the round table process, but I hope you may nevertheless find this of
some value.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4979
The IPR now has the job of building on the foundation of this post war dis-
cussion. In this connection we ought presumably to establish contracts with
Governor Lehman's office — both to insure that full use is made of whatever value
there may be in the Conference documentation and discussion, and also to see
what further IPR work would be most useful for the purpose of Governor Leh-
man's program. After the first of the year we would like to discuss this with
you.
In a few days I will send you under separate cover a new set of IPR school
books on the countries of Asia. They are just out and are already getting an
enthusiastic reception. One wishes that the State Department's Cultural Re-
lations Division and the Office of Education could see their way to assisting sub-
stantially in developing work of this tyi)e. The Rockefeller Foundation has now
decided not to go extensively into this field, thus leaving pretty flat for the
moment the ambitious plans of the IPR and American Council on Education
for capitalizing on the new interest in the Far East among school authorities.
One other matter — Wilma Fairbank has just written to say that she does not
feel that she can accept our offer to her of the Washington IPR secretaryship.
If you happen to think of anyone who might be a candidate, we would welcome
nominations.
Sincerely yours,
"Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary.
Exhibit No. 795
April 17, 1943.
Mr. Anthony .Tenkinson,
16 West 12th Street,
New York, N. Y.
Deak Tony : Fred told me the other day that you saw the notice in the paper
about the film, KNOW TOUR ENEMY. This announcement startled us, too, for
we are still in the preliminary stages of negotiation.
We are probably going to cooperate with the Princeton Film Center, how-
ever, in producing this documentary film on Japan. The producer seized on
this title as a good one though the film narrative itself Avill be somewhat more
general in character than the contents of the pamphlet. The Navy has been
sending us endless forms to sign in connection with the pamphlet order. Once
the payment comes through we will immediately forward a check to you on
the arrangement proposed some weeks ago.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood,
Secretary.
cc: TGS
ECD & MPF
Exhibit No. 796
September 16, 1942.
WWL to : ECC WLH RWB
I understand that W. S. Culbertson, formerly a draft commissioner, is now
creating an office and program in G-2 with the aim of developing certain general
studies of a geopolitical character. He is particularly interested in making use
of the scholarly resources of private research institutes and universities.
4980 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(Handwritten:) Please return to WWL.
(Handwritten:) WLH ECC RWB 10/19/42.
Exhibit No. 797
War Department,
War Department Generax Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
Washington, 2431 Munitions Building, October 12, 1942.
Mr. William W. Lockwood,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dbvvr Mr. Lockwood : Thank you very much for your letter of the 9th instant.
It will be entirely satisfactory to me to have the proposed Round Table Confer-
ence on India postponed until after the tirst of the year. I hardly think we could
do an adequate job before that time anyway. In the meantime I hope to have
an opportunity to talk the whole matter over with you and to explain the pro-
cedure and technique of Round Tables which I have in mind.
With i)ersonal regards, I am,
"Very sincerely yours,
William S. Culbertson,
Lt. Colonel, OSC, Chief, Geopolitical Section, MIS,
Exhibit No, 798
War Department,
War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
Washington, 2431 Munitions Building, October 1, 1942.
Mr. W. W. Lockwood,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Lockwood : In part as a result of our conversation a short time ago
and in part as a result of a conversation which I had with Dr. Earle of Prince-
ton, I desire to raise the question whether a Round Table group, in line with the
procedure which I am developing under this Section, might be sponsored by
the Institute of Pacillc Relations. The suggestion which I have in mind is India.
If you should think well of this idea, I shall be glad to confer with you or with
Mr. P>arnett.
I shall be in New York next Tuesday and continue on to Boston where I
will be for two or three days. I will be back in Wasliington October 12.
With personal regards, I am,
Very sincerely yours,
William S. Culbertson,
Lt. Colonel, GSC, Chief, Geopolitical Section, MIS.
Exhibit No. 799
c. c. : WLH-ECC, RWB, with copy Culbertson to WWL 10-1^2.
(Handwritten:) War Dept.
October 9, 1942.
Lt. Col. William S. Culbertson,
Chief, Geopolitical Section, Military Intelligence Division, 0-2,
General Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
2431 Munitions Building.
Dear Colonel Culbertson : In reply to your letter of October 1, I wonder if
you would explain in a little more detail what you have in mind in regard to
the proposed conference on India.
Would you like to have the Institute take charge of arrangements for t^e
meeting, selection of personnel, preparation of the agenda, etc.? Do you have in
mind a week-end discussion in which both government officials and private indi-
viduals would take part?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4981
If it ijiT«1ved a good deal of organizing work for us here, I doubt that we could
take it on before tlie end of the year. Until that time, we happen to be pretty
well occupied witla plans and «.rrangements for a big IPR conference to be held
In Canada in December.
It wouM be possible now, I fcelieve, to assemble a group of experts, chiefly from
Washington and the New York area, who together might be able to clarify the
Imdian picture in a very useful way. At the moment, however, our staff is so
overloaded with work that we hardly see how we can take on the organizing re-
sponsibility at present.
Simcerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary.
Exhibit No. 799-A
(HaEid'writtffli:) File Lockwood.
[Copy]
Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey,
School of Public and International Affairs,
December 29, 1947.
Mr. MiJxwELL S. Stewart,
American Omincil, InstUnte of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East SJfth St., Netv York 22, N. Y.
Dear Max: My reactions to Arthur Bisson's pamphlet manuscript on Japan
are as follows :
It is a well-written and clear exposition of the outcome of the postwar elections,
in terms of the success of the parties and some of the factors influencing their
soaecess. I learned a lot from it.
Nevertheless, I feel that its political assumptions and value judgments raise
the whole issue of IPR pamphlet policy. A pamphlet carries institutional spon-
sorship of its point of view unless it is one of a number of divergent views pre-
sented— ^which would not be the case here. The question, therefore, is whether
the American Council should sponsor strong political judgments on current
controversial issues. In my own view it should avoid doing so unless in a non-
partisan round-table fashion. This limitation is implicit in its whole set-up, and
failure to recognize this clearly is responsible for many present IPR diflSculties.
It is a real limitation, of course, but it still leaves room for a useful and important
program.
Accordingly, I would question publication of the manuscript as it stands. Now
I'll try to be a little more explicit.
The manuscript defines political progress strictly in terms of the triumph of the
Communists and left-wing Socialists. The "new democratic forces" are equated
with the Communist and Socialist parties on p. 26, but earlier the right-wing
Socialists are excluded from the "true progressives" (p. 24) and are lumped
with the old guard (p. 13). The latter are blamed for the lack of a united Com-
munist-Socialist front (p. 12), and to this is ascribed the deplored Liberal-Pro-
gressive victory in 1946 (p. 14) .
It happens that I also believe that democracy in Japan is linked with the for-
tunes of the Social Democrats (though I'm more skeptical about the united front
with the Communists). But I'm in doubt whether the IPR should argue this
doctrine on either point, especially when the pamphlet presents no factual evi-
dence for this definition of democracy or for labelling the Liberals and Democrats
as the useless and objectionable old guard. A reader is certainly entitled to
ask what about totalitarianism on the left, what are these Japanese parties
really after, what kind of political system can Japan with her traditions be ex-
pected to adopt, etc. Instead, he gets here a very specific standard of judgment,
assumed ex hypothesi.
As for SCAP policy, MacArthur is sharply criticized for failure to conduct
sweeping purges and to do a good many other things, especially in the first six
months. With some of the criticisms I would certainly agree. But I would make
more allowances for lack of preparation, shortage of staff, the inevitable confu-
sion of the earlier period, failure to estimate the depth of the problem, etc. And,
aside from that, it would seem to me that we have faced a basic dilemma in over-
all policy which is not recognized here. We were committed to indirect govern-
4982 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ment, probably for good reasons. We were also committed to encouraging self-
government by democratic procedures, iu a situation wiiere defeat did not itself
bring revolution. Arthur argues for a policy of sweeping intervention which would
have run the danger (1) of our having to administer Japan from top to bottom
and (2) of our installing a set of left-wing puppets lacking real strength in the
Japan of 1945-47. He has much more confldence than I in the possibilities and
the desirability of totalitarian (i. e. military) force operating from the outside
and at the top to democratize Japan. He is therefore more disappointed in the
outcome to date.
But again I don't object to the pamphlet because I disagree ; Arthur has a much
closer knowledge of the facts than I (though I question a few statements like the
one on p. 17 ascribing Japanese support of the Emperor's retention to SCAP).
Rather, I question whether the IPR should sponsor what is in a rather summary,
ex parte judgment on an operation which has been exceedingly delicate in char-
acter and one where good democrats can honestly differ in evaluating the goals
and the progress toward them. Most Americans will reject the tests of success
which he applies and will feel correspondingly less dissatisfied with the Mac-
Arthur record.
Perhaps these objections could be overcome by some alterations in balance, em-
phasis, and phraseology. For example, the conclusions on democratization pre-
sented by Maki and Steele in recent IPR publications are not open to objection on
the issue I have raised. For examples of other articles on Japan which are
valuable and also entirely appropriate for IPR publication, see those by Sansom
and Ladejinsky in Foreign Affairs for January 1948.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Bill,
Wm. W. Lockwood,
Assistant Director.
Exhibit No. 799-B
(Handwritten:) Note made HRH.
"War DEPARTilENT,
MiLiTAKY Intelligence Service,
Washington, Dccemher 26, 194^.
Mr. William W. Lockwood, „ t ^•
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.
My Dear Mr. Lockwood: Your letter to Colonel Pettigrew, dated December
21, has been referred to me during Pettigrew's absence on a rather prolonged
"our office is very much interested in the proceedings of the IPR conference
and would like to get at least two and preferably five complete sets. Our Far
Eastern Group is divided into five branches, and I believe it would be advan-
tageous for us to have one copy on file with each branch.
I expect to •'et in touch with Mr. Barnett today and ask him if he could spare
us some time, with the object of giving us a first-hand picture of the proceed-
ings. Your kind cooperation is greatly appreciated.
Sincerly yours, .^ „ _^
William Mayeb,
Colonel, G8C, Acting Chief, Far Eastern Oroup.
(Handwritten:) original sent to ED.
December 21, 1942.
Colonel M. W. Pettigrew, G. S. C,
Chief, Far Eastern Oroup,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C. *•
Dear Colonel Pettigrew : In answer to the request stated in your letter of
the third, I believe we can arrange to provide your office with a full set of re-
ports from the Mont Tremblant IPR Conference. , ^ ^. ^
We were sorry that the pressure of affairs in Washington prevented the attend-
ance of someone in Military Intelligence Service. The Conference proved to
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4983
be a remarkably interesting discussion of almost every phase of the War effort
and postwar possibilities in the Far East. The British, Chinese, Australians,
New Zealanders, Indians, Canadians and others were ably represented, and the
discussion was quite frank and illuminating. If you would like a i)ersonal re-
port on what went on, may I suggest that you get in touch with Robert W. Bar-
nett, our Washington representative, who can be reached at 700 Jackson Place
(National 3428). I believe he could give you a very interesting and informative
account of the whole proceedings.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary.
Exhibit No. 799-C
Decembeb 2, 1942.
Mr. Philo W. Pabkeb,
Standard-Vacuum Oil Company,
26 Broadway, Netv York City.
Deab Me. Parkee: The War Department has asked the American Council to
assist in compiling a list of technical and advisory personnel who might be
enlisted to take part in its program of military government in occupied areas.
This is to ask whether you could help us in meeting this important request
by forwarding to me nominations of persons qualified in your opinion for the
type of work specified.
The War Department's specifications and general plans in this field are out-
lined in the attached letter and memorandum. To facilitate you in scanning
the material, I have underlined certain passages.
As you will see, the Department is looking for men experienced in such fields
as industry, raw materials, banking and fiscal operations, public health and
sanitation, public utilities and relief administration.
Candidates must be over 45 years of age or, if under 45, must be in one of the
deferred classifications of the Selective Service.
According to the original plan, these men were to be commissioned in the Army
Specialist Corps. With the abolition of that Corps, recently announced,- they will
probably be given commissions in the U. S. Army. They will be allowed to con-
tinue their present civilian employment until called up for service. A brief
training period, not to exceed four weeks, is envisaged.
The Council is particularly interested in submitting nominations of persons
of Far Eastern experience but would be glad to forward suggestions regarding
other specially qualified personnel.
Any help you can give us will be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lockwood, Secretary.
Letters of identical text, as the one sent to Mr. Philo W. Parker, Standard-
Vacuum Oil Company, 26 Broadway, New York City, were sent to the following:
Mr. Boies C. Hart. National City Bank, .55 Wall Street, New York City
Mr. Randall Gould, Starr, Park and Freeman, Inc., 101 Fifth Avenue, New York
City
Dr. Henry Heleney, 60 Gramercy Park North, New York City
Ml'. Joe Mickle, International Missionary Council, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York
City
Mr. W. S. Roberson, American and Foreign Power Company, Two Rector Street,
New York City
Mr. Julian Arnold, 262 Arlington Avenue, Berkeley, California
Mr. William P. Hunt, Hunt Engineering Company, 150 Broadway, New York City
Dean Robert Calkins, "School of Business, Columbia University, New York City
President Everett N. Case, Colgate University, Hamilton, New York
Mr. Lennig Sweet, United China Relief, 1790 Broadway, New York City
Dr. Eugene L. Opie, Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, York Avenue
and 66th Street, New York City
Dr. Reginald Atwater, American Public Health Association, 1790 Broadway,
New York City
Mr. G. Ellsworth Juggins, 79 Worth Street, New York City
Mr. George R. Coleman, 50 Church Street. New York City
Mr. E. E. Barnett, Y. M. C. A., 347 Madison Avenue, New York City
4984
ENSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 800
To—
Programs for Mr. W.
Holland's stay
(office memo)
IPR Staff Members
E. C. Carter
Harondar
E. C. Carter
W. W. Lock wood
ECC
WLH
Phil
Carl F. Remer
W. L. Holland
Maj. G. A. Lincoln
Qeo.H. Kerr
Wm. Holland
Wm. Holland -.
Wm. Holland
W. L. Holland
Wm. T. Stone
W. L. Holland
WLH KM.. -.
(Attached : Back-
ground Information —
The Strength of the
Muslim League in In-
dia, Mr. Jinnah's posi-
tion—164/No. 4/2/1/1.3.
Hugh Borton
Mr. Holland
W. L. Holland
Free distribution list for
"Korean industry and
transport by A.TG:
Preface, Grajdanzev
Hilda Austern
Owen Lattimore
Wilma Fairbank
W. T. Holland
Dr. Wm. T. Holland....
Wm. T. Holland
Wm. Holland
Lauchlin Currie
Wm. Holland
T. A. Bisson
Wilma Fairbank .
Prof. Schuyler Wallace.
Wm. L. Holland
Wm. Holland
Schuyler C. Wallace
Wm. Holland
W. L. Holland
W. L. Holland (note
attach).
Irving Friedman
Wm. L. Holland
Alice B. Foy .. .
W. L. Holland
Eleanor Lattimore
W. L. Holland
W. L.Holland
Douglas MacLennan
W. L.Holland
Edvv. C. Carter
E. Herbert Norman
W.L.Holland
W. L.Holland
Charles Loomis
Sir George Sansom
Holland-
Dean Rusk
II it
Pacific Council Officers (at-
tachment) .
Justice Wm. O. Douglas
S. B. Thomas
V. G.Tseng
Geo. J. Beal (2 attach.)..
W. L. Holland
Edw. C. Carter
From—
1936-1943
1937-1943..
1944-1951.
1944-1951
All years... _..
Research Secretary.
W. L. Holland
WLH
Research Secretary.
WLH
ECC
W. L. Holland
W. L. Holland
James P. Baxter
W. L.Holland
W. L. Holland
Geo. H. Kerr
Chester R. Vail
Philip C. Jessnp
Wm. T. Stone
W. L. Holland
Wm. T. Johnstone..
ECC
Date
Oct.
Nov.
W. L. Holland.
A. Grajdanzev.
W. L.Holland
W. L. Holland
W. L. Holland
W. L. Holland
Edward L. Barlow.
W. L. Holland
Mrs. Wilma Fairbank.
W. L. Holland.
Schulyer _ .
Schuyler C. Wallace..
W. L. Holland
Schuyler C. Wallace..
Philip C. Jesup
Irving S. Friedman
W. L. Holland.
Alice B. Foy
W. L.Holland
Lt. L. H. Chamberlain
W. L.Holland
Louis Dolivet
Douglas A. MacLennan.
Wm. L. Holland.
PhiHp J. Jaffe
Wm. L. Holland
Wm. L. Holland
Herbert
E. H. Norman. _
W. L. Holland
Wm. L. Holland
Harondar
Wm. L. Holland
Wm. L. Holland.
V. G. Tseng.
Wm. L. Holland.
Wm. L. Holland.
Geo. J. Beal
Wm. L. Holland
9/26/34.
10/1/35.
10/4/35.
3/28/39.
5/10/40-
7/.5/40...
7/5/40...
12/1/41.
3/18/42.,
4/2/42...
4/3/42...
4/2/42...
7/25/42..
7/31/42.,
9/2/42...
7/6/42...
7/11/42..
3/1/43...
4/21/43-
1/17/43.
7/22/42.
4/19/43.
5/19/43.
7/20/43-
2/21/44.
12/7/43.
12/6/43.
12/1/43.
12/.3/43-
3/2/44.-,
3/11/44-
2/18/44.
3/20/44-
3/22/44.
3/23/44-
4/14/44.
4/12/44.
4/8/44...
3/27/44-
4/10/44-
5/1/44-..
4/12/44..
4/17/44..
4/25/44..
5/17/44..
6/19/44.-
3/23/46-.
3/25/46-.
4/29/48-.
4/30/48 -.
1/25/50- -
1/ 5/50.-
2/13/50- -
4/26/50..
5/17/50- .
7/ 6/35 .
9/12/.50--
9/16/50.-
12/12/50-
2/ 1/50....
3/22/51
4/ 5/51..--
4/12/51
4/10/51... .
8/14/51...
Type of Doc-
ument
Original.
Original-
Carbon
Carbon
Copy
Carbon
Photostat.
Carbon
Original. .-
Carbon
Photostat.
Carbon
Carbon
Carbon
Original. .-
Original...
Photostat.
Original. .-
Carbon
Original...
Photostat.
Carbon..
Original.
Carbon
Carbon...
Photostat.
Photostat.
Carbon
Original. --
Original---
Carbon..
Original-
Carbon..
Carbon..
Original.
Carbon..
Original-
Original.
Original-
Photostat.
Original...
Carbon
Original...
Carbon...
Original-..
Photostat.
Cable
Photostat-
Carbon...
Original...
Carbon...
Photostat.
File
Number
131B. 11
500.3
105. 95
100. 48
100. 157
191. 258
191. 89
104. 52
100. 384
119. 123
131B.41
131B.40
i31B.40
119. 24
131B. 165
119. 29
131B. 160
119. 15
Exhibit
Number
500.4
500.5
191.59
131B.3
131B.5
191. 57
131B. 10
131B.9
191. 13
131B.23
131B. 23
131B.22
131B.21
107.3
109.2
112.57
112.51
109.9
109. 10
500.6
500.8
101.55
112. 50
100. 46
500. 10
500.11
100. 354
500. 12
500. 14
500.15
500. 16
800A
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
842A
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
859
858
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
4985
Exhibit No. SOO-A
8S34S— uli — pt. 14 — —6
4986
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 800-A — Continued
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
4987
Exhibit No. 801
Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations — Staff members, 19S6-1943
Note. — This list includes paid personnel only. No regular record is available as to volunteer assistance.
Personnel serving in clerical capacity for a few months only are not all listed. Years listed do not neces-
sarily indicate that individual was a member of the staff during the entire year.
Began
Name
Years
Position
1933—
1933—
1933—
1935—
1929—
1934—
)> Hi-.;
1933—
1934—
1934—
Edward C. Carter
Hilda Austern
Joseph Barber, Jr..
Annette Blumenthal
Chen Han-seng
Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley
William L. Holland
Owen Lattimore
Liu Yu-wan
Kate L. Mitchell
Harriet L. Moore
Catherine Porter
Richard L. Pyke
Charlotte Tyler
Elizabeth Downing
Eleanor Fabyan
F. Max
Nagaharu Yasuo
Hugh Borton
Rilma Buckman
Ruth D. Carter
Ch'ao-ting Chi
Irv ng S. Friedman
Helen Kellogg
Philip E. LiUenthal
Elodie Moerman
Ehzabeth Raymond. .-
Jack Shepherd
Katrine Parsons --.
M. Young
F. Mangahas
Barbara Messer
Patricia Glover...
Mar jorie Austern
John Leaning...
Percy E. Corbett
Vera Dodds
M. Matsuo
Michael Minarovich
Lillian Pefler
Russell G. Shiman
Ellen van Zyll de Jong.
Kurt Bloch
John De Francis
Andrew J. Grajdanzev.
Michael Qreenberg
C. Y. Hsiaug...
Y.Y.Hsu
Isabel Ward
Robert W. Barnett
Winnifred Clark
Mary F. Healy
Bruno Lasker
Renee Stern
T. A. Bisson
Edith Bykofsky
Grace Caravello
Frances Friedman ...
Augusta Jay
Harriet Levin thai
Laura Mayer
Ehzabeth Neal
Betty Skrefstad
R. Winslow
Clara Spidell
1936, 1937, 193S, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943_.
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943..
1936
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941
1936
1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940
1936, 1937
1936, 1937, 1938.
1936, 1937, 1938
19.36, 1937
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942.
1937
1937
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940
1938, 1939
1938
1937, 1938 1938, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.
1938, 1939, 1940
1938, 1939
1938
1938, 1939, 1940, 1942
1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942
1938,1939
1938, 1939, 1940, 1941
1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943-.-
1939, 1940, 1941
19.39
1939, 1940, 1941
1939, 1940
1939
1939, 1940, 1941..
1940
1940, 1941, 1942
1940, 1941
1940, 1941, 1942 ,
1940, 1941
1940, 1941
1940, 1941
1941
1941
1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943
1941, 1942
1941
1941, 1942, 1943.
1941, 1942
1942
1942, 1943
1942, 1943
1942,1943
1942, 1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
1943
Secretary-General.
Assistant Treasurer.
Publications.
Distribution Manager.
Research Associate.
Assistant to Secretary-
General.
Research Secretary.
Editor, Pacific ASairs.
.\ssistant to Secretary-
General.
Research Associate.
Managing Editor, Pa
cific ASairs.
Publications Secy.
Research Associate.
Secretary and Publi-
cations.
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Research .Associate.
Research Associate.
Secretary
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Research Associate.
Secretary.
Editorialand Research.
Clerical.
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Clerical.
Research.
Clerical.
Editorial.
Research Associate.
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Shipping clerk.
Research -Associate.
Research Associate.
Research Associate.
Research Associate.
Research Associate.
Research Associate.
Managing Editor, Pa
cific Affairs.
Research Associate.
Research Associate.
Secretary.
Research .\.ssociate.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Clerical.
Research Associate.
Clerical.
Clerical.
Secretary.
Receptionist.
Switchboard.
Secretary.
Stenographer.
Clerical.
(?)
Secretary.
4988
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
American Council, Institute of PacifiG Relations — Staif members, 1937-19^3
[See note at end of table]
Began
1929
1929
19.30
1934
1933
1926
1929 on
and
off.
1927
1933
1935?... .
1934
Name
Frederick V. Field.. .
Helen Wiss
HikH Austern
Katlileen Barnes
Annette Blumenthal.
Elodie Shinkle
Mary E. Harrell
Catherine Porter
Ernest Hauser
Anita Archer
Ruth Earnshaw
Bruno Lasker
Jeanette Randolph...
Joseph Barber, Jr
Inez Campbell
Josephine Metcalf
J. Murphv
B. P. Schoyer
Mrr^aret Taylor
Isibel Ward
Russell Q. Shiman
William W. Lock-
wood.
Miriam S. Farley
Michael Minarovich..
John Stewart. __ ,
Emily Twaddell
Katrine R. C. Greene
Elizabeth Raymond..
Kurt Bloch-.-
E. Todd
Frances Rifchin
Aim Warson
M. Taussig
Robert W. Barnett...
Rose Landres
TillieG. Shahn
Janet Leifert
Elizabeth Downing..
Nancy Wilder
A. Holtman
Mary Rolfe
Dorothy Borg
Vera Dodds
Rose Yardumian
Wilson Morris
Rita Zagon
Harriet Holmes
Judith Daniel.
Theresa Oerathy
Mildred Gilliam
Harold J. Greenberg...
Josephine Owen
Roberta Powell _.
J. O. M. Briek..
Homer H. Dubs
AVilya Gdlus
D'irothy Israel
Alice Jayson
Willi im C. Johnstone
Mildred Klein
Rosamund Lee
Harriet Levinthal
Dorcithy Miyo
Frances Moldauer
(until 1946, Sharpe).
Harriet L. Moore
Years
1937, 1938, 19.39, 1940
1937, 193S, 1939
19.37, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941..
19.37, 1938, 1939, 1940
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942.
19.37, 1938
19.37
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.
1937, 1938
1937
1937
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1943.
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.
1937
19.37
19.37
1938
19.38, 1941. 1942
1938, 1939, 1940
1938 1939
1937^ 1938, 'm9,'im^ 'mi.
1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.
1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.
1938,
1938,
1938,
1939,
19.39.
1939,
19.39.
1939,
1940,
1940,
1941,
1941,
1941,
1941,
1941,
1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943
1939, 1940
1939,1940.-
1940, 1941, 1942, 1943
1940, 1941, 1942.
1940
1941
1941
1942.
1942
1942, 1943.
1942
1942, 1943.
1941, 1942, 1943..
1941, 1942
1941, 1942, 1943..
1941, 1942
1942, 1943
1942, 1943
1942
1942, 1943
1942, 1943
1943
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943-
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
1943.
Position
1943.
Executive.
Secretary.
Assistant Treasurer.
Rese-rch associate.
Subscription manager, Far
Eastern Survey.
Clerk-typist.
Secreti.ry.
Secretary, research associ-
ate editor. Far Eastern
Survey.
Research associate.
?
Librarian.
Research associate.
Librarian.
Promotion.
Secretary.
Membership and radio.
Membership and finance.
Secretary.
Editor, Far Eastern Sur-
vey.
Research secretary and
Executive.
Research associate and
pamphlet Editor.
Shipping clerk.
Research associate.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Research associate.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Research associate.
Assistant treasurer.
Assistant treasurer.
Secretary.
Membership and Publica-
tions.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Education secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary, library.
Secretary.
Clerk-typist.
Secretary.
Secretary, Washington of-
fice.
Secretary, Special Project.
Secretary.
Special project.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Public relations.
Director, Washington
ofllce.
Promotion secretary.
Switchboard operator.
Superintendent public dis-
tribution (1 week Decem-
ber 1948 as typist).
Acting Executive Secre-
tary.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
4989
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations — Staff members, 1937-19Jf3 — Con.
[Se€ note at end of table]
Began
Name
Years
Position
1934
Frieda Neugebauer
S-llieOrnitz
Maggie Smith
Marguerite Stewart..
Elnora Walker
1943 - - .
Stenographer.
1943
1943
Secretary.
Acting hbrarian.
1943
1943 . .
School secretary; adminis-
trative secretary.
Note.— The above list includes paid personnel only, and a few clerical workers who served for 1 or 2
months only may not be listed. A list of volunteers is not available. Years do not necessarily mean that
individual worked for the Institute for the entire year. If 1 month only, year is enclosed in parentheses
( ). Personnel employed locally by regional offices are not listed.
American Institute of Pacific Relations
[Staff members, 1944-1951]
Note. — This list includes paid personnel only, and a few clerical workers who served for one or two months
•only may not be listed. A list of volunteers is not available. Years do not necessarily mean that individual
worked for the Institute for the entire year. If one month only, year is enclosed in parentheses ( ) .
Name
Position
Nina Balfour
Edythe M. Banks
Beatrice Benjuya
Mary .Tane Bowen
J. O. M. Broek
Esther Brown
Jewerl Carroll
Mi-iam Chesman
Lillian Cunningham
Raymond Dennett
Homer H. Dubs
Miriam S. Farley
Margaret Fischl
Wilya Gallus
Marie Godby
Josephine Golembosti
Rose Oreenberg
Dorothy Ts'ael
Alice Jayson
Louise Jenkins
Shirley Jenkins
William C. Johnstone
Caroljni A. Kizer
Mildred Klein
Beatrice Krasnow
Bruno Lasker
Eleanor Lattimore
Ruth Lazarus Turbin
Use Lederer
RosatTiund Lee
Harriet Levinthal
Rhoda Lewis
Dorothy S. Ludwig
Adrienne Maurer
Jean May
Dorothy Mayo
Harriet Mills
Frances Sharpe Moldauer
Harriet L. Moore.
Betty Morita
Marion Morris
HUton Morselcy
Frieda Neugebauer
Harry A. Nelson
David Soyer
Clara Nerenberg
Helen E. Nitka
Zelda Ormont
Sallie Omitz
Harriet H. Parker
Catherine Porter
Ruth Resnick..-
Rhoda Rothrran..
Laurence E. Salisbury
Sophie Schneer
TillieO. Shahn
Rita Shavelson
Maggie Smith
1944
1944, 1945, 1946..
1944
1944, 1945
1944
(1944)
(1944, 1945)
1944, 1945, 1946
(1944)
1944, 1945, 1946
1944...
1944, 1945, 1946, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947
1944
(1944)
(1944)
(1944)
1944
1944
(1944)
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948
1944, 1945
1944,1945
1944 :
1944
1944, 1945, 1946
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947
1944, 1945, 1946
(1944)
1944, 1945
1944, 1945, 1946
(1944)
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948
(1944)
1944
1944
1944,1945
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947
1944
1944
(1944)
(1944)
1944, 1949
(1944) -
1944, 1945
1944, 1945
(1944, 1945)
(1944)
1944
1944, 1945
1944 -. -.
1944
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947..
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948...
1 944
1 944,' V945', 1946," 1947^ 1948", 1949,' 1950, 195l'
(1944)
1944, 1945, 1946
(?) Clerical.
Stenographer.
(?) Clerical.
Library consultant (pttime).
Research project.
(?) Cleri. al.
(?) Clerical.
Subscription clerk.
(?) Clerical.
Executive Secretary.
Research (?).
Research Assoc; Pamphlet
Editor; Ed., F. E. Survey.
Secretary.
Secretarv.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Secretary.
Public Relations.
(?) Clerical.
Research Assoc; Assoc. Ed-
itor, F. E. Survey.
Director, Wash, office.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Research Associate.
Research Associate,
Secretary.
(?) Clerical.
Promotion Secretary.
Switchboard operator.
(?) Clerical.
Asst. Bookkeeper.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Administrative Asst.
Publications Distribution.
Acting Exec. Secretary.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Stenoerapher.
(?) Clerical.
Clerical Asst.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Editor, F. E. Survey.
(?) Clerical.
Billing clerk.
Editor, F. E. Survey,
(?) Clerical.
Assistant Treasurer.
(?) Clerical.
Acting Librarian.
4990
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
American Institute of Pacific Relations — Continued
[Staff members, 1944-1951]
Name
Maxim Snyder
Marguerite Stewart..
Masha Switzer Wise-
Marie Talkington
Frances Tendetnick..
Janet Taylor _.
Elnora Walker
Henrietta Wentholt..
Nancy Wilder
Caroline Woods
Rose Yardumian
Marguerite E. Bear..
Robert S. Bialos--
Jeanne Chalfin
Mike Coffey
Elizabeth A. Converse
Salvatore De Leonardis
Jean Elson
Ethel E. Ewlng
Rita Frucht
Lillie Gerber
Rita Kahane - -
Dorothea Keil
Hiroyo Kiyaba
Bernice Kennedy
Ellen B. Levy
Miyaho Matsuo
Michael E. Minarovitch__.
Wilson Morris
Eugene Newman
Sylvia Rosenfeld
Rima S. Rocers_
Jerome Shishko
Elizabeth Ussachevsky
Lola Brice
Ruth D. Carter
Melvin A. Conant, Jr
Lillian Covelle
Elizabeth Crawford
Sonja Dahl
Lionel C. Delgado
Helen Dimitry -
Elba Aileen Dodson
Florence Englander
Dorothy M. Freist
Bernice Fischman
Gloria Gordon
Renee J. Quthman
Sally R. Hawkins
Callie M. Hickey
Sonia Kramer
Betty Lee
Sony Lipton
Regina Marks
Abe J. Millman
Benjamin Millman
Angelina Morrison
Frank Pelan
John A. Pollard
Jane Radom
Gwendolyn Robertson.
Constance Root
Barbara B. Smith
Louise B. Serot
Rhoda Serot
Louise H. Schatz
Maxwell S. Stewart
Esther Taylor
Yoshi Uchida
Dolores Van Buren
Ella S. Waller
Abraham Barnett
Pearl C. Christian
Daniel F. Doyle
Margaret M. Dunn
Rhoda Goldenberg
Deborah Grigsby.
Marguerite F. Hill
Gerard P. Kok
Pao-Ch'cn Lee
Celestine G. Mott
Years
(1944)
1944, 1945, 1946, 1947.
1944, 1945, 1946
(1944)
(1944)
(1944), (1946)
1944
(1944)
1944
1944
1944,1945
(1945)
(1945)
(1945)
(1945)
1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.
1945, 1946-
(1945)
1945, 1946, 1947
(1945)
1945, 1946
(1945)
(1945)
1945
(1945)
(1945)
(1945)
1945, 1946.
1945, 1946.
1945
(1945)
1945
1945
1945, 1946
(1946)
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1951-
1946-
(1946)
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950-
1946
1946
1946, 1947
(1946)
1946
a9)6)
1946, 1947
(1946)
1946, 1947
1946, 1947
1946, 1947
1946. 1947
(1946)
(1940)
1946, 1947
1946
1946
(1946)
1946, 1947
1946
(1946) ----
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951-
1946, 1947
1946
(1946)
(1946)
1946. 1947
1946, 1947, 1948
1946, 1947
1946, 1947 -
(1946)
(1946)
(1947)
1947, 1948, 1949, 1950
(1947)
1947, 1948... -.
1947-
(1947)
(1947) —
1947
1947
1947, 1948-
Position
(?) Clerical.
School Secy.; Admin. Secy»
Stenographer
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Stenographer.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Secy; Editorial Asst.
Librarian.
Secy; Librarian; Secy.^
Washington Office.
Stenographer.
Shipping Clerk.
(?) Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Asst. Editor, F. E. Survey..
Shipping Clerk.
Typist.
School Secretary.
(?) Clerical.
Stenographer.
Stenographer.
(?) Clerical.
Stenographer.
Stenographer.
Temporary Secretary.
Stenosrapher.
Shipping Clerk.
Asst. Editor-Pamphlets.
Clerical.
(?) Clerical.
Secretary.
Clerical.
Seev-Wasliington Office.
Clerk-Typist.
Secy.; Admin. Asst.
Research .'^.ssistant.
Washington Office.
Switchboard Operator.
Los Angeles Office.
Shipping Clerk.
Stenographer.
Secretary (Wash. Office).
Stenographer.
Stenographer.
Acting Librarian.
Typist.
Branch Secretary, "VV ashmg-
ton Office.
Secretary, Wash. Office.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Stenographer.
Stenograplier.
Stenographer.
Stenographer.
Stenographer.
Stenographer.
Shipping Clerk.
Director. Wash. Office.
Stenographer.
Subscription Clerk.
Promotion Assistant.
Clerk-Typist.
Secretary.
(?) Clerical.
Promotion Secretary.
Pamphlet Editor.
Stenographer.
Membership Clerk.
Stenographer.
Stenographer.
Shipping Clerk.
Clerk-Typist.
Shipping Clcik. x
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secietary.
Secretary.
Chinese Language Iiistr.
Asst. Chinese Lang. Instr..
Secretary (Executive).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
4991
American Institute of Pacific Relations — Continued
[Staff members, 1944-1951]
Name
Belzy M. Parker.
Anna Reinhold
Marjorie Baum
Charles Cherubin
Gladys Edwards
Katrine E.G. Greene
Rosalind Greenwald
Patricia Hochschild
Clayton Lane
Philip E. Lilienthal
Hilda Mayer
Lawrence K. Rosinger —
Francis Dick M'andermaa
Chia-ling Bumgardner
Elaine Douglas-
Irene Conley Chang
Lolita W. Smith
Lucrecia Suguitan
Elizabeth Yates
Anita Ehrlich
"Wei-ta Pons
Ruth V. Stein....
Sadie AVinston
Betty E. Buchsbaum
Robert Hasse
Ora Leak
Gladys Nusbaum
Leslie Morgan
Arm Stopp
Melvin Anderson
Robert Bruce
Edward A. Fujima
Jack Gerson
George Kawata
Marjorie Montana
Edward C. Carter
William L. Holland
1947 --.
(19471
(1948)
1948
(1948)
1948, 1949, 1950, 1951
1948, 1949, 1950
1948, 1949
1948, 1949, 1950
1948
(1948, 1949)
1948, 1949, 1950
1948 ...-■-
(1949, 1950)
(1949)
1949
(1949) -.
1949
1949, 1950
1950
1950, 1951
1950, 1951
1950
1951
1951
(1951)
(1951)
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1946,1947, 1948
1950,1951
Position
Stenographer. .
Secretary.
(?) Clerical.
Shipping Clerk.
(?) Clerical.
Assistant Secretary.
Secretary.
Acting Librarian.
Executive Secretary.
Acting Editor, F. E. Survey.
Clerk-typist.
Research Associate.
Secretary.
Clerk-typist.
Clerk-typist.
Acting Librarian.
Typist.
Typist.
Acting Librarian.
Clerk-typist
Acting Librarian.
Secretarj^.
Secretary.
Secretary,
Clerk-typist.
Typist.
Typist.
Editorial Assistant.
Secretary.
Shipping clerk.
Shipping clerk..
Acting librarian.
Bookkeeper.
Asst. Librarian
Receptionist.
E.xecutive Vice Chairman.
Executive Vice Chairman.
The above list includes only persormel paid by the national office,
locally by regional offices.
It does not include personnel employed
Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations — Staff members, 1944-1951
Note. — This list includes paid persoimel only. No regular record is available as to volunteer assistance.
Persormel serving in clerical capacity for a few montbs only are not all listed. Years listed do not necessarily
indicate that individual was a member of the staff during the entire year. If one month only, year is enclosed
in parentheses ( ).
Hilda Austem
Horace Belshaw...
T. A. Bisson
Joan Bramley
Grace Leah Butts
Edith Bykofsky
Frances Pietrowski Capps.
Grace CaraveUo
Edward C. Carter....
Ruth D. Carter
Olga Field
Frances Friedman
Andrew J. Grajdanzev
Augusta Jay ..
Virginia Mack...
William L. Holland
Yung Ying Hsu
WDhelmina Masselman
Elizabeth Neal
Ruth M. Parsons
Rose Pietrowski
Laura Rosenthal
Florence E. Sanderg.
Betty Skrefstad
Clara Spidell
Elizabeth Ussachevsky
Robert Vernon, Jr
Nellie Wright
Joyce Wagner
Michi Yasumura.
1944, 1945
1944, 1945, 1946 -.
1944, 1945
1944, 1945, 1946
(1944)
1944, 1945, 1946
1944,1945
1944, 1945, 1946
1944, 1945, 1946
1944, 1945, 1946, 1949
1944, 1945
1944
1944ri"945,"l946-."lI"-I
1944
(1944)
1944, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951
1944, 1945
1944
1944
1944, 1945, 1946
(1944)
1944, 1945. 1946
(1944)
1014, 1947
1V4-'. 1!I1-
1944,1945 --
1944. 1945
1944
1944, 1945-.
1944, 1945 .-
Asst. Treasurer.
Research Secretary.
Research Associate.
Clerical.
Clerical, Wash, office.
Subscription clerk.
Bookkeeping Asst.
Clerical.
Secretary-General.
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Secretary.
Research Associate.
Receptionist.
Washington office.
Secretary-General.
Research Associate.
Res.
Stenographer.
Secretary.
Clerical.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Clerical.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Shipping clerk.
Clerical.
Clerical.
Asst. Librarian.
4992
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations-
Continued
-Staff viembers, 19U-1951—
Name
Years
Position
Elizabeth A. Bates..
Helen E. Russell
Rae Solomon
Elaine Annall
Elizabeth Bryant
Donald Fine
Mary F. Healy
Anne O. Hooker
Anita Issen
Mary J. Kilpatriek.-
Philip E. Lilienthal.
Ruth Marcusson
Gloria Mitchell
Helen Schneider.
Alice M. Togo
Rose Alflno
Marguerite Anderson
Edward Bicrman
Thelma Chargar
Charles Cherubin
Stanley Ferber
Filmore Gluck
Martin Gluck
Ruth Gorgas-
James Green
Raymond Greenberg
Gertrude Greenidge
Robert Haulsey
Ayaka Murota —
Joan St. George
Gladys H. Edward
Rosaline Greenwald
Deborah Grigsby
Wei-ta Pons
TillieG. Shahn
Ruth A. Velleman
Aminadau Aloric
Kazuko Kay Fujii
Barbara Harrison
Kathr jTi Hayes —
Martha T. Henderson..
Frances P . Landau
Chiya Oshima
Unsoon Park
Lillian Rosberg
Lolita Smith
Evelyn M. Darrow
Myra M. Jordan
Mary A. McCrimmons.
Kazu Oka
Marjorie Ota
Albert A. Weidon
Melvin T. Anderson
Robert Bruce
Edward A. Fujima
Jack Gerson
George Kawata
Marjorie Montana
Mary C. Spillum..
1945, 1946. 1947, 1948, 1949
1945, 1946, 1947
(1945)
1946
1946. 1947
1946
1946. 1947, 1948. 1949, 1950, 1951.
1946
1946, 1947^
1946, 1947 .
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.
(1946)
1946, 1947, 1948. 1949, 1950, 1951.
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949^
1946
(1947)
1947
(1947)
1947, 1948. 1949
1947. 1948, 1949, 1950.
(1947)
1947
(1947)
1947-
(1947)
(1947)
1947. 1948, 1949
(1947)
1947
1947, 1948
(1948)
(1948)
1948, 1949
1918
1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.
1948
(1949)
1949. 1950
1949, 1950
(1949)
(1949)
1949
1949, 1950, 1951
1949
1949, 1950, 1951
(1949)
1950
1950
1950
1950. 1951.
(1950)
1950. 1951-
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951......
1951.
1951
Distribution Mgr.
Secretary.
Shipping clerk.
Receptionist.
Clerk-Typist.
Shipping Clerk.
Publications Secy.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Assistant Treasurer.
Editor, Pacific Affairs.
Secretary.
Receptionist, Bookkeeper,
Secy.
Business Manager, Pacific
Affairs.
Librarian.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Shipping clerk.
Billing clerk.
Shipping Clerk.
Shipping Clerk.
(7).
(?).
Clerical.
Shipping Clerk.
Shipping Clerk.
Clerical.
Shipping Clerk.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Librarian.
Asst. Treasurer.
Secretary.
Shipping Clerk.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Typist.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Distribution Mgr.
Typist.
Subscription clerk.
(?).
Secretary.
Secretary.
Receptionist.
Secretary.
Secretary.
Shipping Clerk.
Shipping Clerk.
Shipping Clerk.
Asst. Librarian.
Bookkeeper.
Asst. Librarian.
Receptionist.
Secretary.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
4993
IPR staff members
[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]
Name
Alflno, Rose.
Aloric, Aminadau
Anderson, Marguerite
Anderson, Melvin T
Armall, Elaine
Austern, Hilda
Balfour, Nina
Banks, Edythe M
Barnett, Abraham
Bates, Elizabeth
Baum, Mariorie
Bear, Marguerite E
Belshaw, Horace
Belshaw, Michael
Benjuya, Beatrice
Bialos, Roberts
Bierman, Edward
Bisson, T. A
Blumenthal
Bowen, Mary Jane
Bramley, Joan _--
Brice, Lola
Broek, J. O. M
Brown, Esther
Bruce, Robert
Bryant, Elizabeth
Buchsbaum, Betty E
Bumgardner, Chia-Ling
Burt, Virginia
Butts, Grace Leah
Bykofsky, Edith
Capps, Frances Pietrowski
Caravello, Grace
Carroll, Jewerl
Carter, Edward C
Carter, Ruth D
Chalfin, Jeaime
Chang, Irene Conley.
Chargar, Thelma
Cherubin, Charles. ..
Chesman, Miriam
Christian, Pearl C
Clark, Winifred H
CofTey
Conant, Melvin A., Jr...
Converse, Elizabeth A...
Coville, Lilian
Crawford, Elizabeth
Cunningham
Curtis, Aileen
Pahl, Sonja
Darrow, Evelyn M
Day, Augusta
De I^eonardis, Salvatore.
Delgado, Lionel C
Dennett, Raymond..
Dickinson, Edna C.
Dimitry, Helen
Dodson, Elba Aileen.
Dorglas, Elaine.
Doyle, Daniel F
Dubs, Homer H
Dimn, Margaret M..
Edward, Gladys H...
Ehrlich, Anita
Ison, Jean
Englander, Florence.
Ewing, Ethel
Farley, Miriam S
Ferber, Stanlev
Field, Olga -..'.....
Fine, Donald..'
Fischl, Margaret
Fischraan, Bemice.
Freidman, Frances.
Freist, Dorothy M.
Started
2/47
6/49
4/47
5/51
4/46
1930?
3/44
9/44
7/47
6/45
6/48
2/45
9/44-12/44.
5/46
5/44
11/45
1/47
6/43
8/44.
6/44.
5/46.
1/44.
1/51 . .
9/46. .
9/51 . .
12/49.
11/43.
7/44.-
9/44
1/44
12/44
1933
1937,38-41...
5/49-..-
3/46
2/51
8/45.
2/49
12/47
12/48
12/47
4/44
10/47
(?)
1/45
6/46.
3/45
1/46
8/46
12/44 -.
11/43
2/46 ---.
4/50
5/44
2/44
9/46
12/46
2/44
(?)
11/46 -.
5/46
5/49
8/47
10/47
8/48
1/50
4/45
8/46
9/45
11/34 to 1/46.
7/47
6/44-8/44.
.■'''6 ---
9/44
9/46
10/43
9/46
Resigned
3/47.- --
7/49
6/47-
Present
9/46
11/45
6/44
8/46
8/47
6/49 -.-
7/48
3/45
11/45-7/46- —
8/46
9/44
12/45- -
2/47
9/45
9/45
7/46
6/46 — .
5/44
2/44---
Present
6/47
Present
1/50
11/43
8/44
4/46
8/45
2/46
1/45 -..
2/46
42-4/46-
10/49
12/49
Present
9/45 .-
10/49
4/49 -_..
12/48 ,
7/50
4/46
4/50
1/43
2/45
8/46
3/51
3/46
3/50- -.
12/44
3/44
9/46- -.
7/50
8/44 ,
9/46
12/46
1/47
2/46
1/43
8/47
6/46
6/49
9/47
6/44
3/48
8/48
3/50
4/45 ---
9/46
6/47
12/48 to pres-
ent.
8/47
12/44-6/45—
5/46
4/47
10/47 -
6/44
9/46 -
Position
Secretary
Shipping clerk --
Secretary
Sh. elk
Recep. -typist---.
Asst. Treasurer-
Stenographer
Shipping clerk —
Distribution mgr-
Stenographer---
Research Sec'y-
Shipping clerk -
Shipping clerk
Shipping clerk
Research Associate
Clerk-typist
Library consultant part time-
Clk-typ --
Clerk -typist
Special research project--
Sh. elk ;
Clerk-typ---
Secretary
Clerk-typist-
Clk-typ
Subscrip. clerk
Bookkeeping asst-
Clerk-typist
Sec'y General
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Administrative Ass't-
Librarian
Billing clerk
Shipping clerk
Shipping clerk ---
Subscription clerk
Clerk-typist
Temp, secretary
Temporary clerk
Research Assistant
Assistant Editor FES-.
Washington Office
Switchboard Operator.
Clerical
Los Angeles Office. - .
Secretary
Receptionist
Shipping clerk
Shipping clerk
Shipping clerk
Executive Secretary.
(?)-
Stenogrpaher
Secretary (Wash. Office) -
Clerk-typist
Shipping clerk
Secretary
Secretary
Clerk -typist
Typist
Stenographer
School secretary- .
Res. Assoc; Pamphlet Editor;
Editor, Far Eastern Survey.
Sh. elk
Research assoe
Shipping clerk
Secretary
Acting librarian
Secretary
Stenographer
Salary
$20/wk.
$30.20/wk.
$110/mo.
$400/mo.
4994
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
IPR staff members — Continued
[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]
Name
Started
Resigned
Position
Salary
Frncht, Rita
Fujii, Kazuke Kay
Fnijima. Edward A
Oallus, Wilya
Qerber, Lillie
Qerson, Jack
Gibson, Eulalie
Oluck, Filmore
Gluck
Oodby, Marie
Goldenberg, Rhoda
Golembosti, Josephine.
Gordon, Gloria
Qorgas, Ruth
Grajdanzev, Andrew...
Green, James
Greenberg, Raymond.
Qreenberg, Rose
Greene, Katrine R. C_
Greenidge, Gertrude..
Greenwald, Ro'^alin.,
Greenwald, Rosalind..
Grigs by, Deborah
Qutlman, Renee J.
Harrison, Barbara
Hasse, Robert
Haulsey, Robert
Hawkins, Sally R
Hayes, Kathryn
Healy, Mary
Henderson, Martha T.
Hickey, Callie M
Hill, Marguerite F
Hochschild, Patrick —
Holland, W. L
Hooker, Anne O
Hsu, Ying Yung
Israel, Dorothy ...
Issen, Anita -...
Jayson, Alice
Jenkins, Louise
Johnstone, William C.
Jordan, Myra M
Kahane, Rita
Kawata, George
Keil, Dorothea
Kennedy, Bernice
Kilpatrick, Mary J
Kiyaba, Hiroyo..
Kizer, Carolyn A
Klein, Mildred
Kok, Gerard P
Kramer, Sonia
Krasnow, Beatrice
Landau, Frances P
Lane, Clayton
Lasker, Bruno
Lattimore, Eleanor.
Lazarus, Ruth J
(As: Ruth Turbin).
Leak, Ora
Lederor, Use
Lee, Betty
Lee, Pao-Ch'en
Lee, Rosamund
Levinthal, Harriet. .
Levy, Ellen B
Lewis, Rhoda
Lilicnthal, Philip E.
Lipton, Sony
Ludwig, Dorothy S
Mack, Virginia
Marks, Regina.
Masselman, Wilhelmina.
Marcusson, Ruth
1045.
8/49.
9/51.
12/45.
9/51..
6/46..
4/47..
6/47..
12/44.
1/47..
10/44.
4/46..
10/47-
1/43..
7/44..
1/45..
8/47..
2/47..
12/44.
1/48..
6/47-.
5/48..
8/48..
12/47.
/148 ■.
5/46. .
1/49-1/50
5/51
9/47
10/46
1/49
2/43-10/43....
4/49
10/46..
4/47
10/48
1931-32, 1933
1933-1944....
1946
1/46
(?)
6/46.
10/44.
1/50..
1/45..
3/51 -.
10/45.
8/45.-
1/46. .
5/45..
10/44.
2/47..
12/46.
3/44..
1/49- .
10/48.
5/44. .
12/44.
1/46. .
2/51..
3/44..
9/46- .
2/47. .
11/45.
2/44- .
10/48.
1/46. .
9/46. .
3/4...
6/44..
10/46.
2/44..
4/46. .
10/45
1/50
Present.
9/44
6/46
Present .
7/46
6/47
6/47
12/44
10/47....
10/44
5/46
12/47...-
12/43....
12/44-..-
1/46
8/47
3/47
12/44....
1/51
4/49
6/48
6/50
7/49.
9/47.
9/51
10/47
7/47
1/49
4/46-present.
4/49
7/47
4/47
5/49
Present.
5/46
9/45
3/44
4/47
7/44
11/44....
12/45....
5/50
1/45
9/51
10/45
4/45
8/47
8/45
2/45
4/44
5/47
8/47
11/44....
3/49
7/50
9/43
1/40
6/47
8/45..
8/46..
2/51.-
4/44--
10/46-
5/47. -
11/45-
8/46. -
12/45.
2/44..
Present.
11/46
4/48
7/44
8/47
4/44
5/46
See'y
Librarian
Secretary
Stenographer.
Bookkeeper..
Clerk-typist..
(?)
(?) -
Secretary.
$30.20.
Typist-
Clk-typ
Research Associate.
Research Associate.
Shipi)ing clerk
Shipping clerk
Assistant Secretary.
Clerk
Secretary
Secretary
Temporary secretary
Secretary
Branch secretary (Washington
Office).
Secretary
Shipping clerk
Shipping clerk
Secretary (Washington Office)
Temp, typ
Publications sec'y
Temp, sec'y
Secretary
Temporary secretary
Librarian .
Research sec'y
Editor, Pacific afifairs
Sec'y general
Secretary
Res Assoc
Secretary
Secretary
Public relations
Director, Washington office.
Secretary
Stenographer
Librarian
$30.20.
Stenographer.
Asst. treas
Stenographer.
Chinese Language Instructor.
Secretary
Secretary
E.\ecutive Secretary
Research Associate
Research Associate.
Research .\ssociate (Washington
Office).
Secretary
Secretary
Typist
$40/wk.
$30.20.
$30.20.
Stenographer
.4ss't Chinese Language Instruc-
tor.
Promotion secretary
Switchboard operator
Temporary secretary
Editor, Far Eastern Survey-
Editor, Pacific Affairs
Stenographer
Asst. Bookkeeper
(?)
Stenographer
Res -
Secretary -..
$22/wk
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
4995
IPR staft members — Continued
[Submitted by W. L. Hollaud, 10/10/51]
Name
Matsuo, Miyaho
Maurer, Adriemie
May, Jean
Mayer, Hilda
Mayer, Laura
Mayo, Dorothy
McCrimmons, Mary A.
Millman, Abe J
MUlman, Benjamin
Mills, Harriet
Mitchell, Gloria
Minavouitch, Michael E,..
Moldauer, Frances (untO
1946— Sharps).
Montana, Marjorle
Moore, Harriet L
Morgan, Leslie
Morita, Betty
Morris, Marion
Morris, Wilson
Morrison, Angelina
Morseley, Hilton
Mott, Celestine G
Murota, Ayaka
Neal, Elizabeth
Nelson, Harry A
Nerenberg, Clara
Neugebauer, Frieda
Newman, Eugene
Nitka, Helen E
Nusbaum, Gladys
Oka, Kazu
Ormont, Zelda
Ornitz, Sallie
Oshima, Chiye
Ota, Marjorie
Park, Unsoon
Parker, Belzy M
Parker, Harriet H
Parsons, Katrine
Parsons, Ruth M
Pelan, Frank
Pietrowski, Rose
Pollard, John A
Pons, "\Vei-ta
Porter, Catherine.
Radoni, Jane
Reinliold, Anna
Resnick, Ruth
Robertson, Gwendolyn-
Rogers, Rima S
Root, Constance
Rosberg, Lilian
Rosenfcld, Sylvia
Rosenthal, Lanra
Rosinger, Lawrence K..
Rothmau. Rhoda
Russell, Helen E
St. George, Joan
Salisbury, Laurence E..
Sanders, Flarence E-
Sehneer, Sophie
Schneider, Helen
Sebatz, Louise, H__.
Serot, Louise B
Serot, Rhoda
Shahn, Tillie G
ShavelsDn, Rita
Shishko, Jerome
Skrefstad, Betty
Smith, B.irbaraB-
Smith, Lolita W_.
Smith, Maggie
Snyder, Maxim
Solomon, Rae
Soyer, David
Spidell, Clara
Spillum, Mary C
Stein, Ruth V
Stewart, Marguerite.
Started
5/45. .
3/44..
4/44..
12/48.
7/50- .
3/46..
5/46..
9/44..
1'47.-
7/46-.
12/45-
3/51.
6/51.
8/44.
2/45..
10/46-
11/44.
1/47..
4/47-.
4/43-.
12/44-
9/44..
2/45-.
12/44.
3/51..
8/50- .
4/44..
7/49.-
4/50..
7/49-.
4/47-.
2/44--
(?)-..
9/44--
12/46.
11/44-
4/46--
1/48..
9/50.:
1/46.-
4/17..
2/44..
6/46-.
2/45- .
12/46.
4/49..
1/45--
11/44-
9/48. .
3/44..
2/45--
7/47..
10/44-
8/44-.
4/46- -
1/46- .
9/46..
10/46.
(?)-.-
4/44..
3/45-.
11/43.
5/47-.
1/45- -
7/49.-
6/49--
3/44- -
6/44..
9/45. .
6/44-.
11/43.
10/51.
8/50. .
Resigned
4/45.
3/44-
9/44-
1/49-
9/43-
6/44.
5/46. .
7/46..
2/45..
10/51.
9/51..
4/46-.
10/47.
present -
2/44
present -
12/44-..,
1/44
3/46
10/46...
12/44...
3/48
11/47---
12/44--.
12/44. . -
1/45
6/49
6/45
1/45
5/51
3/51
4/44
5/44
2/51
9/50
9/49
7/47
1/45
11/43-..
2/46
8/47
11/44---
7/46-.-.
11/48...
3/51
4/51
10/46
4/47
4/44
present..
12/45
7/47
Present.
1/45
5/40
10/50
10/47
2/47
3/48
5/48
9/44
10/44
4/49
5/47
10/46
12/46
9/51
5/44
5/45
11/44
6/47
9/46
7/49
7/49--.-.
10/46
8/44
10/45
6/45
12/45
Present.
3/51
5/47
Position
Stenographer.
Clerk-typist-
Typist
Temp, typ
Stenographer
Stenographer.
Administrative Asst
Secy-bkpr
.A.sst. bookkeeper; scty
Shipping clerk
Supur. pub. distrib. (1 wk. 12/48 as
typist).
Receptionist
Acting E.xec. Secretary
E ditorial assist
Assistant Editor— Pamphlets -
Stenographer
Executive secretary.
Secretary
Steno-type
Stenographer
Clerical assistant.
Typist-
Sec'y...
Secretary
Distr. IMgr
Sac'y
Temp, typ
Stenographer
Secretary
SecSy
Secretary
Shipoing clerk
Clk-typ
Director, Washington Office
Librarian
Assistant librarian
Res. Assoc; Editor, Far Eastern
Survey.
Stenographer
Temporary secretary
Salary
Subscription clerk
Secretary
Promotion Assistant-
Subscript, clerk
Secretary ■
Research Associate
Billing clerk
Secretary
Secretarv
Editor, FAR EASTERN
VEY.
Secretary 1...
SUR-
Bus. Manager
Promotion Secretary.
Secretary
Asst. Treas-
Clerical assistant. .
Clerk-typist
Clerk-typist
Clerk-typist
(?)
Temporary typist-
Acting librarian.- -
Shipping clerk
Clerical asst
Clerk
See's
Secretary
School scty; admin, sec'y.
$400/mo.
4996
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
IPR staff memhers — Continued
[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]
Name
Stewart, Maxwell S..
Stopp, Ann
Su^iitan, Lucrecia...
Talkington, Marie...
Tandetnick, Frances.
Taylor, Esther
Taylor, Janet
Togo, Alice M
Uchida, Yoshi
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth
Van Buren, Dolores
Velleman, Ruth A
Vernon, Robert Jr
Wagner, Joyce
Walker, Elnora..
Waller, Ella S
Wanderman, Francis Dick-
Weidom, Albert A
Wentholt, Henrietta
Wilder, Nancy
Winston, Sadei
Wise, Masha Switzer
Woods, Caroline
Wright, Nellie
Yardumlan, Rose
Yasumuva, Michi.
Yates, Elizabeth...
Started
2/46. .
2/51..
6/49. .
1/44. .
2/44..
12/46.
10/44.
2/46. .
1/46- -
9/46. .
8/44..
9/45. .
3/46. .
4/48. .
10/44.
9/44..
9/46.
3/48.
8/50.
6/50..
12/44.
3/44.
/42..
10/44.
10/49.
Resigned
Position
2/48
Present.
12/49
2/44
2/44
3/47
10/44
3/46
8/46
7/47
9/45
9/46
4/46
12/48
4/45
8/45
3/44
10/46
5/48
1/51
2/44
12/44
9/50
7/46
7/44
6/44
10/45
9/45.
2/50.
Pamphlet Editor.
Secretary
Typist
Stenographer-
Stenographer.
Librarian
Membership clerk
Secretary
Secretary, Washington Office.
Stenograriher
Secretary
Shi'iping clerk
Clerk-typist
Stenographer.
Secretary
Sh. elk
Sec'y-'. edit, assistant
Secretary
Stenographer..
Librarian
Clerical
Sec'y.; librarian; sec'y., Washing-
ton office.
Asst. librarian ,
Acting librarian
Salary
Exhibit No. 802
September 26, 1934.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter: I was greatly interested in reading a copy of your letter
to Wellington Liu inquiring whether there was any jwsibility of securing the
services of Chen Han-seng for permanent work in the I. P. R. It is an excellent
suggestion and I hope you will keep pushing it. Chen is a first-class researcher
with the good knowledge of Ru.ssian, French, German, and English as well as
one or two Chinese dialects and reading knowledge of .Japanese. He is a hard
worker and one of the few Chinese researchers whose eyes are not blinded to
the real conditions of rural China. While of course he could render great service
to the China Council as a colleague working with Liu, I believe from many
points of view it would be worth your while appointing him to the Secretariat
as my colleague. I shall certainly be glad to make drasdc economies in my own
budget in order to secure Chen.
As you probably know by now, Chen is living here in Tokyo completing a
study of rural conditions in South China and also working over some materials
on Chinese economic history at the Oriental Library in Tokyo. He has taken
a house here with his wife and will return here again in December after making
a short trip back to China in order to get field work started on his I. P. R. study
of standards of living in tobacco-producing regions in China.
One reason why I think it is worth your while to push the question still
further is that Chen's relations with the Sun Yat-sen Institute and especially
with Academia Sinica are not very happy. He is much too close to the radical
elements in China to suit the Nanking authorities and I understand that for
the time being it is better for Chen's political health to be out of China. I shall
be seeing him in a day or two before he goes back to Shanghai and I shall en-
deavour to sound him out as discreetly as possible on his views about working
for the I. P. R.
Sincerely yours,
, Research Secretary.
WLH: MI
Copy to Mr. Loomis.
Copy to Mr. Liu.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4997
Exhibit No. 804
Memorandum W. L. Holland to E. C. Carter
October 4, 1935.
With reference to Harriet Moore's list of discussion questions of Soviet na-
tional policy, I suggest that we write to all the other Ck)uncils immediately after
the Lee Conference, making it clear that "national policy" is being used in a
very different sense in the Round Table on Soviet Policy. I would strongly
support Harriet's plea for changing the word from "national" to "nationality."
All this is assuming that we would want to limit the Soviet Round Table to the
two questions of economic development and policy towards minor nationalities
and dependent peoples. There ought to be rather careful discussion of this point
to make sure first of all how much of a limitation this really is, and, second
whether the Soviet Council would be unwilling to broaden the discussion pro-
gram to include more general and political aspects of Soviet policy in the Far
East.
As you know, I would like to have the broader interpretation so that the
Round Table would be more in line with the other Round Tables on Japanese,
American, and Chinese national policy. While the Soviet policy towards minor
nationiilities in its Far Eastern territories is certainly a major element in the
total Soviet Far Eastern policy, it would be unfortunate if the discussion went
too deeply into the details of cultural autonomy, the language question, et cetera,
when there will be nothing comparable in the discussions on other questions, and
when most of the other delegates will no the in a position to participate in the
discussion for want of detailed knowledge. (Incidentally, I wonder if you have
thought of suggesting to Crawford afe the University of Hawaii that you and
Keesing might invite a Soviet expert to the Conference on Government and
Education in Dependent Territories. A Russian could make a real contribu-
tion, and would certainly throw a lot of monkey wrenches which ought to be
thrown. )
W. L. H.
Exhibit No. 805
CJopy to F.
129 East 52nd Street,
tiew York City, March 28, 1939.
Dear Bill: I apologize for not having sent you an earlier answer to your
letter of March 13th. In the meantime, however, I have sent formal invitations
to Miss Dietrich and Hayden for the Secretariat Inquiry monographs. After
consultation with Carter I decided to offer Hayden $150 and to give him the
opportunity to make the report 20,000 to 25,000 words. I have asked Fred to
send on to you copies of both letters.
I also took up with Carter the question of having authors' names printed
on the cover and title page of Inquiry reports and he has now agreed to make
this a general practice.
I am glad to have the news about Riesenfeld and have told Fred that I certainly
approve paying him the necessary $50. In fact, I should be prepared to pay
$75 if necessary. To avoid complicating our bookkeeping I have suggested to
Fred that this amount should be paid out of the available funds which the
American Council now has and that any necessary additional payments irom
the International Research Fund should be made later this year.
In Washington I had quite a long talk with Saugstad who was extremely
cooperative. The reason for the slightly mysterious tone in his letter to
you was that the person he recommends for the shipping study is Mr. Henry
L. Deimel, Jr., Assistant Chief in the Division of Trade Agreements (private
address 4414 Macomb Street NW., Washington). Deimel, whom I met briefly,
has apparently done a good deal of work on shipping and has at various times
worked in association with Henry Grady who, incidentally, is his father-in-law.
The reason for Saugstad's mysterious phraseology is that (confidentially) Sayre
is probably being sent out soon to the Philippines as High Commissioner, and
Deimel is being asked to go as his economic advisor. There would be a possibil-
ity, however, that Deimel would get leave of absence for about four or five
months during the summer before going out to Manila, and during this period
he would be willing and in a very good position to prepare a report for the
I. P. R.
4998 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The State Department would raise no objections to such a procedure and
Deimel would also be willing to collect additional information on the way out to
Manila. In the meantime he would be able to get access to a great deal of more
or less confidential information in Washington.
Deimel impressed me as a capable and well informed person, but I have too
little evidence to judge whether he is the best possible person we could get. On
the whole, however, I am inclined to offer him the job partly because it might
be an extremely valuable way of making use of State Department and other
governmental material, and incidentally of working in closely with the State
Department. I emphasized to Deimel the fact that the report would have to be
of an international character and not merely present American policy and point
of view.
In the meantime I should be glad to have your comments on the scheme, and
also any other information about Deimel or about the shipping project generally.
I shall not make any move until I hear from you.
Meanwhile Hubbard has just sent you a copy of the Imperial Shipping Com-
mittee's report on British Shipping in the Orient which is being sent to you.
It is better than I had expected and provides a good deal of the information we
should want. It is obvious, however, that there is still room for a great deal
of work along the lines of more systematic analysis of the problems from an in-
ternational point of view and quite certain that we should go ahead with the
I. P. R. study.
I did not call on Gates in the Civil Aeronautics Commission, chiefly because
Saugstad had already warned me off him because Gates apparently, being a fight-
ing young lawyer, has become identified with an anti-Pan-American group and
is interested in nothing but ways of reducing the monopolistic power of Pan-
American. It also appears that the State* Department which has to handle most
of the foreign negotiations has more or less unconsciously found itself lined up
against Gates as an advocate of Pan-American. Saugstad also emphasized the
fact that the State Department has all the information available to the Civil
Aeronautics Commission, and in fact is better informed on the international
aspects. His recommendation was, therefore, that if we wanted to get any
profitable cooperation from people in Washington, it would be much better to do
it through the State Department, and he said that he would be prepared to see
that we did get the necessary cooperation. Apparently they already have one or
two capable young men working on the problem. Obviously there is a little
bureaucratic jealously here, but I think there is a good deal in what Saugstad
says, and unless we find strong evidence to the contrary, I should be inclined
to take his advice. Here, again, however, I should be glad to have a word from
you before I write again to Saugstad.
With best regards.
Sincerely yours,
, Research Secretary.
W. W. LocKwooD Esq.
Exhibit No. 806
Institute of Pacific Rbi^tions
Amsterdam— London — Manila — Moscow — New York — Paris — Shanghai — Sydney — Tokyo —
Toronto — Wellington
OFFICE OF THE SECRETAKY-GENEEAL
GiANNiNi Foundation,
University of California,
Berkeley, Calif., Mfly 10, 1940.
ECC from WLH :
I was somewhat startled to receive your wire saying that Andrew Ross was
waiting for me to write him about a supplementary chapter to Levy's report, but
on looking through my files I find a slip of paper with the name Andrew Roth of
3150 Rochambeau Avenue, written on it. So I am afraid I have clearly been
negligent in forgetting all about him. I enclose herewith a note which you
might send on to him if it seems suitable. The amount of writing to be done
cannot be very great and if Levy's manuscript is only just going to the press
there need be no delay in its final appearance. If you or Kate or Jack have
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 4999
any doubts about tbe present letter, don't hesitate to scrap it and write Roth di-
rectly. (Incidentally you had better find out whether his name is really Ross or
Roth.) I apologize sincerely for having slipped up on this matter.
I should not think it was necessary to get Levy's formal permission for this
supplementary chapter, but presumably you ought at least to notify him that
we are getting it done.
I note that no Inquiry funds will be available for Lockwood's suggested study
by Quigley on the Open Door. The study is not within the present field of the
International Research Committee and I don't think it would interest Lockwood's
committee, although a related study of the Open Door as a cardinal factor in
American policy might. I would not regard the suggested Quigley study as of
major importance, though it might come on the list of new studies to be under-
taken if we get additional Inquiry funds. The subject might be better treated as
one chapter of a larger study of new diplomatic machinery for the Far East.
How would it be to consult two or three i)eople like Blakeslee, Willoughby, Horn-
beck and Quincy Wright, as well as Quigley, about the possible scope and impor-
tance of the study? It might also be possible to have the subject treated in a
Pacific Affaiks article and expanded later if it seemed worthwhile.
I agree with so much of what you say in your letter of May 8 about Japanese
Trojan Horses in the bosoms of various influential people (a vastly intriguing
metaphor when you consider what would have to be done to let the soldiers
escape from the Trojan Horse) that I don't propose to do anything further about
a possible visit by Alsberg to Japan, particularly as Galen Fisher's visit will be
a sufficient goodwill gesture.
If it is convenient I should like to look at "Contemporary International Poli-
tics" by Sharp and Kirk, the latter of whom is doing an American Council study
on electrical communications in the Pacific. If it seems worthwhile, I shall
write a brief review on the Far Eastern sections of the book. Among your sug-
gested reviewers for Morgan Young's book, "The Rise of a Pagan State," I
should be inclined to mention Colegrove, but we had probably better not bother
him until he finishes his present assignment for us. Would you also send me
Lowe's "Japan's Economic Offensive in China," as I may want to review this
myself or, perhaps, ask George Taylor to do it.
I am very interested to hear that the Japan Council have translated "Agrarian
China." I am delighted that they have done so but so far as I remember this,
is the first we have been told of it, although it is a Secretariat book. I should
like to have two of the copies, if possible. The book should be listed under its
Japanese title in the next issue of Pacific Affaiks, but I don't think it need be
reviewed separately. To the best of my recollection we have not yet reviewed
"Agrarian China" in Pacific Affairs but you might check on this ; and if I am
right you might get Wittfogel or Cressey or Rossiter of the Department of Agri-
culture to write about 300 words.
WLH
W. L. H.
Exhibit No. 807
May 10, 1940.
WLH from ECC:
Jessup rang up just now and says that he fears it was you rather than he who^
slipped the cog with reference to the Levy supplement. He has just checked with
Peflfei- and I have condensed his message into the following Day Letter :
"Regarding Levy supplement Jessup says he, Peffer, arranged for Andrew Ross
see you, that Ross says you promised write him. He is eager and ready and
according to PelTer anxious and qualified to go ahead and has been awaiting
daily your letter."
I explained to Jessup how terribly rushed you were with a million things just
before your departure. Under the circumstances, I assume that you will want
to go ahead and have Ross go to work, though I suppose you are still free to
cancel your tentative proposal to Ross.
Somehow or other both Jessup and Peffer have the idea that Ross saw you
before you left New York. His address is : care the Chinese Department at
Columbia.
In the view of Jessup and Peffer his knowledge of French and of France and
of the Far East qualify him to do a good job.
5000 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 808
Berkeley, July 5, 1940.
Dear Phii- Gaffe : The Hollands are duly touched and awed that our offspring
should have made such an impact on 129 E. 52nd St. If you want to indicate
that Amer and Asia are separated by an ever-renewed body of water, then
Patricia is certainly an apt symbol. Photographs a priori and a posteriori will
be forthcoming soon.
I should have no objections to putting Owen's article in Amerasia and in some
ways I think it would be better to print it immediately rather than have it
delayed. It's a difficult topic and I think Owen has made a gallant effort, but I
have a slight feeling that he has tried to find too many historical roots for the
current, and obviously important, connection between Germany and Japan.
Moreover there is singularly little account of the role the U. S. has played and
of the fears of the U. S. S. R. regarding the intentions of both Germany and
Britain. I should like to see the article end with a more outright plea that only
by direct pressure on Japan from the U. S. and by a rapprochement between the
U. S. and the U. S. S. R. can the Axis powers now be checked.
I hope Amerasia will have a blast against the latest wave of appeasement
and Lippmannism favouring a deal with Japan.
My regards to Kate and the rest of the Amerasia bunch.
Yours,
W. L. Holland.
Copy to GEE, I mean ECC.
Exhibit No. 809
Copy for ECO
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., December 1, 1941.
Mr. Carl F. Remer,
Office of the Coordinator of Information,
Library of Congress Annex, Washington, D. C.
Dear Remer; You have probably already heard of this matter through l^'ans
or Fairbank, but I understand that the publishers of the Japanese magazine
Chuo Koron wrote sometime ago that they had had to discontinue mailing the
periodical to the United States as the United States atuhorities had been con-
fiscating it as propagandist literature. The United States action may have been
quite .justified in some cases, but it seems very probable that the Customs au-
thorities have acted as precipitately here as they did formerly with important
Soviet magazines which were urgently needed by libraries and research in-
stitutions in this country.
If the matter has not alreadly been attended to, it might be worth while for
your group to communicate, perhaps through Archibald MacLeish or Mortimer
Graves, with the Customs authorities to see that confiscations are handled in-
telligently and not to the detriment of legitimate research institutions and
libraries.
I enclose a circular in Japanese from Chug Koron.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland, Research Secretary.
Exhibit No. 810
Coordinator of Information,
Washington., D. C, March 18, 19^2.
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relatione,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
My Dear Mr. Holland : The research work of the Institute of Pacific Relations
has been directly useful to the OflSce of the Coordinator of Information in its
efforts to meet the urgent demands created by the war. Certain unpublished
studies of the Institute have been made available to us during the preparation
of reports and you have, yourself, found time to serve as consultant and adviser
to our sections dealing with the British Empire and the Far East.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5001
I am sending this brief acknowledgment in the hope that it may be useful to
you in making plans and securing funds for the coming year. I think you will
agree with me that full informal cooperation must be the basis of the effective
use of the limited number of persons with adequate research training to deal
with the Far East. The OflBce of the Coordinator of Information is looking
forward to the continuance of such cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
James P. Baxter, 3rd,
Deputy Coordinator.
Exhibit No 811
(Pencilled initials) NLH
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.,
April 2nd, 1942.
Major G. A. Lincoln,
Director of Orientation Course,
Bureau of PuMic Relations, War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Major Lincoln: Since I have a certain general responsibility for the
publication program of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I have had occasion to
learn from Miss Downing your sudden decision to cancel the War Department's
order for 10,000 copies of An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics. I want to reinforce
Miss Downing's reply to you by saying that this Institute has acted in all good
faith and has in fact gone to considerable trouble to meet the request originally
made by Colonel Beukema, e. g., in getting paper especially manufactured and
having the maps rephotographed, etc.
Your action in announcing your dissatisfaction with parts of the book and
cancelling the order at this late date without giving us any previous warning
comes as a considerable shock, particularly as nothing in our correspondence
indicated that your office would require further revisions. Had you mentioned
this problem some weeks ago when we were waiting for the paper to be manu-
factured we should, of course, have done our best to meet your wishes.
I therefore hope that you will carefully consider Miss Downing's suggestion
of having a revised edition even now. If you cannot accept this suggestion I hope
that you will at least indicate a procedure whereby we can be compensated for
the losses we shall srffer through your failure to notify us soon. The direct losses
will probably total about $1,600, and we have not included in this figure any
charge for tlie considerable amount of time which the office staff here has devoted
to the problem.
We are genuinely anxious to assist you in your important work. We would
therefore like to be given an opportunity to provide the kind of material you
want. The only thing we ask is that you give us reasonable notice in the sudden
changes of your plans.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 812
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.,
April 3rd, 1H2.
Mr. George H. Kerr,
Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Kerr : Thank you for your letter of April 2nd about Grajdanzev's
report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy of
the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the
Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Eco-
nomic Warfare. , .„ ,,
Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments and if there are
any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that
you let me know in the next day or two as we may want to insert an errata slip
in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing
because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactory set of proofs.
Sincerely yours, ,„ -r ^^
W. L. Holland.
88348— 52— pt. 14-
5002 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 813
War Department,
War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division G-2,
Rm 2628, Munitions Building,
Washington, Aj)ril 2, 19^2.
Mr. William Holland,
J29 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.
Mt Dear Mr. Holland : I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in
February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of
further writing.
Some weeks ago there came to our M. I. D. files — and my Formosa section —
a set of galley sheets of Dr. Gra.idanzev's extraordinary good work, which
I first saw briefly in your office and now have read thoroughly. No covering
letter came with it to me and so It is not clear whether this is a loan or a final
gift to our files. If It is not a loan I shall be free to divide it according to
subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan I shall keep it
Intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be
digested. We live very largely on loans these days.
Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some
day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few
minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.
Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not
be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad
to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment
have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.
With every goood wish.
My residence address : 2700 Wisconsin Ave., NW.
[s] George H. Kerr.
George H. Kerr.
Exhibit No. 814
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C, July 25, 1942.
In reply refer to : 0W-6-RHS.
Mr. Wii LiAM Holland,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mk. Holland : Thank you for sending us the article on the organization
of tlie Chinese Government, which will be most useful to our Far Eastern
Division.
Very sincerely yours,
[s] C. R. Vail,
Chester R. Vail,
Acting Chief, Economic Intelligence Division.
Exhibit No. 815
Joseph P. Chamberlain, Chairman, Professor of Public Law ; Lyman Bryson, Professor of
Education ; Carter Goodrich, Professor of Economics, Chairman, Governing Body, I. L. O. ;
Luther H. Gulicli, Eaton Profe.^sor of Municipal Science and Administration ; Carlton
J. H. Hayes, Seth Low Professor of History : Cliarles Cheney Hyde, Hamilton Fish
Professor "ot International Law and Diplomacy : Huger W. Jervey, Director, Institute
of International Affairs. Professor of Comparative Law ; Philip C. Jessup, Professor of
International Law ; Grayson Kirlj, Associate professor of Government ; Arthur W.
Macmahon, Professor of Public Administration ; Wesley C. Mitchell, Professor of
Economics ; Nathaniel Pefifer, Associate Professor of International Relations ; Lindsay
Rogers, Burger Professor of I'uhlic Law, Assistant Director, I. L. O. ; J. Kussell »Suiith,
Professor of Economic Geography ; James T. Shotwell, Boyce Professor of the History
of International Relations
Consultants : Dr. Prank G. Boudreau, Director, Mulbank Memorial Fund ; Joseph Hyman,
Executive Vice Chairman, Joint Distribution Committee ; General Frank R. McCoy,
President, Foreign Policy Association ; Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Secretary, Ameri-
can Friends Service Committee : George L. Warren, Executive Secretary, President's
Advisory Committee on Political Regugees
ENTSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5003
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Committee on Emebgency Pr<^gram of Tkaining in International
Administration
Professor Schuyler C. Wallace, Director
Room 513 Fayerweather Hall
UNiversity 4-3200, Ext. 188
July 31, 1942.
Mr. William Holland,
129 Eaat 52nd Street, New York, Neiv YorJc.
Dear Bill: Our arran.cements for the course are coming along. Broek wiU
arrive on the 20th of August for the six weeks period. I told him in my letter
that you and Lockwood had waived the I. P. R. claims for those six weeks, and
that arrangements with the Rockefeller people were feasible. Can you take the
initiati\e with the Rockefeller people, or will he do that, or can I help?
Keesing will come up from the Offl -e of Strategic Services in a consultative
capacity one day a week for the first six weeks.
We want very much to have you come up for a few introductory lectures.
What we thought you might be willing to do would be to come on August
IS, 19, and 20 to give three one-hour lectures, which would do the following:
1. Provide a general introductic-n to the Pacific area, just touching the high
spots as to the divisions of the region, the peoples, etc. Some of the men will be
well informed, others may be quite blank about it.
2. A bibliography lecture on materials bearing on the Pacific and Far East,
which would include a description of the inquiry series.
3. A talk on the available sources in the New York area, so that the men
would know where to go after we assigned tliem research projects. This would
include an indication of what you have at the I. P. R., and references to such
other places as the American Museum, the Geographical tBociety, etc.
We can offer you the modest honorarium of $150.00 for this series of lectures.
In addition, we hope that you would be willing to contribute some of your
time to sitting in with a committee which we are forming on the Pacific area,
to plan out our whole curriculum. The committee will include Keesing, Broek,
Clare Holt, and Arthur Schiller.
I hope that we can count on your help in these ways.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Phil.
Philip C. Jessltp.
PCJ : es.
Exhibit No. 816
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C, Sep. 2, 191,2.
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.
Dear Bill: I think you will be interested in seeing the enclosed copy of an
article by the Vice President on "Economic Warfare — The War Behind the War,"
which appears in the current issue of the Army and Navy Journal. It is the first
broad public statement about the work of the Board of Economic Warfare.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Bill
William T. Stone, Assistant Director.
Attachment.
Exhibit No. 817
July 6, 1942.
Mr. William T. Stone,
Board of Econotnic Warfare,
Department of Economic Warfare,
Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
Dear Bill : You may be interested in these reports of Stein's.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. HOIXAND.
5004 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 818
BoABD OF Economic Warfare.
Washington, D. C, July 11, 1942.
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Institnte of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Bill: Many thanks for your note of July 6, enclosing the radio letter
from Guenther Stein. This service is most interesting, and the Board will
appreciate receiving the reports regularly as they come in.
Do look me up the next time you are in Washington.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Bill
William T. Stone, Assistant Director.
Exhibit No. 819
March 1, 1943.
KM from ECC
The private document prepared in Washington on the Strength of the Muslim
League has come into my hands. It is not available for quotations, nor should
any reference be made to it. I thought, however, that you might be interested in
seeing it, so I have had copies made. I don't think that it covers the ground,
but it does contain one or two interesting points.
164/No. 4/2/1/43
Background information
THE STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN INDIA
Mr. Jinnah's Position
Mr. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League has recently been carrying on a
vigorous political drive.
His visit to the Punjab showed the extent to which he has secured contact
with the Muslim masses. It can no longer be argued that because at the General
Elections it was not able to secure a majority of the Muslim votes in any Prov-
ince, the Muslim League has no following among the masses. Since 1937, ac-
cession to the Muslim League's and Mr. Jinnah's strength has been tremendous.
Almost every bye-election in Muslim constitu.encies has been won by the League
and the number of Muslim League members in the various Pi'ovincial Legisla-
tures has increased manifold.
The number of Muslim Ministers who now owe allegiance to the League is
considerable. The latest accession has come from Sind. Sir Ghulam Hussain
Hidayatullah, who succeeded Mr. Allah Bux, has joined the League and his
example lias since been followed by all the Sind Muslim Ministers. Here is a
survey of the Muslim League position in the Muslim majority Provinces :
PUNJAB
The total number of Muslim members in the Punjab Legislative Assembly is
89. Only one out of these was elected on Muslim League ticket in the General
Elections of 1937. The number of Muslims elected on Unionist tickets was
77. All Muslim members of the Unionist Party are, however, now members of
the Muslim League under what is known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact of 1938.
The main terras of the Pact were that the Unionist Party's leader, the late Sir
Sikander Hyat Khan, with all his Muslim followers in the Assembly should join
the League and promise support to it in all Indian constitutional questions. Mr.
Jinnah agreed on his part that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party would
have freedom in Provincial matters and would be free to pursue the Unionist
Party program.
The political complexion of the Punjab made it necessary for the late Sir Si-
kander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Prime Minister, not to form a Muslim League
Government but a Unionist Government in coalition with Hindu and Sikh groups.
In all Provincial matters he pursued a more or less independent line and, though
professing allegiance to the League and ]\Ir. Jinnah, his policy on all-Indian
questions was at times embarrassingly independent of the League. On the other
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5005
hand. Sir Sikander never openly flouted any League mandate and he resigned
from the National Defence Council when required by the League.
The Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore recently wrote: "What is con-
sistently ignored is the fact that Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikander are mutually
dependent ; their common fundamental purpose must over-ride differences aris-
ing from the admitted diversity of their 'spheres of influence.' Whatever their
personal predilections, circumstances must force the Muslim League President
and the Premier of the Punjab (so long as he is a Muslim) to run in double
harness until India's future is hammered out; and that Constitution may con-
ceivably elfect even closer cooperation between them."
Mr. Jinnah's recent Punjab tour monopolised public attention, not only be-
cause of his public utterances on topical questions, but also because of the object
underlying his visit. Recent attempts made by the Punjab Premier to settle the
communal problem in that part of the country on a Provincial basis irrespective
of an all-Indian agi'eement, must doubtless have caused anxiety to Mr. Jinnah.
The formula favored by Sir Sikander, according to most reports conceded self-
determination to the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the event of a Muslim plebi-
scite deciding in favor of secession in a post war settlement. The minorities
may form a sepaiate State or join the main Indian Union. Negotiations went
on for some time amongst the various parties but ultimately broke down or were
adiourned because it was said that he Hindus wished to consult the Mahasabha.
Soon after, Mr. Jinnah arrived in the Punjab and in his first public utterance
made a pointed reference to the main basis of the scheme without naming it and
condemned the move to give the right of self-determination to "Sub-National"
groups like the Hindus and the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Muslims in the
United Provinces. He further tried to win over the Sikhs to his conception of
Pakistan by reassuring them that their interests would be safe under a Muslim
State. This failed, but Mr. Jinnah succeeded in scotching the "mischievious
idea, as he described it, of a purely Provincial settlement of the communal
problem and laid down that "no settlement is worth the paper on which it is
written either in the Punjab or elsewhere, so far as Muslims are concerned, ex-
cept with the Muslim League."
Later, Mr. Jinnah in another speech said that he had not referred to the
Sikander formula, which he had not even studied in his earlier speech. This
enabled Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to make a rapprochement with Mr. Jinnah
and declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Muslim League. If there were
any differences between Sir Sikander and Mr. Jinnah, it was explained, they
related more to the method than to the policy and program of the Muslim
League and were intended soley to further its aims and ideals.
Attempts have lately been made to show that the Sikander formula is in
accordance with the League's resolution on Pakistan which visualised territorial
adjustments. The formula allowed this in accordance with the desires of the
communities concerned and to that extent unintentionally conceded the right of
self-determination to the Hindues and the Sikhs. However, the problem is no
more a live issue. Mr. Jinnah has applied the damper and as a result of his visit
to the Punjab he is back again in the position he occupied prior to Sir Sikander's
attempt.
The death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan on December 26th was regarded by the
New York Times correspondent (N. T. T., Dec. 29) as considerably strengthen-
ing Mr. Jinnah's position by removing the only Muslim figure important enough
to challenge him.
BENGAL
Out of a total of 123 Muslim members in the Bengal Assembly and 30 in the
Legislative Council, 43 and 11 members, respectively, follow the Muslim League.
Mr. Fazlul Haq. the Premier of Bengal, who had been a member of the Muslim
League since 1918, resigned in 1940 when disciplinary action was threatened
against him for accepting membership of the National Defence Council, from
which, however, he resigned. The Muslim League expelled him on Desember 11,
1941, for having formed a coalition Ministry in Bengal without its sanction.
Some unconfirmed reports have appeared in the press that Mr. Fazlul Haq
had met Mr. .Jinnah recently in Delhi. Another report said that Mr. Haq had
rejoined the Muslim League. On this the Bengal Premier made the following
statement: "The news published by Independent India (Mr. M. N. Roy's Delhi
paper) about my rejoining the Muslim League raises an irrelevant issue. I
maintain I was never out of the League, I am still in the League. Therefore,
5006
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the question of my rejoining does not arise. As regards Mr. Jinnah, I have never
been at war with him, nor do I intend to be so. I am not at war with anybody.
I am at war with untruths."
BIND
Out of 35 Muslim members in the Sind Assembly, only 13 were elected on
Muslim League ticket. With the return of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as
Premier of the Province in October last, a number of M. L. A.'s have joined the
League. Sir Ghulam and all his Muslim Ministers are now members of the
League, and the strength of the League party is now 26 out of 35.
Sir Ghulam resigned from the Muslim League when Mr. Allah Bux took him
into his Cabinet two years ago. His rejoining the League has been prompted
by a desire to strengthen the Ministry that he formed on Mr, AUah Bus's
dismissal.
ASSAM
Out of 34 Muslim members in the Assam Assembly, originally only 3 were
elected on Muslim League ticket. But, a few months after the General Elections
30 members signed on as a Muslim League Party. The Premier, Sir Mohammad
Saadullah Khan, has been strictly following Muslim League discipline. He re-
signed from the National Defence Council when required by the League to do
so. On recently assuming office he claimed that his Cabinet was representative
of Assam's people. No mention was made of the party affiliations of the Muslim
members of his Cabinet. In all his public utterances since assuming office, he
has refrained from mentioning the Muslim League.
THE NOBTH-WEST FKONTIEE PROVINCE
Out of 38 members in the N.-W.F. Province Legislative Assembly, only 12
belong to the League Party. The only sign of a weakening of the Congress
Party in the Province has been the resignation of Arbab Alidul Ghafoor Khan,
M. L. A., ex-Parliamentary Secretary, from the Congress Party and the Red Shirts,
but he did not join the Muslim League. He formed a new organisation called
the Pashtoon Jirga. It aims at an independent Pathan State, run in accordance
with the laws of the Shariat. In a statement, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan said
that an alliance with the Congress was harmful as the Pathans were gradually
losing their identity and drifting away from religion.
Total Muslim
Members of leg-
islatures
Total Muslim
League members
Punjab
89
U23
2 30
35
34
78
Bengal
'43
Sind . -.
26
Assam .... . . . ..
30
North West
Frontier Province .. . . . . .
38
12
Totals
349
211
Percent
CO. 45
' Lower House.
« Upper House.
IMPORTANT NOTE. — It is important to remember in using the above figures
that they show the strength of the Muslim League among the Muslim members
of the Legislatures of Muslim majority provinces ; they do not show Muslim
League strength in Hindu majority provinces (these figures will be released later
when available).
JH : MC.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5007
Exhibit No. 820
(Pencilled note) Same letter to Bisson, Moser, Shoemaker, Bloch, Orchard,
Kemer, Fahs.
Dr. Hugh Borton,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Hugh : Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of "Korean Indus-
try and Transport" by Grajdanzev. We would appreciate having your comments
on this.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 821
(Handwritten letter.)
Grajdanzev, Sunday, Jan. 17, 1943.
Dear Mr. Holland: Since Tuesday I am working in the B. of E. W. on
Japanese materials and will finish work on Tuesday, 5 : 30 p. m., so that I shall
be back in the office Wednesday morning. I believe that my stay here is useful,
because I think I shall be able to prepare 3 articles —
(1) Japan after December 7, political
(2) Japan after December 7, economic
(3) Japanese policy in the occupied areas.
Of course, the picture is far from complete, but I believe that those who do
not have access to special sources of information will be glad to read my story.
Whether you will approve all these three articles and whether to publish them
in the F. E. fe. or elsewhere — it will be, of course, up to you. I shall prepare
the articles in the shortest possible time, let us say — the first one may be ready
in one week after my return.
Yours sincerely,
[s] A. Grajdanzev.
P. S. But I may stay here even Wednesday, if not all will be finished.
(Handwritten letter)
Exhibit No. 822
A. Grajdanzev,
July 22, 1942.
To the Secretary of Research,
I. P. R.,
W. L. Holland
Dear IMr. Holland : I read the letter of Mr. Norman's and the outline of the
research project on industrialization of the Soviet Asia, prepared by A. Yugon.
I have to make the following comments on this project.
(1) I do not know whether it is good for the Institute to finance the work of a
person who is a noted political figure, so long as the Institute has the Soviet
Union council as a member and so long as the Soviet Union government is not
over thrown by German and Japanese arms.
As you may see from the curriculum Vital he was the editor and head of the
ec. department of Sotsialistichemyi vestnik since 1923 — a magazine of Russian
Men'sheviki, published abroad, and his part, so far as I know, was larger than
that. The Soviet representatives may not protest now, when they are hard
pressed ; but they may have a certain feeling about that.
If the Institute finds that such work is a necessity, why not entrust it to such
a person as, say, Mandel of the A. R. I., who is able, acquainted with Russian
literature and language, and, probably, would be acceptable for the Soviet and
American circles?
(2)1 have no honor of being acquainted with Mr. Yugon ; but I read his books
and I think that all of them are superficial, including his last one, Russia's Eco-
nomic Front for AVar and Peace. Of course, this is my personal opinion and
it is worth just so much.
(3) I was of the opinion that we have no materials and studies enough for
a serious book on the Soviet Asiatic regions. I am of the same opinion now.
But in so far as many stupid and empty books on this or other regions are
5008 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
written (an example, "Russia and Japan," by Maurice Hindus )^ I think a fairly
tolerable booli of that type can be written and be reasonably informative.
(4) The sources presented by Mr. Yugon are not new to those who study
Russia ; it is clear that they do not go much beyond 1937 or even 1936, though the
chief ec. development took place in Siberia after that date.
(5) Some of the points of the outline are bordering on nonsense.
"(a) Superindustrialization as the fundamental idea of the Five-year
plan." Superindustrialization was not the fundamental idea of any of the
Five-year plans.
B 4, c — "Forest industries of Buryat-Mongolia." That is the only place
in outline on Western and Eastern Siberia where forest industries are men-
tioned, though it is not in Buryat-Mongolia primarily (which contains so
much of the steppe) that forest industry is developed in Siberia.
B 5, f — "Hunting of fur-bearing animals" under the general title the indus-
trialization of Soviet Asia !
(6) Distortion and mutilations of Russian words go beyond the permissible
misprints. Could not Mr. Yugon spend a few minutes in going over these names
and giving us something actual instead of mythical "Sahalimsk" and many other
places like that?
(7) In the sources I see many books included presumably for the increase of
the number of titles.
What relation can have "Stenographic Report of the Shakhtinskyi trial, 1935"?
The trial was related to Don. Cas. production, and not to Siberia. Why then
are omitted recent trials?
What is there useful for this book in Tugan-Bavanovsky, The Russian Factory,
where there is nothing about Siberia,
The hook of Kabo about Tannu-Tuva republic? ,
Miller's History of Siberia, which ends, as far as I remember, in the seventeenth
or eighteenth century?
Shulpin — Sea hunting?
Sergeyer, The Soviet Pacific Islands?
Gapanovich, Russia in Northeast Asia?
Burthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, bibliography ! ! !
and other not less striking examples.
The decision is, of course, up to you. I only point out to certain things which
deserve your attention.
Yours sincerely,
[s] A. Geajdanzbv.
ExHiBrr No. 823
Free Distribution List for "Korean Industry and Transport" by AJG
For Comment (with the Compliments of WLH) :
Hugb Borton, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
T. a. Bisson, 353 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Dr. C. K. Moser, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C. (Far Eastern
Section)
James Shoemaker, Board of Economic Warfare. Washington, D. C.
Kurt Bloch. Fortune Magazine, Time and Life Bldg., Rockefeller Center, N. Y.
Mrs. Dorothy Orchard, Board of Economic Warfare, Walshington, D. C.
Carl Remer, Office of Strategic Services, Library of Congress Annex, Wash-
ington
Charles B. Fahs, Office of Strategic Services, Library of Congress Annex,
Washington
With the Compliments of WLH :
G. Nye Steiger, Simmons College, Boston, Mass.
George Taylor, Room 3313, Social Security Bldg., 4th & Independence Ave.,
Washington
Owen Lattimore, Office of War Information, 111 Sutter Street, San Fran-
cisco, Calif.
American Council (3 copies)
Margaret Cleeve, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S. W. 1,
England (2 copies)
W. D. Berrie, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 369 George Street,
Sydney
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5009
F. L(. W. Wood, Victoria University College, Wellington, W. 1, New Zealand
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 700 Jackson Place, Washing-
ton, D. C.
Kilsoo Haan
Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California
Ben Dorfman, Tariff Commission, Washington, D. C.
Mrs. Vera M. Dean, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38th Street, New
York
Col. M. W. Pettigrew, Chief, Far Eastern Unit, Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, Washington
J. B. Condliffe, Carnegie Endowment, 405 West 117th Street, New York
League of Nations Secretariat, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
International Labor Office, 3480 University Street, Montreal, Canada
G. E. Voitinsky, Institute of World Economics & Politics, Academy of Science,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Sir George Sansom, British Embassy, Washington
Douglas MacLennan, Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 230 Bloor
St., West Toronto, Canada
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Shannon McCune, BEW, 2501 Q Street NW., Washington, D. C.
ExHiBrr No. 824
PREFACE
This preliminary report is part of a lai-ger study on Modern Korea to be
published later by the International Secretariat of the IPR. Other sections of
this book were submitted as documents for the Mont Tremblant Conference of
the Institute of Pacific Relations in December 1942, one entitled "Memorandum
on Korea's Agriculture and Resources" and the other "Memorandum on Politics
and Government in Korea."
The author and the IPR Secretariat will welcome readers' comments and
suggestions for improvements to be made in the final version of the book. The
author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion expressed in this
report.
For convenience in following the author's references herein to other chapters
in the hook, some of which are included in the above-mentioned memoranda
and some are still only in manuscript, the following table of contents of the whole
book may be useful.
I. Introduction (partly included in Agriculture and Resources)
II. General Information (partly included herein)
III. Historical Sketch
IV. Population (included in AgTiculture and Resources)
V. Agriculture (included in Agriculture and Resources)
VI. Forestry and Fishing (included in Agriculture and Resources)
VII. Power and Mineral Resources (included in Agriculture and Resources)
VIII. Industry (included herein)
IX. Communications and Transport (included herein)
X. Money and Banking
XI. Public Finance
XII. External Trade
XIII. Government (included in Politics and Government)
XIV. Courts, Prisons, and Police
XV. Health, Education, and Religion
XVI. Problems of Korean Independence (Included in Politics and Government)
Statistical Appendix Bibliography
W. L. Holland,
Research Secretary.
New York, April 1943
5010 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 825
May 19, 1943.
Miss Hilda Austern,
Assistant Treasurer's Office.
Dear Hilda: This will be .vour authority to remit the sum of $183 by cable
through the bank of China to Mr. Guenther Stein in Chungking (c/o Press
Hostel). This is an advance payment for reports he is to send by radio and mail
on current developments in Free China. This should be charged under the above
title to reserve fund in the current International Research Budget.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 826
July 20, 1943.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
Office of War Information,
111 Sutter Street, New York City.
Dear Owen : The enclosed extract from my letter to Norine about his book
on Sinkiang is self-explanatory. I would greatly appreciate it if you would do
what you can to interest the University of California Press in publishing it for us.
I was sorry that you could not find time to do the review of the Russian book,
but I realize that it is a considerable chore. We will definitely count on it for
our December issue, and I suggest that you make it into a review article in
essay form. I hope you can complete the job by the middle of September at
the latest.
What do you think about Bisson's article on China in the current Far Eastern
Survey? As you can imagine, it has caused a considerable storm among some of
the official Chinese here. While I disagree with some of Bisson's terminology
I think the article is fundamentally sound and says a lot of things that many
people feel ought to have been said before this. I suspect it would have been
better tactics to emphasize the possibilities of reform within the Kuomintang
and under the leadership of the Generalissimo and the younger members of the
party rather than to play up the contrast with the Communist areas. C. L. Hsia
is of course very angry and says it will seriously harm the IPR both here and in
China. We have offered them an opportunity to reply or submit another article,
but I am not sure whether they will accept.
Carter and I have been told to be ready to leave around the end of this month,
although there is still no assurance that we will get our priorities. If you are
going to be in Washington about that time, please be sure to let us know, as we
would both very much like to get your advice on whom to see and how generally
to behave in China.
All the best.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 827
February 21, 1944.
Mrs. Wilma Fatrbank,
Division of Cultural Relations,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
De/h Wilma: Under separate cover and at John's request, I am sending you
a package of Chinese manuscripts which were erroneously sent here with some
other materia! which John brought back from China. They seem to have been
sent by Lowdermilk for somebody in the library of Congress. I told John
about them on Friday and he asked me to return them to you.
\^'ith reference to your note to Art Bisson with reference to Chien's article
on local government in China, you have probably noticed that it was published
in the December 1943 issue of Pacific Affairs. At Chien's instructions, I have
paid the fee to Professor Pei in this country together with an additional $200
representing part payment for the larger study of China's Government and
Politics which Chien is now doing for us. I am anxious to find some way of
remitting another $400 to him during the next few months. I would greatly
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5011
appreciate it if you could suggest some way of doing this. I have already sent
a message to Bob Darnett requesting his help, but I doubt if he can manage more
than about $200 for the present. Incidentally, I should greatly appreciate if it
you could let me know privately, perhaps through Rose Yardumian at our Wash-
ington office, when John Da vies is likely to be going back. I have one or two
pei-sonal messages which I should like him to take.
Best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 828
KKA
December 7, 1943.
Dr. William T. Holland,
Rcscarcli Director of the International Council Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5I,t1i Street, Neiv York, N. Y.
Dear Dr. Holland : The material which you were so kind as to loan to this
office has been most helpful. Thank you for putting it at our disposal for the
last week.
The address by Chou En Lai at Yenan, the disposition of Japanese and puppet
troops in China, and the Report from Yenan on Communist and Kuomintang
effiti-t in the War are being returned at this time. The "Situation in China"
and An Answer to Chinese Comments, by V. Rogev are being used at the present
time. They will be returned to you this week if that is agreeable to you.
Thank you again for allowing this office to make use of the timely and valuable
reports listed above.
[s] E L Barlow,
Edward L. Barlow,
Lt. Colonel, O. S. C, Chief, NY Office, MID.
Exhibit No. 829
8th Floor
1270 Sixth Avenue
New York, N. Y.
Telephone: Circle 6-4250
December 6, 1943.
In reply refer to : KKA :sms
Dr. William T. Holland,
Research Director, International Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5-'ith Street, Fourth Floor, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mk. Holland: The enclosed report on "The Situation in China," by Mr.
V. Rogev, has aided the work of this office. Thank you for your cooperation in
making this report available.
"The Situation in China" and "An Answer to Chinese Criticisms", by Mr. V.
Rogev, are being returned at this time.
[s] E. L. Barlow,
Edward L. Barlow,
Lt. Col, G. 8. C, Chief, N. Y. Office, MID.
Enclosures : 2 Reports
5012 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 830
8th Floor
1270 Sixth Avenue
New York, N. Y.
Telephone: Circle 6-4250
In reply refer to : AAL : med December 1, 1943.
Dr. William T. Holland,
Research Director of the International Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5/f Street, New York, N. T.
Dear Mr. Holland : This is to acknowledge receipt of material, which you
turned over to Miss Francis of this office, as follows :
1. "Situation in China." By V. Rogev. (Translation from the Russian journal
War and the Working Class.)
2. Answer to Chinese Comments. By V. Rogev. (Translation from the Russian
journal War and the Working Class, September 1943.)
3. Address by Chou En Lai at Yenan.
4. Disposition of Japanese and puppet troops in China. (Original with some
Chinese characters and partial carbon copy without Chinese characters.)
5. Report from Yenan on Communist and Kuomiutang effort in the war.
This material will be returned to you at the end of this week.
Thank you for your assistance in making these documents available to this
office.
[s] E. L. Barlow, ,
Edward L. Barlow,
Lt. Colonel, G. 8. C, Chief, N. Y. Office, MID.
Exhibit No. 831
8th Floor
New York, N. Y.
1270 Sixth Avenue
In Reply Telephone : Circle 6-4250
Refer To
December 3, 1943.
Mr. William Holland,
1 East 54th Street, New York City, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Holland : We are returning herewith the following material which
you so kindly loaned to this office :
The Progress of Indian Industries during the War, by D. N. Ghose, No. 10295.
2 Issues of the People's War, newspaper of Indian Communist Party, No. 10295.
2 Issues of The Student, journal of the All India Students' Federation,
No. 10295.
2 Pamphlets from Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs, series. No. 10295.
4 Pamphlets, publ. by Peoples Publishing House, Bombay, No. 10295.
5 Pamphlets, publ. by the New Inflia Planning Groups, No. 10295.
Your kind cooperation and interest in making this available is greatly appre-
ciated.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ E. L. Barlow,
Edward L. Barlow,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
By hand
1(5 items
edm
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5013
Exhibit No. 832
Makch 2, 1944.
Dr. Laughlin Currie,
The White House, Washington, D. C.
Dear Dr. Currie : This is just to let you know that I have filed my application
for final citizenship papers. The application is dated March 1 and the Serial
Number of my first papers (Declaration of Intention) is D22-108175. The appli-
cation has been filed at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 70 Columbus
Avenue, Neve York 23.
Admiral Yarnell has written my draft board supporting Carter's application
for my deferment on occupational grounds. Apparently President Wilbur, of
Stanford, and President Sproul, of the University of California, have also written
in similar vein. I have told Carter, however, that even if he gets deferment for
me I shall want to take a Government job which is more directly connected with
the war, and that I shall stay on only for three or four months until Carter can
find a successor to me.
At the moment the most promising openings in Washington seem to be a Navy
job in the Bureau of Occupied Areas, where there seems to be some hope of my
getting a Commission, or a job in O. S. S. The latter would probably be more to
my taste, as it would be concerned with the India-China-Burma theater. How-
ever, it is almost impossible to get a deferment for a civilian job in O. S. S., and
it is therefore a question of whether O. S. S. can also get a Navy commission for
me, since Army commissions are now practically unobtainable.
I should be most grateful if you cnn do anything to speed up my naturalization,
I apologize for inflicting this chore on you when you are so busy, but I don't
know anyone else who would be in a position to help me in this way.
Best wishes.
Yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 883
Department of State,
Washington, March 11, 194^.
Informal
Mr. William Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54 Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Holland : With reference to your letter of February 21, 1944, I am
glad to hear that Chien's article on Local Government in China was published
in the December 1943 issue of Pacific AlTairs. For my records, and because the
manuscript was transmitted through the Department, would you let me know
what the fee on this was and to whom it was paid [penciled: Yes $100.] (Chou,
Pei-yuan?) Are there reprints of this article for Chien? We might be able to
send two or three to him by pouch. In the case of other manuscripts placed
here through our office we have also offered to distribute reprints to a list of
persons in this country to be designated by the author.
I trust that Rose gave you my message regarding John Davies' departure and
the transmission of funds.
Sincerely yours, •
Wilma Fairbank.
(Mrs.) Wilma Fairbank.
Exhibit No. 834
Department of State,
Washington, February 18, 1944-
Informal
Mr. T. A. Bisson.
American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Art: On October 19, 1943 I wrote to you about T. S. Chien's article
Wartime Local Government in China which Harriet had told me would probably
appear in the December issue of Pacific Affairs.
5014 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Can you tell me whether the article has appeared, If there is any honorarium,
and if tliere will be any reprints for him?
With best regards.
Sincerely yours.
/s/ Wilmn F.
(Mrs.) WiLMA Fairbank.
Exhibit No. 835
1 East 54 Stbeet, March 20, 19U.
Mrs. Welma Fairbank,
Division of Cultural Relations
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Wii.ma : With reference to your l«4ter of March 11, I confirm the fact
that we paid Professor Chien $100 for his article on Local Goveinment in China.
Ihis was in accordance with the arrangement I had made with him when I re-
quested the article several months earlier. On Chien's request, the payment was
made to Professor Chou in this country. We are not supplying reprints of
articles, but I am sending you two copies of the majiazine in the hope tlmt you
can either send these complete to Chien or tear out the pages containing his
article.
Incidentally, if you ever have promising articles on China's social, political, or
economic pioblems, please let me know as we may occasionally be able to use
them in Pacific Affairs. As a general rule, we don't pay for articles and the
payment to Cliien was regarded as an advance payment on the larger book he is
doing for us. However, we sometimes are able to make modest payments in
special cases.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 836
March 22, 1944.
Professor Schuyler Wallace
Coltimbin Universiti/,
JfSl West in Street, New York 27, N. Y.
Dear Schuyler : As you may know, Andrew J. Grajdanzev, one of our Research
Associates and our principal expei't in the Japanese language, is temporarily on
leave getting some teaching experience at Oregon State College. We hope to
get him back heie in the summer, but Carter and I have promised to find a part-
time academic post for him in or near New York. Because of your possible need
for people who are pretty well-informed on Japanese laniiuape sources and on the
economic and social problems of Japan, Ivorea and Formosa, I wonder whether
there is any likelihood of your using him on a part-time basis at the Navy School.
As you may know from Phil Jessup and Nat Pt ffer, Giajdanzev is apt to be
excessively polemical. Moreover, his spoken English, though fluent and pungent,
is not always elegant or idiomatic. I am certain, however, that bis expeiience
in teaching will have greatly diminished these two faults. He would be particu-
larly useful in lectures to seminars on rather specific and even technical problems
relating to industry, trade, transport, shipping, banking and agriculture in the
Japanese empire. He is perhaps more intimately acquainted than any other
research worker outside Washington with the Ja] auese materials on these topics.
We shall shortly be publishing his big book on Modern Korea and be is now work-
ing on a detailed study of Japanese Agriculture. As you probably know, he took
his Ph. I), in E onomics at Columbia and the K'rea book was submitted as the
dissertation. I'effer was rightly ciitical of the lantiuage and aggressive style of
much of it, but we are editing it pretty severely for publication.
Gra.idanzev will probably come back in June and I imagine he would be pre-
paivd to do some teaching during the summer if necessary. He is an Assistant
Professor at the moment. Let me know if you see any prospect of using him.
As you may have heard, my draft boa id relented and gave me a six-month
deierment, only till about the end of .August. I may take a part-time Government
job before that time but my main job will still be here.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5015
Exhibit No, 837
Columbia Univeksity in the City of New York,
Naval School of Military Government and Administration,
March 23, WU-
Mr. William L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, 'New York, New York.
Dear Bill: Could I hold off giving you a definite answer on Grajdanzev for
another week or two insofar as summer work is concerned. I am quite sure that
we will be very much interested in making use of him on a part-time basis in
the fall.
I am deliffhted indeed that your draft board has given you a six months'
deferment and definitely hope that they will renew it at a later period. It seems
uttei-ly ridiculous to force you into uniform when you are doing more effective
work where you are.
Cordially yours,
SCHUYLES.
ECC (handwritten) Encouraging, ECC.
Exhibit No. 838
Columbia University in the City of New York,
April IJf, 19U'
Mr. William Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5!,tli Street, New York 22, Neic York.
Dear Bill : We are scheduling your lectures for Tuesday mornings beginning
with May 2nd as you suggest.
1 am leaving in about an hour for a two weeks' holiday and have not yet begun
to \xnrk on tie summer schedule. The moi-e I think about it, I doubt very much
whether we will want to have Mr. Grajdanzev do any lecturing during the
suinmer. We niis/lit conceivably use hiui as a consultant in connection with some
of the projects if he can be cleared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. I will
leave a note asking .Jessup to start the machinery going to get such clearance if
Mr. Grajdanzev is willing to have the investigation started on the basis of a
possibility, not a certainty.
Cordially yours, .
Schuyler.
Schuyler C. Wallace.
Exhibit No. 839
April 12, 1944.
Prof. SCHUYI.ER C. Wallace,
Coliimhin JJiiivcrsit}/,
JiSl West in Street, New York 27, N. Y.
Dear Schuyler: Thanks for your note of April 8. If it's not inconvenient, I
should prefer Tuesday morning presumably beginning May 2.
Is there any likelihood of your beinii able to reach and decision in the near
future about employing Andrew Gi'ajdnn/.ev? May we assume that you will
certainly not require his services for the Summer Session? I ask simply because
he has asked us to arrange some lectures before he returns from Oregon.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
5016 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 840
Columbia University in the Citt of New Yokk,
Naval School of Military Government and Administration,
New York 27, N. Y., April 8, 19U.
Mr. William Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East SJfth Street, New York, New York.
Dear Bill : After lookins over the schedule it appears that we can run your
series of lectures on either Monday or Tuesday a. m. or Monday at 4 : 00 p. m. It
does not make much difference to us which hour you prefer. If anything, I think
Monday morning would be slightly preferable, but only slightly so.
Cordially yours,
Schuler,
Schuyler C. Wallace.
Exhibit No. 841
Columbia University
in the City of New York,
Department op Public Law and Government,
March 27, 19U-
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Bill : Since you say so, I agree that I undertook to draft some outline
for the Far East security organization but I am appalled at the thought. There
are dozens of schemes running around and I have been participating in one or
two groups that have been dealing with some of them. I think the one to which
Bill Johnstone refers must be that which is being developed by a little committee
tinder Phil Nash. I have a recent text of their draft. There is also a draft
prepared by the former League of Nations group in London which I also have.
I am not sure whether at this stage any particular draft should be selected for
the kind of criticism you suggest unless it be the London draft which has a
certain authority because of its signatories. I shall turn the matter over in my
mind and we can talk about it a little later.
I shall keep in touch with you about the question of your taking another job.
Sincerely yours,
Phil.
Philip C. Jessup.
Exhibit No. 842
Washington, D. C, April 10, 1944-
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Pacific Affairs,
1 East 54 Street, Neiv York, Neiv York.
Dear Bill: I am inclosing for the information of yourself and Mr. Carter
excerpt from letter which I have just received from Adler.
I would appreciate, for obvious reasons, your not showing this around and
your not disclosing your source of this information.
Sincerely,
Irving.
Irving S. Friedman.
Enclosure.
Do you see the I. P. R crowd no\vada>s? If you do, you might inform them
that they have completely bafflod decent people here by appointing Wellington
Liu to the Secretariat of the forthcoming I. P. R. Conference and by allotting
him US$10,000 for research? For scmie reason or other they don't want to-
believe what is common knowledge here, namely that Liu is a pretty highly
placed member of Tai Li's outfit. I had a talk with Holland on the subject
last summer and he se<^med to require written evidence to establish Liu's mem-
bership in the Secret Service. Since then I have received further evidence —
not written but satisfactory to anyone but an ostrich — that such is the case.
Of course he will be very well placed from his point of view in the I. P. R.
Secretariat.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5017
Exhibit No. 842-A
May 1, 1944.
Mr. Irving Friedman,
United States Treasury, Washington, D. C.
Dear Irving : I have been meaning to call on you in Washington to acknowledge
your note of April 10 with the excei'pt from Adler's letter but 1 don't seem able
to escape from O. S. S. where I am now working every Thursday.
I appreciate knowing about Adler's comment although it contains nothing new.
Adler has got things a bit twisted about the I. P. R. research grant, most of which
is to be kept here for publication purposes. Another grant of US.$10,000 was
made by a Chinese in New York partly for the relief of selected Chinese scholars.
Adler's account of my alleged blindness to Liu's connections with Tai is not
very fair. I talked about the matter with him at some length in Calcutta. I
would rather you did not pass the information on but the situation is that Liu
has a number of personal friends in Tai's organization and he came to the atten-
ton of Tai himself some years ago because of his friendship for a Shanghai
engineer who unsuccessfully tried to assassinate Wang Ching-wei. Liu has
talked to me really frankly about the whole business and gave a very convincing
story though I have no means, of course, of proving it. Liu says he had been
repeatedly asked by Tai Li to work for him but has always refused largely
because his wife and friends have urged him not to accept. One of Liu's closest
friends in this country says he is quite certain that Liu is not working for Tai.
Even if the allegation were true, there is not much that Carter or I could do
about it as Liu is employed by the China I. P. R., not by us. He is probably
coming to New York this summer to put a number of research reports through
the press in preparation for our January conference.
One of the incidental advantages of the rumors of Liu's connection with Tai
is that it has thus far saved the China I. P. R. from suffering the fate of all
similar organizations in China, namely being swallowed up by Kung. To the
best of my belief, the funds which the China I. P. R. has recently succeeded in
raising have been obtained because of the personal interest expressed by the
Generalissimo. What bank or agency actually turned over the funds I don't
know but I am pretty sure it was not the usual handout from Kung.
Let's try to have lunch sometime soon. There are several things I want to
discuss with you.
Yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 843
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C, 12 April 1944-
Mr. William L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, Netv York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Holland : Will you be good enough to fill out the enclosed form and
return it to me. We have put through a request for your appointment as a WOC
Consultant. You will get $10 per diem in lieu of subsistence, and your railroad
fare. I have told Personnel that you will be here on April 20.
Sincerely,
/s/ Alice B. Foy
Alice B. Foy,
Administrative Office, Planning Staff.
88348^52— pt. 14 8
5018 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 844
April 17, 1944.
Miss Alice B. Foy,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Miss Foy: Thank you for your letter of April 12 enclosing the Federal
Employment form which I return herewith. You will see that I have filled out
only some of the questions. Having wasted a great deal of time already filling
in a twelve ptige application form for O. S. S., I am not disposed to repeat the
process. Your office is at liberty to answer the remaining questions on the basis
of what I have already submitted. If this is done, I should be prepared to con-
sider signing tlie application form,
If this procedure is likely to prevent your office from employing me on April
20, perhaps you would be good enough to let me and also Dr. Norman Brown know.
1 am sorry to appear uncooperative but there is a limit to the number of forms I
can bring myself to fill in for the Government.
Sincerely yours,
W. L. Holland.
enc.
Exhibit No. 845
Columbia University in the City of New York,
Naval School of Military Government and Administration,
New York 21, N. Y., April 25, 19U-
Mr. Wm L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Holland : As you perhaps know, Mr. AVallace has been out of town
for a few days. Before his departure, he indicated that you had requested that
if possible, your class be scheduled on Tuesday mornings. Accordingly, we have
made the following arrangements:
Your lecture series on South East Asia will come on May 2, 9, 16 and 23rd,
from 9 to 11 in the morning, in Room 302, Fayerweather Hall.
I hope that this arrangement is satisfactory.
Very truly yours,
L. H. Chamberlain
L. H. Chamberlain,
Lieut, (jg) VSNR, Academic Aide.
Exhibit No. 846
May 17, 1944.
Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore,
Institvfe of Pacific Relations,
7Jf.'/ Jackson Place, N. W., Washington, D. C.
Dear Eleanor : I enclose three letters to people in Chungking which I should
very much like to have delivered by Owen if it's not too inconvenient for him. I
know it's a bit of an imposition as he will probably be asked to cari-y dozens
of other messages, but if he can manage to take them I shall be extremely
grateful. I certainly wish I were going along. It will be a most interesting
and probably critical time in Chungking.
I am just starting to read the first draft of the Wallace pamphlet which
looks like a very interesting job.
I am glad you can review the book on the Gobi desert.
Yours,
"W. L. Holland.
encs. 3.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5019
Exhibit No. 847
FREE WORLD
Free World House, 144 Bleeckeb St., New York 12, N. Y.
Telephone : ALgonqdin 4-0722. Cable Address : FREEWORLD NEWYORK
June 19, 1944.
Mr. William L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East o.'iih Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Holland : It gives me great pleasure to send you under separate
cover, a copy of the April 1944 issue of our Mexican edition, Mundo Libue.
In this edition is a reprint of the Round Table Conference, "What to do
with Japan," in which you participated and which was originally published
in the March 1944 edition of Free World magazine.
Very sincerely yours,
Louis DoLI^'ET.
Louis Dolivet.
LD: NB.
Exhibit No. 848
Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
National Secretariat,
230 Bloor Street West, Toronto 5, March 23, 1946.
W. L. Holland, Esq.,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5J,th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Bill: You may not have heard that Fred Poland has been held for
weeks in connection with the spy round-up in Ottawa. I enclose a page from the
local morning paper.
The C. 1. I. A. is ignoring the publicity ; our stand is that our membership
includes all political parties for purposes of good discussion at meetings, and that
the branches can enlist any persons they wish.
Poland has been held without benetlt of counsel and his wife is seeking habeas
corpus. We have no idea of whether Fred is guilty ; I have known about his
being held since the third day after the story broke, or thereabouts but I had
no proof to substantiate my suspicions until the recent announcement (under-
line is pencilled).
Yours sincerely,
DAM : bm
Copy to Mr. E. C. Carter.
Douglas A. MacLennan, National Secretary.
Exhibit No. 849
25th March 1946.
Douglas MacLennan, Esq.,
Canadian Institute of Intei'national Affairs,
230 Bloor Street, West, Toronto 5.
Dear Douglas : I am grateful to you for your note of March 23rd enclosing the
clipping on Fred Poland. I had seen a brief reference to the matter in the
New York Times and got the impression that the habeas corpus request would
probably succeed. The whole procedure adopted by the goverimient seems very
curious and I should imagine there may be a considerable protest about it in
Parliament. I should appreciate it if you would keep me informed of what
develops and particularly of any further references to the Canadian Institute
or the I PR.
You may be interested to know that Dr. Chen Nan-sang and his wife have just
arrived here from India. Chen will be teaching for the next few months at the
University of Washington and during the summer may be doing some work for
the II'R. For the past three years he has been working in New Delhi at the
British Ministry of Information and during the past four months has travelled
5020 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
widely in India studying tlie agricultural situation. Although there will not
be time for him to visit Canada before he goes to Seattle, it occurs to me that
your Victoria and Vancouver branches might want to invite him to speak before
them during the next few months.
J. P. Simon of your Victoria branch has asked Carter or me to participate in
the annual joint conference of the IPR and the Canadian Institute in Victoria
on May 10 to 12. I am inclined to accept this invitation as I may have to visit
the Pacific coast about that time. If so I would probably plan to visit Vancouver
as well.
With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
WiixiAM L. Holland,
Secretary-General.
Exhibit No. 850
Philip J. Jaffe,
225 Fifth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y., April 29, 1948.
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Acting Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5/,th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Holland : For some time now, I bave been one of those that believed'
that in the coming years the most important area in the Far East will be Japan.
Up to the present, no detailed study of developments in postwar Japan has
appeared in print. I feel strongly that such a study is needed, and that the
Institute of Pacific Relations is the appropriate organization to direct it. If you
feel that this is the right time to undertake such a study, and if you have a
competent person available for this project, I would be very happy to make a
financial contribution towards that end.
"Would you be kind enough to let me know whether you feel that this project
is worthwhile and whether you have the right person available for it ; and, if so,
approximately how large a contribution would be required from me to make it
possible?
Cordially yours,
PhtLip J. Jaffe.
(signed) Philip J. Jaffe.
Exhibit No. 851
Amekican Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington, D. C,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y., 30th April, 194S.
ELdorado 5-1759
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Consultant, ECAFE Secretariat,
106 Whangpoo Road, Shanghai, China.
Dear Mr. Carter : With reference to the attached letter from Jaffe of April 29,
I miglit add that he has now decided it would be better for Bisson to continue
working on his research project under IPR auspices and hopes that the American
IPR will be willing to receive a donation of $3,000 which can be used to pay
Bisson for a continuation of his current IPR research project on the impact of
SCAP on Japanese life. We trust tlie Executive Committee will not object to
receiving the money. It will ease Phil's tax problem.
Sincerely,
Bill,
William L. Holland,
Acting Executive Vice Chairman.
P. S. — C. D. Jackson of Time, Inc., phoned Emeny this morning to check on
the IPR. Jackson is a member of the Board of Independent Aid, and apparently
the Board is seriously considering the IPR's appeal. Emeny took the opportunity
to inquire of Jackson what the possibilities of a renewal of Time's contribution
would be, and apparently didn't get a negative response. So we shall wait and
see.
(Penciled:) Rec'd, May 7, 1948.
(Penciled:) Brooks has now retracted his earlier strong criticism of Ros-
singer and now recommends him to me in the most glowing terms.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5021
Exhibit No. 852
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, Neiv York 22, New York, January 25, 1950.
Dr. E. Herbert Noraian,
Canadidn Liajaon Mission, c/o Foreign Liaison Section 0-2,
GHQ, AFPAC, APO 500, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
Dear Herb : I was delighted to find your letter of January 5th awaiting me
on my return to New York and even more pleased to see a copy of your book.
It is an excellent production job despite the unattractive cover and title page. I
took the liberty of sending it immediately to Sansom, who tells me that he is
reading it with very great interest and admiration — so much so that he is going
to write you directly about a number of specific points including probably some
disagreements. He has also agreed to review it for Pacific Affairs, comment-
ing mainly on the broader social and economic implications of your analysis of
Japanese feudalism. At a later date he is keen to write a more detailed and
longer review for one of the professional .iournals, such as the Far Eastern
Quarterly. I shall try to send you a copy of his Pacific Affairs review as soon
as we receive the manuscript, probably some time within the next three or four
weeks.
If you have another copy to spare, I do hope you will send it to Miriam Farley
for review in the Far Eastern Survey. I know she would appreciate seeing it.
She has just written a rather long and interesting review article on Sansom's
book, The Western World and Japan, which we may print in the next Pacific
Affairs.
Mary Healy has sent yon a copy of Sansom's book which I hope you will ad-
mii'e as much as I do. Won't you try to write a review of it for one of the Eng-
lish-language publications in Japan and let me have a copy of your manuscript.
I think there is a good chance that under the joint auspices of the Japan IPR
and the Tokyo National University and with some Rockefeller Foundation help
Sansom will be able to visit Japan next fall and give a series of eight or ten
lectures, which will subsequently form the basis for a book to be published
under IPR auspices. In many ways I think it is likely to be a kind of projec-
tion of the ideas in his present book into the problems of contempoi-ary Japan.
Sansom tells me that he is now planning to work on his "swan song", a rather
general book on eighteenth century Japan with numerous incidental compari-
sons with eighteenth century Europe.
I do hope you are making some headway on your volume, "Essays on Japanese
Politics and Society." Knowing how you are apt to be interrupted by the pres-
sure of other work I hope you will try to finish each chapter one by one and
send along the revised manuscript as soon as possible rather than keeping the
whole book until all the revisions and additional chapters have been completed.
Why not make a start with the principal chapters in the earlier mimeographed
report? Incidentally let me know if it would facilitate things if I can send you
an advance payment of say $200.00, which you can use to cover incidental clerical
or research expenses.
You may be interested to know that Bob Fearey, who is still in the Northeast
Asia Division of the State Department, has just completed a 50,000 word supple-
ment to Ed Martin's earlier IPR book. The Allied Occupation of Japan. We
hope to produce the revised and enlarged edition within the next four months
or so.
I would be most grateful to have any news from you on research developments
in the Japan IPR. Perhaps you can get Okubo to tell you what is happening
and also to remind Matsuo to write me soon about the new projects which I
discussed with the Japan IPR people.
All good wishes to Irene and yourself.
Yours,
William L. Holland, Secretary-General.
cc: PEL.
MFH.
5022 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 853
Canadian Liaison Mission,
Tokyo, 5th January, 1950.
W. L. Holland, Esq.,
Sc&y, Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street,
New York 2, N. Y.
Dear Bill : I presume you have returned to New York by now from your world
jaunt. I would very much like to have an opportunity of seeing some of your
observations on the countries you visited. I trust that you will write up some
aspects of your trip in one of the I. P. R. publications.
I am sending you by the same mail a copy of my work on Ando Shoeki, which
was finally published last month. I think Kenkyusha did a respectable job
oi printing, although I must say that the Asiatic Society format is not the most
attractive in the world. On the first day after publication, I hastily picked up
some of the misprints I noticed and the printer obligingly struck off a page of
errata, which is enclosed with the copy. One or two which I missed I shall
take the liberty of correcting marginally. The work, I fear, shows signs of com-
position at different periods of time but, since it is after all a rather enlarged
essay, it may not affect the argument too seriously. I know I shall be open to
the criticism that I have magnified the subject out of its proper proportion making
Shoeki appear a more orginial or incisive figure than some might think he de-
serves. I should be happy to have your frank opinion on this subject and on-
any other feature of the work on which you feel like commenting. Although
I am sending this book to you personally, I should be grateful if you would
make use of it by reviewing it yourself or, if you are too busy, have someone-
else on yrur staff review it for an I. P .R. publication — preferable Pacific Affairs.
I am asking the editor of the Asiatic Society, who is for the current year Doa
Brown, Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters, to mail
a few copies to the institutions or publications on Far Eastern subjects.
As you may have noticed, our Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr.
Pearson, is coming with a large delegation to Japan at the end of this month
after the Cole mbo Conference and will stay for about four days. Naturally,
things will be quite hectic for a while before and after the visit but, unless I am
in the very near future given another assignment, which is always possible
after the length of time I have been here, I intend to get down to some work on
the series of essays which we discussed on Japanese political and biographical
subjects.
With all good wishes for the coming year to both Doreen and you,
Yours sincerely,
Hebbeet.
Exhibit No. 854
Canadian Liaison Mission,
Tokyo, February 13, 1950.
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Secretary-Oeneral, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 E. 5Jfth Street, New York 22, New York.
Deiar Bill : Many thanks for your letter of January 25 in which you acknowl-
edge receipt of my book. I am delighted, of course, to know that Sansom is re-
viewing it and he wrote me a very kind letter about it. I still have not received
his book, "The Western World and Japan," but am naturally looking forward to
it keenly. I would be honoured to review it, although I would like to take my
time and do as thorough a job as possible.
I must confess that I haven't made much headway on my "Essays on Japanese
politics and society," except to continue accumulating fresh material for other
sections. It is very thoughtful of you to suggest making an advance of $200 to
assist in clerical and research expenses. For the present, I think I had better
decline this kind offer, but may I take a rain check on it so that, when I feel the
work is making real progress, then I would have less scruples about taking it?
At the present, that time is a little remote although my intention to go on is
Still as strong as ever.
I have remembered you to the IPR people here.
With kind regards from both Irene and myself.
Yours sincerely,
Herbert.
E. H. Norman.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5023
Exhibit No. 853
April 26, 1950.
Mr. Charles Loomis,
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Dillingham Building Annex,
Halekamvila Street, Honolulu 16, T. H.
Dear Charles : Thanks for your personal note of April 24 enclosing a copy of
your note to Clayton Lane. Needless to say there are bound to be some adverse
effects on the IPR from all the McCarthy and Budenz charges. On the other
hand, it seems pretty clear from the categorical refutations of Budenz which
Bella Dodd and Browder are making that the myth about the IPR as a communist
organization will be pretty well exploded. While the next 2 months are going to
be very difficult for the American IPR, I am confident that it will weather the
storm and that the IPR's prospects will then be pretty bright. For your strictly
confidential information, I may tell you that the Rockefeller Foundation ofiicers
are going to recommend that a special and very exceptional grant be made to
both the American IPR and the Pacific Council at the June meeting of the
Foundation. Again for your personal information alone, I can tell you that
there is a good prospect that the Ford Foundation (which officially has not yet
begun to operate) will make a special preliminary grant to the Pacific Council
for research on Southeast Asia. I know that our appeal to the Ford Foundation
has had the specific and enthusiastic backing of Arthur Bean, Sir George San-
som, Phil Jessup, Dean Rusk, and Huntington Gilchrist.
As you probably know we have had some excellent publicity, notably in the
Washington Post, where Alfred Friendly ran a very long article exposing Kohl-
berg and enthusiastically supporting the IPR (Sunday issue of April 23).
There is always, of course, the chance that Foundation trustees may be
panicked by some new spectacular development, but my own guess is that this
will not happen and that there is a good chance that the IPR can even benefit in
the long run from the present attacks upon it. So I certainly hope you will go
ahead vigorously with your Pacific House scheme. I think it is wonderful that
you have been able to put this over so well at a time like this, and I only wish
the New York office could point to an achievement like yours.
All good wishes.
Yours sincerely,
William L. Holland,
Secret ary-Oeneral.
Exhibit No. 856
May 17, 1950
Sir George Sanson,
Chnndos Lodge, Eye, Suffolk, England.
Dear Sir George : As you know, the various charges by Senator McCarthy and
Louis Budens against Owen Lattimore have included references to the I. P. R.
as a pro-communist organization or as harboring a communist "cell" in past
years. Despite the statements issued by Lane, President Raymond Allen, myself
and others, these insinuations are likely to continue as long as the attack on
the State Department's Far Eastern policy is kept up. They are being made
continually by certain newspaper columnists, notably George Sokolsky in the
Hearst press. The latest blast comes from a sheet called "Counterattack" which
asserts that the IPR is still employing communists and publishing communist
reports. Specifically they complain about the following items in our current
international research program: "The Impact of SCAP on Japanese Life" by
T. A. Bisson ; "Documents on Soviet Far Eastern Policy Since Yalta" by William
Mandel ; "Philippine Nationalism" by Abraham Chapman ; "Notes on Labor
Problems in Nationalist China During the War" by Israel Epstein (this last
having been published in mimeographed form last year).
These studies are all under the auspices of the International Secretariat,
not the American IPR. Two of them, those by Epstein and by Chapman, were
originally started (in 1943 and 1946) by the American IPR with funds given
by the American People's Fund (Fred Field's money). After the American
IPR Executive Committee, on my recommendation, had appointed Clayton
Lane to be Executive Secretary, I explained the background of these two projects
to him. Because the projects did not directly concern American policy, and
because I wanted him to be free to operate as he wished without being hampered
5024 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
by any past commitments involving such a controversial figure as Field, I
suggested that the two studies be put under the auspices of the International
Secretariat. This was done and the unspent portion of the funds was returned
to Field.
After some delay Epstein completed his manuscript. After being read and
criticized by Lattimore, Fairbank and me, it was edited and somewhat shortened
by Lillienthal and then issued in mineographed form last year. It's a factual
study of limited historical interest and has not aroused criticism from reviewers.
Any way it's over the dam.
The Chapman study has also been delayed. He promised to submit the com-
plete manuscript at the end of 1949. I phoned him the other day and he told
me that the report is about 90 percent finished and that he will definitely submit
the whole manuscript before the middle of Jvme. It's quality is hard to predict
but I expect it will contain (besides historical background) a great deal of
accurate and hitherto not generally available information on Philippine politics
and parties. He knows a lot about the Philippine political situation.
Chapman is under attack because, as he readily states, he was elected In 1945
as a member of the New York State Committee of the Communist Party. I think
it is almost certain that he is still a communist. As far as I know this is the
only case in the IPR research program involving a study by a communist party
member. It thus constitutes a good test case of whether we should follow our
traditional practice of judging a study on its merits, in the light of comments
from qualified critics, or of deciding in advance whether to accept or reject it in
the light of the author's communist party membership. My own past policy, and
the one I would still recommend despite its unpopularity these days, is to decide
on the basis of the manuscript. I've .so informed Chapman and have also told
him that the manuscript will undoubtedly be read with a very critical eye and
that I can give him no assurance it will be accepted for publication. To me it
would seem absurd and cowardly at this late date for us to disown the study in
advance after it's been on our lists for several years.
My idea would be to have the manuscript read by such people as Claude Buss
(Stanford University), Laurence Salisbury, one person on the Philippine desk
in the Research Division of the State Department, one qualified Filipino, and one
qualified businessman with knowledge of the contemporary Philippine scene. If
the comments are generally adverse, and if on the basis of them I conclude that
it would not be feasible to get the study satisfactorily revised, I presume we shall
drop any idea of publication. If the comments are generally favorable, then I
would like your advice on how to proceed. One possibility would be to go ahead
with such editorial revision as seems justified in the light of the readers' com-
ments but to postpone final publication arrangements until the matter of policy
has been decided by the International Research Committee and the Pacific Coun-
cil at the Lucknow Conference. Another possibility would be to issue the study
in a mimeographed edition for restricted circulation to national councils and
research institutions, with a preface mentioning the author's communist party
membership, and perhaps including the comments of those who read the first
draft.
Admittedly it will be easier to form an opinion on this after we see a few
sample chapters, which I may receive in about two weeks. However, the ques-
tion is complicated by the fact that last January, the American I. P. R. at Clay-
ton Lane's strong insistence rejected (but paid for) an article by Chapman on
Philippine politics today, which had previously been requested by the editor
of the Far Eastern Survey, and which in quality and essential accuracy was
judged by all who read it, including Mr. Lane, as acceptable. The ground given
for rejection, was Chapman's membership on the executive committee of the
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, an organization
which was listed as "subversive" last year by the Attorney General. The Survey
editor was unaware of this fact when she originally requested the article. The
American I. P. R. Executive Committee which was asked to rule on this point
of policy was divided in its views, but left it to Mr. Lane to decide.
Mr. Lane still feels that no manuscript should be accepted by the I. P. R.
(either American or International Secretariat) from a writer who is a Commu-
nist or a member of a policy committee of an organization listed as subversive
by the Attorney General. (The list is a very extensive one, including the Amer-
ican-Russian Institute of which Mr. Carter and Harriet Moore Gelfan have been
leading members, but not the American I. P. R.). Undoubtedly several other
members of the American I. P. R. Board of Trustees share Mr. Lane's view,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5025
though the matter has never been put to a vote. Mr. Lane and they would of
course respect the views of the international officers and other members of the
Pacific Council, but would probably point out that since Chapman is an Amer-
ican, and since the study began under American I. P. R. auspices with a grant
from Field's American People's Fund, the publication of the report, even under
International Secretariat auspices, would provide further ammunition to those
who are already attacking the I. P. R. On the other hand it seems to me un-
likely that cancellation of the project now and suppression of the report would
do much to make our critics end their attacks, especially when the project has
been included on our lists for the last five years, and when both Pacific Affairs
and Far Eastern Survey have previously (in 1946) published articles by Chap-
man.
As for Bisson, he is now teaching at the University of California and carrying
on his study of industrial deconcentration in Japan with the aid of a direct grant
from the Rockefeller Foundation. He is not receiving any grant from the I. P. R.
but we are committed to helping in the eventual publication of his book. To sug-
gest that, after publishing several of his earlier books and making several grants
to him over the past ten years, we should now become apologetic about him or
try to dissociate ourselves from him would be ridiculous.
Mandel's project is simply a collection of official Soviet diplomatic documents
and Soviet editorial comments. It is now almost finished and in order to make
it more useful, I've written to Max Beloff at Oxford asking if he would write an
introductory chapter analyzing Soviet Far Eastern policy since 1945, largely
by expanding the excellent article he has written on this topic for the June issue
of Pacific Affairs. Mandel, you will recall, is the author of the Inquiry Series
volume on The Soviet Far East and Central Asia.
I'm sorry to inflict all this on you. If it were not for the fact that the Amer-
ican I. P. R., in the public mind, is almost indistinguishable from the Interna-
tional Secretariat, I would say that we should proceed in our traditional way,
judging the research manuscrips on their merits, and pay no attention to the
McCarthy and similar attacks. What do you advise? I shall await your reply
before sending copies of the correspondence to Gilchrist and other Pacific Council
officers.
All good wishes.
Yours,
WnxiAM L. Holland,
Secretary-General.
3 Moskou 2720 28 5 17 10 CHO
Holland Inspacrel Tokyo
Exhibit No. 857
[Cablegram]
Motylev cabled Carter suggesting meet you Vladivostock July eighteenth Stop
No reply Stop Cable whether coming ; if yes, which Soviet consulate to issue
visa.
Hakondar
Jul. 6 AM 5 54.
Exhibit No. 858
W. L. Holland,
1 East 54th St. {5th floor), Neio York 22, N. T.,
Sevtetnber 12, 1950 [6.S0 p. m.].
Night letter.
Dean Rusk,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Urgent could you kindly cable Supreme Commander urging him favorably
consider permitting Japanese delegation attend IPR conference Lucknow Octo-
ber third to fifteenth? I am advised that influential Washington recommenda-
tion is needed to assure clearances. Please phone or wire me collect if you
wish. Is there anything more I can do regarding Kahins passport? Urgently
need him at Lucknow. Can you now give me names of special American dele-
gates you would like attend Lucknow?
William L. Holland.
5026 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 859
September 16, 1950.
Personal
The Hon. Dean Rusk,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear De:.\n : I was sorry not to reach you on the phone in New York as I
wanted to ask whether you had found any well qualified Americans whom you
might especially wish to attend the Lucknow conference of the IPR as members
of the American delegation. I do hoi>e you'll let me know soon if you have any
special candidates. I'm sorry that Sen. Graham couldn't accept our invitation,
but I'm hoping now that W. W. Waymack will accept the offer of a grant from the
Carnegie Endowment to enable him to go to Lucknow.
Ordinarily we don't include government officials in the American delegation
to an IPR conference, but Lane previously wrote Loy Henderson asking him to
consider sending someone not in a policy-making position and preferably not
a regular foreign service officer. Henderson declined, saying that he disliked
making any such distinctions in his staff. I've told him, however, that I'd like
to discuss the matter further with him in New Delhi, as it might be possible for
us to include one or two specialists, such as cultural or agricultural or informa-
tion officers of the Embassy in the delegation if you thought it desirable. I'd
like your advice on the matter, as it sometimes raises touchy questions with the
other delegations. In spite of all we say, I suspect that the Indian delegation,
and possibly some of the other groups too, may include people who are at least
mainly if not wholly government officials.
May I make an urgent and probably irregular appeal to you to lend your
weightiest support to the double IPR financial appeal which is to be considered
by the Rockefeller Foundation on September 22. As a Foundation trustee, you
probably know better than I that one or two members of the Foundation's
Executive Committee have been worried about all the McCarthy and Budenz
charges against the IPR. The officers of the Foundation have given us very
solid support, but it has been suggested to me that in this abnormal situotion,
their hand would be strengthened if an impressive body of outside testimony
and recommendations wei-e sent to President Barnard, including letters from
former Foundations officers and trustees. I have accordingly asked such people
as Raymond Fosdick, Robert G. Sproul, Stacy May and Sydnor Walker if they
would submit letters, and have also asked General Marshall, as an IPR trustee,
to do likewise if possible before he officially assumes his new job. Your own
position in this question is peculiarly important and Mr. Swope and I would
therefore appreciate it greatly if you could see your way to indicate your belief
in the importance of the IPR at this time. Your words of support for us to the
Ford Foundation were very influential, even though action on that grant has
been postponed pending the forthcoming appointment of a director for the
foundation
Yours,
W. L. Holland.
Exhibit No. 860
12-12-50 — Pacific Council Officers
Chairman — Arthur H. Dean, partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, attorneys. New York.
Vice-Chairmen — Edgar Mclnnis (Canada), Professor of History, University of
Toi'onto.
Paul Emile Naggiar (France), former French Ambassador to
the United States.
S. Kitadai (Japan), former President, Reconstruction Finance
Bank.
A. B. A. Haleem (Pakistan) , President, Sind University.
Manuel Elizalde (Philippines), Elizalde &, Co., Manila.
Chairman, Research Committee — Sir George Sanson, Director, East Asian
Institute, Columbia University, New York.
Chairman, Finance Committee — Laurence Heyworth, Lever Brothers, London.
Chairman, Program Committee — D. R. Gadgil, Director, Gokhale Institute of
Economics and Politics, Poona.
Secretary General — W. L. Holland.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
National Councils
5027
I'ACmC COUNCIL MEMBERS NATIONAL SECRETABIES
Australian Institute of International Affairs
369 George Street, Sydney, Australia
Norman Cowper George Caiger
Canadian Institute of International Affairs
230 Bloor Street West, Toronto 5, Canada
R. G. Cavell Douglas MacLennan
Comite d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique
54 rue de Varenne, Paris VII, France
Paul Emile Naggiar
H. N. Kunzru
S. Kitadai
R. O. McGechan
A. B. A. Haleem
Manuel Elizalde
Eugene Zhukov
Indian Council of World Affairs
Kashi House, Connaught Place
New Delhi, India
Roger Levy
A. Appadorai
Nihon Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai
Room 602, Mitsui Sango Kan
No. 1, 2-chome, Muromachi
Nihombaslii, Chuo-ku, Tokyo, Japan
M. Matsuo
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs
9 Himalaya Crescent, Khandallah
Wellington, New Zealand
J. F. Northey
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Frere Hall, Karachi, Pakistan
K. Sarwar Hasan
Philippine Council, I. P. R.
State Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila, P. I.
Quirino Gregorio
U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R.
Volhonka 14, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Arthur Creech Jones
Royal Institute of International Affairs
10, St. Jame's Square
London, S. W. 1, England
Edward C. Carter
American Institute of Pacific Relations
1 East 54th Street
New York 22, N. Y., U. S. A.
Ivison S. Macadam
K. R. C. Greene
Asst. Secretary
INTEBNATIONAL SECEETAJEHAT, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1 EAST 54 ST.,
New York, N. Y.
Exhibit No. 861
1 February 1951.
Justice William O. Douglas,
Supreme Court,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Justice Douglas : I am sending you an advance copy of a preliminary
report on the Lucknow Conference, entitled : Asian Nationalism and Western
Policies, containing the rapporteurs' summaries of the discussions and the
opening speech by Prime Minister Nehru. I think you will be interested in many
of the points brought out in the discussions.
In view of the widespread publicity which the Lucknow Conference evoked in
the press of India, Pakistan, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and
the United States, you will be interested to see the enclosed copy of some of
the Soviet news dispatches and radio broadcasts on the Conference.
The IPR is now also distributing copies of the recently published volume
Indian-American Relations which summarizes the discussions at the India-
America Conference held in Delhi in December 1949 under the auspices of the
American Institute of Pacific Relations and the Indian Council of World
5028 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Affairs. Many passages in this volume have an important bearing on the present
day relationships between India and the United States. The volume also pro-
vides a useful companion study to the American IPR's previously published book,
India and the United States by L. K. Rosinger.
Sincerely yours,
William L. Holland,
Executive Vice Chairman.
Exhibit No. 862
Ref. PA132
(Penciled:) WLH
Foreign Languages Press,
26, Kuo Hui Chieh, Peking, China, Mar. 22, 1951.
Mr. S. B. Thomas,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 E 5/fth St., New York 22, U. 8. A.
Dear Sir: Your letter addressed to the China Information Bureau has been
forwarded to this Press. We noted that you asked for quite a voluminious set
of documentary materials pertaining to the local administration of the Republic
of China, and also its people's representative organs. As you probably know,
this Press has published a lot of those documents in English and other foreign
languages and your library has acquired a copy of more of each of these publica-
tions. Undoubtedly these cannot meet all your requirements ; but we can hardly
contribute anything more from our own sources. Of course we will be glad
to help you in this connection, but we have to be furnished first with an official
letter from your Institute signed by the Secretary-General with which we can
more conveniently approach other organisations on your behalf.
Hoping to hear from you again,
Yours sincerely,
V. G. Tseng,
V. G. Tseng,
Circulation Department, Foreign Languages Press.
Exhibit No. 863
The Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y., April 5, 1951.
Mr. V. G. Tseng,
Circulation Department, Foreign Languages Press,
26, Kuo Hui Chieh, Peking, China.
Dear Mr. Tseng : In reference to your letter of March 22 to Mr. S. B. Thomas,^
of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I would like to repeat his request
for documentary material on local government in the People's Republic of China.
I would be most grateful if you could arrange to send us the texts of important
documents (other than those contained in the publications you have already
sent us) on the organization, status, and function of organs of local govern-
ment on the county, municipal, and provincial level.
If the relevant documents have been translated into English or one of the
other western languages, we would of course be happy to secure the translated
version, but, if not, would very much appreciate procuring the Chinese texts.
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Very sincerely yours,
Wiluam L. Holland,
WLH :abs Secretary General.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5029
Exhibit No. 864
April 12, 1951.
Mr. George J. Beal,
Office of the Comptroller, The Rockefeller Foundation,
49 West J,9th Street, New York 20, N. Y.
Deab Mb. Beal: This is to acknowledge with cordial thanks your letter of
April 10 enclosing a check for $10,000 for the budget of the Pacific Council of
the I. P. R.
In accordance with your request I am enclosing a budget for the American
I. P. R. for the period October 1, 1950, to September 30, 1951. Since tlie
American I. P. R. budget is normally made up on a calendar year basis, you will
understand that we have had to estimate the enclosed statement by taking the
actual figures for the last three months of 1950 and combining them with pro
rated budget figures for the first nine months of 1951.
"Very truly yours,
William L. Holland,
Secretary General.
WLH :abs
Enc. 2
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
Budget — Calendar Year 1951
Cash Balance, January 1, 1951 $16, 330. 93
Receipts:
Foundations 22, 500. 00
Membership Contributions 44, 394. 00
Other Income 400. 00
Far Eastern Survey, subscriptions 7, 000. 00
Royalties 500.00
Total $91, 124. 93
Expenditures:
Administration $26, 202. 00
Grant to Pacific Council 9, 000. 00
Far Eastern Survey 18, 885. 00
Library 1, 650. 00
Research 6, 400. 00
Publications 5, 150. 00
Conferences & Meetings 3, 900. 00
Services to Members - 4, 435. 00
Promotion 2, 000. 00
Total $77, 622. 00
Balance to be carried forward 12/31/51 13, 502. 93
$91, 124. 93
5030
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
Budget — Receipts and Expenditures, October 1, 1950-8eptemier SO, 1951**
Rec & Exp
Oct-Dee
1950
Budget Jan-
Sept 1951
Tot9l re-
ceipts & Ex-
penditures
Cash Balance, October 1, 1950
Receipts:
Foundations.. -
Membership contributions
Other Income
Far Eastern Survey, subscriptions-
Royalties -
$5, 946. 51
»15, 000. 00
10, 635. 00
10.05
2, 374. 42
164. 38
$16, 875. 00
33, 295 50
300. 00
5, 250. 00
375. 00
$5, 946. 51
31,875.00
43, 930. 50
310 05
7, 624. 42
539. 38
Total.
,$34, 130. 36
$56, 095. 50
$90, 225. 86
Disbursements:
Administration
Grand to Pacific Council -
Research
Conferences & Meetings..
Library .
Services to Members
Publications
Far Eastern Survey
Promotion
$5, 844. 62
4, 000. 00
1,644.73
1, 285. 07
325 02
739. 56
155. 00
3, 751. 76
53.67
$19,651.50
6, 750. 00
4, 800. 00
2, 925. 00
1, 237. 50
3, 326. 25
3, 862. 50
14, 163. 75
1,500,00
$25, 496. 12
10, 750. 00
6, 444. 73
4,210.07
1, 562, 52
4, 065, 81
4. 017. 50
17,915.51
1, ,553. 67
Cash Balance, December 31, 1950
Septembei 30, 1951 (to be carried forward) .
Total
$17, 799, 43
*16, 330. 93
$58, 216. 50
$76, 015. 93
""l4,209,93
$34, 130. 36
$58, 216. 50
0, 225, 86
•$7,500 of this amount earmarked for 1951.
**Oct. 1, 19.50 -December 31, 1950, receipts and expenditures based on actual figures.
Jan. 1, 1951-Sept. 30, 1951 prorated on basis of budget for the year 1951.
Exhibit No. 865
The Rockefeller Foundation,
49 West 49th Street, Netv York 20, April 10, 1951.
Mr. William L. Holland,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
One East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.
Dear Mr. Holland : We are enclosing herewith our check for $10,000, cover-
ing the balance available for the period ending December 31, 1951, under appro-
priation RF 50092 to the Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
toward the general budget.
We note that the budget for the year 1951 under our appropriation RF 50090
to the American Institute of Pacific Relations totals $77,622.00. Before making
further payments under this grant, we would appreciate receiving a budget for
the year beginning October 1, 1950. In connection with your requirements for
this period, a check in the amount of $15,000 was forwarded to you in accordance
with the request in your letter of October 3, 1950,
Very truly yours,
George J. Beal.
fg
Enclosure — 1 Check
Exhibit No. 866
August 14, 1951.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
The Dodge Hotel,
20 E Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. ( 'arter : To refresh your memory for the hearing on Thursday, here
is my recollection of the memo I wrote you on September 1940 from Berkeley
about Phil's forthcoming trip to Shanghai. The Phil, of course, is Phil Lilien-
thal, at that time my research assistant working with me in Berkeley. We sent
him out to Shanghai to supervise the publication of a large number of IPR
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5031
studies which we planned to have printed in Shanghai by Kelly & Walsh. In
my memo, I was obviously telling you about the manuscripts he would be taking
with him.
Morris possibly thinks Phil is either Jessup or JafCe,
If you are asked why I said secret messages should be sent to Lilienthal in
care of Herb Norman in Tokyo, I hope you will say it was a perfectly normal
thing and meant only that there might be some question (e. g., relating to the
China IPR or to the Inquiry Series) which we didn't want to come to the
attention of the Japanese IPR office, which was Lilienthal's ordinary mailing
address in Tokyo. At that time, the Japanese were opposing our plan to go ahead
with the Inquiry Series and were also criticizing the Secretariat as being too
pro-Chinese.
Yours,
William L. Holland,
Executive Vice Chairman.
WLH : abs
Exhibit No. 889
js.
State of New York,
County of New York, ss:
I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as
Exhibit Z. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am
satisfied that these documents, subject to the comments noted below, are letters
or memoranda received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters
or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies :
Document
Atomic Energy and U. S. Int.
Policy. Summary of a Round-
table Conf. under joint auspices
of IPR and S. F. International
Center. JAN. 1946. File No.
122.41.
Harriet Moore, Edward C. Carter.
March 2, 1943. File No. 500.38.
9. W. L. Holland, Edward C. Carter.
March 26, 1943. File No. 100.402.
16. Invitation list of May 8 meeting
46. Raymond Dennett (Return to).
Report on Washington Office Dec.
1943-March 1945. File No.
122.37.
47. MAS RY (Report) April 16, 1945.
File No. 122.37.
Comment
was not present at the meeting de-
scribed in this document, nor do I
know by whom this document was
prepared.
The second page of this document is a
memorandum to me from HM. This
memorandum appears to have no re-
lation to the first page of this docu-
ment.
The second memorandum set forth on
this document appears to be incom-
plete.
The date of the meeting referred to is
May 6.
I do not know whether or not I have
seen these documents before. Neither
of them was prepared by me or ad-
dressed to me.
Edward C. Carter.
Sworn to before me this 9th day of May, 1952.
[seal] Irene R. Donohue,
Notary Public, State of New York.
Qualified in Queens County No. 41-6061300. Certs, filed with Queens, Kings,
New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs. Offices, Westchester & Nassau
Co. Clerks Offices. Commission Expires March 30, 1954.
(The documents referred to by Mr. Carter are exhibits Xos. 901,
907, 909, 916, 946, and 947.)
5032
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 900
To—
From-
Date
File
1m umber
Exhibit
Number
Atomic Energy and U. S. Int. Policy.
Summary of a Roundtable Conf. under
joint auspices of IPR and S. F. Inter-
national Center.
Frederick V. Field
Edgar J. Tarr
W. L. Holland and Background informa-
tion "The Strength of the Muslim
League in India."
Misses Carter
Harriet Moore
W. L. Holland
W. L. Holland
Mabel Carter
Richard J. Walsh
Henry C. Alexander
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
■Capt. John L. Christian
Invitation list of May 8 meeting
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Col. Truman M. Martin
W. W. Lockwood
E. C. Carter
Mortimer Graves
Lauchlin Currie
Lauchlin Currie
Invitation list of 3rd Collective Security
Meeting in the Paciflc and Far East
and list of those invited with notations.
Milo Perkins
E. C. Carter
Milo Perkins — draft to
Lauchlin Currie
Constantine Oumansky
Constantino Oumansky
John A. Carter
Mr. & Mrs. Constantine Oumansky
Mrs. Maxim Litvinofl
Eugene D. Kisselev _
Lauchlin Currie
Lauchlin Currie
E. C. Carter
William D. Carter
Dr. Robt. J. Kerner
Misses Carter
Andrew Grajdanzev
John Carter
Kate Mitchell
Raymond Dennett (Return to Report on
Washington Office, Dec. 1943-March
1945.)
MAS
Andrews J. Grajdanzev
Secretary, Lithuanian Legation
E. C. Carter
Selective Service Board #53
Notes for Cleveland Speech
Speech "Soviet Russia's Contribution to
Peace."
E. C. Carter
Owen Lattimore
Owen Lattimore .
E. C. Carter
Owen Lattimore..
E. C. Carter
Ray Dennett
Ray Dennett
Notes on Mr. Carter's finances of trip
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter.
E. C. Carter.
E. C. Carter.
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
John L. Christian.
M. W. Pettigrew..
E. C. Carter
M. W. Pettigrew
Alger Hiss.
Truman M. Martin.
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Wm. C. Johnstone..
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter.
MOo Perkins.
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter..
E. C. Carter's secretary.
E. C. Carter..
W. D."Bill" Carter....
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
RY (Report).
E. C. Carter.
E. C. Carter.
K. C. Li
K. C. Li
Carter
Carter
Ray Dennett
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Ray Dennett
E. C. Carter
Owen Lattimore.
E. C. Carter
RDC
Ray Dennett.
Jan. 1946
1/29/43
2/ 3/43
3/ 1/43
3/ 1/43
3/ 2/43
3/18/43
3/26/43
4/ 1/43
4/12/43
4/12/43
4/13/43
4/ 1/43
4/- 5/43
4/29/43
4/30/43
5/ 1/43
5/ 4/43
5/10/43
5/21/43
6/ 7/43
6/ 9/43
6/15/43
6/17/43
5/26/42
6/20/42
6/28/43
7/14/43
6/30/43
7/18/43
7/20/43
7/20/43
7/20/43
8/ 4/43
8/ 1/43
8/23/43
10/15/43
11/ 4/43
11/ 8/43
11/13/43
11/15/43
11/15/43
4/16/45
12/13/43
12/22/43
3/ 7/44
3/ 7/44
3/31/44
4/14/44
1/ 7/45
2/10/45
6/ 6/45
6/18/45
6/20/45
6/25/45
9/13/45
9/26/45
10/19/45
11/19/45
122. 41
500. 34
500.35
131B.43
100. 186
500. 38
119. 78
100. 402
119.83
107. 55
100. 183
131B. 29
131B.32
191. 263
131B.31
131B.30
119. 151
191.25
100. 164
119.118
500. 39
119.8
119. 70
500. 40
500. 42
100. 187
500. 43
500. 44
500. 45
119. 68
119. 30
119.76
105. 174
100. 185
100 163
100. 188
131B.161
122. 37
122 37
100. 162
100. 202
119. 28
100 302
100. 289
122. 40
102. 43
102. 42
500. 36
102. 39
500. 41
122. 38
'ioo. 283'
119. 135
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5033
Exhibit No. 901
ATOMIC ENERGY AND UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL POLICY
SUMMART OF A ROUND-TaBLE CONFERENCE
Under joint auspices of Institute of Pacific Relations, 417 Market Street, San
Francisco 5, YUkon 1570; and San Francisco International Center, 68 Post
Street, San Francisco 4, DOuglas 2273. January 1946
(On December 29, 1945. the Institute of Pacific Relations and the San
I'l-ancisco International Center held a round-table conference running
through the day on atomic energy and its international implications.
Attending the conference were physical scientists, some of whom had
contributed to the development of the atomic bomb ; social scientists,
journalists; officers of the United States armed services; and persons
active in women's groups, labor groups, and groups interested in inter-
national relations. The agenda and a list of participants appear at the
end of this summary.)
THE facts about THE BOMB
The moderator opened the discussion by asking whether the scientists present
were agreed on the following five points which seemed to him to emerge from
what the public had heard about the atomic bomb: (1) that the bomb in its
present state of development was capable of enormous destruction and that
"improvements" in the future would almost certainly make it very much more
destriictive ; (2) that secrecy at best was only a temporary protection for the
United States because other countries would probably develop atomic bombs
shortly; (3) that the raw materials necessary for atomic bomb production were
readily available to all great powers and many smaller powers ; (4) that the cost
was not prohibitive; and (5) that no adequate defense against atomic bombs
existed at present or was likely to be found soon.
Recently, however, the moderator had read statements attributed to a high
military authority that cast doubt on some of these conclusions. The talk about
a push-button war, according to these statements, was exaggerated. The people
of this country had no need to fear being atomized by a hostile power. Wash-
ington, D. C, would not be bombed during the lifetime of most people now living
because the United States had the production and engineering know-how to
build the bomb, which other countries lacked. These factors were just as essen-
tial in the making of the bomb as the scientific contributions. The military
authority was said to have declared that the scientists were not engineering ex-
perts and therefore were not qualified to judge the time required for other nations
to produce the bomb.
A scientist who had contributed to the development of the bomb declared that
he agreed with the five points put forward by the moderator. The bomb had
tremendous destructive power at present and was susceptible of great develop-
ment. He suggested the possibility that in the future atomic energy would have
other wartime applications than its original use in blasting Japanese cities.
Radioactive materials might be used, for example, against personnel and agri-
culture. To keep the scientific principles behind the bomb from being known in
other nations was impossible. Moreover, these principles were the critical ele-
ments in its making. The scientists themselves had suggested much of the en-
gineering that went into the making of the bomb. And, since the need for speed
was paramount, practically all of the devices and techniques used were taken
from other operating industries. Any advanced industrial nation could get the
raw materials— uranium and thorium were well scattered over the world — and
make a bomb in reasonable time. No effective defense exists now nor seems likely
in future.
A second scientist who had contributed to the making of the bomb agreed. In
his opinion, quite possibly the present state of the bomb was to its future develop-
ment as the muzzle-loading cannon was to present-day artillery. A policy of
secrecy would only spur on development of the bomb in other countries, now that
the United States had proved its production feasible. For the fundamental
secret was released when the bomb was dropped — namely, that atomic energy
could be harnessed for destruction. Much additional information was contained
in the oflicial Smyth report. Several different methods were available at each
stage of the bomb's manufacture, and foreign nations would probably not be
SS34S — 52— pt. 14 — — n
5034 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
forced to make the same mistakes we did in its hurried development in wartime.
Another scientist suggested that in peacetime the development of the bomb
might go on faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States. P'or the
U. S. S. R. seems to support its scientists more wholeheartedly than this nation
does. Money was no object on a state-supported project, the scientists being
given everything they needed to produce the desired results. As for secrecy,
that was a hope unjustified by the facts of scientific life.
THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION
What is the state of American public opinion about the bomb? the moderator
questioned. Are the people fully and accurately informed about the matter, and
are they reacting in a way that will eventuate in reaching rational solutions to
the problems of the new atomic age?
One word describes the present public mind about atomic energy, a journalist
replied, and that word is fear. The public may have a fuzzy hope that interna- •
tional peace can be obtained by international agreement, but that feeling is sec-
ondary to an almost universal fear — a fear that otlier powers will get the bomb
and will use it. And out of that fear comes an instinctive reaction on the part
of the public that we can and should keep the bomb a secret, and through its
possession write the world ticket for the future. One of the greatest needs of the
hour, he continued, is for a great amount of public education and information,
and that as rapidly as possible.
Will public opinion support the cession of a part of our sovereignty in order to
make international control of atomic power possible? a scientist asked. There
is no indication, a journalist answered, that the public today has even the fog-
giest notion of what such regulation will do to our sovereignty. Without that
understanding, bow can the people answer the question of whether they would
be willing to surrender a part of it? A physicist commented that, unfortunately,
with such a state of public opinion, some of our better Senators, who are con-
stantly asking how much of the wise and decent thing they can "get away with,"
will not feel constrained to fight very hard for intelligent action.
A social scientist observed that at a closed meeting of business men in New
York recently a high official of the army argued for keeping the bomb as a power
instrument and the audience had seemed to agree with his arguments. A labor
educator queried whetlier the May-Johnson bill with its reactionary insistence on
secrecy and tight national control was still the official policy of the military. Or
are the armed forces willing to follow the Moscow agreement, which alters the
May- Johnson concepts? There has not been and is not now an official military
policy, an officer of the armed services replied. That is a matter for the people
of the United States to decide. Another officer concurred. And to aid the people
to decide intelligently, it was generally agreed by all present, an immediate na-
tional campaign of education on the facts of the bomb and its implications for the
future was vitally needed.
THE STATE OF FOREIGN OPINION
The moderator read a newspaper dispatch from Moscow giving "man in the
street" interviews on the atomic bomb. A 38-y?ar-old woman, a dressmaker, had
said she wished the bomb had never been invented. She was afraid that the
attempt of the United States to monopolize it would not be in the interests of
the people of the world. And, she added, she hoped the inventors of the bomb
would find no peace on this earth ! Was this typical of foreign opinion, asked the
moderator?
An educator recently back from a United Nations meeting replied that he was
afraid it was. All over the world there was a sweeping feeling that peoples and
nations must cooperate culturally, politically, and in every way if civilization
were to continue. I'eople felt that it was impossible to keep the atomic bomb the
secret possession of the United States, and that it would be undesirable if it were
possible. For that would lead to suspicion and armed competition, which would
be the final disaster. All during the war Europe has been socially as well as
politically isolated. We should take immediate advantage ol' this emotional
desire by removing all obstructions from the free interchange of technical, po-
litical, artistic and literary ide;is. A scientist agreed that one of the most imme-
diate needs was the launching of such a widespread intercultural program to
encourage free interchange of all types of information, including information
related to potential military weapons.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5035
CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
A labor member stated that he understood we were continuing to make atomic
bombs. Why are we still making them, and against whom are we planning to
use them, he queried? Is this not a threat to all other nations and to the suc-
cessful construction of a working international organization?
A scientist replied that it would be a fine thing if we stopped making them
immediately. But a college otticial disagreed. As long as we maintain an army
for future wars that army should be as efficient as possible and shovild have the-
best tools of destruction available. He remembered that he personally had been
against the fortification of Guam before the recent war and had lived to regret
deeply his stand. Only with effective international control and policemen would
he be willing to see this nation disarm atomically.
An officer of the armed services observed that perhaps international control
was not the only solution to the problem. He suggested that the United States
could possibly stop future wars by maintaining its superiority in atomic re-
search and by building up such an overwhelming stockpile of atomic bombs that
it would be foolhardy for another nation to attack us. One of the principal
reasons why gas was not used against us in the recent war, he observed, was that
we had more of it than the Germans did.
Disagreeing, a scientist replied that we could not be at all sure that we could
continue our sui>eriority in either the research for, or the production of, atomic
bombs. The development of science is one of the most unpredictable things on
this earth. But even if we did remain superior, this policy would lead straight
to an armaments race and catastrophe.
A second officer of the armed services added that if atomic bombs were still
being manufactured it should be remembered that they were being made with the
explicit approval of the President, who was in a much better position to know
about our po.ssible future military needs than anyone sitting in this room. Ap-
parently, a journalist added, the President is supported by public opinion. For
the public obviously believes that another war is not only possible but probable,
and because of that conviction it demands that we have the best engines of
destruction in the world.
Whether this nation should stop making atomic bombs immediately or only
after international control has been evolved was a moot question as was the ques-
tion of revealing or not revealing such "secrets" as we still possess. But there
was little doubt in the majority of minds about the need for ijositive and immedi-
ate action in organizing some type of workable international control. As one
social scientist put it, this is a time of tragic urgency. Unless we solve this
in-oblem now, we shall inevitably drift into an atomic arms race, the catastrophic
effects of which are all too foreseeable. Agreed to also was the remark of a
physicist that the war just ended was the "last victory" on this earth. In any
future major war the great cities on both sides will be destroyed and millions of
people will be anniiiilated. "Victory" will be a purely relative matter, of who
has the most survivors and the greatest capacity and will to fight on.
INSPECTION
Granted some form of world organization, is intei-national control of atomic
energy, backed by an etfective inspection system, technically possible, the mod-
erator questioned?
A scientist replied that he had no doubt about it, if the participating countries
honestly attempted to enforce it. Atomic bombs cannot be made in an abandoned
cellar. Their manufacture requires elaborate machinery and laboratory equip-
menr, whii h are readily detectable. But, a journalist added, inspection of atomic
energy was not enough. The world Is now in a feverish race, not alone in atomic
weapons but in all types of new and deadly armaments. Jet planes, gas turbines,
supersonic speeds and push-button rockets are all being developed. Consequently,
there would have to be inspection of all tj'pes of armament. The fundamental
problem was to stop the outbreak of war. For once hostilities started, and in-
ternational control was abandoned, the atom bomb could be made by any major
nation and would undoubtedly be used.
A social scientist, who had worked for a number of years with the League
of Nations, was of the opinion that the technical problem of inspection would
uoc be too difficult, judging from the experience with the control of opium. One
possible safeguard, for example, was a free interchange of information. The
refusal of any country to make evidence available could be construed as prima
5036 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
facie evidence of something wrong. The problem was really political, not
technical. But because it was political it was perhaps more dilficult to solve.
Certainly, a tremendous revolution in our ways of thought and action would
have to precede or accompany the adoption of a genuine inspection system.
For that would mean opening every industrial laboratory and every factory
door in the world to the official inspectors. It was obvious that our concepts
of secrecy by competitive industries and our theory of patents might offer
obstacles to such a development.
A scientist interjected that efficient inspection would have to be in some
instances by visit and search. We could no longer rely on the negative safe-
guard of a scientist's desire to publish. Most of the research done in this
country today was done not in the university laboratory where publication
always had been and is automatic, except where the government steepped in.
But rather it was done in industrial laboratories where the emphasis was upon
withholding information from possible competitors. In some instances that
condition had greatly changed the traditional concept of freedom in science.
Would the various nations of the world, for example the U. S. S. R., accept
international inspection, the moderator asked?
A member who had devoted particular study to the U. S. S. R. replied that
in the first international meeting of scientists since the war the Russians held
nothing bacli. The desire of the U. S. S. R. for secrecy is commensurate with
tlieir feeling of insecurity. Once the U. S. S. R. feels secure from military in-
vasion, he thought, it will be completely willing to exchange any and all
information.
But would not a system of thoroughgoing international inspection mean a
drastic change in the Russian way of doing things and be harder for them to
accept than for us, a scientist queried?
A military officer thought not. Once the Russian government accepted it, the
whole nation would accept it . For the Russians are accustomed to such
inspection from above. Private industry in the United States, on the contrary,
is not. Even if our government did officially accept such a system, it would
meet with great opposition in practice by private corporations throughout the
country.
A journalist agreed. If the General Motors Corporation will not open its
books to a government committee on prices and wages, it is probable that it
will object strenuously to opening its laboratories and factories to foreign
inspectors. International inspection clearly means a sweeping change in our
ideas about private enterprise and private gain through the use of private
information.
But, several members interposed, the information obtained could be held con-
fidential by the international inspectors. After all, we have had inspection by
income tax authorities and various government enforcement agencies for a long
time. The Department of Commerce regularly gets statistical information from
business firms which it agrees not to publish except as industry totals.
Should not the United Nations Organization run some atomic laboratories of
its own, the moderator asked? It could invite all the world's leading scientists
to work in these laboratories from time to time. In that way the UNO would
know more about atomic energy than any single nation in the world, and full
disclosure and interchange of new developments would be more assured.
There seems to be no intention to do that, replied an educator just returned
from a UNO meeting. For one thing, it would cost too much, and the resulting
huge budget would imperil the life of the entire organization. No, the answer
lies in world control and inspection. And our willingness, or lack of it, to accept
inspection will be a test of whether we are acting in entire good faith in our
efforts to build a world dedicated to amity and security for all peoples.
We should be extremely careful about vetoing any proposition aiding control
and inspection, even though it concerns what we believe to be our own business,
a social scientist added, or it may set a precedent we might live to regret. New
Zealand objected to a League committee investigating a local squabble with the
natives in one of their mandated territories. On tlie basis of that precedent the
League was barred from investigating the state of things in the Japanese man-
dated islands of the Pacific.
I am ready to accept whatever changes in our life effective control of atomic
power necessitates, a journalist stated. I would much rather welcome a Russian
inspector representing the United Nations, than a Russian atomic bomb.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5037
THE PREVENTION OF WAR AND THE UNITB3) NATIONS ORGANIZATION
The next question the moderator posed was whether the present structure of
the United Nations Organization was adequate to fulfill its mission in an atomic
world. Should the veto power reserved by the five great nations be altex-ed?
Many people of world importance, including some statesmen, think that the veto
power and the control of the atomic bomb are irreconcilable. Some, indeed, feel
that we must have a world state now with plenary powers if we are to preserve
our present civilization from disaster.
A social scientist answered that it was a proper procedure to place the respon-
sibility for the control of the atomic bomb squarely on the backs of the great
powers. The idea that all nations large and small should be given equal repre-
sentation and power in an international body has come from all the nonsense
that has been thought and written about sovereignty. To give a nation of five
million inhabitants as much power as a nation with one hundred and seventy-
five millions could not be considered democratic. Modern wars are started by
conflict between the great powers. And it does not make any difference to an
aggressor nation whether it is outvoted four to one or forty to one. The abolition
of the veto power would at this time simply enlarge the sphere of possible dis-
harmony among- the major nations.
Accepting this as true, a scientist believed that the veto power was necessary
under present circumstances. The public, he felt, is not ready to discuss the
veto i)ower, because it seemed to be beside the point. What is needed immedi-
ately is not new machinery but agreement among the great powers.
A college administrator added that the reason why no one at the meeting
was willing to speak for the abolition of the veto was that everyone recognized
that our present popular belief in national sovereignty would make it imjwssible
for either the U. S. S. R. or our own Senate to agree to such a step. We have this
fixation about sovereignty and we have to live with it at least a little while
longer.
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Throughout the meeting, the moderator had observed numerous references
to the U. S. S. R. when the members had speculated on the possibility of keeping
the peace. Apparently, in common with many other people in this country, the
members of this group felt that the gi'eatest potential danger to the peace of
the future lies in the possibility of deteriorating relations between the United
States and Russia. The moderator realized that many people in this nation
are worried, for example, about the Russian policy toward the smaller states
neighboring her. Occasionally there is also a fear expressed in this country that
the Red army may take over the control of the Russian state. And these fears
of ours are also undoubtedly reciprocated by Russian fears about the policy
of the United States. What then can be done here and in Russia to encourage
continuing good relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R.?
One of the best ways to quiet our fears, a labor educator suggested, is to
study and inform ourselves about the structure and the present condition of
the U. S. S. R. If we do, we will know that the Red army comes from the people,
is part of the people, and therefore oifers no threat of any such military domi-
nation of the government. AVe will also know that there are one million am-
putees in Russia today who have lost an arm or a leg. and that they together
with all the Russian i^eople have but one desire internationally — and that is
lasting peace. We should also find out by study that there never have been
and are not now anv irreconcilable conflicts of interest between this nation
and the U. S. S. R.
An officer of the armed forces suggested that perhaps we could use the atomic
bomb as a bargaining counter with Russia to get the things we want interna-
tionally and to obtain a foolproof International organization. To this a scientist
objected that the bomb gives no hartraining power, or very little. Within fire
years or so the Russians will probably be able to make atomic bombsL In the
meantime, we are not going to make war upon them. The people of this country
could not be persuaded to enter another war in the next five year by any gov-
ernment, unless we were attacked. They just would not support a war, and the
Russian government knows that.
A modification of Russian restrictions on the press would help our relations,
a journalist volunteered. There is as much need for international freedom
of the press as there is for free world science.
5038 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
What about looking at our own newspapers, a civic leader interjected, at our
own schools, radio, and movies? Depending upon the definition, we may have a
fr€>e press; but does it express national opinion? Judging from the campaigns
of the last three presidential elections, she thought not. It may be free, but it
certainly is not a responsible press. Many people want Russia to adopt a free
press, but would they want Russia to adopt the policies of some of the news-
papers in this country?
01)viously, a scientist added, the United States and the USSR in the future
are going to compete for the moral leadership of the world in the name of de-
mocracy. They may mean difl"erent things by democracy, but neither of them
is using anti-democratic propaganda as the Nazis were. That is important, for
perhaps one system does not have to swallow the other. Perhaps both will be
modified toward a common mean.
Why do they have to be modified to be accepted by each other, an educator
asked? Is it not possible that cultural pluralism can exist in the world without
war? If we cannot accept the fact of cultural pluralism, then we certainly are
on the broad highway to another world war.
This argument was quickly supported by a college official. Reasoning by
analogies is dangerous, he admitted, but four hundred years ago most of the
civilized world was killing one another l)ecause of religious differences. When
both sides were convinced they could not win they stopped the killing and ac-
cepted the fact of religious pluralism. And types of religion meant as much to
the seventeenth-century European as types of economics to the man in the
street today.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW
A few thousand scientists created this problem of atomic energy, the moderator
stated, but millions of people all over the world have to participate in solving
it. What can be done in the immediate future to dispel their suspicion of one
another and to create both the will and the ability among them to answer these
many difficult questions which we have been discussing?
For one thing, replied a scientist who had worked on the bomb, our own
country can take the lead in allaying suspicion by abandoning production of
atomic weapons. (There was no agreement on the timing of this move, some
holding that international acceptance of an adequate control system should
precede such a step.) Secondly, the scientist continued, we might supply atomic
power plants to nations who do not now have the needed power to develop their
raw materials. One operating uranium pile in China might be convincing testi-
mony to the Chinese, as well as the rest of the world, that we do not intend to
monopolize atomic power for our own selfish national interests.
The National Academy of Science might also further the interests of world
peace, a social scientist suggested, by reciprocating Russia's recent gesture
and inviting the scientists of the world to a conference in the United States
to discuss recent scientific progress and research. Why only science, an officer
of the armed forces asked? Why not call a world conference to talk over the
whole field of human culture and endeavor?
A college official objected that as an educator, he was dubious about per-
suading people through intellectual means rapidly enough to solve the great
problems confronting us. Through the use of symbols we might work faster
and more effectively in the emotional realm. One of the most powerful of our
symbols is the flag. Why not start a United Nations flag movement. A flag,
together with other types of persuasion, might help to create what we really
need — a new area of sovereignty, a world sovereignty.
An officer of the armed forces intervened. One of the most fundamental
things we can do in creating an attitude receptive to world organization and
enduring peace is to obtain an adequate standard of living for everyone. As
we oppose legislation in this nation calculated to assist the rest of the world
to increase its capacity to produce and to raise the world standard of living
we are opposing world peace. And as we support it we are supporting world
peace. An economist signified hearty agreement.
A most essential role in educating the public and in changing public attitudes,
a journalist declared, will be played by the scientists. At no time in the past
has the prestige of the scientists been higher with the American public. If
they remain out of their laboratory shells and continue their activity on the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5039
platform and in the press as they have recently done, the edueational job will
he far less ditficult to perform. They should not c<mfinB their remarks to the
technical aspects of these questions, but, as in this meeting, take the responsi-
bility of discussins publicly at every opportunity all of the social implications
of their discoveries.
A scientist replied that tvpo organizations made up of scientists had already
been formed in the state of Califirnia to work for the proper world control
of atomic power. Other crroups of scientists were active in other parts of the
country and were federating natinnnlly. An association for the international
control of atomic energy, to include both scientists and nonscientists, had re-
cently been launched in this vicinity.
The organization of such small groups all over the nation should be en-
couraged, a social scienti.st concluded. It gives the movement for international
control a grass rt?ots flavor and is in the great tradition of American democracy.
But that is not enough. If these small groups are not organized into a co-
ordinated national movement for education and action, thpir energies will be
dissipated. What is needed today is a national campaign, and indeed a world
campaign. There already exist in this nation several strong and active national
organizations concerned with the maintenance of world peace. By federating
with and supporting there organizations, local groups all over the country can
best bring about their <lesire to harness atomic power for the constructive use
of mankind.
George E. Mowrt,
Kajiporteur.
The Agenda Used by the Conference
i. the situation
A. Testimony of scientists on destructiveness of atomic weapons : on probable
time required for other powers to have them regardless of secrecy ; on future
development possibilities.
B. Official policy proposals and negotiations to date.
C. The present state of public opinion, as gauged by opinion polls, by pronounce-
ments of various groups, and in other ways.
D. Official and unofficial reactions in other countries.
E. Conclusions : How urgent is the problem posed by the situation thus revealed?
In view of the fact that all participants have by now considerable back-
ground information, a relatively brief time will be spent on Topic I.
II. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?
A. Control of atomic weapons.
1. National control? Probable consequences of atomic armaments com-
petition.
2. International control?
a. Methods and feasibility of inspection system.
b. Political problems, including relation to United Nations Organiza-
tion.
B. The prevention of war.
1. The United Nations Organization. What changes, if any, in the Charter
and in T'nited States policy toward the Organization are needed in
in the light of atomic weapons ?
2. Improvement of relations with other great powers, especially the
U. S. S. R. What can be done about the distrust that exists?
3. The issue of "world government." How and when?
C. Re-examination of United States military defense policies.
1. Foreseeable effects of atomic weapons on military strategy and on com-
parative power positions.
2. The relation of atomic weapons to such issues as :
a. Universal peacetime military training.
b. Naval policy and naval bases.
c. Scientific research and mobilization of scientists.
5040 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
III. HOW TO GET DONE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?
A. The problem of public support for constructive policies in relation to atomic
weapons.
B. What specific methods are available for education of the public, especially on
the West Coast, to the real issues involved and to the needs for positive
action?
List op Participants
Bloch, Felix, Physics Department, Stanford University
Boardman, T. D., International Center
Brewer, Leo, Chemistry Department, University of California
Clark. Mrs. Warner, International Center
Condliffe, John B., Economics Department, University of California
Cowell, Mrs. Olive Thompson, Social Science Department, San Francisco State
College .
Douglas, Mrs. W. W., League of Women Voters
Edwards. Paul C, Associate Editor, San Francisco News
Elkus, Mrs. Charles de Young, Jr., Columbia Foundation
Elliott, Robert C, San Francisco News
Greenslade, Admiral John W., USN (ret.)
Hacke, Mrs. Harold, League of Women Voters
Isaacs, Lt. Col. Irwin M., USA
Kirkpatrick, Paul H., School of Physical Sciences, Stanford University
Kefauver, Grayson N., Department of Education, Stanford University
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred, Institute of Pacific Relations
McWilliams, Mrs. Robert, International Center
Merner, Garfield D.
Mowry, George E. (Rapporteur) History Department, Mills College
Oppenheimer, Frank, Radiation Laboratory, University of California
Phillips, Miss Lillian M., Women's Action Committee
Roberts, Holland, California Labor School
Tilton, Mrs. L. Deming, League of Women Voters
Webster, David L., Physics Department, Stanford University
Weinberg, Joseph W., Physics Department, University of California
Wheeler, Oliver P., Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
White, Dr. Lynn, Jr., President, Mills College
Wickett, Fred A., Institute of Pacific Relations
Wickett, Walton A., California Laboratories
Wilbur, Brig. Gen. Wm. H., USA
Selected Reading List
(All items listed are available in the libraries of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, 417 Market Street, or the International Center, 68 Post Street, San Fran-
cisco. Those marked with an asterisk were circulated to conference participants
in advance.)
Angell, Norman. "Human Nature and the Atom Age." Free World, Dec. 1945.
"Atomic Bomb. Asset or Threat?" Appraisai of Weapon by Nation's Foremost
Scientists, V. S. News, October 26, 1945.
*"Atomic Energy, Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States, the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister of Canada,"
Department of State Bulletin, November 18, 1945.
*"Atomic Energy and American Policy, Official and Unofficial Pronouncements,"
Internatonal Conciliation, December 1945.
"Atomic Isolationism," Nation, October 20, 1945.
Baldwin, Hanson W. "The Atom Bomb and Future War," Life, August 20, 1945.
*Brodie, Bernard. "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," Yale Institute
of International Studies, Nov. 1, 1945.
Bush. Vannevar. "Beyond the Atomic Bomb," Supplement to Fortune, Sept.
1945.
Chase, Stuart. "Atomic Age Balance Sheet," Common Sense, October 1945.
*Chapman, Seville. "Atomic Bombs and World Organization." (Mimeographed.)
*Compton, Arthur H. "Atomic Power in War and Peace." (Mimeographed.)
Einstein, Albert (as told to Raymond Swing). "Einstein on the Atomic Bomb,"
Atlantic Monthly, November 1945.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5041
Geddes, D. P. (ed.). The Atomic Age Opens. N. Y. : Pocket Books, Inc., 1945.
*Gideonse, Harry D. "The Politics of Atomic Energy." Pieprint from 'New
Leader, November 3, 1945.
GilfiUan, S. Cohim. "The Atomic Bombshell," Survey Oraphic, Sept. 1945.
Gustavson, R. G. "The Story Behind the Atomic Bomb," Vital Speeches, October
1, 1945.
Hutching, Robert M. "Toward a Durable Society," Fortvne, June 194P..
"The Impact upon International Relations of the New Weapon," World Today,
September 1945.
Jaffe, Bernard. "How the Bomb Came to Be," Nem Republic, Sept. 17, 1E45.
Baldwin, Hanson W., Churchill, Winston ; and Hutchins, "The Blast That Shook
the World." Reader's Digest, October 1945.
Present, Richard D. "Scientists Have No Illusions," Free World, Dec. 1945.
*Ruml, Beardsley. "World Trade and Peace." (INIimeographed.)
Russell, Bertrand. "How to Avoid the Atomic War," Common Sense, Oct. 1945.
Shapley, Harlow. "Status Quo or Pioneer?" Harpefs, October 1945.
Shotwell, James T. "Control of Atomic Energy." Survey Oraphic, Oct. 1945,
Shotwell, James T. "Our Endless Frontier," Survey Graphic, November 1945.
♦Smyth, Henry Dewolf. Atomic Energy for Militai-y Purposes. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1945.
Exhibit No. 902
129 East 52nd St., New York City, January 29, 1945.
Mr. Frederick V. Field,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.
Dear Fred : This is to thank you most sincerely for your extraordinarily helpful
letter of January 26th. I think I agree with practically every one of the criti-
cisms that you have made. If we could have managed to shape the conference in
advance along the lines which we now in retrospect see would have been desirable,
the results would, I b'^lieve, have been even more substantial. The analysis that
you have made means that we must now in the series of continuation conferences
and discussion groups which we are now planning and which you suggested at
Mont Tremblant endeavor to achieve some of those things which we failed to
achieve at Mont Tremblant. In this we will be looking to you for constant sug-
gestion and leadership.
Thanks to your excellent suggestion, yesterday we had Castro to lunch. Lock-
wood and Holland and I all found him most charming, stimulating and intelligent.
We are giving him letters of introduction to friends in Delhi and Chungking and
arranging for him to meet a number of Chinese in New York and Washington
and in addition a circle of Americans who know China in both cities.
He has made excellent suggestions for multiplying our contacts in Mexico itself.
Be sure that I meet Tolefano when he comes to New York.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 903
129 East 52nd Street, New York Citt,
February 3, 1948.
Mr. Edgar J. Tarr,
Chatean Laui'ier, Ottaiva, Canada.
Dear Tarr : On Wednesday evening, February 10th, subject to your approval,
I am planning to take you to a dinner to the great Mexican labor leader, Vin-
centa Lombard Toledano who is one of the most forceful, intelligent, and liberal
leaders in Mexico and is President of the Confederation of Latin American
Workers. The dinner is sponsored by the C. I. O. It will give you opportunity
of meeting someone who would be essential in building an I. P. R. in Mexico. It
will also give you an opportunity of seeing at first hand, progressive New York
City workers en masse.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5042 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 905
Makch 1, 1943.
WLH.
KM from ECC:
The private document prepared in Washiugtou on the Strength of the Muslim
League has come into my hands. It is not available for quotation, nor should
any reference by made to it. I thought, however, that you might be interested
in seeing it, so I have had copies made. I don't think that it covers the
ground, but it does contain one or two interesting points.
164/No. 4/2/1/43
Background infomiation
THE STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN INDIA
Mk. JiNNAii's Position
Mr. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League has recently been carrying on a
vigorous political drive.
His visit to the Punjab showed the extent to which he has secured contact
with the Muslim masses. It can no longer be argued that because at the
General Elections it was not able to secure a majority of the Muslim votes
in any Province, the Muslim League has no following among the masses. Since
1937, accession to the Muslim League's and Mr. .Tinnah's strength has been
tremendous. Almost every bye-election in Muslim constituencies has been
won by the League and the number of Muslim League members in the various
Provincial Legislatures has increased manifold.
The number of Muslim Ministers who now owe allegiance to the League is
considerable. The latest accession has come from Sind. Sir Ghulam Hussain
Hidayatullah, who succeeded Mr. Allah Box, has joined the League and his
example has since been followed by all the Sind Muslim Ministers. Here is a
survey of the Muslim League position in the Muslim majority Provinces :
PUNJAB
The total number of Muslim Members in the Punjab Legislative Assembly is 89.
Only one out of these was elected on Muslim League ticket in the General Elec-
tions of 1937. The number of Muslims elected on Unionist tickets was 77. Aii
Muslim members of the Unionist Party are, however, now members of the Mus-
lim League under what is known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact of 1938. The
main terms of the Pact were that the Unionist Party's Leader, tlie late Sir
Sikander Hyat Khan, with all his Muslim followers in the Assembly should
join the League and promise support to it in all Indian constitutional questions.
Mr. Jinnah agreed on his part that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party
would have freedom in Provincial matters and would be free to pursue the
Unionist Party program.
The political complexion of the Punjab made it necessary for the late Sir
Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Prime JMinister, not to form a Muslim League
Government but a Unionist Government in coalition with Hindu and Sikh groups.
In all Provincial matters he pursued a more or less independent line and, though
professing allegiance to the League and Mr. Jinnah, his policy on all-Indian ques-
tions was at times embarrassingly independent of the League. On the other
hand, Sir Sikander never openly flouted any league mandate and he resigned
from the National Defence Council when required by the League.
The Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore recently wrote : "What is consistently
ignored is the fact that Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikander are mutually dependent;
their common fundamental purpose must override differences arising from the
admitted diversity of their 'spheres of influence.' Whatever their personal pre-
dilections, circumstances must force the Muslim League President and the
Premier of the Punjal) (so long as he is a IMuslim) to I'un in dcmble harness until
India's future is hammered out ; and that Constitution may conceivably effect
even closer cooperation between tiiem."
Mr. Jinnah's recent Punjab tour monopolised public attention, not only be-
cause of his public utterances on topical questions, but also because of the object
underlying his visit. Recent attempts made by the Punjab Premier to settle the
communal proldem in that part of the country on a Provincial basis irrespective
of an all-Indian agreement, must doubtless have caused anxiety to Mr. Jinnah.
The formula favored by Sir Sikander, according to most reports, conceded self-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5043
determination to the Hindu and Sikli minorities in the event of a Muslim
plebiscite deciding in favor of secession in a postwar settlement. The minorities
may form a separate State or join the main Indian Union. Negotiations went
on for some time amon,t,'st the various parties but ultimately broke down or
were adjourned because it was said that the Hindus wished to consult the
Mahasabha.
Soon after, Mr. Jinnah arrived in the Punjab and in his first public utterance
made a pointed reference to the main basis of the scheme without naming it and
condemned the move to give the right of self-determination to "Sub-National"
groups like the Hindus and the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Muslims in the United
Provinces.
He further tried to win over the Sikhs to his conception of Pakistan by
reassuring them tliat their interests would be safe under a Muslim State. This
failed, by Mr. .Jinnah succeeded in scotching the "Mischievious idea," as he
described it, of a purely Provincial settlement of the communal problem and laid
down that "no settlement is worth the paper on which it is written either in
the I'unjah or elsewhere, so far as Muslims are concerned, except with the
Muslim League."
Later, Mr. .linnah in another speech said that he had not referred to the
Sikander formula, which he liad not even studied in his earlier speech. This
enabled Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to make a rapprochement with Mr. Jinnah
and declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Muslim League. If there were
any differences between Sir Sikander and Mr. Jinnah. it was explained, they
related more to the method than to the policy and program of the Muslim League
and were intended solely to further its aims and ideals.
Attempts have lately been made to show that the Sikander formula is in ac-
cordance witli the League's resolution on Pakistan w^hich visualised territorial
adjustments. The formula allowed this in accordance with the desires of the
communities concerned and to that extent unintentionally conceded the right of
self-determination to the Hindues and the Sikhs. However, the problem is no
more a live issue. IMr. Jinnah has applied tlie damper and as a result of his visit
to the Punjab he is back again in the position he occupied prior to Sir Sikander's
attempt.
The death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan on December 26tli was regarded by the
New York Times Correspondent (X. Y. T. Dec. 29) as considerably strengthening
Mr. Jinnah's position by removing the only Muslim figure important enough to
challenge him.
BENGAL
Out of a total of 123 Muslim members in the Bengal Assembly and 30 in the
Legislative Council. 43 and 11 memiiers. respectively, follow the Muslim I^eague.
Mr. Fazlul Haq, the Premier of Bengal, who has been a member of the Muslim
League since 1918, resigned in 1940 when disciplinary action was threatened
against him for accepting membership of the National Defense Council, from
which, however, he resigned. The IMuslim League expelled him on December 11,
1941, for having formed a coalition Ministry in Bengal without its sanction.
Some unconfirmed reports have appeared in the press that Mr. Fazlul Haq
had met Mr. Jinnah recently in Delhi. Another report said that Mr. Haq liad
rejoined the Muslim League. On this the Bengal Premier made the following
statement: "The news published by Independent India (Mr. M. N. Roy's Delhi
paper) about my rejoining the Muslim' League raises an irrelevant issue. I
maintain I was never out of the League, I am still in the League. Therefore,
the question of my rejoining does not arise. As regards Mr. Jinnah, I have
never been at war with him, nor do I intend to be so. I am not at war with
anybody. I am at war with untruths."
SIND
Out of 35 Muslim members in the Sind Assembly, only 13 were elected on
Muslim League ticket. With the return of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah
as Premier of the Province in October last, a number of M. L. A.'s have joined
the League. Sir Ghulam and all his Muslim ]Ministers are now members of the
League, and the strength of the League party is now 26 out of 35.
Sir Ghulam resigned from the Mu.slim League when Mr. Allah Bux took him
into his Cabinet two years ago. His rejoining the League has been prompted
by a desire to strengthen the Ministry that he formed on Mr. Allah Bux's
dismissal.
5044
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ASSAM
Out of 34 Muslim members in the Assam Assembly, originally only 3 were
elected on Muslim League ticket. But, a few months after the General Elections
30 members signed on as a Muslim League I'arty. The Premier, Sir Mohammad
Saadullah Khan, has been strictly followiu'i IMuslim League discipline. He re-
signed from the National Defence Council when re<]uired by the League to do
so. On recently assuming office he claimed that his Cabinet was representative
of Assam's people. No mention was made of the party affi'iations of the Muslim
members of his Cab:net. In all his public utterances siuCvi assuming office, he
has refrained from mentioning the Muslim League.
ihf; north-west frontier province
Out of ."^S members in the N.-W. F. Province Legislative Assembly, only 12 belong
to the League Party. The only sign of a weakening of the Congress Party in
the Province has been the resignation of Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan, M. L. A.
ex-Parliamentary Secretary, from the Congress Party and the Rsd Sldrts, but
he did not join the Muslim League. He formed a new organization called the
Pashtoon .lirga. It aims at an independent Pathan State, run in accordance
with the laws of the Shariat. In a statement, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan said
that an alliance with the Congress was harmful as the Pathans were gradually
losing their identity and drifting away from religion.
Total Muslim
Members of
Legislatures
Total Muslim
League Mem-
bers
Piiniab
89
123
30
35
34
78
Bengal:
Lowpr House - _
A?i
11
Sind
26
Assam --
30
North Wp'^t
Frontier Province
38
12
Total --- ---
349
I 211
> Or 60.45 percent.
Important note. — It is important to remember in using the above figures that
they show the strength of the Muslim League among the Muslim members of
the Legislatures of Muslim majority provinces; they do not show Muslim League
strength in Hindu majority provinces (these figures will be released later when
available).
JH : MC.
Exhibit No. 906
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y. March 1, 19^3.
The Misses Carter,
SI Bartlet Street, Andover, Mass.
Dear Mabel and Harriet : Thank you for all your kindness, thoughtf ulness,
and love, and for this delicious loaf of bread.
I looked everywhere in the station and on the train for Zita, but I guess she
probably decided to take a later train.
Under separate cover I am sending you the four American Council booklets.
They are all good, but I think you will find the one on the Soviet Union the
most interesting and timely.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5045
Exhibit No. 907
March 2, 1943.
Copies to WWL
WLH
HA
ED
HM from ECC :
Going up to New England last week I read "The Land of the Soviets" for the
first time. I was immensely impressed with it and feel that it is a most skillful
and timely job. It is going to have a very big sale in the secondary schools, but
I would like to see a similar sale amongst the general reading public.
If you agree that this is desirable, I am wondering what you and your col-
leagues would think of cooperating with Webster in getting it out as a bound
volume that would sell at $1..50 or $2.00, and go out in a big way for getting it
reviewed and promoted. So long as it is in its present Binding it will probably
fail to make the review columns of the more serious book review editors.
Could you also check with F7-ed Myers and Rose Gandel to see whether it has
been taken up by the merchandising department of RWil and whether there are
any large possibilities there either in the present edition or in a bound volume,
where there could be a considerably larger national distribution.
At the right time I would like to see the present or the new edition go with
personal letters from me to any of the following who have not received it :
Litvinoff
Gousev
Kolokoff
Gromyko
Davies
Standley
Faymonville
Hopkins
Hazard
the whole RWR Board
McLean and some of the leaders of the Canadian Aid to Russia Fund
Welles
Some of the more outstanding members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign
Affairs Committees in Congress
A select list of people in the Ai-my headquarters
T. V. Soong
Some of the Indian Leaders
To Chiang Kai-Shek and some of his colleagues
Motylev
ECC from HM :
Here is a possible type of invitation that might work on the Russians.
It would be necessary to tell Litvinov what it was and urge him to send as
many of his people as possible, if he can't come himself. Likewise it would be
well to get from Jessup, Currie, Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau the names of
their assistants who should be invited, if we don't already know. Also Lukashev
should be urged to let some of his people come.
Exhibit No. 908
Makch 18, 1943.
WLH from ECC.
The talk with Veatch revealed the following :
1. Governor Lehman and Mr. Sayre were very enthusiastic about our talk and
very eager to have the IPR undertake the assignment.
2. The areas to be covered in approximately the following order are :
Burma
Malaysia
Netherlands Indies and, in fact all Southeastern Asia except that we need give
little attention to the Philippines (I imagine Sayre will do that himself)
China
Korea, Japan, and Manchuria
Veatch will send us today or tomorrow such general outlines and directives
as they have already worked out for other areas, but they do not want us
5046 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to be too much ^ided by these. They want us to make our own analysis and
put forward our own project.
They would hope that we could send them an outline of our proposed plan
within the next four or five days ; that after a month we could present a first
draft, and that some of us could take it to Washiugton for a full day's discussion
with them and a few Far Eastern experts from various Government departments.
Then the gaps could be filled and a redraft made and the whole thing submitted
by the middle of May.
I asked Veatch whether they were thinking of a six- or ten-thonsand-doUar
job, and he said that they had been thinking in smaller terms, that he felt pretty
sure that they could get an appropriation to cover the cost of one $6,500 man
for two months and then the money could be used in whatever way we thought
best. But if this is inadequate they would make every effort to get a larger ap-
propriation. I should say that we could count definitely on about $1,100 with a
fair chance of making a case for $2,200 or $2,500.
I told Veatch that professionally we couldn't afford to submit a poor piece
of work.
Exhibit No. 909
Copy.
"WLH from ECC. March 26, 1943.
I was a bit sad when I discovered in Pacific Affairs page proof that you had
secured a review from Norman Thomas, but I decided to say nothing to anyone.
Today however without having mentioned the matter to her I received the
enclosed from Harriet Moore. Please return it at your convenience.
The case of Roy is different, I assume ILO submitted his paper and that we
had to accept it.
Copy.
ECC from HM. Rec'd March 26, 1943.
It is probably unnecessary for me to add this P. S. to the memo in re the
talk with Litvinov, but I believe it should be born in mind. It does not help
the standing of the International Secretariat with the Soviets to use people
like Norman Thomas and Roy of India. Good capitalists are ok with them but
Social democrats are poison — especially of the Thomas variety who remain
the one group in the U. S. who oppose the war. This opposition even comes
out in a piece like his review in the current Pacific Affairs tliough somewhat
disguised — "It is the failure of most American liberals to understand and discuss
openly these facts which warrants grave doubts concerning the success of our
struggle now." It would be one thing for one of the national councils to select
these people — but it is a little different when it is tlie international secretariat.
In the case of Roy their reaction is probably that the IPR is pretty ignorant
about India if they pick Roy to write about the labor movement there. I know
very little about it, but my impression is that Mr. Roy's labor movement is
something minute and doesn't represent anytliing of real significance. Of
course Mr. Roy is incidentally an ex-communist, expelled I believe for "rightist"
tendencies. If we were to pick a minority party in India, it would be more
to the point today to pick the Communists themselves who apparently are co-
operating in the war effort and trying to push the Congress into a settlement.
The British have even let most of them out of jail as their program is construc-
tive for the general war effort. But best of all, the IPR should stock to major
movements and to articles on large groupings first, before it goes in for the
Roys.
I am sure that this position will not be accepted by either the secretariat or
many of the individuals connected with the IPR, but as you know it is bard
for the Soviets to cooperate with an organization whose policy it cannot
identify * * *.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5047
Exhibit No. 910
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 1st Ap7-il 1943.
In pencil (Copy to P. K. C).
Miss Mabel M. Carter,
31 Bartlet Street, Andover, Massachusetts.
Dear Mabel : Herewith my check for $225. I was in Washington on Monday
and so got a little behind with my correspondence.
While in Washington, among others, I called on and had interesting talks
with Dr. T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister of China ; Under Secretary of State Sum-
ner Welles ; Secretary of the Interior Ickes ; John Hazard, of Lend-Lease ; and
Michael Greenberg, of Lauchlin Currie's White House office.' In the evening I
participated in a United Nations discission at Constitution Hall. The other
speakers were: W. L. Batt, of the War Production Board; Gardner Cowles, of
the OWI, who went to Russia with Willkie ; Maurice Hindus ; and Sir Bernard
Pares, of the London School of Slavonic Studies. We dined beforehand at the
home of Mrs. Robert L. Bacon and then went back to her house at 10 : 30 for an
hour and a half further discussion and a number of speakers, Senators, Congress-
men, press, and others. It was a full and useful day.
Affectionately yours.
Exhibit No. 911
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, April 12, 19^3.
Mr. Richard J. Walsh,
Asia Magazine, J,0 East J,9th Street, Neio York City.
Dear Dick : The Dies Committee is after T. A. Bisson, who for the past year
has been working for the BEW. Bisson desires a few of his friends to write
letters testifying to his loyalty as an American citizen, adding anything that the
writer feels free to say.
Enclosed is a copy of what I have written. Would you feel free to writ©
directly to Honorable John H. Kerr, Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Com-
mittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C, sending
a copy of your letter to T. A. Bisson at 383 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase,
Maryland.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 912
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y., 12th April 1943.
Henry C. Alexander, Esq.,
23 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Alexander: From your reading of Land of the Soviets I am afraid
you may have got a wrong impression of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In
the hope of correcting such an impression, I am venturing to send you for your
personal library a few of our publications which may aid in rounding out the
picture.
During the past year the Institute has published in North America more than
fifty books and painphlets. In this entire list the only one which has been criti-
cized as soft and sentimental is Land of the Soviets, which was written espe-
cially for high-school students and which now. happily, is being revised. Much
more representative of the Institute's solid work are such studies as :
Banking and Finance in China.
Japan Since 1931.
The Making of Modern New Guinea.
I am therefore sending copies of these to you under separate cover.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5048 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 913
War Department,
Military Inteixigence SER\^CE;
Washington, April IS, 1943.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
c/o Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, Neio York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter : Thank you for your letter having reference to the Princeton
Conference. I am glad to have the tentative agenda, which I think is well pre-
pared. I have read Mr. Holland's article in the Far Eastern Survey of March
5th ; it seems to be an excellent statement.
I am taking the liberty of inviting Colonel Boekel, who is shortly going to
India in charge of "civilian affairs on General Stilwell's Staff. I do this in the
belief that he will find a great deal in the discussions which will be of value to
him in his work. I have checked with Dr. Johnstone and he thinks it is an
excellent proposal. I realize there isn't time for a reply from you, but unless
you send me a wire to the contrary, I shall bring Colonel Boekel.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ John I* Christian,
Captain, A. U. 8., Southern Asia Branch.
am
Exhibit No. 914
Penciled notations : KP
War Dep.^btment,
Military Intelligence Service.
Washington, Ajrril 1, 194S.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Mb. Carter: You letter to Colonel Mayer with respect to the I. P. R.
meeting on India, scheduled for Princeton, April 17-18, has been received. We
shall be pleased to have Captain John L. Christian of the Southern Asia Branch,
attend this private meeting.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ M. W. Petti grew
M. W. Pettigrew
Colonel, G. S. C, Chief, Far Eastern Unit.
Exhibit No. 915
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, April 5, 1943.
Captain John L. Christian,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Christian : We were delighted to hear from Colonel Pettigrew that you
will be able to attend the Princeton Conference on "India in the United Nations'
War Effort," April 17 and 18. As soon as it is ready we will send you the draft
agenda.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Cakter.
Exhibit No. 916
In pencil (ECC invited 4/28/43)
May 6 Meeting, Washington, Revised Invitation List
Sir Girja S. Bajapi, Indian Agency General, 2633 16th Street NW, Washington,
D. C.
Hugh Horton, Department of State, Washington
H. B. Bnfler, British Embassy, Washington
(penciled in-Carter)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5049
Frank Coe, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
Geoffrev Cox, New Zealand Legation, Washington
J. M. Elizalde, Resident Commissioner of the Philippines, 1617 Mass. Ave.,
Washington
James W. Fnlbright, House Office Building, Washington
Morris Greene, 2117 Woodland Drive NW, Washington
Dr. G. H. C. Hart, 1620 Belmont Street NW
Alger Hiss, Esq. Department of State
(penciled in-Holland)
Luther A. Johnson, House Office Building
(penciled in- Johnstone)
Dr. Walter Judd, House Office Building
Dr. Kan Lee, China Defense Supplies, 1601 V Street NW
(penciled in-Lockwood )
Howard J. MacMurray, House Office Bldg.
T. M. Martin, Col., G. S. C.-Chief, Japan Section, M. I. S. the Pentagon
William Mayer, Col., G. S. C.,-Chief, China Section, M. I. S., the Pentagon
John W. McCormack, House Office Building
Karl Mundt, House Office Building
M. W. Pettigrew, Col., G. S. C.,-Chief Far Eastern Section, M. I. S. the Pentagon
L. B. Pearson, Minister-Counsellor, Canadian Legation, Washington
MomSeni R. Pramoj, Royal Thai Legation, 2.300 Kalorama Road NW, Washington
Mr. A. P. Tixier, Delegation du Comite National Francais, 729 15th Street, NW
Alan Watt, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C.
SUPPLEMENTARY LIST
Mahindra
Someone from Navy
Bruce Turner
Rotor
Exhibit No. 917
WWL
Penciled notations : ( K. P. on Monday ask WWL & WLH whether it's okay to
invite both of these?) ECC
War Department,
Military Intelligence Service,
Washington, April 29, 1943.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Paciftc Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Mr. Carter: Thank you very much for your invitation to attend the
I. P. R. round-table discussions on the problems of collective security in the
Pacific and Far East, commencing Tliursday, May 6. I shall make every effort
either to be there or to delegate someone to represent the Far Eastern Unit.
I think that the two agencies listed below might also be interested in the
discussions :
Brig. General C. W. Wickersham, Commandant, School of Military Govern-
ment, Charlottesville, Virginia.
Colonel Dallas S. Townsend, Chief. Military Government Branch, Civil Affairs
Division, Office, Chief of Staff, War Department.
Very truly yours,
[s] M. W. Pettigrew
M. W. Pettigrew,
Colonel, G. S. C, Chief, Far Eastern Unit.
(Penciled notation: How about shoemaker, too? Lt. Col. gaines H. Office of
Provost Marshal Gen., Service of Supply, Room 2805, Munitions Bldg., War
Dept., Wash., D. C.)
88348— 52— pt. 14 10
5050 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 918
Penciled notation : Hiss, yes
3415 VoLTA Place,
WasMngton, D. C, April SO, 19J,3.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52 Street, New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter : This is to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 28
in which you were so good as to ask me to attend a small private discussion on
May 6 to discuss the tentative outline which was enclosed with your letter.
I shall he very glad to attend this meeting, subject, of cour.se, to some last-
minute call of duty which frankly I do not now foresee.
Yours sincerely,
Alger Hiss.
Exhibit No. 919
Penciled notation : Martin, Yes.
War Department,
Military Inteixigence Service,
Washington, May 1, 1943.
Penciled notation : K. P. By all means come on this basis — ECC
Mr. Edward C. Cabter,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Mr. Carter: I have received your letter of April 28, 1943, inviting me
to join a small private IPR round table discussion on the problem of collective
security in the Pacific and the Far East, to be held in Washington on May 6.
I am glad to have a copy of the tentative outline prepared by Mr. Johnstone,
and I should like to have the privilege of attending the discussion if I am not
expected to participate.
Yours sincerely,
/s/ Truman M. Martin
Truman M. Martin,
Colonel, G. S. C, Chief, Japan Branch.
Exhibit No. 920
129 East ."2nd Street,
New York City, May 4, 1943.
Colonel TrtJman M. Martin, G. S. C,
Chief, Japan Branch, Military Intelligence Service,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Colonel Martin : We will of course be glad to have you come to the
Thursday evening meeting as an observer.
Sincerely Yours,
Edward C. Carthir.
Exhibit No. 921
Mat 10, 1943.
WWL from ECC :
I had a long talk with .Tane Plimpton yesterday about becoming the IPR
representative in Washington. I think she would take the job like a shot if
she wasn't partially committed to going to work for Gulick in the Lehman
oflBce.
She lias agreed to hold up until Wednesday morning taking any final action
with Gulick. This is to give you time to see her on Tuesday and do the final
job (if salesmanship on behalf of the IPR.
Miss Plimpton was an honors graduate of Vassar, and throughout her term
at Vassar has .shown an imusual interest in the study both of American domestic
problems and of foreign relations. She has been very active in tlie student move-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5051
ment, was editor of the Vassar paper, and held several other high positions
in student life.
She could do, I think, a reniarkaldy good job for Bill Johnstone and for our
other Washington study groups because she has already had a lot of experience
in summarizing similar meetings. For several weeks, for example, at 700
Jackson Place, she has been rapporteur of the Washington study group of the
Commission to Organize Peace.
Of incidental value is the fact that she has intimate friends in the White
House and is a born promoter as well as a good scholar. Once she was given a
definite assignment, I would have no hesitation in sending her to Welles Horn-
beck, Harry White, or anyone in our government or any otlier government
with whom we wanted to make an IPR contact.
I think you can render a great service to Amco and Pacco by persuading
her to bec<)me our Washington representative. So far as Pacco is concerned
I would be prepared to recommend an appointment for the rest of the year.
She kno'ws her way around government offices, having been an interne in
the Bureau of the Budget where she has made the necessary grade. She does
not know shorthand, but she types rapidly and well.
You can reach her in lioom 2.jU of the State Department building, though
that particular roo^n is a Bureau of tlie Budget room. She lives at 3913
Huntington Street, N. W. — Telephone : Ordway 6370.
You may want to send her a wire today as to- when and where to meet you.
Exhibit No. 922
May 21, 1943.
Mr. Edward C Cartel,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter : As regards the invitation list for May 27 I suggest adding
Sir George Sansom, and Kan Lee. I presume that you have invited Hiss. I shall
be glad to have a talk with Alger Hiss about the meeting. I still think if we go
ahead on the agenda that it can be a good discussion. I will be on hand to have
dinner with you before the meeting if that is possible or to see you ten or fifteen
minutes before the meeting at 700 Jackson Place.
I will be perfectly willing to preside if you think it best, although you do a
much better job than I can. Please let me know if there is anything further you
would like done before the meeting.
Sincerely,
William C. Johnstone,
Dean of the Junior College.
Exhibit No. 923
Penciled in (copy to HM)
129 Bast 52nd Street,
Neic York 22, N. Y., 7th June 1H3.
Mortimer Graves, Esq.,
American Council of Learned Societies,
1219 Sixteenth Street N. W., Washington, D. C.
Dear Mortimer: On my return I received your little yellow inquiry about a
center of information in Washington. Part of the problem, of course, is
finance ; and part is personnel. I think you ought to get Harriet Moore's advice.
I wish we could see our way clearer and am wondering whether we ought to
wait until we can have the Ickes-Litvinoff-Graves-Moore-Carter dinner that I
spoke of.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5052 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 924
129 East 52nd Street,
New York 22, N. Y., 9th June 1943.
LAucHLiisr CuRRiE, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washiiigton, D. C.
Dear Curbie: Some time ago you asked me for a list of Chinese personnel. I
am now able to send you a copy of a list prepared by Lenning Sweet of UCR
together with a suplementary list which he has also prepared. This, I assume,
will be used in its present form or revised in the report that Lockwood is making
for Governor Lehman. If this is of any use to you, would you have a copy
made for your files and return the enclosed to me in due season?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 925
129 East 52nd Street,
Neiv York 22, N. Y., 15th June 19^3.
Lauchun CuRTiiE, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.
Dear Currie: Sweet of UCR has compiled the enclosed list of foreign per-
sonnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If
there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and
return this copy to me in due course.
Col. Evans » "arlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new
and characteristically valuable experience behind him. He leaves tonight for
Washington and \A'ill be at the Army and Navy Club for the next two days in
case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 926
Invitations for Third Meeting on Collective Securitive in the Pacific and
THE Par East
In ink— June 17, 1943.
In pencil— 6/10/43.
( Hand written : )
No— Sir Girja S. Bajpai : Indian Agency General, 2633 16th St. NW.
Dr. Hugh Borton : Special Division, Department of State.
Yes — Nicholas A. J. deVoogd : 1620 Belmont Street NW.
Yes — iMorris Greene : Australian Legation.
Yes — Alger Hiss : Dejiartment of State.
Yes— M. R. Seni Pramoj : Royal Thai Legation, 2300 Kalorama Road NW.
Lt. Col. James W. Shoemnker : 1729 Q Street NW.
No — Captain Vaughn F. Meisling : Military Intelligence Service, War Department.
Yes — Jf)hn Alexander: British Embassy.
No — Philippe Baudet : French National Committee, 1420 16th Street NW.
Yes — Frank Coe : Board of Economic Warfare.
(?) — L.B.Pearson: Canadian Legation.
Yes — The Honoraltle Frances P. Bolton : 2301 Wyoming Ave. NW.
Yes — The Honorable Howard J. McMurray : House Office Building.
No — The Honorable James W. Wadsworth : House Olfice Building.
G. S. Cox : New Zealand Legation.
No — The Honorable J. W. Fulbright : House Office Building.
Yes — The Honorable Walter Judd : House Office Building.
Yes— Kan I^e : China Defense Supplies, Inc., 2311 Mass. Ave., Washington 8.
Alan Watt : Australian Legation.
Harry B. Price : China Defense Supplies, Inc., 2311 Mass. Ave., Washing-
ton 8.
Yes — J. M. Elizalde: 1617 Massachusetts Avenue NW.
Col. William Mayer: Chief, China Section, MIS, War Dept., Pentagon Bldg
No — Sir George Sansom : British Embassy.
Y. R. C. James Yen : % Chinese Embassy.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5053
No — Bruce Turner: New Zealand Legation (6/14/43) in pencil.
No — W. W. liOekwood.
Yes— W. L. Holland.
Yes — William C. JohnKStons.
Yes— Edward C Cartel*.
(In ink) Walter Laves: Organization Services Division, Office of Civilian
Defense, Dnpont Circle Bldg.
Yes — Grayson Kirk : Department of State.
*Engene Dooman: Department of State.
♦William Y. Elliott : War Shipping Administration.
*Read Hager: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions Assignment Board.
List of those invited to collective security in the Pacific and the Far East,
too Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.
(in ink)
[I— Invited. Ace. = Accepted. Arr. = Attended. N= Did not attend or regretted]
John Alexander
Sir Qirja B-ijpai
Philipne Baudet
T. A. Bisson
Frances P. Bolton
Hus:h Borton
H. B. Butler
Evans F. Carlson
Edward C. Carter
Frank Coe
■Q. S. Cox
N. A. J. de Voogd
Eugene Dooman
J. M. Elizalde
William Y. Elliott
.T. F. Engers
Miriam S. Farley
J. W. Fulbright
Andrew Grajdanzev__.
Morris Greene
Read Hager
O.H. C.Hart
Alger Hiss,
W.L. Holland
Luther Jolmson
William C. Johnstone.
Walter Judd
Grayson Kirk
Walter Laves
Kan Lee
W. W. Lockwood
Col. T. M. Martin __
Col. William Mayer-
John W. McCormack
Howard J. McMurray
■Capt. Vaughn F. Meisling,
Martha Mooney
Harriet Moore
Karl Mundt
L. B. Pearson
Col. M. W. Pettigrew
Catherine Porter
M. R. Seni Pramoj
Harry B. Price
Sir George Sansom
James W. Shoemaker..
Capt. J. P. Taylor
A. P. Tixier
Dallas Townsend
Bruce Turner
James W. Wadsworth.
Alan S. Watt
Urbano Zafra
May 6, 1943
(In ink) May 27, 1943
I., Ace, Att
I. (sorry). New York.
I. (sorry), engaged _
L, Ace, Att
I., England
I., Ace, Att
I., Ace
I. (try attend), Turner.
I., Ace, Att
I. (sorry) engaged.
I., Ace, Att
I. (sorry) engaged.
I., Ace, Att.
I., West Coast
I., Ace, Att
I., Ace, Att
I. (sorry), engaged.
I., Ace., Att
I. (sorry), engaged.
, Ace, Att
, Ace, Att
. (sorry suggests
Meisling).
, i\
(sorry), engaged
, Ace, Att
I., N
I. (sorry) , engaged
I (try), N
I. (try or send some-
one).
I., Ace. Att.
I., Ace, Att-
, London
(sorry) engaged.
I., Ace, Att
I. (sorry). Hot Springs.
L, Ace, .\tt
I., Ace, Att
I., Ace, Att
I., Ace, Att
I., Ace, Att
I., Ace, Att
I., Ace . Att.
I., Ace, Att.
I. (sorry), Hot Springs
I.. N
I., Ace, Att.
I., Ace, Att-
L, N
L, N
I., N
I., Acc, Att-
I.,N
I. (sorry). Hot Springs.
L (try)
I., Acc, Att
L, N
I., Acc, N
I., Ace, Att
I., Acc, Att
I. (sorry), engaged
I. (sorry). Hot Springs
I., N
L, Ace, Att.
I., Ace, Att.
I., Ace, Att.
I., Acc, Att.
I.,N
(sorry) engaged.
, Acc, Att
I. (sorry) engaged.
I., N
Hot Springs
June 17, ;943
I., Ace, Att.
I. (sorry), away.
I. (sorry). New York.
I., .\ce, Att.
I. (very sorry), busy.
I., Ace, Att.
I., Ace, Att.
I., Ace, Att.
I. (no reply).
I., Ace, Att.
I. (sorry).
I. (hopes to come) N.
T., no reply.
I., Ace, Att.
I. (sirry) engaged.
I., Acc, .\tt.
I., Acc, Att.
I.. Ace, Att.
I. (s'>n v), New York.
I., Acc, N.
I., Acc. A!t.
I., Ace, Alt.
I., Ace, Att.
I., Ace, N.
I. (very much inter-
ested).
I., Ace, Att.
I.,N. ■
I. (no reply).
I., Acc, Att.
I.,N.
L,N.
I. (try), N.
I., Ace, Att.
I. Acc, Att.
I. (sorry) Baltimore.
I. (no reply).
I. Acc-., Att.
I., N., regrets.
L,N.
I. (sorry).
(?),N.
•Special letter.
5054 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 927
WLH NWL HA (Pencilled initials)
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, May 26, 191i2
MiLO Perkins, Esq.
Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Perkins : In early September the Institute of Pacific Relations is
planning a small private study conference to make an over-all appraisal of the
factors to be considered in the waging of the war in Asia and the Pacific, and to
stimulate creative thinliing on immediate postwar problems.
We expect able representation from China, India, Great Britain, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Soviet Russia, and the Netherlands
East Indies.
We regard it as most essential that you be present and participate in our
discussions. I want very much to talk with you in the near future as to some
of the personnel whom we should invite from other countries. I am wondering
whether you would have a quarter of an hour free to discuss this matter with
me on Tuesday, June 2nd. I could see you any time from early morning to late
at night except between two and three-thirty.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 928
Penciled Note : ECC Ark July 3
Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C, June 20, 19^2.
OflBL-e of the Executive Director
Penciled note: TARR
HOLLAND
LOCKWOOD
JESS UP
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street,
Neiv York City.
Dear Mr. Carter : I appreciate your invitation to attend the September meet-
ing of the Institute of Pacific Relations to discuss problems of war and recon-
struction in the Far East. Your enterprise in promoting such discussion is
useful. If circumstances permit, I shall be happy to participate ; otherwise I
shall ask James H. Shoemaker of the Far Eastern Division to attend.
I am sorry that I could not get in touch with you before June 2'. Might I
suggest that the next time you come to Washington you see Mr. William T.
Stone and Dr. Shoemaker about the persons to be invited to attend the meeting.
I have asked them to consider this matter now so that your discussion with them
may be as helpful as possible.
Sincerely yours,
[s] MiLO Perkins. Executive Director.
Exhibit No. 929
Draft to Mild Perkins
Dear Mr. Perkins : We deeply appreciated your letter of June 20 indicating
that if circumstances permitted you would be happy to participate in the forth-
coming Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
In deference to the wishes of our Chinese colleagues we have decided to hold
the Conference in December instead of September as originally proposed. The
Chinese cabled that they could send a very much more representative group if
the later date were chosen.
Enclosed is a copy of the draft agenda. Mr. Lockwood has already followed
your suggestion and talked to Mr. Stone and Mr. Shoemaker about our plans.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5055
Exhibit No. 930
129 East 52d Streiet,
New York 22, N. Y., June 28, 194S.
Lauchlin Cxtrrie, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.
Deiak Cukeie: For your private iiiformation I enclose a description of some of
the Chinese who arrived in this country a few weelis ago. This was prepared for
me by Harry Price. I am sure he would have no objection to my sharing it with
you.
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 931
July 14, 1943.
constantin oumansky,
Embassy of the V. 8. S. R.,
Merida 18, Mexico City, Mexico:
Planning see you early Thursday afternoon fifteenth.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 932
129 East 52d Street,
Neio York 22, N. Y., June SO, 19J,3.
His Exceixency, the Soviet Ambassador,
Embassy of the U. S. 8. R.,
Mexico City, Mexico.
Delar Oumansky: If you are unlikely to visit the United States this coming
month I am wondering whether you could spare a half a day to talk over many
matters with me if I found it possible to visit Mexico in the third or fourth week
of July?
Sincerely yours,
Edw^vrd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 933
Copy of Unfinished Handwritten Letter From Edward C. Carter to
John A. Carter
Aloft — Mexico City to Fort Worth, Tex.,
8unday, July 18, 19.'t3.
Dear John : Mexico City is about the same altitude as your birthplace, Simla.
Unlike Simla it is flat. Like Simla it is surrounded by mountains. But Mexico's
mountains though impressive are not as high or extensive as the vast bulk of the
Himalayas. The climate of Mexico City is unlike Simla. It has cool nights and
warm days all the year round. Some people feel the altitude. I didn't. The
city is a mixture of Rome, Paris, New York, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Mexican
Indian and I suppose of Madrid and Lisbon (which I've never visited). It
reminds one alternatively of Manila (the Spanish influence, palm trees, sunshine,
a primitive hinterland and an emotional people who can act with great ability
but who sometimes find great oratory a substitute for practical action. They
both can exert themselves when music bids them dance.
I mentioned Detroit's influence. There is apparently no gas or rubber shortage.
The city is jammed with American cars — mostly Mexican licenses but a scattering
of Texas and Arizona licenses. The hotels are full of American tourists. I had
wired ahead for a room but had to try six hotels after arrival before I could get
located. Luckily Oumansky (who has just arrived from Moscow as the Soviet
Ambassador) sent one of his staff in the Embassy car and she (Miss Alexandra
Nicholsky) drove me around until she found a hotel that would take me in.
After a wash and shave at the Hotel Gillow, she drove me to Embassy for lunch.
Oumansky greeted me most cordially but said quickly, "Don't say anything about
it to Mrs. O." Luckily I knew what he meant. Five days before leaving Moscow
for Mexico their only child, a 15-year-old daughter who was their greatest joy
and interest in life, was killed in an accident in Moscow. She had been at school
5056 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
in Washington, was developing great charm, brains, versatility, and they had all
three been planning together their next great adventure — the flight to Mexico
and life in a totally different civilization. They buried her and 2 days later got
into the great plane that flew them, their files, and the Embassy staff (four or
five people) across Siberia to Fairbanks, Alaska, where I am happy to say the
U. S. Army received them most cordially (lots of generals helping) and on orders
from Washington a big Army transport plane flew them from Fairbanks via
Seattle to Los Angeles when they travelled by American Airlines to Mexico City.
Mr. and Mrs. U. and I had a very nice lunch preceded by a little vodka and
caviar that they had brought. Mrs. O. was in black and you could see how over-
whelmed she is with her sorrow. Several times when I was with O. alone he
told of his anxiety for her and showed how terribly he, too, is suffering. But he
has his work that absorbs so much of his time. She is reading and clipping
American newspapers for him but the mails are awfully slow and that is hardly
a full-time job. I am going to ask Ruthie if she will send Mrs. O. some clippings
from time to time so that Mrs. O. will have more to do and also so that they can
get stuff of value that they wouldn't otherwise get. Mrs. O. has sent Alice and
Ruthie, by me, some little gifts of Mexican silver.
Oumansky and I spent many hours during my 3 days in Mexico discussing IPR
and the world in general. Motylev has gone to the front and has been succeeded
by G. N. Voitinsky as head of the USSR IPR. V. is a very good man — he was long
in China and the Far East. The food situation in Russia for civilians is terribly
bad but the Soviet press says little about it for fear of giving comfort to the
enemy.
With O. I met some of the leaders of the Mexican RWR. Castro Leal, a great
Mexican history and university professor.
(Penciled notation: If he has time ECC may finish this later — RDC.)
Exhibit No. 934
July 20th, 1943.
Mr. and Mrs. Constantin Oumansky,
Enibassy of the V. 8. 8. R.,
Merida 18, Mexico, D. F.
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Oumansky, This is to thank you both for your very kind
hospitality while I was in Mexico City. I enjoyed every minute of the 3 days
and I cannot tell you how pleased I was to renew our old acquaintance.
The new secretary of the Mexican aid to Russia committee came to see me
Sunday morning and we had a long and useful talk.
I arrived at La Guardia Field yesterday (Monday afternoon) about 1 : 30.
I have already given your greetings to several of your friends and will be
seeing more in the course of the week. I tried several times to reach Mrs.
Litvinoff on the phone yesterday afternoon, but there was no answer. So I went
to her apartment at 6 : 00 and discovered she had been away for a few days. At
the apartment house they did not know precisely when she would return, but I
will see that she gets Mrs. Oumansk.v's letter just as soon as she returns.
Mrs. Carter and Ruth were delighted with Mrs. Oumansky's presents and with
all the news I was able to bring them.
I will be w^riting you again in two or three days on several matters.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 935
129 East 52nd Street,
New York 22, N. T. July 20th, 1943.
Mrs. Maxim Litvinofp,
301 Eafit SSth 8treet, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mrs. Litvinoff : Yesterday I arrived by air from Mexico City where I
had spent 3 days. I saw a great deal of Mr. and Mrs. Constantin Oumansky,
who sent you their warmest greetings and the enclosed package. On ray ar-
rival yesterday afternoon I phoned your apartment several times but got no
answer. So I went to the apartment about six in the evening and discovered
that you were away for a few days. So I thoutrht I better send this package
by mail rather than leaving it with the elevator man.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5057
The Oumansky's are settling in to life in Mexico City very well. They have
made many friends already and are clearly very vpell liked. They are both
terribly crushed by their daughter's death. He is most considerate of her and
is doing everything in his power to help her to overcome her profound grief. His
life is, of course, more filled with activity than hers so he does not have as much
time for sadness. But he is terribly crushed by the calamity. He is naturally
eager for her to have as many things to do as possible. I suggested to her a
number of things that she can do for Russian war relief in Mexico.
II' you could possibly manage to go there for a visit, you would be doing the
Oumanskys a very friendly service. Incidentally, you would find much in Mex-
ico to interest you. It is a fascinating mixture of Europe, the Orient, and of
Mexican Indian life and culture. There are interesting people in Mexico from
all over the world and the cultural and aesthetic life would interest you very,
very greatly. The climate is salubrious and the vegetables and fruit, the clear
air and the sunshine are to be had in great abundance. There is little external
evidence of the war and no rationing of rubber, petrol or coffee. Do go if you
possibly can.
There is a chance that I will be flying to Chungking about the first of August.
I do hope that I can have a talk with you at least on the phone before I go, if
I do go.
With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Carter.
Copy care Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.
Exhibit No. 936
Copy to : Oumansky.
129 East 52nd Street,
New York 22, N. Y., July 20th, 1943.
Eugene D. Kisselev, Esq.,
Consul General of the V. 8. 8. R.,
7 East 61st 8treet, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Kisselev : This is to inform you that I have recently received a cable-
gram from Moscow signed by Voitinsky reading as follows :
"Volumes Mont Tremblant Conference Papers Received Many Thanks."
May I thank you most sincerely for your kindness in dispatching the volumes
go promptly.
I will have another consignment of books to send to Voitinsky in another
week or two. May I enlist your help in sending this second instalment also?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 937
129 East 52nd Street, New York 22, N. Y.,
August Jfth, 1943.
liAUCHLIN CURRIE, EsQ.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. CtrERiE: Dad was very grateful to you for sending him the letter
of recommendation which he found awaiting him at the Mayflower on Monday
night. He was sorry to miss having a last word with you. If there is anything
■which you would like to communicate with him you can send it to the Embassy
in Chungking.
He is wondering whether you would feel free to cable John Fairbank that he
is on the way?
Sincerely yours.
Secretary to Edward C. Carter.
5058 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 938
August 1, 1943.
Sent from 331 East 71st Street, N. Y. C.
Lauchlin Currie,
Executive Office of the President,
White House, Washington, D. C:
If you think a general letter of recommendation would be helpful for me on
my journey could I get it at your office nine-thirty Tuesday morning?
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 939
The United States,
Office of War Information,
54 Queensway, New Delhi, India, August 23, 1943.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
% American Eiwhassy, Chungking.
Dear Dad : The following cable came from Bill Holland, which I am passing
along through the pouch.
"Extension AMCO relief studies requested confidential basis hope you Carter
can report briefly from Chungking, extensively following return ; also secure
several studies qualified Americans special aspects 500 dollars available stop
Can you also arrange survey correspondents India Australia Hariet More."
I hope things are going well, and that the trip was not too adventurous.
Affectionately yours,
[s] Bill.
(Penciled note : W. D. Carter.)
Exhibit No. 940
129 East 52nd Street, New York 22, N. Y.,
15th October 1943.
Letter #25
William D. Carter, Esq.,
U. S. Office of War Inforniation,
A. P. O. 885, Postmaster, New York, N. Y.
Dear Bill : Here is another part of the September Pacific Affairs which you
requested. I hope it gets to you soon.
You may be interested to know that Kay Greene is now, as far as we know,
somewhere in the northern part of the continent on which you landed before
flying to your present post. She started out with a job with Lehman's organiza-
tion, which I believe Phill Jessup got for her. I think Margaret is going to use
some of her furniture for her new apartment. Kay had left it for Rose Y'ardu-
mian and Mary Healy to use. But as Rose has now gone to Washington for the
IPR and as Mary will soon be joining Beecroft, they gave up their plans for
taking an apartment here so the furniture was going begging.
Love.
Exhibit No. 941
1 East 54th Street,
■'ith November, 1943.
Private & confidential.
Dr. Robert J. Kerner,
University of California, Berkley.
Dear Kerneb : As you know, W. L. Holland and I were in Cliina in September.
Holland saw your former student and great admirer, Chen Han-.seng. Holland
discovered that because of his honest, liberal views and progressive attitude,
Chen Han-seng was in danger of being spirited away by some underground right-
wing group. We all regard him as one of the soundest students of China's
agrarian economy and a true Chinese patriot. We conferred with both Chinese
and American friends in China as to how best to save Chen Han-seng for future
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5059
usefulness to his country. It is a matter that has to be handled with extreme
delicacy.
All of our advisers say that the best insurance would be an invitation from
one of the three or four leading American universities to Chen Han-seng to come
to the United States either as a temporary research professor or associate or
for a special course of lectures. This apparently would be a greater safeguard
than an invitation from the IPR.
Knowing how familiar you are with Chen Han-seng*s work, Holland and I
are venturing to inquire whether you could act in the matter. If funds should
prove the only difficulty, we would be prepared to find the necessary money for
the journey and, say, a three-months api>ointment.
In confidence, today I have received through the State Department the fol-
lowing confidential message from Chungking :
"Confidential : Please tell Mr. Carter that latest from the Kweilin consul
indicates that Chen Han-seng is in an increasingly precarious position, and
that Sa Kung-liao, the liberal writer who was arrested there this summer,
is now incommunicado; Chen may well be next, and IPR would be well
advised to act suddenly and soon if they want to get him out."
Would you wire me whether you would be in a position to act swiftly and
.affirmatively in this matter?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 9-12
< Handwritten note:) Copies to JAC
PKS
WDC
1 East 54th Street,
.Veir York 22, N. Y., Sth November 1943.
The Misses Caster,
31 Bartlctt ^trert, Andovcr, Massachusetts.
Dear Mabel and Harriet : Letters from each of you have arrived. "We are
glad to hear fj-om you both and to read the interesting clippings that you have
sent.
I finished my work in Moscow just as Hull, Eden, Harriman, and their staffs
arrived. I had an invitation to go to the airport to meet them, but at the same
time I had an important engagement with a Russian expert on China whom I
had been trying to see ever since I arrived, so 1 spent three hours with Rogoff
instead of going to the airport to see the celebrities arrive. The reception for
them was very imiiressive I was told. The American planes came in and landed
their passengers fifteen minutes ahead of the British, so first I\Ir. Hull inspected
the Guard of Honor and then Mr. Eden. The Guard of Honor were all in fancy
uniforms and impressed everyone profoundly. I "did not bother Hull or Eden
after their arrival because I knew they were fully occupied with the preparations
for what proves to have been one of the most historic meetings in our generation.
A great many of the things that we have all worked for for years are beginning
to be realized.
We are not going to Nashville to see Jill because John is staying on at Fort
Sill as an artillery instructor for a month or two at least. His address is : Lt.
John A. Carter 01184470, Battery E, 32nd Battalion, Sth Training Regiment,
F. A. R. T. C, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
Alice and I are going to Lee this afternoon so I can get a little further sleep
and relaxation before I plunge into active work next week.
Ruth and I have just spent two days in Washington. I had talks with Secre-
tary Morgenthau, Ambassador Davies, Lauchlin Currie, Governor Lehman, Phil
Jessup. Selskar Gunn, General Faymonville, Jane Plimpton, Stanley Hornbeck,
Elizalde, Fox of the President's War Relief Control Board, and a few others.
I was very tired when I arrived owing to the strenuous character of the last
week in Russia, but I am now back in my old form.
You will note we have moved into new offices which ai-e going to be a little^
more commodious and convenient than our rabbit-warren at 129 East 52nd
Street.
With much love, I am
Ever affectionately yours,
5060 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 943
November 13, 1943.
AG from ECC :
When I asked yon to translate Rogoff's article I did not know about the part
of it which appeared in the September issue of Amerasia. I hope tliis will reach
you in time so as to prevent your doing the entire translation if part of it has
already been done in Amerasia.
I was sorry that I did not get as far to the east as Irkutsk.
Exhibit No. 944
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.,
15th November, 1943.
Lt. John A. Carter 01184470,
Battery E, 32nd Battalion, 8th Training Regiment,
Fort Sill, Oldahoma.
Dear John : It was wonderful to hear your voice on the phone at Lee Friday
evening. Mother, Ruth and I were very excited.
I got your good letter of November 3rd a few days before. Your present tem-
porary assignment of teaching men survey must, as you say, be both interesting
and instructive to you. I am sure it is also interesting and instructive to your
pupils.
You certainly have a wide variety of subjects to cover in the Field Artillery.
You would have been immensely interested to have visited with me the great
"German War Tropiiies Exhibition" at the Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow.
Here, spreading over many acres is a vast but systematically organized collec-
tion of armament and equipment captured from the Germans. There are special
sections for each classification— tanks, planes, trucks, artillery, uniforms, mines,
bombs, etc. The evolution, for example of tanks and artillery, are vividly shown.
The Russian Major General who personally conducted me had special tech-
nicians elaborating details in each section; i. e., one for howitzers, another for
heavy siege guns, another for light but terribly powerful antitank guns, another
for various types of antiaircraft guns. The different technicians explained the
differences in German and Soviet equipment and indicated how much more mobile
a great deal of the Russian equipment is.
Yes, the Moscow conference was one of the most significant gatherings of our
generation. As I was in Russia for the fortnight before the conference began,
I was aware on every side of the determined efforts the Russians were making to
ensure the success of the conference. The intellectual and documentary educa-
tion had been very extensive. In addition the Russians thought up a thousand
dilTerent acts of hospitality and friendship not only for Hull and Eden but for
all of their staff including all of the members of the crews of every one of the
British and American planes that flew the two staffs into Moscow.
It was, I suppose, necessary for Churchill and Roosevelt to have all of those
two-some conferences of theirs, but it did begin to look to all the rest of the world
as though a secret, closely knit Anglo-American hegemony was emerging to con-
trol the world.
The Moscow conferences dramatize to the world that the four countries —
Britain, China, U. S., and U. S. S. R. — must and will work together. Of course,
there are innumerable problems to be faced still, but the machinery for facing
them is now at long last being set up.
I am sure that all of the public criticism of Hull as being anti-Soviet has been
worth while. It probably needled him into bolder and more friendly action than
he mi!:ht otherwise have taken.
With you, I think that the reports of the travelling Senators were not aS
thoughtful as they should have been. A British Parliamentary Mission of the
same sort would have compared notes and agreed on making a more unified im-
pact on the public on their return.
With you I also question the wisdom of the line which Time is taking regard-
ing air bases abroad. There is bound to be an immense expansion of aviation
after the war, but we will become one of the most hated nations if we try to
scoop other nations in attempting monopoly of postwar commercial aviation.
It is too eai-ly to say whether Wavell will establish a new India or not. Thus
far he has shown no sign of holding out the olive branch to those in prison. He
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5061
has, however, publicly acknowledged that there is famine in India by going per-
sonally to Bengal, which his predecessor failed to do.
I will try and send you copies of any letters or reports that might develop
further my ideas resulting from the trip.
I enclose a hurriedly dictated report on certain aspects of my visit to the
Soviet Union. This is just a first draft and will be revised later. Will you
please send it on to Polly and the Andover Aunts and ask them to return it to me.
Affectionately yours,
Exhibit No. 945
1 East 54th Steeet, New York 22, N. Y.,
15th November 1943.
Miss Kate Mitchell,
Amerasia, 225 Fifth Avenue,
'Nevo York, N. Y.
Dear Kate : May I congratulate you on the September issue of Amerasia. I
do hope that you managed to send a number of copies into China itself. If you
have not done so already, may I venture to suggest that you tear off the cover
and send by air mail to their appropriate APO addresses one copy each to :
General Stilwell
General Chennault
General Stratemeyer (New Delhi)
John Davies and Jack Service ( Both on Stilwell's staff)
George Merrell (American Mission, APO 8S5, Postmaster, NYC)
William D. Carter (U. S. O. W. I., APO 885, Postmaster, NYC)
Mac Fisher (Chungking)
You might also send one by ordinary air mail to Liu fu-wan, P. O. Box 98,
Chungking.
It may help matters with the Indian and Chinese censorship if you refrain
from mentioning that you are sending these at my request. It may also help
if the envelope which carries them is simply marked with your new address
without mentioning Amerasia, 52nd Street, or the IPR.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 946
(Pencilled:) RD San Francisco, 417 Market St.
(Pencilled note:) Return to RD
Report on Washington Office, December 1943-March 1945
Under the joint auspices of the American Council and the International Secre-
tariat the Washington offices of the Institution Of Pacific Relations were re-
opened at 744 Jackson Place NW., in November 1943 with Professor William C.
Johnstone, Dean of the School of Government at The George Washington Uni-
versity, as Director of the Washington Study Program and Miss Rose Yardumian
as Washington Representative. During the past year several research associates
have been added on a part-time basis including Miss Virginia Thompson, Mrs.
Eleanor Lattimoi-e and Dr. Rockwood Chen. (Miss Thompson moved to San
Francisco in October where she is now associated with the Office of War Informa-
tion.) In August 1944 Mrs. Elizabeth Ussachevsky joined the staff of the Wash-
ington Office. A small library including a full set of IPR publications and a
number of reference texts on the Far East has been set up and made available
to members and people working in the field. The Washington Office sells the
publications of both the American Council and the International Secretariat for
the convenience of members in the local area.
The IPR in Wa.shington has been in a favorable position through its inter-
national and private character to simulate informal discussion among Far Eas-
tern experts temporarily stationed in Washington from the various countries
for off-the-record meetings either at the IPR offices or at the Cosmos Club Assem-
bly Hall. Informal meetings at the IPR office — of which there have been 17 in
the course of the past year — have included such speakers as Mr. Edmund Clubb of
5062 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the Department of State; Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Information in
Chungking; Col. Victor Purcell, a Briti.sh colonial administrator with long ex-
perience in Malaya ; Dr. J. S. Kennard, a missionary recently returned from
China ; the Hon. Walter Nash of New Zealand who discussed the ILO confer-
ence ; several Chinese professors visiting this country under the program of
cultural relations of the Department of State; Mr. John Service of the Depart-
ment of State ; Sir Frederick Eggleston, Minister to the United States from
Australia ; Mr. Kumarappa, Director of Social Sciences of the Tata Institute,
India ; Mr. George Yeh, China, Ambassador Naggiar, France, Mrs. Pandit, India,
Mr. Siva Rao, India, delegates to the Hot Springs Conference of IPR ; Senator
Carloos Garcia, a Filipino guerrilla leader from Leyte ; Gunther Stein, British
correspondent from China ; and Mr. John Emmerson of the Department of State
who described plans of the Japanese Emancipation League in Yenan.
General meetings to which all members in the local area are invited have taken
place about every two months usually in the Cosmos Club Assembly Hall. At-
tendance at these meetings ranges from 75 to 100 people. The first meeting of this
kind was held in December 1943 to give tlie members of the IPR an opportunity
to hear Mr. Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General of the IPR and Mr. William
Holland, Research Secretary, discuss their trip to China. The response to this
meeting was so enthusiastic that it was decided to include such meetings as part
of the regular program. Kiglit .such mombei'ship meetings have been held in the
last 16 months. Other speakers have included H. Foster Bain, repatriated from
the Philippines on the second Gripsholm trip, who described some of the effects
of Japanese occupation on the Philippine economy ; Dr. Tsiang Tingfu and Dr.
Mackenzie Stevens who discussed the role of cooperatives in Asia ; Dr. Henry
De Young, Mr. Youngjeuhg Kim, and Mr. Ilhan New who discussed Korean
affairs; Lt. Com. Nelson Spinks, Dr. Wiiljam C. Johnstone and Mr. Wilfred
Fleisher who participated in a panel discussion on What To Do With Japan
under the chairmanship of Admiral Harry Yarnell ; Mr. Obaidnr Rahman and
Mr. John Fischer on U. S. -Indian economic relations. In December 1944 a joint
meeting was held at the home of Mrs. Gifford Pinehot with the local branches
of Americans United and Indusco participating on recent developments in Chinese
affairs — Mr. Lewis Smythe and Mr. Owen Lattimore were the speakers. Early
in March, 194.5, Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana reported on his mis-
sion to China to the IPR membership in a Cosmos Club meeting.
Special functions have included a luncheon for press members to hear Mr.
Carter and Mr. I-Iolland give an off-the-record account of their trip to the Far
East, a dinner for members of Congress and administration officials for the same
purpose. (Penciled note — An informal luncheon discussion led by Mr. Carter
for Army and Navy officials responsible for educational work was held about a
year ago to acquaint officers with IPR materials particularly our pamphlet pro-
gram.) A luncheon was heUl for Owen Lattimore on his return from China
in the summer of 1944 when he accompanied Vice-President Wallace on his trip
to the Soviet Far East and China. At this meeting Mr. Lattimore discussed the
treatment of minorities by the Chinese and Russians. In December 1944 a
sherry party honoring Sir Fi-ederick Eggleston, Minister from Australia to the
U. S. was held at the Mayflower Hotel.
Following the ninth international conference of the IPR held at Hot Springs,
many parties were held in Washington to honor the foreign delegates visiting in
Washington. Highlighting these was a tea given by the Hon. Frances Bolton,
Representative from Ohio, for conference delegates to meet members of Congress
as well as Army, Navy, and Administration officials. A small cocktail party was
given for the press by the IPR to meet the chairmen of the various delegations.
Under Dr. Johnstone's chairmanship a number of small study groups were
formed on various topics sponsored by the American Council in some cases and
by the International Secretariat in others. In one case the American Council
of the IPR and the China Council sponsored jointly a number of meetings on
Postwar U. S.-Chinese P^conomic Relations. Under the auspices of the American
Council study groups met on Trade and Investment Policies in Southeast Asia,
Treatment of Japan and Postwar U. S.-Chinese Economic Relations. The Inter-
national Secretariat has sponsored two groups, one on Treatment of Japan, and
the other on Economic Recovery in Pacific countries. A great part of the dif.-
cussions on Japan have been included by Dr. Johnstone in his forthcoming book.
The Future of .htpnn, soon to be published by the Oxford University Press under
the sponsorship of the American Council of IPR. Plans are under way for
another study group under the auspices of the American Council on the general
topic of Dependent Territories in the Pacific area.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5063
It is interesting to note that as a result of greatly increased interest in the
Pacific area and therefore in the work of the IPR generally, membership in the
AVashington area has almost doubled in the last eighteen months since the re-
opening of the Washington offices. (Checli with TGS on exact figures believe
we have picked up 85 members in the past year bringing our membership up
to 200 approximately. This does not include about 35 non-Americans interested
in the work of the IPR whom we invite to general membership meetings.)
ExHiHiT No. 947
(Pencilled note:) Ray — Some rough notes for Peggy on my vague ideas on
program. Thought you might like to see a copy. RY
(Pencilled note :) Return to R. D.
To: MAS,
From: KY.
April 16, 1945.
During the present phase of the Pacific war and until its final successful con-
clusion and for several years thereafter the interest of the American people in
Far Eastern affairs will increase tremendously. The job before the IPR will
be to build this interest in a constructive way toward the education of an
enlightened American people. The IPR is uniquely organized and favorably
equipped to assume leadership in this task. Through a carefully planned pro-
gram of activities integrating the school program, -pamphlet and research pro-
grams, and through an expanded circulation of Far Eastern Survey, Pacific
Affairs and the other research publications of the International Secretariat,
the IPR should be able to go forward building and broadening the base of its
meuibership. Tlie greatest obstacle before the American Council at present is
the lack of integration between work already done, current program and a
future program. This can be overcome only with the appointment of a mature
qualified and experienced Program Director with a background in Far Eastern
affairs if possible.
In my work in Washington I have found that not all people interested in IPR
are interested in all phases of its work. For example, press and radio people
are far more interested in the Far Eastern Survey than in general meetings or
study group activities. The good job already begun on getting the Far Eastern
Surrey before infiuential new.spapermen and radio commentators with appro-
priate releases should be continued. We have found that government people
are more interested in the program of study groups than in any other single
activity. The international character of IPR l)ringing together experts tor
inftumal di.scussion on Far Eastern problems has interested many government
people who after participating in one of these groups usually become members.
It may be that this kind of activity can be expanded throughout the United
States ; in areas where non-Americans interested in Pacific affairs are present,
the international character could be organized for people with Far Eastern
background. It may be that this phase of our activity should be planned in
cooperatic.ii with local Fl'A's, Carnegie Endownipnt groups, Americans United,
etc. While I strongly favor cooperation \\ ith all groups to avoid duplication,
outside of study group activity I would urge that the IPR set up an independent
program wherever possible.
Organized groups and clubs (including women's groups, international and
national organizations interested in international relations, church groups,
labor groups, and other) are attracted by general membei'ship meetings. An
arbitrary figure of six such meetings a year might be planned for all active
branches. While we have been able to plan only one meeting ahead in Wash-
ington we hope in the future to have plans made a little farther ahead. It is
not always possible to do this, of course, because people come unexpectedly and
sometiiiies stay only briefly. These groups mentioned above who will form
the bi'oader base which we hope to build are also very much interested in the
popular pamphlet program. It may be that the general meetings and new
pamphlets could be coordinated in some way. The Army and Navy can be
included in the above group, generally speaking. We had one special luncheon
in Washington for Army and Navy leaders in orientation work about a year
ago to acquaint them with our work, particularly pur pamphlet progi-am. Per-
haps another one should be planned soon.
5064 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
There has been no demand in Washington for the business luncheons which
have worked so successfully in New York. However, we have had a number
of small informal sherry parties beginning at 5 : 30 and lasting about an hour
for foreign officials, U. S. government officials, newspapermen, etc., just back
from the Far East. To these meetings we invite approximately 3.5 people, mostly
members and some nonmembers whom we wish to interest in membership. The
talks are usually off-the-record and brief, with a long question period. We have
had 17 such meetings in the course of the past 12 months. They are an excellent
technique for building membership in Washington as well as for giving us the
reputation for being closely in touch with the latest visitors from the Far
East. People often call up to ask what's going on at IPR? (We don't tell
them all, of course!) Slightly modified to fit the special branches these meetings
could be more generally used throughout by our branches.
Not a small part of our office time is taken up with requests for information,
not only on IPR publications and others but on substantive material. We have
handled this business very spottily in Washington. When I have time, I work
up bibliographies. Investigate Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's life, etc., but often these
requests must be answered very generally by reference to a pamphlet or article.
This is one specific instance where coordination between a branch and the
national office is bad. There are lots of special bibliographies in the file in
New York (Bruno has worked up many), and somehow when this is done
branches should get copies. It would be desirable to have copies of those
already drawn up. Another criticism which I would like to make is that, unless
I come to New York to find out specifically what each of you is working on,
I am apt to be very loosely informed. ( Don't stop the New York trips thought. )
For instance, I had heard from someone down here that we were putting out a
pamphlet by Pearl Buck but didn't know anything about it until I got to New
York. Each department head or the Secretary should assume responsibility for
keeping branches informed about all work in preparation. This would be a
big help.
We have recently decided in Washington that we would try to build up our
relations with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees. In connec-
tion with these plans which have already been in operation, a few^ of us invited
Congressman Mansfield to dinner, and plans are in process to invite Congress-
woman Emily Taft Douglas for lunch. Getting the IPR better known on the
Hill will be one of our chief aims for the next six months. (I might add, Peggy,
that I am scared to death of this kind of work.) I have asked Ruth Lazurus to
keep me informed about forthcoming issues of FES so that I can use special
articles as a springboard for discussion on IPR.
Finally, on the question of big money raising, I have done nothing in this
field whatsoever. The question is a complex one, I know, but the branches
should be informed of what is being done in the various areas and how. The
national office should assume leadership in this job but with some direction;
perhaps the branches could help share the burden.
The fact that Washington has almost doubled membership figures since the
reestablishment of our Washington office is a concrete indication of the interest
of many kinds of people in our work. (Check with Tillie. I believe we've added
over 85 members and have approximately 200 now.)
Exhibit No. 948
1 East 54 th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.,
ISth December 1943
Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Esq.,
Office.
Dear Andrew: I am giving a small private dinner for several Soviet friends
in Washington on Tuesday, December 14th, to report on my impressions of the
Soviet Union.
I would be delighted if you would join us. The dinner will be held in Suite
237 at the Hotel Mayflower at 8 : 00 p. m. tomorrow night. Business suits will
be worn.
Would you let me know whether, in spite of this short notice, you will be
able to attend.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carteb.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5065
Exhibit No. 949
22nd December, 1943.
Private & Confidential.
The Secretary,
Lithuanian Legation,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Sir : Yesterday I received the enclosed unsigned letter, pamphlet, and
news bulletin in the enclosed envelope.
I have scanned this material and am now returning it to you because I am not
able to write to the anonymous sender, and furthermore I ought in all frankness
to say that I am sure that this is not the moment for friends of Lithuania to
attack the Soviet Union. From a realistic point of view it seems clear that
Lithuanians in Europe will have a better opportunity of working out their own
salvation by forgetting the grievances of the past centuries and seeking to under-
stand and cooperate with the people of the Soviet Union. It would seem to me
that along these lines there is a greater chance for peace in Europe and pros-
perity in Lithuania than along the lines of the enclosed documents.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 949-A
State of New York,
County of New York, ss:
I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as Ex-
hibit I. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am satisfied
that with the following exception they are letters or memoranda received by
me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me
to others or photostatic copies of such copies :
12. Ray Dennett RDC Sept. 26, 1945.
Edward C. Carter.
Sworn to before me this 9th day of May 1952.
[seal] Irene R. Donohue,
Notary Puhlic, State of New York.
Qualified in Queens County, No. 41-6061800.
Certs, filed with Queens, Kings, New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs.
Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co. Clerks Offices.
Commission Expires March 30, 1954.
(The document referred to by Mr. Carter is exhibit No. 9G2.)
Exhibit No. 950
K. C. Li, Woolworth Btjilding, New York
El Runchokee,
El Paso, Texas, March 7, 19U-
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street,
Ne^v York, Neio York.
Dear Mr. Carter: Your letter of March 1 has been forwarded to me and I
am enclosing copy of a letter I have written to the Draft Board in Richmond,
California.
I approve of your assuring Mr. Holland that the IPR for the next two years
will make up the difference between any salary he may receive in government
service and his present IPR salary. It is only fair in view of the reasons you
give.
I hope Holland is deferred, as he is indeed indispensable in preparing for the
important 1945 Meeting. I am leaving here but expect to be back in New York by
the 15th.
With kindest personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) K. C. Li.
K, C. Li.
KCL : efm
(Enclosure)
88348 — 52 — pt. 14 11
5066 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS
Exhibit No. 951
K. C. Li, Woolwobth Building, New York
March 7, 1944.
Selective Service Board #53,
Richmond, Calif.
Gentlemen : I have just learned that Mr. W. L. Holland, a registrant of your
Board, has been classified as 1-A. May I respectfully suggest reconsideration of
this classification for the following reasons :
1. Mr. Holland is International Research Secretary of the Institute of
Pacific Relations which is the leading research organization devoted to
Pacific problems.
2. Because the Institute has lost so many of its staff to Government
service, Mr. Holland has literally become indispensable. Besides being
research secretary, he is also editor of its magazine, "Pacific Affairs."
S. The 1945 Conference of the Institute is regarded as very important,
and preparations for it are in the hands of Mr. Holland. The work of this
Conference will be valuable to the State Department as well as to members
of the United Nations.
4. Mr. Holland is frequently being consulted by representatives of the War,
Navy, and Treasury Departments.
5. Should the registrant be inducted, he will no doubt, because of poor
eyesight, be assigned to limited service. I believe he is of greater value
to his country and the cause of the United Nations in his present position
than he can be in uniform.
For the above reasons, I recommend that Mr. Holland be deferred for 1 year.
Sincerely yours,
K. C. Li,
Chairman, International Finance Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations.
Exhibit No. 952
3/27/44.
Notes Fob Cleveland Speech, March 31, 1944
The peoples and leaders of the United Nations generally believe that they
will win the war. But many thoughtful people in the various nations are not so
sure of the peace. This misgiving is on balance a healthy sign. It derives in
part from a greater degree of political consciousness than that which existed
amongst the Allies in the midst of the First World War. It is true that some
hundreds of people in the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, the United
States and other countries were studying proldems of world organization dur-
ing the last war. But where there were hundreds engaged in this task then,
there are now thousands, probably tens of thousands. Indeed one of the most
striking results of the last war and the Paris and other peace conferences was
the creation of scores of important national and local organizations whose
central purpose was : "It must never happen again." Among the many such non-
governmental organizations that came into being at that period are the Royal
Institute of International Affairs in London, The Centre d'Etudes de Politique
Etrangere in Paris, the Institute of History and Economics in Copenhagen, the
Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations in the United
States. In lf)25 men and women from several of the Pacific countries, meet-
ing in Honolulu, formed the Institute of Pacific Relations as a regional ex-
pression of this broad movement. For it was felt that most international
organizations had their headquarters in Eui-ope and were inadvertently tending
to take the position that if European problems were solved the problems of
the world as a whole would disappear. Many Europeans and Americans, if they
looked to the Far East at all, seemed to be looking that way with a telescope
in reverse. The founders of the IPR were acutely consrious of a whole world of
dynamic forces in the Pacific area which had menacing possibilities and which
cried out for immediate study. The Institute aimed to study the problems of the
Pacific from a world point of view and the problems of the world from a
Pacific point of view. National Councils of the Institute came into being in
eleven countries bordering on the Pacific or having vital interests in that area.
When Japan raised the curtain on the Second World War by occupying Man-
churia in 1931, the foresight of the founders of the Institute was justified. In
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5067
1933 the Institute chose Mr. Newton D. Baker as Chairman of its international
governing body, the Pacific Council and he gave rare insight to the leadership of
the Institute until his death. Recently an eminent American, closely in touch
with the efforts of the United Nations, following Hongkong and Pearl Harbor,
to prepare themselves for the war in the Pacific, remarked: "I would hate
to think of where we would have been if it had not been for the scholarly
research of the Institute of Pacific Relations."
In addition to the national and international organizations which I have
just mentioned there have grown up in this and other countries local and regiouat
societies of similar purpose such as the Cleveland Council on World Affairs^
and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. These still further register th&
growing conviction that the study of foreign affairs was as urgent a concem
of the masses as domestic issues. The contribution of such councils to public
enlightenment has been great.
But the Second World War has come and by history's severest test the efforts
of us all will have to be described with the one word : "failure."
The challenge today is how can we profit by this collective failure to help in
solving now the overwhelming problems of world organization? Do we now
accept Newton D. Baker's prophecy that if the nations did not organize after the
first world struggle, the war would have to be fought over again on a vaster scale
and that the United States would return to the ideal of world organization which
it had rejected?
Although the governments of the world and the peoples through unofficial
organizations like the Cleveland Council on World Affairs and the Institute of
Pacific Relations have failed, they have increased substantially the possibility of
avoiding the grievious mistakes of the past generation. Balked and frustrated
as we are by the caution of our governments, the leaders of the United Nations;
and their respective publics are much further advanced in previsioning the
future than they were at this stage in World War I.
Both governmental agencies and unofficial organizations have done and are
doing quantitatively at least a vastly greater amount of study on the future
organization of the world than they had done in preparation for the Paris Con-
ference. In the United States alone every week sees the appearance of some new
book, plan, or monograph on world organization. The Protestant Churches, under
the leadership of John Foster Dulles, have advanced their views. The interna-
tional lawyers, under the leadership of Manley O. Hudson of Harvard and the
Permanent Court of International Justice, after a long period of careful study,
have made six postulates and twenty-three proposals for the organization of the
proposed community of nations and prescribing details for the operation of its
machinery. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, under the
leadership of James T. Shotwell, has published a flood of memoranda on almost
every aspect of the postwar world. The United States Chamber of Commerce's
Committee on Post War Problems has called for the immediate formation of an
international commission to draft a world peace plan based on the Moscow 4-
Power Declaration. This committee, headed by Harper Sibley of Rochester,
has made six brief but pertinent proposals which, if adopted, might usher in a
new era. The Committee of Economic Development under Paul G. Hoffman of
the Studebaker Corporation has a nation-wide net of study groups working on
the internal problems of American adjustment to the postwar situation. In this
field many other organizations such as the Brookings Institute, the Twentieth
Century Fund, the National Industrial Conference Board, the Chamber of Com-
merce, the A. F. of L., and C. I. O. through a joint committee are busily at work.
Many of the great universities have created institutes of international affairs
which are turning out thoughtful memoranda on the postwar world. The
National League of Women Voters, the American Association of University
Women, the National Federation of Women's Clubs are similarly engaged. In
the periodical field, FORTUNE magazine is conspicuous for its continuing pub-
lication of articles on America and the future. This magazine has already pub-
lished five major articles dealing with relations with Britain, with the Pacific,
with Europe, and also with reference to the American domestic economy and
the United States government. The Institute of Pacific Relations has the coop-
eration of its Councils in ten countries in carrying out a long-range and very
fundamental series of studies on the war and postwar problems of the Pacific
area. The interim volume "WAR AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC," being a
report of the Mont Tremblant Conference, sketches the main outlines of the
problems and indicates the studies which still must be undertaken. The Inter-
5068 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
national Labour Office in Montreal and the Secretariat of the League of Nations
in Princeton are hard at worli.
Within the State Departments and Foreign Offices of the United Nations work
on these problems from the governmental angle is proceeding on a much greater
scale in volume at least than during the first world war.
Both the public and governments of the principal United Nations will have an
immense volume of material with which to face the future. But while recognizing
the value of all this preparatory work, the publics are haunted by several
misgivings.
First, they fear that statesmanship, though adequately documented, will fail
because the statesmen are tired, overworked, overcautious, and so fearful of their
internal political opponents that they are unequipped to give that creative leader-
ship on which the world waits.
Second, they fear that isolationism with its reactionary and appeasing qualities
will rise up to defeat creative statecraft if it emerges.
Third, the people of Britain, China, Russia, France, and Italy fear that if
America's leaders move constructively to implement the Moscow declaration,
the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms in cooperation with the other Powers
that the American Congress will repeat history and defeat American states-
manship at the end of this war.
It is precisely at this point that the role of organizations like the Cleveland
Council on World Affairs emerges as of transcendant importance.
At the first conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu in
1925 at the opening session the Chairman asked the members to list the problems
of the Pacific. The very first spokesman rose and said, "The United States is
the problem of the Pacific." There were many in other countries who asserted
that the United States, becavise of its growing strength and its refusal to cooperate
with the League of Nations, the International Labour Office and the World
Court, was an anarchical influence in the Pacific and in the world in general.
Facing the new and vastly more complex world situation today there are many
responsible Americans who hold that the problem of the postwar world is the
United States. For if it does not use its sovereignty to implement a world
collective system, the third world war will be infinitely more devastating than
anything mankind has yet known.
There is a tendency among other Americans to fear that the application of
the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter will be defeated not by the United
States but by the British and the Dutch in their colonial world and by the
British in their acquiescence in an unjust settlement in eastern Europe. There
is a further American belief that the forming and successful operation of a
world organization will be thwarted by the age-old conflict of the European
nations and the reemei'gence of Britain's ancient balance-of-power policy.
There are other Americans who admit these dangers but who affirm that they
will only be realized if the United States withdraws from the theatre of world
cooperation. Certainly it is not the duty of the Cleveland Council on World
Affairs or the Foreign Policy Association or the Council on Foreign Relations
to dictate to our European or Asiatic allies. It is rather to concentrate on the
colossal task of so informing the American electorate that its representatives in
Congress will voice an overwhelming and intelligent American mass opinion on
behalf of effective and daring cooperation in world machinery and affairs.
Although the various public opinion polls reveal a growing American approval
of International cooperation, they do not yet ensure that when the generalities
are brought down to the concrete issues of "vital interests", the American pub-
lic is prepared to go the whole way. In this decade we have seen the great
Republic of France collapse because for 150 years there have existed two Frances
which hated each other. Within this country the lines do not appear to be as
clearly drawn as in France. But there are menacing movements and atti-
tudes which are growing in strength. In spite of much that is encouraging,
attitudes toward the Negro, the Jew and even the North American Indian make
it inappropriate for Americans to throw stones at the British for their treat-
ment of colonial peoples. The attitude of certain American groups toward pro-
gressive movements in organized labor, among farmers, and the public gen-
erally hold the seeds of future devastating conflict. Usually those who take
these antisocial attitudes are precisely those who still appear to regard the
Nazis and the Japanese more tolerantly than they regard our British, Russian,
and Chinese allies.
mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5069
America today is in debt — deep debt — to China, Britain, and the USSR. To
China because slie was the first to see the nature of aggression and take up
arms against Japan. To England because if she had lost the Battle of Britain
the Nazis would have lunged into the Atlantic and been able to drive further
into Russia before they were stopped. And to the Soviet Union for her early
foresight in knowing that war was coming and for her brilliant and stupendous
war effort.
I would hate to think of how much further Japan would have gone if the
Chinese had not contained from three-quarters of a million to a million Japanese
troops on the mainland of Asia for nearly seven years. Australia, India, Alaska,
and parts of the United States Pacific coast would have been endangered.
If England had lost the Battle of Britain, Canada and the United States would
have become a war theatre instead of arsenals of democracy. Latin America
would undoubtedly have been used by the Nazis as a springboard for bombing
Dallas, New Orleans, Atlanta, and Washington.
If the USSR had not accepted Hitler's challenge, Germany and Japan would
have met in India and all southern Asia would have fallen to the enemy. China's
position would have become well nigh hopeless and most of Africa would have
been in the hands of the Nazis and Fascists.
China's losses have been vaster than those of Britain and America combined.
They have been equalled only by those of Russia, for to date the Red Army has
killed more Nazi troops than the armies of all the United Nations put together.
The magnitude of the Soviet effort is indicated statistically when I remind you
that the published totals of American Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel is
still under forty thousand dead as compared with an estimate of three million
in the Soviet Union.
The comradeship in arms of China, Britain, Russia, and the United States
has naturally led to a measure of collaboration in staking out the broad out-
lines of the peace. The Moscow agreements commit these four Powers to
participate in a new international order. This commitment implied that the
four Powers would police our enemies and substituted four Power collaboration
for the old formula of a balance of power among the strongest states.
Probably a majority of thinking Americans accept the Moscow thesis that a
nuclear alliance of the four Powers is a precondition of an ordered world. They
agree with the Moscow conference leaders that provision should be made for the
cooperation of all peace-loving states with the Big Four. Public opinion in the
United States broadly accepts the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the
Four Freedoms partially because of an incorrigible American habit to accept
broad and idealistic generalities. But the re-educational job with which we are
confronted is as follows :
First, to define what these mean when applies to the American scene ; Second,
to understand the degree to which they can be applied nationally and interna-
tionally by the other Powers ; Third, to aid our government in stating the
issues so concretely and constructively that they will be supported by the people
and the Congress and provide a basis for mutual cooperation with the other
Powers.
One of the many dangers in current American thought is the persistence of
the idea that the United States is the most powerful country in the world. Even
more sinister is the belief that we are the most moral people in the world. And
finally, there is emerging from many platforms the assertion that the cultural
and intellectual center of the world has moved from the European continent
and the British Isles to North America. "Let him that thinkest he standeth,
take heed lest he fall."
In industrial and agricultural production and social organization the Soviet
Union may outstrip the United States in our lifetime. Out of the ruins of conti-
nental Europe there may emerge a daring intellectual vigor surpassing that in
the United States. There are those who believe that the leaders in the realm of
art and thought who will set the pace for the civilized world will emerge from
the vast area that stretches from the Volga to the Yangtze.
Certainly our failure following the Paris conference and our failure to under-
stand the implications of Japanese, Italian, Spanish, and German aggression
sprang in part from the American feeling of overwhelming superiority in power,
social organization, and intellectual leadership. The war has shown that we
are members one of another, that we are strong only as we are united with other
nations.
5070 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Recently Mr. Walter Lippmann in his "U. S. Foreign Policy" has convinced
many Americans that we have never had a coherent world policy. More re-
cently Mr. Joseph M. Jones in his "A Modern Foreign Policy for the United
States" has made an on-the-whole useful critique of our own State Department
and at two points has advanced ideas which call for widespread study on the
part of the American puhlic. He lists some of the main operating concepts of
American foreign policy in the past and affirms that there is scarcely one that
has not heen either demolished by the impact of world events or riddled by the
implications of modern warfare. This is what he says :
"(1) Isolation, avoidance of alliances, avoidance of commitments, diplomacy
by 'parallel action' and 'cooperative effort'— demolished by our inevitable in-
volvement in two devastating world wars in one generation.
"(2) Verbal championing of high principles of international law and conduct
while continually declaring that our action in support of any and all principles
would stop 'short of war,' thereby delivering our diplomacy over to any foreign
nation that could trump our highest ciird— destroyed by Japanese bombs at
Pearl Harbor.
"(3) Nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states— a fraud that was ex-
posed in all of its essential absurdity in Spain in 1937.
"(4) Rights of neutrals — two world wars have shown conclusively that they
are respected only to the extent that it is convenient and expedient for warring
powers to do so.
"(.5) Freedom of the seas — to a large extent made irrelevant by the growth
of civil and military air power.
"(6) National self-determination — proved inadequate as it fails to protect
the rights of individuals and minorities.
"(7) Limitation and reduction of armaments — a policy proved dangerous to
the nation's security in the absence of international organization for policing,
inspection, enforcement, and for mitigating the economic causes of war.
"(8) Concept of international law as applying only to states and not to indi-
viduals, thus permitting atrocities within states that shock and offend the world's
conscience and lead to war — direct bomb hit.
"(9) Nondiscrimination and equality of treatment in commercial relations —
still valid, but inadequate in a world in which economic expansion and a rising
standard of living are conditions of peace and democracy."
Mr. Jones proceeds to sketch the framework of a modern foreign policy as
follows :
"I. The first major requirement of a modern American foreign policy is that
it shall perpetuate after the war the close association of the four ma.ior United
Nations — the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China — as a
nucleus of world order, strong and above challenge.
"II. The second important requirement of American foreign policy is that it
shall be based upon, protect, and extend the principle of freedom in the world.
"III. The third essential requirement of American foreign policy is that it
shall make adequate provision for international control over civil and military
air power everywhere in the world ; and for placing at the disposal of a United
Nations organization a sufficient margin of air power to deal efficiently and
effectively with aggression or threat of aggression anywhere in the world.
"IV. The fourth major requirement of American foreign policy is that it shall
promote, wherever in the world it is desired, steady expansion of economic
activity, a rising standard of living for the masses, and expanding programs of
public education, health, and nutrition as indispensable to democracy and
peace."
In spite of certain limitations I would urge all of you who are here today
carefully to study these two volumes. In addition I venture to suggest study of
the volume "Post War Worlds" by Percy E. Corbett and "War and Peace in the
Pacific" for those concerned for international relationships in that half of the
world. To this latter group I recommend the volume "Winning the Peace in
the Pacific" by S. R. Chow, an eminent Chinese scholar, and another volume
"The Ftttt^re of Southeast Asia" by an Indian leader, K. M. Panikl^ar.
The Institute of Pacific Relations in common with other organizations is en-
gaged in an effort to fill up the vast gaps in the world's knowledge of the Pa-
cific area. The American Council of that Institute has published recently a
sheaf of pamphlets on several of the countries of the Pacific which are being
used widely in the American Army and in American secondary schools. Every-
one here who has a relative in the Armed Forces in the Pacific or a child in an
Ohio school will wish to familiarize themselves with this invaluable series.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5071
This vast Pacific world, almost unknown to Americans before Pearl Harbor,
is now beins visited by a rapidly increasing stream of American men and women
in the Armed Forces. For a few it is a kind of Cook's tour. But for the ma-
jority it is the mud of a South Pacific fox-hole, the fever of the lUirmese jungle,
the lieat of the Indian plains, and the frustration of life in wartime China. A
"must" for all patriotic Americans is to see that their men and women in these
areas are supplied with background material on racial and national cultures and
economic interests so that they can adjust themselves intelligently to their role
of comrades in arms and comrades in peace with their Pacific allies. There
remains the common task of examining the military, political, and economic
policy which the United States and other United Nations should adopt in this
far flung Pacific area. Here more attention has been given to the treatment of
Japan that to any other single topic. But if we think that the resolving of the
problem of Japan means the solution of all the problems of international coopera-
tion in the Pacific area, we will deceive ourselves. For all around that greatest
of oceans new dynamic and divisive forces will emerge which must be faced
on a regional and global basis.
Let us address ourselves first, however, to the treatment of Japan. I am not
familiar with any more comprehensive analysis of this problem than that con-
tained in an article in the current Pacific Affairs by my colleague, T. A. Bis-
son. Recognizing that the treatment of Germany will give some pointers for the
treatment of Japan, Mr. Bisson, from whom I will quote at length, writes as
follows :
"In his Christmas Eve broadcast. President Roosevelt expressed the general
principles underlying the political attack on Germany in most careful and exact
terminology. The conferees at Teheran, said the President, 'were united in
determination that Germany must be stripped of her military might and be
given no opportunity within the foreseeable future to regain that might. The
United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them
to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable mem-
bers of the European family. But we most certainly emphasze that word "i-e-
spectable" — for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian
militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the
"master race.' "
"Against the background of the final military assault on the European fortress,
three simple principles are laid before the Germany people: (1) Germany's mili-
tary power will be crushed and not permitted to revive; (2) the old leadership
must go; and (3) on these bases, the (Jerman people will again be accepted as
normal members of the European community. The uncompromising nature of
this program is perhaps its most striking feature. Even with respect to the sec-
ond principle, there is no call to the Germans to throw out their old leaders.
The words used — 'we intend to rid them' — place the responsibility on the United
Nations for this drastic action. They are an implied threat to those Germans
who support the old leaders, and an implied promise to those Germans who would
like to see them overthrown. Cooperation of the German people in this over-
throw would obviously be welcomed, but it is neither urged nor suggested.
"In the same broadcast. President Roosevelt also made reference to two basic
elements which must enter into the making of peace with Japan. These comprise
llrst, 'the restoration of stolen property to its rightful owners' — a restatement of
the Cairo pledge that Japan will be stripped of all territories gained by aggression
since 1895 ; and secondly, the peace will ensure 'the permanent elimination of the
Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression.' It is noteworthy that these
two pronouncements, taken together, do not go beyond the first principle as stated
for Germany. They constitute a blunt affirmation of the intention of the United
Nations to fight the war against Japan to a finish, somewhat analogous in this
respect to the 'imconditional surrender' demand voiced at Casablanca. It might
have been assumed that further statements on Japan, covering the scope of the
last two principles set forth for Germany, would have to wait upon victory in
Europe and the mounting of the final assault against Japan. At this point, how-
ever, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a New Year's message to the Chinese
Army and people, went far to close the gap. Revealing a hitherto unreported
passfige at the Cairo conference, he made the following statements:
" 'In intimate talks I had with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill at Cairo we considered steps for mutual cooperation and agreed upon
certain plans for prosecution of the war.
" 'We also agreed upon the question of the disposal of the enemy after the war.
One important problem in this connection concerns Japan's form of government.
5072 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
When President Roosevelt asked my views I frankly replied, "It is my opinion
that all Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system
must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements. As to what form of
government Japan should adopt, that question can better be left to the awakened
and repentant Japanese people to decide for themselves."
" 'I also said, "If the Japanese people should rise in revolution to punish their
warmongers and overthrow their militarists' government we should respect their
spontaneous will and allow them to choose their own form of government." Mr.
Roosevelt fuly approved of my idea.'
"Assuming that these statements reflect a common approach to the peace settle-
ments in Europe and the Far East, it is already possible to sketch the type of
peace to be made with Japan. A few of the outlines are even now sharp and
clear ; others must be drawn on the basis of given suggestions in the light of
objectives which seem desirable.
"The peace with Japan will be a harsh one in many of its aspects, notably those
affecting territories, disarmament, and possible reparations. When the costs and
sacrifices of defeating Japan's ruthless aggression are placed in the reckoning,
nothing less should be expected or desired. These terms of the peace will, in some
cases, be setting right old wrongs that have endured for a generation or longer.
They are also required to limit Japan's power to engage in a second adventure in
aggression.
"Obviously, these terras presuppose the existence and continued maintenance of
unity between members of the United Nations and the emergence of a strong and
effective international organization. Continued agreement and firm cooperation,
at least among the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and China, are
indispensable in order to enforce the terms of peace against Japan initially and
then to see that they are upheld. Given this degree of unity, the har«her aspects
of the peace can be mitigated somewhat by measures which will indicate clearly
to the Japanese people that the settlement is dictated not by a polic.v of revenge,
nor with an intention to enslave. The line is not so difficult to draw as might
appear. A vengeful peace can be defined as one aimed at keeping Japan in a state
ot lasting subjection, political or economic. Any such policy would be self-
defeating. Sir George Sansom has rightly declared that the existence of 'a nation
of over 70 million desperate and frustrated people would ruin any plan designed
to bring prosperity and peace to Asia.' The principle enunciated by President
Roosevelt for the German people must also be taken as applying to the Japanese
people — the.v will be given 'a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and
respectable members' of the world community.
"What is stated here really amounts to a process of postwar development. It
looks toward the emergence of a healthy Japan, which can in time reenter the
society of nations as a member in full standing. The process makes serious
demands on the United Nations, as well as on Japan. They must assist her to
develop along peaceful lines on both the political and economic levels ; they must
assume direct responsibility for the type of political and social structure estab-
lished in Japan after her defeat. United Nations guidance will be required in
greater or lesser degree, to make it certain that the old autocratic system is not
reestablished, but that a new system is inaugurated in which the democratic
aspirations of the Japanese people find real expression. Full opportunity must
also he given Japan to raise the living standard of her people by the processes
of normal international trade. The new world organization must have not only
the strength to maintain collective security but also the economic statesmanship
to eliminate trade barriers and develop the colonial areas of the world by meas-
ures for improving the social and economic welfare of the inhabitants on a basis
of nondiscriminatory international cooperation. This process will provide the
most dependable safeguard against renewed Japanese (or German) aggression.
The enemy nations must be restored to health and then must be fitted into a
constructive system of international collaboration."
Whatever the fate of the Royal Family, it is clear that whatever remains of
the Japanese Navy must be surrendered. Munitions and aircraft must be
destroyed or surrendered. Munitions plants must at least be converted into
production of civilian goods. For a considerable period Japan will be pre-
vented from maintaining military and naval forces. A civilian police force
alone will be allowed. The punishment of the Japanese leaders of totalitarian
aggression, whether naval, military, or industrial, must be complete. On the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5073
matter of reparations the experts disagree. Tlie Chinese are expected to in-
inherit such parts of the large industrial plants in Manchuria and Formosa as
are not destroyed by military action or a scorched eai'th policy. In these fac-
tories and in the coal and iron of IManchnria, China will add significantly
to her heavy industry. If, as declared at Cairo, China regains all her lost ter-
ritories there would seem to be but little need of insisting on a long drawn-
out period of reparation payments which might promise more discord than they
are worth. Confined to the slender area of her own islands, Japan will face a
perplexing problem of self-support. "With the security issue settled, intelligent
people in other countries will assert that Japan's economic rehabilitation will
be advantageous to other countries. Mr. Bisson rightly affirms :
"Extension of disarmament into the factory, a necessity under modern con-
ditions, still treats the symptoms, not the disease itself. The key issue in the
degree of success attending the United Nations' dealings with a defeated Japan
is not how well the country is disarmed but how greatly its outlook and mo-
tivations are changed. In the last analysis, what is required is a thorough
recasting of Japan's political and social leadership. Addressing himself to
Germany, Pre.sident Roosevelt declared in the statement already quoted:
'* * * we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian mili-
tarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "master
race." ' In much the same terms. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated that
'all Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system
must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements.' "
As to those who ask, "Can we expect to impose democracy on Japan?" one
answer is that if the United Nations do not concern themselves we will find
the militarists and secret societies back again in their old places of power.
Others will answer that the Japanese people may do a good part of the job
themselves. Without staking Japan's future on the so-called "liberals" we do
know that there have been relatively able opposition movements in Japan. If
the United Nations' political warfare and postwar policy is sound, it will ap-
peal to the Japanese on the ground that there are stronger material, social, and
emotional satisfactions than those deriving from the ideology of conquest and
master race. Confidence must be created in the faith that construction can
follow destruction. If the United States role in United Nations' policy is to
be positive in revolutionizing the psychology of the Japanese, the American
people must steer a courageous and realistic course toward cooperation with
the masses of Japan by avoiding appeasement and collaboration with the mili-
tarists and the great cartels which have never refused to profit from the expan-
sionist policy of the militarists.
As indicated above while the problem of Japan is central it is not the only
one in the Pacific area. A few of those that must be faced are the foreign
trade, investment, airlines, merchant marine, and immigration policies of the
United States. Another is the problem of British relations with India, Burma,
Malay.sia, and China. Internally China has tensions and problems that are as
baffling as those within the United States.
Though Soviet Russia was the first gi-eat power to aid China substantially in
her war with Japan, the role of Russia in the Pacific is still obscure to many
citizens of China, India, the Netherlands, the United States and the British
Commonwealth. This results in large measure to two factors : First and
principally bef^ause of the generation of mutual suspicion between these powers
and the Soviet Union and the fact that but few citizens of these countries
have ever taken the trouble to inform themselves on the rational character
of Soviet policy in Asia and the Pacific. It results to a lesser degi-ee from
a failure to recognize the validity of the position of the combined Chiefs of
Staffs that Ri^ssia's supreme contribution to the global war is to continue
her devastatinsr blows against the Nazis. No United Nations citizen in his
right mind could ask that at this moment the Soviet Union take on a second
front war which would incidentally cut off the great flow of lend-lease supplies
for the defeat of Hitler that now safely cross the Pacific. But in the postwar
period whether Russia enters the Paciflc war or not, the other Pacific nations
will have to recoscnizp Russia as a major Pacific power. The future peace of
the Pacific will depend in part on whether the powers that heretofore have
regarded Russia with suspicion can so thoroughly inform themselves as to
Rxissian policy as to be able to accept at its face value Russia's overwhelming
commitment to the world collective system.
5074 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Cleveland Lecture, March 31, 1944
In Georgia, in the Atlanta Constitution, Mr. Henry Ford proclaimed that the
war will end in two months. Mr. Ford was not in a position to reveal the inside
information on which his prediction was based. The period in which we will
have to wait in order to verily his accuracy is so brief that I shall not take
your time today to speculate on its truth or falsity. I mention it merely to
advance another speculation and that is that Mr. Ford in common with some
other Americans may believe that the collapse of Germany automatically and
simultaneouslv means the end of the war with Japan.
I do not hold this view. It seems to me to spring from several wrong assump-
tions (1) a throw-back to the pre-Pearl Harbor underestimation of Japanese
power; (2) a belief that there is a Pacilic war and a European war rather than
a global conflict; (3) that once the Nazis are subdued the United Nations can
quickly deal the mortal blow to Japan.
But for the moment let us have an end of speculation. Looking across the
Pacilic one sure factor emerges. The way in which the United Nations deal
with Japan and all the areas which Japan has occupied will be one of the
determinants of the issues of war and peace in the world for coming generations.
Undoubtedly the collapse of Germany will have profound repercussions in
Japan. The Japanese will receive the news with mixed feelings. It will spell
ultimate doom. At the same time many Japanese, angry with Hitler's failure
at Moscow, Stalingrad and in the Caucasus and exasperated by the arrogant
behavior of their German colleagues in Japan and China, will secretly rejoice
that the German master race is eating the dust of defeat. The Japanese
command will undoulitedly seek to minimize the meaning of Hitler's down-
fall. With his collapse will come two important opportunities — the first on
the military ; the second on the political and psychological front. If the latter
is as inchoate as in the past United Nations political warefare in Africa and
Europe has been we may yet win the war in the Pacific but lose the np;'c.>
Exhibit No. 953
April 14, 1944.
Soviet Russia's Contribution to Peace
(By Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific Relations)
The Red Army has killed more Nazi soldiers than the armies of all the rest
of the United Nations put together. Surely this is a primary contribution to the
future, for until the Nazi army is destroyed there will be no peace.
If the USSR had not accepted Hitler's challenge, Germany and Japan would
have met in India and all southern Asia would have fallen to the enemy. China's
position would have beoome well nigh hopeless and most of Africa would have
been in the hands of the Nazis and Fascists.
By what means did Russia emerge as the greatest effective military power
in the world in the winter of 1943-44? By what alchemy did the Russia of
1914-17 transform herself in a short generation? Remember that Germany
knocked Czarist Russia out of the First World War while Germany was still at
war with the entire British Empire, the United States, France, Belgium, Italy,
China and Japan. There is no single answer. The process represents a vast
complex of historical and economic forces. Here we have the paradox of a
great people who sought primarily the good life. That was the first aim. Su-
preme military power emerged as a by-product of that objective. In other words,
Russia's second contrilmtion to the peace is the unity of her people and her
progress in social and economic organization, looking forward to a genuine
democracy as the ultimate goal.
The Russians, the British, the Chinese, and indeed many Americans are still
guessing as to the future international role of the United States. Under these
circumstances it is inevitable that people in tlie other countries should be
guessing about Russia's future role. This results in part from a generation of
mingled suspicion and ignorance which has lilinded many of us to the fact
that through the years Russia has had a rather exceptionally consistent for-
eign policy.
No student of current affairs can be blind to the serious effects on present
thinking in many countries on the future role of the Soviet Union as a result of
nearly twenty years of mutual misunderstanding between Russia and other
countries. There is not time tonight for me to list those trends— some real.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5075
some imagined — in the early days of the revolution which caused misgivings
abroad. Those early years provoked a profound and burning suspicion of things
Russian.
To the Russians the behavior of the other nations seemed equally grim. Sus-
picion in Russia of the capitalist countries resulted from foreisiin intervention
in Russia following the revolution. On the advice of Secretary of War Winston
Churchill in 1918 London despatched materials and troops into northern Russia
under Major General Poole and later under Major General Ironside. These
forces at their maximum numbered more than eighteen thousand British and
five thousand Americans. They disposed of the Soviet government at Archangel
and set up a provisional white government. In eastern Siberia, British, French,
American and Japanese forces marched in. The Czechs controlled western
Siberia and Admiral Kolchak with British aid established a provisional regime
at Omsk. You are familiar with the aid which the Allies gave to Generals
Yudenich . You will remember that in 1921 the French General Weygand
played a major role in Poland's war against Russia. For a long time it was
not easy for Russia to forget the foreign intervention of 1918, the Allied blockade
of Russia in 1919, or the credit Iilockade that extended into the 1920's.
From the moment of Litvinov's first arrival in Geneva, the Soviet government
went on record as committed to a world collective security system. Neither the
United States, France, nor Great Britain were really committed to that system.
Englishmen and Frenchmen assure Americans that it was impossible for their
governments to make this commitment because of American isolationism.
The Powers regarded Russia's commitment to the collective system cynically,
and the temporary Moscow-Berlin agreement in 1939 was the direct result of
tlie policies of Chamberlain and Daladier in the Munich period.
It behooves Americans to resurvey the whole history of 150 years of relations
between Russia and the United States, both under the Czar and under the
Bolsheviks. In this period of 150 years the United States has been at war at
one time or another with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Never
throughout this period has the United States been at war with Russia. Misun-
derstanding have arisen from time to time between the United States and both
Czarist and Bolshevik Russia, bur they have never issued in war between the
two countries. The economic and foreign policies of the two countries have
been parallel. Their broad interests have been largely identic. Both have been
more concerned with the maintenance of peace than advancing their fortunes
by wars of aggression.
On both sides there is much to forget. Happily, tliere is a general, though
not yet universal, desire to face forward and profit by the grave mistakes of
the past. Since June 22nd. 1941, immense progress has been made in the task
of liquidating distrust and forging new ties of genuine understanding.
The growing awareness of Russia's indispensability as a member of the family
of nations derives from several causes :
First, a frank recognition of the fact that if the USSR had not resisted the
Nazis the other United Nations would still be fighting a losing war ;
Second, fresh and ever increasing knowledge of the military, industrial and
social strength of the Soviet Union ;
Third, a recognition that Soviet geography, natural resources, and commit-
ment to a steady rise in the standard of living both demand and make possible
Russia's announced and reiterated commitment to a strong woi'ld collective-
security system.
At the recent Moscow and Teheran conferences Russia gave unequivocal evi-
dence of her commitment to a world collective security system. This is sa
clearly in Russia's self-interest that only a defection by London and Washington
can again precipitate Russia's withdrawal.
Mr. Hull has indicated clearly that one of the foundations of United States
war and peace policy is the complete destruction of the Nazi system which
plungr-d us into war. There can now no longer be any question in any informed
person's mind as to the complete commitment of the Soviet government and the
Russian people to the destruction of the Nazi system. In view of the Soviet
war effort the consistent prediction of certain writers of a separate deal between
Stalin and Hitler appears ridiculous. Though the Moscow and Tehei-an declara-
tions have been criticized as indefinite, few can ignore the significance of the
declarations regarding complete agreement as to the scope and timing of mili-
tary operations.
In the political field the Moscow declaration's fourth point recognized "the
necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international
organization — for the maintenance of peace and security." Cooperation of the
5076 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
great Powers is such an indispensable precondition of sulistantial advance that
this must be regarded as a step forward. Moscow and Teheran were also sig-
nilicant in that they were the occasion for the first meetings of the Foreign Min-
isters and the government heads of the three great Powers.
There is a cluster of declarations and agreements which throw a good deal
of light on the interests, intentions, and broad ideals of Great Britain, the United
States, and the Soviet Union : The Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declara-
tion, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942, and the mutual aid agreements con-
cluded by the United States with other countries. The Moscow and Teheran
statements to a large extent implied general approval of the foregoing declara-
tions and agreements. In some cases they stood for concrete and binding com-
mitments. In other cases they repreesnt ultimate goals toward which progress
will be gradual. In other words, the Moscow and Teheran statements under-
lined in clear terms the Soviet Union's commitment to a broad program of
cooperation for peace and security.
As might be expected, the Bolsheviks with their growing appreciation of the
continuity of Russian history have long assumed that the recovery of Russia's
lost territories was a legitimate aim.
The Russians have made it abundantly evident that they regard the reacquisi-
tion of the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and parts of Karelia as desirable and
historically defensible. They have announced that at the right time they are
prepared to negotiate with a responsible and repi'esentative government of Poland
on the general basis of the Curzon line. They have not dogmatically insisted on
the Curzon Line as unalterable, but they have stated frankly that it should form
the basis for negotiation.
The Russians have aflarmed their wholly friendly and cordial interest in the
reestablishraent of the Czechoslovak state. They have entered into a strong
and binding twenty-year agreement with Great Britain. They have made clear
their attitude to the French National Committee of Liberation. They have
stated their attitude to the Badoglio government.
Tlie Soviet authorities have declared that they do not intend to annex
Rumanian territory or to alter the Rumanian social structure.
The Soviet government, together with Great Britain and the United States,
has notified the Austrians, the rest of Europe, and the whole world of their
intention that their goal is that Austria become independent and free. The
Austrians are assured of support in their efforts to find economic and political
advantage througli understandings with "those neighboring states which will
be faced with similar problems." In other words, the world organization will
not in theory stand in the way of regional arrangements in the Danube Valley.
A measure of regionalism was foreshadowed by the creation at Moscow of
the Advisory Council for Italy and the European Advisory Commission.
The Soviets clearly wish to look forward to a hundred years of peace. I
venture to guess that they would prefer to see western Europe emerge from
the war quickly into a long era of peace and progress under liberal, demo-
cratic, capitalistic, and friendly governments than to be torn in twain by long-
drawn-out chaos resulting from inconclusive communist revolutions.
Vis-a-vis Japan, the USSR does not seek a two-front war. The strength of
the Soviet Far Eastern armies is such as to immobilize a Japanese army of
approximately three-quarters of a million in Korea, Manchuria, and North
China. While not seeking war with Japan, one may surmise that the Russian
Army does not fear Japan. Very recently the negotiations regarding Sakhalin
and the fisheries question reveal that Moscow is fully aware of the fact that
her strentrth is greater than that of Japan. In discussing the war in the Pacific,
Soviet writers invariably refer to Japan as the aggressor and China, Britain,
the United States, and other countries as the victims of aggression.
In her relations with China, Russia is reported to have taken a scrupulously
correct position. The Chinese remember that before Pearl Harbor, when the
United States and British countries were aiding Japan with abundant war
materials, Russia was aiding China with substantial credits and supplies.
With reference to British India, a study of Soviet publications indicates that
the Russians are failing to follow the practice of certain American liberals in
lecturincr Britain about her relations with India.
At Teheran the three leaders recognized the common responsibility of making
"a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the
peoples." There was the promise to seek the cooperation of all peoples "dedi-
cated to the elimination of tyranny." There was the welcome to such peoples
to come "as they may choose into the world family of democratic nations." The
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5077
<;oncert of three made clear their dedication to the cause of free lives to nations
and individuals and their repudiation of the role of three-power dictatorship.
There still awaits clarification of the fourth point of the Moscow declaration
mentioned above regarding the necessity of establishing a general international
organization. This was to be open to all peace-loving states for the maintenance
of peace and security. Pending the completion of this organization the three
Powers and China promised to consult with one another and, as occasion re-
quired, with other members of the United Nations.
The foregoing and other declarations point in general terms to the regulation
of armaments and the inauguration of a system of general security.
Moscow and Teheran did not completely blueprint the future. They did,
however, point the way to many forms of international cooperation which are
of self-evident importance to all nations. Neither the British nor the Americans
who participated in those conferences have provided their publics with any in-
formation to controvert the theory that Stalin and Molotov were any less sincere
in their declarations than the leaders from the other nations.
The Soviet government has participated in the United Nations Food Confer^
ence and is also participating in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration. A Soviet delegation recently came to the United States for
preliminary bilateral talks on postwar international currency stabilization
with U. S. Treasury officials. These discussions, which were paralleled with
talks with the British delegation and similar negotiations with thirty other
governments, are paving the way for a United Nations Monetary Conference
toward the end of this year or in 1945. The press has hinted that the subject
matter of the Beaverbrook-Berle conversations in London regarding international
problems of postwar aviation have been communicated to the Soviet authorities.
The Soviet government's policy towards its own diverse nationalities contains
lessons both for Europe and for the colonial areas alike of Europe, the Americas
and Asia. These are lessons that can be learned and applied with necessarily
adopting socialism as the exclusive government policy. Some of these lessons
are:
1. In oi'der to be independent and strong, substantial economic power is an
essential. This is best achieved if there is an effective balance of industrial and
agricultural development. This does not preclude high specialization in the
Internal economy.
2. When there is an integration between internal economic policy and foreign
policy the risk of cultural or social domination of one nation by another is
substantially reduced.
3. Nation-wide education and public health are indispensable to a rising
standard of living and the development of self-government. These, however,
cannot be achieved unless there is an intelligent and dynamic economic and
social motivation on the part of the rank and file of the population.
4. Racial and national antagonisms and prejudices can be reduced by a com-
bination of education, compulsion (i. e. punishment of all overt forms of dis-
crimination and vilification) and economic practices which in fact provide
equality of opportunity.
The Russians' self-confidence in their way of life and in their strength permit
them to work for practical compromises with other nations and other systems.
This is a new development in Soviet foreign policy beginning about 1933 at the
time of the second Five-Year Plan. Before this, they relied more heavily on
hortatory appeals to the rest of the world and other devices showing some lack
of internal self-assurance. Those who have followed the progressive efforts of
the Soviet government to give their many minorities and nationalities a more
indigenous and richer culture of their own, while steadily according them
greater and greater responsibility for political and economic matters, were not
surprised with the Russian announcement recently that the IG Soviet Republics
were hereafter to have a say in Army and foreign policy. The minorities were
to participate in the State's highest responsibilities — the issues of peace and
war. This latest move was not in my view a hastily fabricated device for giving
the Soviet Union more votes in a future world council than the British Empire
or the Pan-American republics, or General Smuts' British countries plus Western
Europe. It was rather a logical development of Stalin's policy of according to
every major racial or nationality group within the S'oviet Union the fullest
share in the complex and abounding life of the Soviet Union and, concurrently,
a new place in the affairs of the family of nations.
In October last I had the privilege of visiting one of the 16 Republics —
Uzbekistan. Here, in half a generation, a medieval, predominantly Mohammedan
5078 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
State has been inducted into full participation in tlie mass production techniques
of the 20th Century. Accompanying the industrial and agricultural leap over
five centuries there has been a corresponding lightning evolution from feudalism
to a political and social structure that has made a backward people heir to
the education, science, and the aesthetic satisfactions of the modern world. None
of these rapidly developing 16 Republics have any urge to participate in wars
of aggression. Their vital interest is in the maintenance of peace and the most
friendly relations in trade and culture with all their neighbors. Their vested
interest in peace is as great as that of every one of the forty-eight states of the
American union.
Exhibit No. 953-A
215 East 72d Street,
Tflew York, N. Y., May 26, 1952.
Mr. ROBEKT MOKRIS,
Room 424y Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mk. Morris: When you brought to New York recently a large number
of documents for identification, one was a mimeographed or photostated article
entitled "Soviet Russia's Contribution to Peace." I remember that there was
no clue as to w'here the article appeared.
I now find that it appeared in volume 234 of July 1944, in The Annals of The
American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited by Dr. Ernest M,
Patterson, professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. The title
of the volume was "Agenda for Peace."
In adition to my own, papers were contributed by Bruno Lasker, Francis B.
Sayre, Percy E. Corbett, F. Cyril James, C. J. Hambro and Samuel S. Fels.
Reviews in the volume, among others, covered books by A. Whitney Griswold,
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Count Sforza, Stuart Chase, H. M. Kallen, Albert
Shaw,
I thought that if you are planning to print this article of mine in the records
-of the hearings, you would want to indicate under what auspices the article was
published.
Sincerly yours,
Edward C. Carter.
ECC : f tw
Exhibit No. 954
(Penciled note :) "MAS scan & return to EC."
January 7, 1945.
ECC from RD :
Apart from Kohlberg, Hearst & Co. there has been [penciled note "No?"] direct
criticism of the school material put out by Amco except as follows :
1. Julean Arnold has been carrying on a one-man crusade against the S.vllabus
prepared by George Harris for some years. This criticism is largely against the
relative amount of attention paid in the material to the modern political aspects
of China's development rather than to any misinterpretations or factual errors.
Arnold feels that relatively more attention should have been devoted to Chinese
history. (Penciled note "anti-Brit?")
2. Kenneth Colegrove took sharp exception to the use of Kate Mitchell (pen-
ciled note right of paragraph : "I'd never heard of this. I know we slaved with
Kate & Komar to make it objective") and Komar Goshal as editors of the
pamphlet texts on India. He wrote me a strong note asserting that Mitchell's
bias had been so evident and so proved that we were doing a disservice in using
her and Goshal. He stated that he felt that the pamphlet was biased. The
correspondence is in the files. I have an impression that Lennox Mills joined
with Colegrove's criticism, but I am not certain.
3. Leland Goodrich told me verbally that IPR pamphlet texts had been subject
to attack in the Cambridge school system, and that some one had talked with him
on the phone about them. My memory is vague on the subject, and at any rate
no direct word reached the office while I was in charge. Again, I have the im-
pression that the attack — if that is what it was— merely mentioned IPR material
along with other stuff used in Cambridge.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5079
(Penciled note:) "This was a question raised by a Catholic group. Later the
pamphlets were adopted in Cambridge."
MAS may know of any comments directly to her from school superintendents
as they did not normally come to my attention.
For your private information, Huggins has raised questions several times in
Executive Committee meetings about the educational program. He has not
been enthusiastic about Mrs. Stewart, and as a member of a school board has
voiced some reluctance to go along with the program. McConaughy and Jessup
have regularly risen to MAS's defense and to the defense of the whole educa-
tional program of Amco.
(Penciled note:) "This is very helpful to know. I'd be grateful to learn Mr.
Huggins' criticisms of our school program, for we do want it to be the best ever.
I can't help wondering, however, how he can judge the school program as no
report of it has ever been made by me. It may be, however, that my departure
from the staff will satisfy his criticism."
(Penciled note with line from next to last paragraph:) "I've had only one —
from Great Neck, L. I., where Land of the Soviets was attacked by the Catholic
Church on the grounds that the pamphlet attacked the R. C. church. When the
high school teacher (who is an ardent admirer of the IPR & the pamphlet series)
called on the priest & pointed out the only the Russian Orthodox Church was
mentioned in the pamphlet, the opposition ceased and the series is still being
used in Great Neck."
Exhibit No. 956
10th February 194.5.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
Roland Vieio Road, Rvxton Jf, ifarj/land.
Dear Owe^t : With immense profit, delight, and admiration I have just finished
reading SOLUTION IN ASIA.
It is a marvelous postscript to Hot Springs. I only wish that I had seen the
manuscript or page proofs in advance and I would have made a special ti'ip to
Little, Brown & Co. to see whether they couldn't strike off a hundred advance
copies to serve as the principal data paper for the Conference. If every member
had had and read SOLUTION IN ASIA before the Conference began, the dis-
cussions would have been on a much higher creative and responsible level.
Personally, I feel deeply indebted to you for writing the book. I believe that
the whole IPR and the leaders of the United Nations will profit immensely by its
publication.
With all good wishes and my warmest congratulations, I am,
Gratefully yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 957
6th June 1945.
Owen Lattimore. Esq..
Roland Vieio Road, Riurton 4, Maryland.
Dear Owen : Ernest Simmons, of Cornell, at the meeting of the American-
Russian Institute Board yesterday, told me he hoped you were not going to take
Max Eastman's article in the Reader's Digest lying down. He asserted that
Eastman could not have read the book and that all he had read was the pub-
lisher's blurb. I am eagerly looking forward to seeing you on the evening of
June 13th.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 958
June 18, 1945.
ECC from RD :
In answer to your memorandum of June 14, I certainly have no objection to
your approaching William Morris, John Hersey, and Mrs. Maurice T. Moore for
contributions to the American Council.
In view of the letter from DeWitt Wallace, of the Reader's Digest, a copy of
which is attached. I am talking to I. F. Stone about the best approach to
Marshall Field. Field is about to come east to talk to PINI about the espionage
5080 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
case, and there is a reasonable possibility that, with the Wallace letter as bait,
I might be able to interest Field in seeing that the IPR did not suffer from this
kind of an attack.
I have also learned that Harpers Magazine is embarrassed by its prophets and,
through Jack Fisher, I am making arrangements to see Cass Caufield when he
retnrns from Europe within the next two weeks to investigate the possibilities
of fi Isirge contribution from them.
Exhibit No. 959
20th June, 1945.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
Roland View Road, Ruxton If, Maryland.
Dear Owen : Enclosed is a review for PACIFIC AFFAIRS just received from
Chen Han-seng. I would deeply appreciate it if you would read it and let me
know whether it should go into PACIFIC AFFAIRS as it stands or whether
you would recommend a few changes.
In the latter event could you in your own inimitable way take your pen in
hand and do the kind of editing that will enable Chen Han-seug's review to
represent his and your best thought? As he will be shortly coming to this country
to join the Secretariat and to lecture at the University of Washington, I am
particularly eager that in all of his published writings he puts his best foot
forward.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 960
The Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Office of the Director
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., June 25, 1945.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Deae Carter : I have several letters from you to acknowledge.
First, I am glad to have your authority for scrapping the old Pacific Affairs
correspondence.
Second, I shall shortly send you all available back issues of Pacific Affairs,
at the same time giving you details on the bound issues that I need.
Third, I am returning herewith the copy of the draft letter with Bisson's notes.
You now have alternative wordings for dealing with the Manchuria-Russia
aspect.
Fourth, I am returning herewith the Chen Han-seng review, with editorial
suggestions. It so happens that I had been reading the Normano book myself for
the purpose of writing a review for another journal. By and large I agree with
Han-seng, as I usually do ; but I think that as frequently happens, his talent for
twisting the knife in the wound has run away with him a little. It would
be a good tiling to submit my proposed revisions to someone like Bisson, in order
to be sure of being fair to Han-seng as well as to Normano.
Sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
OL:ec
Exhibit No. 961
Institute of Pacific Relations,
Office of the Secretary-General,
Park Lane Hotel, London, 13th Sexttemher, 19^5.
Ray>[0nd Dennett, Esq.,
5th Floor, 1 East 5/tth Street,
New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Dennett : The pace has been such that any general report on my progress
to date will have to wait my return. I have been sending rather inconsequential
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 508 i
scraps to Corbett and some of my colleagues in the office, but I have been so long
out of personal touch with our colleagues on this side of the world, and I am
trying to use every possible moment seeing people instead of writing reports.
I have, of course, had hours and hours with our various friends at Chatham-
House. They are deeply cast down by Amco's failure to accept their invitation
for a visit to London in September. Most of their reasons for desiring the visit
would be acceptable to all shades of Amco thought, but some of them would^
as you suspected, be challenged by everyone.
Just before I left you made some cryptic remark to me about Willits. Airmail
me a letter here at this address as to what it was all about.
Also do let me know how you have come on with your Labour troubles and
above all please write me fully as to failures and successes on Finance.
I was both shocked and pleased to discover that under the auspices of Lady
Cripps and with an introduction by the Master of Balliol, Max Stewart's pamphlet
on China has been given a large circulation in the United Kingdom completely
independent of Chatham House.
Austern will be glad to show you the list of the faithful who turned out for the-
luncheon which Lord Astor gave me at Chatham House a few days after my
arrival. It was most sporting of many of them to come under the circumstances,
especially as some of them had to interrupt the first vacation they had had for a
long time, in order to be pi'esent.
When I return I will endeavor to give you and members of the Amco Board
and Staff an oral off-the-record account of my impressions of the prospects of
the Institute in France, Holland. Britain and the U. S. S. R.
By the way, I know your Executive Committee cannot have reached a decision
as to the year and place of the next I. P. K. Conference. I would, however, like to-
have your own personal, though necessarily tentative answer, as you will have
to handle the donkey work for Amco wherever and whenever the Conference-
is held. Specifically, what is your personal answer to the following questions :
1. Should the next Conference be held in 1946 or in 1947?
2. As to place, which would be your personal preference as between (a) Canada.
(6) United Kingdom (c) China (d) India (e) Philippines?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 962
September 26, 1945.
RD from RDC :
Mr. Carter sent me a letter addressed to you asking that I type it up and hand'
it on. This I have done.
He asked me to change the dateline from the letterhead on which lie wrote it to-
the Park Lane Hotel. I note, however, that in one of his paragraphs he asks
that you write him "at this address".
The address to which I think you should send your reply is :
% Mitrany, Unilever House, Blackfriars, London, E. C. 4, England.
I have no idea whether, on his return from France and the Netherlands, he
will be staying at the Park Lane Hotel or not. Therefore, I think it would be-
safer to use the above address.
Exhibit No. 963
10/19/45
Notes on Mr. Carter's Finances in Connection With Recent Trip
On July 27, 1945, Mr. Carter left New York in possession of $1,500 worth of
express checks, $1,000 of this was provided by Pacco and $500 by ASRR. In
addition he had $130 in cash. On his return October 16. 1945, he had $100 in
express checks, $43.00 in dollars and £2. Mr. Carter also had a check on a
New York bank for $50.00, an accommodation to a G. I. officer who wanted the-
equivalent in francs.
88348—52 — pt. 14 12
5082 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Carter's personal expenditures were principally as follows :
1 Hat £2-8-11 $9.93
French perfumery 720 francs 14. 40
2 pair gloves £1-15-0 7. 11
Cigarettes 9. 85
Shaves, laundry, cocktails, theatre (1) 17.25
$58. 54
Transportation from Great Falls, Montana, and throughout the Soviet Union
and on to Berlin was provided free by the Soviet authorities. From Berlin to
London, Mr. Carter paid ATC $84.94. From London to Paris he paid Air France
(£7-10-0) $30.45.
At the request of the Dutch Embassy in Paris the RAF flew Mr. Carter from
Paris to the Hague free. Mr. Carter questions whether we will ever be l)illed
for this.
At the request of the American Embassy, KLM flew Mr. Carter from Amster-
dam to London. A letter from the American Embassy to KLM indicated that
Mr. Carter would be personally responsible for the payment of the passage but
no bill has been received as yet. Pacco should keep in its reserve approximately
£8 ($24.48) in case a bill for this passage should ultimately turn up.
In making out the expense account Mr. Carter will charge the IPR for nothing
from New York to and in Russia and on to Berlin except for IPR cables and
postage from Moscow. He will charge ASRR i/o, of the air travel cost from
Berlin to New York and will bill ASRR % of the London Hotel bill during
his second stay in London.
Miss Nora Ford Smith incurred many pounds worth of expenses for air mail
postage and cables. She will send Mr. Carter a total bill. Instead of paying
that bill the amount of it is to be regarded as available for purchase here for
the Professor of IPR books and food packages.
The American Export passase of $663.75 from Foynes to LaGuardia was paid
by the New York office. In addition Mr. Carter paid £11-10-0 ($46.69) from
Croydon to Foynes.
A gift package of cigarettes handed to Mr. Carter by Sverdin in Moscow was
an expensive gift. To get it into England Mr. Carter had to pay duty amounting
to and then because it weighed too much to bring home across the Atlantic,
Mr. Carter had to pay the American Express Company 10s-6d (.$2.14) to pack
and send it over and presumably Mr. Carter will have to pay duty on it when
it arrives.
Conversion rates :
England— £24-13-0 equals $100. ( Approx. $4.06 per £. )
Belgium — $1.00 equals 2.66 cronen.
Holland — 1 guilder equals approx. $.40.
France — approx. 2 cents per franc.
Summary of hotel bills :
Park Lane, London, 8/29-9/4/45. £28-14-4 $116. 59
Park Lane, London, 9/5-14/45, £37-8-6 151. 94
Park Lane, London, 9/26-10/2/45, £33-19-1 137. 86
Park Lane, London, 10/3-9/45, £28-11-3 115.96
Park Lane, London, 10/10-13/45, £16-8-7 66. 70
$589. 05
Hotel Mitre, Oxford, 10/6-7/4.5, £1-5-0 5. 08
Hotel Lancaster, Paris, 9/14-20/45, 8405 francs 168. 10
Hotel Des Indes, Hague, 9/22-25/45, 44.60 guilders 17. 84
780. 07
Cables and Postage, London, £2-12-9i/. 10. 71
Books, £1-9-1 5. 86
796. 64
Exhibit No. 964
November 19, 1945.
To: ECC.
From: RD.
Herewith is a draft of the Research section of the Annual Report. It needs
considerable redrafting as to style, but I would appreciate your comments on
contents.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5083
Several questions occur to me at once :
1. On pages three and four, should there be more extended discussions of the
Wittfogel and Broek projects, similar to that in IPR in Wartime, so that their
significance would be immediately apparent to readers of the present report?
2. Page 7: Should this discussion on research plans be extended to include
the Indian project and others? The difficulty is that it is hard to predict what
the Research Committee will approve and hence there is some danger of running
ahead of the Committeee in including this in a report.
3. Page S: Are we at liberty to reveal our Army and Government contracts?
4. Should we not include the names of the individual staff people who were
taken on by the Government?
5. Pages 9-10 : Is quite frankly a pet of mine which I may be writing too
heavily in this report, and perhaps it should be deleted entirely.
Exhibit No. 977
To—
E. C. Carter. (Attached: Photo-
stat Hand-dra-\vn map. Photo-
stat N. Y. Times Map).
Discussion on Collective Security
& Far East (Chairman, Carter).
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
ECC. (Attached: Attitt'des of
American Soldiers in Berlin-
District Toward Ovr Allies.
Sept. 1945).
ECC. (Ere. letter to Edward
Carter from AP of Jmie 12,
1946. and Llst Bi-siness & Kox-
COMMERCLVL HOLDINCS IN JAPAN
OF U. S. & American Compa-
nies Having Patent License
OR Trademari^ Agreements
"With Companies in Japan
Proper).
ECC
Kate. (Enc. July 17 notes)
Report of Conference of March 9th
E. C. Carter
?
Pencilled list names on yellow
paper.
Memo: Meeting Arctic Institute,
Apr. 9.
E.C.Carter. (Attached ECC to
JP, April 17, 193.3, and F. V.
Field from E. C. Carter, March
27 1933)
L. T. Chen. (Attached Itr. to
L. T. Chen from E. C. Carter
dated .Tune 28, 1933).
" taiilev Hombeck
£. C. Carter
Memo of Interview with Mortimer
L. Graves.
Individual Travel Expenditure for
past few years. Finance 1936,
Document 7.
Selskar M. Gunn
Conversation between Mr.
Arosev, Prcs. VOKS, IMr. Car-
ter and JB.
Barbara Wertheim
Fred V. Field
E. C. Carter (Memo)
E. C. Carter
Harriet Moore
A. Kantoroyitch
F. V. Field
Galen M. Fisher
Meeting of the Presidium of the
USSR IPR draft.
M. E. Cieeve (Madge) _
William Holland
From —
Eppy
Ouman,sky
CD (Charles Dollard).
MC
RJG
CP
Edward.
Felix Frankfurter.
Edward
J. B_
E. C. Carter.
E. C. Carter.
J. B
E. C. Carter.
E. C. Carter...
E. C. Carter...
KB
Harriet Moore _
E. C. Carter...
E. C. Carter...
E. C. Carter...
E. C. Carter...
Date
8/7
5/6/43
(Stamped
7/8/45).
1/3/46
Undated.
Undated.
Undated.
7/17
?
1/11.
8/6..
Undated .
4/10/33....
6/28/33.
7/13/33..
1 1/29/33.
12/7/33..
2/13/34.
5/21/34.
7/18/34..
9/25/34..
10/22/34.
11/22/34-
12/15/34.
12/25/34.
12/26/34.
1/4/35...,
1/3/35...
E. C. Carter.
Ned
1/18/35.
2/23/35.
T^-pe of
Docu-
ment
Photostat.
Photostat.
Photostat.
Original...
Original...
Original...
Original...
Copy
Photostat.
Original...
Original...
Original...
File Num-
ber
107.33
600.1
600.2
131 B. 38
131B.38
131B.67
105. 123
131B.4
119.91
119.63
104.7
191.101
100. 27
100. 247
100. 195
100.110
100. 135
100.129
100. 122
100. 237
105.82
101.26
100.1
100. 53
100.375
100.31
100. 104
100. 168
100.314
100.167
100. 169
Exhibit
Num-
ber
977A
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
907
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
5084
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
To—
Extracts from Itr. fr. Harriet
Moore to E. C. Carter.
V. E. Motvlev --
V. E. Motylev
Moscow Meeting in Motylev's
office.
ECC
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
F. V. Field
Stanley K. Hombeck
(Attached letter from Stanley K.
Hombeck to Edward C. Carter
dated 1/30/37.)
Edward C. Carter
Extract from letter, San Francisco,
to Catherine Porter from Owen
Lattimore.
E. C. Carter
Clinning from San Francisco
Chronicle.
E. C. Carter
Harry Emerson Fosdick
James G. McDonald
H. B. Elliston
H. B. Elliston
Hall Borovov
Edward C. Carter. (Enc. FVF
fron ECC dated March 8, 1937,
and letter to Edward Carter
from J. P. Chamberlain.)
William L. Holland
Jose-ih P. Chamberlain
FVF
Kate ..-
Kate Mitchell
EVF (and others)
Kate Mitchell
E. C. Carter
V. E. Motylev
Joseph Barnes
Kate Mitchell _--
From —
Supplementary Agenda for
Discussion Between USSR,
IPR & the Sec. Gen., Moscow.
Frederick V. Field
V. E. Motylev
Owen Lattimore
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Fred V. Field
Virginia Burdick
Constantino Oiimansky
Names for membership, including
Alger Hiss.
Vi'. W. Lockwood
Mrs. Edward C. Carter..
Edward C. Carter
Owen Lattimore -.- _.
Joseph P. Chamberlain
Dr. John H. Finley
Russell Shiman.
Copy of memo attached from Div.
of FE Affairs, Dept. of State.
Copy of letter to Joseph W.
Ballentine.
E. C. Carter..
Virginia Burdick
I. F. Wizon
Edward C. Carter
Snydor Walker
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Carter
Dr. Robert S. Lynd
E. C. Carter
Lawrence R. Salisbury..
Edward C. Carter
Owen Lattimore
Edward C. Carter..
Frederick Field
W. L. Holland
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Date
FVF
V. E. Motylev
Stanley K. Hombeck.
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter
V. E. Motylev.
Harriet.
W. L. Holland
Edw. C. Carter
Edw. C. Carter
Edward C. Carter.
Edward C. Carter.
Edward C. Carter.
F. R. Scott
Edward C. Carter.
E. C. Carter
ECC
Edward C. Carter.
Edward C. Carter.
ECC
Edward C. Carter.
Y. P. Bremman
Edward C. Carter.
Edward C. Carter.
Edward C. Carter.
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
R.S. Bratton, Lt. Col
Joe (Josenh Barnes)...
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
F.V. Field
Philip J. Jaffe
C. Onmanskv
Edward C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
ECC.
A. W. Dulles..
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
L F. Wizon
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Robert S. Lynd
Edward C. Carter
Dr. Robert S. Lynd...
Edward C. Carter...
Maxwell M. Hamilton
Edward C. Carter
J. Leigh ton Stuart
Edward C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Jessica Smith...
Chen Han-seng
3/20/35.
5/4/35-.
9/10/35.
3/31/36.
5/18/36..
6/11/36..
7/1S/36..
10/19/36.
1/5/37...
1/15/37-
4/18/35.
1/15/37.
1/27/37 .
2/10/37.
3/1/37..
3/2/37..
3/2/37..
3/2/37..
3/3/37..
3/4/37..
3/5/37...
3/2/37...
3/8/37...
3/8/37...
.3/11/37.
3/21/39.,
4/20/37.
5/15/37.
5/27/37.
5/31/37.
6/18/37.
8/17/37...
8/20/37...
9/7/37-...
10/18/37-
11/5/37--,
11/10/37-
12/23/37-
2/24/38.-
2/25/38..
2/25/38..
3/17/38.
3/31/38.
3/29/38.
3/31/38.
3/31/33.
4/2/38-.
4/16/38.
4/14/48.
4/15/38.
4/22/38-
5/9/3?...
5/2:3/38.-
5/21/38..
0/30/38..
6/16/38- .
12/15/38.
12/14/38.
6/20/38-
6/16/38..
6/27/3S..
7/19/38..
7/20/38..
7/2.3/38..
8/23/38..
9/1/3?...
9/28/38..
Type of
Docu-
ment
File Num-
ber
100. 158
100. 56
100. 287
100. 64
100. 100
100. 28
133.2
131 B. 52
131B.90
100. 332
600.4
100. 294
100. 321
100.118
100. 303
100. 323
100. 363
100. 282
100. 395
100. 403
100. 387
100. 291
100. 319
100. 308
100. 309
107. 19
100. 310
100. 335
100. .330
100. 389
100.311
100. 333
100. 126
100. 326
100. 278
131B.156
100. 374
119.129
100. 143
100. 368
112.61
105. 328
100. 59
105. 196
100. 144
100. 149
191. 145
Exhibit
Num-
ber
100. 151
116.13
119. 60
191. 131
191. 247
100. 34
191. 254
106. 28
191. 148
105. 169
105. 32C
100. 226
119.56
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1070
1071
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5085
To—
Felix Frankfuter
Owen Lattimorc
Frederick V. Field
Irving Friendman
Frederick V. Field
Edward C. Carter
N. Hanwcll
Frederick P. Keppel
Chen Han-seng & Knight
Harriet Moore
Frederick V. Field
Owen Lattimore
Wm. L. Holland
C. Oumansky
Grenville Clark
Constantine Oumansky.,
Edward C. Carter
Constantine Oumansky..
N. H. Hanwell
Harriett Moore
Constantine Oumansky..
E. C. Carter
Owen Lattimore
Margaret R. Taylor
Dr. V. E. Motylev
Kate Mitchell...
Motylev
Sherwood Eddy
E. C. Carter
Owen Lattimore
PhiliD J. Jaffe
E. C. Carter
PhOip Jafle
V. E. Motylev...
V. E. Motylev..
Philip C. Jessup
Edward C. Carter...
Frederick V. Field
Constantine Oumansky. .
Kenneth Durant
From —
Edward C. Carter.. ,
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
M. G. Shippe (Asia-
ticus).
ECC
Edward C. Carter
Biffgerstaff ECC
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter...
Herbert S. Little
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter...
John H. Oakie
Edward C. Carter...
Edward C. Carter
Owen Lattimore
E. C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter...
Sherwood Eddy
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter...
Philip J. .Taffe
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter
Evans F. Carlson
Edward C. Carter. .
Edward C. Carter .
Edward C. Carter .
Date
9/29/38..
10/11/38.
10/16/38.
10/17/38.
10/20/38.
5/28/38..
11/1/38...
11/4/38...
11/9/38...
-1/9/3S...
12/15/38..
12/15/38-.
I2/20/38-.
1/10/39...
1/10/39...
1/18/39...
1/23/39...
2/2/39....
2/13/39...
2/21/39...
3/14/39...
3/23/39...
3/28/39...
4/19/39...
4/21/39 ..
5/20/39. -
6/29/39...
7/3/39-...
6/24/.39...
7/11/39...
7/11/39...
8/11/39...
8/24/39...
9/S/39-.-.
9/11/39...
9/15/30...
9/21/.^J...
10/1./39..
12/3/39 -. .
12/11/39..
Type of
Docu-
ment
Carbon
Telegram.
Telegram.
Telegram.
File Num-
ber
119. 58
100. 189
105. 161
119.62
100. 153
105. 150
131B.86
116.16
100. 145
100. 409
100.414
102. 30
119.117
100. IS
100.60
100. 61
100.411
100. 296
105. 193
119.113
100. 295
100. 264
131B.95
191. 195
100. 288
100. 299
100. 271
100. 268
104.66
104.9
105.7
100.6
100. 299
191. 270
106.49
101. 45
100. 293
100. 211
Exhibit
Num-
ber
1079
10-0
10S2
lO'S
10S4
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1092
1093
1094
1095
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
Exhibit No. 977-A
52 Smith Terrace,
Stapleton, 8. I., August 7.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter : The enclosed rough sketch gives the situation today as it
looks on a larger map on which I have been moving pins carefully since my
arrival. There are no actual maps from China more recent than V-J day, and
the boundaries of areas are therefore proximate and arrived at by linking to-
gether the respective known points (generally district towns) marking the
limits of control of the two parties. The only accurate houndary is that of the
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region (west of the Yellow River, with Yenan at the
center) which has been a stable administrative entity for some years.
The tendency at present (and the situation is changing rather rapidly) is for
the Central (KMT) troops to push through along the railway lines. However,
there is also a tendency on the part of the Communist-led forces to filter back
and take railway points behind the extreme points of KMT advance. Thus the
Communists are back in several stations of the Tsingtao-Tsinan and Taiyuan-
Tungkwan (South Tungpu) railways, with the result that what were once KMT
salients are now KMT pockets. These situations change daily as both sides
sometimes withdraw from points where they are threatened with encirclement
and then come back, very soon afterwards, when they have been reinforced and
feel that their communications are secure. The enclosed map, however, gives
the over-all situations along the railways accurately, as it is quite obvious that,
even though the Eighth Route may withdraw from the 15-20% of any given
railway line that it holds to block KMT traffic, it will at once seek to reoccupy
other places representing an equal fraction of the line, though in a different and
currently more vulnerable place.
5086
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The actual area of Communist influence is greater than shown, because where
regular forces have been withdrawn to avoid being pinned down, or to reinforce
more important points, the local guerillas and their organization remain. An
attempt has been made to show such an area in the cross-hatched red lines
south of Shanghai and Nanking, where no regular New Fourth Army troops
remain. Other such areas exist both north and south of Hankow along the
Pinghan and Canton-Hankow lines, notably around Changsha. The long di-
agonal red pocket between Sian and Ichang represents the line of breakthrough
of the formerly surrounded Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan border pocket, once closer to
Hankow. This "floating kidney" will tend to move north, toward a junction
with the Eighth Route Army in the region of Yenan, or perhaps that sovith of
Taiyuan, depending upon where a KMT weak spot is found,
Sincerely,
Eppy.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5087
HOW CHJNA IS DfVJDEO SEtWEEM
NATIONAtfSTS AND COMWUHJSTS
"L ^Axi^^vV^^^^,^«i^*^^JiL■■^';^ ^^^'^^.'■•^^•^.'■^^ ^-s— t if ^iA<^;i=ai a\.w-y'
,^^^<, y''^yt^,o«*'^££A*^.!Lj«..j?!V^
5088
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
y^^ PACIFIC
MM
« 108 »0» MB
OCEAN
rwumm
Ha
»^TW^^^
{rT?A USS ControlM by KuomintMC
BHI ConbolM by Conlmunil^
Ovnocrals
OA
CHINA, showing Kuomintang and Communist areas
WHERE ARE WE
HEADING?
BV
SUMNER WELLES
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 508^
Exhibit No. 978
Discussion on Coltective Security in the Pacific and the Far East
May 6, 1943, 8: 15 p. m., 700 Jackson Place, Washington
Carter, Chairman.
Present : Mrs. Alexander, Sir Gurj Bajpai, Hugh Borton, de Voogd, Farley,
Greene, Hiss, Johnstone, Lockwood, Martin, Meisling, Pramoj, Shoemaker, Zafra.
Mr. Carter stated that the purpose of these meetings was to stimulate think-
ing around the problems of collective security which appear to be different for
the Pacific area and the Far East, compared with those that exist in Europe.
These questions should be considered now because so much international political
action lias been Europe-centered or concerned with the American hemisphere
that relatively little attention has been paid to the problems of collective secu-
rity in the Far E^.st. The Far East has tended to be ignored in most of the
scholarly efforts on postwar organization. It is thought that the discussion
might form a basis for an essay by one of the members.
It was decided that a few minutes should be spent on the statement on the
first page of the agenda, to see whether there is general concensus that it is a
reasonable forecast.
There was some discussion of paragraph 2 and the meaning of the word ag-
gression as used in the last sentence. Mr. Carter suggested that for pui'poses
of this discussion it should be limited to armed aggression or military occupa-
tion. Shoemaker suggested that one of the most likely dangers would be that
trouble might arise between two sections of China, with Russia coming into the
picture and making claims China would not want to recognize. Bajpai sug-
gested that there ought to be someone at these meetings qualified to speak for
Russia.
Shoemaker thought it was almost certain that Russia would desire a Pacific
outlet and Dairen is a logical one. This would be a point of conflict with China,
as would be Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Communist elements in China.
Pramoj suggested border difficulties between Thailand and French Indo-China.
Mr. Cordell Hull statement on restoring the French Empire was brought up at
this point. Hiss said that the statement was made a long time ago and it was
a statement of intention with reference to a particular action, not a promise
having in mind action regarding Pacific colonies. As it was worded it had to
do with the "integrity" of the French Empire.
Lookvrood said that one general comment on the statement in the agenda is
that if it is intended as an inclusive statement on security as a whole a little
more attention should be given to general economic and social setting of postwar
development. The problem of establishing the basis of security will be a mat-
ter of what machinery can be elaborated for dealing with these issues as well
as what is going to be done about the economic future of Japan or economic
rivalries in the Pacific or the future of the open door and access to the
resources of Southeast Asia, or problems of economic and social reconstruction
in China.
There was further discussion of the possibility of minor or major border dis-
putes breaking out between Pacific countries, and the likelihood of American
or Soviet for'^es interfering in thpse. It was more or less agreed that there
would be no large-scale hostilities in the immediate years after the war.
There was some discussion of what kind of a settlement or security system
would be set up — emergency or short-term — carefully planned and long-term.
Hiss said that we ought to distinguish between a perfect paper settlement
and a more viable day to day arrangement that might grow oiit of developments-
during the war and the early stages of the peace. Good will will make possible-
the satisfactory handling of a good many problems that could not be met with-
qlut it in spite of all careful preparations. In the Pan-American system this is
a pertinent point. The Inter American agreements mentioned in the agenda are
important primarily because they stated something that had already largely been
worked out and accepted as a basis of relationship.
Lockwood said the Pan-American agreements work because there is peace
rather than there being peace because there are agreements.
There was inconclusive discussion of the applicability of the points on page
two to the Far Eastern Situation.
Johnstone said that granted we want a collective security system in the Pa-
cific, whether on a regional or world bases, what could be the basis for agreement
among the nations interested in the Pacific for such a system? Is it just a
5090 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
simple agreement that we are soing to act to prevent aggression, or is some-
thing more necessary? One would assume that you can't have a system unless
it is an agreement. It is quite possible that there will be a general agreement
for the joint use of bases and employment of force in the Pacific, immediately
after the war. When more normal conditions are restored and troops moved
back within their own boundaries, many people will feel that it may not be
necessary to continue joint use of bases. At that point when the period of
large-scale use of occupation forces cames to an end more suitable arrangements
will have to be made. Unless some machinery is set up fairly soon after hos-
tilities end it may be very diflicult to do so later.
Bajpai asked if there were any common interests among the Pacific countries.
Hiss ."^aid it was a questiun of various periods of time. He hoped there would
be an effort to secure an increasing community of interest ; that present and de-
^ eloping military collaboration would l)ring an increasing marking cnit and find-
ing of common interests. Every effort should be made toward reaching an
agreement today. This ought to be supplemented or incorporated in further
agreements.
Bajpai said that of course everyone recognizes that it is impossible at this
stage to envisage all those points either of agreement or clash of interest, mak-
ing for association or separation hereafter. Would it be correct to say that the
United Nations are all interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East
to the extent that they would collaborate with one another to use force against
aggression in the Far East?
Hiss said that you could not say at the present time that they are.
It was agreed that the United Nations would have to have a community of
interest before they could maintain peace in the Far P^ast and this question should
he the first one explored at the next meeting.
Exhibit No. 979
Mexico City, July 8, 1945.
Dr. Edward C. Carter,
Russian War Relief, Neic York, N. Y.:
Will be delighted to see you here any day at your convenience. Am sure
Russian War Relief leaders in Mexico would welcome opportunity discuss with
you their problems and take advantage your great experience. Eye, too, will
be glad to discuss same problems with you, since they come under my present
jurisdiction, and to renew our personal contact. Warmest regards.
OUMANSKY.
Exhibit No. 980
■Charles Bollard, Executive Associate
Carnegie Corporation of New York,
522 Fifth Avenue,
New York 18, N. Y., January 3, 1946.
(Handwritten :) M. C. : Do you know whether the Army did any testing later
than the enclosed? EC, Jan. 24/46.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5-',th Street, Nero York 22, N. Y.
Dear Carter : I think these are the reports referred to in your note of Decem-
ber 27. If not, please try me again. While both of them are technically in the
•clear, I think it would be well to clear with Buck Lanham before using any of
the data in anything that you may prepare for public consumption.
You are w-elcome to keep these for your files.
Sincerely,
DOLLARD.
CD:RN
ENC.
ECC:
These "attitude" surveys appeared in a publication called "What the Soldier
Thinks." I remember seeing that magazine in January 4G and I feel sure it
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5091
will be continued on a limited scale. Surveys were of considerable value. Shall
I try and get a more recent copy dealing with the East?
M. C.
EESTEICTED
Classification cancelled by authority of Brig. Gen. Paul W. Thompson Theater
Chief, Information and Education Theater Service Forces, European Theater,
by
Lt Col C. D. LEATHERMAN,
(Name and Grade of officer cancelling classification and date of can-
cellation) : Oct 4, 1945.
ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE BERLIN DISTRICT
TOWARD OUR ALLIES
(Based on a sample of 700 men surveyed 22-25 August 1945 in the Berlin
District.)
Research Branch, Information and Education Division, Headquarters, Theater
Service Forces, Euroiiean Theater, September 1945
Report No. E70-93
Copy No. 24
FOREWORD
1. The information upon which this report is based was collected in a survey
of a sample of soldiers in the Berlin District during the period 22 to 25 August
1945.
2. The sample includes representative units from Headquarters troops in the
Berlin District as well as a cross section of men in the 82d Airborne Division and
attached troops. Within each unit selected, a random sample was drawn so
that all types of men had a proportional chance of being included in the survey.
3. As in previous Research Branch studies, the men who filled out question-
naires were assured of anonymity. No names or serial numbers were placed on
the questionnaires, and it was explained to the men that the purpose of the survey
was simply to secure their frank and and honest opinion.
4. It is important to keep in mind that the findings presented here do nol
purport to be indicative of attitudes held by troops in other areas. As a matter
of fact, the Berlin District is a unique situation for our troops in the European
Theater.
5. Data have just been returned from the field and have been tallied from a
sample that is representative of the entire theater. When these data are com-
pared with attitudes of a cross section of men in the ETO in late April, it is
found that attitudes toward the English and Russians have not changed ap-
preciably ; however, attitudes toward the French were much less favorable in
August than in April. Troops in Berlin express somewhat more favorable atti-
tudes toward the English, and also toward the Germans, but slightly less
favorable attitudes toward the French than do troops in the entire theater.
Also, the Berlin troops express considerably more skepticism about how we shall
be able to get along with Russia in the future than do a cross section of American
troops in the European Theater.
MAIN FINDINGS
1. A large majority of the American soldiers (85%) in the Berlin area say
they have a favorable attitude toward the English. A smaller proportion, but
still a substantial majority (61%), report favorable attitudes toward the Rus-
sians. Less than half of them (42%) say they have a favorable opinion of the
French.
2. Most of our soldiers who have contacts with Allied soldiers say they get
along very well or fairly well with them. Twenty-three percent said they had
no contact with English soldiers, 28 percent said they had no contact with Rus-
sian soldiers, and 48 percent said they had no contact with French soldiers. Of
those who have contact with Allied soldiers, 91 percent say they get along fairly
well or very well with English soldiers; 75 percent say they get along fairly
5092
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
well or very well with Russian soldiers ; and 60 percent say they get along fairly
well or very well with Fi'ench soldiers.
3. Those who have known some English, Russian, and French soldiers per-
sonally are slightly more favorable in attitude toward the English, Russian,
and French people and soldiers.
4. Educational status seems to be only slightly related to like and dislike for
the various Allies.
5. Men who have had combat experience are somewhat more favorable toward
the Russians and somewhat less favorable toward the French than are noncom-
bat men. The two groups do not differ in their opinion of the English. Combat
men are no more nor less favorable toward the Germans than are noncombat
men.
6. There is a widespread feeling of confidence that we shall be able to get
along well with England from now on, more than 90 percent of the men express-
ing this attitude. A substantial majority (65%) say that we will get along
well with France in the years ahead. There is considerable skepticism as to
how well we shall get along with Russia and only 30 percent of the men say they
think that we shall get along well with her ; a substantial minority anticipate
war with her sometime in the next 25 years.
7. The overwhelming majoi-ity say they expect England (80%) and the
United States (93%) to cooperate with other nations to settle disputes peace-
ably. Only half of them (51%) think Russia will cooperate.
8. The better educated men and those less well educated differ only slightly
in their attitudes on international relations.
9. Men who have been in combat do not differ appreciably from the noncombat
men in their attitudes on international relations.
10. As might be expected, those who have a generally favorable attitude to-
ward the Russian people are also more likely to be more optimistic about the
possibility of working out good international relations with Russia and to ex-
press more confidence in the Russian government's intentions.
Detailed Findings
ATTITUDES OF PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES
General Attitudes
A large majority of the American soldiers (85%) in the Berlin area say they
have a favorable attitude toward the English. A smaller proportion, but still a
substantial majority (61%), i-eport favorable attitudes toward the Russians.
Less than half of them (42% ) say they have a favorable opinion of the French.
For comparison, the same question was aked about Germans. About three
men in every five (59%) reported a favorable attitude toward the Germans.
Question: "What sort of opinion do you have of the English (Russian, French,
German) people?"^
Anther unfavornblo
Vory
PeroontQgo oneworingi fovorable
Fairly favorable
English
Russian
Rpenoh
Qonson
32ii
53%
9%\
52SJ
756
35%
55%
fJZry unfavornblo
/fnhdecided or no
10?;
1^'
answer
1. '"V
2%
25%
8^
33%
7Z%
-w
z%
iii
1^
^ In interpreting tliese replies it must be kept in mind that in general, the contacts with
the Enjrlish, French, and Germans have been of longer duration and have included civilian
contacts while the Russian contacts have been shorter and limited to Russian soldiers and
displaced personnel.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5093
The replies of the men in the Berlin area are more favorable toward the
English and less favorable toveard the French than were those of a cross section
of ETO troops surveyed in April 1945.^
Cross sec-
tion survey,
April 1945
Berlin area
survey,
August 1945
Percentage saying they were very favorable or lairly favorable to—
Enelish - - -
Percent
72
68
Percent
85
French -
42
Most of our soldiers who have contacts with the Allied soldiers say they
get along very well or fairly well with them.
In answer to the question, "How well do you get along with the English
(Russian, French) soldiers?" : 23 percent said they had no contact with English
soldiers, 28 percent said they had no contact with Russian soldiers, and 48 per-
cent said they had no contact with French soldiers.
Of those who have contact with Allied soldiers, the following percentages say
they get along:
With English soldiers
With Russian soldiers
With Fronch soldiers
Very well
Fnlrly vajII
/Hot 30 well
//iJot well Dt
52%
39%
5
*-3%
n
• «
26%
im
16
% 5k
h
23%
yi%
13%
10%
17%
ell
Those who have known some English, Russian, and French soldiers personally
are slightly more iavorable in attitude toward the English, French, and Russian
people than are those who have not.
In the case of the Russians, the relation between personal acquaintanceship
and attitude is greater than it is in the case of the English or French.
Among men vrho have
known —
No soldiers
personally
Some soldiers
personally
Percentage of men who have very favorable or fairly favorable opinions of-
The English people
The Russian people
The French people
Percent
81
59
41
Percent
71
46
Similarly, those men who know some Allied soldiers personally are more likely
to say they get along with English (Russian, French) soldiers very well or
fairly well.
* Comparable data are not available on the Russians or the Germans.
5094 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Percentage of men who say they get along with-
English soldiers
Russian soldiers
French soldiers
Men who have known —
No soldiers
personally
89
72
51
Some soldiers
personally
92
84
69
This relationship does not necessarily mean that getting to know Allied soldiers
personally causes a more favorable attitude though this is probably true in many
instances. It is also likely that getting to know other soldiers is itself an indi-
cation of a previously existing favorable attitude.
It is important to recognize that while personal acquaintanceship is related to
favorableness of attitude, mere length of time the soldier was stationed in Eng-
land, France, and Berlin has no relation to what men say their attitudes ai'e
toward the English, French, and Russians. The only attitudes studied which
seem to be related to time spent in the Berlin area are those toward the Germans.
The men who have been in the area for a month or more are somewhat less
favorable toward the Germans than are those who have been there less than
a month.
It is also interesting to note that educational status seems to be only slightly
related to the attitudes reported above. High school graduates are no more nor
less favorable than are those with less education.
Men who have had combat experience are somewhat more favorable toward
the Russians and somewhat less favorable toward the French than are non-
combat men. The two groups do not differ in their opinions of the English.
Combat men are no more nor less favorable toward the Germans than are non-
combat men.
SPECIAL LIKES AND DISLIKES
In addition to rating the degree to which they were favorable or unfavorable
in attitude toward the various Allies, the men were asked to state what special
things they like or dislike about them.
The following is a summary of the most frequently mentioned things which
they like or dislike.
Like About the English
About half of the men mentioned some characteristics that they dislaked about
the English people. Most frequently mentioned were:
1. Friendly, hospitable, generous, kind, etc.
2. Courage, guts, self-confidence, see things through, etc.
3. They are a lot like we are.
Dislike About the English
About half of the men mentioned some characteristics that they disliked about
the English. Most frequently mentioned were :
1. Superior, conceited, stuck-up, reserved, unfriendly, etc.
2. Traditionalism, unprogressiveness, etc.
3. Take too much credit and give us too little credit for winning the war.
Like About the Russians
About half the men mentioned one or more characteristics they liked about
the Russinns. The things most frequently mentioned were :
1. Friendly, good hearted, etc.
2. Jolly, care-free, happy-go-lucky, etc.
3. Good fighters, courage, fight for their country, guts, never-say-die spirit,
etc.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5095
4. Sturdy, vigorous, full of vitality, hard working, etc.
5. Treat the Germans rough like they said they would and as they should
be treated.
Dislike About the Russians
About half the men listed something about the Russians which they disliked.
Those most frequently mentioned were :
1. Dirty, sloppy, ill-kempt appearance, etc.
2. Ignorant, stupid, uneducated, etc.
3. Crude, uncultured, rude, ill-mannered, etc.
4. Arrogant, conceited, think tliey won the war alone, etc.
5. Brutal, excessively cruel to Germans, rape, etc.
6. Steal, loot.
Like About the French
About a fourth of the men listed something they liked about the French people.
The most frequently mentioned are :
1. Friendly, hospitable, etc.
2. Cheerful, easy-going, know how to have a good time, etc.
3. Helped all they could, tried to do their share in winning war, etc.
Dislike About the French
About two-thirds of the men listed one or more characteristics they disliked
about the French. Most frequently mentioned are :
1. Dirty, filthy, unsanitary, etc.
2. Mercenary, grasping, want to get something for nothing, etc.
3. Lazy, backward, no ambition, no spirit, etc.
4. Undependable, irresponsible, etc.
5. Loose morals.
Like Aboiit the Germans
About half of the men listed one or more things they liked about the Germans.
Most frequent items were :
1. Clean, neat, orderly, etc.
2. Indu.strious, good workers, etc.
3. Intelligent, educated, resourceful, etc.
4. Friendl.v, good manners, treat you well, etc.
5. Look and act like Americans in many ways.
Dislike About the Germans
About two-thirds of the men mentioned something they disliked about Ger-
mans. The most frequent items were :
1. Dishonest, two-faced, treacherous, etc,
2. Fascistic, militaristic ideas, still believe Hitler had right idea, etc.
3. Easily led, can't think for themselves, etc.
4. Superiority complex, arrogant, etc.
5. They don't accept any responsibility or guilt for the war.
6. Self-pity, whining, complaining, fawning, all to get sympathy.
ATTITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The general picture which one gets from the men's replies is that many of
them are in doubt and suspicious about Russia and a substantial minority antici-
pate war with her sometime in the next 25 years. In contrast there is a great
deal of confidence that we shall he able to get along well with England and only
slightly less confidence about our relations with France.
Hoio Will We Get Along With Other Nations?
Four men in every ten say they are either in doubt as to how we will get along
with Russia (26%) or that they expect we will fight Russia sooner or later
(14%). Only about one man in ten expresses this opinion regarding England
and France.
5096
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Qnestiont "How do you think we will get along with England (France,
Russia) from now on?"
^awere t
Peroentage answering:
Russia France England
We will get along very well
We will disagree about some
things but manage to get
along
We will have some serious dis-
agreements but we- won't fight"
each other
W« will very likely fight each
other sooner or later
Undecided
No answer
3^
95i
30^
18%
\IA
2%
1%
5256
22?
10%
1%
3%
K2%
39%
-w
9%
26%
When asked, "Do you think the United States will get into another big war
within the nest 25 years V" 23 percent said, "yes" ; 38 percent said, "undecided" ;
.and 37 percent said "no". Two percent did not answer.
In addition, the men were asked, "If you think the US will be in another big
war, who do you think the US will be fighting against?" Twenty-nine percent
of the men named one or more countries. Twenty-five percent of the men named
Russia. The highest percent of mention any other nation received was Japan,
mentioned by 3 percent of the men.
Cooperation in Settling Disputes
The overwhelming majority say they expect England (80%) and the United
States (93%) to cooperate with otber nations to settle disputes peaceably. Only
half of them (51%) think Russia will cooperate.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5097
qneatlont "Which do you think the US (England, Russia) is most
likoly to do about international problems in the future?"
Answera^
Try to oooperate with other notions
and tiT" to aottle disputes
peaooably
Try to hove nothing to do with
disputes between other
countries ...
Try to settle things their own way
without cooperating with other
nations
No answer
Percentages answering:
Russia
England
United
States
51%
12%
3256
5r
80SI
3%
s%
9?
' 2%
Confidence in the English and Russian Governments
The men express much less confidence that the Russian government will be
"on the up-and-up" in dealing with the US than will the English government.
Qufletlont "How much confidence do you have that the English
(Russian) government will be on the up-and-up in
dealing with the US?"
Anawera;
A great deal of confidence
Some confidence
Not much confidence
No confidence at all .
88348— 52— pt. 14 13
Percentages answering!
BuBsian
Government
25%
A2%
26%
No answer.
JUL
English
Government
1%^
*-3%
*-2%
5098
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The better educated man and those less well educated differ only slightly in
their attitudes on international relations.
Men who have been in combat do not differ appreciably from the non-combat
men in their attitudes on internatioua) relations.
As might be expected, those who have a generally favorable attitude toward
the Russian people are also mca-e likely to be more optimistic about the possi-
bility of working out good int«;rnatior.al relations with Russia and to express
more confidence in the Russian government's intentions. The following charts
will illustrate this relationship.
Question: "How do you think we will get along with Russia from now on?"
Among those who hove , .
Percentage saying . . .
Wo v/111 get along very well
Favorable attitudes
toward the Russian
people
Unfavorable
attitudes toward
the Russian people
We vd.ll disagree about some things
but manage to get along
We will have some serious disagree-
ments but vre won't fight each other
Wg will very likely fight each
other sooner or later
Undeolded
Ko answer
12$
38$
15$
9$
ZlS
2$
15$
26$
26$
27$
^tS
^73.
Question : "Which do you think Russia is most likely to do about international
relations in the future?"
Among those who have . . •
Percentage saying she
Favorable attitudes Unfavorable
toward the Russian attitudes tov7ard
people the Russian people
Will cooperate with other nations and
try to settle disputes peaceably . .
■Will try to have nothing to do with
disputes betvreon other countries . .
Win try to settle things their own
way without cooperating with other
nations
No answer . . .
-3$
31$
12$
50$
'W
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5099
Question: "How much confidence do you have that the Russian government
will be on the up-and-up in dealing with the US?"
Among those who have . . •
Percentage aoying . . .
A great deel of confidence
Favor fible attitudes Unfavorable
tov;ard the Russian attitude a toward
people the Russian people
Some confidence
Hot nruch confidence or
T.o confidence at all
No answer
33%
ijb%
205b
^1%
\1%
yn
i»%
■JS
It cannot be assumed from these data that by changing soldiers' attitudes in
the direction of greater personal favorablfness toward Russian people that one
will effect change in their international attitudes. However, it is very likely
that such personal attitudes are likely to be accompanied by a greater willing-
ness to view the problems of our relations with Russia in a less prejudiced,
more pudicious frame of mind.
Soldiers Suggestions for Improving Allied Relations
The men were asked to write out any suggestions they had for improving-
relations among Allied soldiers in the Berlin area. About six men in every ten
offered one or more suggestions.
By far the most frequent type of suggestion centered around the idea of
increasing opportunities for friendly contact with individuals in other Allied
forces. Typical of these suggestions were :
"More mixing of all Allied troops in sports, joint recreational activities."'
"Have facilities like clubs, canteens, etc., where men can meet."
"Have dances and other social events of interest to all troops."
"Give men more freedom and facilities for transportation to visit soldiers
in the other forces."
"Have joint classes, discussion groups, speakers at meetings open to all
interested Allied soldiers."
Less frequently mentioned were :
"Decrease contacts with Allied soldiers, let each keep to his own area."
"Have a more uniform policy in Berlin and let all Allied forces follow it."
"More control of Russians."
CHANGES IN ATTITUDES OF SOLDIERS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
TOWARD OUR ALLIES FROM APRIL 1945 TO AUGUST 1945
(Based on a Comparison of 2 Cross-sectional Surveys : Survey 1 : Among 3.795
Enlisted Men Queried 25 April to 5 May 1945. Survey 2 : Among 2,9811
Enlisted Men Queried 14 to 24 August 1945)
(Research Branch, Information and Education, Headquartei's, Theater Service
Forces, European Theater, September 1945)
Report No. ETO-102.
Copy No. 8
HOW the study was made
1. Information on men's attitudes and opinions was secured by means of
anonymous questionnaires filled out by two representative cross sections. One
5100
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
survey was conducted during the period from 25 April to 5 May 1945 among a
cross-section sample of 3,795 white enlisted men. The other was conducted dur-
ing the period from 14 to 24 August 1945 among a sample of 2,981.
2. Each sample was designed to give proper representation to all arms and
services and types of outfits. Men in Air Forces, Field Forces, and Service Forces
units were included in the proportions found in the Theater as a whole. Within
each unit selected, a random sample was drawn so that all types of men had a
proportional chance of being included in the survey.
3. As in previous Research Branch studies, the men who filled out question-
naires were assured of anonymity. No names or serial numbers were placed on
the questionnaires, and it was explained to the men that the purpose of the
survey was simply to secure their frank and honest opinions.
OVEB-ALL OPINION Gl'S HAVE OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH PEOPLE
In the four months following VE-day a considerable shift took place in soldiers'
attitudes toward the French. During the same period no appreciable changes
took place in attitudes toward the English.
QUESTION: "?)hnt sort of opinion do you have of the English people?"
"Vfhat sort of opir.ion dc .vcu have of the rrench people?"
English People
April August
19A5 19A5
French People
April
1W5
Au£[ust
19^5
Very Favorable
Fairly Favorable
Rather Unfavorable
Very Unfavorable
No answer » • .
21^6
545&
16^
2
21^
31
39!K
31^
19^
JE
Whereas just prior to VE-day as many soldiers said they thought as well
of the French people as of the English (about 7 in every 10 said they felt "very"
or "fairly" favorable toward them), in August, 75% of the soldiers thought
favorably of the English but only 45% thought well of the French.
The fact that there was a smaller proportion of soldiers who indicated that
they thought favorably of the P'rench in August as compared to April is not
the result of the changing composition of the Theater during the elapsed period
of time but rather is a true reflection of differences in men's attitude between
the two dates.*
' In this as well as In other comparisons of April and Augnst findings appearing in this
report, detailed analysis shows that differences are not the result of a changed composition
of the Armed Forces in Europe in August as compared with April, except insofar as time
in Army and time overseas is concerned where, of course, the 4-month lapse of time must
be taken into account.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5101
OVEE-ALL OPINION OF FEENCH NO BETTEB THAN OF GEBMANS
The two charts below indicate that, in general, the expressed opinion is no
more favorable toward the French people than toward the German and that
attitudes expressed toward both French and German people is considerably
less favorable than toward English people.
QlgSTION: (August Survey) What sort of opinion do you have of
the (Fnpllsh. French. Gernwn) people?
'Very-
favorable
'Fairly
fav •
French people
German people
English people
21^
39^
kl%
5k%
'Pather
imfav. ■
'Very No
unfdv ' ans,
31^
19?6
33^
12^
16^
QtJESTIOK; Leaving aside for
the raomant the fact that thoy
are our enemies or cur allies,
which £ne of the follcv^ing do
you like best .lust as pocple—
the French peop'le, the German
people, or t)te English people?
Answers C^^^^
The tvpes of reasons men gave for disliking the English or French were the
same for both surveys (report of April findings— Research Report No. E-12.5 —
lists cliief reason soldiers mention). Reasons men advance for liking or dis-
liking the Germans, along with other data on attitudes toward Germans, are
presented in Research Report No. E-134.
EFFECT ON ATTITUDES OF TIME SPENT IN COUNTRY
Men who have spent considerable time in all three countries have substan-
tially the same attitudes toward the people of each of the three countries as
do all soldiers surveyed. As was pointed out in the report of the April survey
there is no evidence to support the tlieories that better-educated men have more
favorable attitudes toward our Allies or that the longer men are overseas, the
worse their attitudes toward our Allies become. On the other hand, there is
some evidence to suggest that the longer men remain in a particular country
the more favorable their attitude becomes to the people of that country. This
holds for Germany as well as for France and England.
For example :
6102
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ATTITUDE TOWARD ENGLISH PEOPLE ...
Time spent in England
'Very Fairly 'Rather 'Yeny Ko
favorable' fav.' unfav.' unfav. ' ans.
No time ••••«••«•
18?
53?
13? p 13?
18?
5655
18? (
S ...2?
■ ' L
4 to 8 mos
14?
53?
20?
7 ...1?
Over 8 mos
28^
55?
12? 4 .
. .1?
ATTITU-
Tine sioent in France
DE TOWARD FRENCH PEC]
•Very 'Fairly
fffvwraTDla' fav, •
=LE ...
tRather
unfav. '
•Very
unfav. '
MO
ans.
Less than 4 mos.^- , , .
r
5
35%
33^
20?
7
4 to 8 njoa ••••••
...1*
.256
•F
U-?
3L?
21?
Over 8 mos. » • * .
8 UU%
31?
15? ..
Attitude toward German people seems to be even more closely related to time
spent in the country than patterns shown above for Britain and France.
Among men who spent no time in Germanj 34 percent say they have a
favorable opinion of German people.
Among men who spent less than 4 tcceks in Germany 42 percent say they
have a favorable opinion of German people.
Among men who spent between // and 8 loeeks in Germany 54 percent say
they have a favorable opinion of German people.
Among men who spent over 8 weeks in Germany 59 percent say they have
a favorable opinion of German people.
Althou.yh time spent in country and attitude toward people of the country
are related, analysis reveals no appreciable relationship between time in one
country and attitude toward people of other countries. For example, time
spent in Germany (for men who have also spent some time in England and
France) does not appear to appreciably affect attitudes men have toward the
English or the French.
DECREASE IN FEELING THAT WE SHOULD HELP ALUES GET BACK ON THEIR FEET
In the August as well as in the April survey, more soldiers were favorable
to the idea of helping to feed our Allies after the war than the proportion who
felt we should help our Allies by sending them money and materials. However,
a slightly snuiiler proportion of men in August as compared to April thought we
should send help along these lines.
These two questions were asked the men :
1. "After the war, some of our Allies will need help in feeding their people.
Do you think the United States should send food to these countries
even if it meant that we would have to keep on rationing food in our
own country for a while to do it?"
2. "After the war, soyyie of our Allies will need money and materials
to help them get back on their feet.
Do you think we should let them liave money and materials to help
them get back on their feet, even if it meant that we should have to
pay higher taxes to do it?"
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5103
SZVV TOOD?
April August
1945 19AS
-2-
HELP WITH MONEY
AND MATERIALS?
April
1945
August,
194^5
SHOULD
SHOULD NOT
NO ANSWER
58%
39^
t
h%
49J6
2*
385S
^Tfo
3s:
29%
b&%
Consistent with findings shown ahove is the small decline in proportion of
men ^ho feel we should do everything we can to help Frauce get back on her
feet. Men were asked to tell whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement :
"We should do everything we can to help France get back on her feet as soon
as possible."
In April: 60'% of men surveyed Agreed with statement.
In August: 51% of men surveyed Agreed with statement.
OTHER SHIFTS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD FRENCH
Some Change in Belief That France Will Again Be A Strong Nation. More
men in August than in April felt that French nation is too weak and split up
to ever amount to anything again.
Men were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement : ''The
French nation is so weak and split up that it will never amount to anything
again."
In April: 73% of men surveyed Disagreed with statement.
In August: 62% of men surveyed Disagreed with statement.
Fairly Large Change In Belief That French People Sincerely Like Americans.
Men were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement : "Most
French people sincerely like Americans."
In April: 73% of men surveyed Agreed with statement.
In August: 52% of men surveyed Agreed with statement.
APPRAISAL OF allies' WAR EFFORT UNCHANGED
About the same proportions of men feel that our major Allies — Britain and
Russia — have done as good a job as possible of fighting this war. Even as
regards France, who suffers in other respects a decline in favorable attitudes,
there is no appreciable decrease since April in soldiers' respect for her con-
tribution in war effort.
Statement: "Considering everything, the (specified people) have done as
good a job as possible of fighting this war."
Specified People —
Russians — More than 19 men in every 20 surveyed Agreed with statement
in both April and August surveys.
British — More than 16 in every 20 surveyed Agreed with statement in both
April and August surveys.
5104
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
French — About 10 men in every 20 surveyed Agreed with statement in both
April and August surveys. (In April, slightly more than half the men
agreed. In August just slightly less than half — but the difference is too
small to be significant.)
AIMS OF OUE ALLIES REMAIN UNCHANGED IN EYES OF SOLDIERS
In August just as in April most men had faith in the war aims and the future
course of action that England and Russia are likely to take. In each survey
about as many men expressed faith in Russia as faith in England and no change
in the level of these attitudes took place between the two dates.
Statement : "(Specified country) is more interested in dominating or controlling
the world than she is in building a truly democratic world."
In April and in August about 7 in every 10 men surveyed DISAGREED
with this statement as it applies to both Russia and to Britain.
Statement: "The (specified country) will try as much as possible to work out
a just and lasting peace."
In April and in August about 8 in every 10 men surveyed AGREED with
this statement as it applies to both Russia and to Britain.
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND ENGLAND AFTER THE WAR
No changes have taken place in the 4-month period between surveys, in soldiers'
attitude toward our postwar relations with Russia and England.
Question: "How do you think we will get along with (specified country) after
the war?"
Russia England.
April
194?
August
1%5
April
August
1945
"We will get alone very
well"
"We will disagree about
some things but manage
to get along"
Undecided * . . . .
"We -will have some ser-
ious disagreements but
we won't fight each otli-
er"
"We will very likely-
fight, each other .sooner
or later"
Wo
yi%
15/.
195^
13S
yi%
39/c
16^
19^
9^
17^
■:>%
vi%
'M.
i&^
^yf"
18$
III the April surve.y comparable questions were also asltod about France and
China, but these were not repeated in Augu:;t. (See Research Branch Report
a E-125.)
^■Includes a few men who die not ansv<er the question.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5105
Exhibit No. 981
ECC from R JG :
I am at present having a card file made of all corporation prospects. By now
I have accumulated eight or ten lists, many of which have duplications. Each
card will give the name of the corporation, source, and individual to contact.
When it is completed I thought you and I could go over it to decide what method
of approach to use on each one. Some few you will probably want to contact
personally. Others should get a letter and others we probably won't bother
with at all for awhile. But it seemed a simpler approach to have all the infor-
mation in one place.
If you would like to give this list back to me I will include the names on it
with the rest of the names I have. I know there are some on this list which I
already have on other lists.
(Pencilled note:) Have carded all of these along with our other corp. pros-
pects 6/21/46.
R. J. G.
(Pencilled note :) RJG : Note & Return to ECC who hasn't seen it yet.
American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
June 12, 1946.
Washington Office, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6, D. C. Telephone District 8665
Mr. Edwabd C. Caetee,
IPR, 1 East 54th Street, Netv York 22, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter : Attached are two lists which I spoke of yesterday when
you were here and which should be useful in campaigning among big corporations
interested in the Far East.
You will be interested, I think, in the opinion of Mr. Blair Bolles, of the Foreign
Policy Association, on the outlook for the IPR here. He thinks it will take
six or seven mouths' hard work to lay the base for a sound job of membership
expansion and enlargement of program. He does not believe that the IPR should
hope or expect to get all its financial support in Washington for the local office.
The FPA here gets about $2,500 a year from its membership and the rest from
the New York office, which the Washington unit exists to serve. I judge that the
total budget of the Washington-FPA is above $15,000 a year. Bolles said that a
staff of four people is the minimum he thinks either FPA or IPR needs in order
to do a first class job. He says you have to plug very hard to get the information
you need in order to serve outside offices ; no automatic flow system from gov-
ernment sources will work. He adds that he thinks IPR can and should do
more community service here than FPA can do.
Sincerely,
[s] I. A. P.
Busines& and noncommercial holdings in Japan of United States organizations
(total value of interest is as of December 1, 1941)
Name
Address
Value
All America Radio, Inc
67 Broad St., New York
$8, 494
38 801
American Foreign Insurance Association
80 Maiden Lane, >;ew York
American Magnesium Metals Corp
800 Ohio St., Pittsburgh
327 600
Associated Merchandising Corp
1440 Broadway, r\ew York _ .-
11,231
AmpriVan PrPsidpnf T.inps;
311 California St., San Francisco
4,036
460 526
American Trading Co., Inc
96 Wall St., New York
Anderson, Clayton & Co
Cotton Exchange Bldg., Houston
33 554
Associated Press
50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York
5 721
Baker & Co., Inc. (precious metals)
113 Astnr St., NewaikS, N. J
118, 266
Can ier Corp . - - --.
900 S. Geddes St., Syracuse
67 308
Commercial Pacific Cable Co
67 Broad St., New York
8,129
Dorr Co., The (engineers)
570 Lexington Ave., New York
114 149
Eastman Kodak Co
343 State St., Rochester
213, 424
Ford Motor Co. (2 units in Japan)
Dearborn. Mich __
5,403,873
2,614,973
General Motors Corp 3044 West Grand Blvd., Detroit
5106
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Business and noncommercial holdings in Japan of United States organizations
{total value of interest i!< as of December 1, 19 il) — Coutiuued
isiame
Address
Value
Goodrich, B. F., Co
Go?ho Co., Inc. (Cotton agents) _
Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co. (2 units) .
Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co. (electro-
plating & polishing).
International Automatic Electric Corp
Internationa! Business Machines Corp
International Nickel Co
International Standard Electric Corp. (7 units).
Irwin-Harrisons-Whitney, Inc. (tea)
Locw's, Inc
Metro-Goldvvyn-Mayer Co
National Cash Register Co. (2 units)
Natioaal City Bank
Nichibei Securities Co., Ltd
Otis Elevator Co
Paraffine Co., Inc
Paramount Pictures, Inc. (2 units)
RCA Communications, luc
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc
Sales Afiiliates, Inc. (beauticians' stuff) .-_
Singer Sewing Mad.ine Co
Standard Brands of Asia, Inc
Standard Oil Co. (N. J.)
Standard- Vacuum Oil Co. (.3 units)
Tide Water Associated Oil Co
Titan Co. (titanium products) 2 units
Twentieth Century-Fo.x Film Corp
United Artists Corp
United Engineering & Foundry Co
United Press Associations
Universal Pictures Co., Inc
Warner Brothers-First National Pictures.
Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society
Western Electric Export Co
William Wrigley, Jr., Co
500 S. Main St., Akron, Ohio
c/o Alien Property Custodian, 1577 Mercan-
tile Bank Bldg.. Dallas, Texas.
233 New Jersey Railroad Ave, Newark 5,
N.J.
Matawan, N. J
1033 W. Van Buren St., Chicago
Madison at 57th, New York
67 Wall St., New York
67 Broad St., New York
50 S. Front St., Philadelphia
1540 Broadway, New York
1540 Broadway, New York
Main & K Sts., Dayton, Ohio
55 Wall St., New York
c/o Oinco of Alien Property Custodian, 417
Montgomery St., San Francisco.
260 Eleventh Ave., New York
175 Brannan St., San Francisco
New York
66 Broad St., New York
1270 Sixth Ave., New York _--.
730 Fifth Ave., New York
149 Fiftli Ave., New York.__
595 Madison Axe., New York
30 Rockefeller Plaza, Now York
26 Broadway, New York
17 Battery Place, New York
111 Broadway, New York
444 W. 56th St., New York
729 Seventh Ave., New York
First National Bank Bldg., Pittsburg
220 E. 42nd St., New York
1250 SLxth Ave., New York
321 W. 44th St., New York
124 Columbia Heights, Brooklyn
195 Broadway, New York
410 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago
$334, 080
138, 555
84, 414
37,008
6,111
318.375
3,896
2, 645, 245
405, 887
513, 493
65, 296
928, 507
12, 630
349, 164
154. 101
571.619
5, 342
246, 274
5,733
2, 323, 195
18, 877
2,181
5. 580. 812
1, 549. 613
249, 852
284, 899
37, 520
1,5^1,177
14, 823
150.942
270. 932
43. 023
87, 172
23, 400
AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVING PATENT LICENSE OK TRADE-MAKK AGREEMENTS WITH
COMPANIES IN JAPAN PGOPEE
Ajax Electrothermic Corp., Ajax Park, Trenton 5, N. J.
Ajax Electric Furnace Corp., 1108 Frankford Ave., Philadelpliia, Pa.
American Cyananiid Co., 30 Rockefeller Plaza. New York, N. Y.
American Magnesium Metals Corp., 800 Ohio St., Pittsburgli, Pa.
Baker & Co., 113 Astor St., Newark ^, N. J.
Bendix Aviation Corp., 11th floor, Fisher Bldg., Deti'oit. Mich.
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp., 1400 Lafayette Bld.ii., Detroit 26, Mich.
California Institute of Technology, 1201 E. California St., Pasadena 4.
Carrier Corp., 900 S. Geddes St., Syracuse, N. Y.
Chemical Construction Corp., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y,
China Electric Co., Ltd., 67 Broad St., New York, N. Y.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington 98, Del.
Gasoline Products Co., 26 .Journal Square, Jersey City, N. J.
General Cable Corp., 420 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y.
General Railway Signal Co.. 801 West Ave., Rochester, N. Y.
B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio.
Gray Processes Corp., 26 Journal Sq., Jersey City, N. J.
Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co., 233 New Jersey Railroad AVe., Newark 5. N. J.
Hooker Electrochemical Co., Buffalo Ave. & 47th St., Niagara Falls, N. Y.
International General Electric Co., .570 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y.
International Standard Electric Corp., 67 Broad St., New York, N. Y.
Kidde, Walter & Co., Inc., 675 Main St., Belleville, N. J.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., Nicholas Bldg., Toledo, Ohio.
Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis, Ind.
Merco Nordstrom Valve Co., 400 N. Lexington Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Merrill Co., 582 Market St., San Francisco, Calif.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5107
Northern Equipment Co., 1945 Grove Drive. Erie, Pa.
Kadio Corporation of America, Rockefeller Center, New York, N. Y.
Saint Regis Paper Co., 230 Park Ave., New York, N. Y.
Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc., 40 Flatbush Avenue Extension, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Stanco, Inc., 216 W. 14tli St., Nevp York, N. Y.
Standard Oil Co. (N. J. ) , 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. N. Y.
Standard Oil Development Co., 26 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Stewart-Warner Corp., 1826 Diversoy Parkway, Chicago, 111.
Texaco Development Corp., 26 Journal Square, Jersey City, iN. J.
Titan Co., Ill Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Universal Oil Products Co., 310 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, 111.
Western Electric Co., Inc., 195 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Western Electric Export Co., Ditto.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., Wilmerding, Pa.
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Weston Electric Instrument Corp., 014 Frelinghuysen Ave., Newark 5, N. J.
Exhibit No. 982
(Pencilled note:) Urgent.
Mr. Carter: The attached article on the CIC is to appear in the September
22nd Survey. Its history is as follows : Hugh Deane submitted a short, which
KB and Bob Barnett wanted Hugh to rewrite a little more ol)jectively, giving a
little more on the other side of the question. Hugh's second piece also fell short
of what was required, so I secured Hugh's OK on KB's rewriting the article, the
final piece to be signed by both KB and Hugh. Hugh has seen the article in its
present form and has .iust wired that he is returning it special delivery with his
comments, and he added the phrase "en garde" which may .suggest that he is
unwilling to sign it in its present form. We shall presumably have his comments
tomorrow morning.
In case Hugh is unwilling to sign the piece, KB is also unwilling to sign it. I
therefore suggested some such device as this: indicating that the article had
been written by the staff of the American Council, on the basis of sources given
in the text and of first-hand material supplied by Hugh Deane. I will suggest
this formula to Hugh after I have heard from you.
Do you approve the piece as it stands? If we cannot have the the double signa-
ture, do you approve my suggestion about authorship? (Pencilled note :) Please
let me have your answer Friday morning.
CP.
The piece has gone to the printer and galleys should be here tomorrow after-
noon {Friday). I am sorry to have to bother you with the matter at this late
date, but the possibility of "a hitch about authorship makes it necessary.
CP.
Thursday p. m.
Exhibit No. 983
(Handwritten:)
Seislin, July 17.
Dear Dear Ket: Well I have been to Manchukuo and got in & out alive. I
place our invitation to the Emperors Garden Party on the top of my (your)
office bag at every frontier & where every Japanese gendarme can see it &
though the questions continue they are in a mellow atmosphere. In one Man-
churian city in an important Govt, office — the Japanese chief was called out of
the office to the phone. His Chinese assistant quick as a flash took a piece of
paper out of his pocket & wrote "Don't believe a word they tell you." Then a
moment later on another piece he wrote "I can't talk." When I looked straight
into his eyes as you have seen me some time "intense sympathy" he wrote again
"Meet in front of Station at 6.30. He appeared at 7— driving along a side street
in a half-covered Russian Troika — I walked alone for two blocks down a side
street and then stepped into the Troika & we zigzagged first to a Russian Res-
taurant where I dropped him & drove on. Then I joined him at a Chinese Res-
taurant across the street — we talked & talked & talked. I'll tell you all when
5108 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
we meet. When we started back to my Hotel — Air raid drill was on sirens
blew — tlae streets filled with amateur patriots with arm bands who began wildly
putting out shop lights, bicycle light, & fairly leaped on our driver & blew out
his coach lights — later gendarmes insisted that we alight & we walked on until
a block from my hotel he said goodbye. I wonder whether he was agent provo-
cateur or Chinese patriot — I think the latter. Don't mention this I beg of you
until we meet. I don't want to get the lad shot. (You can tell this to John.)
After leaving him — I had a devil of a time in the hotel — the lights were out
because of the air raid drill & I had to pack in the dark, paying bill in the dark,
drive to the station in a lightless taxi & catch my train in a station that was
dim & where you first bumped into luggage coolies, next excited passengers,
next the muskets of hurrying soldiers & got into a train with an armed &
armoured engine & an armed »& armoured caboose. It was one more hectic and
amusing get away as I had only about 20 minutes and had to get two bags out
of the handgepack.
Much love,
Edward.
JtTLY 19.
Well, here I am in Vladivostok harbor — what a contrast with Korea ! It
is cool & there is a little mist hanging over the lovely hills that are much like
the Korean Hills & not unlike the Japanese sea — I am guessing which is Brem-
man of those on the dock. The Siberia Maru is a very comfortable ship. It
does a regular triangle or quadrant every ten days, Tsuruga, Seislin, Raslin,
Vladivostok. I am the first foreign passenger in a long time to board the ship
at Seislin. There are many who board it at Tsuruga. There were two Soviet
women attached to the Embassy in Tokyo and two Japanese F. O. men on board,
one going to Berlin the other to be consul general in Vladivostok.
Later : I am now on shore in the same hotel with Bremman.
Exhibit No. 984
Report of Conference of March 9th
A conference of leaders in the academic field was held at the Institute of
Pacific Relations on March 9th to devise a scheme for meeting the emergency
demand for people with unusual qualifications, primarily in the language field,
without unduly dislocating the academic system or disrupting future sources
of supply.
what are the main government needs in this respect
1. IntelViience officers for all forces. — Requirements: all-round knowledge of
the language in question, especially reading script and printed matter, and mil-
itary knowledge.
2. Economic analysis. — Requirements : ability to read the language, and
knowledge of the economic situation of the country in question.
3. Interpreters with troops. — Requirement: ability to speak the language.
4. Diplomatic advisers. — Requirements : ability to read the language, and
knowledge of the political situation.
5. Communications Intelligence. — Requirements : ability to read script and
printed matter and speak the language, and a thorough general knowledge of
the country.
6. Propaganda. — Requirement : ability to read, speak, and write the language,
and a thorough knowledge of the country and the people.
7. Censorship. — Requirement: ability to read all forms of writing of the
language.
8. Reserve categorii, including those engaged in basic or special studies, and
those working on long-terra government projects or on research related to
government needs.
Note. — Since it will be impossible for some time to find sufficient personnel
in the above categories who combine all the necessary qualifications, the func-
tions of each category could be divided. (For example, the work of economic
analysis could be shared between economics and linguists.)
ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5109
HOW IS THE GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT RECRUITING SUCH PERSONNEI.?
The governruent is already taking some people with a knowledge' of Russian,
Chinese, and Japanese from academic sources, but so far chiefly from the periph-
ery. There is a danger, however, that its demands will soon involve disloca-
tion of the academic system.
The present method of recruiting varies with the different departments. Thus
the Army may encounter difficulties in recruiting specialists under existing
regulations. On the other hand, the F. B. I., the Marines, and the Navy are
freely enrolling them as the need arises
The supply of those with a knowledge of Russian and Chinese is still sufficient
to meet the present demand without seriously affecting academic organizations.
But in the case of Japanese, the supply is already practically exhausted.
WHAT ARE THE NONACADEMIC SOURCFS FROM WHICH THE GOVERNMENT'S NEEDS
MIGHT BE MET?
1. Japanese language. — (a) Second-generation Japanese. The government is
still reluctant for political reasons to use this group. Moreover, few of them
can read Japanese ; and even those who speak the language frequently speak only
patois. Those who can read and speak well have usually received their train-
ing in Japan and are therefore under suspicion. However, the latter are one of
the few groups who could read script.
(b) Businessmen. — Very few are able to read and wi-ite Japanese. Those with
speaking knowledge would be valuable if they could be used on active service,
but most of them are above the age limit for such work. However, their speak-
ing knowledge could be made use of in the fields of Communications Intelligence
and Propaganda.
(c) Missionaries: Some have reading and writing, as well as speaking, knowl-
edge of the language ; and although the majority would be over-age for active
service, this group might be an important source of supply. However, it is
doubtful how many would be willing to work against Japan in view of their con-
nections with that country and of the fact that by so doing they would probably
be unable to continue their activities in Japan after the war was over.
Missionaries with knowledge of Chinese, on the other hand, could learn to read
Japanese fairly quickly and would not be subject to the same scruples as the
missionaries from Japan.
(d) White-Russian emigres from Manchuria and Koreans knowing Japanese,
It is probable that few would be able to read or write the language; and the
political allegiance of both groups would be suspect.
(e) Chinese could possibly be used to read and write Japanese.
2. Chinese language. — The supply is still adequate to meet the present demands-
of the government. If the demand grows, Chinese could be used.
3. Russian language. — The supply is plentiful ; and, if necessary, new personnel
can be trained comparatively quickly.
4. Siamese and Malay languages. — Missionaries are at present the chief source
of supply, but there are not enough of them to meet possible demands. However^
since the reading and writing problem is not great in the case of these languages,
the training of new personnel would not be difficult. Another possible source of
supply would be British Malaya.
5. Dutch language. — No problem.
6. Political and economic analysts. — The chief problem here is to utilize the
present supply with a minimum of wastage, and to conserve the present facili-
ties, and develop new ones, for training additional personnel. Newspapermen,
State Department officials, and students and research workers abroad would be
a valuable source of supply in this category. Steps should be taken to ensure
that such people will be available in the case of emergency and not interned
abroad.
Conclusion. — As regards languages, the situation is already acute only in the
case of Japanese. However, there is no machinery for making the liest use of
available personnel in all the above categories : and there is no adequate organ-
ization for the training of new personnel. For two reasons, therefore, it is
essential that the academic world, in cooperation with the government, should
devise some scheme to meet these deficiencies. First because its cooperation is
essential to the efficient working out of such a scheme, which is of vital importance
to the whole national defense organization ; and secondly because, in the absence
of such a plan, the whole academic system would be dislocated by the haphazard
extraction of teachers and students for government service.
51 0 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PROPOSALS FOE THE MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE
ABOVE FIELDS
A committee representing the various academic institutions, learned societies,
etc. should be set up to offer its services to the government in the tasli of worliing
out a well integrated plan on a national scale. The first step in the drawing up
of such a plan must be to compile a list of available personnel in the above fields
and to classify them according to their special ability. The questionnaire already
issued by the government with a view to creating a national roster in this con-
nection is just beginning to get under way. This roster will do the mechanical
work satisfactorily; l)nt it cannot show initiative in selection, and it cannot sell
its services to the departments.
Thus, when the preliminary listing and classifying have been completed, a
sclieme must be devised by which the personnel can be utilized with the maxi-
mum efficiency. Both as a means of conserving the limited supply of specialists
and as an aid in coordinating tlie work of the various government departments,
it would be desirable, in the case of the kind of work that lends itself to such
treatment, to set up a central information bureau, possibly through the agency
of the National Resources Planning Board. Without such centralization the
available supply of specialists would soon be exhausted, and the present
practice of duplication of work in the various departments would be perpetuated.
A possible nucleus for such a central information bureau in the Far Eastern
JBeld already exists in the Institute of Pacific Relations.
In coordination with the above scheme for the most efficient utilization of
existing pei-sonnel, machinery should be devised for the training of new personnel
In languages and the social sciences. The establishment of some kind of Na-
tional Training School would preserve intact and even extend the existing
teaching facilities and would guarantee a continued supply of new personnel.
It would also enable those doing important research work to continue their
studies or to undertake special studies in accordance with government needs.
Such a school could either be centralized or decentralized. If it were cen-
tralized at Wasliington, where members of government departments could attend
after office hours, the government might be more inclined to provide the neces-
sary funds. On the other hand, centralization would disorganize the training
centers already established; and the value of part-time study in the present
emergency situation, particularly in the case of the Japanese language, is
doubtful. (In the latter connection, the question of organizing evening classes
wherever the necessary facilities exist was also discussed, and it was agreed
that the matter should be further investigated.)
The teaching facilities for such a National Training School are adequate,
except in the case of the Japanese language, which presents a special difficulty.
{Similar problems will arise if the government should require specialists in such
langauL:;es as Malay, Turkish, and Arabic.) Limited facilities exist for the
teaching of the reading and writing of Japanese print and script in this country.
And in the case of spoken Japanese, students could be sent to Hawaii; or mis-
sionaries and second-generation Japanese might be used for training purposes,
though few are trained teachers. It was agreed that a conference of all teachers
of Japanese should be held to discuss the problem.
THE PROBLEM OF DOCtTMENTS, DICTIONARIES, ETC.
Steps should be taken to lay in a stock and to ensure the future supply of
documents, newspapers, periodicals, etc. from potential enemy countries and
from countries with which commnnications are likely to be blocked. The chief
deficiency at present is in Russian and Japanese materials. In the former case,
inquiry needs to be made as to what agencies or governments are holding up
such materials. In the latter case, the defir-iency should be made up by increased
purchases from Japan. The Institute of Pacific Relations has already increased
its purchases of such materials slightly and is attempting to organize delivery
through neutral countries in the event of war. It was suggested that the
Japanese section of the American Council of Learned tSocieties, and some of
the universities, should take similar steps on as large a scale as possible; and
that the Library of Congress should be encouraged to increase its activities along
these lines.
A special problem arises in the case of Japanese dictionaries, textbooks, etc.,
the supply of which in this country is already practically exhausted. Since
they would be extremely costly to reproduce, an adequate number should be
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5111
ordered from Japan immediately. Snch purchases covild best be made through
the State Department. It was agreed that tlie problem would be taken up
immediately by the Japanese teachers at the conference.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
It was agreed that Mr. Mortimer Graves should be entrusted with the task
of taking all necessary steps, with the assistance of anyone he thought fit, for
the implementation of the above proposals. It was suggested that the aid of
Mr. Philip Moseley should be enlisted in connection with the drawing up of
a new national roster ; and that, as the essential first step, all the proposals
put forward at the conference should be takeu up with Washington as soon as
possible.
NOTE ON FAB EASTERN INSTITUTE AT CORNELL
A two months intensive course in Chinese and Japanese is being given at
Cornell this summer. This course, for which scholarships are available, will
be the equivalent of a normal one-year course. In view of the emergency need
for Japanese linguists, students should be encouraged to attend this summer
school.
The conference was attended by :
Knight Biggerstaff, Cornell
Kurt Rloch, I. P. R.
Hugh Borton, Columbia
E. C. Carter, I. P. R.
Samuel N. Cross, Harvard
Carrington Goodrich, Columbia
Mortimer Graves, A. C. L. S., Wash-
ington
W. L. Holland, I. P. R., Berkeley
Elizabeth Jorgensen, I. P. R.
Cieoi-ge O. Kennedy, Yale
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins
John Leaning, I. P. R.
W. W. Lockwood, A. C. I. S., Princeton
John Marshall, Rockefeller Foundation
Harriet Moore, A. R. I.
E. O. Reischauer, Harvard
G. T. Robinson, Columbia
David N. Rowe, Princeton
Exhibit No. 985
[Telegram]
Washington, D. C, Jan. 11 1129A.
Edward C. Carter :
Delighted to see your son Tuesday 11 : 30 at the Court.
Felix Frankfurtee. 1130.1151A.
Exhibit No. 986
(Handwritten :)
Aug. 6.
It is difficult to answer your very thoughtful letter re office space because
I don't know yet whether Chen Han N-seng will have returned to China as
Holland desires or whether he will still be in N. Y. The problem is simplified
through Bill Holland's not coming. The Amerasia space, i. e., beyond Amerasia
seems a solution.
(Inserted here is a sketch of the office layout, with the following initials
and names : EFC
Orrick
McDonald
KM ECC)
5112 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
If Chen returns before I do I guess we can manage to squeeze into our present
space. I don't think card tables will do. I think you should continue in my
office — I would rather like to work in yours.
We are having a peaceful crossing. Bremman is a store house of information.
I am also lucky in that your friend & Tommy White's is in the next compartment —
Col. Faymonville. He has been out in Vladivostok for the visit of the U. S.
Asiatic Squadron. If every American had his wise and comprehensive out-
look on the U. S. S. R. there would be great possibilities of cooperation between
U. S. and U. S. S. R.
This carriage is very wobbly. I have run out of stationery as you see — so
I am afraid my letters will bother and bore you because of their sloppiness. I
envy you your clear distinguished handwriting & your lovely blue writing paper.
Aua. 7.
It has been hot but today is lovely and cool. I hope when I get to Moscow to be
able to reach you by cable or phone. Bremman and I got up at 4 a. m. to get
your cable at Irkutsk but every one there swore there was no cable from you
anywhere in the city. I saw a lovely sunrise over Baikal but that hardly made
up for the lack of a cable from you.
This is our longest and I hope our last separation.
Love,
Edwaed.
Carter,
Tourist Bureau, HarMn.
Cable care Stationmaster, Birobidjan, whether leaving as planned.
No answer.
Exhibit No. 987
Arthur Paul, Daisy Paul, reserved Don't mention Vluz
Hrepilad Fall Camincho
N. Y. Bus Ma for Roosevelt
Crm. Smith Boat
Wash.
Harriman Clifford Durr
pro court Liberty Able friend
Thurman Arnold FCC South Conf
Abe Fortas, 50,000 income Little money
RS : Albert Friendly, Post Raymond Swing
William Cochrane, Bait., wife Cli
Mary Gresham, Govt. Folk good. I. P. R.
Robert Lamb Anne Wheeler
C. I. O. now Williams F. E. State
AI. Baiting daylete
Miss Nathausen 2 children
Pub. Rel. Bait.
Lincoln Bid.
Exhibit No. 988
Meeting; Arctic Institute; April 9; ECC; OL; FD ; HM ; Schmidt; Motiliet
Harondab
Schmidt is head of all the work north of the 62nd parallel, it is about one-third
of the U. S. S. R.
The first thing that had to be developed in the Arctic was science. This
began in 1917, but since 1929 the development has been very raijid. Every region
of the north has its permanent arctic station, where work is carried on during the
whole year.
The second thing to be developed was transportation. This is the key to the
arctic. The aim is to get a route across the north sea. In 19.S2 the Sibinjakov
made the first complete trip in one season. In 19,33 was the Cheliuskin expedi-
tion in 19P>4 the Litlcn got through and in 19.35 they opened a regular route for
commercial vessels, four ships made the trip. In 1936 six will go from West to
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5113
East ; two from East to West ; 6 as far as the Kolyma ; 8 to the Lena and 40
to the Yennisea. More than 300,000 tons of cargo will be carried.
River transportation is very important. The basin of the Lena is larger
than Western Europe and this has to be developed. Since 1933 ships have gone
to the mouth of the Lena. Now they have their own shipbuilding wharf on the
Lena.
The next thing is the geological survey in order to begin the production of
minerals. There is zinc and lead and niclcel. There is rock salt near the Taimir
penninsula. This is very important because there is no salt in the Soviet Far
East. They have had to get salt for the fishing industry trom Odessa and
from Western Siberia. In 1938 there will be 5,000 worliers there and they
will produce 150 tons per year.
The Yennisea is navigable for ocean ships as far as Igarka, 450 km. from
the mouth. Last year many foreign steamers came there for timber, which is
shipped down the river from Western and Eastern Siberia. One even took timber
to South Africa. River transport on the lower Yennisea has existed since before
the Revolution.
There is no need to colonize the north, because there is better land to be
settled elsewhere in the U. S. S. R. There they plan to have more machines
than men. There is one labor camp on the Yennisea, but there is not much use
for criminal labor there, everyone wants to work in the Arctic. The population
in the asiatic part of the north, north of 62nd parallel is 900,000 of which 150,000
are the native tribes.
Aviation has been widely developed. There is regularly daily, all-year serv-
ice down the great rivers, the Ob, the Yennisea, the Lena, etc. There are oc-
casional services East and West between the rivers to the fur centers or to the
mines. They find it cheaper to transport the men and equipment for the mines
by air. The airplanes also help with the navigation, to locate the ice flows, etc.
At present they have a general rough geological survey of the whole region
and on a basis of this they are doing more specialized surveys. In 1936 there
will be 12 geological expeditions to different parts of the North.
In 1935 the most important product of the region was timber. This is shipped
from the interior. In 1936 they expect that minerals will be the most im-
portant. The Lena and the Yennisea are open about 4 or 4V^ months for
shipping.
The native peoples are helped by the Institute of Northern Peoples. Every
tribe has its schools and at present they are concentrating on training teachers
from the native peoples. There are already native technical experts, ship cap-
tains, wireless operators, etc.
When Schmidt was in the U. S. he found everyone very friendly to him.
Roosevelt was interested in his work and questioned him very carefully on all
the details.
Conditions in Alaska are better than in the North here. The climate is not as
severe. But in the north of Canada they are worse.
The Soviet weather forecasts, based on their observations in the North, are
very good and far ahead of other countries. The U. S. siiould establish similar
stations for this purpose in the north of Canada.
Reindeer are to be increased for meat production, but they will not be used
more widely in transportation. At present there is agriculture in the north,
in Igarka and Franz Joseph Land. It is just for raising vegetables. In the next
few years they plan to have agriciilture for fresh vegetables in all the places
where there are people. There is no grain grown there.
The work in the mines goes on all the year.
At present there is a 50-60 percent increase in transportation facilities every
year. The growth of transportation over the next twenty years will depend on
the development of mining.
Exhibit No. 989
ApEir. 19, 1933.
ECO from JB :
OWEN LATTIMORE
You will remember that when Lattimore was first suggested as a memlier of
the American Council I was inclined to support the proposal. It is true that he
is not an economist, but the following reasons would weigh very heavily in my
mind in favor of inviting him : (1) as far as I know, he is not reputed to be in
88348 — 52— pt. 14 14
5114 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the pay of any frovernraent ; (2) he has a remarkable background of personal
experience in Manchuria and China; (3) he has written what is perhaps the
best book in existence on Manchuria; (4) although he is not an economist, he
is thoroughly familiar with what the economists are interested in. In other
words, he understands the nature of the pressures which impinge on the Far
East, and although I myself think that he overweights the cultural or Spen-
glerian analysis, he never loses sight of reality; (5) he has a very understand-
ing and sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet Union, and (6) our job at the
Banff Conference is not only to break political issues down into their economic
units, but also to put them together again. In this second job, Lattimore would
have a very great deal to contribute.
April 17, 1933.
ECC to JB :
I wrote Fred saying that Lattimore had offered to be a member of the Ameri-
can Group at Banff but that we had misgivings as to whether it was more
important to have him than some of the others who we felt w^ould help more
on our economic program.
Now I have the following cable from Fred dated Honolulu, April 14:
"Matsukata : I Strongly Recommend Lattimore."
This would mean more if you also joined in the recommendation. What is your
reaction? Attached is a copy of the letter I sent Fred.
March 27, 1933.
Mr. F. V. Field,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
Honolulu, Hawaii.
Dear Fred : Owen Lattimore is coming home from Mongolia and Manchuria
across Canada just at the time of the Banff Conference, and he is very eager
to attend. This news came to us after the Selection Committee had met, and it
looks as though we were going to have the very greatest difficulty in keeping
down the American group to 25. So it will be hard to find a place for Lattimore.
But before the Selection Committee finally passes on his name, we should like
to know wliether you feel strongly that he should be secured, even though that
might mean increasing the size of the American group. Please send a full
statement of your views as to the importance or otherwise of having him, at
the earliest possible moment.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 990
June 28, 1933.
Mr. L. T. Chen,
China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
J23 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.
Dear Mr. Chen : Here is a copy of a letter of introduction which I have given
at his request to General Yakhontoff. The General is very eager to get the
backing of the Institute of Pacific Relations in making a study of Communism
in China. He felt that his wide contacts in Russia and in the Far East fitted
him uniquely to make such a study and that he might be employed jointly by the
China Institute, the American Council and the Pacific Committee of the I. P. R.
in the U. S. S. R.
We have told him that the I. P. R. was not in a position to sponsor his study.
We do not know where the funds would come from.
A further difficulty is that we do not think that General Yakhontoff stands in
the first rank as a scholar. He is more in the class of a popular lecturer than a
research worker of high qualifications.
I think it would be a friendly act for you to see him when he calls and talk
with him about his plans, but I do not think there is any reason for you to go
out of your way to render him special favors or give a great deal of time to him.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Cabteb.
ECC:W
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5115
June 28, 1933.
Mr. L. T. Chen,
China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.
Deab Mr. Chen : This is to introduce General Victor Yakhontoff, who hopes to
visit China in September and October to get material for lectures and for a book
on Communism in China. He was formerly a General in the liussian Imperial
army ; later he was an attach^ in the Russian embassy in Tokyo ; after the
Revolution he was an emigre and settled in America. More recently he has
re-established friendly relations with people in Moscow interested in the study
of foreign affairs. He is the author of "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far
East." He recently became an American citizen.
Inasmuch as General Yakhontoff lectures quite widely before men's women's
clubs in America and is making a serious effort to continue as an objective
student of Far Eastern affairs, any help that you can give him will be deeply
appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
ECC:W
Personal.
Exhibit No. 991
July 13, 1933.
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
State Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Hornbeck : As you know, a group of scientific workers in the U. S.
S. R. who have specialized on a study of the economic, ethnic, cultural, and po-
litical problems of the Far East has been definitely organized as the Soviet
Group of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The head of this group was elected
unanimously at the Shanghai Conference as the Soviet member of the Pacific
Council, the international governing body of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Sir Robert Borden, the Honorable Newton W. Rowell and Vincent Massey,
the outstanding leaders of the I. P. R. in Canada, are exceedingly anxious to
have a Soviet representative at the Banff Conference. Unfortunately the ofiicial
attitude of the Canadian Government is such that it is illegal for members of
the Communist Party to visit and live in the Dominion of Canada. Prime
Minister Bennett, however, is so interested in the success of the Banff Conference
that he has privately informed the Honorable Newton W. Rowell that the Ca-
nadian immigration ofiicers at all points of entry in the Dominion will be in-
structed to facilitate the arrival and departure for Banff of all accredited
members of the Institute of Pacific Relations en route for the Banff Conference.
Some months ago he gave a personal assurance of this to Mr. Rowell after Mr,
Rowell raised the question of the legal and administrative obstacles that might
arise in the case of a Soviet representative.
To make doubly certain that there is no embarrassment and unfortunate
incident accompanying the arrival of a Soviet representative, Mr. Rowell has
(again reopened the matter with Prime Minister Bennett. As a result, I am able
to send to yovi herewith a copy of a letter just received from Escott Reid, the
Secretary of the Canadian Institute, conveying to me formally a copy of a recent
letter from Prime Minister Bennett to the Honorable Newton W. Rowell.
It so happens that it would be of the greatest value to the American Council
in developing its program of studies of Russian practice and policy in the Far
East if it were possible for us to get permission from the State Department to
ensure that the Soviet member of the Banff Conference was able to visit New
York for conference with the ofiicers and staff of the American Council both be-
fore and after the Banff Conference.
If the Institute of Pacific Relations group in Moscow is finally able to send
a representative to Banff, the chances are three to one that they will send as
the sole member or as Chairman of a group of two or three, Karl Radek whose
article in Foreign Affairs a few months ago you must have read. He is a member
of the Communist Party and, as you know, he has been specializing for some
time on Soviet policy in the Far East.
I would like to inquire from you what steps the American Council should take
in order that we might be able to cable Karl Radek that if it is possible for him
5116 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to visit New York on his way to and from Banff, the State Department will
attend to the necessary formalities.
I do not know sufficiently the present policy and division of responsibility in
the State Department in such a matter but have wondered whether it will be
possible for you to discuss the question with Mr. Phillips and enlist his interest
in finding a solution to the problem which confronts the American Council. There
is no one in Washington better qualified than you to explain to Mr. Phillips the
purpose and importance of the scientific studies of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tion. If any personal reference would help, you might remind Mr. Phillips that
I was a classmate of his at Harvard and that our fellow classmate, Charles Dana
Draper, whom he knows, is my brother-in-law.
If some formal communication from the American Council addressed to the
Secretary of State is called for, will you kindly let me know what sort of letter
I should send in place of this purely personal inquiry.
With kindest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours.
ECC/NH
Exhibit No. 992
Edward C. Carter.
November 29, 1933.
JB to ECC :
The following men at Harvard should be interested in the Russian field :
Cross, Samuel A. — Professor of Russian, working in the medieval period. An
expert on the Chronicles. Former commercial attache, with, I think, chemical
training. Pretty anti-Soviet personally, but a good American citizen. Said to
be really good at the language. You will remember that Elisieff spoke very
highly of him, and of the six or eight young men, including one of the Coudert
boys, who are working for him.
Fainsod, Merle— Y'oung, married a classmate of Betty Field's, took his Ph. D.
in Government two years ago. Spent last year in Russ'a, working on the Third
International, and is preparing a monograph for publication on this. Thor-
oughly intelligent, a protege of Holcombe's personally, at present a tutor in
government.
Langer, William — Modern European history. One of the best men in this field
in America. Teaches History 30, Archie Coolidge's old course, and therefor
partly inheritor of Coolidge's Russian tradition. Has no special competence
in Russian, but an interest in it. Works for Foreign Affairs, and is the special
friend of Mosely's. On the board of the Fletcher School.
Holcombe — You know.
Elliott, W. Y. — Government, at present titular head of the department. A special
colleague of Lowell's, expert on the British empire, on which he has written a
big book.
Emerson, Rupert — Government, relatively young. Has married a Russian, his
own Russian background uncertain. Said to have spent the past year in the
Far East. Recommended by Cross. Spoken well of by Moseley.
Blake, Robert — Head of the library. A very important fellow in Harvard poli-
tics. Knows only a little Russian, but knows Georgian, Armenian and about
twenty other peripheral languages. Dug up Mount Athos with Kirsopp Lake.
Very much interested in the Russian field.
Pope — Fine Arts. The greatest master of Persian art alive, and personnally said
to be an advance Bolshevik. Went through Russia two years ago with Eddie
Warburg, who has told me that he knows no Russian but is sold on the Soviet
Union. Knows quite a lot about icons, and might be interested from the point
of view of Russian art.
Hopper, Bruce — You know. Away on a sabbatical in Russia.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5117
Exhibit No. 993
Memoeandum of Interview With Mortimer L. Graves
. Thursday, December 7, 1933
Present: Edward C. Carter and Joseph Barnes.
Speaking from meinory Mr. Graves said that the exi)enditure budget for the
Harvard Summer School of Chiuese Studies was as follows :
24 assistances @ 125 and 62.50 $2,500
3 inst. P $800 2, 400
2 sub. @ $400 800
22 spec. lect. @ $50 1, 100
Adm. 40 @ $5 200
$7,000
Income budget was as follows :
Tuitions 40 and 45 $1,800
Harvard Yenching 1, 8.50
Society of Japanese Studies 850
Carnegie Corporation and American Council Learned Societies 2, 500
$7, 000
There were forty students registered ; sixteen paid their way entirely, twenty-
four were assisted, eight at $(J2.50 per person and sixteen at $125 per person.
The charge for board and room for six weeks ranged from $70 upward according
to accommodation. The tuition fee was $45 for the six weeks.
Graves expressed delightful desire that the American Council of Learned
Societies was not to have the credit for taking the initiative for the proposed
Russian Language School but expressed a deep and sincere desire to cooperate
to the full with the I. P. R. in putting the school across.
Exhibit No. 994
Finance 193G
Document 7
Individual Travel Expenditure Foe the Past Few Tears
I — Administration
193-'t
Edward C. Carter
Left New York January 1934, visited Toronto. Winipeg and San Francisco
prior to sailing for Honolulu. Left Honolulu, after a two weeks' visit, for Japan.
After a four weeks' stay in Japan, he sailed from Kobe to Manila for a short
visit. He returned to China early in April and visited the following cities:
Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Peiping, and Ting Hsien. He left for
Moscow early in May, visiting Hsinking en route. He left Moscow the end of
May and visited Amsterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Paris, Geneva and London
and returned to New York the end of June.
He remained in the United States until the fall with the expection of visits
to Toronto and Montreal in July and October.
Early in November he purchased a round-the-world trip ticket via London,
Marseilles, Bombay, Hongkong, Shanghai and San Francisco in order to take
advantage of the saving possible on purchasing a round-the-world ticket. Re-
5118 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
mained in London from the middle of November xmtil early in December, He
then visited I'aris, Amsterdam, The Hague and Moscow, returning to London
January 2, 1935.
Total Expenditure, $4,777.48.
19S5
After a week's stay in London and a brief visit in Paris he sailed from Mar-
seilles to Bomiiay. Remained in India from January 24 to February 7 visiting
Bombay, Delhi, Nagpur and Wardha. Traveled to Shanghai via Hongkong.
He remained in China until April 2 visiting Hankow, Nanking, Tientsin and
Peiping. Left for Japan to attend the interim research confei'ence in Tokyo.
On May 14, he sailed from Japan to Honolulu where he remained until June
3rd. He sailed from Honolulu to Australia, arriving in Sydney on June 18.
In Australia he visited Sydney, INIelbnurne and Brisbane. Left Australia on
July 5 for New Zealand where he remained until July 27, visiting Auckland,
Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, Invercargill, Oamaru, Hastings, and Napier.
He left New Zealand for Los Angeles spending August 5th in Honolulu. He
visited Los Angeles, San Francisco and Yosemite. He reached New York late
in August.
During the autumn he visited Washington, D. C, Seattle, Portland, Vancouver,
Edmonton, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal.
Total Expenditure, $5,077.30.
1936
He visited Washington, D. C, Cleveland, Chicago, San Francisco, and returned
to New York to sail for London on March 11. He visited Amsterdam, The Hague
and Leyden, Moscow, Geneva, Paris, and returned to London. Sailed for New
York on May 7th.
At the end of May he visited Ottawa to attend the meetings of the Canadian
Institute Studies Conference. June and July spent on work in connection with
preparing for the Yosemite Conference at Lee, Mass.
In July he received a $500 advance toward his Yosemite travelling expenses.
Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $1,996.35.
Kate Mitchell
Miss Mitchell accompanied Mr. Carter on all of the above mentioned visits
with the exception of his visits to the west coast and Canada in 1935 and his
visits to Chicago, San Francisco, Amsterdam, The Hague, Leyden, and Moscow,
and Ottawa in 1936.
No expense to the Institute was involved in Miss Mitchell's travel.
Elsie Fairfox-Cholmeley
Miss Cholmeley joined the Secretariat staff on January 9, 1935, and accom-
panied Mr. Carter on his visits to India, China, Japan, Honolulu, Australia, New
Zealand, and returned to the United States, visiting Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Yosemite. She did not accompany Mr. Carter on his trips to the west coast
and Canada during 1935.
No expense to the Institute was involved in Miss Cholmeley's travel during
1935.
The details of Miss Cholmeley's travel during 1936 will be found under item
VI— Staff and Staff Exchange.
n — ^PAcmc AFFAIES
1934
Owen Lnttimore
Mr. Lattimore left New York in September 1934 for Peiping, visiting Honolulu
en route.
Total Expenditure, $1,200.00.
1935
Mr. Lattimore's travel in China during 1935 was paid for by a grant from
the International Research Fund.
1936
Left Peiping in March, visited Moscow, Amsterdam, London, and returned to
New York in May.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5119
Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore were given travelling grants to enable them to attend
the Yosemite Conference.
Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $2,034.39.
Ill — RESEARCH
193Ii
W. L. Holland
Early in 1934 he visited Toronto and Winnipeg en route to Japan vt'here he
established his headquarters in Tokyo. He also visited China during 1934.
Total Expenditure, $5GS.98.
2935
In March 1935 he travelled to Shanghai to meet Mr. Carter and participate
in staff conferences with Mr. Carter, Mr. Lasker, Mr. Lattimore, Miss Tylor
and Miss Mitchell in Shanghai, Nanking and Peiping as well as to confer with
members of the China Council. In June 1935, he visited Manila, Hcmgkong,
Shanghai, Nanking, Teiping, Tientsin, and Dairen. He left Japan in July and
spent some time in Honolulu, relurniug to New York the end of August ; since
which time his headquarters have been in New York and Stockbridge.
In December he paid a short visit to Toronto.
Total Expenditure, $892.98.
1936
Mr. Holland visited Ottawa in May 1936 to attend the Canadian Institute
Studies Conference. He lias also been given a travelling grant in connection with
attending the Yosemite Conference.
Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $280.25.
1935
Carl L. Alsierff
Dr. Alsberg was given a grant towards his travelling expenses in connection
with attending the interim research conference in Tokyo in April.
Total Expenditure, $300.00.
1936
Pardoo Lowe
Incidental travel and travelling grant in connection with attending Yosemite
Conference.
Total Expenditure, $191.06. ,
VI STAFF AND STAFF EXCHANGE
1935
Ricliard Pyke
Mr. Pyke was given a grant of $150 toward his expenses in connection with
coming to the United States. He visited Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa in
December.
He was given a grant of $1,000 to purchase a round-trip ticket from New York
to Shanghai.
Total Expenditure, $1,226.58.
1936
Mr. Pyke visited Toronto early in 1936 in connection with arranging for his
readmission to the United States.
He left for the Far East in February visiting Seattle, Vancouver, and Honolulu
en route. He spent 3 weeks in Japan visiting Tokyo, Nagaya, Kobe, Kyoto, and
Mara. He spent about 8 weeks in China visiting Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, and
Tientsin. He spent a week in Manchuria visiting Hsinking. Mukden, and Dairen.
The advance of $1,000 given Mr. Pyke during 1935 practically covered all his
travel to and in the Far East and return.
Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $63.54.
5120 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
19S5
Charlotte Tyler
Miss Tyler left the United States in the fall of 1934 and visited London. Left
London for the Far East via Singapore, Slam, and Indo China. She spent some
time in Shanghai and accompanied the Secretary General to Nanking and Peiping
where she maintained her headquarters until March 1936.
Total Expenditure, $1,000.00.
1936
She returned from Peiping via Moscow, and London to attend the Yosemite
Conference.
Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $306.25.
Note.— Miss Tyler's salary and travel is paid from a special earmarked grant
from the Payne Fund.
1936
Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley
Miss Cholmeley visited Canada in January 1936 for purposes of readmission to
the United States.
Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $97.02.
1936
Harriet Moore
Miss Moore left New York on March 11 and paid short visits to London and
Amsterdam, and accompanied Mr. Carter to Moscow where she remained until
the latter part of INIay. She then returned to the United States to assist in con-
ference preparation.
Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $600.00.
Exhibit No. 995
Februart 13, 1984,
Selsker M. Gunn, Esq.,
Rockfeller Foundation,
1,9 West J,9th Street, New York City.
Dear Gunn : It is impossible to tell you how highly we all appreciated the
information and the insights which you and Mrs. Gunn gave us here. We only
wish we could have pumped you for 10 weeks instead of 10 hours.
I am hoping that you will have a long talk with Barnes and Holland almost
immediately after you arrive in New York, for Barnes is leaving for Russia and
Siberia a few days after your arrival, and similarly Holland about the first of
March is leaving New York for the Pacific Coast, Honolulu, and Japan.
First of all I hope you can in confidence sketch to Barnes and Holland your
general plan for China. It is of the utmost importance that they get as full
a picture of your analysis of China's needs as you so vividly gave to me. To
understand what is in your mind will be invaluable to Holland when he goes to
the Far East, and to Barnes when he goes to Russia. I know you want to discuss
with them the Standard of Living study, particularly with reference to China.
I hojie you and Mrs. Gunn can go over to the Fifty-second Street office and more
generally give the background of your studies, not only to Barnes and Holland
but also to Lattimore, Miss Tjler, and Lasker.
Any help that any of them can give you in return will be gladly given.
I don't think I told you that, when we saw Kerakhan in Moscow in 1931,
he told us that the Institute's researches in China and Japan would be equally
valuable whether the Far East remained capitalist or became communist. He
afl3rmed that these basic researches on food and population, trade, tariffs, in-
dustrialization, and farm management must form the basis for any socially valid
public policy. Similarly I have the feeling that your program of education
and research for rural reconstruction in China will prove equally indispensable
whether China goes communist or not. I think this is an important point for
you to bear in mind, for it may be that some of your trustees will want to veto
your proposals because they think that China is going communist.
Holland and Barnes you must see soon after your arrival, as they wiil be
leaving the city very soon. A little later, when your initial rush is over, I hope
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5121
you can give a little time to Miss Tyler to tell her what you know of the Basic
English situation in the Far East.
If there are any memoranda that would be of use to me in China, 1 hope
that you will send them to me in care of the China Institute of Pacific Relations,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai. I wish now that I had been forehanded
enough to get from you a list of the twenty or thirty Chinese whom you found
the wisest and most promising. If you could possibly spare the time to send
me the names and cities and a brief "Who's AVho" regarding the people I ought
to see without fail. You would be rendering the I. P. R. a great service.
With deepest appreciation for all that you did for us here, and with kindest
regards from us all to you both, I am
Very sincerely yours,
Edwakd C. Carter.
ECC/H
Exhibit No. 996
Conversation Between Mr. Arosev, President op VOKS, Mr. Carter, and J, B.,
Interpreter
May 21, 1934.
Mr. Carter began by explaining that this was his third trip to the Soviet
Union. On each of his previous trips, he had made every effort possible to work
out arrangements for cooperation between the I. P. R. and Soviet social scien-
tists interested in the Pacific area. The results of these efforts were by no
means insignificant. The degree of cooperation actually achieved today was far
higher than when he first came here in 1929. On the other hand, he was equally
convinced that it did not yet begin to correspond to the volume and importance
of the work being done here or of that with which the Institute is familiar
outside the Soviet Union. The main purpose of his present trip was to try to
improve these arrangements, if possible, through a better organization of
Soviet representation in the I. P. R.
Mr. Arosev began by saying that he wished to be entirely frank and open
with us. As he had told JB previously, the question was unfortunately not
one simply of scientific cooperation. From what he had been able to learn
of the Institute, it was obvious that it was at least in large part a political
institution.
Mr. Carter explained that this was only partly true. The subject matter of
the Institute's research is political, but its own organization and activity is
entirely nonpolitical. The Institute is a research organization which works
through the scientific bodies and workers of different countries, and must con-
sequently take into account the political situation of those bodies and scholars,
but it is not itself a political body.
Mr. Arosev replied that in tlie Soviet Union there were no private bodies or
individuals. The nearest exception to this rule is VOKS, which is organized
on the same lines as TASS, the Soviet News Agency. But even with these, we
must understand, it is inevitable that any activity carried on by anyone in the
Soviet Union in cooperation with other nationals has a political significance. It
was for this reason that he himself was eager to straighten out the question.
The inclusion of Dr. Petrov's name on the Pacific Council, whatever the mis-
understanding as to his action in accepting election three years ago, was today
merely an empty formality, and both sides would profit by clearing the question
up. The very misunderstanding, by which Dr. Petrov feels that he accepted
the position as President of VOKS while the record shows that he did so as an
individual, is representative of the situation here and indicates the need for a
clear understanding of the Soviet position in principle, an understanding which
could be worked out only in responsible quarters when the question had the wide
political significance which is inevitable in joining officially the Institute of
Pacific Relations.
Mr. Carter agreed completely with the desirability of arriving at such an
understanding, and stated that it was the principal reason for his visit to
Moscow. He pointed out that in reality it was the substance of cooperation
which interested him, and that the form or formula, although it was important
to straighten out, was after all of secondary importance. The increase of
5122 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
direct contacts between other research institutions and those of the Soviet
Union, and a wider exchange of documents and materials are the real desiderata
which the Institute had in mind.
Mr. Arosev expressed his gratitude for this statement, which left him in a
better position to understand the motives of the Institute. For these purposes,
VOKS was the ideal organization in the Soviet Union. It is independent, it is
responsil)le to no one and it unites in its contacts with foreign countries all the
organizations of the Soviet Union in the arts and sciences.
The main question at the moment, he felt, was to secure the understanding in
principle about which he liad spoken. If that decision, which under the circum-
stances could be made only by very responsible people, should be favorable, he
would iind no difficulty at all in the Soviet Union. He had been in his new post
only 25 days, but he was convinced that VOKS could be made a significant link
between the Soviet Union and foreign scientists. In regard to the Institute, he
and other officials had lacked hitherto any concrete idea of what the Institute
wanted.
Mr. Carter stated that we are now in a position to supply such a statement in
written form, if desirable, as a formal outline of the aims and objectives of the
Institute and the part which the Soviet Union would be desired to play in their
attainment. He wondered if Mr. Arosev would care to advise him as to the form
and method of presenting such a statement.
Mr. Arosev said tliat he would try as quickly as possible to secure, on the basis
of the large amoimt of information which they now had as a result of our visit, a
definite ruling on the question in principle. He hoped to be able to secure this
by May 2Gth, when he wished we would telephone him. Then we could submit
such a concrete statement as we had mentioned, and he could guarantee that if
the decision in principle should be favorable, we would find every aid and coopera-
tion in carrying out our plans.
Mr. Carter then described in some detail the history of the Institute's relations
with the Soviet Union. In 1929, through the warm interest of Commissar Lit-
vinov, Mr. Alexandre Romm of TASS was sent to the Kyoto Conference as an
observer. In 1931, Vice Commissar Karakhan spoke with cordiality of the re-
search work of the Institute, and of the keen interest in it which was felt by
Soviet scientists, and assured a responsible group of Institute representatives
that individual cooperation on the part of Soviet scientists was entirely accept-
able to the government authorities. At that time he recommended that VOKS be
used as the agency, and in the same year Dr. Petrov who was then President of
VOKS accepted his election to the Pacific Council of the Institute. This formal
representation of the Soviet Union in the Institute bad not developed as might
have been hoped. In other ways, liowever (Mr. Carter referi'ed to JB's presence
in Moscow for the past two months, the survey he had made of research societies
in the Soviet Union, and to the last number of Prohlemii Kitapa, which contains
the translation of an I. P. R. data paper) we have been successful in working
out larger and more fruitful cooperation than we have ever had before.
He concluded by repeating his assurances that he was only too eager to conform
to any suggestion which might be forthcoming as to the formula of cooperation.
He would wait until the 2nth for the decision which Mr. Arosev had promised,
particularly since he planned to be in Moscow again in the fall.
JB added personally, since he knew Mr. Arosev from a previous meeting, that
he wished to assure him that the invitation was by no means a political gesture.
The persistence and zeal of Institute representatives in Moscow in attempting to
work out some answer to this problem reflected no desire on the part of any
nation or group to use the Soviet Union for political purposes. It reflected rather
our increasing conviction of the importance of Soviet studies, as witnessed by the
fact that some of us have learned the Russian language and spent considerable
periods here, and also to some extent the impossibility of securing any sort of
really definite answer from Soviet authorities. If Mr. Arosev could secure a
definite answer, even if it should be negative, it would probably be an assistance
to the substance of what we want to secure.
Mr. Arosev, concluding, assured Mr. Carter that he had no desire to continue
"feeding us with empty promises." While we were here, we should feel free to
commend VOKS in any way possible. If the answer is in the affirmatve, VOKS
will officially bend every effort to advance our projects here. If it is in the nega-
tive, however, VOKS will still be only too happy to help us in any way possible
that does not commit it to our policies. He reminded us that it would be hard toi
convince anyone in the Soviet Union that the Institute is not political. Any
organization in which England, Japan, China and the United States are working,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5123
because of the delicate relations between those countries, is of necessity political.
In this case, political significance is like the fat in wliich a cutlet is fried. It
may be butter fat, or sunflower seed oil, but you can't fry a cutlet without fat.
Mr. Arosev took a list of Banff Conference members, and asked a few additional
questions concerning the central headquarters of the Institute and the role of
Pacific Council members. He liad already been given a pretty complete sheaf of
documents, including Pacific Affairs, a list of A. C. members. Empire in the East,
a check list of publications, the Harvard Summer School circular, etc.
Exhibit No. 997
July 18, 1934.
Miss Barbaea Wb^itheim,
129 East 52nd Street, New York
Dear Miss Wertheim : This is to formalize the invitation that I have already
given you orally to go to Tokyo this autumn for one year to act as Research.
Assistant to W. L. Holland, the Institute's International Research Secretary and
S. Uramatsu, Secretary of the Japanese Council of the I. P. R.
You would thus be serving both the Pacific Council and the Japanese Council
and the division of your work would be made by a three-cornered understanding
between Mr. Holland, Mr. Uramatsu and yourself. At the time of your arrival
Mr. Holland and Mr. Uramatsu will be occupying offices in the same building.
As they are working together in the closest collaboration there will be no diffi-
culties whatsoever in working out your program so that your work for Mr. Ura-
matsu and Mr. Holland will be complementary.
In order that you may know just what has transpired since first I talked with
you I now wish to quote my cable to Holland. It reads as follows :
"Cable could you Uramatsu use I5arbara Wertheim one year from Novem-
ber volunteer research worker. Shiman Barnes endorse."
It was sent on July 12. On July 14, Mr. Holland cabled me from Tokyo in reply,
as follows :
"Wertheim valuable and welcome."
At your convenience v/ould you please let me know whether you would prefer
to sail some time in October, or whether you would prefer to wait until early
November ?
Mr. Barnes informs me that the American Council will be willing to give you
leave of absence for the period of your sojourn in Japan and also six to eight
weeks' leave this summer as soon as you have completed your current assign-
ments.
In the autumn before you go I would be glad to make suggestions for a short
period of reading and work, preparing to assuming responsibilities in the Tokyo
office.
With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 998
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, September 25, 1934.
Mr. Frederick V. Field,
Office.
Dear Fred : Would you let me know whom of the following you would like to
meet before I sail? Sooner or later, under the most easy and natural auspices,
I assume that you will want to establish personal contacts with all whom you
don't know already.
Arthur W. Packard David H. Stevens Stanley K. Hornbeck
Robert M. Lester Henry S. Haskell Henry R. Luce
Frederick P. Keppel Miss Ella Crandell Maurice Wertheim
Raymond B. Fosdick Edwin R. Embree Martin Egan
Henry Allen Moe Richard Walsh James D. Mooney
If there are other people not listed above whom you would like me to establish
contact with for you, please do not hesitate to call on me.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5124 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 999
KB to ECC :
This memorandum, which contains my ideas of what may be accomplished by
the Institute in the Soviet Field, falls into two parts :
I. Long-term objectives.
II. The immediate steps necessary in order to accomplish I.
I. The long-term objectives embody an ideal state of things which is admit-
tedly impossible of accomplishment for many years. I would like to see all
activities which have been proved of value by one national council incorporated
in the work of the other councils with such modification as the peculiar needs and
situation of each may necessitate. Keen interest by all national councils in the
work carried on in the other countries, with active cooperation in such work
would be an integral part of this Utopian picture. A description of this picture
from the Soviet angle falls into the following three divisions :
A. The Soviet Council in relation to the other member countries.
B. The Pacific and National Councils in relation to the Soviet Union.
C. Activities impossible without the active support of the Soviet and other
national councils.
A. 1. The Soviet Council must ultimately be as active on the International
committees, in the preparation for the conferences and in the conferences
them.selves as any other council. This will take a long time to bring about,
due to financial, political and geographic reasons. But there seems to be no
reason why these difficulties should be insurmountable once the Soviets are
convinced of the advantages accruing to their own research and scholarship
from such active cooperation. This conviction can only be given by actual
requests for information and studies and by the reciprocal rendering of
concrete assistance to the Soviet workers in the Pacific field.
2. Under the auspices of the Soviet Council, a survey should be made in
the Soviet Union of the facilities afforded research workers to acquire the
lanuua^'es of the other members of the Institute. Should the survey show
that facilities are provided, adequate to the building of a body of research
workers equipped to function in the various fields, no further action would
be necessary. Should the opposite be the case, action should be taken to
remedy the situation.
3. Coordination of the studies carried on in the Soviet Union of the prob-
lems of the other member countries should be one of the functions of an
active Soviet Council.
4. Tlie Soviet Council should possess an up-to-date record of organisations
and personnel interested in the problems of the Pacific area.
5. The Soviet Council should investigate whether a need exists in the Soviet
Union for the issue of periodical, timely information on the problems of the
Pacific Area. It is possible that the magazines already published absorb
all demand for such information. On the other hand, some such service as
the American Council is giving in its biweekly memoranda might fill a real
lack in providing a section of the population of the USSR, which would not
otherwise be reached, with authoritative accounts of Pacific incidents and
situations.
B. Before going into detail on B and C, I would like to recapitulate the situa-
tion of the various national councils as I know it re the Soviet Union.
Australia— Lack of interest coupled with suspicion. Lack of research
workers in the Soviet field and even of people acquainted with the Russian
language.
New Zealand — Ditto but even stronger.
Canada— Ditto. Feeling towards the Soviets reminiscent of 1920.
Netherlands — Admittance of possible value of Soviet material in their
work, but unable to use it through lack of people acquainted with the lan-
guage and unwilling to through general fear of communism.
Great Britain— Luke-warm attitude towards Soviet Affairs. However,
something is being done in the Soviet field, e. g., in Birmingham, and people
can be found in Great Britain who handle the language.
China— Language facilities exist, but people found in possession of Soviet
literature are in extreme danger during the periodic anti-communist drives.
Japan— Keen interest on the part of some members of the Council exists
but there is a lack of language facilities and it is practically impossiMe to
import Soviet literature.
U. S. A.— Interest is present. Language can be handled. Soviet literature
is importable and causes no embarrassment to possessor.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5125
Such being the case, a considerable period of time will have to be spent in
arousing interest and waiting for political obstacles to disappear. Granted such
a period of time, it would be desirable to have in each member country the
following :
1. Facilities for acquiring the Russian language, so that a body of research
workers could develop, capable of handling Soviet and Russian materials.
2. A coordinating center for all Soviet Studies and the institutions and
personnel concerned.
The Pacific Council of course would act as originator of such plans, with due
regard for national autonomy, and would receive reports as to progress in their
achievement. It would seem logical, moreover, that the compiled lists of Soviet
studies, interested institutions, and research personnel should be sent to the
Pacific Council which would then be in a position to keep all national councils
informed as to the state of Soviet studies in the membership as a whole. Care
would have to be taken in setting up the machinery that it did not become so
cumbersome and the process so lengthy that the information would be out of
date before distributed.
C. Under activities requiring active support of the Soviet and other councils
we can list :
1. Exchange of books and publications. The American Council has for
some time been exchanging books and periodicals with various institutions
in the Soviet Union. This can be continued in the same fashion as before
or through some central agency set up by the Soviet Council. This central
agency would of course carry on exchange arrangements with the other
National Councils. The extent to which this exchange would develop would
depend on how B. was carried out. It is obviously useless for a library to
be collected if it is unused through lack of interest or ability.
2. Exchange of research workers such as has existed between the Ameri-
can Council and the Japanese and Chinese should be extended. It would be
of great value if ultimately such exchange could function between the
Soviet and all the other national councils.
3. A bibliographical service such as is now being contemplated, inevitably
will demand the cooperation of all countries concerned. In the far future
a similar service covering Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the English
and Dutch speaking countries should be set up in each of the member
countries of the Institute.
4. The Soviet and other councils could be of valuable mutual assistance
if they kept each other informed of the progress of their various activities
without waiting for the inevitably longer procedure of communicating
through the Pacific Council.
11. Immediate steps necessary in order to accomplish I. divide into two parts :
A. In the Soviet Union.
B. In other member countries.
A. In the Soviet Union.
1. From the point of view of terminology, it might be as well to suggest
that the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. should be known as the Soviet
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
2. Membership on International Committees. The necessary documents
should be presented to the Soviet Council which will acquaint them with
the activities of the various committees : Program ; Research ; Publications ;
Education. They should be urged to appoint a representative on each
committee. Perhaps, to begin with, one person might do for all, preterably
the person who might conceivably come to the next conference so as to
increase the chance of the Soviet representative actually meeting the other
members of the committees.
3. An associate editor for Pacific Affairs should be appointed and asked
as his first job to check up on the articles promised by Voitinsky, Abram-
son, and Radek.
4. Data Papers. The Soviet Council has already announced five studies
that they intend to publish before the next conference as well as two collec-
tions of articles. As these all deal with subjects pertinent to the general
subject matter for data papers for the next conference as determined at
Banff, these publications may very well be counted enough.
5. Standard of Living Studies. All relevant material such as the Inter-
national Research Program 19.33-35, FVF's report on the progress of the
American Council in the Standard of Living Studies and any other reports
the Secretary General may get from other council visits, should be shown
5126 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to the Soviet Council. They should be asked to draw up a report on what
has been published and on what projects are now under way or being
contemplated on the subject of Standard of Living in the Soviet Union.
HM can be offered as assistant or collaborator. They should be informed
that all countries are making such a report to the International liesearch
Committee early next year and be asked to send their report in at the same
time. Suggestions how the studies in each country might further progress, or
what new ones might be originated, in order best to coordinate all the work,
will then be sent out. As for the cultural side of the research program. I
understand that that is still under discussion. Concrete suggestions as to
just what "cultural relations" signifies will be sent to the Soviet Council
later.
6. The question of translation of Soviet studies should be discussed as it
affects both the data papers and the projects connected with the Research
program of the Institute.
7. The report of JB made last spring on Soviet Institutions concerned
with the problems of the Far East is so confidential in character that no
reference should be made of it to the Soviet Council or to any of tlie In-
stitutions concerned. (N. B. to IIM.) The Soviet Council should be told
that in the American Council we are attempting the coordination of Soviet
and Far Eastern Studies. They should be urged to compile a report of all
Soviet organisations interested in Pacific Relations with a description of the
type of work each carries on. Such a report, they would realize would be
of value not only to themselves but to all Soviet-minded research workers.
If they demur owing to lack of time or personnel, HM could be offered as the
person to undertake it, in so far as her other activities permit, with the Soviet
Council as sponsor and guide.
8. Exchange of books and periodicals. Some machinery should be .set up
within the Soviet Council which could arrange for exchange of books and
periodicals. Obviously this would be feasible as far as the publications of
the nine institutions embodied in the Soviet Council are concerned. Would it
be equally feasible for the Soviet Council to act as the clearing house for
arrangements witli other Soviet Institutions?
9. The possibility of exchange of research workers should be broached.
The preliminary trial of such an arrangement would seem logically to take
place between the American or the Pacific Council and Moscow. An ideal
arrangement would be for Kantorovich to come over here in 1036, after he
has got the data papers published, and stay through the Conference. He
could be attached to the staff of either the Pacific or the American Council
and paid a salary in dollars while in exchange some member of the Pacific
or American Council staff could be sent to the Soviet Union and the Soviet
Council made responsible for his or her room, cooperative cards, supply
of rubles etc. Wliether a foreigner would be willing to live in Moscow with-
out an additional valuta income, of course, is doubtful, but something could
be worked out.
10. What cooperation is asked from the Soviet Council in connection with
the bibliographical service depends on what decision is reached about the
service itself. This matter has already been broached to several people in
Moscow, I believe. I feel that they would be keenly interested in the pros-
pect of a similar service in English and Dutch books being set up some time.
11. Attendance at the next conference should be put forward as being
desirable in order to convince the national councils of the Soviet Council's
real desire to cooperate. It should be stressed, however, even more highly
for the value it would have in facilitating research work and cooperation. If
the suggestion in point 9 should be feasible, the aim would be to some extent
accomplished. Any large representation of the Soviet Union at the next
conference can hardly be expected.
12. In order to give the Soviet Council a picture of what other councils
are doing, national council reports such as the present one of PVF to the
Amei-ican Council should be shown along with any other documentation
possible, such as Cross's report on the Harvard Russian Language School.
Out of the latter could develop a discussion of what are the facilities for
language study in the Soviet Union.
13. In connection with points 7, 10, and 12, a suggestion might be made
to the Soviet Council that they publish a periodic memorandum on work in
Pacific problems in the Soviet Union for dissemination among the member
councils of the Institute. This might appeal to them strongly.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5127
14. Finance. On the question of the Soviet Council contribution to the
Institute, I feel that some contribution should be made if only nominal. In
all financial matters, it must be remembered that the Soviets are intensely
proud. Direct subsidy from abroad, I believe, would not be acceptable, nor
would they wish to be in the position of the only national council not contrib-
uting financially. Exchange relations, both for research workers and mate-
rials, will have to be arranged with the minimum of international money
payments.
In taking up the above points with the Soviet Council, the Secretary General
will have to be constantly on the alert to see how much load they seem willing
to carry and will have to stress the points correspondingly. If necessary, em-
phasis could be merely laid on Data papers and Studies of Standards of Living.
After all, such research work as would be represented in them and the making
of it available to the other countries by means of translation is the main objec-
tive of the Institute. Also the Secretary General must observe to what extent
the Soviet Council is liable to be an integrated unit with functions of its own,
and to what extent it tends to leave everything to the initiative and activity of
the institutions out of which it is made. All discussion of plans with the Soviet
Council will have to be tempered by whichever of the above cases is triie.
B. 1. The Secretary General in his forthcoming tour should endeavour to
discover the exact status of Soviet Studies in ench country visited, both as
regards interest and actual accomplishment. My own impressions of what
exists I have stated earlier. If they are correct, the only thing to be done
seems to be to discuss with the few persons interested ways and means of
utilizing the existence of the Soviet Council.
2. The Secretary General could present to Moscow requests for help in
Mackenzie's Statiis of Aliens coordination, his Communications project and
the navalism project of the American Council. There also could be presented
with a request for suggestions as to broadening or otherwise improving,
a statement of the exchange relations between the American Council and
various Soviet Institutions. Any other concrete requests for assistance
should be gathered from the countries visited for presentation to Moscow.
3. It should be stressed to the national councils that the Soviet Council
is now in existence and eager to cooperate.
Note. — The activities of the Pacific and the American Councils re the Soviet
Union have become intermingled in the past. The library that is being built up
in the oflBce of the American Council, for example, obtains many of its periodicals
in exchange for Pacific AlTairs. The fact that J. Barnes when Secretary of
the American Council acted likewise as representative of the Secretary General
before the latter's arrival in Moscow, also added to the confusion in Soviet
minds. It has been unavoidable owing to personnel reasons, and for the im-
mediate future the distinction of activities will be hard to make at least to the
Soviet Council. In the ideal future, of course, each council will have its staff
worker able to handle Soviet materials, and the intermingling of activities will
cease. Until then, it may be as well not to confuse the Soviets by attempting toa
much to disentangle the Pacific and American Councils.
OcTOBEB 22, 1934.
Exhibit No. 1000
Moscow, Noveniiber 22, 1934.
Mr. E. C. Carter.
Chatham House, St. James Sq., London, S. W. 1.
Dear ]Mr. Carter: I have now been in Moscow twelve days and am more or
less settled. I am sorry that I have not been able to write to you sooner but I
have been separated from my typewriter for some days.
As soon as I arrived I went to VOKS and they arranged for me to see Voitin?ky.
He was very nice to me and offered to help me in every way possible, but of
course, he referred all Institute matters to Kantorovitch. Unfortunately it took
me almost a week to make arrangements to see him. Immediately after my inter-
view with him I sent you the following cable :
"Send complete list Institute publications. Have asked me for specific
answers to questions sent to you. Especially interested in exchange of pub-
lications and afraid you uninterested. General answer desirable now and
details when you arrive."
As soon as I met Kantorovitch, he got down to the business of the Institute. He
first wanted to know if I was empowered to give him specific answers to the ques-
5128 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tions which the Russian group addressed to you this summer. I, of course was
not able to give him these answers. The question that interested him most was
that of the exchange of publications. He aslved if the Institute had its own pub-
lication establishment and I told him that we had books printed through com-
mercial firms. He asked if books prepared by the separate National Councils
appeared under the imprint of the Central Office. I said that apart from the
conference papers this generally was not the policy. He inferred from the fact
that you had not answered him specifically on the possibility of exchanging pub-
lications that you were not interested in doing so. I told him that, as I under-
stood the situation, you were very interested in making some such arrangement
and were waiting to make the definite arrangements after you arrived here.
In the course of the interview he asked many questions about the organization
and functions of the National Groups. I am keeping a full record of these con-
versations for you to see on your arrival. He asked to see the Memoranda. I
have given him a few of my copies which I had with me. If it is possible, I think
it might be wise to send copies here for a certain period. If you do not wish to
do that officially, I will continue to give him mine.
Both Kantorovitch and Voitinsky are very anxious to hear about new books
published in America on this general field. Voitinsky asked specifically for one.
He was not sure of the exact title l)ut thought it was some Annals on the United
States Policy in the Pacific. Perhaps you know what book he is referring to. I
shall try to discover the exact title and if it is convenient for you, you might bring
it when you come. I shall also write Kathleen Barnes and ask her to keep me
posted on all new books and to send me any that she considers particularly
important.
The Institute Office is in the office of the Soviet World Atlas. Kantorovitch
is usually there and his secretary speaks perfect English, having lived in England
for several years. She is taking care of the arrangements for me. There is a
small lil)rary for the Atlas and they are able to get books for me from other lib-
raries. They have also given me letters to two other places which may have more
of the books which I need. Kantorovitch has offered to let me have a desk in the
Institute Office and in a few more days I think that I will work there most of the
time.
As you undoubtedly know, the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Institute of World
Economics and Politics of the Communist Academy is publishing a new magazine
of the Pacific Ocean. It is a quarterly. At the moment I am in the process of
reading it and hope to be able to tell you all about it when you arrive. Among
other things, it has a long review of Empire in the East and a short statement
about the IPR in Russia.
At present I am giving a great deal of time to studying Russian, which you,
of course realise is very important for me. I am starting working on the Na-
tional Minorities, because I have no idea where to begin on the Standards of
Living. I hope that you will be able to bring with you an outline of Gregory's
book on Standards of Living and of any others that have been started. I am
also very eager to hear from Bill Holland in answer to your questions about the
National Minoi'ities.
Just before I left London I heard that in November a new book was to be
Published on the National Minority policy in the U. S. S. R. This is number 7 of
the New Soviet Library, published by Gollanz, Ltd. 14 Henrietta St., Covent
Garden. The title of the book is "tlie Soviet State and the Solution of the
Problems of Nationalities," By Victor Dimanstein. He is a Russian Authority
on the subject and it is very important for me to have this book. Could you
bring it when you come or have it sent?
In London I received from you two files of material in relation to Russian
participation. One was supposed to contain the Preliminary Survey of Soviet
Research Institutions Specializing in the Siberian and Far Eastern Field, pre-
pared by Joe this Spring. On the folder it is marked that I already have this.
Although I saw the first draft of it here in Moscow, I have never had a copy.
If you think it is advisable, you might bring me a copy.
In your letter of October 31st, you asked me to advise you where it would be
most convenient for you to stay when you are here. At present, I would certainly
advise the National again or the Metropole. Both are in a central position and
near the Institutions in which we are interested. As soon as you know definitely
when you are arriving and how many are coming with you, I will make the
arrangements here for you.
In my opinion the Soviet group of the Institute is a very serious and business-
like group. We will get cooperation from them in proportion to the cooperation
we are willing to give to them. For this reason it is most important that I be kept
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5129
informed on all the latest Institute news and any changes in policy, etc. As you
know, I have been away from the office for over a year and there are probably
many things which you take for granted but which are news to me. I will con-
tinue to cable you for specific information, but if you have any general informa-
tion on the work being done by the various National Councils, I would be very
grateful to be kept informed about it.
I think it will be best if you continue to send my mail to Irftourist, as it is
less likely to go astray. However in cases it is necessary to reach me some other
way, my address is
Moscow
Savelevski Pereulok
Dom 2, Kv. 4
Sincerely
Harriet Mooee.
Exhibit No. 1001
Amstel Hotel,
Amsterdam, December 15, 1934.
Miss Harriet Moore,
Hotel Metropole, Moscow, U. 8. 8. R.
Deae, Harriet : There are no special instructions for our visit. It was thought-
ful of you to ask me for further suggestions.
The principal purpose of the visit is twofold — First, to be of every possible
assistance to the new Soviet IPR as it develops its program. The second is to
have the maximum time with you is conferring about your work and in loading
you with IPR ammunition so that you can be of the greatest consultative value
to Kamtorovich is the weeks following our departure. I want, of course, to
talk fully with you regarding your work when you have finished your present
Moscow assignment.
Subordinate to those two purposes is the desire to give my three colleagues a
favorable opportunity of seeing something of important influences in the
U. S. S. R. as revealed in Moscow. For five hours each day all of them will be
engaged on immediate IPR duties, but all of the rest of the time can be given
to studying and observing the various aspects of INIoscow life. All of this can
be easily arranged atter we have arrived. These purposes can be in part
realized in connection with the main object of the visit, for example a couple
of hours spent by us at the Institute of Minor Nationalities would serve many
purposes.
One incidental matter which I will want to discuss with you, and if you
and Kamtorovich advise it, is this. How can scholars from abroad who obey
the Soviet law fare nearly as well as those who violate it?
As a result of your letter to Kate we got the coffee and can opener that yon
requested in Paris.
We will drive straight from the flying field to the Metroi>ole on our arrival
on the night of the 20th. Did I tell you that Simon Wingfield-Digby will, be-
cause of his luggage come by train, arriving in Moscow a little before noon
on the 21st? I have ,iust received two friendly letters from Kantorovich in one of
which he indicates that advancing my visit by a few days is equally convenient
for him. I hope that on the 21st we can have a long conference with him and
then on the 22nd or 23rd a meeting of the Soviet group, if that is regarded by
Kantorovich and yourself as a possible and desirable thing to do.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C Carter.
We want first of all a long talk with you.
Exhibit No. 1002
W. L. H from ECC
Hotel Metropole, Moscow,
December 25th, 19S4.
A. Kantorovttch,
20, Razin 8treet, Moscow.
Dear Kantorovitch : In my conversation vsdth you on December 24th, I men-
tioned two projects which have formed part of the International Research
program of the Institute of Pacific Relations since the 1931 conference. These
are, (1) an international survey of Communicatioits in the Pacific Area, and (2)
an international survey of the Legal 8tatus of Aliens in Pacific Countries.
8834&— 52— pt. 14 15
5130 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This letter constitutes a formal request from the Pacific Council and the
International Research Committee to the U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R. to
contribute a section to each of these two studies.
On December 24th I handed you the British paper on Communications, the
Australian paper on the Status of Aliens, and four pamphlets dealing with the
Status of Aliens in Canada, from which the final Canadian paper will be com-
piled. These papers will serve to show you the general form which the Research
Committee would like yovi to follow, but, of course, the details as to the method
of treatment and the scope of the study would be left entirely to your discretion.
If the U. S. S. R. Council agrees to contribute a chapter to each of these
studies, these should be in manuscript form and mailed to the International
Research Secretary, W. L. Holland, 30G Osaka Building, Tokyo, by April 1st,
1935. A copy of the manuscript should be sent to Professor Norman Mackenzie,
University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada. Professor Mackenzie has been selected
by the International Research Committee to act as final editor and complete the
report on both these studies for publication.
As you will note from the sample sections which I have given you, the material
is almost entii'ely factual. Each study will be published as a small reference
handbook, in which statistics and terminology will have been made as nearly
uniform and comparable as possible. Professor Mackenzie has not decided as
yet whether he will write an interpretive analysis of the material presented. If
he does so, he will circulate it to all the National Councils before the final
publications of the two reports.
At present Professor Mackenzie has on hand papers on the Status of Alietis from
the following countries :
Japan China Australia
United States Canada France
Philippines Holland
New Zealand Great Britain
He is not planning to edit more than is absolutely necessary. His introduction
will emphasize the similarities and the differences in treatment of aliens in the
countries of the Pacific.
With regard to the study of Communications, Professor Mackenzie has received
papers from every member country of the Institute with the exception of
Australia and tlie Philippines. He hopes to receive these papers in the near
future.
The details as to the publication of these two studies have not been decided,,
pending the completion of the final manuscript.
Both the Pacific Council and the International Research Committee feel that
it is of the utmost importance that information from the U. S. S. R. on both
these questions be secured if possible. I hope, therefore, that the U. S. S. R.
Council of the I. P. R. will be able to respond favorably to this request for a
Soviet contribution to each study.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Copies to Holland, Moore
Exhibit No. 1003
Moscow, December 26, 19S4,
Frederick V. Field, Esq.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Fred : As Leonard Wu is coming to Moscow I would strongly recommend
that you urge him seriously to consider reaching here before Harriet Moore
leaves. The reception that we have had from Motylev and Kantorovich and the
other members of the Soviet Council could not have been more cordial or useful.
In no country has any group made more precise and more adequate arrangements
for the fulfillment of the purposes of our visit than the offiees here.
For the sake of continuity there would be very great advantages in Wu's
arriving l)efore Miss Mooi'e leaves. She could be of the greatest assistance to
him, and he could perpetuate the wonderful tradition that she is establishing-
here.
Could you and Kathleen talk this over with Wu to discover what' his plans
are, what he particularly wants to study when he gets here, what his dates are.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5131
and then write Harriet very fully. It w<jald be better if he got here when Har-
riet was in Moscow, rather than when slie was in the Buriyat Mongolian Republic.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1004
Mi-. W. L. Holland : For your information.
Chatham House, 10, St. James's Square,
London, 8. W. 1, 4th January 1935.
Galkn M. FiSHKR, Esq.,
5^7 Madison Aretiiic,
New York City.
Dear (tAlen : The enclosed from Lasker would seem to indicate that he has
got a garbled idea of the proposed Bibliographical Service. I wonder whether
he has received one of your American or international letters on the subject?
I will be writing you more fully about the attitude of the four countries re-
cently visited. Briefly it is as follows :
In England, those who know Russian, Chinese, or Japanese think the proposal
important. Those who do not know any one of these three languages seem to
question its value.
In France, Boyer, Bonnet, Dennery, and Lavey all thought the service would
be of very great value.
In Holland, the entire I. P. R. Council thought that the Service would be very
important, but it would have to be started and an exhibition given of its value
before any large number of people would recognize its importance and subscribe
to it.
In the U. S. S. R. several very important items came out, regarding which I will
write you more fully later.
1. The I. P. R. Group wants immediately from America and, if possible, from
London, a desci'iption of what the I. P. R. people, for example in New York, feel
are the i-eally important books and ai'ticles on the Pacific in the English language.
Tlio listing of such books supported by good reviews that may appear in other
journals not necessarily prepared for the I. P. R. would serve their purpose.
2. Our friends in Moscow at the moment are not terribly impressed by the
scientific quality or the indispensability of much of the literature that is being
published in China and Japan.
3. Although they do not say so, it is quite apparent that we will have to
be careful not to lump Russia, China, and Japan together as in a similar category
when we are dealing with our Rassian colleagues. At that moment when the
Bibliographical Service includes English language publications, then the danger
of Soviet leaders thinking that the Service is lumping Soviet Russia with China
and Japan as Asiatic countries will disappear.
It is difiicult for our Soviet colleagues to envisage a Service conducted from
London or Washington by a staff that will be predominantly capitalistic, describ-
ing either Soviet or other books in a manner that would be regarded as objec-
tive by Communist and capitalist readers.
Here is one of the central difficulties facing us, not only in the Bibliographical
proposal, but from now on in "Pacific Affairs" and any other I. P. R. publications.
We have worshipped at the shrine of objectivity, but nearly all of the wor-
shippers heretofore have been non-Communist. The coming of the Soviet I. P. R.
into not only formal but active, wholehearted, and generous co-operation with
the I. P. R. involves a complete rethinking of our entire programme of research;,
conference, and publication. Each one of us who is working for the Pacific
Council is now a servant of an organisation in which the Communist outlook
on politics and economics must organisationally be regarded as deserving the
same consideration as the capitalists.
Translating this into terms of the Bibliographical problems facing us. suggests
among others three possible plans: (1) a note of each book and articles in the
Bibliographical Service from both a Communist and non-Communist ; (2) an
attempt at a description that would be regarded as equally objective by Com-
munists and capitalists; (3) capitalist reviews of Communist books and articles
and Comnmnist reviews of capitalist books and articles.
As I say, I hope to write you a little more fully on this matter later, but I
wanted to send you immediately this advance report on my discussions in four
European countries.
5132 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
You have doubtless already appraised the value of the International Bibliog-
raphy of Historical Sciences. I would like to have you write me fully as to
vi^hat extent you feel that this meets the need that we have all had in mind. The
fact that it does not come out until about IS or 20 months after the year under
review militates against it slightly, though I suppose we might find ourselves
from six to nine months behind the wishes of our constituency. Do you know
whether the fact that a book or article is listed in this Bibliography persuades
people that books and articles in their field are indispensable to them? The
intrinsic importance of each book and article seems to be the principal criterion
of selection. How widely does the scientific world accept the judgment of those
who make the selection as final?
The letter from Hughes, the Chinese expert at Oxford, is significant as an
example of the reaction of one who knows Chinese. The letter from Webster
is significant as coming from one who does not know any of the three languages,
so also is the formal letter from Arnold here at Chatham House.
Duyveudak, the great sinologist at Leiden, is very keen on the Bibliographical
Service, and believes that both he and several of the Netherland institutions can
-cooperate. Rade, the Japanologist at Leiden, is also ready and eager to help.
Duyvendak goes to Columbia very shortly. It is of the utmost importance that
you see him on arrival. You should talk with him as to the desirability of
considering once a year the review of the very important Dutch publications on
the Pacific.
I am sending copies of this letter to Lattimore, Lasker, and Holland, with
the request that they should not distribute it to others, as it is only a hurried
interim report. I would ask that you share it immediately vdth Field and
Kathleen Barnes, and that you three send me individually or collectively your
Ibest reaction to the problem raised by Soviet cooperation with the I. P. R.
At this point I perhaps ought to add that I believe that the Soviet Group is
going to make a very substantial contribution both to scholarship and realism
in the I. P. R.
I am enclosing a copy of Miss Harriet Moore's private memorandum on the
Bibliographical Service. This was written after she had listened in on the
preliminary discussions which Miss Mitchell and I had with the Praesidium of
the Soviet I. P. R.
Apiiended is a list of those who were present at the Luncheon discussion and
the Afternoon Conference at Oxford. At both of these meetings the Bibiliogra-
phy was discussed. The attitude of those who knew Chinese and Russian was
such as to convince nearly all those present as to the importance of the I. P. R.
proposal. Zimmern, for example, does not know Russian, Chinese or Japanese,
yet he felt that the project was of the utmost importance.
I ought to add that our colleagues in the Soviet Union will cooperate superbly
in whatever plan we finally decide to inaugurate. The resources of the Soviet
I. P. R. Group are very gi-eat indeed. They will be able to command the active
collaboration of the principal Russian scholars throughout the Soviet Union
on any plan which we finally work out which thoroughly commends itself to us
and to them.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Cabter.
Exhibit No. 1005
Draft
20, Razxn Street,
Moscow, 3rd January, 1935.
Meeting of the Peiaesidium of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R.
Present. — V. E. Motylev
A. Kantorovitch
G. Voitinsky
Edward C. Carter
Harriet Moore
Kate Mitchell
Mr. Carter had prepared an Agenda for the Meeting, a copy of which is at-
tached to this Report. It was agreed that the points listed should be taken up
in order.
mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5133
1. Organisation of I. P. R. Conferences. — Mr. Carter explained that the various
international committees of the I. P. C. listed under item 7 on the Agenda, held
their Meetings for two or three days before and after the Conference. The
Conference itself is devoted entirely to education and research work. Mr. Carter
then described the "Round Table" technique. He explained that at I. P. R. Con-
ferences, papers are read by the members in advance of the Confrence and that
the discussion begins as soon as the Conference opens. The Conference is divided
into four or five Round Table groups, with from 35 to 40 members at each.
Discussions begin at 9 o'clock in the morning and ordinarily last until 12 p. m.
The afternoons are given up to informal discussion amongst small groups of
Conference members. The Conference meets as a whole, every two or three days,
and at this time Reports are read by either the Chairman or the Secretary of
each Round Table, thus enabling the Members to follow the course of discussions
at Round Tables other than their own.
Mr. Motylev asked whether discussion at the Round Tables was organised.
Mr. Carter explained that each Round Table had a Chairman and a Secretary
who were responsible for guiding a discussion in such a way that all points of
view were presented. The object of the Round Table technique is to ensure both
a free and informal discussion and at the same time to make sure that each
member of a Round Table is given an opportunity to make his special contribu-
tion. In dividing the Members of the Conference among the Round Tables, the
Programme Committee consults with the National Secretaries and attempts: —
(a) To see that national groups are divided equally amongst the Round
Tables, and
(b) To see that the division brings together men and women of similar
interests or fields of knowledge.
Every effort is made to avoid the formation of national blocs on any question
under discussion. Mr. Carter explained that this description was, of course, a
"Council of perfection," but that he hoped that in the next Conference the Round
Tables would be organised better than they had ever been before, and that this
standard of perfection would be more nearly attained than in former years.
Mr. Motylev asked how the Round Table topics were divided amongst the
different groups.
Mr. Carter explained that all the Round Tables discussed the same topics at
the same time. The equal di^^sion of time amongst the five Round Tables topics
had not yet been decided. Presumably the first two days would be spent on
topic (a) "Japanese Economic Expansion in World Markets." The next two
days on "The United States Recovery Programme;" three days on the "Soviet
Union" ; two days on "China" ; and three days on the final topic, "The Changing
Balance of Political Forces in the Pacific."
Mr. Motylev expressed satisfaction with this plan of organisation. He ex-
plained that it would be something new in Russian experience but that he felt
that it had a distinct advantage in that it created a chance for every member
of the Conference to express his opinion on the subjects under disciission.
Mr. Motylev then discussed the points raised in the letter sent by the Secretary
General to the members of the Institute from Amsterdam, December 18th, 1934.
In general he was in full agreement with the provisions contained therein. With
regard to the specific points, he felt that the American Consul's proposal for
changing topic (e) was not sound. The Soviet Union has no special interest in
Manchuria and, therefore he did not see that the question of Manchuria's status
could properly be discussed in connection with the topic concerning the Soviet
policy in the Far East. It might, of course, be considered in connection with the
topic dealing with China, but he felt that it would be better to leave it under
topic (e).
Mr. Carter said that he was very glad to have this expression of Soviet opinion.
Mr. Voitinsky said that he felt topic (e) was very well formulated and should
prove valuable in summarising the problems brought out during the discussion
of the first four topics.
With regard to the daily papers which the Union intends to contribute to the
Conference, Mr. Motylev explained that the Council had decided to combine Nos.
4 and 5.
This paper will deal not only with the economies, but also with the political
struggle in the Pacific and will therefore furnish the Soviet data for the final
Round Table. Mr. Motylev raised the question as to whether the National Coun-
cils were still to be allowed to prepare an official paper as stated in the Secretary
General's Memorandum of June 21st. Mr. Carter said that this provision still
held good and that his December 18th Memorandum in no way superceded the
5134 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
provisions of the former Memorandum. Mr. Motylev explained tliat the Soviet
g^roup had not decided on any additional paper, but wished to be free to con-
tribute one if international conditions should make it necessary.
Mr. Kantorovitch added that the Soviet Council would see that a definitive list
of papers were sent to the Secretariat by April 1st, 1935, and a partial list of
probable Soviet members by December 1st, 1935.
2, Interim Research Conferences. — Mr. Motylev explained that before he could
give Mr. Carter a definite answer with regard to Soviet attendance at the pro-
posed Conference in Tokyo in April, the Soviet Council would have to discuss
the question of standards of living studies with various specialists in that field.
This would be done during the next few weeks and he would then send to Mr.
Carter and to Mr. Holland, the Soviet Council's views on the question of possible
research projects in this field within the Soviet Union; With regard to Mr.
Carter's invitation to him to attend the Conference in person, Mr. Motylev ex-
j)lained that his teaching duties would ordinarily occupy him until June and that
it might be difficult for him to leave Moscow by April 1st. He asked whether the
Conference was to be a general one confined to Members from the Far Eastern
countries.
Mr. Carter explained that the original plan had been for a Regional Confer-
ence, but that information which he had received while in America and Moscow
had led him to feel that it was of the utmost importance that the Soviet Union,
Great Britain and the United States should be represented there. The principal
task of the Conference will be to try and work out a common methodology for
all future work in the field of standards of living and for this reason it ia
desirable that it should be as international in character as is possible at this
short notice.
Mr. Motylev said that although Soviet representation might not be ix>ssible,
the Council would send a Memorandum setting forth their views on this ques-
tion.
The Meeting then took up items 3 and 4 on the Agenda.
With regard to the exchange of staff, Mr. Motylev said that he was thoroughly
in agreement with the principle involved. In this connection he might say that
the financial aspect need not prove the handicap which Mr. Carter evidently
feared. The Soviet Council could, if it desired, send students at its own ex-
pense as it had been given a certain endowment in valuta. The working out of
principle might, however, take time as the Soviet Council would first have to
attract research workers and students interested in the idea of such an exchange.
Mr. Kantorovitch expressed his gratitude at the invitation of the American
Council for him to spend a period of months in the New York Office. It was, of
course, impossible for him to accept at present, but it might be arranged at a
later date.
Mr. Carter said that he understood that ^Ir. Kantorovitch would be very' oc-
cupied in Moscow for the next few months, but that the invitation was a stand-
ing one which he hoped could be accepted later on.
Mr. Motylev expressed regret that Miss Moore had not asked for more help
from the Soviet Council. He exijlained that his Institute had a special depart-
ment for securing all necessities in the way of materials for his staff, and he
hoped that Miss Moore will make full use of it. He also hoped to arrange any
special consultations with experts in various fields which would be useful for
Miss Moore in carrying out her proposed study. With regard to the possibility
of Miss Moore visiting F.uriat, Mongolia, he was a little doubtful, but promised
to do everything he could to help her in arranging this, should she wish to do so.
Miss Moore expressed her appreciation of this offer and explained that the
reason she had not hitherto asked for more assistance was because she had
been concentrating upon her study of the lan,guage and had not as yet begun
much actual work on her research project.
5. An English Edition of the Great Xoviet World Atlas. — Mr. Carter felt that
it would be a very valuable contribution to the work of the I. I*. R. if such an
edition could be arranged, as English was the first or second language for the
majority of the member countries.
Mr. Motylev promised to inform the Editorial Council of Mr. Carter's proposal
and expressed the hope that a favourable decision would be possible.
6. Langiiaffe Problem. — Mr. Carter explained that one of the most difficult
problems now facing the I. P. R. was that of the language barrier amongst its
different members. As one step in attacking this problem the American Coun-
cil of the I. P. R., in collaboration with Harvard University, had put on 'a.
Summer School during 1934, for an intensive study of the Russian language.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5135
This experiment had iiroved so .successful that it is to be repeated at Cohimbia
University in the summer of 1935. Mr. Carter also mentioned that Mrs. Barnes
had consulted with Tolokonoky. the Soviet Consul-General in New York, con-
cerning the possibility of securing a Russian instructor for the school. Toloko-
noky had suggested writing direct to Arosev for his suggestions. Prince Mlr-
sky's name had been mentioned as a possibility and Mr. Carter wished to find
out from the Praesidium their reaction to this proposal. Mr. Motylev asked
what the terms would be. Mr. Carter explained that Professor Patrick at the
University of California had been secured for the first part of the school and
that Mirsky would be requested to take the second half, from approximately
July 22d to August 30th. His travelling expenses wovild be paid and he would
receive $800 in addition. The Praesidium appeared to feel that there was no
reason why Mirsky should not be approached if it seemed advisable.
Mr. Carter next mentioned the question of Basic English, explaining that
the I. P. R.'s interest in Basic was entirely as a method of learning English in
a much shorter length of time. He told of his conversations with Litvinova
and showed Mr. Motilev the clippings from Pravda which dealt with the matter
of language teaching in the U. S. S. R. Mr. Motilev expressed great interest
and promised to get into touch with Litvinova at once. He agreed that the
present teaching of English in the Soviet Union was far from satisfactory and
was eager to learn more about Basic as a simpler and more effective method.
7. International Committees. — Mr. Carter explained that the Soviet group
was entitled to representation upon all the International Committees of the I.
P. R. The Praesidium agreed to take up this question with the Council and to
inform Mr. Carter as to their nominations for the varioiis positions.
8. Studies in Standards of Living and Culture. — Under this topic the hope was
merely left that, if possible, Mr. Motilov himself should attend the Research
Conference in Tokyo, at which time he could convey the views of the Soviet
group with regard to possible studies in this field, and that if his attendance
was impossible, a memorandum embodying these views should be sent.
9. Exchange of Books. — This had ali'eady been worked out with Kantorovich
and no further discussion appeared necessary at this time.
10. Catalogue in Russian of all books on the Far East. — Mr. Carter asked
whether the catalogue of all books in Russian dealing with Far Eastern questions
which the Soviet Council was planning was to be made available in England as
well. Mr. Kantorovich explained that this would be a very expensive proposi-
tion but that the catalogue would be available in the Soviet Council office and that
Miss Moore could select such items from it as she considered important for
translation into English.
11. Finance. — Mr. Carter stated that contributions to the Pacific Council were
not obligatory, but there were two factors to be considered. First, that the Pa-
cific Council always needed money, and second, that if the Soviet Union made
no financial contribution, some countries might feel that the Soviet Union was
not fully taking part in the Institute's work. Mr. Carter himself, of course, did
not share this feeling, but he knew that the Soviet Council would understand
that such an attitude might be held.
At Mr. Motilov's request, Mr. Carter quoted the contributions which each of
the National groups had given over the last few years. He also explained the
financial situation of the International Research Committee and the method by
which grants from the International Research field were used to stimulate local
financial support for research work.
Mr. Motilev said that so far the I. P. R. had not proved itself in the Soviet
Union sufficiently for him to be able to guarantee a definite financial contribu-
tion. He said, however, that it was only a question of time and not of principle ;
that the Soviet Council wants and can participate fully in the work of the I. P. R.
and that the question of financial contribution will be discussed with all the
institutions represented in the U. S. S. R. Council.
12. Publicity. — As an example of the type of publicity which the I. P. R. sought
for its publications, Mr Carter displayed a copy of a review of the economic
liandbook of the Pacific area which had appeared in the New York Times. He
explained that the Institute preferred to have its work speak for itself rather
than go in for more direct methods of publicity and propaganda.
13 & 14. Chatham Rouse Report and Report of Federation of British Industries
Mission to Manchuria. — At the request of Mr. Carter six copies of the Chatham
House Annual Report had already been received by Mr. Kantorovich. A copy of
the report of the F. B. I. Mission to Manchuria will be sent at once.
5136 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
15. PtiUication of Somet I. P. R. studies in English. — Mr. Kantorovich ex-
plained that the first instalment prepared by the Soviet Council should be ready
for publication by June 1935, and Mr. Carter promised to take up the question
of its publication with a publisher either in London or New York.
16 & 17. Soviet Report, etc., and contribution to Pacific Affairs. — Mr. Kan-*
torovich promised to send a regular contribution for I. P. R. Notes, and also to
get into touch directly with Mr. Lattimore on the matter of Soviet articles and.
reviews for Pacific Affairs. He also requested Mr. Carter to supply the Soviet
office with a full set of all back numbers of Pacific Affairs.
18. A possible bibliographical seri;(ce.— With regard to the possible biblio-
graphical service already described by Mr. Carter, Mr. Kantorovich again ex-
pressed the opinion that what the Soviet Council would value most would be a
list sent at regular intervals from America, and, if possible, from London, of
what the I. P. R. groups in both countries feel are the really important books
and articles on the Pacific appearing in the English language. A list of such
books together with a brief descriptive comment as to which might be the most
important and also such reviews as might appear in other journals, would
serve their purpose adequately. It was obvious that the Praesidium felt that in a
bibliographical service conducted from London or Washington by a staff that
would presumably be predominantly capitalistic, it would be diflicult to describe
either Soviet or other books in a manner which could be regarded as objective by
both communistic and capitalistic readers. It was also obvious that the Soviet
Council did not welcome the idea of being grouped with China and Japan as
Asiatic countries. Unless the bibliographical service included English language
publications, it would not be greeted with any very enthusiastic support. It
also appeared that they are not particularly impressed with the scientific quality
or the indispensability of much of the literature now being published in China
and Japan.
19. Status of Aliens and Communications. — Mr. Kantorovich reported that the
Soviet Council would undertake to prepare a section for the International studies
on the status of aliens and on communications in the Pacific, as requested by Mr.
Carter and by the International Research Committee.
Decembeb 30, 1934.
AGENDA
1. Organisation of I. P. R. Conferences.
2. Attendance at Tokyo Research Conference.
3. Exchange of staff and research workers.
(a) Invitation to Kantorovich to visit New York.
(b) Exchange of research workers (e. g., Miss Moore).
4. Miss Moore's research plans.
5. A request that an English edition of the new great Soviet World Atlas b»
considered.
6. Language problems in the I. P. R.
(a) Advisability of securing D. S. Mirsky for the L P. R.-Columbia Bn»>
sian Language School.
(b) Experiments with Basic English.
7. International Appointments;
(a) Pacific Council.
(b) National Secretary.
(c) Research Committee.
(d) Publications Committee.
(e) Finance Committee.
(f) Pacific Affairs Correspondent.
(g) Program Committee.
8. Studies in Standards of Living and Culture.
9. Exchange of books.
10. Catalogue in Russian of all books on the Far East.
11. Finance.
12. Publicity.
13. Chatham House Report.
14. Report of Federation of British Industries Mission to Manchuria.
15. Publication in English, in England or America, of Soviet I. P. R. studies.
16. Soviet report, quarterly, to I. P. R. Notes.
17. Regular Soviet contribution to Pacific Affaies.
38. A possible bibliographical service.
19. Status of aliens and Communications.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5137
Exhibit 1006
On Board SS. "Chitral," January 18, 19S5.
Miss M. E. Oleve,
10 St. James Square, London, England.
Dear Madge : In looking over our notes on the Moscow visit, I have discovered,
that I have failed to pass on one question raised by Kantorovich. I do not know
whether you have heard from him at all and, if so, whether he mentioned to you
this matter.
It is this. He would like to have the Chatham House publications on the
Far East and on the Pacific on an exchange basis. In addition he wanted me to
inquire whether you could consider an exchange arrangement by which you
would send him the more important English books on the Far East in the eco-
nomic and political field in return for Soviet publications on the Soviet Far East
and Pacific.
Mr. Field has arranged to send to Moscow not only everyone of the I. P. R.
publications from the very beginning but in addition a substantial number of
American and Canadian publications on the Far East and the Pacific. In return
for these Kantorovich has already dispatched to New York a big shipment of
Soviet publications. Enclosed is the list of those that have already gone.
I fully appreciate the nature of the difficulties which Sir Hageburg Wright
has raised in connection with exchanges of English and Soviet publications.
While I have not met him personally, I am acquainted with friends of his iu
liondon and Paris. I am told that he feels that English books of high quality
are sent to Moscow and Soviet books of inferior quality are sent to London in
return. Part of the diflSculty is due to two different sets of values. One in
Moscow, another in London. It would not be surprising to discover that some
Russian scholars do not regard as final some English writing.
If you and your colleagues share Sir Hageburg's skepticism with reference
to the importance of contemporary Soviet Publication, I would not advise your
attempting at this stage any substantial exchange arrangement.
If, however, there is at Chatham House any considerable group of people like
E. H. Carr and Miss Makower who feel that it is of the highest importance that
English students acquaint themselves fully with what Soviet leaders themselves
regard as important, I should advise you to explore the possibilities of a substan-
tial measure of interchange. It may be that you will find that it will not be
worth while to do this until you have on the Chatham House staff some member
-who not only has a mastery of the Russian language but also a mastery, through
living and studying in the Soviet Union, of some one aspect of contemporary
Soviet life.
I would be grateful if you would share this letter with Arnold.
Very sincerely yours,
E. C. Carter.
Enclosure.
Copies to W. Holland, Miss Moore, and Mrs. Barnes.
•office of the secret aey general
Exhibit No. 1007
The Instittjte of Pacific Relations
honoltjlit, hawaii
SS. "Cabthage," Feb. 23, 1935.
WnxiAM Holland,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.
Dear Brrx : You have very kindly sent me a copy of your letter of Feb. 5th to
Kantorovich in which you rebuked the Soviet Group for proposing the Paper by
Dimantshtein.
In view of the fact that we were to meet within a fortnight. I wish to record
my regret that you did not see fit to delay your rebuke until we could meet. With
my colleagues of the Soviet Group I went over the proposed list of Papers for
the next Conference. Without consulting me and within precisely five weeks of
the Secretary General's Moscow visit you take a line that in Moscow might be
5138 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
regarded as evidence of a breach between the Secretary General and his Research
Secretary. No such breach exists. It is a pity to give Moscow such a false
impression.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Ned.
(Handwritten:) Please don't take this letter too seriously. Please hand me
as soon as possible a copy of Kantorovich letter to you of Jan. 13.
Exhibit No. 1010
Extracts From Letter From Harriet Moore to E. C. Carter of March 20, 1935
I was glad to receive a copy of your letter to Bill Holland about the Dimansh-
tien paper. I understand unofficially from Harondar that the group here was
rather taken aback by the letter. This matter, of course, arose over a misuuder-
standing in terminology, a thing for which we are really to blame, since corre-
spondence has to be carried on in English, due to our ignorance of other languages.
Here "National Policy" always means policy in regard to (minor) nationalities.
As a matter of fact, I don't understand why there is any objection to this
paper, since the original list of proposed papers for the USSR group, as it ap-
peared in the IPR Notes of October, listed a. Economic and Social development in
Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The list that the USSR group proposed divided
this group into two papers : The first and second Five-Year plans in the Soviet Far
East, for the economic development; The National Policy in the Soviet Far East
for the social development. It is true that they do not provide a paper on their
foreign relations in the Far East, as was proposed in the original outline. That,
however, could be an additional paper and need not exclude Dimanshtien's.
You did not ask me for any comments on this matter, but I am giving them for
two reasons ; first, because Dimanshtien, as you know, is the authority on this
sub.1ect and his paper ought to be good ; and, secondly, because I feel that this
question has a bearing on the agenda and even more on the research problem of
cultural relations (Incidently, if it has no bearing, my Buriats also are a bit
extraneous).
The next question is the "Suggestions for Round Table Agenda." As I under-
stand it, the six points listed here would all be taken up in each of the first four
major round tables, as announced in your letter of December 18th. For the fifth
round table on "Changing balance of political forces in the Pacific" a different
agenda would be worked out later.
I would suggest adding one or two topics under several of the headings. Under
3, Social Policy, I would add Social Insurance, in general. Under 4, Foreign
Trade and Tariff Policy, I would add "INIanipulation of value of currency."
Perhaps this is covered by "Foreign Exchange Policy," but it should be clearly
stated. Under 6, National Defence Policy, it would be interesting to get an idea
of the meaning of "Defense," as the term is used in each country : e. g., how far
U. S. defense extends to defending the Monroe Doctrine ; offense as defence; etc.
Another question I would raise is in regard to the inclusion of "Class con-
Bciousness" under Social Policy. I think it is fair to say the USSR is the only
country that has the development of class consciousness as part of its social policy.
Other countries tend to foster patriotism, nationalism, or racial consciousness. I
think this question is very interesting, but that some other term should be found
to cover class consciousness and all the others, something that would mean "THE
policy in regard to fostering some type of social psychology or maSs attitude."
Perhaps "Mass attitudes" would serve though it would need a certain amount of
explanation.
The first three jwints in the agenda could be considered matters of primarily
domestic importance, while the last three are directly international in their
effects. In view of the fact that the topics for the round tables in your letter
of December 18 emphasises the International effects of the respective national
policies. I think it might be advisable to stress this in the agenda by putting
under each of the last three points. 4, 5, 6. a defiaite topic on "International
repercussions of, or reactions to, "The Foreign trade policy. Monetary policy,
and Defence Policy, * * *.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5139
Exhibit No. 1011
Copy for W. L. Holland.
Imperial Hotel,
Tokyo, May 4, 1935.
Dr. V. E. MoTYLEV,
20 Razin Street, Moscow.
Dear Dr. Mottlev : This is to confirm our recent interchange of cables as
follows :
"Tokyo, April 22nd.
"Cable whether coming Orient if so dates arriving China, Japan."
"Moscow, April 23rd.
"Trip Soviet Far East definitely scheduled June. Possibility visiting
China, Japan, Korea decided late May. In case positive decision arriving
July."
The object of this letter is to inquire whether, in the event of your visiting
China, Japan, and Korea, you would like me to arrange for Mr. W. L. Holland
to meet you on or about the 1st of July, either in Peiping, Dairen, or Changchun
(Hsinking). Mr. Holland is writing to Kanterovitch at this time very fully with
reference to the recommendations which we are passing on to the National
Councils in the light of the discussions at the Tokyo conference. They involve
a substantial change in the program as adopted at Banff. In addition to the
correspondence between Holland and Kantorovitch it would facilitate coopera-
tion between the Pacific Council and the Soviet Council if it were possible for
Mr. Holland to meet you personally. Among others there would be three advan-
tages in such a meeting; 1) mutual acquaintance between yourself and Holland,
and discussion of the I. P. R. research program, 2) you could tell Mr. Holland
of the latest developments in the U. S. S. R. I. P. R., 3) Mr. Holland could
assist in putting you in touch with I. P. R. and other leaders in China and
Japan so as to make your visits as fruitful as possible from the point of view both
of the I. P. R. and of the other purposes you have in mind in coming to the
Far East.
If you are not able to visit China and Japan but would like to have Mr.
Holland spend a couple of days with you, he could meet you either at Manchouli
or Vladivostok on or about the fifth of July.
If you desire it Mr. Holland would be glad to spend a week with you in the
first half of July either in China, Manchuria, the Soviet Far East, or Japan.
It would be a tremendous education for Holland to have the privilege of meeting
you. I realize, however, that your engagements in the Soviet Far East may
make such a meeting impossible.
As you know, I shall be in Honolulu from May 22nd to June 3rd. Would you
please cable me. CARTER, INPAREL, HONOLULU, as soon as possible after my
arrival in Honolulu as to whether you would like to have Holland meet you,
and, if so, when and where.
Holland himself has to leave Yokohama for Honolulu on either July 9th or
July 19th. He can easily stay in the Far East until July 19th if this permits of
meeting you. He is transferring his Far Eastern headquarters from Tokyo to
Shanghai at the end of this month. His forwarding address throughout June
will be % The China Institute of Pacific Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny,
Shanghai; cables; Holland, Inparel, Shanghai.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carteii.
Exhibit No. 1012
Copy for Miss Austern.
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Mass., 10th September, 1935.
Dr. V. E. Motilev,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, U. 8. S. R.
De:ar Db. Motilev : You will be receiving a formal acknowledgment from Mr.
F. C. Atherton, the Treasurer in Honolulu, of the Soviet Council's very generous
contribution of $2,000 (American) to the budget of the Pacific Council. I want,
5140 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
however, to add my own personal and official thanks, through you, to the Soviet
Council, for this substantial aid in financing the international work of the I. P. R.
It means a great deal, that the newest of the national member groups should
make so generous a contribution within a year of its formation.
With kindest personal regards,
I am, sincerely yours,
Edward C. Caeteb.
Exhibit No. 1013
Moscow — Meeting in Mottlev's Office, 12-2 : 30
March 31, 1936.
Present : Motylev, Harondar, Carter, Lattimore, Moore, Tyler, Donaldson.
To be discussed at a future conference: The Administrative problems of the
I. P. R., and the problems of the Pacific Area.
Motylev said that he would arrange conversations with individuals who were
primarily interested in Mongolia, for Mr. Lattimore in particular ; and the Far
East in general, for Mr. Carter.
Lattimore wanted to see all the reports and books on Mongolia available.
Motylev stated that these were almost entirely in Russian, but if some could be
found in Mongolian these would be produced for Lattimore, otherwise Moore could
help L. with the Russian texts.
Motylev said that his report was ready for the Yosemite conference, and that he
had collected immense wealth of material. All reports Harondar would translate.
Exchanfje of Literature. — Carter requested that more literature be sent to
New York dealing with the internal development of the Soviet Union.
Pacific Affairs to be discussed at a future conference.
Organisational questions. — Questions v^^ere to be formulated to be answered
at a future conference, in conversation not in writing.
Motylev said that he was ready to discuss contradictions and interrelations
in the Pacific, Britain's role in the Pacific, etc.
Carter desired that his staff should have the Atlas shown and explained to them.
German-Japanese alliance. — Motylev stated that a German-Japanese alliance
was only feasible from a military point of view. Japan could not possibly hope
to wage a war against the Soviet Union single-handed. Germany is strong in
the air, Japan is not. From an economic standpoint the alliance is ridiculous.
Neither party can expect to gain anything. Both are deficient in raw materials,
both export finished goods. In fact, they are economic rivals.
Soviet Far East industrialization was predetermined and inevitable without
Japanese aggression. Naturally since 1931 it has been influenced by military
considerations. The direction remains the same, but the tempo has changed.
Japanese action has necessitated acceleration.
Exhibit No. 1014
May 18, 1936.
ECC from FVF :
In reply to your letter of May 12th regarding the allocation of Harriet Moore's
services to the Pacific Council for the next year or two, the matter rests of
course almost entirely with her. The work which the American Council would
like her to do would, I think, fit easily into your own plan for using her.
Specifically, she is now at work on the translation of Kantorovich's book on
American policy in China, in collaboration with Kathleen Barnes. We would
like to have this job finished as soon as possible. She is also engaged in the
preparation of an article for the Fab Eastern Survey scheduled for publication
at the end of June or early in July. We would of course also like to have this
job completed. We would further like to have her contribute occasionally to
the Far Eastern Survey during the next year or two, and we would like to
feel somewhat free in asking her cooperation on the various things in which she
is a specialist.
But all these projects, as I have mentioned, fit as well into your scheme of things
as into ours, so that I cannot see that it makes a great deal of difference to us
whether she carries on under your banner or under ours. One additional fact
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5141
should be mentioned, namely that the American Council probably cannot afford
the luxury of two Russian experts, and we would welcome having the Pacific
Council take over the services of one of them.
Exhibit No. 1015
Council of the USSR,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, June 11, 1936.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
12i) East 52n(L Street, New York.
Dear Carter : I take this opportunity to express once more my regret that
I was not able, as promised, to send you our recommendations for the modification
of the Yosemite agenda to London. This delay was caused by the absence from
Moscow of several members of our Council which prevented us from arranging a
general meeting of the Council for the discussion and approval of these amend-
ments.
Bearing in mind that because of the short time left at your disposal you would
not be able to communicate our comments to other member countries, we decided
to confine them exclusively to Round Table programme No. 3 ( Economic Develop-
ment and Nationality Policy of the Soviet Union).
We would offer the following suggestions :
(1) We proposed to omit entirely from Round Table No. 3 agenda item 29, or;
at least, to reformulate it radically. The original wording ("privations suffered
by the entire population under the First 5 Year Plan") reminds one of the unfair
anti-soviet statements one can still find in some foreign papers. We are confident
that you would prefer to avoid the unfavourable impression which would inevita-
bly be produced here should such a statement appear in a questionnaire published.
by a serious scientific organization.
(2) Item 30 should read : "the peasants as compared to the proletariat ; collec-
tive farmers as compared to individual farmers"' instead of "opposed." The use
of the word "opposed" could result in an absolutely wrong conception of the
situation which in no way corresponds to the actual relations between the peas-
antry and the proletariat in the U. S. S. R.
(3) In item 40 (page 21 IPR Notes) the question "If so, would she be willing
to and would the other powers allow her to?" should be omitted. Reply to such
a question could naturally not be given by the Soviet delegation and it is up to
the delegates of corresponding countries to answer it.
(4) W^e consider unnecessary the inclusion of item 44 as all questions treated
therein are covered fully by the two preceding items.
(5) In items^ 40 and 45 the relations between the USSR and Sinkiang are
presented as a special separate problem. These relations should really be dis-
cussed simultaneously with Sino- Soviet relations as a whole.
(6) Referring to item 40, we were surprized to see that the Soviet nationality
policy could be characterized as "offensive." The application of this term seems
so irrelevant that we would prefer not to see it in the agenda.
(7) It would seem more feasible to transfer discussion of item 47 to Round'
Table No. 1 (USA). The same refers to item 49. The problems covered should,
be discussed in Round Table No. 5.
These are the essential minimum changes which, we believe, should be intro-
duced into the agenda.
At the same time I would like to point out that in our estimation the programme
of discussion in Round Table No. 5 does not give adequate consideration to the
problem of determining the aggressor in the Pacific. On the contrary, some of
the questions are evidently intended to present this problem in a form as vague
and indefinite as possible. As an example, question No. 4 could be indicated.
Once more I repeat that to my regret I am not in the position to offer our:'
criticism of other Round Table topics as I perfectly realize that before intro-
ducing any change you would have to communicate with the respective counti-iea
which is impossible in view of the short time left.
Sincerely yours,
Motylev,
V. E. MOTYTEVt.
EH
5142 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1016
Depabtment of State,
Washington, July 18, 19S6.
Unofficial and Confidential.
Deab Carter : Referring to your letter of July 8.
It was a pleasure to me to see you and to make the appointments which
you requested in connection with your I'ecent visit to Washinston.
With regard to the question which you ask in relation to the text of a mimeo-
graphed memorandum on Far Eastern policy a copy of which you enclose :
First of all a bit of narrative. Early in April I attended, by invitation, a
luncheon where foreign policy was to be under discussion. I was seated beside
a very intelligent woman whom I met for the first time who is active in the
work of women's clubs. In the course of our conversation this woman asked
whether I had seen a memorandum which was being circulated by the "Cause
and Cure of War", on American Far Eastern policy. I said that I had not.
She produced from her pocketbook a copy of the memorandum to which she
referred, with which the copy you give me now is identical. I glanced through
that copy and remarked on the fact and that she considered it outrageous that
«uch materials were circulated thus anonymously ; she went on to say that
she had received this paper along with a number of other papers in an envelope
of materials sent her from the office of the Cause and Cure of War in New York,
and that she thought that all the other papers had some indication of source
or authorship or both. She inquired whether I considered the presentation given
in this memorandum of our Far Eastern policy in its actuality a fair presenta-
tion; also whether I would care to express myself (to her) with regard to the
suggestions offered in the latter part of the text.
In the light of the above, you will realize that it is very Interesting to me
to have the account which you give of the origin of this document. You do not
ask the same questions which were asked of me on the occasion to which I refer ;
and I shall not now make the same comments that I made (to her) at that
time. You state, however, that now you and Mr. Field would like to have
from me "a full personal criticism of this statement" ; and you expressly ask,
"To what extent does the . . . . statement represent various schools of thought
now curi-ent in the United States?
Before addressing myself to this request and enquiry, may I take the liberty
of making the observation that any attempt which I might make to respond
to the request of criticism of the statement under reference would in my opinion
be of far greater value to all concerned had the enquiry and the response been
made before the memorandum was circulated — in January 1936. I believe
that it is regarded as axiomatic that when statements have been made and
there are later made statements in criticism or correction thereof, the latter
never catch up with the former.
I am sure that both you and Mr. Field must realize that it is not possible for
me to discuss Far Eastern policy or statements made with regard thereto on a
purely "personal" basis. I am in an official position; I am an official; I have
as an official some knowledge of and constant connection with the question of
American Far Eastern policy ; and I cannot separate wliat I learn, what I know
and what I think as an official (and in relation to public matters) from what
I know and what I think as a private person. It does not seem to me that any
very useful purpose would be served by my attempting- — especially at this time —
to set down in writing something purporting to be a "personal" criticism of the
statement of policy under reference. IMoreover, I have reached that point (age?)
where the exercise of criticism gives no pleasure and little if any gratification ;
and, in addition, "life is .short" and there is paucity of time, I shall, nevertheless,
take time and make an effort to make some comments— because you ask it and
because I hope that it may be helpful.
To begin with, let's forget the authorship and the circumstances of origin of
the memorandum. Let me treat the matter wholly impersonally and on the
basis solely of what appears in the memorandum.
To the express question asked in the last sentence of your letter, quoted abovB,
I can answer readily that the statement seems to me clearly to set forth what
are the concepts and views of some "schools" of thought now current in the
United States. Going further, I may say that it does not, in my opinion, ac-
curately portray or adequately take account of the reasoning, the conclusiv->ns and
the courses of action of the American Oovcrnment (whether in the past or now).
The author sets out to state, "First, what our Far Eastern policy actually is."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5143
In that connection, in the first paia?:raph he makes it appear that the building
up of our Navy is intended "to make enforcement" of our policy "possible in
the future." He makes it appear that it is a part of our policy to "maintain"
equal trading opportunities for all foreigners in China and to "maintain" China's
territorial and administrative integrity. I am not aware that it is the thought or
intent of the American Government to "enforce" its views or to "maintain" a par-
ticular situation in the Far East. It has been, it is, and I think it will continue
to be the policy of the United Htates to pursue in and with regard to tlie Far
East ohjectivc-^ similar to or identical with those which it pursues in other parts
of the world. Important among these objectives are enjoyment by American
nationals, American ships, and American trade of equal opportunities and fair
and nondiscriminatory treatment ; and, enjoyment by free peoples of rights of
sovereignty and independence within tlie territories which are tlieirs. But — to
seek and to advocate constantly the acceptance and application of certain prin-
ciples is one thing : to f/)*/.s-^ (up to and by threat or use of force) upon the appli-
cation of those principles is quite another thing.
The primary purpose of the present building up of the American Navy is, as
I understand it, not to enforce upon others the views of this country or of the
existing Administration but to diminish the likelihood of resort by others to
methods and instruments of force in such assaults upon American nationals or
interests as, if made, would tend to lead to war ; and, if war should come, to
ensure as far as possible against hostilities being brought to our own shores
or onto our own soil and against a final victory over us by the armed forces of
the assaulting nation. In other words, the naval program is designed for the
purpose of keeping this coutitry out of war. (There are, of course, and there
can be differences of opinion with regard to the efficacy of armament as an
instrument or agency for keeping its possessor out of war. There is less room
for difference with regard to the soundness, in the event of war, of the view
cited by Voltaire that "God is always on the side of the heaviest battalions.")
The author's treatment of the subject of our Far Eastern policy makes it
appear that he considers that the activities of the American Government in
and with regard to the Far East have been and are directed almost entirely
and almost exclusively to the protection and promotion of American business in-
terests. Thio is, in my opinion, altogether too narrow a concept. American
policy and American action in and with regard to the Far East have for more
than a century revolved around and been concerned with at least three things :
protection and promotion of American trade* ; protection and promotion of
American cultural efforts and influences (especially in the field of missionary
activities — evangelistic, educational, philanthropic, etc.) ; and advancement of
certain political concepts which prevail among the American people, especially
the concept that independent nations have the right to remain independent and
that international relations should be regulated by processes of discussion and
agreement rather than processes of war.
It is by no means certain that "China remains one of the greatest, if not
the greatest, future market of American commodities and capital."
It is absolutely erroneous, in my opinion, to say that, "Traditional American
Far Eastern policy is based strictly on commercial interests. The present Far
Eastern policy of the Government is ultimately based on nothing more nor less
than commercial interests." American Far Eastern policy, in line with American
foreign policy in general, has rested and still rests on a far broader basis than
merely that of "commercial interest", trade, or investments.
Not accepting, as you can see very clearly that I do not, the author's account
of what the policy of the United States "actually is," I feel that it would be futile
for me to discuss the suggestions which he makes for change of policy. I may
say, however, that I do not regard the building up of the Navy or the maintenance
in Far Eastern waters of American ships (and at some points in China of small
contingents of American landed forces) or the development of American aviation
in the Pacific Ocean as intended "to defend American imperialistic Interests
in the Far East" or for "the military protection of American investments and
business abroad."
The subject under discussion is too big for compression into any satisfactory
discussion within the limits of the seven pages of the memorandum under refer-
ence or the limtis of a letter such as I am now taking time to write. No one can,
in my opinion, say in a fetv words and categorically what American policy is,
♦And, of c6urse, protection of the lives and various rights (general) of American
nationals.
5144 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
than to avoid disseminating statements which, purporting to be statements of
what it is, declare it to be that which it is not.
It is the policy and the effort of the American Government in any administra-
tion to safeguard and promote the interests of the United States. In different
administrations and at different moments there will be differences in methods
resorted to and instrumentalities employed ; but by and large each administra-
tion reflects the fundamental thought and attitude of the American people. Are
the American people solicitously interested in the idea of protection by their
Government to the nth degree of American "business interests" in the Far East?
Do they desire, would they support resort by this country to arms to "enforce'^
the principle of the "open door" in China or to "maintain" China's administra-
tive or territorial integrity? Our Far Eastern policy is a part of our foreign
policy in general. We use certain methods and certain instruments in connection
with certain problems and certain situations in the Far East because those prob-
lems and situations are peculiar. But the objectives of our action in that connec-
tion are neither peculiar nor unique. And a changing of the methods and the
instrumentalities would by no means signify or effect an alteration of the
objectives.
I am going to give you for your and Mr. Field's confidential information a
copy (herewith enclosed) of a memorandum which I wrote sometime ago which
relates to one part of our many problems in connection with the general question
of operations or course of action in connection with the Far East. When you
have perused this, please be so good as to return the copy to me. You may make
of the thoughts expressed in it any use which you may see fit short of quoting it
with any attribution as to source. If you really care to make a careful study of
what I believe to be the essential principles of our foreign policy, I shall be glad
to send you upon request therefor, for your confidential consideration, a copy of
the talk which I gave at the Army War College last December on that subject.
With cordial regards and all best wishes — always, I am.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Stanley K. Hornbeck.
Enclosure : Memorandum.
Exhibit No. 1017
129 East 52nd Street,
New Yark City, 19th October 1936.
Mr. Fredebick V. Field,
New York City.
Dear Fred : This morning I received your round-robin with the copy of
Alsberg's important letter of October 8th to Holland and Holland's letter of
comment to you of October 13th. I agree heartily with Alsberg that it would
be a grand thing for the IPR if it got into the position not of asking the
S. S. R. C. for funds but of telling it where it ought to head in in research.
Of the various proposals before me I would personally be inclined to put in
the first category Holland's proposal with reference to the economic and political
status of the Philippines and your own with reference to the American Navy
in the Pacific. How the other questions were rated and broken up you and
your colleagues, Alsberg and Holland, should determine better than I'. One
problem is to get questions into manageable proportions. If the continuation
of Remer's work could be done without too great an expenditure it would
clear up several important questions. The study of American shipping and
shipping policies is of considerable importance and if the study of this problem
went ahead concurrently with the study of the American Navy each might
throw a little light on the other.
Of course a full length study of the American Stake in the Far East is a
major item on the agenda of the American Council. If a very able far-reaching
scholar could be put to work on this problem by the S.S.R.C. he would profit
enormously by the work that you have already done and might add substantially
by way of verification and supplement.
I am all for going ahead at the full steam with Alsberg's excellent suggestion
and I am glad that you and Alsberg and Holland have the framing of the project
in hand.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter,
Copies : Alsberg
Holland
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5145
Exhibit No. 1018
129 East 52nd Street,
iVew York City, 5th January, 1937.
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
State Department, Washington, D. C.
Deau HoFvNbeck : A temporary member of the Institute's International Secre-
tariat is making for us at this time a study of Germany's position in the Far
East. In connection with his studies he has run across the question of the Ger-
man-Japanese Alliance, news of which was published in Moscow, Paris, Shanghai
and Budapest in the first part of 1919 as having been concluded in Stockholm in
1918. Most of the news items trace back to a message in cipher which it was
stated was sent by Major Slaughter of the United States Army from Siberia to
Washington. According to these dispatches Major Slaughter was an observer
with the Allied Intervention Forces in Siberia and got the Treaty and a note on
the occasion of the occupation of Perm by Admiral Kolchak.
I do not know whether you are in a position to answer any of the questions
which my colleague wishes me to put, but, if you can answer any or all of them, I
shall be grateful. Here they are : —
a. General Graves mentions Major Slaughter but does not describe his
duties, particularly while at Perm. Do you know what these were.
b. Did Major Slaughter really send a message in cipher regarding the
alleged German- Japanese Treaty? If so, from what place and by what
cable service?
c. Did Major Slaughter ever report as to how he got the document? Were
there any middlemen involved, for example, Chinese or White Russians, or
did he find the document himself?
d. Was the original document sent subsequently to Washington? If so,
in what form was it and in what language?
e. Reports in Paris, perhaps circulated by the Chinese Delegation to the
Peace Conference, state that the document was a part of a correspondence
between the Soviet Government and the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin. Is
there any explanation of why the document was left in Perm by the Soviets?
Did Major Slaughter give any evidence to the effect that the Bolsheviks left
the document in Perm by design?
f. Wlien Senator Lodge on July 15, 1919, inserted the dispatches regard-
ing the Treaty in the United States Senate Documents was there any formal
protest made by the Japanese Embassy in Washington? Did the State De-
partment have any answer sent to Senator Lodge or to the Senate regarding
the authenticity of the Treaty?
g. Is it known whether Senator Lodge was in possession of any other
information besides these dispatches of which the United States Govern-
ment also had knowledge? For example, was Major Shiughter back from
Siberia and was he permitted to give information to Senator Lodge or to
other private persons?
Do the files on the matter give any evidence as to whether Senator Lodge
discussed the matter formally and directly either with the United States
Army or with the Department of State?
h. If there are any clippings or references in your files relating to the
matter, would it be possible for you to have someone in your office send us
the titles and dates to aid in our study of this question?
I do not know whether any of these questions are out of order, but I know
you will not hesitate to let me know which, if any, of the questions you are in a
position to answer.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
(Handwritten:) Unofficial.
Department of State,
Washington, January SO, 1937.
E. C. Carter, Esquire,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.
Dear Carter : Referring to your letter of January 5 laying before me, on be-
half of an unnamed temporary member of the Institute's International Secre--
tariat, certain questions, —
88348—52 — pt. 14 16
5146 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I am able to give informally answers to some of the questions as follows :
(a) Major Slaughter, formerly Assistant Military Attach^ in Russia, was
assigned to duty with the Siberian Expeditionary Force in September 1918.
General Graves immediately directed Major Slaughter to proceed wherever
necessary in Siberia to maintain contact with both Czech and Russian Head-
quarters, and to keep the American Commanding Officer informed in regard to
developments. Major Slaughter was in effect Liaison Officer and Military Ob-
server with both Czech and Russian Armies as General Graves' representative
for the United States Army from September 1918 until January 1920.
(b) In November 1918, probably about November 20. a Bolshevik Commissar,
well known to Major Slaughter, informed him that such a treaty was known
to exist and that the treaty and all pertinent facts had been published in the
'•Rote Fahn," communist publication of Hamburg, on or about November 8,
1918, and that it would also be published in the Moscow IzvestUja immediately.
A few weeks later, probably about December 20, the same Commissar informed
Major Slaiighter that he had been to Moscow and .showed Major Slaughter a
copy of the Izvestiya containing the alleged treaty but declined to surrender the
paper. On the capture of Perm, Major Slaughter proceeded at once to that place
to go over the copies of the Izvestiya required by law to be kept in court and
public offices. Copies were made under court direction and given to Major
Slaughter. Because Major Slaughter declared this news dispatch to have little
or no value, the Commissar stated that he would secure photostat copies of the
treaty. Early in February 1919, the Commissar showed what purported to be
a photostat copy of the treaty in German and in Japanese. There was also said
to be an unofficial initialed copy in French. The Commissar declined to sur-
render the copy without substantial payment, and in view of lack of authentica-
tion Major Slaughter declined to purchase the copy.
An interpreter, who translated the alleged treaty as published in Izvestiya,
later, on arrival in Peking, gave a copy to a North China newspai^er, and this
was published with many apparent factual details intended to give weight to the
story of the existence of the alleged treaty.
(c) No.
(d) Answered above.
(e) Answered above.
(f) Question.
(g) No. No. Question,
(h) Question.
You will note that I have not attempted to an.swer those portions of questions
(f), (g) and (h) which relate to the Department's files. A preliminary exami-
nation of the files indicates that we have not a great amount of material on the
subject of this alleged treaty ; also, that publicity of one kind or another was
given at many points in Europe, at the time, to stories with regard to the alleged
treaty. In view of the fact that the whole matter seems to have rested on
foundations of mere affirmation and allegation, I am reluctant to ask that anyone
in the Department give much time to a study of it. It is clear that the De-
partment did not give credence to the stories that such a treaty had been
concluded.
Could you give me an exact reference to the U. S. Senate document or docu-
ments in which "Senator Lodge on July 15, 1919, inserted the dispatches regard-
ing the Treaty"?
It should be understood, of course, that, in any use which may be made of
the information given above, there should be made neither reference to nor
attribution to the Department of State or the undersigned.
With all best wishes, I am.
Yours sincerely,
Stanley K. Hoenbeck.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5147
Exhibit No. 1019
Council of the U. S. S. R.
Institute of Pacific Relations
Moscow, January 15, 1937.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York.
Dear Carter : First of all I want to thank you for sending us the manuscript of
the Soviet chapter of "Problems of the Pacific 1936." Having carefully studied
its contents I note with satisfaction that in general it renders a correct summary
of the discussion at the Conference. In view of that I was quite surprised to
read the first preliminary paragraph. This literary introduction to the subject
is so queer, not to say offensive, that I simply cannot make up my mind to see
how a statement of that kind could be incorporated in the report. I sincerely
believe that the author intended to say something different. I would request
you to omit it altogether and begin the chapter from the second paragraph as the
first one is entirely inadmissible from the viewpoint of the Soviet Council.
Passing to our comments on the report as such, I would like to offer the fol-
lowing suggestions :
For the purpose of permitting the readers a more objective and comprehensive
study of the prol)lems involved we believe it would be desirable to introduce some
corrections and additions :
( 1 ) To begin with, I would request you, insofar as possible, to quote my state-
ments instead of rendering their summary. This does in no way mean that we
are discontented with the summary as given in the report, but we would rather
prefer to see those statements printed in full as we believe them to be of signifi-
cance as a matter of principle.
(2) Every time mention is made of separate statements made in Round Tables,
the manuscript invariably refers to "an English member," "an American member"
and so forth. We fully realize that the disclosure of the names of those who
participated in Round Table discussion might unfavourably affect the frankness
of their statements at future Conferences. However, we believe it is possible
and would well serve our common purposes if some discrimination was intro-
duced here for stressing the importance of the statements made by the heads
of the delegations. This could easily and conveniently be done by saying "a
leading member of the British delegation," or "a distinguished American mem-
ber," etc. In particular we believe it would be necessary to resort to such a
method of stressing the importance of some statements on pages 20-22 of the
manuscript covering the German-Japanese alliance.
(3) Two further remarks are of utmost importance from our viewpoint. The
first concerns the German-Japanese agreement. On page 21 of the manuscript
it is stated that "the French members were only partially satisfied with the
Japanese denial of the existence of such a treaty, since it did not extend to the
future possibilities." As you probably remember, Mr. Sar rant's second state-
ment was followed by Mr. Yoshizawa taking the word for the second time and
saying that he did not admit such an agreement could be concluded even in
future. We believe this second statement should be included in the report for
the purpose of adequate presentation of such an important problem. This would
also throw light on the existence of difference of opinion on the same question
between members of the delegation of one and the same country ; while in Moscow,
you mentioned this was one of the main objectives of I.P.R. Conferences. In
this particular case this would be of primary importance as it would reveal the
fact that there are influential circles in Japan, which are not agreeing with the
aggressive attitude in Japan's foreign policy.
(4) The second remark concerns Mr. Takayanagi's statements. We believe
it would be essential to include IMr. Takayanagi's outburst and our full reply
(my statement at Round Table "B" session on Aug. 19), of course excluding
5148 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
those parts of the latter which were presented on the preceding images o^f tb«-
report. As a result the two different trends in Japanese public opinion — a
manifestation of which could also be found, as you know it, in the statements-
of the Japanese delegates — would be embodied, at least superficially, in the
report. On the other hand this would be an explanation of the firm reply given
by the Soviet delegation to Mr. Takayanagi, and would at the same time supply
an answer to the question as to the reasons justifying the location of considerable
Soviet forces in the Far East. Otherwise the report is offering no answer to
this question.
(5) On page 24, where my words are extensively quoted, a sentence concern-
ing Germany has been omitted. I would request you to include it.
(6) I would further like to direct your attention to two more items. On
page 2 of the manuscript we read about "the absence of expansionist tendencies
in the Soviet Union in the immediate future." Insofar as I can remember the
words "near iutvire" have been mentioned at the Conference in connection witb
Soviet exports and not with eventual war. A mention of these words in a differ-
ent connection might be misleading.
The second remark concerns our understanding of classless society as pre-
sented on page 3 of the manuscript. The report failed to convey a correct inter-
pretation of our idea. Instead it would be much better to quote paragraphs 4, 11^
and 12 of the new Soviet Constitution.
(7) Moreover, I have a number of suggestions to offer purely concerning the
matter of wording.
On page 7 instead of the words "socialists maintain" we should have : "Soviet
delegates maintain."
On page 10 the sentence : "One should call the U. S. S. R. a directed rather than>
a planned economy" is of no real importance from the viewpoint of the report
as such. However, it is absolutely inadmissible to Soviet representatives. The
Soviet economy is a socialist economy and the above sentence, as we understand
it, confuses a socialist economy with fascist methods of directing national econ-
omy. As you perhaps remember, this has been specially emphasized by Comr.
Stalin in his interview given to Roy Howard. I think that the report would in.
no way suffer if that sentence were simply eliminated.
On page 11 we find reference to the "so-called dumping" "disturbing certain
markets." It seems to me that the use of such misleading words is hardly
feasible.
On page 18, when speaking about commodities the U. S. S. R. would have to-
secure abroad, I would like you to add that we had in mind such commodities
"as for example bananas."
On page 26 (second line from the bottom) it seems to me that my own words
are attributed to the Japanese delegate.
On page 36 I found traces of considerable hesitation on the part of the editor
as to the manner in which Mr. Lattimore should be presented to the reader.
We would find no objection to his being called "an outstanding expert on
Mongolian problems."
On page 32 (last lines) my statement to the effect that China should be allowefl
to work out its own destiny without foreign interference is badly located. An
impression could be thereby created that my statement was directed against
collective security, which of course is absurd. Please have this statement of mine
transferred to some other place or omit it entirely.
On page 43 it is stated that "the U. S. S. R. thought it possible to accept this
offer and agreed to create a demarcation commission." This is probably a bad
misprint, as in the statement I issued on this problem, which has been handed
to the Secretariat in writing, I used the word "redemurcation." As you know, we
consider this difference to be politically of essential importance. I would like the
editor of the book to bear this in mind.
On page 45 terrorist activities of certain Japanese fascist officers are referred
to as related to Marxian ideology. This is such an unbelievable libel, that
nothing more absurd could be invented. You will greatly oblige me by eliminating
this passage. I believe this could be done easily as the corresponding words
are not quoted but rendered in the form of a summary.
Finally, I would suggest to supplement the report by an appendix, in which
be printed the main statements of the Chairman of delegations presented at
plenary sessions ; it would be worth while to include the most interesting pro-
nouncements of other leading delegates (for example Mr. Bisson's) at the same-
sessions. I believe that such a supplement would be of real value to serious;
students of the problems of the Pacific.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5149
I have to stress here that under no circumstances would I want to create any
kind of inconvenience to you in connection with adopting my suggestions out-
lined in items (2), (3) and (4). Will you kindly accept them in that case only
If that can be done without any difficulties or complications. However, I would
insist on eliminating altogether the introductory paragraph on page 1, as I
believe this is quite necessary.
As a whole I note with considerable satisfaction that the present report is
very favorably differing from that published in I. P. R. NOTES. From the politi-
cal viewpoint, the standard of presentation of all questions is high and they are
objectivelp interpreted.
I am awaiting with great interest the publication of this volume.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) V. E. Motylev
V. E. MOTYLEY.
EH
P. S. (handwritten) Manuscript herewith returned. G. H.
Exhibit No. 1020
ECC
Extract From Letter Dated San Francisco, April IS, 1935, Owen Lattimore
TO Catherine Porter
I find around here that the knowing Mr. John Thompson of the San Francisco
Daily News has an explanation of the Moscow trials which is widely accepted.
It is simply that Stalin is getting rid of all the people "who knew him when"
«o as to monopolize control of the political machine. To me this simply does not
make sense because even from the little I know of the personalities of 1917, 1918,
it is clear that a number of the people who have since come to be classified as
Old Bolsheviks did not properly belong to the famous closely welded core of
the Communist Party. On the contrary, many of them were radicals who be-
longed to the fringe of the Party and many of them had already been known
for years of obstinate partisans of one or another variant theory.
As a reader, I should like to find a good article on the Who's Who of the Old
Bolsheviks, sorting out who was really a close follower of Lenin and who was a
more or less loosely harnessed sidekick whom only Lenin's genius could keep
pulling in the traces. As an editor, I don't know whether I should prompt any-
one to write such an article at the present time.
Exhibit No. 1021
January 15, 1937.
• Dear Mr. Carter : In re the Hazard article, I would say that he has done a
fine job. In answer to your questions specifically, I think :
a. His account is very thorough and well documented.
b. His article in no way reveals his point of view. He is presenting the Soviet
analysis, with no apologies or comments. His article, however, does reveal a
thorough understanding of the theory of Marxism. This means nothing in
particular, since no student in a Soviet field is permitted to escape without this.
c. I likewise do not think it possible to judge much about his imaginative
•qualities from this article, as it is a straight-forward factual account. I think
the article is quite well arranged, and, except for unavoidable condensation of
large fields of law, it is written in a comprehensible and easy-reading style. I
may be a poor judge of this, however, as at the moment I am extremely interested
in the subject.
Thank you for sending me the reprint, as I might not have taken the time to
read it, just from its title. I will appreciate your sending me any other articles
on the Soviet Union that you happen to see in out-of-the-way places.
In re Richard's letter to Motylev : I wonder if it misht not also be suggested
that Richard find out how a decision is reached in the U. S. S. R. to translate
foreign books and whether there is some one institution where we should send
our books immediately with this purpose in mind.
Motylev is likely to raise the whole question of getting Soviet material pub-
lished abroad. Insofar as we have anything to say on this point, I hope we
5150 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
will remind him that the question of editing Soviet translations is of paramount
importance to us, if we are to sponsor any such publications. If we should
make any arranf^ements with them about this, I expect we will run into difficulty
on this point. Perhaps Motylev's experience in regard to the Data Papers has
shown him what we mean. He is not unaware of the work we had to put in
on them, and he also probably knows that it did improve them.
I would not be surprised if Motylev wanted to know more about how and
why the proceedings were written as they were. This is just a matter of
information but I think Richard had better be prepared for it.
In that letter I sent you from Harondar you will see some indication of the
type of question he may ask. It might be a good idea for Bill to write him
about the general principles on which it is done, to save Richard the explanation.
Incidentally, I don't think that Motylev will be particularly helpful in regard
to increasing the circulation of our books in the USSR. It might be a good
idea if Richard asked to be put in touch with the institution which handles
the import of foreign books. He might be more successful in dealing directly
with them, as they are the ones who publish lists, etc. and keep in touch with
all the libraries. Moreover, I think that it is through them that all purchases
must be made and it might be possible to establish some sort of an agency
with them, as they are the ones who publish lists, etc., and keep in touch with
sort of thing. He might also try to see the main libraries, such as the Communist
Academy Library, which have special funds for the purchase of foreign books.
You probably have heard that in the last Tikhii Okean there is an article by
Voitinsky on the conference and on Whyte's article. If you don't know the
contents I could make you an outline, or a translation, as you prefer. There
is also an article by Motylev in Pravda on the position of Japanese workers
and peasants as revealed in the big Mitsubishi book.
I will be in the ARI office Saturday morning, if you want to talk to me about
any of these things. At the moment I can't think of anything else which
Motylev might ask Richard.
Harriet.
Exhibit No. 1022
"RoMM Widely Known in U. S. for Peace Efforts
"Vladimir Romm, who has 'confessed' that he was the contact man between
the Trotzkyite conspirators in Russia and Trotzsky himself, is widely known
to the press fraternity in the United States and was an active participant at
the Institute of Pacific Relations conference at Yosemite last summer.
" 'Mr. Romm's confession of personal participation in something which never
happened and in which it would have been physically imposible for him to
have played the part to which he has confessed,' said Chester H. Rowell, editor
of The Chronicle, who was a delegate to the Yosemite meeting, 'is only one
more chapter in the unsolved mystery of these Russian conspiracy trials.'
"Romm, with his colleague. Dr. V. E. Motylev, famous geographer and director
of the Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas, had an important part in the
conference at Yosemite, said Rowell.
" 'These two,' he said, 'were probably the hardest-working members of the
institute, laboring with documents far into the night and frequently all night.
" 'On account of his better knowledge of English, the brunt of the running
discussions in the round tables fell on Romm, though the major written state-
ments were usually made by Motylev.
" 'Romm collaborated in their preparation. He made brilliant analyses of
the Soviet economic and governmental stioicture, and defended with the orthdox
arguments even the ambiguous provisions for the freedom of the press in the new
Soviet constitution. He was an accomplished linguist, speaking Russian, Ger-
man, French, English, and Japanese, and an extremely capable newspaper man.
" 'I first worked with Mr. Romm in Japan, where I learned to know him a»
a newspaperman who I lived up to the highest standards of his profession
" 'Personally, from many contacts with him, some of them close and continued,,
all over the world, I became very fond of Romm.'
"Rowell described Romm as one of the most important Soviet foreign corre-
spondents and much the best known in America. He formerly represented
'Tass', the Russian Associated Press, first in Europe and later in Japan. He
was then transfeiTed to America as the Washington correspondent of the Moscow
'Izvestia,' of which Karl Radek, another of the 'confessed' conspirators, has
long been editor.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5151
"Romm was the first Russian observer accredited to the Institute of Pacific
Relations at its conference in Kyoto, Japan, in 1929, and was one of the two
regular delegates at the institute conference at Yosemite. He also reported the
national conventions of the two parties last summer and commented to friends
that the procedure in Russia was far more democratic and less steam-rollered
than these American conventions."
( Source : San Francisco Chronicle, January 1, 1937, p. 2.)
Exhibit No. 1023
Stanford, Feb. 10, 1937.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
129 East 52nd St., Neio York.
Dear Mr. Carter: I have gone over all Motilev's revisions and find I am in
full agreement with all the changes you and Harinet suggest. I'm sorry about
the misunderstanding over the opening para. I did not realize that Harriet de-
sired and expected it to be left out. 1 certainly have no objection to omitting it.
I agree entirely to having Motilev's reply to Takayanagi quoted directly and
fully in Harriet's chapter, and footnoted to the Takayanagi statement in
Chapter II. I am reluctant to give the Takayanagi statement in direct quota-
tion as I had to reconstruct his words from two not completely identical records,
and I feel that the present form is fuller and more accurate in substance than
if I tried to quote disjointed parts of the recorder's notes.
In the footnote on page 39 of my chapter I now suggest adding the following
words at the end of the note :
", where the Soviet member's reply to the Japanese statement is directly
quoted."
In the paragraph beginning near the foot of Page 39 of my chapter I see no
reason to make any changes, but I am quite ready to accept any amendments
from Harriet or you.
I have generally adopted Motilev's idea of using suitable adjectives to indicate
the importance of speakers and will make further changes of this sort where it
seems advisable.
I accept your suggestion of quoting from the Constitution in a footnote.
My only other comment is on Motilev's wish to cut out the passage about
Japanese officers being actuated by Marxian ideologJ^ I agree it seems an
absurd libel, but it was said in all seriousness by a responsible Japanese, and if
some Japanese think that, I suppose it is not without significance. My own
inclination would have been to leave Harriet's text as it is but add a sentence
saying that to the Soviet and many other members such a statement seemed
inci-edible. However, I don't really mind if the passage is omitted and will
gladly accept Harriet's and your judgment.
You are right in thinking that wherever possible we are including in the
text the relevant and important parts of the national chairmen's statements.
I don't think it practicable or advisable to reproduce them all in an appendix,
even if we could afford the space. Many of them, you recall, are already
printed in IPR Notes.
All in all, Motilev's comments are sound and very reasonable. It's a nice
letter, and I'm glad you decided to s^eud him the MS. I'm keeping the copy
of his letter and returning the MS by air mail herewith. Do you think I should
send him a note personally thanking him for having read and revised the chapter
so carefully? If you don't think it necessary, please be sure to add my thanks to
those of Harriet and yourself when you write.
I have had your wire in answer to my travel inquiry. I shall await further
definite word from you as to whether you are booked for the Empress of Japan
on Mai'ch 26, before I decide anything. Will you please wire or air mail me as
soon as you know. I had the idea you preferred Dollar accommodations to
C. P. R., and in fact I have the impression that in tourist class Dollar ships
are Ijetter, even in the older ships like the Taft. However, either line will suit
us iperfectly well. My slight preference for staying here till March 20 was
mainly because we are liking it so well here, not because of any important
IPR reasons.
Sincerely,
W. L. Holland.
P. S. — -Alsberg and I talked briefly to Wilbur about the Lapham scheme. He
thought it an excellent scheme and said he would be glad to speak in support
.'5152 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of the plan to Lapham senior, who is one of his trustees I gather. The Bay Re-
gion is to hold an Executive Committee meeting on the 16th. I am invited
and will relay to you any news you want. Wilbur leaves today for Chicago
where he can be reached on the 13th and 14th c/o Palmer House. If Alsberg
goes to Europe next June, Wilbur will grant him leave of absence with pay.
Exhibit No. 1024
129 East 52nd Street,
New Ywk City, March 1, 1937.
Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick,
The Riverside Church,
Riverside Drive, New York City.
Dear Harry: One of the functions of the Institute of Pacific Relations is
to confront thoughtful people with points of view that are radically different
from their own. It has recently occurred to me that it might be useful if
you were to invite Bishop McConnell and eight or ten equally intelligent and
open-minded clergymen to meet for a long discussion Constantin Oumansky,
the present Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. An immediate
reason for such a meeting would be the perplexity in the minds of a considerable
section of the American public with reference to the recent Moscow trials. Some
Americans seem to be delighting in the Trotskyist attack on the U. S. S. R., in
ignorance of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are probably supporting
a war maker. I am convinced that for our generation at least Stalin is an
asset for peace.
Oumansky has long been a colleague of Radek and others who figured in the
recent trials, and, now that the verbatim record of the court proceedings is
available, could clear up certain points which have been a matter of concern
to American liberals.
Recently I took the initiative in asking Oumansky whether he would be
willing to meet you and a few other liberal clergymen. He said that he
would be glad to do so. He normally comes to New York about once a fortnight
so a date convenient to you and him could be easily arranged. I may add that
Oumansky said that if desired he would be glad to answer questions with
reference to the status of the Christian Churches in the U. S. S. R.
We are leaving New York for the Far East on Friday, so it might be better
if you communicated with me by letter or phone before I go but if this is not
feasible my colleague Miss Mitchell could communicate with Mr. Oumansky
In case you wished to act on my proposal. Or you could write him direct at
the Soviet Embassy, 1119 16th Street, Washington.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1025
129 East 52nd Street.
New Yorh City, 2nd March 1937.
Mr. Jaites G. McDonald,
New York Times, Times Square,
New York City.
Dear McDonald : Knowing Romm as you did in Kyoto, Washington, Yosemite
and Geneva, you must have been particularly interested in the recent Moscow
Trials. You doubtless knew Radek also.
The Ti'otskyists in America are doing so much to play into the hands of
Americans who are anti-Soviet that I thought you would want to have the
text of the public trial. I have at last succeeded in securing a few copies of
the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme
Court, January 23-January 30, 1937. I am sending you a copy under separate
cover because I know you will want to read it. It is barely possible that you
will want to comment on it editorially.
It is certainly a most amazing record and seems to be very definite evidence
of a widespread counter-revolutionary movement organized by Trotsky, Trot-
sky's denials not withstanding.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5153
If you already have a copy I would be grateful if you would return the one
I have just sent you as they are difficult to get.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carteb.
Exhibit No. 1026
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, 2nd March 1931.
Mr. H. B. Elliston,
Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Massachusetts.
Dear Elliston : So many journalists as well as others have been perplexed by
the recent Moscow Trials that I have thought that possibly you would like to
have a fuller background than has thus far come through on the wires from
Europe.
I have recently managed to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the
Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-
January 30, 1937, and I have just sent a copy to you thinking that it was the kind
of thing that you would want to read. At least you will want to read all that
Radek and Romm said. Knowing them both personally their testimony
in Moscow came to me at the time of the Trial as a complete surprise. Now,
as I think over my relationships with them, I realize something of the striiggle
they have had and the depth of their convictions at certain periods that
Trotsky, not Stalin, had the right way for the world.
The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of
Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely.
It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists
attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they
are supporting a war maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.
May I now turn to another matter? Are you likely to become an American
citizen? The reason for my question is this: Your name is repeatedly proposed
for membership in the American Council of the I. P. R. Unfortunately, the
Constitution limits the membership to American citizens. The American Council
is losing a great deal through your not being a member. How do things stand?
With kindest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Copies of the verbatim report of the 1937 Moscow Trial sent to :
Hon. Newton D. Baker, Cleveland
Mr. Carroll Binder, Chicago
Mr. Edward C. Carter, New York
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain, Columbia University, New York
Dr. J. . Defoe, Winnipeg, Canada
Mr. H. B. Elliston, Boston
Frederick C. Field, New York
Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, New York
Mr. James G. McDonald, New York
Miss Kate L. Mitchell, New York
Mr. Chester H. Rowell, San Francisco
The Hon. Newton Howell, Chief Justice of Ontario, Toronto, Canada
Professor Frank R. Scott, Montreal, Canada
Exhibit No. 1027
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, 2nd March, 1937.
Mr. H. B. EixiSTON,
Christian Science Monitor,
Boston, Massachusetts.
Dear Elliston : So many journalists as well as others have been perplexed
by the recent Moscow Trials that I have thought that possibly you would like
to have a fuller background than has thus far come through on the wires from
Europe.
5154 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I have recently managed to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the
Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-Jan-
uary 30, 1937 and I have just sent a copy to you thinking that it was the kind
of thing that you would want to read. At least you will want to read all that
Radek and Romm said. Knowing them both personally their testimony in
Moscow came to me at the time of the Trial as a complete surprise. Now, as I
think over my relationships with them, I realize something of the struggle they
have had and the depth of their convictions at certain periods that Trotsky, not
Stalin, had the right way for the world.
The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of
Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely.
It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists
attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky
they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.
May I now turn to another matter? Are you likely to become an American
citizen? The reason for my question is this : Your name is repeatedly proposed
for membership in the American Council of the I. P. R. Unfortunately, the
Constitution limits the membership to American citizens. The American Coun-
cil is losing a great deal through your not being a member. How do things
stand?
With kindest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1028
[Telegram]
March 3, 1937.
Hall Borovoy,
Soviet Consulate Oeneral,
7 East 61st Street, New York City:
Can you lunch with me Hotel Ambassador room four eleven one o'clock today.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1029
McGiLL Uni\^ersitt,
Faculty of Law,
Montreal, March Jfth, 1937.
Edward C. Carter, Esq.
c/o Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y., U. S. A.
Dear Carter : I am much obliged to you for taking the trouble to send me the
report of the Moscow Tibials. I shall read it carefully when it comes, and will
let you know how the trial appears to me. I shall also see that others in Mont-
real have a chance to look at it.
There is no doubt that the effect of the trials is vei'y serious for those who wish
to see our society develop a form of economic planning based upon social
ownership.
Yours sincerely,
[s] F. R. Scott
F. R. Scott.
March 8, 1937.
FVF from ECC :
Enclosed for your information and that of Mrs. Barnes are copies of letters
from Joseph P. Chamberlain of Columbia and Professor Scott of McGill.
I wish to reiterate the seriousness of the effect in this country of the most
recent ]\Ioscow Trial. Your suggestions that steps be taken now with reference
to the next trial are most fudamental. I hope you can act on this matter. I am
incined to think that the American Council of the I. P. R. is in a much better
position to do this than the Americari Russian Institute.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5155
Columbia University in the City of New York,
510 Kent Hall, March ^, 1937.
Mr. Edward C. Carter
Institute Of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New Ywk City.
Dear Ned : Thank you for sending me the proceedings of the Soviet court in the
recent Moscow trials. I have not had time to read it carefully, but I hope to get
a chance to do so shortly.
I have personally been anti-Trotsky, because, if for no other reason, I read his
book and became convinced that Stalin was right and he was wrong in regard to
the organization of the Soviet Union. Trotsky, according to his own book, was
a very brilliant person who did not believe in the organization of the state but
opposed the bureaucracy and was for world revolution, while Stalin recognized
that a great job of construction had to be done, that it had to be done by a bureau-
cratic organization and that Russia could stand on its own feet, if organization
and internal discipline were provided.
Furthermore, I have always felt that it would be quite improper for me to join
a society for the defense of Leon Trotsky, for the reason that I do not like to
join committtees whose object would api)ear to be to attack the government of
a state at peace and amity with the United States, especially where I knew as
little as I did about the truth of the situation.
I hope you have a very good trip. I am sorry that I have not had a chance to
see you and Mrs. Carter.
Very sincerely yours,
[s] J. P. Chamberlain
J. P. Chamberlain,
C:S
Exhibit No. 1030
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, 5th March, 1937.
Mr. William L. Holland
Food Research Institute,
Stanford University, California.
Dear Bill : You will, I think, be able to help people who have been perplexed
by the recent Moscow Trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a
copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the
:Supreine Court, January 23-January 30, 1937. I have just managed to secure
a f«w copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you
will find it fascinating and will want to read it all the way through.
I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires
will want to read it also.
The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of
Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely.
It looks to me as though these Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists
attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky
they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials not withstanding.
When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would
most appreciate it, it should be put in the library of the I. P. R. in San Francisco.
Sincerely yours,
Edwaud C. Carteb.
Exhibit No. 1031
129 East 52nd Street,
Neic York City, 2nd March, 1937.
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain,
Cohimhia University, New York City.
Dear Joseph : As a friend of Kurovia and as a student of the Soviet Union
you must have followed with some interest the newspaper accounts of the recent
Moscow Trials. In view of the fantastic interpretations appearing in many
newspapers I have been eager to see whether I could get a copy of the record
5156 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of the public trial. At last I have been able to secure a few copies of the
verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme
Court, January 23-January 30, 1937, and I am sending you one of these under
separate cover. I am rather anxious to have your opinion as a lawyer on what
appears here. The first 150 pages would furnish a pretty fair sample though
you may be intrigued by the whole record as it unfolds from section to section.
As the number of copies available in this country seems limited, it may be
that you will want to share this with one or two of your friends who may be
especially interested and who would not ordinarily have easy access to this
report. It is most interesting to see how the Trotskyists in America are using
this Trial to fool anti-Soviet Americans into believing that Trotslsy is a peace-
maker.
Alice and I are off on Friday for a long absence in the Far East, I only wish
you were going along too.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1033
En Route New York-San Francisco,
March 8th, 1937.
Dear Kate: If it meets with your approval, I wish you would order from
"Soviet Russia Today," 824 Broadway, N. Y., the requisite number of copies of
the 5-cent pamphlet — "At the Moscow Trial" by D. N. Pritt, so that you can
send it with individual letters to each of those whose names appear at the bottom
of this letter. Your letter to them might read somewhat as follows :
"Just before sailing from San Francisco, Mr. Carter asked me to order and
send you a small pamphlet by D. N. Pritt, K. C, M. P. This is his comment on
the Moscow trials of last August. Mr. Pritt was in Moscow at the time and
attended the public trial. He seeks, in the light of his own knowledge of English
court procedure to explain the differences between the English and the Soviet
Courts.
Though Pritt's pamphlet describes the August trial, the procedure was presum-
ably the same at the trial in January, the report of which Mr. Carter recently
sent to you. That report and this pamphlet may serve as a useful background
for the impending trial of Bukharin and Rykoff and others."
When you are ordering the Pritt pamphlet, please order six extra for me;
3 can be sent to Tokyo and 3 to Shanghai. It will be interesting to see whether
they all arrive.
Gratefully yours,
Edward C. Carter,
Ben Cherrington,
Herbert Little,
We miss you Kate — A. C.
Hon. Newton D. Baker
Mr. Carroll Binder
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain
Dr. J. W. Dafoe
Mr. H. B. Elliston
Mr. Chester H. Rowell
The Hon. Newton Rowell
Professor Frank R. Scott
Exhibit No, 1034
Hotel Sir Francis Drake,
San Francisco, 11th March 19S7.
Miss Kate Mitchell,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York City, N. Y.
Dear Kate : It was good of you to send me Baker's letter about the Verbatim'
Report, and the extra copies. I am privately sending a copy to Oumanski and
wish that you would show copies of Baker's letter to me, to Fred, Kathleen, ^nd
Harriet.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5157
I expect to see Bill and Alsberg this afternoon and will try and raise all of
your questions with them. Now I am just starting out to make a round of
financial calls with Esberg.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Caetek.
Exhibit No. 1035
Mabch 21, 1939.
Confidential.
FVF WLH KM CTC IF EFC,
From ECC :
For your private information I enclose a copy of a letter from a friend in
Peiping dated February 21st. Under no circumstances ruust this letter be
circulated or the identity of its author disclosed. Please return it to me when
you have read it.
Exhibit No. 1036
Imperial Hotel,
Toki,o, 20th April, 1931.
Miss Kate Mitchell,
129 East 52nd Street, Neio York City.
Dear Kate: Purely for your private information I enclose this purely per-
sonal letter from Holland. I had Insisted that he and Doreen move from second
to first class from Honolulu to Yokohama, that is the point of the last part of
the letter.
Bill and Doreen are in grand form and have received a very warm welcome
back to Tokyo. The Japanese Council would now appreciate it enormously
if they would spend a year instead of only a week in Tokyo.
This is to acknowledge with thanks your letter of March 29th congratu-
lating the staff on the output between San Francisco and Honolulu.
The point about living on a high intellectual level in my review of the Moscow
trial was simply this : The substance of the dialogue in the Verbatim Report
revealed not only high intellectual development on the part of many of the
participants, but seemed to reveal also that they were living as members of
social groups where discussion was carried on at a level of mental develop-
ment not easily duplicated elsewhere. I cannot remember the record of any
court proceedings in the United States for many years in which the level of
examination and reply averaged as high as that in the January Moscow Trial.
Thank you for forwarding me this copy of Tarr's letter to me of March 23.
I will write him direct to London in a few days and send him a copy.
You will be interested to know that Elisabeth Downing made a highly favor-
able impression during her brief working visit. Both the Japanese I. P. R. and
the Grews and the Andrews spoke of her with enthusiasm. You might pass
this on to her mother.
Affectionately yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1037
Council of the U. S. S. R.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, Ma^y 15, 1937.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
g/o China Institute of Pacific Relations,
123, Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai, China.
Dear Mr. Carter: Upon receipt of your letter of April 11, we cabled you as
follows :
"Regret delay answering re trip myself or Bremman Far East. Stop.
Expect decide within few days will immediately advise by cable.
Motylev."
We very deeply regret that such a considerable delay occurred in finally
settling our plans for arranging a visit with you to the Soviet Far East. This
5158 INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS
was caused by the fact that Mr. Motylev wanted to accompany you iiersonally
and was endeavouring to schedule correspondingly his obligations connected
with the work on the Great Soviet World Atlas. However, recent developments
of his work are such that it does not seem likely he would be able to leave Moscow
at the time of your proposed visit. As we did not want to further delay thi.s
matter, it was finally decided that I would spend a forrnight in July and August
with you in the Soviet Far East. Consequently, we immediately cabled to you :.
"Deeply regret unable personally go Far East looking forward see you
Moscow. Stop. Bremman will spend fortnight with you Soviet Far East
assisting your studying region. Stop. Your visa providing stay Far East
granted Soviet Consulate General Shanghai instructed correspondingly.
Stop. Please cable exact date arrival Vladivostok."
The necessary formalities for arranging such a trip also required some time
because, as you probably know, Intourist does not take care of rendering ac-
commodations for trips in this region.
I am greatly looking forward to meeting you in the District. As I did not.
have an opportunity of visiting the Soviet Far East in recent years, I am sure
this trip will prove most interesting to both of us. We will try to avoid spend-
ing too much time on conferences and instead will endeavour to see the maximum^
of what it is possible to see on a visit of short duration.
I sincerely hope that this delay did not put you to too much inconvenience
and did not interfere with the elaboration of your further plans.
Would you kindly advise us in advance of the exact date of your arrival so a.s
to enable me to be in Vladivostok a few days ahead of you. That would give
me the possibility of making all necessary arrangements beforehand and no time^
would be wasted on trying to find people whom we want to meet and making
appointments.
Sincerely yours,
Y. P. Bremman,
Y. P. BREMlVfAN,
YB/eh
Exhibit No. 1038
Copy to KM.
123 Boulevard de Montigxy, Shanghai.
May 27, 19S7.
Dr. V. E. Motylev,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow.
Dear Dr. Motylev: This is to acknowledge with thanks your cablegram of
May fifteenth reading as follows: Deeply regret unable personally go Far East.
Looking forward see you Moscow. Stop. Bremman will spend fortnight with
you Soviet Far East assisting your studying region. Stop. Your visa providing,
stay Far East granted. Soviet Consulate General Shanghai instructed corres-
pondingly. Stop. Please cable exact date arrival Vladivostok.
I was in Nanking at the time and so was delayed in replying. On my return
here on May twenty-tirst, I cabled you as follows : Many thanks will arrive
Vladivostok July nineteenth or twenty first. Will cable exact date May thir-
tieth. Stop. Barely possilile Holland could accompany me Soviet Far East <»nly
cable frankly whether easy arrange oi' whether better not ask for permission now.
The reason for uncertainty as to the date of my arrival in Vladivostok is due
to the fact that the SovtorgOot S. S. Saver is now under repair in Shanghai and'
it is not known whether she will be repaired in time to resume her regular
schedule.
In view of this uncertainty, it will probably seem best for me to take the
Japane.se steamer Siberia Mam, leaving Seishin (Korea) July eighteenth and
arriving in Vladivostok at 8 : 00 a. m. on July nineteenth.
I am exceedingly glad that Bremman can meet me and that we will find yoir
in Moscow on our arrival.
My present plan is to depart for Moscow on the train which leaves Vladivostok
on Thursday, July twenty-ninth. (I suppose we would join the train at Khaba-
rosk or west of Khabarosk.) My plan is to have the train at Karymskaya on
Sunday, August first, and stop over there for two days until the train from
Manchouli arrives, on which Mrs. Carter, my daughter Ruth, and Miss Nan
Smith will be traveling from Manchouli to Moscow. By joining the train at
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5159'
Karyraskaya, I could take the long journey across with them. I would hope
that Mr. Breninian could travel with us, as this would give us such a splendid
opportunity of conversation day by day, discussing the significance of our visit
to the Far East and preparing for our visit to Moscow.
Tills means that we would all arive in Moscow at 15 : 30 on Sunday, August
eighth.
Miss Smith has to go on from Moscow after a week or ten days, but I am plan-
ning to remain, if you think it desirable, from August eighth until August twenty-
sixtli, when I shall probably have to leave for western Europe.
Tlie time between August eighth and August twenty-sixth I will be prepared to
spend under your direction, staying all the time in Moscow or going to one, two
or three other places, as you think best. There is one short trip that I would
like to make if it is convenient, and that is to go to the industrial city of Kolumua.
I visited Kolumna in 1931. I would tremendously appreciate the privilege of
going there again so as to compare Kolumna then and now.
With reference to the clause in my cable about Mr. Holland, the situation is
this. Ix)ng-postponed work on his book, "The Effect of the Depression on the
Far East," and the fact that the Pacific Council is not to meet in Europe this
year, have decided him to remain in the Far East until he goes to Australia and
New Zealand next November. He would, however, like to accompany me to the
Soviet Far East in July, provided it is perfectly easy for you to get the necessary
permission and also provided transportation arrangements are such that Mr.
Bremman can arrange for two of us to travel about from place to place with him
instead of one.
Neither Mr. Holland nor I wishes to inconvenience you or Mr. Bremman with
this proposal, so we liope that you will feel perfectly free to cable vetoing Mr.
Holland's accompanying me. He will visit the Soviet Union next year after the
meeting of the Pacific Council in China next April, and could go to Moscow then
by way of the Soviet Far East if it is not possible for him to go there this year.
Owing to the fact that Mr. Holland cannot go to Moscow this year, we will
probably arrange for Miss Kate Mitchell to be in Moscow when we are there, in
order to confer with you, Voitinsky and me regarding the research program.
She is handling the supervision of a good deal of the research work in collabora-
tion with Mr. Holland and is particularly anxious to have a long talk with you
about the Economic Handbook, a large responsibility for which has been dele-
gated to her.
Will you continue to address me here, care of the China Institute of Pacific
Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai. I am going to Manila on
June fifth, but Shanghai continues to be my best forwarding address for mail
and cables.
AMtli kindest personal regards, I am
Very sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1039
123 Boulevard de Montigny,
Shanghai, China,
May 31st, 1937.
Joseph Barnes, Esq.,
New York Herald Tribvne Bureau,
Moscow, U. 8. 8. R.
Dear Joe : Our present plan is to reach Moscow on August 8th. I spent about
a fortnight befoi-e in the Soviet Far East with Bremman.
I wonder whether you would be willing to give me a little travel tip. Is the
Hotel Metropole still presumably the most logical place for us to stay or has
some new Hotel arisen which has all the advantages of the Metropole and is a
little less gloomy?
I wish the newspapers of China and Japan would buy your Moscow despatches.
Misinformation in these two countries regarding the Soviet Union is prettj"
discouraging.
Ever sincerely yours,
Edward C. Cakter.
5160 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1040
Bay View Hotel,
Manila, 18th June, 19S7.
Miss Kate Mitchell,
Neio York City.
Dear Kate : Yesterday evening the delayed clipper arrived with your very
welcome airmail letters of June 7. I cannot tell you how grateful I am to you
for arranging to send me Mrs. Barnes's latest article on the Soviet Union in
the Far East. This should give me just the kind of pointers that I want. I
hope that you and she and Harriet will include any questions for which you
wish me to seek the answers. Thank you also for sending me the clipping from
the Times about the "Spy Scare."
Yes, I got your May 11th letter but it was delayed In reaching me owing to
my absence for a week in Szechwan. By now you have received tlie copy of
my letter to Motylev of May 27, in the next-to-last paragraph of which you will
find Bill Holland's reasons for deciding that you visit Moscow in order to
represent him in going over with Voitinsky and Motylev the entire research
program. You have also by now, I hope, received by letter of the 30th of May
in which, in addition to giving Bill Holland's reasons, I mentioned the necessity
of starting work on the semifinal draft of the Budget toward the end of August
or early in September.
In accordance with your request for a cable, which I am sending for fear
my earlier letters may have been delayed in reaching you, I am cabling you
today as follows :
"Mitchell, Inparel, New York:
"Staying Meti'opole, Moscow, until August twenty-sixth. Satisfactory
if you arrive ninth. Stop. Holland self think your visit important. Stop.
If, however, very difficult arrange meet me Berlin August Twenty-eighth
cable. Stop. Ask Dorothea, Kuth, or Martha cable family news this
week end.
"Carter."
Your tentative schedule calling for leaving on the "Washington" on July 28,
reaching Paris on the 4th, Berlin on the 7th and Moscow on the 9th, is satis-
factory to me, except that I wish that you might have a day or two longer in
Paris to relax after your arduous schedule throughout July in New York.
I am told that Catherine Porter's Survey article was widely quoted in the
Philippine papers. Tell her that yesterday we met Mrs. Traynor, who was
Gladys Plunkett of the Inquiry staff. She is now a most sedate matron. We
were delighted to find that Annette's very vivid and attractive sister. Miss
Mayer, is living here at the Bay View.
I have decided to return to Shanghai by steamer from Hongkong so all the
letters that you have sent to Shanghai will reach us automatically, and anyhow,
in Wellington's absence, Elizabeth Downing is attending to the forwai'ding of
all our mail.
The future of the Philippine Council hangs in the balance. I wonder whether
if you go to Washington before you sail, you could have a really frank talk
with Conrado Benitez, who may have left or may stay on in Paredes' place.
Affectionately yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1041
Supplementary Agenda for Discussion Between U. S. S. R., IPR, and the
Secretary-General, Moscow, Aug. 17, 1937
1. Memorandum from Chatham House dated August 3rd, 1937.
2. What steps will be taken to insure intelligent and significant reviews of
Great Soviet World Atlas in principal countries. How secure a few advance
copies with memorandum on principal points of significance.
3. Recommendation as to duration Miss Harriet Moore's visit to Buryat
Mongolia.
4. Could Bremman spend at least 8 months as a member of the Internatiopal
Secretariat in 1938 or 1939.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5161
5. Procedure with reference to members of the International Secretariat and
the Secretariats of the National Councils visiting the Soviet Union in the future,
6. The internal situation in the Soviet Union.
7. Suggestions from Soviet Council to the Secretary-General regarding making
the worii of the International Secretariat more efficient.
8. How secure promptly several copies of the following publications of the
Institute of World Politics and Economics. Provisional titles only :
a. Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria.
b. Guerrila Warfare in Manchuria.
c. Symposium on China.
d. Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions
in Japan.
e. Financial Situation in Japan.
f. Position of the Working Class in Japan.
g. Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourivitch.
h. Dissertation by Levina (?) developing Lenin's idea that Capitalism is
acceptable to the United States peasant because of the absence of feudal
factors.
9. Other business as proposed by the officers of the U. S. S. R. IPR.
10. Shiman.
11. Lattimore.
Exhibit No. 1042
Please pass on the word of Shiman's arrival in the Far East to Liu Yu-wan,
Saionji, Pyke and Downing.
Hotel Metropole,
Moscow, 20th August, 1937.
Feederick v. Field, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y.
Dear Fred : In order to keep the records complete, this is a record of the
Shiman incident.
On the 12th August I received your cable of the 11th reading as follows :
"Shiman stuck London no word Soviet visa applied 8 weeks ago.
Can you push Moscow end cable Shiman Amexco London today."
In order to discover whether he wanted merely to visit Moscow or to go to
the Far East via Manchuria or via Vladivostok I wired him as follows :
"Wire Metropole kind of visa desired".
He replied as follows :
"Tourist visa preferred leaving London new address American Express
Vienna."
As I could only act if I had precise information I wired you as follows on
August 13th.
"Shiman gone Austria wire me duration stay itinerary desired".
To this Hilda replied as follows.
"Shiman care Markus Sevensix Weidner Hauptstrasse Vienna communi-
cate directly no knowledge present itinerary."
I then wired Shiman in Vienna as follows :
"Wire duration stay itinerary desired."
Shiman then wired me on the 16th, as follows :
"Desire enter Negoreloye 3 days Moscow transit Manchouli".
This I received late on the evening of the 16th. On the morning of the 17th
I delivered, personally, letters of recommendation, information, and appeal to,
Belsky, the head of Intourist, Ward, the passport man at the American Embassy,
and to Dr. Motylev. Belsky rang up the Government immediately and discovered
that Shiman's visa had not been refused. This meant that the situation was
88348—52— pt. 11— 17
5162 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
still hopeful. As Belsky told me to pull all possible wires iu order to get
speedy action, I wired you on the 17th as follows :
"Suggest you ask Umansky burn wires behalf Shiman."
On the 19th I had to leave for Kalinin for two days. On my return on the
21st I received a telegram from Shiman in Vienna reading as follows :
"Boat tickets too scarce to wait longer. Stop. Sailing Naples Singapore
August 28 Japanese Terukuni signing off with thanks."
A few moments later Belsky informed me that the visa had been granted and
that the telegram to the Soviet Consul in Vienna had gone forward late on the
evening of the 19th or early on the morning of the 20th. I immediately wired
Shiman at his home address in Vienna, as follows :
"Your telegram received visa telegraphed Vienna nineteenth."
Shiman presumably left Vienna before the final telegram arrived or felt
already committed to sail via Singapore.
Now for the future. Whenever fully accredited and important members of the
Pacific Council or the American Council staff desire to visit or pass through
the Soviet Union, full details as to the person and the purpose of the trip should
be sent by you or me to Dr. Motylev with a copy to Secretary-General Y. P.
Bremman. If possible this information should be sent a full fortnight in
advance of making the application for the visa at the local office of Intourist and
the Soviet Consulate.
Simultaneously similar letters giving all details should be sent to the Chief
of the Consular Section of the American Embassy in Moscow. I would recom-
mend that, even though no one in Moscow proposed it, a similar letter be sent
to any personal friends you may have in the Soviet Embassy in Washington
or Shanghai or wherever the application is made.
Both Motylev and the officials of the American Embassy are always embar-
rassed if the People's Commissariat of Foreign Afi'airs address communications
to them regarding the visits of I. P. R. personalities of whose visits they have not
already heard.
One other suggestion I gather that with reference to members of the American
Council who are not members of the staff you should be very discriminating
in giving letters of introduction to the Soviet I. P. R. Any member of the
American Council who is a really serious student can be introduced but any
who want to go purely as trippers had better stick closely to the Intourist
program. I deeply regret that the hours that I spent on Shiman's behalf did not
secure action two hours earlier.
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Caeter.
P. S.— You might show this letter to CHS, HA, CP, HM, KB, and EFC.
Exhibit No. 1043
Hotel Richemond,
Geneva, Switzerland, 7th September, 1931.
Dr. V. E. Motylev,
% Soviet Union Institute of Pacific Relations,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Dear Motylev : From London I cabled Mr. Field to send you a copy of each
Issue of Amerasia from the beginning mailing each copy separately. I hope
that all will reach you in due course.
In the meantime my copy of the July issue has arrived. I am, therefore, post-
ing it to you. On page 230 you will find the translation of your Pravda article.
Here in Geneva I have had the great privilege of meeting Mr. Sokoline, th»
Soviet Under Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
Very sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5163
Exhibit No. 1044
On Board M. V. "Geobgic,"
En Route to New "York,
18th October, 1931.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
SS Ta Yuan Fu Hutung,
Peiping, China.
Dear Owen : One of the cables that I sent to you which was apparently garbled
was that in which I inquired whether I could give Motylev a copy of your two
articles on your visit to the Chinese Communists. The first was "The Stronghold
of Chinese Communism." The second was "The Present and Future of Chinese
Communism." Motylev was naturally exceedingly eager to have the benefit of
your impressions. Perhaps more eager than any other member of the Pacific
Council.
I did not tell him that I had copies of these two articles because I was not
quite sure whether you would wish me to show them to him. But I would like
to hear from you as to whether I may send them or whether you would prefer
to send him copies or to write him direct a long letter giving him the benefit of
your impressions.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1045
G-2
RSB
War Department,
War Department General Staff
Military Intellience Division G-2,
Washington, D. C, November 5, 1937.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 East 52nd St., New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter : In reply to your request of November 5, I am listing below
the ofiicers who attended the meeting in Colonel Strong's office this morning.
With much appreciation for your kindness in giving us so much of your time,
I am
Sincerely yours,
R. S. Brattou
R. S. Bratton,
Lieut. Col., Inf., DOL.
td
List of Officers :
Captain W. L. Lind, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence
Commander S. M. Creighton, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence
Captain W. L. Bales, U. S. M. C, Office of Naval Intelligence.
Colonel Geo. V. Strong, U. S. A., War Department, G-2
Lieut. Col. P. E. Van Nostrand, U. S. A., War Department, G-2
Lieut. Col. R. S. Bratton, U. S. A., War Department, G-2
Major William Mayer, U. S. A., War Department, G-2
Exhibit No. 1046
JosBPH Baenes, Moscow Correspondent
New York Herald Tribune,
Hotel Metropole,
Moscoiv, November 10, 1937.
Dear Mr. Carter: Your reference to Nyon, however pessimistic, hardly
needed toning down. All that has happened since then has only strengthened
the case of those, and they are legion here, who feel that there is nothing more
to do but wait, and arm, and fight. The blackmail policy of aggression — taking
endless half-loaves of bread by threatening each time to take the whole loaf —
seems to pay such dividends that it is not likely to be discarded voluntarily.
5164
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and the chances of checking it by any sort of collective action certainly grow
slimmer and slimmer. I have reason to believe that even some of the more
bitter-minded Soviet people score the steady losses up to bad diplomacy in
western Europe, and to the failure of otherwise-sensible people to see just
what the policy of endless forbearance and compromise leads to. For myself,
this is steadily a less satisfactory explanation. It maljes me appear to out-
Bolshevik the Bolsheviks, which is not a fair conclusion, but it is hard for me
to dodge the suspicion that increasing groups of owning people, in Japan, in
eastern Europe, and now in England, have beaten the workers to class-conscioii<a-
ness, and that they have in spirit if not in the letter of treaties decided to get
down ofC their post-Versailles fence on the Facist side, God knows it's not an
unreasonable conclusion for a Yugoslav banker, say or Montague Norman, o'-
the b'lwasakis to come to, but it's a depressing one for those who watch it.
Without some such explanation, it is hard to understand the endless patience
of the English, or their old-maid's fright at the thought of a Soviet under the
bed. Brussels appears to have gone the way of Nyon. If I were a Czecho-
slovak today, or a citizen of Danzig, or a young Englishman of draft age, I
would feel that my very life depended on the slim chance that some of my
rulers would wake up to the fact that cooperation with the Soviet Union, a
united front of democi-acies committed to collective security and the indivisibil-
ity of peace, is the only thing that could now stop what's going on.
God knows the Russians don't seem to be working very hard on convincing
them, but they've had twenty years of trying, and maybe they're justified in
being discouraged. If the Bolsheviks decide, after their Spanish expei-ience,
to give the Chinese their blessing and their sympathy — which I am increasingly
convinced is what is happening, and no more — and watch the Japanese slowly
founder in the snow of North China, it will be pretty hard for us Friends of the
Soviet Union, or for our first-cousins, the self-righteous liberals stranded
between realpoUtilc and pacifism, to keep up the present chorus about the world's
liaving been let down by the Soviet Union.
This started out to be a simple note, telling you that I was glad to see you
in Moscow, but the indignation which gets choked on a cable line seems to
liave overflowed.
I assume you have heard all the recent news about Moscow which would
interest you from those of your staff who read Pravda attentively. The issue
of October 3 was full of news.
News continues for us too, with no sign of a let-up. The elections are now
ahead, as soon as the celebration is decently over. When the dull routine
days will come, when I have been planning to settle down and do some of the
real work that I have got to do, is still uncertain.
Give my best regards to Mrs. Carter, Ruth, and John [Handwritten.] Carter.
Very sincerely yours,
Joe
Exhibit No. 1047
[Copy]
Overland Limited, East-bound,
Decem'ber 23, 1937.
Mr. Fkederick V. Field
San Francisco
Dear Fred : May I recommend that the Membership Committee of the Ameri-
can Council undertake to make a serious study of the desirability of securing for
membership in the Council several, if not all, of the members of the House and
Senate Committees on Forei.gn Relations.
The Committee might at the same time consider whether there are not other
members of the two Houses who should be invited to become members of the
American Council. The Nominating Committee or the Executive Committee may
wish to consider having the SURVEY and some of the pamphlets go to key mem-
bers of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees even though they
decide against asking them to become members of the Council.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5165
As one means of capitalizing on my recent expensive visit to Kansas, I would
like to propose that the Nominating Committee consider Governor Landon for
membership in the American Council.
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Cakteb.
Exhibit No. 1048
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, February 2Jt, 1938.
Miss Virginia Btjrdick,
Amei'iGan Russian Institute,
56 West 45th Street, New York City.
Dear Miss Burdick : 1. Because the Bulletin of the American Russian Institute
aims at objectivity, covers contemporary life in the Soviet Union and is written
by a highly competent staff, its importance both to scholars and to the more
thoughtful section of the general public cannot be overemphasized.
2. I was attacked the other day, not by a Soviet citizen but by an American
capitalist, for being on the Board of the American Russian Institute in which,
it was alleged, there are still a number of Trotskyists. To what extent is this
true? I do not believe in persecuting American Trotskyists in general, but I do
not see any point in including them on the Governing Board of an Institute that
is trying to promote intelligent understanding between the United States and
the U. S. S. R.
3. Of what committee of the American Russian Institute am I a member, the
Board or the Executive Committee?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1049
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, February 25, 1938.
Purely personal
Constantine Oumansky, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. 8. S. R., Washington, D. C.
Dear Oumansky : When I saw you last Wednesday, I meant to show you a copy
of the letter that I sent to Motylev last November. At that time I sent a similar
letter to several consultants, the majority of which favored the proposal.
In the light of these letters from several parts of the world we have now
drafted a short statement as to the inquiry to be organized. This I enclose
also. You will note that it is marked confidential.
I would enormously appreciate your personal criticism of these two enclosures.
I was very glad that the Ambassador invited me to lunch, and was particularly
pleased that I was able to meet Mrs. Oumansky. It was delightful sitting beside
her.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1050
Additional Names Recommended fob Membership in the American Coitncil
(By Edward C. Carter)
Oscar Littleton Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. O.
Ernest L. Gruening, Director, Division of Territories and Insular Possessions,
Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C.
Alger Hiss, attached to the staff of Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre
Daniel A. de Menocal, Vice President, First National Bank of Boston, New York
Mr. and Mrs. Philip Moore, Hubbard Woods, Illinois
Recommended by himself:
Dr. Frank Bohn, 2219 California Street, Washington, D. C, formerly a
contributor to the New York Times ; lecturer at the University of Southern
California ; now son-in-law to the Secretary of Commerce
5166
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1051
1795 Califoknta Street,
March 11, 1938.
Mr. William W. Lockwood, Jr.
129 East 52vd Street,
New York, Neio York.
Dear Bill : You will find enclosed a copy of a letter to Dr. Davis which follows
a long discussion which wasted a good deal of the time available to the local
advisory research committee at its meeting last week. I hope that the rela-
tionships I have outlined will be accepted without comment. In any case, I
never could make out why research people were interested in these legalistic
questions.
The remarks in my letter to Davis pertain also to the formation of a research
committee in the East as discussed in your letter of March 14th. Since talk-
ing with you in New York I have somewhat changed my views as I have tried
to figure out an organizational procedure which would be consistent through
the country. It is quite definitely recommended in the report of the nominating
committee to the Annual Meeting of December 17, 1937, that the national
research committee shall remain a skeleton committee composed only of the
chairman, now Dr. Alsberg, and a secretary from the staff, yourself, and that
a series of regional advisoi-y research committees on the model of the one
already established in San Francisco should be organized. Therefore, to
make the committee which you are getting together in and near New York
the national research committee instead of a New York or Eastern research
advisory committee would be contrary to the recommendation made and accepted
at the Annual Meeting.
A procedure more consistent with our development elsewhere and with the
needs of the organization would be to make the committee on which you are
now at work another in the series of advisory research committees to which
Dr. Alsberg and yourself will make definite requests from time to time. At
the moment the principal responsibility which is being put on this new com-
mittee is to take charge of the studies which the International Secretariat has
requested the American Council to undei'take on behalf of the large war settle-
ment inquiry. I shall seek the advice of our research groups here and In
Southern California and of research individuals in other parts of the country
but responsibility for the work will be placed in the hands of this new group.
Do you agree that this will be a sounder way to go alwut our work?
In any case the composition of your committee is hardly affected as we are
not likely to develop more than one research advisory between Chicago and New
York for some time to come. There would be, therefore, no difficulty in includ-
ing a Chicago member on the regional committee established from New York.
I think the names you suggest are excellent with the possible exception of
Erich W. Zimmerman of North Carolina. His book on raw material I'esources
was my bible for a couple of years and I have the highest regard for him as
a scholar. For committee work, however, he is not particularly useful, largely
because of very conspicuous deafness which makes it diflScult for him to par-
ticipate in a discussion. He served on one of the American Coordinating Com-
mittee groups of which I was a member and I recall that the general impression
was that he was very seriously handicapped. There is the further point in
connection with him that the University of North Carolina represents a good
deal of travel expenses to New York. The only other possible question as to
the members you have suggested is Shotwell whose name in some quarters
has become synonymous with monkey wrench. There is no question that he is
inclined to run away with a committee if he becomes interested nor is there
any question that he has more than once started research work off on a tangent
and an expensive one at that. Confidentially, Miss Walker of the Rockefeller
Foundation expressed the frank opinion at lunch three weeks ago that valuable
as Shotwell had been in the past that time had come when he should be no longer
appointed to research committees of any sort.
I feel very self-conscious about Shotwell because of having gone to con-
siderable trouble to organize a stop-Shotwell movement among the younger
people in New York six or seven years ago. The movement was so success-
ful that I have often wondered since whether we were justified in taking such
an unfriendly attitude towards him in our IPR work. At his request Barnes
and I got together a group of about eighteen or twenty people who met at
Shotwell's house and ate his food one evening a week for about four months
ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5167
in order to engage in an open discussion of tbe original motivations of inter-
national relations. Barnes and I carefully stacked the cards so that out of
a meeting of twenty ihere were nineteen Marxists or pseudo-Marxists and one
violent anti-Marxist, Shotwell himself. Each meeting was more embarrassing
than the last for, all being young, we were rather unmerciful in tearing to pieces
every clause Issued by this renowned scholar.
With regard to a representative from the business community, I am quite
certain that Whitney Shepardson will not accept a position on one of our com-
mittees. Some years ago he decided that he would undertake outside work
with only one organization, namely the Council on Foreign Relations, and as
far as I know he has stuck religiously by this self-imposed rule. He is always
available for personal consultation hut not, I think, for committee work. I do
know your alternative candidate, Howard Houston of the American Cyanamid
Company. I do not think that he is a vice president but rather assistant to the
president. He is an old friend of Carter's, was at one time on the staff of the
League of Nations, and very likely was one of the important YIMCA boys during
the War, though of this I am not certain. My acquaintance with him is slight,
being limited to two or three fairly long talks in connection with a possible
gift to the IPR from the company with which he works. We did not receive
the gift but our relations with Houston, and with the company for that matter,
were extremely satisfactory. They actually read a very elaborate report I
prepared for them and gave me the impression of understanding rather accu-
rately what we were driving at. In other words, I would very much support
the suggestion that Houston be included in the committee.
I am also glad to see that you have included Edward M. Earle of Princeton.
I have never met him personally but for a long time I have heard only the high-
est praise of his work. He was a great friend of the Barnes family who used
to tell me about him while I was still an undergraduate at Harvard. More
recently I have often heard Professor Chamberlain speak about him.
In going over your list again as I dictate I notice that you have included
Alsberg on this committee. If we adopt the organizational procedure which I
recommend in the first fifteen paragraphs of this letter, he should not, of course,
be made a member of a regional advisory committee in view of his position as
chairman of our national research committee.
Finally, on the question of the procedure which should be adopted for appoint-
ing this committee, I am today taking the first step which is to secure Alsberg's
approval. After you have replied to this letter, giving me the final list of the
committee, I shall communicate with members of our Executive Committee by
correspondence and I have no doubt that our recommendations will be speedily
accepted.
Sincerely yours,
Frederick V. Field.
Exhibit No. 1052
[Copy]
225 Fifth Ave., N. Y. C,
March 31, 1938.
Mrs. Edward C. Carter,
American Council, I. P. R.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
My Dear Mrs. Carter : It is a pleasure to accept your invitation to participate
in the week-end conference at Princeton, on April 23rd and 24th.
The agenda for the conference is certainly complete. My only criticism would
be that it is too minutely detailed, and in some instances duplicated. It may be
that a somewhat broader and shorter agenda might be easier to handle at a
conference which is to last only two days.
In addition, I would like to suggest one more topic, and that is, concerning
the German-Japanese Pact and its implications. How much truth is there in the
Japanese warning that China is on the verge of going Communist, and what is
meant by Communism in China? A clarification of these issues would go a long
way toward creating a better understanding of what American business may or
may not expect in China, whether victorious or defeated.
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) Philip J. Jaffe.
5168 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1053
Embassy of the Union op Soviet Socialist Republics,
Washington, D. C, March 29, 1938.
]VIr. Edward C. Caetek,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. T.
Dear IMe. Carter : Thank you for your letter of March 26. As before I am
at your disposal for the dinner.
I understand that the verbatim report in English of the recent proceedings
will arrive in this country shortly. At that time I shall not fail to send you a
copy immediately.
Sincerely yours,
tS] C. OUMANSKY.
p, s, — I have sent you under separate cover two issues of the Moscow News
dealing with the trial.
CO:P
Exhibit No. 1054
129 East 52nd St.,
New York City, March 31, 1938.
Mr. Owen Lattimoke,
1795 California St., San Francisco, Calif.
Dear Owen : Here is a copy of my second letter to Scherer. I think I have
already sent you Yasuo's comment.
Tsuro is supposed to have Leftist sources of information. Shiman and Jatte
regard him very highly.
Now it may be that Scherer is right and Tsuro and Yasuo wrong, but I need
to be shown.
Scherer wrote as if he were writing for Pacific Affairs. I hope this is not
the case. He doubtless is a swell guy, but I cannot quite see the point of Pacific
Affairs suddenly taking up with him when our best friends in the Japanese
I. P. E. would have been pained if we had featured him even when he was
doing his pro-Japanese writing.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter^.
Exhibit No. 1055
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, March 31, 1938.
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain
8 Sutton Square, New York City
Dear Joseph : Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others
at the Centurv Club at 7 :15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20th, to listen
to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited
Constantino Oumansky, the able, two-fisted Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of
a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any
of my guests care to put.
If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting
evening.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
(Handwritten note:)
Mr. Chamberlain's secretary called to tell Mr. Carter that a previous engage-
ment prevents Mr. Chamberlain from accepting the dinner invitation for April 20.
12:40
April 6, 1938.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5169
Exhibit No. 1056
129 East 52nd Street,
Vew York City, April 2, 19S8.
Dr. John H. Finley,
Editor in Chief, New York Times.
Dear Dr. Finley : Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others
at the Century Club at 7 : 15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20th, to listen
to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Con-
stantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a
dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any
of my guests care to put.
If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting
evening.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1057
April 16, 1938.
E. C. C. to Russell Shiman :
When I was seeing Ballantine, Thursday, in the State Department on another
matter, lie said he wished to talk to me about Virginia Thompson's notes on
Siam. It apears that she has been most industrious in making voluminous notes
from the private consular reports. The Department has been carefully scruti-
nizing these and hopes that, in the terms of my original application, she will use
this material only as background. Ballantine and Spencer read me an "aide
memoir," a copy of which I attach for your private information. Ballantine
was clearly in a dilemma. He did not wish to have the Department appear rigid
and restrictive with reference to Miss Thompson's work. At the same time, he
felt that there was some material in Miss Thompson's notes which would be em-
barassing if published, especially if the State Department was given as the
source.
I think the Department has confidence in the I. P. R. and in Miss Thompson.
At the same time, they were worried about a good deal of what they felt was
irrelevant, marginal, and indiscreet in her notes.
I as.sured Ballantine and Spencer that Miss Thompson could be trusted to
play the game 100 percent and that I would make a point of seeing her personally
and assuring myself on this score before she sailed for Europe.
This I did yesterday afternoon with entirely satisfactory results as you can
see from the attached letter to Mr. Ballantine.
It seemed to me that all the Department's points were well-taken, but I am
sure that Miss Thompson's promise will dispel their fears.
For the purpose of their confidential information, I wish you would share this
memorandum and the attached correspondence with Miss Porter, Mr. Lockwood,
and Mr. Field.
Exhibit No. 1058
Department of State,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
April IJf, 1948.
In your letter of February 24, 1938, addressed to the Secretary, requesting
permission for Miss Thompson to examine the political reports from Siam, it
was stated that her desire was "solely to get background for her study, not in
any case for direct quotation." It is on the basis of that understanding that it is,
therefore, requested that the materials and information contained in the notes
taken by Miss Thompson in no case be quoted from or be cited as obtained from
official sources. In this connection, attention is invited in particular to the pas-
sages in the notes which have been marked on the margin with red pencil.
5170 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In addition, throughout the notes there will be found certain passages which
have been marked with red brackets. It is desired that the information and
statements contained in those bracketed passages in no wise be used, cited, or
quoted from.
It is with the understanding that the above-mentioned conditions are acceptable
to you and to Miss Thompson that there are being returned to you for delivery
to Miss Thompson the notes under reference.
Exhibit No. 1059
129 East 52nd Street,
Ifew York City, April 15, 1938.
Joseph W. Ballantine, Esq.,
Department of State,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Ballantine : In accordance with my promise to you yesterday I have
just handed Miss Thompson her notes and told her of my conversation with you
and Mr. Spencer yesterday. I also gave her a copy of the memorandum which
was the basis of our discussion.
As I expected Miss Thompson understood that her notes were solely to serve
as background for her study and not in any case for direct quotation.
As I assumed was the case, she has just assured me that she was planning
to make no reference whatsoever in her book to the privilege which you have
accorded her ; and, in addition, was planning to send you the whole manuscript
informally before publication in the hope that you would feel free to read it to
make doubly certain that at no point had she violated the understanding which
was the basis of her work while in Washington.
Very sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1060
(Handwritten:) Copy. FVF return to ECC. A.W.Dulles.
Oumansky
Cable address : "Ladycourt," New York — Paris
Sullivan & Cromwell
48 Wall Street, New York. 39 rue Cambon, Paris
New York, April 22, 1938.
Edward C. Carter, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd St.,
New York, N. T.
Dear Mr. Carter : I want to tell you how much I enjoyed our dinner the other
evening with Mr. Oumansky. It was one of the most interesting affairs of this
character that I have attended for a long time.
Faithfully yours,
[s] A. W. Dulles
(A. W. Dulles.)
Exhibit No. 1061
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, May 8, 1938.
Miss Virginia Bttrdick,
American Russian Institute, 56 West JfStJi Street, New York City.
Dear Miss Burdick : The International Secretariat has arranged for the trans-
lation of the titles of every one of the maps in the "Great Soviet Atlas of the
World." It has also arranged for the translation of detailed items on —
Map 27 — Mineral resources of the world
" 53 — World map of oil and coal industries
" 68 — ]Map of the financial dependence of countries in the capitalist world
" 69 — Map of the financial dependence of capitalist countries. Spheres
of capital investment
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5171
Map 83 — Economic rivalry of imperialistic powers in the Pacific
" 99 — Map of mineral resources of the U. S. S. R.
" 133-34 — Fuel, mining metalurgical, and chemical industries in the
European part of the U. S. S. R.
" 135-36 — Machine-building and machine-working industries of the
European part of U. S. S. R.
" 137 — Machine-building and metal-working industries in the Asiatic
part of the U. S. S. R.
" 138 — Forests, timber and paper industry of the Asiatic part of the
U. S. S. R.
" 141-42— Light industry in the European part of the U. S. S. R.
" 143— Light industry in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.
" 144— Food industry in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.
" 151 — Industry within the limits of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.
in 1913
" 152— Industrial map of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R. in 1935
" 166— Map of the foreign trade of the U. S. S. R. (imports)
" 167 — Map of the foreign trade of the U. S. S. R. (exports)
The translation takes about 28 pages of double-spaced typing. If this abbrevi-
ated translation is of any value to you it can be supplied by the International
Secretariat at $2.00 per copy.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1062
Washington, D. C, 23rd May, 1938.
Ref: 55886/749
Mr. I. F. WizoN,
U. 8. Department of Labor, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Dear Sir : Very many thanks for your letter dated May 21st, advising me
that you have directed that the visas of Mr. Chen Chu and Mrs. Susie Ku Chen
be extended to May 18, 1939.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1063
Address Reply to Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and Refer to
File Number 55886/749
U. S. Department of Labor,
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Washington, May 21, 1938.
Mr, Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Sir : Referring to your letter of the 11th instant and your telegram of
the 18th instant, you are advised that the Department has directed that the
temporary admission of Mr. Chen Chu (Geoffrey C. Chen) and Mrs. Susie Ku
Chen be extended to May 18, 1939.
Respectfully,
I. F. Wixon
I. F. Wixon, Deputy Commissioner.
Exhibit No. 1064
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, June 30, 1938.
Miss Sydnor Walker,
The Rockefeller Foundation,
J,9 West 49th Street, New York.
Dear Miss Walker : Have you any convictions as to whether the I. P. R. ought
to seek to create in any of the Latin American countries unofficial societies for
the scientific study of international affairs?
5172 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Both Sumner Welles and Lawrence Duggan in the State Department would
give a good deal if the I. P. R. could catch on in Latin America.
Their difficulty and that of the I. P. R. is that in none of the states as yet is
the nonofBcial study of international affairs encouraged.
Have you, throuiih any of your contacts or reports, any advice to give?
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edwaed C. Cabtee.
Exhibit No. 1065
129 East 52nd Street
New York, June 16, 1938.
Maxwell M. Hamilton, Esq.,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Deae Hamilton : Would it be possible for you to arrange to have the enclosed
letter sent to Salisbury in the diplomatic pouch? I am particularly anxious to
avoid any risk of having it read by the censors of the present Peking regime.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1066
(Handwritten:) HM
KB
CHS
KM
MT
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
In the City of New York
faculty of political science
Dear Carter: Thanks for your note. I'm not talking in public in re USSR.
It's too durned complex, & we were there only 3 wks.
I did see Motylev, who is a corker. Got from him a glowing sense of a
scientist at work in U. S. S. R. — as well, of course, as much inf 'n.
We will "plan another visit," of course, but it isn't in sight as yet.
Cordially,
Ltnd.
Exhibit No. 1067
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, December H, 1938.
Dr. Robert S. Lynd,
Physics Building, Columbia University,
New York City
Dear Lynd: It was delightful to see you across the room at the Town Hall
Club last week. I would like to hear your impressions of the U. S. S. R. and
if you're giving them to any little group at Columbia, I hope I will be included
in the invitation.
When your hurry-up letter came asking for letters of introduction to Moscow
last summer, I was away. I got back to the office and received your letter a
few hours before you sailed. Someone assured me that Oumansky had given
you the necessary introductions so I did not send any. I do hope that Ouman-
sky's letters gave you the necessary entree. If they didn't and you are planning
another visit, give me a month's notice and I think I may be able to interest
Dr. Motylev, the head of the U. S. S. R. IPR, in your visit. He has thus far
been unfailing in the apportunities he has made available for all who have gone
with our credentials.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5173
Exhibit No. 1068
Columbia University
In the City of New York
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
June 20, 1938.
Mr. E. C. Carteb,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 120 East 52nd Street,
New York City
Dear Carter : Mrs. Lynd and I are going into Russia this summer. We hope
to settle down in a Middletown-sized community of 40-50,000 growing up around
a new industrial site and try to get some sense of how social and community
organization is taking place in Russia.
Ceroid Robinson says we should certainly have a letter of introduction to
the editor of the great Soviet Atlas. Robinson believes he would understand
our problem and be helpful. If you know the editor and are in a position to
give us a letter to him we would appreciate it a lot.
As we sail tomorrow (Tuesday) will you answer this in care of the Open
Road, 8 W. 40th Street, New York City, attention of Miss Messenger?
Truly yours,
[s] Robert D. Lynd.
Exhibit No. 1070
120 East 52nd Street,
New York, June 18, 1938.
Lawrence E. Salisbury, Esq.,
American Emhassy, Peipinff, China
Dear Salisbury: Would you be kind enough to see that the enclosed letter
is delivered privately to Professor George T^iylor at Yenching University? It
so happens that I want to avoid any risk of its being read en route.
Sincerely yours,
Edward 0. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1071
Department of State,
Washington, June 21, 1938.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York
Dear Mr. Carter : As requested in your letter of June 16, 1938, there is being
sent in the diplomatic pouch to the American Embassy at Peiping your letter
addressed to Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury, together with its enclosure addressed to
Professor George E. Taylor, Yenching University. As you of course know the
Department transmits private communications in the pouch only in exceptional
cases.
Sincerely yours,
Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
Exhibit No. 1073
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Massachusetts, 19th July, 1938.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
c/o Allie Robinson's Camp,
Independence, California.
Dear Owen : Thank you for your long and delightful letter of July 10 from
Independence. What an intriguing name for editorial work in this particular
age.
5174 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In the strictest confidence I am sending you a copy of Paul Scheffer's comment
on Bloch's original outline (I did not tell Scheffer who wrote the outline).
With reference to Hu Shih, we had him here at Lee for a week-end conference
just befoi'e he sailed. Chen and Chi were also here. Though both these men
differ with Hu Shih very strongly, the both believe in his integrity of character.
We are all trying to get him to write a major monograph to document the
"temporizing policy" of Nanking in the last few years. He is convinced that
the Generalissimo was preparing as fervently for ultimate resistance to Japan
as were the Communists. We have asked him to go the whole way in making
available documents that would prove his thesis. Whether we agree with his
thesis or not it is important to have the job well done. This a a round about
way of answering your question as to the weight which Hu Shih exerts in
American circles and the extent in which he molds or leads tlie opinions of the
Chinese in America. With Americans who have never heard of Chu Teh, Hu
Shih stands out as a really great Chinese patriot — a man of dignity and a mind
with a spacious point of view. To those Americans wlio feel that the Chinese
Communists are making an epic contribution to Chinese unification Hu Shih
seems to be living in the Victorian Age, albeit in rather a distinguished fashion.
The reaction of Chinese in America to Hu Shih is similar to that of Americans
according to their own line up on the question of Chinese Communists.
Thank you for the tip about Sereno. I will write to Lasswell today.
With reference to the question which you raise as to the role that you should
play in view of Japanese attacks on the impartiality of members of American
Council staff and the Pacific Council staff I am inclined to take the position that
the American Council staff are in one category, the Chinese and Japanese members
of the International Secretariat are in a second, and you. Bill Holland, and I
in a third, though all three categories blur into each other. The American
Council staff are responsible only to the American people. They thus should
be among the freest people on earth. The Chinese and Japanese members of
our own staff are chosen among other reasons because they are Chinese or
Japanese and we want from them the fullest possible reflection of all that is
most fundamental in the attitudes^f their countries. You and Holland and the
other non-Oriental members of the International Secretariat and my.self are the
servants of all eleven Councils. Our role is an almost impossible one. It
might be likened to the role of the Speaker in the House of Commons, namely
to ensure that every responsible point of view in the Institute is given a full
hearing. This means that we ought to convince all the National Councils that
whatever are our own private views, the Secretariat, the research program, the
conferences, and Pacific Affairs are administered with complete detachment
so that every responsible point of view is represented in the most favorable
possible light.
If in our private capacities we take a line that is so conspicuous that any large
element in our constituency feels that we cannot administer our international
responsibilities with impartiality then I think that our non-Secretariat activities
should be reconsidered. Some weeks ago I came to the tentative conclusion that
so far as I myself am concerned I should seriously consider declining all public
invitations to speak on the Far Eastern situation. By public invitations I mean
those which are reported by the press. In the past month I have declined to
write for Amerasia. I did this because in Japan Amerasia is regarded as having
been founded with a definite anti-Japanese bias.
However unjust this feeling may be we have got to make some allowance for
the exigencies of war psychology as it affects our Japanese friends.
Saionji is one of the straightest thinking of young Japanese. He has stood
apart ana above the muddled-headed war philosophy during the past year in a
most striking manner. The other day I learned privately that he had single-
handed raised the money that was needed to carry on the Japanese I. P. R. this
year, but that now the donors were hammering him because of the line taken
both by members of the International Secretariat and the American Council Staff.
I understand that he feels that the American Council staff are free. In other
words to his friends he defends the right of the American Council staff to take
any line they want. But he finds it diflicult to explain what api)ears to be
partisanship on the part of members of the Secretariat. I personally wish that
it was possible for you to withdraw from the Amerasia board in the interests of
the major task of integration which we have ahead of us for the next two years.
I do not think any hasty action is called for but it is a matter I have long wanted
to discuss with you and have never had the opportunity.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5175
I am exceedingly glad that you approve of the way Yasuo is functioning. If
ever a man was in a hot spot he is it.
Motylev is going to the Soviet Far East instead of coming here. I am urging
him to send Voitinsky in his place.
Dennery, Takayanagi, and Dafoe are all coming to Sunset Farm for ten days
on August 10 to meet with the International Secretariat. Is there any chance of
your coming east in time for this meeting or at least arriving by the 16th or 17th?
Would you let us know just how we should describe your Johns Hopkins
appointment so that it can be announced in the next issue of I. P. R. NOTES.
If you are able to come on while Dennery is here you will be able to find out
who the French counterparts of Archie Rose and Barbara Wooton are.
It is grand to hear that the family is all well and that you are making good
progress on your book. If anything takes you to Seattle you may wish to look up
John Alden Carter who is acting as an assistant to the president of McDougall
Southwick Co. He is at present staying with Herb Little. Mrs. Carter and Ruth
send their gi-eetings to your whole household.
Yours very sincerely,
Edwabd C. Caeter.
FVF (Pencilled:)
Exhibit No. 1074
Yenching University
Office of the President
PEKING, CHINA
Telegraph Address : "Yenta"
July 20, 193S,
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52n(l Street, Neio York, N. T.
My Dear Ned : The last American mail brought your note and the clipping
from the New York Times about happenings here. This was quite accurately
reported, and I am impressed with the promptness with which the news reached
America. It happens that thus far yours is the only word that had come to me
about this, so that I am the more grateful.
There has been during the past few days a recrudescence of pressure on another
matter, the yielding of which would seem to me to violate the principle of aca-
demic freedom. The matter is being dealt with at present on a basis of friendly
negotiation, but if driven to it, we shall stand for our principles and take any
consequences. I think the odds are, however, that those concerned will not carry
it to any such extreme.
I hear indirectly that the IPR is considering the organizing of American
opinion with a view to somewhat more definite action. If this is true, I feel very
much pleased, and should like to be kept informed of developments.
With all good wishes.
Very sincerely yours,
[s] J. Leighton Sttjart,
Jls/c
Exhibit No. 1075
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Massachv^etts, July 25, 1938.
Frederick V. Field, Esq.,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.
Dear Fred : For a variety of reasons, both scholarly and politically, both the
Chinese and Japanese outlines have been drastically revised. Enclosed for your
advance information are copies of the latest edition of the two outlines.
The process and reason for these changes I will explain to you on my arrival.
I need hardly add that the following approve of the outlines as they now
stand : Holland, Mitchell, Chen, Borton, Chi, Cholmeley, and myself.
5176 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
None of the assignments to individual research worliers, e. g., Borton, Chen, or
Chi have in any vray to be altered by reason of the reformulation of the outline
of these two studies.
Sincerely yours,
ECC:K
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1076
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, August 23, 1938.
W. L. Holland, Esq.
Office.
Dear Holland: Yesterday, at the suggestion of W. W. Lockwood, Han-seng
and I had a call from Theodore H. White who has this year graduated with high
honors from Harvard University. Lockwood met him at the Institute of Far
Eastern studies at the University of Michigan. White has been awarded a
Frederick Sheldon fellowship by Harvard University. This fellowship is an
unconditional grant and allows the holder to travel and observe in any part of
the world he chooses. He plans to use this fellowship in order to go to the
Far East to enter Chinese China and see and learn what he can. Ultimately,
he would like to write and publish what he learns. Before coming he wrote me
as follows :
"Although my broad general purpose is as I have set it forth, my specific
objectives are, at present, somewhat hazy. There are a great many con-
temporary phenomena in Chinese life that I would like to study ; for example :
the economic reorganization within China since the outbreak of the war ; the
changing relationship of the provincial warlords to the Central Govern-
ment; the shifting of the political base of the Kuomintang; and other
problems."
I showed him a list of some of the questions on which we wish to get informa-
tion and asked him which would be most interesting to him. I quote those
that he checked :
What degree of political coalition exists among parties and groups since
the Kuomintang National Conference of party delegates on March 29th?
Particularly, what is the situation between the Kuomintang and his Com-
munists?
There are many people in the government who have never liked the
Communists. Why are these people now adopting a conciliatory attitude
towards them?
How close does the Kwangsi faction stand with Chiang Kai-shek's group?
In China at present, both patriots and traitors are revealing themselves
almost every day. Is it possible to have a general analysis of these two
groups ?
What recent improvements in communication have been made in China's
northwest and southwest? What new factories have been set up in these
sections?
To what extent and how has the Chinese army been transformed from its
mercenary nature to a modern national force? What is the general com-
position of the present high strata of military officers? What is the general
living condition and the discipline among the Chinese soldiers? Are there
ideological differences among the different troops?
To what extent is the present personnel in the Chinese air force different
from the prewar set-up? Has this new development any political signifi-
cance in China?
It is generally recognized that the Partisan movement in Hopeh, Shansi,
and western Shantung has attained a certain degree of success. To what
extent may we say that the ex-students and ex-teachers of the Peiping-
Tientsin area have organised and led this movement?
What are the most influential and most representative newspapers and
magazines and to what degree do they enjoy freedom of speech?
In Hopeh the Japanese have recently reorganized the puppet political or-
ganization called The North-China Youth Party into an organization called
Hsin Min-wei, which now directs the activities of at least four gjcieties.
These are, Hsin-min Academy, a training school for civil servants ; The
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5177
Dawn of Asia Society ; Federated Association for East Asia Culture ; and
Association ior Promoting East Asian Peace. Is it possible to have a
general analysis of the personnel and procedure of these Japanese-protected
organizations?
Is it true that the Japanese authorities in China entertain different atti-
tudes towards Great Britain and America? If so, what are they and what
motivates them?
What can be inferred as the Soviet policy in China?
Do the German advisers in China take the same stand as the German
Government and as the German merchants in China?
I wired to Fairbank, who was his principal tutor in Harvard, last night as
follows :
"Please wire collect regarding T. H. White. Is his scholarship excep-
tional? How do you rate him on tact, social presentability, capacity to
adjust to new situations, discretion, reliability?"
Today I have had his reply as follows :
"Decidedly exceptional. First history summa in three years supported
himself through college stop Short stature Jewish features keen and sensi-
tive reaction to people feeling for situations and motives mature experience
of practical liie in Dorchester environment inexperienced elsewhere but
apparently adjusted will at Michigan this summer discreet and reliable
without question first appearance probably unimpressive but markedly at-
tractive personality immediately effective stop No hesitation recommending
for anything requiring intelligence initiative selfreliance providing given
forty-eight hours to learn the ropes."
He is coming in this afternoon to talk a little further with us and then returns
to Boston where his home is 60 Greenwood Street, Dorchester, Mass. He is
scheduled to sail for- Europe on September 28. He will return here on the 27th
in the hope of seeing Dick Walsh with a thought of making a tentative arrange-
ment for a few articles after he has been in China a year. He has had three
years of Chinese at Harvard and describes himself as "reading Chinese with
difficulty, but, nevertheless, reading it." He hopes to get his spoken Chinese on
reaching China. After leaving here he pays short visits to England, France,
and possibly to Palestine, and hopes to reach one of the frontiers of China —
either the Burmese or French — either December 15th or 31st. I gave him a
copy of Mrs. I. A. Richards' letter to me describing briefly her journey from
China to Burma. I also let him read Peter Fleming's London Times articles
on the Burma road to China. ■
I would like to have a suggestion as to what specific requests we should make
to him in response to his offer to act as a Secretariat fellow in China without
any financial obligation on our part.
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Caeter.
Exhibit No. 1077
Soviet Russia Today
"The truth about the Soviet Union"
114 EAST 3 2ND STREET
Murray Hill 3-3855-6
September 1, 1938.
Dr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, Neio Ym-fc City.
My Dear Dr. Carter : We are planning to publish a special anniversary issue
of our magazine for November, centered largely around with subject of the
Soviet struggle for peace, and with special emphasis on the Far Eastern situa-
tion. We should very much like to have an article from you for this issue dealing
with the development of the Soviet Far East. If you feel that you can do this
for us, I should appreciate an opportunity to come and discuss it with you, so
that I may also get your advice on other angles of the problem that should be
dealt with, and suggestions of others who might help us. Will you let me know
88348— 52— pt. 14 18
5178 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
whether you would consider writing the article for us, and whether it would be
convenient for you to have me come and see you sometime during the week
following Labor Day?
Your radio speech, which you were good enough to let us publish in our May
issue, was extremely popular with our readers, and many ot them wrote to us
commenting on it as one of the best articles we have ever published. So naturally
we are anxious to have another article from you.
Sincerely yours,
Jessica Smith, Editor.
Exhibit No. 1078
' 28th Septembee, 1938.
ECC from CH-s :
Last week when Fred came in and discussed with me the matter of getting
Soong to a small dinner, I told him that so far as I was informed, Soong was
in this country, having arrived with K. P. Chen, but that to get him to the
public perhaps is difficult. As I was told by some Chinese in private, Soong
is to deal with the loan matter while Chen's delegation is negotiating on the
matter of silver purchase. I suggested to Fred that it would be safe and
desirable to sound out somebody in the Treasury Department to reach Young
first, and then through Young to get a private interview with Soong. I added
that the idea of a small dinner would not probably be feasible. Now, according
to Hornbeck, even Chen may not respond to such an invitation at this time.
I have just telephoned to the Chinese Consulate asking the Consul whether
Soong is here. His answer was that Soong has not come but that even if he
were here it would be better to deny it.
Exhibit No. 1079
i29 East 52nd Street,
New York City, September 29, 1938.
Professor Felix Frankfurter.
Dear Frankfurter : H. J. Timperley, the Manchester Guardian's China cor-
respondent, has recently arrived in this country, having flown from China after
nearly a year there after the war started. While in London he had occasion
to inform himself intimately with regard to the attitudes of different sections
of London life toward the developing Far Eastern struggle. I think you will
enjoy meeting him. He has had more than ten years in the Far East and has
had the friendship of many of the best Chinese and Japanese.
Sincerely yours,
[t] EDWARD C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1080
Institute of Pacific Relations
Amsterdam — Honolulu — London— Manila — Moscow — New York — Paris — Shanghai —
Sydney — Tokyo — Toronto — Wellington
OFFICE OF the SECRETArY-GENERAL
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
llTH October, 1938.
Owen Lattimorb, Esq.,
300 Gilmun Hall,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Owen : Neither Harriet Moore nor I have seen Kantorovich's name or
nom de plume in any Soviet magazines or newspapers recently. In view of
the request that Bremman made to me regarding Kantorovich, I would be in-
clined to suggest that you should not write direct to Kantorovich but write to
Motylev saying that your first choice would be Kantorovich, if he is once more
able to write, if he is not, would Motylev ask whatever Soviet scholar is best
qualified.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5179
Maybe you don't want to give Motylev as much leeway as this. I am in-
clined to think that if you write to Motylev as though you thought Kantorovich
was still certain to be in his orbit, he will feel that the staff work in the
International Secretariat is bad.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Cartel.
Exhibit No. 1082
Sunset Faem,
Lee, Massachusetts, 16th October, 1938.
Frederick V. Field, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1795 California Street,
San Francisco, California.
Dear Fre3) : In accordance with Miss Wiss's suggestion I invited IMeharally to
a meeting in the Pacific Council Library attended by Farley, Lockwood, Chen
Han-seng, Yasuo, Fairfax-Cholmeley, Downing, Friedman, and Ruth Carter.
Meharally gave an ilhiminating account of his experience at the Labor Congress
in Mexico and then swung into a vivid description both of the open and under-
ground political movement in India. He is a brilliant student and a very
shrewd political organizer. He has been in prison often and is clearly con-
nected with a movement that is steadily increasing its power with English
domination clearly on the wane but by no means finished. Yasuo must have
been distinctly interested in his remark that, though after the Russo-Japanese
war the Indians regarded the Japanese as Gods, he doubted there was any other
country in the world now that was as completely anti-Japanese as was India.
He had been informed that tlie boycott against Japan in India was more complete
than in any other country..
Another matter may be of interest to you. Harold Laski is lecturing at
Teachers College. He spoke at a Council House dinner last week on British
Labor Movement and British Foreign Policy. It was an amazingly clear analysis
by the most studied understatement. He left in my view no shred of justifi-
cation for the Chamberlain policy. The audience was predominantly tory and
while all were not convinced of Laski's thesis, I think everyone must have felt
that as sheer tour de force in political analysis Coimcil House had never wit-
nessed such a performance.
I have no idea yet of Laski's plans, but I would love to see Pacific Center
arrange at the Pacific Union Club a dinner of the sixty "most powerful figures
in San Francisco business" and turn Laski loose on them.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1083
October 17, 1938.
E. C. 0. to I. F. :
Here is the State Department's reply to my letter of October 6 regarding
registration of the Pacific Council. Would you immediately read the rules and
regulations as well as the registration form, and advise me as to what action
I should take?
Exhibit No. 1084
(Penciled initials:) CP
MRT
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Massachusetts, 20th October 1938.
Frederick V. Field, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1195 California Street, San Francisco, California.
Dear Fred: Night before last Herbert S. Little arrived full of the European
situation. He seems to have managed to check in at each European capital at
just the right moment — in Prague just after Runciman wrote his ghastly letter
to Chamberlain, in the House of Commons when Churchill made his scathing
arraignment, in Berlin when Hitler made his Nuremburg speech, in Moscow
5180 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
when the Bolsheviks were seething of Lindbergh's reported luncheon conver-
sations in London, and in Vienna, Paris, Munich, etc. at crucial moments.
Motylev and Harrondar were hospitality personified during his five days in
Moscow. That visit made a profound impression on him, and of course was
indispensable in rounding out his European experience.
As I assume you will be seeing him in the near future, I hope you can help
him in sorting out his experiences so that he grasps the deeper meaning of all
that he witnessed. D-o not let his audiences encourage him to dwell on per-
sonalities so that he fails to pass on a picture that will reinforce the realistic
study of the world situation to which j'ou are summoning members of the Ameri-
can Council.
I think with a little coaching you could get him to give at a private meeting
limited to members of the American Council at Pacific Center an account of his
observations which would be valuable to them and of exceptional value to him
if you are able to get him to base his statement on a fundamental political and
economic philosophy.
If you can help him to measure up to your standard in a performance in San
Francisco, it may be that you will want to use him at an early date for the
members in Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle.
Unfortunately his time in New York was so crowded that I was not able to
reach any conclusion as to the stage he himself has reached in making a funda-
mental analysis. He has, however, the raw material for something that may
be important. You can help him greatly in ensuring successful accomplishment.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. lOSo
(Handwritten:) WLH
KM
New Asia Hotel, Ltd.,
Canton, May 28, 1938.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
General Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
57 Post Street, San Francisco.
Deiar Me. Carter: I have just concluded my journey through the Chinese
interior and the front, which I thought to restrict to a period of two months
but it lasted twice as much due to the delays in communication. I have collected
all the material needed for my study, and I return to Shanghai to write the
final manuscript. Now, you wanted to have the final manuscript in New York
end of July, and I agreed to it, but it becomes now quite impossible. However,
I can deliver at that time a considerable part of it, and then the rest in parts
during August. It means that the whole manuscript will be in New York no
later than one month after the date we have agreed upon, which is due to the
exceptional difiiculties I had to overcome a comparatively very short delay. I
am sure you will understand the situation and excuse me for the unavoidable
delay. Please address all correspondence for me through your ofl3ce at Shanghai.
Yours very truly,
[s] M. G. Shippe.
( Handwritten : ) ( Asiaticus ) .
Exhibit No. 1086
Copies to CP
MRT
1st November 1938.
N. Hanwell from ECC :
H. B. EUiston of the Christian Science Monitor was in the otfiee yesterday
and inquired whether someone on the staff of the American Council would be
willing to send him such information as the American Council has on the present
routes into China and a rough estimate of the munition-carrying capacity of
each. Specifically he mentioned : the motor roads from Indo-China into Yunnan,
the railway from Indo-China into Yunnan, the road or roads across the desert
which bring in Russian supplies, and the road from the Burman frontier wuich
is under construction. I told him that there was not a great deal of reliable
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5181
information about, but he thought that someone in the American Council must
have a lot.
If you are interested, what can you get together? Have you been in cor-
respondence with Owen Lattimore to see whether he has been over to Washing-
ton to see his friend Major Mayer in G-2? He admires Lattimore so much that
he probably would give Lattimore all the information that G-2 has.
Elliston is about to write an article for the Atlantic Monthly and wants to
use anything the American Council has on the different munitions routes into
China. I don't know whether you will care to supply Elliston with this informa-
tion or whether you want to use it yourself. In general it is a good thing to
cooperate with Elliston. You probably saw recently the fine blurb which he
or someone contributed to the Christian Science Monitor on October 25th
reviewing Miss Farley's pamphlet on American Far Eastern Policj%
Exhibit No. 1087
(Copy of this letter sent to Virginia Burdick)
129 East 52nd Street,
'New York City, November 4, 1938.
Feedeeick p. Keppel, Esq.,
Carnegie Corporation of New York,
522 Fifth Avenue, New York City.
Dear Keppex : The work of the American Russian Institute is both well done
and important. The very fact that the Bolsheviks are so generally unpopular
in the United States makes the maintenance of the clear-headed, aljle, fact-finding
work of the A. R. I. all the more important to the American people. I know
of few organizations which are as greatly needed at the present time, nor do
I know any which do as big a work on as small a budget. I wanted you to
know that I hope the appeal now before you will merit favorable action.
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. lOSS
CC.OL
ECC TO CHS
KB
November 9, 1938.
Owen Lattimore has just written me as follows :
"Enclosed I am sending you a review of the 'Trotsky Vindication' by
Kingsley Martin, who is editor of the New Statesman. I shall be per-
tieularly interested in your comments. Do you think we should print the
review as it stands, or drop it, or get some other comment to put with it?
I shall cagily reserve my own comments until I have yours."
Attached is the article by Kingsley Martin on Trotsky. It seems to me that
this article adds nothing to the subject except Kingsley Martin's opinion. It
is an interesting opinion but is seems a little like flogging a dead horse.
I don't know whether the article has come in solicited by Lattimore or not.
Lattimore's own writing on this subject is so much more meaty than Kingsley
Martin's that I would mildly vote for returning the manuscript to the author.
Would each of you, however, without reference to my bias against the article,
write your own views to Lattimore.
Exhibit No. 1089
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, November 9, 1938.
Miss Harriet Moore,
American Russian Institute,
56 West J,5 Street, New York City.
Dear Harriet : I assume that you have already seen in the October-December
1938 American Anthropologist the article on archeology in the U. S. S. R. by
5182 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Henry Field and Eugene Prostov. Henry Field is a new member of the Ameri-
can Council of the I. P. R. and is authority for the statement that the U. S. S. R.
has at the present moment more archeological expeditions in the field than all the
rest of the world put together.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1090
(Handwritten : ) Copy sent to B. L. 1/10/39, re 8. F. Exposition.
Institute of Pacific Relations
Amsterdam — London — Manila — Moscow — New York — Paris — Shanghai — Sydney — Tokyo —
Toronto — Wellington
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
129 East 52nd Street, New York
December 15, 193S.
Mr. Frederick V. Field,
Office.
Dear Fred : In continuation of my note forwarding a copy of Lasker's letter
of December 8 about Soviet participation in the San Francisco Exposition, I
had a few moments with Oumansky in Washington and he said that the Soviet
Government was not in a position to participate adequately in two simultaneous
expositions. There is a Russian proverb that one cannot dance at two wedding
ceremonies at the same time. The dance in the New York Fair will be ia
the grand manner and very expensive.
If Californians on their own initiative wish to do something in San Fran-
cisco in the field of art, literature or music, the Soviet Government would prob-
ably assist, but any exhibit on the Fair grounds, signalized by flying the Soviet
flag, etc., would probably not be welcomed by the Soviet Government which
would, I am sure,' be unalterably opposed to anything of an amateurish nature
in the Fair grounds which might be mistaken by visitors as the best the great
Soviet Government could do, and thus subject to highly invidious comparison.
I gather that the San Francisco American Russian Institute has raised the
question and that probably you may wish to suggest to Lasker that he discover
how far that organization has gone in a library, or an art exhibit or what not,
on the old mainland of San Francisco within the city limits.
I assume that you will want to suggest to Lasker that he decide whether
the Fair or the American Council, whichever Lasker is, want to go ahead inde-
pendently or in cooperation with the A. R. I. I gather that there is now in
New York an excellent Soviet art exhibit and a book exhibit which might be
sent to San Francisco at the time of the Fair under the sponsorship of some
American organization. Harriet Moore would know all about these items.
I read between the lines that a great deal of musical talent is likely to com&
from the U. S. S. R. to the New York Fair. I can envisage nothing more
musically thrilling and socially contradictory than to create a music lovers
corporation — Wallace M. Alexander & Bruno Lasker, Inc. — which might sponsor
in the Municipal Opera House under the auspices of Presidents Wilbur and
Sproul a really first-class series of performances of Soviet pianists, violinists,
ballet and national folk music, interspersed with cantatas by, say, the Red Army
chorus, if this exciting musical soci^y could be persuaded to visit the capitalist
shores of San Francisco and Long Island.
Sincerely yours,
Edward O. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1092
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, December 15, 1938.
Owen LAttimore, Esq.
300 Oilman Hall,
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Owen : I have just been reading your letter of the 12th to Miss Van
Kleeck. I do not know that you need to be too afraid of Archibald MacLeish
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5183
because I think he still feels under a considerable debt of obligation to the
I. P. R. on account of letters which I gave him to Ushiba. On his retairn
he told me that these gave him more insight than he got from any other source.
Ushiba apparently let him into the inner shrine and I think MacLeish attributes
a good deal of what success the Fortune on Japan had to the time and trouble
that Ushiba took.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1093
December 20, 1938.
WLH from ECC :
Could you or Lilienthal edit this report of Calder's so as to take out all traces
of its being the work either of Calder or of an official of the United States
Government? All names should be eliminated or hints of names indirectly.
For example, on page 5 the identity of the high official Chinese mentioned at the
beginning of the last paragraph, should be still further obscured. You or
Lilienthal should go through the whole thing with a fine-tooth comb to see
that all traces of sources or authorship are completely obliterated. Then I
can see no reason why this should not be circulated to the people you mention.
Before, however, mimeographing this and sending it to a dozen people
in different countries, I think you and I should talk over the whole problem
with Field in the light of the desirability of carrying out your suggestion of
getting these materials coming into the office in a steady stream from Washington.
Enclosed is a copy of a letter I am sending to Roger Greene.
If we decide to send this information outside the office, it should be with
a personal letter asking that none of the material be quoted.
You will note that Greene in his covering letter said : "If you do not allow
them to be quoted I see no reason why you should not use them in your organiza-
tion."
We have got to be very careful in making certain that the use of this material
with non-Americans does not prove to be a boomerang.
Exhibit No. 1094
[Day letter]
January 10, 1939.
Constantine Oumansky
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C:
Expecting Plopkin and you lunch tomoiTow Wednesday Century Club at one.
Among acceptances are : Roger Levy, Paris ; Liu Yuwan, Chen Hanseng, China ;
W. L. Holland, New Zealand ; Professors Philip Jessup and Joseph Chamberlain,
Columbia ; also Frederick Field, W. W. Lancaster, T. A. Bisson.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1095
[Telegram]
January 10, 1939.
Geenville Clark,
SI Nassau Street, New York City:
Could you lunch Century tomorrow or on Wednesday; meet Plopkin, legal
advisor, Soviet Foreign Office.
Edward C. Carter.
5184 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1097
[Day letter]
January 18, 1939,
constantine oumansky
Embassy of the U. 8. 8. R., Washington, D. C;
I desire Liu Yuwan very able secretary China Institute Pacific Relations see
you for half hour at your convenience. Please wire have you any time free on
the twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, or twenty-third.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1098
January 23, 1939.
Mr. Edward Carter,
c/o American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
My Dear Ned: I am awfully happy to learn that you are coming out this
February in connection with preparations for the International Conference in
October. Ben Kizer and I have both written to Fred Field to utilize you for a
talk, and doubtless Fred has already talked with you about it. I do hope that
you can lengthen your visit in Seattle so that the date will be a little more con-
venient for getting out a good crowd. This would really" be a "kick-off" dinner.
John and I would both like to have you stay at the house. There will be plenty
of room for you there, as we have two unused bedrooms, one of which could be
used by Ruth, or anyone else in your company, and the other by yourself. John
has a portable typewriter, and if this would not be sufficient we could borrow a
regular typewriter for you. You would have more room in which to operate, and
I would be happy to loan you my car so that the distance from the business center
would not be a pressing problem.
By the way, was Motylev at the Pacific Council meeting? I have often
wondered, especially in view of his remarks to me concerning the feasibility of
future Soviet participation. I do hope he came and that the Soviet group will
remain in.
Please pardon me for having inadvertently mislaid your letter sending me the
article written by Maxwell S. Stewart in the Bulletin on the Soviet Union of
October 15th.
On the whole I would agree with Stewart's position except I doubt that there
was much stiffening in the French attitude after Litvinov's speech, although I
do think there was a stiffening of the Czechoslovakia attitude, I think the pattern
of French foreign policy has not really changed very much since the Austrian
Anschluss any more than Chamberlain's policy. There is not much doubt in my
mind that Chamberlain, Halifax, Bonnet and probably Daladier have thought
all year of eventually arriving at a four-power pact. As far as future Soviet
foreign policy is concerned I must say that I was greatly impressed with Joe
Barnes' thoughtful analysis. He pi-efaced his remarks by saying that the new
generation Bolsheviki "who have never been abroad" is at the helm now. The
men behind Stalin are men whose whole mind set has been directed by a score of
years of operation within the framework of the Soviet social order. Those who
are now in charge of shaping government policy are not the old diplomats, but
younger men taken from industry and trade organizations instead of from the
humanistic professions.
One of Joe's principal points was that in the immediate future the policy
of the government will l)e to neutralize the forces of war. He spoke of a
possible, although not necessarily likely alternative of rapprochement with
Germany to make the gentlemen in Paris and London feel uncomfortable, and
perhaps force them to change their policy. He spoke also of a continued desire
for good will and closer relations with the United States. He also mentioned
the likelihood of a determined effort to win back the Oslo Bloc to a policy of
"objective neutrality." He believes that the Soviet Union will now concentrate
in preparing to defend itself singlehanded. The Soviet Union will, of course,
endeavor to build up more friendly relations with Poland and Rumania. This
would be justified on the short-term basis of self defense in order to give the
Union that modicum of time which it undoubtedly needs to put its own house
in order, especially in view of the loss of leadership following the purge.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5185
The intensive Bolshevization of Soviet life, particularly in the army, is most
significant. For example, Leo Mekhlis, a forty-eight-year-old Jew recently
editor of Pravda is now in charge of the Bolshevization of the army. He ranks
in authority above the Marshals. While this would be criticized by army
strategists, nevertheless it is felt necessary as a policy measure. I got the
very definite impression after talking with many people, that the rank and file
of the soldiers are genuinely loyal and also that they are pretty well treated.
I also got the impression that cruel as the purge was, probably partly necessary
and partly unnecessary, nevertheless in the main it was jusitfied on the ground
that it has temporarily at least brushed aside the danger of counter revolution.
If the Soviet Union can delay for two or three years longer any attack from
the west or the east its position will become nearly invulnerable. From many
estimates which I received in Moscow I am inclined to think that at this moment
there are at least 3,500 first-line planes attached to the two western armies,
to-wit, the White Russian and the Kiev armies, which aggregate pretty close
to 400,000 men, and that there are between 2,000 and 2,500 first-line planes in
the Far East with a force of approximately 350,000 men. Furthermore, during
all of this crisis the Red Army of 1,300,000 men, excluding the border troops of
NKVD approximating probably 300,000, have been fully mobilized. Furthermore,
I suppose that the Russians have more fully trained reserves than any other
nation in Europe, not excepting France.
I do not believe the Soviet Union would yield a single inch of territory. I
think a compromise with Germany involving a cession of the Ukraine would
be out of the question. The Soviet Union, like England and France, might be
willing to sacrifice another Czechoslovakia, but not its own territory. It might
be willing to agree to the partition of Poland, by no means an unnatural alter-
native, but I think they would fight to the end to defend themselves. Many
times they mentioned to me "Remember Napoleon", and they do not believe
that either Japan or Germany could defeat them.
I am sorry that I have written at such length, but having once started I became
too interested in the problem to make the letter as short as I had intended.
With best wishes to you, and hoping to see you soon, I remain
Sincerely,
Herbert S. Little.
HSL:C
Exhibit No. 1099
129 East 52nd Street.
"New York, N. Y., 2nd February, 1939.
Constantine Oumansky, Esq.,
Embassy of the V. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.
Dear Oumansky : Thank you most sincerely for sending me the text of the
theses to be delivered by Mr. Molotov on March 10.
Looking forward to seeing you on Sunday, I am.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit 1100
February 13, 1939.
NH from ECC :
Here is what Lattimore has written Utley regarding Haldore Hanson. Do
you think that you ought to put Lattimore wise?
ECC from NDH :
I had an all afternoon discussion yesterday with Hal Hanson on every type
of topic possible and must say that I'm at a loss to understand how the impression
got abroad that he was particularly anti-Soviet. Despite his unpleasant ex-
periences in Yenan, due to undiplomatic question he asked, he seems all for
the guerillas even though he may discount some of the publicity about them. It
may be that he was careful because he knows of my particular bias, but I
feel his background is quite solid. For factual material, he is full to over-
flowing with good stuff — critical and commendable. He has lost his worship
of Chiang K'ai-shek and seems sounder and more mature than when I last
knew him in China. If someone praises too much he might point to the black
side that we all know exists, but otherwise he seems to maintain a proper balance.
5186 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOlSrS
Exhibit No. 1101
c/o John A. Carter, Esq., MacDougall Southwick Co.,
Seattle, Wash., 21st February 19S9.
Miss Harriet Moore,
American Russian Institute,
56 West 45th Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Harriet : Here is a letter from Georue Marshall and a copy of my reply.
I wish you would wire me collect as to whether I am right in having a hunch
that it is a little bit better for me not to accept this invitation.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1102
129 East 52d Street,
New York, N. Y., Uth March, 1939.
Constantine Oumansky, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.
Dear Oumansky : I was on the point of writing you asking if you could
give me a copy of the full text of Stalin's March 10th speech, when the postman
brought it to me. This is yet one more evidence of your unfailing thoughtfull-
ness.
I am almost certain to be in Washington on Friday and Saturday. If I am I
will telephone you in the hope that you may have a few minutes to spare.
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1103
Executive Committee, San Francisco, Bay Region Division : Ray Lyman Wilbur, Cliairman ;
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Vice Chairman ; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman ; Jesse
Steinhart. Treasurer; Wallace M. Alexander; Carl L. Alsberg ; Allan E. Charles; Harry
Deans ; Mrs. Edward H. Heller ; Ira S. Lillick : Mrs. Duncan McDuffie ; William F. Mor-
rlsh ; Mrs. William H. Orrick ; Charles Page, Jr. ; Chester Rowell ; Paul Scharrenberg ;
Richard S. Turner : John H. Oakie, Secretary
National Officers: Carl L. Alsberg, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman;
Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman ; Philip C. Jessup, Vice Chairman ; Benjamin H.
Kizer, Vice Chairman ; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman ; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice
Chairman ; Frederick V. Field. Secretary ; Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer ; Galen M. Fisher,
Counselor on Research and Education
American Council
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
1795 California Street, San Francisco
Telephone TUxedo 3114 — Cable Address : luparel
March 23, 1939.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
129 East 52nd Street, Neio York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter : I took Chen Han-seng to Palo Alto yesterday where he
had what I hope was a fruitful half hour or so with Dr. Wilbur and what I
am sure was a fruitful lunch with Hobart Young, H. H. Fisher, Merrill Bennett,
Masland and a few others. I was not at the luncheon as I had other business
with Radius and a graduate student by the name of Bloch whom I hope to
draft for IPR work. Han-seng informed me, however, that he was delighted
to have discovered H. H. Fisher as a man who knows far more about the USSR
than the more widely known Kerner of the University of California.
I will give you a complete report on Chen's local activities within a few days.
Bill Lockwood has just arrived and is this moment in conference with Hall,
a doctoral student from the University of Michigan, who is en route to Baja,
California to renew his studies of the Japanese in Mexico.
Very sincerely,
[s] Jack John H. Oakie.
0:r
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5187
Exhibit No. 1104
129 East 52nd Street, New York City,
March 28, 1939.
Purely personal
Owen Lattimore, Esquire,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hoplcins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Owen: If you have a chance to write Carlson saying that there are
certain advantages in his remaining in the Navy, I hope you will not hesitate
to do so, for it may be, I suppose, that the Navy will ask him to reconsider.
Your view as expressed in your letter of March 27 to me might be helptul.
I think it would be a good scheme to write McWilliams asking whether he
would like to have you publish a protest on the New Zealand article. I think
the more people see that their protests are recognized, the more they will have
faith in the desire of the editor to include an expression of varying points of
view. It also will encourage people who have not yet dared to criticize this or
that article to come forward.
I am glad that the Fairbanks are staying with you. You will doubtless be
able to help Fairbanks realize what his generally good knowledge of con-
temporary China really means.
Are you in touch with anyone in Baltimore or Washington who is able to
bring illumination to the committees of the Senate and the House on Foreign
Affairs with reference to the terrible deficiencies of Pittman's bill, to be known
as "The Peace Act of 1939," in so far as it applies to the Far Eastern situation?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1105
19th April, 1939.
MRT from ECC :
As a follow up on our lunch with Mr. Plant you may wish to ring him up
and say that on Monday I was informed by two members of the Far Eastern
■division of the State Department that Ambassador Johnson was returning
to China on the next sailing of the President CooUdge. For particulars please
note the enclosed copy of my letter to Field.
Exhibit No. 1106
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland, April 21, 1939.
Dr. V. E. MoTYLEv,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. 8. 8. R.
Dear Db. Motylev: Your book on "Origin and Development of the Pacific
Ocean Nexus of Contradiction" has just arrived. It is too late to be reviewed
in our June issue, but I am listing it among the important books recommended
to readers of Pacific Affairs, and I shall review it myself in the September
issue. I have already started reading it and want to tell you how much I
admire the clarity of your analysis and the precision of your statements.
A review of such an important book helps to make up for the lack of articles
in Pacific Affairs by Soviet authors, but it all the more stimulates my ambition
to get direct contributions from you and some of your colleagues. Take the
case of such a book as this. It would have been an editorial triumph if we
could have published in translation one of the chapters, either before the ap-
pearance of the book or simultaneously. To translate from it now would not
be quite the same thing. It would look as though, in spite of the fact that
there is a Soviet Council of the I. P. R., we were unable to secure original
contributions by Soviet authors.
I am now working myself on the conclusion of my book on Inner Asian
Frontiers of China. It ought to be finished next month. Then there will still
5188 mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
be the planning of a number of maps, and a good deal of work in connection
with completing footnotes and bibliography. However, the book is now definitely
planned for publication in January by the American Geographical Society.
When that is over, I hope to be able to take up some new work on contemporary
aspects of Mongolia and Western China. One thing on which I should especially
like to do some studying is the Moslems of China — both those who speak.
Chinese and those who speak Turkish.
With cordial personal regards,
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
Exhibit No. 1107
CC to Mrs. Carter and RDC.
On Board : S. S. "President Doumer",
Tokyo to Hongkong, 20th May, 1939.
Private and confidential
Miss Kate Mitchell,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, U. 8. A.
Dear Kate : For the most part this will be an off-the-record letter, not for
official circulation round the office or for insertion in the official Seci'etariat
files. Its contents, however, may be communicated orally by preference to
Holland, Field, and Lattimore. It should not go into either the Amco or the
Paco files.
With reference to Boku (Pakh) you may all regard him as a turncoat, a
crook, a spy, a patriot or statesman, but whatever your classification of him;
I think you will conclude, if you get him to talk frankly, that he is able and
courageous. Publicly and privately he is able to make sense out of the positive
side of the organisation of Manchuria. Of more interest to you will be his
private opinion of the muddle and futility of the Japanese invasion of North
China. A professor of agricultural economics in Tokyo told us of the benefi-
cence of Japan in Peiping with the reorganisation of all the universities into
a single great joint Sino-Japanese university ; of the settlement established
by a dozen charming recent girl graduates of Miss Hani's school in Tokyo for
the girls of the Peking slums. That effort can be described with the same
enthusiasm that cliaracterised Mrs. Humphrey Ward's account of Passmore
Edward's settlement in London forty years ago, or the brave deeds of Junior
Leaguers in the Isle of Manhattan. The professor told us that there were now
70.000 Japanese in Peking and that if Chiang Kai-shek did not come back soon,
Peking would be a Japanese city. Boku gave a different picture, the point being
that 70 Japanese gangsters arrive in Peking daily from Japan and go on with
their work of spoliation, adding indescribable exploitation to the chaos and
disorganisation of the invading army. Boku is unreservedly contemptuous
of the complete lack of psychology that has characterised Japanese effort in
China, nor is there in his view any improvement in Japanese ps.vchology in
Korea. Although publicly he describes the positive achievements in Manchuria.
I suspect that privately he has more admiration for the Korean bandits who are
still a far from negligible thorn in the flesh of the IVIanchukuo Government.
These Korean bandits he describes with an enthusiasm similar to the para-
graphs of Snow and Bertram in their eulogy of the Eighth Route leaders. I
hope you, Fred, Bill, Owen, and Bisson may be able to get him to talk
as candidly to you as he did to me. Hypothesis number 7 would be that he
is agent provocateur extraordinaire. If this is his real role, then he de-
serves the highest pay for the quality of his acting in my conversation with him
two years ago in Hsinking and last week in Tokyo. As I think I have already
written you, he is leaving Chicago about the 8th June. He is then going to
have a few days in Washington before coming to New York. He will then
sail on the "Queen Mary" on the 21st June for Warsaw where as Consul-General
of IManchukuo he is expected to bring about closer relationship between his
own and the Polish Government.
For the purposes of confirmation I wish now to quote copies of cables and
radio letters which I hope were ultimately clear and that you were ablo to
separate the paragraphs which may go into the files from those which were
purely personal and unofficial. They are as follows :
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5189
Cable from Kobe on the evening of the 19th:
"Fred Owen : If you discover George inclined to stronger policy than
writing notes urge you arrange he see Stanley Cordell without fail. Stop.
Very important you win Joseph to Harry's viewpoint ask Hilda tell Philip
approve Purvis if she does."
Radio letter sent from the "Doumer" on the evening of the 20th:
"George Means Sansom, Joseph Grew, Harry Price Treat, Fred Owen mes-
sage strictly confidential George may prove more progressive than Joseph
send Craigie affairs my request stop what would Jessup, Field, Holland you
think Victoria consist national councils staffs international secretariat Paco
officers inquiry contributors Ushiba Saionji privately suggested this believing
Victoria more possible and better results if composed younger generation."
Soon after my arrival in Tokyo I had a private talk with Ambassador Grew
whom you know is one of the ablest, straightest and finest ambassadors the
United States has anywhere in the world. His prestige with the people of Japan
Is rightly greater than that of any other Ambassador. His conversations with
the Japanese authorities have never lacked in candour. It is quite clear that
he has put tremendous pressure on highly placed Japanese in order to get the
government and the army to take the view which apparently the navy takes,
that a military alliance between Tokyo and Berlin would be certain to lead to a
long and terrible war between Japan and the United States in the event of a
European war into which he and the Japanese navy believe the United States
would inevitably be drawn. No one is more aware of the barbarity of the
Japanese army's behaviour in China than Grew. No one is more aware of the
fact that there is a vast gulf between the charming, gentle and sophisticated
Japanese who surround the Embassy and the Japanese army and Japanese
gangsters who are overrunning the Mainland. Nevertheless Grew has the same
hope that many of us cherish, namely, that the Japan of the future shall not
become a slave of Hitler with Gestapo agents adding subtlety and strength to the
barbaric impertinence of the Japanese militarists. Rather he envisages the ulti-
mate triumph in Japan of the school of thouiiht which now characterizes the
throne. This school maintains that Japan's natural political and intellectual
friends are the Americans and to a certain extent the English and that the
Ailierican rather than the German way of life will best serve the people of the
Japanese Empire. With the double aim of wooing Japan away from Hitler and
strengthening the position of those whose deepest desire is that Japan be worthy
of American friendship, Grew believes that American sanctions against Japan
would be decisive in deflecting the course of history and throw all Japan into
Hitler's arms. This Grew conceives as a calamity alike to Japan and to the
United States. I surmise that he thinks that sanctions would not only lead to a
military alliance between Tokyo and Berlin (I wonder whether perhaps it has
not already been made), but would lead to war between Japan and the United
States. If I were to disagree with Grew, and this I should hesitate to do because
of my superficial knowledge of the Far East, it would be only at this last point,
namely, that United States sanctions would lead to war between Japan and the
United States. Every day in Japan revealed how critically Japan is dependent on
the United States for her campaign in China and for economic survival at home.
A 100% economic embargo might, I think, quickly lead to war because Japan's
position would soon become so despei-ate that war itself with the United States
would hardly be a more ghastly alternative. But the desire for friendship with
America combined with the fear of America are influences which I think would
prevent war if the sanctions were gradual and explained on the very rational
grounds which already exist for such action. Let the United States begin with
machinery, machine tools, trucks, scrap and oil. Gradualism would give the
extremists less of a case than a complete severance of all economic relations.
Grew's stature and courage never impressed me more. He is certainly right
in his view that the American public does not want war with Japan. He is
certainly right that Japan has more to gain in the long run in freedom and
progress by cultivating America rather than Nazi friendship, but whether he
is right that no means exist stronger than words but short of war, I question.
Unfortunately my visit synchronised with his last days in Tokyo. He was
under terrific pressure and the landing at Kulangsu came only twenty-four
hours before his boat left. Otherwise I would have tried to lead him to my
view or endeavour to accept his, for he as much as I desire to see Japan saved
from the almost certain ruin towards which the extremists are rushing her
today.
5190 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
As this was impossible for lack of time, I am hoping that you can persuade
Field or Lattimore or Holland or any two of them to have long talks with
Grew soon after his return, for several reasons : first, you all ought to get ta
know his views more thoroughly than I was able in our short talk ; second, if
his analysis is different from yours, he would enormously appreciate getting
the benefit of the views of those whose central purpose is so close to his own.
He was full of enthusiasm for Mr. Roosevelt's letter to Hitler and for Roosevelt's
whole foreign policy. He was tremendously pleased to learn that in answer
to questions from .Japanese Cabinet Ministers I had replied that even though
Roosevelt had the support of but, say, 55% of the American public, his letter to
Hitler probably had the support of 80% of Americans.
As you know, Sansom sailed a few days before we arrived. Missing him was
a great disappointment. I wirelessed his steamer to ask whom I had best see in
his Embassy in his absence. He radioed back recommending that I see the
Ambassador himself. This I did. I had never met him before and must con-
fess that my former picture of his views was incorrect, or it may be that his
views have undergone a radical change. In any event he seemed to me to have
views that more nearly approximated those of Harry Price than any Englishman
I have met for a long time. He assured me that the entire Embassy staff was
united. He very definitely feels that there are measures stronger than words,
short of war, that both his government and the American government can take
in the present situation. He was obviously pleased that the British Navy with
or without Cabinet instruction had landed at Kulangsu. He quite obviously
believes that the time for appeasement in the Far East has ended though he
clearly hopes that Japan can be persuaded to extricate herself from a Military
Alliance with Berlin and Rome. I suspect that if he were pressed he would
repudiate the Japanese propaganda that he and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr hold
antithetical views. I told him of the Imperial Hotel lobby gossip about peace
terms which were, according to a terribly well-informed* English hireling of the
Japanese, to be British recognition of Manchukuo ; a British loan of 50 million
sterling for reconstruction in North China, Japanese withdrawal from Canton,
and British opportunity in the Yangtse provided Britain recognised that Japan
had succeeded her as a dominant power in the area. The British would demand
also the Japanese withdrawal from Hainan, but this the Japanese could not
concede. Sir Robert dismissed all this as utterly fantastic and obviously could
not see the slightest possibility of a London loan to Japan for North China
reconstruction.
From the foregoing, I hope that you and your colleagues will be able to make
sense out of my cable and radio letter.
Please send Sir Robert Craigie, "Pacific Affairs" beginning with the June
issue for one year, telling him that you are sending it at my request. The
latter part of my message about Victoria is the only one which you need to
trouble Jessup with. If it is not completely intelligible, it will be when you
receive by, I hope, this same mail, a copy of my long letter to Jessup reporting
on my negotiations with the Japanese Council in Tokyo.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1108
Unofllcial
Carlton Court, Pall Mall Place,
London. S. W. 1 June 29, 1939.
Mr. V. E. Motylev.
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. 8. 8. R.
Dear Motylev: This is to thank you most sincerely for your help while I
was in Moscow. My main object was to have long talks with you and Voitinsky
and the conditions for these could not have been more satisfactory. It was most
encouraging to find you both in such excellent health. I am greatly pleased
with the outline of your bigger book and feel that it will be of the greatest
value.
Now with reference to your criticism of Miss Moore's monograph, both she
and we are very eager to have your best and earliest criticisms. As you pointed
out every member of the Secretariat must have the liberty to write fully, and
♦Well-informed In the view of the hireling.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5191
freely provided he writes objectively. At the same time no member of the
Secretariat writing for an international audience can be sure that he has
attained the maximum degree of objectivity unless he and she have the frankest
criticism and suggestions fi'om scholarly friends like yourself.
All of my colleagues will enormously appreciate the reiteration of the position
which you took in your Pi'inceton cablegram that members of the International
Secretariat must be given full academic freedom but this very freedom makes
everyone of us all the more eager to have the most searching kind of criticism
of all our work.
Please do not wait therefore until you can send your criticism of Miss Moore's
manuscript by word of mouth. You can write a purely private letter marking
it private either to Miss Moore or to me and it will be regarded not as a formal
communication but simply as a private letter from one scholar to another.
In Amsterdam among many others I talked with Van Walree who was
exceedingly sorry that pressure of engagements had prevented his calling on
you on his most recent visit. He had gone in connection with the U. S. S. R.-
Netherlands trade treaty and every minute was taken. Apparently he felt
that the trade treaty was of substantial advantage to the Netherlands and he
hoped also of substantial advantage to the U. S. S. R. He enormously appreciated
the opportunity of meeting you on his former visit.
Sincerely yours,
Edwakd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1109
Carlton Cotjrt, Pall Mall Place,
London, S. W. 1, July 3, 1939.
Mr. Sherwood Eddy,
Toynbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street,
London, E. 1, England
Dear Sherwood : I have just sent Oumansky a night cable letter reading as
follows :
"Sherwood Eddy, a consistent critic but genuinely sincere friend of Soviet
Union, informs me his visa canceled. Personally believe net result of his
seminars is of equal value to both countries in interest of mutual cultural
relations. Urge get matter reconsidered. Eddy's address Toynbee Hall,
London, until July twelfth."
I suggest that you go direct to Maisky and explain the whole situation to him.
I wish I were in a position to do more. My cable address in Paris on Thursday
and Friday will be care of Poletran Paris.
Sincerely yours.
Edward C. Carter.
(Pencilled:) ECO
Exhibit No. 1110
Sherwood Eddy
52 Vanderbilt Avenue
new YORK CITY
Telephone: MUrray Hill 9-3668
JtTNE 24, 1939.
Mr. E. C. Carter
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York City
My Dear Ned : I need your help and you can certainly give me help. At the
last moment, twenty-four hours before sailing, Intourist informs the Open Road
that my Soviet visa, which was granted weeks ago, has been suddenly cancelled.
Someone has blundered. This must be reversed. It means the end of the
Seminars and that would damage Russia. I have taken a thousand people to
Russia in the last twenty years. For a dozen years our parties have been the
largest and most influential that have entered Russia and nine-tenths of our
people have rendered favorable reports. For twenty years I have been a friend
of Russia's. I am on Mrs. Dilling's red network, supposed to be "supported by
Moscow gold". I have always been a Stalinist, never for Trotsky.
5192 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I would appreciate it very much if you would do anything you could to have
this cancellation reversed. It will certainly make a bad impression on our
party of nearly forty and end the Seminars forever.
I am at Tovnbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street, London E, 1 (cable Toynbee
Hall), July 1-15.
Thanking you in advance for your help,
Very sincerely yours,
[s] Shekwood Eddy.
Exhibit No. 1111
On Board S. S. "Aquitania",
July 11, 1939.
Mr. Owen Lattimore,
300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Deak Owen : The Chinese are more unanimously enthusiastic about Pacific
Affairs than the members of any other group. Fi-anklin Ho was immensely
impressed by Guenther Stein's "The Yen and the Sword." Ushiba assured
me that the oflice of the Japanese Council was taking seriously your request
for additional Japanese articles. Motylev was eager for much more intimate
factual details giving both very recent economic information and also personal
observations as to what is going on in China and Japan.
As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Jaffe, he likes the
militancy of Amerasia. He recognizes that Pacific Affairs cannot quite take
this line but he still insists that no one can legitimately critize you if you do
decide to adopt his request to you of three years ago that Pacific Affairs come
out strong consistently and repeatedly for the collective system. Both he and
Voitinsky regret that there is no evidence of our having taken seriously their
request for this three years ago. They feel the necessity for this was never
greater than today. Their insistence was of great interest to me for two
reasons. First, because it is evidence that they treat the IPR seriously and
have orderly memories of their suggestion. Second, because it controverts
the assertions of the reactionaries in Paris, London, and Washington that the
retirement of Litvinoff meant that the Kremlin was throwing over its commitment
to the collective system.
Could you use the present appearance of Sir Arthur Salter's "Security^Can
It Be Retrieved" as the occasion for an early full length treatment that will
be so fundamental as to appeal to the more thoughtful members of the Institute
in every member country and so militant as to convince Motylev and Voitinsky
that we are responding to their suggestion.
One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese
internal economic and financial position. Happily this will be supplied by
Chi's study for the Inquiry. (You have doubtless seen his Virginia Quarterly
article.) I am going to reopen with Jessup and Angus the question of publication
of some inquiry material in Pacific Affairs when it is of such a nature as to
fit in with your own policy as editor and when it is of a kind which will make
important and authentic information of which scholars and statesmen are in
need available to a wide Pacific Affairs audience.
Your many friends all along the line inquired for you and sent you their
warmest greetings. All are asking when your book will be published.
I learned in one or two quarters that Miss Virginia Thompson's book on Indo-
China is not being taken seriously because there is a criticism of Pelliot or an
implied criticism of Pelliot's position. Do you happen to know what would be
the basis of this and whether scholars in other countries regard Pelliot with
the same degree of infallibility as he regards himself.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1112
On Board S. S. "Aqititania,"
July 11, 1930.
Mr. Philip J. Jaffe,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Jaffe : All around the coast of Asia and Europe I picked up highly com-
plimentary remarks with reference to Amerasia. Someday I would like to sit
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5193
down with you and some of your colleagues and run over the whole question of
promotion overseas. Copies ought to be in the reading rooms of the Chinese,
British, American and French Embassies and Legations in Tokyo. Chungking,
Shanghai. Bangkok. Paris, London, Moscow, The Hague, Ottawa, Canberra, Eome,
Berlin and Brussels. Ways and means should be discovered for substantially
increasing the circulation in Japan, China and Great Britain. Motylev wishes
that Pacific Affaii's carried as essential information as that which he discovers
invariably appears in your section •'Economic Notes." Motylev also likes the
consistently militant quality that characterises almost every issue of Amerasia
and whicli appears so clearly, according to Motylev, in everything that Fred Field
writes whether in Amerasia or elsewhere. If Amerasia and AMCO merge the
prestige of both will be enhanced in several countries.
Do you suppose the Amerasia free list could stand sending a complimentary
copy for a year to Murray G. Brooks, Y. M. C. A., Rangoon, Burma. He is W'ork-
ing for the reeducation of certain Burmese members of Parliament who are
obstructing the Burmese government's efforts to facilitate cultural and material
communications between Burma and China. He is facilitating a Burmese ver-
nacular translation of Vesper's "Secret Agent of Japan."
Hoping you can come to Sunset Farm for a long talk sometime before
September, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1114
Editorial Board : Frederick V. Field, chairman ; Philip J. .Jaffe, managing editor ; Lillian
Peffer, assistant editor : T. A. Bisson ; Ch'ao-ting Chi ; Kenneth W. Colegrove ; Owen
Lattimore ; William W. Lockwood ; Cyrus H. Peake ; David H. Popper ; William T. Stone ;
Harriet Levine, secretary
Amerasia
A review of America and the Far East
125 East 52nd St., New York
Telephone : PLaza 3-4700
August the 11th, 1939.
Mr. Edward Carter.
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear JMr. Cabtee: I appreciate the opportunity to make what I hope are
constructive comments on Captain Carlson's report on China's Military Strength
and Efficiency. I am very sorry to be some days late with my comments.
Carlson's report is, in my opinion, a very excellent one and a very much needed
one. The latter half especially is excellent. As I was reading the first half,
without knowing what would follow, I kept thinking that too much was elemen-
tary knowledge easily obtainable elsewhere, but upon completion of the whole
study I am not sure that his way is not the best. Some of the elementary mate-
rial might be converted into explanatory phrases throughout the whole' manu-
script, while some might be converted into notes. In addition the introduction
can perhaps be strengthened by inclusion in it in summary form some of the
strong points in the latter half.
There are a few sections which, in my opinion, are treated too incompletely.
For example, the aviation section could have more precise material on training
centers, particularly those in Kansu and Yunnan. Our own Curtis Wright Com-
pany is apparently very active in building and supplying the Yunnan bases
with planes and instructors. In addition, some estimate should be made of the
probable future eflectiveness as well as size of China's growing air forces.
The section on China's Industrial Cooperatives is too incomplete. They
have not been moving ahead rapidly enough and the five million dollars promised
by Dr. Kung has not been advanced. The reasons for this should be written
and analyzed. Understandably enough, there are many conflicting and con-
tradictory elements in the building up process going on in China.
The section on the Italian Aviation Mission should be enlarged slightly and
it should be brought out that the chief i-eason at the time for the ability of the
Italians to outbid American companies was dr.e to superior credit terms. At
that time the United States demanded practically cash in advance for plane
orders. The fact that we have regained that market and have, even in the
88348 — 52 — pt. 14 19
5194 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
past year or two, extended sizeable credits to Cliina, contains within it the
obvious political conclusions that China has proved itself worthy of commercial
confidence, etc., etc.
In the section where the German Military Mission is discussed, there should
be some study made of the contradictions involved in Germany's selling large
quantities of munitions to China. Germany's continuance to do so in the face
of its pact with Japan may play an important role in the future of the Sino-
Japanese war.
There have been reliable reports about ten million troops being trained in the
province of Sikong. Some study of that should be included in an appropriate
place. Additional material might be added on Mohammedans and Mongols in
Inner Mongolia, and their probable military strength and effectiveness.
In the section on present facilities for arms manufacture, the building of roads
and railways, as well as that on war financing, I feel it would be important to
express an opinion as to how much the continued success of these depend upon
foreign help. On page 79, which contains the six conditions which will bring
China victory. Section 5 states that "China must continue to receive credits
from abroad until such time as she can manufacture her own raw materials,"
which idea is repeated again on page 81. It is not improbable that some time
in the future Great Britain, supported by France and possibly the United
States, will make an effort to effect peace and in its effort to do so will put
presjsure on China by threatening to shut down both the Burma and Indo-China
ports of entry. In the face of such an eventuality, will China be able to con-
tinue to carry on a protracted war even if limited to guerrilla warfare? Will
China then be able to manufacture sufficient small arms and munitions, grow
sufficient food, develop new transportation facilities, and find means of financing
lier economic set-up? Therein, it seems to me, lies the biggest question mark
in China's war of resistance.
I hope that the above remarks have sense and are constructive, and I would
be only too delighted at any time to expand these remarks with whatever
facts are at my disposal.
Sincerely,
Philip J. Jaffe.
P J J : g
Exhibit No. 1115
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Mass., August 24, 1939.
Philip Jaffe, Esquire,
Sunset Farm.
Dear Phil : Here are letters from Edgar Snow, Rewi Alley, and John Her-
sey which are self-explanatory.
Perhaps this evening or this afternoon you can give me the benefit of your
advice on all these matters.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter,
Exhibit No. IIIG
129 East .'j2nd Street,
New York City, Septem'ber 8, 1939.
Dr. V. B. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute,
20 Razin Street, Moscotc, V. 8. S. R.
Dear Motylev : You will be getting a coiiy of Amerasia in due course, but I
thought you would be particularly interested in two of the articles, so I am
enclosing them in this letter. One is by my colleague on the International Secre-
tariat, Miss Kate L. Mitchell. The other is by Mr. Frederick V. Field. The
entire magazine will be reaching you shortl.v.
I understand that it is likely that the American Council will shortly assume
full responsibility for Amerasia as its own journal. ^
I am writing you in another letter regarding the decision to go ahead vvith
the Victoria Meeting. All of us feel that the war in P]urope makes Victoria
more important than ever.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5195
Exhibit No. 1117
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Maiss., 11th September 1939.
Dr. V. E. IMoTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20, Razin Street.
Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Dear Motylev : I have just cabled you as follows :
"Proceeding with victoria as plaiined. War situation makes contribution
your institute more important than ever. Hope nothing will prevent your
attendance. Suggest arriving New York ten days early for preliminary
private discussion."
There is little need to amplify what I have said. All that is necessary is to
emphasize and underline it. You will have learned from my circular letter of
September r)th to the National Secretaries of the decision of Jessup and Tarr to
go aliead with the Study Meeting.
AVliat I consider a very biased interpi-etation of the significance of the Moscow-
Berlin non-aggression pact in editorial and political circles in several of the
I. P. K. member countries gives added importance to your presence and that of
your colleagues at the forthcoming Study Meeting.
Earnestly hoping that we will receive an early word that you are planning to
come, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. lllS
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Mass., 15th September 1939.
(Penciled initials :) KM
Dr. Philip C. Jessup,
Norfolk, Conn.
Dear Jessup : You will remember my telling you that I cabled Dr. Adam von
Trott zu Solz in Berlin urging that he get permission to have his national service
consist of exploring with us the possibilities of extending the I. P. R. Inquiry to
the wider field. You will remember that I secured approval for this proposal from
both Lord Lothian and Mr. Sumner Welles.
I have today received a cable from him in Berlin stating that he will be glad
to come over on the Viilcania if I can facilitate his passage and landing, otherwise
he will have to come via Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. I wired to Sumner Welles
today to see if he can facilitate the passage on the Vidcnnia as he promised me
last week in Washington that he would do everything in his power to facilitate
von Trott's coming to this country.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1119
68 West 91st Street,
Neio York, N. Y., September 21, 1939.
Dear Mr. Carter : With regard to your note of the 16th, I have read with
genuine admiration Ilosinger's article in the September issue of Pacific Affairs
entitled "Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile W^ar." It is the most pene-
trating and most accurate survey of the situation I have seen. I don't know-
whether Rosinger has been in China or not, but it is evident that he has followed
developments there ^ery closely, and he has caught the spirit of the new order.
Now, with respect to Colonel Burckhardfs comments. I have known Burck-
hardt in a casual way for a number of years — since he was British military
attache at Peiping. as a matter of fact. I saw him at Hongkong last autumn.
He was intelligence officer for the General Officer Commanding the China Forces.
Burckhardt has, like so many orthodox military men of the old school, missed
the point in China's guerrilla warfare. Probably the only politics he knows is
the residue of what he was exposed to at Harrow or Sandhurst. At any rate,
he has failed to comprehend the importance of the political (ethical, if you
will) development which parallels the military strategy of the Chinese guerrilla
units. He points to isolated incidents of gueri-illa activities, some of which
5196 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
admittedly have been amateurish, as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the whole
movement. He apparently overlooks the magnitude of the guerrilla movement,
and he has no sense of the social and economic reforms that have made possible
the continuation of Chinese control in those areas which were penetrated by the
Japanese. He even overlooks the fact that in Shansi province the guerrilla
pattern of resistance developed and executed by the 8th Route Army, supple-
mented by provincial troops inspired by the 8th Routers, has for over two
years prevented the Japanese from conquering that province and moving on
Sian.
On the other hand, there is a good deal of truth in many of Colonel Burck-
hardt's comments. There are still many young men in China with the attitude
of the youth who remarked: "Why can't the foreigners fight our wars for us?"
This attitude is prevalent among many of the youth who have not been reached
by the 8th Route Army doctrines. I saw a good deal of it at Hankow, and it
thoroughly disgusted me. But that attitude is diminishing rather than in-
creasing. Both the Generalissmo and Madame Chiang are striving to make
the youth of China more unselfish and more self-reliant.
iStaff work has been poor in the past, but intensive training in staff schools,
plus practical experience in the field, is improving this condition.
Strong leadership, especially in the higher ranks, has been lacking. But
this was largely due to the semifeudal military system with which the General-
issimo had to deal. Political considerations made it imperative for him to
proceed with caution in removing high ranking military officers from office.
Even this obstacle is being overcome. However, as the younger officers move
into positions of high command it takes time for them to adjust themselves
to their new responsibilities. Here again, the important point is that the trend
is in the direction of progress and greater efficiency, rather than the reverse.
The Colonel's remarks regarding the prospect of a revolution in Japan and
about foreign intervention are not new. I have encountered no large scale
sentiment in China in favor of intervention by the Western powers. They want
our material assistance — in the way of loans, war supplies, etc. But that is all.
The point about the China situation which worries me right now is Russia's
attitude. Tlie United Front has been dropped, apparently, as a policy of the
Comintern. Does that mean a possible break in the United Front in China?
Is there any connection between the visit of Chow En-lai to Moscow and the
Russo-Japanese negotiations concerning a possible nonaggression agreement?
Is there a possibility that a Chinese Soviet may be set up in the northwest in
return for freedom being granted the Japanese to move against the British,
French, American and Chinese interests in the balance of China?
Many thanks for letting me see Colonel Burekhardt's comments.
With best regards, I am,
Sincerely,
Evans F. Caelson.
Exhibit No. 1120
October 11, 1939.
FVF from ECC :
The other night at dinner I met Mrs. James Warburg, who purports to have
a flaming interest in China. She struck me as extremely intelligent and more
articulate than her husband. Should she be approached as a recorder for
Virginia Beach, in case I get another opening, or better still through you? Is
there any other moneyed person of brains whom we might rope in with an
eye to long term financial future of the American and Pacific Councils? How
about Ellie Auchincloss?
Exhibit No. 1121
Cavalier Hotrt.,
Virginia Beach, Va., December S, 1949.
Mr. Constantine Oumansky,
Embassy of the U. 8. 8. R., Washington, D. C. —
Dear Oumansky: This is to introduce my colleague from Berlin, Dr. Adam
von Trott. I hope you and he can have a long talk together.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5197
Would you ask one of your consular officials to advise him with reference
to procedure in getting his visa for his Moscow visit?
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1122
129 East 52nd Street,
A'etc York, N. Y., 11th December 1939.
Kenneth Dubant, Esq.,
Tass Ayencii. 50 Rockefeller Plaza,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Dubant : Having returned from the I. P. R. Study Meeting at Virginia
Beach today, I take pleasure in sending you herewith by special messenger
copies of the following statements at Virginia Beach :
1. Dr. Jessup's Opening statement. (Document 9)
2. Statement by L. W. Holland at Opening Plenary Session. (Doc. 10)
3. Rapporteur's Summary of Round Table Topic I. (Document 12)
4. Mr. Lattimore's Statement at Plenary Session Opening Round Table II.
(Document 15)
5. Rapporteur's summary of Round Table Topic II. (Document 16)
6. Mr. Angus' Statement at Plenary Session Opening Round Table III.
(Doc. 18)
7. Rapporteur's Summary of Round Table Topic III. (Document 19)
8. Mr. Staley's Statement Opening Topic IV. (Document 21)
9. Dr. Jessup's Summary of Round Table Topic IV. (Document 23)
Any of these may now be quoted. Ultimately a summary of these will be
published in tlie proceedings. For your purposes, perhaps the most interesting
summary is that made by Dr. Jessup on December 2. It is marked Document 23.
I don't know whether you will wish to share these with Mr. Todd in Wash-
ington but if you so desire you are at liberty to do so.
With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5198
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1123
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From—
Date
File No.
E.xhibitNo.
A von Trott . --
E. C. Carter...
1/ 8/40
12/15/.39
3/13/40
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3/ 8/40
3/ 9/40
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12/19/42
5/10/40
6/ 6/40
6/ 3/40
6/10/40
6/12/40
7/ 3/40
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7/15/40
S/10/40
8/21/40
9/20/40
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10/15/40
10/18/40
10/29/40
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12/17/40
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1/21/41
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2/11/41
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100.111
100. Ill
100.111
100. 249
100. 274
119.36
112.33
119.5
100. 239
104. 22
100.386
107. 22
100.209
191.87
191.90
191. 188
191.188
100. .360
105. 133
131B.99
131B.98
105. 293
191.37
126.4
102.3
102.3
105. 21
100.114
106.9
500. 26
191.162
191.12
105B.4
100. 94
125.1
105. 175
151.65
119.3
105B.3
100. 87
191.257
128. 49
100. 206
100.208
100.218
116.18
105. 13
105. 321
100. 37
131 B. 45
500. 30
100. 220
100.220
191.72
106.47
500. 29
119.143
106. 54
500.31
106. 51
119.31
131 B. 28
105. 297
131 B. 81
500. 32
119.98
119.105
500.33
131B.27
131B.27
100.226
100.248
131 B. 60
131.60
172. 1
172.1
172.1
172.1
172.1
172.1
100.2
131 B. 97
1123A
A Van Sphpltcma fMrs.) _ - .-
E. C. Carter.
1124
E. C. Carter
1125
OiiniiiiKkv
E. C. Carter
1126
K C Crtrtcr
Calvin B. Hoover
1127
Ida Prtiitt
E. C. Carter
1128
E. C. Carter.
1129
E Fpir^tix Cholmelev
E. C. Carter -
1130
E. C. Carter
1131
W. L. n .--
E. C. C
1132
Ouiranskv
E. C. Carter ..
113.'?
Mr. Carter --
Ingrid Warburg
1134
Ounian-kv
Edward C. Carter
1135
W. L. H
E. C. C
Edward C. Carter - ..
1136
W L Holland
1137
Edward C. Carter -- ---
C. K. Moser
1138
C. K. Moser _-
Edward C. Carter
1139
C. K. MostT
Edward C. Carter
1140
H. A - --
E. C. C
1141
Edward C. Carter ' ■•• ■
Charles F. Loomis ... .
1142
Edward C. Carter
Charles F. Loomis
1143
Wni W TjOckwood
Edward C. Carter
1144
Philin C. JessuD
Edward C. Carter
1145
E. C. Carter ..
Edprar Snow.-. ..
1146
E. C. Caiter
1147
E. C. Carter -
John M. Gaus ..
1148
KM
E. C.C. ..
1149
Motylev
Edward Carter _.. . ..
1150
ECC .-
RWB
1151
FVF
ECC
11.52
F. V. Field
E. C. Carter
115:^
Philin C JessuD
E. C. Carter
1154
E. C. Cartel -
O. M. Fisher
1155
E C Carter
V. E. Motylev ..
1156
MortiTTcr Graves
E. C. Carter
1157
Owen Tjattiinore
E. C Carter ...
1158
Owen Lattimore
E. C. Carter
Mortimer Graves
1159
E. C. Carter
1160
F V Field
E. C. Carter .
1161
E C. Carter . --
A. Grajdanzev.
1162
E. C. C'rtcr .
Joseph P. Chamberlain
1163
E C Carter
Phil
1164
Owen Tjattiniore
E. C. Carter ..
1165
Oumansky
E.C.Carter
1166
E. C. Carter
Oumansky
1167
Invitation
AMCO -__ -_
1168
Philin C. JessuD
E. C. Carter
1169
CP
ECC
1170
E C Carter
Grajdanzev
1171
E. C. Carter -- -
Edwin O. Roischauer. . ..
1172
E C Carter
Harriet L. Moore . --
1173
E. C.Carter
1174
Oumansky
E. C. Carter
Bob __
GeofTrey
E. C. Carter....
E. C. Carter
1175
E. C. Carter
1176
E C Carter
1177
Lauchlin Currie
1178
1179
Chen Han-sene CGeoffrev)
E. C. Carter
1180
E. C. Carter
C. K. Moser. _
E. C. Carter
1181
Ch'ao-tine Chi
1182
E. C. Carter
Chen Han-seng
Frederick D. Sharp...
1184
E C Carter
1185
KM
E. C. C__..
Harriet L. Moore ..
1186
E. C. Carter
1187
ECC
MG
1188
Members of 9th Conf
E. C. Carter
1189
Wm R Herod
E. C. Carter
1190
E. C. Carter.
Owen Lattimore.
1191
Lt Col Sharp
E. C. Carter
1192
Lt. Col. Sharp _ . _._
E. C. Carter
1193
HA
ECC
1194
E. C Carter
1195
Lt Col R S Brat ton
E. C. Carter
1196
Lt. Col. G. S. C
James J. Maloney,.
1197
E C Carter
1198
Trvinp Friedman
E C Carter
1199
E. C Carter
Irving S. Friedman .
1200
Irvins
E. C. Carter
1201
Dr White
1202
Memo (handwritten)
12.,3
E. C. Carter
Elsie Fairfa.x-Cholmeley
ECC
7/ 3/41
7/ 8/41
1204
WLH..
1205
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5199
To—
From-
Date
File No.
Exhibit No.
Henry .1. Wadleieh
Capt. R. Stuart Murray
Wra. D. Carter _"
Win. A. M. Burden
Lt. Col. Frederick S. Sharp.
E.C.Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Jessica Smith
Sumner Welles
E. C. Carter
Philip C. Jessup
State Department
Nathaniel Bretholtz (Mrs.) .
Nathaniel Bretholtz (Mrs.).
HA
WWL
E. C. Carter
Tass
Joseph E. Da vies
E. C. Carter
John A. Pollard
E. C. Carter
W. L. Holland .. .
ECC
Wm. W. Lockwood__
E. C. Carter ___
Lauehlin Currie
Lauchlin Currie
Lauehlin Currie
E. C. Carter
Lauchlin Currie
E. C. Carter
Lauchlin Currie
Oumansky
I. P. R
V. M. Molotov
E. C. Carter
Mrs. Johnstone ._
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Charles A. Thomson.
E. C. Carter..
Edgar J. Tarr
E. C. Carter
E. C. Dayason
Philin C. Jessup
Ned (E. C. C.)
G.E. Voitinsky
W. W. Lancaster
E. C. Carter
W. W. L
E. C. Carter
John W. Holmes
Jerome D. Greene
J. W. Dafoe-
Michael Greenberg...
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter....
E. C. Carter
Frederick D. Sharp...
.Tessica Sm.ith
Jessica Smith
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Quincv Wrieht
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter...
E. C.Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
ECC
Herman Beukema
E. C. Carter. _.
E. C. Carter
Catherine Porter
E. C. Carter
Lauchlin Currie
C. F. Remer ^
WLH
Roy Veatch
Larchhn Currie
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Lauchlin Currie
E. C. Carter
Lauchlin Currie
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Oumansky. _
E. C. Carter
Phil
E. C. Carter
Mrs. A. H. Johnstone
Charles A. Thomson..
E. C. Carter
Truman M. Martin..
E. C. Carter
Anthony N. Fedotov. .
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Brooks Emeny
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
W. W. Lancaster
E. C. C
Yung-ving Hsu
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
E. C. Carter
Lauchlin Currie
Robert W. Barnett
7/14/41
7/15/41
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191.184
131 B. 96
131 B. 152
119.97
131 B. 26
131 B. 26
100. 179
100.179
100. 404
100.410
106. 50
105.304
191.83
191.83
191.83
199.38
131B.69
131 B. 153
100. 21
191.147
119.144
119.92
119.122
119.121
191.111
191.111
119.13
119.13
119.13
119.13
119.13
119.13
119.13
119.13
100. 119
100.119
100. 119
105. 31
100. 81
100. 81
191. 74
191. 74
131B.92
119.96
100. 115
119. 109
105. 246
191.139
100. 20
100. 210
100. 210
106.3
105. 59
100. 251
105. 42
112.22
100. 193
500. 48
500.47
1206
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122S
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12.32
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Exhibit No. 1123-A
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 8th January 194O.
Dr. Adam von Tkott,
c/o John H. Oakie, Esq.
Dear Adam : Enclosed is a copy of a letter to Motylev which is self-explanatory.
I shall try and send a copy of it by way of Oumansky's diplomatic pouch so that
it will get to Motylev in advance of your arrival.
Motylev's office, the Pacific Institute, is at 20, Razin Street, Moscow. It is
less than seven minutes' walk from the Kremlin and equally near to whatever
hotel you may be staying at. It is an oldish building in which there are several
other organizations. Motylev, as you know, is an economic geographer and a
very able intellectual. He has been a very active member of the Party and
is a Lecturer at the University of Red Professors.
5200 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Voitinsky you can get in the Far Eastern Section of the Institute of World
Economics and Politics of which Varga is the head. Varga is of German origin
and is of very great intellectual ability.
Eugene Harondar is Office Secretary of the Soviet I. P. R. He does not always
give full-time to the work of the Institute. His Russian, German, Frtnch, and
English are all exceptionally good. Motylev and Voitinsky, if I remember
rightly, speak English, German, and French equally well.
I think you will enjoy greatly meeting all of the friends and members of the
I. P. R. in Moscow. I suggest for the most part that you concentrate your
attention on them while in the city. I vaguely remember that you were only
planning to spend three days in Moscow. If you can possibly extend this,
I would strongly urge it. You ought to try to spend from five to seven days,
unless there are some overriding reasons for hurrying on to Berlin.
J. arrived back from a visit to Edgar on Saturday. On Sunday afternoon
he met K.
We miss you greatly and hope you are getting a little rest in the sunshine
and warmth of California.
If you want to have Loomis arrange to drive you around to see the beauty
spots of Honolulu, please wire me and I will cable him that you are passing
through. Maybe you would perfer to arrive unannounced. His new office
address is 501 Dillingham Building. This is only two minutes' walk from
where your steamer lands.
With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1124
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, December 15, 1939.
Mrs. Adama van Scheltema,
International Institute for Social History,
264 Keizersgracht, Amsterdam C, Holland.
Dear Madam : This letter is to introduce Dr. Adam von Trott, a German
scholar who has been engaged, on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
in the preparation of a study on the relation of the Chinese guild system to
modern Chinese nationalism and labor organization. I am sure you will find
him an able research student and I hope that you and your Institute may be
able to give him the information and help he desires for the completion of
his work. I shall be most grateful for anything you can do for him.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1125
New York City, March 13, 19. 'fO.
Dear Adam : Your vei-y interesting letter from Tokyo dated February 6 reached
me on the morning of March 11, as did your cable from Moscow, dated March 9.
It was most interesting that the two messages, one from Tokyo and one from
Moscow, arrived at the same moment. Your Tokyo letter was posted at Kobe
and came through promptly.
I gather that after you wrote you did get the visa to permit you to stop
over in Moscow. I do hope that you saw Motylev. I am sure he would appreciate
your up-to-date impressions of Virginia Beach and Japan.
I understand that there are considerable delays in the mails to Holland, so
I have not written to His Excellency there. It has seemed better to write to
our good friend Strong. He, I gather, may be able to see you in person before
very long.
It now looks as though I could not start for Chungking until the middle of
July.
Corbett has been hard at work, and he and his group are making real progress.
There is much to be done. He and his colleagues are doing it very well. I
have shown your letter to him, to Jessup, to Bill and to one or two others here.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5201
I have sent a copy to Edgar. Though he was offered the job in the Far East,
he declined. He is lilvcly to spend Good Friday with us in New York.
We are all very eager to get your impressions of Moscow and Berlin.
With warmest regards from Mrs. Carter, Ruth, and myself, I am
Ever sincerelv yours,
Edwabd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1126
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., January 8, 1940.
His ExcEiXENCY, the Soviet Ambassador,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.
Dear Oumaxsky : Here is a letter which I would like to have reach Motylev in
advance of von Trott's arrival in Moscow which encloses a letter of introduction
that I have given to von Trott. Is it possible for you to send these to Motylev
via the Diplomatic pouch? If not, can you advise me how to mark it so as
to ensure its reaching Moscow without interference or delay?
With very best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1127
Duke University,
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Office of the Dean,
Durham, N. C, January 22, 19^0.
Dr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New Yoi-k, N. Y.
Dear Dr. Carter : I regret that an extraordinary press of work has prevented
mv being able to read at all carefully the manuscript by Miss Harriet Moore
on "Soviet Relations in the Far East, 1931-1939." I had hoped I would be
able to do it but I simply have not been able to do so.
In looking the work over hastily, I do have the impression of a sort of pro-
Soviet bias which would prevent the work being accepted as wholly objective.
To quote several isolated sentences on page 76 :
"During the second Czech crisis in September, the Soviet Union indicated,
in the first days of September, its readiness to aid Fi-ance and Czechoslovakia,
only to have this cooperation rejected not only in the final Munich settle-
ment but in all the negotiations leading up to it."
This is quite possibly true but so far as I know the facts are very much in
dispute. Take another sentence as an illustration on the same page :
"Following the annexation of Austria by Germany, and the increasing
threat to Czechoslovakia, Litvinov issued an appeal to convoke a world
conference of peaceful nations to take positive action to prevent further
aggression. But he was answered with silence."
Now it is quite possible to describe what happened in these words ; that is
what Litvinov said he did, but these "peaceful" nations are the very ones
now which Soviet Russia declares are those conducting an imperialistic war.
I could go on with scores of other illustrations. I do not know whether the
nuances which I am attempting to explain are clear to you or not but I feel
quite sure that scholars reading the work would get the impression which I have
mentioned.
With best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
Calvin B. Hoover. Dean.
CBH : RK
5202 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1128
(Handwritten Notation) Copies to:
JRH
Roy Veatch
EFC
R. P. Chin
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 16th February 191,0.
Miss Ida Pruitt,
g/o American Bureau for Medical Aid to China,
61 William Street, Neiv York, N. Y.
Dear Miss Pruitt : Would you please prepare for me on two pages a statement
which will reach me not later than Tuesday morning giving an authoritative
statement of the method of handling any United States Government money that
might conceivably be available for C. I. C. You have written of this several
times. Roy Veatch has asked me to meet next week a number of his friends ta
discuss the matter.
I can give a general description of the way the local cooperatives work, but
I have no material that would show the mechanism for handling government
loans nor have I any details on the two types of financial administration and
control in China. Type I being cooperatives financed by the National Govern-
ment. Type II being cooperatives financed by the Hongkong Committee.
It is going to be relatively easy to arouse people's enthusiasm for the program
of the cooperatives. It is going to be more difficult to describe the entire finan-
cial administration and control in such a way as to show people how it works,
what controls there are, and who audits the accounts.
Don't think for a minute that because Veatch has asked me to meet his friends
that this means that a grant from the Washington government is likely. It is
a long and uncertain .iourney from a junior official in the State Department to
a vote in Congress, and there are many adversaries.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1129
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, March 8, 19J,0.
Miss INGRID Warburg,
25 West 5J,th Street, New York City.
Dear Miss Warburg : I have recently been asked to write a letter to Johannes
Schroeder, whose address is care of Senora Maria E. Villasenor, Humboldt Av
39, Dept. 4, Mexico City, saying that we would like his counsel in anti-Fascist
work in the United States. He has a Mexican passport and was in this country
on a visitor's visa from September 1939 to December 1939. He requires a letter
from some American organization so as to get a visa for a return to the United
States.
This request has come to me from S. A. Trone, 390 Riverside Drive, whose tele-
phone is Monument 2-8335.
I have only known Mr. Trone slightly. Do you know anything about Schroe-
der? I think I will also write Dr. Niebuhr.
Sincerel.v yours,
Edward C. Carter.
(Pencilled notation :)
Sent to 227 Eden Road, Palm Beach, Fla.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5203
Exhibit No. 1130
129 East 52nd Street.
Neiv York, N. Y., 9th March, 19^0.
Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley,
c/o China Institute of Pacific Relations,
10, Pehiny Road, Kowloon, Hon<ikonp.
Dear Elsie : This is to aclinowledge your cablegram reading as follows :
"Hanseng fieldworking sun honorary chairman fully confident committee
due Hanseng's effort Hongkong Chungking cooperating Cripps enthusiastic
committee wishes you urge Kung finance Snow."
I have the approval of John Hersey and Ch'ao-ting Chi of wiring Kung to send
Snow but I am waiting now to hear from Ida Pruitt for I do not want to act
without her full approval.
There is another matter on which I want your help. About a year ago we
managed to get through Miss Madge Cleeve from His Majesty's Stationer's Ofliice
a few copies of the pamphlets in the series of Peace Handbooks that Sir George
Brothero of the British Foreign Oflace prepared for the Paris Peace Conference.
If I remember rightly I handed them over to you to get bound for the Pacific
Council Library.
Phil Lilientlial has searched the Library several times but has failed to find
them.
You may remember that we borrowed one or two of the bound volumes of the
Peace Handbooks from the Council on Foreign Relations but we would invariably
return them to them.
Can you rack your memory and give us some clue as to what happened to the
half dozen little pamphlets in this series that we got from London a little while
before you and I sailed for the Far East?
P. C. Chang is leaving today or tomorrow to attend the meeting of the People's
Political Council. You will doubtless see him as he passes through Hongkong.
I note that about a fortnight ago Miss Pruitt reported to you that I was about
to go to Washington in connection with a Government loan for the Chinese Indus-
trial Cooperatives. I hope this did not raise false hopes on your part or that
of any of your friends. Very informally I met representatives of the Treasury,
the S. E. C., the State Department, and the Department of Agriculture. These
were all for the most part junior officials with whom Miss Pruitt had already been
in contact. They are all deeply interested in the Cooperatives. At the same time
they seem to be of the unanimous opinion that there was no chance whatsoever at
the present session of Congress for any Governmental aid to C. I. C.
If I had seen higher ups I do not think I would have received a different report.
The .$20 million credit through the Export-Import Bank is all I am afraid that can
be expected from Governmental sources this year. And I do not imagine that
the Chinese Government has any intention of deflecting any of the 20 million
to the C. I. C. I ought to add that Miss Pruitt's work among officials in Washing-
ton has been of a very high order. She has aroused genuine interest. It is a
pity it can't be canalized into a substantial government grant.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
P. S. — As you will have gathered from the copy of my letter to John Hersey
of February 8. I do not feel that Hubert Liang should be sent to this country on
behalf of the Industrial Cooperatives. He is a man of the highest character and
patriotic spirit, but what is needed is someone who will carry greater weight and
greater conviction.
Exhibit No. 1131
129 East o2nd Street,
yew York City, March 13, 1940.
Miss IxGRiD Warburg,
25 ^Vest 5'ith street, Wew York City
Dear Miss Warburg : You will, I think, be glad to hear that Adam sent me
a cable from Moscow on March 9, saying that he was leaving for Berlin on that
day. I have also had a letter from him from Tokyo indicating that he had a
very useful and illuminating visit there.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5204 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1132
March 14, 1940.
WLH From ECC :
Here i.s Fred Field's proposed letter to Tsurumi. The letter is to my mind
adequate except for one point : at the top of the second page Fred says that
the American Council strictly avoids political statements. Fred in this letter
is using Amerasia to «[ifferentiate hetween IPR and nou-IPR activities. If this
letter goes to the Japanese Council, will they feel that it puts Fred over his
own signature as frankly playing the role of Mr. Box and Mr. Cox?
Intrinsically I can find no fault with Fred's excellent letter. Should I have
any misgivings ahout it?
(Pencilled: "No".)
Exhibit No. 11.3.3
129 East .52nd Street,
'New York City, March 19, 1940.
His Excellency the Ajnbassador of the U. S. S. R.
Ewhassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.
Dear Oumansky : It has occurred to me that possibly you would he interested
In reading this article of Lattimore's that has just appeared in the Virginia
Quarterly Review.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter,
Exhibit No. 1134
March 20, 1940.
Dear Mr. Carter: Thank you very much for your two letters. They did
not reach me before as I am traveling until about April 6.
I am very glad to know that Adam got as far as he did.
Regarding Johannes Schroeder I want to assure you that I don't know any-
thing about him, only that he was a member of the C. P. in Germany.
I hope to see you soon.
With kind regards.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Ingrid Warburg.
Exhibit No. 1135
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 22nd March 1940.
His Excellency, the Soviet Ambassador,
Embassy of the U. iS, S, R., Washinfftan, D. C.
Dear Oumansky : Doubtless you saw Miss Dorothy Thompson's confession
in her column this morning. Do you happen to know who her misinformants
were ?
With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
Edward C, Carter,
Exhibit No. 11.36
WLH
HA From ECC :
Please note the attached from Cabot Coville. Under the circumstances I
am inclined to send Coville a full set of the Inquiry documents, but do not
wish to go to this expense if either of you think it is unwise. If the State
Department were not so financially starved by Congress I would send the whole
set to him with a bill for the same. For promotion purposes, I am proposing
to send him the five books already issued in printed form and tell him I will
write him later whether we are in a position to send him all of the mimeo-
graphed and forthcoming printed volumes.
Please note the people whom he suggests as in a position to comment on
Colegrove.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5205
Exhibit No. 1137
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 24th April 19.',0.
W. L. Holland, Esq.,
Care, Giannini Found-ation, University of California,
Berkeley, CaUfornia.
Dear Bill: Our copy of the Tamagna manuscript has arrived minus the
material that he says he will send us later. After you have glanced through
it will you immediately air mail me answers to the following questions:
(1) Is this good enough in its present form to justify our making copies
to go immediately to the Advisers and to the following commentators :
Frederick Schuman von Beckwrath
Kurt Bloch proper person in
Dragoni State Department
(2) In view of the arrival of this manuscript a little more promptly than
we anticipated, what are your recommendations with reference to the editing?
Do you or Phil desire to undertake it, or do you wish us to secure someone here?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1138
Department of Commerce,
Br real- of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Washington, April 29, 1940.
In reply refer to 35
(Penciled notation:). "WLH. Scan & return ECC
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street.
Neio York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter : In reply to your letter of April 24, I am informed by my
colleague, Mr. Ernest C. Popes, who handles information on Russian commercial
matters for this Bureau, that the whole matter of Soviet purchases from the
United States is one of considerable complication. The Soviets have bought con-
siderable copper from us during the past year because they were unable to obtain
it elsewhere. The figures over recent months, as far as we have them, are as
follows :
Copper to U. S. S. R.
Exports : ^*''-
Sept.-Dec. 1939 46, 782, 000
January 1940 53, 205, 7S4
February 1940 12, 816,549
Lbs 112, 804, 333
Reexports : Dollar.-'
Sept.-Dec. 1939 1, 149
January 1940 337, 476
February 1940 410, 077
->
748, 70i
Unable to get by the regulations of our Maritime Commission with shipments
of copper to Vladivostok, Amtorg, it appears, shipped the goods to Mexico where
they were reloaded on Soviet boats that had come over from Vladivostok. En
route to port, the vessels were stopped by the British and taken to Hong Kong
where they were turned over to the French who still have them, according to
reports. The last cargo stopped is reported to have been returned to the United
States, and a few days ago the Amtorg in New York offered a lot of copper for
sale but because of unsatisfactory prices offered the copper was withdrawn.
Oil shipments to Soviet Russia in 19.39 and 1940 were actually less than in
the two previous years, although it has been reported in the press that they
amounted to 2.500,000 barrels. Last year only ordinary gasoline was involved,
while in previous years the bulk of shipments were of aviation grade. Mr. Ropes
expre.sses the opinion that in all years these shipments were purely for the supply
5206 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of Soviet Russia in the Far Eastern area and that none was likely to get to
Germany.
Tin shipments appear large because the Soviets have not previously bought tin
in the United States at all, and actually the purchases from us are small compared
to the Soviet's annual imports over a number of years.
Relative to your inquiry regarding shipments of copper from Spain to Germany,
our Metals and Minerals Division does not have any definite Information. It is
known, however, that during the period of the Spanish Civil War considerable
quantities of copper or copper-bearing materials, produced at Rio Tinto, were
sliipped from Spain to Germany. The Division is inclined to doubt that much,
if any, coppei' has gone from Spain to Germany since the outbreak of the war
in Europe.
The newspaper reports which you mentioned in your letter as emanating from
Japan are given little credence here, because reports of a similar nature are almost
a daily occurrence in the course of political disturbances in the Far Eastern area.
With best personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
[S] C. K. Moser,
C. K. MOSER.
Chief, Far Eastern Section, Dicision of Regional Information.
Exhibit Xo. 1130
120 P]ast 52nd Strep:t,
New York Citu, April 2Ji, I't'iO.
Dr. C. K. MosKR
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Dr. Moser: Around the middle of April the British were making a fuss
over American shipments to Vladivostok. At that time, Mr. Butler gave out
figures calculated to give the public the idea that the total of American shipments
to the U.S.S.R. had increased greatly since the beginning of the European war.
An AP dispatch from Tokyo, dated April 23, which appeared in last evening's
and this morning's papei's contained among others, the following paragraphs :
"Reports reaching Japan said Vladivostok was choked with incoming cargoes
consigned to Germany, that warehouses were overflowing and docks piled
high. It was said that an average of 1,500 metric tons (1,653 American tons)
of carbon was being licensed daily for transshipment.
"American copper imports arriving at the Russian port from the outbi-eak
of the war until March 31 totaled 70,000 metric tons (71,140 tons) according
to Japanese statistics, whereas formerly Vladivostok received an average of
only 6.000 metric tons yearly. Imports of oil and tin had increased similarly,
it was said."
It begins to look as though it was the beginning of an Anglo-Japanese alli-
ance to scare people abroad about American shipments to the U. S. S. R. I assume
that you would be able to answer for me the following double question : Have
British and American exports to all U.S.S.R. ports increased or decreased since
the war began?
By the way, what information have you regarding shipments of copper de-
rivatives to Germany from a British-controled company in Spain to the amount
of 30,000 or 35,000 tons per month ?
May I explain to you privately my own personal position and that is that
it will be a political and strategical mistake of the first order for the Allies
to go to war with the U. S. S. R. Contrary to the popular opinion, I am convinced
that the U.S.S.R. wants to stay out of the war in Europe, but that if the British
and French continue their hostile attitude they may still succeed in effecting
an alliance between Moscow and Berlin as a substitute for the present Berlin-
JMoscow non-aggression pact.
Your reply will of course be treated confidentially. With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5207
Exhibit No. 1141
€oi)iesto: WLH
ED
OL
CTC
AB
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.,
2nd May 1940.
HA from ECC :
I note in a letter from Field to Shotwell about sending Carnegie publications
to China the following p. s. :
"Miss Hume also informs me that, as it is the only port which is definitely
open for shipments to China, packages should be marked 'Via Rangoon.' "
Will you please investigate and see whether hook packages that we are sending
to "free China" as differentiated from Hong Kong and Shanghai are and should
be marked "Via Raniioon."' When you have cleared up this point, would you
notify all whose initials appear at the bottom of this letter.
W^LH
OL
AB
ED
CTC
ECC
Exhibit No. 1142
May 2, 1940.
Mr. Edward C. Carter.
Secretary-General, Pacific CoinioiJ, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Ned : This will introduce Lt. Colonel George E. Arneman, who for the
past three years has been one of the most useful and active members of the
Hawaii Group, I. P. R.
He is the one who engineered the two Schotield conferences for us and has
been a member of several of our study groups. He was the G-2 intelligence
officer at Schofield Barracks and has had two different tours as military attache
in Baltic countries.
I want him to see the library and general workings of the Top Floor and
hope it will be possible for him to participate in one of your regional conferences.
His immediate assignment is to the state of Maine.
Sincerely yours,
Charles F. Loomis, Secretary.
Exhibit No. 1143
Telephone 5325 Cable : Inparel, Honolulu
Hawaii Group, Executive Committee : Riley H. Allen, Chairman ; A. L. Dean, Vice Chair-
man : Fnmk C. Atherton, Treasurer ; Charles F. Loomis, Secretary ; Robbiiis B. Anderson ;
Paul S. Bachman : Peter H. Buck ; David L. Crawford ; W. F. Dillingham ; Gerald W.
Fisher : Peyton Harrison ; Shao-chang Lee ; Frank E. Midkiff ; Iga Mori ; Philip S. Piatt ;
•Oscar F. Shepard ; Yasutaro Soga ; Hugh C. Tennet ; Heaton L. Wrenn
american council
Institution of Pacific Relations
501 Dillingham Building
honolulu, hawaii
May 3, 1940.
Mr. Edward C. Carter.
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Ned : Colonel Arneman is an enthusiastic I. P. R. booster and is re-
sponsible for getting several army officers in our Group. At least three of
5208 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
them have written saying that their contacts with our study groups while here
were the most stimulating ones they had.
He sails today on the U. S. T. Hunter Liggett to his new assignment in Maine
and will call on you and Field en route.
Sincerely yours,
Chas.,
Chas. F. Loomis.
End.
(Penciled notation :) P. S. — And what are your travel plans for the summer
and fall? Any new developments with our friends in Japan? — Chas.
Exhibit No. 1144
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, Mag 8, 1940.
Mr. William W. Lookwood,
American Committee for International Studies,
129 East 52nd Street, New York Citg.
Dear Bill : I have given your letter of May 2 considerable thought. Rather
than limit myself to one or two suggestions, I think it is better for me to make
quite a number which I regard as of great importance, or of being worthy of
further investigation.
In order that you may understand my reaction to your letter, and to this highly
interesting and signiticant statement which Earle and you have just issued
on the American Committee for International Studies, I am venturing quite
informally to send you quite a number of names.
Your Committee's statement, as well as the quality of its leadership and its
membership are most encouraging. As would be expected of the kind of leader-
ship that you and Earle are giving, it is encouraging to note that you are not
disinterested in relating scientilic research to questions of policy and that your
main objective is to make new and constructive approaches to the study of
international affairs.
You are, I think, familiar with Dr. Percy E. Corbett's general plan of work. He
has the approval of McGill for a continuation of major work on this project
after his return to McGill in 1941. In the meantime, he and I are looking
for an appropriate colleague with a Far Eastern background comparable to
Corbett's background in Europe, the Americas and the British Commonwealth,
in the hope that the two of them with appropriate assistance can make a
synthesis and interpretation of all that is mo-st fundamental in the I. P. R.'s
Far Eastern Inquiry with what is basic in the studies of Chatham House, of
P. E. P., of Shotweil's Committee, the New School, Buell's book and the many
European Studies and those that are appearing in Australia, New Zealand, and
elsewhere. Corbett is thinking not simply of a review of reviews or a synthesis
of existing plans. He aims to carry them further, more fundamentally and
contageously.
The basic work that he has in mind and much of the work of many of the groups
and individuals just mentioned would in my view be aided enormously if arrange-
)uents could be made for some such international exchange fellowships as the
following :
(1) Bring over R. II. Tawney so that he may appraise, critisize and interpret
the Corbett project, contribute to it and at the same time make a critique of
the plans of the other serious groups on this continent.
(2) Bring Ushiba, Saionji or Yokota in order that we may have someone from
the very inside of Japan closely in touch with current thought in the Japanese
army, and bureaucracies and the universities.
(3) Send Harriet Moore to the U. S. S. R. to go through all government and
party writing on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party
and ]iolltburo chiefs.
(4) Bring von Trott from Berlin to be associated with Corbett, Sansom,
Tawney and others, and hold him hei'e until a week before America enters the
war.
(5) Discover who is the most valuable man in the P. E. P. group, ncmely
the one principally responsible for the now really first-class P. E. P. Memo-
randum (7th Edition), and bring him to the United States after a visit with
Kittredge and his French colleagues in Paris.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5209
(6) If Tamagna turns out to be as promising as he loolvs on paper, send him
to Rome to undertake a study there on lines similar to Miss Moore's study in
Moscow, returning at the end of six months to give six months to collaboration
with the group under the direction of Corbett, Sansom, Holland, Alexander,
and also with the A. C. I. S., Earle and yourself.
(7) Discover whether there is one wise and great man in Manila — (Would
Apostol qualify?) — and have him spend three months on the project in Manila,
a month each in Chungking and Tokyo and then bring him, preferably by way
of the trans-Siberan railway, to collaborate with the groups here.
(8) Send Phil Jessup or Jack Sheppard for three months each to Batavia,
Chungking, Manila, Tokyo.
(9) Discover whether Myrdal would be free three months after his return
to Sweden to contribute an analysis of above-ground and under-ground concepts
in Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania
on postwar organization.
(10) After he has served six months in the French Army, if he is still alive,
dig up Dennery by the roots and bring him over to collaborate with Corbett,
Earle, and yourself. Failing Dennery, consider Joxe.
(11) Discover whether there is some European, African or British scholar
who knows the greater part of Africa from the political and economic angle,
and arrange for him to make a fresh visit to the principal African states and
colonies. After a ten-month survey of war repercussions and the establishment
of contact with that handful of people in each area who are thinking of postwar
organization, bring him to New York for collaboration with the groups here.
(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who are the one or
two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America
from a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact
with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New
York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there
is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization.
(13) Bring both Searle Bates and Chen Han-seng from China to collaborate
both with Corbett, Tawney, Sansom and Holland on the one hand and with
such groups as the American Committee may recommend on the other.
(14) Bring either Motylev, Troyanovsky or Voitinski, to contribute alike to
the I. P. R. Inquiry, Corbett's special synthesis and to such studies by other
American groups as may be recommended by the American Committee for
International Studies.
(1.5) Discover from S. K. Datta and Jawaharlal Nehru what Indian scholar is
qualified or could take time under a Rockefeller fellowship to qualify himself
to come to New York to contribute to the work of the various international
and national groups here.
The parochialism of even the greatest thinkers is such that unless international
organization is studied in an atmosphere that is made realistic by the physical
presence of people from every continent, grave errors are inevitable. You will
remember that in his A Study of History, Arnold .L Toynbee asserts that, as a
historian, he disapproves of the use to which historical information has been
put. He maintains that historical scholarship has substituted the nation for
mankind and thwarted the impulse to comprehend life as a whole. To support
this he examines one case and discovers that English history is unintelligible
when taken by itself. The "intelligible field of study" must be in some larger
unit than the nation. "Historical thought takes a deep impression from the
dominant in.stitutions and the transient social environment in which it happens
to live."
You will note that the people I envisage as fellowship holders and collabor-
ators represent everyone of the disciplines in the social sciences.
It seems to Holland and me that either your Committee or your Committee
acting jointly with the I. P. R. or the Rockefeller Foimdation itself should set up
a temporary research bureau in New York for the next three or four years,
devoted solely to studying the question of wartime and postwar problems.
Many of these suggestions, or perhaps the multiplicity of them, may cause you
to feel that I have gone beyond your request. This I have clearly done, but
I have been moved to do so by my fairly deep convictions. The I. S. C. has done
valuable work, but one of its principal limitations has been that it has been
too much conditioned by its European environment. The I. P. R. has done
valuable work, but it has been too much conditioned by its Pacific environment.
It seems to me that the war situation makes it more imperative than ever that a
nucleus of scholars be established somewhere in the world, probably of neces-
88.348—52 — pt. 14 20
5210 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
sity in New York, which can look at present problems of mankind from an even
more inclusive point of view than that of either the I. S. C. or the I. P. R.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1145
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.,
19th December, 1942.
Dr. Philip C. Jessup.
Colum'bia University, Neiv York, N. Y.
Dear Phil : Here are the rapporteurs" reports for the last group of Round
Tables. I think you will be particularly interested in the reports of Harriet
Moore, Fred Field, and Ralph Buuche. You will want to read, of course, ulti-
mately, Condliffe's report, though it was not regarded as measuring up as well
to the requirements as the three others.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1146
(Handwritten:) RWB, HP, FVF, KM, WLH.
Baguio, May 10, 1940.
Dear Mr. Carter : I have read Robert Barnett's article, China's Industrial
Cooperatives on Trial, and the comments of Rewi Alley and Miss Cholmeley on
this presentation. I am amazed that Barnett could have drawn such a clear
picture of both the strength and weakness of Indusco, from such a distance. He
is to be congratulated for his understanding of both the potential significance of
the movement (with which he is obviously in sympathy) and the dangers which
confront it with possible failure.
What comment I have to offer is not meant as criticism either of hi.s point of
view, which is good, or his objective analysis of the material available to him,
which is sound enough and as competent as anyone could have done without a
more intimate experience with complex problems that face Indusco workers in
the field. I offer these remarks merely to fill in a little of the background of those
problems. Most of it is probably already familiar to you. Fundamentally I
agree with Miss Cholmeley that the weakness of Barnett's article — if it is a
weakness — is failure properly to estimate the degree to which tlie political mileu
conditions the development of Indusco. This is fully implied also in Alley's
comment.
I will just enumerate a few things which might have been handled differently
if Barnett had possessed all the facts.
1. First of all, a word about the objectives of C. I. C. It is not correct, as far
as I know, that "conflicts developed among those who supported the movement"
over the points Barnett mentions. The charge of "communism" came from
C. I. C.'s enemies, not its supporters. Leaders in the organization all fear the
degeneration of the movement into a chi-kuan ; nobody advocates it. And without
exception they welcome foreign help and participation that offers any practicable
advantage.
P>ut a certain disagreement between some leaders over fundamental objectives
sometimes causes confusion of purpose. I should say the majority, in practice,
and almost everybody, in theory, admits that the first objective of C. I. C. is not
to set up a model cooperative movement in the midst of present chaos, but to
win the war. Therefore. C. I. C. is no place for the Rochdale orthodox to come
on pilgrimage, for their principles must be sacrified wherevei- they handicap the
primary purpose. Starting cooperatives with destitute workers possessing no
assets whatever is in itself a mortal sin in Rochdale eyes, yet this is Indusco's
essential method.
To win the war, Indusco recognized its task to be (1) to maintain independent
Chinese industrial production of some kind over the widest possible areas, both
in the rear and behind the Japanese lines, so as to offer a market for the gi'eatest
possible number of Chinese, (2) to mobilize Chinese skilled labor, in order to
prevent Japan from exploiting it in war aims, and for other obvious reasons,
(3) to furnish war bases for the guerrilla troops, (4) to achieve this mobilization
in a form which would strengthen the will and the sense of responsibility of the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5211
working class. Indusco people accepted these aims and the fundamental win-
the-wai' objective because everybody saw clearly that if China lost the war no
cooix>rative organization, however model or ideal it might be, could survive. Doz-
ens of examples of the fate of small-scale, carefully-charted pre-war institutions
(consider Ting Hsieu, for one) in the occupied areas proved this beyond any argu-
ment. The thing was to make this a practical mass organization on the biggest
scale possible, and quickly enough to affect the outcome of the war. Indusco is
above all a mass movement, as Alley keeps repeating, and as such it must acquire
much of its character from below. It is a war-time improvisation, a method of
mobilization, a section of national defense, an instrument of struggle, a training
ground for democracy, a social and political hope, and a focus for the help of all
those who believe it is desirable to have an independent democratic China. It is
all that and a lot of other things simultaneously with its organic form as a cooper-
ative movement. So you see liow very radically it differs from any cooperative
attempt of the past. Because of its unique character, Indusco can fail in some
respects as an efficient cooperative organization, but still be a triumph if it
attains its other objectives.
AVhile I think few inside the movement would dispute the priority of these
hopes, in theory, nevertheless there are some who in practice feel depressed when-
ever the cooperative ideal comes into conflict with the practical need. Thus you
find schisms occasionally where opposition develops to extending co-ops into
dangerous regions, to expansion to new areas or into new industries while existing
units are still in the formation stage, or to the sacrifice of cooperative principles
in order to meet emergency needs. E. g., the army order for 400,000 blankets was
filled partly by employing thousands of women on a piece-work basis. E. g., some
rear-line co-op workers object to C. I. C. extension into the guerrilla areas, where
the danger of loss through war greatly increases. Maybe, as Alley says, C. I. C.
is attempting too much. But if that is true it is because everywhere the need and
the opportunity are so urgent and the alternatives to C. I. C. are so weak, that
the latter cannot restrict itself as a peacetime organization might be able to do.
2. Now. in view of all this, one might think the various elements which make
up the Government would unanimously extend all possible aid to C. I. C. Such
is not the case, though I am afraid Barnett assumes it to be. Certain individuals,
originally lukewarm, are now stanch backers : Mme. Chiang, the Generalissimo,
Mme. Kung, Dr. Kung — in general the "palace satellite group". All liberal
and left-wing elements are behind it, but they have little to say in the Govern-
ment. The groups which dominate the bureaucracy, on the other hand, are
opposed to C. I. C. and will continue to be as long as it is not a chi-kuan under
their control. And these (chiefly the C. C. and the Cheng Hsiieh Hsi) are power-
ful enough to keep the organization from getting necessary financial backing,
often interfere with it locally, raise the baseless cry of "communism" to the em-
barrassment of its friends, and have had to be placated by compromises in certain
regions — which are consequently now the most backward of all.
3. C. I. C. has thus never been given its proper status as a national defense
institution, and the Soong family, while behind It, have never understood the
full implications of the objectives set forth aliove. Thus the Government help
(which up till now amounts to only about $3,000,000, as contrasted with about an
equal amount raised from bank loans and gifts) has been limited mostly to third-
line areas. It was not available for extraordinary expenses which really should
have come from defense expenditure: i. e., salvaging of tools and machinery,
transportation of essential workers, and the setting up on guerrilla industry.
Consequently, countless opportunities to save valuable means of production were
lost, especially in front line areas. The delay in recognizing C. I. C.'s defense
function cost China millions of dollars in lost plant and labor power. What
results it has accomplished in this respect have been financed largely by (1) gifts
from special funds raised by outside supporters, (2) borrowing "special funds"
from capital funds and charging them against loans made to the co-ops eventu-
ally set up. The latter is highly irregular, as Barnett rightly points out. But
what would you do. let the machines fall into enemy hands in order to be regular?
I note, for example, Barnett's praise for the removal of some of the Kingtehchen
kilns and workers to southeast Kiangsi. They would not be there today had it
not been for just the kind of irregularity which he — again quite rightly — de-
plores. Alley and other C. I. C. leaders have repeatedly plowed back their own
salaries into the organization, when the Government would not advance special
funds. Alley in fact put his life savings into this work; and so did others.
Often, due to bureaucratic manipulation, salaries (provided for the staff person-
nel by Government allowance from relief funds) were withheld for months.
5212 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
At one time Alley's own salary was seven months in abeyance. When I was in
Paochi stafE salaries had not been paid for three months and organizers were dig-
ging into their own pockets to meet daily needs. Show me another organiza-
tion, outside of the guerrilla districts, of which this is true. These men were
even facing the prospect of permanent withdrawal of Government aid and had
already brought the problem before the cooperative guild, and considered ways
and means of financing staff work from co-op contributions.
4. "The word cooperative is not mentioned." I know of no cases where co-ops
have been organized without a discussion of the co-op constitution, the pledge
of all to observe it, iiiid in no case has money been loaned to start private factories
or workshops. Unquestionably the basic principles are often but hazily under-
stood by new groups. But there is never any attempt to entice them into this
method of work by deception.
5. "In one co-op more than 200 light machine guns are made daily."' This is
incorrect. The output of China's best arsenal at present is only 200 machine
guns a month. Co-ops have made guns and grenades ; one in southern Shensi
turned out 70,000 hand grenades in one month, on Government order, but on
Government order stopped making them also. The Government does not want
co-ops to make munitions, and extends no aid to C. I. C. to build badly needed
war industries in the guerrilla districts.
6. Most of C. I. C.'s machinery has been salvaged from war areas, purchased
from inoperative plants, or made in its own machine shops. A little has been
imported. In few instances has any functioning plant been bought and turned
over to cooperative ownership. In many cases of handicraft industry one or
more members of a co-op possessed tools or light machines, but lacked operating
capital and technical direction. In other cases odd bits of machinery were lying
unused in scattered villages, but there was no one to bring them together to
create a workable industry. C. I. C. performed that function. Sometimes
Government-owned industry had been abandoned or partly dismantled, until
C. I. C. with great difficulty managed to buy it up and put it back into production.
This was true of C. I. C.'s alcohol plant in Shensi, and of the testing laboratory
there. It is true of a sulphuric acid plant in Sian, which C. I. C. has been try-
ing to buy. But — though the plant remains idle — the political opposition suc-
ceeds in frustrating the purchase.
7. Barnett praises co-op hospitals, schools, creches, and clubhouses. In most
cases these have had to be financed hy non-Government funds, or by methods he
would consider "irregular." When they have proved their value it is hoped the
Government will give them some support. The schools are opposed by the C. C,
who will probably succeed in preventing that support for some time.
8. The Shensi laboratory was not "placed at the disposal" of C. I. C. Though
it was idle, C. I. C. could not secure it from the Government except by payment of
an annual rental of $10,000. This latter will have to be supplied, probably,
from capital funds, until the Co-op Guilds become strong enough to maintain
it themselves — which should be the case in a year or so. Another irregularity —
but an imperative need.
9. "The Government may abandon its support" not because of inefficient
accounting metliods — C. I. C. has an infinitely better record in this respect than
the machine-bossed Credit co-ops — but because? it is making a determined fight
to keep its organization out ot the hands of the bureaucratic apparatus, and
it may lose. C. I. C. is the only war organization now training accountants
from the masses, from its own workers, and the only one whose accountants
are not machine appointees. Exceptions are found in Szechuan, wliere some
C.C. men have had to be given posts, under pressure from the party, and where
the worst co-ops in the organization are found. Government money "earmarked
for use by cooperatives has been withheld" not because of any proven case
of corruption but because of bureaucratic opposition.
10. Barnett is quite riglit in emphasizing the need for improvement in ac-
countancy, for a greater degree of discipline, and for greater coordination
of field workers with general headquarters. Due to various conditions, the
growth of the movement in the field has been far more rapid than the general
section could follow or direct. One vif these conditions is political. Another is
communications. It takes a week to reach Paochi from Chungking, and two
weeks to reach Kanchow. Telegrams take ahno.st as long. Money travels
about four times as slowly as that. People in Chungking have no conception of
the daily problems facing headquarters' chiefs, anil the latter more and more
assume responsibility for decision. The tendency now is definitely away from
too much centralized power, which has in the past handicapped the growth
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5213
of field work. Only when the woikins units become nnmerous and powerful
pnou.uh to be an important factor in national economic life can the central
section find its real place. The aim of most co-op leaders is eventually to bring
th.Tt section under the control of the many field units, through a National
Indnsco Guild, instead of the other way round. C. I. C. people are definitely
democrats, all their workers are being trained in democratic principles, and
that is .iust why "it is not always plain who the single individual is through
whom"' all authority is exercised. The aim of C. I. C. is to make that "single
individual" the united will of the co-op members, not the whim of a politician.
11. Barnett cites a case where "shares carried a fantastic multiple liability
of 2rt0 times their face value" and believes "reform is essential if the coopera-
tives are to merit continued financial support from government or non-political
sources." The case cited is unusual but all through the co-ops liability probably
exceeds share investment by from 10 to 50 times. Should we wait until the
destitute refiigees turn bandit, steal enough cash to buy a shop, and then come
back and get a loan to stai-t a coopei-ative? Barnett probably does not realize
the extraordinar.v rate of capital turnover in light industries in Free China.
In the whole C. I. C. chain it is now averaging 16.8 times per year, and it is
■quite possible for workers in some industries to pay hack an unsecured loan
in six months. In certain areas the value of C. I. C. production appears to be
as much as 25 times that of capital. This is quite "normal," and occurs in all
countries during infant industrialism. Even in Shanghai now an annual 10/1
ratio of production to capital is common. There ai'e many reasons for this,
which T won't go into here. In any case. Barnett's fears in this respect are
exaggerated — though that is the line of attack used by the C. C. and other
enemies of the movement. What they object to, however, is really the fact that
C I. C. loans are not under their control, and go to poor people instead of to the
gentry, as in the case of the so-called "agricultural cooperatives." The C. C,
through the co-op control commission, pumped 50 millions into the villages
last year, through the magistrates, who in many cases simply called in the
gentry and formed a "co-op" with them, distributing the manna without
further ado.
12. The "hired labor" problem is quite serious and C. I. C. must fight against
this abuse. No hard and fast rule can be laid down without more experience.
Clearly a machine shop co-op, for example, cannot take in 10 carpenters as mem-
bers when it needs their labor only for a special order to make wheels for carts,
or frames for looms, for which there may not be another demand for weeks or
months. Spinners, for whose products C. I. C. textile co-ops may have a
temporary need, also present a problem. Clearly the case cited by Barnett, where
in a co-op with 32 members only 16 were at work, together with 13 hired laborers
and 33 apprentices, was an outrage unless it was a temporary phenomenon.
I know that such cases exist in Szechuan, and that when discovered by inspectors
these co-ops are either reorganized or dissolved. Outside that province (where
C. I. C. faces an especially acute political struggle, as I have pointed out)
such instances are rare, though the problem definitely exists. Here Is just
the place, in fact, where C. I. C. would go to pieces if it fell in the hands of
Chinese Tammany methods. It would simply degenerate into another loan
bureau, through which the party machine would dump money into the pockets
of the t'u-hao and the lieh-sheng, to enable them to hire slave labor under the
name of "cooperation."
I would not like any part of this to be quoted under my name but I think it is
worth discussing at this length, so that American friends can better appreciate
the complexity of the tasks that face C. I. C. It is a great movement, with
great aims, and some fine men and women in it. Maybe it is attempting the
impossible, but so far it has achieved enough to keep hope alive. The real
danger is that it is moving much faster than the country as a whole, particularly
its political life. Only the war moves ahead of it, and in that emergency lies
the explanation of its existence at all. It is not "China's Industrial Cooper-
atives on Trial" reall.v — they have already proved that they are inherently
sound — it is "China on Trial Through Industrial Cooperatives."
I wish you would express my profound appreciation to Robert Barnett for his
brilliant statement on C. I. C. Despite the points of disagreement made above,
I think it is the best objective summary I have seen.
With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
[s] Edgar Snow
Edgae Snow.
5214 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1147
Institute of Pacific Relations,
Office of the Secretary-Generat..
129 East 52nd Street.
New York City, June 6, 1940.
Owen Lattimore, Esquire,
300 Oilman Hall, John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Owen : Here is Gaus' reply and my aclinowledgemeiit. Is Viiiceut com-
petent? Is he now in Washington? What do you suggest as the next move?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter
Edward C. Carter.
P. S. — Please return these letters at your convenience.
Exhibit No. 1148
The University of Wisconsin
department of political science
South Hall
madison, wisconsin
( June 3, 1940.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, •
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter : Thank you for your letter of May 29 with its invitation
to review the new book by Owen Lattimore. I am just reading the book with
very great pleasure and profit. I must say in all honesty, however, that I
simply lack the knowledge that a person should possess to review this book
adequately for Pacific Affairs. It is far too distinguished and important a work
to be left to one who is an amateur in these questions. And while I have read
all of Mr. Lattimore's books and some others on Asia, I have not visited that
region or made a special study of its history and problems.
I wonder if you know Mr. John Carter Vincent of our Foreign Service,
formerly a member of the staff of the Embassy in Peiping and during the past
year State Departinent representative at the International Labor Office in Geneva.
He knows Lattimore and his work, and he knows the Far East very well indeed,
as does his wife. I think that he may have been ordered back to this country
in view of the developments abroad, but I am not sure. I mention him,
because I know how much I would turn with eagerness to a review of this
book by him. Doubtless, however, you have many other experts on your list
who are available.
Thank you again for your kindness in inviting me to review the book.
Faithfully yours,
John M. Gaus
John M. Gaus.
JMG : EMB.
(Handwritten :) I find Pacific Affairs excellent.
Exhibit No. 1149
June 10, 1940.
KM from ECC :
Here is a copy of Corbett's proposal for the Summer, also a copy of his
project for the year, entitled, "I. P. R., European War, and International Organ-
ization." From the latter you may wish to make an appropriate note for the
forthcoming issue of I. P. R. Notes.
Miss Virginia Thompson has just completed the manuscript of her book on
Siam. She is at present a member of the International Secretariat in New
York cooperating in the study of the effect of the war in Europe on the policies
of those countries which are chiefly interested in the Far East. Iji this connection
her special field of study is the war and peace aims of France in relationship
to the Far East and the general problem of international organization.
ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5215
Chao-tiug Chi has been given six months leave of absence to assist in an
independent survey of the Cliinese transportation systems and war economy.
He sailed from San Francisco on May 15, 1940. It is expected that he vpill travel
widely in free China in connection with his present assignment.
Xagaharu Yasuo, who joined the International Secretariat on January 11, 1938,
for a ijeriod of two years, was able to get permission from Domei news agency
to continue as a member of the Secretariat longer than was originally proposed,
namely, until April 1st, when he resumed work for Domei, being posted in the
tirst instance in its New York ofiice. He has, however, been able to continue
part time work as a member of the Secretariat. It is hoped that he will be
able to continue to do so until his successor arrives in New York from Tokyo.
Exhibit 1150
[Night letter]
June 12, 1940.
MoTYi.Ev, Pacific Institute, 20 Rasin Street, Moscow (U. S. 8. R.) :
In view his recent Asia visit recommend you talk with Cripps.
Edward Carter.
Exhibit No. 1151
(Handwritten notation :) OL scan & return to ECC.
July 3, 1940.
ECC from RWB :
Thank you for letting me see Lattimore's "Empire in the East." I agree with
you that it represents an important point of view. His argument is, I believe,
that as China goes, so goes Asia ; that China may go under the yoke of colonial
domination and other Asiatic peoples follow, or China may wrest her inde-
pendence and freedom from the existing stalemate in the Far JEastern hostilities.
The future of half the peoples of the world lies largely, therefore, with the fate
of China. The argument is well taken. However, without exaggeration, the
argument may be carried even fui'ther for with the fate of China lies the future
of the other half of the peoples of the world as well. China loses and, whatever
happens in Europe, the United States and the British Empire (or its remnants)
must maintain a military and naval alert in the waters of the Pacific. China
wins and democratic processes acquire a practical verification which they have
not yet gained in Europe. Either of these developments will have far-reaching
repercussions upon democracy here. Thus, one might say that "as China goes,
so goes Asia — so goes democracy — so goes the United States."
On pp. 3-4 Lattimore refers to the lessons of Changkufeng and Namonhan.
I believe his implicit point is that the United States should take a bold stand,
in which I concur. But his depreciation of the argument that boldness unifies
Japan behind counteraction is contradicted by his admission that Japan did
attack the USSR. This argimient cuts no ice with American readers who in
general, desire only to avoid war ; not to win small ones.
(Penciled notation:) Copies to
Exhibit No. 1152
WLH
OL
HP
LKR
RWB
FVF from ECC :
July 2, 1940.
Recently I wrote to a Chinese friend in Hongkong asking about Kuomintang-
Communist relations. He is not a member of the Secretariat of either the China
I. P. R. or the Pacific Council. Under date of May 31st he wrote me as follows :
"Since last March I have been worried about the relations between the
Kuomintang and the Communists. You may be aware that the Communists
have been conducting publicity against the Central Government for the last
5216 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
12 mouths. They have printed lots of pamphlets under the name of a certain
Mr. Robert, at first at Hongkong and then at Manila. Their criticisms seem
reasonable enough, but it is strange that they should print them in English
instead of Chinese. Moreover, quite a number of Kuomintang magistrates
and officials have been done to death by the Communists in certain areas.
All this has been going on for the last ten months or so. The Central Gov-
ernment has done nothing to retaliate. But since last January, certain Party
members apparently couldn't stand any more Communist propaganda and
anti-Government actions. It was then decided that some measures should
be taken to counteract Communist propaganda. So a good many pamphlets
in Chinese have been circulated abroad detailing the anti-Government activi-
ties of the Communists. Tlie whole affair was deplorable. I did what I
could to impress upon our authorities the unfortunate effect which any semi-
official propaganda against the Chinese Communists would have on foreign
friends of China, and how welcome It would be to China's enemies. I sug-
gested that no more pamphlets should be circulated against the Communists,
and that the Central authorities should tell the Communists that they must
stop all anti-Government propaganda and subversive activities in future. I
am glad to tell you that this has been done. So, for the present at any rate,
there is peace between the Central Government and the Communists. But I
would deceive you if I do not tell you that there has been no final settlement
of the Kuoniintang-Conimunist misunderstanding. However, there is no
reason for undue pessimism. I still think that a satisfactory and lasting
solution is not impossible, if there is good faith on both sides.
"I have written rather frankly to you, because I owe it to you as a real
friend of China. The truth is oftentimes most unpleasant, but I know you
like to hear it. Please keep what I have here written confidential."
Exhibit No. 1153
129 East 52nd Strket,
New York, N. Y., llth July, 19 ',0.
Fredeeick v. Field, Esq.,
129 Ea^t 52vd Street,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Fred: Lawrence Duggan says that it will make it easier for Deborah
Hubbard to net into the press conferences at Havana if she goes as a correspond-
ent of a daily rather than of such august periodicals as the Far Eastern Survey
and Pacific Affairs.
Could you manage to have her accredited by PM or by any of the other
newspapers in which you are interested?
Deborah wouldn't object if PM had two representatives there : one to do the
work and herself to do the listening?
Deborah might go down for the illustrative section, as you will remember
she is both an artist and a researcher.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1154
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, July 15. 19J,0.
Dr. Philip C. Jesslt,
Columbia Un iversity.
New York City.
Dear Phil: Recently Holland wrote me as follows:
"The other day I had" a visit from Dr. H. W. Baerensprung who was introduced
by Carlson. He is a very interestinji German social democrat, formerly chief
of policy in Saxony and brought out to China by Rajchman as one of the various
experts in Rajchman's entourage. After Rajchman left he taught International
law in Soochow University for some time and then was employed by the nationa!"
government as a lecturer in the Central Police Training School at Nanking, and
later in Hankow and Chungking. He is still employed in this capacity and has
been sent to this country by Chiang Kai-shek to learn something of American
police methods, and is, accordingly, spending a good deal of time with the police
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5217
in Berkeley and Alameda where they apparently have a number of outstanding
authorities on various aspects of police and finger-printing vFork.
Baerensprung is hoping to return to Chungking but feels that what with the
Japanese blockade and the fact of his German nationality, he may find it
impossible to get back, especially if he has to go through Singapore and Burma.
He is an anti-Nazi and was imprisoned in Germany before he came to China
but this is no guarantee that he would not be interned in British Territory
today, although they let him come through Hongkong without difficulty a few
months ago. He apparently has enough to live on here for nine months or so
but is anxious to obtain one or two lecturing or research assignments that would
enable him to qualify with the immigration authorities as a teacher or research
worker, i. e. as a non-quota immigrant."
I do not know whether any department at Columbia would be interested in
getting Dr. Baerensprung for a lecture or two. If so, you may wish to pass
this letter on to the appropriate person.
He does not quite fit into the I. P. R. research program.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1155
american councii.
Institute of Pacific Relations
Incorporated
260 California Street, San Francisco
Nitta Maru, August 10, 1940.
Dear Carter : Enclosed is my original letter of July 2 to you, which in a cautious
moment I decided it would not be well to entrust to the Japanese post. I repeated
the gist of it in the letter that I did then send.
After my return from our five days in Peking I had leisurely talks with Taka-
yanagi at his home, and with Ushiba, Takagi, and Matsumoto in Tokyo ; also with
Yamakawa. The talk with Matsumoto was unfortunately cut short by the
sudden death of Mr. Cox, of Reuters who was one of his close friends.
It is not easy to summarize the long talks with Ushiba and Takayanagi, but
I will try. In trying to reflect the trend of attitude of the Japan Council toward
the IPR as a whole, and toward the Pacific Council and the Secretariat in particu-
lar, they of course did not always express their own attitudes.
1. There is a conviction that the Secretariat is biased in two unforunate
directions : in favor of China and of USSR. The former they think has been
fostered by Field, Jaffe (whose attendance at the Pac. Council stafi: meeting last
Dec. they resent), and Lattimore, and has been shared at times by you. The
latter they probably resent now more than they did a few years ago, since the
China war is so largely motivated by an anti-USSR objective, and its success
has been greatly hindered by the Red Army in China and by USSR. They doubt
that you and your white associates can overcome this bias sufficiently, or in time,
to reorient and redeem the whole IPR. They do not all distrust you, but I judge
that a majority of the leading minds do, even though they may like and admire
you, in great measure.
2. They mean to send at least one representatve to the next meeting of the
Council, but Matsumoto told me he could not possibly get away for it. Ushiba
is reluctant to go himself, but I believe vrlll do so, especially if a worth-while
agenda is proposed and submitted to the Japan Council as early as practicable.
3. Ushiba seems to hold some doubts as to the practical efficiency of the present
heterogeneous composition of the Pac. Council, and raised the question of some
possible regional groupings, with a federation of them all, which would be in
effect, an Inst, of World Relations. The trend of the European war lends weight
to this query.
4. A reorganization of the International Association of Japan is likely to occur
before long, according to Ushiba, and if it does, greater importance and leeway
will accrue to the Japan Council of IPR. I judge that it would, however, be
premature to count too surely on this.
5. I heard no criticism of the volumes of the Inquiry thus far published, except
that some of them were inevitably inconclusive, because the Sino-Japan conflict
is still in progress, and many trends will depend on its outcome ; not to mention
5218 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the effects of the European war on the Far East. They feel that the Japan
Council has lived up to its assurances respecting the parallel series of studies
made by them, and Ushiba says he has nearly completed the English translations.
They say that the authors are a group of younger men, competent and ambitious,
likely to be heai'd from as time goes on. I have only glanced at a few passages
in two of the eight volumes now out, but they seem to me promising. They will
apparently give an impressive array of data, with emphasis on those which
justify the positions talcen by the Japanese Government. That, at least, is the
tendency in one passage that I read.
6. Pacific AFt\\iKS sticks in their throats. They think that Lattimore's China
bias makes him an.\ious always to counteract the influence of any article that
seems to support Japan's case. But they admit that he has tried liard to secure
articles from Japan, and that they have not given him adequate aid to that end.
They seem to absolve Holland and Alsberg of bias in the administration of re-
searcli, in so far as they control it. None of the men I interviewed had yet read
Lattimore's new l)ook on China's Inner Frontiers.
7. As to tlieir attitudes toward the China war, I found some differences. All
but one of them showed an awareness of the moral weakness of Japan's position,
and of the extreme difficulty of achieving a decisive military or political victory
in China. They are disposed, however, to place heavy responsibility on the United
States for her negative and obstinately obstructive tactics toward Japan, and they .
think that if continued, this will drive Japan into the arms of Berlin and Rome.
Even Matsumoto seemed to believe that China needed Japan's tutelage, and that
Japan can not now turn back, although she should strive to make her benevolent
intentions convincingly clear. When I talked with Prof. Nasu in Peking he paid
no attention to military or political matters, but stressed the backwardness of the
Chinese farmer and villages, and the great need of the science and administrative
efficiency that Japan was beginning to contribute. I am now trying to organize
my voluminous notes of other interviews, and to write a couple of articles. The
day before we sailed I made a short-wave broadcast to the Western U. S. from
Tokyo, and in it I incorporated briefly a point or two. Am sending a copy of it to
Fred Field.
Very inadequate and spotty though this letter will seem, I send it for what
it may be worth.
Faithfully,
(Signed) G. M. Fisher.
Exhibit No. 1156
(Handwritten notation:) Copies to
PCG
HM
JWW
BKB
CA
AG
WLH
MSF
E.TT
CO
(Handwritten notation:)
HA
FVF
WWL
JS
PEC
Council of the USSR,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
20, Razin kitreet, Moscow, August 21, 1940.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
120 East 52nd street. New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.
Dear Carter: Under separate cover I am sending you a complimentary copy
of my latest book entitled "The I'acific Nexus of the Second Imperialist War,"
which has just been published in a cheap edition in 20,000 copies as a part of
our Institute's work.
This study, which represents the continuation of my first small book, will
be included, in a much enlarged form, of course, as Part II in the monograph
on which I am working at present.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5219
The book was finished last spring and I made the last additions to it by the
end of May. However, unfortunately, the publication was somewhat delayed
in print.
Simultaneously, I am sending you a reprint of my article "Anglo German
Contradictious in the Epoch of Imperialism"' which appeared in the sixth issue
of the publication "Pod Znamenem Marxizma." I hope that this article con-
taining my interpretation of the reason.s which led to the present war, will be
of some u.se in tlie Institute's library.
Yours sincerely,
V. Motylev.,
V. E. Motylev.
(Handwritten notation:) Return ECC to send cable.
(Handwritten notation:) Many thanks for yours Aug. 21 eagerly awaiting
arrival your book. Please send 20 additional copies each Pacific Nexus and
12 copies Anglo G Contra.
Exhibit No. 1157
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, September 20, 19^0.
Mortimer Graves, I-']squire,
American Council of Learned Societies,
West Newbury. Massachusetts.
Dear Graves : Ben Dorfman and Knight BiggerstafC liave recently written
me with reference to a grant-in-aid for Mi-. Jay Robinson, who apparently has
an unusual knowledge of the Chinese language. He is within a year of getting
his Ph. D., has supported himself throughout his scholarly career, and accord-
ing to Dorfman and Biggerstaff. is a man of promise.
Enclosed is a copy of a letter that I have written to Ben Dorfman on the
subject.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1158
Institute of Pacific Relations
Amsterdam — London — Manila — Moscow — Now York — Paris — Shanghai — Sydney — Tokyo —
Toronto — Wellington
OFFICE of the secret art-general
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Massachusetts, 24th September 19-'/0.
Ow^EX Lattimore, Esq.,
300 Oilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Owen : On September 20 Holland wrote me as follows regarding Shore's
article :
"I agree with you that the article on 'Sun Yat-sen, Lenin and China,' by
Maurice Shore, is too long for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. I also have the feeling
that this kind of doctrinal discussion is no longer so useful as it might have
lieen before the present Sino- Japanese war started. Moreover, I suspect that
you would get violent differences of opinioin on almost all the issues raised
by Shore if you were to submit the article to such people as Holcombe, McNair,
Browder, Anna Louise Strong, Ed Snow. Harold Isaacs, and Chen Han-seng,
not to mention Borodin, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. That does not
necessarily damn the article, but it suggests that it might better appear in one
of the learned .iournals or else in pamphlet form. Could Owen, perhaps, raise
with the author the question of submitting the article to some of the people I
have mentioned with a view to getting it published, together with their comments,
in pamphlet form? I personally feel that the value of the study would be im-
mensely increased if the author could attempt to apply his arguments to, or to
5220 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
consider how Lenin and Sun Tat-sen might have reacted in the face of, tlie pres-
ent situation in China. Admittedly it would take a pretty colossal intellect to
do such a thing."
I have no idea what your reaction will be to this.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1159
Sunset Farm.
Lee, Massachusetts, September 26. 1940.
Owen Lattimoke, Esquire,
SOO Qilman Hall, John Hopkins Universitp,
Baltimore, Maryland
Dear Owen : Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important mono-
graph for the I. P. R. Inquiry, is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has
completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has
done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese post-war history
and also on Indian history. He will be delighted to contribute to PACIFIC
AJ^'FAIKS if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some
evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into
your plan for PACIFIC AFFAIRS during the next two years. I think you
know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Peffer.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1160
Telephone : District 3395 Cable Address : ACOLS
American Philosophical Society, 1727 ; American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1780 ;
American Antiquarian Society, 1812 ; American Oriental Society, 1842 ; American Nu-
mismatic Societv, 1858 ; American Philological Association, 1869 ; Archaeological Insti-
tute of America, 1879 : Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, 1880 ; Modern
Language Association of America, 1883; American Historical Association, 1884; Ameri-
can Economic Association, 1885 ; American Philosophical Association ; 1900 ; American
Anthropological Association, 1902 ; American Political Science Association, 1903 ;
Bitilio'iraphical Societv of America, 1904; American Sociological Society, 1905; Ameri-
can Society of International Law, 190G ; History of Science Society, 1924 ; Linguistic
Society of America, 1924 ; Mediaeval Academy of America, 1925
American Council of Learned Societies
IMember of the International Union of Academies
Executive Offices : 907 Fifteenth Street
washington, d. c.
October 10, 1940.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52d St., New York, N. Y.
Dear Carter : I am happy to send you two more copies of Notes on Far Eastern
Studies in America, No. 7.
Sidney Glazer is on my list in Arabic and Russian. His name will go into the
Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel as soon as the people on H Street
get it working.
Last week-end, we discussed Mr. Jay Robinson as one of our problems in Far
Eastern personnel. Most of the members of the two Committees knew him, and
all were exceedingly favorably disposed toward him. There is, however, a
very general feeling that he is not in our field. His interest in social and eco-
nomic phases of Far Eastern studies are primary, and he has his linguistic
competences. We have been able earlier to rationalize help to social scientists
on the theory that we were giving them language training, and that after all
language is a "humanity." This rarionalizatioii does not seem possible in Robin-
son's case. Thei'e was general agreement that he would be an excellent man for
you ; in fact that his whole career to date has been training for the kind of thing
which we assume you are doing.
The consensus of opinion was that Mr. Robinson ought to be set down to doing
a job within his competences, and made to stick to the job until he had cleaned
it up. I should think that he might be urged to apply to the Social Science Re-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5221
search Council. Why not give him a card to Phil Mosely, who is with the SSRG
this year, or to somebody else in that organization? I would be quite willing to
convey the opinion of our Committees, individually and collectively, that he is
an excellent prospect, but he just simply is not up our alley. If you know of any
argument against this view, I should be pleased to see what can be done with it.
Most sincerely yours,
[s] M. Cx.
MoKiiMER Graves,
Administrative Secretary.
Exhibit No. 1161
129 East 52d Street,
New York City, October U, 1940.
Urgent
Frederick V. Field. Esquike,
16 West 12th Street, Neiv York City.
DejIr Fred : Here is the galley proof of Peffer's manuscript. Don't bother
with typographical errors. I am most worried over the manuscript because of
a good many very sweeping and unsupported assertions in the manuscript. I
am also a little uncomfortable because he assumes that the behavior of all the
Western Powers, including the U. S. S. R., in the Far East is similar. Finally,
he assumes and declares that the U. S. S. R. is an imperialist power.
I hasten to say that so far as brilliance of style is concerned Peffer's book is
tops in the I. P. R. series.
Sincerely yours,
Exhibit No. 1162
Edward C. Carter.
A. Grajdanze\%
October 15, 1940.
To B. C. CARTER,
Secretary of the IPR:
Dear Mr. Carter : Herewith I enclose a short summary of the contents of
Dr. Motylev's book and the full translation of its conclusions. I do not think
that there is something new for the members of the Institute in this book except
the interpretation of the known facts, but this interpretation is quite clear
from the Conclusions which I translated in full.
By the way, out of 60 quotations in the book 13 are taken from the IPR
books, Far Eastern Survey and Amerasia (others are chiefly the works of S
Stalin, the Oriental Economist and Foreign Trade Statistics). Evidently the
works published by the Institute and its affiliations are studied in Moscow.
May I report you also that the cataloging of the books in Japanese language in
the Library of the IPR is finished and that we have with the recent additions
1,494 volumes for each of which we have two cards (by the author and contents) ,
an entry in the list of the books ; each book has its number on the title page,
on the first and last pages, so that one may easily find in the list the name
of the author, the translation of the title, the name of the publisher, place,
year, and month of the publication, edition, number of pages, and the price.
Herewith I enclose also a list of 20 books just received from Japan, so that
you can see whether there is something what you consider good for translation.
Yours respectfully,
A. Grajdanzev,
(Penciled notation:) Copies to WLH
OL
V. MOTYLEV
The Pacific Knot of the Second Imperialist War, Moscow, 1940, 200 pp., 20,000
•copies.
Introduction — the meaning and the importance of the Sino-Japanese War.
Ch. I. China at the end of the third year of her war for national liberation.
The Creation of the United Front. Three stages of the War. Now — the
stage of the equilibrium. The military-economic construction in China. The
5222 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
economic ties of China with capitalist powers. A hope is expressed that the
development of the economic base in the West will finally make China independ-
ent from foreign supplies.
Chapter II. Japan at the end of the third year of her military adventure in
China. Stimuli and direction of the Japanes aggression. It is shown that
Japan is richly endowed for peaceful development. The National Income
and the problem of the financing of war. The problem of the raw materials in
the tlilrd year of war. Symptoms of the coming economic crises in Japan.
Political situation in Japan.
Chapter III. Pacilk- interests and Pacific policy of the USA. USA as a Pacific
power. Economic interests of the USA in the Pacific. Japano-American an-
tagonism and the Far Eastern policy of the USA. The author shows that the
American policy is based first on the commercial principle of getting profits
from the Chinese as well as from the Japanese; second, on the principle of
the open doors, i. e., the USA as an industrially developed country is sure of
her success in case of the open door competition in China. Thirdly, on the
readiness of certain groups in the USA to support Japan as a bulwark against
the USSll. These groups pray also for the Russo-Japanese war.
Naval construction of the USA in the Pacific. The author presents the
bases under construction as the bases not only for defense, but also for an
offense. The problem of the Philippines' independence. The author ex-
plains some steps made in the direction of the independence (1) by the
desire of the USA to bring Great Britain, France, and Netherlands face to
face with Japan (because before these po\\ers felt that they are sheltered
by the Philippines against Japan and could safely play Japan against the
USA) and (2) by the economic competition of the Philippine sugar with
Cuban sugar. But he believes that this policy is undergoing a change.
Chapter IV. The Economic Interests and the policy of Great Britain. France,
and Netherlands.
Chapter V. The Economic interests and the policy of Germany and Italy.
Conclusions — translated fully.
Conclusions
EUROPEAN AND PACIFIC "KNOTS" OF THE SECOND IMPERIALIST WAR
In the preceding chapters the inner logic of the development of the Pacific
knots leading to the Second World War was examined. The influence of the
Imperialist War in Europe on the War in China and on the Pacific knot of
contradictions connected with it was taken into consideration as much as was
necessary in each particular case. This does not preclude, however, the neces-
sity of considering the interconnection of the European and Pacific knots as a
whole. Insofar as the probable interaction of these two knots of the Second
Imperialist War is only beginning to take definite forms, we shall limit our
task to the mere formulation of the problems. The turning of the Pacific knot of
Imperialist contradictions into the Pacific knot of the Second Imperialist War
was proceeding in direc-t connection with the development of the Second Im-
perialist War in Europe. The struggle of Japan for the subjugation of China
is only a part of the struggle for the redivision of the capitalistic world which
brought on the Second Imperialist War. The outbreak and development of
the Imperialist War in Europe has changed the .situation in the Pacific and is
of tremendous importance in connection with the development of the Sino-Jap-
anese War and Imperialist rivalry on the Pacific. There is a real danger that
the Pacific War will fuse with the European War. First, the war in Europe
caused such a weakening of British and French military positions in the Pacific
that the Anglo-French imperialists become very interested in safeguarding
their rear through an agreement with Japan. At the same time the development
and intensification of the Second Imperialist World War and the growth of the
national-revolutionary movement in India, Burma, etc., as well as the successful
progress of the Chinese War of national liberation present a growing danger
to the Anglo-French Imperialists fs factors in the revolutionization of the
colonial peoples. All this makes these imperialists interested in a speedy end
to the Sino-Japanese war, even at a price of recognition of Japanese demands
on China, at least of a substantial part.
These Imperialists undoubtedly cherish a "clever" plan to bring .Tapan over
on their side, to induce her to sever her trade connections with Germany, to
provoke the deterioration of the Soviet-Japanese relations, etc. In this respect
the information reaching the world press that Great Britain and France are ready
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5223
to supply Japan with necessary raw materials, if she severs her trade connections
with Germany, is symptomatic. If this is true, it means that the British-French
imperialists are trying to use the acute shortage of raw materials and foreign
exchange in Japan to draw Japan in on their side with promises of help.
However, the British-French imperialists are interested in such a policy
only insofar as they can buy Japanese "friendship" in a time of European War.
The fate of this policy depends upon the problem of whether with these con-
cessions to the Japanese demands they will be able to draw Japan into their
orbit. If Japan, with the further development of the European war follows a
German orientation, the British-French imperialists may become interested in
a more intensive use of China against Japan. In spite of all their anti-Chinese
actions and maneuvering, they are intei-ested in China as a tool of their plans.
But even in case a rapprochement with Japan, is realized the growing threat
of Japan to the British and French possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans
cannot be removed.
Secondly, with the growth of demand for American arms on the part of the
Euroi^ean countries the American Imperialists become less and less interested
in selling arms and raw materials to China and Japan. At the same time
continuation of war in the Far P^ast threatens with social and political con-
sequences in China and Japan which are contrary to the interests of American
Capitalists. The hope of the American imperialists that at a certain stage
of exhaustion of the belligerents the USA will be able to dictate a peace which
will be profitable for the American Capitalism becomes more and more iincertain.
This is the reason why the American Imperialists want a speedy end to the
war in China, even at a price of certain concessions to Japan. But though
the USA are evidently ready to recognize temporarily certain Japanese demands
in China, they, unlike to British and French imperialists, are unwilling to
sacrifice their own present and future chances in China. This circumstance
makes difficiTlt an agreement between American and Japanese imi>erialists.
In any case the first attempt of the USA to compel Japan to agree to a compro-
mise which would be acceptable to the USA was not successful and brought
on a new deterioration of Japano-American relations.
In general, whatever maneuvers the American imperialists may carry out
for the speedy end of the Sino-Japanese war, this cannot remove or even mitigate
the intensity of Japano-American contradictions, especially becau.se the develop-
ment of the European war may bring a new burst of Japano-American rivalry
in connection with the struggle for redivision of the Asiatic territories.
Thirdly, the British-French imperialists (and to some degree, the American
imperialists) interested in the speedy end of the Sino-Japanese war have brought
pressure on the Chinese national government with the purpose of getting its
consent to the concessions, i. e., capitulation to tlie Japanese. Insofar as certain
groups of Chinese bourgeoisie are closely connected economically with the
foreign capitalists, this new attitude adopted by the British, French, and
Americans strengthens the psychology of capitulation among these groups.
This creates an atmosphere favorable to the intensification of Japanese intrigue
inside of the Kuomintang and for the provocative work of the Japanese agents
in China. This results in the activity of the right wing of the Kuomintang,
which wants to liquidate the united anti-Japanese national front, which was
and is the only real base of the war of national liberation.
But this defeatist attitude is in sharpest contradiction with the development
of the Sino-.Iapauese war, with the relative strength of Japan and China, with
the present phase of the war of national liberation, with the interests and mood
of the Chinese masses, with the aims of all progressive elements in the Kxiomin-
tang. For almost three years now the heroic Chinese people have been fighting
for their independence. This war has proved beyond doubt that militarily
China is able to resist successfully the Japanese plans of enslavement. Since
the end of 1938 the line of fronts in China has been almost stal)le and a period
of balance of forces has begun. Now it is clear to the whole Chinese people
and even to the whole world that the Japanese imperialists will not be able
to enslave China with bayonets alone. Meanwhile, the political maturity of
the Chinese masses, their activity and their organization has reached such a
level that they will not be leconciled to a defeatist position, whoever may be
behind it. Wrote Chou-eng-lai : "Even if we admit that the Japanese im-
perialists may siicceed in their plot — to strike a blow at the anti-Japanese
forces and to their imity with the help of the defeatists and appeasers, just
the same, the masses of China, the armed forces of the country and all anti-
Japanese parties and groups in China will steadfastly continue their anti-
Japanese war till the victorious end."
5224 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Thus, under all conditions the anti-Japanese war of national liberation will
continue. Meanwhile, .Japan is so weakened by this war, the political state and
the morale of her army in China is so impaired that the continuation of war
will become more and more dangerous for the Japanese imperialists and pregnant
with disasters inside Japan.
Fourth — and this especially important, — each change in the balance of Euro-
pean war will find its reflection in the Pacific and may cause the spread of war
in the Pacific. The essence of the problem of the Pacific is the struggle between
the Imperialist powers for hegemony in Asia and the Pacific approaches to Asia.
If one keeps this in mind, then it becomes clear that the new intensification of the
imperialist struggle in the Pacific is possible not only with regard to China, but
also, for example, with regard to the Dutch Indies and for any territory which
may become a definite object of war. Above it was shown that neither the
Japanese nor the American imperialists are ready to give up the Dutch Indies
to the rival in case of violation of Netherlands' neutrality.
But the development of the European war may create a situation in which the
British and French possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans will become
more defenseless than now ; and though Japan is exhausted by her war with
China and needs peace, the spirit of adventure of her ruling groups may throw
them into the struggle for the redivision of the British and French colonial
Empires. But it is clear that this will bring nearer the moment of Japanese-
American armed conflict in the Pacific. Though this variant of the develop-
ment of events is not the only possible one, yet it is clear that the American
imperialists are not ready to permit the Japanese imperialists to use the war
in Western Europe to thoroughly strengthen the Japanese positions in the West-
ern Pacific and in Asia. Quite the contrary ; the American imperialists want to
use the weakening of Great Britain and France in the Pacific in order to
strengthen the American positions at the expense of the former. At the same
time the British imperialists, even under stress of war in Europe, are ready to
use Japano-American contradictions to their own advantage. All this shows
that the development of war in Western Europe intensifies the Japanese-Amer-
ican antagonism. There are, of course, other problems of interdependence and
interaction of the Pacific knots of the Second Imperialist War. But even these
which were mentioned show how close is the connection between further develop-
ment of the Pacific knot of the second imperialist war and the development of
this war as a whole.
Exhibit No. 1163
Columbia University
In the City of New York
October 18, 1940.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 East 52d Street, New York City.
Dear Ned : I have read Miss Farley's memorandum. I hope to see Phil Jessup
and talk it over with him. I think that he is right in believing that it is better
to wait until after the election. No such letter is likely to get much attention
now, but it might be more useful after the election.
I am in doubt as to whether an open letter like this would do much good. I
think that the general idea is well expressed, and it is of course an idea in the
minds of a few people, but I do not think that in this form it would have much
effect as a letter to the Times. Possibly, if we could have a dinner of some sort,
particularly with a group of men like the American Council, with some of the
really strong names on the Council ready to endorse the statement, we might get
general press publicity.
I understand that there is a committee in the State Department working on
plans after the war, of which Wilson, former American Ambassador to Berlin,
is the chief, and with which Mr. Welles is concerned. So far as the State De-
partment is concerned, it seems to me that there would have to be work done
with this committee or with Feis and Livesay, or Pasvosky, who appear to be the
economic advisors to the Secretary. You might get started in the Department
through someone in the Far Eastern Division who could urge on the powers-that-
be in the Department the value of working with the Institute. That I think
would be the most effective procedure, and I doubt whether newspaper publicity
would be of value in pushing such a program.
To take away the impression that this is simply a group of professors, it
might be a useful thing if you could get some businessman to go down with you
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5225
and Jessnp to talk with the State Department, and then you could perhaps lay
out more definitely the general terms of a study which could be worked in with
consideration of the European situation and its consequences as part of a world
settlement. Even taking Eastern Asia by itself, it would be an advantage to
make some such study. I suppose you are already working with the committee of
which Ed Earle appears to be the head. I have not had a chance to see how
far they are going or what they are doing, but I am a great believer in cooperating
with any important organization which seems likely to produce some effect.
Yon will know better than I if Ed Earle's group fills this prescription.
I trust that Mrs. Carter is much improved. Again give her my best regards
and my best hopes for her getting back to normalcy more successfully than the
United States was able to do after the shock of the last war or, perhaps more
notably, after the shock of the depression.
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) Joseph P. Chamberlain.
Exhibit No. 1164
PACIFIC council
Institxtte of Pacific Relations
Columbia Unversitt,
October 29, 1940.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 E. 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Ned : I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as is, much as I
would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the two,
sometliing like this :
"Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Council
since 1928, has resigned in order to become Executive Secretary of the
American Peace Mobilization. 'The American Peace Mobilization is a mass
organization of progressive trade unions, farm, church, youth, Negro and
fraternal groups dedicated to preserving the interests of the United States
rhrough the strengthening of American democracy and through non-participa-
tion in the war between England and the fascist powers.' Mr. Field had a
deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility and
felt that in view of the acceptance of his new position, it was not possible for
him to continue his olRcial connection with the I. P. R. The Executive Com-
mittee, being forced to the conclusion that ]Mr. Field's decision was final, felt
compelled to accept Mr. Field's resignation with great regret. It expressed
its appreciation of the distinguished service that Mr. Field had rendered
(luring his eleven years of service to the American Council and expressed the
hope that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to
resume active leadership in the work of the I. P. R."
Perhaps we could add to that the expression of appreciation which came from the
staff.
How does that strike you?
The paragraphs in regard to Lasker seem to me excellent.
Sincerely yours,
Chil.
Exhibit No. 1165
129 East 52 xd Street,
Nciv York, N. Y., 29th October 19^0.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
300 Oilman Hall, Johns noi)kins Vnirersitij, Baltimore, Maryland.
Dear Owen : If the page proof of Pacific Affairs is still on your desk, may I
suggest two minor changes?
First, in your admirable and very important summary of Motylev's book, I
think you might add on the bibliographical side that Motylev refers to a consid-
■erable number of I. P. 1'. jiublications. I note, for example, in addition to the
sources that you mention, references to the Far Eastern Survey, to Miriam Far-
88348— 52— pt. 14 21
5226 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ley's book in the Inquiry Series, to Bisson's book in the Inquiry Series, to Remer's
book done at the instance of the I. P. R. on Foreign Investments in China, and to
Kurt Bloch's I. P. R. Inquiry book on German Interests.
In view of the considerable number of references to I. P. R. sources I think
we might allow ourselves a little backscratching, at least to the extent of one
I. P. R. reference.
Second, Adam von Trott has found that the best way of advancing the interests
of the I. P. R. in these difficult days in Germany has been to join the staff of the
Foreign Office to promote Far Eastern studies. As a member of the P'oreign
Office, therefore, he is ineligible to be a member of the International Secretariat
and his name should be deleted from the last page of Pacific Ajffaiks.
I may add privately that he will continue to cooperate with us in every possible
way, though naturally his area of operations is considerably circumscribed.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1166
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, November 6, 1940.
His Excellency the Soviet Ambassador,
Embassy of the U. S. 8. R., Washington, D. G.
Dear Oumansky : It is a matter of the greatest personal regret to both
Mrs. Carter and myself that we are unable to accept the very kind invitation
which you and Mrs. Oumansky have sent us for the Twenty-Third Anniversary.
A long time before your invitation arrived I had promised to preside at a
gathering from five to six-thirty on November 7 here in New York, and I have
not been able to get relieved of this responsibility. Though airplanes are fast,
they can't get me from New York to the Embassy between 6 : 30 and 7 : 00.
Mrs. Carter is making good progress, but she is not yet quite at the place
where a journey to Washington is feasible.
You know that neither of us has ever wanted to "snub" the U. S. S. R.
Embassy — least of all at the present time.
With very kindest regards to you and Mrs. Oumansky from us both, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1167
In Celebration of the Twenty-third Anniversary
of the Great October Socialist Revolution
The Ambassador
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Oumansky
request the honor of the company of
Mb. and Mrs. Edward Carter
at a reception
on Thursday, November the seventh
from five until seven o'clock
at the Embassy
R. S. V. P. Please present this card at the door
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5227
Exhibit No. 1168
The American Council
of
The Institute of Pacific Relations
and
The American Russian Institute
cordially invite you to a dinner conference
on
The Problems of American-Soviet Relations
Tuesday, November 19, 1940
8 : 30 O'clock
at the
Twentieth Century Association
3 Joy Street '
Boston, Massachusetts
Spealiers
Edward C. Carter, Chairman '
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations
Bruce C. Hopper
Professor of Government, Harvard University
Joseph Barnes '
Foreign Editor, New York Herald Tribune
(Discussion and question period will follow speeches.)
R. S. V. P., Harriet L. Moore., 64 Griggs Road, Brookline, Mass.
$1.25 per plate
(Please make checks payable to Miss Moore)
Exhibit No. 1169
129 East .52nd Street.
New York City, November 28, 1940.
Dr. Philip C. Jessup,
Columbia University, Neio York City.
Dear Phil : In view of the probable importance of the Princeton discussions
I am inclined to think that we should invite two or three younger men to come
in the role of recorders or rapporteurs. What would you think of our creating
a panel for this purpose consisting of William W. Lockwood, Charles Dollard,
and William D. Carter?
Bruce Hopper has just written that he cannot come, though he regrets greatly
that he is not free. What would you think of our asking Joseph Barnes? He
has as good, perhaps a better, idea of the potentialities of Soviet policy as it
may affect or be affected by American or British policy in the Pacific.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter,
5228 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1170
December 2, 1940.
CP from ECC :
Yoii found the essence of Miriam's letter to Jessup. Here is the whole letter
and there is nothing of importance in the resolution except what you had already
spotted.
I have taken the liberty of slightly elaborating your first draft. I enclose a
copy of what I have written. I hope it will meet with your approval.
(Handwritten:) This is exactly what should have been written. Sorry the
job fell to you.
CP
F
Frederick V. Field. — It was voted unanimously to record the American Coun-
cil's appreciation of the work of Frederick V. Field as follows :
It was with the deepest regret that the Board of Trustees learned that the
Executive Committee had foimd it necessary to accept the resignation at its
meeting of September 18 of Mr. Frederick V. Field from the Secretaryship of
the American Council. As the minutes of that meeting showed, the Chairman
of the Committee, Mr. Parker, had asked the Chairman of the American Council
whether he felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the Secretary-
ship. Dr. Jessup had replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final.
Mr. Field joined the staff of the American Council in 1929. During his eleven
years of service he has demonstrated an unusually high quality of leadership.
The program of the American Council has expanded notably under his direction,
partly because of his own untiring efforts, and partly because of his imaginative
leadership in developing the cooi^eration of the entire staff. Mr. Field was
one of the Founders of the Far Eastern Survey. He was the author of "Ameri-
can Participation in the China Consortiums," published by the University of
Chicago Press, and presented as a research study at the Hangchow-Shanghai
Conference of the Institute in 19.31. In 1932 and 1933 he acted as Editor-in-chief
of the "Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area," which was published by Double-
day-Doran and Company in 1934 with a foreword by the late Mr. Newton D.
Baker. In this monumental work his own research abilities, together with his
rare capacity for stimulating research on the part of his colleagues, were strik-
ingly exhibited. It was largely through his initiative that the series of regional
conferences on American foreign policy were developed in various parts of the
United States in 1938, 1939 and 1940.
While he was executive secretary the membership of the American Council
more than doubled, but it is impossible to make a full record of his services to
the American Council, because in innumerable unknown and anonymous ways
he has contributed to the maintenance and expansion of the IPR program. His
capacity to surround himself with young and able scholars has served as a
compelling example in other National Councils. His services likewise to the
International Secretariat and the I'acific Council have been a major contribu-
tion to the development of the Institute's international work.
Throughout his connection witli the Institute he has been most scrupulous and
exacting in maintaining the highest objective standards for his own IPR writing
and that of his colleagues. He has combined personal modesty with the capacity
to inspire high achievement on the part of others. He has been noted for his
practical wi.sdom in counsel and amazing energy in action.
The Board of Trustees desire that the officers assure Mr. Field that his job on
the American Council staff will be awaiting him when he completes his present
work.
Exhibit No. 1171
(Handwritten letter :) To Mr. E. C. Carter.
Dec. 13, 1940.
Dear Mr. Carter: I think that there is no necessity to translate the whole
book of Mr. Motylev because the basic ideas were well presented in Owen's
review. However if you find it necessary it may take 10 days of work.
Yours respectfully,
Grajdanzev.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5229
Exhibit No. 1172
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OP FAR EASTERN LANGUAGES
Harvard-Yenching Institute
Boylston Hall
cambridge, massachusetts
December 17, 1940.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd St., Neiv York City.
Dear Sir: As you may already know, there is an urgent need for Japanese
interpreters and translators for service with our armed forces. There is a
project to create here a special training centre to give additional instruction
to those who know some Japanese. These men will probably be given com-
missions in the navy or in the marine corps and will have their full expenses
paid while studying here.
Before a final decision can be made in Washington, we shall have to submit
to the proper authorities a list of possible candidates for this training. Will
you be so kind as to send us a list of all the young men whom you know have
some knowledge of Japanese and who might possibly be interested in receiving
commissions during this emergency or permanently in the navy or the marine
corps.
This request is, of course, strictly confidential and perhaps should not be
mentioned as yet to the possible candidates. We expect to meet with the au-
thorities in Washington on December 26th, and therefore we shall need to
receive your reply at least by December 24th. We are very sorry that we
must ask you for such speed on your part, but the training centre, if organized,
will probably begin to function early in February, so there is need for very
quick action. The persons to whom this request is being sent are :
Knight Biggerstaff Owen Lattimore
Derk Bodde G. MacAfee McCune
Peter A. Boodberg H. F. MacNair
Hugh Borton Harold S. Quigley
E. C. Carter David Rowe
Homer H. Dubs . Earl Swisher
Robert B. Hall George Taylor.
George Kennedy
Yours sincerely,
Serge Elisseeff,
Edwin O. Reischauer.
Exhibit No. 1173
Telephone: MUrrat Hill 2^0312 Calle Address: Amruscul
The American Russian Institute
For Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union, Inc.
Fifty Six West Forty-Fifth Street
NEW TORK
Editor and Executive Secretary: Harriet L. Moore
December 17, 1940.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
129 East 52nd St., New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter: I am returning herewith Miss Anderson's notes from the
round table in Boston. Have you ever received Joe Barnes' outline for his talk?
He has never mentioned to me whether or not he would give them to us. I am
afraid he has probably thrown them away.
I am also returning Mr. Slesinger's letter regarding Vassiliev. I do not know
anything in particular about Vassiliev. I believe he has been in our library
using our materials, but I have never had an opportunity to talk with him. If
he comes in again I shall try to find out what he is now doing. If you are further
interested in him, It may be that Dr. Stefansson knows something about him.
5230 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I hope that after Christmas we will have the opportunity to discuss the ques-
tion of further conferences. We continue to get favorable comment from Boston
and I cannot help but think that such discussions have a very real value, par-
ticularly outside of New York City. I may take the opportunity to talk over
the general idea with people in Chicago when I am there on Christmas.
Very sincerely,
[S] Harriet
Harriet L. Moore.
HLM : ss
Exhibit No. 1174
129 East 52nd Street,
2iew York, N. Y., 18th Decemler, lOJ/O {may be 11 December) .
His Excellency, the Soviet Ambassador,
Embassy of the U. S: S. R.
Washington, D. G.
Dear Oumanskt: You doubtless saw this editorial in the New York Times of
December 11, referring to Lattimore's reference to Motylev's book in the Decem-
ber issue of Pacific Affairs.
Under separate cover I am sending you marked copies of Pacific Affairs for
December and Amerasia for November, for I think you will be interested in glanc-
ing at Lattimore's comment on Motylev's book on page 446 of the former and
Crajdanzev's translation of the last chapter of the book on page 417 of the latter.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1175
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., December 13, IHO.
His Excellency, the Soviet Ambassador,
Embassay of the V. 8. S. R.,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Oumansky, Under separate cover I am sending you marked copies of
Pacific Affairs for December and Amerasia for November which I think you
will be interested in glancing at. In Pacific Affairs beginning on page 446
Lattimore has commented on Motylev's book. In Amerasia on page 417 Grajdan-
zev has translated the last chapter of Motylev's book.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
(Penciled notation :) This is for possible use without reference to the Embassy.
Thank you very much.
CONSTANTINE A. OUMAnSKY,
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Exhibit No. 1176
(Penciled notation :) WLH Scan & return to ECC at Nassau.
AMERICAN council
Institution of Pacific REa:ATioN8
INCOEPOKAXED
131 Museum Rd.,
Shanghai, December 30, 1949.
Edward C. Carter, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City,
New York, U. S. A.
Dear Mr. Carter: Except for your letter of October 3rd and a copy of a
letter from Maxwell Hamilton regarding the Shiratori intei'view we have re-
ceived no communication from you by mail since reaching Shanghai. I state
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5231
this as a matter of fact to be incorporated in the record rather than as a com-
plaint. If complaints were in order I should direct mine to the Chinese Post
Office which is now completely under the control of Japanese supervisors and
censors. We are hoping that on the next boat a letter or two from our head-
quarters may elude the authorities. I have referred to letters. We received a
cable, through Phil, from you on December 19th. To this cable we replied :
"Crisis foreseen developing slowly here Patricia's sailing deferred Shanghai
study finished January cabling then for approval cooperatives if Chekiang im-
possible. Signed : Bob."
At the present time Patricia has tentative reservations on the Taft, sailing
January 20th. and on the Asia, sailing in the second week in February. Other
than putting her name in the lists we have made no preparations for her to go.
"Crisis foreseen developing slowly" may require a word of explanation. Ian
Morrison, special writer for the London Times and resident agent for the British
and Chinese Corporation which handles Chinese railway securities, wrote in his
November report to London as follows : "The Shanghai problem has become
overshadowed by much graver events. It is now one out of many issues involv-
ing those fundamental questions of the relations between Japan, China, Soviet
Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and America. Let us put it like this. A year
ago the Shanghai issue lay primarily between the governments of Great Britain
and America and the government of Japan. Today it lies primarily between
the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Japanese army in Central China."
He implies here that Shanghai is not likely to become a casus belli between
Japan and the Anglo-American bloc. With this opinion I am in agreement.
With his view that the Shanghai issue lies between the SMC and the Central
China Japanese military, I am not. Since the outbreak of the European war
the Shanghai issue has become progressively more closely identified with total
world issues. Since the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact the confict at Shanghai
has been transformed from the underlying triangular conflict involving China,
Japan, and the Western Powers which Vinacke analysed in his preface to
Shanghai and Tientsin, to a bilateral truce involving on the one hand Japan,
Germany, and Italy, and on the other a developing Anglo-American-Chinese bloc.
The USSR is suspended in the balance. Shanghai is, relatively speaking, a pic-
colo stake in this developing antagonism. It is, indeed, to the advantage of the
Central China military authorities to preserve the peculiar status of Shanghai
for as a haven for their loot and as a luxuriant orange to be squeezed, Shanghai
serves weU the greed of the Japanese military. It does so, however, only so long
as it is a going concern, enjoying relative freedom for industry, finance, and
commerce. The private gains now accruing to the local military and to a few
of their favorites, Japanese and Chinese, count for nothing, however, in the light
of the larger designs of Japanese leaders in Tokyo. There is no indication that
today they are less infatuated than in September by visions of their Greater
East Asian autarchy. In that autarchy there wall be no place for Shanghai,
as it now exists, nor for American and British interests, as they have existed.
The fate of Shanghai, therefore, lies with Japan's fortunes in realizing her aims
in Southeast Asia ; and, probably, will not be sealed until that program of
realization is under way. I talked to Sugita yesterday. Sugita is the secre-
tary of the headquarters of the China Seas Fleet of the Japanese Naval Bureau
in Shanghai. When I learned he was a Cambridge man, I mentioned that I was
from Oxford and flashed quickly the range of my Tokyo connections. In conse-
quence, perhaps, he talked more freely than any Japanese of my acquaintance in
Shanghai. Several times he said with quiet intensity that Japanese-American
naval hostilities would be a supreme tragedy. Nevertheless, Sugita informed
me, unprecedented naval preparations are under way in Japan and in the China
Seas. Tomorrow he flies to Formosa. Anioy, Canton, Hainan, Haiphong, and back
to Japan. This is an index of activity in one quarter. This morning's newspapers
reveal that Japan is planning a coup d'etat in Thailand aiming to install a sympa-
thetic war government there. Here is more activity. In Japanese ports, in
Dairen, in Tsingtao and elsewhere German boats are being equipped with arms
and in south Pacific waters German vessels flying Japanese flags have engaged in
naval harassing activity. More activity. Activity, moreover. Axis as much as
Japanese in flavour. Meanwhile, on the other plate of the scales, lies the increas-
ing effectiveness of the RAF in Britain, Greece, and North Africa, the Italian
losses at Taranto, the advances of British mechanized forces towards Bax'dia, the
fulfillment of the American cruiser unit at Manila and the arrival of more heavy
bombers, reports of accelerating American rearmament, the failure of Germany
5232 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and Italy to recognize Wang, the British and American loans to Chungking, and
the continued existence of lai'ge Japanese forces on the Manchukuon border — ■
defense against attack from that enigmatic quarter. These are some of the
basic factors influencing the Shanghai issue. SMC-Army (or Puppet) flurries
are window-dressing. We cabled tliat the crisis was developing slowly because
from this vantage point it looks as though war in Europe has taken a turn advan-
tageous to Britain (despite the shipping losses and the movement of German
troops across Rumania where they confront large Russian concentrations) and
because, as many people have maintained before this, it looks as though the
Japanese threat may prove to be bluff if it runs into determined Anglo-American
opposition. There are some indications, including Grew's latest bucket of cold
water on Axis exuberance, that America means business out here. If Japan
throws caution to the winds, goes south risking war, and has an easy time of it,
then Shanghai falls in her lap. If Japan does not go south and in exasperation
takes over Shanghai she may find herself experiencing the economic counter-
attack, embargoes and tariffs, which even now she fears almost as much as
American and British warships. Hence, we foresee the situation developing
slowly here — unless, Germany unexpectedly upsets the applecart completely in
Europe.
As to the remainder of our cable. My Shanghai study has not proceeded quite
as quickly as might have been the case had I not undertaken, soon after our
arrival here, to do spadework; simultaneously on the Chekiang study. I hope,
and I believe I have good reason to expect that the Shanghai brochure will be
finished by February 1. I already have in hand a large quantity of background
material on Chekiang ; the notes upon which my address on occTipied Hangchow
was based ; extensive notes on the wartime Chekiang coastal blockade ; and
several translations of recent articles appearing in the Chinese press and in
Chinese economic journals on economic and political developments in free
Chekiang. I dislike abandoning a project upon which I have made some
extremely interesting preliminary observations. Tentatively, therefore. I have
arranged that Leonard Hsu, son of an old Hangchow friend of my father,
join me for a six weeks' tour of Chekiang in February and March. He knows
the patois a great deal bettei% naturally, than I do. His contacts in free
Chekiang are excellent. He has had experience with the KMT in its prewar
Nanking days. He kept the accounts of the "refugee center" which formed the
basis of some of my remarks about economic Hangchow. We have in mind
slipping across into guerrilla territory near Hangchow or taking a boat
from Shai to Ningpo. At best, both trips are dangerous. At worst, they might
be fatal. Japanese mopping up in the Hangchow environs is continuous.
The Japanese navy has shelled Chinghai, the port of Ningpo, periodically since
1937 ; intensively since September 1940. I hope, however, that advised by various
shipping magnates here not averse to shady dealing with naval authorities we
may be given what we can consider safe conduct. I mention these details
hoping that they may reflect my determination to complete a really satisfactory
survey of Chekiang. Withoiit field observations, the study would be bloodless,
if not mere guesswork. If. however, the Chekiang study proves quite im-
possible, I shall cable you for approval to go to Chungking. Pat is reading
the second proof of ]\Irs. Ed Snow's book of the cooperatives as a favor to the
family. With that background, which undoubtedly will be highly romanticized,
it should he possible to conduct a systematic survey and a critical analysis
of the movement on the basis of uncollated materials known to exist at
Chungking and on the basis of some travelling.
In recent days there has been much talk of aggravated KMT-Communist
friction. Reports to this effect appearing in the local press come from Domei.
Some of our government people, however, have heard corroborating reports
from Chinese coming out of the interior. Anna Louise Strong, in Hongkong,
expressed alarm over friction several days ago. One indication of the seriousness
of the conflict is seen to be the transfer, on Chungking order, of the New Fourth
Army from East Central China to the northwest. I have not shared alarm
felt in some quarters. Domei's reports of friction have been legion. I seem
to recall Agnes Jaffe's black picture of the United Front last summer and now
find it easy to understand Miss Strong's pessimism. Both of them should be
excused, perhaps, for not seeing the whole China picture because through prefer-
ence they associated only with those who made it their business to see the
seamy side of KMT corruption and tryanny. As to the withdrawal of the New
Fourth Army : They are guerrillas and mobile troops unequipped for or un-
practised in positional warfare while in this war area there are indications that
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS 5233
the Chinese may be contemplating an offensive which will require a unified
command and the best equipment of the most highly trained regular troops. Ta-
kung Pao sums up the matter thus : The crux of todays problems, therefore, does
not lie in the question of political unity, but in the question of unified command
of the Chinese armed forces. If any army today should refuse to obey the
orders of the High Command, or even resort to irregular activities, such action
should be regarded as detrimental to the efforts of resistance, or even as
threatening the safety of the state. Unity applies to political questions, but in
the army there can only be discipline and order. Powell thinks the people of
Central China are congenitally anti-Communist. On this point I am in total
disagi'eement. From the most selfish banker to the wildest little student here
in Shanghai I have heard nothing but admiration for the courage and fighting
effectiveness of the Sth and 4th Armies. While in Hangchow, I was told that
hostility to communists had evaporated, for reasons I have explained to you
before. There may be a recurrence of KMT-Communist friction in Chungking;
partly for political reasons, partly over military issues. Tlie consensus here is
that Chiang has it in his power to annihilate the Communist military threat.
Were he to try, nothing would please the Japanese more. Were he to try without
Soviet approval, few things could so jeopardize one important source of his
power to conduct continued resistance. To answer those who assert that Chiang,
more than ever, is in tow of the petticoat government, Madame etc., and the
corrupt Kung coterie it is relevant to ask if the execution and dismissal of
corrupt mayors and magistrates indicates complete satisfaction with the ad-
ministrative and political status quo.
I am tempted to share with you my estimates of personalities I have reason
to meet here. I am thinking, especially, of Keswick, Hunt, Itoh, Lockhart, Br.
Consul-Genl. George, Smith of BAT, etc. Perhaps these estimates will color
portions of the book when it reaches you. The rest sounds better in a gossip
session, than in print on a page.
I cannot, however, resist the temptation to record a few highlights of my re-
lations with the South Manchuria Railway people. I have not yet received from
them a long-promised reply to a lengthy questionnaire placed in their hands
early in November. Ushiba had told me that Itoh could place at my disposal more
information than any other Japanese in Shanghai. Another Japanese friend
told me that the SINIR employs rather more than 300 researchers. I called on
Itoh and told him my objective in coming to Shanghai. He served tea, offered
cigarettes, and called in an interpreter. All went well and Itoh promised full
and prompt replies to any questions I might wish to ask. That night I prepared
an extensive questionnaire on trade, industry, shipping, etc. In many cases I
presented data which I had got from Japanese english-language sources and
merely asked for confirmation. I sent along the questionnaire. Two days
later Itoh left for Japan, Dairen, Tsingtao, returning to Shanghai early in De-
cember. Meanwhile, his translator told me he had the questionnaire and was
working on it. Three times each week I telephoned for developments. Finally,
his translator rang me up. Expectantly I waited, only to be informed that he
wished to dine me at the French Club. Cigars topped an excellent meal. There
were, however, only vague promises regarding my questionnaire. The next day
I put in writing what I had explained by word of mouth the night before :
namely, that I did not wish to have the responsibility of knowing facts which
had not already appeared in print, either in English or Japanese. I said that
I knew the Shanghai Japanese press gave reports bearing upon my questions,
but unfortunately I did not know Japanese. Could they refer to their clippings?
The translator sympathized with my modest request and promised early action.
In the first week in December Itoh returned. I called upon him and learned that
he had talked about my work with Konoye's private secretary (Ushiba) and
others whom I had met. The next day his translator called me up and said that
the research staff was working on my questionnaire, but that their report would
be in Japanese. Itoh had, apparently, found a way to shift the buck while in
Tokyo. Several days later I called again and learned that the typists had fin-
ished writing the report, that revisions were being made by the translator and
Itoh, and that the document would be in my hands the next day. The next day
I received a telephone call. The document, apparently, had been sent over to the
press division of the local army headquarters. They, however, could not pass it,
though all the materials there contained had previously been published in Japa-
nese papers. They ordered the SMR to send the document to Nanking where it
will be read by the press division of General Nishio's military headquarters.
With apologies to me the SMR has done this and together we aw^ait its return.
5234 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I have found similar difficulties in dealing with British, Chinese, and Americans
here, but none of them have been on this super-Japanese scale.
Cordially,
Bob.
(Pencilled notation:)
P. S. over.
P. S. — Under no circumstances will I expose Pat to the rigors of interior travel.
If I go to Chekiang, she stays here or goes back to U. S. A. If we go to Chungking-
we fly — or, at least she does so.
When you write please include some news of developments in the office. We
are starved for it.
Exhibit No. 1177
Box 222, Post Office,
Hongkong, January 21, lOJfl.
Dear Mr. Carter, This is a note to you in great hurry, as I am so busy with
all sorts of things at the present moment. Enough for me to report that these
are grave days in China. By war regulations in Hongkong we cannot send out
any clippings of any sort; hence I am enclosing herewith a copy of the British
editorial which is published in today's South China Morning Post. Also en-
closed in this envelope is our little Bulletin, under the date of January 1.5th.
I hope that the second article therein on the Japanese international and internal
situation will be of interest to the friends in New York. I hear that Joe Barnes
is now the Foreign Editor of the H-Tribune and please give my best regards
to him when you see him.
There was a battle between the Kuomintang troops and tlie New Fourth
Army from Jan. 9th to Jan. 12th. About four thousand NFA people crossed the
Yangtze, as they were carrying out the order of the Government to go to the
northern part of the River. All of a sudden, the Kuomintang troops attacked
them. Someday the true story of how the four thousand were killed and
wounded, and even children and nurses had to take up rifles in self-defense,
will be told in detail. The deputy commander, Han Ying, was murdered after
being wounded. The commander Yeh Ting was taken after seriously wounded.
Ever since Sian, China's leaders have pledged that tlieir guns would never
again turn direct against their own nationals. Now such a promise is violated.
If such break-up of agreements goes on, how can tlie leaders expect their over-
seas patriots contribute their support in the financial and material contribu-'
tions? How can they guarantee that their leaders' repeated declarations that
they would not make peace with their enemy unless the enemy withdraws,
would be kept ? Certainly the democratic way is not through bullets, but should
be through ballots.
Madame Sun and other Members of the Kuomintang OEC have sent a written
appeal to the Generalissimo to maintain unity at any price. We are all trying
our best to ask our "leaders" to stoy fighting themselves while the enemy
remains in China. Please do not hesitate to call on me for any work for the
Secretariat that I can do while out here.
Most sincerely, and pardon my great hurry.
Yours,
[s] Geoffrey.
Exhibit No. 1178
(Penciled notation:) Sent Jan. 21 — Allen, Bisson, Carlson, Farley, Peffer,
Taylor.
January 21, 1941.
Sent from 33 East 71.
DL.
Lauchlin Cttrbie
S1S2 P Street N. W., Washington, D. C.
Delighted you are going Chungking. Regret illness prevents my going Wash-
inton see you before departure. Strongly recommend you wire my colleague
Dr. Chaoting Chi suggesting he see you Washington before you leave. He is
an economist of distinction and has .iust returned from Free China. You
could wire him direct care Universal Trading Corporation 630 Fifth Avenue,
New York City. He could go Washington almost anytime before you leave.
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5235
Exhibit No. 1179
120 East 52nd Street,
New York City, January 22, 19Itl.
Mr. Lauchlin Cueeie,
S132 P Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Deae Mb. Cukkie : Last evening I wired you as follows :
"Delighted you are going Chungking. Regret illness prevents my going
Washington. See you before departure. Strongly recommend you wire my
colleague. Dr. Chaoting Chi, suggesting he see you Washington before you
leave. He is an economist of distinction and has just returned from Free
China. You could wire him direct, care Universal Trading Corporation, 630
Fifth Avenue, New York City. He could go Washington almost any time
before you leave."
Herewith I am sending you a rather important galley proof of Dr. Chi's forth-
coming study "Wartime Economic Development in China." If you are able to
take on the clipper only one item of all I am sending you, I should recommend
that you take this.
Yesterday, however, I did mail you the following books :
Japanese Industry : Its Recent Development and Present Condition, by G. C.
Allen
American Policy in the Far East: 19-31-1940, by T. A. Bisson
The Chinese Army, by Major Evans F. Carlson
The Problem of Japanese Trade Expansion in the Post-War Situation, by
Miriam S. Farley
Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East, by Nathaniel Peffer
The Japanese-Sponsored Regime in North China, by George E. Taylor
The above volumes are all part of the IPR Inquiry Series.
After you have scanned Dr. Chi's galleys you will, I think, realize what a
valuable piece of work he has done. He gathered this material on a trip he made
to China for the IPR a year and a half ago. About six months ago he made
another trip to free China, accompanying Mr. K. P. Chen, the well-known Chinese
banker, as his research secretary. With Mr. Chen he travelled all over free
China.
It has suddenly occurred to me that if you should want the services of a highly
competent Chinese who is intimate alike with Chinese problems and the Ameri-
can point of view you would be well advised to consider asking Dr. Chi to ac-
company you on this trip. His research and personal qualifications are of the
highest.
The Universal Trading Corporation has recently borrowed him from the IPR
staff, but I cannot think of any more important work for him than to go along
as your interpreter and Chinese secretary, unless you have already made pro-
vision for such a person.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Caktee.
Exhibit No. 1180
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 24th January, 1941-
Dr. Chen Han-seng,
P. O. Box 16881:. Kotrloon, Hong Kong.
Dear Geoffrey; You were doubly generous and thoughtful this year in first
sending me the FAR EAST BULLETIN of December 15 as a substitute for a
Christmas card and then following it up with this charming card from you and
Susie.
There is one good thing about the serious diflaculties within the United Front
in China in recent weeks.
At long last our friend Joe Barnes persuaded the Ogden Reids to appoint
Edgar Snow as a Herald Tribune correspondent in China. Edgar Snow is, there-
fore, giving the American people a more accurate picture of the serious state
of affairs in China than any correspondent has given in cabled stories since the
war began.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5236 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1181
Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
February 11, 19^1.
Edward C. Carter, Esquire,
Board of Editors, Far Eastern Survey,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
My Dear Carter: Knowing your interest in our economic relationships with
the Far East, when in need I turn to you with my cry for help. Recently I
have been placed in charge of a committee for making certain economic studies
in re our relationships with Far Eastern countries in connection with our De-
fense Program. Within the next few weeks we are trying to complete a pre-
liminary report comprehending the basic material required, to be subsequently
expanded into a much more complete study. For this immediate study we are
lacking in trained research workers.
I am wondering if your American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations —
or, more specifically, the Board of Editors and Research Associates of Far
Eastern Survey — could loan us the services of two or three or more of your
research experts over the next two or three weeks. Of course we might like
to have them longer, if their services were still available. I had in mind,
because of their special fields, a list from which any number whose services you
could spare might be detailed to help us: Miss Miriam Farley, Kurt Bloch,
Miss Kathleen Barnes, Miss Virginia Thompson, John R. Stewart, Jack Shepherd,
Dorothy Borg, William N. Lockwood and Ellen de Jong, or others whose names
might occur to you as available.
Our work is under the general direction of the Export Control Administrator,
with whom, I believe, arrangements can be made without difficulty for paying
the present salaries of any who might be available for temporary loan from
your staff, together with such additional expenditures as would be necessarily
incurred. I am not, however, undertaking to initiate such arrangements until
Iiearing from you that the desired personnel may be available.
If you find no one willing or available among those connected with the Far
Eastern Survey, I would be glad to have any other suggestions as to research
assistants that might occur to you. Please let me have a reply at your early
convenience, as the matter is of some urgency.
With sincere personal regards.
Very truly yours,
C. K. MOSER,
Chairman. Far Eastern Research Unit.
Exhibit No. 1182
129 East 52Nn Street,
New York City, February IS, 19-il.
Dr. Ch'ao-tinq Chi,
541 West 113th Street,
New York City.
Dear Chi : What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable
as the following :
Laughlin Currie,
American Em^bassy, Chungking :
If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public
opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's
unified resistance.
It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However,
it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific for
China to start a two-front war.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
:.- INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5237
Exhibit No. 1184
China Institute of Pacific Relations,
P. 0. Box 1688, Koivloon, Hongkong {Received March 12, lyjfl).
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Mr. Carter : With this mail will arrive also Mr. Currie on his way back
to America. He was twenty days iu Chungking but as a trained observer and
not like a trained bureaucrat he has certainly learned and understood many
things. I am sure he has already appreciated the fact that Chungking is not
China because of the exclusive depressive deteriorating atmosphere over there.
He certainly made a splendid speech of half an hour before the highest and
selective audience in Chungking sponsored by the Sino-American Cultural So-
ciety on February 23rd. All the way through his speech he emphasized the
importance of democracy for the sake of both national resistance and the up-
building of a modern state.
I saw him both on his way to Chungking and upon his return despite the
attempts to encircle him. While in Chungking he asked Hollington Tong to
arrange an interview with Professor Ma Yiu-tsu. Holly replied after a day
or so that Ma was not to be found. Currie enquired if Ma was confined some-
where, but Holly said that cannot oe true. Factually, of course, Ma is now
confined somewhere near Chungking because of his criticism of the government
finance. He advocated a tax levy on those who became rich during the war.
By ordinary mail I sent you a few days ago a copy of February l.jth News-
letter of the China Defense League. The article on the United Front in that issue
is worth reading and if I may say so it may be regarded as a brief supplement
to my unprinted MS on that same topic. Kindly pass this on to Rosinger if
you see fit.
(A. W. Circulate)
The American Council is to be congratulated for the improved style and new
policy of the Far Eastern Survey. I for one have always been opposed to the-
narrow and dry statistical articles that the Survey used to carry. I am enclos-
ing a clipping herewith for the Survey's reference. I wish somebody would
find it feasible to use Dr. Lim's speech and write a short piece for the' Survey.
Dr. Lim fwinted out three problems in his work : nutrition, training, and trans-
port. His work is really connected with everybody's work because these prob-
lems are both national and urgent. J wish I could find time to write a short
article to explain how the economic policy has new affected the Central troops
very seriously, because these troops are in the rear where prices are high and
no fighting is being carried out. The guerrillas and other troops are mostly
on the fronts, where prices are much cheaper, being unaffected by the govern-
ment policy. Their morale is much higher. If there is really a wide-scale civil
war. I estimate that only one-tenth of the Central troops are fit to fiuht. Have
you received the 2Sth issue of the FAR EAST BULLETIN, dated February 15th?
With kindest regards and best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
Chen Han-seiig.
Chen Han-seng.
Exhibit No. 1185
FDS/wc
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue.
New Yorik, N. Y., June 4, 19J,1.
Telephone : CIrcle 6-1484-85
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Acting Sec'ty., American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd St., New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter : Thank you for calling our attention to Mr. John R. Stewart
as a specialist familiar with Manchurian affairs.
Your valuable and continued cooperation with this ofiice is very nuich
appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Frederick D. Sharp.
Frederick D. Sharp,
Eieut. Col. G. S. C.
5238 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS "^
Exhibit No. 1186
Maech 24, 1941.
KM from ECC :
I am awfully glad you are reprinting Anna Louise Strong's article. Would
you send me up three copies of it? It is certainly one of tbe most important
articles that you have carried for a long time.
Exhibit No. 1187
Telephone: MUebat Hill 2-0312 Cable Address: Amruscal
Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, Basil Bass, Edward C. Carter. Wm. O. Field, Jr., Mortimer Graves,
Harriet L. Moore, Henry E. Sigerist, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Maxwell S. Stewart
The American Russian Institute
For Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union, Inc.
Fifty-six West Forty-Fifth Street
NEW YORK
/
Editor and Executive Secretary: Harriet L. Moorh
Maech 25, 1941.
Mr. E. C. Cabteb,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City
Dear Mr. Carter: I shall attempt to answer your bevy of letters which I re-
ceived this morning.
I shall be able to attend the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the American
Council on Tuesday, April 8.
As I understand it Dr. Stefansson's handbook for the War Department is a
tremendously long and detailed study of the development of the Soviet Arctic.
In preparing this he has undoubtedly amassed a wealth of new information on
the Northern Sea Route. I do not know just what he means by suggesting that
the IPR undertake research on the subject inasmuch as I believe he has already
exhausted all the material available in this country. I am sure however that
Dr. Stefansson or his staff could write a very interesting article for Pacific
Affairs or perhaps a pamphlet.
The vice president of the Press is the famous Eddie Moore and no relation
of mine.
Florinsky's article in our opinion is about 70% accurate as to fact but very
extremist as to interpretation. A few examples are as follows :
1. In the middle of page 43 he says, "The directors are allowed to grant an
application for dismissal or transfer only in the following instances * * *."
The decree provides that directors must grant the application in those instances
and may grant applications on other grounds as well.
2. On page 47 he says, "volunteers were also admitted * * *." The fact
of the matter is that volunteers filled the entire quota and it was unnecessary
to recruit any youths.
3. An example of his interpretation is on page 45 where he says, "* * *
the Soviet Constitution whose high-sounding promises the new legislation so
flagrantly violates." I think it would be impossible for the strictest lawyer to
find any constitutional violation no matter how much they may dislike the new
laws.
There are other examples of this sort but this is probably enough for you to
understand on what basis we choose 70% as the degree of factual accuracy.
Sincerely yours,
Harriet
[s] Harriet L. Moore.
HLM/kw
Exhibit No. 1188
April 3, 1941.
ECC from MG :
1. I have added a section and altered the conclusion in order to deemphasize
the ten points. I think we have now so hedged the points around that they can
ino longer be taken as a program for a«tion climaxing the discussion.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5239
2. Miss Farley thinks that Jessup's name should not be mentioned. I am
inclined to agree.
3. I agree with WWL that the title should be "Showdown at Singapore" and
that the title page should say by way of explanation "A report of a private inter-
national conference held at Princeton to discuss Anglo-American cooperation in
the Pacific."
4. I think the authorship should be anonymous, unless the authors be described
merely as rapporteurs.
5. Above all, if the pamphlet is to sell it should be published in a big hurry.
Exhibit No. 1189
(Penciled notation:) To the members of the March 9th conference. Return KP.
Apeil 11, 1941.
It is now almost ancient history but I am sending you herewith a report of the
informal conference held in this office on March 9 with a view to investigating
the possibility of a sort of planned economy in the use of scholars with a knowl-
edge of Japanese, Chinese, and Russian during the present crisis.
You will note that we asked Mr. Mortimer Graves to establish contact with
various agencies in Washington. As a result Mr. Graves must have given an
enormous amount of time to the matter since March 9. Confidentially I may
say that he has induced the Civil Service Commission to call together a number
of interested agencies of the United States Government to talk the matter over
with the Civil Service Commission and Mr. Graves in the near future. It looks
as though some progress would be made.
Edward C. Cabteb.
( Penciled notation : ) cc : all members and KG-DB
MSF-CP
AG
Exhibit No. 1190
(Handwritten:) ECC
KRCG
April 18, 1941.
Mr. William R. Hebod,
570 Lexington Avenue, New York City.
Dear Herou : Are the following paragraphs of any use apropos Monday's
discussion?
In connection with the war emergency several United States government
agencies have asked for the loan of members of the Institute's research
staff. In one instance a government department which must remain nameless
asked for the privelege of employing the whole research staff on a particu-
larly urgent and important task involving many weeks of work. These
requests are striking evidence of the government's high appreciation of the
work of the Institute and its reseax'ch staff. Interestingly enough, it so
happens that it has been possible to prove to the government agencies
concerned that the I. P. R.'s staff members can i-ender the government a
greater service by continuing as members of the Institute's highly competent
research group.
In this way the research staff is kept intact for essential group collabora-
tion and is thus in a position to serve all government agencies concerned
with the Pacific through special reports and through articles in the Fab
Eastern Survey.
Maybe you will want to ring me up to let me know whether you would like
the foregoing redrafted in any way to put a little more punch in it. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible for us to put into a letter the names of the government
agencies concerned.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter, Acting Secretary.
5240 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1191
(Handwritten:) WLH
ED
300 GiLMAN Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland, May 2, I9'il.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Carter: There seems to be a number of minor items on my desl< to
clear up. Tlie first is the question of my proposed pamphlet for the Oxford
University Press. They tell me that they want about 8,000 words. My idea
is a survey of the war that covers the time span of four years and the changes
in the character of the war and the internal problems of Japan and China that
run from the Marco Polo Bridge to the Russo-Japanese neutrality declaration,
and include the relation of the Far Eastern war to the European war. Sounds
like quite a large order, but it will be interesting to try. My original idea was
to approach the job by elaborating more completely and linking up with each
other a number of the ideas very briefly brought forward in my recent articles
in Foreign Affairs, Asia, and the "After Four Years" article that is to appear
in Pacific Affairs.
I am quite sure that Oxford will be only too glad to cooperate with the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations not only in planning the format of the pamphlet but in
its distribution. I have not said anything to them yet. It seems to me slightly
immodest, when I have not yet written the pamphlet ! I can either bring it up
with them when I send them the MS or you may feel perfectly free to use your
own discretion in sounding them out in advance.
Another thing I want to mention is the list of translations from the Chinese
that you have sent me — translations totalling about 151 pages, made by
Mr. Hsu, and covering the wide range of subjects. Would it entail much ad-
ditional work to have an extra copy of future translations made? I have been
thinking that if I were able to keep track of them, I might be able to use
extracts in almost every issue of Pacific Affairs, thus matching the very
interesting translations from the Japanese with which Grajdanzev is supplying
me regulai'ly.
That was a vitriolic memorandum on Barndt's article by Bloch that you sent
me. Bloch must be quite a tempermental guy to have around the office. I have
already sent the memorandum on to Bill Holland as you requested, and so can
only refer to it by memory.
Perhaps I am an ineffable innocent, but I can see nothing particularly "Marx-
ist" about the article. It seemed to me to be a perfectly legitimate discussion
of a broad problem which undoubtedly is shaping up as a turning point in the
history of empires and their colonies and spheres of interest — whether you call
the change evolutionary or revolutionary. As far as Brandt has presented his
ideas, I should say that the implications are more New Dealish than Marxist.
It seems to me that a major contention of his is that the future of profitable
private enterprise in Asia requires a system of loans on such a large scale that
they can only be handled by governments. This is undoubtedly a paradox, but
I can see the force of the argument: the loans should be planned in terms of
speeding up industrialization in Asia. The loans themselves should not be made
with a view of political control or even a large margin of profit, though the
capital outlay may be recoverable. By bringing the Asiatic and European-Amer-
ican levels closer together, this will open a new horizon for profitable private
trade. All of this would be, to my mind, compatible with political democracy,
and I fail to see anything sinister in it.
Some of Bloch's criticisms ought to be addressed to me rather than to the
author of the article, whom I asked to present his theory in broad terms, without
using too much statistical documentation or too much space. In at least one
case what Bloch calls "Marxist arithmetic" is purely the result of a slip that
occurred in editing: I tried to untangle a rather Germanic sentence that looked
the wrong way round in English, and in so doing the words got straightened out
but the figures got mixed up. This has already been caught in proof.
I remember one place wliere Bloch makes a great to-do about whether the aver-
age Chinese acreage is half an acre or two acres. I looked up the source quoted
by Brandt, and found that he had simply quoted word for word what was *;aid
by his authority. In this connection, I think you will agree with me that it is
absurd to stickle for statistical exactness in figures that apply to China, where
statistics are so chaotic. For the purposes of an article like this it is quite
sufficient if the fact emerges that the average Chinese acreage is of the order
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5241
of half an acre to 2 acres — not of the order of 20 acres or 40 acres. It is simply
unprofitable to try to determine whether the exact statistical average should
be 1.2 acres, or whatever.
Generally speaking, while Bloch seems to consider that Brandt is obsessed,
it is fairly clear that Bloch has some obsessions of his own. For instance, he
seems to make it an article of faith that an increasing population means a rising
standard of living. This gets right in the teeth of what is evident to any general
observer : that for a couple of decades the rural standard of living in both Japan
and China has fallen. As far as Japan is concerned, I should think it not im-
possible that there has been simultaneously a rise in the urban standards and
a fall in rural standards ; but to hold dogmatically that because the Japanese
population as a whole has been growing, the Japanese standard of living has
been rising, in the face of the fact that it is widely admitted by Japanese that
they are burdened with a chronic rural depression which has been getting worse
and worse, is absurd.
I am keeping by me your quoted note from Bob Barnett on Miss Strong's
"Eighth Route Regions in North China" and shall see what can be done when
the article comes back in proof.
I'm down today with a very heavy cold, and as I have to go out tonight to be
initiated into Phi Beta Kappa, to the greater confusion of American scholarship,
I am dictating this at home and Mrs. Young will sign the letter when she has
typed it.
Yours very sincerely,
Owen Lattimore.
Exhibit No. 1192 '
(Penciled notation:) Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton, Chief of F. E. Section, Mil. Intell.
Div., G2 War Dept., General Staft.
June 6, 1941.
confidential
Lieut. Col. Frederick D. Sharp,
Room 811, 1270 SixfJi Avenue,
New York City.
Dear Colonel Sharp : Thank you for yours of June 4. May I in confidence
bring to your attention Dr. Russell G. Shiman of the IPR staff who for the
past seven years has edited our fortnightly research service The Far Eastern
Survey. Under separate cover I am sending a few sample copies of the Survey
under his editorship.
Dr. Shiman's economic knowledge of the whole Far Eastern region is excep-
tional. He has visited Burma, Malaya. Thailand, Netherlands Indies, the
Philippines, and has long studied China, Japan, and Manchuria. He has a very
unusual knowledge of the source and production cost of the principal commodities
(if the Pacific Area, such as rubber, tungsten, antimony, oil, rice, copra, coal,
iron, etc.
He has unusual skill in gathering material from a great many different sources
and coordinating the researches and investigations of others as well as doing
his own research work.
At the beginning of this year the International Secretariat of the IPR bor-
rowed Mr. Shiman to make a special study of certain of the Far Eastern
commodities for the Economic Plandbook of the Pacific. He is now bringing
this work to a successful conclusion.
It has occurred to me that in view of the inquiries which various members
of your staff have made in this office, you might like to consider borrowing Dr.
Shiman for .several months or for the duration, as he has a wide and encyclopedic
knowledge of the whole Pacific Area, writes well, edits well and knows how to
eliminate irrelevant material.
I have not told Dr. Shiman that I am writing you this letter, for I did not
want to mention it if there were no chance of your wishing to consider him.
If you would like to size him up you could get him over to the office some day
to talk not about a job but about some of the prolilems that your staff are facing.
I have to leave for the Pacific Coast tonight but will be back here on June 16
in case you wish to talk the matter over with me before talking to Dr. Shiman.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. C-vrter.
88348— &2—pt. 14 22
5242 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1193
confidential,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., July Srd, 1941.
Lieut. Col. Frederick D. Sharp,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York City.
DuAR Colonel Sharp : In continuation of my confidential letter to you of June
6th regarding Dr. Russell G. Shiman. I am now writing to say what I would
have passed on to you orally had I had the good luck to find you In when I called
at your ofllce a few days ago.
Shiman has a firm offer from me to continue his work as a member of the
Institute of Pacific Relations staff, but he like other patriotic Americans wants
to spend the coming year where his life experience will best serve our Govern-
ment during the emergency. Knowing something of the great scope of your
woi-k, and of other studies which the War Department is planning, I wish very
strongly and enthusiastically to call him to your attention.
To aid you in forming an opinion of his experience I am enclosing his Cur-
riculum Vitae. Everything I said in my letter of June 6th holds true. He is
not only an indefatigable research worker himself, but has shown marvelous
ability in taking promising but people iintrained in the Far Eastern field and
guiding their studies so that after a short time they have shown great com-
petence.
This combination of qualities might be of very great value to the War Depart-
ment. I do hope that you can arrange in due course to meet him or fix a time
when one of your staff can have a talk with him.
As you will note from my earlier letter, he has first class editorial ability
which you will have noted from the samples of The Far Eastern Survey that
I have already sent, and from perusing his chapters in The Economic Handbook of
the Pacific, published by Doubleday Doran for the IPR in 1934.
I am sending this letter and the Curriculum Vitae in duplicate in case you
wish to send on copies to Lieutenant Colonel Bratton.
With kindest personal regards, I am,
Sincerely yours.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1194
HA from ECC: June 19, 1941.
Will you please prepare a memorandum showing the dates and amounts of
all USSR Council contributions to the Pacific Council since they began to con-
tribute.
Pencilled in :
August 26, 1935 $2,000.00
June 5, 1935 2,000.00
Feb. 7, 1937 $500. 00
Apr. 29, 1937 2,500.00
3, 000. 00
June 1, 1938 2,500.00
May 23, 1939 2,500.00
Exhibit No. 1195
June 23, 1941.
Dr. Philip C. Jessup,
c/o American Express,
Santiago, Chile.
Dear Jessup: Immediately following your excellent suggestion regarding Gen-
eral Barrows I wrote Wilbur and asked whether he would be willing to make
a presentation of a series of IPR publications to the General for the ultimaiia
purpose which you and I discussed.
Wilbur responded in the affirmative, and I sent him a handsome assortment.
These reached Barrows on the morning of June 10. Just by a pure fluke this
was the day on which Wilbur and the Bay Region IPR gave a luncheon at the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5243
Palace Hotel at which Wilbur asked me to speak of some of the latest develop-
ments in the IPR. I sat between Wilbur and General Barrows.
This morninj,' Wilbur sent me a letter from General Burrows, copy of which I
enclose. So far, so good.
I ought to add that at the luncheon I was able to emphasize to General Bar-
rows the role that W. L. Holland and Galen Fisher are playing in the total
program of the IPR. The Bay Region group has a scheme for an emergency
study of the Japanese in California and have made some progress in getting
Barrows interested in seeking to secure part of the funds from the Carnegie
Endowment.
The Canadian Institute — Northwest-American IPR two-day meeting at Vic-
toria was realistic and worth while. The discussions were at a very high level.
After Victoria I met members of the Institute in San Francisco, Stanford, Berke-
ley, and Los Angeles. Holland is a great asset on the Pacific Coast, though we
miss him sorely here. Sproul's Executive Assistant James E. Lash is gradually
wiping out the ditficult situation that existed under Warren Scott.
I wonder whether you happened to hear Churchill's speech yesterday. Hitler,
Stalin, and Churchill managed quite a spectacular week end. It so happened
that last week I hud lunch with Oumansky in Washington on Wednesday. We
talked for a couple of hours. I was fortunate in getting Lattimore O'ver from
Baltimore, as I thought it was pretty important for him to have a long talk
with Oumansky, in view of his job and the evolving world situation. It was a
most illuminating two hours.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1196
(Handwritten:) GL
CO— Oakie
New York City, June 25, 1941.
L,t Col. R. S. Bratton,
Chief, Far Eastern Section, War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, Washingto7i, D. C.
• Dear Colonel Bratton : Your letter of June 23rd reached us this morning.
We shall, of course, be glad to cooperate witJi you to the fullest extent but, before
writing in detail, I am wondering to what extent you have already made use of
the material in the National Roster of Scientific Personnel. We have already
provided somewhat similar information to the National Roster and would like to
i^ave your time and ours by avoiding any duplication of effort.
Needless to say, however, we are very much interested indeed in assisting
you in every way and hope that you will let us know just how we can be of
most assistance to you.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1197
War Department
war department gener-vl staff
Military Intelligence Division G-2
washington
Far Eastern Section, G-2,
June 23, 1941.
Institute of Pacific Relations,
429 East 57th Street, New York City.
Gentlemen : This office is interested in obtaining the services of personnel
who have the necessary linguistic qualifications as well as a knowledge of the
social, geographic, political and economic aspects of the Far East, including
Thailand, Indo China, Burma, Malay Peninsula and the Philippine Islands.
The salary will vary between $2,000 and $3,200 iier year, deiJending upon the
Civil Service rating.
5244 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I shall appreciate the names of individuals who may be desirous of such
employment.
Yours,
R. S. Braxton,
Lt. Col. G. 8. C, Chief, Far Eastern Section.
Exhibit No. 1198
Treasury Department.
Secret Service Division,
New York, N. Y., July 1, 1941.
OflBce of Supervising Agent, District No. 2, State of New York and Territory of Puerto Rico.
Rm. 804, 90 Cliurcli St., New York, N. Y.
Please refer to file CO 5002.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 E. S2d Street, New York, N. Y.
Sir: This office has under investigation Ii-ving S. Friedman relative to his
position with the Treasury Department. He has given your name as a personal
reference.
Will you liindly advise us the length of time you have known the subject and
furnish any information which you may possess regarding his character and
ability, and employment record with you.
There is enclosed for your reply a self-addressed envelope which requires no
postage.
Very truly yours,
James J. Maloney, Sn/pervisinff Agent.
Exhibit No. 1199
129 East 52nd Street,
Neio York, N. Y., August 7th, 19^1.
Irving S. Friedman, Esq.,
Research Ditnsion, Washington, D. C.
Dear Irving : This is just to let you know how glad I am that you are so well
established in Washington. Bob Barnett spoke very enthusiastically about the
way you are taking hold. You certainly have a big job. You have my very best
wishes.
I hope you will forget my harshness the last time we met. I happened to be
very fatigued that week and hope you did not carry away a permanent picture
of me as always loaded with vinegar.
With very kindest regards and best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1200
(Penciled notation:) R. W. B. any suggestion? ECC.
Treasury Department.
Division of Monetary Research,
Washington, D. C, Septemhcr 9, 19'il.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Secretarii Gcncml, International Secretariat,
Institute of Paeifie Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, Neiv York, N. Y.
Dear IMr. Carter : Would you be kind enough to suggest the names of a few
l^eople who might be interested in working down hei-e in the Division of Monetary
Research. From what I have been able to gather from my own brief experience
here, it would be best if any i>erson suggested had some training in economics,
l)nt of more importiince, however, is some acquaintance with the Far Eastern
area.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5245
I do hope that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again the next time I
come up to New York.
With best regards to the IPR.
Sincerely,
Irving S. Friedman.
Exhibit No. 1201
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, February 17, 194i.
Irving S. Friedman, Esquire
Dear Irving: Would you glance through this Act, H. R. 10094 and let me
knovp whether you think either the American Council or the Pacific Council
should consider registration under it.
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward 0. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1202
Dear Dr. White: I understand from Mr. Irving S. Friedman who holds the
appointment of Head Clerk in this office, that he has been appointed to the post
of research economist in your Department.
Under the terms of his appointment here, Mr. Friedman has to give me one
months notice in advance before relinquishing his post, and on account of certain
circumstances it would be extremely inconvenient for me and detrimental to the
interests of the work of this office if I were to allow Mr. Friedman to leave
at any shorter notice than the month referred to above. At the same time I do
not wish to do anything that might in any way affect his prospective position
in your Department, as I am delighted to hear of his new appointment though
I shall be very sorry to lose him. I would be most grateful, therefore, if you
<;ould kindly let me know whether there would be any objection from your
point of view in Mr. Friedman continuing his appointment here until the end
of the current month.
(Handwritten notation on back of letter)
Dear Maxth : I understand that INIr. Friedman is joining the United States
Treasury and as my nominee I hope that he has lived up to my recommendation.
If you have not already secured another man for Mr. Friedman's post, may I
suggest a man whom I believe has any of the qualifications which you seek.
If you are at all interested I shall be glad to have him call on you at any time
convenient to you.
Sincerely yours,
Exhibit No. 1203
( Hand written note : ) •
Note.
Irving S. Friedman started June 9, 1938, on regular payroll at $35.00 a week
until May 15, 1939.
Around the office until January or February 1940.
Exhibit No. 1204
Chinese Industrial Co-operatives
southeast headquarters, kanhsien, kiangsi
108 SiTKiN Road, Kanhsien, Kiangsi, Srd July, 19-^1.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Mr. Carter: Your letter of May 1st was sent to me up here and I was
very glad to hear from you and to know that you have such a good understanding
■of our problems and the reasons for our failings out here.
5246 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I came up to Kian^ssi at the beginning of May, flying to Namyung which is
just one hour from Hongkong. I first went to Kukong, Kwangtung's Provincial
war-time capital for a few days and then came straight here in one day by postal
truck. I am now collecting material for the C. I. C. people in Hongkong to use
for publicity and I send them down a five-page report every two weeks. The
situation has become rather difficult and the C. I. C. is now going through a
period of consolidation rather than of expansion. The two great needs are for
capital and education. I find that I learn mostly about poverty and the only
surprise is that organisations like CIC can do anything at all — not that they
don't do more. The only equipment is the land and the people. Here in
Kanhsien the land is rich and bamboo and wood plentiful. We should be able
to make large quantities of good paper, but improvements in the technique of
manufacture are a first necessity. At present it is all done handicraft way and
no one knows how to tap rosin from the pine trees so that the paper could be
sized to take ink.
Wlien I came here I, of course, relinquished my work with the China Council,
about which I have already written you. I heard that it was possible that you
would be coming out here to talk things over and to discuss the program. I
hope you may be able to make a somewhat extended stay so as to get it really
stabilised because it looks as though the I. P. R. will have, in the great storms to
come, an even more important task to fulfill than it has ever had in the past. It
looks as though it were a historical necessity that the importance of events will
gradually shift from Europe to the Pacific once the path is set.
Connected with this is another matter which I would like to discuss with you.
It seems that now the World War has really begun the relations and inter-rela-
tions of European, Asian and American countries will inevitably become more
complex and inter-dependent. In the present situation it looks as though, if the
IPR succeeded in bringing about a closer collaboration of the Councils of the
Pacific, including the Soviet Union, it might contribute to the important task of
avoiding an extension of the war within the Pacific area. Of course the position
of the Soviet Council in this affair gains in importance for it seems that this
would coincide with the present interests of the Russians and therefore we can
hope to get the most active collaboration of the Soviet Council and could count
on its willingness to cooperate with all the Councils of the other countries in ques-
tion. It looks to me. therefore, as though it would be of great advantage if
somebody from the Secretariat could at present get information on the spot
about Russia's position and the position of the Council, and keep in personal touch
with the people concerned. If you share in this opinion, then I woud like to ask
you to consider letting me proceed to Moscow where I feel I could do far more
effective work than I shall be able to do here in the immediate future.
It seems to me that if the International Secretariat were to have a liaison
ofl5cer in Moscow, closer ties could be established not only between the Secretariat
and the Soviet Union but between the Soviet Union and the other national
Councils. In general such a liaison officer would have to keep the Secretariat
and other Councils informed of the Soviet Council's work and viewpoint, and to
keep the Soviet Council informed of the work of the other Councils and of their
viewpoint. Second, to give a provisional report of the view of the Soviet author-
ities on Pacific problems in view of the present political situation along the
Pacific coasts and as influenced by the present German-Russian war. Third,
to get a special ptiblication for the IPR prepared on a special Russian-Japanese-
Pacific issue. Fourth, to make known and get the widest distribution possible for
the IPR publications, especially those which have lately been published in
Shanghai.
I realize that if you were to consider doing this that my identity would have to
be established before I could get a visa. As you know, when I first came out here
I started sending — on your suggestion — the "Internos" to the Soviet Council —
two copies of each issue. Harondar wrote me asking for information about it
and expressing their appreciation, but at that time owing to the situation in
Hongkong which was very difficult, I was only able to answer him in a very
general way. When the "Far East Bulletin" was issued I asked Alec Crosby of
the "Federated Press" in New York to continue sending the Bulletin to Motylev,
and I think that he did this until communications made it impossible. The
Embassy in Washington, however, is a regular subscriber.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Bill Holland as the percentage of mvHl
that gets lost these days seems to be extremely high, but I hope one or the other
gets through. I haven't had any mail from England for three months and I feel
that that part of the world is marooned.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5247
Please give my best greetings to Mrs. Carter and remember me to all the people
I know in 129, and with best greetings to you,
Yours ever,
Elsie
Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley.
Exhibit No. 1205
July 8, 1941.
WLH from ECC :
I have been working hard with Colonel Sharp in New York and Colonel Brat-
ton in Washington to get Shiman a job in the Army Intelligence either in New
York or Washington. Temporarily Washington has turned him down on the
ground that he does not feel free to go to Washington for full time.
I have also been in correspondence with Loveday, but Loveday doesn't want
to take anyone on until the autumn. I am beginning to think that Field and
other members of the American Council staff were much more responsible for
the success of The Far Eastern Surrey than Shiman himself was. Confi-
dentially, I may say he is rather a pathetic figure at the moment. He is his own
worst eiaemy as he spent several years slaving on the Survey but at the same
time opposing every move of his colleagues that would introduce him to a wider
world and richer personal contacts and a steadily growing personality. The
quality of his work is now so poor and the necessity for his facing the realities
of life so great that I am wondering what you would think of our computing
what severance pay should be given him in line with the traditions in this mat-
ter, with the American Council and the Pacific Council splitting the amount,
and thus endow him for a period of months to paddle his own canoe.
I hate to write you in this way, but his performance since we took him on the
International Secretariat has really been shocking. Not the least is the quality
of the work he has done on Phillip's manuscript and the sort of last straw was
his billing you for employing outside people to do the work that he should have
done during the two months that he was sulking and nursing his grievances,
none of which were caused by either the American Council or the Pacific Council.
In spite of all his limitations, he is so vastly better than many of the cap-
tains, majors and colonels who are studying the Far East that I can recommend
him in the highest terms to service in the Army. He needs a complete change
of environment, a start in a fresh setting. He has got a chance of rehabilitating
himself in a way which he sorely needs. We are rendering him no service by
trying to build up his ego by continued odd jobs.
It may be that I am unduly pessimistic, and I want you to come back at me
with your sternest criticism and your fairest judgment. If you think we should
assign him the five months' job I will defer entirely to your judgment. I am
showing no one a copy of this letter except Bill Lockwood who recognizes that
Shiman is very much more competent than a lot of the people that Washington
is using in important jobs. He is in a position to help Shiman a lot in finding
a new opening.
Exhibit No. 1206
(Penciled notation:) cc. Robinson
WWL
WLH
129 East 52nd Steeet,
New York City, July 14, 19Jil.
Mr. Henry J. Wadleigh,
c/o Dr. Leo Pasvotsky, State Department.
Dear Mr. Wadleigh : In accordance with my promise to you on Friday after-
noon I write to say that I have just had a talk with Mr. Jay Robinson. Before
he came to see me at my request, I took the opportunity of going over our files
regarding him.
As I indicated to you over the phone I think that the recommendations which
Ben Dorfman and Mortimer Graves have sent you regarding Robinson are fully
justified.
Robinson has an unusual experience. I know but few men who have worked so
thoroughly on many of the economic and political problems of the Far East.
His studies have included work on Korea and on the railways of Manchuria for
5248 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Dr. Walter Young of the Lytton Commission, for Mr. Ben Dorfman on currency,
and in connection with his work at Yenching University, on cooperative banking,
the cotton crop of certain Chinese provinces and oil production in China.
For the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Robinson worked for over a year
to our great satisfaction on a cooperative study which we were making of the
effect on China of the overseas Chinese communities.
In addition to a good knowledge of French, German and Spanish, he has an
altogether unusual knowledge of Chinese. Here Graves, Peake and others
are better qualified to speak, for I myself do not know Chinese.
Of course I only have a general idea of the nature of the work that you have
in mind from what you said on the telephone, but from your brief description
I should have no hesitation in recommending Mr. Robinson because the imaginative
character of his mind and the initiative and independence that he has shown
throughout hi.s career. As Dr. Pasvolsky suggested a general area for study, I
would be inclined to think that Mr. Pasvolsky would not have to give Mr. Robinson
detailed supervision but could count on his doing the job independently and
thoroughly.
In the study of post-war adjustments in the Far East, Mr. Robinson could,
I know, count on informal collaboration from time to time on the part of W. W.
Lockwood of Princeton and W. L. Holland of Berkeley, for both of these men
are familiar with Mr. Robinson's qualifications and are deeply intei'ested in
the problems that you have in mind to put up to Mr. Robinson to investigate.
As to character qualifications I am satisfied that they are of the highest. If
I can be of any further assistance to you in this matter please do not hesitate
to command me.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1207
July 15, 1941
Capt. R. Stuart Murray
Room 811, 1270 6th Avenue, New York City.
Dear Captain Murray : This is to confirm in writing my remarks to you when
you telephoned yesterday to the effect that we would not only raise no objection
to your appointing Miss Virginia Thompson but would welcome it in the national
interest provided it would be possible for the War Department to employ her
for four days a week, thus giving her two days a week for a continuance of her
work on the staff of the IPR.
The following work requires her further effort : (1) a study of British Malaya,
(2) occasional contributions to the FAR EASTERN SURVEY (3) IPR staff
consultation (4) the study of nationalism in Southeastern Asia.
Her appointment by the War Department would of course delay completion
of her work on some of these tasks, but the arrangement proposed above would
meet our requirements and would enable us and the public to cash in on the
very large investment already made.
As you know we have the highest regard for Miss Thompson's character and
3'ou are already informed as to the high quality of her work. For purposes of
information you may want to know that her present salary rating is $3,000
annually.
If you wish further information please do not hesitate to call upon me.
Sincerely yours,
Edward 0. Carter,
Acting Secretary.
I
Exhibit No. 1208
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, July 15, 1941.
Mr. William D. Carter.
Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service,
S16 F Street NE, Washington, D. C.
Dear Bill : It was swell to see you in Washington and at Princeton.
Enclosed is a sheet of your notes which you left in my room at the Mayflower.
Andy Roth has recently seen Colonel Black of the Military Intelligence in
Washington. Black is looking for four economic analysts beginning at $2,600
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5249
a year. Roth is very hopeful that Colonel Black will appoint him as soon as the
formal appropriation comes through from the budget office.
Sincerely yours.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1209
July 16, 1941.
William A. M. Burden, Esq.
Reconstructimi Finance Corporation,
Lafayette Building, Room 312, Washington, D. C.
Dear Bill: Aside from the heat, how do you like your new job in Washington?
I am most eager to hear.
I am wondering whether we may count on your making a contribution of
$250 to the I. P. R. some time between now and October 15th.
Since I last saw you, four governments have recognized the I. P. R.'s achieve-
ments and the high quality of the I. P. R. personnel by the following appointments.
You doubtless know that on President Roosevelt's nomination, Creneralissimo
Chiang Kai-shek has invited Owen Lattimore to go to Chungking as his personal
political adviser. Lattimore flew from San Francisco on July 8th and is due
in Chungking this week. Another member of the International Secretariat, Dr.
Ch'ao-ting Chi, has gone with our best wishes on the same plane to become Gen-
eral Secretary of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund
of U. S. $95,000,000. Here we have a case of outstanding services of the I. P. R. —
in the case of Lattimore, an American to the Chinese Government, and in that
of Chi, a Chinese to the American, British and Chinese Governments. A former
member of the Secretariat, Irving Friedman, for whom I secured an appointment
and an opportunity to study India as an employee of the Indian Government
Trade Commissioner in New York, has now been given an important research
position in the Ti'easury in Washington, one for which he is highly qualified.
Officers in the Army, Navy, Federal Reserve Bank, Department of Commerce
and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies are asking for and
getting substantial help from our research staff. The Office of the Export Control
Administrator recently asked for the full time service of all the American Coun-
cil research staff for a long period. We had to persuade that office that our staff
could render a greater service by continuing its work as a well-balanced,
experienced research group, rather than by moving en bloc to Washington, where
its services would be available only to a single Government department.
Another demand of a different kind has been made upon us. Mr. Henry R.
Luce, Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, and Mr. James G. Blaine have asked me to serve
as chairman of tlie Disbursements Committee which is making a very thorough-
going survey of China's needs and how the $5,000,000 fund, if raised, can best
be spent for maximum relief and at the same time to contribute to long-range
reconstruction.
All of the foregoing is for your private information, for part of it is obviously
not for general circulation.
ITiis service to governments has not, happily, thus far lessened our service
to business groups, the press and our university and secondary school constit-
uency. The demands for Institute services from all these groups is greater
than ever before, and I think we are furnishing more help in all these directions
than ever before.
Nor has the international work of the I. P. R. throughout the world been
reduced by the war excepting in the case of France and Holland. In the case
of Holland nearly all of the activities have been transferred to Batavia, where
van Mook, who has been the principal negotiator with Yoshizawa, is the I. P. R.
leader. (Interestingly enough, van Mook and Yoshizawa were members of
the same round table for a fortnight during the I. P. R. Conference at Yosemite
in 1936.)
While Prince Konoye has been Premier, Ushiba, the chief I. P. R. Secretary
in Japan, has acted as his private secretary. It is expected that he will return
to the Tokyo office of the I. P. R. if Konoye refuses to form a new Cabinet.
While Ushiba has been helping the Premier, Saionji, the grandson of the Genro,
has acted as chief Secretary of the I. P. R. in Tokyo, save for the period of
Matsuoka's visit to Europe. Saionji accompanied the Foreign Minister on his
fantastic round of visits to Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin.
Bruce Turner, for many years Secretary of the I. P. R. in New Zealand, has
just come to AVashington with a member of the New Zealand Cabinet and will
5250 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
shortly be going to London to help get another New Zealand Cabinet officer there.
The Royal Institute in London has recently very greatly augmented its studies
of the Far East. The Far Eastern program of the Canadian and Australian
Institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the
past.
As to adjustments in the International Secretariat, we have been fortunate
in getting Y. Y. Hsu in place of Chi. It so happens that he was a classmate
of Chi's both in China and during their undergraduate days in the United States.
While I am taking over the editorship of Pacific Affairs temporarily, I am
going to have the help as managing editor of Michael Greenberg, a fellow of
Trinity College, Cambridge, who has an unusually clear head, a good knowl-
edge of the Far East and an exceptional pen. The Rockefeller Foundation has
just awarded a fellowship to Dr. George E. Taylor, formerly of Nanking and
Yenchiug Universities, who is now head of the Oriental Department at the
University of Washington, to spend a year in this office as a member of our staff
beginning October 1st.
Our Shanghai office is still in charge of our very able associate international
research secretary, Philip E. Lilienthal, who for the past two years has handled
the production and distribution of a very large list of research studies which he
has been putting through the press in Shanghai for prompt distribution to our
vphole Far Eastern constituency as well as for the British and North American
market. Dr. Chen Han-Seng is carrying out his studies with Hong Kong and
Chungking as his two bases. Jack Shepherd, who has been the Australian mem-
ber of the International Secretariat, has just been awarded a Carnegie Cor-
poration fellowship for a study — pilgrimage through Japan, China, Indo-China
and the Netherlands Indies.
In view of the foregoing, I hope that you can come to our financial assistance
again this year.
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Cabtee, Acting Secretary.
enc.
Exhibit No. 1210
129 East 52nd Stret:t,
New York, N. Y., July 23rd, W.'fl.
Lt. Col. FtoiDERicK D. Sharp,
Room 811, 1210 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y.
Dear Colonel Sharp : Some time ago Mr. W. L. Holland, the International
Research Secretary of the IPR, sent me a copy of a letter he had received from
Martin R. Norins applying for a research appointment in the Institute of Pacific
Relations. His offer was declined because the budget of the Institute did not
permit of additional appointments.
Thus, I have personally made no inquiry regarding Mr. Norins. It occurred
to me, however, that you might like to see his letter of May 20th to which is
attached his autobiographical record.
In other words, I am passing on this with the suggestion that if he has quali-
fications that you need you make your own investigation about him.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Cartel,
Exhibit No. 1211
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,
New York, N. Y., July 25, 1941.
FDS/eh
Telephone : Circle 6-1484-85.
( Penciled notation : ) WLH for your private information. ECC.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd St., New York City.
Dear Mr. Carter : Yours of July 23rd with reference to Mr. Martin R. Norira
was received, for which I thank you.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5251
I am forwarding this information to the War Department for such use as they
may care to make of it.
Thanli you for your liindness in keeping me in mind.
Very sincerely,
Frederick D. Sharp,
Frederick D. Sharp,
Lieut. Col., G. 8. C.
Telephone: MU. 3-3S55-6.
Exhibit No. 1212
Soviet Russia Today,
114 East Thirty Second Street, New York,
August 4t lOJtl.
Dr. Edward Carter,
66 East 19th Street, 'New York City.
Dear Dr. Carter : In our August issue we published a preliminary group of
statements from noted figures in the field of culture and public affairs, ex-
pressing support of the U. S. S. R. in its common struggle with Great Britain
against Nazism. Similar statements from others have appeared elsewhere and
some who would be glad to make such statements have been traveling and have
not yet been reached. We would like to publish in our September issue a com-
plete a list as can be gathered. Will you be good enough therefore to send us
a copy of any' public statement you may have made, or wish to make, for this
purpose. We go to press on the 12th of August for the September issue. May
we therefore have your answer before then?
Yours sincerely,
Jessica Smith, Editor.
Jessica Smith.
JS : FMU
UOPWA #18
the authoritative American magazine on the soviet union
Exhibit No. 1213
Telephone: MU. 3-3855-6.
Soviet Russia Today,
114 East Thirty Second Street, New York,
August llf, 1941-
Dr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Dr. Carter. Many thanks for sending us the copy of your cable to
Moscow for publication. I shall be glad to indicate that it was cabled to the
U. S. S. R. on June 26th, and will send you the proof as soon as it comes back from
the printer.
Sincerely yours,
Jessica Smith, Editor.
Jessica Smith.
the authoritative AMERICAN MAGAZINE ON THE SOVIET UNION
Exhibit No. 1214
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Massachusetts, 10th August, 1941.
Miss Jessica Smith,
Soviet Russia Today,
114 East 32nd Street, Nero York, N. Y.
Dear Miss Smith : On June 26th I cabled to friends in Moscow the following
message :
"American opinion, while holding varying political views, agrees with Under
Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in condemning Hitler's 'treacherous attack'
•on the Soviet Union and in declaring that 'any rallying of forces opposing Hitler
5252 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
would redound to the benefit of American security.' It is highly significant that
the vast majority of commentators recognize that this is a clear-cut case of
indefensible Nazi aggression.
"Though American writers on strategy are divided in their judgment of the
military outcome, I i:)ersonally believe that the attitude of the Soviet citizens
and the character of the Soviet Army are such that a Hitler victory is as un-
likely as it is undesirable. The Soviet Army has already proved its competence
in the Far East, and demonstrated its power in the West. Many Americans ex-
pected that Japan would quickly conquer China. After four j^ears of fighting the
army of Free China and the spirit of the Free Chinese are stronger than ever
before. Neither the Chinese people nor the peoples of the U. S. S. R. with their
infinitely more integrated military organization and political structure, would
expect the Soviet Union to be less determined or less certain of final victory.
I believe that the American people, too, will rise above internal differences and
support every Soviet efi'ort to resist the Nazi aggression."
You may use this in the next issue of Soviet Russia Today provided that you
indicate that it was sent to my friends in the U.S.S.R. on June 26th.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1215
129 East 52nd Street,
Neio York, N. Y., Aiigust 13, 19.1,1.
The Hon. Sumner Welles,
State Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Welles : At the suggestion of Charles C. Burlingham, Judge Thomas
D. Thacher, Joseph Barnes, Allen Wardwell, Dr. Henry E. Sigerist and others,
I have accepted the chairmanship of a preparatory and temporary committee
to organize an American Committee for Medical Aid to Russia.
We have consulted the Hon. Joseph E. Davies in his capacity as a member of
the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies, and Mr. Davies has asked
that I go ahead with the organization of the proposed committee. We have con-
sulted the Soviet Ambassador who has assured us of the full cooperation of his
Government. A representative of a New York law firm has undertaken to aid
in drafting articles of incorporation. He will also aid in preparing the papers
necessary for the approach to the Treasury in connection with the necessary
authority for gifts being deductible in income tax returns.
The firm of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie and Co. has accepted our invitation to
serve as honorary auditor and to aid in setting up the books and supervising
the accounts.
Mr. Charles C. Burlingham and I have been in correspondence with the Hon.
Norman H. Davis as to relationships with the American Red Cross. I expect
to talk the matter over further with Mr. Davis in Stockbridge this week end.
Similar consultations are talking place with the American Friends Service, and
the Joint Distribution Committee of the Jews.
In order to have as much coordination as possible we ai'e asking James G.
Blaine to act as consultant for United China Relief and Mr. Winthrop W. Aldrich
to act as consultant for British War Relief. We are asking Mr. Aldrich to ar-
range for Mr. F. V. Gehle, one of the vice presidents of the Chase Bank, to co-
operate with us in setting up a sound organization which can profit by the vei-y
extensive experience of British War Relief.
Colonel Philip R. Faymonville of the War Department is being kept informed
as to the developments of this plan.
When the preliminary appeal is made we will emphasize that the immediate
need in Russia is for medicines, drugs and surgical instruments, rather than for
ambulances or personnel.
The preparatory committee will make a decision very shortly as to the precise
title of the permanent committee. Some recommend American Committee for
Medical Aid to Russia. Others propose United Russian Relief.
All with whom we have consulted favor the idea of a central organization in
order to avoid duplication of effort, as local groups all over the country have
already started raising funds for medical aid.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5253
I would appreciate it if you would pass this letter on to the appropriate officer
of the State Department with the request tliat he inform me as to any further
steps which I should take on behalf of the preparatory committee at this stage.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1216
The University of Chicago,
August 20, 1941.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
139 East 52nd Street, New York City..
Dear Ned : I have just received a letter from Tuan-Sheng Chien from Kun-
ming, China. He is distinctly more optimistic than he was in my last letter from
him, although he says the economic situation, especially around Chungking is
getting pretty bad. He emphasized the importance of the Burma Road and the
great loss to China by the Japanese occupation of Indo-China and the stoppage of
access by that route to the outer world. He hopes the United States may do
more to improve the administration of the Burma Road.
He is a good deal concerned about the Russian entry into the war, thinking it
may complicate China's position, although of course he realizes the possibilities
of great military advantage. As a Left, but not Communist Chinese, he is afraid
China will be squeezed by the Communists on the one hand and the "Shanghai
minds" on the other.
Perhaps you have got this same letter, but if not I am sure you would be in-
terested in the following paragraph : "The attitude of the left intelligentsia of
America towards the Chinese Communists and the latter's quarrel vrith the
Central Government is most unintelligible to me. I know very few of that left.
But I do know that the Amerasia group, which is almost identical with the inter-
national secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, is the moving spirit of
that pro-Communist and shall I say anti-Chungking propaganda. How far that
propaganda poisons the American mind and how far that group gets a sympa-
thetic hearing from the New Deal I am in no position to judge. But I do think
that that propaganda is very harmful in the sense that it interferes with our
liberty of action in regard to the disloyal troops of Communism and prevents
American public opinion from otherwise exerting a great and healthy influence
on Chungking which needs to be crticized and also to go very much further to
the left (again not Communist).
He adds a word of surprise at Owen Lattimore's appointment as adviser to
Chiang Kai-shek on the grounds that he is not very close to the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, nor a man of the technical ability sorely in need in Chungking.
"There was rumor that the choice was matle by that left intelligentsia referred
to above, through Laughlin Currie. If this could be true, one naturally looks to
a more virulent anti-Chungking (but of course pro-Chiang) pinkish propaganda in
America, and tlie task of true reformers of the liberal left of China, will be made
only more difficult."
I have just written Mr. Chien assuring him that the Amersia group now has no
connection witli the Institute of Pacific Relations and that the latter does not
sympathize with the attitude of the former. I also said a word for Owen Latti-
more and assured Chien that he is not closely associated with the Amerasia group.
I would be glad to have your comment on this situation.
Sincerely yours,
QuiNCY Wright.
QW : hmp
Exhibit No. 1217
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, September 2, 19Jfl.
Dr. Philip C. Jessup,
ColiDubia University, New York City.
Dear Phil ; * * *
Professor Tuan-sheng Chien who was one of the members of the Chinese
group at Virginia Beach has written to several Americans criticising Owen Lat-
timore. Lauchlin Currie, and by indirection the IPR.
5254 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
We need not be worried about the letter, because by now Lattimore has
apparently made good with the Generalissimo as is evidenced by the wide pub-
licity which the Chinese Government propaganda ministry has given Lattimore's
address on August 12 at Chungliing, but I would be interested to know whether
Chien has written you ; and if he has, I thought you would want to see my com-
ment on his letter to one of his several correspondents in this country.
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1218
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 2nd October 1941.
Department of Statb:,
Visa Division, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sirs : This is to certify that I am well acquainted with Mrs. Hilda A.
Bretholtz. I have known her for the last twelve years and she is a very respon-
sible character.
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward 0. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1219
[Telegram]
July 15, 1941.
Mrs. Nathaniel Bretholtz,
Care of Philip J. Jaffe,
Box 66, Roxhury, Connecticut (Telephone Woodberry S23) :
Do you know any good unemployed cartographers in addition to Winslow and
Watkins?
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1220
[Telegram]
Jttly 16, 1941.
Mrs. Nathaniel Bretholtz,
o/o Philip Jaffe,
Box 66, Roxbury, Connecticut (Telephone Woodlerry 323):
Earnestly hope you Nat can come Lee lunch one Saturday.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1221
November 14, 1941.
HA from ECC :
Here is my letter to Remer and his reply about Clii's monograph. I suppose
we have to send him a copy if we have one to spare. I do not remember saying
that we put Remer on the mailing list in the sense of his getting free copies.
Would you handle the whole matter on my behalf, both with reference to Chi and
the Economic handbook. The Coordinator of Information has barrels of money
and they ought to pay for all of the books we send them. If you send Chi's
manuscript, be sure to put a time limit of say eight days when it should be
returned.
Exhibit No. 1222
November 22, 1941.
WWL from ECC:
Schoyer has just been in to ask my advice with reference to Colonel Sharp's
proposal. It is quite clear that he is very loath to leave the IPR, but realizes
that if he went to Colonel Sharp it might result in a budget saving.
Considering his age and single blessedness I suppose government service is
indicated.
What I would like to urge very strongly on you is that you tell him you will
release him in the hope that Colonel Sharp will permit his doing two things ;
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5255
First, complete the present radio program; and second, put through a second
AIMCO-CBS program after the first of the year. I think it is likely that CBS
will give us another series and at an even better hour.
I think we ought to do this second series for three reasons :
(1) Its intrinsic value in our total program of public education.
(2) It will in the long run help us with AMCO finances (e. g. Grover's very
complimentary remarks).
(3) If we don't go ahead with a second program we let the Far Eastern radio
field go by default to Dick Walsh and Pearl Buck, and to Upton Close.
I think* Schoyer could manage the second program without its taking too much
of his time from Colonel Sharp's oflice. The more often he does it the more
skillfully and speedily he can do the job. It would hardly be fair to also ask
him to carry the task of answering any questions that come in in the fan mail.
If you agree, I suggest that you get Schoyer to drive a bargain along the
foregoing lines.
EXHIBIT No. 1223
Department of Economics. Government, and History,
United States Military Academy,
West Point, Netv York, November 24, 1941.
(WWL dealing with this)
Mr. Edward C. Cartek,
The Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, Netv York.
Dear Mb. Carte3i : Early in 1942 the War Department will launch an educa-
tional campaign which aims to inform all military personnel as to :
1. The train of events beginning with the outbreak of World War II which
compelled the United States to launch the current defense program.
2. The hazards facing the United States today.
3. The day-to-day interpretation of further events as they occur, with em-
phasis on their relationship to our national defense.
We will look to selected officers in the various posts, camps, and stations
to give the lectures which are intended to bring the soldiers abreast of the
situation. At the same time we hope to build up a "pool" of not less than a
hundred civilian specialists whose lectures will highlight the campaign. In
many cases their intimate knowledge of specific problems will not otherwise
be available to the Army.
The job of organizing this project was turned over to me a few days ago.
We have been fortunate at the outset in securing the full support of the For-
eign Policy Association in our work. I am hoping that the Institute of Pacific
Relations will do likewise, in view of the fact that no other research group
can provide comparable information in the Far Eastern field.
Our immeiliate wants are :
1. A list of your publications which will serve as background material for
the research work of the Army officers who will give the lectures. They shoiild
go back at least to early 1981. I have in mind particularly the pamphlets and
magazines which you publish — issued volumes of the "Far Eastern Survey," etc.
As for your books, altliough I am reasonably sure I can find them in the War
College Library, it will still be advisable to have our own supply. Please
quote your prices on all items.
2. A list, with quotations, of current publications.
3. A list of suggested speakers in the Far Eastern field. We are looking
for the realist who will stick to an objective presentation, avoiding the direct
emotional appeal. Also, he should be able to put his ideas across in a rela-
tively simple style, inasmuch as his audience will in many, prehaps most, cases
be a mixed group — officers and enlisted men. I have in mind James R. Young
as a typical example.
We plan to call on the speakers for not more than six lectures each during
the period Jan. 2-April 15. Their assignments will be at camps and posts as
near as possible to their normal places of business. The standard Government
consultant fee of $10.00 per day. plus expenses, will be paid. As you see, we
look to them for a contribution to defense.
I will be in my Washington office. Chief of Public Relations, War Department,
during the periods November the 26-2S and December 2-6. Thereafter I will be in
5256 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Washington regularly (for an indefinite period) from Tuesday to Saturday
of each week. Please write to that address.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Hitman Boukema,
NB : ht.
Exhibit No. 1225
[Telegram]
Jan. 1, 1942.
(Handwritten:)
TASS,
A. P. BtUMing N. T. C.
Message just received. If not too late you may send following. The spon-
taneous thundering and long sustained applause by the United States Senate and
House of Representatives following Winston Churchill's remarks regarding the
Soviet Union's great role in the World War reflects the feeling of gratitude of
the American people to the people of the Soviet Union as we now are joined
together in the War against Hitler.
Edward Carter.
Exhibit No. 1226
129 East 52nd Stre^it,
New York City, February 27, 1942.
Tlie Honorable Joseph E. Davies,
South Ocean Boulevard, Palm Beach, Florida
Dear Mr. Davies : Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the March
PAciTTc Affairs, the quarterly journal of the IPK. Ultimately I think you may
want to familiarize yourself with this magazine. The reason I am writing you
today is to call your attention to the review of "Mission to Moscow" which begins
on page 124.
With kindest regards.
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward C. Carter,
ExpiiBiT No. 1227
June 2, 1942.
Memo to E. C. C. from C. P. :
My four days in Washington last week were fruitful in ideas if nothing else.
■Several things came up which Bill Lockwood has suggested that I pass on to you.
1. W. Norman Brown (British Empire section of the CO. I., Library of
Congress Annex) whose specialty is India was full of good intentions and
would very much like to see some arrangement made whereby an organiza-
tion like the IPR would have access to material and personnel in the various
Washington departments. He is going to suggest to someone in the Office
of Facts and Figures that they consider making the IPR a semi-official chan-
nel for releasing certain information to the public. This was his own idea,
and coming from him it might carry some weight.
I spent quite a while with Bill Carter in the hope that some way could be
found of securing for the IPR such releases as the ^Monitoring Department
can distribute. Bill felt that the only way that such an arrangement could
be made would be by an important IPR person making an appeal directly
to MacLeish or someone of equal importance. Bill realizes that the IPR
would make far better use of the releases than some of the newspapers which
evidently do get the benefit of tliis service. It does seem ridiculous that an
office like ours has to dei>end upon newspaper stuff at second or third hand.
Would you be willing to write to MacLeish presenting the problem which
the IPR is facing now that it is cut off from most Far Eastern news, and ask
whether it would be possible for certain information secured through the
Monitoring service to be released to us for use in the Survey, Pacific Affairs
etc.
2. The people who are working on India seemed to show more interest
in IPR and its potentialities than anyone else I met in Washington. Eric
Beecroft (Board of Economic Warfare) talked to me at length about his
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5257
desire to see the Far Eastern Survey and other Institute piTblications give
adequate attention to India. He thinlis it important tliat we add a scholar
on Indian to our stalf and raised the question of malsing such an appointmeiit
Having in mind the possibility of a Rockefeller fellowship for such a per-
son, I asked Beecroft whether he could suggest any candidates. He men-
tioned (I suppose this should be treated confidentially) Daniel Thorner
who is in the C. O. I. working under Brown's direction. Brown has an
extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the
most promising young men in the country. He does not know Thorner's
background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at
Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation
to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner
probably knows more about the transport problem in Indian than any other
person in this country. It is Beecroft's notion that a fairly attractive offer
here could wean Thorner away from his present government job. (Beecroft
is not sure what Thorner's present salary is. He thinks it is probably
$2,600 or $3,200.) I have discussed this somewhat briefly with Bill Lock-
wood. He is a little uncertain about the second fellowship for the American
Council staff. If this fellowship could be made available, or if you could
find it possible to give Thorner a secretariat appointment, it would certainly
mean a great deal to the IPR program for the next year.
3. I was very much interested to find a large number of our friends in
Washington bemoaning the fact that the whole IPR was not located in Wash-
ington, or at least that a branch office was nut in full operation there.
Several people mentioned to me the dinner meeting whicli was called by
Graves on May 13 to discuss the whole problem of India and the presenta-
tion of information about India in this country. Every person who attended
that dinner was delighted that the opportunity had been given him, and said
quite honestly that if it had not been for Graves' action, they would prob-
ably not have sought the opportunity to discover what other departments
of the government were doing in their field of particular interest. It was
pointed out that an active IPR ofl3ce in Washington could do a great service
by calling together frequent meetings of this kind. I wish it were possible
for our staffs to have someone in Washington full time. We are certainly
missing opportunities of .service to ourselves and of usefulness to othei'S.
All in all, it is very heartening for a member of the IPR staff to discover
how highly the organization and its publications are regarded everywhere
in the capitol city.
CP : RY
Exhibit No. 1228
(Penciled notation: not sent?)
129 East r»2ND Street,
Neiv York Citi/, March 12, 19J,2.
Mr. John A. Pollard,
Special Reports Division, Coordinator of Infoiiuation,
270 Madison Avenue, New York City.
Dear Mr. Pollard : Thank you for your letter of the 2Sth regarding Mr. Field.
I have no hesitation in testifying to Mr. Field's political integrity and freedom
from activities which might place his loyalty in question.
I was associated with him intimately from 1929 until September 1940. Dur-
ing this period his Americanism was of the most rugged and valuable character.
He was an indefatigable and exceptionally able student of domestic and foreign
policy and became one of our foremost authorities on the Far East. He saw
the menace of Japan, and I do not know of anyone who more unerringly en-
visaged the inevitable movement of Japan into Indo-China, Thailand. Mala.va
and the Netherlands Indies. He again and again called attention to the costly
appeasement policy of London and Washington, and as 1 remember, indicated
that if the United States was not willing to fight to prevent the Japanese occupa-
tion of French Indo-China all of Southeast Asia would fall to the Japanese.
In the autumn of 1940 Mr. Field broke with me in the sense that lie resigned
from the staff of the Institute because lie recognized that it was impossible for
him to continues on the Institute staff and engage in political activities as planned
by the American Peace Mobilization. He felt that the war as defined by the
88348 — 52 — pt. 14 23
5258 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
London and Paris Governments in 1939 was in danger of involving the United
States in Chambei-lainism, in the underwriting of British Imperialism and in the
ultimate appeasement of Germany and Japan as advocated at various times
by the Cliveden set. He therefore resigned from the IPR, threw himself into
the APM, carried on a nation-wide educational campaign and to gain publicity
for this campaign organized the picketing of the White House.
Tliongh I had a great deal of sympathy for many of his ideas I had tried to
dissuade him from joining tlie APM because I thought it might endanger both his
research and political usefulness, and also because I felt that the sooner the
United States got into the war the sooner it could be transformed from an im-
perialist war into a people's war against the new and terrible imperialisms of
Germany and Japan.
The Congress of the United States, many employees of our government, and a
great many trusted officers of our armed forces were in 1940 in my view as in-
adequate in their political analysis as Mr. Field. A very high percentage of
loyal Americans were working, as ]\Ir. Field was working, to keep vis out of the
war. They did this for all kinds of motives and all kinds of reasons.
[Mr. John A. Pollard — 2 — March 12, 1942]
Yet the vast majority of these are accepted today as citizens of integrity,
completely free from activities which might place their loyalty in question.
Mr. Field was, of course, politically ill-advised to picket the White House, but
a great many of our most reliable and responsible citizens have made political
mistakes.
That Mr. Field could be guilty of any disloyalty to the United States is incon-
ceivable. The great advantage that he has over many is that his political analysis
of the Far East has been far in advance of most of our best informed citizens.
His knowledge of the Far East is very extensive. His capacity for work is great.
His usefulness to the Government would, in my view, be beyond question.
Sincerely yours,
Edward 0. Caetee.
[Mr. John A. Pollard —2— March 12, 1942]
Yet the vast majority of these are accepted today as citizens of integrity,
completely free from activities which might place their loyalty in question. I
would trust Mr. Field's integrity more than I would certain well known isolation-
ists, because I think he possesses more than most a keen awareness of the essence
of our American democracy.
There will, of course, be wide difference of opinion as to the wisdom of APM's
picketing the White House. Personally, I think it was an ill-advised move. It
was defended by its protagonists on the ground that APM felt obligated to expose
the nature of what they regarded as the phony war which was being waged at
the beginning. The difference between APM and certain genuinely subversive
movements was that APM was attempting to do everything in the open, and its
picketing of the White House was an attempt to bring out into the open before
the American people and the American government the important issues which
it believed must be faced by the American people.
That Mr. Field could be guilty of any disloyalty to the United States is in-
conceivable. The great advantage he has over many is that his political analysis
of the Far East has been far in advance of most of our best informed citizens.
His knowledge of the Far East is very extensive. His capacity for work is great
His usefulness to the Government would, in my view, be beyond question.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Mr. John A. Pollard,
Special Reports Division, Coordinator of Information,
270 Madison Avcuue, Neiv York City.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5259
Exhibit No. 1229
(Pencilled initials:)
WWL EJT
WLH PCG
HA JWB
ED Lomis
KG RLW
Holmes
Keenleyside
ISM
L. Curtis
Parkin
Claston
Skelton
The "White House,
Washington, March 13, 1942.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
Neiv York, Neiv York.
Dear Mr. Carter : I am happy to express my interest in the continuation of
the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I helieve is more necessary
now than ever before. Several of the volumes of the Inquiry Series have been
of distinct use to this office, and there liave been a number of articles in Pacific:
Affairs and in the Far Eastom Surven which have helped us in the analysis of
problems upon which we liave been working.
It would be a distinct loss if these publications had to be shut down or even
curtailed. I hope that in the interest of our war effort in the Pacific they
may be actually expanded. I do not know of any agency inside the government
or out of it which is in a position to do the work which the Institute has
been doing.
Sincerely yours,
Lauchlin Currie,
Lauchlin Currie,
Administrative Assista7it to the President.
Exhibit No. 1231
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C, March 17th 1942.
Mr. W. L. HoU-and,
Research Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
De-ar Mr. Holland : The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator
of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received
from the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge
of its research activities. . . . The outstanding example is the receipt of a num-
ber of manuscripts in advance of their publication by the Institute. These in-
clude the translation of a work by Charles Robequain on the economic
development of French Indo-China, a manuscript by H. G. Callis on foreign
investments in Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one
by Chao Ting-chi on China.
This acknowledgment may be useful to you in any appeal you may make for
support during the coming year.
May I express the hope that your plans for the year will include provision for
further cooperation with this Section. The immediate importance of this is
emphasized by the fact that our own work has become more closely integrated
with that of the Army and Navy.
We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of
Pacific Relations with confidence that such cooperation will make for effective-
ness in research and economy in the use of personnel.
Sincerely yours,
C. F. Remer, Chief, Far Eastern Section.
5260 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1232
April 6, 1942.
To: ECC
WLH
From : WWL
I'd like your advice on a reply to the attached letter from Roy Veatch. It
proposes a conference this spring on tlie essentials of a postwar settlement, at-
tended by persons in and out of the government.
There isn't any doubt but that this would be a very useful undertaking if
properly set up. It might in fact be the Front's Neck follow-up which we have
been unable to arrange thus far.
The chief problem I should think would not be organizational sponsorship but
finding someone with the standing, time, and resources to pull it off. Given this
it would be easy to get the necessary informal cooperation.
As for our taking the lead, shouldn't positive I.P.R. efforts in this field be
devoted primarily to our own area of concern? I should think any conferencing
that we do ought to be directed first of all at several preparatory meetings for
the September show. This would not preclude our chipping in but would mean
that someone else would really have to carry the ball.
Ed Earle is out west for a mouth investigating different aspects of the Japa-
nese evacuation.
I am sending a copy of Roy's letter to Phil Jessup. He might like to consider
the proposal in relation to his Carnegie Endowment program.
Veatch's personnel proposals are entirely American, but surely this meeting
should be international in character.
Exhibit No. 1233
Board of Economic Waefaue,
Washington, D. C, March SO, 1942.
Mr. William "W. Lockwood, Jr.,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Bill : I have had an opportunity to talk with a good many people both
inside and outside the Government since I came down here, particularly regard-
ing the present state of thought and action on plans and advance preparations
for the postwar world. It seems perfectly clear to me, and to others who are
trying to observe the situation closely, that some new impetus is needed to
bring scattered thinking into focus. We do not yet have in Government or
outside of Government any agreement, or any general understanding, as to the
essential points in a postwar set-up that will make impossible another war
within a generation or two, and there is no adequate plan for such public
discussion of this problem as will lead to general support of the action that
Governments must take.
I, and a few others here, have been casting about for the proper agency or
medium to bring together the people who shoidd think through this problem
and advise upon lines of action. This might be done by Edward Meade Earle's
Committee, as a follow-up of the Fronts Neck Conference last summer. On
the other hand, I believe it would be desirable for the auspices to be a little
broader and I wondered therefore whether the I. F. R. and the P. P. A., and
perhaps also Shotwell's Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, might
join with Earle's Committee in sponsoring such a conference, entirely without
publicity.
It would be my idea that a group ought to meet near Washington during the
Spring, at least before the end of May, and that it should spend two to four
days together. If the meeting is limited to two days, say Saturday and Sunday,
I believe you would have a better chance to hold the entire group together
since each member might be able to commit himself to that much time.
As a starter I woidd suggest the following people outside the Government:
Shotwell. Buell, Fittman Potter, Eugene Staley, Jacob Viner, Clarence Pickett,
Quincy Wright, J. B. Condliffe, Isaiah Bowman, Dr. Boudreau. A. Loveday, A,
Hansen, Edward Meade Earle, Walter Van Kirk, Hamilton Fish Armstrong,
Vera Mieheles Dean, and of course you and Ned Carter. You might want to
include also George Warren, Secretary of the President's Advisory Committee
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5261
on Political Refugees ; Patrick M. Malin, American Director, International
Migration Service; Michael Straight, Maxwell S. Stewart, Carter Goodrich,
Esther Brunauer, Bill and Anne Johnstone, and John Coyl of the National
Planning Association.
From within the Government you might include Mrs. Roosevelt, Vice Presi-
dent Wallace, Milo Perkins, Berle, Acheson, Pasvolsky (and Julian Wadleigh,
Charles Yost, and Harley Notter, from Pasvolsky's Division in the State Depart-
ment) ; Harry White of the Treasury; Leslie Wheeler, Paul Appleby, and
Mordecai Ezekiel of Agriculture ; Wayne Taylor, Amos Taylor and A. K. Upgren
of the Department of Commerce ; Lubin and Hinrichs from the Labor field ;
Stacy May from WPB ; Stephen Raushenbush from the Power Commission ;
Ringland and Fox, on the staff of the President's Committee on War Relief
Appeals (and perhaps Joseph E. Davies and Keppel of the Committee) ; and
from the staff of our Board, Lewis Lorwin, Winfield Riefler, William T. Stone,
and Louis Bean.
Let me know what you think about this plan. If you are not in a position
to take the initiative we should like to take it up with someone else.
Sincerely yours,
Roy Veatoh.
P. S. — Of course other names will occur to me as soon as this has gone — for
instance. I certainly wouldn't leave out Phil Jessup. Presumably a group of
four or five would want to do a careful job of drawing up the list.
Exhibit No. 1234
[Telegram]
April 25 1942
From : The White House, Washington, D. C. 25. 1240P.
Edward C. Carter,
129 East 52nd Street:
Planning to attend conference Tuesday.
Lauchlin Cuekie.
Exhibit No. 1235
[Telegram]
May 5, 1942.
Lauchlin Cureie,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C:
Wire collect can you spare five minutes anytime Wednesday.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1236
[Telegram]
June 23, 1942.
Lauchlin Currie,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C:
Washington visit postponed until next week.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1237
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, June 26, 1942.
Mr. Lauchlin Currie,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.
Dear Currie: I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2nd, and
hope you can see me in the forenoon of the day.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5262
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1238
[Telegram]
The White House,
Washington, D. C, October 7, 1942.
Edward C. Caeteb,
Institute of Pacific Relatione:
Eighth only time would be better if convenient.
LaUCHLIN CtJBRIK.
Exhibit No. 1239
[Telegram]
Octobee 7, 1942.
Lattchlin Cxirrie,
Executive Offices of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C:
Visiting Washington tomorrow, Thursday. Will telephone you in morning
for appointment.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1240
[Telegram]
Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations:
Glad to see you at 12 : 30 Wednesday.
7 Gove:bnment,
Washington, D. C. 5 5:32 P.
Lauchlin Currie.
Exhibit No. 1242
[Day letter]
March 29, 1938.
Mr. Constantine Oumansky,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C:
Could you dine with a dozen of my friends at the Century Club on the evening
of Wednesday April twentieth?
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1243
[Telegram]
Washington, D. C, April 20 1035A.
Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations:
Will be Century Club tonight 7 : 15.
Arriving consulate about five. Regards.
C. Oumansky.
Exhibit No. 1244
NOVEMBEIR 14, 1942.
NLT
93
V. M. Molotov,
Narkomindal, Moscow (U. S. S. R.) :
Respectfully and urgently invite you to authorize some members of Soviet
Embassy Washington and Soviet Legation Ottawa to attend eighth conference
Institute Pacific Relations, Montremblant Province, Quebec, December four tn
fourteen Stop Influential leaders coming from England, China, Fighting
France, Philippines, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United
States Stop E. Varga, G. Voitinsky, Constantine Oumonsky, V. Motylev, famil-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5263
iar with Institute purposes Stop Conference agenda includes better prosecution
of war in racial political economic matters. Conference discussion will be
private.
Edward Carter,
Secretary-General, Institute Pacific Relations,
129 East 52 Street, New York.
Exhibit No. 1245
PACIFIC COtTNCIL
Institute of Pacific Relations
Columbia University,
New York City, March 2Jt, 1942.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York City.
Dear Ned : I hope you have sent copies of Lauchlin Currie's letter to such key
people as Dr. Shotwell, Dr. Butler, Roland Morris, and the people at the corpora-
tion and the Rockefeller Foundation.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Phil.
Exhibit No. 1246
129 East 52nd Street,
Neiv York, N. Y., April 6th, 19^2.
Mrs. Anne Hartwell Johnstone,
Foreign Policy Association,
National Press Building, Washington D. C.
Dear Mrs. Johnstone : Thank you for sending me Russia at War. I am sorry
the War Department took such a timid attitude. I imagine General McCoy
has by this time decided to reopen the question with the War Department. If
the army can't stand as mild a dose of the Soviet Union as this, how can American
soldiers be expected to be effective comrades in arms with our gallant allies of
the Soviet Union? And how can our soldier civilians consider intelligently the
issues which will confront all Americans when the representatives of the Soviet
Union are sitting with our representatives at some future peace conference table?
As for other channels of distribution, neither I nor my colleagues in the IPR
can think of any avenues of promotion with which you are not already familiar.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1247
National Headquarters Vice President and Washington Repeesentativb
22 East 38th Street, New York, N. Y. William T. Stone
Foreign Policy Association, Inc.
Washington Bureau : National Press Building, Washington, D. C.
Telephone : District 3780
April 8, 1942.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter : Thank you for your letter about our Headline Book, "Russia
at War." I sympathize entirely with your questions on the subject and I am
really alarmed at the amount of distrust or, to put it more mildly, questioning
of Russia that I find here.
5264 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I think we have done a good job of promoting Mrs. Dean's pamphlet through
the regular channels. I had in mind that your work with Russian Relief might
have sugggested certain new areas of interest which the pamphlet might help
consolidate.
Sincerely yours,
Anne H Johnstone
Mrs. Anne Haktweix Johnstone,
Education Secretary.
AH J : MH
Exhibit No. 1249
WLH file Department of State,
WWL Washington, May 12, 19^.
In reply refer to RO
My Dear Mr. Carter : In connection with its program of cultural and tech-
nical assistance to China, the Department plans to send to universities and other
research centers in that country scientific and technical textbooks, reference
works, and learned journals.
Because of the difliculties of transportation, it is for the moment impossible to
send to China the actual books and journals needed in any appreciable quantity.
The Department is, therefore, making arrangements for the microfilming of cer-
tain urgently needed books and journals with the permission of their publishers
which has been generously extended in each case thus far taken up.
As a war measure and for the duration of the present transportation strin-
gency the Department would appreciate receiving your permission to make micro-
film copies of pamphlets, books, and articles from the periodicals published both
by the International Secretariat and the American Council of the Institute of
Pacific Relations for transmission to China in connection with the program re-
ferred to above.
Sincerely yours,
[s] Charles A. Thomson,
Chief, Division of Cultural Relatione.
Exhibit No. 1250
129 East 52Nn Street,
New York City, May IS, 19Jf2.
Mr. Charles A. Thomson,
Chief, Division of Cultural Relations,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Thompson : Thank you for your letter of May 12. We are very glad
to cooperate with you in your admirable program for sending microfilms to China
and are glad to give you permission to make microfilm copies of our publications.
We should be interested to hear from time to time what particular articles
or books you select for this purpose.
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1251
(Pencilled notes:) Don't these people ever consult other govt, departments?
V Schumpeter? John Steward?
WLH
WWL
Please deal with this ECC
KG : No, except for the attached stuff, if that counts. WLH
WM 1. Has this been answered?
MR 2. Martin & Pettigrew for our Washington list KG
WWL: What's to be done about this? WLH OK HS
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5265
WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence Division G-2
Washington
May 30, 1942.
Mr. Edward C. Caetee,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, Neio York.
Dear Mr. Carter: The Japan-Manchiuia section of the Far Eastern Branch
of the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, is interested in obtaining
the services of some additional research analysts primarily to prepare economic
and geographic surveys, studies, and reference material on Japan and jManchuria.
In fairness to the analysts now on hand, it is necessary that additional
personnel employed under the new authorizations have outstanding records
of accomplishment in the field of scholarship or in the business world. While
a knowledge of Japanese or other Far Eastern languages is not essential,
some personal experience in the Far East is practically indispensable. The
work consists of the preparation of research material and, in some cases, the
direction and supervision of other research analysts of superior qualifications
and accomplishments.
Salaries range from $2,000 to $3,800, and if someone with the necessary
qualifications and experience is available, it is probable that arrangements could
be made to employ one research analyst at $4,600.
Because of your wide acquaintance among research workers interested in
the Far East and your accomplishments in directing research and the serious
study of Far Eastern questions, it may be that you know of some American
that you would consider suitable for the kind of work roughly described above.
In any case, I shall be under obligations to you if you will send to me or to
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS, any information
you think might be helpful in obtaining the services of two or three research
workers who can be depended upon for at least a year to turn out a considerable
amount of research work of high quality on economic and other subjects relating
to the Japanese Empire and IManchuria.
Yours sincerely,
[s] Truman M. Martin,
[t] Truman M. Martin,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C, Chief, Japan-Manchuria Section.
hi
June 26, 1942.
WWL from ECC :
If John Stewart isn't already in government service isn't he just the person
to recommend to Truman Martin? I certainly would not want to recommend
Mrs. Schumpeter.
(Pencilled note :) ECC I talked with Pettigrew and proposed Stewart, among
others.
WWL
Exhibit No. 1252
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, June 11, 1942.
Edgar J. Takr, Esq.,
Monarch Life Assurance Company,
Winnipeg, Canada.
Dear Edgar: Your letter of the 9th raises two points: first, the welcome
possibility of an invitation from Canada ; second, the question of postponement
until December.
Regarding the latter, I think an overriding consideration will be the point
you raise as to the psychological time for getting the best results. I know that
our chances of getting people from the Soviet Union would be better in December
5266 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
than in September. I raised the matter of Soviet representation with Litvinoff
last weelv. He is deeply interested in the Institute and very appreciative of its
work, but he says that this summer it is going to be terribly difficult to get anyone
to leave the Soviet Union. Everyone wants to stay and participate in the
winning of the war. To the Russians, as you linow, this summer is the crisis
period. Litvinoff has the greatest difficulty in getting over adequate staff for
this reason. On the cultural side he has been under tremendous pressure from
government and private agencies here to get over Shostakovich, the composer,
the Red Army Chorus, etc., and though he has put tremendous pressure on these
people to come over and help in the task of speeding up America's war effort for
Russia he has had absolutely no success. No one wants to leave the Soviet Union
now. In spite of this I do not exclude the possibility of Motylev or Voitinsky
coming, but all the indications point to December being much better than
September.
As to the possibility of our getting a really significant group of people in as
short a time as three months, I believe that we can certainly get as good a person-
nel from the Pacific Area for a September Conference as we got for the Atlantic
Area at Front's Neck last year, but I think we all want to attempt an even
higher level for the IPR than we had for the Atlantic Conference. (I except,
of course, Canada, because we could not think of a better group for the IPB
than that you mobilized for Front's Neck.)
Last week in Washington, Holland and I made some soundings with reference
to Wallace and Milo Perkins. Right now both of them have to watch their step
because of the very delicate relations between the Board of Economic Warfare
and the State Department. The Department is known by the public to be a little
exercised about the activities of the BEW, and I read between the lines that
neither Wallace nor Perkins wants in the next few weeks to do anything that
would aggravate this situation.
And here is one of the critical problems faced by the American Council.
Many thoughtful Americans believe that there is more constructive thinking
on postwar reconstructionin the BEW than in the State Department. Many
would hope that the lead in the proposed Conference, from the American point
of view, could be taken by Wallace and Perkins and some of their very able
staff members. Certain foreign office people from other countries might be
more eager to meet Wallace and Perkins than some of the more routine people
in the State Department. We can undoubtedly secure the presence of some
State Department people if that seems wise to the officers of the Pacific Council,
but it would be difficult to manage at the moment.
Wallace is known to be grieved at the rivalry that the public talks about
and is leaning over backwards to liquidate it. It may be that the whole
matter will be cleared up in another two months, but until it is Wallace may
be very reluctant to commit himself. Mr. Perkins, or any of the other members
of his staff to attendance. If we can get Wallace's consent to attend within
the next fortnight I think we can get good personnel from other countries.
If it is impossible this month to get a decision from Wallace, then I am inclined
to think that for the reasons you give December might be very much more
preferable.
The actual mechanical work I feel sure Holland, Austern, Parsons, Lilienthal,
and I can handle.
.Tessup, Holland, Lockwood and I will meet you in Montreal or N. Y. for the
19th and 20th, or receive you here, as you prefer. Please wire your preference
in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Edwakd C. Carteb.
Exhibit No. 1253
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Washington, D. C, June 26, 1942.
Dr. Edward C. Carter,
Secrelarii General, Institute of Paeifie Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, Neto York, New York.
Dear. Mr. Carter: Thank you for your kind invitation to attend the next
international study conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5267
It would be possible for me to attend the conference only on permission and
Instructions of the Soviet Government. I regret to have to decline your invi-
tation, which I am doing, because I do not have the above instructions.
It is also impossible for me to separate myself from the official diplomatic
rank, which I am holding at the Embassy, and come as a private person.
Sincerely yours,
Anth. Fedotov,
Anthony N. Fedotov, Third Secretary.
Exhibit No. 1254
120 East 52nd Stkeet,
New York City, July 11, 1942.
Edwaed C. Dyason, Esq.
Arroyo 845, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Dear Dyason : It was delightful to get your letter of May 11 and your ex-
traordinarily interesting letter to Spalding which I am forwarding to him at this
time.
Though truncated by the war, activity of the IPR is in many areas greater,
more important and more publicly recognized than ever before. For fifteen
years the IPR has been trying to advance the thesis that the Pacific must be
considered as well as the Atlantic. Pearl Harbor in a single day did perhaps
more to substantiate the IPR's thesis than we have been able to do in the
past decade and a half of careful scholarly and educational work. For example,
here in the United States, departments of the government which reluctantly
ordered but a single copy of our publications, are now ordering them by the
dozen and in the case of the pamphlet series by the tens of thousands. Under
separate cover I am sending you a copy of the latest catalog and supplement.
Some months ago there was a suggestion that Pacific Affairs, the Fab
Eastern Survey, and Amerasia consolidated into a single publication. This
proposal broke down in part because the editors of Amerasia wish to continue
the magazine on an entirely independent basis, free of all institutional impedi-
ments. The negotiations were most friendly but were not successful.
The Canadian Institute and the American Council are broadening out very
substantially in the field of popular or semipopular education. The pamphlet
series of both organizations have reached very large circulation figures. The
American Council is on the air regularly once a week over the Columbia Broad-
casting System. Under separate cover I am sending you a pamphlet. "Spotlight
on Asia" which though out of date, shows you the type of popular presentation
which the American Council has adopted in cooperation with the CBS.
A considerable number of the staffs of the various Institutes have been drafted
into governmental service. Enclosed is an extract (brought up to date) of a
letter I wrote some time ago reporting on some of these. In spite of these
wartime changes in personnel it has been possible to maintain the secretariats of
the American and Pacific Councils intact, as many of the governments, though
eager to employ every member of the staff have recognized that it is in the
interests of all the United Nations governments and the various departments
within the governments to have the IPR retain a balanced, competent, expert
staff that could look at the whole Pacific as a unit and be freer for writing and
publication than if all were in government service.
I was very interested in the December-January issue of the Austral- Asiatic
Bulletin.
On the financial side there have been some losses and some gains. Support
from Japan. France and Holland has faded ; that from the Philippines has
deceased. The China IPR has, however, increased its allocation to the Pacific
Council from $1,000 to Or?,000, which is exceptionally generous and inspiring
at this particular moment in China's struggle against the invaders.
I think the best plan with reference to Spalding's book is for you to keep it
and return it to me when you next come to New York, which I hope will not
be any one of your dollar accounts.
I am a little discouraged by what you say of the cultural efforts in your
neighborhood. International intercultural efforts has many pluses and minuses.
In the light of your letter and your letter to Spalding I am of course intrigued
as always with the development of your own thought. As you will have guessed
5268 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
from our last conversation the world into which you are moving is one which
I myself have not traversed. That does not mean that I shall not be profoundly
interested in the results of your study. My hope is that I may be sufficiently
intelligent to profit by your unique pioneering.
Mrs. Carter joins me in sending you our warmest greetings.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Cabtee.
EXTEACT OF A LETTER REPORTING ON IPR PERSONNEL NoW IN GOVERNMENT
Service (Revised July 11, 1942)
Owen Lattimore, on the nomination of President Roosevelt is acting as
Chiang Kai-shek's personal political adviser. He is at present bacli in Washing-
ton temporarily, but may soon be returning to Chungking.
Ch'ao-ting Chi is serving in Chungking as Secretary General of the Currency
Stabilization Board.
Irving S. Friedman is serving in the Division of Monetary Research in the
U. S. Treasury.
Dr. Russell G. Shiman has gone to the Tariff Commission in Washington.
Ellen van Zyll de Jong is working on the Netherlands East Indies problems
in the Intelligence Section of the War Department.
Virginia Thompson is with the Tariff Commission in Washington.
Information supplied by Miss Harriet Moore of the American Russian Insti-
tute and Edward C. Carter to the British authorities in Washington was said to
have been useful in clearing the way for a coordination of British and Russian
appeals for American material.
Jack Shepherd was attached to the Ministry of Information in Singapore
and is now with the Ministry of Information in India.
W. L. Holland and W. W. Lockwood have served in a consultative capacity
to several Washington agencies but have not entered government service.
'Andrew Grajdanzev has compiled urgently needed information for the Library
of Congress, the War Department, and the Coordinator of Information.
Percy E. Corbett, while serving on the International Secretariat of the IPR
has advised the Ottawa government on Latin American problems as a result
of his observation at the Havana Conference and his subsequent studies of
hemispheric problems.
John Leaning is in charge of the British Press Service for the American
Pacific Coast.
Frank M. Tamagna is dividing his time between the Federal Reserve Bank
in New York and the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington.
Exhibit No. 12.56
129 East 52 nd Street,
New York City, August S, 19Jf2.
Dr. Philip C. Jessup,
Columbia University, New York City.
Dear Phil: I was glad to see your circular on International Administration.
It is most interesting.
As for the people in the TMCA and YWCA who might be interested, here are
a few names to start on :
YMCA, 347 Madison Avenue, New York
E. B. Barnett
S. M. Keeny
Jay Urice
F. V. Slack
YWCA, tJUO Lexington Avenue, New York
Miss Talitha Gerlach
Miss Sarah Lyon
Miss Rhoda McCulloch
Sincerely yours,
[t] Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5269
Exhibit No. i257
(Handwritten:)
PiERSON College — Yale University,
Master's House, 231 Park Street, Septemher 7, 1942.
Deak Ned : I had better send this to you while I have it, but with the reserva-
tion that $50 is to be credited to the account of the Foreign Affairs Council
for purchase of IPR publications. Would you have the Treasurer write a
letter to me in Cleveland to this effect?
The Ted White letter is most interesting. Have a few extra copies which
I might send to members of the Cleveland delegation who participated in the
Conference.
As soon as Winifred can get a line on her own complicated tax situation she
will send a contribution to IPR. We are both up against it !
She sends warmest regards with the hope of seeing you very soon. You
might be interested to know that I am now appointed to the Department of
State for the duration "on a part time basis." My function is still considered
"secret and confidential", but between you and me I am very grateful over the
whole affair. There is much I want to talk to you about.
Warmest regards.
Ever yours,
Brooks Ement.
P. S. — I am here until Thursday of this week then on to Washington for two
days and then to New Hampshire for a week before returning to Cleveland
the 21st. Am in Washington at least every Friday and can always be reached
at the Metropolitan Club or the Department of State. The former is probably
better given the confusion of government departments.
Exhibit No. 1258
September 28, 1942.
G. E. Voitinsky, Esq.,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. 8. S. R.
DBLiR Voitinsky: This is to acknowledge with thanks your cable informing
us that Soviet participation in the IPR December Conference is doubtful.
During these months of titanic struggle between your heroic army and people
and the Nazi hordes we realize how tremendous the pressure is on you and all
Soviet citizens. The whole world is inspired by the epic character of the
gigantic war that the U. S. S. R. is waging. Your countrymen are bearing the
brunt of Hitler's onslaught. All of the rest of the world is in debt to the
Soviet Union.
Many of us in the Institute of Pacific Relations believe that we must do all
in our power to make certain that the war develop not as a series of national
wars but in fact as well as theory as a real United Nations effort. We believe
that the December Conference of the IPR can aid at least in a small way in
facing the problems of a United Nations war. If it were not for this we would
not dream of asking a single Soviet citizen to leave the Soviet Union at this
critical moment.
Enclosed is a copy of the revised Conference announcement, agenda and
provisional document list. We do hope that you will be able to reconsider the
matter and come if possible yourself, or at least arrange for one or two equally
competent scholars to come to the meeting.
Sincerely yours,
Edward O. Cartb31.
Exhibit No. 1259
129 East 52d Street,
liew York City, October 1, 1942.
Mr. W. W. Lancaster,
55 Wall Street, New York City.
Delvr Lancaster : I would be glad to give your friend letters of introduction
to any or all of the following :
Edgar J. Tarr, President of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, Director
of the Bank of Canada, Chairman of the Finance Committee of the IPR.
5270 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
H. L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs, for several years in Tokyo.
L. B. Pierson, Minister-Counsellor, Canadian Legation, Washington.
Brooke Claxton, Member of Parliament from Montreal.
W. A. Mackintosh, Special Economic Adviser, Department of Finance, Ottawa.
M. J. Coldwell, Member of Parliament from Ottawa, Member of the CCF.
J. B. Coyne, K. C, Chairman of the Winnipeg Branch of the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs.
Howard Greene, Member of Parliament from British Columbia.
Louis Rasminsky, Member of the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board,
formerly in the Economic Section of the League Secretariat.
Captain R. G. Cavell, Businessman, Toronto, former army oflScer in India.
(He has a very different attitude from that which might be expected from a
former Indian army officer.)
James M. Macdonnell, National Trust Company, Toronto.
John W. Holmes, Secretary of the Canadian Institute, Toronto.
Norman A. M. MacKenzie, President, University of New Brunswick, Frederic-
ton, N. B.
Is this the kind of list that you think would be helpful?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Caeteb.
Exhibit No. 1260
Wm. W. Lancaster
55 Wall Steeet,
New York, October U, 1942
Personal
Mr. Edwakd C. Carter,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Carter : Referring to your letter of October first, I would like very
much letters of introduction to the following:
Mr. Edgar J. Tarr
Mr. H. L. Keenleyside
Mr. Brooke Claxton
Mr. W. A. Mackintosh
Mr. M. J. Coldwell
Mr. J. B. Coyne
Mr. Louis Rasminsky
Mr. James M. Macdonnell
Mr. John W. Holmes
Mr. Norman A. M. MacKenzie.
The person in whose favor the letters are to be written is Ivan Krotov, Com-
mercial Attach^ to the Legation of the U. S. S. R., at Ottawa. The letters can
be sent to me, and I will endeavor to get them into the hands of Mr. Krotov,
who has already left for Ottawa where he is living in a hoteL
Very sincerely yours,
Wm. W. Lancaster.
WWL/rp.
Exhibit No. 1261
October 21, 1942.
WWL to ECC:
Despres suggests that we consider bringing Rajchmann to the conference in
some capacity. Despres has a high respect of Rajchmann's insight into funda-
mental issues and for his finesse in conference discussion— this particularly on
matters which don't directly concern China, and on which he therefore has
fewer official inhibitions.
Exhibit No. 1262
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, Oct. 23, 19^2.
Dear Mr. Carter : Thanks for the increase in my pay check and the extension
of my appointment, as informed by Miss Hilda Austern.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5271
*
I have been working under Mr. Holland's direction. I am sure he has kept
you informed. I just like to mention that the work has been interesting?, and
as I have just finished translating Mao Tsetung's two books on war the coming
weeks will be devoted to clippings sent by Dr. Chi. Two summaries on these
have been written and a copy of each has been presented to you through
Miss Kuth.
Best wishes to you and IMrs. Carter.
Sincerely yours
[s] Yung-ying Hsu
[t] Yung-ying Hsu.
Exhibit No. 1263
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 23rd October, 1942.
John F. Holmes, Esq.
Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
3 Willeocks Street, Toronto, Canada.
Dear John : It gives me the greatest pleasure to introduce to you Mr. Ivan
Krotov, Commercial Attach^ to the Legation of the U. S. S. R. at Ottawa. Mr.
Krotov has long been connected with the People's Commissariat of Foreign
Trade and has visited the United States several times on special missions.
Sincerely yours,
Edwabd C. Carte:r.
Exhibit No. 1264
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., 17th November 1942.
Jerome D. Greene, Esq.,
54 A Garden Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Dear Jerome: As you know, Tarr and Jessup have been asked to revise the
IPR constitution to bring it in line with present realities and necessities.
In this connection, Jessup has recently written Tarr and I enclose a copy.
The object of my sending this to you is to inquire whether you think Jessup is
right that the quorum provision in the original constitution was inserted to
give the United States a control over the expenditure of funds.
I never sat in on the work of drafting, but this is the first time I have ever
heard of the point which Jessup raises.
Can you enlighten me?
I question a little whether Jessup's proposal would ever be necessary. Won't
you write me frankly?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Garter.
Exhibit No. 1265
129 East 52nd Strket,
New York, N. Y., 25th November 1942.
Dr. J. W. DAFOE,
Winnepeg Free Press, Winnipeg, Canada.
Dear Dafoe : Thank you for your letter of the 6th. Lattimore is due any
moment. We are hoping to persuade him to go to Mont Tremblant. That
gathering, as Tarr will have told you, seems to loom very large in the thoughts
of people in many parts of the world. They are coming in larger numbers than
any of us had anticipated. Apparently the more complicated the world gets, the
more i)eople look to the Institute for light. I only wish our record as a light-
house had been better.
There is great depression among many of my friends regarding Darlanism
and over Otto von Hapsburg. The arrest of Valtin is one bright speck, however,
on the political horizon. We certainly are a nation of suckers.
Have you by any chance heard of the scheme for world order worked out
by Ely Culbertson, the Bridge expert! I have not mastered it yet, but it has
5272 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
been endorsed by a nnmber of fairly thoughtful Americans as "THE ANSWER"
to world order. We will see what we will see.
I am glad there is a prospect of your coming to New York, but don't come until
after we return from Mont Tremblant.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1266
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, March 21, 19J,3.
Michael Greenberg, Esq.,
8i// 11 St. NW., Washingtoti, D. C.
Dear Michael: In a rash moment I agreed to participate in the Constitution
Hall discussion on Monday, March 29th, on Russia and the United Nations.
The topic I was assigned was Russia's Role iu Asia. Here is the first draft
of my proposed remarks. I would be immensely grateful to you if you would
do me the great service of reading this critically and letting me know whether
you can detect any inaccuracies or politically unwise assertions or emphasis.
I will telephone you Monday forenoon in the hope of getting your suggestions.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1267
The White Hoitse,
Washington, October 1, 1942.
Mr. Edward Carter,
Institute of Ptihlic Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.
Dear Carter : Would you drop in and see me the next time you are in Wash-
ington? There are one or two things I would like to discuss with you.
Yours,
Lauchlin Currie.
LAxrcHLiN Currie.
Exhibit No. 1268
NAtional 3428
Pacific Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
100 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C,
September 12, 1942-
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. CartI':r : I hoi>e that .you will be able to attend all four of our round
table discussions on Chinese Post War Recoustritction. Alger Hiss congratu-
lated me on securing you as the wind-up chairman calling you a "whiz-hang" at
that fine art.
Enclosed is an outline containing a statement of our procedure, our guest list
(acceptances to date checked), and a draft agenda. Should you wish to offer
it, I would welcome your comment.
Thus far the quality of our participants is quite unusual even by Wa.shingtou
standards — and reflects, I believe, a confidence in IPR achieved in the last two
decades.
Sincerely yours,
R. W. B.
Robert W. Barnett.
Exhibit No. 1269
State of New York,
County of New York, ss:
I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as
Exhibit A. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5273
satisfied that these documents, subject to the comments noted below, are letters
or memoraiulu received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters
or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies :
Document Comment
2. M. Gerbode ECC File No. 100.3S2 Date is illegible.
5. S. Welles ECC File No. 191.272 Date should be 11/7/46
'These items are respectively an
22. Mrs. McLaughlin ECC 3/11/47, File
No 133.6
23. Mrs. McLaughlin ECC 3/11/47, File
No. 105.194
original copy of a letter to Mrs.
McLaughlin and a photostat of
such original copy ; I do not know
whether the letter or any copy
thereof was ever sent to Mrs.
McLaughlin.
81. Progress Report Wash, office, File No.
119.42 The date should be 5/1-6/12.
42. ECC, C. Lane, WLH 11/4/48, File No. The source of this document is
191.67 KRCG.
Edward C. Garter.
Dated : May 9th, 1952.
Sworn to before me this 9th day of May 1952.
[seal] Irene. R. Donohue,
Notary Public, i<tatc of Neio York.
Qualified in Queens County. No. 41-6061300. Certs, filed with Queens, Kings,
New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs. Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co.
Clerks Offices.
Commission expires March 30, 1954.
88348— 52— pt. 14 24
5274
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1270
To—
From—
Date
Type of
Document
File
Number
Exhibit
Number
ECC
M. Oerbode
V. Kazaniev-
B. Outhman...
S. Welles.
B. Emeny
WLH <t MAS
O. P. Swift
B. Emeny
M. A. Stewart
ECC
O. Lamont
ECC: R. A. Millikan
ECC
F. Myers
R. Outhman
M. Graves
ECC
R. Guthm^n
WLH
MAS
Mrs. McLaughlin
Mrs. McLaughlin
ECC
ECC
G. Q. Davidson
ECC
Ask Beecroft
Memo for: J. F. Byrnes
R.P.Patterson..
J. Forrestal
C. L. Chapman..
ECC
Progress Report
Luncheon _
Memo of ECC's talk with
Lauchlin Currie.
C. Porter; interview with
Report to ECC from W.
Fairbank.
U. S. Industrial Training for
Personnel Survey by
Wilma Fairbank for ECC.
J. K. Penfield
ECC
A. H. Dean
Finance Agenda
C. Oumansky
WLH
ECC, C. Lane, WLH
ECC, refers to Hiss quoting
Conant.
A. Hiss
OL
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
R. A. Millikan
ECC. ..
R. A. Millikan; ECC
J. Barnes
ECC...
ECC
ECC
S. Welles
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
T. Gerlach
O. G. Davidson
ECC
R. D.Carter
R. Outhman.
Wash. Office -
ECC
J. B. Powell.
ECC
ECC
ECC
ECC
4/11/46
4/lfi/46
4/4/46
9/20/46
11/7.46
12/27/46
4/18/46
4/11/46.
12/27/46
11/4/46-.
3/22/46
5/15/46...
3/22/46; 3/27/46.
5/30/46
9/26/46...
10/22/46
11/1/46
11/9/46
12/24/46
1/10/47
3/3/47....
3/11/47
3/11/47
6/11/47
6/9/47
6/12/47
1/9/47
1/9/47
2/20/46
6/12/47
5/1-6/12/47.
5/28/47
7/18/47
3/18/48.
3/48.
ECC.
3/25'48-
5/4/45...
8/7/48..
9/15/48.
9/29/38.
11/4/48.
11/4/48.
12/7/48.
5/8/51...
100.349
ion. 382
100. 383
100.345
191.272
191.251
191.271
104. 70
112.45
131B.33
122.43
100 353
133.5
100.352
107.34
105. 252
105. 250
191.273
100.346
119.19
131 B. 34
133.6
105. 194
105. 295
119.49
119.49
119. 20
119.52
14
If
181. 103
119.43
191.250
100.351
100. 400
101.82
100. 227
191.67
It
191.102
600.17
1270 A
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1314
Exhibit No. 1270-A
Thh Walter Hines Page School of International Relations
Office of the Director
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland, April 11, 1946.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5Wi St., Netv York City.
Dear Carter: Replying to your letter of April 8 on the subject of William
Henry Chamberlain's allegation that I received a letter from the Soviet Council
stating that it would withdraw from membership in the IPR if Chamberlain
wrote on any subject whatever in Pacific Affairs, it is difficult to rely on memory
after the lapse of so many years. I am almost sure that there was a letter, though
whether I showed it to Chamberlain or merely quoted it to him I cannot remem-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5275
ber. I doubt — but not having the letter cannot state positively — that Motylev
threatened to withdraw. My recollection is that the wording was negative
rather than positive ; i. e.. that instead of saying "would withdraw" he said
"could not be expected to participate," or "could not be expected to contribute,"
or something like that.
You will remember perhaps that when you and I talked with Motylev, it
developed that there had been gaps in the correspondence. At least one and
perhaps two letters which I had written had never been received by Motylev.
These gaps had of course given him the impression that I had not written, and
therefore instead of discussing problems was presenting to the Soviet Council
a blank and stony face. It is worth adding that I wrote the iinreceived letter
or letters not from Peiping but from the inland Province of Shansi, which was
under the rule of Yen Hsi-shan, who had a tendency to manifest autonomy in
the matters of politics and censorship as in other matters. The letter or letters
might therefore have disappeared into a censor's pigeonhole either in Shansi
Province, in the process of clearing through the Chinese National Post Office,
or in Russia.
Sincerely,
Owen,
Owen Lattimore.
ol : ec
Exhibit No. 1271
April 194.
Mrs. Frank Carbode,
2560 Divisedcro Street,
San Francisco 15, California.
Dear Martha : Thank you for yours of the 14th. By this time Ray will have
arrived.
If I go out at all I do not expect it will be before the 10th or 15th of May.
Enclosed are letters to the new Soviet Consul-General and to one of his col-
leagues. Both men were attached to the Soviet Consulate in New York for
some months and were most friendly and cooperative while here. They did
a lot for Russian War Relief.
If I go to San Francisco Mrs. Carter will not be accompanying me. Thank
you for your concern about accommodations. A relative has offered me a cot
for a few nights but if collapses I may ask you to be on the look-out. But don't
bother to do anything about it now as I do not yet know whether I can go out
ataU.
If the Soviet authorities have thus far, presumably for strategic reasons,
been reluctant to show their head regarding war with Japan it may be that
they will be reluctant at the moment to identify themselves with I. P. R. ac-
tivities. This, of course, will not be a permanent phenomena.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1272
4th April, 1946.
The Honorable V. Kazaniev,
Consul-General of the U. S. S. R.,
7 East 61st Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Kazaniev: At last I seem to have so caught up with out of towTi
engagements that I am free to have our long-postponed talk.
This is to inquire whether you could do me the honor of coming to this office
for a light lunch at, say, one o'clock on either Monday, April 8, or Tuesdav,
April 9.
I do hope that you will be free on one of these dates as I am very eager to
have a long talk with you regarding the Institute of Pacific Relations' and other
common intei'ests.
With best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
5276 INSTITUTE or pacific relations
Exhibit No. 1273
September 20, 1940.
Miss Renhd^ Guthman,
1110 G Street. NW., WasMnrjton 5, D. C.
Dear Renee : For a fair sized lunch or a meeting in the small hall of the
Chamber of Commerce of the Cosmos Club, you may wish to consider inviting
L. L. Lorwin and E. C. Ropes, who recently went to Moscow for the Department
of Commerce to discuss trade possibilities. It may be that you will find that
they are not allowed to talk or it may be that they were and now the muzzle
on Wallace will be applied to them biit as Russia, whether good or bad, is
very mucli in tlie people's minds at the present time I am sure a talk would
draw a good crowd and both men are tempered, informed and know Russia.
Both of them are familiar with the work of IPR. Lorwin attended either the
Kyoto Conference in 1929 or the Shanghai Conference in 1931. He was also
at Banff.
Yesterday, Charles Gamble came in to see me on another matter and as he
was leaving asked for you. I told him you had been pi-omoted to a new and
bigger job and he was very pleased. He has a higli regard for you and was
glad to be reassured that you had done a swell job while here in New York.
Sincerely yours.
Co to Mrs. Stewart
Exhibit No. 1274
Edward C. Carter.
7th November, 1946.
Sumner Welles, Esq.,
P. O. Box JfG69, Anacostia Station, Washinnton, D. C.
Dear Mr. Welles : It was most encouraging to get your favorable reaction
last week to the problems and plans of the IPR.
After my talk with you I wrote immediately to Mortimer Graves to be sure
to telephone you for an appointment on liis return from the west so that he and
you and Miss Guthman can carry on from where I left off. I told him of your
early departure for the South and the desirability of his getting as much help
from you as possible before you leave.
Ever since I belatedly realized that Benjamin Welles was your son, I have
been reading his New York Times dispatches with renewed interest. He cer-
tainly observes competently and writes well.
It has occurred to me that he might find useful for background reading a
monograph prepared by Michael Lindsay on "The Military Prospects in a
Chinese Civil War." Lindsay, as you may remember is Oxford of Oxford, his
father being the Master of Balliol. Lindsay served for a time in the British
Embassy in China, taught for a period at Yenching University, and then when
the Japanese approached, started for Chungking and Oxford. He had to pass
through the Communist area and was so intrigued by what he found that he
cancelled his passage to England and stayed in Communist China for several
years. Then the British Government asked him to return to share his obser-
vations with the Foreign Office.
The Master of Balliol then wrote me suggesting that his son might visit Canada
and the United States and we arranged with the Canadian Institute to have him
visit a number of the Canadian cities and then we brought him back across the
United States. He is now teaching at Harvard in the Department of Govern-
ment. Last summer, just before returning to this country, the London Times
published a series of his articles. He subsequently put part of them into a
memorandum, a copy of which I am sending to you thinking that your son
might like to read it.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5277
Exhibit No. 1275
27th December, 1946.
Brooks Emeny, Esq.,
Council on World Affair 8,
i)22 Society of Savings Building,
Cleveland H, Ohio.
Dear Brooks : Thank you most sincerely for sending me this quotation from
your anonymous friend's letter.
Rightly or wrongly, our Government during the war tried to woo Petain
away from Hitler. Many Americans felt that this partially successful tactic
saved great numbers of American and British lives.
Personally, I see no reason why our Government and people should not seek
by the same formula to woo the Chinese Commnists. I am not particularly
anxious to have my sons, Bill and John, go through another war fighting the
Russians on the plains of Manchuria.
Perhaps Uncle Sam could have wooed the Chinese Communists nine months
ago with a considerable degree of success. Informed Americans and Chinese
who have recently come from China, tell me that this would be much more
difficult today. But I still think nothing would be lost by such an effort.
Of course Owen Lattimore is not always right. But I am not certain that his
critics are any more accurate. They read extracts from his "Solution in Asia."
If they would only read without emotion the book from cover to cover I think
they would take a little different attitude. It seems to me that what Lattimore
is trying to say is this : If America and Britain go all out for democracy here
and in Asia, we can still attract Asia's restless millions into the democratic
orbit. But if we go on backing up people like Chiang Kai-shek, then Moscow
and not the British-American concept of democracy will win out.
Thanking you for your thoughtfulness in sending me this quotation, and with
best New Year's greeting, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
( Hand written : ) Amco Correspondence, 1947 A-E.
Brooks Emeny, 1947.
Exhibit No. 1276
April 18, 1946.
WUM
MAS from ECC :
Have you any suggestions that I could send in reply to the following letter
from Sumner Welles which arrived this morning?
"When I had the pleasure of seeing you here the other day, I forgot to
ask your advice with regard to a matter which is of much interest to me.
"You may know that I am the editor-in-chief of the Harvard University
Pre.ss Series which is now bringing out a considerable number of volumes
written by individual authors and dealing with the relations between the
United States and other countries and regions of the World. One of the
projected volumes is to deal with Southeastern Asia. My associates and
I have been unable as yet to find a suitable author for this volume,
although we have tried to secure several competent authorities. I shall
be deeply indebted to you if you will let me have your suggestions as to
possible authors for this volume who in your judgment possess the personal
experience and ability required. I should add that we are agreed that
the authors of all of the prospective volumes must be United States citizens."
ExnmiT No. 1277
11th April 1946.
Otis Peabodt Swift, Esq.,
2600 Woodley Road, N. W.,
Washi/ngton 8, D. C.
Dear Otis : Your intriguing and handsome Sea-Air brochure arrived a few
days ago. I\Iany, many thanks, and all success to this venture.
5278 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The lanes across and over the seas and continents give one a renewed zest
for travel.
Today I received a call from a young Lieutenant who is about to be demo-
bilized from the U. S. Navy who hopes to make a leisurely trip around the
world, beginning in Europe, proceeding through the Middle East, India, South-
eastern Asia, China and Japan, and back across the Pacitic. The following
papers and magazines have expressed an interest in his articles and most of them
have already published his writings. They are: The Star Weekly (biggest
circulation in Canada ) ; the Australian Consolidated Press ; Mademoiselle ;
Colliers ; Holiday ; the National Herald in India ; the New Statesman in London ;,
and the Nation in New York.
His name is Andrew Roth and his address is 266 Washington Avenue, Brooklyn,
N. Y. Color is added to his writing by reason of the fact that he was one of
the government servants who was rounded up at the time of the "Arrest of the
Six." As you know, the case against him was completely thrown out and
discredited with due apologies to him.
Now it has occurred to me that there is a possibility that you might like to
retain him in some capacity to publicize the facilities of your principals. The
fact that he already has the above-mentioned outlets would probably be more
advantageous to you than if you had to market his material yourself. If you
could not arrange compensation, you might help meet his financial needs by
getting some of your principals to provide free passages.
Turn it over in your mind, and if there is anything worth exploring, drop
him a note and I know he will be glad to see you.
The other day in the train you asked me to bring you up to date regarding
the IPR. Perhaps one of the best ways of doing this briefly is for you to read
this little folder "21 Years of IPR" and scan this list of our popular pamphlets.
Possibly after reading these you may wish yourself to become a $50 member of
the American Council or recommend that the National Federation of American
Shipping become a corporate and supporting member.
Witii all good wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. CABTiaL
Exhibit No. 1278
27th Decembee 1946.
Brooks Emeny, Esq.,
Council on World Affairs,
922 Society for Savings Building,
Cleveland li, Ohio.
Dear Brooks : Here is a letter which, if you wish, you can pass on to your out-
of-town friend. Naturally, I am glad that you have not lost faith in me. This
means a lot.
I am afraid dear Admiral Greenslade was very much worried by some of my
remarks. And I am told that there was a story in last night's New York Post
by Edgar Mowrer in which, referring to the Cleveland Conference, he criticizes
Lattimore, Teddy White, John Carter Vincent, and myself. Perhaps it was a
mistake to invite him in to a single session without his having heard what went
on before. He is very likeable, but he's not nearly as objective as he was when
he was stationed in Geneva.
Reverting to my remarks in my formal letter of today's date with reference to
American wooing the Ciiinese Communists, I might add that the fact that
General Marshall and Ambassador Leighton Stuart had some sympathy with my
point of view is substantiated indirectly by a letter written from Shanghai on
December 2ud (.lust before the Country Club meeting) by an American doctor
reporting to the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia on the
cooperation of Marshall and Stuart in flying in to Yenan a medical team of six
together with medical supplies.
Because of the cordiality which many of the members of the Country Club
Conference expressed to me personally, I sent letters to several immediately
after the Conference inviting them to membership in the IPR. Two or three
have accepted. This morning I received a letter from Cass of White Motors.
I thought you would be interested in seeing a copy. Here it is.
From the purely selfish, personal point of view, as well as from the point of
view of the public interest, I hope history will prove that I was as right in my
remarks at the recent Cleveland Conference as I was five years ago when one
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5279
of your Cleveland papers on the Saturday preceding the Pearl Harbor Sunday
quoted me as saying that war between the U. S. and Japan was inevitable.
If you can spare the time, would you write me as to your guess as to how Harry
Luce got on the trail of my "misbehavior" at the Country Club?
I don't think Hurst, the Cleveland manager of TIME, was in the round table
I attended. But at the plenary session, when by accident I was in the chair
and you asked me to present the Iglauer resolution, he may have concluded that
I had initiated it.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
(Hand written:) Amco Correspondence, 1947 A-E.
Brooks Emeny, 1947.
Exhibit No. 1279
(Handwritten :) RDC & MAS : Has this contribution come in yet?
November 4, 1946.
MAS from ECC :
On October 24. I wrote Edith Field asking her to contribute $500 to the
American Council. This afternoon she rang up and said that she had jiist got
the letter on her return from California and would be glad to send a check;
only she will be broke throughout this calendar year but plans to send her
donation in January. While she didn't say so specifically, I think she plans to
send $500.
On the train coming east, she met a Captain Leslie Anderson whose designa-
tion on his uniform was United States War Artist. He is going to be around
New York for six months. He is an ex-businessman who has made art his
hobby. He has been attached to the engineers in the war, is about 43, and has a
distinctly liberal outlook. I told her we would be delighted to meet him and
maybe we could persuade him to give us some of his sketches.
Exhibit No. 1280
California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, March 22, 1946.
Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, NeiO York City.
Dear Mr. Carter: The present Russian situation poses a very bothersome
question for the Institute of Pacific Relations which I have felt keenly for some
time and started once or twice to write you frankly about. Perhaps the follow-
ing incident will bring to the fore the matter that has been disturbing me
lately.
You will agree that the Institute loses completely its usefulness if it gives
the readers of the Far Eastern Survey the impression that the articles which
it publishes therein are, wittingly or unwittingly, Russian Communist propa-
ganda. Some time ago I read an article in the Far Eastern Survey entitled
"Political Problems in Indonesia — Independence the Issue" by Charles Bidien,
and I mailed this article to one of the most prominent and informed supporters
of the I. P. R. with this request — "Take a look at this article of Bidien's and
then let me know whether the Institute of Pacific Relations is wise in promoting
the interests of that type of man, as it is certainly doing herein." I received
the reply, "I have been disappointed in the general attitude of the Far Eastern
Survey during the last year or two. Presumably under the influence of a small
group of men it has become biased, I think, in some of these Far Eastern matters,
and I expect to withdraw my support." From articles by Bisson, which have
often appeared in the Survey, I myself have lost all confidence in his scientific
quality or objectivity.
Again, in a copy of the Far Eastern Survey just received I find the advertise-
ment of the book called "The Challenge of Red China" by Gunther Stein, with
the statement at the bottom that "orders may be sent to the American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York City." I know
5280 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
nothing about the content of this book, but in the mind of the public it would,
I fear, tie the Institute of Pacitic Relations in with Red China. That would
certainly tend stron.^iy to destroy its usefulness. From my own point of view,
and I suspect from the point of view of all thou^iitful people, this is about the
worst time in the world for any American organization that wants to do a
constructive job to get the reputation that the present Russian propaganda
influences are capturing it.
Having here at the Calif oi-nia Institute some fifteen to twenty very fine
Chinese advanced men, I have had some opportunity through them and the
Chinese who come here through them to get an impression of wliat Red China is.
I have asl\ed at least a dozen men who know China well this question, "Are
the Chinese Communists merely social reformers, as their friends say they are,
or are they Marxian Communists?" The difference is the difference between
day and night. If they are the last, then they are necessarily a world menace,
for Marx was the most potent war monger that this world has yet seen. I have
generally received the reply from men in whose knowledge and objectivity I had
come to have contidence, such as T. Z. Koo, Secretary of the World Student
Christian Federation, "I think it is correct to call them essentially Marxian
Communists."
That answer is highly significant, for the organization tluit Lenin set up,
following the Marx pattern, was specially designed to infiltrate other govern-
ments the world over and stir up disturbances, unrest, and bi'ing alK)ut by fair
means or foul violent revolutions. This is the way it actually functioned and
is still functioning in Mexico and in many other parts of the world. Marx-
Lenin policy is, I think, reliably reported to have caused the starvation of many
millions in Russia until up to the time of the fight between Stalin and Trotsky.
Then Stalin at least had the intelligence to see that in order to prevent com-
plete starvation of the Russian people he had to desert Marx to an extent and to
borrow the incentive wage principle from capitalism, and he thus began to improve
a little the physical condition of the Russian people, although an American expert
on Russia with whom I talked yesterday told me that the standard of living of
the Russian people as a whole outside ''the party" was not now a particle better
than it was under the Czars. Churchill and Roosevelt both felt that at Yalta
they had got Stalin to join with them in finding a modus Vivendi by which
Russian Comnnmism and the free system of the Western world which has been
successful in raising the standard of living of the common man to historically
unparalleled heights, might exist side by side and a basis of real cooperation for
the prevention of war established. Recent events have shown to the world that
Roosevelt and Churchill failed completely at Yalta. The Lippmann editorials,
the Byrnes and Churchill speeches, and official and private reports on the policies
of the State Department leave no doubt whatever but that the forces of coopera-
tion and enlightenment have been thrown out of the window in Russia by the
small group of men who now hold Russia in their power, and so far as inter-
national relations are concerned are Russia. The evidence is unmistakable, as
Lippmann says, that Russia is now going to use all its energies, not to raise the
standard of living of the Russian people, but to try to build the greatest system
of military imperialism that the world has ever seen, and to keep its own people
in complete ignorance bj^ their secret police system and by the building up of
military force of a system of buffer states all around Russia so as to hermetically
seal Russia against the infiltration of all knowledge of the ideas and of the
standard of living of Western peoples, while it indoctrinates them with the group
of ideas which they must have to keep them submissive to the dictatorship of the
central controlling group.
Further, so as to weaken all the states of the world outside the Bolshevist
core we find that they are continuing now their old methods of stirring up dis-
satisfaction, strikes, riotings, rebellions, and the overthrow of orderly govern-
ment all over the world in order to weaken countries so as to make them as
impotent as possible to resist Russian attack. While you and I are doing what
we can to raise funds for Russian relief for the staving off of Russian famine,
the Russian autocracy while accepting our wheat is sending hundreds of
thousands of bushels into France as the first and weakest country in which they
can destroy what is left of a once free system.
Informed men in this country now know that the UNO, imder the leadership
primarily of the United States and Britain, has got to quit its appeaseme::t
attitude and say "No" to the Russian attack. Manchuria and Northwest
Communist China are merely two of these buffer states which in violation of
all their agreements they are preposing to control.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5281
With that kind of a world outlook, when I see the Institute of Pacific Relations
joining with Anna Louise Strong, Bidian, Bisson, Edgar Snow, and other befud-
dled writers in casting aspersions upon the patriotism of the only leader in China
through whom tliere can be any hope for the building of a united and prosperous
China, namely, the Cliiang Kai-shek government, I begin to be greatly concerned.
I took dinner just a little while ago with Dr. Mei, the Acting Chancellor
of Yenchiug University, and said to him. "There is a group of American
writers, some of them connected with the Institute of Pacitic Relations, whom
I find continually pouring out poison with respect to the patriotism and motives
of the Chiang Kai-shek government. Would you be good enough to tell me,
first, whether that distrust as to the patriotism of Chiang Kai-shek is generally
prevalent in North China where you live, namely in Peiping? His reply was,
"We Chinese as a group realize that the only hope for the unifieation and the
building up of China is in Chiang Kai-shek. I can assure you that in Peiping
if you took a poll, eighty percent would be behind Chiang Kai-shek as a great
patriot and the hope of China." I then put precisely the same question to
Leighton Stuart whom you must know, a wise and objective man, telling him
that I was disturl)ed by the writings of some of the men who have become
hipped by the Chinese Communist movement — a movement which I thought
gave itself away as to its motives &y its insistence upon maintaining an army,
that this thing alone indicating that ivhat it was after ivas military conquest
corresponding to all Communist teachings but something which at the very
start makes constitutional government impossil)le. I knew that the Chiang
Kai-shek government had promised to China constitutional government which
would give the Communist party the same right in elections to get across its
ideas by nonviolence that they have in this country. Mr. Leighton Stuarfs
reply was, "I think I can assure you that you need not be worried about the
attitude of the Chinese people. I would say that President Mei understated
it in saying that eighty percent regard him as a patriot and were behind him.
I should estimate that fraction at eighty-five or ninety percent."
I myself have been on Mr. Leighton Stuart's Advisory Board for years, and
I know him well. I regard him as a very able and an exceedingly tine man.
I would trust one word of his farther than I would trust one hundred words
of writers of the sort I have mentioned above, or even of Owen Lattimore's
who is better than the rest but who I heard speaking at Banif in a way which
I thought tended to undermine the influence of Chiang Kai-shek. Everybody
recognizes the terrible difl5culties that confront him in a country in which the
whole atmosphere is permeated with graft, and if Mr. Lattimore w^as wise
enough I thought he would have stated something of that sort instead of in
eiTect by his words to begin to undermine the effectiveness and smear the
character of the man whom I suppose is the only hope of China.
Finally, in your own speech which you made here at the Biltmore before
the Town Hall you first showed a complete misunderstanding of the fission prob-
lem and the kind of world benefits than can come from it. For this you were not
to blame; you can lay this to the type of foolish reports which some scientists
have made. Bvat when you stated that the London conference broke down
because of the attitude of Mr. Truman with respect to the bomb, I thought
you exhibited a most uninformed mind with respect to the real significance of
Avhat Russia is doing and is likely to do at this stage of world history. In my
own judgment, if the United Nations cannot say a powerful and emphatic "no"
to Russia in her present machinations in playing every possible game to build
a Russian imperialism at the expense of the well-being of the Russian people
and of the world, we shall be in World War III with certainty inside of thirty
years. The situation is identical with that existing at the tinte of the invasion of
the Ruhr by Hitler. If all the powers had said "No" to Hitler at that time there
probably would not have been World War II. If we have not the strength and
the intelligence to say "No" to Russia now, when she is not prepared for war and
is afraid of atomic bombs, too, then World War III is inevitable some time.
I am writing this letter because the Institute of Pacific Relations is now trying
to build a strong branch in Southern California, and I told the organizing persons,
at their request, that I would write to you my doubts about the wisdom of
trying t<i do too much right now, and that primarily because the recent record
of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been such as to raise dotibts about the
kind of management which is behind It.
Very cordially yours,
(Signed) Robert A, Milixkan.
RAM : IH
5282 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1281
15th May, 1946.
Corliss La>iont, Esq.,
Jf50 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y.
Dear Corliss : As you know, the IPR has done a modest task in interpreting
the U. S. S. R. to this and other countries. The pamphlet "Land of the Soviets"
was distributed to many thousand men and women in the armed forces. It
is being used in over a thousand public school systems.
In another of our pamphlet series we hope to publish before the year is over
a pamphlet on American-Soviet Relations by I^oster Rhee Dulles and a pamphlet
on Soviet Asia by Marguerite Stewart of our staff.
In our various publications we endeavor to make people realize that the
U. S. S. R. is a Pacific as well as a European power and that her destiny and our
own are intertwined in Asia.
You are already familiar with Harriet Moore's admirable book published
jointly by the Princeton University Press and the IPR on Soviet Far Eastern
Policy.
Enclosed is a formal invitation to you to become a member of the American
Council of the IPR. We hope that you will accept. You can, as you will see,
become a member for $10. In that event the IPR financially would profit to
the extent of about $1 a year.
If, however, you should be so venturesome as to think of the IPR as a public
institution like a university, art museum, or library, to which you would like
to contribute so that the public rather than you personally could benefit, then
you might wish to become a Supporting Member at, say, 8-500 or $1,000 a year.
Some of my friends have felt that I have neglected the IPR by giving so
much of my attention in recent years to Russian Relief and the American Rus-
sian Institute. Most of my intimate colleagues feel that I have been justified
in doing this. But there is one thing that I have neglected, and that is to bring
home to those who think as you do the important role of the IPR in the total
picture.
As you know, the international IPR is one of the very few private bodies that
has an affiliate in Russia, namely, the U. S. S. R. Council of the IPR. This is
a present and a long-range asset in our common cause.
If you would like further information before reaching a decision, I would
be delighted to talk the matter over with you.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1282
27th March, 1946.
Dr. Robert A. Millikan,
California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, Calif.
Dear Dr. Millikan : Thank you most sincerely for your letter of March 22nd.
If only all our members wrote as frankly, the IPR would have even greater
vitality, though happily I think it has reached a new high not only in number of
members but in membership interest and participation and also in its inclusive-
ness of people of many different points of view and background.
This very diversity means an enrichment of the essential texture of the IPR.
For example, you imply that readers of the Far Eastern Survey may be getting
the idea that its articles are wittingly or unwittingly Russian-communist propa-
ganda. You or others are entitled to that opinion, though personally I do not
think it would be easy to substantiate that thesis.
In contrast to your appai'ent view, for example, is that of Chancellor Ray
Lyman Wibur of Stanford University who recently wrote an unsolicited letter to
Mr. Salisbury, the Editor of the Far Eastern Survey, as follows :
Stanford University,
Stanford University, California, March 18, 1946.
Office of the Chancellor
Dear Mr. Salisrury : This is just a line to tell you that I have noted a
steady improvement in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I am particularly
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5283
struck with the March 13th issue. I trust that you will be able to keep the
same kind of material constantly before as many people in the country as pos-
sible.
Congratulations and all good wishes.
Faithfully,
Ray Lyman Wilbur.
With regard to the article in the Survey by Charles Bidien, I am convinced
that the editors were attempting to follow an unbiased policy. They asked a
Dutch oflBicial and an Indonesian each to write an article on the situation in the
Netherlands Indies. Each was shown the article written by the other pi-ior to
publication. The Bidien article preceded the Dutch article in the issue for the
reason that in the issue of the Survey of October 18, 1944, when pro and contra
views had been publishe^l regarding Dutch policy in the Netherlands, the article
expressing the p7-o views preceded the article expressing the contra views. The
editors would have preferred to obtain an objective article by an American
writer instead of publishing the Bidien and Vlekke articles. None was, however,
available. And, believing that the Indonesian situation should be dealt with,
the editors followed what they believed to be an unbiased course, namely, that
of permitting each side, the official Dutch side and the Indonesian side, to present
their views side by side. Bidien was recommended to the editors by a competent
American scholar as a suitable man to present the Indonesian view.
A comparable recent instance of this policy of the editors was the publishing
of two articles on the situation in North China, one by Michael Lindsay (the
son of the Master of Balliol) who was in the area from 1941 to 1945, and the
second by Lin Yu-tang, outstanding protagonist of the Kuoraintang.
Concerning the attitude expressed in articles published in the Survey dealing
with Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communists, articles
which have dealt with those subjects during the past year and one-half have
been written by the present Editor, Laurence Salisbury, except for the Michael
Lindsay and Lin Yu-tang letters already referred to. Mr. Salisbury was a
senior State Department officer in China for several years and, from Pearl
Harbor until June 1944, served in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the De-
partment of State. In none of his articles has he advocated the overthrow of
Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, nor lias he advocated rule by the Chinese
Communists. He -has expressed the view, held by many interested officials in
our Government and in the Kuomintang, that the government of Chiang Kai-
shek should be liberalized. A number of Chinese and American officials have
privately assured Mr. Salisbury that his articles have been accurate and sound.
Because of their official position, I cannot quote them. I am taking the liberty,
however, of quoting in confidence a sentence or two from an unsolicited letter
received by Mr. Salisbury from General Stilwell after the publication of Mr.
Salisbury's article in the Survey of April 25, 1945, perhaps his most significant
article. General Stilwell, who certainly knew the situation existing then as
thoroughly as any one, wrote in his letter of May 4, 1945 : "Congratulations on
your article, 'Our China Policy' in the Far Eastern Survey. We all read it with
great interest and I believe you should print it in large gobs and give it wide-
spread distribution. At least send a copy to every Member of Congress as a
matter of education. I marveled at the restraint you showed and the complete-
ness of the picture." Mr. Salisbury also received an unsolicited and favorable
letter from former Ambassador Gauss at the same time, but I have not secured
Ambassador Gauss' permission to quote it. However I can assure you it was
most favorable. Neither General Stilwell nor Ambassador Gauss could he re-
garded as having Communist tendencies, but both have first hand knowledge of
the situation in China.
With reference to Mr. Bisson, he has had no article on China in the Survey
since the issue of July 14, 1943. He had no article in the Sm-vey in 1944, and his
three articles published in 1945 all dealt with Japan. In 194.5 Mr. Bisson was
invited by the United States Government to accompany Mr. Ed Pauley as a mem-
ber of the American Reparations Commission to .Japan. His work was so
acceptable that he was recently invited by General MacArthur to return to
Tokyo as a member of MacArthur's staff and he has already started for Japan
for a second visit for the United States Government.
Contrary to your impression of bias on the part of Mr. Bisson, his volume
"America's Far Eastern Policy," published by the IPR in 1945 and distributed by
5284 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the Macmillan Company, has received universally high commendations, for its
scholarly objectivity.
In sendin.i; out advertisements of Gunther Stein's "The Challenge of Red
China," the American Council was following its policy of bringing to the atten-
tion of its readers important books dealing with the Far East. Stein's book hud
received almost without exception favorable reviews in leading newspapers and
periodicals. As a competent reporter with long Far Eastern experience, Stein's
book contains material not available elsewhere in regard to Kuomintang-Chinese
Communist relations. To those who have read the volume, it seems to be as
impartial a presentation as one can expect in dealing with so controversial a
situation. I have looked through the file of advertisements sent out in the
Survey since last July and find that only one other book on China was advertised
during that period, Lawrence K. Rosinger's "China's Crisis," an advertisement
of which was sent out in July. Since then the publications advertised have been
William C. Johnstone's "The Future of Japan," William Herbert Hobbs' "The
Fortress Islands of the Pacific," John J:mbree's "The Japanese Nation," Harriet
L. Moore's "Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931^5," and a pamphlet issued by
Chatham House entitled "The I'ublications of the Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs." To my mind this seems to be a varied group of advertisements
which are not pressing a "line."
In addition to reviews and an occasional advertisement in the Far Eastern
Survey, the American Council from time to time sends out bibliographies and
reading lists. These are selective, but comprehensive and authoritative. For
example, a great many of them have been distributed by the oflBce of United
Cliina Relief because UCR is as eager as is the IPR to develop an informed
public.
It is quite true that many Chinese, as well as many Americans, dislike and
distrust Red China. But Red China is a political fact, whether we like it or
not, and it is important for informed Americans to luiderstand it. This does
not imply that they necessarily approve of it. It is so important that the United
States Government sent no one less than General George C. Marshall to bring
about a modus operandi between Red China, the Kuomintang, and the Demo-
cratic League. Certainly the IPR, which is obligated to face real situations,
could hardly fulfill its task by ignoring the existence of Red China. I hold no
personal brief for Gunther Stein, but I think yovi would be on safer ground if
you read the book before passing judgment on it.
For many years I have been a friend of both T. Z. Koo and Leighton Stuart. I
would agree with Koo that the leaders of Red China are essentially Marxian
Communists, though their present program is in no sense Communist. Neverthe-
less, classifying them as Marxian Communists does not obliterate the fact that
they are the leaders of millions of Chinese citizens.
Your splendid group of nearly a score of fine Chinese advance scientists at
Cal Tech are from all accounts men of great integrity and competence. I
imagine that they have all come from Kuonnntang China. It may be that many
of them have been nominated by the Kuitmintang Government for study with
you. I imagine that at least a half a dozen mature men might come to Pasadena
from Yenan with as strong anti-Kuomintang feelings as your present group
possesses pro-Kuomintang views.
As to my remarks on the bomb at the Town Hall luncheon in Los Angeles to
which you refer, I must confess tliat on the scientific aspects of the fission prob-
lem I must bow to you as a scientist, for I am a layman. What I did say at
that meeting was that I believed Truman's early handling of the problem did
result in a sharp change in Molotov's behavior at the London conference of
Foreign Ministers. Warm supporters and appointees of Mr. Truman's govern-
ment have assured me that his early pronouncements were most unfortunate, not
only in our relations with Russia, but with other countries as well. Mr. Byrnes'
later visit to Moscow, which was apparently prompted by Mr. Truman's earlier
treatment of the matter, was further evidence of Washington's recognition that
the first statements by Mr. Truman were not ideal. And Mr. Acheson has only
this week helped clarify the situation.
My observations at the Town Hall luncheon are, I think, substantiated by the
writings of Alexander Worth, for many years an accredited English correspondent
in Russia for the Sunday Times (London) and other English newspapers. As,
you will remember. International Affairs is the journal of the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, the Patron of which is His Majesty the King. In the
January 1946 issue of International Affairs Mr. Worth wrote as follows:
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5285
.'* * * -When I was recently in Sweden, ray friend Paul Winterton had
(he enviable publicity of being splashed over the front page of at least half
the newspapers for saying that the atomic bomb had reihiced Russia to a
second-class Power overnight. Such things do not make for good relations
with Russia, do they? And day after day the Swedish Press was featuring
on its front pages new details about the atomic bomb, with always this impli-
cation : 'That'll teach the Russians.'
"My own private view is that the atomic bomb has a great deal to do with
the breakdown of the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference in London. The
Russians were in a very bad mood ; sticky and obstructive, and reluctant to
compromise. I do not think there was any fear that Great Britain and the
United States would attack them with atomic bombs in a foreseeable future.
I think the chief reason for their obstructiveness was to show the world that
they were not a 'sec(md-class Power,' and that they were not frightened,
and that they could be a nuisance, despite the atomic bomb.
"Against this idea that Russia can some day be threatened and bullied by
the atomic bomb, there is a wave of popular, one might say, national re-
sentment in Russia. As one Russian put it, with a touch of bitterness: 'I
suppose one day they will want to atomise the heroes of Stalingrad.' There
is a tricky question of national pride involved in all this, and a feeling of
'How can we trust anyone?' It is a deplorable state of affairs, and it is
my profound conviction that unless something is done to place the atomic
bomb at the disposal of the Security Council of the United Nations Organ-
ization (without even necessarily giving away the technical secrets to any-
one) the Russians will remain acutely distrustful and difficult. But I do
not believe that they want to go into isolation."
But correspondence is, of course, a poor substitute for face-to-face discus-
sion. I wonder whether there is any chance of your being in New York in the
near future because I do want a long talk with you, for I know how deeply
interested you have been in the IPR ever since your attendance at the Banff
Conference in 1933. I remember, too, how pleased Allen Wardwell and I were
when you were one of the very first (Jalifornians to aflirm that you would be
glad to be a sponsor of Russian Relief way back in the autumn of 1941.
Few Americans have had more recent experience as to the perplexities of deal-
ing with the Russians than our late Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. And
yet with all his background, he recently afiirmed at a great dinner at the Hotel
Commodore that he did not think there was anything so important at the pres-
ent time than for private American citizens to intensify their humanitarian
gifts to the people of the Soviet Union through Russian Relief.
The present effort to develop a branch of the IPR in Southern California
derives principally from the luncheon at the University Club convened by Mr.
Rosecrans in December which you attended when all seemed to agree that South-
ern California should be given an opportunity for a larger participation and
when all further agreed that the appointment of a full-time executive officer was
necessary in order Lo carry out the wishes of Southern California IPR members.
I do hope that my letter has aided you a little in clarifying your mind, and
that you will be able to give to Mr. Rosecrans, Mr. McKelvey, Professor Coons,
Miss Dahl, Mrs. Heineman, and all the others that fine cooperation that you have
given in the past.
With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,
Edwakd C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1283
European Edition : Published Daily and Sunday in Paris
New York Herald Tribune,
280 West 41st Street,
New York 18, May 30, 1946.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter: I think you would be well within your rights in declining
to sign the final report of the Russian study group. At the last meeting, it was
decided to submit the report to the Committee on Studies of the Council together
5286 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
with a very strong minority report, so I doubt if any signatures will be included
without express authorization.
The final meeting- was interesting. Of 20 men present, only four (hssented
sharply from the report, which is on the friendly side although not very danger-
ously so These four were led by Frank Altschul. Four more were prepared
to sign with some reservations. Twelve of us were ready to swallow our objec-
tions and sign it as it was (they were very different objections) — we included
Dugaan, Gerry Robinson, John Hazard, and Bidwell himself, but I still think the
vote is an interesting commentary on the increasingly common assumption that
nearly all business and banking leaders are openly hostile to Russia.
Sincerely yours,
Joe
Joseph Barnes, Foreign Editor.
Exhibit No. 1284
CC: MAS ,^,^
September 26, 1946.
Fred INI vers, Esq.,
American Russian Institute,
58 Park Avenue, Neto York City.
Dear Fred : Eleanor Lattimore, you know, is terribly keen on our Washington
IPR program and recognized that our Pollard experiment did not work out
presumably because his campaign would have been keyed on Sumner Welles and
Welles didn't come across.
Mrs. I-attimore has just written Peggy Stewart as follows :
"Here is some information about the public relations outfit I spoke to you
about. My friend Carl Green understood, and I am sure made clear to Mr.
Flato, that I was not inquiring about it in any official capacity or represent-
ing Mr. Carter in any way, but was asking only because of my personal
concern about IPR finances. There is no point in my talking with Mr. Flato,
but if you or ECC would like to talk with him when you come down, I'd be
glad to arrange it."
Enclosed is a letter from someone named Carl Green, whom I do not identify.
Will you return it with your comments?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Enclosure.
Mrs. Owen Lattimore
ROLAND view ROAD
Ruxton 4, Md., September 24, 1946.
Dear Peggy: Here is some information about the public relations outfit I
spoke to you about. My friend Carl Green understood, and I am sure made clear
to Mr. Flato, that I was not inquiring about it in any official capacity or repre-
senting Mr. Carter in any way, but was asking only because of my personal
concern about IPR finances. There is no point in my talking with Mr. Flato^
but if you or ECO would like to talk with him when you come down I'd be glad
to arrange it.
Mr. Carter's wire to Owen about the Kohlberg case being settled has just
come. What a relief ! We are longing to know the details.
Was my pamphlet ever found? [Handwritten :] What pam.?
Yours, Eleanoe.
Exhibit No. 12S5
October 22, 1946.
Miss Renee Guthman,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
mo G. Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Dear Renee : Here is a copy of a letter I have just sent to Mortimer Graves.
I don't know whether you would consider J. Franklin Ray for some kind of a
meeting. He is only two weeks back from China where he was acting head of
UNRRA after Kizer's resignation. He knows Japan — has long been connected
with our Government's enterprises in China, first I think for Lauchlin Currie
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5287
and Lend-Lease, then FEA and, more recently, UNRRA. Mrs. Ray, as you know,
was Miss Hilda Austern, for a long time a valued member of the IPR stafE.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
End.
Exhibit No. 1286
No'.t;mber 1, 1946.
Mr. Mortimer Graves,
1219 16th Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Dkab Mortimer: Yesterday I had an hour and a quarter with Welles at
Oxon Hill Manor. He was in excellent form. First I told him of the fine
reports I had had of his recent visit to Canada where he was immensely impressed
with our Edgar Tarr. Then we discussed his earlier and his most recent book.
He expressed great gratitude to the IPR for furnishing the map for his latest
book showing the division between Kuomintang and Communist China.
We tlien wandered around the world a bit and then came down to the IPR.
I presented him with a copy of Olga Lang's "Chinese Family and Society" and
an advance copy of Dulles' pamphlet on "Russia and America — Pacific Neighbors"
as samples of our work at two levels, long-term research and competitive popu-
larization. He professed eagerness to read both. He clearly is aware of the
existence of the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs. He had already seen
"Treatment of Asia in American Textbooks" so that was a good preliminary
to presenting Miss Guthman's report of the current program in Washington, and
I told him of the way both a teachers' institute and a regional conference would
tit into the national and international picture. I showed him the list of
present members prepared very carefully in the Washington office. He agreed
that it was a mixed grill and that there were a great many obvious gaps. He
noted particularly that there were not enough people from Baltimore and the
"rich counties or Maryland." He is going to see Isaiah Bowman next week
and will try to get suggestions for additional Marylanders. I told him that most
of the Washington members gave $10 a year but some gave $25, $50 and more,
and that Mrs. Bolton had given $1,000 a year for several years and promised a
larger gift in. 1947. He has a very high regard for her. Somewhere in the
conversation he mentioned that taxes had about broken him this year but would
send a "generous check" in 1947. We will all have to guess as to his interpre-
tation of the word "generous." If he has a good memory, he will recall that
several months ago I asked him for a gift of $1,500.
Later I showed him the long list that Pollard and others compiled last summer
and asked him to check the names of those whom he thought were membership
prospects. He took that rather seriously and said that rather than do it hurriedly
yesterday he would like to take more time and would mail the list back to me.
I think it contains the names of a number of people in his exclusive world.
I certainly hope so.
At an appropriate time in the conversation I described adequately the real
gifts of his two principal colleagues, yourself and Miss Guthman. I empha-
sized your travels, your broad knowledge of the Far East, your linguistic serv-
ices to the L'nited States Government, not only in the matter of Chinese, Japanese,
and Russian but also the innumerable "funny" languages. Then I spoke of
your statesmanship in facilitating the building up of area faculties in seme
of the larger universities. As Miss Guthman is in the room, I will not set down
in this letter my description of her.
He asked me to be sure and request you to phone him immediately on your
return to Washington next week from your present trip and make an appoint-
ment to go out and see him to discuss ways in which you and he can cooperate
in activating the progi'am.
He has a copy of Miss Guthman's one page i-eport on the Washington office
activities. He has seen the present membership list and by that time will have
checked the long prospect list. There is one joker and that is that he goes
to Florida, I presume for the rest of the winter, around the tenth of December
so you will want to line him up for the maximum activity before he goes.
I am convinced that he is deeply interested in the IPR. He likes bouquets
about his books. Benjamin Welles, the New York Times correspondent in
Peiping, is his much admired son and this gives him an added interest in the
Far Eastern scene.
5288 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
He had read enough of our circular letters to the Board of Trustees to have
formed the impression that we had eliminated Kohlherg from the scene which
he thought was a great blessing. I had to amplify that this was, alas, not the
case but the amplification gave me a good opportunity to reinforce his own
conviction that Kohlberg was a crackpot.
With very best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
Edwakd C. Cabteb.
cc Mrs. Steward, N. Y.
cc Miss Guthman, Washington.
ECC : sh
Exhibit No. 1287
(Handwritten :) Mortimer Graves : Note and return to ECC.
SuMNEE Welles
OXON HILL MANOR
OxoN Hill, Maryland, November 9, 1946.
Edward C. Carter, Esquire,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East SJfth Street, Neio York, Neiv York.
My Dear Mr. Carter : I am very glad to have your letter of November 7 and
I am indebted to you for your kindness in sending me with it a copy of the mono-
graph prepared by Micliael Lindsay. I am sending this on to my son and I
know he will be much interested in it.
I have not yet heard from Mr. Graves, but I shall be glad to talk with him
as soon as he notifies me that he is back from his trip to the west.
With my kind regards, believe me,
Sincerely yours,
Sumner Welles.
(Handwritten :) Seeing him at Oxon Hill Nov. 22 at 5 p. m.— MG.
Exhibit No. 1288
December 24, 1946.
Miss Kenee Guthman,
American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
Dear Eenee: Professor Dorothy Douglas of Smith College will be sending,
in a few days, to me in care of the Washington Office a small bundle of books.
These, she wants me to present to the Soviet Ambassador on the occasion of my
next visit to Washington. Would you guard the package when it arrives and
keep it until I call for it? I am hoping to have a few hours for Washington
some time within the next two or three weeks. Is there in this period any par-
ticular date on which you would like to have me in Washington if I can manage
it?
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
p]xHiBiT No. 1289
10th January 1947.
WLH from ECC :
Toward the end of my recent talk with Secretary Krug of the Department of
the Interior, he asked whether we couldn't make a comparison of social, economic,
and political results of civil government in the Virgin Islands and Naval govern-
ment in American Samoa. He had in mind a comparison of such services as
police, fire, roads, water, health, education, economic advance, costs to Unclt
Sam, etc.
Beecroft is going to help us in assembling material.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5289
Doubtless Emerson at Harvard, Kennedy at Yale, Keesing at Stanford, would
be amonK those who can comment helpfully on how to go at the study, including
an outline for the study itself. Also Ralph Bunche at U. N.
But before approaching; others, I would like your general comment.
(Handwritten:) Good idea, but include Guam also. — W. L. H.
(The name Kennedy is circled and a line is drawn to the handwritten name
L. Thompson.)
Exhibit No. 1290
Febkuaby 3, 1947.
(Cross ofE with pencil :) CGM
MAS from ECC :
Here is a copy of Brooks Emeny's letter and my acknowledgment. Have
you any comments?
(The following is handwritten in pencil :)
Feb. 3, 1947.
ECC f r. MAS :
It is an advantage in many ways to have Brooks as a national oflBcer.
I wonder, however, whether it might not be preferable to have him serve
as a Vice Chairman, rather than Treasurer.
In these days of rising costs, and expanding budget and unusual difficulties
in fund-raising, it seems to me there would be important advantages in
having a Ti-easurer here in New York to advise and help you possible. As
it is now, with Brooks in Cleveland, you've had to bear the brunt alone.
Exhibit No. 1291
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
Honolulu — Los Angeles — Milwaukee — New York — San Francisco —
Seattle— Washington, D. C.
1 East 54th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.
ELdorado 5-1759
Mabch 11, 1947.
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin
3575 Clay Street, San Francisco IS, California.
Dear Mrs. McLaughlin : Thank you for your frank and helpful letter of
February 25. I can well appreciate how the connection of Frederick Field
and myself with the IPR have added to your difficulties in the Bay Region.
Without doubt an easy, though merely tempoi-ary, gain would result from a
decision on his part and mine to withdraw from all official connection with
the IFR.
But, alas, we are up against a vastly complicated, abundantly financed move-
ment which is employing the classical Nazi methods in attacking liberals, leftists,
and middle-of-the-road conservatives.
Mr. Kohlbei'g is one of the spearheads of this nation-wide intrigue. He
has carefully planned his time table and is moving with great skill from ob-
jective to objective. To the IPR he has added the FPA, and to that he has
recently added an attack on Alger Hiss, the very able but by no means leftist
successor to President Nicholas Murray Butler as the new President of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Reverting to the IPR, Kolilberg's time table is roughly something like this:
(1) the expulsion of Field, (2) the expulsion of Carter, (3) of Lattimore, (4) of
Salisbury, (5) of Staley, (6) Mrs. Stewart, and so on. Now you may personally
feel that Field, Carter, Lattimore and Salisbury should leave but I am sure
you would regret as much as I would the loss of Staley. It is because of the
end result rather than the fortunes of Field and myself that I am inclined to
stand my ground in adhering to the invitation extended me by Sproul, Jessup,
Calkins, and others late in 1945: that I accept a three-year appointment as
Executive Officer of the American IPR. beginning in the early part of 1946.
88348— 52— pt. 14 25
5290 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
You will remember the Bay Region Committee, when apprised of this invita-
tion, suggested the appointment be for one year but its attitude changed to
approval of the three-year appointment at a meeting of the Bay Region Com-
mittee presided over by Admiral (Jreenslade and attended by Mrs. Rogers, Mrs.
Gerbode, Julean Arnold and others. I think you will remember that Admiral
Greenslade made himself the spol<esman for the entire committee in saying that
now that the whole picture was clear he fully supported the three-year
appointment.
I am fully aware that at one stage some of the members of your committee felt
that all would be well if we could eliminate Field but, subsequently, some felt
that both Field and I should go. The reason why I have reluctantly come to the
conclusion that I should stand my ground personally is because, as I have
sketched above, I know the Nazi technique of killing off its opponents progres-
sively one by one. I am aware also that you and a few others have had your
fingers crossed on me for many years, long before my alleged redness entered the
picture. I am pretty confident that these criticisms have aided the redbaiters in
recommending my elimination. On all of these issues, I am quite willing to
admit that I have made mistakes but I would also ask from your side that degree
of live and let live that I have consistently granted to you personally. Further-
more, I hope that some day you and I can sit down alone for a couple of hours,
if you have the time to review all these matters which have worried you over the
years such as : Mrs. Grady, the librarian, the Bell-Nugent textbook, our national
secondary school program, etc. I do not want to defend myself or my colleagues
in these matters, but I think you owe it to me to let me explain the reasons for
the actions I took and, then, when you have given me your side of the picture,
I know I will profit by your description of the ways in which you think I have
been in error.
With reference to our invitation to you to go to Coronado, I should inform you
that invitations were automatically sent to all of the 1946 National Board of
Trustees and all of the candidates for the 1947 Board. You were in the first
category and thus the invitation went to you with no thought that it would
jeopardize the freedom of the Bay Region committee in its choice of the Bay
Region group at Coronado. We do hope that the Bay Region quota will be
fully utilized and that the Bay Region committee will not feel that it must
limit its selection to the quota because the 1946 and 1947 Trustees have been
invited and we sincerely hope they will accept.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1293
Tel. 15212.213.214 Cable Address : "Emissaeids Shanghai"
National Committee of the Young Women's Christian Association of China
133 yuen ming tuen road
Shanghai, June 11, 194^.
Mr. EdwArd O. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter : Thank you kindly for your acknowledgment of the cabled
proxy which IPR members in Shanghai sent for the fateful April 22nd meeting.
We rejoice that the IPR was given the overwhelming vote of confidence which
the quality of its work unquestionably merits.
May I take this opportunity to recommend a coworker of mine who I hope will
be invited to become a member of the IPR? This person is Miss Edith Lerrigo
who has served on the national staff of the YWCA in China for the past five
years. Miss Lerrigo is returning to the States for furlough the end of June.
She wishes to be in constant touch with up-to-date sources of dependable infor-
mation about the Far East. She should be addressed as follows:
Miss Edith M. Lerrigo,
Foreign Divi.'^ion. ^
National Board YWCA,
60(J Lexington Avenue,
New York 22, N. Y.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5291
You will find her to be a staunch supporter of the democratic movement in China
and the Far East.
We are happy to see Dorothy Berg from time to time.
S^^^^^^^^' Talitha a. Geklach.
TAG/s
Exhibit No. 1294
Assistant Secretary.
United States Department of the interior,
Washington, June 9, 1947.
Mr. Edward Carter,
President, Instititte of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Carter: There has been quite a number of developments relating
to the Pacific since our last conversation, which was prior to the trip that several
of us took to the Pacific. I should like to discuss some of these developments
with you at your convenience. .
If you expect to be down in Washington, I hope you will give me a ring, it
may be that I will be in New York the latter part of this week, and if so I will
try to get in touch with you at that time.
With all kind regards and best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
C. GiRARD Davidson,
Assistant Secretary.
Take to Washington.
Exhibit No. 1295
June 12, 1947.
Mr. C. Giraed Davidson,
Assistant Secretary, United States Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Davidson : Thank you for yours of June 9. I certainly will be de-
lighted to see you in the near future. If you come to New York, let me know a
Little in advance so I may be sure to be here.
If you don't turn up here first, I will certainly make every effort to see you
in Washington the next time I am there.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
ECC : sk.
Exhibit No. 1296
January 9, 1947. •
ECC from RDC:
In response to the various points I gave Beecroft over the phone, he remarked
the following:
1. He wondered whether we had anyone in mind for the Virgin Islands Study.
He said he might send someone in to see you on this, i. e.. Nelson Nichols, who was
in the Virgin Islands representing the OPA, who is interested in making the kind
of study you have in mind.
2. He didn't have time to mention it when he saw you, but he thought the IPR
should approach the dependent areas division of the Department of State with
any plans it has for research on the South Pacific and Pacific Islands. Some
other organizations are very active on this and a good deal of planning is going
on for research activities in the Pacific. A good deal of pressure is being put on
the State Department by the National Academy of Sciences, Douglas Oliver,
Harold Coolidge, etc. He would like to talk with you about this some time soon.
Exhibit No. 1297
January 9, 1947.
(Shorthand notes unreadable across top.)
Ask Beecroft :
1. Spelling, initials, title & address of Davidson (penned) C. Garard.
2. That Davidson was the only additional person at the Krug-Carter interview
5292 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
3. Davidson had never seen the Thompson study on Guam, so ECC is sending him
a copy even though he knows there is a copy in Beecroft's office.
4. In talking to Krug, ECC didn't mention Beecroft, but in talking with Davidson
afterwards, ECC did mention Beecroft in his capacity as an expert on
Hawaii apropos of the possibility of Krug visiting Hawaii and Davidson
wanted ECC's help in nominating people of different points of view to talk
to Krug while in Hawaii. Davidson wants ECC to send him a list of people
Krug should see in Hawaii. Would Beecroft send ECC such a list for him
to pass on to Krug? (Penciled notation:) ECC will add few names.
5. Krug suggested that the IPR make a small comparative study of the Virgin
Islands and American Samoa. Would Beecroft be able to send ECC some
material on this? (Penciled notation:) & a brief outline of how the com-
parison could best be made in the proposed monograph.
(Penciled notation:) With comments on them (not legible) and specialties
e. g., pro Statehood anti-Statehood pro Civil Gov't for most of the Pacific
islands or pro Navy gov't, also whether (Bus?) men formalists, etc.
(Shorthand notes unreadable.)
Exhibit No. 1298
February 20, 1946.
Memorandum for Hon. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State.
Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Secretai-y of War.
Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy.
Hon. Oscar L. Chapman, Acting Secretary of Interior.
The following proposal of the Department of the Interior for administration
of the Pacific islands is submitted in accordance with the resolution adopted
on January 30 by the subcommittee of the committee of four Secretaries which
was appointed by the President on October 20, 1945.
1. It is proposed that military government should be replaced by civil govern-
ment in all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services of the United
States, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated
as military reservations, subject to any future international agreement as to
the status of these islands. The proposal will apply to Guam and American
Samoa and to the other islands which are already under United States sover-
eignty ; to all of the Micronesian islands which were formerly under Japanese
mandate, including the Marianas, the Palaus, the Carolines and the Marshalls;
and to the Ryukyus, the Volcanos, the Izus and the Bonins. It will also apply
to any additional Pacific islands which may from time to time be brought under
United States administration.
2. The administrative agency for the islands will be the Department of the
Interior. Through its Division of Territories and Island Possessions, the De-
partment of the Interior is already responsible for administration in nearly all
overseas territories of the United States. For over 100 years, the D^i)artment
has dealt with the problems of indigenous peoples, both on the mainland and
overseas. Under its jurisdiction, the Philippine Commonwealth is preparing
for independence; Hawaii and Alaska for statehood; Puerto Rico (under the bill
supported by the President and the Department) for such status as its voters
may choose ; and the Virgin Islands for a rapidly increasing measure of self-
government. By maintaining Navy rule in Guam and American Samoa for the
past 45 years, the United States has had the distinction of being the only power
in the Pacific which treats an inhabited area as a mere appurtenance of a mili-
tary base. This is not a distinction which the American people will justify at
a time when enlightened opinion, at home and abroad, demands expert attention
to the progress of dependent peoples.
3. The Department of the Interior recommends that, even if some delay in
transferring jurisdiction is anticipate, the decision to employ civil administi'ation
in islands under United States control should be made and announced at once.
Such a decision would correct a belief which is prevalent, both at home and
abroad, that our military interest in this area tends to ignore the civil rights
and the economic welfare of the island inhabitants. The announced intention
of this Government to employ civil administration in areas under its super-
vision will strengthen, not prejudice, our claims for military or administrative
responsibility in the Pacific, and it will place this Government in a sound posi-
tion to insist upon the adoption and maintenance of proper standards of civil
administration in areas under the control of other powers.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5293
4. The decision and announcement concerning civil administration will permit
immediate steps to be taken by the Department of the Interior to prepare the
necessary plans. The transfer from military to civil administration should be
made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can
be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent
international agreements. Nothing done under an interim civil administra-
tion would stand in the way of sound decisions concerning military use or con-
cerning the future disposition of the Pacific Islands or concerning trusteeship or
other terms under which the islands are to be governed.
5. An immediate decision to replace military by civil government at an
early date and to begin planning to that end will have the further advantage
of easing the necessary final adjustment which will have to be made by the
Departments and the personnel concerned. It would help to remove the im-
pression that exists among civil affairs personnel and island peoples alike that
the present island program is a temporary one. It would also help to give
a sense of continuing responsibility to those concerned with carrying out the
administration of island affairs.
6. American experience in the Micronesian area already strongly suggests
that any division of the islands for administrative purposes would multiply
the difficulties in the way of economical and efficient government. If the tax-
payers of the United States (or those of some other administering power) are
to be relieved largely of cost in connection with island affairs and if the islanders
are to have the benefit of an adequate control of conditions affecting their
welfare, it would be essential to regard Micronesia, including Guam, as a single
administrative unit, subdivided only for the purposes of local administration.
Some of the islands have agricultural, mineral and fish resources which may
be used for the maintenance of the population and as a source of taxable reve-
nues. Other islands may be deficit areas which, if left to their own resources,
might become a charge upon the budget of the administering power. To treat
the whole region as a single unit for the purpose of dealing with the practical
and difficult problems of transportation, communication, food distribution,
public health, and public finance will provide a sound basis for economical
administration.
SUMMAEY OF EECOMMENDATIONS
1. Military government should be replaced by civil government, with the Depart-
ment of the Interior as administering agency, in all Pacific islands under
the control of the armed services, with the exception of islands or parts
of islands which may be designated as military reservations.
2. The decision to adopt civil government should be made and announced at
once. The Department of the Interior should then proceed accordingly,
with the assistance of other departments concerned, to prepare plans of
administration.
3. The transfer from military to civil administration should be made, as an
interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can be com-
pleted. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent
international agreements.
4. In the interest of economical and effective administration, the Micronesian
area, including Guam, should be regarded as a single unit, subdivided
only for purposes of local administration.
Exhibit No. 1299
SuMXER Welles, Chairman
MOBTiMEB Geaves. Vicc Chairman
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
New York — San Francisco — Lo.s Angeles — Honolulu — Milwaukee — Seattle
Telephone District 8665
Washington Office : 1710 G Street N. W.
Washington, D. C, June 12, 1947.
Dear Mr. Carter: There seems to an accumulation of items for this letter.
General Marshall's home address is simply Leesburg, Virginia.
Mac Fisher still will not give a yes or no answer on being a trustee. When
I asked him last night he said he wanted to wait till Abbot Low Moffat returned
5294 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to talk it over with him, Moffat will not be back till next Monday. I explained
that the trustees met on Tuesday and you would like to know before then.
He said he would let me know Monday. I have a suspicion his answer will
be no. However, I'm amazed and so is Shirley at the list Bill Holland suggested
and which I am enclosing. Unless it were simply for prestige reasons Ropes
and Hummel are too old. Ropes has taken no interest in this office at all —
Hummel only a mild interest. Ed Martin and Stelle aren't even members
and never attended anything even when asked personally. Gauss is a teriil)ly
busy person. Hoskins and Linebarger share opinions and Linebarger considers
the IPR Communist. Beecroft is out of Interior and will be looking around
for a job elsewhere. On the positive side what about Harry White or Bob
Berkov or Nelson Johnson. Mortimer Graves will be at the meeting Tuesday
of the trustees. He might have some other suggestions for a replacement then
if Mac Fisher says no on Monday.
Mortimer Graves will also be telling you about the meeting last night which
I have reported on briefly in the enclosed report. As I mentioned to Celestine,
Mr. Graves would like to make a report on the Washington ofHce at the meeting.
On the basis of the talk with Welles and the meeting last night various ideas
and suggestions were put forth. Everyone is enthusiastic about having the
program here continue. But there does seem to be some differences on what
the aims of this office should be. Graves is planning to leave in September if
OIC gets its budget. So we have until then to think of a possible successor.
Perhaps you can get him to express some ideas on that too.
I'm afraid the results of my financial efforts today were two very cold
shoulders. But perhaps it was the heat ! Anyway, I'll continue to try.
Sincerely,
RenSe GTTTHMAIf.
p. S. — Had lunch with Eric Beecroft yesterday and Catherine Porter today.
Catherine will be in New York next Wednesday as I guess you know. Eric
Beecroft is out of a job and very anxious to talk to you and Bill Holland about
various ideas and job possibilities.
Exhibit No. 1300
Progress Report, Washington Office, May 1-June 12
During the month of May two meetings were held — an office meeting for Mr.
U Myat Tun, the Secretary of the Commerce Department of the Government of
Burma on May 1st, and a luncheon meeting for Mr. .John Caldwell on May 28
(list attached). Mr. Caldwell was head of the U. S. Information Program in
China until recently. The luncheon was held in the YWCA dining room and
was one of the most successful meetings of the year.
The present Washington membership totals 265. As of the first of November
the membership was 20.5. This is an increase of 60 members in seven months
even disregarding those who have moved away, resigned or allowed their member-
ships to lapse.
Much of the time covered by this report has been spent attempting to raise
some money in the Washington area. Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, Mrs. Lillian Coville
and the Hon. Sumner Welles have all made suggestions of people to approach.
To date the results of those approached have not been too encouraging, but there
are still many contacts to pursue and the main efforts of the office during June
are being devoted to this end.
A final meeting of the season of the advisory committee and other interested
and active Washington members was held Wednesday evening, .Tune 11th. Pres-
ent were : Mortimer Graves, William Carter, Isohel Ward, F. MacCracken Fisher,
Cora DuBois, Robert Berkov, Robert Fearey, Frank Lorimer, John Barrow, Karl
Pelzer, Shirley Jenkins and Renee Guthman. The program for the past year was
reviewed and suggestions and comments made on the program for the coming
year. The general feeling of the group was that the Washington office should
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5295
concentrate its effort on a program to aid and abet the national program rather
than attempting to have a typical regional office program. For example, more
effort should be made to '"win friends and influence" Congressmen and Senators ;
the Far Eastern experts which are concentrated in Washington should be utilized
more than they are perhaps by a weekly broadcast over a local station from
which records could be made and sent around the country ; efforts should be made
to keep track of various national and international conferences eminating from
Washington to see that the Far East is given as much attention as possible; close
contact should be established and maintained with the information officers of all
embassies; international relations secretaries of all national organizations with
offices in Washington should be contacted and all help and information available
through the II'R should be offered to them. There seemed to be some question
in the minds of the Washington group as to just what course the National Office
wanted the Washington Office to pursue, and it was hoped that perhaps a more
clearly defined directive could be worked out through the mutual efforts of the
Washington group and the National Office.
A somewhat curtailed program is being planned for the summer months — two
luncheon meetings a month to suffice — with the full program to be resumed in
September.
Exhibit No. 1301
Luncheon May 28, 1947—12 : 30 P. M.— Y. W. C. A
Speaker : John Caldwell, O. I. C, State Department ; Introduced by
Robert Berkov, O. I. C, State Department
Drury Anderson, State Dept.
Russell Andrus, State Dept.
Pat Barnett, State
John Barrow, U. S. Office of Educ.
Dr. M. Bernardo, State
Effie Browne, State
Mr. Busuego, State
Mrs. Busuego
Stanley Caidin, formerly with Foreign
Broadcast Intell., FE
Wallace Cohen, attorney
Mrs. Cohen
Lillian Coville, member
John DeFrances, Social Sei. Res Fellow
Henry Douglas, Library of Congress
Jim Elliot, State
Katherine Erwin, Librarian, Wilson
State Teachers College
Mrs. Fairbank
F. M. Fisher, State
George Ford, guest of Mr. Andrus
Mr. Friedberg, Int. Monet. Fund
Henry Galant, guest of Agnes Roman
Mrs. Galant
Jean Gates, Central Intell. Group
Carl Green, WQQW
Engracio Guerzon, State
Reuee Guthman
Sally Hawkins
John Heideman, State
Arthur Hummel, Library of Congress
Mrs. Hummel
Clarence Hendershot, State
Robert Hummel, State
Mr. Isikoff, UNRRA
Shirley Jenkins
Eugene Karst, State
Bessie Kibbey, member and guest
EUeanor Lattimore
Mildred Lau, State
Mr. Liang, Int. Monet. Fund
W^m McAfee, State
General McCoy, FE Commiss.
Lloyd Millegan, State
Frances F. Miller, guest of Miss Roman
Lorna Morley, State
Raymond Moyer, Agric.
Mrs. Moyer
Carl Nelson, State
Mrs. Nicholas, Miss Simester's mother
John Oldham, Australian Embassy
Mrs. James Penfield and mother
Hilda Ray (Mrs. Frank) and sister
Charlotte Riznik, guest of E. Lattimore
Agnes Roman
Rodolfo Severino, State
Edith Simester, former teacher in
China
Joseph Smith, Office Educ.
Ted Tannenwald, attorney
Mr. Ubaldo, State
Freda Utley
Henry F. Vicinus, State
Mr. Villareal, State
Isabel Ward, State
5296 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1302
July 18, 1947.
Memorandum of Carter's Talk with Lauchlin Currie
1. Can you be sure of saving Salisbury and the rest of the IPR if you let one
member of the Executive Committee resign?
2. Currie will contribute $25 now and another $25 at the end of the year if he
can possibly do so.
3. Harry Beyster of the Beyster Corporation in Detroit is an advisor to the
Philippine Government with a 16-million-dollar project in the wind.
4. Joe Swan of Haydon Stone handles the accounts of a great many Chinese.
5. Bill Pauley (of Pauieyville) has the State of Travancore pretty well sew^d up,
6. A number of American corporations are angling in a big way for Japanese
business. The IPR might begin by lining up the group mentioned in the
attached New York Times column of July 18.
Exhibit No, 1303
Philippine Reconstruction Act
(Ecafe Training Study Report to ECC from W. Fairbank)
Interview with Miss Catherine Porter, in charge of Philippine desk, Area Divi-
sion, Far East, Office of Information and Educational Exchange, Department
of State, Washington 25, D. C,
March 18, 1948,
Miss Porter reported that under the Philippine Reconstruction Act it is
planned to bring to the U. S. on American Government funds about 800 Fili-
pinos for in-service training in U. S. Government department's or bureaus
between 1947 and 1950. Some of the trainees will be studying purely military
subjects at West Point or with the Signal Corps, etc. but that others will get
civilian training analogous to that now received by Latin Americans in U. S.
Government Bureaus under the U. S. Government program supervised by the
Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation.
I was not able in my brief talk with her to get details of this program or of
State Department information regarding any trainees from the Philippines
in the U. S. under other auspices but will look into this further if ECC desires.
Miss Porter suggested that if ECC should go to the Philippines in the course
of his survey he might find it useful to discuss possible training programs or
to get information on current programs from Bienvenido Gonzalez, President of
the University of the Philippines.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5297
Exhibit No. 1304
U. S. Industrial Training for Personnel From: ECAFE Countries
Survey by Mrs. Wilma Fairbank for Mr. Edward C. Carter, ECAFE Consultant,
March 1948
Table of Contents
Table of
Contents Index
Numbers Numbers
(Black Ink) (Red Ink)
I. Introduction:
I- A. Draft questionnaire followed in intenitws 1-
II. Qovemraent Programs Financing Study and Training In the U. S. for Foreign
Students:
A. U. S. Government:
2-3^- 1. The Fnlbright Act 8-11-1&-
5-6-7- 2. The Smith-Mundt Act -.- -.. 6-17-31-
8- 3. The Philippine Reconstruction Act 15-
B. ECAFE Governments:
9- 1. Indian Oovernment Program 1&-
II- 2. Chinese Oovernment Programs — Placement of Chinese in U. S.
Industries by E. S. Taub 2-
10- a. The National Resources Commission 29-
12- b. Plans {Extract from the A. Taub plan) 3-
13- Z. Other ECAFE Countries 9-
III. Agencies Placing and Supervising Foreign Trainees in the U. S.:
A. Oovernment:
14- 1. U. S. Government In-Sertice Training for Foreign Nationals 12-
15- 2. International Trade Division of the Department of Commerce 14-
3. State Department:
16-17-18- a. Administration 21-18-
b. Hospitality 30-
B. Private:
19- 1. International Training Administration (now defvnct) 20-
20- 2. China Institute In America. .. 27-
21-22-23-24- 3. Institute of International Education 28-5-7-10-
IV. Agencies in the U. S. Providing Training for Foreign Trainees:
A. Technical Institutions:
25-26- 1. Example: Mass. Institute of Technology. 23-24-
B. Industrial Firms:
27-28- 1. Examnle: International Oeneral Electric 25-26-
29- 2. Example: Studebaker Export Corporation 34-
C. Oovernment Bureaus:
30- 1. Example: Tennessee Valley Authority i. 22-
V. Conclusions — Assessment of Value of Training, and Suggested Improvements:
31- A. Development of Skilled Laborers and Foremen 32-
32- B. Extract from "The Development and Operation of Programs to Train
Foreign Technicians in U. S." by E. S. Taub 4-
33- C. Comments on the Training of Chinese Trainees by Officials of the Bureau
of Reclamation. 1946.. - - - 33-
34- APPENDIX: Training Films. -.-. 13-
NoTE. — Italicized phrases in the index refer to individual memoranda which constitute the body of the
report.
Exhibit No. 1305
Straight Message. March 25, 1948.
James K. Penfield,
Far Eastern Division, Department of State,
Washington, D. C:
Hope see you nine fifteen Friday morning two minutes urgent matter. Re-
turning for longer talk at ten.
Edward C. Carter.
Exhibit No. 1306
John B. Powell
presbyterian hospital, harknes8 pavilion
180 Ft. Washington Avenue
NEW York 32, N. T., May 4, 1945.
Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Editor, Pacific Affairs,
1 East Slfth Street, Neiv York, N. Y.
Dear M. Caktbui : After reading T. A. Bisson's letter to the New York Herald
Tribune, dealing with political changes in China, I am prompted to ask you
5298 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
whether Bisson is the official spokesman of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
You may have noticed that he indicated such at the end of his article.
I make the inquiry because his article more or less confirms charges which
I have recently heard regarding the Red leanings of a considerable number of
officials and employees of the Institute. Mr. Bisson's charge against the Kuomin-
tang may be quite correct, but why not say something about the totalitarian
pro-Russian inclinations and connections of the Chinese Communist Party?
It is quite true that the Kuomintang has not had an election, but what coun-
try, aside from the United States, has had one? Also, how would China go about
having a general election with the Japs and Reds holding about half of the
country ?
Also, incidentally, why confine all the attacks to China when Russia seems
to be the main disrupting force at the San Francisco meeting? I have read
a great many publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations but I have never
seen one single criticism of the dictatorial Communist Party in Russia. Accord-
ing to Sun Fo, who has always been friendly toward the U. S. S. R., there isn't
the slightest chance of a democratic development in Russia within fifty years,
and possibly it will take a hundred. Why do you ignore the situation in Russia
while concentrating all of the Institute's critcism on China and the Kuomintang?
Since practically all of the attacks on the Kuomintang and Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek can be traced back to Chinese Communist and Russian sources,
It seems to me that the whole thing is a build-up for a further grab of Chinese
territory, this time by the U. S. S. R. All through "World War I we appeased
Japan ; now we seem to be following a similar policy with respect to the Soviet
Union and the Communist Party.
Sincerely yours,
(signed) J. B. Powell
J. B. Powell.
Exhibit No. 1307
Cathay Hotel, Shanghai, China, 7 August lOJfS.
Arthur H. Dean, Esquire,
48 Wall Street, New York City.
Dear Arthur : The enclosed was delayed. Since writing it I have received
a clipping from the New York Herald Tribune reporting on Mr. Cromwell's
bequests. I was particularly interested in his gift of $450,000 to the Russian
War Relief and his $r.00,000 gift to United China Relief. As you can well
imagine, as an IPR person, I wish it could lie established that Mr. Cromwell
made this gift to the Russian War Relief berause I was its president: In such
an event you might persuade the executives that the money should be paid
over to the American IPR because it was the IPR that enabled me to serve
as president of the Russian War Relief ! I
Doubtless my colleagues Bill Lancaster and Peter Grimm are in touch with
the executers as to the pros and cons of asking that the $450,000 be made avail-
able for relief to war sufferers in the Soviet Union. I am wondering whether
the Un-American Committee will wish to have Mr. Cromwell's remains examined
in order to discover whether he was a Moscow agent.
I hope to see you the end of August or early September.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. CARTiat.
Exhibit No. 1308
9/15/48 Jerome Cohen
Ellen Hammer
Agenda foe B. C. O.
i. finance
1. Follow up September 13 memo — KRCG from ECO
2. Contact : Devereux Josephs
Dollard
Shepardson
Joseph E. Davies
$100 and over
Mrs. Emmons Blaine
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5299
3. Check all $50 and up for 1947 and 1948, starring any who have not paid yet
in 1948.
Detroit
4. Arrange to see Ford Foiindation at the same time as Economic Club engage-
ment. If this does not take place, see Craig anyhow. (Handwritten:)
See or write with Compton before seeing Craig.
5. Make sure that as many as possible of the following are invited to one or
more of the appropriate small dinners :
Willits Mr. and Mrs. Stein
Fahs Wilbur Forrest
Shepardson Beatrice Auerbach
DoUard Mr. and Mrs. Michael Straight
Josephs Henry Allen Moe
Mrs. James W. A. M. Burden
Mrs. Schoellkopf Nelson Rockefeller
Mrs. Lilienthal William S. Paley
The Rossbachs John Hay Whitney
Joe Bai-nes Mr. & Mrs. Maurice T. Moore
Louis Weiss David H. McAlpin
Marshall Field John Cranes
Dr. and Mrs. David M. Levy
6. Consider a meeting for such people as:
Mr. and Mrs. Max Stewart F. P. A. Barber
Henry Collins Mrs. W. W. L. Tuckman
Fred Myers The Coffs
The Gelfans W. W. Lancasters
The Lauterbachs Andrew Grad
Mrs. Jaffe Mr. and Mrs. Cune
Mrs. Hale Rosamond Lee
Rose Rubin Tiedemann
The Jenkins Weems
The Conants John Stewart
Mr. and Mrs. John Hazard Mrs. P. E. L. Norees
Mrs. Brownell Larule Davis
E. C. Roper
n. ASIA : REPORT AND FOLLOW UP
1. Read, edit and revise all ECC'S letters from Asia.
2. Decide to what use they can best be put.
3. Place in chronological or other order all miscellaneous memos, clippings,
bibliographical material, etc., collected during or since the Asia visit.
4. Revise speech for Pakistan Institute or write fresh article.
5. Consider revising the three instalments of material on Ooty for Lilienthal.
6. Prepare outlines for two or three talks in case FPA or others ask for formal
engagements.
7. Write appropriate letters to those in each country who facilitated visits and
asked for some action here.
8. Review with Holland, Healy, Lilienthal, Greene, Rosinger, Ruth Carter various
suggestions, e. g.
A. A follow np of key Asians in this country, particularly Siamese, Bur-
mese, Filipinos, Javanese.
B. Consider possibility of Southeast Asia graduate student conference.
C. Consider ways and means for more effective cultivation of Chinese in
the United States.
9. Go to bottom of reasons for failure to get visa for Japan and decide whether
to make an issue of it.
m. OFFICE ARRANGEMENTS
In advance of Lane's arrival, about September 26, evacuate all personal material
from present office, allocating some to the new office, here, some to 72nd Street,
and some to Lee.
5300 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
IV. EXPENSE ACCOUNT
1. Clear with Holland, Shahn, Greene adjustment of Asia expense account.
2. Finish and submit AIPR expense account for period prior to March 30,
(Handwritten:) (done) (out $70)
V. WHAT TO DO AFTEB JANUARY FIRST
1. Get advice from Holland, Greene, Lilienthal, Willits, Dollard, Dean, Cham-
berlain, Vera Dean. Mitrany, Bolton, Davies, Lattimore, Fairbank.
2. Review from time to time the 14 alternatives outlined at Lee.
3. Consider seriously taking three months for study and writing before fulnill-
ing any engagements either in North America or Asia. One object of this
might be to supplement present sketchy knowledge of Eastern situations by
thorough study, possibly at Andover-cum-Cambridge so as to be able to deal
more authoritatively on Eastern topics, whether in America or Asia. A
last trip to Asia could be far more productive if it was preceded by such a
period of study.
VI. PACIFIC COUNCIL
Review with Holland and Shahn Pacific Council financial situation and con-
sider what letters Carter or others should write to India, Pakistan, etc.
VII. WASHINGTON VISIT
See among others : Joe Davies
Keiser (middle east)
Johnstone
Bolles
Sumner Welles
Margaret Carter
Whoever in State Dept. is in charge of ECAFE both with
reference to Ooty and the November meeting in Austrialia
Catherine Porter
Oneal — U. S. Ambassador to the PhiL
Burmese Ambassador
Siamese Ambassador
Indian Ambassador
Pakistan Ambassador
Philippine Ambassador
Ask Holland and Greene whether one of them could persuade Arthur Dean to
write separately to Davies and Welles suggesting that each arrange a small
dinner at which ECC could report. (It might be better to ask Dean to write
but one of the men and get someone else to write the other.)
(Handwritten:)
? Canadian Visit (See ECC to WLH of 15 Sept. & his reply.)
? Cleveland Visit (See ECC's corresp. with Mrs. Bolton & Cleveland Council.)
? F. P. A. Visits (See ECX's corresp. with Frances Pratt.) If Pittsburgh is
visited see that Paul Mellon & his Foundation are invited to small luncheon
or dinner.
Exhibit No. 1309
129 East 52nd Street, New York City,
September 29, 1938.
Constantine Oumanskt, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. 8. R.
Washington, D. C. •
Dear Oumanskt : My colleague, Owen Lattimore — Editor of Pacific Affairs —
has just written his interpretation of the meaning of recent events in Japanese-
Soviet relations. He has done this in an article entitled "Siberia Seals Japan's
Fate."
It will probably be published in an early issue of Amerasia, but I thought
that you would like to see it immediately. If you have any personal comments
to make on this analysis, I would be very glad to have them.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5301
You may be interested to know that Owen Lattimore has now come to the
Atlantic seaboard and, while continuing on the I. P. R. staff as editor of Pacific
Affairs, he will be on the faculty of Johns Hopkins University in charge of what
is called the Walter Hines Pajie School of International Affairs.
When are you coming to New York next? Are you visiting Moscow in the
near future?
Sincerely yours,
Edwaed C. Carter,
Exhibit No. 1310
November 4, 1948.
WLH (cc. to KRCG
CLfrom ECC: PEI
LKR)
(KRCG)
Holland will remember that I wrote to New York from Southeastern A.sia last
summer of the desire of the Burmese, Siamese and Filipinos that either the
American IPR or the International Secretariat undertake the task of educating
their abler graduate students and engineers in North America in the lore of the
IPR. I suggested that one way of doing this might be for one or other of the
IPRs to organize a Southeast Asia student conference.
Last week in the State Department in Washington I asked Miss Cora DuBois
what she thought of the proposal of a student conference. She reacted highly
favorably and said that she thought the time was ripe for it and that much
could be accomplished. Her section of Research and Analysis covers all of
Southeast Asia with the exception, I think, of Pakistan and India, but she feels
that the inclusion of Pakistanis and Indians in such a conference would be of
great value. Her tentative recommendation was that it be a southern Asia
affair and that greater reality would be achieved if we didn't bother to include
Chinese students.
On the basis of her reaction I tried the idea out on Bill Johnstone and found
him wholly favorable.
Of course both of them recognize that the best results would accrue if it was
entirely non-official and that the State Department did not appeal — though each
of them would be glad to help with names and in any other way that the IPR
desired. They both were under the impression that the majority of the students
from southern Asia are in the East and thus that a conference on the eastern
seaboard would be indicated — though Miss DuBois wished that funds could be
secured so that it could be a national conference, bringing a few of the best from
the Pacific Coast. But she added that a successful eastern seaboard gathering
might pave the way for a similar conference later on the West Coast.
If you and your colleagues think that the matter should be further explored, I
think we should talk it over with Miss Nuvart Parseghian, the head of the Asiatic
and African Division of the Institute of International Education. She. accord-
ing to Wilma Fairbank, is a most unusual person, as we all discovered when we
got her views on the ECAFE study of technical training. Perhaps it would be
advantageous to have the conference under the joint auspices of the IPR and
the HE. Until we have all discussed the matter further, I am not certain whether
it would be best to have the American IPR or the International Secretariat take
the lead.
I should assume that the more student participation in the affair, the better.
To this end a consultative meeting of some of the best leaders among the students
in the east might be desirable so that they could feel a stake in the show from
the start.
As to possible topics, several ideas were mentioned, including the following:
The Role of Southern Asia in World Affairs
Intellectual and Economic Cooperation in Southe3?n Asia
The Security and Defense Needs and Possibilities of Southern Asia
What Has America to Learn from Southern Asia and Vice Versa?
At the moment I cannot think of any special source to which we might appeal
for the necessary financing. In the case of Government students, we would
probably discover that they mi lit drnw on tlieir expense accounts for travel
and hotel bills, but probably some of the best students would have no funds on
which to draw. Further, there would be expense of organization and for paying
the expenses of the few adult leaders — IPR and non-IPR — whose presence would
be important.
5302 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
From one angle it could be said that the project falls within the scope of
the Secretariat because one of the aims would be to develop IPR leadership in
Asia. On the other hand, it could be affirmed that it is equally in the interests
of the American IPR and the American people to have such leadership developed.
Perhaps you can all be thinking of the pros and cons and ways and means
and then in a few days we could get together and try and reach a consensus.
Exhibit No. 1311
4 Nov. 48.
Memorandum to: E. C. Carter,
C. Lane.
W. L. Holland.
Subject : Conference of Students from Southeast Asia.
Isn't this a project in which we could get excellent cooperation from Alger
Hiss and the Carnegie Endowment? As you know, the Endowment is reworking
its whole student program, and particularly the organization and work of the
International Relations Clubs in colleges throughout the States. Last April,
these Clui)s held their first national conference (at Endowment expense) in St.
Louis. They planned, at that meeting, to hold annual, nation-wide meetings,
with, I gather, the lively expectation that the Endowment would pay the costs.
One of the theme songs of the student conference in St. Louis was that almost
every college intl. rel. club was "using" the foreign students.
It seems to me that, rather than a conference exclusively of Southeast Asian
students (with, of course, a few experts from US faculties, etc.) it might be more
interesting and more valuable for the students (most of whom, I assume, are
graduate students (?) ), to have an opportunity to meet with leading Americans
in fields outside of their actual college and university contacts — social work
leaders ; heads of hospitals ; heads of city and small town libraries ; school
teachers ; public health oflacers ; country agricultural agents, and so on and so
forth, including business ; newspapers ; radio ; etc.
The danger of a conference exclusively, or very largely of Asian students
would be (I should imagine) the danger of continuing "international house"
relations — seeing too much of one's fellow Asians and fellow foreigners gen-
erally, and not enough of the plain, unvarnished U. S. picture.
These are very random thoughts; the only one with any value (I hope) being
that the Endowment might be called in for financial and organizing help. I
confess to being slightly appalled at the thought of organizing any more con-
ferences, when the AIPR's own program is not yet started.
Krog.
-) Exhibit No. 1312
8 A. M. 8 : 58 A. u. Tues. Dec. 7 48 Harvard Club of N. Y., President
CONANT & ECC
Conant — knows Hiss lawyer — says nothing in it — JBC Do you know him — ECO
Yes as inconceivable as the late Henry James. J. B. C. The press can break an
innocent man witliout recourse in the present Am scene. ECC Brooks House — ■
Harvard Mission to India intercoU. pride not brick & mortar — strange alliance
between Harvard and YMCA play grounds coop. cred. Student Hostels not
bricks & mortar Yale in China Hence ECC a Bias on India since 1902. Self
Govt. 400 yrs. Vast change today British prestige. Lord Louis — Rajago-
palachari Marion Dix — Strongest & most dera. Govt, in Asia Middle East
Africa— (So. Africa exception) Within framework Truman Doct India im-
mense asset to US. What increases confidence & coop, between UK & India
is an asset to US. Now India no longer British Preserve. US & India
getting together can aid UK Univ — Trade — Libraries (reminded JBC Har-
vard IPR Russia State War Navy) India Am. Conf. Dec. 1949 41/2 weeks De
Kiewist— Allen (JBC knows him) ECC asks Conant should see — JBC likes
traveling but never does his home work — Appalled at idea that being an
expert in 5 weeks. If JBC asked ECC to become an atom scientist in 5
weeks. ECC said if he was head of a great Univ. without a nuclear faculty
5 weeks miglit result in his establishing one. JBC would like to go would
he diflicult because Annual Report to Bd. Overseers Jan. 6. However, that
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5303
could be managed. But it might be better for his Provost Buck went. He
has established a precedent of taking December off. So if ECC asked JBC to
designate an alternate in case he could go JBC would suggest Buck — ECC
mentioned Don Ingalls came in Gen'l Ed on India (half course undergrad)
JBC thot Clark had impossible task Sanskrit to present day — Maybe Har-
vard should get some other Univ. to take on India — two Universities should
do India not more. Why not get revolutionized AAU to form a Committee
of the best six and make it a joint project — Tressider started revolution
now Pres. Wriston of Brown is present president (one yr. rotation) He
is always looking for new things — Let the Univ. part of this be Wriston
baby. JBC said tried interest Carnegie in a master catalog of all Univ.
courses in Int. affairs there should be far more coord. & coop, among ding
imivs. Harvard for eg. should loan or send Clark to whatever Univ. was
doing a thorough job on India. Worried about financing when Carnegie
700,000 to Harvard Russia Institute ends. Ratlier appealed to by Eisen-
hower & Stassen. Delighted to hear of new India strength & attitude to
British. Really something new & surprising like the election every one
delighted at the fall of the Polsters?? Spoke proudly of Harvard — Yenching
(ECC mentioned Fail bank JBC "please write me & I will give matter my
best consideration"— Prestige of Haiward should not mean Harvard should
do everything — Again delighted to hear of new forces in India & pleased
to be asked."
12.40 phoned Fairbank re above says Buck young first class liberal the key men
at Harvard under JBC. He might not want to leave for 5 yrs. Warm sup-
port of Fairbanks program. Fairbanks thinks Wriston's committee well
worth exploring.
Paul Herman Buck 1899, A B OSU MA Phd Harvard Sheldon Fellow
London, Paris, 25-26, Pulitzer Prize History, 9 Kirkland Place, 5 Uni-
versity Hall, Cambridge.
Henry M. Wriston, 1889, 180 Hope St., Providence.
James Bryant Conant, 1893, 1 Quincy St.
3.10 PM ECC phoned Whitney Shepardson reporting on JBC — Shepardson was
interested — also though Wriston good action man sometime second thots better
than first. ECC mentioned Buck — WHS tliot new AAU idea worth explor-
ing— WHS also said ECC should talk John Gardiner of Carnegie Corp. full of
ideas — WHS says avoid Leslie Ames — owns Minneapolis & has largest librai'y
on India in U. S. Talks your head off & other peoples also has some good
ideas but.
Exhibit No. 1314
Mat 8, 1941.
Alger Hiss, Esq,
3J,15 Volta Place NW., Washington, D. C.
Dear Hiss : Your private comments have so svipported ray own views that
they have been most gratefully received ! I think our final production will be
better as a result of our accidental conversation.
Sincerely yours,
Edward C. Carter.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS
FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1952
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act
AND Other Internal Security Laws
of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. G.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 : 30 a. m., in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Hon, Arthur V. Watkins presiding.
Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin
Mandel, research director.
Senator Watkins. The committee will be in session.
You may present such matters as you have.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, there are certain documents and affi-
davits which have come to the attention of the committee since the
last hearing and I would like all of these to go into the public record
today.
Senator Watkins. All right.
Mr. Morris. The first one is the sworn statement of Karl August
Wittfogel, dated May 29, 1952, to Senator McCarran, with attached
documents.
Senator Watkins. They may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit 1380, A, B, C, D, E,"
and is as follows :)
Exhibit No. 1380
Tel. UNiversity 4-3200, Ext. 2657
CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT
Low Memorial Library, Columbia University
Sponsored by Universitt of Washington', Seattle, In cooperation with
Columbia University
May 29, 1952.
Senator Pat McCarran,
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Internal Security Subcommittee, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator : Mr. Lattimore devotes a section of the statement that he read
before your Committee on February 26-28, 1952, to my testimony of August 7,
1951. I beg permission to correct, insofar as they concern me, the most serious
of his distortions and misrepresentations.
(1) Mr. Lattimore claims that, in my testimony, I tried to create the impres-
sion that "in the early years of our acquaintance we were friendly with each
other on the basis of mutual Communist sympathies." This is just not so.
The basis of our relations was primarily scholarly interest. As I said in my
testimony, I considered him a leading expert in the field of Inner Asiatic and
Chinese relations (Hearings of the Committee on the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, Part I : p. 328) ; and he on his part was very receptive to my ideas on
5305
88348—52 — pt. 14 26
5306 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Chinese history and society. Although our relations became "less and less
cordial" (p. 327), they were maintained in the academic field until 1947 (p. 331).
(2) This leads up to Lattimore's second misrepresentation. Allegedly I tried
to create the impression that after I "finally stopped being a Communist in 1939"
I broke off relations with him. I neither made such a claim, nor is it justified
by my testimony, which documents in considerable detail the continuation of
our relations until 1947.
(3) Lattimore calls "the flimsy statements by which Wittfogel attempted to
show that I knew he was a Communist * * * complete nonsense." And to
prove his point he invokes the very method which he so eagerly ascribes to his
critics. First he disregards my many relevant remarks, and then he tries to
create the impression that all I did to indicate that I was a Communist was to
smile at him. As my testimony states, I had indicated my political past in dif-
ferent ways to Lattimore. For instance, "all our talks about Chi the son and
Chi the father made sense only in connection with the background of the Chis'
story when it was perfectly clear that we were dealing with a man who had
this Communist background, and my relations were in the same set" (p. 301).
How well Lattimore understood my position is shown by a letter that he wrote
to Frederick V. Field immediately after a trip we had made together in the first
week of September 1935. In this letter, dated September 27 and identified as
Exhibit No. 492 in the Hearings of your Committee, Lattimore wrote : "I have
just been traveling with Wittfogel who, as you probably know and I dimly sus-
pect, is a bit of a heretic from either the Stalinist or Trotskyist point of view,
when it comes to the bourgeois feudal controversy over the nature of Chinese
society." Thus, Lattimore related my position not to any conservative, liberal,
or social-democratic views, but to the views of the two most prominent protag-
onists in the Communist movement of that day, Stalin and Trotsky ; and he felt
that my interpretation of Chinese society differed, but only "a bit," from theirs.
Lattimore's description shows him not only "dimly," but very clearly aware both
of my ideological and political orientation.
(4) Throughout his attack on me, Lattimore tries to prove that, contrary to
my alleged claims, he was no Communist. To quote him directly : "He [Witt-
fogel] has attempted to show that at that time [in 1935 and 1936] I knew he was
a Communist and must therefore have been one myself." Lattimore's assertion
that I called him a Communist again misrepresents the facts. In my testimony
I carefully distinguished between party membership and a pro-Soviet attitude.
Senator Smith asked me, "Do you know whether or not he [Lattimore] was a
full-fledged member of the party?", and I answered: "No, I do not know." But
in commenting on his political development, I did say that he showed "a con-
sistent pro-Soviet pattern," which in the earlier days was accompanied by a
somewhat "easy-going" ideological attitude (p. 309 ff.).
(5) As a scholar I am especially concerned with the analysis and interpre-
tation of Asiatic society in general and of Chinese society in particular ; and it
was just in these matters that Lattimore's views for years lagged behind per-
tinent Soviet tenets. In his statement before the Committee and also in other
recent writings, Lattimore has sought to obscure the political meaning of the
very important political issue underlying this seemingly academic argument.
In his statement, Lattimore wrote : "Wittfogel also made the ridiculous asser-
tion that the fact that I used the terms 'feudal' and 'feudal survival' in de-
scribing Asiatic societies showed that I was a Communist. His claim that
these terms are nothing but litmus papers for telling Communists from non-
Communists is ridiculous." In his attempt to confuse the issue completely,
Lattimore notes that Esther S. Goldfrank (Mrs. K. A. Wittfogel) speaks of
the survival of "feudal elements" in Japan. But if Lattimore thought that the
mention of feudalism in Japan would make my position absurd, why did he
bother with my wife's passing remark? Why didn't he cite from my writings
directly on this subject? Wasn't he familiar with these writings of mine, which
distinguish sharply between the great manaiierially bureaucratic Oriental so-
cieties of the Asiatic mainland and feudal Japan? On the contrary. Lattimore
knew these writings so well that he quoted from them at length and approvingly
in his Inner Asian Frontiers of China, published in 1940 (pp. 572, 39, 395 passim).
And more, in this same publication, while speaking of Japan's "feudal" aris-
tocracy (p. 147), Lattimore was at great pains to explain why, as the result of
"the prime factors of evolution and growth, which have been authoritativelj
classified by Wittfogel" (p. 370), China's early and not quite European type of
feudalism (pp. 3G9 ff.) was superseded by a "bureaucratically administered
.empire" (p. 375 ; cf. also pp. 368, 369, 373, 376 ff.).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5307
In March 1944, a few months before he went on his widely discussed trip to
the USSR with our then vice president, Henry A. Wallace, Lattimore in a review
of certain recent Russian writings on China still noted that Stalin's concept of
^'feudal survivals" was among the "paramount Communist theses" that "a
€ommunist writer has * * * to maintain" when dealing with China (Poct/!c
Affairs, March 1944, p. 83). And in this same article, which otherwise highly
praised the Soviet studies under review, he objected to the "emphasis on 'feudal'
thought later than the Christian era" for China; and he noted that "the social
data are somewhat obscured by loosely used terms like 'semi-feudal' and 'feudal
survivals'" (p. 86).
I cannot enter into a full explanation here as to why the concept of "feudal
.survivals" is among the "paramount Communist theses" that "a Communist
writer has * * * to maintain." SuflBce it to say that it obscures the true
natuT-e of Oriental despotism with its managerial functions and its bureaucracy
as a ruling and exploiting class. The masters of the USSR were quick to see
the devastating implications of such a historic precedent for their own despotic
class rule and the appropriateness of a "feudal" ersatz formula that one-sidedly
stresses the property issue and conveniently bides the dangers of a totalitarian
apparatus state. But they were also extremely careful not to propagandize so
explosive an argument. Thus it was that in 1935, when I began to familiarize
Latt imore v;ith the concept of Asiatic society, I myself was not yet fully aware
of all its political implications. And Lattimore, despite his pro-Soviet leanings,
upheld until 1944 a theory, which seemed only "a bit" heretic and which was
scientifically so productive.
(6) In the late 1940's Lattimore shifted to the "feudal" position, which was
being upheld with increasing rigidity by the Communist world outside the
borders of the USSR. In his statement before your Committee, he defended his
later use of the form "semifeudal" as accurate : and this he has every right
to do ; but he failed to explain his changed position — and this poses a serious
problem.
Lattimore's assertion that in my testimony I had described the terms "feudal"
and "feudal survivals" as litmus papers for telling Communists from non-Com-
munists is a complete distortion of what I said ; and his quip : "I am sorry
that I did not know the Communists had a patent on the term 'semifeudal' "
confuses the issue further. In a democracy, any student is free to employ what-
ever intei'pretation or terminology he chooses ; and a number of writers have
used "feudal" designations naively and in good faith. In my testimony I
warned expressly and strongly against "narrow word catching," and against
accusing those who applied the term "feudal" naively to agrarian Asia of having
Communist leanings (Hearings I: p. 338 ff.). But Lattimore, who knew in
the fall of 1935 that the "feudal" issue was part of the Communist controversy
over the character of Chinese society, who upheld in his main scientific work
(1940) the bureaucratic and not the feudal interpretation of imperial China,
and who recognized up to the time of his 1944 trip to the USSR that the "feudal"
interpretation of traditional China was Communist-promoted and scientifically
harmful, did not live in what I, in my testimony, called "the innocence of
paradise" (p. c3">). Lattimore must justify his new position with convincing
scientific arguments. If he fails to do so, it will certainly be viewed, as he him-
self formerly viewed this position, as an acceptance of one of the "paramount
Communist theses" in the field of Oriental studies.
(7) Lattimore has placed with your Committee several of my letters, which
were written in 1940, 1941, and 1945, and which give evidence of our friendly
personal relations and my high regard for his major scientific work. Inner
Asian Frontiers of China. By referring to his book as the "Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft (economics and society) of the oases," I was playing on the title
of my own book, Wirtschaft nnd Gesellschaft Chinas (China's Economics and
Society). This is quite understandable, for Lattimore had used my key con-
cepts in his analysis of the oases of Inner Asia, and he had also discussed the
development of Chinese society in terms of factors which, to quote him again,
"have been authoritatively classified by Wittfogel." Indeed, I had every reason
to be satisfied with a book, which in its historical and institutional analysis
so faithfully followed my ideas.
To be sure, the fact that Lattimoi-e, in the late 30's and early 40's and under
my influence, was upholding the "bureaucratic" interpretation of Asiatic society
against the Soviet-promoted "feudal" view does not mean that he was opposed
politically to a crucial Communist position. V/hen a prominent English Com-
munist told Mr. Carter in 1934 that my disagreement with the Soviet interpreta-
5308 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tion of Asiatic society was purely "academic" (Hearings I: p. 340), be ex-
pressed wliat many prominent Communists outside the Soviet Union tliought»
not only then but for years afterwards. Dr. Chi Ch'ao-ting in his Key Econontio
Areas occasionally applied the term "semifeudal" to China, but essentially he
upheld the classical "Asiatic"' view. The leading theoretician of the English
Communist Party, R. P. Dutt, in his introduction to a pamphlet entitled, Knrt
Mai'x: Articles on India, and published by the Indian Communist Party in
Bombay in 1943, consistently upheld Marx' version of the classicial non-feudal
interpretation of Asiatic society. Thus it may be said that Lattimore's later
adjustment to the "feudal" and Soviet-promoted concept is politically significant,
whereas his early adherence to the "Asiatic" interpretation, when viewed in
the context of international Communist usage of the time, merely expressed
preference for a less favored, but permissible ideological variant.
(8) The intricacies of Lattimore's ideological development explain in large
degree, but not completely, my attitude towaid him over the years. As a former
Communist, I had decided to rebuild my life on an essentially scholarly basis;
and while my evaluation of the ideas of Marx and Lenin underwent great and
continuous change, I was happy in the middle 30's to establish relations with
such persons as Lattimore, who not only shared my professional interest in
Chinese society, but who also accepted the key tenets of my interpretation.
The letters of mine which Lattimore put in the record were undoubtedly chosen
to demonstrate my esteem for his writings ; and in this respect they are extreme
rather than typical. However, they indicate the essentially scientific and per-
sonal quality of our conversations and correspondence. In our exchange of
opinions, political argument played no great part. But there were times when
it did. I attach herewith photostatic copies of four letters written me by Latti-
more in 1942, 1944, 1946, and 1947, respectively, as well as photostatic copies of
two letters that I wrote him in 1944 and 1947, respectively, all of which have a
direct bearing on the statement he made before your Committee.
(a) Lattimore's letter of April 20, 1942, shows that our relations were by no
means free of open political disagreement. (Some of our earlier arguments I
have indicated in my testimony.) In this letter Lattimore an.swers my criticism
of his stand on certain Communist problems. His argument is typical of the
attitude he has maintained toward me throughout these yeai-s, the attitude of
a man who knows little about Communism and who considers himself neither
an anti-Communist nor a pro-Communist. Like his letter of September 27, 1985,
this letter refutes his claim that he was unaware of my background : Lattimore
distinguishes me from both Browder and Freda Utley ; but these two (a then
top-ranking Communist and a former Communist) are his only points of reference.
(6) Lattimore has sought to characterize our relations in 1944 and 194.5 on
the basis of the letter I wrote him on March 4, 1945, while carefully omitting to
mention the sharp political argument we had in the fall of 1944 concerning Joseph
Barnes and the future of Korea (cf. Hearings: p. 327 ff.). Lattimore's letter
of October 3, 1944, mentions my "violent personal attack" on his "old friend" ;
and it also supplies evidence that this initial clash was followed by such a "force-
ful presentation of political opinions" on my part that he was "completely dazed."
In my letter of November 5, 1944, I criticized him for failing to answer questions
raised in my previous letter (written, as he says, on September 24, but of which
I have no copy at hand) ; and I felt there was no point in continuing the politi- al
argument since I encountered a "psychological situation, which it is probably
wise to accept as definite, at least for the time being."
(c) However, since I still considered Lattimore the leading American authority
in the Inner Asian field and since, in his book Solution in Asia, he, despite some
compromise formulations, did not embrace the feudal interpretation of Chinese
society, I endeavored to keep our political differences in the background. So on
March 4, 1945, I wrote him the "nice" letter, which I referred to in my testimony
(p. 328) and which Lattimore put into the record.
I am not proud of this letter. However, such a phrase as "an expert to end
all experts" was, if Lattimore cared to remember our previous conversations
hardly the flattering epithet he wants others to believe it was. But aside from
this, anyone who reads this letter of mine carefully, will see that I praised
Lattimore essentially, if fulsomely, for the problems he raised and not for the
solutions he offered. And while I did not elaboi'ate on our political differences,
1 expressly indicated, in the l&st sentence, that such differences did exist. Sig-
nificantly, Lattimore's statement neither quotes nor paraphrases this critical last
sentence.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5309
(d) The three letters written in 1946 and 1947 clearly refute the description
that Lattimore gave your Committee of our final break in the latter year. Says
Lattimore in his statement : "During 1947 we had a disagreement over his invita-
tion to me, at the end of 1946, to write an introduction to his History of Chinese
Society: Liao. I aslied him to be allowed to read the book before writing tlie
introduction, and I am afraid that I indicated that I would not write an introduc-
tion without being given a chance to form my own opinion about the work I was
supposed to sponsor in this way" (Galley 78).
Lattimore's story is as specific as it is false. In the first place, and as our
correspondence shows, I invited him to write the introduction not "at the end of
1946" but in 1944. In the second place, it was Lattimore who, in his letter of
December IS, 1946, reopened the subject by asking whether I still wanted his
introduction ; and in doing so, he did not mention the manuscript. Thus his
statement that his entirely reasonable request for the manuscript "didn't seem to
suit Wittfogel" is a fairy tale behind which he has hidden the real reason for our
break.
In my letter of January 24, 1947, I said politely, but firmly, that we needed
no introduction by him. Under these circumstances, I naturally made no refer-
ence to the manuscript ; and Lattimore's letter of January 29, 1947, which once
more reasserts his eagerness to write the introduction (" * * * i should
feel very much honored by such an association with such an important piece of
work"), con-ectly states the reason for my not sending him the manuscript: "To
be quite frank with you. I thought that since you had never sent me a copy of the
manuscript, or of proofs, * * * that you were hinting that you no longer
needed an Introduction by me."
In my letter of January 24, 1947, which cancelled our previous arrangement
about the introduction, I expressed the wish that our scientific relations be
maintained. But at the same time I clearly emphasized the differences in our
political attitudes. In his recent statement Lattimore falsely lays our break to
my unwillingness to let him see the Liao manuscript. But in his letter of
January 29, 1947, he showed that he was thoroughly aware of our political differ-
ences, which were indeed the sole basis for my decision.
Lattimore's account of our break as given in his statement concludes as it
began — with misrepresentation : "* * * after several letters I heard no more
from him." The fact of the matter is that in my letter of Mai'ch 19, 1947, I had
refuted his mendacious political assertion with his own writings (pp. 330 ff. ) ;
and this letter Lattimore failed to answer — on paper. And when he remarked
to me sulisequently at a meeting in Princeton : "Yon were probably pleased that
you caught me with the one about the Mikado" (p. 333), he terminated in a cheap
and ugly way what had been originally, at least on my part, a genuine and pro-
ductive friendship.
(9) At least on my part. In making this qualification, I do not mean to say
that in the middle 30's Lattimore did not have a genuinely friendly attitude
toward me. I have every reason to believe that he did. But the documents that
have come to light recently show Lattimore, from the middle 30's on, intensifying
his relations with Soviet representatives and pro-Communist Americans ; and
although Lattimore's interest in — and sympathy for — the USSR was clear
enough, he was careful not to express in conversations with me the blunt pro-
Soviet attitude that emerges from letters such as the one he wrote to E. C.
Carter on July 10, 1938. Lattimore's way of handling political disagreements
as evidenced by our correspondence permitted him to hide ideas even from so
close a scientific friend as I was. Usually he listened attentively to all argu-
ments ; and when they were critical of the USSR, as indeed they were from the
early days of our friendship on, he nodded thoughtfully, claimed lack of com-
petence, and let it go at that.
(10) These facts may make more understandable not only my own relations
to Lattimore, but also the relations to him of many others, who, since they were
probably less experienced politically than I, were even more easily misled as to
his real political acts and intentions. If I had known the full extent of Latti-
more's relations with the representatives of the USSR and with their many
foreign friends, I would surely have been more critical of him even before 1939;
and our relations would certainly have deteriorated much faster after that date.
I make this statement in order to explain rather than to excuse my own develop-
ment. And I make it about facts that were dynamic and changing rather than
static and set. Today I am not the political person I was in the 30's, although
it was during that decade that I gradually disassociated myself from the C!om-
5310 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
munist orbit. And as far as I can judge, the Lattimore of 1952 is not tlie Latti-
more of the 30's either, although his behavior during that decade, as recent
investigations have disclosed, show him already willing in the 30's to take the-
course that he has followed ruthlessly since. Realizing how Lattimore's special
and unusual talents were increasingly furthering the aims of total power, we
should examine more than this single man, who without doubt did great harm to
the free world. We should study the entire political nexus that encourages the
Lattimores, for the world that admires the Lattimores is disastrously related
to the world that breeds them.
EZael a. Wittfogel.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of May 1952.
[seal] Madeline F. Scully,
Notary Public, State of New York.
Commission expires March 30, 1953.
Exhibit 1380-A
The Johns Hopkins Univeksity
baltimore, maryland
RuxTON, Md., April 20, 1952.
Deab Karl August : First, a piece of news which I know you will be glad tO'
hear, if you have not heard of it already. T'ao Hsi-sheng escaped from Hong-
kong and is now in Chungking. This news from Liu Yu-Wan, via Hu Shih.
Second, a belated word of thanks to you and Esther for the visit with you,
which refreshed me more than I can say. I am only disappointed that Eleanor
was again unable to meet Esther.
I have just sent back the General Introduction. As I said when I saw you,
many of the marginalia are not to be taken too seriously. They are just things
that occurred to me while reading your introductory remarks, without having
the opportunity to see the main text.
In reading your remarks, in your letter, about "watchmaker" problems — the
delicate, specialized approach in contrast with the crude or amateur approach, I
think I can fairly say that I appreciate many of your criticisms, without being
able to share them. Like anybody who tries to study and understand China, I
have in recent years heard a lot about Communism. And when you learn about
Communism and China, it naturally overlaps to include, at least to a certain
extent. Communism & Russia.
Now the main point about Communism, so far as I am concerned, is that I
am no Marxist. I have never read Das Kapital, much less studied it. I have
never read Lenin. Therefore when I hear Communists presenting Commu-
nistic arguments, based on specialized "watchmaker" interpretations of Marx
& Lenin, I cannot judge them as if I were a watchmaker myself. I can only
form my own judgments on political problems and methods according to my
own non-specialized, non-Marxist qualifications.
But for the same reason, when I hear specialized anti-Communist arguments
which are also based on a specialized knowledge of Marx and Lenin, I am equally
compelled to continue following my own crude, general, non-specialized judg-
ments.
Thus, if I were to have an argument with Earl Browder, and disagree with
him, I should not necessarily consider myself an anti-Communist. But in the
same way, if I were to disagree with Freda Utley, I should not necessarily con-
sider myself a pro-Communist.
But, human nature being what it is, in the one case Browder would probably
call me an anti-Communist, while in the other, Utley would probably call me a
pro-Communist.
You are in a different classification. You should, therefore, respect those
intellectual responsibilities which are yours, because of their qualifications. But
I must equally respect my own classification.
These are very hurried thoughts while waiting to catch a train to Philadelphia.
As ever,
Owen.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5311
Exhibit No. 1380-B
Office of War Information,
Washington, October 3, 1944-
Dr. K. A. WiTTFOGEL,
Chinese History rroject, Low Memorial Lihrary,
Columbia University, Neiv York, New York.
Dear Karl August : Forgive my having taken so long to answer your letter
of September 24. I have been working mostly at home without a secretary, so
my correspondence has fallen behind.
I am really eager to see your Liao manuscript as a whole, and the additional
ptages on Qara-Khitay will be especially interesting. I shall read it with
envy as well as admiration. It seems an endless time since I have been able
to do any new work or fresh thinking on these problems which once so en-
grossed me. I sometimes get very despondent because in these years I have
accumulated a certain number of books ; but most of these I have not even
been able to read. The Liao manuscript was so promising in its early stages
that I am sure the finished work is going to be really important.
About my confining myself to conventional phrases during your brief visit
here, the fact is that I was completely dazed. I thought we were meeting as
old friends for the first time in a long period and was at a loss as to what
to say when you opened with a violent personal attack on another old friend
for whom I have as much respect as I do for you. You followed that up by
a very forceful presentation of political opinions on which I, myself, have
either no opinion or only an unformed or half-formed opinion. In such cases
I find it very difficult to be expected to endorse somebody else's strongly held
opinions, even if I know that his opinion is based on experience and knowledge.
I still cling to the privilege of what I believe is known legally as the "Scotch
Verdict'"— that is, the right to say that I don't know.
With the best regards and hoping to see you when I come up to New York.
Very sincerely,
Owen
Owen Lattimore.
November 5, 44.
Dear Owen : Your last letter did not answer the questions raised in my
letter. Please, permit me therefore not to answer your letter either. The pat-
tern of our correspondence evidently reflects a psychological situation, which
it is probably wise to accept as definite, at least for the time being.
Of course, I am glad to notice your continued interest in my work. Yes,
the Liao manuscript is completed; half of it went to Philadelphia the other
day. Although work on the Ch'ing, T'ang, Chin, and Ch'in and Han periods
may still require much effort and time, Liao ought to be out in the spring or
summer of 1945.
You remember my dream of having Professor Tawney and you write fore-
words. Tawney, who twice agreed to do so, came finally to the conclusion that
he ought to spend a couple of weeks studying the manuscript before formulating
a preface or foreword. He will not be able to devote himself so long to this
jol), so we shiill have to do without him — for Liao.
I think that there is something in his attitude which is right, but I am
equally sure that your case is different. You are much closer to our pi'ob-
lems ; you will get an over-all picture much faster. It would be fine if you
could come to New York, as you once suggested, to look the matter over. I
am aware how busy you are, but having just reread your Inner Asian Frontiers
(which are required reading in my Columbia class), I feel most vividly how
close Liao is to your life work. It would be fine if we could discuss the question
soon, here, or wherever you wish.
Tours cordially,
5312 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit 1380-0
The Johns Hopkins University
baltimore 18, maryland
Walter Hines Page School of
International Relations
OFFICE of the director
December 18, 1946.
Dr. Karl August Wittfogel,
Chinese History Project, Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Karl August: This is just an interim note to tell you both how much
I am impressed with your Liao Introduction and how warmly I appreciate
your very generous remarks about me personally. I look forward to a careful
and detailed study of the Introduction, and still more to the eventual publication
of tlie entire work.
In view of your own very careful and complete introduction, and in view
of the fact that the work of printing and publication is now so far advanced,
I assume that you do not wish me to write a special introduction. It would
look very thin and unsubstantial in comparison with your terrific assemblage
of documentation !
With warm regards for the Christmas season.
Sincerely,
Owen
Owen Lattimore.
OL/m
Exhibit No. 1380-D
January 24, 1947.
Professor Owen Lattimore,
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Maryland.
Dear Owen : Please forgive me for not answering your good letter of December
18th before this. George was here between the two holidays and I was busy
with conferences. Immediately afterwards I went to Seattle with him to con-
tribute whatever small experience I have to the crystallization and development
of his research group. He is building a very fine Far Eastern Institute.
I am glad that you like the General Introduction to our Liao volume. The
question of whether, in view of my "very careful and complete introduction," a
special introduction by you is still needed took nie by surprise. Indeed your
feeling that another introduction would suffer by comparison certainly seems
a Chinese way of being polite. However, it is true that I tried to incorporate
as many of your relevant ideas as possible, and it is good to know that you are
so well satisfied with the results. If it weren't for this, I should be even more
reluctant to accept your implied suggestion not to insist upon another intro-
duction to the General Introduction.
As you well know, you have had little time for scientific contacts with me
since your trip to the U. S. S. R. with Henry Wallace. This I regret, for I feel
that different political attitudes should not interfere with scholarly relations.
In fact, I have a great many scientific friends whose political opinions differ
strongly from mine. Surely it should be possible for us also to meet on these
terms.
Good wishes to you and Eleanor for the New Year,
Sincerely Yours,
Karl A. Wittfogel.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5313
Exhibit No. 13S0-E
The Johns Hopkins University
baltimore 18, maryland
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations
office of the directob
January 29, 1947.
Dr. Karl A. Wittfogel,
Chinese History Project, Low Memorial Library,
Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
DEAR Karl August : Many thanks for your letter of January 24.
I should not only be very glad to write an introduction for your Liao volume;
I should feel very much honored by such an association with such an important
piece of work. To be quite frank with you, I thought that since you had never
sent me a copy of the manuscript, or of the proofs, from which I could draw the
material for framing the ideas which would need to be expressed in an intro-
duction, that you were hinting that you no longer needed an introduction by
me. So I thought the graceful thing to do would be to offer, with as much
Chinese politeness as possible, not to write an introduction.
As far as concerns any difference between us in political attitudes, the adjust-
ment of the relations between us depends more on you than it does on me.
Your political opinions are much stronger than mine, and much more vehemently
expressed. I am not conscious of any awkwardness except on occasions when
you devote a great deal of energy, and some very vivid language, to trying to
convert me from opinions which I do not hold.
With all good wishes to you and Esther for 1947,
Sincerely as ever,
Owen
Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. Next is the sworn statement of Eugene Staley dated
May 27, 1952.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit 1381" and is as
follows :)
ElxHiBiT No. 1381
State of New York,
County of New York, ss:
Eugene Staley, being duly sworn, deposes and says :
My name is Alvah Eugene Staley, but my customary practice is to call myself
simply "Eugene Staley."
I am an economist. I am referred to in "Who's Who in America", Vol. 27
(1952-1953), as follows:
"Staley (Alvah), Eugene, economist; b. Friend, Neb., July 3, 1906; s.
Alvah H. and Helen Teresa (Browne) S. ; A. B., magna cum laude, Hastings
Coll., Hastings, Neb., 1925 ; Ph. D., U. of Chicago, 1928 ; study and research
(fellowship of Social Science Research Council) in Geneva, Paris, Berlin,
Kiel, London and the Balkans, 1929-31 ; m. Phyllis Eugenia Parker, Dee.
19, 1936; children — Pamela Myrick, Thomas Eugene, Asst. prof, economics,
U. of Chicago, 1931-37; asst. prof, (on leave from U. of Chicago), Grad.
Inst. Internat. Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 1934-35; asso. prof., later
prof, internat. economic relations, Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy,
1937-44, on leave for govt, service, 1943-44 ; prof, internat. economic rela-
tions Sch. of Advanced Internat. Studies and Foreign Service Training
Center, Washington, D. C, 1944-45 ; director Bay Region Div. of Am.
Council, Inst. Pacific Relations, 1945; teaching Grad. Sch. of Business,
Stanford U., 1945-46; executive dir. World Affairs Council of Northern
Calif., 1947-49; research associate. Hoover Inst, and Library on War,
Revolution and Peace, Stanford U., also cons. Stanford Research Institute,
1948-50; economist Stanford Research Institute since 1950. Government
work as economist with Administrator of Export Control, Bur. of Budget,
Dept. of State, UNRRA; mem. UNRRA mission to China, 1944; mem.
Secretariat U. N. charter conf., 1945; cons. econ. affair United Nations;
5314 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
senior economist Cuban Mission of International Bank of Reconstruction
and Development, 1950. Mem. Am. Economic Assn., American Political
Science Association, Council on Foreign Relations, American Institute of
Pacilic Relations, Foreign Policy Assn. Author or coauthor books relating
to field since 1930. Home: 455 Seale Av., Palo Alto, Calif. Office: Stan-
ford Research Inst., Stanford, Calif."
At the hearing on September 25, 1951, conducted by the Subcommittee of the
Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate To Investigate The Adminis-
tration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Mr.
Kenneth Colegrove mentioned my name in the following extract from the testi-
mony (p. 920, Printed Record of the Hearings of the Subcommittee Investigat-
ing The Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3) :
"The Chairman. You have named certain people who were present at
that meeting as belonging to that particular group that favored Communist
China and the Kremlin. Have you named all of them that you can recall
who belonged to that group?
"Mr. Colegrove. I see one other name I should have thought of, Mr.
Benjamin H. K.zer, who is very decidedly of that group; sometimes Eugene
Staley, Professor Staley."
I have never belonged to any such group and the imputation that at any
time I was actuated by anything except a strong concern for the national inter-
est of the American people, and in a manner to defeat the aims of the Kremlin
and its Communist leadership, is completely false. I have never been a Com-
munist, or a member of the Communist Party, or a fellow-traveler, and any
implication or suggestion that I have been is completely untrue and does me
irreparable damage.
Mr. Colegrove testified that in an advisory conference of Far Eastern specialists
held by the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, "one group was very
obviously pro-American in its thinking, put America first, that is, foreign policy
must serve the national interest of the American people," while another group
"tended to be sympathetic to Communistic China and very, very considerate of
the Kremlin." In answer to a question by Senator Ferguson whether this latter
group "were favoring, in your opinion, the Communist line rather than the good
interests of the United States of America?" Mr. Colegrove replied, "That was
my impression." The testimony continued :
"Senator Ferguson. From what was said?
"Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
"Senator Eastland. Did they advocate economic aid to Communist China?
"Mr. Colegrove. Yes, very, very strongly.
"Senator Ferguson. And recognition of Communist China?
"Mr. Colegrove. Immediate recognition of Communist China, and were very
much opposed to a Pacific pact."
Mr. Colegrove named a number of participants who, in his opinion, comprised
this group and, in answer to the Chairman's question, "Have you named all of
them that you can recall who belonged to that group?" he added:
"Mr. Colegrove. * * * sometimes Eugene Staley, Professor Staley." (Printed
record of the Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3, pp. 919, 920,
921.)
I desire to make two points, the first with reference to my part in the con-
ference itself, the second on my general attitude toward Communism.
First, my remarks in the conference were based on a very strong concern for
the national interest of the American people and were distinctly directed toward
finding ways to defeat the aims of the Kremlin and its Communist leadership in
China and all over the world. This is plainly shown by the stenographic tran-
script published subsequent to Mr. Colegrove's testimony. Mr. Colegrove himself
apparently recognized this fact when he had an opportunity to read the tran-
script, for he testified again on October 12, 1951, and this time omitted to men-
tion my name, though he claimed that his original testimony with respect to
various other i)eople was supported by the transcript.
Permit me to cite the following pages of the transcript, which report my
main statements in the conference. References are to the subcommittee's printed
Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 5, Appendix.
(P. 1562.) I asked a question of Mr. George Kennan, prefacing it with a state
ment that Marxist doctrine had predicted proletarian revolutions in the most
advanced capitalist countries and that this had been "a great failure as a fore-
cast," but that now apparently the Russians had shifted the emphasis in their
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5315
strategic thinking and planning to the so-called backward countries like China
and the rest of Asia.
(P. 1576.) I proposed that we analyze "what are the intei-ests of the United
States in relation to China?" After stating a number of possible formulations,
I said, "expressing my own view" our "dominant concern' should be the interest
which I had described as "whether or not China's regime is tied to the apron
strings of Russia," and I added that "what we are mainly interested in is (that)
the power of the Soviet Union should not be augmented by having subservient
regimes in China and all through Asia. * * *"
( P. 159.5. ) I referred to Mr. Stassen's proposal for a greatly stepped-up posi-
tive program of American economic aid to strengthen non-Communist Asia
against Communism as "a liroad and constructive concept." (The rest of the
first sentence or two is mixed up in the reporting, but this much is clear, and this
was my meaning.) Then I asked him whether "maybe we haven't more to gain
from the standpoint of American interests" by using United Nations asencies
whenever we can for this sort of effort, thus lessening the charges of "imperial-
ism" against us and "setting up as against a Marxist internationalism the United
Nations type of more voluntary internationalism and doing everything we can
to boost that * * *?"
(Pp. 1620-21.) I suggested measures to improve the preparation of the per-
sonnel we send to Asia on Point Four operations, urging that in this way we
could "derive very great political values for the United States." Specifically, I
recommended that Point Four personnel should be briefed on political matters,
"the kind of attitudes they will find towards the United States as they get to
talking with people, the kind of attitudes they will find toward Russia, what the
Russian propaganda has been in the area * * * At least so they will be
informed so that in a cafe one day if it is thrown up to them that the United
States has consistently tried to dominate the country and a lot of misinforma-
tion is involved in it at least they know some of the elementary answers to it."
(P. 1641.) I opposed economic aid to Communist China, recommending instead
a policy of "judicious disinterestedness." I concluded : "In other words, help
the countries more that are more friendly to us."
(Pp. 1666-7). On the question of recognition of the Communist regime in
China, my statement was : "In general, the view that Mr. Herod first expressed,
and expressed very ably, seems right to me, so I am not going to discuss that
any more." Mr. William R. Herod, President of the International General Elec-
tric Company, had not favored immediate recognition, but had advised recogniz-
ing if and when the Communists attained the positions of having complete
control of the machinery of state, "unless in the meantime there has been some
other factor" (p. 1659). I went on to consider public opinion in relation to
possible recognition and quoted in that connection four points made by Mr.
Roger Lapham on his return to San Francisco from his ECA mission in China.
I quoted these points from a resolution that had just been formally adopted by
the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. The fourth of these points advised
"acceptance of the fact that we may soon have to recognize, in such areas as
they control, the Communist government as the de facto government, and be pre-
pared to recognize it whether we like it or not," just as we had found it expedi-
ent to recognize the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and other countries whose regimes
we do not particularly admire.
My own view at the time on the recognition problem was based principally
on two thoughts: (1) that nonrecognition is not a very effective weapon, and
at the same time has the effect of cutting us off from possibly useful sources of
information and means of action on behalf of American citizens, and (2) that
recognition might have some value in holding open the possibility of an eventual
defection of the Chinese Communist regime from the Kremlin, as had hap-
pened with Tito in Yugoslavia. The merits of these tactical views are, of
course, debatable ; but to suggest, as Mr. Colegrove seemed to do, that persons
willing to contemplate recognition of Communist China under the conditions of
the autumn of 1949 (before the Communist aggression in Korea) were there-
fore "sympathetic" to Communist China and the Kremlin and not "pro-Ameri-
can" is quite unwarranted. Imputations of this kind definitely weaken our
side, because they tend to prevent full consideration of any tactics except those
dictated by the most simple emotional responses.
Second, as to my general attitude, I believe deeply and honestly in the prin-
ciples of freedom on which the American government and the American eco-
nomic and social system are founded, and I am decidedly opposed to the phil-
osophy, aims, and practices of Communism and Communist regimes. The Com-
5316 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
munist world movement is in my view the greatest menace in the woi-ld today,
both to America and to the broad interests of humanity. It seems superfluous
to add, though I am glad to do so for the record, that I have never been a
member of the Communist Party and have never sought to advance the Com-
munist cause of propaganda through "front" activities or in other ways. Far
from looking to the Communist "line" for guidance in my conclusions as a
social scientist or in my efforts to assist in public education on world affairs,
I have consistently opposed key Communist dottrines and have on numerous
crucial issues advocated policies such as no one "considerate of the Kremlin"
could possibly advocate. This is true not only lately but over the years. Spe-
cifically :
a. My book War and the Private Investor: A Stiidy in the Interrelations of
Diplomacy and International Private Investment, published in 1935, reaches
conclusions directly contrary to the Marxist-Leninist dogma on issues very im-
portant to Communists.
b. In 1940-41, before Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the Communist
line was that the war in Europe was an "imperialist war," and American Com-
munists and fellow-travelers were urging America to stay neutral. I was pub-
licly urging that American interests would be gravely j 'opardized by a Hitler
victory and that we should intervene to any extent necessary to prevent it.
(See my article, "The Myth of the Continents," Foreign Affairs, April, 1941.)
c. I have strongly supported, by public speeches or writings, the Truman Doc-
trine for containment of Communist aggression, the Marshall Plan, the United
States proposals for international control of atomic energy, the North Atlantic
Treaty and the military organ'zation based on it, the United Nations resistance
to Communist aggression in Korea, and the present rearmament program of
the United States and its allies. All of these things are anathema to Commu-
nists and those who follow the Communist line.
Eugene Staley.
Sworn to before me this 27th day of May, 1952.
[seal] Thomas P. Dunn,
Notary Public, State of New York.
Commission Expires March 30, 1954.
Mr. Morris. I would now like to introduce a sworn statement by
Edward C. Carter, dated June 10, 1952, entitled "A personal view of
the IPE 1925-1952 by E. C. Carter.'^
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1382" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1382
A Personai, View of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925-1952
(By Edward C. Carter)
TABLE OF CONTENTS p
1. Foreword 5.316
2. The Institute of Pacific Relations — What It Is? 5317
3. How the Organization Started 5.317
4. What Countries Have Had Members Councils in the IPR 5318
5. The Role of the International Conferences 5319
6. Chairmen of National Groups at International Conferences 5319
7. Observers at Conferences . 5322
8. Binational Conferences 5322
9. Research — a Primary Function 5326
10. The Inquiry Series 5327
11. The Institute Publishes Magazines 5328
12. A Variety of Educational Projects 5330
13. The Role of Edward C. Carter 5330
14. Training Personnel 5331
15. How the Institute Is Financed 5332
16. Eminent People Were Active in the IPR 5333
17. A Tribute 5334
18. Conclusion 5335
FOREWORD
Here recorded are some personal impressions of the important events in
the story of the Institute of Pacific Relations over the past twenty-seven years.
The IPR record is one of which thousands of citizens in this and other coun-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5317
tries are proud. It is indeed the record of an unusual organization. It is a
society whicli, by committing itself to painstaking and objective scliolarsliip, has
enlisted the enthusiasm of a great company of men and women from business,
banking, academic, and professional life in an unfolding process of research,
discussion, and publication.
It is an organization that has attracted mature minds from many countries
that were united in a common belief. They held that the process and power
of adding painstakingly to the world store of knowledge about the Pacific area
would gradually remove the misunderstanding and ignorance that has cur-
tained off from the Western world that half of mankind which dwells in Asia.
Although tlie record which follows contains many pages, it is actually a
severely condensed account. I believe it to be an accurate one, however. If it
were extended many times, it would be found to be rich in detail and grounded
in fact. Nevertheless it would differ sharply from the muddled story unfolded
in the proceedings of Senator McCarran's Subcommittee. So replete have the
hearings been with half truths and innuendo that those familiar with the actual
work of the Institute are convinced that the Subcommittee's lawyer has at-
tempted to prove the IPR subversive, rather than objectively to provide Senator
McCarran and his associates with the true facts concerning the organization
and its real record and achievements.
This nay or may not have been deliberate. There is no doubt, however, that
the attorney has concentrated on the Institute's correspondence files rather than
its publications — on letters and informal inter-staff memoranda which were a
necessary and legitimate part of its efforts to present all sides of a given
study, rather than the study itself. In short, he has put the spotlight on the
macliinery of the organization, while virtually ignoring the finished product.
Here I shall endeavor to tell the story of the Institute — the story of the final
product as well as the machinery. This is the record of events as I saw them as
an IPR officer for many years. But it does not tell the whole story. It should
be read in connection with the Institute's periodical reports, its published output
and the letters and statements presented to the Subcommittee by William L.
Holland, John K. Fairbank, Gerard Swope, Owen Lattimore, Jerome D. Greene,
William W. Lockwood, and the many letters from Americans of eminent scholar-
ship and integrity who have a first-hand knowledge of Asia and a long-time
acquaintance with the IPR and its publications.
215 East 72nd Stkeet, New York, N. Y., April 23, 1952.
The Institute of Pacific Relations
What It Is
The Institute of Pacific Relations is a non-partisan, non-governmental organi-
zation with member councils at present in ten countries which have an interest
in Asia. Its purpose is to carry on research and educational activities designed
to create an informed public opinion in all countries on the problems of develop-
ment of the Far East and the Pacific area.
Hoiv The Organization Started
The Institute grew out of a dawning awareness after World War I of the need
of an intelligent understanding of Far Eastern affairs. There were few non-
governmental agencies dedicated to this subject. Two — the Royal Institute of
International Affairs in London and the Council of Foreign Relations in New
York — had grown out of private discussions by members of the British and
American delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. A third — the Foreign
Policy Association — had begun to hold meetings in New York.
It was already apparent, however, that these groups were going to concen-
trate primarily on European issues. The League of Nations and the other offi-
cial international bodies (all of vv^hich had their headquarters in Europe) like-
wise were focussing major attention on European problems. Even when situa-
tions in other parts of the world were considered, there was an almost inevitable
tendency to look at them through Eui'opean eyes.
Naturally this was viewed with concern in Far Eastern countries. It was not
long before a group of prominent business men, educators and YMCA leaders in
Hawaii began to protest that the I'acific area was being overlooked. Keenly
aware of the vast new forces upsurging in Asia, these men expressed a need for
an organization which would concentrate on the needs and developments of the
far-flung region washed by the Pacific Ocean.
By 1924 this group in Hawaii had associated with itself Chinese, Japanese,
Canadians, mainland Americans and others. Out of their efforts, the IPR was
5318 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
born. It was organized formally at an international conference held in Honolulu,
in 1925. The Hawaiian group had been inspired by YMCA leaders and the con-
ference had been originally organized by YMCA people from Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines and the United States.
But before it convened, there had been a demand for a more representative
membership, and the YMCA leaders had farseeingly relinquished their spon-
sorship and agreed to cooperate in the development of the Institute on a broad
and wholly secular basis.
What Countries Were Invited To Join The Institute?
The founders of the IPR in Honolulu and their later associates in the coun-
tries around the Pacific not only insisted from the first on the Institute's being
nongovernmental ; they also insisted that it should be completely non-partisan,
providing a platform for the expression of the widest possible variety of view-
points. For example, the Honolulu leaders urged that trade unionists be in-
cluded among the conference members so that labor's opinions might be heard
during the deliberations. At the same time, efforts were made to get the at-
tendance of bankers, journalists and scholars in China, Japan, the Philippines,
Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
By 1927, leaders from these seven countries had joined with Americans in
deciding to enlist scholars, business men and others from additional countries
with interests in the Pacific, in the work of the Institute. At first, a few of the
Americans had hesitated about inviting Europeans to join the Institute, on the
ground that membership should be limited to groups in those countries whose
shores were washed by the Pacific Ocean. Those who took a broader view main-
tained that the problems of the Pacific could not be studied scientifically unless
help were received from all countries which exercised sovereignty in the Pacific
area. The latter concept prevailed and it was agreed to establish contacts with
people and institutions in the United Kingdom, Holland, France and the U. S. S. R.
Although Portugal exercised sovereignty in Macao and Timur, no effort was made
to enlist any of its citizens in the Institute's effort.
The Institute's leaders, recognizing that Soviet Russia's shores were also
washed by the Pacific and that its influence in Asia and the Pacific area might
have great potentiality, considered it desirable to seek collaboration of Oriental
research scholars in Russia. Thus it was that the first General Secretary, Mr.
J. Merle Davis (formerly a YMCA secretary in Japan), in connection with visits
to England, France, and Holland was sent to Moscow in the winter of 1927-1928,
in the hope of securing scholarly cooperation in Russia, and the formation of a
Soviet IPR. This visit was followed by sending the Institute's Conference Sec-
retary, Charles F. Loomis, to Moscow in the summer of 1928, and a little later,
Dr. J. B. Condliffe, the International Research Secretary (at that time a New
Zealand citizen).
The leaders of the IPR, not only those in Hawaii, but eminent Americans on
the mainhmd, like Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene, Roland W. Boyden,
Chester H. Kowell, Joseph P. Chamberlain, Carl L. Alsberg, and Norman F.
Coleman, maintained that it was of the utmost importance to have the fullest
possible Soviet collaboration. This was generally the position held by the rep-
resentatives of all of the other countries participating in the IPR. It was because
of this that, following the visits to Russia by Mr. Davis, Mr. Loomis, and Dr.
Condliffe, I made my visits to Russia and stimulated others in the IPR to do so.
My first visit to Moscow was to accompany Mr. Jerome D. Greene (then a partner
of Lee, Higginson & Co. ) who was then chairman of the American IPR. We were
seeking Soviet scholarly cooperation in the IPR while en route to the Kyoto
Conference in 1929. Among those who accompanied us were Mr. Boyden, for-
merly United States Observer with the Reparations Commission, and Joseph
P. Chamberlain of Columbia University.
In 1948, IPR Councils were formed in India and Pakistan.
A month before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese IPR ceased contact with the
Institute and ordered the immediate return of the Japanese member of the
International Secretariat. After the war, the Japanese IPR was reorganized
and in 1949 permitted to renew its membership.
Although contacts were established in 1927-1928 with Soviet Oriental scholars,
an active Soviet IPR was not formed until the winter of 1934-1935. This
Council contributed to the support of the Pacific Council in the years 1935, 1936,
1937, 1938 and 19.39. Its leadership suffered greatly during World War II and
the Secretariat's last contact with the Soviet IPR was in 1945.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5319
The Role of the IPR's International Conferences
Between 1925 and 1950, the IPR sponsored ten international conferences,
usually of a fortnijiht's duration, as follows : Honolulu, 1927 : Kyoto, Japan, 1929 ;
Hangchow and Shanghai, 1931 ; Banff, Canada, 1933 ; Yosemite National Park,
1936; Virginia Beach, Va., 1939; Mt. Tremblant, Canada, 1942; Hot Springs, Va.,
1945; Stratford-at-Avon, England, 1947; Lucknow, India, 1950.
Here outstanding Far Eastern authorities and men and women of different
professions from many countries gathered to discuss the problems of the Pacific
area, freely and informally. To insure a frank give-and-take and the widest
possible expression of views, newspaper reporters acting as reporters were
excluded from the discussions. No delegate need hesitate to si)eak lest his
remarks conflict with some oflScial policy of his native land. Not the least
among the values of IPR conferences was the fact that they were nonofficial
private meetings where experts could exchange opinions without any fear of
press misinterpretation.
Months of preparation preceded each conference. Research monographs were
prepared on each question on the agenda. The conference discussions were care-
fully recorded and a final report published.
The position of the national groups at the conferences was unusual, as it
was also in the membership of the national councils in each country. The public
had become accustomed to conferences of bankers. Chambers of Commerce con-
ferences, newspaper gatherings, trade-union conventions and a great number of
assemblies of college and university professors. The IPR, in its membership and
in the groups attending its conferences, attempted to cross these lines. Its
goal was unique. It aimed to draw in to distinctive academic discussions and
research the practical experience of members of all the foregoing groups. The
conference personnel consisted of academic leaders, businessmen, bankers,
editors, trade-unionists, women's organizations. Here was something new,
stimulating and highly productive. Concrete evidence of this important innova-
tion will be found in the following lists of those who served as chairmen of the
national council groups at the international conferences and in a sample list of
the personnel of a single binational conference at Delhi in India.
Conference Chairmen of National Member Groups
It should be emphasized that the lists that immediately follow are simply the
chairmen of the national groups. The total attendance at these conferences
from all the national councils ranged from 150 to 250 members.
HONOLULU, HAWAII — 1927
Hon. F. W. Eggleston, Australia. Formerly Attorney General and Minister of
Railways, State of Victoria, and subsequently Australian Ambassador in China
and the United Stares. (Australian group)
General Sir Arthur Carrie, G. C. M. G., K. C. B., principal and vice chancellor,
McGill University, Montreal. Formerly general officer commanding the Cana-
dian Corps in France during the First World War. (Canadian group)
David Z. T. Yui, general secretary of the National Committee of the Young Men's
Christian Association of China, Shanghai. (Chinese group)
Sir Frederick Whyte, K. C, S. I., formerly president of the National Indian Legis-
lative Assembly. (British group)
Frank C. Atherton, vice president and manager. Castle & Cooke Ltd., chairman
Central Advisory Committee, Honolulu. (Hawaii group)
Hon. Masataro Sawayanagi, member of the House of Peers; president of the
Imperial Educational Association, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
Uck Kym Yu, dean and professor of Law, Chosen Christian College, Seoul.
(Korean group)
Walter Nash, secretary of the New Zealand Labor Party, Wellington. (New
Zealand group)
Francisco Benitez, dean of the College of Education, University of the Philippines,
Manila. (Philippine group)
Ray Lyman Wilbur, President of Stanford University, California. (U. S. group)
KYOTO, JAPAN 1929
Hon. F. W. Eggleston, Australia. (See above.) (Australian group)
Rt. Hon. Viscount Hailsham, formerly Lord Chancellor. (British group)
Hon. Newton W. Rowell, K. C, President of the Privy Council of the Government
of Canada and subsequently Chief Justice of Canada. (Canadian group)
5320 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Dr. David Z. T. Yui. (See above.) (Chinese group)
Inazo Nitobe, Member of House of Peers, formerly Under Secretary General of
League of Nations. (Japanese group)
W. B. Matheson, Government Representative at International Agricultural Con-
ference at Rome. (New Zealand group)
Conrado Benitez, Dean, School of Business Administration. University of the
Philippines. (Philippine group)
Jerome D. Greene, Lee, Higginson & Co., New York. Subsequently, Secretary of
the Harvard University Corporation. (U. S. group)
HANGCHOW AND SHANGHAI, CHINA — 1931
Tristan Buesst, Writer, Melbourne. (Australian group)
J. Mackintosh Bell, Mining Engineer, Almonte, Ontario. (Canadian group)
Chang Poling, President, Nankai University, Tientsin. (Chinese group)
W. G. S. Adams, Professor of Politics, Oxford. (British group)
Jerome D. Greene, Lee, Higginson & Co., New York. (U. S. group)
Inazo Nitobe, Member, House of Peers, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
J. E. Strachan, Headmaster, Rangiora High School. (New Zealand group)
Rafael Palma, President, University of the Philippines, Manila. (Philippines
group)
BANFF, CANADA — 1933
Ernest Scott, Professor of History, University of Melbourne. (Australian group)
Edgar J. Tarr, K. C, Attorney, Winnepeg. Later, President of Monarch Life
Assurance Company, and Director of the Bank of Canada. (Canadian group)
Hu Shih, Professor of Philosophy, National Peking University. Later, President
of Peking University, and Chinese Ambassador in Washington. (Chinese
group)
Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, G. C. B., G. B. E., M. P., later Lord Samuel.
(British group)
Inazo Nitobe, Member, House of Peers, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
J. H. Boeke, Professor of Eastern Economics, University of Leyden. The
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies group)
Hon. Walter Nash, M. P. Later, Finance Minister of the Government of New
Zealand. (New Zealand group)
Judge Manuel Camus, Member, Philippine Senate. (Philippine group)
Hon. Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of War. (U. S. group)
TOSEMITE NATIONAL PARK, TT. S. — 1936
Hon. W. F. Eggleston. (See above.) Australian groun
Hon. Newton W. Rowell, K. C, Member, Imperial War Cabinet, 1918. (See
above.) Canadian group
Hu Shih. (See above.) Chinese group
Albert Sarraut. Former Governor-General of Indo-China ; Former Prime Min-
ister of France. (French group)
•Tadao Yaniakawa, Member of House of Peers. (Japanese group)
<G. A. Dunlop, Managing Director, Netherlandsch Indische Handelsbank. (Nether-
lands-Netherlands-Indies group)
Horace Belshaw, Professor of Economics, Auckland University College. (New
Zealand group)
-Conrado Benitez. (See above.) Philippine group
The Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, M. P. Formerly and subsequently First Lord of
the Admiralty. (British group)
€arl L. Alsberg. Director, Food Reseai'ch Institute, Stanford University. (U. S.
group)
V. E. INIotylev. Director, Institute of the Great SQviet World Atlas ; Professor,
Institute of National Economy, Moscow. (U. S. S. R. group)
VIRGINIA BEACH, TT. S. — 1939
Jack Shepard. Formerly, Hon. Secretary, Australian Institute of International
Alfairs, 1936-38. (Australian group)
J. W. Dafoe, Editor in Chief, Winnipeg Free Press; Chancellor of University of
Manitoba. (Canadian group)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5321
VV. W. Yen. Foi-merly Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador to tlae United States, 1931 ; Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., 1933-36.
(Cliinese group)
J. B. Condliffe. Formerly Professor of Commerce, London School of Economics,
and a member of the Economic staff of the League of Nations. (New Zealand
group)
Camilo Osias. Former Resident Commissioner of the Philippines in Washing-
ton: Chairman of the Philippine Educational Commission Abroad. (Philii>-
pine group)
George H. Blakeslee. Formerly special assistant to the American Legation,
Peiping, and Counselor to American Member of Lytton Commission ; Professor
of History and International Relations at Clark University and at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy. (U. S. group)
MONT TREMBLANT, CANADA 19 42
R. J. F. Boyer. Member of the Australian Broadcasting Commission since Jan-
uary, 1940. President, Graziers' Federal Council of Australia. (Australian
group)
Edgar J. Tarr. (See above.) Canadian group
Sao-Ke Alfred Sze. Acting Chairman, China Defense Supplies, Inc., Washington.
Former Ambassador to London and Washington. Head of the Chinese Delega-
tion to the Washington Conference, 1921-22. Chief Delegate to the Assembly
of the League of Nations, 1931. (Chinese group)
Paul Rivet. Formerly Professor at the Paris Museum and Head of the Musee de
I'Homme, Paris, 1928-40. (Fighting France group)
Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, K. C. S. I. Indian Delegate, Nine Power Conference,
Brussels, 1937. Member, Imperial Economic Committee, London, 1936-39.
Commerce Member, Government of India, 1932-42. Member, British War
Cabinet and Paciiic War Council, London, 1942. (Indian group)
Younghill Kang. Economic Analyst, Board of Economic Warfare. (Korean
group )
Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat. Director of the Department of Education and
Public Worship. (Netherlands-Netherlands Indies group)
Walter Nash. New Zealand Minister to the United States and New Zealand
Member of the Pacific War Council, Washington. New Zealand Minister of
Finance since December, 1935. Deput Prime Minister since 1940. (New
Zealand group)
Joaquin M. Elizalde. Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the U. S.
Member, Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs, 1937. Philippine
Delegate to the International Sugar Conference, London, 1938-42. (Philippine
group)
M. R. Seni Pramoj. Free Thai Minister of the United States. (Thailand).
The Lord Hailey, G. C. S. I.,G. C. M. G. C. I. E. Member of the Indian Council
Service, 189.5-193r». Governor of the Punjab, 1924-28, and of the United Prov-
inces, 1928-30 and 1931-34. Director of the African Research Survey. (British
group )
Philip C. Jessup. Chairman, Pacific Council, IPR; Professor of International
Law, Columbia University. Assistant Solicitor, U. S. Department of State,
1924-2.J. Leval Adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Later, U. S.
Ambassador-at-Large. (U. S. group)
HOT SPRINGS, VA., U. S. A. — 1945
Boyer, R. J. F. (See above.) Australian group
Wallace, Malcolm. Principal Emeritus of University College, University of
Toronto. (Canadian group)
Chiang, Mon-Lin. Formerly Minister of Education, Chancellor, National Peking
University. Now, Member, Executive Council, National Southwest Associated
University; President, Chinese Red Cross. (Chinese group)
Naggiar, Paul Emile. Ambassadeur de France. Formerly Ambassador in JIos-
cow and previously Ambassador in Nanking and Hankow. (French group)
Pandit, Mrs. V. L. Ex-Minister for Public Health, Local Self-Governmeut,
United Provinces. Later, Indian Ambassador to the U. S. (Indian group)
DeYoung. Henry C. Member, Korean Delegation to Disarmament Conference,
1921. Member, Korean Commission, Washington, D. C. (Korean group)
88348— 52— pt. 14 27
5322 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOiSTS
Visman, Frans H. Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam
and Curacao in New York since 1943. Netlierlands Indies Civil Service,
1910-32; Governor of Menado (Celebes), Netherlands Indies, 1932-35; Com-
missioner for Reforms in the internal administration of the Netherlands Indies,
Batavia, 1935 ; INIember of the Council for the Netherlands Indies, Batavia,
1936-41. (Netherlands-Netherlands Indies group)
Belshaw, Horace. (See above.) New Zealand group.
Zafra, Urbano A. Economic Adviser to the President of the Philippines ; Mem-
ber, War Cabinet; Member, Filipino Rehabilitation Commission; Chairman,
Technical Committee of the President of the Philippines ; Alternate Member,
Council of UNRRA ; United Nations Food and Agriculture Interim Commis-
sion. (Philippine group)
Pramoj, M. R. Seni. (See above.) Thailand group
McFadyean, Sir Andrew. His Majesty's Treasury, 1910-19. Director of the
P. litish North Borneo (Chartered) Company. Secretary of the British Delega-
tion, Reparation Commission, 1920-22. General Secretary to the Reparation
Commission, 1922-24 and to the Dawes Committee 1923-24. Commissioner of
Controlled Revenue, Berlin, 1924-30. (British group)
Jessup, Philip C. ( See above. ) U. S. group
STRATFOKD-ON-AVON, ENGLAND 19 47
Ross, Ian Clunies. Excutive Officer, Australian Council for Scientific and In-
dustrial Re.search. (Australian group)
Mclnnis, Edgar. Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto. (Ca-
nadian group)
Chiang, INIonlin. (See above.) Chinese group
Gourou, Pierre. Professor of Geography, College de France, Paris. (French
group)
Belshaw, Cyril. Formerly Administrative Officer, British Solomon Islands.
(New Zealand group)
McFadyean, Sir Andrew. (See above.) British group
Gilchrist, Huntington. Executive, American Cynamid Co., New York ; con-
sultant on Trusteeship to United Nations ; League of Nations Secretariat, 1919-
28. (U. S. group)
LUCKNOW, INDIA — 19 50
Ed.srar Mclnnis. (See above.) Canadian group
Ilriday Nath Kunzru. President, Indian Council of World Affairs; President,
Servants of India Society; Member of Parliament. (Indian group)
Koniakichi Matsuoka. INIember, Nippon House of Representatives ; President,
Japanese Federation of Trade Unions. (Japanese group)
A. B. A. Haleem. Vice Chancellor, Sind University, Karachi ; Chairman of Coun-
cil of Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. (Pakistani group)
Quirino G. Gregorio. Executive Secretary, Philippine IPR. (Philippine group)
Sir George Sansom. Professor of Japanese Studies and Director, East A.sian
Institute, Columbia University; Chairman, International Research Committee,
IPR. (British group)
Harold H. Fisher. Chairman, Hoover Institute and Library; Professor of His-
tory, Stanford University, California ; Representative of Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, New York. (U. S. group)
Hadji Agoes Salini. Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta ; former
Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Indonesian group)
Observers at Conferences
In addition to members from the national councils, a number of people from
other organizations were invited as observers. Frequently these included people
from the International Labor Organization, the League of Nations, the Carnegie
Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation. Later, observers attended from the
United Nations Seci-etariat and the following United Nations agencies: United
JNations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Children's
Emergency Fund.
Binational Conferences
Binational conferences attended by businessmen, journalists and scholars, from
British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, have been held almost every year,
alternating between Canada and the U. S. A significant binational conference
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5323
(India-America) was held in Delhi iu December 1949. Among the 37 members
of the Indian group were :
Kunzru. H. N. President of the Savants of India Society, and member of the
Constituent Assembly since 1947
Aiyer, Sir C. P. Ramaswami. Former Dewan (Prime Minister) Travancore
State
Durga Das. Joint Editor, HindKstan Times, New Delhi
Gadgil, D. R. Economist ; Director, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics,
Poona
Kabir, Huamyun. Educationist; Joint Educational Adviser to the Government
of India. Educated at Calcutta and Oxford. Secretary, Oxford Union Society
and Indian representative on the International Students Union
Lokanathan, P. S. Economist, Member, Executive Committee, Indian Council of
World Affairs. Professor of Economics, University of Madras and E'litor,
Eastern Economist. At present, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East, Bangkok
Pattani, A. P. Formerly Dewan (Prime Minister) of Bhavnagar State
Prasad, P. S. N. Economist. Director, Balance of Payments Division, Reserve
Bank of India, Bombay
Ranga. N. G. Principal, Indian Peasants Institute, Nidubrolu
Rao, V. K. R. V. Economist. Director, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi
University
Setalvad, M. C. Lawyer. Former Advocate-General to the Government of India.
Leader, Indian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 1949
Shri Ram, Sir. Industrialist
Srinivasan. C. R. Journalist. President, All-India Newspaper Editors' Con-
ference, 1949-1950
Tara Chand. Educationist
Trivedi, H. M. Deputy Manager, Scindia Steam Navigation Company Limited,
Bombay
Vakil, C. N. Director, University School of Economics and Sociology, Bombay
and Univer.sity Professor of Economics, Bombay University
Todh Raj. Banker
The members of the American group were :
Atherton. J. B. Vice President, Mutual Telephone Company, Honolulu
Ames, C. L. Ames Library of South Asia, St. Paul, Minnesota
Baker, I. F. Director, Vice President and Treasurer, Westinghouse Electric
International Company, New York
Carter, E. C. Provost, New School for Social Research, New York. Member,
Executive Committee, American Institute of Pacific Relations
Compton, A. H. Chancellor, Washington University, St. Louis
Darden, C. W. Jr. President, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.
EUiston, H. Editor, the Washington Post
Fisher, H. H. Chairman, Hoover Institute and Library
Fosque, J. D. Caltex (India) Limited
Hancher, V. M. President State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa
James, F. C. Principal and Vice Chancellor, McGill University, Montreal,
Canada
Johnson, C. S. President, Fisk University, Nashville, Tennessee
Kizer, B. H. Lawyer. Graves, Kiser & Graves, Spokane and Seattle, Washing-
ton
Lamb, Beatrice P. Editor, The United Nations News
Lattimore, O. Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
The Johns Hopkins University
Lewis, Vinita V. Cliild Welfare Officer, International Refuge Organization,
U. S. Zone, Germany, since 194S
Lindeman, E. C. Professor of Social Philosophy, New York School of Social
Work, Columbia University, New York
Malcott. D. W. ('hHiic('ll<!r, University of Kansas, Lawrence
]\Iandelhanm, D. G. I'rofe.'^sor of Anthopology, University of California
Murphy, J. M. Assistant Vice President and Chief, Far Eastern Section, For-
eign Division. Bankers Trust Company, New York
Opler, M. E. Professor of Anthropology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
Parton, Margaret. Correspondent for India and Pakistan, Netv York Herald
Tribune
Potter, P. B. Dean, Graduate Division. School of Social Sciences and Public
Affairs, The American University, Washington, D. C.
5324 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Rivers, W. F. Manager, New Delhi branch of the Standard Vaccum Oil Company
Shaw, G E. Manager, Overseas Industrial Relations Department, Standard Oil
Company
Straus, D. B. Vice President, Management-Employee Relations, Inc.
Talbot, P. Senior Associate, Institute of Current World Affairs
Trone, S. Adviser to the Government of India on Industrial Planning
Turner, R. E. Professor of History, Yale University
Valentine, A. President, University of Rochester
The reports of these conferences were submitted many months ago to the
Senate Subcommittee for its study. In the Senators' questions and remarks,
there was little evidence that they had noted the significance of these conferences,
however, either from the point of view of the high quality of the discussion, the
monograph submitted, or the importance of the personnel and the long-term
results.
Instead of noting these, the Subcommittee and its counsel have put their
fingers on minor matters of trivial import. Instead of appraising the high sig-
nificance of the participation of scholars, businessmen and journalists from
many countries interested in the Pacific, attention has been called to the presence
at two or three of these conferences of men and women who served in minor
secretarial positions.
Senator McCarran's insinuation in his opening statement at the first hearing
that, though there were many "eminent people of great respectability and of
preeminence in capitalistic achievement," the real work of the IPR wa ' done
by Communists, operating shrewdly behind the scenes, is completely false. The
men and women of respectability and those who had attained preeminence in
capitalistic achievement did not travel thousands of miles to attend these con-
ferences as a "joy ride" or to be "taken for a ride" ; instead they took the
work of the conferences most seriously. They did not absent themselves from
the discussions.
Summaries or reports of the discussions of each conference were published
and distributed widely. The volumes contain the gist of the discussions, they
list all of the data papers submitted, they provide a brief "who's who" of all
who attended from national groups, and the observers. They list those who
attended in clerical and administrative positions. The volumes are on the shelves
of many of the principal libraries of the world. They speak for themselves. I
cannot remember a single case when a member of a conference called in question
the accuracy of these books of standard reference.
If the Senators could even now take the time merely to scan the names of
those who attended the conferences, they might revise their estimate of the
pai-amount importance of these gatherings. Members spent a full twelve to
fourteen days living, usually, in a small compact area or under the same roof,
eating together in the same dining room, conferring together on the conference
agenda between the sessions, and observing the work of the recorders, rappor-
teurs, and the conference staff.
Toward the end of nearly every conference, one or two full sessions were given
to appraising the work of the conference, its staff, and its permanent secretariat.
The chairmen urged the members for criticisms, rather than bouquets; there
was great frankness. There was, too, the" fact that groups from the various
countries were always asked to contribute financially to the Institute's support.
Thus, they had a very direct stake in the IPR, because they had to make up
their minds whether it was worth their continued supiwrt. If any of the
national groups had seen signs of Communistic control, the Senators may be
assured that capitalistic financial support of the Institute would have been
withdrawn.
Among the hundreds of delegates who participated in IPR international con-
ferences, and aside from the four Soviet citizens (two at Kyoto, 1929, and two
at Yosemite, 19.36) whom we assumed, of course, were Communists, the McCarran
Committee has cited and given major attention to the name of a member of the
Japanese delegation at Yosemite in 1936, Hotsumi Ozaki. It is quite clear that
the group of eminent .Japanese attending that conference would not have in-
cluded him in their group if they had suspected that he was a Communist.*
No member of the Senate Subcommittee, or its staff, has ever accused any ol
the following of being Communists : Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene,
Newton D. Baker, J. W. Dafoe, Edgar J. Tarr, Philip C. Jessup, Percy E. Corbett,
♦There is certainly no evidence tliat he was one at that time.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5325
and Huntingtou Gilchrist. Yet all of these men, as chairmen of the Institute's
international governing body— the Pacitic Council — were very active rather than
tigurehead chairmen. They attended, participated in, and guided the inter-
national conferences. Between conferences, tliey gave an enormous amount of
time to the work of the Institute. As is well known, they were all anti-
Communist.
The members of the international conferences were not only men and women
of stature in their own countries, many of them were of international eminence.
1 cannot remember a single instance where an IPR member in any of the
national groups declined to attend an international conference, because he
suspected that the Institute was infiltrated by Communists.
One of the fundamental principles of the IPR was its nonofficial and non-
governmental character. It not only did not seek governmental officials for
membership in its international conferences, it definitely and strongly discour-
aged such proposals. There were notable exceptions during the second World
War when, in every country, business men, bankers, journalists and university
personnel were drafted into government service in large numbers. This wartime
situation robbed the national councils of a high propoi*tion of nongovernmental
personnel interested in Pacific problems. The officers of the Pacific Council,
therefore, made an exception in the case of the conference membership at Mt.
Tremblant, in 1942, and at Hot Springs, in 1945. In most delegations there was
a minority of wartime government otticials, but even here every effort was made
to insure that the number of permanent officials of foreign offices and state
departments was kept at a minimum. The officials who did attend came prin-
cipally as observers, not as active participants in the round-table discussions.
In a few instances exceptions were made at other times. At one or two of the
earliest conferences the American delegation, which would have stoutly opposed
the membership in its group of a state, war or navy official, did include an
agriciTlture economist from the Department of Agriculture. He was an expert
on Asia's agricultural and rural problems.
The atmosphere at all the conferences was that of a group of private citizens.
The importance of this was emphasized repeatedly by Pacific Council Chairman,
Ray Lyman Wilbur, who said that at an official international conference free
discussion could not be carried beyond the point where the official's instructions
from his home government began and ended. He asserted that the great
advantage of the IPR conferences was that thinking was sought in areas that
were difficult for government representatives to discuss. Every effort was made
to provide a setting in which the members of the conferences could examine the
most controversial questions — questions which, in the days before the United
Nations was organized, government officials rarely discussed on a broad basis
with representatives from other governments.
The IPR conferences progressively worked out what might be described as
a cooperative technique for dealing with confiict. The "hottest" and most
highly controversial questions were, by design, placed on the agenda. There was
a consistent invitation for the utmost frankness, because a premium was put on
the most candid expression of the most diverse points of view. An atmosphere
of cooperation and a respect for the views of others developed. After a fortnight
of intense discussions, members were not exi>ected to depart to their countries
and homes with precisely the same point of view with which they arrived. The
discussions were aimed at widening the members' points of view in the light
of fresh data and the deeper knowledge of the psychology and interests of those
with whom they disagreed.
It was because of the importance of the foregoing that the IPR developed
its public relations policy as it concerned members of the press. Round-table
discussions were closed to reporters. Many eminent newspaper men attended
the conferences, but their role was not that of reporters, but that of informed
citizens who could make a contribution to the discussions. The presence of
reportere would have prevented most of the members from giving any appearance
of having learned anything in the discussions. If, for example, an American,
a Japanese, a Chinese, or an Englishman, said on a Monday: "This is my point
of view" or "This is the point of view of my country." his position might be cabled
to the country from which he came. Then, if by Friday his point of view had
widened and changed, he would still have to adhere to what he had said on
Monday, even though by Friday he realized that he had spoken earlier without
full knowledge. The conferences were not "secret" in the sense that its members
were conspirators. It was rather a private gathering where the members sought
to widen their outlook and to grow.
5326 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Because the Institute recognized the enormous importance of tlie press, at
most conferences a member of the Institute from one of the national delegations
was appointed as press officer. He would report to the newspaper men each day
on the general trend of the discussion, the subject matter of the round-tables, the
different points of view expressed, but withheld the individual names of those
who made this or that statement. This did not, of course, of course, completely
satisfy all the reporters but, in the main, their cooperation was invaluable in
bringing the Institute's discussion to a wider public. Among those who served
as conference press officers were Chester H. Rowell of the San Francisco Chron-
icle, Victor Sifton of the Winnipeg Free Press, and W. W. Waymack of the Des
Moines Register and Tribune.*
The results of the international conferences are difficult to describe. They
may be listed as follows :
1. From 150 to 250 people, during the fortnight's discussions, met many
people from other coimtries, whom they would not have met otherwise.
They must have learned much at the discussions because, for the most
part, these were intensely interesting and exciting. A high proportion
of the members read the substantial data papers either before, during,
or soon after the conference and they kept them for reference in future
years.
2. Most of the members took to their own constituencies on their return not
only the publications of the Institute, but oral reports of its proceedings.
Some of them spoke to small and large audiences in their countries on
the results.
3. Copies of the data papers and the proceedings were distributed widely
to the press of many countries.
4. Full documentation of each conference was filed in the national libraries
of each member country and also with the foreign offices. INIany li-
braries have standing orders, not only for all the publications of the
Institute, but for the proceedings of each conference.
5. In spite of the limitations imposed on new^spaper reporters, the press of
several countries was aided in making the problems of the Pacific vivid
to their great audiences.
6. Althougli tiie aim of the conferences was to add to the body of knowledge
on the part of the members, the members of the delegations in their
individual capacities were so influential that, on their return, in many
instances, they discussed the conference topics with members of their
own governments.
Research, a Primary Function of the IPR From The Beginning
In addition to its conferences, research is a major function of the IPR in all
the countries where the oi'gauization has member covuicils. This has been true
from tlie beginning. At the first conference at Honolulu in 1925, the various
roundtables discovered that while there was a great measure of good will, and
a deep eagerness to solve the problems of the Pacific, the conferees, coming as
they did from many professions and many countries, were without a broad and
deep factual basis for their discussions. It was then and there that the IPR's
most momentous step was taken, namely, its commitment to long-term funda-
mental research. Idealistic speeches, pleasant social intercourse, lofty gen-
eralities were to be set aside in favor of fact finding.
At the start, to be sure, there was a minority who were irked by this com-
mitment to research, who wanted to "get things done", to pass resolutions, to
memorialize governments, to use the Institute as a crusading organization. But
the majority ruled otherwise. The Institute was never to become an action
organization. It would continue its efforts to conferences, research, publications,
and education, on a factual, non-partisan basis.
This research program has done much to raise the level of public information
on Far Eastern questions. It has given people in all parts of the world a factual
base on which to judge developments in Asia. It has provided material for
journalists and commentators. It has been of practical value to economists,
importers, exporters, scholars, and others with interest in the Pacific area.
The Institute of Pacific Relations has recently made a quantitative com-
pilation of the materials published by the Institute and its national councils
during the past quarter century, as follows :
•Also Christopher Chancellor of Reuters.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5327
Books 249 titles 72, 411 pages
Conference documents 696 " 26, 171 "
Monographs 61 " 5,183 "
Pamphlets 136 " 6,919
Educational materials ' 46 " 3,782
Totals 1,190 " 114,466 "
The Institute's chief executive, Mr. W. L. Holland, has, I believe, presented
a list of the titles of these publications. As of today neither the members of
the Subcommittee nor its counsel have given any substantial evidence that they
have appraised the value of this considerable and carefully prepared material.
In the early days, the founders of the IPR were particularly mindful in plan-
ning the research program of the necessity of a deeper understanding of the
emerging nationalisms in Asia and the uncertain implications of the Bolshevik
Revolution. Although a measure of attention was given to Australia and New
Zealand, the Philippines, Korea, and the Far Eastern interests of Canada, Great
Britain, Holland and France, the IPR leaders, especially those in the U. S.,
regarded Japan, China and Russia as presenting the most baffling problems.
During the early period there was but little concern with the Asian areas under
the sovereignty of Britain, Holland and France. These were to emerge as
"hot spots" later. In the 1920's, many considered Japan as a danger only in
the event of the U. S. failing to adjust some of her discriminative policies which
irked the Japanese — the Oriental-exclusion policy, and the discrimination —
legal and social — against resident Orientals, particularly in the Pacific Coast
states. Toward the study of these, the American IPR undertook several major
studies such as The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries, Oriental Ex-
clusion, The Status of Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast.
Meanwhile, studies to which the National Councils and the International
Secretariat devoted themselves were, among others : Land Utilization in Japan,
Land Utilization in China, Trade and Tariff Barriers, Problems of Japanese
Shipping, Mandated Territories, The Position of Japan and China in Manchuria,
Foreign Merchant Ships in Chinese Rivers, Commodity Control, Land and Labor
in China, The State of Asia, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 1925-
1928, Economic Survey of The Pacific Area, The Government and Politics of
China, Manchuria Since 1931, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office, China :
The Land and the People, Symposium on Chinese Culture, The Occupation of
Japan : Second Phase, Korea Today, The Western World and Japan, Japan's
Economy in War and Reconstruction, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, Malay
Fishermen, The Economic Development of French Indochina, The Structure of
Netherlands Indian Economy, Thailand : The New Siam, Land Utilization in
Australia, Guam and Its People, The South Seas in The Modern World, Ameri-
cans of Japanese Ancestry, China Enters the Machine Age, China's Post-War
Markets, The Chinese Family and Society, Earthbound China, The Economic
Development of French Indo China, Gateway to Asia : Sinkiang, The Governing
of Men, Industrial Development of The Netherlands Indies, Japan's Prospect,
Japan's War Economy, Life and Labour in Shanghai, Modern Korea, Pioneer
Settlement in The Asiatic Tropics.
The Inquiry Series
Shortly after the Japanese occupation of North China, in 1937, the officers of the
Pacific Council decided to undertake an inquiry into the problems arising from
the conflict in the Far East. This was called the IPR INQUIRY. During 1938
the Inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe, Chair-
man of the Pacific Council, and in 1939. under his successor. Dr. Philip C. Jessup.
L>r. Dafoe, up to the time of his death, was Editor of the Winnipeg Free Press.
Dr. Jessup was Professor of International Law at Columbia University. The
officers of the Council had the benefit of the counsel of the following advisors :
Professor H. F. August of the University of British Columbia
Dr. J. B. Condliffe of the London School of Economics
Mr. Etienne Dennery of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris
In addition to the foregoing, the Secretariat secured the expert help of several
dozen authorities in the U. S. and abroad, to whom, according to their specialized
fields, cojMes of early drafts of Inquiry manuscripts were sent for comment and
criticism.
The Inquiry was financed by a grant of .'i;90,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation.
The purpose of the project was to jirovide members of the Institute and the public
with an account of the economic and political conditions which had produced the
5328 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
situation existing in Jnly 1937, with respect to China, Japan and other foreign
powers concerned, and a constructive analysis of the major issues which must be
considered in any future adjustment of international relations in the Pacitic area.
The project comprised twenty-seven published volumes. It turned out to be
one of the most important Far Eastern research enterprises undertaken by a
private agency. Manuscripts were sent to experts in various fields and in various
countries for criticism. Their comments were then sent to the authors, with the
request that they be seriously considered in the final draft.
The Japanese Council of the IPR feared that the Inquiry would prove to be an
anti-Japanese project. On two occasions, it sent emissaries to tlie United States to
discuss the project with officers of the Pacific Council. Several changes were made
in the plans for the study in an effort to meet the Japanese objections without
interfering with the integrity of the research. But despite these concessions, the
Japanese IPR refused to participate. The foreword of each volume in the series
carried the following :
"The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the
views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any
of the National Councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsi-
bility of the author. The Japanese Council has not found it possible to partici-
pate in the Inquiry, and assumes, therefore, no responsibility either for its
results or for its organization."
"Attention may also be drawn to a series of studies on topics bearing on the
Far Eastern situation which is being prepared by the Japanese Council. Tliat
series is l)eing undertaken entirely independently of this Inquiry, and for its
organization and publication the Japanese Council alone is responsible."
Scholars from Australia, Canada, England, France, New Zealand and the
United States contributed volumes to the Inquiry series. Several Chinese ad-
vised the Institute in the development of the project. A notable example was
Dr. H. D. Fong. As indicated elsewhere. Dr. Chi was invited to write one of
the volumes but his duties in the American-British-Chinese Government Currency
Stabilization Board prevented this. He did contribute a partial study which
was printed in a small edition of merely 100 copies in mimeographed form for
limited circulation. Presumably for lack of time, it did not measure up to the
standards of the regular printed volumes in the Inquiry series. China's most
modern and most able banker, and Minister of Finance, the Honorable T. V,
Soong, wrote an important and laudatory preface for the book by Frank M.
Tamagna on Banking and Finance in China. His closing paragraph reads as
follows :
"Until now there has been no single book to which a Western reader could
turn for an account of this development. Dr. Tamagna's comprehensive and
up-to-date survey is therefore especially timely. It is the result of careful
work, extending over several years. This volume may stand for a number of
years, therefore, as the standard work in its field."
Soviet scliolars did not cooperate in tlie project because they said that the
Soviet Union wished them to concentrate all their efforts on defeating Hitler.
(It was generally believed that botli Churchill and Roosevelt believed that Russia
should direct all its efforts to crushing the Nazis before taking on any other
enemy.) In this situation the Soviet leaders did not wish to give the Japanese
imperialists any occasion, however slight, for thinking that Russia was planning
war with Japan.
The Institute Publishes Magazines in Several Countries
The Pacific Oiuncil (the Institute's international governing body) and several
of the National Councils have, at various times, published nine different maga-
zines. Tlie Pacific Council's quarterly magazine, Pacific Affairs, holds a
unique position amongst the most thoughtful persons, academic and government
leaders in many countries. Its International Secretariat publishes monthly in
mimeograph form the Far East Digest. This consists of summaries on current
periodical material on the Far East, India, Pakistan, Australia, and New
Zealand.
The American IPR's research fortniglitly. the Far Eastern Survey which, like
Pacific Affairs, concentrates on Asia and the Pacific and circulates principally
in the United States.
Periodicals have been also put out by several of the other National Councils.
These have included the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin ; the International Journal
published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs ; Taiiieiyo Mondai
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5329
Shiryo, published prior to the war by the Japanese Institute of Pacific Relations ;
JMededeelingen (Bulletin of the Royal Colonial Institute in cooperation with the
I'acific Institute) published before the war by the Netherlands-Netherlands Indies
IPR (no longer in circulation) ; Politique Etrangere, published by the French
Council ; Pakistan Horizon published by the Pakistan Council of International
Affairs ; the India Quarterly published by the Indian Council of World Affairs ;
and International Affairs published by the Royal Institute of International
Affairs in liOndon. Some of these magazines covered more than the Pacific.
At first, Pacific Affairs was edited and published in Honolulu as a monthly.
Later, when it was edited on the mainland, it became a quarterly. It enlisted
the cooperation of as wide a circle of writers from different countries as could
be secured.
The IPR, as is well known, has sought consistently the expression of diverse
points of view on controversial questions, both in its books and its magazines.
If at this time, in retrospect, an attempt should be made to classify the place in
the political spectrum of the Institute's scores of writers, I think it would be
an almost impossible task for the following reasons :
(1) It would involve subjective judgments. In any group of competent
scholars unanimity of appraisal is difficult to achieve.
(2) What in one decade is regarded as right, center, or left, is often quite
different from that of a later decade.
Pacific Affairs' first editor was Miss Elizabeth Green in Honolulu. Her suc-
cessors wore Owen Lattimore, 19.34 to June 1941 ; Edward C. Carter, 1942 ; W.
L. Holland, 1943 ; Edward C. Carter, 1944-1945 ; P. E. Lilienthal, 1946-1952.
The first of the fortnightly research bulletins of the American IPR was pub-
lished on March 3, 1932. It was first called the IPR ME^roRANOA. and was issued
in mimeographed form. It was for the most part staff written. It gradually
became so highly regarded because of its coverage and objectivity that after, I
believe, a couple of years, it was published in printed form, and called the Fab
Eastern Surntey. It has had a succession of able editors, including Russell
Shiman. 1935-1941 ; Catherine Porter, 1941-1944; Laurence Salisbury, 1944-1948;
Miriam Farley, 1948-1952.
The Soviet IPR leaders criticized a few articles in the quarterly Pacific
Affairs, but so far as I can remember in twenty years, with about 500 issues
of the Far Eastern Survey and about twice as many major articles, only a
single article stirred up a measure of public controversy. This article appeared
in July 1943, and was entitled China's Role m a Coalition War by T. A. Bisson.
It caused more criticism on the part of a self-appointed American critic than it
did among the Chinese in China. The author spoke in high terms of the accom-
plishments of the Generalissimo and the Chinese people in the war, passed on to
some of the prevailing Chinese criticisms of the Nationalist regime, and then
moved on to a description of Chinese Communist contributions to the war against
Japan. The article probably would have avoided controversy if the author had
not used one or two debatable phrases. He described the Kuomintang regime
as "feudal" and the Chinese Communists as "democratic." This was perhaps a
tactical error rather than a factual one. It is true that subsequently the Gen-
eralissimo himself and many non-Communist writers described China as feudal
or semifeudal. It is also true that at that period China's communism was
developing a peasant base that was more democratic than the Kuomintang.
However, "feudal" and "democratic" were fighting words among pro-Kuomintang
Americans and some of the Chinese in the United States.
The flurry that followed the publication of that article was accentuated be-
cause just previously two other articles had appeared in New York which
were very critical of China, one by Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times,
and the other by Pearl Buck in Life magazine. When the editor of Par Eastern
SiTRVEY learned that the article was challenged by Chinese Nationalists in
New York, she asked Dr. C. L. Hsia to write a rebuttal which was printed in
full in a subsequent issue of the magazine.
It so happened that, at the invitation of the Generalissimo, Mr. W. L. Holland
and I arrived in Chungking just about the time that incomplete quotations
from these three articles were cabled to China. The Chungking newspaper
printed in English published an editorial under the title of "The Three Busy
Bees." These were identified as Baldwin, Buck, and Bisson. On the basis of
these inadequate and misleading caljles from America, the editor felt himself
justified in writing as he did.
The matter ended in an amicable fashion. One morning. Dr. Chiang Monlin,
Chancellor of the National University and Chairman of the China IPR, came to
5330 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
see us at our hotel and told u*! that at a dinner the previous evening, attended
by several of the top people in the Government, criticisn of the IPR had been
made. However, General Wu Teh-chen, the Secretary General of the Kuomin-
tans, had remarked that the Chinese in the long view should be grateful to the
IPR instead of being critical. He asked them to remember the twenty years
in which the Il'H had served China, that it had called attention to China's needs
when hardly any other research group in the U. S. had done so. It had made
China favorably known throughout tlie world. The IPR, he declared, had
been one of the stauncliest and most influential friends that China had ever
possessed, and even this one critical article was the work of a long-time friend
of China.
A Variety of Educational Projects Developed
In addition to its program of research and conferences at the expert level,
the IPR saw the need for educational activities designed to inform the public
at large on developments in various countries of Asia.
As time went on, some of the National Councils of the IPR — particularly the
Royal Institute of International Affairs (United Kingdom) and the AIPR — pub-
lished popular pamphlets, bibliographies and other materials designed for the
nonspecialist in Far Eastern affairs. In addition, the AIPR undertook a
number of special projects which were designed to improve teaching, library
and museum services in the Far Eastern field, and increase the number of
specialists and trained personnel.
(1) It was noted, for example, that the Far East was generally neglected in
universities so a study was made by the IPR and published in a volume entitled
China and Japan In Our University Curricula with the results that scores of
colleges added Far Eastern courses to their curricula.
(2) It soon became apparent that almost all of the fellowships for post-grad-
uate study abroad were being awarded to American students for research in
Europe. An examination of this situation resulted in a volume which called at-
tention to the need of more opportunities for graduate study in the Far East.
(3) It was observed that the language requirement for American college
entrance was such as to discourage the children of American businessmen, edu-
cators and missionaries in China and Japan, from capitalizing on their early
knowledge of these difficult languages. A study of this resulted in the alteration
of the language requirements in over 500 American colleges and universities.*
This was achieved just in time to provide for the United States Government,
both civil and military, a larger company of American linguists in the Second
World AVar than would otherwise have been available.
(4) A book was published on Careers for Americans in China and Japan.
(5) Considerable attention was paid to the problem of providing secondary and
elementary school teachers with factual information on the geography, history
and way of life of Far Eastern peoples. As one educator wrote, "the fact is that
the average American school cliild learns more about the tiny country of Holland
than about the whole continent of Asia, which includes more than one-third of
the land surface and is inhabited by nearly one-half of the imputation of the
earth."
So the AIPR initiated a series of disaissions with high-school authorities, city
Boards of Education, and State Superintendents of Schools, on the preparation
of study outlines, bibliographies, and finally of a series of textb'^oks for high-
school use.
In 194."). the AIPR in cooperation with the American Council of Education
appointed a committee of educators to appraise the treatment of Asia in 108
widely used junior and senior high school textbooks for history, geography, civics
and modern problems.
Tl'e results of this study were published by AIPR and the American Council
on Education in a pamplilet entitled Treatment of Asia in American Textbooks.
This report showed the lamentable neglect of all the countries of the Far East
in books used in American schools. It was widely read by educators and text-
book publishers, and several of the latter sent their authors to the IPR to get
advice as to how to include adequate material on Asia in new editions.
The Role of Edward C. Carter in the IPR
My principal initial contact with the organization was attendance at an all-day
meeting held at the Yale Club in New York, in 1925, where some forty Americans
♦This, in turn, had enabled many American students with an early knowledge of Chinese
or Japanese to continue their language study in American institutions.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5331
met to consider the pros and cons of holding the conference at Honolulu at which
the IPR was born.
Although I was consulted both before and after the Yale Club meeting, I did
not attend the 1925 conference, but I did attend those held in 1927 (Honolulu),
1929 (Kyoto), 1931 (Shanghai), 1933 (Banff), 1936 (Yosemite), 1939 (Virginia
Beach), 1942 (Mont Tremblant), 1945 (Hot Springs), and 1947 (Stratford on
Avon). I became honorary Secretary of the American IPR in, I think, 1926, and
a year or two later, became the salaried Secretary of the American IPR, which
I served until 1933 when I became Secretary' General of the Pacific Council,
serving through 1946, when I reverted to the American IPR as Executive Vice
Chairman, continuing in that position until the end of 1948.
When I became Secretary General of the Pacific Council in 1933, among my
special responsibilities was the strengthening of the National Councils; helping
them to secure their income ; bringing about general liaison between the National
Councils, the Pacific Council and the International Secretariat; encouraging
liaison between the IPR and scholars, publicists and businessmen in coun-
tries having a stake in the Pacific, who were not members of the Institute;
stepping up the preparation of each National Council for and participation in
the international conferences ; and, above all, extending their research and pub-
lication programs.
Training Personnel
Along with the organization of international conferences and cooperation with
my colleagues in the research and publication program, I was expected, in most
of the countries, to be a sort of talent-scout to find young people of promise
who might join the staffs of the National Councils or tlie Pacific Council, for
periods of training and service. Most of those who were recruited, whether
for the National Councils or the International Secretariat, were paid modest
salaries. But over the years quite a number of highly competent young men
and women were trained, thus adding to the intellectual output of the Institute
in a way that was not recorded in the annual financial statements. The number
of volunteers from various countries who participated with little or no salary
in the administration of the International Conferences was considerable and
established a tradition of high-level voluntary participation which had pei-ma-
nent value. The spirit of spontaneous service was a great asset.
As Secretary General I was charged with the responsibility not only of help-
ing to strengthen all of the National Councils, but also of increasing their
number. A continuous effort was made to strengthen the existing Councils and
to form new ones. This activity was undertaken through the following methods :
(a) correspondence; (b) inviting leaders from organized and unorganized coun-
tries to attend the periodic international conferences; (c) getting scholars, in
their regular travels, to talk with leaders in other countries with reference to
possible organization ; (d) personal visits to other countries by my staff colleagues
and myself.
In view of statements made before the McCarran Committee and in the press,
casting suspicion on my relations with a few Russians, I cannot emphasize
too strongly the far greater volume of correspondence, personal interviews, and
conferences that I also had with important Chinese leaders in Kuomintang
China ; with people in many professions in Japan, the Philippines, Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, Great Britain, France, Holland, and with similar people
in India, Pakistan, Burma, and Siam. The correspondence and personal con-
tacts with people interested in the Pacific in the U. S. S. R. were only a small
fraction of those which I had with people in the countries just named.
In fact, the proper fulflllnient of my obligation to the IPR as a whole called
for many more contacts with Russians than I am able to make either in the
TJ. S. S. R. or in other countries. Apart from diplomats and a few newspaper-
men, there were scarcely any Russians abroad whom one could see except during
the War, When Lend-Lease brought scores to the United States. But few of
these knew Asia.
Formality or red tape or something else, meant that I could see fewer Rus-
sians in a day in Moscow than interested people in any other capital. Russians,
whether officials or scholars, were or puriwrted to be busier than those in other
countries. Further, only in prewar Japan was it necessary to spend as much
time in "sightseeing" and in being "entertained" as in the U. S. S. R. The
social hospitality in both countries was lavish and warm. In a fortnight in
Moscow I would be taken gratis to more plays and performances at the Opera
than I could afford in New York in a whole season. In Tokyo that "No" plays
were a "must" and deeply impressive. Russia and Japan were still in the
5332 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
propaganda stage. In all other countries it was assumed that I knew and
enjoyed their cultures. I need not be "educated."
M.v efforts to stimulate the formation of IPR Councils in the Pacific Ocean
countries of Latin American — Mexico and Chile — were a complete failure. I did
not visit Chile, but a Chinese and a Canadian diplomat, serving in Chile and
knowing the value of the Institute to their own countries, sought in vain to
persuade thoughtful Chileans to organize. I made two visits to Mexico with-
out result. Private citizens there as in Chile maintained that the authorities
would not favor the formation of a private society for the study of international
problems independent of government control. Further, they affirmed that their
people were not interested in the lands across the Pacific. They concentrated
their foreign concern on Europe and the Americas.
My visits to the principal National Councils were frequent (eleven or twelve
times to each). They were always personally rewarding. The warmth and
volume of the hospitality that was extended to me in every country and especially
in China, Japan, the Philippines, and later in India and Pakistan was informa-
tive and inspiring. All of this added greatly to the value of the Institute's
work. In all countries my visits seemed to be cordially welcomed. ■*Every
facility was accorded to me. *Engagements were made to acquaint me with
every possible person and institution that might assist in the work of the
Institute. Invitations to speak before various groups were received in volume.
Great candor and mutual "give and take" in academic circles were charac-
teristic during the few years of active Soviet IPR membership. A very small
company of Soviet scholars appeared to be nearly as eager for cooperation as
the much larger number in all the other countries, but after 1945, personal
contacts with the Soviet IPR leaders ceased. I felt that I had failed signally
in achieving what the leaders of the IPR in all countries expected of me.
In the other memlier countries the IPR v/as welcome because it was unofficial,
scholarly, and provided a platform for the expression of widely differing and
conflicting points of view. This, of course, was one of the many reasons for
the Institute's great stren.gth in the earlier years, as it is still today.
How The Institute Is Financed
Much of my time was spent in obtaining financial support for the Institute —
not only for the Pacific Council, but for the American IPR and some of the other
Councils as well.
For the American IPR the principal sources of income are :
(1) regular annual dues from members;
(2) individual donations from $100 a year and upward :
(3) industrial and bu.siness corporations, and banks (from $200 to $2,500
annually).
(4) Foundations.
The Pacific Council is financed by annual contributions from the National
Councils and by Foundation grants. Of all the National Councils, the American
IPR was able to raise larger funds for Pacific area study than any of the others.
The AIPR and certain American Foundations were therefore the largest con-
tributors to the Pacific Council budget. Neither the American nor the Pacific
Council has a penny of endowment. Grants from the Foundations were rarely
for more than a three-year period. Contributions from banks and industrial
corporations, as well as from individual members, were on an annual basis.
All of the national Councils of the IPR incurred large expenditures over and
above their money contributions to the Pacific Council budget. The Pacific
Council did not pay the very heavy expenses of the National Council representa-
tives attending the international conferences and the meetings of the Pacific
Council that were held between the international conferences. The National
Councils met the bill for the hundreds of data papers presented at the conferences.
They also met the travelling and living expenses of some of their members who
attended the international conferences. IMany members paid their own expenses,
thus, in efi'ect, the National Councils' total financial contribution to the work of
the Institute wuh very much higher than the grand total that would be shown
by combining the budgets of all the National Councils and the Pacific Council.
Between and during the conferences the amount of highly intelligent volunteer
work of hundreds of people in the different countries was substantial.
The same phenomena characterized my own secretariat. Except during
the war, Mrs. Carter accompanied me on most trips aiding greatly in my staff
•Except in the U. S. S. R. There social hospitality was bountiful, but Intellectual
contacts severely limited.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5333
work. The staff included at various times young people from Great Britain,
China, Japan, and the United States. Seventeen young men and women served
as volunteer members of my travelling staff without cost to the Pacific Council
for either salary or traveling expenses.
Of even greater significance have been the travels of the unpaid and senior
officers of the Institute. Most of Them frequently gave as much as two or three
months in a single year in advancing the Institute's program. They travelled
thousands of miles at their own expense to distant countries for conference, and
for the international conferences. The large cost, both in time and money, to
the Institute's ofiicers cannot be estimated. Among others who travelled exten-
sively in the interest of the IPR were : Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene,
Newton D. Baker, J. W. Dafoe, Edgar J. Tarr, Sir George Sansom, Philip C.
Jessup, Percy H Corbett, Huntington Gilchrist, Carl L. Alsberg.
The foregoing list includes only men from the United Kingdom and North
America. It would be greatly increased by adding to the record many eminent
leaders from China, Japan, the Philippines, and later from India and Pakistan.
Many eminent people were active in the IPR
As already noted, a significant feature of the IPR was the opportunity it
afforded people of various countries to know each other. Notable were the
personal contacts established during the international conferences when any-
where from 150 to 250 people from several Pacific countries met for periods of
twelve to fourteen days. As I indicated earlier, they were usually housed under
the same roof or in the same small area. They discussed and ate their meals
and took such limited recreation as the program permitted together. Many of
these contacts were kept up for years and persist today. After each conference,
a good many of the members remained in the country where the conference was
held and visited quite widely under the auspices of the host Council.
Further personal contacts came in the intervals between conferences when
members of the Institute and its staff travelled widely in countries other than
their own. Members, when travelling, were invited by the National Councils to
address meetings at their headquarters or at their branches. The International
Secretariat took the initiative in facilitating such contacts so that the confer-
ence discussions might continue informally and not be limited to the arbitrary
times of the conferences themselves.
Many scores of visits and discussions have taken place over the years. With-
out access to the files but simply from memoi-y, I could give many dozen illustra-
tions of this sort. Often when former members of the Institute became govern-
ment officials stationed in countries other than their own, these contacts were
informally continued. For example, one of the founders of the IPR was F. W.
Eggleston of Australia, who many years later became Australian ambassador
to China in Chungking. He was allowed by the Chinese government a limited,
but fairly substantial luggage allowance "over the hump." This he used in
large measure to have flown in his entire library of IPR books. As a result,
his embassy provided for scholars and government servants in Chungking the
largest library of books on the Pacific that existed in that part of war-torn
China. Later, Mr. Eggleston became Australian ambassador in Washington
wiiere he continued his interests and contacts with the Institute.
The Hon. Vincent Massey, who has .iust become Governor-General of Canada,
attended the Shanghai conference in 1931 and made a I'eal contribution through
the Canadian Institute in which he was a leader.
There were many Chinese IPR leaders whose lectures and discussions in other
countries added much to the development of knowledge of the Far East. These
included W. W. Yen. Hn Shih. Chiang Mon-lin. Y. C. James Yen, P. C. Chang,
Liu Yu-wan, Franklin Ho, K. P. Chen and Chang Po-ling.
Similarly. Japanese IPR leaders who advanced the Institute's program while
abroad were Dr. I. Nitobe, Professor Y. Takaki, K. Yozizawa, M. Matsuo, Ino
Dan, S. Saito, Y. Iwanaga, M. Anesaki, T. Mayeda, S. Matsukata, S. Urumatsu
and S. INIatsumoto.
Canadians other than Vincent Massey were Newton W. Rowell, Edgar J. Tarr,
J. W. Dafoe, Edgar Mclnnis, Norman MacKenzie, F. H. Soward, Escott Reid
G. R. Parkin and R. G. Cavell.
From France there were Paul Pelliott (now deceased), the greatest French
Sinologist; Emile Naggiar, formerly French Minister in China; E. Dennery, now
in the French diplomatic service; H. Bonnet, now French Ambassador in Wash-
ington; Roger Levy, author and Secretary of the French IPR; Father Robert
(Society of Jesus) ; Pierre Gourou ; Charles Robequain.
5334 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
From Holland there were H. J. van Mook, formerly Lieutenant Governor-
General of the Netherlands Indies; G. A. Dunlop, Amsterdam banker; Baron
F. M. van Asbeck ; J. J. L. Duyvendak ; T. Moll.
From England there were Lord Hailsham, Lord Hailey, Lord Samuel, Arnold
J. Toynbee, Sir Frederick Whyte, Miss Eileen Power, Sir Andrew McFadyean,
Ivison S. Macadam, Captain L. D. Gammans, Sir John Pratt, Lord Snell, G. F.
Hudson, A. V. Alexander, Sir Charles Webster, Margaret Cleeve, Malcolm Mac-
Donald, W. W. Astor, Miss Barbara Ward, Archibald Rose and A. Creech Jones.
I remember, for example, that on Miss Ward's first visit to the United States
(she was then foreign editor of the London Economist) , the American IPR
arranged for her to meet influential audiences in Seattle, Los Angeles, Washing-
ton and New York. A large luncheon was given for her at the Mayflower in
Washington and a large dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria here. The IPR had
the honor of introducing to influential Americans on their first visits to North
America Mrs. Pandit, lately Indian ambassador in Washington ; Zafrulla Khan,
foreign minister of Pakistan: and many other Indians and Pakistanis. The
same can be said of Herbert Gepp of Australia, Walter Nash of New Zealand,
Francisco Benitez and Rafael Palma of the Philippines.
Reference should also be made at this time to the names of many others men-
tioned in the statement for the McCarran Subcommittee prepared by William
L. Holland, the Institute's present Secretary General. In the Institute's pub-
lished proceedings of the international conferences and in the printed and
mimeographed periodical reports of the American IPR, the names of a very large
number of participants in IPR activities have been regularly made aval' hie to
a wide pulilic. I cannot remember a case in the entire history of the Institute
when an effort was made to suppress the name of any person. In fact, it would
have been completely contrary to the whole philosophy of the IPR so to do.
Nevertheless, at the very first session of the McCarran Subcommittee (July JZS,
1951) counsel Robert Morris said he was going to read to me a list of names — •
"which names turn up with great frequency in the files. This list has been
compiled by the staff here as a condensation of many people, of many names
who are interested in the Institute." Reading the list of some 80 names Mr.
Morris did not find time to mention a single one of the foregoing who had been
really active in IPR affairs in one capacity or another. Nor did Mr. Morris call
attention to many of the names which Mr. Holland has submitted.
The following afternoon Mr. Morris went to great pains to blow up out of all
proportion the role that I played in introducing to Washington peple interested in
Asia, a Tass representative, Vladimir Rogov, whom I had met several times in
my IPR travels. The number of Soviet citizens witli a knowledge of the Far East
who visited the United States, was much more limited than those from China,
Japan, Great Britain or France, and I took the opportunity of letting a number
of people in Washington know of his presence in this country. If more Soviet
citizens of his background had come to my attention in this country, I would
have sought as the Secretary General of the Pacific Council to give them the
opportunity of meeting thoughtful Americans. I considered it a part of mv job
as an officer of the international IPR. I did not think and still do not think for
a moment that hardheaded Congressmen like Judd and F'ulln-ight would be poi-
soned by such contact. Nor did I have any misgivings as to any deleterious effect
from talks between a convinced Russian Communist like Rogov, and such compe-
tent, democratic-minded Americans as Stanley Hornbeck and John Carter Yin-
cent. According to State Department protocol, my inquiry to Hornbeck was
through his right-hand man, Alger Hiss, of whose loyalty at that time there was
no question whatever in the American mind. Rogov had a wide circle of ac-
quaintances in several countries. The list included representatives of Reuters,
Havas, A. P., U. P., correspondents of metropolitan newspapers and American
business men in Shanghai. I feel sure that all of these knew him as a convinced
Communist. Rogov was, of course, not the only foreigner whom I introduced
to ])eople in Washington. There were a great many and they were non-
Communists.
Tlie foregoing instance is but one illustration of Anne O'Hare McCormick's
charge in the New York Times (October 3, 1951) that the Senate Subcommittee
is "carrying on its investigation in the context of today instead of in the state
of mind of yesterday when such events occurred."
A Tribute
To the late Frank C. Atherton (one of Hawaii's "Big Five") and Charles F.
Xoomis (Secretary of the Honolulu YMCA) should go a major tribute as the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5335
two most decisive initiators of the IPR. With Atherton's bacliing, Loomis
travelled abroad studying official and unofficial international organizations. He
consulted leaders from the Orient and the Occident.
Atherton and Loomis enlisted the interest in these formative years of David
Z. T. Yui and S. 8aito, the National Secretaries of the YMCA in China and
Japan ; secured the commanding interest of the late Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stan-
ford University, the late AVallace M. Alexander (Alexander and Baldwin Ltd.,
San Francisco), Carl L. Alsberg, of the Food Research Institute (aided much
by Herbert Hoover), Chester H. Rowell of the San Francisco Chronicle; .John
Nelson (Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Montreal). This group, of
course, were all volunteers. The administrative w^ork in Honolulu and explo-
ratory work abroad was undertaken by Charles F. Loomis, who was loaned for
the purpose by the Hawaiian YMCA. But a little later, the steadily growing
group from several countries required a larger staff and a nucleus international
secretariat was appointed consisting of J. Merle Davis as General Secretary,
Dr. .7. B. Condliffe as International Research Secretary, and Miss Elizabeth
Green, a very competent newspaper woman with Far Eastern experience, as
Editor. Loomis himself became Associate and Conference Secretary. Under
the inspiring Dr. Ray Lman Wilbur, these four staff members made a remark-
able team. They envisaged the potentialities of the developing organization,
they overcame great obstacles, they enlisted the active participation of many
others, including Dr. Nitobe of Japan ; Dr. Hu Shih of China ; Newton W. Rowell
and General Sir Arthur Currie of Canada : Jerome D. Greene, Stanley K. Horn-
beck (then at Harvard) and George H. Blakeslee of Clark University. All of
these whom they secured were active in building up national councils in their
own countries.
The imagination and competence of Davis, Loomis, Condliffe and Miss Green
contributed in a distinct way to building the Institute on sound foundations.
A few years after the founding of the Institute. Dr. Condliffe secured as his
research colleague a fellow-New Zealander, William L. Holland, whose unique
abilities led to his succeeding Condliffe when the latter joined the Economic
Staff of the League of Nations in Geneva ; and, in 1946. he succeeded me as the
Secretary General of the Pacific Council. Under his creative leadership, the
Institute has advanced to a position of world recognition which was only barely
envisaged by the first founders. His capacity for discovering, training and
leading researchers, and in skillfully editing the first drafts of their manuscripts
has been outstanding. No Secretary General of any international organization,
official or unofficial, has approached Holland in a rare combination of intel-
lectual fertility combined with administrative skill. The Pacific, the American,
and all the other National Councils are counting on him for eminent leadership
for many years to come. Such talented and self-eft"acing leaders are indi-spensable.
Without the financial contributions of business men, bankers, industrialists
and the officers of steamship companies, both in California and Hawaii, the
early efforts of IPR leaders would have been limited. Later, bankers and indus-
trialists on the eastern seaboard and in other countries followed the example
of those far-sighted men in San Francisco and Honolulu.
At an early stage also substantial support came first from the Laura Spelman
Rockefeller Memorial ; later from the Rockefeller Foundation itself ; and later
still from the Carnegie Corporation. The smaller gifts from high school teachers,
college professors, journalists, librarians and government servants were greater
in number, and not less generous proportionate to their income. These donors
were invaluable, too, in the Institute's discussions, and in their criticism of and
use of IPR publications.
The contributions to the international budget from the National Councils,
large and small, were significant in the Institute's support. They were creative
in building a living, working solidarity of scholars, journalists and business
men. By their own standards, national councils' contributions were all gen-
erous. When compared in terms of national income, the contributions from the
councils in Nationalist China and in Canada were the most substantial.
CONCLUSION
Let the Record Testify
In my personal view the foregoing are characteristic of the activities that have
occupied the IPR over tlie past quarter century. These have been the muscle and
sinew of its tireless effort to realize the aim — its only aim — of acquiring and
making available an accurate fund of knowledge regarding conditions in Asia.
That this has been a sole objective of the organization over the years is plain
5336 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to any fair-minded observer who will take the trouble to look into the record
of the Institute's work as it was actually carried on, not as the counsel of the
Senate subcommittee has endeavored to portray it to Senator McCarran and his
associates, so as to conform with a preconceived bias.
In addition to this personal statement (A Personal View of the Institute of
Pacific Relations), I shall soon submit to the Senate Subcommittee another
memoiandum. This will be entitled "Amplification, Correction and Clarification
of Edward C. Carter's Testimony Before the McCarran Subcommittee." Those
who read the present statement will, I believe, find it useful to read also this
Amplification. In it I will attempt to correct errors I made in answering some
of the questions at the hearings. I will try to amplify and clarify my testimony,
too, in order that Senator McCarran and his associates may have a clearer
picture of my personal views of the Institute, and my considered reactions to
several of the questions put to me by members of the Subcommittee and its
counsel.
I cannot close this statement without affirming that something far more im-
portant than the institutional fortunes of the IPR is at stake in the attacks
during the hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on scholars
concerned with teaching and studying the Far East. A whole generation of
American scliolars in the Far Eastern field is being threatened. Even more
important than this is the menace to the American people of a movement which
might rob thrm of the services of those who. through long study of and great
experience in Asia, are highly qualified in aiding the citizens of this country
to reach their own conchisions regarding American Far Eastern policy. This
situation has been emphasized in a short letter pnb'ished April 23, 1952, on the
editorial page of the New York Times, and signed by the following from
universities which specialize on Far Eastern issues. They are as follows :
Dork Bodde University of Pennsylvania.
Delmer Brown University of California.
George B. Cressey Syracuse University.
Rupert Emerson _ Harvard University.
L. C. Goodrich ' Columbia University.
K. S. Latourette Yale University.
Shannon INTcCune Colgate University.
Lauriston Sharp Cornell University.
C. Martin Wilbur Columbia University.
The letter says that the attacks "do violence to the principle of academic free-
dom inl erent in our democratic heritage, and tend to deprive the Nation of
the views of trained specialists regarding an area which is today of critical
national concern."
State of New York,
County of New York, ss:
Eldward C. Carter, being duly sworn, says : That he has read the foregoing
document and knows the contents thereof ; that the same is true to his own
knowledge, except as to the matters therein indicated to have been communicated
to him by other persons and except as to the matters therein which are matters
of opinion, and that as to the matters indicated to have been communicated to
him by others, he believes it to be true and as to matters of opinion, that the
opinion expressed is his own and that is his true opinion.
Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.
[seal] Irene R. Donohue,
Notni-ij Public, State of Neio York.
Mr. Morris. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a sworn statement again
by Mr. Edward C. Carter, dated Jime 10, 1952, entitled "Amplifica-
tion, Correction, and Clarification of Testimony Before the Committee
by E. C. Carter."
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1383" and is
as follows:)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5337
Exhibit No. 1383
Amplification, Correction, and Clarification of Testimony Before the Senate
Subcommittee
(By EuwAKD C. Carter)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Relationsliii) of Frederick V. Field to the Ir.stitute of Pacific Relations.
2. Tht' Irtter of July 10, 1938. from Owen Lattimore.
3. Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng and Chao-ting Chi.
4. Did the IPR ever place pe pie in government departments?
5. The illegal seizure of the Institute's files by an agent of Senator McCarran's Sub-
committee.
6. Has the Hoard of the IPR ever conducted an inquiry into the 0])erations of the IPR
to determine whether it is under Communist influence or domination?
7. People who were and were n t actively associated \.ith the IPK.
8. The role of the IPR in making it possible for persons in various countries to meet
people of opposing Far Eastern backgrounds and unpalatable viewpoints.
9. How did I happen t^ suggest that a pro-Communist book be sent to certain American
offlcia's and Senators?
10. The Institute explored many controversial issues.
11. Facts about IPR methods and purposes of which the McCarran Subcommittee has
shown little understanding.
12. Further amplifications, correction, addition, and clarification :
(a) The Subc mmittee's procedures contrasted with those proposed by Senators
Kefauver and O'Conor.
(b) Senator Ferguson's irritation at my implication that the IPR files had been
tampered with.
(c) Correction of my testimony regarding Alger Hiss.
(d) The Committee on Militarism in Education.
(e) "Iteath does not r b a man of his place in history."
(f) James S. Allen's appeal for a financial subsidy was not granted.
(g) Miss Smedley asked the IPR's help in getting two Chinese (prisoners of the
Japanese in Hong Kong) placed on an exchange list,
(h) Challenge to Mrs. Massing's testimony by Miss Harriet Moore.
(i) Invitation list to a conference at Subset Farm — Oct ber 18-21, 1935.
(j) Mrs. Massing's attack on Corliss Lamont.
(k) William S. White's significant article in the New Yo7-k Times.
Appendix A. Copy of a letter from Carter to Lattimore, dated July 19, 1938.
Appendix B. Letter to members of the American IPR from seven pr.minent members of
the IPR Board, dated March 17. 1947.
Appendix C. Copy of letter from Dr. James L. McConaughy, President of United China
Relief, to Alfred Kohlberg, dated August 13, 1946.
ERRATA
Hearings, page 11, line 42 : For Rolafid Boyd read Roland Boyden.
Hearings, page 12, line 23 : Dr. Chao-ting Chi, a Chinese Communist, should read Di\
Chao-ting Chi. a Chinese economist.
Hearings, page 16, line 14 : For UNESCO read ECOSOC (The Economic and Social Coun-
cil of the U. N.).
Hearings, page 29, line 46 : Stone teas in the AIPR should read Static teas in the FPA
(Foreign Policy Association).
Hearings, page 38, line 17 : Comintern should be corrected to read Kuomintang.
Hearings, page 141. line 32 : For Mr. Lewis read Mr. Luce.
I would like to clarify aud amend my testimony before the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Internal Security on the following points :
1. relationship of FREDERICK V. FIELD TO THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
At the Senate Subcommittee's first public hearing on July 25, 1951, questions
were asked of me regarding Mr. Field's relationship to the Neiv Masses and the
Daily Wofket: Senator Eastland and the Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Robert
Morri.s, appeared to be endeavoring to prove that while Field was Secretary of the
American IPR, he was also connected with the New Masses and the Daily Worker.
I realized that the question of dates was important. I endeavored, therefore, at
four different times to get the Subcommittee's assistance, but completely in
vain. I spoke as follows :
"I would like to, if I may, ask counsel, Mr. Morris, who must have all
these dates at his fingertips, whether Mr. Field was an executive officer of
the IPR concurrently with being on the editorial board (New Masses or
Daily Worker).'"
Unable to get a precise answer the first time, I asked Senator McCarran's permis-
sion again to help clarify the question of dates. My query was as follows :
* Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee, page 10.
88348— 52— pt. 14 28
5338 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"The point I wanted to clear up was whether the committee's records show
that Mr. Field wrote for the New Masses or the Daily Worker before 1940
and the date he went on the board of New Masses and the relationship of
the date of his withdrawal from the secretaryship of the institute." ^
Again, the matter of dates came up as follows :
"Senator Eastland. And you knew at that time that Mr. Field was on the
editorial board of either New Masses or the Daily Worker, did you not?
"Mr. Carter. One reason that I wanted to get these dates straightened
out
"The Chairman. Answer the question, if you can. There was a direct
question put to you, Mr. Carter." '
Still again, I beseeched and begged Mr. Morris for the dates :
"Senator Eastl.\nd. He was on the board of editors (New Masses or Daily
Worker) before 1940, was lie not?
"Mr. Carter. That was the question that I challenge and beseech and beg
INIr. Morris to produce for me." *
That Mr. Morris did have the dates at his command at that time when I was
pressing for them is clear from Exhibit No. 15, Hearings, pages 125-126. These
Exhibits were not shown to me, altliough Mr. Morris had them filed in the record
at the end of Mr. Field's testimony the following day, July 26, 1951. I had no
opportunity of seeing them until many weeks later when they were printed in
Part I of the Subcommittee's hearings.
B'rom the foregoing, it is clear to me that Senator Eastland and Mr. Morris
were evading questions that I put on four separate occasions. It seemed as
though they were trying to prove that Field was identified with the Neic Masses
and the Daily IForfcer while he was still Secretary of the American IPR.
It would be noted that after the first of my four consecutive attempts to clarify
the question of dates, the Institute's lawyer, Mr. Grossman, saw immediately
that this matter of dates was crucial. As Mr. Grossman was sitting at my
side at the Subcommittee's table, he attempted to help me, but Chairman Mc-
Carran rules against this. A little later. Senator MeCarran threatened to remove
IMr. Grossman from the table to the audience and to "do it very fast." ^ Senator
MeCarran thus identified himself with the efforts of Senator Eastland and Mr.
INIorris to frustrate the sincere efforts of Mr. Grossman and myself to get the facts.
These facts, as it now appears from the printed record, were in total disagree-
ment with the false thesis that two members of the Committee and its counsel
were seeking to establish.
Now, the facts are these : Mr. Field, the then -Secretary of the American IPR,
asked in June, 1940, to be relieved of the administrative and financial routine of
his ofllce.'' With regret the IPR deferred to his wishes. He was appointed staff
advisor, to be on leave without salary for the ensuing six months. Furthermore,
three months later, namely, on September 1, 1940, he resigned as Secretary of
the IPR and his resignation was accepted by the IPR on September IS, 1940.
Turning now to the Subcommittee's Exhibit No. 15, it appears that the earliest
date on which Field had any connection with either the l<!ew Masses or the
Daily Worker was on December 16, 1941, when the T^ew Masses published an
article by him entitled "How Strong is Japan?"' (This immediately followed
Pearl Harbor and I have been informed, was cleared by jMilitary Intelligence.)
Thus, eighteen months elapsed between the time Field first asked to be relieved
of administrative responsiliility and the appearance of his first article in either
of these periodicals. According to Exhibit No. 15, Field was not listed as an
editor of the Nciv Masses until December 15, 1943.
According to the same Exhibit, Field's first article in the Daily Worker was
not until April 25, 1944 — three years and seven months after he had resigned
as Secretary of the American IPR. Exhibit No. 15 further shows that Field's
first article in the Commwuisf, later known as Political Affairs, did not appear
until September 1944 — four years after he had resigned as Secretary of the
American IPR.
During the six years Field served as Executive Secretary of the American
IPR (1934-1940), he maintained a very high standard of ob.iectivity, factual
*Ibid., page 17.
3 Ihifl., tiaffe 21.
•« Ibid., page 22.
^ Ibid., page 18.
« Thid., yiase 122, Exhibit No. 13.
' Ibid., page 125.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5339
accuracy and nonpartisanship. The same is true of his attitude on the Execu-
tive Committee of the Board (1940-1947). In 1946, as a matter of fact, when he
offered his resignation to the Board of Trustees, it was decided at a largely
attended meeting, with but one dissenting vote, that he be urged to withdraw
it so obvious was it to those who had ovserved him in action that he had fol-
lowed only the most exemplary, nonpartisan standards in his work for the
I PR and liad always been scrupulous in keeping his political views out of IPIl
affairs.
The Committee's counsel appeared to take exception to my having written
a letter recommending Mr. Field for a commission in Army Intelligence.'' I
testified that I had done so on the basis of his record of objective, nonpartisan
scholarship and factual accuracy while at the iPIi, and his background on
Japan. I was certain that Mr. Field would perform an outstanding service for
his country if granted a commission. For this reason I was glad to recommend
him.
The Committee made much of my letter to the War Department. / have never
been shown a copy of that letter, although it was made the basis of extensive
questioning. At the hearing on July 25th I did not remember fully the details of
this incident but, on the following day, when Mr. Field himself appeared as a
witness, the Subcommittee asked him many questions about his negotiations in
the matter of a commission in Army Intelligence. Here Field, under oath,
brought out that he did not initiate the proposal. On page 100 and following of
Part 1, Mr. Field stated clearly that the origin was the other way around. His
words were : "I was asked if I could accept a commission." ' Field subsequently
was asked to visit officers in Washington, where the matter was fully discussed.
Mr. Field in his testimony '° made it clear that, in his discussions in Washing-
ton, the question of his political views was discussed frankly and that finally he
was definitely offered a commission. In response to further questioning on this
same point by Senators Ferguson and O' Conor, Field testified again that he
revealed his views fully to Army Intelligence. Senator O'Conor asked what was
the problem on which Army Intelligence wanted Mr. Field's help. He replied that
it was the strategic bombing of Japan.
From a perusal of all of Field's testimony, it is apparent that Field was first
approached by an officer of United States Army Intelligence proposing that
Field accept a commission in that unit to work on the problem of the strategic
bombing of Japan. Subsequently, Army Intelligence asked Field to do what he
could to eliminate objections which had been made to his appointment by some-
one outside of the United States Army. Without the IPR files I cannot remember
at what stage I wrote my letter commending Field. Field, I remember, ap-
proached me and I volunteered to write a letter to the Army recommending him.
This I did in good faith, for the following reasons: (a) I knew that from
Japan's illegal occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and onward. Field had been a
constant and intense opponent of Japanese aggression; (b) I knew that Field
had a good knowledge of the Japanese economy, its industrial centers, railway
assembly yards, ship building facilities, communication centers, which, if dam-
aged, could deprive Japan of much of her economic power ; (c) I knew that Field
had extensive knowledge and facilities for bringing to the attention of highest
Anny authorities those locations and installations overseas which, if the Army
planned a large bombing program, would substantially weaken Japan's strength
and her war potential; (d) I was convinced that Field would throw himself
with complete abandon into the United States Government's attempt to weaken
and ultimately destroy Japanese aggression; (e) I was aware, too, that Field
had an excellent general knowledge not only of Japan, but of the Philippines
and China ; (f ) as I stated in my testimony, I was confident that if the security
agencies had derogatory data regarding Field that I did not possess, his appoint-
ment would not be approved. Under no circumstances could I conceive of a
letter from me taking ijrecedence over the recommendations of a security service
objection.
So far as I could see Army Intelligence wanted Field and wished that he could
overcome the objections to his serving. In view of the foregoing, I not only
had no hesitation about recommending him, I felt it was my patriotic duty
because, like him, I had seen on the spot, step by step, Japan's massive attempt
to become master of as much of China as possible. With Professor Chamber-
* Ibid., page 11.
"Ibid., page 106.
" Ibid., page 107.
O34:0 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
lain and others I had traveled across Europe and Siberia, arriving in Manchuria,
on the eve of the Mukden "incident." Our party traveled from the border to
Harbin and through no man's land to Changchung and Mukden where we were
Joined by Field, who had traveled through Japan and Korea, arriving in Muk-
den the night of the "incident." We saw concrete instances of the ever-ex-
panding plans of the .Japanese militarists. As Japan's aggression increased, I
had noted that Field became more deeply concerned. INIany of his studies were
calculated to aid our people and our Government in recognizing the danger of
Japan's march both to the vital interests of China and those of the United
States. His early isolationism toward Europe did not apply to the Far East.
Now I will revert to a part of the testimony which I will quote as follows from
pages 21 and 22 of Part I :
"Senator Eastland. You do not remember, then, whether or not you at-
tempted to get a commission in Army Air Force Intelligence for a member
of the Editorial Board of either the Daily Worker or the New Masses?
"Mr. Carter. I don't remember."
I did not remember because, at this time, Field had no editorial connection
with either of these publications (as shown above. Hearings, Exhibit No. 15,
pages 125-126).
Mr. INIorris asked whether I recalled that Field took a position with tl:e
American Peace Mobilization and had I known that that organization was Com-
munist coiitidlled." 1 rerlied that I knew that it was cited as that and that I
had come to the conclusion that the Communists took it over.
A the time of Pearl Harbor, Field's position (which had been isolationist
with reference to Europe up to .June 1941) changed radically. Here his position
seemed similar to that of a great company of other Americans including many
notable conservatives. The war had now developed away from the Chamberlain-
Daladier concept of appeasement. The attack on Pearl Harbor compelled the
United States to fight aggression. Here was a campaign to which all patriotic
Americans could be expected to respond with complete devotion. I was con-
vinced that to the war against Japan for which Field was so well fitted, he
would commit his remarkable gifts and knowledge with utter devotion. I could
not conceive then, nor can I conceive now, of his not having given everything
he had.
I wish to extend my remarks with reference to the autumn of 1940 when the
American Peace Mobilization was forming at a time when Quakers, pacifists,
Reds, and conservatives were trying to keep vis out of the Chamberlain-Daladier
war. I understood that the Chairman of the Peace Mobilization was a non-
Communist clergyman — the Chaplain of the University of Chicago. He had
associated with him not only Quakers, but other non-Communist American citi-
zens who wanted to keep our country out of war if possible. (This movement
synchronized and in many respects was parallel to the powerful America First
movement.)
Under what I understood to be pressure from the Chaplain of the University
of Chicago and others. Field responded to the invitation to become Executive
Secretary. At what point in the American Peace Mobilization the Communists
c; me to dominate, I never learned ; but, by the time of the picketing of the AVhite
House, I surmised that they had attained large influence. When I said to the
Subcommittee that at this time (i. e.. the picketing of the White House) Field
was behaving like a Communist, I did not mean to suggest that I knew him to be
a Communist or that I considered him as even a fellow traveler.
A little later. Senator O'Conor implied that I had been doing something detri-
mental to the interests of my country.^" I certainly did not and do not now think
I was doing anything detrimental. Please rememlier that at that time all the
Allies were concerned in stopping Japan and Germany. Field's special compe-
tence was such that I firmly believed his talents could be used in aiding in the
stopping of Japan.
Senator O'Conor then introduced a letter on the stationery of the periodical
Atuerasia. This I identified and noted that the editorial board included Professor
Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University. I would now like to remark
tliat AmeraMa was never connected with the IPR. Its Board and its authors
were a mixture of persons familiar with developments in Asia, but of widely
differing political points of view. Professor Colegrove of Northwestern, Dr.
Cyrus Peake of Columbia, and several others on its Board, could by no stretch
of the imagination be labeled as pro-Communist.
" Ibid., jmge 22.
" Ibid., page 30.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5341
2. THE LETTER FROM OWEN LATTIMORE OF JULT 10, 1938
Mr. Morris read two paragraphs from a long letter from Owen Lattimore to
me dated July 10, 1938." This letter became the subject of extensive question-
ing by members of the Subcommittee and its counsel. I was asked what was the
Inquiry referred to in that letter. I replied that it was an inquiry into the
issues of the Sino-Japanese War. I was in Peking in 1937 when the Japanese
came in and took over Tientsin and Peking. The Japanese were clearly on the
march. It seemed to me that here we had an opportunity while a major con-
flict was starting to get people of different points of view to analyze it.
It is now clear that at one of the preliminary planning stages of the Inquiry,
it had been proposed that Chi, Chen Han-seng and Asiaticus be asked to write
books for the Inquiry. The.se proposals along with many others were con-
tained in a letter of mine to Dr. Carl Alsberg who had served for so many years
as head of the Food Research Institute aided by Mr. Herbert Hoover at Stanford
University.
But later it was decided not to employ either Asiaticus or Chen Han-seng.
For particulars with reference to the limited and non-Inquiry series assignment
to Chi, please see page 23 of "A Personal View of the IPR", recently submitted
to the Subcommittee. The best evidence of the integrity of the IPR was not in
inter-staff letters, but in what was actually published in the Inquiry series, in its
many other published volumes and in its periodicals.
However, Lattimore's letter was attacked over and over again. When, at
long last, he was allowed to testify on February 26, 1952, he explained in detail
what he meant in the passages quoted from his letter.
In the early autumn of 1951 and continuing to December, I wrote several
times to Senator McCarran and Mr. Morris requesting copies of my corre-
spondence with Lattimore just prior to and following the letter to me of July
10, 1938. Although, last year, Mr. Morris told a Herald Tribune representative
that he was sending me the material, and although Mr. Mandel confirmed last
year that there was such material in the files, nothing was sent to me until
March 1952, when I received from Morris a copy of my letter to Lattimore of
July 19, 1938. This letter reveals so clearly the impartial position which the
IPR has endeavored to maintain throughout its history that I respectfully re-
quest that it be published in the Subcommittee's printed record. It is submitted
herewith and marked "Appendix A" to this statement.
3. DID I EEGARD ASIATICUS, CHEN HAN-SENG AND CHAO-TING CHI AS COMMUNISTS?
The purpose of the introduction of the Lattimore letter was apparently in-
tended to prove that Asiaticus, Chi and Chen Han-seng wei'e known to be
Communists.
My testimony regarding the three men was and is that I did not regard either
Chen Han-seng or Dr. Chi as Communists when they were writing for the
Institute. Today I do not know whether Chen Han-seng is a Party member or
not ; he left the United States last year, I believe. I do not know whether Chi
is a Party member or not. I was not aware of the fact that he wrote for China
Today under a pseudonym. I do know that for a long time he was an official in
the Kuomintang government of China, assisting Dr. H. H. Kung. The pre-
sumption now is that he is a Communist Party member because he is employed
in a high position by the Chinese Communist Government. Regarding Asi-
aticus, who never wrote a book in the IPR Inquiry series, I do know that he did
some writing for the IPR, but at the time I was not informed that he was a
Communist.
4. DID THE IPR EVER ATTEMPT TO PLACE PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS?
In response to Mr. Morris' question as to whether I was instrumental in hav-
ing Dr. Philip C. Jessup go into the State Department, I replied that I was not,
although we regarded him as a competent man. Senator Eastland apparently
ignored my denial of putting Jessup into the State Department when he asked
that I tell "who else they placed in the State Department." "
The implication of Senator Eastland's questions I believe to be completely
without foundation. The Senator here revealed a basic lack of knowledge, both
" Ibid., page 36.
« Ibid., page 32.
5342 INSTITUTE or pacific relations
of the Institute's policy and its history. From its beginning, the Institute has
maintained itself as a private and non-governmental society. It has refused
as strongly to bow befoi'e government pressure as it has refrained from putting
pressure on the government. Its raison d'etre from 192.5 to the present time has
been the important and distinctive role which it could play in public understand-
ing by remaining private and unofficial. There is ample justification for this in
terms of the American way of life. This was the accepted view of the national
units of the IPR in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philip-
pines, China, France, Holland, and in Japan. During the few years of activity
on the part of the Soviet Russian IPR, even its leaders made the best attempts
they could to disassociate their organization from foreign office control. Just
before Pearl Harbor the Japanese IPR was compelled to bow before government
pressure. The Chinese IPR throughout its history courageously resisted govern-
ment pressure.
To revert to the American IPR, I want to make it clear that what actually
happened was precisely the reverse of Senator Eastland's implication. Both the
American Institute and the International Secretariat had one major concern —
how could the IPR resources in research and personnel malie the maximum con-
tribution to the war effort. The case of eacli individual was studied carefully
with this objective in view. When some of the civilian agencies of the govern-
ment made inquiries regarding this or that person, I discussed the case with
the government representative in the light of the foregoing principle and usually
siicceeded in establishing the fact that the person concerned could help the
Allies most by continuing his or lier study of a problem which bore directly on
Allied success. My attitude toward those of my associates who were of mili-
tary age was, of course, different.
I remember that at one time, late in the war, when the IPR personnel consisted
only of older people, I had been invited to the Pentagon for conference with
Major General Fredericli Osborn and some of his colleagues. A Colonel on the
staff of General Osborn proposed that practically the entire American staff of
the IPR should enter the service of General Osborn's program. Flattering though
this was, I took the position that my associates and I could render the United
States a greater service by remaining at our posts. The deal was never con-
summated.
To the best of my knowledge, the IPR or its officers made no move whatsoever
in the matter of Jessup's entering the State Department. Over the years he
had acquired experience, stature and contacts which were even more imposing
than his invaluable service to the IPR. So far as I am informed, the initiative
came from the State Department, based on Jessup's long record as a scholar, in-
ternational lawyer and public servant.
Senator Eastland asked whether the Institute or whether I, as an official of
the Institute, recommended people to the State Department for employment. To
this I replied that several times we had had requests from several agencies of
the government for a man for this or that job. Senator Eastland reminded me
that he had asked about the State Department. I replied that a number of our
people, more of our junior staff, were employed in the State Department during
the war. Senator Eastland then asked who they were. I said that I thought
more of tlie people went into the Army, that Robert W. Barnett is in the State
Department at present. My testimony regarding Barnett was incomplete. He
did not go from the IPR into the State Department. He went from the IPR to,
I think, an OSS training course and thence to General Chennault's staff in
Kunming. Later, he was attached to the staff of the Far Eastern Commission
in Washington under General Frank R. McCoy. Whether that was a State De-
partment or an independent appointment, I do not remember. It was made
several years after he had resigned from the IPR staff. However, he has now
for some years been a State Department employee.
5. THE ILLBXIAL SEIZURE OF THE INSTITUTE'S FILES BY AN AGENT OF SENATOR
M'CARRAN'S SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Sourwine asked if I thought the seizure of the files was illegal, why wasn't
there a contention to that effect made in February or March rather than in July
in connection with the hearings. I replied that that question should be ad-
dressed to a responsible officer of the Institute."
" Ibid., page 43.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5343
At the close of the hearing, Mr. Holland reminded me that Mr. Sourwine was
completely wrong in his intimation that the Institute had made no previous
challenges to the legality of the Subcommittee's taking possession of the files.
He handed me a press release, dated February 16, 1951, which had been issued
by Mr. Gerard Swope, the Chairman of the AIPR, and which included a tele-
gram that the IPR had sent to Senator McCarran and other members of the Sub-
conmiittee, calling to their attention the fact that the Insitute's files had been
seized illegally.
Here is the text of the telegram sent to Senator McCarran and other members
of the Subcommittee :
"We respectfully call your attention to the recent publication in several
newspapers of materials obviously taken from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations which your Subcommittee has seized without any subpoena
being served either on Mr. Carter or on any officer of the Institute. As pre-
viously stated, we have no objection to these files being examined in an or-
derly manner by any properly accredited U. S. agency or to their being made
public through appropriate procedures.
"But we again appeal to you, in common decency and for the protection
of himdreds of persons named in the files, to see that such unauthorized and
partial leakages of private correspondence are stopped and that the ma-
terials are used fairly and not taken out of context. May we have your
public assurance on this?"
So far as I have been informed, Mr. Gerard Swope never received a reply
from Senator McCarran, or from any of the other members of the subcommittee,
or its staff.
6. HAS THE BOARD OF THE IPR EVER CONDUCTED AN INQUIRY INTO THE OPERATIONS OF
THE IPR TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS UNDER COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OB DOMINA-
TION?
Senator Ferguson asked a question about investigations within the IPR itself.^'
He said that I had indicated that prior to the Amerasia exposure there had bepn
an investigation on the so-called Kohlberg charges. A little later, Ferguson read "
what he described as a line or two of testimony, not giving the name of the person
icho testified to it. The anonymous writer asserted that the IPR investigation of
the Kohlberg charges was prepared by a staff member and then accepted by the
Executive Committee.
That description is not quite adequate. The Kohlberg charges were studied by
the Executive Committee, and very carefully analyzed by a subcommittee of three
Board members. The two committees were aided in this by a staff committee
designated for the purpose. A member of the staiT, Mrs. Stewart, was asked to
edit the written reports of all those who worked on the Kohlberg charges. This
she did. Her summary was then approved by the Executive Committee and issued
in mimeographed form.
There was a good and compelling reason why the officers and trustees of the IPR
had never been impressed by charges that the organization was serving as a
Communist front, or even influenced by Communists or any other partisan group.
The IRP trustees and especially the Executive Committee knew from first-hand
observation that such charges were completely groundless because they kept in
close personal touch with the organization and its publications. It would have
been impossible to pull the wool over the eyes of this group of representative
business, academic, and professional leaders. They were genuinely interested in
the IPR and felt a keen sense of responsibility regarding its successful operation.
They were all kept fully advised on the nature of Mr. Kohlberg's charges.
The Executive Committee met frequently, giving scrupulous attention to all
aspects of its progi-am and functioning. They were familiar with its publications
so they were not taken in by a few paragraphs taken out of context by an irre-
sponsible or dishonest critic. They were present at its conferences and observed
for themselves the high degree of nonpartisanship that characterized those meet-
ings. In short, they did not require an independent outside investiiration to prove
that the Institute was not a front for Communism. They knew it was not.
Senator Ferguson wanted to know whether or not it would be reasonable when
charges were made against an organization as large as the Institute that it was
acting as a front for Communism that someone would not have ordered another
^^ Ibid., page 45.
" Ibid., page 74.
5344 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
detailed investigation after the papers were seized, and whether or not they did,
and whether or not they made a report.^*
I replied that the charges made in recent months were in large part the same
baseless and irresponsible diaries that had been made by Mr. Kohlberg in
1944, that these had been investigated by the IPR and were not substantiated.
The recent charges were so similar, in some cases so identical, that the Institute
trustees felt that there was no use in going through them again. Senator Fer-
guson asked whether any officer, or group of officers, of the IPR had made an
independent check to ascertain whether there were any reasonable grounds for
the charges that the IPR was serving as a Communist front.
I replied that from the time of the Senate Subcommittee's illegal seizure of the
IPR files in early 1951, the officers and Executive Committee of the American IPR
have followed the proceedings in Washington. It has kept its members through-
out the United States Informed regarding the procedures of the Senate Sub-
committee. P\irther, it employed the firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland &
Kiendl to watch its interests. Inasmuch as the charges have so faithfully fol-
lowed the lines established and developed by Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, the officers
and the Executive Committee have felt that the investigation which the IPR made
of those charges in the 1945-1947 period was still valid. Mr. Holland, the In-
stitute's present chief executive, has, I believe, already submitted a copy of a
circular letter which was sent to all the members on March 17, 1947. This I
regard as valid today as it was then. It was signed by : Joseph P. Chamberlain,
Professor of Public Law, Columbia University ; ^^ Arthur H. Dean, attorney,
Sullivan & Cromwell, New York ; Walter F. Dillingham, Oahu Railway & Land
Company, Honolulu ; Brooks Emeny, formerly President of Cleveland Council of
World Affairs, now President of Forei.gn Policy Association, New York ; Hunting-
ton Gilchrist, American Cyanimid Company (now in Europe with MSA) ; W. R.
Herod, President, International General Electric ; Philip C. Jessup, then Professor
of International Law, Columbia University.
For purposes of emphasis. I enclose a copy of the letter of March 17, 1947.
I request that it be reproduced in tlie published record of the Sut>committee in
photostat form as "Appendix B" to this statement.
Reference has already been made to my service to the Chinese Mass Education
Movement and to Nankai University. As mentioned elsewhere, during the war I
was Chairman of the Program and Disbursements Committee of United China
Relief at the request of Henry R. Luce, W. R. Herod and B. A. Garside. (At the
same time, I was President of Russian War Relief.)
Mv services in United China Relief were imiiaired by an attack on me and on
UCR's Field Director in China, Mr. Dwight Edwards, by an importer of Chinese
textiles, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg. Mr. Kolilberg had been splendidly active in one
of UCR's constituent societies, the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China.
Although UCR contributed more to ABMAC than to any of the other societies,
Mr. Kohlberg came to the conclusion that we should give more to his society, and
thus less to the others. He launched an attack on Mr. Edwards and myself in a
long document which he submitted to the officers of the UCR. Charles A. Edison,
ex-Governor of New Jersey, was then President of UCR. He appointed a special
committee to listen to Mr. Kohlberg's charges. The committee consisted of Paul
G. Hoffman, Henry R. Luce and James G. Blaine, President of the Marine-Mid-
land Trust Company. These three men listened for some hours to Mr. Kohlberg,
Subsequently, they submitted to the UCR Board a report dismissing Mr. Kohl-
berg's charges. In addition, they recommended that Mr. Edwards' salary be in-
creased and that he be promoted to a vice presidency of UCR.
They exonerated me and, sometime later, a group of eminent Chinese in China
sent me an elaborate and hand.somely illuminated Chinese scroll testifying to
what they regarded as my distinguished service to the Chinese people."
The signers of this scroll included Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director General of
CNRRA (Ciiinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) ; Dr.
Chiang ]\Ion-lin, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan ; Dr. Han Lih-wu,
Vice Minister of Education; Bishop Paul Yu Pin, Catholic Bishop of Nanking;
Dr. Robert K. S. Lim, Surgeon General of the Chinese Army; Dr. Y. T. Tsur,
Minister of Agriculture: Dr. King Chu, Vice :Minister of Education; Dr. P. Z.
King, Director of the National Health Administration ; Dr. C. K. Chu, Director
of the National Health Institute; Mi-s. William C. Wang. Chairman of the
Women's Advisory Committee of the New Life Movement ; Mrs. Nora T. H. Chu,
" II>ifl.. pace 46.
^" Since deceased.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5345
Director of the National Association for Refugee Cliildren; Dr. Cliang Fu-liang,
General Secretary of the Chinese Industrial CooiDeratives ; Dr. Y. 8. Djaug,
Treasurer of the International Relief Connnittee ; Dr. H. C. Chang, Chief of the
Welfare Division of the Ministry of Social Affairs ; and Dr. A. Pan-tung Sah,
of the Academica Sinica.
A translation of part of the text in typically flowery Chinese was sent to me
by Dr. James L. ]McConanghy, at that time President of the UCR. Subsequently,
Dr. McConaughy became Governor of C-onnecticut. The translation was also
conveyed by Dr. McConaughy to ^Nlr. Alfred Kohlberg in a letter dated August
13. 1946. A copy of this letter is attached as "Appendix C" to this statement.
Mr. Kohlberg, having been refuted, resigned from ABMAC and all connection
with United China Relief. Some months later, however, he came up with a
violent attack on the Institute of Pacific Relations and on me pei'sonally. The
IPR made a thorough investigation of Mr. Kohlberg's charges and then, after
an effort to take his case to the courts, he was allowed to send his massive
attack to all of the members of the Institute throughout the United States,
appealing for proxies which would enable him to have the IPR investigated and
presumably re-organized to his liking.
Mr. Kohllierg's immense propaganda against the IPR did not pay off. He lost
his proxy battle decisivel.v — 66 members voted in his favor ; 1,163 members voted
against him, thus affirming their confidence in the Institute and its adminis-
tration.
7. PEOPLE WHO WERE AND WERE NOT. ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IPR
Counsel Morris announced that he was going to read a list of names that had
turned up with (jrcat frequevcy in the files."" The list purported to be a con-
densation of names of many people who were active in the Institute. I was
admonished to give a quick yes or no answer.
Mr. Morris' definition of "connection" was confusing because he described it
in three different ways. First, he said "people who were interested in the Insti-
tute" ; second, he said "names that were connected with the Institute in any
way" ; third and finally, he established his criteria as follows : "The standard
is this, Mr. Carter : They are either members of the staff, they were contributors
to IPR publications, they were members of the executive board of trustees, or
they performed substantial services in addition to their membership in the
IPR."
Further, Mr. Morris' method of query precluded advance notice so I could
have investigated to see what, if any, connection these individuals had had with
the IPR during the past 27 years. This, it seems to me, should have been done
if the Subcommittee had really desired to fulfill its announced purpose of getting
the facts. Mr. Morris' list was, of course, what some people might call a "loaded"
list. It was unfair because of the implication that the Subcommittee's staff had
assembled these names as thouffh they were principal personalities in the Insti-
tute's program and policies.
I should like to remind the Subcommittee that my entire life has not been
devoted to the Institute of Pacific Relations. That has been for a span of nearly
a quarter of a century. I've had a great many other contacts before and during
my IPR relationship: Y. M. C. A., Columbia University, RWR, UCR, ARI, China
Institute, Japan Society, the United Nations, and many others. After having
had connections with so many people. I do not see how, when a very long list of
names was suddenly presented to me, I could possibly have been expected to give
completely adequate answers, as well as accurate ones.
I now wish fully and frankly to declare that several of my answers were in-
accurate or inadequate. Here I will set down the correction and amplification
of my answers in the light of Mr. Morris' final criteria. For ease of reference,
I will put the names of those I refer to in capital letters. My replies to Mr.
Morris at the hearing will be in italics. These will be followed by my current
comments."^
SoLOMOX Adler. I can't answer.
My answer is that Adler met none of Morris' criteria.
James S. Allex. / think he irrote one article.
As a matter of fact, he wrote two articles for Pacific Affairs.
Betty Barnes. Yes.
This is incorrect — my reply is no.
^ Ibid., pages 69 through 73.
-1 Those comments are based in part on data furnished to me bv the Institute of Pacific
Relations.
5346 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Esther Brunauer. Yes.
This is incorrect — my answer is no.
Evans Carlson. Lecturer. Yes.
My reply is that he wrote a book in the Inquiry Series on the Chinese Na-
tionalist Army, and a few articles. He was a Brigadier General in the Marines
and commanded "Carlson's Raiders."
O. Edmund Clubb. Yes.
He wrote a single article for the Far Eastern Survey which was published in
1950.
Frank V. Coe. Yes.
This is incorrect — my answer is no.
John Davies. Yes.
This is incorrect — my answer is no.
Hugh Deane. / don't remember.
It seems he wrote on article for the Far Eastern Survey.
EiiiLE Despres. / doiit remember.
The answer is no.
Lawrence Duggan. Yes.
This is incorrect — my answer is no.
Theodore Draper. Dromedary Dates, teas he, or Federal Reserve? Yes, I had
lunch icith Mm one day.
Mr. Morris then asked, "Was he connected with the IPR, Mr. Carter?" I
replied : / don't think so.
My answer is no. The Draper with the Federal Reserve System was another
person (Ernest G. Draper).
Julian Friedman. We had a Friedman whose name was Irving. I don't place
Julian.
Julian Friedman wrote a supplement to a monograph by Epstein entitled
"Notes on Labor in Nationalist China."
Mark J. Gayn. Yes, slight.
The answer is no.
Haldore Hanson. Ycs.
This is incorrect — my answer is no.
Philip J. Jaffe. Yes.
My answer is no. He met none of Mr. Morris' criteria. He was a contributing
member as were hundreds of others.
Sergei Kournakoff. Don't rciwcmber.
My answer is no. To this day I have failed to identify him.
Corliss Lamont. Contributor. Yes.
Actually, Mr. Lamont met none of Mr. Morris' criteria. Mr. Morris avoided
mentioning Mr. Thomas W. Lamont who contributed many times as much money
as his son, and a great deal more of his time.
Duncan C. Lee. Yes, sir.
This is incorrect — my answer is no.
Michael Lee. Attended a conference, yes.
My answer is no.
HozuMi OzAKi. Ex-mayor of Tokyo. Maybe, I don't knoiv.
Mr. Morris then asked "Was he not a delegate to your Yosemite Conference
in 1930?" To which I replied : Yes.
There were two Ozakis. One had been the greatly venerated mayor of Tokyo.
The one who attended the Yosemite Conference way back in 19.36 was, at that
time, attached to one of Japan's greatest newspapers, The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun.
He contrIl)uted a data paper for Yosemite on recent development in Sino-
Japanese relations.
Fred Poland. Yes.
This is incorrect — my answer is no.
Mildred Price. / don't know.
The answer is that she met none of Morris' criteria.
LuDwiG R^xjcHMAN. / don't remember. I remember him. I don't remember his
IPR connections. * * *
The answer is no. Dr. Rajchman, a Polish citizen, was long a member of the
International Health staff of the League of Nations. For many years, he was a
close associate and assistant to the Honorable T. V. Soong, both in China and
in Washington. Because of his knowledge of China he was proposed, I think,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5347
by some influential Knomintang person for membership in the international
IPR conference at Mt. Tremblant in Canada in 1942. As a Pole, he could not be
admitted as a regular conference member because no Polish organization
was affiliated with the IPR. I remember that be was invited to attend as an
observer, but for some reason he did not accept.
Helen ScHNEiDsai. Don-t rememher.
Mr. Morris asked "Was she not a staff worker?" To which I replied: I don't
remeviher.
Subsequent inquiry reveals that she was employed as Business Manager of
Pacific Affairs for about two years in the late 1940's.
John S. Service. Yes.
The answer is tw. Mr. Service met none of Morris' criteria.
Agnes Smedley. Yes; she was a member for two years.
The answer is no. Dues-paying members did not meet the criteria set up by
Morris.
Mary van KI-eek. I don't knoic. I know her, but I don't remember her in an
IPR connection.
Mr. Morris asked "Did she not write for your publication?" I replied: I
don't remember.
My answer is that Miss Van Kleek contributed one article to Pacific Affairs in
June 19.38.
HARRY Dexter White. Very limited; yes.
The answer is )io. Mr. White was not even a member of the IPR. He did not
meet any of the Morris criteria.
Ella Winter. / don't remember.
Miss Winter contributed one article to Pacific Affairs in 1935.
Following the foregoing colloquy I endeavored to point out that the Morris list
was not at all representative. It could not be regarded as a balanced sample
of people who influenced IPR publications and policies. I reminded the Chair-
man that, at the outset, he wanted me to give the whole picture. If I had done
this, I would have been able to mention the names of a far longer list than that
of Morris'. These would have been people who rendered a much greater service
than the majority of those that Morris mentioned.
8. the role of the IPR IN MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR PlilVATE CITIZENS AND OFFICIALS
IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO MEET PEOPLE OF OPPOSING FAR EASTERN BACKGROUNDS
AND UNPALATABLE VIEWPOINTS
Mr. Morris introduced an article by Rogov printed in the Soviet trade union
periodical, "The "War and the Working Class." '-
I asked that I be supplied with an extra copy of that article. Morris replied
than an extra copy would be made for me."^ (This he failed to do, but many weeks
later it appeared in the published edition of the Hearings. )
Morris asked whether I took Rogov to introduce him to important Government
officials in Washington. I said yes, but this should be qualified. I did not take
him personally. From New York I wrote letters suggesting that several Wash-
ington people might wish to meet him. This was a routine procedure at the
IPR. I regarded it as part of my .lob to acquaint Americans and others — both
officials and laymen — with visiting Europeans and Asians who were well informed
on the Far East.
Mr. Morris made a great deal of the fact that I wrote to Mr. Alger Hiss to
inquire whether his chief. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, would wish to see Rogov.
I replied stating that Hiss was Hornbeck's secretary or assistant and a natural
channel. I should add that I was following correct State Department protocol.
In the matter of high officials seeing a citizen of a foreign country whom they
might not wish to see, the proper procedui'e was to approach them through a
subordinate, so that the higher official might not have to be placed in the position
of himself refusing to see a foreigner.
It so happens that Rogov, in my view, bad special credentials. These came
from Knomintang Chinese, American and British friends of mine who knew full
well that he was a hundred percent Russian Communist. For example, Dr.
Hollington Tong, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's principal public relations
adviser, told me that there was hardly one foreign correspondent in China
who knew China as widely as Rogov. He mentioned Rogov's mastery of the
« Ibid., page 128.
2» Ibid., pages 130-131.
5348
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Chinese language and added that he liad travelled more widely in China tliam
almost any correspondent.
This was also the view of Christopher Chancellor, of Reuters ; Liu Yu-wan, then
secretary of the China IPR; and several of the American correspondents.
I conceived it as one of my duties to use every opportunity to promote occa-
sions when people of different backgrounds and diverse points of view could meet
informally to discuss problems of public importance.
In 1940, for example, the then British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, whom I had
known intimately for years, invited me to lunch at the British Embassy in Wash-
ington to meet the late Sir Stafford Cripps, who had just returned from a visit to
Asia. Lord Lothian believed that I would want to hear of Cripps' impressions.
His remarks at lunch were so illuminating that I arranged for him to meet a
dozen or more people later at a private dinner in New York.
Earlier, in the mid-1930's, when Prince Konoye was visiting this country, I
gave a lunch in his honor in private rooms at the Century Club, so that a number
of Americans might meet him.
Later, in 1939, when I was visiting in Japan and China, I received word from
Dr. S. K. Datta, principal of the Forman College in Lahore, urging that I visit
India to discuss with him and with Pandit Nehru the organization of an IPR
affiliate in India. I cabled that on my flight from China to Europe I would be
glad to stop over for a few days, in order to meet Nehru and himself. The
three of us spent twelve hours in intimate conversation about the problems of
India, and about the ways and means for forming the India section of the IPR.
Naturally, Nehru and Datta asked me my impressions of Japan and China. To-
ward the end of the day, I told Nehru that I thought it was of the utmost im-
portance that he should visit China himself. He retorted that he had never
had an invitation. I replied that I was sure that the China IPR would invite
him, if it thought that there was any chance of his accepting.
So I cabled to Mr. Liu Yu-wan, the secretary of the China IPR, suggesting
that he cable an inviation to Nehru to visit China. I then took the plane for
Amsterdam. On arriving there, I received a cable from Nehru, saying that the
China IPR, a number of other Chinese organizations, and the Generalissimo had
all cabled him, inviting him to visit Chungking, and what should he do. I simplj^
replied "accept."
This he did. He flew to Chungking as the guest of the Generalissimo and
received an overwhelming reception. He had an exceptional opportunity for a
long, intimate talk with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang for, in the middle
of a big state dinner in Nehru's honor, there was a Japanese air raid on Chung-
king. The Chiangs took Nehru alone to one of those deep shelters in the cliffs of
wartime Chungking, where, for several hours, under rather dramatic circum-
stances, the three of them were able quietly to discuss the common problems of
the two most populated countries in the world — China and India.
Upon my return to the United States, I called on the then Chief of the State-
Department's Far Eastern Division, Dr. Stanley K. Hoi-nbeck, and reported on
what I thought were the significant features of the experiences on my journey.
He was so impressed that he asked if he could turn me over to interested officers
in the office of Naval Intelligence and G-2 in the "War Department. As a result,.
I was invited to spend a long morning at one of the War Department's offices.
Both the Army and Navy officers were interested in my impressions, especially
with reference to Japan. China, Korea, and the Soviet Far East. I had been in
Peiping and Tientsin when the Japanese took over at the time of Marco Polo-
Bridge in 10.37. I had passed through the Japanese lines to Manchuria where,
in the capital (Change-hung), I was received by Lieutenant General Hoshino and
members of his staff". Hoshino was the commanding General of the Japanese
Army in Manchuria and had authority over all Japanese, whether civilian or
military.
Those who were present at the conference at the War Department mentioned
above were :
Captain W. L. Lind, U. S. N
Commander S. M. Creighton. U. S. N
Captain W. L. Bales, U. S. M. C
Colonel Geo. V. Strong, U. S. A
Lieut Col. P. E. Van Nostrand, U. S. A—
Lieut. Col. R. S. Bratton, U. S. A
Major William Mayer, U. S. A
Office of Naval Intelligence.
Do.
Do.
War Department, G-2.
Do.
Do.
Do.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5349
In the summer of 1942. Mr. Henry R. Luce (publisher of Time, Life, and
Fortune) told me that he was eager to have Mr. Wendell Willkie familiarize
himself with the Far Eastern situation by vLsiting China. Because of Mr.
Willkie's relationship to President Roosevelt, Mr. Luce told me that he assumed
that if Mr. "Willkie could be persuaded to go to China, he would want to avoid
a presidential veto. As Mr. Lauchlin Currie was the one of the President's
six executive assistants who was dealing, with Chinese affairs on behalf of INIr.
Roosevelt, it was suggested that I might arrange for Mr. Willkie to meet with
Mr. Luce, Mr. Currie and myself informally to talk the matter over.
I then gave a small private dinner in New York at which my guests were Mr.
Willkie, Mr. Luce, and Mr. Currie. During most of the dinner, the conversation
stemmed from Mr. Willkie's request that the three of us should tell him as much
as we could about China. He did his liest to get us to explain the Chinese
situation and to get IMr. Luce and me to indicate why we thought a visit to
China by him< would be in the public interest.
Toward the end of the evening the delicate question of Mr. Willkie's relation-
ship to the President in the matter of a possible visit to China was discussed.
If I remember rightly, Mr. Currie had not discussed the matter with Mr. Roo.se-
velt prior to the dinner. He indicated, however, that in his personal opinion
such a visit by Mr. Willkie would be useful. Mr. Currie clearly thought that
the more intelligent Americans made a first-hand study of China, the better.
The dinner ended without any firm commitment on either side. It was, how-
ever, a valuable and highly intei-esting affair.
I have forgotten precisely what happened subsequently but, as is well known.
Mr. Willkie with Mr. Roosevelt's blessing on his around-the-world journey did
visit China and. on his return, gave the American public the benefit of his im-
pressions of China and of the Chinese leaders. I was personally glad that Mr.
Willkie had visited China because of wliat he brought back to the public, and
also because I was at that time Chairman of the Disbursements and Program
Committee of United China Relief. Mr. Willkie's service to that organization
in securing greater interest in China's needs was of great value to UCR.
In the winter of 1934—35, when Mrs. Carter and I were in England prior to
proceeding to India, China, .lapan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand,
we were invited by an old friend. 'Mv. Philip Kerr, for a week end at Blickling
Hall in Norfolk. Mr. Kerr was then head of the Cecil Rhodes Trust in Oxford.
Later he became Lord Lothian and British Ambassador in Washington.
Among the other guests were Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Admiral Standley, the
Honorable Norman H. Davis and Sir Archibald Sinclair, M. P., who later became
Secretary for Air in Mr. Churchill's War Cabinet.
Because of my knowledge of Asia and Mr. Davis' concern with the continuing
repercussions of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, our host led the discus-
sions again and again to the Far East, both during the meals and before and
after. Mr. Chamberlain seemed to be so impressed with my general knowledge
of the Far East that he subsequently invited me to lunch in London. Toward the
end of our talk, the conversation swung around to India with which I had had
considerable contact since 1902 when I first went to live and travel in that sub-
continent. After inquiring as to the purposes of my Indian visit (which were to
inquire as to the possibilities of establishing an Indian affiliate of the IPR and
to see Mr. Gandhi, in whom my friends in the Far East were immensely inter-
ested), Mr. Chamberlain expressed his desire to have me talk with Lord Wil-
lingdon. then Viceroy of India.
This he arranged presumably by cable for, on our arrival in Bombay, a mes-
senger from the Viceroy met our steamer with an invitation from Lord Willing-
don to proceed immediately to New Delhi as his guests. There we stayed for a
few days at Viceroy's House, where we had long talks with him and Lady
Willingdon. We met members of his government and staff and attended the
festivities in honor of the visiting Mahaiajah of Nepal. Lord Willingdon ex-
pressed the hope that after his term as Viceroy was over, he himself could visit
the Far East. He questioned me extensively about conditions in that area and
wished me well on my impending visit to Gandhi in Central India. He added
that I was fortunate to have this opportunity and added that he had made a
mistake in affirming that while he was Viceroy he would never meet Gandhi.
His official interest in the possibility of the eventual establishment of an
Indian affiliate of the IPR luckily did not obstruct but aided indirectly in the
eventual establishment of the Indian Council of World Affairs. This today is
•one of the strongest members of the Institute.
5350 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This catalogue could continue to excessive length. It is included here only to
point out that I made it my business as Secretary-General to inform both private
citizens and government representatives of the developing work of the IPR and
the IPR's desire to secure authentic information from as many sources as
possible.
9. HOW DID I HAPPEN TO STJGGEST THAT* A PKO-COMMUNIST BOOK BE SENT CE:RTAIN
AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND SENATORS?
I was asked several questions regarding a book published by Little Brown & Co.,
entitled The Unfinished Revolution in China by Israel Epstein."^ In response
to an inquiry by the publisher's publicity director, Miss Anne Ford, for sugges-
tions as to whom she might send the book, I wrote Miss Ford making a number of
suggestions. It was a frequent procedure for publishers to consult the IPR on
such occasions. But I want to point that this was not an IFR hook. It was
published quite independently of the IPR by Little Brown & Co., a reputable pub-
lishing firm.
In reply to Miss Ford's inquiry for a list of names to whom she might mail
copies, I indicated that I had read two-thirds of it and I thought it important
for Little Brown to send copies of the Secretary of State, to Senators Vandenberg,
Morse and Ives, and also to John Foster Dulles, John Carter Vincent, United
States Ambassador Leighton Stuart and others in China. Knowing the com-
petence of all of the foregoing, I did not thiidf that the reading of a single book
would sway them. This appeared to me to be the first major postwar book that
had appeared on the Chinese Communist program in North China. The first
part of the book contained a great amount oi' material that had not been available
to the public.
In suggesting that it be sent to American officials and Senators, however,
I did not expect any one of them to accept the book as anything more than the
outlook of one person. To think that such wise Americans as those I men-
tioned would be swayed by the book strikes me as ridiculous and childish.
Those who are familiar with the ability and integrity of the late Senator
Vandenberg, for example, could hardly picture him as being thrown off balance
by one book from a little known author.
Whether Miss Ford did actually send copies to any or all on the list, or whether
any of them read the book, I have never learned. Today I am convinced that if a
large number of thoughtful Americans and Chinese had more seriously studied
the sort of problems which Epstein outlined, we would have been better prepared
to meet the challenge of Chinese communism in subsequent years.
10. THE INSTITUTE EXPLORED MANY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
In its research studies and at. its conferences, the Institute unhesitatingly
focussed attention on the "hot spots" of Far Eastern conditions. Listed below
are a few examples of published studies of issues that were highly controversial
at the time they were undertaken :
Extra-territoriaUtij in China, by James T. Shotwell (1929)
Tariff Autonomy of China, by Mingchien Bau (1929)
The ManchuriaH Dilemma-Force or Pacific ISettlement f by Shuhsi Hsu (1931)
Land and Labor in China, by R. H. Tawney (1932)
Trade and Trade Rivalry Betivccn the United States and Japan, by W. W.
Lockwood (1936)
The Strnci<nefor North China, by George E. Taylor (1940)
Social and Industrial Problems of Shanghai, by Eleanor Hinder (1940)
Japan and the Opium Menace, by Frederick T. iSIerill (1942)
British Economic Interests in the Far East, by E. M. Gull (1943)
Industrial Development of the Netherlands-Indies, by Peter Sitsen (1944)
American Policy and the Chinese Revolution {1925-1928), by Dorothy Borg
(1947)
The Chinese in Malaya, by Victor Purcell (1948)
Manclmria Since 1931, by F. C. Jones (1949)
Korea Today, by George McCune (1950)
^ Ibid., pages 452-466.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5351
11. FACTS ABOUT IPR JtETHODS AND PURPOSES OF WHICH THE M'CARRAN SUBCOM-
MITTEE HAS SHOWN LITTLE UNDERSTANDING
From the line of the questions put by members and counsel of the McCarran
Subcommittee, it would appear that they are so obsessed by the fairy tale which
had been fabricated of the IPR as a Communist front and espionage agency that
they could not examine the true purpose and achievements of the Institute
throughout its history.
They seem to have refused to acknowledge the plain fact that here is an organ-
ization that has adopted the most nonpartisan, democratic of methods in an
eflort to add to the fund of human knc'wledge on the Pacific. Closing their eyes
to the preponderance of reliable evidence in the IPR record, the Subcommittee
has become a prisoner of its own unethical procedure of taking isolated letters,
documents and sentences from published volumes completely out of context, both
as to date and substance. Ignoring the full pattern of the organization's woik,
they have built their case on the flimsy basis of minor and unrelated threads.
Particularly startling is the fact that these Senators of the United States show
so little understanding of the abysmal ignorance of the Far East on the part of
the American people, and fail so utterly to appreciate the need for the very type
of program the Institute has carried on this past quarter century. (I have
found as yet no evidence that more than one of the Subcommittee has ever set
foot in Asia.)
Yet the founders of the IPR faced the problem of public inertia from the first.
In 192.J, they saw clearly that if anything was to be done to increase American
knowledge of the Pacific, many sectors of American life had to be aroused to a
sense of the need of more information on the subject. This meant that fresh
factual material had to be prepared. New research personnel must be recruited
and trained, and linguistic skills had to be developed. Funds for the new venture
had to be raised. Media for testing and ditfusing the new knowledge had to be
devi-sed, and a long-range plan developed for mobilizing scholars, teachers,
librarians, businessmen, publicists and others to our work.
The founders realized, too, that the underlying approach of the new organiza-
tion would be all-important. Committed to the task of studying the problems of
many peoples whose outlook was dift'erent and whose viewpoint might fre-
quently conflict, they saw that it would necessarily have to adopt a coldly
scientific attitude in all its activities, and would have to be completely non-
partisan. It would have to assemble data from all countries concerned with
each issue studied. It would have to show the same hospitality to the "unpalata-
ble" as to the "palatable" point of view on controversial issues.
Thus the standard was set up for the organization — a strict standard of
accuracy, objectivity and nonpartisanship. For twenty-seven years this philoso-
phy has shaped the work of the IPR. It has been respected throughout the world.
The McCarran Subcommittee seems to have missed its significance.
They have failed utterly to understand that here is an organization which has
refused to be limited to safe issues and the viewpoints of a chosen few.
This is an organization whose standards of scientific inquiry have been so
strict and so generally respected, that for the past quarter century it has been
able to focus the spotlight of study and discussion on the "hot spots" of Asia and
East-West relations — on the most controversial issues of our time. It is obvious
to anyone of unbiased mind that this has been an outstanding achievement.
It has made a unique contribution to the record of human knowledge. Only
men of small minds would wish to see it changed either in approach or content.
Bankers, industrialists, scholars and journalists in several countries, including
the United States, do however desire one change. They urge that its program
be enlarged.
One eminent American who holds this view is IMr. Gerard Swope, the honorary
president of the General Electric Company, and the active chairman of the
American Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to close this page by
quoting a paragraph from a statement which Mr. Swope made at a press confer-
ence in New York on October 9, 1951, as follows :
"If the day ever comes when it will not be possible for a private non-
partisan society like the American Institute of Pacific Relations to seek and
publish facts without fear of political reprisal, and to present to the public
differing opinions on controversial issues, something essential to the Amer-
ican way of life will have been lost."
5352 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
12. FURTHER AMPLIFICATION, CORRECTION AND CLARIFICATION
(o) The Subcommittrr's procedures contrasted with those proposed by Senators
Kefauver and 0' Conor
The officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations are only a few of many Ameri-
cans who believe that the time has come to establish a sound set of procedures for
Senate investigatory committees. For example, Senator Estes Kefauver has
shown his concern by introducing S. Con. Res. 44. This has not yet been referred
out of the Committee on Rules and Administration. I understand that Senator
Kefauver does not expect that there will be a revision of Senate committee pro-
cedures until this resolution is adopted by the Senate. It should be noted that he is
a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, although he is- not a member of that
body's subcommittee on the Institute of Pacific Relations.
I would like i-espectfuUy to call attention also to the admirable suggestions
for Senate committees' procedures which were put forward last year by Senator
O'Conor, an eminent member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and also a mem-
ber of the Subcommittee on the IPR. A few weeks after Senator McCarran's Sub-
committee began its public sessions, Senator O'Conor made a widely publicized
statement in the course of an address before Chief Justices of the State Supreme
Courts, New York, September 13, 1951. In this statement, like Senator Kefauver's,
he summarized the principles that should guide the procedures of Senate investi-
gating committees. Nevertheless, in not one of the sevex-al sessions of the McCar-
ran Committee which I had the privilege of attending in 1951, did I note evidence
that the Subcommittee was following the admirable courses which two members of
the Judiciary Committee had already advanced and advocated.
Under these circumstances it was inevitable that many of our citizens, including
officers of the IPR and its attorneys, were inclined to believe that the Senate Com-
mittee was not keeping up-to-date with reference to the march of American
thought. The Subcommittee's sessions which I attended took on the atmospliere of
an inquisition rather than that of a scientific inquiry.
Perhaps this was not so much the fault of the Senators as that of the Subcom-
mittee's counsel, Mr. Robert Morris. Illustrations of procedures and tactics which
I personally challenge are as follows :
(1) The Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Morris, made an effort to put words into
my mouth by summarizing remarks which I had just made, but in a quite different
sense.
(2) From September 1951 to March 1952, I\Ir. Morris failed to keep his promises
to provide me with copies of material from the IPR tiles which I requested in order
that I might answer questions intelligently.
(3) I was asked to comment on Mr. Owen Lattimore's long letter to me of July
1938, before I had time to read it. In another case I was to read a part of a letter
but ordered not to look at the rest of the contents.
(4) Mr. Morris avoided answering my questions as to the dates when Mr. Field
wrote for leftist publications, i. e., The New Masses and The Daily Wo7-ker. It
now appears from the Subcommittee's printed record, which was not published
for several weeks after the session in which I interrogated Mr. Morris, that Field
did not write for either of these two publications until a considerable time after he
had ceased to be an executive officer of the Institute.
(5) I am free to admit that even if a truly American procedure had been fol-
fowed, I wouhl still have been handicapped. The Institute's Secretary General
and also the Institute's attorneys, Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl,
requested that the Senate Subcommittee return to the IPR files which an agent
of the Subcommittee had seized illegally from my barn at Lee, Massachusetts. The
Subcommittee failed to reply to these requests, nor did they offer even limited ac-
cess to those IPR files which were stored in the Senate Office Building until some
thirteen months after the robbery took place. Without access to these records
during the hearings, I could not answer many of Mr. Morris' questions with satis-
faction either to the Committee or to myself.
(b) Senator Ferguson's irritation at my implication that the IPR files had been
tampered with
(Pp. 44-45) Here Senator Ferguson was apparently annoyed at a remark of
mine that had implied that I suspected that the old files stored by the IPR in my
barn at Lee, ^Massachusetts, might have been tampered with. That my suspicion
was justified, but in a quite different context, was clear from the following.
At the time of the Subcommittee's illegal seizure of the files, it became apparent
that the tiles had been tampered with prior to the Subcommittee's raid. It
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5353
is now a matter of public record that an agent of Senator :MeCarthy was party
to robbing the barn on two occasions prior to the Subcommittee's seizure. Sena-
tor I^Iundt has been l)oId enough to malve this sorry spectacle available to the
public The occasion of this was the appearance in The New York Post, on
September IS, 1951, of one of a series of articles by Oliver Pilat and William V.
Shannon. The pertinent excerpt is as follows : , .-r ^-, ^
"Early in 1951, McCarthy was again poaching on Hoovers (J. I.dgar)
preserves. Surine, his investigator, broke into a barn in Lee, Mass., and
carried off some of the documents tliat had been stored there by the Institute
of Pacific Relations. The IPli had already offered to let any authorized
government agency go through the papers. In the summer of 1950, several
FBI agents spent weeks iwring over the material. Surine was unauthorized
but eauer to score a beat for McCarthy.
" 'Surine got the papers through one of the methods used by investigators
generally, without the knowledge of the IPR,' boasted Sen. Mundt (K—
S D.), :"i' friend of McCarthy's who found the adventure a diversion from
tlie weightier problems of his office. 'I don't think I'd better say just how
he got tliem. It might get somebody into a lot of trouble,' Mundt told this
newsi^ai^er.
" 'Surine brought some of the documents to :\IcCarthy. McCarthy brought
the samples to me. I went through part of them and Joe went through the
others. Surine said the FBI was watching the barn and he was afrai'd the
IPR might find that out and move the papers. We decided something had
to be done quickly.
" 'We finaliv decided that Joe should talk it over with Senator McCarran
(D — Nev.), chairman of the new judicial suljcommittee investigating Com-
munism. He did and the subcommittee decided to issue a subpena for the
documents! I suggested that instead of serving the subpena on officials of
the IPR it be served on the caretaker of the farm so there would be no
pooaibiuty of the records being destroyed. That's the way it was done.'
"That isn't quite the whole story. Surine took thousands of letters from
the farm in the course of two different trips. He brought them to the
otflce of Matthews (J. B.) in Hearst headquarters at 8th Avenue and 57th
Street, where some of the more interesting ones were photostated. The
samples examined by Mundt came from his cache. The real purpose of the
McCarran seizure was to cover up the earlier escapade.
"The Mundt statement carried an implication that the FBI was not quite
bright enough to protect the papers. The FBI may have noticed that, too.
"The FBI does not discuss grievances against a Senator or a former FBI
man for the public record. It issued no statement on the Suriue-McCarthy-
Matthews-Mundt melodrama. It did, however, summon Surine and Matthews
privately for extended questioning about the documents and the way they were
acquired."
(c) Correction of my testimony regarding Alger Hiss
(Pp. 135-136) Here either I, myself, or the stenotypist, was responsible for
totally misleading statements. Senator McCarran asked whether Mr. Hiss was
not an assistant to Dr. Hornbeck, although I had designated him as a secretary.
The printed hearings record me as having stated twice that Mr. Hiss was not
much more than a .stenographer. I was then asked whether it was not true
that Mr. Hiss had an office of his own, separate and apart from Dr. Hornbeck.
My reply was :
"You went in and there were two or three lady secretaries, and receptionists,
and so on, and to the right was one of those old State Department lattice doors,
and you went in to Hornbeck ; and at the left you went in to Hiss, and it was
a much smaller office, and as I remember it there was not a lattice door ; and that
was the geography of it."
I am sure I meant to say that Mr. Hiss clearly was much more than a ste-
nographer. Of course, I knew at the time of my visits to Dr. Horubeck's office
that Mr. Hiss was Dr. Hornheck's principal and highly valued assistant.
(d) The Committee on Militarism in Education
In the early summer of 1940, Mr. Field asked me for my opinion regarding
invitations which both he and I had received from what was called the Committee
on ^Militarism in Education to sign the Declaration Against Conscription. I did
not accept the invitation. I learned later that Mr. Field did not do so either.
I now wish to quote for insertion in the Subcommittee's printed record the
following copy of my letter of July 2, 1940, to Field on this matter :
88348 — 52 — pt. 14 — —2^
5354 EsrsTiTUTE of pacific relations
"Dear Fred : I did not respond to the invitation of tlie Committee on
Militarism in Education to sign the Declaration Against Conscription be-
cause I couldn't agree to sign it and I didn't have the time to write an
adequate letter explaining why I couldn't sign it.
"Some of my reasons for dissent are as follows:
"1. The main body of the declaration seeks to prove that we are not in
danger. I believe that American interests including American ways of life
are greatly endangered by both Germany and Japan.
"2. This declaration appears to malie the point that because a thing has
never been necessary in the past it will never be necessary in the future.
"3. I think mass conscription of whatever forces are necessary whether
it is five per cent or fifty per cent of our citizens is much healthier and
democratic than the building up of an aristocratic professional army.
"If, for example, Versailles had permitted Germany a democratic army
the post-war history of Germany might have been different. By limiting
Germany to 100 thousand, Versailles created an aristocratic army which was
predominantly Prussian. In other words, it perpetuated the Prussian mili-
tary caste, the destruction of which was one of the announced aims of
the Allies in going to war with Germany. This Prussian military caste
was even more influential in bringing Hitler to power than German big
business.
"With you, I would like to see a public authoritative study of our defense
needs. I think such a study would prove the one sound' point which I
find in this declaration, namely, the last sentence — 'that comparatively
small forces of highly trained soldier-mechanics, properly equipped, can
defeat many times their number of partially trained civilian conscripts re-
gardless of how courageous tho latter may be.' I want to see the government
have the power to conscript highly trained solclier-iiiechanics to whatever
extent necessary, but on a mass and democratic basis, not on the bnsis of
aristocracy or poverty.
"Most of the declaration makes me sick at its emotional ardor for the
American tradition and its total blindness to the dangers that confront
us. I know that Hitler didn't pay for the drafting of this declaration, but
he would get his money's worth out of its publication if he had contributed
a large sum to its drafting. Until we as a people are willing to back up
our I)eliefs with force, I see nothing but the total eclipse of civilization
ahead.
"Sincerely yours,
"Edward C. Carter."
(e) "Death does not rob a man of his place in history."
In opening the session of August 2, 1951, Senator McCarran spoke in part as
follows :
(P. 223) "Let me say before commencing the hearing of today I wou'd like
to mention tliat the names of people now dead will figure in today's testi-
mony. I would like to say that the introduction of such names into the
record is done with reluctance because we are aware that it is not for us to
pass judgment on those who have passed beyond. But a congressional com-
mittee, charged with a henvy duty, must present every possible fact to shed
light on present-day conspiracy. Thus an association of 5 or 10 years back
involving a man or woman now dead can well illuminate a relationship of
today or aid in characterizing a living con.spirator. Death does not rob a
man of his place in history. It is in this spirit then that reference will be
made to the dead today."
Here Senator McCarran was preparing the way for the next witness, Mrs. Hede
Massing, to pass judgment on Mr. Laurence Duggan when he was no longer alive
to answer Mrs. IMassing's charges. Senator McCarran's outlook could hardly
have had a better Illustration, for witli the voice of one who was so deeply pained
at the thought of mentioning the name of a deceased person, he said : "It is not for
us to pass judgment on those who have passed beyond."
Mrs. Massing wns given the opportunity of explaining her role as a Communist
agent and then told of her success in recruiting Laurence Duggan into the Com-
munist apparatus.
Against Mrs. Massing's boast regarding Duggan must be set the flatly contrary
statements of Whittaker Chambers, Isaac Don Levine, Attorney General Tom
Clark and Richard M. Nixon. These are to be found in the memorial volume
published by the Overbrook Press of Stamford, Conn., entitled "Laurence Duggan,
1905-1048." For Whittaker Chambers, see page 11 ; for Attorney General Clark,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5355
see page 60; for Isaac Don Levine, see pages 61-63; and for Richard M. Nixon,
see pages 51-52. The text of the Attorney General's statement is as follows :
"December 24, 1948.
"The FBI investigation has produced no evidence of Mr. Duggan's con-
nection with the Communist Party or with any other espionage activity.
On the contrary, the evidence discloses that Mr. Duggan was a loyal employe
of the United States Government. ..^.„^.^
"In answer to manv inquiries concerning Laurence Duggan, the Attorney
General stated that while it is the policy of the Department of Justice not
to comment upon the evidence in the files or upon interviews made hy its
agents, he was deviating from this rule in order to prevent an mjustice.
being done to the family of a former employe of the Government,"
A few hours after Mr. Duggan's death, Karl Mundt, then Acting Chairman of
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, called a meeting of the sub-
committee of the General Committee which was attended by a minority of tvs*o-
members— Mundt himself and Richard M. Nixon. According to the press, these
two members proceeded to inform a press gathering that the files of the Com-
mittee showed that Duggan has passed on to Whittaker Chambers confidential
information. The following day. Chambers denied this. The public reaction
to Mundt's action was shown immediately in condemnatory newspaper edito-
rials. These appeared in such reliable organs of public opinion as the New York
Herald Tribune, The New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and by
broadcasters such as Edward R. Murrow, Elmer Davis, Martin Agronsky and
Drew Pearson.
The testimony thus far presented to the McCarran Committee shows that Dug-
gan's contact with the Institute of Pacific Relations was of a most insignificant
character due to the fact that his field was Latin America, and not the Far East.
It is to be hoped that the McCarran Subcommittee will include in its printed
record a copy of the memorial volume described above. This little book gives
the record of Duggan's life and, as previously mentioned, contains the state-
ments by Whittaker Chambers, Isaac Don Levine and Attorney General Clark.
It also contains Senator Mundt's inexcusable attack and the text of the dissent
from that attack by certain other members of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities.
Here Mr. Morris introduced letters from the IPR files concerning Laurence
Duggan. The first was from me to W. W. Lockwood, dated May 8, 1940." Mr.
Morris asserted that in this letter I was discussing plans of the Institute of
Pacific Relations. This was not true. My letter to Lockwood was addressed to
him. care of the American Committee for International Studies. This was not
an IPR body ; it was an entirely separate Committee under the chairmanship of
Dr. Edward M. Earle, of Princeton University. It was made up of prominent
American scholars and men of affairs. It was aided by the Social Science
Research Council. It included in its purview, not only the Pacific, but the whole
world. My letter was written in response to a letter that I received from Mr.
Lockwood in his capacity as secretary of that Committee. He had asked for
suggestions in reference to the Committee's programs. I made some fifteen
suggestions for that Committee's study. The only reference to Laurence Duggan
was in Suggestion 12, as follows :
(P. 239) "(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who
are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at
Latin America for a continental and international point of view, who might
establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and
then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of
such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar
organization."
Mr. Moe was at that time, and still is, the head of the Guggenheim Foundation
and a man who, like Laurence Duggan, was exceptionally well-informed on
Latin America.
It should be pointed out that the purpose of the letter was to urge the American
Committee for International Studies to adopt a broad and comprehensive plan
for studying the problems of post-war organization in relationship to war aims.
25 Tho full text of my letter to W. W. Lockwood of Maj* 8, 1940, Is printed on pages
237-239 as Exhibit No. 41. Following this letter Is a favorable comment on it by Dr.
Percv E. Corhett (pages 239-240). Dr. Corbett has been Dean of the Faculty of Law,
McGill University, a Guggenheim Fellow, Professor of Government and Jurisprudence at
Yale, and is now a Professor at Princeton.
5356 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In the United States and other countries, unoflBcial organizations were beginning
to study these questions. My suggestion was that Dr. Earle's Committee could
aid in giving these studies a global character in the hope that when the war was
over, the peace could be won and not lost.
(P. 241) Mr. Morris' irresponsible method of establishing guilt by associa-
tion without any fidelity to dates was illustrated by his introducing correspond-
ence between Duggan and Frederick V. Field of November and December, 1935 —
long before Mr. Field had resigned as Secretary of the American IPR and an
even longer period before Field had begun to write for The Daily Worker and
The Neiv Musses and when he was highly regarded by eminent scholars and
bankers, who were familiar with his work. Duggan's letter to Field was simply
an invitation to Field to spend an evening in Washington with an informal group
that was carrying on a series of discussions of international matters of interest.
The attempt l)y Senator McCarran and Mr. Morris to discredit the IPR by
bringing in the name of Laurence Duggan was in bad taste and irrelevant.
Duggan was dead and could not comment. Duggan in fact did not meet any of
the criteria of association with the IPR which Mr. Morris laid down.
(f) James S. Allen's appeal for a financial subsidy teas not granted
(Pp. 251-2.52) These pages give the correspondence I had with .James S. Allen
about his desire to get financial assistance from the IPR in furthering his
studies of the Filipino economy. American knowledge of agrarian problems in
the Pliilippines was severely limited. It seemed as though it was both in the
American and in the Filipino interest to get several scholars to work on the
problem. Because of the Institute's limited financial resources. Mr. Allen's
request for monetary assistance for his project was never granted.
(g) Miss Smedley asked the IPR's help in getting ttvo Chinese (prisoners of the
Japanese in Hong Kong) placed on an exchange list
(P. 259) The reference here is to the letter which the IPR received from
Miss Agnes Smedley, asking the Institute's good offices in getting two Chinese,
who were prisoners of the Japanese in Hong Kong, placed on an exchange list.
This couple was Dr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. Mrs. Chen was reported as
seriously ill. This was a request for a humanitarian effort on the part of the
IPR.
(h) Challenge to Mrs. Massing's testimony by Miss Harriet Moore
(P. 260) The reference made is to Miss Harriet Moore by Mrs. Massing.
She asserts that she met Miss Moore socially in Moscow and that Miss Moore
stayed either at the International Hotel or the Hotel Lux. Miss Moore, now
Mrs. Gelfan, wrote to William L. Holland on September 8, 1951, regarding Mrs.
Massing's testimony, that she had never been inside the Lux Hotel and doesn't
even recall the existence of the Hotel International. On her visits to Russia,
Miss Moore traveled Intourist and the hotels at which she stayed in Moscow were
the Metroi>ole and the New Moscow. She adds that she never met Mrs. Massing
or Mr. Gerhard Eisler. In fact, she never heard of them until their namea
came into prominence in the past year or two. She never met Agnes Smedley
and never heard of Grace Maul. Mrs. Gelfan closed with a paragraph saying
that Mrs. Massing's testimony is false.
(i) Invitation' list to a conference at Sunset Farm — October 18-21, 1935
(P. 263) Mr. Robert Morris introduced to the Committee a letter of mine
dated Lee, Mass., August 31, 1935, to Frederick V. Field, inviting him to partici-
pate in a staff conference at Sunset Farm, October 18-21. The letter stated
that I was hoping that the following could be present : Escott Reid, Richard
Pyke, Kate Mitchell, Leonard Wu, Kathleen Barnes, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley,
Harriet Moore, W. L. Holland. May I comment on these as follows :
Mr. Reid was at that time Secretary of the Canadian Institute of International
Affairs and, later, for many years, has held high positions in the Canadian diplo-
matic service. Richard Pyke (British) was, for several years, on the staff of
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London, and had just accepted a
position on the IPR's Secretariat to handle the publication of IPR books in
Shanghai. Miss Mitchell, at that time, was serving as my secretary. Mr. Wu
was a scholar from Kuomintang China, highly regarded by his Chinese colleagues.
Kathleen Barnes (American) was then aiding in the IPR's studies of the Soviet
Union.
Miss Fairfax-Cholmeley had accompanied Mrs. Carter and me on our visits to
India, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in 1935. She came from a
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5357
well-known family in Yorkshire. Many years later she married Israel Epstein
who, in the past years, has been accused by the Subcommittee as a supporter
of the Chinese Communist cause. At the time of the Lee meeting in 1935, Miss
Fairfax-Cholmeley showed no interest in Chinese Communists. I think she did
not meet Mr. Epstein until they were fellow-prisoners of the Japanese in the
Stanley Prison in Hong Kong in 1941. They and one or two Englishmen escaped
from that prison and, together, traveled by sampan and on foot to Chungking.
Mr. William L. Holland is well known to the Committee.
Miss Moore, in her letter to Mr. Holland of September 8, 1951, pointed out
that during the brief period when she was Acting Secretary of the American
IPR in 1943-44, many of the staff members were called into military and other
war service. Her appointment was simply to carry out existing projects until
the staff returned and a new secretary could be found. As far as she was aware,
there was not, at any time, any group in the IPR seeking to use it for propa-
ganda espionage purposes. She believes that the record of that period, in regard
to publications, research, and meetings, will confirm her view as to the variety
of subjects dealt with and the diversity of views of the authors and subjects.
Subsequent documents introduced by Mr. Robert Morris indicate some of Miss
Moore's routine duties in connection with the Mt. Tremblant Conference and the
favorable comment which the American IPR liiade on Miss Moore's services during
the year that she served as, Acting Secretary, following Mr. William Lock-
wood's departure for the China war theatre. (Mr. Lockwood was a Major on
General Chennault's staff in Kunming. He is now a professor at Princeton.)
(/) Mrs. Massing's attacJc on Corliss Lanwnt
(P. 267) Mrs. Massing asserted that everybody knew Corliss Lament was a
Communist. This Mr. Lament has denied in a communication to the Senate Sub-
committee. He has recently published a pamphlet entitled "Why I Am Not a
Communist."
( k ) William, 8. White's signiflcant article in the New York Times
Toward the end of the Subcommittee's first public hearing (July 25, 1951),
Senator McCarran called attention to the length of the period during which
I had been on the witness stand and added, "You have been a ready witness,
and the Committee is grateful for the information you have given us." This
was naturally reassuring to me personally, for this Subcommittee was the first
Congressional Committee of which I had had personal knowledge.
I knew, of course, that the procedures of some Communists had been increasingly
challenged in recent years. Indeed there were those who were saying that the
procedures were such that a person being investigated could not hope to convince
the general public, but he could at least reassure his friends. To this end and be-
cause it was my duty as an American citizen, I resolved that I would do my best to
answer all questions as fully and frankly as possible. I do not consciously evade
any question.
But, as the hearings continued, my skepticism of the current methods of the
Sulieommittee increased. It has grown as the months have rolled by. It was
confirmed still further on March 23, 1952, when I read a significant article by
William S. White in the Sunday Magazine Section of the New York Times. As
is well known, Mr. White of the Times Washington staff, has covered many of
the Congressional investigations since the end of the war. In this article, he
has departed from straight reporting and expresses a personal opinion of what
he considers a dangerous trend. He did not refer In his article to the Sub-
committee's investigation of the IPR, but he did emphasize the evolution of
Congressional investigation into what lie thought, in all disinterest, must be
called, all too often, a kind of pitiless inquisition in which, he put it plainly,
the accused is licked before he starts. He added that such inquiries have now
become, however, punitive rather than fact-finding. It is my personal opinion
that what Mr. White said applied, for the most part, to the proceedings of the
Subcommittee on the IPR. In fact, I am reminded that perhaps the best descrip-
tion of the Subcommittee's procedure is what they call in France The Com-
munist Technique of Retroactive Defamation. The methods adopted by the
Subcommittee's counsel, presumably with the approval of the Subcommittee, are
sadly reminiscent of previous and current attempts by Communist authorities
in several governments to defame retroactively or posthumously destroy the
reputations of those who block their evil purposes.
215 East 72nd Street, New York, N. Y., May 1 1952.
5358 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Appendix A
Sunset Farm,
Lee, Massachusetts, 19th July, 1938.
Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
C/o Allie Robinson's Camp, Independence, California.
Dear Owen : Thank you for your long and delightful letter of July 10 from
Independence. What an intriguing name for editorial work in this particular
age.
In the strictest confidence I am sending you a copy of Paul Scheffer's comment
on Bloch's original outline (I did not tell Scheffer who wrote the outline).
With reference to Hu Shih, we had him here at Lee for a weekend confer-
ence just before he sailed. Chen and Chi were also here. Though both these
men differ with Hu Shih very strongly, they both believe in his integrity of char-
acter. We are all trying to get him to write a major monograph to document the
"temporizing policy" of Nanking in the last few years. He is convinced that the
Generalissimo was preparing as fervently for ultimate resistance to Japan as
were the Communists. We have asked him to go the whole way in making avail-
able documents that would prove his thesis. Whether we agree with his thesis or
not it is important to have the job well done. This is a round about way of an-
swering your question as to the weight which Hu Shih exerts in American circles
and the extent in which he molds or leads the opinions of the Chinese in America.
With Americans who have never heard of Chu Teh, Hu Shih stands out as a
really great Chinese patriot- — a man of dignity and a mind with a spacious point
of view. To those Americans who feel that the Chinese Communists are making
an epic contribution to Chinese unification Hu Shih seems to be living in the
Victorian Age, albeit in rather a distinguished fashion. The reaction of Chinese
in America to Hu Shih is similar to that of Americans according to their own
line up on the question of Chinese Communists.
Thank you for the tip about Serene. I will write to Lasswell today.
With reference to the question which you raise as to the role that you should
play in view of Japanese attacks on the impartiality of members of the Amer-
ican Council staff and the Pacific Council staff I am inclined to take the position
that the American Council staff are in one category, the Chinese and Japanese
members of the International Secretariat are in a second, and you. Bill Hol-
land, and I in a third, though all three categories blur into each other. The
American Council staff are responsible only to the American people. They thus
should be among the freest people on earth. The Chinese and Japanese members
of our own staff are chosen among other reasons because they are Chinese or
Japanese and we want from them the fullest possible reflection of all that is most
fundamental in the attitudes of their countries. You and Hollard and the other
non-Oriental members of the International Secretariat and myself are the
servants of all eleven Councils. Our role is an almost impossible one. It might
be likened to the role of the Speaker in the House of Commons, namely to ensure
that every responsible point of view in the Institute is given a full hearing.
This means that we ought to convince all the National Councils that whatever
are our own private views, the Secretariat, the research program, the confer-
ences, and Pacific Affairs are administered with complete detachment so that
every responsible point of view is represented in the most favorable possible
Hght.
If in our private capacities we take a line that is so conspicuous that any
large element in our constituency feels that we cannot administer our inter-
national responsibilities with impartiality then I think that our non-Secretariat
activities should be reconsidered. Some weeks ago I came to the tentative
conclusion that so far as I myself am concerned I should seriously consider
declining all public invitations to speak on the Far Eastern situation. ' By public
invitations I mean those which are reported by the press. In the past month
I have declined to write for Amerasia. I did this because in Japan Amerasia
is regarded as having been founded with a definite anti-Japanese bias.
However unjust this feeling may be we have got to make some allowance for
the exigencies of war psychology as it affects our Japanese friends.
Saionjl is one of the straishtest thinking of young Japanese. He has stood
apart and above the muddled-headed war philosophy during the past year in a
most striking manner. The other day I learned privately that he had single-
handed raised the money that was needed to carry on the Japanese I. P. R.
this year, but that now the donors were hammering him because of the line
taken both by members of the International Secretariat and the American
Council staff. I understand that he feels that the American Council staff are
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5359
free. In other words to his friends he defends the right of the American
Council staff to talve any line they want. But he finds it difficult to explain
what appears to be partisanship on the part of members of the Secretariat.
I personally wish that it was possible for you to withdraw from the Amerasia
board in the interests of the major tas\s. of integration which we have ahead
of us for the next two years. I do not think any hasty action is called for but
it is a matter I have long wanted to discuss with you and have never had the
opportunity.
I am exceedingly glad that you approve of the way Yasuo is functioning. If
ever a man was in a hot spot he is it.
Motylev is going to the Soviet Far East instead of coming here. I am urging
him to send Voitinsky in his place.
Dennery, Takayanagi, and Dafoe are all coming to Sunset Farm for ten days
on August 10 to meet with the International Secretariat. Is there any chance
of your coming east in time for this meeting or at least arriving by the 16th or
17th? „ ,
Would you let us know just how we should describe your Johns Hopkins
appointment so that it can be announced in the next issue of IPR Notes.
If you are able to come on while Dennery is here you will be able to find out
who the French counterparts of Archie Rose and Barbara Wooton are.
It is grand to hear that the family is all well and that you are making good
progress on your book. If anything takes you to Seattle you may wish to look
up John Alden Carter who is acting as an assistant to the president of Mc-
Dougall Southwick Co. He is at present staying with Herb Little. Mrs. Carter
and Ruth send their greetings to your whole household.
Yours very sincerely,
Edward C. Carter.
Appendix B
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
HONOLULD — Los Angeles — New York — San Feancisco — Seattle — Washington, D. C.
1 east B4TH street, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.
ELdorado 5-1759
March 17, 1947.
Dear Fellow Member: For over two years, INIr. Alfred Kohlherg, a former
member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and an importer with
substantial business interests in China, has been carrying on a campaign charg-
ing the Institute with bias in its treatment of the contemporary situation in
the Far East, especially in China.
In any country as wartorn as China, there may well develop honest differences
as to the factors which underlie the current difficulties and, consequently, as
to the course which will lead to a solution. Feelings naturally run high. But
no reader can draw as severe criticisms of the Kuomintang Government from the
publications of the IPR as those set forth in General Marshall's report to Presi-
dent Truman.
You will note in the enclosure entitled "An Attempt to Stifle IPR Scrutiny
of the Chinese Situation" that as one of the many efforts to meet Mr. Kohlberg's
demands, he has been offered the privilege of mailing his accusations on March
20th to the entire membership of the American IPR. In this mailing, we under-
stand, he will ask the members for proxies to be posted direct to him, authorizing
him at a members' meeting on April 22nd to introduce a resolution appointing
a committee to investigate his charges.
The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees has investigated Mr. Kohl-
berg's charges and found them inaccurate and irresponsible.
We, the undersigned, have been connected with the IPR over a period of years.
We have observed its research and educational program closely and have no
hesitation in stating that the charges are false. We believe that you will agree
with us that the IPR has an enviable record for uni>iased and scholarly re-
search. The enclosed excerpts of letters from recognized experts on the Far
East are only some of the many that have been received emphasizing the high
regard in which IPR publications are held by scholars. Some of the very pub-
lications criticized by Mr. Kohlberg have been highly praised by Army, Navy,
and State Department officials in a position to know the facts and were exten-
5360 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
sively used by the armed services during the war. Indeed, so useful were IPR
materials to the war effort that the American IPR was awarded the Navy "E"
in 1945.
Please sign the enclosed proxy and return it by quickest mail if you wish to
support the present administration of the American IPR under the direction
of the recently elected Board of Trustees whose names you will find enclosed.
We hope that you will be present to vote in person. But in any case we urge
that you send in your proxy. If you attend in person, your proxy will not be
used.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph P. Chamberlain.
Arthur H. Dean.
Walter F. Dillingham.
Brooks Emeny.
Huntington Gilchrist.
W. R. Herod.
Philip C. Jessup.
Notice of Special Meeting of Members of American Institute of Pacific
Relations, Inc., To Be Held at its Offices, 1 East 54tii Street, New York
City at 4 :30 p. m. on Tuesday, April 22, 1947
purpose of the meeting
Considering a resolution to be proposed by Alfred Kohlberg appointing a com-
mittee to investigate certain charges of Alfred Kohlberg, and such other business
as may properly come before the meeting
Marguerite Ann Stewart,
Secretary.
Please cut along this line and sign and return the proxy to the offices of the
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street, New York 22
PROXY
The undersigned member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
does hereby constitute and appoint Arthur H. Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain,
or either of them, with full power of substitution, as my duly constituted proxies
and attorneys to vote in my behalf against any and all proposals made by Alfred
Kohlberg at a meeting of the members on Tuesday, April 22nd, 1947, or any
ad.iournment thereof, and to vote in favor of sustaining the policies of the
Board of Trustees, with all the power I would possess if personally present,
liereby ratifying and confirming all my proxies and attorneys may do in my
behalf.
(Sign here)
Memiber
Appendix C
United China Relief, Inc.
1790 broadway
New York 19, N. Y.
August 13, 1946.
Mr. Alfred Kohlberg,
1 West 37th Street, New York 1, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Kohlberg : Because of your interest in the American Council of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, I believe the following may prove of interest to you.
(I served on the Executive Committee of tlie Council for nearly three years.)
When United China Relief was organized one of the most difficult problems was
the division of funds collected. A Program Committee was organized, an office
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5361
established in China, and an Advisory Committee of Chinese and Americans there
was formed.
Mr. Carter was elected Chairman of the Program Comnnttee from its start.
At great personal sacrifice, he so served, with remarkable tact and diplomacy,
until late last year.
The strongest test of the effectiveness of this Committee was in China itself.
Accordingly, we were deeply impressed to receive, last month, for presentation
to Mr. Carter a Chinese scroll expressing, from outstanding Chinese leaders, their
gratitude for his leadership, devotion to China, and fairness.
I'hrased in typically flowery Chinese, it reads, in translation, in part as follows :
America the glorious.
Our friend and neighbor.
Kindness in l)irth,
Righteousness in spirit,
\ Bright as the sun and stars.
That recognizes no national boundary.
Prominent among her people,
Is Mr. E. C. Carter.
We, the unworthy ones,
Through close contacts
And advisory capacity,
Have come to know his work more intimately.
So great is he
That none can emulate him.
His virtue is Christian
And his fame is historic.
Stronger he cemented national relations ;
Closer he promoted spirit of friendship.
One person but two responsibilities,
He uifdertook to shoulder.
To bridge the Pacific.
East and West, standing on either side
Link hands through the clouds,
United our spirit in the sky.
With distance exceeding thousands of miles.
Age lasting hundred of years
This is to commemorate our everlasting gratitude.
The signers include Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director General of CNRRA, Dr. Chiang
Mou-lin, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan. Dr. Han Lih-wu, Vice Minister
of Education, Bishop Paul Yu Pin. Catholic Bishop of Nanking, Dr. Robert K.
S. Lin, Surgeon General of the Chinese Army, Dr. Y. T. Tsur, Minister of Agricul-
ture, Dr. King Chu, Vice Minister of Education, Dr. P. Z. King, Director of the
National Health Administration, Dr. C. K. Chu, Director of the National Health
Institute, Mrs. William C. Wang, Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee
of the New Life Movement, Mrs. Nora T. H. Chu, Director of the National Asso-
ciation for Refugee Children, Dr. Chang Fu-liang, General Secretary of the
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, Dr. Y. S. Djang, Treasurer of the International
Relief Committee, Dr. H. C. Chang, Chief of the Welfare Division of the Ministry
of Social Affaii's, and Dr. A. Pan-tung Sab, of the Academica Sinica.
I have always felt deep resentment at those who have criticized Mr. Carter as
being "anti-Chinese" ; I think, accordingly, this statement deserves special con-
sideration.
Sincerely,
[s] James L. McConaughy,
President.
State of New York,
County of New York ss:
Edward C. Carter, being duly sworn, says: That he has read the foregoing
document and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to his own
knowledge, except as to the matters therein indicated to have been communicated
5362 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to him by other persons and except as to the matters therein which are matters
of opinion, and that as to the matters indicated to have been communicated to
him by others, he believes it to be true and as to matters of opinion, that the
opinion expressed is his own and that it is his true opinion.
Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.
[seal] Irene R. Donohue,
Notary Public, State of New York.
Mr. Morris. Next is the affidavit of Hilda Austern, dated May 5,
1952, which I would like to introduce at this time.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1384" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1384 ,
Geneva, Switzerland,
May 5, 1952.
Confederation of Svpitzerland,
City and Canton of Geneva,
Consulate General of the United States of America, ss:
Affidavit
I, Hilda Austern (Ray) , being duly sworn, depose and say as follows :
(1) I have just learned for the first time of the following testimony of Louis
Francis Budenz before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security
in August 1951 :
"Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Hilda Austern was a member
of the Communist Party?
"Mr. Budenz. From official reports."
(2) It is my intent and purpose by this affidavit to deny, under oath, the
charges against me which seem to be intended by this vague find more or less
unresponsive reply of which, I understand, there is no further elaboration of
any kind in the rest of his testimony.
(3) I am not now and never have been a member of the Communist Party nor
of any other organization cited as subversive by the Attorney General of the
United States. I do not hold and never have held any beliefs contrary to Amer-
ican democracy or the principles for which the United States stands. I am and
have always been completely loyal to my country, its government, and its form
of government.
Hilda Austern Ray,
Hilda Austern (Ray).
Subscribed and sworn to before me, Charles W. Thomas, Consul of the United
States of America in and for the consular district of Geneva, Switzerland, duly
commissioned and qualified, this 5th day of May 1952, A. D.
[seal] Charles W. Thomas, American Consul.
Service No. : 2861. Fee : $2.00 equals SW Frs. 8.80. Tariff No. 24.
American Foreign Service $2.00 Fee Stamp [aflSxed].
Ameeioan Consulate Gener.^l.
Geneva, Switzerland, May 5, 1952.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would next like to introduce excerpts
from the executive-session testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck of May
21, 1952.
Senator Watkins. They will be received into the record.
(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1385" and are
as follows:)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5363
Exhibit No. 1385
[execxttive session]
^ United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
OF the Internal Security Act and other
Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C, Wednesday, May 21, 1952.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 :30 a. m., in Room 42-i-C Senate
Office Building, Senator Arthur Watkins, presiding.
President : Senator Watkins.
Also present : Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.
Senator Watkins. The committee will be in session.
Mr. Morris, you have a witness here this morning?
Mr. Morris. Yes, Senator, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.
Senator Watkins. Will you stand and be sworn, Doctor?
Ml-. Hornbeck. Yes.
Senator Watkins. Do you solemnly swear that this testimony you shall give
before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Mr. Hornbeck. I do.
Mr. Morris. Dr. Hornbeck, this committee has obtained from the Department
of State an exehan^e of letters between Dean Rusk and yourself dated May 19
and June 7, 1950. In your answer to Dean Rusk you state that :
"* * * It was in the year 1945 — and not before then — that the Govern-
ment of the United States, first having taken action inconsistent with tradition
and commitment in regard to China, embarked upon what became a course of
intervention in regard to the civil conflict, the conflict between the National
Government and the Communists, in China. It was then that words and
action of the Government of the United States began to be expressive of an
'against' and a 'for' attitude; then and thereafter that the Government of the
United States brought to bear pressures, pressures upon the National Govern-
ment, pressures which were not 'against' the Communists but were on their be-
half, pressures not to the disadvantage of the Communists, but, in effect, to the
disadvantage of the National Government."
Dr. Hornbeck, I offer you the full text of both of these letters which have be-
come part of our record, and I ask, did j'ou in fact, write the reply of June 7,
1950, to Dean Rusk?
Mr. Hornbeck. The letter which ajipears as having been addressed by me to
Dean Rusk under date of June 7, 1950, in reply to a letter addressed by Mr.
Rusk to me under date of May 19, 1950, is a copy, exact except for a few in-
consequential typographical errors, of a letter written by me at the time and
under the circumstances indicated.
Mr. Morris. Are the statements in that letter true statements?
Mr. Hornbeck. Everything that is said in that letter is to the best of my
knowledge true.
Mr. Morris. On what facts and what experience did you base the conclusions
that appear therein?
Mr. Hornbeck. I have been studying the subjects of international relations,
American foreign policy and Far Eastern affairs for nearly 50 years. I was
closely associated with matters involving conduct of United States Far Eastern
policy for more than 25 years. In the Department of State, I was especially
concerned with Far Eastern affairs from 1928 to 1944. Since my retirement in
1947. I have given and am giving most of my time to study of these subjects.
The conclusions to which I gave expression in the paragraph which you have
quoted were^and are — based in part on consideration of the facts set forth
in the preceding paragraphs of the letter, in part on consideration of other facts
known to me from study and from experience, and in part on consideration of
still other facts, knowledge of which I bad gained from study of contemporary
evidence and from conversations and discussions with participants in the acts
or events to which they relate.
The paragraph in which I state that change of policy took place in the year
1945 is expressive in terms of interpretation of a conclusion or group of con-
clusions drawn from facts and stating what I believe to be absolutely true.
5364 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
INIr. Morris. Next is an affidavit by Henry A. Wallace, dated June
6, 1952.
Senator Watkins. It may be received and made a part of the
record.
(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1386" and s
\
)
Exhibit No. 1386
as follows '"^
Farvue, South Salem, N. T., June 6, 1952.
Hon. Pat McCaeban,
Senate Office Building, Washington D. C.
Dear Senator McCarran : Thanks for the courtesy of your wire of June 6
in reply to my letter of June 3. In conformity therewith I am hereby formally
swearing before a notary public that the following statement is the truth :
I am testifying with regard to the bottom 14 lines of page 1792, the top 16
lines of page 1793, the bottom 14 lines of page 1993, the top 19 lines of page
1994, the bottom 9 lines of page 2046, and the top IS lines of page 2047 — all
from parts 6 and 7 of the hearings of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of
the Senate with regard to the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The first 4 pages referred to in the foregoing have to do with Counsel Sour-
wine's apparent belief that I had in my Mission to China recommended that the
Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to
China. On pages 1793 and 1994 Vincent makes clear his belief that I made no
such recommendations. I am sure that I was not directly or indirectly re-
sponsible for initiating the July 7 telegram from Roosevelt referred to on page
2073.
With regard to pages 2046 and 2047 commenting on the statement made by
Vincent in the white paper, "Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the
Communists in the United States — " I wish to call attention to my wire of June
5, 1951, to Senator Knowland which he kindly inserted in the June 6, 19.51,
hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. This
wire was printed in its entirety on page 17 of the June 6, 1951, and again on
page 14 of the June 7, 1951, issue of the New York Times. I hope therefore
that your committee may extend me the same courtesy as the Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committees by at least publishing the reference to my letter
to Senator Knowland as reproduced in the hearings of June 6, 1951, of the
Senate committee. Exactly the same matter is up for discussion as on pages
2046 and 2047 of your committee's hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The prime purpose of this sworn statement is to say that I am in complete
accord with Vincent and that I say independently that I made no recommenda-
tion to Roosevelt that the Communist armies be sent a proportionate share of
American arms. (Communist in the foregoing means Chinese Communist.)
Respectfully submitted.
H. A. Wallace.
Sworn to this 5th day of June 1952, before notary public.
Ctrus W. Russell,
Notary PuiUc in the State of New York.
Mr. Morris. I have here a sworn statement of W. L. Holland, dated
June 10, 1952, which I would like to put in the record at this time.
Senator Watkins. It may be received and made a part of the record.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1387" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1387
memorandum on RAYMOND DENNETT'S TESTIMONY
I, William L. Holland, l)eing duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
In his testimony before the McCarran Subcommittee, September 26, 1951,
(Hearings, part 4, pp. 937-1005), Raymond Dennett, who had been Secretary
of the American IPR from March 1944 to December 1945, made a number of
misleading and unsubstantiated allegations concerning the American IPR and
members of its staff. Among other things lie said that he did not think the
Institute "was an objective research organization"; that he had "grave doubts"
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5365
of the staff's objectivity; that he "came not to trust" the staff (although he ex-
plained that he had no reason to think any of them were Communists) that
members of the staff tended to "favorably interpret" the Soviet Umon( he
Splained that this was because the staff felt at tbat time that ''if we had to
li4 with the Soviet Union during the postwar period we had to explain why
the Soviet Union acted this way") ; that he thought ^^rtain members of the
staff were biased against the Chinese Nationalist government and Pio»abIy
svmpathetic to the Chinese Communists; that the staff tried to "control" the
SSzation ; and that when he took steps to reduce the staff s influence the staff
attempted to use the union contract as an instrument for /^"ing i d of him
He also said : "I was responsible for objective research. I do not feel there was
obiectivity and I resigned and got out." 4= .v,^ A,,,^v;r.on tpt?
It is incumbent on me as the present executive oflicer of the Ameiican IFK
to point out how, in several important respects, Mr. Dennett's testimony was
(perhaps inadvertently) inaccurate or incomplete. I do this with reluctance-
and reliret, since mv own relations with Mr. Dennett during and after his
period of work for the American IPIl were always cordial. Moreover, I ad-
mired his insistence in his testimony that he was convinced that Dr. Phihp
C Jessup was not a Communist sympathizer. However, for the sake ot cw-
rectin"- the record, I feel it necessary to submit the following remarks, whiclif
are ba^ed on my own knowlediie, on a careful study of the relevant documents,
and on corroboration by other persons directly acquainted with the period of
Mr. Dennett's employment by the American IPR.
Much of Mr Dennett's testimony must be judsed in the light of the circum-
stances attending his departure from the IPK. His testimony creates the
impression that he resigned his position with the IPR because he was dis-
satisfied with the state of affairs in the office. The fact is that the Executive
Committee of the American IPR decided and made clear to Mr. Dennett that
it would not be in the best interests of the organization for him to continue as
Executive Secretary. This decision did not reflect unfavorably in any way
upon Mr. Dennett's character.
When he became the administrative head of tlie American IPR, Mr. Den-
nett was a young man of limited experience. The job in which he found
himself was one that required a high order of tact, judgment, and adminis-
trative and fund-raising skill. After a considerable period of observation, the
j:xecutive Committee regretfully concluded that Mr. Dennett did not fully meas-
ure up to all these requirements, especially the first and the last. Eventually
the Committee decided that in the interests of the organization a change in
the administrative direction was imperative, and made this known to Mr.
Dennett. The matter was handled in such a way as to cause Mr. Dennett as
little embarrassment as possible. For this reason, the full details of the
story were never put in the official record. Nevertheless, its main outlines are
sufiiciently clear from a careful reading of the minutes of the Executive Com-
mittee at this period. These show :
(1) That the Executive Committee, at its meeting on June 18, 1945. adopted a
resolution instructing the Secretary (Mr. Dennett) to devote the major portion
of his time to fund raising.
(2) That the Executive Committee held two meetings, on October 11 and
November 13, 1945, at Midston House, at which Mr. Dennett was not present.
Customarily, the Executive Committee met in the IPR office, and the Secretary,
a member of the Committee, attended its meetings.
(3) That at its meeting on October 11 the Executive Committee engaged in
"general consideration of the purposes and program of the American Council
and of the problems confronting it." There were present the following mem-
bers of the Executive Committee : Robert D. Calkins, Chairman ; Eugene E.
Barnett, Frederick V. Field, Huntington Gilchrist, G. Ellsworth Huggins, James
L. McConaughy, Lawrence Morris, and Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein ; also the
following guests : Joseph P. Chamberlain, Philip C. Jessup, Grayson Kirk, and
Owen Lattimore. At this meeting the Executive Committee appointed a special
committee consisting of Messrs. Calkins, Jessup, and McConaughy "to carry on
discussions and negotiations with any otticers or branches of the American Coun-
cil and with any outside organizations with a view to making proposals con-
cerning the solution of the problems facing the Council, including recommenda-
tions concerning the location of the various activities of the Council." (This
referred in part to certain proposals which had been made by Mr. Dennett.)
(4) That at the Executive Committee meeting on Novemiier 13, the same per-
sons being present with the exception of Messrs. Gilchrist and Lattimore, the
5366 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
special committee presented its recommendations. The Executive Committee
thereupon voted to accept Mr. Dennett's resignation as Secretary, and to ap-
point Edward C. Carter as Executive Vice Chairman of the American IPR.
The resolution accepting Mr. Dennett's resignation referred to the difficulties
confronting the American IPR at tlie time when he became Secretary, and to
subsequent unforeseen problems of great magnitude : it expressed appreciation
of Mr. Dennett's services, mentioning his energy and devotion, but omitting
any reference to his ability or accomplishments. It requested Mr. Dennett,
if he found it possible, to continue on the staff until March 1946, performing
such duties as might be assigned to him by the Executive Vice Chairman. The
resolution appointing Mr. Carter as Executive Vice Chairman stated that
"efficient management of the affairs of tlie American Council of the IPR re-
quires an expansion of its executive direction at the top levels and the services
of a man of great public prestige and broad experience in the work of the IPR."
Mr. Carter was therefore "charged with the general management and control
of the general activities and business affairs of the American Coimcil."
It is worth noting that Philip C. Jessup, who had originally recommended
Mr. Dennett for the position of Secretary, was a member of the special committee
mentioned above.
In the light of this history it was perhaps natural for Mr. Dennett to feel
that he had a grievance against the IPR. Unfortunately this feeling seems to
have influenced his recollections to the point where parts of his testimony
cannot be regarded as fully reliable, although it is certainly not suggested that
he deliberately falsified.
Many of Mr. Dennett's administrative weaknesses at this period were those
of inexperience. In fairness to him, it should be noted that he had the difficult
task of dealing with an experienced senior staff, most of whom were older than
he and had more knowledge than be of the Far East and of the IPR, and some
of whom possessed strong personalities. Toward the end of his tenure in
office, considerable friction developed between Mr. Dennett and some members
of his staff. Hence he undoubtedly took away with him some i>ersonal grudges.
His testimony concerning staff members must be interpreted in this light.
It should be added that the differences between Mr. Dennett and members
of the senior staff arose partly from factors of temperament, partly from differ-
ences of opinion on administrative questions, and partly from the fact that the
senior staff eventually lost confidence in his ability to administer the affairs
of the American IPR in an effective manner. These differences were in no
sense political.
As Executive Secretary, Mr. Dennett had full authority to protest or block
any actions or publications of the staff if he felt they were not in keeping with
the purposes and policies of the Institute and he could depend on full support
from the Executive Committee. In fact, there is no evidence that he did make
any such protests while he was Executive Secretary on any matters concerning
the politics of staff members or the objectivity of the work and publications of
the Institute.
A few specific points in Mr. Dennett's testimony are worth comment :
(1) His statement that the staff "began to rely on the union contract as a
method for, shall we say, getting rid of me." Mr. Dennett may have believed
this to be true, but it was not true. Neither the Book and Magazine Union,
UOPWA, with which the American IPR had a contract, nor the shop unit (i. e.,
the group of union members in the office) made any attempt whatever to "get
rid of" Mr. Dennett. (A fuller notarized statement on the Union has been
submitted by IMiss Miriam S. Farley to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Internal Security.)
(2) His statement that there was no "thorough investigation" of Alfred
Kohlberg's charges against the IPR, but only an "answer" prepared by Mrs.
Marguerite A. Stewart. Mrs. Stewart has stated that this "answer" was not
prepared by her but by a committee of the American IPR staff under her editor-
ship. Mr. Kohlberg's principal charges were contained in a lengthy document
which alleged, with what purported to be supporting documentation, that IPR
publications during a certain period had followed the Communist Party line.
■The staff, at the request of the Executive Committee, prepared a detailed analysis
.of Mr. Kohlberg's document, concluding that tlie evidence did not support his
allegations. This was the analysis edited by Mrs. Stewart. Certain other in-
. Quiries were conducted, and some members of the Executive Committee, notably
Mr. Arthur H. Dean (then a vice chairman) did a considerable amount of research
won their own. In general, however, Mr. Kohlberg's charges were regarded as
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5367
so irresponsible, and so obviously motivated by political partisansliip, that they
commanded little credence among officers and members of the Executive Com-
mittee, who concluded that there was no necessity for the additional full-dress
investigation demanded by INIr. Kohlberg. It will be recalled that in 1947 Mr.
Kohlberg's demand for an investigation by an outside committee was rejected
by a vote of the American IPR membership, 1,163 to 66, after the members
had received through the mails materials from Mr. Kohlberg and from officers
of the organization. In other words, the investigation conducted at that time
was sufficient, in the judgment of the organization's officers and Executive
Committee, to establish that there was no valid foundation for Mr. Kohlberg's
charges, and this decision was upheld by an overwhelming vote of the membership.
"W. L. Holland.
State of New York,
County of New York, ss:
William L. Holland, being duly sworn, declares that every statement in the
above letter is true to the best of his knowledge.
Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.
David Adler,
Notary Public, State of New York.
Mr. Morris. Next is the sworn statement of Michael Lindsay, dated
Jime 3, 1952.
Senator TVatkins. It may be received.
(The statement referred to was maiked "Exhibit No. 1388," and is as
follows :)
Exhibit N(\ 1388
Commonwealth of Australia, State of NE^v South Wales, City of Sydney,
Consulate General of the United States of America, ss:
I, Lord Lindsay of Birker hereby declare under oath :
It has been brought to my attention that, in the hearings on the Institute of
Pacific Relations before the Senate Committee on Internal Security, my name
has been mentioned as a Communist or fellow traveller connected with the I. P. R.
I would, therefore, like to make the following statement, firstly about my
political standpoint and, secondly about my connections with the I. P. R.
Since I began to take a serious interest in politics I have consistently supported
democratic government — defining democracy in the same general sense as ex-
pounded in my father's writings.' That is, I have believed that democracy im-
plied free discussion, human fellowship, and a preference for the use of per-
suasion rather than force. As a corollary I have consistently opposed militarism
and authoritarian and police state regimes.
On more general issues my thinking was greatly influenced by such books as
J. M. Keynes' Treatise on Probability and Felix Kaufmann's Methodenlehre der
Sozialwissenschaften. I have believed that the truth or falsehold of any state-
ment about the real world could only be tested by comparison of its implications
with the evidence of observation and experiment and that, in consequence, any
generalisation was subject to possible modification as new evidence became
available; that, while economic or racial factors might influence the questions
in which men were interested or incline them to illogical thinking on some sub-
jects, the truth or falsity of the answer to any question was normally objective
or interpersonally invariant. As a corollary I have opposed the claims of all
groups who have believed that the absolute certainty of their knowledge entitled
them to impose their views by force or deception and I have opposed all theories
which claimed that truth or falsehood should not be judged by interpersonally
invariant standards but according to expediency for the intex'ests of some par-
ticular group.
The application of these principles has implied agreement at various times
with parts of the orthodox Communist position and cooperation for a consider-
able period with the Chinese Communist Party,- but it has also implied a con-
sistently critical attitude towards the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership
and disagreement with parts of the Communist position even during the period
when I was working in the Chinese Communist organization. I would accept
Such as The Essentials of Democracy, O. U. P., 1929.
5368 liSrsTiTUTE of pacific relations
the standard suggested in the following quotation from Freda Utley, "If one ap-
preciates the fundamental difference between fortuitous similarity of views at
a given moment, and consistent changes of attitude paralleling those of the
Communists, thei-e can be no danger of 'guilt by association' trapping the inno-
cent." " Judged by this standard I have never been either a Communist or a
fellow traveller.
Before leaving England for China at the end of 1937 I was engaged in adult
education and economic research work in South Wales. I was extremely critical
of the failure of the British Government to take any effective action on the
problems of unemployment and the depressed areas and this implied a certain
amount of sympathy for Communist criticisms of the existing economic system.
1 was also extremely critical of the failure of the British Government to support
collective security and resist the development of aggressive militarism and this
implied approval of the Soviet policies associated with Mr. Litvinov. On the
other hand, a study of the history of the Weimar Republic, on which I gave a
course of lectures, convinced nie that Hitler's rise to power had been greatly
assisted by the policies which the German Communist Party had followed under
Comintern leadership. The evidence available about the Soviet Union seemed to
show that, while it might have overcome some of the evils of the capitalist
system, such as unemployment, it had even more serious though different de-
fects of its own. In arguments with Commiuiist friends I consistently criticized
what I called their "fairy story" attitude — the belief that once they had the
revolution "everyone would live happily ever after" so that meanwhile they could
indvilge in completely irresponsible criticism and sabotage with a clear conscience.
I arrived at Peiping in January 1938 to take up the position of Tutor in
Economics at Yencliing University. The evidence I saw of Japanese behaviour
in Nortii China soon convinced me that Japanese militarism was an evil which
it was a duty to resist.
My first contacts with the Chinese Communist organisation came largely by
chance. In April 1938 I was invited by some American friends at Yencliing to
go on a trip in the Easter vacation to have a look at the guerilla organisation
that was starting in Central Hopei. I made a more extended trip in the summer
vacation of 1938 with Mr. George Taylor to Central Hopei and the Wut'ai
area and, in the summer vacation of 1939, I made a journey with Mr. Ralph
Lapwood and Chinese friends from Peiping to Sian, mainly through Eighth
Route Army territory, returning via Chungking and Hongkong. On these trips
I met generals Lu Cheng-ts'ao, Nieh Jung-chen, Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai and
both in 1938 and 1939 I stayed some days with Dr. Norman Bethune whom I
had first met on the boad from Vancouver to Yokohama.
Assistance to these guerilla organisations was an obvious way of taking part
in opposition to Japanese militarism and, owing to the existence of extraterri-
toriality, a foreigner could give considerable assistance. By the summer of
1938 I had become fairly active in groups that were engaged in purchasing
medical supplies in Peiping and later became involved in the purchase of radio
and communications equipment, technical books, etc., and in delivering supplies
to Chinese units outside the city.
I knew that the main Chinese resistance groups that I was working with were
under Communist leadership but the Chinese communists whom I met on my
trips into the countryside seemed to me a very different type of person from
the Communists I had known in England. Instead of irresponsible destructive
activity the Chinese Communists were engaged in responsible constructive work
and seemed to be doing a very effective job both in organising resisting to
Japanese militarism and in mass education and social and economic reform.
Instead of the unreasoning dogmatism that had characterized most of the
Communists I had known in England, the Chinese Communists mostly seemed to
be reasonable sensible people who could argue without losing their temi>ers,
who seemed ready to modify their theories to fit the facts and who were capable
of cooperating with people who did not share their beliefs.
I contributed a number of articles to the London Times based in my observa-
tions during my trips into the Eighth Route Army areas. The account given of
the Chinese Communist organisation was strongly favourable and I would still
maintain that the facts of the situation at that time entirely justified such
favourable reports. But even then I was critical of some of the Stalinist aspects
of the organisation. A report I wrote after my trip in 1939 is strongly critical
of the tendency of education to concentrate on indoctrination and discourage
»The China Story. By Froda Utley, Chicago; Henry Regnery Co., 1951, page 1-96.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5369
critical thought. I argue, "For the development of democratic government it is
essential to have people who are able to think scientifically and who can see
throu,2:h any attempts to deceive and exploit them through plausible propaganda.
There is little point in fighting Japanese militarism by means which make the
Chinese people equally liable to fall a prey to militarism. So long as the people
believe whatever the government tells them democracy rests on a very insecure
foundation and the people can be exploited by any group which can gain
temporary control of the government."
I never felt any incompatibility between cooperation with the Chinese Com-
munist organisation and loyalty to my own country or cooperation witli other
governments working for democratic objectives. The information obtained on
my trips in the Chinese countryside was made available not only to the British
but also to the American authorities in Peiping. While Kuomintang resistance
groups were operating near Peiping I was equally ready to assist them. I helped
in the collection of money to buy winter clothing for Chao T'ung's troops in the
winter of 1938 and tried to establish radio communication with Chungking on
behalf of another Kuomintang organisation. (The attempt failed because the
frequency fixed was. as I afterwards found, unsuitable.) Towards the end of
1941 I had managed to obtain permission from General Nieli Jung-chen for a
British intelligence unit to operate in his area and maintain radio contacts with
Hongkong or Singapore though unfortunately the scheme fell through because
of delays in London.
Also my cooperation with the Chinese Communist organisation did not imply
any agreement with the international Communist line. In the winter of 1938-9,
Yenching University tried the experiment of a formal debate in the British or
American college debating society style and in this I proposed the motion that
"There is nothing to choose between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia." (The
experiment was not repeated as we found that the Japanese Gendarmerie had
taken the greatest interest in the proceedings.) In my course on Logi(! and Sci-
entific Method I introduced my students to a certain amount of Marxian writing
but used a good deal of it as illustration of logical and scientific fallacies.
I was erarely opposed to the official Communist line on international affairs
between lt)39 and 1941. Though I was strongly critical of the Chamberlain gov-
^^rnmeni I had no doubts that it was right to go to war over the German invasion
of Poland and that, whatever the defects of the British and French governments,
the war was basically a war of democracy against totalitarianism. I criticised
the Communist arguments about an imperialist war in which the Germans were
slightly less to blame than the British as being dishonest nonsense. I argued
that the Soviet Union was clearly playing a game of completely cynical power
politics and that the invasion of Finland and annexation of the Baltic States
were clear acts of aggression.
In March 19.j0 I accepted an appointment as British Press Attache at Chung-
king and in this capacity I made a number of protests to the Chinese authori-
ties over the material appearing in the Communist New China Daily News which
made frequent and violently abusive attacks on the Allies and only occasionally
exijressed mild disapproval of the Germans. I returned to Yenching University in
September 1940 at the request of Dr. J. Leighton Stuart with the approval of the
British Ambassador.
In June 1941 I married Li Hsiao-li who had been one of my students at Yen-
ching. Since many allegations have been made, and fairly widely believetl, that
my wife was connected with the Chinese Communist organisation I will set out
briefly the facts about her. My father-in-law came from the leading landlord
family of Lishih hsien in Shansi, studied at the Paoting Military Academy and
served in the Shansi Provincial Army under Yen Hsi-shan. He held some mod-
erately important positions but was too lionest to be very successful in Y'en
Hsi-shan's organisation and had retired some years before 1937 to live on liis
private income. When I first knew the family he was living in retirement near
Peiping as he was afraid that he might be forced to serve in the Japanese pup-
pet organisation if he returned to Lishih and the family was supported by my
brother-in-law, a graduate of Harvard Business School, who was working in the
Bank of China at Chungking. Lady Lindsay went to Bridgeman Academy, an
American missionary school in Peiping, and then to Yenching University. She
had very little interest in politics apart from a natural patriotic dislike of the
Japanese. She had refused invitations from her friends to join the Kuomin-
tang Blue Shirt organisation and had no connections with the underground Com-
munist organisation at Y^enchiug. Until December 1941 her knowledge of the
88348— 52— pt. 14 30
5370 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Chinese Communist Party and the Liberated Areas came almost entirely from
what I had told her.
On the morning of the attack on Pearl Harbour my wife and I escaped from
Yenchinff to the Western Hills and made contact with local 18th Group Army
units. Our original idea had been to go on to Chungking and India but, on
linding that I knew a fair amount about radio, General Nieh Jung-chen invited
me to stay and work for his organisation and this jc 'med likely to be quite as
useful a piece of war service as I could do anywhere else. I therefore remained
in the Shansi-( 'hahor-Hopei area for nearly two and a half years during which
I gave classes in radio engineering to ISth Group Army technicians and trav-
elled round rebuilding the army radio equipment. In 1943 I was officially ap-
pointed Technical Adviser to the Communications Department of the Shansi-
Chahar-Hopei Military District.
During this period I was in a good position to confirm that the ISth group
Army was doing an extremely good job in fighting the Japanese within the lim-
itations imposed by the complete absence of outside supplies. I could also con-
firm that the government, under Communist leadership, was doing an extremely
good .iob in economic and social reform and had succeeded in winning strong
support from the great majority of the population. In this respect Lady Lind-
say's observations were of great asistance. She had lived in the country as a
child and found it easier to establish friendly relations with the peasants than
many of the Communist Party organisers. She could also make the direct com-
parison with the prewar countryside in North China.
But while I was working in the Chinese Communist organisation and strongly
approving of the greater part of their actual policies I still expressed disagree-
ment with parts of the Communist position. I remember arguments in which
I maintained that large parts of Marxian economics were fallacious ; that the
Chinese Communist Party was only successful because of its differences with
other Communist parties ; that the stupidities of Comintern policy were largely
responsible for Hitler's rise to power. On the basis of information from British
and American broadcasts I publicly criticized the official Communist views about
the second front in Europe. I still have the draft in Chinese romanisation of
a reply to a questionnaire about my political views from a friend in the Com-
munist Secret Service Organisation. I was writing to minimize rather than
to emphasize our points of difference but even so 1 argue that Hitler would cer-
tainly have won the war if the British workers had been silly enough to follow
the leadership of the British Communist Party under Comintern direction. I
admit that the Soviet Union might be very democratic in some respects but I
argue that in other respects it was definitely inferior to British or American
democracy, in particular I criticize the absence of free and informed discus-
sion and the insecurity of the ordinary citizen against oppression by officials.
The fact that people in the Chinese Communist organisation were prepared
to work in full and friendly cooi)eration for common objectives with someone
who disagreed with them to this extent is strong evidence that, at this period,
the Chinese Communist Party was considerably different from orthodox Stalinist
parties.
P>y the beginning of 1944 I was becoming increasingly concerned at the com-
plete lack of contact between the ISth Group Army and the British and Amer- .
ican organisations in China as I believed that cooperation between them could
make a vei'y valuable contribution to the Allied war effort against Japan. At-
tempts to establish contacts from Shansi-Chahar-Hopei had failed and it seems
that the best chances of making contacts were from Yenan. My main work in
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei was also coming to an end as I had done almost all the
rebuilding of apparatus possible with the material available and nearly all the
technicians with sufficient mathematical background to profit by my courses on
radio engineering had been through them. We therefore moved to Yenan in
the spring of 1944.
In fact contacts with the outside world were established very soon after our
arrival at Yenan through the visit of foreign correspondents and the arrival
of the U. S. Army Observers Section.
I designed the radio transmitter and dix'ectional antenna which enabled the
New China News Agency to transmit its service to America and India but I
gradually withdrew from technical communications work largely because the
head of the Yenan Communications Department was uncooperative and resent-
ful of outside advice. I concentrated on helping the New China News Agency
with their English language service and on trying to nromote cooperation with
the U. S. Army Observers Section. (Colonel David Barrett and Colonel Ivan
IXSTiTUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5371
Featon could give evidence of my work in this connection.) Unfortunately
relations between tlie U. S. Army and the 18th Group Army gradually deterior-
ated, largely owing to bad faith on the American side. The American personnel
at Yenan saw the advantages of cooperation for the Allied War effort and tried
to work for it but their efforts were often sabotaged by the higher U. S. Army
authorities at Chungking.
These American authorities in Chungking appeared to be opposed to coopera-
tion with the British as well as to cooperate with the Communists. I heard
that the head of British Military Intelligence at Chungking had wanted to visit
Yenan but had been compelled to postpone his visit and I wrote to him to say
that, in case he was not getting all the information he wanted from Yenan
through the Americans, I hlid arranged with General Yeh Chien-ying for copies
of all" the ISth Group Army reports given to the U. S. A. O. S. to be made avail-
able for the British and that if he wanted any additional information I would
ask General Yeh if it could be procured. On reaching Chungking in November
1945 I found that my letter had been suppressed by the anti-British American
authorities in Chungking and that none of the information obtained by the
U. S. A. O. S. at Yenan had been shared with the British. I later learnt that
General Hurley had issued orders that no British representatives was to be
allowed to visit Yenan and had been grossly insulting to Colonel Harmon in
the presence of the British Ambassador because he had heard a rumor that
Colonel Harmon had managed to visit Yenan without his permission.
The result of the policies of the American authorities was that in a number
of projects the 18th Group Army authorities were led by as.surances of Amer-
ican cooperation into considerable expenditures of labour and scarce materials
only to find that the Americans had backed out of their share of the proposed
undertaking. For example, I worked with the U. S. A. O. S. on plans for a com-
munications network. An appreciable part of the very limited communications
equipment of the 18th Group Army became tied up in providing intelligence
and weather reports for American use. Repeated assurances were given that
this was only a temporary expedient and that American material would be
provided for all radio stations working for the U. S. forces. But it was only
after very long delays that any apparatus was delivered and then it was of
types that the 18th Group Army had clearly and repeatedly stated to be use-
less for the front line areas so that it could only be used to scrap for the com-
ponents.
This is not the place to discuss other instances but I would like to place it
on record that the 18th Group Army was one of the few Allied forces that
could almost certainly claim a balance due from the United States under any
sort of Lend Lease arrangement. I would also like to record my opinion that
the reluctance of the higher American military authorities in Chungking to co-
operate in good faith for the common objective of defeating Japan played an
appreciable part in stimulating the growth of anti-American feeling in China.
In this situation I tried to advise the ISth Group Army authorities that the
best policy was to make a frank statement of their gTievances to Anaericans and
to make it clear that they were ready to carry out fully their part of any
scheme for cooperation provided the Americans did the same. Unfortunately
this advice had only slight effect in preventing the 18th Group Army authorities
from reacting to American bad faith and lack of cooperation by becoming dis-
courteous and obstructive on their side, even towards those Americans who
were working for cooperation.
I was not directly concerned in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations
but I was in fairly close touch with developments and I would also like to
place on record that General Hurley provided the Chinese Communist Party
with a glaring instance of American bad faitli. According to both Chinese
and American eyewitnesses, General Hurley si,gned the Five Point Draft Agree-
ment of 10th November 1944 saying that, though he could not commit his gov-
ernment, he was signing to show that he personally fully approved the draft
terms and pledged himself to support them. Within a few weeks he had
repudiated his signature. (It is an indication of the cowardice of the State
Department against its critics that the White Paper tries to cover up for Gen-
eral Hurley by saying that he only signed the Draft Agreement as a witness
(page 74) instead of revealing that, at one time. General Hurley had pledged
himself to support the full Communist claims for a settlement with the Kuomin-
tang with some additions proposed l)y himself, going even fiirther than the
original Communist draft). The point at issue is not General Hurley's judg-
ment in first supporting the Communist terms or in later opposing them, it is
5372 iisrsTiTUTE of pacific relations
the simple issue of elementary honesty. When people of any political view
take the Stalinist position that any undertaking can be repudiated as soon as
it is considered expedient to do so, any agreement liased on mutual trust be-
comes impossible. If every promise is liable to arbitrary repudiation, the only
remaining guarantee of security is superior force.
It is strong evidence of the desire of the Chinese Communist leaders for a
peaceful settlement in China that they should again have accepted American
mediation after this experience of the behaviour of a United States Ambassador.
Their rather quixotic honesty in some respects was also shown by their refusal
to publish the evidence of General Hurley's bad faith because, during his visit
to Yenan. they had agreed that the terms to which he had pledged his support
should ndt Ijemade public without his consent.
In Yenan, as in Shansi-Chnhar-Hopei, I was working with the Chinese Com-
munist organisation l)ecause in most matters of practical policy they seemed
to be in the right and to be doing a good job. A large part of the criticism of
the Chinese Communist Party and ISth Group Army that appeared m the
Kuomintang or right-wing American press was based on statements that had
almost no relation to the facts. But here again, my attitude was not one of
uncritiial support. Members of the U. S. A. O. S. could probal)ly remember argu-
ments I had with the ISth Group Army Liaison officers in which I maintained
that some things that happened at Yenan would arouse violent public protests
in democratic societies such as Britain or America. I also wrote a long report
of 30,000 words entitled "What's wrong with Yenan," which I circulated among
friends in the higher ranks of the Connnunist organisation. In this I pointed
out the instances of l)ureancracy and incompetence in the Yenan organisation
and that the general standards of work at Yenan were lower than in the front-
line areas. I related these defects to the fact that organisations at Yenan
were more purely Communist and less genuinely united front and suggested that
the Communist theories about "democratic centralism" and aliout the nature
of scientific judgments almost inevitably led to maladministration in any organi-
sation that was predominantly controlled by Communist Party members. Al-
though these criticisms attacked some of the basic principles of Communist,
organisation they were accepted by the people to whom I showed them as worthy
of serious consideration and discussion. This again indicated an absence of
dogmatism which was abnormal among Communists outside China.
In November 1945 I left Yenan for England with my family. I had already
been away from home for eight years and it seemed that if we did not return
then the spread of a general civil war might prevent us leaving North China
for a very long period. After a short time in England I went on a lecture
tour in Canada and the United States at the invitation of the Canadian Insitute
of International Affairs, the Institute of International Education and the
Institute of Pacific Relations. I was then invited to Harvard as a visiting
lecturer and returned to the United States in September 1946 and worked
at Harvard, mainly in the Far Eastern Area Programme, until June 1947. I
was the oidy West'ener who combined a knowledge of the Chinese Communist
areas outside Yenan, some inside knowledge of the Chinese Communist organisa-
tion through having worked in it and academic qualifications in social science,
and these invitations were a natural result of this.
I took part in the general controversy about China and U. S. policy in
China, mostly in defence of the general position of the Chinese Cominunist
Party, though I always ba^ed my support for the Chinese Communist Party
on the fact that tlieir policies were considerably different from those of normal
Stalinist parties and on the hope that these differences might increase and
become i>ermanent.
In an article which appeared in the London Times of 17th January 1946 I
wrote, "To sum up. the Chinese Communist Party is definitely Communist in its
basic principles and its party organisation, but its practical programme and
its traditions differ considerably from those of other Communist parties." And,
by September 1946, I was writing to friends in the Chinese Communist
organisation to the effect that the Russian form of Communism was showing
itself to be similar in many ways to Japanese militarism and that it was only if
Communism followed some of the special featui-es of the Chinese organisation
that it could become democratic. (The relevant passages of one such letter are
reproduced in Appendix I.)
Looking back on the controversy about China it seems that there was a real
problem al>out which people who accepted the assmuptions of scientific think-
ing could honestly hold differing opinions on the evidence available at the time.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5373
This problem was whether or not the Chinese Communist leadership was sin-
cere in its proclaimed objective of serving the interests of the common people
of China and whether or not it was capable of acting rationally in pursuit of
this objective. If the answer on both these points was affirmative the policies
of the Chinese Communist Party were bound to diverge increasingly from those
of orthodox Stalinist Communist Parties and a unification of theory with
practice was bound to involve the Chinese Communist Party in condemnation of
the monolithic police-state systems of the Soviet Union and tlie Soviet satellites.
But there was evidence of conflicting tendencies within the Chinese Communist
Party.
On the one hand the success of the Chinese Communist Party and their ability
to win very general popular support in the areas'they controlled had depended
on their readiness to adjust their policies to fit the facts and to give the
ordinary i)easant what he actually wanted and not just what Marx-Leninist
theory said he ought to want. This had involved important departures from
Stalinist orthodoxy. For example, the distinction between "good" and "bad"
landlords corresponded to the obvious facts of experience but implied a rejec-
tion of the rigid Marxian view of determination of thought by class position.
The agrarian policy in force from 1937 to 1946 was a "reformist" one. It pro-
duced strong economic pressures towards equalization of land holdings and
transfer of capital from land or usury to productive industry or trade but it
did not put any group in the community in a position where they either had to
fight the regime or else passively accept "liquidation." The result of this
unorthodoxy was to make possible a government in which the reality of
popular support was proved by the absence of secret police terrorism. In spite
of wartime conditions which made ir impossible to prevent the infiltration of
enemy agents the respect for due process of law was, by Chinese standards, re-
markably high. Though rejecting the name the Communist Party had in prac-
tice accepted Sun Yat-sen's theory of "political tutelage" and it is hard to see
how, in the Chinese situation, anything else could have functioned effectively at
the higher levels of government. But the element of tutelage was more real
th;in with the Kuomintang. At the village level, where the ordinary citizen
could imderstand the issues involved in spite of illiteracy and lack of political
experience, the system was genuinely democratic and, in the more advanced
areas, there was a considerable degree of effective discussion and popular
participation at higher levels. (The whole subject is discussed at greater length
in Chapter II, Political and Social Background, of my Notes on Educational
Problems in Communist China, New York IPR 1950.)
Besides this there were indications that the Chinese Communist leadership
had begun to think about the question, "How can we know that the policies of
the Communist Party do in fact represent the masses?" and were beginning to
arrive at the obvious answer that this was only pc/ssible if the power of the
Communist Party dependent on persuasion and if non-Communists had effec-
tive powers of criticism and discussion. An editorial in the official Yenan paper
went so far as to say, "Only when a party is functionally separate from the
government can it be fitted into a system of democracy ; * * *." Authoritari-
anism was a defect that was strongly condemned by the Chinese Communists
in the early 1940's and the whole atmosphere of Yenan was felt to be very
different from that of Russia by people who had experience of both. And the
atmosphere of the front-line areas was freer than Yenan. In pure theory, Mao's
lectures on Dialectical Materialism gave an interpretation that was almost cer-
tainly unorthodox. (By 1949 this book had. apparently, been completely sui>-
pressed.) If one considered these aspects of the Chinese Communist Party it
seemed that it was likely to act reasonably in the interests of the Chinese people
and to develop in an increasingly democratic and anti-Stalinist direction.
On the other hand, while many Chinese Communists were sensible, refisonable
people, the Party also contained many docti'inaire fanatics who were not likely
to modify their Marx-Leninist dogmas or their blind faith in the Soviet Union.
Although the leaders paid lip service to the importance of discussion and critical
thought, the training of Party cadres always suffered from the tendency to in-
culcate a blind uncritical respect for the authority of the Party. Even in the
thinking of the sensible leaders there were elements of contradiction. For ex-
ample, in an article entitled "The Reconstruction of our Studies" Mao Tse-tung
makes a strong argument for genuinel.v scientific thinking — "seek the truth by
referring to fact" — but ends by uncritical praise of the "History of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union," "* * * in the whole world, this is still
the one perfect model." Judged by everything that Mao has said before the
5374 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
last two paragraphs he should have condemned his illustration as the perfect
model of what to avoid, the distortion of the facts to lit a preconceived view.
Finally, in all its official statements on the international situation and nearly
all its high-level public statements on theory and policy the Chinese Communist
Party had followed the Stalinist line. This is not conclusive evidence that no
anti-Stalinist tendencies existed as such public statements would be among the
last things likely to change. The Yugolsav Communist Party continued official
theoretical support of Stalin and the Soviet Union for a considerable period
after the actual breach and it was not until 1950 that theoretical criticism of
the Soviet Union appeared. The pre-Hitler German Social Democratic Party
retained a revolutionary Marxian theoretical position for decades after it had
become a predominantly Tracle Union party working in an accepted capitalist
system. But the failure of the Chinese Communist Party openly to dissociate
itself from the Stalinist position indicated that the reasonable and democratic
policies practiced after 1937 might be only a tactical move and that the Party
might swing over to the orthodox doctrinaire, authoritarian and terrorist line
as soon as it became strong enough to do so with impunity.
There was a similar real problem about whether or not the Kuomintang was
capable of developing toward democracy and the evidence also indicated con-
flicting tendencies.
But these real problems were largely obscured in the public controversy that
raged in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom.
Anyone who defended the respect for objective standards, which has been a basic
part of both the Christian and the scientific traditions in Western civilization,
found themselves in conflict over Chinese questions with the extreme anti-Com-
munist groups in America and Britain. The Kuomintang publicity organisa-
tion and many Kuomintang supporters had, in practice, accepted the standards
common to Stalinism and Hitlerism about what was legitimate in political con-
troversy. Anyone who maintained that it was wrong to invent or suppress his-
torical evidence to serve the interests of any cause inevitably became involved
in defence of tlie Chinese Communist position, because such a large proportion
of the attacks on the Chinese Communists were based on statements or assump-
tions which were completely untrue. One continually met arguments based on
the assumption that Communist land policy and methods of government were
the same after 1937 as in the Chinese Soviet Republic before 1935. Other argu-
ments assumed that the area round Yenan had remained the only important
Communist area throughout the war. It was alleged that Communist-Japanese
hostilities had practically ceased after 1939. The evidence of Kuomintang-
Japanese collaboration and continuing Kuomintang secret-police terrorism was
denied ; and so on. Many of these completely false arguments, which only dis-
credit genuine criticism of Chinese Communism, have remained in circulation
until the present. (See Appendix II.)
Totalitarians of both sides have been united in denouncing people and insti-
tutions who have tried to retain standards of objectivity. Left-wing totalitarian
views have been less in evidence in America but it should be pointed out that
institutions such as the Institute of Paciflc Relations and individual experts
such as Professor J. K. Fairbank have been denounced by the genuine Com-
munists and fellow travellers as well as by the anti-Communists (e. g., article
by I. Epstein in Cliina Monthly Review of January 1952). For my part, I have
attacked those who have tried to falsify the historical record whether from
the Communist or the anti-Communist point of view. Appendix III gives the
text of an article written in October 1951 for the Manchester Guardian, criti-
cising an official liistory of the Chinese Communist Party.
Looking back on events, I was too optimistic to begin with and underesti-
mated the strength of the doctrinaire, extremist tendencies in the Chinese
Communist Party. But as signs of extremism became more apparent, I more
and more stressed that support for the Chinese Communist Party must be
dependent on its differences from orthodox Stalinism and that the crucial test
for popular support was the absence of secret police terrorism. I also argued
that the only sensible policy for the West was to fight on the real issue between
democracy and totalitarianism by challenging the good faith of the Chinese
Communist Party over its proclaimed objectives of freedom and friendly rela-
tions with non-Communist countries. In a memorandum written in 194.S and
circulated to Members of Parliament and others interested in Far Eastern policy
I urge that Britain should establish contacts with the Communiss and that
British representatives in the CP areas should publish strictly factual material
about Russian actions in Europe, from which everyone in North China or Man-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5375
churia would draw the obvious conclusions about the similarities of the Soviet
and Japanese systems, and that they should offer Chinese Communist repre-
sentatives facilities for investigation in Germany if these reports were chal-
lenged. In a letter to Liu Ning-I in May 1948, I say, "The point which I
hope you can make clear to people in the Liberated Areas is that the great
majority even of socialist opinion in this country is Anti-Russian simply because
they hate secret policy terrorism." I say that if the Chinese Communists really
wished for popular support in England or America they should issue a statement
"denouncing the Kuomintang secret police, pointing out that the Liberated Areas
do not need an organisation like the Kuomintang secret police organisation
because the governments really have popular support and then saying that
no government could &e called democratic trhich had to use an orf/anisatioti
like the Kuomintang secret police or the old Japanese Kempetai to keep itself
in potver." I made the same general points in a number of letters publislied in
the British press and in the articles written after a visit to China in 1949. (The
relevant passages are reproduced in Appendix IV.)
On the outbreak of the Korean war I supported the U. N. action as being
a defence of collective security and argued that if the U. N. had failed to act
in Korea it would almost certainly have led to further acts of Stalinist aggres-
sion which would have produced a general war. I have been strongly critical
of the handling of the Korean situation and of American intervention in For-
mosa and have maintained that Chinese intervention in Korea could probably
have been avoided if earlier action had been taken to control General Mac-
Arthur's disloyalty and insubordination as U. N. commander but I have con-
sistently attacked those who have tried to deny that the war was started by
North Korean aggression and those who have tried to maintain that Chinese
intervention was justified. (The persecution mania about the United States
among the Chinese leaders was a fact of which U. N. policy should have taken
account ; but while this persecution mania explains Chinese intervention it does
not justify it.) Appendix V reproduces some of my letters on these points
which have appeared in the British press.
Since the degeneration of the Chinese regime towards terrorism and police-
state methods after the middle of 1950 I have become steadily more critical of
the Chinese Communist Party. In a broadcast (published in the Listener of
31st May 1951), I said, "If the Chinese take Russia as a model China may
well develop something like the old Confucian system with the Communist
Party in place of the scholar officials and Marxism instead of Confucianism
as the official ideology * * * Que Q^n even see the beginnings of a move-
ment in this direction," and, "If the enforcement of a new uniform ideology
prevents people from thinking scientifically they will be unable to prevent the
degeneration of Chinese society into what Milovan Djilas calls 'bureaucratic
centralism,' because they will not be able to understand what is happening. A
static China will again face a progressing West." In a letter to the New States-
man on 27th May 1951 I reply to Chinese critics of British policy and argue
that the main obstacle to better Sino-British relations was the intransigence
of the Chinese government. (See appendix VI.) In a controversy in the Man-
chester Guardian I criticise Mr. Zilliacus's defence of Chinese terrorism and
say, "It is quite true that American action over Formosa and the advance to
the Manchurian border played a large part in producing political hysteria in
China, but this does not alter the fact that political hysteria is a mental disease
with dis,ffusting symptoms. * * * ^j. zmiacus * * * jg j^ere asserting
a principle that would equally well excuse Maidenek or Biichenwald because
of the part which French intervention in the Ruhr and Rhineland played in
the growth of Nazism. As against this Lord Vansittart is entirely right in
asserting the principle that all terrorism and massacre should be condemned.
One only regrets that he did not apply this principle some years ago by con-
demning the Kuomintang with the same vigour that he now condemns the Com-
munists." (Letter written 11th May 1951.) In more recent lectures I have
argued that the resort of the Chinese regime to terrorism is evidence that it
can no longer command popular support.
I have been strongly critical of United States policy in China, not because
it opposed Stalinism and Soviet imperialism but because its actual result has
been to assist the acceptance of Stalinist views in China, to discredit democracy,
and to force China into reliance on the Soviet Union. After my return from a
visit to China in 1949 I wrote, "The complete discrediting of America in Chinese
eyes has been the work of the group who might be called the Kuomintang fellow
travellers, whose attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek has been that of Com-
5376 i^rsTiTUTE of pacific relations
muuist fellow-travellers towards Stalin. * * * This powerful group has made
America appear in China as the consistent supporter of the most corrupt and
reactionary forces in Chinese society," and, "If China ever becomes a Russian
dependency, the best assistants of Russian imperialism will, as usual, have been
the doctrinaire anti-Communists." ' In many public speeches I have said that if
General Hurley had accepted a commission from the Soviet government to
discredit American influence in China there was scarcely one of his actions he
would have needed to change.''
I have maintained that, during the period from 1945-49, the State Depart-
ment was very nuich better informed about China than the British Foreign
Office and that the basic weakness of American policy was the failure of the
State Department to stick to its principles against its right-wing critics. A sum-
mary of my views is given in an article on The Cold War in the East which
appeared in the Political Quarterly for January-March 1951. (Appendix VII.)
I have argued that if Genei-al Marshall and the State Department had had a
free hand over China policy they could have very probably prevented the civil
war in China and that a skilful handling of American policy could have put
the Chinese Communists in a position in which they either had to break with
the Soviet Union and repudiate the doctrinaire Stalinist elements in their posi-
tion or else bi-eak with America and the democratic forces in China over issues
on which the.v would have been violently opposed by all nationalist and demo-
cratic Chinese pul)lic opinion. I have argued that, in such circumstances, it is
vei"y probable that most of the Chinese Communist leaders would have broken
with the Soviet Union. If they had not, their chances of success in the civil
war would have been very much reduced if they had fought with the active
opposition of the great majority of educated Chinese public opinion.
The points on which I disagree with the right-wing critics of the State Depart-
ment involve the fundamental issues of democracy versus totalitarianism. I
have argued that these right-wing groups have in fact accepted the Stalinist
assumptions about the nature of the world conflict and the correct forms of
political strategy. (See letter reproduced in Appendix V (b) and letters repro-
duced in Appendix VIII.) As against this I have argued that the most serious
danger in the present world conflict is the practical cooperation between exti'em-
ists of both sides in strengthening each other's influence and in working for a
situation in which no disputes can be settled except by war. A short statement
of my views was given in a series of broadcasts which I gave last year for the
B. B. C. Far P^astern Service which are reproduced in Appendix IX.
I have argued that, in psychological warfare, it is vital to fight on the right
issues and that American policy in China failed because, under pressure from
the groups in America who supported Stalinist strategy, it always fought on the
wrong issues. It has seemed to me the height of folly for a democratic country
to try to compete with Stalinism by using Stalinist strategies. In such competi-
tion the highly organized and completely unscrupulous professionals are certain
to defeat the disunited and slightly half-hearted amateurs. On the other hand
I have maintained that Stalinism could be defeated in psychological warfare if
democratic countries insisted in fighting on democratic principles.
In writing on American policy in China I have always criticized the failure
to stand for democratic principles and the failure to carry out the declaimed
objectives of American policy. As early as January 1946 I wrote that a settle-
ment was only possible if the Americans insisted on the conditions set out in
President Truman's statement of 15th December 1945. (See appendix X (a).)
In an analysis of American policy written in May 1947 I wrote, "Judged in terms
of American objectives the basic mistake in American policy was failure to sup-
port the groups that would have been America's natural allies." (The full
analysis is given in Appendix X (b).) The Chinese Communists were never
challenged on the real issues of their conflicting loyalties to China and to the
Soviet Union or on their readiness to repudiate policies of secret-police terrorism
and to allow freedom of information and discussion. On the contrary the United
" The New Cliina : three views. London. Turnstile Press. 1950. pages 141 and 14.5.
••In view of the controversy about military aid to the Kuomintang, it Is worth pointing
out that, in 1945, Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer and Commodore Miles told the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that, "They were all of the opinion that the rebellion in China could be
put down by comparatively small assi.stance to Chiang's Central Govornnient."' (Admiral
Leahy, I Was There. London Gollancz, 1950, page 395.) An important iiart of General
Hiirlep's assistance to the Soviet Union was his provision to the U. S. government of
completely inaccurate information about both the political and the military situation and
his efforts to prevent the transmission of more accurate reports.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5377
States became involved in the support of a corrupt and incompetent police-state
regime against a regime \\liicli was strilvingly more tionest and efficient and which,
until 1950, could make out a strong case for claiming to be more democratic.
Most non-Communist foreign observers in contact with Chinese opinion agree
that these policies completely discredited America and made educated Chinese
opinion inclined to accept Communism. (Derk Bodde's "Peking Diary" is one
example of such reporting.) The Formosan problem is, perhaps, the clearest
illustration of the troubles caused by American failure to stand on the principles
of American democracy. By every principle of American democracy, going back
to the Declaration of Independence, the United States should have supported the
efforts of the Formosans to free themselves from intolerable misgovernment,
especially since there was no question of Communism involved in the rising of
February 1947. If America had then supported Formosan home rule there
would now be a Formosan government, either independent or under U. N.
trusteeship, which would have represented the great majority of Formosan
opinion in asking for support against attack from any totalitarian government
on the mainland./ Defence of Formosa would be an issue on which the United
States could obtain support from democratic opinion throughout the world.
Instead, the United States allowed the Kuomintaug to suppress the rising by
terrorism, including the regular Stalinist technique of killing oft the educated
natives who were likely to lead any opposition.'^ As a result the defence of For-
mosa is defensible only in terms of military strategy and has become an issue on
which democratic opinion in the free countries is strongly and justifiably critical
of American action, and which, therefore, causes disagreements between America
and her allies.
It is extremely improbable that the American advocates of totalitarian strat-
egy could have prevented a Kuomintaug defeat even if they had had a free
hand in determining American policy in China, because they had lost the con-
tact with objective reality which, as George Orwell showed in his brilliant
analysis of totalitarianism, is an essential constituent of successful "double-
think." All the aru'uments that the outcome of the civil war could have l)een
changed by a limited extension of military aid to the Kuomintang depend on
completely unrealistic estimates of the relative military strength and general
competence of the Kuomintaug and the Communists. My estimates of the mili-
tary prospects in 1946 and 1947 proved to be much more nearly correct than
those which were generally accepted at the time. In an analysis written at the
end of 1946, based on the experience of the Communist-Japanese fighting, I argued
that, even with full-scale American assistance and the use of American troops,
it would take the Kuomintang a minimum of four or five years to win the war ;
that with only limited American assistance the Kuomintang might win posi-
tional battles to begin with but would probably end by being completely de-
feated by the Communists, also in four or five years (Virginia Quarterly Re-
view, Vol. 23, No. 2). By the middle of 1947 I was pointing out that the Kuomin-
tang seemed to have weakened to the point where it could not even win posi-
tional battles and suggested that while this might be altered by increased
American intervention there was the possibility that full-scale American in-
tervention on one side might produce Russian intervention on the other (Fabian
Quarterly, June 1947).
This is not the place for a full discussion of American policy but I would main-
tain that there is strong evidence to support my general contention that the in-
fluence on U. S. policy of such bodies as the China Policy Association and such
personalities as Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer, Senators Knowland and Mc-
Carthy, Congressman Judd and Mr. Henry Luce has been a major factor in
bringing about the victory of Stalinism in China. I would also maintain that
there is strong evidence to support my view that the present situation would be
much better if U. S. policy had followed the views of those experienced China
Service officers who have been denounced and in some cases dismissed for al-
leged disloyalty. There was, at the least, a reasonable possibility that the poli-
cies they advocated might have produced a Chinese government committed to
democratic values and opposed to police-state methods and, therefore, aligned
with the democracies against Stalinism, even though some of the leading fig-
5 By an irony of arrangement, Annexe 169 of the American White Paper, which describes
the- suppression of the Formosan rising liy troops with American equipment and which
reads rather like the accounts of the establishment of Soviet rule in the Baltic States, is
followed immediately by an Annexe in which President Truman declares, ". . . it should be
clearly understood that military assistance furnished by the United States would not be
diverted for use in fratricidal warfare or to support undemocratic administration."
5378 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ures in such a government would have been members of the Chinese Communist
Party. Even if such policies had failed to prevent the complete dominance of
the Chinese Communist Party by the doctrinaire Stalinist and blindly pro-Rus-
sian elements in it and the complete victory in China of such a Communist Party,
the American position in the Far East would still be far stronger than it is now.
Stalinist dominance in China would have depended far more directly on force
and terrorism against a Chinese public opinion which would have been naturally
ju-o-Anierican ; and American moral influence and trust in American good faith
would be far stronger in other Asian countries.
In conclusion, I would claim that the above account shows that my actions
have always been based on a viewpoint completely different both from that of
Stalinist Communists or fellow travellers and from that of the right-wing groups
in America and Britain who accept the basic Stalinist assumptions on philosophy
and political strategy.
Appendix XI gives a short account of my membership of political associations.
SECTION II
I first became acquainted with the publications of the I. P. R. after reaching
China in 1938 and, at Yenching University, I was a close friend of the late Mr.
Norman Hanwell, an I. P. R. research scholar who was doing very interesting
work (unfortunately uncompleted because of his illness and death).
When in the United States in 1946 and 1947 I got to know a number of the
staff of the American I. P. R. and gave a number of lectures under their auspices.
After returning to England, I was one of the British delegates, chosen by the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, to the World I. P. R. conference at
Stratford-on-Avon. After the conference I was invited to become a member of
the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
I have been working on a book on the growth of the Chinese Communist areas
and the history of Communist-Kuomintang relations between 1937 and 1947.
The book is sponsored by the I. P. R. and by the Royal Institute of International
Affairs and, in 1949, the I. P. R. financed a visit to China on which I hoped to
obtain more material for the book.
I have done some writing for Pacific Affairs, and Far Eastern Survey, largely
book reviews, and in 1950 the I. P. R. published a mimeographed edition of my
"Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China" which was originally
written as a report for an international organisation.
In all my work on Chinese problems I have found publications by the I. P. R.
to be among the most useful English4anguage sources. In the sample of I. P. R.
publications, whose accuracy I have been in a position to check, the standards of
objectivity and respect for the facts has been extremely high and, judging from
the reports of other workers in the Far Eastern field, the work of the I. P. R.
is very generally respected among serious scholars.
In the political, social, and economic problems with which the I. P. R. has
been concerned, the evidence available is normally insufficient to give a definite
decision ])etween a range of alternative hypotheses. This means that there is a
range within which scholars genu'nely trying to be objective can honestly and
legitimately differ, and the material published by the I. P. R. has seemed to
me to represent a variety of views within this range. But the standards of
scholarship and objectivity which the I. P. R. has tried to preserve imply the
rejection of views outside j:he range which can be supported by an honest exami-
nation of the evidence. This has meant that the I. P. R. has been committed to
a stand for one side in certain political controversies. To give an example that
has now l)ecome comparatively uncontroversial, during the years before 1941
the I. P. R. was definitely pro-Chinese in the Sino-Japanese conflict and highly
critical of the viewpoint which supported Japan's alleged "civilizing mission"
and which advocated that the Western powers should accept the Japanese claims
for a special position in China. But the pro-Japanese case was not one which
could be supported by any honest examination of the record of Japanese be-
haviour in IVIanchuriaor China. The argument, used by some influential Ameri-
cans, that Japan should be conciliated as being the best customer for American
cotton ignored the frequent statements in Japanese publications that control of
North China was vital to Japan because it would make Japan independent of
American cotton supplies. Thus, a refusal to accept views which depended on
deliberate distortion or falsification of evidence inevitably put the I. P. R. in a
position strongly critical of Japanese policy.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5379
In the present controversies, a pood deal of the criticism of the I. P. R. from
both the extreme right and the extreme left has been caused by the policy of
the I. P. R. in publishing factual material. If the I. P. R. were compelled to
change its present standards for standards which reject scholarship and objec-
tivity it would be an important victory for totalitarianism over the traditions of
Western civilization.
Lindsay of Bikker.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this third day of June, 1952.
[SEAL] North Burn,
Vice Coyisiil of the United States of America.
Service No. 7671, Item No. 24, Fee $2.00— 18s 4d.
Appendix I
ExTRzVCT From Letter to Yu Kuang-sheng (of New China News Agency in
Yenan ) , September 13, 1946
However, Hsin Hua Shih publicity is far better than the publicity of the British
or American Communist parties and especially the Soviet Union. Soviet public-
ity is almost incredibly incompetent. IMy impression in England was that
Soviet publicity was a big factor in producing anti-Soviet feeling, and some of
the Labour Party people who want to get Bevin out as Foreign Secretary feel
that the attacks made on him by the Communists are one of the main factors
keeping him in power. You could see the same sort of result very clearly in the
Labour Party conference rejection of Communist affiliation. Even the South
Wales Miner's Federation, which had elected a Communist as their chairman,
voted against affiliation by a large majority apparently because Communist
publicity had been so subjective and so dogmatic that even very left-wing work-
ers' organisations distrusted it.
The weaknesses seem to be dogmatism and an extreme subjectivism, which
might be called Marxian idealism. They seem to have turned iMarx upside down
again and got back to a position like Hegel in "Naturphilosophie" of supposing
that truth and falsehood can be determined entirely from ideas without reference
to the material world.
As far as I could judge, Hsin Hua Shih was often guilty of serious omissions
and was sometimes inaccurate through carelessness but it did not go in for deliber-
ate invention or false statements. Soviet and Western Communist publicity, on
the other hand, seems to have extremely little respect for facts. I'm carrying
on a correspondence with "Soviet News" about an article they had on American
intervention in China which was typical of the sort of stuff they put out. Among
other things the author tries to make out that American policy was very good
before the death of Roosevelt and very bad ever since, which of course means
that he has to distort the whole history of the recall of Stilwell and Hurley's press
conference on April 5th. Even when the facts support his general case he does
not bother to get them right. He argues that it would have been cheaper (sic)
both for China and America for the "People's Armies of Liberation" to i-eceive
the Japanese surrender rather than to send American and Kuomintang troops
to disarm the Japanese. As he writes it, the reader would understand that the
Japanese had been disarmed as soon as American and Kuomintang troops got to
North China. In general, Soviet publicity makes so many statements that are
clearly untrue that people often disbelieve even the true statements.
People who have had to do with the Russians find their subjectivism quite
fantastic. My brother had one story about a committee he was on in Berlin.
The British had one set of proposals and the Russians quite a different set, and
as they could not agree on a compromise the meeting was adjourned for three
weeks. At the next meeting the Russians said, "We have a new set of proposals,"
and produced almost word for word what had been the British proposals at the
last meeting. They then said, "These are the Russian proposals and they always
have been the Russian proposals." Someone who had been at San Francisco told
me a very similar story about the conference. The Russians wanted to change
some resolution, which may have been quite a sensible thing to do, but instead of
proposing that the original resolution should be changed they proposed that there
should be a new resolution and that all mention of the original resolution should
be removed from the records of the conference. The man who told me said that
5380 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the Russians just did not seem able to understand it when other people said, "But
the conference did pass the original resolution and tliat is a fact which you can-
not alter by falsifying the records."
All the stories you hear from people who have been in Europe give you a fairly
poor opinion of the Russians. In many ways the Russian army seems to be much
more like the Japanese army than the Eighth Route army. All the British army
people in Germany are struck by the fact that the difference in treatment between
officers and men is much greater in the Russian army than it is in the British
(and of course it is much greater in the British than in the Eighth Route). Also,
for a long time there was a breakdown in discipline in many units with very wide-
spread looting and raping. This was not just in enemy territory. A friend of
mine was over in Denmark recently and he said that people had heard from
friends or relations in Bornholm that the Russians had behaved very much worse
than the Germans. (The people he was meeting were Danish workers or farm-
ers.) Russian discipline was tightened up several months ago, apparently on
orders from INIoscow, though by rather brutal methods in which a lot of people
were shot, and is now said to be rather better than American discipline.
Another point where the Russians seem to be much more like the Japanese or
Kuomintang than they are like the Eighth Route is in secret-police activities.
My brother had a lot of stories about it. This is a typical case. A German Com-
munist was arrested in the British zone of Berlin for black-market activities. A
day or two later two Russians came to the house of the German policeman who
had arrested him and when they found the policeman was not in they carried off
his wife. The Russian HQ said they knew nothing about it, but British
intelligence got news of where she was and a British patrol went into the Russian
zone and found her shut up in a cellar after having been raped and beaten. This
is just the sort of thing which might have happened in Peiping if a Chinese police-
man had arrested a criminal with Japanese connections.
A lot of the Russian defects seem to have come from the development of an
authoritarian tradition. At the moment that seems to be vei'y strong. People
who have to do with the Russians say that people on the spot are very much tied
down by detailed orders from Moscow and have very little freedom of initiative
and also there seems to be a general aiithoritarian outlook. For example, my
bother said he had a long argument with one of the Russians when the Russians
wanted to prohibit private schools in Germany. The Russian attitude was that
there was a correct education and that it was the business of the government
to see that all children received this correct education and so all children should
go to official government schools. My brother said to him, "Surely what you
want is exactly the same as the Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung." The Russian
thought about this for a bit and finally said, "Well perhaps our methods are the
same as the Nazis', but we are using them for different ends."
I tlank that is the real point at issue between the Russians and British Social-
ists— how far the methods the Russians use can produce a democratic Socialist
society. For example, in the part of Europe imder Russian influence there have
been very important reforms. On the other hand, they have usually been put
through by rather authoritarian methods and a considerable amount of terrorism
by secret police. Once a government starts using secret-police terrorism it auto-
matically produces an irreconcilable opposition and has to go on using secret-
police methods against them, and unless it manages to wipe out the opposition
without creating other opposition groups in the process it may be extremely
difficult ever to get away from authoritarian methods. It seems to me that secret
police and terrorism in government are like morphine in medicine. It may be
necessary to use them occasionally, but if they are used too long it may be very
difficult to stop and they will have a disastrous effect on the whole society.
I think that one of the causes of misunderstanding l)etween Russia and the
West is that the Russians don't seem to understand this objection to authoritarian
methods and assume that everyone who disagrees with them must do so becaiise
they are reactionaries who disagree with their aims. This comes from different
theories about democracy. My father wrote a very good article, pointing out that
to a very large extent the Russians and the West were talking at cross-purposes
when they talked about democracy. The Russians asked, "Whose interest does
the government represent?" The Russians would define a democracy as a country
in which the government represents the interests of the masses while people in
the West would define a democracy as a country in which government was carried
on by free discussion and compromise. On the Russian definition America and,
until recently. England are not very democratic, while on the Western definition
Russia and other eastern European countries are not very democratic.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5381
It seems to me that democracy should really iuclude both definitions. The weak-
ness of a lot of Western argument about democracy, especially in America, is that
it ignores the class struggle. It refuses to face the difficulty that free speech and
free elections are not in fact sufficient to prevent control of the government by
groups representing interests opposed to the mass of the people. You would
probably agree with criticisms of Western democracy on these lines; so I need
not expand the point.
On the other hand the weakness of Communist theory is that it ignores the
dangers of authoritarian organisation. It does not face the difficulty that unless
there is effective free criticism and unless people can turn out a government
they do not like there is no guarantee that the government will remain responsive
to popular opinion. It seems to me that the Chinese party is the only one which
has begun to face the question and that the Russian and European parties are
still about at the stage of the Chinese party in 1935 or earlier. If you once start
to ask, "How can we guarantee that the party will remain in touch with the
masses and responsive to popular opinion?'' it seems to me that you must be led
to something like Mao Tse-tung's views about the. 3-3 system. That is, the
party must be separate from the government and be in a position where it only
has power in the government by providing leadership which can gain the sup-
port of freely elected non-Communists. Where the system is working properly
that automatically means that the Party has to adjust its program in response to
popular opinion, has to know how^ to discuss its policy and to get along with non-
Communists and has to face continual informed criticism and suggestions. My
main criticism was that the Chinese Party had not fully worked out the theore-
tical implications of experiences for organisation within the party. I don't
know if Po Ku ever showed you the long manuscript I wrote called What's Wrong
with Yenan. The point I tried to show was that general standards of efficiency
in most Yenan organisations were very much lower than in similar organisations
at the front largely because they were much more one-party organisation which,
because of Communist theories on party organisation, meant that they did not
face continuous and effective criticism. I think there is little doubt about the
low standards at Yenan. Almost everyone I knew who came to Yenan from the
front noticed it, but you may not agree with my diagnosis. My theory was that
at the front most organisations were subject to continual criticism. In the
government there were able non-Communists who were free to criticize and in
army organisation there was the continual test of the military struggle which
amounted to very effective criticism from the Japanese. When an organisation
was not engaged in a competitive struggle and did not have important non-Com-
munist participation it was not subject to any effective criticism because of the
Communist rule about not criticising party decisions. It seemed to me that the
results of this rule were that in a Communist organisation mistakes were never
corrected until their bad effects had become obvious to the party leaders. In
What's Wrong with Yenan I gave examples of cases where most people recog-
nised that things were wrong but no one did anything because the defects were
connected with some party decision. Actually Yenan was never very bad be-
cause there was the general anti-authoritarian tradition and non-Communist
participation, though not very effective, in the government. Also the organisa-
tion was so small that the leaders became aware of mistakes before they became
really serious.
It seems to me that the big drop in administrative efficiency between 3-3 or-
ganisations and party organisations has important implications for party or-
ganisation. It implies that the best form of party organisation is relative to the
situation. Lenin's views about the necessity for a centralised organisation
which was authoritarian in the sense of not allowing discussion in the carrying
out of policies which had been decided by the party are quite correct for a party
carrying out a revolution. For dealing with this sort of situation an organisa-
tion'must be largely authoritarian because quickness and decisiveness in action
are so important. On the other hand as soon as you get a situation in which
quickness and decisiveness in action are less important, then the loss in efficiency
caused by the limitation of discussion and criticism becomes serious. As a re-
sult I don't think you can generalize about the best form of organisation and the
fact that all Communist parties have adopted the same form of organisation has
had important consequences. Communist parties operating in the type of situ-
ation for which the organisation was designed have been relatively successful
while parties operating in Western democracies where the organisation is not
suitable have been relatively unsuccessful.
5382 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
To come back to Russia, my impression is that the Russian party has never
even aslied the question, "liow can we guarantee that the party will remain in
touch with the masses and responsive to popular opinion?" and that the same
is true of most Western Parties. They seem to assume it as self-evident that
the Party is the representative of the masses and that decisions of the Party
are the only correct policy representing the interests of the masses. This has
naturally made them authoritarian. If you believe that you certainly represent
the people and that you know with certainty what should be done in the interests
of the people you are naturally impatient of criticism and discussion and think
that the best form of organisation is one which enables you to put your policies
into practice as quickly as possible. Of course there is a lot of disagreement
about what the Russian organisation is like but it seems to me that there is fairly
strong evidence that it is autlioritarian in the sense that there is not general free-
dom of criticism of government policies and that the government puts through
the policies it thinks correct without very much concern for popular opinion, or
perhaps you might say that the actions of the government are limited not by
what the people would want if they knew and could discuss possible alternatives
but by what the government can persuade them to want with a monopoly of pub-
licity. I think you could confirm that judgement entirely from Communist
sources. There are several good examples in the official Short History of the
Communist Party in the Soviet Union.
I feel that a lot of the trouble in Euroix' has come from this Communist
authoritarianism. If the Russian army had maintained proper discipline and
the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe tried to set up united-front govern-
ments which were democratic in the Western sense as well as in the Russian
sense there might have been quite a rapid political settlement which would
have left the really reactionary opposition as a group too small to be dangerous.
In fact the bad discipline of the Russian army produced a lot of anti-Communist
feeling so that where there were fairly free elections in Hungary and Austria
the biggest vote went to Catholic parties with strong reactionary elements. In
countries like Poland or Yugoslavia there seems to be a vicious circle of Com-
munist authoritarianism producing so much opposition that the government
dare not allow free elections; this in turn makes more of the opposition side
with the extreme reactionaries who want violent resistance to the government
which in turn makes it necessary for the government to be still more authori-
tarian. The only country which seems to be progressing is Czechoslovakia
where there was a real tradition of democracy in the Western sense.
Lindsay of Bikkeb.
Appendix II
Some Popular Fallacies on Chinese Communism
The importance of continued publication of factually accurate accounts of
recent Chinese history is shown by the recurrence in comparatively reputable
publications of arguments based on simple and definite errors of fact. This
appendix gives only a few of the simpler examples.
A whole series of arguments have been based on the assumption that the
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area around Yenan was the most important Communist
base area throughout the war. E. g., "undoubtedly, the organization of the
Communists was good, but their forces were concentrated into a specific area
[sic] which made matters easy for them. The Central Government suffered
from the drawbacks of geography, with their forces sprawling awkwardly over
vast areas both unmanaged and unmanageable with transport problems that
were insoluble. (General Carton de Wiart, "Happy Odessey," London 11)50,
page 268.) "Americans on conducted tours also failed to take into account that
'land reform' was comparatively easy in the sparsely populated Northwest left
practically unmolested by Japan [sic]. Only a few perspicacious correspondents
realized that the National Government, whose armies had to bear the main brunt
of the Japanese attack, could not, even if it had wished, have instituted 'agrarian
reform' in the midst of war and blockade." (Freda Utley, The China Story,
Chicago. 1951, page 140.) G. F. Winfield uses a slightly similar argument about
Communist land reform being easy because the Northwest was one of the few
areas in China where there was .some good uncultivated land. (China: The
Land and the People, New York, 1948.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5383
In fact, the population of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area was never over
two million and, even by the summer of 1938, some of the Communist base areas
in Shansi and Hopei had much larger populations. By 1940 Shensi-Kansu-
Ninghsia had become one of the smallest of the Communist areas which extended
to Shantung in the East and the Yangtze valley in the South and by the end
of the war the total population under Communist control had risen to about
one hundred million. (The first map in Appendix B of the Bolton Report
shows the position at VJ-Day.)
Thus the arguments that the Kuomintang suffered from greater transport
difficulties tlian the Communists and that Communist agrarian reform depended
on the specially favourable conditions of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area are
based on assumptions which are the exact reverse of the truth. Kuomintang
communications may have been poor but they were almost all through territory
imder continuous Kuomintang control ; while the Communist areas were cut up
by strips of Japanese-held territory, in some cases 20 or 30 miles wide and
strongly fortified, which could only be crossed by fairly dangerous night marches.
Large parts of the Kuomintang area, including the whole of Szechuan, saw
no fighting throughout the war, except for air raids on the cities, while all the
Communist areas except Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia were overrun repeatedly in the
course of Japanese mopping-up campaigns ; but this did not prevent agrarian
reforms being carried out in tlie fruiit-line Communist areas. The reorganisa-
tion of taxation and public finance was actually further advanced in the front-
line Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base area than in Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia.
It is also frequently alleged that Communist-Japanese hostilities practically
ceased after 1989 (the allegation is made, for example, in the Bolton Report and
in Freda Utley's China Story). But the biggest Communist offensive which put
some Japanese-held railways out of action for a period was in the summer of
1940 and was rei)orted by the National Government spokesman at news con-
ferences in Chungking. The largest Japanese offensives against the Communist
areas came in the period from 1941 to 1943 and evidence of widespread hostilities
was seen by the various foreign observers who were in the front-line areas from
1941 on.
Another fallacy which occurs in the Bolton Report is the argument that
Communist land policy was always simply redistribution of land (pp. 19-20)
Mhile, in fact, the agrarian reform policy between 1938 and 1946 was based
on the reform measures which had been passed but never enforced by the
National Government at Nanking.
These examples have been chosen because the errors of fact involved are
simple and obvious, but the list could be greatly extended.
Lindsay of Bibkeb.
Appendix III
1921 AND All Tha-T
Review, written for Manchester Guardian, of an official history of the Chinese
Communist Party that appeared in 1951 in "People's Cihna"
The official Chinese-English language magazine People's China has been com-
memorating the 30th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party with a series
of articles on the history of the Party by Hu Chiao-mu, Vice Director of the
Party's Propaganda Department. These articles give very little information
that has not already been published in English but they do give a very revealing
picture of the mental climate of present day China.
It is interesting to compare these articles with the history of the Party that
was given to Anna Louise Strong at Yenan in 1946-7. The description of Com-
munist relations with the leaders of the Fukien revolt in 1933 provides a good
illustration of the difference. The 1947 version is short enough to quote in full.
"The leadership of the dogmatists cost us heavily," said Lu Ting-yi, giving the
present Communist view. "When we were in Kiangsi we were offered an
alliance with the Fukien general Ts'ai Ting-kai, the hero of Shanghai's 1932
resistance to Japan. The opposed Chiang's appeasement of Japan and was will-
ing to cooperate with us. Our dogmatists were too orthodox to have a united
front with 'that bourgeoi.se' and thus we lost the chance of victory." (Dawn Out
of China, by Anna Louise Strong, People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1948, page
18). In the 1951 version given by Hu Chiao-mu we are told that the Fukien
5384 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
leaders "sought to unite with the Communists" ; that the Communists had made
a declaration in favour of an anti-Japanesp united front ; and that "the leader-
ship of the Party, between 1931 and 1934 coniuiitted new, serious 'left' mistakes"
(People's China, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 15-16). But we are left to guess that one of
these mistakes was a failure to reach an agreement for cooperation with the
Fukien leaders. The readiness to face facts and to exercise critical judgment
that still characterized Chinese Communist thinking in 1947 has been replaced by
an apparent fear of making any definite statemeut that might prove unorthodox.
The result is to produce a highly formalized version of history in which a
decisive role is played by the ideological struggle between the invariably correct
views of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin and the erroneous views of various deviation-
ists. If this emphasis on the importance of the ideas of individual leaders
represented a reaction from a rigidly determinist Marxism it would be a sign of
progress. Unfortunately the assumption that ideas play an independent, and
often decisive role in history is nowhere integrated or even reconciled with the
rather doctrinaire Marxism which characterizes other parts of the narrative.
The orthodox scheme in which the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin must be
not only correct but also obviously correct makes it imijossible to give any
rational explanation of the views of their opponents. We are back in the old
fashioned history where men just say to themselves, "I am determined to prove
a villain."
Events which do not fit into this highly conventionalized version of history are
usually simply ignored and the gaps are especially noticeable in the period uj)
to 1928 when a serious Communist set-back has to be explained away. For
example, most authorities on this period attach considerable importance to the
various Comintern advisers who were active in China. The Soviet sources
who provided the information for Louis Fischer's The Soviets in World Affairs
describe Borodin as exercising an important influence on both Communist and
Kuomintang policy and place a large part of the blame for the Communist
defeat on the rival Comintern adviser who opposed his policy. Roy, in his
Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, claims that a number of important
Communist decisions were the result of instructions which he gave as repre-
sentative of the Comintern. Even short histories of the period usually connect •
the reorganisation of the Canton government under a Kuomintang-Communist
united front with the Sun Yat-sen-Joffe declaration of January 1923. But in
Hu Chiao-mu's narrative all the Comintern representatives have vanished with-
out trace. The only Russian influence which is admitted is wise advice from
Stalin and resjjonsibility for all Communist decisions is placed entirely on the
Chinese leaders of the time.
It is interesting that the other important authority who agrees with Hu Chiao-
mu is Chiang Kai-shek. The chapters of China's Destiny which describe the
period from 1923-27 also make no mention of the Comintern advisers in the
Kuomintang and Communist organizations. Unfortunately neither Hu Chiao-
mu nor Chiang Kai-shek give any reasons to justify their assumption that the
Comintern advisers were too unimportant to be worth mentioning.
Again, Hu Chiao-mu describes Chiang Kai-shek as "the Right-wing KMT
commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army of the time who "had
already organized an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet conspiracy on March
20th, 1926 * * *" and who "at the end of 1926 * * * turned his head-
quarters at Nanchang into a centre of opposition to the Left-wing of the KMT at
Hankow" (People's China. Vol. IV. No. 2. page 12). All this is quite correct but
nothing is said about the line of the international Communist press which con-
tinued to praise Chiang Kai-shek as the lo.val revolutionary leader right up to
the Shanghai coup of April 1927 and denov^nced all proi)hecies of an impending
split as counter-revolutionary attempts to weaken the revolutionary forces. After
the Communist defeat Stalin defended his policy by pointing out various passages
in his speeches in which he had advised the Chinese CP to build up their organi-
sation in the Chinese armed forces in i)reparation for a split with the KMT. If
the Chinese CP had consisted of highly disciplined revolutionaries it might have
been possible to make effective preparations to fight Chiang Kai-shek while
publicly proclaiming completed trust in him as a loyal revoluHonary leader. But
tlie majority of tlie Chinese Communists were comparatively initrained enthu-
siasts who tended to believe what they read in the Communist press so that
effective preparations to resist Chiang Kai-shek were incompatible with accept-
ance of the Comintern line on publicity. When the Chinese Communists faced
a similar problem during the second united front period they acted quite differ-
ently. In 1943, when the Comnumist leadership thought that there was a real
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5385
danser of a general Knomintan? offensive against the Commnnist areas, the
Communist press at once started to attaclv Chiang Kai-shek and to exjtose his
cooperation with the Japanese against the Communists. And his policy was
defended as a lesson learnt from the mistakes of 1926-7. Thus, even if one
accepts the explanations which Stalin gave after the event, it would seem that
his propaganda policy in 192f>-7 was mistaken and weakened his allies more
effectively than it deceived his enemies. If, on the contrary, the Comintern
press line up to April 1927 represented the real beliefs of the CPSU leaders than
it is clear that their estimates of the Chinese situation were seriously mistaken.
If history must teach the lesson that Stalin and the CPSU are always right,
then the record of events must be distorted in the sort of way in which Hu
Chiao-mu distorts it. If tliis orthodox version of history is to be secure against
overthrow by anyone with a sufficiently critical and scientific attitude to inves-
tigate the original sources, then these original sources must be suppressed. So
far the process may only have got to the stage where it would be unhealthy for
any Chinese historian to point out the obvious gaps in this official version of
history; but Hu Chiao-mu has committed the Propaganda Department of the
Chinese Communist Party to a policy whose logical conclusion is the activities
of George Orwell's Ministry of Truth.
In dealing with later periods when the Chinese Communist Party was generally
successful there are not such striking gaps in the record of events though a great
deal of the narrative is still very controversial. One of the more interesting
sections is that which deals with the negotiations in 194.3-tl. Here Hu Chiao-mu
seems to be undecided between two objectives. On the one hand he wishes to
show that the Chinese CP really wanted peace and, therefore, did its best to
i-each an agreement with the KMT which would have prevented the civil war.
On the other hand he wishes to show that the Chinese CP knew from the start
that both the K^IT and the Americans were determined on war and. therefore,
did not allow itself to be tricked into making any concessions tbat would weaken
its military position. On the whole, it seems to be the latter objective which
predominates, and as a result, Hu Chiao-mu leaves out some of the evidence
which shows that the Chinese CP acted with more good faith than either the
KMT or the Americans. The Chinese CP did, in fact, carry its effort to reach a
peaceful settlement to the point of making concessions which quite seriously
weakened its military position. Under tbe agreement of 10th October 194.5, the
Communists evacuated quite large areas south of the Tangtse in which they
could almost certainly have maintained guerrilla bases and which they did not
in fact recover until 1949. Again, while the demobilisation agreements were
almost completely evaded by the Kuomintang. in some important Communist
areas a third of the regular army had been demobilisf d bv the end of March 10 '6.
Hu Chiao-mu spoils his case against America by exaggeration. The American
attempts at mediation are represented as nothing bnt devices to gain time for
Chiang Kai-shek's military preparations and the whole of the American govern-
ment organisation is represented as being united in a policy of supporting the
Kuomintang in a civil war. By taking this line Hu Chiao-mu preclndes himself
from making the criticism of American policy for which there really is strong
evidence; that, while defeating .Japan, America had become infected with the
disease that proved fatal to the .Japanese political system. The more resnonsible
and better informed Americans who really wished to mediate a peacefiil settle-
ment in China were unable to control the military leaders who followed their
own line in Chinese politics and the equally ignorant and irresponsible extremists
who supported them at home, just as the more responsible Japanese statesmen
could never control the military hotheads or the ultrapatriotic political gangster
organisations.
Here again Hu Chiao-mu finds himself in strange company. He is revising the
record of events in exactly the same way as it is being revised in America. Under
pressure from Senator McCarthy and the Kuomintang lobby, the American states-
men whose words and actions in 194.5-(i indicated a genuine desire to act as
honest mediators in the Chinese dispute now try to show that they were always
really in favour of supporting the Kuomintang in a civil war.
No doubt Hu Chiao-mii has managed to persuade himself that his revision of
history serves the cause of peace and the interests of the Chinese peonle. But
if he could discard the blinkers of Stalinist orthodoxy, he would see that he is
actually fighting side by side with such men as Senator Knowland and Henry
Luce. The version of history for whose acceptance they are all fighting is one in
which no Communist can hope for peaceful agreement with an non-Communist
American and in which no American can hope for peaceful agreement with any
88348 — 52 — pt. 14 31
5386 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Communist ; in short, a version of history in which war is inevitable. The only
Chinese interests which are served by such a revision of history are those of the
Kuomintang regime in Formosa whose only hoi)e of return to power in China
lies in a new world war.
Lindsay of Birker.
Appendix IV (a)
Letter Published in New Statesman
Baujol College,
Oxford, 27/3/48.
Sir: The following analysis may explain why Communism under Russian
influence has led to results which democratic socialists are compelled to re-
pudiate.
Firstly, Communists tend to believe that Marx-Leninism is an exact science
from which they can deduce with absolute certainty the policies required by
the interests of the masses. (The official "Short History of the Communist
Party in the Soviet Union" suggests that Marx-Leninism is as exact a science
as biology). This inevitably produces a tendency to treat the ordinary workers
who are not Marx-Leninist scholars like children who do not know what is good
for them and whose wishes must be overruled in their own interests.
Secondly, Communists tend to be influenced by the Hegelian element in Marx-
ism and to believe that abstract concepts such as classes or the socialist state
are realities superior to the individuals who compose them. This leads to a
readiness to sacrifice human beings to ideas (cf. Gorki's remark that Lenin
treated the Russian people as a scientist treats his experimental material). It
leads to a belief that the Communist Party representing the masses is an
a pi-iori truth which does not need to be validated by regular testing against
actual mass opinion. The theoretical simplicity of "liquidating a class" has
made Communists ignore the vicious circle inherent in police-state methods —
the people who form an opposition class cannot, in practice, be "liquidated"
without making other people into a new opposition.
The striking thing about East European Communist Parties is their contempt
for the intelligence of the masses. Communists claim that the Communist-led
governments of Eastern Europe enjoy general popular support. (If this were
so then scrupulously fair elections could give irrefutable proof of popular sup-
port for Communism.) But they also claim that it has been necessary to dis-
solve or purge opposition parties and prevent the free expression of opposition
views before holding elections. The two claims are only consistent on the
assumption that the average worker or peasant in Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.,
is so stupid that, if he is allowed to hear arguments against Communism as well
as arguments for it, he will vote for parties which wish to enslave and exploit
him instead of for a party that offers him freedom and prosperity.
The Russians act on the assumption that nearly all Soviet citizens are so
weak-minded that their belief in Communism and loyalty to their country would
be corrupted by any first-hand contact with the non-Communist West. The size
and powers of the Russian secret police would seem to show that a generation
of Communist government and liquidating the opposition has left cleavages in
Russian society more bitter than those in capitalist democracies.
It is only in China that a Communist Party has shown a genuine respect for
popular opinion and has tried to secure an objective correspondence between
Communist policies and the desires of the masses. The wartime experience of
the Chinese Liberated Areas is conclusive proof that New Democratic govern-
ments which really have wholehearted mass support can deal with enemy and
fascist agents supported by a small opposition class without resorting to Russian
style secret police terrorism.
It is possible to agree with much of the Communist criticism of Social
Democracy, but the striking practical defects of the alternative ofi'ered by
Communism have been a major factor in making progressive opinion in the
West tolerant of reaction as the lesser evil. Communist doctrinaires and the
Russian secret police have been the most effective assistants of world reaction.
Yours, etc.,
Michael Lindsay.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5387
Appendix IV (b)
[From the Times of 25th January 1949]
Communism in China
Sib : Mr. Samson's conclusion that the Chinese Comnumist leaders are in
favour of Communism is hardly new or surprising. Over three years ago (The
Times of January 17, 1946) your own Special Correspondent lately in China
wrote that "* * * the Chinese Communist Party is definitely Communist in its
basic principles and its party organisation." The real question is whether one
objects to Communism even if it is based on popular support or whether one
objects only to the use of terrorism and deceit by a minority to force through
Communist policies regardless of human suffering or the wishes of the masses.
Strong elements in the Chinese Communist Party have taken the line that
Communist power should be based on popular support. In Mao Tse-tung's re-
port to the 1945 Party Congress one finds such statements as "Our starting point
is to serve the Chinese people earnestly and wholeheartedly * * *" and "Au-
thoritarianism is wrong in all kinds of work * * *" The economic policies of
New Democracy fit into this pattern by providing a possible transition to Social-
ism without a drastic reduction in the general standard of living. For a period
in 1946 and 1947 the more extremist doctrinaire elements in the Chinese Com-
munist Party seemed to be in the ascendant. But recent developments seem to
show that the party has returned to the policy of basing its power on popular
support through providing honest administration and respecting public opinion
in the policies which are applied.
It is unfortunate that British policy towards China, insofar as it has existed
at all, has usually played the role assigned to it by Cominform propaganda.
British, and still more American, policy towards China has given left-wing
Chinese opinion quite reasonable grounds for accepting the Cominform analysis
of world affairs. Cominform attacks on the Marshall plan must appear reason-
able if it is judged by analogy with the workings of UNRRA in China. (See your
own siJecial correspondent's comments in The Times of September 20, 1947.)
The British reaction to elections with no opposition candidates and to secret
police terrorism in Kuomintang China has been very different from the reaction
to similar events in Eastern Europe. In spite of statements by the Chinese
Communist leaders that they would welcome friendly relations with foreign
countries besides Russia, no attempts have been made to penetrate the "iron
curtain" in China imposed from the anti-Communist side. If present British
policy continue.s, the leaders of the new regime in China will have had every
reason to suppose that they face irreconcilable hostility from non-Communist
countries, regardless of whether or not they represent majority opinion in
China and whether or not they allow greater freedom than the old regime.
This would make dependence on Russia unavoidable.
The only way in which this country can maintain Bi'itish prestige in China
and assist the new Chinese regime to genuine independence is by proving that
the British people dislike government based on terrorism, either Communist or
non-Communist, but that they would welcome friendly relations with any regime
enjoying popular support, also either Communist or non-Communist. British
policy should, therefore, make the experiment of assuming that the Chinese Com-
munists are acting in good faith when they say that they would like friendly
cooperation with other powers besides Russia and that they intend to maintain
democratic liberties. British cultural and commercial contacts should at once
be extended to the Communist areas and the possibilities of cooperation explored
on the merits of the case in China.
If cooperation on these lines proved possible it would greatly raise British
prestige in China, would greatly help in securing Chinese independence, and
might even have an important influence on the world situation. Even if the
experiment failed through Communist bad faith it would still be better than
present policy. If this country made a sincere attempt to establish friendly
re'ations with the new regime and was rebuffed by Communist prejudice it
would then be more diflScult for the Communists to obtain popular support for a
policy aligned solely tovt-ards Russia against the interests of the Chinese
people.
Yours, etc.
Michael Lindsay.
84, Sunny Bank, Hull.
5388 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Appendix IV (c)
Extracts From New Statesman, Articles 1949, From New China: Three
Views, pp. 147-1.jU
(P. 147) * * * While the official British attitude toward Communism is one
of unqualified opposition, every Communist is bound to treat the British au-
thorities as declared enemies and accept the doctrinaire thesis of two irrecon-
cilable factions in the world. But the position would be altered if the British
authorities formulated the grounds of their opposition to Communism in a
way which would command general support in England. Most people in England
dislike Stalin's Communism because of its similarities to Hitler's National
Socialism and would have very different feelings about any foi'm of Communism
which did not share these similarities. The principles involved are simple:
The techniques by which the Nazis seized and lield power are those which enable
an organized minority to control and exploit the rest of the population. If any
Communist regime uses the Nazi techniques of govei'nment— secret-police ter-
rorism against all organized opposition or criticism and isolation of the masses
from all information except highly distorted propaganda — tliis shows that the
claim of the Communist Party to represent the masses is no better than that
of the Nazis to represent the German people. And, in such regimes, the dominant
secret-police organizations have a strong vested interest in a continuing threat
of war.
Such a formulation of policy would involve an internal struggle against the
extreme anti-Communists who have no objection to the Nazi techniques of
government when used by anti-Communist regimes, by Chiang Kai-shek or Franco,
and who would not accept a dil'ference in principle between Communism based
on terrorism and Communism based on mass support. But such a distinction
•would provide a rational basis for British foreign policy, with applications ex-
tending far beyond China. It would be possible to give both recognition and
approval to the Chinese regime, insofar as it applied Mao Tse-tung's "scientific"
interpretation of Communist principles, and quite consistently to oppose Com-
munism in IMalaya and Europe.
Such principles would not, at present, command agreement within the Chinese
Communist Party, though they might well do so among the non-Communist
elements in the regime. They would, however, reduce the basic disgreement
between Britain and China from a fundamental conflict of principle to a dispute
about facts, the truth or falsity of the claims of various Communist parties to
represent the masses. (Such a development would destroy the whole mental
world of the real doctrinaires both in China and England and would, therefore,
produce violent emotional reactions.) Furthermore, if this diagnosis of the
Russian regime is correct, it is likely that increased contact with Russia would
lead the members of the Chinese Communist Party who really wished to serve
the masses into agreement with the British position. * * *
(P. 150) With much smaller responsibilities in China, the British authorities
have avoided the spectacular blunders of the Americans, but British policy has
been extremely ineffective. China faces a choice between two roads of develop-
ment ; the one, based on the "scientific" interpretation of jMarxism, toward a form
of Communism wliich would really serve the people and could become fully
democratic; the other, based on the "doctrinaire" interpretation, along the Rus-
sian road of degeneration toward "oligarchical collectivism" which could produce
something like the traditional Chinese social structure but with Marxian instead
of Confucian orthodoxy as the ideology of the ruling bureaucracy. Both tenden-
cies exist and the British people have every reason for wishing the former to
prevail. In fact, however, through lack of principles, lack of imagination, and
lack of courage, perhaps all traceable to class prejudice, the British authorities
have done almost nothing to encourage the democratic forces in China but, by
both action and inaction, have done a good deal to strengthen the worst "doc-
trinaire" tendencies in Chinese Communism. Great opportunities have already
been lost but it is still true that the essentials for an effective British policy
are the repudiation of the anti-Communist doctrinaires and the formulation
of rational principles of democratic policy.
Lindsay of Birker.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5389
Appendix V (a)
Letters to the Manchester Guardian
29th September 1950.
Sir : The North Korean peace proposals reported in your issue of September
28th are likely to be repeated and developed and may form the basis of plaus-
ible arguments that any continuation of the fighting is proof that the U. N.
forces are acting for American interests and not for collective security. It
is, therefore, very important that the U. N. should announce conditions under
which it would cease military action and should make absolutely clear the
relation of such conditions to the basic principle of collective security, that
rulers who resort to armed aggression as an instrument of policy cannot be
allowed to benefit by it.
A condition which would meet these requirements, and whose inclusion might
render something like the North Korean proposals acceptable, is this : that
the responsible leaders of the North Korean regime should put themselves and
their archives at the disposal of a tribunal investigating the responsibility for
the war. If the North Korean leaders could substantiate the claims of their
own propaganda, they would have nothing to fear from such a tribunal. If,
on the contrary, it could be substantiated beyond reasonable doubt that it was
the unscrupulous ambition or fanaticism of the North Korean leaders, or their
subservience to foreign advice, which has led to the devastation of their country
and tlie sacrifice of thousands of lives, then it is important that they should
not be allowed to retire unpunished and free to repeat their behaviour at the
next opportunity.
Yours, etc.
Michael Lindsay.
Appendix V (b)
Letter to Listener
21/1/51.
Sir : While accusing the British press of failing to report the full story of
the origins of the Korean war. Sir John Pratt states a case that depends on
the omission of important evidence, in particular, the report of the U. N. Com-
mission dated June 24th on their tour of the frontier. This stated that "South
Korea army is organised entirely for defence and is in no condition to carry
out attack on large scale against forces of North" (Annexe J. of British White
Paper, Cmd. 8078 of 1950). Apart from this Sir John Pratt's case depends
on equating South Korean words with North Korean deeds. The South Koreans
made threats which their forces were completely incapable of carrying out.
Whatever happened on June 25th, the North Koreans had an army vastly supe-
rior in offensive weapons and proceeded to use it in an attempt to conquer the
whole of Korea, in which they nearly succeeded.
There is strong evidence to support the charges that General MacArthur and
his political associates would like to embroil the United States and, if possible,
the United Nations in a war with China. But the ability of this group to
influence policy has depended at every crucial point on Communist assistance.
Suppose the North Korean army had remained on the 3Sth parallel where it
could have repulsed with ease any Soutli Korean attack. And it is almost
certain that the North Korean government, set up by the Russians and de-
pendent on Russian military supplies, would have accepted Russian advice
against taking the offensive. There would then have been nothing to justify
U. N. military support for South Korea and no foreign forces would have
supported any South Korean attack. Suppose that the Chinese government,
instead of actively applauding the North Korean attempt to settle the Korean
problem by war, had exerted its influence in favour of a peaceful settlement.
There would then have been no pretext for U. S. intervention in Formosa and
it is practically certain that China would by now have obtained both Formosa
and the seat on the U. N. Suppose that, even now, the Communists were to
indicate their desire for a peaceful settlement, as opposed to a settlement which
would give them the fruits of victory without fighting. It is certain that the
attempt to brand China as an aggressor would fail.
5390 iisrsTiTUTE of pacific relations
Sir John Pratt discredits his largely sound case against General MacArthur
by his refusal to criticize the more fanatical, hut equally unscrupulous and
irresponsible men on the Communist side who combine professions of violent
hostility against the extreme anti-Communists with practical collaboration in
opposing every attempt to settle international disputes without resort to war.
Yours, etc.
Michael Lindsay.
Appendix V (c)
Letter to Listener
84, SuNNT Bank, Hull, ^/2/51.
Sir: Sir John Pratt still says nothing about the most obvious fact of the
Korean war — that the North Koreans had an army vastly superior to the South
Koreans in equipment and preparation and used it in an attempt to conquer all
Korea. In the ordinary use of words such an attempt at conquest is aggression.
Even if he could substantiate his allegations that the South Koreans were crazy
enou'-di to attack a -far better armed opponent and thnt the members of the TT. N.
Commission faked their evidence to cover up this attack, Sir John Pratt would
still not have proved his case. He would only have shown that the North
Koreans could plead provocation as an extenuation for their aggression. He
would not have shown that the U. N. decision to support South Korea against
aggression was wrong but only that it was taken before the evidence had be-
come conclusive. His arguments are irrelevant to the main contention of my
previous letter — that, whatever actually happened on or before June 25th, the
involvement of U. N. forces in a Korean war and all that has followed from
this could have been prevented by a North Korean decision to remain on the
defensive along the 38th parallel.
The question of principle involved is whether there is such a thing as a right
of self-defence against anticipated attack? When the government of country A
is convinced that some other country has aggressive intentions and that mili-
tary intervention in country B is essential for defence against this anticipated
aggression, has country A the right to resort to such military intervention with-
out being condemned as an aggressor? Sir John Pratt seems to consider that
North Korea and China had such a right ; the Americans invoked the principle
to justify their intervention in Formosa. In all these cases the evidence of
aggressive intentions was by no means conclusive, but, quite apart from this,
the principle itself is indefensible. In the present state of mutual suspicion in
the world the assertion of a right of anticipatory self-defence is almost certain
to produce a chain reaction in which the extremists of both sides co-operate in
extending the scale of any conflict. The original North Korean offensive, the
American intervention in Formosa and General MacArthur's advance to the
Manchurian border, and the Chinese intervention in Korea are stages in such a
chain reaction. If the principle of anticipatory self-defence is rejected as in-
compatible with world peace, then all these stages should be condemned.
I would suggest that a good definition of a warmonger is a man who claims
the right of anticipatory self-defence for his own side but rejects it for the
other.
Yours etc.
Michael Lindsay.
Lindsay of Birker.
Appendix VI
Letter to New Statesman and Nation
84 Sunny Bank, Hull, 27/5/51.
Sir : Some of the points raised by Mr. Tsou confirm Critic's contentions rather
than his own. Tlie issue of the British consulate at T'aipei is one of the
points which have led the British authorities to suspect that the Chinese Govern-
ment does not want normal diplomatic relations. It has been the estabished
precedent for a consulate to deal with the de facto authorities in its area with-
out prejudice to relations with the recognised government. Foreign consulates
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5391
continued to operate in Manchnkuo and foreign powers, including the Soviet
Union, retained consulates in the Japanese occupied areas under the Wang
K'e-min or Wang Ching-wei puppet governments. So far as I know, neither Chung-
king nor Yeuan ever protested that this showed unfriendliness towards China.
The Chinese Government is now trying to establish a completely new precedent in
international relations and is demanding British acceptance of its decision as a
condition for accepting normal diplomatic relations.
Again. Mr. Tsou deduces British unfriendliness from an incident in which a
visa was refused to one member of a Chinese delegation against whom the
British authorities alleged personal objections although the other members were
given visas at a few days notice. What, then, should we deduce from the
Chinese response to British applications for visas or exit permits? Over 90
percent of official British requests for visas have been refused and the normal
delay in granting a visa has been a matter of months.
One might also ask Mr. Tsou to imagine the Chinese reaction to British
"friendship" delegation which modelled its conduct on that of the Chinese delega-
tion which did visit this country. Suppose that a British "friendship" delega-
tion were to allow its contacts with representatives of the Chinese Government
or the party controlling that Government to be restricted to a single meeting
which was made the occasion for reading a speech denouncing the Chinese
leaders as puppets of Moscow. It is fairly certain that such behaviour would be
taken as clear evidence of British ill will, and that no visas would be granted
to any persons who wished to visit China under the same auspices.
Mr. Dean Rusk's recent assertions that the Chinese Government was a
Russian colonial regime and that the Kuomintang really represented the Chinese
people have been widely criticised as completely contrary to the evidence and as
ruling out any possibility of any peaceful agreement with China. But numerous
Chinese official statements have denoimced the British Government as an Amer-
ican colonial regime and claimed that the British Communist Party really
represents the British people. Such statements are quite as contrary to the
evidence as Mr. Rusk's and create the same obstacles to any improvement in
relations.
Many people in this country would agree with Mr. Tsou in. regretting the
rather half hearted stand which the British Government has taken in support-
ing Chinese claims which they believed to be just — the U. N. seat, Formosa and
representation in settling the Japanese peace treaty. But tlie British authorities
could take a much stronger stand in supporting Chinese claims if they had some
reason to believe that a response from the Chine.se side would enable them to
refute their critics at home and abroad by reaching a fair negotiated settlement
of Sino-British differences. In fact, Chinese statements have led the British
authorities to suspect that nothing short of the subordination of British policy
to Communist control would produce a response from the Chinese side. Given
this complete lack of encouragement from China even the rather half hearted
British actions indicate a very genuine desire for better relations.
The real issue between Britain and China is that the British Government
believes that Russian imi)erialism is a far more serious danger than American
imperialism while the Chinese Government holds the opposite opinion. Both
could produce some valid evidence in support of their views and in both coun-
tries actions motivated by fear are taken by the other country as evidence of
aggressive intentions. In this sort of situation the most urgent nece.ssity is
the development of mutual understanding based on a determination to find out
the real facts and a desire to understand the position of the other side. What
is alarming in the present Chinese position is the rejection of the frank discus-
sion of differences which is the essential basis for any such understanding. A
few years ago the obstacles to Sino-British understanding came preponderantly
from the British side. But more recently an increasing British reasonableness
has coincided with a growing Chinese intransigence. Tlae best assistance wliich
Mr. Tsou or your correspondents from Tsinghua could give to those in the West
who are opposing MacArthurism would be to denounce the Chinese exponents of
the Communist equivalent of MacArthurism.
Yours etc.
]MiciiAEL Lindsay.
Lindsay of Birker.
5392 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Appendix VII
[Political Quarterly, vol. XXII, No. 1, January-March 1951]
The Cold War in the East
By Michael Lindsay
The most obvious feature of the cold war in the East is that it has been
anything but cold. In Europe actual fighting has been confined to guerrilla
warfare in Greece, but in the east there has been fighting of varying intensity
and duration between communist and anticommunist forces in most countries,
in some cases large-scale regular warfare.
The character of the opposing forces is also different from Europe. The anti-
communist governments are not democracies of the west European or American
type. (The countries nearest to western democratic government tend to have
the weakest communist movements.) Comnuinism in the east is opposed by
colonial regimes or by independent governments run by comparatively small
ruling cliques with low standards of administration. On the other side, com-
munism in the east has been greatly influenced by developments in China and
tends to base its power on the peasants rather than on the city workers and to
use the methods of guerrilla warfare rather than insurrection or political
action.
Finally, the dependence of communism on direct Russian assistance has been
much smaller in the east than in Europe. In the east it is only the Government
of North Korea which was established under Russian military occupation and
which contains former Soviet citizens in important positions. Elsewhere in the
east, the successes of communism have owed little or nothing to direct Russian
assistance.*^
By far the most spectacular development of the cold war in the east has
been the loss of China to the American sphere of influence. The Americans
started with everything in their favour. American reputation in China stood
very high, even among the communists. The predominant foreign influence in
Chinese universities was American, and American returned students held many
important positions. This moral influence was backed by very great material
power through the almost complete dependence of the Chinese Government
on American military and economic assistance. The American Government
attached enough importance to China to send General Marshall on a special
niL'sion. Several thousand million dollars were spent on military and economic
assistance after VJ-Day. But within less than four years the forces supported
by America had been driven from the Chinese mainland and Chinese public
opinif)n had become strongly anti-American.
Many Americans realized that this might happen. In October 1944, one
of the best-informed State Department officials wrote: "Unless the Kuomintang
goes as far as the communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise
proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet
shows signs of being willing or able to do), the communists will be the dominant
force in China within a comparatively few years." And earlier: "If we come
to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms . . . both China and our-
selves would only be its gaining a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckon-
ing" ( U. S. White Paper on China, pp. 572-3) . The deductions from this analysis,
which subsenuent events very fully substantiated, were that the alternatives for
American policy, not necessarily exclusive, were democratization of the Kuomin-
tansr or coming to terms with the communists, who, it was hoped, might be led
to take an independent position friendly to America.
This sort of view seems to have prevailed in the State Department and formed
the oflficial basis of American policy during the Marshall mission. It has been
widely criticized on the grounds that no connnunist party can ever be trusted
to cooperate with noncommunists, and that the Chinese communists, once ad-
mitted to a coalition government, would have eliminated their associates like
^Tliis afntoT'ipnt Ims bopii flis^putpd in the case of China. Both rijrht-winc: propasanda,
intero^tPfl in .1nsti<''"ins Amerirnn assistance to the Knomintancr. and Chinese communist
pror'H'rnnd.'i interested in ins*ifv)n<?' the extreme pro-Rnssian policy adonted in 1940, have
p'nyed nn t'le imnortanee of Rnssian artion in TNTanchnria from Aiisnst 1045 to April IMfii
The snliiect is too lar^e to discnss here, hut there is very strontr evidence for asserting
tlvit nnv Rn'-sinn assictancp to the commnnists in Manchuria was not on a scale whose
absence would have altered the outcome of the civil war.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5393
the communist parties of Eastern Europe. In fact, however, it is probable that
if this policy had ever been effectively implemented it would have completely
altered the course of events, especially as the Americans could have benefited from
serious Russian mistakes.
The Chinese comnumists have been exceptionally successful because they have
combined the normal discipline and enthusiasm of comnuinism with a leader-
ship sufhciently skilful and sufficiently independent to adjust policy to meet the
demands of the Chinese people and the needs of the Chinese situation. On
several important occasions Mao Tse-tung showed his readiness to reject bad
advice from Moscow. This independence seems to have led the Russians to
start with a serious underestimate of Chinese communism. According to Gen-
eral Hurley, Molotov told him that he did not consider the Chinese communists
to be communists at all (TJ. S. White Paper, p. 93). While General Hurley is a
very unreliable witness, articles in Izvestia and Mr. Byrnes's account of Molo-
tov's remarks at the Moscow Conference indicate that the Russians were very
badly informed about China, and Russian actions in Manchuria can very plaus-
ibly be explained on the hypothesis that they hoped to weaken a hostile Kuo-
mintang Government rather than to help a communist rise to power.
Suppose that General Marshall had been able to implement official American
policy ; that a coalition government had been established ; that the military
reorganization agreements were in process of realization ; that American influ-
ence had been used to strengthen the natural supporters of American democratic
ideas and to eliminate from power those whom General Marshall called the "ir-
reconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their
feudal control of China." Suppose, then, that America had expressed her readi-
ness to support China in protests auainst the Russian removal of Manchurian
industrial equipment and the behaviour of Russian troops in Manchuria. The
communists would have faced a clear choice between loyalty to China and loy-
alty to Russia. If they had gone into opposition on this issue and resumed the
civil war against a government rendered more democratic and efficient by the
previous removal of the extreme right, their chances of success would have been
very small. It is much more likely that the majority of the communists would
have come out against Russia and that the break with Russia would have been
followed as in the case of Yugoslavia, by increasing rejection of the Byzantine
and Mongolian influences in Russian communism in favour of the liberal and
scientific elements in the Marxian tradition. Such tendencies were already
strong ; "objective" was a term of abuse for Zhdanov, but a term of praise for
Mao Tse-tung.
In fact, the issue of Russian action in Manchuria was largely discredited
through its use by the right-wing Kuomintang in their campaign against the
implementation of the agreements reached in January and February 1946.
But what might be called the "State Department" policy was always in con-
flict with a rival policy of unqualified support for the Kuomintang. Very influ-
ential sections of American opinion were ready to back any opponent of com-
munism, and managed to persuade themselves that Chiang Kai-shek was a great
democratic leader, aided by publicity, which was the only thing the Kuomintang
did efficiently. General Marshall's efforts at mediation were nullified by Gen-
eral Wedemeyer, who saw the Chinese problem simply as a question of how to
help the Kuomintang defeat the comumnists. The official account of American
policy leaves out the episodes in General Wedemeyer's command hardest to
reconcile with official American policy, such as his long delays in disarming the
Japanese. But even so, it shows that the communists were given very good
reasons to suspect the honesty of American mediation long before negotiations
finally broke down.
The dominant impression is of the helplessness of those Americans who under-
stood the situation. Chiang Kai-shek, confident of American support so long as
he fights communism and refusing to the end to admit the dangers of the situa-
tion, drags both his party and American influence in Chmina towards disaster.
The Americans who see where they are going can only plead with him with
steadily diminishing hopes that their advice will be taken.
If the American reactionaries had been anything like as intelligent and as
unscrupulous as communist propaganda represents them, they would have organ-
ized a coup d'etat to replace the right-win2; Kuomintang by a government capable
of reaching an essential minimum of efficiency. In fact, the dominant mental
quality of reactionaries appears to be a vast power of self-deception. Chiang
Kai-shek remained confident of victory till the siimmer of 1948. In face of over-
whelming evidence from Ajuerican advisers and officials in China that the Kuo-
5394 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
mintang defeat was caused by hopeless incompetence and corruption in both
Army and Government, Senator Taft continues to maintain tlaat "the proper
kind of sincere aid to the Nationalist Government a few years ago could have
stopped communism in China."
The case of China is an excellent illustration of the basic dilemma involved
in the decision to support an inefficient and reactionary government because it
is anti-communist. What is needed is immediate assistance combined with re-
forms and democratization which can produce a government which can remain
stable without outside assistance. But reforms touch on the vested interests of
the ruling groups, and once the government has outside assistance the incentive
to malie reforms disappears. The strength of the communist forces depends on
their ability to offer leadership in securing essential reforms which their op-
ponents are" unwilling or unal)le to make. The assisting power, therefore, finds
itself committed to the support of a degenerating government against a growing
communist movement. A simple policy of anti-communism, while it may seem
effective in the short run, inevitably leads to this type of vicious circle. Positive
support for democracy is much harder in the short run and involves fighting
both the extreme right and the extreme left, but it is the only policy which can
lead to permanent success.
In Korea the element of pure confusion in American policy was much larger
than in China. Occupation started with no definite policy at all, and the normal
prejudice of regular soldiers that "maintenance of order" is the supreme objective
led to incidents in which Japanese police under American orders fired on Korean
demonstrations to welcome the Americans. Sub.sequent policy was crippled by
false economies. The occupation authorities never had the personnel to replace,
or to train Koreans to replace, the Japanese who had held all responsible posi-
tions in all branches of administration. The limitation of salaries to regular
civil service scales produced a rapid turn-over of American officials, who were
forced to rely on the .small minority of English-siDeaking Koreans whose politics
and social background were usually conservative. Improvements were made
after a very slow start, and fairly effective measures of land reform were started
before the American withdrawal. The level of competence in South Korean
administration fell even lower after the American withdrawal, but the elections,
despite many abuses, were free enough to allow many opposition candidates to be
elected.
The rival administration set up by the Russians in North Korea had the ad-
vantage of being able to draw on trained personnel from the Korean population
of Eastern Siberia, and was much more drastic in land reform and in elimina-
tion of the Japanese. But it is not at all certain that it has an better claims to
represent the Korean people. All the negotiations for the unification of Korea
broke down because the Russians refused to accept any solution which would
have forced the communists to compete with non-communist parties for popular
support in free elections. The North Korean Government has always refused
to allow its claims to enjoy popular support to be examined by the U. N. Com-
mission or by other observers likely to diverge from the communist line. Even
stronger evidence is provided by refugee movements. One quarter of the entire
population of North Korea ran away to the South, while the reverse movement
from the South was on a much smaller scale. Such movements indicate very
strong preferences for one regime rather than the other. The unfortunate
Koreans may quite possibly feel that they have only had the choice between King
Log in the South and King Stork in the North. The resort of the North to long-
prepared military action may well be an admission that the Soviet satellite type of
communism cannot stand peaceful competition even with a government like that
of South Korea.
Indo-China is the other area of large-scale conflict. There are obvious
similarities with the Chinese situation. Viet Minh has an administration func-
tioning over large parts of the countryside, while their opponents hold the cities.
Like the Chinese communists, Viet Minh has managed to win very general popu-
lar .support. Negotiations which might have settled the conflict in 1946 broke
down, with Admiral d'Argenlieu playing the role of Generals Hurley and Wede-
meyer. The additional complication is the colonial relationship with France.
French concessions to nationalist feeling have nearly always been made too late.
On the one hand, there was a reluctance to admit how bad colonial rule in Indo-
China had been and how unpopular it had become, and on the other there has
been a desire for precise definition of the future status of Indo-China which has
prevented such gestures as the British withdrawal from India. An agreement
with Ho Chi Minh would have been perfectly possible for less than has now been
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5395
conceded to Bao Dai. The French now seem to have reached a settlement in
Laos and Cambodia, where the local population are afraid of Annamite domina-
tion, but there seems little prospect of a settlement elsewhere. The establish-
ment of the Bao Dai Government was based on the sound principle that it is
more effective to compete with a revolutionary movement than simply to tight it.
But it is very doubtful whether such French-sponsored competition can prove
effective after feelings have been embittered by several years of very brutal
fighting. So long as Viet Minh can only draw on internal resources, the French
army may be able to maintain their present holdings. But the position will re-
main unstable, and at any time Chinese assistance to Viet Minh could cause a
rapid collapse of the French position.
The Malayan communists seem to have tried to repeat the strategy of the
Chinese communist party without having the basis of mass support which would
have made this possible. The continued resort to terrorist tactics has been made
possible partly by the geography of Malaya and still more by the failure of the
Govei-nmeut to conciliate the Chinese population, who, while not particularly
pro-communist, have disliked the Government too much to assist it against the
terrorists. The basic problem of the Government is how to implement policies
which could win popular support while handicapped by an administration whose
traditions include an authoritarian outlook, an anti-Chinese bias, and ideas of
racial superiority.
Communist forces have also been fighting in the Philippines and Burma, but
the Huk movement does not seem to be strong enough to be a serious threat
even to the weak Government at Manila, while Burmese communism seems to be
part of the general struggle between armed factions rather than a normal com-
munist movement.
In India and Japan the cold war has been cold except for a few small guer-
rilla areas in Hyderabad. In both countries communism might easily become
strong if government by other parties became too incompetent or too oppressive.
The recent Russian criticism of the Japanese communist leadership seems to be
another instance of the tendency to sacrifice local communist strength in the in-
terests of Russian international strategy. It is not likely that either the Japanese
or the Indian communist parties will be able to win general mass support under
present conditions until they are able to assert the right to independent judgment
on the policies demanded by the Japanese and Indian people.
To sum up : communism in the east has been successful where, and in so far as,
it could take the leadership in popular demands which its opponents were un-
willing or unable to meet. The west has been defeated and Russia has won at
no cost where, and in so far as, the forces of the west have been committed, not
to the support of democracy, but to a blind opposition to communism.
Lindsay of Bibker.
Appendix VII (a)
84 Sunny Bank, Hull, 11/3/50.
The Editor, the Manchester Guardian,
S Cross St., Manchester 2.
Sir : Your report, on March 14, of Senator McCarthy's activities in Washington
provides a good illustration of the natural affinity between right- and left-wing
extremists.
Mr. Haldore Hanson of the State Department, who has been denounced by
Senator McCarthy, was AP correspondent in Peking and made two visits to the
new Communist areas in 1938. The factual basis of the chai-ges against him is
that he gave sympathy and assistance to the Chinese resistance against Japan, in
which the Communists played an important part, at a time when many Americans
of Senator McCarthy's views were advocating a policy of appeasement. But he
did so as a believer in the American tradition of democracy. I visited the Com-
munist headquarters at Wutai in 1938 soon after Mr. Hanson had passed through
and was told that relations had become rather strained because of several
heated arguments in which Mr. Hanson had maintained that the American type
of democracy was greatly superior to the Communist tyi)e.
There is here a very obvious similarity with the distrust of the Czech Com-
munists for their comrades who joined in resistance to Hitler before June 1941.
Senator McCarthy apparently agrees with the Czech Communist leaders that
consistent opposition to imperialist military aggression is a proof of political
unreliability.
5396 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
On a wider view, the right-wing extremist group to which Senator McCarthy
belongs is a more serious threat to British and American security than any group
under definite Communist control. Their campaign to eliminate from public life
all people having any understanding or direct knowledge of Communism is, in
effect, a campaign for the disarmament of America in the fields of psychological
warfare and political intelligence. The Communists among the French dock
workers are trying to deprive their country of the means to resist military
aggression. Senator McCarthy and his supporters are trying to deprive their
Country of the means to prevent the outbi-eak of war, to leave their country
powerless to counteract the deliberately produced ignorance and hysterical fear
wliich may lead the masses under Communist rule to support the extremists of
the Russian Communist Party in a policy of military aggression.
There has been considerable comment in America on the laxity of the British
authorities in the case of Dr. Fuchs. This would seem to give the British public
some right to comment on the extraordinary laxity of the American authorities
toward the equally dangerous activities of Senator McCarthy and his
associates.
Yours, etc.
Michael Lindsay.
Appendix VIII (b)
Letter to Manchester Guardian
84 Sunny Bank, Hull, 21st April 1951.
Sir: Your American correspondents who defend General MacArthur, and
indeed the General himself, appear to accept the basic assumptions of Com-
munist propaganda. They assume that there is a clear-cut struggle between the
forces of good and the forces of evil in which all right-thinking persons must
suliordinate every other standard to securing a victory for the right side, and
that this simple partisan motivation enables self-appointed leaders to provide
infallible guidance on every question of policy. The case both against Russian
Stalinism and this inverted American Stalinism can be stated in terms of the
more realistic assumptions implicit in the practice of democi-acy and in scientific
method ; that any human cause is seldom wholely right or wholely wrong, that
justice is not simply that which serves some particular interest but is something
which makes cooperation between free men possible, and that our judgments
can seldom be based on anything but the weight of more or less circumstantial
ev dmce.
There is strong evidence to indicate that the continued loss of American, and
allied, lives in Korea is a direct consequence of General MacArthur's refusal to
lake account of the well-founded warnings that an advance to the Manchurian
border was almost certain to produce Chinese intervention. It is not unreason-
able to suppose that General MacArthur is equally mistaken in believing that
further hostile measures against China could be taken without producing Russian
Intervention and a general world war.
Going further back, there is evidence that the extremist and blindly pro-
Russian forces in China owe their dominance very largely to the continued and
active assistance they have received from the forces in America who now support
General MacArthur. By their blind support of the corrupt and incompetent
Knomintang police state, these groups in America discredited democracy in
Chinese opinion and appeared to substantiate extremist Communist propaganda.
Even conservative Chinese opinion was rendered anti-American through the
bombing of Chinese cities by an air force based on Foi-mosa with American
planes and, as most people believed, with American or Japanese pilots. Further-
n)ore, ir was these .same groups in America who provided the Chinese armies
now fighting the U. N. forces with a considerable part of their equipment. The
shipment of American arms to China was continued in the face of expert warn-
ings that a high proportion of these supplies was likely to end in Communist
hands. It is likely that the same would happen to any fresh supplies given to
the Knomintang army.
The term "appeasement" was originally applied to policies which abandoned
principles in the hope of appeasing aggressors. But in this case, British policy
is upholding the principles of civilized justice against the totalitarian concept
of justice. If the U. N. is maintaining any principle in condemning China on an
issue where China is in the wrong it must also be ready to support China on issues
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5397
where China is in the right. And, on the merits of the case, the claims of the
Chinese government both for recognition and the U. N. seat and for a free hand
in Formosa are extremely strong. Those who argue that Chinese claims should
not be .ludged according to the merits of the case but according to the political
views of the Chinese government are rejecting civilized standards of justice
in favour of the standards propounded by Himmler and Vyshinsky. Quite apart
from any questions of principle, a policy which rejects even reasonable Chinese
claims must destroy any hope of reaching a peaceful settlement in the Far
East.
British policy has often been confused and has been greatly weakened by a
reluctance to think about principles. But the general trend of British opinion
has been consistent in disliking totalitarian philosophy and methods in what-
ever country they appear. One might have hoped that Americans who value
their own democratic traditions would have approved these sentiments instead
of denouncing them.
Yours, etc.
Michael, Lindsay.
Lindsay of Birker.
Appendix IX
[Broadcasts for B. B. C. Far Eastern Service, 1951, P. S. 12]
Political Extremism
In a broadcast I gave some months ago I referred to political extremism
as probably the most serious problem in the modern world, and in these talks
1 would like to develop the view that the risk of war is directly related to the
influence of extremism on governments.
Perhaps the argument will be clearer if I begin by summarizing my main
contention. Disputes between reasonable people should not lead to war. Resort
to war in the modern world involves .such great losses even for the victors that,
even when there is a real conflict of interests, both sides can gain by compromis-
ing rather than by fighting it out. But compromise demands a certain degree
of objectivity. Compromise is impossible when either party insists on terms
quite disproportionate to its actual bargaining strength or refuses to give reason-
able assurances that a bargain once made will be observed. When lack of
objectivity rules out compromise, a conflict of interest can only be settled by
force. Objectivity is even more important in the large class of disputes which
can be settled by agreement and not merely by compromise. If people accept
the basic assumption of rational thought, that there is some sort of ol^jective real
world about which human minds can obtain some sort of true knowledge by
thinking, observation, and experiment, th^n it follows that those who are gen-
uinely trying to get at the truth will ultimately agree on the answer to any
question, becau.se they will all i-each the right answer. The parties to any
controversy who accept this assumption of objectivity can agree to differ and to
respect each others opinions in the expectation that continued discussidu and the
accumulation of evidence will ultimately lead to agreement. Even when possible
agreement lies in the indefinite future reasonable people will realise that a con-
troversy about facts or principles cannot he settled by fighting.
The trouble with extremists is that they maintain opinions which cannot be
modified either by evidence or logic and may be determined to impose these
opinions regardless of the cost. The extremist is always really making a demand
for submission. He demands that others should accept his opinions even though
he cannot give conclusive evidence to support them or, more simply, he demands
that others should submit to his arbitrary personal will. When faced with a
demand for submission one must either surrender or fight. To give an obvious
example, what can one do when faced by people with an unshakable conviction
that they have a right to rule the world and are justified in using any means to
conquer it? This was roughly the challenge from the Nazi leaders and Japanese
militarists. Given that these people had effective control of Germany and Japan
the only alternative to the last war was submission to slavery. War could only
have been avoided by policies which might have prevented these extremists from
obtaining full control of theit countries. The problem of preventing another
5398 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
world war is the same problem of reducing extremist influence and there is not
much to choose between the diffei'ent varieties of extremism. And to reduce
extremist influence one must understand extremism.
One of the best concise descriptions of extremism was given nearly 200 years
ago by Hume. He describes two types of persons with whom reasonable dis-
cussion is impossible, "men pertinaciously obstinate in their principles" and,
"persons . . . 'who really do not believe the opinions they defend . . .".
Hume then goes on, "The same blind adherence to their own arguments is
to be expected in both ; the same contempt of their antagonists ; and the same
passionate vehemence in enforcing sophistry and falsehood. And, as reason-
ing is not the source whence either disputant derives his tenets, it is vain to
expect that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him
to embrace sounder principles." The appositeness of Hume's description can
be illustrated today from almost any extremist statement, either of the right or
of the left, and anyone who argues with extremists can confirm Hume's diag-
nosis that their tenents are based on emotion and not on reason.
The case of "persons . . . who really do not believe the opinion they de-
fend . . ." had been very widely discussed, especially by the Marxists. Most
people are familiar with the argument that certain views are maintained only
from motives of class interest. And this Marxian analysis does explain a great
deal. When one finds people refusing to admit certain evidence into their
thinking or refusing to accept conclusions which follow logically from their own
arguments one can vei'y often relate these emotionally charged irrationalities
to class interest. If you have read some of the better Marxian writings you will
easily be able to supply examples. What is not so often realised is that this
Marxian analysis can be applied to Communist organisations just as much
as to Capitalist ones. One need only a.sk the question, "How would the interests
of the secret-police organisations in Communist countries be affected if the
risk of war became small or the internal class struggle really diminished?"
Here are closely organised groups of men enjoying great powers and a con-
sideral)le degree of economic privilege. The only justification for society giv-
ing them these powers is the existence of violent international tension and bit-
ter internal class struggle. Their special skills, such as the interrogation of
suspects, would be socially valueless in a peaceful and stable society. It fol-
lows that powerful elements in most Communist parties have a strong interest
in maintaining the internal class conflict, for example, by economic policies
which will antagonise large sections of the population, and an equally strong
interest in preventing any international reconciliation or understanding. The
vested interest of Communist secret-police agents in a continuing risk of war is
at least as strong as that of capitalistic armament manufacturers. One can ex-
tend this line of argument and explain a good deal of Stalinist doctrine as a
rationalisation by which Communist ruling groups try to maintain their power.
But this simple Marxian analysis does not give anything like a complete ex-
planation of extremism, largely because its psychology is so inadequate. One
can find many examples of people who use "passionate vehemence in enforcing
sophistry and falsehood" as a means to gain power or privilege for themselves
or their group. But very few people can convincingly defend an opinion of whose
falsity they are fully conscious. The really dangerous political extremists are
dangerous because they manage to combine sincerity with dishonesty. A bril-
liant analysis of this type of extremist was given by George Orwell in his
"1984". Orwell defines a concept he calls douMethinh which makes it possible
"to use conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose that goes
with complete honesty. * * *" Though Orwell is obviously describing the
unchecked development of tendencies in left-wing extremism, most of his analysis
applies equally well to the extreme right. The Japanese militarists in China
often combined completely criminal behaviour with an apparently sincere
belief in the superiority of their moral values over what they called the material-
ism of the West. One of the best examples of present-day doWblethink is a com-
bination one finds among some Western politicians who combine an apparently
sincere belief in freedom and democracy with support for some of the most
corrupt and oppressive regimes in Asia and Europe.
Luckily for the world, very few extremists manage to preserve the delicate
balance of successful doublethink. What usually seems to happen is that peopl"^-
gradually come to believe in their own propaganda and lose the ability to take
account of the objective reality which they deny in public. There is no sharp
dividing line between the pure political gangster type that Orwell describes, who
is to some extent conscious that he is defending false opinions from ulterior
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5399
motives and the genuine fanatic "pertinaciously obstinate in his principles", who
may be completely altruistic but who operates in a world of fantasy and myth.
The typical fanatic starts with the conviction that some policy or some doctrine
is of such supreme importance that lie is justified in using any means to impose
his convictions on his fellow men. There is always an element of fantasy about
the future in the fanatic's thinking. His certainty about the results which
would follow from the acceptance of his doctrine is quite disproportionate to any-
thing justified by the evidence. In most cases the element of fantasy goes much
further and covers a wide field within which the fanatic refuses to admit any
posibility of difference between the world as it is and the world as it should be
according to liis theories. Again, there is no sharp dividing line between political
fanaticism and thinking which is definitely psychopathic. A very high proportion
of political extremists have tendencies to persecution mania and some extremist
behaviour is hard to explain except in terms of compulsive obsessions.
There has been much less public discussion of the fanatical type of extremist,
"pertinaciously obstinate in his principles", probably because comparatively little
is known about this field of abnormal psychology. But it is not reasonable to
ignore something which is obviously important simply because we do not under-
stand it. An investigation into the problems of what might be called psycho-
pathic extremism might well prove to be one of the biggest contributions towards
the prevention of war.
n
In my first talk I gave a general description of political extremism and today I
want to develop some generalizations and to show their relevance to present
problems.
One cannot describe the very important distinctions between different types of
extremist by a simple division into classes. It doesn't make sense to divide
mankind into reasonable people and extremists and then to subdivide extremists
into gangsters and fanatics. For one thing, there are no reasonable people.
Everyone has some extremism in his make-up and the completely reasonable man
is a theoretical limiting case, in the same category as frictionless mechanisms or
reversible heat engines in natural science. There is a continuous range from
people of low extremism to people of higli extremism. Similarly, the different
varieties of extremist shade off into one another. To describe extremism one
must talk in terms of variables, not in terms of classes, and one can give a fairly
accurate description of any type in terms of three variables. Firstly, there is the
degree of extremism. Secondly, there is the range between the pure gangster
type, intent only on personal power, and the pure fanatic type, intent only on
promoting some cause. Finally, there is the degree of realism, the extent to
which irrationality about ends is combined with irrationality about means. Some
extremists are only irrational in their objectives but remain very realistic in the
way they set about attaining these objectives. Others operate in terms of a
mental picture of the world so unlike objective reality that their actions may
often produce results completely different from their intentions.
The whole controversy about appeasement can be clarified by discussing it in
terms of degrees of extremism. The real issue is whether or not the people one
is dealing with are so extremist that no agreement or compromise with themi
is possible. Such extremists do exist and may control governments. The com-
pletely ruthless and un.scrupulous fanatic and the megalomaniac conqueror are
types that apijear again and again in history. Take an account written two
thousand years ago : "* * * there was talk in the house of Nabuchodonosor,
King of the Assyrians, that he sliould, as he said, avenge himself on all the
earth. So he called unto him his officers, and all his nobles, and communicated
with them his secret counsel, and concluded the afflicting of the earth out of
his mouth. Then they decreed to destroy all flesh, that did not obey the com-
mandment of his mouth." This isn't very different from Hitler and his officers as
revealed in the Nuremberg trials. People at this level of extremism are absolutely
determined to obtain complete submission to their will and the fallacy of ap-
peasement lies in a refusal to recognize this fact. In spite of all evidence to the
contrary, the British Government refused to believe that Hitler would not be
satisfied with a compromise which gave him satisfaction on almost every issue
where he could produce any sort of reasonable claim. They became disillusioned
when Hitler occupied completely non-German territory. But the Russian Gov-
ernment then tried appeasement in the equally mistaken belief that Hitler would
leave a modest share of the world to his allies if he were allowed to conquer the
5400 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
rest. In the event it became clear that nothing eouhl deflect Hitler from his
funt'amiental aim of subjecting the whole world to the rule of the so-called
'"master race".
The appea.ser just refuses to admit that there can be men like Hitler or Attila
or Chiang Hsien-tsung. He is like a man in tiger-infested country who talks
about the perfectly real advantages that would follow from a nouaggression
pact between human beings and tigers and refuses to admit the impossibility
of making an agreement with tigers.
It is worth while pointing out the fallacy in the simple appeasement theory
because there are still people who argue on the assumption that it must somehow
be possible to reach a peaceful compromise with anyone. This still leaves the
problem of how to decide whether or not some organisation is so extremist that
no agreement or peaceful compromise is possible. The complication is that
one is normally dealing with a ruling or controlling group which is not homo-
genous. Some individuals in the group may be hopelessly extremist ; others
may be comparatively reasonable. The possibility of peaceful compromise de-
pends on the balance of power within the group, and attempts to reach a com-
promise may shift this balance of power or even alter the degree of extremism
in individuals.
The present situation is much more complicated than in the 1930's but in
some ways it is more hopeful. Nazism, fascism, or the philosophy of the
Japanese militarists were almost purely extremist theories. They were fairly
transparent rationalisations of extremist demands for submission. This shows
very clearly in the concept of the "master race" which was fundamental to
German and Japanese theory. Present-day extremism is mostly based on exag-
gerations and distortions of theories which are very largely reasonable, and the
sham controversies which only rationalize extremist demands are mixed up with
genuine controversies about the best form of social organisation or the nature
of human knowledge. The nearest equivalent to the "master race" concept is
the Communist belief in the infallibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union. This is like the "master race" idea because it implies a clear demand
for submission to the will of one particular group but it is not a belief which
Communists formulate explicity as an essential part of their theory. The
difference with the 1930's is this : a nazi or fascist could only be reasonable and
ready to accept a peaceful solution of world problems if he rejected the greater
part of nazi or fascist theory, which meant that peace was impossible without
the elimination of nazism and fascism. At present there are extremists of the
type with whom no agreement or compromise is possible on both sides of the world
conflict, but their power could be eliminated by comparatively small changes.
A Christian, or a Communist, or a believer in free competition can all work for
agreement and peaceful compromise without rejecting anything but exaggera-
tions and distortions of their fundamental beliefs. There is no inherent reason
why the present world tension should not be transformed into peaceful rivalry
between different hypotheses about the best form of social organisation. The
main requirement is to find a stabilizer which will stop the chain reaction in
which rival forms of extremism help and intensify one another.
A major obstacle to the lessening of world tension comes from the implicit
assumptions on which both sides base their policy. The constant theme of
communist publicity is that the danger to world peace conies entirely from the
plotting of the imperialists to extend their power and that peace can only be
defended by demonstrating the military strength and preparedness of Russia
and her allies. Very similar arguments are used in the West to justify the re-
armament programme. In both cases the implicit assumption is that tlie other
side is controlled by a fairly homogeneous group of high extremism and fairly
high realism. It is only on these assumptions that the policy is sensible. High
extremism and homogeneity imply that no genuine agreement or compromise
is possible with any sections of the controlling group. Hibh realism implies that
the determination of the extremist controlling group to extend their power will
not lead them to start a war unless they are reasonably certain of winning it.
In this special case, rearmament is the only possible policy and is likely to secure
peace. P>ut extremists who are not realistic are quite capable of starting wars
which they have no chance of winning. Francisco Lopez, the dictator of
Paraguay, went to war with all the neighbouring states and went on fighting
until five-sixths of the entire population of his country had been killed. When
one is dealing with unrealistic extremists, rearmament is very unreliable as a
security against war. The most that can be said for it is that It gives security
against defeat.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5401
In fact, it is extremely doubtful wliether either side is justified in the implicit
assumption on which it bases its policy. This can be seen most clearly in the
West where politics operate witli a fairly liigh degree of publicity. The in-
dividuals who control or iufiueuce Western policy obviously vary enormously
in degree of extremism and the individuals who are violently extremist are very
far fi-om realistic, in many cases their extremism is clearly psychopathic.
Under these circumstances, communist policy does not make sense as a means to
promote peace. Its actual effect is to produce a widespread fear of communist
aggression among reasonable people and to intensify and strengthen Western
extremism. It is much harder to say whether the West is justified in its implicit
assumption about communist controlling groups because the whole communist
system operates behind the facade of the uniform party line. But one can say
that the West has decided its policy without taking nearly enough trouble to
find out whether its assumptions are correct. It is possible that Western policy
for peace may be as mistaken as the communist. The difficulty is that for either
side to pursue a policy that might really reduce the risk of war it would first
have to be ready to oppose its own extremists. Next week I will try to discuss
this general problem of how to reduce extremist influence.
ni
In the last talk I tried to make two main points. Firstly, that one must face
the unpleasant fact that there are people so extremist — so determined to enforce
submission to their arbitrary will — that no agreement or peaceful compromise
with them is possible. Secondly, that the rival views in the present world con-
flict are not inherently extremist as nazism or fascism were, which means that
the danger to world peace could be eliminated simply by a lessening of ex-
tremist influence on both sides. The problem is to find out what produces ex-
tremism and what can be done to reduce it. What one has to explain is the
process by which people who would be considered rather comic lunatics in stable
times rise to positions of leadership and seem to infect large parts of society
with their extremism. An obvious major factor in this process is frustration.
People lose their ability to act rationally when faced with insoluble problems.
This is very well established by psychological experiments. In wartime officer
selection tests candidates were deliberately given insoluble problems to test
their mental stability and a fair proportion broke down, often with the typical
extremist reaction of disruptive aggression. There are also some very sugges-
tive experiments on animals. Rats which were forced to face insoluble prob-
lems would develop compulsive obsessions. In some experiments a rat which
could see and smell food in one direction would be driven by its obsession to
go in another direction which always led to plainful results. Maier, who made
these experiments, pointed out the analogy with types of human extremist
behaviour. Actual political examples are not as clear as controlled experiments
but there are important cases which support the view that extremism is the
product of frustration. The pre-Hitler elections in Germany showed a rise in
the extremist vote whenever economic problems seemed insoluble, during the in-
flation and in the depression, and a rapid fall in extremism when ccmditions be-
came stable. The growth of extremism in the Chinese Communist Party can
be very directly related to frustration, over the failure to avoid the civil war
in 1946 and over international problems in 1950. The growth of extremism in
the West can also be very directly related to the frustration by Russian suspicion
and obstruction of every attempt to improve international relations.
Frustration also explains the mechanism of the chain reaction between different
forms of extremism. Because it is impossible to reach any agreement or peace-
ful compromise with people above a certain degree of extremism ; extremism
in one group presents an apparently insoluble problem to people in other groups
who wish for a peaceful settlement of disputes. This frustration produces
extremism which reacts back to produce further frustration and further ex-
,lremism.
/ I've been talking about frustration produced by insoluble problems and I
should make the point that it is just as frustrating to face a problem that one
doesn't know how to solve as it is to face a problem that is really insoluble. One
could make out quite a strong case for the theoi-y that a lot of the difficulties
of the modern world come from the long-time lag with which new ideas get into
ordinary thought. Many people feel that problems are insoluble because they
still think in terms of pre-Newtoniau science and pre-Freudian psychology when
they would not feel frustrated if they could use the tools of modern psychology
SS.34S— 52— pt. 14 32
5402 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
and logical analysis. What is relevant here is that many people get frustrated
because they do not see the fallacies in extremist arguments. Extremists are
always trying to present disputes in forms that allow no peaceful solution. It
is only when differences can be made to appear irrconcilable that extremists can
say, "This dispute can only be settled by everyone submitting to my opinion."
And submission is what the extremist always wants. The typical extremist con-
clusion is that the only important political decision is choosing which side to
support. And to reach this conclusion extremist arguments have to exaggerate
some distinctions and explain away others. The fallacy in these arguments is
nearly always an assumption that the world can be completely described in terms
of simple pairs of alternatives ; that if something is not black it must therefore
be white. A great many fairly reasonable people get the worst of arguments with
extremists because they don't realise that the extremist introduces his fallacy
by the way in which he puts the question. An example can make the point clear.
Consider the people who say, "In the West there is a free press while in com-
munist countries tliere is not." They are easily made to look silly by a defender
of communist extremism who can point out all the obvious limitations of press
freedom in the West and tlien draw the conclusion that there is nothing to choose
between the press on either side of the Iron Curtain. The fallacy is the as.sump-
tion that the press must be either free or not free. "Free or not free" is a dis-
junction like "hot or not hot" which is meaningless without a definition of
standards. If one states the question rightly, one must say that no country
lias a perfectly free press but there is more freedom in some countries than in
others. One can also say that great social dangers appear when press freedom
falls so low that no one outside a small privileged group can obtain the infor-
mation necessary to form a correct political judgment. In this form the criticism
of the totalitarian press is not easily refxited. As soon as one realises that most
extremist arguments are based on this sort of fallacy one ceases to be worried
by them.
Finally, what can one do about it all? The general lines of a sensible policy
for reasonable people on either side become clear when one states the elements
of the problem, (a) There can be no compromise with violent extremists, one
must either fight them or submit to them. (6) The disputes between people of
low extremism on either side in the world conflict could be settled by agreement
or peaceful compromise, (c) Extremism is always strengthened by frustration
and extremists are always trying to present disputes in forms that have no peace-
ful solution and so produce frustration. A policy to avoid war under these con-
ditions must meet two requirements. On the one hand it must show complete
firmness in resisting extremist demands for submission. On the other hand it
must avoid producing the frustration which would strengthen extremism on the
other side which means that it must offer a solution or possibility of peaceful com-
promise which would be accepted by the less extremist elements on the other side.
A policy of appeasement, which fails to meet tlie first condition, cannot do more
than postpone a war, at tlie expense of increasing the risk of defeat when war
does come. A policy of intransigence, wliich fails to meet the second condition,
makes war inevitable by increasing extremism to the point where no disputes
can be se^^tled except by figliting.
The diflSculties in meeting these conditions for a policy likely to secure peace
come from tlie fact that neither side could follow this sort of policy witliout re-
pudiating its own extremists. At present these conditions are clearly not ful-
filled by either Russian or Western policy. Communist policy claims to be try-
ing to win over the less extremist elements in the West, but the attempt is made
practically futile by an unrealistic analysis of the West and by a complete fail-
ure to repudiate or even to criticize the most extremist elements in Communism.
There are some grounds for suspecting that the most violent extremists hold
dominating positions in the Russian conununist party. Tlie West criticizes its
extremists and sometimes even repudiates them, but its policies are confused.
Those who see the dangers of appeasement are inclined to intransigence and
those who see the dangers of intransigence are inclined to appeasement. One
cannot say for certain that either side will prove able to follow an effective peace
policy. But this only means that one cannot say for certain that war will be
avoided.
The basic problem remains the repudiation of extremism, and I think extrem-
ists could be fought more etfectively if tliey were attacked where they are weak-
est. The obvious case for repudiating one's own extremists is that they are a
liability and not an asset in the cokl war. They are like very bellicose generals
who are always committing their forces to the defence of untenable positions.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5403
I remember reading an article by American supporters of Chiang Kai-shek which
measured liis services in the war against Japan by tlie number of Chinese sol-
diers who had been Ivilled under his command. Those who support their own
extremists judge their services by the same perverse standards. There is very
strong evidence that the complete discrediting of America in Chinese opinion was
primarily the work of the anti-communist "Ciiina Lobby" in America, with only
minor assistance from the communists. There is even stronger evidence that the
Russian secret police have done more effective anti-communist propaganda than
any nominally anti-communist organization. This means that peace-loving com-
munists and anti-communists .should be able to agree in fighting extremi.sm. It
is not at all clear which side eitlier set of extremists is actually helping by their
actions. It is quite clear that both sets of extremists are working for war.
Lindsay of Bikkeb.
Appendix X (a)
[Times, January 2, 1946]
The Chinese Tug-of-War — Prospects fob Settlement at Chungkin
kuomintang and communist suspicions
From a special correspondent lately in China
Pre.'^ident Truman's statement on LTnited States policy towards China and the
reopening of negotiations in Chungking encourage hopes of a peaceful settlement
of the differences between the central Government and the Chinese Communists,
but there are still big differences to be overcome. All previous negotiations be-
tween Chungking and Yenan had liroken down because of the completely differ-
ent views of the Kuomintang and the Communists, and the deep suspicions be-
tween them.
The Kuomintang has always insisted on its legal position as the National Gov-
ernment. It suspects that the Communists are determined to keep their inde-
I)endence and so insists that it must restore its full authority over all armies and
all areas. The Communists base their claims on their achievements and actual
position. They suspect that the Kuomintang is determined to maintain one-
party rule, and so they refuse to give up their separate armies and areas until the
central Government is completely reorganized. Since both parties claim that they
stand for a democratic and united China the real issue is which party lias more
.iustification for its suspicions of the other. Here the Communists have the
stronger case.
ONE-PARTY RULE
A great deal of the Kuomintang suspicion is the product of its own propaganda
and censorship. At times the Sian authorities even stopped copies of the Yenan
papers addressed to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Kuomintang leaders have had no
means of checking the stories put out by the violently anti-Communist secret
police or by military commanders, who found reports of Communist attacks a
convenient excuse for their failure to resist the Japanese. Actually the Com-
munists refused to take their best opportunity for claiming independence at the
time when tliere would have been a chance of the allies applying the Tito-Mik-
hailovich precedent.
On the other side the Kuomintang has a long record of promised reforms which
have never materialized. For example, the secret police still make arrests, poli-
tical prisoners have not been released, and the taking over of the Japanese occu-
pied cities has produced graft and speculation on a larger scale than ever. The
only real reform has been a relaxation of censorship. Also the Kuomintang has
always resisted any real modification of one-party rule. In the recent negotia-
tions it refused new elections for the National Assembly though the old delegates,
chosen in 1936, are completely unrepresentative, as the government was then
suppressing anyone who advocated resistance to Japan. These old delegates,
many of whom have served imder the puppet Wang Ching-wei. plus the Kuo-
mintang Central Committee as ex officio members, would produce an assembly
completely dominated by the right-wing Kuomintang, which would probably pass
the 1936 draft constitution that has been described as "nothing but a legalistic
device for the continuation of the Kuomintang dictatorship."
5404 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
THE REAL ISSUE
The Communists have also had reasons for saying that the Kuomintang has
considered them as worse enemies than the Japanese. Chungking always bloclied
any allied cooperation with the Communists, which could have greatly helped in
the war against Japan, and even demanded the disbandment of most of the
Communist armies regardless of the help this would have given the Japanese.
Many Kuomintang commanders deserted to the Japanese and their prompt rein-
statement after the surrender seemed to show that these deserters had been
condoned in order to keep a Kuomintang army in \orth China ready for civil war.
After the Japanese surrender the Kuomintang relied largely on the puppets
and Japanese. The puppets were made responsible for maintaining order till
the arrival of Kuomintang forces. The Communists refused to recognize a sur-
render in which they had no share and advanced rapidly against the puppets until
the Japanese started a general counteroffensive at the end of August. The
Chinese surrender terms of September 11 ordered the Japanese to cooperate with
Kuomintang forces, and Japanese, puppets, and Kuomintang forces have since
fought together against the Communists. Even after the joint declaration on
October 11, when Government and Communist leaders pledged themselves to
avoid civil war by all possible means, Kuomintang forces continued to attack
positions which the Communists held and had declared they would defend. The
real issue has been the Communist right to hold positions taken from the Japanese
and puppets since the surrender. As in previous disputes, the Kuomintang have
a strong legal case and the Communists a strong moral one.
The Kuomintang had good reasons for sending troops into Manchuria, where
the Communists had only small guerrilla iorces in the southwest, but the argu-
ment that Kuomintang and American forces had to go into North China to
receive the surrender depends on the unstated assumption that the Communist
armies could not be used. In fact, if the Japanese and their puppets in North
China had been ordered to surrender to the Communist 18th Group Army they
could have been disarmed and normal conditions restored within a few weeks,
as the Communists could quickly have sent large forces to every centre in North
China. This would have strengthened the Communist position, but equally the
Kuomintang movements strengthened their position against the Communists.
American policy after the surrender was contradictory. Their declared poli-
cies of eliminating the Japanese and of neutrality in Chinese internal conflicts
were incompatible with their effective policy of cooperating only with the Kuo-
mintang. Their assistance to Kuomintang troop movements greatly influenced
civil friction and they have done nothing to eliminate the Japanese influence
which the Kuomintang has been willing to preserve. In Peking the Americans
neither disarmed the Japanese nor insisted that the Kuomintang should do so.
They everywhere cooperated with the puppet commanders and collaborationist
officials whom the Kuomintang had recognized, and actually had clashes with
the Communists while protecting puppet troop movements. They made no pro-
test aliout the arrangements by which Yen Hsi Shan protected Japanese interests
in Shansi in return for their military support. In fact the United States cannot
avoid interference in Chinese affairs because the present central Government
depends on American support. Without this support its chances in a civil war
are doubtful and it faces strong internal opposition which the withdrawal of
American support would crystallize.
AMEBICAN PROPOSALS
President Truman's statement advocates "modification of the one-party 'politi-
cal tutelage' " and the "institution of a broadly representative Government"
and repeatedly emphasizes the "elimination of Japanese influence from China."
These are the essential conditions for a settlement but they are opposed by strong
vested interests. The "elimination of Japanese influence" should include the
removal of puppet commanders and of officials who have been closely associated
with the Japanese and puppets, but many of them have powerful connexions in
Chungking. A "broadly representative Government" should mean one in which
the balance of power is held by the Democratic League. The Democratic League
is still a fairly small organization but in any free election it would almost cex'-
tninly get a big vote Irom the very large group which dislikes the present Govern-
ment but distrusts the Communists. Also the balance of power in the hands of a
party which stands for the policies which both Kuomintang and Communists
accept in principle would be a giiarantee to both sides. Such a Government
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5405
would, however, mean the eud of one-party rule and the elimination of some
leading figures in the present Government.
If the Americans insist on such conditions Chiang Kai-shek would he com-
pelled tt) throw over his more reactionary associates and return to the more pro-
gressive position of 1937 and 1938. The Communists, who have always said they
would merge their armies and areas under a coalition Government, could not now
refuse to cooperate without losing popular support, and their military power
depends entirely on popular support. Such a Government would face difficult
problems, but there would no longer be irreconcilable conflicts which the Chinese
genius for compromise would not solve.
The danger is that the United States may not insist on the conditions for a
settlement but support proposals like the suggestions in Chiang Kai-shek's
speech of March 1, 1945, which both Communists and Democratic League rejected
as not really ending one-party rule. In refusing such proposals the Communists
would have the support of the population of Noi'tb China, who would fight rather
than come under Kuomintang one-party rule. The result would be a very long
civil war. The Communists could not easily defeat Kuomintang armies which
continued to get American supplies, but it is equally unlikely that the Kuomin-
tang would be more successful than the Japanese in eliminating the Comniunists
from their bases, and the development of a strong and prosperous China would
be indefinitely delayed.
LiNDSAT OF BiRKER.
Appendix X (b)
POST-MORTEM ON AMERICAN MEDIATION IN CHINA
Michael Lindsay
[Reprinted from International Journal, a Canadian quarterly, published by the Canadian
Jnstitute of International Affairs, 2i30 Bloor St. W., Toronto 5, Canada]
A post mortem is useful if it reveals something about the disease from which
the patient died, which can help in avoiding similar deaths in the future. In this
case the disease is not a unique one. There were very obvious analogies between
the American position in China and the British position in Greece. Also the
results seem to indicate the necessity for the rethinking of some basic principles
in foreign policy if similar frustrations are to be avoided in the future.
General Mar.shall's mission to China started with an excellent formulation of
United States policy in the President's statement of December 15, 1945. The
basic aim was a "strong, united and democratic China" and the major obstacles
to this were correctly diagnosed as the existence of an independent Communist
party army which made political unity impossible and the form of the National
Government as a "one-party government" operating under a theory of "Political
Tutelage."
There is no reason to suppose that this aim was unattainable. General
Marshall found that there were moderates in both the main parties who agreed
in wanting a strong, united, and democratic China and who were prepared to
compromise to avoid civil war. They had the support of most of the minor
parties and the main body of imorganized public opinion.
However, in fact the United States completely failed to attain its objectives
and the situation when General Marshall left was very much worse than in
December 1945. The reasons for this failure are obviously complex but there
is one major factor which has been very little discussed. This is the legal and
diplomatic traditions within which the United States has operated.
The United States has usually operated in terms of the legal forms of the
situation and has seldom been willing to take official notice of the divergence
between legal forms and reality. As a result American action has often been
diverted so that its actiial results have been directly contrary to the declared
objectives of American policy. American policy has been planned in terms of
American traditions but it has operated in a situation where most people judge
it in terms of Chinese traditions, which make it look very different.
The same failure to recogize the difference in political traditions made the
United States miss its opportunities in the period when American mediation
was accepted by both sides. American influence was dissipated in securing a
legal structure of agreements which looked excellent on paper and might have
5406 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
been effective in a country with the tradition of the rule of law, but which was
largely unrealistic in terms of Chinese politics.
The most obvious example of the frustration of American policy through ad-
herence to legal forms, was in the disarmament of the Japanese and the elimina-
tion of Japanese inrtuence. The effectiveness of American mediation was al-
ways greatly weakened by the false position into which the United States had
allowed itself to be manoeuvered. The President's statement of December 15,
1045, laid great stress on these objectives/
The fatal ambiguity in the statement was the implicit assumption that Ameri-
can objectives were shared by the Chinese National Government and could be
attained by assisting it. But at the end of 1945 the military position of the
Kuomintang in North China depended very largely on assistance from Japanese
and puppet troops so that the implementaticm of American policy would have
greatly weakened the Kuomintang position in the civil war.
The justification for arranging the transportation of Kuomintang armies to
North China was the possibility that strong forces might be needed to disarm
and evacuate the local Japanese army units. However, by the end of August,
1945, it was clear that the Japanese army in China remained an organized force
under the control of its commanders who were willing to obey Allied instruc-
tions. It also soon became clear that the Chinese National Government was
more interested in using the Japanese in the civil war than in securing their
evacuation.^ Japanese officers from North China Headquarters stated to the
American Headquarters in Peiping that they could deliver all their troops at
the ports within six weeks to await evacuation if only the Chinese government
would allow them to do so.
The President's statement of December 18, 1946, points out the real physical
difficulties of repatriating all the Japanese forces but it was purely legal and
diplomatic inhibitions that prevented the United States from securing their re-
moval from the Chinese political and military scene within a few weeks of
VJ-Day. All that was required for this was the issue of appropriate orders to
the Japanese and, if the Chinese government had refused to cooperate, the
United States was in a position to issue orders directly through General Mac-
Arthur and the Japanese government.
The American government has always defended its military activities in
North China with the argument that these actions were only assistance to the
Chinese National Government in disarming and repatriating the Japanese.
This argument is perfectly sound on the assumption that the American govern-
ment had no obligation to go behind the forms of legal and diplomatic correct-
ness ; that it would have been an unfriendly act towards an allied government
to have inquired whether the large Kuomintang armies transported to North
China were necessary to disarm and repatriate the Japanese or whether they
were in fact used for that purpose ; that for the American forces to disarm the
Japanese except at the request of the Chinese government would have been
illegal interference in Chinese internal affairs.
Although American actions were correct from this formal legal standpoint
they were, in reality, completely contrary to the declared olijectives of American
policy. Though most of the Japanese troops were finally repatriated when
they were no longer essential to the Kuomintang military position, the Ameri-
can forces in North China made no attempts to secure the rapid elimination of
the Japanese.^ The Kuomintang armies transported to North China were used
1 It stated that, "to remove the possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the
United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and repatriation of
Japanese troops," and that, "The maintenance of peace In the Pacific may be .ieopardized,
if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed." For these pur-
poses the United States would "assist the National Government of China in effecting the
disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas," and would
"cooperate with it * ♦ * in eliminating Japanese Influences from China." It was also
stated that. "United States support (to the National Government) will not extend to
military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife."
2 Immediately after VJ-day, the Japanese in North China started retiring to a few main
concentration points, fighting only defensive actions. But at the end of August they started
a general counteroffensive against the Communists in cooperation with the puppet armies
and later with regular Kuomintang troops. The Communists claim that this counter-
offensive was the result of orders from' General Ho Ying-chin to General Oltamura that the
Japanese should assist the puppet armies and must recover positions they liad abandoned'
to "illegal armed forces and bandits." Such an order would explain the Japanese action
and the Chinese surrender terms of September 11 ordering the Japanese forces to assist
the National Government armies but making no mention of cessation of hostilities.
^ According to Dr. Abrams, the Regional Medical Officer of UNRRA, at the end of
February 1946 .Japanese troops were holding sections of the Kuomintang front within
a few miles of the main American base at Tsingtao. Other American sources reported
40,000 Japanese still fighting in Shansi in April 1946 and some still remaining in
December.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5407
entirely in "Chinese internal strife" and American action was diverted into very
definite intervention in the civil war."
The position with reyard to the pni)pets was similarly confused. The United
States was not prepared to challenge the good faith of the Chinese government
in making official appointnjents. As a result any puppet who received a new ap-
pointment from the Kuomintang became, for the Americans, an official of the
Chinese National Government and as such he automatically received American
support and assistance.
Here again the position was legally correct. It would have been interference
in the internal affairs of Cliina to query appointments made by the recognized
national government. In practice the American forces which had come to
•'eliminate Japanese influence" were working with men who, a few months be-
fore, had been serving under the Japanese and proclaming their determination
to defend Greater East Asia against American imperialism.^
In terms of the Western tradition of law this does not necessarily imply bad
faith on the part of the American government. The Kuomintang were trying
to divert American action to their own ends ; and the Kuomintang has the services
of almost all the Western-trained legal talent in China. Also important sections
of the American armed forces were, to say the least, not unwilling to allow
American action to be diverted into intervention against the Communists.'' It is
quite possible to argue that the American government meant well but was ma-
noeuvered into a false position. But this would be hard to understand in terms
of Chinese traditions. The whole Confucian tradition has been hostile to the
idea of law as a set of invarient rules and has emphasized the subordination of
legal rules to the special circumstances of each particular case.
This Chinese tradition of law is only part of the whole Chinese social and
political tradition which has been very different from that of America. At its
best the traditional Confucian imperial system was a benevolent, paternalistic
authoritarianism. In times of decline it became a struggle for office and wealth
between individuals or small groups in the ruling class. In modern history the
decline of the Manchu dynasty began between ISOO and 1S50 and Chinese politics
since the revolution have been an open and ruthless struggle for power only
slightly modified by some conventional rules. There were accepted fictions
which no one openly challenged. For example, even the most independent war
lords always officially claimed to be within the political and military organization
of a united China under a central government. There were conventional forms
of words whose real meaning was quite well understood.
Within the limits of these conventions everyone operating in Chinese politics,
including the Japanese before 1937, used their actual power as far as possible
to get their friends into office and their enemies out and to protect the groups
they wished to support. It was the spoils system in an extreme form except
that office depended on guns rather than on votes. The development of the forms
of a modern state in recent years had only begun to modify the system. The
Chinese liberals are trying to build up something very different but so far they
have been more successful on paper than in real life.
Though some of the traditions of Chinese politics may be unique, there are
many countries where the general pattern of political struggle is nearer to
China than to America.
The United States has, for the past few years, been playing a leading part
in Chinese politics, but has been playing it according to rules completely different
from those which have been used by any other players. ^
There has been no doubt about the actual power of the United States during
the last few years. It is widely believed, with some reason, that the continued
existence of the National Government has depended on American support. If
America had wished to change the composition of the National Government
it is highly probable that it could have done so. Thrice-repeated invitations
* On one occasion American forces were nearly manoeuvred into a full-scale battle with
the Communist army when they accepted without question a Kuomintang request to take
over Cheefoo to receive the Japanese surrender more than a month after its capture by
the Communists.
^ To give only two out of many possible examples : Li Hslen-llang, who was Mayor of
Tsingtao until the autumn of 1946, was known to the American army to have been an
officer In the Japanese sponsored "Imperial Collaboration Army" but received full Amer-
ican support ; the first troops transported to Changchun with American assistance in-
cluded units organized by the Japanese, under Chiang P'eng-fei, who had entered Japanese
service in the East Hope! Autonomous Government before 1937.
^ From conversations with officers who served in China it is clear that General Wede-
meyer did not consider himself bound by the official American policy of nonintervention
in the civil war but planned Ameiican action to assist the Kuomintang military position.
5408 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to the leading reactionaries in the government to visit the United States on
missions with high-sounding titles but no real functions, could hardly have been
refused.
In the cities where American troops were stationed there was no doubt at all
about tlie ability of America to secure the removal of anyone it disliked and
to protect any groups that it wished to support. Local Kuomintang forces were
obviously not going to oppose the Americans unless American action were so
crudely managed as to leave no possible way of saving face.' In any city with
American troops the liberals could have been given complete seciirity and
freedom of action.
In fact the United States allowed the extreme reactionaries to play a leading
part in the National Government. In the cities with American troops, power
and office have been in the hands of the extreme reactionaries or semigangster
elements in the Kuomintang, sometimes of leading collaborationists. In Peiping
the presence of American Marines did not prevent the appointment of the former
head of the Nazi Gestapo organization to a position in the Kuomintang secret
police.
Liberals received much less protection from the Americans than they had
from Lung Yun, the Yunnan warlord, before his removal by Chiang Kai-shek
in October 1945. Even in the cities with American troops liberal meetings have
been broken up, liberal newspapers suppressed, and liberal leaders beaten up,
arrested, or kidnapped.
In .spite of the declared intentions of America to avoid intervention in the
civil war American assistance to the Kuomintang was continued in forms which
directly strengthened its military position in the civil war.
If it were assumed that the United States were acting in the same sort of
way as any other power in modern Chinese politics, and this is the natural
assumption for a Chinese without foreign training to make, the deduction from
the situation was obvious. Namely that the United States was firmly supporting
the ultrareactionary, irreconcilably anti-Communist group in the Kuomintang;
that the statements of American policy praising the liberals and calling for
democracy and settlement by compromise were merely a foreign form of the
conventional euphemisms like calling a government opium monopoly an opium
suppression bureau. Of coui'se it was a good thing to suppress opium ; but
what could the government do when it needed money? Of course the Americans
liked democracy, civil liberties, and so on ; but what could they do when they
needed reliable allies against Communism?
This is, most probably, the sort of picture that American policy has presented
to the majority of Chinese. It fully explains the fact that, "'The reactionaries
in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support
regardless of their actions" (to quote General ilarshall). The Western-trained
group in the Kuomintang have realized that America does not too much like
the extreme reactionaries but they have considered that the bad relations between
America and Russia would always secure them American support against the
Communists.
A very slight relaxation of the strict forms of diplomatic correctness would
have made a very big difference to the chances of success of American mediation.
The most obvious example is the failure to make any protest in March 1946
when tliere was growing evidence of Kuomintang failure to carry out its part of
the agreements and when the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee repu-
diated some of the key points in the settlements reached through American
mediation. This was most probably responsible for the change in the Communist
party line from conciliation and readiness to accept American mediation to its
present uncompromising ant i- American attitude.
By the end of General Hurley's ambassadorship the Communists were ex-
tremely suspicious of America. "General Marshall undoubtedly impressed the
Communist leaders with his personal integrity but their willingness to accept
American mediation must have met with considerable slvepticism from the nmre
doctrinaire members of the party. It could be ai-gued, on doctrinaire Marxian
theory, that American policy was inevitably determined by the position of
America as a capitalist, imperialist power; that whatever General Marshall's
personal intentions he could^ not in fact change the policy dictated by
the interests of the groups that controlled the American government.
' After the fissassination of Li Kung-pu and Wen I-to last summer the American Consu-
late in Kunming protected a number of other liberals against the secret police without
any local American troops to back them.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5409
To the Communist Central Coniuiittee, the attempt to reach agreement through
American mediation must have seemed a policy that was worth trying as a
last hope of avoitlins' civil war but which, on tlieorerical grounds, was not very
likely to succeed. American silence in March and the beginning of April must
have seemed convincing proof of the correctness of the docti'inaire position. Tlie
Kuomintang was repudiating the agreements which General Marshall had
mediated and America did nothing about it. When it came to the point General
Marshall appeared to be powerless against the forces that linked America to the
right-wing Kunniintang, exactly as Marxian theory predicted. The Communist
party could no longer afford to trust in American mediation but must strengthen
its military position. If the Communist leaders still felt confidence in General
Marshall's personal good faith they may have felt that to appeal to him to safe-
guard the agreements would only cause him an embarrassing loss of face.
If this analysis of Communist policy is anywhere near correct then a state-
ment by General Marshall, at the beginning of April 194G denouncing the right-
wing Kuomintang in the sort of terms he v/as finally prepared to use in January
1947 would probably have prevented the Communist offensive in Manchuria and
the change in party line which it indicated.
In many other cases simple plain speaking on the part of America could have
greatly weakened the extremists on both sides by making it clear that America
was not irrevocably committed to support of the right-wing Kuomintang.
In January and February 1046 when American mediation was accepted by
both sides it produced a system of agreements which seemed to be moi'e designed
to impress the Americans than to solve the practical problems of Chinese politics.
There is an interesting contrast between the 1946 agreements with their essen-
tially western legal structure and the reports of the direct Kuomintang-Conimu-
nist negotiations in September 1945 with their emphasis on practical problems.
The only part of the agreements which applied immediately to the practical
situation was the truce agreement. This was very definitely only a truce and
not in any way a settlement. It put military conflict into a state of suspended
animation but it stabilized a completely impossible siuation in which the two
armies were so mixed up in the disputed territory that neither side could settle
down to the badly needed economic and social reconstruction. Friction was
almost inevitable and became quite certain when the truce was extended to
include pupiiet troops. The Communist leaders could not really restrain their
local units from continuing attacks on the puppets, who in many cases had a
record for atrocities little better than the Japanese. Equally the Kuomintang
could not really control many of the puppet units it had recognized as part of
its army.
Almost everything except the truce agreement was a theoretical legal struc-
ture which started at the top with the constitution. On paper it looked very
nice and if it had been possible to bring the whole system into effect simultane-
ously it might have worked. P.ut all the bits were interconnected. Neither side
could afford to make the concessions it had agreed to without some guarantee
that the other side would do the same. The whole structure depended on the
Western view of law. that the signing of a contract implied an unconditional
obligation to observe it and that the enforcement of law in one case was an elfec-
tive precedent for its enforcement in others. But in modern Chinese politics the
observance of agreements has been the exception rather than the rule and the
system could only have worked if America had been willing to guarantee the
agreements with sanctions against either party which broke them.
In fact America seems to have taken the diplomatically correct but completely
unrealistic position of operating entirely in terms of the legal forms of the agree-
ments and refusing to take official notice of any actuaf failure to implement
them. Months after the Military Reorganization Agreement had decided that
all war-lord armies and all troops that had served under the Japanese should
be disarmed and disbanded as quickly as possible the Truce Teams continued to
treat former puppet units as legitimate parts of the Kuomintang array. Even
more striking was the attitude to secret police activities in Chungking.' These
were undermining the whole basis of the agreements which were aimed at setting
up a system in which parties could compete by legitimate political activities
without needing private armies to protect them. If Chiang Kai-shek was un-
willing or unable to secure obedience to the law from his own party organizations
8 On paper the National Government had implemented the civil liberties clauses of the
asreements by issuing a set of decrees throuah the Supreme National Defence Council.
Within two weeks, a meeting held by left-wins: Kuoniintan? and other liberal croups in
Chungking was broken up by the Kuomintang secret police and similar ancidents continued.
5410 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
or enforcement of the law by the local police even in his own capital the agree-
ments were meaningless. But it was not until his statement in January 1947 that
General Marshall made any official reference to the "quite obviously inspired mob
actions."
It is probable that American mediation would have had a nuich greater chance
of success if it had started from the bottom instead of from the top, if it had
worked in the Chinese tradition of practical problems and personalities instead
of in the American tradition of general legal principles.
A practical solution had to reconcile two claims both of which have had the
support of moderate opinion in China. The basic Kuomintang case, which the
Communists accepted in principle, can be put in President Truman's words : "The
existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Connuunist army is incon-
sistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China." The
Kuomintang has had a legitimate case against allowing the Communists military
as well as civil power in what would be in practice an independent North China.
The basic Communist case, which the Kuomintang have accepted in principle,
is that there should be democratization, civil liberties, and local self-government.
In North China the local government organizations set up under the Communists
have been far ahead of the Kuomintang areas in honesty, efficiency, and degree
of popular control. The Communists have had a legitimate case in claiming
that these existing elected local governments should not be replaced by appointed
Kuomintang officials who were proving scandalously corrupt and inefficient in all
the areas they had taken over.
At the beginning of 1946 it should have been possible to secure a provisional
settlement of outstanding practical issues in terms of the concessions which both
parties were prepared to make in tlie agreements."
This sort of provisional settlement would have enabled both sides to get down
to the real job of reconstruction while discussing the more theoretical points
of the constitution and army reorganization. It would have greatly increased
the chances of further agreements as both sides would have made practical ges-
tures of good faith which involved the repudiation of their extremists.
Of course there would have been difficulties in getting this kind of provisional
settlement of actual problems, but even if it has always been true that one or
both sides have only been willing to promise concessions but not to make them
in practice, it would have been better to tind this out at the beginning of 1946
rather than after a year of confusion and disillusionment. America could have
started to face the realities of the situation a year sooner.
It would have been almost impossible to work for a settlement of practical
problems within the limits of normal diplomatic traditions. At every .step it
would have been necessary to consider questions of fact and of personalities, to
be prepared to challenge the good faith of the parties in any agreement and the
correspondence of legal forms and official statements with reality.^"
In fact American policy continued to operate in terms of legal forms even
when the legal forms of early 1946 had obviously failed to be effective in the real
situation. American influence on the Chinese government was concentrated
on securing the passage of a comparatively democratic constitution though there
was no reason to suppose that legal forms would gain a new effectiveness simply
from being in a constitution.
Judged in terms of American objectives the basic mistake in American policy
was failure to support the groups that would have l)een America's natural allies.
The Democratic League and the left wing of the Kuomintang had a large pro-
» In the Military Reorg-anization Agreement of February 1945, the Communists accepted
a preponderance of Kuomintang troops even in the main Communist areas of North China.
In a provisional settlement they misht have been asked to concede control of the railways
and strateuic points at least to Kuomintang armies untainted by collaboration under com-
manders who might reasonably he expected to ol)Si^rve atcreements.
In the agreements the Kuomintang accepted provisions for elected county and provincial
governments. They also agreed to the quickest possible elimination of war lord and puppet
troops. In return for military iireponderance in North China they mighr have been asked
to agree that existing elected local governments should tnke over the whole of areas of
which they already controlled the larger part, at least till arrangements were made for
new elections.
1" For example, it would have been necessary to take official notice of the fact that Yen
Hfii-shan was a local war lord who had liad close relations with the Jaiinnese so that settle-
ment was impossil)le while he remained the official go\ernor and military commander in
Sbansi : or to investigate hr)w far the Communists had actually set up elected local govern-
ments in Manchuria. The task would not have been impossible, but it was certainly not
compatible witli an official policy of nonintervention in Cliinese affairs and correct diplo-
matic relations with the recognized Chinese government.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5411
portion of leaders with American education and were the groups in China that
really wanted a democratic system of the American type. Under any system
which secured genuine free elections these groups might become a major force
in Chinese politics. The right wing Kuomintang has little popular support and
many people are afraid of the Commimists in spite of their moderate programme.
The liberal groups received a lot of verbal praise from America but nothing
more. The major weakness of the liberals in modern Chinese politics is that
they do not control an army. They could only assume leadership with American
support against the secret police and militarists but no support was ever given.
Because America acted only through the recognized government, American
assistance to China automatically meant American support for the groups that
controlled the government by their command of the army and secret police
organizations. On the one hand General Marshall tried to negotiate agreements,
on the other American assistance strengthened the "irreconciliable groups within
the Kuomintang party, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control
of China, (who) evidently had no real intention of implementing them." "
Secret police terrorism has greatly weakened the liberals and American assist-
ance to the right-wing Kuomintang has made the naturally pro-American Dem-
ocratic League almost as anti- American as the Communists whose anti-American
and more extremist line dates from the failure of America to protest against
the repudiation of the agreements reached through American mediation.
By failing to support its natural allies American policy has placed itself in
a dilemma. Without continued American support the Kuomintang will prob-
ably lose the civil war and the Communists will play a leading part in a new
Chinese government. On the other hand a resumption of large-scale mifitary
assistance to the Kuomintang might easily produce Russian support for the
Communists, of which there has l^een no evidence up till now; and the Com-
munists with a very large mass organization behind them would need very much
less foreign assistance than the present Kuomintang government. Only very
large-scale American intervention could then prevent a Kuomintang defeat.
The moral of all this obvious. Assistance to a country where thei-e is a violent
political struggle must be, in effect, assistance to the group that controls the
recognized government so long as the forms of nonintervention and diplomatic
correctness are preserved. There is no choice between supporting this group
and discontinuing all assistance.
So long as the group that controls the government is confident of continued
foreign assistance it will have no motive for compromising with its rivals or for
introducing reforms that conflict with the vested interests of its members.
If it is desired to give support but at the same time to secure reforms or
perhaps to secure a compromise between the government and opposition groups,
then it is necessary to abandon the forms of diplomatic correctness and to
intervene on behalf of the groups it is desired to support or in favour of the
reforms which are desired.
Harvard University, May 1947.
Lindsay of Birkee.
The Canadian Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial, nonpolitlcal. nonprofit-
making organization founded in 1928 to promote an understanding of international ques-
tions and problems, and of Canada's position both as a member of the international
community of nations and as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
,The Institute, as such, is precluded by its Constitution from expressing an opinion on
any aspect of public affairs. The views expressed in this journal, therefore, are those of
the writers.
Appendix XI
Membership of Political Associations
1. general
As an undergraduate at Oxford I was a member of the Oxford University
Labour Club, supporting, and I think affiliated with, the British Labour Party.
In 1948 I joined the British Fabian Society, of which I am still a member,
and between 1949 and 1951, I was a member of the Hull Fabian Society.
" From General Marshall's statement of January 7. 1947.
5412 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
2. CONNECTED WITH CHINA
While in the United States in 1946 I became a "consultant" to the Com-
mittee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. This Committee has been largely
under communist influence but it was, at one period, publishing some quite
interesting material on China and I was in agreement with its criticism of the
totalitarian influences in U. S. Far Eastern policy. The only advice I have given
to the Committee as "consultant" has been that it would completely discredit
its ability to work for its ostensible objective if it allowed itself to become associ-
ated with support for the Soviet Union. In 1946 I sent a strong letter of protest
when the Committee sent out a pro-Soviet pamphlet with its material on the
Far East. In, I think, 1950 I wrote a letter to the Committee strongly criticizing
an editorial in Far East Spotlight and saying that I could not remain associated
with the Committee if it continued to support the Soviet Union, which, in my
opinion, was a fascist power opposed to democracy. This produced a very con-
ciliatory reply.
In 1946 I became Chairman of the China Campaign Committee in England.
This committee had been formed at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict
to organise support for China. Its membership was fairly wide and included
some Communists but control was in the hands of British Labour Party sup-
porters. The joint secretaries, Miss Dorothy Woodman and Lady Selwyn Clarke,
were both members of Labour Party organisations.
At the end of 1948 or beginning of 1949 the Committee was asked by Mr. Jack
Ch'en of the New China News Agency in London whether, in view of the develop-
mentg in the Chinese situation, we were ready to commit ourselves to full support
of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Liberated Areas. We replied
that while our general attitude had been favourable to the Chinese Communist
Party because we felt that it had usually been in the right as against the
Kuomintang, we could not commit ourselves to unconditional support and felt
that we served a more useful purpose for Siho-British friendship by remaining
independent.
Most probably as a result of this reply from the China Campaign Committee
Mr. .Jack Ch'en and members of the British Communist Party organised the
Britain-China Friendship Association in 1949, and this organization received
the support of the Chinese government. Members of the China Campaign Com-
mittee were invited to join the BCFA. We refused to accept suggestions for
merging the two organisations but, with considerable misgivings, joined the
BCFA as a means of keeping contacts with China after receiving the most
explitit assurances that the BCFA would be run as a nonparty and not as a
Communist-front organisation. These assurances were broken over the handling
of a Chinese "friendship" delegation which visited England in October 1950.
I published an article in the Manchester Guardian of 2nd January 1951, strongly
attacking the BCFA management and, after some correspondence and con-
troversy, resigned from the BCFA. Other non-Communist members of the China
Campaign Committee also resigned.
As a matter of strategy, I would maintain that this temporary association
with the Communist-controlled BCFA was justified. If cooperation had been
refused before the bad faith of the management had been made clear, the
Communists could have argued, with considerable effect, that they wanted to
work honestly for Sino-British friendship but had found that non-Communists
would not cooperate. As it is, there is clear evidence to show that the Britan-
China Friendship Association was given every opportunity of working for its
ostensible objective but instead chose to act in ways that worsened Sino-British
relations.
I have spoken at meetings for the Peace with China Association which was
organised by members of the China Campaign Committee with the wording of
its objectives framed to exclude Comnmnists and Communist supporters by
accepting the correctness of the original UN action in Korea but I do not
remember if I ever actually joined the association.
I have also belonged to a number of associations connected with politics
though nonpolitical. For example, I was active in the Hull branch of the United
Nations Association and I now belong to the Canberra Branch. I am a member
of the lioyal Institute of International Affairs.
I cannot remember all the organisations, and societies with which I have been
connected at various times, but, to the best of my recollection, the above list
gives all the political associations in which I have played any sort of active part.
I can state definitely that I have never belonged to any branch of any Communist
Party in any country.
Lindsay of Birkeb.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5413
Mr. Morris. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a sworn statement by
Miriam S. Farley on the UOPWA Union in the American IPR, dated
June 10, 1952, which I would like to have received at this time.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1389" and is
as follows :)
Exhibit No. 1389
State of Netw York,
County of New York, ss:
Memorandum on the UOPWA Union in the American IPR
By Miriam S. Farley, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says :
The following is intended to correct and supplement certain inaccurate, in-
complete or misleading statements concerning the relations between the Ameri-
can Institute of Pacific Relations (formerly American Council, Institute of
Pacific Relations) and the United Office and Professional Workers of American
(later merged in the Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America)
made before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security by Ray-
mond Dennett (Hearings, Part 4, pp. 939-50) and Harvey Matusow (stenographic
transcript, Vol. .55, pp. 6211-29).
On this subject I can speak from personal knowledge as I have been a mem-
ber of the American IPR staff since 1934 and was a member of the union
from 1939 to 1951, except for a period in 1946-48 when I was not employed by
the American IPR. I was the first shop chairman in the American IPR and
was an active member of the union for a number of years. M.v union activi-
ties were largely confined to maintaining and operating the machinery of col-
lective bargaining in the American IPR office. Later, my feeling toward the
union having changed, I became inactive, and remained a member only be-
cause it was required by the contract.
In 1939 the American IPR signed a contract with the Book and Magazine
Guild, Local 18, UOPWA, CIO. The initiative in forming a union in the Amer-
ican IPR did not come from Frederick V. Field, as stated by Mr. Dennett. Mr.
Dennett was not connected with the IPR at that time and, as he said himself,
could not speak from personal knowledge. The initiative came from the Amer-
ican IPR employees. Their motive was nonpolitical ; they simply wished to
conduct their relations with their employer on a basis of collective bargaining.
Mr. Field was executive secretary of the American IPR at this time, but he
made no attempt to influence the emploj-ees either for or against joining the
union.
At that time, so far as I know, the UOPWA was not under Communist con-
trol. The UOPWA had contracts at this period with a number of reputable
organizations, including Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Phi Beta Kappa, and the For-
eign Policy Association. Ten years later, in 1949, charges were made in the
I CIO that the UOPWA was under Communist control. These charges were in-
' vestigated by the CIO and as a result the UOPWA was expelled from the CIO
in 1950. Subsequently the American IPR officers gave notice that they would
1 not renew the contract with the union after it expired in May 1951, and it
I was not renewed. The decision not to renew was taken by the American IPR
officers with the approval of the American IPR employees.
At no time, to my knowledge, did the union ever make any attempt whatever
to influence, directly or indirectly, the policies, program, or publications of the
American IPR. And I was in a good position to know of such attempts had they
been made. Any attempt of this kind would have been resented and rejected
both by the American IPR employees and by the Institute officers and Executive
Committee members. In its relations with the American IPR the union con-
fined itself strictly to normal union functions, i. e., negotiations with manage-
ment on wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
The implication in Mr. Dennett's testimony that the union attempted to "get
rid of" him has no basis in fact. In saying this I do not mean to charge Mr.
Dennett with a deliberate untruth. He may have believed this to be true, but
it was not true.
From 1943 on the American IPR contract contained a standard union-shop
clause, common in union contracts, requiring all new employees to join the
5414 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
union. Mr. Dennett stated that he feared this clause might make it impossible
for the American IPR to obtain the services of research persons whom it might
wish to employ. It should be noted that the the contract contained a number
of loopholes. Certain cate.uorie of eniplo.vees were excluded from its operation,
including "research persons en.i,"aged for special reseai'ch projects" (quotation is
from contract as revised on January 6, 1945 ; earlier wording was "persons
engaged temporarily for special projects"), "workers on a retainer basis," and
"holders of fellowships working under the supervision of the Council but re-
ceiving no compensation from it." Other exceptions might be made by vote of
the union members in the office. To the best of my knowledge and recollection
the American II'Il never in fact experienced any difficulty in engaging research
persons because of the union shop clause in the contract.
Mr. Matusow testified that it was the policy of the Communist Party to at-
tempt to get Party members into the IPR and similar organizations through the
operation of the preferential hiring clause. It should be noted that he did not
cite any concrete examples.
From the l)eginnin.n- the union contract contained a prefei-ential hiring clause,
another standard clause common in union contracts, requring the American
IPK to hire through the union provided the union could supply a "qualified"
candidate for the job in question. Under the contract the American IPR could
and did reject candidates reconunended by the union if in its judgment they were
not "qualified." (Any difference of opinion between the American IPR and the
union as to whether or not a candidate was qualified would have been subject to
arl)itration under the terms of the contract ; to the best of my knowledge no
such case ever arose.) In addition, as mentioned above, various categories
of employees were excluded from the operation of the contract. The American
IPR was thus protected against having to hire only persons recommended by
the union, which could rarely, if ever, furnish qualified candidates for senior,
specialized or research jobs.
In practice, clerical employees were usually, though not always, hired through
the union, but senior research, editox'ial and administrative employees seldom
if ever came through the union. As regards the clerical employees who were
hired through the union — who, of course, had no concern with IPR policy — it
should not be assumed tliat any of them were Communists because of the fact
that tliey were rank-and-file members of this union.
It should be added that the Pacific Council (i. e., the International Secretariat
of the IPR) never had a contract with any union.
[seal] Miriam S. Farley.
New York, N. Y.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.
Elsie Jenriche.
Notary Public, State of New York.
Mr. Morris. I also have another statement sworn to by Miriam S.
Farley, this one dated also June 10, 1952, supplementing previously
sworn statement.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
•(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1389 A," and
is as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1389A
State of New York,
Votinty of New York, ss:
Supplementary Statement by Miriam S. Farley
Miriam S. Farley, being duly sworn, deposes and says :
With reference to the mention of my name during testimony by Maj. Gen.
Charles A. Willonghby before tlie Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal
Security (Hearings, pt. 2, pp. 387, 395, 396), the following information is sub-
mitted for the i-ecord :
General Willoughby referred to me and two other people as persons who were
"hired in the States and unloaded on Tokyo" ; i. e., on General MacArthur's
headquarters (GHQ, SCAP). He also, in answer to questioning, made a point
of the fact that Army regulations prevented him from testifying regarding the
contents of personnel files on present or former Government employees.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5415
I am not acquainted with General Willonjiliby and never was employed by him.
All of the three persons whom he mentioned, including myself, were employed by
Government Section. GHQ, SCAP, headed by Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney.
I was employed by the War Depai'tment as>f-i civilian employee in Tokyo from
February 1940 to February 1947. From February to August 1946 I served in
Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, as an editorial analyst, and from August 1946
to February 1947 in the Civil Information and Education Section (C. I. & E.) as
an information officer. Both jobs were purely opei'ational ; neither was at the
policy-making level. I was recruited through War Department channels, and
understood that I had undergone a security check and received clearance before
I was put on the Government payroll.
At no time, to my knowledge, was the quality of my work for SCAP criticized.
On the contrary, it was frequently commended by my superior officers in both
Government Section and C. I. & E. I had originally agreed to remain in Japan
for a period of 9 months. At the end of that time I was requested to remain
kmger, and did remain for an additional 3 months, during which I was rei^eatedly
and strongly urged to continue in my job. I do not mean to suggest that I was
indispensable, but it seems improbable that I should have lieen urged to remain
in GHQ if my work had been considered unsatisfactory or if any doubts had been
entertained as to my loyalty to the United States.
Confirmation of the above statements may be obtained from the following
persons under whom I worked in Tokyo : In Government Section, Lt. O. I. Hauge,
U. S. N., and Col. Charles L.. Kades ; in C. I. & E., Lt. Col. J. W. Gaddis and
Mr. Don Bi'own.
As regards my letter to Hugh Deane. which is quoted in the record, this hardly
requires explanation. In it I merely congratulated an acquaintance on a new job
and offered assistance to the Government in time of war. My acquaintance with
Mr. Deane is slight. At the time the letter wa;':; written (1942) I knew him chiefly
as a former China correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor and, as the
letter indicates, as an employee of the Coordinator of Information. I had no
reason to believe that he was a Communist.
[seal] Miriam S. Farley.
New York, N. Y.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of June, 1952.
Elsie Jenriche,
Notary Public, State of Neio York.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, next is report No, 22 by John S. Service,
dated September 4, 1944.
Senator Watkixs. It may l^e received.
(The report referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1390," and is
as follows : )
[Report No. 22]
United States Army Observer Section
APO 879, Septemhcr 4, 19U
Subject : The Growth of the New Fourth Army : An Example of the Popular
Democratic Appeal of the Chinese Communists.
To : Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF-CBI, APO 879.
1. The growth of the Chinese Communists armies during the present war
has proved them to be an extremely powerful political instrument because this
spectacular development would not have been possible without the support of
the people of the areas in which they have operated. This widespread popular
support must, under the circumstances in which it has occurred, be considered
a practical indication that the iwlicies and methods of the Chinese Communists
have a democratic character.
2. This may seem to be jumping to an ipso facto conclusion.
(a) It might be assumed, for instance, that a patriotic desire to fight the
foreign invader was responsilile for this popular support. This is partially true.
But to the Chinese peasant (who is the only important class involved, both
because of his overwhelming numerical superiority in China and becai;se the
Communists have had to operate entirely away from the cities) the idea of
active personal resistance was entirely new. In the past the peasant has re-
garded all governments merely as something to be endured : there was little,
as far as he was concerned, to choose from between them ; and even if one was
5416 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
•
slightly better or worse than another, it was no- concern of his and there was
nothing he could do about it.
i^o the peasant needed a great deal of education and indoctrination — and some
tangilile evidence that it would benefit his own interest — before he was willing
to take up arms. The fact that the Communists were able to accomplish this
while the Kuomintang was not, indicates a closeness to and an ability to appeal
to the common people in terms which they understand. This is something akin,
at least, to democracy.
(b) Furthermore, the people, if they were willing to fight, almost always —
certainly in the early years of the war had two choices : They could fight with
either Kuomintang or the Communists. It would have been more natural fo-r
them to have turned to the Kuomintang because it was the Government. In-
stead they turned to the Connnunists. who have come more and more to be re-
garded and treated by the Government as rebels. It would seem therefore that
the peasants received better understanding and treatment from the Communists.
This, again, is a prima facie indication of democracy. At least it can be said,
on this basis, that the people must regard the Communists as more democratic
than the Kuomintang.
(c) It might be argued that the Comnnniists have the advantage of a "cause,"
that they use such direct appeals as distributing the land of the landlords to
the peasants, that they spread a ralible-rousing communism, or that they have
found an equivalent of the fervor which gave such impetus to the Taipings or
the Boxers. But, in fact, this argument is never heard. Even the Kuomintang
does not bother to advance it. If they did, it would be refuted by the evidence
of every foreign observer who has traveled through the Communist guerrilla
areas. The Communists are not even actively preaching communism — though
it cannot be denied that they are, sometimes by not too subtle means, trying to
create support for the Communist Party.
(d) It can also be claimed this popular support is chiefly due to the Com-
munist skill in propaganda. The Communists are masters of this art, and it
does have a part, but only a relatively small one. The war has lasted more
than 7 years, longer than mere propaganda without positive results could hope
to hold the stolid and practical Chinese peasant. Furthermore, the guerrilla
warfare into which the Communists have drawn their supporters is the type
which is hardest of all military forms on the i>easant because the whole area
is continually a battleground.
(e) Another argument, little heard because it is so obviou.sly untenable, is
that the Communists have forced the people to support them and join their
armies. But the Communist armies were small when the war began ; they did
not have the military power necessary to have forced the people. Their armies,
relatively speaking are still small. They are, for instance, much smaller than
the Kuomintang uses to garrison areas of equivalent size far in the rear away
from any enemy. It is obvious therefore that the Communist army does not
need large forces to maintain its own rear — as it would if it carried out Kuo-
mintang policies of conscription and taxation and was plagued by the same
resultant problems of banditry and internal unrest. It is also true that these
relatively small regular forces could not successfully fight off the Japanese and
hold these areas unless they had the active assistance and participation of the
people in large irregular auxiliary forces, which can only, )iy their nature, be
voluntary. The Communists claim over 2,000.000 local volunteers, the Peoples
]\Iilitia, who are an active force in resisting and harassing the enemy. This
figure may be exaggerated — though the evidence we have so far been able to
gather indicates that Communist statistics of this nature are not inflated. But
an organization of this type cannot be created and made effective by the threat
of military force. And the Kuomintang does not even claim to have such an
organization.
3. The conclusion therefore seems justified that the peasants support, join, and
fight with the Communist armies because they have been convinced that, the
Communists are fighting for their interests, and because the Communists have
created this conviction by producing some tangible benefits for the peasants.
These benefits must be improvement of the social, political or economic condi-
tion of the peasants. Whatever the exact nature of this improvement, it must
be — in the broader sense of the term as the serving of the interests of the
majority of the people — toward democracy.
3. I believe that this success of the Communist forces in winning the support of
the people is particularly well shown in the history of the new Fourth Army
(hereinafter referred to as N4A). This force has not received the publicity
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5417
given to the development of the Eighth Route Army, which was visited by a
number of foreign journalists and other observers early in the war. In many
ways, however, its growth has been even more remarkable.
4. The N4A was not organized until 1938. It was formed out of remnants
of the old Red Army who had l)een scattered among numerous isolated areas in
South and Central China since the withdrawal of the main Communist forces
from Kiangai at the end of 1934. (See my Report No. 19, August 31, 1944, par.
2). This was therefore an entirely new force with no background of unified
organization : it could hardly compare with the Eighth Route Army, which at
the outl)reak of the war was already a well-organized army in being.
When organized the X4A had a strength of only 12,000 officers and men : This
is small compared with the 80,000 of the Eighty Route Army in 1937. Weapons
and equipment were insufficient and mostly old ; many of them were dug up
from the ground where they had remain buried during the years of Kuomin-
tang suppression. The new arms promised them by the Central Government
were never forthcoming ; all they ever received was a small amount of ammu-
nition. Likewise the recruits that had been promised by the Central Govern-
ment to fill their ranks were never turned over to them.
This new army was immediately thrown into action and was assigned the
lower Yangtze Valley, where it was to attack already important and heavily
garrisoned Japanese areas. In these areas, or close to them, there were also
Kuouiintang troops. The N4A army thus had much less favorable opportunities
for expansion than the Eighth Route Army, which had first occupied large al-
most empty areas behind the Japanese lines, from which the Central Govern-
ment forces had withdrawn and which the Japanese had left very lightly
guarded as they moved south.
Having this greater freedom, the Eighth Route Army was able, as early as
1938, to establish stable bases to support its operations. When the Kuomintang,
in the years 1939—42, made an attempt to recover this territory, the physical
difficulties of distance and interposing .Japanese lines made it impossible for the
Kuomintang to bring great strength against them. But the N4A, operating
partly in Kuomintang territory much more easily accessible to the Central
Government, was subjected to much stronger Kuomintang pressure and was
forced to change its bases of operations several times. The result has been
that most of the present N4A bases date from only 1940 or 1941. This is a
serious handicap to the Communist method of growth by the mobilization of
local support through a comprehensive political and economic program.
The N4A not only had to move: it also suffered heavy losses in conflicts with
the Central Government troops. There have been sporadic small engagements
and several of considerable size. In the largest of these, the "incident" of
January 1941, the N4A suffered about 7.000 casualties. Furthermore, since that
time the N4A has been "illegal"' by official mandate of the Central Government.
Recruits joining it, therefore, know that they will be regarded by the Kuomin-
tang as rebels and that this official vengeance will extend to their families. The
Eighth Route Army has also suffered under this opprobrium, but to a much less
extent.
What was the actual development of the N4A under these apparently unfavor-
able conditions?
At the end of its first year (spring 1939) the original strength of 12.(X)0 vad
grown to 35,000. Operations extended from Shanghai to Hangchow, from Nan-
king to Hsuchow, and from Hsuchow west along the Lunghai Railway to the
vicinity of Kaifeng. Equipment had been brought in by recruits and captured
from the Japanese.
By the spring of 1942 strength had risen to 100,000 regulars. Operations in
the ai-ea between the Yangtze and the lAinghai Railway had been extended to
the Kisngsu coast ; it had also moved forces into the Japanese-occupied areas
around Hankow.
By the spring of 1944 the regular strength of the N4A had increased to 152.000
men, armed with 93.000 rifles, and supported by an organized Peoples Militia of
550.000. Operations had been extended into East Chekiang and into South and
West Hupeh. Stable base areas had been created with a total population, pay-
ing taxes only to Communist-controlled governments, of about 30 000.000. All
of these bases had withstood large-scale Japanese attacks and some areas had
not been penetrated by the Japanese for over 2 years.
In this development the N4A has increased its size by more than 12 times. In
a slightly longer period the Eighth Route Army has increased sixfold.
5. These results have been achieved by a force which started from almost
nothing. It has grown as it went along, out of the people. It has been an
88348— 52— pt. li 33
5418 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
orphan, without any powerful, well-established government with large resources
behind it. It has had to supply itself entirely.
During much of its history it has shared areas with or been in close proximity
to Kuomintang troops. Despite the advantages of supply, reenforcements and
government support, those Kuomintang forces did not have any such increase.
To the contrary, they grew steadily weaker and most of them have by now dis-
integrated, turned puppet, or withdrawn. They have never carried out an
offensive against the Japanese; and they have shown repeatedly that they cannot
successfully withstand Japanese attack.
6. General Chen Yi, acting commander of the N4A (General Yeh Ting is stiU
regarded as commander although he has been a prisoner of the Kuomintang since
1941) insists that the success and growth of the N4A is wholly due to its policy
toward the people. The most important of these were the following :
(a) First it was necessary to win the people's confidence, in a military sense.
Fortunately the original cadres were old and experienced guerrilla tighters. In
their first engagements, the Japanese were not used to their tactics and were
unprepared and overconfident because of their easy defeats of other Chinese
troops. During the first year they had uniform success: after that they had
newly trained and capable forces. The Communists always follow the policy of
using their best troops in important engagements, holding tieir newer trooi)s
as reserve or to throw in after the enemy is reti'eating to give them experience.
(b) The first step after coming into an area is intensive propaganda to explain
the war and secure popular support.
(c) This followed by the creation of mass organizations of the people. These
include farmers, youth, women, militia, and so on. All of these are for the
purpose of carrying out some function in resisting the enemy. But they are
also encouraged to Interest themselves in their own problems. For instance, the
farmers are told that in the well-established guerrilla bases rents and interest
have been reduced.
(d) Through and from these mass organizations, democratically elected gov-
ernments are set up. At first these are on the village level. As the area be-
comes stabilized the system is extended until the hsien governments, and finally
the base governments are elected by the people. Nominations and elections are
carried out in general village meetings.
(e) As soon as some sort of government control is established, rents and
interest are reduced. This is done moderately. The minimum standard is
371/2 percent for rent. But in the first stage rents are not usually reduced by
more than one-quarter. This is to avoid driving the landlords away and into
Japanese camp. In many areas into which the N4A has gone, the power of the
landlords has been very great and they have been able to hang on to their control
and even in some areas to dominate the local governments. In such areas the
Communists move slowly by strengthening the organization of the people until
they gain control by democratic methods.
(f) Taxes are reduced because of the moderate requirements of the N4A
and the elimination of corruption through popular election of oflieials.
(g) Taxation is made moderately progressive. At present the poorest ap-
proximately 20 percent of the farmers pay no tax. The highest rate on the
rich landlords usually does not exceed 35 percent.
(h) Banditry is vigorously attacked and the welfare of the i)eople is im-
proved by the maintenance of peace and order. In additicm to direct attack,
the other policie sof the Communists are effective in removing this old burden of
banditry.
(i) As important as any of these is the practical demonstration of the unity
of the army and the people. The army takes as one of its major tasks the
protection of the people (to the degree that this often determines its military
operations). It takes positive measures to prevent enemy interference with
the sowing and harvest. It actually assists when possible in farm work. When
and where able its troops produce a part of their own needs. It avoids any
sort of arbitrary demands on the people, pays for what it takes, and replaces
breakage or damage. It helps the people cope with disasters such as breaks in
dikes. In times of poor crops it reduces its own rations to the level of sub-
sistence of the people. It continually harps on tlie idea that the army and "
people are "one family."
(j) There is never any forced conscription. Except for the encouragement of
the formation, on a volunteer basis, of such organizations as the militia, it
avoids in the early stages of its control of an area, any attempt at recruiting.
ENSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5419
<k) Within the army, it takes special measures to care for families of soldiers ;
emphasis is given to care of wounded ; such practices as beating of soldiers are
prohibited ; and there is a democratic relationship — outside of purely military
matters — between officers and men.
(1) Various other phases of the program include women's rights, intensive
advancement of popular education, promotion of all types of cooperative so-
cieties, and so on.
7. General Chen, with whom I have had several long talks on these general
subjects, can be excused if he paints an exaggeratedly pretty picture.
The fact remains that the Communists have been successful in winning the
support of the people in the areas in which they operate, while the Kuomintang
has not. General Chen laughingly says that the Communists should thank the
Kuomintang for coming into the same areas, because tJiey have provided the
people with a basis for comparison.
W« cannot yet say with certainty that the Communists claims of democratic
policies are true. But that they are at least partially true is the only reasonable
explanation of the popular appeal which the Communist armies have shown.
8. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American
Ambas.sador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF-CBI for the information of
Mr. Davies.
John S. Service.
Mr. Morris. Also, Mr. Chairman, I have report No. 34 by John
S. Service, this one dated September 28, 1944, which I would like to
introduce at this time.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The report referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1391," and is as
follows:)
[Report No. 34]
United States Akmy Observer Section,
AFO 879, September 28, 1944.
Subject :
The orientation of the Chinese Communists toward the Soviet Union and the
United States.
To : Commanding general, Fwd, Ech. USAF-CBI, AFO 879.
1. There is attached a memorandum on present policies of the Chinese Com-
munists as they affect and are indications of present Chinese Communist orienta-
tion toward the Soviet Union and the United States.
2. This memorandum may be summarized as follows :
Summary : Politically, any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once
have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past. The Commun-
ists have worked to make their thinking and program realistically Chinese, and
(hey are carrying out democratic policies which they expect the United States
to approve and sympathetically support.
Economically, the Chinese Communists seek the rapid development and indus-
trialization of China for the primary objective of raising the economic level of
the people. They recognize that under present conditions in China this must
be accomplished through capitalism with large-scale foreign assistance. They
believe that the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, will be the only
country able to give this economic assistance and realize that for reasons of
efficiency, as well as to attract American investment, it will be wise to give this
American participation great freedom. (End of summary.)
3. The conclusion, which is the continual statement of the Communist leaders
themselves, is that American friendship and support is more important to China
than Russia. The Communists also believe, of course, in the necessity of close
and friendly relations of China with the Soviet Union, but they insist that this
should involve no conflict in interests between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
4. This apparent strong orientation of the Chinese Communists toward the
United States may be somewhat contrary to general expectation — which may
be too ready to emphasize the Communist name of the party. Apart from what
may be called the practical considerations that the United States will be the
strongest power in the Pacific area and America the country best able to give
economic assistance to China, it is also based on the strong Communist con-
viction that China cannot remain divided. I believe that the Chinese Commu-
5420 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
nists are at present sincere in seeliing Ctiinese unity on the basis of American
support. This does not preclude their turning bacli toward Soviet Russia if they
are forced to in order to survive American-supported Kuomintang attack.
5. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American
Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF-CBI, for the information
of Mr. Davies.
John S. Service.
Policies of the Chinese Communists Affecting Their Attitudes Toward the
Soviet Union and the United States
A. political
1. The attempt to make Chinese Communist thinking more Chinese. — There is
apparent in the major statements of tlieory by Communist leaders during the
past several years an effort to get away from slavish attempts to apply Russian
communism to China. The emphasis is laid on realistic study of China itself.
The strongest intellectual movement within the Communist Party has been
against the "three gx'eat faults" of subjectivism, sectarianism, and pedantic for-
malism. The most important of these, judging from the attention given to it, is
subjectivism, which is interpreted to include the dogmatic application of foreign
theories unsuited to existing conditions in China. The attitude set forth as cor-
rect is "objectivism"- — the application of theory on the basis of exhaustive study
of actual facts and true conditions. The general effect of this movement has
been to take the communism out of Chinese Communist thinking, at least in re-
gard to the immediate future of China.
Examples of such Communist statements are numerous. Perhaps one of the
best is a lecture entitled, "How To Change the Way We Study," given by Mao
Tse-tung to high party workers at Yenan in May 19-41. This lecture is now in-
cluded in a volume of selected papei'S which is required textbook for all Com-
munist Party cadres. The following is a partial quotation : ^
"No one has begun in a really serious manner the study of the political, eco-
nomic, military, and cultural history of China during the past century, the period
of real significance. '■■ * * Many of our comi-ades regard this ignorance or
partial knowledge of our own history not as a shame, but on the contrary as
something to be proud of. * * * Since they know nothing about their own
country, they turn to foreign lands. * * & During recent decades many for-
eign returned students have made this mistake. They have merely been phono-
graphs, forgetting that their duty is to make something useful to China out of
the imported stuff they have learned. The Communist Party has not escaped
this infection.
"We study the teachings of Marx and his followers. P.ut the way that many
of ns learn those teachings is in direct opposition to their spirit. * * * Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin teach us to study seriously the existing conditions,
starting from the actual objective circumstances, not from our sulijeetive wishes.
But many of our comrades are acting directly contrary to this guiding principle.
"* * * Many comrades learn the truths of Marx-Leninism merely for the
sake of IMarj-Leninism. * * * Although they can quote at length from
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, yet they cannot apply their learnings to the
conci*ete study of Chinese history and the present conditions in China : They
cannot analyze and solve problems that arise from the Chinese revolution.
"These people, who are unscientific in attitude, who only know how to recite
dogmas, who have degrees but no real knowledge * * * are a practical
joke on real Marx-Lenini.sm."
2. The application of Marxism to China. — I attempted to in my report No.
5 of August 3, ]944, to descrilie the Chinese Ciunmunist application of IMarxist
ideology to China. The gist was that the Chinese Connnmiist Party in its
present program has abandoned everything except the doctrine of historical
materialism and the belief in the eventual socialistic society.
That exposition was based on very incomplete study and fragmentary state-
ments by various Communist lenders. It was confirmed, however, in a striking
way by Po Ku (generally referred to by the Knomintaiig liy his original name,
Ch'ing Pao-hsien) in a conversation on Septemlier 3, 19-14. Po Ku's comments
1 This translation has been madp by Communist sources in Yenan. I have, however,
cheeked it roughly by reading the Chinese original.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5421
are of interest, not only because of bis position as a member of tlie Political
Bureau and former chairman of the Communist Party's Central Committee,
but also because he is a Russian-returned and usually described in Kuomintang
"analyses" of the Communists as the leader of a "pro-Russian clique." My
notes or Po Ku's remarks are as follows :
"We regard Marxism not as a dogma but as a guide. We accept its historical
materialism and its ideological method. It furnishes us with the conclusions
and the objectives toward which we strive. This objective is the classless society
built on socialism — in other words, the good of the individual and the interests
of all the people.
"But to try to transplant to China all of Marx's description of the society
in which he found himself (the industrial revolution of Europe in the nine-
teenth century) and the steps (class struggle and violent revolution) which he
saw would be necessary for the people to escape from those conditions, wovild
not only be ridiculous, it would also be a violation of our liasic principles of
realistic objectivism and the avoidance of doctrinaire dogmatism.
"China at present is not even capitalistic. Its economy is still that of semi-
feudalism. We cannot advance at one jump to socialism. In fact, because we
are at least 200 years behind most of the rest of the world, we probably cannot
hope to reach socialism until after most of the rest of the world has reached
that state.
"First we must rid ourselves of this semifeudalism. Then we must raise our
economic level by a long stage of democracy and free enterprise.
"What we Communists hope to do is to keep China moving smoothly and stead-
ily toward this goal. By orderly, gradual, and progressive development we
will avoid the conditions which forced Marx to draw his conclusions of the neces-
sity (in his society) for class struggle; we will prevent the need for a violent
revolution by a peaceful planned revolution.
"It is impossible to predict how long this process will take. But we can be
sure that it will be more than 30 or 40 years, and probably more than 100 years."
3. The Communist political program is democracy. — Advancing from the field
of theory to that of practice, the Communist political program is simple democ-
racy. This is much more American than Soviet in form and spirit.
Communists now are apt to argue that they were not really communistic even
in the days of their power in Kiangsi. I am not competent to discuss this.
.But even though they may have distributed the land to the peasants as private
property and have left the landlord enough for his own needs, still the fact re-
mains that their governments were organized as Soviets during that period.
Starting in August 19.35 the Communists based their policy on a democratic
united front. Since that time — now over 9 years — they have adopted the San
Min Chu I (as set forth by Sun Yat-sen in the manifesto of the first Kuomintang
congress ) have abandoned the Soviet form of government, have sought the coop-
eration of all groups based on the democratic rights of the whole people.
This Communist program is well known and there is hence no need for de-
tailed description here. Basic documents are the above-mentioned manifesto
of the first Kuomintang congress and Mao Tse-tung's book. New Democracy (a
translation of which was submitted to the headquarters and Embassy under
cover of one of my reports dated early in 1944).
First we must rid ourselves of this semifeudalism. Then we must raise our
economic level by a long stage of democracy and free enterprise.
"What we communists hope to do is to keep the country moving smoothly
toward this goal. By orderly, gradual, and progressive development we will
avoid the conditions which forced Marx to draw his conclusions of the necessity
(in his society) for class struggle; we will prevent a revolution in the violent
sense of the term.
"It is impossible to predict how long this process will take. But we can be
sure that it will be more than 30 or 40 years, probably more nearly 100."
3. The Communist political program is democracy. — Changing from theory to
practice, the Communist political program is simple democracy. This is much
more American than Russian in form and spirit.
Comnuinists now are prone to deny that they were communistic even in the
early days of their rule in Kiangsi. I am not competent to discuss this. But the
fact was their governments were organized as Soviets during that period.
Starting in August 1985 the Communists reversed their basic policy on the basis
of the united front line. Since that time — for over 9 years — they have adopted
the San Min Chu I as set forth by Sun Yat-sen in the manifesto of the first
Kuomintang congress, and Mao Tse-tung's book. New Democracy (a tran.slation
of which was submitted to the headquarters and the Embassy early in 1944).
5i22 INSTITXJTEi OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Generally speaking, the Communists are faithfully carrying out this democratic
progran). There is no question but that in the areas under their influence they
have given democratic rights to the people, and that the party is supported by
the majority of the population.
Will stick to first manifesto, even if KMT fails.
The question of whether the Communists are willing to share their power with
other parties in a democratic way is a question more difficult to answer. They
are working in backward rural districts with a population without previous
political experience. This has required them to assume a role in organization
and leadership which gives them power and influence greater than normal for a
political party as the Americans think it. Furthermore the only other real
political party, the Kuomintang, has generally refused cooperation. Through
their institution of such policies as the three-three system (not more than one-
third of elective officials to be Communist), through their close cooperation with
such liberal groups as the intellectuals, and through their inclusions of such
groups as the landlords and merchant classes in their govei'nmeuts and efforts
to give them reasonable treatment, the Communists seem to have demonstrated,
this broad-minded, democratic spirit.
Of course, it can be argued that the Communists are advancing their own inter-
ests and moving toward a goal of control of the country by the use of these
methods. This is true. But it must be acknowledged that the Communists have
not tried to eliminate such groups as the landlords and native capitalists, and
that they realize that their own advancement and the interest of the country are
best served by the cooperation of all groups based on reasonable protection of
the interests of all those groups.
4. There is little aping of Soviet Russia and little evidence of strong ties to
Russia. — Not only in theory and policy, also in the atmosphere and daily scene in
Yenan there is little direct evidence of Soviet influence. Except in speeches
within the party there is little reference to Communism or to Marx and the other
patriarchs of communism. In party institutions there are pictures of Marx and
occasionally of Engles and Lenin : but these are rare. Stalin's picture is common
but usually placed alongside those of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang
Kai-shek, Roosevelt, and Churchill.
The Communist newspaper gives considerable prominence to Russian war
news but not more than it does news of American victories and much less
than it does to the operations of the Communist armies.
Soviet influence is obvious in the organization of the Communist Party: but
the same can be said of the Kuomintang,
Soviet examples also seem appai*ent in the measures used to promote the
production campaign such as the selection and honoring of labor heroes, the
assigning of planned quotas, and the stress on competition. But these measures
seem to be effective and are hardly in themselves characteristically Soviet.
Since we have been in Yenan one foreign play has been produced (in trans-
lation ) . This was Russian. But its choice was particularly appropriate because
it was a war play, involving guerrillas and old Communist leaders whose main
claim to position was that they had fought through the civil war and now had
to be removed because they were out of date (Budenny?).
The Soviet symbols of the hammer and sickle are almost never seen. In
fact the casual observer sees little to remind him of Russia or to make him
think that the Chinese Communists are particularly attached to Soviet Russia
or, as suggested by the extreme faction of the Kuomintang, in any way a front
for the Russian Communists.
It cannot be said, on the other hand, that the Chinese Communists are trying
to ape American models (except in the surprising ways of social dancing and
a mild interest in bridge and poker). In fact they are imitating nobody.
Their emphasis is on being Chinese. And in this they seek to come down to
the level of the common people. There is no hocus-pocus such as the Kuomin-
tang insists on of weekly Sun Yat-sen Memorial Meetings, no formal posting
of Sun Yat-sen's (or anyone else's) picture to be bowed to before every meet-
ing, no ceremonial of repeating Snn Yat-sen's will, no standing every time some-
one's name is mentioned. The Russian-inspired romanization of the Chinese
language has been dropped. Except for limited audiences of the party cadres,
the western drama has been abandoned for a popularization and development
of the native northern Chinese folk plays and dances. Music has been made
native. In every sphere the Communists have made the most strenuous efforts
to go native and to approach the mass of the people in terms that they will
understand.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5423
B. ECONOMIC
Following views chiefly Po Ku, supplemented by talks with Mao and Liu
Shao-ch'i :
1. The Communists agree that China must industrialize. — The Communists are
just as convinced as the Kuomintang (and everyone else) that China must
industrialize.
Where the Communists dil¥er from the Kuomintang is in their motivation and
emphasis. One gains the impression from China's Destiny and much of the
present thinking in Chungking that the primary objective of China's industriali-
zation is defense — in other words, national power. The Communists place this
second. First in their minds (at least in their talk) is welfare. Unless the living
standards of the people are raised, there can be no real foundation for either
economic or political progress. The first great expansion, the Communists claim,
should therefore, be in light, consumer industry and communications, More
gradually and slowly there can be built up a heavy industry (or as China's
Destiny calls it, a national defense) base.
The Communists also place greater emphasis on the idea that China will prob-
ably be predominantly an agricultural country, that China's agricultural re-
sources and problems must therefore not be neglected, that China does not have
the material resources to be a first-rank heavy-industry country.
2. China can industrialize at present only on a capitalistic basis. — China's
basic condition at present is still semifeudalism. To get rid of this is the first
important step. From this it is impossible to step at once to socialism because
there is neither the political nor economic foundation. The Chinese people are
not yet ready for socialism and will not be for a long time to come. To talk of
socialism now is impractical. The next stage in China's advance must be capi-
talism. In this capitalism must be given the freest possible opportunity to de-
velop the country economically. China's weakness now is the under-development
of capitalism.
3. Foreign assistance will be necessary to bring about this industrialization. —
China not only lacks enough native capital to finance large-scale industrializa-
tion, it also lacks an adequate industry to serve as a starting point for this
industrialization, it lacks experience and technical personnel. The end of the
war will see these conditions accentuated. China will be suffering from ruinous
inflation, from the disorganization and destruction brought by the war. It is
probable that the Japanese will complete the destruction of the rudimentary
Chinese industry before they withdraw or are defeated.
Tliese conditions make it impossible for China to follow Russia's example of
building herself. Backward as Russia was after the Revolution, she had far
more of a modern industrial base than China will have. Low as were the living
standards of the Russian people, they were not as low as the irreducible mini-
mum of the great majority of the Chinese people, and it was therefore possible
for the Soviets to depress those living standards even further to raise the capital
for their industrialization. But even Russia accomplished what she did only
with terrific sacrifices. She did not do it on her own I'esourees because she
wanted to ; but because she had to. China, even if she were able to accomplish
such a Herculean feat, will be under no such compulsion to do so. The attempt
would be foolish.
4. Soviet Russia will be unable to give this needed large-scale economic
assistance to China. After the war, Russia will have a great part of her coun-
try to rebuild. Her own reconstruction and the continuation of her own in-
ternal development which was interrupted by the war will continue for a long
time. Published reports indicate that the reopening of the mines in the Donbas
Basin may take as long as 2 or 3 years of work. The report of Mr. Johnson,
the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, of his talks in Moscow
indicate that Russia herself will seek large-scale assistance from the United
States after the war in imports of materials and machinery. These will have
to be financed by loans.
It is therefore obvious that Russia will have neither surplus capital nor
technical personnel available to assist us in the industrialization of China.
.5. The United States is the only country which will be able to help China.
Even if Russia were able (which she will not be) to assist China, the United
States will be the logical country to play the greatest share. American resources
will be tremendous. They have been geared to huge exports during thp war.
America will have industrial plants which will not be needed and can be ex-
ported whole. She will have capital to invest and the necessary technical per-
5424 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
sonnel. In addition, her sea commuuications with China are better than those
from European Russia. America faces on the Pacific. Siberia is still under
development.
American ties with China are strong". America has all t)f China's good will.
For reasons of China's internal unity it will be better for America to play the
major role in this economic development.
The other European countries will be engaged in reconstruction of their own
countries. They will not have capital to invest. The same will be true to some
extent of Great Britain, whose large-scale participation in China will, in any
case, be less welcome than American.
6. Great freedom must be given to foreign capital in this economic develop-
ment of China. — Since our goal is the most rapid possible development of Chinese
resources, communications, and industry, we must make investment attractive
to foreign capital. We cannot reasonably expect China to reap all the profit.
The logic of our moderate treatment of landlords and merchants and limited
reduction of rent and interest in order to obtain the support of these groups
in a united front which can strengthen our bases economically will hold good.
If we carried out drastic reduction of rents or confiscation of land and restric-
tion of private business, we would cut off our own noses and weaken our bases
by driving out these necessary capitalistic groups.
We must therefore give foreign capital very wide freedom of opportunity.
Experience has shown us that Government enterprises in our own areas can-
not yet be operated efficiently. Our Army factories are not as efficient as
privately run factories.
We believe that Chungking's efforts to create a bureaucratic industry (for in-
stance, the enterprises of the National Ttesources Commission and the monopo-
lies of H. H. Kung) are pi'oving the same thing. They may enrich Kung and a
few others. But they are rotten with favoritism, graft, and inefficiency. They
are not the best means to bring about this economic development."
Mr. Morris. Mr. Cliairman, I have here a document entitled "IPK.
Notes on Chinese Clippinjrs." It is No. 15, dated July 28, 1943. It
bears the initials TAB, CP, and P. Jaffe. It also has a notation "Re-
turn to W. H. H. File."
Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record?
Senator Watkins. You say this is a photostat of a document you
found in the files ?
Mr. Mandel. It is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations.
Senator Watkins. It may be received and made part of the record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1392" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1392
IPR Notes on Chinese Clippings, Number Fifteen, July 28, 1943
(By Yung Ying Hsu)
CHINESE communist STATEMENT ON COMINTERN DISSOLUTION
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement on
May 26 approving the dissolution of the Communist International. The full text
of the statement was published in the Hsin Hua Jlh Pae (May 28, 1943) with
a total of sixty-three characters deleted by the censor. This censored version
reads as follows :
1. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party fully endorses the
proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist Inter-
national to dissolve the Communist International. The Chinese Communist
Party considers Itself free, beginning this very day, from all the obligations pro-
vided in the Constitution, and in resolutions adopted by its congresses of the
Communist International.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5425
2. The Comniunist International has accomplished its historical mission. It
has not only safeguarded revolutionary Marxism in Europe, America and Japan
from distortions by the opportunists, aided the advanced workers [in these
lands] to consolidate themselves into genuine workers' parties, supported the
Socialist Soviet Union, and repeatedly opposed, Fascism and Fascist wars, but
has also olTered its best aid to the advanced workers of the oppressed nations
of the East in organizing into their own parties and becoming the people's van-
guard standing in tJie foremost ranks of all movements for lilieration. What is
especially unforgettable for the Chinese people was the strong elfort exerted by
the Communist International in helping to bring about the united front of the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1924, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was still
alive. Following that it helped the Northern Expedition to achieve its victory.
During 1927 to 1937, the most trying period for the Chinese revolution, the Com-
munist International again supported tlie people of China. Finally, during the
six years of anti-Japanese war since 1937, it rallied its affiliated section and the
toiling people of the nations in assisting the Chinese people against the Japanese
imperialists' war of aggression. In a word, throughout its entire existence, the
Communist International put forth its best effort to aid the suffering Chinese
people.
As rightly stated in the proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International, conditions within nations and on an interna-
tional scale have become so complex today that the existing organizational form
has become unadaptable to the continuously growing labor movement in the
different countries. In the present allied anti-Fascist war of liberation there
is a much greater necessity for the national Communist Parties to solve their
respective problems independently on the basis of the specific circumstances and
historical conditions of their own people, thus broadening and hastening the
national upsurge and mass mobilization in order to achieve a thorougii-going
and complete victory. [Meanwhile] the National Communist Parties and their
leading cadres have grown up and reached their political maturity. In view
of these facts the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comniunist
International proposed to the national Communist Parties the dissolution of
the Communist International. [It was held that] under present conditions the
dissolution of the Communist International has become more advantageous
than its- continuance.
Since the present war situation does not permit the convening of an inter-
national congress, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International lays this proposal before the national Communist Parties. In
view of the Central Conunittee of the Chinese Connnunist Party fully
agrees with the reasons given in the proposal and endorses the dissolution of
the Communist International. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party further points out that after dissolution of the First International by
Karl Marx the labor movement in the different countries recorded a greater
development. Dissolution of the Third International now will undoubtedly
hasten the victory of the Anti-Fascist Global War as well as the liberation of
all mankind.
3. The founding of the Chinese Communist Party was a sequence of a develop-
ing labor movement in China as well as of the unfolding of modern Chinese
history since the "May Fourth" movement in 1919. It also meant that where
there is a proletarian and labor movement, there will emerge a party of the
proletariat. Even if there were no Communist International, the Chinese Com-
munist Party would einerge according to the law of historical necessity.
After its founding in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out
the anti-imperialist and antifeudal road to the Chinese people for the first time
in the modern history of China. Moreover, the entire membership of the Party
set a practical example of undeviating loyalty, in defiance of torture and death,
to struggle for the liberation of its nation along all lines. The Chinese Com-
munist Party has received a great deal of lielp from the Comniunist Interna-
tional ; but for a long time the Chinese Communists have been able to determine
their own political path, policy and action with complete independence on the
basis of the concrete circumstances and specific conditions in their own nation.
Since the decision of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist Interna-
tional, held in August 1935, not to interfere in organizational matters of the
national Communist Parties, the Executive Committee of the Communist Inter-
national and its Presidium have lived up to this decision and have not interfered
with the organizational matters of the Chinese Communist Party. (29 characters
deleted here). Since the W?.r of Resistance, the Chinese Communist Party has
5426 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
been carrying on a hai'd struggle unprecedented in history. These are the in-
dependent achievements of the Chinese Communist Party with its bare hands,
unaided by any outside power. This may be said to be historically unparallelled
in China's revolutionary movement during the last several decades.
Revolution can neither be exported nor imported. It can only arise through
the internal development of each nation. This is the truth repeatedly dwelled
upon by the Marxists. The practice of the Chinese Communist Party has com-
pletely'vindicated this truth. In view of this fact, dissolution of the Communist
International will strengthen the self-confidence and the initiative of the Chi-
nese Communists, it will reinforce the link between the Party and the people
of the entire nation, and it will increase further the fighting power of the Party.
The Chinese Communists (13 characters deleted here) will remain militantly
in the foremost ranks of the anti- Japanese war (21 characters deleted here)
and to support the war effort of the national government, until our victory over
the Japanese aggressors and their German and Italian allies, until the com-
pletion of the great task for an independent, democratic new China.
4. The Chinese Communists are Marxist-Leninists, because Marxism-Lenin-
ism is a science transcending national limits. The Chinese Communists will
continue to base themselves on the conditions of their nation in applying and
developing skillfully the principles of Marxism-Leninism, in order to serve our
nation in war and in reconstruction. The Chinese Communists are also the
inheritor of the best traditions in all of our national culture, thought, and
ethics ; they consider such tradition as their own blood and flesh and will con-
tinue to develop and glorify them. The campaign carried on by the Chinese
Communist Party in recent years against subjectivism, against sectarianism,
and against doctrinaire sterotypes is aimed at the further integration of the
revolutionary science of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese revolutionary prac-
tice, Chinese history, and Chinese culture. This campaign has demonstrated a
power of initiative in thought and in revolutionary practice on the part of the
Chinese Communists. It also demonstrates that the Chinese Communists are
surely able to accomplish the historical tasks of the Chinese people together
with them. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is deeply
convinced that our Party comrades will unite as one man to overcome our
shortcomings and to develop our initiative and positiveness. If this is the case,
we will surely accomplish our tasks despite the fact that our enemy the Japanese
imperialists is still strong and that there are still innumerable difiiculties lying
ahead of us.
Central Committee, Communist Pabty of China-
May 26, 1943. }
Mr. Morris. I would next like to introduce, INIr. Chairman, tlie
sworn statement of T. A. Bisson, dated April 16, 1952.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1393" and is
as follows:)
97 Kingston Road,
Berkeley 7, Calif., April 16, 1952.
Hon. Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Sevate Judiciary Suhcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator McCarran : With reference to my testimony before the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary, I wish to point out that I made
an important denial in executive session but did not have an opportunity to re-
peat it in public session. I denied that my article (China's Role in a Coalition
War) in the Far Eastern Survey of July 14, 1943, was written at the instruction
or request of the Community Party and emphasized that it was written entirely
independently and expressed only my own personal views at the time.
This denial is very important to me because it refuted a serious charge made
against me by Mr. Louis Budenz before the subcommittee. Accordingly, I re-
spectfully request that my executive session testimony on this point be made part
of the printed record of the hearings. I feel that it is only fair to me and my
reputation tliat this should be done immediately. Otherwise, the public record
will give the impression that this serious charge against me has not been denied
by me in sworn testimony.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5427
May I also request that the full text of the Survey article in question, together
with the reply to it by Dr. C. L. Hsia and my final comment printed in the Survey
issue of Auiiust 16, 1943, be inserted in the printed record of the public hearing.
Reference was made in the public liearing of March 31, 1952, to my member-
ship in the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression.
This committee was long headed by Mr. Henry L. Stimson as honorary secretary,
a testimony to the character of the committee, which was exclusively concerned
with stopping the sale of American war materials to Japan while it was engaged
in its aggressive attack on China. Since this point was not made clear at the
hearing, where I did not have my data available, I respectfully request that the
statement here made concerning the committee be made part of the printed
record of the hearing.
Would you kindly acknowledge tliis letter and give me assurance that my
requests will be granted.
Sincerely yours,
[seal] T. a. Bisson.
Subscribed and sworn to before me by T. A. Bisson this ISth day of April 1952.
Edith Lawrence Smith,
Notary Public in and for the County of Alameda, State of California.
My commission expires June 2, 1955.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce at this point
the sworn statement of William L. Holland, dated April 12, 1952.
Senator Watkins. It may be received and made a part of the record.
(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1394" and is as
follows:)
New York, April 12, 1952.
Supplementary Memorandum by W. L. Holland on Israel Epstein
Mr. Israel Epstein has been mentioned in testimony before the subcommittee
as the author of an IPR research report entitled "Notes on Labor Problems in
Nationalist China." Since it has recently been alleged that Mr. Epstein is or
was a Communist, I wish to exijlain how it came about that he prepared this
study for the II'R.
^ly acquaintance with Mr. Epstein began in 1943 in Chungking when he was
working as a correspondent for several newspapers and magazines, including,
at one period, the New York Times. He was well known at that time as a
writer on Chinese affairs and the author of a substantial book on China as well
as many articles. In 1943 he had started work on an investigation of labor
problems in Nationalist China. He had already collected a valuable amount of
hitherto unavailable first-hand information on labor conditions in formerly back-
ward parts of western China which were now being rapidly transformed by
migration of industry from the coastal areas. He had had the close cooperation
of well-qualified Chinese labor experts and had clearly acquired a unique knowl-
edge of this problem, about which no serious reseai-ch report had been written.
In my capacity as international research secretary of the IPR, I therefore
commissioned Mr. Epstein (in 1943) to prepare a full report on this subject for
the international research program of the IPR and authorized him to make
arrangements with a number of Chinese colleagues, including the well-known
sociologist. Professor Ta Chen, to work on this project during the ensuing year
or two. Mr. Epstein did so and eventually returned to New York with a great
collection of data which, after a long delay, he wrote up in a rather poorly
organized first draft.
In accordance with the standard IPR procedure, this draft was submitted for
comment to a number of people, including Prof. W. W. Lockwood at Princeton
University, Prof. Owen Lattimore. and Prof. John K. Fairbank. It was also
read by several persons on the IPR staff. All readers felt that the study con-
tained valuable new information which ought to be made available, but^ some
thought that there were also certain passages which expressed criticism of the
Nationalist authorities in a tone not suitable for an IPR research volume. I
therefore told Mr. Epstein that the study would be accepted for publication for
the IPR only if he agreed to have the manuscript undergo considerable editing,
5428 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
including the removal of the above excessively critical passages. Mr. Epstein
agreed and tinally approved the drastically revised version, vphich was subse-
quently issued in 1949 by the IPR in mimeographed form under the above-
mentioned title.
The report contains a preface by me, clearly indicating that the study does not
claim to be a definitive work but was simply intended as an interim compilation
providing a useful body of reference materials pending the time when a more
comprehensive book might be written.
I also arranged for an appendix (briefly sketching some outstanding postwar
labor developments) to be added. This was written by Mr. Julian Friedman, then
lecturer in colonial economics at the University of London and formerly labor
attache at the United States consulate general in Shanghai in 1946.
A glance at the volume will show that it is essentially factual and accurate
in the general picture it gives of China's wartime and immediate postwar labor
relations. It has been favorably reviewed in many journals.
W. L. Holland.
State of New York,
County of New York, ss:
William L. Holland, being duly sworn, declares that every statement in the
above memorandum is true to the best of his knowledge.
Russell S. Golde,
Notary Public, State of New York.
April 12, 1952.
Mr. Morris. I have here a statement entitled "United States Eco-
nomic, Financial, and Military Aid to China Since 1 April 1941,"
prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is secret
security information only when statement 7 is attached, and state-
ment 7 is not attached to this report, therefore relieving it of its
secret classification.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The statement referred "to was marked "Exhibit No. 1395" and is
as follows:)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5429
Exhibit No. 1395
UNiTEa» States Economic, Financial, and Military Aid to China Since
1 April 1941
Prepared lay Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Progress Reports and
Statistics
United States economic, financial, and military aid to China since Apr. 1, 1941
[In millions of United States dollars]
Transfers
Apr. 1, 1941,
to
Sept. 2, 1945
Transfers
Sept. 2, 1945,
to
Dee. 31. 1951
Aid to China furnished in whole or in part by the Army, N'ary, and Air Force
1. Lend-lease program;
May 6, 1941, to Sept. 2, 1945
Sept. 2, 1945, to June 30, 1946
Subsequent to .Tune 30, 1946
Pipeline credit agreement
2. Military aid under Sino-American Cooperative Organization agreement
(SACO).
3. Transfer of United States naval vessels under Public Law 512, 79th
Cong.
4. Transfers under the China aid program authorized by sec. 404 (b) China
Aid Act of 1948.
5. Amm'Tiition transferred by the United States First Marine Division in
the Pei ring-Tientsin Area.
6. Ammunition transferred by Fleet Marine Force, \^ estem Pacific at
Tsingtao, China.
7. Mutual Defense Assistance Program. (See attached secret statement
7.)
8. U. S. Army sale of e.xcess stocks in ^^ est China
Aid to China furnished by agencies other than Army, Navy, and Air Force
9. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and War Asset Adminis-
tration: Sale of surplus military equipment.
10. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner sale of civilian surplus
property, (b'dk-sales agreement).
Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner dockyard-facUities sales
Maritime Commission ship sales
Assistance by American Red Cross:
Prior to VJ-day
Suhseqaent to VJ-day
Export-Import Bank credits:
Prior to VJ-day
Subsequent to VJ-day
Economic Cooperation Administration program
United States foreign relief program (Department of State)
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration — United States
contribution
Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs
Stabilization fund agreement, 1941 (Department of Treasury)
1942 Treasury credit (Public Law 442, 77th Cong.)
Chinese Stndent Assistance (Department of State)
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Total.
Grand total. ^.
$845. 8
4.6
20.3
10.0
485.0
1, 365. 2
3, 331. 9
$714. 1
17.9
50.3
17.7
74.6
123.1
3.0
1.3
24.7
20.0
3.9
55.0
4.1
16.4
1.9
83.5
213.5
43.9
474.0
3.&
15.0
5.2
1, 966. 7
DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL CATEGORIES OF UNITED STATES AID
(Paragraph numbers correspond with numbers of items listed in table above)
1. Lend-lease program
As of December 31, 1951, Treasury Department records on fiscal operations
show aid, both material and services, furnished to the Chinese Government
under the lend-lease program amounted to $1,627.6 million of which $S45.3
million had been cfblivered prior to VJ-day and the remainder of $782.3 million
had been delivered svibsequent to VJ-day.
Of the total aid, $1,627.6 million, the War Department, which included the
Armv Air Corps effpcted transfers amounting to $1,420.7 million, according
5430 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
to records of the Department of the Army. This amount includes: (1) Over-
seas transfers out of United States theater stoclis and services rendered amount-
ing to $1,073 million. Approximately 97 percent of all overseas transfers of
materials and services are supported by receipted transfer documents listing
in detail the nature and extent of the aid furnished. (Photostat copies of re-
ceipted transfer documents attached as exhibit I). Lend-lease shipments to
United States commanding generals earmarked for China amounting to $385.9
million against which credits for diversions to non-Chinese recipients and
returns amounting to $308.6 million were applied, leaving for these shipments a
net of $77.3 million as the value of actual transfers to the Chinese. (3) All
other War Department transfers, amounting to $270.4 million, took place in the
continental United States and are supported by transfer documents of which
approximately 98 percent are receipted by either Chinese Government rep-
resentatives or their authorized agents.
The bulk of the lend-lease transfers made by the Department of the Navy
were accomplished in China and in most instances are supported by receipts
signed by representatives of the Chinese Government. The total lend-lease
aid furnished by the Novy, according to Navy Department records, was $71
million of which $66.8 million represents the value of the 96 vessels charged to
lend-lease and transferred under Public Law r)12 (79th Cong.).
In addition to the War and Navy Department transfers, there were lend-
lease transfers by Treasury Department, Maritime Commission, and other
agencies totaling $135.9 million, according to Treasury Department records.
Included in the above totals are amounts resulting from transfers under
the pipeline credit agreement which authorized the delivery under credit ar-
rangements of lend-lease civilian-type equipment and supplies contracted for
but undelivered on VJ-day. The agreement provided for the shipment of $51.7
million of such supplies to be paid for over a period of 30 years beginning July 1,
1947, with interest at 2% percent per year. Goods with a value of $50.3 million
were actually delivered and charged to the Chinese under the terms of this
agreement. Also included in the above totals are charges in the amount of
$25.9 million covering certain transfers made under lend-lease for which the
Chinese Government agreed to pay. No other credit arrangements under lend-
lease are indicated by the December 31, 1951, lend-lease reports of the Treasury
Department.
The pricing policy for aid furni.shed under the Lend-Lease Act was United
States procurement cost for new items and value based on condition for used
items, plus an amount to cover packing, handling, and inland transportation.
Charges for transfers out of excess military stocks overseas were United States
procurement cost for new items, the value based on condition for used items, plus
an amount to cover packing, handling, and inland and ocean transportation.
(Statement 1.)
2. Sino-American cooperative agreement
The military transfers under the Sino-American Cooperative agreement
(SACO) consisted primarily of ordnance supplies furnished the Chinese between
September 2, 1945, and March 2, 1946, by the United States Navy. These transfers
were accomplished in fulfillment of a wartime agreement calling for the exchange
of services and supplies for certain specified services provided by the Chinese
Government. (Statement 2.)
S. Transfer of United States Naval Vessels
A total of 131 vessels were transferred to the Chinese Nationalist Government
as grant aid under Public Law 512 (79th Cong.). The procurement cost of these
vessels was $141.4 million of which $74.6 million is reflected in this report as
value of aid rendered under Public Law 512, and $66.8 million is reflected in the
lend-lease accounts with $27.3 million prior to VJ-day and $39.5 million subse-
quent to VJ-day. (Statement 3.)
4. China-aid program
Through December 31, 1951, shipments to the Chinese Government made by
United States Government agencies under the China-aid program, for which
$125 million was appropriated, amounted to $94.2 million. In fiddition, there was
a cash advance of $28.9 million made to the Nationalist Government of China to
be utilized in direct procurement of military equipment by the Chinese on the
•open market. A portion of the cash advance was pal dto the War Assets Admin-
istration and the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner for certain surplus
material obtained from them.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5431
Pricing of aid furnished by the Departments of the Army and the Aid Force
which amounted to $71.8 million, was in accordance with the pricing policy estab-
lished by the Department of the Army covering all military-aid programs. In
accordance with this policy actual procurement cost was charged for items pro-
cured for foreign aid programs, plus packing, handling, transportation, and ad-
dinistrative costs. Full current replacement cost was charged for transfers out
of stock, plus packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs. Trans-
fers out of excess stocks were priced at 10 percent of prices in effect in 1945, plus
rehabilitation costs, packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs.
(Statements 4 and 4A.)
5 and 6. Ammunition transferred by United States marines
Between April and September 1947 the United States marines in the Peiping-
Tientsin area and the Tsingtao area transferred at no cost to the Chinese Govern-
ment approximately 6,500 tons of ammunition. Complete listings of the items and
quantities transferred, together with dollar values, based on estimated 1947
procurement costs are attached. (Statements 5 and 6.)
7. Mutual Defense Assistance Program
As of December 31, 1951, certain military material with a value of $24.7 million
had been shipped under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. All detailed
information concerning this program is classified for security reasons.
Pricing of aid furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program is in
accordance with the provision set forth in section 403 of the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. (See attached secret statement 7.)
8. Sale of excess stocks of the United States Army in West China
In 1946 the United States Army contracted to transfer to the Chinese Govern-
ment a broad assortment of United States Army supplies, with a depreciated
landed cost value of U. S. $67.24 million, plus CN $5.16 billion and located in West
China. In return the Chinese Government agreed to pay $25 million (US) and
$5.16 billion (CN) for the property transferred.
Certain terms of the agreement follow :
"Aeticle 4. In consideration of the immediate transfer of said property, China
hereby agrees to purchase and to pay for the property thus transferred, and
further agrees t hold the United States harmless fur all claims for rents, damages,
breach of contract or otherwise which may arise from any sourse whatever. . . .
"Article 7. China agrees to pay US $25,000,000 and CN $5,160,000,000 for the
property thus transferred in accordance with the following terms and conditions :
"a. CN $5,160,000,000 will be deducted from the total of the CN dollar advance
made by China to the United States.
"b. US $5,000,000 will be paid in cash.
"c. US $20,000,000 will be payable in accordance with the terms of a contract
to be negotiated between China and the United States Treasury Department,
which contract will provide for :
(1) Principal to be paid in 30 equal installments.
(2) Interest at 2% percent.
(3) Any surplus of settlement of US indebtedness to China for military
expenditures in excess of China's cash down payments for surplus property
of the US will thereupon be used by China for the purchase of property in
the United States or will be applied to the liquidation of the unpaid balance
of this contract.
"d. If at the completion of the transfer the actual net depreciated value
computed as above is greater or loss than the estimated net depreciated value
stated herein, China's purchase price will be increased or decreased by the same
percentage by which the actual net depreciated value varies from the contract
referred to in c, above."
The cash down payment in United States dollars was later incorporated into
the Office of P^'oreign Liquidation Commissioner bulk-sale agreement as part of
the considerations received by the United States. The Chinese obligation of $20
million was later included as one of the items presented as a United States
claim in negotiations with the Chinese Government on settlement of war
accounts.
9. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and Mar Assets Administration
sale of surplus mililary equipment
The Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and the War Assets
Administration sold material and equipment to the Chinese Nationalist Govern-
5432 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
ment with an estimated procurement cost of $102 million for $6.7 million,
according to the records of the Department of State. The Chinese Government
paid the Office of the Foreifin Liquidation Commissioner $2.78 million out of the
$125 million grant authorized by the China Aid Act of 1948. (See item 4.) The
remaining $3.03 million was paid to the United States Government; however,
the source of these funds is not known.
10. Office of Foreign Ldquidation Commissioner sale of civilian surplus property
(bulk-sales agreement)
Under an agreement dated August 30, 1946, the Office of the Foreign Liquida-
tion Commissioner sold to the Chinese Nationalist Government surplus property
located in China and on various islands in the Pacific. Total acquisition cost of
the property covered by this agreement was $842 million, according to the records
of the Department of State. The total sales price was $175 million. Of this
amount $120 million was offset against obligations of the United States Armed
Forces to the Chinese Government, and $55 million represents a Chinese obliga-
tion to be paid in local currency for real property to be acquired in the future
for United States diplomatic and consular establishments and for the expenses
of educational programs under the Fulbright Act (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.).
11. Office of Foreign Liquidation CoDimissioner dockyard-facilities sales
The procurement cost of the property transferred under this sale was $11.5
million and the sale price was $4.1 million, according to the records of the
Department of State.
12. Maritime Commission ship sales
The IMaritime Commission sold the Chinese Government 43 vessels for a total
sales price of $26.2 million under the Merchant Ships Sales Act of 1946. Of this
amovuit $16.4 million was on Maritime Commission credit terms. The balance
of $9.8 million was paid in cash, obtained in part through an Export-Import Bank
credit. (See item 14.) The total wartime procurement cost of the 43 vessels
was $77.3 million. This information was taken from ptige 1049 of the Depart-
ment of State's United States Relations With China.
13. Assistance hii America ti Red Cross; 15. Economic Cooperation Administration
prog-ram; 16. United States foreign-relief program {Department of State)
The amounts indicated above regarding the aid furnished under these programs
were obtained from Foreign Transactions of the United States Govermnent,
released in January 1952 by the Department of Commerce, Office of Business
Economics, Clearing Office for Foreign Transactions.
IJf. Export-Import Bank credits
Amounts reflected in this report were obtained from the Export-Import Bank.
n. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration — United States
contribution ; 18. Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs •
The values cited are from United States Relations With China (Department
of State), page 1043.
19. Stabilization fund agreement, 19.'il {Department of Treasury) ; 20. 19If2
Treasury credit {Public Law Ji-'f2, 11th Cong.)
The amounts of aid reported under these agreements are in accordance with
the records of the Department of the Treasury.
21. Chinese student assistance {Department of State)
The amount of aid reported under this program is in accordance with records
of the Department of State.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5433
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88348— 52— pt. 14-
-34
5434
ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Statement 2. — Materials and services provided under Sitvo-American
Cooperative Organization Agreement
Ordnance supplies and equipment $14, 284, 068
Radio equipment and supplies 1, 320, 664
Fiscal codes, aerology — 957, 782
Elquipage, shore bases 585, 045
Training of Chinese students— 200,000
Medical equipment 159, 494
Public-works construction and maintenance 79, 304
Furniture and fixtures 63,449
Communications 14, 747
Clothing 2,310
Aviation supplies and materials 67
Total 17, 666. 930
Statement 3.
-Transfer of United States naval vessels under Public Law 512
Seventy-ninth Cong. .
Total—
River gunboat -
Destroyer escort --.
Patrol-craft escort ---
Large mine sweepers
Landing ships, tang
Landing ships, mechanized
Landing craft, Infantry (large)
Destroyer escort tender ---
Landing craft, ta'ik.
Auxiliary ocean tug tanker _
Auxiliary floating drydock
Landing craft, mechanized
Larding craft, vehicle and personnel
Motor mine sweeper
Submarine chaser ---
Motor gunboat
Repair ship, landing craft_
Number of
vessels trans-
ferred at a
procurement
cost of $141.4
million
131
1
6
2
12
10
8
2
2
25
25
1
13
6
1
Number of
vessels trans-
ferred at a
procurement
cost of $27.3
million in-
eluded in
lend-lease
transfers
prior to Sept.
2, 1045
Number of
vessels trans-
ferred at a
procurement
cost of $39.5
million in-
cluded in
lend-lease
transfers
after Sept.
2, 1945
87
10
8
8
1
8
1
1
25
25
Number of
vessels trans-
ferred at a
procurement
cost of $74.6
million re-
ported under
Public Law
512
35
1
13
6
1
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5435
Statement 4. — Transfers under the China-aid program, authorized by sec.
404 (6) , China Aid Act of 1948, through Dec. 81, 1951
[In
thousands of dollars]
Army
Navy
General
Services
Admin-
istration
Depart-
ment of
State
Office of
Foreign
Liquida-
tion
Commis-
sioner
Govern-
ment of
China
Ground
program
Air
pro-
gram
Total
Medical supplies and equipment
$5, 582. 0
$6.0
$2.1
144.4
$5 590 1
Fuel, lubricants, and petroleum
products - - - -
$7,675.0
7,819.4
3,729.0
452 0
Communication and transporta-
tion equipment (except mDi-
tary aircraft and watercraf t) . - .
3, 384. 0
452.0
14.0
3.0
299.0
51, 355. 0
63.0
345.0
Industrial equipment -
Other equipment (except agri-
cultural and military aircraft
and watercraft .
14.0
Clothing, textiles and footwear..
15.0
18.0
Miscellaneous manufacturing
end products (except ordnance,
ordnance stores, and aero-
nautical material) . . .
6, 030. 6
6, 329. 6
59, 854. 4
5, 681. 6
1 592.6
Ordnance and ordnance stores
3,999.0
3, 726. 0
4,481.3
$19.1
1,892.6
Military aircraft and aeronautical
material
Military vessels and watercraft
1, 592. 6
Services,
180.0
266.0
446.0
Technical aid
559.7
559 7
Ocean transportation . . __
1, 800. 0
310.0
2 110.0
Cash (Riggs National Bank)
28, 880. 8
28, 880. 8
Total
63, 132. 0
8, 652. 0
6, 795. 1
13, 705. 6
1,911.7
28, 880. 8
123,077.2
Statement 4A. — Selected items shipped to China under the China-aid program
Number delivered
United States rifles, caliber .30 132, 851
Browning automatic rifles, caliber .30 8, 793
Heavy machine guns, caliber .30 1, 707
Submachine suns, caliber .45 12,975
Rocket launchers 1, 196
Grenade launchers 5, 758
.30-caliber ammunition units— 231, 221, 082
.45-caliber ammunition do 26, 577, 498
Rocket ammunition do 66, 380
Grenades 280,560
5436
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Statement 5. — Ammunition transferred to Chinese Nationalists by the United
States Marines in north China, April^September 1947
Type
Number of
units trans-
ferred
1947 esti-
mated unit
cost
Total esti-
mated cost
Rockets:
High explosive, antitank 2.36 inch.
High explosive, antitank 4.50 inch.
20-millimeter
37-millimeter
6l)-millimeter mortar
80-millimeter mortar
75-millimeter gun
105-millimeter howitzer
155-millimeter howitzer
155-millimeter prop, charge
Grenades:
Hand
Rifle
Demolition blocks
TNT (pounds)
Charges, M-12 prop
Bangalore torpedoes
Mines, antipersonnel
Mines, antitank
Small arms:
.30-caliber
.45-caliber
. 50-caliber
Grenade adapters
Flame throwers:
Portable
Cylinders
Bombs, 500 pounds GP
Demolition charges
Artillery fuzes
Pyrotechnics
Blasting caps
Blasting fuze, feet
Firing device
Detonators
Shaped charges
Detonating cord, feet
Firecrackers, M-11
Ignition cylinder, M-1
Napalm, gallons
Bomb fuzes, AN, M-230
Shells, shotgun, 12-gage
Lighter fuze
Total.
3,646
300
9,493
4,993
47, 678
20,916
5,577
64, 538
18, 726
10,725
55, 529
23,038
47, 438
29, 787
2,420
3,020
1,014
2,636
!, 195,370
94, 100
225,515
8,592
35
302
62
3,248
16, 975
13,174
32, 913
100, 500
2,575
460
288
366, 200
1,200
3. 000
12, 751
48
9,000
72, 581
$6.88
64.00
1.84
2.77
2.97
9.00
10.51
18.59
23.00
4.93
1.20
3.48
.38
.25
1.00
6.02
8.00
14.00
1 110.00
1 60. 00
" 285. 00
.26
313.00
27.00
198. 00
4.40
6.80
9.30
.17
.04
.80
.04
43.00
.04
.03
1.00
.78
9.50
54.00
.04
$25, 084
19.200
17,467
13,831
141, 604
188, 244
58, 614
1, 199, 761
430, 698
52, 874
66,635
80,172
18, 026
7,447
2,420
18, 180
8,112
36, 904
241, 450
5,640
64, 410
2,234
10, 955
8,154
12, 276
14,291
115, 430
122,518
5,595
4,020
2,060
18
12,384
14, 648
36
3,000
9,946
456
486
2,903
3, 038, 183
> Cost per thousand units.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5437
Statement 6. — Ammunition transferred by the Fleet Marine Foree, Western
Pacific, at Tsangkoti airfield, Tsingtao, China, April^September 1947
Type
105-millimoter howitzer
81-milIimeter mortar
60-millinieter mortar
V.'^-millimpter howitzer
15.5-milMmeter prop charge
Grenades:
HaiKi, fragmentation
HaTid, all others
Rifle, all types
Bancalore torpedoes
Small arms, caliber .30, carbine and rifle.
Mines;
Antitank
Antipersonnel
Shaped charges:
4C-pound
10-pomid
Grenade adapters, all types
Shell, 37-millimetcr, all types and shot-..
Rocket, high explosive, antitank
Flares, trip, all types
Device:
Firing, pressure-type
Firing, pull-type
Firing, push-type
Firing, release-type
ghter:
Fuze, waterproof
Fuze, friction-type
Pyrotechnic signals, ground
Fuze, igniting, hand grenade
Shells, shotgim No. COB
Cord, detonating CPrima) ."iOC-foot spools.
Li 2
Total.
Number of
units trans-
ferred
24, 665
30, 903
28. 042
9,337
7, 414
27, 575
13, 640
9,650
1,810
, 488, 490
732
686
634
200
4,272
1,035
321
911
980
no
340
1,040
1,41
102, 000
55, 000
1,01C
7.725
720
280
1947 esti-
mated unit
cost
$1S. .56
9.00
2.97
10.51
4.93
1.20
1.65
3.48
6.02
I 110.00
14. CO
8.00
43.66
14.66
.26
2.77
64.00
8.fO
.85
.74
.85
.85
.04
.06
9.30
.42
> 54. 00
.04
Total esti
mated cost
$457, 782
278, 127
83, 285
98, 132
36, 551
33, 090
22, 506
33,582
10, 896
163, 680
10,248
5, 488
27, 680
Z 932
1,111
2,867
2C, 544
7,288
833
1,043
289
884
4,080
3.300
9,393
3,244
38
11
1.318,904
• Cost per thousand units.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have here the correspondence between
the Attorney General of the United States and Senator McCarran on
the question of the transmission to the Justice Department of the
transcript of Mr. Lyle Munson and Mr. John P. Davies. There has
been a contradiction in the testimony of Mr. Davies and Mr. Munson,
and it is one of the things sent down to the Department of Justice
asking them to look into it and look into the possibility that perjury
may have been committed. I would like the files on this issue to go
into the record at this point.
Senator Watkins. Those may be received.
(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit 1396, A, B,
C, D, E, F. G." and is as follows :)
Exhibit No. 1396
memorandum
February 19, 1952.
To : Mr. Sourwine
From : Mr. Green
Re testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., and Lyle H. Munson — items contained in
testimony appearing to be contradictory.
Below you will find some samples of apparently contradictory statements in
testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., and Lyle H. Munson. All of the excerpts come
from the confidential testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., of August 10, 1951, and
the confidential testimony of Lyle H. Munson of February 15, 1952, except the
last item which comes from the confidential testimony of Mr. Davies on August
8, 1951, and the open testimony of Mr. Munson dated February 15, 1952. The last
5438 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
item referred to is peculiar in tliat Mr. Davies tends to mislead the committee in
believing the situation existed which, in fact, was contradicted as not existing
by the witness Munson.
There are other statements throughout the records which are contradictory by
inference as well as misleading in fact, and if it is desired that all of these
statements be cataloged, I shall be very happy to do so. I do believe that in
the main most of the material differences in testimony appear in this
Memorandum.
Item No. 1
( P. 38, Davies testimony, August 10, 1951 : )
Mr. SouKWiNE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by
another Government agency for policy guidance?
Mr. Davies. No, sir — categorically.
(P. 4, Munson testimony, February 15, 1952:)
Mr. Morris. Do you recall that Mr. Davies recommended that the six people
whose names I have mentioned work for the Central Intelligence Agency in a
position where they would give guidance to a certain program of the Central
Intelligence Agency?
Mr. Munson. It was Mr. Davies' recommendation in our conference with him
that we, as officials of CIA, should avail ourselves of the knowledge and guidance
and counsel that these six persons could provide us and that they should be used
for consultation and guidance and for the preparation of materials that would
be useful to us in our activities or responsibilities.
Mr. IMoRRis. It was your understanding that they were to give the guidance
rather than to be guided?
Mr. Munson. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The persons you are talking about are those named in the
memorandum, that is, John K. Fairbank, and wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley,
Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz ; is that correct?
Mr. Munson. That is correct.
(P. 16, Munson testimony:)
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, did the recommendations Mr. Davies made with regard
to these persons or any of them involve the use of those persons as a part of
the CIA operation or any CIA operation?
Mr. IMunson. Mr. Davies recommended that we at OPC should consult with
and procure guidance and materials from Professor Fairbank, and his wife,
Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz,
and that these materials and guidance should be used by us and that they
would represent a proper approach to effecting our responsibilities.
Senator Ferguson. And proper guidance?
Mr. Munson. And proper guidance.
Item No. 2
(P. 73. Davies testimony.)
Mr. Sourwixe. Did you ever state she [Smedley] was not a Communist, but
only "very sophisticated," or "very politically sophisticated?"
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever suggest that another agency of Government set
her up in an office?
Mr. Davies. No.
(P. 18, Munson testimony:)
INIr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Davies have any plans to have any contacts with these
listed persons or they with the Government in any capacity?
Mr. Munson. It was Mr. Davies' suggestion that these persons be situated
physically outside Washington in some other geographical location and that
they should be contacted and made use of only through what he called cut-outs
or a cut out. This would seem to imply that these persons would not have been
knowledgeable that they were furnishing guidance, counsel, and materials to
the Central Intelligence Agency but that they were actually furnishing it to
some intermediary who himself would have been knowledgeable of where it
was going, but that the six persons would not have been.
(P. 25, Munson testimony:)
Mr. Sourwine. Was Agnes Smedley one of those recommended by Mr. Davies
to be set up in this workshop or office somewhere away by themselves?
Mr. Munson. She was.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5439
Item No. 3
( P. 38, Davies testimony : )
Mr. SouRwiNE. I would like to have a categorical answer, if we can get it, and
let me recall to you in that connection that you have already testified on this
record that Dr. Schwartz did not serve as a consultant to you at any time.
Mr. Davies. He did not, certainly.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That being the case, sir, does that help you to answer the
question as to whether at any time you told any person, a representative of
another Government agency, that he had been helpful to you as a consultant?
Mr. Davies. Well, I could not have said that, because he was not my consultant.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Did you ever say it?
Mr. Davies. No: I never did.
Mr. SoTJKWiNE. All right, sir. That is all I was trying to get at.
(P. 31, Munson testimony:)
Mr. SoTjRwine. Did Mr. Davies, at the conference which is the subject of the
questioning today, that is, which took place on November 16, 1949, discuss Dr.
Schwartz's possible Communist or Communist-front affiliations other than as a
part of the group?
Mr. Mu:>;soN. No. Mr. Davies did urge that Dr. Schwartz should be used
by us in certain fields of our responsibilities, again as a source of guidance and
counsel.
Mr. SouBwixE. He was recommending that Dr. Schwartz be retained by you for
policy guidance; is that right?
Mr. MuNSON. In broad and general terms, yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Mr. Davies state that Schwartz had been helpful to him
as a consultant?
Mr. MuNsox. He did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You are quite sure about that?
Mr. MuxsoN. I am quite sure about that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would it make any difference to you that Mr. Davies has
denied ever making such a statement? Would that change your testimony in
any way ?
Mr. MuNsoN. It would not change my testimony in any way.
Item No. 4
( P. 79, Davies testimony : )
Mr. SouRWiNE. Other than in connection with top-secret matters, did you ever
state that materials prepared by her (Anna Louise Strong) would represent the
proper approach?
Mr. Da\t:es. No.
( P. 24, Munson testimony : )
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you understand Mr. Davies' recommendations to be, his
statement to be that the materials prepared by them would represent the proper
approach ?
Mr. MuNSON. Yes, I did so understand.
Item No. 5
(P. 89, Davies testimony:)
Mr. SouRWixE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for con-
snltation and guidance by an agency of the United States?
Mr. Davies. No.
(P. 37, Munson testimony:)
Mr. SouRWixE. But he did recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consulta-
tion and guidance by CIA or OPC?
Mr. MuxsoN. In the manner we have indicated, yes.
(P. 23, Munson testimony:)
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Mr. Davies ever state that materials prepared by Edgar
Snow would represent the proper approach?
Mr. Mu.xsox. Yes, he did. Let me interrupt to say that it is not my recollec-
tion that be singled out Edgar Snow individually, laut that he did recommend
that these persons collectively would be supplying information and guidance
which would represent a proper approach.
Item No. 6
(P. 91, Davies testimony:)
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Professor Fairbank be set up
in an office by some agency of Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
5440 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
IMr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you ever state that Professor Fairhank was a person
ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the
Government ?
Mr. Davies. No.
(P. 24, Munson testimony:)
Mr. SouKwiNE. Did Davies recommend that Snow be set up in an office by an
agency of the Government?
Mr. MuNsoN. No, that Snow, along with the other afore-mentioned persons
should be provided quarters and space in which to function. This was not
designated as an office. Again such limiting terms or refined terms were not
used. It was simply suggested that these persons be situated physically in an
oflSee or suite of offices at some distant point from which they would function.
Item No. 7
(P. 11, Davies testimony August 8, 1951 :)
Senator Smith. You can say "Yes" or "No," '"I did," or "I didn't."
Then, if you wish to enlarge or explain, if you say "I did," then I can see how
you might wish to go further and say, "Here is the reason I did," or "Here is
what they do."
We are not asking you that at the moment. We are asking you now for the
yes or no answer.
Did you recommend them for anybody?
Mr. Davies. Well, hypothetically, let us put it this way : Supposing — and this
completely hypothetical — I were to have recommended the employment of some-
body as a double agent, and then I was charged with having recommended some-
body who was known to have belonged in the other camp from us.
The fact that I recommended the employment of a person as a double agent
would be perfectly legitimate, and would be in the national interest of this
countr.v.
But if I can only reply to questions on this, "Yes, I suggested the utilization,
not the employment, but the employment of so and so as a double agent"
(P. 4224, Munson open testimony, February 15, 1952:)
Mr. SauKWiNE. Let me ask this question: Was there anything in his recom-
mendation which could have been construed or which, in your opinion, was in-
tended as a recommendation that these people, or any of them, be used as double
agents?
Mr. Munson. At no time did I understand that Mr. Davies was suggesting the
use of any one or all of these persons as double agents.
Senator Ferguson. They were to be used, were they not, according to this
memorandum, as a unit?
Mr. Munson. They were to be used as a workshop team, or unit : yes, sir.
Exhibit No. 1396A
September 21, 1951.
Hon. J. Howard McGrath,
Attorney Gcricral of the United States, Department of Justice,
Washington 25, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Attorney General : I am submitting to you herewith the official
transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the Internal Security Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in executive session, on
August 10, 1951. It is requested that you examine this testimony and check it
against information available to you, with a view to determining, and advising
the committee, what if any action by the Department of Justice is indicated.
Please return the transcript when you have concluded your examination of it.
Kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
, Chairman.
Exhibit No. 1396B
September 27, 1951.
Hon. Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Wasliinpton, D. C.
My Dear Senator : This will acknowledge your letter of September 21, 1951,
forwarding the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5441
Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in
executive session on August 10, 1951.
In accordance with your request I am having an examination made of this
testimony and will communicate with you again in the matter in the near future.
Your sincerely,
WnxiAM Amoby Undebhill,
Acting Deputy Attorney General.
Exhibit No. 1396C
OCTOBEE 29, 1951.
Hon. Pat McCaeean,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Deae Senatoe: Further reference is made to your letter of September 21,
1951, with which you transmitted the official transcript of the testimony of
John P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.
The testimony of Davies has now been examined in light of the information
available to the Department. As a result it appears that there is insufficient
evidence of perjury or any Federal violation on Davies' part to sustain prose-
cution.
In accordance with your request I am returning the official transcript of
Davies' testimony to you.
Sincerely,
James M. McInebney,
Assistant Attorney General.
Exhibit No. 1396D
Febeuaby 21, 1952.
Hon. J. HowAED McGeath,
Attorney General of the United States,
Department of Justice, Washington 2o, D. C.
My Deae Me. Attoeney Geneeal : On or about September 21, 1951, and under
that date, I transmitted to you the official transcript of the testimony of John
P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.
In that letter I requested that you examine this testimony and check it against
information available to you with a view to determining and advising the
committee what if any action by the Department of Justice was indicated.
Under date of October 29, 1951, Mr. James M. Mclnemey, Assistant Attorney-
General, advised me that :
"The testimony of Davies has now been examined in light of the information
available to the Department. As a result it appears that there is insufficient
evidence of pei-jury or any Federal violation on Davies' part to sustain prosecu-
tion."
Enclosed herewith are official transcripts of testimony before this committee
by Mr. Lyle H. Munson, in executive session on February 15, 1952, and in public
session later the same day. It is requested that this testimony also be examined
by you, in connection with the information previously made available to you,
with a view to determining, and advising the committee, what action, if any,
by the Department of Justice, now appears indicated.
With the thought that it may possibly be of some slight assistance to you, I
am enclosing also a memorandum prepared by a member of the staff of the
Committee on the Judiciary, indicating some (but by no means all) of the
conflicts between testimony of Mr. Davies, previously referred to, and that of
Mr. Munson, transmitted herewith.
Kindest personal regards and all good wishes.
Sincerely,
, Chairman.
5442 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1B96F
Febbuabt 27, 1952.
Hon. Pat McCarban,
United States Senate, Washington, D. 0.
My Dear Senator : Your letter of February 21, 1952, to the Attorney General,
enclosing official transcripts of Lyle H. Munson's testimony before your committee
in executive session on February 15, 1952, and in a public session on the same
date, together with a memorandum on some conflicts between Mr. Munson's
testimony and the previous testimony of John P. Davles, has been referred to me.
I will be pleased to review this matter again in the light of the testimony adduced
from Mr. Munson.
I have noted that in the memorandum to Mr. Sourwine, your staff representa-
tive, Mr. Green states :
"There are other statements throughout the record which are contradictory by
inference as well as misleading in fact, and if it is desired that all of these
statements be cataloged, I shall be very happy to do so. I do believe that in
the main most of the material differences in testimony appear in this memoran-
dum."
It would be very helpful to the Department's review of this matter if Mr. Green
prepared a catalog of the additional material conflicts of evidence which he has
encountered.
Sincerely,
» James M. McInernet,
Assistant Attorney General.
Exhibit No. 1396 B
February 28, 1952.
Mr. James M. McInebney,
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. McInerney : This will acknowledge your letter of February 27,
in which you suggest that Mr. Green of the Judiciary Committee professional stafC
be asked to prepare a catalog of the additional material conflicts of evidence
which he has encountered in comparing the testimony of Mr. Lyle H. Munson
with the prior testimony of Mr. John P. Davies, before the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee.
It is my hope that the Department of Justice will make its own careful exami-
nation of the matters called to the Department's attention by my letter of Feb-
ruary 21, 1952 ; and I would not wish either to suggest or imply that the Depart-
ment rely entirely upon a memorandum prepared by a member of the .Judiciary
Committee staff, or that the Judiciary Committee is attempting to establish proof
of the commission of an actionable offense.
The question is: What is the opinion of the Department of Justice, on the
basis of an examination of the testimony to which attention has b^en directed,
in connection with all information otherwise available to the Department?
Thanks for your prompt acknowldegement of my letter of February 21, and
kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
Pat McOabran, Chairman.
Exhibit No. 1396G
March 12, 1952.
Hon. Pat McCarran,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : I have received your letter of February 28, 1952, concern-
ing the testimony of Mr. Lyle H. Munson and the prior testimony of Mr. John
P. Davies, Jr., given before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
As yon will recall, I stated in my letter of February 27, 19.52, that I would
review the matter again in the light of Mr. Munson's testimony based on the
information presently available to the Department. A preliminary review has
now been completed, in consequence of which it has been deemed appropriate to
conduct further investigation predicated upon certain statements contained in
Mr. Munson's testimony.
INSTITUTR OP PACIFIC RELATIONS 5443
When this investigation has been completed you may rest assured that I shall
advise you concerning any further action which the Department feels is
warranted.
Sincerely,
James M. McInerney,
Assistant Attorney General.
Mr. Morris. May I also put into the record at this time two tran-
scripts taken before this committee in executive session, of John P.
Davies, both of those have been transmitted to the Department of
Justice, but I would like those introduced at this time as an exhibit,
and may that bear the next consecutive exhibit number ?
Senator Watkins. You want it actually printed in the record at
this point ? It has been printed once.
Mr. Morris. No; it has not, Mr. Chairman. This is executive
session testimony.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
]Mr, Morris. I would like it introduced as an exhibit rather than
made part of the public testimony, because we have no public testi-
mony here today other than this session. This is the executive sessions
of August 8 and 10, 1951.
Senator Watkins. They may be received as an exhibit and will be
marked the next consecutive number.
(The transcripts referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1397,
1397A," and are as follows:) >,
Exhibit No. 1397
[executive session — confidential]
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C, Wednesday, August 8, 1951.
The siibeomniittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate OflBce
Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.
Present : Senators Watkins and Smith.
Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.
Senator Watkins. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Davies, do you solemnly swear that the testimony given in the matter
now pending before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Davies. I do.
Testimony of John Paton Davies, Jr., Policy Planning Staff, United States
Department of State
Mr. Morris. Would you give your name and address to the reporter?
Mr. Davies. John Paton Davies, Jr., care of Department of State.
Mr. Morris. What is your present position, Mr. Davies?
Mr. Da\ies. My present position is a member of the policy planning staff,
State Department.
Mr. Morris. Do you specialize in any one division of that planning staff?
Mr. Davies. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. You do not specialize in Far Eastern affairs?
Mr. Davies. No ; because the planning staff operates as a unit and we deal
with all areas.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Davies, have you recommended for employment with
CIA John K. Fairbank?
5444 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Davies. This is a question, if it is what you are leading to, which is of
a top secret classification, and it is one which very few people in the Government
are clear to know about.
It touches on an operation which is only slightly less sensitive than that of
atomic energy.
I, therefore, am not at liberty to talk about this subject without clearance
from my superiors.
Mr. Morris. We will make the record clear on it, Mr. Davies.
Concerning John K. Fairbank, and you have answered as far as that is con-
cerned, you are not at liberty to discuss it?
Mr. Davies. The discussions regarding any recommendations I have made
regarding the employment of persons in CIA.
Mr. Morris. Yes. I was going to ask you about John K. Fairbank, Wilma
Fairbank, Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, Benjamin Schwartz, and Edgar
Snow.
It is your statement, Mr. Davies, that we will have to take this up with higher
authorities in the State Department.
Now, could you recommend who, particularly, we can take this up with?
Mr. Davies. I would make a formal request to the Department.
Mr. Morris. You cannot recommend any one particular person?
Mr. Davies. I can't, because this goes into the type of the operation.
Mr. Morris. All right.
Mr. Davies. I am sorry.
Mr. Morris. That is all right, Mr. Davies. We wanted to find out, and we
figured you would be the best one to find out from.
Senator Watkins. Does your same objection pertain to answering any ques-
tions about any of these persons named, the same as with respect to the indi-
vidual John Fairbank?
Mr. Davies. No, sir ; no objection to my answering any questions regarding
them as persons.
Senator Watkins. I understand he can answer with respect to the rest of
them, except Fairbank.
Mr. Davies. No, all of them. I can answer questions regarding them in gen-
eral, but I can't answer any questions regai'ding any alleged charges that I
recommended the employment of any one.
Mr. Morris. It is not a charge, Mr. Davies. I have seen a sworn statement
to that effect. It is our job here to look into things like that, and we decided
the first person to ask would be you.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You do know these people; do you not?
Mr. Davies. Yes, I know all of those that you mentioned.
Mr. Morris. I mean, the fact that you know them
Mr. Davies. That, of course, is no question.
Mr. Morris. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Senator Watkins. I fail to see that the fact of whether you did or did not
recommend them is such a question that you could not answer it.
Mr. Davies. I can't answer without going into the nature of the operation.
Senator Watkins. Certainly, all he is asking you is whether you recommended
them.
Mr. Davies. This statement I can make : I did not recommend the employ-
ment of these people to be placed on the CIA rolls as a regular part of the
American Government, to be taken into the operation as such.
I\lr. Morris. You did not recommend them?
Mr. Davies. I did not recommend them.
Mr. Morris. Well, will you make that clearer? Y^ou are making a qualifica-
tion, are you not?
Mr. Davies. To go into it any further would be to intrude into the nature of
the operation, which is a highly secret operation.
Senator Smith. Have they been recommended by anybody?
Mr. Davies. That I can't answer, because I do not know.
Senator Smith. Do you know these people yourself?
Mr. Davies. I know these people, sir.
Senator Smith. Do you know whether they are about to be employed in the
State Department?
Mr. Morris. It is in the CIA.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5445
Senator Smith. That is not under the State Department?
Mr. Morris. No. Mr. Davies is in the Planning Division of the State Depart-
ment, and the statement is that he recommended the employment of these six
people for a certain classified project with CIA.
Senator Smith. That is the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Now, without asking anything about the nature of the project, we would like
to know if the statement, and there are two statements that I have seen, are
true, that you have recommended them as personnel for this project.
Mr. Davies. I have not recommended them for employment by the CIA as a
part of the CIA operation.
Senator Watkins. Have you recommended them for the CIA for any tyi^e of
operation?
' Mr. Davies. To go into an explanation, sir
Senator Watkixs. I do not ask you to explain.
You understand what I mean. I am referring to any other operation of any
kind.
Mr. Davies. Not for employment by the CIA in any operation. You see, we
are in the very complicated business of a highly classified type of operation.
Senator Smith. I know that, but it is just as important to us as it is to you,
and it is just as important to the American people as it is to your Department,
the way I see it.
Now. are these people recommended for any position of that kind? I do not
know whether you use just technical words, or not.
Mr. Davies. I am trying to be helpful, you see, and give you as much as I can
without transgressing security.
Senator Smith. Now, are those people in the employment now of any de-
partment of the Government?
Mr. Davies. Not so far as I know.
Senator Smith. Do you know each of these parties whose names have been
mentioned?
Mr. Davies. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. You know all of them?
Mr. DA\aES. I know all of them.
Senator Smith. Have you had contacts with them?
Mr. Davies. I have had intermittent contacts with them ; yes.
Senator Smith. Are you having any contacts with them now of any kind of a
governmental nature?
Mr. Davies. No, sir.
Senator Smith. Do you have any plans to have any contacts with them, or
they with the Government, in any capacity?
Mr. Davies. No, sir.
Jlr. :Morris. I have seen two official reports which relate the story that I have
expressed.
Now, tell me this: Do you consider those people Communists, Mr. Davies?
Mr. Davies. Well, they are people of a variety of points of view.
Mr. Morris. Do you consider .Tolin K. Fairbank a Communist?
Mr. Davies. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Do you consider Wilma Fairbank a Communist?
Mr. Davies. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Edgar Snow?
Mr. Davies. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Morris. Agnes Smedley?
Mr. Davies. She is dead.
Mr. IMoRRis. Well, did you consider lier a Communist when you made the
recommendations?
Mr. Davies. I made no recommendation of this type.
Agnes Smedley I have always regarded as at least a fellow traveler and
probably part of the agitation apparatus.
Mr. Morris. And did yon consider her such in 1949?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. MoKKis. And did you make that clear at the time?
Mr. Davies. Make what clear?
Mr. Morris. That you considered her as you just described her?
Mr. Davies. There lias never bpen any question in my discussions with Agnes
Smedley as to what I regarded her as, which is, as I say, probably a part of the
apiiaratus. but probably of the agitation side of it.
5446 ENSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Davies, is it your testimony that, in 1949, you did not
make the statement that these people were not Communists?
Mr. Davies. And I did not make the statement they were not Communist?
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you did not make the statement that
they were not Communists?
Mr. Davies. I never said that Mrs. Smedley was a Communist, or never
denied, or never stated, that I did not regard Miss Smedley as not a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Do you remember considering these people as a unit of six?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Morris. I mean, six people.
Mr. Davies. Six people?
Mr. Morris. Do you remember commenting and characterizing these six
people, politically characterizing the six of them, and saying, "Whereas some
l>eople think they are Communists, they actually are not"? Do you remember
making that statement?
Mr. Davies. No.
Senator Watkins. Or anything like it?
Mr. Davies. No.
Senator Watkins. I would like to ask you, you said you never recommended
for employment of this type. Now, what did you mean by that?
Senator Smith. I noticed that, too.
Senator Watkins. What is the qualification for? That indicates that you
may have recommended for something, but not of this type?
Mr. Davies. I did not recommend them for employment.
Senator Watkins. Of any kind?
Mr. Davies. Any kind.
Senator Watkins. At any time or place?
Mr. Davies. At any time or place.
Senator Watkins. Or to anybody?
Mr. Davies. Or to anybody.
Mr. Morris. Did you recommend for any puiTJose?
Mr. Davies. We go then into the nature of this operation.
Senator Watkins. You could say whether you recommended them or did not
recommend them. That is all we want to ask about.
Mr. Davies. I think that pursuit on this, which can be clarified for you
completely, should be conducted to my superiors, because I am not at liberty
to go into any discussion which would help you out in any further examination
of this type of operation.
Senator Smith. What we have asked here was just a simple question,
whether or not you recommended these i>eople for positions, and you said "of this
type."
That excited my curiosity, as it did Senator Watkins' ; what did you mean
by limiting yourself to "this type"?
Appai'ently you did recommend them for some type of work. We are not
asking you at the moment what kind of work that was. We are asking you
whether or not that was a fact that you did recommend them for some type
of work.
That is not giving away any secrets, except the secret that you may have
recommended them.
Mr. Davies. That, from my superiors, would be no secret, because they can
discuss that.
Senator Smith. I know, but we are trying to find out about these things. That
is wliat we are constituted for. We are not going to get this from your superiors,
if they already know it, but we just asked you a very simple question :
Now, did you recommend them?
Mr. Davifs. But to answer intelligently, so that you would understand the
answer completely, would be to have to go into the nature of this.
Senator Smith. You can say yes or no, "I did," or "I didn't."
Then, if you wish to enlarge or explain, if you say "I did," then I can see how
you might wish to go further and say, "Here is the reason I did," or "Here is
what they do."
We are not asking you that at the moment. We are asking you now for the
yes or no answer.
Did you recommend them for anybody?
Mr. Davies. Well, hypothetically, let us put it this way; Supposing — and this
is completely hypothetical — I were to have recommende^l the employment of
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5447
somebody as a double agent, and then I was charged with having recommended
somebody who was known to have belonged in the other camp from us.
The fact that I recommended the employment of a person as a double agent
would be perfectly legitimate, and would be in the national interest of this
country.
But if I can only reply to questions on this, "yes, I suggested the utilization,
not the employment, but the employment of so and so as a double agent"
Senator Smith. Well, there is no suggestion here that we are going to require
you to stop at answering "yes" or "no." We have asked you a simple question.
The answer is either "Yes" or "No." You did or you did not. That is simple.
If you did, there is no reason, so far as I know, from out standpoint, why we
would not give you full opportunity as to why you did, because it might com-
pletely exonerate you even if there had been anything wrong in the first
instance.
Mr. Davies. Well. I can't answer it.
Senator Watkins. You can answer the first question ; but, if you cannot
answer the next one — if there should be a next one — that would be one of the
matters that we can consider as to whether we ought to require you to answer
It or not.
If it should be highly classified, and somebody else ought to answer it, all
right. We can bring somebody else in. But I think you ought to answer
the question whether you did or did not recommend those people.
Mr. Davies. It can't be answered without leading right into this other ques-
tion.
Senator Watkins. I know ; but, if it goes that far, that is one of those things.
I do not think it is revealing any secrets or not, whether you did or did not.
Not only that, but this is an executive session, sir.
Mr. Davies. I realize that. But this is more than top secret. I mean, it is
highly classified, this whole business.
Senator Watkins. Personally, I do not want to press you to revealing any top-
classified secrets that you are under obligation not to reveal.
Mr. Davies. I am under strict obligations not to.
Senator Watkins. But I cannot understand how on earth the question that
has been propounded to you, about the recommendation of these people, could
possibly be that kind of secret.
Senator Smith. Apparently what Mr. Davies is worried about is if he says
"Yes," which is a manifested answer to my mind — if you say "Yes" to that —
then you feel that that standing alone might be prejudicial to you without
an explanation, and you do not feel that you can give an exjilanation.
Mr. Davies. I can't give the explanation.
Senator Smith. The point about this, to my mind, there is no reason why ;
but, if he answers "Yes" and then wishes to consult his superiors and get either
permisvsion or the reason why he cannot answer the rest of the questions, that
would be perfectly all right. I do not wish to press him.
Mr. Davies. It leaves the story half told, and me completely on the spot.
Mr. Morris. I was just asking your individual opinion of these people. You
considered John Fairbank not to be a Communist'?
Mr. Davies. So far as I know.
Mr. Morris. Wilma Fairbank?
Mr. Davies. Not so far as I know.
Mr. Morris. How about Benjamin Schwartz?
Mr. Davies. So far as I know, not a Communist.
Mr. Morris. And Anna Louise Strong?
Mr. Davies. At least a fellow traveler, and maybe a part of the apparatus.
Mr. Morris. Edgar Snow?
Mr. Davies. I don't know well enough to really have a definite opinion.
Mr. Morris. And, finally, Agnes Smedley?
Mr. Davies. I answered that as certainly a part of the apparatus.
Senator Smith. She is dead.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
You see, there are people of very different types ; at least, they seem to me so.
Senator Watkins. How about Mrs. Agnes Smedley? When did you first
come to the conclusion that she was a member of the apparatus, or at least con-
nected with it?
Mr. Davies. From the very beginning of the time I knew her.
Senator Watkins. How long ago was that?
5448 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Davies. In 103,S, whpn she was working with, and intimately identified
with, the Chinese Communist delegation in Hangkow, which at that time was
part of the United Front government in Hangkow.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Davies, the statements that I alluded to as having heen read
contained a report that, when the olijection was raised, some of these people
were Communists. You made the assertion that they certainly were not ; they
were just people who were extremely politically sophisticated.
Mr. Davies. That is untrue.
Mr. Morris. You never interposed an objection to a statement tliat any one
of these people was a Communist?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Morris. Interposing an objection on your part would have been a defense
of them.
Mr. Davies. The statement that you gave me is, of course, as given to you, a
fabrication.
Mr. McRRis. I am not holding the statement. I am telling you what it was.
Mr. Davies. But, had they asked me did I think that Fairbank was a Com-
munist, I would have given them the answer that I gave you. If they asked me
about any of the others, I would have given the answers I gave you, because that
was my feeling.
Senator Smith. You would have given the answer at that time and you still
would have given the answer, to your own knowledge?
Mr. Davies. That is right.
Mr. Morris. I think that is all. Senator.
I told Mr. Davies that we were just going to ask him about one thing. It was
just that one thing that had come under our scrutiny, and we wanted to ask him
about it.
Senator Smith. You are talking about here, if you answered the question and
then explained why, gave the reasons why you answered that way, that you would
be disclosing top-secret information as to present conditions?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Senator Smith. As to current conditions?
Mr. Davies. As an operation as a whole.
Senator Smith. You mean an operation that started in 1949?
Mr. Davies. Well, I shouldn't say when it started, either.
Senator Smith. Back at the time that this question was raised, and continuing
on up to now?
Mr. Davies. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. I have no more questions.
Senator Smith. I think, Mr. I\Iorris, that certainly none of us want to ask Mr.
Davies to do something that he should not do. I think we might have the record,
made and have the chairman and members look it over and see if they want to
pursue the matter further.
Senator Watkins. I feel the same way about it, but I still feel that he could
have answered "Yes" or "No."
Senator Smith. He would have answered "Yes" to my satisfaction, because if
lie answered "No" that would have been a complete answer to the whole thing.
Mr. Morris. And you made a distinction between utilization and employment.
Mr. Davies. Exactly, a very important distinction.
Mr. Morris. All right.
Senator Watkins. He said "employment of this type."
When you said you had not, as I understood it, recommended for employment
of this type, you did not mean to say that you did not recommend them to be
employed ?
Mr. Davies. I will say that I luade no recommendation that they be employed
and put on the CIA rolls and bet'ome part of the CIA operation.
Senator Smith. He is apparently drawing a distinction between "employment"
in the general acceiitation of the word and using somebody in a particular en-
deavor, maybe for compensation and maybe not. I think that is what he has
in mind.
You have not said that, but that is what I believe you have in mind.
Senator Watkins. That is a play on words, but it indicated something to me
that there has been, apparently, a recommendation of employment at some time.
Senator Smith. I think it indicates mysteriousness, myself.
Mr. Davies. It is a mysterious operation.
I am sorry I could not be of more help in this thing, but you understand.
air. Morris. Thank you for coming down, Mr. Davies.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5449
(Thereupon, at 10: 25 a. m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene subjegt to
call of the Chair.)
Exhibit No. 1397A
[executive session — confidential]
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C, Friday, Auyuist 10, 1951.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 : 30 a. m., Hon. Willis Smith
presiding.
i'resent : Senator Smith.
Also present : J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ; and Robert Morris, subcom-
mittee counsel.
Senator Smith. Come to«order, please.
1 understand that this morning we have present to testify Mr. John P. Davies.
Mr. Davies, will you stand and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear that tlie testimony you shall give in this proceeding
before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Davies. I do, sir.
Testimony of John P. Davies, Policy Planning Division, United States
Department of State
Mr. ^ourwine. In order that this record may be full and complete, I respect-
fully suggest that we insert at this point a copy of Senate Resolution 336, Eighty-
first Congress, second session, which is the basic authority for the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee.
Senator Smith. Very well, that will be inserted.
(S. Res. 366 follows:)
[S. Res. 366, 81»t Cong., 2d sess.]
Resolution
Whereas the Congress from time to time has enacted laws designed to protect
the internal security of the United States from acts of espionage and sabotage
and from infiltration by persons wiio seek to overthrow the Government of the
United States by force and violence; and
Whereas those who seek to evade such laws or to violate them with impunity
constantly seek to devise and do devise clever and evasive means and tactics
for such purposes ; and
Whereas agents and dupes of the world Communist conspiracy have been and
are engaged in activities (including the origination and dissemination of
propaganda) designed and intended to bring such protective laws into disrepute
or disfavor and to hamper or prevent effective administration and enforcement
thereof ; and
Whereas it is vital to the internal security of the United States that the Congress
maintain a continuous surveillance over the problems presented by such
activity and threatened activity and over the administration and enforcement
of such laws : Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized sub-
committee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a complete and continuing
study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enfoix-eiuent
of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and
enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and tlie protection
of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and
effects of srbversive activities in the United States, its Territories and poss<'ssions,
including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who
are or may be under the chamination of the foreign government or organizations
controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to
overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.
8S34S— 52 — pt. 14 35
5450 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Sec. 2. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is
authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses,
and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by
subpenas or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production
of such boolis, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to talie such testi-
mony, to procure such printing and binding, and, within the amount appropriated
therefor, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of steno-
graphic services to report liearings of the committee or subcommittee shall not
be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. Subpenas shall be issued by the
chairman of the committee or the subcommittee, and may be served by any
person designated by such chairman.
A majority of the members of the committee, or duly authoriz?d subcommittee
thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that
a lesser number to be fixed by the committee, or by such subcommittee, shall
constitute a quorum for the purpose of administering oaths and taking sworn
testimony.
Sec. 3. The committee, or duly authorized subcommittee, shall have power to
employ and fix the compensation of such officers, experts, and employees as it
deems necessary in the performance of its duties, and is authorized to utilize
the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the vai-ious departments
and agencies of the Government to the extent that such services, information,
facilities, and personnel, in the opinion of the heads of such departments and
agencies, can be furnished without undue interference with the performance of
the work and duties of such departments and agencies.
Sec. 4. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $10,000, shall
be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the
chairman of the committee on or before January 31, 1951.
Mr. SouEWiNE. I believe it would also be well to insert Senate Resolution 7,
Eighty-second Congress, first session, which is the resolution continuing the au-
thority of the subcommittee.
Senator Smith. Very well ; it is so ordered.
(S. Res. 7 is as follows :)
[S. Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]
Resolution
Resolved, That the limitation of expenditures under S. Res. 366, Eighty-
first Congress, relating to the internal security of the Ignited States, acrreed to
December 21, 1950. is hereby increased by $75,000, and such sum together with
any unexpended balance of the sum previously authorized to be expended under
such resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon
vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee and covering obligations
incurred under such resolution on or before January 31, 1952.
Mr. Soitrwine. I should like also to insert at this point the minutes of the
Internal Security Subcommittee for Thursday, January 18, 1951, being that
portion of the minutes which show the subcommittee approval of a resolution
with regard to the quorum of the subcommittee.
Senator Smith. Very well, it is so ordered.
(The minutes referred to follow:)
"The chairman laid before the subcommittee the following resolution:
"Resolved by the special svhcomniittee appohited to investigate the adminis-
tration of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laivs under Sen-
ate Resolution 36G (SJst Cony.) of the Committee on the Judiciary, That pur-
suant to subsection (3) of rule XXV, as amended, of the Standing Rules of
the Senate (S. Res. 180, 81st Cong., 2d sess., agreed to February 1, 1950) a quorum
of the subcommittee for the purpose of taking sworn testimony shall consist
of one Senator of said subcommittee.
"On motion of Senator Ferguson, there being no objection, the above resolution
was adopted."
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Davies, you have testified before this committee in execu-
tive session on August 8, have you notV
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SauRWiNE. At that time, Mr. Davies, certain, questions were asked you
■which you felt you could not answer, before, because they referred to a matter
which, in your opinion, was of a higher classification than top secret; is that
correct?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5451
Mr. Davies. It is at least top secret. It is one of the higher categories of
tOD SGCl'Gt.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Would you explain for the record, Mr. Davies, what the classi-
fications are which are higher than top secret?
Mr. Davies. There are some categories, I believe, which I think it would be
a violation of security to name, which affect certain operations.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You understand that this is an executive session of a com-
mittee of the Senate?
Mr. Davies. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. And is it your understanding that it is a violation of security
to discuss with this committee in executive session and in response to inquiries
classified material?
Mr. Davies. Certainly, of top-secret classification.
Mr. Sourwine. You feel, then, that it would be a violation of security to state
to this committee on this record what classifications may exist higher than top
secret?
Mr. Davies. I think that information is available to the committee.
Mr. Sourwine. I do too, Mr. Davies.
Mr. Davies. And I do not know whether those classifications are, themselves,
classified material, and therefore
Mr. Sourwine. Not l^nowing 'that they are classified material, sir, on what
basis did you previously refuse to discuss it with the committee?
Mr. Davies. The matter simply of identification of classifications?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Davies. Because I can only identify them by relating them to the opera-
tion which they cover.
Mr. Sourwine. I respectfully submit, sir, that you may not mean that answer
to stand just the way you gave it.
Would you read that answer back, Mr. Reporter?
(The record was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean to say, Mr. Davies, that the only way you can
identify the various levels of classified material is by relating to the material
itself?'
Mr. Davies. I misunderstood you.
Mr. Sourwine. I am sure you have.
Mr. Davies. I was talking only about the top level of top secret.
Mr. Sourwine. I am at the present time dealing only with the question of
the method and degree of classification. I am seeking to establish for the record
your familiarity with classified material, the way in which it is classified, and
the relative importance of it. I think that question has become germane be-
cause of the problem that has arisen.
Mr. Davies. I am sorry ; I misunderstood.
Mr. Sourwine. I am sure you did.
To rephrase the question : Would you tell the committee what the degrees of
classification of classified material are?
Mr. Davies. Restricted is the lowest, confidential, secret, and top secret.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. And what comes above top secret?
Mr. Da\t:es. There are classifications within top secret of certain material
which has its own identification in the top-secret category.
Mr. Sourwine. Is the existence of such classifications within the top-secret
classification itself a top secret?
Mr. Davies. I think so, because the identification of it uses a code name which
is associated only Vv-ith that particular operation.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever hear of the classification of "Top secret ultra"?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; that is one.
Mr. Morris. That does not involve a code name, does it?
Mr. Davies. No : that doesn't involve a code name.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever hear of the classification : "Top secret, eyes only"?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that involve a code name?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. That is one of the subclassifications of top secret, isn't it?
Mr. Davies. Eyes only, as I understand it, is not a security classification, but
a distribution classification.
Senator Smith. A what?
Mr. Davies. A distribution, as to whom it goes to.
5452 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SoURWiNE. Top secfet ultra is a security classification?
Mr. Davies. I should say so.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, what authority do you have to classify material in the
State Department, sir?
Mr. Davies. I don't have any authority in myself to classify material ; I am
not in a top-secret office.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any authority to classify any material at any of
the levels of classification?
Mr. Davies. I believe that I have authority to classify up to top secret.
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you exercised that authority on occasions in the past?
Mr. Davies. Oh, certainly.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you ever attempted to exercise the authority to classify
some material or matter as top secret?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; but subject, of course, to the approval of that classification,
which is the procedure.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Do you mean you have only made recommendations for that
classification?
Mr. Davies. Yes. I mark it top secret and it carries on.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that material which you had originated?
Mr. Davies. Yes, some of it — entirely what I had originated, yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever classify anyone else's material as top secret?
Mr. Davies. Not that I recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Or any hiiiher classification than top secret?
Mr. Davies. Not that I recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any authority with regard to classification of ma-
terial outside the State Department?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not attempt to classify or pass on the classification of
material at the Department of Justice or the CIA or Military Intelligence?
Mr. Davies. No, sir.
Mr. Soukwine. Now, is it true, then, that material which is not originated
by you, in order to be top secret, in your understanding, must have come to you
from one of your superiors in the Department with the top-secret classification?
Mr. Davies. That is, written material; yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. All right, sir.
Now, for the moment I would like to take a slightly different line of inquiry,
and I would like to ask you some questions with regard to your knowledge of an
acquaintanceship with certain persons.
Some of this will be repetitive of testimony which you gave day before yes-
terday.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Speaking now of Mr. Benjamin K. Schwartz, do you know Mr.
Schwartz?
Mr. Davies. Yes, I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How long have you known him?
Mr. Davies. Since 1948 or 1949.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall how you met him?
Mr. Davies. I am sorry ; I don't recall the precise circumstances under which
I met him.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you seen him on subsequent occasions?
Mr. Davies. I have seen him, roughly, I should say, three or four times.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall any of those occasions?
Mr. Davies. I recall two of the occasions. I cannot give you the date beyond
saying that the most recent one, I believe, was either late last year or early this
year, and the previous one, I think, was some time in 1950.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you tell us something about the nature of those occa-
sions?
Mr. Davies. A most recent occasion was when I had lunch with him and an
American businessman by the name of Hartmann, I believe it is, who is a repre-
sentative of Cornell Bros., in San Francisco.
Others present were Mr. C. P>. Marshall, of the policy planning staff, and Mr.
Kenneth Krentz, policy plaiming staff.
Mr. Sour wine. Would you tell us what the purpose of the meeting was, sir?
Was it social?
Mr. Davies. It was a casual get-together. He happened to be in town. He
joined a luncheon that we had arranged with Haitmann.
Mr. Soubwine. Did Hartmann bring him in to the luncheon?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5453
Mr. Davies. No; I invited him in to the luncheon.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How did you invite him?
Mr. Davies. Pardon?
Mr. SouKwiNE. How did you invite him? By telephone?
Mr. Davies. I don't recall whether I invited him by telephone or whether —
we had made a previous arrangement for lunch.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You had made a previous arrangement?
Mr. Davies. I mean, as a matter of an hour or so. I had seen him in the
halls, or some such thing, and had then said, "Come to lunch with us, because
we are having lunch."
Mr. SouRWiNE. Does he work within the Department?
Mr. Davies. Not that I know of. He was down from Harvard, where he was a
research fellow, or maybe now on the faculty.
I\Ir. SouRwiNE. Does he come to Washington frequently?
Mr. Davies. I do not believe that he does.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you see him when he does come to Washington?
Mr. Davies. He may have come on occasions that I have not seen him.
As I say
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you usually know when he comes to Washington? Does
he look yon up, or call you?
Mr. Davies. No — well, I don't know. As I say, all I know is that on two
occasions, either 1950 or 1951 I saw him.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Did I understand you to say on the occasion of this luncheon
which was in 1951 with Mr. Hartman and the others, you were not sure whether
you had invited him by telephone or whether you had met him in the hall?
Mr. Davies. That is right.
Mr. $ourwine. Now. if you had wanted to invite him by telephone, where
would you have called?
Mr. Davies. He may have called me. I would not have known where to have
called him.
Mr. SouRwixE. You don't recall whether he called you or not?
Mr. Davies. Or whether I met him in the hall and said "Come to lunch."
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you recall what was discussed at the luncheon?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; in general terms.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Could you tell the committee?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; with pleasure.
I asked Schwartz what he had dug up in his studies of the Chinese Com-
munists.
I might say parenthetically here that Schwartz is one of the most — has made
one of the most extensive studies of Chinese Communists' documents, history,
and so forth, from original sources— which is very unusual — because he works
in Chinese, Japanese, and the Russian languages, which is quite
Mr. Morris. Is that at Harvard University?
Mr. Davies. It is Harvard. He is one of the really serious students of the
sub.iect. That is the end of my parenthetical comment, and now back to the
subject.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes.
Mv. Davies. I was very interested in the strategy and the tactics which were
being used by the Chinese Communists in Korea at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This was in what month?
Mr. Davies. This must have been at the time of the Chinese offensive, after the
big Chinese offensive in North Korea.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you recall the month, with that refreshment?
Mr. Davies. Let's see. That must have been in the winter or early spring that
this luncheon took place.
Mr. Sourwine. That is some time between January and the end of April of this
year?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You cannot place it any closer than that?
Mr. Davies. I couldn't place it, because it was some time after the offensive,
and I have been wondering about the strategy that was used, particularly the
question of the human sea tactics which the Chinese Communists have talked
a great deal about.
I queried Schwartz as to what he had discovered in his readings and research
on the subject and he said there was, of course, a great deal of material on it.
This was of considerable interest to us, because I had not had much success with
our research people in getting translated material on the strategic thinking of
the Chinese Communists.
5454 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
It is strongly influenced by Clausewitz and is also influenced by Lenin, who,
as you know, is influenced by Clausewitz in his military thinking, and therefore,
Schwartz was a very interesting check point.
Mr. PouKWixE. Did you find that the other members of the State Department
staff who were with you at the luncheon were also interested in what he had
to say?
Mr. Da VIES. Yes. certainly, and so was Hartmann, of course, who is an Ameri-
can businessman, who knows the Far East very well. He is a very exp-rienced
man. He thought it was very interesting.
Jlr. MoKRis. Is Schwartz interested with John K. Fairbank at Harvard?
Mr. Davies. I don't know whether he is formally connected with him or not.
I don't know whether he is now. He was connected with Fairbank when doing
his Chinese study.
Mr. Morris. Do you mean in Hawaii?
Mr. Davtes. No, at Harvard, when he was doing his graduate work, and taking
his doctorates.
Mr. Morris. You don't know whether Schwartz worked with Fairbank during
the war?
Mr. Davies. He was in Military Intelligence during the war.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Schwartz was?
Mr. Davies. Schwartz was.
Mr. SoiTRWiNE. Do you recall, now that you have b?en thinking about the sub-
ject of Mr. Schwartz for some few minutes, perchance who it was that introduced
you, or how you happened to meet him?
Mr. Davies. It was probably Fairbank, because Fairbank considered him one
of the bright boys on the subject
Mr. Sourwine. Did he liring him in to see you. perhaps?
Mr. Da\'ies. Who had these extraordinary qualifications.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he perhaps bring him in to see you?
Mr. Davies. I don't know whether he sent him down with a note or told him
to call me when he came to Washington, or whether I may have seen him on a
trip that I made up to Harvard in, let's see, I think that was 1947.
Mr. Sourwine. If you will pardon us ; I want to be sure the record is straight.
I realize we are going backward and forward over your recollection.
I understood that you had testified earlier that you had only known Schwartz
since 1940. Are you saying now that there is a possibility that you might have
met him in 1947? It is possible I misunderstood you, of course.
Mr. Davies. Now that I think back to my trip to Harvard, I may have known
him since 1947. I would like to make that correction.
I\Ir. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Davies. It is possible.
Mr. Morris. What was Schwartz doing at Harvard at that- time?
Mr. Davies. He was working, must have been working on his doctorate, or
maybe his M. A., I don't know.
Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Fairbank present at that time?
Mr. Davies. At the time he was at Harvard, yes.
Mr. Morris. So tliey were together in 1947?
Mr. Davies. If I met Schwartz then, Fairbank was at Harvard in 1947.
Mr. Sottrwine. I think the witness has testified, Mr. Morris, that he either
was introduced to Schwartz by Fairbank at Harvard in 1947 or that Fairbank
sent Schwartz to him in Washington, either with a note or telling him to call
him.
It is in one of those two alternatives, is that right, sir? •
Mr. Davies. I think so.
IVIr. Sottrwine. You have already partially answered this question, sir, but
will you expand as much as necessary to complete the answer to the question, to
wit : What do you know of Mr. Schwartz?
Mr. Davies. I know him through some of his writings, which I have seen In
the mimeographic form, sent down by the Cluckhorn Russian Institute, at Har-
vard. They mimeographed some of his papers. I know him from his writings,
which are considered very scholarly — rather dry — but a thorough studv of the
early period of the Chinese Communists, which is the period he is interested in.
As a person, he struck me as a shy, rather professorial, very dispassionate
individual. That is abnnt all.
Mr. Sourwine. You have referred to one of the instances on which you met
him, that is in 19.ol.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5455
Mr. SouRwiNE. You said you could recall at least one other of the three or
four. Would you tell us about that other one ?
Mr. Davies. It was an instance in, I should say it was 1950 or 1949. This was
at a period when he was trying to make up his mind whether to go on with
teaching or to go into some Government job, research, or something like that;
and we discussed the pros and cons of it in informal terms. It was, I believe,
a visit to my office.
Mr. SouuwiNE. Would you say he had come to you for advice?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; he had come to consult me as to what he should do.
Mr. SouRWixE. You knew him fairly well then, at that time?
Mr. Davies. Not particularly well, but I was one of the few people in Govern-
ment that he knew, you see?
Mr. SouRWiNE. I see.
Mr. Davies. And I must say that I could have recommended Government
service to him very highly.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You knew him well enough to know what his circle of acquaint-
anceship was in Government at that time?
Mr. Davies. I knew some of the people that he knew, amongst the research
people.
Mr. Sourwtne. Well, you apparently knew him well enough to know he didn't
know very many people in Government?
Mr. Davies. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. That connotes a very good acquaintanceship with his circle
of acquaintances, doesn't it?
Mr. Davies. No ; because he told me he knew only so and so and so and so,
a few people in our research shop who were doing research parallel to his, but
in Government.
Mr. Sourwine. What did you advise him to do?
Mr. Davies. I don't like to give people advice about going into the Government
or staying out of the Government. I think they have to make that bitter choice
themselves.
Mr. Sourwine. You then refused to advise him?
Mr. Davies. I certainly did. Thereby the Government loses many good people,
too.
Mr. Sourwine. I had thought perhaps because of your earlier answer that you
could not advise him very strongly to come into the Government, or words to
that effect, that you had expressed that view to him?
Mr. Davies. I don't recall whether I expressed it explictly. I said I thought
his considerable talents could be used in the Government.
Mr. Sourwine. Pardon me. May we suspend for a moment?
Senator Smith. Yes. We will take a short recess.
(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing was resumed.)
Senator Smith. We will reconvene. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. I believe you have now told us in substance what you know
of that earlier meeting. Do you recall any other meeting that you had with
Mr. Schwartz?
Mr. Davies. Not in definite terms. I think that I saw him on another trip
that he made to Washington.
Mr. Sourwine. Before or after the occasion on which he had asked your advice?
Mr. Davies. Well, I am not sure whether it was before or after. It was on
one side or the other.
Mr. Sourwine. You must have seen him before that occasion on which he
asked your advice or he would not have come to you for that purpose.
Mr. Davies. That is right ; so it was presumably before.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you place the time of the occasion when he came to see
you at your office and asked your advice with rejrard to his career?
Mr. Davies. I believe that I recollected it was some time in 1950.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, you had already stated, I think, that it was in 1947 that
you first met him.
I\Ir. Davies. Yes ; I may have met him in 1947.
Mr. Sourwine. How much later might it have been?
Mr. Davies. It might have been 1948 or 1949.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it your statement that you cannot recall whether you met
him in 1947 or 1948 or 1949?
Mr. Davies. W^hen I first met him, I cannot recall whether it was 1947 or
1948 or 1949.
5456 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is it also your statement, however, tliat on the occasion when
you did meet him it was either through introduction by Mr. Fairbank at Harvard",
or through a contact arranged by Mr. I^'airbank here in Washington?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, is it your statement that at this time you do not recall
any other occasions on which you met Mr. Schwartz?
Mr. Davies. Any other than
Mr. SouKwiNE. Than the two with regard to which you have testified, and
the original meeting, concerning which you have not testified, except that there
was such a meeting?
Mr. Davies. I do not recall any others. There may have been others.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is it your statement that you did not make a practice of
meeting with him, that there were no frequent associations with him, or fre-
quent meetings?
Mr. Davies. Certainly.
Mr. Sour WINE. Is that your statement?
Mr. Davies. That is my statement.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall any occasions when you originated a communi-
cation with him?
Mr. Davies. I do not recall any such instance, but I may well have written
to him and asked him if he was coming to Washington.
Mr. SouRVPiNE. Do you think it possible you might have written to him more
than once?
Mr. Davies. I might have written to him more than once. I might have written
to him twice. If I wrote at all, I don't think it was more than perhaps twice.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You did not then carry on a correspondence with him; is that
correct?
Mr. Davies. I did not carry on anything that might be generally termed a
correspondence.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Could you say how many letters you might have received from
him?
Mr. Davies. I doubt that I received more than one or two letters from him,
perhaps informing me that he was coming to Washington.
Mr. Sour wine. Do you remember receiving any particular letters from him?
Mr. Davies. No ; I don't recall any.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember that you did receive certain letters from him?
Mr. Davies. No ; I don't remember that, but I may well have.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember that you did write letters to him on one or
more occasions?
Mr. Davies. That, I can't be sure of, but I would not exclude that I had.
Mr. SoiTRWiNE. Do you know whether you ever telephoned him?
Mr. Davies. I don't think I have ever telephoned him. I don't remember,
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall whether he ever telephoned you?
Mr. Davies. Oh, yes ; I am sure he must have telephoned to me.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Would that be on several occasions?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; tliat would probably be on one or two occasions.
Mr. SOURWINE. Were those occasions when he had come to Washington, and
wanted to let you know that he was here?
Mr. Davies. I should say that there would be such occasions.
Mr. SouRwiNE. When he made those calls, was it in the nature of putting him-
self at your disposal or in the nature of asking for an opportunity to see you?
Mr. Davies. Asking for an opportunity to see me.
Mr. SoiTRwiNE. Do you recall what he wanted, on any of those occasions?
Mr. Davies. Not otherwise than as I have previously testified.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever sent him any telegrams or
cables?
]\Ir. DAVIES. No ; I do not recall any telegrams to him.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean that you did not send him any telegrams?
Mr. Davies. I did not, so far as I recall, send him any telegrams.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever send you any telegrams or cables?
Mr. Davies. Not so far as I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ha^e a question, Mr. Morris?
Mr. Morris. No ; I do not think so.
Mr. Sourwine. Other than the occasion on which you all had luncheon, with
regard to which you have testified, in the early months of 1951, is that correct?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; I would say early in 1951.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5457
Mr. SouRWiNE. Other than that occasion, do you recall ever breaking bread
with Mr. Schwartz?
Mr. Davies. No ; I do not.
Mr. SouuwiNE. Other than the occasion concerning which you have testified,
in 1950, that is, the occasion in 19.50 concerning which you have testified, on
which occasion he asked your advice with regard to his course of action
Mr. Davies. Yes.
. Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you ever discussed with him his employment or possible
employment in the Government?
Mr." Davies. I may have discussed it with him on the first occasion that I
met him, or if there was still another occasion, I might have discussed it at
that time. We have established a total of three meetings, I believe.
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that is right.
IMr. Davies. And I said, I do not exclude that there may have been a fourth.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; it is your memory that when he first met you his possible
employment in the Government was discussed?
Mr. Davies. That may well have been discussed at that time, because he was
looking forward to what he would do after the conclusion of his studies.
Mr. Sourwine. That was in 1947?
Mr. Davies. Either 1947 or 1948 or 1949.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; some time prior to the end of 1949?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You discussed with him the question of employment in the
Fefleral Government?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he at that time ask you to assist him in any way?
Mr. Davies. I don't think so, because he had not, you see, made up his mind.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Fairbank ask you to assist him in any way?
Mr. Davies. Fairbank initially, of course, was very anxious for him to stay in
academic life and to go on and continue his studies and then teach.
Later — This must have been the end of 19.50 or early 1951, when there was a
question of Schwartz' being called back into military service asain — Fairbank
felt that his considerable talents shovdd not be overlooked, and that if he were
going back into military service he should be in some capacity where his experi-
ence and his training would be of use, or that, as an alternative, he mi"ht be
placed in some other Government service; for example, the State Department,
in the research field.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Fairbank told you that that is the way he felt about it?
Mr. Davies. That was his thnn,!2:ht.
Mr. Sourwine. He told you that that was his thought?
Mr. Davies. Yes. And a third alternative was that Schwartz continue at
Harvard in the Russian Institute, but do work which could be considered as
contributing: to the national interest, and thereby his draft be deferred?
Mr. Sourwine. This was in what year?
Mr. Davies. This was last year. I remember that conversation.
Mr. Sourwine. Incidentally, is it Dr. Schwartz?
Mr. DA\^ES. He is a doctor now ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Doctor of what— philosophy?
Mr. Davies. I suppose Ph. D.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when he got that degree?
IMr. Davies. I think in 1949 or 1950.
Mr. Sourwine. 1949 or 1950. Over what period was Dr. Schwartz connected
with the Russian Institute at Harvard?
Mr. Davies. I can't answer that definitely, but I would say that the Russian
Institute began to use his services as a consultant, or take his papers and publish
his papers, shortly after they were established, which I think was in 1947 or
1948.
Mr. Sourwine. How did you learn that, Mr. Davies?
Mr. Davies. I know Cluckhorn, and I see the Russian Institute stuff. It is
sent down to me by Cluckhorn.
Mr. Sourwine. They used his papers, then, as early as that, and identified
them as his?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I see.
Mr. Davies. They were mimeographed; I don't think they were printed.
Monographs, with his name, and the heading at the top "Russian Institute".
Mr. Sourwine. Is he still associated with the Russian Institute?
5458 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Davies. I don't know what lie is doing now.
Mr. SotJuwiNE. When is the last that you heard of him or from him?
Mr. Davies. The last I heard of him was this luncheon that we had, and I
have heard, so far as I can recall, nothing since that.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Did he ever serve in any consultant capacity with the De-
partment of State, or any agency of the Department of State?
Mr. Davies. That I cannot answer definitely. I think he came down on con-
sultation at one time, whether formally or informally, I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever serve you in a consultant capacity?
Mr. davies. No ; certainly not formally. I was interested in what he was
writing, to see it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever tell him that you had recommended him or were
going to recommend him for any position in which he could serve his Gov-
ernment?
Mr. Davies. In one of the earlier contacts — that is, perhaps the first one; or,
if there was a fourth, in the early period — I told him, as I have indicated here,
that I thought his considerable talents should be turned to use by this Gov-
ernment, and I said that I would want to explore on my own the possibilities
of where he might be utilized, but gave him no indication.
Mr. SoiiRWiNE. Did you tell him that you had made any specific recommenda-
tions, or that you would?
IMr. Davies. Oh, no.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you subsequently explore the possibilities of his utiliza-
tion in Government?
Mr. Davies. I did, in the Department, I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Davies. In research, and in connection with the- question, which raises
this whole situation.
Mr. Sourwine. I am not sure that I know just what you mean by that. Would
you expand on that answer a little, if you please?
Mr. Davies. On the question of whether or not he might be utilized in a
clandestine operation.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with him the possibility of his utilization
in a clandestine operation?
Mr. Davies. No : certainly not.
Mr. Sourwine. Not ever, at any time?
Mr. Davies. Certainly not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever make a recommendation that he be used in a
clandestine operation?
Mr. Davies. This is where I came in.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Davies, the term "clandestine operation" is sufficiently
broad that it does not connote anything particularly classified.
Mr. Davies. I considered and suggested his utilization.
Mr. Sourwine. You considered and suggested his utilization?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. In a clandestine operation?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did anyone else in the State Department ever suggest to you
the utilization of Dr. Schwartz in a clandestine operation?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did any of your superiors in the State Department ever direct
you to make a recommendation to any other agency with regard to the employ-
ment of Dr. Schwartz?
Mr. Davies. Insofar as I made any suggestions of this character, they were
made under standing orders from my .superiors.
Mr. Sourwine. I can understand that. sir.
Mr. Davies. Rut not specitically with respect to Dr. Schwartz.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; I can understand that statement. But I would ap-
preciate it, if you would, if you feel that you can, give us a direct "Yes" or "No"
answer to the previous question. Do you recall it?
Mr. Davies. The answer is "No." ■*
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. The answer is "No."
Mr. Davies. Yes ; it is "No."
Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry I confu.sed the record a little bit by saying "Yes"
after you said "No." I wanted to make it perfectly clear your answer was a
direct negative.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5459
Did you on your own initiative malce a recommendation for the utilization of
Dr. Schwartz by another agency, and, if so, did you make that recommendation
without Dr. Schwartz' knowledge?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; without Dr. Schwartz' knowledge.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you feel that you are unable, for security reasons, to an-
swer any further questions with regard to the nature of the recommendations
that you made respecting the utilization of Dr. Schwartz by another agency?
Mr. Davies. I do, sir; because of the reasons which I have previously stated,
and because it is, strictly speaking, the operation of another agency, which it
would be most inappropriate in any event for me to comment upon.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Until you are asked to comment upon what some other agency
did, I do not think we' need to cross that bridge. We are concerned at the
moment, and up to this point, with what you did.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouuwiNE. And I want the record to be perfectly clear on this point be-
cause, frankly, there may be some question with regard to what privilege you
may have under the circumstances.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwixe. And I want to be sure the record shows your basis for claiming
the privilege.
Now, on the basis of the testimony that is in the record, is this a fair state-
ment :
You did make a recommendation to another agency for the utilization of
Mr. Schwartz by that agency, in a clandestine manner; you made that recom-
mendation on your own initiative, and not having been instructed or directed by
any superior to make it. In spite of which situation, you now state that the
making of it constituted a top secret or higher matter, concerning which you
cannot testify.
Is that correct?
Mr. Davies. Would you read that back to me?
( ihe record was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Davies. That is not entirely accurate.
Mr. Sourwine. By all means correct it.
Mr. Davies. Because, when I took an action, as you say, on my own initiative,
it was not a private action, a personal action ; it was an action in the line of
duty, within the framework of standing orders that I had from my superiors.
All of my actions within that framework were, because of the nature of this
operation, properly not divulgable to anyone outside of the executive charged
with knowing about and conducting this operation. That is my position. It is
a very awkward one, in the circumstances.
Mr. SoURWiNK. I wanted the record to show clearly what your position was.
I think, in fairness to you, it must be. I trust you will appreciate that I was
attempting only to summarize how the record appeared at that time.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. So that you might have a chance to correct it if it was giving
a false impression of your true position.
Senator Smith. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator Smith. Back on the record.
Mr. Sourwine. Was this, then, Mr. Davies, a case in which you had exercised
your prerogative to initiate a top-secret classification since, as you have stated,
this was with respect to a subject which, under your general orders, you con-
sidered to require such a classification?
Mr. Davies. Yes. It was impossible for me to act with respect to this partic-
ular question, outside of the top-secret category.
Mr. Sourwine. I want to leave that for the moment, at least, and I want to
ask what may appear to be an unrelated question, but we will bring it in later,
Mr. Chairman, in connection with another line of inquiry.
Please don't let your natural modesty hold you down in answering this ques-
tion, sir :
Is it not true that you are recognized as an authority on Far East affairs?
Mr. Davies. I think that is hotly disputed in certain quarters.
Mr. Sourwine. You have tried over the years to mak-e yourself an authority,
or at least to keep yourself currently well informed on Far East affairs ; is that
not true?
Mr. DA^^ES. I have endeavored to keep myself currently well informed.
5460 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you believe that you are well informed on Far East affairs
at the present time?
Mr. Davies. I believe that I am fairly well informed on Far East affairs. But,
during the past 6 years, I have not kept very close contact with Far East affairs,
ever since I proceeded to the Embassy of Moscow and the Soviet Union.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, I am sure you appreciate these questions are not being
asked for the purpose of embarrassing you ; they are a necessary line of ques-
tions, necessary to establish that you are an expert in the field.
Are you familiar with the Communist Party line as it applies to affairs in the
Far East?
]\Ir. Davies. Yes ; I believe that I am, generally.
IMr. SouRwiNE. You necessarily have tried to keep yourself apprised of that
line as it changed?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you feel that you know what the Communist ideology is
with regard to the Far East?
]\Ir. Davies. Yes.
INIr. SouRwiNE. And you attempt to keep yourself currently informed with re-
gard to that ideology?
Mr. Davies. I do.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you give us your own general conclusion as to the extent
to which you may have sympathized with that Communist ideology?
Mr. DA^^ES. I have at no time sympathized with the Communist ideology. My
basic motivation, since I was a small American missionary boy in China, was
almost Xenophonically American.
Mr. Sourwine. If the witness will permit me to render an apology, which ap-
pears to be called for, I think we have a slight semantic difference. I did not
use the word or intend to use the word "sympathized" in the connotation in
which the witness accepted it. However, Mr. Davies, you had a perfect right
to accept it that way.
May I rephrase my question?
INlr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. What I am really after is your own general conclusion as to
the extent to which your own conclusions and feelings with regard to Far East
matters coincided with the current Communist Party ideology on those same
things.
Mr. Davies. I cannot say that my opinions coincide with Communist ideologies
in any respect.
IMr. Sourwine. Very good.
Now, if we may go back to Dr. Schwartz; : Have you had a sufficient acquaint-
ance with him to be able to have formed an opinion as to the extent to which
his opinions agreed with Communist ideologies and the Communist Party line?
Mr. Davies. We went, in my relations with Dr. Schwartz, very little into the
opinions. What I was after was what information he had dug up, and I
would evaluate that myself.
Mr. Sourwine. Is your answer to the question "No," then?
Mr. Davies. My answer to the question is that so far as I knew Dr. Schwartz,
I saw no indication of his associating himself in any way with Communist
ideology ; to the contrary.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiries concerning Dr.
Schwartz' record, his possible affiliation with Conununists or Communist-front
organizations, or his loyalty?
Mr. Davies. No : I did not, because, I might go on and say a little further that
when I considered him as potential material for Government use, I was in-
terested in his knowledge, and not his attitudes, at that time. So far as the
check on his attitudes, that was not my job. That was the job of the Security
people. If they came up with a negative check on his attitudes, then I had
no further interest.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that mean, sir, or by that do you mean that you never
discussed the question of his possible Communist affiliations, with anyone in
Government?
Mr. Davies. No ; that did not arise with the people with whom I discussed
this matter.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, let me rephrase the question. Did you ever discuss Dr.
Schwartz's possible Communist or Communist-front affiliations with any other
person in Government?
Mr. Davies. I cannot recall any instance of it.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5461
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever defend him against the suggestion that he might
have Communist or Communist-front connections?
Mr. Da VIES. I may have said tliat I saw no indications of it.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Did you ever state with reference to him, that he was not
Communist, but only very sophisticated, or very politically sophisticated?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Souk WINE. That is a categorical answer? You never did make that
statement?
Mr. Davies. That is a categorical answer.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever
Mr. Davies. One doesn't make that statement about anybody, these days.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by
another Government agency for policy guidance?
Mr. Davies. No, sir — categorically.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state to a representative of another Government
agency that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to you as a consultant?
Mr. Davies. I cannot recall ever having made any such statement. However,
it is true that I was interested in what Schwartz had produced. And in that
sense, that any material coming in, information, is of help. In that sense, he
was.
Jlr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have told a representative of another
agency of Government that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to you as a con-
sultant?
Mr. Davies. I have no recollection of ever having said anything of that sort.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you say categorically that you did or that you did not?
Mr. Davies. I would not have said it to
Mr. Sourwine. I have not asked any question about whom you said it to,
sir.
Mr. DA\^ES. I simply have no recollection of ever having made such a state-
ment.
Mr. Sourwine. I would like to have a categorical answer, if we can get it, and
let me recall to you in that connection that yoii have already testified on this
record that Dr. Schwartz did not serve as a consultant to you at any time.
Mr. Davies. He did not, certainly.
Mr. Sourwine. That being the case, sir, does that help you to answer the
question as to whether at any time you told any person, a representative of
another Government agency, that he had been helpful to you as a consultant?
Mr. Davies. Well, I could not have said that, because he was not my con-
sultant.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever say it?
Mr. Davies. No, I never did.
Mr. Sourwine. All risht, sir. That is all I was trying to get at.
Now, I would like to discuss Edgar Snow. Do you know Mr. Edgar Snow?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. When did you meet Mr. Snow?
Mr. Davies. I first met Mr. Snow, so far as I can remember, in probably 1933
or 1934.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall the occasion, or in what manner you met him?
Mr. Davies. I think I recall a cocktail party at his house, to which I was
invited, amongst many other people.
Mr. Sourwine. That was in 1934?
Mr. Davies. 1933 or 1934, or maybe 1935.
Mr. Sourwine. Where did he live at that time?
Mr. Davies. This was in Pekin. At that time he was a language ofiicer at
the Embassy, or then Legation, in Pekin.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how you came to be invited? Was it because
of your diplomatic connections?
Mr. Davies. Very likely, and because it was a small community there, that
entertained one another.
Mr Sourwine. Now, did you see him on frequent occasions thereafter?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Were the occasions of your meetings thereafter so infrequent
that you can recall them?
Mr. Davies. They were so infrequent that I do not recall any.
Mr. Sourwine. In other words, you met him in 1933 or 1934 and you have
never met him again?
5462 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Davies. Oh, during that period of 1933, 1934, 1935, I cannot recall but
one meeting.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Perhaps it would be helpful if at this point, instead of asking
precise questions, I simply requested that the witness give for the record his
recollection of his acquaintanceship with Mr. Snow.
Mr. Davies. Yes. Mr. Snow was a journalist who traveled extensively
throughout the Far East.
Senator Smith. Is he the man who wrote the book People on Our Side?
Mr. Davies. I think he did write that book. I haven't read it. I think he
has written it.
Senator Smith. In which, as I recall, he attempted to show that not all
righteousness was on our side, or something of that sort?
Mr. Davies. I have not read the book. He was a journalist who traveled
extensively throughout the Far East, throughout Asia and Europe. Our paths
crossed at various times because I, too, traveled on the same continents, and
being Americans, we would meet each other on social occasions, or he would
come into an office where I was stationed.
I cannot recall any instance of meeting him in the period following the first
meeting, until 1942 or 1943, when I was detailed to the commanding general of
the China-Burma-India theater.
I\rr. Sour WINE. Who was the general?
Mr. Davies. General Stilwell.
At that time Snow made several trips to the theater, and we met on those
occasions, briefly, and then he would move on. He would come to the G-2, and
to me, as one of the political advisers. He was around as a newspaperman,
and my contacts with him were of that nature.
We made one trip together in the company of the American Ambassador to
China. Mr. Gauss, in India, where Mr. Gauss was visiting. It was a trip from
New Dehli to Allahabad. I stopped off there to see if I could get an interview
with Nehru and Snow stopped off at the same time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that in your official capacity, which was
Mr. Davies. That was in my official capacity as investigator, political officer,
exploring for General Stilwell, the internal political situation in India, which
was then very explosive and dangerous. He helped to arrange for a meeting
with Nehru, and also got me into a meeting of the Indian Congress Executive
Committee, and I think probably I was the tirst and only American official who
had ever attended one of these meetings.
I then saw him some time during the war, at Cairo, for a day, as we passed,
I rr'member meeting him at Shepards' Hotel.
Then my next recollection is a visit that he made to Moscow when I was
stationed at the Embassy there, and we saw him then socially. And since then
I do not recollect of any instance of having seen him.
Oh, I have seen him at the Metropolitan Club, but not to talk with him.
Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell the committee about Mr. Snow, in addition
to what you have already said?
Mr. Davies. Mr. Snow is a man whom I never became well acquainted with,
and therefore I have no very strong impressions of his personality or his outlook.
beyond that he is a very active newspaperman who had leftist tendencies in the
war years.
Sir. SOURWINE. Do you mean in 1941-45?
Mr. Davies. Yes, and before it — in the thirties, when he wrote Ked Star Over
China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. He had leftist tendencies when you first met him in Pekin?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether he still has those tendencies today?
Mr. Davies. Not having seen him, I cannot speak from personal experience,
although one of his recent articles on Tito and Russia seemed to indicate a
considerable disillusionment with the Soviet Union.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to discuss political affairs with
him?
Mr. Davies. Only as I would with any newspaperman trying to explore what
information he had that would be of use to us.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any business relationships with him?
]\Ir. Davies. Commercial? Financial?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Commercial or financial affairs conducted with the hope of
mutual profit?
Mr. Davies. No.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5463
Mr. SouRwiNE. That does not necessarily imply that you were both on the same
side, beciiuse all business affairs are conducted with the hope of profit or loss.
Mr. Davies. No; only from an int'orniation profit on my side. ■
Mr. SouuwiNE. I mean commercial or financial. You never had any com-
mercial or financial business with him?
Ml-. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRWixE. Did you know him to have any connection with the Institute of
Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. I didn't know that he had any connections with the Institute of
Pacific Relations. If, indeed he did, I didn't know it.
Mi*. Sourwixe. Do you now know whether he ever did?
:\rr. Davies. No, I don't.
I\Ir. SouRWiNE. And do you know what the Institute of Pacific Relations is?
Mr. Davies. Yes, I do.
Mr. SoiiRwiNE. Do you know any persons who are connected with the Institute
of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. Yes. I could not give you a complete list, because I do not
know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. But you do know some?
Mr. Davies. Yes, I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That lays the foundation for this question :
Did you ever see Mr. Snow in the company of any person whom you knew to be
connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. Inasmuch as many Americans in the Far East belonged to the
Institute of Pacific Relations, or subscribed to their journal, I assume that I
must have, but I can't identify any such relationships.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever have any occasion to comunicate or confer with
Mr. Snow in connection with or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And do you recall whether you ever wrote any letters to Mr.
Snow?
Vr. Davies. Yes, I think I did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How extensive was that correspondence?
Mr. Davies. Very limited. He had a girl friend in Moscow. I remember his
inquiring about her, and my writing back and saying that the NKVD had not
gotten her and she was all right.
Mr. Sourwine. That was at the time you were in Moscow?
Mr. Davies. When I was in Moscow.
Mr. Sourwine. When was that?
Mr. Davies. That was in, I should say, 1945 or 1946.
Mr. Sourwine. Was that the only ocasion you can recall when you corresponded
with Mr. Snow?
Mr. Davies. That is the only occasion.
Mr. Morris. Can yo-u name this girl, Mr. Davies?
Mr. Davies. I don't remember what her name was. She was a girl who had
contacts with people in the British Embassy. She was a — we all recognized
her as somebody that the NKVD was ti-ying to use on us. She was a cute dish.
Mr. Sourwine. You say someone in the NKVD was trying to use her?
Mr. Davies. We assumed that.
Mr. Sourwine. You say you all recognized her?
Mr. Davies. "Recognized" is the wrong word. We assumed that.
Mr. Sourwine. And you say she was Mr. Sno-w's girl friend?
Mr. Davies. I don't — I think that
Mr. Sourwine. I wasn't a.sking you what you meant by it. You did use that
woi-d. didn't you — his 'girl friend"?
Mr. Davies. I think it was an "A" political relationship.
Mr. Sourwine. A what?
Mr. Davies. An "A" political relationship.
Mr. Sourwine. What does an "A" political relationship mean?
Mr. Davies. A relationship without any political connotation.
f Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Sourwine. I think perhaps the committee might be interested if you
might recall the young lady's name. I would like to ask you, if the name does
come to your mind, or if you can in any way refresh your memory in the future
and can furnish the committee with her name, would ycu try to do that?
Mr. Davies. I think I may be able to.
5464 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. If the name is subsequently furnished, may it be in-
serted in the record at this point, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. SouKwiNE. Do you know why Mr. Snow wrote to you for information
with regard to the young lady in question?
Mr. Davies. Because he had known me at various times, and I suppose that
I was the member of the American Embassy staff that he had had the acquaint-
anceship with the longest.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was he keeping close track on your movements at that time,
do you know?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. How did he know you were in Moscow?
Mr. Davies. Where a foreign officer is is pretty well known to the corre-
spondents corps. They know where we are, because they tell one another that
so-and-so is in such-and-such a place.
Mr. Sourwine. I thought perhaps there might have been something in his
letter that would give you a clue to that and that you would bring it out on
response to the question. That is why I asked you that.
Mr. Davies. I don't recall the letter.
Mr. Sourwine. Something, that he might have wanted to find someone in
Moscow he knew, and looked in the register to find if someone he knew was in
Moscow, and said so in his letter?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; this was after his visit to Moscow, so he knew I was there.
Mr. Sourwine. He had visited Moscow earlier?
Mr. Davies. That is my recollection.
Mr. Sourwine. How much earlier was it?
Mr. Davies. A matter of months.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him in Moscow?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; I said I had seen him.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Davies. We had, I recall, one meeting with him, a dinner which he gave,
at which the British Ambassador was present.
Mr. Sourwine. I thought it might be possible that the young lady in question
was a mutual acquaintance, that is, an acquaintance of both you and Mr. Snow,
and that is why he wrote you about it.
Mr. Davies. I knew who she was.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you met her?
Mr. Davies. I had just met her socially.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you met her in Mr. Snow's company?
Mr. Davies. No.
Senator Smith. Was she at the dinner?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Since you presumed the young lady to be an NKVD agent,
why was it that you told Mr. Snow that the NKVD did not have her yet, or had
not gotten her yet?
Mr. Davies. A totalitarian state devours its own, you know.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think he knew that she had the indicia of an NKVD
agent?
Mr. Davies. I think so. Any American or Englishman who went into the Soviet
Union and was there more than a day or two realized that all
Mr. Sourwine. You think he was sophisticated enough politically, so that he
knew what the score was?
Mr. Davies. Something as elementary as that, I think so.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any other Occasions on which Mr. Snow wrote
to you ?
Mr. Davies. I do not recall any other circumstances.
Mr. SouRWiNi;. Can you say there was no other occasion?
Mr. DxWiES. I can't categorically say that, but I can — again it is a question
that I cannot recall.
Mr. Sourwine. I believe the record should show, Mr. Chairman, by this ques-
tioning, I do not imply there was or was not another occasion. I am simply
trying to get as accurately as possible .i^st what the situation was.
Do you recall any other occasion on which you wrote to him?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any other occasion
Mr. Davies. I can recall another occasion when he wrote to me.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5465
Mr. Davies. It was after tie wrote the Saturday Evening Post article on Tito
and he sent me a copy of it, and aslved for my reactions. I did not reply.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That was fairly recently?
Mr. Davies. That was while I was in Washington, within the past 3 years.
Mr. SouKwiNE. Was that the only time you can recall that he ever asked for
your reaction on something he had written?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SoURWiNE. Do you know why he wanted your reaction on this particular
article at that time?
Mr. Davies. I think maybe he wanted me to say that I felt he had swung
his views more toward center.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he indicate that in his letter to you?
Mr. Davies. No ; that is an assumption.
Mr. Sourwine. You don't know why that might have been important to him?
]Mr. Davies. Oh, his sense of esteem, I suppose.
Mr. Sourwine. But you don't know?
Mr. Davies. I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall any occasion when you got a telegram from him?
Ml-. Davies. No ; I do not recall any occasion when I got a telegram.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever send him a telegram or cable?
Mr. Davies. I think I can answer that "No."
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever telephone him?
Mr. Davies. I must have telephoned him. for instance, when he was in India.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean when you both were in India?
Mr. Davies. When we were both in India.
Mr. Sourwine. Was there any other occasion or occasions?
Mr. Davies. I can recall no other occasions.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever telephone him when you were both in the United
States?
Mr. DA\^ES. Not that I can recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever telephone you other than the occasion when you
were both in India?
Mr. Davies. No ; I have no recollection of his ever having telephoned me.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever send a message to him by word of mouth through
another person?
Mr. Davies. I have no recollection of having done that.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever receive a message from him by word of mouth
through another person?
Mr. Davies. I may well have, during the war years, when be may have told
another correspondent that he was coming to Delhi or Chungking.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you received a message from him by word of mouth
through another person since you have returned to the United States?
Mr. Davies. I have no recollection of ever having received such.
Mr. Sourwine. If you had, you would remember it?
Mr. Davies. I am quite sure that I would.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiry with regard to Mr.
Snow's possible afhliation with the Communist Party or Communist front?
Mr. D wies. I remember in Moscow that we — in the Embassy, I discussed his
orientation, and we had our doubts.
Mr. Sourwine. Did anything ever happen to dissipate those doubts in your
mind?
Mr. Davies. Nothing happened to confirm the doubts that we entertained.
Mr. Sourwine. My question was : Did anything ever happen to dissipate them?
Mr. Davies. I think that probably this Tito article tended to dissipate those
views.
Mr. Sourwine. That was in what year?
Mr. Davies. The date I can't recall. It was in the last 2 or 3 years — his ar-
ticle in the Saturday Evening Post.
Mr. Sourwine. Prior to that time, nothing had happened to dissipate the
doubts previously entertained?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it not true — psychologically — that the doubts that you
maintain with regard to a person need dissipation by some outside impact?
Your faith in a person may die of ennui but doubts don't die that way?
Mr. I>a\-tes. I think that is true.
Mr. Sourwine. That is why I asked the question in that way.
Mr. Davies. However. I reserve judgment on this man because I think it is
a terrible thing to go on the record about it.
88348— 52— pt. 14— — 36
5466 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. You say you do reserve judgment or you did reserve judgment?
Mr. Davies. I said that the indications in his Saturday Evening Post article
tended to dissipate the doul)ts.
Mr. SouRwiNE. As a result of which, you now reserve judgment?
Mr. Davies. I have always reserved judgment with regard to whether a per-
son is a Conmumist or not, until the full evidence is in.
Mr. Sourwine. I hadn't ask; d that question.
Mr. Davies. Yes, sir — your question was the donhts.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I had initiated the line of inquiry by asking you if you had
had occasion to check with or consult security officers with regard to the question
of his loyalty.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiiNE. That is a rephrasing of it, and now I will put the question in
just those terms. Did ycu have such occasion?
Mr. Davies. Not with security officers, because we in the Embassy of Moscow
were political officers.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Then 1 take it from that answer that subsequent to the oc-
casion in the Embassy in Moscow when his — what was the word you used? —
orientation was discussed there
Mr. Davies. Orientation.
Mr. SOURWINE. You have no subsequent occasion to inquire as to any loyalty
question vis-a-vis Mr. Snow?
Mr. Davies. No ; I have had no occasion to.
INlr. SOURWINE. You have made no such inquiries of security officers or others?
Mr. Davies. No; I havent.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Now, did you ever recommend Mr. Snow for employment by
an agency of the United States Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend to another agency of the Govern-
ment or a representative of another agency of the Government that Mr. Snow
be utilized by that agency?
Mr. Davies. The answer is the same as I gave on Schwartz.
Mr. SOURWINE. Would you just give the answer? I respectfully suggest to you
that perhaps what you really want here is just a "Yes" or "No" answer, but I
would be happy to have you expand, if you wish to do so.
Mr. Davies. I am sorry ; I have .lost the trend of the question.
Mr. SOURWINE. So as to save time. I w( uM be glad to repeat the question.
Did you ever recommend to another agency of Govei-nment, or representative
of another agency of Government, that Mr. Snow be utilized by that agency?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything about the circumstances under which
that recommendation was, made?
Mr. Davies. I do not feel that I can, for the reasons that I gave with regard
to Schwartz.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do all of the other answers that you gave in connection with
my inquiries concerning your recommendation of Dr. Schwartz hold true with
respect to your recommendation of Mr. Snow?
Mr. Davies. To wit?
Mr. SouuwiNE. To wit : That the recommendation was not initiated at a higher
level, was your own suggestion, which you implemented in accordance with
what you assumed to be a general directive under which you were operating?
Mr. Davies. Which was explicitly a general directive, not which I assumed,
but which— — -
Mr. S URWiNE. I accept the correction.
Mr. Daviis. All right.
Mr. SoiRwiNE. Under your construction of an explicit general directive under
which you were operating?
]\Ir. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I meant by saying "all."
Mr. Davies. The answer is "Yes."
Mr. SoURWiNE. Did you ever defend Mr. Snow against the charge or sug-
gestion that he was a Communist or associated with communism?
Mr. Davies. That he was a Communist or associated with? No.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Did you ever, in response to the suggestion that Mr. Snow
was cons'dered as a Communist or Communist .sympathiz 'r, say that he was
not a Communist, but only very sophisticated, or very politically sophisticated?
Mr. Davies. No.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5467
Mr. SotTRWiNE. Did you ever suggest or urge that Mr. Snow be used for
guidance by another agency of the Government?
Mr. Davits. No.
Mr. SuuKWiNE. Did you ever recommend that he be used for consultation and
guidance by another agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SCU..WINE. Did you ever state to a representative of anotlier agency of
the Government that materials prepared by Mr. Snow would represent the
proper approach?
Mr. Davies. The proper approach for what and for whom?
Mr. SouijwiNE. If you would answer the question, then I would be glad to
have you expand upon it with whatever qualifying information is necessary
to make your answer perfectly responsive.
Mr. Davies. 1 will answer it this way : That to reply to this question takes
us right into the heart of this operation, which is a top-secret operation, and
in another agency.
Mr. Soukwine. Would your answer then be that you never did so, except in
connection with a top-secret operation, concerning which you feel you can-
not testify?
Mr. Davies. My answer would be "Yes."
Mr. Souswi.ne. That is, that you never did so, except in connection with a
top-secret operation concerning which you feel you cannot testify?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Did Mr. Snow ever serve the State Department in a consulting
or consultant capacity, to your knowledge?
Mr. Davies. No.
JMr. SouRwixE. I take it that includes possible service to you as a consultant?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you ever state to anyone that Mr. Snow had been helpful
to you as a consultant?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I neglected a question, and I must apologize for putting it out
of context, Mr. Chairman, with regard to Dr. Schwartz.
Do you know anything of his poss.ble connection with the Institute of Pacific
Relations?
Mr. Davies. No : I do not.
Mr. Soukwine. Do you recall ever meeting him in company with or in con-
nection With persons you knew to be members of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. Here again, I am in the same disability of not knowing who are
members of the institute.
Mr. ScuRwiNE. I realize that I might get exactly the same answers as when
I asked that question with regard to Mr. Snow.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever communicate or confer with Dr. Schwartz at or
through the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SoTJiiWiNE. We are back on Mr. Snow now.
Did you ever recommend that Mr. Snow be set up in an office by an agency
of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SoURWiNE. You never did?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be set up in an
office by an agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. Xo.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, with regard to Agnes Smedley: Did you know Agnes
Sm dley?
Mr. Davies. I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you tell us of your acquaintance with her. when you
met her, and follow throu':h alone the same lines we have already had with the
otiier two persons that we have discussed?
Mr. Davies. I first knew Agnes Sm nlley in 19.38 in Hanchow, when she was
living tiiere and workin^r with the Chinese Communists. She had presented to
the consulate general there a letter of introduction, which I might read here.
It is a letter from the Department of State, Washington, May 4, 1934, to the
American diplomatic consular officers.
5468 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"Sirs : At the instance of the Honorable Robert F. Wagner, Senator of the
United States from the State of New York, I talie pleasure in introducing
to you Miss Agnes Smedley of New York City, who is about to proceed abroad.
"I cordially bespeak for Miss Smedley such courtesies and assistance as you
may be able to render, consistently with your official duties.
"Very truly yours,
"GORDELL HtJLL."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was this presented to you?
Mr. D.wiES. This was a standard letter of introduction Miss Smedley carried,
and which she presented to the American officials in Hanchow.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was it presented to you?
Mr. Da VIES. I saw it, or knew of it. I do not recall whether I physically saw
the document, but I knew of it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean you saw it or you knew of it at the time you met
her?
Mr. Davies. At the time I met her.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Where did you get this photostat?
Mr. Davies. This is a photostat which I received from Mr. Clubb.
Mr. Sour wine. Mr. Clubb?
Mr. Davies. A colleague of mine.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you mean a colleague in the State Department?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. When did he give it to you?
Mr. Davies. He gave it to me about 2 or 3 weeks ago.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ask him for it or did he bring it to you and suggest
it might be well if you had it?
Mr. Davies. He brought it to me. He thought it might be of interest to me.
Mr. Sourwine. We just thought it might be of interest?
Mr. Davies. No — it might be of use to me.
Mr. Morris. How long were you in Hanchow, Mr. Davies?
Mr. Davies. I was in Hanchow from 1938 until 1940.
Mr. Sourwine. I do not mean to interrupt that, but I wanted to go back for
just a moment, because I would like to have this put in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Very well, it is so ordered.
(The letter above referred to follows:)
Department of State, U. S. A.
To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States of America.
Introducing : Miss Agnes Smedley.
Department of State,
Washington, May Jf, 1934-
To the American Diplomatic and Consular Officers.
Sirs : At the instance of the Honorable Robert F. Wagner, Senator of the
United States from the State of New York, I take pleasure in introducing to you
Miss Agnes Smedley of New York City, who is about to proceed abroad.
I cordially besiieak for Miss Smedley such courtesies and assistance as you
may be able to render, consistently with your official duties.
Very truly yours,
Mr. Sourwine. I would like to ask Mr. Davies for Mr. Clubb's full name.
Mr. Davies. Edmund Clubb.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that E-d-m-u-n-d?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. C-1-u-b-b?
Mr. Davies. Double b.
Mr. Sourwine. What position does he hold with the State Department now?
Mr. Davies. He is Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know why Mr. Clubb felt that this might be of service
to you?
]\Ir. Davies. IMiss Smedley has been mentioned in connection with me, publicly,
in Miss Smedley's book and elsewhere.
Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to get the tie. As I understand it, you say Mr.
Clubb gave you this letter 2 or 3 weeks ago. Wasn't that too late to have been
of service to you in connection with any proceeding in the Department, and with-
out knowledge that there would be or might be any proceedings before this com-
mittee?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5469
Mr. Davies. Oh, it was without reference to any proceedings in this committee,
about which, of course, I had no forewarning.
Mr. SoxjEwiNE. Tliat is right. Is it your testimony that you do not linow just
how he intended it to be of service to you?
Mr. Davies. It might be of some use to me in case there were questions on the
subject.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It was a friendly gesture by Mr. Clubb?
Mr. Davies. A friendly gesture.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. He was a friend of yours and he made a friendly gesture?
Mr. Davies. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am sorry, Mr. Morris— I interrupted you.
Mr. Morris. I just wanted to know what was his service in China before he
went to Hanchow?
Mr. Davies. My official service in China began in 1933 in Yunnanfu. In 1933
I was transferred for my language study in Peking. I completed that after 2
years' study and then went to Mukden. I left Mukden in 1938 and went to Han-
chow, and tliere we are.
Mr. Sourwine. Before you go further, I want to clear up the question of your
meeting. Is it your testimony that your initial meeting with Miss Smedley was in
linfe of duty — that she came to the offices of the State Department which you were
occupying, in which you were working in Peking, and
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. In Hanchow?
Mr. DA\aES. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. In Hanchow. And that she either there presented, or had pre-
viously presented, and you knew about, this letter of introduction, and therefore
you met her in connection with your official duties?
Mr. Davies. That is so. I was
Mr. Sourwine. Now, proceed.
Mr. Davies. I was a political officer reporting on the local scene. I was an
Investigator. My job was to know everybody that I could know on the local
scene. I knew everyone from von Faulkenhausen, who was the German mili-
tary adviser to the Generalissimo, to Agnes Smedley. As a political officer, it
was my duty to know everybody I could know.
Mr. Sourwine. Why do you say from von Faulkenhausen to Agnes Smedley.
Are they at opposite poles? •
Mr. Davies. They are not, because one was a Nazi and the other was a mem-
ber of the Communist apparatus.
i\Ir. Sourwine. This was at what time?
Mr. Davies. This was in 1938.
Mr. Sourwine. They were not at opposite poles?
Mr. Davies. Well, it depends on your reading of the meaning of whether the
Nazis and Communists are at opposite poles or the same poles.
Mr. Sourwine. I did not mean to be argumentative. I was ti'ying to find out
whether you intentionally used them in that way.
Mr. Da\is. I think they are contrasting personalities.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes. Please go ahead.
Mr. Davies. Miss Smedley was at that time, as I have previously testified, in-
timately identified with the Communist headquarters.
She was a channel through whom foreign correspondents and members of the
diplomatic and consular corps obtained information, established contacts with
the Chinese Communist delegation in Hanchow.
Mr. Sourw^ine. Was her position in that regard knovsTi to the State Depart-
ment— the American State Department?
Mr. Davies. To the Embassy and the consulate.
Mr. Sourwine. You certainly had reported it to Washington?
Mr. Davies. Oh, yes. Insofar as we sought to get information from the Com-
munists, in addition to ,the other elements, we would use Miss Smedley as an
intermediary, to see what we could get. That was during the period of the
Japanese advance on Hanchow. The city was filled with correspondents and
the official staffs of the various consulates and embassies there were very large.
There was a constant coming and going and contact-seeking information, and in
that way I had contacts with Miss Smedley, endeavored to get what information
I could from her, the hand-outs that they produced at the Communist head-
quarters, asking her questions, officially had these various associations with her.
She then left Hanchow at the time the Embassy pulled out ; the Chinese Gov-
ernment pulled out. and most of the correspondents left, which was just as the
5470 ESrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Japanese came in. I stayed behind with the consul general's staff. We under-
went the Japanese occupation.
Smedley told us that she was going oiit into the guerrilla territory in the out-
lying areas. This was of great interest to us for two reasons: One was that wfe
were following the military campaign very closely, and were also interested in
how the Japanese occupied, and observed their control, through the area, and
Avere very interested in what tlie guerrilla resistance would be in the surrounding
areas.
Secondly. Japanese-American relations were rather tense. The Payiay had
been sunk a short time before, and we never knew when, while under Japanese
occupation, the balloon might not go up. We were therefore interested in the
guerrilla movement from the view of getting out in the event of war between
Japan and the United States. Therefore, I asked Smedley to keep us informed.
She wrote to the British and wrote to us little notes that would be sent back in
through the Japanese lines to us.
Her information on the guerrilla operations out there was of considerable
interest to us. We always had to make very large corrections in her bias, but
nevertheless, it was a first-hand account of guerrilla operations. '
Mr. SovKwiNE. With a deflection for windage, it showed reasonable accuracy?
Mr. D.wtES. Yes. It was of great use to us in our appraisals of the guerrilla
operations. Her estimates, of course, were checked against what estimates we
got from the Chinese agents who remained behind, and from what the Japanese
carried in their communiques, and what we got from missionaries who came
from the area.
Mr. SornwiXE. Did her reports, after correction for bias, show suflacient ac-
curacy to indicate that she had a pretty good knowledge or sources of informa-
tion with regard to the matters she was reporting on?
Mr. Davies. Oh, yes; because she had lived with the guerrilla units in these
little villages and marched with them, not in the heart of battle, but on the
periphery of battles.
Mr. SouKwixE. After that period, during which her services were utilized, and
you had some contacts in your official capacity, what further acquaintanceship
have you had?
Mr. Davies. I have had none.
Mr. Soukwine. When did that period end?
Mr. Davies. It ended before my departure from Hanchow, which was late in
104(1 — or the summer of 1940, I think, so I would say it ended at probably about
1939.
Mr. SoTJKwiNE. Since that time, have you sent her any letters?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouKwixE. Has she sent you any?
Mr. Da\ies. No.
Mr. SofKWiNE. Have you sent her any telegrams or cables?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Soi'KwiXE. Has she sent you any?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SorRwiNE. Have you telephoned her or has she telephoned you?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SorRwiXE. Did you have any communication with her by word of moutk
or through another person?
Mr. Daxtes. No.
:Mr. SofKWiNE. Now. at the time that you initially met her. did she present
to you any letter of introduction from any person other than tlie letter that has
gone into the record here?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRwixE. Did anyone write you about her. or give her a good-character
rarins. or .'^uggest that you get together, or anything of that sort?
:Mr^ DavieV. I don't recall any such. She was a public ligure. well known in
the area.
Mr. SovRwiNE. Do you know anything of her connections — still speaking of
Miss Smedley? Do you know anything of her connections, if any, with the
Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. None.
IMr. SorRwiNE. Do you recall meeting her in connection with or in the company
of persons known to you to be members of the institute?
Mr. Davies. No ; with the same caveat I gave on the other two.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOXS 5471
Mr. Morris. I wonder if I might ask : "Would you tell us at this point what
generally have b^en your connections with the in.stituteV May I have a response
to that question?
Mr. Davies. Very slight. I have known, of necessity, many people who have
been connectf d with the institute. I have seen their journal.
Mr. Mo[{Ris. You are a member, are you not?
Mr. Davies. That, I don't know. I do not recall ever having been a member.
I afk a question for information — whether subscription to the jr^urnal makes one
a member? I don't recall having been a member, nor do I recall having sub-
scrib. d to the magazine. I may have .subscribed to the magazine, but I have no
recol'e tion.
Mr. Morris. You make payments to the institute, do you not?
> r. Davies. I make payments?
Mr. Morris. Don't you make payments to the institute?
Mr. Davies. No ; I don't make any payments.
Mr. SouRWiXE. Didn't you ever pay dues to the institute, as such?
Mr. Davies. I have no recollection of it.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You never applied for membership in the institute?
Mr. Davies. That I am not sure of. I have, as I said, no recollection of hav-
ing been a member.
Mr. SouRWixE. Did you ever get a bill for dues from the Institute of Pacfic
Relations ?
Mr. Davies. I have no recollection.
Mr. SouRWixE. A bill, or other requests for dues?
ilr. Da\ies. I may have had solicitation from it. I do not exclude the pos-
sibility that I may have been a member, but I haven't checked back — I have no
record of it.
Mr. Sourwixe. Can you say definitely that you have not, over a period of suc-
ceeding years, two or more, paid annual dues to the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. In the past 2 years?
Mr. Sox'RwixE. Xo — I said over a period of two or more years consecutively.
Mr. Davies. I have no recollection of paying any dues to the institute.
Mr. SouRwixE. If you had you would have recalled it ?
Mr. Davies. Xo, sir ; not necessarily.
Mr. SouRwixE. You mean you pay dues in organizations you don't know you
belong to?
Mr. Davies. Well, I know I pay dues to the American Automobile Association.
Mr. SocRwixE. But you know you pay the dues?
Mr. Da\tes. I know I pay those dues. I have no recollection of ever having
paid any dues to the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. SoLRwixE. Did you ever pay dues to the Amalgamated Sons and Daugh-
ters of I Will Rise?
Mr. Da\t^es. Xo.
Mr. SouRwixE. You can say "Xo" to that?
Mr. Davies. I can say "Xo" to that because, of course, it was an organization
in which I — it is utterly improbable that I would ever have had anything to do
with it, whereas, the Institute of Pacific Relations, to my knowledge, was a very
respectable, and rather stuffy, organization. It was one which I naturally really
should have belonged to. I am afraid I didn't.
Mr. Morris. Excuse me for interrupting.
Mr. Sourwixe. It was a very good interruption, Mr. Morris.
With regard to Agnes Smedley, did you ever communicate with her through
or in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. Xo.
Mr. Sourwixe. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiry with respect to
Agnes Smedley's possible Communist connections?
Mr. Davies. Certainly. That was something we were all very interested in.
Just what her relation.ships were — she denied, of course, that she was a party
member.
Mr. SnuEwixE. Did you ever make inquiry in that regard subsequent to leav-
ing the Orient?
Mr. D wiEs. Xo : because I lost interest in Smedley.
ilr. Sourwixe. You knew her at that time to be a Communist?
Mr. Davits In the Orient?
Mr. Sourwixe. Yes.
Mr. Davies. I assumed that she was a Communist. As I have testified, I re-
garded her as a part of the Communist apparatus there.
5472 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did anything ever occur to change your mind with regard
to her?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SoURwixE. Did you ever recommend Agnes Smedley for employment
with another agency of the Government, that is, an agency other than the State
Department?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouEWiNE. Did you recommend her employment with the State De-
partment?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Soubwine. Did you ever recommend to a representative of another
agency of tlie Government that Agnes Smedley be utilized by that agency?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SoiTRwiNE. Can you tell us anything further about that occasion?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. For the same reasons that apply to the case of Dr. Schwartz
and Edgar Snow?
Mr. Davies. Yes. ^
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever defend Agnes Smedley against the charge or the
suggestion that she was a Communist?
Mr. Da\ies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever defend her against the suggestion or charge that
she had Communist sympathies, or was a member of a Communist-front organ-
ization?
Mr. Da\ies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state she was not a Communist, but only very
sophisticated or very politically sophisticated?
Mr. DAVIES. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever suggest that another agency of Government set
her up in an office?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouinviNE. Did you ever state that she had been useful to you or helpful
to you as a consultant?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Soukwine. Did you ever suggest that she be assigned to produce materials
for utilization by another department of the Government?
Mr. Davies. Assigned? I beg your pardon, will you repeat that?
Mr. Sourwine. That she be assigned to produce materials for utilization by
another agency of the Govei-nment?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state to a representative of another agency of
the Government that materials prepared by her would represent the proper
approach ?
Mr. Davies. The same answer that I gave on Snow.
Mr. Sourwine. What was that answer?
Mr. Davies. That this goes into the nature of the operation a top-secret
operation, which I do not feel at liberty to discuss.
Mr. Sourwine. I am not sure that that is the precise answer you gave with
regard to Mr. Snow, but it is the answer you intend to give here with regard to
Miss Smedley?
Mr. Davies. It is.
Mr. Sourwine. But you cannot answer that question, because to answer it
goes into a top-secret operation about which you feel you cannot testify?
Mr. Davies. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. Except with regard to the said top-secret operations, did you
ever represent to a representative of any other agency of the Government —
that is, other than the State Department, that materials prepared by Agnes
Smedley would repi'esent the proper approach?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever represent to a representative of an agency of
the Government, other than the State Department, that Agnes Smedley could
be used by that agency for consultation and guidance?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. That is a categorical "No"?
Mr. Davies. A categorical "No."
Mr. Sourwine. Moving now to Anna Louise Strong, are you acquainted, or
were you acquainted with Anna Louise Strong?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5473
Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you tell us about when you met her, and follow along
the same lines we have had with the other persons concerning whom we have
asked you?
Mr. Davies. I first met Anna Louise Strong in 1945 or 1946 at a reception
In the Embassy. I do not remember the precise occasion, but my only contacts
with Miss Strong were at the Embassy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is the Embassy where?
Mv. Davies. In Moscow. She was a member of the press corps.
Mr. Sour WINE. For what organization or publication?
Mr. Davies. I beg your pardon?
Mr. SouRWiNE. What organization or publication did she represent?
Mr. Davies. My recollection was that she was a free lance. She may have
corresponded for various Communist magazines or newspapers, but I don't think
that she had a
Mr. SounwiNE. Were free-lance correspondents permitted to roam around
Moscow at that time?
Mr. Davies. Communists, or those who were a part of the apparatus, were
permitted to roam around.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was she a part of the apparatus?
Mr. Davies. I assumed that she was at least a fellow traveler, completely
acceptable to the regime and under its controL
Mr. SouRwiNE. Go ahead.
Mr. Davies. Aside from the social contacts, for example, the Fourth of July,
when she would appear at the Ambassador's reception, or contacts during the
council of foreign ministers, in 1947, when Mr. Harriman asked me to help out
with handling the press. In that situation I would see her, with a group of
newspapermen, when the releases were made, and in similar circumstances.
That was my only contact with her, and I have had no contact with her since.
Mr. SoiTRWiNE. What do you know of her besides the fact that she had this
Communist connection or presumed Communist connection in Moscow?
Mr. Davies. I know little about her personal history.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is she still alive?
Mr. Davies. I believe she is.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where she is?
Mr. Davies. She is in this country, so far as I know.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where?
Mr. Davies. But I do not know where.
Mr. Sourwine. When was it that you knew her in Moscow?
Mr. Davies. In Moscow, 1945 through April of 1947.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, since April of 1947, have you had any communication
with her of any nature?
Mr. Davies. None whatsoever.
Mr. Sourwine. You have not written her a letter, nor sent her a telegram or
cable or telephoned her?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. And she has not written a letter to you or sent you a telegram
or a cable or telephone to you?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you had any communications by word of mouth through
any other individual?
Mr. Davies. None.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about her connections with the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. No, I do not.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you ever recall meeting her in connection with or in com-
pany with persons whom you knew to be members of the institute?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever consult with her or communicate with her or
confer with her in connection with or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend Anna Louise Strong for employment
by the State Department?
Mr. Davies. No.
INIr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend her for employment by any other de-
partment or agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
5474 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever recommend to a representative of another agency
of the Government, that is, other than the State Department, that Anna Louise
Strong be utilized by that agency?
INIr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell us anything more about the occasion on which you
made that recommendation?
Mr. Davies. No ; for the reasons which I have cited in the other cases.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The same reasons as cited in the cases of Dr. Schwartz and Mr.
Snow and Agnes Smedley?
Mr. Davies. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, did you ever recommend that Anna Louise Strong be set
up in an office by some agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever recommend that she be used for consultation and
guidance by another agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever state to the representative of another agency of
the Government that materials prepared by her would I'epresent the proper
approach?
Mr. Davies. The same answer that I gave on the others.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is, you cannot answer that question, you are stating you
cannot answer that question without discussing matters which are, in your
opinion, top secret?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Other than in connection with top-secret matters, did you ever
state that materials prepared by her would represent the proper approach?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever state that she had been useful to you as a
consultant?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Had she ever been useful to you as a consultant?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Was she ever employed by the State Department?
Mr. Davies. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever receive instructions from any superior to make
a recommendation to another agency of Government with respect to Anna
Louise Strong?
Mr. Davies. I received no specific instructions.
Mr. Sourwine. Is it correct, then, that the situation is the same with regard
to Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow and Benjamin Schwartz
in that regard, to wit, that the recommendations which you made were your own
implementation, of your own suggestion, acting under your construction of an
explicit directive which was then in existence, and which you were attempting to
follow out?
Mr. Davies. And which was of a top-secret category, yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I accept the amendment.
All right, sir. Now, I have one more name to move on to, but I would like
to go back for just a minute and pick up a loose end.
When we were talking about Mr. Edgar Snow, I did not ask you if you knevsr
Mrs. Snow — did you?
Mr. Davies. Which Mrs. Snow?
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know a Mrs. Snow?
Mr. Davies. I knew a Mrs. Snow.
Mr. Sourwine. Which one did you know?
Mr. Davies. Who wrote under the nom de plume of Nym Wales.
Mr. Sourwine. N-y-m W-a-1-e-s?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. She was the Mrs. — that is, she was Edgar Snow's wife at
the time you knew him?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where she is now?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you maintained contact with her?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have an acquaintanceship with her other than your
contact with Mr. Snow? •
Mr. Davies. No.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5475
Mr. SouRWiNE. You never had any social connections?
Mr. Davies. Any what?
Mr. SoURWiNE. Any social connections with her.
Mr. Davies. She was a hostess at the cocktail party where I first met Snow.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Aside from that?
Mr. Davies. Aside from that, no.
Mr. SoUKWiNE. Do you know Professor John Fairbank?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Will you tell us when you met him and under what circum-
stances, and what your acquaintance has been?
Mr. Davies. I met Mr. Fairbank in 1933 or 1934 when he was a student, doing
a thesis on the Chinese maritime customs. This was in Peking. I was a language
officer at that time.
I knew iiini fairly well, because we had many interesting comments. I was
at that time, as I said, a student, and we were covering much the same ground.
I have maintained this acquaintanceship with Fairbank over these subsequent
years. I cannot say when I next saw him after I left Peking in 1935.
In 1937, I think, was the next time I met him, and that was when I was home
on leave, and then only briefly.
During the war he was a Government official employed in General Donovan's
office.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The Office of Strategic Services?
Mr. Davies. It preceded the OSS. I have forgotten the name of it. OIC, or
something like that.
Mr. Morris. COI — Coordinated Information.
Mr. Davies. Yes ; it may have been Coordinated Information. But it was the
office which preceded the OSS.
Mr. SouRWiNE. These lette's are a little confusing. What is the CIA?
Mr. Davies. Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. SouEWiNE. What is the OIC?
Mr. DA\^ES. Well, that is one I am not sure of the letters. It is the organiza-
tion set up before they set up the OSS.
Mr. SOURWINE. What is the OPC?
Mr. Davies. That is the Office of Policy Coordination, within the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Mr. SotTRWiNE. Whether this was OIC or OCI that Mr. Snow was in we don't
know?
Mr. Davies. Mr. Fairbank?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Fairbank.
Mr. Davies. I don't remember the initials. It was the organization which
ultimately was replaced by the OSS.
Mr. IMoRRis. I think it was called the COT, Coordinated Information.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Office of Coordinator of Information.
Go ahead, sir, please.
Mr. Davies. He was in the book and periodicals acquisition organization. I
■do not recall under what office that w^as. It may have been under OSS or it may
have been pai't of the State Department. But at any rate he was, during the
-war, in China as an official, carrying out official duties.
At that period I saw a good deal of him when I went to China and I saw him
also, I think, in the United States when he came back and he was OWI.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is the Office of War Information?
Mr. Davies. Officer of War Information. After the war years I did not see him
again until I returned to the United States in 1947. My first meeting with him
then, I believe, was in the fall of 1947. I have since seen him occasionally as he
c-omes to Washington. Sometimes I discover he has been in Washington and
I have not seen him. Sometimes we meet and have lunch together, or I go
to his house for a drink, and that has been our relationship.
Mr. SoURwiNE. You are then more than mere acquaintances?
Mr. Davies. Oh, yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. You are friends of long standing?
Mr. Davies. We are friends of long standing.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall when was the most recent occasion that you saw
him?
Mr. DA^^ES. It was sometime this spring I saw him. I don't recall the date.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Besides Dr. Schwartz, has he ever introduced to you or brought
you into contact with other persons in connection with their possible future
course of employment, or their employment by the Government or some agency of
the Government?
5476 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Davies. I don't think so. No ; I have no recollection of it.
Mr. SouBwiNE. He never sent you any other bright young man?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouKwiNE. Have you ever had any commercial relations, business rela-
tions, commercial or monetary, with Mr. Fairbank?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you maintain a correspondence with him?
Mr. Davies. Irregularly.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you maintained this irregular correspondence over a
period of years?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever send him telegrams?
Mr. Davies. No ; I don't recall sending him a telegram.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever send you one?
Mr. Davies. No ; not that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Does he ever telephone you long distance?
Mr. Davies. He has ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Frequently or infrequently?
Mr. Davies. Infrequently.
Mr. SotjRwiNE. Do you recall what it was aboiit?
Mr. Davies. Oh, that he was coming to Washington and would like to see me ;
have lunch with me.
Mr. Soi'BwiNE. Did you ever telephone him long distance?
Mr. Davies. I think I may have ; I don't recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall what it would have been about, if you did?
Mr. Davies. No. It wouldn't have been of any importance.
Mr. Sourwine. Which means, of course, you don't recall what it was about?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever send to him or receive from him oral messages
through some third person?
Mr. Davies. Not that I recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether he is a member of the Institute of
Pacific Relations or has any connections with the institute?
Mr. Davies. I do not know.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever meet him in connection with or in the company
of persons whom you knew to be members of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Davies. Again, not that I know of.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever communicate with him or confer with him at
or in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, or through the institute?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiries with regard to
his possible loyalty or his possible connection with communism or the Communist
Party or Communist-front organizations?
Mr. Davies. It had not occurred to me that it would be necessary to do so.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever do so?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have an opinion with regard to the question of whether
he had any connection with communism or Communist-front organizations?
IMr. Davies. In my long acquaintance with him I have seen not the slightest
evidence of any connections which might be considered disloyal to the United
States.
Mr. Sourwine. Does that mean that you do have an opinion, and that your
opinion is that he has no such connection?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
]\Ir. Sourwine. Have you ever heard of the chai'ge that he is or has been a
member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Davies. Not until recently.
Mr. Sourwine. How recently?
Mr. Davies. I am sorry. Was he a member of the Communist Party or asso-
ciated with it?
INIr. Sourwine. I said member.
Mr. Davies. Oh, member. No ; I have never heard that.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you heard the charge that he was associated with the
Communist Party?
Mr. Davies. In the sense that I have heard the charge that he was sympathetic
to the Communists.
Mr. Sourwine. How recently did you hear that charge?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5477
Mr. Davies. I should say it was in the last few months.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you recall where and how you heard it?
Mr. Davies. I think probably I read it in the Congressional Record.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Do you recall whether you saw anything about it in the public
press?
Mr. Davies. I have seen his name mentioned in the publications.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you a careful reader of the Congressional Record, Mr.
Davies?
Mr. Davies. Spasmodically.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall whether the mention of Mr. Fairbank in the
Congressional Record was called to your attention?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Might it have been called to your attention?
Mr. Davies. It might have been ; yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you would have found it yourself if it had not
been called to your attention?
Mr. Davis. I might have found his name, and connected it with other names
that I knew.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You know there is no index in the Congressional Record?
Mr. Davies. I know thei'e isn't?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say that it wasn't called to your attention?
Mr. Davies. No; I can't say that. It may have been called to my attention.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility that Mr. Fairbank himself called it
to your attention?
Mr. Davies. No ; I can't think he did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any possibility Mr. Clubb might have called it to your
attention?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, do you recall having heard any other charge bearing any
relation to communism, against Mr. Fairbank?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the allegation that he had carried mes-
sages for the Communists?
Mr. Davies. No; I hadn't.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the employment of Mr. Fairbank by
the State Department?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend Mr. Fairbank's employment by an-
othLr agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for con-
sultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used to prepare
materials for another agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. My answer to that is that I cannot reply to it because to do so
would lie to go into a top-secret operation, which I don't feel ready to do.
Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean to cross you up by changing the order of my
questions, although I did change them. The question that I ask earlier in the
series with respect to these other persons I will ask now with respect to Mr.
Fairbank.
Did you ever recommend to a representative of an agency of Government other
than the State Department the utilization of Mr. Fairbank by that agency?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell us any further details with regard to that recom-
mendation?
Mr. Davies. No : for the reasons which I have given with respect to the others.
Mr. SoURwiNE. Was Mr. Fairbank's wife included in that recommendation?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouBwiNE. Did you ever state that Mr. Fairbank could be trusted to pre-
pare materials which would represent the proper approach?
Mr. Davies. I cannot answer that because to do so would be to reveal the
nature of a top-secret operation.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I take it you noted that that question is slightly different from
the question I asked in that regard with respect to these other i^eople. I do not
want to trap you, Mr. Davies.
Mr. Davies. I am sorry.
5478 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SoURWiNE. The question I asked was: "Did you ever state that Mr. Fair-
bank could be trusted to prepare materials that would represent the proper
approach?" I am not urging you to change your answer nor am I attempting to
coerce your answer. I call your attention to the fact that the question is slightly
different in form from the similar questions that have been asked earlier.
Mr. Davies. Yes ; I did recommend that, but I can't go further into the reasons.
Mr. SouRWiNE. All right.
Did you ever state that you had perfect confidence in both Professor and Mrs.
Fairbank?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Can you tell us anything further about any occasion on which
you may have stated that?
Mr. Davies. I probably have stated that on a number of occasions, because that
is what I believe.
Mr. SoTTKwiNE. Did you ever recommend tliat Professor Fairbank be set up
in an office by some agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SoTRWiNE. Did you ever state that Professor Fairbank was a person ideally
suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Gov-
ernment?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever recommend his use for consultation and guidance
by another agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SoTTRWiNE. Did you ever recommend the use of Mrs. Fairbank for con-
sultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. SoiiRwiNE. Did you ever recommend the use of Professor and Mrs. Fair-
bank for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever defend Professor Fairbank or his wife, or he and
his wife, from any allegation of communism or Communist connections?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; I think I have, on a number of occasions.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, does that imply that you had heard charges made against
them on a number of occasions?
Mr. Davies. It implies that, as I said, in the past few months I have heard
that he is a Communist.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean you have defended them against such allegations
only during the past few months?
Mr. Davies. No ; there may have been earlier allegations. There may have
been earlier allegations against which I have defended them.
Mr. Sourwine. How eai-ly? Do you know?
Mr. Davies. I cannot recall. That would be going back at least months and
maybe a year or two.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you a year ago defending Professor and Mrs. Fairbank,
or either of them, against allegations of Communist connections or Communist
sympathies?
Mr. Davies. I may have— it may have been a year ago ; yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you, as early as 2 years ago, defending Professor and
Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against allegations of Communist connections
or Communist sympathies?
Mr. Davies. It may have been that early.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you defending them against such allegations as early as
1949?
Mr. Davies. It may have been 1949.
Mr. Sourwine. Were you defending them as early as 1948?
Mr. Davies. Well, if there were such allegations in 1948
Mr. Sourwine. I am asking you, sir,
Mr. DAVIES. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. For you to defend a person against an allegation, you would
have had to have heard it. Allegations might have been heard elsewhere, but
they would have no meaning in that connection. All I can do is ask you whether
yon werp defendins; them a-ainst such allegations as early as 1948.
Mr. Davies. I do not recall any allegations as early as 1948. There may have
been allegations in 1949. If there were, I certainly defended them.
Mr. Sourwine. You have been since, presumably 1949, and subsequently, been
defending I'rufessor and Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against such Com-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5479
munist allegations as may have been made against them and have come to your
attention?
Mv. Da VIES. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you recall any specific allegations that have been made
against them and on which you have defended them?
Mr. Davies. No ; I don't.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Did you ever state that they were not Communists, but only
very sophisticated or very politically sophisticated?
Mr. Davifs. I don't think I ever used those words. No ; I did not.
INIr. SouKWiNE. That is a categorical answer?
Mr. Da\tes. That is a categorical answer.
Mr. Sou WINE. Is Professor Fairbank a very politically sophisticated man?
Mr. Davies. Yes : I would say that he is.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is he so politically sophisticated that he could be confused
with a Communist?
I\Ir. Davifs. A Communist is politically naive, for my money.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You do not feel that political sophistication is an earmark
of commnnismV
Mr. Davies. I think it is the reverse.
Mr. SoURWixE. You would not, under any circumstances, refer to a Communist
as being politically sophisticated?
Mr. Davies. Never.
Mr. Sorr.wixE. You would never refer to a person in terms of so being politi-
cally sophisticated as an explanation of why they might be mistaken for a
Communist?
Mr. Davies. No.
I\Ir. SouRWiNE. And you never did so refer to any of these people in any other
way?
Mr. Davies. That is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. I have just a few more questions and we will be through, Mr.
Chairman.
Is your acquaintanceship with Professor Fairbank's wife the outgrowth of
your acquaintance and friendship with him?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you had any independent acquaintance with her?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know her as well as you know Mr. Fairbank?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Does she have any professional attainments?
Mr. Davies. Yes. She is a very talented woman in a number of ways. She
is an artist. She is something of a student of history. For a while she was in
the Department of State and in the field in China as a cultural relations officer,
dealing with students.
Mr. SorRWTNE. How long ago was that?
Mr. Davies. That was, I believe, in the last days of the war, or right after
the war.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who employed her for that job?
Mr. Davies. No.
;Mr. SoiniwiNE. Do you know who recommended her?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. How long was she there?
Mr. Davies. I don't know. My impression is it was perhaps a year or per-
haps 2 years.
Mr. Sourwine. Has she been employed by the Government or any Government
agency since then, to your knowledge?
Mr. Davies. No ; not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether she is working at all?
Mr. Davies. Pardon?
Mr. Sourwine, Do you know whether she is working at all?
Mr. Davies. Now?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Does she write for publication ?
Mr. Davies. Not that I know of.
Mr. Sourwine. Did she ever?
Mr. Davies. She may have. I do not know of any of her writings.
Mr. Sourwine. Is she a stenographer or typist?
5480 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Davies. Not so far as I know.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Is she an expert on foreign affairs?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. Soui'.wiNE. Is she a specialist in Pacific Affairs?
Mr. Davies. No ; not technically so.
Mr. SouRWiNE. She doesn't worlj with and collaborate with her husband?
Mr. Davies. No. She is independently a very intelligent and well-educated
woman.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And that is the picture?
Mr. Daviks. That is the picture.
Mr. SouBwiNE. Now, sir, if I may hop around a little bit, I think I have left
some loose ends.
Did you know Edgar Snow's second wife?
Mr. Davies. No.
Mr. S;;URwiNE. And do you know who she was?
Mr. davies. That is, the current one, is it?
Mr. SoURWiNE. Well, T Mm asking you.
Mr. Davies. The only wife that I knew was named Wales.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you speak the Chinese language, sir?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You are, as a matter of fact, one of a relatively small number
of persons employed by the State Department today who do speak the Chinese
language fluently, are you not?
Mr. Davies. That may be so.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how many others there are in the Department
who do?
Mr. Davies. I don't, but I could make a rough estimate of 10 or 15.
Mr. Sourwine. How many do you know that do? Do you think you know
all of the 10 or 15?
Mr. Davies. I don't know the younger ones.
Mr. Sourwine. Would you name those employees or officials of the State De-
paitment who, to your knowledge, speak Chinese fluently?
Mr. Davies. Who speak Chinese fluently?
Everett Drumwright, John S. Service, Philip D. Sprouse, Fulton Freeman, Ed-
mund Clubb.
Mr. Sourwine. That is the same Mr. Clubb referred to earlier in this hearing?
Mr. Davies. Right.
Mr. Sourwine. Have you finished your answer?
Mr. Davies. That is roughly, yes. That is the list that comes to thind.
Mr. Sourwine. I do not mean to burden this record with conclusions nor to
try to testify, but isn't it perhaps an unfortunate thing that we do not have more
experts in that language in the State Department than we have?
Mr. Davies. It is a very serious matter, and it is nlso a serious matter that
very few of them now are dealing with Far Eastern affairs.
Mr. Sourwine. Why is that? Do yon know what that is?
Mr. Davies. I have my guesses, but they aren't
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you know?
Mr. Davies. They are personal guesses.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you know why that is?
Mr. Davies. I think it is because they have been persecuted out of the Far East.
You have two China language officers in London.
Mr. Sourwine. Who are they?
Mr. Davies. James K. Penfield and Arthur Ringwalt. Both of them are
senior officers. Penfield is No. 3 in the London Embassy. He went there from
Czechoslovakia.
In Paris there is Philip Sprouse, who was Director of the Office of Chinese
Affairs in the Department.
Mr. Sourwine. You say he was?
Mr. Davies. He was, prior to Clubb's arrival.
In Brussels is Raymond P. Ludden. In Rome is Joseph E. Jacobs, who is a
career Minister, China Service. And there is assigned to Rome, Fulton Free-
man, who was one of the best younger officers in China Service.
In Tangiers is John Carter Vincent, who is of China Service.
Mr. Sourwine. You say all
Mr. Davies. At the present time, in the two posts which deal most intimately
in the field with China, that is. Hong Kong and Formosa, there is no senior
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5481
China language officer. They are all junior officers that have come in since
the war. They are young men with very little background and experience in
the problems they have to deal with.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Does Dr. Schwartz speak Chinese?
Mr. DAviEs. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Does Edgar Snow speak Chinese?
Mr. Davies. Poorly.
Mr. SotTRWiNE. Did Agnes Smedley speak Chinese?
Mr. Davies. I think poorly.
Mr. Soitrwinp:. Does Anna Louise Strong speak Chinese?
Mr. Davies. Not that I know of.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Does Professor Fairbank speak Chinese?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
]Mr. SouRwiNE. Does he speak it well?
Mr. Davies. He speaks, reads and writes it well.
Mr. Sourwine. He is a Chinese scholar?
Mr. Davies. He is a scholar.
Mr. Sourwine. Does Mrs. Fairbank speak Chinese?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SoxTRwiNE. Does she also read and write?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; not as well as her husband.
Mr. Sourwine. Does she read well enough to translate?
Mr. Davies. I don't tliink so. That is very difficult.
Mr. Sourwixe. I apologize for that diversion. I thought it would be well to
have that situation in the record.
Now, I want to get back to the question of the top secret, Itecause I think we
have to tie this rectird up.
Mr. Davies. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. I would like to ask : Can you, without violation of top secret,
identify for us the specific general directive under which you were operating?
Mr. Davies. It is an NC document, national-security document, establishing
the operation, organization, regarding whom 1 made the personnel recom-
mendations.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, I assume, since you have not identified it with more
particularity, you feel you cannot, without violating the classification itself?
Mr. Davies. Yes ; that classification is a top-secret document.
Mr. Sourwine. That being the case, will you undertake to make the proper
approach through the proper channels to the persons who might be able to make
a determination as to whether this committee can liave tliat document under
the classification, and subject to the classification, and to inform the committee
of the determination which is made in that regard?
Mr. I>AviES. That I make the approach?
Mr. Sourwine. I know of no otlier way, since you cannot tell us whom to
approach.
Mr. Davies. I can say that the most appropriate person to go to in the situation
is the Directoi- of Centi-al Intelligence, (ien. Walter Bedell Smith.
Mr. SoTRWiNE. Will General Smith know what we are referring to when we
refer to it in the terms which are referred to here, which are at best very vague?
Mr. Davies. I think he will.
Mr. Sourwine. Y'ou think we will have no question as to what to ask him for?
Do you see any impropriety, sir, in the committee requesting that you make the
approach, since yon obviously know specifically what it is, and attempt to get us
an answer frcmi General Smith? Would it be improper for you to do so?
Mr. Davies. I should be glad to do so.
Mr. Sourwine. Could we make that a request of the committee, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Smith. Very well.
I^Ir. Sourwine. And you will get us an official refusal, or if it can be submitted
to the committee, or to the chairman thereof, under whatever restrictions may
be necessary?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I can envisage the possibility that it might be something that
would not be for the eyes or knowledge of the staff, perhaps, but I find it hard
to envision the possibility that anything can be so top secret that, for instance,
the chairman of the Judiciary Committee may not be permitted to see it under
proper classification.
Mr. Davies. I shall transmit this request to my superiors, who in turn will
8S348 — 52 — pt. 14 — — 37
5482 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SotTRwiNE. Through what channels or what manner you deem appropriate
under the circumstances, but with the end of getting the committee a definitive
answer on it.
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiiN'E. The chairman asks me lo say that I sliould make it clear on
the record that I meant Senator McCarran, but I would like to state also for the
record that I have just as great difficulty in imagining a refusal for the present
chairman of this hearing as in the case of the chairman of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, Senator McCarran.
Senator Smith. There might be some difference there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The record shows tlmt the request is first on behalf of the
committee, with a request that if they want to narrow that, they narrow it as
far as they think necessary down to the point of an absolute refusal, which we
hope will not result.
Now, sir, do you know whether any of these six people, that is. Prof. Benjamin
SchwartJC, Edsar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Prof. John Fair-
bank and his wife, I\Irs. Fairbank, were ever hired as a result of this recom-
mendation which you made?
Mr. Davies. Insofar as I know, none of them were hired.
Mr. SouRWiNE. As a matter of fact, you know that they were not hired, don't
you, Mr. Davies?
Mr. Davies. I cannot answer categorically on this, because if they were hired,
it would have been by another agency, but so far as I know, they certainly were
not hired.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You have seen and talked with Professor Fairbank since the
date of this recommendation, have you not?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you know that he wasn't hired?
Mr. Davies. I know that he wasn't — within my knowledge he was not hired.
Senator Smith. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.) ,
Mr. SouRwiNE. When you were using the word "hire," were you using it solely
in the connotation of employment as an employee for compensation?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, now, let me repeat the question :
Do you know whether any of these six persons were ever utilized by the
agency to which you made the recommendations, along the lines of the recom-
mendations you made?
Mr. Davies. I have no knowledge, but my belief and all of the Information
that I have points to the fact that none of them were used for this purpose.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Now, as a matter of fact, you have seen, as you testified, Mr.
Fairbank, since the recommendation was made?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You do know, do you not, that Mr. Fairbank was not and
has not been utilized in accordance with your recommendation?
Mr. Davies. So far as my information goes, he was not.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mean you have never discussed the matter with him at all?
Mr. Davies. I could not discuss a clandestine operation with him.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Not necessarily as such ; but I mean, as between good friends,
you know pretty well what he is doing?
Mr. Davies. I know what he is doing. His time is taken up. In fact, he is
now in Japan or on his way to Japan.
Mr. SoURWiNE. If he had been utilized in the way which you recommended,
you would have had opportunity to have learned of it, in his case, at least?
Mr. Davies. I probably would have.
Mr. SouRViaNE. Would you tell us, sir, since the project did not go forward
and the people were not utilized in accordance with the recommendations, why it
still remains a top secret?
Mr. Davies. Because the authorities who are in charge of this operation con-
sider it in that category.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, in order to secure permission to testify with regard to
this subject, testify beyond the point where you have felt you must stop, would
you have to go outside of your own agency?
Mr. Davies. I think I would, because this operation is not under the State
Department. This operation is under CIA, which is another agency.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5483-
Mr. SouRWiNE. You would then have to get permission from General Smith?
Mr. Davies. Precisely. , .^^ , . .
Mr SouRWiNE. Would it be improper for you, at the committees request, ta
seek permission from General Smith to give the committee testimony with re-
gard to that recommendation in executive session, and subject to such classihca-
tion as might be imposed?
Mr. Davies. I certainly can make that request.
Mr. SouEWiNE. Would you be willing to do so?
Mr. Davies. I would be glad to.
Mr. Sourwine. May the record show that as a request of the committee?
Senator Smith. Yes. The record will so show.
Mr. SouKwiNE. And you will report back to the committee what the answer is
or the ruling is?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
The two things you want are — let me summarize: One is the authorization
under which I decline to reveal this information; and secondly, a request for
authorization for me to reveal the further details?
Mr. Sourwine. That is right.
Mr. Davies. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. I am almost through, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask whether, in connection with your recommendation of these-
six people, IMr. Davies, you thought it necessary to make any spot check or theui
current check with regard to security ?
Mr. Davies. On all operations involving personnel, I consider it necessary fa
have a security check.
IMr. Sourwine. You say you do feel it necessary?
Mr. Davies. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you make such a check with regard to any of these six
people?
Mr. Davies. No, because that was not in my purview to make the check.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean you recommended them, subject to security check?
Mr. DA\aEs. This again goes into the nature of the operation.
Mr. Sourwine. That is a question you cannot answer?
Mr. Davies. That is a question I cannot answer.
Mr. Sourwine. I think on that point we have reached an impasse, an amicable-
impasse, Mr. Chairman, and I have no further questions of this witness at
this time.
Senator Smith. Very well. Thank you very much, for your testimony, Mr»
Davies.
The committee is recessed subject to call.
(Whereupon, at 2: 45 p. m., the committee was recessed subject to call.)
Mr. Morris. I also have here, Mr. Chairman, a memorandum dated
June 19, prepared by me for the chairman of this committee, explain-
ing that I have been to the office of Carlyle Humelsine, Deputy Under
Secretary of State, and examined the penciled notes which Alger
Hiss made during the Yalta Conference. As I indicate in this memo-
randum, the notes do indicate that Hiss was active at the Conference
and had an active role in the Conference, but that there is no direct
IPR association in the notes. There is one reference, however, to the
fact that a memorandum was handled by or prepared by Hiss urging
President Koosevelt to take up with Prime Minister Churchill and
Premier Stalin the question of unity between the Kuomintang and
the Communists. AVe have not been able to verify whether the note
was prepared by the Secretary of State himself or by Mr. Hiss. It is
among the Hiss notes. It has a notation by Charles E. Bohlen which
indicated that the point had been taken up with Premier Stalin. I
think it describes it "with satisfactory results."
Senator Watkins. That memo may be received as part of the-
record.
5484 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exliibit No. 1398" and
is as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1398
Memorandum
June 19, 1952.
To : Senator McCarran.
From : J. G. Sourwine and R. Morris.
Mr. Morris spent tliree afternoons in the office of Carlisle Humelsine, Under-
secretary of State, examining pencil notes of Alger Hiss made at Yalta. On the
third occasion, he was accompanied by Mr. Sourwine, and together we reviewed
the folder containing the Hiss notes. After Mr. Morris left on this third occa-
sion, Mr. Sourwine stayed on with the expectation of conversing with Mr. C. B.
Bohlen, but spoke instead with Mr. Humelsine.
The Hiss notes do not directly concern the Institute of Pacific Relations, but
they are very interesting and significant in a colhxteral way.
On the very first page, Hiss made a diagram of the seating arrangement at
Yalta. The seating was around a round table, at which was seated 19 persons.
On Mr. Roosevelt's left was C. E. B. (obviously standing for Bohlen). On his
right was E. R. S. (obviously standing for Steltinius). On Stettinius' right was
Leahy, and on his left was Byrnes and Harriman. Behind the President were
Hopkins, Matthews, and Hiss. Maisky was on Stalin's left, and on his right
were Molotov and Vyshinsky, and Gromyko, in that order. On the upper right-
hand page there was a notation headed "tonight, Harriman, Page, and A. H. with
Gromkyo and who else." Hiss" handwritten notes indicated that E. R. S. had sug-
gested the words "and the dismemberment" (referring to Germany) be added to
article XII of the Articles of Surrender. Molotov apparently had a proposal of
his own which he withdrew after Stettinius' suggestion. On this same page, in
what was apparently the first day of the session. Hiss made the following note :
"Intermission — Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L. P. (Pasvol-
sky?) the change in the third paragraph of our proposal. I straightened him out
on the text but he was still not satisfied that the effect of the reference to Roman
numeral VIII was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great dif-
• ficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier
for the R's if we could drop the whole reference and ask if Pres. would agree
to that. I said I thought so." Later in the notes after the Roman numeral
VIII there is the following notation, "Prisoners of War.'" ST (obviously Stalin)
suggests mention of prisoners of war should be deleted. It was explained that
this should be among the conferees and that they could take a decision and it
would not be necessary to publish it. Molotov is reported as having said that
it would come up in meeting of the Foreign Ministers. There was nothing else
on the notes that would link up a reference made in the intermission note above
and this last note other than the identity of Roman numerals.
On February Sth Hiss made a notation that after meeting of Foreign Secre-
taries, Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss met as a committee to discuss U. N. conference
procedures. A. H. (Alger Hiss) explains State Department views, but said Pres.
had not approved. After lunch before plenary session E. R. S. cleared all with
Pres. and A. H. told Gromyko and sent word to Jelib.
There was one document dated February 10, 194.5. on the stationery of the
Secretary of State. Subject : Recommendation that the three powers encourage
Kuomintang Communists unity in the war effort against Japan. As this is likely
to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today's meeting
you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full
encouragement is given by the governments to Kuomintang Communists unity
in the war effort against Japan. The importance of encouraging united Chinese
efforts at the moment must be apparent to all three governments.
Alger Hiss had pencilled a note in the corner of the page : "Bohlen says the
Pres. has already taken this up with Stalin."
It was in connection with this memorandum that Mr. Sourwine had hoped to
see Mr. Bohlen. He wanted to find out whether Hiss had dictated the memo on
the letterhead of the Secretary of State. We also wanted to find out frop:
Bohlen what were the circumstances described in Hiss' handwritten note. This
could posisil)ly be a corollary factor in the II'R hearings. Mr. Bohlen subse-
quently told Mr. Sourwine he did not remember seeing this memorandum, but
did remember telling either Secretary Stettinius or Mr. Hiss that the President
had taken this matter up with Stalin. There is another activity of Hiss' indi-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5485
cated iu the remaindei- of the notes. Six pages of notes taken by Mr. Morris
are in the subcommittee tile.
Appended with this memorandum are copies of all the correspondence between
the Chairman and the State Department on this matter.
February 21, 1952.
Hon. Dean Acheson,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. G.
My Dear Mr. Secretary : A witness before the Senate Internal Security Sub-
committee, Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, testified yesterday that, in the course of her
ofBcial duties at the Department of State, she dealt with and handled the pen-
ciled notes of Alger Hiss taken at Yalta which were available to her in her work
of postwar planning.
Dr. Fluegel was an employee of the Department from 1942 to 1948.
On the basis of this testimony, the Internal Security Subcommittee agreed
that these handwritten notes of Alger Hiss should be made available in the
original, or photostatic duplicate, to the committee.
Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
May 1, 1952.
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Secretary : On February 21, 1952, I wrote to you asking that
the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945 be
made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee.
In my letter of February 21, it was pointed out that a witness before the
subcommittee, Dr. Edna Fluegel, an employee of the State Department from 1942
to 1948, testified that, in the course of her official duties in the Department, she
dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Mr. Hiss.
This letter is written to determine what action has been taken on my request
of February 21, 1952, to you.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
May 22, 1952.
Hon. Dean Acheson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mn. Secretary : Under date of May 14, 19.52, over the signature of
Mr. David Bruce, the Under Secretary of State, your Department made reply
to my letter of February 21, 1952. In view of the length of time (nearly 3
months) that my letter was apparently under study in the Department, I must
conclude the Department's reply was carefully considered, and represents firm
policy ; and, therefore, I must assume that you participated in the decision
which this letter reflects, and concur therewith.
The Department's letter of May 14, 1952, was as follows :
"This is in reply to your letter of February 21, 1952, in which you request
the penciled notes which Alger Hiss made at the Crimea Conference. These
papers contain informal notes of the internal discussions of the members of the
American delegation to that conference. They also contain informal notes of
the discussions at the international meetings held during the conference at
which Mr. Hiss was present.
"It has been the consistent policy of the Department not to permit the release
of papers of this type. If release were to be permitted, each person participat-
ing in the discussion of an American delegation in the future would feel called
upon to take similar notes. The discussion would tend to be for the record
rather than the full and frank exchange of views which is essential if a con-
sidered position is to be developed. By the same token, if the informal notes
of the international meetings were released, persons now active in public life
in friendly governments would have just cause to feel aggrieved. The position
of the United States in future diplomatic dLscussions might well be prejudiced.
"For the above reasons, the request to make these notes available must be
respectfully declined."
5486 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
That letter is a rather remarkable document. It will bear some discussion.
At the outset, let me say frankly it had not been expected the Department
would refuse to make the Hiss notes available to the Internal Security Sub-
committee; though consideration had been given to the possibility that the De-
partment might report that no such notes were in its possession. I am there-
fore grateful for the confirmation, contained in the first paragraph of the De-
partment's letter, of the fact that these papers are in the possession of tlie State
Department.
The State Department's answer that "it has been the consistent policy of the
Department not to permit the release of papers of this type" is not an honest
statement of fact. Informal notes, and in fact full transcripts of conferences,
have been released in the past. The Wake Island Conference is only one example
In a long series. Furthermore, Sherwood's book, the Forrestal diaries, Byrnes'
book Speaking Frankly, and Stettinius' book, all gave what purported to be in-
timate conversations and descriptions of informal statements made at the
Yalta Conference. There should be nothing about Alger Hiss' notes which
would make them sacrosanct ; nor should there be anything about the conversa-
tions of the persons mentioned in his notes, even "persons now active in public
life in friendly governments," which would entitle those conversations to pro-
tection in a situation where no protection was given to the conversations of such
persons as General MacArthur at Wake Island, and all those at Yalta who are
mentioned in the Byrnes, Sherwood, and Stettinius books and the Forrestal
diaries.
Incidentally, speaking of "persons now active in public life in friendly gov-
ernments", Mr. Churchill has written extensively on his meetings with many
Americans, and on many occasions has been quite candid. To mention a case
more in point, the "inside" story of Klaus Fuchs is now being syndicated.
Would your Department object to disclosure of any notes Fuchs may have
made?
Alger Hiss was not just another State Department functionary. He is a
man who has been found by a jury to have been guilty of acts which brand
him as a traitor of his country. What he did in the State Department were not
the acts of an ordinary man. The notes he took and the influence he bore on
the shaping of our policy at the Yalta Conference should be known and exposed
at this time. Certainly, the contents of the Hiss notes are a proper subject of
inquiry by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
There is an implication in the Department's letter that to release those notes
would give notice to all persons in the State Department that auy notes they
might take would be subject to release in the future. Perhaps there may have
been such an implication in the release of other notes and recollections of various
meetin;j;s ; but in the particular case of the Hiss notes there is only implied no-
tice that if the taker of notes subsequently is proven to be a traitor to his
country his notes may be subject to examination by a Senate committee.
Alger Hiss was in a position where he could have placed many persons in
key positions in our Government. We should know what his notes show about
those with whom he dealt, those upon whom he relied, and those who assisted
him ; and we should check up on what they are doing now. By nature, training,
and doctrine. Communists attract other Communists and put them in positions
of influence.
Tlie position of the United States in future diplomatic discussions, about which
the Department's letter expresses concern, would be much more hampered by
the continued presence of persons Alger Hiss may have put into important posi-
tions than it would be by any revelation of what Hiss wrote in his notes. It is
an ironical standard that every single secret that the United States Government
possessed, according to testimony before our subcommittee, was available to
Alger Hiss in his position as Director of Postwar Planning; yet the notes which
Hiss wrote at Yalta are being withheld not only from the people of the United
States but even from tlie United States Senate.
I noted particularly that the Department's letter made no mention whatever
of security in connection with the Hiss notes. I assume this was not because
the Department thought the matter of security unworthy of consideration, or
failed to consider it, but rather because no valid question of security, under the
circumstances, could exist.
Though this letter has been written, as I have indicated, in the light of the
assumption that the Department's answer under date of May 14 and over the
signature of Mr. David Bruce, the Under Secretary of State, represented a
considered decision in which you had participated and with which you concur,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5487
yet I want to ask if there is any possibility tliat you wish to modify or amend
that reply in any way. It is hard and painful to believe that your attitude with
regard to Alger Hiss extends so far as to embrace a determination to protect
his notes not only against public exposure but even against examination by a duly
constituted committee of the United States Senate. I earnestly hope you will
tell me there is still further word to come from the Department on this matter.
I await your reply.
Sincerely,
Pat McCakban, Chairman.
June S, 1952.
Hon. Pat McCarran,
United States Senate.
Dear Senator McCarran : In accordance with your request, I have reviewed
the correspondence between you and Mr. Bruce regarding the notes which Mr.
Alger Hiss took at the Yalta Conference. The concern of the Department which
Mr. Bruce was stressing was that reports made by an employee of the Depart-
ment stating views expressed or positions taken by representatives of other
governments should not be made public by the Department. The Department
has, of course, no power to control writings by former officers or employees or
former representatives of other governments.
Neither the Department nor I have any concern in withholding the notes for
any other reason. Since you believe that these notes may have information
bearing on Mr. Hiss or his activities, I would be perfectly willing to have a rep-
resentative of the committee examine the notes in the Department. If, as a
result of this examination, the committee feels that it requires any portion of
these notes for its work, the Department will be prepared to discuss the question
further.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Acheson.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have some specimens of the "pump-
kin papers," and some of them concern a handwritten memorandum
of Harry Dexter White which was turned up in our hearings. These
come from Senator Kichard Nixon, a Senator from California, and
they were turned over to the committee with a covering letter from
Senator Nixon dated June 7, 1952. May they, with the covering
letter, go into the record at this time?
Senator Watkins. They may be received and made a part of the
record.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1399" and
are as follow:)
Exhibit No. 1399
United States Senate,
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
June 7, 1952.
Hon. Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator McCarran : At the request of Mr. Robert Morris, counsel for
the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I have
forwarded to you under separate cover the following documents :
1. Documents identified as K-1, K-2, K-3, and copy of a memo from Harold J. E.
Gessell regarding the handwriting of Harry D. White. These documents came
from my files.
2. Documents identified as Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4. These documents were
obtained by me from the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of
Representatives.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon.
5488 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
March 2, 1949.
EI/HJEG : ml.
#1829.
Director, Inspection-Investigation Service.
Cliief, Identitication & Detection Division.
Examination of liandwritiug of Harry D. White (Committee on Un-American
Activities).
1. On February 21, 1949, Investigator Owens, of the Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities of the U. S. House of Representatives, personally and informally
submitted three photostatic copies of documents purporting to bear the
known writings of one Harry D. White, whicli are identified as follows :
K-1 Photostatic copy of letter dated June 11, 1934, addressed to "Dr.
Jacob Viner, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C." and signed "Harry
D. White".
K-2 Photostatic copy of Personal History St;itement (Standard Form
No. 6), which purports to be the Personal History Statement of Harry Dex-
ter Wliite, understood to bear certain writings made by Harry Dexter
White.
K-3 Photostatic copy of hnal portion of Personal History Statement
(Standard Form No. 6), purporting to bear the known writings of Harry
D. White.
Investigator Owens also submitted eight pages (pliotostatic copies) of ques-
tioned writing herein identified as Q-1 through Q-8.
2. It was requested that an examination and comparison be conducted of the
purported known writings of Harry D. White (identified as K-1, K-2, and K-3)
with the questioned writings (identified as Q-1 through Q-8), to determine
whether Harry D. White is the author of the questioned writing. It was also
requested that the documents as submitted be photographed, and that several
copies of each document be attached to the report.
3. A careful examination and comparison was conducted regarding the afore-
mentioned writings and as a result of such a study, it is conehxded that the per-
son responsi])le for the writings appearing on K-1. K-2, and K-3. purporting
to be the known writings of Harry D. White, also is responsible for all of the
writing appearing on Q-1 through Q-8. In other words, Harry I). White is the
author of the questioned writings purporting to be notes involving State De-
partment activities.
4. The above conclusion is subject to verification upon examination of the
original documents.
5. Photostatic copies of the documents as submitted, together with three
photographic copies of each document, are attaclied.
Hakold J. E. Gesell.
Atts.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5489
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5490
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5497
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mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5499
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5500 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have one other affidavit here, and
that is an affidavit by Igor Bogolepov, who has been a witness before
this committee. I would like this added to the list of affidavits pre-
viously introduced.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1400" and is
as follows:)
r:xHiBiT 1400
The Aims and Methods of Soviet Policies in the Far East in 1937-44
I. general background
Tlie theory which guided the Soviet Fai' East policy more than actual bal-
ance of powers was Lenin's theory of colonial Asia as a reserve of tlie world
proletarian revolution. In Stalin's time this theory was completed l)y recogni-
tion of the fact of the failure of the worker movement in the west to become
a vehicle for Comnumist domination ; now the poor an<l bewildered masses of
the Orient had to play the role of cannon fodder for conununism, and, contrary
to Marx, the pace of tlie world revolution had to take an east-west direction,
instead of a west-east direction. Out of this came the change in the' Commu-
nist tactics and slogans from the internationalistic proletarian line to nation-
alistic popular line.
I have to repeat once more and with full responsibility that although strange
to the western mind, this theoretical set-up, 'and not merely political realities,
commanded the mind of Soviet leaders and their actions.
II. policies toward japan
One can say that in case of Japan the Soviet policies were less international-
istic in form — that is, communistic — and more customary than anywhere in
the relations of the Soviet Union with other foreign countries; it must be
emphasized, however, that generally speaking the mentality of the members
of the Politburo and their actions were motivated l)y interest of the international
Communist movement and Comumnist world revolution rather than by any
Russian national interest, the latter always being sacrififed for the tirst-
Since the rise of nazism and the beginning of .Japanese aggression on the
Asiatic mainland Stalin's main preoccupation consisted in avoiding a war on two
fronts ; as we know here he succeeded fully and wholly. This line of policy
required a lot of appeasement in the case of Japan. Therefore, the Comintern
was actually "put on ice" in the case of Soviet relations with Japan. The Soviet
policy toward that country was channeled through the Foreign Office (NKID)
and not through the Comintern, as it was in the case of China. Being frightened
by Japanese menace, the Soviet leaders required always from the Foreign Office
staff to carry out such kind of policy which will not induce the Japanese to
believe we are carrying out Communist subversive tactics. We were ordered to
be extremely careful and polite to the Japanese. The idea was to make the
Japanese believe that the U. S. S. R. intended to entertain with them relations
as usually existing between nations, tliat Comintern and Communist tactics were
not to be applied by the U. S. S. R. in its relations with Japan. Previously to
my own participation in the negotiations with the Japanese on the oil concessions
on Sakhalin and fisheries around Kamchatka, I had to read the directives and
tlien had to sign them as proof I had read them. Of course, all this does not
preclude the efforts of Soviet military and naval intelligence to penetrate Japan
(mostly with the assistance of Koreans and Chinese as well as the White Russian
emigrants). Yet more important in China prop(>r the Soviet Union met militai'y
aggression of Japan with methods of propaganda. Communist subversive activi-
ties, and so forth, that's along the usual Communist lines of conducting the
struggle.
The second aim of the Soviet policy toward Japan besides the tactics of appease-
ment, of avoiding much friction directly between the U. S. S. R. and Japan, was
indeed the aim of diverting the Japanese aggression from the northwest to the
southwest (from the Soviet angle of view). In this respect the Soviet Foreign
Office was instructed to let the Japanese think that the U. S. S. R. would not
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5501
oppose any Japanese move against (a) British, Dutch, and other European
colonies in China and Indonesia, (b) China proper.
I remember havin,ii read in the secret files of Litvinov's office the same instruc-
tions to the newly appointed Ambassador Malik in 1938. At the same time the
Japanese were told that every attempt to move in the general direction of the
Soviet sphere, including Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, would "create serious
consequences."
In accordance with this double line of ideas, the Chinese Communist forces were
transferred in 1931 from the south China to Tenan and adjoining areas. It was
tantamount to an invitation for the Japanese to attack China pi'oper as well as a
warning against any aggressive steps toward the Siberian border. We had in our
files the text of declaration to that effect made by Karakhan to the Japanese
Government.
Only after long hesitation and arguing inside the Politburo the Soviet Union
decided to take a risk of an open clash with the Japanese on the Siberian border
in order to show that Soviet leaders meant business. Everything was at stake
to defeat the Japanese military reconnoissance in strength directly on the
Siberian border (1938) and in the steppes of Mongolia (1938-39). In the
Khalkin-Gol operation Marshal Zhukov first proved his military talent, and the
invading force was circled and annihilated with the help of then secret task
force of the famous tanks T-34. The risk was worth while to undertake. The
strength of the Soviet Far East defense impressed the Japanese greatly. The
reports of the Soviet ambassadors in Great Britain and Japan, as I rememlier.
told that this was the turning point in the Japanese policy. Then they decided
positively to take the Pacific and Indonesia direction instead of Siberia-Mongolia.
As Litvinov told me in 1939 that here was the great success of Soviet policy and
one of the main premises of the failure of the coming German onslaught.
It is quite obvious that the Soviets were veliemently opposed to any attempt by
the Japanese to approach the United States or vice versa. They were interested
only in an oi^en clash in the Pacific, for this would be the surest guaranty for
them on their Far East frontier. I can only wonder myself at the thinking
of some people — that is why the Soviet Union did not release to the United States
Government information of the coming attack on Pearl Harbor. As General
Vlassov, one of the defenders of Moscow, told me later that Pearl Harbor rescued
Moscow in December 1941.
WashixgtO'X,
District of Columbia, ss:
I have prepared the within statement, and I represent that the facts stated
herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and^are predicated on the
basis of my experience within the Soviet organization.
Igor Bogolepov.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of Jane 1952.
[SEAL] CHAS. E. AlDEN,
Notary Public, District of Col/umbia.
My commission expires August IS, 1952.
:Mr. ]MoRRis. Mr. Mandel, clo you have something here ?
Mr. INIaxdel. I have two quotations from a vohime entitled "The
United Front'" by George Dimitrov, pages 52 and 193, which I wonkl
like to introduce into the record.
Senator AVatkixs. They may be received.
(The quotations referred to* were marked "Exhibit No. 1401" and
are as follows:)
"Comrades, you remember the ancient tale of the capture of Troy. Trov was
inaccessible to the armies attacking her, thanks to her impregnable walls." And
the attacking aj-my, after suffering many sacrifices, was unable to achieve vic-
tory until, with the aid of the famous Trojan horse, it managed to penetrate to
the very heart of the enemy's camp "
(The United Front, by Georgi Dimitrov, general secretary. Communist Inter-
national, International Publishers, 1938, p. 52).
5502 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"The efforts of the romnninist Party, directed toward ending the civil war ii>
the country and establishing collaboration with the Kuomintang and all other
political groupings and armed forces of China in the organization of resistance-
to the Japanese marauders, have the sympathy, endorsement, and support
of the friends of the Chinese people throughout the world." (ibid, p. 193).
Mr. Mandel. I have here excerpts from the testimony of Lee Press-
man before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on
Aiioriist 28, 1950, which I would like to introduce in the record, in-
cluding several pages.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1402" and are-
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1402
HEARINGS REGARDING COmiUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT— PART 2
United States House of Representatives,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington, D. C, Monday, August 28, 1950.
Public Hearings
The committee met. pursuant to call, at 10 : 50 a. m., in room 226, Old House-
Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood, Francis E. Wal-
ter, Burr P. Harrison, John McSweeney, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon,
Francis Case, and Harold H. Velde.
Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Louis J. Russell,
senior investigator; Donald T. Appell, and Courtney Owens, investigators; Ben-
jamin IMandel, director of research ; and A. S. Poore, editor.
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call at this time Mr. Lee Press-
man.
Mr. Wood. Let us have order, please.
Mr. Pressman, will you hold up your right hand, please. You swear that
the evidence you will give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Pressman. I dO.
Mr. Wood. Have a seat, please.
Testimony of Lee Pressman
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name?
IMr. Pressman. My name is Lee Pressman.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Pressman, the record of proceedings of this committee
shows that you appeared before it on August 20, 1948, and at that time you re-
fused, on constitutional grounds, to answer certain questions relating to your
alleged affiliation with the Communist Party.
The Committee on Un-American Activities has learned through the public
press that when you recently resigned from the American Labor Party you
issued a statement to the effect that you were doing so because of the Com-
munist control of that organization. The committee has consistently endeavored
to give an opportunity to witnesses who have appeared before it to repudiate
their Communist affiliations or associations. A full disclosure of your knowledge
of Commiuiist Party activities would perform a great public service, especially
at this time, when acts of military aggression are being committed by the forces
of international communism. It would also be evidence that the break with
your alleged Communist association has been full and complete, and that your
action was taken in good faith.
The committee will not be satisfied with a mere perfunctory repudiation of
the Communist Party, nor, it is suggested, will the American public. The
committee desires to know if you are willing to cooperate with it in its effort
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5503
to expose Communist activities by answering such questions as will be pro-
pounded to you with regard to Communist activities during the course of this
hearing?
Mr. Pressman. Mr. Chairman, I ask at this time for the opportunity of mak-
ing a brief statement to the committee.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Pressman, you will be accorded the privilege of making what-
ever statement jou desire, but you have .lust been asked a direct question, and
we would like to have a direct answer to that question.
Mr. Pressman. May I suggest the question was rather lengthy.
Mr. Wood. The latter part was direct.
Mr. Pressman. I believe my statement, which will be very brief, will answer
the question, as well as indicate precisely what my position will be before the
committee today.
Mr. Wood. Then will you be prepared to answer questions asked you?
Mr. Pressman. That is correct.
IMr. Wood. Proceed.
Mr. Pressman. I understand, Mr. Chairman, there is a desire that I further
clarify the position which I took in my recent letter resigning from the American
Labor Party. This I desire to do, as well as take this opportunity to expose many
distortions which have been circulated regarding my past activities. There has
been considerable speculation regarding my past activities. I propose at this
moment to set forth a few very simple facts.
In the early 1930's, Mr. Chairman, as you may well recall, as well as other
members of this committee, there was a very severe depression in our country.
The future looked black for my generation just emerging from school. At the
same time, the growing specter of nazism in Germany presented to my mfnd an
equally grave threat.
In my desire to see the destruction of Hitlerism and an improvement in
economic conditions here at home, I joined a Communist group in Washington,
D. C, about 1934. My participation in such group extended for about a year,
to the best of my recollection. I recall that about the latter part of 19.35— the
precise date I cannot recall, but it is a matter of public record — I left the Gov-
ernment service and left Washington to reenter the private practice of law in
New York City. And at that time I discontinued any further participation in
the group from that date until the present.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I state the following at this time :
There were three other persons in that group in addition to myself. They were
all at the time with me in the Department of Agriculture. They have all been
named before this committee by others.
I state to you that I am prepared, as I will Indicate, to answer any and all
questions regarding my activities in the past up to the present, and possibly
project my viewpoint into the future. It would be offensive to me, as it would
be to practically all people, to have to name individuals with whom I have asso-
ciated in the past.
What I have stated to you would indicate that I offer no additional information
that this committee does not already have. However, that is a decision which
this committee will have to make in propounding its questions to me and the
directives you issue to me.
Rear in mind, sir, there may be others like myself who, out of deep convictions,
will change their beliefs. If this committee assumes the position that those who
do change their convictions and beliefs, as I have, must also be compelled to
take what I submit would be an offensive — offensive to one's own personal self-
position, that might well be discouraging to other people to do what I have done.
But, I repeat, that is a decision which this committee will have to make.
Now, I believe it is of interest to comment that I have no knowledge regarding
the political beliefs or affiliations of Alger Hiss. And when I say I have no
knowledge, I am not endeavoring to quibble with this committee. I appear
here, as I necessarily must, as a lawyer. I am a lawyer. When one asks me
for knowledge, knowledge to my mind is based on fact, and I have no facts.
And bear in mind, sir, that as an attorney, to be asked to comment on a case
now pending In court is a very unusual experience for an attorney, because any-
thing I say undoubtedly may have an impact one way or another on that case,
and for that reason I am trying to he very, very precise. I do know, I can state
as a matter of knowledge, that for the period of my participation in that group,
5504 msTiTUTE of pacific relations
which is the only basis on which I can say I have knowledge, Alger Hiss was
not a member of the group.
Now, those two statements of mine are based on knowledge, which embraces
facts within my possession. I do not believe that this committee would want
me to hazard conjectural surmise. That is not my function. You want from
me, I as.sume, facts and nothing but facts.
Now, there has been a great deal of wild speculation, a great deal of unfortu-
nate distortion, regarding my name as it arose in the course of previous testimony
l)elore this committee by a man named Chambers.
\\hen 1 left the city of Washington I advised the group — and I believe
on that occasion Mr. Peters may have been present — that I was leaving
the city of Washington, leaving the Federal Government, and I was disassociat-
ing myself from the group, or the Communist Party, or any group of the Com-
munist Party.
Mr. Wood. Were all members of the group present when you made that asser-
tion?
INIr. Peessman. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you assign any reason for doing so?
Mr. Pressman. I think the most precise way I can put it is to say, as I have
stated before, that I wanted to leave the Federal Government, that I was going
back to the city of New York and that I preferred from that moment on, at least,
in my private practice, not to have organizational relationship with the Com-
munist Party, such as being a member of the Connnunist Party.
Mr. Tavenner. That did not mean that you had severed all connection with
the Communist Party, did it?
Mr. Pressman. At that time?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. Pressman. At that time it did not.
Mr. Tavenner. Tell the committee about your subsequent connection with the
Connnunist Party.
J\lr. Pressman. Over the past number of years I have had contacts and dealings
with known leaders of the Communist Party whom I have met Irom time to
time.
Mr. Tavenneb. And what was the nature of those contacts which you have
mentioned?
Mr. Pressman. They would discuss with me their viewpoints, their recom-
mendations, and suggestions, with respect to organizational activities of the
CIO while I was counsel for the CIO. I discussed those problems with these
people. When they made recommendations or suggestions which I deemed to
be of assistance or helpful to the CIO, I accepted them.
I state here now, as categorically as I can, that at no time from 1936 until
194S did I take instructions or directives from anyone, including these leaders of
the Communist Party, which were contrary to tlie established policy of the CIO.
The only persons who gave me instructions or directives while I was with the
CIO were the ofiicial officers of the CIO. And here now I challenge anyone to
point to a single act or utterance of mine while I was with the CIO, Mr. Chair-
man, which was contrary to the establislied policy of the CIO.
Mr. Case. But you did receive instructions during the period you were a
member of the Communist Party and in the Department of Agriculture?
Mr. Pressman. I would say I do not I'ecall instructions as such, Mr. .Con-
gressman, because in the kind of work I was then doing there was nothing I
could be instructed about.
Mr. Nixon. Mr. Pi'essman, can I go back a moment to your break with the
party. You said you wanted no organizational relationship with the party?
Mr. Pressman. In the sense of considering myself a member completely
committed to all the policies and doctrines of the Communist Party.
Mr. Nixon. Was your break in 1935 an ideological break with the party?
Mr. Mandkl. The next is a letter of transmittal from the Library
of Congress with the material sent to us on June 16, 1952, covering the
contributors to the Far Eastern Survey of Pacific Affairs.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5505
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1403" and
are as follows:)
The Library of Congress,
Washington 25, D. C, June 16, 1952.
Hon. PAT McCarran,
Chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator McCarran : We are transmitting to you the study on the
contributors to the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, which we have
compiled for the subcommittee.
Sincerely yours, ,
W. C. Gilbert, Acting Director.
5506
mSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
3
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5619
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
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5621
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"3
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5623
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
3
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5625
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88348— 52— pt. 14-
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5626
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
33
O
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5627
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5628
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
3
a
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5629
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
"3
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5634 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELaTIOXS
Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter from the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Services, dated December 12, 1951, dealing Avith the case of
Charles Bidien.
Senator Watkins, It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exliibit No. 1404" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 1404
Office op the Commissioner
Please address reply to
and refer to this file no : A-2987117 — In v.
United States Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Washington 25, D. C, December 12, 1951.
Honorable Pat McCarkan,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator McCarran : This is in response to your letter of December 1,
1951, requesting full information regarding tlie deportation proceedings of
Charles Bidien.
Your inquiry appears to relate to the Charles Bidien who is the subject of
immigration file A-2987117. He was born at Acheh, Sumatra, Indonesia, on
July 18, 1904, and is an Indonesian citizen of the Malayan race. His name in his
native land was Sheh Bidien Ben Aroon.
A warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings was issued against him on
September 16, 1948, charging him with: (1) membership in an organization
advocating the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United
States; (2) membership in an organization that circulates or distributes printed
matter advocating such overthrow ; (.3) being an immigrant not in possession of
a valid immigration visa at time of entry; and (4) being an alien ineligible
to citizenship and not entitled to enter the United States under any exception.
He was accorded a hearing under this warrant of arrest on November 1, 1949,
at the New York Office of this Service. Charges (3) and (4), above, were found
sustained by the evidence. Charges (1) and (2), above, were not sustained as
no evidence was adduced bearing upon these charges. Admissible evidence to
sustain these latter two charges was not available for production at the hearing.
According to the record, Bidien last arrived in the United States February 8,
1930, at Boston, Massachusetts, as a seaman aboard the S. S. City of Rangoon,
and deserted the vessel at the port of Philadelphia. He was never lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence.
On December 21, 1949, an order of deportation was entered. The warrant of
■deportation was issued on the same date. His deportation was effected on the
SS "Batory" which sailed foreign from the port of New York January 20, 1950.
I hope that the foregoing satisfactorily answers your inquiry.
Sincerely yours,
Argyi-e R. Mackey,
Coni7nissioner.
Mr. Mandel. Next is a photostat which I had made of an article
from Political Affairs, of September 1947, a Communist Magazine,
the article being by Charles Bidien.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The photostat referred to vras marked "Exhibit No. 1405" and is
SIS follows:)
Exhibit No. 1405
[Political Affairs, September 1947]
Indonesia : Asian New Democracy
(By Charles Bidien)
The struggle for Indonesian independence is at a turning point. Either the
Dutch war against the Indonesian Republic will be stopped by United Nations
action, or the Dutch will continue their present imperialist offensive. This
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5635
offensive will be along the followin;; lines: (1) Occupation of all deep-water
ports and major cities; (2) capture of transportation, communications, irriga-
tion, and industrial facilities; (3) military operations to divide the island of
Java into three distinct units, and to effect the division of Sumatra into small
areas.
The Netherlands Government is rapidly consolidating its position in Repub-
lican territory. The fate of the Indonesian Republic has wide political ramifi-
cations for the entire colonial world, since Indonesia alone of all the prewar
colonies to set up independent governments since the end of the war, has set a
pace in political democracy and economic change comparable to the European
new peoples' democracies. Furthermore, as a nation of 70 million people, 90
per cent of whom are Moslems, Indonesia exerts a progressive influence on the
Mohammedan countries. Indonesia is of major significance to world trade,
having in prewar years produced 90 percent of the world's quinine, one-third of
the world's rubber, one-fourth of its tin, as well as great amounts of sugar, copra,
tapioca, spices, tea, coffee, tobacco and petroleum. Its need for industralization
and expanded commerce make Indonesia important to the United States and
Great Britain.
All of these constructive potentialities are in danger of being lost at this time.
The undeclared Dutch war, started on July 19, against the Indonesian Republic,
focused world attention on Dutch policy for the first time since the Ukrainian
request that the Security Council investigate the Indonesian crisis in February,
1946.
During the period from August 17, 194.5, when the Indonesian Republic was
set up, until the present, the Netherlands has vacillated between a policy of
negotiating with the Indonesian Republic, and one of conducting outright war-
fare to destroy it. Discussions with the Indonesian Republic reflected mass
pressure within the Netherlands; gradual withdrawal of British forces which
had borne the initial military efforts against Indonesian independence; limited
aid to Dutch imperialism from the United States acquired at gi-eat sacrifice of
Dutch interests in the Indies ; and the unparalleled unity and resistance of the
Indonesians. However, the Dutch imperialists never abandoned their desire
to crush the Republic and regain dominance in Indonesian financial affairs.
The policy of "limited" war has been championed by Lieutenant-General S. H.
Spoor, Commander of Dutch forces in Indonesia, with the support in the Nether-
lands of the Right Wing of the major party, the Labor Party (Social-Democrat) ;
as well as the Catholic Party, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, and other imperial-
istic-minded groups. In an appeal for additional American credits and war
material on February 13, 1947, General Spoor outlined the plan of opera-
tions :
The policy I will follow is that of the late President Theodore Roosevelt:
namely, soft words backed up with a big stick. . . . Our intention is to under-
take a series of limited objectives. In this way we hope to eliminate resistance
without stirring up trouble over a wide area.
Within the Netherlands, only the Communist Party is calling for an end
to the imperialistic war ; the other, parties are backing the Beel govern-
ment in its grandiose plans of conquest. The following are the objectives of
the Dutch imperialist war.
* « «
1. The Dutch imperialists aim to weaken the Republic in order to wrest major
political and economic concessions in a '"legal" manner.
The Dutch have utilized the past six months of negotiations and relative quiet
to mobilize a full fighting force of at least 100,000 trained men, and adequate
equipment purchased with the 1946 loans from the United States. They have
stabilized their positions in the major cities that were captured by the British.
They have extended and entrenched their perimeters. From October 1946,
when a truce was signed between the Republic and the Netherlands, Dutch forces,
by agreement, took over many strategic oil areas, plantations, and other prewar
Dutch properties. After the signing of the Linggadjati Settlement— by which
the Dutch granted de facto recognition to the Republiea in .Java, Madocra. and
Sumatra, and the Republic gave up its claim to the other islands until 1949 —
the Dutch set up puppet governments in East Indonesia (Bali, Celebes, and lesser
islands) and Borneo.
Having limited the Republican areas, the Dutch now consider themselves
strong enough to make demands upon the Indonesian Republic so as to weaken
its internal structure. Most significant of these, and the one on which negotia-
5636 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tions were deadlocked, was Dutch insistence on joint Dutch-Indonesian gen-
darmerie to "police" the Republic. The Republic, having made major conces-
sions, refused this obvious attempt to dominate the functioning of its adminis-
tration; supervise political, trade-union, and cultural organization; gain access
to the entire industrial and agricultural development of the Republic; and
acquire legitimate power to create "incidents" and disturb peace and order as
an excuse for Dutch military intervention. The refusal of the Netherlands to
arbitrate this and other disputed points under the provisions of Linggadjati,
and Dutch resistance to U. N. consideration of the issues, fully confirm the
Republic'.s fears that the Dutch will negotiate only when they can impose all
conditions upon a prostrate Republic.
* * *
2. The Dutch strive to command absolute control of all ports, thus assuring
final decision on imports and exports, arid all inter-insular, coastal, and ocean-
going traffic.
Before the war, the Netherlands had absolute control of inter-insular and coas-
tal shipping through the government-ownet fleet, K. P. M. This Dutch monopoly
not only prevented the growth of Indonesian or other shipping, but was one of
the Netherlands East Indies government's instruments to enforce its economic
cartel system. It was virtually impossible to transport commodities even from
island to island, without the approval of the shipping monopoly. Thus, in cases
of rebellion, an island or an area could be starved into submission by halting
the shipping of exports and imports.
In the present Dutch war, this has been a major tactic in cutting the Republic
off from the rest of the world. The Dutch economic blockade has been over
90 per cent effective. Thus the huge stockpiles of sugar, rubber, rice, quinine,
and other commodities within Republican areas have been kept off the world
market, and imports of textiles, machinery, shoes, rolling stock, and other items
desperately needed by the Republic have been kept from reaching it. This war
of economic attrition has not only cost the world millions in trade, but has
retarded the reconstruction and development of Indonesia by many years beyond
the blockade.
This use of the blockade received wide publicity in relation to the efforts of the
American Isbrandtsen shipping line in March, 1947, to purchase exports from the
Republic. The Dutch seized the ship, confiscated the cargo, and attempted to
hold the master and crew for court-martial. Similar actions were taken against
British and Chinese shipping. In each case the Dutch tried to buy off the ship-
ping interests and make them deal with the Netherlands.
However, the rapid interest taken by Australian, American, and British busi-
ness in the great market offered them by the Republic and in the tremendous
stockpiles it could produce, threatened to place the Dutch in a weak bargaining
position. Therefore, one of the first objectives in the current Dutch drive has
been the deep-water port of Cheribon, in Republican lands since 1945. The fall
of this port on July 25 called a halt to Republican trade with Singapore and
India. This will have a particularly great impact on India, since the Republic
had pledged half a million tons of rice to relieve Indian famine, in exchange for
imports of Indian textiles. Up to the fall of Cheribon, the Dutch had waged an
unsuccessful war against this trade.
* • *
3. The Dutch imperialists want to establish political control through puppets
in partitioned islands.
The Indonesian nationalist movement grew rapidly after World War I. The
Dutch made every effort to suppress the political parties and trade unions, and
imprisoned or drove into exile their leaders. Efforts were also made to buy
out leadership or act as a front for Dutch rule. This was practiced particularly
in relation to the feudal remnants in the islands, where hereditary village chiefs,
nobility, and co-administrators with the Dutch retained their positions and titles
through government patronage, Japanese occupation perpetuated this hierarchy,
with the former Dutch puppets serving in the same capacity for the Japanese.
Dutch propaganda regarding "Japanese influence" has never been leveled
against these elements. The Dutch have made every effort to utilize them
again. The leaders of East Indonesia and West Borneo, which are Dutch
satellites In the Indonesian archipelago, are prewar Dutch agents. A notable
example of this tactic to divide and destroy the Republic was the recent Soedanese
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5637
"revolt" in West Java. Openly precipitated by the Dutch immediately after the
signing of Linggadjati, this "revolt" was the first major effort in military opera-
tions to destroy the Republic. The so-called leader of the Soedanese separatist
movement was a notorious Dutch puppet before the war, a rabid racist who
practiced atrocities on Dutch prisoners of war during Japanese occupation, and
now a loyal adherent to Dutch rule "for at least 100 years" over Indonesia. The
recent Dutch all-out attack on the Republic was supported by the head of the
state of East Indonesia who declared the war was "police action" in "internal
affairs."
While the Indonesian Republic has abolished the bulk of these Dutch-preserved
oflSces, the Dutch have by no means given up their intention to place Indonesian
puppets in olBce so as to mask the bloody military dictatorship which is charac-
teristic of Dutch administration over Republican areas. The Dutch thus hope to
beguile international opinion by presenting Indonesians mouthing Dutch policy,
and to divide resentment and opposition within the governed areas. The Dutch
captured Ratulangi, Republican Governor of Celebes, and six of his associates,
and without trial have kept them imprisoned since then. These men were out-
standing resistance fighters against the Japanese. Their crime today is their
support of the Republic and their refusal to repudiate their i)ositions of leader-
ship. Perhaps the fact that Celebes, now within the Dutch puppet-state of East
Indonesia, is rich in rubber, sugar, and manganese has had some influence in
this Dutch action.
* * *
4. The Dutch dim to regulate all industrial changes through domination of
urhan areas.
The major cities in Indonesia are seaports (Batavia, Soerabaja), railroad and
transportation centers (Medan), or close to the exploitation of major exports
(Palembang, near the major Sumatra petroleum and tea centers). Thus, control
of urban areas actually means control over production areas, transportation
terminals and routes, shipping centers, and the industrial plants processing the
raw material. These actually were the first line of attack and conquest by the
Dutch.
While control of these areas cannot starve the Indonesians into submission
(since rice production centered in the interior is the basis of the Indonesian
diet), it can make the Republic incapable of offering the people more than a bare
subsistence diet. The resulting shortages of clothing, curtailment of industrial
productivity, and deterioration of transportation would lessen internal support,
keep it at the lowest economic level, block its political and economic influence on
Asia, and keep the riches of the islands out of the world market. No govern-
ment, operating under such handicaps, could long withstand concerted military
or political pressure to make major concessions.
* * «
5. The Dutch imperialists want to supervise and allocate agricultural produc-
tion and the removal of natural resources.
Exports from Indonesia before the war fell into two major categories: agri-
cultural products and petroleum ; manganese, and tin. The last three items were
exploited by European and American firms exclusively; and in the case of tin
from the island of Billiton, it was owned by the Dutch royal family outright.
Other than spices, most agricultural export produce came from European-owned
plantations. Rubber, tin, petroleum and sugar production were all regulated by
international cartels. The Indonesians were primarily laborers. The wealth of
the country flowed out in a steady stream. Dutch capital investment in Indonesia
of one billion dollars yielded an annual profit of $160,000,000.
The economic policy of the Republic would make drastic changes in the eco-
nomic position of the Indonesians, since it is based on the principle that profit
from the exploitation of the riches of Indonesia must be reflected in the national
income. But the essential fact is that the Dutch imperialists, despite any agree-
ment entered into between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands, have
no intention of losing their stranglehold on Indonesia's economy. In their eyes,
the only fashion in which the devastation of the Netherlands, its acute dollar-
shortage, its steadily increasing indebtedness to the United States, can be over-
come, is to regain and strengthen Dutch control over Indonesian production and
development.
5638 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
6. The Dutch ivipcriaUsts strive to halt yrowth of Indonesian bourgeoisie and
economic ex-pansion.
The existenre of the Indonesian Eepnblic as an economic force presents a
major threat to Dutch investment, not through limitation of the latter, but as a
developing industrial center. In the prewar pei^iod, Indonesian capital was
invested primarily in land. In Indonesian business, such as kapok and cigarette
factories, Chinese competition proved keen ; in other industries Europeans held
virtual monopoly. But above all, the pauperization of the Indonesian masses
was so extensive that for all practical purposes there was no Indonesian capital.
A survey for the N.E.I, government, by Huender, of Indonesian income during
the 1920's estimated the Indonesian's normal annual income at $57 in produce
and money, in cash only $19. Such standards applied to over 80 per cent of the
population. There did not emerge, therefore, an Indonesian bourgeoisie; the
population was an almost inexhaustible cheap labor reservoir.
However, the Indonesian Republic immediately took steps to develop Indone-
sian enterprise and industry. Communications, transportation, and irrigation
were nationalized. Those industries essential to the welfare of the people as a
whole were placed under government ownership, supervision, or control. To
encourage the development of industry, the National State Bank now gives
financial backing to enterprises if capital is not available. Plans to spread
ownership among the people by the issuance of shares of stock at a small
face value have been projected. Cooperatives are also being encouraged.
Plans have been made to diversify agriculture; large European estates, which
were usually centered on the most fertile areas, are being broken up to permit
the Indonesian farmers to move off marginal lands, and to facilitate crop diversi-
fications by bringing more land under cultivation.
These rapid transformations in the Republic's economic life threaten Dutch,
British, and American imperialist monopoly control over Indonesia. The
growth of an Indonesian bourgeoisie, not like the development of that class dur-
ing the rise of English capitalism, but within the framework of a planned economy
such as Czechoslovakia or Poland, is part of an intensive economic program
to raise the Indonesian standard of living and industrialize the country under
five, ten, and fifteen year plans.
* * *
7. The Dutch objective is to iveaken the influence of other capitalist nations in
Indonesia, particularly Oreat Britain and the United States.
During the first two decades of this century, British and American investments
in Indonesia grew rapidly. The Dutch,, whose final conquest of Indonesia was
completed only in 190S, tried to combat the severe depression that hit the
Netherlands in 1900 by intensified super-exploitation of Indonesia.
By 1913, of 206 million guilders invested in East Sumatra, only about 109 mil-
lion constituted Dutch capital. By 1929, foreign capital (other than Dutch) ac-
counted for 40 per cent of the investment in crops, aside from sugar, throughout
Indonesia. However, it was in petroleum, due to the lack of Dutch capital, that
American and British interests grew most rapidly ; Standard Oil of N. J., Stand-
ard Vacuum. Socony, and Royal Dutch Shell (British) were the leaders in the
field. British American Tobacco, Lever Soap, and other concerns expanded in
the 1930's at the expense of older and weaker Dutch interests.
With the crisis of 1929, the bottom fell out of this intensively exploited area.
Exports declined by 50 per cent, but the imlnc of exports fell 75 per cent. In 1928
the Netherlands East Indies government showed a profit of 54 million guilders in
agricultural enterprises ; by 1932, these enterprises showed a deficit of 9 million
guilders. Through the Crisis Acts of the '30's, the Dutch tried to bolster up their
position ; they tried to stabilize world markets through participation in rubber,
tea, sugar, tin and petroleum cartels ; preferential tariffs were introduced. Noth-
ing bi'Otight an upward trend. British and American capital, particularly the
latter, made concerted efforts to squeeze out Dutch interests by great purchases
of rubber, tin, petroleum, and quinine as the Second World War drew near.
The jockeying for top position in Indonesian economy was halted by the Jap-
anese invasion ; but the postwar rivalry continues. But for the advent of the
Indonesian Republic, which presents a threat to all imperialism, the Dutch would
have fallen before the American financial drive. However, to enable the Dutch
to continue in at least the position of watchdog and policeman in Indonesia, over
300 million dollars has been loaned by the U. S. to the Netherlands and Nether-
lands East Indies governments, and great amounts of American lend-lease and
war surplus material, American-trained Dutch marines, and a major force of
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5639'
British Indian troops wen^ put at the disposal of the Dutch imperialists. The
positions taken by the British and American governments toward the Republic
through their diplomatic statements, and their actions in the Security Council
are designed to prevent the Indonesians from achieving full political and economic-
independence.
With the upsurge of democratic and independence movements in colonial and,
semicolonial countries throughout the world, imperialism is losing ground every-
day. The United States, as the backbone and moving force of imperialism is tak-
ing the leading role in United Nations discussions to preserve Dutch imperial
rule of Indonesia, with American imperialism as the guiding force. Thus, the-
United States is leading the bloc to prevent United Nations consideration of the
substance of the Indonesian question, namely, independence.
However, the imperialist rivalries for hegemony over Indonesian economic
affairs continue. The deeper the Netherlands falls under American control
through loans, the more desperate the Dutch efforts to force economic con-
cessions from the Indonesians. Because the Dutch have spent two years in
fruitless efforts to wear down Indonesian resistance, British and American busi-
ness interests have been trying direct negotiations for contracts with the Indo-
nesians. In its July attacks on the Republic, the Dutch hoped for a rapid con-
quest, approved by Great Britain and the United States, because prolonged hos-
tilities would hamper the economic plans of all three imperialist governments.
At the same time, by its token show of military power, the Dutch hoped to limit
vigorous American and British economic expansion in Indonesia.
The Dutch have won their round so far because the United States carried the
Security Council along over Soviet objections by having the Council instruct
both Dutch and Indonesians to cease fighting without calling on both sides
to withdraw to pre-attack positions or set up machinery to settle the over-all
dispute. But the Dutch will pay heavily to American imperialism for this
maneuver. Furthermore, in view of the magnificent struggle of the Indonesian
Republic, and the support it has won from Asiatic, Middle Eastern, and South
American countries, as well as from the Soviet Union, the Dutch may before
long discover they have won no more than a Pyrrhic victory.
^ ^ ^
8. The Dutch imperialists want to restrict the growth of Asiaii unity for
industrialization , commerce, and cultural exchange.
Since the end of the war, a tremendous independence movement has swept
over Asia. A general Asian confidence has developed in its ability to throw
off the yoke of European domination. The movements in various Asian coun-
tries have drawn active sympathy and support to each other. This has been
particularly true with regard to the Indonesian Republic. Support has come-
from Viet Nam, the Malayan independence movement and anti-imperialist
forces in Japan and the Philippines. Mass protests and demonstrations in;
India, by British acknowledgment, have led to unrest among Indian troops
in Indonesia. IMoreover, consistent efforts have been made to establish the
closest economic and political relations between these two countries. Dutch
opposition has not stopped this intercourse, but has instead strengthened inter-
national support for the Republic. Singapore, the trading center of the Malay
peninsula, has exerted great pressure against the Dutch economic blockade;
Chinese importers and exporters, through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce,^
threatened to boycott Dutch goods throughout Asia. The entire Far Eastern
world has assisted the Indonesian Republic because of its political and economic
advancement and above all because its united resistance to colonial rule has
created a major, immediate threat to imperialism.
This was clearly demonstrated at the Inter-Asian Conference called this year
under the auspices of India. Although a non-governmental, non-partisan meet-
ing, the Conference had the highest political significance as the first meeting of
the Asian people — including Soviet delegations — to discuss the questions of
ending imperialist domination, and substituting therefor cooperation of all
Asian countries for the joint utilization of their resources to effect rapid indus-
trializaton and to raise the health, educational, social and cultural levels of the
Asian people.
Reports of the Conference indicated that the speeches of the Indonesian dele-
gates, particularly Soetan Sjahrir, then Premier, were given the most serious'
attention. Indonesians, forming the largest delegation, were elected to the
Central Committee of the Asian Conference, and will continue to exert great
influence in its affairs.
5640 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The moral and material aid rendered the Indonesian Republic by Asian peoples
has not gone unnoticed by the imperialists. One of the important considerations
for Great Britain and France in Security Council discussions of Indonesia has
been the prospect of a fully independent Idonesia acting as a catalyst for the
French and English colonies throughout Asia and Africa. Thus, despite the cost,
despite the greatly strengthened position of the W')rking class in England and
France, despite imperialist antagonisms — the United States, England, the Nether-
lands, and France have operated as a U. N. bloc, with only minor differences to
resolve, regarding the Indonesian Republic.
These, in short, represent major objectives of Dutch imperialism in its war on
the Indonesian Republic. Let us now turn to the Indonesian people's forces
themselves.
* ^ *
An understanding of the present internal relation of social forces in Indonesia
requires a brief background survey of the subjugation of the Indonesian people,
:and the development of their struggles for national liberation.
In discussing the history of the Indonesian people one might go back to the
7th Century Sumatran Kingdom of Sriwidjaja or the 13th century Empire of
Madjapahit. These feudal governments, which extended Indonesian rule from
Ceylon to Formosa, were the "Golden Age" of Indonesia's history, periods of the
development of the arts, education, culture, and the skills of trading, navigation,
and manufacture. During the decline and dissolution of the Empire of Madjapa-
hit in the 15th and 16tii centuries, Portuguese, Spanish, English, and Dutch
traders began their search for the fabulous Indies, the Spice Islands. From 1602,
when the first Dutch traders established a foothold in Indonesia, the islands
became the scene of constant revolts, which were suppressed with bloody terror,
and expansion of European imperialist control.
As has been noted, it was in the 20th century that the Dutch made the most
concerted efforts to link up Indonesian economic life with the demands of
the Western, industrialized nations, and the economic vicissitudes which re-
sulted brought about the mass pauperization of the people. While the bulk
of the Indonesians were i)easants (with average holdings of 2% acres), oj)-
pressive taxation and substandard incomes compelled most of them to seek at
least occasional or seasonal work on European capitalist agricultural export
enterprises like sugar and rubber.
Indonesia came under the political influences of the day. The Russo-Japan-
ese War, and the First World War, began to show the vulnerability of European
power and prestige. The Chinese Revolution under Dr. Sun Yat Sen opened new
vistas of a free Asia ; the impact of the Socialist revolution in czarist Russia
gave tremendous impetus to the colonial liberation movement.
Political parties and trade unions — all with a nationalist approach — grew
rapidly. The railway, pawnshop, and tram workers struck in 1921, 1923, and
1925. A small organization of Moslem merchants, formed in 1912 to combat
the Chinese bourgeois group, became a mass political instrument of two mil-
lion members by the 1920's. The Netherlands East Indies Government Penal
Code was revised to make punishable by fine and imprisonment "indirect"
criticism of the Government. Oppression became so great that in 1926-27
revolts broke out in Java and Sumatra, which were vigorously suppressed by
the Dutch. Political movements and parties were abolished, trade unions broken
up ; over 1,300 Indonesians were exiled or thrown into the Dutch concentration
camp of Boven Digoel in New Guinea^ The Communist Party, which led the
revolts, was illegal from 1927 on (and until the autumn of 1945 after the es-
tablishment of the Republic). The present leaders of the Republic, Soekarno
(Nationalist), Hatta (Moslem), Sjahir and Sjahrifoeddin (Socialist) were
all imprisoned by the Dutch for political and trade union activity.
Despite all Dutch efforts, the nationalist movement continued to grow, con-
stantly changing its organizational names and form, but acting consistently in
its efforts to bring democracy and independence to Indonesia. Just before the
start of the Japanese War, the Indonesians petitioned the Netherlands Gov-
ernment for adequate representation in the Indies Government and military
training to enable them to withstand expected Japanese aggression. The re-
quest was denied as not being "practical."
The brief limited defense of Indonesia by the Dutch was followed by 3y2 yearj
of Japanese occupation and exploitation. In order to achieve maximum rice
production for Japanese consumption, many of the plantations set aside for
European export crops were broken up into individual holdings; because of the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5641
shortage of rolling stock and shipping, areas were made economically self-
sufficient. All these changes, made for military expediency and under condi-
tions of virtual slavery and starvation of the Indonesian people, nevertheless
gave the people the opportunity to acquire skills that they were later able to
utilize in building the Kepublic. The Indonesians did not passively accept Jap-
anese rule any more than they had Dutch control. A disciplined resistance
movement, under Communist and Socialist leadership, organized sabotage
against Japanese communications and transportation, and five major revolts
in Java, Sumatra, and Borneo.
Dutch propaganda that the Indonesian Republic is Japanese-inspired has as
much logic or truth as the assertion that the new postwar peoples' democracies
are German-inspired.
* * *
At the time of Japan's unconditional surrender, the Indonesians had the
strength, the issues and the lack of effective opposition enabling them to seize
power. Under the leadership of President Soekarno, a Constitution was drawn
up for a democratic Repul)lic which provides for freedom of speech, press,
religion, assembly, and organization ; and the right to work and to strike. Start-
ing on a narrow Nationalist-lNIoslem base, the Republic has been broadened.
Today, the goverment is a coalition of the Nationalist, Moslem, Socialist, Labor,
Peasant and Communist Parties. In the Centi'al Working Committee (Parlia-
ment), the Left Wing (Sajap Kiri), consisting of the Labor, Socialist, Com-
munist, Peasant, and People's Parties, commands a voting block of two-thirds and
represents the advanced political and economic position of the people. The
representation accorded Chinese and other national minorities, areas not yet
under Republican authority, the Christian Party and the Catliolic Party, as
well as to the women and youth movements, testifies to the inclusive national
character of the Republic.
The Labor I'arty is structurally similar to the British Labor Party, although
radically different in political character. Based on the All-Indonesian Fe:lera-
tiou of Trade Unions (S. O. B. S. I.), the national organ of craft and industrial
unions, the Labor Party reflects the military and class-consciousness of the
workers. I^abor-management committees have been set up to insure maximum
production : during the early crisis days of the Republic, the unions pledged
to work without pay, if necessary, to sustain the Republic. Furthermore,
S. O. B. S. I. is afhliated with tlie World Federation of Trade Unions. The recent
appeal by S. O. B. S. I. for international working-class solidarity with the Indo-
nesians to prevent Dutch agression shows the high level of responsibility and
vanguard position taken by Indonesian labor.
Action has already been taken by the Australian Waterfront Federation in
renewing its boycott of all shipping for use by the Dutch in Indonesia. The
Executive Board of the National Maritime Union in the United States has called
on its members to vote affirmatively that the entire membership "boycott all
vessels designed to aid the Dutch in their war of aggression." There are sporadic
strikes of Dutch dockers that are hindering Dutch shipping to a considerable
extent. A rank-and-file motion passed at the recent British Labour Party con-
vention called for a halt to training of Dutch troops in Great Britain. Both
India and Pakistan have condemned the Dutch colonial war, and have revoked,
for the time being, Dutch rights to land any aircraft on their soil.
The Socialist Party of Indonesia, basing its political position on Mao Tse-tung's
writing's, has worked in harmony v.ith the Indonesian Communist Party for the
past two years. This is an Asian example of the new Socialist-Communist
coalitions that have developed in Eastern Europe, and contrasts sharply with
the Netherlands, where the Socialist Party supports imperialist war against
Indonesia.
The economic policies of the Repuljlic, projected by A. K. Gani (Chairman of
the Nationalist Party), Minister of Economics and Deputy Premier, are perhaps
the most comprehensive in all Asia. Projecting public, private, and mixed
property and funds for the industrialization of the country, Indonesian, foreign
and mixed capital to increase Indonesian production, the Five-, Ten-, and Fifteen-
year plans will change Indonesia from a liackward, poverty-stricken, agricul-
tural and raw-material exporter, into a technologically advanced state.
Any consideration of the basic changes in Indonesia has little value without
a keen awareness of the imminent danger of their destruction. China and India,
because of great populations, huge land mass, and strategic locations, continue as
the major countries of the Far East. But Indonesia at this moment is the focal
88348 — 52— pt. 14 47
5642 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
point of attention in the Far East and the United Nations because of its decisive
significance to the entire colonial and imperialist world. Unlike the Philippines
or Viet Nam, where the independence forces have not yet achieved sufficient
unity and a wide enou.^h mass base, or China, where the struggle is being resolved
Internally, or yet India, where the imperialists succeeded in affecting a three-
way split among the Hindu, Moslem and Princely interests — the Indonesian Re-
public has forged the support of all sections of its people in consistent revolu-
tionary struggle against imperialism. Indonesia is the only colonial country
that has proved capable of forcing consideration of colonial independence at the
highest intei-national level, the Security Council.
At this juncture, the demands of the Republic are clear : international super-
vision of the cease-fire order of the Security Council, withdrawal of Dutch troops
from Indonesia, international settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian crisis, full
diplomatic recognition internationally, and membership in the United Xatloiis.
Support of these completely just conditions must be developed in the United
States. The recent Republican proposal that the U. S. use its offer of "good
offices" to settle the Indonesian question by urging United Nations action clearly
indicates that American prestige in Asia has reached a low point because of the
actions of American imperialism in giving full support to the Dutch. Sharply
fixing responsibility for the Indonesian situation on the imperialist powers, the
note of the Indonesian Republic to the United States (August 7, 1947) stated:
The Republic feels sure that the Governments of the United States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands will all agree, in view of the fact that two years
of negotiation and mediation failed to prevent the outbreak of large-scale
hostilities, that in arbitration by a United Natictus commission lies the only and
final hope of settling the dispute by peaceful means.
The American people bear the major responsibility for the establishment of
such a commmission and lasting peace in Indonesia. In addition to demanding
that such a fully representative international conunission be established to arbi-
trate the issues in Indonesia, the American people nuist demand that there be no
bypassing of the U. N. by the United States. They must demand that the U. S.
recognize the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic. They must insist that
no American supplies be sent to the Dutch for war on Indonesia ; and a boycott
should be declared here on Dutch goods, and an embargo on Dutch and other
shipping of materials for the Dutch imperialist war. The action of the Execu-
tive Board of the N. M. U. deserves the applause of all labor, all anti-imperialists.
It calls for support by all unions.
Imperialist forces in the United States have brought war to the Indonesian
people in the past two years ; it rests with the American people to change
United States policy to one of friendship with the Indonesian Republic.
Mr. Mandel. Next is an excerpt from the testimony of Ambassador
Philip Jessup from hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Rehitions, the excerpt dealing with the Soviet
IPR Coimcil.
]Mr. Morris. May that go into the record ?
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
( The excerpt referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1406" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 1400
Testimony of Ambassador Philip Jessup Regarding the Soviet Council of IPR
"A national council was established in the U. S. S. R., tlie Soviet Union, in
ir>;!4. but did not participate at all in the activities of the Pacific Council after
li).'!9."
(Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 82d Congress, first session, on Nomination of Pliilip C.
Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assemhlv of the
United Nations, October 4, 1951, p. 444.)
Mr. ]Nf Axnr.L. Next is a statement from the diary of Senator II. Alex-
ander Smith of New Jersey from a subconnnittee of the Senate Coia-
mittee on Foreign Relations.
INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS 5643
]Mr. Morris. We are just putting the diary itself in. We are not
extracting testimony from tlie Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The diary referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1407'' and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 1407
Statement from the Diary of Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey
This is an entry of November 23, 1949, Wednesday :
"We are in New York. Yesterday I went to tlie meeting of the United States
delegation to the United Nations. Met old friends Austin, John Cooper. Also
Mrs. Roosevelt and Ruth Bryan Rohde.
"Talked with Francis Wilcox re China situation.
"Went up to Assembly at Flushing. Lunch with Philip Jessup and Ray Fos-
dick. They are leaning toward the British who want to recognize Communist
China. Also they do not seem to see the dangers in the Formosa situation."
Mr. Mandel. Next is a study made by the staff of the research direc-
tor on the number of communications to and from the IPR and Philip
Jessup.
Mr. Morris. The purpose of this, Mr. Chairman, is to show activity
on the part of Mr. Jessup within the Institute of Pacific Relations.
I mean, the number of letters sent by him or received by him in con-
nection with our investigation.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The study referred to was marked ''Exhibit No. 1408" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 140S
Memorandum
A study of tlie files of the Institute of Pacific Relations for 1939 shows 262
communications to Philip C. Jessup and 12S from JeSsup.
A similar study of communications for 1940 shows 91 communications to Mr.
Jessup and 50 from Mr. Jessup.
A similar study for 1941 shows 10 communications to Jessup and 8 from Jessup.
A similar study made for 1942 shows 3 to Jessup and 2 from Jessup.
Mr. Mandel. Next is the incorporation papers of the American
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. Morris. Ma}' that go into the record ?
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The papers referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1409" and are
as follows:)
No. 25407
Exhibit No. 1409
Certificate of Incorporation of American Council of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, Inc.
We, the undersigned, being all of full age and citizens of the United States and
a majority of whom are citizens and residents of the District of Columbia,
desiring to form a corporation pursuant to and in conformity with Subchapter
Three of Chapter Eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia,
Do hereby certify :
First : The name of the Corporation shall be The American Institute
OF Pacific Relations, Inc.
Second : The Corporation shall have perpetual existence.
Three: The particular business and objects of the Corporation shall be:
Amended and recorded Jan. 14, 1947.
5644 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
To promote the study of the problems of the peoples and nations of the Pacific
ai'ea by means of cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations by stimulat-
ing attention to these problems on the part of others and by means of such
research and educational methods as discussion conferences, language and other
schools, Far Eastern seminars, international conferences, study groups, publica-
tions and other lawful and appropriate methods.
In pursuance of and not in liimtation of the general powers conferred by law
and the objects and purposes herein set forth, it is expressly provided that this
Corporation shall also have the following powers :
To do all such acts as are necessary or convenient to attain the objects and
purposes herein set forth, to the same extent and as fully as any natural person
could or might do, and as are not forbidden by law or by this certificate of incorpo-
ration or by the bylaws of this Corporation.
As a nonprofit Corporation, none of the income of which shall accrue to any
member, to purchase, lease, sell, mortgage, hold, receive by gift, devise or be-
quest, or otherwise acquire or dispose of such real or personal property as may
be necessary to the purposes of this Corporation.
To have offices and promote and carry on its objects and purposes, within
or without the District of Columbia, and in the states or territories of the United
States and in foreign countries.
To have all powers that may be conferred upon corporations formed under
Sub-Chapter Eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia.
Fourth : The property of the oflicers, trustees and members of this
Coi'poration shall not be subject to or chargeable with the payment of cor-
porate debts or obligations.
FuTH : The Board of Trustees shall have power to make by-laws for the
government of the Corporation and to alter, change or amend the same.
Sixth : The principal office of this Corporation in the District of Columbia
shall be located at No. 3417 Quebec Street NW., in the City of Washington.
SEVEjyTH : The meetings of the members and of the trustees of this Cor-
poration may be held in the District of Columbia, or elsewhere within the
confines of the United States or its possessions.
Eighth : The number of Trustees of this Corporation for the first year
of its existence shall be fifty.
Witness our hands and seals this 20th day of February One thousand nine
hundred and thirty-nine.
Esthek Caukin Brunauer [Seal]
William T. Stone [Seal]
Roy Veatch [Seal]
Ernest O. Paland,
Witness.
District of Columbia, ss :
I, Ernest O. Paland a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, do
hereby certify that Esther Caukin Brunauer, William T. Stone, and Roy
Veatch, parties to a certificate of incorporation bearing date of February 20th,
1939, and hereto annexed, personally appeared before me in said District, the
said Esther Caukin Brunauer, William T. Stone, and Roy Veatch being per-'
sonally known to me as the persons who executed the said' certificate of incor-
poration and acknowledged the same to be their act and deed.
Given under my hand and seal this 20th day of February, 1939.
[notarial seal] Ernest O. Paland,
Notary PuMic, D. C.
My commission expires April 15, 1943.
OmcE OF THE Recokder of Deeds
district of COLUMBIA
THIS IS TO certify that the foregoing is a true and verified copy of the Certificate
of Incorporation of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
Inc., and of the whole of said Certificate of Incorporation, as filed in this Office
the 20th day of February A. D. 1939.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affived the seal of this
Office this 21st day of February A. D. 1939.
[seal] (Signature) ,
Recorder of Deeds, D. C.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5645
Mr. Mandel. Next is a clipping from the Daily Worker sliowino; the
candidacy of Corliss Lamont on the American Labor Party ticket for
the United States Senate.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The clii)ping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1410" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 1410
[Daily Worker, June 10, 1952]
ALP Leaders Recommend Corliss Lamont for Senate
Former Representative Vito Marcantonio, State Chairman of the American
Labor Party, announced today that at a meeting of the American Labor Party
State Executive Committee, held on June 3, the nomination of Corliss Lamont as
the ALP candidate for United States Senator from the State of New York was
unanimously recommended to all ALP clubs and to the ALP State Convention,
which will take place on Aug. 28, 1952.
Mr. Mandel. Next is a compilation of the Government posts held by
Philip C. Jessup as taken from the hearings of a snbcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and also from Who's Wlio
and also from the Biographical Register of the Department of State,
Mr. Morris. It is background material, Senator.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The compilation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1411" and
is as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1411
Government Posts of Philip C. Jessup
App. drafting officer in the Dept. of St., Oct. 15, 1924.
Asst. solicitor, Dept. of State, 1924-25.
Asst. to Elihu Root, Conf, of Jurists on Permanent Ct. Internat. Justice.
Legal adviser to Am. amb. to Cuba 1930.
App. Chief of Div. of Personnel & Training, Office of For. Relief & Rehibilitation
Operations, Dept. of St., February 1, 1943.
Transferred to Office of For. Econ. Admin., Sept. 30, 1943.
Asst. Sec. gen. U. X. R. R. A. and Bre tton Woods Confs., 1943^4.
Consultant, Bd. of Econ. Warfare & Navy Dept.
Asst. Dir Naval Sch. Mil. Govt and Administration, 1942-44.
Asst. on judicial orgn., U. S. del. San Francisco Conf., 1945.
App. Consultant, Div. of Int. Org. Affairs, Dept. of State, Sept. 5, 1945.
Rep. of U. S., United Nations Comm., on Progressive Development of Int. Law &
Codification, Apr. 25, 1947-Dec. 5, 1947.
January 5, 1948. — Appointed deputy United States representative in the Interim
Committee of the U. N. General Assembly (That is sometimes referred to in our
record as the Little Assembly).
January-March 1948. — Representative of United States in Interim Committee,
dealing with —
(a) Korea: Consultation by U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea with
Interim Committee.
(b) Pacific settlement: Study of methods for improving international co-
operation in the political field.
(c) Veto: Recommendations on the problem of voting in the Security Coun-
cil.
April 14, 1948. — Appointed United States representative to the second special
session of the U. N. General Assembly.
April-INIay, 1948. — Representative of United States in General Assembly,
dealing with —
(a) Palestine: Problem of disposition of Palestine following termination
of the mandate.
(b) Jerusalem: Provisions for protection of the holy places and measures
to carry on municipal administration in Jerusalem.
5646 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
June 7. 1948. — Appointed United States deputy representative in U. N. Secu-
rity Council.
June 2.", 1948. — Appointed Deputy Cliief, United States mission to the
U. N.
June 1948. — Representative of United States in U. N. Security Council.
February 1949. — dealing with —
(a) Palestine (June-November) : Preservation of cease-fire between Israel
and Arab States.
(b) Atomic energy (June) : Forwarding to General Assembly of U. N. Atomic
Energy Commission's report.
(c) Trieste (August) : Consideration of Yugoslav charges concerning ad-
ministration of zone A in Trieste.
(d) Hyderabad (Septeml)er) : Consideration of complaint made to Security
Council following Indian "invasion" of Hyderabad.
(e) Berlin (October to February) : Security Council consideration of Ber-
lin bloclfade by U. S. S. R.
(f) Israel (December) : Security Council consideration of Israeli applica-
tion for admission to U. N. membership.
(g) Indonesia (December- January 1949) : Security Council consideration
of second Dutch police action and recommendations designed to bring about
a political solution.
September-December, 1948. — United States rein-esentative to third regular
session of the U. N. General Assembly in Paris, dealing with —
(a) Consideration of the problem of the future of Palestine but chiefly oc-
cupied with Security Council problems noted above.
December 2, 1948. — Appointed Acting Chief, United States mission to U. N.,
with personal rank of Ambassador.
December 2, 1948. — Appointed acting United States representative, U. N.
Security Council.
March 2, 1949. — Appointed United States Ambassador at Large. (Present
position.)
March-April, 1949. — Negotiations in New York with Soviet U. N. Delegate
Malik which resulted in lifting of Berlin blockade.
April-May, 1949.— Delegate at second part of third regular session of U. N.
General Assembly, New York, but not actively in charge of any item on agenda.
May-June, 1949. — Adviser to Secretary of State at sixth session of Council of
Foreign Ministers, Paris :
( a ) Austrian Treaty : Further negotiations and limited agreements among
Big Four to move toward conclusion of Austrian Treaty.
(b) Berlin: Agreement concerning access by Western Powers to air sectors
of Berlin.
(c) Germany : Further discussions on restoration of economic and political
unity of Germany.
July-September, 1949. — Assignment in Department of State to work on far
eastern problems :
(a) Editorial supervision of final states of preparation of China white paper.
(b) Preparation for anticipated debate in General Assembly on Soviet viola-
tions of Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.
(c) Discussion with consultants on far eastern problems.
September 1949. — Adviser to Secretary of State at meeting of three Foreign
Ministers, New York, including especially —
(a) North Atlantaic Treaty.
(b) Western Germany.
September 1949. — Adviser to Secretary of State at meeting of four Foreign
Ministers, New York, Austrian Treaty.
September-December, 1949. — United States representative at fourth regular
session of U. N. General Assembly, dealing with —
(a) Italian colonies: Negotiation and adoption of Assembly resolution pn
disposition of former Italian colonies.
(b) Consideration of the question of "Threats to the political independence
and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting
from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of
August 14, 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations."
December 20-March 15, 19,50. — Trip through the Far East and Middle East,
visiting Hawaii, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Formo.sa, Hong Kong, Philippines,
Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Ceylon. India, Pakistan,
nsrSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5647
Afghanistan, including Banglvok Conference of United States representatives in
area. February 13-15.
May 1950 — Fourth session, North Atlantic Council meeting and three Foreign
Ministers meeting, London.
May 29-August, 1950. — General and varied assignments in State Department
including far eastern questions especially as a result of the aggression on Korea,
June 25, 1950.
April 5. 1950. — Designated Department of State consultant to the National
Security Council.
August 3. 1950-Fcbrnary, 1951. — Designated Department of State represent-
ative on the senior staff of the National Security Council.
September, 1950. — Fifth session, North Atlantic Council meeting and three
Foreign Ministers meeting. New York.
October 1950-February 1951. — General and varied assignments in State
Department including preparations for and participation in meetings with Prime
Minister Attlee, December 4—8. 1950, and preparations for and participation in
meetings with Prime Minister Plevin January 29-30, 1951.
March 5-June 20, 1951.^ — Four Power deputies meeting, Paris, discussion of
agenda for possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
July 1951 to present.- — ^Assignment to western European subjects, including
NATO, preparation for Foreign Ministers' Conference in Washington and Ottawa
NAC Meeting.
Sources :
Who's Who In America, Vol. 26, 1950-51, page 1390.
Biographic Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1951, page 226.
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate. Eighty-second Congress, First Session, on Nominiiti<ui
of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General
Assembly of the United Nations, October 15, 1951, pages 842, 843.
Mr. Morris. It gives INIr. Jessup's connection with the Government.
He has been one who has fignred in the hearings of the IPR.
Mr. ]\Iaxdell. Next is a compilation made by the Library of Con-
gress Legislative Reference Service of Reviewers of Books on the Far
East which pertains to our report.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The compilation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1412" and
is as follows:)
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Legislative Reference Service
washington 25, d. c.
Selected Reviewers, Book Review Digest 1945
P. 5: Richard Watts
A. WooUcott; his life and his world, by Samuel H. Adams, New
Repub. 112 : 795, Je. '45 ; 800 words.
P. 26 : Richard Watts
Old Lcatherface of the Flying Tigers, by Keith Ayling, New Repub.
113 : 293, S. 3, '45 ; 950 words.
P. 89: Richard Watts
Artie Grcengroin. Pfc, by Harry Peter M'Nab Brown, N. Y. Times,
p. 6, Jl. 15, '45 ; 1,100 words.
P. 96: Eleanor Lattimore
China in black and ichite, by Pearl Buck, Weekly Book Review,
p. 4. D. 23, '455 ; 310 words.
P. 97 : Owen Lattimore
Tell the people, by Pearl Buck, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Ap. S,
'45 ; 950 words.
P. 132 : Eleanor Lattimore
The Asian legacy and American life, by Artliur Christy, Weekly
Book Review, p. 5, Jl. 29, '45 ; 1,000 words.
5648 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
P. 212 : T. A. Bisson
Japanese nation, bv John Fee Embree, Nation 161:262, S. 15, '45,
360 words.
P. 212 : T. A. Bisson
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:17, S. 1,
'45 ; 900 words.
P. 212 : Gunther Stein
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Yale, R. n. s. 35:342, win-
ter '46 ; 40 words.
P. 223 : Eleanor Lattimore
Earthhound China, Fei Hsiao-T'ung, and Chang Tse-I, Weekly Book
Review, p. 26, N. 25, '45 ; 400 words.
P. 237 : T. A. Bisson
M'hat to do with Japan, by Wilfri<l Fleisher, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:21,
IMr. 17, '45 ; 650 words.
P. 237 : Gunther Stein
What to do icifh Japan, by Wilfrid Fleisher, Yale R. n. s. 35:342,
winter, '46 ; 40 words.
P. 242 : Owen Lattimore
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, Atlantic 175:133,
Ap. '45 ; 650 words.
P. 242 : Edgar Snow
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Times, p. 3, Mr.
11. '45; 2,100 words.
P. 243 : Richard Watts
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:9,
IMr. 10, '45 ; 2,250 words.
P. 344 : Eleanor Lattimore
ChaUenfie at Changsha, by Paul Hughes, Weekly Book Review, p.
7, D. 23, '45 ; 380 words.
P. 367: L. K. Rosinger
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Nation, 161:17,
Jl. 7, '45 ; 360 words.
P. 367 : Richard Watts
Tlie future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, New Repub.
112 : 876, Je. 25, '45 ; 1,150 words.
P. 367 : T. A. Bisson
The future of Japan, l)y William Crane Johnstone, N. Y. Times, p.
4. S. 2, '45 ; 700 words.
P. 367 : T. A. Bisson
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Pacific Affairs
IS : 384, D. '45 ; 1,220 words.
P. 367 : Gunther Stein
Tlie future of Jn/ian, by William Crane Johnstone, Yale R. n. s.
35 : 342, winter 46 ; 40 words.
P. 371 : Richard Watts
Stcphi'n Hero, by James Joyce, New Repub. 112:518, Ap. 16, '45 ;
1,150 words.
P. 409 : T. A. Bisson
Asia on the move, by Bruno Lasker, Sat. R. of Lit. 28: 14, Mr. 3,
'45 : 800 words
P. 411: Richard Watts, Jr.
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, New Repub. 112:302, F. 26,
'45, 1550 words
P. 411 : Edgar Snow
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Times, p. 3, F. 25, '45;
1750 words
P. 411 : T. A. Bisson
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:9, Mr. 10,
'45 : 750 words
P. 414 : Richard Watts
A star da need, by Gertrude Lawrence, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:17, Ag.
18, '45 ; 650 words
P. 419: Richard Watts
The ballad and the source, by Rosamond Lehmann, New Repub.
112 : 481, Ap. 9, '45 ; 1350 words
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5649
P. 433: Richard Watts, Jr.
yiffil of a nation, by Lin Yu-T'Ang, New Repub. 112: 180, F. 5, '45;
1550 words
P. 461: T. A. Bisson
Japanese militarism, by Jolm McGilvrey Malvi, Nation 160:627,
Je. 2, '45 ; 300 words
P. 465: Richard Watts
Little superman, by Heinrich Mann, N. Y. Times, p. 11, D. 16, '45 ; 600
words
P. 504 : Nym Wales
^ti-aiKjers in India, by Peuderel Moon, Weekly Book Review, p. 4,
Ap. 8, '45 ; 650 words.
P. 516: Richard Watts
Theatre book of the year, by George Jean Nathan, N. Y. Times,
p. 8, N. 25, '45 ; 600 words.
P. 518 : Owen Lattimore
Korea and the old orders in eastern Asia, by Melvin Frederick
Nelson, Ann. Am. Acad. 242 : 171, N. '45 ; 400 words.
P. 552 : L. K. Rosinger
Forever China, by Pierre Stephen Robert Payne, Survey G. 34 : 450,
N. '45 ; 450 words.
P. 570 : Annalee Jacoby
Aly twenty-five years in China, by John Benjamin Powell, N. Y.
Times, p. 7, D. 16, '45 ; 1350 words.
P. 570 : Owen Lattimore
Mil ticeni!j-five years in China, by John Benjamin Powell, Weekly
Book Review, p. 2, N. 11, '45 ; 1350 words.
P. 573 : Owen Lattimore
Japan and the Son of Heaven, by Willard DeMille Price, N. Y. Times,
p. 3, O. 14, '45 ; 700 words.
P. 607 : Richard Watts
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, New Repub. 113 : 138,
Jl. 30, '45 ; 1950 words.
P. 607 : T. A. Bisson
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, N. Y. Times, p. 4,
Jl. 29, '45 ; 600 words.
P. 608: Owen Lattimore
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, Weekly Book Review,
p. 4, Jl. 15, '45 ; 1,350 words.
P. 608 : T. A. Bisson
Dilemma in Japan, by Andrew Roth, New Repub. 113 : 473, O. 8, '45 ;
1450 words.
P. 608 : Gunther Stein
Dilemma in Japan, by Andrew Roth, Yale R. n. s. 35: 340, winter
'46 ; 1,000 words.
P. 610: T. A. Bisson
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Nation 160:255,
Mr. 3, '45 ; 350 words.
P. 610: Edgar Snow
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, N. Y. Times, p.
8, My. 20, '45 ; 700 words.
P. 610 : L. K. Rosinger
China among the poicers, by David Nelson Rowe, Pol. Sci. Q. 60 : 300,
Je. '45 ; 650 words.
P. 610: Eleanor Lattimore
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Weekly Book
Review, p. 16, F. 18, '45 ; 850 words.
P. 647 : Richard Watts
Richshaw 1)011, by Shu Ch'ing-Ch'un, New Repub. 113: 163, Ag. 6,
'45 ; 1,050 words.
P. 660: Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese labor movement, by Helen Snow (Nym Wales, pseud) , Week-
ly Book Review, p. 12, Ap. 8, '45 ; 800 words.
P. 667 : Richard Watts
Small general, by Robert Standish, N. Y. Times, p. 7, O. 14. '45; 900
words.
5650 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
P. 673 : Richard Watts
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, New Repub., 113:873,
D. 24, '45 ; 750 words.
P. 673 : Nathaniel Peffer
Challenge of Bed China, by Guenther Stein, N. Y. Times, p. 4, O. 28,
'45 ; 1,400 words.
P. 673 : Owen Lattimore
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, Weekly Book Review,
p. 3, O. 14, '45 ; 1,250 words.
P. 678 : Edgar Snow
Russia is no riddle, bv Edmund Stevens, Weekly Book Review, p. 3,
Mr. 25, '45 ; 1,000 words.
P. 697: Richard Watts
Building of the Burma road, by T'an Pei-Ying, Weekly Book Review,
p. 5, O. 14, '45 ; 900 words.
P. 712 : T. A. Bisson
Through Japanese eyes, by Otto David Tolischus, Nation, 160 : 522,
My. 5, '45 ; 280 words.
P. 712 : T. A. Bisson
Through Japanese eyes, by Otto David Tolischus, N. Y. Times, p. 6,
Ap. 15, '45 ; 900 words.
P. 713 : Richard Watts
China after seven years of war, by HoUington Kong Tong, Sat. R.
of Lit., 28: 13, Mr. 3, '45; 1,100 words.
P. 713: Guenther Stein
China after serpen years of war, by HoUington Kong Tong, Weekly
Book Review, p. 2, Mr. 4, '45 ; 800 words.
P. 746 : T. A. Bisson
Asia for the Asiatics, bv Robert Spencer Ward, Sat. R. of Lit., 28 : 11,
Jl. 21, '45 ; 1,000 words.
P. 746 : Eleanor Lattimore
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Weekly Book Re-
view, p. 18, Ag. 26, '45 ; 450 words.
P. 746: Guenther Stein
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Yale R. n. s., 35 : 342,
winter '46 ; 300 words.
P. 782 : Eleanor Lattimore
/ saw the Russian people, bv Ella Winter, Weekly Book Review,
p. 4, Ja. 20, '46 ; 2,000 words.
P. 787 : Richard Watts
American guerrilla in the Philippines, bv Ira Wolfert, New Repub.,
112 : 713, My. 21, '45 ; 1,250 words.
Selected Reviewers, Book Review Digest, 1946
P. 1: L. K. Rosinger
Bctrai/al in the Philippines, bv Hernando Abaya, New Republic
115 ; 771, D, 9, '46 ; 650 words.
P. 137: Richard Watts
Innocents in Paris, by Gilbert Cesbron, N. Y. T., p. 5, Je. 23, '46;
90O words.
P. 144 : Guenther Stein
Sun Yat-scn, by Stephen Chen and Pierre S. R. Payne, p. 16, Jl. 11,
'46 : Chi-istian Science Monitor ; 450 words.
P. 144: Richard Watts
Sun Yat-sen, by Stephen-Chen and Pierre S. R. Payne, Weekly
Book Review, p. 5, Jl. 14, '46; 1,650 words.
P. 145 : Owen Lattimore
Collected wartime messages, bv Chiang Kai-shek, Weekly Book
Review, p. 5, O. 20, '46 ; 1,350 words.
P. 219: Richard Watts
China Cycle, by R. P. Dobson, Sat. R. of Lit. 29 ; 9, S. 28, '46 ; 750
words.
P. 224: Richard Watts
Toiir of Duty, by John Dos Passos, New Repub. 115: 267, S. 2, '46;
900 words.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5651
P. 231 : Owen Lattimoie
China and America, by Foster Rhea Dulles, Weekly Book Review,
p. 5, Je. 2, '46: 900 words.
P. 244: Richard Watts
Wrath in Burma, by Fred Eldridge, AYeekly Book Review, p. 5,
My. 12. '46 : 1,500 words.
P. 231 : Richard Watts
China and America, by Foster Rhea Dulles, New Repub. 115: 52,
Jl. 15. '46; 850 words.
P. 312: Richard Watts
The B. 0. W.'s. by Gillmore, Margalo, and Patricia Collinge, Sat.
Rev. of Lit. 29 : 11, F. 2, '46 : 1,200 words.
P. 329: Richard AVatts
China in the Sim, by Randall C. Gould, Weekly Book Rev., p. 5,
.Ja. 27. '46; 1,500 words.
P. 376: Richard Watts
Kro:}/ Kat. by George Harriman, New Repub. 115: 487, O. 14, '46;
550 words.
P. 404 : Eleanor Lattimore
Doctors East, Doctors West, by Edward H. Hume, New York Times,
p. 7, My. 5, '46 ; 1.250 words.
P. 458: Richard Watts
Thieves in the Niffht. by Arthur Koestler, N. Y. Times, p. 1, N. 3,
'46; 1,550 words.
P. 473 : Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese FainiJy and Society, by Olga Lang, N. Y. Times, p. 42, S. 15,
'46 : 1 .150 words.
P. 478: J. K. Fairbank
The United States Moves Across the Pacific, by Kenneth S.
Latourette, Pol. Sci. Q. 61 : 602, D. '46 ; 1,250 words.
P. 478 : Owen Lattimore
77(c United States Moves Across the Pacific, by Kenneth S.
Latourette, Weekly Book Review, p. 16, Je. 2, '46 ; 950 words.
P. 508: Richard Watts
It is Dark Underground, by Pin fei Loo, Weekly Book Review, p. 2,
My. 19. '46; 1,000 words.
P. 530: Richard Watts
Eamon de VaUra, by M. J. MacManus, N. Y. Times, p. 6, O. 27, '46;
1,100 words.
P. 634: L. K. Rosinger
Chinese Constitution, a stvdy of forty years of constitution making
in China, by Wei-Tung, Pan, Am. Hist. R. 51: 718, Jl. '46; 400
words.
P. 640: Richard Watts
Torrents of Spring, by Pierre S. R. Payne, N. Y. Times, p. 5, My. 12,
'46 ; 850 words.
P. 644: Richard Watts
Oscar Wilde, his life and wit. by Hesketh Pearson, Weekly Book
Review, p. 3, Jl. 21, '46 ; 1,150 words.
P. 654 : Richard Watts
Wind in the Olive Tree by Abel Plenn, New Repub. 114 : 738, My. 20,
'46 : 1,000 words.
P. 695 : Richard Watts
South of Heaven by Lettie Rogers, N. Y. Times, p. 7, O. 20; '46;
950 words.
P. 733 : Richard Watts
Burma Surgeon Returns by Gordon S. Seagrave, Weekly Book
Review, p. 1. Mr. 10, '46 : 1.300 words.
P. 852 : Richard Watts
Soviet Asia Mission by Andrew J. Steiger and Henry A. Wallace,
New Repub. 115 : 83. Jl. 22, '46 ; 1.100 words.
P. 855 : Richard Watts, Jr.
Black Ships off Japam. by Arthur C. Walworth, New Repub. 115 : 52,
Jl. 15, '46 ; 450 words.
P. 855 : L. K. Rosinger
Black Ships off Japan by Arthur C. Walworth, Sat. R. of Lit. 24: 23,
Ap. 20, '46; 800 words.
5g52 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
P. 856: Eleanor Lattimore rr;mo« n 91 Tl 14 '46-
Chinese Mind by Gung-hsing Wang, N. Y. Times, p. 21, Jl. 14, 4b,
650 words.
P. 856 : Richard Watts 1 1 p? . p;9 • Tni l ^
Chinese Mind by Gung-hsing Wang, New Repub. 115 . 52 , Jul. 15,
'46 ; 80 words.
P. 866 : Richard Watts ^^ „ ^. ^ ^ a ti i j. m« .
Eomccominrr by Joseph Wechsberg, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Jl. 14, 46,
1,200 words.
P. 886: L. Ky^^oJ^"g.e^Q„^ ^^ ^;,^^^^ Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, New
Repiib. 115 : 666 ; N. 18, '46 ; 1,000 words.
P. 886 : J. K-jFai^J^nk ^^^ ^^ ^^^_^^ ^^ Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, N. Y.
Times, p. 1, O. 27, "46 ; 1,S.50 words.
P. 886: Edga^r^Snow ^^^^ ^^ ^^^.^^^ ^^ Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby,
Sat. Rev. of Lit. 29 : 12, O. 26, '46 ; 1,600 words.
P. 886: Richard Wattsj^^^ ^^ ^^^.^^ ^^ Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby,
Weekly Book Rev., p. 1, O. 27, '46 ; 1,450 words.
P. 886 : Richard Watts, Jr. ^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^.^^^ ^^^ ^^p^^^ ^^_ ^ ^2 ;
Jl. 15, '46 ; 220 words.
P. 886: Eleanor^L^ammore^ ^^^ ^^.^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^.^^_ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^
p. 18, i\Iy. 5, '46 ; 1,300 words.
P. 901 : Richard AVatts^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^.^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^.^^^^ p 2,
Je. 16, '46 ; 1,300 words.
P. 912: Eleanor Lattimore ,tt i , -d i tj^^t r^ iq
A Chinese ViUage by Mou-Ch-un Yang, Weekly Book Rev., p. 19,
Mr. 3, '46 ; 400 words.
P. 918: Richard Watts ^^ „ , wwp-.ooR r> ir
Mirror of tlie Past by Kodne ZiUiacus, New Repub., 115. 82b, v. lb,
'46 ; 1,650 words.
(Source: 1945 Book Review Digest.)
Selected Reviewers Book Review Digest, 1947
P. 60 : Richard Watts , ^. ^^^ ^„ ., ik ^at . -t K^in
Cervantes, by Aubrey F. Bell, New Republic 117 : 28, S. 15 47 , l,&t)U
words.
P. 74: Richard Watts ^^ _, ut n^-oc
Slick hut not streamlined, by John Betjeman, New Republic li^ . ^s,
Ag. 4, '47; 1,900 words.
P. 84: Richard Watts , ,,. , , „, ,^^^1.
Bio Yankee, the life of Carlson of the Raiders, by Michael Blankfort
N. Y. Herald Tribune Weekly Book Report, p. 7, Mr. 2, 47 ; 1,-^UU
words.
^%'ar m- peace with Russia? by Earl Russell Browder, N. Y. Times,
p. 7, April 6, '47 ; 1,150 words.
P. 132: Richard Watts . ^^ ^ vt ht.oc
Spcakinfj frankly, by James Francis Byrnes, New Republic 117 . ^»,
0. 27, '47 ; 1,550 words.
P. 135: Annalee Jacoby „ ^ , ^.r ^ m- k
i.oo7c south to the polar star, by Holger Cahill, N. Y. Times, p. 5,
Feb. 9, '47 ; 650 words.
P. 135 : Richard Watts ^ , . „ , „ . „ t •<.
Look south to the polar star, by Holger Cahill, Sat. Review of Lit-
30:23, Feb. 15, '47; 800 words.
P. 157 : Annalee Jacoby ^ ,„ . ,.^ \ r^^. xt v
Autohio(iraphy of a Chinese woman, by Bu-Wei (Yang) Chao, N. X.
Herfild Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 14, Mr. 16, '47; 550 words.
P. 160 : Richard Watts ,^ . , ^ ^^ -o k
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), New RepuD.
116 : 37, F. 10, '47 ; 850 words.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5653
P. 160 : Owen Lattimore
China's dcstini/, bv Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), N. Y. Herald
Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 5, F. 16, '47; 600 words,
P. 160 : J. K. Fairbank
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), N. Y. Times, p.
3, F. 9, '47 ; SOO words.
P. 160 : Nathaniel Peffer
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), Pol. Sci. Q.
62 : 598, D. '47 ; 330 words.
P. 161 : Richard Watts
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.). New Repub.
116 : 37, F. 10, '47 ; 850 words.
P. 161 : Owen Lattimore
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), N. Y. Herald
Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 5, F. 16, '47 ; 600 words.
P. 161 : J. K. Fairbank
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), N. Y. Times, p. 3, F.
9, '47 ; 800 words.
P. 161 : Nathaniel Peffer
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), Pol. Sci. Q. 62 : 598,
D, '47 : 330 words.
P. 161 : J. K. Fairbank
2'ides from the West, by Chiang Monlin, Ann. Am, Acad. 253 : 224,
S. '47 ; 420 words.
P. 161 : Annalee Jacoby
Tides from the West, by Chiang Monlin, Sat. R. of Lit. 30 : 19, Je.
7, '47 ; 750 words.
P. 178 : Richard Watts
Foreign mud, by Maurice Collis, New Repub. 117 : 29, O. 6, '47 ; 140
words,
P. 186 : Richard Watts
Future of freedom, in the Orient, by Ralph A. Coniston, New Repub.
116 : 27, My. 19, '47 ; 110 words,
P. 186 : Nathaniel Ptffer
Future of freedom in the Orient, by Ralph A. Coniston, New York
Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 11, Ag. 24. '47 ; 550 words.
P. 201 : Richard Watts
Roosevelt era, by Milton Crane, New Repub. 117 : 25, D. 1, '47 ; 1,600
words.
P. 208: Richard Watts
Behind the silken curtain, by Bartley Cavanaugh Crum, New Repub.
116 : 31, Ap. 14, '47 ; 900 words.
P. 229 : Edgar Snow
Russia, menace or promise, by INIrs. Vera (Micheles) Dean, N. Y.
Times, p. 7, Ap. 6, '47 ; 800 words.
P. 278 : Richard Watts
Unfimshed revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, New Repub,
116 : 27. Je. 23, '47 ; 750 words.
P. 279 : Owen Lattimore
Unfinished revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, N. Y. Times, p.
5, Je. 22, '47 ; 700 words.
P. 304: Richard Watts
Why they behave like Russians, by John Fischer, New Repub.
lie : 31, Ap. 28, '47 ; 1,200 words.
P. 811: Richard Watts
You're the boss, by Edward Joseph Flynn, New Repub. 117 : 26, S. 8,
'47; 1,800 words.
P. 315 : Richard Watts
Collected tales, by Edward Morgan Forster, New Repub, 117 : 27,
Jl. 14, '47 ; 1,400 words.
P. 838 : Richard Watts
American Agent, by IMark J. Gayn, and John Cope Caldwell, New
Repub. 116 : 27, Je. 23, '47 ; 140 words.
P. 838: L, K. Rosinger
Atnerican Agent, bv Mark ,T. Gavn, and John Cope Caldwell, Sat.
R. of Lit. 30 : 12, Je. 14, '47 ; 600 words.
5654 IXSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
P. 366: Richard Watts
Jourvals, by Isabella Augusta Gregorv, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wklv.
Bk. R., p. 4, Ap. 6, '47 ; 1,300 words.
P. 441: Richard Watts
Repoi-t from Spain, by Emmet John Hughes, New Repub. 116 : 27,
Je. 23, '47 ; 1,250 words.
P. 454 : Richard Watts
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, New Repub. 116 : 25,
My. 19, '47 ; 2,000 words.
P. 454 : Owen Lattimore
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, N. Y. Herald Tribune
Wkly. Bk. R., p. 10, Je. 22, '47 ; 600 words.
P. 454: Annalee Jacoby
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, N. Y. Times, p. 6, My.
18, '47 ; 800 words.
P, 477 : Richard Watts
Portable James Joyce, by James Joyce, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Mr. 2, '47 ;
1,400 words.
P. 479: Richard Watts
Fabulous voyager, by Richard Morgan Kain, N. Y. Times, p. 42,
Mr. 2, '47 ; 700 words.
P. 481: Richard Watts
Zotz!, by Walter Patrick Karig, New Repub, 117:31, O. 20, '47;
850 words.
P. 486: Annalee Jacoby
Three came home, by Mrs. Agues Keith, N. Y. Times, p. 5, Ap. 6,
'47; 650 words.
P. 523: T. A. Bisson
History of Japan, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, Am. Hist. R. 53 : 178,
O. '47 ; 280 words.
P. 523 : Richard Watts
China: a short history (rev.), by Owen Lattimore and Eleanor
Lattimore, Saturday R. of Lit. 30 : 16, My. 10, '47 ; 800 words.
P. 636: Owen Lattimore
This is Pearl!, by Walter Millis, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk.
R., p. 1, 0. 12, '47 ; 1,650 words.
P. 663 : Richard Watts
Bend sinister, by Vladimir Vladimirovich Nebokov, New Republic
117 : 26, Jl. 7, '47 ; 1,650 words.
P. 668: Richard Watts
There is a tyrant in every country, by Gilbert Neiman, New Repub.
116 : 26, Je. 16, '47 ; 1,350 words.
P. 703 : Richard Watts
The bear coughs at the North Pole, by Pierre Stephen Payne, New
Repub. 117 : 29, O. 6, '47 ; 230 words.
P. 703: OAA'en Lattimore
China awake, by Pierre S. -R. Payne, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly.,
Bk. R., p. 18, N. 2, '47 ; 650 words.
P. 703 : J. K. Fairbank
China aivake, by PieiTe S. R. Payne, N. Y. Times, p. 6, O. 19, '47
1,000 words.
P. 704 : J. K. Fairbank
Revolt of Asia, by Pierre S. R. Payne, Nation 165 : 422, O. 18, '47
1,650 words.
P. 704: Richard Watts
Revolt of Asia, by Pierre S. R. Payne, New Repub. 117 : 27, O. 6, '47
1,300 words.
P. 716 : Owen Lattimore
Breaking New Ground, by Gifford Pinchot, N. Y. Herald Tribune
Wkly., Bk. R., p. 5, D. 21, '47 ; 1,200 words.
P. 724: Richard Watts
Russia, a short history, by Helen Gay Pratt and Harriet Lucv Moore,
New Repub. 116 : 29, My. 26, '47 ; 60 words.
P. 737: Richard Watts
When the mountain fell, by Charles Ferdinand Ramuz, New Repub.
117 : 31, O. 20, '47; 850 words.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5655
P. 745 : Owen Lattimore
Japan, past and present, by Edwiu Oklfather Reischauer, N. Y.
Times, p. 10, Ja. 26, '47 ; 700 words.
P. 764 : Richard Watts
Juardez and his Mexico, by Ralph Roeder, New Repub. 117 : 27, N. 10,
'47 ; 1,700 words.
P. 765 : Richard Watts
/ rememher distinctly, by Agnes Rogers, New Repub. 117 : 26, S. 1,
'47 ; 1,800 words.
P. 767 : Richard Watts
F. D. R., letters, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, New Repub. 117 : 26,
D. 1, '47 ; 140 words.
P. 776: Richard Watts
Bread and rice, by Doris Rubens, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk.
R., p. 4, Ap. 27, '47; 1,350 words.
P. 795 : Richard Watts
Judas time, by Isidor Schneider, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk.
R.. p. 10, Mr. 30, '47 ; 1,100 words.
P. 798 : Richard Watts
Harder they fall, by Budd Wilson Sehulberg, New Repub. 117 : 27,
Ag. 11, '47 ; 1,700 words.
P. 802 : Richard Watts
Story of Mrs. Murphy, by Natalie Anderson Scott, New Repub. 116 :
24, Je. 30, '47 ; 1,250 words.
P. 818 : Richard Watts
End of a Berlin diary, by William Lawrence Shirer, New Repub.
117 : 28, S. 22, '47 ; 1,650 words.
P. 837 : Richard Watts
Stalin must have peace, by Edgar Snow, New Repub. 116: 31, Ap. 28,
'47 ; 1,200 words.
P. 854 : Richard Watts
Four in America, by Gertrude Stein, New Repub. 117 : 28, N. 17, '47 ;
470 words.
P. 855: Richard Watts
Wayxcard bus, by .John Steinbeck, New Repub. 116: 37, Mr. 10, '47;
1,250 words.
P. 870 : Richard Watts
Just tell the truth, by John Louis Strohm, New Repub. 116 : 29, My.
26, '47 ; 140 words.
P. 874 : Richard Watts
Yoxir newspaper, by Leon Svirsky, New Repub. 117 : 27, D. 15, '47 ;
1,150 words.
P. 884 : T. H. White
Richer by Asia, by Edmond Taylor, New Repub. 117 : 28, S. 8, '47 ;
1,100 words.
P. 884 : Owen Lattimore
Richer by Asia, by Edmond Taylor, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly.,
Bk. R., p. 1, Jl. 13, '47; 1,350 words.
P. 890 : Richard Watts
Complacent dictator, by Samuel .John Gurney Hoare Templewood,
New Repub. 116 : 39, F. 3, '47 ; 1,200 words.
P. 924 : Fairbank, J. K.
Last Chance in China, by Freda Utley, Nation 166 : 78, Ja. 17, '48 ;
1,050 words.
P. 924: Owen Lattimore
Last Chance in China, by Freda Utley, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly.
Bk. R., p. 20, N. 30, '47 ; 1,200 words.
P. 935 : Richard Watts
Sa^on charm, by Frederic Wakeman, New Repub. 117 : 28, O. 13,
'47 ; 1,300 words.
P. 940 : T. H. White
Stories of China at War, by Chi-chem Wang, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Ja. 12,
'47 ; 700 words.
P. 946 : Richard Watts
When the going was good, by Evelyn Waugh, N. Y. Times, p. 7, Ja. 12,
•47 ; 900 words.
5358 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
P. 946: Richard Watts
Comics, by Coulton Waiigh, New Repub. 117:28, D. 10, '47; ISfV
words.
P. 958 : Richard Watts
Year of Stalingrad, by Alexander Werth, New Repub. 116 : 27, My. 2(*v
'47 ; 1,500 words.
P. 959 : Richard Watts
Meaning of treason, by Rebecca West, New Repub. 117:24; I). 8»
'47 ; 1,500 words.
P. 964 : Richard Watts
Report on the Oermans, by William Lindsay White, New Repub.
117 : 25, July 21, '47 ; 2,300 words.
Selected REViEWEais, Book Review Digest, 1948
P. 7 : Richard Watts, Jr.
2'uming stream, by Duncan Aikman, New Repub. 118: 25, Je. 7, '48;
380 words.
P. 22 : Richard Watts, Jr.
What the people wavt, by Ellis Gibbs Arnall, New Repub. 118:24,
Je. 21, '48 ; 1,150 words.
P. 40 : J. K. Fairbank
Two years with the Chinese Communists, by Claire Band and
William Band, Nation 166 : 581, My. 22, '48 ; 750 words.
P. 40: Owen Lattimore
Tico years with the Chinese communists, by Claire Band and William
Band, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 6, Jl. 11, '48 ; 1,150
words.
P. 98 : Nathaniel Peffer
MacArthur's Japan, by Russell Brines, Nation 167 : 500, O. 30, '48 ;
400 words.
P. 134: Richard Watts
Persuade or perish, by Wallace Carroll, New ReputK 119 : 26, S. 6,
'48 ; 1,300 words.
P. 157 : J. K. Fairbank
The Far East, by Paul Hibbert Clyde, Am. Hist. R. 53 : 889, Jl. '48 ;
240 words.
P. 205 : Richard Watts
United States and Russia, by Mrs. Vera Dean, New Repub. 117: 2&,
D. 29, '47 ; 850 words.
P. 234: Richard Watts
Enjoyment of living, by Max Eastman, New Repub. 118 : 17 ; Ap. 12,
'4!S ; 750 words.
P. 238 : Richard Watts
Freedom and order, by Anthony Eden, New Repub. 119 : 23, Ag. 2,
'48 ; 1,300 words.
P. 242 : Richard Watts
Eisenhower speaks, by Dwisht David Eisenhower, New Repub.
US: 31, My. 17, '48; 1.300 words.
P.. 243 : Richard Watts
Hate, hope and high explosives, by George Fielding Eliot, New
Repub. 119 : 22, S. 20, '48 ; 1,250 words.
P. 249 : J. K. Fairbank
Eastern Asia, by Thomas Edson Ennis, Ann. Am. Acad. 258:137,
Jl. '48 ; 550 words.
P. 255 : L. K. Rosinger
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, Am. Hist.
R. 54 : 364, Ja. '49 ; 550 words.
P. 255 : Owen Lattimore
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, Nation
167 : 104, Jl. 24, '48 ; 1,000 words.
P. 255 : Richard Watts
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, New Repub.
119 : 24, Jl. 12, '48 ; 1,550 words.
P. 255: Annalee Jacoby
The United States and China, by JoLn King Fairbank, N. Y. Times,
p. 1, Jl. 11, '48 ; 140 words.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5657
P. 257: Richard Watts
Jim Farleif's storii. by James Aloysius Farley, New Repub. 118 : 21,
Mr. 15, '48 ; 1,550 words.
P. 268 : Richard Watts
America's destiny, by Herman Finer, New Repub. 117 : 27, D. 22, '47 ;
750 words.
P. 280: J. K. Fairbank
Changing China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly.
Bk. R., p. 8, Ja. 2, '49 ; 750 words.
P. 302 : Richard Watts
Jnixui diary, by Mark J. Gayu, New Repub. 119:25, N. 29, '48;
1,200 words.
P. 280: Annalee Jacoby
Changing China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Times, p. 32, N. 14,
'48; 700 words.
P. 318 : Richard Watts
Goehbcls diaries, by Joseph Goebbels, New Repub. 118:21, Ap. 26,
'48 ; 1,350 words.
P. 435 : Richard Watts
Latin America, by Ray Josephs, New Repub. 119:23, Ag. 23, '48;
1,:S00 words.
P. 471 : Richard Watts
Making of an insurgent, by F^orella Henry La Guardia, New Repub.
118 : 22, My. 24, '48 ; 1,450 wurds.
P. 474: Richard Watts
Pursuit of Robert Emmet, by Helen Landreth, New Repub. 118:25,
F. 16, '48 ; 1,450 words.
P. 505 : Richard Watts
Of flight and life, by Charles Augustus Lindbergh, New Repub. 119:
24, Ag. 30, '48 ; 1,200 words.
P. 506: Eleanor Lattimore
Carolii, by Paul Myron Anthony Liuebarger, N. Y. Herald Tribune
Wkly. Bk. R. p. 6, F. 1, '48 ; 450 words.
P. 571: Nathaniel PefCer
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Hears, Nation 167:499,
O. ;iO, '48 ; 600 words.
P. 571 : Richard Watts
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears, New Repub. 119 : 34,
S. 27, '48 ; 1,250 words.
P. 571 : L. K. Rosiuger
Mirror for Ainerican.'s: Japan, by Helen Mears, Survey G. 37:475,
N. '48; 700 words.
P. 603 : Richard Watts, Jr.
Folitivs in the Empire, by Warren Moscow, New Repub. 119:24,
Ag. 16, 48 ; 1,150 words.
P. 666 : Richard Watts
The southern Americas, by Abel Plenn, New Repub. 118 : 25, Mr. 29,
'48 ; 600 words.
F. 709 : Richard Watts
Whe7i this you see remember me, by William Garland Rogers, New
Kepub. 119 : 24, Ag. 9, '48 ; 1,450 words.
P. 728: Richard Watts
Tlie silent people speak, by Robert St. John, New Repub. 118: 28,
F. 2, '48 ; 1,250 words.
P. 747: Richard Watts
This icas normalcy, by Karl Schriftgiesser, New Repub. 118: 24,
Je. 7, '48 ; 1,100 words.
P. 755: Richard Watts
One thousand Americans, by George Seldes, New Repub. 118: 26,
Ja. 5. '48 ; 1,200 words.
P. 757: Richard \n atts
Donald of China, by Earl Albert Selle, New Repub. 118:22, F. 23,
'48 ; 1,250 words.
P. 757 : Owen Lattimore
Donald of China, by Earl Albert Selle, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly.
Bk. R., p. 4, F. 8, '48; 1,000 words.
88348 — 52 — pa. 14 48
5658 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIOXS
P. 768: Richard Watts
Qvest for love of Lao Lee, by Shu Ch'ing-Ch'un, New Repub. 119 : 26,
D. 27, '48 ; 950 words.
P. 772: Richard Watts
The South, old and new, l)y Frauds Butler Simkins, New Repub.
118 : 26, Ja. 19, '48 ; 1,300 words.
P. IM: T. A. Bissou
Americans from Japan, by Bradford Smith, Sat. R. of Lit. 31 : 12,
S. 4, '48; 900 words.
P. 794: Richard Watts, Jr.
Busy, busy people, by Samuel Spewack, New Repub. 119 : 25, N. 22,
'48: 800 words.
P. 798: Richard Watts, Jr.
The invisible island, by Irwin Stark, New Repub. 119: 26, Jl. 26,
'48 ; 1,250 words.
P. 801: Richard Watts
Russian journal, by John Steinbeck, New Repub. 118: 22, Apr. 19,
'48; 1,300 words.
P. 807: J. K. Fairbank
Stilwell papers, by Joseph Warren Stilwell, Nation 166 : 608, My. 29,
'48: 1,900 words.
P. 807: Richard Watts
Stihcell papers, by Joseph Warren Stilwell, New Repub. 118: 30,
My. 31, '48; 1,500 words.
P. 811: Richard Watts
Earl Warren, a great American story, by Irving Stone, New Repub.
119: 22, S. 13, '48; 1,250 words.
P. 824: Richard Watts
Silent children, by Sze Mai-mai. New Repub. 118: 29, Mar. 22, '48;
1 ,100 words.
P. 864: Richard Watts
Great rehearsal, by Carl Clinton Van Doren, New Repub. 118: 27,
Ja. 26, '48 ; 1,000 words.
P. 878: Nathaniel Peffer
New Paths for Japan, by Harold Wakefield, Nation 167: 500, O. 30,
'48 ; 110 words.
P. 904: Richard Watts
We need not fail, by Sumner Welle.s, New Repub. 118: 23, Je. 14,
'48 ; l,4fl0 words.
P. 912: Richard Watts
United States and South America, by Arthur Preston Whitaker,
New Repub. 118 : 24, My. 3, '48 ; 1,100 words.
P. 922: Richard Watts, Jr.
Ides of March, by Thornton Niven Wilder, New Repub. 118: 22,
Mr. 1. '48; 1,150 words.
P. 932: Richard Watts, Jr.
China ; the land and the people, by Gerald Freeman Winfield. issued
in cooperation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations,
New Repub. 120 : 26, Ja. 17, '49 ; 900 words.
P. 932: J. K. Fairbank
China : the land and the people, by Gerald Freeman Winfield, N. Y.
Times, p. 1, D. 12, '48 ; 1,650 words.
P. 936 : Richard Watts
IndoneHian story, by Charles Wolf, New Repub. 118 : 24, Je. 28, '48 ;
800 words.
Selected Reviewers, Book Review Digest, 1949
P. 58: Edgar Snow
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden. New Repub. 121 : 18, N.
7, '49 ; 2,200 words.
P. 58 : Owen Lattimore
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk.
R., p. 3. O. 23, '49; 1,500 words.
P. 58: Nathaniel Peffer
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, N. Y. Times, p. 47, O. 23,
'49; 600 words.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5659
P. 77: Nathaniel Peffer
Prospects for democracy in Japan, by Thomas Arthur Bisson, Na-
tion 168 : 337, Mr. 19, '49; 800 words.
P. 159 : J. K. Fairbank
Way of a fifJhter, by Claire Lee Chennault, Nation 168 : 244, F. 26, '49 ;
1,400 words.
P. 159 : Richard Watts
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, New Repub. 120 : 23, Mr.
7, '49 ; 1,000 words.
P. 159 : Annalee Jacoby
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Ja. 30,
'49; 1,550 words.
P. 201: Nathaniel Peffer
Russia's race for Asia, by George Creel, N. Y. Times, p. 10, IMr. 13,
'49; 450 words.
P. 201 : Edgar Snow
Russia's race for Asia, by George Creel, Sat. R. of Lit. 32 : 11, Ap.
9, '49 ; 1,150 words.
P. 201 : Owen Lattimore
Confucius, the man and the myth, by H. G. Creel. N. Y. Herald
Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 15, S. il, '49 ; 900 words.
P. 201: J. K. Fairbank
Confucius, the man and the myth, by H. G. Creel, N. Y. Times, p. 7,
My. 8, '49: 900 words.
P. 252 : Edgar Snow
Social forces in southu-est Asia, by Cora Alice DuBois, Sat. R. of
Lit. 32 : 21. My. 14 ; '49.
P. 259: Edgar Snow
Stalin and Co., by Walter Duranty, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly, Bk.
R., p. 4, Mr. 13, '49 ; 750 words ; p. 14, Mr. 20, '49 ; 180 words.
P. 286: Edgar Snow
Next step in Asia, by .John King Fairbank (and others), New Repub.
121 : 28, D. 12, '49 ; 360 words.
P. 448 : J. K. Fairbank
Venerable ancestor, by Harry Hussey, N. Y. Times, p. 6, N. 20, '49;
650 words.
P. 533: Edgar Snow ',~y
Situation ir(Asia,hy Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly.
Bk. R., pi., Ap. 10, '49 ; 1,650 words.
P. 534 : T. A. Bisson
Situation in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Survey 85 : 455 Ag. '49 ; 700
words.
P. 612: Nathaniel Peffer
Allied occupation of Japan, by Edwin M. JIartin (pub. under auspi-
ces of Am. Inst, of Pacific Relations).
P. 661: Owen Lattimore
Chin^a chanaed my mind, by David Ehvyn Morris, N. Y. Herald
aCiShaiae Wkly. Bk. R.,:p. 8, My. 1, '49 ; 7.50 words.
P. 661 : Annalee .Tacoby
China chnnged my mind, by David Elwyn Morris, N. Y. Times, p. 12,
Jl. 17. '49 ; 550 words.
P, 672: Richard Watt«
World must be governed, by Vernon Nash, Sat. R. of Lit. 32 : 11,
D. 31, '49 ; 750 words.
P. 846: Owen Lattimore
Out of eiPile, by Soetan Sjahrir, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk.
R.. p. 3. Mr. 13, '49; 950 words.
P. 846: Richard Watts
Out of PiPile, by Soetan Sjahrir, New Repub. 120 : 24, My. 9, '49 ;
900 words.
P. 890: J. K. Fairbank
Chinese conquer China, by Anna Louise Strong, N. Y. Herald
Tribune Bk. R., p. 3, N. 13, '49; 1,100 words.
P. 890: Edgar Snow
Chinese conquer China, by Anna Louise Strong, Sat R. of Lit.
32 : IS, N. 19, '49 ; 1,250 words.
5660 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
P. 906 : Richard Watts
W. C. Fields; his follies and fortunes, by Robert Lewis Taylor, Sat.
R. of lAt. 32 : 26, O. 22, '49 ; 800 words.
P. 920: Nathaniel PefEer
American-Russian relations in the Far East, by Pauline Tomkins,
N. Y. Times, p. 22, N. 20, '49 ; 550 words.
P. 984: Richard Watts
Land of milk and honey, by William Lindsay White, New Repub.
120 : 23, F. 21, '49 ; 1,200 words.
Selected Reviewers, Book Review Digest 1950
P. 91: Nathaniel PefEer
Peking diary, by Derk Bodde, N. Y. Times, p. 3, O. 29, '50; 1,000
words.
P. 330: J. K. Fail-bank
Outer Mongolia and its international position; ed. by Eleanor Latti-
more; with an introd. by Owen Lattimore [issued under the
auspices of the Int. secretariat. Inst, of Pacific relations]. N. Y.
Times, p. 11, Ja. 1, '50 ; 320 words.
P. 398 : T. A. Bisson
Education for a new Japan, by Robert King Hall, Survey 86:92,
F. '50 ; 320 words.
P. 476. T. A. Bisson
Kokutai no hongi (Cardinal principles of the national entity of
Japan), by Japan, Ministry of education, Survey 86:92, F. '50;
320 words.
P. 537 : T. H. White
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, New Repub. 123 : 20, Jl. 10, '50 ;
1,250 words.
P. 537 : J. K. Fairbank
Pivot of Asia., by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R.,
p. 1, Mr. 19, '50 : 1,600 words.
P. 537 : T. A. Bisson
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Survey 86 : 467, O. '50 ; 650 words.
P. 589 : J. K. Fairbank
Korea todai/, bv George McAfee McCune, and Arthur L. Grey, N. Y.
Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 1, Jl. 23, '50 ; 1,750 words.
P. 648 : Richard Watts
Companion in exile, by Ferenc Molnar, Sat. R. of Lit. 33 : 52, Ap. 15,
'50 ; 750 words.
P. 650: Edgar Snow
Stakes of democracy in southeast Asia, by Hubertus Johannes Van
Mook, Sat. R. of Lit. 33 : 12, Jl. 22, '50 ; 800 words.
P. 718 : Nathaniel Peffer
Tico kinds of time, by Graham Peck, N. Y. Times, p. 4, N. 5, '50; 800
words.
P. 757 : Nathaniel Peffer
United States and Japan, bv Edwin Oldfather Reischauer, N. Y.
Times, p. 1, Jl. 16, '50 ; 1,700 words.
P. 763 : Nathaniel Peffer
Roof of the world, by Amaury de Riencourt, N. Y. Times, p. 29, Ap.
16, '50 ; 450 words.
P. 790: Nathaniel Peffer
Western world and Japan, l)v Sii- George Bailey Sanson, Nation
170 : 183, F. 25, '50 ; 1,050 words.
P. 899 : Edgar Snow
Left wing in southeast Asia, bv Virginia McLean Thompson, Sat. R.
of Lit. 33 : 12, Jl. 22, '50 ; 800 words.
Mr. M.vNDEL. Next is a photostat of a roiind-taMe conference in
which Owen Lattimore participated, dealing with the terms of un-
conditional surrender for Japan.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1413" and is
as follows:)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5661
Exhibit No. 1413
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE
A Radio Dlscussiou Ijy Leeds Gulick, Paul Hutchinson and Owen Lattimoke
592d Broadcast in Cooperation "With the National Broadcasting Company
Number 381 July S, 1945
The University of Chicago Round Table. Published Weekly. 10 cents a copy ; full-year sub-
scription. 52 issues, two dollars. Published by the University of Chicago. Chicaao,
Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago,
Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879
More on This Topic
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Around the Round Table . . .
Leeds Gulick, visiting professor of Japanese at the University of Chicago,
was born in Osaka, Japan, and has lived in the Orient for a number of years. He
is, at the University of Chicago, at the present time the director of the A.S.T.P.
Japanese Area and Language instruction. Professor Gulick received his B.A.
and M. A. degrees at George Williams College and has studied at the Univer-
sity of Chicago. From 1924 until 1937 he served as a superintendent of schools.
He has written numerous magazine articles and is the author of Christian
Camp Conference Leaders' Manual (1934) ; Nihonga (1945) ; and Selected Japan-
ese Vocabulary (1945).
Paul Hutchinson, managing editor of the Christian Century magazine, was
editor of the China Christian Advocate in Shanghai China, from 1916 to 1921.
5662 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELu\TIONS
He also was, for a time, executive secretary of the China Centenary Movement
for the Methodist Episcopal church in China and was the secretary of the Ep-
worth Leagvie in China. He studied at Lafayette College, where he received
his Ph.B. degree, and Garrett Bible Institute, where he received his B.D. de-
gree. Mr. Hutchinson has been managing editor of the Christian Century since
1924. He is a regular magazine contributor and the author of Guide to Mis-
sion Stations in Eastern China (1919) : The Next Step (1921) : The Spread of
Christianity (1922; China's Real Revolution (1924) ; What and Why in China
(1927) ; The United States of Europe (1929) ; Men Who Made the Churches
(1930) ; World Revolution and Reliyion (1931) : Storm over Asia (1982) ; The
Ordeal of Western Reliyion (1933) ; From Victory to Peace (1943) ; and joint
author of The Story of Methodism (with H. E. Luccock) (1926) .
Owen I.attimoke, director of the Page School of International Relations of
Jolm Hopkins University, studied at St. Bees School in England and at Harvard
University. From 1920 to 1926 he was engaged in business in China, and since
that time he has traveled widely, working on various research pro.1ects in
China for the Social Science Research Council, the Guggenheim Foundation, the
Institute of Pacitic Relations, and Harvard-Yenching Institute. He was editor
of Pacific Affairs from 1934 to 1941. Professor Latrimore served as political
adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (1941-42), and he has been associated with the
Office of War Information on Pacific operations. He has been a regular con-
tributor to many magazines and is the author of The Desert Road to Ttirk^~
Stan (1929) ; Hiyh Tartary (1930) Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict (1932) ;
Tlie Mongols of Manchuria (1934) ; Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940) ;
MQtiyol Journeys (1941) ; The Making of Modern China (with Eleanor Lattimore:)
(1944) ; and Solution in Asia (1945).
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5663
Terms or Unconditional Surrender for Japan?
Mr. GuLiCK. The policies which we adopt in the next few mouths are crucial.
They may determine the early termination or long duration of the war. Hutchin-
son." as managing editor of the Christian Century, in a recent issue in your
magazine you reprinted a recent petition to the President.^
^ See "A Petition to the President." Chrltfiaji Century, June 27
petition on page 762 of the same issue of Christian Century.
1945, and the text of the
5664 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Hutchinson. That petition was an attempt to give expression to tlie feel-
ing tliat there are many Americans who believe that the tei-m "unconditional
surrender" is still not understood by the .Japanese and that it needs to be cleared
up in their minds as well as in the minds of most Americans.
Mr. Lattimore. Unconditional surrender, I believe, is the only stand vshich
we can take against the Japanese at the present time. Unconditional surrender
is something which has to be determined on the spot by the theater commanders;
and, short of unconditional surrender, we should only get into a situation in
which the Japanese were trying to play off one of the Allies against the other.
Mr. Hutchinson. I can see that there is that grave difficulty, but is it not
true that, while we have unconditional surrender as, you might say, a given
element in this situation, something has to happen after unconditional surrender.
It is time now that we were given an idea as to what that something is going
to be.
IMr. Lattimore. There are two things which before unconditional surrender
we must make clear to the Japanese. First, we must make it clear that nothing
will be satisfactory except their complete defeat. The second stage is something
else again and concerns how we behave after victory. If the Japanese can get it
into their heads that after our victory we are a people who will behave in a
decent and humane manner and will not exterminate them like some inferior
breed, why, so much the better.
Mr. GuLicK. But these points shovild be specifically stated, I believe, in some-
thing like Wilson's Fourteen Points, which seemed to hasten the end of the first
World War. I do not know that we ought to issue generalities, because they
will say, "There, again, they are jut putting something over on us."
Mr. Laitimore. There is an incomplete parallel there. I do not think that the
situation is the same as it was in Wilson's time. If we — specifically the United
States — were to make a declaration of that kind at the present time, we should
simply be acting on our own without the other United Nations. One essential
condition of unconditional surrender is that the nations which demand it should
be completely unified.
Mr. lluTCiiiKsoN. And that means, does it not, that the time is here when we
should be seeking some clear-cut understanding among the United Nations which
would really unite us on what we are after in Japan?
Mr. GuLiCK. You see, the Japanese idea of unconditional surrender may be
most anything, and, probably because of their propagandists, it has meant en-
slavement. They have watched the way that we have acted in Italy and said,
"Well, that is fine. That is not enslavement." And then in Germany it seemed
more harsh, so they do not know just what we might mean. Of course, our orig-
inal idea of unconditional surrender was in order that we might have something
to state before the world to prove that we are united.
Mr. Lattimore. The Japanese, I believe, know very well what unconditional
surrender would mean. It would mean complete military defeat, and they are try-
ing to avoid that. Their propaganda on the radio right now is trying to balance
America and Russia against each other, and they hope that the other United
Nations will also be split from China. In other words, they want to squeeze out
of the war without a complete military defeat. It we are to counteract that, we
have to have complete understanding among all the United Nations about un-
conditional surrender and about the administration of the victory which is to
follow it.
Mr. GuLicK. I think that you have misunderstood what I meant about that.
I do not think that the United States should, just on its own authority, issue
what the terms should be; but I believe that the United Nations should work
that out.
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, but, as I understand Lattimore, what he means is that
we have come to the point now at which in the coming Big Three conversations —
and perhaps following them, bringing China into the conversations — we should
reach a clear understanding among ourselves as to how we are going to handle
Japan after the military victory is complete. I agree with that. We are very
far from an understanding on that point as yet.
Mr. Lattimore. We have to expect the development in the Far East to follow
somewhat the course that it did in Europe. You will remember that at the
time that Roosevelt launched the phrase "unconditional surrender," it was ar
a period when cooiieration among America, Russia, and Britain in the war
against Germany was only beginning to develop its full potentiality.
Mr. Hutchinson. That is true.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5665
Mr. Lattimore. And the phrase "unconditional surrender" was a signal that
the United Nations were really getting together and that Germany wouhl have
to deal with all of thein alike. We are getting to the same stage against Japan,
and I think I hat it is reasonal)le to expect that the coming Big Three meeting
will be followed up by other meetings which will really align the United Nations
as a whole against Japan. Until that is done, any talk of modified terms for
the Japanese is likely only to give them the hope that they can succeed in splitting
us. and. therefore, such talk is more likely to prolong their resistance than to
reduce it.
Mr. GuLicK. How about the terms which were drawn up aiter we had taken
Germany, for instance, or Italy? Did they have any etfect upon the surrender?
Mr. Hutchinson. There was in that case complete collapse, and it was not a
case of negotiating at all, except that there may have been some sort of secret
negotiations which went on for the preservation of the House of Savoy in Italy,
about which we know nothing ; but we are dealing now with a nation which
still has an army of four million men on its front lines. What we are feeling
after. I take it, is whether or not it is possible to introduce psychological elements
which will put those four million men out of action more quickly than simply by
blasting them out of action.
]\Ir. Lattimoke. The biggest psychological element is the feeling that the
united lineui) against them is something which is much greater than their four
million men and that they cannot possil)ly split us.
Mr. Hutchinson. That is true, and I, therefore, say that I feel that we need
to understand each other quite as much as we need to have the Japanese under-
stand us.
Mr. GuLicK. I see that the three of us do not agree exactly upon what terms
should be stated or how much, so that we cannot argue this out. Let us go on to
the matter of what might be done, however, in administration following the col-
lapse of Japan — whether it is early or late. We might divide the discussion into
three parts : the military, the political, and the economic.
Mr. Hutchinson. There is no great question as to what has to be done on
the military question. Japan has to be demilitarized. That is what it amounts
to. We have to wipe out the whole setuji — the Japanese army and the navy,
the shipbuilding and the airplane-building industries. Everything which has
contriluited to make Japan a military state headed toward aggression in the
Pacific has to be wiped out.
Mr. Lattimoke. That includes a lot of economic and political action as well,
because we cannot forget that the civilian warmaker.s — that is, the big indus-
trialists and financiers of Japan — are really primarily even more responsible
for Japan's going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and
the navy are only the striking instruments and the tools.
Mr. Hutchinson. I quite gree with that, but that is the economic side which
Gulick was saying that we would lead to after we talked about the mili-
tary. That really goes to show that we cannctt divide the categories in any such
clear-cut \\ay as he was suggesting, because they are all mixed up together. Be-
hind the army cFcpie which we are forever talking about in T< kyo there does
stand this oligarchy of big business.
Mr. Lattimore. And they are not in opposition to each other ; they are in
partnership with each other.
Mr. Hutchinson. Exactly
Mr. GuLicK. You are quite right, but what I was saying was that our listen-
ers would like to know \\ hat specific points we are making on this issue. Then
we can let it go at that, I believe, without further di.scussion. They would in-
clude; (1) the evacuation of whole territories outside the home islands of Japan ;
(2) the complete demobilization of the army and the navy and the air force;
(3) the dismantling of the factories whicli manufacture armaments and the dis-
mantling of the navy yards: and (4) the delivery to the United Nations for trial
and punishment of all the war criminals.
Mr. Hutchinson. And at that point, including, as Lattimore was saying, the
people who have been responsible for the policy which has produced this ag-
gressive Japan. They are the big-business elements.
Mr. Lattijiore. The Zaibatsu people — the same people who a lot of Ameri-
cans unfortunately think are the crowd with whom we should deal in Japan
after the war, because they stand for law and order. So far as we stand for
any Japanese, we have to stand, not for that bunch, but for the Japanese
people. Only when the power of that bunch is crushed, can the Japanese people
rise up, and only then can we find anyone else to deal with. And we will not
find that until we have imposed unconditional surrender.
5666
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
<
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U
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Mr. GuLiCK. By Zaibatsu, you mean the fifteen wealthiest families that con-
trol the economic life of Japan.
Mr. Hutchinson. The Mitsui, the Mitsubishi, the Yasuda. . .
Mr. Lattimore. The whole crowd, and I would include the Emperor and the
Imperial Clan with them, because the Imperial Clan, with its economic and
financial holdings, is built into the whole structure.
Mr. HxjTCHiNSON. Yes, of course, for they have stock in everythuig. There
is a further point which I would like to get at for a minute. It seems to me that
what we really should be trying to do in Japan at this moment is to get the idea
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5667
across to the Japanese masses that we come as liberators. They have been
slaves of this old oligarchy and the hangover of the feudal order and the rest
of it. The Japanese, whether he is a common soldier in the army or whether
he is a farmer on his little plot, is a virtual slave. Now we should be coming
in to say to them, "After we have wiped out this crowd who has been running
things, we mean to give you a chance to have the kind of a government and the
kind of a nation which you deserve."
Mr. Lattimore. I am thoroughly in favor of that, and I think that we may
reasonably count on a certain element of cooperation in Japan.
Mr. GuLiCK. Of course, that will take a lot of reeducation of the people,
will it not?
Mr. Lattimore. First, it will take a little bit of that good old "chaos" of
which so many people are afraid. I cannot think of any country in the world in
which a little period of chaos would be more healthy, because the respectable
people in Japan and the decent people in Japan will not be able to get their
heads up before they have had some chaos. I mean specifically the people who
tried to vote against military aggression in the last election which they had.
Mr. Hutchinson. That was very significant — that final vote or election that
they had before the military crowd simply ran away with things in Manchuria.
Mr. Lattimore. You will find that that crowd will not be ^ble to get in touch
with the people in the State Department who stand for a Japanese equivalent
of a Darlan policy, a Badoglio policy, and all that kind of thing.
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, it seems to me that if there is any one thing clear
about that Far Eastern situation at the present time, it is that to attempt to
■work through a puppet system out there will simply produce in the long run a
worse tragedy than we have had.
Mr. GuLicK. Then you believe that we should not have the Emperor or an
Imperial family of any kind on the throne or in any relationship to the gov-
ernment?
Mr. Hutchinson. I am not saying that. What I am saying is that, in the
long run, that is something which has to be settled by the Japanese themselves,
and I am saying that to attempt to use the Imperial family as puppets, as, for
instance, the Japanese have attempted to use Wang Ching-wei as a puppet in
China, will simply land us in unutterable confusion and a blind alley.
Mr. Lattimore. I agree with you there, and I am afraid that it is a very dan-
gerous notion that a lot of Americans have that we could use the Emperor to do
our job for us. It seems to me that the only way out of that is to put the
Emperor and Imperial Clan, the whole gang of tliem, out of circulation the
moment we get to Japan — simply sequester them, do not kill them or anythnig
like that, but put them out of circulation.
Mr. GuLiCK. I will agree with you on that if, however, we use the Emperor
in the first place to declare the war over, because he is the only man to be
followed or obeyed by the military forces.
Mr. Lattimore. I am not so sure of that. I think that the Japanese can sur-
render without a top command to surrender, just as the Germans surrendered
without a top command to surrende^r. When the time comes, they will surrender.
Mr. Hutchinson. You mean that generals in the field will surrender?
Mr. Lattimore. Generals in the field will surrender, or at least troops in the
field will surrender. We have the beginnings of that already. Do not forget
that, when we come to the home islands of Japan, we are dealing with bigger
areas in terms of square miles. People are not going to be crowded into little
caves where they can put up last stands. There is going to be room to run away,
and when you get room to run away is when you get the time that people
surrender.
Mr. Hutchinson. And you do not believe that we are going to need anything
like this Flensburg business which we had in Germany?
Mr. Latti.moee. Not unless we create in the Japanese mind the idea that we
are fighting a race war, that all Japanese are yellow-bellied so-and-so's, and that
Americans are not going to deal with them as human people. If you give them
an idea that when they have surrendered, they will get a reasonable break, then
they will surrender.
Mr. Hutchinson. I am glad to hear you say that, because your experience
out there has been so extensive that it carries great weight, and that is what I
have been trying to believe myself. It seems to me, then, that what we really
should be trying to get across to the Japanese people as a whole the.se days is
that surrender does not mean that they are going to have to exchange one des-
potism for another but that surrender will mean that, in place of the despotism
which they have known, they are going to have a wholly new opportunity to
build a democratic order of their own.
5668
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
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y$ Of LQtyO ARCA Of mofziD
tHt. t/MIVKttSlTV
or c^iCACo spuno
ff^S?^^ 7^ OF POPUiOJiOn Of WOULD
Mr. GuLicK. I agree with you in that we ought to let them Iviiow beforehand
that we are going to allow them to form the kind of government which they want.
If they want the Emperor back, all right — after a number of years, of course.
Mr. Lattimork. But if they get the Emperor back, it should be done by a
Japanese plebiscite in which they are allowed to vote for having the Emperor
back or having a constitutional monarchy or a republic. If it is done in that
way, then the Japanese Emperor would come back not as a divine ruler but as
a ruler by permission of the people. However, I am perfectly convinced that, in
the disillusionment following defeat, the Japanese will all turn to the common
idea prevailing in the world today — that progressive government is government
under republican forms by democratic methods — and that very soon there will
be a Japanese demand for doing away with the Emperor and that at that point
we should not have a conservative American policy of preserving the Emperor.
Mr. IIuTcuiNsoN. Yes, exactly, and therefore our responsibility is simply to
see that there is a period after surrender in which the Japanese democratic forces
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5669
SOUTHEAST ASIA
get a chance to develop while we have the Emperor and his crowd, as you say, "on
ice" somewhere. When the people have really had a chance, then let there be
the plebiscite. Then the decision will be up to the Japanese, and let us let them
go to it.
Mr. Lattimore. But there is an all-important point of timing there, and that is
the one point on which I should criticize your C'/'r/.s-Zian Century petition, Hutch-
inson, for it might mLslead i>eople as to timing, both in this country and in Japan.
It would mislead them in the sense that they might think that if there were a
little bargaining about the terms, it might end earlier. I am convinced that the
more bargaining there is, the longer the Japanese will go on fighting, because they
hope that they will be able to split the United Nations ; and, therefore, we have
to show an absolutely firm and unshakable front on the idea of military uncon-
ditional surrender.
Mr. GtTLicK. While we do not agree on the temis that should be stated, I
believe that they should be specifically stated, however. Then there would not
be the bargaining going on.
Mr. Lattimore. They have been, I think, specifically enough stated.
Mr. GuLicK. By Truman's statement?
Mr. Lattimore. By Truman's statement that this is military unconditional
surrender and that it does not mean the extermination of the Japanese people.
5670
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5671
Mr. Hutchinson. And there is the Caii-o Declaration, also. That has to be
taken into account.^
Mr. Lattimore. The Cairo Declaration is one element of consideration. One
unspoken thing is also all-important. While we have promised not to extermi-
nate the Japanese people, we should not promise not to exterminate the Japanese
financial and industrial oligarchy which is back of the whole nasty business.
Mr. GuLicK. That brings up the statement, then, in the Christian Century
about the administration of the merchant marine, finance, and industry by
commissions of the United Nations.^
Mr. Hutchinson. That means simply this : That by defeating the army we
do not really defeat the Japanese threat to peace. As I have said before, behind
the army lies this economic oligarchy. If we do not break that up and administer
the wl>ole economic situation long enough to be sure that it is broken up and
that a new group has moved in to whatever Japanese economy comes on, why,
ihen tlie war was practically fought in vain.
Mr. }jAttimore. Is your point not that we have not only to administer the
industries through the United Nations commissions, but that the United Na-
tions ccmmissions should not work through the nominees of the old Zaibatsu
oligarchy. We have to allow new people to come up in Japan who will constitute
a vested interest against the return of the oligarclis and against the return of the
financial agents of the Imperial household and so on.
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes. and who will not be interested in a type of economy
that is the old-fashioned imperialism — getting foreign territory in order to get
raw materials.
Mr. Lattimore. And should you not go on beyond that and say that the
restoration of Japan's economy is not our primary concern, but, on the contrary,
the Japanese should in all Asia have the last priority on restoration of their
standard of living.
Mr. Hutchinson. China has first priority.
Mr. Lattimore. China, the Philippines, and all other territories overrun and
damaged by the Japanese. Japanese industry can contribute to that reha-
bilitation. After it has done so, the Japanese should have no more basic war-
making heavy industry but may be allowed to have consumer industries and
other light industry, obtaining their materials at market prices on a free world
market and not obtaining them by political control of dependent territories
Mr. Hutchinson. Exactly, and thus we give the Japar ese people the chance
for a very dec-ent, probably improved, standard of living, because of their not
having to carry the tax burden of this tremendous militaiy establishment.
Mr. Lattimore. I dislike comparing a nice people like the Swedes with tho
Japanese, but I have said before that there is no reason why Japan should not
become a Sweden of Asia. Sweden at one time was an aggressive country, ye';
now. for many years, it has been one of the most progressive countries in thu
world. It has no major war-making industr\ . It is a peace-trading system.
Mr. GiTiJtK. Of course, what you have left out of your calculations is the slav'>
position that the Japanese laborer will feel. If they are to produce for other
countries first in reparations and particularly not under their accustomed tuIptr
- Presiclent Roosevelt. Gener.ilissimo Cliiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill
nift at Cairo in November 1943. From that conference the following general statement
was issued :
"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against
Japan.
"The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against
their brutal enemies by sea. land, and the air. This pressure is already rising.
"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of
Japan.
"They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.
"It is their purpose that .Japan shall be stript>ed of all the islands in the Pacific whicli
she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all
the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
"Jai)an will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence
and greed.
"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavem.#nt of the people of Korea,
are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
"With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United
Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged-
operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."
^ Point 4 of the petition to the President says that the signers request : "Administration
by commissions of the United Nations of the Japanese merchant marine, finance and
indnslry with a view to the complete demilitarization of Japanese life and the restoration
of Japan to membership in the world conrmunity. * * *" {Christian Century, June
27. 19451.
5672 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of the wealthy class, I think that they will tend, at first anyway, to lie down on
the job.
]\Ir. Hutchinson. Why should they feel in a slave position if they are getting
more food than they have been under tlie old order? I think that it is perfectly
possible, under the kind of set-up that Lattimore aud 1 have been suggesting,
that actually the Japanese farmer on his little plot will be better off, in terms of
the standard of living, than he ever was before.
Mr. Lattimore. Not only the farmer but also the industrial worker. If we
dispossess the monopolists who are gouging the ordinary people of Japan to pay
fantastic profits on their war-making industry, we will have a margin there which
we can use for raising the level of the peasant and the industrial worker. Then,
far from feeling enslaved to work for other Asiatic countries, he will feel lib-
erated from his own oppressors and feel that he has something in common with
other peoples in Asia who also want progress and economic development and
republican self-government.
Mr Hutchinson. In other words, he has to come into this freedom bloc that is
growing up in Asia, tliat you have talked about in your book.''
Mr. LATTi^rouE. I tliink tliat that this is quite possible, yes.
Mr. GuLicK. He may look to that later on, but certainly in the immediate fu-
ture he will not be any better otf than he has been. The farmer has always been
able to hide out enough food that he has needed to support life. Of course, when
you point out that agrarian reform will give him more land that is another thing.
When the factories will pay more to labor, again that will help the population as
a whole : but I do not believe he will be willing to trade those for the direction
under the heel of a commission from a foreign power.
Mr. Lattimoke. Neither were tlie Germans willing to trade it, but that is not
the point. Neither the Germans nor the Japanese can expect that the reward of
surrender will be inmiediate prosperity, and enough Japanese, like enough
Germans, have been abroad to see the work done by their own conquerors to show
that the nation is guilty. The nation has a certain expiation to work out, and
there is no reason why they sliould not work it out.
Mr. Hutchinson. Of course, we are taking for granted that there is going
to be common sense in the administration of this thing, that it is not going to be a
matter of United Nations commissars' going in.
Mr. Lattimore. How far can you take common sense for granted? Common
sense is something for whicli we have to work hard, and we have to put pressure
on our own governuient to get it sometimes.
Mr. Hutchinson. I admit that that is true, but at least it should be a program
that is aimed toward developing this new industrial group in Japan just as
rapidly as possible.
Mr. GuLicK. In other words, a new "Yalta Conference" perhaps should be
in the making for that very purpose.
Mr. Lattimore. Politically, we certainly need a "Yalta Conference" in Asia
as one step toward the final military victory over Japan. Otherwise, the military
victory will lead us vip into a position that is politically unclear.
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, but do not forget that a Yalta Conference for Japan
has to liave China in it.
Mr. Lattimore. It has to have China in it, and in my opinion it has to have
Russia in it, because Russia will be important in the future of Japan wliether
they fight or not. In fact, they have already made a military contribution
simply by tying down Japanese troops.
Mr. Hutchinson. I was taking that for granted, because Russia was in the
Yalta Conference originally, that conference that you are using in your parallel..
Mr. Lattimore. I see, yes, I think, tliough, that in the Yalta Conference for
Asia there should not be first-class participation and second-class participation.
The full equality of tlie United Nations should be essential to that concept.
Mr. Hutchinson. One of the things that needs to be pinned down right away
on fliis whole Far Eastern situation is that China is in this thing just as much as
we are and should have not merely formal but actual equality.
Mr. Lattimore. It is somewhat ditlicult to summarize a discussion that has
moved as rapidly as this one has over so much ground in this Round Table dis-
cussion, but I think that I can say this: We are agreed that there must be un-
limited victory over Japan — a clear-cut military victory. There is some dis-
agreement among the three of ns al)out whether the prosecution of the demand
for unconditional surrender should be accompanied by some sort of declaration
* Owen Lattimore. Solution in Asia (Boston : liittle, Brown & Co., 1945.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5673
to Japan comparable to Wilson's Fourteen Points in the last war. Ho\Yever, all
of us are in agreement again that, after victory over Japan, the utmost should
be done to make the Japanese feel that, while they have a great deal to expiate,
they are not going to be treated as a pariah or outcast people and that they will
have a chance to build a better Japan than the one which has brought so much
misery in Asia and the world.
The IvouND Table, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is
broadcast entirely without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare
a topical outline, and exchange data and views. The opinion of each speaker
is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of
Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary informa-
tion in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be
considered as representing the opinions of the Round Table speakers.
WHAT DO YOU THINK
1. How do you define "unconditional surrender"? What did it mean in the case
of Italy and Germany? Do you favor similar action and policy for Japan?
Or do you favor the acceptance of victory upon the basis of certain terms?
Which course, in your opinion, will hasten the end of the war? Do you
favor a "Yalta" agreement for Japan?
2. What should be the objectives of American policy in the Far East? Toward
Japan? Upon what basis can cooperation with the other great powers be
effected for the Pacific? What is the relation between the political and
economic problems of the Far East? How can Japanese aggression be
eliminated?
3. What are the inherent dangers in the peace settlement for the Pacific? What
should be the role of China? Upon what basis can Japan be reconstructed
to take her place among the nations of the Orient? AVhat policies must be
adopted by the Western powers if a future race war is to be avoided?
4. Why is it important that the United Nations cooperate in future policies for
Japan? Do you believe that they should occupy Japan after the war? Or
do you think that an ovei-whelming military defeat will be enough? How can
Japan be demilitarized? What should be done with Japanese industry and
its present economic system? W'ould you agree with the suggestion that
Japan become the "Sweden of Asia"?
5. What does Mr. Lattimore mean when he says that, after the defeat of Japan,
a "little period of chaos" would be "healthy"? If Japan is occupied, should
the United Nations try to establish order, or should they encourage a revolu-
tion in the effort to build a new Japan? What are the "democratic forces"
in Japan upon which a new regime might be built? How can they be en-
couraged? What would be your attitude toward a communist revolution in
Japan?
6. Discuss the role of the Emperor in Japan today and the system of State
Shintoism. Can there be peace in the Far East without the uprooting of em-
peror-worship and Shintoism? How can these be effectively eliminated
from Japanese life?
7. What are the prospects for a United Nations' policy toward the Far East
which will put an end to the traditional policy of Western imperialism? How
will the end of imperialism in the Orient affect and_ condition the people of
the Western world? What are the probable political consequences of the
comin:x industrialization of Asia?
More on This Topic
"AMG Plans for Japan," Nation, June 16, 1945. Excerpts from a letter hy a
member of the training program for Japanese military government which
criticizes the policies which are being advocated.
Balling, Francis C. "Unconditional Surrender and a Unilateral Declaration
of Peace," Political Science Review, June, 1945.
BissoN, T. A. America's Far Eastern Policy. New York : Macmillan Co., 1915.
"The Far East— from War to Peace," New Republic, May 28, 1945. A special issue
ichich is devoted to discussions of the Far East by prominent authorities.
Fleisher, Wilfrid. "What to Do with Japan," Life, April 16, 1945.
. What to Do with Japan. New York : Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1945.
Hailey, Foster. "The War Converges on Japan," Yale Review, summer, 1945.
Halsey, Admiral William F. "A Plan for Japan," Collier's, April 28, 1945.
Says that he does not believe in "halfivay" measures and suggests how he
would deal tvith Japan to prevent another war.
88348— 52— pt. 14 49
5674 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HuTCHiNS, Robert M. "The New Realism," Commonweal, July 6, 1945.
"Japan," Fortune, April, 1944. The entire issue is devoted to discussions of
various phases of Japanese life.
Lamott, Willis Church. "What Not To Do with Japan." Harper's, June, 1945.
Argues that mUitanj and economic restrictions should be enforced but other-
wise we should adopt a policy of "hands off" and allow Japan to become a
''good third-rate power."
Lattimore, O.wen. "Freedom Bloc in Asia," Common Sense, March, 1945. Says
that our basic attitude toward the Orient must be a recognition that the age
of imperialism is over and that a policy toward Asia involves the imposition
of terms on Japan and the creation of a democratic bloc of nations on the
continent.
. Solution, in Asia. Boston : Little, Brown & Co., 1945.
MacNair, Harley F. The Real Conflict betioeen China and Japan: An Analysis
of Opposing Ideologies. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1938. Says that
the "nonphysical factors involved in the present struggle in eastern Asia are at
least as important as the physical."
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Anna H. Rubio appeared in our hear-
ings. There was testimony from the Ohio State Un-American Ac-
tivities Commission bearing on her behavior before that committee.
1 would like this put into the record. This is the reply of the Ohio
committee ; it is dated June 13, 1950.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1414" a.nd is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1414
Ohio Un-American Activities CoMiiissioN
state house
Columbus 15, Ohio
Adams 5751
Senator Roscoe R. Walciitt, Pres. Pro Tern House Speaker Gordon Renner. Chairman
Senator Leo Blackburn Senator Joseph W. Bartunek, Vice Chairman
Senator Charles J. Carney Representative Samuel L. Devine, Secretary
Senator James G. Headley Sidney Isaacs, Legal Director and Counsel
Senator C. I. Powell James P. Worster. Chief Investigator
Representative John V. Corrigan Margaret H. Moorhous, Office Secretary
Representative Robert W. Reider
Representative Kenneth A. Robinson
Representative Louis J. Schneider, Jr.
June 13, 1952.
Mr. Robert Morris,
Special Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
Deae Mb. Morris : This is in reply to your inquiry of May 10, 1952, concerning
Anna H. Rubio whose signed letter in behalf of the China Aid Council was in-
troduced into the oflScial records regarding the investigation of the Institute of
Pacific Relations.
Mrs. Anna H. Morgan, in answer to a subpoena, appeared before this Com-
mission on April 1, 1952. Although she was not questioned as to her affiliations
with the China Aid Council, nor whether she was the Anna H. Rubio whose
letter was introduced on page 1514, Vol. V. of your hearings, it appears that Mrs.
Anna H. Morgan and Anna H. Rul)io are one and the same person. The enclosed
newspaper item from the Columbus (Ohio) Citizen for March 27, 1948, sliows
that Anna H. Morgan was formerly known as Rubio, and also that Alfred (Al)
Rubio is a son by a former marriage.
Anna Hass Morgan, upon her appearance before this Commission on April ],
1952, being first duly sworn, gave her name as Anna H. Morgan. Thereupon she
refused to answer the following questions invoking the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as her protection.
Where she resided.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5675
Was she a citizen of the United States.
How long she had been a resident of Franklin County, Ohio.
Where she was employed.
If she was, or had ever been a member of the Communist Party.
That it was not a fact that she was, during the entire time of her resi-
dence in Franklin County, Ohio, a member and an active member of the
Communist Party of Franklin County.
That it was not a fact that as of January 9, 1949, she was not the finance
director of the Cdiumunist I'arty of Franklin County.
If, on that date, she didn't take full responsibility as cochairman of the
Franklin County Communist Party, directing registration and securing new
i-ecruits.
If, in February 1949, in her capacity as executive secretary of the Com-
munist Party of Franklin County, she didn't report that she had recently
attended the Ruthenberg dinner in Cleveland, Ohio.
Did she report to the Franklin County section of the Commianist Party at
the time that Martin Chancey (Ohio State Communist Party secretary) had
emphasized that the fund drive in Franklin County being conducted at that
time must go over the top with the point that if members had to borrow
money to meet the quota, they must do so, and the quota would not be re-
duced but might be increased ten percent. And did she recall making that
report for the Franklin County Cousmunist Party section.
If, during the time she was not the paid Communist Party organizer for the
Communist Party in Franklin County, having been promised $35 a week for
that duty.
If it was not a fact that on April 24, 1049, she attended a Marxist class
held by the Franklin County Communist Party at the home of Manny Shore
at 4.54 South Wayne Avenue, at which time she reported that she had received
no pay for eight weeks at .$35 a week from the Communist Party.
If it was not a fact that on May 9, 1949, at a regular meeting of the Com-
munist Party of Franklin County, she announced that she and her husband
might have to leave Columbus because her salary had not been paid and
her husband at that time had no job.
If it was not a fact that she was a delegate to the Franklin County Com-
munist Party convention held in Columbus, Ohio, from June 6 to 13, 1949.
If it was not a fact that on the fifth day of June, immediately prior to
that convention, she was elected executive secretary of the Franklin County
Communist Party.
If it was not a fact that on the 26th day of June a Communist Party
meeting was held in her home.
If it was not a fact that at that meeting held in her home, Robert Camp-
bell, a State Communist Party functionary, spoke on the subject of white
chauvinism, a white Communist Party in the north-end of Columbus
and a Negro Communist Party in the south-end.
If it was not a fact that on August 12, 1949, the executive committee of the
Franklin County Communist Party met in her home.
If it was not a fact that at that meeting Robert Gunkle was introduced
as the new Communist Party organizer for Fi'anklin County.
If it was not a fact that a Communist Party meeting was held in her
home on September 16, 1949.
If the principal item of discussion at that meeting held in her home was
not the fact that Robert Gunkle had left Columbus, Ohio, without notifying
the State committee of the Communist Party.
And that there was discussion as to who would take his place as his
successor.
If it was not true that in February 19-50 Arthur Rappaport was appointed
to succeed Robert Gunkle, and that he and his wife resided in her home.
If it was not a fact that during that period of time her home was not actu-
ally the Communist Party headquarters for Franklin County.
If it was not a fact that on the 2nd of May, 1950, a Communist May Day
meeting was held in her home.
If it was not a fact that at that meeting Arnold Johnson was scheduled to
speak, had to return to New York when it appeared that Eugene Dennis
might have to go to jail and Frank Hashmall was a substitute sjjeaker.
Had she ever been employed by the American Zinx Oxide Company.
If it wasn't a fact that she was arrested wider the name of Katherine
O'Rourke for illegal picketing during a strike at the AZO strike.
5676 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
If it wasn't a fact that of today she was in charge of activities of the
Communist Party of Franklin County.
Was she not one of the four Ohio sponsors of the petition, "We Charge
Genocide."
If it was not a petition presented to the United Nations alleging that as
the official and studied policy of the United States Government to exter-
minate the Negro race in the United States.
If it was not a publication of the Civil Rights Congress.
If she was not a member of the Civil R ghts Congress.
If she was not aware that the Civil Rights Congress had been cited as
both a subversive and Communist organization by the Attorney General of
the United States.
If it was not a fact that she was an active member of the Communist Party
in Franklin County at the present time.
Where she resided before she came to Franklin County.
If it was not a fact that she was active in Communist Party affairs in
Champaign, Illinois, prior to coming to Franklin County.
Enclosed are copies of letters addressed l>y Mrs. Morgan to the chairman of this
Commission, and the statement she presented to the Commission at the time she
appeared as a witness, together with photostat copies of her signature.
Kindest regards.
Yours very truly,
Sidney Isaacs,
Sidney Isaacs,
Legal Director and Counsel.
Ends. : 8.
[Columbus Citizen, Saturday, March 27, 1948],
Window Shattered At Hashmaix Home — Efforts to Organize Communists at
Low Ebb
Glass in Communist Frank Hashmall's front door was smashed with a brick
Friday night.
Hashmall, his wife and year-old son were not at their home at 1403 S. Fourth
St., when the incident occurred. Neighbors said they didn't even hear a noise
during the night.
But Saturday morning, shattered glass, a large paving brick, stones and hard
lumps of clay gave mute testimony to the bombardment. The house of tlie
Franklin County Communist organizer was still deserted at noon Saturday.
Presumably Hashmall was A^^'OL from his duties as Columbus' No 1 Commu-
nist who receives his pay check from party coffers. Neighbors said the family
left the house early Friday morning.
But Ohio Communist headquarters in Cleveland insisted he was still at his
job in Columbus Saturday.
"If Frank isn't in Columbus, he's supposed to be," said Martin Chauncey,
Communist leader at the Cleveland heai'quarters. "He hasn't checked in here,
and we hnven't henrd from him for several days."
Frank Hashmall's efforts to organize a Communist Party in Franklin County
had reached a dismal stage Saturday.
Two attempts to pass out handbills to Timken plant workers had met with
failure. His statements bitterly complaining about his party activities had
ceased arriving at The Citizen.
The low point in Hashmall's activities in Columbus came seven days after he
first identified himself as executive secretary of the Franklin County Communist
Party. He complained at that time, in a signed statement, about the reception of
his handbill-passing efforts and the publicity about it.
Developments came fast :
Last Sunday Ilashmairs connection with the Cleveland Communists was
disclosed in The Citizen.
Last Wednesday a second attempt was made to give Timken workers handbills.
This effort was led by Arthur Vincent Rappeport, 4.5 E. 11th Ave.,- who pro-
tested "treatment" received when at attempted to distribute communistic hand-
bills with Hashmall on March 19.
W<u-kers again destroyed the handbills and police broke up the gathering at
plant gates on Cleveland Ave.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5677
Then came the disclosure that Hashmall's home is owned by Mrs. Anna Mor-
gan's son, Alfred M. Rubio, a Communist. Rubio lives in Chicago and is a tool
grinder. Mrs. Morgan said she had turned the home over to her son.
HUSBAND FIKED
Mrs. Morgan's husband, Richard C. Morgan, 154 E. Kelso Rd., was fired from
his position of curator of the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Museum
the next day. Museum officials said they didn't like the "damning publicity."
Mrs. Morgan complained that she is an innocent bystander in the Communist
activities led by Hashmall. She said she is not a Communist Party member.
She said she had closed her book shop at 38 E. Goodale St., because the business
was losing money.
"All this Communist publicity," she added, "has made people afraid to come
into the store.
"Just because I sold the house to my son, and a man they say is a Communist
lives in it now, my business is ruined and my husband loses his job.
"interracial unity
"My husband is an anthropologist. What we believe in is based on sound an-
thropological theory. We believe in interracial unity. We think everybody
should have a chance."
She said her husband never had received official notice of his dismissal at the
museum. Yet. officials there told reporters an official letter had been sent to Mr.
Morgan Wednesday.
Mrs. Morgan, then Mrs. Rubio, was known to be interested in Communist activi-
ties when she lived in Indianapolis, a source there revealed Saturday. She later
was divorced, and married Mr. Morgan.
"I have received threatening telephone calls," she said. "After the way they're
treating that girl (Mrs. Hashmall) on Fourth St., I don't know what will happen
next." She said she hadn't told police of her fears because she didn't think they
would give her protection.
HELPED strikers
Mrs. Morgan said she had tried to help Timken workers when they were on
strike.
"We tried to help them in every way we could."
She was asked whom she meant by "we."
"Why, the decent people in Columbus," she replied.
doesn't like it here
Her son, Alfred, the avowed Communist, expressed strong dislike for Columbus.
"From what my mother wrote me and what I learned the day I went down
(to accept the Hashmall house deed) I decided I didn't want to rear my two little
girls there," he said.
"The Communist Party," he went on, "is fighting for the best traditions of
America. It is slanderous to say we are members of any foreign jwwer. Any
member would quit if that were so."
He explained that a person trying to join the Communist Party must have two
character references from party members.
is excitable
Mrs. Morgan, an attractive middle-aged woman of olive complexion, becomes
excited in her conversation. She rarely directly answers a reporter's question,
but counters with one of her own.
Her white Good:ile St. book shop is the most prominent structure in the area.
The public part of the shop is backed up by several rooms used for routine store
purposes.
Mrs. Morgan denied the store was a meeting place of Communists. She said
she doesn't know where party members meet.
HITS TRUMAN PROGRAM
She stated political beliefs, several of which followed Communist Party lines.
Among these was her dislike of President Truman's belligerent actions toward
Russian aggression, Universal Military Training, and the draft.
5678 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
She said she doesn't handle the Communist paper, "Daily Worker," and added
that she had been criticized by some patrons because she carried literature of
interest to Negroes.
Mrs. IMorgan said her son. Alfred, and a second son, Carlos, are veterans of
World War II. She said neither she nor Mr. Morgan plans to leave Columbus.
Statement of Belief by Anna H. Morgan
On SuDday afternoon on returning home I found a subpoena dated March
25 stuck under the kitchen door. It was signed by one Gordon Renner, chair-
man of the Ohio Un-American Committee. On Monday evening again there was
introduced a subpoena, this one dated March 24, signed by the same person but
not bearing the stamp of the sheriff's office nor spelling my name correctly. This
highly irregular service and slaphappy juggling of subpoena's (usually con-
sidered a serious and important document) is typical of the tactics of this
unconstitutional committee which breaks laws to suit themselves and harasses,
intimidates and smears citizens who dare protest corrupt political practices and
the drive towards fascism. This committee was paid to investigate so-called
Un-American and subversive activities but in all these months is has failed to
state what it considers Un-American or subversive. This bipartisan witch-hunt-
ing committee feeds anti-red propaganda to the press without admitting that the
Communist Party has never even been outlawed in the U. S. A. This committee
persecutes all those who seek to establish a third party with a peace progi-am in
the 1952 elections. Its so-called "friendly" witnesses are the worse characters
dragged from the labor movement ; one witness was convicted of attempted rape ;
another mismanaged union funds ; another urged youths to join an organiza-
tion that he represented, then he sold out to the FBI and betrayed his young
friends who followed him. Some FBI witnesses concentrate their attacks on
peace workers, thereby seeking to boost the government's horrible war plans.
Paid informers feed there lies to committees as long as committees feed money to
them. Decent Americans traditionally reject all informers.
Who am I, you may ask. I am just an average American housewife. Daugh-
ter of a deacon I early was baptized in a Congregational Church. I accept its
teachings of the brotherhood of man for every day in the year, not just for
Sunday. I now present my sincere beliefs and let this committee and all
interested citizens who pay this committee judge me.
I believe in the complete economic and social equality of all races and I ask
this committee how come Ohio has never enacted FEPC legislation to guarantee
those rights to its minority citizens? I feel that the American pattern of
lynching Negroes, of murder and genocide in general is bringing down the hatred
of the world upon us. I believe in freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. I demand that traditional American soap-box right to say what I
think and let the man in the street decide for himself if I am a sage or a crack-
pot. I believe in clean newspaper reporting and I denounce those who use
dirty journalism to build hate between nations with lies and half truths. Since
the working man gives his strength, bis life, his blood and his sweat to build up
the big business machine I believe in his right to organize unions to protect
himself from those who exploit him. I protest 76 percent of our national
income being spent on war preparations while millions of our citizens lack
decent housing, jobs, medical care, clothing, nourishment, education and our
old age pensioners starve. I protest American planes dropping napalin bombs
on Korean villages, making human torches of the living bodies of w^omen,
children and old men. I, who recall with horror the World War II pictures of
naked bodies stacked like corded wood in the German concentration camps, I
protest Atty. Gen. McGrath's boast that he is rushing to completion American
concentration camps. Gen. Grow of the U. S. Army in his recently exposed
diary boasts "we need not play fair * * * hit beiow the ))elt if necessary."
I protest that this policy of hitting below the belt has passed unjust judgment
on these young Jewish parents, the Rosenbergs, who are now kept in solitary
confinement of death cells on framed-up charges which have never been proved.
I protest a cowardly Supreme Court riding on the political coat-tails of a co--
rupt administration instead of defending the Constitution of the United States
and the Bill of Rights against the Smith, McCarran, Taft-Hartley Acts and all
other i)ro-fascist legislation. I protest certain veterans organizations liounding
simple citizens while they condone films like DESERT FOX, glorifying the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5679
Nazi general Rommel. These veterans have already forgotten our heroes who
died to defeat fascism. As the mother of veterans I hate war — I know the
anxiety of long nights while sons serve in foi'eign lands.
I believe that peace can be achieved only through negotiation. It is futile
for Americans to believe we can conquer the entire world just because we sit
on the large.st heap of atom bombs. As poisoned gas was outlawed after World
War I, so should the atom bomb and cowardly bacteriological warfare be out-
lawed now.
I believe we cannot export freedom if we do not possess it. All the world
watches cynically as Truman boasts of American freedom while his courts
throw progressive leaders into jails as political prisoners on the framed-up testi-
mony of discredited informers.
I challenge this committee to examine those who are dishonest in politics ;
to examine those who discriminate against and hurt minority groups ; to examine
those heads of educational institutions who stifle freedom of speech on the
campus. I call upon Gov. Lausche to witness the tactics of this committee which
sneaks about to the homes, offices of factories and institutions, calling on their
victims for questioning while endangering those victims' reputations and liveli-
hoods. I charge that this bi-partisan committee operates in an un-American
and subversive manner in order to silence the independent voters during the
1952 election campaign.
Because this committee conducts its hearings like an inquisition, with no
rules of evidence, its victims are denied the rights which they would have in
a duly constituted court. Therefore I must claim the protection of the 5th
amendment of the Constitution of the United States and remain silent before
this committee.
(Signed) Anna H. Morgan.
Anna H. Morgan.
April 1, 1952.
Room 8, House of Representatives.
State House, Columbus, Ohio.
5800 Cleveland Ave.,
Worthington No. 1, Ohio, April 2, 1952.
Mr. Gordon Renner,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Committee,
State House, Columbus, Ohio.
Dear Sir: Yesterday when you had me on the stand before your committee
your man Issacs badgered me because I would not give my address. Last
evening's edition of the Green Stripe, Ohio State Journal, dated Wednesday
morning, April 2. stated that I refused to give you my address, then it continued :
"Mrs. Morgan, whose address, according to the commission records, is 5800 Cleve-
land Ave. * * *" After this came out we have received repeated calls threat-
ening our lives and our property and warning us to get off Cleveland Ave. E'ur-
thermore, you allowed the press to take my photograph- while in the hearing room
which further identified me for attack. I thought I went before an investigating
committee for questioning, not before a court charged with some crime. I would
like to point out that when your "friendly" witness was on the stand and refused
to give his address you did not release it to the press but you protected it.
Apparently it is within the power of your committee to withold from the press
information that may hurt people and it is also in the power of your committee
to feed to the press information that you know from long experience in Ohio
will open your victims to violent attack. I went before you with the pride of a
clear conscience — I have broken no laws. I have all my life stood for what was
just and honest, but your committee, being what it is, has given me the publicity
of a criminal. I now find it necessary to have my phone disconnected in order
to gain a little rest. I send you this letter to inform you that if any harm comes
to me, my family, or my property as a result of your inspired publicity I shall
hold you responsible.
Yours truly,
[S] Anna H. Morgan.
5680 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5800 Cleveland Ave.,
Worthington 1, Ohio, April 11, 1952.
Mr. G. Renner,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Commission,
State House No. 8, Columhiis, Ohio.
Dear Sir : Last week following your performance on March 31 and April 1,
I wrote to Inform you that as a result of the publicity you fed the press we
received so many threats and harassing phone calls it was necessary to order
our phone disconnected.
This week on April 9 as a further result of your undesirable publicity with
the publication of addresses the National Union Fire Insurance Company
notified me that it was lifting within five (5) days all insurance protection from
my property which it has covered for years. I report this to you as proof of the
result of your dirty work. Your committee is supposed to be a fact-finding
committee but from the beginning it has operated as a bragging smear com-
mittee seeking headlines for political ends. You seem to think that you can
ride to popularity (like the dixiecrat politicians who specialize in lynching)
by availing yourself of the present red hysteria created by a corrupt bipartisan
policy and aided and abetted by equally corrupt local newspapers. While the
citizens of our state expected your committee to conduct yourselves like mature
representatives of the voters you instead throw yourselves about and swagger
around with the irresponsibility of school-yard bullies until regardless of one's
party affiliation no decent citizen in the state respects you and cheap comedians
constantly .joke about you.
Your man Issacs badgered me to tell my address in an open hearing in a city
which has become known all over the world (French papers reported this) for
smashing the home and attempting to kill the family of persons with whom
local Republicans happen to disagree. Your man Issacs sought to tell where I
was employed when my own husband lost his state job through the Johnson-
Hatcher frame-up and the corrupt Ohio Supreme Court shocked decent lawyers
across the country by refusing to review the case, claiming he was not state
employed (even though he had for 12 years been paid by state checks and had
for 12 years had his salary deducted for the state retirement fund) and even
though the greatest part of the money financing the Museum is appropriated by
the state. Your man Issacs raised the question of my citizenship when any one
of his paid stooges, either Worster or Prebbles using the skill of a half-wit could
have (and no doubt did know) that I was born in Providence, R. I., and further-
more it is not yet subversive to be born — or have you already decreed that it is?
While you had your victim trapped at the hearing, denying us even the right
of representation by attorney which is allowed common criminals in any cheap
little politically controlled police court (and we were not cliar'red w'th any
crime even by the FBI) we who were under threat of heavy fines, jail sentences,
etc., not for crimes committed but for perchance slipping into your technical
"contempt" trap, we sat and saw you permit one of your committeemen ask us
what day of the week it was (it being April fool's day) and when both ]\Ir.
Terrell and myself scorning this cheap humor at a hearing that was supposed to
be a State Commission hearing, when we scorned to reply you as chairman did not
have the decency to cut out such wise cracks and your committee laughed as if
it were, oh, so funny. I have seen such "hearings" in Nazi movies but I never
expected to have to stomach it even from your Ohio Gang.
Since your publicity has so affected certain unstable minds of the public to
the point that a hysterical insurance agent removes insurance protection what
guarantee have we that such unstable persons will not take one more step and
stoop to arson? Since only that agent and you know of the lifting of this insur-
ance I c<msider you responsible for any destruction that my property may suffer
until such time that I may find an honest and courageous American who will
insure it for me again.
Knowing you and your committee and under.standing the mind of the sadist
at work (your investigators behind closed doors threatened the livelihood of
several persons they visited, knowing such persons had no one to whom they
could appeal for justice or mercy) knowing your method of work I do not expect
any reply from you except the same coarse laughter I heard when I sat before y ju
and heard your man ask what day it was.
I am a housewife. I have a simple understanding of and a belief in the Con-
stitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights but when you injected into
the questioning by Isaacs your own question asking me if I knew wliat the 5th
amendment said I smelled the rat that you were nosing out — that legal techni-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5681
cality of "contempt." But I knew that we had reached a period in the history of
Ohio if not in the nation when justice had broken down completely and judges
are so corrupt. Your man Issacs asked did I not get arrested for illegally walk-
ing the picket line at the AZO strike. You were so corrupt you let that question
go into the record but the record of our trial showed that the injunction against
picketing was to have been signed at 9 AM but the bosses and the press got the
corrupt Judge Reynolds out of bed very early to sign it so we could be trapped
on the line. This is Ohio history in the making.
These hearings are your sounding board. With your questions so stacked you
are able to inject anything you wish into the record and the press comes to you
and sucks It up like pigeons milk. Only an aroused movement of the voters can
clean up the condition which now exists. Atty. Gen. McGrath whose office prose-
cuted so many and tilled our jails with political prisonei-s like the prisons of Hitler,
Franco, and Mussolini, that high officer of justice proved to be the number one
grafter of the nation. One would laugh cynically if so many good citizens were
not in jail while he enjoys his ill-got millions. And this pattern extends all down
the line from McGrath to you and your committee checking the "loyalty" of your
fellow citizens. Loyalty to what? Truman? Dulles? McGrath? Costello?
Morris? Or your man Issacs?
Very truly,
[s] Anna H. Morgan.
5800 Clevbxand Ave.,
Worthivgton 1, Ohio, April IS, 1952.
Mr. G. Eennee,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Commission,
Columhus, Ohio.
Dear Sir: It is now brought to our attention that several persons who have
been "investigated" by your committee have lost their jobs or been forced by
bosses to resign, on the spot, the threat being that if they did not resign they
would receive more undesirable publicity. This has led to several persons al-
ready moving rtut of the state. Wbate\er your committee touches it seems to
contaminate with something fearful, repulsive, and un-American which panics
the inexperienced and the weak.
I myself was dismissed this past week by my survey supervisor who stated
that wliile he sympathized with my defense of the people's rights and while he
recognized that your hearing was nothing more than a kangaroo court never-
theless since big advertising companies sent my checks through his hands it was
necessary for him to disassociate himself from me until a more democratic
government came to Ohio, perhaps in the fall of 1952. This dismissal I expected
after your tactics of allowing photographers in the hearing room with your
victims on the stand. (But the press did not publish photographs of your Co-
lumbus man DeLong nor did they emphasize his address.)
Because of the photographs which you allowed another member of my family .
has suffered extreme nervous strain when fellow associates circulating the
pictures in tbe building where they reside impressed upon others that this per-
son's relative was some sort of criminal. (In the United States a man was con-
sidered innocent until proved guilty of some crime but not in Ohio where you
smear and slander first, then try to trap your victim through some technicality of
the law into some sort of guilt with heavy punishment.) I recall that you in-
sinuated you could "embarrass" me if I refused to answer your man Issacs. You
were already trying to "embarrass" me but I have a clear conscience and know
I have never broken a law outside of a U turn in a public highway — which I
believe is a cleaner record than any of the politicians serving on tbe crucifixion
committee.
Perhaps the most pathetic case of all those who lost their livelihood because
of your legal blackmail was that of Mr. Robert Terrill. Do you recall how your
man Issacs pompously referred to Mr. Terrill's "employment at University Hos-
pital" and then read, not a copy of the loyalty oath of the university but read
the oath from the very card that Mr. Terrill had signed thus proving to ISIr.
Terrill and the world at large that Mr. Terrill's bosses had been contacted and
through the insinuation and innuendo Issacs, doubt was cast upon Sir. TerrMTs
loyalty and forces were already at work on Mr. Terrill's dismissal or compulsion
to resign. (As a matter of fact there seemed to be nothing in the oath as read
that Mr. Terrill could have violated and Issacs failed to show any subversive
or disloyal conduct or to charge Mr. Terrill with any such act.)
5682
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
And so because of sharp snooping of Issaes the aged and half-starved dish-
washer at Ohio State University was told to resign? Now Ohio I suppose has
cleaner dishes, if not cleaner politics under Chairman Renner? The cruel part is
that in playing your political game Mr. Terrill's poor bed-ridden wife is the real
victim. Mr. Terrill's income has been so limited that there have been many days
when he had to decide whether to buy medicine for his wife or food. I recall
your man Issaes, a tall, heavy-flushed man, red hair, red face, well-fed, hound-
ing a poor aged Negro dishwasher whom Issaes sought to prove had some doubts
that the capitalist system was the best in the world and maybe wanted to find
out. You got $50,000 to persecute such citizens — Mr. Jackson was already un-
employed but it seemed to worry one Bartunek about the source of Mr. Jackson's
livelihood.
I do not know how much of the taxpayer's money you paid to your friend
DeLong to finger Terrill with his vague memoirs but to any honest and decent
citizen it seems that if you base your work on the testimony of such already dis-
credited characters we can accurately judge you and Issaes and the rest of your
un-American Ohio Gang. For it stands to reason that a man who will make such
statements in an effort to betray those who he himself claims were his former
associates and those who he admitted gave him a job and a home for his wife
and children (not to mention loans for medicine, furniture, his wife's false
teeth, etc.) such a character who sells himself to you for I don't know how many
pieces of silver will have no integrity even under oath on the witness stand
and for more silver will name as many names as desired from any lists Issaes
may feed him. Don't forget that Mrs. Roosevelt and Shirley Temple have also
been suspected by the witch hunters but they had money and were not "investi-
gated" like a poor dishwasher.
We are now reliably informed that of some 60 Columbus attorneys listed in
the telephone book not one can be found who will go into your hearing room or
into a Columbus court with a victim marked by you for crucifixion. Did you
have to buy off these attorneys with your taxpayers' appropriation or was it
your legalized blackmail that frightened them?
Mr. Renner — I have lived and traveled in fascist countries and I know fascism
when I see it. This is fascism. You as chairman of this committee which
functions as it does have accepted the role of chief fascist in Ohio and you and
your machinations must be exposed to all voters, especially to those in decent
organizations which can move against you.
As the Bible says, ''As ye sow, so shall ye reap." You are riding high today
on the crest of fascist hysteria sweeping the U. S. A. under the protection of
McGrath's order to rush to completion his four concentration camps but I warn
you that the American people will not stomach it for long and those fascist
friends who support you now will flee like the rats they are when the tide
turns.
Very truly,
[s] Anna H. Morgan
Anna H. Morgan.
xoura truly.
d^v%^aJ i^'
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
5683
Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter dated June 10, 1952, transmitted to us
by William L. Holland \Yliicli he requests be inserted into the record.
Senator Watkixs. It may be received.
(The letter referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 1415" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 1415
American Institute Of Pacific Relations, Inc.
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. T.
Eldorado 5-1759
June 10, 1952.
Mr. Robeut Mokris,
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morris : In connection with Professor David N. Rowe's testimony
before the Subcommittee on Internal Security, I wish to point out that Pro-
fessor Rowe on a number of points made inaccurate or misleading statements.
Some of these have already been corrected by Miss Farley in her testimony.
In addition, however, Professor Rowe submitted a statistical analysis of some
IPR publications by his colleague Professor Richard Walker, and I understand
that the Subcommittee accepted this for inclusion in the record. These statistics
were subsequently published in the Neic Leader of March 31, 1952, in an article
by Professor Walker entitled, "Lattimore and the IPR," to which I have written
a reply to Professor Walker. In the course of my reply I pointed out the inade-
quacy of his statistical analysis. Since the Subcommittee accepted Walker's
statistics at second hand from Professor Rowe, it seems to me only fair that
you should insert my own comments on these statistics into the printel record.
I therefore enclose a copy of the relevant portions of my statement and request
that you put it into the record.
In order to correct a number of other misleading impressions which Pro-
fessor Rowe gave in his testimony, I am enclosing herewith copies of cor-
respondence from the IPR files which in my opinion will help to give a more
accurate picture of some of the incidents he mentioned. I request that you
insert these documents into the record also. Please return the originals to us
in the near future after you have made copies of them for your files.
Sincerely yours,
William L. Holland,
Executive Vice Chairman.
Mr. Walker's Statistical Analysis
Mr. Walker's basis for selecting his so-called "anti-Communist" writers is
quite unreliable. He uses my list (which I clearly described as only a partial
5684
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
list) from my October 10 statement, whereas he could easily have ascertained
that the IPR published contributions from scores of anti-Communist writers
besides those whom I happened to mention in my list of 47. Following is a sup-
plementary list (still incomplete) of other IPR writers whom I know to have
been anti-Communist when they wrote for the IPR (and I am not aware that
any of them later become pro-Communist). In addition, one could of course
easily present an even longer list of reputable writers who may not have been
knoivn as "anti-Communist" but were certainly nou-Gommuuist and in most
cases anti-Communist.
ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST IPB WRITERS
A. Vandenbosch
C. Hartley Grattan
K. P. Landon
J. W. Masland
Galen Fisher
Percy E. Corbett
C. Walter Young
William C. Johnstone
E. F. Penro.se
K. Pelzer
F. Tamagna
Philip Wright
Quincv Wright
Charles Wolf, Jr.
Jerome Cohen
J. M. Maki
William Ballis
(1) American
Franz Michael
M. S. Bates
Dcnald Nugent
H. S. Quigley
Andrew Lind
R. L. Pendleton
H. Foster Bain
F. M. Keesing
Tyler Dennett
Julius Edelstein
Joseph R. Hayden
K. S. Latourette
John E. Orchard
Stephen W. Reed
John R. Stewart
Joseph S. Davis
Harold M. Vinacke
(2) Non-American
E. M. Gull
F. L. Ho
H. D. Fong
C. H. Lowe
H. K. Lee
K. Takayanagi
N. MacKenzie
H. Angus
P. Gourou
C. Robequain
D. Lew
W. M. Borrie
D. Copland
W. J. Cator
Sir Paul Butler
E. Deniiery
W. D. Forsyth
T. P. Fry
C. Y. Wu
O. M. Greene
A. A. Schiller
Charles N. Spinks
James H. Shoemaker
.7. R. Andrus
Warren S. Hunsberger
R. E. Dupuy
J. E. Spencer
C. Yanaga
N. Pelcovits
K. Kuriliara
Glenn T. Trewartha
Carl L. Alsberg
Grover Clark
Arthur L. Dean
Royal Chapman
Theodore J. Kreps
Arthur D. Gayer
F. C. Jones
Sir Charles Collins
A. R. M. Lower
F. W. Soward
Edgar M Jnnis
Victor Purcell
Eleancr Hinder
Lord Hailey
T. Uyeda
T. E. Gregory
Li Choh-ming
Gaston Rueff
Toshi Go
Sir James Allen
A. D. A. de Kat Angelino
J. L. Christian
G. H. C. Hart
H. Visman
J. H. Beke
M. Royama
Turning now to Mr. Walker's list of 40 so-called "pro-Communist" IPR writers,
we find that it is compiled from the McCarran Subcommittee's misleading list of
37 "IPR Personnel" plus Mr. Walker's additions of Kate Mitchell, Philip JafEe,
and Nym Wales. It should be noted first that many on the list of 37 were never,
in any meaningful sense, IPR "personnel" (e. g. Solomon Adler, Lawrence
Duggan, Alger Hiss, Hotsumi Ozaki, .A'i'dred Price, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise
Strong, Andrew Steiger, and Harry White). Many of them never wrote at all
for the IPR (e. g. Adler, Currie, De Caux, Duggan, Hiss, Price, Smedley, Vincent,
and White) ; and in fairness to Mr. Walker, I must note that he did not cla.m
that these people did write.
Second, this was a list of people only nUcfied to be Communist or pro-Commu-
nist. There is no proof that many of them were or are. Indeed, many have
given sworn testimony denying that they are or ever were Communists (e. g..
W. J. Hinton
'. L. Hsia
K. Kanai
G. W. Keeton
G. Lacam
H. Lauterpacht
J. Th. Moll
I. Nitobe
G. R. Parkin
Sir Harold Parlett
P. D. Philipps
G. L. Wood
I. Clunies Ross
G. W. Swire
K. Yokota
P. H. W. Sitsen
Sir William Barton
P. T. Bauer
Sir J. Crosby
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5685
T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimnre, Kate Mitchell, Maxwell Stewart, Benjamin Kizer,
Joseph Barnes, John Fairbanks, and John Carter Vincent). Jaffe, whose nasno
is added by Mr. Walker, does not belong on the list at all, as he wrote for
the I PR.
But let us consider the much more important question of v::hat these alleged
"pro-Communists" actually wrote for the IPR. Here we cannot check exactly
with Mr. Walker because he does not specify the titles which he included in his
statistics. But in the arbitrary period, 1934-1917, which he selected, he must have
included, for instance, some or all of the following studies:
Bisson : American Policy in the Far East
Mitchell: Industrialization of the Western Pacific
Norman : Japan's Emergence as a Modern State
Not everyone will agree with the views expressed in these publications, but
they are very competent studies which certainly cannot be considered as pro-
Communist. (Here again, in fairness to Mr. Walker, let me note that he did
not say these publications were pro-Communist. He avoided listing the titles,
probably because that would have exposed the misleading nature of his statistics).
In the same way, most of the articles written for Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern
Survey by the alleged "pro-Communist" writers turn out, on examination, to leveal
little or no trace of "pro-Communist bias, partly because they were often purely
factual and descriptive in character.
A much graver omission in Mr. Walker's table is his exclusion of a large
number of the regular IPR research volumes, conference papers, and booklets
for high schools. Why he omitted them is hard to imagine for they comprise a
major part of the IPR output, but it certainly makes his statistics very ques-
tionable. For instance, he has omitted such important studies by "anti-Commu-
nists" as the following:
Taylor : America and the New Pacific
Mills: British Rule in Eastern Asia
Lieu: Industrialization of Shanghai
Buck: Land Utilization in China
Nasu : Aspects of Japanese Agriculture
Levy : French Policies in the Far East
Christian : Modern Burma
Chamberlin: Modern Japan
BoeUe : Structure of Netheilands Ind'an Economy
Johnstone: The U. S. and Japan's New Order
Robequain : Enonomic Development of French Indochina
Keesing : The South Seas in the Modern World
Gull: British Economic Interests in the Far East
Lee : Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea
Wright : Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific
Royama : Foreign Policy of Japan
Pelzer : Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics
Grattan : Lands Down Under
Jones : Shanghai and Tientsin
Lin Yu-tang: Press and Public Opinion in China
Nitobe : Lectures on Japan
Shepherd : Industry in Southeast Asia
Porter : Crisis in the Philippines
Belshaw : Agricultural Organization in New Zealand
Wadham and Wood: Land Utilization in Australia
Thompson : Thailand, the New Siam
Uyeda : Small Industries in Japan
Besides the above, Mr. Walker has also omitted numerous other major research
volumes and conference papers by writers who are certainly non-Communist,
even if they may not be well known as anti-Communists. It is hardly necessary
to present a list here. Examples can readily be found from a glance at the
back catalogues of the IPR or its volumes of conference proceedings.
Now g'ance, however, at some of the studies by alleged "pro-Communist"
writers, which Mr. Walker has also omitted from his list. Here are a few:
Lang: Chinese Family and Society
Field : Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area
Lattimore : Inner Asian Frontiers of China
Chi : Key Economic Areas in Chinese History
Here again, opinions may differ as to the importance of these studies, but it
would be quite ridiculous to consider these valuable studies as pro-Communist.
W. L. Holland.
56S6 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The following paragraph, referring to Professor Walker's statistical analysis,
was contained in my letter to the Tslew Leader of April 5, 1952, and published by
the AV/r Leader on April 21, 1952 :
"Professor Wall^er's statistics are highly misleading. For reasons of his
own he takes an arbitrary period of 1934-1947 instead of the full period, 1925-
1952, of the Institute's history. Even in that shorter period he considers only
a portion of the total IPR publication, omitting the very important regular
research volumes, the numerous conference papers and the pamphlets prepared
for high-school use. Worse still, he makes his comparison on the basis of (a)
my random and partial list of 47 IPR writers well known for their opposition
to communism and (h) 40 persons who have been alleged (not proved) to be
Communist sjTnpathizers, in the hearings. The absurdity of this procedure is
obvious. There are of course many other IPR writers besides those named in
my list who are strongly opposed to conununism. By excluding them. Professor
Walker quietly omits a very large proportion of all IPR authors. On the other
hand, by accepting mere allegations as his criterion of 'pro-Communists' he
includes in his list of 'pro-Communist' publications a number of scholarly, objec-
tive and widely acclaimed studies which have no trace of pro-Communist bias."
W. L. Holland.
WrLLiAM L. Holland,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations.
Decembeb 26, 1946.
Professor David M. Rowb,
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Deae Dave : To my great distress I find that I shall not be able to return from
China in time to attend the Princeton Conference. I had counted on going out
to China by ship and coming back quickly by plane, as our budget won't permit
of plane travel both ways. I have now had to postpone my departure until
around January 17 in order to await Corbett's return, and will probably fly
out by an UNRRA plane. I had hoped that there might still be a chance of my
getting a ship back in time to attend the Princeton meeting, but it now seems quite
clear that I won't be able to reach California until about April 7, and I will then
have to attend the IPR National Conference in Southern California on April 9.
Under the circumstances, I must ask you to find someone else to take my place
at the Princeton session. This is a real disappointment to me as I had been
looking forward to this meeting. I would have told you about this the other
day, but at that time there was still a chance that I might be able to get back
here in time. In fact there is still a very faint possibility, but not enough to
count on. If by any chance you can persuade the Army or Navy people to in-
clude me among the distinguished visitors that you are bringing over from China
about the end of March, and if I would not need to pay more than the $350 boat
fare, I could probably make it, but I don't honestly believe you would be justified
in spending money on me when you might use it for Chinese or other foreign
guests. However if you think of any other angles that might be worked, please
let me know.
I enclose a copy of my letter to Fei Hsiao-tung. He had written me that he
was at last accepting your invitation on condition that Tsing Hua would give
him three weeks absence and the government would allow him to go. He seemed
doubtful whether permission would be granted and I wondered therefore
whether you and Fairbank could enter into a conspiracy with me to get him over
here for several months. Let's talk it over on Saturday.
Sincer. yours.
William L. Holland,
Secretary-General.
Yale University,
Foreign Area Studies,
New Haven, Connecticut, December 30, 1946-
Mr. William L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 5Jtih Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Dear Bill : I was very sorry indeed to hear that there is a strong possibility
that you will not be able to get back from China in time for the Princeton con-
ference, April 1, 2 and 3.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5687
I am very reluctant to substitute anyone else for you in tliat meeting. I do
not need to say bow important I feel it would be tbat you sbould be there for
these sessions. I have taken the responsibility of referring your letter to the
Princeton Bicentennial, with the request that if it is at all possible they should
secure your passage back to this country by Naval Air Transport with our
other delegates from China to the Princeton conference. I do not know whether
they can expand the number for whom they have requested these accomodations
from the Navy Department. If there is any chance of our getting you back in
this way in time for the conference, I am sure the Bicentennial authorities will
do everything in their power to make use of it.
I do not know whether we can get a ruling from the Navy Department before
you must leave this country for China in January. I wonder, therefore, if you
can provide me with a very reliable address at which we could be sure to reach
you in China by cable later on. This v/ould make it possible for us to notify you
in case we secure Naval Air Transport facilities for bringing you back to this
country and to provide you with all necessary instructions in this connection.
If we succeed in working this out with the Navy Department, I should be of
the opinion that it would not cost the IPR anything. I do not believe there is
any way in which we can pay the Navy Department for this service, but I should
say that I don't know the facts on this point. I have sent to the Bicentennial
authorities a copy of your letter to Fei Hsiao-tung. Naturally, I should be glad
to see him remain in this country for a longer time than required by the Prince-
ton meetings.
If any subsequent angles on the matter of your travel schedule develop, please
Inform me as soon as possible.
Sincerely yours.
[s] Rowe
David N. Rowe,
Director of Far Eastern Studies.
dr/bm.
September 17, 1949.
Dr. David N. Rowe,
Foreign Area Studies, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.
Dear Dave: I have your letter of September 14 enclosing the comments on
Grad's manuscript on Japanese Agriculture. Naturally, I attach considerable
weight to the views of su^'h a qualified group of scholars. Your letter raises
some difiicult problems, however, because within the last few weeks I have re-
ceived enthusiastic reports about the manuscript from other well-qualified per-
sons in the State Department and other Washington agencies. There have, of
course, been criticisms on specific points, some of which I had previously made
myself. In the meantime. Grad, with the assistance of T. A. Bisson, has been
making a very thorough revision of the manuscript and has recently written me
that he expects to work for another two or three months on further revision and
reorganization of the manuscript. For this reason, I am a little disturbed at
your implied remark that Grad is unlikely to be willing or able to make the
necessary revisions, and I therefore wonder if there are not some other factors
in the whole matter. If so, I do hope you will let me know in all frankness. I
will treat your remarks as strictly confidential.
While I am, of course, grateful to you for having taken the time and the trou-
ble to obtain these detaik'd criticisms from your colleagues, I want to assure
you, in case there has been any misunderstanding, that I have never expected
the Yale Foreign Area Studies Division to take any responsibility for Grad's
study on Japanese agriculture. It is his other Japanese Urban Community study
for which I had requested the professional assistance and guidance of Embree
and any other interested faculty people at Yale.
I would like to discuss this whole matter further with you after I return from
a visit to Toronto next week. In the meantime, if there is any more "low down,"
please let me have it.
With all good wishes.
Yours,
William L. Holland,
Secretary General.
06S8 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Yale University,
FoRKiGN Area Studies,
New Haven, Connecticut, September 20, 1949.
Mr. William Holland,
Institute of Pacific Nelotions,
1 East 5J,th Street, Nein York 22, New York.
Dear Bill : Thank you for your letter of the 17th. In reply to it I would like
to say that the work we have done on the Grad manuscript on Japanese aixri-
culture has been without knowledge of the "very thorougli revision of the manu-
script" which you report that he is makinu: with the help of T. A. IMsson.
I do not know exactly how to interpret the last three sentences in your lirst
parai-'raph. I have shown, or read your letter over the phone, to Embree, Kaplan,
Pelzer, and Yanaga. and have had it sug2:ested to me that perhaps what you mean
by "other factors in the wliole matter" may be a possible lack of thoroughly
friendly relations and working arrangements between Grad and those of us that
have been concerned with his work here. If so, I assure you most sincerely
that all of us are and have been on the best of terms with Grad. There is, as far
as I know, absolutely no friction with him. This, I believe, is all I can con-
tribute on the matter of further "low down" as you put it. The letter to you,
and the memo to Grad of which a copy was sent you, were both w(n-ked out
careluUy by me in consultation with each of the persons named above, and at
times in conference of as many as three of us at one time. These documents
represent, I regret to sa.v, our delibei-ately reasoned evaluations of the present
work under consideration.
N:itura!ly, you are at liberty to do what you will with our comments. In this
connection, however, I do believe that the matter of our relation to his project
on Japanese Agriculure is not as simple as indicated in your next to last para-
graph. It is clear that the Rockefeller grant, your sponsorship, and our ai point-
ment of Grad as Visiting Fellow in Far Eastern Studies in the Graduate School
for 194S— 19. were all based upon his project for the Fukaya study. In regard to
it he stated in his memo to the Foundation with your letter to Roger Evans of
March 22, 1948, that "My work on the project will be supervised by Professor
D. N. R:)we and John Embree of Yale University." (See also mv letter to you
of March 13, 1948.)
On the other hand, it seems that Grad has given most, if not all [pencilled note:
(Not true)] of his time to the Agriculture study during the term of his appoint-
ment as Visiting Fellow. As he finished the chapters of this book, he gave them
one by one to Embree, whose comments on were made at the time and have been
generally summarized in the memorandum from myself to Grad. Grad also sub-
mitted the entire draft to me on completion. I suppose both Embree and myself
could have fallen back on the fact that we were only responsible for the Fukaya
study, in which case we should certainly have spared ourselves and the other three
of our faculty much work. This, however, could well have seemed rather unco-
operative. In addition, since Grad icas Visiting Fellow here in Far Eastern
Studies, I believe our responsibility runs at least as far as doing what we could to
improve the work, even if only in order to protect ourselves and our organization.
Now, I believe, that latter objective has been secured, and as to the former, the
statement in my letter about its likelihood still represents I believe, the opinion
of all of us. This does not mean that we will not make every effort to continue to
help him. that is, if he wishes us to. We are all most friendly to Grad. Please
keep in mind that I certainly, and I believe this applies to Embree also, did not
ask to see Grad's materials on Agriculture. He submitteed them to us on his own
initiative. What would you have done if you had been in our position?
Now Grad is sidimitting to both of us the chapters, one by one, of his Fukaya
study. Embree states and I agree, that we must now get Grad to submit to us a
rather complete plan, so as to try to avoid much of the poor organization of
material and duplication of treatment that characterized the work on Agricul-
ture. Of course, we were hardly in a position to get this done at the beginning
of the Agricultui-e project. Embree also has decided ideas about substantive
revision of the first (and only submitted) section of the Fukaya work.
Incidentally, I find that we, as usual in such cases, gave Cirad a one-year
Visiting Fellowship. Your letter confirms our connection with the Fukaya p 'ej-
ect, and I will take steps to have the fellowship relationship extended for the
academic year 1949-50, This should have been done before July 1, but the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5689
administrative affairs of Forei.cn Area Studies have been in a state of readjust-
ment recently. This is the only reason I can thinli of to explain this lapse.
Sincerely yours,
[s] David Rowe
David N. Rowe.
DNR :dl
Pencilled note : (ack 11/3/49 MFH).
Yale University,
FoRKiGN Akea Studies,
New Haven, Conn., November 1, 19Ji9.
Mr. William L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street. Nciv Ynrl; N. Y.
Dear Bill : I have referred your letter of Oct. 19 to Provost E.S. Fnrniss who
is now Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Area Studies, and he has author-
ized me to reply to it.
We note your statement regarding the new plan for the completion of the
study on Fukaya by Dr. Grad, connected with his acceptance of a position with
the United Nations S cretariat as a translator. I am glad to hear of this new
arrangement, under which support the Rockefeller Foundation will be con-
tinued to allow Dr. Grad to engage tiie help uf twn assistants.
Under these circumstances the arrangement for Dr. Grad to call upon the
services of members of the Columbia faculty to advise him from time to time
on his study, seems a logical one. On our part, since any reappointment of Dr.
Grad as Visitin'X Fellow at Yale had been deferred pending our discussion with
you of the projr>ct, we will not lind it necessary to take action of any kind
on the reappointment, but will allow the whole matter to lapse.
I note your hope that some members of our staff will be available to read
and criticise parts of the manuscript on an individual and informal basis.
Arrangements for this would of course be made hetween your organization and
the individuals of our faculty. These channels are always open to you at any
time.
With all assurances of our cooperation in future matters of our mutual
interest.
Sincerely yours,
[s] David N. Rowe
David N. Rowe.
Yale University,
FoREioN Area Studies,
New Haven, Connecticut, February 6, 1950.
Mr. Clayton Lane,
American Institute of Pacific Relations,
One East SJ/th Street, New York 22, New York.
Dear Mr. Lane : I wanted to write you in full approval of the point of view
stated by you in the executive committee meeting last January 11, regarding
editorial policy for the Far Eastern Survey. While I am in the fullest theoretical
agreement with the position expressed by Mr. Lockwood as summarized at the
bottom of Page four of the Minutes, I believe that fi'om a practical point of view
your position is the only tenable one.
I want to wiite you regarding a decision which I recently reached regarding my
membership in the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I have decided to
let this membership lapse and what I wanted to say is that I hope you will not
read into this action any reflection on the recent administiation of the IPR under
your secretaryship. I have simply reached a stage where I must reduce my
membership in organizations. I cannot affoi-d as many memberships as I now
support. Furthermore I cannot keep up with, not to mention pai-ticipate in,
the activities of so many organizations. I have recently decided that I will in
the future maintain membership only in the American Political Sci^'uce Asso-
ciation for professional reasons, and in the Far Eastern Association as an ex-
pression of my particular regional interest. It must be clear to you that I have
not been :ible to participate in the activities of the IPR, either as a Trustee or
88348— 52— pt. 14 50
5690 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
an ordinary member. I simply do not have the time or energy to keep up many
organizational affiliations in the way in which they should be maintained.
My purpose in making the above statement is merely to indicate that my
decision to let my membership in the IPR lapse is based upon nothing sub-
stantially more positive than the considerations mentioned above.
Sincerely yours,
[s] David N. Rowe
David N. Rowe,
Chairman, Executive Committee of Foreign Area Studies.
DNR : cs
Febrtjaey 27, 1950.
Professor David N. Rowe,
Chairman, Executive Committee of Foreing Area Studies,
Yale Vniversitu, New Haven, Conn.
Deae Professor Rowe : Thanks for your letter of February 6, expressing
agreement with my position on the Philippines article.
Your decision not to renew your membership in the American IPR is bad
news, particularly because having you as a Trustee assisted in a balance of
views on the Board. In any case, I shall always welcome any expression of your
views on American IPR matters you may wish to send me. Our close relations
with the Far Eastern Association will be conserved.
Sincerely yours,
Clayton Lane, Executive Secretary.
CL: ae
March 15, 1951.
Dr. David N. Rowe,
Graduate School, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.
Dear Dave : Because of your interest in the subject, I am sending you here-
with a manuscript on Security Problems in Southern and Eastern Asia, by V. P.
Dutt, of the Indian Council of World Affairs. I would greatly appreciate your
comments and detailed criticisms of this study, which seems to me a rather imma-
ture and diffuse job with relatively little analysis of actual security problems.
I propose to write the Secretary of the Indian Council that I regard this report
as quite imsuitable for publication as an IPR research report and that it is quite
unsatisfactory as a substitute for the study the Indian Council was expected to
do for us, namely, an analysis of security problems in India and the Indian
Ocean area. However, it occurs to me that with a good deal of rewriting the
Indian Council might find it possible to use Dutt's report as a more or less popular
pamphlet for publication and distribution in India. I would, therefore, like your
advice on this possibility, as well as your specific suggestions for revising the
manuscript.
I apologize for inflicting this job on you. My only hope is here and there in
the manuscript you may find a few points of interest, or at least some indication
of Indian attitudes on some of the problems under discussion.
How is your own study going? Have you a tentative outline or table of con-
tents which you could send me for my personal information?
All the best.
Yours,
William L. Holland,
Secretary General.
WLH : abs.
Yale University,
Foreign Area Studies,
New Haven, Conn., May 28, 1951.
Mr. William L. Holland,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.
Dear Bill: I return herewith the manuscript by Mr. V. P. Dutt which -^ou
sent me some time ago.
I have looked this manuscript over, but have not had a chance to scrutinize
it as carefully as I would have liked to. It seems to me to be worth publica-
tion, although, on the other hand, it is hardly what I consider a study of security
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5691
problems as I would define them. There is a lot of information in this publica-
tion. Providing the IPR understands what it is doing in publishing this manu-
script, I would see no objection to its being put out for information.
Please accept my apologies for the slowness of this reaction. I am completely
swamped these days with many concerns.
Sincerely yours,
[s] David Rowe.
I>A^^D N. Rowe,
Professor of Political Science.
DNR : me.
enc. 1.
Mr. Mandel. Next is a photostat made by the Library of Congress
at our request, of the Soviet personnel of the Disarmament Conference
in Geneva in 192'8.
It shows the name of Mr. Bogolepov. That is the reason for it.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1416" and is
as follows:)
Library of Congress,
Legislatr-e Reference S■ER^^CE,
June 10, 1952.
"Senate Internal Security,
S. 0. B. i24 C.
( Attn. : Miss "Walker. )
The attached information is forwarded in response to the inquiry from your
■oflSce noted below.
Respectfully,
W. C. Gilbert,
Acting Director, Legislative Reference Service.
Material re: Geneva Disarmament Conference: list of delegates.
Exhibit No. 1416
Societe des Nations,
C. P. D. 112,
Geneve, le 15 mars 1928.
Commission Peeparatoibe de la Conference du Desarmement
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference
LISTE des delegations A LA COMMISSION PREPARATOIRE
LIST of delegations TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
5EME. Session, Geneve, is mars i928
Allemagne : Adresses A Geneve
S. E. le Comte de Bernstorff, Ambassadeur en
disponibilite, Membre du Reichstag, Staren-
berg bei Munchen. H. des Bergues.
Le Baron E. de Weizsacher, Conseiller intime,
;Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Berlin. H. Metrople.
Contre-Amiral Baron von Freyberg-Eisenberg,
Reichstwehrministerium, Volkerbundstabteil-
ung, Heer, Berlin W. 10. Do.
Colonel F. von Boetticher, Reichswehrminister-
ium, Volkerbundsabteilung, Marine, Berlin W.
10. Do.
Colonel Stkeccius, Reichswehrministerium,
Volkerbundsabteilung, Heer, Berlin W. 10. Do.
5692
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
des Bergues.
Do.
Do.
des Famillies.
Argentine :
S. E. M. Perez, Ministre d'Argentine k Rome,
Piazza Esquilino, Rome. H.
M. Jose Maria Cantillo, Ministre de I'Argentine
a Berne, L6i;'ation de I'Argentine, Behne.
Capitaine de Vaisseau Julian Fablet, Legation
de I'Argentine, Piazza Esquilino, 2, Rome.
Colonel Fasola Castano. H.
Union des Republiciues Socialistes Sovietistes:
M. Maxime Lif vinoff, Membre du Comity central
executif U. R. S. S., Commissaire du peuple
adjoint aux Affaires Etrangeres, Narkomindiel,
Moscou. H. Bellevue.
M. Anatole Lounatcharsky, Membre du Comit6
central executif U. R. S. S., Commissaire du
peuple a rinstruction Publique — Narkomindiel,
Moscou. Do.
M. Simeon Pougatchef, Cbef-Adjoint h I'Etat-
Major g^n^ral, Narkomvoien, Moscou. Do.
M Ijoris Stein, Directeur du Departement au
Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires
Etrangeres, Narkomindiel, Moscou. Do.
M. Vs. Egoriew. Professeur k I'Academie Navale
de Leningrade. Do.
M. Vladimir Egoriew, Sous-Directeur au Com-
missariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Etran-
geres, 3, Troilzki 18 log. 3, Moscou X 4, Traj-
danskaia. Do.
M. Vladimir SocoLXNE-ScHAPTRn, Chef adjoint du
Protocole au Commissariat du Peuple pour les
Affaires Etrangeres, Narkomindiel, Moscou. Do.
M. I. Bogolaepoff. Attache au Commissariat du
Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangeres, Narkomin-
diel, Moscou. Do.
Mr. IVIoRRis. Mr. Mandel has some other letters that he would like
to enter in the record at this time.
INIr. INIandel. This is a letter from the Coordinator of Information,
dated March 17, 1942, to Mr. Holland, dealing with the relations be-
tween the Institute and the Office of the Coordinator of Information.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1417" and is as
follows:)
(Pencil note: W L H)
(Pencil note : ECC, should we include one of these in the letter to Willits?)
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C, March 17, 191(2.
Mr. W. L. Holland,
Research Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52n(l Street, Neiv York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Holland : The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator
of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has I'eceived from
the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge of its
research activities. The outstanding example is the receipt of a number of
manuscripts in advance of their publication liy the Institute. These inc ude the
translation of a work by Charles Robequain on the economic development of
French Indo-China, a manuscript by H. G. Callis on foreign investments in
Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one by Chao Ting-chi
on China.
This acknowledgement may be useful to you in any appeal you may make fo.'
support (luring the coming year. May I express the hope that your plans for the
year will include provision for further cooperation with this Section. The
immediate importance of this is emphasized by the fact that our own work has
become more closely integrated with that of the Army and Navy.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5693
We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of
Pacific Relations with contideme that such cooperation will nialie for effective-
ness in research and economy in the use of personnel.
Sincerely yours,
[s] C. F. Remer
C. F. Remer,
Chief, Far Eastern Section.
Mr. Mandel. This is a letter to "Dear Mary," dated September 12,
1946, si<^ned "Renee" who, according to our file is Renee Guthman,
which I would like to incorporate into the record.
Mr. Morris. Did you take this letter from the files of the Institute
of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Mandel. All the letters are from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations. Those two are from the files of the Institute of
Pacific Relations.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1418" and is as
follows:)
< Pencil note: file. Guthman filc-W -L^St We seem to have hit a gold mine)
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
New York — Washington, D. C. — Chicago — San Francisco — Honolulu
Washington Office, 1710 G Street, NW., Washington 6, D. C.
Telephone District 8665
Washington 6, D. C, September 12, 1946.
Dear Mary: No; I'll be in New Yorlj Monday and Tuesday. Only I find I
can't keep both Washington and New York on my mind at once -so I'm writing
letters about Washington just as though I were here full time.
My accomplishments for the afternoon for Pacco were securing twelve copies
of the Navy Insular Report to the United Nations, twelve copies of the Senate
hearings on the Philippine Trade Act, twelve copies of the House hearings on
the Philippine Trade Act and twelve copies of the House hearings of the resolu-
tion on Statehood for Hawaii. The latter three are being sent directly to
you, the first one is being sent here and I will send them on up to you. Am I
right In assuming that one copy of each is intended for the Amco library? I
haven't done anything about getting them one for I figured one of the twelve
would be for them.
I've gotten as far as locating the strategic Colonel from whom all copies of
the Strategic Bombing Survey seem to emanate. I'll get as many copies of
that as possible. I located a sergeant who said he could give me two copies
but for any more I had to talk to the Colonel. So if the Colonel says no I
tnow that I can at least get two copies.
What else may I do for you, m'am? Let me know, won't you.
See you Monday.
[s] Renee.
Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated May 5, 1947, also addressed to
"Dear Mary" from "Renee." Presumably Mary is Mary Healy and
Renee is Renee Guthman. This is a photostat of a document from the
files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We had the photostat made.
Senator Watktns. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1419" and is as
follows:)
5694 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1419
Sumner Welles, Chairman
Mortimer Graves, Vice Chairman
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
New York — San Francisco — Los Angeles — Honolulu — Milwaukee — Seattle
Washington Office, 1710 G Street NW.
Telephone District 8665
Washington 6, D. C, May 5, 1947.
Deak Mary : Thanks so much for sending me the news that Molly and Joan
have passage from New Zealand. I wonder when that will bring them to this
country?
On the Library of Congress list of declassified documents — in my own devious
method I have discovered that such a list is in preparation but that they have
no idea when it will be completed, if ever. A list of what they have received to
date reclines in a little card file on the desk of one Mr. Greenwood in the docu-
ments section. He will be very glad to let anyone look at the list any time. But
he says they have no way of telling how complete a list it is. They are trying to
get all the agencies to let them know whenever any material is declassified
but he seems to feel it is a losing struggle and that there is no way of checking
up on just what proportion they do know about. However, what they do have
they will be glad to let us in on. Will you be down soon or would you like one
of us to take a look?
When will you be down? Soon, I hope.
Let me hear.
Renee.
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Renee Guthman from Mary
F. Healy, dated April 30, 1947. I would like to offer it for the record.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1420'- and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 1420
30th April 1947.
Miss Renee Guthman,
American IPR, 1110 G Street TSfW., Washington, D. C.
Dear Renee : Bill Holland has received a cable from Miss St. George as
follows :
"Now sailing by Rangitata May 7th via Panama advise Guthman." St. George.
I suppose it will be a long trip but at last we know they are actually on their
way.
Pat Barnett has written me that she thinks the Library of Congress is preparing
or has prepared a list of various Government documents that have been declassi-
fied and that a good way of keeping informed would be through the Library of Con-
gress, for a copy of every declassified document is sent to them. Have you
heard of such a list or do you know someone who would keep us informed of
such documents.
All the best.
Yours,
Mart F. Healy.
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from Mar-
guerite Ann Stewart, dated December 6, 1946.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1421" and is as r
follows :)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5695
Exhibit No. 1421
Decembeb 6, 1946.
Miss Renee Guthman,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1110 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.
Dear Renee : I am about to flit to San Francisco, but I do want to take a
minute to give you my reaction to your suggestion of a rebate to the Far Eastern
Commission for twelve subscriptions to the Survey.
I talked this over with Larry, and he said there was no sense in our giving a
rebate to any government agency whatever. It seems that any publications
they really want can be requisitioned in their budgets. In any case, a rebate on
the Survey is highly impractical. The $5 subscription price does not nearly
cover the cost of the Survey as it is. I find that tlie past year it cost us $6.80
per Survey subscription. So, the only thing I can suggest is that you tell the
Commission that we are awfully sorry, but we cannot give them any reduction,
and recommend that they take the number of subscriptions (at $5 each!) that
they can afford.
I am so happy to hear that you are planning to really push Sui-vey promotion
among government agencies. That will be simply swell !
Affectionately,
(Mrs.) Marguerite Ann Stewart,
Secretary.
MAS : rs.
P. S. — Congratulations on your interesting meetings and on your luncheon
for Teddy White. I hear wonderful things about them.
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman, from Mar-
guerite Ann Stewart, dated December 3, 1946.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1422," and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 1422
December 3, 1946.
Miss Renee Guthman,
Institnte of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washinyton 5, D. C.
Dear Renee : Thanks for the membership records. Yoshi is going to check
them against our plates as soon as she gets time, probably next week when I am
in California and she can have a bit more help than is the case when we are
all working full tilt. One thing I notice from your list. You have included
all the State Departmeiit men who are serving in various parts of Asia and
whose mail is forwarded by the State Department. Strictly speaking, these are
not Washington members. They merely use Washington as a forwarding ad-
dress and nre "members at large." Your list should not be cluttered up with
them, for it is to your advantage to have an active list of people who are actually
serviced by your office.
These, however, do not account fully for the discrepancies. Yoshi will en-
deavor to find other reasons for these in checking your list against hers.
Thanks for your list of nominees. I am afraid, however, that Wallace will
have to be run for New York rather than Washington, as he tells us that his
residence is now here. ECC strongly urges that Mrs. Frances Bolton be in-
cluded in the Washington list of nominees. Will you please let me know at
once if this is agreeable to you?
Affectionately,
(Mrs.) Marruekite Ann Stewart,
Secretary.
MAS :rs.
Mr. Majtoel. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from
Marguerite Ann Stewart, dated November 19, 1946.
5698 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(Tlie document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1423" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No 1423
NOVEMBEK 19, 1946.
Miss Renee Guthman,
American Council, Institvtion of Pacific Relations,
1110 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.
Dear I?e\ee: I nni trying desperately to weed out the "free copy" list for the
Far Eastern Survey.
I note that at the moment only three government agencies receive free copies
(Library of Congress; two copies, Social Record Division, Library of Congress;
one copy, Head of the Far Eastern Desk; one copy, and Division of Regional
Information, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, one copy).
It seems to me that if we are going to give free copies to strategic government
agencies, we should be systematic about it. In general, I believe that most gov-
ernment agencies should take out paid subscriptions, and I wish you would
undertake this little piece of business for us. In the meantime, will you. Sliirley,
and Eleanor i)leuse go into a huddle and make out for me a "must" list of bureaus
which should receive free copies? I suggest that these be addressed in the name
of the bureau or division, not in the name of a particular person. Will you please
give this your very earliest attention.
I had a talk yesterday with Mr. Halstead of the International Film Founda-
ti(m, 1600 Broadway. He is the man who is to speak on the "Use of Visual Aides
in Teaching International Understanding at your teachers' conference, and he
is responsible for loaning us Peoples of the Soviet Union. I told him about the
change of date, and he will be glad to save January 11th. I suggest that you
write him confirming the date, place, and time, and that in the future he receive
all his information from you directly. This will avoid any chance of slip-up.
AfCeetionately,
(Mrs.) Maegtjerite Ann Stewart,
Secretary.
MAS : rs.
Mr. Maxdel. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Eenee Guthman from Mar-
guerite Ann Stewart dated November 4, 1946.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1424" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 1424
November 4, 1946.
Miss Renee Guthman,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 O Street NW., WasJiington, D. 0.
Dear Renee: As Shirley has no doubt told you, I am simply thrilled about
plans for the Teachers Conference on December 7th.
Enclosed is a draft of the program as I would suggest it. It has the advantage
of having three speakers — approximately twenty minutes each — in the morning,
rather than two long speeches such as Miss Summy suggested. I prefer the
former, as an audience reacts better to several shorter speeches than to fewer
longish ones. It has the disadvantage that the speakers are all women. This
frequently happens at Teachers Conferences, and while I do not consider it ideal,
I can think of worse elements in a conference.
I had a long talk with Miss Jean Gates, whom I believe you sent to me.
I think she can give exactly the kind of talk teachers would like on Chinese
cultural achievements and their contribution to the West. This is always use-
ful to the classroom teacher. As Miss Gates is in G-2, she cannot speak on any-
thin;j: political but will, I believe, be willing to talk on a cultural topic.
Mrs. Dickinson has the advantage of bringing a recent first hand picture of
Russia and of living in Wasliinu'ton, so that you will have no railroad fare to
pay. She spoke the other night at the Herald Tribune Forum, where I under-
stand she was very well received.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5697
I have already arranged for the loan of the film (without charge) by Julien
Bryan, Peoples of the Soviet Union. As it has been made by a new educational
outtit working toward international understanding through visual aids, I took
the liberty of asking their public relations man, who formerly lived in India,
and has a Far Eastern slant, to go down (without any cost to us) and give
a seven-minute talk after this film on the use of films in teaching international
relations.
I will get you one or two other films, but have not as yet had time to do so.
These will have to be rented.
As Shirley may have told you, I hope you will include a registration fee of
approximately $.75, in addition to the cost of the Ivmcheon. This is the only
way you can cover the cost of mailing, film rental, and honoraria for speakers.
I do not know whether you and Miss Summy had any conversation about this.
T always feel that if it is at all possible, speakers should receive some honoraria,
no matter how small. I would suggest ten or fifteen dollars for Mrs. Dickinson,
Miss Gates, and Eleanor. Ethel, of course, will be glad to speak without charge.
Another .$.25 should be added to the total cost to cover the free kits. This is
a swell idea and also important in a teachers' conference. I would suggest that
we include Eleanor's new pamphlet, Russia and America, Pacific Neighbors, my
article (enclosed) on Asia and the school curriculum, a school leaflet, and two
bibliographies. What to Read on China and Books on the Soviet Union. We
will be glad to make this available at cost or $.25 per kit.
Do let me Iiear of your and Miss Summy's reaction to all of these ideas and to
the enclosed program.
You certairdy are a whirlbeater the way you are getting things lined up down
there. Teddy White and all ! I am so proud of you I could pop.
Affectionately,
Marguerite Ann Stewart.
Secretary.
P. S. — You will note that the titles on this tentative program are too long. I
have designed them primarily to convey the content I have in mind for each
speech.
Tentative Suggestions of Teachers' Conference on the Far East
Wilson Teachers College, Washington, D. C, Saturday, December 7, 1946,
10 : 30 A. M.— 3 : 00 P. M.
Morning Session (10:30—11:45)
1. China's Cultural Heritage and Her Gifts to the West — .lean Gates
2. The Soviets and Their Problems Today — Mrs. LaFell Dickenson
3. *American Problems and Policies in China and Korea — Eleanor Lattimore
Luncheon Session (12 :00 — 1 : 30)
Asia and the School Curriculum — Ethel Ewing
Aftfjinoon Session (1 : 45 — 3 : 00)
Films :
A Film on China — (30 minutes)
Peoples of the Soviet Union (33 minutes)
Films in the Teaching of International Relations (7 minutes)
♦This would of course indude among other things an analysis of Soviet-American rela-
tions in the Far East.
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Relations dated October 14, 1946, addressed to
''Dear Mary" from Renee J. Guthman.
Senator Watktns. It may be received.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1425" and is as
follows :)
5698 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 1425
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
New York — Washington, D. C. — Chicago — San Francisco — Honolulu
Washington Office, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6, D. C.
Telephone District 8665
' October 14, 1946.
Dear Mary : I'm afraid I haven't done so well this time on the documents you
asked me to track down, but here's the report on your October 8th letter.
The reports on the textile and education missions to Japan will be out next
week or the week after. Mrs. Florence Thomason, who is in charge of the
distribution of documents in the public liaison office, says that you will auto-
matically get one copy but that if you want 12 copies they will be glad to send
them to you on a written request. If you request them now they'll keep the
request and mail them to you as soon as they are out.
Pawley's report on Japanese reparations hasn't yet gone to the President and
they don't know whether it ever will be released generally. What I think you
must be referring to is the report on the press conference he had when he
returned. I am getting 12 copies of this sent to me and will forward them on to
you as soon as they arrive. Pawley's report on German reparations is available
as such through the State Department. If that's what you want you can request
that at the same time as the above material from Mrs. Thomason.
I called the Gov. Printing Office and they said they had not filled your order
because you had not sent the money along with it. How you would have known
the prices I'm sure I don't know. But here is the dope :
U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey reports :
1. Japan's Struggle to End the War 20^ each
2 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Naga-
saki 450 each
3. Summary Report (Pacific War) 25<lt each
[Handwritten : BAB — would you follow up your previous order with a check?]
I have tried and tried to get you twelve copies for free. But the Strategic
Bombing Survev has been dissolved and the only distribution point for the
material seems "to be the GPO. Do you want to try sending in an order accom-
panied with a check or would you like one of us to go around there and buy the
stuff and send it from this office to you? Whichever you say— it's no trouble
for one of us to go over and pick things up. How you managed to get the first
copies I can't imagine. They were so firm about "no tickee, no laundry" except
for Gov. agencies. ,^ , , ,
Now, on the last two I'm afraid I haven't done well at all. Would you look
at your one copy of the Industrial Disarmament of Japan and see if they give
any Washington clues at all. No one in State or War seems to have ever heard
of "them at all and I can find no trace of a National Engineers Committee here
in Washington. Sorry to be stupid but I imagine there must be some reference
or name or address that would shed some light on the sub.ioct.
The same goes for Corwin Edward's report on the Japanese combines. No one
in State seems to have ever heard of them. Do you have any furtiier clues such
as who Edwards is or for whom the report was made or anything like that?
Guess I'm no rival for Scotland Yards yet.
Now there is one favor you can do for us, please m'am. The recent catalogue
(I suppose it's too much to hope that the additional order has arrived yet, isnt
it?) lists pamphlets from the Australian Council and from the Royal Institute.
We have none of them here in the office either in the library or on our "for sale'
shelf. Do you suppose your office could send me one copy of each of these?
Somehow I have the feeling that you could do it without any effort where it
wonUl l)e a struggle for the ATMCO shipping room if I asked them for a set.
When can I expect you down? Your bed is waiting for you and any day or any
hour is convenient. So let me hear, won't you.
Best, .„ -r ^
ReNEE J. GUTHMAN.
I^Ir. Mandei.. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the
Institute of Pacific Eelations, dated October 8, 1946, addressed to
Renee Guthman from Mary F. Healy.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5699
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1426" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 1426
Sth October 1946.
Miss Renee Gtjthman ;
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1106 G. Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Dear Renee : We have just received twelve copies of Hearings on Statehood
for Hawaii from Representative Peterson's office. I believe these probably came
through your good efforts. Thank you very much.
We have heard through Bill Lockwood that reports on textiles and education
in Japan ai'e now available in the State Department. At first I thought I would
write to Margaret Carter to find out from who we should get these, but you seem
to have such remarkalile success I decided to ask you. We would like twelve
copies of each report, if possible (I shall pass one on to the Amco library).
Also, we should like to obtain copies of Pawley's report on reparations from
the State Department which was released some time back.
We have received one copy of each of the first reports of the U. S. Strategic
Bombing Survey (one on .lapan. one on Germany) and have an order in for some
time with the government printing office for an additional ten copies. I won-
dered if you would have a chance to get in touch with Colonel INIcMurrin about
«ur getting copies directly from the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Gravelly
Point, Virginia as indicated in the attached correspondence, rather than order-
ing them through the government printing office. It took us a good month to get
the first copies and we have not yet received any additional ones. I should tell
you that the government printing office did not bill us for the first copies, so per-
haps if Gravely Point fails to comply you might try calling the GPO directly.
You see we are making full use of your generosity. It is wonderful to have
someone to write to with these rather vague requests.
While I think of it, perhaps while you are on the trail of these reports you
might see if we can obtain copies of the report on Industrial Disarmament of
Japan made by the National Engineers Committee which was submitted to the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy. We have received one copy from the Engi-
neers Joint Council here, but would like ten to twelve more.
Sincerely yours,
Mary P. Heal\.
Mr. ]\Iaxdel. This is a photostat from the list of the files of the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations headed "List of Washington, Virginia, and
Maryland members," dated October, 1946.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The list referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1427" and is as fol-
lows:)
Exhibit No. 1427
October 1946.
List of Washington, Virginia, and Maryland Members
Capt. A. Alcan, 3130 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
Mrs. Jane M. Alden,'4607 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
R. P. Alexander, 4507 Van Ness St., D. C.
John M. Allison, Division of .Japanese Affairs, State Dept.
J. Russell Andrus, 602 Woodside Parkwav, Silver Spring, Md.
C. O. Arndt, U. S. Office of Education, D. C.
Edwin G. Arnold. Box 2.34. R. F. D. No. 2, Fairfax, Va.
Mrs. Ellen Atkinson, 3447 S. Wakefield St., Arlington, Va.
Australian Legation, 3117 Woodland Drive, D. C.
Dr. O. E. Baker, University of Maryland, College Park, Md.
Mr. and Mrs. Robert Barnett, 422.5 49th St., D. C.
John Barrow, 5034 41st Street, D. C.
Margaret Beard, 2110 Florida Ave., D. C.
Eric A. Beecroft, 2017— 37th Street, D. C.
Konrad Bekkar, 1323 Naw Hampshire Ave., D. C.
5700 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Harold R. Benjamin, 3915 Calverton Drive, Hyattsville, Md.
Charles R. Bennett, Hotel Fairfax, D. C.
Prof. George H. Blakeslee, Division of Political Studies, State Dept.
The Hon. Frances P. Bolton, House of Representatives
Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. William Braisted, 3104 Cleveland Ave., D. C.
Senator Ralph O. Brewster, Senate Office Bldg.
Stephen C. Brown, State Dept.
William O. Brown, Uanham, Md.
Ralph J. Bunche, 1510 Jackson St., D. C.
AV. A. M. Burden, Commerce Dept. Bldg.
Dorothy Burgeson, 4905 Potomac Ave., D. C.
Ardath W. Burks, The John Paul Jones, 1717 "G" Street, D. C.
Ralph H. Busick, 220 North Thon-as St., Arlington
Halleck A. Butts, 4701 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
John F. Cady, 2824 S. Abingdon Drive, Arlington
John C. Caldwell, 8408 Queen Anne's Drive, Silver Spring, Md.
Schuyler Van R. Cammann, 4103 W 'Street, D. C.
Ellsworth C. Carlson, 3207 Commonwealth Ave., Alexandria
Mrs. Margaret R. Taylor Carter, Division of Public Liaison, State Dept.
William D. Carter, 1215 16th St., D. C.
Catholic Assn. for Int'l Peace, 1312 Mssachusetts Ave., D. O.
Len De Caux, C. I. O., 718 Jackson Place, D. C.
Alfred D. Charles, 29 College Ave., Annapolis
Chester Chartrand, 700 N. Wayne St. Arlington
Jean-Felix Charvet, French Embassy, 2129 Wyoming, D. C.
Office of Commercial Counselor, Chinese Embassy, 2001 19 St., D. C.
The Hon. O. Edmund Clubb, Foreign Service Mail Desk, State Dept.
Wallace M. Cohen, 6302 Oakridge Ave., Chevy Chase
Mrs. Evelyn S. Colbert, 1858 Mintwood Place, D. C.
Nickolas Cottrell, 1815 N. Randolph St., Arlington
Cabot Coville, Mail Room, Dept. of State
Mrs. Lillian Coville, 3114 Dumbarton Ave., D. C.
David Daiches, British Embassy, 3100 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
The Hon. F. M. Davenport, 8000 Parkside Drive, D. C.
Capt. R. A. Dawes, USN (Ret.)., Hunting Ter. Apts., 1200 South Washington St.^.
Alexandria
Eleanor E. Dennison, 3900 39th St., D. C.
Ellery Denison, Export Import Bank of Washington, D. C.
Ludwell Denny, Scripps-Howard Newspapers, 1013 13th St., D. C.
LaFell Dickinson, Pres., General Federation of Women's Clubs, 1734 N St., D. C.
Ben Dorfman, U. S. Tariff Commission, D. C.
Dr. H. V. Dreyhausen, Dir., Evans Products Co., 1608 20th St., D. C.
Cora DuBois, 1()39 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
James Terry Dace, Arabian-American Oil Co., Shoreham Bldg., D. C.
Col. R. Erne.st Dupuy, 2719 Dumbarton Ave., D. C.
Clara Eastlake, 1411 No. Hartford St.. Arlington
Charleen Egan, 4905 Potomac Ave., D. C.
Capt. E. M. Eller, USN, Office of Public Information, Navy Dept., D. C.
Charles B. Fahs, 8411 Piney Branch Court, Silver Spring
Elizabeth Faut7.. FAO, 2841 McGill Terrace, D. C.
Prof. Alfred P. Fernbach, Lyndhall Apts., Univ. of Virginia
Dr. Henrv Field, Library of Congress
Gwendolyn R. Fillman, 2019 Eye St., D. C.
Ruth Finney, 1525 2Sth St.. D. C.
Sam Fishhack, 202 Wilmington PI., S. E., D. C.
Mr. and Mrs. F. M. Fisher, 2313 South June St., Arlington
Ralph Fisher. 2(X)5 North Madison St., Arlington
Wilfred Fleisher, 2320 Tracy Place. D. C.
Dr. Guy Stanton Ford, 3133 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
John De Francis, 1706 Prest Road, Alexandria
M. Jean Gates (Miss) 3100 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
C. E. Gauss, Export-Impoi-t P.ank, D. C.
Mortimer Graves. 1219 10th St., D. C.
James Frederick Green, 21 East r>radlev Lane, Chevy Chase
The Honorable J. C. Grew. 2840 Woodland Drive. D. C.
Gordon Griffiths, 1811 N. Oak St., Arlington
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5701
H. Lawrence Groves, Dept. of State, Mail Room, D. C.
Eleanor M. Hadley, Govt. Sect, (in Japan witli military government)
Jane E. Hallenbeck, London Hall. 1133 13th St., D. C.
Dr. and Mrs. E. S. C. Handy, P. O. Box 57, Oakton
Georw L. Harris, 2102 Sonth Knoll St., Arlington
Joseph C. Hars(h,^CBS, Earle Bldg., D. C.
Lowell H. Hattery, 945 Pennsylvania Ave.. D. C.
Senator Harry B. Hawes, Transportation Bldg., D. C.
Mrs. Carrol Healy, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1470 Euclid St., D. C.
Sister Helen, Library, Trinity College
Dr. Clarence Hendershot, 8454 Piney Branch Court, Silver Spring
Arthur B. Hei'sey, 807 Chalfonte Drive, Alexandria
James J. Hitchcock, 1821 M St., D. C.
Claire Holt, 3260 Prospect Ave., D. C.
Halford L. Hoskiiis, 1906 Florida Ave., D. C.
Robert B. Holtz, 1188 National Press Bldg., D. C.
James L. Houghteling, 2431 Kalorama Road, D. 0.
A. W. Hummel, 4615 Hunt Ave., Chevy Chase
Robert Stuart Hummel, 1201 Clifton St., D. C.
Lt. Com. W. S. Hunsberger, 16 West Woodbine St., Chevy Chase
Lt. Walter G. Inman, USNR, 2310 9th St. North, Arlington
Roy James, 1210 South Barton St., Arlington
Dr. David Jenkins, .3500 39th St., D. C.
Odette L. Jenzen, 1079 31st St., D. C.
Joan Johnson, Cardinal Point, Norfolk
Dr. William C. Johnstone, New Delhi, India
S. Shepard Jones, 4404 Maple Ave., Bethesda
Allen L. Jonns, 1320 Olds St., Norfolk
Walter B. Kahn, 2231 Q St., D. C.
Mrs. Mary Jane Keeney, 215 B Street, D. C.
Arthr S. Keller, 1436 N. Inglewood St., Arlington
John W. Kendall, 1313 Southview Road, Northwood, Baltimore
Bessie J. Kibbey, 2025 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
H. S. Konijn, 1823 North Monroe St., Arlington
I'hilip E. Krif hbaum, 821 Maryland Ave., D. C.
John F. Knllgren, 2800 Woodley Rd., D. C.
Mrs. Helen B. Lamb, 2931 Morrison St., D. C.
Margaret Lambie, 1661 Crescent Place, D. C.
Emmanuel S. Lar.sen, 1650 Harvard St., D. C.
Owen Lattimore, Roland View Rd., Riixton, Md.
Rev. Edmund J. Lee, Chatham Hall, Chatham, Va.
Waldo G. Leland, Amer. Council of Learned Societies
Morris R. Lewis, China
Sir Willmott Lewis, 1202 National Press Bldg., Washington
Ernest K. Lindley, 1227 National Press Bldg., D. C.
Paul M. A. Linebarger, 2831 29th St., D. C.
Walter S. Lippman, 3525 Woodley Rd., D. C.
Frank Lorimer, 29.30 Chesapeake St., D. C.
Lewis L. Lorwin, .39th & Cathedral Ave., D. C.
Dr. W. C. Lowdermilk, 3127 Patterson PI., D. C.
J. V. A. MacMurray. Lutherville. Md.
Robert N. Magill, 231 First St., D. C.
John McGilvrey INlalci, Harvard University
Kimdric N. Marshall, 122 Aspen St., Chevy Chase
Edwin M. Martin, 9 Brookdale Road, D. C.
Col. Truman M. Martin, 4801 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
George H. A. Masselman, 24 Woodhaven Blvd., Bethesda.
Maior Gen. Frank R. McCov. 2516 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
Lt. Harry L. McMasters, USXR, 3720 9th St., D. O.
Selden & Audrey Mens^fee. 2729 Daniel Road, Chevy Chase
Eugene Meyer, World Bank
E. W. Mill, 4100 Russell Ave., Mt. Rainier, Md.
Mr. & Mrs. A. L. Moffat, 3705 Thirty-Third Place, D. C.
Mrs. Boswell Moorhead, 2220 R Street. D. C.
George W. Morris, 10 Shenandoah Road, R. F. D. 1, Alexandria
Phoebe Morrison, 7320 Piney Branch Road, Takoma Park, D. C.
William D. F. Morrisson, State Dept.
5702 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Warner Moss. 704 Powell St., Williamsburg, Va.
Edgar A. Mowrer, 3301 Garfield St., D. C.
Raymond T. Meyer, 400 High St., Chevy Chase
Rev. James Murdook, 23-1840 Biltmore St., D. C.
Prof. G. Bernard Noble, 909 N. Wayne St., Arlington, Va.
Frank B. Noyes, Evening Star, Washington, D. C.
Earl L. Packer, State Dept.
Ruth E. Pardee, 227 N. Pitt St., Alexandria
Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, Brookings Institute, D. C.
Cyrus H. Peake, 4(J1G Hunt Ave., Chevy Chase
Dr. Karl J. Pelzer, 5530 Broad Branch Road. D. C.
James K. Penfield, State Dept.
Marshall N. Peterson, 4107 Conn. Ave., D. C.
Mrs. GifEord Pinchot. 1615 Rhode Island Ave., D. C.
Abe Pivowitz, 3143 P Street, D. C.
Jane F. Plimpton, 2139 R St., D. C.
Major James Plimsoll, Australian Embassy
Mrs. Hilda C. Pontius, 4020 Arkansas Ave., D. C.
Catherine Porter, 2102 So. Knoll St., Arlington
Mr. & Mrs. G. R. Powles, New Zealand Legation
Olive I. Reddick, Hood College, Frederick, Maryland
Helen Dwight Reid, AAUW, 1634 I St., D. C.
Arthur R. Ringwalt, State Dept.
Jay Robinson, 1631 S Street, D. C.
Mrs. Eryl Rudlin, 3213 Volta Place, D. C.
Robert Rutherford, State Dept.
Corp. of St. Timothy's School. Catonsville, Baltimore
Mr. & Mrs. F. B. Sayre, 4S53 Rockwood Pky., D. C.
W. A. Scharffenberg, 804 Houston Ave., Takoma Park, Md.
E. B. Schefer, 119 South Oak St., Falls Church, Va.
Karl de Scheinitz, 2505 P St., D. C.
Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Wardman Park Hotel
Katherine Sherman, 2808 8th St., Arlington, Va.
William Phillip Simms, 1013 13th St., D. C.
Lt. Bennet Skewes-Cox, 1635 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
Florence M. Smith. 2558 Mass. Ave., D. C.
Henri Sokolove. 2010 N. Taft St., Arlington, Va.
H. M. Spitzer, 901 16th St., D. C.
Hon. Edwin F. Stanton, Bangkok
John Stenhouse, 4808 Park Ave., D. C.
Arthur Sweetser, 3060 Garrison St., D. C.
Carlton B. Swift, 1318 29th St., D. C.
Raymond Swing, 1613 19th St., D. C.
Wayne C. Taylor, 1743 22nd St., D. C.
William Lonsdale Tayler, Galesville, Md.
Sen. Elbert D. Thomas, Senate Office Bklg., D. C.
Laura Thompson (Mrs. John Collier), Vienna, Va.
Daniel Thorner, 4522 49th St., D. C.
M. B. Thresher, British Embassy. 3100 Mass. Ave., D. C.
Mrs. W. H. Turner, Jr., 513 South Fairfax St., Alexandria, Va.
TWA Library, 1740 G Street, D. C.
Mr. & Mrs. J. Parker Van Zandt, 712-A Westchester Apts., D. C.
Mrs. Ilza Veith, 4507 Prospect Circle, Baltimore
Comm. K. L. Veth, Claridge Hotel, D. C.
John Carter Vincent, State Dept.
Elliot Wadsworth, 2416 Tracy PL, D. C.
Benjamin B. Wallace. U. S. Tariff Commission, D. C.
Mrs. Isabel A. Ward, 1449 Chapin St., D. C.
Lt. James T. Watkins IV. 2943 N. Charles St., Baltimore
Capt. Leon H. Weaver, 2901 Erie St., D. C.
Guy P. Webb, 5232 4th St., D. C.
The Hon. Sumner Welles
Alfred E. Wellon, 3517 Vallev Drive, Alexandria
Mrs. Stafford M. Wheeler, 7811 Stratford Road, Bethesda
C. Martin Wilbur, Parkfairfax, Alexandria, Va.
Mrs. Daniel Willard, Jr., 4204 Somerset Place, Baltimore
Charles W. Yost, Department of State, D. C.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5703
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a tentative list of American
delegates to the Ninth International Conference of the IPR. It is
dated December 5, 194J:, and was taken from the files of the Institute
of Pacific Relations.
Senator Watkixs. It may be received.
(The list referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1428'' and is as fol-
lows:)
Exhibit No. 1428
MASTER rXLE COPY
12/5/44.
' Tentative List of Aaierican Delegates to Ninth International Conference,
Hot Spkings, Va., January 5 to 19, 1945
l*Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department
Ralph Bunche, Department of State
William A. M. Burden, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Robert D. Calkins, Dean, School of Business, Columbia University
Frank Coe, Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration
Arthur G. Coons, Dean of Faculty, Occidental College, Los Angeles
Len De Caux, Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations
Rupert Emerson, Deputy Director, Liberated Areas Branch, Foreign Economic
Administration
Frederick V. Field, Executive Vice Chairman, Council for Pan-American De-
mocracy ; formerly Secretary, American Council, IPR
Mrs. Frank A. Gerbode, Executive Committee, San Francisco Office, IPR
Admiral T. C. Hart, Navy General Board, Navy Department
Philip C. Jessup, Professor of International Law, Columbia University
Eric Johnston, Chairman, United States Chamber of Commerce
Grayson Kirk, Institute of International Studies, Yale Univ.
Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Rela-
tions, Johns Hopkins Univ.
Walter Lippmann, Columnist and author
J. A. MacKay, Vice President, National City Bank, New York
George Abbot Morison, Vice Chairman, Bucyrus-Erie Co., Milwaukee
Laurence Salisbury, Editor, Far Eastern Surveij, American Council, IPR
Robert G. Sproul, President, University of California
Eugene Staley, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.
Ralph Turner, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
John Carter Vincent, Chief, China Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, De-
partment of State
W. W. Waymack, Editor, The Des Moines Register and Tribune, Des Moines,
Iowa
alternates
l*Colonel William Mayer, Chief Japanese Specialist, Military Intelligence Divi-
sion, War Department
Boris Shishkin, Research Economist, American Federatio nof Labor
Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Yosemite conference stail
as taken by me from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1429" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1429
[Secretariat 1936, Document 1 (subject to revision)]
Pacific Council — Yosemite Conference Staff
General Administration Edward C. Carter.
Chief Liaison Officer Hobart N. Young.
Pacific Council :
Secretary Edward C. Carter.
Minute Secretary Kate Mitchell.
5704 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Research Committee:
Secretary W. L. HollaDtl.
Minute Secretary Rutli Lee You.ag.
Program Committee :
Secretary Charles F. Loomis.
Minute Secretary Pardee Lowe.
Finance Committee :
Secretary Edward C. Carter.
Minute Secretary Hilda Austern.
Publications Committee:
Secretary Richard Pyke.
Asst. Secretary Hilda Austern.
Minute Secretary Bruce Turner.
Education Committee:
Secretary Harriet Moore.
Minute Secretary Sir Anthony Jenkinson.
Joint Meeting, Pacific Council and Finance
Committee:
Secretary Edward C. Carter.
Minute Secretaries Hilda Austern & Kate Mitchell.
Pacific Affairs :
Editor Owen Lattimore.
Managing Editor Catherine I^orter.
Secretary to the Editor Harriet Chi.
The Press :
Conference Press Officer Chester H. Rowell.
Deputy Press Officer Charles F. Loomis.
Secretary to the Press Officer Sadie Rogers.
Conference Proceedings and Supervision of W. L. Holland and Richard Pyke.
Recorders.
I. P. R. Notes — special Conference issue Bruno Lasker, Richard Pyke, W. L.
Holland.
Conference Broadcasts Charles F. Loomis.
Conference Bulletin Board I'ardee Lowe.
Language Problems Charlotte Tyler.
Conference Library, Bookstore, Biblio- Chen Han-s ng Harriet M "ore,
graphical Exhibit. Charlotte Tyler, Van Waldheim,
John Stevens, Gertrude Van
Eeghen, M. Matsuo, C. B. Fahs,
Ne.'l A. Unger.
Conference Maps Marian Cannon.
Data Papers : Distribution Richard Pyke.
1^1- ^*^f i^'^^^.^f r-— . |(ialen M. Fisher.
National Council Libraries J
'Mchard Pyke.
Office Management and Financial Records Hilda .\ustern and Kate Mitchell.
Stenographic Bureau :
General Supervision and .Supplies Annette Blumenthal.
Assistants to Edward C. Carter Elsie Fairfax-Ch(»luieley, M. Mat-
suo, Kate Mitchell, S. V. C. Mor-
ris. Pardee Lowe, Nan Lincoln
Smith.
Assistants to Hobart N. Young Sur> Curtis (Secretary & Reserva-
tions), Rita Ayers (Office Areas),
Benjamin De Roy, Rawson
Holmes (Meetings) George Als-
berg.
Assistants to Richard Pyke Eleanor Breed.
Recreation. — Edith Hunter.
August 9, 1930.
Mr. Mandel. Tliis is a photostat of the minutes dated August 25,
1936, headed '•'Record of group D." It is a photostat of a document
from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5705
(The minutes referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1430" and are
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1430
Record of Group D
august 25th, 193 6 — first session
(See Lattimore, pp. 5, 7)
Chairman — Dr. R. C. Wallace.
Rapporteur — Field.
Secretary — Miss Moore.
Recorder — Trevor Lloyd.
The Rapporteur presented a brief summary of the proceedings of previous day.
Chairman. — Suggested that the Group try to discover what are the announced
aims of Communism in China and how do they oppose the aims of Reconstruc-
tion. He invited the Chinese delegation to explain its attitude to be followed
by anything the .Japanese might wish to add.
T. Z. Eoo. — China. Offered an estimate of the influence and extent of Com-
munism in China based on two aspects of the subject :
i. Regarding it as an organized political movement,
ii. As an ideal of economic organization.
i. As an organized political movement, it was not serious before 1918, when it
was an intellectual movement with very little political force. In 1919 a Russian
element was added providing a technique of organization and popular propaganda
to the already existing idealism. Between 1922 and 1927 there followed a period
when Communism and Nationalism joined forces, the former agreeing to give up
its own organization and to cooperate. During this period of cooperation, the
Communist groups were enabled to penetrate throughout China. During the
years 192.5-26-27, Communism as an organization reached its peak. Then came
the separation of it from Nationalists groups, and since that time it has shown
a steady decline in strength. Today the movement is weak and broken, with
fragments continuing to exist in Shansi and Sechuan.
As an organized political force it has no immediate future, although in the
distant future it may revive. It is not a matter of immediate concern.
ii. As an idea of economic organisation it is very widespread indeed in view
of the acute economic distress of the country. All who think of the future of
China must think in Economic terms and Communism cannot be lightly brushed
aside. Communism as an idea is still of interest and importance.
A new angle has been injected into the discussion with the pressure from
without. Especially among younger people Communism is being seen as the
only alternative to Imperialism (since the Manchurian conquest, etc.) and in
the event of a choice being made the former will receive the most support. So,
the speaker went on to say, internally there is acute distress and outside there
is pressure. Together these may convert many to Communism. Those fully
familiar with the conditions within China do not di.scuss the matter in terms
of the failure or success of Communism. It has not yet been tried seriously.
The Communists have had no chance of showing their real skill. All recognise
that the Communism of 19.36 is a very different matter from that of 1926.
The earlier brand was based more on a class attitude, involving the confiscation
of land and its redivision, etc. But nowadays by their own pronouncements
they are no longer stressing class consciousness. They are fighting Imperialism
as represented by Japan. Further they are abandoning many of their economic
theories in view of the need for practical application, e. g., the confiscation of
property. They are working on a more reasonable programme with a wider
appeal.
In summary, as a political factor it is a spent force. As an idea it is still
worthy of consideration and there is a change in its method of approach at
present.
Dr. Nasu, Japan, translating for General Banzai. — Communism in China is
just changing its front, the speaker said and although it had lost power in Cen-
tral China it is becoming more powerful in the north. Although Communism
may not be readily exportable, Japan is worried about its possible influence
in Japan. This is especially true when the C. P. makes so much of its slogan
the fighting of Japan. That slogan is put on the banners of the Communists
and causes the gravest dismay.
88348 — 52 — pt. 14 51
5706 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. — Wondered whether there should be some discussion of the
United Front.
U. 8. delegate. — Is this modification of aim by the Communists a fore-
shadowing of a cooperation between the Communists and Nanking in some
future emergency.
Mr. Liu, China. — There have been rumours within the past year — it is very
difficult to judse the sincerity of the Communists — that there have been discus-
sions about a United Front between the Communists and Nanking, also for an
agreement to allow the Communists to extend into Northern China in order to
fight the Japanese. In northern Shansi a Government oil well was captured by
the Communists and but minor changes in its personnel — a few years ago
there would have been many beheadings. This shows, said the speaker, a dispo-
sition to work with the Government. On March 24th, 1936, there was a secret
meeting of the Communist Party in Shanghai and the speaker understood that
a United Front was discussed.
Dr. Nasu. — What connections exist between the Communist Party and the
Third International or the U. S. S. R.?
Mr. Liu said that the Comintern had expressed its lack of desire to interfere
in China — probably there existed very little contact.
Dr. Nasu wondered whether there was financial help or assistance with organi-
sation as in the case of Borodin.
Mr. Liu believed there had been no contact since December 1935.
Dr. Quincey Wright was interested in what Dr. Koo had said about the Com-
munists changing their attitude. Mr. Bisson had already stated that Commu-
nists and the Nanking Government were in effect offering alternative methods
•for protecting the territorial integrity of China. What are the essential dif-
ferences between the two groups and in what way do they offer alternative
solutions of the problems of Japanese Imperialism.
Mr. Loong, Chinese delegate. — The Communists have given up the idea of
confiscating property. They are not hostile to all Imperialist nations, merely
Japan.
Dr. Mah, China. — A very great deal of attention is being paid to Communism
in China in the outside world, particularly in Japan. People have a
bogey of it. The speaker agreed with Dr. Koo in mentioning that Communism
is a factor in the life of China, but it is probably a spent force as an organised
political movement. Some years ago in the south Shangsi (?) Province there
was considerable fear that the movement might develop but on being driven from
there and scattered very thoroughly by the Government, the danger passed.
The speaker went on to add that the sole difliculty was that small scattered
groups are able to offer opposition to the Government's programme for reconstruc-
tion. The Government has had difficulty in completing its programme in Com-
munist regions. From an ideological point of view he added. Communism need
not disturb people. It is simply a manifestation of discontent and in view
of the condition of the country would continue. If the National Government
could alleviate the living conditions then Communism would have made a very
great contribution to the progress of the country.
Further the speaker wondered whether the Communism of China was similar
to that of Russia. The latter had developed a great deal since the early years.
If Communism was to be regarded as a challenge to the evils of existing Society
then it need not disturb one.
Certain principles were laid down by the Premier of Japan — Hiroto as a basis
for Japanese-Chinese agreement. One of these was that the two countries should
join together to remove the menace of Communism in China. The Chinese, the
speaker added, are gravely suspicious. It would be difficult to discover .iust what
are Communists. The Japanese might begin to describe as Communists those
they had previously termed bandits, i. e., those in opposition to Japanese aggres-
sion. Under such an agreement it is possible, that, in view of what has already
happened in the Northeast that the Japanese might send their troops to re-
mote parts of China on the pretext of driving out Communists.
The failure of Japan to agree with China on the basis mentioned was largely
due to such su.spicions.
Dr. Na.'in, Japan. — The speaker indicated that he could not pretend to repr?~
sent the Hiroto Government — but if a definition of Communists was needed, it
was those against whom Chang Kai Shek was fighting at the moment. Those
occupying very large tracts of China at the present time. He did not think that
Chang Kai Sliek was a friend of the Communists — especially as the latter have
been highly critical of him.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5707
Any comparison between China and the USSR is misleading. The latter has
changed a great deal and its attitude is partly due to its being firmly estab-
Ushed and desirous of combining with foreign countries. Chinese Communism is
not so firmly established and has not the experience of the USSR. The speaker
doubted whether they had modified their attitude at all seriously. The change
of front may have been due to their receiving a severe blow from Chiang Kai
Shek. . ^, ., ....
Dr Koo pointed out that when delegates asked for an opinion on the possibility
of a United Front, it was impossible to give an answer. There are many in
the present Government who believe that although the attitude of the Commu-
nists has changed, its fundamental policy does not change. It merely changes-
its outer appearance. At the moment they are capitalising on the anti-Japanese
feeling that exists. Yet most observers think that as a whole the Communists
are a group whose principles do not change. Such knowledge makes a United
Front difficult. Fundamentally Communism is an internal problem for China
and although it may be serious it will probably disappear before external threats.
Thus, the speaker concluded under pressure from outside a United front might
be formed. It was impossible to give a direct answer.
Dr. Wright, U. S. A.— In discussing the difference in Foreign Policy between
the two factions suggested that the sole real difference between the Communists
and the National Government lay in the speed with which they would demand the
return of Chinese rights abrogated by treaty. The Nanking method he sug-
gested was the capitalistic democracy wa.v — that of gradualism. The Commu-
nists would denounce all foreign rights abruptly. Whichever way was followed
there was a universal feeling that the matter must be solved.
Mr. Loong, China.— A. great deal of attention is being directed, he indicated,
to tlie Constitution and in a few months time it might be possible to answer the
question. There was the possibility of the Communists being permitted to exist
as a legal party.
Mr. Nimmo, Australia. — Pointed out that if the question of Communism was
an internal one then nations were entitled to expect China to take the responsi-
bility for what they did. Did the 1925-1927 efilorts of the Communists effect
the rights and lives of foreigners and did it provide grounds for foreign
Intervention?
Dr. Koo. — In the period mentioned in the question, so far as he knew there
were no such problems. He was not aware of the Communists providing any
grounds for foreign intervention.
The Communists were all driven inland, away from the Treaty Ports.
Owen Lattimore. — There had been a certain moral tone about the discussion of
Communism, speakers had talked of it as being good or evil. The speaker wanted
to discuss whether Chinese Communism was on the upgrade or going down-
ward. He wondered what the governing factors were. The historical approach
is the only possible one. The speaker congratulated Dr. Koo on his quite re-
markable speech — the best short exposition of the topic he had ever heard —
but doubted whether Communism was a spent force. It had merely changed its
manifestations — it was not a spent force.
The matter could be discussed from two points of view.
i. As far as its strength went, in 1925-26 there was very powerful Russian
influence. Since the movement retreated to the interior it had become separated
and it was impossible for them to have obtained much financial assistance or
ammunition. Thus for ten years it had been a completely Chinese movement.
It had shifted its territorial position but its strength was undiminished.
The Party possessed a nucleus of highly trained men and around each of the
nuclei! there was a loosely organized group of discontented peasants — followers
for negative reasons. The group was driven out of the old strongholds in
Shanshi (?) and had done tremendous forced marches in taking up the new
ground. They had moved and changed slogans but the principles remained
unchanged.
The Communists believed that Communism would normally follow Capitalism
as a stage in the evolution of Society and that the Revolution was merely a
means of hastening the process. Thus it was possible for them to change
the means in the face of Japanese aggression without modifying their principles.
ii. It has often been said that Japan is the only solid bulwark against the spread
of Communism in Asia. The speaker suggested that the opposite point of view
might well be put that Communism in China was the only bulwark against the
spread of Japanese imperialism.
5708 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
When Manchuria was being taken there was some resistance offered, proba-
bly comparable with that of Haile Selassie in Ethopia. The Governor of Man-
churia represented one of the progressive movements in China — he saw that rail-
ways and factories were built and a new group of vested interests arose founded
on the westernisation of the counti-y. The ineffective resistance showed that
there existed a division of interest— the ofiicial policy was to make as great a nui-
sance as possible for Japan so that they might be prepared to come to a deal.
The Governor was successful and at the moment lived in China still a rich man.
The Communists pointed out that aggression from Japan divided the people
of China into two groups. The wealthy were leaders up to a point and were
then prepared to compromise to save themselves. Then they deserted the masses.
Further the speaker pointed out that they suggest that under the leadership of
Nanking Chinese Reconstruction is only possible with foreign aid against Japan.
Thus Nanking prepared for an opposition to Japan at some future date but if
foreign aid was not forthcoming in time to stop Japan it will have to be bargained
for. Thus a weak country — China — will be bound in the end to lose by playing
with other nations for help. So that the Communists had a fundamental appeal
to the people of China. "Here are a backward people, who must learn western
techniques. Will this come through the agency of profit-making groups with
the workers ail lowered to a coolie class or is the people going to take it on its
own." Such an appeal, he pointed out, was an appeal to temporary conditions —
a front towards Japan that would not compromise — but there was also a separate
long-term appeal offering Communism as the best possible means of freeing
China to make her master of Western ways rather than to allow them to master
lier.
Communism needed to be thought of not only as a threat to Japan but also as
a protection against her.
Mr. Kerr. U. K. — Was the Pau Cha system being used as an opposition to
Communism or was it a half-way compromise, or was it a simple revival of an
old system.
Mr. Liu, Chwa. — Suggested that it was probably a survival of an earlier
custom. It amounted to the collective responsibility of a small community for
the behaviour of its members. Thus if a murder was committed in a village,
the Government held the whole group responsible for detecting the murderer.
It was also used to' discover troublesome people like Communists. There was
a further use as a channel for propaganda.
Dr. Koo suggested the main reason that of an antidote for crime — a village of
ten families would report any newcomers. The Government used it as one of
the agencies for clearing up bandits.
Dr. Wright, USA. — Had been trying to think of Communism as an inter-
national problem. As Dr. Koo had said it was an internal problem but the
acceptance of Communist leadership by the country would have important inter-
national consequences. He had been thinking of Germany since the war. The
inequities of the Treaty of Versailles were too much for the moderate Govern-
ment of Stresemann to remove. A later and more violent government was able
to bring about their rapid dissolution. There might be a parallel in China.
There existed at the moment moderate parties using moderate methods. In the
background there existed a more violent party. In ten years this picture might
be well worth bearing in mind.
The future depends on the success of the moderates in handling the dominant
problem. The Radicals will fade away if the moderates succeed. Otherwise if
the moderates fail in their international policies then the Communists will come
to the fore once again.
Given Lattimore suggested that Communism is an internal question and that
it was up to the Chinese to choose democratic Capitalism or Communism. But
its effects are NOT internal since the intervention of Japan. The people of
China may well say, "How can WE settle this problem when we are continually
being interfered with from Manchuria — wave after wave flowing down until
they reach the Yellow River?" After all he went on, far from being unable to
build railways parallel with the South Manchuria it is now forbidden even to
keep Provinces which are parallel with Manchuria. Japan keeps pumping
propaganda — Japanese propaganda into Japan. In effect "cooperation" is th**
inieotion of the Japanese view of Chinese affairs into China.
WriftJit, USA suggested that the difference between internal and external
affairs in International Law breaks down when as the Germans pointed out in
their case — the occupation of the Ruhr complicated the internal matters of the
■country as a whole. Every State has the right to insist on complete sovereignty.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5709
If foreign influences enter it may be impossible for China to control her own
internal affairs. Then all other parties will fall before that which offers deter-
mined leadership against the common foe.
The Chairman wondered whether the few remaining minutes would be best
spent in considering the attitude of the Japanese delegation to these points
or in some consideration of question B 3 which read: "What are the specific
objections of the Japanese Govt, to foreign help in schemes for Chinese recon-
struction? * * * etc., etc." He suggested that at the beginning of the
next session of the Round Table, the Japanese delegation be prepared to make
a statement. He then invited short questions on the Chinese question in
general.
Mr. Oull, U. K. asked Dr. Koo whether there was a parallel between the na-
tionalists attitude being adopted by the Communists and the agreement of 1927.
Was the separation of the two groups at that time due to a fear of Borodin get-
ting too great an influence.
Dr. Koo. — Most of those present will see nationalism as a dominant note for
years to come. When the Communist-Nationalist break up came it was not
alone because of Borodin but because the Communists contrary to the agree-
ment kept their own cell organisations intact.
Mr. Loong, China, felt that the matter was receiving too great attention, yet
he believed that if the alternative was the loss of property rights or the loss of
sovereign rights, he would not only raise his son to be a soldier but his two
daughters also.
The Chairman thanked the Chinese for their most impressive and objective
contributions.
Mr, Mandel. This is a photostat of a document taken from the files
of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Minutes" as taken by
M. Price, which I offer for the record.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The minutes referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1431" and are
as follows:)
( Pencil note : China Aid Council. )
Pencil note: As taken by M. Price.)
MiNUTEa
The following people from Indusco and China Aid Council met together on
March 27, 1944, at the Jaffe home, 49 Bast 9th Street: Norman Applezweig,
Melvin Fox, David Leacock, Agnes Jaffe, Ida Pruitt from Indusco ; William Hol-
land, Phillip Jaffe, Talitha Gerlach and Miss Price from China Aid Council. Rose
Terlin could not come.
Talitha Gerlach was asked to preside.
It was decided to discuss : (1) Ways of working harmoniously with UCR, i. e.,
a modus vivendi ; (2) The sending of funds to China by UCR.
Mr. Jaffe outlined what he thinks are the differences between China Aid
Council and Indusco. In addition to its children's work, China Aid Council sends
funds to Mme. Sun and these funds therefore cannot fall into any other hands
than Mme. Sun's. Indusco, on the other hand, sends funds through the In-
ternational Committee and Indusco must be assured that its funds go in a
way satisfactory to Indusco. In this case therefore Indusco may have a problem.
The question was asked whether or not the International Committee is con-
trolled by the K. M. T. Spokesmen from Indusco considered that this was not
the case.
It was asked whether the fight should not be to try to democratize UCR.
After discussion over what this process of democratization would consist of, it
was decided that the first step would be to try to democratize the Program
Committee.
One of those present felt that UCR should be strengthened but expressed
the fear that this strength might be turned against the agencies' programs. He
agreed that the first point that should be made is the democratization of UCR.
Mr. Jaffe thought that we should talk in terms our immediate rather than our
future problems.
Mr. Holland said that in his opinion the U. S. Treasury would most probably
permit UCR to enter into the procedure of exchange of American money on
the open market in China if a single, solid organization is used, such as UCR.
5710 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The point was brought up that apparently it is Dr. H H. Rung who wants
the money to be sent by one group such as UCR. This fact indicates that
funds sent from the U. S. probably support other groups than those controlled by
Dr Kung The sending of funds through one group is extremely dangerous
in that it might mean complete control of all foreign funds by that group and
in time preventing any other groups from carrying on relief and rehabilitation
work in China. , „„„ ,
Mr Applezweig suggested that some machinery was necessary and expressed
the opinion that the agencies receive the worst deal when each agency is dealt
with separately. He proposed that an Inter-Agency Council be set up m
which matters can be thrashed out before they are taken up with UCR.
Mrs. Jaffe felt that all agencies within UCR can work together but should
be content to limit themlseves to a few simple points to begin witli.
Mr Applezweig said there should be no tendency to keep the knowledge of such
discussions from UCR, that the group should discuss frankly and openly with
the view of improving relations with UCR. , ^ ,. . -, rrr^n
Mrs. Jaffe pointed out that the meeting should be for the betterment ot UCR
and not against UCR. ^, .^ „
Mr Fox then said that CAC and Indusco both agree on the necessity for a
strong UCR. UCR can only be strengthened, however, if there are strong agen-
cies- The following resolution was suggested and adopted:
"In the interests of effective functioning of the agencies with United China
Relief, it is suggested that an Inter-Agency Council to discuss matters of
mutual concern be formed. During the past period there have been diffi-
culties due to certain causes. One of these causes has been that agencies
have felt that they have had neither direct representation nor representa-
tion elected bv themselves on the Program Committee. When this matter
has been worked out, it is to be hoped that there will be a discussion of other
questions of mutual concern to the agencies and United China Relief."
The group decided, if Mrs. Carter would give her consent for China Aid Coun-
cil's representatives to do so, to meet with ABMAC representatives on the fol-
lowing Tuesday at 6 : 30 at the Jaffe's.
Mr. Mandel. This is a telegram dated November 29, 1944, ad-
dressed to Raymond Bennett, from Rose Yardumian. It is taken from
the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
(The telegram referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1432" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1432
Washington, D, C, November 29, I944.
Raymond Bennett,
Institute Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York:
Ellen Van Zyll DeJong Atkinson, formerly IPR research staff, now Far East
Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, eager attend Hot
Springs conference as recorder, has discussed matter Bissell's aid Colonel Mc-
Cormick, but because wording in your letter to Bissell requesting three junior
officers cannot be assigned Mrs. Atkinson. Competent and good worker, helpful
to IPR in Washington ; recommend her highly. Would you be willing write
Bissell immediately suggesting her name either in place of one of three oflScers
or in addition to three Atkinson consulted on whether MIS should send rep-
resentatives.
Rose Yardumian.
Zyll, IPR, IPR, MIS.
[Handwritten : HHP — Will you take this up with HA and see what she thinks?
I have no objection but don't want to get wires crossed in MIS, and HA has
talked with them since I have. D.]
Mr. Mandel. This is a "Draft of suggestions for the Washington
office," a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
dated June 23, 1943.
Senator Watkins. It may be received.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 5711
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1433" and is
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 1433
June 23, 1948.
RoTTGH Draft of Suggestions for Washington Office
I. PRELIMINARY PREPARATION (TO BE COMPLETED DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST)
1. An effort should be made to find more accessible offices and a minimum of
furniture secured.
2. All IPR publications should be sent down, as well as maps, any duplicate
materials in either library, a duplicate file of the American Council bibliog-
raphy file, copies of bibliographical material prepared by American council,
a list of periodicals in Amco and Pacco libraries. Such organizations as
FPA, NPA, WPA might be asked to send their publications to the Washington
office as well as the New York office.
3. The Secretary should talk with members of Amco and Pacco staffs to secure
their ideas on development of Washington office and information on work
each is doing.
4. Tlie secretary should have a talk with Bob Barnett at the first opportunity.
5. The secretary should contact key people in government offices concerned with
the Far East to inform them of existence of office and to discover how it can
be most useful to their work, and to discover what information is available
in their offices.
6. An informal advisory committee should be set up. Possible members : Harry
Price, Michael Greenberg, Irving Friedman. Alvin Barber, Alger Hiss, .Tim
Shoemaker, Bill Johnstone, Wilma Fairbank, Mrs. Boulton.
II. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON OFFICE AND DUTIES OF SECRETABY
1. Arrangements and secretarial work in connection with two study groups al-
ready running under Johnstone's direction.
2. Possible organization of new groups, such as (a) small "clearing house"
groups of specialists working on the same field in different government de-
partments; (b) popular meetings and luncheons on appropriate occasions.
3. Secretary should keep in touch with activities of French, Dutch, and Philip-
pine Councils.
4. Secretary should be prepared to perform any special tasks asked of her by
New York staff.
5. Secretary should keep in touch with the activities of such organizations as the
FPA, League of Women Voters, NPA, etc.
6. Secretary should keep informed as much as possible on developments in
Congress.
7. Secretary should make and maintain contact with the press.
8. Secretary should be prepared to arrange for book reviews and contributions
of articles and keep an eye open for likely speakers and authors.
9. Development of AmCo membership.
Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Chairman, may I incorporate by reference the
State Department biographical registers into the record at this time ?
Senator Watkins. Yes ; you may have that permission.
(The incorporation by reference is noted and marked as "Exhibit
No. 1434.")
Mr. Mandel. I wish to enter into the record by way of reference
the following document appearing as exhibit No. 18 in the appendix,
part I, of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities of the
House of Kepresentatives on pages 245 to 292, entitled "Excerpts from
speeches and resolutions adopted at the Third World Congress of the
Communist International (June 22 to July 12, 1921), published by the
Contemporary Publishing Association, New York City, 1921, pages
34^70, 75-114, 115-117, 131-149, 150-153, 190-199.
5712 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. The matter will be received as offered.
(The incorporation by reference is noted and marked as "Exhibit
No. 1435.")
Mr, Morris. I think that is all, Senator. Thank you very much.
Senator Watkins. We will be in recess.
(Whereupon, at 12: 20 p. m. the committee recessed, subject to the
call of the chairman.)
INDEX TO PART 14
(Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organiza-
tion in this index.)
A
AAUW. (See American Association of University Women.) P^so
Abaya, Hernando 5650
Abdul, Arbab, Ghafoor Khan 50f>6, 5044
Abend, Hallet 5506, 5507
ABM AC. {See American Bureau for Medical Aid to China.)
Abrams, Dr 5406
Abrahms, Herbert K 5506, 5507
Abramson 5125
Academica Sinica 4996, 5345
Academy of Science (Moscow) 5009
Acheson, Dean 4924, 4931, 4975, 5261, 5485, 5487
ACIS. (See American Committee for International Studies.)
Aclierman, Edward 5506, 5507
Adams, Romanzo 5506, 5507
Adams, Samuel H 5647
Adams, W. G. S 5320
Adarkar, B. P 5506
Adler 5017
Adler, David 5367
Adler, Solomon 5345, 5684
AdlofE. Richard 5506, 5507
Afzal, Mohammed 5506, 5507
Agronsky, Martin 5355
Ahlers, John 5506, 5507
Aikman, Duncan 5656
AIPR. (See Institute of Pacific Relations, American.)
Airey, Willis T. G 5506, 5507
Aiver, C. P. Ramaswami 5323
Akagi, Roy 5506, 5507
Alcan, A 5699
Alden, Charles E 5501
Alden, Mrs. Jane M 5699
Aldrich, Winthrop W 5252
Alexander 5209
Alexander, Mrs 5089
Alexander, A. V 5320, 5334
Alexander, Fred 4964, 5506, 5507
Alexander, Henry C 5047
Alexander, John 5052, 5053
Alexander, R. P ,5099
Alexander, Wallace M 5182, 5186, 5335
Alflno, Rose 4992, 4993
Alis.iahbana, Takdir 5506, 5507
All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions 5641
Allan, Dorothy W 5506, 5507
Allemagne. (See Germany.)
Allen 5234
Allen, Edward Weber 4944, 5506, 5507
Allen, G. C 5253, 5506, 5507
Allen, James S 5337, 5345, 5356, 5506, 5507, 5684
T
H INDEX
Page
Allison, John M 5506, 5507, 5699
Allen, Joseph S 4941
Allen, Raymond B 4944, 5023
Allen, Riley H 5207
Alley, Rewi 5194, 5210, 5211, 5212
Ailing, Paul 4975
Aloric, Aminadau 4992, 4993
ALP. (Sfee American Labor Party.)
Alsberg, Carl L 4999, 5119, 5144, 5151, 5152,
5155, 5157, 5167, 5186, 5218, 5318, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5341, 5506, 5507,
5684.
Alsberg, George 5704
Altschul, Frank 5286
AMCO. (See Institute of Pacific Relations, American.)
Amerasia 4941, 4977, 5000, 5060, 5061. 5111,
5162, 5174, 5192-5194, 5204, 5221, 5230, 5267, 5300, 5340, 5343, 5358
America. (See United States of America.)
American Association of University Women 5067,5702
American-British-Chinese Government Currency Board 5249, 5268, 5328
American Bureau for Medical Aid to China 4936, 5202, 5344, 5345, 5710
American Chamber of Commerce 5423
American Committee for International Studies 4915,5111,5208,5209,5355
American Committee for Nonpurticipation in Japanese Aggression 5427
American Council of Learned Societies 5051, 5110, 5117, 5219, 5220
American Economic Association 5220, 5314
American Embassy (Amsterdam) 5082
American Embassy (Bangkok) 5193
American Embassy (Berlin) 5193
American Embassy (Brussels) 5193
American Embassy (Canberra) 5193
American Embassy (Chungking) 5057,5058,5193,5236
American Embassy (Hague) 5193
American Embassy (London) 5193
American Embassy (Moscow) 5161,5162,5193
American Embassy (Ottawa) 5193
American Embassy (Paris) 5193
American Embassy (Peiping) 5173,5214
American Embassy (Rome) 5193
American p]mbassy (Shanghai) 5193
American Embassy (Tokyo) 5193
American Federation of Labor 4975, 4977, 5067, 5703
American History Review 5651, 5656
American Labor Party 5502, 5503, 5645
American Peace Mobilization 5225, 5257, 5258, 5840
American Political Science Association 5220, 5G89
American Red Cross 4956, 4973, 5252, 5429, 5432
American Reparations Commission to Japan 5283
American Russian Institute 4974, 4977, 5007, 5079, 5111, 5150, 5154,
5165, 5170, 5181, 5182, 5186, 5227, 5229, 5238, 5268, 5282, 5286, 5345
American Russian Institute, San Francisco 5182
Ames, C. L 5323
Amsterdam 5348
Amtorg Trading Corporation 4935, 5205
Anderson, Miss 5229
Anderson, Drury 5295
Anderson, Karl L 5506,5507
Anderson, Leslie 5279
Anderson, Marguerite 4992, 4993
Anderson, Melvin 4991-4993
Anderson, Robbins B 5207
Andrews , 5157
Andrews, Mrs 515T
Andrus, J. Russell 5295, 5506, 5507, 5684, 5699
Anesaki, Masahara 5333, 5506, 5507
Angelino, A. D. A. deKat 5684
Angell, Norman 5040, 5506, 5507
INDEX ni
Page
Anglo-Soviet Ti-eaty (1942) 5076
Angus, H. F 5508, 5509, 5684
Angus, William N 5508,5509
Annall, Elaine 4992
Annals of American Academy 5469, 5653, 5656
Anstev, Vera 5508, 5509
Anstice, E. H 5508,5509
Apostol, John 5209, 5508, 5509
Appadorai, A 5027
Appleby, Paul 5261
Appell, Donald T 5502
Applezweig, Norman 5709, 5710
Araneta, Salvador 5508, 5509
Arbolino, Jack 5508, 5509
Archer, Anita 4988
Archy, Gilbert 5508, 5509
Argentina 5692
Arctic Institute 4915, 5083, 5112
ARI. {See American Russian Institute.)
Armall, Elaine 4993
Arms, Brig. Gen 4940
Armstrong, Elizabeth H 5508, 5509
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish 5260
Army War College 5144
Arnall, Ellis Gibbs 5656
Arndt, Christian O 4944, 5699
Arneman, George E 5207
Arnold 5132,5137
Arnold, Edwin G 5699
Arnold, Julian 4983, 5078, 5090, 5508, 5509
Arnold, Thurman 5112
Aroon, Sheh Bidien Ben Aroon. {Sec Bidien, Charles.)
Arosev 5083, 5121, 5123, 5135
Asbeck, F. V 5508, 5509
Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank 5508, 5509
Asia Magazine 0047, 5240
Asiaticus 5085, 5180, 5337, 5341, 5508, 5509
Associated Press (AP) 5105,5256,5334,5395
Astor, W. W 5334
Atcheson, George, Jr 4925,4926
Atherton, Frank C 5139, 5207, 5319, 5334, 5335
Atherton, J. Ballard ^ 4944, 5323
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll DeJong 5710
Atlantic Charter 5068, 5069, 5076
Atlantic Monthly 5040, 5181
Atwater, Reginald 4983
Auchter, E. C 4944
Auckland University College 5320
Auerbach, Beatrice 5299
August, H. F 5327
Austern, Hilda. (See Ray, Hilda Austern.)
Austern, Marjorie 4987
Austin 5643
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin 5328
Australia 5318-5322,
5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5349, 5356, 5367, 5668, 5670, 5707
Australia, Government of 4936, 4971, 5130
Australian Embassy (Washington) 5295
Australian Legation (Washington) 5049,5052
Australian Institnte of International Affairs 5320
Austria 5382
Austria, Government of 5076, 5201
Axis Powers 4972, 5000, 5231, 5232
Ayers, Rita • 5704
Ayling, Keith 5647
Aziz, Ungku A 5508,5509
IV INDEX
B
Page
Bache, Carl 5508, 5509
Bachman, George 4936
Bachman, Paul S 5207,5508,5509
Bacon, Mrs. Robert L 5047
Baernsprung, H. W 5216, 5508, 5509
Bailev, K. H 5508, 5509
Bain,' H. Foster 5062, 5508, 5509, 5684
Bajpai, Girja S 5048, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5090
Baker, I. E 5323
Baker, John Earl 5508, 5509
Baker, Nathan M 5510, 5511
Baker, Newton D 5067, 5153, 5156, 5228, 5320, 5324, 5333
Baker, O. E 5699
Balazs, Etienne 5510, 5511
Baldwin, Hanson W 5040, 5041, 5329
Bales, W. L 5163, 5348
Balfour, Nina 4989, 4993
Ball, W. MacMahon 5510, 5511
Ballantine, Joseph 4936, 5084, 5169, 5170, 5510, 5511
Balling, Francis C 5673
Balliol, Master of 5081, 5276, 5283
Ballis, William 5510, 5511, 5684
Band, Claire 5656
Band, William 5656
Banff 5319, 5320, 5331
Bansjkok 5702
Banks. Edythe M 5989, 4992
Banzai, General 5705
Barber, Alvin 5510, 5511, 5711
Barber, F. P. A 5299
Barber, Joseph 5510, 5511
Barber, Joseph. Jr 4987, 4988
Barclay, George W 5510, 5511
Barlow, dward L 5984, 5011, 5012
Barmine, Alexander 4953, 4954, 5207
Barnard, President 5026
Barnes, Betty 5345
Barnes, Carleton P 5510, 5511
Barnes, Joseph 4915
4955, 4956, 4965, 4973, 5083, .5084, 5113, 5114, 5116, 5117, 5120-5122,
5126, 5127, 5159, 5163, 5164, 5167, 5168, 5185, 5227, 5229, 5234, 5235,
5252, 5259, 5274, 5286, 5299, 5308, 5510, 5511, 5685.
Barnes, Kathleen 4916,
4958, 4967, 4972, 4988, 5107, 5124, 5128, 51.30, 5132, 5135, 5137, 5140,
5154, 5156, 5160, 5162, 5172, 5181, 5236, 5238, 5356, 5510, 5511.
Barnes, Shiman 5123
Barnett, Abraham 499O, 4993
Barnett, Eugene E 4983, 5268, 5365, 5510, 5511
Barnett, Robert W 4935
4958, 4967, 4975, 5976, 4978-4980, 4983, 4987, 4988, 5011, 5107, 5198,'
5199, 5210-5212, 5215, 5231, 5234, 5241, 5244, 5272, 5342, 5510, 5511,
5699, 5710.
Barnett, Mrs. Robert W. (Patricia) __ 5000, 5231, 5234, 5295, 5510, 5511, 5694, 5699
Barrett, David 5370
Barrow, John _" 5294, 5295, 5699
Barrows, General 5949 5943
Barton, William 55IO, 5^11, 5684
Bartunek, .Joseph W 5674 5682
Bass, Basil ~ ' 5935
Bassett, Arthur 4973
Bates, Elizabeth A ~_ ~ 4999 4993-
Bates, M. S ~___2 — :__ 5510, 551^; 5684
Bates Searle ^ 4973^ 5209
Batt, W. L 5Q4Y
Bau, Mingchien 535Q
INDEX " 'V
Page
Baudette, Philippe 5042, 50g
Bauer P. T 5510, 5oll, 5b&4
Baum,' Marjorie_I I-I 4991, 4993
Baxter, James P., 3d 5001
Baxter, Joseph P 49f)9, 4984
B. C. F. A. {See Britain-China Friendship Association.)
Beaglehole, Ernest 5510, 5511
Beagleliole, J. G 5olO, o511
Beal, Edwin G., Jr 5510, Soil
Beal, George J 4984, 5028, 5030
Bean, Arthur 5023
Bean, Louis 4973, 5261
Bear, Marguerite E 4990, 4992
Beard, Margaret 5699
Beardsley, Richard K 5510, 5511
Beaumont, K. M 5512, 5513
Beclc, L 5512, 5513
Becker. Carl 5661
Beecroft, Eric 4975,
5058, 5256, 5257, 5274, 5288, 5291, 5292, 5294, 5512, 5513, 5699'
Belvker, Konrad 5512, 5513, 5699
Belden, Jack 565S
Belgium, Government of 5074
Bell, Aubrey F 5652
Bell, Charles 5512, 5513
Bell. J. Mackintosh -' 5320
Bell, Reginald 5512, 5513
Belle, Minnie 5512, 5513
Beloff, Max 5025
Belshaw 5685
Belshaw, Cyril 5322, 5512, 5513
Belshaw, Horace 4991, 4993, 5320, 5322, 5512, 5513
Belshaw, James P 5512, 5513
Belshaw, Michael 4993
Belsky 5161,5162
Bengal Assembly (India) 5005, 5043, 5044
Benitez, Conrado 5160, 5320, 5512, 5513
Benitez, Francisco 5319, 5334
Benjamin, Harold R 5700
Benjuya, Beatrice 4989, 4993
Bennett, Prime Minister 5115
Bennett, Charles R 5700
Bennett, M. K 5512, 5513
Bennett, Marjorie 5512, 5513
Bennett, Martin T 5512, 5513
Bennett, Merrill 5186
Bennett, Raymond 5710
Benson, Wilfred 5512, 5513
Berg, Dorothy 5291
Berkhov, Robert H 5294, 5295, 5512, 5513
Berle, A. A 4973, 4975, 5261
Bernardelli, Harro 5512, 5513
Bernardo, Dr. M 5295
Bernstein, Harry 5512, 5513
Berreman, Joel V 5512, 5513
Berrie, W. D 5008
Bertram 5188
Bertram, James 5512, 5513
Berzin, General ; 4953, 4954
Bethuue, Norman 5.368
Betjeman, John 5652
Beukema, Herman 4966, 4973, 5001, 5199
Bevin 5.379
Bewes, Windham H 5512, 5513
Beyster, Harry 5296
Bhott, V. M 5514, 5515
VI INDEX
Faga
Bialos, Robert S 4990, 4993
Bidien, Charles 5279, 5281, 5283, 5514, 5515, 5fi34
Bidwell 5286
Bierman, Edward 4992, 4993
Biggerstalf, Knight 4944, 5111, 5219, 5229, 5514, 5515
Binder Carroll 4973, 5153, 5156
Bingham, Woodbridge 5514, 5515
Birker, Lindsay of. (See Lindsay, Michael.)
Birkhead, Leon 4935
Bishop, Carl Whiting 5514,5515
Bishop, W. A 4934, 4936
Bissell, Clayton 5703, 5710
Bisson T. A 4939
4981, 4984, ~4~987, 4991,~4993, 5007, 5008, 5010, 5013^5023" 5025, 5047^
5053, 5071, 5080, 5148, 5183, 5188, 5193, 5226, 5234, 5235, 5281, 5283,
5297, 5298, 5329, 5424, 5426. 5427. 5514, 5515, 5648-5650, 5654, 5658-
5660, 5673, 5685, 5687, 5688, 5706.
Black, Colonel 5248, 5249
Blackburn, Leo 5674
Blackton, Charles S 5514, 5515
Blaine, Mrs. Emmons 5298
Blaine, James G 5249, 5252, 5344
Blake, Robert 5116
Blakeley, R. J 5514, 5515
Blakeslee, George H 4999, 5321, 5335, 5514, 5515, 5700
Blankfort, Michael 5652
Bloch 5358, 5514, 5515
Bloch, Felix 5040
Bloch, Kurt 4987, 4988, 5007, 5008, 5111, 5174, 5186, 5205, 5226, 5236, 5241
Blue, George V 4958, 4964
Bluuienthal, Annette 4987, 4988, 4993, 5704
Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) 4967, 4973. 4977,
5001-5004, 5008, 5009, 5047, 5049, 5052, 5054, 5256, 5260. 5266, 5268
Boardman, T. D 5040
Bodde, Derk 5229, 5336, 5377, 5514, .5515, 5660
Boeke, J. H .5.320, 5514, 5515, 5684
Boekel, Colonel 5048
Boericke, William F 5514, 5515
Bogolepov, Igor 4921, 4924, 5500, 5501, 5692
Bohlen, Charles E 5483, 5484
Bohn, Frank 5165
Bolles, Blair 5105, 5514, 5515
Bolton, Frances P 5052, 5053, 5062, 5287, 5300, 5695, 5700
Bolton Report 5383
Bonnet 5131, 5184
Bonnet, H 5333
Boodberg, Peter A 5229
Boody. Elizabeth 5514, 5515
Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18 5413
Book and Magazine Union 5366
Borden, Robert 5115
Borg, Dorothy 4988, 5236, 5350, 5514, 5515
Borja. Victorino 5514, 5.515
Borodin 5219, 5384, 5706, 5709
Borovoy, Hall 5084, r.l54
Borrie, W. D 5514, 5515
Borrie, W. M 5684
Borton, Hugh 4984, 4987, 5007,
5008, 5048, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5111, 5175, 5176, 5229, 5514, 5515, 5663
Boudreau, Frank C 5002, 5260
Boukema, Herman 5.''56
Boulton, Mrs 5711
Bousquet, G. H 5514, 5515
Bowen, Mary Jane 4989, 4993
Bowers, Claude G 5661
Bowman, Isaiah 5260, 5287, 5516, 5517, 5700
INDEX vn
Face
Bowman, Robert G 5516, 5517
Box, Mr 5204
Bovden, Roland W. (Boyd, Roland) 5318, 5837
Bo'yer, R. J. F 5131, 5321, 5516, 5517
Braake, Alex L. Ter 5516, 5517
Bradley, Anita 5516, 5517
Bradley, Omar 4944
Brady, Alexander 5516, 5517
Brady, Robert A 5516, 5517
Braibanti, Ralph J. D 5516, 5517
Braisted, William 5700
Bramley, Joan 4991, 4993
Brand, Willem 5516, 5517
Brandt, William 5240, 5241, 5516, 5517
Bratter, Herbert 5516. 5517
Bratton, R. S 4966, 5084, 5163, 5198, 5242-5244, 5247, 5348
Brebner, J. B 5516, 5517
Breed, Eleanor __ 5704
Bremer 4975
Bremman, Y. P 5084, 5108, 5112, 5157-5159, 5162, 5178
Brent, John 5516, 5517
Bretholtz-Austern, Hilda A. (See Ray, Hilda Austern.)
Brewer, Leo 5040
Brewster, Owen 4943
Brewster, Ralph O 5700
Brice, Lola 4990, 4993
Brigden, J. B 5516, 5517
Brines, Russell 5656
Britain-China Friendship Association 5412
Britain. (See Great Britain.)
British Army 5093, 5094
British Embassy (Bangkok) 5193
British Embassy (Berlin) 5193
British Embassy (Brussels) 5193
British Embassy (Canberra) 5193
British Embassy (China) 5276
British Embassy (Chungking) 5193
British Embassy (Hague) 5193
British Embassy (Hong Kong) 5190
British Embassy (Moscow) 5193, 5463
British Embassy (Paris) 5193
British Embassy (Rome) 5193
British Embassy (Shanghai) 5193
British Embassy (Tokyo) 5193
British Embassy (Washington) 4936, 5009, 5048, 5052, 5348, 5700, 5702
British Foreign Office 5376
British Labour Party 5412
British Military Intelligence 5371
British Ministry of Information 5019
British Navy 5190
Britton, Roswell S 5.516, 5.517
Brodie, Bernard 5040, 5.516, 5517
Brodie, Fawn M 5516, 5.517
Brodrick, Alan Houghton 5516, 5517
Broek, Jan O. M 4988, 4989, 4993, 5003. 5083, 5516. .5517
Brogan. D. W 5518, 5519, 5661
Brondgeest, C ,5.518, 5519
Brookings Institute 5067, 5702
Brooks, Murray G 5193, 5289
Brothero, George 5203
Browder. Earl Russell 4924-4928, 5023, 5219. 5.308, 5310, 5622
Brown, Delmer M 5336, 5518, 5519
Brown, Don 5022, 5415
Brown, Esther 4989, 4993
Brown, Harrison 5518, 5519
Vni INDEX
Pagt
Brown, Harry Peter M'Nab 5647
Brown, Norman 4975, 4977, 5018, 5256, 5257
Brown, Stuart Gerry 5661
Brown, W. Norman 5518, 5519
Brown, William O 5700
Browne, Effie 5295
Brownell, Mrs 5299
Bruce, David 5485-5487
Bruce, Robert 4991-4993
Bruuauer, Esther Caukin 5261, 5346, 5518, 5519, 5644
Brunuer, Edmund DeS 5518, 5519
Bryan, E. H., Jr 5518, 5519
Bryan, Julien 5697
Bryaut, Elizabeth 4992, 4993
Brvson, Lyman 5002
Buchsbaum, Betty E 4991, 4993
Buck 5685
Buck, Paul Herman 5303
Buck, Pearl 5064, 5255, 5329, 5518, 5519, 5647
Buck. Peter H 5207
Buckman, Rilma 4987
Budenz, Louis 4944, 5023, 5426
Buell 5208, 5260
Buell, Raymond Leslie 5518, 5519
Buesst, Tristan 5320, 5518, 5519
Bulick 5050
Bumsardner, Chia-ling 4991, 4993
Bunce, Arthur C 5518, 5519
Bunche, Ralph 4973, 4975, 4977, 5210, 5289, 5700, 5703
Bundy, Harvey 4975
Burckhardt, Colonel 5195, 5196
Burden, William A. M 4956, 4977, 5199, 5249, 5299, 5700, 5703
Burdick, Virginia 5084, 5165, 5170, 5181
Burgeson, Dorothy 5700
Burgess, J. Stewart 5518, 5519
Burke, James 5518, 5519
Burks, Ardath Walter 5518, 5519, 5700
Burlingham, Charles C 5252
Burma 5331, 5395, 5692
Burma, Government of 5193, 5294
Burn, North 5379
Burnett, Patricia G 5518, 5519
Burpt^e, Lawrence J :__ 5518, 5519
Burt, Virginia 4993
Burthold 5008
Burton, Herbert 5518, 5519
Burton, William 5518, 5519
Burtt, John O ^___ 5518, 5519
Bush, Chilton 5518, 5519
Bush, Vainievar 5040
Busick. Ralph H 5700
Buss, Claude A 5024, 5520, 5521
Busuego, Mr , 5295
Busuego, Mrs 5295
Butler, Mr 5206, 5263
Butler, H. B 5048, 5053
Butler, Nicholas Murray 5289
Butler, Paul 5520, 5521, 5684
Buttrose, Charles 5520, 5521
Butts, Grace Leah 4991, 4993
Butts, Halleck A 5700
Bux, Allah 5004, 5006, 5042, 50-tS
Byas, Hugh 5520, 5521
Bykofsky, Edith 4987, 4991, 4993
Byrnes, Mr 5393, 5484, 5486
Byrnes, James Francis-: 5274, 5292, 5652
Bywater, Hector C 5520, 5521
INDEX IX
0
CAO. (-See China Aid Council.) Page
Cadv, John F 5520, 5521, 5700
Cahill, Holger 5652
Caidin, Stanley 5295
Caiger, George 5027, 5520, 5521
Cairo Declaration 5073, 5671
Calder 518a
Caldwell, John Cope 5294, 5295, 5653, 5700
Caldwell, Oliver 5520, 5521
California Institute of Technology 5106, 5279, 5280, 5282, 5284
California Labor School 504O
Calkins. Robert D 4938, 4983, 5289, 5365, 5703
Callis, H. G 5259, 5692
! Cameron, George T 4941, 4944
Cameron, Merton 5520, 5521
Camincho 5112
Camman, Schuyler Van R 5520, 5521, 5700
Campbell, Inez 4988.
Campbell, Persia 5520, 5521
Campbell, Robert 5675
Camus, Manuel 5320
Canada 5318-5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5335, 5372, 5411, 5705
Canada, Government of 4936, 4937, 5115, 5130
Canadian Institute of International Affairs 5328, 5356
Canadian Legation (Washington) 5049, 5052, 5270
Caniff 5520, 5521
Cannon, Marian 5520, 5521, 5704
Cantillo, M. Jose Maria 5692
Capell, A 5520, 5521
Capps, Frances Petrowski 4991, 4993
Caravello, Grace 4987, 4991, 4993
Carbode, Frank 5275
Carlson, Ellsworth C 5700
Carlson, Evans F 5052,
5053, 5085, 5111, 5193, 5196, 5216, 5234, 5235, 5346, 5521
Carnegie Corporation 4973, 5090, 5117, 5181, 5207, 5250, 5303, 5322, 5335
Carnegie Endowment 4969, 5009, 5026, 5063, 5207, 5243, 5289, 5302
Carney, Charles J 5674
Carr, E. H 5137
Carroll, Jewerl 4989, 4993
Carroll, Wallace 5656
Carrothers, W. A 5520, 5521
Carter, Mrs 5710
Carter, Edward C 4907-1924,
4937-4941, 4944-4947, 4953-4958, 4964, 4965, 4967, 4969, 4972, 4973,
4976, 4978, 4980, 4984, 4991, 4993, 4996-5000, 5004, 5010, 5013-5017,
5019, 5020, 5024, 5025, 5027, 5030, 5031, 5041, 5042, 5045-5062, 5065,
5074, 5078-5085, 5089, 5090, 5105, 5107, 5108, 5111-5124, 5127,
5129-5145, 5147, 5149, 5151-5157, 5307, 5309, 5316-5362, 5366, 5520,
5521, 5695, 5703, 5704.
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 5056, 5155, 5158,
5164, 5175, 5188, 5201, 5225, 5226, 5275, 5332, 5349, 5356, 5359
Carter, Gwendolyn M 5520, 5521
Carter, Harriet 1 5032, 5044, 5059, 5060
Carter, John A 5032, 5055, 5059, 5060, 5108, 5164, 5175, 5184, 5186, 5277, 5359
Carter, Mabel 5032, 5044, 5047, 5059, 5060, 5083, 5090, 5091
Carter, Mrs. Margaret R. Taylor 5699, 5700
Carter, Ruth D 4987, 4990, 4991, 4993, 5056, 5059, 5060, 5065, 5081, 5158,
5160, 5164, 5175, 5179, 5184, 5188, 5201, 5271, 5274, 5279, 5291, 5299
Carter, William D 5032,
5058, 5059, 5061, 5199, 5227, 5256, 5277, 5294, 5520, 5521, 5700
Carthage, S. S 5137
Cartwright, Frank T 5520, 5521
Cartwri.ght, Steven 5.522, 5523
Case, Everett N 4983, 5090
Case, Francis 5502, 5504
88348— 52— pt. 14 52
S. INDEX
Paga
Cassers, W. G 5522, 5523
Castillo, Andres V 5522, 5523
Castro 5041
Catholic Association for International Peace 5700
Cator, W. J 5684
Cavell R. G 5027 5270 5383 5522 5523
Central Intelligence Agency"_5438, 5439" 5443-5445, 5448, 5452, '5475,' 5481,' 5482
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Policy Coordination 5438, 5439, 5475
Cesbron, Gilbert 5650
Chalfin, Jeanne 4990, 4993
Chamberlain 5340, 5369
Chamberlain, Ansten 5349
Chamberlain, Joseph P 4943, 5002, 5084, 5153-5158,
5183, 5198, 5225, 5300, 5318, 5339, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5522, 5523
Chamberlain, L. H 4984, 5018
Chamberlain, Neville 4935, 5075, 5179, 5184, 5258
Chamberlain, William Henry 5274, 5522, 5523
Chamberlin 5685
Chambers, Whittaker 5354, 5355, 5504
Chan, Shaw Wing 5522, 5523
Chan, T. W 5522, 5523
Chancellor, Christopher 5326
Chancey, Martin 5675
Chandra, Kiron 5522, 5523
Chandrasekhar, S 5522, 5523
Chang, C. F 5522, 5523
Chang, C. M 5522, 5523
Chang, Chih-chung 5522, 5523
Chang, Chih-Yi 5522, 5523
Chang, Fu-liang 5345, 5361
Chang, H. C 5345, 5361
Chang, Irene Conley 4991, 4993
Chang, Mon-lin. (See Chiang, Mon-lin.)
Chang, N. K 5522, 5523
Chang, P. C 5203, 5333, 5522, 5523
Chang, Po-ling 5333
Chang, S. T 5522, 5523
Chang, Su-Lee 5522, 5523
Chang, Tse-I 5648
Chao, Bu-wei (Yang) 5652
Chao, Ting-chi 5692
Chapman, Abraham 4941, 5023, 5024, 5025, 5522, 5523
Chapman, C. L 5274
Chapman, Oscar Littleton 5165, 5292
Chapman, Royal N 5522, 5523, 5684
Chapman, Seville 5040
Chapman, Wilhert McLeod 5522, 5523
Chargar, Thelma l 4992, 4993
Charles, Alfred D 5700
Charles, Allan F. 5186
Chartrand, Chester 5700
Charvet, Jean-Felix 5700
Chase, Stuart 5040, 5078
Chatham House 5008, 5081, 5127, 5131,' 5132, 5135-37, 5160, 5208, 5284
Chauucey, Martin 5676
Chen 5358
Chen, General 5419
Chen, Chu 5171, 5174-5176
Chen, Han-seng (Geoffrey C.) 4987,
4996, 5058-5080, 5084, 5085, 5112, 5114, 5115, 5162, 5171, 5178, 5181,
5183, 5186, 5203, 5209, 5219, 5234, 5235, 5237, 5250, 5337, 5341, 5356,
5524, 5525, 5704.
Chen, Mrs. Han-seng (Susie) 5235
Chen, Jack 5412
Chen, K. P 5178, 5235, 5333
Chen, Ll-fu 4939, 4960
I^"DEX XI
Pag«
Chen, L. T 5083
Chen, Nan-sang 5019
Chen, Rockwood 50G1
Chen, Shou-Yi 5524, 5525
Chen, Stephen 5650
Chen, Su-ching 5524, 5525
Chen, Mrs. Susie Ku 5171
Chen, Ta 5427
Cheng, Hsueh-Hsi 5211
Chennault, Claire Lee 5061, 5342, 5357, 5659
Cherrington, Ben 5156
Cherubin, Charles 4991-4993
Chesman, Miriam 4989, 4993
Chi 5306
Chi, Chao-ting 4968,
4987, 5174-^5176, 5192, 5193, 5198, 5203, 5234-5236, 5249, 5250, 5254,
5259, 5268, 5271, 5308, 5328, 5337, 5341, 5358, 5524, 5525.
Chi, Harriet 5704
Chiang, Hsien-tsung 5400
Chiang, Kai-shek (Generalissimo) 4932,
4935, 4938, 4939, 4941, 4968, 5010, 5017, 5045, 5071, 5073, 5174, 5176,
5185, 5188, 5196, 5211, 5216, 5219, 5233, 5249, 5253, 52.54, 5268, 5277,
5281, 5283, 5298, 5329, 5347, 5348, 5358, 5375, 5384, 5388, 5403, 5405,
5408, 5409, 5422, 5469, 5650, 5653, 5662, 5671, 5706.
Chiang, Madame Kai-shek 5064, 5196, 5211, 5348, 5385, 5393
Chiang, Mon-Lin 5321, 5322, 5329, 5333, 5344, 5361, 5578, 5579, 56-53
Chiang, Peng-fei 5407
Chicago Daily News 4973
Chien, Tuan-sheng 5010, 5013, 5014, 5054, 5253, 5524, 5525
Chile 5332
Chin, Ai-Li S 5524, 5525
Chin, Rockwood Q. P 5524, 5525
Chin, R. P 5202
China 5306,
5307, 5313-5315, .5318-5321, 5327-5330, 5332-5335, 5339, 5346, 5348-
5350, 5356, 5357, 5359, 5331, 5363, 5364, 5368, 5371, 5372, 537.5-5378,
5382-5384, 5386-5389, 5391-5394, 5396, 5397, 540:3-5407, 5410-5412,
5415, 5419-.5421, 5423, 5424, 5426, 5427-5432, 5435, 5460, 5462, 5469,
.5475, 5479, 5480, 5481, 5500-5502, 5641-5642, 5664, 5666, 5639-5672,
5674, 5686, 5687, 5692, 5701, 5705-5710.
China Aid Council 5674, 5710
China Campaign Committee .5412
China, Central Government of 5176, 5215, 5218, 52.53, 5382, 5417
China Christian Advocate .5661
China, Government of 5391, 5392, 5397, 5431, 54.32, 5433, 5469
China I^istitute 5345
China Monthly Review 5.374
China, Republic of 5671
China, Small Political Parties of 5524, 5.525
China Today 5341
Chinese Chamber of Commerce ,5639
Chinese Communist Government 5341
Chinese Consulate (Wasliington) 5178
Chinese Embsissy (Bangkok) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Berlin) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Brussels) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Canberra) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Hague) 5193
Chinese Embassy (London) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Moscow) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Ottawa) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Paris) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Rome) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Tokyo) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Washington) 4961. .5042. .5700
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 5002,5193,5210,5245,5345,5709,5710
Xn INDEX
Pase
Chinese Nationalist Government 4929,
4932, 4935-4939, 4941, 4959, 5002, 5023, 5060, 5062, 5069, 5070, 5072,
5087, 508S, 5104, 5120, 5130, 5133, 5176, 5196, 5202, 5203, 5211, 5223,
5231, 5249, 5254, 5329, 5335, 5359, 5363, 5365, 5383, 5393, 5394, 5403,
5406-5409, 5427, 5430, 5436, 5709.
Chinese National Party 4932,
4937, 5010-5012, 5085, 5086, 5088, 5176, 5215, 5216, 5223, 5232-5234,
5283, 5284, 5287, 5329-5331, 5337, 5347, 5356, 5369, 5372, 5374, 5375,
5377, 5383-5387, 5391, 5392, 5396, 5403, 5404, 5406-5412, 5416-5423.
5425, 5483, 5484, 5502.
Chinese Nationalist Army 4936, 4937, 4940, 4970, 5071, 5252
Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation 5344, 5361
Chinese Red Army 5085, 5217
Chinese Soviet Republic 5374
Chitral, S. S 5137
Chiu, A. Kaiming 5524, 5525
Chosen Christian College 5319
Chou, En-lai 5011, 5012, 5196, 5223, 5236
Chou, Pei-yuan 5013, 5014
Chow, S. R 5070,5524,5525
Christian 5685
Christian Century, The 5661, 5663, 5669, 5671
Christian, John L 5032, 5048, 5524, 5525, 5684
Christian, Pearl C 1 4990,4993
Christian Science Monitor 5153, 5180, 5181, 5355, 5415, 5650
Christy, Arthur 5647
Chu, C. K 5344,-5361
Chu, Ching-Lai 5524, 5525
Chu, Coching 5524, 5525
Chu, King 5344, 5361
Chu, Mrs. Nora T. H 5344,5361
Chu, Teh 5358,5368, 5422
Chungking 5310, 5333, 5348,
5368, 5369, 5371, 5383, 5391, 5403, 5404, 5409, 5420, 5424, 5427, 5465
Churchill, Arthur C 5524, 5525
Churchill, Winston 4935, 5041,
5060, 5071, 5075, 5179, 5243, 5280, 5328, 5349, 5422, 5483, 5486, 5671
CIA. (See Central Intelligence Agency.)
CIO. (See Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
CIO News 4975
Civil Rights Congress 5676
Clapper, Raymond 4973
Clark, Andrew H 5524,5525
Clark, Elizabeth Allerton 5524, 5.525, 5666
Clark, Glover 5684
Clark, Grenville 5085, 5183
Clark, Tom 5354,5355
Clark, Walter 5524,5525
Clark, Mrs. Warner 5040
Clark, Winnifred 4987, 4993
Clarke, Colin 5524, 5-525
Clarke, D. C 4944
Clarke, Lady, Selwyn 5412
Claston 52-59
Clausewitz 5454
Claxton, Brooke 5270
Cleeve, Margaret E. (Madge) 5008, 5083, 5137, 5203, 5334
Clementln. J. R 5-524,5-^25
Cleveland, Harlan 5524, 5525
Close, Upton 52,55
Clough, Edwin 5524, 5r>2'y
Clulib, O. Edmund 5061, 5346, 5468, 5469, 5477, .5489, 5700
Cluckhorn Russian Institute 54-54, 54-57
Clyde, Paul Hibbert 5526, 5.527, 5656
CNRR A. ( See Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation. )
Co, Tui 5526, 5527
INDEX xm
Page
Goad, N. E 5526, 5527
Coast, John 5526, 5527
Coatman, J 5526, 5527
Cochrane, William 5112
Cochrane, Mrs. William 5112
Coe. Frank V 4975, 4977, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5346, 5703
Coff, Mr 5299
Coff, Mrs 5299
Coffee, Congressman 4975
Coffee, John 4976
Coffey, Mike 4990, 4993
Cohen, Jerome B 5298, 5526, 5527, 5684
Cohen, Nathaniel 5526, 5527
Cohen, Theodore 5526, 5527
Cohen, Wallace M 5295, 5700
Cohen, Mrs. Wallace 5295
€01. (-See Office of Coordinator of Information.)
Colbert, Mrs. Evelyn S 5700
Coldwell, M. J 5270
Cole, Allan B 5526,5527
Colegrove, Kenneth 4931, 5078, 5193, 5204, 5314, 5315, 5340, 5526, 5527
Coleman, George R 4983
Coleman, Norman F 5318
College de France 5322
Collier, Mrs. John 5702
Colliers Magazine 5278, 5673
Collinge, Patricia 5651
Collins, Charles 5684
Collins, Henry 5299
Collis, Maurice 5526, 5527, 5653
Colombos, C. J 5526,5527
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 5255,5267,5701
Columbus (Ohio) Citizen 5674,5676
Cominform 5387
Comintern 4942, 5196, 5337, 5368, 5370, 5384, 5385, 5500, 5706
Commager, H. S 5661
Commerce International-China 5107, 5202, 5203, 5210-5213, 5246
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 4941, 5024, 5412
Committee on Militarism in Education 5353, 5354
Common Sense magazine 5040, 5041, 5674
Communist (see also Political Affairs) 1 5338
Communist Academy (^Moscow) . 4922,5128,5150
Communist International 5424, 5425, 5426, 5501
Communist International, Executive Committee 5424, 5425
Communist International, Third World Conference 4956, 5711
Communist International, Seventh World Congress 5425
Communist Parties, National 4942, 5425
Communist Party 4928,
4929, 4931, 4932, 4935, 4937-4945, 4950-4953, 4981, 5011, 5012, 5085-
5089, 5115, 5120, 5128, 5131, 5149, 5163, 5167, 5174, 5176, 5204, 5213,
5215, 5216, 5232, 5233, 5253, 5276-5283, 5284, 5287, 5298, 5306, 5310,
5314, 5316, 5324, 5334, 5337, 5340, 5341, 5343-5355, 5357, 5358, 5365,
5367, 5368, 5381, 5386, 5396, 5400, 5403, 5404, 5412, 5414, 5418, 5420,
5421, 5422, 5426, 5427, 5438, 5439, 5445-5447, 5460, 5465, 5466, 5469,
5471-5473, 5476, 5477-5479, 5486, 5500, 5502-5504, 5675, 5677, 5678,
5684-5686, 5705-5709.
Communist Party (American) 4937,4939,4941,5024,5364,5379,5412,5413
Communist Party (American, Ohio) 5675
Communist Party (American, Ohio, Cleveland) 5676
Communist Party (American, Ohio, Franklin County) 5675,5676
Communist Party (British) 5307, 5308, 5370, 5412
Communist Party (Chinese) 4928,
4929, 4931, 4932, 4935, 4937-4941, 4945, 4950-4953, 5011, 5012,
5085-5089, 5115, 5120, 5163, 5176, 5213, 5215. 5216, 5232, 5233, 5253,
5276-5281, 5283, 5284, 5287, 5298, 5314, 5315, 5329, 5350, 5357, 5358,
5364, 5365, 5367-5378, 5382-5385, 5387, 5388, 5392-5395, 5405, 5407,
5409-5412, 5415-5417, 5419, 5420, 5422-5426, 5448, 5453, 5454, 5467.
5483, 5484, 5501, 5707.
XIV INDEX
Pag©
Communist Party (Czechoslovakian) 5395
Communist Party (German) 5204, 5368
Communist Party (Indian) 530S
Communist Party (Indonesian) 5641
Communist Party (Malayan) 5395
Communist Party (Netherland) 5635
Communist Party (New York State Committee) 5024
Communist Party (Russian) 5279, 5282, 5382, 5385, 5386, 5396, 5422
Communist Party (Yugoslavian) 5374
Communist Party Central Committee 5409. 5421
Compton, Arthur H 5040, 5299, 5323
Comstock, Ada L 5186
Comstock. Alzada 5526, 5527
Comyus-Carr, A. S 5526. 5527
Conant, Mrs 5299
Conant, James Bryant 5299, 5302, 5303
Conant, Melvin A., Jr 4990, 4993, 5526, 5527
Conde, David 5526, 5527
Condliffe, J. B 5009,
5040, 5260, 5318, 5321, 5327. 5335, 5526, 5527
Condominas, George 5526, 5527
Confederation of Latin American Workers 5041
Congress of Industrial Organizations 4974,
4975, 4977, 5041, 5067, 5413, 5504, 5700, 5703
Coniston, Ralph A 5653
Connally, Senator 4935
Conolly, Violet 5526, 5527
Conover, Harry 5526, 5527
Constantino. Renato 5526. 5527
Converse, Elizabeth A 4990, 4993, 5526, 5527
Cook, John B 4976
Coolidge, Archie 5116
Coolidge, Harold J 5291, 5528, 5529
Coons, Arthur G 4944, 5285, 5703
Cooper, John 5643
Coordinator of Information 4958.
4973, 5000, 5001. 5254, 5256-5259, 5268, 5415, 5692
Cope, Elizabeth W 5528, 5529
Copland, D. B 5528, 5529, 5684
Corbett 5686
Cori)ett, Charles H 5528, 5529
Corbett, Percy E 4987, 5070,
5078, 5081, 5208, 5209, 5214, 5268, 5324, 5333, 5355, 5528, 5529, 5684
Corbitt, Duvon C . 5528, 5529
Cordell, Stanley 5189
CorriL'-an, John V 5674
Costello 5681
Cottrell, Nickolas 5700
Coughlin, Richard J 5528, 5529
Coulter. John W 5528, 5529
Coulter, John W 4958,4978
Council for Pan-American Democracy 5703
Council on Foreign Relations 5066, 5068, 5167, 5203, 5260, 5314, 5317
Coupland, Reginald 5528. 5529
Coville, Cabot 5204, 5700
Coville, Mrs. Lillian 4990, 4993, 5294, 5295, 5700
Cowell, Mrs. Olive Thompson 5040
Cowles, Gardner 4973, 4975, 5047
Cowper, Norman 5027
Cowie, Donald s 5.528, 5529
Cox, Mr 5204, 5217
Cox, Geoffrey 5049, 50.52, 5053
Coxe, Spencer 5528, 5529
Coyne, J. B 5270
Coyl, John 5261
CPSU. ((See Communist Party, Russian.)
INDEX XV
Page
Craig 5299
Craigie, Robert 5189, 5190
Crandell, Miss Ella 5123
Crane, Milton 5653
Cranes, John 5299
Crawford, David L__ 5207
Crawford, Elizabeth 4990, 4993, 4997
Creel, George 5659
Creel, Herrlee, Glessner 5528,5529
Creighton, S. M 5163, 5348
Cressey, George B 4944, 4999, 5336, 5528, 5529
Crimea Conference 5485
Cripps 5203,5215
Cripps, Lady 5081
Cripps, Stafford 5348
Crocker, W. K 5528, 5529
Crosbv, Alec 5246
Crosbv, E. H. G 5528, 5529
Crosby, Josiah 5528, 5529, 5684
Cross, Samuel N 5111,5116
Cromwell, Mr 5298
Grossman, Mr 1 — 5338
Crowford, John G 5528,5529
Crnm, Bartley Cavannaugh 5653
Culbertson, Ely 5271
Culbertson, William S 4958, 4979, 4980
Cullum, Robert M 5528, 5529, 5582, 5583
Culver, Margaret S 5528, 5529
Cumberland, Kenneth B 5528, 5529
Cune, Mr 5299
Cune, Mrs 5299
Cunningham, George 5528, 5529
Cunningham, Kenneth B 5528, 5529
Cunningham, Lillian 4989, 4993
Curran, Jean A., Jr 5530, 5531
Currie, Arthur 5319, 5335, 5349, 5684
Currie, Lauchlin 4919,
4924-4926, 4936, 4944, 4958, 4973, 4977, 4978, 4984, 5013, 5082, 5045,
5047, 5052, 5055, 5057-5059, 5198, 5199, 5234-5237, 5253, 5259, 5261,
5262, 5272, 5274, 5286, 5296.
Curti, Merle 5661
Curtis, Aileen 4985, 4993
Curtis, John L 4944, 5259
Curtis, Sue 5704
Czechoslovaljia 5076, 5185, 5382, 5386, 5480, 5638
Czechoslovakia, Government of 5075, 5201
D
Dafoe, J. W 5153, 5156, 5175, 5199, 5271, 5320, 5324, 5327, 5333, 5359
Dahl, Sonja 4990, 4993, 5285
Dai, Bao 5395
Daiches, David 5700
Daily Worker, The 4926,
4935, 4939, 4941, 5337, 5338, 5340, 5352, 5356, 5645, 5678
Daladier 5184,5340
Dalley, F. W 5530, 5531
Dan, Ino 5333
Daniel, Howard 5530, 5531
Daniel, Judith 4988
Dantwala, M. L 5530, 5531
d'Argenlieu, Admiral 5394
Darden, C. W., Jr 5323
Darrow, Evelyn M 4992, 4993
Das Kapital 5310
Datta, S. K 5209,5348
XVI INDEX
Page
Davenport, F. M -3- 51^
David, Edward M ^^§*^' 2? j?"
David, Madeline ^^f//- 2:^^1
Davidson, C. G »2(4, 5291, o292
Davidson, J. W ^^•*"' P;??^
Davies, Ambassador ^^^^
Davies Mr 504o, 5300, o420
Davies! C. Collins 5530,5531
Davies, C. H oo30, uo31
Davies, John oOll, 5013, 5061, 5346
Davies! John P., Jr 5437-5483
Davies. Joseph 4973, 5199, 5252, 5256, 5201, 5298
Davis, Mr »166
Davis, Elmer -;- »2^^
Davis, Harold C 5oo0, 5o31
Davis, J. Merle 5318, o33d
Davis, Joseph S o530, 5o31, 5684
Davis, Kingsley 5530, 5531
Davis, Larule :;-- ^^^
Davis, Norman H 5252, 5349
Davis. Palk, WardweU, Sunderland & Kiendl 4908, 5344, 5352
Dawes, R. A o'i'OO
Dawson. C. C o530, 5531
Dav, Augusta 4993
Davason, E. C -^199
Dean, A. L t>207
Dean, Arthur H 4942. 4943,
4958, 4968, 5026, 5274, 5298, 5300, 5344, 5360, 5366, 5684
Dean, Edgar Packard 5530, 5531
Dean. Vera Micheles 5009, 5260, 5264, 5300, 5530, 5531, 5653. 5656
Deane, Hugh 5107, 5346, 5415
Deans. Harry 5186
de Beauclair, I 5510,5511
de Bernstorfif. S. E. le Comte 5691
de Boov, H. Th 5514, 5515
De Caux, Len 4944, 4975, 4977, 5522, 5523, 5684, 5700, 5703
Decker, J. W 5530,5531
De Francis 4987, 5295, 5530, 5531. 5700
Desras, Jane 5530, 5531
Deimel. Henry L.. Jr 4997,5998
de Jong. Ellen Van Zyll 4987, 5236, 5268, 5558, 5559
DeKiewist 5302
De Korne. John C 5530, 5531
de Laguna, Frederica 5564, 5.565
de Lapomarded, Baron 5564, 5565
DeLeonardis, Salvatore 4990, 4993
Delgado, Lionel C 4990, 4993
Delhi 5465
Delhi School of Economics 5323
D'Elia. Paschal M 5530,5531
De Long 5681. 5682
de Meel, H 5576, 5577
DeMenocal, Daniel A 5165
Demieville, P 5532, 5533
Democratic League 5404, 5410, 5411
Denison, Ellery 5700
Denmark 5380
Dennery, E 5131, 5175, 5209, 5333, 5359. 5684
Dennett, Raymond 4937, 4939, 4944, 4989, 4993, 5032,
5063, 5065, 5078-5082, 5031, 5061, 5364-5367, 5413, 5414, 5.532, 5533
Dennett, Tyler 4973. 4977. 5532, 5533, 5r84
Dennison, Eleanor 5532, 5533, 5700
Dennison, Robert L 4930, 49.32
Denny, Ludwell 5700
de Riencourt, Amaury 5660
De Roy, Benjamin 5704
INDEX xrv^n
Page
Derrick, K. A 5532, 5533
de Seheinitz. Karl - 5702
Des Moines Register and Tribune 4973, 5326, 5703
Despres. Emile 4975, 4977, 5270, 5346
Devine. Samuel L 5674
DeVoosd, Nicholas A. J 5052, 5053, 5089
de Tries, E 5620, 5621
Dewantara, Ki Hadjar 5532,5533
Dewar, Margaret 5532, 5533
de Weizsacher, Le Baron E 5691
Dewev, A. Gordon 5532,5533
de Wiart, Carton 5382
De Young, Henry C 5062, 5321
Dliar. Subhas K 5532, 5533
Dickinson, Edna O 4993
Dickinson, La Fell 5700
Dickinson. Mrs. La Fell 5696, 5697
Dies Committee 5047
Dietrich, Miss 4997
Dietrich, Ethel B 5532. 5533
Dillard, Hardv C 4958,4972,4973
Dillingham, Walter F 4^3, 5207, 5344. 5360
Dillings, Mrs 5191
Dimantshtein, Victor 5128, 5137, 5138
Dimitrov, George 5501
Dimitry, Helen 4990. 4993
Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America 5413
Dix, Marion 5302
Djajadininsrat, Raden Lockman 5321
Djang, Y. S 5345,5361
Dobb, Maurice 5532. 5533
Dobby, E. H. G 5532, 5533
Dobson, R. P 5650
Dodd, Bella 5023
Dodds, Vera 4987, 4988, 5532. 5533
Dodson, Elba Aileen 4990, 4993
Dolivet, Louis 4984. 5019
Dollard, Charles 4913, 4973, 5083, 5090, 5227, 5298, 5299. 5300
Domei 5215,5232
Donald, Dudley B 5532. 5533
Donaldson, Faith 4915-4917. 5140
Donohue, Irene R 5031, 5065, 5273, 5336, 5362
Donovan, General 5475
Dooman. Eugene 5053
Dorfman, Ben 5009, 5219, 5247, 5248, 5700
Door Co 5105
Douglas, Dorothy 5288
Douglas, Elaine 4991. 4993
Douglas, Emily Taft 5064
Douglas, Henry 5295
Douglas, Mrs. W. W 5040
Douglas, William O 4984. 5027
Downing. Elizabeth 4987, 4988, 5001, 5045, 5157, 5160, 5161, 5179
Do Yandly, Anthony 5532, 5533
Doyle, Daniel F 4990. 4993
Drabble, J. G ,5532.5533
Dragoni, C 5205, 5532, 5533
Draper, Charles Dana 5116
Draper, Ernest G 5346
Draper, Theodore 5346
Dreyhausen. H. V 5700
Drummond, W. M 5532, 5533
Drumwright, Everett 5480
Dubin, Wilbert B 5532.5533
DuBois, Cora Alice 5294, 5301, 5659, 5700
XVin INDEX
Pa£«
Dubs, Homer H 4988, 4989, 4993, 5229, 5532, 5532
Duce, James Terry 5700
Dufigan, Lawrence 5172, 5209, 5216, 5286, 5346, 5354-5356, 5684
Duke. K. R 4944
Dull, Paul S 5532,5533
Dulles, A. W 5084,5170
Dulles, Foster Rhea 5282, 5287, 5651
Dulles, John Foster 4931, 5067, 5350. 5534, 5535. 5681
Dunlop, G. A 5320,5:^34
Dunn, J. Kynang 5534,5535
Dunn, Margaret M 4990,4993
Dunn, Thomas P 5316
Dunsont, J. Leslie 5534,5535
Dupuy, R. Ernest 5534,5535,5684,5700
Durant, Kenneth 5085, 5197
Duranty, Walter 5659
Durga, Das 5323
Durham, Walter A., Jr 5534,5535
Durr, Clifford 5112
Dutt, R. P 5308
Dutt, V. P 5690
Duyvendak, J. J. L 5334
Dyason, Edward C 5267
Dykstra, Clarence A 4944
Dutch Embassy (Paris) 5082
E
Earle, Edward M 4977, 5167, 5208, 5209, 5225, 5260, 5355, 5356
Earle, Frances M 5534, 5535
Earnshaw, Ruth 4988, 5534, 5535
Eastlake, Clara 5700
Eastman, Max 5079, 5656
Eaton College 5002
Eaton, Paul E 5534, 5535
Eberhard, W 5534, 5535
Eby, Kermit 5534, 5535
EGA. {See Economic Cooperation Administration.)
ECAFE. {See Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.)
Ecole des Science Politiques 5327
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 5296, 5297, 5300, 5301
Economic Cooperation Administration 5315, 5432
Eddy, Sherwood 5085, 5191, 5192
Edelman, H 5534, 5535
Edelstein, Julius 5684
Eden, Anthony 5059, 5060, 5656
Edison, Charles A 5344
Edward, Gladys H 4991, 4992, 4993
Edwards, Corwin D 5534, 5535, 5698
Edwards, Dwight 4936, 5344
Edwards, Passmore 5188
Edwards, Paul C 5040
Ega'n, Charleen 5700
Egan, Martin 5123
Eggan, Fred 5534, 5535
Eggleston, Frederick 5062
Eggleston, F. W 5319, 5320, 5333, 5534, 5535
Eggleston, Polly 5534, 5535
Egoriew, Vladimir 5692
Ehle, Emily L 55.34, 5.535
Ehrlich, Anita 4991, 49.)3
Eighth Route Army 5085, 5086, 5188, 5196, 5233, 5241, 5.368, 53S0, 5417
Eighteenth Group Army 5370, 5371, 5372, .5404
Einstein, Ali)ert 5040
Eisenhower, Dwight David 5656
Eisler, Gerhard 5356
INDEX xrx
Page
Elchibegoff. Ivan 5534, 5535
Eldridge, Fred 5651
Eliot, George Fielding 5536, 5537, 5656
Elisiefif, Serge 5116, 5229
Elizalde, Joaquin M 5321
Elizalde. Manuel 5026, 5027, 5052, 5053, 5059
Elkus, Mrs. Charles De Young 5040
Eller, E. M 5700
Ellinger, Barnard 5534, 5535
Elliott, Jim 5295
Elliott, Robert C 5040
Elliott, WilUam Y 5053,5116
EUiston, H 5323
Elliston, H. B 5084, 5153, 5156, 5180, 5181
Eloesser, Herbert 4944
Elson, Jean 4990, 4993
Embree 5688
Embree, Edwin R 4977, 5123, 5536, 5537
Embree, John Fee 5536, 5537, 5648, 5688
Emeny, Brooks 4943,
4973, 4977, 5020, 5199, 5269, 5274, 5277, 5279, 5344, 5360, 5536, 5537
Emerson. Hubert 4944, 4967, 4973, 4975, 5116, 5289, 5336, 5536, 5537, 5703
Emery, Edgar B 5536, 5537
Emmerson, John 5062
p]ngel, Leonard 5536, 5537
Engels 5420. 5422
Engers, J. F 5053,5536,5537
England. (See Great Britain.)
Englander, Florence 4990, 4993
Ennis, Thomas Edson , 5656
Ensor, R. C. K 5536, 5537
Entenberg, Barbara 5536, 5537
Epstein, Israel. 5023, 5024, 5083, 5346, 5350, 5357, 5374, 5427, 5428, 5536, 5537, 5653
Erwin, Katherine 5295
Escara, Jean 5536, 5537
Espy, Willard R 5536, 5537
Ethiopia 5708
Evans, Roger 5688
Evening Star Nevrspaper 5702
Ewins, Ethel E 4990, 4993, 5536, 5537, 5697
Export-Import Bank 5429, 5432, 5700
Ezekiel, Mordecai 5261
F
Fabian, quarterly 5377
Fablet, Capitaine de Vaisseau Julian 5692
Fabyan, Eleanor 4987
Fahs, C. B 4973, 5000, 5007, 5008, 5299, 5536, 5537, 5700, 5704
Fainsod, Merle 5116
Fair Employment Practices Commission 5678
Fairbank 5686
Fairbank, John K 4944, 5000, 5024, 5057, 5177, 5187, 5296, 5300, 5303,
5317, 5374, 5427, 5438, 5439, 5440, 5443, 5445, 5447, 5448, 5454, 5456,
5457, 5475, 5479, 5481, 5482, 5536, 5537, 5651, 5652, 5654-5660. 5685
Fairbank, Mrs. John K. (Wilma) 4979, 4984, 5010, 5013, 5014, 5274, 5295, 5297,
5301, 5438, 5444, 5445, 5447, 5478, 5479, 5481, 5482, 5536, 5537, 5711
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie 4987, 5118,
5120, 5175, 5179, 5198, 5203, 5210, 5247, 5356, 5357, 5536, 5537. 5704
Falconer, Fobert A 5536, 5537
Fall, Hrepilad 5112
Fang. Cbaoying 5536, 5537
FAO 5700
Far East Digest 5328
Far East Spotlight 5412
Far Eastern Commission 5342
XX INDEX
Pag»
Far Eastern Institute 5312
Far Eastern Survey 4940, 4956, 4977, 49SS, 49S9, 4991, 5007, 5010, 5021,
5024, 5025, 5029, 5030, 5048, 5063, 5064, 5140, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5236,
5237, 5239, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5248, 5255, 5257, 5259, 5267, 5279, 5282,
5283, 5284, 5287, 5328, 5329, 5378, 5426, 5504-5633, 5689, 5696, 5703
Farley, James Aloysius 5657
Farley, Miriam S 4965, 5967,
4969, 4972, 4988, 4989, 4993, 5021, 5053, 5089, 5179, 5181, 5218, 5224,
5225, 5228, 5234, 5236, 5239, 5329, 5366, 5413-5415, 5536, 5537, 5683
Farmer, Victor 5536, 5537
Farrelly, Theodore S 5538,5539
Faulkner. James M ^^38, 5539
Fautz, Elizabeth ^'^00
Faymonvilie, Philip R 5045,5059,5112,5252
FBI. (See Federal Bureau of Investigation.) .
FEA. (See Forei2;n Economic Administration.)
Feary, Bob 5021, 5294
Federal Bureau of Investigation 5109, 5353, 5355, 56 < 8, 5680
Federal Council of Churches Executive Committee 5538, 5539
Federal Reserve Bank 4974, 5040, 5249, 5268
Federal Reserve System 5346
Fedotov, Anthony N 5199, 5267
Fei, Hsiao-Tung 5538, 5539, 5648, 5686, 5687
Feis 5224
Fels, Samuel S 5078
Feng (Fing), Chia-Sheng 5538,5539
Fenico, Pasquale J 4944
Fenn, Henry C 5538,5539
FEPC. {See Fair Employment Practices Commission.)
Feraru, Arthur 5538, 5539
Ferber, Stanley 4992, 4993
Ferguson, G. V 5538, 5539
Fernbach, Alfred P 5700
Ferns, H. S 5538, 5539
Fever, Lewis S 5538, 5539
Field 5685,5705
Field, Betty 5116
Field, Edith 5279
Field, Frederick V 4922,
4939, 4941, 4944, 4955, 4958, 4959, 4967, 4973, 4977, 4979, 4988, 4997,
5023, 5024, 5032, 5041, 5083-5085, 5114, 5123, 5125, 5126, 5137, 5140,
5142, 5144, 5153, 5154, 5156, 5161, 5162, 5164, 5167, 5169, 5170, 5175,
5178, 5179, 5182-5184, 5186-5190, 5193, 5196, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5210,
5215-5218, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5257, 5258, 5289, 5290, 5306, 5337, 5338,
5339, 5352, 5353, 5354, 5356, 5365, 5413, 5538, 5539, 5703.
Field, Henry 5182, 5700
Field, Marshall 5079, 5080, 5299
Field, Olga V 4991, 4993, 5538, 5539
Field, William O. Jr 5238
Fields, John E 5538, 5539
Fifield, Russell H 5538,5539
Fillman, Gwendolyn R 5700
Fine, Donald 4992, 4993
Finer, Herman 5657
Finklestein, Lawrence S 5538, 5539
Finland 5369
Finley, John H 5084, 5169
Finn, Dallas 5538, 5539
Finney, Ruth 5700
Firth, Ra.vmond 5538, 5539
Fischer, John 5062, 5653
Fischer, Louis 5384
Fischl, Margaret 4989, 4993
Firshman, Bernice 4990, 4993
Fish, Hamilton 5002
Fishback, Sam 5700
nSTDEX XXI
Page
risher, Allan G. B 5538, 5539
Fisher, F. MacCracken 5294, 5295, 5700
Fisher, Mrs. F. M 57(X)
Fisher Galen M_ 4944,
4999, 5083, 5131, 5186, 5198, 5218, 5243, 5538, 5539, 5684, 5704
Fisher, George 5538, 5539
Fisher, Gerald W 5207
Fisher, Harold H 4944, 5186, 5322, 5323, 5538, 5539
Fisher' Jack 5080
Fisher, Mac 5061
Fisher, Ralph 5700
Fitzgerald, C. P 5540, 5541
Flato 5286
Fleisher Wilfred 5062, 5648, 5673, 5700
Fleming, Peter 5177, 5540, 5541
Flersheim, Robert E 5540, 5541
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 5313, 5321
Fleugal, Edna R 4929, 5485
Florinsky ' 5238
Flournov, Richard 5540, 5541
Flower, Lida 5540, 5541
Flvnn, Edward Joseph 5653
Fo, Snn 5540, 5541
Fong, H. D 5328, 5540, 5541, 5684
Food Research Institute 5335, 5341
Ford, Anne 5350
Ford Foundation 5023, 5026
Ford, George 5295
Ford, Guy Stanton 5700
Ford, Henry 5074
Foreign Affairs ^- 4982, 5115, 5116, 5240, 5316
Foreign Economic Administration 5287, 5703
Foreign Policy Association 4959,
4961, 4962, 4963, 4971, 5009, 5063, 5066, 5068, 5105, 5263, 5289, 5299,
5314, 5317, 5337, 5344, 5413, 5711.
Foreman. Clark 4964
Forrester, C. S 5440, 5441
Forman College 5348
Forman, Harrison 5648, 5657
Formosa 5375, 5386, 5396, 5397, 5480, 5643, 5671
Forrest, R. A. D 5540, 5541
Forrest, Wilbur 5299
Forrestal. James 4930, 4932, 4983, 5274, 5292, 5486
Forster, Edward Morgan 5658
Fortas. Abe 5112
Forsyth, W. D 5540, 5541, 5684
Fortune Magazine 5008, 5041, 5067, 5183, 5349, 5674
Fosdick, Harry Emerson 5084, 5152, 5158
Fosdick, Raymond 5026, 5123, 5648
Fosque, J. D 5328
Fox 5059, .5261
Fox, Mr 5710
Foy, Alice B 4985, 5017, 5018
Fox, Clarence J 5540, 5541
Fox, Melvin 5709
Foxworthy, F. W 5540, 5541
Foynes 5082
FPA. (See Foreign Policy Association.)
France 5318,
5321, 5827, 5828, 5881, 5333, 5334, 5357, 5369, 5640
France, Government of 4936,
4971, 5062, 5068, 5074. 5081, 5089, 5091, 5096, 5100-5104, 5130, 5185,
5196, 5201, 5206, 5222, 5224. 5258.
Franco 5388, 5681
Francus, Lan 5564, 5565
Franke, Herbert 5540, 5541
XXII INDEX
Page
Frankfurter, Felix 5083, 5085, 5111, 5178
Franz, Joseph Land 5113
Freedman, Frances 5540, 5541
Freedman, Maurice 5540, 5541
Freeman 4942
Freeman, Fulton 5480
Freeman, Miller 4939
Free World Magazine 5019, 5040, 5041
Freist, Dorothy M 4990, 4993
French Army 5092, 5095, 5209
French Embassy (Bangkok) 5193
French Embassy (Berlin) 5193
French Embassy (Brussels) 5193
French Embassy (Canberra) 5193
French Embassy (Chungking) 5193
French Embassy (Hague) 5193
French Embassy (London) 5193
French Embassy (Moscow) 5193
French Eml)assy (Ottawa) 5193
French Embassy (Rome) 5193
French Embassy (Shanghai) 5193
French Embassy (Tokyo) 5193
French Indochina 5089, 5259
Friedberg, Mr 5295
Friedman, Frances 4987, 4991, 4993
Friedman Irving S 4919, 4920, 4983, 4987,
5016, 5017, 5085, 5179, 5198, 5244, 5245, 5249, 5268, 5540, 5541, 5711
Friedman, Julian 5346, 5428
Friedrich, Carl J 5540, 5541
Friendly, Alfred 5023, 5112
Friends of the Soviet Union 5164
Friters, Gerald M 5540, 5541
Frost. Richard A 5540, 5541
Frumkin, Grzegorz 5540, 5541
Frucht, Rita 4990, 4993
Fry, Thomas Pentherthy 5540, 5541, 5684
Fuchs, Dr 5396
Fuchs, Klaus 5486
Fuchs, Walter 5540, 5541
Fugh, PhilliD 5542. 5543
Fulii, Kazuko Kay 4992. 4993
Fujii. Shuji 5542. 554.^
Fuiima. Edward A 4991, 4992, 499a
Fulbright, James W 5049, 5052, 5053
Furber, Holden 5542, 5543
Furnass, J. C 5542, 5543
Furniss, E. S 5689
Furnival, T. J , 5542, 5543-
G
G-2. (See United States War Department, Military Intelligence.)
Gabriel, Ralph H 5661
Gaddis, J. W 5415
Gadgil, D. R 5323,5542,5543
Gadgri, D. R , 5026
Gaffe, Phil 5000
Gage, Eugenia , 5542, 5543
Gaines, Lt. Col 5049
Galant, Henry 5295
Galant, Mrs. Henry 5295
Galletti, R , 5542, 5543
Gallus, Wilya 4988, 4989, 4994
Gamba, Charles 5.542, 5543
Gamble, Charles K 4944,5276
Gamble, Sydney , 5542, 5543
i^,DEx xxm
Page
Gammas, L. D 5334
Gandel, Rose • fQ^
Gandhi, Mr '^'^a^
Gani, A. K ^641
Gapanovich ^^^^
Garbuny, Siegfried 5542, 5j43
Garcia, Carlos , »^^
Gardiner, John ^oV"^
Garside, B. A 5344
Gary, Howard C 5542, 5543
Gaskill, Gussie Esther 5o42, o54.^
Gates, Artemus 4934, 4936, 4998
Gates, M. Jean 5295, 5696, 5697
Gauss, Ambassador 5283
Gauss, Mr 5461
Gauss, C. E , 5700
Gaus, John M 5198, 5214
Gayer, Arthur D 5684
Gayn, Mark J 5346, o653
Geddes, D. P , 5041
Gehle, F. V 5252
Gilber, Lionel . 5542, 5o43
Gelder, Stuart 5542, 5543
Gelfan, Mr , 5299
Gelfan, Mrs. (See Moore, Harriet.)
Gelman, George 5542, 5543
General Federation of Women's Clubs 5700
Geneva . 5335, 5362
Geneva Disarmament Conference 5691
George, W. H 5542, 5543
George Williams College 5661
Gepp, Herbert 5334
Gerathy, Theresa 4988
Gerber, LiUie ^ 4990, 4994
Gerbode, Mrs. Frank A 4944, 5290, 5703
Gerbode, M 5273, 5274
Gerlach, Miss Talitha 5268, 5274, 5291, 5709
German Army 4970, 5232
German-Japanese Alliance 4935, 5140, 5145, 5147, 5167, 5189, 5194
German-Russian War 5246
German Social Democratic Party 5374
Germany 5354,
5369, 5375, 5380, 5397, 5401, 5426, 5484, 5503, 5664, 5665, 5667, 5673,
5691, 5699.
Germany, Government of 4929,
4935, 4970, 4971, 5000, 5035, 5071, 5073, 5074, 5092-5102, 5145, 5177,
5184, 5185, 5194, 5201, 5206, 5222, 5223, 5226, 5231, 5258.
Germany, National Socialist Party of 4965,
5038, 5069, 5071, 5073, 5075, 5189, 5217, 5251, 5269, 5289, 5290, 5369,
5469, 5679, 5680.
Gerschenkron, Alexander 5542, 5543
Gerson, Jack 4991, 4992, 4994
Gessell, Harold, J. E 5487, 5488
Ghose, D. N 5012
Ghose, Sudhin H 5542,5543
Ghosh, D 5542, 5543
Gibson, Eulalie 4994
Gideonse, Harry D - 5041
Gilbert, Kathleen 5544, 5545
Gilbert, Rodney 5544, 5545
Gilbert, W. C - 5505
Gilchrist, Huntington 4943,
5023, 5025, 5322, 5325, 5333, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5544, 5545
Gilfillan, S. Colum 5041
Gilliam, Mildred 4988
XXrV INDEX
Vaee
Gillmore 5651
Gini, Conrade 5544, 5545
Glass, Leslie 5544, 5545
Glazebrook, G. de T 5544,5545
Glazer, Sidney 5220, 5544, 5545
Glover, Patricia 4987, 5544, 5545
Glowes, Harry G 5544, 5545
Gluck, Filmore 4992, 4994
Gluck, Martin 4992, 4994
Go, Toshi 5544, 5545, 5684
Godby, Marie 4989, 4994
Goebbels, Joseph 5657
Golde, Russell S 5428
Goldenberg, H. Carl 5544,5545
Goldenberg, Rboda 4990, 4994
Goldfrauk. Estlier S. (Sec Wittfogel, Mrs. K. A.)
Golembosti, Josephine 4989, 4994
Gollodin, Ira 5544, 5545
Gonzalez, Bienvenido 5296
Goodrich, Carrington 4944, 5111
Goodrich, Carter 5002, 5261, 5544, 5545
Goodrich, L. C 5336, 5544, 5545
Goodrich, Leland M 5078, 5544, 5545
Gordon, Gloria " 4990, 4994
Gordon, J. King 5544, 5545
Gordon, Margaret S 5544, 5545
Gore-Booth, P. H 5544,5545
Gorgas, Ruth 4992, 4994
Gorki 5386
Goshal, Komar 5078
Gould, B. J 5544, 5545
Gould, Randall C 4983, 5544, 5545, 5851
Gourivitch 5161
Gouron, Pierre 5544, 5545
Gourou, Pierre 5322, 5333, 5ij84
Gousev 5045
Government Printing Office 5698, 5699
Grad, Andrew J 4910,
4984, 4987, 4991, 4994, 5001, 5002, 5007, 5008, 5014, 5015, 5032, 5053,
5060, 6064, 5083, 5198, 5218, 5221, 5228, 5230, 5240, 5268, 5299, 5520,
5521, 5544, 5545, 5546, 5547, 5580, 5581, 5687, 5688, 5689.
Grady, Mrs 5290
Grady, Henry F 4944, 4973, 4997, 5546, 5547
Graham, Senator 5026
Graham, Gerald S 5546, 5547
Grajdanzev, Andrew. (See Grad, Andrew J.)
Granger, Lester B 5546, 5547
Grant, John B 5546, 5547
Grattan, C. Hartley 5546,5547,5684,5685
Graves, General 5145, 5146
Graves, Mortimer 4915,
4944, 4967, 4972, 5000, 5032, 5051, 5083, 5111, 5117, 5198, 5219, 5221,
5238, 5239, 5247, 5248, 5257, 5276, 5286, 5287, 5288, 5293, 5294, 5546,
5547, 5693, 5700.
Gray, F. W 5546, 5547
Great Britain 5318, 5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333,
53:i4, 5368, 5374, 5412, 5424, 5501, 5635, 5638, 5642, 5664, 5708, 5709
Great Britain, Government of 4935-4937,
4966, 4970-4972, 5000, 5009, 5042, 5046, 5048, 5060, 5062, 5066, 5067,
5(16:), 5070, 5072-5074, 5076, 5077, 5081, 5091, 5092, 5096, 5097, 5100,
5103, 5104, 5116, 5130, 5134, 5140, 5177, 5194, 5196, 5206, 5208. 5215,
5222, 5224, 5231, 5249, 5251, 5256, 5258, 5276, 5280, 5285, 5369, 5369,
5399.
Great Soviet World Atlas 5128,
5134, 5136, 5140, 5150, 5158, 5160, 5170, 5173, 5320
Greece 5405
IJSDEX XXV
Page
Green, Carl 5"286, 5295
Green, Elizabeth 5329, 5335, 5546, 5547
Green, James- - — - — 4992, 4994, 5105
Green, James Frederick ■ 5700
Green, O. M 5546, 5547
Greenberg, Harold J . 4988
Greenberg, Michael 4987, 5047, 5199, 5250, 5272, 5546, 5547, 5711
Greenberg, Raymond 4992, 4994
Greenberg, Rose—. 49S9, 4994
Greene-L 5089, 5299, 5300
Greene, Howard 5270
Greene, Jerome D 5199, 5271, 5317, 5318, 5320, 5324, 5333, 5335, 5546, 5547
Greene, Katrine R. C 4972, 4988, 4991, 4994, 5027, 5058, 5259, 5273, 5298, 5301
Greene, Morris 5049, 5052, 5053
Greene, O. M 5684
Greene, Roger S 4958, 4967, 5183, 5546, 5547
Greenidge, Gertrude 4992, 4994
Greenslade, John W 5040, 5278, 5290
Greenwald, Rosalind 4991, 4992, 4994
Greenwood, Mr 5694
Greenwood, Gordon 5546, 5547
Gregorio, Qnirino G 5027, 5322
Gregory ■ 5128
Gregory, Herbert 5546, 5547
Gregory, Isabella Augusta 5654
Gregory, T. E 56S4
Gresham, Mary 5112
Grew, Joseph C 5157, 5189, 5232, 5700
Grew, Mrs. Joseph C 5157
Grey, Arthur L 5660
Grey, Austin 5546, 5547
Griffith, Ernest 4931, 4932
Griffiths, Gordon 5700
Grigsby, Deborah 4990, 4992, 4994
Grimm, Peter 5298
Grimsdale, A. Whitney 5546, 5547
Gripsholm, S. S 5062
Griswold, A. Whitney 5078, 3546, 5547
Gromyko 5045,54,84
Grover 5255
Groves, H. Lawrence 5701
Grow, General 5678
Gruening, Ernest H 4973, 5165
Grunge, Walter 5546, 5547
Guerrero, Leon Ma 5546, 5547
Giierzon, Engracio 5295
Guest, S. Haden 5546, 5547
Guggenheim Foundation 5355, 5662
Gulick, Leeds 5661-5674
Gulick. Luther H 4973, 5002, 5050
Gull, Mr 4985, 5709
Gull. E. M 5350, 5548, 5549, 5684
Gunkle, Robert 5675
Gunn, Selskar M 5059, 5083, 5120
Gunn, Mrs. Selskar M 5120
Gustavson, R. G 5041
Guthman. Renee J 4990, 4994, 5274, 5276, .5286-5288, 5294, 5295, 5693-5699
H
Haan, Kilsoo 5009
Hacke, Mrs. Harold 5040
Hadley, Eleanor M 5548, 5549, 5701
Hager, Reed 4975, 5053, 5548, 5549
Hailey, Lord 5321, 5334, 5548, 5549, 5684
88348 — 52— pt. 14 53
XXVI INDEX
Page
Hailey, Foster 5Jg
Hailsham, Viscount oaij, o^*i
^^^1::b:i::::::::::::::::::"::::::--:-~-----"^^^ 5322
Halifax, Lord ^i^*
■tj„ii 4Jo9
HalirMon'roe 5548, 5549
Hall, Robert B ^j^
Hall, Robert Kiug --;„ '^
Hall, Russell E '^^^S- 5549
Hall, T. D. H u548,5o49
Hallenbeck, Jane E ^i^l
Halsema, James J 5o48, 5o49
Halsey, William F oo73
Halstead, Mr ^^^^
Hambro, C. J 5078
Hamilton, Maxwell M 4J-b,
4927, 4958, 4960, 4976, 5084, 5172, 5173, 5230
Hammer, Ellen J 5298, 5548, 5549
Han, Lih-wu 5344, 5361
Ham-her, V. M 5323
Handy, E. S. C 5548, 5549, 5701
Handy, Mrs. E. S. C -— oTOl
Handy, Elizabeth G 5548, 5549
Handv, Willowdean C 5o48, o549
Hangchow 5319, 5320, 5417
Hansen, A 5260
Hansen, O. C ^ 4944
Hanson, Haldore 5185, 5346, 5395, 5548, 5o49
Hanwell, Norman D 5085, 5180, 5378, 5548, 5549
Haq, Fa/Jul 5005, 5043
Harada, Tasuku 5548, 5549
Harbin 5340
Harden, Sheila 5548, 5549
Haring, C. H- 5548, 5549
Haring, Douglas G 5548, 5549
Harmon, Colonel 5371
Harondar, E. V 4909.
4916, 4922, 4984, 5025, 5112, 5138, 5140, 5150, 5180, 5200
Harper, Norman D 5550, 5551
Harpers Magazine 5041, 5080, 5674
Harrell, Mary E 4988
Hariiman, Mr 5473, 5484
Harriman, George '^651
Harriman, W. Averell 5059, 5112, 5285
Harris, George 5078
Harris, George L 5701
Harrison, Barbara 4992, 4994
Harrison, Burr P 5p02
Harriscm, Peyton 5207
Harsch, Joseph C 5701
Hart 4941
Hart. George H. C 5049, 5053, 5550, 55.51, 5684
Hart, L. V 5550, 5551
Hart, Roies C 4983
Hart, T. C 5703
Hartley, Arnold B 4925
Hartmann, Mr 5452, 5453, 5454
Ilnrtshorne 4965
Harvard Business School 5369
Harvai-d-Yenching Institute 5662
Harvard University Press 5277
Harvey. Evelyn 5550, 5551
Hasan, K. Sarwar 5027
Hashmall, Mrs 5677
INDEX XXVII
Page
HashmaU, Frank 5675, 5676
Haskell, Henry S 5123
Hasse, Robert 4991, 4994
Haste, J. M. D 5550, 5551
Hastings College 5313
Hatcher 5680
Hatta 5640
Hattery, Lowell H 5701
Hauge, O. I 5415
Haulsey, Robert 4992, 4994
Hauser, Ernest O 4988, 5550, 5551
Havas 5334
Hawaii 5317, 5319, 5454, 5699
Haward, Edwin 5550, 5551
Hawes, Harry B 5701
Hawkins, Everett D 5550. 55ol
Hawkins, Sally R 4990,4994,5295
Hawthorn. H. B 5550, 5551
Hawtrey, R. G 5550,5551
Havden, Joseph R 4973, 4997, 5684
Haydon. H ■ 5668
Hayes, Carlton, J. H 5002
Hayes, Kathryu 4992, 4994
Haziu, John G 5550, 5551
Hazard, John 5006, 5045, 5047, 5049, 5286, 5299, 5550, 5551
Hazard, Mrs. John 5299
Headley, James G 5674
Heald, Stephen 5550, 5551
Healv, Mrs. Carrol 5701
Healy, Mary F 4987, 4992, 4994, 5021, 5058, 5299, 5693, 5694, 5697, 5698, 5699
Heaslett. S 5550, 5551
Heath, John 5550, 5551
Heideman, John 5295
Heine-Gelden, Robert 5550, 5551
Heineman, Mrs 5285
Heives, Lawrence I., Jr 5550, 5551
Helen, Sister 5701
Heleney, Henry 4983
Heller, Mrs. E. H 4944, 5186
Helmick, Milton 5550, 5551
Hendershot, Clarence 5295, 5550, 5551, 5701
Henderson, Harold 5550, 5551
Henderson, Loy 5026
Henderson, Martha T 4992, 4994
Heppner, R. P 4944
Herald Tribune 5341
Herod, William R 4943, 4973, 5198, 5239, 5315. 5344. 5360
Herre, Albert W. C. T 5550, 5551
Hersey, Arthur B 5701
Hersey, John R 4944, 5079, 5194, 5203
Hevworth. Laurence 5026
Hickey, Callie M 4990,4994
HidavatuUah, Ghulam Hussain 5006, 5043
Hill, :Marguerite F 4990, 4994
Hill, Walter 5552, 5553
Himmler 5397
Hinden, Rita 5552, 5553
Hinder, Eleanor M 5350,5552,5553,5684
Hindus, Maurice 5008, 5047
Hindustan Times 5323
Hinrichs 5261
Hinton, W. J 5552,5553,5684
Hirohito, Emperor 4982, 5107
Hiroto, Premier 5706
XXVm INDEX
Paee
Hiss, Alger ^ 492Q,
4929, 4964, 4969, 4973, 4975, 4976, 5032, 5049-5053, 5084, 5089, 5090,
5165, 5272, 5274, 5289, 5302, 5303, 5334, 5337, 5347, 5353. 5483-5487,
5503, 5504, 5684, 5711.
Hitchock, James J 5701
,Ho, Franklin L 5333, 5684
Hitler, Adolph 4935,
4938, 5069, 5073, 5074, 5075, 5095, 5179. 5189, 5190, 5243, 5249, 5251,
5252, 5256, 5269, 5277, 5281, 5328, 5354, 5368, 5370, 5388, 5395, 5399,
5400, 5401.
Ho, Ying-cbin 4939, 5406
Hobart, Alice Tisdale 5552, 55.53
Hobbs, William Herbert 5284
Hochscbild, Patricia 4991
Hoehschild, Patrick 4994
Hocking, William Ernest 5.'')52, 5553
Hodson, H. V 5552, 5-5.53
Hoebei, E. Adamson 5.552, 5553
H(sffman, Paul G 4944, .5067, 5344
Hogbin, H. Ian 5552, 5.)53
Hogg, Mr 4958
Holcombe 5116, 5219
Holcomlie, Arthur 5552, 5553
Holiday Magazine 5278
Holland 5318, 5327, 5331, 5334
Holland. William L 4907-
4912, 4918, 4919, 4923, 4930, 4045-4949, 4957, 4958, 4963, 4965, 4967,
4972, 4973, 4977-4980, 4984, 4985, 4987, 4991, 4994, 4996-5004, 5007-
5032, 5042, 5045, 5046, 5048, 5049, 5053, 5054, 50.-,8, 5059, 5062, 5065,
5066, 5083, 5084, 5085, 5111, 5119, 5123, 5128-5123, 5134, 5137-5139,
5144, 5150, 5151, 5155. 5157-5160, 5174-5176, 5180, 5183, 5188-5190,
5197-5200, 5204, 5205, 5207, 5209, .5210, .5215, 5216, 5218, 5221, 5230,
5240, 5243, 5246-5248, 5250, 5259, 5260, 5264, 5266, 5268, 5271, 5273,
5274, 5288, 5289, 5294, 5299, 5300, 5301, 5302, 5317, 5327, 5329, 5330,
5334, 5335, 5343. 5344, 5356, 5357, 5358, 5364-5367, 5424, 5427-5428,
5552, 55.53, 5683-5691, 5692, 5694, 5704, 5709.
Holland, Mrs. William L. (Doreen) 5000,5051,5022
HoUerman, Leon 5.5.52, 5553
Holman, D. S 5552, 5.553
Holmes — 5259
Holmes, Harriet 4988
Holmes, John W — 5199, 5270, 5271
Holmes, Rawson . 5704
Holt, Claire 5003, 5552, 5553, 5701
Holtmau, A 4988
Holtom, D. C 5552, 5553
Holtz, Robert B 5701
Hongkong 5310, 5337, 5356, 5357, 5368, 5369
Honig, Pieter 55.52, .5553
Honolulu 5318, 5319, 5326, 5329, 5331, 5334, 5335
Hood College 5702
Hooker, Annie O 4992, 4994
Hoover, Calvin B 5198, 5201
Hoover, Herbert 5334, 5341
Hoover Institute 5313, 5.323
Hoover, J. Edgar 5353
Hoover Library on War, Revolution and Peace 4944, 49-54, 5313, 5323
Hopkins 4975, 5045
Hopkins, Mr 5484
Hopkins, Carl E 5552, 5558
Hopper, Bruce 511G, 5227
Hormann, Bernard L 5552, 55.53
Hornbeck, Stanley K 4925^927,
4929, 4936, 4937, 4958, 4973, 4976, 4977, 4999, 5009, 5059, 5083, 5084,
5115, 5123, 5144, 5145, 5146, 5178, 5334, 5335, 5347, 5348, 5353, 5363.
Hoshino, Lt. Gen 5348
n^'DEX XXIX
Page
Hoskins 5294
Hosldns, Halford L 5701
Hosono, Gunji 5^52, 5553
Hotson, Ernest 5552, 5553
Hon, Wai-long 5552, 5553
Houghteling, James L 5701
Houston, Howard 51G7
Howard, Harry Paxton 5554, 5555
Howard, Roy 5148
Howell, Newton 5153
Howie, Janet K 5554, 5555
Howland, Charles :_ 5554, 5555
Hsia, C. L 5010, 5329, 5427, 5554, 5555, 5684
Hsia, Pin Fang 5554, 5555
Hsiang, C. T 4987, 5554, 5555
Hsien, Ting 5211
Hsin Hiia Jin Pae, The 5424
Hsu, Mr 5240
Hsu, C. Y 5554, 5555
Hsu, Frances L. K 5554, 5555
Hsu, Leonard S 5232, 5554, 5555
Hsu, Sliushi 5350, 5554, 5555
Hsu, Y. Y 4939, 4987, 4991, 4994, 5199, 5250, 5271, 5554, 5555
Hu, Charles Y 5554, 5555
Hu, Chiao-mu 5383, 5384, 5385
Hu, Hsien-Chin 5554, 5555
Hu, Shih 5554, 5555
Hua, Tsing 5686
Hubbard, Mr 4985, 4998
Hubbard, Deborah 5216, 5554, 5555
Hubbard, G. E 5554, 5555
Hubbard, L. E 5554, 5555
Hudson, G. F 5334, 5554, 5555
Hudson, Manly O 5067
Huggins, G. Ellsworth 4938, 5365
Hughes 5132
Hughes, E. R 5554,5555
Hughes, Emmet John 5654
Hughes, John 5554, 5555
Hughes. Paul 5648
Hukbalahap (Huk) 5395
Hull, Cordell 4929, 4941, 4942, 5059, 5060, 5075, 5089, 5412, 5468
Hulsewe, A. F. D 5554, 5555
Hume, Edward H 5651
Hume, Joy 5554, 5555
Humelsine, Carlisle 4922, 4924, 4925, 5483, 5484
Hummel, Arthur 5294, 5295
Hummel, Mrs. Arthur 5295
Hummel, Robert 5295
Hummel, A. W 5701
Hummel, Robert Stuart 5701
Hummell, Arthur 5556, 5557
Humphrey, John P 5556, 5557
Hungary 5382
Hunsberger, Warren S 5556, 5557, 5684, 5701
Hunt 5233
Hunt, William P 4983
Hunter, Charles 5556, 5557
Hunter, Edith 5704
Huntington, Ellsworth 5556, 5557
Hurley, General 5371, 5372, 5376, 5377, 5379, 5393, 5394, 5408
Hurst 5279
Hussey, Harry 5659
Hutchins, Robert M 5041, 5674
Hutchinson, Paul 5661
Hutchison, Bruce 5556, 5557
XXX INDEX
Page
Hutchison, Paul 5661-5674
Button, D. Graham 5556, 5557
Hyde, Charles Cheney 5002
Hyma, Albert ~_ 555(5^ 5557
Hytuan, Joseph 5002
I
Ichihoshi, Yamato 5556, 5557
Ickes, Harold 5045, 5047, 5051
Ike, Nolnitaka 5556 5557
Ince, Arthur D 5556'^ 5557
India 4920,
4971, 5062, 5074, 5249, 5318, 5321-5324, 532<S, 5331, 5332, 5349,
5356, 5370, 5374, 5395, 5462, 5465, 5656, 5641, 5668, 5670, 5701
India Quarterly 5329
Indian Council of World Affairs 5329 5349
Indiochina 5320, 5394,' 5692
Indonesia 5501, 5634, 5636, 5637, 5641, 5642
Indonesian Republic 5635, 5637, 5638, 5640-5642
Indusco. {See Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.)
Ingalls, Don 5303
Ingeles, Glen Z. 5556, 5557
Inlow, E. Burke 5556^ 5557
Inman, Walter G 5701
Inner Mousolia 5089
Innis, H. A _~_ 555~6, 5557
Institute of Current World Affairs 5324
Institute of History and Economics (Copenhagen) 5066
Institute of International Studies 5313
Institute of Minor Nationalities ~_ 5129
Institute of National Economy (Moscow) 5320
Institute of Oceanography 4922
Institute of Pacific Relations 4907-
4924, 4933--1949, 4953^956. 4959, 5961, 4962-5091, 5105", 5108,
5118, 5119, 5133-5136, 5195-5197, 5200, 5253, 5268, 5302, 5305,
5314, 5316-5336, 5337-5339, 5341, 5342, 5344-5348, 5350-5356, 5360,
5364, 5366, 5367, 5373, 5374, 5378, 5379, 5414, 5424, 5427, 5463,
5467, 5470, 5471, 5473, 5476, 5483, 5484, 5506-5633, 5643, 5647,
5666, 5674, 5683-5689, 5662, 5691-5693, 5695, 5699^5711.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American) 4911
4934, 4938, 4942 4955, 4956, 4959, 4962, 4987-4972, 4974-4978!
4980-4983, 4907. 4999, 5008, 5013, 5020, 5023-5030, 5051, 5061-5063,
5070, 5078, 5081, 5105, 5107, 5113-5116, 5123, 5125, 5126, 5134,
5140, 5141, 5144, 5153, 5154, 5162, 5164 5167, 5174, 5180-5182,
5328-5332, 5334, 5337, 5338, 5342-5344, 5351, 5356-5360, 5364-
5367, 5378, 5413, 5414, 5643, 5644, 5658, 5659, 5683, 5689, 5690,
5693, 5694, 5696, 5698, 5699, 5703, 5711.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Australia) 5008,5027,5250,5342
Institute of Pacific Relations (Bay Region Division of American
Council) 5152, 5186, 5242, 5243, 5289, 5290, 5313
Institute of Pacific Relations (British) 4985,
5002, 5027, 5066, 5147, 5250, 5284, 5342
Institute of Pacific Relations (Canada) 5009
5019, 5020, 5027, 5115, 5243, 5250, 5267, 5270, 5271, 5276, 5333!
5342, 5405, 5411.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese) 4939,
4996, 5017, 5031, 5062, 5114, 5115. 5119, 5121, 5125, 5157, 5159,
5184, 5203, 5237, 5246, 5329, 5333, 5342.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Dutch) 5329, 5342, 5711
Institute of Pacific Relations (French) 4985, 5329, 5333, 5342,' 5711
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hawaii) 5207
Institute of Pacific Relations (Indian) 5027, 5028, 5348
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Council) 5011,' 5012
INDEX XXXI
Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Research Secretary) 5024,
5000, 5126, 5130, 5135, 5136
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 4999,
5009, 5016, 5023, 5024. 5027. 5046, 5061, 5062, 5063, 5118, 5134,
5145, 5148, 5160. 5161, 5166, 5170, 5171, 5174. 5175, 5188, 5191,
5194, 5215. 5217, 5226, 5228, 5234, 5244, 5246. 5247, 5249, 5250,
5257, 5268, 5301, 5302, 5327, 5331, 5342, 5356, 5358, 5359, 5414,
5660.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japan) 4999,
5021, 5025, 5131, 5128, 5125, 5157, 5190, 5192, 5204, 5217, r?318,
5328, 5329, 5333, 5342.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Los Anjieles Office) 4990
Institute of Pacific Relations (Netherlands Indies) 5329
Institute of Pacific Relations (New Zealand) 5027, 5342
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 4911,
4938, 4987, 5021, 5023-5027, 5030, 5067, 5081, 5114, 5115, 5121-
5127, 5130. 5131. 5136, 5139, 5140, 5158, 5159, 5162, 5163, 5174,
5179, 3184, 5194-5196, 5199, 5203, 5207, 5215, 5217, 5228, 5242,
5247, 5267, 5269, 5272, 5300, 5318, 5321, 5325, 5327, 5828, 5329,
5331-5335. 5358, 5703.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pakistan) 5027, 5299
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippines) 5027, 5160, 5322. 5342, 5711
Institute of Pacific Relations (Russia) 4909,
4997, 5007, 5027, 5083, 5084, 5115, 5124-5128, 5130, 5134-5139,
5141, 5147. 5148. 5157. 5160-5162. 5187, 5200. 5218, 5242, 5246,
5274. 52S2. 5318. 5329. 5332, 5342, 5642.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Board of Trustees) 4941,
4943, 4944. 4967. 5228, 5238, 5288, 5290, 5339
Institute of Pacific Relations (Executive Committee) 4941,
4943. 5164. 5167, 5225, 5228, 5296, 5343, 5366. 5367
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Binational 5322-5326
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, First, Honolulu, 1925__ 5318, 5326, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Second, International, Hono-
lulu, 1927 5319-5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Third. International, Kyoto,
Japan. 1929 5122, 5151, 5152, 5276, 5319, 5320, 5324, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations. Conference, Fourth, International, Hang-
chow and Shanghai. China. 1931__ 4956. 5115. 5228, 5279. 5319. 5320. 5331, 5333
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Fifth, International. Banff,
Canada. 1933 4955, 5114-5116. 5123, 5276, 5281. 5285, 5319, 5320, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Sixth, International, Yosemite
National Park, 1936 5118-5120,
5140. 5141. 5150, 5151, 5152, 5249. 5319, 5320. 5324. 5331, 5346, 5703
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Seventh, International, Virginia
Beach, Virginia. 1939 5319-5321, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Eighth, International, Mont
Tremblant, Canada, 1942 4958. 4976-4978. 4981. 4982.
5009. 5057. 5067. 5262. 5271, 5272. 5319, 5321, 5325, 5331, 5347, 5357
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Ninth, International, Hot
Springs, Virginia, 1945 _.. 5^62.
5079, 5198, 5319, 5321, 5322, 5325. 5331. 5552, 5553. 5703, 5710
Institute of Pacific Relations. Conference, Tenth, International, Strat-
ford-on-Avon, England. 1947 5319. 5322. 5331, 5378
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Eleventh, International, Luck-
now. India. 1950 5024-5027, 5319, 5322
Institute of Pacific Relations. Round Table on Atomic Energy 4921. 50:n-50''3
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 4961-4963.
4975. 4978. 4988^990. 4995. 5011. 5032, 5061, 5286, 5287, 5294, 5295
Institute of World Economics and Politics (Moscow) 5009, 5161, 5200
International Bibliography of Historical Science 5132
International Film Foundation 5696
International Institute for Social History 5200
International Journal 5328, 5405
International Labor Office (Geneva) 5214
International Labour Office (Montreal) 5067, 5068
International Labor Organization 5.322
International IVIissionary Council 4973, 4983
International Relief Committee 5345
XXXII INDEX
Pse*
International Union of Academies 5220
Intourist 5161, 5162, 5191
Ironside, Major General 5075
Irvine, P. F 5556, 5557
Isaacs 5679, 5680, 5681, 5682
Isaacs, Harold Kobert — 5219, 5556, 5557, 5654
Isaacs, Lt. Col. Irwin — i 5040
Isaacs, Sidney 5674, 5676
Isikoff, Mr 5295
Isley, Jeter A 5556, 5557
Israel, Dorothy 4988, 4989, 4994
Issen, Anita 4992, 4994
Italy!— - 5074, 5222, 5231, 5426, 5665, 5673
Itoh 5233
Ivens, Germaine KruU 5556, 5557
Ives, Senator 5350
Iwanaga, Y 5333
Izvestia 5146, 5303
J
Jackman, W. T 5556,5557
Jackson, Mr 5682
Jackson, C. D 5020
Jacobs, Joseph E 5480
Jacoby, Annalee 5649, 5652-5654, 5656, 5657, 5659
Jaffe, Mrs 5710
Jafte, Agnes 5232, 5299, 5709
Jafife, Bernard 5041
Jaffe, Philip 4941, 4984, 5020, 5031, 5084, 5085,
5167, 5168, 5192, 5198, 5194, 5217, 5254, 5346, 5424, 5684, 5685, 5709
James, Mrs 5299
James, F. Cyril 5078,5323
James, Grace 5556, 5557
James, Henry 5302
James, Jack 5556, 5557
James, Roy 5701
James, Roy E 5558,5559
James, R. W 5558,5559
Janeway, Eliot 4960, 5558, 5559
Japan 5306,
5318, 5319, 5320, 5327, 5328, 5330-5335, 5339, 5340. 5348. 5349, 5354,
5356, 5358, 5370, 5378, 5382, 5383, 53S5, 5395, 5397, 5403, 5404, 5425,
5426, 5427, 5470, 5500, 5501, 5641, 5663-5667, 5669-5674, 5698, 5699,
5705, 5706, 5708.
Japan, Government of 4929,
4931, 4935-4937, 4940-4942, 4959, 4964, 4968, 4970, 4971, 4979, 4981,
4982, 4999, 5000, 5007, 5009, 5014, 5021, 5025, 5026, 5062, 5066, 5069,
5071-5074, 5087-5089, 5108, 5130, 5164, 5174, 5176, 5177, 5185, 5189,
5190, 5215, 5218, 5222, 5223, 5231, 5233, 5240, 5258, 5275, 5298, 5663,
5709.
Japanese American Committee for Democracy 4941
Japanese Army 4932, 4936,
4959. 5011, 5012, 5062, 5070, 5074, 5151, 5189, 5208, 5231, 5232.
Japanese Emancipation League (Yenan) 5062
Japanese Embassy (Washington) 4961,5145
Japanese Navy 5072, 5189, 5231, 5232
Jardine, R. J 5558, 5559
Jav, Augusta 4987, 4991
Jayson, Alice 4988, 4989, 4994
Jebb ■)484
Jenkins, Mr 5299
Jenkins, David R 5558,55.59,5701
Jenkins, Louise 4989, 4999, 5299
Jenkins, Shirley 4989, 5294, 5295, 5299, 555S, 5.559
Jenkinson, Anthony 4958, 4979
INDEX XXXIII
Page
Jennings, W. Ivor 5558,5559
Jenriche, Elsie 5414, 5415
Jenzeu, David 5701
Jervey, Huger W 5002
Jessup. Philip C 491S,
4938, 4943, 4973, 4976, 4984, 4999, 5002, 5003, 5014, 5016, 5023, 5031,
5045, 5054, 5058, 5059, 5079, 5085, 5183, 5186, 5189, 5195, 5197-5200,
5209, 5210, 5216, 5220, 5224, 5225, 5227, 5228, 5231, 5239, 5247, 5253,
5261. 5263, 5266. 526S, 5271, 5289, 5321, 5322, 5324, 5327, 5333, 5341,
5342, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5366, 5558, 5559, 5642, 5643, 5645-5647, 5703
Jinnah, Mr 4984, 5004, 5006, 5042, 5043
Joffe 5384
Johnson 5680
Johnson, Mr 5423
Johnson, Ambassador 5187
Johnson, Arnold 5675
Johnson, C. S 5323
Johnson, Eugene I 5558,5559
Johnson, Guy B 5558, 5559
Johnson, Joan 5701
Johnson, Luther A 4977, 5049, 5053
Johnson, Nelson T 5294, 5558, 5559
Johnston, Bruce 5558, 5559
Johnston, Eric 5558, 5559, 5703
Johnston, Reginald F . ■ 5558, 5559
Johnstone 5685
Johnstone, Mrs. A. H 5199, 5261, 5263, 5264
Johnstone, William Crane 4988,
4989, 4994, 5048, 5049, 5051, 5053, 5061, 5062, 5089, 5261, 5284, 5301,
5558, 5559, 5648, 5684, 5701, 5711.
Johnstone, William T 4911, 4984, 5016
Jones 5685
Jones, Arthur Creech 5027, 5334, 5528, 5529
Jones, F. C 5350, 5558, 5559, 5684
Jones, George E 5558, 5559
Jones, Joe 4960, 4964, 4969, 4972, 5070
Jones, Joseph '. 5558, 5559
J'ones, Stella 5558, 5559
Jones, S. Shenard 5701
Jonkinson, Anthony 5404
Jonns, Allen L — 5701
Jordan, Myra M_______ 4992, 4994
, Jorgensen, Arthur 5558, 5559
Jorgensen, Elizabeth 5111, 5558, 5559
Joseph. Devereux 5298, 5299
Josephs, Ray 5657
Joyce, James 5648, 5654
Joxe 5209
Judd, Walter 5049, 5052, 5053, 5377
Juggins. E. Ellsworth 4983
Julius Rosenwald Fund (Chicago) 4977
K
Kabir, Huamyan 5323
Kades, Charles L 5415
Kahane, Rita 4990, 4994
Kahin, George McT 5560, .5561
Kahu, Walter B 5701
Kaim, J. R 5560, 5561
Kain, Richard Morgan 5654
Kaji, Ryucchi 5560, 5561
Kalaw. Maximo M 5560, 5561
Kallen. H. M 5078, 5560, 5561
Kan. Shina 5560, 5561
Kanai. K 5684
XXXIV INDEX
Page
Kang, Younghill 5321
Kano, R 4963
Kanta. K. A. Nila 5560,5561
Kantorovich, A. J___ 5083, 5126, 5127-5129, 5132, 5134, 5136-5140, 5178, 5560, 5561
Kaplan 5688
Karaklian, Comissar 5122 5501
Karig, Walter Patrick " 5654
Karst, Eugene 5295
Kaninakaran, K. P 1 5560,5561
Kattenhurg, Paul M 5560,5561
Kaufinann, Felix 5367
Kawai, Kazuo 556O, 5561
Kawakami, K. K 5560,5561
Wawata, George 499I, 4992,' 4994
Kazaniev, V 5274, 5275
Keeney, Mrs. Mary Jane 57OI
Keeuey, Phillip O 5560,5561
Keenleyside, Hugh L 5259, 5270, 5560, 5561
Keeny, S. M 526,s
Keesing ._ 4997^ 5003, 5289, 5685
Keesing, F. M 5560,5561,5684
Keesing, Marie 5560,5561
Keeton, G. W 5684
Kefauver, Senator 5337 5352
Kefauver. Grayson N 5040
Keil, Dorothea 4990, 4994
Keith, Mrs. Agnes ' 5554
Keller, Arthur S I-IIIIZir"5560,~5561, 5701
Kellogg, Helen 498-
Kelly, Helen G IllllirsseO, 5561
Ken George_ 556o, 5561
Kendall. John W 5701
Kenkyusha 502*?
Kennan, George 4944 53^'!
Kennard, J. S 5062
Kennedy, Bernice 499O 4994
Kennedy, George Ii:::.,:::: 556o! 5561
Kennedy, (Jeorge O 51II 5929
Kennedy, Raymond igii 5560,' 5561
Kennedy, W^P. M 5562, 5563
Kent, P. H. B 5560 5563
Keppel, Frederick P 50S5,"5123, 5181, 5261
Kerner, Itobert J 5032, 5058, 5186, 5562, 5563
Kerr, Mr 5^08
Kerr, Archibald Clark 559O
Kerr, George H 4984, 5001, 5002, 5562, 5563
Kerr, John H 5O47
Kerr. Philip iiii-ii"__":::::::_::_::__ 5349
Keswick 5233
Keynes, J. M 5367
Khan, Zafrulla 5334
Kibbey, Bessie J 5295 5701
Kiendl. (.^ee Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Kilpatrick, Mary J 499'> 4994
Kim. Yougjeung _V_ __"___"_"_ _"__"__ 5062, 5562! 5563
^•"^' F- \-^ 5344, 5361
Kings-land. R 5562, 5563
Kiralfy. Alexander 5562, 5563
Kirby. Stuart 5562, 5563
Kiik, Grayson 4999, 5002, 5053, 5365, 5562, 5563, 5703
Kirkpatrif'k, Paul H 5O40
Kisselev. Eugene D 1" ~_ \ 5032, 5057
Kitadai, S 5026, 5027
Kit fridge 5208
Kiyaba, Hiroyo 499O, 4994
INDEX XXXV
Page
Kizer, Benjamin H _ 4944
4958, 4973, 4975-4977, 5184, 5186, 5286, 5314, 5323, 5562, 5563, 5685
Kizer, Carolyn A 4989, 4994
Klein. Mildred 4988, 4989, 4994
Klinebery, Otto 5562, 5563
KMT (Kuomintaug). {See Chinese National Party.)
Knight 5085
Knight, M. M 5562, 5563
Kniper, F. B. J 5562, 5563
Knopf, Alfred A 5661
Knorr, K. E 5562, 5563
Knowland, Senator 4927, 4944, 5364, 5377
Knox, Secretary 4975, 4976
Ko, Siang-Feng__ 5562, 5563
Koestler, Arthur 5651
Kohlberg, Alfred 4933-4935, 4938, 4944
5023, 5078, 5286, 5287, 5289, 5337, 5343-5345, 5359, 5360, 5366, 5367
Kok. Gerard P 4990, 4994
Kolb, Albert 5562, 5563
Kolohak, Admiral 5075, 5145
Kolokoff 5045
Kondapi, E 5562, 5563
Konijn, H. S 5701
Konoye, Prince _ 5233, 5249, 5348
Koo. T. Z 5280, 5284, 5705-5709
Korea 5308,
5315, 5316, 5318, 5321, 5327, 5340, 5348, 5375, 5394, 5396, 5412, 5453
Korea, North 5389, 5390, 5392, 5394
Korea, South 5389, 5390, 5394
Koron, Chuo 5000
Koshland, Daniel E 4944
Kournakoff, Sergei 5346
Kraal, Johanna Felhoen 5562, 5563
Krader, Lawrence 5562, 5563
Kramer, Sonia 4990, 4994
Kreamer, H 5562. 5563
Krasnow, Beatrice 4989, 4994
Kremlin 5314
Krentz, Kenneth 5452
KreiJS. Theodore J 5562, 5563, 5684
Krichbaum, Philip E 5701
Kroeber, A. L 5564, 5565
Krog 5302
Krotov, Ivan 5270
Krug. Secretary 5288, 5291, 5292
Ku. Po 5381, 5420, 5421, 5423
Kublin. Hyman 5564, 5565
Kullgren, John F 5701
Kung, Dr 5017, 5193, 5203, 5211, 5233
Kung, H. H 5341, 5424, 5710
Kung, jMadam 5211
Kunming 5342, 5357, 5408
Kunzru, Hriday Nath 5027, 5322, 5323
Kuo, Ping-chia 5564, 5565
Kuo, Yen-ti 5564, 5565
Kuomintang. {See Chinese National Party.)
Kurihara, Kenneth K 5564, 5565, 5684
Kuroda, Andrew Y 5564, 5565
Kurovia 5155
L
Labor Congress (Mexico) 5179
Lacam, G 5684
Ladejinsky 4982
Lader, Lawrence 5564, 5565
XXXVI INDEX
Page
'"Lafayette College 5662
LaGuaidia, Fiorello Henry 5C57
LauUer, Harry 5564, 5565
Lamb, Beatrice P 5823
Larab, Helen B 5701
Lamb, L. H 5566, 5567
Lamb, Robert 5112
Lambie, Margaret 5701
Lament, Corliss 5274, 5282, 5337, 5346, 5564, 5565, 5645
Lamont, Thomas W 5346, 5357
Lamott, Willis Church 5674
Lancaster, W. W 5183, 5199, 5269, 5270, 5298, 5299
Landau, Frances P 4992, 4994
Landhier, Bartholomew 5564, 5565
Landon, Governor 5165
Landon, Kenneth Perry 5564, 5565, 5684
Landres, Rose 4988
Landreth, Helen 5657
Lane, Clayton 4991, 4994, 5023-5025, 5273, 5274, 5299, 5302, 5689
Lane, Robert P 4959
Lang 5685
Lang, Olga 5287, 5564, 5565, 5651
Langer, Paul 5566, 5567
Langer, William , 5116
Lanham, Buck 5090
Lanterbach, Richard E 5566, 5567
Lapham 5152
Laphara, Lew L 4944
Lapham, Roger 5315
Lapie, M 4985
Lapie, Pierre Olivier 5564, 5565
La Pierre, Richard T 5564, 5565
Lapwood, Ralph 5368
Larken, E. T 5566, 5567
La Roche, Jean de 5596, 5597
Larsen, Emmanuel S 5701
Larsen, Harold W 5566, 5567
Lash, James E 5243
Lasker, Bruno 4958, 4987, 4988, 4989. 4994,
5064, 5078, 5119, 5120, 5131, 5132, 5182, 5225, 5564, 5565, 5648, 5704
Lasker, Gabriel 5564, 5565
Laski, Harold 5179
Lasswell 5174 5358
Latonrette, Kenneth S 4944, 5*336' 5564, 5565," 5661, 5664, 5684
Lattimore, David 5564, 5565
Lattimore, Margaret 5566, 5567
Lattimore, Owen 4933-4935,
4941, 4944, 4958, 4963, 4968, 4987, 5000, 5008, 5010, 5018, 5023, 5024,
5032, 5062, 5079, 5080, 5084, 5085, 5111-5114, 5118-5120, 5132, 5136,
5148, 5149, 5163, 5168, 5173, 5178, 5181, 5182, 5185, 5187, 5188, 5190,
5192, 5193, 5197, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5214, 5215, 5218-5221. 5225, 5228-
5230, 5241, 5243. 5249, 5253, 5254. 5268, 5271, 5274, 5275, 5277, 5278,
5281, 5289, 5300, 5.301, 5305-5313, 5317, 5323, 5329, 5337, 5341, 53.52,
5358, 5305, 5427, 5566, 5567, 5647-5651, 5653-5674, 5683, 5685, 5701,
5703, 5704, 5707, 5708.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) 4084,4989,4994,5018,5061,5119,
5286, 5295, 5310, 5312, 5564, 5565, .5647-5652, 5657, 5660, 5662, 5697
Lau, Mildred 5295
Lauren College 5491
Lausche, Governor 5679
Lauterbach, Mr 5299
Lauterbach, Mrs 5299
Lautorpacht, H 5684
Laves, Walter 5053
Lavey 5131
Laviolette Forrest 5566, 5567
INDEX 3tXXVlt
Page
Laviolette, Robert E ^^— 5566, 5567
Lawrence College 5489
Lawrence, Gertrude 5648
Lawrence, Oliver 5566, 5567
Lazarus, Ruth J. (Ruth Turbin) 4989, 4494, 5064
Leach, E. R 5566, 5567
Leacock ,David J 5566, 5567, 5709
League of Nations 5016 5035, 5162, 5167, 5317, 5320-5322, 5335, 5346
League of Nations Secretariat 5009, 5068, 5270
League of Women Voters 4961, 5040, 5711
Leahy, Admiral 5376, 5484
Leaing, John 5268-
Leaning, W. J 5566, 5567
Leak, Ora 4991, 4994
Leal, Castro 50o6.
Leaning, John 4987, 5111r
Leathern, S 5566, 5567
Leatherman, C. D 5091
Le Branchu, Jean-Yves 5516, 5517
Lederer, Emil 5566, 5567
Lederer, Use 4989, 4994
Lee 5685
Lee, Alwyn 5566, 5567
Lee, Betty 4990, 4994
Lee, Duncan C 5346-
Lee, Edmund J 5701
Lee, Franklin C. H 5566, 5567
Lee, H. K 5684
Lee, Kan 5049, 5051, 5052, 5053, 5566, 5567
Lee, Michael 5346-
Lee, Pao-Chen 4990, 4994
Lee, Rosamund 4937, 4988, 4989, 4994, 5299
Lee, S. C 5566, 5567
Lee, Shao-chang 5207'
Lee, Stephen 5566, 5567
Legge, J. D 5568, 5569
Leggett, T. P 5568, 5569
Lehman, Herbert 4935, 4979, 5050, 5052, 5058, 5059
Lehmann, Rosamond 5648
Lei, Kit-King 5568, 5569
Leiberman, Henry R 5568, 5569
Leifert, Janet - 4988
Leighton, Alexander H 5568, 5569
Leland, Waldo G 5701
Lenin 5149, 5161,
5219, 5220, 52S0, 5308, 5310, 5381, 5386, 5420, 5422, 5426, 5454, 5500
Lerrigo, Miss Edith 5290
Lester, Robert M 5123
Leung, George Kin 5568, 5569
Levenson, Joseph R 5568, 5569
Levi, Werner 5568, 5569
Levina 5161
Levine, Harriet 5193
Levine, Isaac Don 5354,5355
Levinthal, Harriet 4987, 4988, 4989, 4994
Levmore, Bernard W 5568, 5569
Levy 4999, 5299
Levy, David M 5299
Levy, Mrs. David M 5299
Levy, Ellen B 4990,4994
Levy, Marion J., Jr 5568,5569
Levy, Roger 5027, 5183, 5333, 5568, 5569
Lew, Daniel H 5568, 5569, 5684
Lewis 5337
Lewis, A. B 5568, 5569
Lems, Morris R 5701
XL INDEX
Pag*
MacDonnell, W. H 5572, 5573
Macfalyen, Eric 5572, 5573
MacFisher 5293
Mac Gibbon, D. A 5572, 5573
Mack, Virginia • 4991, 4994
MacKay, Mr 4958
MacKay, J. A 5703
Mackay, Robert A 5572, 5573
Mac Kenzie, Norman A. M 5130, 5270, 5333, 5572, 5573, 5684
Mackintosh, W. A — 5270
Mac Lachhin. John M — 5572, 5573
MacLeish, Archibald — 5000, 5182, 5183, 5256, 5661
MacLennan, Douglas 4984, 5009, 5019, 5027, 5572, 5573
MacMahon, Arthur W 5002
MacManus, M. J 5651
MacMurray, Howard J 5049
MacMurray, J. V. A___- 5701
MacNair, Harley F 5219, 5229, 5674
Maeda, Tauion _: 5572, 5573
Magill, Robert N — — 4958,4978,5701
Magistretti, William 5572, 5573
Magruder, General '■ 4975
Mah, Dr — _— 5706
Mah, N. Wing 5572,5573
Mahasabha 5043
Mahindra 5049
Maisky - 5191,5484
Maki, John McGilvery 4982, 5574, 5575, 5649, 5684, 5701
Makower, Miss 5137
Malaya 5388
Malcott, D. W - 5323
Malik, Ambassador 4919, 5501
Malin, Patrick M ; — 5261
Maloney, James J 5198, 5244
Manchester Guardian 5178, 5374, 5375, 5383, 5389, 5395, 5396, 5412
Manchuria 5339, 5340,
5348, 5349, 5378, 5392, 5893, 5396, 5404, 5409, 5410, 5667, 5671, 5708
MandPl, William M 5023, 5574, 5575
Mander, L. A 5574, 5575
Mandlbaum, David G 5323,5574,5575
Mangahas, F 4987
Mann, Heinrich 5649
Manning, C. A. W 5574,5575
Mansergh, Nicholas 5574, 5575
Manslield, Mike 5062, 5064
Mao, Tse-tung 5210,
5373, 5381, 5384, 5387, 5388, 5393, 5420, 5421, 5422, 5423, 5641
Marcantino, Vito 5645
IMarcusson, Ruth 4992, 4994
Margalo 5651
Marks, Regina 4990, 4994
Marks, Stuart 4908,
4909, 4913-4920, 4922, 4923, 4933, 4945. 4946, 4948, 4949, 4957
Marshall, George C 4934, 4943, 4944,
5278, 5284, 5293, 5359, 5376, 5392, 5393. 5405, 5408, 5409, 5410, 5411
Marsl'all, C. B 5452
Marshall, John 5411
Marshall, Kondric N 5701
Marshall Mission 5392
Marshall Plan 5387
Martin, Boyd A 4944
Martin, Charles E__ 4944.5289,5574,5575
Martin, Edwin M 5021, 5294, 5659, 5701
Martin, King.sley 5181, 5574, 5575
IMartiii. Truman M 5032, 5049, 5050, 5053, 5089, 5199, 5265, 5701
IKDEX XLI
Marx, Daniel '- 5574, 5575
Jlarx, Karl 4941, 4963, 5148, 5149, 5151, 5167,
5240, 5280, 5284, 5308, 5310, 5379, 5420, 5421, 5422, 5425, 5426, 5500
Masani, M. R 5574, 5575'
Masland 5186
Ma.sland, Jolin W 5574, 5575, 5684
Mason, Leonard 5574, 5575
Massachusetts Institute of Technology _ — 5297
Massellman, George H. A . 5574, 5575, 5701
Masselman. Wilhelmina 4991, 4994
Massey, Vincent 5115, 5333
Massing, Mrs. Hede — 5337, 5354, 5356, 5357
Mathesou, W. B 5820
Mathews, J. B 5353
Matsumoto 5217
Matsuo, M 4987, 499a, 4994, 5021, 5027, 5333, 5574, 5575, 5704
Matsuoka ___ 5249
Mathews, Mr 5484
Matsui, Shichiri 5574, 5575
Matsukata, Saburo . 5333, 5574, 5575
Matsumoto, Shigeharu 5333, 5574, 5575
Matsuoka, Komakichi 5322
Matthews, Phillip 5574, 5575
Matusow, Harvey _ 5413, 5414
Matveev, lUarion 5574, 5575
Maul, Grace 5356
Maurer, Adrienne 4989, 4995
Maurer, Herrymon 5574, 5575
Maurer, Isabel Avila 5574, 5575
Max, Alfred 5576, 5577
Max, F 49S7
May, Jean 4989, 4995
May, Rene A 4944
May, Stacy 5026, 5261
Mayeda, Miyeko 5576, 5577
Mayeda, T 5333
Mayer, Miss 5160
Mayer, Adrian 5576, 5577
Mayer, Hilda 4991, 4995
Mayer, Laura 4987, 4995
Mayer, William 4907, 4958, 4982, 5048, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5163, 5348, 5703
Mayo, Dorothy 4988, 4989, 4995
McAfee, William_ 5295
McAlpin, David H 5299
McAuley, James 5580, 5581
McCallum, J. A 5580, 5581
McCarthy, Senator 4934, 4935, 4943, 5023, 5026, 5353, 5377, 5385, 5395, 5396
McConaughy, James L 5079, 5337, 5345, 5361, 5365
McCounell, Bishop 5152
McCormick, Col 5710
McCormick, Anne O'Hare 5334
McCormack, John W 5049, 5053
McCoy, Frank R 4977, 5002, 5263, 5295, 5342, 5701
McCrimmons. Mary A 4992 4995
McCulloch 5268
McCune, Evelyn 5582, 5583
McCune, George McAfee: 5229, 5350, 5582, 5583, 5360
McCuue, Shannon 5009, 5336
McCure, Shannon 5582, 5583
McDiarmid, Orville J 5582, 5583
McDonald, A. H 5r)82, 5583
McDonald, C. M 5582, 5583
McDonald, James G 5084, 5111, 5152. 5153
McDuffie. Mrs. Duncan 5186
McFadyean, Andrew 5322, 5334
8S.S4S— .52— pt. 14 — —54
XLII INDEX
Page
McGechan, R. O 5027
McGill 5208
McGrath, J. Howard 5440, 5441, 5678, 5681, 5682
Mclnernev. James M 5441, 5442, 5443
Mclnnis Edgar 5026, 5322, 5333, 5582, 5583, 5684
Mcintosh, A. D 5582, 5583
McKay, Vernon 5o82, 5583
McKlvey 628o
McKinlav A D - - oo&ii, Dooo
McLaughlin, MrsrAlfVeZ^Jl.. ""-'"_ 4944, 5040, 5186, 5273, 5274, 5289
McLean 5045
McMahon, Senator 4935, 4943
McMahon, B. B 4958, 4966
McMasters, Harry L -^l^l
McMiirray, Howard J 5052, 5053
McNair, Harley Farnsworth fffo' kScq
MeN^Jly, Theodore 5582, 5583
McSweeney, John 5502
McWilliams, Carey 558^:, &&»^
McWilliams 5187
McWilliams, Mrs. Robert 5040
Mead, Margaret 55(^6, 5577
Mears, Elliot G --- ^Z',^^ 5577
Mears, Helen 5o76, 5o7(, 5657
Mededeelingen 5-J--^
Meharally ^H^
Mehta, D. H 5o76, 5o^7
Mei, Dr 'J-^i
Mei, Ju-ao 5576, 5577
Meiklejohn, Alexander 5661
Meisling, Vaughn F 5052, 5053, 5089
Mekeel, H. Scudder 5576, 5577
Mekhlis, Leo 5185
Melish, William 5576, 5577
Mellon, Paul 5300
Menefee, Selden 5701
Menefee. Mrs. Selden (Audrey) 5576, 5577, 5701
Meng, Chih 5576, 5577
Menjies, A. R 5576, 5577
Menzies, James M 5576, 5577
Merill, Frederick T 5350
Merner, Garfield D 5040
Merrell, George 5061
Merriam, Charles E 5661
Messer, Barbara 4987
Messenger, Miss 5173
Meston, Lord 5576, 5577
Metcalf, Josephine 4988
Metzmaekers, L 5576, 5577
Meuvret, Colette 5576, 5577
Mexico 5332
Meyer, :\Ia.1or 5181
Meyer, Eugene 5701
Mever, Raymond T 5702
Mez. John Richard 5576, 5577
Michael, Franz 5576, 5577, 5684
Mickey, Margaret Portia 5576, .5577
Mickle, Joe 4983, 5578, 5579
Midkiff, Frank E 5207, 5578, 5579
Miles, Commodore 5376
Military Collegium of the Supreme Court (U.S.S.R.) 5152-5156
Mill. Edward W 5578, 5579, 5V01
Millegan, Lloyd 5295
Miller, Agnes R 5578, 5579
Miller, Clayton 5578, 5.579
Miller, Frances F 5295
\
INDEX XLIII
Page
Miller. Jesse I 4958, 4972, 4974
Miller, John C 5661
Miller, Margaret 5578, 5579
Miller, Kobert T 4947
Millikan, K. A 5274, 5281, 5282
.Millis, Walter 4959, 5578, 5579, 5654
Millman, Abe J 4990, 4995
Millinan, Benjamin 4990, 4995
Mills 5685
Mills College 5040
Mills, Harriet 4989, 4995
Mills, Lennox A 5078, 5578, 5579
Milner, Ian F. G 5578, 5579
Minarovicli, Michael 4987, 4988, 4990, 4995
Minh, Ho Chi 5394
Minor, Robert 4924-4926
Mintz, Jeanne S 5578, 5579
Mirkowich, Nicholas 5578, 5579
Mirsky. D. S 5135, 5136
Mitdiell. C. Clyde 5578, 5579
Mitchell, Gloria 4992, 4995
Mitchell, Kate 4910,
4914, 4916, 4987, 4998, 5003, 5032, 5042, 5061, 5078, 5083-5085, 5111,
5118, 5119, 5129, 5132, 5152, 5153, 5156-5160, 5172, 5175, 5180, 5188,
5194, 5195, 5198, 5210, 5214, 5238, 5356, 5578, 5579, 5684, 5685,
5703, 5704.
Mitchell. Wesley C 5002
Mitranv. D 5081, 5300, 5578, 5579
Mitsubishi 5150,5666
Mitsui 5666
Moe, Henry Allen 5123, 5209, 5299, 53.>5
Moe. Kilmer 5578, 5579
Moeller. Hans. (/See Asiaticus.)
Moerman. Elodie 4987
Moffat. Abbot Low 4944,5293,5294,5701
IMoffat. Mrs. A. L 5701
Mohammad. Saadullah Khan 5006, 5044
Mohanimed. Azizah F 5578, 5579
Moldauer, Frances (Sharpe) 4988,4989,4995
Mok, P. K 5578, 5579
IMoll. J. T 5334,5578,5579,5684
Molnar, Ferenc 5660
INIolotoy. V. M 5077, 5185, 5199, 5262, 5284, 5393, 5484, 5578, 5579
Molyneanx, Peter 4974
Mongolian Peoples Republic 5087,5088
Montague, R 5578, 5579
Montana. Marjorie 4991, 4992, 4995
MooKerjee. Girija 5580, 5581
Moon. Penderel 5580, 5581, 5649
Mooney. James D 5123
Mooney. Martha 50.53
Moore, Miss 5705
Moore, E. S 5580,5581
JMoore. Eddie 5238
Moore, Harriet Lucy (Gelfan) 4915,
4917, 4941. 4958, 4965, 4974. 4977, 4987-4989, 4995, 4997, 5013, 5024,
5031, 5032. 5045. 5046. 5051, 5053. 508.3-5085, 5111, 5112, 5120, 5126,
5129-51.32. 51.34. 5136-5138, 5140, 5150. 5151, 5156, 5160. 5162. 5172,
5178. 5181. 5190. 5198, 5201, 5208-5210. 5218, 5227, .52.30, 5238, 5268,
5282, 5284. .5299, 5337. 5356, 5357, 5580, 5581*, 5654, 5704.
Moore, IMaurice T 5299
JNIoore, Mrs. Maurice T 5079, 5299
Moore, Philip 5165
Moore. ^Irs. Philip 5165
Moore, T. Inglis 5.580. .5581
Moorehead, Helen Howell 5580, 5.581
XLIV ESTDEX
Page-.
Moorhead, Mrs. Boswell 5701
Moorhous, Afargaret H : 5674
Morales, Alfredo T 5580, 5581
Moran, William T__ 5580, 5581
Morantie, P. C 5580,5581
Morgan, Leslie 4991, 4995, 5580, 5581
Morgan, Richard C 5677
Morgan, Mrs. Richard C. (Anna Haas) 5674-5683
Morgenthau, Henry 5045, 5059
Mori, Iga — 5207
Morison, George Abbot 5703;
Morita, Betty 4989, 4995
Morley, Lorna 5295
Morris _—_ 5681
Morris, David Elwyn 5659
Morris, George W 5701
Morris, John 5580, 5581
Morris, Lawrence— : .— _ — _ . 5365'
Morris, Marion : 4989, 4995
Morris, Roland— 5263
Morris, S. V. C 5704
Morris. William 5079
Morris, Wilson 4988, 4990, 4995
Morrish, William F 5186
Morrison, Angelina 4990, 4995
Morrison, Ian 5231, 5580, 5581
Morrison, Phoebe 5701
Morrison. William D. F 1 5701
Morse, Senator 4935, 5350-
Morse, Richard 5580, 5581
Morseley, Hilton 4989, 4995
Morton, Robert S 5580, 5581
Morton, W. L 5580,5581
Moscow 5318, 5331, 5356, 5380, 5391, 5393, 5463, 5464, 5465, 5473
Moscow-Berlin Nonaggression Pact 5075, 5195
Moscow Trials 5149, 5152-5155, 5157, 5168, 5169
Moscow, Warren 565T
Moseley. Phillip 5116, 5221, 5580, 5581
Moser, C. K 5007, 5008, 5198, 5206, 5236
Moss, W^arner 5702
Mott, Celestine G 4990, 4995
Motylev, V. E 4916,
5025, 5045, 5056, 5084, 5085, 5112, 5132-5135, 5139, 5140, 5149-5151,
5157, 5158, 5160-5163, 5165, 5172, 5175, 5178-5180, 5184, 5187, 5190,
5192-5195. 5198-5201, 5209, 5215, 5219, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5230, 5246,
5262. 5266, 5275, 5320, 5359.
Moulder, Morgan M 5502
Mowrer, Edgar A 5701, 5278
Mowry, George E 5039, 5040'
Moyer, Raymond 5295, 5580, 5581
Moyer, Mrs. Raymond 5295
Mudaliar, A. Ramaswami 5321
Mnndt, Karl 5049, 5053, 5353, 5355
Munson, Lyle 5437-5442
Murdock, James 5702
Murota. Ayaka 4992, 4995
Murphy, Charles 4932, 4933
Murphy, J 4988
Murphy J. M 5323
Murphv, Roads 5580, 5581
Murray, R. Stuart 5199, 5248:
Murray, AVallace 4975
Murrow, Edward R 5355
Mus, Paul 5580, 5581
Mussolini 5249, 5681
Mvers, Fred 5045, 5274, 5286, 5299
Myrdal 5209
INDEX XLV
N
Fagi
Naggiar, Paul Emile 5026, 5027, 5062, 5321, 5333
Nagtegoal, C 5582, 5583
Nash, Phil 5016
Nash, Vernon 5582, 5583, 5659
Nash, Walter 5062, 5319, 5320, 5321, 5334, 5582, 5583
Nasu, Dr 5218, 5705, 5706
Nater, W. R 5584, 5585
Nath, Vishwambhar 5582, 5583
Nathan, George Jean 5649
Nathan, R. S 5582, 5583
Nathan, Robert 4973
Nathausen, Miss 5112
Nation, The 4935, 5040, 5278, 5648-5650, 5654-5660, 5673
National Academy of Sciences 5038, 5291
National Defence Council (India) 5005, 5006, 5042, 5043
National Federation of Women's Clubs 5067
National Government of China. {See Chinese National Government.)
National Herald (India) 5278
National Indusco Guild 5213
National League of Women Voters 5067
National Party of China. (See Chinese Nationalist Party.)
National Production Authority 5711
Nazi. ( See Germany, National Socialist Party of. )
Neal, Arthur L 5582, 5583
Neal, Elizabeth 4987, 4991, 4995
Nebokov, Vladimir Vladimirovich 5654
Needham, Joseph 5584, 5585
Nehmer, Stanley 5584, 5585
Nehru, Pandit 5027, 5209, 5348, 5462
Neiman. Gilbert 5654
Nelson, Carl 5295
Nelson, Donald M 4944
Nelson, Harry A 4989, 4995
Nelson, John 5335
Nelson, Melvin Frederick 5649
Nelson, William E 5576, 5577
Neprud, Carl 5584, 5585
Nerenberg, Clara 4989, 4995
Netherlands 5130, 5191,
5222, 5224, 5320, 5321, 5322, 5329, 5635. 5636, 5639, 5640, 5641, 5642
Netherlands Indies 5322, 5329, 53.34
Neugebauer, Frieda 4989, 4995
Nevins, Allan 5661
New China Daily News 5369, 5370
New China News Agency 5379, 5412
New Delhi 5349
New Fourth Army 5086, 5232, 5415, 5416, 5418
New, Ilhan 5062, 5584, 5585
New Leader 4939, 5041, 5683, 5686
New Masses 4937, 4939, 5337, 5338, 5340, 53.52, 5356
New Republic 4935, 4977, 5041, .5647-5660, 5673
New School for Social Research 5208, 5323
New Statesman 5181, 5278, 5386, 5388
New York Compass 4935
New York Post 4935, 5278, 5353
New York Herald Tribune 4925,
4927, 4930, 4932, 5159, 5163, 5227, 5234, 5235, 5285, 5297, 5298, 5323,
5355, 5652-5660.
New York Times 4930,
4932, 4935, 5005, 5019, 5043, 5083, 5135, 5152, 5160, 5165, 5169, 5175,
5224, 5230, 5276, 5287, 5296, 5329, 5334, 5336, 5337, 5355, 5357,
5364, 5427.
New Zealand 4971, 5130, o318,
5319, 5320, 5321, 5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5334, 5349, 5356, 5694
New Zealand Legation (Washington) 5049, 5052, o053
XLVI INDEX
Page
Newoombe. Robinson ')o84, o585
Newman, Eugene 4990, 4995
Nicholas. Mrs 5295
Nicholsky, Miss Alexandra 5055
Niebuhr. Reinhold 5202. 5661
Nieli, Jnng-chen 5368. 5869
Nihon Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai 5027
Nimitz, Chester 4934, 4943
Nimmo. Mr 5707
Nishio 5233
Nitka. Helen E 4989, 4995
Nitobe, Inazo 5320, 5333. 5335, 5583, 5584. 5684, 5685
Nixon, Richard N 5354, 5355, 5487, 5502
NKVD. (See Soviet Secret Police.)
Noble. G. Bernard 5702
Nolde. John J 5584. 5585
Nomura, Ambassador 4941, 4942
Norees, Mrs. P. E. L 5299
Norins. Martin R 5250, 5584. 5585
Norman, E. H 4984, 5007, 5021, 5022, 5031, 5584. 5585. 5685
Norman, Irene 5022
Norman. Montague 5164
Normano, J. F 5584, 5585
North Atlantic Treaty 5316
North China Youth Party 5176
North. Robert C 5584, 5585
Nortliey, J. F 5027
Norton, Henry K 5584, 5585
Noteboom, C 5584, 5585
Notestein, Ada Comstock 5365
Notter. Harley 5261
Noyes, Frank B 5702
NPA. {8ee National Production Authority.)
Nugent. Donald 5684
Nusbaum, Gladys 4991. 4995
Nyon 5163
O
Oakie. John II 5085, 5186, 5199, 5243, 5584. 5585. 5666
Obana, Tsutomu 5584, 5585
Occidental College 5703
Odell, Lawrence H 5584. 5585
Office of Coordinator of Information (OCI) 4958,
4973. 5000, 5001, 5254, 5256-5259, 5268. 5415. 5475, 5692
Office of Price Administration (OPA) 4973,4975,5249,5291
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 4975,
4977, 4978, 5003, 5008, 5013, 5017, 5018, 5342. 5475
Office of War Information (OWI) 4940.
4941, 4975, 5008, 5010, 5047, 5058, 5061, 5311, 5475, 5662
Ohio State Journal 5679
Ohio Supreme Court 5680
Ohio Un-American Activities Committee 5674, 5678, 5679, 5680, 5681
Oka, Kazu 4992, 4995
Okamura. General 5400
Okita, Saburo 5584, 5585
Oldham, John 5295
Oliver, Douglas 5291
Oliver, Robert T 5584,5585
Olshausen, George G 5584, 5585
Olver, A. S. B 5584, 5585
Ooty 5800
OI*C. (See Central Intelligence Agency Office of Policy Coordination.)
Opie, Eugene L> 4983
Opler, M. E 5323
Oppenheimm-, Frank 5040
INDEX XLVII
Page
OrchaM, Dorothy J 5007, 5586, 5587
Orchard, John E 5586, 5587, 5684
Oregon State College 5014
Orniont, Zelda 4989, 4995
Ornitz, Sallie 4989, 4995
O'Rourke, Katherine 5675
Orriek 5111
Orrick, William H 5186
Orwell, George 5385, 5398
Osborn, Frederick 5342
Oshima. Chiya 4992, 4995
O.shima, H. T 5586, 5587
(^sias, Caiuilo 5321
OSS. {See Office of Strategic Services.)
Ota, Lillian 5586, 558*7'
Ota, Mar.i()rie 4992, 4995
Oil, Pao-San 5586, 5587
Oudendyk, W. J 5586, 5587
Oumansky, Constantine 5032,
5055, 5056, 5057, 5083, 50S4, 5085, 5094, 5152, 5162, 5165, 5168, 5170,
51S;3-5185, 5186, 5198, 5199, 5201, 5204, 5226, 5230, 5243, 5262, 5274,
53(X>.
Oumansky, Mrs. Constantine 5032, 5056, 5057, 5169, 5191, 5196, 5226
Outer Mongolia 5089, 5501
Owen, Fred 5189
Owen, Josephine 4988
Owens 5488
Owens, Courtney 5502
OWI. (See Office of AVar Information.)
Oxford University Press 5062, 5240, 5661
Ozaki, Hotsumi 5324, 5346, 5684
Paasche, John H 5586, 5587
Pacific Affairs 4940, 4956, 4959, 4987, 4999, 5010. 5013, 5014, 5016, 5021,
5022, 5025, 5046, 5058, 5063, 5066, 5071, 5080, 5123, 5125, 5127, 5131.
5136. 5168, 51S7, 5190, 5192, 5195, 5214, 5216, 521S-5220, 5225, 5226,
5230. 5238, 5240, 5250. 5256. 5259. 5267, 5274, 5287, 5297, 5300. 5301,
5307, 5328, 5329, 5345, 5347, 5358, 5378, 5504, 5505-5633, 5648, 5662
Packard, Arthur W 5123
Packer, Earl L 5702
Packer, Gerald 5586, 5587
Padilla, Pedro 5586, 5587
Page 5484
Page, Charles Jr 1_1Z___"_.1 5186
Paige, Mrs. Harold L 4944
Pakistan 5318. 5322. 5328, 5331, 5332, 5333. 5-^34
Pakistan Council of International Affairs 5329
Poland, Ernest O 5644
Paley. William S 5299
Palliser, A. F. E 5586. 5587
Palnia. Rafael 5.S-20, 5.^34
Pan, Kung Chan 5586, 5587
Pandit, Mrs. V. L 5062, 5321, 5334
Panikkar. K. M 5070, 5586, 5587
Pao, Ta-kung 5233
Pardee, Ruth E 5586. 5587. 5702
Pares, Bernard 5047, 5586, 5587
Paris Peace Conference 5317
Park, Richard L 5586, 5587
Park, Robert E 5586. 5587
Park, Unsoon 4992, 4995
Parker, Mr 5228
Parker. Belzy M 4991, 4995
Parker, Harriet H 4989. 4995
; XLVni INDEX
Page
Parker, Harrison 5586, 5587
Parker, Philo W— —- ;— ^ 4907, 4958, 4983
Parker, Phyllis Eugenia 5313
Parkin : 5259
Parkin, G. R 5333, 5684
Parlett, Haro]d__-____-__-_ 5586, 5587, 5684
Parrington, Vernon L 5661
Parry, Albert 5586, 5587
Parsegbian, Miss Nuvart 5301
Parsons, Katrine 4987, 4995, 5048, 5049, 5050, 5239, 5266
Parsons, Rutb 4991, 4995, 5586, 5587
Parton, Margaret 5323
Partridge, P. H 5588, 5589
Pashtoon, Jirga 5006, 5044
Passos, John Dos 5650
Pasvolsky, Leo 4976, 4977, 5224, 5247, 5248, 5261, 5284, 5702
Patel, Surendra J 5588, 5589
Patrick, Professor 5135
Patrick, George F 5588, 5589
Patani, P. S 5323
Patterson, Ernest M 5078
Patterson, J. A 5588, 5589
i'atterson, R. P 5274, 5292
Patton, H. S 5588,5589
Patumanon, Prasert 5588, 5589
Paul, Arthur 5112
Paul, Daisy 5112
Pauley - 5698, 5699
Pauley, Bill 5296
Pauley, Ed 5283
Payne, Pierre Steohen Robert 5588, 5589, 5649, 5650, 5651, 5654
Pe, Melvin Tun 5588, 5589
Peace with China Association 5412
Peake, Cyrus H 5193, 5248, 5340, 5588, 5589, 5702
Peardon, Thomas P 5588,5589
Pearl Harbor 4936, 4939, 4942, 4968, 4978,
5062, 5070, 5071, 5076, 5267, 5279, 5283, 5318, 5340, 5342, 5370, 5501
Pearn, B. R 5588, 5589
Pearson, Mr 5022
Pearson, Drevr 4943, 5355
Pearson, F. A 5588, 5589
Pearson, Plesketh 5651
Pearson, L. B 5049, 5052, 5053
Peck, Graham 5588, 5589, 5660
Peffer, Lillian 4987, 4999, 5193
Peffer, Nathaniel 5002,
5014, 5220, 5221, 5234, 5235, 5588, 5589, 5650, 5653, 5656-5660
Pei, Professor . 5010
Peiping ( Peking) 5341, 5348, 5368, 5369, 5380, 5395, 5404, 5406, 5461
Pelan, Frank l 4990, 4995
Pelcoyits, N. A 5588, 5589, 56S4
Pelliot 5192
Pelliott, Paul 5333
Pelzer, Karl J 5294, 5588, 5589, 5684, 5685, 5688, 5702
Pendleton, Robert L : 5588,5589,5684
Penfield, James K 5274, 5297, 5480, 5702
P'eng, Te-huai ^ 5368
Penrose, E. F 5588,5589,5684
Perez. S. E. M 5692
Perkins, B. Ward 5588, 5589
Perkins, Milo 4973, 4975, 5032, 5054, 5261, 5266
Perm 5145
Pescadore 5671
Petain, Marshal 5277
Peters, Mr 5504
I'eterson, Representatiye 5699
INDEX XLIX
Page
Peterson, Marshall N 5702
Petrov, Dr 5121
Pettigi-ew, M. W 4958, 4982, 5009, 5032, 5048, 5049, 5053, 5264, 5265
I'ettus, W. B 5588, 5589
Pfeifer, G 5588, 5589
Phelps, Ward 5588, 5589
Philippines 4971, 5130, 5292, 5296, 5318, 5319, 5320, 5321,
5322, 5327, 5331-5334, 5339, 5349, 5395, 5639, 5642, 5666, 5671, 5690
Phillips, Mr ^^ .__ 5116
Phillips, Miss Lillian M 5040
Phillips, P. D 5590, 5591, 5684
Phinney, Archie 5590, 5591
Pickersgill, J. W 5590, 5591
Pickett, Clarence E 5002, 5260
Pierson College 5269
Pierson, L. B 5270
Pietrowski, Rose 4991, 4995
Pigulevskaya, E 5590, 5591
Pilat, Oliver 5353
Pin, Paul Yu 5344,5361
Pinchot, Gifford 5654
Pinchot, Mrs. Gifford 5062,5294,5702
Pitt, Malcom 5590, 5591
Pittman, Bill 5187
Pivowitz, Abe 5702
Plain Talk 4939, 4942
Piatt, Philip S 5207
Plenn, Abel 5651, 5657
Plimpton, Jane F 5050, 5059, 5702
Plimsoll, James 5702
Plopkin 5183
Plumptre, A. F. W 5590,5591
PM 5216
Pod Znamenem Marxizma 5219
Poland 5382, 5386, 5638
Poland, Fred 5019, 5346
Poland. Government of 5188
Poleman, Jenny F 5590, 5591
Poling, Chang 5320
Politburo 5500,5501
Political Affairs 5338, 5634
Political Quarterly 5302
Political Science Review 5673
Polk. (See Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Pollard, Arthur L 4963
Pollard, John A 4990, 4995, 5199, 5257, 5258, 5287
Pollard, Robert 5590, 5591
Pone, D 5590, 5591
Pons, Wei-ta ^ 4991, 4992, 4995
Pontius, Dale 5590, 55591
Pontius, Hilda C 5702
Poole, Major General 5075
Poore, A. S 5502
Pope 5116
Pope, Everett P 5590, 5591
Pope, Frederick 5590, 5591
Popper, David H 5193
Porter, Catherine 4958,
4967, 4972, 4987, 4988, 4989, 4995, 5053. 5084, 5149, 5160, 5162,
5169, 5179, 5198, 5199, 5228, 5239, 5246, 5256, 5257, 5274, 5300, 5329,
5424, 5590, 5591, 5685, 5702, 5704.
Porteus, S. D 5590,5591
Portugal 5318
Portus, G. V 5590,5591
Potter, Pittman 5260
Poter, P. B 5323
I INDEX
Page
Potsdam Conference 4929
Pougatchef, Simeon 5692
Pound, Roscoe 4934, 4949
Poweles, G. R 5590,5591
Powell, C. I 5674
Powell, Ifor 5590, 5591
Powell, John Benjamin 4942, 5274, 5297, 5298, 5590, 5591, 5649
Powell, Roberta 4988
Power. Eileen 5334, 5590, 5591
Power, Joseph E 5590,5591
Powles, G. R 5702
Powles, Mrs. G. R 5702
PrauK.i. M. R. Seni 5049, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5321, 5322, 5590, 5591
Prasad, P. ?. N 5323
Pratt, Frances 5330
Pratt. Frederick 5590, 5591
Pratt, Helen Gay 5592, 5593, 5654
Pratt, John 5334, 5389, 5390, 5592, 5593
Pravda 5150, 5162, 5164, 5185
Prebbles 56S0
Present, Richard D 5041
Pressman, Lee 5501-5504
Preuss, Lawrence 5592, 5593
Price, Ernest 5592. 5593
Price, Harry B 5052, 5053, 5189, 5190. 5210, 5215, 5592, 5593, 5711
Price. Maurice T 5592,5593
Price, M. Phillips 5592, 5593
Price, Mildred 5346, 5684, 5700
Price, Willard DeMille 5649
Princeton University Press 5041,5282
Prien. Charles H 5592, 5593
Priest, Alan 5592, 5.593
Pritt, D. N 5156
Prostov, Euwne 5182
Pruitt. Ida 5198, 5202, 5203, 5592, 5593, 5709
Pu. Wei-meng 5592, 5593
Pureed, Victor 5062, 5350, 5592, 5593, 5684
Purvis 5189
Pyke, Richard 4987, 5119, 5161, 5356, 5592, 5593, 5704
Q
Quit;ley. Harold S 4999, 5229, 5502, 5593, 5684
Qureshi, I. H 5592,5593
R
Rade 5132
Radek, Karl 5115,5125. 5151-5154
Radius, Walter A 5186, 5592, 5593
Radom, Jane 4990, 4995
Raser, F. A 5592.5593
Rahder, J 5592, 5593
Rahman, Obaidur 5062
Rahna-Trone 4958
Rajchman, Ludwig ,5216, 5270, 5346
Raman, T. A 5592,5593
Ramnz. Cliarles Ferdinand 5654
Randolph. Jeanette 4988, 5592, 5593
Ranga, N. G 5323
Rao, B. Shiva ,5062,5594,5595
Rao, V. K. R. V 5323
Rappaport, Arthur Vincent 5675, 5676
Rasmiiisky, Louis 5270
Rasmussen, A. H 55^4, 5595
Ratnam, P 5594, 5595
INDEX LI
Page
Raushenbush, Joan 4964
Raushenbush, Stephen , 5261
Rawlings. Bernard 5594, 5595
Rawson, Geoffrey 5594, 5595
Rav, Hilda Anstern 4984,
4987, 4988, 4991, 4993, 5010, 5045. 5054, 5139, 5161, 5189, 5198, 5199,
5204, 5207, 5218, 5242, 5254, 5287, 5295, 5362, 5516, 5517, 5704
Rav. J. Franklin 5286, 5594, 5595
Raymond. Elizabeth 4987, 4988
Kayner. Charles 4967
Read. T. T 5594,5595
Redav. Joseph Z 5594, 5595
Reddick, Olive I 5702
Redfield, A. H 5594, 5595
Redman, H. Vere 5594, 5595
Reed, Stephen W 5684
Rees, Frederick 5594, 5595
Rees. Williams, D. R 5594, 5595
Reicbshaver. Edwin O 5594, 5595
Reid, Escott 5115, 5333, 5356, 5594, 5595
Reid. Helen Dwight 5702
Reid. John Gilbert 55M, 5595
Reid, Ogden 5235
Reider, Robert W 5674
Reinhold, Anna 4991, 4995
Reischauer, A. K 5594, 5595
Reischaner. Edwin Oldfather 4930, 4931, 5111, 5198, 5229, 5655, 5660
Remer, C. F 4919,4958,
4975, 4977, 4984, 5001, 5007, 5008, 5199, 5226, 5254, 5259. 5594. 5r)95
Renner. Gordon 5674, 5678, 5679, 5680, 5681, 5682
Resnick, Ruth 4989, 4995
Reubens, Edwin P 5594,5595
Reuters 5217, 5326, 5334, 5348
Reynolds, Judge 5681
Rhoads, Charles J 5186
Rhodes Trust. Cecil 5349
Rice. Llovd P 5594,5595
Richards, Mrs. I. A 5177
Richards, I. A 5594,5595
Riches, E. J 5594,5595
Riddell, R. G 5594,5595
Ridley, John 5596, 5597
Riefler, Winfield 4973, 5261
Rjenaecker, Victor 5596, 5597
Rifchin, Frances , 4988
Riggs. Fred \V 5596. 5597
Ringwalt. Arthur R 5261, 5480, 5702
Risenfeld 4997
Rivers, W. F 5324, 5596, 5597
Rivet. Paul 5321
Riznik, Charlotte 5295
Roach. Jame.s R 5596.5597
Robequain, Charles 5259, 5333, 5596, 5597, 5684, 5685, 5692
Roberson, W. S 49,83
Robert, Father 5333
Robert. Mr 5216
Roberts, Holland 5040
Roberts, Stephen H 5596, 5597
Robertson. C. J 5596.5597
Robertson, Gwendolyn .___ 4990, 4995
Robinson, Geroid 5173
Robinson. Gerry . 5286
Robinson, G. T 5111
Robinson, Jay , 5219, 5220, 5247, 5248, 5702
Robinson, Kenneth A 5674
Rochdale 5210
LII ESTDEX
Page
Rockefeller Foundation 4974,
4979, 5003, 5021, 5023, 5025, 5026, 5029, 5030, 5111, 5120, 5166, 5171,
5209. 5250, 5263, 5322, 5327, 5335, 5688, 5689.
Rockefeller Memorial, Laura Spelman 5335
Rockefeller, Nelson 5299
Rockley, Glen . 5596, 5597
Rockwood, Charles P 5596, 5597
Rodwell, H. R 5596,5597
Roeder, Ralph ^- 5655
Rogers, Agnes l 5655
Rogers, Lettie . 5651
Rogers, Lindsay 5002
Roger.s, Rima S 4990, 4995, 5290
Rogers, Sadie . 5704
Rogers, William Garland 5657
Rogov, Vladimir - 5011, 5012, 5059, 5060, 5334, 5347
Rohde, Ruth Bryan 5643
Rolfe, Mary 4988
Rolph, Earl 5596, 5597
Roman, Agnes 5295, 5596, 5597
Romm, Alexandre . — 5122
Romm, V 5150-5154, 5596, 5597
Rommel , 5679
Romulo, Carlos P ^- 5.596, 5597
Roman, William 5596, 5597
Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin ,_- _ 5261, 5643, 5682
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 4929,
4937, 4941, 4964, 4968, 4977, 5035, 5040, 5052, 5055, 5057-5060, 5071,
5072, 5073, 5112, 5190, 5249, 5253, 5268, 5280, 5328, 5349, 5364, 5379,
5422, 5483, 5484, 5655, 5664, 5671.
Roosevelt, Nicholas 5596, 5597
Roo.sevelt, Theodore , 5635
Root, Constance 4990, 4995
Roper, E. C 5299
Ropes, E. C 4973, 5205, 5276, 5294, 5.596, 5597
Rosberg, Lillian 4992, 4995
Rose, Archibald , 5175, 53.34, .5.3.59
Rose, S 5596, 5597
Rosenberg 5678
Rosenfeld, Sylvia 4990, 4995
Ro.senthal, Alma , 5596, 5597
Rosenthal, Laura 4991, 4995
Rosinger, Lawrence K 4939, 4991, 4995.
5021, 5027, 5195, 5214, 5237, 5284, 5299, 5301, 5596, 5597, 564^-5653
Rosinski, Herbert 5598, 5599
Ross, Andrew , 4999
Ross, G. A. Johnston 5598, 5599
Ross, Ian Clunies , 5322, .5684
Ross, John 4959
Ro.ss, Lloyd , 5598, 5599
Rossbach, Mr 5299
Rossbach, Mrs 5299
Rossiter, Fred J 4999, 559~8, 5599
Roth, Andrew 5220, 5248, 5249, 5278, 5598, 5.599, 5649
Rothe, Cecile 5598, 5599
Rothraan, Rhoda 4989, 4995
Rotor ' 5049
Rowe, David Nelson 4944, 5111, 5229, .5.598, 5599, 5649, 5683, 5686-5691
Rowell, Chester H 5150, 5153, 5156, 5186, 5318, 5326, 5334, .5704
Rowell, Newton R 5II5, 5156
Rowell, Newton W 5319, 5320, 5333, 5335, .5.598, 55r'9
Rowland, D. W 5598, 5599
Roxas, Manuel 5598, 5.599
Roxby, P. M 5.598, 5599
Roy, M. N 5005, 5043, 5046, 5598, 5599
Royal Institute of International Affairs 5317, 5329, 5330, 5356, 5378, 5412
I
INDEX Lm
Page
Royjima . 5685
Royama, Masamicbi 5598, 5599, 5684, 5685
Rubens, Doris 5655
Rubin, Barnard 5598, 5599
Rubin, Rose 5299
Rubio, Alfred 5674, 5677, 5678
Rubio, Carlos 5678
Rubio, Anna H. (See Morgan, Mrs. Richard.)
Rudlin, Mrs. Eryl 5702
Ruebens. Beatrice G 5598, 5599
Rueflf, Gaston 5598, 5599, 5684
Rufus, W. Carl 5598, 5599
Ruml, Beardsley 5041
Rusk, Dean 4925, 4926, 4984, 5023, 5025, 5026, 5363, 5391
Russell, I'.ertrand 5041
Russell, Cyrus W 5334
Russell, Helen E 4992, 4995
Russell, Louis J 5502
Russia. (See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Russian Consulate (Moscow) 5025
Russian Consulate (NYC) 5154, 5275
Russian Consulate (Shanghai) 5158
Russian Consulate (Vienna) 5162
Russian Legation (Ottawa) 5262
Russian Embassy (Toronto) 5270, 5271
Russian Embassy (Mexico City) 5055, 5056
Russian Embassy (Tokyo) 5108, 5115
Russian Embassy (Washington) 5057,5152,5162,5165,5168,5169
5183-5186, 5196, 5201, 5204, 5226, 5230, 5246, 5262, 5266, 5267, 5300
Russian-German Pact, 1939 4971, 5206
Russian Imperial Army 5115, 5146
Russian War Relief ^ 4940, 5090, 5275, 5282, 5285, 5298, 5344
Russo-Japanese Neutrality Declaration 5240
Rutherford. Robert 5702
Rykoff 5156
Ryu. Shintaro 5598, 5599
S
Sa, Kung-Liao 5059
Sabarwal, K. R .5598, 5599
Sacks, Milton 5598, 5599
Sadler, A. L 5598, 5599
Sagar, T. H 5600, 5601
Sah, Pan-tung 5345, 5861
Sahalimsk 5008
St. Bees School (England) 5662
St. George, Joan 4992, 4995, 5694
St. John, Robert 5657
St. Louis Despatch 4935
St. Timothy's School 5702
Saionji 5156, 5174, .5189, 5208, 5249, 5358
Saito, Soichi 5333, 5335. 5600, 5601
Saiyidain, K. G 5600, 5(;01
Sakanishi, Shio 5600, 5601
Salim, Hadji Agoes 5322
Salisbury, Laurence E 4989
4995, 5024, 5084, 5173, 5282, 5283, 5289, 5296, 5329, 5600, 5601, 5703
Salmon, Alfred 5600, 5601
Salter, Arthur 5192, 5800, 5601
Samson, Mr 5387
Samson, Gerald 5600, 5601
Samuel, Herbert 5320, 5334, 5600, 5601
Sanders, Florence E 4991, 4995
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce 5315
San Francisco Chronicle 5084, 5151, 5326, 5335
LIV INDEX
Page
San Francisco Daily News 5149-
San Francisco News 5040
San Francisco State College 5040
Sank, H. K 5600, 5601
Sansom, Sir George 4982, 4984, 5009,
5021-5023, 5026, 5051, 5053, 5072, 5189, 5190, 5208, 5209, 5322, 5333
Sansom, George Bailey 5600, 5601, 5660
Santillan-Castrence, Pura 5600, 5601
Santos, Bienveniod N 5600, 5601
Sarafam, Bertram D 5600, 5601
Sarraut, Mr 5147
Sarraut, Albert 5320, 5600, 5601
Saturday Evening Post 5465, 5466
Saturday Review of Literature 5648, 5650, 5651, 5653, 5654, 5659, 5660
Saugstad 4997, 4998
Saunders, Kenneth 5600, 5601
Sauvy, Alfred 5600, 5601
Savord, Ruth 5600, 5601
Sawayanagi, Masataro 4319
Sawer, Beatrice 5600, 5601
Sayre, Francis B 4973, 4997, 5045, 5078, 5165, 5702
Savre, Mrs. Francis B 5702
Scalapino, Robert A 5600, 5601
SCAl'. {Sec Supreme Command Allied Powers.)
Schappes, Morris U 4926
Scharlfenberg, W. A 5702
Scharrenberg. Paul 5186
Schatz, Louise H 4990
Schefer, E. E 5702
Scheffer, Paul 5174, 5358
Schechtman, Joseph B 5600, 5601
Scherer 5168
Schiller, A. Arthur 5003, 5602, 5603, 5684
Schmidt 5112, 5113
Schneer, Sophie 4989, 4995
Schneider, Helen 4992, 4995, 5347
Schneider, Isidor 5655
Schneider. Louis J., Jr 5674
Schoellkoi)f, Mrs 5299
School for Democracy (NYC) 4926
School of Advanced International Studies and Foreign Service Training
Center 5313, 5703
Schoyer, B. P 4988
Schoyer, Preston 5602, 5603
Schrieke, B 5602, 5603
Schriftgiesser, Karl 5657
Schroeder, Johannes 5202, 5204
Schulberg, Bndd Wilson 5655
Schultbers. Frederic D 5602, 5603
Schuman, Frederick L 5205, 5602, 5603
Schunian, Frederick 5205
Schumpeter, Elizal)eth B 5264, 5265, 5602, 5603
Schwartz, Beniamin K 5438, 5439, 5444, .5447. .54.52,
5455, 5457-5461, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5481, 5482. 5602, 5603
Schweitzer, Leonard J 5602, 5603
Schwellenbnch. Lewis B 4974. 4977, 5702
Scott, Ernest 5320, .5602. 5603
Scott, F. R 5084, 5158, 5154, 5156, 5602, 5603
Scott, Natalie Anderson 5655
Scott, Warren 5243
Scroggs. William O 5602. .5603
Scully, Madeline F 5?10
Seagrave, Gordon S 5651
Searles, P. J 5602, 5603
Sebatz, Louise H 4995
Seidensticker, Edward G 5602, 5603
INDEX LV
Page
Seiteliuan, Max 5602. 5603
SekigiK-hi. Yasushi 5602, 5603
Selcles, George 5657
Selassie, Haile 5708
Selle, Earl Albert 5657
Selwyn-Clarke, Hilda 5602, 5603
Sen, Gertrude Emerson 5602, 5603
Serene 5358
Sereno 5174
Sergever 5008
Serot, Louise B 4990, 4995
Serot. Rhoda 4990, 4995
Service, John S 5061,5062,5347,5415-5424.5480
Setalvad. M. C 5323
Sevensix, iMarkus - — 5161
Severino, liodolfo 5295
Sevniour, Gideon 4976
Sforza, Carlo 5078, 5602, 5608
Sbahn. Judy 5602, 5603
Shahn, Tillie G 4988, 4989, 4992, 4995, 4300, 5064, 5300
Shan. Yen Hsi 5404
Shanahan, Eileen 5602, 5603
Shanghai 5319, 5320, 5331, 5333, 5334,5356, 5383, 5417
Shannon. William V 5353
Shaplej-, Harlow 5041
Shariat 5044
Sharp 4999
Sharp, Frederick D 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242, 5247, 5250, 5251, 5254, 5255
Sharp, Frederick S 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242
Sharpe. Frances (Moldauer) 4988. 4989, 49£5
Sharp, R. Lauriston 5336,5602,5603
Shavelson, Rita 4989, 4995
Shaw, Albert 5078
Shaw, Glen E 5323,5602,5603
Sheeks, Robert 'B 5604, 5605
Sheehan, Vincent 4958
Sheldon, Frederick 5176
Sheldon. George F 5604. 5605
Sheperd 5685
Shepard, Jack 5320, 5604, 5605
Shepard, Oscar P^ .5207
Shepardson. Whitney 5167, 5298, 5299, 5303
Shepherd, Jack 4987, 5209, 5236, 5268
Sheppard, William R 5604, 5605
Sherman. Kathei-ine 5702
Sherwani. Latif Ahmad 5604, 5605
Sherwood 5486
Shidachi, Tetsujiri .5604. 5605
Shih. Chao-Ying 5630, 5631
Shih, Heng-Kno 5604, 5605
Shih, Hsin Hua 5379
Shih, Hu 5174, 5310, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5358
Shiman. Russell G , 4987,4988
5084, 5161, 5162, 5168, 5169, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5268, 5329, 5604,' 5605
Shinkle. Elodie 49S8
Shippe, M. G. (See Asiaticus.)
Shirer, William Lawrence 5655
Shiskin, Boris ~_ 4975, 4977^ 5703
Shishko. Jerome 4990, 4995
Shoeki 5022
Shoemaker, James H 4967
4967. 4973, 5007, 5008, 5052-5054, 5089, 5604, 5605, 5684, 5711
Shore, Manny 5575
Shore. Maurice 5219
Shostokovich ~~ 5266
LIV INDEX
Page
San Francisco Daily News 514&
San Francisco News 5040
San Francisco State College 5040
Sank, H. K 5600, 5601
Sansom, Sir George 4982, 4984, 5009,
5021-5023, 5026, 5051, 5053, 5072, 5189, 5190, 5208, 5209, 5322, 5333
Sansom, George Bailey 5600, 5601, 5660
Santillan-Castrence, Pura . 5600, 5601
Santos, Bienveniod N 5600, 5601
Sarafam, Bertram D 5600, 5601
Sarraut, Mr 5147
Sarraut, Albert 5320, 5600, 5601
Saturday Evening Post 5465, 5466
Saturday Review of Literature 5648, 5650, 5651, 5653, 5654, 5659, 5660
Saugstad 4997, 4998
Saunders, Kennetti 5600, 5601
Sauvy, Alfred 5600, 5601
Savord, Ruth 5600, 5601
Sawayanajil. IMasataro 4319
Sawer, Beatrice 5600, 5601
Savre, Francis B 4973, 4997, 5045, 5078, 5165, 5702
Savre, iNlrs. Francis B 5702
Scalapino, Robert A 5600, 5601
SCAP. {Sec Supreme Command Allied Powers.)
Schappes, Morris U^ 4926
Schartfenberg, W. A 5702
Scharrenberg, Paul 5186
Schatz, Louise H 4990
Schefer, E. E 5702
Scheffer, Paul 5174, 5358
Schechtman, Joseph B 5600, 5601
Seherer 5168
Schiller, A. Arthur 5003, 5602, 5603, 5684
Schmidt 5112, 5113
Sclmeer, Sophie 4989, 4995
Schneider, Helen 4992, 4995, 5347
Schneider, Isidor 5655
Schneider, Louis J., Jr 5674
Schoellkojif, Mrs 5299
School for Democracy (NYC) 4926
School of Advanced International Studies and Foreign Service Training
Center 5313, 5703
Schover, B. P 4988
Schover, Preston 5602, 5603
Schrieke, B 5602, 5603
Scliriftgiesser, Karl 5657
Schroeder, Johannes 5202, 5204
Schulberg, Budd Wilson 5655
Schulthers, Frederic D 5602, 5603
Scliuman, Frederick L 5205, 5602, 5603
Schunian, Fredericlc 5205
Schumpeter, Elizabeth B 5264, 5265, 5602, 5603
Schwartz, Benjamin K 5438, 5439, 5444, 5447, 5452,
5455, 5457-5461, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5481, 5482, 5602, 5603
Schweitzer, Leonard J 5602, 5603
Schwellenbach, Lewis B 4974. 4977, 5702
Scott, Ernest 5320, 5602, 5603
Scott, P. R 5084, 5153, 5154, 5156, 5602, 5603
Scott, Natalie Anderson 5655
Scott, Warren 5243
Scroggs, William O 5602, 5603
Scully, Madeline F 5310
Seagrave, Gordon S 5651
Searles, P. J 5602, 5603
Sebatz, Louise H 4995
Seidensticker, Edward G 5602. 5603
INDEX LV
Page
Seitelman, Max 5602, 5603
Sekignchi, Yasushi f>602, o603
Seldes, George ^^^"^
Selassie, Haile 5708
Selle, Earl Albert 56o7
Selwyn-Clarke, Hilda 5602, 5603
Sen, Gertrude Emerson 5602, 5603
Serene 5358
Sereno r^Ac
Sergever -^OOS
Serot," Louise B 4J)90 4995
Serot, Rhoda 4990, 4995
Service, John S 5061,5062,5347,5415-5424,5480
Setalva'd, M. C 5323
Sevensix, Markus ^lol
Severiuo, Rodolfo 51.9o
Seymour, Gideon o~"7~o "^io
Sforza, Carlo 5078, 5602, 5603
Shahn, .Uidy 5602, 5603
Shahn, Tillie G 4988, 4989, 4992, 4995, 4300, 5064, 5300
Slian, Yen Hsi 5404
Shanahan, Eileen 5602, 5603
Shanghai 5319, 5320, 5331, 5333, 5334,5356, 5383, 5417
Shannon, William V 5353
ShapleV, Harlow 5041
Shariat 5044
Sharp 4999
Sharp, Frederick B- 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242, 5247, 5250, 5251, 5254, 5255
Sharp, Frederick S 5198, 5190, 5237, 5242
Sharpe. Frances (Moldauer) 4988, 4989, 49£5
Sharp, E. Lauriston 5336, 5602, 5603
Shavelson, Rita 4989, 4995
Shaw, Albert 5078
Shaw, Glen E 5323,5602,5603
Sheeks, Robert "B 5604, 5605
Sheehan, Vincent — 4958
Sheldon, Frederick 5176
Sheldon, George F 5604. 5605
Sheperd 5685
Shepard, Jack 5320, 5604, 5605
Shepard, Oscar F 5207
Shepardson, Whitney 5167, 5298, 5299, 5303
Shepherd, Jack 4987, 5209, 5236, 5268
Sheppard. William R 5604, 5605
Sherman, Katherine 5702
Sherwani. Latif Ahmad 5604, 5605
Sherwood 5486
Shidachi, Tetsujiri 5604, 5605
Shih, Chao-Ying 5630, 5631
Shih, Heng-Kuo 5604, 5605
Shih, Hsin Hua 5379
Shih, Hu 5174, 5310, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5358
Shiman, Russell G . 4987,4988
5084, 5161, 5162, 5168, 5169, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5268, 5329, 5604, 5605
Shinkle, Elodie 4988
Shippe, M. G. {See Asiaticus.)
Shirer, William Lawrence 5655
Shiskin, Boris 4975, 4977, 5703
Shishko, Jerome 4990, 4995
Shoeki 5022
Shoemaker, James H 4967,
4967, 4973, 5007, 5008, 5052-5054, 5089, 5604, 5605, 5684, 5711
Shore, Manny 5675
Shore, Maurice 5219
Shostokovich 5266
LVI . INDEX
I'age
Shotwell, James T 5002
5041, 5067, 5166, 5207, 5208, 5260, 5263, 5350, 5604, 5605, 5601
Shri, Ram 5323
Shridharani, Krishnalal 5G04, 5605
Shu, Cb'ing-Ch'un 5G49, 5058
Shu, Hsi-Hsu 5604, 5605
Shulpin 5008
Siam 5331
Sian 5368, 5403
Siberia 5340,5424
Sibley, Harper 5067
Sifton, Victor 5326
Sigerist, Henry E 5238, 5252
Sikanrler, Hyat Khan 5004, 5042, 5043
Simester, Miss 5295
Simkins, Francis Butler 56.18
Simmons College (Boston) 4065,5008
Simmons, Ernest 5079
Sinims, William Phillip 5702
Simon, J. P 50i:0
Simons, Grace 4958
Sinclair, Archibald 5349
Sinclair, George M 5604, 5605
Sinclair, Gregg M 4944
Singh, Anup 5604, 5605
Sino-American Cultural Society 5237
Sino-Japanese War 5194, 5217, 5219, 5221, 5223, 5341
Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi 5604, 5605
Sitsen, Peter H. W 5350,5604,5605,5684
Sjahir 5040
Sjahrir, Soetan 5639, 5659
Skelton 5259
Skinner, G. William 5604, 5605
Skrefstad, Betty 4987, 4991, 4994, 4995
Slack, Frank V 5268, 5604, 5605
Slaski, J 5604, 5605
Slaughter, Major 5145^ 5146
Slesinger, Mr 5229
Smedley, Agnes ~__ 5337^
5347, 5356, 5438, 5444, 5447, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5481, 5482. 5684
Smith 5H2
Smith, Barbara B ^11 4990, 4995
Smith, Bradford 5604, 5605, 5658
Smith, C. P 5606,5607
Smith College 5288
Smith, Edith Lawrence 5427
Smith, Edwin K 5606,5607
Smith, Elmer R 5606,5607
Smith, Fayette 56O6, 5607
Smith, Florence M 5702
Smith, Guy Harold 5606,5607
Smith, H. Alexander 4943, 5642, 5643
Smith, Homer 4936
Smith, Jessica 5084, 5178, 5199, 5251
Smith, Joseph 5295
Smith, Lolita W 1 4991,4992,4995
Smith, M. Paske 5606,5607
Smitli, Maggie 4989_ 4995
Smith, Jlarion W 5606 5607
Smith, N. skeene iiz::::::::::, 5606;5607
Smith, Miss ^an Lincoln 5158,5159,5704
Smith, Miss Nora Ford 50S'?
Smith, Rennie 5606, 5607
Smith, Russell 5qq2
Smith, Sydney B ~ 4070
Smith, T. V ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 5661
INDEX LVII
Page
Smith, Walter Bedell 5481, 5483
Smith, Warren D 5606,5607
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell 5606, 5607
Smuts, General 5077
Smyth, Helen 5606, 5607
Smyth, Henry Dewolf 5041
Smythe, Lewis C 5062,5606,5607
Snell, Lord 5334, 5606, 5607
Snow, Edgar 5188,
5194, 5198, 5200, 5201, 5203, 5213, 5219, 5235, 5281, 5438, 5440, 5444,
5445, 5447, 5461-5464, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474. 5475, 5481, 5482, 5606,
5607, 5648-5650, 5652, 5653, 5658-5660, 5684.
Snow, Mrs. Edgar 4965, 5232, 5474, 5480, 5620, 5621, 5649
Snyder, Maxim 4990, 4995
SOBSI. (See All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions.)
Social Science Research Council 5220, 5295, 5355, 5662
Socoline-Schapiro, Valdimir 5692
Socony 5638
Soebandrio, Dr 5606, 5607
Soekarno, President 5640, 5641
Soga, Shigeo 5606, 5607
Soga, Yasutaro 5207
Sokolove, Henri 5702
Sokolsky, George 5023
Soljak, Phillip L 5606,5607
Solomon, Kae 4992, 4995
Sommerich, Jane 5606, 5607
Soong, T. V 4969, 5945, 5047, 5178, 5211, 5328, 5346
South Wales Miners Federation 5379
Sovani, N. V 5606,5607
Soviet Russia Today 5156, 5177, 5251, 5252
Soviet Secret Police (NKVD) 5185.5463,5464
Soviet Union or Soviet Russia. {See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Soward, F. H— . 5333, 5606-5609
Soward, F, W 5684
Soyer, David 4989, 4995
Spalding 5267
Spalding, W, F 5608, 5609
Spanish Civil War 5206
Speer, James P 5608, 5609
Speier, Hans 5608, 5609
Spencer 5169, 5170
Spencer, J. E 5608, 5609, 5684
Spewack, Samuel 5658
Spidell, Clara 4987, 4991, 4995
Spillum, Mary C 4992, 4995
Spinks, Charles Nelson 5062, 5608, 5609, 5684
Spitzer, H. M 5608, 5609, 5702
Spoor, S. H 5635
Sproul, Allan _ 4974
Sproul, Robert G 4938, 4942, 4944, 5013, 5026, 5186, 5243, ~5~289, 5703
Sprouse, Philip D _ _ 5430
Sprout, Harold "-~rr""Z_r"5608, 5609
Srinivasan, C. R 5.3'>3
Stacey, C. P 1 ~__~_ HI 5608, 5609
Stade, Ido B 5608, 5609
Staley. Alvah Eugene 5313, 5314 5316
Staley, Alvah H _ _ _ 5313
Stale.v, Eugene 4944, 4973, 5197, 5200, 5289r5~603, 5608, 5609
Staley, Helen Teresa Browne 5313
Staley, Pamela Myrick I_I"~ZZ"_II~ 5,313
Staley, Phyllis Eugenia Parker (Mrs. Alvah Eugene) ___ZIIZIZZZZIZ~Z_ ~ 5313
Staley, Thomas Eugene 5313^
Stalin, Joseph 4935. 4938, 5075, 50~77, 5149, 5154, 5'l84, 518675191, 5243,
5249, 5280, 5374, 5376, 5384, 5385, 5388, 5420, 5483. 5484. 5500
Stalin, S ___ 5221
88348—52— pt. 14 55
LX INDEX
Page
Tannenwald, Ted 5205
Tao. Hsi-sheng 5310
Tao, L. K 5612, 5613
Tara, Chand 5323
Tarr, Edgar J 5032, 5041, 5054, 5157, 5195,
5199, 5265, 5269, 5270, 5271, 5287, 5320, 5321, 5324, 5333, 5614, 5615
Tarue, Luis 5614, 5615
Tass (Soviet News Agency) 5121,5122,5150,5197,5199,5256
Tata Institute (India) 5062
Tatevania, Y__ 5614, 5615
Taub, A 5297
Taub, E. S 5297
Taussig, Marv 4988, 5614, 5615
Tawney, R. H 5208, 5209, 5311, 5350, 5614, 5615
Tavenner, Frank S., Jr 5502, 55.)4
Tavler, William Lonsdale 5702
Tavlor 5685
Taylor, A. H 5261, 5614, 5615
Tavlor, Edmond 5655
Tavlor, Esther 4990, 4995
Tavlor, George E 4999, 5008, 5173. 5229, 5234, 5250, 5312, 5350, 5368, 5614, 5615
Tavlor. Griffith 5614, 5615
Tavlor, J. P 5053
Tavlor, Janet 4990, 4995
Tavlor, K. W t)614, 5615
Tavlor, Margaret R 4988, 5085, 5179, 5180. 5187
Taylor, Paul S 5614, 5615
Tavlor, Robert Lewis 5(60
Tavlor, Wayne C 5261, 5702
Taylor, William H 5al4, 5615
Teggart, Frederick J 5614, 5615
Teheran Conference 4928, 5071, o075, o076, 5 77
Temple, Shirley 5682
Templewood, Samuel John Gurney Hoare 5655
Tendetnick, Frances 4990, 49115
Tpno- S Y 5614,5615
Tennet. Hugh C 5207
Terlin, Rose - 5709
Terrell, Robert 5(i80. o682
Tewksburv, Donald G 5614,5615
Texton. Robert B 5614, 561 »
Thacher, Judge Thomas D — •- ^-p'^
Thailand 5089, 5321 .5322
Thakur, B. T ■^^^^' ^^^
Thomas, Charles W '5362
Thomas, Elhert D O'02
Thomas, Elbert H ;-- 4977
Thomas, Mendell ^ol4, 5bl5
Thomas, Norman 5046, ;)614, 561o
Thomas, S. B 4910, 4984, 5028, 5614, 5 il5
Thomason, Mrs. Florence 5ii98
Thompson =^292, 5bba
Thompson, Miss Dorothy 5204
Thompson, John 9.,^^
Thompson. L. (Kennedy) ^-°p
Thompson, Laura 5614, 5615, 5r02
Thompson. Paul W ---- _ "^?-
Thompson, Virginia McLean 50<il, ol6J,
5170, 5192, 5214, 5236, 5248, 5259, 5268, 5614, 5615, 5660, 5692
Thompson, Warren S 5614, 5615
Thomson, Charles A 5199, 5161
Thong. M 5616. 5617
Thorner, Alice oblb, ,)bi<
Thorneri Daniel 5257, 5616, 5617. 5702
Thoi-pe. .Tames o616, 5617
Tiedemann ^"^^^
INDEX LXI
Page
Thresher, M. B 5616, 5617, 5702
Thurnwall, Richard C 5616, 5617
Tideman, J 5616, 5617
Tikhii Okean (Pacific Ocean) 5150
Tilton, Mrs. L. Deming 5040
Time, Inc 4974, 5008, 5020, 5060, 5279, 5349
Timperley, H. J 5178, 5616, 5617
Ting, Sa 5616, 5617
Tinj:, Yeh 5234, 5418
Tinjifu, Tsiang 5062
Timur 5318
Titan Company 5106, 5107
Tito, Marshal 5315, 5462, 5465
Tixier, A. P 5049, 5053
Todd, E 4988, 5197
Togo, Alice M 4992, 4995, 5616, 5617
Tokyo 5346, 5414, 5665
Tokyo Asahi, Shimbun, The 5346
Toledano, Vincenta Lombard 5041
Tolokonoky 5135
Tolisclius, Otto David 5650
Toller, W. Stark 5616, 5617
Tompkins, Pauline 5616, 5617, 5660
Tong, Hollin^'ton Kong 5237, 5347, 5650
Tontiyai, Chakkratong 5616, 5617
Torrens, James G 5616, 5617
Townsend, Dallas S 5049, 5053
Towusend, Peter 5616, 5617
Toynbee, Arnold J 5209, 5334, 5616, 5617
Trammell, Mr 4939
Trans-Siberian Railway 4956, 4968, 5209
Treat, Harry Price 5189
Tressider, Donald B 4944, 5303
Trewartha, Glenn T 5616, 5617, 5684
Trinity College 5250, 5701
Trippe, Juan 4944
Trivedi, H. M 5323, 5616, 5617
Trone, S 5202, 5324
Trotter, Reginald 5616, 5617
Trotsky 5150, 5152-5156, 5165, 5181, 5191, 5280
Troyanovsky 5209
Truman, Harry S 4929, 4932,
4933, 5281, 5284, 5292, 5302, 5359, 5376, 5377, 5403-5406, 5410, 5669,
5677, 5679, 5681
Ts'ai, Ting-Kai 5383
Tseng, Chao-lun 5616, 5617
Tseng, V. G - 4910, 4984, 5028
Tsiang, Tingfu F 5344, 5361, 5616, 5617
Tsingtao 5406, 5429
Tsou, Mr 5390, 5391
Tsur Y. T _ 5344 5361
Tsuru, Shigeto l^.llZ.Z.^Zl.^Z 2..1.I^~_._ 4963, 5168, 5616, 5617
Tuckman, Mrs. W. W. L 5299
Tngan-Bavanovsky 5008
Tun, U Myat 5294
T'ung, Chao 5369
Turbin, Ruth (Ruth J. Lazarus) 4989, 4994
Turner, Bruce 5049, 5053, 5249, 5704
Turner, Ralph E 4967, 5324, 5703
Turner, Richard S 5186
Turner, Mrs. W. H., Jr 5702
Tusurumi 5204
Twaddell, Emily 4988
Tweksbury, Donald G 4944
Tydings, Millard 4926, 4935
Tyler, Charlotte 4917, 4987, 5119, 5121, 5140, 5618, 5619, 5704
Tyrell, Edith 5618, 5619
LXII INDEX
u
Page
Ubaldo, Mr 5295
Ucliida, Yoshi 4990, 4995
VCR. {See United China Relief.)
Ulilman, Lt. George 5618, 5619
Ultee, A. J 5618, 5619
Underbill, William Amory 5441
UNESCO. (iSee United Nations Economic and Social Council.)
Unger, Neel A 5704
Ungphakorn, Puey 5618, 5619
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA) 5251, 5366, 5413
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U. S. S. R.) 4920-
4922, 4929, 4932, 4937-4942, 4954, 4956, 4963^971, 4997, 5000, 5007-
5009, 5025, 5032-5039, 5045-5047, 5055, 5056, 5060-5064, 5069-5082,
5086-5095, 5103, 5112-5117, 5120-5128, 5132-5135, 5138-5140, 5145,
5148-5150, 5154-5156, 5159-5161, 5164, 5165, 5172, 5173, 5177, 5181-
5187, 5191, 5195, 5196, 5201, 5205-5208, 5215-5221, 5226, 5230-5233,
5238, 5240, 5246, 5251-5253, 5256, 5263, 5265-5267, 5272, 5275, 5279,
5280-5282, 5284-5287, 5298, 5302, 5306, 5307, 5309, 5312, 5315, 5316,
5318, 5320, 5321, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5332, 5356, 5365, 5367-5370, 5373,
5374, 5376, 5379, 5380, 5382, 5387, 5391, 5393, 5395, 5400, 5412, 5419,
5420, 5422-5425, 5460, 5462, 5500, 5501, 5639, 5640, 5642, 5664, 5668-
5670, 5672, 5692. 5696, 5706, 5707.
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic Army 5074,
5077, 5092, 5094, 5182, 5185, 5232, 5252
United China Relief 4936, 4937,
4968, 4983, 5252, 5284, 5298, 5337, 5344, 5345, 5349, 5360, 5709, 5710
United Kingdom. (See Great Britain.)
United Nations (UN) 4925,
4968, 4969, 4977, 5034, 5036-5039, 5047, 5066-5077, 5079, 5090, 5267,
5269, 5272, 5280, 5281, 5285, 5289, 5316, .5322, 5323, 5325, 5345, 5375,
5389, 5390, 5394, 5396, 5397, 5412, 5484, 5634, 5636, 5639, 5642, 5643,
5664, 5665, 5669, 5671, 5672, 5673, 5676, 5693.
United Nations Economic and Social Council (Unesco) 5337
United Nations News, The 5323
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 4940,
4941, 5286, 5287, 5295, 5313, 5322, 5387. 5406, 5432, 5686
United Nations Secretariat 5313, 5323, 5689
United Press (UP) 5106,5334
United Russian Relief 5252
United States Air Force 4936, 5340, 5429
United States Armed Forces 4936,
4940, 4958, 4959, 4965, 4966, 4968, 4972, 4974-^977, 4979-4983, 5001,
5002, 5009, 5013, 5033, 5040, 5045, 5048-5050, 5052, 5053, 5056, 5062,
5063, 5066, 5070, 5071, 5083, 5090, 5092, 5100, 5109, 5112, 5143-5146,
5163, 5187, 5144-5146, 5229, 5231, 5238, 5241-5243, 5247-5249, 5251,
5252, 5255, 5259, 5263, 5265, 5268, 5278, 5288, 5292.
United States Army 4940, 4958,
4968, 4972, 4974, 4983, 5040, 5045, 5056, 5062, 5063, 5070, 5083, 5090,
5145, 5146, 5249, 5254, 5259, 5339, 5371, 5414, 5415, 5419, 5429, 5678
United States Army Intelligence 5339
United States Bureau of Mines 4960
United States Chamber of Commerce 5703
United States Civil Service Commission 5239, 5243
United States Department of Agriculture 4960,
4964, 4973, 4999, 5203, 5261, 5295, 5325, 5503, 5504
United States Department of Commerce 4973,
4977, 5003, 5008, 5036, 5205, 5206, 5236, 5249, 5261, 5297, 5432. 5703
United States Department of Defense 5428, .542£^
United States Department of Justice 5165,
5288, 5291-5294, 5437, 5440, 5443, 5452, 56.34
United States Department of Labor 5171
INDEX LXIII
Page
United States Department of State 4924-
4927, 4929, 4931, 4935-4946, 4948-4953, 4960, 4964, 4967, 4973, 4975-
4979, 4998, 5007-5010, 5013, 5014, 5021, 5023-5026, 5040, 5049, 5052,
5053, 5062, 5066, 5068, 5070, 5084, 5111, 5112, 5115, 5116, 5142, 5145,
5146, 5169, 5170, 5172, 5173, 5179, 5187, 5199, 5202-5206, 5214, 5224,
5225, 5247, 5252, 5254, 5261, 5264, 5266, 5269, 5280, 5283, 5291, 5292,
5295, 5296, 5297, 5300, 5301, 5313, 5314, 5321, 5334, 5341, 5342, 5347-
5359, 5363, 5371, 5376, 5392, 5393, 5395, 5429-5432, 5435, 5443, 5444,
5445, 5449, 5453, 5454, 5457, 5458, 5467, 5468, 5469, 5472, 5474, 5475,
5477, 5479, 5480, 5482, 5484, 5485, 5486, 5645, 5663, 5667, 5687, 5695,
5698, 5703, 5711.
United States Department of the Army 5359, 5430, 5431, 5433
United States Department of the Navy 5359, 5430, 5433, 5435, 5687, 5703-
United States Department of the Treasury 4964,
4973, 5017, 5066, 5077, 5178, 5203, 5244, 5245, 5249, 5252, 5261, 5268,
5430. 5432, 5488, 5489, 5490, 5709.
United States Embassy (London) 5480
United States Embassy (Moscow) 5460,5466,5473
United States Embassy (Pekin) 5461
United States Government 5330,
5339, 5355, 5363, 5399, 5432, 5449, 5466, 5486, 5634, 5663, 5676
United States House of Representatives Committee on Un-American
Activities 5355, 5487, 5488, 5502, 5711
United States Marine Corp 5109,5408,5431,5436
United States Maritime Commission 5429,5430,5432,5433
United States Naval Intelligence 5348
United States Navy 4959,
4968, 4974, 4975-4977, 4979, 5013, 5040, 5062, 5063, 5066, 5109, 5112,
5143, 5144, 5163, 5187, 5231, 5249, 5259, 5278, 5288, 5292, 5415, 5429,
5430
United States News 5040
United States of America 4927,
4929, 4932, 4935, 4937, 4939, 4941, 4968, 4970-4972, 5000, 5033-
5037, 5039, 5046, 5060, 5062, 5066, 5067, 5070-5074, 5076, 5077, 5083,
5092, 5096, 5097, 5102-5104, 5109, 5113, 5130, 5134, 5143-5145, 5165,
5177, 5183, 5184, 5189, 5190, 5193, 5194, 5196, 5202, 5215, 5218, 5222,
5231, 5239, 5249, 5255, 5258, 5260, 5277, 5280, 5283, 5285-5287, 5292,
5296, 5297, 5314, 5315, 5318-5323, 5327-5334, 5340-5342, 5345, 5348,
5350, 5351, 5356, 5362, 5363, 5367, 5370-5372, 5374, 5377-5379, 5385,
5389, 5392, 5403, 540-5-5408, 5410, 5412, 5415, 5419, 5420, 5423, 5424,
5428-5431, 5434, 5439, 5449, 5465, 5470, 5475, 5477, 5501, 5635, 5637-
5640, 5642, 5643, 5644, 5675, 5677, 5678, 5680-5682, 5707, 5708, 5710
United States Senate, Armed Services Committee 5364
United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee 5364, 5642, 5645
United States Senate, Labor and Public Welfare Committee 5487
United States Securities and Exchange Commission 5203
United States Supreme Court 5027, 5678
United States Tariff Commission 5009, 5268, 5700, 5702
United States War Assets Administration 5429, 5430, 5431
United States War Department 4958,
4965, 4966, 4968, 4972, 4974, 4983, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5048, 5049, 5050,
5052, 5163, 5238, 5241-5243, 5247-5249, 5251, 5252, 5255, 5263, 5265,
5268, 5292, 5339, 5348, 5415.
United States War Department (Military Intelligence Division) 4966,
4980, 4982, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5011, 5012, 5048, 5049, 5050, 5052, 5163,
5241, 5243, 5247, 5248, 5265, 5268, 5348, 5703, 5710.
United States White Paper on China 5392, 5393
Universal Trading Corporation 4973, 5234, 5235
University, American 5323
University, Bombay 5323
University of British Columbia 5327
LXIV INDEX
Page
University, Brown 4967, 5303
University, Calcutta 5321
University of California 4944, 4998, 5010, 5013, 5025,
5040, 5058, 5135, 5186, 5205, 5323, 5336, 5703
University, Cambridge 5231
University of Chicago 4977, 5228, 5313, 5340, 5661, 5668, 5673, 5674
University, Clark 5321, 5335
University, Colgate 4983, 5336
University, Columbia 4938,
4944. 4965, 4973, 4983, 4999, 5003, 5014-5016, 5018, 5026, 5111, 5135,
5153-5155, 5172, 5173, 5179, 5183, 5210, 5216, 5217, 5224, 5225, 5227,
5253, 5257, 5263, 5268, 5305, 5311, 5312, 5313, 5318, 5321, 5322, 5323,
5327, 5336, 5340, 5344, 5345, 5703.
University, Cornell 4944, 5079, 5111, 5323, 5336
University, Delhi 5323
University, Fisk 5323
University, George Washington 5061
University, Harvard 4931,
4944, 4956, 4959, 4963, 5067, 5111, 5116, 5117, 5126, 5134, 5167, 5176,
5177, 5227, 5229, 5276, 5289, 5303, 5320, 5335, 5336, 5372, 5411, 5453,
5454, 5456, 5457, 5491, 5662, 5701.
University of Hawaii 4997
University of Iowa, State 5323
University, Johns Hopkins 5080,
5111, 5175, 5178, 5182, 5187, 5192, 5214, 5219, 5220, 5225, 5240, 5301,
5310, 5312, 5313, 5323, 5359, 5700, 5703.
University of Kansas 5323
University of Leyden 5320
University of London 5428
University of Madras 5323
University of Manitoba 5320
University of Maryland 5699
University of McGill 5154, 5319, 5323, 5355
University of Melbourne 5320
University of Michigan 5176, 5186
University of Nankai 5320
University, Nanking 5250
University, National 53^9
University, National Peking 5320, 5321
University of New Brunswick 5270
University of North Carolina 5166
University, Northwestern 5340
University, Ohio State 5682
University, Oxford 5025, 5131, 5232, 5276, 5320, 5323, 5349, 5386, 5411
University, Peking 5320
University of Pennsylvania 5078, 5336
University of the Philippines 5296, 5319, 5320
University of Pittsburgh 4967
University, Princeton ^^^^'
4969, 4981, 5009, 5048, 5068, 5111, 5167, 5191, 5239, 5248, 5355, 5357,
5427.
University of Shizuoka 4963
University, Sind 5026, 5322
University, Sino-Japanese 5188
University of Southern California 5165
University, Stanford 4954,
5009, 5013, 5024, 5040, 5282, 5155, 5289, 5313, 5319, 5320, 5322, 5335,
5341.
University, Syracuse 5336
University, Tokyo National 5021
University of Toronto 5026, 5130, 5321, 5322
Universitv of Virginia 4972, 5049
University of Washington 5019, 52.50, .5305, 5.S23
Univer.sity of Wisconsin 5214
University, Yale 4944,
4959, 5040, 5269, 5289, 5324, 5336, 5686, 5688, 5689, 5690, 5703
INDEX LXV
Page
University of Yenching 5173
5175, 5229, 5248, 5250, 5276, 5281, 5368, 5369
UOPWA, (See Union of Office and Professional Workers of America.)
Upgren, A. P ^ 5261
L'ri.mutsu, Sanutaro 5333, 5618, 5619, 5123
Urice, Jay 5268
Useem, John 5618. 5619
Ushiba 5183, 5189, 5208, 5217, 5218, 5233, 5249
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth 4990, 4991, 4995. 5061
U. S. S. R.-Netherlands Trade Treaty 5191
Utley, Freda 5185, 5295, 5308, 5310, 5368, 5382, 5383, 5618. 5619
Uyeda, Teijiro 5618, 5619, 5684, 5685
Uzbekistan Republic 5077
Vail, Chester R 4984, 5002
Vakil. C. N 5323
Valentine, A 5324
Valtin 5271
Van Asbeck, F 5334, 5618, 5619
Tan Beusekom, J 5512, 5513
Van Bloklan, F. Beelaerts 5514,5515
Van Bnren, Dolores 4990, 4995
Vancouver 5868
Vandenbosch, Amry 5618, 5619, 5684
Vandenberg, Senator 5350
Van der Kolff, G. H 5562, 5563
Van Der Kroef, Justus M 5618. 5619
Van der Valk, M. H 5618, 5619
Van Dijk, R 5532, 5533
Van Doren, Carl Clinton 5658
Van Eeghen, Geertrui M. (Gertrude) 5534,5535,5618,5619,5704
Vangley, Anthony 5618, 5619
Van Helsdingen, W. H 5550, 5551
Van Kirk. Walter 5260
van Kleeck, Mary 5182, 5347, 5618, 5619
Van Le, Nguyen 5566. 5567
Van Lummell, Mr 5572, 5573
Van Mook, Hubertus Johannes 5249,5333,5660,5578,5579
Van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O 5584, 5585
Van Nostrand, P. E 5163, 5348
Van Patten, Louise Merrick 5618, 5619
Van Scheltema, Mrs. A 5198, 5200
Vansittart, Lord 5375
Van Waldheim, Harold 5620, 5621
Van Zandt, J. Parker 5702
Van Zandt, Mrs. J. Parker 5702
Varga, E 5200, 5262
Vassar College 5050, 5051
Vassiliev 5229
Veatch, Roy 5045, 5046, 5199, 5202, 5260, .5261, 5644
VE-Day 5100
Velde. Harold H 5-502
Velleman. Ruth A 4992,4995
Venkatasubbiah, H 5618, 5619
Veith, Ilza 5618, 5619
Veith, Mrs. Ilza 5702
Ventaryman, A 5618, 5619
Verdoorn, J. A 5618,5619
Vernon, Robert, Jr 4991, 4995
Versailles 5164
Versailles, Treaty of 5708
Vesper 5193
Veth, K. L 5702
Viciuus, Henry F 5295
LXVI INDEX
Page-
Victoria University College 5009
Viet Minh 5394, 5395^
Viet Nam 5639, 5642
Villamor, Jesus A 5620, 5621
Villareal, Mr 5295
Villasenor, Marie E 5202
Vinacke, Harold M 5231, 5620, 5621, 5684
Vinee, Jacob 4973
Vincent, John Carter 4941, 5214, 5278, 5334, 5350, 5480, 5684, 5685, 5702, 5703
Viner, Jacob 4977, 5260, 5488, 5489
A'irata, Leoiiides S 5620,5621
Viriiin Islands Civil Government 5288
Virginia Quarterly Review 5204, 5377
Visman, Frans H 5322, 5620, 5621, 5684
Vize, V 5620, 5621
VJ-Day 4935, 5392, 5406, 5429, 5430
Vlassov, General 5501
Vlekke, Bernard H. M 5283, 5620, 5621
Vlieland, C. A 5620,5621
VIuz_____ 5112
Vogel, Werner 5620, 5621
Voitinsky, G. E 5009,
5056, 5057, 5125, 5127, 5128, 5132, 5133, 5150, 5159, 5160, 5175, 5192^
5199, 5200, 5209, 5262, 5266, 5269, 5359.
VOKS 5083, 5121, 5122, 5127
Von Beckwrath 5205
von Boeticher, F 5691
von Faulkenhausen 5469
von Freyberg-Eisenberg, Contre-Amiral Baron 5691
Von Haast, H. F 5620, 5621
Von Hapsburg, Otto 5271
Von Trott, A 4933, 5195, 5196, 5198-5201, 5204, 5208, 5226
Voorhis, Jerry 4974
Vyshinsky 5397, 5484
W
Wadham 5685
Wadleigh, Henry J 5199, 5247, 5261
Wadsworth, Elliot 4955, 4956
Wa isworth, James W 5052, 5053
Wagner, Joyce 4991, 4995
Wagner, Robert F 5468
Wake Island Conference 5486
Wakeman, Frederic 5655
Wakefield. Harold 5620, 5621, 5658
Wakukawa, Seiyer 5620, 5621
Walcutt, Roscoe R 5t)74
Waldheim, Van 5704
Wales, Nym. (See Snow, Mrs. Edgar.)
Walker, Miss 4931, 5166
AValker, Elnora 4989, 4990, 4995
Walker, E. Roland 5620. 5621
Walker, Richard 5683-5686
Wa'ker. Sydnor 5026, 5084, 5171
Wallace, Mr 5695
Wallace, Benjamin B 5702
Wallace, DeWitt 5079, 5080
Wallace, Henry A___ 4941, 4973, 5003, 5018, 5261, 5266, 5276, 5307, 5312, 5364, 5651
Wallace, Malcolm 5321
Wallace M. Alexander & Bruno Lasker, Inc 5182
Wallace, R. C 5620, 5621, 5705
Wallace. Schuyler 4911, 4984, 5003, 5014, 5015. 5016
Waller, Ella S 4990, 4995
Walree, Van 5191
Walsh. (See Kelly & Walsh.)
INDEX LXVII
Page
Walsh, Richard J 5032, 5047, 5123, 5177, 5255, 5620, 5G21
Walsh, Robert M 5620, 5621
Walter, Francis E 5502
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations 5080,
5301, 5312, 5313, 5323, 5586, 5587, 5662
Walworth, Arthur C 5651
Wan, Lin Yu 5620, 5621
Wanderman, Francis Dick 4991, 4995
Wang 5232
Wang, Chi-Chen 5620, 5621, 5655
Wang, Ching-wei 5391, 5403, 5667
Wang, Chiu-An 5620, 5621
Wang, Gung-hsing 5652
Wang, H. C 5622, 5623
Wang, K'e-min 5391
Wang, Kung-Ping 5622, 5623
Wang, Samuel Hsuan 5622, 5623
Wang, Shih-chieh 5062
Wang, Tieh-Yai 5622, 5623
Wang, Mrs. William G 5344, 5361
Wang, Yu-Chuan 5622, 5623
Wang, Yun-Sheng 5622, 5623
Warburg, Eddie 5116
Warburg, Ingrid 5198, 5202, 5204
Warburg, James Paul 5622, 5623
Warburg, Mrs. James 5196
Ward 5161
Ward, Barbara 5334
Ward, E. E 5622, 5623
Ward, Mrs. Humphrey 5188
Ward, Isabel 4987, 4988, 5294, 5295, 5622, 5623, 5702
Ward, John M 5622, 5623
Ward, Robert Spencer 5650
Wardwell, Allen 4956, 5252, 5285
Warden. {See Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Warnecke, G. W 5622, 5623
Warner, F. W 5622, 5623
Warner, Kenneth 5622, 5623
Warner, L 5622, 5623
Warren, George L 5002, 5260
Warson, Ann 4988
Washburn, John N 5622, 5623
Washington Post 4935, 5023, 5112, 5323
Watkins 5255
Watkins, James T., IV 5702
Watson, J. H 5622, 5623
Watt, Alan 5049, 5052, 505a
Watts, Richard 5647-5660
Watts, Richard, Jr 5622, 5623
Waugh, Coulton 5656
Waugh, Evelyn 5655
Wavell 5060
Waymack, W. W 5026, 5326, 5703
Weaver, G. R 5622,5623
Weaver, James T 5702
Weaver, Leon H 5622, 5623
Webb, Beatrice 5622, 5623
Webb, Guy P 5702
Webb, Richard E 5622, 5623
Webster, Charles 5334, 5624, 0625
Webster, David L 5040
Wechsberg, Joseph 5652
Wedemeyer, General 5376, 5~377, 5393, 5394, 5407
Wedgwood, Camilla 5624, 5625
Weekly Book Review 5649-5652
Weems 5299
LXVIII INDEX
Page
Weems, Benjamin 5626, 5627
Wei, Francis Cho-Min 5624, 5625
Weidou, Albert A 4992,4996
Weinberg, Albert K 5624, 5625
Weinberg, Joseph W 5040
Weiss, Leonard 1 5624, 5625
Weiss, Louis 5299
Welles, Benjamin 5276, 5287
Welles, Sumner 4924r-
4928, 4944, 4976, 5045, 5047, 5088, 5172, 5195, 5199, 5224, 5251, 5252,
5273, 5274, 5276, 5277, 5286, 5288, 5293, 5300, 5658, 5693, 5702.
Wellon, Alfred E 5702
Wells, Katharine A 5624,5625
Weltfish, Gene 5624, 5625
Wen, I-to 5408
Wentholt, Henrietta 4990, 4995
Wentworth, Edna C 5624, 5625
Werner, Max 4969, 4970
Werth, Alexander 5656
Wertham Barbara 5083, 5123, 5624, 5625
Wertheim, Maurice 5123
Wertheim, W. F 5624,5625
West Point Military Academy 4973, 5255
West, Rebecca 5656
Westphal, Albert C. P 5624, 5625
Weston, Lora S 5624, 5625
Westra, H 5624, 5625
Weygand, General 5075
Wheare, K. C 5624, 5625
Wheeler, Anne 5112
Wheeler, L. Richmond 5624, 5625
Wheeler, Leslie 4973, 5261
Wheeler, Oliver P 5040
Wheeler, Mrs. Stafford M 5702
Wheeler, W. E 5624, 5625
Whitaker, Arthur Preston . 5658
Whitaker, Urban G 5624, 5625
White, Dr 4918, 4919, 5198, 5245
White, Frederick 5624, 5625
White, Gerald T 5624, 5625
White, Harry Dexter 4973, 4975, 5051, 5294, 5347, 5487-5499, 5684
White House 4930, 4932, 4939, 4973, 5013, 5047, 5051, 5052,
5055, 5057, 5058, 5258, 5259, 5261, 5262, 5272
White, J. Patrick 5024, 5625
White, Lynn, Jr 4944, 5040
White Russian Government 5075, 5109, .'">14o, 51S5
White, Theodore H__ 5176, 5177, 5261, 5269, 5278, 5624, 5625, 5652, 5655, 5695, 5697
White, Tommy 5112
White, Vaughan 5652
White, William Lindsay— ,5656, 5660
White, William S 5337, 5357
White Paper 5371
Wliitney, Courtney 5415
Whitney, John Hay 5299
Whyte 5150
Whyte, Frederick F 5319, 5834, 5624, 5625
Wickersham, C. W 5049
Wickes, George A 5626, 5627
Wickett, Fred A 5040
Wickett, Walton A 5040
Wiens, Herold J — . 5626, 5627
Wilbur 5151, 5152, 5242, 5243
Wilbur, Brayton 4944, 4977
Wilbur, C. Martin 5336, 5626, 5627, 5702
Wilbur, Ray Lyman 4944, 4954,
5013, 5182, 5186, 5282, 5283, 5318, 5319, 5324, 5325, 5333, 5335
INDEX LXIX
Page
Wilbur, Wm. H 5040
Wilcox. Francis 5643
Wilder, Nancy 4988, 4990, 4995, 5626, 5627
Wilder, Thorton Niven 5658
Wilgus, A. Curtis 5626, 5627
Wilhelm, Hellniut 5626, 5627
Willard. Mrs. Daniel, Jr 5702
Williams . 5112
Williams CoUejie 4977
Wllliains, E. K 5626, 5627
Williams, Emilio 5626, 5627
Williams, J. W 5626, 5627
Williams, L. F. Rushbrook 5626, 5627
Williams, W. Wynne 5626, 5627
Willingdon, Lord 5349
Willits, Joseph H 4974, 5081, 5300
Willkie. Wendell 4974, 5047, 5249, 5349, 5626, 5627
Willoughby, Charles A 4999, 5414, 5415
Wilson 4985
Wilson, C. E 4974
Wilson, Francis 5626, 5627
Wilson State Teachers College 5295
Wilson Teachers College . 5697
Wilson, Thomas George 56.52
Wilson's Fourteen Points 5664, 5673
Winfield. Oerald Freeman 5382, 56.58
Winsfield-Digby, Simon 5129
Winnipeg Free Press 5271, 5320
Winslow, C. E. A 5626,5627
Winslow, R 4987, 5254
Winstedt, R. O 5626, 5627
Winston, Sadie 4991, 4^95
Wint, Guy 5626, 5627
Winter, Ella 5347, 5626, 5627, 5a50
Winterhottom, F. S 5626, 5627
Winterton, Paul 5285
Wise, Masha Switzer 4990, 4995
Wiss, Helen 4988, .5179
Wissler, Clark 5626, 5627
Wittfogel, Karl August 4999,
5083, 5305, 5306, 5309, 5310, 5311, 5312, 5313, 5626, 5627
Wittfogel, Mrs, K. A. (Esther S.) 5306, 5310, .5313
Wittke, Carl 5626, 5627
Wizon, I. F 5084,5171
Wold, Emma 5628, 5629
Wolf, Charles 56.")8
Wolf, Charles, Jr 5628, ,562'9, 5684
Wolfers, Arnold 5628, 5629
Wolfert, Ira ,^6.50
Womens Action Committee 5040
Wood, 5685
Wood, Bryce 5628, 5629
Woods, Caroline 4990, 4995
Wood, F. L. W 5009, 5628, 5629
Wood, G. L 5628, 5629, 5^! '4
Woods, Huhbard 5165
Wood, John S 5502, 5.503, 5504
Woodhead, H. G 5628,5629
Woodman, Dorthy 5412, 5628, 5629
Woodworth, Charles J .5628, .5629
Wooton, Barbara 5175, 5359, 5628, 5629
Work Projects Administration 5710
Worker, The 492.5-4928
World Affairs, Council of .5277, 5278
World Affairs Council (Cleveland) 5067,5068,5300,5.344
World Affairs Council of Northern California 5S13
IXX INDEX
Page
World Bank 5701
World Federation of Trade Unions 5641
World Student Christian Federation 5280
World War I 5066,
5067, 5074, 5298, 5317, 5319, 5636, 5640, 5664, 5679
World War II 4970,
5066, 5067, 5222, 5255, 5256, 5246, 5281, 5318, 5330, 5678
World War III 5068, 5281
Worster 5680
Worster, James F 5674
Worth, Alexander 5284
WPA. (See Work Projects Administration.)
Wrenn, Heaton L 4944, 5207
Wright 5685
Wright, Dr 5707, 5708
Wright, Arthur F 5628, 5629
Wright, Curtis 5193
Wright, George 5628, 5629
Wright, Sir Hageburg 5137
Wright, Louise L 4944
Wright, Mary O 5628, 5629
Wright, Nellie 4991, 4995
Wright, Philip 5684
Wright, Quincy 4959,
4,999, 5199, 5253, 5260, 5628, 5629, 5684, 5606
Wright, Ruth C 5628,5629
Wriston, Henry M 5303
Wu, Chi-Yuen 5628, 5629, 5684
Wu, Ching-Chao 5628, 5629
Wu, Leonard K 5356, 5628, 5629
Wu, Teh-Chen 5330
Wubnig, Arthur 5628, 5629
Wyatt, Woodrow 5628, 5629
Wye, C. Kay 5629,5629
Yakhontoff, Victor H 5114,5115,5630,5631
Yale Review 5648-5650, 5673
Yale University Press 5661
Yalta 5673
Yalta Conference 4929, 5280, 5483-5487, 5672
Yamakawa, Tadao 5320, 5630, 5631
Yamasaki, Keichi 5630, 5631
Yanaga, Chitoshi 5630,5631,5684, 5688
Yanaihara, Tadao 5630, 5631
Yang, C. K 5630,5631
Yank, Ching-Shih 5630, 5631
Yang, Hsin-Pao 5630, 5631
Yang, L. S 5630, 5631
Yang, Mou-Ch-un 5652
Yardumian, Rose 4988, 4995, 5011, 5058, 5061, 5063, 5630, 5631, 5710
Yarnell, H. E 4974, 4976, 4977, 5013, 5062, 5630, 5631
Yasker, Bruno. (See Lasker, Bruno.)
Yasuda 5666
Yasumura, Michi 4991, 4995
Yasuo, Nagaharu 4987, 5168, 5175, 5179, 5630, 5631
Yates, Elizabeth 4991, 4995
Yates, P. Lamartine 5630,5631
Yav^^akama 5217
Yeaton, Ivan 5370
Yeh, Chien-ying 5371
Yeh, George 5062
Yen, Hsi-shan 5275, 5369, 5410
Yen, Jen Keng 5630,5631
Yen, W. M 5321,5333
INDEX LXXI
Page
Yen, Y. O. James 5052
Yenan 5370-5374, 5379, 5381-5383, 5391, 5403, 5420, 5422
Yenching 5368, 5370
Yi, Chin 5418
Ying, Han 5234
Yodh, Raj 5323
Yokose, Seishi 5630, 5631
Yokota, Kisaburo 5208, 5630, 5631, 5684
Yone, Edward M. Law 5630, 5631
Yosemite National Park 5319, 5320, 5324, 5331, 5346, 5703
Yoshi 5695
Yoshino, Sakuzo 5630, 5631
Yoshizawa, Mr 5147, 5249
Yost, Charles W 5261, 5702
Young 5178
Young, Mrs 5241
Young, Hobart 5186
Young, A Morgan 4987, 4999, 5630, 5631
Young, C. Walter 5684
Young, Hobart N 5703, 5704
Young, John P 5630, 5631
Young Men's Christian Association 5317-5319, 5334, 5335, 5345
Young, Ruth Lee 5704
Young, Walter 5248
Young Women's Christian Association of China (National Committee) — 5290
Yozizawa, K 5333
Yu, Kuang-sheng 5379
Yu, Uck Kym 5319
Yu, W. Y 5630,5631
Yudenich, General 5075
Yugon, A 5007, 5008
Yugoslavia 5315,5382,5393
Yui, David Z. T 5319, 5320, 5335
Yun, C 5632, 5633
Yun, Lung 5408
Yu-wan, Liu 5333
Z
Zafara, Urbano A__ 5053, 5089, 5322
Zagon, Rita 4988
Zaibatsu 5665, 5666, 5671
Zellerbach, J. D 4914
Zen, H. C 5632,5633
Zen, Sophia Chen 5632, 5633
Zhdanov 5393
Zhukov, Eugene 5027
Zhukov, Marshal 5501
Zilliacus, Kodne 5375. 5652
Zimmerman, Carle C 5632,5^33
Zimmerman, Erich W 5166.5632,5633
Zimmern 5132
Zinkin, Maurice 5632, 5633
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